Power Relations and Education of the Korean Minority in the Japanese Karafuto and Soviet/Russian Sakhalin

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Abstract This chapter is on the Korean diaspora community in the Japanese Karafuto and Soviet-Russian Sakhalin Island. Using historiography, it examines the vicissitudes of Korean ethnic minority people who were mostly from the Southern part of the Joseon kingdom. They were forced to stay in the Karafuto/Sakhalin Island, first as conscripts and then cheap labor for mining and fishery. They were subjects of two imperial powers but without a passport, hence, making their repatriation impossible. Under strict and pragmatic ethnic language policies, they suffered periodic ban or closure of "Korean schools" and manipulation of the education curriculum. Thus, it is argued, the Koreans became victims of two imperial systems of difference (ruler-ruled) and exploitation without being allowed to return to their motherland during the Japanese colonial rule of Korea (1910–1945), as well as after the handover of the Southern territory to the Soviet Union as a result of Japanese defeat in the World War II and continued all the way to 1986 when they were allowed to be repatriated under the political slogans of Perestroika and Glasnost (reformation and openness) that the Soviet Union was preoccupied with.

1 Introduction

Education, ethnicity, and equity never remain generationally static. It is widely known that communities in diaspora are subject to the greatest intergenerational variations in their schooling, level of instruction, perceived self-identity, and ability to join the mainstream in terms of social network and mobility. It has been argued that under a strong acculturation process (Berry 2003), for example, diasporic

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communities' mobility, attitude toward learning, and cultural identity can undergo significant subordination under the ruling power structure.

This chapter draws on the literature, statistical information, and archival documents on the Korean diaspora in the Japanese Karafuto and Soviet-Russian Sakhalin Island and their education. "Times" or historical perspective is chosen as the unit of comparative analysis (Sweeting 2014). Among the prevailing forms of histories of education expounded by Sweeting, this chapter uses the "Social Histories," which is perhaps one of the most fruitful perspectives for education researchers to "illuminate cultural and other contextual matters and especially in the planning and processing of their research" (Sweeting 2014, pp. 174–175). Historiography is a methodology of its own standing, and the main theoretical framework of this chapter will be the analysis of power relation suggested by Michel Foucault (1983).

2 Background of the Korean Minority in Sakhalin

Today, there are two ethnic Russian Korean communities with significant differences in geopolitical background, culture, and assimilation/integration processes that set them apart. About 90% of Russian Koreans live in the former Soviet Republics of Central Asia, primarily in Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan. They are fourth-/fifth-generation descendants of some 170,000 Koreans of the Russia Far East who moved from the northern provinces of the Joseon Peninsula, the Hamgyeong Province in particular, to Primore in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century (Gelb 1995) and were subsequently deported by Stalin to Central Asia. The other 10% currently reside in the Sakhalin Island of the Russian Federation. The present chapter is on the latter diaspora community. We examine their exposure to more than one colonial/imperial education system and their ethnic identity that is authentic neither in the place they now live nor in their South Korean motherland.

With geopolitics as the main focus, the literature of social science and history of ethnic Koreans in Central Asia have been more widely reported than those in the Sakhalin Island. Research on education in either community has seldom been done separately if at all. This chapter is an attempt to fill up that gap by reviewing how the Koreans have regarded education along with their own Confucian heritage cultural identity and practices as a means to belong to the mainstream society, obtain job-related skills, and pursue social mobility (Park 2011).

We submit that a historiography needs to deal with sociological or political concepts that are contingent in time yet determine the notional categories with which we researchers look at the reality, such as the concepts of class and identity. In fact, reinterpretation and self-examination are essential tasks for researchers. For example, the term *nationality* used throughout this chapter means ethnic minority in the political and academic lexicon in the Soviet and even post-Soviet era. *Nationality* assigns to minority people static socio-historical traits. The term *Korean nationality*, for example, implies that Russian Koreans are peninsular Koreans at the core,

and this fact cannot be changed or overridden in spite of many generations of birth and residence in Russian territories. Stalin's definition of *nationality* articulates a static identity which has been known since the late imperial Russia: "historically constituted, stable community of people formed on the basis of a common language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in a common culture" (Stalin 2003[1935], p. 9–10).

3 Subjects of Two Empires

Russian Koreans on the Sakhalin Isle, also known as Sakhalin Koreans, constitute the largest ethnic minority in Sakhalin according to the 2010 Russian census, and they represent about a tenth of the total population in the capital city of Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk (Gradoteka 2015).

Japan came into possession of the southern half of the Sakhalin having won the Russian-Japanese War in 1905. Korean immigration to Sakhalin around this period was voluntary but something similar to the indentured labor of the nineteenth century (Park 2013). In the 1930s, a greater number of Koreans arrived to Sakhalin: "The island had large coal deposits and abundant fisheries as well as large forests, so it was of considerable value to the resource-poor Japanese empire. Developmental projects, however, needed cheap labor—labor that was found in Korea, then a colony of Japan" (Lankov 2010, p. 8). When the Pacific War (the Asian chapter of the World War II) erupted, Korean laborers were conscripted under duress by the Japanese colonial military power to work in Sakhalin and exploit the much needed raw materials. Foucault (1983, p. 212) identified three types of struggle against the ruling power structure: first, a domination against several structured categories such as ethnicity, social whole, and categorical belief-knowledge such as religion; second, an exploitation of extant structures to satisfy needs such as industrial productivity; and third, subjection and submission of "others" with corresponding loss of subjectivity.

