Education in the Asia-Pacific Region: Issues, Concerns and Prospects 46

Akiyoshi Yonezawa · Yuto Kitamura
Beverley Yamamoto · Tomoko Tokunaga
Editors

Japanese Education in a Global Age

Sociological Reflections and Future Directions

UNEVOC Network Member
ASIA-PACIFIC EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH ASSOCIATION
Springer

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Volume 46

More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/5888

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ISSN 1573-5397 ISSN 2214-9791 (electronic)
Education in the Asia-Pacific Region: Issues, Concerns and Prospects
ISBN 978-981-13-1527-5 ISBN 978-981-13-1528-2 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-1528-2

Library of Congress Control Number: 2018951609

This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd.
The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore

Foreword: The Development of Research on Japanese Education in a Global Age

In 1989, Edward R. Beauchamp and Richard Rubinger, two doyens of the field, published *Education in Japan: A Source Book* (Garland Publishing, New York and London) which they described as a 'comprehensive' annotated bibliography of the most important works published in English on the topic of Japanese education. In those pre-Internet days, their source book immediately became something of a bible, particularly for those interested in understanding Japanese education and its relationship with the development of Japanese society which, by the late 1980s, was confidently predicted to be the number one economy in the world by the end of the millennium. Indeed, it was the increased interest in this relationship between Japanese education and economy which the authors believed had led to 'an explosion of scholarly interest in Japanese education (which) multiplied the number of articles and books on the subject far beyond what they were in 1970s'.

In total Beauchamp and Rubinger's book had 989 entries. It is interesting to look back at exactly what those less than 1000 entries included since it demonstrates just how the study of Japanese education has developed since. The entries, for example, included nonacademic primary sources – such as translations of the eleventh century like *The Tale of Genji* and *The Pillow Book* of Sei Shōnagon and the novels of Tōson Shimazaki written in the early twentieth century about the late Tokugawa and Meiji periods – which the editors believed were helpful for understanding the development of Japanese educational thought. The book also included many government reports, general surveys and personal diaries going back to the 1870s as well as unpublished doctoral dissertations and articles printed in university department bulletins (*kiyō*). As a result, the number of entries in the bibliography that could be described as both academic and primarily focussed on Japanese education was probably no more than a hundred: 30 to 40 monographs, 10 to 15 edited volumes with chapters on aspects of Japanese society, 30 to 40 articles published in journals (some of which no longer exist) which specialised on either Japan alone or Asia more generally and around 10 articles in mainstream English language journals such as *Comparative Education*, *Comparative Education Review*, *Harvard Educational Review*, *History of Education Quarterly* and *International Review of Education*. The number of academics working on Japanese education was, of course, even smaller. The major contributors working inside Japan on the list were Amano Ikuo, Kitamura Kazuyuki, Kobayashi Tetsuya, Nagai Michio and Shimahara Nobuo, while the leading authors who based outside Japan were Edward Beauchamp, William Cummings, Ronald Dore, Benjamin Duke, Herbert Passin, Thomas Rohlen and Hiroshi Wagatsuma. Between them, these 12 (all men) were responsible for the vast majority of the scholarly works in Beauchamp and Rubinger's list.

It would, of course, be impossible to publish a comprehensive annotated bibliography of works on Japanese education today, even if it was focussed only on those in scholarly journals and from academic presses. As we can see from the Chap. 14 by Okitsu, Yagi and Kitamura in this volume, there has not only been a very considerable growth in the publication of works by non-Japanese scholars on Japanese education over the past 20 years but also in the publication of work in English and in mainstream journals by Japanese scholars of Japanese education in the same period. The reasons for this growth in publication in two communities have some important overlapping features.

In part, it reflects the growth of the number of scholars who are comfortable working in both the Japanese and English language. Foreigners who could work comfortably in Japanese in the 1980s were still considered an exotic rarity, and Japanese who were completely bilingual at that time sometimes said that they did not feel fully incorporated into Japanese institutions where overseas qualifications still had less status than local ones. That language gap, however, has shrunk hugely in recent years for a number of reasons: the growth in teaching of Japanese at high schools across the globe, the Japan English Teaching Scheme (JETS) which has brought tens of thousands of young graduates to work in Japanese educational institutions over the past 30 years, and the huge growth, particularly in the 1990s and early 2000s, of Japanese students going overseas to study, particularly at graduate level. The personal biographies of many of the authors of the chapters in this volume reflect these factors.

Another part of the explanation for the development of scholarly work on Japanese education lies in the increasing sophistication in the study of comparative education itself. Until the late 1980s, comparative education was often a 'Cook's Tour' of different education systems. While this often presented detailed accounts of the economic, political and social forces which had led to the development of each education system in its own right, it was very rare for systems to be systematically compared with each other. Comparative education as a field very largely lacked the methodological and theoretical tools to do this. This explains in part the huge interest in those works which did try to be explicitly and rigorously comparative, such as Ronald Dore's *The Diploma Disease* published in the mid-1970s. As the chapters in this volume show, those working on Japanese education have become in recent years much more theoretically and methodologically sophisticated. Almost every chapter in this volume draws significantly for their arguments on important theoretical works which were not designed originally for the study of Japanese education.

A third part of the explanation for the growing significance of work on Japanese education lies in its policy orientation. While most academics inside and outside

Japan in the 1980s did not feel it necessary to see a link between their work and policy, preferring to stick to what they saw as blue skies rather than commissioned research, scholars of education these days feel much more comfortable including a policy dimension in their work. Some of the authors of papers in this volume such as Takehiko Kariya and Akiyoshi Yonezawa have worked closely with the Japanese Ministry of Education in various roles over the years. It could indeed be argued that all of the papers in this volume have policy implications. These include the impact of low public expenditure on educational inequality, the early development of universal education in Japan, how the education system interacts with pupils' gender identities, how the school-to-work system of the pre-1980s was upset by the economic problems of the 1990s and subsequent decades, policies for absenteeism, the need to internationalise Japanese higher education, the experience of immigrant children, the role of the government in teacher education and the role of education in developing entrepreneurship. Behind all of these questions lies another much more simple set of questions which drives all social, economic and political policy in Japan these days: how to increase productivity in a population which both is rapidly ageing and declining in size and where human beings, more specifically children, are the only natural resource and education the only tool that government has completely in its own hands, particularly as the world moves away from the path of globalisation which has served Japan, with its export economy, almost better than any other country for the past 50 years. As Nakamura points out on his paper in this volume, the fact that these questions are not articulated clearly in many of the papers in this volume is only because they are so taken for granted by all those who work on Japan.

The editors of *Japanese Education in a Global Age* set out to 'promote international discussion concerning sociological studies in education among researchers, educators and policy decision makers by adding cases from Japan that have hitherto tended to be invisible to the world'. I would argue that they succeed not only in doing this but actually have also put down a marker of what the sociology of Japanese education can offer to broader theoretical and policy insights. It may be – for the simplistic reason that the Japanese economy is not doing as well as it was then – that the general English language readership is not quite as interested in Japanese education per se as it was in the 1980s when Beauchamp and Rubinger published their source book. The papers in this volume suggest, however, that an academic audience of students and scholars should be much more interested than it was previously in the sociology of Japanese education and what insights from Japan can contribute to broader sociological analysis and practice. I believe therefore that this volume will become a new source book for the third decade of the twenty-first century just as Beauchamp and Rubinger's book became a bible for those of us who were working on Japanese education in the last decade of the last century.

University of Oxford Roger Goodman
Oxford, UK
22 December 2017

Series Editors Introduction

This volume by Akiyoshi Yonezawa, Yuto Kitamura, Beverley Yamamoto and Tomoko Tokunaga on *Japanese Education in a Global Age: Sociological Reflections and Future Directions* is the latest book to be published in the long-standing Springer book series *Education in the Asia-Pacific Region: Issues, Concerns and Prospects*. The first volume in this Springer series was published in 2002, with this book by Yonezawa et al. being the 46th volume to be published to date.

This 17-chapter book, which contains chapters from some of Japan's most eminent scholars, is an important, up-to-date contribution to the available research literature on education in Japan and provides a sociology of Japanese education.

It provides information, from a mainly sociology of education perspective, on key aspects of education and schooling in Japan; topics covered include educational inequality, school-to-work transitions for Japanese youth, the academic profession and universities in Japan, rethinking the educational research agenda in Japan for a global age, the educational experience of immigrant students, new pathways to economic participation through education and schooling and the radical reform of teacher education.

This book will be of particular interest to those interested in understanding Japanese education, and its interrelationship with the development of Japanese society. Part of the explanation for the growing significance of research being undertaken on Japanese education occurs as a result of its strong and well-focused policy orientation.

In terms of the Springer book series in which this volume is published, the various topics dealt with in the series are wide ranging and varied in coverage, with an emphasis on cutting-edge developments, best practices and education innovations for development. Topics examined in the series include environmental education and education for sustainable development; the interaction between technology and education; the reform of primary, secondary and teacher education; innovative approaches to education assessment; alternative education; most effective ways to achieve quality and highly relevant education for all; active ageing through active learning; case studies of education and schooling systems in various countries in the region; cross-country and cross-cultural studies of education and schooling; and the sociology of teachers as an occupational group, to mention just a few. More information about this book series is available at http://www.springer.com/series/6969.

All volumes in this series aim to meet the interests and priorities of a diverse education audience including researchers, policymakers and practitioners, tertiary students, teachers at all levels within education systems and members of the public who are interested in better understanding cutting-edge developments in education and schooling in Asia-Pacific region.

The reason why this book series has been devoted exclusively to examining various aspects of education and schooling in the Asia-Pacific region is that this is a particularly challenging region which is renowned for its size, diversity and complexity, whether it be geographical, socio-economic, cultural, political or developmental. Education and schooling in countries throughout the region impact on every aspect of people's lives, including employment, labour force considerations, education and training, cultural orientation, and attitudes and values. Asia and the Pacific are home to some 63% of the world's population of 7 billion. Countries with the largest populations (China, 1.4 billion; India, 1.3 billion) and the most rapidly growing megacities are to be found in the region, as are countries with relatively small populations (Bhutan, 755,000; the island of Niue, 1,600).

Levels of economic and socio-political development vary widely, with some of the richest countries (such as Japan) and some of the poorest countries on the earth (such as Bangladesh). Asia contains the largest number of poor of any region in the world, the incidence of those living below the poverty line remaining as high as 40% in some countries in Asia. At the same time, many countries in Asia are experiencing a period of great economic growth and social development. However, inclusive growth remains elusive, as does growth that is sustainable and does not destroy the quality of the environment. The growing prominence of Asian economies and corporations, together with globalisation and technological innovation, is leading to long-term changes in trade, business and labour markets, to the sociology of populations within (and between) countries. There is a rebalancing of power, centred on Asia-Pacific region, with the Asian Development Bank in Manila declaring that the twenty-first century will be 'the Century of Asia-Pacific'.

We believe this book series makes a useful contribution to knowledge sharing about education and schooling in Asia-Pacific region. Any readers of this or other volumes in the series who have an idea for writing their own book (or editing a book) on any aspect of education and/or schooling, that is relevant to the region, are enthusiastically encouraged to approach the series editors either direct or through Springer to publish their own volume in the series, since we are always willing to assist perspective authors shape their manuscripts in ways that make them suitable for publication in this series.

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Chapter 1
Introduction: Japanese Education in a Global Age

Akiyoshi Yonezawa, Yuto Kitamura, Beverley A. Yamamoto, and Tomoko Tokunaga

Abstract This introductory chapter clarifies the aims, framework, and outline of the book. The book aims to highlight the forefront of Japan's education research through sociological and other related research approaches to historical developments and accomplishments provided mostly by members of the Japan Society of Educational Sociology (JSES). Japanese education exhibits unique dynamics among policy, demand, and supply. Sociologists and other social scientists in education in Japan have approached this issue mainly focusing on familial relationships, equity, and poverty. This chapter focuses on educational research phenomena which are possibly unique to Japan to many international readers. This includes global and regional policy and social trends such as neoliberalism, mobility, and the diffusion of ICT medias, while the reactions of researchers and society against these trends have often been different from other countries. It is hoped that this collection will contribute to the international debate on education and help sociologists and a wider range of social scientists outside of Japan gain a precise comprehension of ongoing changes in education in Japan as well as its historical and structural contexts.

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A. Yonezawa et al. (eds.), *Japanese Education in a Global Age*, Education in the Asia-Pacific Region: Issues, Concerns and Prospects 46,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-1528-2_1

1.1 The "Uniqueness" of Japanese Education

In the 1980s and 1990s, Japanese education garnered world attention as its students consistently outperformed those of other countries, including those of Western nations, in a variety of subjects. At this time, Japanese education appeared unique – even somewhat mysterious – given that the main points of comparison were with educational systems of Western nations. Today, Japan continues to rank highly among most other countries in terms of outcomes from international testing, such as PISA and TIMSS scores, demonstrating the strength of its primary and lower secondary education systems. Yet, keeping its place within the top 5 or 6 nations in different components of these tests has involved concerted effort and policymaking as Japan competes with high-performing Asian neighbors such as Singapore, South Korea, China, and India. A focus on test performance has also taken attention away from other important areas of education.

Japan's high level of scientific achievement at the higher education level is also evident in the number of Nobel and other international prizes awarded to its researchers. Japanese institutions of higher education were, until recently, considered to be leading the way in Asia, but universities in Singapore, China, and South Korea have been focusing considerable resources to gain a firm foothold at the top of global rankings. Japan has been less strategic in this area, especially when it comes to internationalization, resulting in its top institutions competing less well than perhaps would be expected for world class recognition and prestige status (Ishikawa 2009, 2014).

In this volume, our argument is that Japanese education warrants further international attention, not so much on the basis of rather simplistic arguments of its "uniqueness" but more so by engaging in careful analyses and a wider international dialogue on education. In particular, we identify noteworthy dynamics in the field of education between policy and related supply and demand sides of the equation. From the policy perspective, Japan has been highly engaged with international trends in education, often borrowing in a game of educational "catch-up." In contrast, from the supply side of teachers, school leaders, and administrators, there has been a highly local or domestic focus. Those involved in the training of teachers and studying school-based pedagogy also exist within a relatively closed system. If we consider the demand side of the equation – i.e., students, parents, and business – this has become more diversified over the past decades, adding another area of tension in the system between dynamism and lethargy and between international engagement and sticking to inherited cultural tradition.

Sociologists and other social scientists in Japan have approached the education field by paying particular attention to three issues that impact the policy, supply, and demand sides of the equation, namely, familial relationships and equity (mostly relative), poverty, and the social safety net. Even recognizing that at the level of supply the system of educational provision is somewhat insular, we recognize the profound influence of broader socioeconomic and technological trends that are impacting education, including global and regional policy, the rise of neoliberalism as a dominating discourse, global and regional mobility, and the diffusion of information, communication, and technology (ICT) media.

This volume focuses on research in the sociology of Japanese education, hoping to discover and make the results of scholarly activities available to international readers. As a result, we hope that this volume, with contributions from a wide variety of authors working in the field of Japanese education, will open up new conversations at the international level. It is our wish to promote international discussion concerning sociological studies in education among researchers, educators, and policy decision-makers by adding cases from Japan that have hitherto tended to be invisible to the world. By focusing on educational research and other phenomena that are particular to the Japanese context but that resonate beyond borders, we expect that this collection will contribute to the international debate on education and help sociologists and a wider range of social scientists outside of Japan gain a precise comprehension of ongoing changes in education in Japan as well as its historical and structural context.

1.2 Aims, Frameworks, and Approaches

This introductory chapter sets out to clarify the aims, theoretical frameworks, and structural organization of the book. In putting together this collection of manuscripts, the editors have sought to showcase the work of leading scholars in the field of the sociology of education in Japan or of those working in Japan. As an anniversary edition celebrating 70 years of the Japan Society of Educational Sociology (JSES), it also serves to highlight historical developments as well as contemporary accomplishments that have been generated by JSES members. The JSES has long functioned as one of the main forums for sociological and social science research on education in Japan.

A number of exciting volumes focusing on Japanese education from social science perspectives have appeared in recent years, including Stephens (1991), Okano (1999), Gordon et al. (2009), and Decoker and Christopher (2013). This current volume not only builds on these important works but adds greatly to extant literature by giving voice to prominent scholars in education who do not usually publish in English. The breadth and depth of coverage of Japanese education across the 15 chapters and 2 columns is another feature worth highlighting as we introduce the reader to this new scholarship on Japanese education.

In theorizing the tensions between dynamism and lethargy in Japanese education, we see that we have constructed an interactive triangle of policy, supply, and demand that also reveals a tension between "global" and "local" (Fig. 1.1). We argue throughout this volume that the dynamics exhibited by the policy, supply, and demand sides of the education triangle help to explain contemporary and observable outcomes and dilemmas. At the center of the triangle are specific topics for consideration that have been keenly focused upon by sociologists of education: family,



Fig. 1.1 The Japanese educational dilemma

equity, poverty, and safety net. We would now like to elaborate on these three points in the triangle before moving on.

Japan has maintained and developed a high level of connectivity to international policy trends. This has been realized largely through voluntary policy borrowings in a bid to "catch up" up with the West, which has involved a dynamic process of translation, discussion, introduction, and, in some cases, adoption of policy trends by education experts, including scholars in the sociology of education.

In contrast to the dynamism of the policy side, we note that the supply side of education in Japan has been somewhat inflexible, unchangeable, and self-contained, partly due to the closed mobility system surrounding teachers and school leadership who are locally hired, (re)located, and/or promoted. We also note the lack of an outward orientation among academics in the field of education. These tendencies have been strengthened by a highly centralized education system, where rather strong direct and indirect controls by the national government have resulted in standardization rather than diversification and innovation. At the same time, with the emergence of mass upper secondary and higher education systems and a dwindling school and college population, expectations for schooling, testing, and selection are in a state of flux.

Focusing on the demand side of the education equation, namely, learners, families (parents), and business (employers), we note a rapid diversification that is creating its own dynamism. The security attached to education and employment, perceived to be meritocratic and providing equal opportunities, has been undermined by forces of neoliberalism and globalization. The belief that "hard work" in school will lead to "a better life" through entrance to a "good school" and a "good university," which in turn would lead to a "well-paid position" in a "good company" for men and a "good marriage" that would bring affluence and security for women, is more fragile that it had been two or three decades ago. A well-documented transformation has taken place over the past two decades that has resulted in segmentation, individualization, and widening inequalities as Japan laments the emergence of a "gap society" (*kakusa shakai*). Competition in this system and the costs of being a "loser" rather than a "winner" in a gap society are now all too evident to young people and their families. Given the extent of inequality of opportunity in such a system (Ishida 2007), some have a higher disposition to becoming "losers" than others in an emerging cycle of underachievement.

At the same time, corporations exposed to competition both locally and globally are demanding that education create global *jinzai* or global human resources. While in the past, companies wanted to hire young people who come as "blank pieces of paper," trainable as generalists to fit into a specific corporate culture, today an expectation of prior training is falling on schools and institutions to fulfill. Indeed, today, corporations are rather demanding that school and college graduates arrive with skills and competencies that will give them an edge in both local and global competition. Given the above dynamic socioeconomic environment, there is a discernable gap between the demand side and supply side, whereas national policy is not effectively responding to this dilemma.

Given the changed circumstances surrounding Japanese education at all three points in the triangle and heightened concerns about equity, poverty, and safety net, the chapters of this volume grapple with the implications of this dynamic discursive and physical environment. Each chapter employs sociological or more general social scientific approaches to highlight what Japanese education looks like and how it has been evolving in a global age. The authors argue for dramatic changes in how we think, talk about, research and deliver education in Japan. We call for greater participation in discussion and decision-making of all stakeholders both on the supply and demand sides of education.

Over several decades, as noted above, due partly to Japan's excellent performance in various international academic achievement tests, Japanese education, particularly school education, has been highly appraised in the global community. Moreover, as the first country to achieve modernization through the intake of Western civilization in Asia, Japan has led other non-Western countries in establishing a modern, merit-based education system that includes higher education and social education. Needless to say, Japanese education has had its share of problems, and many educators have continued tireless efforts to find ways to ensure higher-quality and more effective educational practices to realize the well-being of children and citizens. While Japan shares a number of common educational problems with other industrialized countries and Asian countries, there are also a number of educational phenomena (or educational maladies) that are often considered as being uniquely Japanese or noteworthy compared with other countries.

For many years, the sociology of education, a discipline that bridges research and practice through clear analytical frameworks and evidence, has produced various studies concerning diverse phenomena in Japanese education. Some of these studies have had enormous influence on educational policies and systems. However, much of the research output by sociologists and social scientists of education working in Japan is written in the Japanese language. Consequently, these important works have received limited international recognition; therefore, the scope of these works has tended to be limited to a domestic (i.e., Japanese) audience. To change this situation, this collection of papers is designed to present the latest accomplishments and ongoing frontier research in the sociology of education in Japan, which so far has not been sufficiently well connected to international academia.

1.3 Organization of the Book

In Chap. 1, this book opens with key features within the field of the social sciences and the study of Japanese education. Here, the editors of this volume, Akiyoshi Yonezawa, Yuto Kitamura, Beverley Yamamoto, and Tomoko Tokunaga, outline their reasons, goals, and perspectives for putting together this coedited volume on the achievements and future prospects of Japan's sociology of education research. Following this introductory chapter, the book is comprised of 3 parts, including 14 chapters and 2 columns. The columns are written by scholars based outside of Japan and provide "outsider" perspectives into critical themes and issues in the sociology of education and related fields linked with contemporary education and society in Japan.

Part I focuses on the ways in which social scientists have discussed Japan's education policies. Through comparative, sociological and historical analysis, this section gives a somewhat "macro" overview of the changing dynamics of Japanese education. In Chap. 2, Wataru Nakazawa looks through a comparative lens and discusses the reasons for the low public expenditure on education in Japan, focusing on Japanese attitudes toward social inequality and government policy. Through analyzing data from the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) 2009 module that focused on social inequality, his chapter illuminates how Japanese perceptions toward public education have led to low public education expenditure and a high private financial burden for education.

Drawing on historical resources and quantitative and qualitative data, Chap. 3 by Shinichi Aizawa traces the historical process of Japanese educational expansion and universal participation over the last 150 years. This chapter examines how and why Japan, as a non-Western country, achieved early universalization in all stages of schooling. Aizawa points out two significant turning points that led to the development of the present Japanese education system and society, arguing that Japan became a "schooled" society in the 1970s.

In Chap. 4, Jeremy Rappleye examines sociological research on Japanese education and proposes an alternative research agenda for Japanese sociology of education scholars as they take part in the global conversation on education. Rappleye suggests that scholars shift away from similarity/difference discussions and center instead on de-axialization, interconnectivity, and relationality in research analysis.

Part II delves into specific topics in the field of the sociology of education and describes various challenges Japanese education faces today. This section provides examples of a widening gap and dilemma between demand side and supply side as mentioned earlier.

In Chap. 5, Ayumi Miyazaki provides "qualitative threads" of gender and sexuality studies in the sociology of education, focusing specifically on gender and sexual issues in school. Miyazaki illuminates how research has shifted from traditional gender and education studies that focused on gender disparity and construction to contemporary studies on gender multiplicities, sexualities, and intersectionalities. She suggests that gender studies scholars develop a more intersectional research approach and take an active role and position in theoretically contributing to the sociology of education.

Chapter 6, authored by Yukie Hori and Yuri Nakajima, explores contemporary features of the transition from high school and university to work among Japanese youth. The authors argue that the once stable and efficient Japanese school-to-work transition system destabilized in the mid-1990s with a diminished labor market for high school graduates, increased labor demand for college graduates, and a lack of mobility among young people from rural areas to urban areas.

Sachiko Horiguchi, in Chap. 7, focuses on the issue of school nonattendance (*futoko*) and explores how it has been framed and discussed in postwar Japan. This chapter illuminates dynamic and shifting discourses and practices around school absenteeism, ranging from positive to negative, and blaming that focuses on society/schools and/or the individual. Horiguchi describes the emergence of diverse alternative education opportunities and problematizes the lack of discussion on socioeconomic and racial/ethnic factors that lead to long-term school absence.

In Chap. 8, Akiyoshi Yonezawa, Arthur Meerman, and Min Li examine the development of the academic profession and describe how social scientists grapple with challenges that Japanese higher education faces in the midst of societal changes such as population aging, globalization, and a shift to the knowledge-based economy. The authors argue for the significance of nurturing international connectivity among social scientists who conduct research on academic professions.

Drawing on qualitative data, Chap. 9, authored by Tomoko Tokunaga, Misako Nukaga, and Fumiko Takahashi, focuses on the educational experiences of second-generation immigrants in Japan, specifically Filipino youth, and explores their diverging acculturation patters and academic trajectories. The authors describe the emergence of academically successful Filipino immigrant students who manage to preserve their ethnic culture while achieving upward mobility. They emphasize the importance of acknowledging youth social networks and often invisible local educational support such as local government policies, international classes, and NGOs/NPOs that contribute to educational outcomes of immigrant students.

Sawako Yufu and Ryoji Matsuoka, in Chap. 10, examine teacher education reforms over the past few decades and specifically analyze the Central Council on Education Report 184 that focuses on teacher education and training. The authors critically posit that the reforms fail to contribute to professionalization of teachers as they devalue academic knowledge and have a strong focus on practicality. The authors further question the increase of national control in recent teacher education reforms as this potentially disempowers teachers and weakens oppositional movements.

In Chap. 11, Hideki Maruyama illustrates changes that have occurred in and out-of-school settings since the Great North Eastern Earthquake of 2011. Maruyama discusses the fast recovery of the school system in the affected areas, following joint efforts by national and local governments, teachers, and NPOs. He describes how schools improved disaster education in collaboration with community members and education researchers and emphasizes the changing role of education scholars as they commit to the recovery process.

Column 1 (Chap. 12) by Tuukka Toivonen and Agata Kapturkiewicz presents alternative pathways of economic participation for Japanese youth through the youth support services and entrepreneurship supported by startup communities. The column provides new ways of understanding youth employment, the labor market, and the lifestyles of the rising generation.

Part III discusses the challenges and hopes of Japan's sociology of education as it crosses national, cultural, and linguistic boundaries and borders. In Chap. 13, Beverley Yamamoto critically and reflexively examines the rhetoric and realities of internationalization policies and practices in Japanese higher education. Drawing on research and her unique position as an internationalization provocateur, she provides nuanced analysis of changes undertaken in universities, such as the rise in the number of incoming international students and expansion of English taught programs, while describing limitations such as an exclusive admission system and the marginal position of foreign faculty members. She concludes that Japanese universities are yet to reach inclusive form of internationalization as they maintain elitist and nationalistic features.

Chapter 14, authored by Taeko Okitsu, Eriko Yagi, and Yuto Kitamura, expands on their focus on comparative education, international education development, and neighboring fields of sociology of education by analyzing patterns and trends in the publication of articles published by Japanese scholars in leading international journals since 1990. Through the reviewing articles, the authors identify a shift in the role of Japanese scholars, ranging from introducing educational phenomenon in Japan to providing critical analysis of theories and methodologies, diversification of themes and geographical focus, and an increase in research on education in developing countries.

Takayasu Nakamura, in Chap. 15, provides a detailed analysis of the academic development of the field of a Japanese sociology of education, highlighting its achievements over 70 years. Nakamura describes three relationships between Japan's sociology of education and (1) Western sociology, (2) pedagogy, and (3) changes in the society. Given his rich research findings in the field, he proposes that scholars disseminate their research to the international academic community.

Column 2 (Chap. 16) by Jason Chien-chen Chang describes the emergence and recent development of the dialogue and network in the field of sociology of education in East Asia, specifically among scholars in Japan, Taiwan, and China.

Takehiko Kariya, in Chap. 17, as the final chapter, ties up some loose threads by examining the shift from "catch-up" to "post catch-up modernity" in the Japanese educational experience, in a theoretical contribution to social science research globally. The chapter illustrates the paradox of Japanese education reforms and policies developed within a "catching-up" mentality, which has contributed further to educational inequality.

1.4 The Future of Sociology and Education: Our Views

Founded in 1948, the JSES will celebrate its 70th anniversary in 2018. Taking this milestone anniversary as an opportunity, we publish this collection of papers with the aim of communicating internationally the results of studies so far accumulated by members of the JSES and showing the direction that sociology and related social sciences in education are taking – and expected to take – in Japan in years ahead. Today, with its membership nearing 1500, and with a prestigious history and accumulated academic results, the JSES is duly recognized as an outstanding education-related society in Japan. Also internationally, the JSES is one of the largest academic societies specializing in the sociology of education. The JSES, with these advantages, has formulated a plan and gained approval to publish this collection of papers as an organization-wide project. We have no doubt that this alone will make this publication unique and special.

Through editing this book, we discern a need to redefine the role and the position of researchers and experts in education in Japan. The problems and challenges we are facing today in relation to education in Japan need the urgent and deep commitment of education experts, backed up by solid and insightful research. A wider perspective beyond national and local ones should be strengthened both by research and practice in education in this country. Moreover, there is room for scholars to be more reflexive and critical of their identities, perspectives, and positions in conducting research on Japanese education and society, rather than having a "catch-up" mentality and blindly borrowing policies and theories from the "West" and advancing models from the "East."

We hope this book becomes an impetus to initiate open, cross-border, and transnational dialogue among researchers both within and outside of Japan. It is hoped that this collection will contribute to international debate on education and help sociologists and a wider range of social scientists outside of Japan gain a precise comprehension of ongoing changes in education.

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Part I
How Have Japan’s Education Policies Been Discussed by Social Scientists?

Chapter 2
Japanese Public Education: A Comparative Perspective of Attitudes Toward Educational Inequality

Wataru Nakazawa

Abstract This chapter examines Japanese people's attitude toward an educational policy for socially disadvantaged students in order to consider the reasons for the low public spending on education in Japan. Although 1.5% of the country's total GDP is spent on tertiary educational institutions, which is equivalent to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) average, it is the lowest among the OECD countries. Thus, the total expenditure on tertiary education is sustained with the help of large private educational funds. Since educational financial issues are associated with people's attitude toward educational policies, this chapter analyzed the data from the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) by adopting a comparative perspective and specifically focusing on Japan. The results indicated that people with relatively higher socioeconomic status were less likely to recognize inequality in advancing to university; this trend became stronger as public spending on tertiary education increased. In Japan, the trend of socioeconomic background effects was generally in accordance with the comparative analysis. However, there may be a conflict between generations because of the small governmental financial resource in Japan.

2.1 A Low Public Expenditure on Education in Japan?

Before the first oil crisis in 1973, the Japanese government could collect sufficient tax revenue due to the rapid economic growth, although it did not have an adequate tax base. To balance the country's excessive income disparity, the government traditionally adopted a progressive taxation system for income tax. However, the ruling party, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) of Japan, repeatedly lowered taxes to stimulate the economy after the first oil crisis and created a new reduction system to maintain a certain approval rating during the economic slowdown (Miyamoto

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A. Yonezawa et al. (eds.), *Japanese Education in a Global Age*, Education in the Asia-Pacific Region: Issues, Concerns and Prospects 46,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-1528-2_2

2008). In addition, costs for social security and welfare increased with the aging society. These conditions worsened the Japanese government's economy. As a result, the Japanese government's financial circumstances have been poor since the end of the 1970s, although in the 1980s, Japan enjoyed a booming economy while the United States and European countries were in recession.

When Japanese government introduced its universal health insurance and pension coverage system in 1961, the country was in good economic condition and the aging population was small. However, the 1973 oil crisis halted the nation's rapid economic growth, resulting in a shortage of government financial resources. Although the government lowered taxes to encourage consumption, economic circumstances did not improve, and the tax base diminished. If the government were to introduce an indirect tax (such as a consumption tax) to secure stable resources, the subsequent tax revolt would cause it difficulty. Economically speaking, Japan shares some similarities with the United States (Prasad 2012), but the rapidly increasing costs of social security and welfare (due to the country's aging population) have caused the government to face a dead end (Nakazawa 2016). While younger people tend to go to school or university, elderly people are more likely to obtain benefits from social security and welfare programs. If financial resources are limited, conflicts between generations may occur regarding their allocation.

According to statistics from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), among the OECD member states, Japan has one of the lowest rates of public expenditure on education as a percentage of total public expenditure and gross domestic product (GDP) (OECD 2015: 259). Primary, secondary, and post-secondary non-tertiary educational institutions are virtually managed by public funds. As a percentage of GDP, public spending on these institutions is 2.7% (compared to 2.9% of the total expenditure on them), which is below the OECD average of 3.7%. Considering the results of the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) and Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS), we can appreciate the Japanese educational system's low cost, high performance, and efficiency.

The total expenditure on tertiary educational institutions as a percentage of GDP in Japan is 1.5%, which is equivalent to the OECD average. However, public spending on them is extremely low; Japan has the lowest rate of public expenditure on tertiary educational institutions as a percentage of GDP (0.5% of GDP) – except for Luxembourg – among the OECD nations (OECD 2015: 235). The total expenditure on tertiary educational institutions in Japan is kept at the OECD average with the help of large private educational funds.[1]

[1] The United States attracts students from all over the world, and the US government pays a great deal of attention to higher education policy. The percentage of total expenditure on tertiary education relative to GDP was 2.8% in 2012, which is the highest among the OECD member states. When it comes to public expenditure on tertiary education in the United States, this number was 1.4%. This stood in comparison with European countries, including Scandinavian nations. With regard to the high private burden of tertiary education, South Korea was similar to Japan. However, Korean percentage of total expenditure on tertiary education relative to GDP was fourth highest among the OECD member states, followed by the United States, Chile, and Canada (OECD 2015: 228).

When we examine government budgets for tertiary education, we need to consider country size and the number of tertiary educational institutions. Japan has the second largest population and GDP among the OECD countries after the United States. Public spending on education as a percentage of GDP in Japan may be low because the economy is large. In 2012, the amount of public expenditure on tertiary educational institutions could be converted into US dollars using purchasing power parity (PPP) to USD 24,368 million. In comparison, the amount in the United States was prodigious at USD 227,749 million; furthermore, Japan was outdone by Germany, France, Russia, and the United Kingdom.[2]

People's attitudes (e.g., views on fairness and justice) are crucial clues in tackling financial problems because their perceptions may be linked to government policies. Since industrialized wealthy countries could afford to pay for solid welfare programs, it was believed that welfare programs' degree of development had a positive correlation with GDP. However, according to the theory of the welfare regime by Esping-Andersen (1990), the social policy programs did not converge as societies industrialized. Rather, it differentiated into the three types of regimes seen in Western societies (Esping-Andersen 1990). For example, while Scandinavian countries (social democratic regimes) aim for massive welfare programs at the expense of heavy taxes, people in the United States and other Anglo-Saxon countries (liberal regimes) are less likely to demand solid social welfare programs from the government. Rather, social security programs in liberal regimes are market-based and privatized. Continental European nations (conservative regimes) take a moderate approach between the social democratic and liberal regimes.

Of course, it is difficult to say whether there is a causal relationship between people's attitudes and social policies, for example, people's attitudes might lead to the creation of some kinds of social systems, or social institutions might shape people's attitudes toward government policies. In any case, it is safe to say that people's perceptions intertwine with social policies.

It is difficult to locate Japan in Esping-Andersen's welfare regime because the target of his analysis was limited to American and European nations. For example, when considering the small size of government finance, we can see that Japan has an extremely small government like Anglo-Saxon liberal regimes. On the other hand, Japanese citizens generally regard social security and welfare as the government's responsibility. Weak social security and welfare programs are not because of people's requirements. Rather, the government cannot afford to pay for full social security programs due to fragile financial resources. The Japanese government has urged companies to provide employees and their families with fringe benefits. Due to gender roles, women have shouldered the majority of housework (including child-rearing and nursing care), and the government has saved costs for social security and welfare programs. Japan's family-based social security and welfare programs are similar to those of conservative regimes.

In any case, regardless of cost cutting, the aging population has tightened government budgets. As a result, government financial support for families, the poor,

[2] I calculated this based on data from the OECD.

and unemployment have weakened (Tanaka 2013). Education has also been influenced by small budgets and lopsided financial allocation toward the elderly. Politicians do not have any incentives to reduce pensions and raise insurance costs because they are afraid of losing their constituents. Everyone faces the risks of aging, illness, and unexpected events. However, the strong private burden of education has not been a serious political issue in Japan because many people think that parents should pay for their child's education, especially higher education. Japanese people share common beliefs such as "It is the parents' responsibility to pay for their children's education" or "Children thank their parents for paying for their education." Thus, educational expenditure is less likely to be regarded as a public issue. In fact, the proportion of people who think the government should pay for tertiary education is smaller in Japan than in any other industrialized country (Nakazawa 2016; Yano et al. 2016; Yano 2015).

In this chapter, I briefly review the issues relating to educational spending and people's perspectives on tuition fees for higher education, as well as the heavy financial burden of the country's entire educational system, as seen from the viewpoints of Japanese educational sociologists. Then, I reveal the significance of people's perceptions of social inequality. I used data from the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) 2009 module, which focused on inequality. I examine the issues from a comparative angle and specifically analyze the case of Japan. Finally, I discuss the results of my analysis, the limitations of my research, and some potential paths for future research.

2.2 Research Background

2.2.1 Education Finance Issues in the Japanese Sociology of Education

Before the end of World War II, pedagogy in Japan strongly supported militarism and imperialization (*kominka*). However, scholars of pedagogy came to regret this history and adopted a critical stance toward authority, such as the government; this was particularly true in the Ministry of Education. Socialism and Marxism also influenced the development of Japanese pedagogy. Scholars tended to interpret educational policies as a system that reproduced social inequality; they did not examine the economic functions of education and its positive effects on the economy.

The sociology of education in Japan was relatively independent of this trend because it valued data analyses over ideology. Hence, the sociology of education included targets such as the economics of education and social program theory via educational policies (Fujita 1992; Kaneko 1990). Since people have understood that those from higher educational backgrounds could enjoy benefits such as high salaries and prestigious positions, they have voluntarily competed to obtain higher educational qualifications. Most Japanese education researchers criticized the educational system simply because education subordinated the requirements of the labor market. Thus, although education researchers were required to tackle social issues involved in the development of human capital, they did not provide useful knowledge except in regards to the sociology of education. During Japan's rapid economic growth, educational sociologists accumulated studies on educational expansion and inequality in access to higher education (Yano 1992).

Originally, the Japanese government did not provide much financial support for education (Nakazawa 2016). However, after World War II ended, the educational system completely changed, and junior high schools were established to extend compulsory education by 3 years.[3] The establishment of junior high schools was given priority over other educational policies because the government was responsible for compulsory educational institutions. In addition, the number of students who wanted to progress to senior high school also rapidly increased; advancement to senior high school stood at under 50% of the population when the new educational system was introduced but exceeded 90% by the middle of the 1970s. Although advancement to university did not see such a rapid rise, universities were popularized. This educational expansion was supported by parents' strong aspirations, and they voluntarily paid tuition fees for higher education institutions and other forms of private education to prepare their children for entrance exams (Ojima 1997; Stevenson and Baker 1992; Yano 1992).

Among educational sociologists in Japan, Ushiogi (1962) was a pioneer in the study of public spending on education. He demonstrated that a country's economic development level was linked to its public expenditure on education based on a comparative data analysis. Although the Japanese government's financial situation before and during rapid economic growth was poor, he found that it made larger investments in education than other industrialized countries. After that, the knowledge that education is important for economic growth became common, and other industrialized nations also increased their investments in education. The Japanese government's tax revenue improved not because of tax system reform but rather due to rapid economic growth. However, the Japanese government was severely short of financial resources after rapid economic growth ended. The government failed to reform the tax system to expand the tax base. Since then, the government has had to raise tuition fees for national/public universities,[4] and the individual burden of paying for education has grown.

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[3] Before World War II ended, compulsory education in Japan only consisted of 6 years of elementary school. Secondary schools were single-sex and diverged into academic and vocational tracks, and the advancement rate to secondary and tertiary educational institutions was low. After the war, the General Headquarters (GHQ) introduced the simple American style educational system, which involves a coeducational, single-track, 6-3-3-4 system, which implies the recipient of education would spend 6 years in primary school, 3 years in junior high school, 3 years in senior high school, and 4 years in university.

[4] Generally, there is a correlation between academic grade and socioeconomic background, and people need to progress to higher grades in order to attend university. In addition, students from privileged social backgrounds are more likely to go to university; even when grades are controlled for (Boudon 1974), they are more likely to do so. Thus, if public universities' tuition fees were low

Qian (1989) concluded that it is important to provide financial support for those from less advantaged social backgrounds and those attending private universities to equalize the opportunity to receive a higher education. However, students from low-income households in Japan must often take out student loans. There are quite a few scholarships or grant systems to support students from less-advantaged social backgrounds.[5] Since students who take out loans have to repay them over time, some less advantaged students are prevented from advancing to higher education. Thus, it is disputable whether such loans really contribute to equalizing educational opportunities. According to Furuta (2006), while expanding education loan coverage helped equalize educational opportunities, inequality remains because only people who take out loans have to repay them. That is, students who take out such loans tend to come from less well-off social backgrounds, while privileged students do not need to repay such debts. Recently, studies focusing on scholarship have increased given the fragility of financial support in Japan (Hozawa and Shirakawa 2006; Kobayashi 2008; Kobayashi 2009; Ouchi 2015).

In sum, the private financial burden of education has been heavy in Japan. In addition, investments in private informal schools that provide preparatory education for entrance exams are common among the Japanese, and parents' socioeconomic backgrounds determine whether students can receive a private education (Katase and Hirasawa 2008; Park 2015; Tsumura et al. 2011). The Japanese think it is natural that parents should shoulder the responsibility of investing in education (Furuta 2007). However, the pattern of parents' attitudes toward educational spending are complicated (Suetomi 2005); while some parents view education as an investment for the future, others regard it as consumption or a gift.

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or free, they would be funded by taxes from all sectors of society, even people from lower socioeconomic backgrounds. This means that benefits would be redistributed from less privileged people to those from higher socioeconomic levels, allowing everyone to receive a university education, whereby education has a regressive function (Wilensky 1975). When budgetary circumstances became severe in the 1970s, bureaucrats in the Ministry of Finance and some conservative politicians claimed that tuition fees for national/public universities were too cheap and that these universities should raise the tuition because most of their students would obtain certain benefits (high salary, high position, etc.) due to obtaining a higher education. Private universities also complained about the cheap tuition fees of national/public universities because they claimed that national/public institutions drew excellent students away from them. Government subsidies for private educational institutions began in the mid-1970s, and the tuition fees of national/public universities have been rising since then.

[5] In 2016, the Japanese government has started to introduce scholarships and grants because Japan has one of the worst poverty rates – particularly among single-parent families – out of the OECD member states.

2.2.2 *Social Policy and People's Attitudes*

As mentioned above, we cannot say that there is no relationship between the educational system and parents' attitudes. In order to understand this connection, a comparative analysis can be helpful, because we may find some universal patterns in international comparative data and be able to highlight the characteristics of a specific country in comparison to other nations.

Focusing on the individual level, a person who is more likely to face risky social conditions such as unemployment or poverty may show support for social welfare policies. Rehm (2009) indicated that a person without high-level skills who works in an occupation with a high unemployment rate is more likely to support a redistribution policy by the government. In addition, apart from objective social conditions, people's perceptions of social conditions may also be important. If people have a deep understanding of social issues, they tend to support social policies.

Social environments or institutions also influence people's attitudes directly. Steele (2015) examined the relationship between degree of social mobility and views on redistribution policies. We tend to expect people who live in a society with a large income disparity to support redistribution policies. However, according to Steele, people living in a society where we often observe social mobility tend to support redistribution policies, and income disparity is not a significant factor. In addition, a person who has experienced social mobility firsthand is more likely to support redistribution policies. The tangible effects of policies contribute to increasing support for social policies.

In terms of public spending on education, social conditions have a strong influence. Busemeyer showed that GDP per capita and population share of youth had positive effects, while GDP growth and a strong constitutional veto structure had negative effects on public expenditure on education. Partisanship, particularly in government participation by Social Democrats, who tend to support increasing public expenditure on education, has been found to have a negligible or small effect on this kind of spending (Busemeyer 2007). People living in a country where the share of private expenditure on education is large are less likely to support a redistribution policy. In such nations, people tend to perceive education as a private issue and see educational costs as an investment in their own future careers (Busemeyer 2013).

In sum, both people's socioeconomic positions and institutions inform their understanding of social issues. In a country where the private burden of education is high, people tend to view the education they receive as a private benefit. In such a nation, it might become hard for people to understand the public benefits or public functions of education because they paid for their education themselves, and there are few opportunities for them to recognize that their education was supported by public funds. Thus, they tend to regard education as a self-responsibility and not as a public matter. People in these societies might be less likely to be aware of social inequality in education. If this relationship can be found, it might be the key to understanding why the Japanese are less likely to support increased public spending on education.

2.3 Analysis

2.3.1 Data and Variables

For this chapter, I used data from the ISSP 2009 module. The ISSP, which started in 1985, selects a specific topic every year. It is conducted using surveys that cover people's attitudes on the topic in question, taking into account the social backgrounds of respondents from plural societies. The survey topic for 2009 was "inequality." A total of 38 nations and societies participated, and the total number of respondents was 53,115.[6]

I consider two attitude variables in this chapter. One is the answer to the statement: "In your country, only the rich can afford to attend university." I assigned "strongly agree" to 4, "agree" to 3, "neither agree nor disagree" to 2, "disagree" to 1, and "strongly disagree" to 0. Hereafter, this variable will be called y. The second variable is the answer to the statement: "Is it fair or unfair (right or wrong) that people with higher incomes can buy a better education for their children than people with lower incomes?" I assigned "very fair" to 4, "somewhat fair" to 3, "neither fair nor unfair" to 2, "somewhat unfair" to 1, and "very unfair" to 0. Hereafter, this variable will be called z. I excluded respondents who did not answer or could not choose any of the options from my analysis.

It is best not to assume a causal relationship between these two attitudes. Attitude y can be understood as a social perception, while attitude z can be understood as a value or opinion. While some people who have a specific opinion may tend to see their society as heading in a specific direction, others who perceive their society in a certain way may tend to have a particular belief or opinion. This chapter does not try to determine which causal relationship is correct. I think that both interpretations are probable. The final aim of this chapter is attitude y: people's perception of their society. Therefore, I only examine the relationship between z and y.

In terms of public education, this paper focuses on the percentage of public expenditure on tertiary educational institutions relative to GDP in 2009.[7] I excluded samples from countries where these data were not available. Hence, the number of target nations was 29. In addition, the samples were restricted to people aged 20–69, because I focused on the respondents' socioeconomic status, such as education and occupation. If the respondents in the samples were too young, it might not have been possible to determine their educational history; if they were too old, they may have been retired.

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[6] I used data from the International Social Survey Programme: Social Inequality IV – ISSP 2009 (ZA4850). The data came from the Data Archive for the Social Sciences, a department of GESIS in Cologne, Germany. The data file version is 3.0.0, doi:https://doi.org/10.4232/1.11506.

[7] The data source is in Table B2.3 from the OECD's source about information on education in the OECD member states: *Education at a Glance, 2012*.

2.3.2 Analytical Strategy

The dataset of the ISSP consists of merged data from surveys that were conducted in each participating country. In other words, individuals' data were nested in the country data. Considering this data structure, this article used the hierarchical linear modeling (HLM). Since the number of countries was small ($N = 29$), I applied the restricted maximum likelihood (REML) method (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002: 52–53).

Attitude y can be expressed as seen in the following two equations:

$$y_{ij} = \beta_{0j} + r_{ij} \tag{2.1}$$

$$\beta_{0j} = \gamma_{00} + u_{0j} \tag{2.2}$$

where i indicates the individual and j indicates the country. From Eq. (2.1), y can be broken down into the country's average level of attitude y and the error term at the individual level. Equation (2.2) shows that the country's average level of attitude y can be broken down into the total average attitude level and the error term at the country level. Substitute eq. (2.2) for (2.1) and

$$y_{ij} = \gamma_{00} + u_{0j} + r_{ij} \tag{2.3}$$

can be obtained. Thus, y is composed of the nation's average score, its error term, and the individual error term. Equation (2.3) is usually called a null model. The data can be seen as taking a stratified structure, and the HLM model can be applied when a part of the total error term can be explained by between-group variance. Supposing that X (the percentage of public expenditure on tertiary educational institutions relative to GDP) affects the national average of people's attitudes, then Eq. (2.2) can be expressed as follows:

$$\beta_{0j} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01} \times X_j + u_{0j} \tag{2.4}$$

This chapter calls Eq. (2.4) Model 1.

I assume that individual socioeconomic statuses such as educational level, occupational class, and household income influence people's attitudes. Attitude y, the view that only the rich can afford to attend university, indicated that individuals saw their society as unequal; that is to say, they understood that only the privileged class could enjoy tertiary education. Generally, the beneficiaries of tertiary education are less likely to adopt this perspective. Even if people from relatively high socioeconomic backgrounds have a high level of education, they tend to think this is due to their efforts, rather than their advantageous social context (Lareau 2011). Thus, they are more likely to deny the existence of a privileged social class and tend to think that a lack of effort leads one to fail in terms of educational career. Equation (2.4) substitutes for Eq. (2.1) considering the individual level independent variables:

$$y_{ij} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01} \times X_j + \sum_{k=1}^{n} \beta_{kj} x_{ij} + u_{0j} + r_{ij} \tag{2.5}$$

where k indicates the kth explanatory and controlled variables (such as gender, age, and marital status) and β indicates their coefficients. x_{ij} indicates the individual-level explanatory and controlled variables. I call Eq. (2.5) Model 2.

In addition, one could suppose that the coefficient of the independent variable has variance at the country level. For example, as mentioned earlier, I assumed that people who had a high educational background were less likely to agree with attitude y. The extent of agreement might also depend on the strength of public support for education. It is difficult to determine a causal relationship, but the extent of disagreement with attitude y might be stronger in a country where public support for education is low, because people in such a country tend to see education as a private matter. If we can assume this, then it is possible to settle the coefficient of educational career as a dependent variable, to enter the percentage of public educational expenditure on tertiary education relative to GDP as a country-level independent variable, and to consider the random effects that indicates variance at the country level. I call this Model 3.

Finally, I examined whether people's thoughts on inequality (z) affected social understanding (y) independently. In other words, I investigated whether fairness (z) informed people's social understanding, and whether the effect of z remained after other individual-level variables were controlled for. I call this Model 4.

Table 2.1 shows the descriptive statistics for all variables. I only focused on one level-two explanatory variable because the number of countries was only 29, and I thought that the level-two independent variable should not be increased so as to produce a reliable result (Bryan and Jenkins 2016).

2.4 Results

2.4.1 Distributions of People's Attitudes from the ISSP Survey

Figure 2.1 shows the distribution of attitude y, with the countries arranged according to agreement level. People in Scandinavian countries, which can be regarded as social democratic regimes, disagreed with the question. People in liberal regimes, which consist of Anglo-Saxon countries, seemed to be located in the middle. Japan had a high position, and the number of people who considered their society to be unequal was relatively large.

However, Japan seemed to be unique because the proportion of disagreement was also high. I scored from 0 to 4 for attitude y and calculated the standard deviation. I found that Japan had the largest standard deviation. This implied that attitude y is bipolarized in Japan.

Table 2.1 Descriptive statistics

Level 1 variables ($N = 30{,}931$)	Mean	S.D.	Minimum	Maximum
Attitude (dependent variable)	1.81	1.24	0	4
Gender (base. Female)				
Male	0.45	0.50	0	1
Age	44.65	13.73	20	69
Marital status (base. Never married)				
Married	0.59	0.49	0	1
Divorced, widowed, or separated	0.13	0.34	0	1
Education (base. Primary or secondary completed)				
Post-secondary education completed	0.17	0.38	0	1
University degree	0.20	0.40	0	1
Occupational status (base. EGP III nonmanual routine)				
EGP I+II (professional and managerial)	0.30	0.46	0	1
EGP IVa + b (small business owners)	0.03	0.18	0	1
EGP IVc + VIIb (farmers)	0.03	0.18	0	1
EGP V + VI (manual)	0.09	0.29	0	1
EGP VIIa (semiskilled or non-skilled)	0.17	0.38	0	1
No job	0.13	0.34	0	1
Household income (base. 1st quartile)				
2nd quartile	0.19	0.39	0	1
3rd quartile	0.21	0.41	0	1
4th quartile	0.30	0.46	0	1
Don't know, no answer	0.17	0.38	0	1
Attitude (fairness)	1.43	1.29	0	4
Level 2 variable ($N = 29$)	**Mean**	**S.D.**	**Minimum**	**Maximum**
Percentage of public expenditure on tertiary education	1.14	0.37	0.50	1.80

Sources: International Social Survey Programme 2009 module and *Education at a Glance 2012* (OECD)
Note: Classification of occupational status is based on Erikson et al. (1979)

Figure 2.2 shows the distribution of attitude z, with countries arranged according to agreement level. In terms of attitude z, people in liberal countries were more likely to agree, while people in European countries tended to disagree. Japanese people seemed more likely to agree with attitude z.

Figure 2.3 shows the relationship between a country's average score for y and the proportion of public expenditure on tertiary education relative to GDP. A negative correlation can be observed ($r = -0.598$). If public spending on tertiary education was large, people were less likely to recognize unequal opportunities in tertiary education. Instead of the average score, if we consider the relationship between the standard deviation and public expenditure on tertiary education, a negative correlation ($r = -0.608$) can be observed (figures are omitted). This implies that attitude y tended to be bipolarized if the proportion of public expenditure on tertiary education was small.



Fig. 2.1 Distribution of answers to the statement: "In your country, only the rich can afford to attend university". (Source: International Social Survey Programme 2009 module). Notes: The sample is restricted to respondents with no missing data that would affect the analyses in this chapter. The numbers in parentheses indicate the sample size

2.4.2 Results of HLM

Table 2.2 show the results of HLM. According to the null model, the random effect of intercept (variance component) was 0.270, and the intra-class correlation coefficient (ICC) was calculated at 0.177.[8] This implies that a little under 20% of total error variance can be interpreted as country-level variance and that the HLM should be applied.

Model 1 included one country-level independent variable. This model examined whether the percentage of public expenditure on tertiary education relative to GDP could predict a country's average level of attitude y. The percentage of public

[8] $0.270/(0.270+1.260) \approx 0.177$ ·



Fig. 2.2 Distribution of answers to the statement: "Is it fair or unfair (right or wrong) that people with higher incomes can buy a better education for their children than people with lower incomes?" (Source: International Social Survey Programme 2009 module). Notes: The sample is restricted to respondents with no missing data that would affect the analyses in this chapter. The numbers in parentheses indicate the sample size

expenditure on tertiary education was negatively significant. This implies that people in a country where the percentage of public expenditure on tertiary education relative to GDP was high were less likely to agree with attitude *y*. Since people in these nations tend to provide financial support for tertiary education and to pay few tuition fees, it may be natural that they do not think only the rich can afford to go to university.

Model 2 includes the independent and controlled variables at the individual level. The coefficient of the individual variable included in Model 1 went virtually unchanged. As I expected, those with a high educational background, high occupational class (professionals and managerial workers), and high household incomes



Fig. 2.3 The relationship between the country-level mean attitude score for "In your country, only the rich can afford to attend university" and public expenditure on tertiary educational institutions as a percentage of GDP. (Sources: International Social Survey Programme 2009 module, and *Education at a Glance 2012* (OECD)). Note: *AR* Argentina, *AU* Australia, *AT* Austria, *BE* Belgium, *CL* Chile, *CZ* Czech Republic, *DK* Denmark, *EE* Estonia, *FI* Finland, *FR* France, *DE* Germany, *HU* Hungary, *IS* Iceland, *IL* Israel, *JP* Japan, *KR* South Korea, *NZ* New Zealand, *NO* Norway, *PL* Poland, *PT* Portugal, *RU* Russia, *SK* Slovakia, *SL* Slovenia, *ZA* South Africa, *ES* Spain, *SE* Sweden, *CH* Switzerland, *GB* the United Kingdom, *US* the United States

were less likely to support attitude *y*. This implies that people with a high socioeconomic status were less likely to recognize the existence of social inequality in obtaining a university education. On the other hand, blue-collar workers strongly recognized inequality relative to nonmanual employees.

Model 3 assumed a random effect in the coefficient of the dummy variable university education completed, while the slope depended on the percentage of public expenditure on tertiary education relative to GDP.[9] There were few changes in the fixed effects in comparison with Model 2. The coefficient of public expenditure on education in the university education variable had a negative effect, although it was

[9] I entered the percentage of public expenditure on tertiary education relative to GDP to the coefficient of post-secondary education completed. However, this variable was not statistically significant. Since the random effect of this coefficient was significant, I left it alone.

Table 2.2 Coefficients of hierarchical linear regression models

Fixed effects	Null model	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Intercept (γ_{00})	1.731***	1.731***	1.885***	1.887***	1.873***
	(0.095)	(0.083)	(0.094)	(0.094)	(0.093)
Expenditure for tertiary education relative to GDP (%) (γ_{01})		−0.698**	−0.700**	−0.667**	−0.672**
		(0.213)	(0.205)	(0.203)	(0.200)
Gender (base. Female)					
Male ($\beta_1 = \gamma_{10}$)			0.016	0.012	0.024
			(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Age ($\beta_2 = \gamma_{20}$)			0.004**	0.004**	0.004***
			(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Marital status (base. Never married)					
Married ($\beta_3 = \gamma_{30}$)			0.006	0.009	0.012
			(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.027)
Divorced, widowed, or separated ($\beta_4 = \gamma_{40}$)			0.038	0.037	0.041
			(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.027)
Education (base. Primary or secondary completed)					
Post-secondary education completed ($\beta_5 = \gamma_{50}$)			−0.128**	−0.147**	−0.148***
			(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.037)
University degree ($\beta_6 = \gamma_{60}$)			−0.296***	−0.293***	−0.291***
			(0.044)	(0.034)	(0.034)
Expenditure for tertiary education relative to GDP (%) (γ_{61})				−0.179+	−0.172+
				(0.089)	(0.088)
Occupational status (base. EGP III nonmanual routine)					
EGP I+II (professional and managerial) ($\beta_7 = \gamma_{70}$)			−0.086***	−0.074***	−0.070***
			(0.018)	(0.016)	(0.016)
EGP IVa + b (Small business owners) ($\beta_8 = \gamma_{80}$)			0.027	0.030	0.035
			(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.045)
EGP IVc + VIIb (farmers) ($\beta_9 = \gamma_{90}$)			−0.018	−0.015	−0.017
			(0.065)	(0.064)	(0.064)
EGP V + VI (manual) ($\beta_{10} = \gamma_{100}$)			0.115***	0.112***	0.106***
			(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.024)
EGP VIIa (semiskilled or non-skilled) ($\beta_{11} = \gamma_{110}$)			0.149***	0.147***	0.139***
			(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.029)
No job ($\beta_{12} = \gamma_{120}$)			−0.054+	−0.054+	−0.050
			(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.031)
Household income (base. 1st quartile)					
2nd quartile ($\beta_{13} = \gamma_{130}$)			−0.004	−0.013	−0.011
			(0.039)	(0.034)	(0.034)

(continued)

Table 2.2 (continued)

Fixed effects	Null model	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
3rd quartile ($\beta_{14} = \gamma_{140}$)			−0.084*	−0.094**	−0.093**
			(0.038)	(0.033)	(0.033)
4th quartile ($\beta_{15} = \gamma_{150}$)			−0.188***	−0.199***	−0.181***
			(0.042)	(0.035)	(0.034)
Don't know, no answer ($\beta_{16} = \gamma_{160}$)			−0.134**	−0.142***	−0.135***
			(0.040)	(0.036)	(0.036)
Attitude (fairness) ($\beta_{17} = \gamma_{170}$)					-.066***
					(0.014)
Random effects (variance components)					
Intercept (u_{0j})	0.270***	0.213***	0.203***	0.214***	0.211***
Above secondary education completed (u_{5j})				0.028***	0.027***
University degree (u_{6j})				0.028***	0.028***
Attitude (Justness) (u_{17j})					0.005***
Within-country (r_{ij})	1.260	1.260	1.215	1.208	1.196
Model deviance	95082.740	95074.242	94048.395	93929.173	93677.415

Source: International Social Survey Programme 2009 Module
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The sample is restricted to respondents with no missing data in the full covariates
+$p < 0.10$, *$p < 0.05$, **$p < 0.01$, ***$p < 0.001$

only statistically significant at the 10% level. Originally, those with a high educational background tended to deny the existence of inequality in obtaining a university education, and this trend strengthened as public spending on tertiary education increased.

Finally, Model 4 included people's sense of fairness, and there were few changes in the coefficients included in Model 3. Even if attitude z was included, the effects of socioeconomic background remained. Attitude z had a significant negative effect. People who did not mind that only the rich could enjoy high-quality education were less likely to recognize inequality in going to university. In other words, people who thought it unfair that only the rich could receive high-quality education were more likely to be aware of inequality in advancing to university. This result seems natural; it implies that people who have experienced unfairness tend to recognize social inequality. The slope coefficient of attitude z assumed a random effect because it was statistically significant,[10] and the degree of slope did not change based on the percentage of public expenditure on tertiary education relative to GDP.

[10] If we consider the interaction of educational level and attitude z, it was negatively significant at the 10% level. This implies that those who had a university degree and agreed with the statement that only the rich can receive a good-quality education were more likely to disagree that there is inequality in terms of attending university. However, even if the interaction effect was included, the model was not improved significantly. Therefore, I did not adopt this model.

In sum, as I expected, those with relatively higher socioeconomic status were less likely to recognize inequality in advancing to university. In addition, people's values or opinions differed from their social perception or understanding.

2.4.3 An Analysis of the Japanese Samples

In Sect. 2.4.1, I mentioned the unique context of Japan, which implies bipolarization in social perception. In this section, I focus on the Japanese samples and include the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model (Table 2.3).

The results that differed from the HLM were as follows. Although the significance level was 10%, the variable of post-secondary education completed had a positive effect. Graduates of junior colleges, national institutes of technology (*kosen*), and specialized training colleges (*senmon gakko*) were included in this category. Junior college is a unique tertiary educational institution where most students are female (Matsui 1997; Ogata 1994). On the other hand, at National Institutes of Technology, which are small in number, most students are male (Ishida 2007). I think that the tuition fees for university are generally expensive, and junior colleges, national institutes of technology, and specialized training colleges accept students who cannot afford to pay such costs for 4 years. Therefore, students in these institutes and colleges might tend to recognize inequality in advancement to university.

Gender and marital status had significant effects, and age had the reverse effect of HLM. In terms of age, elderly people were less likely to recognize inequality in attending university. When these people were young, Japanese society was not wealthy, and it was not common to go to university. Compared to the past, university education has expanded, and the elderly might think that young people today have a better chance of attending university. Although private expenditure on tertiary education in Japan used to be high, the elderly might think that people can now afford to pay tuition fees because most Japanese have become wealthier.

Married people had a positive effect. They might be more likely to have children and might be unsatisfied with the high costs of education. Generally, the elderly tend to assign much value to social security and welfare and are less likely to be aware of the seriousness of the heavy individual burden of education. Since the national budget of the Japanese government has been small, concern over the allocation of funds is especially noticeable (Nakazawa 2016). These mechanisms may have caused the bipolarization of social understanding in Japan.

2.5 Conclusion

In conclusion, those from high socioeconomic backgrounds were less likely to recognize inequality in advancing to university. In addition, people in countries where the percentage of public expenditure on tertiary education relative to GDP was high

Table 2.3 Coefficients of ordinary least squares (OLS) for Japanese samples

Intercept	2.029***
	(0.229)
Gender (base. Female)	
Male	0.220*
	(0.097)
Age	−0.012**
	(0.003)
Marital status (base. Never married)	
Married	0.315*
	(0.211)
Divorced, widowed, or separated	0.316
	(0.211)
Education (base. Primary or secondary completed)	
Post-secondary education completed	0.207+
	(0.117)
University degree	−0.236+
	(0.121)
Occupational status (base. EGP III nonmanual routine)	
EGP I+II (professional and managerial)	−0.036
	(0.153)
EGP IVa + b (small business owners)	−0.085
	(0.230)
EGP IVc + VIIb (farmers)	−0.193
	(0.353)
EGP V + VI (manual)	0.172
	(0.203)
EGP VIIa (semiskilled or non-skilled)	−0.042
	(0.175)
No job	−0.112
	(0.124)
Household income (base. 1st quartile)	
2nd quartile	−0.049
	(0.142)
3rd quartile	−0.332*
	(0.145)
4th quartile	−0.293+
	(0.149)
Don't know, no answer	−0.419*
	(0.193)
Attitude (fairness)	0.098**
	(0.033)
N	976
R^2	0.047
Adj. R^2	0.030

Source: International Social Survey Programme 2009 Module
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Sample is restricted to respondents with no missing data in the full covariates
+$p < 0.10$, *$p < 0.05$, **$p < 0.01$, ***$p < 0.001$

tended to disagree with the statement that only the rich can afford to pay for university because the level of social support seemed to be high. The effect of a high educational background (university degree) was clearer in countries where the percentage of public expenditure on tertiary education relative to GDP was high. People's sense of fairness also had a significant effect on their social perceptions, which implies that people who thought it unfair that only the rich could afford to go to university were more likely to perceive inequality in advancing to university.

Considering the Japanese case, the trend of socioeconomic background effects was generally in accordance with the HLM. However, marital status was significant, and age had a reverse effect. Conflicts between generations might appear in a country such as Japan, where the size of government budgets is very restricted. Generally, elderly people want to improve the social welfare and social security systems. In order to confirm this interpretation, future researchers should consider the interaction between age and the size of government budgets.

Even if the private financial burden of education is heavy, a certain amount of public funds are spent on education. However, in a country where public expenditure on education is low, it might be difficult for people to recognize that they should return benefits they receive from education to their society. As a result, the privatization of education is being hastened. If the Japanese government does not change the situation, inequality in higher education will increase, and such an educational system may increase the social divide between privileged and less advantaged social classes.

Acknowledgment This article was supported by the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS KAKENHI, Grant Numbers 15K04359 and 15H03490).

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Chapter 3
Universal Participation in School Education as a Historical Process in Modern Japan

Shinichi Aizawa

Abstract Why and how has universal participation in education emerged in Japan, despite it being a non-Western country? How has this universal participation in education transformed Japanese society? This chapter elaborates on the Japanese universal participation process according to individual educational stages, ranging from primary education to upper secondary education, and introduces characteristics of equality within the Japanese school system, as a universalized educated society in a non-Western context. Through historical research, it is shown that there were two important turning points for the development of Japanese education and society. The first turning point was the introduction of the Japanese school model in the Meiji era (1868–1912). The second turning point responded to and sought to reform a restricted, unequal prewar society with partial support from the General Headquarters (GHQ). These two turning points made it possible for Japanese society to find and cultivate new, bright human resources from every social class. Another interesting finding from this historical account is that Japan became a completely "schooled" society. This "schooled" society means that the importance of formal education is deeply rooted in contemporary Japanese society.

3.1 Introduction

Why and how has universal participation in education emerged in Japanese society, despite it being a non-Western country? How has this universal participation in education transformed Japanese society? This chapter elaborates on the Japanese universal participation process according to individual educational stages, ranging from primary education to upper secondary education, and introduces some characteristics of the equality of Japanese school systems, as a universalized educated society in a non-Western context. This chapter also discusses some transformations

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A. Yonezawa et al. (eds.), *Japanese Education in a Global Age*, Education in the Asia-Pacific Region: Issues, Concerns and Prospects 46,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-1528-2_3

relating to this universal participation process. Japan has experienced great success in economic and social development and has influenced European and US educational systems. However, as this chapter will show, in moving toward universal participation in education, Japan has established educational practices and customs that differ greatly from those of developed Western countries.

Only a few scholars have discussed the processes of educational expansion and universal participation, including Martin Trow and Margaret Archer (Archer 1982; Trow 1961, 1972). Though, as Rappleye argues (2016: 25), Trow focuses more on describing the transformations that take place during expansion than on theorizing the causes of expansion, his classification using concrete, numerical information helps us to more easily comprehend the historical path toward universal participation. Trow specifically describes this route according to three stages: Phase I, elite stage; Phase II, mass stage; and Phase III, universal stage. In his work, these three stages, respectively, indicate under 15%, under 70%, and around 100% participation in secondary education (Trow 1961) and under 15%, under 30%, and above 50% in higher education for each enrollment of the age-grade cohort (Trow 1972).

According to historical record as *Monbushō-nenpō* (The Yearbook of the Ministry of Education), the formal schooling system in Japan was initiated in 1872. During the nineteenth century, primary education was nominally universalized and officially universalized in the 1910s (Hijikata 1987). This universalized education expanded to the postprimary stage prior to World War II (Kimura 2015). After World War II, the Japanese school system was reformed and democratized under the influence of the US occupation. The Japanese school system has continued using the same system since then, involving a 6-year primary, a 3-year lower secondary, a 3-year upper secondary, and a 2- or 4-year tertiary education. One of the most significant changes during the late 1940s was the extension of compulsory education from 6 to 9 years, making lower secondary education compulsory. After some years of confusion regarding this change, from the late 1950s to the early 1970s, the structure of advancement to upper secondary education was rapidly expanded in each prefecture. The rate of advancement to upper secondary education, which was around 50% in 1950, reached over 90% in 1972 (Aizawa in print; Kagawa et al. 2014; Kariya 1995). Under such governmental policies, the advancement rate to tertiary education reached around 30% in the 1970s and 1980s. Following deregulation, the number of colleges and the rate of advancement to tertiary education have continued to increase. In 2007, the advancement rate to tertiary education reached over 50%, suggesting that tertiary education had also reached the universal stage according to Trow's definition (Trow 1972).

