CONTEMPORARY CHINESE DIASPORAS

Edited by Min Zhou



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For my mom and dad with love and gratitude from the diaspora

Foreword

It is now widely acknowledged that the history of Chinese migrations changed significantly after World War II following the end of the age of global empires. Thereafter, migrations everywhere faced the rise of new nation-states. Where the Chinese were concerned, this change highlighted the fact that the migrations up to that time were largely to colonies of one kind or another. For most Chinese living overseas, some of them descendants of men who left China two or more centuries earlier, the next few decades were a time of major readjustments.

The most important challenges arose from two shifts in modern history. The first was the victory of the Chinese Communist Party that led China to cut off relations with the global capitalist economy. The second was the post-imperial conditions, including the Cold War, that spurred a many-faceted process of nation-building that engaged the attention of more than 100 totally new sovereign states. Both impacted greatly on the nature of migration for every country in the world.

This volume contributes richly to the sociology of migrations and captures the variety in the Chinese diasporic experience following those post-war shifts. In particular, it focuses on the period of rapid development in mainland China after the economic reforms of 1978, and provides absorbing details about the new migrants from the country, the *xin yimin* (新移民) who have reached out in every direction to five continents.

Through close examination of the various groups of Chinese in selected countries, the chapters draw special attention to the changes that are related to the rise of China. They show that what is happening has similar features

to what we know about earlier Chinese migrants and can also be compared to the experiences of other migrant peoples. However, of particular interest are the depictions of the many new kinds of migrant who are significantly different from those who left their homes in the past. Reading the chapters helps us not only to understand what motivates *xin yimin* to emigrate but also throws light on what is happening in Chinese society as the country undergoes deep social and economic changes.

For many students of China it is remarkable that so many Chinese are seeking to emigrate from a country that is now recognized as the world's second largest economy and expected to be the world's largest in the not too distant future. Those who are engaged in thinking about the economic and political implications of that transformation will be fascinated by what these new migrant Chinese populations are doing today. There will understandably be concerns as to how their activities in the host countries will impact on the lives of the local people. There is also an interest in how the growing presence of Chinese migrants will affect the relationships between China and the nation-states. In particular, as we see how anti-immigration politics is evolving in the developed countries, we can expect that development to influence those people who are ultrasensitive to issues of national sovereignty.

I commend this book to all those who are interested in the trajectories of Chinese social and cultural change. For myself, as I was reading the chapters covering all parts of the world, I was reminded of what I wrote some 30 years ago in *Pacific Affairs* (Spring 1985). There I suggested that the China that opened itself up to the global economy will have a new policy area, one that I called "External China" (*waihua zhengce* 外华政策). Since then, those responsible for dealing with the Chinese overseas have indeed had to make many major adjustments in policy as they responded to China's growing involvement in all aspects of the global economy and its increasing clout in international affairs.

It is clear that, in the end, much will depend on how host countries recalculate their policies of letting the Chinese in to work and allowing them to settle. In the established areas of Chinese settlement, it was not surprising how quickly those back home in South China took up offers to reunite with their families overseas, but the speed at which mainland Chinese from other parts of China also sought emigration after the end of the Cold War was astonishing.

As late as 1994, when I was at the University of Hong Kong, I did not expect emigration from the mainland to grow so quickly. Instead, what impressed me was the numbers of Hong Kong people still seeking to leave. In my foreword to R. Skeldon's edited volume of essays, *Reluctant Exiles?*,

I welcomed the opportunity to track the migration trails of those Hong Kong families in detail. Never before have we been able to follow them so closely, from the decision to leave to the time of entry (to Canada, Australasia and the UK), and then through the early years of adjustment and settlement. I did not expect that, within a few years of that, large numbers of mainland Chinese emigrating would become the norm.

It was not until the International Society for the Study of Chinese Overseas met in Taipei in 2001 that it became clear that a new era was before us. I spoke about new migrants and asked: "How new? Why new?" All of us at the conference saw how the term *xin yimin* was being used to describe the new phenomenon. Unclear was how that term would relate to older ones such as *huaqiao* (华侨) or *huaqiaohuaren* (华侨华人) in the minds of policy-making officials in Beijing and elsewhere, what the label meant to those now living and working abroad and, in particular, whether the new usage would affect those who saw themselves as foreign nationals of Chinese descent. It has been for me a source of wonderment to read reports about the different ways in which these terms have since been used to describe Chinese migrations in various settings.

I regret I was unable to attend the conference at the Chinese Heritage Centre in December 2015 that produced this admirable volume. A few weeks before that, at another meeting, I spoke about the new mix of expectations that has evolved in recent years among all those involved in the sending and receiving of Chinese migrants; what different groups of Chinese emigrants now expect from their host countries; what the earlier migrants expect of these newcomers; what the current generation of policy-makers and populations in the host countries expect of their new Chinese; how expectations among their family members back home have changed; and, given the twists and turns in China's policies over the centuries, what the governments of mainland China and Taiwan now expect of the millions of *huaqiao*, *huaren* and *xin yimin*, most of whom are now citizens of more than 100 different nation-states.

Finally, I fully understand how the word "diaspora" is used in sociology research. Years ago, I was on record as saying that I have reservations about the word being used to describe the Chinese because of the possible repercussions of having a single word to describe complex realities. The chapters here about old and new Chinese migrants in many countries confirm that when Chinese authorities add *xin yimin* to their conflated use of the composite term *huaqiaohuaren* (mainly for earlier migrant Chinese), this leads them to what I had feared. When a single inclusive

word is officially used for all the Chinese living or settled outside Chinese lands, as the word *huaqiao* once did, there will once again be a blurring of the differences between the variety of the Chinese who reside or settle in foreign nation-states.

This points to one notable feature of this excellent collection. Professor Min Zhou and her colleagues have unpicked the word "diaspora" used for the Chinese who have migrated and described the great variety of life and activity that may be found in each locality and the potential for future changes. I am also delighted to see that there are now more answers to some of the questions I have asked over the years. By juxtaposing a few countries to represent each of the five continents, these chapters give us an illuminating bird's-eye view of what is happening around the world. The volume makes an important contribution not only to the study of the many kinds of Chinese migrants but also to migration studies in general.

University Professor Wang Gungwu
National University of Singapore, Singapore
25 February 2017

Preface

Diasporas refer to extraterritorial populations, including temporary, permanent or circular migrants, as well as their native-born descendants.[1] They are constantly in flux. Differences in emigration histories and migrant reception in host societies lead to variations in diasporic formation. The Chinese diaspora is arguably one of the largest and oldest in the world. History has witnessed various streams of emigration from China to the outside world since ancient times and from Chinese diasporic communities to other countries since World War II.[2] Between 1949 when the People's Republic of China (PRC) was founded and 1978 when the PRC government launched its economic reform, emigration from China was reduced to a trickle. After a hiatus of several decade, China has experienced a new surge of emigration, which has been perpetuated by the country's economic transformation and relaxed control over emigration, revived diasporic networks, immigration-policy reform in migrant-receiving countries, and global geopolitical and economic restructuring. Since 1978 the total number of emigrants from mainland China has passed 8 million, with little sign of slowing down.[3]

Post-1978 Chinese migrants, commonly referred to as new Chinese migrants or *xin yimin*, are now spreading to every corner of the globe and developing diasporic communities wherever they set foot. The goals, forms, organizational structures and power dynamics of these new diasporas and their impact on individual migrants, social groups, and sending and receiving societies are vastly different from those of the past. This book is about the new Chinese migrants and their communities.

Background

Between 1949 and 1978, when China was cut off from the outside world, migration to and from the country was strictly prohibited by the state. Border crossing without papers became a crime, and overseas connections were condemned as espionage and treason subject to punishment in labor camp or jail. The three-decade Chinese emigration hiatus and nation-state building in Asia and around the world after World War II transformed diasporic communities oriented toward the ancestral homeland—China—into ethnonational communities oriented toward integration into the countries of residence. People of Chinese descent have taken up citizenship and struck roots in the land of sojourning they now call home.[4]

Since China opened its door in 1979, massive waves of Chinese emigration have surged onto the shores of all continents of the globe, giving rise to new Chinese diasporas in both traditional and contemporary migrant-receiving countries. Several macrostructural factors in China had profound impacts on emigration. First, the open door and economic reforms fueled enormous foreign investments in China, more than three-quarters of which came from the Chinese diaspora in the 1980s, thereby helping restore transnational family ties and rebuild migration networks.[5] Second, China has removed barriers to emigration, easing requirements to obtain passports and allowing Chinese citizens with overseas sponsors to emigrate. Third, China has sponsored hundreds of thousands of scholars and students on academic exchanges or studying abroad, while allowing many more to study abroad with private funding, first from their overseas relatives and, since 1990, from their newly enriched families in China. Fourth, as China becomes integrated into the world economy, especially since gaining entry into the World Trade Organization in 2001, both state and private capital investments overseas have become increasingly visible. These broader structural factors, interacting with changing immigrant policies and globalized economic development in receiving countries, have ushered in a new era of massive Chinese immigration that shows little sign of slowing down.

One of the most direct, though unintended, consequences of China's economic reforms is the self-perpetuating wave of network-driven human mobility. This wave is tremendously diverse in nature and composition, ranging from massive internal migration to international labor migration (both low and highly skilled), investor migration, student migration, and undocumented or clandestine migration. Contemporary Chinese immigrants are vastly heterogeneous with regard not only to their places of origin and

destination, socioeconomic backgrounds, and mobility and integration patterns and outcomes, but also to their patterns of diasporic formation, development and transnationalism. These extremely diverse migration streams link the local, regional and national economies, social networks and polities together more deeply and extensively than ever before and produce a more entrenched infrastructure for interpersonal, interorganizational and interstate interactions.

This book was born out of an international symposium on the formation and development of new Chinese diasporas. Funded by the Chiang Ching-kuo Foundation for International Scholarly Exchange and the School of Humanities and Social Sciences and the Centre for Liberal Arts and Social Sciences at Nanyang Technological University (NTU), an International Symposium on the Formation and Development of New Chinese Diasporas: A Transnational, Cross-regional, and Interdisciplinary Comparative Study convened in December 2015 at NTU's Chinese Heritage Centre. It aimed to stimulate innovative, thought-provoking and ground-breaking research on new Chinese diasporas from a transnational, cross-regional and interdisciplinary perspective. The symposium had two objectives. One was to advance scientific knowledge about the causes and consequences of contemporary migrations that are less known to social scientists, technologists, policy-makers and civil-society practitioners. The other was to advance an alternative theoretical paradigm that is based on the experiences of the global south (developing or underdeveloped countries) and that addresses and challenges established theories derived from the worldview and experiences of the global north (developed countries). Distinguished scholars from mainland China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan, as well as from Australia, Canada, the Czech Republic (Czechia), Germany, New Zealand, Singapore, South Africa, the UK, and the USA gathered together to share their seminal work on contemporary Chinese migrations. These scholars emphasized the importance of local, national and transnational contexts of migrations to and from mainland China, the history and timing of migration, individuals' premigration lived experiences and the perspectives so formed, and the contexts of reception in host societies when analyzing diverse patterns of diasporic formation and development, and varied outcomes of immigrant integration and local social transformations.

Theoretical and Practical Significances

Regarding Chinese immigration, we have long known much more about the history of migration and patterns of diasporic formation and migrant settlement in the context of a poor, backward homeland than in that of a highly globalized and economically powerful homeland, much more about migration as an end than as a means to an end, and about immigrants' struggles and marginalization than about their triumphs and contributions. The symposium will not only stimulate cutting-edge research from diverse lived experiences of new Chinese immigrants in different parts of world but also brainstorm ideas for new knowledge production.

In migration studies, classical theories and models have shed light on why and how people move, how well migrants fare in and integrate into their host countries, how they interact with one another and with natives to negotiate harmonious living in the host societies, and what implications global processes have for local transformations. However, these theories and models were extracted primarily from the decades before or immediately after World War II. Gaps in existing knowledge have become even more visible in migrations in the age of rapid globalization and of internet and mobile communication. These gaps widen further as existing theories and models are established from the perspective of the USA, Europe or the global north, often reflecting an out-of-date world order and very different levels of technological and economic development.

China and many new countries now receiving Chinese immigrants are part of the global south. A systematic study of new Chinese migrants and their communities matters greatly, and for at least three main reasons. First, countries in the global south are developing rapidly and attracting huge volumes of foreign capital investment. These emerging economies draw exceptional rates of cross-border flows that are extremely diverse and selective, including streams that originate from the urban and more developed regions and among more resourceful immigrants—traders, investors, capitalists and professionals alike. Moreover, the rise of new modes of transportation and communication has facilitated not only physical movement but also virtual travel and interaction, shrinking the global into handheld gadgets that help people on the move or in different geographic places form and maintain long-distance ties. Further, rapid cross-border movements produce a host of new business opportunities to capitalize both on the migrants' desires to migrate and the struggle by governments to manage migration, leading to the rapid growth of a specialized migration industry

(including legitimate labor brokerage firms and related services as well as organized criminal networks of human trafficking).

Second, the global south presents several unique realities that render established theories insufficient. One is the expectation of integration into the host society. Many developing countries are now simultaneously migrant-sending and -receiving countries. Of those receiving immigrants, many restrict permanent settlement or lack a sophisticated integration policy while facing the urgent need to comprehend changing demographics and intergroup dynamics. Another reality is the new composition of a host society's mainstream. Unlike traditional Western countries of settlement in the global north, dominated by a clear racial hierarchy with white Christians constituting the "mainstream" and other racial and ethnoreligious groups positioned on the margin, developing countries of the global south are much more diverse. They lack such clear-cut racial formation, and may not even be countries of resettlement. Still another unique reality is that of class heterogeneity. Diverse migration streams have given rise to a highly stratified and globalized labor market with privileges for some but marginalization and exploitation for others.

Third, a rising China has challenged commonsense knowledge about migration and development. Emigration from China has not followed the same historical trajectory as migration to the global north by, for example, populations from places previously directly colonized by the global north. Neither have Chinese migrations been wholly or uniformly encouraged by non-Chinese states as a means of economic development. On the contrary, they have often been discouraged. Moreover, China has undergone drastic economic reform and risen up to become a key player in the global economy while experiencing high rates of internal migration and, on a small but highly visible scale, international or transnational migrations or both. Further, the rising economic power of expatriate communities and their strong orientation toward helping their home communities and countries has rendered them increasingly important with regard to prospects for local and national development. Consequently, new institutional structures and cultures emerge to give rise to new patterns of migrant adaptation and integration, and of diaspora-homeland interaction, which ultimately shape policy-making and developments in both sending and receiving countries. Migrations are also increasingly circular and transitory at each site or stage, with migrants often moving between different destination countries or returning for a while or forever to the sending state. Yet classical theories bounded by disciplines have reached limits in explaining these diverse

contemporary flows, their directions over time, their cultural nuances, their socioeconomic and environmental impacts, and their societal complexity.

Understanding contemporary Chinese immigration also matters practically. China, with its fastest-growing economy, largest population and most expansive (and best-developed) diasporic communities in the world, is potentially a huge emigration country. Increasingly integrated into the world system, its marketization has continued to undermine the power of the state, and, as the Chinese people have reconnected with their overseas diasporas, Chinese emigration (legal or clandestine, permanent or temporary, international or transnational) may define a new "Chinese Century," of a magnitude many times greater than Anthony Reid's "Chinese Century" of 1740–1840.[6] The potential for emigration from China has already been likened to a "Tsunami on the horizon."[7] This signals a mixed blessing for China, Asia and the world. The challenge for China and other immigrant-receiving countries may be how to negotiate and manage international and transnational flows, but the power of the state is severely constrained not only by the market but also by diasporic and ethnonational networks, institutions and communities overseas. Policy-wise, it therefore becomes relevant to understand the formation and development of contemporary diasporas and their economic, sociocultural and political impacts on a global scale, beyond that of the nation-state.

Preview of the Book

This book is a collection of research papers originally presented at the abovementioned symposium and subsequently revised and polished. It starts with a historical overview of Chinese emigration by myself and Gregor Benton. In it we examine how centuries-old Chinese diasporas were formed to facilitate subsequent migrant flows and migrant resettlement. We do so with a focus on intra-Asia migrations to offer some points of reference from which to understand contemporary Chinese migrations across the globe. We argue that distinct streams of emigration from China and remigrations from the Chinese diaspora are contingent upon historical circumstances and influenced by the intersection of nation-state policies, global economic forces and migrant socioeconomic networks.

The chapters that follow are organized according to the geography of the receiving places, including three on Africa, five on Asia, two on Oceania, three on Europe and four on the Americas.

Chapter 2, by Yoon Jung Park, is about the politics of Chineseness in South Africa, one of the few African countries with three distinct ethnic-Chinese communities as well as a critical mass of ethnic-Chinese people. In South Africa the Chinese have been targeted because of their Chineseness. However, they have also made use of it—their ethnic difference from other South Africans as well as their links to "rising China" and the "Chinese factory"—to further their own interests in the receiving country. Park focuses on the fluidity of "Chineseness" in terms of both its content and its uses by examining the differences between the three main Chinese communities in South Africa: the third-plus-generation Chinese South Africans, first- or second-generation Taiwanese South Africans, and mainland Chinese arriving recently. She also explores shifting connections and identifications with China and Chineseness over time.

Chapter 3, by Karsten Giese, looks at Chinese traders in Accra, Ghana's capital and economic center. Unlike contemporary Chinese migrants in other parts of the world, those in Africa are predominantly petty entrepreneurs. Their lack of ethnic and national solidarity and social cohesion culminating in the widespread absence of community defies conventional wisdom with regard to overseas Chinese. Their strong individualism also offers a stark contrast with similarly common perceptions based on the transnational network paradigm. Giese shows that the Chinese who have arrived as individual entrepreneurs and in substantial numbers since the turn of the millennium form a highly concentrated trading cluster in Accra. This pattern of spatial clustering has made the Chinese and Chinese commercial activities highly visible, whereas residential patterns are characterized by a high degree of dispersion across middle-class residential areas. Widespread social isolation of the Chinese from each other and from the local population presents challenges for ethnic formation and integration. In particular, fierce economic competition among Chinese entrepreneurs, along with their individual convictions that their sojourn in Ghana will be temporary, effectively limits the possibilities for community-building based on ethnic solidarity. Short-term economic rationales also hamper integration and acculturation. Giese concludes that many Chinese traders in Ghana are trapped in liminality: unwilling and unable to acculturate locally but prolonging their sojourn for economic reasons, they experience personality changes during their stay in Africa that eventually obstruct their successful reintegration into Chinese society.

Chapter 4, by Xiaolei Shen, takes a close look at the integration of new Chinese migrants into local communities in Zimbabwe. Shen shows that

although the Chinese have made an important contribution to Zimbabwe's local and national economic development, they are slow to integrate. Unlike in Accra, however, new Chinese migrants have started to form associations and develop Chinese-language media despite the geographic dispersion of their living and commerce. As the Chinese community in Zimbabwe has gradually matured, new Chinese migrants have become more involved in their internally oriented social environment, which offers them greater social support but decreases their motivation and ability to integrate into local communities. Their slow integration is also a result of resistance from local Zimbabweans, who stereotype them negatively. To promote social integration, new Chinese migrants have carried out a series of activities through their associations, including helping each other adapt to local behavioral patterns, fulfilling social responsibilities and engaging with locals by organizing large-scale cultural or sports activities. These efforts have seen some success. However, full integration into the local Zimbabwean community has a long way to go.

The next five chapters are about new Chinese migrants in Asia. Chapter 5, by Elaine Lynn-Ee Ho and Fang Yu Foo, focuses on integration debates concerning new migrants from mainland China in Singapore. While the Singaporean state emphasizes the importance of integrating new immigrants into the existing social fabric of the nation-state, Singaporeans seem to doubt whether new Chinese migrants really want to integrate. It is critical to counterbalance this set of discourses with the views expressed about integration by the new immigrants themselves. The chapter suggests that integration pressures and social inclusion or exclusion are experienced in contradictory ways as a result of coethnic tensions, which are in turn tied to the periodization of migration to Singapore. By examining the attitudes expressed by new Chinese immigrants and their experiences of integration, it also draws out the variegations found in the Chinese diaspora that have deepened in Singapore across the decades.

Chapter 6, by Changzoo Song, traces the evolution and development of diasporic Chinese communities in South Korea. Song highlights the differences between old and new Chinese migrants. Old Chinese migrants are made up of those who migrated and resettled in South Korea (then Chosŏn) in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (known as old *huaqiao*) and their descendants. The once prosperous old *huaqiao* community went through hard times in the turbulent history of modern Korea, and then shrank in size. Nevertheless, its members maintained their identity and are now reviving their communities. The new Chinese migrants, arriving in

South Korea after the normalization of diplomatic relations between China and South Korea in 1992, can be further classified into two subgroup. One is made up of *Chaoxianzu* (Chinese citizens of Korean ethnicity) and the other of *xin yimin* (new Chinese migrants who are of Han ethnicity). The numbers of both *Chaoxianzu* and x*in yimin* have increased rapidly since the mid-1990s to more than a million. The two subgroups of new migrants are very different from old *huaqiao* in terms of their socioeconomic characteristics, cultural ways and political orientations. There are also major differences between *Chaoxianzu* and Han Chinese migrants in the patterns and experiences of migration and adaptation. The *xin yimin* subgroup is internally diverse, comprising laborers who search for better employment opportunities, international students, migrant brides, entrepreneurs and wealthy retirees. The chapter sets out to give a full picture of the diverse Chinese communities in contemporary South Korea by exploring their migration patterns, lifestyles, and social and cultural impacts on the host society. In particular, it investigates some prominent differences among the old *huaqiao*, *Chaoxianzu* and *xin yimin* migrants in South Korea. In so doing, it also highlights some of the profound impacts these Chinese migrants have had on South Korea, a non-conventional host country.

Chapter 7, by Chunfen Shao, addresses issues related to the formation and development of the new Chinese migrant community in Japan. Using official statistics from the Japanese Ministry of Justice and data collected from personal interviews and mainstream newspapers, Shao examines the phenomenon of recent Chinese migration to Japan, with a comprehensive and systematic analysis of the changes and challenges the existing Chinese community in Japan is experiencing. She offers a profile of the distinctive characteristics of contemporary Chinese immigration to Japan and details the ways in which the existing Chinese community is being transformed by the continuing influx of new Chinese migrants. Shao concludes with a discussion of the broader impacts of Chinese immigration on future migration trends and local Japanese society and on policy implications.

Chapter 8, by Fan Dai, examines the patterns of Chinese immigration to the Philippines, which has attracted a large number of new Chinese migrants since the late 1970s. Based on fieldwork conducted in the Chinatown located in Binondo in Manila, this chapter categorizes the new Chinese immigrants flowing into the country, either legally or illegally, while analyzing the motivation and other factors behind such a population flow. Dai argues that, in addition to migration history, migration culture and migration networks, the comparative advantages of the Philippines and

the unique economic niches established by the ethnic-Chinese economy provide new Chinese immigrants with the opportunities necessary for both survival and further development. She points out that the contemporary flow of international migrants does not necessarily move from low-income countries to high-income ones, and that the opportunities and comparative advantages in business contained in low-income countries play a significant role in driving migration flows from a relative high-income country to a low-income country.

Chapter 9, by James K. Chin, examines the formation of ethicized networks and the local embeddedness of the new Chinese migrant community in Cambodia. Ethnic Chinese in Cambodia form the country's largest ethnic minority, with around 60 % living in urban areas and engaged mainly in commerce and the other 40 % in rural areas. Since the fall of the Khmer Rouge regime, the once stricken Chinese community has been rejuvenating, with large numbers of new Chinese migrants flowing in from mainland China, Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan, as well as from neighboring Southeast Asian countries. Companies set up by new Chinese migrants can now be seen in almost every town and city in the country, particularly in Phnom Penh, Siem Reap, Sihanouk Ville and Battambang. Chinese entrepreneurs own, operate and build factories, banks, hospitals, restaurants, hotels, discos and casinos. At the same time a great many skilled Chinese laborers have been recruited to work in garment factories owned by entrepreneurs from Taiwan, Hong Kong and mainland China. According to a Cambodian congressman, new Chinese migrants are playing a very important role in Cambodia's economy as the majority of the revenue of the country comes from duties levied upon them. Three major groups can be discerned within the new Chinese migrant community: migrants from mainland China; from Hong Kong and Macau; and from Taiwan. Based on fieldwork conducted in the Chinese community over the past 15 years, this chapter gives an overall account of the new Chinese migrant community in Cambodia with a focus on those from Hong Kong and Macau. Chin argues that commercial acumen and entrepreneurship are acknowledged gifts of the Chinese migrants, who on the whole adapt well to the different environments abroad. Nevertheless, they still need various institutional mechanisms to assist or protect their interests. What stands out in all cases is that as transnational entrepreneurs they are quite active and successful in establishing different networks, intertwining with each other while becoming deeply embedded in local society.

Two chapters are on Oceania. Chapter 10, by Jia Gao, offers an overview of Chinese immigration to Australia since the mid-1980s. Australia was known to the Chinese as the "New Gold Mountain" at the time of the gold rush in the mid-nineteenth century, as distinct from San Francisco's "(Old) Gold Mountain." The history of Chinese migration to Australia from the 1850s to the present may be broadly divided into several stages: the gold-rush period of the 1850s and 1860s; the establishment stage after the gold rush; the consolidation period in the early years of "White Australia"; the diversification phase in the 1950s and 1960s; the multicultural period in the 1970s and 1980s; and the "model community" stage since the 1990s. The most significant stream in contemporary Chinese immigration to Australia was the settlement of 45,000 or so students from mainland China in the late 1980s and early 1990s. This sizeable and unique group of students has not only reactivated direct immigration from China to Australia but has renewed Australia's status as the New Gold Mountain and a preferred destination for new Chinese immigrants since 1978. This chapter offers a political-economic analysis of immigration and diasporic development as impacted by contemporary inflows of migrants, students, tourists and investors from China. It seeks to examine the patterns, trends and characteristics of Chinese migration to Australia from the mid-1980s to the mid-2010s, and to explain how and why Chinese migrants, once seen as aliens in Australia, have become an integral part of contemporary Australian society.

Chapter 11, by Liangni Sally Liu, provides an overview of the new Chinese immigration flow and its engendered return and re-migration patterns since the mid-1980s. Liu contextualizes the new wave of PRC immigration against the backdrop of New Zealand's changing immigration policy after 1986, and China's economic and social transformation. Her chapter focuses on examining the immigration pathways of PRC migrants, their general profile, and patterns of labor market participation and transitional migratory mobility. She concludes with a discussion of how new Chinese migrants are perceived by the host society, especially the indigenous Maoris.

Three chapters are on Europe. Chapter 12, by Adam Horálek, Ter-hsing James Cheng, and Liyan Hu, examines the patterns of identity formation, community-building and social integration among new Chinese migrants and their community in Prague, the Czech Republic. In the 1990s and the early 2000s, Czech Chinese were the focus of intensive scholarly research. However, there was little study from a demographic, geographic, or

sociological perspective, mostly because of the language barrier, but also because the Czech Chinese community has stagnated. Even so, the stagnation is not equivalent to homogenization or consolidation. The group remains incoherent, non-settled, non-identified, non-evolved and pioneering. Most studies on Asian immigrants in Czechia focus on Vietnamese as the largest non-European foreign community in the country, so a major aim of this study was to widen the focus. The first part undertakes a statistical analysis of the Chinese community in Czechia and in Prague between 1989 and 2013 in the framework of historical circumstances, geopolitical change, globalization, migration and ethnic development. The chapter demonstrates that the Vietnamese and Chinese communities develop in different ways, have different strategies and constitute different communities. Still, as the Chinese are usually assumed to be dominant (owing to their worldwide demographic dominance), Vietnamese are often seen as the Chinese from the Czechs' Orientalized perspective. The chapter also delves deeper into the Chinese community, explaining its internal heterogeneity, and its behavioral specifics and patterns of adaptation and integration from an intergenerational perspective.

Chapter 13, by Minghuan Li, focuses on new Chinese migrants to Spain. The majority of the Chinese in Spain are first-generation immigrants. Most migrated to the country after the 1980s, when China reopened its door to emigration. Owing to historical links, nearly 72 % of new Chinese immigrants in Spain come from Zhejiang Province, including some 65 % from Qingtian County. After arriving in Spain, the new Chinese immigrants quickly set up businesses, initially in catering and later spreading gradually to other economic sectors. Particularly after the turn of the twenty-first century, the business of "selling MIC (Made in China)" has become a symbol of the scale of the immigrant Chinese economic presence in Spain. However, while rising economically, the Chinese in Spain face ever greater problems, especially since the global economic crisis of 2008 and the resulting social challenge to Spain's stability. How does Chinese emigration to Spain happen? Why has Spain become a favorite destination for new Chinese immigrants and for Qingtianese in particular? What are the sociodemographic characteristics of the Chinese immigrant community in Spain? What dream have they carried to Spain? How do they try to realize it? What are the rising social challenges they face in Spain and why have these challenges arisen? This study analyzes these issues on the basis of the author's field research in the country over the last two decades, and it looks at how immigrants have challenged Spanish law. It is easy to declare

some transnational activities illegal, but greater effort must be directed toward exploring the origins and persistence of the illegality, and its widespread toleration and apparent acceptability. The new Chinese community in Spain is a case in point. The current chapter is a preliminary effort to open up this delicate subject for discussion.

Chapter 14, by Bin Wu, focuses on student migration and examines the relationships between Chinese students and their coethnics and other non-Chinese in the British host society. The unprecedented growth in the number of Chinese international students since the twenty-first century raises questions about their links to and impact on local communities in host countries. Viewing Chinese students as a special segment of Chinese diaspora, Wu explores their social networking, and their interconnections and interactions with different groups, both the Chinese and non-Chinese, on campus and off. Many questions arise. What contribution do Chinese students make to the growth and transformation of diasporic Chinese communities in major destinations? What are the scope and functions of their social networking for Chinese community cohesion and integration? What are the differences between Chinese students and local residents, and between Chinese students from mainland China and those from Hong Kong and Singapore in terms of network building and local engagement? The above questions are addressed by a combination of official data analysis and a questionnaire survey conducted in Nottingham, England.

Chapter 15, by Weinong Gao, provides an overview of contemporary Chinese immigration to Latin America. Although the history of Chinese immigration into this part of the world dates back to the mid-nineteenth century, it largely stopped until after China's reform and opening up in the late 1970s. Most of the new Chinese migrants come from rural areas. They typically move to Latin America through the double "networks" of kin and clan. In some countries in Latin America, clustering based on same-locality clans has become a trend among new Chinese migrants. Although their origins may differ, their clustering largely relies on locality clans. Because the history of Chinese migration in Latin America varies from country to country, the ratios of new immigrants to traditional ones in different countries also vary significantly. Among new Chinese migrants, some went to Latin America by "abnormal" (or undocumented) means. Even so, most have survived and even thrived with the help of clan associations in their relatively tolerant host countries, especially where law enforcement is slack. New Chinese migrants differ from traditional migrants in many ways, such as professions, progress patterns and ideas. In terms of new migrants'

solidarity, development and rights protection, clan and business associations play a central role.

Chapter 16, by Evelyn Hu-DeHart, looks at new Chinese migrants in Cuba. At the time of the Cuban Revolution of 1959 led by Fidel Castro, China, itself still a new socialist nation undergoing its own profound transformation, was one of the earliest to establish constructive relations with Cuba. However, when the Soviet Union became socialist Cuba's major ally and economic partner, Cuba's relationship with China faded, in step with the decline in Sino-Soviet relations. The downfall of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s left Cuba adrift economically. The resulting vacuum partially filled for a while by Venezuela. China has also returned to Cuba, its presence advertised by the Chinese Yudong buses that roll down Havana's avenues, the growing visibility of the Confucius Institute at the University of Havana, the more than 300 Chinese medical students in Cuba, Xi Jinping's recent visit to the island as part of his grand Caribbean tour, and the gradual trickle of Chinese tourists. With Barack Obama having announced his intention to normalize relations with Cuba after a failed 60-year-old US-led embargo that has lost most of its international support, Cuba's world trade is expected to grow markedly, not only with the USA but with existing partners, such as China. Following China's grand commercial entrance in the twenty-first century into many Latin American countries, such as Brazil, Mexico and Peru, will Cuba's expectation of accelerated trade with China as well as significant Chinese investment be realized? Will new Chinese immigrants once again find their way to Havana, which once boasted Latin America's first and largest Chinatown? Will China find enough compelling economic and political incentives to make significant investments in Cuba? Hu DeHart explores these and other questions in the current era and near future, as China resurfaces as a presence in Cuba, and in the context of normalizing US-Cuban relations.

Chapter 17, by Eva Xiaoling Li and Peter S. Li, is about the making of new Chinese immigrants in Canada. The authors show that, from their initial arrival in 1859 until the end of World War II, the Chinese were marginalized in Canadian society. They argue that, even after repealing discriminatory laws against the Chinese, it took another 20 years before Chinese could enter Canada by criteria similar to those that applied to other migrants. While Hong Kong was the main source of Chinese immigration to Canada from the 1950s till the 1980s, there has been a shift in the source of emigration, from Hong Kong to mainland China, related partly to the rising demand in Canada for skilled labor and partly to the growing supply

of university graduates in China. The continuous arrival of new migrants from Hong Kong and mainland China has brought economic vitality and social change to metropolitan Canada. Despite many coming with university education, new Chinese migrants receive lower remuneration than white migrants from the USA and Europe. Differences in human-capital levels and other factors account for only some of the disparity. It appears that racial inequality remains an obstacle for new Chinese as they establish their place in Canada.

The last chapter, by myself and Hong Liu, traces the histories of longstanding Chinese migrations to the USA to examine the link between immigrant entrepreneurship and diasporic development. Based on data collected from two parallel research projects and multisite fieldwork in the USA and China, we show that immigrant entrepreneurship has continued to serve as a key pattern of adaptation among new Chinese migrants and that this longstanding pattern is shaped by different migration histories, structural circumstances in both sending and receiving societies, and locations in the transnational social fields. We also show that rapid globalization, changing geopolitics in the Asia Pacific region and the rise of China have opened up new avenues for transnational entrepreneurship. We conclude that immigrant entrepreneurship is conducive to integration because it enhances not only an individual's economic opportunities but also their sociocultural opportunities by way of diasporic development.

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CHAPTER 1

Intra-Asian Chinese Migrations: A Historical Overview

Min Zhou and Gregor Benton

Introduction

International migration among Chinese people is centuries old. Long before European colonists set foot on the Asian continent, and before the formation of modern nations there, the Chinese moved across sea and land, seasonally or permanently, to the outside world, Asia in particular, to pursue opportunities and alternative means of livelihood. The world has witnessed various flows and patterns of emigration from China and remigrations from its diasporic communities to other parts of the world, by the migrants themselves or by their descendants (Poston et al. 1994; Poston and Wong 2016; Ma 2003; Ma and Cartier 2003; Zhuang 1989). It is estimated that, as of 2011, more than 40 million overseas Chinese (*Huaqiao*) and people of Chinese ancestry (*Huayi*) lived outside mainland China (including Hong Kong and Macau) and Taiwan, and *Huayi* had spread to 148 countries (Poston and Wong 2016).[1] The top five countries with the largest number of ethnic Chinese (exceeding 4 million) are Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, and the USA, and other countries with more than 500,000 *Huayi* (according to official figures) include Canada, Myanmar, Vietnam,

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Peru, Australia, and Japan (Poston and Wong 2016). Nearly three-quarters are in Southeast Asia.

This chapter addresses a key issue from a sociological perspective based on a review of existing literature: How does the centuries-old Chinese trade diaspora and its emerging migrant networks interact with broader structural factors—colonization or decolonization, nation-state-building, changes to political regimes, and globalization—and how do these interactions alter the course and pattern of Chinese migrations?[2] We argue that distinct streams of emigration from China and intradiasporic migrations are shaped by special circumstances and influenced by the intersection of nation-state policies, global economic forces and diasporic networks. We also discuss the implications of contemporary Chinese emigration for socioeconomic development in countries of origin and destination.

The Chinese Trade Diaspora and *Huashang*-Dominated Intra-Asian Migration

The Chinese have migrated differently in different periods and places, and the role played by the Chinese state in their migrations has varied. Their ways of trading, the pattern of their movements and the networks they form have changed according to time and circumstance. Large-scale international migration across Asia and the globe came, in modern form, in the mid-nineteenth century. Before then, the Chinese moved from their places of birth in search of means and opportunities for survival and betterment selectively and seasonally, mostly to neighboring towns and cities. Between the twelfth and sixteenth centuries, numerous migrations happened across Eurasia, and within Asia and Africa, but few Chinese ventured off shore or went far from home before the nineteenth century. The main exception was the Fujianese (Liao 2002), who migrated to Southeast Asia as *Huashang* (Chinese traders and merchants) and helped build the regional trading system (Wang 1991). In this section, we focus on how Chinese maritime commerce shaped migration to and from China and how the resulting trade diaspora in Southeast Asia affected patterns of international migration in general and intra-Asian migrations in particular.

Pre-Nineteenth-Century Maritime Commerce

International migration before the nineteenth century was closely linked to tribute missions to China, which imported tropical goods and exported Chinese manufacture. In the Tang (618–907), China was the world's largest, richest and most sophisticated state. Its maritime trade was already well developed, and the Chinese were referred to overseas as Tang people (Zhuang 1989, 2001). During the 1100s, the Chinese extended their trade routes from the South China Sea to other parts of Southeast Asia, which they called the Nanyang (the Southern Ocean).[3] They had formal trade relations with Korea, Burma, Siam, Vietnam and the Ryukyu (Okinawa) Kingdom, while local officials and private traders conducted informal trade with foreign merchants through port-states, such as Ayudhya, Malacca and Brunei (Reid 1996). The Philippines and Borneo were, at the time, run by chieftains struggling to turn their territories into states (Pan 1999).

Overseas trade had its heyday in the Southern Song (1127–1279), when porcelain, textiles and lacquer production flourished, and printing and publishing technologies were well developed. Depictions of Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean from a Chinese perspective appeared in books (Liao 2002; Pan 1999; Zeng 1998; Zhuang 2001). Trade continued to flourish and expanded into Russia and Persia under the Mongols, who conquered China and set up the Yuan (1279–1368). The Mongols promoted trade with the Arabs and allowed Islam to take root in China, while sponsoring expeditions to Japan, Java, Vietnam, Cambodia and Burma (Pan 1999). After the fall of the Yuan, the Ming (1368–1644) banned private overseas trade in an attempt to tighten its grip on maritime commerce and curb foreign influences. It sought to incorporate Southeast Asian states into the tribute system that defined China's relations with its neighbors.

Long before the arrival of the Europeans in large numbers in the sixteenth century, the Chinese dominated trade in most of the Nanyang. Chinese traders turned many Southeast Asian port-cities into entrepots through which they channeled silk, porcelain, and other manufacture. By the early fifteenth century, Chinese commercial communities had established a strong presence in Java and Sumatra. In 1567, the Ming government legalized informal trade, which gave rise to new Southeast Asian port-cities such as Manila in the Philippines, Hoi An in southern Vietnam, Phnom Penh in Cambodia, Patani in Malaya, the pepper port in West Java and the Batavia in the Dutch East Indies (Pan 1999; Purcel 1965; Reid 1996). Early trade often required that merchants and traders physically

traveled from one place to another or settled temporarily overseas (Zhuang 2001). This was because of poor communications and transportation. Circular migration from China to the Nanyang became the norm. *Huashang* took workers with them for a while and then returned home to prepare for the next journey. When the Dutch and English arrived in the region in the seventeenth century, they found large and distinct Chinese communities residing in key ports. Precolonial Chinese emigration was intertwined with trade and was dominated by *Huashang* and their seasonal workers, mostly their relatives or fellow villagers (Wang 1991). Those who settled overseas acted as middleman minorities, turning their places of settlement into bustling markets and using their economic muscle to dominate trade (Zhuang 2001). In the process, they developed migration networks and planted the seeds for further Chinese trade and emigration.

The Role of the Imperial Chinese State

The imperial Chinese state had long been ambivalent about international migration. Sometimes it allowed migrants to go overseas but discouraged their return, at other times it favored out-migration for its remittances, and at still other times it prohibited international migration (Zhuang 1989). Whether in prosperity or decline, the Chinese state played, and has continued to play, a paramount role in shaping the Chinese diaspora.

In the early Ming, private trade and trade outside the tribute system (e.g., with Japan) was banned, making it difficult for merchants to move to and from China freely. Later on, the imperial state relaxed its constraints on private and localized maritime commerce but it largely banned overseas residence (Zeng 1998). The Qing (1644–1911) inherited the Ming's hostility toward emigration and, for a long time, made overseas travel and residence a capital crime (Liao 2002; Zeng 1998; Zhuang 1989). Trade with foreigners was restricted to the port of Guangzhou. So as early as the late fourteenth century, when restrictions were in place, traders developed ways of bypassing them. These strategies were later institutionalized to facilitate migration and the formation of communities overseas. The Ming government's efforts to stop trade with Japan drove Chinese seasonal traders, mostly Fujianese, to seek permanent refuge in Nagasaki and other Japanese ports. These Chinese settlements resulted in the establishment of new routes between Fujian, Taiwan and Manila (Kyo 1999; Zeng 1998).

Most of the bans on private trade abroad were revoked in 1727. In 1754, the Qing began allowing law-abiding emigrants to return home and guaranteed their property (Reid 1997). However, even during the sea ban, overseas and overland private trade in South and Southeast China boomed. The Chinese saying, "the mountain is high and the emperor is far away," accurately described the attitude of local officials and traders to the ban.

The relaxation led to a booming junk trade and an outflow of traders, miners, planters, shipbuilders, mariners and adventurers of all kinds (Reid 1996, 1997). At the peak of China's prosperity and peace, the imperial government took over neighboring states. It incorporated Korea into the tribute system in the 1630s, then invaded Burma in 1766 and Vietnam in 1788. In the last decade of the eighteenth century, tribute missions from Korea and Southeast Asia were visiting the Chinese emperor two, three or four times a year (Reid 1997).

Intra-Asian trade and tribute missions to China peaked in 1790, despite Western colonialism, and continued to thrive until China's decline in the mid-1840s. Trade and tribute missions stimulated emigration. During what Anthony Reid has called the "Chinese Century" (1740–1840), nearly a million Chinese settled in Southeast Asia, amounting to 3 % of the population (Reid 1996; Trocki 1997). An estimated 30,000 the Chinese lived in Bangka in the mid-1700s (Andaya 1997). In Batavia, the Chinese accounted for around 10 % of the population in the early 1810s (Abeyasekere 1983). Siam, Java and Borneo each had some 100,000 the Chinese, representing between 46 % and 65 % of the population in the early 1820s (Blythe 1969). Diasporic communities formed as a result. Merchants and traders, both sojourners and settlers, dominated these communities (Reid 1996). Almost all of the 11,500 seafarers engaged in Bangkok's maritime trade were of Chinese descent (Reid 1999). Not all were merchants or traders. As merchants and traders started to invest in agriculture, mining and other land-based ventures, they brought in workers from their ancestral villages to staff them.

Most of the early emigrants came from coastal regions of Fujian or from Chaozhou (Teochiu) in southeastern Guangdong. They worked primarily in cash-crop farming (of sugar, pepper, gambier and rubber, etc.) and in tin or gold mining. Most products were destined for the Chinese and international markets (Trocki 1997; Wickberg 1999a). The diasporic communities strengthened both formal and informal trade connections, which facilitated subsequent emigration.

The Fall of the Chinese Empire: Semicolonialism and Huagong *Migration*

European colonists arrived in Southeast Asia's continental and island states in the early sixteenth century.[4] The Spanish occupied the central Philippine archipelago, captured Manila, and extended their control to Cebu and other islands (Brown 1999). The Dutch East Indies Company turned the archipelago into a colonial empire (Cribb 1999). However, Western colonization and expansion did not peak until the nineteenth century. The Dutch took over Indonesia in 1799. The British occupied and ruled territories on the Malay Peninsula, and they founded a trading post in Singapore in 1819. In 1842 and 1860, the British defeated China in two opium wars, forcing China to open its ports and turn Hong Kong over to British control, and thus become a semicolonial state (Li 2002; Zeng 1998).

The French annexed Cochinchina in 1864 and the whole of Vietnam in 1885, and it formed the Union Indochinoise, which included Cambodia and Laos (Smith 1999). Colonial expansion allowed Western private enterprises to develop plantation agriculture and mining, extract petroleum and other natural resources, and expand the market in the new colonies. European colonists began importing *Huagong* (Chinese contract labor), often referred to as coolies, from China and neighboring states (Wang 1991). The new geopolitics transformed the nature and course of migration. Two distinct streams of Chinese contract labor emigration formed: one to European colonies in Southeast Asia and another to the Americas.

The Chinese Century was followed by a century of humiliation for the Chinese, who were forced to sign unequal treaties, pay a large indemnity, open ports to foreign trade and residence, cede Hong Kong and grant rights conferred by China on one foreign power to other foreign powers. The Taiping Rebellion and a series of peasant uprisings further weakened the power of the state and accelerated its decline.

In the nineteenth century, Japan rose from centuries of national seclusion and began to pursue industrialization and modernization. In 1894 it won the Sino-Japanese War, forcing China to cede the island of Taiwan and the Liaodong Peninsula in South Manchuria (Storry 1999). The UK, France, Germany and Russia then forced China to grant more trading rights and territory. China would probably have been divided up into colonies by Japan and the Western powers but for a growing nationalism among the Chinese and rivalry among foreign powers (Pan 1999). The Qing

government promoted Japanese-type reforms, but they came too late and the dynasty fell in 1911.

The republic that then formed, initially under the Nationalist Party (Kuomintang, KMT), was too weak to unify the nation and lead it out of distress. In 1921 the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was established to challenge the new regime. Warlord rivalries and civil wars became widespread. In 1931, Japan occupied China's northeast, leading in 1937 to the Sino-Japanese War, which lasted until 1945. This split the short-lived coalition between the Nationalists and the Communists. After 1945, civil war broke out in China and was later won by the Communists, who established the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949.

China's lapse into semicolonial status and the colonization of the Asian Pacific region by the West and Japan profoundly influenced Chinese emigration. Western economic power broke the Chinese dominance over intra-Asian trade and made Asia's export economy part of an East–West trade in manufactured goods, food products and industrial raw materials. *Huashang* became agents or partners of the European traders and colonists, and they later played a major role in recruiting contract labor (Zhuang 2001). On the other hand, agricultural and industrial developments in the new colonies opened up new opportunities for Chinese diasporic communities to expand into the plantation economy and mining, hence creating a tremendous demand for labor (Pan 1999). This demand was fed by China's vast population and its centuries-old migration networks.

In China, foreign aggression and internal rebellions disrupted normal life and routine sources of livelihood. The country had a strong tradition of out-migration as a household strategy to combat poverty and turmoil. When war broke out or a dynasty fell, people fled, either from the villages to the cities or, in a small minority of cases, to the port-cities of Southeast Asia, where the Chinese had traded (Pan 1999).

Huagong *(Chinese Labor) to Southeast Asia*

In the century starting in the 1840s, the Chinese left China in one of two ways: as free migrants, along networks, roughly on the precolonial *Huashang* pattern, or as *Huagong* (Wang 1991), as part of the new coolie trade. The latter greatly outnumbered the former.

Most *Huagong* worked for Westerners, but some worked for other Chinese who owned plantations and mines in the Western colonies (Zhuang 2001). Precolonial and colonial emigration mostly originated in

and headed for the same sets of places. Colonial-era emigration from China was based on dialect groups and traced its origins to the same regions as the maritime trade in its heyday. The new emigration was closely linked to the old trade diasporas that originated in Guangdong and Fujian. In the mid-1950s, of the 12 million ethnic Chinese living in Southeast Asia, 68 % (8.2 million) were of Guangdong origin and 32 % (3.7 million) of Fujian origin. They were not evenly distributed in destination states (Zhu 1994). In the Philippines they were almost entirely Fujianese in 1800, whereas 100 years later between 85 % and 90 % were Fujianese and the rest were Cantonese (See 1960; Wickberg 1999a, b). In Cambodia, Cantonese dominated the early Chinese community but were later overwhelmed by the ethnically distinct Chaozhounese from eastern Guangdong (Wickberg 1999b). In Malaya, Hakkas were among the dominant groups. In contrast, almost all (99 %) Chinese in North and South America and the West Indies in that period were from Guangdong (Pan 1999), although these included some Cantonese Hakka concentrations.

Within a particular province, emigrants tended to come from just a few places. For example, most emigrants to Southeast Asia were from eastern Guangdong (Chaozhou and Shantou [Swatow]), while most emigrants to the Philippines and the Americas were from the Sze Yap (Siyi) region of southwestern Guangdong. In Thailand (Siam before 1939), 95 % of ethnic Chinese or Sino-Thais could trace their origin to the Chaozhou-Shantou region (Burusratanaphand 1995; Chan and Tong 2001). In the Philippines, nearly all Cantonese were from Sze Yap. In the USA, close to 75 % of the Chinese in San Francisco in the era of the Chinese Exclusion Act were from Toishan (Taishan), part of Sze Yap.

Most Chinese migrants in the colonial era went to parts of Southeast Asia where diasporic communities were already established. Between 1801 and 1850, 63 % went to Southeast Asia compared with 6 % to Hawaii and the USA, 5 % to the West Indies and 8 % to Cuba and Peru.[5] Between 1851 and 1875, record numbers went to Hawaii, the USA, and Canada (17 %), Cuba (11 %) and Peru (9 %) (Stewart 1951), but far greater numbers continued to head for Southeast Asia: about 27 % went to the Malay Peninsula, 20 % to the East Indies and 4 % to the Philippines. Between 1876 and 1900, the period of Chinese exclusion from the USA, the Malay Peninsula received 48 % and the East Indies 43 % of Chinese migrants, while Hawaii, the USA and Canada received less than 3 % (Zhu 1994). In Southeast Asia, most worked for plantations, mines and other businesses owned by coethnics.

Much of the migration continued to be circular, given the high rates of return migration. Most merchants, traders and workers were sojourning men. The patriarchal family system and the practice of partible inheritance facilitated the formation of bachelor societies abroad, since sons, regardless of birth order, could claim an equal share of patrimony. Daughters, however, were largely forbidden to leave home. The male sojourner typically left his family behind, or returned home to get married and then left his bride behind to take care of his parents and raise his children. He routinely remitted, and hoped to return himself at some point. Merchants and traders, who usually spent time overseas in temporary homes, traveled frequently between China and abroad. Workers, especially those employed on plantations or in mines, were less likely to make frequent home visits. Nonetheless, return rates were high. In Thailand, for example, the return rate was 57 % between 1882 and 1905, 78 % between 1906 and 1917, and 68 % between 1918 and 1945, although it dropped to 40 % between 1946 and 1955 (Skinner 1957).

Precolonial vs. Colonial Chinese Migration

Huagong migration during the second half of the nineteenth and the early part of the twentieth centuries highlighted the historical relationship between the centuries-old Chinese trade diaspora and emigration. However, Chinese migration in the colonial period differed in several ways from that in the precolonial era. Most *Huagong* still originated from Guangdong and Fujian, but they were relatively diverse and more often worked for Western colonists rather than for the Chinese. In precolonial times, most migrant workers were kinsmen or fellow-villagers of the merchants or traders in whose shops, farms or mines they were employed. In the colonial era, most were indentured.

Chinese migrants headed primarily for the same destinations as in precolonial times, but they were more responsive to labor demand at these destinations. Previously, trade and local investment in destinations by the Chinese had created a demand for labor in the investors' places of origin. In that sense, workers followed the trade diaspora. In colonial times, the plantation economy, mining and infrastructural development led to a less well-balanced demand for contract labor across the region, even in destinations with well-established diasporic communities. For example, the Philippines, the East Indies and the Malay Peninsula attracted more than 95 % of all Chinese contract labor in Southeast Asia. In the peak years

(1851–1875), 350,000 laborers arrived in British colonies in the Malay Peninsula, 250,000 in the Dutch East Indies and 45,000 in the Spanish-ruled Philippines (Zhu 1994). Between 1923 and 1951, 1.2 million Chinese went to Vietnam to work as contract laborers (but 850,000 returned).[6] In contrast, few went to French-ruled Cambodia and Laos. The means of labor export had also changed.[7]

In the past, merchants and traders set up migration networks in their home villages. In colonial times, labor migration was facilitated by the credit-ticket system and labor contracts. Merchants and traders brokered labor, and agents recruited workers not only from their own villages but from among fellow dialect-speakers. Most *Huagong* were poor, unschooled and unable to fund their own migration. Some received advances from their labor brokers (at home or overseas) while others contracted to repay their ticket from their future wages. So only those with direct connections to the centuries-old diasporic communities or to labor migrant networks were likely to leave.

Colonial labor migration was highly organized, and large numbers of migrants sailed from a small number of ports. For example, most Chinese labor migrants to Malaya sailed from Macao. As a result, Chinese in the Malay Peninsula were often known as Macaos to local people, even though they were Chaoshanese, Fujianese, Hakkas, Cantonese or Hainanese (Blythe 1969). British labor agencies also ran operations in Hong Kong, Guangzhou and Shantou in consultation with the Chinese authorities (Pan 1999). Most migrants to Hawaii and the Americas assembled in Hong Kong, whence they were shipped across the Pacific.

Even though they reached destinations with longstanding Chinese communities, many *Huagong* lived on plantations and in work camps, and had little to do with their established coethnics. The poorest workers were unable to send money home, let alone find a bride. Intermarriage with indigenous women became increasingly common in certain destinations. The descendants of this mixing were known as *mestizos* in the Philippines, jeks in Thailand, peranakans in Indonesia, babas or nyonyas in the Malay Peninsula and Sino-Viets in Vietnam. Some were assimilated into local cultures while others remained Chinese (Pan 1999).

In the colonial period, China was Asia's largest labor exporter. Nearly two-thirds of Chinese migrants went to Asian destinations, usually as contract laborers. Most in Southeast Asia returned home when their contracts ended, but some stayed and integrated into local Chinese communities. Countries in Southeast Asia ruled by Western colonists both received and

sent migrants. The Dutch East Indies received more than 300,000 Chinese labor migrants, while the colonial government sponsored the dispatch of 30,000 migrants from Java to the sparsely populated outer islands (Zhu 1994). The Philippines under Spanish rule received more than 65,000 Chinese laborers between 1850 and 1900, and continued to receive Chinese migrants even after Spain ceded the colony to the USA in 1898 and after restrictive anti-Chinese immigration legislation was implemented. Meanwhile, thousands of Filipino laborers were sent to Hawaii and the US West Coast to replace Chinese and Japanese labor (Melendy 1977).

Large-scale emigration from China to Southeast Asia testified both to the weakness of the Chinese state and to the resilience of the centuries-old trade diaspora. Though never colonized by a single nation, China had only limited control over the contract labor demanded by Western colonists in Southeast Asia and the Americas, and it did next to nothing to protect its nationals from harsh exploitation and mistreatment. The apathy and incompetence of the Chinese state indirectly strengthened the cohesion and organization of the diaspora. Its communities were initially established to provide aid to sojourning workers, protect them against competing or threatening outside forces and anti-Chinese laws, and enhance profit-making and economic opportunities for the ethnic Chinese elite. The latter played a more active role in labor migration than the Chinese state.

Developments After World War II

Decolonization, Nation-State-Building and Restrictive Immigration

From the late Ming through to the end of World War II, more than 10 million Chinese emigrated across the world. About two-thirds settled in Southeast Asia. World War II shattered direct colonial power in most of Asia. The Japanese lost the war along with their Great East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere and all their colonies. The British gave up the Indian subcontinent but resumed their control over Malaya and Hong Kong, the French regained control over Indo-China, and the Dutch struggled to take back the East Indies with British support (Azuma 1999; Cribb 1999). Inspired by nationalist and Marxist ideologies, Asian leaders in the former colonies led independence movements. The USA also opposed European colonialism in the region. Within a decade of the war, nearly all the colonies—in the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaya, Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos—had collapsed (Brown 1999; Cribb 1999). Indigenous

nationalist and socialist factions in newly independent nations competed for power and struggled to rebuild their countries while exercising stricter control over their borders, greatly stemming Chinese immigration.

The slow-down in Chinese immigration during the three decades following World War II was also a result of developments in East Asia. The Japanese surrender in 1945 left China deeply divided between the ruling KMT and the CCP. After the USA failed to mediate, civil war broke out. The CCP armies fought well and gained support from the peasants and the urban working class, while the KMT armies had little will to fight. The crumbling economy, record inflation and widespread corruption alienated all social classes, even the capitalists (Fitzgerald 1965, 1999). In 1949, the Communists won power at the national level, despite massive US arms supplies to the KMT, and the KMT's full control of the air and vastly superior numbers. The KMT retreated to Taiwan with about 2 million supporters, mainly soldiers and their families, marking the start of a bitter standoff between the Republic of China (ROC) and the PRC. Soon after its founding, the PRC was forced into the Korean War and then the Cold War, which isolated it from the West and from Chinese diasporic communities until the late 1970s. Beijing largely prohibited migrations to and from China. Border crossing became a crime and those with overseas connections could be denounced as spies.

In Taiwan, the KMT rejected demands for Taiwanese independence, but with US help and protection it implemented programs of land reform, industrialization and state-sponsored education, and it rapidly turned Taiwan into a modern industrializing nation. However, the fear of a Communist takeover remained, and in the 1950s large numbers of mainlanders remigrated from Taiwan to the USA. In the 1960s, the children of mainlanders and islanders, having benefited from the reformed school system, began arriving in the USA to study as one of the largest groups of international students. In the 1960s and 1970s, most stayed in the USA after graduating. The ousting of the ROC from the United Nations in 1972 and the normalization of Sino-US diplomatic relations in 1978 set off a big brain drain and capital drain to the USA, Canada and Australia. In some senses, Taiwan acted as a skilled labor exporter, with the USA as its primary destination.

Economic Development and Contemporary Migration Trends

Nation-state-building in Southeast and East Asia since the end of World War II has significantly reshaped the region's political economy. Nation-states in the region have protected their sovereignty by controlling population flows internally and internationally (Hugo 1998), while pursuing agricultural reform and industrial development (Abella 1992). Many have rapidly integrated into the Western-centered world economy and the newly formed Asian core. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), founded in 1967, allied Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines into a system aimed at further developing their economies. Brunei joined in 1984, Vietnam in 1995, and Myanmar (Burma until 1989) and Laos in 1997 (Turnbull 1999). Japan emerged as Asia's industrial and financial locomotive in the 1970s, and Asia's "Four Little Dragons" (South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore) achieved impressive economic growth and prosperity a decade later. Malaysia and Thailand rose rapidly to Newly Industrialized Country (NIC) status. The new Asian alliance, led by Japan and comprising Taiwan, Hong Kong, South Korea and the ASEAN countries, challenged the single-core world system and brought unprecedented economic growth to the region.

The development of the regional trade and investment alliance set off massive state-sponsored intra-Asian labor migration in the 1980s. Japan, Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Brunei imported labor: the Philippines, Indonesia, and China exported it (Hugo 1998; Martin et al. 1995; Tyner 2000).[8] South Korea, Malaysia and Thailand both imported and exported labor owing to domestic labor-market segmentation (Hugo 1998; Martin et al. 1995). Japan had the largest pool of foreign workers absolutely, but slightly fewer proportionately than South Korea (whose economy was a 13th of the size) (Martin et al. 1995). Foreign workers made up 5 % of the labor force in Taiwan, 13 % in Hong Kong and 18 % in Singapore (Hugo 1998). Since the turn of the twenty-first century, however, the role of the state in regulating migration flows in these fast-developing Asian nations has been undercut by longstanding migration networks and a rising migration industry consisting of both legal and illegal businesses, and of agencies catering to labor demands and individuals' desire to migrate (Bretts 2012; Gammeltoft-Hansen and Sørensen 2013).

The high wages in Hong Kong and Taiwan drew workers from other Asian countries. However, Hong Kong and Taiwan differed from each other and from other labor-short Asian countries such as Japan, South

Korea and Singapore in the type, number and origin of workers they allowed to enter. Labor importation on a massive scale did not take off until the 1980s. In Hong Kong, the rapid growth in labor-intensive manufacturing, coupled with low fertility, created a severe labor shortage (Skeldon 1995). While Hong Kong was starting to import workers, its middle classes began to leave in accelerating numbers for Australia and North America as a result of uncertainties surrounding the 1997 return of the colony to Chinese sovereignty. Some migrant workers moved to China to work in domestic services, manufacturing and construction, while others filled technical and managerial jobs left vacant by the middle-class exodus. Almost a third of foreign workers in Hong Kong were educated professionals from Japan, the UK, the USA, Canada and Australia (Skeldon 1995). Since the late 1990s, students and highly skilled professionals from mainland China have become increasingly visible (Chiu 2015).

Taiwan, despite strict immigration controls, attracted migrant workers from other Asian countries—mainly low-skilled workers from Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines and Indonesia. Filipino and Indonesian women typically worked as domestic maids, while men worked in construction (Tsay 1995). Taiwan's exodus of people and capital to the USA and elsewhere owing to political uncertainty reversed in the mid-1980s and the 1990s when many migrants returned and the trend towards transnational migration eased the brain drain. Demographic and economic trends, such as decreasing fertility, the switch from labor-intensive manufacturing to capital-intensive high-tech and financial services, and public investment in highway construction (Tsay 1995), created a huge demand for domestic and construction workers. In the late 1980s and the 1990s, Taiwan imported workers mainly from Malaysia and the Philippines to work in manufacturing and construction (Tsay 1995), although only a small number were admitted to perform domestic services. After China opened its door in 1979, Taiwan invested heavily in the mainland, and trans-Strait commerce flourished. Offshore fishing employed a large number of Chinese workers, but they were not allowed to come ashore (Lee 1998).