The Japanese war efforts created a renewed power relation between Korea and Japan. Korean minorities were dominated and exploited and became imperial subjects but without full citizenship. They were simply arms and legs of war efforts.

The conscription of Korean workers to Karafuto was a massive mobilization. According to Yulia Din's archival research in the Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History (*Sotsialno-politicheskoy Istorii Rossiyskiy Gosudarstvennyy Arkhiv*, RGASPI), by 1945, there were some 23,000 Koreans on the island representing about 5–6% of the total population of Southern Sakhalin (Din 2015).

Japanese colonial rule brought about deprivation of culture and language to the Koreans in colonial territories. Any public usage of Korean language was prohibited, and a harsh policy of assimilation was imposed. The colonial education was not only devoid of the use of the Korean language, but it was also utilized to enforce colonial policies: "The [Japanese] Government-General enacted laws legalizing racial discrimination against the Koreans, making them second-class citizens.

Education served as a means of justifying such racism" (Kim 2012, p. 323). In our view, the term "second-class citizens" is an overstatement. Koreans in the southern Sakhalin ("Karafuto" in Japanese) were subjected to deprivation of their native language to the extent of being forced to change their names into Japanese and the work supervisors discriminating among the miners according to their fluency in the Japanese language (Yi 2004). Power usually meets resistance, but when the power distance is huge and its main trait is authoritarian, the machinery of power overrides it all. It rules, subjugates, commodifies, and dehumanizes people in every possible way.

After the World War II in 1945, when the entire Island became a part of Russian territory, the Sakhalin Koreans found themselves locked up on the Island. Political circumstances prevented them from returning to their homeland, now divided into North and South Korea. Initially, the Soviet Government planned to repatriate Koreans back to their native land (Din 2014, 2015), but the plan was repeatedly postponed because of the potential manpower shortage for Soviet Russia. In all local industries such as coal mining, fishing, and logging, a large part of skilled and semi-skilled labor was provided by the Koreans who adapted relatively well to the local climate and conditions (Lankov 2010). They were seen as the ideal labor. Andrei Lankov further says that Sakhalin Koreans were explicitly forbidden to leave the island by the Soviet establishment (2012). It is possible to argue that Sakhalin Koreans' adaptability skill and manpower were both a blessing and a curse.

After the return of Sakhalin to Russia in August 1945, and with no more nominal Japanese imperial subjectivity (Kim 2012), the Sakhalin Koreans found themselves caught between the Soviet concept of *nationalities* and a lack of official citizenship on papers. Since the imposition of the internal passport system in the 1930s until the fall of the Soviet Union, a Soviet individual inherited his or her parents' *nationality* as specified in the birth certificate. A person's ethnic affiliation was recorded in the passport and noted in all identifying documents and was taken into consideration when applying to a university, for employment, for promotion, or for emigration (Khazanov 1995, p. 16). Since only this "primordial" identity was socially and economically recognized within the Russian society, it was taken into consideration when making friends, finding spouses, applying for employment, and so on.

Moreover, the Joseon Peninsula they had left was now divided by the Parallel 38 line into the North and South, and on the brink of a civil war. On the other hand, there was no political will of the Soviet Government to repatriate a readily available Korean blue-collar manpower. While this situation was dragging on for years, "Russia refused to grant them citizenship because Russia had no diplomatic relationship with South Korea. These denationalized people experienced discrimination in residence, education, and jobs and wanted to return to South Korea" (Yoon 2000, p. 43).

Sakhalin Koreans were mostly from the Southern part of the Joseon Peninsula and not from an independent South Korean state. The rationale for refusing repatriation was that the change in the global political situation made it untenable: "With the onset of the Cold War, it became politically impossible for the Soviet Union to allow a large scale relocation of Koreans back to South Korea" (Lankov 2012, para. 6).

Indeed, repatriation of Sakhalin Koreans to South Korea occurred only after 1986 when the Soviet Union was preoccupied with its internal predicaments and reformation.

Sakhalin Koreans were officially considered foreigners but, ironically, without a Korean or any citizenship. The lack of citizenship must have been a great source of hardship. A case in point would be Sakhalin Koreans' marriages with the Soviet citizens. It was explicitly forbidden by the 1947 decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council, "On the prohibition of marriages between Soviet citizens and foreigners," which remained in force until 1969. Even marriage was at the service for the "system of differentiation," but it illustrates the extent in which power relations were set up. The ruling power, be it Japanese or Soviet, acted through "differentiations determined by the law or by traditions of status and privilege; economic differences in the appropriation of riches and goods, shifts in the processes of production, linguistic or cultural differences, differences in know-how and competence, and so forth" (Foucault 1983, p. 223).