This chapter is based on two research methods: a review of historical works and an original analysis that is both quantitative and qualitative. The current chapter is, in the Weberian sense, a historical sociological work, as it utilizes many secondary historical resources to grasp an overview of the history of Japan over the span of the last 150 years; as such, this work will enable a new understanding of Japanese education. This chapter first reviews several existing works on the history of Japanese education from the Meiji era to the 2000s, going on to provide plentiful material showing Japan as an example of the success of a non-Western country that saw late industrialization.

3.2 Literature on the History of Japanese Education as an Egalitarian, Universal Process

In the broad view of comparative historical analysis, Japanese modernization has been considered an enigma, set apart from the Western world. The classic comparative historical analysis of Barrington Moore (1966), a comparative historical sociologist, includes an examination of the case of Japan in its discussion of the relationships among modernization, dictatorship, and democracy. As Moore could not understand Japanese, his resources were exclusively English, and this caused several issues that were raised by translators (Moore 1966). Still, Moore makes a significant reference to one of the most interesting characteristics of Japanese modernization: "The solidarity and 'harmony' of the Japanese village, its avoidance – perhaps we ought to say suppression – of open conflict are also a feudal legacy that has adapted itself more or less successfully to modern times" (Moore 1966: 310). According to his comparative analysis, Japanese modernization provides some hints toward understanding global modernization. From the perspective of economic history, Gerschenkron advances the influential concept of "economic backwardness (Gerschenkron 1962)." He focuses on the leading role of the government in the late development of countries, synthesizing a few basic elements in the industrialization processes of backward countries from the available historical information on economic development (Gerschenkron 1962: 7). His range of discussion is limited to European countries, and he only addresses elements of development from the nineteenth century to the beginning of World War I. He admits his ignorance of Japanese economic history but mentions the desirability of studying Japanese experiences (Gerschenkron 1962: 7).

Ronald Dore's *Diploma Disease* (1976; revised in 1997), one of the first studies to apply the concept of economic backwardness to comparative educational studies, provides a key framework for understanding the development of non-European countries. Dore compares England, Japan, Sri Lanka, and Kenya, utilizing his thorough understanding of the Japanese language. Dore expands upon Gerschenkron's concept of the late development effect to include three hypotheses about the late development effect and educational competition. According to his discussion, the later the development occurs,

> the more widely education certificates are used for occupational selection;
> the faster the rate of qualification inflation; and the more examination-oriented schooling becomes at the expense of genuine education. (Dore 1997: 72)

Dore's argument is very useful for comprehending the process of universal participation in education. For example, he points to the expansion of secondary education in the 1920s as an example of the rise of the qualification, and his thesis on the Japanese industrialization process is arguably valid. On the whole, *Diploma Disease* is one of the most valuable works on the history of Japanese education including comparisons with countries in the English-speaking world. After his work, studies of Japanese education from the English-speaking world have placed great emphasis on examinations, a time which is sometimes exaggerated as "examination hell" (for instance, Frost 1999).

After Dore's work, some scholars have attempted further comparative works, including many scholars from Japan. Such comparative works have brought another aspect of society to light: "diplomaism." Andy Green's *Education and State Formation* (2013) offers sociological approaches to comprehending the Japanese case through a comparative lens. Although the first version of this book dealt exclusively with European countries and the USA, Green developed his discussion to include East Asian countries in the second edition (Green 2013). Green admits that East Asian (in his words, notably Japan and the four Asian tigers as South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore) education played a remarkable role in the accelerated process of state formation and accompanied rapid industrialization in the region, with this development managing to distribute the social benefits of growth quite widely (Green 2013: 305, 319). While his explanation of colonial legacies emphasizes the influence of Japan on other countries, he suggests that some Japanese values such as *wa* (group loyalty or harmony) have altered the industrial revolution in Japan itself (Green 2013: 322–23). The first scholar to take up his cultural analysis in the English-speaking world was William Cummings, who remarks upon the uniquely Japanese value of a "competent contribution to the group" in comparison to other developed countries (Cummings 1980). Moreover, in a separate work, Cummings (1980) emphasizes the equity and equality of Japanese schools based on his fieldwork. Cummings is not the only one who stresses equality in his analysis; however, several other researchers of Japanese education have raised the same point (e.g., Singleton 1990; Stevenson and Stigler 1994). Cummings (2003) also uses comparative analysis to demonstrate several institutional differences among developed countries, whose primary educational systems have been universalized. According to Cummings, the Japanese case forms one of the typical, ideal patterns of educational development, and he cites the educational ideals of a "competent contribution to the group" and accounting for the "whole person, wide range of subjects, moral values, physical & aesthetic skills" as being uniquely Japanese (Cummings 2003: 35).

In short, Green and Cummings strongly emphasize the Japanese characteristic of equality. Green, Cummings, and other scholars claim that this characteristic is more frequently observed in Japan and East Asian countries than in other places. In light of this, one can raise questions about the history of Japanese school education, such as why equality in schools has been emphasized and which values and characteristics strengthen or weaken Japanese schools and society in the historical process of universalized education.

Japanese egalitarianism has been thoroughly discussed by Japanese scholars, in particular by sociologists of education. Takehiko Kariya, a sociologist of education, compares the original meaning of discrimination to its significance in the Japanese context (Kariya 1994), finding an illustrative difference between them. Referring to *Webster's Third New International Dictionary* (published in 1966), Kariya points out that the original meaning of "discriminate" indicates "to make a difference in treatment or favor on a class or categorical basis in disregard of individual merit" and further that "discrimination" indicates "the act, practice, or instance of discriminating categorically rather than individually" (Kariya 1994: 237). On the other hand, he introduces a Japanese perspective on discrimination, in which ability grouping is regarded as "discrimination," and goes on to verify the unique connection between this view of discrimination and egalitarianism in Japanese schools. Kariya insists that Japanese egalitarianism in schools places great importance on treatment that does not lead children or parents to experience "discrimination," specifically referring to the equality of treatment. Other scholars claim that this view of quality has prevailed in Japanese schools and forms various practices in those schools (Aizawa et al. in print).

Though it seems likely that Japanese egalitarianism in education does indeed exist, there is an academic debate concerning when this egalitarianism was historically founded. Kariya asserts that it was brought about during the process of expanding upper secondary education from the 1950s to the 1960s, characterizing it as a unique phenomenon that had a formative effect on postwar Japan (Kariya 1994). Yoshio Katagiri, a historian of education, objects to Kariya's argument, referring documents from Japanese schools from the Tokugawa era to those of contemporary times that contain similar meanings to the material used in Kariya's analysis. Katagiri concludes that Japanese school education has contained its own unique egalitarianism since at least before World War II, perhaps arising in the 1890s (Katagiri 2004).

Such analyses provide fascinating suggestions for understanding the characteristics of education in Japan. To clarify the perspective of this chapter, it is assumed that the birth of Japanese egalitarianism in education was prior to World War II, but this perspective did not prevail in mass society until the postwar era, continuing up to the present day. Following a review of the existing literature, the following question is posed: Why has universal participation in education succeeded in Japanese society, with its unique egalitarianism?

To address this question, it is necessary to discuss the transformation of social stratification and the rise of egalitarianism in tandem with the historical process of universal participation. To this end, four phases occurring between the mid-nineteenth century and contemporary times are proposed and categorized according to specific sections (see Sects. 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5). The first phase (Sect. 3.3) spans from 1872, when the Meiji government announced the creation of the modern school system, to the 1900s, when primary education had been nominally universalized. The second phase (Sect. 3.4) ranges from the 1910s (including the late 1900s), when secondary education had changed from the elite stage, to 1945, when World War II ended. In the second phase, primary education was substantially universalized, and secondary education expanded until it reached the mass stage, strengthening a new class division. This class division changed in the last few years of this period, as the period in which all nations were at war transformed the system; complete institutional change in school education was not brought about until the next phase. The third phase (Sect. 3.5) spans from 1945 to 1985. This chapter mainly focuses on the early 1950s to the early 1970s, when the enrollment rates of upper secondary schools (high schools) grew from 50% to 90%, making upper secondary education universal in Japanese society.

3.3 The Universalization Process of Japanese Primary Education in the Late Nineteenth Century

Before the Meiji era, during the Tokugawa era (1603–1867), Japan's class structure incorporated the so-called *shi-nō-kō-shō* system of stratification, which separated the population into four classes (samurai, farmer, artisan, and merchant). The political change of the Meiji era was brought about by lower-class samurais in local areas collaborating with the emperor and some aristocrats in Kyoto who had not held substantial political power in the Tokugawa era. The latter groups abolished the privileges of the samurai class through overcoming political conflicts and equalized the remaining three classes into one class, the *heimin* (commoners). These political changes yielded a more egalitarian school education throughout Japan.

According to previous historical analyses of the Tokugawa era, the development of the educational system and the media resulted in Japan having higher literacy than other parts of the world. By Dore's estimation, *terakoya* (private schools for ordinary people) prevailed all over Japan, and 40–45% of men and 15% of women attended *terakoya* to learn by 1870 (Dore 1965). The creation of the schooling system by the Meiji central government stimulated much social mobility. The official establishment of primary education was initiated in 1872 and was referred to as *Gakusei* (Institutionalization of Schooling) by the Meiji government's Ministry of Education. *Gakusei* emphasized learning as a significant source of capital in life (*Gakumon ha mi wo tatsuru no zaihon*). In the same year, Yukichi Fukuzawa, an individual from the lower samurai class, published *An Encouragement of Learning* (*Gakumon no susume*, 1872), a bestseller during that time that argued for the equality of human beings and denied innate distinction, as the following introductory statement shows:

> Heaven, it is said, does not create one person above or below another. This signifies that when we are born from Heaven we all are equal and there is no innate distinction between high and low. (Fukuzawa 1872; English translation 2013: 3)

Additionally, Fukuzawa insisted that society is based on merit and educational attainment, explaining the social significance of attending school and learning for the purpose of upward social mobility:

> Nevertheless, as we broadly survey the human scene, there are the wise and the stupid, the rich and poor, the noble and lowly, whose conditions seem to differ as greatly as the clouds and the mud. Why is this? The reason is clear. In the Jitsugo-kyō we read that if a man does not learn he will remain ignorant, and such an ignorant man is stupid. Therefore the question of the difference between wise and stupid is traceable to the degree of learning. (Fukuzawa et al. 2013: 3)

Fukuzawa's face has appeared for many years on the front of the 10,000 yen bill. This introductory statement is not only one of the most famous sentences memorized in Japanese schools, but it also helped to form the basic characteristics of the Japanese view of equality and education. As Fukuzawa remarked, one of the most significant differences between the Tokugawa era and the Meiji era was the possibility of upward mobility through education.

This is the basic starting point for a sociological historical analysis of Japanese school education. Ikuo Amano has written excellent sociological historical analyses of the Meiji era, publishing several books on the creation of the examination system, changes in the significance of diploma obtainment, and social mobility at that time. In light of the prestige and impact of his research, many researchers have translated his work into English. Of course, this chapter will not seek to introduce Amano's entire body of work but rather to describe his view of the historical process toward universal participation in education in Japan.

In his comparative historical summary of mass participation in education in European countries, China, and Japan, Amano (1982; revised 2006) verifies that although there was a word to describe human resources (*jinsa*) among the han schools (*hanko*) in the Tokugawa era, its emphasis was not on the selection of human resources but rather on the training of human resources (Amano 2006: 120–21). Amano concludes that until the mid-nineteenth century, Japan only contained primitively meritocratic and selective experiences and traditions, and further that the Meiji government's *Gakusei* inaugurated the two principles of "equality" and "meritocracy" (Amano 2006: 132). While disseminating these values, the Meiji government maintained a strong fear of colonization by Western countries. Japan had already made unequal pacts with Western countries in the late Tokugawa era, though their territories were rarely invaded for the sake of colonization. The Meiji government coined the slogan of *fukoku-kyōhei* ("Rich nation, strong army"). Its goal was to distance Japan from semicivilized countries while participating in civilized countries in the same manner as other colonizing countries, such as the USA and Western European countries. To achieve this goal, it had to recruit bright human talent from the entire country; thus, it became necessary to establish a modern schooling system based upon equal, meritocratic selection.

Under the slogan of *fukoku-kyōhei*, the Meiji government developed an army and industry. It demanded not only the establishment of a meritocratic selection system but also the teaching of basic literacy and the cultivation of strong bodies for the entire nation. However, in reality these social structures could not be transformed over a short period of time. Amano has comprehensively researched the Japanese education system's process of catching up to become an institution of examination, "diplomaism," and meritocracy (Amano 1983, 1984, 1992). First, it is important to examine his work on primary schools in relation to the Phase I as proposed in this chapter: Amano's paper entitled "Institutionalization of Primary Compulsory Education: From the viewpoint of Wastage" (Amano 1967; revised 1997) illustrates the universalization process according to official statistics (*monbushō nenpō*, Yearbook of the Ministry of Education). He asserts that universalization of primary education in Japan was first achieved about 35 years after it was declared that all Japanese citizens should attend 4 years of compulsory education without fees. After 11 more years had passed, a 6-year compulsory education was universalized in 1920. Although recent research involving critical readings of these official statistics estimates that true universalization was not achieved until the 1930s (Hijikata 1987), Amano's discussion forms a basic explanation of the process of universalization in primary schools in Japan. This path toward universalization at the primary education level was much more rapid than in other modernized countries such as Britain.

Dore (1997) illustrates several factors that made this leap toward a unified school system possible, focusing on the most important factor: the discontinuity in both the composition and the culture of the ruling class. In Japan, the Meiji Restoration (a) radically altered the identity of the power-holders, now a group of rank-and-file samurai bureaucrats as opposed to the upper-samurai fief-holding aristocrats; (b) altered the economic basis of wealth, which went from feudal land revenues to cash salaries from the State Treasury; and (c) increased the impact of this economic change on cultural ethos (Dore 1997: 39). A common point raised by both Amano and Dore is that the growth of elementary school attendance proceeded steadily, with a final spurt after fees were abolished in 1900 (Amano 1997: 16; Dore 1997: 40).

In this historical process, Japanese schools invented various practices of their own. Japanese class was established in schools in 1890, and examinations for proceeding and graduation were abolished in 1900; classes have been sorted according to children's ages up until the present day (Hamana 1983; Sato 1970). The Japanese teaching style applied by Johann Friedrich Herbart, a German educationalist, prevailed in the classroom after the emerging class was sorted according to children's ages (Inagaki 1966). Teachers and professionals began to have issues with "less capable" or "inferior" pupils in this universalized and institutionalized process. *Jidō kenkyū* (Children's Studies), now a long-standing professional Japanese magazine on child research, was initially published in 1898. The magazine began applying for research submissions on "inferior children" in 1901, and one detailed report was published in 1903. As we can see from the reports in this magazine, Japan was not exceptional in that, as a modern nation-state, it had issues with poverty. Though the Meiji government initially established an antipoverty rule (*jukkyu kisoku*) in 1874, the national feeling did not accord with this rule until 1898, brought about by the arrival of Gennosuke Yokoyama's work, *Nihon no Kasō Shakai* (Japanese Underclass Society, firstly published in 1898; reprinted 1985). Yokoyama was a journalist for a major Japanese newspaper, and the foreword of his 1898 work represented the book as the Japanese version of *In Darkest England and the Way Out* by William Booth (1890) and *Life and Labour of the People in London* by Charles Booth (1889). Surprisingly, these surveys of underclass individuals in London had already been introduced to Japan in the late 1890s, a time that marked the first stages of the industrial revolution in Japan. For example, the government built a modern steel furnace after the victory of the Sino-Japanese War in 1895. During this time, Japanese society began to show interest in social poverty and inequality. It could simply be a historical coincidence, but Japan experienced both underclass problems embedded in the industrial revolution and universalization of primary education simultaneously. Therefore, Japanese inequality started to become visible in schools, factories, and societies. One of the historical roots of the national concern for social equality and inequality began at the end of the nineteenth century.

3.4 Expansion from the Elite Stage to the Mass Stage in Secondary Education in the First Half of the Twentieth Century

As was noted in the previous section, the expansion of modern education visualized the class divisions in Japanese society. This class division had widened until the beginning of World War II (Moriguchi and Saez 2008; Piketty 2014; Yazawa 2004), and although school education was universalized in Japan in the Meiji era, students in most nations did not progress beyond primary education: there was no room available to offer students the opportunity to move to the upper schools. On the other hand, Dore (1997) and Amano (1992) point to the birth of "diplomaism" in Japanese society, which was particularly enabled by the *Shizoku* (formerly the samurai class) (Amano 1992; Sonoda et al. 1995). The *Shizoku* were the first participants in the modern school system, as they had less economic capital than the merchants and were forced to transform their cultural capital into diplomas and licenses for modern white-collar jobs (Amano 1992).

Dore insists that the significance of primary education had changed by this time for a much larger proportion of the population: there were more secondary schools; a higher proportion of each age group went to them; and preparation for them became a more important preoccupation for primary school children and their teachers. As a result, the discontinuity of the ruling class changed in the structure of Japanese society, and by the 1920s, Japan had become a "qualification society". Yo Takeuchi, who wrote many works on the historical relations among schools, universities, individuals, and the elite, refined both theoretical and empirical findings in his 1995 work, *Japanese Meritocracy*. He explains not only the rise of a mobile pattern in Japanese meritocracy but also the characteristics of Japanese meritocracy as compared to those of Britain and France. His analysis distinguishes Japanese meritocracy as not focused upon entry into the upper class for the purposes of upward social mobility (such as in Britain and France) but rather as working toward a national, harmonious culture that would enable such mobility. He observes that the Japanese meritocratic model was formed in the late 1910s (Takeuchi 1995: 246) and introduces further interesting examples from the 1930s as influenced by fascism (Takeuchi 1995: 248).

According to this research, the origin of a meritocratic, diploma-focused society appears to have been in the era between the First and Second World Wars. However, this opportunity must be explored in terms of how it appeared in secondary education and tertiary education, accounting for universalization and its relationship to the original social class structure. This section shall focus on this particular point by initially referring to the work of Joji Kikuchi, who comprehensively researched the opportunities for secondary education in modern Japan (Kikuchi 1967, 2003). His analysis considers both supply and demand, explaining the expansion of secondary schools and higher educational institutions through various case studies, as well as the progression of educational opportunities from the perspective of social background.

Table 3.1 Cross tabulation of career of primary school graduates by size of city and gender

	Male graduates			Female graduates		
	Big cities	Urban areas	Rural areas	Big cities	Urban areas	Rural areas
High schools	20.8	14.0	8.8	31.5	27.0	12.8
Technical schools	13.2	10.1	4.1	11.2	1.9	0.7
Upper primary schools	48.7	66.2	71.8	45.7	51.5	52.1
Youth schools	–	0.9	8.2	–	2.1	9.9
Other schools	5.6	0.1	–	6.6	1.9	0.3
Not going to school	11.7	8.7	7.1	5.0	15.6	24.2
No. of observation	197	4375	3554	197	4191	3354

Source: Kikuchi (2003: 273)

From the perspective of demand, Kikuchi deeply analyzed survey data on primary school graduates that included the level of household capital and students' school achievement in 1936 (Kikuchi 1967, 2003). He calculated the enrollment rate for secondary schools and estimated 19.5% among male graduates and 22.5% among female graduates. These rates refer to the number of those attending secondary schools and technical schools, and Kikuchi showed this variance as outlined Table 3.1.

Prior to World War II, the Japanese secondary school system was similar to the German tracking system between *Gymnasium* and *Hauptschule* and the traditional British separating system (Amano et al. 1994). In this era, the Japanese secondary education system was split between secondary schools and upper primary schools. Generally, secondary schools referred to high schools and technical schools, which were stratified by gender. These were the only schools in which students were taught foreign languages. As Kikuchi's (1967) analysis shows, the enrollment rate was around 20% even by 1936, meaning the lowest quantile in terms of economic capital was excluded from the opportunity of enrolling in secondary education in Japanese society. Kikuchi's recent work further displays the variance between cities and other areas, and he emphasizes the importance of comprehending that the boundary between the third quantile and the lowest quantile was not uniform but rather a boundary existed above the lowest quantile that varied between different regions (Kikuchi 2003). He concludes that Japanese "diplomaism" and its modern industrialized system arose locally only in urban areas in the time before World War II (Kikuchi 2003: 295).

This unequal situation transformed in the era of fascism, as a result of militarization and mobilization. Koketsu (1981) was the first Japanese scholar to focus on the national mobilization process in the two World Wars, terming it "total war," while Noguchi (1995; revised 2010) named the economic mobilization process the "1940 regime." Unfortunately, detailed research of this era is extremely difficult, because the freedom to speak and publish was strictly controlled by the national authority. However, we can raise some points at least from studies based on the fragments we do have (Oguma 2002; Kurita 2010). According to Kurita (2010), the mobilization process was an equalizing process for all social classes. His work and Oguma's share a focus on the process of moral destruction. The first point is that this mobilization process strongly decreased the economic power of the aristocracy, because all economic goods were claimed in this process. The standing of the Japanese upper class was altered not only by post-World War II reforms but also by the modernization process. The second point is that this mobilization process facilitated the aspirations of lower-class people. Research on Japanese military organization and military education has discussed the role of military scholarships for uplifting those in poverty. Though contemporary studies partially deny the strength of the possibility for upward mobility in military education (Takeishi 2010), stories such as that of Kurazo Suzuki, who became a lieutenant colonel from very poor origins, suggest otherwise (Sato 2004). Rieko Takada admits that the battlefield in World War II was the place in which the smaller number of upper-class people came face to face with the majority of lower-class people (Takada 2008). These chances of upward mobility and social conflicts became more visible through school education after World War II.

3.5 After World War II: The Second Wave of Mass Participation in Education

Following defeat in World War II, Japan was occupied for 7 years by the GHQ, SCAP (General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers). During that time, school education was chosen as one of the targets for reform. The GHQ changed Japanese school education to follow the style of the USA: a 6-year primary education, a 3-year lower secondary education (junior high school, *Chuu-gakkou*), a 3-year upper secondary education (high school, *Koutou-gakkuo*), and mostly a 4-year tertiary education. The GHQ emphasized various issues in its educational reform, one of the most significant being the realization of equal opportunities according to several criteria. For example, Japanese school education was integrated in terms of gender after secondary education.

Naturally, the most integral aspect of this reform was the democratization of Japanese school education. However, these reforms changed the examination system and also affected social stratification and social mobility in Japanese society. The most important reform involved the abolition of the tracking system at the lower secondary level. Japanese compulsory education was prolonged from 6 to 9 years, without either entrance or graduation examinations. All Japanese nationals began attending local primary schools and junior high schools for 9 years, and this transition was surprisingly swift and smooth compared to the struggle in the Meiji era.

The GHQ also reformed upper secondary education (high school) by attempting to invent a public school system similar to the one in the USA. They began to change the high school system according to three basic principles: gender equality (mixed gender schools), no entrance examinations, and comprehensive schools. However, this reform was imperfectly fulfilled compared to the changes to primary and lower secondary education, because upper secondary education was reformed according to old secondary schools, and local districts and local prefectures were responsible for implementing these changes (Kuroha 1974). Gender equality was one of the most fulfilled reforms, but some prefectures still have gender division in public high schools (Kagawa et al. 2014). Comprehensive education among high schools is still the least fulfilled reform, because local governments are responsible for it, and such changes require a larger budget. Consequently, Japanese high schools have continued to adhere to a school tracking system between schools and still require entrance examinations even though high schools are now equalized on the point of gender (Taki 2010). These high school entrance examinations have contributed significantly to the formation of a new Japanese society, as the examination system has become visible among all nations. Before this reform, the Japanese examination system was divided due to the fact that non-compulsory education was split between secondary schools for secondary education that did involve examinations and higher primary schools for postprimary education that did not involve examinations.

After the chaotic confusion immediately following the war, efforts to improve Japanese social mobility concentrated on education. As Meyer and other scholars have analyzed, the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s saw great educational expansion all over the world (Benavot 1983; Meyer and Rowan 1977). Unlike the human capital theories advanced by Becker (1962), Meyer insists that there was a noncausal relationship between this educational expansion and economic development. Clearly, it was a worldwide phenomenon, but Japanese society substantially changed in that era, in ways that were different from modernized European countries. In the UK for instance, secondary education expanded only after manual occupations held a considerable share of total employment; Kariya (2013) insists that the expansion of secondary education in the UK did not change people's perceptions of the role of education, as shown in Paul Willis's "Learning to Labour (Willis 1977)."

On the other hand, the Japanese case is quite different. The expansion of secondary school education coincided with a period in which manual employment drastically increased. Many Japanese researchers depict this as the Japanese postwar dream for a new middle class (Mori 2008; Murakami 1984). This is the upward mobility myth that arose from the wave of educational expansion and changing occupational structure; but it was not only myth: it also brought about great social transformation. From these analyses, we can say that the postwar era was an economic and educational miracle for Japan. We have more concrete numbers that indicate that the first 20 years after World War II constituted a special egalitarian era, clearly contrasting with the time before the war: students in the national university had the same income distribution as the nation overall in the early 1960s. Namely, students from the lowest income quintile occupied 19.7% of national university places, and students from the second lowest quintile occupied 20.2% (Rohlen 1977: 41).

Japanese school education and egalitarianism transformed to become more competitive as a result of the participation of the baby boomers (those born between



Fig. 3.1 Entrance to upper secondary schools, 1951–2011
Source: *School Basic Survey*, Ministry of Education. This graph is created by Mei Kagawa

1947 and 1949) and, from the mid-1960s, during the economic miracle. The demand these placed on school education was higher than the government's estimation. School construction could not catch up with the rate of this growth (Kagawa et al. 2014). Severe competition transformed some aspects of Japanese school education: first and foremost, the baby boomers enlarged the number of students entering high schools, as seen in Fig. 3.1. Figure 3.1 shows the real number of public high school students, private high school students, and graduates of junior high schools who did not go to high schools on the left side and rate of high school enrollment and the percentage of students in private high schools on the right side.

As we can understand from Fig. 3.1, the number of schools was insufficient for the first baby boomers, meaning many graduates could not go to high school. However, entrance to high school expanded overall opportunities in high school education: after the baby boomers left, high schools could accommodate more entrants, as the huge demand of the baby boomers had forced them to expand. This meant that they could accommodate a greater number of junior high school graduates. This process was how Japan achieved "high school education for all." Naturally, the country experienced some conflicts in the institutionalization process because of the increase and decrease in numbers of students. Hiroshi Ishida and other researchers described the institutionalization process of the school to work transition for junior high school graduates as "Golden Eggs" (Kariya et al. 2000; Kase 1997). On the other hand, the Teachers Union and parents raised their voices as a movement, demanding "Don't make 15-year-old students cry" (Kagawa et al. 2014).

This era marked the transformation process by which Japanese meritocracy became a "mass education society" (Kariya 1995). High schools with entrance examinations became more connected to junior high schools, making them more meritocratic. Junior high school instruction for streaming for high schools also prevailed. Universalized high school education has changed the Japanese national structure of school education, and this massive expansion also changed universities.

Colleges were also not prepared to accommodate so many students. The huge numbers of high school graduates becoming university students brought about a huge student resistance movement (Oguma 2009). The prestige of elitist universities had decreased, and the elitist culture in these universities diminished in that era (Takeuchi 2003). The arrival of baby boomers to colleges ended the elitist stage in Trow's terms. According to Takeuchi, the first generation of baby boomers that went to college, whose parents were not college educated, starkly questioned scholarly knowledge and intellectuals. As a result, the baby boomers denied the elitist culture of modern Japanese universities (Oguma 2009; Takeuchi 2003); this student movement transformed the discourse that held that university was not useful.

3.6 Conclusive Discussion

Japan has achieved universalization in all stages of schooling, from primary education to tertiary education. Consequently, this society of universalized education has achieved one of the highest educational achievements not only among students but also among older generations, as we can see from the results of surveys such as the PIAAC and PISA. Through my historical research, I can say that there were two important turning points for the development of Japanese school education and society.

The first turning point was the invention of the Japanese schooling model in the Meiji era. At this time, school education was imported but quickly adjusted to Japanese society, and the government developed systems for upward mobility, such as examinations (Amano 1983, 1992). On the other hand, this system was limited pointing terms of national equality, as I illustrated using Kikuchi's research (Kikuchi 1967, 2003). This restricted opportunity and inequality obstructed the national mobilization system during World War II, as we have seen through Kurita and Oguma's research (Kurita 2010; Oguma 2002). The second turning point responded to and sought to reform to this restricted, unequal prewar society, with partial support from the GHQ. Democratization and the massive population wave of the baby boomers opened Japanese school education up, and it began to admit far larger quantities of students. Through the boomers' entry to and expansion of high schools, Japan became a "high school for all society" (Kagawa et al. 2014). In addition, the arrival of second generation of baby boomers, whose parents were born in the 1940s, transformed Japanese higher education, making it universal in Trow's terms.

These two turning points made it possible for Japanese society to find and cultivate new, bright human resources from every social class. Japan has developed school education with the philosophy that citizens will attain higher positions with higher education, in line with Fukuzawa's thoughts (Fukuzawa et al. 2013). Its philosophy accelerated, transformed, and became universalized among all nations after World War II. However, another principle about education is still alive in contemporary Japan. Fukuzawa insisted on the necessity of school tuition (Amano 1992). This thought refined the beneficiary principle in those days, and it is the philosophical basis of Japanese school education, especially post-compulsory education. As many researchers point out, the Japanese government's expenditure on education is the lowest of all OECD countries, and this places a financial burden on individual households (Ooka 2014; Yano 2011). This structure of expenditure compounds the problem of the Japanese social class structure and education, as many Japanese sociological studies of education demonstrate. In recent years, the Japanese higher education enrollment rate has not increased much: it was at 54.3% in 2010 and 54.6% in 2015, in spite of a decreasing youth population and the expansion of tertiary education. We need to invent a new, equal school education system to make it possible to find and teach new, bright human resources from every social class.

We have another finding from this historical account: Japan becomes a completely "schooled" society, borrowing Illich's term (Illich 1973). As I noted in the previous sections, almost all young people go to high schools, and over half of the people go to universities in Japan. As I wrote in another article, Japanese schools have great apparatuses for the "state commons," in contrast to the French "state nobility" as outlined by Pierre Bourdieu (Aizawa and Iso 2016). Japanese schools have, for better or worse, a great apparatus for addressing social inequality, involving various activities. This is partly very inclusive, but it also has very exclusive aspects, especially for children who do not go to schools (Aizawa et al. in print). Namely, not going to school results in social stigma in Japanese society. This stigma prevails even up to the level of higher education, so that many people go to colleges even when they have to take out student loans. This "schooled" society means that school is deeply rooted in contemporary Japanese society. Therefore, problems with Japanese youth are often similar to the problems with Japanese schools, and vice versa. The school is expected to solve youth problems, and they have tried to cope with these problems. Naturally, it is impossible for schools to completely solve social problems, but people often expect this.

Acknowledgment This work would not have been possible without fruitful discussion with Jürgen Schriewer, Katja Schmidtpott, Takehiko Kariya, and Hideyasu Kodama. Mei Kagawa not only contributed to the discussion but also helped with graph construction. Ami Kobayashi and Kentaro Hori helped with bibliography construction. Arthur Meerman, Gabriel Innes, and Editage gave linguistic help. This author is grateful to the Chukyo University Research Fund for financial assistance with this research. Finally, I appreciate the extremely tolerant acceptance of this manuscript by editorial members, especially Akiyoshi Yonezawa.

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Chapter 4
Borrowings, Modernity, and De-axialization: Rethinking the Educational Research Agenda for a Global Age

Jeremy Rappleye

Abstract This chapter invites readers, both non-Japanese and Japanese alike, to contemplate how Japan's educational sociology can take its rightful place in the global conversation but in ways that avoid being reduced to either comfortable commonality or incommensurable uniqueness. It argues for greater attention to the themes of "borrowing" and the processes of externally driven modernity. It deepens this discussion with reference to rich comparative-historical sociological work that has long argued that Japan constitutes a civilization distinct in its non-axial premises. It concludes with reflections on the current state of the field and an appeal, particularly aimed at younger scholars, to remain committed to *de-axialization* as the way forward in this new Global Age.

4.1 Introduction: From Golden Age to Global Age

Today it is arguably more difficult to do educational sociology in Japan than at any other time in history. Since the field's founding in 1948, there has never been as much pressure to internationalize. This first-ever English-language volume itself is evidence of that. At the same time, there has never been *less* interest in Japan's educational research by those outside of Japan. In stark contrast to the postwar fascination with Japanese society and education that reached a resounding crescendo in the 1980s, today relatively few non-Japanese social scientists are interested in Japan. Fewer still are invested in terms of language proficiency, networks with Japanese scholars, and ongoing data collection.

One consequence of this shift from the Golden Age to the Global Age is that the current generation of educational sociologists in Japan is forced to confront new, far more challenging questions, ones that the previous generation could simply leave to

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A. Yonezawa et al. (eds.), *Japanese Education in a Global Age*, Education in the Asia-Pacific Region: Issues, Concerns and Prospects 46,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-1528-2_4

foreign scholars to answer: Why is Japan's educational research relevant for those outside Japan? How can research on Japanese education be shaped in ways that have larger global significance? How can one resolve the insoluble tensions between domestic relevance and international visibility for a context so "different" as Japan?

Following these questions, the issue of similarity and difference inevitably emerges to take center stage. For those emphasizing similarities, Japan tends to be read in alignment: there is nothing fundamentally unique about Japan; it can be compared as any other "case" to weigh in larger global debates in education, sociology, policy, and practice. From this perspective, sociologists of Japanese education just need to do a better job of articulating "the case of Japan" within converging global debates.

On the other side stand those championing differences. For this group, Japan tends to be read in divergence: Japan cannot be understood through sociological theory originally derived from Western societies; its road to modernity was different, and it is useful as a "case" only in so far as it shows how much an ill-fit Western sociology is. Japanese sociology will always remain apart. From this angle, sociologists of Japanese education had best continue highlighting difference and exposing incommensurability. If the world is no longer interested in Japan, it is little fault of Japanese educational sociologists: Why waste time speaking to world that does not want to listen anyways?

Cognizant of the challenging new world facing Japanese sociology of education and yet interested in exploring ways out of the similarity/difference impasse, this chapter seeks to outline an alternative research agenda for educational sociologists in Japan. The aim is to invite readers, both non-Japanese and Japanese alike, to begin contemplating how "Japan" might be resuscitated and to open a discussion on how Japan's educational sociology can take its rightful place in the global conversation but without being reduced to either comfortable commonality or incommensurable uniqueness. I stress here at the outset that many attempts at reconceptualization need to be made, with this chapter an example of what such work might look like.

The alternative sketch I unfolds here makes four moves. The first is to center the phenomenon of educational borrowing. After reviewing relevant examples, I argue that the topic should be the new empirical focus of a reconstituted field, not least because it forces scholars out of the comforts of methodological nationalism. The second move is to step back and situate this new empirical focus against a larger historical backdrop: Japan's appropriation of Western modernity. I argue here that Koto's (2006) notion of *externally driven modernity* is a more useful way to conceptualize the Japanese experience than mainstream models offered up by Western social theory. The third move is to take another step back, thinking theoretically and philosophically through "civilization analysis." The key questions here become: What is the deeper source of Japan's penchant for borrowing and cross-civilizational learning? How can we understand the recurrence and refinement of import? Here I draw on the work of comparative-historical sociologists who argue Japan constitutes a civilization distinct in its non-axial premises. In my fourth and final move, I return to think about why educational sociologists in Japan have not focused much on these themes to date, undertaking a brief rereading of the field since its founding after the World War II. I conclude by arguing that the way forward for educational sociology on Japan in the Global Age is to continue the work of *de-axialization*.

In constructing this sketch, I draw roughly equally on Japanese and non-Japanese works. This reflects my latest thinking on more than a decade of work seeking articulate the Japanese "case" to a global audience (e.g., Rappleye 2007; Rappleye and Komatsu 2017) but in a way that does not succumb to the easy extremes of convergence or incommensurability. It also reflects a life course that has unfolded with one foot in Anglo-America and one foot in Japan. The result is pastiche but hopefully less so in the negative English sense of incongruity or hodgepodge and more so in the Japanese sense of *konsei* (混成). It is precisely the spatial "in-betweenness" and temporally "yet unfinished" nature of pastiche that makes it an attractive alternative for the Global Age.

4.2 Japan as Successful Borrower: The Empirical Foci

When viewed with even the slightest amount of global historical imagination, it is immediately evident that nearly every sphere of Japanese society is marked by "borrowings" from the outside world. From French bread to baseball, Chinese characters to *cha* (tea), translated books to Buddhists temples, and hybrid motorcars to modern clocks, arguably every facet of contemporary Japanese society announces its connected, *relational* history. But not just that: these same artifacts reveal an unprecedented capacity for things borrowed to be remade and *refined* upon insertion into the social space called "Japan."

Although labeling something as "success" threatens endless debates over divergent norms, can't the claim of Japanese borrowing prowess be defended by pointing out that those who originally invented something have later *reimported* the refined Japanese version? For example, hundreds of Chinese character combinations invented by the Japanese (wasei kango) to make sense of Western modernity were later reimported into China by Chinese students studying abroad in Japan. Today these words continue to be a central pillar of the modern Chinese language. Japanese ramen is now more popular in Chinese cities than the once-famed flour noodles and beef broth of Lanzhou in Western China that were its origin. Toyota cars continue to dominate American and global markets, in effect a reimport of the motorcar refined through the Japanese *kaizen* for less pollution, better gas mileage, superior performance, and lower cost. Even clocks and watches, so ubiquitous in our modern world, that were once the purview of a small group of Swiss artisans were refined by the Japanese to become the leading global brands of today: Citizen, Casio, and Seiko. And should some readers demand more consequential examples, consider that Japan is home to more Nobel Prize winners than any other non-Western country (all of which had to import Western science). Japan is also widely credited with reinventing capitalism itself in the form of the development state (Johnson 1982), a process that has made Japan one of the world's leading economic powers.

These twin themes of *relationality* and *refinement* are everywhere evident in the field of education as well. From the Meiji origins of the modern system right through to today's *active learning* (アクティブラーニング), there is hardly a sphere of Japanese education that cannot be traced to a borrowing from the outside world. At the same time, large-scale international achievement tests such as the TIMSS and PISA have continually evaluated Japan as among the highest performing modern systems in the world. That is, Japan now educationally outperforms the Western countries from which it previously borrowed. It is little surprise then that just like *kanji* and motorcars, the world has sought to borrow Japanese educational innovations, including approaches to mathematics instruction, whole-class teaching, and structuring of curriculum. One of the most visible recent attempts to borrow has been the American borrowing of Japanese Lesson Study (授業研究), now crystallizing into a teacher education reform movement that has now spread globally to education systems as diverse as Australia, China, England, Indonesia, Hong Kong, Singapore, Iran, and Germany (Rappleye and Komatsu 2017). While all non-Western modern education systems were constituted through relationality, which of them can match Japan's record for *refinement*?

Before pondering the "secrets" underlying this success, let us first examine what new perspectives on Japanese education arise once international connections become the focus. Because educational borrowings are ubiquitous, I here review just two, selected to speak to the larger framework of this edited volume: (i) the origins and unfolding of the mass modern system and (ii) policies aiming to achieve educational equality.

Japan's modern mass education system not only began with an unprecedented act of institutional borrowing, but the primary driver of subsequent cycles of policy formulation/revision has nearly always been educational developments in Western countries. In some sense, this was a selective splicing together of the best from the West: America's universal primary school system, France's centralized administration, and German universities among others (see Shibata 2004). More directly, one David Murray, recruited from Rutgers University by Mori Arinori during the Iwakura Mission, served as a leading writer of policy in the most formative period of the modern system (Duke 2009, 237–245). One Marion Scott of San Francisco who took a position as head of the newly established Normal School of Tokyo in 1872 became the Ministry's key advisor on textbooks, curricula, and teacher training curricula (Lincicome 1995). By 1893, of the 130 university professors in Japan at the time, only 30 lacked experience abroad, mostly thanks to massive government outlays to send students abroad (Amano 1997, p. 264). There is simply no precedent anywhere in world history for Japan's voluntary, wholesale appropriation of the institutions of Western modernity (Westney 1987). Not least among these was modern education itself. It was viewed as the lynchpin of rearticulating "Japan" within the modern world – a bold act framed as "catch-up" with Western countries who, in their Black Ships, looked poised to reduce Japan to a Western colony.

Nor did the salience of the Western example wane in subsequent policy formulation cycles. Since Meiji, "catch-up" with Western countries has continued to function as the lodestar of Japanese educational policy debates (Rappleye and Kariya 2011;

Rohlen 1983), legitimating nearly everything from expanding access to reducing class size to reforming pedagogical and curricular models. Even in periods when modern Japanese policymakers seemed to resolutely turn away from Western learning, they were often still tacitly playing the game of "catch-up." Consider the 1890 Imperial Rescript on Education (kyoiku chokugo). It was the rescript that would enshrine the emperor's pictures in schools and tighten the linkage between schooling, state loyalty, and imperial authority. Although on the surface it appeared to be the reassertion of primordial tradition, in fact the movement can be traced to an attempt by Meiji oligarchs to borrow Western notions of the state: constitutional monarchy backed culturally by explicit religious authority. As Itō Hirobumi, chief architect of the Meiji Constitution (1889), remarked of the new modern regime:

> In Japan the power of religion is slight, and there is none that could serve as the axis of the state. Buddhism, when it flourished, was able to unite people of all classes, but it is today in a state of decline. Shinto, though it is based upon and perpetuates the teachings of our ancestors, as a religion lacks the power to move the hearts of men. In Japan, it is only the imperial house that can become the axis of the state. It is with this point in mind that we have placed so high a value on imperial authority and endeavored to restrict it as little as possible. (Cited in Jansen 2000, 393)

Here the modern state – the very institution that underwrites modern, mass education – was being constructed out of international transactions.[1]

Another illustrative example is postwar policies aimed at educational equality. On one level there is no denying that the immediate, drastic postwar shift in the years 1945–1952 was a direct result of policy imposition by the American Occupation: the departure from the prewar European-inspired elitist system through merger of elite institutions with "lesser" ones, expansion of access through rendering lower secondary schooling compulsory, and relocation of administrative control from the central Ministry to local school boards. Yet on another somewhat deeper level, the postwar commitment to educational equality was a result of a substantive embrace of the democratic ideals by postwar Japanese leaders now in charge at the reorganized Ministry of Education. Undertaking one of the most comprehensive recent reviews of the origins of the postwar educational financing blueprint ever conducted, Kariya (2009) highlights the writings of one Naito Takasaburo, a policymaker who would eventually rise to become Vice-Minister of Education and played a leading role in the *Committee for National Educational Financing* (1952). Takasaburo clearly spells out the new connections the Ministry itself was making between equality of educational opportunity and its new methods of educational financing:

> The postwar education reform rests on the following two basic principles and is thus deeply rooted in them: (1) Education is of the greatest importance for a democratic country; (2) Democratic society affords equal status to all its members and within education it ensures equal opportunity. The potential for such a guarantee begins with secure financial support; (3) The fundamental principles of democratic education reform and educational financing

[1] For more nuanced, critical readings of this history and intellectual environment in English, see Kuroda (1981), Hardacre (1989), and Skya (2009).

> are assurances of the fruits of mankind's collective efforts over a long stretch of time to attain freedom. The new Japanese Constitution is in line with this, ensuring these principles as an everlasting, inviolable right for Japanese citizens of today and tomorrow. The Constitution and the Fundamental Law of Education frame the principles of equality of educational opportunity grounded on these fundamental principles. Without discrimination based on race, creed, gender, social standing, economic status, or family origin, these laws stipulate the principle of an economic guarantee that all shall enjoy the fundamental principles of free compulsory education. (Cited in Kariya 2009, pg. 112)

Here was the arrival of policy ideas that could trace its origins back through the idealism of the American Occupation to the promise of the French Revolution: democracy, equality, freedom rights, citizenship, and solidarity ("mankind's collective efforts"). Based on these ideas, the Ministry promulgated the *law concerning the central government's share of compulsory education* (1958). This ensured Ministry financial support to allow all schools nationwide to achieve a "minimum criteria" in virtually every domain: homeroom class sizes, teacher deployment and salaries, institutional facilities, classroom equipment, and so on. The Ministry viewed the achievement of this "minimum criteria" as the realization of equality of opportunity itself, another step in the direction of the "catch-up" cynosure.

However, what is most interesting this time is less international connectivity, more the ways in which the Japanese context *transformed* the notion of equality of educational opportunity. Kariya (2009) highlights how even though Japanese policymakers were committed to equalizing educational opportunity they did not simply adopt the American model to do so. In America, educational financing was "per head," meaning that schools would receive state funding based on the number of students enrolled and the number of "pupil hours" that teachers instructed. From this basic financial calculation scheme, schools were given authority, albeit to varying degrees, to determine how funding should be allocated, dispersed, and utilized. In contrast, in the Japanese Ministry's postwar subsidy scheme, the calculation formula was comprised in a wholly different way: setting an upper threshold on class size, calculating the number of "homeroom units" needed to serve a given student population, calculating the corresponding number of teachers, and then providing Ministry support for a percentage of those salaries.

The key point is that funding in postwar Japan was calculated not based on individuals but on homeroom units – *groups*. Kariya (2009) labels this alternative scheme "The World of Standardization," showing how it came to be institutionalized and how it contributed to a "surface equality" revolution that served to homogenize nearly every aspect of the system, right down to viewing any differential treatment approach (e.g., ability tracking, steaming) as anathema to the ideal of equality of educational opportunity. In short, not only was the ideal of equality of opportunity – *perhaps the most important topic of postwar sociology of education in Japan* – another demonstration of the central role international borrowings have played in Japanese educational policy formation, but it shows that something in the Japanese context is at work that changes, transforms, or refracts what is imported from abroad.

The two sketches above of the internationally connected, relational character of Japanese educational policy might still be too rough to impress scholars committed to mining empirical richness. Other readers might protest that focusing attention on substantive borrowings can give the mistaken impression that everything that appears to be borrowed in fact signifies substantive spatial "movement" of policy or practice from a foreign context. Indeed, there are a wealth of examples that underscore "phony borrowing" (Phillips 2004), i.e., references to conditions elsewhere that function to reinforce or reinscribe long-standing reform preferences into reform debates. One recent example would be the English Education Research Group (英国教育調査団), a group comprised of high-ranking Liberal Democratic Party leaders who argued that that road to "rebuild" Japanese education was through emulation of Margaret Thatcher's reforms in England (Nakanishi 2004). Led by Prime Minister Abe and former Minister of Education Shimomura Hakubun, the group came back from just 2 weeks of meetings with key British policymakers central to Thatcher's 1988 Education Reform Act (e.g., Kenneth Baker), to propose a whole list of education policy reforms for Japan. The problem was, of course, that the group came back with the very recommendations they had set out to England with: reform of "masochistic" history textbooks, inculcation of "love of country" curricula, and revision of the Fundamental Law of Education (Rappleye 2012; Takayama and Apple 2008). Rather than borrowing, then, this was the rearticulation of long-standing ideological agendas in the tried-and-true language of developments in "advanced" foreign countries.

Notwithstanding various episodes of the foreign example being blatantly fabricated to catalyze reform (imagined *gaiatsu*), this cannot detract from the fact that virtually every facet of Japanese education rose *relationally* through international transactions.

But so what? Why is this perspective important? Why is it necessary to move international connections – a dimension long peripheral or all together forgotten – to the center of future empirical work? Let us now turn to see how relationally sensitive empirical work opens up onto far more ambitious ways of viewing Japan.

4.3 Japanese Modernity as Externally Driven: The Conceptual Lens

> Japan has shown a remarkable capacity to absorb foreign culture on its own terms in a series of "revolutions from above," for example, the seventh century appropriation of Chinese culture and the Meiji appropriation of Western culture. The American Occupation imposed a liberal constitution but most of the American-inspired reforms were carried out by Japanese in their own way. Through all these enormous changes the basic premises of Japanese society, through drastically reformulated, have remained nonaxial. That is, the axial and subsequent differentiations between transcendent reality and the state, between state and society, and between society and self have not been completed. (Bellah 2003, 59)



Fig. 4.1 Koto Yusuke's concepts of externally driven and internally induced modernity. (Redrawn from the original, see Koto 2006, pg. 166–167)

Centering international interconnections in our empirical work inevitably raises challenging questions over the precise nature of Japanese modernity and role that education has played therein. Modernity has perhaps been *the* key puzzle for Western social theory from its very origins. As such, many Japanese scholars have tried to understand the Japanese experience through such lenses, usually concluding however that Western theories are an ill-fit (e.g., Masao 1963). To better understand the key distinctions, the work of Japanese sociologist Koto (2006) may be useful, particularly his conceptual distinction between *internally induced modernity* (IIM) and *externally driven modernity* (EDM), as depicted in Fig. 4.1.

In the case of internally induced modernity (IIM), phase I is characterized by the rise of the capitalist middle classes (bourgeois) driven by changes in the nature of production, technological advances, and the new lifestyles generated by the surplus capital created. Phase II is termed the revolutionary stage of modern society, marked by divergence and then standoff between the modern middle classes on one side and the elites and commoners on the other side. Phase III is modern society embedded with duality. Here the split is an ideological axis of modernism/traditionalism. On the side of traditionalism, the "discovery of tradition" attempts to neutralize the threat of new middle-class, modern (bourgeois) values. Social "tradition" is discovered in relation to modern values it seeks to oppose and then integrated to greater or lesser degrees into formal schooling. Here modern forms gradually expand their share of the social space, pushing upward and downward to eventually overrun both elite and lower-class cultural forms and modes of production. Modernism and traditionalism exist together in a "conflicting division of labor" but also find their dynamism in this opposition: each move by modernity to expand its scope elicits a response from traditionalism that creates more "tradition," in turn fueling another round of modern development. In this way, the dynamism underpinning "internally driven" modernity is induced *within* society itself.

These dynamics are wholly different in the case of externally driven modernity (EDM). Here Koto underscores less class conflicts, more the division between a "modern elite"s above and a "native base" below. In phase I, modernity "arrives" rather than evolves out of domestic socioeconomic developments. This sudden arrival of modernity falls squarely on the shoulders of pre-modern elites ("the core"), usually backed by force of arms or imposition of binding legal agreements such as unequal treaties (不平等条約). As Koto explains: "In the case of the externally driven modernization the impact and push for modernization comes in the form of a direct threat to the core. Perry walked off his Black Ships and made his intrusive demands on the Tokugawa Shogunate and no one else" (171).

Phase II emerges when pre-modern elites begin to "modernize" (read: Westernize), creating divergence and an axis of conflict with the "native" society below. Koto posits that after a long period of "repeated attempts to resist" the new order, the native elites "ultimately realize that the only means to survival is to actively push forward modernization. Thus, they become the active bearers of modernity" (172). Koto thus terms this period the "Acceptance and Resistance of Modernity" – elites accepting and the native base resisting.

In phase III, this axis of conflict between modernizing (Westernizing) elites and the native base subsides. In its place arises a double movement. First there is the gradual immigration from the "native" social formations into the new modern social structures set up by modernizing elites. Unlike in the IIM (Western) model where political-cum-social structures lag behind cultural change, here political-cum-social structures exist in advance of cultural change. This is highly significant for education: modern Western schools become the channel for the native base to become a member of the "modern elite." Koto pays particular attention to the cultural dynamics of phase III, centered on the term "Fuzokuka" (風俗化), perhaps best translated to English as "Becoming and Vulgarization."

The resulting society is one Koto calls "A Layered Modern-Native Society." For the elites, modernity entailed not simply imitation but virtually becoming Western: "Native elites could not stop at simple imitation. They had to become modernity, digesting it to become translators of culture" (174). In contrast, for the increasing number of non-elites who aspired to this "becoming," they had to study and imitate, attempting to replicate the cultural tradition passed down by the translating elites. Cultural change was, in this sense, both bottom-up and top-down. Koto employs the term *pastiche* to describe the situation, with all its implications of borrowing and incongruity.

Viewed against the wider backdrop of EDM, might it become possible to situate various, apparently unrelated borrowings across various social spheres? Through such a lens, don't the dynamics of borrowing that characterize so much of Japanese education and society come into clearer focus? Prompted by Perry's Black Ships (arriving off the Japan coast in 1853), Japanese elites have attempted to refashion Japanese society along Western lines primarily through the translation of Western form. Foremost among these translated forms were the modern state and modern education system, as in the previous section. Once in place, the modern schools became the primary channel through which the "revolution from above" unfolded, with upward selection based primarily on different degrees of mastery (or at least perceived mastery) of the translated Western forms.

Yet, while the account above may help us understand borrowings more broadly, it still does not provide clues to *refinemen*t. Put simply: How is it that translated forms become *better* than the original import? What is the "secret" of Japanese success? This latter puzzle is difficult to answer through Koto Yusuke's top-down, structuralist perspective alone. Instead, we must continue moving to a deeper level, beyond concepts to theory and philosophy.

4.4 Japanese Modernity as Non-axial: The Theoretical-Philosophical Hypothesis

"Civilization analysis" is the name given to a growing body of work interested in constructing a more open, diverse global sociological dialogue (for a discussion in Japanese, see Yazawa 2014). It seeks to return to sociology's comparative-historical foundations in order to rethink the founding assumptions generated out of the ideal type of European modernity. The project traces its roots to Max Weber's (1922) comparative sociology of religions but crystallizes in existential philosopher Karl Jaspers' *The Origin and Goal of History* (1949). Jaspers put forth the idea of "axial civilizations," the notion that sometime between the eighth and third century BC new ways of thinking appeared in human societies in various places globally. These new ways of thinking centered on the quest for the meaning of human existence, giving rise to such projects as religion, philosophy, and history. Concretely, this was the age when thinkers such as Lao-Tzu and Confucius emerged in China, the Upanishads and Buddha appeared in India, Zarathustra taught in Persia, several major prophets arose in what is now Palestine, and Parmenides and Plato became dominant in Greece: "In this age were born the fundamental categories within which we still think today…the step into universality was taken in every sense" (Jaspers 1949, 3).

But what exactly does "axial" signify? And what are the educational implications? For Jaspers, the key term axial signified a central or principal intellectual structure around which everything revolved and one that facilitated the ascent to "universality," a theory about human existence that would come to structure human consciousness and legitimate institutional-cum-social structures. One familiar example is the Western notion of Platonic form: nonphysical Forms represent the most accurate, "real" ontological reality. It was this view that came to legitimate the notion of philosophical inquiry, Socratic dialogue, Plato's Academy, Aristotle's Lyceum, and various other institutions in Classical Greece (Eisenstadt 1986; see also Sullivan 2012). It was this same fundamental axial "grammar" that would return in the form Christianity (Greek thought admixed with Judaism), resulting in the institutions of the Catholic Church, theological seminaries, and the earliest European universities (e.g., Oxford University still reveals its origins as a religious training institute through its motto: *Dominus Illuminatio Mea*, "The Lord is My Light").

In other words, in the Judeo-Greek West thought was fundamentally structured around a central, vertical axis: the idea of a transcendent Form/God with whom each individual soul could approach through reason, language, and logic (*Logos*), aided by priest-teachers who taught in institutions called schools and universities. This process of seeking to attain the ontological high ground conversely disembedded individuals from the surrounding social *mythos* and individualized them in relation to transcendent Form.[2] In effect, what Jaspers was seeking to construct with the Axial Age notion was a comparative-historical framework rooted in the divergent ways in which different civilizations grasped existence itself.

But what could possibly be the significance of civilizational analysis for understanding Japan generally? For repositioning sociological research on education in Japan in particular? In fact, Karl Jaspers much like Max Weber and Talcott Parsons was dismissive of Japan, viewing it as simply an incomplete copy of Chinese Confucian civilization. Yet, as later research emerged revealing how different Japan was from China, Japan soon became an object of intense fascination. This is demonstrated by S.N. Eisenstadt's (1996) *Japanese Civilization: A Comparative View*, Robert Bellah's (2003) *Imagining Japan: The Japanese Tradition and Its Modern Interpretation*, and J.P. Arnason's (1997) *Social Theory and the Japanese Experience: The Dual Civilization*. What most fascinated these thinkers was that Japan appeared to be *non-axial*. That is, Japan never achieved a transcendental breakthrough and instead found alternatives ways to order society:

> Any institutional arena – political, economic, family and cultural creativity, or individual, group or organizations – has been defined in terms of its relation to the social nexus in which it was embedded…The distinctive characteristic…[is] that they were not defined in relation to some principles transcending them. Thus, social actors, individuals or institutional arenas have been defined in their relation to other such actors not as autonomous ontological entities, but in terms of their mutual interweaving in common frameworks or contexts. (Eisenstadt 1999, pp. 2–3)

Instead of organizing society around a central axis of transcendence as in the West, Japanese society was and continues to be constituted by webs of social relations. Social actors are recognized less as autonomous and ontologically distinct

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[2] China represents another example, a civilization whose axis revolved, albeit quite divergent from the West, around an Emperor who had to align with the universal Mandate of Heaven (tianming), usually through following the teachings of the Confucian sages (see Schwarz 1985; Hall and Ames 1998; as related to subjectivity, see Zhao 2009).

and more as interweaving and ontologically co-arising.[3] Social relations are not subordinate to an autonomous ontological reality "out there" but are given precedence in defining and continually defining ontological-cum-social reality.

To understand this more clearly, let us briefly revisit the examples raised above, this time in reverse order: (i) postwar policies aimed at achieving educational equality in the postwar period and (ii) the borrowing of modern educational institutions during the early Meiji period.

Recall that in the immediate postwar period, Ministry policymakers attempted to study, imitate, and implement reforms aimed at American-style educational equality. Yet, rather than implement a "per head" funding scheme that would have *individualized* students, what ultimately emerged was a "World of Standardization" arrangement that allocated funding based on *groups* of students (e.g., homeroom units). Although Kariya (2009) emphasizes the material constraints (i.e., lack of funding) that play a part in this decision, when viewed through the conceptual lens of externally driven modernity, things begin to look somewhat different: less a result of lack of funds and more the imposition and subsequent appropriation of the principle of equality by the native base. That is, elite policymakers indeed became Western in a sense (recall Takasaburo's comments), but the process of "vulgarization" was also critical: the removal of elements that would permit individuals to be defined by something beyond the immediate local social nexus (i.e., as individuals in relation to state policies; individuals as ontological realities). To lend support to such a reading, one might also cite a range of pedagogical practices in Japanese schools that actively seek to create and embed notions of a social nexus, e.g., school lunches, classroom cleaning, whole-class teaching, nonintervention by teachers in disputes, sports festivals, and club activities (Tsuneyoshi 1992, 2001; Tobin et al. 1991, 2009; Cave 2007, 2016). A further example would be the widespread practice of Lesson Study (授業研究; see Rappleye and Komatsu 2017). All of these practices can trace roots in the prewar and even pre-Meiji period, thus suggesting these cannot be explained solely by material constraints or postwar reconstruction alone.

The early Meiji borrowing of modern Western educational institutions exhibits a similar process, although it unfolds somewhat differently. Beginning with Iwakura Mission and the hiring of thousands of *oyatoi-gaikokujin*, the earliest episodes of borrowing were focused but indiscriminate. That is, Meiji policymakers had clearly identified which features of which Western system to adopt, but they made few distinctions about what to select within that sphere. One illustrative example is elementary schools, particularly textbooks and curriculum. Meiji leaders had identified the American model of elementary education, prompting the appointment of American Marion Scott as head of the Normal School of Tokyo. What Scott wrote and the

[3] Of note here are connections to sociologist John Clammer (1995) who writes: "A vitally interesting question here is whether Japan has succeeded in taming modernity by understanding subjectivity (shutaisei) not as the opposite of the 'objective' but as the creation of a form of experience which locates the evanescence of modern life in the restraining context of an essentially social order." Future work might wish to explore what connections this view of ontology has with premodern traditions (in English see Izutsu 2008).

Ministry approved was a virtual carbon copy of what was used in San Francisco elementary schools.

This was, as expected, very much at odds with the traditional subjects of temple (terakoya) and domain (han) schools already in place in rural communities. As such, this indiscriminate borrowing provoked a backlash when it was rolled out in localities. As one prominent Western historian summarizes:

> Moral education proved to be a major obstacle to the new school system. To many rural parents, a disproportionate emphasis was placed on the new technical subjects, science and mathematics, in a policy objective by the government to lay the basis for a modern industrial society… The new public schools were thus often regarded as appealing only to the intellect. In contrast, the terakoya schools, according to the prevalent attitude of the day, appealed to the heart. (Duke 2009, 161)

Other *oyatoi-gaikokujin* including William Clark, president of the Sapporo Agricultural College, actively promoted moral education but insisted that his puritanical reading of the Christian faith become the basis of moral teachings.

These frictions rose in intensity as the modern school system rapidly expanded in scope through the 1870s, until the Imperial Household issued the *Imperial Will on Education* (1879). Written by the Meiji Emperor's education advisor Motoda Nagazane after the Emperor had personally toured rural classrooms, it stated that what Western schools taught were "only values of fact-gathering and technique, thus violating the rules of good manners and bringing harm to our customary ways" (see Duke 2009, 274–280). More specifically, Motoda argued that education was fundamentally moral in character but that the basis of this morality could not be an imported Western Christianity focused on a transcendent God but on social relations. It was the opening salvo in an original reverse course that eventually led to the Imperial Rescript on Education (1890), portraits of the Emperor being placed in schools, and other practices aimed at matching Western techniques with "moral" teachings (here see Mitani 2017, 213–246 who explicitly links the Rescript with discussions of an axis (機軸)).

The parallels between the postwar and early Meiji periods when we view the borrowing process against the wider motif of *removal* or purging of transcendent elements would allow individuals to define themselves outside the social nexus. That is, the emphasis on moral education that began around 1880 can be read as the reassertion of social relations in place of (i) intellectual transcendence (valuing "fact-gathering and technique" above social utility or relations) and or (ii) moral-cum-ontological transcendence (through recourse to an ultimate Christian morality and ontologically autonomous individualized souls). Put simply, the social space of Japan had *de-axialized* educational forms that were first imported the Western axial "grammar" embedded, much as it did postwar.

And might it be precisely this recurrent *de-axialization* movement that is the "secret" of Japanese success in refining borrowings? Might *de-axialization* be both cause and correlate of the non-axial social space that so fascinates leading comparative sociologists abroad? *De-axialization* signifies the removal of the myth of transcendent reality or immutable principles, the dismantling of any ideas gaining legitimacy from the idea that something exists beyond the social nexus that constructs it. As opposed to an axial civilization like the West where belief in a transcendent reality makes possible a number of key distinctions including ideal/mundane, state/society, and society/self and enables action based on principles alone, in Japan, such distinctions are unclear, inaccessible, misunderstood, or incomplete (much to the frustration liberal social scientists such as Masao (1963)). Put simply, much of what is borrowed is later evaluated less on fidelity to the original and more on the usefulness within the needs of the social nexus. And because the needs of the social nexus change, there is necessarily an ongoing process of *refinement*. In contrast, in social contexts where axiality has been achieved and some principles are transcendent (and thus actors become ontologically autonomous), it is revolutions, ruptures, and rivalries that preempt refinement. Adherence to constants takes prominence over openness to change.

The key is that in *non-axial* contexts, the center is always open – a particularly receptive nucleus becomes the ground on which recurrent borrowings and ongoing refinement become possible. Might this feature of the Japanese context, when situated within growing global interest in civilizational analysis and critiques of Western worldviews, become a useful alternative theoretical-philosophical hypothesis opening up fresh lines for future research?

4.5 Sociology of Education in Japan: A Reevaluation of the Field

On the whole, sociologists of education in Japan have not focused on the themes highlight above: international borrowings, externally driven modernity, civilizational analyses, and *de-axialization*. Why? One way to understand why is to critically revisit the origins of the field itself.

Founded in 1948, the Japan Society of Educational Sociology (JSES) was a product of the immediate postwar period. Constituted the year after the enactment of the Fundamental Law of Education (1947), the field also emerged amidst the high tide of American idealism and confidence, infused with the notion that education was the key to throwing off the militarism, replacing ‘feudalism’ with democracy, eradicating myth through promoting science, and ensuring equality social opportunity. One scholar relates the general feeling of the immediate postwar period:

> Social science in the early postwar decades may be equated with what is known as modernism (kindaishugi), and with an assault on Japan’s “negative distinctiveness” as a state and society. Its temporal starting point was defeat and occupation, its critical genesis a drive to expose the causes of Japan’s disaster….As part of this effort, the task of the social science as a whole was for the first time seen as a critique of the past, and of the present to the extent that it perpetuated the past...The assault on the negative distinctiveness was itself a means to a positive end: the exploration and promotion, in the Japanese context, of new human possibilities that the bitter experience of repression, war, defeat, and occupation had revealed. To open up these possibilities and translate them to a needy populace was indeed an elitist project: Japan’s people were now, finally, to be made fully modern. (Barshay 2004, 62–64)

Arguably these trends were strongest in the field of education. Pressed into service of these political-cum-education goals were sociological theories that had successfully survived the American purge of the Japanese academy – most prominently Marxism – and those theories then dominant in the United States, particularly Parsonian structural-functionalism.

Functionalism evolved and emerge in many forms, most prominently modernization theory. Viewing Japanese society through the modernization lens, functionalist sociologists were largely driven by the promise that the new field could help solve many of the problems and contradictions arising first from the postwar rupture-cum-reorganization of society and then later from Japan's rapid economic growth period. Meanwhile, Marxism retained its immediate political focus, frequently reinvigorated by signals that the prewar education system was being reintroduced (e.g., *Anpo* demonstrations, 1959–1960). Marxist sociologists also continued spotlighting the various ways that social class was reproduced in Japanese society and education, despite a boom in personal wealth. Later iterations of this research agenda drew on subsequent European theorists looking at class, control, and culture in new ways, most notably the work of Basil Bernstein and Pierre Bourdieu. With the general increase in university enrollments following World War II and the expansion of sociology of course offerings from the late 1950s onward, more and more students learned to think sociologically through these two dominant theories (Koto 2009; Kokichi 1998). Eventually, Parsonian functionalism and Marxism occupied nearly all of the theoretical terrain of the field. Even when the field later shifted more toward methods and empiricism (Honda et al. 2012), these works were nearly always formulated against an implicit theoretical "worldview" derived from functionalism or Marxism.

One consequence was that JSES work became overwhelmingly focused on factors *within* Japan's national borders, an assumed starting point sociologists now refer to critically as "methodological nationalism" (see Chernilo 2006). Under the influence of functionalism, scholars read changes in education as derivative of *domestic* changes in the economy and population, divergent cultural environments between the rural periphery and urbanizing city centers, different norms present in rural and industrial households, and so on. Critical scholars too read changes in education as *domestic*, largely the result of political machinations or derivatives of shifting class configurations.

Another significant consequence was the adoption, often unrecognized, of the models of historical change embedded in these theoretical models. Functional-cum-modernization theory implicitly assumed that if domestic variables aligned in just the right constellation, full modernization of economic, political, and cultural spheres would unfold just as it had in the modern West. Marxist theories similarly assumed that modernization was driven by bourgeois industrialization with education functioning primarily as a means to legitimate and obfuscate growing social inequalities. Of course, this theoretical work was rarely "pure" but instead admixed with more immediate concerns (the pressures of "exam hell," unequal patterns of expansion and achievement, inefficient linkages to the labor market, etc.).

Nonetheless, the point here is that JSES was largely dominated, at least theoretically, by two groups whose analytical starting points were from the very outset dismissive of international interconnectivity, externally driven modernization, or comparative perspectives on the Japanese experience. The only comparisons that counted, in fact, were those that promised to show what Japan was "lacking" when compared with the universal sweep of Western civilization. In this sense, theory in JSES very much paralleled policy: both were understood within the overarching assumption of being *behind* not *different* from the West. Theory, much like policy, unfolded underneath the lodestar of the "catch-up" discourse (Rappleye and Kariya 2011).

This is perhaps one major reason that Japan's educational sociologists have been so quick to warmly embrace Western scholars work on Japanese society and education, particularly those confirming the views outlined above. The archetype is Ezra Vogel's *Japan as Number One* (1979) that both confirmed the "catch-up" discourse and endowed Japan with confidence that the process was all but complete. In a similar vein, the works of Cummings (1980), Rohlen (1983), and Duke (1986) were sometimes fed back into scholarly discussions on education as a way to confirm preexisting perspectives. Meanwhile, more negative assessments such as Dore (1965, 1976) could be utilized in a similar fashion by more critical scholars. The research community would not have so easily embraced those ideas or transformed them into *gaiatsu*-style support if their initial theoretical starting points had been further apart.