Singapore is a small island city-state with a population of 5.6 million in 2016. The exceptionally high population density (7797 per sq. km) necessitates a carefully managed development strategy.[9] Becoming an NIC in the 1970s, it faced the challenges of the rising cost of labor, severe labor shortages and near-zero population growth, like other Asian NICs. Importation of foreign labor, both skilled and unskilled, became a priority. The government allowed two categories of guest labor into the country: those

with work permits and those with professional passes. Those holding work permits were barred from bringing in dependents or giving birth in Singapore, and their contract terms were strictly enforced. Those holding professional passes were better treated (Yeoh and Lin 2012). In the mid-1980s, foreign workers comprised only 8 % of the workforce in Singapore, rising to 20 % in the mid-1990s and 38 % in mid-2015.[10] Most were Malaysians and Thais, with a smaller number of Filipinos (Chew and Chew 1995). In the 1990s, highly skilled workers from China began arriving in greater numbers (Liu 2005; Yang 2016).

Before 1990, China exported labor migrants on a much lesser scale than the Philippines and Indonesia, the two major labor-exporting countries. During the Cold War, migration to and from China was insignificant, especially in relation to the country's size, but the potential for labor export was great given its huge domestic labor force (Arnold and Shah 1986; Goldstone 1997). In the late 1970s and at the peak of the Asian boom in the 1980s, China reformed first faming and then the market economy, and then went on to restructure industry with an eye to exporting and to privatizing state enterprises. The country's drive for modernization and industrialization, coupled with its vast population and diasporic ties, has tipped the regional balance in its favor. These developments ushered in the "Pacific Century" (Forbes 1999), which has led to tremendous changes in the pace, extent, direction and nature of human movements.

Much labor migration to other parts of Asia from China in the late 1970s and the 1980s was more or less clandestine, assisted by pre-existing diasporic networks, and was on smaller scale than in the previous 25 years, while some of it happened as an unintended result of the Chinese government's student exchange program. The Chinese authorities continued, under pressure from the West and neighboring countries, to exert tight control on emigration. Most Chinese workers in Korea and Japan were irregular, having entered as students or visitors. Relatively few Chinese worked in other Asian NICs. However, international migration from China to North America surged once the USA and Canada relaxed their immigration policies. The ethnic Chinese population in the USA grew from 237,292 in 1960 to 1,645,472 in 1990, and to nearly 4.76 million (including more than 0.5 million mixed-race persons) in 2015, exceeding 1 % of the US population (Zhou and Liu, see also Chap. 18 in this volume). In Canada, the ethnic Chinese population grew from 58,197 in 1961 to 633,933 in 1991 and to 1.5 million in 2011, becoming the largest non-European ethnic group in the country and comprising 3 % of the total

population, with Chinese as Canada's third language (after English and French) (See also Chap. 17 in this volume; Li 1998). New patterns of intra-Asian migration and transatlantic migration have set Asian nations a new challenge—how to manage migration (Martin et al. 1995).

Undocumented or Clandestine Chinese Immigration

Intra-Asian labor migration is typically recent, short term and circular, with few possibilities for long-term settlement and integration (Battistella 1995). Both sending and receiving states negotiate and manage labor flows. However, the integration of national economies into the world system can undermine a state's capacity to control emigration and immigration. In regulating labor migration, both sending and receiving states create loopholes for undocumented or clandestine migration. China is a case in point. Emigration from China was strictly controlled between 1950 and 1980 (Zhuang 2001). Since China opened its door and implemented economic reform in the late 1970s, it has experienced unprecedented economic growth. In its drive to build a market economy, it encouraged internal migration and international migration, chiefly unintentionally (Chan 1994), but it lacked a sophisticated system of state-sponsored and state-managed migration of the sort that many Asian sending countries had developed. Starting in the late 1980s, and especially in the 1990s and since the turn of the twenty-first century, Chinese immigrants have become highly visible in Asian NICs as well as in Australia, Canada, the USA and many European countries. As many as 10 % are undocumented immigrants who have either overstayed their visas or been smuggled abroad (Chin 1999; Li 2002; Myers 1997; Smith 1997).

Roughly 180,000 people emigrated from China annually in the 1990s. Undocumented Chinese immigration grew by a factor of 6 in the early 1990s and by a factor of 10 between 1995 and 2005, which would translate into a net gain of 200,000 to 300,000 annually (Goldstone 1997). Such undocumented Chinese prefer to go to developed countries of the global north, such as the USA, the UK, Australia and, in Asia, South Korea and Japan. However, they are increasingly visible, both as entrepreneurs and as employees of coethnic businesses, in many developing and underdeveloped countries in the global south (e.g., Southeast Asia, Southern and Eastern Europe, Africa and Latin America), as this volume shows. Hong Kong and Macau have traditionally served as entrepots for Chinese immigration. Thailand and Cambodia have recently emerged both as destinations in

themselves and as staging posts to other developed countries in the West (Smith 1997). Latin American countries, particularly Mexico, have also served as staging posts for undocumented Chinese migrants to enter the USA. As of 2015, it was reported that the rate of growth in Asian undocumented migration exceeded that of undocumented Mexican migration to the USA, and many Chinese migrants went to Mexico in the hope of later getting to the USA (Rosenblum and Soto 2015).

Several factors linked to China's economic reform and structural changes in its new political economy help explain the rise of undocumented Chinese immigration. The erosion of the welfare state and the dissolution of food rationing and state welfare benefits, such as housing, removed the incentive to stay put. Workers felt free to consider migration, both domestic and international, as a means of livelihood (Goldstone 1997). Economic development weakened the political and economic power of the central government and strengthened those of provincial and local officials, while corruption at the local level made it easier for well-connected and resourceful individuals and syndicates to engage in smuggling. Long-established diasporic communities throughout the world revived their ties with China and their ancestral places, which in many cases triggered chain migration. Tourists, students and people travelling on business visas were helped by family or other overseas sponsors to survive, initially at least as illegal immigrants. Chinese syndicates and criminals exploited looser borders to traffic migrants to different destinations, either directly from China or with the help of Chinese diasporic communities (Zai 2001).

Receiving countries in Asia generally control migrant inflows, but they vary in their ways of dealing with undocumented immigration (Smith 1997). Repatriation rarely seems to be one of them because it is not in the interests of the receiving countries, especially those in need of migrant labor, legal or otherwise, and because it is discouraged by sending countries, which fear declining remittances and rising unemployment (Lee 1998). Receiving countries find it hard to stop undocumented immigration. Informal migrant networks and the growing migration industry often bypass government control of front-door entry (Gammeltoft-Hansen and Sørensen 2013).

Discussion and Conclusion

Existing research suggests that intra-Asian and international migrations from China have been closely linked to the centuries-old Chinese diaspora, and that they have been strongly shaped by a range of geopolitical,

economic and sociocultural factors. These include colonization, decolonization, nation-state-building, changes in political regimes, state economic development programs, diasporic networks and the migration industry.

In the precolonial era, China's dominance and the proliferation of Chinese trade routes to Southeast Asia played a major role in intra-Asian migration, primarily by way of tribute missions and maritime trade routes. Native people moved from place to place or island to island in search of new land, fishing and a better living, but rarely in large numbers. The Chinese wrought profound changes in the pattern of regional movement. Their merchants and traders, and the accompanying workers, turned port-cities all over Southeast Asia into trade entrepots where overseas Chinese communities and institutions nestled. Because of the tight control exercised over trade by the Chinese state, Chinese overseas had to find more sophisticated ways of going back and forth between their homes and their diasporic settlements, resulting in a unique pattern of networks.

Western colonization capsized the dominance of Chinese trade and China's geopolitical centrality in the region. With networks of the centuries-old trade diaspora already in place, Chinese merchants and traders turned into agents of labor recruitment, bypassing the state to facilitate mass labor emigration from China to Western colonies in and beyond Asia. Post-World War II nation-state-building and economic development realigned the geopolitical order in East and Southeast Asia, while the Cold War severed China's ties to the world. Newly founded nation-states strove aggressively to develop and modernize. In the process, barriers were set up at the borders. As governments bilaterally institutionalized international migration, diasporic communities, along with their informal networks, and migrant syndicates emerged or were revived in both places of origin and settlement. These networks and institutions sometimes worked in tandem with the state to facilitate migration in response to economic change, but at other times they facilitated migration with little or no state sponsorship or intervention. Where pre-existing coethnic communities were well established overseas, individuals could reactivate longstanding ethnic or kinship connections to evade regulation by the sending or receiving state. Once the migration started, migrants, networks and diasporic communities effectively undercut the power of the states at either end of the migration chain to structure and manage it (Massey et al. 1994).

When China threw open its door to the outside world and reformed its economy, tremendous pressures for international migration rapidly mounted. Patterns of contemporary intra-Asian and international migration

from China show that a direct but unintended consequence of China's economic reform has been network-driven and clandestine migrations, which have often overlapped. Undocumented or clandestine migration is a response to efforts by states to control their borders and curb migration. Current patterns in the 2010s are likely to persist in the following decade and beyond. As China becomes increasingly integrated into the world system, its perpetual marketization, working in tandem with its uniquely extensive (and uniquely developed) diasporic communities, is likely to undermine the power of the state even further.

However, the chains established in the colonial era to facilitate Chinese emigration may not be as strong as they once were. Beyond chain migration, people from all over China, including regions with little or no previous tradition of overseas migration, have begun to go abroad in ever great numbers, and they are more likely to rely on formal and informal services offered by the migration industry than in the past. In some overseas destinations, China's *xin yimin* (new migrants) may still have some connection to the old diasporas, but the tie is increasingly tenuous and relatively weak, even among compatriots from the same places of origin, and in many cases there is no tie. This has given rise to coethnic tensions between established and new migrants. Singapore is the most obvious example, but there are many others, including in Africa and Europe (see Chaps. 2, 3, 12 and 14; Yeoh and Lam 2016). Even where tensions are relatively mild, such as in Japan, the relationship between old and new Chinese migrants is far from close. The new migrants differ profoundly and in many ways from the old. They are far more numerous, with a far larger proportion of women and accompanying children. They are geographically more diverse in terms of places both of origin and of destination. They are socioeconomically far more diverse, with widely different levels of schooling and job skills among them. They are also less likely to form old-style Chinatowns or even new-style "ethnoburbs."

Another novel factor in the contemporary equation is the fact that China has now risen and become a center of attraction, far more so than in the past. It is already a country of immigration, not just from neighboring countries but from other continents, including Africa (Li et al. 2008; Zhou et al. 2016). The overseas Chinese attachment to China, at least among first-generation migrants, was always strong, but today the "hometown" tie is wired in by technology, and cemented by ease of travel and communications, as well as by other aspects of globalization, including that

of Chinese culture. As a result, some new migrants have chosen to return to China from overseas, and even some highly assimilated second- or third-generation members of long-established ethnic Chinese communities in some countries have begun to talk of ethnicization and root-searching in China.

Will Chinese emigration, legal and undocumented, define a new Chinese Century, on a scale far greater than that of 1740–1840 (Reid 1996)? Does the potential for emigration from China resemble a "Tsunami on the horizon" (Goldstone 1997)? Tsunami or not, it would be a mixed blessing for China and the receiving countries in Asia and the world. Many countries of immigration would have to find ways of negotiating and managing the potentially large and diverse influxes from China—an endeavor that would greatly tax the Chinese state, which is severely constrained not only by economic and globalization forces but also by the countervailing efforts of migration networks and ethnic institutions.

The notion of an ever-growing Chinese diaspora, fed by natural births and the arrival of new Chinese migrants, has begun to pose a new "Chinese problem" for countries of immigration. Nativist protectionism is growing in both developed and developing countries that receive *xin yimin*. If it continues to grow, the result will be not only a stemming of immigration as a result of policy intervention but possibly also a strengthening of forms of national identity based on the othering, or exclusion, of the Chinese and other migrants. In places where ethnic and migrant Chinese are already vulnerable to discrimination, they would become even more so at a time of troubled international relations between China and migrant-receiving countries, both developed and underdeveloped, and of a possible rightward shift in some nations. In the worst case, the Sinophobia that once rampaged across the West might be revived in the global south as well. In the event of a further rise in xenophobic pressures, the growth and growing sophistication of the Chinese economy could be expected to attract ever more migrants and their descendants to return home, or to begin to operate transnationally by straddling places in China and overseas. Such trends are likely to accelerate, given the current rapid aging of China's population, soon to become the world's oldest and already set on the path to rapid demographic decline. If these various trends continue and combine, the future fate and shape of the Chinese diaspora will become less certain and less predictable.

Notes

1. Estimates of the total number of people of Chinese descent in the world outside mainland China, Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan vary widely, ranging from a low of 40 million to a high of more than 50 million (see Office of Overseas Chinese Affairs of the State Council, China, "Demographic Distribution and Development Trends of Overseas Chinese http://qwgzyj.gqb.gov.cn/yjytt/155/1830.shtml, accessed on October 16, 2016). The analysis by Poston and Wong (2016) was based on the extensive data resources collected by the Overseas Chinese Affairs Council in Taiwan (2012) and Overseas Community Affairs Council (2013).
2. This chapter was developed from "The Chinese Diaspora and International Migration" (Zhou 2006).
3. More precisely, the Nanyang refers to the region immediately to the south of China, including the Philippines, the Dutch East Indies, Malaya and Borneo, Siam, Burma, Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos (Pan 1999: 16).
4. The Portuguese reached China by sea in 1514 and were believed to be the first Europeans to do so (Pan 1999: 365).
5. The total number of emigrants leaving China between 1801 and 1850 was 320,000. Most went to Southeast Asia, less than 6 % to the USA and 9 % to Cuba and Peru.
6. This number probably included the refugees who walked across the border to Vietnam after the Communist takeover in 1949.
7. The credit-ticket system and labor contracts were also the main means of labor migration to South Pacific, Hawaii, the USA and the Americas.
8. Hong Kong became a special administrative district of China when it was returned to China in 1997. Since it is operated under the "one China two systems" policy, it is treated as a nation-state but only in an analytical sense. Taiwan is also treated analytically as a nation-state despite controversy over its sovereignty.
9. Statistics Singapore, http://www.singstat.gov.sg/statistics/latest-data#16, accessed on October 15, 2016.
10. Singapore Ministry of Manpower, http://stats.mom.gov.sg/Pages/Labour-Force-Summary-Table.aspx, accessed on October 16, 2016.

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PART I

New Chinese Diasporas in Africa

CHAPTER 2

The Politics of Chineseness in South Africa: From Apartheid to 2015

Yoon Jung Park

Introduction

South Africa is one of very few African countries[1] with three distinct Chinese communities. Issues of community and identity in the country that perfected and codified racial segregation have been complicated by fault lines of ethnicity, generation (or the length of time in South Africa), language, region of origin, education and class, as well as nation (specifically, South Africa, Taiwan and mainland China) and citizenship. The state and larger society often fail to see these intragroup differences and on numerous occasions have treated the Chinese as alien, different, or "other." Ethnic Chinese communities have also defied or co-opted these assigned identities to their own advantage. In this chapter, I describe several instances when Chinese communities tussled with the state and society over the politics of being Chinese and I make some observations about the future of these communities in a still multiethnic South Africa. I focus on the fluidity of "Chineseness" both in terms of its content and its uses, while pointing to the differences between the three main communities of Chinese in South Africa: third-plus-generation Chinese South Africans, first- and second-generation Taiwanese South Africans, and those more recently arrived from mainland Chinese. I also explore shifting connections and

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identifications with China and Chineseness over time. Material for this chapter was culled from in-depth interviews with Chinese South Africans conducted in 1999, interviews with newer Chinese migrants conducted between 2007 and 2010, more recent interviews with several Chinese South Africans, Taiwanese South Africans, and Chinese migrants conducted in 2015, and close participant observation between 1999 and 2015.[2]

Multiple Chinese Communities

Early Chinese Immigration from Guangzhou

The Chinese South Africans or "local Chinese" have roots going back as far as the late 1870s when diamonds and then gold were discovered in South Africa.[3] The young men were mostly from Guangzhou (the Pearl Delta region of Guangdong Province). On hearing of yet another gold rush, they hopped aboard ships bound for the newest *Kam Saan* (Gold Mountain), only to find that, at the tip of Africa, the land had already been "discovered" by European colonizers and earmarked as white men's territory even though the majority population was black. The newcomers from China, referred to derogatively as "Chinamen," were prohibited from obtaining mining licenses and relegated to livelihoods supporting the very miners they had thought to become. Their lives were marked by controls and prohibitions: the Chinese, together with other "non-whites" (including blacks, "coloreds" and Indians), were subjected to pass laws and travel restrictions, residential permits, occupational controls and immigration laws.

Despite legal controls and prohibitions, a trickle of Chinese men continued to land on South Africa's shores, eventually bringing wives and later children to settle into lives of hardship. According to census data, in 1891 there was a total of 413 Chinese in South Africa. By 1904, these numbers had increased five-fold with the incremental immigration of independent migrants, but they remained, relative to the total population, quite small at 2,556 (Yap and Man 1996: 62, 76–84). By 1936, in addition to the predominantly male population, there were more than 1000 Chinese women in South Africa and 1,000 children born in South Africa of Chinese parents. Over the next decade, these numbers doubled (ibid.).

Large-scale immigration from China was prohibited by restrictions in the Transvaal Immigration Restriction Act of 1902 and the Cape Chinese Exclusion Act of 1904.[4] By the 1970s, the total number of Chinese

South Africans had reached approximately 12,000. With out-migration during apartheid, low rates of marriage (see Park 2008) and low birth rates, these numbers remained fairly stable for nearly five decades, fluctuating between 10,000 and 12,000.

Two distinct groups of the Chinese—the Cantonese and the Hakka (or Moiyeanese)—immigrated to South Africa and for several decades they maintained distinct communities, with the Cantonese settling in and around Johannesburg and the Hakka in the Eastern and Western Cape (Yap and Man 1996; Park 2008). Apartheid restrictions, which prohibited mingling between race groups, eventually pushed these two ethnic Chinese communities together. Both maintained close ties to China, with young men returning home to find Chinese wives, and couples sending children to China for a "proper Chinese education." Many Chinese still considered themselves to be sojourners. All the back-and-forth movement was halted in 1948/1949 when drastic changes in China and South Africa slammed shut the door between the two countries and forced the small Chinese communities to make their permanent homes in the country at the tip of Africa.

While South African barriers to Chinese immigration to North America had been lowered around the time of World War II, the Nationalist Party's racist and anti-communist policies prohibited new immigration from mainland China with the passage of the Immigrants Regulation Amendment Act (Act 43 of 1953). South Africa retained ties to the Nationalist government that fled to Taiwan at the founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, preferring their traditional allies to the new Communist government on the mainland. With the doors to new immigration closed, there were only a few isolated cases of the Chinese entering South Africa between 1953 and the late 1970s. These included some wives, a few qualified Chinese chefs, Chinese-language instructors, and a small number of illegal immigrants who persisted in their attempts to join family members in South Africa (Yap and Man 1996: 350–351).

Immigration from Taiwan

Significant changes took place in South Africa from 1961 through the 1980s as anti-apartheid activities intensified. In the aftermath of the Sharpeville Massacre, when police shot at protestors and killed 69 people, many in the international community began calling for action against the apartheid government. Divestment from the country did not begin on a significant scale until the mid-1980s, but several states began to distance

themselves from South Africa. Global economic sanctions forced South Africa to pursue closer ties with other pariah nations, including Israel, Chile, and Taiwan. As traditional economic partners started pulling away, the apartheid government instituted an incentive scheme to attract investors from these three countries. By encouraging investment in the black "homelands," the government also implicated foreign investors in their plans to staunch flows of black Africans from these rural areas into urban ones. A small but steady influx of Taiwanese industrialists immigrated to South Africa, beginning in the late 1970s. Generous incentives included relocation costs, subsidized wages for seven years and subsidized rent for ten years, cheap transport of goods to urban markets or ports, housing loans, and favorable exchange rates. Combined with increasing competition in Taiwan, these were sufficient reason for some to take their chances in South Africa (Hart 2003: 2).[5]

These plans were quite successful for a while. An estimated 2,500 immigrants from Taiwan had arrived in South Africa by the late 1980s. By 1989, nearly 150 factories had been established; by 1992, 40,000 jobs had been created and ZAR1 billion invested in these remote areas (Yap and Man 1996: 421; Hart 2003: 2–3). The arrival of the Taiwanese also prompted changes to some of the existing race-based policies: South Africa's longstanding prohibition of non-white immigration was waived in order to accommodate them, and in the Free State laws were overturned to permit Chinese residence in the province, allowing the Taiwanese to purchase homes in formerly white-only areas and send their children to white schools.

A second wave of Taiwanese migration, mostly comprising small entrepreneurs and students, followed on the heels of the industrialists. This group settled in the larger cities and towns. This later inflow led to the establishment of financial services, newspapers and other businesses catering to this growing community. The Taiwanese established their own community organizations, the Bank of Taiwan established a branch in Johannesburg in 1991, airlines ran six weekly flights between Taipei and Johannesburg, and one entrepreneur started a Taiwanese-run newspaper (Tseng 1991: 7). At their height there were between 30,000 and 50,000 Taiwanese in South Africa (Park 2012a; Grimm et al. 2014); today the community is much diminished, with most officials and community representatives indicating that there are approximately 6,000 (Park 2012b).

These Taiwanese differed from the earlier migrants from China in a number of ways: many migrated as families, they were well educated, and they had resources. They were also different insofar as they engaged in

South African civic and political life in ways that the "local Chinese" never did. When some prominent and wealthy Taiwanese publicly announced their support for the African National Congress (ANC) in 1994, the local Chinese protested, saying that because no one could tell them apart, they would all suffer from the potential backlash. The Taiwanese ignored the cries of the Chinese South Africans and continued to participate in local politics. Unhampered as they were by a history of racist oppression that kept most Chinese South Africans quiet, the Taiwanese made advances to various political parties when it suited them. Given the general invisibility of Chinese South Africans in local politics up to that point, it was a shock when in the national elections of 2004 four Taiwan-born South Africans were elected to parliament.

Both South Africa and Taiwan, for a time, permitted dual citizenship, so many of the Taiwanese became citizens of their new country. While large numbers eventually returned to Taiwan (or moved elsewhere) when subsidies expired or when South Africa switched official recognition from Taiwan to mainland China in 1998 (see Section 4), those who remained raised children in the country and became committed residents and citizens. The largest communities of these Taiwanese South Africans now reside in the greater Johannesburg/Pretoria area, in the area surrounding Bloemfontein in the Free State province, and in the greater Cape Town area.

New Chinese Migration from Mainland China

Except for a small number of mainland Chinese brought in by the Taiwanese as factory supervisors and line managers, there was little new migration from mainland China even after China's open-door economic reform; most participants in these newer waves of migration appear to have gone first to the Americas, Europe, and Australasia. New migration from the PRC to South Africa began to surge only after the mid-1990s, around the time of the first democratic elections in South Africa. This occurred in several waves. Many members of the first wave of Chinese migrants from the mainland arrived in South Africa by way of third countries, often from Eastern Europe, while the second wave arrived directly from China. Among these earliest migrants were a handful of employees of Chinese state-owned enterprises or private companies. The vast majority of the Chinese in the first two waves were well-educated professionals, many with international work experience and some capital. Most were linked by both family and other close social networks to factories in China. With these resources and

competitive advantages, many went into importing, wholesale trade and distribution. Those who were successful have since established extensive business networks in South Africa and in China; and some have expanded beyond their initial trading businesses into other sectors, including mining, manufacturing, tourism, and property development (see Park and Chen 2010).

The third wave of Chinese migrants from mainland China began arriving in the new millennium, and this is continuing. This latest influx is distinct from the first two in some important respects. These immigrants are mostly peasants of low socioeconomic background primarily from Fujian Province; they are much more numerous; and they have no connections with the Chinese state or its official representatives. Many enter illegally, mostly by overstaying their tourist visas or undertaking land crossings from bordering countries and then applying for asylum. South Africa's inefficient and corrupt Department of Home Affairs allows for these extralegal processes.[6] Owing to their lack of English-language proficiency, limited education, and inadequate connections to existing Taiwanese or Chinese business networks, nearly all of these newcomers have gone into the retail sector, opening up small grocery, convenience or other stores across the country.[7]

Unfortunately, there are no accurate statistics regarding the total population of the Chinese in South Africa. There are currently fewer than 10,000 Chinese South Africans and between 6000 and 10,000 Taiwanese in the country. However, because of the large numbers of illegal border crossings, poor record-keeping and corruption within the Department of Home Affairs, and continuing out-migration, it is impossible to know the total number of people of Chinese descent in South Africa. Estimates typically range from 200,000 to 350,000 (Park 2012b; Sautman and Yan 2007; see also Mohan and Kale 2007). However, more recent research indicates that current numbers may have topped 500,000 (Lin 2014: 182).

Chinese South Africans: Not White Enough, Not Black Enough

Through most of South Africa's early history, during the colonial period as well as the apartheid era, the Chinese were officially classified as "non-white" and treated as second-class citizens. Just as often they were designated as "Chinese" and treated as foreigners, even if born in South Africa. However, the small local Chinese community did not accept all such designations lying

down. They challenged their state-assigned identities as they fought to be recognized as South Africans and quietly struggled for their rights. Later, in the post-apartheid era, they conducted what became a very public battle to be included as designees of affirmative action legislation.

Legislation, as applied to the small ethnic Chinese population of South Africa, has been haphazard at best and, ironically, was often prompted by South African government interests or concerns about other ethnic groups or foreign relations: the Indians in the late 1890s; Japan and the small non-resident population of Japanese diplomats and businessmen in the 1920s and again in the late 1940s; Taiwan and the Taiwanese in the 1970s and 1980s; and, most recently, China. As mentioned earlier, the first pieces of anti-Asian legislation actually targeted the Indian population. Alarm at the growth of the Indian population, first with the "coolies" and later with independent migrants, spurred Natal, the Cape Colony, and the then South African Republic to implement immigration restrictions, as well as laws pertaining to trading, residence and citizenship (Yap and Man 1996; Harris 1998; Park 2008). These legal measures were targeted at all "Asiatics," including the Chinese.

Chinese as "Honorary Whites"

While Indians and Chinese were constructed as "non-white" during this period, racial policies were constantly being negotiated and at times economics trumped ideologies. The tiny Japanese business and diplomatic community and the larger (but still small) Chinese communities in South Africa posed challenges to the ruling party, because of their small size, the global position of these countries, and racial difference. It was untenable to create separate areas and institutions for these two groups, such as existed for blacks, whites, coloreds, and Indians. But what to do with them? It was ultimately the growing importance of trade relations with Asian countries that caused shifts, ultimately necessitating special accommodation within racial ideologies. Economic necessity gradually influenced a policy of exemptions, concessions and privileges for the local Chinese, which contradicted the race-based legislation of the country.

The Japanese were the first and only official "honorary whites" in South Africa (Yamamoto 2013). Because of their important status as a principal economic partner, Japanese visitors and short-term residents in South Africa were exempted from "non-white" status and granted specific privileges, while Chinese continued to be legally "non-white." As early as

1928, this special status of the Japanese was written into the Liquor Act, which exempted them from the definition of "Asiatic," allowing them to buy liquor in stores and public bars (Yap and Man 1996). The small Chinese community in South Africa, with the aid of the Chinese consul-general, publicly protested this differential treatment but they failed to convince the government to change the laws. However, the inability of most South Africans to differentiate the Chinese from the Japanese worked in the interests of the Chinese South Africans. In their own private acts of defiance, many Chinese simply allowed whites to believe they were Japanese or said as much; when their Chineseness did not serve them, they "became" Japanese (Park 2008).

Starting in the early 1960s, opposition party politicians and the press joined the quiet protests of the Chinese South Africans. They too began to question why only the Japanese were granted special privileges. Granting "honorary white" status to the Japanese only in terms of one law proved to be problematic for the government on ethical, political, and practical grounds. While they defended a rigid white vs. non-white divide in the face of contradictions and inconsistencies, as a practical matter it was almost impossible for the bureaucrats, hotel managers, restaurateurs and others to distinguish between the two Asian groups. As such, there was a gradual acceptance of the Chinese into white areas. The National Party ultimately paid a high price for these state exemptions and exceptions, revealing the first of many cracks in the edifice of apartheid.

Just as South Africa's economic ties with Japan affected Chinese South Africans, so did government ties with Taiwan in the 1970s and 1980s. The two states increased bilateral trade, exchanged visits of cabinet ministers and, in 1976, raised their diplomatic relations to ambassadorial level. By 1979, Taiwan ranked as South Africa's fifth largest trading partner (Harris 1998: 280). State efforts to encourage Taiwanese investment in manufacturing precipitated changes in immigration legislation, allowing immigration from Asia to South Africa for the first time since 1951. The Taiwanese were also granted exemptions under the Group Areas Act and permitted to live in white-only designated areas. By the mid-1980s, new legislation repealed "certain laws regulating the admission of Asians into certain parts of the Republic" (ibid.). The upshot was that all ethnic Chinese were permitted to establish residence in the Free State, from which they had been banned (with the Indians) since 1891.

Chinese South Africans, again, had stayed abreast of political developments and their potential impact on their community. As they had earlier,

they exploited the changing national climate resulting from improved relations between Taiwan and South Africa, even if it meant jeopardizing their relations with blacks, Indians and "coloreds."[8] Their acceptance of concessions and privileges can also been seen as a firm refusal to acquiesce to their assigned second-class citizenship.

Officially, the apartheid state, still ambivalent about the Chinese, made periodic advances toward the local Chinese community. Some apartheid leaders, aware of China's history as an advanced civilization, had continued to be conflicted about the inclusion of the Chinese as "non-white". Prompted by continued jibes from the white liberals, the impracticalities of creating another set of separate institutions for the tiny Chinese community, and their own growing ties with Taiwan, they advanced several national propositions to include the small Chinese South African population on the white voter rolls, add a Chinese representative (together with white, coloured and Indian representatives) to the President's Council, and install a Chinese person on the tricameral parliament (Park 2008: 49–51), while continuing to deny rights to the majority black population. The catch? All of these proposals would have necessitated that the Chinese officially be reclassified as white.

Interestingly, while the Chinese South Africans were quietly willing to accept and even fight for concessions, they refused to become officially designated as "white." Their position can be viewed, in part, as their unwillingness to officially give up their Chineseness. It was one thing to "pass" as Japanese or Taiwanese; it was quite another to be officially reclassified as white. Their Chineseness had helped them to retain some semblance of community and identity when they were treated as foreigners in South Africa. Morality and political maneuvering also played a role in their collective decision to wait it out; they would not accept any political carrots from the apartheid government until South Africans of all colors were granted the franchise.

"Chinese Now Black!"

While some Chinese lamented their position as second-class citizens under apartheid, arguing that they were never "white enough," in the post-apartheid era, local Chinese South Africans fought to be included under affirmative action policies, which defined previously disadvantaged groups as black.[9] From 1998 and for the next eight years, leaders of the Chinese South African community made multiple efforts to get clarification from

parliament and several branches of government about whether or not the Chinese were included in the definition of "black" as contained in the two pieces of affirmative action legislation. Failing to get answers, in 2006 the Chinese Association of South Africa (CASA) decided to take the government to court. With representation from a top law firm and apartheid activist George Bizos, they won their case. In June 2008 the Pretoria High Court issued an order that Chinese South Africans fall within the broad definition of "black people"—the specific language in the legislation to indicate their previous disadvantaged position—as pertains to the Employment Equity Act and the broad-based Black Economic Empowerment Act.

While their court battle ended successfully, the media fallout was replete with scathing headlines about the Chinese "becoming black." The court order only applied to Chinese South Africans and other Taiwanese or Chinese immigrants who had become citizens prior to 1994—likely fewer than 20,000. However, the lack of clarity about "which Chinese" and "how many Chinese" was a major contributory factor to the subsequent media frenzy and public reaction. Black South Africans expressed anger that the Chinese South Africans had not fought against apartheid. They were also concerned that the government "pie" would be further divided into ever-smaller pieces if all Chinese were permitted to apply for affirmative action benefits. It continues to be the case that few South Africans can distinguish between Chinese South African, Taiwanese and new Chinese migrant.[10] The fact that the ethnic Chinese community had grown from approximately 12,000 in the 1970s to well over 300,000 by 2008 added to these concerns. This case, decided soon after one of the most heinous and heartbreaking episodes of xenophobic violence, further politicized Chineseness (Park 2012a; Erasmus and Park 2008).

The CASA case speaks to the ambiguity and complications involved in systems of racial classification, past and present. This ambiguity has manifested itself in confused popular perceptions about how the Chinese were classified during apartheid, whether they had suffered discrimination, and where they stand today. The confusion was heightened by the immigration of large numbers of ethnic Chinese from Taiwan and mainland China. The strong negative public response dampened any sense of victory on the part of the Chinese South African community, providing further evidence of their marginal and tenuous position in South Africa, despite their efforts to integrate and claim their South Africanness.

Taken together, these instances in which the tiny Chinese South African community contested its racial classification in both public and private ways also speak to the shifting politics of being Chinese in South Africa. In the country's early history and throughout the apartheid period, Chineseness was neither desirable nor advantageous. Sometimes it was worthwhile to fib and claim Japanese or Taiwanese identity in order to gain access to a restaurant or a bus, or sometimes just to avoid the embarrassment of being removed from white-only spaces. And sometimes it became imperative to make public the fight for inclusion, even if these fights were ostensibly for "white" or "black" rights.

At the same time, the Chinese South Africans protectively clung to their Chineseness. After multiple generations, geographically scattered, numerically insignificant, and divided between two distinct ethnic/linguistic groups (the Cantonese and the Hakka), most Chinese South Africans have long since lost any Chinese-language abilities. Despite this, many of them continue to cling tenaciously to remnants of their Chinese culture, dated interpretations of Chinese values, Chinese community associations with their annual events, and memories of an imagined Chinese past. Most Chinese South Africans claim their South Africanness, but they also retain their Chineseness. These struggles were always been challenging, but they became even more complicated with the arrival of ethnic Chinese from Taiwan, Hong Kong, and mainland China. Confronted with "real Chinese" from China, many Chinese South Africans began to question the authenticity of their "Chinese" label.

Taiwanese South Africans

Taiwanese engagement with South Africa is a fascinating and understudied topic. Between the late 1970s and the early 1990s, tens of thousands of Taiwanese moved to South Africa, set up shop, made some money and subsequently left. In many ways, their behavior can be likened to that of other ethnic Chinese transnational migrants who regular flit between East Asia, Southeast Asia, Australasia, and the Americas (as described by Ong [1999]). As with many transnational migrations, some of these new migrants can only be described as opportunistic capitalists: they took advantage of incentive schemes and then moved on when conditions for business deteriorated.

Cheap South African Passports

Starting in the late 1980s, and continuing into the early 2000s, many Taiwanese who had been living in South Africa took their leave. From a high of between 30,000 and 50,000 in the mid-1990s, there are currently only between 6000 and 10,000 Taiwanese in South Africa. Taiwanese investors cited South Africa's increasing crime level and threats to physical safety as the top reasons for their departure (Pickles and Woods 1989). The post-apartheid increase in labor union power was another substantial reason for the Taiwanese exodus. A study conducted by the Center for Chinese Studies interviewed one Taiwanese investor who stated: "After 2000, 70 % of investors left because of wage demands from labor unions which negatively affected investors' profit margins, and 30 % left the country due to security reasons " (Grimm et al. 2014). Adding to their incentives to leave, South Africa shifted official recognition from Taiwan to the PRC in 1998. Taiwanese people, without formal diplomatic relations, were left more vulnerable insofar as they had no official authority that could protect or represent them in South Africa (Grimm et al. 2014).

One of the curiosities of these Taiwanese inflows and outflows is that so many Taiwanese had acquired South African citizenship. Political and economic ties between the two nations had permitted dual citizenship. South African citizenship had allowed Taiwanese business people to bypass costly visa renewals and simplify business transactions. The ease and speed with which some of them were able to acquire (and then discard) passports calls into question the value of South African citizenship. The behavior of these Taiwanese reinforces Benedict Anderson's argument that passports have become "less and less attestations of citizenship, let alone of loyalty to a protective nation-state, than of claims to participate in labor markets" (Anderson 1994: 323). South African passports were simply a means to an end—a relatively easy way to avoid the additional costs of doing business as a foreigner. For those who stayed in South Africa, however, their South Africanness and their Chineseness have taken on more significance in a period of formation for the "new South Africa" and China's global rise.

Political Participation

In the early 1990s, just before the first democratic elections in South Africa, tensions between the Chinese South African community and the newer Taiwanese community were running high. The Chinese South Africans

were concerned about increasing reports of illicit and illegal activities of "the Chinese." Media reports mentioned gill-net fishing, seal culling, rhino horn and ivory poaching, credit card fraud, gang warfare, and labor abuses (Yap and Man 1996; Park 2008). A clear "us" and "them" divide formed as Chinese South Africans grew increasingly frustrated that no one could tell the difference between them (the law-abiding citizens) and the newcomers. Chineseness, again, was in the spotlight. These conflicts also surfaced in politics at various levels: over leadership positions within local Chinese associations, over growing tensions between the Republic of China and PRC activities in South Africa, and over public pronouncements of support for local political parties in the lead-up to the 1994 elections. One Chinese South African woman complained:

> The new (Chinese) immigrants make announcements on behalf of the Chinese in South Africa. Meanwhile, we don't wear our political allegiance on our sleeves, okay? And also, the (local) Chinese feel that a lot of them trade in black areas and you know, to say that "I am DP (Democratic Party)" or "I am NP (National Party)" is just not on. Because, you know, you lay yourself wide open for victimization again, because you are identifiable. I mean, for a Greek or an Italian to get up and say "I support the ANC" or "I support the Freedom Front"—nobody is going the recognize that man after he walks down the street. (Interview, from Park 2008: 163)

As Taiwanese business leaders came out in support of the ANC, an acknowledgement of the changing tides, they exacerbated tensions with the Chinese South Africans who found that their primary mode of survival—being inconspicuous and invisible in South African politics was challenged by these newcomers. These newer arrivals, both Taiwanese and mainland Chinese, were often unaware of the vulnerable position of the Chinese South Africans during (and even before) apartheid. With no experience of discrimination, of second-class citizenship, and of the uncertainties and fears of living under apartheid as a "non-white, they blindly pursued their own ambitions in South Africa. For a small handful of Taiwanese, these included political ambitions.

In 2004, ethnic-Chinese civic engagement reached new heights when it was announced that the newest members of parliament included four Taiwan-born South Africans. Interestingly, there was one Taiwanese South African for each of the major political parties represented: the ANC, the Democratic Alliance, the Inkatha Freedom Party, and the

Independent Democrats. Such inclusivity in the political institutions of South Africa and the higher-level engagement of Taiwanese in those institutions is regarded by some as evidence of the increasing integration and acceptance of Taiwanese (and therefore other Chinese) residents, both citizen and immigrant.

While differences between Chinese South Africans and the Taiwanese South Africans remain—as evidenced in their separate community organizations—the gaps are closing as they gradually become more identified with South Africa. There is anecdotal evidence of greater social interaction, especially among the younger members of these communities, both between these two communities and with other South Africans. They also seem united in their concerns about the growing community of new Chinese migrants from mainland China to South Africa.

New Chinese Migrants: Love Affair with the ANC

With the ongoing influx of new migrants from across mainland China to South Africa (and the African continent), the politics of being Chinese in South Africa and the politics of Chineseness continue to morph as various (and increasing numbers of) people negotiate for power, privileges, or simply survival. One of the primary elements of Western narratives of "China-in-Africa" has been the influence of a rising China over African leaders: China is criticized for buying influence from corrupt and unsavory dictators.[11] At the same time, the Chinese in Africa also seem to be wielding influence as and when they can, exploiting their Chineseness when it suits them. However, this has also been a double-edged sword because their identity as Chinese (and stereotypes of ethnic Chinese) also leaves them vulnerable to crime, corruption, and criticism.

Rising China and Its Influence on South Africa

South Africa and mainland China began the current stage of their official relationship relatively late, in 1998. From 1949 until 1998, the government of South Africa officially recognized Taiwan. To further complicate matters, the ANC had established its own ties to the People's Republic of China as far back as the Bandung Conference in 1955. However, with the Sino-Soviet split of the 1960s, the ANC chose to align itself with Russia, while China maintained its support for the more radical Pan Africanist Congress. With the end of apartheid, loyal ANC cadres engaged in fierce debates

about changing recognition from Taiwan to mainland China. At the end of the day, those supporting PRC recognition won the day with both moral and practical arguments: (1) Beijing had always supported African freedom movements whereas Taiwan was a partner to the apartheid government; and (2) China's huge population and growing economic engine promised greater long-term economic benefits for South Africa (for more, see Park and Alden 2013; Alden and Wu 2014). Since establishing official ties, a multifaceted relationship between the two countries has continued to grow and China is now one of South Africa's principal economic partners.

In recent years, both opposition leaders and ANC insiders and loyalists have criticized the ANC government for kowtowing to China. South Africans were particularly angered by the ANC government's (mis)handling of visa requests for the Dalai Lama.[12] There have now been three incidents—in March 2009, October 2011 and October 2014—when the Dalai Lama was refused a visa or when his visa application was so delayed as to cause him to cancel his trip. Responses to these events from people ranging from Patricia de Lille, the then mayor of Cape Town, to Archbishop Desmond Tutu were almost unanimously hostile to the Zuma-led government for ostensibly succumbing to pressure from Beijing. The most recent incident also elicited a petition with more than 10,000 signatories, all repudiating the government's decision. All this opposition seems to have had little impact on the ANC's love affair with China. For government leaders, it would appear that business deals, including both trade and investment, take precedence over all other matters.[13]

As indicated by Ross Anthony in a Centre for Chinese Studies commentary, the South African government has done its cost–benefit analysis and China appears to be the big winner (see note 14). The Chinese government and the CCP are doing their part to woo their ANC counterparts, often through the distribution of all-paid trips to China, either for short business trips or for longer "educational" jaunts. By all accounts, Chinese investment in South Africa is growing, but South African investment in China is also keeping pace (Alden and Wu 2014).[14]

Criticisms of the ANC because of the Dalai Lama episodes illustrate that most South Africans are concerned about China's lack of democracy and the Zuma government's sacrifice of South African sovereignty. The increased entanglements at the level of both the state and the political parties are also reflected on the interpersonal level.

New Chinese Migrants and the ANC

Sometimes a picture speaks a thousand words. In the run-up to the last South African elections in 2014, a political poster was seen on a lamp-post in Cyrildene, Johannesburg's new Chinatown. It is unclear who was behind the Chinese-language ANC campaign poster (Fig. 2.1). Regardless of whether it was the brainchild of an ANC official or some wealthy and influential Chinese business leader, it certainly speaks to some sort of courting in the relationship between members of new Chinese migrant communities and the ANC.

Researchers examining these newer Chinese migrant communities in and around Johannesburg have described the presence of prominent local ANC officials at Chinese community events and Chinese-owned shops in Cyrildene featuring photos of ANC leaders. In the course of my research, I also came across one Chinese migrant from Fujian, not five years in South Africa, who showed me his ANC membership card. He explained that flashing his card worked to his advantage in many business interactions. Across small towns and in large cities across South Africa, there is growing evidence that Chinese migrants are learning that to do business in the country it is beneficial to have friends in high places. In South Africa, this means making friends within the upper echelons of the ANC. And, increasingly, it would appear that some in the Chinese migrant business community are playing the "China card," using their Chineseness and exploiting the close ties between South Africa and China for their own benefit.

Being Chinese in South Africa also comes with costs. While Chineseness can be used as a trump card, it can also be used to target ethnic Chinese. At one end of the spectrum, South Africans can be guilty of stereotyping and discriminating against the Chinese. At the other end, increasing numbers of the Chinese have been murdered and have been victims of other crimes. Most South Africans are unable to distinguish between Chinese groups. As such, there has been a tendency to paint all the Chinese with one brush, disregarding differences in citizenship, language, and legal status, as indicated by the outcry in the CASA affirmative-action case. Chinese people, as in the past, are seen as part of China, even if they happen to be third- or fourth-generation South Africans. In this vein, grievances against China also become grievances against Chinese people.

Racialized stereotypes have resulted in an increasing number of attacks against the Chinese. It is true that some Chinese are victimized by other Chinese as business competition or criminal syndicates spiral out of control.

Fig. 2.1 2014 ANC campaign poster in Chinese, as seen in Cyrildene, Johannesburg

Exact figures are unknown because the South African police no longer track the ethnicity or race of perpetrators and victims. However, newspaper accounts would seem to indicate that Chinese-on-Chinese crime is significant enough to warrant attention. According to the only scholar to have studied Chinese triads in South Africa, Peter Gastrow stated, "Violence aimed at settling turf battles or at extorting money is perpetuated primarily by members of the respective groups . . . some contract killings have been performed by professionals brought in from China . . . Access to firearms is not difficult in South Africa" (Gastrow 2001). Chinese criminal syndicates have been active in South Africa since the 1980s (ibid.).

The Chinese are also targeted by corrupt government officials and common criminals. In a study of xenophobia in South Africa, immigrant retailers from China and the Indian subcontinent complained that they were constantly harassed by police officers and other authorities for bribes (Park and Rugunanan 2009). While the study found that Asians in South Africa are not primary targets of xenophobic violence, they are seen as "soft targets" for extortion and petty crime. Because so many of the new Chinese migrants are engaged in the retail sector, they are vulnerable to robberies, break-ins and looting. The targeting of the Chinese is exacerbated by rumors that they keep large quantities of cash on their persons, in their shops and in their homes. This sort of stereotyping puts all the Chinese (and those who appear to be Chinese) in danger. Such was evidenced in the tragic tale of Alan Ho, a 77-year-old Chinese South African shopkeeper who was found dead, bound and gagged, in his shop in Johannesburg. Police hypothesized that he had been tortured because the criminals believed he was hiding money somewhere in his shop.[15] While Chineseness and links to "rising China" might be used strategically to get ahead in business, they can sometimes also be used against people as racialized stereotypes, perpetuating myths of wealth and hordes of cash.

Conclusion: Becoming South African or Using Chineseness to Get Ahead?

Even as South Africa is becoming increasingly ethnically diverse, particularly with increasing in-migration since the end of apartheid, definitions of South Africanness appear to be narrowing. South Africanness is, in some discourses, increasingly equated with blackness.[16] However, as indicated by the continued if sporadic outbursts of xenophobic violence targeting black

Africans, not all blacks are viewed as South African. Ethnic minorities, specifically members of the colored, Indian, and Chinese South African communities, complain that they are increasingly being excluded, and the common refrain heard across these communities is that before "we weren't white enough," but now "we are not black enough." [17] Processes of inclusion and exclusion are uneven and, at times, contradictory. For example, it would appear that even with a predominantly black government, the white minority continues to benefit economically, while those defined as *amakwerekwere* (foreigners), especially the black African *amakwerekwere*, suffer the most vicious attacks.[18]

The negative responses to the Chinese South Africa affirmative action court case decision indicates that these shifting and narrowing social perceptions may ultimately determine the levels of acceptance of any ethnic minority or new migrant group. Perceptions of ethnic Chinese in South Africa are confused and ambiguous at best.[19] In the South African case, despite the protection afforded by citizenship, the constitution and other progressive legislation, all Chinese people in the country continue to occupy an ambiguous, marginal, in-between, and sometimes precarious position within South African society.

This may be changing. As the love affair between China and South Africa continues to grow, we have seen that ethnic Chinese in the country can (and often do) take advantage of certain relationships and privileges afforded to these most valuable economic partners. However, close identification with China also poses a potential danger. As several prominent scholars of overseas Chinese have noted in other countries, particularly in Southeast Asia, such (perceived) close ties with China have been used to single out and target ethnic Chinese (Purdey 2006, Reid 1999). Perhaps the best road for Chinese in South Africa to take, then, would be to become *luodi shenggen* (seeds that take root where they fall) (Wang 1998). Some Chinese migrants to South Africa have clearly taken this road, but it will likely take a much greater critical mass for it to make a difference in how Chinese are perceived in the country—as more South African than Chinese. Given the extent of social media use and the ease and relatively low cost of air travel, it would appear that many more Chinese have maintained their close ties with China. Chinese South Africans, too, are traveling to China and reconnecting with long-lost family. Still, conversations with both Chinese South Africans and long-time Chinese residents of South Africa indicate that they are home; South Africa, while sometimes uncomfortable and occasionally dangerous, is home.

Notes

1. Several of the Indian Ocean nations, including Mauritius, Reunion and Madagascar, also have multigenerational as well as newer ethnic Chinese communities. Note that "communities" is used very loosely because these three groupings have more differences within than between them.
2. From 1995 to 2010 I was resident in South Africa, allowing for regular interaction with the various communities of Chinese.
3. The Chinese were the second "Asian" group to arrive in South Africa. The first were the more numerous Indians. The Indian population had arrived in South Africa both as indentured laborers and as free migrants a decade or more earlier. The various governing bodies of the time referred to them broadly as "Asiatics" and they formed the fourth major group in South Africa's racial classification system after the black/"Bantu", white/European, and "colored" (or mixed-race) groups. It should also be remembered that the Chinese were among those who set up the first permanent (Western) settlement in the Cape of Good Hope with the arrival of the Dutch East India Company in 1652. These earlier Chinese were few. Some eventually returned to their homes, while others perished in the Cape. Those who stayed on were too few to establish a lasting Chinese community and instead became part of a growing mixed-race (now colored) community.
4. These laws were passed in response to two separate issues. The first was the long-term settlement of indentured Indian workers who, freed from their periods of indenture and part of the British Empire, were given land and had begun to compete with the white petit bourgeoisie. The first set of anti-Asian laws was designed to restrict their mobility, residence and occupations. The second was the proposal to import indentured Chinese to work in the gold mines of the Transvaal. Extremely controversial, the idea that thousands of pigtailed "Mandarins" might roam the streets or might eventually gain their independence to also compete with white business owners caused fear among segments of the white population. As a result, the importation of nearly 65,000 Chinese miners took place under the strictest conditions and was curtailed within a few years. Both the Transvaal and the Cape colonies also passed the laws mentioned here to restrict or entirely prevent the immigration of the Chinese.
5. Hart explains that, at the same time, large numbers of small-scale industrialists in Taiwan came under enormous pressure to leave the country owing to rising wages, escalating exchange rates and high rents. Ironically, these conditions, she says, were created by the stunning pace of their industrial investment and export drive (Hart 2003: 2).
6. A quick internet search for "corruption in home affairs-South Africa" resulted in more than 8 million hits. This is a well-known problem.

7. Recent research conducted on Chinese migrants in Namibia and Lesotho revealed similar classes of migrant throughout these neighboring countries as well (see Dobler 2009; Hanisch 2013).
8. The older generation of Chinese South African shopkeepers depended for their livelihood on their black and coloured customers. However, with each passing decade, fewer and fewer Chinese remained in the shops as ever-larger numbers completed tertiary degrees and became professionals.
9. Headlines such as this could be seen on media platforms around the globe. See, for example, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7461099.stm, accessed August 3, 2016.
10. To be fair, this is the case throughout Africa, that anyone from East Asia is identified as Chinese. Increasingly, too, whites are also identified as the Chinese, indicating that at least in some parts of Africa, the Chinese have become the most significant and most familiar face of the "other."
11. Many recent articles attest to these concerns See, for example, http://thediplomat.com/2014/08/china-and-the-us-compete-for-influence-in-africa/ and http://tribune.com.pk/story/428026/chinas-growing-influence-in-africa/, both accessed on August 3, 2016. The Western media, in particular, seems concerned about "competition" between China and the USA, or China and Europe, as they vie for influence in Africa.
12. See http://mg.co.za/article/2014-10-02-zuma-accused-of-selling-sas-sovereignty-to-china and http://www.bdlive.co.za/opinion/2015/12/04/how-to-read-the-tea-leaves-grown-and-brewed-in-china, both accessed August 3, 2016.
13. See http://www.ccs.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/CCS_Commentary_Dalai_Lama_RA_2014.pdf for one of many analyses and comment, accessed August 3, 2016.
14. Regarding Chinese investment, see http://www.scmp.com/business/china-business/article/1512517/winery-factories-chinese-firms-investing-billions-south, accessed August 3, 2016.
15. Ufrieda Ho, http://mg.co.za/article/2015-04-23-allan-hos-death-stirs-hope-out-of-tragedy
16. This is not "black" in the Steve Biko, political and broad definition of "blackness" as inclusive of all those who fought against white rule but rather a narrow view of South African "blackness", which will be elaborated in this chapter.
17. For examples of exclusion, see Lewis (1987), James et al. (1996), Adhikari (2005) and Wicomb (1998).
18. A. Botha, "Could Affirmative Action Be Helping White People?" thought leader, *Mail & Guardian*, March 24, 2011.

19. I use the term "ethnic Chinese" here and in various places throughout this chapter as an inclusive term for all three communities of the Chinese in South Africa: Chinese South Africans, Taiwanese South Africans and the newer Chinese migrants from mainland China.

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CHAPTER 3

Chinese Traders in Ghana: The Liminality Trap, and Challenges for Ethnic Formation and Integration

Karsten Giese

Introduction: The Chinese Paradox in Africa

When discussing the new presence on the African continent of Chinese nationals who have arrived since the early 2000s, the many clusters of Chinese entrepreneurs across Africa present a paradox. In most cases, the Chinese in Africa today do not fit the characteristics typically ascribed to ethnic Chinese groups outside China. Their lack of ethnic or national solidarity and social cohesion, culminating in the widespread absence of community (compare Dobler 2009; Haugen and Carling 2005; Lam 2015a), defies conventional wisdom about overseas Chinese. The Chinese in Ghana, who have arrived as individual entrepreneurs and in substantial numbers since the turn of the millennium, are no exception in this general picture found across the African continent. They form a highly concentrated trading cluster in Accra, the country's capital and economic center. Chinese economic activities in trade have concentrated at the periphery of Makola Market, which has served as the main site of commerce. Though this pattern of spatial clustering has made the Chinese and Chinese commercial activities

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highly visible, most Chinese are dispersed across middle-class residential areas of Accra and neighboring Tema, and their isolation both from each other and from the local population presents challenges for ethnic formation and integration.

First impressions suggest that the Chinese cluster in the Ghanaian capital is temporary and transient, completely lacking in any visible expression of Chinese identity apart from the corporeal. Shops and residences appear to be improvised, bare of any decoration, sparsely furnished, and without any comfort or individual character—spaces strictly reduced to their core functions. The absence rather than the presence of common signifiers of “Chineseness” are characteristic of the Chinese trading cluster. None of the trading enterprises has Chinese characters in its name or on its shop front. Many are not even recognizable as Chinese or East Asian from their names, if they display one. Nor are there altars worshiping ancestors or folk religious deities of happiness, wealth and longevity traditionally regarded as essential for business success. The Chinese entrepreneurs seem to show no real interest in permanent resettlement, or in identifying with other Chinese or being recognized by others as Chinese. How can we explain this lack of visible Chinese identity and community? What factors cause this strong sense of temporariness and transience?

I first offer a brief overview of the history of Chinese migration to Ghana and a theoretical discussion of key concepts in liminality theory.[1] I then present empirical findings about the current Chinese presence in Ghana and address my main research questions. First, however, I must explain the basis of my data. Conflating and homogenizing “the” Chinese is a pointless though widespread exercise, so my conclusions about a non-representative sample of Chinese nationals engaged exclusively in trade do not necessarily apply to other groups of Chinese in Ghana—that is, contract workers and investors in industrial production, mining or agriculture. I gathered my information from around 120 Chinese informants through participant observation and intensive qualitative interviewing between early 2011 and late 2013.[2] The informants had been residing in Ghana for as little as two months and as long as ten years. The surveyed population of Chinese traders specializing in cheap fashion and household goods is concentrated in Accra and forms an ethnoeconomic cluster of some 200 enterprises consisting of around 1000–1500 Chinese migrants (both shareholders and employees).

Chinese Migration to Ghana

The Early Years: Manufacturers from Hong Kong, and Trading Representatives from Taiwan and Mainland China

Research on the Chinese in Ghana is scant. The few scholars who have done it agree that the first Chinese entered the Gold Coast region shortly before the British colony became independent in 1957. Drawing on interviews with long-term Chinese residents, Ho (2008, 2012) and Lam (2015a, b) report that the embryonic Chinese presence in Accra in the late 1950s was dominated by Hong Kong industrial investors (many of Shanghai origin) and their staff, thus also from a British colony. Partly as a result of restrictions imposed by the UK and the USA on textile imports from Hong Kong, manufacturers there are said to have arrived in Ghana to seek alternative markets (Lam 2017: 34). Soon Ghana was promoted among Hong Kong manufacturers as a suitable base. Investments were made in the manufacture of enamelware, textiles, tobacco and steel products, among other things (Lam 2015b: 33). During a period of political turmoil in Ghana in the 1970s and the early 1980s, most of the Hong Kong-run factories closed down and their investors, technicians and managers left, save for a small number who stayed with their families and opened restaurants and other businesses (Lam 2015b: 35). Many of the staff in the few remaining factories returned to Hong Kong and were replaced by cheaper labor from mainland China, particularly after the late 1980s (Lam 2015b). Some Taiwanese enterprises also entered the Ghanaian market, first as importers, and later as manufacturers and service providers. So did a small number of Chinese state-owned trading companies. Though statistics are not available, the Chinese presence seems to have been numerically insignificant. The first stage was characterized by long-term investment in basic manufacturing and the settlement of mostly Cantonese-speaking investors, managers and staff, but in the 1970s and 1980s the movements of trading representatives belonging to private Taiwan companies and mainland Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) were more transitory. No more than a dozen or so of these early Chinese migrants remained in Ghana. Informants still present in Ghana during the period of my research agreed that, by the 1990s, migratory movements of Hong Kong and Taiwan entrepreneurs and staff had ceased, and Chinese state-owned trading offices were closed or had moved into private hands in the course of economic reforms and privatization within the People's Republic of China.

The Age of Trade Liberalization: Trading Entrepreneurs from Mainland China

The foundations of the current Chinese presence in Ghana, which is dominated by independent traders, were not laid until the late 1990s. A limited number of Chinese state-owned trading offices had been active in Ghana since the late 1980s, but they ceased operations one by one in the second half of the 1990s in a phase of major restructuring and privatization in China (Tang, May 2, 2011; Tang, December 11, 2011). Confronted with the choice of unemployment in China or entrepreneurship in Ghana, some of these trade representatives became the Chinese pioneers of private Sino-Ghanaian trade. These formerly state-employed entrepreneurs continue to occupy influential positions, but the present Chinese trading cluster has been shaped by the large wave of entrepreneurial migrants from China arriving since the turn of the millennium. Chinese SOEs are generally absent, except for a very few involved in large-scale infrastructural projects.

There is little reliable information about the number of Chinese in Ghana. Estimates vary and are largely based on interviewees' subjective impressions or vague statements by officials rather than on surveys or official counts. The figure that was widely accepted for the late 2000s was 10,000 (cf. Ho 2008: 59f; Sautman and Yan 2007), while Lam (2015b: 37) quotes the Chinese embassy's estimate of 20,000 in 2010, based on data provided by the Ghanaian Immigration Department.[3] These figures usually include a substantial number of Chinese employees working on temporary contracts as managers, technicians, engineers or construction workers in one of the large-scale projects that Chinese SOEs are carrying out across the country.

Informants from all groups (the few remaining Hong Kong migrants, a handful of later Taiwan investors and the large majority of newly arrived mainland traders, as well the people interviewed by Ho [2008, 2012] and Lam [2015b]), generally agree that there is little interaction between the few remaining Hong Kong migrants and Taiwan traders scattered across Accra, the larger numbers of temporary construction workers, technicians and managers of infrastructure projects in remote areas, and the large numbers of new Chinese entrepreneurial migrants who have created a highly visible economic cluster in the central business district of the city. Most new Chinese entrepreneurial migrants have chosen to import cheap consumer goods made in China, so trade is the dominant economic activity of the Chinese in Ghana today.

Regulatory Framework and Business Environment in Trade

All foreigners investing in trade are barred from the "sale of anything whatsoever in a market, petty trading, hawking or selling from a kiosk at any place" by the Ghana Investment Act (1994), which reserves these economic activities for Ghanaians. This stipulation is usually interpreted as banning foreigners from engaging in retail selling. Chinese merchants today therefore limit their activities to import and wholesale, or at least they present their practices as such. When we began researching, the Ghana Companies Code (1963) required foreign-invested wholesale companies to prove an investment of at least USD300,000 (deposited in a local bank account or in commodities of equivalent value) and, in theory, to create jobs for at least ten Ghanaians. The investment floor was later raised to USD1 million. Once the foreign investor has fulfilled these minimum legal requirements, the company is entitled to two working visas (more if the registered investment is higher). As a rule of thumb, Chinese entrepreneurs who intended to set up a wholesale business in Ghana during the period of our research needed between USD0.5 million and USD1 million as initial capital. In addition to the legal requirements, shop and warehouse spaces had to be rented for five to ten years at a rent of USD25,000–USD60,000 each, payable in advance (Gan, February 17, 2011; Lian, December 20, 2011; Luo, February 4, 2011; Shen, February 4, 2011). Housing, a car, maybe a van or truck for delivering goods and—last but not least—commodities accounted for the rest.

