



The State and Internal Security Management in Nigeria

Ikenna Mike Alumona

INTRODUCTION

Security is one of the most fundamental conditions required for human existence in the modern state. In fact, the modern state itself is principally a product of the realisation of the need for security by the different individuals inhabiting the state. This point has been ably demonstrated by political theorists such as John Locke and Thomas Hobbes who in their different treatises argued that security is the reason for the coming into existence of the state. This implies that the state through the agency of the government is the principal addressee of security challenges in any given political entity. Any state that cannot ensure the security of her citizens is therefore not worth existing. Hence the old maxim, *salus populi est suprema lex*—the safety of the people is the supreme law, the supreme duty of the state. Contemporary scholars have also upheld this position in different ways. As Bislev (2004, p. 13) succinctly argues, “the maintenance of security is a necessary function of the state, something without which it cannot exist ... without the state to ensure basic security, there would be

I. M. Alumona (✉)

Department of Political Science, Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu University, Igbariam, Nigeria

© The Author(s) 2019

O. O. Oshita et al. (eds.), *Internal Security Management in Nigeria*,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-8215-4_3

no civilisation, no civil society”. In a related vein, Loader and Walker (2007, p. 10) write that “the protection of its people from internal and external threats stands consequently as the first and defining priority of government”.

In contemporary international politics, the provision of security by the state has been an issue of great importance that it has become the principal variable in determining the success or failure of any state. In fact, the loss of the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force which essentially has to do with security maintenance is among the basic indicators of a failed state. However, despite the fact that the concept of failed state has become one of the “most used and abused concepts in the last two decades” (Vannoni 2011, p. 3), the dynamics of international politics has placed great value on the maintenance of security at either the national or the international level.

The security challenges facing every given state—whether strong and weak ones—are, according to Yusuf (2012, p. 60), “understood and protected from two dimensions: internal and external”. While the internal security challenges have to do with threats that affect peace and order within the territorial borders of a sovereign state, the external security challenges deal with threats that affect the territorial integrity of the state from forces outside the state. It is in order to deal with both the internal and external security challenges of the state that the state’s claim to the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within its territory is assumed and exercised by the government through its coercive institutions such as the police, military and paramilitary forces.

Ordinarily, in most countries, while the maintenance of the internal security is the primary responsibility of the police, Prisons and Immigration, the maintenance of external security is the responsibility of the armed forces. However, Imobighe (2003) rightly states that the overlapping nature of the security functions of the state requires that the army can also be of assistance in maintaining internal security, especially in emergency situations. In a similar vein, Lutterbeck (2004) also argues that the dividing line between internal and external security in the post-Cold War era has increasingly become blurred as a result of the emergence of a growing number of transnational risks and challenges.

The ability of a state to effectively ensure the maintenance of internal security is conditioned by the nature of certain fundamental doctrines governing internal security management and the linkages that surround the state. Imobighe (1990, p. 14) has identified two basic principles that

affect the doctrines of internal security management adopted by different states. First is the military perspective. From a military and coercive perspective, it is believed that military might and hardware is very critical in ensuring peace and stability. Secondly, the progressive perspective argues that since the essence of society has to do with the general welfare of citizens, internal security therefore, guarantees the safety of life and general welfare of the people so that they can realise their genuine goals and aspirations.

Since the post-Cold War era, there has been a steady decline in the rate of external security challenges. But at the same time, states, especially the new ones, most of which are in Africa, came to be faced with the rising incidence of internal security challenges. According to Nnoli (2006, p. 6), security has become a big issue in Africa today because of the various forms of carnage, brutality, pogroms and even genocide associated with incessant civil wars and other forms of violent conflicts on the continent.

Despite the steady decline in the rate of external security challenges, new threats to the internal security have continued to manifest in the different states across the globe. Ranging from issues such as terrorism, kidnapping, hostage taking, bombing, cybercrime, climate change, ozone layer depletion, and so on; the increasing internal insecurity profile has also resulted in the deepening and broadening of the scope of internal security. Thus, the architecture of internal security has expanded to cover many new areas which hitherto were non-existent.

THE PROBLEMATIQUE

The history of challenges to internal security in Nigeria dates back to the period of colonialism. Internal conflicts such as the Aba women riots, the Abeokuta rebellion and the general strike of 1945 were all manifestations of the character of insecurity during the period of colonial occupation. From the era of independence to the return of democracy in 1999, the country also has witnessed several internal security challenges. Nigerians are not in a hurry to forget the numerous internal conflicts that culminated in a civil war in 1967 and the numerous conflicts that erupted in different parts of the country during the era of military rule. Since the advent of democracy in 1999, the situation has not changed.