4 Desired and Denied Repatriation

The early waves of Koreans were poorly educated and had no knowledge of the Russian language. In addition, they were deprived of opportunities to formally learn or socially interact with locals. They were regarded as limbs put to work and not humans. Without a citizenship, they were denied jobs with prestige or any public posts such as becoming civil servants or teachers. In the 1950s, most Koreans were unskilled workers who made a living at fisheries and mining fields; they did not and could not aspire to upward social mobility, and seldom left their villages. These sustained adversities and uncertainties kept them dreaming of repatriation to their native country (Din 2015).

Soon after the handover from Japan to the Soviet authorities, the latter first felt uneasy about the presence of numerous Koreans. To manage and control the Koreans, Soviet authorities needed intermediaries, interpreters, and educators, for example, Russian managers needed bilingual translators, educators, and journalists to communicate with Korean workers. Qualified Russian Koreans were far away in Central Asia where the Korean population was much more Russified culturally and even politically (Chang and Park 2013; Fuchs 2004). Hence, the Government selected some 2000 politically reliable Koreans in Central Asia and sent them to work in Sakhalin as teachers, journalists, translators, and clerks (Lankov 2009). The Central Asian Soviet Koreans became interpreters and translators between Russian-speaking managers and Sakhalin Korean workers. Some of them became school principals and teachers. Sakhalin Koreans regarded them as "privileged continental Koreans" or "agents of authority." Relations between these two groups remained tense. In other words, the Foucauldian "system of differentiation" increased in number and scope of differentiation. As it will be argued later, only more parties or stakeholders of power will get involved during the era of globalization.

Din (2015) offers archival proofs to argue that the manpower shortage was the first and foremost reason for postponements of repatriation of Koreans in 1947, 1948, and 1950. The repatriation of the Sakhalin Koreans suffered further delays due to the Korean Civil War (1950–1953) and in its aftermath – the politics of the Cold War. In 1953, the Soviet authorities finally announced that Sakhalin Koreans were allowed to adopt Soviet citizenship if they freely wished to do so. However, few Sakhalin Koreans accepted the offer, arguably because of the emotional value of the motherland. In fact, 21,251 out of 30,000 Koreans on the island had no citizenship in 1956 (Lankov 2009). We have to take into account that the so-called Cold War that divided the world between the Soviet Union-led Eastern Block and the Western Europe-American alliance started with the Korean War.

The signs of assimilation were more visible in the Sakhalin island community from the 1960s onward. The Korean community changed significantly when they started to leave Korean enclaves in rural areas to acquire education and jobs in the cities in the mid-1960s. It only confirms that urbanization and assimilation are two sides of the same coin (Khazanov 1995).

In the interpretation of the 1970 Soviet National Census by George and Herta Ginsburgs, the Koreans of *Sakhalinskaya Oblast* (Sakhalin region) are regarded as the pièce de résistance compared with other Russian Korean communities (1977). According to this census, there were 35,396 Sakhalin Koreans, representing 54% of the Korean population in the Russian Far East and 35% of the all Koreans living in the Soviet Union. Koreans represented 5.7% of the entire population in the *Sakhalinskaya Oblast*, and 84% of them were urban dwellers.

During this period, the Koreans were assimilated in the matters of language, lifestyle, and economic activities of the host society such as Russian-style naming and the use of the Russian language at schools. Gradually, the Koreans became hardly distinguishable from the local Russians in language use, lifestyle, social relation, and residential choice, although they still maintained strong ethnic preferences in marriage, diet, and rituals. Assimilation, as referred here, should not be "romanticized" and forcibly turned into a cultural phenomenon. If looked at it as an occurrence of power relation, it is not but only the final leg of an oppressive power march. As pointed out by Foucault (1983), assimilation is but a reified later stage of power relation. As mentioned earlier, it starts with a "system of difference" such as government-public and continues with a "type of actualization" by a wide range of top-down maneuvers such as policy formulation, implementation, juridical ruling, granting of a reduced number of rights, and authorizing. These, in turn, rely on a set of "means of actualization" such as compulsory language instruction in schooling and official examination system with planned-ahead selection system that faithfully portraits a functionalist paradigm of education. These maneuvers are never improvised in random locations, but, instead, they take "forms of institutionalization" (ibid. 223) in specific *loci* such as schools (hence "state apparatus" for Althusser) and public exam authorities. All of these sag of policies and control come with credible justifications, which Foucault termed the "degrees of rationalization." In contemporary education, rationalization is usually actualized with citizenship

education, national/moral education, and a rampant neoliberal priority given to prosperity and limitless growth even at the expense of overt environmental degradation.

When it comes to rationalization in the name of true identity or recognized identity, we need to be on alert as we could unintentionally become subservient to such a rationalization. In our study, for example, the "Koreanness" qua perceived Korean self-identity is relatively weaker among Sakhalin Koreans in objective and behavioral aspects, such as interpersonal relations, than more fiercely defended emotional and psychological aspects, such as native language and ethnic heritage culture. Sakhalin Koreans usually live in extended families where traditions are transmitted from generation to generation and follow cultural practices such as removing shoes, bowing to elders, being reserved around elders, and dining etiquette (Yoon 2000). Preserving the ethnic language and culture has become less important than gaining access to resources available in the mainstream society and advancing one's socioeconomic status. These findings echo research on the Korean minorities in Mainland China (Gao and Park 2012; Gao et al. 2011). In our view, a theoretical or even scientific attempt to "freeze" identity should be avoided. Tagging or categorizing people into a particular culture as though culture is static and it always resists the mainstream culture, capital, people, and authority are abstractions that should be refused. Indeed, this static categorization that makes people ask questions such as "Who are we?" and "What are they?" (Foucault 1983, p. 212) could be the very instrument of domination. Instead, we should look into the fluidity of identities and how such abstractions push people to face a lack of social recognition and integration (Park 2009).

The collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s was accompanied by further development in the Sakhalin Koreans' cultural and political assimilation. As the post-Soviet social transformation made the old restrictions void, it generated among the Sakhalin Koreans a renewed desire to reunite with lost family members, learn the native language, and boost the sense of belonging to an ethnic culture. Not without paradox, an even larger number of Sakhalin Koreans opted for Russian citizenship, which increased migration to the Russian mainland facilitated by the loosening of internal migration controls as well as increased diversification in the roles of Sakhalin Koreans in the local economy. Korean cultural associations, language lessons, national dance clubs, and other analogous organizations began to flourish in this new environment.

For the Korean community, the Soviet political reforms of the 1980s and 1990s signaled the opening of the path to South Korea. However, the real and mass repatriation became possible only after a diplomatic breakthrough of a tripartite agreement over reunification of divided families between Russian Federation, South Korea, and Japan in 1992 (Din 2015, p. 186). Since then, Sakhalin Koreans have managed to integrate into South Korean society with opportunities to reside and work there. In the late 1990s, persistent effort of the Korean activists and their friends, Japan, South Korea, and other countries, jointly funded the construction of a special apartment complex near Incheon. This apartment complex is for elder Koreans who wish to come back to Korea; there are about 2300 elderly Sakhalin Koreans.

By then Sakhalin Koreans were occupied as postal employees, bureaucrats, and even customs and immigration officers. Not only did they hold positions in the civil administration, but they became successful in business and in the attainment of higher education. Thus, some returnees to South Korea came back to Sakhalin because, by that time, the Korean population was rather prosperous and well integrated.

The rapid development of economic and cultural relations between Russia and the Republic of Korea, and the related assistance programs organized by the Russian Government, changed the attitude of the Sakhalin Koreans toward their own unique identity. The latter was no longer absolutely dependent on the ancestral race or geographical location because Sakhalin Island had become an inextricable part of their unique tradition and narrative.

The post-Soviet period for the Sakhalin Korean community indicates a score of complex changes and developments in the nature of Sakhalin Koreans' engagement with their Korean identity and diaspora. After the period of Perestroika, the Russian Government increased communication with South Korea and began to allow the Sakhalin Koreans greater freedom in terms of cultural expressions, occupation, and residency. Since 1989, there has been a remarkable upheaval of interest and pride in issues related to ethnic identity across all *nationalities* of the former USSR.

5 Schooling Between Empires

In articulating Japanese colonial realpolitik of categorizing colonial subjects pinning down the similarities and differences with fully Japanese subjects, Morris-Suzuki argued that Japanese colonial subjects of Korea were regarded as Japanese citizens only nominally and on the international stage. Koreans were listed in the "external family registers" (Jap. gaichi kaseki), and they generally educated separately from the Japanese settlers of Karafuto. It was "generally" because at a later stage, Korean children will be sent to Japanese schools where they will be taught to speak Japanese with Japanese as the medium of instruction in "immersion" style. In other words, there was a move from the politics of separation to active assimilation. Tessa Morris-Suzuki is right in cautioning against "defining colonial policy simply as 'assimilationist' or simply as 'discriminatory'" (1998, p. 159), and she does so not because such strategies were not used, but, rather, they were among other strategies.

The education system in Sakhalin during the Japanese occupation had different forms. First, there was a segregated education system for the *Ainu* aboriginal children until early 1930s, which lasted, at least, until 1932 when the colonial government granted full Japanese citizenship to only *Ainu* people (Morris-Suzuki 1998). Second, there was an official education policy for the entire colony, which emphasized the fostering of [Japanese imperial] patriotism, productive skills, cooperation, and diligence. Learning consisted of speaking the Japanese language (writing was often discouraged), moral education, arithmetic, art, and large periods devoted to

practical handicrafts (Morris-Suzuki 1998). Lesson stories from Shinto mythology and the heroic deeds of Japanese military, in short, the post-Meiji nationalism were taught across curriculum (see interesting discussion on the Shinto mythology's role in Japanese nationalist movements in the cited work of Morris-Suzuki).

The Japanese authorities imposed on the Korean population a forced assimilation policy in and through education. There were no Koreans among teachers because they were none in the teachers' College following the Governor's order (Din 2014). In essence, there was no further education for Koreans.

In the postwar period, when southern Sakhalin became a Russian territory, a new political and state system started dictating the conditions of life. One of the most important tasks for the Soviet authorities was to give to the Japanese and Korean populations the basics of Soviet education and to educate them in ideology and politics. Up until 1945, many Koreans were illiterate. In 1958, it was revealed that there were 6106 illiterates on the island – a majority of them Koreans. Seventy percent of these were women. Teachers and party activists were recruited to teach adults, and a special tutorial in the Korean language had been prepared for this purpose (Din 2014).