To be sure, we cannot overlook various attempts to develop "Japanese theory" (*nihon hatsu no riron*). This work began in the mid-1980s and reached a peak in the early 1990s. In 1991 an entire special issue of *Research in the Sociology of Education* was dedicated to the possibilities of "original theory" (JSES 1991). Yet the papers were more adept at identifying the problems rather than putting forth alternatives: the overwhelming dominance of American and European theory, how imported theory tended to distort empirical realities, and how Japanese sociologists often spent more time consuming and translating Western theory than carrying out original research.

Among work that did attempt to lay out an original theoretical course, Sonoda's (1991) "Theory of Reverse Deficiency" is noteworthy.[4] Recognizing that virtually all JSES work was embedded within an assumption that Japan "lacked" what advanced Western countries had (here again is the "catch-up" lodestar), Sonoda proposed to reverse the conceptual framework and try to understand sociologically

[4] What is particularly interesting here is that Sonoda would later serve as the chair of a major conference on axial civilizations held at Nichibunken in 1998, where he argued in his own paper: "I agree with him [Eisenstadt] in his postulate that Japan is a non-Axial civilization. There is 'no basic tension' between the 'transcendental world' and 'mundane world' in Japan. I believe there was no way to develop an tension, as the two worlds are not clearly demarcated to begin with" (Sonoda 1999, 32). To my knowledge, however, Sonoda never took the next step to develop this into an original theoretical perspective, something I am suggesting in this piece is both possible and pressing.

why Japan had features that other advanced countries did not. For example, why in Japan was the competition for educational credentials was so deeply rooted and all decisive in terms of career? With such a move, Sonoda could then transform America and England into case studies, trying to understand why these systems never achieved the same dedication to educational credentials that Japan had. Although certainly innovative, at base even this work took place within the assumptions above: it was methodologically bound by nation-state borders, placed a heavy emphasis on class culture as the decisive factor, and still viewed cases as behind or ahead on a universal arc, rather than different. It is perhaps little wonder then that such perspectives have not dominated in the Global Age. As one recent review of the state of the art of JSES lamented, although discussions of original theory had some degree of momentum in the early 1990s, "thereafter not only was their no remarkable developments in the attempts to create original Japanese theory, but the process itself stagnated in the form of simply repeating calls for original theory" (Honda et al. 2012, 94).[5]

This underscores that what JSES has done consistently since its founding is translate, introduce, and apply Western social theory to empirical objects within Japan. This has been viewed as largely unproblematic, presumably because most scholars have already come to believe the truths embedded in these imported Western theories. Through Koto's externally driven modernity lens, one way to view JSES is that it continues to function as the elite layer modernizing ("Westernizing") Japanese society. It also means that it lacks any source of deep dynamism: major change only occurs when new changes occur in the imported Western discourse. Given such a stance, it is little wonder that we can find most work in JSES both tracking on and congruent with the sociology of education in Western countries. Unfortunately, such an approach can result only in an unoriginal and thus forever marginal position for JSES in the intensifying Global Age.

What I am attempting to highlight here is that one auxiliary research agenda to open the door for alternatives is one that critically revisits the history of JSES itself. Like so many spheres of Japanese society today, JSES cannot avoid reevaluating the past in order to regain an ability to learn, adapt, and innovate. It cannot shy from realignment with the themes of *relationality* and *refinement* that has been both the strength of Japan and the pathways to new beginnings. Researching the hypothesis of *de-axialization* is a gesture toward a return to nonaxiality: it represents the willingness to return to or recreate a receptive nucleus. Only when fixed truth is absent can something new arise. And this message need not be only for domestic consumption: sociology of education work worldwide needs to be de-axialized of the Western truths and, following the rush toward hard methods, re-embedded in various social nexuses if it will regain its legitimate claim to be an institution of learning.

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[5] Space does not permit a discussion of the wider reasons for this "stagnation." For a useful, but concise, discussion of the key issues, see the Gulbenkian Commission's Report entitled *Open the Social Sciences* (1996, 54–60).

4.6 Conclusion: Betwixt Convergence and Incommensurability Through De-axialization

In this chapter, I have attempted to argue that for sociology of education in Japan to transition from the Golden Age to the Global Age, one promising agenda would be to center interconnectivity and *relationality* across all layers of analysis – empirical, conceptual, and theoretical. Even as a relatively junior scholar, I recognize the many limitations inherent in this perspective. Some of these are briefly reviewed below. Yet, as stated at the outset, the main contribution I envisaged here was initiating a collective process of thinking about how to make research on Japanese education powerfully present at the global level while retaining a sense of Japan's distinctive experience.

It must be obvious that I am making a case for a return to historical, comparative, theoretical, and cultural approaches within the field. This echoes others in JSES who have raised similar calls (Inoue and Mori 2013; Terasaki 1992). This runs somewhat counter to a growing focus on methods and gradual self-identification by those within JSES as the most empirically rigorous educational research community within Japan. But is there any reason why we cannot create work that will retain empirical rigor but yet direct itself toward different conceptual and theoretical *problematiques*? Indeed, any attempt to rethink will remain unconvincing in our contemporary, positivist global academic environment unless backed by empirical richness.

This invitation to return to history and theory partially reflects my long-standing dismay that virtually no Japanese social scientists are at the forefront of the growing global debates seeking to challenge Western social theory.[6] Despite the fact that, say, Max Weber's dismissive attitude to Japan as merely a poor copy of Chinese civilization was so obviously off the mark (see Arnason 1997, 75–81), scholars in Japan have not led the ongoing reevaluation of Max Weber. The same can be said for the recent work reevaluating Marx (see Chakrabarty 2000; Hobson 2004, 12–19). That is, despite obvious ways to reinsert the Japanese experience into contemporary theoretical debates at the global level, the shift away from history, theory, and comparison is closing off that avenue to sociologists in Japan.

I can anticipate other objections as well. One might be that the notion of non-axial in particular seems to focus solely on consensus, slighting a long history of intra-social conflict in Japan and reinscribing the cliché of Japanese society as harmonious whole. However, as Eisenstadt (1996) and Bellah (2003) show, the point is not the lack of conflict but the lack of transcendent principles that define a recurrent axis of conflict. Recall also that Koto's EDM model is predicated on conflict, first international and then intranational.

Another objection might well be that centering civilizational-cum-cultural continuity might unwittingly reinforce the growing political cadence to return to "tradition, culture, and history," thereby transforming JSES into an accomplice of

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[6] The possible partial exception here is Naoko Sakai (see Sakai 1997). I believe that Keita Takayama is currently the closest we have in the field of education (e.g., Takayama 2015).

conservative LDP attempts to fundamentally rewrite Japanese education. Some might also view the return to a civilizational (cultural) lens as coming dangerously close to resuscitating *nihonjinron* theories, undercutting decades of work that has moved away from simplistic cultural explanations, and risking further critiques of cultural essentialism (e.g., Takayama 2011). But the vision sketched above could not be further from political disengagement or cultural essentialism. In fact, I see these new directions sketched out above as crucial to gaining greater clarity into current political and cultural trends. The reason is that this alternative agenda spotlights that "Japanese uniqueness" lies not in an essential past but in the dynamism of international interconnectivity and ongoing learning. I am thus in agreement with one leading scholar who over 20 years ago wrote:

> the view that the formative patterns of the Japanese tradition were superimposed on a changing and heterogeneous background now seems more plausible than the notion of an underlying continuum from prehistorical to post-reform culture. To make that claim is not to deny the originality of Japanese civilization. The point is, rather, that this originality has often been misrepresented by its most militant advocates: it does not consist in the conservation of a primordial essence, but in the creation of new patterns from indigenous sources alongside – and in response to – the model derived from a more advanced civilization. (Arnason 1997, 129)

Put simply, the originality of Japanese civilization is its continual ability to borrow and innovate, rather than preserve an essence. Thus, in contrast to the LDP's project to construct a timeless, unchanging cultural essence (e.g., Shimomura 2014), this alternative research agenda supports the view that the only cultural "essence" of Japan is the preservation of radical openness – non-essence. This is precisely why *de-axialization* becomes the crux. *De-axialization* is the process of removing the essence from things borrowed from axial cultures, including the high modern concept of "culture" as something essential.[7]

One brief final note to conclude: the civilizational analysis lens I present here is, again, merely one choice for sociologists of education in Japan. It is arguably the most conservative choice because it is still built out of mainstream Western social theory but therefore also the most palatable. Hence, I have raised it here. Postcolonial sociology is another alternative (Connell 2007; Takayama 2015), one arguably much more sophisticated sociologically and elaborated, especially in terms of power, than civilizational analysis. It is also more radical in its critiques of Eurocentrism (see Smith 2015). Arguably even more radical still would be revisiting Japanese philosophers and social thinkers marginalized by the war, those whose initial assumptions derived from formative experiences in social and educational spaces not yet so heavily structured by postwar Western (read: American) borrowings.

Yet all that seems very far off at the moment. What looks more likely is a step-by-step process where civilizational analysis gives way to post-colonialism which,

[7] For an excellent discussion of how "culture" has been understood in Japan, see Morris-Suzuki (1998, 60–78). Note the same work carries an insightful chapter critical of "civilizations" as an analytical frame (140–160). While I do not agree with many of the points made, it is clearly important for (i) reviewing what prominent Japanese scholars have made of the term "civilization" and (ii) avoiding the pitfalls that attend the approach.

in turn, gives way to “original” ideas now buried under the relatively short history of Western modernity.[8] Whichever way the transformation of the field in a Global Age ultimately unfolds, in a sense it will have already arrived if it remains committed to *de-axialization*, continual learning, and at home between convergence and incommensurability.

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[8] For one example, see Rappleye and Komatsu (2016). This paper draws on Japanese philosophers and social theorist to deaxialize linear time, imported from the West during the Meiji era and spread through Japan largely via modern schooling. One of the problems with such work is that it requires readers to have a deep understanding of Western and non-Western sources – a demand that is somewhat impractical without preceding civilizational analysis and postcolonial work to pave the way. Note that “original” in this sentence signifies both prior to and fresh/innovative/novel, i.e., those ideas would be viewed as “new” even though they were already there prior to modernity, in a sense.

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Part II
What Contemporary Challenges is Japan's Education Facing?

Chapter 5
Gender and Sexuality in Japanese Education: From Gender Disparity to Intersectional and Multiple Gender/Sexualities

Ayumi Miyazaki

Abstract This chapter examines both traditional and recent studies that pursue the central question of gender and sexuality studies in Japanese sociology of education: how gender and sexualized power relationships are constructed at school and among youth in Japan. The thread of these studies is woven through the depiction of three theoretical focuses: gender disparity, gender construction, and the intersectionalities and multiplicities of gender and sexualities. These studies work hand in hand to explore still-persistent gender disparities in education, invisible gendered constructions in the organization of Japanese schools, and the multiple and intersectional interplays of gender, sexualities, and other axes of power relations. Although this chapter does not cover the whole picture of gender and sexuality studies in Japanese sociology of education, this chapter aims to introduce the rich body of Japanese gender studies in education, which in turn will shed light on how the construction of gender and sexualities is intertwined with its specific systems, social context and relationships, and cultural practices. Gender and sexuality studies in Japan could move from the periphery to the theoretical center of the field of sociology of education and serve as a driving force for understanding Japanese youth and education. This chapter hopes to contribute to this move.

5.1 Introduction: Educational Attainment and Beyond

This chapter depicts both the established tradition and the developing trend of gender/sexuality studies in Japanese sociology of education. Japanese education has attracted much attention from outside for its excellent academic achievement and its distinct cultural practices. Many studies have depicted Japanese education as a well-oiled machine for reproducing Japanese cultural norms such as groupism, harmony,

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https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-1528-2_5

and cooperation (e.g., Peak 1993), which these scholars believe leads to Japanese students' high academic achievement (e.g., Singleton 1993). In recent years, however, a monolithic view of Japanese education has become increasingly difficult to support. Japanese education has become an arena of conflicts between various norms, and gender is at the core of those conflicts.

In spite of the rich tradition of gender studies in sociology of education in Japan, surprisingly little literature has been introduced in English (with the exception of Brinton 1988 and few others). This chapter has two objectives: providing an overview of the main tradition of gender and education in Japan, which pursues the causes of gender disparities, and describing important recent studies in the field. For the first objective, I rely heavily on a number of reviews of studies of Japanese gender and education that trace and analyze the field's development (Amano 1988; Kanda et al. 1985; Mori 1992; Nakanishi and Hori 1997; Taga and Tendo 2013). These reviews agree that the strongest tradition in Japanese studies of gender and education has focused on the central question of the field: Why does gender disparity persist? To date, this line of research has examined Japanese school systems, textbooks, teaching, overt and hidden curriculum, and classroom interactions to determine how gender disparity is produced and reproduced in education. In doing so, these studies have formed the mainstream of Japanese studies of gender and education. This line of research is mainly based on the philosophies of first- and second-wave feminism, such as liberal feminism, radical feminism, and Marxist feminism, concerning issues such as equal access to education, restrictive gender roles, and masculine domination over schools.

Recent developments in gender and education studies in Japan, however, have shifted the focus from gender disparities to gender constructions and to the multiplicities and intersectionalities of gender/sexualities. Many recent studies pursue different sets of questions from traditional gender disparity studies to reveal various forms of masculinities/femininities/sexualities and how these forms intersect with other inequalities, such as class and ethnicity. These studies explore, for instance, how masculinities and sexualities play a crucial role in constructing gender dynamics of schools or how class and ethnic minorities construct their gender identities in their social world. These studies illuminate the detailed processes of how gender and sexualities are dynamically constructed hand in hand with other forces of subject formation, based mostly on feminist poststructuralism, third-wave feminism, and intersectionality theories.

In US and European studies of gender and education, the field's central concern has shifted from gender disparity to gender construction. As Ringrose (2007) and others explain, as girls' grades started catching up with those of boys in the 1990s, even in the so-called boys' subjects, such as math and sciences, a political backlash arose in the media, academia, and society to undermine the accomplishments of gender disparity studies in the 1970s and 1980s, claiming that feminism was no longer relevant in this postfeminism era. Scholars of gender and education counter the backlash by stressing that women's subordination remains substantial and unequivocal, but at the same time, they question existing gender disparity studies for having treated boys and girls as two monolithic groups (namely, as white middle-class girls and boys) and for having used a liberal feminist framework: how girls can catch up with boys in their educational and occupational attainment. Gender and education scholars state that there is much more to explore in gender studies than educational attainment, and they need to expand their perspectives to examine gender not as a category but as being momentarily constructed in the "new gender regime" (McRobbie 2009).

In Japan, on the other hand, because of the stubborn persistence of gender inequalities in many aspects of education, gender disparity studies still constitute the mainstream of the field, while the recent trend is only just developing. Moreover, in many cases, there is no clear-cut distinction between gender disparity studies and gender construction studies, which coexist hand in hand to tackle specific gender issues in Japanese cultural and societal contexts; therefore, the distinction I make in this chapter is sometimes a mere convenience. As I explain in this chapter, Japanese studies are not merely following the path of western studies. Each academic society harnesses its particular composition of the field, and the development of each field is deeply related to its specific context. The illuminations of Japanese gender and sexualities in their specificities will help in understanding the diverse contextual factors of gender and sexual construction and, in so doing, will shed light on how the construction of gender and sexualities is intertwined with its specific systems, social contexts and relationships, and cultural practices.

In the following sections, I will first examine gender disparity studies – a driving force for the development of the field of gender and education in Japan. Second, I will describe the important line of qualitative research about the processes of gender construction within Japanese schools through the hidden curriculum. I consider these studies to contain features of both gender disparity studies and gender construction studies. Finally, I will describe the recent development of gender/sexualities and education studies, which veered its attention from gender disparity to gender multiplicities and intersectionalities. As mentioned above, although this trend is not yet fully established in Japan, discussing this new trend will offer perspectives on where this field is heading and will contribute to laying the groundwork for the future development of the gender/sexuality studies in Japanese education.

Before discussing Japanese gender studies, I note that a complete review of the field is beyond the scope of this chapter. This chapter merely traces one thread of Japanese education and only a handful of studies regarding the central question of the field, which is how gender and sexualized power relationships are constructed at school and among youth in Japan, and, as a result, inevitably excludes some important works in the field. Moreover, instead of summarizing a large quantity of studies, I have chosen to extract the qualitative essence of some field-forming traditional and recent studies and, in so doing, will show the theoretical importance of Japanese studies of gender education. This qualitative thread, I hope, will show the richness, difficulties, and complexities of Japanese gender studies in education and provide important insights into its bright future.

5.2 Gender Disparity Studies

In this section, I will first introduce gender disparity studies – the strongest tradition of Japanese gender and education studies to date – which have pursued their inquiry into the reasons and mechanisms of gender inequalities in Japanese education from institutional, historical, and interactional perspectives. The main purpose of these studies is to explore how gender disparities in educational and occupational attainments are maintained and reproduced in Japanese education. As Kanda, Kameda, Amano, and other prominent pioneering scholars of gender and education explain in their review article (Kanda et al. 1985), studies of women were conducted as early as the 1950s, but these studies were not necessarily produced through feminist lenses, and "the studies of women out of social concern" sprang out slowly through the 1970s and 1980s, significantly impacted by internal and international feminism movements, such as the International Women's Year in 1975.

Mori (1992) traces and analyzes the development of the field of gender and education in Japan by dividing it into three periods: (1) the period before the impact of women's studies (the 1950s and 1960s), (2) the period after this impact (from 1970 to 1985), and finally, (3) the transition period from women's studies to gender studies (from 1985 to 1992, when the paper was written). In the first stage, researchers examine women's situations not necessarily from the perspective of women's issues but as a factor that arises in the analysis of mainstream themes of sociology of education, such as occupational attainment and work division in villages. The second stage, affected by women's movements, defines a clearer goal for research: the improvement of the status of women. In this period, the number of studies rose sharply, and the themes of research diversified to cover career and educational paths, higher education, female teachers and scholars, occupational education, and motherhood. In the third period, Mori explains, much qualitative research stresses the need to take the gaze of scholars inside schools to understand the intricate cultural and social processes of gender construction, which had been hidden as matter-of-fact school practices.

In the following sections, I will first review the main themes and findings of the first and the second periods of studies, as defined by Mori, and then describe in detail the studies in the third period, in which the perspective of gender construction emerges.

5.2.1 Gender Disparity in Occupational and Educational Attainment

One of the most traditional topics in the field of Japanese education and gender is the mechanism that prevents women, even with college degrees, from continuing and advancing their careers. In the 1970s and 1980s, women with university degrees were still a minority (12.3% in 1980, for instance, less than one-third of the male equivalent), but the rising population of female college graduates made professional women visible as a category, especially after the Equal Opportunity Act came into effect in Japan in 1985.

Many scholars of women and education were keen to reveal the difficulties women face in pursuing their professional careers, and these scholars turned their focus to teaching from very early on because it is a field where women outnumbered men starting in the 1960s but struggled nonetheless. Those studies found that persistent norms about sex roles in Japanese society prevent female teachers from developing their careers. Female teachers in Amano's study (1976), for instance, show strong motivation to continue their work but occupy the bottom rung of the power ladder at school, rarely receiving promotions to administrative positions, and yet they are satisfied with their lower status. Amano states that what consigns female teachers to a lower status is the strong societal expectations for women to be exclusively responsible for housework and child-rearing. Many scholars identify this strong gender norm as the greatest impediment to women's career development.

What exactly are Japanese norms for women's roles? Scholars such as Yamamura (1971) stress the prevalence of the norm called *ryousai kenbo* (good wife, wise mother), which is a pivotal component of Japanese society and culture. Koyama's (1991) study reveals that the image of a good, devoted mother has historically been the principal aim of Japanese women's education, which has always been treated differently from men's education. Nakayama (1985) problematizes "feminine socialization," which ensures that women will acquire the traditional norms of sex roles and *ryousai kenbo*. As a result of this socialization, even when women seek higher education, they tend to aspire not to a professional career of their own but to have a partner with high status, and even when they seek a career, they assign less value to income, status, and power than to helping and getting along with others. This is the reason, Amano states, that women's education does not necessarily lift their social status. This phenomenon applies to female university teachers who have just as many publications and other accomplishments as their male counterparts but remain as a long-term part-time lecturers (Nakagawa et al. 1982). Researchers posit that "feminine socialization" and "female sex roles" such as *ryousai kenbo* drag women's social status down not only in the case of teachers but also of other occupations, such as nurses, even after implementation of the Equal Opportunity Act. Kameda (1977), based on her study of junior high school and high school girls, reveals that girls' occupational identity tends to develop in the transition from junior high school to high school, and their mother's occupational status has a strong influence on their career choice. Kameda concludes that proper occupational education is a solution to combat the strong "feminization" processes.

Japanese gender research in the field of sociology of education thus started out exploring the obstacles for working women but then turned its direction to the educational system, which seemed to produce and perpetuate the strong traditional norms about female sex roles. Amano (1986) observes from her historical analysis that Japanese education has served women not as a status-obtaining function through their own careers but as a status-representing function through marriage. Researchers argue that even the rise of female participation in universities does not help women in the labor market because the educational system itself is gender segregated. Women tend to go to junior college and women's universities, major in "feminine" fields, such as home economics and humanities, enter "feminine" work fields, and stop working upon marriage or childbirth. More recent studies also focus on the still gender-segregated Japanese educational system. Nakanishi (1998) conducts an extensive quantitative research on the system of the "female track" in high schools. To this day, many junior high and high schools are sex-separate schools, and boys' schools tend to be more competitive. As Yoshihara (1998) points out, girls and boys are screened through different systems in Japanese education.

Women today are still underrepresented in various professions, politics, and education in Japan, making Japan an outlier among developed countries. Recent governmental statics show that only 14% of faculty members at Japanese universities are women, with high concentrations in less competitive universities and junior colleges, in lower status, in part-time positions, and in "female" fields – 50% in home economics and 7% in the sciences. The report concludes that this tendency is a result of women's greater burden in family and child-rearing, but Kikuno (2013) points out that 48% of female part-time faculty members at a university where she conducted research are single and living below relative poverty, which disproves the perception of the typical female part-time lecturer as being married and working on the side of her family life. Thus, gender disparity in career and education as a research topic is still imperative in Japanese society today.

5.2.2 Gender Inequalities at School

From the late 1980s, researchers started turning their attention from women who internalize feminine roles to the educational system that inducts women into traditional roles. Amano's influential article (1988), *The current issues about 'sex (gender) and education': The continuation of the hidden 'realms*,*'* contributes to the theoretical shift in the field: women to the mechanism of inequality and sex roles to gender relations.

> Education, compared to family, labor markets, and politics, is a field where inequalities between the sexes are hidden by the strong control of "the illusion of equality." Schools in modern-day Japan are considered to be generally a meritocratic institution. Students are supposed to be judged on the basis of grades and abilities regardless of sex. In this arena, women are believed to choose freely and voluntarily the sex "track" in higher education – sciences and for male students and humanities junior colleges for female students – and to use university degrees as status-representing function for marriage. But is this really true?
>
> (Amano 1988)

Amano discusses the need to shift the research focus from "equality in educational opportunities" to "equality in results" (the shift that American and European gender studies made earlier) and to examine the hidden mechanism of Japanese schools that produce gender inequalities. After Amano's review, and especially after the World Women's Conference in Beijing in 1995, Japan experienced a movement to fight against gender discrimination at school from diverse groups: feminist activists, lawyers, teachers, and scholars. This movement has been labeled gender-free (*jendā furii*) education, meaning education that is free from gender bias. "The association for examining schools from gender perspectives" was established in 1996, and the "National Network for Freeing Schools from Gender Bias" was established the following year. Researchers got together with teachers, activists, local government officials, and concerned citizens to discuss how to examine and eliminate systematic gender discriminations at Japanese school, resulting in many edited volumes (e.g., Kameda and Tachi 2000).

The topics the movement focused on first were the "explicit" hidden curriculum, such as sexist textbooks, gender-segregated school practices and disproportionate power status, and school organization by gender. After the mandatory gender division for electives – home economics for girls and shop for boys – was finally phased out in 1993 and 1994, all formal gender discrimination seemed to be eliminated, but researchers insisted that Japanese schools were still saturated with gender discrimination based on long-lasting beliefs about "*tokusei kyouiku* (gender-specific education)." Inspired by gender studies in the USA and Europe (e.g., Delamont 1980), Japanese scholars revealed both universal and cultural-specific forms of discriminations. Japanese textbooks are overwhelmingly written by male authors and peopled by male characters, and even a story about a tomboy ends with the girl becoming girlish and happy. School uniforms, gym clothes, school bags, and school materials (red for girls, blue for boys) were differentiated according to gender. Class rosters, which are used not only to call roll but also to group students for school activities, were segregated by gender, with boys first. Those gender-specific practices have recently become problematized again from the perspectives of sexual minority students, which I will discuss later. Girls are prevented from exercising leadership in many ways; the chief students for the school assembly and sports festivals were all boys, and teachers tended to assign girls with supplemental chores. These divisional practices contributed to the maintenance of the divided gender spheres that Amano identified (1988), channeling women into the female sphere.

5.2.3 From Gender Disparity to Gender Construction: Cultural Practice of "Hidden Curriculum"

Along with the gender-free movement, gender scholars in sociology of education started examining not only the "explicit" hidden curriculum, such as sexist textbooks and school organization, but also the "implicit" hidden curriculum, such as teaching practices and classroom interactions. Many influential studies in the west and elsewhere explored these themes (e.g., Sadker and Sadker 1994), and Japanese scholars, too, revealed, through in-depth qualitative research, how implicit hidden curriculum plays out in the specific culture, context, and organization of Japanese schools. This line of research is what Amano and other reviewers considered as necessary for exposing the system of hidden gender bias reproduction in Japan.

Mori (1989) revealed the complex hidden curriculum of Japanese schools, which is embedded in its cultural and organizational context. Japanese preschool teachers in his research often divided girls and boys, but did not consider the division to be related to gender socialization. They used gender categories to maintain order in the classroom, not necessarily for promoting gender socialization. Teachers considered the gender category as a natural framework for children and a useful resource and strategy for teachers, but Mori argues that teachers' frequent use of the category brought about unintended gender socialization.

Miyazaki (1991) conducted an ethnographic study at an elementary school to examine this process of unintended gender socialization. The majority of teachers in this study explained that they separated girls and boys not as a means of gender socialization but as an effective tool to control and organize a large number of students, because students know which gender they are supposed to belong to and they can rapidly separate themselves into those groups. Miyazaki's research was conducted before the concept of gender had been introduced to schools, and some teachers explained that they deliberately divided girls and boys to educate them differently with different messages. Most teachers, however, denied the intention of gender socialization and willingly participated in an experiment to rid their instructions of gender categorization, but once they did, they found themselves having trouble organizing their students. Mori and Miyazaki thus show how gender is naturalized and intertwined with the organizational feature of Japanese large classrooms.

Kawakami (1990) revealed another process of gender discrimination embedded within the Japanese school system through examining how teachers are evaluated for promotion. Taking on the role of overseeing a school sports club contributes significantly to promotion within a school because the tremendous time commitment required to carry out this role demonstrates loyalty and devotion to the school and students. This basis for evaluation is not stipulated as a gendered standard, but in effect it is, because female teachers are excluded from overseeing sports clubs and, consequently, do not have this valuable opportunity for advancement within the school. Thus, seemingly universal organizational principles are gendered, and the resulting disproportionate gender ratio of managerial positions ends up serving as a hidden gender lesson for students.

Kimura (1997) explored yet another process of "implicit" gendered hidden curriculum through her research at a Japanese elementary school classroom. Most Japanese classrooms are composed of a large number of students (up to 40) who undertake group activities throughout the day, cleaning the classroom together, serving and eating lunch in the classroom, and participating in sports and other school competitions as a team. Kimura found that boys talk more than girls in class, a similar finding of Sadker and Sadker (1994) and other western scholars who examined gender disproportion in classroom interactions. In Kimura's study, however, this tightly-knit classroom system plays a role: The classroom is a field of constant power dynamics where boys try to undercut girls' power by making fun of and questioning their statements in class and by silencing them, and when teachers try to help girls take leadership, the boys criticize female teachers' favoritism of girls. Miyazaki (1993) too, following the lead of western gender subculture studies (e.g., McRobbie 1991), documenting the dynamic construction of gender relationships at school, how four main groups – studiers, geeks, normal girls, and Yankees (delinquents) – at a girls' high school construct different types of femininities at school, and through criticizing one another's construction of femininities, negotiate what desirable femininities are.

These studies revealed intricate cultural and organizational practices of gender at Japanese schools and in doing so contributed to changing gender-separate practices of Japanese education. Currently, some obvious forms of gender discrimination, such as gender-separate rosters, have been abolished. Despite these accomplishments, or rather because of them, Japanese education faced a severe backlash against the movement of "gender-free (freeing school from gendered bias)" education at the turn of the century. The ruling (Liberal Democratic) party established the "Research committee on extreme sex education and gender-free education" and argued that the idea of "gender-free" is dangerous and harmful to traditional family values. Home economics textbooks that discuss gender equality were criticized. Many local governments questioned and cut back sex education at school and even banned books with the word gender in their titles from public libraries. Japanese gender scholars argued against this backlash by pointing out how intimately gender is intertwined with nationalist agendas to keep women at home (e.g., Asai et al. 2006).

As I mentioned above, gender studies in the west, too, experienced a backlash in the media, academia, and politics when these studies suggested in the 1990s that girls had caught up with boys in academic achievements. It is interesting to note that in Japan, however, a backlash occurred not against actual changes in educational achievement or even against efforts to uncover and remedy gender gaps – which indeed had not even taken place – but rather against the mere attempt to change discriminatory practices and traditional gender roles in education. In the face of this backlash, gender scholars in the USA and Europe reevaluated their stance, which tended to be based on liberal feminism and the dichotomy of a girls-vs-boys framework, widening their perspectives by going beyond educational and occupational achievements and seeking to establish their theoretical basis on feminist poststructuralism, third-wave feminism, and the theory of intersectionalities. After the damaging backlash movement, Japanese gender scholars have taken a similar path, which I will introduce in the following sections.

5.3 Gender Multiplicities, Sexualities, and Intersectionalities

In the age of globalization and neoliberalism, it is necessary for gender studies to go beyond the simple dichotomy of gender and to closely look at gender multiplicities. Gender studies need a perspective that sees through multiple power relationships, which remain hidden

> behind the façade of superficial equalities that were talked up following women's "liberation" and feminist "victory". (Taga and Tendo 2013: 139).

Taga and Tendo (2013) point out at the end of their review article, quoted above, that Japanese gender studies need a sharp theoretical turn to deepen the analysis of multiple power relationships that are pervasive in the new era. Women are to take the blame for their failure because of their "free choice" and "self-accountability (*jiko-sekinin*)," while hidden mechanisms deprive them of power. In 2013, Taga and Tendo found almost no article in the field of Japanese sociology of education dealing with sexualities and intersectionalities of the new power regime. Since then, however, Japan is undergoing significant societal and academic changes. In this section, I will introduce (1) a group of gender studies that adapt the framework of feminist poststructuralism, which played an important role in introducing a theoretical turn in gender and education studies; (2) studies of masculinities and sexualities, which show the complex composition of gender; and (3) studies based on intersectionality theories, which deal with multiple axes of inequalities.

5.3.1 Feminist Poststructuralism and Japanese Education

Taga and Tendo (2013) point out that Japanese gender studies are less theoretical compared to their counterparts in the west – or at least that their theoretical stances are less clearly stated – and that theoretical development is crucial for the advancement of Japanese gender studies in education. Nishitai (1998) and others argue that feminist poststructuralist theories are useful for the development of Japanese gendered studies of education. Some researchers have stated clearly since the 2000s that their studies are based on this theoretical stance.

Otaki (2006), for example, employs Butler's theory on the making of the gendered subject, which is the application of Althusser's notion of appellation. Otaki's thorough ethnography reveals how Japanese toddlers are made into gendered beings at preschool and how the appellation is related to preschool classroom practices. Right after the 3-year-old children in Otaki's research enter the preschool, most of them do not respond when called upon by teachers to form gender-separate groups (e.g., "Come here, girls!"), but through classroom practices day after day, the children gradually came to understand that they belonged either to girls' or boys' groups. Otaki recounts that when a group of boys got into a TV animation series called *Serious Rangers* and pretended to be characters in that series, the boys' speech and behavior became masculine, and their recognition of their gender solidified. Otaki concludes that such everyday interactions between teachers and children and among children construct children into gendered beings.

Fujita (2004) bases her ethnography at a Japanese preschool on the theory of feminist poststructuralism to explain preschoolers' negotiations with gender categories. She argues that most research focuses on how schools construct gender-separate practices, but students, and even preschoolers in her study, avidly engage themselves in gender boundary building. These children use the dichotomy of gender categories and stereotypes prevalent in the media in their daily "gender play (Thorne 1993)," such as when they play pirate and princess, and mock and correct each other's gender-crossing behavior. But these gender-building practices are not "internalized" by these preschoolers. They construct a gender boundary moment to moment by crossing and reinforcing it at the same time, for example, when a girl defends her preference for a "male" color by arguing that that is the color of vegetables mothers cook and when another girl uses masculine language to introduce her boyfriend.

Hatano (2004) takes up the poststructuralist feminist inquiry in the judo club of a junior high school by examining the spatial negotiations of girl and boy club members. Although female and male students practice together, the gender-divided space is maintained through everyday practice, and male students occupy space three times as large as female space despite the numbers of female and male members being roughly equal. The spatial division is challenged when female students step into male space, but the challenge is negated by a persistent myth of "male superiority of physicality." The judo system ranks females and males differently, and even when female students excel, they are paired up with younger, weaker male students.

Gender disparity studies overlooked sports, as explained by Hatano. Iida and Itani (2004) argues that Japanese physical education values competitive sports and muscle strength and in turn creates the myth of men's physical superiority, which has slipover effects to broader gender norms. Educational attainments are only a part of the gender system in school, and it is important that we examine other powerful means to construct gender norms, such as sports, without assuming the preexistence of the category but, instead, revealing how the category is created, maintained, and challenged in the moment-to-moment gender constructions of school life.

5.3.2 Masculinities and Sexualities in Japanese Education

5.3.2.1 Masculinities in Japanese Education

Since the 1980s, the concept of masculinity has been an important analytical tool that transformed the basic understanding of gendered power dynamics across western societies. Connell (e.g., 2006) criticizes the notion of patriarchy for simplifying gender relations and proposes to analyze more complex gendered power relations between men, women, and sexualities. He argues that it is important to understand how multiple masculinities are practiced every day in myriad ways and how a normative masculinity acquires and exercises power through different institutions, such as the media and politics. Education is one of the main institutions of masculinity making, Mac an Ghaill (1994) posits, and school is an apparatus in which teachers, regardless of their values, be they conservative, liberal, or neoliberal, convey different versions of desirable heterosexual masculinities through which boys learn how to become a heterosexual masculine subject.

In Japan, men's liberation movements (*menribu*) started in the mid-1970s. Many groups sprang out from the movements, such as "Association for childrearing men" and "Men against prostitution-solicitation in Asia." These groups, influenced by women's liberation movements, reflected men as both the oppressor and the oppressed in Japanese society. The former group, for instance, problematized Japanese men's overwork and embedded identities in corporations and asserted that while women are deprived of their right to work, men are deprived of their right to family life.

In Japanese academia, masculinity studies got underway in the 1990s by exploring how different masculinities play out in Japan's heavily gendered society and how men oppress and are oppressed in various realms such as politics, family, sexualities, and violence. In the field of sociology of education, as Taga and Tendo point out in their review article (2013), masculinity studies are grossly underdeveloped, to the point where a single scholar, Taga, can be credited with stressing the theoretical importance of masculinity studies in education. Several important studies have been published, however. Taga's life history interviews (2001), for instance, reveal how the interviewees try to meet the norms of desirable masculinity and how they experience conflicts in doing so. The interviewees perceive normative heterosexual masculinities in sports clubs, the seniority system, and classroom relationships at school and try to practice masculine language, body, and mannerisms but end up experiencing identity conflicts. In contemporary Japan, masculine and sexual norms are in flux, varying in different contexts and relationships in society, which makes a desirable masculinity even harder to acquire.

Miyazaki (2004), based on a longitudinal ethnography, explores gender-crossing linguistic and social practices of Japanese junior high school students. It is easier for girls to use masculine language than it is for boys to use feminine language: Girls were often able to use masculine language as a means for attaining popularity and power, but boys were ridiculed, bullied, and stigmatized as homosexual when they crossed the gender border to act and speak in a feminine manner. Feminine boys were placed at the bottom rung of the tightly-knit classroom relationships and had to defend their feminine practices moment to moment through their tactful linguistic practices. Miyazaki shows that masculinities and femininities are not directly attached to boys and girls but are intertwined and work hand in hand to constitute gender power relations at school.

In examining the historicity of the formation of Japanese masculinity, Uchida (2010) takes his analysis further than just describing what constitutes a desirable masculinity. Through extensive analysis of popular magazines for boys from Japan's modernization period (starting in the 1880s) to World War II, Uchida defines the ideal of Japanese masculinity as "weakness phobia," a phobia of weakness and an obsession not to be judged weak. Weakness phobia is not just a component of a masculine identity, but a driving force of the Japanese nationalistic agenda. During times of war, a desirable masculinity for *shounen* (boys) was defined and redefined in terms of the principle of weakness phobia, by contrasting desirable Japanese masculinity with gentle *shoujo* (girls) and by assigning undesirable masculinities to war enemies, such as "sexually ambiguous Koreans." Military schools and the media flooded 14-year-old *shounen* soldiers with this weakness phobia to prepare them for supreme violence and untimely death at war. Shibuya (2013) also reveals from her historical analysis that not only femininity, but also masculinity, was used to promote a nationalistic agenda. At the turn of the nineteenth century, during Japan's modernization period, boys' sexual activities were suddenly considered to be against the national agenda of producing efficient human capital. So pressing was this concern that schools took extreme measures to control boys' bodies and to suppress their sexualities. As these studies show, it is imperative to analyze masculinities in the broader historical and national constructions of gendered and sexualized power relationships in Japan.

5.3.2.2 Sexualities in Japanese Education

Sexuality issues in Japan are on the verge of changing. Gender identity disorder (GID) caught public attention in 2001 because of a popular TV drama series featuring a character with GID, followed by medical and political attention and reform in the early 2000s, but public knowledge about sexual minorities as a whole was very limited until recently. Starting in 2015, Shibuya and setagaya wards in Tokyo and five other local governments implemented partnership legislation. A number of *manga* featuring sexual minorities have been published. The media attention devoted to and the social visibility of sexual minority issues have surged. At the same time, sexual minority bashing has not gone away, as seen in the disapproval by the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology of once-approved school textbooks that mention same-sex partnership and diverse families (Kato and Watanabe 2010). And sexual minorities continue to be caricaturized as transsexual *onee* (big sister) in the media (Maree 2013).

In the field of education, there remains much work to broaden understanding of the difficulties faced by sexual minority students and to create supportive environments for these students. The government issued a notice in 2016 advising public schools to be considerate to sexual minority students by establishing a support team and by protecting these students from bullying. There are only a handful of studies in the field of sociology of education regarding sexual minority students so far, although such studies are being done as I write this article.

In the USA, on the other hand, as early as in the late 1980s, difficulties facing LGBT youth became an urgent issue after the US Department of Health and Human Services published a report showing surprisingly high suicide rate among LGBT youth – 30% of suicide are committed by LGBT youth (Perrotti and Westheimer 2001). From then on, the number of studies exploded, and the implementation of LGBT-related policies increased in the USA. In Japan, such statistics became known only recently. Hidaka and Operario (2014), based on a large-scale survey of Japanese GBQ men, found high levels of attempted suicide (15%) and anxiety (70%) as a result of many experiences of being bullied at school (83%). Now is the time for Japan to conduct in-depth research and establish thorough support systems and detailed policies to protect sexual minority students.

In the field of sociology of education, several studies have revealed the difficulties Japanese sexual minority youth face at school. Dohi (2015) analyzes the accounts of eight transgender youths and how they experienced conflicts between what they want to be and what they are required to be at school. Their conflicts often stemmed from gender stereotypes and divisions at Japanese schools, such as school uniforms – part of the gender socialization machinery described in the hidden curriculum studies I mentioned above. For example, an FTM (Female-to-Male) student could not bear wearing the school-issued skirt uniform. The FTM student came out, obtained permission from the school to wear pants, and then contributed to the school's changing uniforms so that students can choose uniforms regardless of their gender. Gender categories confront sexual minority students every day at Japanese schools and form one of the many red lines that affect bullying, dropping out of school, and school refusal.

Imai & Yamada (2008), based on interviews with sexual minority students, reveals that Japanese schools assume that sexual minority students are nonexistent. Not only do these students have very few opportunities to learn about sexual minority issues, but they also receive negative messages about sexual minorities from peers and teachers, evidence of the strong heteronormatism that undergirds the operation of Japanese schools. Sixty percent of the research participants in Imai's study have heard discriminatory remarks such as *okama* (faggot), *homo*, *kishoi* (disgusting), and *otoko-onna* (dyke) and 30% from teachers. Students and teachers consider these words to be jocular and are blind to the fact that these words hurt and are discriminatory. Pascoe (2005) finds that these remarks are not only homophobic but are also a constituent of a complex system of gender power relations. Californian male high school students in Pascoe's study censor and control one another's desirable masculinities through their daily joking rituals of homophobic "fag" discourse and, in doing so, construct gendered power relations. A research participant (Kato and Watanabe 2010) echoes these findings, explaining that teachers use "fag" discourse to build friendly relationships with students and homosocial bonding, which in turn shows that sexualities and masculinities crisscross within a specific context and relationships at school.

5.3.3 Intersectionalities in Japanese Education

Intersectionality is a theoretical tool to analyze how multiple axes of societies, such as gender, sexuality, class, race, ethnicity, and disability, intersect in constructing social inequalities (e.g., Collins and Bilge 2016). Intersectionality has been widely taken up in recent years not only by scholars in the USA and Europe but elsewhere too and not only in the fields such as sociology, political sciences, and history but also by human rights activists, teachers, and government officials to deal with the complex issues of inequalities.

The idea of multiple axes of inequalities is not entirely new. As Collins (1990) argues in her monumental book, *Black Feminist Thought*, mainstream feminism, which at the time tended to deal only with white, middle-class women, should include class and racial axes for analysis. Marxist feminists state that "sex class," which locates women in the lower class in the sexual division of labor, is an important analytical category. Many Japanese gender scholars in the field of sociology of education, too, point out that they tended to focus on themes related to their immediate middle-class concerns, such as higher education and teaching, and analyze the intersections of gender and class from the perspectives of radical and Marxist feminisms.

The notion of intersectionality, originally coined by Crenshaw (1989), has picked up these feminist concerns and has been expanding rapidly since the 2000s. The feature of this new theoretical turn is its analysis of multiple factors that are deeply intertwined, mutually influencing and simultaneously constructing one another. For example, a woman might not only be just a woman but Arab, French, immigrant, young, and deprived, like the teenagers in Tetreault's research (2008) in the poverty-stricken outskirts of Paris, who resist both French racism and sexism and traditional North African gender norms by dressing like male gangsters. Multiple axes reside in every person, supplementing, reinforcing, and contradicting one another in constructing her social relationships and subjectivities.

The theory of intersectionality has not yet been discussed in the studies of Japanese education, but some important studies have come out, seeking to understand the complex relationships between the plural axes of society. It is imperative to pursue the gender-class axe in Japan, where young women are more and more inclined to fall into poverty under widening economic disparity. Uema (2015) interviews at-risk female teenagers who engage in the sex industry in Okinawa and finds out that even for young women who drop out of school, their supportive friendship network from school serves as a safety net when young women cope with extreme sexual violence at work. The stories of young women in danger of being beaten while fellating in the dark and entertaining men while bleeding after an abortion show the tremendous difficulty of their negotiations over their identity, body, and dignity and the deep intersection of poverty, gender, and sexual violence at the bottom of the social ladder.

Tokunaga's ethnography (2011) explores the gender-ethnicity axe, which is becoming an increasingly important issue in Japan. The meaning of "home" is complicated for the five Filipino-born young women at the center of Tokunaga's study. These women migrated to Japan as a result of their mother's earlier move to Japan for economic reasons. These young women spoke fondly of their closely-knit extended family and safe home in the Philippines, to which they could not imagine returning because of economic conditions. In the economically more stable Japan, on the other hand, they are faced with the traditional Japanese gendered norms of their stepfathers and are alienated by the Japanese perception of Filipina as sex workers. They are ethnicized and sexualized simultaneously, or in other words, they are sexualized through their ethnicity. Located in impossible realities, they romanticize the USA as their future home and thus navigate difficult borderland negotiations.

Kojima (2006) discusses how Brazilian girls resist Japanese schools that encourage prim and proper femininities by using their maturity and sexual charm, while Sugiyama (2005) depicts Brazilian girls who completely erase any trace of their sexual charm to become pristine Japanese girls. These girls' negotiations with Japanese schools show that their ethnicity is always translated into their sexuality no matter how they negotiate, just like the economically stricken girls in Uema's study who are exposed and exploited as sexual beings. Thus, gender and other axes of inequalities influence and reinforce one another in complex ways.

5.4 Conclusion

In this chapter, I examined the theoretical trends of gender/sexuality studies in Japanese sociology of education, which deal with gender disparity, construction, multiplicities, and intersectionalities. As stated earlier, this chapter focuses on gender and sexual relations at school and does not do justice to the wide range of topics in these fields. This chapter demonstrates, however, that for close to half a century, many gender scholars in Japan have challenged gender disparity at school; have examined the mechanism of gender construction in specific contexts, relationships, and organizations; and have started exploring the intricate interplays of gender in its multiple manifestations of femininities/masculinities/sexualities and with other inequalities such as class and ethnicity.

Japanese gender studies now need to move from the periphery to the theoretical center of the field of sociology of education, as a position occupied by gender studies in the west and in other parts of the world. The construction of gendered power relations should be examined not only with other unexplored forces of subject formations, such as race and disabilities, but also with other crucial social phenomena discussed elsewhere in this volume, such as bullying, harassment, school refusers, and *hikikomori*. As Pascoe (2005) and others show, bullying is tightly connected to the building practices of desirable masculinities at school, and as many sexuality and education studies reveal, sexual minority students are alienated from school to the point of dropping out. A close examination of the intersections within gender/sexualities, and between gender/sexualities (Paechter 2006) and other cultural, economic, and political grids of society, will make a tremendous theoretical contribution to sociology of education and in doing so will serve as a driving force for understanding today's youth navigating a difficult new era.

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Chapter 6
School-to-Work Transitions for Japanese Youth in a Globalized Era

Yukie Hori and Yuri Nakajima

Abstract This chapter examines recent changes in and current issues related to the transition from high school or university to work in Japan. Moreover, given that the educational and occupational opportunities offered in different parts of the country vary substantially, we examine how youth in rural areas respond to these two choices, whether to move away from rural areas to seek greater educational and occupational opportunity or to remain in rural areas, for example, in order to help revitalize the local communities in which they were raised. In conclusion, whereas the labor market for high school graduates has shrunk, that for college graduates has expanded in accordance with increasing enrollment in higher education. The mechanisms for school-to-work transition differ between high school and university. In addition, we presume that regional disparities in the school-to-work transition will increase. The question of who chooses to be geographically mobile and who chooses to stay in their home area should be recognized as being a socioeconomic issue.

The Japanese labor market and school-to-work transition are thought to be stable (OECD 2000). A recent OECD (2000) report introduces the Japanese school-to-work transition system as an example of a highly efficient system. It is true that Japan's school drop-out rates are relatively low; upper secondary graduation rates are high; unemployment to population ratios are low for both teenagers and young adults; and employment rates are high among young adults. Japan has had a strong internal labor market and tradition of internal training, which has led to firms placing great emphasis on general educational achievement, positive attitude, and trainability (OECD 2000). As a result, very few youth have workplace experience, even in the form of vocational courses, prior to entering the labor market (Dore and Sako

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A. Yonezawa et al. (eds.), *Japanese Education in a Global Age*, Education in the Asia-Pacific Region: Issues, Concerns and Prospects 46,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-1528-2_6

1998, as cited in OECD 2000). Another important aspect of the transition from school to work in Japan is that, for most Japanese, this occurs only once in a lifetime (Brinton 1993; Ishida 1993, 1998). That is to say, it is rare for Japanese workers to return to school once they have entered the labor market (Ishida 1998).

However, this previously efficient system has begun to unravel as a result of increasing enrollment in higher education and changes in industrial structure. It has become more difficult for high school and college graduates to obtain stable employment. In this chapter, we examine recent changes in and current issues related to the transition from high school or university to work in Japan.

Furthermore, given that the educational and occupational opportunities offered in different parts of the country vary substantially, high school graduates who plan to advance to higher education or to start working often face the possibility of having to move geographically. Despite the difficulty in obtaining stable employment, it appears that young people tend to stay in rural areas, which have smaller labor markets compared to big cities. At the same time, the excess concentration of population in the Tokyo metropolitan area has been seen as a major issue and has led to policies that encourage young people to stay in local areas and contribute to the revitalization of local communities. Thus, we examine how youth in rural areas respond to these two choices, whether to move away from rural areas to seek greater educational and occupational opportunity or to remain in rural areas, for example, in order to help revitalize the local communities in which they were raised.

In the first section of this chapter, we examine previous studies on school-to-work transition and related issues from the perspective of social mobility. In the second section, we present an overview of Japanese educational and employment systems. In the third and fourth sections, we examine the transition from high school and university, respectively, and clarify issues related to these transitions for young people. In the fifth section, we discuss trends in geographic mobility with respect to school-to-work transition. In the last section, we discuss future challenges related to school-to-work transition in Japan.

6.1 Japanese Studies on Social Mobility and School-to-Work Transition

In the Japanese context, school-to-work transition should be understood as a component of social mobility, since the employment status of an individual's first job after graduation determines the status of subsequent jobs to which he or she may switch. It is worth noting that the school and college that an individual attends play a major role in determining the first job and that an individual's socioeconomic background influences his or her educational and occupational attainment. Studies on social mobility focus on people's social status and interpersonal and intergenerational shifts in social status within the social hierarchy and are concerned with the influence of social, economic, and cultural dynamics of social class and gender on educational and occupational attainment (Arum and Hout 1998; Blau and Duncan

1967; Ishida 1993, 1998). In the past, it was believed that "opportunities for education are more open in Japan, and that education has much more determinate consequences for socioeconomic success in Japan than in other societies" (Ishida 1993: 2). This thesis of "educational credentialism" was, however, refuted by Ishida (1993). Ishida found that the role of educational credentials in increasing the mobility chances of people did not dominate the reproduction mechanism of social background, while the credentials from privileged colleges continue to have an effect on returns in the labor market. However, Ishida clarified that this finding only holds true for men. For women, the link between educational and occupational attainment is weaker than it is for men (Ishida 1998).

As discussed above, to understand the current situation of school-to-work transition is to understand the nature of social mobility in Japan today. Japanese scholars have examined what kinds of students are able to attain more stable or prestigious jobs, while others cannot, taking into consideration the students' schools or colleges, the fields of study, socioeconomic backgrounds, and gender. Japanese hiring customs prevent those who were unable to obtain *seiki koyo* (permanent full-time jobs) upon graduation from getting full-time jobs in the labor market in the future. After the post-1990s economic recession, the process of transitioning from school to work has changed, although on the surface it may still appear the same in comparison to other countries. The increasing number of *hiseiki koyo* (non-regular/non-permanent employment) workers and unemployed youth has become a scholarly and political issue in Japan, as it has in many postindustrial countries (OECD 2010). The effects of recession, however, have not impacted everyone equally. Sociologists have shown that youth who are disadvantaged in terms of family background and educational qualification are more likely to become unemployed or hold *hiseiki koyo* jobs (Brinton 2011; Kosugi 2005; Mimizuka 2002).

6.2 Overview of Educational and Employment Systems

This section provides an overview of Japanese educational and employment systems. Young people usually make major career path choices when graduating from high school or college.

6.2.1 The Japanese Educational System

Figure 6.1 provides an outline of Japan's educational system. Compulsory education comprises 9 years of study at the elementary and junior high school level. Ninety-eight percent of junior high school students then progress to high school. Half of all high school graduates progress to 4-year universities or 2-year junior colleges, while 20% advance to professional training colleges, and 5% go on to preparatory schools that prepare students for university entrance examinations the following year. Less than 1% of high school graduates enter vocational training



Fig. 6.1 The Japanese educational system and rates of continuing education/entering employment. (Source: Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT), *School Basic Survey*)

courses, while 20% enter employment, and 7% neither continue their education nor enter employment (the majority take on part-time jobs). The vast majority of students in institutions of higher education are aged between 18 and 22, since most high school graduates either go on to higher education or start working after graduation without any interruption or "gap year."

Looking at the career paths of university graduates, the percentage of university graduates entering employment directly after graduation dropped to 55% in around 2000, down substantially from a peak of 70–80% in the 1980s. This number has since recovered to around about 60–70% in recent years. In addition, approximately 10% of university graduates go on to graduate school. The percentage of people not in employment or education – namely, who neither go on to further study nor enter employment despite having graduated university – has remained low in recent years, at around 15%.

6.2.2 The Japanese Employment System

Shinsotsu issei saiyo (simultaneous mass recruiting of new graduates) has long been a customary means of hiring students in Japan. Companies recruit inexperienced young people on the basis of their "trainability." The principal criterion for taking on a graduate is the school or college from which he or she graduated. Companies plan on developing employees' abilities within the company over the long term. Unlike recruitment aimed at filling vacancies, the mass recruitment of new graduates involves recruitment of school or college students at fixed intervals to start



Fig. 6.2 Change in percentage of employees whose first job is *seiki koyo*. (Source: Japan Institute for Labour Policy and Training Research Material Series No. 144, Youth Employment Status and Current Situation of Careers and Vocational Ability Development (2): From the 2012 "Employment Status Survey"). Note: Excluding students enrolled in school or for whom "attending school is main activity"

work as *seiki koyo* employees.[1] After entering *seiki koyo* employment, the new graduates receive initial in-house training designed especially for new hires, after which they go through job rotations to expand their scope of work. This, in turn, allows the hirees to develop their careers by being promoted to higher positions, statuses, or pay grades. The custom of *shinsotsu issei saiyo,* however, does not allow graduates to obtain *seiki koyo* employment easily if they are not able to get a *seiki koyo* job while still in college.

The situation, however, has been changing. For over a decade now, starting in the mid-1990s, the *seiki koyo* labor market for young people has continued to shrink. As Fig. 6.2 shows, for male high school graduates, 82.6% of job seekers finishing high school in 1986–1990 became *seiki koyo* employees. However, this percentage has progressively declined to 61.8% among the youngest group surveyed. The situation is worse for women. Whereas 72.7% of female graduates were hired as *seiki koyo* employees immediately after finishing high school in 1986–1990, only approximately

[1] In Japanese employment, there are two different forms of employment: "regular employment (*seiki koyo*)" and "non-regular employment (*hiseiki koyo*)." There are significant differences between these two employment forms in terms of recruitment, vocational training, and promotion. *Seiki koyo* offers relatively higher wages with benefits and longer working hours relative to part-time employment. *Seiki koyo* employees have opportunities for vocational training within the company after recruitment and are more likely to be promoted. *Hiseiki koyo* employees receive few opportunities for vocational training and are much less likely to be promoted. *Seiki koyo* employees are generally on full-time contracts with unlimited terms, while *hiseiki koyo* employees are generally under part-time, limited-term agreements. *Hiseiki koyo* includes "temporary workers ('*arubaito*' in Japanese), part-time workers, temporary agency workers (*dispatched workers*), contract workers, and others" (OECD 2009: 54). Mass recruitment of new graduates generally means the recruitment of *seiki koyo* employees, and new graduates compete to secure positions as *seiki koyo* employees.

half are able to obtain comparable jobs today. Although the change is not as pronounced among university graduates, 90.5% of men leaving university in 1990–1994 were hired as *seiki koyo* employees. This percentage has fallen to around 70% today. The least substantial drop has occurred among women completing university, with 78.9% becoming permanent employees in 1990–1994 compared to around 70% today. This result indicates that the status of female university graduates in the Japanese labor market has risen in relative terms.

More recently, the demand for younger workers fell after the financial crisis of 2008 but appears to be on an upward trajectory since 2013.

6.3 Transition from High School to Work from the Mid-1990s

This section discusses the current situation of transition from high school to work in Japan from the mid-1990s.

6.3.1 Mechanisms of Employment for High School Graduates

The transition from school to work for young people who do not enter higher education became a serious social problem in developed countries starting in the late 1970s, when industrial structure began to shift from secondary industry centered on manufacturing to tertiary industry. Among OECD countries, the problem of youth unemployment has been especially pressing in Germany and Japan, which had long avoided the problem through mechanisms that enabled young people to leave education at an early stage and to move to work (Hori 2016).

In Japan, public employment security offices, high schools, and employers have had a strong rules-based relationship. Although considerable regional variability exists, such relationships have developed the high school graduate labor market. One concrete form of such relationships is the *jisseki kankei* (semiformal employment contract), which constitutes an informal institutional agreement between contracted high schools and contracting employers (Rosenbaum and Kariya 1989). The contract is "not a formal or written contract" but, rather, just an "ongoing relationship" (Rosenbaum and Kariya 1989: 1343). Figure 6.3 illustrates the specific job matching process for new high school graduates, which is prescribed by institutional arrangements. The key elements of the transition are as follows. First, employers are not allowed to have direct contact with high school students; instead, the students seek employment through public employment security offices or high



Dates of commencement of recruitment screening, etc.

1. Commencement of acceptance of requests for applicants for job openings by public employment security offices (June 20)

3. Commencement of request for applicants for job openings and visits to schools (July 1)

7. Commencement of submission of student application documents to companies (September 5)

8 & 9. Commencement of screening and offers (September 16)

Fig. 6.3 Framework for employment of new high school graduates through high schools. (Source: Hori 2009 p. 95)

schools. Second, the timing of disclosure of job openings is governed by recruitment agreements. Job openings are disclosed to high schools on July 1 and selections made by September 16. In the 1980s, over 600,000 high school students decided which companies they wanted to apply to and over half decided on their jobs during this short period. Third, students are allowed to apply to only one company at a time. The schools select a specified number of student(s) based on their academic performance and recommend them to contracting employers. Although the specific numbers vary by region, employers give employment exams, interview the students, and end up employing approximately 70% of the applicants (Hori 2016). This practice enables the maximum number of students to get jobs with their first-choice employer. This practice of "*jisseki kankei*" has been recognized as facilitating the transition from high school to work.



Fig. 6.4 Changing career choices of high school graduates. (Source: MEXT, School Basic Survey)

6.3.2 The Shrinking High School Graduate Labor Market

Looking at the present state of Japan's high school graduate labor market, the career choices of high school students have been changing since the late 1990s (Hori 2009). As Fig. 6.4 shows, first, an increasing proportion of students are enrolling in higher education. The proportion of students entering university has increased due to the policy of higher education expansion and the decline in the 18-year-old population. Second, the proportion of high school graduates who are neither enrolled in higher education nor found employment has increased. Although this proportion rose until 2002, it has been declining since 2003. Third, the proportion of job seekers has declined, falling sharply in the 1990s from over 600,000 in the 1980s. Since around 2003, the number of job seekers has remained at around 210,000. Similarly, the number of job openings for high school graduates declined rapidly following the collapse of the economic bubble in the early 1990s but has been on a recovery trend since 2003. While overall demand from manufacturers is presently experiencing a temporary high, the number of employers seeking high school graduates is declining overall, and the job openings they offer are mainly for skilled positions.

Figure 6.5 shows the number of job openings and the job opening to job applicant ratio for prospective new high school graduates. Despite recent indications of an economic downturn, job openings for high school graduates are on the rise since the recession in the late 1990s. The general economic recovery has not necessarily led to improvement in employment conditions in all areas of the country.



Fig. 6.5 The job offer to job application ratio for high school graduates. (Source: MHLW, *Labor Market for New Graduates,* and MEXT, *School Basic Survey*)

6.4 Transition from University to Work

University enrollment constitutes the vast majority of enrollment in higher educational institutions,[2] and job search processes for university and nonuniversity institutions are similar. As in the case of high school students discussed in the previous section, college students also look for jobs while in college and start working immediately after graduation.

6.4.1 Job Search Processes for College Graduates

In contrast to high school students, students in higher education find employment on their own while in college. University-to-work transition has been a focus since the 1960s, when a smaller number of students were enrolled in universities. At that time, the strong dependence of job and career advancement on academic credential was criticized (Kariya 2010). Although such dependence still exists in some areas (especially in science-related fields for graduate students), the customary practice of university professors recommending their students to employers has been diminishing as greater numbers of students have entered higher education (Ikeda 1966, cited in Kariya 2010). Brinton and Kariya (1998) found that job searches by Japanese college students tend to be done through semi-institutional networks between universities and employers, wherein universities help students by preparing lists of alumni whom the students can contact to find employment.

[2] Japanese higher education institutions include universities (4 or 6 years), junior colleges (2 years), national institutes of technology, and professional training colleges.

Students look for jobs through job postings provided by college job placement sections or career service centers as well as through web sites and job information magazines for new college graduates. It is not common for new graduates to contact employers directly to ask if they have job openings. Many students use job information web sites run by the private sector. A few graduates employ public placement agencies called *Hello Work*, which usually cover mid-career employment. According to a Japan Institute of Labor, Policy, and Training (JILPT) survey (2006), 80.5% of senior university students who received official job offers before graduation looked for jobs through “free application systems” wherein students submit their curriculum vitae to employers posting job offers for new graduates. The use of “free application systems” implies that the students obtain job information through web sites, college career centers, or magazines. In contrast, only 6.9% received employment based on recommendations from their universities or faculty members. In the field of engineering, 21.0% of students used such systems. Although some students may have used alumni network to identify and contact companies, it is not possible to know the number of students who employ such networking since the students usually end up applying for jobs through “free application systems.”

Recently, more college students have employed job information web sites. Although job searches using the Internet can provide job postings for graduates throughout the country, it could end up making the job search process less efficient. According to Kosugi (2013), since information provided via the Internet expands the labor market for college graduates to the entire country, graduates tend to apply to many employers, while companies need more effort to select graduates. Moreover, the expansion of job searches via the Internet weakens the function of college career service centers, which assume the role of career counseling. Some staff in college career service sections point out that students who search for jobs mainly through the Internet tend to give up looking for jobs (Kosugi 2013).

Moreover, since 1953, there has been a system of *shushoku kyotei* (recruitment agreement) for college students which is essentially nonlegally binding agreements between universities and companies regarding the starting date of companies’ recruitment activities (Kanazaki 2006). However, such agreements have been banned as of 1996. This means that companies now have more power than universities and tend to control the labor market for college students (Kanazaki 2006). More recently, employers and universities have started to conclude *rinri kensho* (ethical charter), which are weak agreements regarding on the starting date of companies’ recruitment activities.



Fig. 6.6 Eighteen-year-old population and number of enrollment in higher education institutions (1955–2015). (Source: MEXT, *School Basic Survey*)

6.4.2 Increasing Demands in College Student Labor Market

As the number and ratio of 18-year-olds entering higher education institutions has increased, so, too, has the demand in the college student labor market.[3] Figure 6.6 shows the 18-year-old population and enrollment in higher education institutions. The 18-year-old population reached a peak of 2.5 million in 1966. At the time, there were 0.3 million newly enrolled university students in university, representing 11.8% of the 18-year-old population. Since 1966, the young population has been decreasing, while enrollment in higher education increased. In 2015, the 18-year-old population was 1.2 million, and the number of newly enrolled university students was 0.6 million or 51.5% of the 18-year-old population. If we include new students in all higher education institutions, enrollment was 1.0 million or 79.9% of the 18-year-old population.

Since the 1990s, the demand for new high school graduates in the metropolitan area has decreased and has been replaced by demand for college graduates (Hozawa 2016). As Fig. 6.2 shows in the previous section, the *seiki koyo* employment rate of

[3] The reason we look at the 18-year-old population is that enrollment of nontraditional students such as part-time students, adult students, and early college students is quite low in Japan. Most college-bound young people go on to higher education directly or a few years after high school graduation, without an intervening period of full-time work. According to the OECD education database (2007), the rate of college students aged over 25 is only 2.0% in Japan, in contrast to the OECD average of 20.6%. Therefore, in the Japanese context, the rate of advancement to higher education institutions by high school graduates is often used instead of the college enrollment rate for the entire population. The advancement rate is essentially the same as the percentage of new enrollment in each higher education institution.



Fig. 6.7 Change in educational background of employees in different job categories (2002–2012). (Source: Statistics Bureau, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, *Employment Status Survey*. Note: This figure focuses only on graduates of each educational level, not including those who are enrolled in education)

graduates from university is higher than that of high school graduates. Figure 6.7 represents the change in educational background of workers in professional and managerial jobs, clerical jobs, sales jobs, and service jobs from 2002 to 2012. The ratio of university and graduate school graduates has increased in each job category, which suggests that university graduates have replaced jobs that were previously occupied by less-educated individuals.

6.5 Geographic Mobility in the School-to-Work Transition

The community or region in which a person lives should be recognized as being one of the socioeconomic factors determining an individual's career path. According to a classic study undertaken by Lipset (1955), people from urban areas tend to obtain higher-level jobs and higher education than those from rural areas. Therefore, the decision to become geographically mobile could influence an individual's subsequent social upward/downward mobility. As Yasuda (1971) suggests, rethinking Sorokin's concept of social mobility, geographic mobility does not always mean horizontal mobility but may signal vertical (i.e., socially upward or downward) mobility. While some people move from rural areas to cities as unskilled workers, Japanese researchers emphasize that, in Japan, geographic mobility from rural to urban areas is often related to social upward mobility. Geographic mobility has, in fact, played a prominent role in the Japanese meritocratic system. Historically, since the Meiji era (1868–1912), before and after the World War II, people moved from the countryside to cities with the expectation of upward mobility. Takeuchi (2005) calls this tendency "*risshin-shusse shugi*" (central-mobility-ism). *Risshin-shusse* means doing well in the "central" areas away from home and was especially prevalent among the *shi-zoku* (old warrior class). The aspiration for the "central" indicated not only the desire of going to central locations or big cities in Japan but also a desire for promotion within the bureaucratic system (Aso 1960; Harada 1969). It was easier for *shi-zoku* to become government bureaucrats than those in other classes, even after the Edo era class system was abolished in the Meiji era (Harada 1969; Sonoda et al. 1995; Takeuchi 2005; Yasuda 1971).

The socioeconomic advantage of moving to cities has also been pointed out even more recently (Lee 2012; Tsukahara and Kobayashi 1979). Tsukahara and Kobayashi (1979) showed that individuals and especially those from smaller towns and villages, who moved and those who did not move, had different kinds of jobs. Many who moved from smaller towns got more advantageous jobs such as non-manual, professional, and managerial jobs. This same tendency was not found for migrants from other big cities. Rather, those who moved from large cities tended to own fewer goods than those who did not move (Tsukahara and Kobayashi 1979). Moreover, economists have tried to analyze whether economic opportunities in a given area affect the decisions related to geographic mobility and how much income benefit is gained by geographic mobility. According to Lee (2012), examining the differences in the benefit of geographic mobility by educational attainment, the increased income gained by moving to Tokyo for those with a high school degree is not high, while the increased income for those with university degree exceeds moving costs.

As part of the urbanization process, many people moved from rural areas to cities to get jobs especially during the period of high economic growth after the World War II (Harada 1969). However, some scholars point out that the expectation of geographic mobility to be a first step toward upward mobility has diminished (Nakamura 1999; Tsuburai and Hayashi 2000). Nakamura (1999) demonstrated that, at least in terms of primary and secondary education, families tend not to move for better education, since educational institutions have spread throughout Japan after the war. The expansion of the school system has led to greater awareness of the possibility of social and geographic mobility while simultaneously inhibiting the need for geographical mobility. In a similar fashion, Tsuburai and Hayashi (2000) suggested that since the high economic growth period after the World War II, the effect of moving from rural areas to cities on upward mobility has been greatly reduced and that people move to cities to attend prestigious universities. Accordingly, in recent years, geographic mobility has increasingly come to represent the possibility of going on to higher education. In fact, many universities, especially prestigious universities, are located in big cities such as Tokyo and Osaka (Isoda 2009; Shimizu and Bando 2013). According to a 2015 School Basic Survey by MEXT, of the 779 universities in Japan, 224 institutions are located in the Tokyo area.