Although the Nigerian state has experienced several internal security challenges in the past, the emergence of the *Boko Haram* terrorist group together with the phenomenon of kidnapping, youth militancy, pipeline

vandalism and militant herdsmen have added a new dimension to the country's internal insecurity profile. The details of the impact of the phenomenon of kidnapping, youth militancy, *Boko Haram* and lately militant herdsmen on the security of lives are well known and captured in the literature. Yet, the capacity of the Nigerian state to effectively manage her internal security problem is seriously in doubt. The internal security architecture in Nigeria characterised as it were by the increasing number of checkpoints mounted by the security agencies—Police, Army, Navy, Immigration, Civil Defence corps and Customs—across all parts of the country points to the simple fact that one of the most sensitive realities of life in contemporary Nigeria is the challenge of internal insecurity.

Nevertheless, to manage the internal insecurity problem, special military operations and police squads have also been set up in different parts of the country to take care of the threats to the sovereignty of the Nigerian state. Going with scary and frightful names such as *Operation Crocodile Smile*, *Operation Lafiya Dole*, *Operation Python Dance*, *Safer Highways Squad*, *Anti-Terrorist Squad*, these special squads have come to be part of the features of Nigerian cities and highways. While these special operations and squads with their checkpoints might have recorded some successes in terms of preventing threats to the internal security of the country, the agony and trauma their operations have caused for the ordinary and helpless citizens deserves urgent attention. The untold hardship motorists and travellers alike have suffered in terms of inhuman treatment, molestation, loss of manpower hours and extortions of different kinds cannot be overemphasised. On a daily basis the activities of these special squads and other security agencies appear to aggravate the suffering of the ordinary Nigerian citizen.

Paradoxically, Nigerians have continued to witness on a daily basis, serious and increasing threats to the security of their lives and properties despite the strong military and police presence across the country. Across the country, different security threats abound. The phenomenon of kidnapping in different parts of the country has continued unabated. In many cases, high-profile citizens or their relatives have been involved in these kidnaps. Recently, the fall out of the constant clash between rural farmers and Fulani herdsmen across communities in different parts of the country has come to aggravate the insecurity situation in the country. In another dimension, the constant attack on oil pipelines and installations by the Niger Delta Avengers and other similar groups in the south has continued to affect the revenue base of the federal government. In the north, the issue of *Boko Haram* is still raging despite all the assurances by the federal government that they have been defeated.

The strong military and police presence across the country when juxtaposed with the insecurity situation in the country has opened a serious lacuna about the whole idea and essence of internal security. A lot of questions such as these have been raised about the internal security situation: is internal security all about the uncountable military and police checkpoints manned by fierce-looking and unfriendly military and policemen who harass ordinary citizens that they are meant to protect? Or is it about the fact that the police and military personnel have practically turned these checkpoints into toll gates? Or is it about the procurement of military hardware and recruitment of more security personnel? On the other hand, is internal security about the large retinue of security personnel attached to government officials and the elites in Nigeria? Is it about the security of the ordinary citizens or that of the state? And who is actually responsible for the maintenance of internal security? Is it the state or the ordinary citizens?

The above questions and other such related ones have continued to raise disturbing concern that revolves around the Nigerian state and the management of internal security. A crucial aspect of the problem is the peculiar nature of Nigerian federalism that denies the constituent states the constitutional right to organise and provide security within their boundaries. With a Police Force and other security agencies that are centrally organised and controlled by the federal government, the prevailing security governance structure seems to be a partnership arrangement where the constituent states have become passive partners with the federal government in the management of internal security. The states periodically provide support to the security agencies, particularly the police, yet they make no form of input in the organisation and management of the security agencies.

The primary concern of this chapter is to provide the theoretical foundations for the empirical issues raised by the different chapters in this book. Though our main interest lies in the theoretical discourses about the state and the provision and maintenance of security, the chapter is also particularly interested in understanding the experience of the Nigerian state. In this regard, the central argument of this chapter is that the dysfunctionality of Nigeria's federal system, which is a product of the post-colonial character of the Nigerian state, has resulted in the politicisation of security structures and governance processes involved in security management. This, in turn, has negatively aggravated and sustained internal security in the country.

WHY THE STATE MATTERS IN SECURITY MANAGEMENT

The concept of the state has several contentious definitions because scholars have defined it from different ideological, historical, normative and descriptive perspectives. Despite the disagreement among scholars over the meaning and origin of the state, the concept of the state has continued to occupy a prominent place in political discourse. The concept of the state has also experienced varying status in political analysis as a result of the dominant approach adopted in the study of political science as a discipline and certain historical developments such as the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the emergence of a new world order, the emergence of a unipolar world led by the United States and globalisation (Onyeoziri 2005). Yet, the centrality of the state in the daily existence of individuals in modern times cannot be ignored nor overemphasised. Miliband (1969, p. 59) has captured this in the following words:

...more than ever before men now live in the shadow of the state. What they want to achieve individually or in groups, now mainly depends on the state's sanction and support. It is possible not to be interested in what the state does but it is not possible to be unaffected by it.