A comparison of the number of Chinese trading firms clearly visible in the central market area of Accra in early 2011 with the total of 147 such businesses accounted for in Ghanaian official statistics in the period 1994–2010 (GIPC 2011) suggests that Chinese entrepreneurs are reluctant to comply with the requirement to register with the Ghana Investment Promotion Centre and that the official records are not to be trusted. The unreliability of the data reflects a general problem regarding estimates of the number of Chinese in Ghana.

The Chinese Trade Cluster of Accra: Matured but Not Institutionalized

Chinese entrepreneurs trying their luck in Ghana initially came from a range of places in China, including the northeast. However, the financial crisis of 2007/2008 was a turning point. Thus, by the time of my research, Zhejiangese (and, to a lesser extent, Fujianese) had largely outcompeted and replaced their fellow Chinese from other regions. Those who survived

the competition included former employees of state-owned Chinese trading companies, who had not only turned into successful independent traders but successfully diversified and expanded the scope of their economic activities. Most of these pioneers have started up in the service sector, invested in industrial production or teamed up with SOEs active mainly in the building and telecommunications sectors (Gu 2011; Lam 2015a). Several Chinese restaurants operated by northeasterners, Zhejiangese and Cantonese cater mostly to the Ghanaian middle class, whereas three Chinese supermarkets offer Chinese vegetables produced locally by Chinese farmers, a small range of soybean-based products such as tofu and soybean milk made by local Chinese, and fruit freshly imported from China.

Services provided by the Chinese cluster in Accra generally seem to be diversified and mature. However, the supermarkets do not serve as community centers or network nodes because the Chinese traders, who still dominate the community numerically, avoid buying there. Instead they import their own (dry) foodstuffs in the containers they receive every other week. Many even replenish their supplies of garlic, ginger and leeks in this way. Others grow vegetables in their backyards (Hong, February 15, 2011; Lu, December 7, 2011; Shen, December 10, 2011). It is small wonder that the first of the three Chinese supermarkets that opened was established by one of the pioneering private investors to comply with repeated requests by the Chinese embassy, which regarded the existence of such a business as essential, at least symbolically (Cao, January 30, 2011; Fang, December 8, 2011; Tang, January 27, 2011).

Attempts to build and institutionalize a community by incorporating all or most of the Chinese entrepreneurs into a Chinese (business) association largely failed. Only a small group of private businessmen (not primarily active in trade) was enlisted by the Chinese embassy to form the core of a pan-Chinese association officially registered as the Ghana Chinese Chamber of Commerce (*Jiana Zhonghua Gongshang Zonghui*) in 1994. This association has represented the interests of Chinese entrepreneurs who arrived comparatively early and were able to diversify their portfolios from trade to services and industrial production. The recruitment of members among the numerically dominating traders, however, has remained half-hearted and sluggish, and traders said in interviews that their interests were not represented by the association. Many regarded it as an exclusive club of those bigger private investors and representatives of SOEs able to benefit from close relations with both the Chinese embassy and local Ghanaian authorities, while their own business success did not depend on such political ties (Dai, February 9, 2011; Hong, December 10, 2011; Lu, January 30, 2011; Shen,

December 13, 2011). Thus they have generally been reluctant to join activities promoted by the Chinese embassy or this association and instead prefer to keep their distance from Chinese official institutions. By the end of my data-collection period the Ghana Chinese Chamber of Commerce served as an exclusive class-based club of Chinese investors lobbying both Chinese and Ghanaian state institutions for their own narrow business interests without providing any community service to the wider group of Chinese nationals (Fang, February 5, 2011; Hong, January 30, 2011; Shen, December 19, 2011; Tang, December 19, 2011). The traders have not yet tried to build up social institutions among themselves. Although Chinese trading businesses have clustered almost exclusively within a small area on the periphery of Makola Market in central Accra, social isolation has been the rule. The traders regard each other as competitors instead of coethnic collaborators, and they do not visit each other's shops, unless they trade in different goods or were on good terms with each other prior to migrating. This isolation is accentuated by the pattern of their housing, which is widely dispersed across middle-class neighborhoods of Accra and nearby Tema.

Migration, Ritual Passage and Liminality: Some Theoretical Considerations

In struggling to conceptualize the new Chinese entrepreneurs in Africa in terms of migration, diaspora, transnationalism, translocality or sojourning, the concept of liminality has been a strong inspiration. The nonconformist anthropologist Arnold van Gennep (1909) was convinced that the *rites de passage* that every individual in all forms of society undergoes when entering a new life phase (adolescence, adulthood, apprenticeship, marriage, pregnancy, etc.) follow the same tripartite sequence, beginning with separation (*rites de séparation*), leading into a phase of transition (*rites de marge*) and ending in reintegration (*rites d'aggregation*). He emphasized the spatial character of this sequential process.

Almost completely ignored and forgotten by the scientific community for half a century, Van Gennep's work was rediscovered by the anthropologist Victor Turner when *Rites de Passage* was first published in English in 1960. Turner was most interested in the second, liminal phase of the *rites de passage*, in which those who have parted from society are "neither here nor there; they are betwixt and between the positions assigned and arrayed by law, custom, convention" (1969: 80f). In this transitional phase, individuals

do not belong to the society that they were previously part of and they are not yet reincorporated into it. For Turner, liminality is a limbo, a phase or space characterized by seclusion, tests and hardships, ambiguity and possibilities, uncertainty, the absence of structure and the experience of community (*communitas*). This latter aspect of unstructured *communitas* has drawn much criticism. Referring to pilgrimage in Turner's work, Eade and Swallow (1991) argue that unlike the imagined *communitas*, liminality is far from unstructured and may even accentuate prior distinctions between individuals as much as it dissolves differences.

One primary characteristic of liminality (as defined by Van Gennep and Turner) is that there is a way into it as well as a way out (Thomassen 2009: 21). In ritual passages, "members of the society are themselves aware of the liminal state: they know that they will leave it sooner or later" (21). But Turner suggested that "a liminal state may become 'fixed', referring to a situation in which the suspended character of social life takes on a more permanent character" (Thomassen 2009: 15). This idea of permanent liminality has been elaborated extensively by the sociologist Arpad Szakolczai. Within the context of ritual passages, a key feature of liminality is the final stage of reintegration, in which the initiand is recognized as a part of the social order and welcomed into that order with a new role, "stamped by the formative experience" (Thomassen 2009: 22). Without this reintegration process, liminality becomes permanent and can also become very dangerous. Szakolczai acknowledges that "liminality becomes a permanent condition when any of the three phases in this sequence becomes frozen, as if a film stopped at a particular frame" (2000: 220).

A number of researchers have taken the concept of liminality beyond tribal rites of passage or Christian pilgrimage and applied it to secular contexts and contemporary situations, such as traveling, studying abroad and labor migration. In these secular contexts of spatial mobility, quite a few authors also found indicators that liminal entities can be permanently caught in the in-between space. Various minority groups can be considered liminal. Thomassen (2009: 19) argues that undocumented immigrants (present but not "official") and stateless people can be regarded as liminal because they are "betwixt and between home and host, part of society, but sometimes never fully integrated.". In migration studies, this is applied mainly to migrant workers, refugees, asylum seekers and "illegal" or undocumented migrants: "for some migrants the passage is never complete … these migrants remain trapped in a liminal phase, as unincorporated outsiders" (Hastings and Wilson 1999: 10).

If we remember the brief initial impressions of temporariness and transience of the Chinese trading cluster in Accra, the traders can also be seen, ultimately, as torn between two (or more) places or trapped in a state "which is betwixt-and-between the normal, day-to-day cultural and social states and processes of getting and spending, preserving law and order and registering structural status" (Turner 1977: 465). What happened to cause the entrepreneurial sojourns of these Chinese traders to end up in this frozen liminality? Is liminality the clue to understanding the lack of ethnic identifications, institutionalization and community-building among the Chinese trading migrants in Ghana?

Chinese Traders in Accra: Entrepreneurial Sojourning as Ritual Journey

From the individual Chinese trader's perspective, the endeavor to leave China in order to become entrepreneurially active in an unknown place somewhere in Africa can be seen as a *rite de passage* and a ritual journey. First the trader wants to make money from international trade. After a period of overseas entrepreneurship, they return home. The stages of economic sojourning in Africa resemble a ritual journey that eventuates in the integration of a markedly transformed person, the successful international trader, into Chinese society or the African host country.

Separation: Entrepreneurs Embarking on a Ritual Journey

The ritual journey of the Chinese entrepreneur starts with their separation from family, peers and community in China. Family members are left behind either to spare them the strains and stresses of the ritual journey (in the case of small children) or because they are not qualified for this transformative experience (unproductive spouses whose company would only reduce the expected profit) (Cao, December 10, 2011; Hong, February 10, 2011; Li, December 16, 2011). Physical separation and spatial as well as emotional distance are part of the ritual journey. Language, culture, customs, rules, laws and practices that structure the quotidian and provide the individual with security and predictability within one sociocultural context are exchanged for the unknown. Regardless of their individual backgrounds before migration, most Chinese traders in Accra thought their new host city would be a temporary space of possibilities and ambiguities, and still insisted

on this interpretation of liminality when they were interviewed about their actual experiences. There were only minor variations between those who had earlier been traders in China and those who became traders only after reaching Ghana. The official Chinese government rhetoric regarding the "Going Out" policy and China's South–South partnership with Africa, though both not addressed to petty entrepreneurs, may have had some impact on their decision to go to Ghana. Together with the general emphasis on entrepreneurship in China and the country's emigration fever, this can be seen to have further strengthened the idea of embarking on a ritual journey that involves physical mobility, spatial displacement, hardship and sacrifice.

The Nature of Liminality: Trials and Hardships

A recurring theme in the interviews with Chinese traders was the narrative of eating bitterness. Traders regard living standards as much lower than in China, at both the personal and the societal level. They see power cuts, cuts in the water supply, the absence of modern public transport, dysfunctional political institutions, the poor health of the local population, and the omnipresent threat of contracting malaria and other infectious diseases as symptomatic of general underdevelopment. All this has to be endured for the greater good. Most traders see their life in an African city as a period of trial and testing, a mental and physical challenge that had to be met in this liminal phase of transition that would ultimately bring them financial profits, enhanced wellbeing and improved status. Also suggestive of the liminal phase of a ritual journey is the repetitive routine that informants call the "challenge of the deadly dullness of everyday life" as transient Chinese in an African city.

Chinese traders in Accra experience little change from day to day and over the weeks, months and years. They start at 6.00 am, have a brief breakfast and drive to their shops, where they stay until 5.00 pm, selling goods by the carton, interrupted only by internet chat during slack periods and collecting debts from African customers at Makola Market. Fish, meat, vegetables and fruit are delivered to the shop front by itinerant vendors, so exploring the neighborhood for purchases is not necessary (and is seen as unsafe). Visiting nearby Chinese shops is regarded as inappropriate or even taboo because of the fierce competition. After driving home, a simple dinner is cooked, together with lunch for the following day. Washing and personal hygiene are followed by internet chat, gaming and watching Chinese

movies, if the electricity is on. Sundays are free and usually spent mostly in bed, together with housekeeping, cooking, eating and internet surfing, or a trip to Accra Mall and a visit to the supermarket and a fast-food venue. In most cases not even important traditional Chinese festivals or National Day interrupt these daily routines and weekly rhythms.

Transforming Personalities: Alienation through Adaption

All the informants were prepared to stay in Ghana for "as long as profits are sufficient", but none considered making Accra their permanent home. They had entered an alien space but only temporarily, and it was one in which many of their social and communicative skills became dysfunctional. Although many had adjusted to local business practices, and learned words and rudimentary phrases in local languages for strictly functional conversation in the course of their transformation within this liminal phase, in effect they never really arrived. Irrespective of the length of their stay, personal backgrounds, financial means or previous status, they had sought to maintain close links with their peers back home and around the world by means of electronic communication and the consumption of electronic cultural products. Skype, QQ, WeChat and Chinese video portals connected them with what they had left behind in China. Not surprisingly, however, their personal connections with the homeland had thinned over time, and they had lost track of the continuing rapid change in China. Some even thought their knowledge of China had become dated.

Most interviewees agreed that they had started to become alienated from China. In Africa they began to lose their Chinese identity or even saw it (or at least displaying it) as detrimental to economic success. African customers knew nothing about any of China's brands of good reputation in the Chinese domestic market. They rather associated Chinese names and the Chinese language with an inferior quality of goods made in China. In this context it was not a good idea to advertise one's commodities by displaying signifiers of Chinese identity. A few of my informants even used Italian-sounding brand names in order to increase the marketability of their shoes made in Zhejiang. Uncertainty and vulnerability (as outsiders within a highly religious society, of Pentecostal Christianity influenced by animistic cults) have also had an impact. Chinese folk religious practices, such as burning paper money in front of the shop and raising a small altar to the God of Wealth, which are commonplace in China, are absent from Chinese stores in Accra. Even the Fortune Cat, imported to China from Japan, is

missing. Traders explain that these folk religious practices or superstitions have either lost their meaning or have been abandoned to avoid suspicion in the host society. Ironically, though, Ghanaians are more likely to suspect Chinese traders because of their apparent lack of any religious belief.

Clear markers of Chinese identity are often avoided so as not to antagonize local groups or jeopardize business success, or simply because some customs have lost their meaning in the African environment. At Chinese New Year, the absence from Accra of visible signs of this important festival surprised me. None of my informants attached Spring Festival couplets to their shop doors. Without the presence of an extended family, New Year's Eve was either ignored or reduced to a slightly more opulent dinner. On the first day of New Year, everybody was back in the shop. The same happened during the Mid-Autumn Festival and on Chinese National Day. Informants usually explained that these holidays and customs had lost all meaning in Accra.

With regard to business, all my informants had adapted to Ghanaian society more or less consciously. Business practices, both individual and collective, had changed either on arrival or gradually over time. Commodity loans, for instance, are an integral part of trade in Ghana. Most Chinese informants said they would never accept this practice. In time, however, all of them grudgingly admitted that they regularly granted commodity loans and even had to tolerate a large proportion of bad loans if they wanted to stay in business. Offering free storage of sold goods for undefined periods of time; tolerating physical encroachments on one's private space by customers, collaborators or local neighbors; enduring insubordinate behavior on the part of local employees; and the frequent tipping of employees for routine tasks—all are accommodations that the Chinese traders had quickly learned, even though they violated their value system (Giese 2016; Giese and Thiel 2015a).

Liminality Without Communitas

Included among the traders were people who had previously engaged in commerce, owned a supermarket or a restaurant in China, worked as a sales assistant, a construction or factory worker, an ambulance driver or a hostess, or studied business administration in Germany. However, all Chinese traders were stripped of their previous experience, rank and status in the course of their ritual journey to Ghana. They had all started out in Africa by adjusting to local expectations. Individual trajectories do not matter much

in the African context, even less so in regard to the immigrants' hosts. Local people are quick to deny these ethnic and cultural outsiders any individuality. "The Chinese" are usually perceived as a uniform group, and stereotypes are the rule. They are collectively portrayed as unwelcome competitors, suppliers of cheap and shoddy goods, greedy profiteers void of social responsibility, exploitative employers and antisocial individuals without morality rooted in religion. They are suspected of illegal residence, fraud, tax evasion and the like. And "they are all the same."

Being all in the same boat and on the same ritual journey, these Chinese entrepreneurs might have been expected to experience Turner's *communitas*. Structurally, they share the same fate as Chinese outsiders in African markets, and they perceive themselves as vulnerable (cf. Giese and Thiel 2014). Large numbers are from the same place (Zhejiang or Fujian), which in the past might have ensured ethnic solidarity and community. However, they have failed to experience *communitas*. It is important to ask why.

First, their shared identity as traders in the same market and dealing with the same range of goods makes them competitors instead of collaborators. Local markets have long been saturated, and turned from sellers' into buyers' markets. With everyone pursuing the same strategy of "high turnover at marginal profit rates" (*bo li duo xiao*), which economists see as suitable for driving competitors out of the market but not for sustaining one's own business, they engage in ruinous competition among themselves. Local observers often ask why the Chinese are incapable of ethnic solidarity and collective bargaining at the expense of their non-Chinese competitors. Their individualization isolates them from each other rather than creating grounds for (ethnic) community.

Second, the embeddedness of some Chinese groups (notably families from Zhejiang and Fujian) in transnational kinship networks is not conducive to establishing *communitas* on the basis of ethnic solidarity. Being a member of a transnational network based on kinship or virtual kinship[4] means that Chinese migrants from Zhejiang and Fujian "can move over large geographical distances within one community" (Christiansen 2013: 149).[5] Quite a few Chinese informants have moved between locations in different countries in which members of the same family network run businesses. Moving from one network node to another without ever leaving the transnational community of kin, they do not need a localized community of fellow Chinese.

Third, Chinese traders themselves believe that they are economic sojourners and that this explains their reluctance to engage in community-building: "People come for a couple of years in order to make quick profits. Why should we stay in a place where we have to eat so much bitterness? Then why should anyone of us be interested in local community [building] when there is so much fluctuation?" This was said by an informant who had been living in Accra for more than a decade—others made the same point. How long will they stay in Ghana? Most said that this would depend on profitability, and that they were always ready to leave. Most envisaged staying "a few years" and rejected the idea of permanent settlement. But, as a matter of fact, fluctuation was far less than suggested by these interviewees, and most of those who suggested they were about to leave Ghana soon at the beginning of research were still firmly in place at the end of data collection and beyond.

Fourth, differences in status and power hinder rather than help community-building. Critics of Turner's theory have convincingly opposed his idea that interpersonal relationships in liminality are unstructured and lack differentiation by rank or status. In the case of Chinese traders in the liminal space of African cities, there is also ample evidence that differences in status and power play a crucial role. Although all these Chinese entrepreneurial sojourners meet the same tests and hardships, they are not equally prepared for dealing with them and lack equal access to the means for coping with them. In the same way as tribal initiands entering the liminal phase of a *rite de passage* differ in physical strength, cunning or hunting skills, Chinese traders are unequally equipped in terms of financial means, general business skills, readiness to assume a risk, flexibility and adaptability. Not all Chinese traders present in Accra have joined the ritual journey at the same time, and the early comers can profit from their greater experience. Individual power struggles explain much of the general lack of trust and failure to build community.

Fifth, the recent socioeconomic history of rapid change and individualization in China has left its mark on Chinese entrepreneurial migrants in Ghana and beyond. On the plus side, these entrepreneurs no longer have to maintain interpersonal relationships in order to get access to goods and to secure export licenses, as in the 1990s. The expansion of the private sector and trade liberalization in China has in principle made international trade accessible to any Chinese with the ability to raise the necessary capital. Quite a few Chinese traders in Accra simply rely on the market, sourcing their merchandise from suppliers in China without bothering too much about

cultivating personal relationships and moral obligations. Most of the interviewees have neoliberal and Social Darwinist attitudes of the sort that have dominated China's socioeconomic development since the 1990s at least. These attitudes also hinder the development of *communitas*. However, this is certainly neither specifically Chinese nor limited to Chinese groups in Africa.

In the Liminality Trap: Neither Reintegration in China Nor Integration in Ghana

The Point of No Return: Chinese Ways Unlearned

It is therefore not surprising that few Chinese traders maintain close interpersonal relationships. Even within the small groups of two to four persons that run the businesses (either collectively as shareholders or as owners and employees), the relationships often lack emotional attachment. Forced to work and live under the same roof for long periods of time with little privacy or freedom from social control and largely without alternative personal relationships, many avoid each other whenever possible. Interpersonal relationships become superficial. Quite a few informants, especially the older ones, said that keeping social relationships with fellow Chinese to a minimum freed them from the social obligations known as renqing—the exchange of favours as core element of cultivating and maintaining social networks within Chinese society. However, they find that their communicative and interpersonal skills deteriorate as a result. Because they maintain old ties at home solely by electronic means, they see themselves as less and less compatible with the social fabric in China. Efforts to stay abreast of developments at home become ever less meaningful. Quite a few interviewees feared they were "unlearning their Chinese ways" and losing their vital connection to China and their own culture.

As I mentioned earlier, signifiers of "Chineseness" and cultural, national and religious symbols are abandoned in the absence of ethnic solidarity and community. Given Ghanaian prejudice against Chinese and goods made in China, some traders see any public display of their nationality and ethnicity as detrimental. The importation from China of African wax, regarded as part of Ghana's national cultural heritage, has been particularly controversial. While there is huge demand for cheaper Chinese-made alternatives to established cloth brands, imports from China, particularly by Chinese traders, are seen as illegitimate. Although African wax ceased to be

produced in Ghana before imports from China started, and although Chinese cloth imports compete mainly with expensive Dutch brands, Chinese selling African wax feel obliged to operate secretly and underground. Other Chinese imports are less disputed, but the widespread perception that these goods are shoddy and that their import is harming local manufacturers has led most Chinese traders to play down their goods' origins. This also helps explain the suppression of visible signs of Chinese identity.

This renunciation of Chinese identity, the long absence from China, the much slower pace of life in Ghana, the lack of a Chinese social life and the simplicity of economic interactions has made the traders feeling too weak to fight off the fierce competition that they regard as the core characteristic of the domestic economy in China. As the prospect of completing their ritual journey by reintegrating into their society of origin fades the longer they live abroad, these Chinese traders tend to postpone their return indefinitely.

Rejecting the Second Option: Integration in Africa

Ritual journeys are not completed only by reintegrating into the society of origin—other options are available. In the case of Chinese migrants in Ghana, local integration might be one such option. However, most Chinese informants, in Ghana and Africa as a whole, reject it. Lower living standards as compared with China and general reservations against the African continent as a destination for resettlement are part of the general narrative, but there are other important factors, too. Though many informants were content to entertain only shallow social relationships with other Chinese, social isolation both from the Chinese and from the host society was one of the main reasons for not integrating and taking permanent residence in Africa. Despite their growing distance from China, they insisted that China must remain their point of reference. Most remained convinced that their sojourn would be of limited duration, even if they had already spent many years in Africa. It comes as no surprise that stubbornly adhering to the idea of a (postponed) return is one side of the coin, while rejecting integration into African society is the other.

With few exceptions, Chinese traders adapt and acculturate only enough to achieve the economic goals they envisage as the outcome of their ritual journey through liminality in Africa. They have learned the social skills necessary for ritual interpersonal interaction and adapted business strategies that might qualify them to survive, but most have remained cultural illiterates. Hardly any have seriously attempted to learn English, let alone the

local languages. Key terms and rudimentary phrases in English or local languages are memorized by attaching them to similar Chinese syllables. The calculator remains the key means of communication. None of my informants has ever tried to master whole sentences or complex conversations. A personal investment of that kind is regarded as unproductive because it does not generate immediate returns and would only help if long-term integration into local African society was the aim. "Local knowledge" is accumulated only insofar as it is immediately useful for business. Only one of my informants (numbering more than 120) bothered to read a local English-language newspaper to learn about social, economic and political developments in Ghana. The others were only interested in hearing about specific administrative measures or general political tendencies that might harm their interests. They did not seek serious information but instead engaged in speculation and in spreading rumors that promoted all sorts of reservations and suspicions about Ghana and its inhabitants.

The traders adjust as little as possible to their Ghanaian environment. This goes even for daily necessities such as food. Instead, they import spices, rice, noodles, and even garlic, ginger and leeks, along with their general merchandise. They cultivate vegetables in the backyard of their houses and buy from the two or three Chinese farmers who engage in market-gardening near Accra to serve their fellow Chinese.

Food, often seen as bridging the different cultural backgrounds of migrants and hosts, in this case separates them. Although members of the Ghanaian middle class frequent Chinese restaurants in Accra, most Ghanaians reject Chinese food. In a country where locals boil water for at least three minutes before it is considered safe to drink, the short time needed for Chinese panfrying is seen as dangerous. Fried rice and one or two additional dishes prepared by Ghanaian cooks seem to be the only acceptable options in Chinese restaurants. Similarly, Chinese traders reject Ghanaian food because the ingredients are overcooked. These differing ideas about food result in cultural and social rejection, both individual and collective.

Denial of Access: Ghana Is No Immigration Country for Chinese

Just as Chinese traders are not interested in integration, so too the idea that they might eventually join Ghanaian society is widely rejected by Ghanaians. Anti-Chinese sentiment has been mobilized for political purposes. Small-scale market traders, for instance, are regularly mobilized by political

opposition parties, which play on their fears of being outcompeted by the Chinese. Protectionist calls have always been popular. Laws and regulations barring foreign nationals from retail trade and erecting high investment thresholds for wholesale activities are evidence of these political struggles. Chinese traders are regularly accused of unfair competition, dumping inferior goods on the Ghanaian market and exploiting local workers.

Not surprisingly, Ghana shows little interest in integrating the Chinese into a society characterized by high levels of unemployment, social inequality and ethnic tensions. This is especially so because Chinese traders are said to reap huge profits from selling to Ghanaians while at the same time contributing little to Ghanaian national development or the material wellbeing of local employees and business partners. Colonial legacies, postcolonial political agendas and the longstanding presence of international intergovernmental and non-governmental organization-financed aid projects mean that there is a general expectation in Ghana that non-African foreigners should contribute to national development, local economic progress and wellbeing. Chinese SOEs have started to look at the potentially beneficial effects of isolated catchpenny acts of corporate social responsibility. To counteract the idea that all Chinese companies have ties to corrupt politicians plundering the country, the Chinese telecommunications company Huawei has resorted to occasional "donating." Company staff have distributed sweets or stationery to children in hospitals, orphanages or schools. The company buys these gifts cheaply from Ghanaian merchants in the local market.

Very few of the Chinese traders I interviewed knew much about the expectations of the host population, and none showed any interest in redistribution. The market is increasingly saturated, there are legal obligations to employ more local staff than necessary for what are essentially simple operations, rents are high, there is a serious risk of being robbed, and profits are no more than 5–10 %, so the traders have little incentive to engage in local redistribution. Their economic and migratory strategies are aimed at short-term gain, and their behavior does not promote their acceptance as immigrants. Since 1978 China has witnessed a transition from a socialist economy to extreme marketization in all spheres, so it is hard for the traders to understand why their Ghanaian employees should expect anything other than regular wages (Giese 2013). Some traders have given their employees items such as Chinese smartphones to reward good performance, but they hardly understand how to behave as responsible employers in a local context where employees expect regular and highly symbolic gifts of rice, flour and so on in addition to their wages

(Giese and Thiel 2015b). Even when the traders pay average or above-average wages and add small tips several times a day, they lack authority in the eyes of their Ghanaian workers. The idea of local integration, should the traders ever opt for it, is rejected by the host population on the grounds of the traders' moral failure, and the stereotype of the greedy Chinese.

Even so, now that the passage back to China is blocked for many traders, some have turned to alternative destinations in neighboring African countries. However, whether these migrations will eventually lead to the ritual journey's end is a moot point.

No Way Out of Liminality without Proper Achievement

Many of the ritual journeys of Chinese traders have been extended year after year. Apart from the problem of coping with reintegration into China, the traders' rejection of integration into African city life and the host society's unwillingness to accept them as immigrants, another reason to prolong the liminality is the trader's actual or perceived lack of economic success and of savings that might translate into status back home. The decision to return is not easy. Profits are generally heavily reinvested into new commodities in an attempt to gradually expand the scope of the business, but many items end as shelf-warmers. Preparations for leaving normally last at least a year, and losses are almost unavoidable. In order to keep the business running, existing stock has to be continuously complemented with new items, gradually reducing the volumes of new supplies. In this way, traders wishing to exit hope to continue attracting customers and get rid of larger shares of shelf-warmers alongside new items. This is the only way to reduce stock and potential losses since few other traders would want to buy the stock of someone leaving. Even the scarcity of suitable shop spaces usually does not motivate newcomers to pay for shelf-warmers in exchange for transferring long-term tenancy of shop and warehouse spaces. Because rental contracts are usually for around ten years and the rent for the full period has to be paid in advance, tenants preparing to leave Ghana before the termination of the tenancy are in a weak bargaining position vis-à-vis newcomers looking for business space. In spite of rather low profits and individual net gains of USD10,000–USD80,000 a year (if the business is running smoothly), most of my informants found it hard to take the final decision to pack up and go. There is always the idea of finally hitting the jackpot with one killer item. With all the ups and downs of the global economy and the Ghanaian market, many of my informants prolonged the liminal phase from year to

year and even indefinitely. As is so often the case, people are usually trapped in liminality by a whole set of factors and considerations rather than just one.

Given the historical experience of Chinese sojourners across the globe, it seems likely that many of the Chinese in Ghana will remain in their self-created liminal spaces without ever completing their ritual journeys and the third and final phase of the *rites de passage*, either by returning to China or integrating locally in Africa. Although many will probably remain in Ghana for most of their lives, few will end the journey by deciding to make Accra their permanent home and strive for acceptance by the host society.

Conclusion

In this chapter I have discussed the recent and continuing wave of Chinese migration to Ghana. I have concentrated on traders as the numerically dominant group among Chinese nationals. Reports suggest that these traders are in a similar position to the Chinese in other countries in Africa. My sample of around 120 Chinese informants can therefore serve as a typical example, representative of the new Chinese in Africa.[6] The chapter asks why Chinese migrants refrain from enacting Chinese identities, why they fail to build a Chinese community, why they do not integrate into African society and why their diasporic lives remain transient and temporary.

The lack of visible enactments of Chinese identities is caused by a set of factors closely associated with the particularities of the economic sojourn and the host environment as perceived by the Chinese. Basically ignorant about Ghana but exposed to media reports and hearsay about anti-Chinese sentiments both in Ghana and across Africa, Chinese economic sojourners see Ghanaian society as potentially hostile and themselves as highly vulnerable, both individually (because of the threat of armed robbery) and collectively (as ethnic outsiders competing with local populations). Although Chinese traders have undoubtedly contributed to widening the access to global consumption to poorer groups beyond the local middle classes, they are faced with the idea that goods of Chinese production are of inferior quality, don't last long and, as a consequence, are harmful, particularly to the poorest consumers. Unable to counter this negative image because of cost pressures from local merchants, the Chinese traders do not see fit to make a proud display of their Chineseness. Instead they disguise their ethnic Chinese identity, since everything Chinese has a negative connotation. Chinese brands and family names are avoided, as are public displays of Chinese rituals. Misperceiving local people's deep religiosity, the Chinese

in Ghana seek to avoid confrontation by refraining from public folk religious practices. Finally, the absence of extended families and peers is often used to explain why Chinese seasonal festivals are not observed in Ghana. In other Chinese diasporas, community-organized collective enactments of Chinese identities have filled this void, but this does not happen in Accra.

Community-building efforts among the Chinese in Ghana have been limited to initiatives by the Chinese embassy and Chinese entrepreneurs whose businesses profit from close links to both Chinese and Ghanaian authorities. The embassy and the entrepreneurs have tried to include the traders, but only half-heartedly. Traders generally resist because they do not think their interests are properly represented and they are suspicious of the additional cost of a close association with the embassy. Class differences have been an issue regarding the reluctance to join the existing club of big businessmen and women, but the traders have also shown themselves to be unable and unwilling to create their own local social institutions. Fierce economic competition, primarily with each other, in a buyers' market; the short time Chinese traders generally intend to spend in Africa; the traders' embeddedness within transnational family networks; and their individualized business strategies all stand in the way of any form of localized community-building.

Local integration into the host society often depends in part on the existence of functioning social institutions among migrants. The absence of community among Chinese traders in Accra hinders their incorporation into Ghanaian society. However, the decisive factor is probably the traders' failure to see Ghana as a place for settlement, despite their prolonged sojourns. They balk at cultural learning and adaptation beyond the bare minimum, and, in turn, they are largely denied acceptance and integration by a host society that is not ready to incorporate substantial numbers of financially stronger East Asians. Thus their transience is perpetuated.

Viewed through the lens of liminality, the economic sojourn of Chinese traders in Africa can be interpreted as a *rite de passage* in the form of a ritual journey. The inner logic of their transnational spatial mobility, their (indefinitely) prolonged presence in Accra and their failure to build a localized Chinese community or experience *communitas* calls for a focus on the second, liminal phase (the time spent in Africa) of the tripartite sequence that constitutes ritual journeys. Like refugees, asylum seekers and undocumented immigrants of any nationality or ethnicity around the world, many Chinese traders in Africa get trapped in liminality because of their alienation from the home society, their rejection of acculturation and integration at

the destination, and the particular modes and patterns of their trading businesses.

Chinese traders on their passage through liminality in Africa are profoundly transformed, accumulate skills and knowledge, and realize personal goals. But this transformation in the liminal phase of the ritual journey in which they engage through their economic sojourn in Africa is responsible for the fact that many of them are caught in a liminality trap. The strong conviction that the liminal phase is of short duration prevents them from transforming themselves, acculturating and finally integrating into the African context, individually and collectively, as localized Chinese communities. At the same time the liminal experience gradually alienates them from their culture and society of origin. The unlearning of Chinese social skills and values that seem largely irrelevant in Africa renders many Chinese traders in Africa incompatible with Chinese society or incapable of coping with the changes that have occurred there during their absence. Thus Chinese traders resist full transformation, which in return results in their rejection as dangerous and polluting (Douglas 1966) by Africans. They thus run the risk of prolonging the liminal phase of their *rites de passage* again and again, and becoming frozen in indefinite liminality. Cut-throat competition with other Chinese prevents them from achieving *communitas*.

Those who successfully complete the liminal phase and leave Accra usually find it extremely challenging to reintegrate into a rapidly changing China after years of absence and personal transformation. The many reports about Chinese traders setting up businesses in other African countries after completing the liminal phase in Accra suggest that this particular form of transnational trade becomes a semipermanent engagement with globalization from below, one that denies the participants reincorporation into China and at the same time ties them to Africa, where they are unlikely to integrate or build communities.

Interviews

Cao, January 30, 2011, December 10, 2011
Dai, February 9, 2011
Fang, February 5, 2011, December 8, 2011
Gan February 17, 2011
Hong January 30, 2011, February 10, 2011, February 15, 2011, December 10, 2011
Li December 16, 2011
Lian December 20, 2011
Lu January 30, 2011, December 7, 2011

Luo February 4, 2011
Shen February 4, 2011, December 10, 2011, December 13, 2011, December 19, 2011
Tang January 27, 2011, February 5, 2011, December 9, 2011, December 11, 2011

Notes

1. In this chapter the term "migration" refers to movements of people between places in general and does not imply factual or intended permanent spatial relocation.
2. Unless otherwise stated, all information provided in this chapter is based on participant observation and statements shared by the great majority of informants. Information that cannot be regarded as representative of the whole sample is attributed to individual informants; names are fictitious in order to safeguard interviewees' anonymity. This data collection was part of two larger research projects on Chinese-African interactions in Ghana, Senegal and China, starting in 2011 and finishing by mid-2017. The research project, Entrepreneurial Chinese Migrants and Petty African Entrepreneurs: Local Impacts of Interaction in Urban West Africa (2011–2013), was conducted in close collaboration with my colleagues, Laurence Marfaing and Alena Thiel. The project West African Traders as Translators between Chinese and African Urban Modernities (2013–2017) was conducted with Laurence Marfaing, Alena Thiel, Kelly Si Miao Liang and Jessica Wilczak. Both projects were generously funded by the German Research Foundation (DFG) as part of the Priority Program Adaptation and Creativity in Africa—Technologies and Significations in the Production of Order and Disorder.
3. It has to be emphasized that the Ghanaian authorities only record flow data (entry/exit statistics); no stock data are recorded. Although information gathered during fieldwork suggests that there are substantial numbers of undocumented Chinese operating in a legal gray zone (mostly visa overstayers who entered the country on tourist visas), publicized estimates often serve political purposes and tend to be inflated.
4. Particularly entrepreneurs from Fujian tended to incorporate friends and trustworthy partners into their kinship networks, establishing virtual kinship ties with persons without family relations. This practice seems to be particularly advantageous if family enterprises aim to expand and diversify their scope but lack specific expertise and/or capital.
5. Referring to Chinese migrants across Europe, Christiansen (2013: 149) suggests the existence of world-spanning communities based on "Fellow-townsman relationships, virtual kinship, fledging solidarity of those sharing similar conditions or speaking the same dialect or at least Mandarin, and a moral grid

of shared purpose, altruism, sacrifice, and co-ethnic compassion." In view of the fact that the Chinese migrants whom Christiansen referred to mostly originated from Zhejiang Province (or Fujian Province in some cases), and regarding the high degree of intraethnic fragmentation and competition where other Chinese groups are present, it remains rather doubtful that this claimed community has ever extended beyond family and virtual kinship networks.

6. South Africa, it has to be noted, is an exception. This country has one of the longest continuous interactions with China on the African continent and the Chinese, and it has one of the oldest, most layered and complex presence of people of Chinese origin and descent within the continent (cf. Park 2009).

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CHAPTER 4

Integration of Newcomers into Local Communities: An Analysis of New Chinese Immigrants in Zimbabwe

Xiaolei Shen

Introduction

Since 2000, owing to the deepening of the relationship between China and African countries, especially the rapid development of the economic and trade relationships between them, Africa has become a major destination for new immigrants from mainland China. In the mid-1990s there were only 130,000 people of Chinese descent living in Africa (Li 2000). By 2012 the number had shot up to about 1.1 million (Li 2013).

Along with the continuous increases in population, new Chinese immigrants have contributed greatly to the economic development of African countries. However, at the same time, they face daunting challenges in their interactions with Africans and in their integration into local communities. During my fieldwork in Zimbabwe, my Chinese respondents told me that their relationships with Zimbabweans were not very good, and some said that they were worse than they were a decade earlier.[1] My Zimbabwean respondents told me the same story: many were dissatisfied with their

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relationships with new Chinese immigrants, and some reported that "more than 60 per cent of these Chinese are not good men." The failure of integration into local communities not only constrains new Chinese immigrants' sustainable economic development in African countries but also has a negative impact on the overall image of the Chinese in Africa and on the relationship between China and Africa.

One would assume that it would be easier for new Chinese immigrants to integrate into local communities in Zimbabwe today than in the past. First, since China and Zimbabwe established diplomatic relations in 1980, the political trust between the two nations has deepened, the scale of trade and investment has grown, and, especially after Zimbabwe was sanctioned by Western countries in 2002, China became the major target of its "Looking East" policy and "its only major international supporter" in some people's eyes (Eisenman 2005). Second, Chinese enterprises have made a great contribution to Zimbabwe's economic recovery and development, and they have created a large number of jobs that can help Zimbabwe reduce its high unemployment.[2] Third, even in the period of hyperinflation, when large numbers of European and Indian immigrants left Zimbabwe, between 2003 and 2009, new Chinese immigrants remained, and their wholesale and retail businesses became almost the only source of economic support to meet the basic needs of Zimbabweans.[3]

So what about the community formation of new Chinese immigrants? What are the main constraints that prevent them from integrating? How do they perceive Zimbabweans and how do Zimbabweans perceive them, and what are the results of these mutual perceptions? What have they done to promote their social integration with Zimbabweans? This chapter seeks to answer these questions. But, first, let us look back at the situation before 1980 and introduce the general trend of new Chinese immigrants in Zimbabwe.

A Historical Overview of Chinese Immigration to Zimbabwe

Earlier Chinese Immigrants and Their Offspring

Chinese immigrants first moved to Zimbabwe in around the early 1900s, mainly as indentured labor, and they worked on white European settlers' farms, mines and railways. Most of them originated from Guangdong's Pearl River delta.[4] They can be classified into two types: those brought over by the Rhodesia Land and Mine Owners Association and the

Rhodesian Native Labour Supply Association Ltd., and those who came outside the contract system with the help of their kin. Most returned to China when their contracts ended. The few who stayed in Zimbabwe opened groceries, laundries, bakeries or restaurants.

From the early 1990s, the small Chinese community has now entered its fourth generation, and the earlier Chinese immigrants and their offspring have become almost an integral part of Zimbabwean society. Those born in Zimbabwe receive a Western education and are moving further and further away from Chinese culture. The third and fourth generations like Western food more than Chinese food and they use English to communicate. Some speak Cantonese or even Mandarin, but almost no one uses Chinese writing. The older generation call them "bananas": yellow on the outside but white on the inside (Tandon 1992).

The Chinese Zimbabweans do not play an important role in the Zimbabwean economy or in politics. The one exception, Fay Chung, was minister of education from 1988 to 1992 and made a great contribution to Zimbabwe's educational development (Chung 2006). In 1962, Chinese Zimbabweans established a Chinese Association to defend their interests as a community. This raised £10,000 to build a Chinese school, which was closed on the eve of independence. It also managed to obtain a separate burial ground where more than 80 Chinese are buried. As more and more Chinese entered Zimbabwe and formed new associations, the earlier immigrants became the minority and played a less and less important role in the community, and the old association ceased to function.

General Trends among New Chinese Immigrants

New Chinese immigrants began moving to Zimbabwe after China and Zimbabwe established diplomatic relations in 1980. Starting in 1984, a large number of Chinese interpreters and engineers were dispatched by Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs), such as China National Complete Plant Import and Export Corporation (Group), China North Industries Corporation, and China Jiangxi Corporation for International Economic and Technical Cooperation, to carry out large public construction projects. After the projects were completed, some stayed on and used their relationships with Zimbabweans to open wholesale or retail shops, or to establish factories. Those who remained are the first generation of new Chinese immigrants. After their businesses developed, they invited their families, relatives and friends to Zimbabwe. The new Chinese community built up

Table 4.1 The origin of new Chinese immigrants from China

Number	*Province*
1500	Liaoning[a]
300–500	Heilongjiang, Gansu, Shaanxi, Shanxi, Jiangsu, Zhejiang and Shandong
Fewer than 300	Hebei, Hunan, Beijing, Shanghai and Fujian

[a]Of those from Liaoning Province, the City of Anshan alone contributes more than 1000

gradually. But the development of this community was very slow in the beginning, and in 2000 there were only about 500 individuals (SCROCA 2005). This was the first wave of new Chinese immigrants.

The second wave began in 2000 and reached its height in 2006. It peaked because China accelerated its policy of "going out" to Africa; Zimbabwe implemented its "Looking East" policy in 2003; and the friendship between China and Zimbabwe strengthened and deepened. According to my fieldwork, about 6000 new Chinese immigrants live in Zimbabwe, including 5000 in Harare, 150 in Gweru, 100 in Bulawayo and 10–50 in other smaller cities, such as Mutare, Chinoyi and Chegutu. Unlike the older immigrants, most of them come from Liaoning, Heilongjiang, Gansu, Shaanxi, Shanxi, Jiangsu, Zhejiang and Shandong (see Table 4.1). The Fujianese, who are the largest group in other Southern African countries, including South Africa, Botswana and Lesotho (McNamee et al. 2012/2013), only number around 100 in Zimbabwe.

Most of the new Chinese immigrants who entered Zimbabwe from the mid-1980s to 2000 are now 45–60 years old, accounting for 20 % of the Chinese in the country. Most of those who entered after 2000 are now 30–45 years old, accounting for 60 % of the total. The other 20 % are parents or children. Those who achieved a college education before moving to Zimbabwe account for about 30 % of the total, and most of them were from Liaoning, Gansu and Zhejiang. The educational level of those moving to Zimbabwe in the late 1980s and the early 1990s is higher than that of the rest, especially those who arrive after 2005.

There are three types of migrant: owners of small and medium-sized enterprises who invest in manufacturing; private businessmen engaged in catering, recreation, tourism, and wholesale and retail trading; and Chinese employees hired by the former two, or dispatched by China's SOEs, who stayed on after finishing their contracts. Up to now, the first type have established more than 100 factories producing garments, footwear,

construction materials, chemical products and food products, and exploiting and refining minerals. The second type have opened more than 1000 wholesale and retail shops, 6 well-known restaurants (5 in Harare, 1 in Bulawayo), a club and a tour company.

The New Chinese Community and Its Development in Harare

As mentioned above, it has been more than 30 years since new Chinese immigrants started entering Zimbabwe. The first generation consisted mainly of interpreters who settled down quickly in the country, with their language abilities and good relationship with Zimbabweans. Unlike them, most of the newcomers lack language skills and are unfamiliar with local customs and business conditions. They therefore have to use ties of blood and provenance to seek help from those who arrived earlier. At the same time, based on the belief that "all Chinese belong to one big family in Zimbabwe," the earlier ones are very happy to support the newcomers. As the population of new Chinese immigrants gradually increases, the Chinese community is being constructed. Although there is no "new Chinatown" emerging in Zimbabwe, unlike in Johannesburg (Chen 2012), its new Chinese community is becoming more and more mature. We will discuss four aspects of this: place of residence; centers of economic activity; Chinese associations; and Chinese-language media. Since the majority live in Harare, I shall focus on the new Chinese community and its development in Harare.

Place of Residence

A place of residence is the most important material foundation for the Chinese community to develop. According to my research, new Chinese immigrants in Zimbabwe, especially in its capital, are concentrated in certain residential areas.

In Harare, most new Chinese live in the three "white districts" located in the northern part of the city—namely Mount Pleasant district, Borrowdale district and Avondale district. Taking Brooks, the best and most famous residential suburb of Borrowdale district, as an example, nearly a third of its residents are new Chinese, whereas almost no Chinese live in the "black

districts" located in the south of Harare, such as in Mbare. "We don't live in 'black districts'. Except for businesses, we don't even go there, especially in the evening. We doubt the security situation in those districts is very good," a Chinese told me on the first day I arrived in Harare.[5]

Centers of Economic Activity

The places in which economic activities go on are another important material foundation on which the Chinese community develops. According to the interviews, these places are scattered, just like the places of residence. Two commercial centers are occupied mainly by new Chinese immigrants in Harare: Long Cheng Plaza shopping mall and the Gulf Shopping Complex.[6] The former is a very large integrated shopping mall in Belvedere, to the west of Harare, and it was built by Anhui Foreign Economic Construction (Group) Co. Ltd. More than 50 Chinese enterprises have already moved in, including the Horizon Ivato Supermarket, the Happy Club and the Wild Africa Travel Agency, all big companies. The latter is located in the heart of Harare and was built by Lebanese. The Gulf Shopping Complex is near a big bus station and its shops are centralized, so it is popular among new Chinese immigrants. Of the 70 big shops there, more than 60 are rented by new Chinese immigrants.

Chinese Associations

The establishment of Chinese associations is an important indicator of the maturity of a Chinese community. Informal Chinese associations can be traced to the "singles club" and "the gang of nine Anshanese" established in the late 1990s. The members of the former were bachelors or men whose partners were still in China. The members of the latter were nine men from Anshan in Liaoning Province. Both met every week or fortnight. These were places to exchange information, look for a partner and amuse oneself, and they equipped some people to lead formal Chinese associations later on.[7]

The first formal Chinese association, called the Zimbabwe Chinese Business Association (ZCBA), was established in Harare on October 3, 2004. That same year the government of Zimbabwe declared that it would sharply increase customs duty on imported goods on August 26. This would have caused Chinese businessmen big losses. To deal with the emergency, 28 Chinese businessmen in coordination with the Chinese embassy gained two months' grace. As a result the ZCBA was established.[8] It has since

become one of the most important Chinese associations in Zimbabwe. Its first two chairmen were Li Jiaqi and Guo Faxin, and its present one is Li Xinfeng.

New Chinese associations soon sprang up on all sides. On September 18, 2007, the Zimbabwe Chinese Association was established in Bulawayo; On September 19, 2010, the Association of Chinese Northern Fellow Countrymen in Zimbabwe was established in Harare; and on March 30, 2014, the Chinese Federation of Zimbabwe (CFZ) was established in Harare.[9]

The CFZ's main aims are to accelerate economic and commercial cooperation between China and Zimbabwe, and to protect the interests of the Chinese in Zimbabwe. It has ten branches. Its chairwoman is Madam Cong Yuling. Since its establishment, the CFZ has held some big cultural and sporting events, which have improved the relationship between new Chinese immigrants and Zimbabweans and opened up a new private channel between China and Zimbabwe.

Chinese-Language Media

The emergence and development of Chinese-language media is another important indicator of the maturity of the Chinese community.

The ZCBA launched the first Chinese-language magazine, *Qiao Sheng*, in 2005. Its aims were to "serve Chinese in Zimbabwe, exchange information among Chinese community and build bridges between Chinese and Zimbabweans". It carried news of the ZCBA, the Chinese community and Zimbabwe. It was short of funds, articles, and professional designers and editors, so it published only two issues before closing. In 2011, ZCBA launched another magazine, *Gei Li*, which suffered the same fate.[10]

Chinese-language media made a breakthrough in 2014. On March 30 of that year, *Zimbabwe Chinese Web* was established by the ZCBA. This aims to "serve all Chinese in Zimbabwe, provide news and information to them and create a spiritual home for them," and it carries "Zimbabwean news, ZCBA's news, policies and regulations, Chinese literature, and commercial information." It has become the most important source of news for new Chinese immigrants in Zimbabwe.[11] On December 1, 2014, the *Zim-time*s Wechat Offical Account (*Zim-times*) was launched by Zhao Ke, the acting vice chairman of the CFZ. On December 13, 2014, another Wechat Offical Account, *Zimbabwe Chinese Web*, was launched by the ZCBA.[12] The main contents of these two are very similar: Zimbabwe's political, economic and

social news; news of the Chinese community; and information concerning business and daily life. Up to now, both have more than 1000 subscribers and have become the most convenient way for new immigrants to get news.

Quite a few online chat groups have also been established by Chinese associations, which play a more and more important role in the lives of new Chinese immigrants.

So with residence and economic activities concentrated in certain areas and the establishment of Chinese associations and Chinese-language media, the Chinese community in Zimbabwe is taking off. The community offers new Chinese immigrants greater support and new opportunities to integrate with Zimbabweans. For example, in November 2014, the Chinese living in the Mount Pleasant district established a Chinese Joint Defense Group (CJDG) with the help of the ZCBA. The CJDG went on patrol at night with the district's police, not only to protect their own interests but to make a contribution to the neighborhood. As a result they have been praised by the police, and their images in the community have improved. The Chinese-language media also help new immigrants, especially those who cannot read English, to learn more about Zimbabwe's politics, economics and society. This helps newcomers to respond better to changes in Zimbabwe and avoid misunderstanding or conflicts.

Constraints on Social Integration

The Chinese community strengthens new Chinese immigrants' ability to adapt, regulate themselves, cohere and protect themselves, and it improves their overall ability to communicate with and integrate into local communities. However, since its social functions are improving, it also provides an internally oriented social environment that Yoon Jung Park has called "our own little box" (Park 2009). As a result, this environment becomes a protective shell, strengthens their identification as Chinese, and decreases their motivation and ability to integrate into local communities. Through interviews with new Chinese immigrants, I found that the constraints on assimilation were the language barrier, self-isolation and patterns of intimate relationships.

The Language Barrier

The language barrier is one of the most formidable constraints on social integration for new Chinese immigrants. There are three official languages:

English, Shona and Ndebele. In Harare, where most new Chinese immigrants live, English and Shona are widely spoken. Most early Chinese immigrants to Zimbabwe were interpreters and engineers. Most could speak English well and used it to communicate with Zimbabweans. Some even learned Shona. Furthermore, because the Chinese community had not yet emerged, those who could not speak English had to learn it. Chinese-style English emerged, such as "me no in office" (I am not in the office) and "me ok, you no ok" (I can do something, you cannot).

Most immigrants in the second wave consisted of the families, relatives and friends of those in the first wave, and employees in small and medium-sized enterprises, especially in mining. Generally speaking, their English is poor, and some cannot speak a single word. But the Chinese community has matured, so people can work and live in an internally oriented social environment: if they want to go to work, they can drive their own car; if they want to go shopping, they can go to Chinese supermarkets; if they want to go out for dinner, they can go to Chinese restaurants; if they want a job, they can go to Chinese enterprises; and if they want to communicate with Zimbabweans, they can seek help from friends or hire an interpreter. As one correspondent said, "my husband's English is very poor, so he can only do administrative work in our garments factory and leaves business dealings with partners to me."[13] As a result, those who cannot communicate with Zimbabweans lost their motivation to learn English and the opportunity to integrate into the local community.

Self-Isolation

Although there are only 5000 new Chinese immigrants in Harare, the social functions of the Chinese community provide a perfect platform for them to communicate with each other. For those who cannot speak English, it is almost the only opportunity for communication. As a result, they seem to have isolated themselves from the local community.

Many new Chinese immigrants told me that their lives are almost the same every day: in the morning they go out to work; in the evening they come home, eat dinner with their families and then go for a walk or watch television.[14] Only at the Spring Festival and other important festivals, or when relatives or friends get married, give birth to a child, and arrive in or leave Zimbabwe, do they go out for dinner with other new Chinese immigrants in Chinese restaurants. The leaders of the Chinese community may attend more social activities, but their meeting and eating places are mainly

Chinese restaurants or the houses of other new Chinese immigrants rather than bars or clubs owned by Zimbabweans.

The Spring Festival Gala held by Chinese associations, and performances offered by Chinese domestic art troupes, are the biggest events for new Chinese immigrants. On February 14, 2015 I attended the performance of *2015 Happy Chinese New Year* organized by China's Ministry of Culture and given by artists from Tianjin in Harare's Celebration Center. At least 2000 new Chinese immigrants attended. Compared with these activities, very few new Chinese immigrants attend activities organized by Zimbabweans.

Patterns of Intimate Relationships

The language barrier and self-isolation pose challenges to building intimate relationships. Marriage is one way immigrants can integrate into local communities. Owing to differences in language, culture, tradition and custom, few new immigrants date or marry Zimbabweans. A new Chinese immigrant who has lived in Zimbabwe for about 20 years told me that "more than 90 per cent" of the Chinese new immigrants who marry in Zimbabwe do so with other Chinese. Mr. Zhu was dispatched by a Chinese agribusiness to Zimbabwe in 2014. Several months later he had got used to the Zimbabwean climate and work conditions, and he decided to stay longer. His friends introduced some girls to him. He told me in the interview that he wants to marry a Chinese girl instead of a black or colored girl.[15]

Few new Chinese immigrants marry Zimbabweans. There are exceptions. I met four new Chinese immigrants with Zimbabwean husbands or wives during my fieldwork there. The mother of one of them told me:

> My daughter-in-law is Zimbabwean. When my son told me he had a black girlfriend, I was very angry. There are so many Chinese girls, why did he get a black one? After they married, I found they love each other very much and she is very fond of me, so I accepted her gradually.[16]

Another woman who married a Zimbabwean told me that

> my husband is fine except that he is too generous to his relatives and friends. For example, if a guy from his home town comes to our home, he can stay as long as he wants, and take away anything he likes. This is impossible in China,

> but my husband said it's the tradition and custom of his tribe and he cannot say no. Finally I convinced myself that since he is very nice to me, the best thing I can do is "follow the man I marry."[17]

Intergroup Perceptions between New Chinese Immigrants and Zimbabweans

Social integration is a two-way process. The integration of new Chinese immigrants, as foreigners in Zimbabwe, is affected not only by the social functions of the Chinese community but also by intergroup perceptions. My fieldwork showed that in the eyes of new Chinese immigrants, there are more negative than positive perceptions of Zimbabweans, and it's the same vice versa. This negative mutual perception is another obstacle to new Chinese immigrants' integration.

New Chinese Immigrants' Perceptions of Zimbabweans

In the eyes of new Chinese immigrants, most Zimbabweans are sweet-tempered and cheerful. They think this is the main reason Zimbabwe has remained stable in the economic downturn since 2012 and the political problems that erupted in late 2015. This was why many new Chinese immigrants decided to stay in Zimbabwe and increase their investment. They also have other positive perceptions of Zimbabweans: they are loyal and well educated, and they have strong technical skills, so they make good business partners and employees. But the interviews show that the Chinese perception of Zimbabweans is more negative than positive. Stealing, corruption and indolence are the three main charges.

Stealing

New Chinese immigrants often say "Chinese love gambling, Zimbabweans love stealing." Many are robbed by their servants or employees. They joke that "if you have not been robbed several times, you are not an 'older migrant'."

On February 3, 2015, I was invited by a new Chinese immigrant to visit his vegetable farm near Harare. The first thing I saw was a tractor mechanic being arrested by the police. The Chinese manager told me that the man had stolen vegetable seeds and repair tools, and sold them for beer. The same night, a Chinese businessman told me that he had been robbed by his employee.

> When I checked the stock, I found I had lost several truckloads of goods. After an investigation, I ascertained that the goods had been stolen by drivers in transit. They drove the goods away from my factory, but they didn't drive them to my shops. Instead, they sold them secretly.[18]

Another Chinese businessman said:

> someone told me that goods being sold on the market were almost the same as ours, but they were much cheaper. I came to my storage to check the stock immediately. I had been robbed of more than USD40,000 worth of goods. The police suspected a stockman and driver had stolen the goods. So they were arrested. But up to now, they refuse to confess to their crime.[19]

Corruption

If you ask new Chinese immigrants what their impressions are of Zimbabwe's officials and police, almost all of them will say "corrupt." They told me in the interviews that the local officials or police take any opportunity to ask for bribes, whenever they enter or leave customs, drive vehicles, open new shops or set up new factories. They have to offer bribes for many things. One respondent said: "I have a good relationship with an official from the Ministry of Health. When he needs something, he will call me and ask me to buy it for him. I bought him an LCD television recently."[20] A woman said: "I have good relationships with several high officials, and I can enter their offices without appointments. But I know those relationships are absolutely based on the money or expensive gifts I give them. Otherwise, they would not want to know me or help me."[21]

Many new Chinese immigrants think that the main targets of corrupt officials and police are Chinese. One respondent said:

> If you are at the airport customs in Harare, it's easy for the Whites or Blacks to get through. But when it comes to Chinese, especially those coming to Zimbabwe for the first time, the Customs officers usually look at their passports very carefully, ask them a lot of questions, and even make them wait while other passengers pass by. It is very clear that they want money, maybe USD10 or USD20 will be ok . . . It is the same with traffic police. They like to inspect Chinese drivers because they think they can get money from them. Of course they can, especially those who cannot speak English.[22]

Indolence

Most new Chinese immigrants can earn enough money for a decent life in Zimbabwe because they are diligent and frugal. One respondent said: "If you work hard and have a mind, you will be a success, definitely."[23] They think the main reason many Zimbabweans are so poor is that they are lazy.

A manager from a Chinese agribusiness told me:

> very few farm workers come to our farm every day in a month. They usually work on the farm for one or two weeks, then get their wages and take a rest for some days. After spending all the money, they come back again ... Some do even worse than that, they take the wages directly to the bars or clubs instead of to their homes. They also borrow money from us, but they never pay us back. We don't lend money to them now, because they don't use the money for their families, they just enjoy it.[24]

There is much land lying fallow in the suburbs of Harare. This is all public land. If the municipal government of Harare has no plan to build public facilities on it, people can use it to plant food. However, as Mr. Zhao Ke said, "the locals are so lazy that they prefer to stay at home rather than reclaim a piece of land to get extra food for the families."

Zimbabweans' Perceptions of New Chinese Immigrants

In the eyes of Zimbabweans, most new Chinese immigrants are diligent and frugal. They think that it is because of these habits that new Chinese immigrants can earn so much money in Zimbabwe. Although some cannot understand why new Chinese immigrants are so hard-working (one respondent asked me: "Why do you Chinese always work, work and work, why don't you take a rest on Sunday?"), most of those interviewed appreciated this spirit. One woman told me: "as a businesswoman, I admire you Chinese very much. Without diligence and frugality, they cannot earn money and live with dignity in my country."[25] The other positive perceptions held by Zimbabweans of new Chinese immigrants include their efficiency and the fact that the cheap goods they sell meet the needs of low-income groups. But alongside these positive perceptions are more negative ones, such as bad behavior, selling fake goods, and wanting to earn money while making no meaningful investments.

Bad Behavior

When I asked Zimbabweans what their impressions of new Chinese immigrants are, their answers surprised me. Most said that Chinese are rude, impolite, unhygienic, untidy, smoke in public, spit everywhere and lack respect for locals.

George works in a Chinese travel agency. He told me:

> the Chinese in Zimbabwe are very impolite. When we meet someone we know, we always say hello to him. But you guys don't say hello, neither to us, nor to your countrymen. And some Chinese even curse us in Chinese, for they think we don't understand it. Actually, we all know the meaning of their dirty words.[26]

Then he imitated some dirty words in Chinese, which embarrassed me very much.

Anderson Ngondo, George's colleague, agreed with him:

> As a driver in the travel agency, I often guide Chinese tourists. I find they are always loud in public. Some even yell at me. I have guided a very impolite Chinese. When he passed by a beautiful house, to our great surprise, he knocked on the door and asked the owner if he could sell the house to him. He was so rude.[27]

Selling Fake Goods

As mentioned above, most new Chinese immigrants moved to Zimbabwe after 2000 and made their living mainly in wholesale or retail shops. Given the low purchasing power of locals and fierce competition in the local markets, some try to sell fake goods to make more profit. This is therefore another negative Zimbabwean perception of new Chinese immigrants.