More recently, however, people have tended to not move geographically, even when advancing to higher education. Figure 6.8 shows the rate of advancement to



Fig. 6.8 Enrollment in local universities (home prefecture or area) and universities in the Tokyo area (1971–2015). Note 1: This figure treats the Tokyo area, which includes Saitama, Chiba, Tokyo, and Kanagawa, as a single "home prefecture" and the Osaka area, which includes Kyoto, Osaka, and Hyogo, as a different "home prefecture," based on the fact that they have convenient commuter systems that are much more integrated compared to other areas. People move among prefectures within these areas on a daily basis. Note 2: Okinawa Prefecture is not included in the 1971 data

universities in graduates' home prefectures,[4] home areas,[5] and in the Tokyo area. More high school graduates are choosing to attend universities in their home prefectures or areas. The proportion of students attending universities in their home prefectures has increased from 49.3% in 1971 to 59.9% in 2015. Moreover, the proportion of students attending universities in their home areas has increased from 61.1% in 1971 to 74.9% in 2015. That said, these proportions, which are represented by solid lines in the figure, may overestimate the actual local attendance rate, since population has been increasingly concentrated in the Tokyo area (especially the Tokyo Prefecture) according to the population census (Statistics Bureau 2015). The Tokyo area is home to many universities, including numerous prestigious colleges, and has relatively convenient commuter systems, which make it unnecessary

[4]We use the term "prefecture" to denote administrative boundaries controlled by local governments and the term "areas" to denote groups of adjacent prefectures, which prefectures included in a given area vary depending on various criteria such as economy, culture, and history. In this chapter, we divide Japan into ten areas comprising of 47 prefectures: Hokkaido, Tohoku, Kanto, Koshinetsu, Hokuriku, Chubu, Osaka, Chugoku, Shikoku, and Kyushu and Okinawa. In addition, the Tokyo area comprises the metropolitan area and a part of the Kanto area.

[5]To be exact, "home prefecture" or "home area" refers to the prefecture or area in which the high school attended by an individual is located. Since most people attend high school in their home prefecture or in the area where they grew up, while this may not be the case for some individuals who moved around as children, in this chapter, we refer to the prefecture or area in which someone has grown up as their "home prefecture" or "home area."



Fig. 6.9 Long-term geographic mobility patterns for male high school graduates from rural areas. (Source: National Institute of Population and Social Security Research (IPSS), *National Survey on Migration*, cited in Hori and Kishi (2017), p. 153)

for high school graduates from the Tokyo area to move elsewhere for university. The dashed lines in Fig. 6.8 represent university enrollment rates excluding individuals from the Tokyo area. The percentage of students attending universities in their home prefectures has increased from 34.3% in 1971 to 44.5% in 2015. In terms of universities in home areas, the percentage has increased from 49.6% in 1971 to 65.3%. In contrast, the percentage of students attending universities in the Tokyo area, excluding those who are originally from the Tokyo area, has fallen from 34.8% in 1971 to 18.7% in 2015.

Another study has shown the tendency for younger people to stay in or return to their home prefectures. Hori and Kishi (2017) draw an analysis of longer-term geographic mobility patterns of high school graduates. Figure 6.9 shows geographic mobility patterns after high school graduation for male cohorts originally from rural areas. The younger the generation, the lower the percentage of individuals who move to another prefecture to continue education or to enter employment after high school graduation and the greater the number of individuals who do not leave their home area or who initially move away but return when entering the job market for the first time. One of the main reasons is a significant decline in the ratio of job openings in metropolitan areas for new high school graduates from rural areas. Furthermore, with respect to college graduates, relative to the number of college students who move to the Tokyo area for education, the number of job openings in Tokyo is small. Graduates have to compete for jobs, which results in a large proportion of graduates who have no choice but to return to their home areas for jobs (Hozawa 2016).

According to Nakajima (2015), the staff of college career service centers see students' locally oriented tendency to stay in their hometowns, refusal to go out for



Fig. 6.10 Timing of job interview by geographic area (cumulative rates). (Source: Nakajima (2007), p. 91. Note: See Footnote 6 regarding the geographic areas)

jobs, and lack of desire to seek stable, well-paying jobs that often offered in big cities as problematic. As shown in Fig. 6.10, job searches progress at different paces in different areas. Staff in career service centers encourage students, who do not realize there are regional differences in the job search process, to start their job search earlier, explaining that it will be difficult otherwise find good jobs in big cities. Another factor that inhibits graduates from moving is the economic disadvantage faced by individuals in rural areas. For students in rural areas, job searches require more money for travel, since job interviews and employment exams are often given in big cities. This can hinder students from moving geographically for work after graduation. Career center staff suggest that universities should provide assistance to students searching for better jobs by providing aid and buses to take students to job fairs in big cities (Nakajima 2015).

6.6 Conclusion and Discussion

To conclude, transition from high school and university to work has changed in Japan since the mid-1990s. Whereas the labor market for high school graduates has shrunk, that for college graduates has expanded in accordance with increasing enrollment in higher education. The mechanisms for school-to-work transition differ between high school and university. High school graduates basically find jobs through their high schools or public employment service based on informal agreements between schools and employers. In contrast, college graduates look for jobs by themselves, mainly by using job information web sites. However, such online job searches may become increasingly inefficient as the labor market for college graduates increases.

In addition, we presume that regional disparities in the school-to-work transition will increase. In the Japanese context, geographic mobility from rural areas to big cities, especially Tokyo, for education and work has historically been prompted by a meritocratic belief, i.e., that geographic mobility will lead to upward social mobility. The *place* (i.e., region or community) in which an individual has grown up, gone to school, or worked affects his or her future socioeconomic benefits. In the Japanese context, *place* is a significant factor that, along with family background and gender, partially determines one's career trajectory. The question of who chooses to be geographically mobile and who chooses to stay in their home area should be recognized as being a socioeconomic issue.

Although recent Japanese policies assume that more young people in rural areas are moving to Tokyo, our study shows that young people are increasingly tending not to move geographically. Scholars point out that the impact of geographic mobility for work on social upward mobility has diminished. More recently, people are increasingly tending to remain in their home areas and to not move even for education. Potential reasons remaining in home areas include narrowing regional disparities in higher education institutions and labor markets, changing aspirations and thoughts of young people, or changing parent-child relationships. These reasons, however, have not been investigated and warrant further examination.

The current educational environments of students' home areas are very likely to continue, at least for the moment. If the higher education policy of operating at least one national university per prefecture changes and existing universities are amalgamated into regional universities in accordance with the decline in student population, young people may have no choice but to move for education. Such mobility would be largely involuntarily, unlike the previous proactive mobility that was motivated by meritocratic belief.

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Chapter 7
Are Children Who Do Not Go to School "Bad," "Sick," or "Happy"?: Shifting Interpretations of Long-Term School Nonattendance in Postwar Japan

Sachiko Horiguchi

Abstract This chapter examines postwar debates in Japan around long-term school absence at the level of discourse and practice. The chapter begins by unpacking postwar official statistics and policy discourses on long-term school absence in relation to competing medical and citizens' discourses, with a particular focus on changes in terms used to refer to school nonattendance. I show how moves toward the medicalization of absenteeism as an individual "sickness" in the 1980s were met with criticism from citizens promoting alternative school movements, leading to encouragement for noninterventionist approaches at policy level. I then outline the "emergence" of *hikikomori* (social withdrawal) as a youth social problem in the 2000s, which prompted a revision of these approaches, shifting the blame back to the individual children and their families. This chapter reveals how policy and popular discourse have resonated with each other and how various stakeholders of education have led competing discourses and practices on long-term school nonattendance, both positive and negative, shedding light on a larger question of *whom* education is for. The chapter concludes by introducing the latest debates and issues around school absenteeism and by highlighting the diversification of alternative schooling opportunities.

7.1 Introduction

In any educational system, there are always children who stop attending school, and yet, the ways in which school nonattendance is framed and conceived vary across societies. How have children who stopped going to school been viewed and treated in postwar Japan? This chapter attempts to answer this question by examining postwar debates in Japan around long-term school absence, both at the level of discourse

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A. Yonezawa et al. (eds.), *Japanese Education in a Global Age*, Education in the Asia-Pacific Region: Issues, Concerns and Prospects 46,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-1528-2_7

and practice. Currently, the term most commonly used for nonattendance is *futōkō*, literally "not going to school," but postwar decades have seen transitions in terminology, from *gakkō-kyōfu* (school phobia), *tōkōkyohi* (school refusal), to *futōkō* (school nonattendance). This chapter begins by unpacking postwar official statistics and policy discourses on long-term school absence in relation to competing medical and citizens' discourses, with particular attention to these changes in terminology. I will show how moves toward the medicalization of absenteeism as an individual "sickness" in the 1980s were met with criticism from citizens promoting alternative school movements, placing the blame on problems with the *schools* and not individual children. This led to an emphasis on noninterventionist approaches, with the government recognizing that *any* child can stop going to school. The "emergence" of *hikikomori* (social withdrawal) as a youth social problem in the 2000s is then briefly outlined, followed by a discussion of how this led to a revision of these approaches at the level of discourse and practice, shifting the blame back to the individual children and their families. This chapter will illustrate how policy and popular discourse have resonated with each other, both emphasizing the psychological dimensions of school absenteeism, with a lack of attention to class and racial/ethnic minority issues. It will also demonstrate how various stakeholders of education – the Japanese Education Ministry, mainstream and alternative schools, medical professionals, clinical psychologists, sociologists, lay supporters, media, parents, as well as children – have led competing discourses and practices on long-term school nonattendance, both positive and negative, shedding light on a larger question of *whom* education is for. Throughout the chapter, reference will be made to sociological studies published in Japanese as well as English. The chapter concludes by introducing the latest debates and issues around school absenteeism and by highlighting the diversification of alternative schooling opportunities.

7.2 Postwar Statistics of Long-Term School Nonattendance and Shifting Categorizations

Japan's Education Ministry (hereafter referred to as MEXT[1]) has given attention to the prevalence of long-term school absenteeism throughout the postwar period, and it is therefore important to begin the discussion on this topic with an overview of how MEXT has compiled statistics on long-term school nonattendance. Postwar trends in the number of long-term school absentees compiled annually by MEXT since 1952 followed a U-shaped curve. Figure 7.1 shows the trends in populations of long-term school absentees (*chōki-kesseki*) from 1952 onward.

As Fig. 7.1 shows, the numbers of absentees dropped steadily until the mid-1970s, but since then, they have been rising overall. Some argue that the 10-year period after the late 1960s was a peculiar period, with an exceptionally small number

[1] The Ministry of Education, Culture, and Science (Monbushō) changed its name to the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology (MEXT; Monbukagakushō, abbreviated as Monkashō) in January 2001. Here, I will use the abbreviation MEXT for both.



Fig. 7.1 Population trends of long-term school absentees, 1952–2014. (Source: MEXT 1953–2015)

of absentees (Kano 2001; Kido 2004: 38; Shimizu 2011: 172 footnote 13; Takigawa 1996; Yamamoto 1991), which led to the perception that the rise in the numbers from mid-1970s was alarming and "new," though in fact they were slowly approaching earlier levels. Scholars have pointed to the correlation between trends in the number of long-term absentees and educational expansion (Fujita 2015: 50–51). From the 1950s to the mid-1970s, the number of long-term absentees declined, while high school enrollment rose, possibly due to the expectation that high school graduation would give children a better future. As the economic miracle started to fade and high school enrollment rate reached over 90% in the mid-1970s, the incentive for attending school may have declined (Fujita 2015: 51).

For the first annual survey in 1952, the definition of "long-term absence" (*chōki-kesseki*) was set at 50-plus days of absence. The survey found the percentage of long-term absentees roughly halving during this 6-year period, from 1.4% to 0.7% in elementary school and from 3.8% to 1.8% in middle school (Shimizu 2011: 171). Katō (2012: 90, 97–100) and Fujita (2015: 47) observe that the fact that MEXT conducted this large-scale survey contributed to schools grasping the number of long-term absentees and thereby encouraging teachers and residents in the community to push children to attend school.

In 1991, MEXT revised its strategy and began gathering data on students missing 30-plus days per year, in addition to those missing 50 days or more, and in 1999, MEXT stopped collecting data on pupils missing 50-plus days, so that 30-plus days' absence became the single benchmark for defining long-term absence (Shimizu 2011: 172). In 1999, MEXT also stopped using "dislike of school" in its annual statistics in favor of "school nonattendance," termed *futōkō* (Shimizu 2011: 172–3),[2] which, as I will demonstrate below, has become the most commonly used term to refer to the issue of school absenteeism. It should therefore be noted that this neutral-sounding term *futōkō* is a particular subcategory of long-term absence (*chōki-kesseki*) in official discourse, separated from long-term absence due to sickness or economic reasons. Shimizu (2011: 173) finds that only the "dislike of school"/"school nonattendance" category has been constantly rising, to the point where it is now the biggest category, while the "sickness" category which used to be the largest has gradually declined[3], and cases due to "economic reasons" have also decreased, staying at around total 1000 or significantly lower (among roughly 50,000–230,000 long-term absentees) since 1972.[4]

Before proceeding to an examination of societal discourse, I should point out ways in which MEXT's school nonattendance statistics have been challenged by scholars, in relation to either its validity or its lack of attention to certain issues. Yamamoto (2008), for example, identifies inconsistencies in criteria used for the three subcategories of

[2] As Shimizu (2011: 179) finds, MEXT had started using the term *futōkō* in its policy documents in 1990.

[3] Orihara et al. (2005) point to the possibility that children previously categorized under "sickness" were recategorized under "dislike of school" in the 1970s.

[4] While the term *tōkōkyohi* (school refusal) has not been used in MEXT's annual statistics of long-term absentees, as in the case of popular discourse since the 1960s, it was used extensively in its policy documents (see Shimizu 2011: 173–80).

long-term absence depending on prefectures (see also Kano 2001) and years. Katō (2012), on the other hand, notes how the official policy discourses and surveys fail to address ethnic minority issues, e.g., resident Koreans (*zainichi Korean*) due to their focus on children with Japanese citizenship required by law to be enrolled in compulsory education, while Shimizu (2011: 182–3) points to MEXT’s failure to address the issue of poverty in relation to school absenteeism, reflecting Japanese bureaucrat’s sectionalism and lack of collaboration with child welfare offices. Discussions related to ethnic minority and poverty problems are largely absent not only in the official statistics but also in much of postwar policy and popular discourse on absenteeism, which will be reviewed in detail in the following section.

7.3 Shifts in Terminologies and Societal Views in the Postwar Period

7.3.1 From “School Phobia” to “School Refusal”

The issue of long-term absenteeism has been discussed in various arenas throughout the postwar period, after being given official attention in the 1950s (Lock 1988: 380), at times intersecting with MEXT’s official policies and leading to diversification of alternative educational opportunities for absentees at the level of practice. According to Itō (2007: 38–44, see also Shimizu 2011: 167–8), postwar views have shifted from the focus on economic/welfare issues of the family to psychological/psychiatric problems with the child, followed by problems with the school/educational institution. Up until 1960, the main issue was with the children who were not allowed to attend school because of their household’s economic factors and lack of understanding for school as well as children’s laziness (Hiroi 2010: 201–5; Itō 2007). The term *gakkō-kyōfu*, a translation of Johnson et al. (1941)‘s label “school phobia,” which connotes pathology on the side of the student (Takatsuka 2002: 64–5), along with the term *chōki-kesseki* (long-term absence) (Itō 2007), was used until the 1960s when the label *tōkōkyohi* (school refusal) came to replace it. Takayama (2008: 30) suggests that societal attention to this issue grew in the high economic period of the 1960s when it became normative for children to attend school and deviance from this norm gradually came to be viewed as “laziness” or “sickness” requiring discipline or treatment. Discourse on absenteeism in the 1960s was led by child psychiatrists who started to bring up this topic in psychiatry conferences (Asakura 1995: 48–54), thereby creating a view of *tōkōkyohi* as a type of neurosis occurring among a small number of children until the late 1970s (Kudō 2003: 27–8). At the time, MEXT expected school refusal children to undergo treatment at special institutions, such as medical institutions and educational counseling bodies (Shimizu 2011: 173–4).[5]

[5] See Shimizu (2011) for a detailed review of how MEXT has framed school nonattendance in the postwar period.

A diverse group of individuals and institutions, including not only child psychiatrists, psychologists, and teachers but also lay, "nonprofessional" supporters began to engage in the treatment and support for these children from the 1970s (Asakura 1995: 55–65), and from the 1980s, the label *tōkōkyohi* began to be used from the perspective that students refused to go to school on their own initiative (Kudō 2003: 28–31). During the 1980s, *tōkōkyohi* began to attract a great deal of attention from the mass media (Lock 1988: 382), along with, and in relation to the heavily reported problem of, bullying (*ijime*) (Kudō 2003: 32–3; Takayama 2008: 33–4).[6] Until the mid-1980s, measures taken for *tōkōkyohi* children included (1) counseling and student guidance led by MEXT; (2) "treatment" (*chiryō*) outside hospitals and counseling centers, such as "camping therapy"; (3) disciplinary rehabilitation by "nonprofessionals" such as Totsuka Yacht School[7] to "fix" (*naosu*) children; (4) support also by "nonprofessionals" but in softer and unforceful ways to support "recovery" (*tachinaori*); and (5) attempts by child psychiatrists, psychologists, and counselors who do not see *tōkōkyohi* as something to be "treated" (Asakura 1995: 55–65). Okuchi Keiko (Okuchi 2005: 158; see below) called the 1970s and 1980s the "leash era" (*kubinawa jidai*), as adults often tried to forcibly send children to school, as if they were pulling a leash they put on the children. It was in the 1980s that MEXT started publishing a number of manuals and surveys in response to this rise of public awareness.

7.3.2 Protests Against Medicalization and Their Impact on Policy

One key historic turning point in the postwar debate on long-term school nonattendance was the 1988 *Asahi Shimbun* newspaper coverage of *tōkōkyohi* children (Asakura 1995: 69–75). Psychiatrist Inamura Hiroshi argued that children's "*tōkōkyohi-shō"* (school refusal syndrome) would develop into apathy syndrome unless it was treated properly. This report drew great attention as well as criticism and stirred debate, since it was reported on the front page of the *Asahi Shimbun* evening edition (September 16 1988). For instance, Okuchi Keiko, founder of Tokyo Shūre, one of the pioneering *free schools* for absentees outside formal schooling, with the support of psychiatrist Watanabe Takashi, criticized Inamura, arguing that

[6] School-based bullying (*ijime*) has been discussed as a social problem in Japan since the mid-1980s particularly in relation to "bullycide" cases. Sociologists have associated patterns of bullying with the school climate, including power-dominant human relationships and conformity (Yoneyama and Naito 2003). See Yoneyama (2008) for a structural analysis of school-based bullying and its relevance to post-1990s sociopolitical climate of Japan.

[7] Totsuka Hiroshi, the leader of Totsuka Yacht School in Aichi Prefecture (1976~), a privately run organization for troubled children and youth, including *futōkō* children, was arrested in 1992 for deaths of children in the institution (Goodman 2002: 142–3). After serving 3 years in prison, Totsuka returned as director, and this institution has continued to be one of the last resorts for parents with troubled children and youth (see Miller and Toivonen 2010).

tōkōkyohi should not be seen as a sickness but regarded positively as a necessary period to recharge oneself (Shiokura 2000: 43; Takayama 2008: 32). Okuchi is a former schoolteacher whose son became an absentee and had founded Tokyo Shūre in 1985 (see Asakura 1995 for an ethnography of Tokyo Shūre). She and other parents of *tōkōkyohi* children became leading advocates of the citizens' discourse which promoted the view that it is the *schools*, and not the children refusing to go to school, that were "sick." Criticisms of Inamura remain influential to this day, as seen in Takemura's (2002: 171–2) later accusation of Inamura for advocating forceful treatment, for his ambiguous statistical basis, and for incurring anxiety among a large number of school nonattenders and their parents. Since the late 1980s, new movements promoting home education and alternative education also started in order to support children who want to study on their own, without going to school. These movements questioned the modern assumption that children in school age should all attend school (Asakura 1995: 209–14; Hosaka 2000: 185; see also Hida 2001)[8] and strengthened the view of school nonattendance as a way of life (*ikikata*) or choice (*sentaku*).

Not only this rise of citizens' activism to challenge the medicalization of school absenteeism (Yamazaki 1994[9]; Yoneyama 1999)[10] but also the increasing number of *tōkōkyohi* children and a publication of a sociological survey raising concerns about the spread of *tōkōkyohi* in the 1980s (Kudō 2003: 35) led MEXT to announce in 1990 that it "can happen to anyone" (Yoneyama 1999: 187; see Hanatani and Takahashi 2004). Morita Yōji conducted a massive survey of 6000 second-year middle school students in 12 major cities in 1988, and the results, published in 1991, found that 70.8% of the pupils surveyed had at least considered the possibility of refusing to go to school (Shimizu 2011: 182). Morita (1991: 26) described these pupils as exhibiting "school avoidance feelings," and as Shimizu (2011: 182) points out, this research had a significant impact on the shift in MEXT's perception of long-term absence. Morita's findings were later strongly criticized by Kudō (2003: 47–48), but at the time, they resonated with many Japanese people who suspected that the phenomenon of school nonattendance went far beyond the numbers generated by the government's definition (Shimizu 2011: 182).

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[8] Hida's paper (2001) is one of six contributions by educational sociologists in a special issue dedicated to the topic of *futōkō* in *The Journal of Educational Sociology* (*Kyōiku Shakai-gaku Kenkyū*) with an introduction by Kano (2001).

[9] Yamazaki (1994) examines how *futōkō* was medicalized and subsequently de-medicalized and pointed to the tendency to ignore family problems associated with *futōkō*. Later in 2006, Kudō (2006) problematized this dichotomized shift from medicalization to de-medicalization and critically analyzed a number of cases where children and parents who assert that *futōkō* is not a sickness in fact consult "good, understanding" medical doctors and do not exclude the option of psychiatric treatment.

[10] Yoneyama (1999) categorizes postwar discourses of school absenteeism into four types: (1) psychiatric discourse which treats it as mental illness, (2) behavioral discourse which views absenteeism as laziness requiring discipline and punishment, (3) citizen's discourse which puts the blame on the schools rather than the children, and (4) sociomedical discourse which also places the schools as the cause of the problem but describes nonattenders as burnouts suffering from chronic fatigue.

This shift meant that MEXT started taking an observational (*mimamori*) and liberal rather than an interventional and intrusive approach to long-term nonattendance, which persisted throughout the 1990s (Kido 2004: 46–51). For example, in a 1992 report, MEXT called on schoolteachers to encourage absentees' "independence" (*jiritsu*) and "growth" (*seichō*), to give official approval to children's attendance at alternative schools and to create more comfortable school environments. As Shimizu (2011: 178–9) writes, these ideas were put into practice during the 1990s. In 1990, MEXT launched a project to establish public alternative classes/schools run by local boards of education (called *tekiō-shidō-kyōshitsu* or adaptation guidance classes, but later commonly renamed *kyōiku shien center* or educational support centers), treating attendance at these schools as equivalent to attendance at formal schools. Two years later, MEXT began to give the same benefit to privately run alternative schools. From 1995, certified clinical psychologists were allocated to every school as school counselors to provide psychological support to individual cases (Kudō 2003: 35–6).[11] A 1997 teaching manual (MOE 1997: 74–98, cited in Shimizu 2011: 179) stressed the idea that schools should become sites where children feel at home (*kokoro no ibasho*); it is no coincidence that the manual's authors included scholars who considered absenteeism a sign of healthy growth and therefore advocated positive and sympathetic responses to long-term absence (e.g., Kawai 1992; Sakamoto 1993) and the negative phrases that earlier teaching manuals used to explain nonattenders disappeared. It was around this time that the more neutral term *futōkō* (school nonattendance) came to be used more generally in the public, and as I have shown above, MEXT started adopting the term *futōkō* in its annual surveys in 1999. While these shifts were welcomed by proponents of citizens' discourse, they also stirred confusion among psychiatrists and clinical psychologists, who grew uncertain about the extent to which they should get away from finding causes within the individual or the family when treating school nonattenders (Takayama 2008: 34–5).

It should be noted that these changes correspond to MEXT policy's emphasis on children's "individuality" (*kosei*) from the 1990s, as well as its liberalization reforms (Kato 2012: 150–1). In the 15 years from the mid-1980s, in response to proposals led by Ad Hoc Council on Education (Rinkyōshin) and other governmental bodies, MEXT attempted to liberalize government regulations concerning the school system in general, giving greater freedom for children to choose their schools and even for children to choose *not* to go to school (Shimizu 2002; 2011: 181–2). The early 1990s also saw the start of Japan's post-bubble "lost decades," with growing economic disparity and a breakdown of school-to-work transition (Brinton 2010); as Kido (Kido and Yamashita 2012: 8) suggests, there was a heightened sense that going to the good schools does not necessarily ensure a better future.

As we have seen thus far and as many scholars (e.g., Yamazaki 1994; Asakura 1995; Hida 1997; Kano 2001; Kudō 2003; Hanatani and Takahashi 2004; Kido 2004; Fujioka 2006; Itō 2007; see Shimizu 2011: 166) agree, both positive and

[11] See Tajan (2015) for the role clinical psychology (and its expansion) has played in the treatment of school nonattenders.

negative perspectives on long-term school nonattendance have coexisted in postwar Japan, with the former gaining currency in the 1990s. This is in contrast to the Anglophone context where negative views toward school absenteeism seem prevalent, seeing it as either sick (in the pathological sense) or bad (in the behavioral sense) (see also Pelligrini 2007). As we shall see below, however, negativity toward absenteeism has regained currency since the early 2000s, partly due to the emergence of *hikikomori* as a social problem.

7.3.3 The Emergence of the **Hikikomori** *"Problem" and School Nonattendance as a Life Course Issue*

One significant change observed around 2000 was the emergence of *hikikomori*, or social withdrawal, as a social problem afflicting youth in and beyond school age in popular discourse. *Hikikomori* generally refers to the condition of being withdrawn at home for a long period of time without participating in any social activities. The term also refers to the person/people under this condition. *Hikikomori* has come to be increasingly recognized as a social problem, allegedly afflicting a number of young people – particularly male youth – from the 1990s. It was around 1990 that *hikikomori* started to draw attention as a youth problem among small circles of psychiatrists, counselors, and policy makers (Takayama 2008: 28–9). Among them was counselor Tomita Fujiya who has been running a *free space* for *futōkō* children. By the early 1990s, the existence of ex-*futōkō* youth beyond school age who remained excluded from society had caught the attention of Tomita (Takayama 2008: 29–30; Tomita 1992: 133–5).

In 1998, psychiatrist Saitō Tamaki, who later became a leading figure of the *hikikomori* issue, published *Shakaiteki hikikomori* (Social withdrawal) and coined the term "*shakaiteki hikikomori*." Having seen the heavy criticism that his doctoral supervisor Inamura Hiroshi received for medicalizing long-term school nonattendance, Saitō was careful to define *hikikomori* as a condition, not a sickness (see Saitō 2006). Two years later, in the year 2000, due to series of mass media reports on crimes allegedly committed by *hikikomori*, *hikikomori* came to be seen as potential criminals in the popular media. But these "moral panics" (Cohen 1972) in consequence offered opportunities for Saitō not only to eradicate prejudice against *hikikomori* but also to publicize the *hikikomori* issue to larger society. After the "moral panics" faded and shifted to more constructive discussions on how to deal with *hikikomori* (targeted mainly to families with *hikikomori*), *hikikomori* was recognized as requiring support and treatment and came to be seen as a *social* problem, not merely as an individual, mental problem.

This has not only prompted the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (hereafter referred to as MHLW) to devise guidelines (MHLW 2001, 2003) on *hikikomori* but also a number of privately run support organizations for *futōkō* children, such as *free schools*, to expand their market to socially isolated youth over school age (as in the case of Tomita) to comprise what is sometimes called the "*hikikomori* industry" (*hikikomori gyōkai*).[12] In this social climate, various support groups for *futōkō* children extended their target to *hikikomori*, and some *hikikomori* support groups were set up by parents who "graduated" from the groups for parents of *futōkō* (Shiokura 2002: 232). One of my field sites which identified as a *hikikomori* support group was among them. It was set up in 1995 by a former editor of an educational magazine and has not only become an information hub of alternative schooling opportunities for long-term school nonattenders and high school dropouts and provided visiting support for school nonattenders but also maintained a *free space* (*ibasho*, literally "place-to-be" where comfort of being in the space and freedom to do whatever the participant wants to do is offered) for *hikikomori* youth in their 20s and beyond.

It is not surprising that a number of providers of *futōkō* support in the private sector have started working with *hikikomori* youth, given that the connection between *futōkō* and *hikikomori* has often been made by policy makers, practitioners, as well as the media. Shiokura (2000: 185–6) and Okamoto (2005: 120) suggest that the growth of societal attention on long-term school nonattendance phenomena since the 1980s led to the later "discovery" of *hikikomori*. This included a small group of *futōkō* children who appeared to stay withdrawn at home, some of whom remained isolated from society during and after adolescence. To give an example, a few references to school nonattenders who stay withdrawn at home were indeed made in Okuchi's early work on school refusal (1989). A survey done by MHLW (2003) reported that 41% of *hikikomori* experienced *futōkō.* Saitō (1998: 39) suggested that nearly 90% of *hikikomori* experienced *futōkō*, whereas 15–20% of *futōkō* cases develop into *hikikomori* (Saitō 2003: 311). Saitō (1998: 37) used the metaphor of *futōkō* as a cold, and *hikikomori* as pneumonia or tuberculosis, assuming that some *futōkō* cases need to be treated before they fall into the more serious condition of *hikikomori*. Ishikawa (2004: 37–8) and Kawakita (2003: 188–9) as well as counselor Tomita (see above) have also noted that the issues of *futōkō* and *hikikomori* overlap, as *hikikomori* is seen as the later stage of *futōkō.* In the media coverage of *hikikomori*, cases of *hikikomori* originating from *futōkō* experience were frequently mentioned as well, as in the case of *Asahi Shimbun* newspaper's 5 October 2000 report (see also Hisada 1999: 286–99).

Around the time when "moral panics" surrounding *hikikomori* youth were invoked in Japanese mass media, sociological survey results that also challenge the positive views on *futōkō* were starting to make an impact on MEXT policy. A quantitative sociological survey investigating the life course (*shinro*) of *futōkō* children done by Morita (Gendai Kyōiku Kenkyūjo 2001), commissioned by MEXT in 1999,[13] revealed that the rate of those who go on to further education or employment

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[12] See Horiguchi (2012) for an overview of how and why *hikikomori* came to be discussed as a social problem.

[13] In this survey (Gendai Kyōiku Kenkyūjo 2001), follow-up questionnaires and interviews were conducted in 1998 with youths who were *futōkō* in the final year of middle school in 1993 (5 years before). The results showed that 23% of the respondents were neither in education nor employment.

among those who were *futōkō* is lower than the average of the same generation (Kido 2004: 52, 66–8). Despite the potential bias inherent in this report, this led MEXT to emphasize the importance of making contact with nonattenders and their parents and of providing institutional care for children (Shimizu 2011: 180). There was also growing public awareness that a lack of intervention does not necessarily entail positive outcomes and that early discovery and early intervention are of importance (Kido 2004: 50–3). Therefore, as Ishikawa (2004: 37) and Kido (2004: 53) agree, there emerged a realization of risk that prolonged *futōkō* may lead to *hikikomori*. It is worth noting that Saitō has been a member of committees for *futōkō* research commissioned by MEXT since 2002, and has argued that it is important to identify "sick *futōkō*" (*byōki no futōkō*) cases at high risk of becoming *hikikomori* from "healthy *futōkō*" (*kenjō na futōkō*) cases which do not require treatment, in the early stages of *futōkō*.

This argument has led to encouragement for students to go to school (*tōkō-shigeki*) and was naturally criticized by those engaged in *free school* movements like Okuchi (Kido 2004: 68, 72–3; Takayama 2008: 46, endnote 6). What these discussions and practices have revealed is that despite the positive perspectives promoted by citizens' discourse and the success of organizations like Tokyo Shūre to provide a place for long-term school nonattenders to meet their peers and thereby potentially contributing to bringing down the number of *hikikomori* cases among school nonattenders, ex-*futōkō* youth over school age can remain socially isolated (Takayama 2008: 35–6). With a growing concern about the long-term consequences of school nonattendance, *futōkō* has increasingly come to be regarded an issue to do with the life course (Takayama 2008: 45), beyond what sociologists previously saw as a problem primarily to do with medicalization.

7.3.4 Public Attention to Developmental Disabilities and Reframing of School Nonattendance

Recent years have seen the emergence of another medicalized discourse on children exhibiting behavioral problems in schools, leading to a reframing of school nonattendance in the context of both mainstream and alternative schools and further complicating the relationship between medical and citizens' discourses. There is a growing awareness in education, psychology, and psychiatry, as well as the mass media, of the treatment of children with developmental disabilities (*hattatsu shōgai*) including learning disability (LD), autism spectrum disorder (ASD), and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), particularly after MEXT implemented the Special Support Education (SSE, *Tokubetsu Shien Kyōiku*) scheme for these children and others with diverse needs in 2007 (Teruyama 2014). By 2003, MEXT (2003) had acknowledged the importance of recognizing developmental disabilities in *futōkō* support (Ichikawa 2014: 85), and this has impacted both policy and practice surrounding long-term school nonattendance. Ichikawa (2014), in her review and analysis of support for *futōkō* children with developmental disabilities in educational and clinical contexts, advocates the need for incorporating *futōkō* support in SSE, pointing to studies (e.g. Miyamoto 2010; Koeda 2002) revealing the higher-than-average rate of children with developmental disabilities who become school nonattenders. As Sagawa (2010) shows, while the clinical concept of *hattatsu shōgai* brings the focus to the individual apparently going against the demedicalization and de-schooling movements led by *free schools* that attempted to move the focus away from the individual, the language of *hattatsu shōgai* permeates in *free schools* and in fact can help supporters engage well with troubled members.

7.3.5 **Tōjisha** ***Discourses and Regaining Subjectivity***

It should be pointed out that it is not only MEXT, psychiatrists, and *free schools* that have led the discourse on long-term school nonattendance; a relatively new voice is that of those who have experienced *futōkō* themselves challenging existing medical as well as citizens' discourse. Sociologists such as Yoneyama (1999, 2000) and Kido (2004) have examined the narratives of "*tōjisha"* and provided a new perspective on the term *futōkō* (*tōkōkyohi,* in Yoneyama's studies) as a means for re-construction of personhood and subjectivity. *Tōjisha* literally means "those who are concerned with the matter." Nakanishi Shōji, himself a *tōjisha* of disabilities, and sociologist Ueno Chizuko (Nakanishi and Ueno 2003: 2) define *tōjisha* as those who are in need. Nakanishi and Ueno (2003: 2–4) advocate the concept of *tōjisha-shuken* (*tōjisha* sovereignty)*,* or the idea that the *tōjisha* have the right to make decisions about themselves on their own. Much research has been conducted by *tōjisha*, called *tōjisha-gaku* or *tojisha-kenkyū*, in feminist studies, disability studies, patient studies, as well as gay and lesbian studies. The study by Kido (2004: 24–6), herself a *futōkō tōjisha*, follows this trend.[14] Kido (2004) problematized the performative aspect of "bright and happy" (*akarui*) *futōkō* narratives imposed by proponents of *free school* movements, which can be a blessing for parents but also can suppress the "dark" aspects of *futōkō* experiences such as the dilemmas of not being able to go to school or the disadvantages the *tōjisha* have faced in later life due to discrimination based on academic background. Kido was later met with criticisms from Tokyo Shūre (see Kido 2005; also Kido and Tsuneno 2005), and this stirred a heated debate on *futōkō* and the life course (Kido and Yamashita 2012).

[14] Kido (2004: 26–7) notes that there are two potential criticisms against *tōjisha-gaku*. First is the line of argument that points out the ideological nature of *tōjisha-gaku* and its lack of "objectivity." The second is "exclusivism" of *tōjisha*-ism in that it perpetuates the idea that *tōjisha* are the only ones who understand the real issue. Both arguments, Kido (2005:27–8) suggests, may be countered by finding merits in allowing *tōjisha* to speak for themselves and its contribution in questioning the "objectivity" of studies done by so-called "professionals."

7.3.6 *Increase in Alternative Schooling Opportunities for School Nonattenders in the Public and Private Sectors and Issues*

A final, positive recent trend to note is a rise in the rate of *futōkō* children continuing on to the next stage of education, reflecting the growing diversity in alternative schooling options (Futōkō nikansuru Chōsa-kenkyū-kyōryokusha-kaigi 2016: 6). Ito (2016: 94–100) identifies six types of alternative schooling opportunities currently available in Japan, in both public and private sectors catering for children and youth in compulsory and post-compulsory years: (1) the educational support centers (public institutions for primary and middle school nonattenders established and run by the local boards of education); (2) the *free schools* and *free spaces* (privately run institutions that champion freedom and child centeredness); (3) the part-time high schools (*teijisei-kōtō-gakkō*) offering day and night classes, majority of which are publicly run; (4) correspondence high schools (*tsūshinsei-kōtō-gakkō*) 2/3 of which are privately run; (5) support schools (*support-kō*) or a recently expanding type of mostly private institutions that give "support" to correspondence high school students in their study and daily life, in order to maximize their chances of graduating; and (6) specialized training schools (*kōtō-senshū-gakkō*) that offer vocational subjects not available in full time, regular high schools, including nursing, food preparation, fashion, data processing, art and beautician courses, for middle school graduates. The option of "homeschooling" has been discussed since the late 1980s, but it has not taken hold in Japan partly due to economic burdens and concerns with the parent and child sticking together all day (Kido 2004: 93). A *futōkō* research committee commissioned by MEXT (Futōkō nikansuru Chōsa-kenkyū-kyōryokusha-kaigi 2016: 3) recently reported that there is room for improvement for the initiatives for using IT launched in 2005, to expand learning opportunities for school nonattenders and to allow the schools to count the studying hours using IT at home as attendance.

Since 2000, networks have been formed between public and private sectors, and some local governments (e.g., Nagano Prefecture, Kawasaki City) started working with privately run organizations to provide support for *futōkō* youth (Kido and Yamashita 2012: 3). In 2005, MEXT advised local governments to network with the private sector, which culminated in the launch of "*free schools* support schemes" in several prefectures and cities (Kido and Yamashita 2012: 3). From 2004 onward, new schools for school nonattenders (sometimes called *futōkō tokureikō* or specially designated schools for school nonattenders) were set up under the "special deregulation zone" (*kōzō-kaikaku-tokkui)* scheme, which allowed municipalities, nonprofit organizations, and corporations to conduct educational experiments. This project was extended nationwide in 2005, and a total of ten schools were designated by 2015 (Futōkō nikansuru Chōsa-kenkyū-kyōryokusha-kaigi 2016: 3).

These alternative schools and institutions are not without problems, however. Motoyama (2011)'s nationwide survey on 1256 educational support centers and 436 *free schools* showed that there was regional disparity in the availability of these alternative educational opportunities and that about half of the *free schools* were in deficit. Yamashita (Kido and Yamashita 2012: 4) also points to a long-standing issue with incidents related to violence and/or confinement occurring in several disciplinary youth rehabilitation institutions that cater for school nonattenders, including the Totsuka Yacht School (see footnote 7), Fudō-juku (1987, Saitama Prefecture), Kazunoko Gakuen (1991, Hiroshima Prefecture), and Ai Mental School (2006, Aichi Prefecture).

7.4 Conclusions and Future Challenges

As the above review shows, postwar policies on absenteeism have paralleled popular societal discourses and debates, fluctuating between positivity and negativity toward absenteeism (see also Shimizu 2011). We have observed transitions in the terms used to refer to school absentees, from school phobia to school refusal and to school nonattendance, reflecting shifts in the blame placed on the individual to the educational system. A rise in citizens' discourses and activism since the 1980s against the pathologization of absenteeism has promoted noninterventionist approaches. The emergence of the *hikikomori* (social withdrawal) "problem" in the 2000s, however, has brought the blame back to the individual children and their families, prompting early intervention. The postwar period has seen conflicts involving different stakeholders of education, particularly between the medical professionals and citizens, with various parties providing critiques of the educational system through their practices. A variety of alternative opportunities for education beyond the mainstream schools have become available in the last few decades, catering to children with different issues and needs.

This review also reveals that policy as well as academic and popular discourses on absenteeism in Japan are characterized by their emphasis on absenteeism as a psychological problem (see also Ito 2016: 92–3) with lack of attention paid to class, race/ethnic minority, or delinquency issues (with the exception of Katō 2012). In particular, as Fujita (2015: 50) and Shimizu (2011: 182–3) point out, there was a significant lack of attention to the absenteeism as a class issue in both popular and policy discourse since the 1960s, despite the existence of studies and surveys that pointed to the prevalence of nonattendance among children from poor family backgrounds (Furukawa and Hishiyama 1980; Takeuchi 1987; Watanabe 1992; Hasegawa 1993; Sasaki 2004; Tsumaki 2005; Itabashi Ward Board of Education 2007; Iwata 2008). Fujita cites Hiroi (2010: 215) who explains that the cases that were reported to local authorities and hospitals tended to be of the "neurotic" type, leading the psychiatrists and psychologists who examined data in these institutions to situate this type as the core type, moving societal attention away from poverty issues. Shimizu (2011: 183) points out that not only MEXT but also MHLW has also neglected to consider the causal relationship between poverty and absenteeism. This issue is beginning to be discussed in policy discourse, however; the 2016 report on MEXT-commissioned *futōkō* research addresses the importance of recognizing diversity of causes/reasons for nonattendance and acknowledges issues of child abuse and child poverty (Futōkō nikansuru Chōsa-kenkyū-kyōryokusha-kaigi 2016: 7). It also stresses the role of school social workers with strengths in networking with especially welfare institutions, in addition to school counselors throughout (Futōkō nikansuru Chōsa-kenkyū-kyōryokusha-kaigi 2016). What policy also needs to address is the issue of children with foreign citizenship who are not enrolled in school (Katō 2012: 206–7; Sakai 2010; Sakuma 2006). The parents of these children are not required by Japanese law to send their children to Japanese school, and if they are not attending school, they are counted as "non-enrolled" (*fushūgaku*) rather than *futōkō* (Fujita 2015: 53).

In terms of alternative schooling opportunities in practice, further linkages between the public and private sectors are expected in coming years. The new law for securing diverse educational opportunities (*Tayō-na kyōiku-kikai-kakuho hō*) (2016) stipulated the roles that the government and local authorities have in supporting *futōkō* children, recognizing the need for the nonattending children to get a rest. As *Tokyo Shimbun* newspaper (December 7, 2016) reported, however, the individuals and institutions working with *futōkō* were divided on the bill, and the initial proposal to recognize studying at home and in *free schools* as part of compulsory education was excluded from the enacted Law. Dilemmas will remain in balancing ensuring educational opportunities for all and allowing children and families to make their own choices about education; whatever direction is taken, it is hoped that the welfare of the child is always the priority.

Acknowledgments Part of the research conducted for this chapter was supported by Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (No. 22720333). I would like to thank all the individuals and institutions that have supported me during the course of this research, including the *tōjisha*, the practitioners and scholars, with special thanks to Shimizu Katsunobu for his invaluable assistance.

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Chapter 8
Sociological Studies on Universities in Japan: Focusing on the Academic Profession

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Abstract This chapter examines the history, current status, and future prospects of universities in Japan through a sociological examination of the academic profession. Studies on the academic profession have always been a key topic of higher education research in Japan, where sociologists assumed a crucial role in theorization and positive research. The formation of the academic profession in Japan is highly linked with the formation of national identity both in education and research and has therefore always attracted international attention. Also, we need to reflect on the role of university academics and their organizations as opinion leaders in political dialogues and contributors to the overall well-being of society. In this chapter, firstly, the authors discuss how sociologists and other researchers in higher education have approached the formation and development of the academic profession. Secondly, the authors highlight how sociologists and other social scientists are tackling current challenges to Japan's higher education in a difficult social environment characterized by aging, globalization, and the knowledge economy. Finally, the authors anticipate future perspectives of sociological studies on academics and universities in Japan, focusing on strengthening linkages within the international research community.

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A. Yonezawa et al. (eds.), *Japanese Education in a Global Age*, Education in the Asia-Pacific Region: Issues, Concerns and Prospects 46,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-1528-2_8

8.1 Introduction

Sociology and related social science research on higher education in Japan has a relatively short history. Arimoto (1992) pointed out that the “sociology of higher education” in Japan was an academic field that emerged from the latter half of 1960s, when student activism spread throughout the country. Amano (1990) reflects that higher education had been a peripheral topic in educational research in postwar Japan. The newly developed community of Japan Society of Educational Sociology (JSES), especially those at the former imperial universities that did not have program of teacher training, found higher education as one of the major fields reflecting the rather marginalized identity of the sociology of education itself.

These “first-generation” researchers in the social sciences on higher education who started their academic careers after World War II did not always limit their approach to sociology but also assumed a more interdisciplinary approach including history, international comparison, economics, public administration, and social psychology. Kaneko (2010) pointed out that the sociology of education in Japan was flexible enough to widen its view to “education as a social fact,” a development which proved particularly effective in approaching the emerging sector of education, i.e., higher education.

Adding to the abovementioned interdisciplinary characteristics, there has been growing interaction among practitioners such as policy makers, institutional leaders, and individual academics in various disciplines ranging from the humanities to engineering. Interactions among researchers from other countries have also been increasingly active.

We can categorize social science research on Japan’s higher education into three main themes. The first theme is the *systemic development of higher education*. Japan is the first country in East Asia to have experienced a significant expansion of higher education into mass higher education. Students have been absorbed mainly by private universities, junior colleges, and professional training colleges that function primarily on tuition fee incomes. The government has become involved through granting its official acceptance of newly established programs with designated student enrolment quotas, national higher education plans, and later accreditation and quality assessment (Amano 1997; Yonezawa 2008).

The second theme is the *function of higher education in articulation with secondary education and the labor market*. As to the discussion on the function of higher education, in short, the articulation in relation to higher education runs smoothly as a system, but is not directly linked to educational or curricular content. Namely, an absolute majority of students enroll into undergraduate education directly or within 1 year after finishing secondary education without full-time work experience. Also, it is perceived as de facto standard to secure full-time (hopefully regular) jobs at companies without time loss after graduating bachelor or master programs at most. However, this does not presuppose direct, systemic linkages with learned contents or the respective study approaches of the fields within secondary education and tertiary education and the required, specific knowledge and skills of the firm (Kariya and Honda 2010). The extremely high graduation rate even among open-entry institutions could also pose pressure to university teachers to grant student credits and somehow facilitate their graduation, while the actual acquisition of skills and knowledge may not have been seriously assessed and assured, at least until quite recently (Eades et al. 2005). Also, an expanded participation in higher education has also raised various discussions regarding the changing characteristics of students and their study lives.

The third theme is the *social behavior and perspectives of academics and students inside the higher education sector*. Sociological works targeting academics are found around the globe (e.g., Altbach 2003; Bourdieu 1984). Sociologist communities in this country have paid most attention to the behaviors of university academics in the process of education expansion and massification. While the number of university students had already peaked from around 2005, the number of university teachers has continued to expand. However, the expected further decline of the youth population and decreasing public support for operational funding, especially among public (both national and local public) universities, has rendered the academic profession to be an unattractive and unstable job.

In this chapter, we will focus mainly on the third theme, especially research on the academic profession, because research on the first and second themes is largely addressed by other chapters in this volume. The issue of academics is highly related to issues pertaining to the functioning of the higher education system, partly as the degree of academic autonomy has been deeply influenced by the degree of expectations for the functional articulation of university education.

Firstly, the authors outline the historical background of the academic profession at universities in Japan and then discuss how sociologists and other researchers in higher education have approached the formation and development of the academic profession. Secondly, the authors highlight how sociologists and other social scientists are tackling current challenges to Japan's higher education in a difficult social environment characterized by aging, globalization, and the knowledge economy. Finally, the authors present future possibilities for sociological studies on academics and universities in Japan, focusing on strengthening linkages within the international research community.

8.2 Formation and Development of the Academic Profession

Universities and higher education institutions in Japan have assumed an important function to link Japanese society with international communities. Until the mid-nineteenth century, Japanese society had highly limited interaction with the external world due to the prohibition and strict control of international trade and human mobility. The intake of knowledge in the humanities and sciences from the advanced world, namely, China and the Western world, had been almost monopolized by a limited number of intellectuals who were able to access Chinese and Dutch literature. These privileged few translated and introduced foreign literature in Japanese so that intellectuals and other interested citizens could have access to updated knowledge. Also, the academics in Japan developed their original intellectual works based on these imported knowledge and technology.

Before the Meiji Restoration of 1868, there had been three main academic streams based on their intellectual origins; Chinese studies (*Kangaku*), Dutch studies (*Rangaku*), and the national (Japanese) studies (*Kokugaku*). After Japan opened up trade and interaction with various Western countries in the mid-nineteenth century, Dutch studies were replaced by Western studies on a wide range of topics related to European and North American civilization.

A more direct and wider interaction with the external world, especially with North America and Europe, was opened up. A new government that replaced traditional feudal rulers from the Samurai class, headed by the Tokugawa family, started the dynamic implantation of Western ideas and processes including universities and higher education institutions. First, foreign experts were invited and hired by the government as advisors, consultants, and teachers. They oversaw the design of higher education institutions and curricula of Japanese universities and higher education institutions, and also, in turn, actively introduced Japanese society and culture to the world. However, these foreign experts were not allowed to participate as full faculty members at the level of university governance but were treated as "guests" (Amano 2004; Kitamura 1984).

Japanese intellectuals also studied in the Western world – with some sent and supported by the government and various organizations and leaders in Japan, while others received support from various host countries and institutions both publicly and privately. Many came back to Japan to assume leading positions in the newly established academic community in Japan and contributed to the formation and development of public and private universities and higher education institutions. At the same time, these Japanese returnees replaced the existing foreign experts mentioned above. Thus, the national university system in Japan had allotted foreign academics with a merely peripheral status from the beginning.

At national and local public universities and higher education institutions, the Japanese government stressed two functions: the development of highly skilled human resources necessary for national development and, in the case of universities, high-level academic activities as a symbol of a modern, civilized society. At private higher education institutions, teachers and leaders were mostly dominated by Japanese nationals, partly due to a limited financial capacity for hiring western experts with internationally attractive salaries. Also, an increased supply of domestic students, linked with rapidly developing basic and secondary schooling in the Japanese language, made Japanese to the mainstream language media of instruction in university education in this country.

By the end of the 1920s, Japan had established its modern, national higher education system, namely, universities, polytechnics, and higher schools (gymnasiums), based mainly on continental European examples. At the universities, academics gradually gained autonomous power to select their leaders and colleagues. At the same time, wider civilization and a strengthening military voice in politics from the 1930s posed harsh challenges for university autonomy. The freedom of academic activities faced intervention by the government, and the focus on the role of universities and higher education was increasingly geared toward the development of human resources which could be directly used for military interests and pursuits (i.e., technology fields), and students were sent to battlefields and factories.

After World War II, a new university and higher education system was introduced under the supervision of the allied forces. This new university system was based on the US model. National comprehensive universities were established and reorganized in every prefecture, and the number of new, private universities mushroomed. This new university system was designed to be more open to a wide range of citizens and policy and academic debate on higher education started to follow US trends more closely. However, in contrast with its establishment in the Meiji Era, this postwar higher education reform was not realized as a complete renewal. Many academic staff from the former, flagship imperial universities, normal universities and schools, polytechnics, higher schools, and other technical and vocational education institutions merged into the new higher education system with different, already modernized, and also indigenous traditions and images of the academic profession. Compared with the newly established countries that had resulted from decolonization and/or socialist revolutions, the impact of external academics was rather limited.

University academics in Japan gained strong autonomy at the faculty level under the School Education Act enacted in 1947. Terasaki (1979), a leading Japanese historian, analyzed the development and establishment of university autonomy as a resistance and reaction to political (i.e., governmental) appointments and intervention. This story of bottom up, acquired autonomy by faculty meeting (*kyojukai*), or professoriate, justified the weak power of university presidents that was not unique to Japan, but basically followed the continental European model. The strong power of the professoriate, especially the almost full autonomy in the appointment of newly recruited faculty is a myth, or misunderstanding of the European norm. Ushiogi (1993a, b) introduced the story of Althof, a senior Prussian bureaucrat who actively intervened in the appointment of professors in nineteenth century to Japanese readers. This story was utilized as a clarification that the appointment of professors through the autonomous decisions of school level professorate was typically seen at Japanese universities as not being of the "global standard." Hashimoto (2009) reexamined the characteristics of the academic profession in Japan as merely a contingent of the wider labor market of professional occupations in Japan.

8.3 Transformation of Academic Profession Under System Expansion

Interestingly, the first article on the academic profession that appeared in the Journal of the JSES in Japanese, based on a quantitative survey to university faculty members, was written by Cummings (1971a), an American scholar, as a part of his doctoral dissertation submitted to Harvard University (Cummings 1971b). His work, conducted in collaboration with Japanese researchers, was published in a leading international journal *Higher Education* (Cummings and Amano 1977). The main focus of his discussion is the transformation of the characteristics of the academic labor market in Japan through the participation of wider and diversified social groups as well as the new generation faculty members in higher education. In his view, the traditional academic labor market was dominated by a limited number of "academic bosses," who possessed leading positions (chair professors) at a limited number of top comprehensive universities with doctoral programs that could produce next-generation researchers.

This was more clearly stated by Shimbori (1965) and his colleagues at Hiroshima University, which originated from a higher teacher's college and possessed a status next to the former imperial universities. Shimbori explained the near domination of alumni networks in Japan, noting that the number of research universities that had the capacity to produce future academics remained highly limited, while the number of universities and university academics in the country as a whole had increased significantly since the end of World War II. In this context, academics training at graduate schools of prestigious universities tended to rely on alumni networks to recruit new faculty members. In the case of the recruitment of doctoral program alumni, or even graduates at the undergraduate and master level, this was perceived as inbreeding. Universities that do not have well-established doctoral programs for training next-generation researchers tend to rely on networks of faculty members that have a strong influence among their professoriate for introducing employable candidates. This is perceived as "colonization." Of course, such inbreeding has been criticized as working against healthy competition through outright nepotism. In order to avoid this inbreeding, many top universities established internal rules, or customs not to hire senior staff directly from among internal members, and requested applicants to have work experience at other universities. However, the strong decision-making power of the professoriate in recruiting new faculty members has continuously worked more or less in favor of inbreeding and colonization.

Higher education researchers in Japan have approached the issue of inbreeding based mainly on sociological and empirical analysis. In so doing, a great resource was the publicly available list of faculty member names, ages, universities attended, and most recently obtained degrees. The *Zenkoku Daigaku Shokuinroku* (National Directory of University Staff) that was published annually from 1954 to 1976 covered a majority of university academics in Japan. Yamanoi (1990) conducted a comprehensive analysis of the mobility of academics among institutions and led the discussion on the problems of inbreeding. Fujimura (2005) analyzed those universities where faculty members had obtained their most recent degrees and demonstrated that the alumni of 6 out of 250 universities dominated around a half of all full-time university positions in Japan in 1961. By 2001, this number had increased (only slightly) to 12 but out of 669.

Results of international survey projects on the academic profession are also publicly available. A series of large-scale comparative surveys include samples of Japanese universities in 1992 by Carnegie Foundation (Ehara 1998), the "Changing Academic Profession survey (CAP)" in 2007 and the "Academic Profession Asia survey (APA)" in 2012 (Arimoto et al. 2015; Research Institute for Higher Education

2015). Participation in these surveys by Arimoto and his research group can be recognized as an epoch-making achievement in the field of education, based on research grants from the Japanese government (Yonezawa 2015a). Additionally, many surveys targeting specific topics regarding university faculty in Japan have been implemented.

The massification process of higher education through system expansion was unquestionably harsh both for students and academics. Especially for the students, the rapid expansion of the enrolment in the 1960s and 1970s worsened the learning environment through over-enrollment, especially at private universities, causing the devaluation of university degrees and the social status of university graduates. The drastic increase of tuition fees at Japanese private universities, reflecting increased personnel costs, and the slow change of the academic culture at elite national universities triggered student activism. The expansion also worsened the working environment of university academics and managers who faced, for example, an increased teaching load and lectures with large class sizes and also tough negotiations with radical student groups (Ogata 1977; Osaki 1991). While the life of academics in this difficult age had not been chronicled in academic works beyond essays and interview records, conflict at the university level stimulated activity among sociologists of education and the development of higher education research policy. One example of this increased involvement was the establishment of Hiroshima University's Research Institute of Higher Education which has come to facilitate various types of social science research on higher education, including Changing Academic Profession and other surveys.

8.4 Challenges to Transformation

A fundamental transformation of higher education and the lives of academics in Japan became increasingly visible from the 1990s onward, labeled as a "crisis" and later as "structural change" (Amano 2002; Amano and Poole 2005).

Firstly, a continuous decrease in the youth population started from the 1990s. Universities in Japan target their student market to the 18-year-old population which has just graduated from high school. Some students who do not pass university entrance examinations try again in the following year: these *ronin* ("masterless samurai") became less frequent, from comprising 36.6% of newly enrolled university students in 1990 to 16.1% in 2014, according to the School Basic Survey by MEXT. While there have been various trials among universities to attract adult students, 94.9% of newly enrolled undergraduate students are under 20 years old, and 83.4% of newly enrolled master students were under 25 years old in 2017. The share of international students in regular university programs is also highly limited. In 2017, 97.0% of newly enrolled undergraduate students graduated from domestic secondary schools, and only 2.7% of undergraduate students, 18.6% of master students, 22.0% of doctoral students, and 14.6% of professional school students were foreign nationals. Under these conditions, the population of 18-year-olds is crucial for determining student market conditions. Because of the highly limited international inflow and outflow of the population in Japan and also because of the very small contingent of adult students, it has been possible to predict the population of 18-year-olds from the number of compulsory junior high school graduates national population census data. As had been expected for a long time, the population of 18-year-olds started to decrease from 1993, after the enrolment of the second and last baby boomer generations. While the decrease has temporarily abated since 2010, a further decrease is forecast to occur from around 2020.

Secondly, the Japanese economy started to face the increasing pressure of the knowledge-based global economy in the "lost 20 years", a slow but continuous period of economic recession extending from the 1990s to the present. The success of the Japanese economy and industry in the 1980s was based mainly on an internationally competitive manufacturing sector. Faced with the rapid catch-up by neighboring "New Industrial Economies" such as Taiwan and South Korea, it was perceived that further investment in science and technology was crucial. Amano and Poole (2005) pointed out that the concentration of governmental resources toward top research universities started to become evident from the 1990s, later taking the form of the official promotion of "world-class universities" (Yonezawa and Shimmi 2015).

Regarding the labor market among university graduates, however, the transformation of university education toward transnational employability has not been discussed until very recently. Until around 2000, a strong incentive to leave Japan for better job opportunities did not exist among Japanese youth, as they had been protected by still-attractive job opportunities and living standards in Japan. Kaneko (2000) pointed out the necessity and difficulty of considerable restructuring in organization and values for seizing the opportunities of the cross-border knowledge flow. After the global financial crisis in 2008, the leaders of Japanese industry and the government started to argue the needs of fostering "global human resources" that had foreign language skills and intercultural competency through university education. However, it was taken for granted that graduates from Japanese universities should be hired by Japanese firms that are trying to expand their activities toward outside of Japan (Yonezawa 2014; Yoshida 2014). Here, the possible brain drain (or brain circulation) of these highly skilled human resources outside of Japanese economy is not seriously discussed.

Thirdly, the financial environment surrounding higher education had become unstable as of 1980. The idea of neoliberalism and new public management gradually became influential in the direction of Japanese higher education policies since the 1980s. While projects based on competitive funds for research, education, and social contribution have increased, basic budgeting toward national universities by the national government experienced a gradual decrease, especially after national universities were reorganized as corporate educational entities in 2004. Private universities have also experienced financial pressure, faced with the shrinkage of the youth population and the continuous establishment of new universities including those upgraded and transformed from women's junior colleges under the governmental policies for market deregulation. Neoliberal policies were also directed to enforce quality assurance and performance assessments, in combination with the requirement of institutional-level leadership at universities (Amano 2002; Kaneko

2004, 2009). At the same time, many sociologists and social scientists focusing on education argued the importance of an active commitment to university education and academic-led quality assurance reflecting the nature of the academic profession and professoriate in Japan (e.g., Hirota 2016). Under these circumstances, social science research investigating the academic profession shifted more to the identification of current issues and started to seek the direct impact of the working conditions of academics.

First, the professional life and career of junior academics became a highlighted social issue in the 1990s (Kato 1996). Among the traditional (i.e., former imperial) research universities, the *joshu*, or research associate, was the first professional position at the bottom of the chair system (Iwata 1995). Stringent financial policies of the national government from the 1980s led to pressure not to increase the number of national university staff. However, the number of full professors continued to increase to secure senior academic staff positions. In turn, the number of junior academic staff, as represented by research associates and others in nonacademic positions, gradually decreased. Newer universities that have a weaker research function also employ more professors and tend not to employ research associates, who are expected to commit more to research. This decrease in the number of junior faculty positions has led to double, negative consequences: a decrease in the number of academic job opportunities for younger researchers and an increased workload among junior academic staff who have to support an increasing number of both (especially graduate) students and senior faculty members. Policies reflected an increased tendency toward fixed-term positions, mainly for younger academic staff to encourage academic mobility and also to create postdoctoral fellowship positions to encourage younger academics to concentrate on research.

However, the resultant instability of academic career paths has been perceived as posing an increased risk to next-generation academics (Horta et al. 2011). The enlarged capacity of graduate education and stagnated numbers of university faculty positions has caused an oversupply of applicants within the academic labor market in some fields such as the humanities and social sciences (Ushiogi 2011). The role of university professors has been diversified according to their positions in a rather hierarchically diverse higher education system (Yoshida 2011). Kuzuki (2015) set out to establish the critical conditions of university faculty members who are facing identity crises by being inactive in research and required to engage more in teaching activities without maintaining clear future perspectives within the academic community where career development is still mainly based on research performance.

Secondly, the internationalization of universities became a hot topic in various aspects of education, research, and management. At a policy level, the attraction of international students became a critical challenge to strengthen an international presence within Japanese higher education and society. In 1983, the Japanese government established a plan to accept 100,000 non-Japanese students, a target which was achieved in 2003. It now aims to host 300,000 international students (Horie 2002, 2015).

Simultaneously, problems related to internationalization became visible in different fields within the academic profession. Kitamura (1984) placed the issue of foreign academics as a central issue of the internationalization of university education. Before a legal amendment in 1982, foreign citizens were not able to acquire full faculty positions at national universities, where faculty had the status of national civil servants. The Research Institute for Higher Education (1980) conducted a large-scale survey of foreign academics in the English language in 1979 with 77.4% of foreign faculty members engaged in foreign language education. Thirty years later, in 2009, Yonezawa et al. (2013) administered a survey targeted at foreign faculty members, finding that half of foreign faculty members in Japan are working in the science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) fields and contributing mainly to research as junior faculty members. In spite of the numeric increases in foreign researchers, the typical image and role of foreign faculty is that of foreign language instruction. Houghton and Rivers (2013) explore the differential treatment of non-Japanese foreign language faculty, particularly in terms of relatively restricted opportunities for advancement out of limited-term contract positions and limited participation in university governance.

According to the School Basic Survey by the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT), the number of foreign university faculty members itself increased drastically from 1127 in 1980 to 8262 in 2017. These international researchers, who engaged in university education in Japan, also made an active commitment to research on education and other aspects of universities and the academic profession in Japan through various social scientific approaches, such as anthropological and policy studies. McVeigh (2002, 2013, 2017) presented a critical analysis of Japanese university education and research through ethnographic and historical analyses. Poole (2010) examined the professoriate and their commitment to education and governance through an ethnographic approach. Breaden (2013) focused on university administration under pressure of internationalization reforms encouraged by the governmental projects. Nagatomo (2012) explored the professional identities of educators in Japan and their relationship to wider societal and gender norms. These works have contributed to the linkage between international, academic perspectives, and the daily lives of academics at Japanese universities.

The works mentioned above by the international researchers are, however, mostly critical to the education, research, governance, administration, and management of Japanese universities. These criticisms may be partly based on the widely held perception of non-Japanese faculty members that they are treated as being on the periphery of the Japanese academic community (Fujimura 2016) and also partly on wider and more international perspectives on universities.

While the outbound mobility of academics from Japan to other countries is limited, Kariya (1992, 2010), a leading sociologist in education who moved from the University of Tokyo to the University of Oxford, has compared university education in Japan with that in the USA and UK through essays based on his professional experiences, resulting in negative views of Japanese university education. Similar research and findings on the academic profession in Japan have also been done and found by researchers in neighboring Asian countries in their own languages. In China, for example, examinations into policy trends of the academic profession in Japan, such as fixed-term employment, have been conducted by Chen (1999) and Ba (2007). Likewise, Jiang and Lin (2011) engaged in performance assessments and research into faculty development in Japan, mainly for policy borrowing purposes. However, as these works were published neither in Japanese nor in English, they have not been well known and had little impact on the research communities inside Japan.

Thirdly, gender equality among academics has always been a serious issue, with quantitative and qualitative analyses on the participation and career of female academics being implemented by, among others, Kano (1988), Osumi (2006), Kato and Chayama (2012), and Shibayama and Geuna (2016). Policies to encourage female academics have also been reviewed (Yokoyama et al. 2016). Yukawa (2011) and Yukawa et al. (2014) approached this issue in relation to power structures within the academic community in Japan, which led to a widespread discussion on academic integrity and ethics. Yonezawa et al. (2014a, b) underscored the gender issue through the analysis of the personal lives of female academics. Similar research was conducted from the point of view of non-Japanese female academics by Nagatomo (2012, 2016) and differential hiring practices by Hayes (2012). More importantly, earlier generations of sociologists of education, who researched female participation in higher education such as Michiko Kanda (1965) and Masako Amano (1986), later became university presidents while discussing the role of female university leaders (Amano 2011; Kanda et al. 2001).

Fourth, participation toward university governance within the academic profession became a critical issue, especially from the beginning of twenty-first century. From the mid-1980s, neoliberal policy reforms and the idea of a "new public management" became influential in regards to higher education in Japan. All national, and almost all local, public universities were incorporated in 2004. Under this incorporation scheme, university presidents were expected to seek and acquire a greater capacity to lead universities as corporate bodies. However, at the same time, the Japanese government strengthened performance assessments at national universities (Kaneko 2012; Yamamoto 2004). While management at private universities had also been required to strengthen their capacities in light of an unstable student market, partly through the transformation from being a planning- to a market-based process (Amano 1997), the national government strengthened its indirect control through a quality assurance system. Hata (2007) analyzed a survey of presidents, deans, and department heads and pointed out that these policy transformations on university governance posed a differentiated impact to university leaders according to their positions. Ogata (2014) pointed out a strong autonomy in the decision-making of the individual academics toward education and learning at Japanese universities are to some degree maintained.

8.5 Conclusion: Research and Reality

Research into the academic profession has been one in fields that have developed through direct linkages among the international community. Historical and philosophical connections toward the academic profession with Western examples as reference models and active participation toward international surveys have helped to connect this field to the international research community. Except for a few cases such as Arimoto (e.g., Arimoto et al. 2015) and Huang (e.g., Huang et al. 2014), the direct participation of Japan to develop a global and international framework in research related with the academic profession has been limited.

Concern regarding Japan in, for example, the inbreeding of academics, graduate education and the university-industry relationship has been high. As an established model in East Asia, researchers from Japan have provided national case studies (e.g., Ushiogi 1993b; Yonezawa 2015b) and comparative studies (e.g., Branscomb et al. 1999). This contributes to what had been a weak engagement in international research in the field of higher education (Teichler 1997; Yonezawa 2015a). At the same time, a very strong tendency toward self-containment with respect to academic training at a limited number of top universities dominating academic the Japanese labor market has also made it difficult to establish a direct link between actual, pressing issues to the global and regional context.

Here, a term such as "globalization" tends to be utilized as a magic term without a solid examination of definitions linked to the inherent domestic and local reality at Japanese universities (Nakamura 2007). Global insights, beyond a mere collection of case studies for policy borrowings, have been developed by researchers in Japan and published in the Japanese language. For example, Kitamura (2002) expounded upon international trends in quality assurance in higher education, and Ushiogi (2004) discussed global-level identity crises in university education. However, these works were not published in other (i.e., non-Japanese) languages; therefore their arguments were not examined through any international review process.

Yonezawa et al. (2014a, b) examined emerging international dimensions of higher education from regional perspectives, including Japan. These authors discussed, for example, the ASEAN University Network (AUN)'s subnetwork in engineering field; AUN-SEED network has been supported by the Japan's overseas development assistance project to foster regional academic human resources and networks in the field of engineering among ASEAN countries in collaboration with the Japanese universities and the government. This book, however, could be understood both as a collection of new initiatives and the status quo, but did not necessary present a rigorous theoretical examination.

In order to present a theoretical framework beyond the national perspectives, Yonezawa et al. (2016) attempted to examine empirical evidence on academic mobility and the formation and development of academic profession in East and Southeast Asia in STEM fields. These authors, however, found that it is impossible to establish a single framework or empirical pattern to comprehend these highly diversified regions, while they underscored the deep interconnectedness of academic professions among higher education systems within the Asian region (see Table 8.1).