The link between the state and the provision and management of security is in varying degrees deeply rooted in the different conceptions of the origin of the state. Political thinkers and scholars have in different ways espoused that the state is principally responsible for the provision and management of security. The Weberian conception of the state posits that it is the traditional responsibility of the state to provide security. In other words, the state is designed primarily to maintain order and security (Raphael 1976). According to Raphael (1976, p. 53), "the state is an association designed primarily to maintain order and security, exercising universal jurisdiction within territorial boundaries by means of laws backed by force and recognised as having sovereign authority". It is the security provided by the state that ensures that a conducive environment exists for the citizens to pursue their legitimate needs. In a similar vein, Bislev (2004) opines that Max Weber's classical definition of the state as holding a monopoly on the exercise of legitimate violence rests upon the notion that social order is crucial to the state. It is therefore in order to ensure social order that the state must provide security. Bislev captures this issue thus: "the maintenance of security is a necessary function of the state something

without which it cannot exist ... without the state to ensure basic security, there would be no civilization, no civil society” (Bislev 2004, p. 48).

Social contract theorists such as John Locke and Thomas Hobbes in their different treaties have also captured the essence of the state in security maintenance. Despite the differences in their postulations about man and the state of nature, the social contract theorists all agree that the movement of society from the original state of nature where according to Thomas Hobbes, life was short, nasty and brutish, to the modern state system, was basically propelled by the desire for security. Along this view-point, Nnoli (2003, p. 28) also argues that states are formed solely for the sake of obtaining security, especially against the aggressiveness of other men since men are essentially selfish and seek only their own good. Using the social contract theory, Nnoli (2003) further explains that the modern state emerged at the point where people, in order to preserve humanity, decided to give up their rights and liberties to the state and agreed to obey the laws prescribed by the government set up by the state. The state in return was required to ensure the maintenance of law and order and also the security of the subjects of the state. Nnoli concluded that if it could be shown that the state can no longer guarantee security and prosperity, then it has lost the justification for existence.

Gamble (1981) holds a similar view with Nnoli about the state and the provision of security. He succinctly argues that:

The state emerged as a result of the contract between the citizens and itself. It is established to serve the interests of the citizenry so long as the state preserves security; individuals have a moral obligation to obey the commands and laws of the state. But if the state ceases to maintain the security of its subjects, they have the right to resist the state by force of arms if necessary. (Gamble 1981)

An emerging view in the literature on security sector governance and reforms points to the fact that despite the traditional role of the state in providing security, the processes of globalisation and privatisation, together with the weakness of some states, especially in developing countries, have necessitated the intrusion of the private sector in the provision of security. To that end, Abrahamsen and Williams (2006, p. 6) assert that “bringing the private sector into the business of security is crucial to a comprehensive understanding of the security situation in most countries and any attempt to ensure better security for all must take account of the activities and

operations of private security providers”. In the context of sub-Saharan Africa, Abrahamsen and Williams (2006, p. 7) argue that this assertion comes to fore in the face of “the declining ability and/or willingness of the state to provide adequate protection of life and property”.

In practical terms, the state is an abstract entity that cannot be seen nor touched. It is “an artificial social construction” (Onyeoziri 2005, p. 56). Hence, the responsibilities of the state including that of security maintenance are exercised by the government which is an agent of the state. According to Onyeoziri (2005, p. 56), “the government is the most important agent of the state”. Appadorai (1968, p. 12) similarly states that the government is saddled with the responsibility of maintaining security because, “essentially it is the agency or machinery through which the will of the state is formulated, expressed and realised”. Government acts and speaks on behalf of the state, and is formally vested with state power (Miliband 1969). Government is represented by the executive, legislature and judiciary functionaries who take charge of the everyday running of the affairs of government. Since the state cannot be seen, and is represented by the government, it also implies that it is the government that fulfils the obligations of the state. It is in the process or set of activities through which the government fulfils the obligations of the state to the citizens that governance takes place. Governance according to Fukuyama (2013, p. 3) is defined as “government’s ability to make and enforce rules, and to deliver services, regardless of whether that government is democratic or not”. Similarly, Omodia (2013, p. 36) also asserts that “governance entails the proper management of state institutions and structures to enhance socio-economic and political transformation of society”. It is in the processes of governance that state structures or institutions do perform the essential function of security maintenance.

The relationship between governance and security cannot be ignored. According to Oyeode (2011, p. 27), “security has become the touchstone of governance in modern society”. Vohra (2008, p. 8) also captures the nexus between governance and internal security thus:

If internal security is not maintained, governance cannot be delivered and there would be grave threats to the very unity and integrity of the country. Likewise, internal security cannot be safeguarded if governance is delivered by an inefficient and corrupt administration.