Anderson told me that fake goods became almost synonymous with the Chinese in about 2006. "When we met Chinese at that time, we always called them 'Jing Zhong', which means fake goods or rubbish."[28] Li Xinfeng, Chairman of the ZCBA, confirmed that "when the blacks saw us on the street, they always called us 'Jing Zhong' in a discriminatory tone. At first we didn't know the meaning of it. Then our local employees told us that they were laughing at the bad quality of our goods."[29]

There are several arguments about the origin of the term "Jing Zhong." Some Chinese think it resulted from slanders against Chinese goods in Western media. Others think it was caused by bad publicity generated by

local white and Indian businessmen because their businesses were harmed by Chinese competition. Yet others think the main reason is the bad quality of Chinese goods. I agree with the last argument. One respondent said:

> When Zimbabweans go to Chinese shops to buy something, they usually ask "How about the quality of your goods?" The answer is almost always the same, "Zheng Zong," which means that the goods are genuine and the price is fair. But, actually, the goods are often fake. So they use the word "Jing Zhong" to satirize and mock Chinese.[30]

Making No Meaningful Investments

Some Zimbabwean respondents told me that the biggest problem with new Chinese immigrants is that they make no meaningful investment in Zimbabwe. Andersen said:

> New Chinese immigrants only want to earn money in my country. Most open wholesale and retail shops or exploit and develop mineral resources. Only a very few invest in manufacturing. We think they not only earn our money but take our jobs and damage our environment. However, they don't bring us the development of infrastructure and manufacturing, which is what we need most.[31]

Another respondent told me that "the shops opened by Chinese make our lives more convenient, but what we need most is investment, jobs, and economic development."[32] Against a background of continuous economic downturn, their argument is realistic.

Some new Chinese immigrants recognized this. Li Xinfeng told me that "some of us have no long-term plan. We only want to be 'fortune hunters' instead of investors. We are short-sighted, and will do anything to make more profit."[33] Another respondent, Yi Shutong, who invested in agriculture in Zimbabwe, said:

> if you want to be accepted by the locals, you must have a long-term objective, you must be an investor, not a "fortune hunter." I have a long-term plan. I know Zimbabwe is facing food shortages and lacks investment in the agricultural sector. I also know that investment in agriculture is large but the return is slow. Even so, I want to do something to change the impression Zimbabweans have of new Chinese immigrants.[34]

The mainly negative intergroup perceptions between new Chinese immigrants and Zimbabweans have two adverse effects. First, negative Chinese perceptions of Zimbabweans make it hard for the former to consider Zimbabwe as their second home: "Zimbabwe is simply a strange land for us, and we are just visitors in Zimbabwe." This attitude becomes a big obstacle to their integration into local communities. Second, negative Zimbabwean perceptions of new Chinese immigrants make it hard for Zimbabweans to accept them, unlike in the 1990s. They are largely seen as foreign "fortune hunters" by Zimbabweans, which makes it more difficult for them to integrate into local communities.

However, these negative perceptions are a result of broader and deeper contact between new Chinese immigrants and Zimbabweans. Only when the Chinese look on Zimbabweans more positively, recognize the problems that they themselves pose, and change for the better can these negative perceptions be removed and new Chinese immigrants integrate into local communities fully.

Seeking to Integrate

Although most Chinese respondents said they would go back to China when they had earned enough money or grown old, some said that they would put down roots in Zimbabwe. However, both groups thought that, as foreigners, if they wanted to integrate into local communities fully and achieve sustainable development in Zimbabwe, they should do their best to solve their own problems, look upon local people more positively and make more contributions to local communities. In recent years, especially since 2014, they have therefore carried out a series of activities through their associations, including helping each other adapt to local behavior, fulfilling social responsibilities and engaging with local people by organizing large-scale cultural or sports activities.

Adapting to Local Behavioral Patterns

As an important means of integration, Chinese associations and media, especially the CFZ and *Zim-times*, have put forward some initiatives and published articles to regulate the behavior of new Chinese immigrants.

On January 19, 2015, the presidium of the CFZ released "Initiative by the Chinese Federation of Zimbabwe on behalf of Chinese in Zimbabwe."

This said: "in recent years, Chinese enterprises ... have made some contributions to the local economy. But at the same time, because of the bad behavior of some Chinese, the whole Chinese community has been misunderstood by local Zimbabweans, which will discourage the future development of Chinese in Zimbabwe." To regulate the behavior of new Chinese immigrants, the CFZ put forward the following recommendations: be self-disciplined, well-behaved, law-abiding, and honest; respect local customs, be kind to your neighbors and fulfil your social responsibilities; be helpful and kind to others, and strive to serve as a good example to others; safeguard your own rights by legal means; carry on Chinese cultural traditions and serve as a bridge between China and Zimbabwe so as to realize a win–win style of cooperation.[35]

On February 2, 2015, the presidium of the CFZ recommended a "Chinese in Zimbabwe Joint Pledge" and demanded that *Zim-times* publish it from February 2 onwards. From January 16 to 26, *Zim-times* published three reviews titled "How Far Can We Go if We Continue Offering Bribes in Zimbabwe?", "Chinese Still Need to Regulate Themselves in Zimbabwe" and "Being Unpopular and Unacceptable, Do Chinese Really Integrate into Africa?"[36] The reviews suggest that if new Chinese immigrants want to achieve sustainable development in Zimbabwe, they must improve their relationships with local people and truly integrate into local communities.

The initiative and reviews have provoked strong reactions across the Chinese community. Many new Chinese immigrants wrote to *Zim-times* to say that the initiative and reviews expressed their views and they will pay more attention to their behavior in future.[37]

Fulfilling Social Responsibilities

Li Xinfeng said:

> There is a saying in China: "What comes from the people should be used for the people." If we want to integrate fully into local communities, we should follow the principle of "What comes from Zimbabweans should be used for Zimbabweans," fulfill social responsibilities actively and make more contributions to the development of Zimbabwe.[38]

Since 2010, new Chinese immigrants in Zimbabwe have begun to change their mode of operation by localizing and hiring more and more

employees from local communities, thus contributing greatly to solving the problem of high unemployment in the country. We can take wholesale and retail shops as an example. As mentioned above, more than 1000 such shops have been opened by new Chinese immigrants in Zimbabwe. The average number of employees hired by each is thought to be around ten, which adds up to more than 10,000 jobs. Some Chinese enterprises have promoted the development of local manufacturing. Wang Jianhong, vice chairwoman of the CFZ, owns a big garment factory in Harare. Starting early in 2012, she has provided cloth to local garment factories on credit and allowed them to delay paying back until they sell the clothes. A local factory with more than 150 workers has emerged with her help. She plans to train local fashion designers and introduce new sewing machines to improve the production of Zimbabwe's textile and clothing sector.[39]

Getting out of the relatively isolated Chinese community to do charity is another important step in new Chinese immigrants' integration. From 2009 to now, Cheng Xinhua, vice president of the ZCBA, has continuously provided clothes and food to Gweru's street children and is known to them as "Father Cheng." Founded on April 10, 2014 by a group of mothers in Harare, the "Love in Africa" mothers group has donated food, clothes, books, toys, beds and bedding to schools and orphanages, thus gaining respect in the community. On May 31, 2015, at a party for about 400 orphans to celebrate International Children's Day, the children shouted: "I love you China!"[40]

Engaging Locals by Organizing Large-Scale Cultural or Sports Activities

To become better understood by local people and develop new ways of integration, Chinese associations have organized a serious of large-scale cultural and sporting activities such as "Zimbabwe Has Talent" and the "Sino-Zim Cement" soccer game, starting in 2014.

"Zimbabwe Has Talent" is the first major event organized by the CFZ since it was founded in March 2014. It began in August and ended on October 17, 2014. More than 1000 new Chinese immigrants and Zimbabweans entered the competition. It was broadcast live by Zimbabwe National Television and Zimbabwe National Broadcasting Station, and it produced a "Chinese storm" on local social media. From July 24 to September 5, 2015, the CFZ organized a "Talent Search." The winners of the two competitions were invited by China's minister of culture to perform in Chengdu, Shenzhen and Beijing in September 2015. Zhao Ke,

one of the organizers, said: "the two competitions have promoted cultural exchange between China and Zimbabwe and will help new Chinese immigrants integrate into local communities."[41]

To celebrate the 35th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between Zimbabwe and China, and to strengthen the friendship between Zimbabweans and Chinese people, the CFZ and China's embassy in Zimbabwe organized a soccer friendly. The game was played by Chinese amateur soccer players and the top two teams in Zimbabwe's Premium League, the Dynamos and the Caps. The 30,000 seats in the Rufaro stadium were occupied by fanatical fans. The Chinese ambassador, Lin Lin, said: "Soccer is not only the favorite sport in Zimbabwe but a bridge to mutual friendship between Chinese and Zimbabweans . . . Its influence is very great and the result is very good."[42] When the game was over and fans entered the field to celebrate, the Chinese were treated as stars, embraced and photographed.[43]

Conclusion

These activities have helped to deepen the mutual understanding between new Chinese immigrants and Zimbabweans, and to improve new Chinese immigrants' image. But constraints continue to prevent them from fully integrating into local communities. Their businesses are still mainly in the wholesale and retail trade and the mining industry, both of which are unsustainable and attract severe criticism. If the immigrants want to solve this problem, they must change their current business model and invest more in manufacturing. However, they lack funds and technological ability. They also continue to lack an effective means of publicity. Chinese media serve only the Chinese community. If they want to publicize their presence to local people and be accepted and recognized, they need to establish English, or even Shona, media, which is beyond their current capability. Although they have had some achievements in the economic field, they still haven't entered mainstream Zimbabwean society. Up to now, no one has entered politics, local mainstream media, higher education or research institutions. As a result, they cannot construct their own discourse in Zimbabwe. Lastly, they continue to identify more as Chinese than as Zimbabweans. Very few have become citizens of Zimbabwe and married Zimbabweans. They prefer their children to be educated in China or Western countries. Few have decided to put down roots in Zimbabwe.

So the full integration of new Chinese immigrants into Zimbabwean communities has a long way to go, and it needs joint efforts by individuals, Chinese associations and the whole Chinese community. In the course of this, because of constraints, the support of the Chinese government is needed in terms of both funds and of policies. Through tireless efforts, new Chinese immigrants will not only integrate fully into local communities and achieve sustainable development but also make a greater contribution to Sino-Zimbabwean relations.

Notes

1. I conducted fieldwork in Zimbabwe from November 2014 to March 2015. During this period I interviewed more than 40 new Chinese immigrants and 10 Zimbabweans.
2. Tianze Tobacco Company (Private) Limited played a pivotal role in the recovery of Zimbabwe's tobacco industry. See Longton Mukwereza (2015), "Situating TianZe's Role in Reviving Zimbabwe's Flue-Cured Tobacco Sector in the Wider Discourse on Zimbabwe-China Cooperation: Will the Scorecard Remain Win-Win?" China and Brazil in Africa Agriculture Project Working Paper 115, p. 8. Sinosteel Corporation's subsidiary, Zimbabwe Iron and Steel Company Limited, for example, employs more than 6000 Zimbabweans. See "Speech by Chinese Ambassador in Zimbabwe on the 60th Anniversary of the University of Zimbabwe," May 3, 2015, http://gb.cri.cn/42071/2015/05/03/6351s4949912.htm, accessed June 9, 2015.
3. Interview, Li Xinfeng, chairman of the ZCBA, Harare, February 4, 2015. About the hyperinflation, please see J. Hanlon, J. Manjengwa & T. Smart (2013), Zimbabwe Takes Back Its Land (Cape Town: Jacana Media (Pty) Ltd), p. 94.
4. On January 1, 2015, I went to the Chinese graveyard located in a suburb of Harare, where more than 80 Chinese are buried. Most were from Guangdong, including Taishan, Jingmei, Huangchong in Xinhui, Jiangmen, Chishui in Kaiping, Guxiang in Zhongshan, and Nanhai and Shunde in Foshan.
5. Interview, Yu Yongyuan, a businessman who has opened a little printing house, Harare, November 23, 2014.
6. The buildings in Gulf Shopping Complex were painted pink, so the complex is known to Chinese as the "little pink buildings."
7. The leaders of these informal associations include Zhao Ke, the acting vice chairman of the Chinese Federation of Zimbabwe, Li Manjuan, the acting vice chairwoman and general secretary of the ZCBA, and Luo Yuesheng, the

chairman of the Association of Chinese Northern Fellow Countrymen in Zimbabwe. Interview, Zhao Ke, Harare, January 25, 2015.

8. "Zimbabwe Chinese Business Association was established in Harare," October 3, 2004, http://gb.cri.cn/3821/2004/10/03/622@317203.htm, accessed May 9, 2015; see also "a brief historical retrospect of big events of Zimbabwe Chinese Business Association in the last ten years," (internal materials), August 29, 2014.
9. See "Zimbabwe Chinese Association was established", September 18, 2007, http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2007-09/18/content_6748014.htm, accessed May 9, 2015. It was combined into the CFZ as its Bulawayo branch on March 30, 2014; "Ambassador Qi Shunkang attended the inaugural ceremony of Association of Chinese Northern Fellow Countrymen in Zimbabwe", September 21, 2010, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_chn/wjdt_611265/zwbd_611281/t754632.shtml, accessed May 9, 2015; "Chinese Federation of Zimbabwe was established", April 1, 2014, http://gb.cri.cn/42071/2014/04/01/6071s4486557.htm, accessed May 9, 2015.
10. Interview through Wechat, Li Manjuan, Beijing, May 14, 2015.
11. The website of Zimbabwe Chinese Web is http://www.zimbbs.com/
12. The public names of *Zim-times* Wechat Offical Account and *Zimbabwe Chinese Web* We chat Offical Account are *Zimbabwe-times* and *Zimbabwe_Chinese Web* respectively.
13. Interview, Wang Jianhong, vice chairwoman of the Chinese Federation of Zimbabwe, Harare, March 2, 2015.
14. They can watch 17 Chinese television channels in Zimbabwe, including CCTV and some popular provincial channels.
15. Interview, Zhu Xuewu, manager of Zim-China Wanjin Tianrui Food Processing (Private) Limited, Chegutu, December 14, 2014.
16. Interview, Liu Huilin, owner of a bakery in Chegutu, Chegutu, December 14, 2014.
17. Interview, Wang Hong, owner of a retailer in Gweru, Gweru, February 24, 2015.
18. Interview, Li Yubin, businessman in Harare, Harare, February 3, 2015.
19. Interview, Wei Changjin, businessman in Harare, Harare, January 29, 2015.
20. Interview, Mr. Gao, Harare, February 3, 2015.
21. Interview, Mrs. Song, Harare, February 11, 2015.
22. Interview, Fang Wei, businessman in Harare, Harare, January 29, 2015.
23. Interview, Guo Yongwei, vice chairman of CFZ, Bulawayo, February 25, 2015.
24. Interview, Zhu Xuewu, Chegutu, January 26, 2015.
25. Interview, Brain Chamboko, member of the Zimbabwean table tennis team, Harare, January 10, 2015.

26. Interview, George, driver of Wild Africa Travel Agency, Harare, December 28, 2014.
27. Interview, Anderson Ngondo, driver of Wild Africa Travel Agency, Harare, January 5, 2015.
28. Interview, Anderson Ngondo, Harare, January 17, 2015.
29. Interview, Li Xinfeng, Harare, February 4, 2015.
30. Interview, Xia Hongyan, employee of Tianze Tobacco Company (Private) Limited, Harare, February 10, 2015.
31. Interview, Anderson Ngondo, Harare, January 17, 2015.
32. Interview, Troe, policy office, Harare, February 27, 2015.
33. Interview, Li Xinfeng, Harare, February 4, 2015.
34. Interview, Yi Shutong, general manager of Anhui Tianrui Environment Technology Co., Harare, Ltd., November 24, 2014.
35. "Initiative by Chinese Federation of Zimbabwe to Chinese in Zimbabwe", *Zim-times*, Issue 22, January 22, 2015.
36. "How far can we go if we continue offering bribes in Zimbabwe?" *Zim-times*, 21, January 16, 2015; "Chinese Still Need to Regulate Themselves in Zimbabwe," *Zim-times*, 23, January 21, 2015; "Being Unpopular and Unacceptable, Did Chinese Really Integrate into Africa?" *Zim-times*, 25, January 26, 2015.
37. Interview, Zhao Ke, February 15, 2015.
38. Interview, Li Xinfeng, February 4, 2015.
39. Interview, Wang Jianhong, March 2, 2015.
40. "'Father's Car'—The Pride of Gweru's Street Children," December 11, 2014, http://www.zimbbs.com/forum.php?mod=viewthread&tid=5616&highlight=father; "Loving Mums, Love in Africa," February 4, 2014, http://www.zimbbs.com/thread-6475-1-1.html; "2015 'Love Without Boundary' Children's Party," February 23, 2015, http://www.zimbbs.com/forum.php?mod=viewthread&tid=7702&highlight=%B0%AE%D0%C4%CE%DE%B9%FA%BD%E7, accessed May 21, 2015. Before visiting Zimbabwe on December 1, 2015, the Chinese president, Xi Jinping, praised "Father Cheng" and "Love in Africa" mums group in his article published in Zimbabwe's newspaper *The Herald*. See Xi Jinping, "Let the Sino-Zim Flower Bloom with New Splendor," *The Herald*, November 30, 2015.
41. Interview, Zhao Ke, Beijing, September 15, 2015.
42. "Sino-Zim Friendly Soccer was played in Harare to celebrate the 35th anniversary of diplomatic relations," February 23, 2015, http://gb.cri.cn/42071/2015/02/23/7211s4880002.htm, accessed May 21, 2015.
43. I was one of the organizers of the game.

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PART II

New Chinese Diasporas in Asia

CHAPTER 5

Debating Integration in Singapore, Deepening the Variegations of the Chinese Diaspora

Elaine Lynn-Ee Ho and Fang Yu Foo

Introduction

During the 1990s, in a bid to address immediate labor shortages and mitigate the potential impact of declining fertility rates, the Singaporean government implemented a series of initiatives to make the country a more favorable destination for immigrants. China proved to be an important source of immigration given its abundant supply of the skilled and unskilled workforce that Singapore desired. The cultural background of immigrants from mainland China was thought to be compatible with the majority-ethnic Chinese composition of the Singaporean population, given that 76 % are of Chinese ethnicity (NPTD et al. 2014). Successive waves of Chinese immigration have accentuated Singapore's reputation as a key site where Chinese ethnicity, identity and culture are expressed as part of a wider Chinese diaspora landscape. The growing number of new Chinese immigrants (*xin yimin*) arriving in the country through the different immigration schemes made available by the Singaporean state has served to deepen the variegation of the "Chinese diaspora," a label that has been conceptually interrogated by scholars of Chinese overseas studies such as Wang (1991) and Suryadinata (1997).

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Singapore has a majority population of ethnic Chinese (74.3 % compared with 13.3 % Malays, 9.1 % Indians and 3.2 % other ethnic groups in 2015; Department of Statistics Singapore 2016). Most Chinese-Singaporeans were born in Singapore and assert claims of natal belonging that differentiate them from those who were born elsewhere. They distinguish themselves from coethnics born and bred in mainland China (Ho 2006). However, the new Chinese immigrants who left China after 1979 are far from homogenous, and their migration experiences can be periodized according to the conditions in China at the time of departure and the type of migration route they took to get to Singapore. We argue that these contextual factors have an impact on immigrants' attitudes toward integration and the extent of their integration. In the wider literature on integration, one view is that it is the host country that sets the expectations and guidelines for integration. Immigrants are expected to internalize them and thereby become subjects of the state (Lewis and Neal 2005). Some scholars question such notions of integration (Ehrkamp 2006), highlighting that immigrants inevitably bring with them characteristics from their homeland, remaining culturally different from the host society (Nagel 2005). Such debates about integration tend to focus on visible cultural difference such as those to do with ethnicity or religion. Much less has been said about the cultural diversity and differences between coethnics who have converged in immigration societies at different times (for an exception, see Liu 2014). This chapter discusses integration expectations in Singapore, which is experiencing a new wave of immigration from China. It also considers the integration experiences of new Chinese immigrants, and the intraethnic tensions between Chinese-Singaporeans and new Chinese immigrants, as well as differences among the new Chinese immigrant population. This discussion contributes to a more nuanced understanding of the Chinese diaspora at a time when greater emphasis is being placed on human mobility as a resource for driving national progress and wealth accumulation.

The chapter focuses on new Chinese immigrants who have permanent residency or citizenship status. The Singaporean government approaches the integration of permanent residents and citizens separately from that of low-skilled workers. Low-skilled migrant workers are treated as a transient presence because their visas are tied to fixed-term contracts and they do not have the option of applying for long-term residency status. For this group the policy goal has been to minimize alleged social problems; in comparison, highly skilled or capital-bearing foreigners are treated as subjects to be socialized into Singaporean norms and values.

This chapter is based on 28 interviews conducted with 20 immigrants during 2014–2015 (we conducted repeat interviews with a selection of interviewees). The interviewees comprised 12 male and 8 female immigrants, and their ages ranged from 35 to 65. All of them held Singaporean permanent residency status or citizenship. They had immigrated through the employment-pass scheme or as entrepreneurs and investors. The interviews were conducted in Mandarin and lasted for 45 minutes to two hours. The interviewees were recruited through personal contacts initially and subsequently through snowballing contacts. We are both Chinese-Singaporeans born and bred in Singapore but we have forged strong personal and professional networks in mainland China. We situate our analysis of immigration and integration debates in a wider ethnography of Singaporean society and its transnational links with China. Additional analyses of newspaper reports and policy were carried out to set the interview data in a policy context and a social context.

The next section contextualizes integration debates in Singapore's history of immigration and nation-building. As a country built on past immigration flows, Singapore is facing new immigration today that challenges its approach to managing both ethnic diversity and coethnic relations. The section discusses government initiatives to encourage integration and the expectations of Singaporean society of immigrants. The subsequent section discusses the attitudes of new Chinese immigrants to the expectation that they will integrate. It highlights the platforms for integration they have used, in particular the links they forge with new Chinese clan associations in Singapore that are distinct from the pioneer clan associations associated with the Chinese immigrants of yesteryear. The section highlights the intraethnic tensions manifested among the different cohorts of ethnic Chinese in Singapore. Distinctions are drawn not only between Chinese-Singaporeans who consider the country their birthplace and see the newer arrivals as outsiders, but also among new Chinese immigrants according to their period of immigration. These dynamics underline the variegated nature of the Chinese diaspora.

Immigration and Integration in Singapore

Immigration Trends and Tensions in Singapore

From 2000 to 2010, Singapore's permanently resident and non-resident immigrant population nearly doubled in size (see Fig. 5.1) (Department of



	1990	2000	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Citizens	2,623.7	2,985.9	3,200.7	3,230.7	3,257.2	3,285.1	3,313.5	3,343.0	3,375.0
PRs	112.1	287.5	533.2	541.0	532.0	533.1	531.2	527.7	527.7
Non-Residents	311.3	754.5	1,253.7	1,305.0	1,394.4	1,494.2	1,554.4	1,599.0	1,632.3

Fig. 5.1 Singapore population composition, 1990–2015 (Source: Authors' own graph based on data derived from the Department of Statistics Singapore 2015)

Statistics Singapore 2015). At the population's peak in 2008, 79,167 permanent residency applications were approved (NPTD et al. 2014). Cumulatively this means that the overall permanently resident immigrant population in Singapore increased by more than 0.25 million in less than a decade (2008–2013). Immigration regulations were tightened in late 2009 in response to growing unease among Singaporean citizens who found it difficult to adapt to the pace of change and the changing cultural dynamics. Foreigners are thought to drive up the cost of housing, and are seen as competitors in schools and workplaces. The city-state's capacity to accommodate a rapidly growing population (e.g. in terms of transportation) has been questioned.

Cultural tensions between Singaporeans and pockets of foreigners have been manifested in both physical space and cyberspace. Prominent social media incidents include racist remarks made by some mainland Chinese students towards Singaporeans, or the "cook a pot of curry" Facebook campaign that galvanized Singaporeans to participate in a day of curry cooking after a reported case of neighborhood conflict between an Indian-Singaporean family and their neighbors from China who disliked the smell of curry (Teo 2015). The latter episode, mobilizing non-Indian Singaporeans to demonstrate solidarity with Indian-Singaporeans, signaled the multicultural or interethnic identifications that Singaporeans allegedly

prioritize in their understanding of national identity and nationhood. However, it also underscored the cultural tensions between locally born Singaporeans and new immigrants to the country. In 2013 the government announcement of a projected population increase to 6.9 million by 2030, primarily through immigration, triggered a debate about its feasibility relative to space constraints, infrastructural capacity, and whether immigration is a quick but in effect merely temporary means of driving forward economic growth (i.e., one that does not address issues of economic productivity and fertility decline adequately). Singaporeans, including those of Chinese ethnicity, reacted defensively to the import of more immigrants, even if they were coethnics. The government announcement sparked an outcry and resulted in a protest by more than 4000 people in Hong Lim Park, the only space where protests are allowed in Singapore (BBC News 16 February 2013).

The Singaporean government responded by tightening immigration criteria, publicizing its efforts in this regard, and accentuating the benefits that citizens have over foreigners and permanent residents. According to a population report released in 2014, since immigration regulations were tightened in 2009, only about 30,000 new permanent residency applications had been approved each year so as to retain the permanent resident population at 0.5 million to 0.6 million in the hope that its members would progress toward citizenship. Of these about 20,000 became new citizens each year. The policy goal is to accept between 15,000 and 25,000 new citizens each year to keep the citizen population from shrinking (NPTD et al. 2014). Demands for foreigners to integrate into Singaporean society and policies in this direction have increased concomitantly. The unprecedented increase in the immigrant population year on year has resulted in growing resentment among Singaporeans toward what they see as foreigners encroaching on their living space, workplaces, recreational sites and educational landscapes. This was reflected in the debates about immigration during the general election in 2011 and again in 2015. The ruling People's Action Party (PAP) won a majority in the 2011 general election but its share of the winning votes was smaller than in previous years. Political pundits suggested that this reflected a dissatisfaction with key policies, including its pro-immigration policy. As a result, a new agency known as the National Population and Talent Division was established that same year. Under the Prime Minister's Office, its mandate is to consolidate and coordinate population planning, including the talent-recruitment strategy for Singapore. Visa processing still falls under the remit of the Ministry of

Manpower, while permanent residency and citizenship applications are decided by the Immigration and Checkpoints Authority.

Since the general election of 2011, the Singaporean government has distinguished more clearly between the benefits of citizenship and those of permanent residence by foreigners (known as non-residents in population reports). Recent policies include increasing the monthly school fees paid by permanent residents (SGD110–SGD220) and foreigners (SGD550–SGD1150), whereas citizens enjoy subsidized rates (MOE 2015). Permanent residents now have to wait three years after applying successfully for public housing (known as HDB flats) in Singapore. Previously there was no such waiting period (HDB 2015). There are restrictions on the foreign ownership of landed housing (SLA 2015). Permanent residents and foreigners pay higher stamp duty for private-property purchases than do Singaporean citizens. This is in contrast to the liberal policy in 2005, when foreign investors could count property as part of their investment portfolio to apply for permanent residency status in Singapore. The restrictive policies of recent years suggest that the Singaporean government is clawing back on immigration and signaling the benefits of citizenship more purposefully, not only to assure Singaporean citizens but also to nudge foreigners toward applying for permanent residency and subsequently citizenship.

Integration Initiatives and Expectations in Singapore

Integration is generally understood as the process by which migrants adapt to the receiving society at a policy level and migrants' own experiences of negotiating change. Erdal and Oeppen (2013: 870) argue that it is important to distinguish between "empirical observations of integration as a *process* that affects migrants and the societies in which they live, and the politically loaded idea of integration as an identifiable '*endpoint*' that social policy can implement" (our emphasis). They highlight two different aspects of integration: one focuses on the "functional" aspects of integration, such as how migrants are incorporated into social structures (e.g. labor market, education); the other concerns aspects that are harder to measure, such as relations between the migrant and majority populations and belonging or feeling at home.

The latter aspect of integration has gained prominence in Singapore as a result of government-led initiatives to encourage new citizens' emotional and social integration into Singaporean society. An example of this is the

Singapore Citizenship Journey program conducted by the National Integration Council (NIC), the People's Association (PA) and the Immigration and Checkpoints Authority of Singapore. It comprises an online component to learn about the country's history and values, a guided tour to key landmarks in Singapore and a community-sharing session. There is also a Citizenship Ceremony where new citizens are sworn in. The NIC was established in 2009 "to promote and foster social integration among Singaporeans, new immigrants and foreigners. It comprises leaders from the Government, community and the private sector" (NIC 2010). The PA, seen as a political tool of the PAP for consolidating power through ethnic and social management during the immediate post-independence years (Mauzy and Milne 2002), has adopted a new role in light of immigration challenges. The PA dates back to the pre-independence period when it was established to encourage ethnic and religious integration among the pioneer immigrant groups represented in Singapore. Over the years, as ethnic integration progressed, the significance of the PA and its community centers waned until it was revived to take on the new role of integrating new immigrants into the social fabric of immigrant Singapore.

At the policy level, migrant adaptation is managed in a multicultural framework. Singaporean multiculturalism (or multiracialism, as it is known officially) is upheld as a founding tenet to guide social interaction. When the PAP was elected into government in 1965, it saw that maintaining racial harmony and social stability was essential for Singapore to thrive economically. The Singaporean government had inherited from British colonialism and the Federation of Malaya a plural mixture of immigrant populations (primarily from China and India) that lived alongside the indigenous Malay and mixed-race Eurasians. Singapore adopted an acculturation model of integration (Yap 2014) in which different ethnic groups in the country were encouraged to preserve their distinctive cultures and ethnic identities but to respect the social differences in Singapore and subscribe to its civic values (e.g. meritocracy and the rule of law). The multicultural ethos was incorporated into laws and policies, such as constitutional recognition for racial equality, an ethnic quota on housing estates and the bilingual program in schools. Integration in the context of Singaporean society focused on interethnic assimilation during the immediate post-independence period. The classification of ethnic groups is known popularly as the CMIO (Chinese, Malay, Indian and Others) model (Chua 2003).

However, multiculturalism has been criticized in Singapore and elsewhere for compartmentalizing complex and fluid ethnic identifications

into overarching racial classifications. Contemporary immigration presents new challenges to the multiculturalism model premised on the CMIO categories. The CMIO model glosses over intraethnic differences within individual categories (e.g. Singaporean-Chinese compared with mainland Chinese) while simultaneously lending support to expectations that new immigrants will acculturate to a model of interethnic relations that assumes stable intraethnic relations (see Ho 2017). Inasmuch as the Singaporean state cultivates a project of integration that steers immigrants toward the goal of being accepted in Singaporean society (see Rahman and Kiong 2013), how do newer cohorts of immigrants perceive integration in a context where earlier plural immigrant cultures have meshed into a national fabric, as in the case of Singapore?

Integration from the Perspective of New Chinese Immigrants

Characteristics of New Immigration from China to Singapore

New immigration has introduced greater complexity into managing multiculturalism in Singapore in two ways. First, the range of cultural diversity found in Singapore today (in terms of both ethnicity and nationalities) exceeds the categorizations under the CMIO model. Second, within the category of 'Chinese' there have been new cohorts of immigrants who share the same ethnicity but embody cultural traits perceived to be distinct from coethnics who identify themselves as 'Singaporean' on the basis of birthplace and national identity. Chinese-Singaporeans trace their ancestry to coastal provinces in China, such as Fujian, Guangdong and Hainan, whereas new Chinese immigrants come from a greater range of places. Other aspects of stratification differentiate the diverse group of new Chinese immigrants, including dialects and socioeconomic characteristics.

The Singaporean government implemented several pro-immigration schemes during the 1990s. China became a key market for recruitment drives by the Ministry of Education, which offered scholarships to outstanding foreign students who would then be contractually bound to work in Singapore for a stipulated number of years after graduating. The Singaporean government liberalized "employment pass" (EP) procedures (processed by the Ministry of Manpower) to enable successful applicants to apply for permanent residency status if they fulfilled the residency requirement and

other criteria (processed by the Immigration and Checkpoints Authority). Since 2004 there has been a business visa scheme, Entrepass, popular with new Chinese immigrants who have the business experience and start-up capital required by the Singaporean immigration criteria (MOM 2016). Such schemes targeting wealthy immigrants have since been extended to investors through the Global Investor Program (GIP) (Contact Singapore 2015). Like the highly skilled immigrants, both entrepreneurs and global investors are eligible to apply for permanent residency status. Successful applications are contingent on a range of factors such as income, assets, educational qualifications, professional skills and age (see Table 5.1). Previously it was considered fairly easy for such immigrants to progress to permanent residency status, but in recent years the Singaporean government has raised the bar and this is reflected in the declining number of approvals.

At the lower end of the skills spectrum, China was, and continues to be, one of the main source countries from which construction and manufacturing industries in Singapore recruited foreign workers (through "work permits" processed by the Ministry of Manpower) (Yeoh and Lin 2013). Unlike skilled foreigners on EPs, low-skilled foreigners thus employed cannot apply for permanent residency. There is a separate category of "S-pass" workers for professionals whose qualifications and salary levels are lower than those of foreigners eligible for EPs but higher than those of work permit holders. S-pass holders are able to apply for permanent residency but are considered on a competitive basis. A "study mothers" (*peidu mama*) visa scheme allows mothers to accompany young children studying in Singapore. Under this scheme, the mothers are allowed to work only after a year in Singapore and restricted to selected service sectors (owing to earlier instances of alleged sex work done by study mothers) (Huang and Yeoh 2005). Although this chapter focuses on new Chinese immigrants who qualify for permanent residency and citizenship through the EP, investor or entrepass categories, the negative stereotypes associated with study mothers and S-pass or work permit holders were evoked by participants in the study as a basis on which they reflected on their experiences of integration and the social prejudice they encountered in their interactions with Singaporeans. The next section discusses the attitudes that the research participants expressed toward integration.

Table 5.1 Routes for the immigration of professionals, entrepreneurs, and investors

Schemes	*Criteria*
Employment pass	**1. Employment pass** • Foreigners who earn a fixed monthly salary of at least \$3300 and possess good university degrees, professional qualifications or specialist skills. (w.e.f. January 2017, new EP applicants will have to earn a fixed monthly salary of \$3600 or more, depending on their qualifications and experience) **2. Personalised employment pass** • High-earning existing Employment Pass holders with a fixed monthly salary of at least \$12,000; OR • An overseas foreign professional with a fixed monthly salary of at least \$18,000
Business Visa: Singapore Entrepreneur pass (EntrePass from 2004)	• Foreigners who owns 30% shareholding of a company that is less than six-months old, and with a minimum \$50,000 paid-up-capital • Sponsored by a well-established Singapore company; OR have obtained a Banker's Guarantee of \$3000 by a Singapore bank • Fulfil at least one out of the following innovative conditions: – Funded by a government-accredited venture capitalist or business angel – Holds an intellectual property – Has research collaboration with A*STAR or higher institution in Singapore – The company is an incubatee at a Singapore Government-supported incubator
Global Investor Program (GIP) (from 2004)	• An investor with at least 3 years of entrepreneurial or business track record, and is interested to start up a business or invest in Singapore • May apply for the approval-in-principal Singapore Permanent Residence status (PR) through the GIP. Choosing either investment options: Option A: Invest at least \$2.5 million in a new business entity or to expand an existing business operation; Option B: Invest at least \$2.5 million in a GIP fund that invests in Singapore-based companies

Source: Authors' own data derived from Contact Singapore (2015) and Ministry of Manpower (2016)

Attitudes of New Chinese Immigrants toward Integration

Despite being a country where most people are of Chinese ethnicity, Singapore has acquired a unique cultural blend as a result of its multicultural ethos. For new Chinese immigrants, this means understanding not only the history and culture of the country but also the social characteristics that guide people's cultural interactions, or participating in activities with "elements of Singaporean culture" (Zhong, male, naturalized citizen). The new Chinese immigrants interviewed saw integration as a process of adaptation to "avoid conflicts with the local culture" (Li Li, female, naturalized citizen) or in "getting along with the locals" (Heather, female, naturalized citizen). Several said that immigrating to Singapore means accepting the values and norms of multiculturalism and meritocracy, seen as founding tenets of Singaporean identity. Both values are tied to the national narrative of how the plural cultural groups found in the country are to be treated equally. Historically, the emphasis on these values has to be understood in the context of the *bumiputra* policy in neighboring Malaysia, which privileges the indigenous Malays and others. It was the difference in political approaches upheld by the Singaporean and Malaysian leadership toward ethnic diversity that led to the separation of Singapore from the Federation of Malaya in 1965. Values of meritocracy and multiculturalism espoused in Singapore resonated with the new Chinese immigrants. As Ma Ning (female, permanent resident), who has lived in Singapore since 1991, put it, "I am a Chinese national; I am not born in Singapore nor did I grow up here. Yet when I step[ped] into society, the place that offered me all the [opportunities] is Singapore."

Some interviewees said that when they first arrived they sought entry into Singaporean society by participating in the activities of Chinese associations, and several remain active in the new Chinese associations formed by new Chinese immigrants like themselves. Inadvertently, this channels them into narrowly defined and predominantly Chinese social networks, even though Singapore is a country characterized by ethnic diversity. The new Chinese associations are closely associated with emigration from mainland China since 1979, whereas the established or pioneer Chinese clan associations trace their historical emergence to an earlier wave of immigration during colonial times. The new Chinese immigrants come from a more diverse range of provinces in mainland China than the earlier wave. As Montsion (2014) suggests, the temporal qualities of Chineseness differ across these different types of Chinese association. The pioneer Chinese clan

associations, such as the Hokkien Huay Kuan, seek to preserve their dialect roots among a younger generation of Westernized Chinese-Singaporeans. Like the PA, the significance of the pioneer clan associations as a tool of social cohesion waned as Singaporean society matured, but, through the renewed immigration from mainland China, some associations seek a new role—one of helping to integrate the newcomers (see also Yeoh and Lin 2013; Montsion 2014).

Meanwhile, the new clan associations formed by post-1979 Chinese immigrants aspire to build links to Singaporean society by partnering the pioneer Chinese clan associations and other Singaporean organizations or institutions through their activities. Their mandate is to provide a platform for members to interact with one another and get to know Singaporean society better. The route toward integration taken by both types of association arguably chimes with government-led integration. Both types of clan association work closely with Singaporean government agencies or members of the political elite to aid integration. Such associations facilitate the entry of Singaporean businesses into the mainland Chinese market. Reflecting on her participation in one of the new associations, An Ni (female, naturalized citizen) said:

> Why we come together in this association is different from the motivation of early immigrants when they joined the clan associations back then. These early immigrants they may face difficulties in their lives, and when they first came to a new place they [...] needed to seek help. As for today's new Chinese immigrants, these people they have good background, they are well educated, equipped with professional skills so [...] their motivation to join a social organisation is beyond issues of bread and butter, they seek to have emotional and social interaction with others, yes. [Our association] is part of the Singapore Federation of Chinese Clan Association, which has joined multiple talks organised by the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, and even hosted Chinese officials from the PRC Qiaoban. It also introduces and links up entrepreneurs from both China and Singapore. It serves its role as a bridge (*qiaoliang*) between the two countries.

The interviews suggest that several of the new Chinese clan associations seek to forge close links with the Singaporean political elites, and to channel integration efforts through government-led initiatives such as the activities of the PA or by inviting ministers and members of parliament as guests of honor at their events. However, the close links between new Chinese immigrants and the ruling political party have triggered speculation in

Singaporean social media that the pro-immigration policy gives the PAP an electoral advantage since new citizens are more likely to cast their votes in its favor (e.g. TR Emeritus 12 September 2015). The predominance of new Chinese immigrants in Singapore compared with other immigrant groups has also led to claims that the government uses this policy to retain the Chinese majority in the Singaporean population, thus entrenching Chinese privilege over that of the minority groups. This argument, however, overlooks the intraethnic distinction between coethnics, who consider themselves locally born and bred Chinese-Singaporeans, and the post-1979 new Chinese immigrants. Another distinction is between new Chinese immigrants who arrived in the 1990s as skilled workers (emphasizing educational levels and skills) and the later cohort whose members entered as entrepreneurs or investors. This periodization corresponds with changes in mainland China, from a low-income developing country before and during the 1990s to a middle-income developing country from early 2000 onward.

Seeking entry into Singaporean society through the Chinese clan associations limits the extent to which new Chinese immigrants socialize with wider Singaporean society. Singaporeans who participate in Chinese clan associations, even pioneer associations, are a minority. Young Chinese-Singaporeans, in particular, communicate in English or Singlish and are socially distant from the Chinese traditions and customs through which the pioneer clan associations tend to organize their activities. Although they learn Mandarin as a second language as a result of the bilingual educational policy, English or Singlish is still the lingua franca. This also means that their ability to communicate or socialize with new Chinese immigrants is limited. New Chinese immigrants said that they had very few social interactions with non-Chinese Singaporeans, such as Malays, Indians and Eurasians.

Coethnic Tensions and Social Prejudice Experienced by New Chinese Immigrants

Despite the integration policies that seek to bridge the social differences, intraethnic distinctions exist between new Chinese immigrants and Singaporean-Chinese, together with interethnic distinctions with regard to other ethnic groups in Singapore. New Chinese immigrants feel that their inability to express themselves effectively in English or Singlish affects their integration. They are less confident interacting with English- or Singlish-speaking Singaporeans and have few opportunities to interact with non-Chinese Singaporeans. They acknowledge the usefulness of

speaking the Chinese dialects represented in Singapore in order to communicate with older Singaporeans. The older generation of Chinese still communicate in dialects such as Cantonese or Hokkien, rather than English or Mandarin. These dialects are different from those that the new Chinese immigrants speak since many come from other parts of China. An Ni said, for example, that:

> I think that language is a very huge factor [. . .] I really admire Singaporeans because they are quite talented with languages. I mean quite a number of Singaporeans can use Chinese to communicate, at the same time they can also speak different dialects such as Cantonese, Hokkien etc. Take myself for example, I think language is a problem for me. Back in China I can take up the role of an emcee, but in Singapore I cannot, this is because I do not know dialect. If you do not know dialect, it creates a distance between you and the audience (especially those uncles and aunties). Hence, I feel that language poses a huge challenge to integration. When you are with a group of people, okay maybe we can still communicate in English, but once they switch to dialect there is no way we can still communicate. In Singapore if I do not open my mouth, people will assume that I am a local Singaporean. However once I start to talk, my [Mandarin] accent gives me away. So I think because of our accent problem, it discourages new Chinese immigrants from taking the initiative to meet locals.

This passage highlights not only the structural aspects of language ability but also the social prejudice that new Chinese immigrants face in Singapore. An Ni's reference to "accent" signals the social stereotypes that Singaporeans, especially Chinese-Singaporeans, project onto new Chinese immigrants.

Li Li, who used to attend karaoke sessions at the community center (under the PA) in an attempt to get to know local Singaporeans, observed that older Singaporean women (known in local parlance as "aunties") in the classes exhibited a mild prejudice towards younger women from mainland China:

> When I spoke my accent gave me away. My fellow classmates (aunties) were still quite polite to not harp on this. [. . .] At least Singaporeans try to be courteous and still try to take care of me. Maybe I am sensitive but you can sense from the very minute details that they may be judging you. They would ask me why do I have time to attend the classes, and given my young age and I am a female why do I come over? While they try to probe and ask in a polite manner, and they asked these out of curiosity, I feel that there is some form of prejudice and stereotype.

The prejudice that Li Li described refers to the negative stereotypes Singaporeans associate with younger women from mainland China, whom they see as "husband snatchers." Heather, also a female immigrant, said:

> As an immigrant, I devote myself to this country. I work hard all the way [...] Sometimes when people kept saying, you Chinese etc. [...] When they hear my accent, they question me on my standard of living and whether I married a local [...] To them my identity as a Chinese woman, I am here to take advantage of the country. Even today, those old people who are 60-plus years old still have such stereotypes ingrained in them. They may still discriminate you.

In a separate interview, Ma Ning brought up this topic but added:

> To put it objectively, although Singapore is very good there are also middle aged men in Singapore who are not that decent [...] You know you have a family and you are old, why do you still look for young [mainland Chinese] women and give in to temptation because of their looks.

Another type of negative stereotype is the belief held by some Singaporeans that new Chinese immigrants come from a less "developed" country, or that, even if China has advanced economically, mainland Chinese nationals still fail to behave in a "civilized" way. As the pioneer Chinese immigrants improved their lives in the 1980s and early 1990s alongside economic growth in Singapore, their kin and village networks in China lagged behind. The pioneers project old impressions onto the new immigrants. Recalling her experience in the late 1990s when she first relocated to Singapore, Ma Ning said:

> For instance when I first came here, I was living in a HDB [...] My neighbours would ask if I have any pigs at home, and if I ever owned a pair of leather shoes. It was my own house already, so upon hearing such questions [...] At that time I would feel like they are asking stupid questions, but [...] When you think back on this, you have to ponder [...] Firstly, the [HDB residents] do not belong to upper class of society, they may have never gone travelling, so perhaps they do not know how China has developed. That means they do not have any malicious intent when they ask us this [...] When they ask you such questions, they do not know they are just curious. So I just respond and explain to them how China is like now.

Another interviewee, Betty (female permanent resident), said much the same, but added that it is different for younger Singaporeans:

> [Singaporeans who do not know China] tell me they been to China in the past [. . .] Some of them still think that China is mainly sustained by agriculture [. . .] The funniest thing was one of my mother's friends even asked if our house is still farming [. . .] Our family has been detached from the agricultural way of life for such a long time, but many of them still hold an outdated view that China is a country sustained by agriculture [. . .] Maybe because in their minds, China is still a backward country, after all in the olden days the older generation did perceive China as like that. But after a while [. . .] Youngsters who were born in the 1980s and 1990s they feel that China is getting stronger. Some even ask me why I come here, because China is developing so well now and I can go back!

The social prejudice toward coethnics described by Betty is not unusual in the wider context of intraethnic tensions studied elsewhere in the world (e.g. Tsuda 2009; Ho 2013). However, such studies have tended to focus on ethnic "return" migration, whereas the structural and social features of intraethnic tensions discussed here are brought forth by the policies of capitalist nation-states that seek to court human capital and financial capital through immigration.

Although the image that China projects today differs markedly from that of its rural past, another stereotype has come to be projected onto new Chinese immigrants. This has to do with the newfound wealth of the entrepreneur and investor migrants that Singapore started to attract after the Entrepass visa was launched in 2004, together with the later GIP visa. Wealthy migrants purchase luxurious apartments or landed property in housing districts coveted by aspiring middle-class Singaporeans. Incidents such as a horrific car crash involving a Ferrari driven by a *fu-erdai* (second-generation wealthy Chinese) draw the ire of the Singaporean public toward what they consider ostentatious behavior by new immigrants (see Yeoh and Lin 2013 for the public responses to this incident). The dual nature of the stereotypes associated with the socioeconomic status of the new Chinese immigrants also signal distinctions within the wider category generally referred to as 'new Chinese immigrants.'

Cohort Distinctions among New Chinese Immigrants

Deepening the variegations of the Chinese diaspora found in Singapore are cohort distinctions drawn by the new Chinese immigrants themselves, who

consider those who arrived in the 1990s (*lao xinyimin*) to be different from those who arrived from the mid-2000s onwards (*xin xinyimin*). The earlier cohort moved to Singapore as educational and skilled migrants and they differentiated their experiences of integration from the later cohort of entrepreneurs and investor migrants, as well as from the skilled migrants who left China after its economic boom. Zhong reflects thus:

> [First] the earlier cohort of new Chinese immigrants definitely have a better understanding than those new Chinese immigrants who just came. Secondly, I think the difference in age is quite significant too. It is essentially two different generations of immigrants who are coming to Singapore, and differences already exist in their background and how they are being brought up. Even as you are speaking about Chinese immigrants, those who came twenty years ago, and those who came five years ago, they are very different people. If you put these two groups of people back in China's setting, differences still exist between them. This is with reference to their education background, economic background and the influences they have when growing up.

The earlier cohort of new Chinese immigrants arrived as students on scholarships or as skilled professionals. Their socioeconomic status was modest compared with that of the later arrivals, who came as entrepreneurs or investors. Several new Chinese immigrants who arrived in the 1990s said they lived in HDB estates when they first arrived (many continue to do so) and found this to be helpful in interacting with local Singaporeans. Echoing similar views, Jia Jia (female, permanent resident) said:

> I have some new Chinese immigrant friends, they took such a long time to integrate despite having the chance to interact and be exposed to the Singapore society. A lot of them always fall back on the thought of how life used to be like [in China], and how life has changed over here [in Singapore]. Yes, when they feel this, it impedes them from integrating easily […] These people may be well taken care of at home, so their parents' influence is very strong. Maybe people of my generation, our parents cared for us but not to such a large extent. We have to sort out a lot of things for ourselves, especially after we graduate from university. Now it is not like that, now the parents take care of everything for them! As such the mentality and beliefs of their parents will have some influence on them, but for our generation we are the ones who influence our parents! Another thing is […] These people when they are back in China, a lot of times their conditions are really different from ours. A lot of times money is a form of power, so they may feel that they are rich [and powerful].

This discussion underlines the heterogeneity of the Chinese population in Singapore, suggesting that social distinctions exist not only between Chinese-Singaporeans and the new Chinese immigrants, but also among new Chinese immigrants. The earlier cohort of new Chinese immigrants maintain that they made a stronger effort to integrate into Singaporean society through their work and housing choices, as well as the local schools they sent their children to (entrepreneurs or investors can afford to have their children educated in private schools known locally as "international schools"). Such social distinctions are tied to policies that have attracted new Chinese migrants from different socioeconomic backgrounds across the decades, as well as to the changing social and economic conditions of emigration in rising China.

Conclusion

In this chapter we have examined the attitudes and platforms for integration used by new Chinese immigrants. We have focused on those who have become permanent residents or citizens. The chapter signals how, alongside social transformations in China, the immigration policies of the Singaporean government paved the way for distinct types of People's Republic of China immigrants to move to Singapore in order to meet the labor or investment needs of the country. Both factors have contributed to deepening the cleavages within the Chinese diaspora in Singapore. Far from being a homogeneous category, the new Chinese immigrants are stratified by socioeconomic status, type of employment, place of origin and period of immigration, which in turn determines the type of visa they have and their routes to permanent residency or citizenship.

The chapter highlights the emic labels that different cohorts of new Chinese immigrants use to frame their experiences of immigration and integration. Corresponding to the immigration policies of the 1990s is an older cohort of new Chinese immigrants who arrived mainly as students or skilled professionals and then remained in Singapore. The immigration policies after 2004 attracted wealthier skilled immigrants, entrepreneurs and global investors who belong to the upper-middle or upper socioeconomic strata. This chapter has shown how the Chinese diaspora in Singapore is stratified in terms of (1) the migrants' own social and economic backgrounds and (2) the policies developed by the Singapore government in its pursuit of a global competitive advantage. The distinct timeframes

described correspond to transformations in China's economy and politics that in turn have an impact on the attitudes of Chinese immigrants toward the country of immigration.

The *lao xinyimin* say that they adapted to Singapore by living in HDB flats on estates alongside Singaporeans. They are more likely to have achieved upward social mobility by starting in lower-paying jobs and working in the same places as Singaporeans. The later cohort of *xin xinyimin* came with the financial means to purchase private property (or HDB in more expensive housing estates). They are more likely to start their own businesses servicing mainland Chinese clientele in Singapore or China, and they retain other business operations in China. This means that their interactions with Singaporeans through housing or employment networks are more limited. The later new Chinese immigrants now have a range of newly established Chinese associations and friendship networks (distinct from the pioneer clan associations) to join. For the older cohort, this was not the case during the 1990s, and they were more likely to seek integration and widen their Singaporean social networks through voluntary associations. Nonetheless, they believe that, as first-generation immigrants, their inclusion in Singaporean society will always be deemed partial, even though they belong to the majority-ethnic group. They retain their identification as mainland Chinese together with Singaporean permanent residency or citizenship status, a sign of their transnational identification alongside an aspiration to integrate.

New Chinese diasporic identity is characterized by the simultaneous negotiation of orientations towards both the ancestral land and the adopted country. Inasmuch as new Chinese immigrants seek to localize in Singapore, their assumption that they can integrate into a multicultural society while interacting predominantly with fellow Chinese immigrants or Singaporean-Chinese may differ from the expectations of the wider society, which envisages integration into a multicultural society that includes cultural interactions. This chapter also shows how successive episodes of Chinese immigration create new axes of differentiation and tension among coethnics. The development of contemporary or new Chinese diasporas reflects a variegated landscape characterized by the multiple layers of attachment that diasporic descendants and new immigrants forge with the countries in which they claim belonging and citizenship.

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CHAPTER 6

Chinese Migrant Communities in South Korea: Old Huaqiao, Chaoxianzu and *Xin Yimin*

Changzoo Song

Introduction

As elsewhere in today's globalized world, South Korea has acquired a growing number of foreign residents since the 1990s. South Korea was a major source country for emigrants until the 1990s, but it made the transition to a country of immigration in the early 1990s (Park 1994), when immigrants came to outnumber emigrants. A large number of unskilled laborers from less developed Asian countries migrated to South Korea to take advantage of higher wages and better employment opportunities. Many migrant brides also settled in the country as spouses of South Korean citizens. As a result, there are now more than two million foreigners in the country, comprising 3.9 % of the whole population. Given that several Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries have a foreign-born population of more than 10 % (OECD 2016), South Korea's 3.9 % does not seem to be particularly high. Nevertheless, this is a remarkable development in light of Korea's vaunted ethnic "homogeneity." In 2006, South Korea officially declared itself a "multicultural" society.

More than half (nearly a million, or 50.6 %) of South Korea's 2 million foreign residents are from China. Chinese outnumber the second largest group of foreign residents—Americans, who make up just 7.8 % of all

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foreigners in the country—by a factor of seven. The 1 million Chinese in South Korea include some 650,000 Chaoxianzu (*Chosŏnjok* in Korean: ethnic Koreans who are citizens of the People's Republic of China), and the rest are mostly Han Chinese, who arrived largely after the 1992 normalization of diplomatic relations between China and South Korea. The latter are so-called *xin yimin* (new Chinese migrants), as distinct from the old Huaqiao migrants (cf. Rhee 2009).

The old Huaqiao are descendants of early Chinese migrants who started settling in the country in the early 1880s, as followers of the Qing troops sent by Li Hongzhang. Many were from Shandong, close to the Korean peninsula. These old Huaqiao have maintained their culture and identity despite the turbulent times they have lived through. They have been engaging in trade, particularly catering, for more than a century. Though their numbers were never large (always fewer than 100,000, and today just 25,000), they have had an important cultural impact, especially in the culinary field.

The Chaoxianzu migrants, who make up the great majority of Chinese migrants in South Korea, are mostly from the three northeastern provinces of Jilin, Heilongjiang and Liaoning. Being ethnically Korean and familiar with Korean culture and language, they have advantages over other migrants. South Korean government policy, though criticized for its inconsistent and discriminatory treatment of the Chaoxianzu until recently, has granted them a privileged status regarding jobs and entry visas. The majority came to South Korea as migrant workers, brides and students, and recently as business people and professionals.

The Han Chinese *xin yimin* in South Korea number nearly 350,000 and are a substantial part of the migrant population. Many came to South Korea as laborers seeking jobs and higher wages. After 2000, however, increasing numbers have arrived as brides, students, professional workers, business people, and even wealthy retirees. Together with the growing number of tourists from China, these *xin yimin* are having a big impact on the host society's economy and culture.

Though these three groups of Chinese migrants in today's South Korea—the old Huaqiao, Chaoxianzu and *xin yimin*—are all "Chinese," they differ in migration patterns, ways of adaptation, cultural style and degree of transnationality. The old Huaqiao, who have been living in South Korea for generations and in many cases have dual citizenship (of Korea and the Republic of China [ROC]), are quite different from the *xin yimin*, who started arriving in the 1990s. The Chaoxianzu are also

distinguished from the *xin yimin* in many regards, including their status as "ethnic Korean" and their knowledge of the Korean language and culture, which privileges them to some extent with regard to immigration and employment.

This chapter explores the migration and adaptation patterns, transnationality, and social, economic and cultural impact these historically, culturally and socioeconomically diverse groups of Chinese residents have had on their host society's culture and economy since 1992. It addresses three main questions: How do the new Chinese migrations to South Korea differ from that of the old Huaqiao? How do the *xin yimin* and Chaoxianzu adapt to work and life in South Korea? And what impact do the *xin yimin* have on the cultural and social landscape of South Korea?

By exploring these questions, this chapter seeks to deepen our understanding of the lives of the *xin yimin* and their rapidly growing cultural, social and economic influence in South Korea.

Chinese Migrations to South Korea

As mentioned, the number of foreign residents in South Korea grew significantly after the 1990s. Though some professionals and businessmen were among this surge, the growth was mostly the result of an influx of migrant workers from less developed Asian countries. Foreign workers started to migrate to South Korea after the Seoul Olympics in 1988, and their numbers continued to grow through the 1990s and on. The normalization of diplomatic relations between China and South Korea in 1992 brought about a large Chinese influx, including Chaoxianzu, which is also related to the changes within China on emigration (cf. Nyiri 2001).

This changed South Korea from a major migrant-sending country into a migrant-receiving one (Park 1994). Behind this increase in the number of foreign workers was the country's rapid industrial growth through the 1970s and 1980s, which caused labor shortages and wage increases. Small and medium-sized companies were feeling the labor shortage acutely by the end of the 1980s and their demand for foreign workers grew. The labor shortage pushed the South Korean government to launch the Industrial Trainee System in 1991, which promoted an influx of cheap labor, especially from less developed Asian countries, including China. In 2005 there were about 800,000 foreigners in the country, and by 2007 the number exceeded a million. According to the Korean Ministry of Justice, in 2016



Fig. 6.1 The growth in the number of foreign residents in South Korea, 2005–2015 (Source: Korean Immigration Bureau (www.immigration.go.kr))

the number of foreign residents exceeded 2 million, or 3.9 % of the population (Ministry of Justice 2016). Figure 6.1 shows the rapid and continuous growth in the number of foreigners in the country from 2005 to 2015.

One of the first groups to arrive in South Korea as migrant workers were ethnic Koreans from China. In the late 1980s, the first groups of Korean Chinese arrived in South Korea to visit relatives, on short-term visas. This followed a much larger influx of Korean Chinese visitors, who subsequently settled in South Korea as migrant workers, both legally and illegally. The 1992 normalization of diplomatic relations between China and South Korea brought about a huge increase in the number of both Chaoxianzu and *xin yimin* migrant workers. Their numbers continued to grow over the next two decades. Figure 6.2 shows the increase in the number of Chinese residents in South Korea in the decade starting in 2007, which exceeded a million in 2016. As mentioned, more than half of the 2 million foreign residents in South Korea are Chinese.



Fig. 6.2 The growth in the number of Chinese residents in South Korea, 2007–2016 (Source: Korea Immigration Service (www.immigration.go.kr))

Earlier Waves: The Old Huaqiao

The first group of Chinese migrants to enter Korea in modern history were the Huaqiao, who formed a small but important community beginning in the early 1880s. They are the descendants of the Chinese merchants who followed the Qing troops to Inchŏn in 1882, when Korea was opening up and foreign powers were competing for influence in this geopolitically important country. By 1889 more than 1000 Chinese were in Korea. Chinese merchants and traders formed a prominent network and their commercial activities expanded widely. They competed with Japanese merchants and traders until Korea was colonized by Japan in 1910.

Though the commercial activities of these Huaqiao decreased dramatically with the Japanese occupation of Korea, Chinese migrants were still active in certain trades, such as catering and commerce. The number of Huaqiao in Korea increased continuously throughout the colonial period. Some Chinese business people in Japan's Chinatowns followed the Japanese to Korea in search of new business opportunities. It seems that the Huaqiao in Japan and Korea in those days were as transnational as their coethnics in other countries. Table 6.1 shows how their number grew almost seven-fold between 1911 and 1942. It was at this time that the Chinese invented popular foods such as champong by transforming the Japanized Chinese noodle soup ch'anpon they had sold in Japan (Chu 2009).

Table 6.1 Huaqiao population change, 1911–2015

Year	*Number of Huaqiao*
1911	11,837
1930	67,794
1940	63,976
1942	82,661
1950	17,443
1970	34,599
1992	24,414
2011	21,381
2015	21,806

Source: Annual Yearbook of Korea Immigration Office, 1985–1994, 1995–2005

With the outbreak of the Korean War (1950–1953) just five years after the end of the Pacific War (1945), the number of Huaqiao in Korea fell quickly from more than 80,000 at the end of the colonial period to fewer than 20,000 in 1950. As the situation in South Korea became more stable after the war, their numbers slowly revived and by 1970 they exceeded 30,000. Under Park Chung-Hee's military regime in South Korea, however, Huaqiao business activities were tightly controlled as the regime pursued an economic policy that drained Huaqiao capital (Choi 2001). Opening new businesses was restricted under Park's regime, so expanding the Huaqiao catering trade was very difficult.