As to international linkages, the academic profession within Japanese universities has been categorized as rather weak; a model somehow developed to avoid "brain drain" in its formation process, to realize a modest "brain gain" in its developing process. In the current knowledge-based society, "brain circulation" and "brain linkage" that provide benefits both for sending and receiving countries through international mobility of human talents are considered to be the key for the high knowledge productivity (Lee and Kim 2010; Shin and Choi 2015). Japan is

Table 8.1 Dominating mobility patterns of academic profession

Dominating mobility pattern	Academic profession in a forming mode	Academic profession in a growing mode	Academic profession in a maturing mode
Self-contained: obtained both first degree and doctoral degree in the country where currently employed		Argentina, Brazil, China, Portugal	Germany, Italy, Japan
Study abroad: obtained first degree in the country where currently employed and doctoral degree in another country		Malaysia, Mexico, Vietnam	Taiwan, South Korea
Magnet through study: obtained first degree in another country and doctoral degree in the country where currently employed		Finland, The Netherlands, Norway, South Africa	USA
Magnet through employment: obtained both first degree and doctoral degree outside the country where currently employed	Cambodia	Australia	Canada, HK, Singapore, UK

Source: Created by the authors based on the analysis developed in Yonezawa et al. (2016)
Asian higher education systems are underlined

suffering from insufficient brain circulation and linkages, in the face of widespread academic mobility within and across regions. For an international audience, to merely describe the case of Japan in this field may no longer be appealing, because Japan's example is itself now losing international attractiveness.

From our perspective, research on the academic profession in Japan is now facing the following three challenges: First, research should focus on the reality of vulnerable groups within the academic profession, such as junior, female, and international academics. Second, research could indicate a future vision on academic mobility, especially for improving international linkages. Thirdly, research on the academic profession from Japan itself should serve as a model of active participation toward international research initiatives.

A mere provision of Japan's case as a model for policy borrowing does not suffice to present a significant contribution to the international research community. On the other hand, international mainstream discussions that assume a high level of academic mobility for granted do not fit the reality inside Japan. Facing this dilemma, more practically oriented research (e.g., faculty development, institutional research) could flourish by letting experts take the role of interpreters both linguistically and in regard to social context. Otherwise, social scientists in the field of the education sociology could widen their research scope beyond national boundaries, regardless of whether or not Japan can be a central case in future research foci.

The academic profession in Japan is looking for international connections, as are researchers on the academic profession in Japan. Here, networking, a core feature of sociology, will continue to take a critical role among social science researchers within the academic profession and universities in Japan.

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Chapter 9
Growing Up in Multicultural Japan: Diversifying Educational Experiences of Immigrant Students

Tomoko Tokunaga, Misako Nukaga, and Fumiko Takahashi

Abstract This chapter explores diversifying educational experiences of immigrant students as they grow up in Japan, which is becoming increasingly multicultural in the past several decades due to the influx of immigrants. We provide a broad picture of acculturation patterns and diverging academic trajectories of the second-generation immigrants by presenting our own data analysis on Filipino youth. Then we explore some in- and out-of-school policies and practices that contribute to the educational outcomes of immigrant youth. Our analysis of multivariate educational experiences of second-generation immigrants suggests an increasing diversification within the immigrant population and a need to look carefully into the intersecting effects of various factors – ethnicity, class, gender, nationality, migration history – and an understanding of contexts that together shape students' educational experiences. We also suggest the significance of social networks and local educational support on immigrant youth's acculturation and academic achievement, given the lack of social integration and national education policies for immigrants in Japan.

9.1 Introduction

Reflecting an increase of the immigrant population to Japan since the 1990s, we observe a growing number of studies that focus on immigrant students' experiences in the area of sociology of education. The presence of these children, who are "different" from the majority of "Japanese," poses new challenges to Japanese schools that take "sameness" for granted. Using case study methods, scholars have revealed

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A. Yonezawa et al. (eds.), *Japanese Education in a Global Age*, Education in the Asia-Pacific Region: Issues, Concerns and Prospects 46,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-1528-2_9

the academic, cultural, and linguistic struggles of immigrant students[1] in Japan resulting from assimilative school cultures and a lack of educational support (Burgess 2007; Miyajima and Ota 2005; Ota 2000; Shimizu and Shimizu 2001; Tsuneyoshi 1996). Although immigration and ethnicity have received relatively little scholarly attention in Japan's sociology of education, the recent focus on these themes underscores the need to consider the meaning of equity in Japanese education from the perspectives of underrepresented minority students.

While many studies have pointed out the cultural and systemic barriers that impede immigrant students' academic achievement, few, if any, focused on the educational experiences of second-generation immigrant youth, a population that has been growing over the past several years. How are the second-generation immigrants assimilating into a Japanese society that is becoming more multicultural than ever before? In this chapter, we first present Japan's historical and social contexts that receive immigrants and current educational issues of immigrant students based on the existing literature. Second, we provide a broad picture of acculturation patterns and diverging academic trajectories of the second-generation immigrants by presenting our own data analysis on Filipino youth. Finally, we explore some in- and out-of-school policies and practices that contribute to the educational outcomes of immigrant youth. Our analysis of multivariate educational experiences of second-generation immigrants suggests an increasing diversification *within* the immigrant population and a need to look carefully into the intersecting effects of various factors – ethnicity, class, gender, nationality, migration history – and an understanding of contexts that together shape students' educational experiences.

9.1.1 Minorities and Multicultural Coexistence

Though Japan is often depicted as a homogenous country, it has long had various minorities such as Ainu,[2] Buraku,[3] Okinawans and Amerasians,[4] Zainichi Koreans,[5] and Chinese returnees,[6] which have shaped the experiences of newer immigrants in Japan. The growth of the number of incoming foreigners is huge: from approximately a 0.4 million increase within the 40 years following WWII to a 1 million increase

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[1] In this chapter, we use the term "immigrants" to refer to "newcomers," most of whom immigrated to Japan after the 1990s.

[2] *Ainu* is the name of indigenous inhabitants living in the northern part of Japan (see Nozaki 2010).

[3] *Buraku* or *Burakumin* (*min* refers to people) is the largest discriminated-against population in Japan. They are not a racial or a national minority but a caste-like minority among the ethnic Japanese (cited from the homepage of Headquarters of *Buraku* Liberation League 2016) (see Nabeshima 1993).

[4] See Noiri (2011).

[5] See Fukuoka (1993).

[6] Japanese children left behind in China at the end of the WWII.

within the 20 years from the 1990s to 2008.[7] The Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act's amendment in the 1990s opened up the path for Japanese descendants from South American countries such as Brazil and Peru to return to Japan to find work, which increased the number of foreigners drastically.[8]

The number of registered foreigners in Japan is about 2 million now, comprising 2% of the total population. Except for the USA, the top sending countries are mostly Asian and South American countries.[9] In studies of immigrants to Japan, the people who migrated to Japan after the 1970s and particularly after the 1990s when the Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act was amended are often called "newcomers," while the people who migrated before that are called "oldcomers." "Oldcomers" are mainly Chinese and Korean people who were forced to migrate to Japan during the WWII and their descendants.

Currently, Japan does not have a social integration policy for immigrants but only a migration policy – the Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act (Iguchi 2014). The national government presents basic principles for how to accept foreigners into Japanese society – multicultural coexistence (*tabunka kyosei*) – and encourages local governments to promote it in respectable communities. Multicultural coexistence is defined as a situation where "people of different nationalities and ethnicities live together as members of local communities, with respect for cultural differences and efforts to establish fair relationships" (Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIC) 2006). People of different nationalities and ethnicities are recognized as members of "local" communities, not "national," reflecting the significance of ethnic national identity and citizenship policy in Japan.

9.1.2 Educational Issues of Immigrant Students

There are 42,721 pupils and 21,143 students with foreign nationalities in public elementary and junior high schools, respectively, in Japan (MEXT 2014). 18,884 pupils and 7809 students with foreign nationalities and 5899 pupils and 1586 students with Japanese nationalities in elementary and junior high school are recognized as students who are in need of Japanese as a Second Language (JSL) class (MEXT 2014).

While elementary and junior high school are compulsory for Japanese students, MEXT does not enforce this rule with foreign students. The lack of government support for immigrant students has led to high nonattendance rates (*fushugaku*), low advancement rates to high school, high dropout rates, and low matriculation rate to higher education. While approximately 98% of Japanese students enter high school, entrance rates of foreign students are assumed to be about 50% (Shimizu 2008),

[7] Calculated based on the statistics on foreign residents in Japan (*Zairyu gaikokujin toukei*), Ministry of Justice (2015).

[8] Statistics on foreign residents in Japan (*Zairyu gaikokujin toukei*), Ministry of Justice (2015).

[9] Statistics on foreign residents in Japan (*Zairyu gaikokujin toukei*), Ministry of Justice (2015).

although there is no nationwide survey on this issue. In 2012, the high school matriculation rate among foreign students was 78.9% in cities that have a large concentration of foreign residents. Kaji (2011) analyzed national census data and revealed a high school retention rate of foreign students by ethnicity: Chinese 75%, Filipino 40–45%, and Brazilian 30–35%. Although high school entrance is at a critical juncture for many immigrant students and could impact their life course, it is facing a great challenge, particularly for recent immigrants to Japan who have low Japanese language proficiency.

In addition to systemic barriers, scholars have argued that the assimilative pressure in Japanese schools is so strong that it fails to serve special needs among immigrant children (Burgess 2007; Miyajima and Ota 2005; Ota 2000; Shimizu and Shimizu 2001; Tsuneyoshi 1996). Ota (2000) argues that one of the characteristics of Japanese school culture is that it has a very limited degree of tolerance, and it is implicitly required for children to be the same as others and to do the same as others. At school, Japanese teachers are likely to dismiss the different educational needs associated with immigrant backgrounds, interpreting academic failure as resulting from a lack of individual effort (Shimizu and Shimizu 2001). Immigrant children's physical features, lack of Japanese language proficiency, and cultural knowledge tend to become a target of bullying (Takenoshita 2005). Such insensitivity and harassment toward immigrant children's differences at school often hinder their self-esteem and educational aspirations, leading them to drop out of school and enter working-class jobs at a young age.

However, we observed some recent changes in immigrant children's educational attainment. According to Takaya et al.'s (2015) study of the national census, both high school enrollment and matriculation rate among children from the Philippines, Brazil, and Peru increased dramatically from 2000 to 2010, although these numbers are much smaller than those for the Japanese and newly arrived Koreans and Chinese. It appears that immigrant children's experiences and educational outcomes are becoming heterogeneous and segmented in Japan. These children follow different trajectories of acculturation and assimilate into different segments of Japanese society in which inequality is said to have widened over decades of economic stagnancy (Tachibanaki 2006). In the following section, we examine the diverging trajectories of second-generation immigrant youth, focusing on family factors and structural contexts.

9.2 Variations in Acculturation Processes: A Case of Second-Generation Filipino Youth

While the number of second-generation immigrant children in Japan is increasing, studies focusing on their assimilation have only recently begun to be conducted. The recent development of the segmented assimilation theory in the USA provides us with a framework to consider the different educational outcomes of immigrant children. Portes and Rumbaut (2001) suggest that today's second-generation immigrant youth are assimilating into different segments of American society that are structured by racial and class hierarchies and that the outcomes are not unidirectional toward a single mainstream. In addition to this so-called segmented assimilation theory, some scholars emphasize the importance of transnational perspectives, arguing that the second generation's engagement in transnational practices has further diversified the processes of acculturation and assimilation (Levitt and Waters 2002).

Drawing on these perspectives, we introduce the case of second-generation Filipino youth to address different processes of immigrant children's acculturation and educational attainment in today's Japan.[10] Our analysis is based on interviews with 26 youth (aged 18–32; 8 male and 18 female) who originated from the Philippines; 19 were born in Japan, and 7 came to Japan before the age of 12, and thus we categorize them broadly as "second-generation immigrants," following the expression's definition and use in the USA (Portes and Rumbaut 2001).[11] We collected data between 2011 and 2016 using snowball sampling.[12]

The family and migration backgrounds of second-generation Filipinos in Japan are quite diverse and can be largely categorized into three groups (Takahata and Hara 2016): (1) children born to Filipino parents and arriving in Japan because of the mother's remarriage with a Japanese male, (2) children of Japanese descent (*Nikkei*), and (3) children born to a Filipino mother and a Japanese father. In our study, we collected data from all the above groups.[13] Their socioeconomic backgrounds are diverse. While most have parents with working-class backgrounds and are economically disadvantaged, four fathers own a company, and two fathers have professional occupations.

Based on the data, we found four acculturation patterns that led to different educational outcomes, categorized as follows: *mainstream conformists*, *cultural in-betweens*, *ethnic devotees*, and *nonconformists*. The first two groups tended to show high academic aspiration and entered college, while the latter two groups showed low academic aspiration and did not enter college. Below, we demonstrate how each group perceived and engaged in ethnic culture and how they reacted to the dominant culture and discrimination in the host society.

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[10] Berry (2005) defines the term "acculturation" as a "dual process of cultural and psychological change that takes place as a result of contact between two or more cultural groups and their individual members" (698). He explains acculturation process at two levels: group and individual (Berry 1992, 1997, 2005). In this chapter, we focus on the acculturation process at immigrant individual level. According to Portes and Rumbaut (2001), it is also a process by which immigrants learn the new language and normative lifestyles of the host society and is a first step toward assimilation (53).

[11] In line with Portes and Rumbaut's definition (2001), we define 1.5 generation as those who were born abroad and arrived in Japan in their early teens (before the age of 14).

[12] The interviews were conducted by one of the authors, Nukaga, and two other researchers, Akiko Miura (Chukyo University) and Kohei Tsubota (Polytechnic University). A part of the analysis presented here appeared in Nukaga and Miura (2017).

[13] Out of 26 youth, 5 are children with a Filipino mother and a Japanese stepfather, 2 are *Nikkei*, and 19 were born to a Filipino mother and Japanese father.

9.2.1 Variations in Acculturation Processes and Educational Achievement

9.2.1.1 Mainstream Conformists: "I Want to Be Seen as Japanese"

Mainstream conformists ($N = 3$) demonstrated a strong preference for "becoming Japanese" and were distant toward their Filipino families and roots. They were aware of their ethnic origin, but seeing Filipino culture as inferior to Japanese culture, they were reluctant to present their Filipino origin in the host society. They subscribed to the dominant norms, preferred to associate with Japanese peers, and aspired to do well at school.

Antonio, a mainstream conformist, was born to *Nikkei* parents. He came to Japan at the age of 12 after being separated from his parents for 9 years. Nukaga first met him when he was 13, and since then, he repeatedly said that he wanted to "act like a Japanese and be seen as a Japanese," although his dark skin and lack of Japanese language proficiency made his full immersion into the host society difficult. While he seemed to integrate well into elementary school with the support from teachers and classmates, he started to struggle in junior high school, a stage in which curricula become more rigorous and peer communication becomes more complex. Antonio gradually stopped going to school and stayed home for over 6 months, until his classroom teacher and tutors from a voluntary organization, including Nukaga, suggested that he attend a special guidance classroom (*tekiou shidou kyoushitsu*) for *futoko* (nonattendance) students. Participating in this small-sized classroom and receiving full attention from the teachers, Antonio regained his confidence and aspiration to study hard, which led him to enter a part-time high school. Antonio showed a strong urge to enter university, and while most students at part-time school get a job or go to a vocational school after graduation, Antonio became one of the few students who successfully got into a middle-ranked university using *suisen nyushi* (admission based on recommendation). Surrounded by Japanese friends, Antonio is currently spending a busy college life and is determined to become a nurse in the future.

Mainstream conformists like Antonio believe in fairness and opportunities in Japanese society and thus are eager to follow dominant norms without strong opposition. Even during difficult times in junior high school, Antonio never showed a critical stance toward Japanese teachers and students but blamed himself for his school failure. He said at that time, "I think my classmates are nice. My teacher tries his best for my learning. How can I accuse them? The problem is my lack of Japanese language and communication skill." His assimilative attitude and a resistance toward Filipino culture were two sides of the same coin. Antonio sees little value in learning more about the history and culture of his native country and shows no intention to live in the Philippines, which he describes as "dangerous and poor." Although he speaks Tagalog at home and visits the Philippines occasionally with his family, he cannot help but feel distant from his parents who, according to Antonio, "know nothing about Japanese school and cannot understand Japanese." Role reversal (Portes and Rumbaut 2001) in the parent-child relationship is a critical problem in the case of *mainstream conformists*.

9.2.1.2 Nonconformists: "I Hang Out with Japanese Gangs"

Nonconformists share similarities with *mainstream conformists*, in that they both assimilate into the host society while discarding ethnic culture. However, their framework of reference is not mainstream values but the oppositional culture that undermines academic achievement. In our study, only one person fit into this category. Identifying strongly with the Japanese gangs (*furyo*), he did not see ethnic identity as important in his life.

James was born in Japan to a Filipino mother and Japanese father who met at a nightclub. His father is a university graduate and owns a company, and thus, he did not experience any economic hardships. James said he never liked studying and had poor grades since elementary school. His mother, who spoke little Japanese, emphasized the importance of studying, but his Japanese father cared much less and let him do as he liked. In junior high school, James joined a *furyo* group and engaged in various misbehaviors, including skipping class, smoking, stealing, drinking, and hanging out until late in the evening. During this time, he had many fights with his parents. He went on to a part-time night high school but decided to leave the school in the third year because he wanted to earn money after his girlfriend became pregnant. He found a job as a carpenter but has also been active as a professional kickboxer. Although he has divorced his wife, he cares about his two children and has their names tattooed on his leg.

James has little knowledge of his Filipino roots and culture. He spoke only Japanese at home because his father insisted that he speak Japanese in Japan. His mother socialized with Filipino women at a workplace and church, but this had little influence on James's life. For James, the Philippines is an "interesting and fun" place where he visited when he was small. As he grew older, his mother stopped visiting home, and thus his connection with the Philippines became much weaker. In turn, he identified himself as a Japanese, saying that "I guess people don't see me as showing foreignness. My skin is not too dark or too light. That is probably the reason I never got teased." The only thing that makes James stand out as a "foreigner" is his English name. While James was embarrassed about his English name when he was small, at a high school, his peers perceived his name as cool. Through this experience, James started to feel proud of his English name and willingly uses it as a nickname when he plays kickboxing games. For James, being Filipino is a "symbolic ethnicity" (Gans 1979), rather than an instrumental one as it does not have substantial consequences on his life.

9.2.1.3 Ethnic Devotees: "For the Sake of My Filipino Families"

At the other end of the spectrum, there were *ethnic devotees*, who demonstrated strong pride in their ethnic origin and identified themselves as Filipinos ($N = 8$). All of them spoke Japanese but were also fluent in Filipino. Compared to other groups, they were more likely to practice Filipino culture, which encompassed various transnational practices. Their life was centered around ethnic values, which often collided with Japanese mainstream culture, particularly with respect to the degree of emphasis placed upon succeeding in school.

Sarah and Katie represent a prototype of *ethnic devotees*. They are half-sisters born to Filipino parents. Their Filipino mother, who was an entertainer, married a Japanese man and came to Japan with Katie when she was 4 but left Sarah in the Philippines with her grandmother until she turned 10. Sarah had no Japanese language skill, had a difficult time catching up in class, and was frequently absent from school. Her difficulty resembles that of Antonio, but her response was different as she often showed an adversarial attitude toward Japanese culture and people. When asked how she identified herself, she replied, "I am Filipino. I don't consider myself as Japanese. Never. I feel more comfortable hanging out with Filipino friends and families." Katie, although she had lived in Japan much longer than Sarah, also expressed attachment to the Philippines, saying, "Since I was very small, I have never thought of myself other than Filipina."

Their Filipina identity was strongly tied to various ethnic practices that included speaking Tagalog at home, eating Filipino dishes, hanging out with Filipino friends, communicating with relatives in the Philippines via phone, sending remittances, and visiting the Philippines. Transnational family practices were particularly prominent among the *ethnic devotees*. When Katie turned 18, her mother arranged a party in the Philippines to celebrate her coming of age. Sarah too flew to the Philippines to attend the party, although she had to miss school for more than a week. Schoolteachers perceived Sarah's frequent travel to the Philippines as a sign of anti-school behavior. Sarah knew the importance of attending school, yet she saw family events and reunions more crucial in her life.

For *ethnic devotees*, "helping the family" was their highest priority, which is characteristic of Filipino culture (Wolf 2002). In turn, school values were perceived as less important. Well aware of the poverty back home, Katie and Sarah both recognized their responsibility to become caregivers for family members. Katie said that she did not see significance in going to high school. After graduating from a junior high school, she took multiple part-time jobs, including as a hostess at a nightclub. Sarah graduated from a part-time high school and began helping her mother's newly opened Filipino restaurant. From time to time, both of them send some money to their relatives. As their lives center around their family, Katie and Sarah keep close ties to the Philippines but are marginalized in the host society.

9.2.1.4 Cultural In-Betweens: "I Feel that I Have Two Homes"

Cultural in-betweens ($N = 14$) creatively blend various aspects of two cultures and describe themselves as "Japanese and Filipino," *hafu* (=half) or *daburu* (=double), which are labels frequently used in the Japanese society to describe a person born to Japanese and non-Japanese parents. Through the frequent cultural border crossing and blending, these youth explore ways to preserve some aspects of ethnic culture while successfully adopting mainstream norms and performing well in school. Achieving bicultural and bilingual skills that become assets for gaining school success, the *in-betweens* are the most functional in myriad cultural environments among the four patterns.

KeikoEmma typifies the acculturation style of the *in-betweens*. She was born to a Filipino mother and a Japanese father, who met at a nightclub where her mother was working as a hostess. Her name is peculiar in Japan in that a Japanese and English name are fused therein, and together with her darker skin, this signals her "foreignness." She experienced learning difficulty at an elementary school, yet her educationally minded parents hired a tutor for a year, through which KeikoEmma's writing skills made remarkable progress. Speaking Japanese, Tagalog, and English at home, KeikoEmma wanted to brush up her English skills, and she chose a high school whose academic rank was low but had a 1-year study abroad program to the UK with a full scholarship. Returning with advanced English skills and intercultural experience, she successfully entered a high-ranked private university through *AO nyushi* (admission that focus on the student's individuality through multiple measures).

While KeikoEmma saw many opportunities available to her in the Japanese society, she was also aware of the discrimination and barriers against foreigners. Experiencing bullying at an elementary school, she perceived the Philippines as her comfort zone and described the place as "very warm-hearted, totally not like Japan." Her father showed an understanding toward Keiko-Emma and her mother's frequent visits to the Philippines. She says, "My father said he wanted me to study under the Japanese educational system so [that] my foundation would be in Japan, but I could also visit the Philippines because I have my roots there."

The ways in which the cultural *in-betweens* keep their feet in both societies often contribute to their empowerment and status achievement. KeikoEmma said she intentionally stressed her *hafu* and international background – Filipino mother, competent in three languages, living experience in the Philippines and the UK – in university admission interviews, as well as at a job interview for a large Japanese corporation, where she successfully got hired. She feels a sense of belonging to both Japan and the Philippines saying that "I feel like I have two homes." However, thinking of her career plan, she is willing to go beyond these two countries and move to other countries. She asserts, "I don't want to stay in one place. I want to be constantly moving. Japan is too exclusive. I like being global." As her career plan suggests, some youth in this category aspire to follow the track of a "global elite" (Nukaga 2016; Takahata and Hara 2016). Simultaneously, the c*ultural in-betweens* aim to become a role model for the younger Filipino generation in Japan, as many of our informants participated in NPO/NGO activities that supported immigrant children's learning.

9.2.2 Factors Behind Acculturation and Achievement Processes

There are various factors that influence immigrant youth's tendency to gravitate to a certain acculturation pattern. Here, we focus on family and youth's social networks.[14] These factors affect the kinds and amount of resources that the youth can gain to succeed in school.

Previous studies identified variations of family's educational values across immigrant groups in Japan and their difficulties to support children's education. For instance, Brazilian parents, most of whom are temporary workers, have low expectations for their children's education and emphasize the value of earning money (Shimizu and Shimizu 2001; Takenoshita 2005). Inui (2007) asserts that Laotian parents in general had limited education back home and thus did not believe in the benefits of children's education. Meanwhile, consistent with the previous findings (Nukaga 2010; Miura 2015), our study affirmed a high level of educational values among Filipino parents. However, due to socioeconomic constraints, the family's educational value does not necessarily translate into a practice that supports their children's academic achievement (Miyajima 2002).

Among the aforementioned four groups, we found that the parents of the *ethnic devotees* were most economically disadvantaged. Out of eight youth, two live with a Filipino single mother under government financial support, and the rest have parents with a low-paying and unstable job (truck driver, assembly line worker, restaurant cook, nightclub hostess, etc.). Because of long working hours, these parents find little time to assist in their children's learning. Additionally, the *ethnic devotees*' relatives in the Philippines tend to be poor, which make their parents feel obligated to keep sending remittances. In these socioeconomic conditions, the *ethnic devotees* attach more significance to earning money at a young age rather than doing well in school. Meanwhile, the parents of the *cultural in-betweens* tend to have relatively higher educational background and stable jobs. The economic condition of families back home in particular is not as impoverished as that of the families of the *ethnic devotees*, and thus the youth are free from the obligation to earn and send money. The family's middle-class background enabled the *in-betweens* to go to after-school supplementary classes (*juku*), an experience none of the *ethnic devotees* had.

We also found differences in the kinds of social networks that the Filipino youth forge as they grow up. *Mainstream conformist* and *nonconformis*t tend to have weak ties to relatives in the Philippines and act distant toward their Filipino parents. They both identify themselves as "Japanese," although they differ with respect to which segment of the host society they are assimilating into. Antonio, a *mainstream conformist*, holds strong ties with schoolteachers, volunteer teachers at NGO support groups, and students who share similar academic goals while refusing to interact

[14] Gender may be another significant factor that impacts youth's acculturation process. Nukaga (2014, 2016) identified that girls, rather than boys, hold stronger relationship with their Filipino mothers and that they are strongly influenced by the social networks and ethnic practices of their mothers. In our study, six out of eight *ethnic devotees* were girls. Filipino boys, rather than girls, might be more prone to gang culture, in which boys are usually dominant.

with gang members at school. James, a *nonconformist*, became a member of a gang, which was the only strong relationship that he had.

The *ethnic devotees*, meanwhile, have strong ties to their Filipino parents and relatives in the Philippines but only weak ties to their Japanese father and to the Japanese schoolteachers and students that subscribe to the dominant norms. They tend to hang out with co-ethnic peers and/or Japanese gang members, which makes it difficult for them to succeed in school. Out of the 8 youth in this category, 5 belong to the 1.5 generation, who were born in the Philippines and later brought to Japan. As Tokunaga's study suggests (2011, 2017), 1.5-generation Filipino youth, in particular, tend to be disconnected from the mainstream culture while keeping physical, social, and emotional ties to the Philippines.

Finally, the *cultural in-betweens* have the most variations in their social networks, which straddle Japanese mainstream culture and Filipino culture. They have a good relationship with their Japanese father and Filipino mother, which enables their access to cultural resources in both Japan and the Philippines. They show emotional bonds with Japanese schoolteachers and NPO/NGO volunteers and tend to hang out with Japanese students who adhere to school values and distance themselves from co-ethnic peers who show anti-school behaviors. Two factors seem to affect the formation of such networks. First, the Japanese father of these youth shows understanding toward the child's acquisition of Filipino culture. Being educationally minded, they are also involved in the child's learning. Secondly, the school and local community show inclusive attitudes toward foreigners and provide some support for the family's integration into the mainstream culture.

In sum, the case of Filipino youth suggests diverging acculturation trajectories among second-generation immigrants in today's Japan. The question remains if such diverging acculturation patterns can be seen across other migrant groups. We believe that Filipino youth have the advantage of becoming the *in-betweens*, an acculturation pattern we view as most adaptable, due to the family's strong educational value, frequent transnational practices, and the Japanese father's cultural capital at home. Additionally, the Filipino youth have opportunities to learn English at home and in the Philippines, which promote their status as "global elites." This is a privilege that other immigrant groups in Japan do not share.

Despite group differences, our findings suggest the importance of variable networks that enable the youth to access the cultural and educational resources of the host society and their home country. In the next section, we introduce various in- and out-of-school supports offered for the educational achievement of immigrant children.

9.3 Multiplicity of Educational Actors that Support Immigrant Students

With a lack of national education policy for foreign students, multiple local actors such as prefectural governments, schools, teachers, and NPOs/NGOs have taken initiatives to contribute to the educational outcomes of immigrant students by providing resources of the host society and affirming ethnic cultures.

9.3.1 Schools[15]

9.3.1.1 Use of Educational Policies by Local Governments

To reduce the number of barriers immigrant students face in entering high school, some local governments have adopted a "quota system" and a "testing system" for these students. The "quota system" (*tokubetsu nyugaku waku*) is a Japanese version of affirmative action policy in which some high schools provide a quota for the high school admission of Chinese returnees and other foreign students. Designated high schools allow immigrant students to take fewer test subjects (e.g., Japanese, math, and English) and take special examinations (e.g., essays and interviews). The "testing system" is an academic accommodation provided for immigrant students who take general entrance examinations. It is a linguistically and culturally sensitive testing that allows students to take extra time and use a dictionary, provides *furigana* (words written above the Chinese character to show its pronunciation), reduces the number of exam subjects, etc. (Chugoku Kikokusha Shien Kouryu Senta 2015; Inui 2008).

Although the number of local governments that take special measurements for immigrant students is increasing, a limited number of local districts adopt these policies. In 2015, among 59 prefectures and major cities, only 21 had a quota system for Chinese returnees and/or other foreign students (Chugoku Kikokusha Shien Kouryu Senta 2015). Additionally, not all local governments that have a high population of immigrants offer adequate quotas, which results in many students taking the ordinary route as Japanese students. Furthermore, many local governments have restrictive eligibility requirements including nationality criteria (e.g., students with Japanese nationality are not eligible) and age of arrival in Japan (e.g., less than 3 years). Many immigrant students who live in Japan for more than 3 years (such as second-generation immigrant students we introduced in the previous section) or have Japanese nationality (e.g., through naturalization or having a Japanese parent) are excluded from these policies.

9.3.1.2 International Classes (Adaptation Class or JSL Class) and School Culture

Based on the notion of equal treatment and the assimilative approach, MEXT has provided remedial education to support foreign students to adjust to mainstream Japanese school culture.[16] This approach follows assimilative educational policies

[15] There are a number of ethnic schools (e.g., Brazilian schools, Chinese schools, Korean schools, etc.), many of which are not accredited by the Japanese government, that teach native language, affirm ethnic identities, and prepare the students for their education and career beyond Japan (see Shimizu et al. 2014).

[16] While this chapter mainly focuses on public daytime schools, there is a large number of immigrant children who are above the compulsory school age studying in nighttime junior high

toward oldcomers, such as Zainichi Koreans and Chinese returnees, and *kikokushijo* (Japanese children who lived abroad due to their parents' occupations and later returned to Japan). MEXT has provided JSL classes at the compulsory education level for immigrant students in order to facilitate integration into the Japanese school culture.

When a child is recognized as needing JSL lessons in order to catch up with other children, he/she takes these classes while his/her classmates take other lessons. Some schools have JSL classes in school and ask for additional teachers sent from local education authorities depending on the number of students who needs JSL lessons. Other schools where only a few children need JSL lessons send children to the nearest school that has JSL classes. An immigrant child who has not yet lived in Japan for a long time learns Japanese in JSL class and gradually reduces the number of JSL lessons to join his/her classmates in taking other subjects depending on the level of his/her Japanese language ability.

Schools also provide immigrant children with adaptation assistance or international classes. International classes play an important role in accommodating immigrant children to school culture. They also help immigrant children tackle such culturally assimilative pressures within school. Ota (2000) states that the JSL classroom is decorated with various countries' flags and posters introducing the countries' cultures; this is very different from mainstream classrooms, and the teaching method and materials are also quite different from those of the other subjects. Together with the fact that immigrant children do not necessarily find themselves as ethnic/cultural minorities in such classrooms like in the "normal" classrooms where they study with "Japanese" children, this frees immigrant children from cultural pressure to be the same as the majority "Japanese" (Ota 2000; Shimizu and Shimizu 2001) and encourages them to continue their school lives.

Often, international classes offer career guidance for immigrant students by providing networks and resources that most students take for granted. In Tokunaga's fieldwork with 1.5-generation Filipina immigrant students at a public junior high school, the students took career education classes with 1.5-generation Chinese and Korean students offered by an international classroom teacher. The students learned about the educational system in Japan, discussed high school and career options, acquired test-taking strategies and interview techniques, etc. The teacher acknowledged the ethnic cultures, languages, and class backgrounds of immigrant students and attempted to supplement resources and bridge the students to out-of-school educational sites. With much support from the teachers, all Filipina students passed the high school entrance examinations, including a few middle-rank full-time high school ones (Tokunaga 2011, 2017).

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schools. These schools provide opportunities for the students to start working in Japan while studying Japanese language and preparing for high school simultaneously. Although there are challenges, the growing attention to nighttime junior high schools in these few years may have a profound impact on Japanese society by creating a supportive educational route for immigrants (Sumino 2015).

However, not all immigrant children have equal access to international classes. Because such classes specifically target children who lack Japanese language proficiency, second-generation immigrants, who were born and raised in Japan and thus are fluent in Japanese conversation, are often excluded from such support even if they are experiencing academic difficulties. As the case of James in the previous section suggests, second-generation immigrant youth are often left to survive on their own at school, which can make them vulnerable to the negative influence of gang culture.

9.3.1.3 Teachers' Support

Although scholars have argued that some teachers' attitudes toward immigrant students negatively impact their self-esteem, most likely resulting in low academic achievement, there are many teachers who voluntarily and enthusiastically contribute themselves to support immigrant children to overcome various educational issues. Teachers in Japan do not just provide cognitive knowledge and skills by teaching academic subjects but also support holistic development of children by taking care of their social and emotional development (Lewis 1995; Tsuneyoshi 2001). For example, Takahashi sees and hears of areas where many immigrant children have single parents who are very busy working and cannot spend much time on taking care of their children. Teachers pay special attention to those immigrant children, asking whether they have had breakfast and/or dinner last night, and if not, they buy some food for them. Additionally, some teachers cooperate with voluntary organizations to provide educational support after school, such as helping the students do their homework and preparing them with their exams until late.

Some studies revealed that teachers' culture has an effect on the educational aspirations of immigrant children. In the case of Indo-Chinese, South American, and Chinese immigrant children, teachers' culture affects the educational aspirations of immigrant children together with the family's story (i.e., what kind of meaning they give to the notion of migrating to and living in Japan) and school culture (Hirosaki 2007; Shimizu and Shimizu 2001). Scholars also revealed that teachers select what kind of immigrants' ethnic culture can/cannot be used as resources for learning, depending on whether it is compatible with the rules of the Japanese schools or not (Takahashi 2015, 2016).

9.3.2 Out-of-School Sites

While scholars often focus on the role of school as the main educational institution for immigrant students, multiple out-of-school sites play a critical role in developing an educational support system that provides immigrant students with pipelines to host society while affirming their ethnic cultures and roots.

In an attempt to empower the youth to survive in the host society, many of these sites provide academic, linguistic, and career support such as tutoring for school subjects, preparing students for high school entrance examinations, and teaching the Japanese language. Some offer education for immigrant students who are not attending schools (*fushugaku*). Recently, there has been an increase of "free schools" run by NPOs that serve immigrant students who are not eligible to enter junior high school due to age restrictions (over the age of 15) or the fact that they graduated from junior high school in their countries of origin. These free schools play a critical role in serving immigrant students who fall in between the educational systems. Some organizations, often the ones developed by immigrant themselves, utilize their strong connections to local communities and immigrant families and provide social work services to marginalized students and families. While there is diversity in the purpose of these organizations, most of these sites articulate the need to create *ibasho*, a place where students feel a sense of safety, comfort, and acceptance. It is a great concern for these community organizers to create a safe and inclusive learning environment for immigrant students who often feel alienated and excluded in mainstream schools.

In our fieldwork, we observed many newly arrived immigrant students who need linguistic and academic support regularly attend afterschool tutoring programs conducted by Japanese residents and volunteers in the community. For 1.5-generation Filipina students who had low Japanese proficiency and financial difficulties as mentioned above, community support in addition to international classroom support was crucial to prepare for high school entrance examination. In these out-of-school spaces, they were encouraged to share their experiences in their homeland, use languages they were comfortable speaking, and learned ways to successfully navigate the school system in Japan. The academic success of Antonio in the aforementioned section is also partly due to his participation in the afterschool program run by NPO, where he received not only academic support but also emotional support from co-ethnic peers and Japanese tutors who showed understanding of cultural differences.

Although many of these programs are run by Japanese, there are a few organizations and programs that are run by immigrant communities. "Stand-by-Me" (SBM), a local immigrant children's group located in Kanagawa Prefecture, is one of them. The role of SBM is to empower students to "live in Japan as foreigners" and provides opportunities for students to acknowledge shared experiences among diverse immigrant students (Shimizu 2006; 2011). SBM provides academic support and native language classes and conducts various activities for immigrant children in the local area. Since 2001, children of Vietnamese, Cambodian, or Laotian backgrounds have mainly developed and run the programs. Many of them or their parents are refugees, and others migrated to Japan for a family reunion. One of the group's strengths in terms of providing educational support is the existence of role models. Older students with similar situations encourage younger ones to have high aspirations, to learn, to think about their identities and culture, to deal with family problems, and to tackle many other issues.

In our study of second-generation Filipino youth, we also observed their engagement in self-help groups. This was most prominent among the cultural *in-betweens*.

One female took an active role in coordinating language classes and cultural events for Filipino children at a church where Filipino families in the neighborhood congregated. She found it meaningful to discuss identity issues with the younger generation, a problem that she herself suffered for a long time, and to provide them with some advice from her own life experiences. Bridging mainstream values and ethnic culture, the *in-betweens* become the role models that the younger generations can look up to. The existence of such role models who have the same ethnicity and share similar experiences in the society becomes an important tool for empowerment, which students rarely receive in mainstream schools or NPOs/NGOs run by Japanese staff.

While there are a number of out-of-school sites, ranging from volunteer-run groups to more stable NPOs/NGOs, not all immigrant students have access to these programs. These programs tend to be concentrated in urban areas or localities where many foreigners reside, which limit access to students in areas with less foreigners. Furthermore, based on our fieldwork, newly arrived immigrants who have low Japanese proficiency and have difficulty in learning academic subjects in Japanese tend to have more access to these out-of-school sites than second-generation immigrant students. It is particularly difficult for *nonconformists* and *mainstream conformists*, who are not committed to ethnic culture, to participate in these sites because of their "invisible" educational needs as foreigners. The visibility (foreignness) of immigrant youth often alerts concerned teachers, local government administrators, and multicultural coordinators to connect immigrant students to community organizations and programs.

9.4 Conclusion

While studies have suggested that many oldcomers, such as Koreans and Chinese returnees, as well as Japanese returnees, gradually lost their ethnic heritage or "foreignness" in the face of paramount assimilative pressure in the past (Nukaga and Tsuneyoshi 2011; Sato 2010), today's second-generation immigrant youth, as we have discussed in the case of Filipino youth, are navigating a transnational terrain that enables them to preserve some aspects of ethnic culture and still achieve upward mobility in the host society. Some students like the *cultural in-betweens* are carving out an in-between path by maintaining transnational ties, affirming bilingual and bicultural ability, and utilizing community resources. Specifically, given the presence of a Japanese parent, as well as the diasporic nature of Filipinos and their high English competency, which could lead to a career abroad, Filipino students might have more of this tendency compared to other ethnic groups.

Furthermore, our study suggests the significance of social networks and local educational support on immigrant youth's acculturation and academic achievement. Given the lack of social integration and national education policies for immigrants, local actors such as prefectural governments and schools with a large immigrant population, concerned teachers, and NPOs/NGOs have developed educational programs and support systems for immigrant students. While there is disparity in the quantity and quality of support among communities, many students, specifically high achievers, receive educational assistance from local actors that value their ethnic culture and offer resources. At the same time, we acknowledge the group of immigrant students who struggle academically with a lack of resources and educational support, leading to social exclusion within Japan. The social networks of these youth are severely limited: they either forge strong ties with co-ethnics as a “marginalized foreigner” or hang out with Japanese gangs and become a part of a “Japanese underclass.” Because immigrant families cannot rely on the ethnic community’s resources alone, inclusive attitudes and measures of local actors in the host society become extremely important to encourage children’s school success.

As the immigrant population and their academic trajectories have diversified, there needs to be more systematic surveys and research that illuminate the educational attainment and experiences of immigrant students in the field of sociology of education. In doing so, scholars should take into account multiple intersecting factors such as ethnicity, class, gender, nationality, migration history, and social context rather than focus solely on ethnicity or nationality as the main category of difference. Additionally, building on multiple case studies and immigration theories, we suggest education scholars to conduct more cross-cultural and comparative research that reveals diverging acculturation patterns of immigrants and illuminates its unique features of Japan, in order to contribute to expand the international discussion on immigration, education, and equity.

Acknowledgments This work was supported by the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science [JSPS KAKENHI grant number 15K17387], [26285193].

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Chapter 10
The Growing Influence of Political Leadership on Teacher Education: Radical Policy Reforms in the Absence of Opposition Forces

Sawako Yufu and Ryoji Matsuoka

Abstract This chapter discusses the increased influence of political leadership over education policies during the past decades in Japan by providing a detailed assessment of recent teacher education reforms from periods not covered in previous studies. For this purpose, it will first describe how education policy-making has changed over the past few decades (including critical changes such as power shifting after reorganizations of government ministries), then provide a brief history of teacher education reforms in Japan, and finally scrutinize the contents of the recent reform proposed by the Central Council on Education Report 184. In addition, the chapter will explain stronger national control over teacher education and standardization of teacher education at universities across the country, with examples of the devaluation of academic knowledge in teacher education. Then, it will describe the absence of opposition to the radical policy changes by describing detailed conditions that seemingly inhibit universities and teachers' unions from becoming influential over the direction of the reforms. The chapter will conclude with discussions on how and why the reforms will be less likely to achieve the professionalization of teachers, which is the goal of reform efforts in other societies.

10.1 Introduction

In an era of rapid change, when children need to acquire skills applicable to new problems, major economies such as in the United States (Ravitch 2010; Akahoshi 2005) and United Kingdom (Akahoshi 2005; Labour Party 2005; Ota 2010) have enacted various education reforms, one of which aims at increasing the quality of teachers. There appears to be a worldwide trend in teacher education reform that involves teacher assessment and an emphasis on longer periods of practical

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A. Yonezawa et al. (eds.), *Japanese Education in a Global Age*, Education in the Asia-Pacific Region: Issues, Concerns and Prospects 46,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-1528-2_10

training at school, which are meant to enhance teaching skills and contribute to professionalizing teaching jobs (Yoshioka 2008; Takano 2008; Furusawa 2008; Sato 2008). Standards for teaching, such as the Interstate New Teacher Assessment and Support Consortium (InTASC), have been implemented recently in various places around the world, and long-term practical training in pre-service teacher education has been regarded as important to connecting disparate teaching theories and practices. These efforts are seen as contributing to the preparation of highly qualified teachers (Darling-Hammond and Lieberman 2012; Kurebayashi and Kawamura 2014).

Japan is also concerned with how to increase the quality of teachers. In fact, training plans for teachers were proposed in 1987, followed by a number of reforms, especially in recent years (see Fig. 10.1 for details). Specifically, graduate schools of teacher education were founded in 2008, training sessions linked to the renewal of teaching certificates were mandated, and new practical sessions for college teacher training programs were initiated (Central Council on Education [*Chuo Kyoiku Shingi Kai*] 2006). After these major changes, the Central Council on Education (Chuo Kyoiku Shingi Kai, hereafter CCE) submitted Report 184 in December 2015, which formed the basis of a revision of the Law for Special Regulations Concerning Educational Public Service Personnel (*Kyoiku Komuin Tokurei Ho*) in the fall of 2016. A major teacher education reform effort with an emphasis on, among other things, the introduction of a standard for teaching called "core curriculum of teacher education" was announced in 2017.

CCE Report 184 can be seen in line with the characteristics of the worldwide trend in teacher education reform. However, the following detailed assessment of this report and its associated reform effort will show that the Japanese version of teacher education reform is different from what might first be surmised, as it does not contribute to the professionalization of teachers but rather institutes more state control through administrative organizations. Rather than examining specific hypotheses, this chapter aims to provide a detailed assessment of recent events regarding teacher education reforms that have not been covered by the various assessments of Japanese education reforms in previous decades (Schoppa 1991; Aspinall 2001; Nitta 2008). This will contribute to the literature on teacher education reform by highlighting some peculiarities in reforms from periods not covered in the literature as of 2017. For this purpose, the chapter will first describe how education policy-making has changed over the past few decades, give a brief history of teacher education reforms in Japan, scrutinize the contents of the recent reform proposed by the CCE Report 184, and clarify in detail the absence of opposition forces toward the radical policy changes. Then, the chapter will conclude with discussions on how and why the reform does not achieve what those seen in other societies have aimed at.

Year	Prime Minister	Advisory Body to Prime Minister	Central Education Council's Report Regarding Teacher Training		Related Reforms
			Name of Report	Highlights	
82	Nakasone	Ad Hoc Council on Education			
83					
84					
85					
86					Final report by Provisional Council on Administrative and Fiscal Reform/re-examining admission quota for colleges of education Research group's report on future national universities and colleges for teacher education about college programs not requiring students to take teacher education courses
87			Policies to enhance the qualifications and abilities of teachers	・Improving the teacher training and licensing systems ・Establishing beginning teachers' training ・Streamlining the training system for in-service teachers	
88	Takeshita				
89	Uno				
89–90	Kaifu				
91–92	Miyazawa				Easing MEXT's regulations regarding "Standards for the Establishment of Universities"/Down-scaling general education
93	Hosokawa*				
94	Hata*				
94–95	Murayama*				
96–97	Hashimoto		Policies to improve teacher training in the new era	Changing the basic structure of the curriculum for teacher training and improving learning contents	Amendment of "Education Personnel Certification Act" (lawmaker-initiated legislation)
98	Obuchi		Teacher training plan including master's programs	Improving master's programs Re-training in-service teachers	About future regional education administration (CCE Report)
99		National Commission on Educational Reform	Facilitating linkages between teacher training, hiring, and further training	About qualifications and abilities of teachers/those based on teachers' career stages Improving teacher adoption/multifaceted adoption process Enhancing partnerships between universities and education boards	
00	Mori	National Commission on Educational Reform			Amendment of "Special Rules for the Public Educational Personnel and Staff Act" (Establishing a system enabling teachers to absent from work to attend graduate school) regenerate education plans for the 21st century)
01	Koizumi				Advisory body on national universities and colleges for teacher education (Initiated by the director-general, Higher Education

Fig. 10.1 Teacher education reforms from the 1980s to the 2010s

					Bureau, MEXT)
02			Future teacher licensing system (Report)	Making teaching licenses flexible/Teaching license renewal system/teacher aptitude/teacher evaluation	
03			Fundamental Law of Education and basic plan for promotion of education appropriate to the new period		
04					Turning national universities into independent agencies CCE Report "about future administrative operations in school"
05			Creating compulsory education for the new era (Report)		Reforming the system of national treasury's share of compulsory education expenses
06	Abe	Education Rebuilding Council	Future teacher training and licensing (Report)	Improving the quality of teacher training programs	
07					Amendment to "Fundamental Law of Education"
08	Fukuda	Education Rebuilding Conference			
	Aso				
09	Hatoyama*				
10	Kan*				
11					
12	Noda*		Policies to comprehensively enhance the qualifications and abilities of teachers throughout their entire career (Report)	Improving the quality of teacher training programs Reform directions for teaching license system/education boards/partnerships between schools and universities/improving training for in-service teachers and administrators	
13	Abe	Education Rebuilding Council			Strategy for rebuilding Japan: plan to reform national universities (redefinition of mission)
14					
15			Report 184: About enhancing the qualifications and abilities of teachers who will be in charge of future school education Report 185: School as a team and future improvement plan Report 186: About school-community cooperation and the future plan to realize education for the new era and revitalize local communities	Teacher education council/training indicators/establishing National Institute for School Teacher and Staff Development Cooperating with various professionals/reforming school organizations Community schools	
16					Discussion on subsidy for national universities by ministry of finance

*Non-Liberal Democratic Party

Fig. 10.1 (continued)

10.2 Changes in Education Policy-Making over the Past Few Decades: Education Policy in Japan After the *Rinkyoshin* (Ad Hoc Council on Education)

10.2.1 Power over Education Policy

The Japanese Constitution, implemented after the end of World War II, refers to the general principle of *trias politica*, the separation of governmental powers into legislative, executive, and judicial branches. Until the end of the twentieth century, there were nearly 20 legislative councils serving as advisory bodies to the Minister of Education (Namimoto 2001). Among them, the CCE was considered the most important. The Minister of Education submitted reports by these committees to the National Diet. The reports then became laws and were enforced. These processes of education policy-making changed when Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone established the Ad Hoc Council on Education (*Rinji Kyoiku Shingikai*, hereafter AHCE), a supra-cabinet advisory council, in 1984 (Schoppa 1991; Hood 2001). Even though the AHCE was formed as a temporary council, after the CCE was forced to cease its activities, the AHCE stayed in place until 1987. Policies proposed by the AHCE were subsequently implemented, such as establishing credit-based high schools and 6-year secondary schools and introducing first-year in-service teacher training. The AHCE also proposed an organizational reform of the Ministry of Education, which was then transformed into the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology (hereafter MEXT), along with founding a new university council and lifelong learning council; this transformation limited the role of the CCE to elementary and secondary education (Namimoto 2001). As part of these reforms, the influence of the CCE on education policy was reduced, and its scope became restricted to “primary and secondary education.” Since then, education policy has strongly reflected the intentions of the present government administration.

In 2000, Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi assembled the National Commission on Educational Reform (*Kyoiku Kaikaku Kokumin Kaigi*, hereafter NCER), which Junichiro Koizumi continued during his term of office (2001–2006) (Fujita 2005). The NCER was a private advisory body to the prime minister without a firm legal basis, unlike the AHCE, but subsequent prime ministers conventionally set up similar advisory committees, such as the Education Rebuilding Implementation Council (*Kyoiku Saisei Kaigi*, 2006–2008, Abe Administration), the Education Rebuilding Conference (*Kyoiku Saisei Konndankai*, 2008–2009, Fukuda Administration), and the second Education Rebuilding Implementation Council (*Kyoiku Saisei Jikko Kaigi*, 2013–present, second Abe Administration). Thus, since 2000, education policies came to be formulated based on discussions led by the prime minister’s office, rather than recommendations by councils consisting of scholars and other individuals (Fujita 2015; Hirota 2014; Yufu 2015; Yamagishi 2001).

Among the past advisory bodies, the second Education Rebuilding Implementation Council of the Abe administration (2013–present) has been the most active, issuing nine proposals from early 2013 to May 2016, based on those by the Education

Rebuilding Implementation headquarters established by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP or *Jiminto*), to which the prime minister belongs. Almost all of them were then reflected in reports issued by the CCE. This suggests that the CCE, which once held power over education policy-making, came to merely play the role of authorizing proposals by the prime minister's advisory body (Fujita 2015; Hirota 2014; Takahashi 2015).

10.2.2 Power Shift after Reorganizations of Government Ministries

Political leadership over education policy can be observed not only from the influence of private advisory bodies but also from changes in the organizational structures of the power. Specifically, in 2001, as part of a reorganization effort by central government ministries to reduce bureaucracy and strengthen the cabinet's functions, the Ministry of Education was combined with the Science and Technology Agency, becoming MEXT (Ogawa 2007). At the time of this reorganization, new posts were created in addition to the minister of MEXT: two vice-ministers and two parliamentary vice-ministers. As of the time of writing, lawmakers affiliated with the ruling parties hold these positions. Additionally, due to this organizational change, the Cabinet Office has had the power to shuffle personnel including the administrative vice-minister, the highest position for a government official, and other high-level officials, such as deputy vice-ministers and directors general who are nonpoliticians or government bureaucrats (Hirota 2014). Thus, the minister of MEXT appointed by the prime minister has some influence over the conduct of these personnel (Yamagishi 2001). This means that the political leadership took control over both education policy and administration. In particular, the prime minister's administrative power increased, and therefore education policy-making came to depend largely on the prime minister's motivation and plan for education reforms. Teacher education reform, the topic of this chapter, was also inevitably influenced by these structural changes, including the shift of power.

10.3 A Brief History of Teacher Education Reform in Recent Years

The AHCE's neoliberal recommendations to the political leadership in 1984 were not implemented at the time, but they became laws and were implemented around the beginning of 2000, which was when the NCER was assembled by Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi (Namimoto 2001). Building on this trend, a teacher education reform was initiated. This section will mainly explain the policy changes, which include detailed descriptions of reforms up until 2000. After briefly describing the history of teacher education reform, this section will describe three major reforms (i.e., teacher training programs at universities, the establishment of graduate schools for teacher education, and the introduction of a periodic renewal system for teaching licenses) articulated in a CCE report by the NCER which continued during the Mori Administration.

Since the beginning of this century, political leadership on education policy has significantly changed the financial bedrock for education and the laws that articulate the purposes of schooling in a time when welfare states are facing financial difficulties and the introduction of neoliberal schemes. Not only were there changes to the foundations of the education system, but also a number of teacher education reforms were introduced to improve the quality of teaching, which has been considered to be a critical issue by administrations since the AHCE's establishment. Three important points were articulated by the CCE in 2008.

The first point concerned the quality of teacher training programs at universities; eventually a mandatory course named "Teacher Training Practice" (*Kyosyoku Jissenn Ensyu*) was added (MEXT 2006). College students who seek to obtain teaching credentials have to take this course at the end of the teacher education program, raising the bar on the quality of teaching training that each university needs to be held responsible for. This policy was implemented as previously it had been relatively easy to obtain a teaching license. Concretely, more than 10,000 students acquire teaching licenses each year by fulfilling basic requirements (a certain number of compulsory courses) in Japan, where about 80% of universities offer teaching training courses (MEXT 2012). Due to the nondemanding nature of the teacher certification system, only 20% of students who receive a teaching license take a teacher recruitment examination, and only 5% of them actually become teachers (MEXT 2012). Those with teaching licenses who do not choose the teaching profession are considered as "paper teachers" (an expression based on the "paper driver," which is a Japanese English term for someone who holds a driving license but rarely drives a car). A high number of "paper teachers" waste university resources and arguably devalue the teaching certificate (Yamasaki 2003).

The second critical point of the 2008 reform was the establishment of graduate schools for teacher education. This policy was facilitated by two trends. One is that creating graduate schools for professionals was a trend in higher education policies, with the early attempts being seen in law (*Homu Kenkyu Ka*) and business in 1990 (Yamada 2003). The other is that EU countries developed teacher training programs featuring graduate education (Kurebayashi and Kawamura 2014). In 2008, graduate schools for teacher education were founded at 15 national universities and 4 private counterparts. Under the influence of university reforms, the number of graduate schools increased in both sectors; 39 national and 6 private universities established such schools resulting in a total of 45 graduate schools nationwide (MEXT 2016).

The third point of the reform was the introduction of a periodic renewal system for teaching licenses. Since this reform, teachers have been required to attend lectures held by regulated agents (such as universities) every 10 years (Ushiwata 2006), lest their certification become invalid. This reform was initially motivated by the notion that incompetent teachers need to be removed from the school system, as they had been seen as not being able to solve a number of school-related problems including bullying, school refusal, and other disorders since the 1980s.

With these reforms in the 2000s, along with teacher evaluation in the name of accountability, there were policies that attempted to increase the quality of teacher education. The next section will further describe reforms in the 2010s, during the second Abe administration, and elaborate upon some issues and concerns regarding reform attempts.

10.4 Report 184 and Related Issues

The CCE issued three reports as teacher education reform in Japan reached its zenith in December 2015 during the second Abe Administration, which has demonstrated strong control over teacher education. Report 184 covers teacher education and training to increase the quality of teaching (MEXT 2015a), Report 185 is about reforming school administration (MEXT 2015b), and Report 186 mentions establishing schools that cooperate with neighbors (MEXT 2015c). These reports changed how the education system had operated since the postwar period. Arguably, these attempts seemed to have been aimed at educating future teachers to be obedient, rather than critical thinkers who can be role models for students. The following sections will further describe current teacher education reform in detail and explain why measures based on the recommendations of Report 184 may serve to erode teachers' strengths.

10.4.1 Strengthening National Control over Teacher Education

The CCE report issued in December of 2015 included institutional reforms covering all aspects of teacher training, recruitment examination, and in-service teacher training (MEXT 2015a). The most significant feature of this reform is that it involved the national government, the board of education, and universities cooperating to establish a "teacher training council" (*Kyoin Ikusei Kyogikai*) and administrate teacher education by following "training indicators" (*Ikusei Shihyo*).

Under this reform, universities are now responsible for implementing teacher education according to the "training indicators" as defined by MEXT (2015a). This standardization of teacher education may have its own merits, but it also raises the issue as to each prefecture's board of education being required to set up new organizations called "teacher training councils" that collaborate with universities and other bodies (MEXT 2015a). These councils seem to be a collaborative effort between prefectural-level education administrations and universities, but having some members from universities on these councils will not sufficiently represent the voices of universities in each prefecture as more than one university offers teacher education in each prefecture. Specifically, council members from higher education institutions will likely come from national universities, not private ones, which issue the majority of teacher licenses.

Likewise, under the above reform, teachers may lose their autonomy. Creating "training indicators" is an attempt to standardize the quality of teachers. In this sense, the reform follows a global trend (Hargreaves 2003; Darling-Hammond and Lieberman 2012) of requiring teachers to achieve certain standards and improve their teaching skills. However, unlike standards such as those delineated by InTASC cultivated by educational researchers and professionals over many years (Yamazaki 2016), several institutional designs in Japan were created by MEXT without input from education and research professionals. Specifically, "training indicators" are not based on academic knowledge accumulated by education researchers over a long period, and no education philosophy is articulated that should have been stated before the creation of these indicators; deconstructed or fragmented parts of teaching skills required in classroom are merely listed as indicators, without any articulation of which parts are more important (Sato 2016). Furthermore, even though using standards as a checklist is cautioned by other education systems, such as those in the United States (CCSSO's Interstate Teacher Assessment and Support Consortium (InTASC) 2011), the teacher training indicators in Japan are synonymous with checklists of activities that the government or MEXT considers as valid, based on societal demands, not on the code of ethics created by professionals. This means that activities are not necessary meant to improve teachers' skills, but rather to enact strict controls over their behavior.

Establishing and enforcing teaching standards may have increased the quality of teachers in other societies, especially where a shortage of teachers and a low equality of teachers are indisputable, such as in the United States (Darling-Hammond 2000; Darling-Hammond and Lieberman 2012), but it is unclear if "training indicators" would work the same in the specific context of Japan. This is because, since the postwar period, there have been national curriculum guidelines (*Gakushu Shido Yoryo*) legally bound by the School Education Law Enforcement Regulation (*Gakko Kyoiku Ho Shiko Kisoku*) (Matsubara 2012). With curricula that had been clearly standardized nationwide, a certain level of equality in teaching had presumably been assured among classrooms, especially when compared to other societies with a highly decentralized education system, such as that of the United States. In addition to this standardization, which determined what and how to teach in classrooms, the enforcement of "training indicators" further limited teachers' autonomy over teaching activities. Moreover, there have been formal and informal learning opportunities for students to improve their teaching methods, including the widely known "lesson study" (Lewis 2002) and local voluntary study groups in which teachers learn from one another. Enforcing "training indicators," which present a national model, may standardize certain characteristics of teachers while eroding their learning communities and cultures, which could be considered a strength of Japanese education.

A newly formed nationwide organization called the “National Center for Teachers’ Development,” which was based on a CCE proposal, is also an indicator of stronger national control. This national center is meant to develop teaching tools and methods for pre-service or in-service teachers using national indicators. It is also intended to be the national core of teacher education in cooperation with graduate schools for teacher education that functions as a local hub that diffuses teaching materials, methods, and content developed at the center (MEXT 2015a). After a legal amendment was passed in 2016, the center is now called the “National Institute for School Teachers and Staff Development” and is expected to expand its scope to cover national exams, such as the teacher recruitment examination.

10.4.2 Standardizing Teacher Education at Universities

Report 184 proposes a reform of teacher education by universities (MEXT 2015a). Specifically, it contended that private universities need to reconsider their teacher education programs, perhaps even closing them if they cannot provide the same range of programs as national universities.

Currently, about 80% of universities throughout the country are involved in teacher training (MEXT 2012). Because it is popular among students to acquire a teaching license for future job security, private universities have benefited from offering teacher education programs to recruit students while meeting national standards through on-site surveys conducted by the teacher’s course accreditation committee of MEXT. If many of the students who receive teaching certification from these teacher education programs, which are limited in scope at private universities, continue to become “paper teachers,” the programs may no longer receive permission from MEXT because of proposals stipulated in Report 184 that mandate universities to provide a full range of programs. This shift in teacher education policy is a major change and indicates that a limited number of higher education institutions will play a role in teacher education, instead of many universities (including small private ones); in sum, the system will go from “open” to “closed” (Iwata 2015). It should be noted that the “open” system was established after the end of World War II based on an understanding that the closed, nationally controlled teacher education system of the pre-war period was not for pursuing academia, but for learning codes of ethics for the benefit of the nation, and insufficient teacher education is believed to have created citizens who were not critical of government and its decisions regarding war (Terasaki and Maeda 1994). In the postwar period, teacher education was implemented as an “open” system in which a number of universities across the nation offered programs that helped students develop critical thinking skills, liberal arts backgrounds, and expertise. Going back to the “closed” system with its stronger national controls is therefore controversial.

Finally, another major shift in teacher education proposed by Report 184 is revisions to course requirements. Following Report 184 (MEXT 2015a), MEXT will determine the “core curriculum of teacher education,” which includes detailed requirements for two-thirds of the curriculum in terms of the contents and goals of each course. This essentially means teacher education programs offered at different universities will be nationally standardized, and this may mean that universities lose their autonomy in setting the standards for their education programs.

10.4.3 Devaluing Academic Knowledge

Teacher education is criticized as useless in some societies—for example, described by Korthagen et al. (2001)—and Japan is no exception. Strong negative perceptions can be observed in media, for instance, in professional magazines for teachers. More specifically, in the 1980s, teachers were considered as becoming more incompetent than before as various issues emerged, such as school violence, bullying, and class disruption, even though these issues were likely due to rapid social changes (e.g., secondary education becoming universal and academic credentials not necessarily securing jobs anymore). The proposals in Report 184 appear to be based on this understanding of teachers' incapacity to deal with education problems, implying that teacher education has to confer a practical, wide range of knowledge that can be used in classroom teaching. As internships and practical experiences at schools are emphasized as parts of teacher education, studies in theory and research and conventional types of college education appear to be viewed as unimportant.

One clear example of this emphasis on practicality in education policy is the increase in hiring practitioners as college instructors for teacher education. Under law, 40% of faculty members at graduate schools for teacher education have to be practitioners, while the upper limit of this percentage is not clear (MEXT 2010). Thus, the share of practitioners is larger than that of professors who conduct research at some graduate schools for teacher education. More specifically, according to recent annual reports from the Institute for the Evaluation of Teacher Education (www.iete.jp), which collects information about graduate schools for teacher education nationwide, practitioners make up 12 out of 17 faculty members at Hyogo University of Teacher Education, 10 out of 19 at Fukui University, and 10 out of 16 at Joetsu University of Education. Many of these practitioners are former school principals or people with educational administrative experience, as the only stated requirement for these positions is having more than 20 years of work experience. Despite the unavailability of current data, it seems that the number of practitioners teaching undergraduate teacher education courses as part-time or specially appointed lecturers has also increased. In addition, Report 184 requests academic faculty members (i.e., non-practitioners) pursue faculty development and obtain experiences in school so that they pick up knowledge from outside of their field of expertise.

Another example that demonstrates the reduced role or influence of universities over teacher education is the issuance of special teaching licenses to those who have prominent experience but lack university-level teacher training. This system was put in place in 1988 to respond to diversifying school education and consequent challenges (MEXT 2012). Prefectural boards of education issue this special license for each school type and subject based on their own screening processes. Report 184 clearly states that this special licensing should be expanded. The number of special licenses issued has gradually increased, with 915 having been issued by 2015 (MEXT 2015d). Examples of recipients are individuals with overseas experience being licensed as English teachers and those who used to work for manufacturing companies becoming science teachers.

10.5 Stronger National Control over Teacher Education without Any Opposition

The fundamental reform efforts of strong political leadership, which entailed great changes, have faced no clear counterbalancing force. This is likely to be one of the major reasons why stronger national control over teacher education is achieved. This section offers hypothetical arguments on some conditions that partly explain why faculty members of teacher education programs have followed the direction of political leadership and describes how some academic societies and individual scholars have attempted to share their concern. It also considers explanations for scholars' reduced presence in policy-making and the weakening of teachers' unions in recent years.

10.5.1 Higher Education

10.5.1.1 National Universities

It was extremely important for the central government to reduce the proportion of personnel expenses in the national budget during the neoliberal reform period, when a reduction in the number of national public employees had become a major issue. At the turn of the millennium, a reform entailing austerity measures was implemented, and regulations were eased (Ushiwata 2006). As part of the reorganization of government ministries, the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications was privatized, and national universities and hospitals were transformed into independent corporations. Then, after the enactment of the National University Corporate Law in 2003, national universities became national university corporations in 2004.

Under a MEXT policy that revitalizes national universities in an autonomous environment, each independent administrative institution and ex-national university is required to create and implement a midterm plan with concrete goals reflecting their specialties. In 2013, the mission of national universities was redefined to further improve their strengths and specialties and fulfill their social roles (MEXT 2013). In the case of universities that focus on teacher education in each prefecture, MEXT's statement (2013) asked them to specialize in teacher training. The statement was likely issued in response to cases where colleges of education offered courses whose main purpose was not teacher training. In the 1990s, when teacher demand was low due to social changes (such as a declining birthrate), universities with teacher training programs reduced the number of such courses and created new departments to compensate for this reduction (*Kokuritsu Daigaku Kyokai* [The Japan Association of National Universities] 2000).

As national universities were mostly subsidized by the government in the past (Amano 2008), their transformation into independent institutions did not immediately help them to gain their own financial sources. Additionally, it is not conventional for departments of "soft" sciences (including teacher education) to obtain donations or financial supports from organizations such as commercial companies (Yoshimi 2016). Because they depend on it financially, universities need to follow government policies.

10.5.1.2 Private Universities

Not all private universities have a college of education, but about four-fifths of them do offer a teaching education program. Such programs are for those who intend to obtain a teaching license for lower and upper secondary education (i.e., junior high and high school). Also, the number of private universities offering elementary school teachers' licenses has been increasing (MEXT 2015a). Thus, the number of private universities that offer some form of teacher education program is larger than that of their national counterparts (which is not negligible).

Despite their strong presence in the nation's teacher education, many of these programs at private universities are maintained to appeal to future students; unlike national universities, they are normally operated at the lowest level of MEXT's standards in terms of, for example, the number of facilities and faculty members. In general, instructors in these programs are not conventional faculty members, but rather practitioners such as retired teachers or former educational administrators. Few students who obtain teaching licenses from these programs apply for teacher recruitment examinations, and many remain "paper teachers"; these teacher education programs are marginal at the colleges to which they are attached. Given these conditions, faculty members in charge of teacher education programs at private institutions appear to be focusing on how to adapt to the changes brought in by Report 184 (e.g., how to maintain permission from MEXT regarding new requirements or standards).

10.5.1.3 Scholars

While both national and private universities face conditions that inhibit them from becoming major opposition forces against the stronger national control over teacher education, it should be mentioned that there have been some attempts to share concerns regarding the reform policies. For example, The Japanese Society for the Study on Teacher Education (JSSTE) convened public symposiums that questioned Report 184 and the introduction of the "core curriculum of teacher education." Building on one of the symposiums, JSSTE (2017) published a book including collections of detailed critical discussions about the core curriculum of teacher education. Additionally, renowned scholars such as Fujita (2005, 2015) and Sato (2016) have questioned the nationally controlled policies in books written for a general audience.

Despite these efforts to disseminate concerns regarding the directions of the policies, scholars' involvement in policy-making has become less prominent. Specifically, during the CCE's fifth period (from 2009 to 2011), when the Democratic Party of Japan was the governing party (from 2009 to 2012), 30 appointed commissioners could be divided into four categories according to their jobs or fields of specialization. The first group consisted of 14 members and comprised scholars in education, department chairs from universities, and presidents of universities. The second group included nine individuals who were governors, members of education boards, and representatives from school sites. Five individuals were appointed from the industrial circle, representing business perspectives. The last group was from journalism; two journalists were appointed as commissioners. In the latest CCE, which is in its ninth period, which began in 2017 at the time of the second Abe Administration (2013–present) with the LDP as the governing party, the numbers of each category of commissioners are 15, 9, 5, and 1, respectively. This composition of categories appears unchanged from that in the fifth period, but a focus on commissioners' backgrounds provides a different picture. In fact, many of the commissioners in the first category were university presidents who used to be scholars in education in the fifth period of the CCE. Conversely, most commissioners in the category in the ninth period of the CCE are presidents of universities who were not scholars in education. This change means that a larger number of commissioners serving the CCE discuss education policies from administrative and managerial perspectives rather than from scholastic standpoints with professional expertise in education. The same pattern can be observed in the backgrounds of members in the second Education Rebuilding Implementation Council of the Abe administration (2013–present) as well. Of 18 members of the advisory body whose decisions likely receive approval from the CCE and become laws, 6 are public administrators, including governors, and none of the members from universities specialize in education.