Anah (2014) has tried to examine the nexus between governance and security within the context of Africa. According to him, the apparent

intractability of governance and security problems in Africa has resulted in insecurity and poor governance which also have provided the basis for the interventionist efforts of international donor agencies and non-governmental organisations. Anah (2014) also debunks the mainstream view that poor institutions and the instrumentalisation of disorder are responsible for insecurity and poor governance in Africa. Using a political economy approach, he links poor governance and insecurity in Africa to external factors such as the declining terms of trade between Africa and the industrialised economies of the world. He further highlights the following three major historical facts which to a large extent have shaped security and governance in Africa:

1. the quest for raw materials by the industrialised developed countries,
2. the scope and nature of international politics that characterise the Cold War era and
3. the institutional structures put in place at the end of the era of empires.

Since Nigeria is seen as the giant of Africa, we believe that Anah's observations particularly present the Nigerian experience. For instance, the insecurity experienced in the Niger Delta, which is a fallout of the exploitative activities of the multinational corporations, is rightly linked to the quest for raw materials by the industrialised developed countries as opined by Anah. From another dimension, the seeming connivance of successive Nigerian governments could also be seen as part of the institutional structures put in place by the colonialists to ensure a conducive environment for the exploitation of oil wealth.

In the wider Nigerian context, the insecurity problem that has continued to threaten the stability of the Fourth Republic has been linked by several scholars to the failure of governance. According to Omilusi (2013), the crisis of insecurity in Nigeria can only be understood within the context of governance failure. He argues that the inability of the Nigerian state to ensure the security of its citizens stems from the fact that the state has not been able to meet the minimum requirements of the social contract it entered with the citizens because of the forces of bad governance. The resultant effect of this, as he puts it, is that "there is thus a disconnection between the governed and the government" (Omilusi 2013, p. 374). Omilusi also listed the following factors as some of the manifestations of the crisis of governance that are behind the problem of insecurity: inability

of the government to guarantee a basic minimum standard of living that is in accord with human dignity, lingering conditions of political instability, repression and violence, widespread petty and grand corruption, economic decline resulting in capacity underutilisation, structural distortion and huge debt burden, very high unemployment rate especially among young people, deterioration of socio-economic infrastructure and widening inequality among individuals.

The nexus between governance and security is further seen in the fact that the absence of good governance adversely affects the security of the state. It is along this line of thought that good governance became a reverberating variable in the discussions of the neorealist conception of security. In fact, the existence of human security is largely tied to good governance.

WHY INTERNAL INSECURITY IN NIGERIA?

Events since 1960 when Nigeria became an independent state point to the fact the territorial integrity of Nigerian state has suffered more internal challenges than external ones. Since the return of democracy in 1999, events have also shown that the greatest threat to the current democratic dispensation is internal insecurity. The 2016 World Internal Security and Police Index showed that Nigeria (0.2554) ranked 127th out of 127 countries in internal security levels, while Democratic Republic of the Congo (0.2720), Kenya (0.2982) and Uganda (0.3119) were ranked 126th, 125th and 124th, respectively. The different chapters in this volume have critically discussed the incidence, character and implications of insecurity in Nigeria. Yet, it is important to note that the incidence of insecurity in Nigeria has led to the situation where there is a growing public resentment against the Nigerian state and its management of the internal insecurity problem. This resentment is further driven by the fact that insecurity is becoming more complex and widespread despite all the assurances by the government that they are in control of the situation. The fallout from this situation is that Nigerians have lost confidence in the ability of the state to provide security. People now rely more on non-state actors for their security. The increasing participation of non-state actors such as private security organisations and vigilantes of all sorts in the maintenance of security without adequate supervision by the government attests to this fact.

Our concern here is to theoretically offer some explanation why internal insecurity has continued to subsist in Nigeria. The debates about the

character and incidence of insecurity have been long standing. A survey of the extant literature will suffice before our own understanding is highlighted. Mijah (2007) argues that the state of insecurity in Nigeria can be traced to two main factors, namely the character of the Nigerian state and the context of democratic politics. With regard to the character of the Nigerian state, he argues that the problem of internal security in Nigeria is derived from, and is aggravated by, the inclusion and/or exclusion of certain groups from access to opportunities and resources of the state, as a result of the structural imbalance inherent in the Nigerian federation. According to Mijah, the structural imbalance in the ethnic, religious and regional composition of the Nigerian state and the manipulation of such identities are responsible for the various ethno-religious and even communal conflicts in Nigeria. Also related to this issue is the desperation for political offices and the unrestrained access to state resources which accompanies the occupation of these political offices.

Secondly, Mijah (2007, p. 4) also argues that there is evidence of a correlation between the context of democratic governance and the state of insecurity in Nigeria. This is derived from the fact that “since 1999, democratic governance has not instituted sufficient policies and programmes to alter the structures of imbalance and inequity imposed on the character of the state by the forces of colonialism and prolonged military rule”.