The first action countering this problem was opening Korean schools on the belief that, perhaps, Korean schools would educate Koreans as Soviet citizens and inculcate in them Soviet ideas and values. Therefore, the teachers were required to have special political training. It was expected that Korean schools would support the ethnic culture of the Korean people. The actual transition from the Japanese to the Soviet education system began in January 1947 upon the completion of the repatriation of Japanese population. Japanese schools were abolished and Korean schools were established instead. The number of Korean schools reached its peak in 1950. According to the Regional Committee of the Communist Party documents kept in the State Historical Archive of Sakhalin Region, there were 87 schools in 1950 (50 primary schools and 37 7-year junior high schools; the number of students was 7000) (Din 2014, p. 180). A second source from the work of Kostanov and Podlubnaya (1994) marks it at 72 (Table 1).

The problem of the teaching staff remained serious throughout this process. At first the graduates of the Japanese schools had taught in Korean schools for many years, but they were not familiar with the Soviet system of education, and they did not have recognized qualifications. To replace a large part of these teachers together with the expanding network of Korean schools, the Regional Party Committee

Table 1 Korean schools in the Sakhalin region 1945–1963

	1945	1946	1947	1949	1950	1955	1958	1963
Primary schools	27	28	28	55	57	32	17	10
Junior high schools	–	8	11	13	15	22	13	11
High schools	–	–	–	–	–	–	11	11
Total number of schools	27	36	39	68	72	54	41	32
Total number of students	2300	3000	3137	4692	5308	5950	7214	7239

Source: Adapted from Din (2014) and Kostanov and Podlubnaya (1994)

invited Soviet Koreans of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan (Kostanov and Podlubnaya 1994). Thus a Korean Department in the Teachers College of Poronaisk in 1952 was established to prepare teachers for the Korean schools (Lim 2012, p. 189).

The Korean language as a medium of instruction could have had an overall positive effect, at least psychologically if not pedagogically. The local Soviet authorities were seen making significant efforts to provide the Korean schools with textbooks and teaching materials in the Korean language, which had to be either translated from Russian or written from scratch. From 1946–1948, a number of textbooks, for example, Arithmetic (grades 4 and 5), Botany (grades 5 and 6), Native Language (grades 1 and 2), and Geography (grade 4), were translated into Korean (Kostanov and Podlubnaya 1994; Lim 2012, p. 189).

However, the referred postwar euphoria of instruction in Korean was doomed. By 1962–1963, many of them had been outdated and did not meet the program requirements. Hence, students from fourth grade and older mainly used Russian textbooks. Textbooks for high school students were not translated into Korean (Kostanov and Podlubnaya 1994). From the outset, this apparently localized "liberal language policy" in Sakhalin was at odds with Stalin's national language policy reversing Linin's. Drawing on the case of the Kazakhstan, Yoon argued (2000, p. 44):

> Following the Decree of March 1938, Russian was made a compulsory subject in all non-Russian schools and Lenin's idea of equality of all languages was officially dropped…all Korean schools were closed. In December of 1939, the Soviet government also ratified the acts 'Concerning Korean Literature' and 'Concerning the Removal of Literature in the Korean Language from Book Stores and Libraries.' As a result, the State Committee for the Preservation of Secrets in Print confiscated and destroyed thousands of Korean books, including those Koreans had brought with them. According to available statistics, 120,000 textbooks were destroyed, including 17,000 textbooks for the study of Korean language. After World War II, Russian language was openly proclaimed as 'the language of high culture' and 'treasure source for other languages' as well as 'the language of socialism.'

It comes to no surprise, therefore, that the Russian language was taught to the students in the Korean schools of Sakhalin for 12 h every week in grades 1–3, and 2 to 3 h a day to grades 7–8. Even leisure and extracurricular activities such as school theater plays were loaded with ideological content in the repertoire (Kostanov and Podlubnaya 1994).

It should be noted that Stalin's language policy and the policy of assimilation in general were implemented through schooling and public education and continued even after his death in 1953. "From Khrushchev to Brezhnev and to Andropov, the Soviet Government continued to make efforts to achieve the goal of the Russification of nationality groups. Brezhnev, for example, campaigned for the fusion of all peoples into a single unit (Soviet People, *Sovetskii narod* in Russian), and was determined to speed up the process of linguistic assimilation" (Yoon 2000, p. 44).

The fast assimilation of the Sakhalin Koreans in the 1960s and 1970s discussed earlier in this chapter has a strong correlation with the Soviet Union-wide educational system and policy on *nationalities*. It could be argued that a substantive part of assimilation and even perhaps Russification occurred quietly in the very Sakhalin Korean classrooms. It also must be said that Stalin's realpolitik regarding the issues

being discussed here completely dismissed the Constitution. For example, the 1933 Soviet Constitution guaranteed the right to education ahead of the United Nations' Universal Declaration of Human Rights and also stipulated that "instruction in schools being conducted in the native language" (Supreme Soviet of the USSR 1936, Article 121).