10.5.2 Teachers' Union

Unlike countries like Finland where the teachers' union membership ratio is very high (*Sho Gaikoku Kyoin Kyuyo Kenkyu Kai* [Study Group on Teachers' Salaries in Foreign Countries] 2007), in Japan these unions have become less influential over time. At present, the largest teachers' union in the nation is the Japan Teachers Union (*Nikkyoso*, hereafter JTU), which predominantly consists of elementary and junior high school teachers (*Naigai Kyoiku Henshu Bu* [Editorial Office of Naigai Education] 2015). Under the slogan "not sending students to the battlefield again,"



Fig. 10.2 Changes in Japan Teachers Union's membership rates

many teachers have attended JTU meetings and criticized education policies proposed by LDP or MOE (Monbusho) until the beginning of the 1970s (Schoppa 1991). As Fig. 10.2 shows, the JTU's membership ratio has gradually fallen, recently dropping below 25%. In addition, less than 20% of newly appointed teachers join the JTU.

The main reasons for the decline in the unionization rate are that teachers who cannot agree with the union's strong involvement in political activities have withdrawn, while newly appointed teachers have not joined up (Aspinall 2001). JTU is sometimes described as a Japanese red-crowned crane whose head is red and feathers are white, suggesting that gaps between its leadership and ordinal members are large in terms of what the union stands for (Tokuhisa 2012). Policies improving teachers' living conditions through advances in wages contributed to conflicts between members regarding the union's political activities (Hood 2001), creating disruptions in interpersonal relations at worksites. This is believed to have led teachers, who are exposed to such routine tensions at school, to develop negative feelings toward the union.

In addition to the improvement in teachers' living conditions, another major reason for the decline in the JTU's unionization rate that needs to be addressed is that one segment of the organization left and formed another union. Specifically, there were disputes over whether JTU would join Japanese Trade Union Confederation in 1989 (Tokuhisa 2012). As a result, teachers who supported the Japanese Communist Party withdrew from the JTU and formed a new union, the All Japan Teacher and Staff Union (Maruyama 2006). Moreover, it should be noted that the JTU has been involved in political activities as a power base of the Socialist Party of Japan, standing against LDP in the post-war era. However, the Socialist Party of Japan significantly dropped in popularity, particularly in the 1990s (Aspinall 2001). While the union membership ratio was on the decrease, the JTU and the Ministry of Education (Monbusyo, MOE) reconciled in 1995 after decades of severe conflict (Kano 2010). This means that the Ministry of Education no longer has any clear, organized force opposing their policies.

10.6 Conclusion

In the past, there were voluntary learning communities by and for teachers across Japan; some leading teachers initiated study groups where teachers studied together to improve their knowledge and teaching methods (Horio 1994). These practices seem to be vanishing. One of the major reasons is that teachers are overworked. In fact, internationally comparable data on teachers from TALIS (OECD 2014) indicate that Japanese teachers work longer hours and have little time to learn by themselves. This overtime work is derived from demands placed on teachers in Japan (e.g., Kudomi 2008); in addition to preparing lessons, teachers are expected to address a vast range of issues with students, from discipline to emotional concerns. Even though expectations and demands for teachers have seemingly increased over the decades, financial compensation for the overtime work has been kept low. Since a law enacted in 1972, public school teachers receive an additional 4% of their salary for all the after-hours work. Given these circumstances (i.e., low level of rewards for long additional working hours with increasing pressures to deal with every school-related issue), it is understandable that TALIS (OECD 2014) indicates that most teachers in Japan do not read books, participate in social activities, or volunteer in the local area. Furthermore, at present, the in-school training introduced as "lesson study" (Lewis 2002) is not a spontaneous activity on the part of teachers but is implemented at the request of the education committee, along with all the work required at school sites. In addition, school management has undergone structural changes since a report by the CCE in 2005 (Central Council on Education [Chuo Kyoiku Shingi Kai] 2005). Rather than seeking consensus through discussions among teachers at staff meetings, the school principal is expected to demonstrate stronger and more unilateral leadership over school management. With the introduction of teacher evaluation, each teacher is now supposed to meet school goals without much collegial cooperation that was observed before.

While teachers' voluntary, collective learning activities wane, strong political leadership will likely continue to increase government control over teacher education. There is no visible opposition, as such forces have been inhibited by reforms that included a structural power shift, financing changes for universities, and less influence of scholars in policy-making. It should be emphasized that the reforms proposed by Report 184 do not aim to cultivate future teachers who are capable of critical and academic thinking. Instead, they devalue academic knowledge and emphasize practicality so as to ensure that teachers can deal with the mountain of practical issues at school. As some recent studies (Kudomi 2008; Yufu et al. 2010) indicate, college students and newly hired teachers submit to authority. Such teachers, who do not consider themselves as laborers, unconditionally accept long work hours (*Rengo Sogo Seikatsu Kaihatsu Kenkyu Jo* [Japanese Trade Union Confederation Research Institute for the Advancement of Living Standards] 2016). If these conditions persist and reforms do not contribute to the professionalization of teachers (which should be the aim of all teacher education reforms, as observed in other countries), there is a possibility that teachers' social position will be greatly devalued, which will likely inhibit them from dealing with educational problems at school. Ironically, reform attempts could defeat the primary purpose of teacher education reforms.

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Chapter 11
Learning Opportunities Since the Great Earthquake of 2011

Hideki Maruyama

Abstract Japan experienced one of the largest earthquakes and tsunami in March 2011. While its strong social systems, including the school system, recovered to a relatively normal situation soon after the tsunami and nuclear crisis, a number of citizens started to stand up and take action for their own futures more than ever before. This chapter illustrates changes in education in and out of schools after the great earthquake of 2011. Firstly, it briefly describes facts surrounding the event itself and its impact on the education environment in Japan. The following sections focus on preparations for disasters. The necessity of an inclusive approach also arose for those who have different cultural and ethnic backgrounds and those with either physical or mental challenges in the disaster and survival. The chapter also describes disaster education and the participatory role of academic researchers with other citizens. Education researchers are more actively involved in the ongoing recovery process.

11.1 Introduction

In March of 2011, Japan experienced one of the largest earthquakes in recent world history. While its strong social systems, including the school system, recovered to a relatively normal situation soon after the tsunami and nuclear crisis, negative trends such as population decline and decreased accessibility to public resources were accelerated. Citizens were forced to stand up and take action for their own futures more than ever before with education researchers also revisiting the future direction of their studies.

This chapter illustrates changes in education in and out of schools after the great earthquake of 2011. The first section briefly describes facts surrounding the event itself and its impact on the education environment in Japan. The following sections focus on preparedness for any future earthquakes tsunamis and identify three sur-

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A. Yonezawa et al. (eds.), *Japanese Education in a Global Age*, Education in the Asia-Pacific Region: Issues, Concerns and Prospects 46,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-1528-2_11

vival techniques developed by a local elementary school. The chapter explains how children in one school learned lessons from the recent earthquake and implemented an evacuation strategy. The necessity of an inclusive approach also arose for those who have different cultural and ethnic backgrounds and those with either physical and/or mental challenges.

The final section of this chapter describes revised approaches to disaster education and the participatory role of academic researchers with other citizens. The contents of disaster education and preparation among students have changed within the school curriculum, with schools interacting with community members and the academic community more proactively. Education researchers are now more actively involved in the ongoing recovery process, with learning opportunities expanding both dramatically and dynamically among Japanese citizens after the disaster.

11.2 What Happened?

11.2.1 Earthquake, Tsunami, Nuclear Crisis, and Evacuation

With more than 2000 active seismic faults, more than 20% of strong earthquakes (i.e., those having a magnitude (M) larger than 6.0) all over the world occur in or near Japan. Technologies for building and coast levee construction as well as early alarm systems for earthquakes and tsunamis have been developed in Japan for many years (JICE n.d.). For example, smartphone and television automatically turn on for people to receive alerts before the earthquake hits their location. Schools regularly conduct evacuation drills for earthquakes across the country. However, these efforts could have hardly prevented much of the damage in the case of the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami.

The largest earthquake, measuring M 9.0, in the modern history of Japan occurred at 2:46 pm on Friday, March 11, 2011. The earthquake's epicenter was 450 km long from north to south and 200 km wide from east to west in the Pacific Ocean. The initial and primary shaking of the earthquake continued for approximately 3 min, with aftershocks observed 494 times (MEXT 2011: 5)

A 10-m tsunami approached the settled coast of northern Japan after the earthquake, eventually consuming 56 km^2 and taking about 15,000 lives. The tsunami was observed to some extent by all Japanese islands on the Pacific Ocean side (MEXT-Bureau of Science and Technology 2011). When the tsunami retreated, it had accumulated even stronger power to pull destroyed infrastructure, buildings, and materials away to the sea. When people cleaned up the land, almost nothing remained (Fig. 11.1).

The nuclear power plants in Onagawa, Fukushima Daiichi [number one], Fukushima Daini [number two], and Tokai Daini [number two], automatically stopped their nuclear reactors as the shake was noticed. The Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant lost electricity when the 14-m tsunami crashed into its control center an hour after the earthquake. Three of four reactors in the Fukushima Daiichi

Fig. 11.1 Nothing remained after Tsunami: a school campus scene

plant started to melt down, with the accompanying nuclear crisis displacing tens of thousands of people over what proved to be a long-term evacuation. The Japanese government was initially not aware that the meltdown happened but soon declared an emergency and moved all people living within a 20-km radius when learning that high radiation monitoring values were being reported in Fukushima.

The government declared all land within the same 20-km radius from Fukushima Daiichi as a restricted area in April 2011 and appointed various schools as shelters based on the advice of the National Nuclear Security Committee. The radioactive level within this zone was determined to be at the highest level of 7 in the International Nuclear Event Scale. Following the International Commission on Radiological Protection's recommendations, the government also regulated the use of schools and school playgrounds in order to limit students' radiation exposure. Other nuclear power plants near active faults stopped in May 2011, and all 54 nuclear power plants stopped working in Japan until the restart of the Kyushu's Sendai nuclear power plant in August 2015.

As of March 2013, 2 years after the earthquake, 313,329 people continued to live in temporary shelters or other evacuation circumstances. This number had declined to 170,841 as of March 2016, while the nuclear accident left affected areas inaccessible (Reconstruction Agency 2016). The number of schoolchildren in Fukushima that were evacuated was 161,000 in 2012, 154,000 in 2013, and 136,000 in 2014 (Auchi and Maruyama 2015: 129).

No one anticipated this accident and its aftermath; people had trusted that the nuclear power plants were all strong, safe, and environmentally friendly more than carbon dioxide-emitting power generators. The nuclear crisis soon led to widespread volunteerism in the region; official announcements and media coverage initially reported "no immediate effects of radioactivity." Scarce amount of accurate information was shared with the public, leading to the development of citizens' networks in later weeks and months.

11.2.2 Media, Civil Supports, and International Aids

Domestic and international aid flowed into the stricken area. Rescue teams and external aid first reached shelters that the local people had hastily set up. There were, however, also many people who stayed in their homes because their house seemed habitable or a family member could not move due to age or infirmity. It was difficult for volunteers to go to deep into affected areas because of exposure to the high levels of radioactivity that were existent at that time.

Volunteer activities in Japan became considerably more popular following the M 7.3 Hanshin-Awaji Great Earthquake of January 1995. This earthquake hit urban Kobe City, while no tsunami nor nuclear accident followed. The inputs of materials and volunteers were not as widespread for the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake because the damaged area, called Tohoku, was much larger than Kobe and involved other logistical compilations such as geological factors (i.e., mountains) and the risk of exposure to radiation. Disparity in the levels of assistance that could be provided to those areas that could be quickly reached and other, more distant ones soon became evident. As a weakness of the Japanese disaster response efforts, it was pointed out that little attention was paid to particularly vulnerable groups, such as women, seniors, children, and non-Japanese people during the emergency (Ranghirei and Ishiwatari 2014).

After the Kobe earthquake, volunteer groups scrambled to form ad hoc networks with other social, political, and economic groups. Individual volunteers traveled to affected areas on their own accord and, in some cases, even initiated their own relief efforts. In the Tohoku case, however, the volunteer response appears to have been a far more structured and systematized affair (Avenell 2012: 54). The official record of volunteer numbers was the same between the Kobe and Tohoku cases. 1.3 million volunteers became involved in the process of recovery in both the Kobe and Tohoku earthquakes (Cabinet Office Disaster Management Section n.d.).

Although at the time of the Tohoku earthquake the Internet was more useful than in Kobe, traditional media played a certain role, especially among senior citizens in the region while electricity was stopped. People depended on updated information provided by television and radio as aftershocks frequently continued, and rumors about radiation were largely transmitted from person to person without any reliable evidence. People had the fear of long-standing and negative effects of radiation because the Japanese had been exposed to and suffered from radioactivity from the nuclear bombs of Hiroshima and Nagasaki during World War II and the exposure of Japanese fishermen to experimental nuclear fallout in Bikini Atoll in 1954.

Traditional media got a wider audience when many university professors of nuclear science appeared on television programs to explain radiation and measures to counter its negative effects. There was some misinformation about invisible radioactivity, and therefore the people misunderstood that they could wash radioactive food clean with water. Information regarding internal and external radioactive exposure was also mixed in some public media which showed, for example, that the risks of medical X-ray checks or long-distance flights were on par with that of eating radioactive food. Initially, people were simply not sufficiently worried by the nuclear crisis. Similarly, many incidences such as rape in the shelters went unreported, and the media did not show dead bodies on air because of domestic media regulations.

Civil voluntary support, on the other hand, spread across the country thanks to new Internet media and its tools. Social networks such as Twitter and Facebook became direct channels to communicate with one another and share the latest information between damaged areas and the rest of the country. The Internet also allowed people to share information about specific living techniques such as cooking with limited water and served as an accurate source of radiation knowledge.

Civil social networks also connected with international non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The strengths of international NGOs in the Tohoku earthquake and tsunami recovery assistance have already been identified in previous studies as follows: (1) international experiences in emergency response, (2) networks to support the provision of emergency activities at a time of disaster, (3) fundraising capacity to respond to emergency response, and (4) capacity to dispatch staff for longer periods to affected areas (JANIC 2012; Sakurai 2016b: 185). Sakurai also points out the advantages of collaboration between governments and NGOs as the combination of the strong governance of the Japanese education sector and the existence of experienced NGOs in disaster recovery support (Sakurai 2016b: 191).

Coordination is always an issue in the disaster recovery stages. International aid NGOs came from so-called developing countries to assist the Tohoku region. For example, Save the Children Japan dispatched experts and helped schoolchildren both with hardware and software such as setting up the location for their play and assistance with their study. International networks also helped people to change their mindset. There were 163 countries and 43 international organizations that extended help to Japan in the wake of March 2011. Twenty-nine rescue teams and various medical personnel arrived during the 1st week (Samuels 2013: 17). The third United Nations World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction was held in Sendai City, the largest city in Tohoku, on March 14–18, 2015. Through intergovernmental and multi-stakeholder negotiations and debates, the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030 was endorsed and adopted by 187 countries as the conference closed. The forum's objective was to bring together stakeholders and others concerned with disaster education in Japan and elsewhere to share their diverse experiences and lessons learned and to further enhance disaster preparedness in communities through disaster education (Sakurai and Sato 2016: 402).

At the time of the Tohoku earthquake, it soon became apparent that the provision of multi-language and multichannel information had become much more common than in previous years. Many more voluntary interpretation and translation services were available personally or automatically than before. Technologies such as Google Translate changed Japanese characters, shown in the shelter, for example, into different languages. In the meantime, more accurate data about radiation across country became available through foreign online media, and Japanese people could directly receive information in addition to that commonly found on purely domestic channels. This situation made for a good cycle of information flow between Japanese and non-Japanese people. For example, international students were evacuated in March 2011, and universities tried hard to provide information in order to make their families satisfied with their children's safe return to study in Japan. This was not limited to the non-Japanese. There were also issues for those who had invisible challenges such as problems with hearing. When meal packs reached shelters, vocal announcements could not suffice to call people without access to sound. As with conventional media like radio, these people tended to be isolated, leading to severe stress in shelters. However, as was evinced at the time of the Tohoku earthquake, more people tended to pay attention to those who were physically and/or mentally challenged because a more inclusive approach was possible through a combination of both conventional and newer forms of media.

11.3 Recovery of the Education System

11.3.1 Resilience: A Speedy Recovery

The Japanese official fiscal year starts in April and ends in March, with the school year having the same cycle. Mid-March, when the Tohoku earthquake occurred, was the busiest season for school teachers and staff preparing for the student's graduation and documentation for the end of the fiscal year. Schools in the affected areas were therefore expected, as were all other schools in Japan, to start the new academic term from the coming April in 2011 only 20 days after the disaster. Most damaged schools could restart to open from May through efforts made by school teachers and staff.

A total of 6484 school facilities throughout Japan were damaged in the Tohoku earthquake (MEXT 2012c). Of these facilities, 2328 were heavily damaged and applied or planned to apply for a subsidy to undertake post-disaster rehabilitation before March 31, 2013, with recovery having been largely completed at 2148 schools (92%) by that date. By this date, 2308 applications for such assistance had been received, and 2210 (96%) of recovery projects were completed (Aoki 2016: 138). Recovery of educational infrastructure such as school facilities and teacher assignments was almost fully completed within 3 years. This accomplishment was due to the robustness of the existing administrative system supporting education and the dedication and professionalism of teachers. The rapid recovery of school facilities and the smooth assignment of teaching personnel were important factors behind the early resumption of school education in affected areas. Generally, the national and local governments ensure the teacher salaries in Japan. The national government paid to hire additional teachers who were dispatched to provide mental health care for traumatized students. Schools recovered due to the accelerated reinforcement of the national education ministry (MEXT 2014).

The Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) is 1 of 24 ministerial agencies comprising the Central Disaster Management Council. MEXT's initiatives include promoting accident prevention by improving disaster-related education and strengthening the disaster prevention functions of school facilities, promoting emergency disaster control measures, and promoting research and development with respect to disaster prevention and support for disaster recovery. To promote the education reform described in the Basic Act, MEXT formulated the Basic Plan for Promotion of Education in 2008. It also activated the second phase of the Basic Plan from 2013 to 2017. This phase shows four basic directions of education reform: (1) fostering the survival capabilities of children in a diversified and changing society, (2) fostering human resources to lead Japan by creating new values, (3) establishing a safety net of learning opportunities for everyone, and (4) formulating tight-knit and vital community networks. One of the eight missions in the second phase relates to building a safety net of learning opportunities to ensure a safe and secure educational and research environment (Sakurai 2016a: 13–15).

11.3.2 Teacher's Professionalism and Social Expectations

A total of 590 students and 36 teachers died in the damaged Tohoku region of Iwate, Miyagi, and Fukushima (MEXT 2012b). Teachers usually receive strong social expectations and social status in Japan. While some teachers' family members were victims, many applied themselves to their professional positions before attending to their own private priorities. Teachers played a key role in managing shelters while preparing to open schools and lessons as early as possible after April. Due to evacuations forced by the earthquake and the ensuing nuclear crisis, thousands of children found themselves placed in schools different from their original schools. There were 13,744 elementary and 4896 secondary school students in this situation as of May 1, 2012 (Aoki 2016: 143). 47.2% of 335 schools in coastal areas responded that all teachers were involved in operating shelters; approximately 70% of schools reported that the majority of their teachers were operating shelters (MEXT 2012a). These teachers played the role of school staff, community facilitator, and manager of shelters.

Support for students and teachers has become very important. After the disaster, financial support was extended to students by flexibly applying the existing public support system of providing aid to children of low-income families. Private NPOs provided students with academic support such as supplementary lessons and project studies. More importantly, the need for mental health support was also identified and implemented. Thanks to a stronger interest in PTSD after the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake in Kobe, which left over 6400 people dead, this was a starting point for the last 20 years of progress in recent Japanese disaster risk reduction efforts in the education sector (Sakurai and Sato 2016: 407). Major observational studies were conducted after 2011 to monitor children's mental health, revealing that children aged about 6–8 from heavily damaged areas had suffered significant psychological impacts. This motivated MEXT to set up an emergency, limited-time program during the 2011 fiscal year to dispatch school counselors; the program is scheduled to end in fiscal 2020 (Aoki 2016: 145; Kato and Maruyama 2015).

Generally speaking, Japanese teachers are very busy. OECD TALIS (Teaching and Learning International Survey) shows that Japanese teachers are the busiest in the world (OECD 2013). Kambayashi's (2015) analysis of Japanese teacher's conditions showed that working conditions became more severe than pre-disaster times in regard to caring for students and also explained the increasing burden for teachers in the region to work even harder because MEXT updated the curriculum volume about 10% at elementary schools from Arpil 2011 and lower secondary schools from April 2012.

11.3.3 Preparation for the Disaster: The Kamaishi Miracle

How did local schools design and implement drills for disasters? Such efforts might be a waste of time for children who study only for 3–6 years in school. The case of Kamaishi City is one of the best examples to be shared because it tells us that everyday life, especially in a seismically active country such as Japan, should include preparation for an emergency.

Kamaishi City is located in northern Japan, a distance of 4-h by express and local trains from Tokyo. Historically, the city has experienced severe tsunami prior to the 2011 earthquake. In 1896, casualties were counted at 6477 from a total population of 12,665. There were 400 or more in 1933, and several houses were damaged due to a tsunami originating in Chile in 1960. "Evacuation stairs" heading for shelters have been built in public streets in this mountainous city for people to escape from possible tsunami. These experiences led to "infrastructural firsts" such as tsunami barriers or specially designed concrete breakwaters. Disaster education started around 2004 because residents thought existing provisions could hardly be sufficient to save children's lives. Local teachers gathered to develop learning materials, as advised by experts, and conducted evacuation drills. The results of these trials became clear in 2011. Most of 3000 elementary and secondary students survived, a fact which is now referred to as "the Kamaishi miracle."

Kamaishi Elementary School had 184 students when the 2011 earthquake occurred. Most had already gone home as the main M 9.0 earthquake occurred for about 3 min from 2:46 pm on that day. When the tsunami reached the city at 3:21 PM, 35 min after the earthquake hit, it came over the seawall and covered all the city area. The 184 children, however, survived the tsunami by running to higher ground for themselves. Moreover, they remembered the fact that even 50 cm high wave would endanger their lives, and guided other people, including seniors, to safety.

Kamaishi Elementary School teachers set up shelters on campus as did other schools in the affected areas, leading refugees to gymnasiums, providing warm meals and blankets, and started to confirm students' safety throughout the day. The head teacher asked the teachers to check the students' safety on foot and to confirm this by face-to-face communication because in the panic, many rumors abounded. For example, "Another tsunami alert came, and 5-meter tsunami is approaching the neighborhood" or "Stay inside, because high level radiation is coming." In addition, the local newspaper headlined "19 students of Kamaishi Elementary School are missing" and "200 dead bodies found," without evidence. Phone and fax did not work, so that the head teacher went to Morioka, the capital city of Iwate Prefecture, where she explained the situation to the local media. Daily school routines for those days included that teachers sometimes stayed overnight on campus, attended meetings for recovery, brought water for bathrooms, guided local people to meet the refugees, and cleaned up the campus, besides preparing for the new academic year from April (NHK 2015: 100). It was finally confirmed that all the students were safe on the second morning after the tsunami. Eight days after the earthquake, the head teacher decided to start the new school year in mid-April because opening the school would accelerate the return to daily life of the local people and their community, although refugees filled with the gymnasium and classrooms of the school.

There was an opportunity to hold an emergency drill, with formal materials developed by officials just before the main earthquake hit. A M 7.2 earthquake struck on March 9, 2 days prior to the main M 9.0 earthquake of March 11. Students were fortunate to have such an opportunity to practice evacuating from the school, in accordance with teachers' guidance. Teachers emphasized that students ought to run for higher ground and their lives on that day.

The damaged Tohoku area has an expression, "tsunami *tendenko*," meaning "As a tsunami comes, run for yourself first without thinking of family." This could be misleading for some Japanese parents who want to save their children's lives before their own. However, Tohoku parents trust their children without the parents' help for survival because they generally try to talk about how they evacuate and meet in the case of emergency. The children and people were ready to run before the tsunami came.

The teachers used learning materials developed by the local board of education with the assistance of Professor Katada of Gunma University (Kamaishi City Board of Education, Kamaishi City Civil Life Department, & Gunma University 2010). Based on these materials, a 9-year-old girl of Kamaishi Elementary School said, "I remembered 'run to higher ground when a large earthquake hits', which was written on the wall of my classroom," and she also remembered a video scene in which several-feet-high tsunami water suddenly approached and covered all the surrounding area in the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami disaster (NHK 2015: 35–40).

11.4 Changes in Education

11.4.1 Contents of Disaster Education in Schools

Professor Katada of Gunma University points out the risks of our mental frameworks by which we tend to believe severe accidents would rarely hit ourselves that we will not be required to escape even though a security alert warns. He also explains that expert knowledge is of very little use for local people. For example, when one is told to leave their village due to impending risk to their lives, they could prefer choosing to die because they have lived in the village for a long time; their friends and family members have died there anyway. Leaving a familiar environment and building a new life are unattractive to them. Katada nonetheless recommends evacuation and identified a human-centered approach to impending disaster (NHK 2015: 114–115).

Professor Katada became an adviser to Kamaishi City for disaster education and developed the "Kamaishi City Tsunami Disaster Education Guideline" in 2008. Professor Katada and the Kamaishi disaster education team summarized three rules for tsunami evacuation as follows:

1. Do not take the present situational estimate for granted: Japanese local governments have a "hazard map" to show where water may come out, houses may be damaged, mountains broken down, and where local shelters are. Children see this map and seem to enjoy talking about whose house would be safe, or not. The map is made from previous data and simulations, and does not ensure the security of the land and rivers. He explains that we can recognize safety from the risk information on the map.
2. Try your best: Simply that we should concentrate on what we can do best in a certain situation. The most important point of this rule is that we should drill in everyday life by doing something physically, rather than merely imagining disasters.
3. Take an initiative to escape: Run first. The Japanese culture sometimes requires self-sacrifice, and selfishness is one of the most loathed attitudes in the Tohoku region. We have a normalization bias that makes us believe we are alright, even though an alert is sounded. When someone says, "Run!," people start to move together. Thus, Kamaishi students learned to show their figure running away in an emergency case, with other people following (NHK 2015: 128–139).

Other Japanese schools have started the same approach as Kamaishi. They developed local safety map by themselves, including evacuation routes and the practice of escape as students go home from school on normal days. When they push seniors' wheelchairs, for example, they physically experience the steep slopes in the street, which they would have otherwise never known in daily life.

In contrast to Fukushima Prefecture, which was devastated by the nuclear disaster, Miyagi and Iwate Prefectures have made changes to academic content and school activities on their own. "Iwate Prefecture has developed a program ... to foster local pride and to nurture individuals to support Iwate's recovery and development. Miyagi Prefecture created a starter pack for disaster prevention education... all teachers in charge of disaster prevention can use it immediately. Fukushima Prefecture, meanwhile, has not created any reconstruction education package, and no emphasis has been placed on creating education content for disaster prevention (Aoki 2016: 146)."

The nuclear crisis affects school management and lets teachers and NGOs develop learning materials to prepare for radiation. For example, the institute of Japanese Teachers' Union (2013) published a child-friendly book about radiation, written in simple Japanese, showing students how to avoid radioactive hotspots such as ditches in the street and what to avoid for meals.

11.4.2 Disaster Education in Daily Life

The core message in disaster education is that we should all recognize a social manner by which we believe evacuation to save our own lives and protection of beautiful nature in Kamaishi are something common, but we should not be threaten by disaster. The Sendai Declaration by UNISDR (United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction) emphasizes that disaster preparedness be made a part of daily life. The goal of disaster education is defined as capacity building among individuals based on the concept of the “three helps”: self-help, mutual help, and public help – an idea that became popular in Japan after the 1995 Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake (Sakurai and Sato 2016: 407).

Tohoku’s “tsunami *tendenko*” is used in many areas. Figure 11.2 shows a multilingual notice at a streetcar station in the street where local people can read the explanation about how people should think about evacuation when their families are not together.

For daily practice and meaningful engagements by lifelong learners or citizens, nonformal education settings are always very important (Maruyama and Ohta 2013; Maruyama and Sogel 2015; Sakurai and Sato 2016). Neither formalized practice nor authority ensures the people’s security and sound decisions in emergency cases. There is no formal structure or hierarchy, but there is a great deal of informal organizing, with all decisions arrived at through consensus; anyone may participate, and volunteer groups perform all tasks (Solnit 2009: 296).

In addition, formal and public approaches are important for general information leading to a safe environment. Local governments in Japan have started to set each area’s hazard maps in their streets. The northern island of Hokkaido was also sub-

Fig. 11.2 Localized Tsunami *Tendenko* notice in Hakodate, Hokkaido (10/9/2016)

Fig. 11.3 Tsunami hazard map in Hakodate, Hokkaido (10/9/2016)

ject to the tsunami of 2011, leading to the updating of hazard maps in a central point of the city (Fig. 11.3).

11.4.3 Learning Opportunities for Citizens

Education researchers have visited the damaged region of Tohoku and participated in demonstrations with other citizens against the restart of nuclear power plants. They also have used social networking sites to share the information and analyses on the situation. This series of movements could prove most educational for Japanese youth.

The remarkable changes in Japanese society were that citizens started to voice and to build their network with a certain common purpose after disasters. Civil society and volunteerism have been materialized for some time in Japan, and Japanese people have the image of volunteerism as something ordinary people could easily participate in since the Kobe earthquake (Avenell 2012). Japanese society has created a base of volunteering after that earthquake, and the Law to Promote Specified Nonprofit Activities, or so-called NPO Law of 1998, supports such volunteer activities.

Volunteer activities require the active involvement of the people. It is still difficult for some people in the damaged areas to take initiatives by themselves because they are in the process of recover, and Samuels (2013) points out that the people of Tohoku, the affected northern region, have a patient and persevering nature (*gaman tsuyoi*) and embody what it means to be Japanese. However, he also explains the word *kizuna*, meaning "bond" among people, as a metaphor for social solidarity in disaster and emergency. He also leaves the lesson that Japan learned as a paradox, because the system could recover to the same levels as those prior to the 3.11 Disaster. The direction of recovery is not always toward a renaissance; people's mutual aid and sense of giving were shared among the Japanese people across the country. This is what Solnit (2009) illustrates as a paradise. Certain types of positive emotions arise in unpromising circumstances, demonstrating that social ties and meaningful work are deeply desired.

Parents from Fukushima approached the Japanese central government's buildings to request an organized evacuation in order to protect their children from radiation. When this was shown in the media, the people in Tokyo also became vocal in front of the national parliament. This demonstration enlarged people's involvement, and ordinary people started to gather to speak up in central Tokyo every Friday evening. Many liberal intellectuals and academics also came to join the movement. Prior to the earthquake and tsunami, the antinuclear movement in Japan was relatively peripheral, but as the deeply engrained notion of nuclear power as "safe" unraveled, the diffuse fear of and opposition to nuclear energy increased exponentially. The urgency felt around the nuclear situation in particular provoked spontaneous mobilization in new and constantly changing networks configurations. The thousands marching against nuclear power in Tokyo on April 10, June 7, and July 11 should therefore be seen not only as a result of mobilization through already existing networks but also as driven by a myriad of micro-interactions of the sort described above (Slater et al. 2012: 107).

Informal networks also appeared and provided many channels to share information besides official data. People started to judge that the electric company did not provide accurate values of radiation in the streets, and they used compact but good quality Geiger counter devices. They have shared the values and exchanged information online (Fig. 11.4). Civil society groups as well as scholars now are active in creating a shadow-monitoring grid of radiation levels. Before March 11, 2011, however, civil society groups were not as successful in preventing problems in nuclear policy or the nuclear industry (Kawato et al. 2012: 81). This is a learning process for the Japanese people who have tended to think school was the only source of education. When we talk of social change, we talk of movements, a word that suggests vast groups of people walking together, leaving behind one way and traveling toward another. But what exists among people is not just movement but also a "settling in" together that is the beginning of community (Solnit 2009: 286).

11.5 Conclusion

The Cabinet Office of Japanese Government divides "recovery" into two types: One is "restoration to the original state," meaning restoring to pre-disaster functions and "upgraded restoration" for improving facilities to better withstand future disasters. The other is "reconstruction" measures to better offer a safe living environment and qualitative improvements in the industrial structure and regional revitalization

Fig. 11.4 Facebook group for radiation measurement and information

(Cabinet Office Disaster Management Section 2010). The school education system in the Tohoku area recovered very quickly due to strong structure of the Japan's school system. Did the remaining areas or the whole of Japan reconstruct the school education? Many schools introduced more practical evacuation drills for disaster and developed hazard maps with local communities.

The role of education researchers has also changed after the disasters. More academics have visited as volunteers for recovery and opened dialogues to share their analyses on education and society. The relationship between society and education has become a common topic to discuss, especially in the field of structural issues such as the poverty of children and equity of education. The citizens' learning process is another focus of education research because demonstrations against government were not common till now. Information about education on social networks is easily shared beyond the different age groups in and out of Japan. The sociology of education research in Japan would do well to focus more on this wide range of learning processes in the future.

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Chapter 12
(Column 1) New Pathways to Economic Participation? Youth, Labour Policy and Entrepreneurship in Japan

Tuukka Toivonen and Agata Kapturkiewicz

Abstract This column discusses two new pathways to economic participation by youth in Japan that run through youth employment support services and startup communities. These emerging pathways provide alternative possibilities for youth who are navigating changing employment landscapes and opportunity structures in an era when smooth transitions to permanent employment have become complex. The "new" pathways to economic participation described are juxtaposed with a critical analysis of policy efforts to "bring youth back to work" and the blind spots of relevant policies. The column highlights the importance of *endorsing several alternative routes to economic participation and personal success* (rather than trying to fit everyone into one template of lifetime employment) and points to new research opportunities in following and tracing diverse youth, in a longitudinal fashion, as they explore original pathways through changing landscapes and opportunity structures.

12.1 Introduction

After an era of remarkably smooth transitions to permanent employment, Japanese young people's paths to economic participation grew significantly more complex at the start of the 2000s. In the more fluid, post-industrial labour markets of the globalized era, not only did a subset of youth find itself in continued temporary work as "freeters" but also an increasing number fell outside paid employment altogether as so-called NEETs (not in education, employment or training). Japan's modern youth activation policies took shape in the mid-2000s very much as a reaction to this

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A. Yonezawa et al. (eds.), *Japanese Education in a Global Age*, Education in the Asia-Pacific Region: Issues, Concerns and Prospects 46,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-1528-2_12

"anomaly" of youth temping and joblessness, with policymakers combining forces with social innovators to identify new ways to get young adults "back to work". While not unproblematic, these efforts generated some promising measures, such as the Youth Support Stations (YSSs) that remain active at present. By responding to each young user in a comprehensive manner and without trying to fit everyone into the same template of success, the YSSs have opened up new paths and possibilities for thousands of youths (Toivonen 2013).

Alongside the economic and social challenges that prompted the above policy responses, Japan has also witnessed a new wave of entrepreneurial activity since the late 1990s and early 2000s. This has been exemplified by a proliferation of start-ups – new companies that are predominantly growth-oriented and focused on information technology (IT), many of which cluster around the Shibuya ward of Tokyo. Although hit by a number of crises throughout the 2000s, the new ventures and communities around them have experienced increased activity and development in recent years (Kapturkiewicz 2016). Consequently, as more young adults are pulled into their orbit, new routes into legitimate economic activity are emerging outside the (gradually eroding) lifetime employment system of large organizations.

Drawing on empirical research conducted by the authors and a review of relevant state policies, this column revisits the past 15 years and reflects on youth's[1] changing pathways into economic participation in Japanese society. It looks into what alternative paths to work have emerged of the many efforts made by "youth supporters" (*wakamono shiensha*) at the intersection of labour market policy, the social sector and educational institutions. It also examines the alternatives provided by the recent rise of startup entrepreneurship, which also interacts with the domain of education on multiple levels. Finally, this column highlights potent avenues for future research.

12.2 New Pathway I: Government-Backed Youth Support

Japan's policy responses to new problems and transformations within youth employment emerged in the mid-2000s from the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (MHLW), the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) and the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports (MEXT). The symbolic and technical category of NEETs served as a focal target for new activation responses that took shape in this period (Toivonen 2013). Enacting this category made it possible to mobilize substantial government resources, though not without important pitfalls. Notably, the public discourse surrounding NEETs, as well as the very idea that problematic youth required "independence support", had certain stigmatizing connotations. Also, many of the analyses of NEETs portrayed individual-level deficiencies of young people as the main cause of non-employment, often neglecting the role of

[1] It is important to note that the "youth" in Japan comprise a diverse group, including various ethnic minorities and immigrant segments, including those migrating to Japan to enrol at university (see for example Chap. 9 of this volume).

social structural factors. Hence, many young adults did not want to be identified as NEETs and felt discouraged from using the new support services, even though many of the services themselves were innovative, non-judgmental and provided genuinely helpful (if not always sufficient) support towards navigating complex economic and social realities.

The Youth Support Station (*Wakamono Sapooto Suteeshon*) is without doubt one of the most remarkable new support services created in the mid-2000s. This programme – a one-stop counselling service inspired by both domestic and international examples – opened up a new space for processing complex, interwoven problems among youth (problems that were impinging on their economic participation) and developed alternative, typically local, pathways into work with "understanding" employees. The YSSs focused on "exploring the user" (approaching each young person's needs in a comprehensive and nuanced way) in the context of "communities of recognition" (which help to restore the self-esteem of stigmatized youth; note that the contemporaneous Youth Independence Camps placed comparatively more emphasis on this latter dimension (Toivonen 2013)). Introducing multiple evaluative criteria for success, as well as developing strong relationships with local, national and even international collaborators, constitutes another key feature of the YSSs.

These novel, emergent patterns of flexible, nuanced youth support have remained largely hidden behind official statistics and labour market white papers. They are difficult to appreciate without empirical research capable of detailed description and fresh theorizations of what is happening on the ground. Nevertheless, quite positively, the government does recognize that the YSSs is a popular service providing good value for users, and indeed this programme still continues to survive and grow 10 years after its birth.[2]

Another different but not unrelated recent policy change that stands out is the 2011 law that stipulates that young graduates should be treated as new graduates (*shin-sotsu*) for up to 3 years after graduation. This measure is important because Japan has a system where the job hunting process for full-time employment in a mainstream company (conventionally the most desirable career pathway) is particularly rigid and unhospitable to those who do not secure a job offer while students. Matching job seekers with small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and encouraging SMEs to employ and train young people are another intervention discussed in a number of MHLW documents. Although working for SMEs is still often considered a less desirable option than entering a big company,[3] it is clearly perceived as better than non-regular employment. This stance is embodied by various support measures aiming to shift casual employees into regular employment, such as Job Cafés, Hello Work centres and trial employment programs.

[2] See recent MHLW white papers (MHLW 2007–2015). In 2008, there was a declared increase from 50 to 75 stations, in 2010 from 92 to 100 and in 2011 from 100 to 110; from 2012 to 2015, there was the same pledge to increase the number of YSSs from 110 to 115/116.

[3] See a note in "Employment Measures for Young People" (MHLW 2014), which states that although the job openings-to-applicants ratio is better for SMEs, it is the large companies that have a growing popularity among job-seeking students.

It is clear that, regardless of the above changes, the normative ideal that most government interventions have upheld is that of a young university graduate who enters a regular full-time position in a large company. This seeming inability of youth labour policy to see beyond the salaryman career is increasingly problematic. It overlooks great variations in individual circumstances, work patterns and preferences. For instance, it scarcely takes into account youth engaged in high-skill freelance jobs, young mothers working part-time or entrepreneurial careers. Such an approach belies the limits (and potential outdatedness) of the very term "labour policy" – it has failed to keep up with the diversification of paths to work and the fragmentation of institutions. For this reason, the present column gives preference to the term *economic participation* as a more inclusive term capable of both expanding our views (to take in new trends) and bringing attention back to the essential issue at stake: participation in the economy, rather than entry into an employment relationship. Although the centrality of belonging to a corporate community in the context of lifelong employment in postwar Japan has to be recognised, it is equally important to notice that it is just one possible pathway to participation. Meaningful participation in the economy can be achieved in a number of different ways, for instance, through entrepreneurship.

Surprisingly, the theme of entrepreneurship seems to be absent from MHLW documents concerning youth, indicating that youth labour policy and entrepreneurship have, to a large extent, been kept in their separate silos (however, the YSSs feature in MEXT reports discussing entrepreneurship). As entrepreneurship provides an increasingly important pathway to economic participation and a potent alternative to mainstream company employment, it is to this topic that we now turn.

12.3 New Pathway II: A New Wave of Entrepreneurship

Making a living by establishing one's own company is not strictly speaking a "new" path for Japanese youth. Indeed, Japan has historically had a very large population of small firms, though these have been typically portrayed in a less favourable light than big companies and sometimes have even been referred to as a "problem" (Whittaker 1997). In more recent years, however, substantial hopes for boosting economic growth or solving youth unemployment have become pinned on fostering growth-oriented, innovative ventures of a new type (many of which take inspiration from successful IT companies of the Silicon Valley innovation cluster), and the current "small firms problem" is that there is not enough of them (ibid.). Policymakers and the government are trying to devise different measures to remedy this situation. For instance, METI has introduced new subsidies and loans for SMEs, a number of which are explicitly targeting youth. Prime Minister Abe has also paid attention to entrepreneurship as part of his "third arrow" of Abenomics, which aims to tackle structural problems of the Japanese economy, including the limited participation of women.

Interestingly, Abe's "third arrow" is in fact often criticized for trying to attend to too many problem areas at once. Setting aside the performance of this specific policy, tackling diverse problem areas in an interrelated manner could be potentially very fruitful from a youth (and youth pathways) perspective. For example, Womenomics, youth activation and IT startup support could well be brought together with measures supporting young mothers, some of whom wish to launch new companies while taking care of small children at home. Following a similar logic, it seems counterproductive that youth labour policies related to the NEETs category have focused so narrowly on getting "deviant" young people into employment. Such an approach overlooks the fact that so-called NEETs, freeters and *hikikomori* (individuals who cannot or do not leave their homes) could pursue many pathways, including entrepreneurship. One example here is the (unusual but not unique) case of the successful young Internet entrepreneur Kazuma Ieiri who recently wrote an autobiographical book discussing how his former life as *hikikomori* led him to establish his own company (Ieiri 2012).

One of the key strengths of the "new wave" of entrepreneurship lies in the internal diversity of this field and in the variety of potential pathways available within it. It provides a number of alternative routes to economic participation, including the option of becoming an entrepreneur, an employee of a new startup, a member of an investment fund or a freelancer, among other routes. The lines between these roles are often blurred, as people keep shifting between them. Moreover, participants in Japan's rising entrepreneurship scene are not limited to only high-growth IT startups, even if many role models of the movement would seem to fit this mould (most visible examples include the founder of the e-commerce empire Rakuten, Hiroshi Mikitani, and the founder of the gaming giant GREE, Yoshikazu Tanaka). In fact, there is a wide panoply of "players" who associate themselves with the notion of startup entrepreneurship and startup communities, including mission-driven ventures aiming to solve social problems, big companies interested in partnering with startups, communities bringing together IT entrepreneurs with people from the creative industries, various types of investors and others (Kapturkiewicz 2016).

The upshot is that, due to the "new wave" of entrepreneurship, various alternative routes into economic participation are becoming both attractive and viable from the perspective of many youth in Japan. This is a result of overall improvement in the conditions for entrepreneurship in Japan, including growing infrastructure and recently established startup communities. To give a few examples, many new startup events provide networking opportunities; communities centred on investors increase the quality of participating ventures; and new organizational forms such as accelerators, incubators and co-working spaces are proliferating. Also, it is becoming easier for startups to access labour and financial markets (Sako and Kotosaka 2012; Kapturkiewicz 2016), and engaging in entrepreneurship or working in/with entrepreneurial startups is becoming more recognized socially (for instance, a number of established startup companies are now becoming perceived as "mainstream", which results in parental generations being less resistant to their children seeking employment in those companies). The "new wave" of entrepreneurship is also heavily youth-oriented, with incubators and other organizations striving to attract young talented entrepreneurs, as well as readily involving and employing students. In fact, some of our own recent informants have even noted a degree of age discrimination against older people within startup communities. Still, securing a large company job remains a default choice for the majority of young adults, even for many ostensibly entrepreneurial students. A vivid illustration of this was provided by an interviewee who mentioned that the entrepreneurship course taught by him at a university mainly attracted students who wanted to boost their CVs ahead of applying to big companies (ibid.).

It is difficult to produce a definite answer to the question of whether entrepreneurship, or entrepreneurial work, is displacing stable employment as a normative ideal among a substantial segment of Japanese young people. Instead, the myriad connections between different routes to economic participation – some more mainstream and recognized than others (and all with a degree of internal diversity) – remind us that the story of economic participation by youth is not necessarily a case of "either-or" or "old versus new". Rather, it presents *a new intermingling of opportunities* that, taken together, amount to a growing range of possible pathways. Actual, realized pathways can be quite complex and varied, and thus future research would do well to trace these across different fields rather than in separate silos. Specifically, instead of looking only at "jobless youth", "youth in entrepreneurship" or "youth working for consulting companies", in-depth analyses should *follow* youth as they build personal pathways through emerging opportunity structures. Some of the individual pathways forged by young people will, needless to say, incorporate relationships and experiences beyond the boundaries of Japan.

12.4 Conclusion

Two notable new pathways to economic participation by youth were discussed in this column: alternative youth support services and entrepreneurship supported by startup communities. These provide new possibilities for youth who navigate changing social and economic landscapes and opportunity structures. It is important to remember that transitions can often quite seamlessly take place between "old" and "new" opportunities, so we are not necessarily dealing with a case of "either-or". Recognizing this point has implications for both policymaking and for future academic studies concerning the economic participation of youth.

In terms of policymaking, there are many issues and pathways that are currently under the radar of policies and dominant institutions. As the lines between different types of economic participation are often blurred, and young people's biographies are often complex, policies designed by separate ministries can easily develop "blind spots". This creates a danger of failing those who fall between the cracks of the existing system, institutions and policy measures. For instance, in the MHLW's youth labour policies, full-time employment at a mainstream company is still upheld as the ideal path. In order to serve better those who could benefit from the support, various state-led policymaking bodies should recognize that "social norms and policies [can be] reformed to value diverse ways of living and working" (Toivonen 2013: 174). This approach can already be found in the organizations situated at the forefront of new pathways to economic participation. Within government-backed youth support, the example of YSSs shows that positive outcomes have been achieved by celebrating the various individual accomplishments of their members and by endorsing several alternative routes to personal success (rather than trying to fit everyone into the one template of success).

In the sphere of entrepreneurship, many startup communities also celebrate and encourage pathways quite different from the "ideal path" conceptualized in youth employment support. For instance, a success story might involve quitting one's stable employment in a large company in order to establish a new venture, followed by selling off the venture and then launching a new one or by becoming an investor to other entrepreneurs. Also, it is worth mentioning that pathways chosen by participants of the "new wave" of entrepreneurship might be sometimes more than just routes to economic participation and could even constitute whole alternative lifestyles. One such example is provided by a community in Tokyo, which combines a shared house with a shared office so that a number of startup entrepreneurs and employees can live and work in the same place (slightly outside of the very centre of the city), without the need of commuting and within a "village-like community" (Kapturkiewicz 2016).

To increase the volume of academic studies that can inform practical solutions in the future, it would be fruitful to *follow and trace diverse youth in a longitudinal fashion* as they develop pathways across changing landscapes and opportunity structures and to appreciate both the new difficulties and opportunities they face. Such research promises to shed light not only on the issue of economic participation but also on the future direction of educational programmes that wish to better prepare young people for active engagement in the economy. Further longitudinal research may find that youth pathways are increasingly mediated not only by credentials but also by personal networks, agility, multidisciplinary knowledge, the ability to learn quickly and the clarity of one's values, priorities and personal missions. It is important for future research to also observe how youths themselves – in spite of the great weight of conventional institutions – may be shaping qualitatively new paths into economic participation and not just finding their way into pre-existing categories defined by academics, policymakers or bureaucrats. While beyond the scope of this short column, it is intriguing to muse that the next true paradigm shift in "labour policy" may arrive when educational institutions, companies and the government join forces with diverse youth to collaboratively explore and design alternative pathways into economic participation, doing far more than is being done at present to align policy with emerging challenges and possibilities.

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Part III
How Does Japan's Sociology of Education Go Beyond the National Boundary?

Chapter 13
The Internationalization of Japanese Higher Education: Incremental Change in a Dynamic Global Environment

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Abstract It is noteworthy that "internationalization" has not been treated systematically in the sociology of education literature in Japan. It has been largely dealt with by researchers working in comparative and international education. This being the case, this chapter explores the rhetoric and practice of internationalization in higher education in Japan paying attention to power dynamics and inequities. Drawing on research, official documentation and policy statements on the one hand, and situated practice as the director of one undergraduate English-taught program (ETP) and international faculty member on the other, the author seeks to explore internationalization policy and practice in the context of leading universities in Japan. This exploration will demonstrate that on the basis of a number of indicators, quantitative and qualitative, these leading institutions are becoming internationalized. Yet, with a number of Asian countries more aggressive in the global ratings game, Japanese HEIs are falling behind on a key indicator of world-class status. At the same time, the top-down nature of the dynamic for change and neoliberal evaluative processes that require numerical target-setting undermine loftier goals of embracing diversity. We will conclude that internationalization is happening but at a slow pace in a highly dynamic global environment.

13.1 Introduction

Developments in the late twentieth and early twenty-first century have led to wide-ranging transformations in higher education (HE) with rapid diversification and differentiation of all arenas (David and Naidoo 2013). Student advancement rates have grown exponentially along with high levels of global mobility. At the same time, there has been a dramatic expansion of program providers, funding pathways, and regulatory frameworks as neoliberal agendas have opened up the academy to global

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A. Yonezawa et al. (eds.), *Japanese Education in a Global Age*, Education in the Asia-Pacific Region: Issues, Concerns and Prospects 46,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-1528-2_13

competition. The emergence of the terms transnational education (TNE) and cross-border education (CBE) indicates the fluidity and dynamism of the current situation. It is not just students on the move, but programs, pedagogies, agendas, program providers, administrators, and instructors as well (Knight 2014).

In the context of the so-called knowledge economy, leading research universities around the world are now tasked with being drivers of knowledge innovation and creating human resources capable of pushing forward economic development and competitiveness in their countries. This is even impacting public universities that previously kept some distance from economic imperatives. Competition for students and research funding is taking place not only at national (local) levels but also at regional and global levels as well. Japan is not exempt from this trend, and increasingly its universities are expected to produce human resources who can support the Japanese economy in the context of global competition.

In the context of this global competition, internationalization has become a key part of the mission of many leading higher education institutions (HEIs) worldwide (David and Naidoo 2013). Leading institutions around the world are competing for students, research funding, and status. In this context, global rankings have emerged as salient and are shaping national government policy and institutional agendas in often profound ways. The English language plays a key part in this competition, and some would argue a colonizing role, in this process as a measure of internationalization and global status. In Asia as well as Europe and the Arab Gulf, the spread of English as a medium of instruction (EMI) in HEIs is notable. At the same time, the impact of citation indexing, which is heavily biased toward the English language and the Anglophone countries, is now pervasive. The growing importance of the English language in competition between HAEIs has raised concerns about global convergence and the loss of linguistic-cultural diversity (Findlow 2013; Ishikawa 2014).

It is noteworthy that "internationalization" has not been treated systematically as a key topic in the sociology of education in Japan. Instead, it has been largely dealt with by researchers working in comparative and international education. Given this situation, this chapter explores the rhetoric and practice of internationalization in higher education in Japan drawing attention to power dynamics and inequities. Drawing on research, official documentation and policy statements on the one hand, and situated practice as the director of one undergraduate English-taught program (ETP) and international faculty member on the other, I seek to explore internationalization policy and practice in the context of leading universities in Japan. I will argue that on the basis of a number of indicators, quantitative and qualitative, these leading institutions are becoming more international. Nevertheless, the top-down nature of the dynamic for change and neoliberal evaluative processes that require numerical target-setting means that results on the ground are often patchy. At the same time, there are a number of Asian countries that are more aggressive in their internationalization policy than Japan, meaning that in the global catch-up game, Japanese HEIs are finding themselves falling behind. I will conclude that internationalization is happening, but at a slow pace in a highly dynamic global environment.

13.2 Setting the Scene

Even without internationalization, the Japanese HE sector is characterized by considerable diversity both in terms of types of institution and programs being offered. There are not only universities offering undergraduate and oftentimes postgraduate degree programs but also junior colleges offering 2-year associate degree programs as well as colleges of technology, or *kōsen*, special vocational training colleges offering “high-level vocational qualifications” (Newby et al. 2009, 11). These HEIs may be funded by the state, local municipalities, or private foundations (Ishida 2007; Newby et al. 2009; Yamamoto 2017a).

It is well documented that Japan has transitioned from an elite to a universal stage of upper secondary and higher education (Ishikawa 2009; Kariya 2013). Over 98% of the age cohort are now advancing on to some kind of upper secondary education, 80% are going on to some form of HE, and over 54% are going on to a university or junior college (MEXT 2016a, Tables 4 and 30). We can trace the shift from elite to universal upper secondary education back to the 1970s and the change in higher education to the 1990s. While access may be universal, the system is still highly stratified and hierarchical in nature.

Regardless of the high ratio of young people continuing on beyond compulsory education, equality of access to elite institutions at both high school and university levels remains an issue. As with national systems in many other countries, highly selective research universities and some elite teaching universities exist in hierarchical relationships of power alongside a range of HEIs in intermediate and lower positions, which have their own hierarchies. All HEIs are competing for student numbers, revenue, and market share at their respective levels.

This hierarchical relationship serves a highly differentiated employment market, where recruiting for the much-sort-after positions in big-named companies occurs directly from the elite status universities. This recruitment is highly gendered as is entry to elite institutions. This bias is in favor of men. Further down, this system is supported by a hierarchical high school system where elite schools feed indirectly into the top-ranked universities. This process is aptly summarized by Kaori Okano (2000):

> Schools located at different ranks in the hierarchy provide distinctive life chances for their students after graduation. Graduates from the lower ranked schools commonly enter the work force directly and settle on the lower mass strata of the occupational hierarchy.
> The high school hierarchy also reflects the students’ family backgrounds. Students of the top ranking schools tend to have well-resourced families.’ (p 548).

The Japanese “super-league” (Marginson 2013) is largely made up of seven of the nine former Imperial Universities (today they are National University Corporations, NUCs), and they enjoy considerable prestige in Japanese society. The remaining two Imperial Universities, established under the period of Japanese colonization, were renamed and reformed as the prestigious Seoul National University and National Taiwan University in the postcolonial period and now compete with Japan’s top universities in the world rankings. In addition to the seven former

Imperial Universities, other NUCs generally fill out the Japanese super-league, including Tokyo Institute of Technology and University of Tsukuba. A small number of prestigious private universities also fit comfortably into the Japanese super-league, namely, Keio University and Waseda University.

The reality today is that while competition for university entrance remains fierce at the top of the system, many of the lower and increasingly intermediate level universities are not able to fill quotas. Due to demographic trends and the overexpansion of universities in the 1990s, Japan has entered what is called the full-admission era (*zennyu jidai*) where there is a place for every student wanting to continue on to HE. Internationalization of education serves different functions and finds expression in different ways depending where institutions fit within the educational league tables (Goodman 2007). For elite universities, internationalization is linked to global rankings, research prowess, and attracting the most able students to stimulate the campus environment. Outside the Japanese super-league, internationalization is mostly about survival. International students fill the seats that are no longer being taken by Japanese students. International students are keeping many of these universities in business.

13.3 *Kokusaika* or Internationalization as Strategy Targeting Education

Internationally, a widely accepted definition of internationalization in education is Jane Knight's, where:

> Internationalization at the national, sector, and institutional levels is defined as the process of integrating an international, intercultural, or global dimension into the purpose, functions or delivery of postsecondary education. (Knight 2003, 2)

Knight distinguishes between policies and practices that target "internationalization abroad" and those that seek "internationalization at home." The former was initially conceived as the process by which HEIs send students and faculty overseas to become "internationalized," but recently it also includes TNE where HEIs export their educational services to students in a third country. Education at home has been typified as home generated where the home campus environment becomes the object of change. Here, not just students but pedagogy, curricula, and the delivery of services all emerge as targets of internationalization (Knight 2004). We could, therefore, typify "internationalization abroad" as somewhat exclusive, targeting those students and faculty who are *able* to be mobile. Economic and other forms of capital, as well as disciplinary and degree categories will influence this. Internationalization at home, however, is potentially more inclusive in its mission targets the wider campus.

13.3.1 Internationalization as an Idea in Japanese Higher Education

Use of the word international (*kokusai*) and the rhetoric of internationalization (*kokusaika*) are now commonplace in the field of education in Japan. The understood meanings these words evoke and the practices they occasion are multiple and mutable. A significant body of research attests to the importance of and shifts in internationalization rhetoric and strategy within national and institutional educational policy in Japan over the past 25 years (Goodman 2007; Hashimoto 2013; Horie 2002).

From the earliest articulations of *kokusaika*, education and educational institutions became both targets and desired propagators. The term started to be used frequently in the context of higher education policy from the 1980s (Goodman 2007). Goodman notes the multivocality of the term where the concept of *kokusaika* has been used "instrumentally by a large number of actors in Japanese higher education in very different ways" (Goodman 2007, 85). As such, the same word "can carry many meanings" in complex organizations such as universities. This allows for flexibility (Goodman 2007, 85) and for localization of policy at the *genba* or level of practice.

A key characteristic of internationalization policy in Japan is that it has been top-down and primarily focused on quantitative targets (Horie 2002; Kuwamura 2009; Yonezawa et al. 2009) and mainly about inbound and outbound student numbers (Ninomiya et al. 2009; Lassegard 2006). As early as 1983, the Japanese government set as a target receiving 100,000 international students annually by 2000 – the so-called 100,000 International Student Plan. This goal was reached in 2003 and largely by attracting students from neighboring Asian countries, who came with reasonably high levels of Japanese language proficiency. An expansion of short-term exchange programs delivered in English also helped Japan meet the 100,000 international student target (Lassegard 2006).

In 2008, the government set a more ambitious numerical target of receiving 300,000 international students annually by 2020 – the so-called 300,000 International Student Plan. The following year, 2009, the Project for Establishing University Network (sic) for Internationalization, or the Global 30 Project as it came to be known, was announced as a way of realizing the goal of receiving 300,000 international students per year. The leading NUCs were strongly encouraged to bid for funding that aimed to promote internationalization through the development of ETPs at both the undergraduate and postgraduate levels.

In most cases, the introduction of undergraduate programs in English had not previously been a part of the universities' mission, It was expected that by offering degree programs in English, Japan could attract some of the world's "brightest," globally mobile students and would be able to provide a more international environment for Japanese students. Thus, the intentions were linked to competing globally for talent and reinforcing elite status nationally as well as internationally.

Table 13.1 offers a summary overview of some key internationalization policies impacting universities in Japan. This demonstrates a move away from what has been

Table 13.1 Summary of key internationalization initiatives targeting universities in Japan

Year	Policies and initiatives to promote internationalization	Main aims
1945	Sending Japanese students to the USA and Asian countries	For Japanese students to better understand democracy and subsequently make a contribution to the reconstruction of Japan and mutual understanding with other countries
1952–1957	Setting up a Japanese Government Scholarship Program for international students from Asia; system for international students to study established; the Japan Foundation for Intercultural Exchange was established	To build better relationships with Asian countries and as compensation for wartime damage
1985–2000	Plan to receive 100,000 international students annually by 2000	To increase the number of international students to 100,000 and improve university infrastructure to accommodate more international students
2008~	Plan to receive 300,000 high-quality international students by 2020	To increase the number of international students to 300,000 and make Japan an "open country" and attract high-quality students
		To reexamine the admission systems, support systems, academic environment, and potential career support for international students to work in Japan
2009–2013	Project for Establishing Core Universities for Internationalization (Global 30)	Part of the 300,000 International Student plan. Aim to establish an environment where International and Japanese students can learn from one another and establish long-lasting international bonds that will propel the latter into the international scene. Involved the creation of English-taught degree programs, hiring of more foreign faculty, and the creation of an admissions structure for students without Japanese proficiency
	13 universities selected	
2012–2015	Project for Promotion of Global Human Resource Development (Global 30 Plus)	To overcome the Japanese younger generation's "inward tendency" and to foster human resources who can positively meet the challenges and succeed in the global field, as the basis for improving Japan's global competitiveness and enhancing the ties between nations. Key strategy to promote the fostering of global human resources by promoting study abroad and creating at-home international learning environments
	42 universities selected for the University-wide Type (11) and Faculty/school-Specific Type (31) funding	
2014–2023	Top Global University Project	To enhance the international compatibility and competitiveness of Japanese HE. The aim is to "thoroughly internationalize Japanese universities by establishing linkages between them and top-flight overseas universities and advancing university reforms" (MEXT 2014)
	37 universities selected as either Top Type (13) or Global Traction Type (24)	

described as “traditional internationalization” (*dentō tekina kokusaika*), where the emphasis was on international cooperation and enhancing international trade through soft power, to “internationalization within” (*uchinaru kokusaika*) where the focus is on fostering Japanese who can function as global *jinzai* (human resources) to enhance the competitiveness of Japan (see METI 2016). This categorical distinction is not perfect but points to a shift in attention from internationalization abroad to internationalization at home – from an exclusive to a more inclusive internationalization approach.

The Top Global University (TGU) Project requires that the “Top Type” universities take steps to be ranked in the top 100 of global university rankings. This includes many “internationalization within” requirements. As with G30, it involves expanding provision of EMI courses and degree awarding ETPs. Funding is also linked to hiring more foreign faculty, increasing international student numbers, and producing more publications in English in citation indexed journals. The campus environment is meant to be enhanced to allow foreign faculty and students to work more effectively and comfortably. Yet, resources to do this are on an inherently insecure project-by-project basis in an era where the NUCs are having their budgets cut steadily each year. There is also considerable internal resistance to many of these measures.

While both the G30 and TGU projects have taken a more holistic internationalization at home approach, key targets for evaluation continue to be expressed numerically (i.e., the number of international students at one point in the year, the number of courses and programs delivered in English, the number of foreign faculty). The need to meet numerical targets places pressures on universities generally and particularly on faculties instituting change. There is tangible “reform fatigue” among faculty in the leading NUCs and a suspicion of the “nascent audit culture” that is slowly overtaking processes (Ishikawa 2014, 5).

Numerical targets are also pertinent in global competition. While the NUCs and leading private universities enjoy considerable status at home, most do not do very well in global rankings. Other than the University of Tokyo and Kyoto University, leading Japanese institutions do not enter the global super-league. If we look at those elite top 100 ranked universities in the three main global rankings, Japan had only 2 universities in the top 100 of the Times Higher Education’s World University Rankings for 2016 (University of Tokyo and Kyoto University), 4 in the top 100 of the Academic Rankings of World Universities for 2016 (University of Tokyo, Kyoto University, Nagoya University, and Osaka University), and 5 in the top 100 of the QS World University Rankings (University of Tokyo, Kyoto University, Tokyo Institute of Technology, Osaka University, and Tohoku University) (THE 2016; ARWU 2016; QS 2016). Despite recent policy, the Japanese super-league is finding it harder to make inroads into the global super-league, as other Asian countries are directing HE investment in this area even more aggressively.

Government policy around internationalization may also conflict with other policy agendas, which creates additional barriers to implementation. One recent example is the announcement by MEXT in academic year 2016 that the leading universities must more strictly adhere to quotas for undergraduate students and that this would be monitored in 2-year periods with heavy penalties for those institutions who fail to adhere. At the same time, after the status of regular (*seiki*) international students being unclear, universities were informed by MEXT that these students would be included inside rather than outside the quota. This means that any increase in regular international student numbers requires a decrease in the number of domestic students admitted over a 2-year period. This is not an easy sell in many of the NUCs. International students are often viewed as burdensome by faculty and, as a result, taking time away from research (Ebuchi et al. 1989; Ninomiya et al. 2009). There is also the concern about taking highly subsidized (affordable) university places away from domestic students with tax-paying parents and giving them to international students. Unlike many countries attracting large numbers of international students, in Japan fees are not higher for international students. Indeed, international students are more likely to receive fee waivers and scholarships than domestic students, even though increasing numbers of the latter fund their education through state loans (Ouchi 2015).

Short- (6 months to a year) and very short-term (*chō tanki* -1 week to 3 months) exchange programs had already been the default way of reaching international student targets. They cause minimum disruption and allow faculty routines and processes to continue as relatively unhindered by the internationalization agenda. With regular international students now counted as part of the student quota, there will be an even stronger drive to meet imposed targets with short- and very short-term exchange. As one program provider noted, what matters is how many students with international student visas are on campus on May 1st in any 1 year when figures are calculated. With such a focus, the spirit or vision of internationalization may be lost.

Simply having more international students on campus does not bring about internationalization, especially if these students are enrolled in dedicated programs. If the environment is already internationalized, then domestic and international student interactions seem to function positively to bring about individual change. When the campus environment is local rather than global in perspective and international students are separated from domestic students, the process of internationalization is blocked. The mission of internationalization at home can be further undermined if specially appointed staff rather than regular faculty are tasked with looking after international students and internationalization activities (Haswell 2014).

13.4 Internationalization and Student Mobility

While scholars offer a rather critical account of Japan's internationalization intentions and activities, we should not overlook the fact that internationalization of education policy initiatives focusing on increasing the number of inbound international students have been extremely successful. Japan is a major receiving country of globally mobile students, and in recent years, it has been attracting ever larger numbers of privately

Table 13.2 Trends in number of international students as of May 1 in four different years by source of funds

Year	MEXT scholarship	Foreign gov't scholarship	Privately financed
2000	8930	1441	45,439
2005	9891	1903	110,018
2010	10,349	3505	119,317
2015	9223	3737	195,419

Source for data: JASSO (2016)

funded students. Indeed, much of the increase in international student numbers is from privately funded students (Table 13.2). UNESCO's Institute for Statistics data reveals that in 2014 Japan was the seventh most attractive HE destination for international students globally with an inbound mobility rate of 3.4 (UNIS 2016).

As of May 1, 2016, there were 239,287 students with international visas studying in Japan these are "international students" as defined by the Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Law (JASSO 2017). This definition offers an incomplete picture as students with international backgrounds who have alternative visa types (e.g., permanent residence, spouse, dependents) or students with a dual nationality that includes Japanese nationality, even if raised wholly overseas, are not counted as international students.

Of the 239, 287 "international students" in Japan as of May 2016, the majority were studying in HEIs (171,122). The other major group was students studying in Japanese language schools (68,165), which are counted as a pre-college level of study[1] (JASSO 2017). Even with the expansion of EMI and ETPs, the majority of degree-seeking students in Japan are studying in Japanese. For international students, this generally means investing in pre-college language education, which increases the costs and time period associated with gaining a degree in Japan by 1 or 2 years.

The majority of students (data for May 1, 2016; source JASSO 2017: 5) come to Japan to study at the undergraduate level (72, 229) with graduate level students forming a smaller group (43, 478). At undergraduate level, the majority of students (81.8%) head to private universities to study, while the research-driven NUCs take only a minority of undergraduate students (15.9%). The reverse is the case at graduate level, with the NUCs taking the majority of students (62.5%) and only a minority studying at private institutions (33.1%). Nevertheless, in terms of numbers per institution, the leading research-driven NUCs have been attracting the largest number of international students with the help of the government media machine and large project funding (see Table 13.3).

Goodman (2007) has pointed to the hierarchical structure of the international student market in Japan. The leading research-oriented NUCs and a small number of elite large private universities have managed to attract globally attractive interna-

[1] Previously, international students in Japanese language institutes were issued a pre-college visa, but this was unified with the "college visa" category in 2009 (JASSO 2017).

Table 13.3 Top 10 universities in terms of accepting the highest number of international students by year and type of university in 2010, 2010, and 2015

Position/ year	2005 University/status/# IS	2010 University/status/# IS	2015 University/status/# IS
1	The University of Tokyo (NUC) 2111	Waseda University/ Private/3568	Waseda University/ Private/4603
2	Waseda University (Private) 1949	Ritsumeikan APU/ Private/2921	The University of Tokyo/ NUC/2990
3	Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University (APU)/ Private/1884	The University of Tokyo/ NUC/2772	Japan University of Economics/Private/2835
4	Osaka Sangyo University/ Private/1259	Japan University of Economics/Private/2388	Ritsumeikan APU/ Private/2649
5	Kyoto University/NUC/1227	Kyushu University/ NUC/1713	Kyushu University/ NUC/2097
6	Tohoku University/NUC/1173	University of Tsukuba/ NUC/1697	Osaka University/ NUC/2094
7	University of Tsukuba/ NUC/1163	Osaka University/ NUC/1662	University of Tsukuba/ NUC/2062
8.	Nagoya University/ NUC/1150	Kyoto University/ NUC/1530	Kyoto University/ NUC/1814
9.	Kyushu University/ NUC/1103	Tohoku University/ NUC/1511	Tohoku University/ NUC/1661
10.	Nihon University/ Private/1100	Nagoya University/ NUC/1501	Nagoya University/ NUC/1613

Sources: JASSO (2004, 2005, 2010, 2016)
NB. Universities in bold only appear once in the table. Underlined universities increased their relative position between first appearance and 2015

tional students at graduate levels by providing scholarship opportunities, research funding, and academic networking.