Locating the problem of insecurity in Nigeria within the context of the politics of security decision-making, Ibeanu and Momoh (2008, p. 13) state that what constitutes security for the Nigerian state and political elites is traditionally rooted in the state’s monopoly and control of all legitimate instruments of coercion, and its ability to contain both internal insurgency and external aggression. They also argue that the crisis of insecurity in Nigeria arises from the character of the state and the character of the state security agencies. According to Ibeanu and Momoh (2008, p. 15), the sincerity of the Nigerian state to respond to insecurity has repeatedly appeared to be questioned by the citizens because the state has spent more time on nation-building and far less on state-building. They further noted that the character of the state security agencies threatens the security of lives and property because of the politicisation of security. In their words:

State security agencies constitute a veritable threat to the security of the citizens of Nigeria. More often, rather than restore peace and order, they exacerbate crises, ramping up social and political tensions. (Ibeanu and Momoh 2008, p. 14)

Nnoli (2006), in his discourse on national security in Africa, points to the collapsed character of the state as a serious aspect of the problem of African security. According to Nnoli (2006, p. 9), political exclusion, economic marginalisation and social discrimination, which are at the heart of the crises of the state in Africa, have so much threatened the security of the citizens to such an extent that they regard the state as the primary threat to their survival. In this context, Nnoli further asserts that physical safety has become the preeminent concern of most Africans, since the state is no longer able to generate the fundamental conditions for the protection of life.

Isima (2007) shares a similar view with Nnoli (2006) on the relationship between the character of the state and the problem of insecurity. He asserts that the outsourcing of noncore security functions of the state to private military and security companies is not an African phenomenon, but rather a global development that is propelled by globalisation and privatisation. Isima further argues that the fragility of the states in Africa together with their weak institutional capacity is responsible for the expanding scope of the private sector into the core security functions of the state. As he succinctly puts it:

It is the low institutional capacity of the African state to deliver the public good of physical security for citizens efficiently and effectively that creates the security vacuum, which is increasingly being filled by the private sector in response to genuine demands of citizens for protection. (Isima 2007, p. 23)

In another work, Nnoli (2012) shares the same view with Mijah (2007) as he points to the undemocratic character of the Nigerian state as a serious aspect of the problem of national security. According to Nnoli (2012, p. 6), state violence and internal conflicts are at the heart of the security crisis in Nigeria. After a critical evaluation of the numerous violent internal conflicts which include the Boko Haram insurgency, he argues that “violent conflicts have persisted and even intensified in various parts of the country because democracy has remained elusive” (Nnoli 2012, p. 14). He further argues that the undemocratic character of the state also stands in the way of resolving the security crisis. This is because the alienation of the masses creates a problem for intelligence gathering which is a very important tool in maintaining security. As he succinctly puts it:

Since the central issue of national security in Nigeria concerns internal security, the need for good intelligence gathering in the country is critical. The consequence of the alienation of the masses from the undemocratic state is their unwillingness to provide the necessary intelligence as they need to. In fact, they tend to provide intelligence to those opposed to the state or they feign ignorance of what is going on. (Nnoli 2012, p. 22)

Olorode (2011) similarly shares the views of Nnoli (2006) and Isima (2007) on the relationship between the character of the Nigerian state and the problem of insecurity, only that he adds a cultural dimension to the debate. For Olorode (2011, p. 9), it is necessary to situate the Nigerian security crisis in a global context, “since insecurity cuts across national and international boundaries and has implications on the global economy and political stability”. To this end, the ideological struggle to entrench capitalism in developing countries and colonialism, which helped to ensure the propagation of the capitalist ideology, are important factors which he believes should not be ignored in trying to understand the security crisis. Olorode further asserts that “to understand the issue of insecurity and the attendant crisis in Nigeria, one must take cognizance of the involvement of the state (i.e governments at different levels), the state agencies (i.e the courts, police and similar agencies) and the cultural institutions (i.e religion, the media, educational institutions, etc)”. The cultural dimension that Olorode (2011) added to the debate on insecurity in Nigeria is informed by the fact that religious fundamentalism has been so manipulated by the political elites that it has also contributed to the problem of insecurity.

Achumba et al. (2013, p. 88) have also examined the character of insecurity in Nigeria. According to them, the remote and immediate sources of insecurity in Nigeria include lack of institutional capacity resulting in government failure, pervasive material inequalities and unfairness, ethno-religious conflicts, conflict of perception between the public and government, weak state security system, loss of sociocultural and communal value system, porous borders, unemployment, rural/urban migration and terrorism.

In another contribution, Imobighe (2013) argues that the cause of insecurity in Nigeria is closely tied to the attitude of Nigerian leaders to threat assessment. According to him, threat, which is part of the main determinants of defence and national security planning, has not been properly managed in Nigeria and some other African countries. To this end, he further argues that the misplacement of defence and national security efforts and the haphazard treatment of threats which focus solely on

regime perpetuation and how to silence opposition elements are crucial factors responsible for the increasing incidence of insecurity in the country.