As a result of the Cold War, Huaqiao were pushed to take up citizenship of the ROC even though most of South Korea's Huaqiao were originally from Shandong. According to the Chinese Residents Association in Seoul (http://www.craskhc.com/htm/sub0303.htm), about 90 % of Huaqiao have Taiwanese nationality. Many Huaqiao "returned" to Taiwan and, like many South Koreans of the time, a large number migrated to the USA. These out-migrations resulted in a reduction in their population in South Korea after the 1970s. Even when they migrated to countries such as the USA, they tended to settle around the Korean communities in their new host country because of their business and cultural connections to Koreans. Until recently it was not unusual to see Huaqiao-owned Korean-style Chinese restaurants in the Korean communities in Los Angeles and other US cities.[1]

The 1992 normalization of relations between South Korea and China brought the Huaqiao community new opportunities. The Huaqiao originally

from Shandong helped South Korean companies to expand and relocate to cities in Shandong in the 1990s, using their networks in China. The South Korean government wanted to revive the Chinatowns in the country to promote and deepen economic and cultural relationships with China (Yang & Yi 2004). Local governments in Inchŏn and Busan, where there had been well-established Huaqiao communities in the past, made efforts to rebuild the old and languishing Chinatowns. Thus the number of Huaqiao slowly began to grow, and the Chinatowns were rebuilt with impressive gates. Inchŏn's Chinatown has become a popular destination for Koreans as well as for foreign tourists, especially from Taiwan and Hong Kong. Though the Huaqiao community in South Korea is still small, with only about 25,000 people, the Chinatowns in South Korea are growing steadily.

The Influx of Chaoxianzu

As Cold War tensions eased in the late 1980s and diplomatic ties were restored between China and South Korea, migration between the two countries quickly increased. Ethnic Koreans from China's northeastern provinces, a community numbering nearly 2 million, arrived in large numbers. They had been cut off from South Korea during the Cold War and had a strong desire to visit their "ethnic homeland" in the late 1980s. At first they came to visit relatives in South Korea, but then they stayed on to engage in street peddling and other jobs. South Korean companies were experiencing labor shortages, especially manual labor, and there were many jobs for Korean-Chinese men and women visiting the country. The large wage gap between China and South Korea, and their familiarity with the Korean language and culture, were pull factors. There were also push factors: economic development in northeastern China was slower than in the country's coastal regions further south (Song 2009). The exodus of South Korea's small and medium-sized companies to China starting in the early 1990s helped Korean-Chinese who had worked in these companies in China to migrate to South Korea.

This migration of Chaoxianzu to South Korea was part of the "ethnic return migration" trend—peoples who have lived in foreign countries for more than a generation "returning" to their ethnic "homelands"—after the late 1980s. For example, ethnic Germans who had lived in Eastern Europe and in the former Soviet Union returned to their ethnic homeland as the Cold War came to an end, and especially after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Many Latin American ethnic Italians, Spaniards and Greeks

returned to their ancestral homelands in the 1990s, when the Latin American economy was performing poorly, especially by comparison with that of Western Europe. Ethnic Japanese in Brazil and Peru also returned to their ethnic homeland, where they could earn much higher wages. The large-scale migrations of Chaoxianzu "ethnic return" migrants is part of that trend, caused by global political and economic changes (Song 2014).

Of the nearly 1 million Chinese nationals in South Korea today, Chaoxianzu comprise more than 65 %. The great majority started by working in South Korea as manual workers: typically, men were construction workers and women were kitchen hands and domestic workers. Their knowledge of Korean gave them an advantage over other foreign workers, including Han Chinese. They normally earned more than other ethnic Korean workers (e.g. "Soviet" Koreans) who did not speak Korean well.

Being ethnic Koreans, Chaoxianzu had legal advantages over other foreign workers, and the South Korean government supported their visiting and working in South Korea. They could, and do, receive H-2 (Visitor Employment Visa) and F-4 (Overseas Koreans Visa) visas, which are for ethnic Koreans. Holders of the H-2 visa can work in South Korea, mainly in "unskilled" jobs. Holders of the F-4 visa are allowed to work in "skilled" jobs and to renew their stay continuously. The F-4 visa was first issued in 1999 to attract ethnic Koreans overseas to invest in South Korea. Initially, Korean-Chinese were not given this visa, both because of the possible labor market disturbance and because of objections from the Chinese government. From 2008, however, Korean-Chinese were allowed to use this visa. The visa does not allow its holders to engage in manual work, in which many Chaoxianzu are employed. Thus the great majority of Chaoxianzu in South Korea hold H-2 visas. As of 2016, about 257,700 Chaoxianzu people hold an H-2 visa (Korea Immigration Service).

Many Chaoxianzu women came to South Korea as international brides in the 1990s and 2000s. Like Japan and Taiwan, South Korea had become an "importer" of international brides by the 1990s. In the mid-2000s, nearly 15 % of all marriages in South Korea were between Koreans and foreigners. As a country that had long boasted about its racial or ethnic homogeneity, this was unprecedented. When the need arose for foreign brides, especially among older bachelors in rural areas, ethnic Koreans were preferred and Chaoxianzu were considered the best option (cf. Freeman 2011). The phenomenon began at the end of the 1980s, when local governments in South Korea promoted match-making between rural bachelors and potential brides in Yanbian (the Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture in Jilin,

China). As a result of this scheme, and others promoted by private marriage agencies, an increasing number of Korean-Chinese women from the ethnic-Korean community in China came to South Korea. The trend continued for the next 20 years, and today Korean-Chinese women form the majority of migrant brides. As shown in the Table 6.2 below, Chaoxianzu marriage migrants form the majority of international marriage migrants (nearly 40 % in 2009).

Recently, however, brides have been entering from countries such as Vietnam, Cambodia, the Philippines and Mongolia. The Table 6.3 below shows the number of Chaoxianzu in South Korea in the last ten years by gender, indicating how popular Han Chinese brides have become in South Korea.

While the earlier Chaoxianzu migrants tended to work as manual workers, the younger generation of Chaoxianzu are increasingly entrepreneurial and many work as professionals and businessmen in South Korea. Some work as tour guides, duty-free shop staff and translators. The increasing number of Chinese tourists in South Korea has created jobs there, and Chaoxianzu youths, who speak both Korean and Chinese, are in strong demand in tourism, marketing, entertainment and the medical sector.

The Migrations of **Xin Yimin**

As we have seen, *xin yimin* started coming to South Korea after the country normalized relations with China. Bilateral trade grew rapidly in the 1990s, and by 2004 China had become South Korea's biggest trading partner. Today the volume of trade between the two is more extensive than that between South Korea and the USA, and South Korea and Japan, combined. South Korea is China's third largest trading partner. As the two countries' economic and trade relationship has deepened, contact between their peoples has also increased.

For Han Chinese workers, South Korea was once a favorite destination, with lots of jobs and high wages. South Korean companies, which faced labor shortages and frequent labor disputes, needed cheap labor. In 1993 the government adopted the Industrial Trainee System, which allowed foreign workers to be "trained" by South Korean companies and to receive much lower pay than South Korean workers. In 1995 the government established the Employment Permit System, allowing foreign workers to be imported. As a result, increasing number of Chinese workers went to South Korea as manual workers. Many undocumented workers also

arrived. Beginning in the early 1990s, many of South Korea's small and medium-sized companies moved to China to exploit its cheaper labor. They hired local people, Chaoxianzu as well as Han Chinese, which ultimately encouraged Chinese migration to South Korea.

In South Korea, most Han Chinese migrant workers hold the E-9 (Employment Permit) visa for unskilled manual work. This is granted to workers from 15 countries, including China. The great majority of manual workers who hold this visa are from countries such as Myanmar, Cambodia and Indonesia, and a large number of Chaoxianzu also have one. However, official statistics suggest that the number of Han Chinese in this category is small. For example, 38,143 Chaoxianzu were issued this visa compared with just 8473 in 2015.[2]

The number of Chinese nationals in South Korea increased dramatically after 2000. Most entered as workers. Their number almost doubled from 2003 (237,497) to 2008 (559,711). Many were undocumented, and in 2008 some 18.2 % of Chinese nationals in South Korea were recorded as undocumented (Korea Immigration Service 2017). However, this number fell rapidly when the South Korean government started deporting them and giving potential migrant workers legal opportunities to work in the country.

Han Chinese migrant brides have entered South Korea in increasing numbers, especially since the late 2000s (Song et al. 2013). The South Korean marriage market changed sometime in the early 2010s, and South Koreans now tend to prefer non-Chaoxianzu brides (Song 2016). Table 6.2 shows how Han Chinese bride migration is increasing, while that of Chaoxianzu brides has been falling. Han Chinese marriage migrants outnumbered Chaoxianzu after the 2010s. Table 6.3 shows that there were more Han Chinese women than men in South Korea in 2014. This reflects the general feminization of international migration in recent times. Similar trends have been observed throughout the world.[3]

After the first decade of the new millennium there was a big influx of students from China. International students in South Korea have been steadily increasing in number since 2000. In 2001 the South Korean government established a plan to increase its international student population, reasoning that they help the economy and compensate for the country's brain drain (cf. ICEF 2015). As a result there was a rapid increase in the number of international students in South Korea through the 2000s. This was driven chiefly by Chinese students. More than 70 % of international students in South Korea are Chinese (Table 6.4). The number of Chinese students reached almost 60,000 in 2011, before which the rate of

Table 6.2 Chinese marriage migrants in South Korea, 2008–2015

Year	*Total marriage migrants in South Korea*	*All Chinese migrant brides*	*Chaoxianzu migrant brides*	*Non-Chaoxianzu (Han Chinese) migrant brides*
2008	144,385	67,787	35,707	32,080
2009	125,087	65,992	32,566	33,426
2010	141,654	67,019	31,664	35,355
2011	144,681	64,173	29,184	34,989
2012	148,498	63,035	27,895	35,140
2013	150,865	62,400	26,274	36,126
2014	150,994	60,663	24,604	36,059
2015	151,608	58,788	23,130	35,658

Source: Korea Immigration Service (www.immigration.go.kr)

Table 6.3 Chinese residents in South Korea by gender, 2014

Gender	*All Chinese*	*Chaoxinazu*	*Non-Chaoxianzu (Han Chinese)*
Male	449,733	310,364	139,369
Female	448,921	280,492	168,429

Source: Korea Statistics (2014)

increase in their numbers was 50–100 % a year (Hu 2012: 452). Some analysts say that this was a result of the slowdown in the Chinese economy and the rise in unemployment among young people, some of whom sought opportunities to study overseas (Hu 2012).

Table 6.5 shows that older age groups contain proportionately more Chaoxianzu, while younger age groups, especially people in their twenties and younger, contain more Han. This suggests that the Han Chinese population in South Korea consists predominantly of young students and perhaps their children.

An increasing number of transnational entrepreneurs have arrived from China. The new economic relationship between South Korea and China has encouraged entrepreneurs to explore each other's markets. Chinese enterprises are particularly prominent in real-estate development in South Korea. Since the late 2000s, large Chinese real-estate developers have been buying land and houses on Jeju Island, which allows them to reside in South Korea.

Table 6.4 Students from China

Year	*Total number of international students*	*Students from China/ (Korean Chinese)*	*Percent students from China*
2003	12,314	5607	N/A
2004	16,832	8960/(283)	N/A
2005	22,526	13,091/(779)	N/A
2006	32,557	20,080/(920)	47.0
2007	49,270	33,650/(1821)	75.3
2008	63,952	44,746	70.0
2009	75,850	53,461	70.0
2010	83,842	57,783	69.0
2011	89,537	59,317	66.0
2012	86,878	55,427	64.0
2013	85,923	50,343	58.6
2014	84,891	N/A	N/A
2015	91,332	54,214	59.4

Source: Republic of Korea Ministry of Education, Science, and Technology

Table 6.5 Han Chinese and Chaoxianzu residents in South Korea by age

Age Cohort (years)	*All Chinese (A)*	*Chaoxianzu (B)*	*Chaoxianzu (%)*
0–9	74,672	6159	8.2
10–19	19,184	1880	9.8
20–29	186,968	75,969	40.6
30–39	168,182	107,386	64.0
40–49	194,322	144,568	74.4
50–59	194,969	157,175	80.6
60 and older	110,377	97,739	88.6
Total number	948,674	590,876	62.3

Source: "Korea Statics: Chinese residents in South Korea by age groups" (2014)

Since 2014 Chinese entrepreneurs are investing more in land and buildings around the *xin yimin* Chinatowns in Seoul and other regions (Kim 2015). Much of this investment is for the development of Chinese tourism in South Korea. Consequently, growing numbers of Han Chinese professional workers, especially in the tourism sector, have started migrating to South Korea.

Life and Work in Korea

Both Chaoxianzu and Han Chinese *xin yimin* moved to South Korea initially as manual workers. Typically they worked in "3D" sectors (dirty, difficult, and dangerous), particularly in construction. Chaoxianzu and *xin yimin* are, however, in different positions because the former speak Korean while the latter do not. As a result, Chaoxianzu workers tend to get better jobs and earn more than their Han counterparts. Chaoxianzu migrants also have a better visa status than Han Chinese. This is due to South Korea's policy, which gives more privileges to ethnic Koreans to enter to the country and have jobs more easily than non-Korean migrants (Choe 2006; Song 2014). Nevertheless, both Chaoxianzu and Han Chinese tend to earn more than other foreign workers. *Xin yimin* manual workers are much more likely to take jobs shunned by others, including Chaoxianzu, such as in agriculture and fishing. These kinds of work usually attract higher pay because of the poor working conditions, and Han Chinese workers tend to prefer to work harder for higher pay.

The Han Chinese *xin yimin* and Chaoxianzu settlers in South Korea have formed a number of highly visible communities of their own in Seoul and Ansan in Gyeonggi Province. In Seoul, the Daerim-dong in the Yeongdeungpo-Gu area has quickly evolved into the largest and most visible *xin yimin* and Chaoxianzu community. Both areas used to be poor industrial zones where small and medium-sized light-industry factories were relocated in the 1970s. Until the early 1990s, South Korean workers in the nearby industrial towns lived there.

In the early 1990s, Chinese migrant workers (both Chaoxianzu and Han Chinese) started arriving in these areas, where housing was relatively cheap. In 2000, some 600 Chinese settled in the Daerim-dong area, and their numbers started to grow quickly. In 2002 there were more than 1000, and now there are more than 30,000, making Daerim-dong a well-established "Chinatown." Daerim-dong functions as the center for all kinds of services, businesses, restaurants and entertainment for both Chaoxianzu and Han Chinese (Baek 2016). It has recruitment centers, legal services, traditional Chinese medicine doctors, Han Chinese and Chaoxianzu news media, churches and financial institutes, together with karaoke bars, cafés and restaurants.

Xin yimin and Chaoxianzu in Daerim-dong made money in more or less the same way as in Chinatowns throughout the world, including through catering, which expanded from Daerim-dong to other parts of the country.

A noteworthy example is the lamb-skewer barbecue restaurant chains. Barbecued lamb skewers are a Uighur food, but they have been reinvented in Daerim-dong by the Chinese residents and have spread to other parts of the country. As the number of Chinese tourists to South Korea grows, many *xin yimin* are getting rich from tourism and marketing. Tourism creates much professional employment. *Xin yimin* and Chaoxianzu who become rich in Daerim-dong tend to move to other parts of Seoul in search of better living conditions and better business environments (Baek 2016). With the rapidly increasing number of Chinese students, Daerim-dong's entertainment sector has been re-energized. There are clear signs that old Chinatowns are reviving and new Chinatowns are established in many parts of South Korea (cf. Yang & Yi 2004).

Both Chaoxianzu and *xin yimin* workers, like most migrant workers in South Korea, face discrimination at work. Few South Koreans live alongside foreigners, and even though the country is now formally "multicultural," racial "homogeneity" is still a popular concept among South Koreans (Shin 2006). South Koreans tend to be suspicious of China and the Chinese, a legacy of the Cold War. The older generation are strongly anti-communist because of China's role in the Korean War. While the situation has improved, abused Chaoxianzu resent their treatment, which tends to strengthen their identity as Chinese (cf. Song 2009). In general, the treatment of foreign migrant workers in South Korea is still a problem and they, including some Han Chinese migrant workers, might develop anti-Korean sentiments (cf. Lim 2012).

Chinese residents of South Korea have formed a number of organizations, such as the Chinese Resident Association and the Association for Peace and Unity. These are officially recognized by the Chinese embassy in South Korea. Daerim-dong has emerged as the entertainment and shopping center for the ethnic and migrant Chinese population, many of whom gather there at weekends for Chinese-style entertainment.

The large number of Chinese tourists in South Korea also offers new opportunities to *xin yimin* and Chinese international students looking for new business opportunities. Chinese sales clerks work in many shops in Myŏngdong, and there are many others who work as tour guides on Jeju Island for Chinese customers. The popular internet portal, Fendou Zaihanguo (奋斗在韩国 www.icnkr.com), was established by Zhāng Jīnkǎi, who used to be a student in South Korea. Today the company hires many former Chinese students and offers helpful information about Korea to Chinese tourists, students and business people.

A small but increasing number of rich Chinese business people and retirees own expensive resort houses in Jeju Island and elsewhere. Unlike migrant workers, marriage migrants or international students, these individuals (known as *fùyīdài* 富一代, or first-generation *nouveau riche*) live in newly developed resort facilities with their families. This phenomenon began in 2010 when the South Korean government launched an investment scheme to attract wealthy foreigners. Local governments in South Korea used the policy to boost their economies, and now they offer various promotions. So far this scheme has attracted mostly Chinese, and large Chinese development companies have built resorts on Jeju Island and in other places. The migrants are mostly wealthy business people, many of whom keep their businesses in China and lead highly transnational lifestyles. In some cases, family members live in South Korea and the father of the family commutes between Korea and China. South Korea (including Jeju Island) is only one or two hours' flight from most large cities in China. These people find its clean air, safe environment and cultural affinities attractive.

Changing Cultural and Social Landscape

The *xin yimin* and Chaoxianzu migrants, like the early Huaqiao, have had a cultural and social impact on their host society. First, the rapid growth of the Chinese community within South Korea has given South Koreans the chance to interact directly with nearly a million Han Chinese and Chaoxianzu. This can cause fear and xenophobia, but it has also allowed South Koreans to understand contemporary Chinese society and culture.

Xin yimin and Chaoxianzu workers have contributed greatly to the economy of the country. Without them, the economy would have been less able to sustain itself. Another important impact of the *xin yimin* on South Korea is in the culinary sphere. Initially, Korean-style Chinese food such as chajangmyeon (noodle with fried black bean sauce) and champpong (hot chili noodle soup) were developed by the old Huaqiao. Today, contemporary Chinese food culture has been introduced by the *xin yimin*. New dishes have also been developed by *xin yimin* and Chaoxianzu, lamb skewers being a prime example. Originally a Uighur dish, lamb skewers have been "globalized" in the new Chinatowns in South Korea by Chaoxianzu migrants.[4]

Chinese students have brought about changes in South Korean universities and the country's entertainment culture. They have led South Korean

universities to adopt policies that are friendlier to foreign students. Many college neighborhoods now host “mini Chinatowns” (Mun and Pak 2016). Universities are surrounded by internet cafes and karaoke bars that cater to Chinese students. Often these small businesses are owned and run by *xin yimin*. In them, Chinese students enjoy up-to-date Chinese popular songs and internet games. Such places are not patronized by Koreans since everything in them is in Chinese.

According to a recent news report, the influence of Chinese students on intramural matters in Korean universities has also grown. Student leaders of Korean universities pay attention to Chinese students, who are present in sufficient numbers to make a difference in student elections. Korean student candidates running for election to student bodies often use slogans in Chinese to appeal to these voters. Chinese student representatives normally sit on student bodies (Mun and Pak 2016).

Another important outcome of the increasing Chinese presence in South Korea is the changes brought about in Daerim-dong, with its Chinatown. Daerim-dong and other areas of the Yŏngdŭngp’o District of Seoul have changed from typical working-class residential areas to burgeoning commercial hubs, thanks to the influx of Chaoxianzu and *xin yimin*. These areas function as catering and entertainment centers for Xinyimin and Chaoxinzu, especially at weekends. People with expensive cars drive up to this area every weekend, and wealthy *Xin yimin* and students from China enjoy the Chinese food and karaoke bars (Baek 2016).

Conclusion

Today, South Korea has many Chinese communities. The old Huaqiao communities in Inchŏn, Seoul and Busan have existed for more than a century. They are known for their contribution to the culinary culture of Korea. Starting in the 1990s, “new” Chinese migrants began arriving in South Korea in ever greater numbers. They included migrant workers, migrant brides and students. Many were Chaoxianzu who came to do manual work. Speaking Korean, they have come to occupy higher positions on the employment ladder. As ethnic Koreans, they have better access than other migrants to entry visas. Thus there are three big Chinese migrant communities in South Korea: the old Huaqiao, many of whom retain ROC citizenship; the Chaoxianzu community; and the “new” Chinese residents, who include migrant workers, students and migrant brides. In addition, there are an increasing number of wealthy Chinese businessmen and retirees

who live in newly built resort areas. These groups demonstrate the great diversity of the Chinese migrant community in South Korea.

The lifestyle of the Chinese in South Korea is increasingly transnational. Korean-Chinese move back and forth between South Korea and China. Han Chinese *xin yimin* are less transnational in this regard. However, as the number of Chinese students is increasing, and more Han Chinese stay on in South Korea after finishing their studies, we can expect that transnationality will be more and more a feature of *xin yimin* life in the future.

The increasing number of students of both countries crossing the Yellow Sea in both directions suggests that in future more Chinese (Han Chinese in particular) will work in South Korea, and more South Koreans in China. The twenty-first century will truly be an age of migration between the two countries.

The old Huaqiao, the Chaoxianzu and the *xin yimin* have all had a big cultural, economic and social impact on South Korea, and they continue to do so. The new prosperity and gentrification of Daerim-dong is an example of this influence.

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Notes

1. This was my own observation in Koreatowns in Los AngelesLos Angeles and New YorkNew York City in the 1990s and early 2000s.
2. This data is from South Korean Statistical Bureau. http://www.index.go.kr/potal/main/EachDtlPageDetail.do?idx_cd=1501

   The South Korean government distinguishes Korean–Chinese“Korean-Chinese” from “Chinese” in its immigration statistics. Thus we can safely assume that the “Chinese” category indicates that they are Han ChineseHan Chinese.
3. Chaoxianzu migrants are exceptional here, at least in South Korea, where many older people move to work so that they can support their children studying or working in China.
4. The highly transnational Chaoxianzu people have also spread this food to other parts of China and even Japan. In Shinokubo in Tokyo, where there are many Korean “newcomer” restaurantrestaurants businesses, there is a lamb-skewer restaurantrestaurants run by Chaoxianzu. Similarly, a Chaoxinzu businessman opened another such restaurantsrestaurant in the Nam an area of Osaka a few years ago.

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CHAPTER 7

The Formation and Development of the Contemporary Chinese Diaspora in Japan

Chunfen Shao

Introduction

Since 1978 there has been a surge of emigration from China to developed cities and regions around the world. Chinese migration is driving changes in the patterns of resettlement and integration of the migrants themselves and affecting transnational lifestyles and global citizenship. While transforming diasporic communities and host societies, it is also contributing to China's economic development (Shao 2009). It is thus crucial to understand the patterns, causes and consequences of this cross-border population movement and its relationship with economic and social changes (Hugo 2008; Li 2008; Roberts 2003; Shao 2014a).

There has been an exponential increase in the number of Chinese migrating to Japan. China's close neighbor has been an important destination for Chinese international migration since the mid-1980s. The Chinese community in Japan was for a long time the second largest ethnic community after the Korean community. Despite this, it was a small and stable ethnic community up until 1972 (Guo 1999). In 1978, Chinese nationals, including Taiwanese, in Japan numbered only 48,528, approximately 6.3 % of the foreign population

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(766,894). In 2007, Chinese (606,889) overtook Koreans (593,489) to become the largest group. Since then the gap between Chinese and Koreans has widened. In 2014 the population of Chinese in Japan reached 694,974. This marked a 14-fold increase compared with 1978 and represented 33 % of the total population of foreign nationals in 2014 (2,121,831).

Despite the increasing numbers migrating to Japan from China, new Chinese migration to Japan and the formation and development of a Chinese community in Japan is under-researched in migration studies and in the study of Chinese overseas. This chapter analyses statistical data on Chinese migration to Japan and examines patterns of cross-border movement and diasporic development among new Chinese migrants.[1] I address three questions: What are the distinctive characteristics of new Chinese immigration to Japan? In what ways is the Chinese community changing? And how does the continuing influx of new migrants affect the ethnic-Chinese community and the host society? I first describe the trends in new Chinese migration to Japan since 1978, dividing new Chinese migrants into three main subgroups. I then compare the current data with the data in the 1970s to examine the changes and transformation of the existing Chinese community and to discuss the impact of new international migration on the ethnic Chinese community as a whole. Lastly, I discuss the broader impact of Chinese immigration on the ethnic community, possible future trends, and the impact on local society in Japan and policy implications.

Recent Trends in Migration from the People's Republic of China to Japan

Historical Overview of Immigration to Japan

Traditionally, Japan was never a country of immigration. During China's "Reform and Opening-up" in 1978, Japan had just 766,894 foreign residents, including 659,025 (85.9 %) South and North Koreans, 48,528 (6.3 %) Chinese, 21,396 (2.8 %) Americans, 4511 (0.6 %) British and 33,434 (4.4 %) others. The Koreans and Chinese who migrated to Japan prior to World War II were mostly colonial immigrants. Japan has always welcomed foreign skills and technologies, but to protect Japanese "racial" purity and the sense of Yamato (Japanese) cultural homogeneity, the concept of *Wakon-yōsai* (Japanese spirit and Western techniques) was for a long time encouraged. However, since the early 1980s, Japan has started accepting large numbers of

international students, mainly to promote internationalization, enhance the country's international image and cultivate affection for Japan (Shao 1996, 2008). Around the mid-1980s, Japan experienced rapid economic development but was short of unskilled labor (owing to the native workforce's refusal to do dirty, dangerous and demeaning jobs) (Komai 2001; Mori 1997). To address this problem, it adopted a "side-door" policy and began to accept foreign labor in the guise of pre-college (*Shūgakusei*) and trainee programs, thereby allowing the government to adjust the length of visas and force foreigners to leave when the market no longer needed them (Zha 2003). Since the start of the 1990s, Japan has been accepting Japanese descendants born and raised abroad, known as *Nikkejin* (Japanese diaspora), in order to minimize the ethnic conflict that recruiting non-*Nikkejin* foreigners might unleash. The country has a severely aging population and an internationally low fertility rate, so it has no choice other than to open its doors a little in an attempt to meet labor-market needs. It thus increased the number of Filipino skilled immigrants, especially nurses. As of the end of 2014, the population of foreigners reached 2,121,831, nearly triple that in 1978. The Chinese are the largest group (33 %) with 694,974 people (654,777 from the mainland, 40,197 from Taiwan), followed by Koreans with 501,230, Filipinos with 217,585 and Brazilians with 175,410 (see Fig. 7.1).



Fig. 7.1 Foreign nationals in Japan by country (Source: Japanese Ministry of Justice)

Contemporary Chinese Immigration to Japan

International migration from China to Japan is not new. Even when Japan's door was closed, Chinese migrants engaged in trading, plus translating for and representing large firms. Since the establishment of the Sino-Japan Friendship Agreement in 1871, many Chinese have migrated to Japan. Until the end of World War II, a large number of Chinese from China, especially Taiwan, were sent to Japan as slave laborers (Guo 1999; Shao 2014a; Zhu 2003).

In examining contemporary Chinese migration to Japan up to 2014, this study identifies the following characteristics. First, it is a post-1978 phenomenon and is on a scale never before seen in Chinese history. Since the start of the Chinese Reforms, the number of visitors between China and Japan has steadily increased. Starting in 1990, the number of Chinese visitors has not only increased but the rate among new arrivals of foreigners has also risen markedly. In 1993, as shown in Fig. 7.2, the number of Chinese arrivals was 127,446. This increased to 1,140,579 in 2010. However, as a result of the global financial crisis, the East Japan earthquake and



Fig. 7.2 New arrivals of Chinese nationals to Japan, 1978–2014 (Source: Japanese Ministry of Justice)

nuclear-safety issues, this rise has not been steady but has adopted a W shape (Shao 2014b).

Second, Japan does not accept permanent settlers directly from overseas, unlike the USA and other countries (Shao 2014a). Contemporary Chinese immigration to Japan comes in three major types. The first is marriage and family migration, including "spouse or child of Japanese national" (*Nihonjin no haigūsha* 日本人の配偶者), "spouse or child of permanent resident" (*Eijyūsha no haigūsha* 永住者の配偶者), "long-term resident" (*Teijyūsha* 定住者) and "dependent" (*Kazoku taizai* 家族滞在). In 2014, 13,590 Chinese arrived in Japan under the classification of family migration, "spouse or child of Japanese national" (2665); "spouse or child of permanent resident" (1105); "long-term resident" (2165) and "dependent" (7655). The second is student migration, including "college student" (*Ryūgakusei* 留学生), "pre-college student" (*Shūgakusei* 就学生) and "trainee" (*Kenshūsei* 研修生). The largest category of Chinese migrants to Japan in 2014 was "trainee and intern" (45,012), followed by "college student" (28,566). The third type is skilled migration. This includes all skilled workers on working visas, such as professors, researchers and engineers. In 2014, 8518 Chinese migrated to Japan under this category.

Third, international education, including study abroad and international training, has been the most important and effective channel of cross-border migration for the Chinese. China has become Japan's largest source country for college students, pre-college students and trainees (Fig. 7.3; Duan 2003; Liu-Farrer 2009; Oka and Fukuda 1995; Shao 1996).

Spatial Distribution of New Chinese Migrants

New Chinese migrants show a scattered spatial distribution (Shao and Lu 2014). Unlike the old generation, they tend not to settle in Chinatowns. Although 48 % are concentrated in the Greater Tokyo Area, most live in suburbs like ordinary Japanese.

In 1974, Chinese migrants were concentrated in metropolitan areas such as Tokyo (29.4 %) and Osaka (13.1 %); Kobe (the capital of Hyogo prefecture, whose Chinese inhabitants made up 18.3 % of the total Chinese in Japan); and Yokohama (Kanagawa prefecture, 11.5 %), in which there are famous Chinatowns. The Chinese living in the old ports of Nagasaki and Hakodate formed a smaller proportion and 4.2 % lived in Okinawa. However, in 2009, the new Chinese were more scattered. Most lived in suburban areas as the tendency to concentrate in Chinatowns



Fig. 7.3 New arrivals of Chinese college students in Japan, 1978–2014 (Source: Japanese Ministry of Justice)

declined. Some 45 % lived in the *1-To 3-Ken* (一都三県, "One Capital City and Three Prefectures")—namely, Tokyo, whose Chinese inhabitants account for 23 % of the total, and its main three neighboring prefectures, Saitama (6.8 %), Chiba (6.5 %) and Kanagawa (8.1 %). However, they did not live compactly, as in the old days in the old Chinatowns when Chinese faced limitation on choices of locations. This was as a result of the large population of international students, language school students and professionals. In 2014, mainland Chinese showed an even greater tendency to concentrate in metropolitan areas, with 47.9 % in the Greater Tokyo area and 13.2 % in the Osaka-Kobei area.

The Formation and Development of the Contemporary Chinese Diaspora in Japan

Demographic Change

How does contemporary Chinese migration to Japan affect the demography of the Chinese community? First, the community has been the most rapidly expanding in Japan in the last 30 years and was the largest ethnic

group in Japan in 2007. Even as the numbers of other foreigners fell during the global financial crises, the Chinese kept rising, until 2010.

The demography of the Chinese community in Japan has shifted substantially from old hands to newcomers. Most Chinese in Japan are now new immigrants who migrated after 1978. As a result, mainlanders have replaced Taiwanese as the biggest group. In the 1970s, most Chinese in Japan were Taiwanese (24,080, 51.3 % in 1974), but mainlanders predominated in the 2010s (634,271, 94 % in 2011). In the 1980s there was a sharp increase in the number of people from Beijing, Shanghai and Fujian, while in the 2000s most came from the northeastern provinces (Manchuria). In 1974 only a handful came from Manchuria, but by 2011 their numbers had shot up to 239,789 (Liaoning, 105,127, 15.6 %, Heilongjiang, 77,753, 11.5 % and Jilin 56,909, 8.4 %). This was caused mainly by a sharp increase in the "return" of Japanese war orphans since the 1970s, followed by the migration of their Chinese families and relatives (Araragi 2000; Wu 2004).

Most Chinese in Japan are young, and there are more women than men. The ethnic-Chinese age demographics can be represented in the shape of a vase. The youthfulness of this group can be attributed mainly to changes in the categories of the Chinese now coming to Japan because the newcomers include many college students, language-school students and trainees. In 2014 the total number of Chinese in Japan was 694,974, of whom 289,015 were male and 405,959 female, a male-to-female ratio of 100:140. In 1974 there were 25,896 men and 21,048 women, a male-to-female ratio of 100:81. Most of the Chinese who are spouses of the Japanese are women.

Patterns of Economic Integration among New Chinese Migrants

Hairdressing, cooking and tailoring, referred to playfully as *Sanbadao* (三把刀,"the three sharp edges"), used to be the main occupations of the Chinese in Japan. This remained the case until the normalization of Sino-Japanese relations in 1972. During the economic recession, foreigners were unable to receive bank loans, as a result of which hairdressing and tailoring declined and only cooking survived as *Yidao durong* (一刀独荣, "the one sharp edge"). Owing to discrimination, many second- and the third-generations Chinese, even graduates, found it hard to get jobs. They had little option other than to continue working in the family business, and many ended up unemployed (Guo 1999: 61–62).

Table 7.1 Chinese professionals in Japan, 2014

Chinese by visa category	*Foreigner (A)*	*Mainlander*	*Taiwanese*	*Chinese (B)*	*B/A (%)*
Total	**2,121,831**	654,777	40,197	694,974	33
Permanent resident	**677,019**	215,155	16,870	232,025	34
Spouse or child of Japanese national	**145,312**	36,469	4024	40,493	28
Spouse or child of permanent resident	**27,066**	11,107	190	11,297	42
Long-term resident	**159,596**	26,676	1563	28,239	18
Special permanent resident	**358,409**	1596	775	2371	1
Subtotal	**1,367,402**	**291,003**	**23,422**	**314,425**	**23**
Professor	**7565**	1751	167	1918	25
Artist	**409**	71	4	75	18
Religious activities	**4528**	64	85	149	3
Journalist	**225**	45	7	52	23
Investor/business manager	**15,184**	6394	571	6965	46
Legal/accounting services	**143**	5	–	5	3
Medical services	**695**	511	11	522	75
Researcher	**1841**	555	66	621	34
Instructor	**10,141**	69	28	97	1
Engineer	**45,892**	20,873	800	21,673	47
Specialist in humanities/ international services	**76,902**	34,574	3442	38,016	49
Intracompany transferee	**15,378**	5593	526	6119	40
Entertainer	**1967**	126	23	149	8
Skilled laborer	**33,374**	17,240	83	17,323	52
Subtotal	**214,244**	**87,871**	**5813**	**93,684**	**44**
Technical intern training 1	**77,516**	40,974	7	40,981	53
Technical intern training 2	**90,110**	59,119	2	59,121	66
Cultural activities	**2614**	777	123	900	34
International student	**214,525**	105,557	7528	113,085	53
Trainee	**1427**	253	21	274	19
Dependent	**125,992**	62,599	1455	64,054	51
Designated activities	**28,001**	6624	1826	8450	30
Subtotal	**540,185**	**275,903**	**10,962**	**286,865**	**53**

Source: Japanese Ministry of Justice

The distribution of occupations among new Chinese migrants is shown in Table 7.1. We have no data about the occupations of the Chinese who have adopted Japanese nationality, but we can group other Chinese into three main categories based on the type of visa or work permit they hold:

(1) settled permanent/long-term residents, including spouses or children of Japanese nationals and the spouses or children of permanent residents, with no restriction on employment, totaling 314,425 people (45 %); (2) professionals, who are allowed to exercise their professions, including all types shown in Table 7.1, from professors to skilled laborers, totaling 93,684 people (13 %); and (3) sojourners, in principle not allowed to work, including international students, trainees and family members of non-permanent foreign residents, totaling 286,865 people (41 %).

New Chinese immigrants are employed in many fields and have many different kinds of visa. Of all working foreigners in Japan, Chinese comprise the largest number of professors, artists, investors, business managers, medical service providers, researchers, engineers, intracompany transferees and skilled laborers. Most belong to the stratum of specialized professionals, which requires good Japanese, professional knowledge and technical skills. They receive due acknowledgement and respect from Japanese society (Shao 2010, 2011).

Japan was originally characterized by a dual labor market. The Chinese have always aimed to integrate and join the middle class. Those Chinese who are already employed seem close to their goal, particularly those with Japanese academic qualifications.

Below I identify the ways in which they have integrated into the economy and improved their social position:

Investors or Business Managers: In 2014 there were 6965 Chinese investors or business managers (6394 of whom were born in mainland China). Just 1 % of the Chinese community, they represented 46 % of foreign investors and business managers. Many Chinese in Japan want to start up new businesses. In Japan there are more than 1700 businesses set up by the Chinese (Zhongwen Daobao, December 24, 2009). Some Chinese entrepreneurs have even developed their businesses into public enterprises, listed on Japan's stock exchange. Up until 2015, eight companies founded by the Chinese were listed on Japan's stock exchange, and the founders of all of them were students who moved to Japan in the 1980s, most of them as government-sponsored students.

Professors/researchers: In 2014 there were 1918 Chinese professors and 621 researchers, representing around 0.4 % of the Chinese in Japan. They comprise a large proportion of the foreign professors and researchers in Japan (25 % and 34 %, respectively). They are well respected in their fields.

Engineers: Another common pathway to upward social mobility for Chinese in Japan is through employment as an engineer, mainly in IT. There are currently 45,892 foreign engineers, 21,673 of whom are Chinese (47 %).

Specialists in humanities/international services: Most Chinese in Japan work as "specialists in the humanities and international services." A total of 38,016 work in these fields. Of 76,902 foreigners holding this specific type of visa, around 49 % are Chinese. For every two foreigners working in Japan's international service sector, one is Chinese.

The Chinese community in Japan forms a pyramid, with a broad base and a narrow apex. Members of the elite, mainly government-sponsored international students from earlier periods, have worked their way into mainstream society. On the other hand, a vulnerable group, consisting mainly of international students, trainees and war orphans, remain at the bottom of society. War orphans and their descendants are particularly subject to physical and psychological stress, and a harsh living environment.

Chinese nationals and even naturalized people of Chinese ethnicity face invisible barriers in the workplace, particularly in large corporate companies. For new migrants, being born outside Japan or possessing a foreign passport is a huge disadvantage. Their classification as foreigners prevents them from becoming public servants or teachers in schools.

Following steady rises in both the number and the middle-class composition of new migrants, the Chinese community will probably develop in the direction of a spindle shape, narrow at both ends and thick in the middle. In the twenty-first century, with China's rise and Japanese businesses' high expectations of the Chinese market, a transnational strategy is ideal for companies keen to compete in foreign markets. The Chinese market has an international reach and a global network, allowing both China and Japan to connect with the global communities of Chinese people.

The Changing Structure of the Ethnic Community

How has the continuous influx of new Chinese migrants affected the ethnic-Chinese community? The social transition from the older generation to the new generation within Chinese associations in Japan is essentially complete, and these associations, now mainly composed of new immigrants, are gradually becoming a core component of Chinese communities in Japan. Since the 1980s, following an increase in the Chinese population in Japan and an improvement in their visa status, many different Chinese associations have been established. In 2015 it was reported that there were around 200 in Japan (Zhongwen Daobao 中文导报 January 1, 2016), including a variety of

new-immigrant associations. For example, there are business associations such as Riben Zhonghua Zongshanghui (日本中华总商会 Chinese Chamber of Commerce in Japan), a new overseas Chinese-based transnational Chinese economic association, established on September 9, 1999, and ZaiRi Zhongguo Qiye Xiehui (在日中国企业协会 China Enterprise Association in Japan), an association for Chinese-owned corporations active in Japan, established in July 2000. There are also hometown associations, such as ZaiRi Jilin Tongxianghui (在日吉林同乡会 Jilin Hometown Association). Most visible are professional associations and alumni associations based on universities in Japan and in China, such as Riben Huaren Jiaoshou Huiyi (日本华人教授会议 the Society of Chinese Professors in Japan), ZaiRi Zhongguo Lushi Lianhehui (在日中国律师联合会 Chinese Lawyers Associations in Japan), Zairi Zhongguo Kexue Jishuzhe Lianmeng (在日中国科学技术者联盟 the Chinese Association of Science and Technology in Japan), the Association of Chinese Alumni at the University of Tokyo (东京大学中国留日同学会) and Nanjing University Alumni Association in Japan (南京大学日本校友会).

Overseas-Chinese associations have grown not only in quantity but in quality. Membership of new associations has grown, and bonds have been formed with Chinese people around the world. The overseas-Chinese associations are energized and powerful. Their activities include *Zhongguo Wenhuajie* (中国文化节 Chinese Cultural Festivals), *Dongjing Zhongguo Dianyingzhou* (东京中国电影周 Chinese Film Festival in Tokyo) and *Qinqing Zhonghua* (亲情中华 Affection China). Together with Liuri Huaqiao Lianhehui (留日华侨联合会, Overseas Chinese Association of Japan) and Shenhu Zhonghua Zongshanghui (神户中华总商会 Chinese General Chamber of Commerce of Kobe), Riben Zhonghua Zongshanghui convened the 9th World Chinese Entrepreneurs Convention (世界华商大会) in September 2007.

In 2003, Riben Xin Huaqiao Huarenhui (日本新华侨华人会), the New Overseas Chinese Association in Japan, was established by eight associations. In 2013 it became the Union of Chinese Residing in Japan (QuanRiben Huaoqiao Huaren Lianhehui 全日本华侨华人連合会), which now has 47 member associations. Riben Zhonghua Zongshanghui, which always had branches in Beijing and Shanghai, now has additional branches such as Dongjing Zhonghua Zongshanghui (东京中华总商会 China General Chamber of Commerce of Tokyo) and Guanxi Zhonghua Zongshanghui (关西中华总商会 China General Chamber of Commerce of Kansai). In 2003 the early-overseas-Chinese association, Liuri Huaqiao

Lianhe Zonghui (留日华侨联合总会, established on May 27, 1999) was renamed Riben Huaqiao Huaren Lianhe Zonghui (日本华侨华人联合总会). Associations for old and new Chinese immigrants are now collaborating.

Given the current surge in social networking, numerous communities across Japan have come together via social media. Chinese media in Japan provide essential support for the Chinese community. In Japan, ethnic-Chinese associations had always made Chinese newspapers and magazines available to its members from an early age (Liao 2012: 26). However, since the 1980s, many Chinese in Japan, particularly students, have worked in the media sector prior to migrating. In Japan they tend to return to work in this sector. In addition to publishing newspapers and magazines such as *Liuxuesheng Xinwen* (留学生新闻, *International Students' News*), *Zhongwen Daobao* (中文导报), *Riben Xinhuaqiao Bao* (日本新华侨报) and *Riben Qiao Bao* (日本侨报), they have started up a Chinese television station, DafuTV (大富电视), which does live broadcasts of important events such as National Day. Chinese media are popular with the Chinese community in Japan. In March 2014, *Zhongwen Daobao* celebrated the occasion of publishing its 1000th issue after nearly 22 years.

The ethnic Chinese communities in Japan have done many positive things. They have provided new immigrants with assistance and support, helped them to resettle and integrate into a new environment, and provided them with a sense of security, identity and belonging. They have built bridges between China and Japan, encouraged trade, and promoted educational and cultural exchanges. They have enabled mainstream society to hear the voices of minorities. They have also passed on traditional Chinese culture.

Of the ten Chinese schools active in Japan in 1948, only five remained in 1998 (Guo 1999: 71). Though the new immigrants have not established any full-time Chinese schools, there are numerous after-hours establishments. For example, the Tong Yuan Chinese School (同源中文学校), established in 1995, operates as a weekend school. It started with just two teachers and 30 students, but it now has ten branch campuses in Tokyo, Chiba, Saitama, Kanagawa and Aichi. It has around 800 students and has taught more than 8000 in the course of its history. It strives to ensure that Chinese children do not forget their ancestral language (*Zhongwen Daobao*, January 1, 2016).

The Impact of Chinese Immigrants on Local Society

Becoming Japanese?

The longer Chinese migrants remain in Japan, the more likely they are to apply for permanent residency. From 1984 to 1990, the number of permanent residents among Chinese nationals in Japan increased by a mere 1520, from 22,757 to 24,277. However, this figure has climbed rapidly since then. In 2006 it exceeded 100,000, with 117,329 Chinese migrants granted permanent residency. By 2014 it had reached 232,025. The number of Chinese spouses of Japanese nationals and permanent residents has also continued to grow. By the end of 2014, the number of *Huaqiao* (overseas Chinese) and their families reached 314,425. This is almost seven times as high as Japan's total population of Chinese nationals in 1974 (46,944).

In 2014, 9277 foreigners were granted Japanese citizenship, among them 3060 Chinese (33 %). Between 1978 and 2014, 111,681 Chinese were naturalized (27 % of all naturalized foreign nationals). The number of naturalized Chinese started to rise quickly at the beginning of the 1990s, and then stabilized in the 2000s (see Fig. 7.4). However, it fell dramatically



Fig. 7.4 Naturalization of the Chinese in Japan, 1978–2014 (Source: Japanese Ministry of Justice)

after the *Kantō* earthquake in 2011. In the 25 years from 1952 to 1977, only 20,692 Chinese migrants were naturalized (Guo 1999: 76). The number of naturalized newcomers is much higher. However, in Australia, 73 % of Chinese migrants have naturalized and become Australian citizens, so the Japanese figure is low by comparison (Shao 2013). Most Chinese in Japan choose to remain Chinese nationals. This phenomenon is unique to the Chinese. It can be explained by Japan's opposition to immigration, the history of war between Japan and China, and Chinese people's negative feelings about Japan. In Japan, one may get citizenship without first getting permanent residency. There, loyalty is highly prized and Japanese people believe that a foreigner who lives in Japan as a permanent resident remains a foreigner until they become naturalized. For the Japanese, the naturalization of migrants is preferable to granting them permanent resident status.

Identity Formation

Neither the Japanese government nor the Chinese government allows dual citizenship. Living and working in Japan as a Chinese citizen can be inconvenient. A Chinese citizen who wishes to pursue Japanese citizenship will be required to renounce their Chinese citizenship. The issue of nationality has long perplexed new Chinese migrants in Japan. China is where they were born and raised, where their childhood memories lie, and where their family and friends are. They identify with their Chinese heritage at a certain level. On the other hand, Japan is where they live and work, and where their offspring are born and raised. The future wellbeing of these migrants is intertwined with the prosperity of Japan, and this contributes to their sense of identity and belonging. Furthermore, as residents of Japan, they absorb the Japanese language and culture. They originate in China, yet they have adapted to the way of life in Japan. Their sense of belonging is complicated and multifaceted, and it can be influenced by factors such as their earlier experience in China; their age when they left China; the nature of their migration; their status in Japan; their life after arrival; the extent to which they speak Japanese; and their social circle, profession and level of achievement. A person's sense of belonging is fluid and dynamic. It is influenced not only by recognition from others but also by personal awareness (Shao 1996, 2000). The sense of identity among the Chinese in Japan can be categorized roughly as follows: (1) I am Chinese; (2) I am Japanese; (3) I am a Chinese that lives in Japan; (4) I am an international citizen. New migrants, regardless of whether they have been granted permanent residency or have

been naturalized, are essentially Chinese in the cultural sense (Shao 2013), whereas the younger generation born, raised and educated in Japan considers itself culturally Japanese, despite perhaps having Chinese citizenship.

New migrants who have moved to Japan, and in some cases even their offspring, often occupy a nebulous, ambivalent position within Japanese society. They get labeled as "Chinese" in Japan and as "foreigners" in China. This perpetuates a sense of displacement. They feel to some extent that they belong to mainstream society in both countries, yet they are fully recognized by neither. Unstable Sino-Japanese relations also affect their sense of belonging. Ultimately, they are "overseas Chinese" (海外中国人) who live in Japan.

Transformation at the Local Level

Ethnic communities in Japan have a profound impact on Japanese society, especially its Chinese community (Shao 2002). The presence of ethnic communities provides Japan with a natural laboratory in which Japanese people can communicate and interact with them, thus achieving a degree of internationalization. Japan is no longer a homogeneous society in the traditional sense of being shaped by a single language or nationality. In contemporary Japan, foreign languages are spoken, and foreigners are encountered everywhere. Although Japanese society has known conflicts with ethnic communities, it has also gained from the experience of hosting them. The country has transformed the role of ethnic communities and elevated Japan's Chinese community into a means whereby relations between the two countries can be improved.

Japanese society is increasingly open to immigrants, and to foreign languages and cultures. The state is gradually altering its policies in an effort to deal with recessions in regional economies and its declining population. It has developed a national strategy aimed at opening the door to international students and keeping them in the country (Shao 2008). In the 1980s, the purpose of accepting international students was to cultivate a pro-Japanese element and thus raise Japan's global influence; while, in the 1990s, the country began to adopt incentives to keep foreign students there. By the 2000s, a main focus was on cultivating policies to keep this international talent and make it easier for students to remain. In the meantime, starting in the 1990s, Japan has also started to accept professionals directly from overseas.

Japan is now trying to improve its policies toward foreigners and to make the coexistence of ethnic communities a reality. The Immigration Refugee Law, drafted and implemented in 1981, was revised in 2004. In 2012, Japan introduced a new management system for foreign residents, and the amended version of the Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act officially came into effect in July. Ethnic schools in Japan have been formally recognized and can lead to university entrance. When national or public universities admit new students, graduates from ethnic schools can enrol for university entrance exams directly, like graduates of any other high school, thus abolishing the old *Daiken* (大検, University Entry Proficiency Test) (Zhongwen Daobao October 6, 2006). Regarding social security, the subsistence allowance has been extended to cover permanent residents.

Conclusion

Since 1978, China's reforms have redrawn the map of Chinese communities in Japan. Thousands of Chinese have migrated to the country in different ways and to varying ends, including family reunification, studying aboard and joining the professional workforce. On the basis of the old Chinese community, a new Chinese community, formed mainly around new immigrants from China, has taken shape within contemporary Japanese society. It consists mainly of young people, and more women than men. Unlike the old Chinese communities, which lived mainly in Chinatowns, it is concentrated in the Greater Tokyo area, though it also extends to every other prefecture.

Since the mid-1980s, the community has increased greatly in size. In 2007 it overtook the Korean community, and it is now the biggest ethnic group in Japan. From an international point of view, it can no longer be considered small, except by comparison with the Chinese communities of Southeast Asia.

The new Chinese migrant community has developed rapidly in both size and quality. New migrants in Japan are able to obtain rights of permanent residency or citizenship, which strengthens their position. They are relatively well-educated and talented professionals, which raises their social status. Some have entered the middle class and integrated into the mainstream. They are no longer invisible. Instead they make efforts to get their voices heard, and they attempt to express their opinions on social issues on behalf of individuals or ethnic organizations. They now have the courage and vision to explore the world outside their country of birth.

Regarding recent trends, immigration to Japan is no longer growing rapidly. In recent years from 2011, the number of Chinese who want to go to Japan has steadily fallen. This is because of the Japanese economic downturn, poor working conditions for foreigners, the devaluation of the yen, and the gradual rise in Chinese people's income. However, Japan is China's close neighbor and has relatively low tuition fees and fewer limits on student working hours than other countries, so it is still a popular choice with Chinese students. Given this, the Chinese student community and the Chinese community as a whole, will continue to increase, though more slowly than before.

The old Chinese communities in the three old Chinatowns remain cautious about Japanese policies and tend to keep their distance from politics. So far, very few mainland Chinese immigrants as individuals have participated in the country's political affairs. The same goes for Chinese communities.

However, in April 2016, Li Xiaomu, a writer born in Changsha, became the first Shinjuku city chancellor candidate born in mainland China. Although he did not win the election, he is blazing the way for those who wish to participate in Japanese polities (*Zhongwen Daobao* December 31, 2015). However, there are obstacles in the way of Chinese migrants who wish to do so. Japanese society is facing a long-term challenge, not only in accepting new Chinese migrants but in maximizing their potential by giving them equal opportunities.

Note

1. All data presented in this chapter comes from the Ministry of Justice. Japan provides reliable official statistics on international migration by country of citizenship (Minister of Justice 1978–2014). However, while new arrivals of the Chinese are divided into the People's Republic of China, Taiwan (China), Hong Kong (China) and others, all four groups are lumped together in figures for registrations by Chinese nationals.

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CHAPTER 8

Chinese Immigration to the Philippines since the Late 1970s

Fan Dai

Introduction

Being close to China, the Philippines archipelago islands attracted Chinese migration even before the arrival of the Spaniards in the sixteenth century. A Chinese community was formed before 1949 on the basis of several hundred years of immigration. With the establishment of China–Philippines relations in 1975, many more Chinese nationals have migrated to the Philippines.

Earlier migrants were forced to leave China because of poverty, famine and political chaos. Migrants after the late 1970s relocated mainly to be reunited with their families. What factors drove them to migrate at a time when China was experiencing unprecedented economic prosperity and rising as a great power? Why do new Chinese migrants move to underdeveloped countries such as the Philippines, which has been a labor-exporting country and has suffered from a brain drain to the rest of the world, rather than to the highly developed Western countries?[1] Are they following family members, migration networks or markets? This chapter is based on my research in Manila's Chinatown from two periods 2007–2008 and 2014–2015. The main source of my data is questionnaire surveys and face-to-face

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interviews with new Chinese migrants.[2] Key information was also collected from leaders of Chinese associations and from Chinese Filipinos through conversations and e-mail exchanges.

Driving Forces behind International Migration: Theoretical Backgrounds

The relationships between international migrants and sovereign states have undergone drastic changes since the twentieth century, with the emergence of large number of nation-states along with rigorous controls on population movement across national borders. Migration studies have also increased in volume and quality. Social scientists in different fields, notably demography, geography, economics, sociology, and political science, have paid attention to the phenomenon of human movement. Theories, such as push–pull theory, neoclassical economics, new economics of migration, segmented labor-market theory, world-systems theory, network theory and cumulative causation, have been developed to explain the causes and consequences of international migration.

Push–pull theory was among the earliest systematic attempts to explore the mechanisms of migration. It saw migration as governed by push–pull factors. Unfavorable conditions, such as economic stagnation, political or religious persecution, and environmental deterioration, pushed people out, while favorable conditions, such as jobs, freedom, a better climate and an improved lifestyle, pulled them in. A person's mobility is driven mainly by different push and pull forces depending on their stage of life (Lee 1966).

Neoclassical economics sees international migration as stemming from international disequilibria in labor markets that produce gaps in expected wages across national borders. According to this theory, national markets are assumed to be complete and well functioning, playing no role in an individual's migration decision. People move because they expect to earn more abroad. Flows of labor from low-wage to high-wage countries gradually reach equilibrium. At equilibrium, the international wage gap equals the cost of migration between the countries (Massey et al. 1994).

The new economics of migration considers migration decisions as being made by households rather than individuals. Families expect to maximize their benefits through international migration, especially when domestic market failures threaten the material wellbeing of households. In developing countries, markets for capital, futures and insurance may be absent, imperfect or inaccessible. To self-insure against risks to income reduction

and property, or to gain access to scarce investment capital, households send one or more members to participate in foreign labor markets (Massey et al. 1994). Theorists of the new economics of migration argue that international migration not only improves the absolute incomes of households but also increases migrant households' incomes relative to non-migrants in the same sending community, and hence ameliorates the sense of relative deprivation (Massey et al. 1994).

Postmodern theorists of cumulative causation argue that the circulation of people, goods and ideas creates a new transnational culture that integrates and combines values, behaviors and attitudes from sending and receiving societies to create a new, largely autonomous social space that transcends national boundaries. This transnational culture changes the context in which migration takes place and boosts future migration. For example, migrants exhibit a widely admired lifestyle that others wish to emulate. Materially successful migrants have a powerful demonstration effect, especially for the young, based on their enhanced ability to consume goods and purchase property (Massey et al. 1994).

These theories have greatly enriched and deepened our understanding of international migration. Many Chinese scholars have also written on this subject (Li 2000; Zhou and Ruan 2003). However, existing theories, though useful in explaining different aspects of international migration, cannot cover worldwide migration as a whole, since most of the theories are developed from empirical research or case studies in developed countries as host countries. Some important concepts generalized from the experience of the labor influx from developing countries into developed countries, such as wage or income gap and equilibrium, are not necessarily valid in explaining contemporary migration flows from developing countries to other developing countries. For example, not only Europe and the USA attract new Chinese migrants—so do developing countries such as Cambodia, Laos, Burma, Thailand, the Philippines, Brazil and even some of the island states of the South Pacific. Current research done by Chinese scholars has also concentrated mainly on movements between China and developed countries, and overlooked the enormous numbers of Chinese who move to underdeveloped countries (Li 2005).[3]

The new economics of migration theory is perhaps more applicable than classical push–pull theories to studying new Chinese migrants in the Philippines.[4] Long-term, large-scale migration profoundly shapes the sending place's society and culture, and the individuals immersed in it. Early migrants already settled in receiving countries provide latecomers not only

with a social network but also with a culture of migration, based, for example, on rags-to-riches stories. Now, new Chinese migrants continue to hail from Qiaoxiang (hometown of overseas Chinese). For example, most of the new Chinese migrants in the Philippines are still from Fujian Province, as in the past. While a more balanced perspective should take into account factors both in the sending and receiving countries, in this chapter I give more weight to the factors in the host society that pull new Chinese migrants into the Philippines.

Chinese Migration to the Philippines

A Historical Overview

Chinese migration to the Philippines dates back more than a thousand years, but it only took off after the mid-Ming Dynasty when the Pacific maritime route linking East Asia and Latin America was opened up. Most Chinese migration was from Fujian and Guangdong (See 1988).[5] Although Chinese were present across the whole archipelago, most lived in Manila, especially the Binondo-Divisoria area, which was the biggest Chinatown in the Philippines at the end of the twentieth century.

Between 1949 and 1975 the Philippines had diplomatic relations with Taiwan. The Chinese community kept close ties with Taiwan since the Philippines recognized Taiwan's jurisdiction over alien Chinese permanently residing in the Philippines and allowed the Taiwan authorities to supervise their affairs (See 1997). Earlier Chinese migrants still identify with China, but members of the younger generation are well integrated and tend to identify instead with mainstream Philippine society. This is especially true of those born in the Philippines since World War II.

In April 1975, just before deciding to establish diplomatic relations with China, President Marcos issued the Letters of Instruction 270 to promote the mass naturalization of resident Chinese by administrative means. Those who met the requirements of naturalization, nearly 80–90 % of local Chinese, obtained Filipino citizenship (See 1997). This mass naturalization led to further integration on the part of local Chinese into local society, both politically and economically. However, the older Chinese migrants, especially those born in China, continued to maintain emotional ties with China.

Chinese Filipinos account for less than 1.5 % of the total population, but they have more associations in proportion to their population than Chinese communities in other Southeast Asian countries. The Filipino-Chinese

Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Inc. (商总), formed in 1954, leads the community. Other associations are based on business, kinship and hometown connections. They include the Filipino-Chinese General Chamber of Commerce, Inc. (菲律宾中华总商会), formed in 1904, and the Grand Family Association (宗联), formed in 1958.

New Arrivals: Numbers and Types

The influx of new Chinese migrants since the 1970s has brought fresh blood to the Chinese Filipino community. Chinese immigration since the 1970s can be divided into three periods. The earliest wave after 1975 was initiated by family reunion, after the Philippine government fully abolished the 1950 migrant quota for Chinese nationals in 1950, which had separated numerous Chinese families. The Chinese moved to the Philippines mainly to join their immediate relatives, such as their fathers, who might have remarried in the Philippines. Some joined more distant relatives. The promulgation of the Law of the People's Republic of China on the control of the exit and entry of citizens in 1985 triggered another wave of migration to the Philippines. After the mid-1990s, immigrants without relatives in the Philippines joined friends and fellow villagers or fellow provincials. This can be seen as an expansion of the network formed during the first two stages.[6]

A large Chinese migrant community is forming as a result of the continuous inflow of migrants since the late 1970s. Researchers estimate that around 200,000 new Chinese migrants arrived during that period. It should be noted that the influx of Chinese migration to the Philippines has remained stable since the mid-2000s, and some Chinese migrants have chosen to go back to China (Landingin 2007; Li 2003; See 1997). Chinese form the biggest group of foreigners in the Philippines. The Bureau of Immigration reported that, among Philippine visa holders, there were 27,834 Chinese, as opposed to 111,923 foreign nationals as a whole, in February 2015.[7]

The Chinese nationals holding an immigrant visa or a permanent residence permit fall into four main groups. The first consists of those who were legalized and obtained permanent residence under the amnesty program. In 1988 the Philippines government initiated an amnesty program under Executive Order 314 to legalize those who had entered the Philippines before 1984. This program was suspended by Congress in 1989 after a three-month implementation. On February 24, 1995, the Republic Act 7919 was launched to grant legalized status to those who had entered the

Philippines before June 30, 1992. About 11,000 applicants were approved. These people then applied for permanent residence for their spouses and children under 18 years of age under the above two acts.[8] However, many Chinese who moved to the Philippines after 1992 obtained permanent residence for themselves and their spouses or children by providing fake documents with the help of travel agencies or Chinese local governments, or by bribing Philippine officials to issue them with fake immigration stamps or to destroy their records held by the Bureau of Immigration.

The second group is those who applied for permanent residence through the Special Investor's Resident Visa (SIRV) and the Special Resident Retiree's Visa (SRRV).[9] From 1987 to 2014, 5577 Chinese immigrants obtained a SRRV as principal holders and 7028 obtained one as spouses and dependents (under 21 years of age), topping all other countries at a rate of 33.63 %, as Table 8.1 shows.