Although the Korean schools were fully supported by the government, they still experienced problems of placement in the dilapidated infrastructure of old Japanese schools. In 1958, the Soviet Ministry of Education conducted an inspection of the Korean schools. Many problems were identified, such as lack of proper curricula, textbooks, and other teaching aids and facilities. The academic performance of students was 80% on average, and it was reported that every six students, one dropped out of school (Kuzin 2011, p. 253).

Regardless of the possible causes, one of the most serious problems for Sakhalin Koreans' social mobility was poor knowledge of the Russian language and the subsequent failure of the Korean youth to obtain professional education and a career. Korean middle school graduates had problems with advanced education, which called for further Russian-language learning to increase chances to access Russian-speaking environments. Until 1956, it was impossible for the Sakhalin Koreans to get into higher education institutions because they were "stateless." From 1956 onward, they were allowed to enter a local pedagogical college but could take no managerial level jobs.

By the end of the 1950s and early 1960s, the situation began to change. Korean children constantly interacted with Russians and quickly mastered the Russian language. Many of them transferred to Russian schools, and the number of Korean children in Russian schools increased steadily. In most cases, the parents themselves preferred to transfer their children to Russian schools. In the academic school year of 1962/1963, 75% of the Korean students with Soviet citizenship studied in Russian schools (Lim 2012, p. 189).

In the early 1960s, the Regional Communist Party Committee and education authorities were scrutinizing the situation of the Korean schools in Sakhalin. The following predicaments were found (Kostanov and Podlubnaya 1994):

1. Insufficient number of textbooks and teaching aids and inadequate school facilities
2. A lower level of knowledge among Korean schools students, especially in the Russian language and literature, not allowing them to pass the entrance exams successfully and continue their education in colleges and universities
3. Higher motivation of Korean parents to educate their children in Russian schools as Russian-language education was necessary to increase chances to succeed in a Russian-speaking environment

Based on the foregoing, the Regional Board of Education consulted the Ministry of Education of the Soviet Union in 1962. The Ministry recommended to resolve this problem locally. As a result of the decision taken by the Sakhalin Region Executive Committee on 13 May 1963, a major change took place. The language of instruction was changed into Russian, and the Korean language was not taught

anymore as a subject. Two Korean schools for working adults (Schools for Working Youth – *shkola rabochei molodyozhi*) were annexed to Russian schools (Din 2014) (Table 1 shows the number of schools in the year of the closure of all Korean schools). In some cases, the process was gradual; some Korean schools continued to operate after 1963 to cater for the children of North Korean families who studied there until they returned to their homeland.

This step has often been described as an attempt of forced Russification as the Sakhalin Koreans were deprived of the opportunity of studying the Korean language for a long time. But witnesses insist that the driving force behind the switch to the Russian-language education were the Koreans themselves. In our view, such an opinion deserves at least some credit because the number of Korean schools has been declining since the early 1950s (Table 1). It is likely that the Korean parents chose for their children a realistic schooling path leading to them becoming engineers, doctors, and professors. In addition, the absence of the diplomatic relations between the USSR and the Republic of Korea probably made them feel that returning to their homeland is rather unlikely any time soon. We assume that perhaps rational and pragmatic decisions prevailed over the emotional motives for education in the native language. It was no lesser a process of assimilation.

6 Echoes of Globalization

From 1963 to the 1970s, there was no Korean school in Sakhalin but, rather, a mixed medium of instruction system. In the cities, the Korean language was not taught because there was not enough demand for it. Because of its importance in Russian and Soviet society, Korean parents sent their children to study in schools with Russian as the medium of instruction (Lee 2011). As argued earlier, this was a period of assimilation into the Soviet community and culture; the younger generations were increasingly at ease with the Russian culture and did not care much about being proficient in the Korean language.

Language is generally regarded as the most significant symbol of ethnicity, and, consequently, linguistic assimilation is considered to be a reliable indicator of ethnic assimilation (Holmes 2008). Since cultural values and identity are transmitted from generation to generation, the degree to which younger generations can speak their mother tongue is an indicator of the likelihood of the intergenerational continuity of ethnic culture and identity (Yoon 2000). By 1990, some two-thirds of Sakhalin Koreans had limited or no knowledge of their ancestors' language, but somehow the Korean cultural heritage survived in the island.

Having realized the challenging task to educate the Korean population, the Soviet authorities made significant progress. The opening of Korean schools for people of all ages has led to the elimination of illiteracy. The national policy of the USSR stemmed from the fact that the Korean people learned their native language. As a result, in 1959, 93.8% of all Koreans called Korean their mother tongue, and Russian, 6%. In the same breath, 59.4% of the Korean population mentioned

Russian as a second language. However, by the time of Perestroika, 63.2% of the Koreans named Russian as their native language, but according to the 2002 Census, Russian was considered a native language by 99.3% Koreans, and merely 0.7% regarded Korean as their native language (Din 2014, p. 195).

Therefore, during the period of Perestroika in the 1980s, both the Russians and Koreans saw with uneasiness the decline in Korean language proficiency. The process of restoring Korean schools in Sakhalin began with the resumption of teaching in the Korean language. This became possible only after 1985, as a result of radical socioeconomic and political reforms in Russia outlining changes within and without the sphere of international relations. State policy toward ethnic groups changed and became, in a way, more democratic.