Finally, Oarhe and Aghedo (2010) argue that the increasing internal insecurity in Nigeria is a result of the culture of corruption that has overtaken the security agencies charged with the responsibility of providing security. They also strongly believe that since the principles and ethical values such as integrity, precision, impartiality, courage, competence, teamwork, leadership, efficiency in the use of public funds, respect, trust, professionalism, patriotism, credibility, loyalty, reputation, responsibility, compliance with obligations under the law, diligence, discipline, fairness, accountability, commitment, transparency, innovation and objectivity that are paramount in the effective performance of security functions are lacking in the Nigerian security sector, the security sector cannot promote internal security. According to them, the prevailing images of corruption in the security sector have resulted to the following problems: poor quality of services by the internal security agencies, the proliferation of small and light weapons, the perpetration of crime, the manipulation of criminal records, the dented image and credibility of security agencies and the crisis of economic development. All these problems for them account for the reason why Nigeria is the “open sore” of the African continent.

The explanations offered by these scholars, when taken together, do not adequately explain the persistence of internal security threats in Nigeria. As good and incisive as they appear, they have failed to adequately capture the nexus between the character of the Nigerian state and problem of internal security. But we argue that the crisis of internal insecurity in Nigeria borders mainly on the post-colonial character of the Nigerian state. It is the dynamics of the post-colonial character of the Nigerian state that is responsible for the dysfunctional nature of federalism in the country. The dysfunctional character of federalism has resulted in the politicisation of security structures and governance processes involved in the management of security. This in a way has negatively aggravated and sustained insecurity in the country.

POST-COLONIALISM, FEDERALISM AND THE POLITICISATION OF SECURITY IN NIGERIA

Undoubtedly, the Nigerian federalism is riddled with contradictions and crises. The immanent contradictions in the Nigerian federation have resulted in what is commonly referred to as the national question

(Nwabueze 2016), which has often degenerated to varying degrees of protestations over resource control/revenue allocation and outright separatist agitations by cross sections of the country. In the face of the numerous crises and the frequent violent outbursts it has engendered, Nigeria's security sector appears to have been politicised and the security apparatuses compromised as a result.

A proper understanding of these tensions, contradictions and crises of the Nigerian federation requires a return to Nigeria's post-colonial foundations. Scholars such as Alavi (1973), Ake (1985), Ekekwe (1985) and Ibeanu (1998), among others, had developed the classical Marxist theory of the state and employed it in the elucidation and understanding of the peculiarity of the neocolonial state. The major contention of these scholars is that the post-colonial state is a creation of imperialism and, as such, has followed a developmental strategy dictated by the interest of imperialism and its local allies rather than that of the majority of the indigenous population. According to Ekekwe (1985), the post-colonial state rests on the foundation of the colonial state whose major preoccupation was to create conditions under which accumulation of capital by the foreign bourgeoisie in alliance with the ruling elite would take place through the exploitation of local human and other natural resources. Therefore, the post-colonial state that now emerged, though ostensibly independent and sovereign, was no less a creation of imperialism than the colonial state (Ekekwe 1985).

One basic character of the post-colonial state, as articulated by Ake (1985), is that it has very limited autonomy. This means that the state is institutionally constituted in such a way that it enjoys limited independence from the social classes, particularly the hegemonic social class, and, so, is immersed in the class struggles that go on in the society. The post-colonial state is also constituted in such a way that it reflects and mainly caters for a narrow range of interests: the interests of the rapacious political elite in comprador and subordinate relationship with foreign capital. For Ake, therefore, "the political conditions in Africa are the greatest impediment to development" (Ake 2003, p. 1). He traced these political conditions to the political legacy colonialism bequeathed on Africa, and which manifested in the absolutism and arbitrariness of the post-colonial states.

Buttressing this point, Ibeanu (1998) conceived of the state as "the totality of the materiality of political class domination in a society". He surmised that since the post-colonial state is all-powerful and there are few safeguards on how its tremendous power is to be used in a moderate and

civil manner, groups and individuals take a great stock in controlling the power of the state. So it is characteristic of the post-colonial state that its members put a premium on politics. Politics is everything and everything is politics, including life and death (Ibeanu 1998, p. 11).

In applying the theory of the post-colonial state to the elucidation of the crisis of the Nigerian federation, it needs to be understood that at the time a federal system was being adopted in 1946–1954, the colonial state had become a battleground for three rival pluralities: the plurality of economic and geographic regions, the plurality of ethnic nationalities and the plurality of colonial administrative traditions. The first two pluralities make up what Afigbo (1991) described as the primordial federal features of indigenous Nigerian society. Meanwhile, these two pluralities have since intruded into the post-colonial state, shaping in a very decisive manner the structure and evolution of that state.