The Special Visa for Employment Generation, which took effect in March 2009, is issued to qualified non-immigrant foreigners who agree to employ at least ten Filipinos in a lawful and sustainable enterprise, trade or industry. A foreigner must contract to engage in a viable and sustainable commercial investment or enterprise in the Philippines, to manage an enterprise, or to hire, promote and dismiss employees. Up to now, few Chinese have met this requirement or shown any interest in this type of visa. The Chinese who marry a Philippine citizen are also given immigrant visas. Some Chinese legitimate their status in the Philippines through bogus marriages.

Table 8.1 1987–2014 top ten nationalities enrollees, as of 31 December 2014

	Nationality	*Principal*	*Spouse and dependent*	*Total number*	*Percentage*
1	Chinese (mainland)	5577	7028	12,605	33.63
2	Korean	3406	4813	8219	21.93
3	Chinese (Taiwan)	1711	2239	3950	10.54
4	Japanese	2262	758	3020	8.06
5	American	1378	427	1805	4.82
6	Indian	847	760	1607	4.29
7	Chinese (Hong Kong)	541	538	1079	2.88
8	British	696	189	885	2.36
9	German	383	142	525	1.40
10	Australian	357	110	467	1.25
11	Others	2277	1046	3323	8.86

Source: Philippine Retirement Authority

The third group is those who have stayed in the Philippines without proper papers. According to a non-profit organization report, almost 70–80 % of the aliens deported each year are Chinese citizens (See 1997). This undocumented group consists of two main categories. The first includes people who overstay their visas. Some Chinese tourists or business people enter the county with valid visas and later overstay to work as entrepreneurs or employees. They tend to concentrate in Chinatown, where most Chinese migrants live, work or conduct their business. The Philippine government's relaxation of controls on Chinese tourism and investment in 2005 helped boost the number of undocumented immigrants. The other main category consists of people who enter via unofficial channels. With the help of immigration officials, some Chinese migrants enter and depart through the international airport in Manila without official clearance. So the official data on the number of Chinese migrants in the Philippines does not give a true picture.

The fourth group includes those who hover between legal and illegal status. In the Philippines, those born in the Philippines acquire their citizenship by descent.[10] Some Chinese migrants purchase Philippine citizens' birth certificates to disguise their true nationality. However, they are deemed to be illegal despite having citizenship papers issued by the Philippine government.[11]

The third and fourth groups are more numerous than the first and second. The undocumented Chinese migrants in the Philippines are trying to legalize their status. My 2015 survey of board members of Overseas Chinese Chamber of Commerce and Industry (OCCCII) suggests that only 25 % hold tourist visas, while most hold a legal visa such as a SIRV or a SRRV, or obtained a permanent residence permit under an amnesty program, in either 1988 or 1992.

Why Migrate: Social Capital and Push–Pull Forces

Social Capital: History, Culture and Network

Network theory defines migrant networks as sets of interpersonal ties that connect migrants, former migrants and non-immigrants at points of origin and destination through ties of kinship, friendship and shared provenance. The existence of these ties is hypothesized to increase the likelihood of emigration by lowering the costs, raising the benefits and mitigating the risks of international movement (Massey et al. 1994).

In the case of the Philippines, networks rooted in history are the grounds on which contemporary Chinese migrants connect. With the mass influx of Chinese nationals to the Philippines, the migration process can become self-sustaining through the construction of increasingly dense social ties across space, thus further encouraging chain migration on the basis of family reunion and ties to relatives, friends and people from the same place.[12] This represents an expansion and development of the network and constitutes the potential capital available to future non-migrants.[13] As a result, though new Chinese migrants come from places such as Liaoning, Shandong, Jiangsu, Shanghai and Guangxi outside the traditional Qiaoxiang in Fujian and Guangdong, Fujianese continue to be the main source of the current migrant wave. For example, my survey in August 2015 showed that 97.2 % of the board members of OCCCI were from Fujian, mainly Quanzhou, Fujian.

Long-term, large-scale migration undoubtedly has a profound social-cultural impact on the Qiaoxiang in Fujian, and on the individuals immersed in it. Many respondents confessed that before moving to the Philippines, they knew nothing about it except for stories told in the local towns and villages. They are inspired by stories about earlier migrants who ventured abroad and finally succeeded. Some migrants' stories, together with the respect they earned among local people and officials, and their donations to public welfare, encouraged a positive expectation of migration and transformed the dynamics for migration. Several respondents said it is better to be a boss than to be an employee, which local people view as somewhat humiliating. Their dream can come true in the Philippines, though only in the form of running a grocery store.

The migrant network formed in the Qiaoxiang in Fujian, together with its concomitant culture, is a form of social capital available to potential migrants and a self-sustaining mechanism encouraging subsequent migration. People living outside Qiaoxiang lack exposure to migrant culture and may find it harder to migrate, given that they lack the support of a migrant network.

Push Forces from China

My surveys in 2007 and 2015 (see Table 8.2) found that most respondents were from rural areas and small towns, while nearly a third were from cities. Before emigrating, most (64.7 %) were from families of medium economic level, and only 25.9 % were from well-to-do families. Regarding schooling, less than a quarter had tertiary education or higher.

Table 8.2 Profile of new Chinese migrants in the Philippines (2007: N = 176; 2015: N = 74)

Hometown's origin	Survey time	Rural area (%)	Small town (%)	Urban area (%)
	2007	55.9	14.7	29.4
	2015	36.1	27.8	36.1
Family economic level		Poor	Medium	Well-to-do
	2007	9.4	64.7	25.9
Educational level		Primary school or below	Secondary school	Tertiary or above
	2015	16.2	59.5	24.3

Although China is rising as an economic power, it struggles to provide sufficient opportunities for its huge population, especially in the villages. The country has long suffered from uneven economic development, whether between urban and rural areas or between east and west. To mitigate the pressure generated by its huge population, especially its surplus rural labor force, parts of the population are encouraged to move, either domestically or overseas. In China, people move from the poor mid-west to the relatively rich eastern and southern coastal provinces such as Guangdong, Jiangsu and Zhejiang. Others leave China for other countries.

Urban residents, usually with a better education and a higher economic status, have advantages in the labor market competition over rural residents. The latter, lacking education, social capital and economic resources, leave home to seek opportunities in cities. Those who are connected to a migrant social network and influenced by Qiaoxiang culture, such as the Fujianese, often cast their eyes abroad.

Migration networks play a key role in promoting the new wave of migration since most new Chinese migrants to the Philippines continue to be from Quanzhou, the native home of most Chinese Filipinos. Why do they want to try their luck in the Philippines, an underdeveloped country plagued by poverty and unemployment? What attracts them there? I argue that the pull factors play a more central role than the push factors.

Pull: Opportunity and Comparative Advantage

According to most of my respondents, the Philippines offer all kinds of opportunity and business advantage. These include:

1. *Low cost*: Nearly everyone agreed that the cost of doing business in the Philippines is lower than in China. Ordinary people cannot afford the high start-up investment necessary to set up a grocery store in China owing to high rents and the need for long-term contracts. In the Philippines, however, one can rent a stall at a lower price and on a more flexible lease. Some newcomers even start up a grocery store just a week or so after arriving in the country.
2. *Strong purchasing power and conspicuous consumption*: Rich or poor, most Filipinos enjoy shopping, unlike ethnic Chinese Filipinos or Chinese migrants, who are more tightfisted. The growing Filipino middle class like to buy cheap Chinese goods (Landingin 2007).
3. *Low-intensity commercial competition*: Go Bon Juan, research director at Kaisa (Unity), has argued that Chinese Filipinos' long history of commercial activity and their commercial ethos accounts for their dominance in business (Juan 1996). Many respondents pointed out that both Chinese Filipinos and new Chinese migrants have a better instinct for business than Filipinos. As a result, Chinese face less market competition than in China. Many respondents believe that they can thrive if they are industrious and smart enough.
4. *Good commercial credit*: Having commercial credit is seen as essential by many new Chinese immigrants. They admit that both Chinese Filipinos (Tsinoy) and other Filipinos (Pinoy) have more access to commercial credit and a better reputation than they do. They believe that, if they abide by local commercial rules and have high commercial credits in the Philippines, they can succeed in business. Many new Chinese migrants start their grocery store within a few weeks or even days of their arrival, even though they lack sufficient capital. What they depend on is the credit within their family and coethnic networks, which still works in Chinatown as the traditional Chinese businessmen's survival principle. With the help of relatives and friends, or simply on the basis of their own credit worthiness, anyone in the community can borrow money or buy goods from the wholesalers with a grace period of up to five months. If the debtors fail to pay back on time, they lose their credit and their standing in the community, which they do not want to do.[14] For Chinese migrants who have insufficient resources, only credit can ensure their business success. If they go bankrupt and lose their credit and reputation, their situation is hopeless.
5. *Flexible law enforcement*: Flexible law enforcement is often more or less equivalent to corruption in the Philippines, and is seen as a

> commercial advantage by many new Chinese migrants. Elsewhere, for example in the USA or Brazil, undocumented migrants can only engage in unlawful work, but in the Philippines, despite laws limiting foreigner's participation in retailing, most new Chinese migrants work in grocery stores because the government turns a blind eye to their commercial activities. It is an open secret that immigrants, legal or illegal, can bribe government agencies, immigration agents, policemen and other officials.

If the social capital of Qiaoxiang and the existing migration network provide an external opportunity for Fujianese's new transitional movement, then the business opportunity and comparative advantage in the Philippines are important pull factors. However, the above factors are not sufficient to explain Chinese immigration since the late 1970s. An exploration of migrant life and business in the host country is necessary for a fuller understanding of Chinese migration.

Chinatown: Land of Dreams

Manila Chinatown is located in the Binondo area on the north bank of the Pasig River, opposite Fort Santiago, the center of Spanish colonial government in the Philippines. It was built in 1594 and is one of the world's oldest and biggest Chinatowns. Its influence extends to adjacent places such as Quiapo, Santa Cruz and San Nicolas.

Unlike many Chinatowns in other countries that function only as tourist attractions, Manila Chinatown continues to play a key role in Chinese Filipinos' business and day-to-day life. Though most Chinese Filipinos live outside Chinatown, many remain there. It is still a hub of Chinese commerce. Since 2000, more shopping malls and mansions have appeared. Most Chinese associations still have offices in Chinatown and organize activities there. Restaurants offer a range of Chinese food. Because of old Chinatown's traffic problems and cramped space, Chinese Filipinos have been expanding their activities into Quezon City and Green Hills, an extension of the traditional Chinatown, both geographically and spatially. The connection between old Chinatown and the newly emerging business centers in Quezon City and Green Hills is well maintained.

Chinatown acts as a magnet for new Chinese migrants and serves their daily and business needs. Several shopping malls have grown up since the mid-1990s, of which 168, Divisoria, Tutuban and Quiapo are the best

Table 8.3 Main occupations of new Chinese migrants (2007: N = 176; 2015: N = 74)

	Running company (%)	*Retail grocery (%)*	*Shop assistant (%)*	*Company staff (%)*	*Others (%)*
2007	35.3	61.8	5.9	5.9	–
2015	45.9	29.7	0	10.8	13.5

known. Similar to the vast commodity malls in Yiwu, Zhejiang in China, they are separated into stalls, almost 90 % of which are owned or rented by Chinese migrants. Table 8.3 shows that, in 2007, 61.8 % of new Chinese migrants ran grocery stores, and 35.3 % ran companies that engaged mainly in trade, retailing and wholesale. They were rarely in manufacturing. By 2015 the proportion of Chinese migrants in the grocery business had dropped by half, while the proportion of those who ran trading, retailing and wholesale companies increased substantially. I found that some of the small business owners eventually succeeded and became big wholesalers. It is said that almost 70 % of goods in the Philippines are distributed by wholesalers in the Binondo area, many of them Chinese.[15]

With the massive influx into the Philippines, Chinese traders have, to some extent, replaced Chinese Filipinos in retailing and wholesale. While new Chinese migrants reach developed countries as low-level laborers in the secondary labor market, in underdeveloped countries such as the Philippines they have become an integral part of local business activities.

Rural migrants who lack finance and resources usually turn to grocery retailing or trading, which brings quick rewards at relatively low cost. They know a lot about the local Chinese market and its business channels and principles, they are able to gain a firm foothold in Chinatown with support from the migrant network and the ethnic community, and they can extend their business activities—mainly grocery retailing—to areas outside Chinatown and even outside Manila.

Chinatown is a closed enclave that offers advantages to its residents, who are mainly from Fujian. As shown in Fig. 8.1, most new Chinese immigrants speak Hokkien as their main business language since Chinese or Chinese Filipinos are their principal business partners or daily associates, very few of whom speak good Tagalog or English (Table 8.4). New Chinese migrants' linguistic failings do not prevent them from starting up businesses because



Fig. 8.1 Working languages (2007: N = 176)

Table 8.4 Language ability (2007: N = 176)

	Good (%)	*Fair (%)*	*Poor (%)*
Tagalog	31.8	60.0	8.2
English	2.4	50.6	47.0

they can resort to calculators or sign language, or hire Filipinos as shop assistants.

Many new Chinese migrants run retail grocery stores in the shopping malls in Baclaran in Pasay City or, even further afield, in Baguio City, but their running model scarcely differs from that used by their counterparts in Chinatown in Manila. These shopping malls, though far away from traditional Chinatown geographically, are still part of it. They also benefit from the same migrant networks at every point in the commercial cycle. In general, the migrant network based in Chinatown reduces the risk of running a business and the cost of living for migrants. Meanwhile it also serves to stimulate non-migrants' desire to migrate.

New Chinese migrants' economic activities in and around Chinatown have some features in common with the ethnic enclave economy that Alejandro Portes describes. Portes defined the enclave economy as involving "immigrant groups which concentrate in a distinct spatial location and organize a variety of enterprises serving their own ethnic market and/or the general population" (Portes 1981). Thus the ethnic enclave economy has two characteristics: (1) a critical mass of immigrant-owned business

firms that employ a critical mass of coethnic workers; and (2) a spatial clustering of enterprises (Portes and Manning 1986).

Chinatown as established by early migrants is precisely such an enclave. As a network it enhances in-group trust and solidarity and it helps networkers engage in trading and middleman economic activities (Adida 2006), as well as providing a range of social and moral resources that are useful both psychologically and economically (Portes and Rumbaut 2006). To preserve and develop the ethnic community, the Chinese Filipinos attached to Chinatown consume plentiful resources, with a preference for goods from China, thus creating opportunities for newcomers. This is the case in Manila's Chinatown and Green Hills, where large numbers of Chinese Filipinos live. New Chinese migrants depend more on Chinatown even than the Chinese Filipinos. Chinese migrants living outside Chinatown or Manila—for example, in Cebu, Davao and Baguio, where their numbers are increasing—can also establish networks through which to share information about business and living by joining new migrant associations or resorting to ties of kinship, friendship and provenance. Some of the more successful Chinese business people seek to intensify their ties with mainstream society.

New Chinese immigrants engaged in retailing serve not only the community itself but also local Filipinos.[16] Their shopping malls are popular among locals because of variety and affordability (Tan 2006). Few new Chinese migrants were engaged in manufacturing and real estate although more and more of them are now turning to these industries.

Local Filipinos' dependence on China's cheap and value-priced goods creates a niche for new Chinese migrants in the local market. As a result, grocery stores become highly visible Chinese enterprises. So do new Chinese migrants enter the grocery business in the Philippines as a result of structural or cultural factors, or both? Structural factors include immigrants' status in the receiving country, the host country's migrant policy and mainstream society's attitude toward migrants. Most new Chinese migrants are poorly schooled and skilled, and they lack financial resources. They turn to the retail trade not only because it has a low entry bar and offers a shortcut to profitability at a relatively low cost but because, as undocumented migrants, they have to work for fellow Chinese, who are in the trade, through which they learn how to operate the business. Although Philippine laws limit foreigner participation in retailing, they are poorly enforced, so new migrants can easily get licenses, often by using a Filipino's name and documents to register their own business. Running a grocery

store is hard work but it is still considered an honorable form of self-employment, and those engaged in the grocery trade can earn as much as a wage worker. As a result, once an opportunity arises, they will leave their wage jobs in a company and open up their own business.[17] According to Portes and Rumbau's findings, Japanese, Asian Indians, Koreans and Chinese own more firms with paid employees than groups such as Filipinos and Latin Americans. The usual explanation for this pattern is cultural. Members of certain nationalities are apt to seek avenues of profitable enterprise while others remain content with wage employment (Portes and Rumbaut 2006).

Migrants' spirit of adventure and their general expectations may also be among the forces driving them. Since most new Chinese migrants to the Philippines are from low socioeconomic backgrounds, they have nothing to lose, neither are they afraid of losing anything. Instead, the adventure of migration may change their fate.

Although the Philippines is a labor-export country, where the problems of kidnappings, corruption, inadequate public infrastructure and services drive Filipinos out to other parts of world to seek better lives, the Chinese are migrating into the country in increasing numbers. These new Chinese migrants are optimistic about their future and about the prospects for economic prosperity in the Philippines.[18] Their optimism stems from the country's comparative advantages, Chinatown's networks and the ethnic economy based on them.[19]

Community Transformation

Just like the rags-to-riches story that crop up repeatedly among Chinese communities in the Philippines and other host countries, after a long spell of hard work and capital accumulation, some new Chinese migrants have indeed become wealthy and achieved their dreams. But many are still struggling for survival. On the whole, new Chinese migrants in the Philippines are better off than before, and some of them have made it by moving into more respectable fields of business, such as real estate and manufacturing. For example, Tommy Co, one of my respondents, was born in a poor rural family in Jinjiang, Fujian. He went to the Philippines in 1996 on a tourist visa when he was only 13 years old. At school he admired the donations that Chinese Filipinos made to his primary school, and dreamed that someday he too might become rich and return home with honor. In 2006, after ten years in the Philippines, with the help of his sister, he used the capital he had accumulated to rent a retail store in the 168 Shopping

Mall, a famous commercial building in the Chinese community. He sold clothes, backpacks and shoes. His store soon expanded, and he now employs two Filipina saleswomen. George Tan, another respondent, owns several companies and is a leader of several Chinese associations. He arrived in the Philippines in 1986 as an agricultural expert and overstayed his visa to remain there. After accumulating enough capital, he set up in his own business selling pesticides, seed and rice. Later he went to Manila and started importing marine products and running a big ice plant. He legalized his status by acquiring a RA7919 visa in 1995, and he married a Chinese Filipina who later helped him a lot with his business. In 2006, together with some Fujianese friends, Tan established the OCCCII and served as its first president. He is grateful for what he has achieved and tells his fellow Chinese migrants that they should devote themselves to developing the Philippines since they are benefiting from its society.

New Chinese migrants have set up two sorts of association: comprehensive chambers of commerce and chambers of commerce serving just one mall. The former includes the Overseas Chinese Alumni Association of the Philippines (菲律宾旅菲各校友会联合会), the Overseas Chinese Chamber of Commerce and Industry (旅菲华侨工商联总会), the Philippines Chinese Chamber of Commerce and Industry (菲律宾中国商会) and the New Chinese Friendship Association in Cebu (宿雾新华友谊协会). The latter includes the Fil-Chinese 168 Shopping Mall United Friendship Association (菲华一路发商会), the Fil-Chinese Baclaran Shopping Mall United Friendship Association (菲华墨拉兰联合总商会) and the Philippine Meisic Mall Business Club Inc. (菲华诚昌1188商会). These associations, supported by the Chinese Filipino community, play a key role in protecting new Chinese migrants.

However, such migrants are in many ways disunited. Some early and more successful Chinese migrants are inclined to mix with Chinese Filipinos rather than with new Chinese migrants. Sometimes such people criticize the bad behavior or illegal activities of a minority of new Chinese migrants on the grounds that they hurt both local society and the interests of the newcomers themselves.

The arrival of new migrants can lead to competition and conflicts with Chinese Filipinos. The latter complain that Chinese migrants violate business rules and local laws in order to make quick money. However, more and more Chinese migrants are joining traditional Chinese associations, so these differences seem to be narrowing.

Though Chinese migrant's activities such as illegal engagement in retail trade as aliens and sales of counterfeits products have led to occasional raids by police or the Bureau of Immigration, they seldom evoke local Filipino's resistance. An exception is some irregular resentment arising from contradictions concerning employment. For example, some Filipino salesmen who are paid poorly by their Chinese bosses may report it to Immigration Bureau or other government agency. The goods from the shopping malls operated by new Chinese migrants are usually more affordable and meet ordinary Filipinos' needs, and many Filipino vendors rely on Chinatown or the shopping malls for their supplies. In short, new Chinese migrants play an important though not indispensable role in the economic development of the Philippines.

Conclusion

Developing countries can benefit from the influx of international migrants from other developing countries. There are some factors that have pushed migrants to leave China since the end of 1970s, but these are outweighed by the pull of opportunities and comparative advantages in the Philippines. The migrant networks in Chinatown play an important role. However, Chinese migrants may not continue to enter in ever greater numbers even if the Philippine government's migration policy remains unchanged. First, a greater influx would increase in-group and transgroup competition and make it harder for new immigrants to succeed. Second, wealth accumulation is no longer as easy as it used to be and the threshold to the market is becoming increasingly high. As a result, some migrants struggle to survive and may decide to return to China. Third, prejudice and discrimination against the Chinese in the host society can serve as a deterrent to new migrants. The police raids on the shopping malls in Chinatown—so called "inspection sorties" conducted by the agents from the Bureau of Customs, the Bureau of Internal Revenue and the Bureau of Immigration—usually result from complaints by the Philippines Retailers Association about unfair trading practices.[20] Fourth, if Chinese migrants fail to integrate into, and stay on good terms with, mainstream society, it will further stir up local hostility toward themselves, and the host country will probably restrict immigration. Finally, if China's economy continues to grow, potential migrants may prefer to stay at home rather than go abroad.

Notes

1. Almost 10 % of Filipinos work and live overseas.
2. From October 2007 to February 2008, I did a survey among new Chinese migrants in Manila's Chinatown and obtained 176 valid samples. I interviewed nearly 30 individuals. All of the samples are from Chinese associations or result from random distribution on the streets in Chinatown. In 2015 another survey was conducted among board members of the Overseas Chinese Chamber of Commerce and Industry (OCCCI), a Chinese association for new Chinese migrants. I gathered 74 valid samples. I am grateful to all my Filipino informants, especially Andrew Co and his family, for their helpful assistance in my research in the Philippines.
3. Li proposes the concept "Qiaoxiang social capital" to explain Fujian Province's international migration to Europe.
4. New Chinese migrants are Chinese nationals who have been emigrating to others countries for residence or business since the late 1970s. People on student visas and China's labor export staff and Chinese companies' staff who are dispatched abroad are not included. Those who choose to settle down after graduation, and workers who overstay their visas and join the local labor market, are included. Nevertheless, it is hard to define the accurate boundaries of this group.
5. Some 85 % of the Chinese immigrants came from Fujian Province (Chinben See, "Chinese Organizations and Ethnic Identity in the Philippines," in Jennifer Cushman and Wang Gungwu eds., *Changing identities of the Southeast Asian Chinese since World War II*, Hong Kong University Press, 1988, p.321).
6. Wenhui Bao, February 25, 2002.
7. "111,923 foreign nationals comply with annual report requirement" (website of the Bureau of Immigration, http://www.immigration.gov.ph/news/press-release/107-march-2015-pr/759-111-923-foreign-nationals-comply-with-annual-report-requirement).
8. *Tulay*, June 5, 1995; *Tulay*, January 6, 1997; *Tulay*, August 5, 1996.
9. To obtain a SIRV, an alien is supposed to invest at least USD75,000 in the Philippines in the form of stock, real estate or bank deposits. The SRRV launched by the Philippines Retirement Authority in 1987 is issued to applicants above 35 years of age and with a USD75,000 deposit and/or investment in the Philippines, and USD50,000 for applicants who are more than 50 years old.
10. Anyone who is born to at least one parent who was a Philippine citizen at the time of their birth was born with Philippine citizenship.
11. Tagalog language ability is usually used to test whether or not a Filipino birth certificate holder is a real Filipino citizen.

12. Alejandro Portes and Ruben G. Rumbaut, *Immigrant America: A Portrait*, University of California Press, 3rd edition, 2006, p. 356.
13. According to my survey in August 2015, when asked if they had relatives or friends in the Philippines before they migrated, only 5.6 % said no.
14. One respondent said fewer than 2 % of his clients failed to pay on schedule in the course of his more than 20 years of business experience in Chinatown.
15. Li Tian Rong, "New Chinese Immigrants Being New Engine for Philippines' Economy", *Asia weekly*, August 29, 2002, pp. 7–8.
16. For example, Chinese medicine stores have been expanding in recent years and are becoming increasingly popular (Philippines *Shijie Ribao*, March 5, 2003).
17. A successful Chinese entrepreneur engaged in manufacturing told me that his company prefers to employ Filipinos because new Chinese migrants want to set up on their own business. Moreover, Filipinos tend to be content with their wages.
18. "Puzzling Inward Migration to RP," *Philippines Daily Inquirer*, August 11, 2002.
19. According to my survey in August 2015, when asked about the degree of satisfaction in their life and work in the Philippines on a scale of 0–10, my respondents gave an average score of 7.31.
20. "168 Mall in Binondo Raided," *Tulay*, March 21, 2006.

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CHAPTER 9

Ethnicized Networks and Local Embeddedness: The New Chinese Migrant Community in Cambodia

James K. Chin

Ethnic Chinese in Cambodia are the country's largest ethnic minority. About 60 % are urban residents engaged mainly in commerce, and the other 40 % are in rural areas. Since the fall of the Khmer Rouge regime, the once stricken Chinese community has been rejuvenated by an influx of new migrants from mainland China, Hong Kong, Macau, Taiwan and neighboring Southeast Asian countries. Enterprises set up by new Chinese migrants are now present in almost every city and town, particularly Phnom Penh, Siem Reap, Sihanouk Ville and Battambang. Chinese migrant entrepreneurs invest in building factories, banks, hospitals, restaurants, hotels, discos and casinos, while Chinese skilled laborers have been recruited to work in these enterprises, especially in garment factories. New Chinese migrants play a very important role in the economy of Cambodia, whose revenue relies mainly on the duties levied on their factories and companies.

The new Chinese community is vastly different from the old. Three major groups can be discerned: migrants from mainland China; migrants from Hong Kong and Macau; and migrants from Taiwan. How does this community evolve and develop? How do new Chinese migrants build and rebuild social networks? What accounts for their economic integration and

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success? Why do migrant entrepreneurs from Hong Kong and Macau perform much better than those from Taiwan and the mainland? What is the difference between entrepreneurship and crony capitalism? What is the boundary between rent-seeking and migrant entrepreneurship? How can one understand and analyze Chinese capitalism and ethnic migrant entrepreneurship in the developing countries of Southeast Asia?

Based on fieldwork conducted from 2000 to 2015, this chapter focuses on new Chinese migrants from Hong Kong and Macau. I argue that these migrants have commercial acumen and an entrepreneurial spirit that enable them to adapt well to different environments. However, they rely on institutional mechanisms to protect their interests. Through transnational entrepreneurship, new Chinese migrants appear to fare well in the host country, in whose local society they are deeply embedded.

A Historical Overview of the Chinese Community in Cambodia

Earlier Development

Cambodia has had contacts with China since the beginnings of recorded history, and the history of Chinese immigration to Cambodia dates back at least to the late twelfth century (Coedès 1948; Malleret 1959–63). When the Chinese emissary Zhou Daguan visited Angkor in 1296–1297, a Chinese community had long been established there (Zhou 1981). In Phnom Penh, according to a Portuguese adventurer's account, of 20,000 local inhabitants, 3000 were Chinese (Groslier 1958).

Before the French occupation of Cochinchina in 1859, the Chinese born in Cambodia were considered Cambodian if they adopted Khmer customs and dress. Shortly afterwards, Admiral Louis-Adolphe Bonard, the first French governor of Cochinchina, formalized a system of indirect rule over the Chinese, making it compulsory for the Chinese to belong to a *congregation* representative of their dialect group in 1871. Each *congregation* chief was held personally responsible for the taxes of his *congréganistes* and for maintaining order among them. He also had the authority to deport any of them, and each Chinese had to carry an identification card (Willmott 1967). This mechanism reinforced boundaries among dialect groups.

By the end of colonial rule, different Chinese dialect groups had come to corner different economic niches. Teochiu were prominent in business and

trade, Cantonese specialized as craftsmen and in building, Hainanese dominated food and catering, and Hokkien followed careers in government, or traded in books and cloth. Hakka, the smallest group, ran coffee shops and peddled fruit (Teston and Percheron 1931; Edwards 2009).

Statistics released by the All-Cambodian Ethnic Chinese Association (Jianpuzhai Huaren Lishi Zonghui, ACECA) show that in the1950s and 1960s the Chinese community in Cambodia had a booming ethnic economy and a growing population of more than 700,000, excluding those who had taken Cambodian citizenship. Most lived in rural areas before the 1960s and engaged in petty trade. After 1970, revolution launched by the Communist Party of Kampuchea swept the countryside and rural Chinese fled to cities such as Phnom Penh. By early 1975 the Chinese population was basically urban.

Under democratic Kampuchea the cities were evacuated and everyday family ended. In April 1975, ethnic Chinese were driven into the countryside, where they suffered greatly. Around 150,000 Chinese died in the Northwest Zone alone between 1976 and 1978 as a result of execution, starvation and disease. Almost all ethnic Chinese were resettled in the "Chinese village" (Zhen Xiang Zazhi 1981–1982; Kiernan 2002). Their numbers were halved, to some 200,000, by Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge regime, a death rate twice as high as that of the Khmer urban population under the same regime (Zhen Xiang Zazhi 1981–1982; Kiernan 1986, 1990).

Intragroup Diversity

Historically, the Chinese community in Cambodia has been internally diverse. Although literate Chinese can communicate with each other irrespective of dialect, Cantonese, Hainan, Hakka, Hokkien and Teochiu are mutually unintelligible. Hainanese and Hokkiens came to Cambodia much earlier than the other three groups and were already active in Phnom Penh by the late nineteenth century. Before1891, neither the colonial government nor the Cambodian crown required Chinese communities to group along dialect lines. The Chinese must have gravitated spontaneously toward their dialect groups.

Dialect group identity, an intrinsic feature of Chinese immigrant communities, was further entrenched by the *congregation* system. Five *congregations* were established in Phnom Penh: Teochiu, Hainan, Hokkien, Hakka and Cantonese. They arose elsewhere according to the size of Chinese communities. *Congrégation* leaders, hand-picked by the French, were

responsible for policing and taxing their constituents and for enrolling new immigrants (Willmott 1967). While the boundaries between dialect groups were reinforced by the *congrégation* system, language policies of mainland China paved the way for Mandarin teaching in Cambodia's Chinese schools. From the 1950s to 1970, an unprecedented number of Cambodia's Chinese learned Mandarin, and so communication barriers between dialect groups were eroded.

The Socioeconomic Niche of the Sino-Khmer Community

By the end of colonial rule, different dialect groups had cornered different economic niches, as we have seen. Economic specialization generally comes about after emigration, shaped by opportunities and obstacles in the land of settlement, the demographic spread of a given dialect group and its level of access to resources. In this case, colonial economic planning and labor policy also played a role.

There is evidence of a Teochiu community in Phnom Penh from at least the 1880s, and in Kampot and Kompong Cham from the early1900s, but most Teochiu immigration came after the Thai annexation of Battambang in 1941. Thousands of Teochiu poured in from Thailand, radically changing the Chinese demography of Battambang, where Hokkien and Cantonese had previously held sway. When Battambang was returned to Cambodia in 1945, most of these Teochiu settlers stayed on to escape the stringent anti-Chinese restrictions in Thailand. Soon the Teochiu outnumbered the earlier Hokkien and Cantonese settlers in Battambang, and they dominated business. By the 1960s, Teochiu had become the language of commerce in the town. Teochiu has been a driving force behind Chinese education in Cambodia. The Teochiu dialect group runs the most influential voluntary organization in the Sino-Khmer community. The leader of the Teochiu Association, Yang Qiqiu, chairs the All-Cambodian Ethnic Chinese Association, an umbrella organization for the five dialect groups.

The New Chinese Migrant Community Today

Khmer Rouge incursions into Vietnam and the slaughter of ethnic Vietnamese in Cambodia triggered a Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in 1978–1979 (Chanda 1988; Seekins 1990; Becker 1998). Vietnamese motorized troops captured Phnom Penh and dispersed the Khmer Rouge army. More than 150,000 Vietnamese soldiers remained in Cambodia for

the next ten years. In July 1989, the Paris Peace Conference called for their withdrawal (Berman 1996; Becker 1998; Pribbenow II and Merle 2006), which happened shortly afterwards. In October 1991 the Paris Peace Agreements were signed, paving the way for new migrations.

In 1989 the new State of Cambodia began relaxing restrictions on the Chinese community and, backed by Hanoi, gave it more freedom and revived Chinese education. Once peace was restored, new Chinese migrants started to arrive.

According to ACECA, around 500,000 ethnic Chinese live in Cambodia, representing some 2 % of the population. More than 80 % are engaged in trade and business. At least 90 % were born in Cambodia but, over the past 25 years, new migrants have flowed in from mainland China, Hong Kong, Taiwan and other Southeast Asian countries. Most have settled in Phnom Penh, Siem Reap, Sihanouk Ville and Battambang. The Chinese community comprises assimilated ethnic Chinese or Sino-Khmers and new Chinese migrants.

Some new Chinese migrants arrived along ties of kinship and dialect. Others have specialist skills, such as dentistry, medicine, cooking, news reporting and editing, as well as Chinese language teaching. Many have found it difficult to settle down in local society. Chinese schools and companies would not employ them without the proper documents. However, such documents could easily be bought on the local black market. These new Chinese migrants normally had no regional, dialect or occupational identity but their common background in either mainland China, Taiwan or Hong Kong, their knowledge of Mandarin (*putonghua*) or Cantonese, and their shared predicament and national pride gave them a common sense of identity distinct from that of the longstanding ethnic-Chinese community.

New Migrants from Taiwan

A small number of new migrants from Taiwan came to Cambodia in the 1980s. By the time the mainlanders arrived, the Taiwanese had already begun to prosper. Most of the new migrants from Taiwan were investors and businessmen. However, when in the late 1990s the Taipei authorities supported Norodom Ranariddh in his political struggle against the prime minister, Hun Sen, the latter shut down the official Taiwan office in Phnom Penh and expelled Taiwanese officials and business migrants. Businessmen and migrants from Taiwan faded from the picture, and their numbers fell

from 30,000 to around 1000. Their businesses were purchased by new migrants from Hong Kong and mainland China.[1]

Efforts in the early 2010s to restore a semi-official Taiwan presence in Phnom Penh have led to a situation in which an estimated 5000–6000 Taiwanese-owned firms operate in Cambodia. Unfortunately, plans for an official trade office were quashed by Hun Sen because of their political sensitivity (Naren and Robertson 2014).

A large number of the Taiwanese have set up catering businesses in cities such as Phnom Penh and Siem Reap. Interviews with local Taiwanese businessmen and leaders of Chinese voluntary associations in Phnom Penh suggest that around 20,000–30,000 Taiwanese migrants live in Cambodia, though there are no reliable statistics. Thus the Taiwanese community has quietly re-established itself since the late 2000s.

New Migrants from Neighboring ASEAN Countries

Ethnic Chinese from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries, Singapore and Malaysia in particular, also came to Cambodia in the early 1990s. Their numbers are estimated at around 2000. Like the Taiwanese, they are mostly businessmen and include some wealthy tycoons. The most active businessmen are likely to be Chinese Malaysians and Singaporeans. Chinese business migrants from these two countries have established their own commercial associations.

They tend to maintain a low profile. Nexus Naga Hotel presents a good example. The hotel is the biggest luxury hotel in Cambodia. It is owned by Ariston, a little-known company in Malaysia, and its boss is a Malaysian Chinese named Chen Lip Keong. The Ariston Company has close ties to the Cambodian government, so the Malaysian Chinese tycoon was able to secure a special license from the authorities to run a casino in Phnom Penh.

New Migrants from Mainland China

In the early 1990s, Chinese business migrants from Taiwan, Hong Kong and the ASEAN countries were the major players in Cambodia's economy, but new migrants from mainland China have come to dominate the Chinese community during the last decade, at least demographically.

A local-born Chinese journalist based in Phnom Penh, Mr. Li, who has close ties with different Chinese migrant groups, said:

> The new migrants from mainland China are mostly from Zhejiang, Sichuan, Hunan and Guangxi, followed by Guangdong, the Northeast (Liaoning, Jilin and Heilongjiang), Hubei, Henan, Chongqing, Shanghai, Yunnan, Beijing and Fujian. The earliest migrants are the Fujianese, who came in the early 1990s.

According to Li, between 1992 and 1996, 20,000–30,000 Fujianese worked in garment factories owned by Taiwanese. They came not to settle down but as a stepping-stone to the USA. However, the smuggling of migrants by way of Cambodia came to an end in 1997 as a result of US action. New migrants from Zhejiang began arriving in 1999, and their numbers peaked between 2002 and 2004, at 20,000–30,000. Currently at least 5000 Zhejiangese work in the grocery trade. Those from Hunan mainly work in farming. Those from Hubei, Chongqing, Shanghai, Guangdong, Sichuan, Yunnan and Guangxi are small traders, and most Beijingese are engineers and technicians. Some 500 Henanese work in garment factories. The northeasterners number around 2000 and are mostly female, aged late 20s to early 40s. Many work in the sex trade.[2]

Nobody knows exactly how many new migrants from mainland China live and work in Cambodia. Some Cambodian officials say there are more than 40,000 mainland Chinese in the country, but embassy officials and leaders of associations put the figure at more than 100,000. Journalists familiar with Chinese migrant groups put the figure at 150,000–200,000, of whom around 60,000 are illegal.

Unlike new Chinese migrants to developed countries, those in Cambodia are diverse. They include bankers, investors, businessmen, small traders, restaurant owners, schoolteachers, doctors and nurses, journalists and skilled laborers, as well as farmers, fishermen, miners, prostitutes and even refugees (see Table 9.1). Their monthly incomes also vary, as shown in Table 9.2.

Some are *nouveaux riches.* The owner of Nexus Naga Hotel is an example. He was formerly a senior Chinese People's Liberation Army adviser working in the Cambodian army who built up a range of connections with Khmer officials, whence his business success. He remains aloof from his compatriots and keeps a low profile.

Table 9.1 Origins and occupations of mainland Chinese migrants

Origin	*Occupation*
Anhui	Traders and peddlers
Beijing	Clinics and hospitals; engineers and technicians
Fujian	Management in garment factories
Guangdong	Aquiculture; Chinese language teachers; media and journalism
Guangdong: Teochew	Farming and gardening
Guangxi	Clinics and hospitals; traders and peddlers; Chinese language teachers; media and journalism
Hebei	Forestry and logging
Hubei	Farming of rice, vegetables, and mushrooms
Hunan	Farming of rice, vegetables, and mushrooms
Northeastern China (women)	Massage and sex industry
Shanghai	Traders and peddlers
Shandong	Forestry and logging
Sichuan	Chinese language teachers; media and journalism; traders and peddlers
Yunnan	Chinese language teachers; media and journalism; forestry and logging
Zhejiang: Zhuji, Ningbo, Shaoxing	Technicians; management in garment factories
Zhejiang: Qingtian	Import, wholesale, supermarket

Source: Author's compilation

Table 9.2 Monthly income of mainland Chinese migrants in Cambodia

Occupations	*Monthly income (USD)*
Factory workers	500–600
Factory management	600–1500
Private taxi drivers	1000–1500
Engineers	1000–1500
Massage workers and nightclub dancers	500–1500
Chinese language teachers	250–300 (teaching 20–24 hours per week)

Source: Author's compilation

New Migrants from Hong Kong and Macau

New business migrants from Hong Kong and Macau form a small but visible community in Cambodia around 2000 strong. This is often referred to as Gangshang (Hong Kong traders or merchants) by other Chinese

migrants in the country. The Gangshang community comprises two groups of business people:

- The first is Cambodian Chinese who fled to Hong Kong during the war and moved back when the new government was formed. These Sino-Khmers maintained close links with the local Sino-Khmer community, though they had lived in Hong Kong or Macau for more than 15 years and many had children living in Hong Kong. Their dual identities helped them develop businesses in Cambodia.
- The second is businessmen who immigrated from Hong Kong and Macau together with their family business over the past 25 years, mainly (so I am told) because production costs in the Pearl River Delta had increased, whereas post-war Cambodia benefited from a most-favored-nation clause granted by the USA and other Western countries. Many big garment factories moved from the Pearl River Delta to Cambodia, a step warmly welcomed by the Hung Sen government, which needed foreign direct investment.

Some Hong Kong and Macau migrants are in, for example, banking, pharmacy, shipping, catering and as in real estate. However, most are in the garment trade. The Hong Kong and Macau Expatriate and Business Association of Cambodia has 78 corporate members, more than 85 % of whom are in the garment business.

Almost all the businesses established by Hong Kong and Macau new migrants are family owned. They were well established and developed decades before moving to Cambodia in pursuit of cheaper labor and the quota-free system, so they can easily secure orders from clients in Europe and the USA. Most keep their headquarters in Hong Kong, whence they maintain contact with the factories in Cambodia and with clients in the West, while purchasing raw materials and shipping them to Phnom Penh. The patriarch or big boss is based in Cambodia to monitor and control production, while one of his sons (usually the eldest) works in the Hong Kong office. Decisions are made by the patriarch, while senior managers are family members.

As in the case of Taiwanese companies in Cambodia, the senior managers and engineers are from Hong Kong while middle-level managers and workshop chiefs are from mainland China. Initially, the Hong Kong business migrants had to help the latter get working visas, but now they come to Cambodia on their own and seek employment. To show solidarity within

the management, the patriarch invites them, together with middle managers from mainland China, for meals. The workers are Khmers or Sino-Khmers from the villages.

It is not easy for new migrants to set up businesses in a country ravaged by war. Corruption and extortion are rampant and most officials at all levels ask for bribes. New migrants from Hong Kong and Macau, like their counterparts from mainland China and Taiwan, encounter blackmailing and bribe-taking. Nearly all new migrants suffer from the system.

Gangshang business people and other foreign investors frequently experience trouble at the hands of the workers' union. Cambodia has a large number of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) financially supported from abroad. They are wealthy and influential, and they get their voices heard. Some NGOs encourage factory workers to form unions and teach them how to negotiate with the factory owners for higher wages and shorter working hours.

Network-Building and Local Embeddedness: The Case of Gangshang

During my fieldwork I often asked which new Chinese migrant group in Cambodia was most successful. To my surprise, everyone answered Gangshang. I conclude that this is because the multilayered social networks that Gangshang have built in the host society since 1992 have assisted them in their efforts. Six layers of social networking can be discerned in the case of the Gangshang community.

Networking within the Gangshang Community

Internal solidarity has always been a Gangshang priority. The Gangshang community is centered on its leader, Mr. Y, a banker whose clients are business people from Hong Kong and Macau, mainly in the garment trade. To facilitate collaboration among Gangshang and mobilize their financial resources, Mr. Y set up a voluntary association, the China, Hong Kong and Macau Expatriate and Business Association of Cambodia, officially established on March 18, 1998. It is the first of its kind in Southeast Asia. So far only Cambodia has an independent organization established by and for Hong Kong migrant entrepreneurs.

The Hong Kong Migrants' Association obtained the blessing and support of the Chinese embassy. Mr. Y was elected as its founding chairman and the association is based in his bank building. It employs someone from China as its secretary and publishes a monthly newsletter. Its aims are to

- promote and encourage commercial institutions and businessmen from Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR) and Macau SAR to invest and conduct business in Cambodia, and help them contact local government authorities;
- protect the legal rights of members in Cambodia;
- provide consultancy and advice to investors from Hong Kong and Macau, particularly regarding Cambodia's investment policy, environment, working opportunities, accommodation and tourism;
- provide legal and financial consultancy and advice to members, assisting members to solve problems in their investment, management, job searching and accommodation in Cambodia;
- promote business cooperation and information-sharing among members;
- provide members with information about business and security in Cambodia.[3]

The solidarity of the community was tested in July 1997 when Hun Sen launched a military assault on Prince Norodom Ranariddh's Funcinpec party and army. Garment factories owned by Hong Kong and Taiwan businessmen urgently needed cash to purchase materials or comfort their workers, so a large crowd gathered in front of Mr. Y's bank. Mr. Y ordered his staff to release funds to those in need and asked shareholders to inject more cash into the bank. The bank thus not only won the trust and gratitude of migrant entrepreneurs but benefited some Taiwanese businessmen. As a result, the latter applied to join the Gangshang Association.

The association organizes group tours for its members and special workshops, while inviting officials from the Chinese embassy and the Cambodian government to give speeches and explain government policies.

Networking with Other Chinese Communities

Maintaining regular and close cooperation links with other Chinese communities is important for the survival and development of the Gangshang group. It has relations with the Singapore Chamber of Commerce in

Cambodia, the Malaysian Chamber of Commerce in Cambodia and the China Chamber of Commerce in Cambodia.

The local ethnic-Chinese community has been established for generations, and a nationwide umbrella organization named Jianhua Lishi Zonghui (All-Cambodian Ethnic Chinese Association) was re-established on December 26, 1990 with the approval of the Hun Sen regime. It comprises five dialect groups and 18 branches in all of Cambodia's provinces. It has set up more than 70 Chinese schools, with one in almost every town and big village. More than 50,000 Chinese students have enrolled to study Chinese language and culture (Wu 1993). The community numbers between 600,000 and 800,000, 250,000 of whom live in Phnom Penh. Some are wealthy and maintain links with senior officials. The Gangshang community treats these local ethnic Chinese with care and respect, regularly inviting their leaders to dinner, and it donates money and provisions to support poor ethnic Chinese.

There are regular exchanges between Gangshang and Chinese from mainland China and Taiwan, although it is my observation that the relationship between Gangshang and businessmen from mainland China and Taiwan is not close. Relations are harmonious but built on the basis of mutual respect and understanding rather than of real trust and cooperation.

Networking with the Chinese Government

Hong Kong and Macau are now part of China, so migrant entrepreneurs spend much time and energy networking with the Chinese government by building up a relationship with the embassy. At important events, such as when leaders or officials of the People's Republic of China visit Cambodia, the Gangshang invite them to a banquet and they frequently invite the Chinese ambassador to attend their activities. The Gangshang community has extended this network to some provincial governments in China, including in Guangxi, Guangdong and Shandong, to promote new investment opportunities on the mainland.

When I asked why they put so much effort into building close links with the embassy and different levels of the Chinese government, I was told that it is sometimes useful when seeking the embassy's assistance in negotiating with the Cambodian government and protecting Gangshang rights and interests.

Networking with the Homeland

Gangshang as a whole identify with Hong Kong or Macau, though many have permanent residence permits or Cambodian passports. On December 22, 1999, the Gangshang held a party to celebrate the handover of Macau's sovereignty. In June 2004, it invited the Hong Kong SAR football team to visit Cambodia. Official visits from Hong Kong and Macau are warmly received by the Gangshang community. Mr. Y's bank and many private enterprises based in Cambodia receive logistic and financial support from Hong Kong, which encourages their identification with the region. As one of their advertisements says, *Xiang Gang shi wo jia* (Hong Kong is my home).

Networking with Ethnic Chinese Communities from ASEAN Countries

The association established by mainland Chinese entrepreneurs and the local ethnic-Chinese community would not normally have contacts or collaborate with ethnic-Chinese migrants from ASEAN countries. However, the Gangshang community sees the ASEAN Chinese as good business partners and so maintains regular working relations with them. In November 2002, for instance, a trip to Thailand was organized by the Gangshang Association to link up with Chinese associations in Thailand. In October 2004 it organized a big party with Cambodia's Malaysian Chamber of Commerce and Singapore's Chamber of Commerce to promote commercial cooperation. Ambassadors from these three countries were invited.

Cross-Ethnic Networking with the Cambodian Regime

This network with the regime is most important for the survival and development of the Gangshang community, which has spent years building it up. First on the long list of VIPs who supports the Gangshang community is Premier Hun Sen's wife Bun Rany. She is from a Hainanese migrant family and has close connections with the ethnic Chinese community. Her intimate friend is a local Chinese woman named Ms. YDP, also from the Hainan dialect group. The Gangshang leaders, following Ms. YDP's suggestion, raised funds for Cambodia's Red Cross, which Hun Sen's wife chairs. Thus they succeeded in getting close to Bun Rany and through her they could speak with Hun Sen.

Second on the list is Mr. S, deputy premier minister and senior minister in charge of the Office of the Council of Ministers. He is an old friend of Mr. Y, and he helped him in 1991 to open a bank in Cambodia. Mr. S is an invisible partner in the bank and recently, after resigning from it, became the honorary president of the Gangshang. His personal relationship with Mr. Y is very close and he is always ready to give him advice and help. The important but invisible assistance of Mr. S and other senior officials in the Cambodian government has helped make the Gangshang community a successful business group. Through Mr. Y, all the other Gangshang can tap indirectly into the social capital forged between Hong Kong's migrant entrepreneurs and the ruling elite. On the one hand, Mr. S and his colleagues in the cabinet provide enormous assistance, protection and favors to the Hong Kong migrant entrepreneurs; on the other hand, the Khmer ruling elite collect enough "rent" from their business partners as a result of the relationship. Neither the mainland Chinese migrants nor the Taiwan businessmen have networks of this sort. That is why the Gangshang perform so much better in Cambodia than their counterparts from Taiwan and mainland China.

Entrepreneurship or Crony Capitalism?

Are the business activities of Chinese overseas best described as entrepreneurship or crony capitalism? How can one best understand Chinese capitalism and ethnic migrant entrepreneurship in Southeast Asia? What is the boundary between rent-seeking and migrant entrepreneurship? Are Chinese migrant rent-seekers entrepreneurs? Can the collaboration between Chinese migrant entrepreneurs and the Cambodian regime be viewed as an inevitable part of the early stage of economic development in the host society?

Crony capitalism refers to a situation in which success in business depends on close relations between business people and government officials. It may take the form of favoritism in the distribution of legal permits, government grants and special tax breaks, or other forms of state intervention. Yoshihara Kunio argues in his research on ersatz capitalism in Southeast Asia that crony capitalists are "private-sector businessmen who benefit enormously from close relations with leading officials and politicians, obtaining not only protection from foreign competition, but also concessions, licenses, monopoly rights, and government subsidies" (Yoshihara 1988). Rent-seeking occurs when an individual, organization or firm seeks

to earn income by capturing economic rent by manipulating or exploiting the economic environment rather than by earning profits through economic transactions and the production of added value (Tullock 1967; Krueger 1974; Ross 1996). It generally implies the extraction of uncompensated value from others without making any contribution to productivity, such as by gaining control of land and other natural resources, or by imposing burdensome regulations or government decisions that may affect consumers or businesses. Rent-seeking in the aggregate imposes substantial losses on society (Kang 2003). Rent-seeking behavior is distinguished in theory from profit-seeking behavior, in which entities seek to extract value by engaging in mutually beneficial transactions. Critics point out that, in practice, it can be hard to distinguish between beneficial profit-seeking and detrimental rent-seeking (Pasour 1987). The term "rent-seeking" has been applied to bureaucrats who solicit and extract "bribes" or "rent" for applying legal but discretionary authority to benefit clients (Chowdhury 2006).

It is generally agreed that clean governments are better at fostering growth than those driven by crony capitalism and corruption. In Southeast Asia and East Asia, particularly in Indonesia, Malaysia and South Korea, crony capitalism is too widespread to ignore. Why does it impede growth in some developing countries but not in others? Theoretical advances on rent-seeking, transaction costs and the new institutional economics can help explain when cronyism is deleterious and when it is not. If there is a situation of mutual hostages among a small and stable number of government and business actors, for instance, cronyism can reduce transaction costs and minimize dead weight losses through its special links forged and arrangements reached with the government authorities.

By examining corruption and cronyism through the lens of transaction costs, it can be shown why a particular set of government–business relations, although corrupt, reduces transaction costs and makes investment more credible means while another set of relations does not. This approach can explain one aspect of corruption and offers a theoretically grounded causal mechanism that distinguishes between types of corruption. An analytic framework that contrasts a transaction-cost approach with neoclassical models of the economy will show that the former leads to different expectations and different conclusions regarding cronyism and policy-making.

The perspective of new institutional economics is particularly useful for understanding cronyism and Chinese capitalism in most of Southeast Asia, especially Cambodia. While personal relations sometimes enhance efficiency and reduce transaction costs, special links formed with local ruling elites can

provide Chinese migrants with protection and opportunities for corporate expansion and investment. In a developing country where legal, political and economic institutions are weak, where information about market conditions is scarce and difficult to obtain, and where investments and property rights are often insecure, Chinese migrant entrepreneurs have to engage in crony capitalism by networking with local regimes to get protection and lower transaction costs. The boundary between rent-seeking and migrant entrepreneurship is blurred in such a context, and the actions of new Chinese migrant entrepreneurs in Cambodia are understandable. It is necessary for them to form rent-seeking connections with powerful ruling elites in the host society, especially in the early stages of economic development.

Conclusion

The influx into Cambodia of Chinese migrants, mainly merchants and entrepreneurs, has been going on for a long time. Unlike in developed countries and most developing countries of Southeast Asia, the new Chinese migrant community in Cambodia is highly diversified—socially, professionally and in terms of provenance. Some new migrants are from remote inland places such as Xinjiang and Qinghai. In that sense, this research concerns a new trend in Chinese transnational migration.

Sociologists have highlighted the importance of social networks in economic transactions (Granovetter 1985; Coleman 1990). Network relationships underpin the social capital that determines a firm's or an ethnic migrant community's ability to create value or achieve economic goals (Coleman 1990; Tsia and Ghoshal 1998; Echols and Tsai 2005). The performance of the Chinese migrant community in Cambodia can be better understood by examining the network of relationships in which different subethnic migrant groups are embedded. The multilayered network built up by the Gangshang community helps harmonize its intragroup relationships while providing channels for sharing valuable information and resources. Migrant entrepreneurs from Hong Kong and Macau use its network channels to seek advice and gain access to key resources and investment opportunities.

Since the early 1990s, studies on Chinese capitalism have argued that ethnic Chinese networks are spearheading Asia's economic growth and becoming a major global force (Kotkin 1993; Nasbitt 1995; Rowher 1995; East Asia Analytical Unit 1995; Weidenbaum and Hughes 1996; Hiscock 1997). Other studies contend that contemporary Chinese

capitalism has distinctive characteristics that have facilitated its growth. The institutions, norms and practices of ethnic Chinese have been identified as reasons for the growth of their enterprises and the emergence of Chinese business networks. Ethnic networks, based on trust and kinship ties, have reduced transaction costs, increased coordination and diminished risks (Redding 1990; Whitley 1992; Kotkin 1993; Gomez 1999).

While acknowledging the contributions made by intraethnic networks to the rise of Chinese capitalism, this research emphasizes the role played in the Cambodian case by cross-ethnic networks. The multilayered Gangshang network depicted is useful in the daily life and business activities of the Gangshang community. Carefully built up over three decades, it has strengthened their internal solidarity while promoting friendly relations with different subgroups of Chinese community, fellow ethnic Chinese from other ASEAN countries, the Chinese government and its official representatives, and the Khmer ruling elite, which is essential for their survival and success. In the Gangshang case, the most important tie is that forged with the Khmer ruling elite. The Gangshang community has thus become an influential and successful business group in Cambodia, despite its small size. That is why new Chinese migrants from other parts of mainland China and Taiwan cannot compete with those from Hong Kong and Macau.

It is possible to depict the network system established by new Chinese migrants in Cambodia using a multilayered ball-shaped model. As illustrated, the migrants are protected by different layers of networks. All these networks are pliable and strong, and, whenever the network system is pressed by external forces, the interwoven networks quickly respond and help the system to recover to its original state. Like a multilayered rubber ball, the heavier the blow, the quicker the reaction. Sometimes layers of the network might be broken by violent external attacks, but other layers maintain their protective function.

New Chinese migrants, especially those from Hong Kong and Macau, are endowed with a commercial acumen and entrepreneurial spirit that enables them to adapt to different environments in the host society. However, they must rely on various institutional mechanisms to keep them safe and protect their interests. Where legal, political and economic institutions are weak, as in post-war Cambodia, personal relations between migrant entrepreneurs and government officials, patron–client relations, rent-seeking and crony capitalism are needed as strategies for survival and social mobility. Through transnational entrepreneurship, new Chinese migrants

appear to fare well in Cambodia, while transforming their diversified community into one protected and assisted by different networks intertwining with each other. By collaborating with the Khmer ruling elite, some new Chinese migrants have successfully established themselves in Cambodia and become deeply embedded in Cambodian society.

Notes

1. Interview notes with the chairman of the Taiwanese Commercial Association of Cambodia, March 25, 2009.
2. Interview notes, November 5, 2011, Phnom Penh, Cambodia.
3. See "Pamphlet on the China Hong Kong & Macau Expatriate & Business Association," 2000, p. 3. Phnom Penh, internal publication. It can also be read on the official website: http://www.chkmeba.com.kh/about/statute.html

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PART III

New Chinese Diasporas in Oceania

CHAPTER 10

Rediscovering the New Gold Mountain: Chinese Immigration to Australia Since the Mid-1980s

Jia Gao

Introduction

Graeme Hugo, an Australian demographer, wrote in 2012 that in the post-war shift of Australian economic, political and social attention to Asia, one of the major elements has been "an increased level of population movement in both directions" (Hugo 2012: 20). He defined the 1970s as a significant turning point because of the official end to the "White Australia" policy in 1973 and the acceptance of large groups of Indochinese boat people after 1976. According to James Jupp, a British-Australian political scientist, the concept and practice of multiculturalism were also introduced in Australia in the 1970s, and multiculturalism was endorsed by the Racial Discrimination Act of 1975 (Jupp 1995). The 1970s were a decade of crucial social and political transformation in Australia. Australians' views on war, the role of women, immigration, labor rights and many other social issues underwent far-reaching changes (Viviani 1996). As a result, hundreds of thousands of immigrants from Asia and the Middle East were allowed to migrate to Australia in the late 1970s and 1980s.

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During the 1970s, when Australia opened its doors to large numbers of immigrants from Asia and the Middle East, China's door was still largely closed to the outside world. Australia received few immigrants from China before the mid-1980s, with the exception of a few thousand Chinese nationals from Xinjiang, allowed in under the Australia China Family Reunion Agreement initiated by Prime Minister Gough Whitlam and Premier Zhou Enlai in early 1973 (Woodard 1985). Other immigrants of Chinese descent who arrived in Australia during the 1970s and 1980s were mainly Indochinese boat people or remigrants from other Asian countries. Their arrival helped change the Chinese community in Australia dramatically. The ethnic Chinese population, fewer than 10,000 in the late 1940s, grew steadily to about 50,000 in 1976 and 200,000 in 1986 (Kee 1992). According to the 1986 Census, the Chinese population experienced the largest increase in the late 1970s and early 1980s. While not ranking high in terms of wealth accumulation, they already displayed significant educational achievement. For example, 13 % of first-generation, 16.4 % of second-generation and 10 % of third-generation Chinese settlers had a tertiary education compared with the Australian average of 5.4 % (Kee 1992).

As shown in Fig. 10.1, Australia mainly attracted migrants from the UK and other European countries before the early 1970s. At the end of World War II, the country was seriously short of labor, and there was a growing awareness that population growth was the key to future prosperity. The government implemented a new large-scale immigration program. However, the "White Australia" policy resulted in post-war immigrants still



Fig. 10.1 Foreign-born population in Australia, 1901–1971 (Source: DIBP 2015)

being recruited from the UK, Ireland and continental Europe. Chinese and other "non-whites" were excluded.

Australia's ethnic Chinese population grew suddenly and significantly in the late 1980s and early 1990s as a result of the settlement of 45,000 or so Chinese students living in the country. Since then it has seen a rapid increase. The 1996 Census recorded 343,523 Australian residents identifying themselves as Chinese speakers, and in 2001 the number claiming to be of Chinese origin rose to about 555,500 (Gao 2015). According to the 2011 Census, around 866,200 Australian residents claimed Chinese origin and as many as 74 % were first-generation immigrants (ABS 2012a). The settlement of 45,000 or so Chinese students in the late 1980s and early 1990s not only reactivated direct immigration from the Chinese mainland to Australia but renewed Australia's status as the "new gold mountain," a preferred destination for new Chinese immigrants.

This chapter asks how and why the settlement of Chinese students affected immigration from China to Australia from the mid-1980s onwards, and examines its patterns, trends and characteristics from the mid-1980s to the present. It offers an analysis in political-economic terms of immigration and diasporic development as impacted by contemporary inflows of migrants, students, tourists and investors from China, and explains how and why Chinese, once seen as aliens, have now become an integral part of contemporary Australia. The chapter goes on to take a brief look at the literature on Chinese immigration to Australia. This is followed by a section that looks at how the tightly closed doors to China and Australia were opened in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and another that examines major changes in the ethnic Chinese population in recent decades and their current socioeconomic status in Australia. The chapter concludes with some thoughts on how Chinese migrant experiences can be analyzed in future research.