In 1987, the Korean language newspaper *The Leninist Path* began to receive letters from young Sakhalin Koreans who asked to open schools, start courses, and introduce other forms of learning the Korean language. In March 1988, a special group was organized to produce Korean textbooks. This group involved people who knew Korean and could still speak the language: Sin Dyun Mo (an editor of a local Korean newspaper), Kim Hwa Soon (a director of a Korean broadcasting department), Pak Dyan Ne (a journalist), and Kim Soo Man (Korean Broadcasting journalist), among others (Pak 2007).

In 1988, an elective course of the Korean language was introduced in the Secondary School No. 9 with the support of Korean public activists. Similar elective courses were introduced in secondary schools of other Sakhalin towns and villages. Later, a training course – "The Korean Language" – was implemented in the secondary school curricula and aroused great interest among the Korean population. In 1989, the first NGO "Society of separated families of Sakhalin region" was registered. Meanwhile and throughout the USSR, Russian Koreans' access to higher education was above Russian average (Table 2).

The Association of Sakhalin Koreans was established in a conference organized by Korean diaspora representatives in 1990. In the following year, the Federal Government accepted the plan of stabilization and development of the education system, which created additional conditions to study native languages, including Korean. Many young Koreans began to study their ancestors' language as several schools started teaching Korean as a second language. The Korean language was introduced in the curricula of 12 schools in the Sakhalin region in 1991. A year later, a secondary school offering intensive Asian language studies and cultural studies in the capital Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk received the once abandoned status of "Korean School." In this school, the Korean language is obligatory from year 2.

Today, the Korean language is taught in nine secondary schools in different modalities such as a compulsory second foreign language course and an elective course. The total number of students studying Korean is about 1000 and increasing every year (Lim 2012). However, the process of teaching the Korean language experienced a number of difficulties. There were very little professional educators with appropriate philological education among Korean language teachers. In order to tackle this problem, the Teachers Training Institute of Sakhalin organized special courses with instructors invited from North Korea as mentors in 1988.

Table 2 Level of Education by *nationalities* in the USSR

Nationality	Total number with higher education
1. Jewish[a]	561
2. Korean[b]	249
3. Georgian	195
4. Armenian	163
5. Kalmyk[a]	145
6. Yakut[a]	144
7. Russian	138
8. Kazakh	119
9. Azerbaijanian	116
10. Ukrainian	108
11. Belarusian	107
12. Uzbek	90
13. Tatar[a]	92
14. Tadjik	79
15. Chuvash[a]	74

Census of 1989 (per 1000) Adapted from Viktor Krieger (2006, p. 260)

[a]Data extrapolated to the particular nationality's population throughout the entire USSR

[b]Data from Kazakhstan and extrapolated to entire Korean population in the USSR. The Korean population of Kazakhstan was 103,100 in 1989

The Korean language and other related subjects began to be taught in higher education institutions of the Sakhalin region. In 1988, the Faculty of History of the Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk State Pedagogical Institute (now the Sakhalin State University) began training students majoring in History and Korean Language (Bok 1993). The History Department of the same university was transformed into an independent Department of Asian Languages which was headed by Professor Bok Zi Kou. Later in December 1991, the Institute of Economics and Asian Studies was founded where teachers of the Korean language and experts in the field of literature and the Korean economy are trained. Currently, the Sakhalin State University offers bachelor degrees in the following fields: Korean Language Teacher, Korean Language and Literature, and Korean Economy.

South Korean exchange students constitute the largest international student population at the Sakhalin State University, interacting with Sakhalin Korean communities and facilitating cultural and economic exchange. Local students' interest in mastering the Korean language has increased tremendously, and, conversely, some Sakhalin Korean students also study at South Korean universities.

At the initiative of the Ministry of Education of the Republic of Korea, together with regional and City Board of Education of Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, the Center for Education of the Republic of Korea was established in December 1993. The main objectives of its activities are (Lim 2012, p. 192):

- The organization of an educational institution of general education on the basis of the educational programs of the Republic of Korea
- Training and retraining of teachers of the Korean language
- Acquaintance of Sakhalin population with history and culture of the Republic of Korea
- Holding permanent training seminars for Korean speakers
- Maintaining the connection between schools with Korean language classes and educational institutions of the Republic of Korea
- Organizing training courses for the students of pedagogical college and pedagogical institute

The Korean Cultural Center (*Koreisky kulturnyi Tsentr*) was opened in 2006, and it organizes classes of Korean national music, dances, sport, and games. The Center supports studies of the Korean language, culture, and history, catering to students who are planning to continue their education in South Korea. Both the Center for Education and the Korean Cultural Center have become an important bridge between Sakhalin Koreans and their historical homeland, their ethnic culture, language, and history.

More public organizations and NGOs for Sakhalin Koreans were organized in and around 2010. They play a significant role in the revival of the native language and culture. The current third generation of Sakhalin Koreans congregate somewhere near the Korean Cultural Center in smaller groups, often formed by membership and affiliation to organizations such as a church. South Korean Christian missionaries built about ten protestant churches in the southern Sakhalin creating a space for the third-generation Sakhalin Koreans. About 20–25% of them attend these churches. In 1993, a private religious institution Sam Yuk was founded with the support of South Korean pastors. The institute trains local interpreters to assist South Korean pastors.