However, substantial numbers of self-financed international students are studying at the undergraduate level and are spread out across a very large number of less-selective private universities.

As Table 13.3 demonstrates, seven of the top 10 receiving universities of international students in 2010 and 2015 were NUCs. Even prior to G30 and TGU, in 2005, six of the top 10 receiving universities were NUCs. Between 2005 and 2015, only two universities in Table 13.3 increased their overall share of international student market: Waseda University and Kyushu University. To achieve this, both have more than doubled their intake of international students over this period. Both have received G30 and TGU funding and are in the Japanese super-league. Between 2010 and 2015, two universities gained a larger relative share of the international student market: Osaka University and Japan University of Economics. While the former is an elite NUC, the latter is a small private university established in 1968 as a college specializing in economics that is surviving through a proactive international student policy.

Table 13.4 Trends in inbound international students numbers and top sending countries, 2004–2015

Year	Number of ISs	Annual change relative to previous year	5 major countries
2004	117,302	7.1%	China (77,713), Republic of Korea (15,533), Taiwan (4096), Malaysia (2010), Thailand (1665)
2005	121,812	3.8%	China (80,592), Republic of Korea (15,606), Taiwan (4134), Malaysia (2114), Vietnam (1745)
2010	141,774	6.8%	China (86,173), Republic of Korea (20,202), Taiwan (5297), Vietnam (3597), Malaysia (2465)
2015	208,379	13.2%	China (94,111), Vietnam (38,882), Nepal (16,250), Republic of Korea (15,279), Taiwan (7314)

Data sources: JASSO (2004, 2005, 2010, 2015)
Similar data was presented in Rakhshandehroo and Yamamoto (2017)

At the same time, over the period looked at in Table 13.3, competition between the elite institutions for international students has increased. Even those universities that have remained in the top 10 but are positioned lower in the ranking in 2015 compared to 2005 have increased the overall number of international students. With intense competition for international students among the elite universities, even a significant increase in numbers may not translate into moving up the rankings.

The vast majority of students come from Asia (93%) and, whether studying in Japanese or English, are second-language (L2) users in their studies (see Table 13.4). While students on Japanese-medium programs often attend Japanese language schools before entering, the English proficiency requirements for those entering ETPs vary greatly. This raises issues around language support (both Japanese and English), especially given the high representation of international students in the humanities and social sciences and language-intensive disciplinary fields that have yet to be adequately addressed (see Rakhshandehroo and Yamamoto 2017).

Concerns about the "quality" of international students heading to the lower-tier universities are frequently articulated both by government and members of the academy. In particular, there is concern that large numbers of students are using their student visas to come to Japan primarily to work (Lassegard 2006: 123). At the same time, against a background of an Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Law that does not allow foreign workers easy entry into Japan by the front door, international students enrolled in HEIs and Japanese language schools make up an important part of the low-paid workforce. They form a part of Japan's "side-door" labor policy (Asato 2017), essential to boosting the ratio of economically productive to nonproductive population in Japan in an age of continuing super-low fertility and a hyper-ageing society.

In addition, these "lower-quality" students fill out college places in institutions that could not otherwise secure sufficient numbers of students to continue in operation. Despite this seemingly win-win symbiotic relationship, this student demographic is frequently demonized by the media (Morita 2012). As a shadow labor force who are constituted as temporary guests through their college visa status, social integration measures are often ad hoc and left to the voluntary sector (Asato 2017).

At the top end of the hierarchy, attracting global talent and providing "quality" students with generous scholarships so that they can concentrate on their studies are a prominent and well-articulated part of Japanese internationalization strategy. Generously funded initiatives such as G30 and TGU policies explicitly target the top-tier universities and seek to gain benefits at a national level from this "talent" pool in the context of the global knowledge economy. The expansion of EMI and ETPs is part of a bid to make Japanese universities attractive to students who might otherwise be bound for the Western Anglophone countries, as well as enhance diversity and the quality of the international student body. It is, moreover, hoped that up to a third will stay in Japan and boost the knowledge elite in order to enhance the country's global competitiveness. With demand for higher education in neighboring China, Vietnam, and South Korea exceeding supply, Japan is currently an attractive destination as, compared to other major destinations, it is geographically and culturally closer, creates an attractive financial package for students, and offers the possibility of work during studies and after graduation.

13.5 The Expansion of English Medium Education and English-Taught Programs

The recent expansion of courses and programs delivered in English is an area of internationalization in Japanese universities that has garnered considerable scholarly attention in recent years (Kuwamura 2009; Huang 2006; Hashimoto 2013; Chapple 2015; Bradford 2016; Haswell 2014; Brown 2014). While critics have argued that internationalization cannot be or should not be reduced to (English) language policy (Haswell 2014; Kuwamura 2009), the G30 and TGU initiatives arguably represent a new way of approaching *kokusaika* in Japan that targets both domestic and international students.

One aim articulated by MEXT for the introduction of the G30 project was to create a more diverse and international environment for Japanese students as well as foster the kind of cross cultural networking that could translate into global social capital in the future.

> These selected universities aim to nurture internationally competent individuals by creating an academic environment where international and Japanese students can learn from one another and build lasting international bonds that will propel them into the international scene. (MEXT 2016b)

While any commentators have noted the successes of the G30 initiative (Bradford 2016; Ishikura 2015; Yamamoto and Ishikura 2017c), concerns have also been raised about the *dejimization*, or isolation, of international students in specially created G30 programs, the lack of motivation of many to study Japanese and stay on in Japan, and the perceived lower quality of some of the G30 programs compared to regular Japanese programs.

Table 13.5 Number of universities with restrictions surrounding admission criteria for English-taught programs established at the former Global 30 universities based on nationality, visa status, and/or type of schooling

Criteria	NUCs n-7	Private universities n-7
Nationality other than Japanese	3	0
Visa status of foreign nationals	2 (some limitations imposed)	0
Number of years educated in article 1 school in Japan	7	1
Educated in Japan, including international school	2	0

Source: Data collected from each university's websites in February 2016 for admission in 2017 academic year

The issue of *dejimization* appears to be particularly pertinent for the NUCs where ETPs have often been restricted exclusively or largely to international students. The structuring of these courses has frequently led to students on ETP having little interaction with students on regular Japanese-taught programs. Table 13.5 demonstrates that the NUCs are more likely to have restrictive admission criteria for their ETPs based on nationality, visa status, and education system. This data was drawn from current websites and shows the eligibility criteria[2] for the 2017 academic year. All the NCUs have some restrictions on Japanese nationals applying, especially if they have been educated under the regular Japanese National Curriculum. Two universities treat foreign nationals differently depending on whether they have permanent residence or would be eligible for an international student visa. This suggests that ETPS are being viewed as programs for international students and unsuitable for Japanese nationals unless they have had extensive years of education overseas. Three NUCs do not allow Japanese nationals to apply. This means that even a Japanese national raised and educated overseas, even in an English-speaking country, would be ineligible to apply for these programs.

In contrast, there are minimal exclusions by nationality, visa status, or schooling background in the private universities. One has restrictions on both Japanese nationals and foreign nationals who have been educated in Japanese schools, unless they have studied for the International Baccalaureate Diploma (IBDP). Otherwise, the private universities do not restrict eligibility to apply based on nationality and visa status of schooling. For the private universities, ETPs are a vehicle to attract both local and international students.

With Global 30, a top-down initiative, the NUCs and private universities implemented differently depending on their own mission and strategies. NUCs were more concerned about preserving their elite status domestically by ensuring that the ETPs did not become an admission's backdoor for Japanese students. Admissions criteria ensure symbolic boundary maintenance between the regular student body, who

[2] Japanese universities have "eligibility" requirements to be able to apply for the programs. Unless you are eligible to apply, your application will not be included in the selection process.

must be seen to have been subjected to rigorous quality assurance at entry through hitherto recognized admission routes and requirements, and the "international student" body, who enter on a different basis. Ironically, this works against the vision of Global 30 as a means of getting international and Japanese students to study together in an internationalized environment. Hashimoto's argument about the narrow vision of internationalization would seem to apply to the NUCs, but not the private universities:

> Japan's concept of internationalization is about promoting Japan to the international community, not about becoming part of it, and this concept is based on a view of the world as the Japanese/Other. This form of internationalisation also requires a view that Japan should remain a monolingual state in order to stand as a unified entity against the rest of the world' and 'English remains the Other in Japan.' (Hashimoto 2013: 29–30)

Here perhaps we get a sense of the limits of the vision of internationalization in the elite NUCs where the appetite for embracing diversity may be undermined by the desire to maintain elite status in the eyes of a domestic audience.

13.6 Internationalization of the Academy and Research

Current HE policy demands new priorities in terms of hiring and training faculty who can teach in ETPs and administrative staff who are competent at promoting the internationalization of administrative procedures. I would like to consider the issue of numbers of foreign faculty here and whether there is a critical mass.

As Table 13.6 makes clear, the growing diversity of the student body is not reflected in the makeup of the faculty body. Only 2.4% of all university faculty members in full-time positions are non-Japanese nationals in Japanese universities. This figure rises to 6.4% if we look at those counted as part-time (*kenmusha*). In either case, foreign academic staff do not make up a critical mass.

Diversity has been raised as an issue not only due to the low representation of foreign faculty but also female faculty. Full-time academic positions in Japanese universities are dominated by Japanese men. Female faculty (foreign and Japanese)

Table 13.6 Number and percentage of all faculty, and foreign and female faculty in Japanese Universities

University academic staff 2012	Total	Female	Foreign faculty	Female foreign faculty
Full-time faculty[a] (Tenure and contract)	282,130	53,378 (18.9%)	6,835 (2.4%)	1,757 (0.6%)
Part-time faculty[b]	191,308	54,681 (28.5%)	12,361(6.4%)	4,467 (2.3%)

Source: Based on MEXT (2013): 96

[a]This figure includes faculty affiliated to university and graduate schools

[b]In Japanese, the term is *kenmusha* and can refer to someone employed at institution A but teaches part time at university B as well as to a person who teaches only on a part-time basis at one or more institutions. Therefore, a proportion of the population counted as full-time are double counted here as part-time

make up less than 20% of all full-time academic staff. Foreign female academics in full-time positions are even more poorly represented accounting for less that than 1% of all full-time faculty members.

Women who do secure full-time positions are more likely to find themselves in "soft positons" that involve a high level of "caring for students" (Yamamoto 2017b). Vertical and horizontal patterns of gender segregation in academia are global tendencies and not limited to Japan, but the gendering is perhaps more extreme (Vabø et al. 2014).

Foreign faculty generally and foreign female faculty in particular have played only a marginal role in Japanese higher education and until recently were largely relegated to the English language education sector regardless of their degree specialization. Unlike many other universities in Asia, Japan has sustained an independent higher education sector that has largely nurtured its own academic and administrative leaders. As noted by Mayumi Ishikawa (2009):

> Japan has maintained a rather self-sustained, national language-based higher education model with a stratification mechanism to select and produce future leaders and professionals. It has existed outside the realm of Western higher education power domains, and Western university degrees have held little relevance for upward mobility in an existing national social ladder. (p.160)

With domestic networks carrying considerable weight and foreign university degrees holding "little relevance," it has been very hard for foreign trained academics, whether Japanese or foreign, to gain a tenure track position in Japan. However, in the global ranking game, the number of international faculty has emerged as another indicator of "internationalization," and Japanese universities are now trying to increase the ratio of foreign to Japanese faculty (Ishikawa 2009: 160).

Recent emphasis on expanding programs and teaching in the English medium has made the hiring of foreign faculty more desirable to take up some of the teaching load. Nevertheless, while broader top-down polices may result in target setting for increasing female and foreign faculty, these may not find acceptance on the ground. For some academics, the hitherto practice of not hiring foreign faculty is regarded as proof of the independence and success in developing domestic human resources and the "predominance of Japanese as the medium of instruction, a symbol of cultural and linguistic autonomy" (Ishikawa 2009: 165). Further research is needed on the experiences of foreign faculty and their structural positioning within the Japanese academy.

13.7 A Final Word: Internationalization in a Dynamic Global Environment

Anyone working in a leading Japanese university can see that something we can all probably agree on as being "internationalization" is happening. There are increasing numbers of international students on campus and more who stand out as being "international" due to a greater diversity of backgrounds. There has been an increase in regular students on campus who are studying in the English medium both at undergraduate and graduate levels, administrative staff who are making efforts to put key documentation into English and sometimes other languages as well, and faculty with international backgrounds. Yet, there are still clear limits to the vision of how internationalization, *kokusaika*, is imagined.

With recent policy shifts, not only students but staff, curriculum, and institutions emerge as subjects of internationalization. There is currently an opening up process, marked by the creation of new routes within the education system for students and staff with more diverse backgrounds. Novel, for the Japanese context, forms of learning and pedagogy are being emphasized. These shifts potentially disrupt and reorganize hierarchies of privilege and prestige, socioeconomic resource allocation, and educational practice in ways not seen in earlier internationalization policy. At the same time, there is a long tradition of skillful resistance by Japanese faculty and administration to top-down policy initiatives, where imposed targets and requirements are seemingly met through ingenious box-ticking exercises, but the intended change do not quite materialize (see Poole 2010). This form of quiet resistance at the institutional level, without open or serious opposition or criticism of policy, makes it difficult for concerns and issues to be adequately addressed by policy makers.

Moreover, many of the institutions that are at the forefront of the government-driven internationalization agenda are the most competitive for entry and inherently conservative, keen to maintain the "trappings of elitism that surround them" (Harrison and Mountford-Zimdars 2017: 245). They are invested in maintaining a selective system that is not particularly meritocratic but has placed their own institution at the top (Harrison and Mountford-Zimdars 2017; see also Yamamoto 2017a). In other words, as tends to be the case globally, the elite from overseas are given access to Japanese universities to study with the elite of Japan (Scott 2010).

At the same time, symbolic boundary maintenance is still strong, with systems and processes that place students into an insider (*uchi)* or outsider (*soto)* group based on language, passport or visa status, and place of schooling. Some students with "international" backgrounds are welcome, while others are overlooked or even excluded. The problem is succinctly summarized by Horie (2002):

> What has been lacking from the government's policy for internationalization is a consideration for securing equality for all participants of higher education in Japan. The government, as the most powerful agent of university reforms, needs to have the courage to face the reality that rights of foreign nationals residing in Japan have not been secured. It is time for shifting the basic idea of internationalization; what matters is not the number of international students studying in Japan but a basic philosophy which embraces students from various backgrounds, including international students and foreign nationals, as full participants in Japanese higher education. (pp. 82–83)

On the one hand, Japan does not regard students as "money cows" who can fill up university coffers as the government withdraws its support. International students in the NUCs often enjoy scholarships and fee waivers. If they pay tuition, it is at the same rate as domestic students. In private universities, it is likely that Japanese students on international programs will be expected to pay the higher fee in order to be exposed to an international education. International students can work in Japan within certain but reasonable limitations. They can apply for a "looking for work" visa after they complete their studies, and it is hoped that a third will stay on, although domestic recruitment procedures often make this difficult (METI 2016).

While Japan is pushing forward its own, ever-developing internationalization strategy, attention needs to focus on what neighboring Asian countries are doing as they are moving at a faster pace than Japan is able or willing to move. To date, Japan's self-sustained model of HE has served the country reasonably well and produced a high level of basic research that is the envy of many other countries. Japan is not alone in Asia or beyond in trying to accommodate the demands of globalization and neoliberalism through internationalization without undermining the strengths and uniqueness of its own system. On the other hand, global trends and internal demographics demand actions that include internationalization in new and more comprehensive ways than hitherto seen in Japanese HEIs.

Acknowledgments I would like to thank Mahboubeh Rakhshandehroo and Justin Sanders, who as research assistants made important contributions to this chapter in terms of data gathering and proofreading.

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Chapter 14
Beyond National Frameworks: Patterns and Trends in Articles by Japanese Researchers Published in *International Journals of Sociology of Education* and Related Fields Since the 1990s

Taeko Okitsu, Eriko Yagi, and Yuto Kitamura

Abstract This chapter examines how Japanese researchers' contributions to the international scholarly community in the fields of sociology of education or related fields have transformed over the years. It does so by examining the trends and patterns of Japanese researchers' articles in key international journals in these fields since the 1990s. The analysis of 90 articles revealed that Japanese researchers' presence in the international scholarly community of the sociology of education and related fields has steadily increased since the 1990s, particularly through their active publications of English language articles in the field of comparative education, international education development, and higher education. The regions and themes of focus have also changed, from the dissemination of the particularities of Japanese education to the world in the 1990s to the investigation of contemporary educational issues through either single -country or comparative study and in more recent years to active engagement in theoretical and epistemological debates.

14.1 Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to identify patterns and trends in academic papers by Japanese researchers published in leading international journals of the sociology of education or closely related fields since the 1990s. Emergent patterns and future

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A. Yonezawa et al. (eds.), *Japanese Education in a Global Age*, Education in the Asia-Pacific Region: Issues, Concerns and Prospects 46,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-1528-2_14

prospects for the Japanese scholarly communities' contribution to the global academic knowledge construction in the fields will also be examined.

The sociology of education is a branch of education studies, in which education is perceived as a set of social phenomena and as such is studied from a sociological perspective. More specifically, the sociology of education is a discipline which tries to understand the relation between education and society, including such themes as the social functions of education, the social determinants of education, and the links between family, social structure, and education. Positioned somewhat between education and sociology, this broad research field consists of a variety of research themes and methodologies, with studies in this field being conducted in various geographical regions. For this reason, we believe that international comparisons of educational phenomena need to be highlighted, particularly in an era of globalization.

In this chapter, we will examine not only academic journals specializing exclusively in the sociology of education but also those in the neighboring fields of comparative education and international education development, in which some researchers have actively conducted educational studies with an international perspective, often by adopting approaches developed in the field of the sociology of education. It is important to recognize that such international perspectives can broaden the scope of studies to be conducted in the field of the sociology of education.

Japanese language journals of the sociology of education or comparative education have been regularly reviewed by researchers in the past. In particular, the journal of the Japan Society of Educational Sociology (JSES), *Studies of Educational Sociology*, has been conducting regular reviews of research trends since the 1950s at a rate of once every 5–10 years.[1] At the individual level, Nakazawa (2003) and Honda et al. (2012) have examined the characteristics of research by Japanese education sociologists in terms of themes and methodologies adopted in their research. Umakoshi (1993), Ogawa (2006), and Fukudome (2014) have reviewed trends in Japanese scholars' research on higher education. Yamada (2013, 2015) and Kuroda and Kitamura (2013) studied trends in Japanese scholars' research in the field of comparative education.[2] However, all of these studies basically examine Japanese researchers' academic works in the Japanese language for a domestic readership. No study has been found so far that examines trends in published articles by Japanese scholars in major international journals of the sociology of education or related fields.

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[1] The Japan Society of Educational Sociology (JSES) has published special issues on research trends in its journal, *The Journal of Educational Sociology*, i.e., "The Current Status and Future Challenges of JSES" (vol. 6, 1958), "Achievements in Sociology of Education Over the Last 5 Years and Future Challenges" (vol. 19, 1964), "Prospects for Sociology of Education" (vol. 34, 1979), "Critical Review of Sociology of Education" (vol. 47, 1990), "Paradigm Development in Sociology of Education" (vol. 50, 1992), and "Self-reflection Upon and Prospects of the Field of Sociology of Education" (vol. 64, 1999).

[2] Examples of similar studies outside Japan include Rust et al. (1999) and Little (2001), who surveyed trends in articles published in major Western academic journals of comparative education in different periods.

Meanwhile, as will be discussed in the following section, reference has been increasingly made in recent years to the impression that a growing number of Japanese researchers in the fields of the sociology of education and comparative education are becoming more capable of communicating their research results internationally while actively engaging in international research networks. Such a phenomenon is thought to have been developed in tune with the gradual advancement of these academic fields in Japan. It is therefore becoming an urgent task to verify if this impression is reflective of reality as supported by observable data.

Against such a background, the present study attempts to examine the characteristics of international academic communication by Japanese researchers in the field of the sociology of education and the closely related field of comparative education by analyzing patterns and trends in articles in major international academic publications since the 1990s.

14.2 Research Publications by Japanese Researchers in the Fields of the Sociology of Education and Comparative Education

In Japan, research in the sociology of education began to develop in both quantity and quality at the beginning of the second half of the twentieth century. In this regard, the establishment of the Japan Society for Educational Sociology (JSES) in 1948 can be considered as the event that spearheaded the development of this discipline in Japan. The birth of JSES immediately followed the thorough reform of the Japanese school system after the end of World War II. This reform included the reorganization of higher education, with former tertiary or post-secondary educational institutions transformed into 4-year universities in 1947, in some of which courses and programs on the sociology of education were introduced, allowing the gradual development of research in this field. In those days, however, research in the sociology of education in Japan was mostly limited to introducing research results or theories and methodologies developed in the West, upon which the Japanese scholarly community relied substantially when it started accumulating their own research in the field. At the time, only a few Japanese educational sociologists had their papers published in international journals. It was only in the 1990s that Japanese educational sociologists began presenting their academic work to the international scholarly community in a more substantial manner, often through the publication of scholarly books in a variety of languages.

Michiya Shimbori was one of the most recognized, first-generation Japanese scholars in the field who strove to disseminate his research to the international audience.[3] Among the scholars who led Japan's postwar research in the discipline,

[3] In this section, Japanese scholars in the field of sociology of education have been divided into four main generations basically according to their age.

including Yoshihiro Shimizu and Shiro Baba, Shimbori was no doubt the first to publish his papers in English and actively engage in international scholarly networks. He is known for vigorous research conducted on unique and highly original themes covering a broad range of aspects of education in Japan, including higher education, teachers, educational reform, and pathology in education. He published many articles in English, including Shimbori (1973), which mainly aimed to introduce the "uniqueness" of Japanese education to the outside world. In addition to his own research work, Shimbori actively engaged in various international scholarly debates on education as a Japanese education expert, by participating in many conferences organized by international organizations such as the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).

Succeeding the first generation of scholars who disseminated their research internationally, represented primarily by Shimbori, was the second generation including Ikuo Amano, Hidenori Fujita, and Akira Arimoto. In 1990, Amano published an English text based on his Japanese book on education and the examination system in Japan from a historical and sociological perspective. This work was highly regarded not only by Japanese educational sociologists but also by Japanese sociologists as a whole (Amano 1990). In 2011, he once again published a translation analyzing educational credentialism in Japan (Amano 2011). While Amano has principally disseminated his work overseas via the translation of his work, Fujita and Arimoto have been disseminating research results in English with an international readership in mind from the outset, respectively, through their participation in international joint research.

For example, Fujita has served as a bridge between the Japanese research community in the sociology of education and Western counterparts for many years, using his personal international network of researchers. He has applied theories developed in the West to analyze Japanese phenomena in education to develop his original arguments. One product of such international scholarly exchange is the publication of a book in which Fujita discusses Japan's educational reforms with his Japanese and non-Japanese colleagues from multiple perspectives (Gordon et al. 2009).

Arimoto has probably been the most successful among Japanese educational sociologists in building an international collaborative research network. Since his participation in the Carnegie International Survey of the Academic Profession conducted at the outset of the 1990s – the first international survey of the academic profession – he has led various research projects as a core member of international collaborative research teams. Results from these projects have culminated in several books and numerous papers and reports written in English (e.g., Arimoto et al. 2015; Teichler et al. 2013).

In addition to the researchers mentioned above, others such as Morikazu Ushiogi, Kazuyuki Kitamura, and Toru Umakoshi can also be considered as having spearheaded the second generation of internationally active Japanese scholars in the sociology of education and related fields.

For example, Kitamura offered important historical explanations for Japanese universities' relative emphasis on their research function over their educational function (Kitamura 1986). He also provided a critical account of the Japanese higher education and argued for a need of a basic structural change (Kitamura 1991). Ushiogi also actively published his works on various themes including the Japanese graduate education system and the links between education and labor market in Japan (e.g., Ushiogi 1971, 1986, 1993). Umakoshi edited a book on the contemporary challenges of the universities in Asia, together with Philip G. Altbach. In this book, he provided rigorous analysis of the development of private higher education of not only in Japan but also in the region as a whole (Umakoshi 2004).

The following third generation is represented by Takehiko Kariya, Akira Sakai, and Ryoko Tsuneyoshi. Kariya is internationally recognized in academia as a leading sociologist of Japanese education, particularly for studies that quantitatively demonstrate how social class affects students' school achievement in Japan. He presented fresh insights from Japan to the international scholarly community by appropriating theories developed in the West to explain the Japanese education system (e.g., Kariya 2012). Recognized for such research achievements, Kariya, professor at the University of Tokyo until 2008, moved to Oxford University to assume an even more central role in international research networking. Sakai co-authored *Learning to Teach in Two Cultures: Japan and the United States*, with Nobuo K. Shimahara of Rutgers University. This internationally acclaimed book, which drew great attention from the 1980s to the 1990s, partly explained the cultural aspects of the Japanese school and classroom environment (Shimahara and Sakai 1995). Offering non-Japanese readers important insights into teacher practices and beliefs within the two different national contexts of Japan and the United States, the book has been put on the reading lists of many graduate schools of education in North America. Tsuneyoshi (2001) offered a "Japanese model of schooling" that was in sharp comparison with American school education. She also organized an international collaborative research project that resulted in a publication providing a vivid account of schooling in contemporary Japan, which has become increasingly multicultural with the increasing number of immigrant children (Tsuneyoshi 2010). Kokichi Shimizu and Reiko Yamada can also be counted among the third generation of internationally active Japanese educational sociologists for their active publications in English (e.g., Shimizu 2001; Yamada 2014).

Third-generation scholars have analyzed various educational phenomena in Japan with reference to relevant international debate in the sociology of education, presenting Japan not as a country of "exception" but as a country facing challenges similarly felt or experienced by many other countries or societies while avoiding overlooking aspects specific to Japan. In this sense, it can be argued that third-generation Japanese educational sociologists have been more actively engaged in academic exchange in the international research community of sociology of education than preceding generations. Such an active attitude by third-generation researchers has been further reinforced by fourth-generation researchers, including Akiyoshi Yonezawa and Keita Takayama.

Yonezawa has been publishing a number of scholarly articles on Japanese higher education in international academic journals on a regular basis. In recent years, he has expanded his scope of research in higher education to other Asian countries while also actively engaging in theoretical work (e.g., Yonezawa et al. 2014). He has built a close network with overseas researchers specializing in higher education. Takayama teaches at the University of New England in Australia, conducting multifaceted analyses of the effects of globalization on educational policies and practices. His papers have been frequently published in leading international academic journals (e.g., Takayama 2009).

Daisuke Sonoyama, who has been collaborating with French scholars, is a noteworthy fourth-generation researcher (Sabouret and Sonoyama 2008). Among the fourth-generation Japanese educational sociologists are scholars who exhibit a greater focus on education in developing countries. Kazuo Kuroda, Shoko Yamada, Mikiko Nishimura, and Yuto Kitamura have all conducted research on issues surrounding education and development in developing countries from various perspectives (e.g., Kitamura et al. 2015; Neubauer and Kuroda 2012; Yamada 2016; Nishimura and Yamano 2013). These fourth-generation researchers have been contributing to the increased presence of Japanese researchers beyond the boundaries of Japan.

A half century has passed since Japanese scholars have started conducting research in the field of the sociology of education. Over these years, the Japanese scholars mentioned above, together with Japan-based non-Japanese scholars, have steadily constructed international networks of researchers while being actively engaged in joint international research and publishing research results internationally.

In this section, we have reviewed the evolution of international research activities by Japanese educational sociologists by roughly classifying them into four generations. The review indicates that the characteristics of research have shifted over the years, from the introduction of the particularities of Japanese education to the world to the demonstration of similarities and differences between Japan and other societies with regard to various contemporary educational issues and challenges and in more recent years to the active engagement in theoretical debate. In view of this progression, international academic communications from Japan in the future are expected to be even more active and influential in shaping research trends.

It should be noted that, in this section, the most representative researchers mentioned constitute only a small fraction of researchers within the Japanese research community of the sociology of education and related fields. We add here that there are many other Japanese educational sociologists who have actively published research results internationally, including many of the authors of this book who are engaged in research at an international level.

In the sections that follow, we will examine whether or not the evolution of research as described thus far sufficiently characterizes the broader base of Japanese researchers. We will do so by analyzing, in more quantitatively precise terms, papers by Japanese scholars published in major international journals.

14.3 Previous Studies That Examine Trends in Journal Articles in the Fields

Several studies have analyzed trends in articles published in leading academic journals in the field, particularly those of comparative education. For example, Rust et al. (1999) closely investigated the characteristics of 2000 journal articles published in *Comparative Education*, the *Comparative Education Review*, and the *International Journal of Education Development* from 1957 to 1995. Their studies revealed an increase in the number of empirical studies since the 1980s, as a result of an increase in articles concerning education in developing countries as published particularly in the *International Journal of Education Development*. Similarly, Little (2001), who analyzed trends in articles published in *Comparative Education* from 1977 to 1998, demonstrated an increase in the number of articles about education in developing countries, resulting in a diversification in the geographical regions studied, although the authors of these articles remained predominantly of Western nationalities.

In the context of Japanese journals, Yamada (2013, 2015) examined trends among articles published in the journal of the Japan Comparative Education Society – *Comparative Education* – from 1975 to 2011. She reports that the majority of articles published before the 1990s treat cases in Western countries, whereas an increasing number of papers study East Asian countries since the 1990s. Yamada further revealed that research themes and target regions began to further diversify in the 2000s, following the emergence of researchers studying education in developing countries. Kuroda and Kitamura (2013) present similar findings.

Previous studies suggest that there has been an increasing trend for major international academic journals to present articles about education in developing countries since the 1980s – a trend which was followed by the Japanese journal of *Comparative Education* about 20 years later.

14.4 Methodology

14.4.1 Sampling of Journal Articles

We selected six leading English language, peer-reviewed international journals in the field of the sociology of education or the closely related field of comparative education for our review, i.e., (1) *Sociology of Education*, (2) *British Journal of Sociology of Education*, (3) *Comparative Education*, (4) *Compare*, (5) *Comparative Education Review*, and (6) *International Journal of Educational Development*. We selected a total of 90 articles written by Japanese authors published in these six journals for the period between 1990 and 2016.[4] The nationality of each author was

[4] For 2015–2016, only articles published by the end of October 2016 are included.

Table 14.1 Number of articles by Japanese authors published in the six selected international journals (1990–2016)

	No. of articles by Japanese authors
(1) *Sociology of Education*	3
(2) *British Journal of Sociology of Education*	7
(3) *Compare*	24
(4) *Comparative Education*	26
(5) *Comparative Education Review*	12
(6) *International Journal of Educational Development*	18
Total	90

Data compiled by the authors

determined by assessing first and family names. Authors deemed to be of Japanese descent but of a non-Japanese nationality were classified as non-Japanese authors and excluded from our study. The period from 1990 to 2016 was chosen to investigate whether or not Japanese authors' contributions to English language international journals showed the same pattern of diversification of geographical focus and research themes since 2000 as suggested by Yamada in the case of the Japanese journal of *Comparative Education* (2013, 2015).

As in the analysis of Yamada (2013, 2015), we only selected original research articles for our review, excluding book reviews and other texts, based on our belief that the latter do not necessarily fully reflect authors' own academic interests or orientation, which is the subject of our investigation. Meanwhile, we included not only peer-reviewed articles but also invited articles upon editors' requests for special issues in our selected sample so as to grasp patterns and trends more broadly. The classification of 90 articles selected for our investigation according to journals is summarized in Table 14.1.

14.4.2 Classification of Published Articles for Analysis

In order to examine the changes reflected in the 90 papers over the years, we first divided articles into six, 5-year period groups based on their year of publication. We then counted the number of articles in each period group and by journal. It should be noted that the period group from 2015 is shorter than the other groups by over 3 years, since the former group only included articles published by the end of October 2016.

We further classified the articles in terms of (1) theme, (2) geographical focus, and (3) author's affiliation (whether he or she belongs to a Japanese or overseas institution) to analyze period-by-period changes.

It appeared that there were several cases in which more than one country (region) or theme was the focus of a single paper. Therefore, multiple items were allowed for

(1) and (2), and in the case of articles with two or more or overlapping themes or geographical foci, each item was counted as one under its corresponding type. This resulted in the total number of papers being greater than 90 in some categories.

14.5 Analysis and Discussion: The Evolution of Trends in Japanese Researchers' Articles Published in Leading International Academic Journals

In the following sections, we discuss prominent patterns and trends emerging from our analysis of 90 journal articles published in the six selected international journals between 1990 and 2016.

14.5.1 Changes in the Number of Articles by Japanese Researchers Published in Six International Journals from 1990 to 2016

Figure 14.1 shows trends in Japanese authors' articles published in the six international academic journals from 1990 to 2016, classified over a 5-year period. While a total of 17 papers were published between 1990 and 1999, this number more than doubled to 41 from 2000 to 2009. In the period from 2010 to 2014, 19 papers were published in the selected journals, a slight drop from the 26 papers published during the previous 5-year period (2005–2009). In the 2010–2014 period, the number was about twice as many as in the 1990–1994 period (ten papers) and the 1995–1999 period (seven papers). Thus, Japanese authors' articles have been published with overwhelmingly greater frequency throughout the 2000s and 2010s than they had been during the 1990s. Furthermore, with the total number of Japanese authors' articles published in the last 2 years (2015 and 2016) already reaching 13, it may be safe to suggest that Japanese authors' articles will be now published in international academic journals at an even more rapid rate than prior to 2015.

Table 14.2 indicates the numbers of Japanese-authored articles published in the selected international academic journals from 1990 to 2016, classified by the journal. As is clear in Table 14.2, the increase in Japanese-authored articles since the 2000s can mainly be attributed to the somewhat sudden increase in the number of articles published in *Compare*, *Comparative Education*, and the *International Journal of Educational Development*.

As its name suggests, the *International Journal of Educational Development* is an academic journal that publishes papers on themes relating to education and development, notably the development of education in developing countries. As for *Compare*, which is edited by the British Association for International and Comparative Education Societies (BAICE), it is known for publishing large numbers of papers on



Fig. 14.1 Trend of the number of articles by Japanese authors published in the six selected international journals (1990–2016). (Data compiled by the authors). NB: The 2015–2016 figure is the total number of Japanese-authored articles published by the end of October 2016

Table 14.2 Trend of the number of Japanese authors' articles published in the selected international journals classified by journals (1990–2016)

	1990–1994	1995–1999	2000–2004	2005–2009	2010–2014	2015–2016	Total number of papers
(1) *Sociology of Education*	1	1	1	0	0	0	3
(2) *British Journal of Sociology of Education*	1	0	2	2	1	1	7
(3) *Compare*	1	3	5	8	5	2	24
(4) *Comparative Education*	5	0	6	7	6	2	26
(5) *Comparative Education Review*	2	3	0	1	4	2	12
(6) *International Journal of Educational Development*	0	0	1	8	3	6	18
The total number of papers	10	7	15	26	19	13	90

Data compiled by the authors
NB: The 2015–2016 figure is the total number of Japanese-authored articles published by the end of October 2016

themes relating not only to education in advanced countries but also to educational development in developing countries in Africa and Asia. In view of this, it can be inferred that the marked increase in Japanese researchers' articles in these two journals since 2000 reflects the increased numbers of articles that deal with educational issues in developing countries. This point will be further analyzed in following sections in connection with the choice of research theme and target geographical region.

14.5.2 Trends of Geographical Regions Dealt with in Articles by Japanese Authors

Figure 14.2 shows the distribution of geographical regions dealt with by articles written by Japanese authors and published in reviewed journals. Those articles whose target countries include Japan account for 42% of all papers published during the study period (1990–2016).[5] It is not surprising that Japanese researchers tend to choose Japan as the country of study, considering their linguistic and cultural competences.

The majority of these articles study education in Japan alone, while the second largest group of such articles consist of studies that compare education in Japan and that of economically advanced countries in North America or Western Europe

[5] The number of articles on Japan in each time period has remained somewhat unchanged to date, except during the period from 1995 to 1999.



Fig. 14.2 Geographical regions considered by six international, Japanese-authored journals (1990–2016). (Data compiled by the author)

(Table 14.3). After Japan, countries in North America/Western Europe are most frequently selected for research, accounting for 21% of the total (Fig. 14.3). Yamada and Nishimura (2013) and Yamada (2013, 2015) report that the Japanese research community in comparative education reflected a strong tradition of "education borrowing," whereby education in the "advanced" West is seen as the "norm" from which Japan should learn so as to develop its own education. The overwhelming choice when conducting comparative studies of North American or Western European countries by Japanese scholars in the 1990s can be explained by academic traditions in Japan. The United States particularly stands out among Western nations as a popular choice for Japanese authors to compare with Japan. This could be related to the fact that many Japanese scholars in comparative education have taken a strong interest in American education as a model, given the strong American influence on Japan's postwar education, sociology education, and society itself.[6]

This trend, however, began to change in the 2000s. As shown in Fig. 14.3, regional categories such as Sub-Saharan Africa, East Asia and the Pacific, and South and

[6] In Japan, the sociology of education was established as a full-scale academic discipline after the end of World War II under strong American influence. In 1949, courses and programs in the sociology of education were established at universities during the reorganization of the education system. In the following years, the Japan Society of Educational Sociology (JSES) was established. The society organizes a national conference every year and publishes its journal, *The Journal of Educational Sociology*, twice a year.

Table 14.3 Details of articles by Japanese authors that include Japan as their study area (1990–2016)

Period	Japan alone	Japan compared with North America/Western Europe	Japan compared with East Asia and the Pacific	Study of research approaches based on cases relating to Japan
1990–1994	7	3	0	0
1995–1999	2	3	0	0
2000–2004	8	3	1	0
2005–2009	5	4	0	0
2010–2014	3	1	0	5
2015–2016	1	1	1	1
Total	26	15	2	6

Data compiled by the authors
NB: The 2015–2016 figure is the total number of Japanese scholars' articles published at the end of October 2016



Fig. 14.3 Trends of geographical regions dealt with in published Japanese authors' articles in six international journals (1990–2016). (Data compiled by the authors)

West Asia, which were totally absent from articles written in the 1990s, began to appear in the 2000s, with their share of the total considerably increasing since 2010.

The diversification of the geographical focus in research since 2000 corresponds strongly in particular to observations made by Yamada (2013, 2015) in articles in the Japanese journal of *Comparative Education* that there has been a notable increase in the number of articles on low-income countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, and South and West Asia since the 2000s.

Yamada, referring to the argument put forward by Kuroda and Kitamura (2013), maintains that geographical diversification since the 2000s was mainly driven by an increase in the number of Japanese researchers in the field of comparative education who specialize in development issues in connection with global education agendas as exemplified by the "Education for All (EFA)" movement and the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) (Yamada 2013:89). At the same time, while Yamada found that East Asia and the Pacific have been the second most frequently selected regional categories after North America/Western Europe in the Japanese journal of *Comparative Education* throughout this period, our study found that the number of articles about education in Sub-Saharan Africa have surpassed those treating East Asia and the Pacific since 2000. This difference is quite intriguing, given the great geographical and psychological distance that Japanese researchers generally feel vis-à-vis Sub-Saharan Africa.

Meanwhile, most of the papers studying education in Sub-Saharan Africa, East Asia and the Pacific, and South and West Asia (the number of these articles began to rapidly increase in 2000) published in the six international journals are single-country studies. A few exceptions are comparative studies between Japan and a country or more than one country in relatively economically advanced areas of East Asia and the Pacific (Table 14.3). Nevertheless, it can be argued that Japanese scholars are more inclined to take up comparative studies between Japan and countries in North America and Western Europe or in relatively high-income East Asian countries, but not with low-income countries in Sub-Saharan Africa or South and West Asia.

14.5.3 Research Themes

Research themes chosen in Japanese authors' articles published in the first half of the 1990s include trends in curricular reform in Japan, teacher satisfaction in Japan, the culture of the teaching profession in Japan, the influence of family-related factors on students' academic achievement in Japan and the United States, the entrance examination system in Japan (the so-called examination hell), and the Japanese model of schooling as exemplified by small group activities. It is plausible that these articles were published principally to introduce Japan's educational model and to show some specific aspects of Japanese education to a non-Japanese readership. These subjects were of great interest outside Japan as international attention was drawn to the country's remarkable economic success from the 1980s to the 1990s.

In the second half of the 1990s, a tendency continued whereby articles were written mainly to introduce the peculiarities of Japanese education. At the same time, with regard to higher education, articles emerged that situated Japan in the broader context of a global movement of higher educational reform. One article published in this period, for instance, was a comparative study of university governance in Japan and the United States written by Ehara (1998).

In the second half of the 1990s, publications of several articles studying education in countries other than Japan or those that reviewed the methodological approaches of the discipline were still few in number. These articles included, for example, the one discussing the perceptions of gender roles among Japanese and Chinese students studying in American universities (Matsui 1995) and on a critical review of research methods of comparative education (Rust et al. 1999). Many of these articles were written by Japanese scholars either teaching or studying at universities in the United States, with some of them being co-authored by their American colleagues.

The 2000s saw a further diversification in research themes. Many articles discussing Japan alone typically presented challenges that the nation experienced at the time, such as school phobia (school refusal) and bullying, which were widely perceived as negative effects of the conventional model of Japanese education characterized by an excessive focus on academic performance. In addition to such specifically Japanese themes, there was an emergence of articles that examined contemporary educational challenges commonly experienced by several countries in the course of advancing globalization. Particularly noteworthy was an increase in the number of articles discussing development education, citizenship education, education for children of foreign origin, and multicultural education, reflecting a growing national and international interest in these subjects.

From the mid-2000s, the diversification of research themes progressed further in concurrence with the diversification of regions covered by research, as discussed in the previous section. Among the papers on Japan, Keita Takayama, who teaches at the University of New England, Australia, and Yoko Motani, who taught at the University of California, Davis, presented discussions on the impact of globalization on educational reform in Japan and on the politics of "educational borrowing" (Motani 2002, 2005; Takayama 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2012; Takayama and Apple 2008). There was also a slight increase in the number of articles comparing education between economically advanced countries other than Japan. For example, there was a comparative study of education in the United States and South Korea and that of Canada and the United States. In addition, during this period, there were articles discussing education across the world or in developing countries as a whole, based on large-scale survey data. These articles were mainly written by researchers who were teaching in the universities in Western Europe/North America after their postgraduate study or who were working in international organizations.

As stated in the previous section, the second half of the 2000s also saw a marked increase in the number of articles about education in Sub-Saharan Africa, East Asia and the Pacific, and South and West Asia. Reflecting this change, many articles published during this period featured diverse themes of educational challenges in these regions, including teacher training, collaborative learning, literacy education, early childhood education, the role of NGO, the introduction of fee-free education, and the decentralization of education. Such trends continued beyond 2010, with a variety of themes that include teachers as key agents for education quality, inclusive education, low-fee private schools, gender in education, and education in conflict situations. These themes appear to reflect a growing international attention to the issues of quality and equity of education in developing countries, which were argued to be compromised partly as a result of the prioritization of access to schooling in the previous periods.

Many researchers who published articles about education in developing countries in leading Japanese journals since the latter half of 2000s worked at Japanese universities or bilateral/multilateral aid organizations after completing their doctoral studies, mostly at universities in the West. In addition, alumni of graduate schools and research centers specializing in international education development that were newly established in Japan in the 1990s and later (notably those at Hiroshima University and Nagoya University) have also had papers published in international academic journals with a growing frequency. These researchers share a common characteristic, in that they actively strive to publish their papers in English language international journals from the early stages of their academic careers, regardless of their Japanese language publication records.

Finally, there has been a slight increase in the number of theoretical study and studies reviewing the methodological approaches to the sociology of education and comparative education since 2010. The authors of such articles include Keita Takayama of the University of New England in Australia and several other Japanese scholars engaging in joint research with Jeremy Rappleye at Kyoto University (e.g., Takayama 2011; Rappleye and Komatsu 2016). These researchers have begun to critically examine conventional research methodology that used to be dominated by Western scholars and propose the need for alternative frameworks for analyzing education in a post-global era. Such a trend had hardly existed until the mid-2000s.

Japanese researchers have also begun to actively offer theoretical discussions in the field of higher education since the 2010s, as exemplified by Akiyoshi Yonezawa, who has been publishing articles on mobility within the academic profession in East Asia (e.g., Yonezawa et al. 2016). In addition, researchers affiliated to leading Japanese universities in the field of higher education, such as Jun Oba at the Hiroshima University Research Institute for Higher Education, Takeshi Kushimoto of the Institute for Excellence in Higher Education at Tohoku University, and Yoko Kobayashi at Iwate University, have been actively publishing articles in international academic journals.

With regard to higher education, it would also be useful to take a look at the trends of papers by Japanese authors published in *Higher Education*, a major international journal in the field of higher education research, although it was not included as a sample journal for investigation in our study. From 1990 to 2009, the majority of Japanese researchers' articles published in this journal appeared in a special issue on Japan, namely, vol. 33 (1997) and vol. 43 (2002).[7] Since 2010, however, and although there has been no special issue on Japan in this journal, eight

[7] From 1990 to 1999, a total of 12 papers by Japanese authors were published in *Higher Education*, of which 10 were in the special issue on Japan; from 2000 to 2009, a total of 12 were published, of which 8 were in the special issue.

papers have been published as general peer-reviewed articles.[8] This evidence together may suggest that a growing number of Japanese researchers who work in the field of higher education are becoming capable of actively contributing to the international scholarly discussion.

14.6 Conclusion

In the preceding sections, we have demonstrated that Japanese researchers have steadily increased their presence in the international scholarly community of the sociology of education and related fields, particularly in the field of comparative education, international education development, and higher education, through efforts to publish works in leading international academic journals. By analyzing changes in themes and the focus regions of these articles over this period, we have observed certain shifts in the roles that Japanese scholars have played in the international scholarly community over the years.

In the 1990s, their role was mainly limited to introducing the certain phenomenon of Japanese education to non-English readers as something "peculiar" to Japan. In those days, cases were presented in articles as uniquely Japanese phenomena and were rarely articulated from the perspective of contemporary theoretical debates on the sociology of education or comparative education. Such academic efforts to particularize Japanese education – what was called a "discourse of particularity" by Takayama (2011) – continued throughout the 2000s. However, several Japanese scholars if not in a large number – have also started attempting to discuss certain topic of Japanese education by articulating theories about contemporary educational issues or the influence of globalization of educational policy. In the 2010s, there has been an emergence of Japanese scholars – albeit still extremely limited in number – who attempt to conduct critical reviews of theories and methodologies adopted in the discipline that have traditionally been constructed in the West.

In the sociology of education or comparative education, a global hierarchy of knowledge production has long existed whereby Western scholars have constructed the theoretical framework, which researchers in other parts of the world have accepted and used rather uncritically (Takayama 2011). In light of this situation, challenging the existing world system of knowledge production should be beneficial for the promotion of intellectual pluralization and relativization. As noted earlier, however, there are only a small number of Japanese researchers attempting to make this type of academic contribution in English language publications, one of them being Keita Takayama.

[8] Note that the Japanese authors' article published in *Higher Education* basically concerns Japan only, addressing such themes as the Japanese university system and the internationalization of Japanese higher education. A small number of article that treat other countries do so in comparison with Japan, and no paper addresses other countries alone (the number of papers studying Japan alone, 29; comparing Japan with other countries:

Our analysis revealed that the limited number of Japanese scholars who wrote about education in Japan, either alone or in comparison with other developed nations, engaged themselves actively with contemporary theoretical debates mostly to teach and/or conduct research at the universities in Western countries after being trained. This is probably not surprising given that in Western universities, the number of published works in well- recognized, international peer-reviewed journals typically serves as an important criteria for hiring and promoting faculty. Japanese universities and research institutions do not attach as much importance to them, except perhaps in the case of researchers in the field international development. In order to change this situation, it seems necessary to build systems that can enable Japanese universities to encourage faculty to have research work published in major international journals. On the other hand, as Takayama (2011) noted, it should be remembered that thriving to have research work published in "international" journals often requires non-Western scholars, including Japanese scholars, to conform to certain theoretical traditions developed in English language scholarship, which may perpetuate global the hierarchy of knowledge production to some extent.

Our analysis also reveals a trend of diversification of geographical regions dealt with by Japanese scholarly articles since the 2000s. More specifically, there was a marked increase in articles about education systems in Sub-Saharan Africa, East Asia and the Pacific, and South and West Asia since 2000s, whereas the focus on geographical regions was predominantly limited to Japan, North America, and Western Europe in the 1990s. Such geographical diversification is mainly driven by the marked increase in articles published in two journals, namely, the *International Journal of Educational Development* and *Compare*, by Japanese researchers and practitioners who have interest in international educational development. It is noteworthy that these articles typically drew upon contemporary theoretical frameworks and debates, unlike many of the Japanese articles about education in Japan, as discussed above. Interestingly, the diversification of geographical regions in Japanese researchers' articles occurred at a time when the Japanese government embarked on its full-fledged official assistance to basic education in developing countries in the 1990s so as to contribute to the achievement of the globally adopted goal of Education for All (EFA) in 1990. The increase in the number of journal articles about education by Japanese authors can be to some extent attributed to Japan's deliberate efforts to foster practitioners and researchers in international educational development with relevant competence who can play an active role in global fora. Such effort may have been necessary when Japan strove to increase its influence and presence in the international community through its contribution to the EFA agenda while ensuring the effective implementation of individual educational development projects. Our data demonstrates that Japanese researchers' articles about education in less developed countries have been steadily increasing even after 2010. It is worth pointing out that these Japanese scholars include not only those who have completed postgraduate studies in the West but also those who have been trained domestically at such universities such as Hiroshima University and Nagoya University. The increase in articles in leading international journals by Japanese researchers who were educated at Japanese universities is encouraging, in that it may contribute to the plurality of knowledge production in international education development or the sociology of/comparative education that were traditionally dominated by Western universities (Takayama 2011).

Meanwhile, despite their geographical diversification, the majority of countries studied in comparison with Japan continue to be Western countries, along with a small number of middle- to high-income East Asian countries such as Hong Kong and Malaysia. In this study, no articles were found that attempted to compare Japanese education systems to those of low-income developing countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, Southeast Asia, and South Asia. This can be explained by the different research orientation of two types of scholars. As Yamada (2013, 2015) pointed out, while Japanese scholars tend to study education in Western Europe and North America in order to draw some useful lessons for Japan, some scholars whose locus of research being educational development of less developed countries are more oriented toward influencing policy and practices of the country or countries they study. It may be plausible that the latter type of scholars is not particularly interested in extracting lesson for Japan from the education system and practices of the less developed countries that they study.

Nevertheless, as globalization continues to advance, there is a growing need to relativize the practice of policy borrowing. To this end, pursuing research comparing the Japanese education system of the schooling of non-Western countries including East Asia and the Pacific, South and West Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin America may hold a potential to help accumulate a new body of knowledge that can lead to fresh insights. This opinion is also in tune with the shift of focus in Japan's international cooperation from unilateral assistance to mutual learning through collaboration with developing countries.

Finally, contrary to the rapid growth of research on developing countries, there has been very limited number of research publications by Japanese scholars in international journals that examine education systems and practices in the developed countries other than Japan, either as a single-country study or a study comparing between different non-Japanese developed countries. Moreover, the total absence of Latin/Central and South America, the Middle East, Central Asia, and Russia as focus regions in articles by Japanese scholars published in the international journals is striking. We can argue that more published articles on education systems and practices in these currently underrepresented regions by Japanese scholars in international journals might be desirable, for the advancement and pluralization of knowledge to build a base in sociology of education and related fields.

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Chapter 15
Achievements and Future Challenges in Japan's Sociology of Education: Sociologization, Pedagogization, and Resociologization

Takayasu Nakamura

Abstract When considering the trends in the Japanese sociology of education over the 70 years since the end of World War II, there have been several significant changes in the nature and social position of the sociology of education within the academic history of expansion and development. These changes can be further understood by focusing on (1) the relationship between the sociology of education in Japan and research trends in Western sociology, (2) the relationship between the sociology of education and pedagogy in Japan, and (3) the relationship between the sociology of education and changes in Japanese society itself.

This chapter focuses on these three relationships to provide an overview of the characteristics and the future direction of postwar Japanese sociology of education.

It is evident that it lacks transmission of research results to other countries. So, the future task for Japanese researchers in the sociology of education is to demonstrate the significance of their research on Japanese education to international sociology of education markets.

This chapter, a slightly modified version of the original article entitled "Sociologization, Pedagogization, and Resociologization: Has the Post-war Japanese Sociology of Education Suffered from the Galapagos Syndrome?" (Nakamura 2013) was reproduced with the original publisher's permission.

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A. Yonezawa et al. (eds.), *Japanese Education in a Global Age*, Education in the Asia-Pacific Region: Issues, Concerns and Prospects 46,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-1528-2_15

15.1 Establishment and Development of the Sociology of Education in Japan

The terms "educational sociology" and "sociology of education" (both referred to as *Kyoiku Shakaigaku* in Japanese) may have first been used in Japan during the 1920s. The oldest book in Japan that includes the term "educational sociology" in its title is *Educational Sociology* (Tasei 1922). In the United States, *The Journal of Educational Sociology* was established in 1927 (Karabel and Halsey 1977). Based on the assumption that a specialist journal indicates a more mature state of field development, it is possible that the sociology of education began earlier in the United States than in Japan, though the time lapse between the two is not as significant. At the very least, the sociology of education was "imported" to Japan before World War II.

Nevertheless, the full-fledged establishment and development of the sociology of education as an academic discipline occurred after the war. In 1948, workshops entitled "The Institute for Educational Leadership" were jointly held by Japan's Ministry of Education, Science, and Culture and the Civil Information and Education (CIE) Section of the General Headquarters, Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers, stationed in Japan. The objective of these workshops was to foster specialists in the study of education. The Japan Society of Educational Sociology was established in 1949, primarily by the university professors who participated in these workshops. This occurred 10 years before the establishment of the Japanese Association of Educational Psychology in 1959, which is currently the largest academic society relating to education in Japan. Furthermore, *The Journal of Educational Sociology* launched its first issue in 1951.

The institutional groundwork that became the foundation for the development of the sociology of education included implementing the sociology of education courses as part of the required university training for obtaining teaching licenses and creating teaching posts for sociology of education in the departments of education of universities across Japan. As part of their training, Japanese teachers must acquire the number of university credits stipulated by law in subjects related to their specific discipline (e.g., teaching methods for mathematics and science) as well as subjects related to the teaching profession in general (e.g., teaching theory and educational counseling). A course on Social, Institutional, and Administrative Matters Related to Education was required for teachers to obtain accreditation. Because this content is related to the sociology of education, courses on the sociology of education and a full-time post in the discipline were introduced to the educational departments of universities across the country.

Courses on the sociology of education were instituted as "experimental courses" at national universities, which serve as key centers for researcher training, and the resulting increase in government funding was a significant step in the postwar development of the sociology of education as a discipline. In 1973, standard sociology of education courses was reestablished as experimental courses at the University of Tokyo, Nagoya University, and Osaka University. Following this, courses in sociology of education were also reorganized at nationally run research universities across Japan as experimental courses (Hashimoto and Ito 1999). Thus, this institutional groundwork enabled the training of researchers who specialize in the sociology of education.

Building on this institutional groundwork, the sociology of education discipline continues to expand and develop in Japan. Currently, the Japan Society of Educational Sociology includes approximately 1500 members, and *The Journal of Educational Sociology* recently published issue No. 102 in 2018. With the diminished influence of pedagogy in recent years, this has been replaced by sociology of education as the focus of educational research, and its weight within the field has become comparatively larger than in the past. For example, the majority of critical discourses on the Japanese government's more relaxed approach to education (*yutori* education) with regard to the decline in scholastic ability (which has become a societal problem since the late 1990s) has been authored by academics in the sociology of education.

When considering the trends in the Japanese sociology of education over the 70 years following the end of World War II, there have been several significant changes in the nature and social position of the sociology of education within the academic history of expansion and development. These changes can be further understood by focusing on (1) the relationship between the sociology of education in Japan and research trends in Western sociology, (2) the relationship between the sociology of education and pedagogy in Japan, and (3) the relationship between the sociology of education and changes in Japanese society itself.

As its primary task, this chapter focuses on these three relationships to provide an overview of the characteristics and the future direction of postwar Japan's sociology of education. The keywords of this chapter are sociologization, pedagogization, resociologization, and the Galapagos syndrome.[1] The secondary task of this chapter is to then examine whether postwar Japan's sociology of education has suffered from the Galapagos syndrome when compared to the international standard of the field.

15.2 Impact of Western Sociology

Like other academic fields, the sociology of education in Japan has responded strongly to cutting-edge theories and approaches of the West. A particular source of influence in the sociology of education in Japan is the trend of texts in periodic

[1] "Galapagos syndrome" is a frequently used term in Japanese business circles to mockingly refer to technologies advancing in a form that lacks compatibility with other countries (referencing the animals of the Galapagos Islands who evolved uniquely in a closed environment). As Japanese mobile phones have been developed quite differently from their international counterparts, incorporating unique specifications in accordance with the demands of the Japanese market, this phenomenon is often referred to as reflective of the Galapagos syndrome.

English publications. Specifically, volumes on the sociology of education edited by Halsey et al. (1962, 1997), Karabel and Halsey (1977), and Lauder et al. (2006) have been translated into Japanese and introduced as definitive texts in the field of sociology of education. In particular, the opening paper in Karabel and Halsey's (1977) edited volume was widely read among Japanese academics in the field of sociology of education and essentially became required readings in the history of the sociology of education. In addition, the five classifications of theory consisting of functionalism, human capital theory, methodological empiricism, conflict theory, and the "new" sociology of education has long provided the theoretical orientation of this discipline.

Nevertheless, these theories became insufficiently referenced by the time the third wave of readings became available in the 1990s. This trend probably relates to the shift of focus that occurred with many educational researchers toward the education reforms progressing rapidly since the 1980s. As a result, an opening review paper by Brown et al. (1997) did not have as much impact in Japan as the 1977 paper "Educational research" by Karabel and Halsey.

Although the Japanese translation of Lauder et al.'s (2006) latest edited volume on the sociology of education has had a lesser impact on Japanese researchers compared to Karabel and Halsey's 1977 work, Lauder et al.'s (2006) paper, "The Prospects for Education: Individualization, Globalization and Social change," is strikingly indicative of the current trends in the sociology of education. Specifically, the three sections of this paper reflect the following: (1) the lack of clarity in the theoretical forecast of current sociology of education research; (2) the inclination toward debates (not theories) of contemporary society as represented in the late modernity arguments, especially in conjunction with the previous point; and (3) the strong need for policy science. These points unexpectedly coincide with trends in the Japanese sociology of education; therefore, the Japanese sociology of education may not be suffering from the Galapagos syndrome.

Even so, the speed with which educational sociologists from a non-English-speaking country acquire information will naturally be slower if research papers are provided in a nonnative language. This tendency is visible especially in humanities containing sociology; therefore, the availability of translations exerts noticeable influence on research trends in Japan, including not only academic texts but also books. Fortunately, books by Bowles and Gintis (1976) and Willis (1977) have been promptly translated by Japanese economists. As a result, the arguments of Bowles and Gintis (1976) and Willis (1977) have been referenced frequently in Japanese research. Other significant studies by Cicourel and Kitsuse (1963), Collins (1979), Bourdieu and Passeron (1970), and Bernstein (1975) are also frequently incorporated into Japanese studies through translation.

However, if the Japanese translation of a research paper is not readily available, with the exception of researchers interested in the particular field, it will not be known to most, for example, papers and books by Meyer, Rosenbaum, and Archer are rarely translated. Because of the problems associated with obtaining translations of research originally published in other languages, younger educational sociologists pursuing themes that are not explicitly related to the topic of such papers may not have had the opportunity to read these materials. In this sense, the Japanese sociology of education may have been suffering from the Galapagos syndrome for quite some time.

On the other hand, the Japanese sociology of education strove to differentiate itself from pedagogy as a survival strategy. As part of this effort, academics in the sociology of education fervently consumed the latest developments in Japanese sociology and, by extension, Western developments in sociology. For example, in the 1960s and 1970s when Parsons' structural functionalism became popular in Japanese sociology, many sociologists of education in Japan incorporated it into their research; conversely, when it was criticized in the 1980s, sociology of education scholars also incorporated these criticisms. When ethnomethodology was introduced into sociology, sociology of education research influenced by ethnomethodology began to appear. Then, when social scientists became interested in Foucault in the 1990s, his research also became popular in the sociology of education. The late modernity theories of Giddens (1991) and Beck (1986) are currently popular. Therefore, the postwar Japanese sociology of education has been fortifying its foundation as a field in sociology by following the research trends in the West and sociology. Therefore, the experience of the Galapagos syndrome suffered by Japanese sociology of education seems to be a cyclical occurrence.

15.3 Historical Relationship with Pedagogy and the Recent Pedagogization

The postwar Japanese sociology of education has experienced some restrictions in its historical relationship with pedagogy. These restrictions stem from the fact that pedagogy, which has long been central to the field of education, existed prior to the sociology of education. In addition, pedagogy has been an extremely normative academic field. Therefore, the postwar Japanese sociology of education has had two aspects through its scholastic characteristic as a sociology that studies the field of education, an area filled with normative discourses. Firstly, it differentiated itself from normative pedagogy by adopting a sociological approach of disassociating itself from education in order to observe it as the target of analysis. Secondly, it would be required to pursue practical and normative interests of the educational field that cannot be satisfied by simply applying sociological approaches to educational phenomena. By taking this position, the Japanese sociology of education moved to a precarious position that required balancing these two aspects. Yoshihiro Shimizu, who led the postwar sociology of education, called such an approach "policy science" (Shimizu 1978). Supposing that factual science stands against normative science, Shimizu objected to the assignment of the sociology of education as exclusive to factual science (these are discussions in the same vein as those that converted educational sociology to the sociology of education, as indicated by Brookover (1949). To sublimate both sides, Shimizu positioned policy science as a discipline that, while still factual science, commits to some of the demands of normative science. Shimizu's approach represents a strong resistance to those who aimed to dissolve all issues related to the sociology of education by focusing purely on the academic interests of sociology while still emphasizing the distancing of the sociology of education from normative pedagogy.

At any rate, the balance between academic and normative interests – which will be referred to in this chapter as a sense of equilibrium within the sociology of education – continues today. In fact, some have suggested that this approach has borne fruit for the sociology of education. For example, Amano (1990) stated that the sociology of education was located in a "remote region," farthest from the center of sociology or pedagogy. Furthermore, he claimed that this "remoteness" allowed specialists in the sociology of education to explore the frontiers of education, committing to solving the tangible problems that have been disparaged by previous academics, including examinations, educational credentialism, and economic development (Amano 1990).

Nevertheless, the future of the sociology of education is less optimistic. Given the current situation lacking any clear prospects, there have been increased calls for educational reforms that are better adapted to the times. In line with this development, scholars of sociology of education are increasingly being asked to propose and support normative and policy-advising initiatives. Several such scholars are now serving as specialist committee members on councils in the Japanese government and municipalities or have made sociological comments via mass media. This trend is more prevalent today than it was in the past; however, this has dulled the sense of equilibrium within the sociology of education and, as a result, may have shaken up the sociological foundations of the sociology of education as a discipline. I refer to this trend as the "pedagogization" of the sociology of education.

As discussed at length in the next section, the topics central to Japanese sociology of education research today include poverty, the precarious state of employment for young people, and the lowering of scholastic ability. All of these topics are closely related to normative propositions, as follows: poverty that needs to be eradicated, the number of job-hopping part-timers that should be reduced, and scholastic ability that must be improved. As long as these normative propositions exist within the sociology of education, presenting opposing ideas will require a great deal of courage. Conversely, ideas that stem from or confirm the norm are easily presented and unlikely to receive criticism, even if they lack substantial proof. Accordingly, studies increasingly use the terms "political/practical implication" to refer to normative statements that are appended conclusively, despite containing a weak referential basis. Thus, the sense of equilibrium within the sociology of education seems to have been paralyzed (this point will be further discussed in the last chapter).

15.4 Japanese Society and the Sociology of Education

As described above, the postwar Japanese sociology of education has experienced cycles of sociologization and pedagogization, depending on what perspective exerted greater influence on the discipline. In addition, these shifts reflect changes



Fig. 15.1 Social change and education in postwar Japan. (Data sources: Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology. *School Basic Survey*. Statistical Survey Department, Statistic Bureau, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications. *Labour Force Survey*)

in Japanese society. This section will chronologically discuss the research trends in the sociology of education in relation to social changes in Japan.

Figure 15.1 overlays changes in the postwar Japanese educational system with social and economic changes. To capture the changes in the educational system, Fig. 15.1 includes several important factors such as the state of school advancement, population dynamics of children, the political and economic situations, educational reforms, and trends in public opinion. In this section, the postwar period will be divided into three periods and examined with an emphasis on population dynamics.[2]

The first period began with postwar reconstruction and ended in the mid-1960s. The first half of this period occurred prior to the rule of the Liberal Democratic Party. The educational policies of the time were strongly influenced by the US occupational administration and included characteristics of a democratic progressive education. Then, political stability and economic growth developed in the latter half of this period. The Liberal Democratic Party was established as a single-party government system from the merger of conservative parties, and stable, conservative administration by the ruling party continued for some time. Throughout this period, economic growth increased, and national control strengthened even in the educational system, and industry structures were greatly transformed as primary industries steadily declined. A population shift from farming villages to cities occurred, and academic qualifications became an important means to facilitate such movement. Nevertheless, the higher education advancement rate only rose to 15%, and upper secondary education had not yet become the norm. In this sense, it was a transient time. Before the mid-1960s, it was an elite higher education phase (Trow 1974) in Japan. As the major wave of the first baby boomers reached upper secondary education (as indicated with a ★ in Fig. 15.1), the educational environment changed greatly.

According to Baba's aggregated bibliography of *Sociology of Education* research journals in Japan by research field, studies related to regional society and education were the most common during this period at 22.2% (Baba 1964). The prevalence of these studies was because of the increased role of local administration in education demanded during the postwar democratic reform and the interest of sociology of education academics on the impact of major changes in farming communities due to the shift in the industry. Furthermore, there were growing concerns leading up to the early 1960s that attendance by the baby boomer generation and the rapid growth of school advancement would further increase the existing competition within the educational system. Prominent Japanese sociology of education academics of the time discussed this issue (Nagai 1957; Shimizu 1957; Shinbori 1955).

The second period, extending from the mid-1960s to the 1990s, saw the expansion of high schools and universities because of the manpower policy and educational demands until the mid-1970s. Simultaneously, teachers developed unions to oppose state control of education (this is the same construct as the Socialist Party of Japan, which opposed the Liberal Democratic Party that securely held the political majority). This pattern continued until the 1980s. Influenced by the oil crisis, the

[2] When classifying postwar Japan's education into time periods, they are commonly divided among 3 years (1955, 1975, and 1990) to coincide with the increase and stagnation of school advancement rates. However, due to the significant impacts that the second set of baby boomers and the declining birth rate have had on Japan's educational structure, this chapter adopts a classification based on population dynamics, based on the assumption that the classifications ignoring population dynamics are biased.

latter half of this period saw policies that restrained higher education accompanied by continued stagnation of university and college advancement rates. During this period, the entire school system including universities experienced various issues as upper secondary education became the universal phase and higher education became the mass phase.

The criticism of the "examination hell" that was voiced during the first period should have been settled with the spread of education. However, with the emergence of the second baby boomer generation in the education market, the image of educational expansion was generally maintained, and the typical postwar criticism of intense competition within the educational system remained prevalent until the late 1980s. At the same time, the number of students who unwillingly attended school increased dramatically. During this period, issues such as bullying, school nonattendance, and school violence increased.

Some have observed that the pre-existing hierarchical structure became even more explicit as high schools expanded in the 1960s to accommodate the first baby boomers. In conjunction with this trend, sociology of education research began focusing on the disparity between high schools. With tracking research in the Japanese definition (which deals with not within-school track but between-school track) picking up pace, research results on school problems also began to accumulate, as mentioned in a later section of this chapter.

Furthermore, virtually everyone started enrolling in secondary education, and the increase in the advancement rate to universities became a research focus for sociology of education academics. As a result, research studies on mass higher education were widely conducted. Furthermore, deconstructionism began to appear, characterized by studies that questioned the school system against the backdrop of educational expansion. These studies linked themselves to the Western postmodern philosophy that came into Japan during the 1980s (Fujita 1992). Shigeo Mori exemplifies the research from this period. Mori built on the arguments of Foucault and Ariès to suggest that not only is education a product of modern times but education is itself modernity (Mori 1988).