Arising from the plurality of ethnic groups and colonial administrative traditions, the struggle for power in Nigeria has been intense and whichever ethnic group that gets hold of power maximises it to the benefit of the group. The fallout of the desire to maximise the powers of the state is what is seen as the over-centralisation of the federal system. Of the numerous pathologies arising from the over-centralisation of the federal system in Nigeria, none threatens the stability of the constituent states such as the maintenance of security.

In Nigeria, the powers of security governance lie solely with the federal government, which exercises supreme control over all the security agencies. The high degree of centralisation of the security sector has adversely affected the governance structures, resulting in its politicisation. This anomaly has become so glaring in the use and control of the police. As regards the maintenance of public order and safety, the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended) makes it the concurrent responsibility of both the federal and state governments. Yet, the coercive institution responsible for the job which is the police is solely controlled by the federal government. The controversy over the use and control of the police has been a source of tension and confrontations between the federal government and the states. The clamour for state police, which began before independence in 1960 has also met with stiff opposition by the federal government with the tacit support of a section of the federating units.

The politicisation of the security governance structures has resulted in a situation where state governors as chief security officers of their respec-

tive states have minimal or no control over the security infrastructure in their state because they cannot control any of the security agencies. This clearly undermines security. The abduction and forced resignation of a sitting governor in Anambra State several years ago and the seeming silence of the Nigerian Police in the face of wanton destruction of lives and property in Nimbo-Uzo Uwani in Enugu State and across Benue State during the crises between rural farmers and Fulani herdsmen speaks volumes about the challenges of centralised control of the police. During the crises, the respective governors were helpless as they could not effectively take charge of the situation. Also, in the face of the crisis, the way and manner the police directed vigilante groups and militias to return all the arms in their possession appeared suspect, given that nothing was said about the Fulani herdsmen who have been carrying sophisticated arms and terrorising rural farmers across the country.

The sectionalism and nepotism exhibited in recent strategic appointments in the security sector by the President Muhammadu Buhari-led administration is another example of the politicisation of the security governance structure. In a state like Nigeria where there are sharp ethnic and religious divisions, the appointment of key security chiefs such as the Inspector-General of Police, Director of Department of State Security, Controller-Generals of Nigerian Custom Service and Nigerian Immigration Service, Director-General of National Intelligence Agency, Chairman of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission as well as the National Security Adviser, from one geopolitical zone of the country has not only dampened the morale of the men and officers of the security agencies concerned, but has exacerbated insecurity. The resurgence of secessionist threats and the vociferous demands for the immediate restructuring of the Nigerian federation are clear pointers to the disaffection and ill-will that the politicisation of the security architecture has engendered within the polity.

The politicisation of the security sector has also resulted to the prevailing situation where the Nigerian state appears to be only interested in the security of those in power. The large retinue of security personnel that is attached to elected political office holders, their appointed allies and the financial oligarchs together with elitist orientation of these security personnel leaves much to be desired. More worrisome is the fact that the security personnel are increasingly alienated from the public they are meant to protect. In most cases, the lawlessness exhibited by the security personnel has also exacerbated insecurity. There are several cases of police brutality across the country.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

This chapter has critically explored the theoretical nexus between the state and security management. It then focused on the Nigerian experience. The nature and character of internal security management in Nigeria have not only raised doubts about the role of the Nigerian state, but have also exposed how the contradictions of the post-colonial character of the state have undermined federal practice which turns around to affect the maintenance of internal security. What readily comes to mind from the analyses of the role of the Nigerian state in the management of internal security is that there is urgent need to reinvent federalism for it to meet the changing demands of the political society. One of such demands centres on restructuring of the security sector. This has become necessary considering the fact that security threats vary across the different states, and it requires some degree of self-rule, which is part of the dictates of federalism to respond to local security issues. Following Livingston's (1952) sociological thesis of federalism, there is urgent need for the operators of Nigeria's federal system to develop instrumentalities that will respond to the numerous demands of the different ethnic nationalities. As postulated by Livingston (1952), federal instrumentalities are expected to change and respond to the demands from the political society. When there is a gap between the demands from the political society and the state of the federal system, it basically leads to tension and crises. This is part of the problem of federalism in Nigeria which is creating the problems in security management.

REFERENCES

- Abrahamsen, R., & Williams, M. (2006). Security sector reform: Bringing the private in. *Conflict, Security and Development*, 6(1), 1–23.
- Achumba, O., Ighomerelo, M., & Akpor-Robarro, M. (2013). Security challenges in Nigeria and the implication for business activities and sustainable development. *Journal of Economic and Sustainable Development*, 4(2), 79–99.
- Afigbo, A. E. (1991). Background to Nigerian federalism: Federal features in the colonial state. *Publius*, 21 (4). Retrieved August 25, 2018, from <https://www.jstor.org/stable/3330308>. 05:33 UTC.
- Ake, C. (1985). The future of the state in Africa. *International Political Science Review*, 6(1), 105–114.
- Ake, C. (2003). *Democracy and development in Africa*. Ibadan: Spectrum Books Limited.
- Alavi, H. (1973). The state in post-colonial societies: Pakistan and Bangladesh. In H. Goul' Bourne (Ed.), *Politics and state in the Third World*. London: Longman.