Regarding the media and communication, the Sakhalin Korean community owns a newspaper. The "New Korean newspaper" (*Se Koryo Sinmun*) in the Korean language has been in circulation for more than 60 years. Its name was "Korean Worker" between 1949 and 1961 and the "The Leninist Path" between 1961 and 1991. The newspaper's circulation currently stands at 1500. The number of readers has been dwindling due to the attrition and/or outflow of the older generation of Koreans on the repatriation program to South Korea.

In 2004, the state TV and radio channel established a broadcasting group to conduct programs in the Korean language. The Korean language broadcasts had existed in Sakhalin since 1956, but it had been created to promote the Communist ideology. From Perestroika onward, the main focus of the Korean radio has changed to the problems of Sakhalin Koreans, such as the restoration of spiritual and cultural ties with their historic homeland, reunion of separated families, and the revival of language and traditions. However, due to financial difficulties, television broadcasting in the Korean language was suspended only to resume on August 15, 2004. The Korean channel broadcasts, in both Russian and Korean, news, talk shows, and documentaries about the history and culture of Korea.

Thus, the existing formal and informal education influence the ethnic and cultural revival of the young Sakhalin Koreans despite the fact that many have already lost their native language and cultural traditions. The situation of the third-generation Sakhalin Koreans has changed and is changing. They show a growing interest in knowing more about their roots. Were they to encounter their cultural, linguistic, and educational past and future, they would with a mix of light and darkness.

7 Discussion and Conclusions

Koreans in the Russian Sakhalin Island are mostly South Koreans who were conscripted to work in the resource-rich island during the Japanese colonial rule. After the surrender of Japan in 1945, Sakhalin Koreans were unable to return home due to Soviet economic interests to keep them as workers. They underwent various types of acculturation, namely, separation, marginalization, assimilation, and, currently, integration (Berry 2003). Formal schooling and public education were the main tools of the assimilation policy under the veneer of Soviet citizens' rights stipulated in the Constitutions of 1936 and 1977. This chapter examined history and education of Sakhalin Koreans and discusses the conditions of interaction between Koreans and the host society as well as with "mainland" Russian Koreans. Unlike the Soviet Korean rice farmers in Central Asia who were mass deported from the Primore region of the Russian Far East by Stalin in 1937, the Sakhalin Koreans in the southern Korean peninsula arrived on the island as citizenship-less colonial subjects of Japan, which was in dire need of manpower to exploit the natural resources to sustain the Pacific War. This chapter made a critical review of the history, social context, education, and language of the Sakhalin Koreans.

Our findings indicate that Sakhalin Koreans underwent different types and periods of acculturation (Berry 2003). Under the Japanese colonial rule, Sakhalin Koreans were first marginalized, separated, and then assimilated via Japanese post-Meiji colonial education. After the handover to the Soviet Union in 1945, Sakhalin Koreans were denied of repatriation (while Japanese subjects were allowed) and retained sine die on the island as labor force, "not as humans but working limbs," to borrow from critical Latin-Americanist Jose Carlos Mariátegui (2008 [1928]). Sakhalin Koreans were neither Japanese colonial subjects nor Russians, and they were in a limbo between the Cold War politics and integration/assimilation to the local society.

Education received by the Sakhalin Korean children was merely at the service of Soviet efforts of indigenization or "enrooting" (*Koretnizatziia*), which was arguably a politically correct and distilled form of assimilation called "Russification" that can be traced back to Imperial Russia. Russification was overt in the Tsarist education system. The 1936 Constitution of the USSR, under which the language education policy in Sakhalin was implemented, also guaranteed racial equality and education in the native language (Supreme Soviet of the USSR 1936, Art. 121). However, rather tragically, such rights were largely denied to the Soviet Korean students.

When Sakhalin Korean children were allowed to use their native language, they were being segregated from the mainstream society; when pushed to use the Russian language in formal schooling, they were being assimilated.

The 1977 Constitution of the USSR also guaranteed racial equality and education in the native language. Nigel Grant pointed out that, in practice, the intermediate to small size ethnic minorities did not enjoy these rights (1979). Therefore, it could be argued that under the veneer of the constitutional rights (both in 1936 and 1977), the Soviet "liberal language policy" in Sakhalin was ultimately a lip service. From 1938 to 1982, that is, from Stalin to Brezhnev, a policy of assimilation was imposed on them and irreversibly so.

In his proposal of the "New economy of power relations," Foucault suggested possible managerial strategies, hence *economy*, for resistance or struggle against power (1983). To resist extant power forms, he argued, there is a need to rationally analyze power from antagonistic positions. In other words, analyzing power is to be done not from an authority position but from a horizontal position, and by looking at concrete effects of power exerted. Furthermore, the struggle should be against a static conception or abstractions of individuals as well as the effects of power such as knowledge production, competence, and qualifications in the field of education. In this regard, the case presented in this chapter is also a caution call for academics in the field to critically examine the very knowledge we generate about ethnicity and identity when they are intersected with power establishment and social mobility.

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