Perspectives on Chinese Immigration to Australia

Because of Australia's long history dating back to the gold-rush years of the 1850s, the Chinese community there and the experiences of new migrants from China have been considered from a number of perspectives, resulting in quite a large number of scholarly publications. This literature can be divided into two main types, depending on the focus of research.

The first type is oriented toward mainstream society or studies of the dominant group. It focuses on documenting and analyzing how Chinese in

Australia were mistreated in the nineteenth century, and draws on accounts of the early Chinese experience in a range of genres and social contexts (e.g., Cronin 1982; Fitzgerald 2007; Ryan 1995, 2003). Some studies have related Chinese experiences in Australia to broader issues, including racism and its global and historical contexts, capitalism and multiculturalism (Fitzgerald 2007, 2012; Lake and Reynolds 2008; Jakubowicz 2011). According to Tung (2005), many studies look at specific geographical regions, smaller localities, family networks, Chinatowns and the trade activities of earlier groups of Chinese (e.g., Atkinson 1995; Couchman 1995; Fitzgerald 2001; Lydon 1999; McGowan 2004).

The second type is more concerned with the Chinese community itself. A variety of studies look at the premigration experiences of new migrants and the factors that affected their decision to come to Australia (Kee and Skeldon 1994; Ho and Coughlan 1997; Wang and Lai 1987). A small number of publications document how Chinese students obtained the right to stay in Australia after 1989 (Birrell 1994; Gao 2006a, 2009, 2011). Since the mid-1990s and especially the 2000s, more researchers have turned their attention to post-arrival experiences of Chinese immigrants to focus on settlement-related issues (Chan 2005; Kee 1992, 1995; Khoo and Mak 2003). These topics include changing perceptions of Australia and China (Fung and Chen 1996; Ip et al. 1998); family life (Crissman 1991); identity and transnationality (Ang 2000; Fung and Chen 1996; Ip et al. 1997; Tan 2006); media consumption and cultural life (Gao 2006c; Sun 2005; Sun et al. 2011); and social mobility (Wu 2003; Wu et al. 1998). Also explored are gender (Hibbins 2006; Ho 2006); health and aging (Lo and Russell 2007); and intergenerational issues and education (Dooley 2003).

Publications in the second category include some that look at issues specifically related to the occupational adjustment of Chinese immigrants (Wu et al. 1998; Hugo 2008) and their family businesses and entrepreneurship (Collins 2002; Ip 1993; Lever-Tracy et al. 1991; Yu 2001). These focus on a crucial aspect of post-migration life—that is, the means of livelihood of new migrants—and have continued the scholarly tradition of studying the entrepreneurship of overseas Chinese. In more recent years, owing to Asian economic development, the topic of migrant entrepreneurship has since the mid-2000s attracted more atention than before, and a large number of studies have examined the causes and consequences of ethnic Chinese entrepreneurship and related conceptual issues (Li 2007; Zhou 2004). As part of this worldwide trend, researchers have sought to

explain Chinese immigrant entrepreneurship in Australia, including the impact of social and human capital (Collins and Low 2010; Lund et al. 2006) and the relationship between them (Peters 2002; Zolin et al. 2011); the integration experience of Chinese entrepreneurs (Liu 2011); intergenerational succession (Ye et al. 2010); Chinese entrepreneurs' role in trade and commerce (Tung and Chung 2010); and transnationalism and dynamism (Gao 2006b; Hsu 2009).

However, few studies analyze overall patterns, trends and key features of new Chinese migration to Australia, and political economic analyses of the emergence and growth of new Chinese immigration to Australia in the context of what has happened in both China and Australia as the host country are fewer still. Although a few scholars have pointed out that the new Chinese migration has to be considered in the context of "the global economic restructuring process" (Lo and Wang 1997: 49) or "within the political economy of the nation state" (Jakubowicz 2009: 115), little attention has been paid to such analysis. Researchers have focused instead on the post-arrival experiences of new Chinese migrants and a number of settlement-related issues, and the growing body of such studies has further blurred our understanding of the socioeconomic circumstances in which the new Chinese migration to Australia has taken place and in which migrants have lived and worked. Without taking into account sociopolitical and socioeconomic transformations in China and Australia in recent decades, researchers fail to provide a fuller and clearer picture of this fastest-growing immigrant community in Australia.

To address this major gap in the research literature, this chapter analyzes Chinese migration to Australia at the intersection of two rapidly changing contexts of exit and reception, from China to Australia. While both countries are undergoing a sustained period of economic growth and social transformation, they are doing so in distinctive ways that have contributed to shaping patterns of immigration and adaptation or integration. These patterns are not adequately explained by existing theories and models. While Australia has been 'in the process of becoming more Asian' (Katzenstein 2002: 106), China has become more open and globalized. By examining relevant aspects of political-economic conditions in China and Australia, this chapter offers an explanation of how recent Chinese immigration to Australia happened and what factors affected the overall patterns, trends and characteristics of the new generations of Chinese migrants.

Opening Two Tightly Closed Doors

The discussion about the resumption of Chinese immigration to Australia in the mid-1980s has to start with a brief mention of the fact that both Australia and China were famous for their closed-door policies. The resumption of direct immigration from China to Australia was a result of the efforts of many young Chinese who took advantage of the changing policy environments in both China and Australia and facilitated the opening of two tightly closed doors: China's to allow its populace to migrate and travel internationally, and Australia's to allow in Chinese migrants, students and tourists. China officially reopened its door after the end of the Cultural Revolution in the late 1970s, but only gradually. China first opened its door to inbound tourists and then sent many young students to developed countries.

However, Australia resumed significant direct immigration from China in the late 1980s and early 1990s in a rather abnormal fashion. Many young Chinese students came to Australia under its English Language Intensive Course for Overseas Students (ELICOS) scheme in the mid-1980s, and some 45,000 were given a four-year temporary residency after the June 4 incident of 1989 (the Tiananmen Square Massacre). They were allowed to stay permanently in 1993 (Gao 2006a, 2009). As a direct result, Australia has seen a rapid increase in its Chinese-speaking population.

The Joint Effects of International Education Policies

The major push factors behind the arrival of Chinese students in Australia emerged out of changes in China in the early 1980s, especially the country's new strategy of sending thousands of young Chinese to study abroad (Orleans 1988). A social craze emerged, the so-called "tide of going abroad," which swelled even further after the first major setback to China's reform in 1984. At the time, the USA was the favored destination, but it took mostly graduate students or visiting researchers. Other countries, including Canada, Germany, Japan, Australia and New Zealand, quickly identified a new market in language education.

International education in Australia has its origins in the 1950s, when the Colombo Plan was launched as a postcolonial or post-war initiative to maintain British influence in South and Southeast Asia (Oakman 2004) and brought tens of thousands of Asian students from Southeast Asia to the country. However, international education only became one of Australia's

economic sectors of importance in the mid-1980s, after economic restructuring in the 1970s and 1980s failed to introduce new industries and jobs (Gao 2015). The ELICOS scheme was therefore introduced to earn foreign currency (Marginson 1997). It started in 1986, when a few hundred Chinese arrived to take the courses.

Despite the ELICOS scheme, Chinese students had yet to dominate the overseas-student market in Australia in the mid-1980s. However, their strong interest in studying overseas and Australia's efforts to attract more students from Asia resulted in a steady inflow of young Chinese. China was relatively poor, but it was potentially the biggest market in the world and became a prime target for Australian language-teaching. A number of ELICOS colleges promoted their courses in Chinese cities, and the pull factor from Australia started to take effect in 1987 and 1988. An "Australia fever" thus emerged in China.

While "the tide of going abroad" was in full flow in China, the "Australia fever" spread from more globalized places in Guangdong to others elsewhere in China. The attention of a large number of Chinese turned to Australia, one of several countries offering language courses. Known as the "new gold mountain" in the 1850s, as against San Francisco's "old gold mountain," Australia, was rediscovered by young Chinese. In 1988, Chinese students recruited by ELICOS colleges flocked there, and their numbers doubled shortly before June 1989. It was estimated that more than 100,000 Chinese students studied in Australia from 1986 to 1989 (Fung and Chen 1996).

The Chinese Student Issue of 1989

A few days after the June 4 incident, the Australian government published figures showing that 15,405 Chinese nationals lived in Australia on June 4, 1989 (Birrell 1994; Jupp 1991). Australia decided to join several Western countries to offer temporary protection to Chinese nationals, who were given temporary protection visas several times a year after that (Cronin 1993; Gao 2013). However, the number of Chinese nationals in need of Australia's protection increased significantly because none of the ELICOS colleges wanted to refund the tuition fees that thousands of Chinese students had already paid, though they had not yet arrived in Australia by June 4, 1989. To help ELICOS colleges keep the money, as well as the job opportunities for thousands of Australians, the Australian government made a number of changes to tighten the screening procedures for visa

applications and allow more than 25,000 Chinese students to come to Australia to start courses a few months after the June 4 incident. These late arrivals were called the "post-20 June [1989] group" and their number was considerably larger than that of the "pre-20 June group." The pressure from the small but growing education export industry gave the impression that Australia could further open up its border to Chinese if other sectors required a similar policy response.

The June 4 incident changed the nature of the "tide of going abroad" and turned the great majority of Chinese students studying overseas in the late 1980s and early 1990s into a new generation of Chinese migrants. In the course of dealing with the Chinese-student issue in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the Australian government had three ministers look after the immigration department. Gerry Hand, representing the left faction of the Australian Labor Party (ALP), once used the number of students and the low level of their qualifications to argue against a blanket approach to handling the student issue. He was "dumped" soon after making the comment on the grounds that it might weaken the ALP's "ethnic" support. However, Hand's successor, Nick Bolkus, publicly praised the Chinese students as an enormously talented group (Gao 2015). He later recalled that his department carefully went through the profiles of these students, and discovered that "we had within our shores some of the crème of young China" (Bourke 2009: 1).

The policies and actions of the Australian government in response to the Chinese student issue, and the students' demand to stay permanently in Australia, were contradictory, dictated by both national interests and humanitarian concerns. The students were allowed to stay permanently as a result of the so-called "1 November [1993] decisions" made by the Paul Keating Labor government. The decisions honored a promise made by the previous Labor prime minister, Bob Hawke, that none of the Chinese students would be forced to return to China against their will. In addition to the students who were allowed to stay under these decisions, about 4000–5000 did not meet the criteria for residency. Fortunately for them, Australia was a rather different place by the mid-1990s. After the federal election in March 1996, the newly elected Liberal-National Coalition government abandoned the tough stance on the Chinese-student issue and adopted a more pragmatic approach to solving the problem left unsolved by the 1993 decisions.

China's Post-Deng Reform and Australia's Responses

The 1993 decisions to allow 45,000 or so Chinese students to stay permanently were not made without consideration of Australia's long-term and strategic interests. As a strong advocate of integration with Asia, Paul Keating made the decision, flawlessly timed to coincide with a new phase of China's reform after Deng Xiaoping's famous inspection tour of southern China in early 1992. Despite the humanitarian nature of the student issue, Keating's "Asianization" policies (Cotton and Ravenhill 1997: 12) not only included an understanding of the potential of human capital for Australia's future relations with China and other Asian countries but re-emphasized education and skills in the selection of immigrants.

A number of published studies on the topic, including some of my own, have failed to consider the dynamism behind the resumption of direct immigration from China. As mentioned earlier, both China and Australia were undergoing socioeconomic transformation at the time. If one considers the resumption of Chinese immigration to Australia from a different perspective, the 1993 decision to allow the students to stay permanently was part of Australia's historic shift toward Asia. This shift was initiated by the Whitlam Labor government and the Fraser Liberal government in the 1970s and early 1980s, and was advocated by the next two Labor prime ministers, Bob Hawke and Paul Keating.

Australia saw greater trade potential in China than in other regions. In 1980 the volume of trade between Australia and China already "amounted to US$1.27 billion, and Australia was China's fifth biggest trading partner' (Huan 1985: 124). In 1980, Australia had a trade surplus of more than AUD650 million with China, much larger than its surpluses with Taiwan and Hong Kong (Fung and Mackerras 1985), and "the annual growth rate averaged 24.5 %, almost twice Australia's total export growth rate" (Woodard 1997: 147–148). By the mid-1980s, Australia had integrated itself into the Asia-Pacific economy, and more than 60 % of its total trade was conducted with Asia and the Pacific (Humphreys 1985).

Despite being frequently distracted by pessimistic comments about China, Australian policy-makers have found China's potential as a trading partner too good to ignore. Keeping the door open was in the interests not only of ELICOS colleges but also of many other industries. While Australia was making efforts to adjust its economy to the rapidly developing Chinese economy and to connect its economic restructuring to China's modernization, the renewed interest of young Chinese in studying abroad and the



Fig. 10.2 China's share of Australia's total merchandise trade, 1901–2012 (Source: The Treasury 2012)

establishment of Australia's ELICOS program brought thousands of Chinese to Australia.

As a direct effect of the settlement of 45,000 or so Chinese students in the early 1990s, many thousands of Chinese students and migrants have arrived every year since, and Australia has seen a rapid increase in the Chinese-speaking population. As shown in Fig. 10.2, the settlement of the students coincided with, if not resulted in, a turning point in Australia's trade history: a big and growing proportion of this trade has since been conducted with China.

The latest wave of Chinese migration to Australia has significantly influenced present-day Australia. The early debate about whether to accept the Chinese students was part of a learning process. Since June 1989, two parallel processes had been going on at the same time. The Chinese students were seeking opportunities to stay, and some dominant sections of mainstream society, especially government institutions, were experiencing a long and onerous learning curve with regard to an increased intake of Chinese immigrants and its policy implications. The focus of the rethinking was on whether it was worth allowing the students to stay because, at the time, many Australians were still influenced by the stereotype of the poor Chinese diggers who arrived in the country during the gold rush. As shown in



Fig. 10.3 Migration program outcome by family and skill stream (Source: DIBP 2015)

Fig. 10.3, the settlement of the large group of Chinese students in the early 1990s also coincided with another vital turning point in Australian immigration history: the decision to admit more skilled than unskilled migrants. The arrival of hundreds of educated Chinese from Hong Kong and Taiwan in the 1980s and the settlement of the students in the early 1990s had helped Australia to renew its policy emphasis on immigrants' education, skills and contribution to the local economy, which had also gone through a prolonged period of restructuring.

If the number of ethnic Chinese living in Australia in 1986 was only about 200,000, ten years later the Census recorded as many as 343,500 Chinese-speakers. Since the mid-1990s, the number of residents claiming Chinese origin has increased rapidly, especially in the decade since the mid-2000s. In 2006 the number of people claiming to be of Chinese origin rose to about 669,900 (ABS 2007). The 2006 Census revealed that the largest group of overseas-born in Australia were still from the UK and New Zealand, but the Chinese-born population had moved up from seventh place on the list in 1996 to third place. Given problems with the Census design (e.g., listing Australia as a country of ancestry and excluding birthplaces of grandparents), the Chinese population in Australia is believed to be much larger than the 866,200 recorded by the 2011 Census. A big factor in this increase has been the inflow of students and migrants, which started with the acceptance of the students in the early 1990s. Since then, the Chinese community in Australia has entered its current model-community phase, as we shall see in the following section.

Settling Down in the New Gold Mountain

As an essential part of Australia's nation-building, post-1993 immigration to the country has been guided by more selective policies than in the past. In addition to increases in the number of highly qualified immigrants, the number of skilled immigrants has also increased steadily. In March 1996, the Labor government was replaced by a Liberal-National coalition government led by John Howard, and within a few months the newly elected coalition government "shifted the focus of the Migration Programme from family towards skilled migration" (DIBP 2015: 71). In 1997 the Howard government announced that greater priority would be given to business and skilled migrants, with the skill stream being rapidly increased to about 37 % of the total immigration intake, as against 29 % in the previous year (DIBP 2015: 71).

The New Demography of the Chinese Community

Post-1993 Chinese immigration to Australia has been managed by more selective policies than before, especially the inclusion of two new selection criteria: skills were added to the list, followed by the capacity to invest in the Australian economy. Obviously, the Chinese student issue of the late 1980s and early 1990s helped Australia to develop its new emphasis on educational qualifications, skills and the capacity to invest.

China's reform and open-door policy has been further liberalized and some new policy initiatives, such as its "going out" strategy, have been implemented. To benefit from China's booming economy, the Howard government (1996–2007) allowed a large number of overseas students to seek residency after their study under an onshore skilled-migration scheme. This policy initiative has not only helped Australia's universities but has radically reshaped the demographic structure of the Chinese community and completely transformed it in terms of levels of education and family wealth. As a result, immigration from major Asian countries to Australia, as shown in Fig. 10.4, has increased rapidly since the 1990s, but immigrants from China have been the largest group.

Australia's Liberal-National coalition was in government from 1996 to 2007, when immigration policy became even more central to the country's nation-building and economic growth strategies. In addition to the above changes, special attention has been paid to new business migration schemes. By the late 1990s about 80 % of business migrants were of Chinese origin



Fig. 10.4 East-Asian sources of migrants relative to 1991 levels (Source: Australian Census Stats 2012)

(Jordens 2001). This trend has continued in the past 20 years since the mid-1990s. For example, around 84 % of sponsored business migrants in Victoria in the mid-2000s were from China (Murphy 2006). Since the financial crisis of 2008, "almost two-thirds of Business Skills visas went to nationals from the People's Republic of China" (DIAC 2013: 34). All this happened while the Chinese in Australia were becoming more visible among professionals, and the ethnic Chinese community's capacity to invest and run businesses has improved beyond recognition.

Over the past two decades since the mid-1990s, China has rapidly moved from being Australia's fifth-largest trade partner to its largest, and Australia has become China's first foreign direct-investment destination, while China has been at the top of Australia's list of incoming tourists, international students and new immigrants. Therefore, apart from many jobs created by governments and companies, only a small fraction of which are offered to people of Chinese origin, the continuing growth and massive scale of trade and people-to-people exchange between Australia and China have provided many Chinese immigrants with more opportunities than non-Chinese Australians have.

China-Related Businesses and the Community's Prosperity

A free-market economy like that of Australia is often dominated by a few big companies. When new Chinese immigrants started importing in the late 1990s and early 2000s, they could only import products that the purchasing managers of big Australian companies did not purchase. There has been an invisible competition for market share between the purchasing managers and ethnic-Chinese business people in the past 20 years since the mid-1990s. While Chinese have slowly taken a larger market share than ever, they have also played a more vital role than other Australians in activating and maintaining people-to-people exchanges between China and Australia, while also exporting.

As illustrated in Fig. 10.5, international tourism and education have developed at a phenomenal rate in Australia since the 1990s, making them the country's second and third largest foreign-currency earners. Without its Chinese community, Australia would almost certainly never attract so many tourists and students from China and persuade so many Chinese to purchase Australian goods and services. For these reasons, the Chinese community has taken up a large share of some markets and earned a large slice of the total incomes from them.



Fig. 10.5 China is Australia's largest services (tourism and education) export market (Source: The Treasury 2012)

Australia is one of the few countries that have greatly benefited from China's socioeconomic development and integration into the world economy, and especially from the increasing size of the Chinese middle class and its enthusiasm for international travel. In 2015, Australia received more than a million short-term visitors from China, out of a total of 120 million Chinese outbound tourists, and it earned USD7.7 billion of the USD215 billion that they spent (Freed 2016; Petroff 2016). The number of Chinese tourists to Australia has increased steadily since the mid-1990s, and now China is the second-largest source of tourists for Australia, behind only New Zealand, although the spending of Chinese visitors in Australia has ranked first for almost a decade. Australia's international education was worth about USD1 billion in the early 1990s. In 2007, when the country attracted around 0.5 million overseas students, education became the second-largest export sector behind mining, worth around USD13 billion (Tsukamoto 2009). Total earnings from the sector peaked in 2009, reaching about USD19 billion, with international students accounting for 22 % of the total university student population (ABS 2012b). Despite the fall in earnings after 2009, the sector is still Australia's largest service export, worth USD15 billion in 2012, several billion more than its tourism revenue. For many years, since the late 1990s, China has been the largest national contributor to the foreign-student population in Australia, and the proportion of Chinese students in the past decade has been about 30 % (ACPET 2013: ii).

In the process of opening up both the tourism market and the international student market, hundreds of Chinese operators, big and small, have worked in the industries at both ends of the markets, in Australia and China. Operators providing services to Chinese tourists and students have taken up large shares of the market since the late 1990s. Onshore services alone, such as travel, shopping, food and accommodation, have brought hundreds of millions of dollars a year into the Chinese community. Thus the ethnic Chinese community as a whole has become well settled economically.

A huge amount of Chinese earnings has been spent on further developing the community's economy and cultural activities, important mechanisms for making the community sustainable and prosperous. Two often mentioned examples are the Chinese-language schools that the community has established in Australia since the early 1990s and an unusually large number of newspapers, magazines and even radio stations. The Chinese in Sydney and Melbourne have never had fewer than ten Chinese newspapers, including weeklies and dailies, and magazines since the 1990s (Gao 2006c). Back then, new Chinese migrants stopped being consumers of and became

participants in the community media market. The competition has not deterred new players from entering the media market. The reason behind the significant expansion is the growing scale of the community-based economy. The community media market has grown in response to the increasing demand for advertisements. This media surge is an indicator of a high level of economic activity.

Another indicator of a thriving community is the educational success of Chinese children and intergenerational upward social mobility. Well-off or not, almost all Chinese families put much effort and money into their children's education. The publication of Victorian Certificate of Education results in Victoria and Higher School Certificate results in New South Wales in daily newspapers has helped the Chinese community enormously because Chinese names take up much of the lists. This has not only further refined the image of Australian Chinese and new migrants in Australians' eyes but has shown that students of Chinese origin are not only good at mathematics, physics, chemistry and Chinese but also top the tests in English. Their academic performance has long been reflected in university enrolment. An increasing number of Chinese take degrees, especially in law, medicine, pharmacy, engineering, architecture, accounting and finance. This has been a trend for more than two decades, and many have completed university courses and entered the professions. The success of the second generation is normally the main indicator of satisfaction for migrant families.

The attendance of a large number of Chinese at university has helped to remove another hurdle in the way of the community, now widely regarded as a middle-class or "model" community (Ho 2007: 1; Pung 2008: 4). These achievements have resulted from changes in both China and Australia, but this new chapter in Australian history and Chinese migration history started with the settlement of Chinese students in the late 1980s and early 1990s.

Conclusion

This chapter has analyzed a number of socioeconomic and political factors shaping Chinese migration and settlement in Australia and has explained how the Chinese, once "undesirable aliens" (Chan 2005: 643), have become an integral part of society. Although there are many publications on the Chinese in Australia, the depth and scope of research lag behind the rapid expansion of the community, and research outcomes are insufficient to offer guidance as to how to understand it. This chapter analyzes Chinese

immigration from a political and economic point of view and considers the socioeconomic circumstances in which it has taken place.

This approach is constructive in at least two ways. First, the community cannot be analyzed or understood from the point of view of the host country alone, especially a point of view based on the old international economic system and geopolitical order. The changes in post-1978 China are so profound that one cannot consider the community from an Australia-centric perspective. This is particularly true of new Chinese immigrants, whose home country has recently provided many with the opportunity to be economically successful. Their decision to leave China has confused researchers unfamiliar with the new transnational perspective and unable to comprehend what has happened outside their own sphere of research. This chapter has shown how Chinese in Australia have responded to the transformations in China and used the chances created by China's economic growth and Australia's historic shift towards Asia, thus offering a new perspective on the Chinese in Australia.

Many members of the community are engaged in China-related businesses. The emergence of this sector has profound implications for immigration, for the adaptation or integration of individuals, and for community-building because the nature of such type of the ethnic economy is both local and transnational. As the world economy becomes highly globalized, the business activities of the Chinese community help Australia to open up new markets in Asia and bridge the gaps between Chinese immigrants and other Australians. Chinese families in Australia have become more prosperous by utilizing their China-related resources. This has not been happening in all sectors but it has in most. The Chinese success is, increasingly, a result of their links with China and its economy, and their efforts to reposition themselves in the course of developing Sino-Australian business relations. Their role in Australia's nation-building has only recently become public knowledge, aided by Australians with a clearer idea of Australia's nationhood and its identity as an Asia-Pacific nation. As a direct outcome of the maturing of Australia, and especially of China's globalized economy, Chinese settlers and new migrants now contribute significantly to Australian prosperity.

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CHAPTER 11

New Chinese Immigration to New Zealand: Policies, Immigration Patterns, Mobility and Perception

Liangni Sally Liu

Introduction

In the New Zealand context, large-scale Chinese immigration started very recently. The country's immigrant selection was based on racial preference until 1986 when a major immigration policy review was enforced (Ip 1995; Trlin 1992). The 1986 Immigration Policy Reviews that abolished the traditional source-country preference (such as the Great Britain) and proclaimed a liberal philosophy of selecting immigrants based on "criteria of personal merit without discrimination on grounds of race, national or ethnic origin" (Burke 1986: 11) resulted in a dramatic increase in the number of new Chinese migrants to the country (Ip 1995).[1] The new policy was further refined by the introduction of a points-based system in 1991, which accentuated the human-capital factor of recruiting talent and economic investment (Trlin 1997). These changes brought in a large influx of new Chinese migrants. Of the new Chinese intake, Hong Kong, Taiwan and the People's Republic of China (PRC[2]) are the three main contributing sources (Ho 2003).

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

Fig. 11.1 Top 16 countries of origin for New Zealand permanent residents, 1987–2015

Immigrants from Hong Kong and Taiwan started arriving in the early 1990s, but PRC immigrants started coming in significant numbers at a later date (Ip 2006b; Liu 2011). Most started to arrive in the mid-1990s, and their numbers increased rapidly in the late 1990s, making the PRC a major immigrant source for New Zealand. The PRC became the second largest source country for New Zealand in 1997 and it has remained the second-largest source for residence approvals in New Zealand (94,859), just after the Great Britain (149,969) (see Fig. 11.1).

Given the significance of the PRC's migrant population in New Zealand, it is important to study this new Chinese immigration. Much attention has been given to the Chinese diaspora in other traditional immigration-based "New World" countries whose geopolitical and economic positioning in the world migration system is much more visible and is closer to the center of global politics. Although new Chinese migrants in New Zealand contribute greatly to the global Chinese diaspora population, this group has often been overlooked in Chinese diaspora studies. This chapter sets out to remedy this gap. It focuses on the changing patterns of immigration, routes and trans-national mobility in the context of New Zealand's changing immigration policy and the geopolitical positioning of both China and New Zealand in

the global system. It distinguishes PRC migrants from Hong Kong and Taiwan Chinese migrants because the latter two groups differ from PRC Chinese in terms of time of arrival, migration incentives and patterns, and demographic structure.

Studying new Chinese immigration in the New Zealand context has far-reaching implications for Chinese diaspora studies. New Zealand is more likely a destination for short-term or mid-term immigration settlement than it is for long-term settlement (Bedford et al. 2000). To study new Chinese migrants to this traditional "land of immigration" that is geographically far away from the world center and Asia can help us understand the changing themes, patterns and circulation of the contemporary Chinese diaspora in a changing world migration hierarchy.

I first provide a brief historical overview of early Chinese immigration to New Zealand. I then contextualize the new wave of PRC immigration against the background of New Zealand's changing immigration policy after 1986 and China's economic and social transformation. The transformation of China after the early 1990s speeded the new Chinese immigration wave. This second section addresses how policy and the social, political and economic environment of both immigrant-receiving and immigrant-sending countries conditioned new Chinese immigration. I focus on immigration policy in New Zealand and its impact on the volume of this inflow. The third section focuses on the immigration categories under which PRC migrants arrive. Other immigrant groups will be used as benchmarks to show the distinct pattern of PRC migrants. The fourth section looks at the general profile of the PRC migrant population in New Zealand and their settlement, indicated by participation in the labor market. The last section touches on the transnational migration and mobility of PRC migrants, a theme of research on new Chinese immigration everywhere. The chapter concludes with a discussion of how new Chinese migrants are perceived by the host society, especially Maoris.

Setting the Scene: Early Chinese Immigration to New Zealand

Early Chinese immigration to New Zealand was part of a broad pattern of early Chinese migration to various immigration-based "New World" countries in the Pacific Rim (e.g., the USA, Canada and Australia) during the mid-nineteenth-century gold-rush period (Eng 2006a, b; Ip 1995; Skeldon

1996). This immigration was driven by push factors, such as China's internal poverty, natural disasters and warfare, and pull factors exerted from New Zealand, where gold was found in the Otago region (Ng 1993; Ip 1995).

Early Chinese migrants to New Zealand in the mid-1860s entered mainly as itinerant gold miners and were mostly uneducated male peasants from rural Southern China, especially Guangdong. In Australia, a "White Australia" policy was officially sanctioned, but New Zealand never had an explicitly anti-Chinese policy. However, legislative discrimination against the Chinese also happened there and ensured that the Chinese population remained at just a couple of thousand (Ip 1995). The Chinese Immigrants Act of 1881 introduced a "Poll Tax" of NZ£10 aimed at restricting Chinese entry. The act imposed a restriction on ship passengers: one Chinese passenger per 10 tons of cargo. In 1896 the ratio was reduced to one passenger per 200 tons of cargo, and the poll tax was increased to NZ£100. The rationale for this was New Zealand's settlement policy, which aimed to create a "fairer Britain of the South Seas." In such a nation, non-white migrants would be undesirable (Murphy 2003).

Besides the poll tax a series of anti-Chinese laws were passed. The "Reading Test" in 1907 required the Chinese to read 100 English words picked at random. The 1920 Immigration Restriction Amendment Act required every aspiring immigrant (other than people of British and Irish descent) to apply for a special permit which, in effect, severely restricted the number of Chinese. Applicants not admitted were given no reason (Ip 1995, 1996). Legislation discriminating against Chinese also affected those already in the country. In 1908, naturalization of Chinese stopped, and it did not resume until 1952. Chinese women seldom immigrated to New Zealand before World War II and the sex ratio of the early Chinese community was extremely unbalanced (Ip 2002b). Chinese male migrants immigrated to New Zealand primarily for reasons of economic survival. They were "sojourners"—a word used of overseas Chinese in the goldrush years. They made a living overseas and earned income to support their families in China as long-term laborers without permanent residence, expecting an eventual return (Yang 2000).

Despite these official barriers, the Chinese still managed to develop their community, especially during World War II. With China's fight against Japanese, wives and children of Chinese men were allowed temporary entry to New Zealand for humanistic reasons in 1939. This bolstered the number of Chinese there, and the Chinese community got the chance to

sink roots. In 1947 the New Zealand government granted permanent residence to migrants' wives and children. These changes eventually turned the "sojourner" paradigm into a "settler" model (Ip 2006a).

The depletion of the goldfields in the late 1880s resulted in Chinese drifting from rural areas to towns and cities looking for work. Like Chinese in other countries, many of those in New Zealand worked in fruit shops, laundries and stores. They also found a niche in market gardening, starting in the late 1920s (Ip 1995, 2008). During the post-war period, the Chinese community remained largely self-contained and low key. The label "model minority" describes the marginalized social status and painful assimilation of early Chinese migrants (Ip 1995, 1996). The local-born descendants were educated in New Zealand, and some climbed into the professions. In general, the descendants of early Chinese migrants were lawful, hard-working, rarely lived on welfare and were invisible. The "model minority" label sounds positive but it is a tool of social control created by the dominant white supremacy through racial profiling.

Alongside natural increase, the community grew through chain migration. The period from the 1950s through to the 1980s is viewed as the assimilation phase (Ip 1995; Ng 1993). Connections with China loosened, mainly because China's isolation from the West and the Cold War mentality that prevented the Chinese nationals from emigrating until the 1980s. The ten-year Cultural Revolution further isolated the PRC from the rest of the world and prevented Chinese descendants in New Zealand from staying in touch with China.

New Chinese Immigrants in New Zealand

The Homeland Factor

New Chinese migrants have no strong affiliation with early migrants from Guangdong, given that the homeland connection had been cut. The presence of new Chinese migrants in New Zealand is a result of the changing social, economic and political conditions in China. People from Hong Kong and Taiwan started moving overseas in the late 1960s, but PRC migration came into emigration arena later (Skeldon 1996, 2004), in the early 1990s. The reason was mainly geopolitical (Liu and Norcliffe 1996). The Cold War led the PRC to close its borders and remain largely closed to the West until the late 1970s. Overseas travel was only possible if officially sanctioned. These controls blocked nearly all direct international emigration (Luo et al.

2003; Xiang 2003). There were no official channels to link the PRC with immigrant-receiving countries (Liu and Norcliffe 1996).

The situation started to change in the late 1970s. The PRC government allowed students and scholars to study overseas in 1978, in the expectation that they would return to China (Gittings 1989; Luo et al. 2003). Throughout the early 1990s, it initiated a series of policies aimed at relaxing border controls. In 1981 it recognized self-financed overseas study. This recognition produced a wave of student migration (Luo et al. 2003; Xiang 2003), which led to permanent settlement in the host countries. The official trigger for the increasing migration flow was the Emigration and Immigration Law of 1985. This guaranteed the right of Chinese citizens to travel outside China and allowed those who wished to leave the country for private reasons to do so (Liu and Norcliffe 1996; Skeldon 1996). The political ideology that viewed international emigration as a political "betrayal" was on its way out (Xiang 2003: 22): international emigration was accepted as a matter of individual choice. All these factors combined to increase the scale of Chinese international migration in the late 1990s.

The "Open-Door" Immigration Policy in New Zealand

The conditions under which new PRC migrants arrive at New Zealand now are remarkably different from those encountered by early Chinese migrants. New PRC migrants to New Zealand meet a largely favorable social and political environment. The Immigration Policy Review 1986 introduced an open immigration policy to welcome immigrants with financial and human capital. This review and its implementation (in the Immigration Act of 1987) was part of the Fourth Labour government's efforts to embark on a radical path of economic deregulation to revitalize the economy (Trlin 1992).[3] Immigration was encouraged, especially by skilled and business migrants with "ability and investment capital" who could contribute to the process of "economic restructuring and … the development of new competitive industries and markets" (Burke 1986: 19). Immigration was seen as a positive means of attracting foreign investment and stimulating domestic growth. The new policy sought to use immigration to remedy the "brain-drain" (owing to the out-migration of educated New Zealanders) (Henderson 2003: 143; Kasper 1990). There was also a desire to use immigration to link up with Pacific Rim countries and the "Asian Little Dragons" (Henderson 2003: 143; Ip 1995: 188; Trlin and Kang 1992: 49).[4] Seeing a competitive global economy that was increasingly influenced

by Asian industrial production and markets, New Zealand realized the importance of integrating more closely with Asia. To establish business links, human capital is essential. The new policy in New Zealand was a way of acquiring human capital (Trlin 1992).

When the National government came to power in the 1990s, it maintained the previous Labour government's program of economic deregulation and accentuated it by encouraging immigration. In line with countries such as Canada and Australia, a points-based system was introduced in 1991 (Trlin 1997).[5] This had a big impact on the number and composition of new Chinese immigrants arriving in New Zealand, where the Chinese presence grew ever stronger. Of the three main sources, Hong Kong was the earliest and peaked in 1991. It was followed by Taiwan, which peaked in 1996. Migrant totals from China started to catch up with Hong Kong and Taiwan after the 1991 policy change and then increased steadily (see Fig. 11.2).

This sudden influx caused unease and put pressure on New Zealand's immigration system. The immigration policy was tightened up and more challenging criteria for entry were introduced.[6] This tightening-up in 1995, together with the 1997 Asian financial crisis, reduced the number of Hong Kong and Taiwan immigration approvals. However, it had little effect on immigrants arriving from the PRC (Henderson 2003; Liu 2014): applications steadily increased during the following years.

The new Labour government, which returned to power in 1999, was determined to open the door even wider. With a series of policy adjustments and the introduction of a managed entry regime between 2000 and 2002, PRC migrant numbers increased, peaking in 2003 (see Fig. 11.2).[7] Since then the PRC has become a dominant source country.

The latest immigration policy change in New Zealand was a new selection system, introduced in 2003.[8] This focuses on ensuring that migrants with skills are needed rather than merely accepting those who meet a specific target. The minister of immigration announced a new Skilled Migrant Category (SMC) to replace the General Skills Category (GSC). The new SMC shifted the way the points system worked from passive acceptance to active selection. It replaced the "pass" mark system with a process in which people who qualify above a certain level of points submit an expression of interest (EOI) to a selection pool, from which they are then invited to apply. The system came about in a context in which successful settlement outcomes of migrants were recognized by the government as more important than numerical and economic outcomes (Bedford et al. 2005). Approvals



Fig. 11.2 Annual New Zealand residence approval number for people from the PRC, Hong Kong and Taiwan, 1982–2008

for applicants from China fell for a while but started to climb back in 2005 (see Fig. 11.2), though they have not returned to their highest level, which was achieved at the beginning of the new millennium.

The presence of new PRC migrants in New Zealand is a direct result of the "open-door" immigration policy introduced in 1987. The immigration

door swung to and fro as a result of unstable and fluctuating entry criteria over the years. However, the overall policy of encouraging skilled and business immigration was consistently maintained. It is under this policy that new Chinese migrants have arrived and settled in New Zealand.

Seeking "Greener Pastures"? Reasons for Immigrating

Unlike earlier Chinese immigrants to New Zealand, who were mostly peasants from South China and forced to leave their homeland because of disasters and warfare, most new PRC migrants are highly educated and have specialized skills and financial capital, which allows them to meet the entry criteria (Friesen and Ip 1997). Looking for economic opportunities overseas is no longer the primary reason for new Chinese migrants to immigrate; rather, they are often motivated by non-economic reasons, including searching for "greener pastures". A better lifestyle, an advanced education system and the securing of foreign passports have propelled this migratory movement (Liu 2011, 2014).

In the years 2007–2009 I conducted multisite interviews with 47 new PRC migrants in New Zealand, Australia and China to find out about their transnational mobility.[9] Socially, they see New Zealand as safe, liberal and easy-going. Politically, its democratic and stable government is perceived as better than China's. In practice, the entry criteria and living costs are lower than those of the USA, Canada and Australia. The natural environment, the advanced education system and the welfare system are also attractive (Friesen and Ip 1997; Ip 2006b; Liu 2011).

These findings coincide with the data from *Longitudinal Immigration Survey: New Zealand*, which shows that the attraction of New Zealand is often environmental, educational and social (Department of Labour 2009). This suggests that the country occupies a unique position in the world migration system. With competition for skilled migrants from the USA, Canada and Australia, New Zealand is not the first choice for many PRC migrants. According to one survey, the favorite destination is the USA, followed by Canada and Australia (Luo et al. 2003). New Zealand ranks fourth.

Another factor that causes PRC immigrants to choose to go to New Zealand is the country's historical ties to Britain, which gives it the image of a Western society. This is important for many PRC migrants. Quite often, interviewees see going to New Zealand as "going to the outside world to have a look," "an eye-opening experience" or "getting a gilded

wrapping for myself (镀金)". The "outside world" and "an eye-opening experience" refer to experiencing life in Western countries, and "getting a gilded wrapping" means that an overseas experience or degree can give someone a valuable credential and an international outlook. These help on China's job market (Liu 2011).

More recently, wealthy Chinese have turned moving to New Zealand into a social phenomenon. They are labeled as "lifestyle migrants" (Spoonley et al. 2009) who possess great financial assets and whose immigration is generated by the desire to secure their wealth, a different education for their children, less air pollution and greater food safety. Liu-Farrer (2016) suggests that the most recent wave of emigration from China is a form of class consumption, a strategy of class reproduction, and a way of converting economic resources into social status and prestige. My New Zealand studies confirm this trend. My research on the transnational migratory mobility of PRC migrants shows that New Zealand citizenship, which immigrants can obtain after a five-year stay, gives the Chinese greater transnational mobility. With improved mobility, they can move to a third country and reach their goal—not necessarily New Zealand (Liu 2011, 2014, 2015).

Diversified Immigration Paths

The way in which new PRC Chinese migrants use the New Zealand immigration program differs from that of other migrants. To show the distinct immigration pathways of PRC migrants, one must see their migration in a comparative framework. Recent data show that in 1997–2015, China was one of the top eight immigrant source countries for New Zealand. Table 11.1 shows that the number of residence approvals under the New Zealand Residence Programme was 765,179, of which 13.7 % (104,484) were for PRC migrants. This puts the PRC second after the UK, which had 17.8 % (136,384) approvals.

As the table shows, South Africa and the UK have the greatest number of residence approvals under the skilled category (78.8 % and 65.3 %, respectively) of residence approvals, while China has 35.3 % approvals.[10] However, China has a large percentage of residence approvals under the business category (10.3 %), which is much higher than the figure for the UK (2.2 %) and South Africa (0.7 %).[11]

Table 11.1 also shows that China has the greatest number of residence approvals under the parent category (22.8 %; 23,799), followed by the Fiji

Table 11.1 Residence approvals by nationality (top eight immigrant source countries) and immigration stream/category, 1997–2015

Nationality	*Total approvals*	*Total family sponsorship*	*Family sponsorship subcategories*				*Skilled*	*Business*	*Other*
			Spouse	*Parents*	*Dependent child*	*Siblings and adult child*			
Asia									
China	104,484	50,478 (48.3 %)	18,688 (17.9 %)	23,779 (22.8 %)	2106 (1.9 %)	4433 (4.2 %)	36,874 (35.3 %)	10,713 (10.3 %)	6419 (6.1 %)
India	80,950	26,473 (32.7 %)	13,292 (16.4 %)	9357 (11.6 %)	932 (1.1 %)	2484 (3.0 %)	43,348 (53.5 %)	346 (0.4 %)	10,783 (13.3 %)
South Korea	23,959	5345 (22.3 %)	3099 (12.9 %)	1045 (4.4 %)	363 (1.5 %)	353 (1.4 %)	11,967 (50.0 %)	5421 (22.6 %)	1226 (5.1 %)
Philippines	39,640	8606 (21.7 %)	5928 (15.0 %)	4413 (11.1 %)	1122 (2.8 %)	392 (1.0 %)	24,865 (62.7 %)	39 (0.1 %)	6130 (15.4 %)
Sub-total	249,033	90,902 (36.5 %)	41,007 (16.5 %)	38,594 (15.5 %)	4433 (1.8 %)	7662 (30.8 %)	117,054 (47.0 %)	16,519 (6.6 %)	24,558 (9.8 %)
% Asia	32.5	34.6	28.3	55.0	24.2	41.6	31.3	58.9	24.3
Pacific									
Fiji	44,753	19,544 (43.7 %)	8262 (18.5 %)	5973 (13.3 %)	1014 (2.3 %)	3046 (6.8 %)	20,236 (45.4 %)	691 (1.5 %)	4282 (9.6 %)
Samoa	35,735	15,190 (14.5 %)	6626 (18.5 %)	1987 (5.5 %)	5557 (15.5 %)	648 (1.8 %)	553 (1.5 %)	0	19,992 (56.0 %)
Sub-total	80,488	34,734 (43.1 %)	14,888 (18.5 %)	7960 (9.9 %)	6571 (8.2 %)	3694 (4.6 %)	20,789 (25.8 %)	691 (0.8 %)	24,274 (30.1 %)
% Pacific	10.5	13.2	10.2	11.3	35.9	20.0	5.5	2.5	24.0
Other									
UK	136,384	37,189 (27.2 %)	25,111 (18.4 %)	9547 (7.0 %)	921 (0.7 %)	1346 (1.0 %)	89,035 (65.3 %)	3013 (2.2 %)	7147 (5.2 %)

(*continued*)

Table 11.1 (continued)

Nationality	*Total approvals*	*Total family sponsorship*	*Family sponsorship subcategories*				*Skilled*	*Business*	*Other*
			Spouse	*Parents*	*Dependent child*	*Siblings and adult child*			
South Africa	61,723	9451 (15.3 %)	3232 (5.2 %)	4413 (7.1 %)	740 (7.8 %)	879 (1.4 %)	48,624 (78.8 %)	444 (0.7 %)	3204 (5.2 %)
Sub-total	198,107	46,640 (23.5 %)	28,343 (14.3 %)	13,960 (7.0 %)	1661 (0.8 %)	2225 (1.1 %)	137,659 (69.5 %)	3457 (1.7 %)	10,351 (5.2 %)
% other	25.9	17.7	19.5	19.9	9.1	12.1	36.9	12.3	10.2
Total 8 countries	527,628	172,276	84,238	60,874	12,665	13,581	275,502	20,667	59,183
% resident approvals	100	32.7	16.0	11.5	2.4	2.6	52.2	3.9	11.2
Total all countries	765,179	262,456	145,019	70,212	18,285	18,413	373,531	28,050	101,142
% resident approvals	100	34.3	19.0	9.2	2.4	2.4	48.8	3.7	13.2
% from 8 countries	69.0	65.6	58.0	86.7	69.3	73.8	73.8	73.7	58.5

Source: Immigration New Zealand

(13.3 %; 5973) and India (11.6 %; 9357). This is probably due in large part because filial piety is an important value in Chinese culture, even today, including among Chinese overseas (Bedford and Liu 2013). Chinese like to live with their parents, either in the same household or in the same locality, so many PRC migrants sponsor their parents to immigrate immediately after they have settled in New Zealand.

New PRC migrants often use other family sponsorship subcategories such as the spouse category. The countries with the largest number of migrants in the spouse category are Fiji (18.5 %) and Samoa (18.5 %), followed by the UK (18.4 %) and China (17.9 %). Samoa, which has relatively small numbers in all the above categories, has the largest number of migrants in the dependent child category (15.5 %).

The data show that new PRC migrants follow various routes to New Zealand. Most are in the skilled and parent categories, and quite a few are in the business category. This reflects the fact that China's growing economy has played an important role in bolstering its nationals' financial ability to obtain permanent residence in New Zealand.

Social Indicators: Age-Gender Pyramid, Educational Background and Employment Status

Unlike some other source countries where the flows are strongly gendered, the age-gender distribution of the PRC population in New Zealand is balanced, as Fig. 11.3 shows. This population is distributed across all age groups, though with smaller numbers among young people (0–15 years), much larger numbers among students and younger working ages (20–39 years), and many people in the middle (40–64 years) and older age groups (66 years and over). The largest groups are aged between 20 and 34. Two factors contribute to this: New Zealand immigration policy targets well-educated young professionals; and Census data include Chinese international students, many of whom remain in New Zealand after completing their education. There is a growing number of international students in New Zealand (*New Zealand Herald* 2015). The most important message one can get from Fig. 11.3 is that the migration process, after about three decades of settlement in New Zealand, has produced a viable multigenerational PRC-born community.

The most recent New Zealand Census data (2013) show that PRC Chinese are one of the best-educated groups in New Zealand: 24.7 % have



Fig. 11.3 Age-sex pyramid for the Chinese-born ethnic Chinese population in the 2013 Census (Source: Immigration New Zealand)

bachelor's degrees or higher, compared with the New Zealand national average of 14.2 % (Statistics New Zealand 2013a). This is one outcome of immigration selection processes that target highly skilled and educated migrants.

Many studies have found that immigrant performance in the labor market is an important indicator of how well immigrants adapt to a host society (Baker 1994; Winkelmann and Winkelmann 1998). Examining the labor market participation of PRC Chinese, one can conclude that prospects for this group in terms of settlement are not good. Their advanced qualifications and educational background do not appear to be an advantage in the job market. The 2013 Census shows that the percentage of PRC Chinese employed full time and those employed part time is smaller than the New Zealand national average, and their unemployment rate is higher than the national average (Table 11.2). Immigrant labor market performance closely relates to immigrants' educational level. However, there is a serious mismatch between the educational profile of PRC Chinese and their performance in the labor market.

More PRC Chinese are self-employed or not employed than the national average (Tables 11.3). Among those not in the labor force, most are studying full time. The PRC group has the largest percentage of people

Table 11.2 Labor market participation by New Zealand residents born in the PRC compared with the national average

Labor market participation	*%*	
	PRC	*NZ national average*
Employed full time	30.7	50.1
Employed part time	15.3	14.9
Unemployed	6.8	3.5
Not in the labor force	47.1	31.5

Source: Statistics New Zealand (2013b)

Table 11.3 Employment status of New Zealand residents born in the PRC compared with the New Zealand national average

Employment status	*%*	
	PRC	*NZ national average*
Employee	70.6	76.1
Employer	8.3	7.2
Self-employed without employees	12.5	11.8
Unpaid family worker	2.8	2.0
Other	5.7	2.9

Source: Statistics New Zealand (2013b)

studying full time among adults over 18 (33.7 %), more than six times the national average (5.1 %) (Statistics New Zealand 2013a).[12] However, not all are students and, in common with many immigrants from other countries, not all are employed in roles commensurate with their qualifications, often out of necessity (Jansen and Grant 2012). This is true of many new PRC migrants. Rejected for employment, many realize that obtaining a recognized local qualification could give them a better chance of getting work. Retraining is perceived by many as a way of getting a job.

Here and There: Transnational Migratory Mobility

Transnational migration is a remarkable feature of new Chinese migration, including from the PRC (Liu 2011). A recent report on long-term absentees puts China sixth on the list, with 20 % (8450) of the total approved permanent residents (41,577) (New Zealand Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment 2013) (see Appendix).[13] These absence rates might

reflect the transnational character of PRC migration. Return-migration, step-migration and commuting between home country and destination country are typical of their transnational mobility (Liu 2015; Liu and Lu 2015).

There are various reasons for the PRC migrants to make return journeys to their homeland. The strength of the Chinese economy and the potential of China's market help propel them homeward. The desire for career development and business opportunities is a key reason. Professional satisfaction in China is an attraction. Compared with China, the job market and entrepreneurial opportunities in New Zealand are limited. With China's market booming, many overseas Chinese want to return (Liu 2009a).

Some non-economic factors also drive the return. In-depth interviews I conducted in 2007–2009 reveal that many PRC migrants return to take care of aging parents. Reunion with the family is also an important reason. Like Chinese immigrants in other countries, New Zealand's PRC migrants and their family members are strategically positioned along the Pacific Rim. When one stage of the life cycle is completed, they move to another stage using different strategies. For example, the "astronauting" technique is often applied to meet family needs.[14] Later, its goal achieved, "astronauting" is discarded, and returning to one's original place is a choice for many (Liu 2011).

The idea of a comfort zone also promotes return. This includes a familiar language and social environment, and closeness to family and friends. Some interviewees revealed how the emotional link brought them back (Liu 2009a).

Step-migration is another manifestation of PRC migrants' transnational mobility. Motivated by similar pulls, there is no fundamental difference between step-migration to a third destination and returning to the homeland. Both stem from migrants' wish to seek opportunities to maximize their social, human and financial capital in order to achieve a better migration outcome. Special in the case of New Zealand is that step-migration is often in the direction of Australia, because of the close relationship, especially the bilateral immigration arrangement, between these two countries. Based on the Trans-Tasman Travel Arrangement, citizens of each country are free to work and settle in the other without a visa and to get almost all the educational and welfare benefits available to permanent residents (Birrell and Rapson 2001).[15] In the late 1990s, the immigrant influx from Asian countries to New Zealand coincided with a sharp increase in trans-Tasman migration, heavily criticized by Australia.

The Australian government introduced stricter control over access to welfare provisions by New Zealand citizens in 2001 (Hugo 2004). However, this has not diminished Chinese migrants' desire to reimmigrate to Australia. Many PRC migrants see crossing the Tasman as logical after a few years in New Zealand (Liu 2011, 2015; Liu and Lu 2015).

PRC migrants harbor complex and unfinished plans for their future movement. Returning to China is not the end of their transnational journey; many interviewees plan to go back to New Zealand for their children's education or retirement. Many leave their children in New Zealand because of its good education system. On reaching retirement age, people want to move away from bustling metropolitan urban centers to a quieter environment with enough savings to sustain a good quality of life (Liu 2011, 2015). Returning to New Zealand is a strategy of double return (Ley and Kobayashi 2005), from New Zealand to China for work and career development, and then to New Zealand for its lifestyle. The transnational longing of PRC returnees leads to a novel trajectory through a seamless social space that crosses oceans and national borders, passing from their native place as a place for work and securing financial assets to their adopted place for lifestyle and leisure. While some returnees want to return to New Zealand, others have plans that may involve a move to a third country. Although many trans-Tasman interviewees give long-term residence in Australia as their first choice, they are also attracted to the idea of staying in China, largely for economic reasons. The potential for business success in China could result in another relocation or more frequent travel across the Pacific Ocean between the second immigration destination and the homeland. For many, returning to China would be only temporary, long enough to accumulate sufficient capital. Binational residence was an option for some when economically viable.

So the return is not permanent, just as step-migration is not permanent. There is no simple one-way cross-border movement for many PRC migrants. It is a movement with multiple ways within a cycle that follows its own logic of arriving, leaving and further movements—so-called "circulatory transnational migration" (Ip 2011: 6). This concept accurately describes an unfinished set of circulatory movements that many PRC migrants engage in between homeland and host countries. As time progresses, those who "return" to their countries of origin do not settle permanently. This may be because they have a different sense associated with their return, or because they don't adjust to changes that have occurred in their absence. Similarly, step migration to a second immigration

destination country is a temporary move for many. However, the foremost factor that propels this unfinished sequence of migration and relocation is the consideration of family members' needs at different life stages. This consideration is central to the decision about whether to stay, return or relocate. The location of family members, especially older parents and school-age children, matters greatly in the decision-making process. Different family members' needs at different life stages can separate or reunite family members. The geographic locations of different family members could either converge or, later, diverge (Liu 2016).

Conclusion: New Chinese Immigrants in a Bicultural New Zealand

Like their historical counterpart, new PRC immigrants are perceived more negatively than positively in New Zealand. An article titled "Inv-Asian," published in the suburban newspaper the *Easter Courier* in 1993, is typical of anti-Chinese/Asian sentiment. Such feelings have been a perpetual theme in New Zealand's ethnic relations, sometimes surging, sometimes ebbing (Liu 2005). The politicization of Chinese/Asian immigration has often been used as a means for political power struggle, subsequently fueling the public's and the media's anti-Chinese/Asian sentiment. For example, Chinese and Asian immigration was exploited by politicians such as Winston Peters, leader of the New Zealand First Party. He used an anti-Chinese/Asian strategy in the 1996 election. By playing the race card, he ensured that his party gained enough seats to secure a coalition with the National Party. His anti-immigrant rhetoric stirred up social tensions. Support for New Zealand First increased from less than 3 % in February to 28 % in July (Ip 2002a).

Ironically, New Zealand is multiethnic, and multiculturalism is promoted in public and political discourse. Why can a multicultural country that embarks on a neoliberal immigration policy not accommodate and tolerate its immigrants? One answer may lie in the demographic composition of New Zealand. The most recent Census data (2013) shows that New Zealand Europeans (1,969,391) account for 74 % of the population (4,242,048). Indigenous Maori (598, 605; 14.9 %) and Pacific islanders (295,944; 7.4 %) come second and third (Statistics New Zealand 2013b), while Chinese are the fourth largest and fastest-growing group (171,411; 4.0 %) (Statistics New Zealand 2013c). Maoris, too, are uneasy about new

Chinese and Asian immigrants, and in some cases they express hostility (Liu 2009b).

The unresolved problem surrounding the settlement of the Treaty of Waitangi is perhaps at the root of Maori racial tension. New Zealand is a bicultural country built on the basis of a treaty signed by "white" European settlers and Maoris (Mutu 2009). Maoris have always had a difficult relationship with *Pakeha* (New Zealand Europeans), a legacy of disputes over interpretation of the treaty. The status of Maoris was acknowledged in the 1980s, so any new groups, including the Chinese, remain the "classic essential outsiders" (Ip 2009: 2). Maoris feel that they are not consulted enough about the "open-door" policies that invite "outsiders" into New Zealand. A popular Maori perception is that Chinese immigration could compromise the Maoris' struggle to reassert their prestige and sovereignty.

This socially and economically disadvantaged group is often subjected to political and cultural marginalization. Maori anti-immigration sentiment is also driven by insecurity over resource allocation (Ip 2009; Liu 2009b). New Chinese immigrants are perceived by Maoris as competitors for jobs and business opportunities, and as a threat to Maori culture (Ip 2009). Many new Chinese immigrants are well off, and this makes Maoris feel insecure and disadvantaged. Many Maoris think that new Chinese immigrants are pushing them to "the bottom of the economic heap" (Ip 2009: 2). Therefore new Chinese immigrants have become a target of jealousy and criticism from Maoris and mainstream *Pakeha*. On the other hand, new Chinese immigrants believe that the Maori people's status grants them too many privileges. They feel vulnerable and insignificant. Therefore they criticize the Maoris' relative dependence on social welfare and association with crime (Liu and Lu 2008).

New Chinese immigrants are thus opposed to Maoris in a bicultural New Zealand that is actually multicultural. The majority *Pakeha* act as gatekeepers without consulting the Maoris. The Maoris see this as a denial of their rights. The victims are the new Chinese immigrants, who are viewed as gate-crashers. After satisfying the immigration criteria, they find they are not welcome because of a historical quarrel between *Pakeha* and Maoris. The racial dynamics in New Zealand have major implications for the new Chinese immigrant community. The *Pakeha* look on while the two big minorities fight each other over resources. The future and wellbeing of new Chinese and other immigrants will depend on how the New Zealand government deals with the unresolved tension between biculturalism and

multiculturalism (Bartley and Spoonley 2004). Addressing biculturalism within a multicultural framework is perhaps a solution. However, how to implement this conceptualization is a real challenge. A successful multicultural society is based on all ethnicities receiving equal recognition and developing relationships of collaboration and appreciation instead of competition.

Appendix: Rates of Long-Term Absence by Source Country as of June 30, 2013 for Migrants Approved for Residence, 2005/2006–2011/2012

Source country	*Number approved for residence*	*Number long-term absent*[*]	*% long-term absent*
USA	8892	2364	27
Canada	3139	809	26
Singapore	1460	366	25
Taiwan	1019	227	22
Netherlands	2315	522	22
China	41,577	8450	20
Hong Kong	1004	201	20
France	1632	320	20
Malaysia	4506	877	19
Germany	4700	898	19

Note: [*]Long-term absent in this report is used to describe a migrant who, on the Department of Labour survey day in 2007, had spent a period or periods of time overseas for more than six months after their arrival as a resident

Source: Adapted from Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (2013) *Migration Trend and Outlook 2012/13*, p. 106

Notes

1. "New Chinese migrant" in the New Zealand context usually refers to Chinese who have migrated to New Zealand since the introduction of the Immigration Policy Review in 1986, which abolished the "traditional origin" preference for British migrants. New Chinese migrants are mostly from Hong Kong, Taiwan and the PRC. These three groups plus Chinese from other countries (e.g. Malaysia and Indonesia) are categorized as new Chinese migrants.
2. In this chapter, the PRC, Mainland China and China are used interchangeably.

3. The Labour Party or Labour is a social-democratic political party in New Zealand and one of the two major parties in the country's politics. Another major party is the National Party.
4. The "Little Asian Dragons" are South Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore.
5. The National government came into power in 1991 and introduced an even more open policy to welcome migrants from various regions. Its 1991 policy changes primarily featured the introduction of a revised Business Investment Category (BIC) to replace the previous Business Investment Policy (BIP) and the encouragement of skilled immigration via a General Category that involved a points-based selection system (Trlin 1997). While the BIC's aim was to deal with the shortcomings of the BIP, the points system shifted the focus from obtaining immediate economic and financial benefit from new immigrants to a greater determination to secure human capital and "quality" migrants who would make a contribution to the nation's economic growth and strengthen the international links required for that growth (Trlin 1997). It was supposed to be a "key instrument" to attract a greater number of "quality migrants who would make a positive contribution to economic and social development" (Trlin 1997: 5). This new system targeted people with tertiary education who were young and had a track record of gainful employment (Ip 1995).
6. Immigration policy was tightened up in October 1995 as a response to the influx of new Asian immigrants and its negative backlash in the media and among the public (Ip 2001). This raised the bar to entry, especially regarding the English-language requirement for both principal and non-principal (over 16) skilled and business migrants. The language requirement was designed to restrict the entry of migrants from non-English-speaking backgrounds (Henderson 2003). All principal applicants from such backgrounds had to achieve a minimum Band score of 5, and a NZD20,000 language bond was applied to spouses and dependents of 16 years and over if they failed to meet the English-language requirements within the specified time.
7. The most significant immigration policy initiative during the Labour government's first term (1999–2002) was the launch of the New Zealand Immigration Programme in October 2001 and the introduction of a managed entry regime. Within this regime a "skilled/business" stream was allocated 60 % of the government's total target for residence approvals, while a "family sponsored" stream was allocated 30 % and an "international/humanitarian" stream 10 %. This managed entry was designed to regulate the "economic" and "social" streams of immigrants. A series of further policy relaxations took place between 2000 and 2002. The overall permanent residency approval target was raised from 38,000 to 48,000; under the GSC, those who were within five points of the pass mark could

apply for an open work permit, thus making it easier for them to accumulate the points necessary for residence while meeting a demand for labor; applicants' skills and qualifications did not need to have any direct link with the work they were seeking; and the language requirements for principal applicants were reduced from a minimum of five in each of the four International English Language Testing System modules to an average of five across all four modules (Bedford et al. 2005). Apart from the October 2001 package, there were some side-stream immigration channels promoted by the government. The enforcement of the government's initiative of "work to residence" in April 2002 was significant during this period in terms of its potential to encourage highly employable people to become permanent residents.