The third period saw the bursting of the economic bubble, the end of the single-party rule of the Liberal Democratic Party, and the beginning of a coalition government. In the field of education, the university advancement rate continued to increase despite the stagnation of the Japanese economy. This trend resulted from the increasing number of universities by the easing of regulations, despite the decreasing number of children.[3] Furthermore, policies based on progressive education, conceived as a reflexive response to the school issues that erupted in the 1980s, were realized one after another. Examples include the introduction of criterion-referenced evaluations, the reduction of learning contents by 30%, the creation of class time for comprehensive learning (the "Period for Integrated Studies"), and the market-oriented proposal to introduce a school choice system. We can call the reform that occurred in the nineteenth century, as Japan commenced modernization, the first educational

[3]Although the number of universities totalled 507 in 1990, the number in 2016 grew to 777, a growth of 1.5 times.

reform. The second educational reform occurred after World War II and featured democratic principles. Accordingly, we can call the most recent reform, aimed at correcting long-standing distortions to the postwar educational system, the third educational reform.

Many sociology of education academics have not been receptive to the third educational reform. Although the diversification of educational assessments, easing of educational curricula, and introduction of a school choice system seem to increase the freedom of those receiving education, there are significant social reasons why these reforms were not instituted previously. In particular, academics of sociology of education argue that these reforms often increase social disparities.

The trend of deconstructionist theoretical studies persisted in the early 1990s. After this time, research influenced by postmodernism shifted toward the study of specific subjects, as exemplified by historical and discourse research (e.g., Hirota 2001). A growing number of researchers started to analyze and present the social disparity in education (e.g., Kariya 2001). With the tightening of the labor market, more researchers focused on young people with part-time employment and unemployed people whose academic qualifications included only a high school degree. Research on gender and minorities also increased, especially as more women began to attend high schools and universities, leading to their greater social presence, and a large number of immigrants arrived in Japan. Recently, the third educational reform has been criticized because of anxieties engendered by the prolonged recession and political disorder. Declining scholastic abilities, evidenced by Japan's decreasing rank on the international academic ability survey in early 2000s, was the biggest educational issue in Japan during the 2000s. To address this issue, researchers began using data from the Program for International Student Assessment (PISA) to quantitatively analyze scholastic abilities, which is becoming a genre in itself. Research on child poverty, viewed as a contributing factor to social anxiety, also increased significantly. Finally, researchers have increasingly turned their attention to youth.

15.5 Accomplishments of the Sociology of Education in Japan

The Japanese sociology of education has been influenced greatly by changes in Japanese education and society and the characteristics of Japanese academia. In this sense, the sociology of education in Japan has developed independent of international trends in the sociology of education. As a result, the Japanese sociology of education may have suffered from the Galapagos syndrome. Yet, the sociology of education in Japan was proactive in catching up with the sociology of education in Western countries. Thus, sociology of education research in Japan of Japanese social phenomena may have the potential to be exchanged as information valuable for sociology of education researchers in Western countries.

In fact, researchers within the Japanese sociology of education have conducted several significant studies of such potential value, some of which are discussed in this section in order to highlight characteristic trends in Japanese sociology of education research with considerations to international research trends.

15.5.1 Japanese Development of Educational Expansion

As Fig. 15.1 shows, upper secondary education had begun to be universalized in Japan by the 1970s. As a result of this trend, discussions on educational expansion began to focus on higher education. Because higher education was not frequently addressed in other educational research fields, many academics of sociology of education had studied higher education from an early stage. Shimizu, Shinbori, and Nagai authored significant papers on higher education. This research tradition was continued by Morikazu Ushiogi, Makoto Aso, and Ikuo Amano. Ushiogi conducted significant studies on the basis of extensive knowledge of German university history, which became the model for modern Japanese universities (e.g., Ushiogi 1973). As a specialist in the research of the elite, Aso is known for clarifying the formation of elites in modern Japan (Aso 1967).

Trow's (1974) theory on the developmental stages of higher education received particular attention because of its translation by Kazuyuki Kitamura and Ikuo Amano. At the time, mass higher education had been achieved only in the United States and Japan. Although the historical circumstances that led Japan to model its system of higher education on the United States firmly remained, the two researchers began to wonder if the social and institutional circumstances of higher educational expansion in Japan differed from the circumstances in America. For example, Amano (1978) noted that American higher educational expansion was supported by land-grant colleges, while private universities were largely responsible for Japanese higher educational expansion. Amano attributes this development to prewar specialized training colleges that were previously marginalized within higher education before the war but many of which had later transformed into private universities after the war (Amano 1978). In other words, Japan had to prepare an institutional structure responsive to educational demands to support educational expansion, which he generalized that privately funded universities became central to this institutional structure in Japan. Thus, Amano's research on the development of Japanese higher education remains uncontested even today.

In addition, 2-year junior colleges retain a certain proportion within Japanese higher education. Most of the students enrolled at junior colleges are females, even though there are no institutional constrains on gender. While junior colleges have had a positive impact on the educational expansion of women, some consider them a device that segregates males and females when a comparison with university is made from a gender perspective. Masako Amano referred to the junior college education as a women-specific track (Amano 1986).

15.5.2 Japanese Tracking System and Meritocracy

Secondary education was universalized in Japan by the 1970s, and higher education became popular soon after it gained popularity in the United States. These observations may indicate that Japan is a contest mobility society where the selection of elites is postponed, as Turner (1960) previously suggested. However, several developments during the expansion of upper secondary education indicate that this may be inaccurate. First, a clear hierarchical structure developed among high schools due to the difficulty level of student selection as differentiated by school. Second, the prewar hierarchical structure present among universities, which was based on entrance difficulty levels, expanded while retaining the same proportions. Therefore, to understand Japanese education and the school selection system, the disparities between schools or universities needed to be considered.

These situations of disparity also affected how tracking was imported into Japanese sociology of education. In Japan, the hierarchical structures that developed between schools were understood as functional equivalents of the American tracking system within the school. Because the tracking concept was easy to use, a vast amount of research was conducted by Japanese scholars on topics such as the relationship between tracking and student culture and tracking and social stratification.

Furthermore, since high school and university entrance exams also screened students for particular career paths and achievable strata, many researchers focused on the warming up and cooling out of students' aspirations for advancement in school. While addressing the cooling out concept of Clark (1960), Amano (1982, 2011) and Takeuchi (1990, 1995) considered that the expanded Japanese educational system warmed up student aspirations internally but inevitably also cooled down aspirations of those students filtered out of the school selection process. In addition, Takeuchi indicated that because of the clearly defined high school hierarchy unique to Japan, a rewarming-up process existed even for students with lower grades who, at first glance, seemed to have diminished aspirations for educational advancement by losing the competition. As part of the rewarming-up process, students would have the incentive to aim for a slightly higher-ranking high school. Thus, Takeuchi proposed that the characteristic educational competition of Japanese meritocracy became visible as a result of an autonomous reaction by the education system to this mechanism.

15.5.3 Academic Career-Based Society and "Transition Without Intermission"

Discussions of meritocracy are closely related to discussions of academic career-based society. In Japan, societal concerns focus more on an academic career-based society, which is characterized by career selection on the basis of educational background, than hierarchical and class issues. As a result, research by Dore (1976) has been widely accepted in Japan to account for Japanese academic career issues that are absent in the west. Similarly, arguments regarding economics of education can also be taken to address the aforementioned academic career-based issue. Yano used Becker's framework to conduct a calculation of the rate of return to education and found that advancement to university is reasonable in Japan (Yano 1991). Thurow's (1975) job competition model was also introduced quickly into Japan and generated interesting and indicative results. His argument for using statistical discrimination to measure, on the premise that on-the-job training (OJT) is given within the internal labor market, a candidate's trainability index based solely on an educational background when information is insufficiently provided, is highly compatible with the Japanese labor market. In the Japanese labor market, the educational background has long been used as an index for employment selection screening for potential long-term employees, due to insufficient information stemming from a lack of an intermission period during the transition from school to work. Therefore, it was recognized that the "transition without intermission" had enforced the social trend of emphasizing educational backgrounds.

The impact that the "transition without intermission" exerted on the educational system has not been limited to the issues of an academic career-based society, as exemplified by research on high school graduate employees conducted by Amano and other researchers (Amano et al. 1988). In other societies, the transition from school to work usually raises issues regarding youth and educated unemployment, unstable employment, and those who are not in employment, education, or training (NEET). However, in Japan, the lack of intermission between school and work was in fact the very issue. The practice of "transition without intermission" was widespread among university graduates and non-elite high school graduates, fueled by the high labor demand associated with economic growth during the "postwar economic miracle." For hiring students from vocational high schools with no previous exposure to the labor market, companies requested the same high schools to provide them yearly referrals. This led to a system where students were selected on the basis of school standards (and eventually on the basis of grades) not directly related to the occupations. While this system may seem unreasonable, using school grades as a trainability index was in fact effective, and this provided the companies with a network allowing them to secure employees with consistent quality every year without incurring any cost. Kariya and colleagues have conceptualized this as an institutional network or linkage (Kariya 1988; Kariya and Rosenbaum 1995), distinct from a personal network as Granovetter (1974) emphasized.[4]

[4] As indicated in Fig. 15.1, the rate of economic growth has decreased in recent years. In addition, because the number of employees whose final qualification is a high school degree decreased with the surge in the school advancement rate, many researchers have stated that this network has steadily ceased to function.

15.5.4 Schools Under the Competitive System and Japanese School Issues

The issue of competition in school entrance exams, which has affected the entirety of postwar Japanese society, was also addressed in sociology of education research. Because of the impact of the "new" sociology of education and ethnomethodology during the 1980s, Japanese researchers began the qualitative exploration inside schools. The fieldwork on examinations conducted by Yamamura (1982) exemplifies this development, using the research of Cicourel and Kitsuse (1963) as their model. Despite the difficulty of conducting investigative research in schools even today, Yamamura and colleagues were able to conduct extremely detailed fieldwork. They analyzed school test papers, observed test taking, and recorded meetings among middle school students, their parents, and their teachers, vividly capturing the behind-the-scenes activities of the Japanese examination system.

Another significant development during the 1970s and 1980s was the eruption of social issues in schools, as seen in Fig. 15.1, accompanied by many school researches performed on their respective topics. Morita and Kiyonaga (1986) were the central figures in research on these issues, which included bullying and school nonattendance. The discussion on bullying occurred in Japan earlier than in other countries. Morita and Kiyonaga separated the characteristics of bullying seen in Japan into a four-layer structure. More recently, the characteristics of bullying in Japan have also been examined in a large-scale international comparative research project (Smith et al. 1999). In addition, Morita (1991) has interpreted the phenomenon of school nonattendance in Japan from the standpoint of privatization, using the bond theory of Hirschi (1969) as a guide.

The constructionism of Kitsuse and Spector (1977), which had been used to study similar school issues, was introduced to Japan in the 1980s. This analytical perspective has greatly affected Japanese sociology of education research, influencing many studies which perceived various education-related keywords as socially constructed elements (e.g., Kitazawa and Katagiri 2002).

Another research focus within the sociology of education has been school culture, with notable accumulation of studies in the cultures of teachers and students. This focus also includes a study on the relationship between school culture and gender by Kimura (1999). Kimura observed a classroom in a Japanese elementary school and found that male students made several utterances during class while female students made few utterances. Kimura (1999) interpreted these differences as a reflection of male "eloquence" and female "silence." In turn, Kimura argued that this difference renders the model of equality ineffective, even in Japanese elementary schools designed to be egalitarian. Instead, male students were unconscious agents who exercised a sexist ideology (Kimura 1999). The relationships Kimura observed between school culture and gender may be common globally. Kimura continues to theorize the relationship between school culture and the reproduction of gender within Japan from a Marxist feminist standpoint. Furthermore, the research by Kimura suggests that the significance of studies of Japanese school culture may retain a certain consistent message applicable to the international study of the sociology of education.

15.5.5 Japanese Class/Hierarchical Issues and Education

In addition to addressing gender discrimination, Kimura's research perspective also includes the investigation of class-based discrimination. However, the class-based discrimination seen in Britain is infrequent in Japan, and the middle-class consciousness is generally stronger. The lack of ethnic diversity in Japan provides few visual indices for discrimination, such as skin color or differences in clothing. Even in these circumstances, there have been cases of discrimination. The custom of calling those areas densely settled by people historically positioned as the lower-class "buraku," a people who are visually undistinguishable from others and often discriminated against, has persisted in some parts of Japan. Ikeda (2001) has examined the educational achievements in buraku regions.

There is value in examining class issues in Japan (e.g., Hashimoto 2003). Nevertheless, research such as that of Ishida (1993), which distances itself from Marxist class concepts in examining the Japanese hierarchy and education, would be considered a more orthodox type of education study in Japan. For example, Ishida has demonstrated through data the importance of the role of education with regard to the issue of intergenerational social mobility. In addition, Ishida (1993) exposed the surprising fact that Japan's strong emphasis on academic background, which was thought to be uniquely Japanese, is not that different from Britain or the United States.

Ishida built these arguments on data from the Social Stratification and Social Mobility (SSM) Survey. The SSM is a survey that has been conducted every 10 years since 1955 and is used by a number of Japanese sociology of education researchers in their studies. In the 1970s, the status attainment model of Blau and Dancan (1967) was applied to these survey data and confirmed the significance of education as a parameter of status attainment (Naoi and Fujita 1978). More recently, Kondo used a log-linear model to demonstrate that education mediates intergenerational status attainment processes over the long term (Kondo 2000). Kondo has also developed models that use the latent class model and the threshold model, which are advanced variations of a log-linear model (Kondo 1988, 1997). As these studies demonstrate, researchers who have developed quantitative methods in Japanese sociology of education have tended to use SSM data. Though these are not always provided in English, these types of research do provide a certain analytical standard for leading researchers of the field. This is an area of study that is expected to continue to conduct research and transmit its results to sociologists in the world.

15.6 Conclusion

It is not necessarily considered that the postwar Japanese sociology of education has suffered from the Galapagos syndrome. In part, this is because of the efforts of early sociology of education academics to absorb the latest arguments from overseas. However, it is evident that it lacks transmission of research results to other countries. Although removing the language barrier remains a difficulty, the future task for Japanese researchers in the sociology of education is to demonstrate the significance of their research on Japanese education to international sociology of education markets. The pedagogical sociology that is partly responsible for current normative discourse will not be able to accomplish this objective on its own, because the significance of these normative messages differs depending on their social contexts. In other words, the normative messages of pedagogical sociology are only transmitted to and resonate with Japan. The Japanese sociology of education especially seems to be experiencing a pedagogization similar to that of British sociology of education. To achieve a more generalized perspective and regain a sense of equilibrium within the Japanese sociology of education, a "resociologization" will be required for the sociology of education in Japan.[5]

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[5]The comments of the following scholars of sociology of education served as references for the concepts developed in this chapter: Kouichi Hashimoto; Kazushi Hirasawa; Wataru Nakazawa; Akira Sakai. I would like to extend my gratitude to each of them.

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Chapter 16
(Column 2) The East Asian Network in the Sociology of Education

Jason Chien-chen Chang

Abstract Sociologists of education in East Asia have a long past in making personal communications and informal networks but a relatively short history in making regular contacts and formal exchanges in organizational contexts internationally. This column focuses on the cross-cultural networking endeavors commenced since the first decade of the twenty-first century by some members of the region, namely, Mainland China, Taiwan, and Japan. The author goes along with the official documents of the "sociology of education" (or educational sociology) organizations in these countries or areas, including conference programs, meeting minutes, newsletters, online messages, and so on, to delineate the current accomplishments in instituting a sociology of education community in East Asia. As far as the future development is concerned, issues about how to enhance the community's vitality are discussed in the final part, such as involving Korea, Hong Kong, and other members of East Asia, encouraging younger generation, female scholars, and those who of sociology backgrounds to participate more and promoting international collaborative studies.

It can be said that there are three layers of academic exchange activities. The first is personal and thus amounts to informal connections between individual scholars. The second is a mix of formal and informal in the sense that scholars build networks and sometimes even friendships, through taking part in conferences and meetings held by academic organizations. The third is reciprocal exchange between academic partner organizations, in which formal norms of interaction are always followed.

This article highlights the formation and development of East Asian networks in the sociology of education, with a focus on the interactions of professional academic organizations across countries or regions. While a small number of global platforms among sociologists of education such as the International Sociological Association (ISA) and the American Educational Research Association (AERA) make significant contributions, here I would like to emphasize direct and official exchange between academic associations at the regional level as they arguably have

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A. Yonezawa et al. (eds.), *Japanese Education in a Global Age*, Education in the Asia-Pacific Region: Issues, Concerns and Prospects 46,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-1528-2_16

had a stronger impact in the development of a sociology of education in East Asia. These organized, official exchanges are in fact results of accumulated connections of members at levels one and two indicated above. Given that official exchanges related to the sociology of education in East Asia have primarily been between Japan, Taiwan, and China, this column offers a chronological account of how links have been made over the past two to three decades.

16.1 Networking Between Mainland China and Taiwan

The network between China and Taiwan began with the Chinese Professional Committee on the Sociology of Education (CPCSE) and the Taiwan Association for Sociology of Education (TASE). CPCSE[1] was established in April 1989 as an offshoot of The Chinese Society of Education (CSE) and has held biennial meetings and issued its *Sociology of Education Newsletter* periodically since 1991. TASE was founded roughly a decade later in June 2000 as an independent academic organization and has hosted annual meetings since then and published *Taiwan Journal of Sociology of Education* (TJSE) biannually from 2001.

Connections between the above two associations was made possible to a large extent by the efforts of professor Chin-hsu Lee of National Pingtung University in Taiwan. In the early 1990s, Lee participated in related activities of the Chinese circle of sociology of education, such as the translation of foundational texts in the sociology of education that were generated in the Western world (Li et al. 1992), and developed solid relationships with the leading figures such as Yi-xian Li of Beijing Normal University (BNU), Ren-jie Zhang of Guangzhou University (GU), and Kang-ning Wu of Nanjing Normal University (NNU). Under the coordination of Lee, TASE sent a delegation in November 2000 to the sixth biennial meeting of CPCSE in NNU. Some agreements were reached in this meeting. Besides publication exchanges and the promotion of joint research,[2] both sides, with a view to enhancing cooperation, decided to appoint four to six delegates to each other's annual conference every second year. According to the agreements, guests attending the conferences are responsible for paying their own travel expenses, and each of them is supposed to prepare a scholarly paper to present. At the same time, the host has to arrange at least one keynote session and offer a complimentary tour for guests, covering all the necessary fees. To date, both sides have maintained regular,

[1] There is also a CPCSE under Chinese Sociological Association (CSA), but it did not convene its own annual meetings on a regular basis and was relatively inactive. It is, therefore, not discussed in this article.

[2] Unfortunately, due to the institutional regulations on both sides, it was not easy to carry out joint research projects, which was exactly why to date there was only one coauthored chapter: Chang and Zhang (2003). This chapter presents an introduction of the historical development of sociology of education in Mainland China and Taiwan to the international audience.

close relationships as agreed, and the mode of exchange and its effects have been appreciated to the extent that many other parties have rushed to follow suit.

In addition, there were also reciprocal exchanges between BNU and TASE. BNU hosted Sociology of Education forums and invited TASE delegates in November 2007, February 2014, and June 2016, respectively. Over the past 3 or 4 years, TASE invited delegations from the Institute of Education Theories of BNU, in the hope of following the pattern of biennial visits between CPCSE and TASE. However, since BNU has not convened conferences on a regular basis, the impact has yet to be seen.

16.2 Networking Between Japan and Taiwan

The Japan Society of Educational Sociology (JSES) has organized conferences each year since its establishment in 1948 and from 1951 has published *The Journal of Educational Sociology* (JES) annually through to 1988 and two issues every year from 1989. JSES has not only a longer history but also much larger membership (of about 1450) than CPCSE and TASE, both of which have around 100 members.

Exchange between Japan and Taiwan began mainly as the results of two professors' joint efforts. One is Noritsugu Ishido of Saitama University, Japan, and the other is Tien-hui Chiang of the National University of Tainan, Taiwan. The two professors became acquainted in 2006. From similar sociology of education backgrounds, they discussed the possibility of building connections between JSES and TASE. Later, each was appointed representative of his respective association and, as a gesture of willingness to cooperate, visited each other's association. In order for bilateral interactions to become possible, TASE placed it on the agenda of the April 2007 board meeting of directors and supervisors. Nevertheless, owing to differences of cultural and institutional logistics between the two associations, several opportunities for interaction were not capitalized upon. It was not until 2012 when the president of JSES, Yoshimasa Kano of Kagawa University, took office and determined to increase international exchanges under official agreements that were made with Tien-hui Chiang, the then TASE president. They agreed to follow the cross-Taiwan-Strait exchange mode and send a delegation biennially from 2013 to the other's annual meeting.

In June 2013 and May 2015, JSES president Kano led delegations to TASE annual meetings and gave keynote speeches. In September 2014, TASE president Tien-hui Chiang, the keynote speaker and other members were invited for the JSES conference. Mutual visits and participation of presenters, including young researchers, have been continuing through until today. Some spillover effects have been produced, such as a consensus between the Graduate School of Education, Hiroshima University, Japan, and the Graduate Institute of Education, National Chung Cheng University, Taiwan, on deepening mutual cooperation. The participation of Tien-Hui Chiang and Mutsuko Tendo in a book project (Calogiannakis et al. 2014) and the joint comparative research such as Shinichi Aizawa (2016) and Yu-fei Liu (2015) on upper secondary education could be recent examples of research collaboration among the sociologists of education between Taiwan and Japan.

16.3 Networking Between Japan and Mainland China

Sociology of education exchanges between China and Japan lie not in formal associations but mainly through alumni networks from those who studied at universities in Japan. These include Yoshimasa Kano and Hiroyuki Yamada in Japan and Kang-ning Wu, Xiao-xing He, and Xing-hai Jiang in China, both of whom did their doctoral studies at Hiroshima University, albeit in different years. Through their arrangements, contacts between China and Japan were created. For instance, Peking University hosted the second International Conference on Sociology of Education in July 2012, with president Kano of JSES and his peer members having been invited.[3] In June 2013, NNU held a Sino-Japanese Sociology of Education research workshop, with Japan having sent the same group of delegates. At the annual conference in 2015, JSES hosted the research groups from Mainland China and held a special exchange session in Chinese.

16.4 Trilateral Relationships of Japan, China, and Taiwan

At the annual meetings of TASE in June 2013 and May 2015, invitations were extended to delegations from both JSES and CPCSE. In the 2013 meeting, President A. G. Dworkin of the Research Committee on the Sociology of Education of the International Sociological Association was in attendance to witness the trilateral exchange. After that, the idea of establishing an East Asian Association of Sociology of Education (EAASE) was proposed.

At the 2016 and 2017 annual meetings of TASE, representatives from Taiwan, Japan, and China discussed informally the possibility of the establishment of EAASE in terms of membership and the related rights and obligations. Due to differences in standpoints, no specific conclusions were made, but the initial agreement was brought back to each association for further consideration. It is believed to be a matter of time before deeper negotiations take place.

16.5 Prospects

The preliminary basis for the bilateral connections of East Asian scholars of the sociology of education has been built among Japan, China, and Taiwan in the first 15 years of the twenty-first century. Looking forward, the founding of EAASE may

[3] The Department of Sociology of Peking University convened two international conferences on Sociology of Education, one of which was in March 2006 and the other July 2012. At these two conferences, no TASE delegations but rather individual scholars were invited from Taiwan.

be a desirable and feasible goal; however, before its realization, we can prepare in the directions below to raise the potential for development.

To begin with, current networking efforts would be more complete if extended to other East Asian counterparts, including South Korea, Mongolia, and Hong Kong. Based on past experience, the first thing to do is to identify, via all formal and informal accesses, key persons in these countries and regions, and then through their individual connections and affiliations, we may foster bilateral, trilateral, or even multilateral sociology of education networking more expeditiously.

Secondly, it is not enough simply to send delegations. When a network becomes more inclusive, it is recommended that agreements be achieved in advance by the host country/region year by year. The host should choose among global sociology of education trends or emerging issues in East Asian sociology of education as the theme of the conference and organize a panel session focusing on East Asian Sociology of Education and invite delegations from other countries and regions. The conference languages should be English and the language of the host country/region, with simultaneous interpretation available. To alleviate the financial burden of the host, participants, based on generally accepted conventions, should be responsible for their own expenses.

Thirdly, current partnerships are mainly among associations of sociology of education. Exchanges and collaboration between higher learning institutions are relatively fragmented, taking the form of either short-term seminars on an irregular basis (e.g., 1-week academic exchanges between colleges across the Taiwan Strait) or personal side trips, at times with students, to some universities when invited to annual conferences (e.g., recent interactions between Hiroshima University and Chung Cheng University). In the future, we may carry out regular, long-term, and on-site academic research cooperation among higher education institutes. In that regard, Professor Masayoshi Koga of Chuo University, Japan, is going to start a 1-year research at Chinese Culture University, Taiwan, in 2019. This initiative will be helpful in enhancing mutual understanding and exploring the research themes of shared interest.

Fourthly, exchanges to date are mostly ritual rather than deep and substantive academic partnerships, nor can they be said to constitute transnational or transcultural collaborative studies on fundamental issues. Moreover, actual research collaboration is still limited to individual scholars, with minimal effect, and sometimes the geopolitical context has functioned as an obstacle to the development of critical academic discussion. Yet, there are in fact many common education issues in East Asia, for example, helicopter parents, over-education, youth precariats, and so on. If transnational or transcultural joint research teams on these unique issues can be formed, with the combination of insightful analyses from Japanese, Chinese, and Taiwanese scholars, theorists, and researchers, it is certain that joint efforts can produce meaningful research outcomes in the foreseeable future and make sociology of education research in East Asia more visible and connected to the international community.

Last but not least, scholars taking part in the above exchanges have been mainly senior male professors from the education field or teacher education institutes.

Participants of sociology backgrounds are relatively few in number; meanwhile, younger generation and female scholars have had little opportunity to have their voices heard. In the long run, future relays between generations would be difficult, even impossible, should the chronic discursive suppression of sociologists, younger scholars, and female researchers and the concomitant arbitrariness of maleness and seniority continue. Obviously, contradictions resulting from different backgrounds, ages, and genders among scholars are not merely characteristic of academic exchanges in East Asian sociology of education but also a ubiquitous drawback in the construction of sociology of education as an academic discipline. Leading figures will need to face these challenges delicately, yet effectively in future years.

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Chapter 17
Meritocracy, Modernity, and the Completion of Catch-Up: Problems and Paradoxes

Takehiko Kariya

Abstract Japan is among just a few non-western countries to have experienced both "catch-up" (with the west) and what might be called a "post-catch-up modernization." Undergoing these two stages of distinct social transformation, Japanese society has encountered difficulties in making a smooth transition from catch-up to post-catch-up modernity. This is particularly clear in the field of education. In this chapter, I place these Japanese experiences in a global context and discuss what implications they have for sociological research on education as well as what theoretical contributions such a lens can contribute to recent debates on modernity across the social sciences. I argue that the Japanese mind-set built up over the catch-up modernization period later greatly impacted the ways problems were socially constructed in education during the transition to the post-catch-up stage. It unexpectedly produced paradoxical results of successful catch-up modernization: an unintentional slide into failure in the envisaged transition toward post-catch-up modernity. Through analyzing these experiences, this chapter will explicate and theorize a mechanism in which how misrecognition and misguidance are generated within the transition from catch-up to post-catch-up modernity.

17.1 Introduction

Japan is among just a few non-western countries to have experienced both "catch-up" (with the west) and what might be called a "post-catch-up modernization."[1] Undergoing these two stages of distinct social transformation, Japanese society has encountered difficulties in making a smooth transition from catch-up to

[1] As detailed below, the phrase "catch-up" or "catch-up modernization" is used in government official documents, while "post-catch-up" and "post-catch-up modernity" are analytical concepts coined by the author of this chapter.

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A. Yonezawa et al. (eds.), *Japanese Education in a Global Age*, Education in the Asia-Pacific Region: Issues, Concerns and Prospects 46,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-1528-2_17

post-catch-up modernity. This is particularly clear in the field of education. In this final chapter, I place these Japanese experiences in a global context and discuss what implications they have for sociological research on education as well as what theoretical contributions such a lens can contribute to recent debates on modernity across the social sciences.

As detailed below, the Japanese mind-set, or *zeitgeist*, that was built up over the catch-up modernization period (1868–late 1970s) later greatly impacted the ways problems were socially constructed in education during the transition to the post-catch-up stage (1980s–present). Solutions to these problems, which are guided foremost by the way the problems were first constructed, produced unintended results. Among these unintended results was the expansion of educational inequality. This occurred because the problems were misrecognized, usually in the form of either overestimation or undervaluation, and therefore the solutions also became misguided: responding primarily to how problems were constructed at the transitional phase to post-catch-up modernity. In this respect, the Japanese experiences provide a rich example of the paradoxical results of successful catch-up modernization: an unintentional slide into failure in the envisaged transition toward post-catch-up modernity. Through analyzing these experiences, we can explicate and theorize a mechanism in which how misrecognition and misguidance are generated within the transition from catch-up to post-catch-up modernity. A theory of paradoxical failure embedded in catch-up and post-catch-up modernity will, I argue, give us a cogent theoretical framework through which we understand more articulately how and why policies for reforming education that were launched and developed at the end of the catch-up period likely result in failing, perhaps even in producing, various unintended consequences, particularly the expansion of inequality in education. This has contributed greatly, I argue, to educational crisis in this highly modernized society.

To explicate this argument, in this chapter, I focus on *meritocracy*, an old yet still important subject in educational sociology, specifically in the Japanese scholarship. Meritocracy as a sociological concept was coined by Michael Young (1958) over a half century ago. Despite his original pessimism, the word meritocracy, specifically after its "Americanization," has become used as a key concept to capture the nature of modernity in education and society. Under meritocracy, modernizing societies strive to depart from pre-modern society, one where not merit but origins of individuals determine their social positions. Such a rosier interpretation makes meritocracy become an integral principle (or ideology) embodied and embedded in "modern" education. In other words, to modernize a society, meritocracy is mandated and transformed into a core organizing principle of modern educational systems, one seen to contribute to nurturing productive human resources (human capital), selecting and allocating people into appropriate social positions according to their talents and merits (achieved status), and providing wider opportunities for education to the populace (equality of opportunity). All of those features were believed to be essential components for modernizing a society. Regardless of whether or not it could be achieved in reality, this was the driving ideal.

Hence, tracing the evolutions of meritocracy, both in its contemporary positive and original negative sense, helps us to become aware of our reflections of modernity and modern education in a society. Through the rise and the fall of meritocracy, which articulates paradoxical relations between success in catch-up modernization and failure in post-catch-up modernity, we can observe how a society reflects itself in the process of building and modifying its modern education. This becomes one aspect of the reflexivity in and on modernity, which one may call "reflexive modernity" (Beck et al. 1995).[2] Reflexive modernity, nonetheless, may sometimes produce paradoxical results due to the distorted reflection on the particular articulation of "first modernity" (Beck and Grande 2010) itself. The distortion may result in misguided reforms striving to solve problems and even in unintended consequences such as expanding inequality, which is partly internally generated (e.g., promoting individualization intentionally in education) and partly intensified by the external pressures under globalization (e.g., enforced individualization under neoliberal economic and welfare reforms).

In this respect, the Japanese experience is outstanding as a case of reflexive modernity in education. What role has meritocratic education played in the process of catch-up modernization? What *new* roles are expected to exert in the post-catch-up modernity? What problems in meritocratic education are identified and socially constructed over the transitional process from catch-up to post-catch-up phases? What impacts have the transition had on the ways of those problems were constructed? By addressing these questions, I will discuss what theoretical and policy implications that Japanese experiences can deliver for larger global and theoretical concerns.

17.2 Meritocracy Revisited

Why does meritocracy still matter? There are three advantages in tracing the evolutions of meritocracy in Japan. Firstly, the evolutions of meritocracy reflect and therefore can depict how a "modern" national education system has been established and what problems have emerged in the process of modernization of society and education. Japan is a typical case of a "late" modernizing country, one which intended to design and establish a meritocratic education system rapidly, extensively, explicitly, and even excessively. Hence, the analysis of evolutions of meritocracy in Japan enables us to examine how and what problems in education are

[2] Beck and Grande (2010) distinguish the first and the second modernity. According to them, the "premises of First Modernity societies" include "the nation-state, a programmatic individualization bounded by collective structures and identities, gainful work and employment, a conception of nature founded on its exploitation, a concept of scientifically defined rationality, and the principle of functional differentiation," while as "the basic social institutions of the First Modernity have become ineffective or dysfunctional for both society and individuals," the second or reflexive modernity arises, which enhances reflexivity in and on modernity (Beck and Grande 2010, p. 415). Our discussions regarding catch-up and post-catch-up modernity overlaps to some extent their conceptualization of two kinds of modernity, but we pay more attentions to the transition between the two more clearly by giving different concepts.

embedded in the process of modernizing education more clearly than is the case in western nations. The reason is that western countries have developed meritocratic education more slowly, restrictedly, and implicitly, as in the British case.

Secondly, plenty of problems in education are discussed surrounding and concerning the issues of meritocratic education in Japan. Among these are inequalities in education such as those between social classes, gender, and ethnicities, as well as student and youth problems such as bullying, delinquencies, and refusal to attend school. Reading the chapters in the current edited volume, readers must recognize that Japan's education has ample problems, as discussed in each chapter of this volume. I will partially show in this chapter how the evolutions of meritocracy, specifically those identified in the transition period from the catch-up to the post-catch-up modernization are related to all those current, purported problems in Japan's education.

Thirdly, since evolutions of meritocracy reflect to some extent path dependency of education policies in the past, we can distinguish similarities and differences in the problems encountered in Japanese education as compared with other societies. Despite the nature of meritocracy as a modern universalistic ideology, the specific evolutions of meritocracy formed in "meritocratic" education differ among societies, in its structure, pace of development, and outcomes. Those differences reflect distinctive path dependencies developed within specific contexts, specificities emerging within their own path to modernity. Meritocracy, as a solid ideology of modernity and modernization, has played a central role in establishing modern education in numerous countries. Discussing the Japanese case, however, helps us examine more closely how path dependency in modernization affects the evolutions of meritocracy. Furthermore, the Japanese experiences depict what problems in education are produced and conceived over the course of the rise and the fall of meritocracy, providing a good showcase of the complexities and paradoxes of reflexive modernity.

17.3 Establishing National Meritocracy and Paradoxes Embedded in the Process

A brief history of modern education in Japan reveals how a national meritocracy was established, one that sets a cogent basis of our discussion. Ikuo Amano, a prominent historical sociologist of education in Japan, discovers convincingly that meritocratic education was established in Japan much earlier than in European advanced nations in the early twentieth century (Amano 2011). He points out that Japanese business corporations were ahead of their counterparts in Europe in appreciating the values of educational degrees and diplomas for efficiently recruiting new employees, i.e., this selection was not limited to public bureaucracies for high rank officials. Amano, worth quoting at length, states:

> After its birth in late-eighteenth century Germany, credentialism spread to many other European countries during the nineteenth century. In Europe, however, credentialism was limited to professional occupations and government offices and bureaucracies, and did not spread to business corporations as the supporters of industrialisation and the central organisation in industrial society. One reason for this seems to be that the European legitimate school systems were unrelated to the training of human resources needed in the world of business. Another reason seems to be the delay in the bureaucratisation of their organisation. In any case, the development of industrialisation did not directly bring about the development of credentialism.
>
> By contrast, Japanese credentialism was introduced in the business world in the early stages of industrialisation, or before the full-scale bureaucratisation of their organizations began, and spread to the entire society with the development and bureaucratisation of companies. Among the organizations and occupations constituting the modern sector, companies and their human resources intrinsically have the greatest growth potential. (Amano 2011, p. 135)

This discovery of earlier and more extensive development in Japan's meritocracy (named "credentialism") may not be all that surprising for readers familiar with Roland Dore's arguments about "the late development effect" on "diploma disease" (Dore 1997). Dore posits:

> Other things are equal, the later development starts (i.e. the later the point in world history that a country starts on a modernization drive): the more widely education certificates are used for occupational selection; the faster the rate of qualification inflation; and the more examination-oriented schooling becomes at the expense of genuine education. (Dore 1997, p. 72)

While Dore does not detail the evolutions of Japanese meritocracy, the first symptom of the diploma disease undeniably speaks to the Japanese meritocracy, while the last one, known as "exam hells," also fits the Japanese case quite well. Dore argued the reason why late-developed countries experience those symptoms:

> Part of it is the late developers' need to *catch-up* fast—by improving knowledge and skills in formal education packages. The most important part is the general tendency of the later developer to import the latest technology from the metropolitan models—social as well as machine technology. (Dore 1997, p. 72; emphasis added)

As Amano's research confirms, Japan as late developer in catching-up pursued the western advanced nations by importing and borrowing advanced knowledge and technology.[3] Japanese modernizers, however, had to face many intractable difficulties to do this. But foremost among these was the language barrier. Note that Japanese is one of the most different and therefore one of the most difficult languages to learn of most of western languages including English and vice versa.[4] The way of overcoming the language barrier, according to Amano, contributed greatly to

[3] See the chapter by Rappleye in this volume about importing and borrowing advanced knowledge and technology from advanced western countries.

[4] The Foreign Service Institute (FSI) of the US Department of State places Japanese as among foreign languages which are "typically somewhat more difficult for native English speakers to learn than other languages" (http://web.archive.org/web/20071014005901/http://www.nvtc.gov/lotw/months/november/learningExpectations.html)

the hierarchical structure of Japanese education, thus helping to shape the highly competitive nature of educational meritocracy in Japan from the beginning, one which would later produce paradoxical consequences for the meritocracy.

Learning western languages was necessitated in importing advanced western knowledge and technology. To attain this goal, language education was prioritized at the higher levels of formal, modern education. To achieve the transmission of knowledge, the Meiji government implemented two policies: employing foreign instructors and professors with paying high salaries and sending the best and brightest students to study abroad to western countries. Both policies entailed enormous costs for the government, at a time when the national budget was already strained and the Japanese currency was of very low value internationally. Both in the path of learning under foreign professors in European languages in Japan and through studying abroad, a very high command of western languages was required, while the number of students who could access such high-level language education was naturally limited. To screen the best and brightest boys (females were excluded entirely) to reach that high level, the Japanese education system was constructed in the form of a sharp hierarchical structure (Amano 2011). It had the only one national higher education institution (Tokyo University first, then renamed the Imperial University later, and then renamed again to Tokyo Imperial University after the government established more Imperial Universities) at the top, where foreign professors taught advanced western knowledge in their own languages. Below the university, elitist state preparatory schools (later called higher schools or *Kōtō Gakkō* in Japanese) taught mostly western languages and screened and fed best and brightest students into the university. To enter those elitist state preparatory schools, students were required to pass sever entrance examinations. Since a visible hierarchical structure among those preparatory schools was created according to the results of entrance examinations, the academically best students strived to enter the top preparatory school, which was later called the First Higher School to distinguish from other higher schools. Likewise, in a somewhat later period, boys' middle schools, feeding academic institutions to higher schools also, were established, further solidifying a clear hierarchical structure among students in each prefecture. Within this system, ranking positions were determined primarily by students' test scores, i.e., scores needed to successfully gain admission.

In this way, a dual hierarchical structure of Japanese education, one between different levels of education from elementary to university education and the other among schools, colleges, and universities at the same level of education, thus came to be established. Since then, the structure has intensified competitions among students in seeking for higher test scores at entrance examinations to enter higher-rank positioned schools. The structure of Japanese education as such contributed to the rise of meritocracy by engaging and motivating many ambitious and aspired young Japanese to work hard in schools to learn advanced knowledge. This appeal was strong regardless of their social origins (Amano 2011). The self-intensifying competitions, however, undermined the legitimacy of meritocracy in the later period. The success of meritocracy contributed to it falling to crisis and even to exposing the failure of meritocratic education. Such paradoxical results of the dual hierarchical structure of education will be discussed in detail later.

The language barrier produced another feature of Japanese educational meritocracy. Japan was among the "latecomers" to modernization, but its trajectory of the development of meritocracy in Japan was distinctively different from the other latecomers like Sri Lanka and Kenya, as analyzed by Dore (1997). The latter two cases, among others, were former British colonies, where education for elite during the colonial period was done in English, not in their vernacular languages. Therefore, former colonialized countries are more likely to reserve parts of elite education in the language of former colonizers, even after their independence. In many cases, these places relied heavily on studying abroad in the former colonizing countries to nurture the knowledge and dispositions deemed essential for elites – a holdover from colonial times.

In this sense, we can see that the use of vernacular language is of great importance in the construction of a *national* meritocratic education system. Where vernacular languages become the media of instruction in schooling, including higher level, the transition from compulsory to secondary and to higher education can be done more smoothly. According to Amano, in this respect, changing the media of instruction in higher education from western languages to Japanese proceeded rapidly in Japan. Only about 20 years after establishing modern higher education institutions, students were able to learn most subjects in Japanese. Considering that Japanese is one of the most different languages from western languages (including English), this is an astonishing feat of localizing western advanced knowledge and of transmitting the imported knowledge to the wider Japanese populace.

Building the meritocratic education based on their vernacular language made it possible for Japanese education to develop much rapidly and smoothly by providing more educational opportunities to people. The postwar education reforms, influenced by the American occupation, only accelerated this because the American-born ideology of equal opportunity of education and the more simplified school system encouraged greater numbers of Japanese to obtain more education at the higher levels. This resulted in further intensifying meritocratic competition, particularly at the selection points of entrance examinations to senior high schools and universities, by increasing the number of participants to the competitions. All these competitions, from the bottom to the highest rung of schooling system through to the abovementioned dual structure of hierarchy, were and still are conducted in the use of Japanese language. As a result, learning foreign languages, except for foreign language examinations with limited contents in exam questions, gradually lost its appeal. Such a "regression," unlike in former colonized countries, came to be problematized explicitly and deliberately after Japan encountered the necessity to "globalize" its education, i.e., enhancing proficiency in English as a lingua franca. But, this result is ironically and obviously a by-product of earlier success in localizing advanced knowledge into Japanese language, which helped establish a once successful national meritocracy built on its vernacular language. In this way, practically useful English education was *sacrificed* under national meritocracy, which prioritized the Japanese language to establish the modern education system.

The localization of advanced western knowledge did proceed not only on the side of language use as the media of instruction in schooling but also as nationalization in other aspects advanced. To avoid the societal influences of the western values and ideology such as individualism, freedom, and republican idealism, which were viewed as compromising Japanese values and traditions, nationalization of education both in contents and pedagogy was deemed inevitable for the prewar government (Duke 2009).

In so doing, the very centralized national education system was designed and established aiming to exert central control over the contents and pedagogies in school by setting, for example, national guidelines of curricula and nationally edited school textbooks, and establishing national normal schools to train and certify teachers. To manage the centrally controlled education, local educational administrations were also watched close by the central government through the deployment of high rank administrators to localities and their flagship schools from Tokyo. Thus, a uniform education system was established.[5]

This uniform education, both in teaching practices and administrations, significantly and substantially contributed to the successful launch of a national meritocratic education system by advancing standardization of education under the restricted resources in the prewar Japan. Furthermore, the legacy of uniform education it produced has generally remained up until the late 1980s despite substantial restructuring of the education system through the postwar reforms. This is partly because the postwar attempt to decentralize did not work. However, there is also convincing evidence to suggest that the uniform education was deemed an efficient system even for the postwar government who suffered from severe financial and other resource restrictions due to the devastations during the war time (Kariya 2009, 2013b). Therefore, to reestablish the new school systems under the limited resources, the uniform education had been preserved until the end of catch-up modernization. In this regard, uniform education succeeded in reestablishing national meritocracy in the postwar period much more inclusively and extensively than in the prewar elitist system by extending more education opportunities in more standardized and equal financing and resourcing to education. Despite its feat, it has become ironically judged an obstacle preventing promoting diversity and flexibility in education and advancing global adaptation of Japan's education over the post-catch-up modernity. This is another paradox of Japanese education in "catch-up" modernization.

17.4 Excessive Competition and Criticism of Meritocracy

Postwar education reforms, influenced by US idealism on education as led by the American New Dealers in charge at the time, introduced the principle of equality of educational opportunity to Japan. The reforms simplified the schooling system

[5] Despite the strong central control over local education administrations, in terms of finance of education, localities were burdened heavily. See Kariya (2009).

through abolishing the misogynist and elitist university and higher school systems. The postwar government accredited more colleges and universities for both male and female students and introduced co-ed junior high schools as the last 3 years of compulsory education. Furthermore, between these, more accessible and mostly co-ed new senior high schools were rebuilt. These, nonetheless, kept in place a hierarchical structure among schools based on the results of entrance examinations. Both the egalitarian ideology and the more accessible school system had accelerated meritocratic competitions among students. This coincided with the arrival of the baby boomers in the 1960s. The number of applicants to senior high schools and universities drastically increased in the 1960s and 1970s, as Japan's economy rapidly recovered from the war and moved into a period of sustained high growth.

The enrolment rate to senior high school skyrocketed during the two decades of the 1960s and the 1970s. By the end of 1970s, it had reached over 90% out of all junior high school graduates. Likewise, the enrolment rate to higher education has increased under the new university and college system: 10.1% in 1955 to 38.4% in 1975 and then 56.8% in 2016. A "mass education society" (Kariya 1995) thus grew up rapidly in the wake of WWII.

The mass education society arose in tandem with a "mass meritocracy" (Kariya 1995; Nakamura 2011). Almost all the populace underwent meritocratic competitions at a certain stage of their life. The rapid growth and wider provision of senior high school education is indicative of the establishment of mass meritocracy, in which more educational opportunities were offered more equally. It also signified that almost all young Japanese had undergone meritocratic selection through entrance examinations to sort themselves into different ranked high schools by their test scores in the visible hierarchy of the upper secondary education. Competition was perhaps an inevitable by-product of this and was reported to be heating up almost to the point of burning students, as detailed by both the media and progressive education scholars in the 1960s and the 1970s as the boomers reached college age. Critics pointed out that these overwhelming meritocratic competitions gave rise to educational problems among children and youth such as deviant behaviors, bullying in school, school-phobia (later given a more neutral name as "school nonattendance"), and an increase in participating in private tutoring ("shadow education").[6]

The most prominent criticism against national meritocratic education appeared in the mid-1970s from a group of eminent educational scholars commissioned by the Japan Teachers' Union. Their report entitled "Committee for Reflecting the Japan's Education System" stated:

> Children are classified according to 'achievement', ranked from top to bottom based on their 'ability', divided into kids who continue to the next higher level and those who won't, sorted further into general and vocational high schools, and discriminated by gender. In addition to that, they are separated and selected by attending either a top-rank or a lower-tier school. Thus, a fierce and unfeeling focus on competition is born. This strengthens the trend toward a diploma society in our country, while schools are becoming scenes of hell in a struggle for educational credentials. This tendency in education can be termed 'meritocracy.' (Kyōiku seido kentō iinkai 1974: 54)

[6] Regarding those problems in education, see Chaps. 7 and 9 in this volume.

> Meritocracy (nōryokushugi) is the chief culprit behind the decay of today's education. It is the root of all educational evils. (Ibid. 1974: 82)

Such critical voices echoed extensively across Japan during the later stage of Japan's catch-up period. The exception was, at that time, the government. Both education scholars and the mass media frequently condemned harsh competitions through Japanese meritocratic education as the "evil," one that allegedly had given rise to most of the contemporary problems in education: school violence, school-phobia, rote memorization learning, ignoring students' individuality, and thus ruining students' creativity and autonomy. These maladies were looked upon as symptoms or *sacrifices* required due to the prioritized development of efficient (costless) meritocratic education. The establishment of meritocratic education, which was once regarded as great success over the catch-up modernization, thus, had gradually become considered as obstacles preventing the development of "genuine" education, i.e., it required the *sacrifice* of something important.

The criticisms of meritocratic education also blamed it for depreciating the value of knowledge transmitted through its exam-driven education. The knowledge transferred through meritocratic education was once deemed highly valuable, as only elites accessed the knowledge imported and translated from western advanced countries. The usefulness and legitimacy of knowledge learned and examined through meritocratic education had never been doubted at the earliest stages. However, once meritocracy was extended to cover most people in the society thanks to universally accessible educational opportunities, the value and usefulness of knowledge learned by rote for examinations in meritocratic education became obscure for many, although it was still recognized as unambiguously usefulness for entrance examinations. Knowledge learned in school depreciated in value as the scholastic meritocracy became more successful in covering more young Japanese. Job placements of high school and university graduates were greatly influenced by the rank positions of their graduating schools and universities (Kariya 2011; Ishida 1993; Rosenbaum and Kariya 1989). The rank positions were in turn determined by their exam scores in general subjects. Consequently, the relations between knowledge and vocation become progressively less visible and more vaguely connected for the majority of non-elite students who learned mostly general not vocational subjects in schools up to the end of senior high school. This is significant because most Japanese were now completing high school, whereas most subjects are in general education. Exceptions are the limited numbers of those who can obtain and attain professional and elitist professions from top-rank universities. Put differently, outcomes of meritocratic education were no longer being regarded or rewarded as "merits" for the majority who underwent exam-driven education equipped with little vocational skills. Thus, the past successful accomplishment of meritocratic education led to its reversal, leading to crisis in its legitimacy. This is another paradox of meritocracy in Japan.

A decade later, the Japanese government finally joined the growing chorus of criticisms against the meritocratic nature of Japan's education. The most politically influential education council, the Ad Hoc Council on Education Reforms (AHCER), was the first government body officially pointing out the problems of Japanese meritocratic education. Its fourth report stated, "it is undeniable that Japan's traditional education has mostly rested upon the tendency of cramming knowledge by rote memorization" (AHCER 1988, p. 278). Furthermore, the AHCER recognized and identified such problems in Japanese education as "uniform education system," "deteriorating children's spirits," harmful influences from "diploma society" on education and youth, and so on. It should be noted that in identifying those educational problems, the AHCER explicitly referred to this back to their conception of catch-up modernization. The first report states:

> We need to recognize that the 'negative side-effects' of Japan's modern-industrial-civilization, its 'catch-up model' of modernization, and/or the rapid economic growth in the postwar period, led to the deterioration of children's spirits, built a society upon foundations that damaged the physical and mental health conditions of human beings, tainted interactions among people, and had negative influences on culture and education. (AHCER 1988, 50)

Furthermore, the report attributed the rise of uniform education both in teaching at classroom level and educational administrations at the nation level to the past success in importing advanced western knowledge by saying:

> We imported and adopted from Western advanced industrial countries such things as their advanced technology and systems, and we emphasized efficiency to promote swiftly their dissemination. From a broader perspective, in terms of both content and method, a rigidly uniform education system was inevitably established. (AHCER 1988, 9)

Here, other educational problems such as "the tendency of cramming knowledge by rote memorization" and "failure in nurturing students' creativity and individuality" were attributed to the catch-up model of education, one which primarily sought efficiency in importing and adopting advanced knowledge from western, advanced countries. This official recognition or construction of the problems in catch-up stage of education evidences the views of the government that the "rigidly uniform education" as well as learning through "cramming knowledge by rote memorization" have brought a once successful meritocratic Japanese education in the past into crisis in its functions and legitimacy. They argued that education producing those problems as *sacrifices* of efficient meritocracy was no longer alleged appropriate to the post-catch-up era.

It is important to point out that right after the government recognized that Japan's catch-up had been completed in the late 1970s or early 1980s, they began arguing publically that meritocratic education in the catch-up period had become problematic. This fact suggests that the government reluctantly had to accept the Japanese meritocratic education as a "necessary evil" during the catch-up period, i.e., they believed that meritocratic education could have helped Japan catch up with the west effectively and efficiently. The success of meritocracy was thus seen to be falling into failure concomitant with the end of catch-up modernity. But ironically, again, it must be remembered that the end of catch-up had been attained by the very rise of meritocracy itself.

17.5 Solutions to the Paradoxes and Their Unintended Results

The perceived problems and obstacles that meritocratic education supposedly produced led policymakers to pursue specific policy solutions at the end of catch-up modernization. Scrutinizing the logic and rationale behind policies aiming to solve those problems and obstacles, we can reveal a shift in how Japan's national meritocracy was being perceived. In this section, I choose two problems: mitigation of competitions and reforms for cramming knowledge learning.

17.5.1 Policies for Mitigating Educational Competitions

From the mid-1990s onward, the government has strived to mitigate sever academic competitions in the national meritocracy. The system was alleged to have produced exam-driven education and its related problems in education as *sacrifices*, as discussed earlier. Targeting entrance examinations to enter senior high school and university, the government thus introduced multidimensional assessments of applicants as a substitute for one-dimensional exam score style admissions.

In 1997, the Ministry of Education (MEXT) proposed several reforms in admissions to high school (Kariya 2017). Among these, the MEXT promoted local boards of education to adopt multidimensional assessments of students in admissions, including not only looking at academic talent but also other aspects of applicants such as extracurricular activities, behavioral and attitudinal characteristics, aptitude, and personality. This most often took the form of school recommendation submitted by junior high school principals to senior high schools as an essential part of admission application, so that it was called recommendation admissions (suisen nyūshi in Japanese). This avenue has since become widely adopted by local boards of education. To further avoid relying wholly on exam score-based school selection, the MEXT also prohibited administering mock exams in public junior high schools in 1995. Thus, more emphasis was put on respecting students' aptitudes and own choice through school counseling in junior high schools, which aimed to help students choose which high schools to apply to.

The use of the multifaceted admission criteria and admission students' own choices was an attempt to mitigate the negative effects of "exam-only"-based admissions, even though – in actuality – formal admissions still utilized the scores of entrance examinations as the primary standard for selection. Significantly, underneath those policy changes, we can find a new logic and rationale in the MEXT, which was expressed in their shift away from regarding students as a mere subject of meritocratic selection toward respecting individuals as agency who could make their own choice in learning and choosing a school. In this sense, "individualization" as a mainstream ideology led to education policies aimed at mitigating rigorous meritocratic competition.

17.5.2 Curricula and Pedagogic Reforms to Transform "Cramming Knowledge" Learning

Under the same logic, curricula and pedagogic reforms aiming to change cramming knowledge style learning were designed and implemented from the early 1990s and onward. AHCER pointed out in the late 1980s:

> The society of the future will require us not merely to acquire knowledge and information, but to further develop the ability to express, create, think with our heads, and to make an appropriate use of that knowledge and information. Creativity is closely connected to individuality, and only when individuality is fostered can creativity be nourished. (AHCER 1988, p. 278)

To transform learning "merely to acquire knowledge and information" into that which could "develop the ability to express, create, think with our heads," the Ministry emphasized that creativity and individuality were the key to education. Such a statement is obviously founded on the judgment that learning "merely to acquire knowledge and information" had been necessary only under catch-up modernization but had also become obsolete, and obstacles in the post-catch-up modernity where "the ability to express, create, think with our heads" would now become of importance (AHCER 1988, p. 278).

Accordingly, on the grounds of fostering greater respect for students' individuality, two main curriculum and pedagogy reforms were implemented in 1992 and 2002, respectively; the former introduced new ways of teaching and learning called *atarashii gakuryokukan* or "a new concept of academic achievements/ability" in English, and the latter was called "relaxed education reforms" or *yutori kyoiku* in Japanese.

As for the 1992 reform, the MEXT published and distributed a guidebook to public elementary school teachers to explain what the new concept meant in terms of actual classroom practices:

> From now on it is important for teachers to see children as having the desire to improve themselves, to seek for a better life, and possess a variety of good qualities and potential unique to them as individuals. For education to make best use of children's individual assets, it is inevitable and necessary that students' self-directed learning activities must come to be respected. We understand that intrinsic learning motivations must be the basis, which supports and motivates learning related-activities. (MEXT 1993, p. 14)

In implementing educational practices to encourage students' self-directed learning, the role of teachers had to change, according this logic, to a supporter of children by standing by their side rather than one-sidedly instilling knowledge into students. From the expressions such as "students' self-directed learning activities" and "intrinsic learning motivations," it is obvious that the principle behind the introduction of this new pedagogy labeled "a new concept of academic achievements/ability" was also founded on the principle of individualization.

The 2002 curriculum reforms further deepened the direction first set out in the 1992 reforms. To increase experiential learning in classrooms from elementary to upper secondary level, the reforms introduced so-called integrated learning classes.

According to Bernstein's education code theory (Bernstein 2003), in integrated learning classes, "classification" between barriers among subjects became blurred, and "framing" in teaching and learning controlled by a teacher was loosened to promote student self-learning, i.e., one that would be free from one-sided cramming knowledge learning. To give more "room to grow" (*yutori*, in Japanese) as well to reduce exam pressure on students, the relaxed education reforms also reduced 30% of textbook content in tandem with decreasing the number of days in school per year (by taking off all Saturdays).[7] As a representative example out of a range of government policy documents emphasizing the premises of the reforms, a 1999 White Paper on Education's front page offers an answer to the question, "Why is educational reform necessary now?":

> (I)ncreased competition in examinations has resulted in school education being reduced to a form in which knowledge is one-sidedly instilled in students, thus leading to the neglect of education and activities that cultivate thinking faculties, creativity, and humanness. Indeed, with the excessive emphasis placed on equal opportunities in education, the original concept of education in accordance with the individuality and capabilities of each and every child has not been taken into full consideration. These are many points upon which we must reflect. (MEXT 1999)

Here the MEXT argues that learning in the form of one-sidedly instilling knowledge in students can be attributed to "increased competition in examinations," a typical symptom of Japan's national meritocracy. Uniform education, depicted as one "with excessive emphasis placed on equal opportunities in education," was also blamed for education that *sacrificed* individuality and the capabilities of each child. Meritocratic education with uniformity, which was once regarded as a successful apparatus, here came to be perceived as a chief obstacle preventing education respecting individuality, all of which was now viewed as evident *sacrifice*. Such a way of constructing educational problems led the MEXT to insist that its solutions must take the form of "individualization" in education.

17.6 What Logics Were Operating Behind the Scene?

Respect for individuality in Japanese education, as a main principle leading reform since the mid-1980s, reflects the Japanese ways of individualization arising after the end of catch-up modernity, as it appeared in the minds of policymakers. Why individuality? How and why have the ideologies of individualism and societal movement toward individualization emerged over the transition to the post-catch-up modernity? What logic forged the association between the necessity of individualization and the perception of the end of catch-up? An official governmental report published in 1980 provides the answer to these questions. A blue-ribbon council

[7] Some of the private schools even rejected the change in number of school days and maintained the textbook contents, which gave rise to "bright flight," that is, some middle-class parents send their bright children to those private secondary schools to avoid risks of failures in the reforms.

under the Prime Minister Ōhira Masayoshi in 1980 (Ōhira Seisaku Kenkyūkai) was outstanding in terms of its clarity and tangibility as an official statement that Japan had completed catching-up with the West. Its Report No. 7, titled Economic Administration in an Age of Culture (1980), noted that:

> Japan's modernization (industrialization and westernization) and the maturation of it into a highly industrial society implies the end of any models involving the need to align to, or to "catch-up with." From now on, *we need to find our own path to follow*. (Age of Culture Economic Management Group 1980, p. 14, emphasis added)

Once Japan had achieved its goal of "catching-up," the Council mandated that the Japanese "need to find our own path to follow" and need to go its own way without following "any models" from outside. In corresponding to this mandate in the education sphere, AHCER maintained the importance of respecting and nurturing individuality in education through promoting individualization in learning. Without nurturing independent and autonomous individuals, political leaders believed there would be no way for Japan to "find our own path to follow." The association of the logics – independent Japanese citizens with individuality should enable future Japan to pursue "our own path" – is an obviously a product of transitional phase to post-catch-up modernity, being indicative of reflections in modernity after the perceived end of catch-up modernization.

Another important document depicting the government's premises underneath the curriculum and pedagogy reforms is found in the report of the National Council on Curriculum that proposed the relaxed education in 1998. It states:

> Taking account of rapidly changing current society, it is of crucial importance that education should be transformed from the one clinging to instill knowledge in students to the one nurturing competences among students to learn and think themselves as self-learners. For this sake, it is necessary to provoke active learning practices in classroom teaching in which students can acquire self-motivation to learn independently, abilities to think logically, deliver their own thoughts appropriately, discover and solve problems, establish intellectual foundations for creativity, and take actions independently and autonomously in accordance to rapidly changing society, all of which should undergo through their curiosity, exploration and trials and errors in learning. (MEXT 1998)

Here again, we find strong assumptions that emphasize the importance of respecting students' individuality and independence, which is viewed as a commonly shared value within the government's efforts to make a smooth transition from catch-up to the post-catch-up modernity aimed at "find[ing] our own path to follow."

This represents the typical mind-set among Japanese political and intellectual leaders at the time; but it also reflects the way of recognizing Japan's past as catch-up modernization, one in which Japanese had to borrow and copy advanced knowledge and "models" from the west under the restricted resources. For the sake of this, building an efficient national meritocratic education was prioritized at the *sacrifice* of other aims such as nurturing individuality and independence among young Japanese. From within the catching-up mind-set, as expressed above, problems in Japan's education and society were constructed through the lens of their common perceptions about Japanese society as one lacking in independent individuals. Political and intellectual leaders attribute problems to national meritocracy, which was considered to fail in nurturing independent individuals over the period of catching-up as the *sacrifice* of those qualities.

The logic supporting the attribution to the meritocracy works in this way: the efficient borrowing and copying advanced knowledge from the west ordained Japanese not only become independent individuals or critical thinkers but also become obedient and subordinate learners or *students* under the instructions of the advanced west.[8] They were also convinced that undergoing the harsh competitions in the meritocratic education, Japanese youth were domesticated to adjust themselves to the one-sided instilment of knowledge to pass examinations. Japanese leaders tended to even deny the potential that Japanese had their own creativity, individuality, and/or independent personality at least in the Japanese cultural and historical context. In their belief, therefore, fixing these weaknesses of Japanese through reformed education could enable newly educated Japanese to adjust themselves to rapidly changing society and globalized world by standing on their own feet and "find[ing] our own path to follow."

Ironically, however, despite their official announcement of the necessity for finding "our own path to follow," those new goals set in education reforms since the mid-1980s are all derived from the "learner-centered' ideology, born in the west. Idealized, independent learners with intrinsic learning motivation are also modelled from the western educational thoughts. Despite their hesitation in the future borrowing of advanced knowledge and modelling from the west, Japanese leaders' mind-sets are to some extent, unconsciously or unintentionally, still clinging with the views of "looking west."

Such paradoxical reflections are typical of those who undertook catch-up modernization and then reached the transitional phase to post-catch-up modernity. In this sense, such mind-sets or the zeitgeist of catch-up modernizers continued to have an impact on the way of constructing problems in education and their pursued solutions to those problems. Their insistence on and admiration for individuality and independent individuals were coined by such reflections on the process toward post-catch-up modernity. Japan's experience in undergoing the transition from catch-up to post-catch-up modernization, thus, is evidence that reflections in modernity are influenced not only by perceived past achievements but also by perceptions of what are *sacrificed* underneath these achievements during catch-up-style modernization. Because of this nature of setting new goals and launching reforms toward the post-catch-up stage, goals become harder to attain.

Why is it difficult to attain these goals? The difficulty comes from the habitus of constructing the problems. Through the habitus, the goals in reforms are likely set as recovering *something sacrificed* in the process of catch-up. Such a mind-set results in policies aiming to remove perceived hazards, i.e., those things preventing emerging those *somethings sacrificed*, as discussed earlier. Eradicating the hazards or "necessary evils," however, could not possibly automatically produce desired outcomes, i.e., not recovering those *somethings* previously *sacrificed*, particularly in under-resourced circumstances (Kariya 2013b). Nonetheless, discovery of *some-*

[8] As for theory of deficiency and "de-axialization," see Rappleye in this volume.

thing sacrificed and deficient in the catch-up period sets a common knowledge base on which problems in education and society are constructed: reform discourses and reforms converge around the pillar of discovering those things *sacrificed*. The more the knowledge base of *sacrifices* is shared and taken for granted among leaders, the more easily and extensively the ways of constructing problems are accepted without thorough and realistic investigations of the causalities underlying those problems. Eradicate the evils, and then we will recover *something sacrificed* – this is the all-too-simple logic operating behind the scene in the transitional phase to the post-catch-up modernity. The evil was, of course, here deemed to be the exam-driven, meritocratic education.

Furthermore, from the analysis above, we can theorize logic operating and associating in between the paradoxes of meritocracy and the theory of deficiency (Sonoda 1991, Rappleye, Chap. 4 in this volume) as follows. To repair the gaps between past successes, present problems, and future necessities is viewed and constructed through the abovementioned views on educational problems. As discussed earlier, gaps are indicative of paradoxes derived from past successes in national meritocracy: once regarded as great successes in establishing efficient education system to promote catch-up modernization. Nevertheless, encountering the transitional stage to post-catch-up modernity, political leaders began regarding the Japanese national meritocracy as a generator to produce a constraint, one preventing the development of new competencies and skills necessary in a global era. This is because meritocracy under "catch-up" are believed to *sacrifice* those new competencies for these skills to develop; therefore leaders recognize a dearth of those skills necessitated as independent individuals in the global era. The rise and the fall of meritocracy are linked in such a way via a folk theory of sacrifice and deficiency. This type of reflection on modernity itself originates in a specific path of the dependency of modernization: the reflexivity in post-catch-up modernity adhered to by a catching-up mentality, which differs from the experience of countries that did not experience such a clear-cut transition to post-catch-up modernity. Hence, one could say that the folk theory of sacrifice and deficiency is the pivotal nexus in Japan's reflexive modernity.

17.7 Conclusion: Unintended Results Consequences?

By nature, the habitus of constructing problems likely simplifies the understanding and interpretation of how the problems are caused and can be solved. This is partly because the folk theory of deficiency tends to lack realistic means to achieve the goals (Kariya forthcoming) and partly because the perceived paradoxical turnover of the past success into present failure attracts leaders too readily willing to identify with problems and to find solutions based on the aforementioned knowledge base.

This simplification and the inevitably oversimplified solution that results frequently fail to pay enough attention to potential unintended results in the reforms: expanding inequality in education. As examined in my earlier works, admission reforms created an "incentive divide" for hardworking among students along the social class line by reducing the exam pressures and blurring the clarity of selection criteria (Kariya 2013a). The more complicated processes in multidimensional assessments in admissions also have expanded inequality in school choice among students from different socioeconomic background (Kariya 2017). The continuous curricula and pedagogical reforms toward individualization of learning, which were implemented in under-resourced circumstances, have expanded the gaps in student academic achievements both in conventional test scores and in new skills such as problem-solving and communications demanded in the new curricula (Kariya 2016).

The recent curricula reforms implemented in 2008 and the next one planned for 2020 are also founded on the same ideology of individualization. The newest national curricula reforms propose the introduction of "active learning" to promote further individualization in learning, but unless enough resources are invested and clear guidelines for teachers are provided – a highly unlikely prospect – those idealistic curricula centered on the principle of individualization may fail and could even increase inequalities in education further.

Emphasis on English language skills also carries the potential to expand inequality. From 2008, English activities have been introduced in elementary schools, and in the 2020 revision, these are planned to expand starting from third grade (currently they only cover fifth and sixth grades). Under the current circumstances, however, teachers are not well trained nor certified in teaching English in many elementary schools. Such under-resourced situations could divide students into those who are supported by their highly educated and wealthier parents and those otherwise. These inequalities in education in different settings are well researched and documented in recent sociological research of Japanese education (Kariya 2013a; Matsuoka 2015; Yamada 2014; Shimizu and Takada 2016). Nonetheless, the government reforms have stuck with the same ideology of individualization, and the government has continuously failed in solving the problem of under-resourced situations in public education that is a prerequisite for achieving their ambitious goals (see Nakazawa, Chap. 2 in this volume).

Against these backdrops of recent tendencies in Japanese education, further promotion of individualization in education, which is the main product of reflexive and paradoxical modernity in the transition to the post-catch-up modernity, as the primary pull factor (Han and Shim 2010), might conflate and resonate with other forces pushing toward individualization, i.e., those proceeding under the risk society (Beck 1992) led by the global impact of neoliberal reforms in the economy (Suzuki et al. 2010). The conflation and resonance between the two lines of individualization is likely to intensify the trend in expanding inequality in education, even while it provides easy justification to blame individuals' failure in education as a matter of personal responsibility. Intentionally or unintentionally, the two individualizations are liable to worsen educational inequality.

Meritocracy in its nature, from the pessimist view, should result in inequality in the real world, as Michal Young (2001) himself lamented and warned a half century later since his epoch-making book publication (Young 1958). The envisaged future of a reformed Japanese meritocracy, more ironically and paradoxically, could intensify this tendency even further by the conflation of two individualizations. It is ironic that the mitigated competitions and pursuing "genuine education" by eradicating the "evil" in competitive meritocracy have produced little to actually be aimed for, even while contributed to expanding inequality in education. This paradoxical result is to be produced by the very reflections in modernity. Reflexive modernity in the post-catch-up modernization makes its reflections depend on its past path to the modernity, yet reflections can be distorted depending on how accurately the past paths are observed and understood. One cannot understand the present state of Japanese education without recognizing the habitus of constructing problems born in the catch-up experience that still shapes the policy and research field today.

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