- Anah, C. (2014). Governance and security in Africa in the 21st century: A political economy perspective. *Journal of Alternative Perspective in the Social Sciences*, 5(4), 783–807.
- Appadorai, A. (1968). *The substance of politics*. London: Oxford University Press.
- Bislev, S. (2004). Globalisation, state transformation, and public security. *International Political Science Review*, 25(3), 281–296.
- Ekekwe, E. (1985). State and economic development in Nigeria. In C. Ake (Ed.), *Political economy of Nigeria*. London and Lagos: Longman.
- Fukuyama, F. (2013, January). What is governance? Centre for Global Development Working Papers 314. Washington, DC: Center for Global Development.
- Gamble, A. (1981). *An introduction to modern social and political thought*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Ibeanu, O. (1998). The Nigerian state and the politics of democratization. Paper presented at a conference for the book project on Comparative Democratization in Africa: Nigeria and South Africa. University of Cape Town South Africa. May 31–June 1.
- Ibeanu, O., & Momoh, A. (2008). *State responsiveness to public security needs: The politics of security decision-making*. London: Conflict, Security and Development, Group Papers, Kings College London.
- Imobighe, T. (1990). Doctrines for and threats to internal security. In A. Ekoko & M. Vogt (Eds.), *Nigerian defence policy: Issues and problems*. Lagos: Malthouse Press.
- Imobighe, T. (2003). *Nigeria's defence and national security linkages: A framework of analysis*. Ibadan: Heinemann Educational Books Plc.
- Imobighe, T. (2013). Dimensions of threats and national development challenges in Nigeria. In O. Mbachu & B. Umar (Eds.), *Internal security management in Nigeria: A study in terrorism and counter – Terrorism*. Kaduna: Medusa Academic Publishers Limited.
- Isima, J. (2007). Regulating the private security sector: An imperative for security sector governance in Africa. *Journal of Security Sector Management*, 5(1), 1–16.
- Livingston, W. (1952). A note on the nature of federalism. *Political Studies Quarterly*, LXII, 2.
- Loader, I., & Walker, N. (2007). *Civilizing security*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Lutterbeck, D. (2004). Blurring the dividing line: The convergence of internal and external security in Western Europe. *European Security*, 14(2), 231–253.
- Mijah, E. (2007). Democracy, internal security and policing in Nigeria. Paper presented at International Conference, Evangelische Akademie Loccum, June 15–17.
- Miliband, R. (1969). *The state in capitalist society*. New York: Basic Books.

- Nnoli, O. (2003). *Introduction to politics*. Enugu: Pan African Centre for Research on Peace and Conflict Resolution (PACREP).
- Nnoli, O. (2006). *National security in Africa: A radical new perspective*. Enugu: Pan African Centre for Research on Peace and Conflict Resolution (PACREP).
- Nnoli, O. (2012). *Democracy and national security in Nigeria. First Zik lecture series*. Onitsha: Eagleman Books Ltd.
- Nwabueze, B. (2016). *The national question and corruption in Nigeria*. Ibadan: John Archers.
- Oarhe, O., & Aghedo, I. (2010). The open sore of a nation: Corruption complex and internal security in Nigeria. *African Security*, 3, 127–147.
- Olorode, O. (2011). Security crisis: Implications for national integration. *The National Scholar*, 8(2), 33–38.
- Omilusi, M. (2013). Interrogating Nigeria's governance failure through the prism of insecurity. *Global Journal of Human Social Sciences*, 13(7), 34–48.
- Onyeoziri, F. (2005). *The citizen and the state*. Ibadan: Ibadan University Press.
- Oyebode, A. (2011). The imperative of security. *The National Scholar*, 8(2), 27–29.
- Raphael, D. (1976). *Problems of political philosophy*. London: The Macmillan Press, Ltd.
- Vannoni, M. (2011). Failed states and failed theories: The (re)securitization of underdevelopment. Paper presented at the 25th conference of the Italian Society of Political Sciences, 8–10 Sept 2011. Retrieved from <http://www.sisp.it/files/papers/2011/Matia-Vannoni-1064.pdf>.
- Vohra, N. N. (2008). National governance and internal security. *Journal of Defence Studies*, 2(1), 1–16.
- Yusuf, M. D. (2012). *National security challenges: A general checklist on civil-military relations as a panacea*. Ibadan: Gold Press Ltd.