8. In July 2003 the minister of immigration suddenly announced that a new Skilled Migrant Category would come into force in December to replace the GSC. Overall, this new selection system replaced the pass mark system with a process whereby people who qualify above a certain level of points (at least 100 points) can submit an EOI into a selection pool, from which they are invited to apply for residence. Points are allocated on the basis of age, qualifications, a skilled job or offer, the regional location of the job offer, work experience and identified skills shortage. Bonus points are granted in certain circumstances and partners' employment and experience, New Zealand qualifications and employment outside of Auckland are recognized.
9. Interviews in China targeted returned Chinese migrants, termed "returnees" in the research. The interviews conducted in Australia were done with Chinese migrants with New Zealand permanent residence or citizenship who moved across the Tasman Sea and stayed there long-term. This group of interviewees is termed "trans-Tasman." Interviews in New Zealand collected conversations with Chinese immigrants who are settling in New Zealand but who stay in touch with their homeland or other destinations where family or other personal ties live. This group of interviewees is named "settlers". They have family members who are "returnees" and/or "trans-Tasman" migrants.
10. Total Skilled residency approval is the sum of the number of subcategories, including General Skills, Skilled Migrants and Work to Residence.
11. Total Business residence approval is the sum of the number of subcategories, including Old Business, Employee of Business, Entrepreneur and Investor.
12. PRC-born Chinese studying and categorized as not-in-labour-force in the Census data are Chinese international students. These percentages may indicate a relatively poor performance on the part of PRC migrants in the labor market since self-employment and enrolment on education programs are often strategies among Chinese to avoid unemployment (Ip 2001).

13. "Long-term absentees" are those who, on the survey day, had spent a period or periods of time overseas amounting to more than six months after their arrival as permanent residents.
14. "Astronaut" families are those in which (usually) the wife and children stay abroad while the husband returns to his Asian homeland to work and provide financial support
15. Migration between New Zealand and Australia was less regulated before the 2001 policy change in Australia. Even though this movement is essentially international, "in many respects it is more similar to internal migration within Australia" (Hugo 2004: 35).

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PART IV

New Chinese Diasporas in Europe

CHAPTER 12

Identity Formation and Social Integration: Creating and Imagining the Chinese Community in Prague, the Czech Republic

Adam Horálek, Ter-hsing James Cheng, and Liyan Hu

Introduction

The Chinese community in Prague is fairly new, established more or less after the Velvet Revolution in 1989, with next to no history in the communist era. Despite its small size, it is still the second largest Chinese community in the Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs[1]) after that in Budapest and is worth studying for at least two major reasons. First, for the last decade, its size has remained stable, though its internal composition has changed significantly. In general, the community is not settled, has little communal life or communal areas within the city (e.g., a Chinatown), and is demographically, economically and socially diverse despite its relatively compact place of origin. The increased interest of

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Chinese tourists and investors in Prague may, however, result in a reassessment of the goals and future of the community. In general, the development of the Chinese community in Prague is unique and differs greatly from that of similar communities in Western and Southern Europe, the USA and elsewhere outside the CEECs. The second reason for studying Chinese in Prague is that it can serve as a case study to understand general trends in Chinese migration to the CEECs. Even though the founding of contemporary Chinese communities there in the early 1990s differed from place to place, the timing, longitudinal development, general motivation factors, place of origin and so forth are not unlike those in other CEECs.

The unprecedented human flow into Europe during the present "refugee crisis" may change the whole migration policy of the European Union (EU) and especially the stereotyping of "us" and "them." The terrorist attacks in Paris on November 13, 2015 suggested that it was necessary to question the sustainability of the EU's security policy, multicultural values and welcoming of immigration. Czechia and other post-socialist members of the EU are continuously portrayed as conservative and immigration-negative countries with a much smaller share of foreign nationals in their populations than their Western counterparts. Recent events will not foster any change in this direction and may result in further restrictions on migration to Czechia, including by Chinese.[2]

In the 1990s and the early 2000s, Czech Chinese were the focus of intensive scholarly research, predominantly by orientalists and sinologists (Bakešová 1996a, b; Obuchová 1999, 2001, 2002; Moore 2002; Moore and Tubilewicz 2001). However, there was little study from a demographic, geographic or sociological perspective, mostly because of the language barrier (cf. Čermák and Dzúrová 2008). Since 2003 there have been almost no further publications from any perspective. One reason is that the Chinese community has stagnated. Even so, the stagnation is not the equivalent of homogeneity or consolidation. The group remains incoherent, non-settled, non-identified, non-evolved and pioneering. Most studies on Asian immigrants in Czechia focus on Vietnamese as the largest non-European foreign community in the country, so a major aim of this study is to widen the focus. The first part carries out a statistical analysis of the Chinese community in Czechia and in Prague between 1989 and 2013 in the framework of historical circumstances, geopolitical changes, globalization, migration and ethnic development. As we demonstrate in the last section, the Vietnamese and Chinese communities develop in different ways, have different

strategies and constitute different communities. Still, as Chinese are usually assumed to be dominant (owing to their worldwide demographic dominance), Vietnamese are often seen as Chinese from the Czechs' orientalized perspective. The later parts of the chapter delve deeper into the Chinese community, aiming to explain its internal heterogeneity and behavioral specifics, and its patterns of adaptation and integration from an intergenerational perspective.[3]

Formation of the Chinese Community in Czechia since 1989

The Chinese population of Prague is small, dispersed, without a central cultural or hometown institution and, compared with other Chinese communities in the world, not very communal. Its history goes back to the early twentieth century, but the contemporary Czech Chinese community is recent. There was a small Chinese Christian community in Czechoslovakia before World War II, predominantly from Wenzhou in Zhejiang. However, it moved en masse to Western Europe because of the war and post-war political developments in the country (Latham and Wu 2013: 30).

World War II and consequent developments resulted in dramatic migrations across Central Europe. In Czechoslovakia, almost all the German population, about 3 million people, was deported. For the first time since the Middle Ages, Czech lands became 99 % ethnically homogenous. For the next four decades (1948–1989) of communist government, people experienced an almost monolithically ethnic society, except for migrants admitted within the framework of multilateral cooperation under the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon).

When the Velvet Revolution succeeded in 1989 and the Iron Curtain fell, of 10.2 million people in the Czech part of Czechoslovakia only some 50,000 were of nationalities[4] other than Czech or Slovak—that is, less than 0.5 % of the total population. In 1994, only 104,300 foreign nationals (then including Slovaks) lived in Czechia, making it the second most homogenous society after North Korea. At that time, only 54 Chinese had permanent residence in Czechia, all of them from the People's Republic of China (PRC).

Since 1989 there has been a combined transformation of post-totalitarianism, post-industrialism and globalization, and its challenge is expressed in terms of political, economic, social, cultural and sociogeographical structures (Hampl et al. 2007: 476). In spite of the pressure of transformation, the Czech Republic is an immigration and transit

country and is located in the "buffer zone" between Western and Eastern Europe (Drbohlav 2003).

In the two decades after the independence of Czechia in 1993, the population of foreign nationals rose four-fold to more than 440,000 in 2013. Most of the foreigners are nationals of other EU countries (39 %), mainly Slovaks, Poles and Germans. Among the non-EU nationalities the three traditionally dominant groups are Ukrainians, Vietnamese and Russians. The Ukrainians are the most populous minority, which has been steadily growing since the early 1990s as they constitute the main workforce for non-qualified jobs, principally in construction. Slovaks are very well enculturated, encounter almost no language or cultural barriers and usually do qualified jobs, and unlike other foreign nationals they earn a higher than average salary.

The third largest foreign nationality is the Vietnamese with almost 60,000 residents in 2013, comprising 0.54 % of the population. After 1998, Vietnamese became the third biggest foreign nationality in Czechia when they surpassed the Polish minority. Whereas Hungary faced massive Chinese immigration in around 1990, Czechoslovakia experienced massive immigration from Vietnam. The reason lay in the earlier bilateral cooperation between socialist Czechoslovakia and Vietnam. Vietnamese students were educated in comparatively large numbers at Czech universities and formed the framework for post-1989 migration from Vietnam. Today, this community, unlike the Chinese one, is stable, settled and integrated, with a big second generation of Czech-born Czech-speaking Vietnamese (Freidingerová 2014). The Chinese, approximately 5500 strong, take 13th place and are a rather marginal minority, concentrated in Prague.

The four most populous minorities represent nearly 65 % of the minority-ethnic population, though only 2.7 % of the total population. Chinese make up a very marginal proportion of the population. Given Czechia's ethnically homogenous past, it is obvious that Chinese in Prague experience a completely different environment from those in Western Europe and the USA.

According to Ĺubica Obuchová (2002), the contemporary Chinese community in the Czech Republic can be divided into four groups depending on their time of arrival. The first group is the oldest and settled in Czechia before 1989. These Chinese came to Czechoslovakia in the framework of Comecon, intermarried in some cases with local people, learned Czech, integrated into the majority population, and nowadays represent an informal "bridge" between the Czechs and Chinese immigrants.

The second group is Chinese "Bohemians" (former students of Czech studies), who had their first experience in Czechia in the pre-1989 era but returned there after 1989. They have good Czech, understand local culture and use that knowledge for business purposes. They stay in touch with China. The third group emerged in the same period as the second one (after 1989) but it exemplifies a classical pattern of chain migration. Its members settled in Czechia to establish businesses, often in logistics or hospitality, or worked as specialists, and later brought the rest of their families and fellow villagers. The last group is characterized by Obuchová as non-settled, recent and fluctuating, with no previous foreign experience and within an established migration chain. They represent a modern variation of guest workers whose intention is not settlement but to earn money (2002: 10).

Despite political changes, the region of origin of Czech Chinese has not changed over time. Most Chinese in the Czech Republic come from Wenzhou and Qingtian. Qingtian in particular and Wenzhou in general are traditional emigration regions, especially for those going to Europe. The first migrants from this region emigrated in the late nineteenth century. As Mette Thunø (1999) explains, the vast majority of emigrants to continental Europe (but not the UK) are from the rural areas of Wenzhou rather than from the towns and cities. However, according to Latham and Wu, in the Czech case, the Chinese are predominantly "white-collar urban migrants, former civil servants and employees of state-owned enterprises looking to make their fortune in business overseas, as opposed to the poor rural migrants often found in other countries" (2013: 31). Both types can be found in the contemporary Chinese community in Czechia.

The proportion of Qingtian Chinese in Czechia has probably increased over time. Obuchová (2002) shows that in 2001 they comprised around a quarter (according to her research sample). Research by Horálek more than a decade later showed that Qingtian Chinese made up more than 42 % and that almost three in four respondents were from Zhejiang.[5]

The Chinese boom happened between 1991 and 1995, when the number of Chinese rose sixteen-fold, from 261 to 4210 (CZSO 2015). Most Chinese arrived in the CEECs in 1988 and 1989, especially in Hungary.[6] The "Hungarian fever" (1989–1990) gave rise to a new Chinese community of more than 27,000, mostly from the Wenzhou area (Nyíri 1999a: 251). This happened because of a bilateral visa-free agreement between the PRC and Hungary was signed in 1988 (Nyíri 1999b). The Hungarian fever must be seen in the context of global Chinese migration, which rapidly expanded to the European continent in the 1980s and 1990s (Pieke 2004).

"New migrants originating from the PRC began to occupy a greater proportion among the overall Chinese emigration" (Liu 2005: 293).

The emerging Chinese community in post-socialist Hungary led to restrictions and the abandoning of visa-free migration, resulting in the termination of this unique Chinese immigration wave. Immediately afterwards, the Chinese population of Hungary dropped by almost two-thirds. Most moved to neighboring countries, including Czechoslovakia. Following are the grounds for the continuing migration strategy of Wenzhounese and Qingtianese in Czechia.

In the early 1990s, countries such as Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary were seen as gateways to the EU, especially Germany.[7] Traditional Chinese communities in Europe, such as those in France, Britain and Italy, have increased greatly in 1990s and 2000s (Marsden 2014). The biggest influx in the 1990s and 2000s was to the UK, France, Italy and Spain, totaling 1,090,000 new Chinese migrants between 1998 and 2011. The CEECs gained 50,000 new Chinese over the same period.

Since 1995 the population of Chinese in Czechia has fluctuated between 3300 and 5600. The Chinese still do come and go, and only a little portion of the community remains stable. This is a unique demographic development compared with the situation of other foreign nationalities, such as the Vietnamese. All other Asian nationalities in Czechia have increased significantly over time. Even the largest Asian community there—Vietnamese—rose by almost 600 % between 1994 and 2013. Other Asian nationalities, such as the Mongolians, Japanese and South Koreans expanded in the second half of the 2000s.

Settlement Strategies of Czech Chinese

Marketa Moore and Czeslaw Tubilewicz (2001) mention two major conditions of Chinese migration to Czechia: the absence of an active migration policy to discourage foreigners from settling permanently and the Chinese perception of Czechia as a gateway to the EU (cf. Chu 2009). There was no active migration policy until Czechia joined the EU in 2004. However, because of the Sino-Czechoslovakian visa agreement of 1956, Chinese citizens with service passports were entitled to visa-free entry. This was the easiest administrative way to get residence status in Czechia (Moore and Tubilewicz 2001).

"Since administrative restrictions made obtaining a work permit in the Czech Republic difficult, the most convenient way to legalize their stay was

to set up a company . . . This practice inevitably led to an increasing number of Chinese phantom companies that never functioned as business units but acted solely as administrative devices for obtaining residence permits" (Moore and Tubilewicz 2001: 614). In the Czech case the argument of E. M. Mung that "entrepreneurship represents a central element of the strategy that the Chinese employ to reproduce themselves as a group" (Mung 1998: 133) is also valid. However, according to statistics, of 5500 Chinese, only 219 held valid trade licenses. That is low compared with most foreign nationalities and in conflict with the general stereotyping of overseas Chinese as business oriented. Czech Chinese are mostly known for their ethnic restaurants. Most are "low-cost" restaurants customized to the taste of the Czech majority. There are several hundred of them throughout the country. Most Chinese working in restaurants are employees, very often relatives, and few companies and owners run more than one restaurant. Many such restaurants are registered by Czech owners with the Chinese as employees, thus having a Czech business partner was one way of getting a work permit and a residence permit.

In 2001, Moore and Tubilewicz (2001: 615) observed that the Chinese had started to replace their service passports with private ones, which was considered a major shift in their status, from official to migrant. After 2004, the service passport diminished in importance when Czechia joined the EU. Czech immigration policy was reassessed to adhere to EU rules, and work permits for nationals from "third countries" became more accessible and valid throughout the Schengen Area.[8] Today, Chinese migrants mostly apply for a work permit, but that makes them much more mobile. The youngest adult Chinese immigrants go to Czechia without prior foreign experience and next to no knowledge of foreign languages, and mainly along established migration chains. This strategy reinforces the domination of migrants from Qingtian in the Chinese community in Prague and Czechia. On the other hand, they are the most fluctuating part of the community.

Between 2010 and 2014 some 14,430 foreigners applied for Czech citizenship, of which 11,802 received it (81.8 %).[9] Very few of them were Chinese. The reason lies partially in the *de facto* status of many Chinese. They do not meet the requirements for Czech citizenship, predominantly because they often leave the country. However, the Chinese do not consider Czechia as their "final" host country, so they have little interest in obtaining Czech citizenship. The EU legal system adopted in 2004 provides foreign nationals with wide autonomy and thus no urgent need for citizenship.

Most applicants were Chinese women marrying Czechs. There have been only 161 such marriages in the last two decades. During the same period, 702 Chinese were born in Czechia, compared with 9000 Vietnamese and 28,549 foreign nationals. So the Chinese comprised 2.5 % of all children born in Czechia to foreigners. The Chinese represent only 1.25 % of the foreign population in the country, so their fertility rate is much higher than the foreigners' average. However, they are 20 % less fertile than Vietnamese.

Chinese Community Formation

The Chinese in Czechia follow a similar pattern of settlement in core areas to the Chinese elsewhere overseas, but with one big difference—they barely create a community.[10] Some 60 % of the Chinese in Czechia live in Prague (Latham and Wu 2013). However, as Moore and Tubilewicz (2001: 614) show, the trend is toward further dispersion. Whereas in 1993 some 90.5 % of all Czech Chinese lived in Prague, in 2000 only 58.6 % did (Moore and Tubilewicz 2001: 614). However, they are concentrated in the neighborhood of the capital.

There are no ethnic enclaves, usually associated with the country of origin, in Prague, except for the Asian "bazaar," a business and cultural center called Sapa on the southeastern edge of Prague.[11] Mainly associated with the Vietnamese community, it includes other, mostly Far East Asian, minorities, including the Chinese. Chinatowns are a key symbol of Chineseness and are important for its preservation (Christiansen 2003). Although current migrants tend to move to non-ethnicized and open immigrant neighborhoods in ethnoburbs (Zhou 2009), not only in the USA but also in the UK, France and Italy, they are still aware of Chinatowns or at least of ethnoburbs. The situation in the CEECs is different: the new Chinese migrants settle widely and copy the already existing social and economic clusters. Prague is no exception to this pattern.

As noted above, according to our research, most Chinese in Prague come from Zhejiang. Many respondents and interviewees who originally said they had come from Shanghai or Hangzhou admitted while being interviewed that they actually came from Qingtian or Wenzhou. It can be assumed that the real proportion of people from Qingtian, or who arrived along migration chains from Qingtian, may be even higher. Apart from Zhejiang, the Chinese in Czechia come from Shanghai, Beijing, Shandong and the

northeast. The language used by members of the Prague Chinese community is predominantly Putonghua. The Chinese use simplified characters. However, they also speak regional dialects. Despite the regional and ethnic homogeneity of the group, there are three distinct dialects among the Chinese in Czechia from Qingtian as well as other dialects, which, although marginal in the Prague community, represent other regions of China. Regional patriotism is commonplace in Chinese communities throughout Europe, especially among Qingtianese, Wenzhounese and Siyinese, and it leads to subethnic divisions within ethnic communities (Christiansen 2003).

The social and economic stratification within the community is related to age, among other factors. In general, the older, the wealthier. The wealthier group is represented by Chinese senior officials or businessmen and their spouses, mostly living in residential neighborhoods of Prague. The women enjoy being retired in Prague or being a housewife. They appreciate the space, cleanliness, quality of life, cost of living and so on. Men more than 50 years of age go to Czechia for business or other types of work. They moved to Prague before 2005, so they have lived there for at least a decade, though not continuously. They are well traveled and often return to China for several months or even for a year at a time. Women return to China mostly to take care of aging parents or grandchildren, while the children build their careers. Men return to China mostly for business and administrative reasons. They do not see Czechia as their homeland but as a place to live, and they consider themselves Chinese who live in Czechia. They usually do not speak Czech, though most speak English. Most come from parts of China other than Qingtian or Wenzhou (e.g., Shanghai, Beijing and the northeast).

Most respondents were aged 21–40. Those under 30 are predominantly single, while those over 30 are married. Most are employees in family businesses (largely restaurants) and have lived in Prague since 2001. They do not consider Prague to be their lifelong destination. Those above 30 years old have their families with them in Prague—most married before leaving China. Almost all of them came from Qingtian or other parts of Zhejiang. The youngest (under 20 years of age) came to Prague with their parents, work in family businesses and are expected to take over the businesses when their parents retire, although many of them hope not to do so. Only two of the respondents were born in Prague (or Czechia). The age composition of Chinese respondents shows social differences between cohorts. They tend to live in different parts of Prague, come from different places in China and speak different dialects. Nevertheless, there is one

commonality across age, and that is their view of Prague as only one stop on their lifelong journey.

According to Hendrick Serrie (1998: 191–196), there are five major types of social organization among overseas Chinese. The first is based on kinship and its members are recruited through birth or marriage. The second is based on surnames understood as ancestral lineage. The third is residential, based on the territorial proximity of its members within the Chinese community. The fourth is based on place of origin, usually the province, county, dialect or town in China. The fifth is contractual—that is, open to all. Most previous studies on the Chinese community in the Czech Republic (Obuchová 2002; Moore 2002) confirm that only the two last types are present among the Chinese in Prague, and even then not to much avail. As Moore and Tubilewicz (2001: 624) said, unlike "their counterparts in Hungary who organized themselves through numerous associations, Chinese in the Czech Republic lacked interest in establishing ethnic organizations."

Hometown associations among Prague Chinese include the Wenzhou Tong Xiang Hui, Qingtian Tong Xiang Hui and the Fujian Tong Xiang Hui, but in 2015 these associations had little impact on the Chinese community. The Central Association of Chinese Businessmen in the Czech Republic (Jieke Huaqiao Zongshanghui), established in 1995, and the Association of the Chinese in the Czech Republic (Lüjie Huaren Lianyihui), established a couple years later by Tang Yunling, a pre-1989 Chinese immigrant, are relatively important.[12] Whereas the first focuses only on Chinese businessmen, the latter was established with the idea of serving the community and becoming a platform for mutual cooperation, help and cultural exchange. There are other institutions of a communal character (e.g., two Chinese newspapers), but they have a limited impact on community-building. Although associations have some impact on the settled and older part of the community, they attract little attention from the younger generation, especially the tiny second generation.

Many scholars, including Min Zhou (2009) and Pál Nyíri (2014), argue rightly that overseas Chinese have a transnational identity. Pál Nyíri (2014) even says that in Hungary, children of the new migrant cohort are trained in transnationalism rather than in accepting their ethnic-minority position in the host society. These migrants maintain their Chinese citizenship and close emotional ties with the PRC. Transnationalism is seen as the most suitable way of accommodating to the host society, not just in Czechia. The core idea of transnationalism among migrants, as Linda Basch argues, is that

it is a "process by which immigrants forge and sustain multi-stranded social relations that link together their societies of origin and settlement" (Zhou and Lee 2013: 25).

Integration and Intergenerational Differences among Czech Chinese

In the following, we focus on how the emerging second generation differs from the first and how both generations integrate into the host society. Levitt's research confirmed that immigrants always maintain a connection with their original countries and simultaneously integrate into their new societies. However, he argues that the second generation does not maintain a strong connection with the host country but is still "regularly influenced by people, objects, practice and know-how from their ancestral homes" (Levitt 2009: 1225). Yet the second generation of Chinese in Czechia seems to relate more strongly to the values and norms of their original countries than to Czechia. Here we are confronted with the problem of how to define the second generation.

In the case of immigrants not born in the host countries, the lines between immigrants' identities seem to blur more quickly. Brettell and Nibbs suggest that "today's second generation no longer necessarily chooses to emphasize one identity over the other but that their identities are more fluid and multifaceted" (2009: 679). Members of the second generation accept the cultural identity of their families. However, another form of their cultural or social identity is to integrate into the new world in which they live. The second generation seems to adapt more easily to a set of different identities than the first generation. The second generation of Czech Chinese sticks to the values, norms, and identities of their families and follows a mobile trajectory of social integration. Most of our second-generation informants were born in Czechia.[13]

Of our 139 first- and 36 second-generation interviewees, 55.4 % were men. As for the first generation, about two-thirds were under the age of 39. Some 65 % were married. Three out of four (75.4 %) had at least a high-school education. More than half (51.8 %) of respondents had lived in Czechia for between 10 and 19 years, 44 % for between 1 and 9 years and only 4.4 % for more than 20 years. Their former jobs in China included hospitality and catering (16.5 %), wholesale trading in textiles or shoes (14.4 %), retail trading in textiles or shoes (7.9 %), the civil service (3.6 %),

the financial sector (6.0 %), enterprise (other kinds of companies in addition to textiles, shoes, etc.) (15 %), students (16.5 %) and others (20 %). In Czechia, most work in restaurants (35.3 %) and as wholesale traders in textiles or shoes (40.3 %), while 37.8 % are employers, 5.9 % managers and 51 % employees. Some 48.5 % of respondents received help from relatives to get their current jobs, while another 25 % were helped by compatriots in the Czechia. Some 19 % found jobs by themselves.

As for the second generation, 47.2 % of Chinese respondents are between 13 and 20 years, 44.5 % between 21 and 29, and 8.3 % 30 or above. Some 48.6 % of them are still students, 33.3 % have lived in Czechia for 1–5 years, 36 % for 6–10 years and 30.6 % for 11 or more years. Some 91.7 % were born in China. As for educational levels, 27.8 % were college educated, half graduated from high school and 16.7 % had only elementary school education.

In this section, we focus on whether the model of "social integration" of the second generation will follow that of the first generation as a result of their similar "cultural identity."

The family background of the second generation, which plays a vital role in its social integration, is substantial. About 41.7 % of respondents belong to economically well-situated families while 55.6 % of respondents are from averagely situated families.

Connection with Homeland

We deduce that the first generation will keep a stronger connection with their homeland because of the necessity to do business and maintain their social life. To measure the four variables related to "homeland connection" we used (1) interest in Chinese news; (2) watching Chinese television; (3) pride in being Chinese; and (4) trusting the Chinese. We found that there is a significant difference between the first and second generation. The first is interested in Chinese political, social and economical news.

An interest in Chinese news probably helps maintain social networks in the host country, especially among the first generation. "Watching Chinese television" reveals no significant difference between the first and second generations. Watching television via the internet or satellite is quite easy to do. However, compared with the variable "concern for Chinese news," the first generation prefer to watch Chinese television and turn the information received into topics of conversation. Watching television or exchanging information about the Chinese political and social situation is a vital part

of daily life. Chinese immigrants also like to share the confidence of rising China with their counterparts.

Regarding national identity, pride in being Chinese demonstrates that respondents remember their roots and are proud of recent economic development in their country. China is the second biggest country by territory and Gross Domestic Product. Many Chinese immigrants know this. When they say, “I am really proud of being Chinese”, they seemingly express real feelings of satisfaction. Many cannot agree with the attitude to work of local people and they are lazy. This reduces their desire to integrate into local culture and social life. The first and second generations share this feeling of national pride.

On the other hand, the Chinese in Czechia do not trust one another. This is because of the increasing difficulty of social integration—greater mistrust leads to less integration. Most Chinese only trust their close relatives or friends. Their social networks are narrow and they guard against intrusion by outsiders. This happens also because many Chinese migrate to obtain similar jobs, and there is a lot of competition among them. On the other hand, low trust is commonplace in China, and they bring it with them to Czechia. However, the mistrust does persuade Chinese immigrants to have less contact with Czechs. The Chinese seem to integrate less than Vietnamese immigrants.

Social Integration

Here we use nine variables to examine and discuss factors regarding social integration, including use of the Czech language, having Czech friends, having an interest in Czech history and culture, the degree of social integration into the host society, views about whether or not Czechs are friendly to the Chinese, views about the living environment in the Czech Republic, the extent to which the Chinese watch Czech television, the extent to which they trust Czech people and whether or not they are discriminated against by Czechs.

Language is an essential means of social integration, and people who can speak the local language can integrate more easily. It is harder for older people to learn a new language. Only 31 % of respondents speak good Czech, while nearly 70 % of the first generation speak only a little or no Czech. They seldom use Czech with Czech customers, so it is not difficult to imagine that the first generation lives separately from Czech society in its

own small social circle. Here there is a significant difference between the first and the second generation.

Social networking with local people occurs less in the case of the first generation than in the case of the second. The first generation has Czech friends only through inevitable work contacts. The interaction between them and Czechs is limited to business, and after work they seldom interact with them. The second generation has Czech friends from school or other places, as well as work, so it is understandable that more social interaction takes place between young Chinese and local young people. The first generation only make local friends because of work, and the social relationship is narrow and hardly promotes social integration into the host society. Statistically, however, the difference in social integration between the first and second generations is not marked from the perspective of "social networking with local people."

If immigrants show an interest in Czech history, they are more likely to interact with local people. However, 70.5 % of the first generation expressed little interest in Czech history and culture. Their main place of entertainment is the casino, which local people seldom visit.

The Chinese like to talk about Chinese politics and social news, but they seem less interested in Czech news. The same is more or less true of the second generation, which is even less interested in Czech news. The Chinese still live in Czechia as outsiders. If language is indeed the most important road to social integration, few Chinese want to learn it. They think the current state of interaction with Czechs is sufficient for their "comfortable" life in the host country.

Watching local television is also important for social integration and interaction with local society. Television programs show daily life and reflect local values and life styles, and they are a way of learning Czech. However, few first- or second-generation Chinese watch much Czech television. This is partly because of the language gap, but also because they are too busy at work.

Some 73 % of the first generation think it is not easy to integrate into local society, and 50 % of the second generation agree. Chinese immigrants are seemingly more willing to stay in touch with China and keep their own national identity than to integrate. For them, the concept of community does not refer to a specific dwelling place, where the Chinese live together. Although most Chinese live inside the Czech "community" and they often meet Czechs face to face in their daily life, it does not mean the Chinese can easily integrate themselves into the local society.

It could be argued that members of the first generation retain their "national confidence" in order to be less dependent on the host society and ready to undertake further migration. This might also explain the low drive among the Chinese in Czechia to integrate.

There is a significant difference between the first and second generation with regard to discrimination. On the one hand, the first generation recognize their homeland as one of the most powerful states nowadays all over the world, and owing to their national confidence, generally speaking, they more or less enjoy the living environment in local society no matter how they are imagined by the local society. However, such a large percentage of the second generation perceiving discrimination puts a definite limit on their integration. The first generation perceives themselves as less discriminated than the second generation according to our survey, and the feeling of being discriminated against seems to interfere with the greater social integration of the second generation.

Most Czech Chinese appreciate life in the Czech Republic but feel no need to understand its history and culture. They see it as a good place for Chinese immigrants to live. However, having a good living does not mean achieving better social integration for Chinese immigrants.

Conclusion

This chapter shows that new Chinese immigrants in Prague have adopted a number of pragmatic strategies to accommodate themselves in Czech society, but that they have reproduced and sometimes even compounded their internal heterogeneity and thereby stymie any effort toward institutional integration and formal communization.

Our study are among just a handful since 2003 that have carried out longitudinal field research. It is therefore divided into two parts. The first focuses on history and an up-to-date demographic analysis and comparison of the ethnic Chinese population of Czechia with other foreign nationalities. The second presents outcomes of the two fieldwork projects conducted by us between 2010 and 2015.

The contemporary Chinese community in Prague began in 1989. The Velvet Revolution and subsequent political developments in Czechoslovakia and other CEECs prepared the ground for unprecedented Chinese immigration into the region. The flow of the Chinese is very much smaller than that into Western Europe. It started in Hungary during the so-called "Hungarian fever" in 1989 and 1990. In just a short period of time,

Hungary received an influx of 27,000 Chinese. Subsequent restrictions by Hungary on immigration caused a further flow of “Hungarian” Chinese to other CEECs, including Czechoslovakia. Since then, Prague has become home to the second largest Chinese community in the CEECs.

Chinese immigrants have experienced, and still experience, a host society that has unique features. As a result of historical events in the mid- to late twentieth century, Czechia became one of the ethnically most homogenous countries in the world. Czech society, which had almost no contact with immigrants for half a century, was very conservative in its immigration policy and was not so receptive to foreigners. Because of these unique characteristics as a host society, and the country’s rather peripheral location in the framework of world migration, there are still only a small number of foreign nationals residing in the country, amounting to about 4 % of the total population, two-and-a-half decades after the fall of the Iron Curtain.

Czech Chinese comprise a small foreigner group numbering only 5500. The milestone was 2004, when Czechia joined the EU. The swift change in immigration rules and residential law for citizens of third countries resulted in much internal reassessment of the Chinese and other foreign nationalities by Czechs. Chinese immigration increased rapidly as a result, and the proportion of Czech Chinese from Qingtian and Wenzhou has increased over time. Since the early 2000s a second generation has emerged.

Despite increasing numbers, the Chinese in Czechia have slowly dispersed since the 1990s. Although Prague concentrates the largest proportion of the Chinese in Czechia, the ethnic Chinese community in the capital city does not take the form of an identifiable ethnic community as in other countries. Therefore the two research studies presented here have focused on the community’s heterogeneity in terms of identity, integration and intergenerational dichotomy. The first used a psychological ethnicity questionnaire to examine the ethnic identity of Czech Chinese in the context of their communal heterogeneity. The second focused on the social integration of the Chinese into Czech society and their connections to China, and made an intergenerational comparison. In the second project, we concluded that both generations display “high cultural identity and low social integration.” The lack of intergenerational difference is because most second-generation Chinese were born in China or in a place other than Czechia. Social segregation, on the other hand, is a result of an unsettled communal life resulting from the community’s still unsettled demography.

In summary, the Chinese in Prague barely create a community in the first place. They settle widely, partially because of the mistrust within the society,

and find themselves in the already existing social and economic clusters which represent typical migrant resettlement patterns for the CEECs. Despite the fact that most Chinese in Prague come from Qingtian and Wenzhou, and predominantly their language is *Putonghua*, the demography and social organization of the society are still very patchy. There are Chinese associations in Prague but they have little impact on community formation and attract mostly members of the older generation.

There are two major socioeconomic groups distinguishable by age. The wealthier group is represented by Chinese senior officials, businessmen and their spouses residing mostly in neighborhoods of Prague. Those under 30 are mostly single, are employees in family businesses, poorer and speak much better Czech. Still, the language barrier seems to be an optional marginalization strategy. Most first-generation Chinese have Czech friends only through inevitable work contacts. All generations think the current state of interaction with Czechs is sufficient for their "comfortable" life. This is partially owing to the fact that most Chinese do not consider Prague (or Czechia) to be their lifelong destination. Even those under 30 mostly go to Prague with their families, and the second generation Chinese are mostly foreign-borns and they loose their and parent's bonds to Prague as a homeplace.

Our work points to arguable conclusions that, currently, the Chinese in Prague retain their own "national confidence" in order to be less dependent on the host society, that they become more transnational and expect further migrations, and that they still live in Czechia mostly as voluntary outsiders.

Notes

1. In the geographical framework as formulated by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.
2. Czechia is the short version of the official name of the Czech Republic.
3. Our analysis is based on two major fieldwork projects carried out among Czech Chinese between 2011 and 2014, conducted independently of each other and with different aims. The research conducted by Adam Horálek used mainly psychological ethnicity questionnaire and semistructured narrative interviews. That by Cheng Ter-hsing James and Hu Liyan focused on a quantitative sociological analysis of integration processes within the community and its intergenerational dimensions. The two reports have been combined in an attempt to remedy the lack of studies on community organization and configuration as opposed to migration networks and processes (see Zhou and Lee 2013).

4. Czechoslovakia comprised two nations (Czechs and Slovaks), four nationalities (Germans, Hungarians, Poles and Russians) and other ethnic groups (e.g. Roma people). All other non-autochthonous peoples were labeled as foreigners (and in statistics still are). The Czech statistical office now distinguishes between two types of minority: foreigners by their citizenship and autochthonous ethnic minorities possessing Czech citizenship (these are not included in presented numbers).
5. Neither of the research samples was representative of the whole population of Czech Chinese, and the methodology differs too.
6. Nyiri in his paper "Chinese Migration to Eastern Europe" (2003: 243–244) detached four main flows of Chinese migration: (1) from Russian Far East to European Russia; (2) from Moscow to Hungary, Romania and the Czechia (1991–1993) to look for better business opportunities and safety; (3) from Hungary to Czechia, Romania, Yugoslavia, Russia and the rest of Eastern Europe; and (4) from Hungary and Czechia to Germany, Austria and Italy.
7. Karsten Giese (1999: 199) shows that in 1980s the "invasion" of the Chinese into Europe went through Germany, which became a transit country for further migration to Western Europe and North America.
8. The term "third country" refers to non-EU and non-European Free Trade Association countries (e.g. Norway, Switzerland and Iceland).
9. Ministry of the Interior of the Czech Republic, http://www.mvcr.cz/clanek/statistika-poctu-podanych-zadosti-a-pocet-nabyti-statniho-obcanstvi-ceske-republiky.aspx (accessed on November 8, 2015).
10. Data presented in this section come mainly from the research conducted by Adam Horálek, unless stated otherwise.
11. According to Zhou and Lee, ethnic enclaves refer to "urban clusters of immigrants from the same sending country" (Zhou and Lee 2013: 24).
12. See also Česko-čínská obchodní asociace (Czech-Chinese Business Association, CCOA), http://www.ccoa.cz/en/home.php
13. Ter-Hsing James Cheng and Liyan Hu conducted a survey specifically for this research in 2010. The main issue was to make a comparison between the first and second generations on the issue of cultural identity and social integration in Czechia. Accordingly, we designed two questionnaires for the first and second generations of Chinese immigrants. We adopted a face-to-face interview for the survey, and we trained two Chinese college-level students as our research assistants. Demographically, we restricted the first-generation participants to those above 19 years who had lived in Czechia for at least one year, and the second-generation participants to those above 13 years who had lived in Czechia for at least one year. In addition to the questionnaire, we conducted in-depth interviews with six Chinese immigrants who were owners of restaurants and textile shops, or were college students.

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CHAPTER 13

New Chinese Immigrants in Spain: The Migration Process, Demographic Characteristics and Adaptation Strategies

Minghuan Li

Most Chinese in today's Spain are first-generation immigrants; almost all emigrated from China after the late 1970s, when China reopened its door to the West. In about three decades between the mid-1980s and the mid-2010s, the number of Chinese migrants in Spain has grown more than 100-fold. This chapter traces the migration process of the Chinese to Spain, describes their sociodemographic characteristics, and analyzes their economic activities and the social challenges they face. In particular, it addresses the following questions: Why did hundreds of thousands of Chinese choose Spain, not a traditional country of Chinese immigration? How did they migrate? And what are their adaptation strategies to cope with life there?

The Migration Process

The Earlier Waves

Historical records demonstrate that a handful of Chinese servants, merchants and novices were found in Spain before the twentieth century. However, the earlier Chinese migrants there were mainly from the

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Philippines, a former Spanish colony and one of the most important migration destinations of the Chinese at the time. The Chinese did not begin migrating directly from China until the early twentieth century. The port city of Barcelona became the first place where Chinese seamen and traders chose to settle (Antolin 1998).

According to Chinese records, Chinese migration directly from China to Spain started in the early twentieth century. One record described a circus formed by the people from Shandong arriving from North China by way of Russia. It arrived in Spain in around 1910. Finding that Spain was a country in which it was relatively easy to make a living, the circus decided to set up a base there and went north now and then to perform in other European countries (Xu 1956: 45). Another oral record suggests that the first Chinese in Spain were Chen Xianting and Wang Tingxiang, both from Qingtian in Zhejiang, in around 1914.[1]

In the late 1920s and the early 1930s, emigration toward Europe surged in the southern part of Zhejiang, particularly in Qingtian and Wenzhou. Most migrants settled in Rotterdam, Hamburg and Marseilles. However, these Zhejiangese saw Europe as a single entity, often transferring from one country to another and then on to a third or fourth country, especially shortly after arriving (Li 1999). Dozens of the earliest Zhejiangese migrants went south to Spain to make a living. Most worked as peddlers selling cheap ties and trinkets. Few intended to settle down in Spain. Instead, they planned to return home with enough money to purchase land for the family. In the winter of 1930, Jin Guangkui, a Qingtianese, set up a Huaqiao Gongyu (华侨公寓, lodging house for overseas Chinese) in Madrid for the 300-odd Chinese living in the city who needed somewhere to live. These people rented bunk beds. Dozens of them lived together, so the Huaqiao Gongyu became a meeting place for Qingtian people. However, most left in 1936 after the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War. Only a dozen or so stayed, most of whom had married Spanish women.

After the 1950s, emigration from mainland China to Spain came to a stop, apart from several hundred immigrants from Taiwan and Hong Kong. In 1949 a dozen Chinese Christians left Shanghai for Spain to study theology. In the early 1950s, the Spanish government provided 150 scholarships to allow students from Taiwan to study theology in Spain. More than 100 students went. Some switched their status to that of immigrant after finishing their studies.[2] They later attracted new migrants from Taiwan. In 1955 there were 132 Chinese living in Spain, and the number increased to 336 in 1965. Most came from Taiwan.[3]

Table 13.1 Chinese immigrants in select European countries

Country	*1935*	*1955*	*1965*	*1975*	*1985*
UK	8000	3000	45,000	120,000	230,000
France	17,000	2000	6000	90,000	210,000
Netherlands	8000	2000	2353	30,000	60,000
Germany	1800	500	1200	8000	30,000
Belgium	500	99	565	2000	11,400
Portugal	1200	120	176	300	6800
Austria	N.A.	30	N.A.	1000	6000
Italy	274	330	700	1000	5000
Spain	273	132	336	2000	5000

Source: Li (2002: 830)

Up until the mid-1980s, Europe was not a destination for emigrants from mainland China. Compared with other Western European countries, Spain was among the smallest places of Chinese settlement. The European countries that accepted most Chinese were the UK, France and the Netherlands, mainly from Hong Kong, Malaysia, Indochina and Indonesia (see Table 13.1).

New Chinese Migration

Only in the 1970s did migration to Spain from mainland China, particularly Qingtian and Wenzhou, in Zhejiang, begin to pick up again. In 1973, Spain and the People's Republic of China (PRC) established diplomatic relations. In 1975, Chen Diguang, a Qingtianese whose father lived in Spain, became the first migrant to go directly from the PRC to Spain. In the following years a couple of Zhejiangese with relatives in Spain obtained permission to emigrate there. After that, emigration to Spain surged.

Why the surge? Many studies have explored the general reasons (Antolin 1998; Li 1999; Nieto 2003; Thunø 1999). Here I focus on the special case of Spain and try to update my data to the 2010s, exploring how the interaction of push and pull factors shaped the migration.

Reopening the Chinese Emigration Door and Its Consequences in Zhejiang

According to migration theories based on what is often conveniently summarized as "traditional neoclassical economics," international migration is a response to differentials in incomes between countries of origin and

destination (Massey et al. 1994: 708–711). Dreams of getting rich, high expectations and imagination have pushed people to emigrate despite the ethnic and cultural differences they encounter. China's reforms have greatly raised the expectations of Chinese people regarding the pursuit of material wealth. Many studies have explored the motivation of Chinese migrants in the late twentieth century (Benton and Pieke 1998; Li 1999; Thunø 1999).

Migration was particularly important for Zhejiang people, even more so for Qingtianese, during the early period when the PRC reopened the door to emigration. The economic reforms that started in the late 1970s reignited Chinese emigration. At the beginning, permission to emigrate could be granted if the applicant could demonstrate sponsorship from relatives abroad. Zhejiang people, with their special links with Spain, became active participants in this process.

In 1985 the Law on the Control of Exit and Entry of Citizens was promulgated in China. It granted the right of exit to all Chinese citizens but required proof of an entry visa in the overseas destination. A Chinese citizen still needed to go through complicated formalities when applying for a passport. Relevant requirements included an invitation letter from the warrantor in the destination country, who also had to provide a financial guarantee for the duration of the visit; household registration documents; and approval from one's work unit, which in rural areas meant the township authorities. With these documents, the applicant could go to the Public Security Bureau to apply for a passport.

In qiaoxiang areas such as Qingtian and Wenzhou in Zhejiang, the revival of emigration relied on the availability of supportive links with relatives and friends abroad, not only to provide the documents needed but to receive the new arrivals. In the early years of emigration, *qiaoxiang* people pioneered the new wave of emigration.

Table 13.2 shows the annual number of Qingtian people who received permission from the Qingtian Public Security Bureau to emigrate between 1986 and 2000. The variation shows how quickly the number grew, from a few thousand in the 1980s to more than 20,000 a year at the end of the 1990s.

The records show that Spain was the number-one destination for Qingtian people. During those 15 years, Qingtian migrants went to more than 39 different countries, but at the height of the wave 44.5 % went to Spain, and on average up to 28.5 % chose Spain as their destination. Why was Spain chosen?

Table 13.2 Annual report of Qingtian people who received emigration permission from Qingtian Public Security Bureau (1986–2000)

Year	*Spain*	*Italy*	*Austria*	*Germany*	*Portugal*	*Other*	*Total*[a]	*Spain/ total (%)*
1986	960	325	283	167	111	540	2386	40.2
1987	1392	158	315	198	145	920	3128	44.5
1988	156	376	404	193	50	939	2118	7.4
1989	N.A.	385	418	325	81	1528	N.A.	N.A.
1990	284	1240	645	1076	304	908	4457	6.4
1991	659	1661	767	828	265	1036	5216	12.6
1992	774	509	395	828	153	1472	4131	18.7
1993	590	344	330	763	158	2794	4979	11.8
1994	392	319	201	147	60	1230	2349	16.7
1995	937	553	297	253	96	2070	4206	22.3
1996	2322	799	400	354	210	4372	8457	27.5
1997	3572	2511	358	366	283	4824	11,914	30.0
1998	8920	3473	516	392	782	8835	22,918	38.9
1999	7944	3784	878	333	860	9537	23,336	34.0
2000	8754	8917	888	531	938	9952	29,980	29.2
Total	37,656	25,354	7095	6754	4496	50,957	132,312	28.5

[a]The original table lists the statistics under 39 different countries. Here I have selected only the top five countries and grouped the remaining 34 under "Other"

Source: Editorial Board, Qingtian Huaqiaoshi [A History of Qingtianese Abroad]. Hangzhou: Zhejiang renmin chubanshe, 2011, p. 94

Changes in Immigration Policy in Spain

The migration policy of the destination country helps to shape migration. Emigration to Spain and rapid economic development there went hand in hand.

In the three decades after World War II, Spain experienced outmigration. Spanish people went north to more developed European countries. However, after the mid-1980s and into the first half of 2008, before the global financial crisis in 2008, Spain entered a period of rapid economic development (see Fig. 13.1). The Barcelona Olympics of 1992 initiated a large number of public construction projects in the 1980s. New immigrants were attracted by this opportunity. Although the economy was disrupted almost immediately after the Olympics, it soon started to grow again. Spanish gross domestic product (GDP) grew quickly for most of the subsequent decade.



Fig. 13.1 Economic growth rate in Spain and in the EU (1980–2014) (Source: http://data.un.org/Data.aspx?d=WDI&f=Indicator_Code%3ANY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG)

Along with rapid economic development, particularly at the turn of the century, the Spanish government implemented a rather liberal immigration policy in order to attract Spanish returnees and cheap foreign labor to work on its construction projects. The policy was effective. According to statistics published in June 2015, in the period between 1998 and 2008, Spain received 4,933,231 new immigrants, 2,823,048 (57.2 %) of which came from other European Union (EU) states and the rest from outside the EU. Many of the non-EU foreigners (up to 34 %) were from Morocco. Chinese immigrants were the second biggest group (around 9 %) (Ministerio de Empleo y Seguridad Social 2015: 10).

The Chinese, particularly the Zhejiangese, emigrated in different ways. In the beginning they did so by way of family reunion, for most West European countries allow this. For Chinese, "family" (*jia*) is a concept that embraces brothers and sisters, married or unmarried, and their children. Moreover, even sharing the same family name is sufficient evidence for descent from a common ancestor and membership of one great family. It is not unusual for a migrant to adopt a son or a daughter from another family who is already abroad, and then to arrange their emigration via the "family

reunion" procedure (Li 1998). Zhejiang people, particularly Qingtian and Wenzhou people, grasped the opportunity and became the first group to emigrate from mainland China to Spain. When this new generation of pioneers had settled down, a new migration chain started up.

However, the family link is still limited. Those who could not find a family link emigrated where possible by a number of ways. Some entered Spain on a tourist or business visa but remained after its expiry. Others were smuggled into Europe. As the number of undocumented Chinese migrants rose, amnesties for illegal immigrants launched in some European countries offered hope. France launched its first amnesty in 1981, when 132,000 immigrants legalized their status (Li 2002: 493).

While news of the French amnesty was spreading across the *qiaoxiang* areas of Zhejiang, Spain followed suit in 1985. Undocumented Chinese in Spain and neighboring countries rushed to take advantage of the opportunity. A total of 1192 Chinese applied and 845 were legalized, accounting for 2.2 % of the total number of legalized foreigners. In June 1991 a second amnesty followed in Spain. A total of 4291 Chinese legalized their status, representing 4 % of the total.

In 2000 the Spanish government announced a new Aliens Act (*Ley de Extranjería*). Any foreigner who had lived in Spain for more than three years and held a contract of more than a year could obtain a residential and working permit. This act, in effect a third amnesty, started in March and ended on July 31, 2000. Nearly 5000 Chinese legalized their status, representing 5.8 % of the total.[4] Undocumented Chinese had to buy a work contract from a settled Chinese with a business in Spain. A one-year work contract cost USD10,000 in around 2000 and EUR16,000 at the beginning of 2008.

From 1985 up until 2010, Spain carried out seven legalization programs. As a result, it quickly became a main destination for Chinese migrants, particularly those unable to emigrate via official channels but who had local contacts able to provide the necessary information and documents. In this way, more and more Chinese joined the official migrant community and started up new migration chains. Meanwhile, more irregular migrants awaited the next amnesty.

According to a report published in 2015, nearly 5 million foreign migrants had received permits to live in Spain, including 189,853 Chinese, or 193,690 Chinese if those with another EU citizenship are included (Ministerio de Empleo y Seguridad Social 2015: 1).

The Chinese have migrated to Spain in different ways. It is difficult, however, to define what is and what isn't a normal approach. For example, having a legal immigration permit may require forged documents. Someone who overstays their tourist visa, or is trafficked, may have the legal right to join their family in Spain but be unaware of it or be unwilling or unable to carry out the complicated and time-consuming process of application. In the eyes of potential Chinese migrants in the qiaoxiang areas, "being channeled to another country" is not a crime but a worthwhile undertaking by people who want to make a fortune abroad but lack the legal entitlement to try. The most attractive point of going abroad—regardless of its legality—is that no matter how tough the experience, the reward will prove worthwhile. As long as the migrant returns one day as a successful overseas Chinese, all the processes along the way, no matter how frustrating or demeaning, and no matter whether legal or illegal, are as if erased.

In 2010 a Chinese association in Spain reviewed the ways in which Chinese immigrants reached Spain. From the 1980s to the early 1990s, about 40 % entered on tourist visas and overstayed; about 40 % were smuggled in via a third or fourth country; and the other 20 % gained access by way of family reunion or study. In the 1990s about 40 % entered through family reunion and work contracts, based on people who had legalized their status in the first two legalization programs; about 40 % were smuggled in to await new amnesties; and the remaining 20 % entered on business or student visas. Starting in 2000, about 35 % entered Spain on work contracts, most of them Zhejiangese; 40 % relied on tourist or business visas and then stayed in the expectation of a new amnesty; about 8 % used student visas; and the remaining 12 % gained entry via another European country or via South America.[5]

Size and Composition

Chinese migrants who have legalized their status in Spain have continued to bring over family members. Since the mid-1990s, new Chinese immigrants have become a socially visible ethnic group in Spain.

In the mid-1950s there were only 132 Chinese immigrants in Spain; the number was limited to a few thousand until the mid-1980s but started to rise after the end of the 1980s; it then increased from 20,000 in the mid-1990s to 190,000 in 2015. Table 13.3 shows the changes in the number of Chinese formally registered with the authorities. In 2015, Don Juan Aguilar, chief of the Spanish Police Office, said there were about

Table 13.3 Chinese immigrants in Spain

1952	*1961*	*1971*	*1981*	*1991*	*2000*	*2011*	*2013*	*2015*
116	167	439	758	7024	28,693	160,636	182,072	230,000

Sources: The statistics for 1952–1991 are from Ministerio de Interior, Direccion General de la Policia (Ministry of the Interior, Directorate-General of the Police). Requoted from Antolin 1998: 217; the statistics for 2000, 2011 and 2013 are from the National Statistics Bureau of Spain, quoted from personal email contacts with Mr. Xu Songhua, the honorary chairman of the Association of Chinese in Spain; and the statistics for 2015 are quoted from an announcement made by Mr. Don Juan Aguilar, chief of the Spanish Police Office

230,000 Chinese immigrants in Spain, and it is informally claimed that their numbers are currently approaching 300,000, including undocumented migrants.

In the first decade of this century, the number of Chinese with resident permits increased from 28,693 to 145,425—that is, at a rate of around 20 % a year (Table 13.4).

In March 2010 a nationwide survey by a Chinese association showed that the Chinese in Spain came from all provinces of China, but most from Zhejiang, and among the Zhejiangese, most were from Qingtian. Nearly 62 % came from Zhejiang, 65 % of those came from Qingtian and nearly 32 % from Wenzhou. Fujianese comprised nearly 21.5 % of the total. Thus more than 83 % of the Chinese in Spain came from Zhejiang and Fujian (see Table 13.5).

Most Chinese in Spain are in their productive years, so aged 15 to 64, while dependents are those under the age of 15 and over the age of 64. According to the Census published by the Ministry of Employment and Social Security in Spain in 2013, the dependency ratio of the Chinese in Spain is much lower than that of native Spanish. Among the Chinese, 74.58 % belong to the productive part compared with 67.50 % among indigenous people. The proportion of those over 64 is 17.40 % among the Spanish population as a whole but less than 1.5 % among Chinese immigrants (Figs. 13.2 and 13.3).

The dependency ratio is another important measure of the population structure. The total dependency ratio can be separated into two subsections: the child dependency ratio and the aged dependency ratio. The cost of caring for the aged is much greater than that of raising a child, particularly as life expectancy keeps rising. The greater the proportion of the aged, the heavier the pressure on the productive population. In Spain, the

Table 13.4 Chinese immigrants in Spain (2000–2015)

Year	*Chinese (N)*	*Annual growth (%)*
2000	28,693	
2001	38,561	34.39
2002	45,815	18.81
2003	56,086	22.42
2004	71,881	28.16
2005	89,137	24.01
2006	93,116	4.46
2007	104,011	11.70
2008	126,075	21.21
2009	145,425	15.35
2010	154,056	5.94
2011	160,636	4.27
2012	175,813	9.45
2013	184,072	4.70
2014	191,078	3.81
2015	198,017	3.63

Source: Provided by Mr. Xu, honorary chairman of the Association of Chinese in Spain (Asociacion de Chinos en Espana). The data are taken from the relevant government bulletin. There are some differences from the statistics published by the Ministry of Employment and Social Security (Ministerio de Empleo Y Seguridad Social)

aged dependency ratio is 26 among natives but only 2 among Chinese. The child dependency ratio is 22 among natives but 32 among Chinese. The total dependency ratio of the Spanish population is 14 points higher than the Chinese immigrant ratio (see Table 13.6). Spain has the highest median age of any nation in the world, so the Chinese contribution is notable.[6]

Besides migrants moving directly from China to Spain who mainly comprise unskilled laborers, such as Qinqtianese, three other Chinese groups should be noted. Although entering Spain to study is not a new phenomenon, and many went to work rather than to study during the 1980s and 1990s, since 2000, more and more Chinese students have been going there to study. In early 2015 there were more than 6000 Chinese students at Spanish universities, most of them in Madrid. Some may become immigrants after finishing their studies. Another group is Chinese children adopted by Spanish parents. In 2015, Spanish families adopted at least 12,000 Chinese children, almost all of them girls.[7] The third and most recent group is Chinese investors. Rising China has produced a group of new rich. When the Spanish government announced the

Table 13.5 Hometowns of Chinese immigrants in Spain, 2010

	Province/city	*Number*	*Percent*
1	Zhejiang	100,530	61.72
	Qingtian	65,400	
	Wenzhou	32,000	
	Other Counties	3130	
2	Fujian	35,000	21.49
	Zhejiang + Fujian	135,530	83.21
3	Shanghai	5200	3.19
4	Shandong	4500	2.76
5	Liaoning	3000	1.84
6	Taiwan	2800	1.72
7	Henan	2600	1.60
8	Guangdong	1980	1.22
9	Jilin	1800	1.11
10	Heilongjiang	1700	1.04
	Other provinces	3779	2.31
Total		162,889	100%

Source: Provided by Mr. Xu, honorary chairman of the Association of Chinese in Spain (Asociacion de Chinos en Espana)



Fig. 13.2 Age structure of the Spanish population, 2012

policy of "buy property, get residency," the first group of Chinese new rich, a dozen families from Shanghai, were granted automatic residency in early 2014. More are expected.



Fig. 13.3 Age structure of the Chinese immigrants in Spain, 2013

Table 13.6 Dependency ratio of Spanish population and Chinese immigrants in Spain, 2013

	Total dependency ratio	*Child dependency ratio*	*Age dependency ratio*
(A) Spanish population	48	22	26
(B) Chinese immigrants in Spain	34	32	2
(A) : (B)	+14	−10	+24

Source: Gobierno de Espana Ministerio de Empleoy Seguridad Social, Extranjeros Residentesen Espana: A 31 de Marzo de 2013

Statistics show that Chinese immigrants live in big cities. In Madrid, 71 % entered directly from China, but 29 % went by way of another place. Some 94 % of Chinese immigrants do not take Spanish nationality, although 57 % claim they would like to be naturalized. Some 63 % are married but only 1 % have a Spanish partner. Some 55 % were originally peasants, 20 % factory workers, 20 % students and the remaining 5 % civil servants, business people and others.[8]

Chinese immigrants in Spain have a strong enterprising drive. This links to their economic activities, which are discussed in the following section.

Economic Activities

Like those of Chinese immigrants in other European countries, the economic activities of the Chinese in Spain were traditionally focused on catering. However, since the late 1990s, they have diversified. The Chinese immigrant economy in Spain was flourishing until the global economic crisis in 2008.

The Catering Business

In 1953 the first Chinese restaurant was set up in Madrid by Lin Lianshui, a Zhejiangese. In 1965 there were five Chinese restaurants there. In 1975, Chen Diguang was the first Qingtianese migrant since the establishment of the PRC to set up a restaurant in the capital. His menu catered to both Chinese and Spanish tastes and was taken as a model by other Chinese restaurants. In 1978, King Juan Carlos of Spain visited Beijing and ate with chopsticks. Suddenly large numbers of Spanish people started frequenting Chinese restaurants. In 1979 there were 59 in Madrid, rising to more than 500 in the early1990s. The number peaked in early 1996, with more than 4000 Chinese restaurants all over the Spain, the golden age of Chinese catering in the country.[9]

The boom attracted more new immigrants from China, so competition increased. Few cooks had much professional training—most were peasants with no knowledge of catering. The only way forward was to cut prices. In the summer of 1996, local public health department officials found that some Chinese restaurants were using out-of-date food in their cooking. Chinese catering suffered a disastrous decline almost overnight. More than 300 Chinese restaurants went bankrupt within a year. Those restaurants that survived paid more attention to regularizing their business, while some Chinese sought other economic niches.

After 2000, Chinese restaurants in Spain followed a relatively stable line of development. The number of restaurants is around 3000 but they are moving in different directions, not only because of competition but also because of shifts in Chinese owners' marketing strategy.

At the high end of the trade, restaurants created a sophisticated environment in which to enjoy genuine Chinese cuisine. There are only a handful of such restaurants. The decor is Spanish and the restaurant is clean and quiet, with small candles rather than big red lanterns and soft Western classical

music instead of Chinese music. The service is adapted to the Spanish palate. Most customers are Spanish.

Other restaurants meet the needs of Chinese customers. Some smaller ones provide cheap Chinese-style snacks, while bigger ones also cater to tourists from China. The big Chinese restaurants often have a hall that can be used for banquets on the occasion of a wedding or Chinese associations' meeting. Customers talk loudly while toasting one another. Some restaurants provide karaoke equipment. Some Chinese like to enjoy themselves by whooping, talking and shouting.

Two other trends are worth mentioning. One is the emergence of the so-called "wok restaurant." The most important feature of this kind of restaurant is that it has an open kitchen. Chinese kitchens are often criticized on account of their unsanitary conditions, so wok restaurants show a clean and open kitchen to convince customers of their hygiene. Customers pick up half-prepared meat, seafood and vegetables from a set of open glass cupboards and hand them to the chef, who cooks in front of them. However, wok restaurants do not usually have much of a menu beyond three or four types of dish: very spicy, spicy, not very spicy or not at all spicy. Some professional Chinese chefs despair at this development, which they believe spells death for the reputation of Chinese cuisine. When wok restaurants first emerged in around 2000, they flourished, but the model quickly declined.

Some Chinese migrants have become owners of Spanish cafés. Although the profit margins for running a café are small, it needs little investment and can function as a family business. Cafés are deeply integrated into Spanish daily life. There is no need to worry about a shortage of customers. To increase the profits, some owners have developed a new range of services. For instance, coffee can be ordered by phone and delivered to the customer's shop or office.[10] The working hours of these Chinese cafés are long and they stay open until the last guest leaves. By the end of 2014 there were at least 8000 Chinese cafés in Spain.

Made in China

Since around 2000, selling Made in China goods has become the main Chinese economic activity in Spain. The Chinese working in this field include street peddlers, stall keepers, grocery-shop owners, supermarket owners and wholesale business people, as well as multinational companies.

Quite a few Chinese-run import-export companies, goods wholesalers and commercial malls of various sizes have been set up in Spanish cities.

In Madrid, Chinese shops first appeared in Lavapies in the mid-1990s. In 1996 about a dozen Chinese shops were selling clothes imported from China. Many Spanish buyers were attracted by the modern style and cheap price. Chinese business in the district peaked between 2000 and 2006, and Chinese wholesale shops there increased to more than 500. The Chinese with savings rushed to Lavapies to open businesses, and the price of real estate there shot up. A storefront valued at EUR230,000 in 1999 would fetch EUR1 million in 2006, according to a Chinese store owner.[11] The heavy traffic and the noise greatly disturbed people's daily lives. The conflict between Chinese (and some Arab) owners and local people reached breaking point.

In 2006 the local government regularized business in the district. Trucks were only allowed into the area to load or unload goods at certain times. The Chinese shop owners sent representatives to talk with the local government, but to no avail. Business suffered as a result

Some Chinese then moved their businesses to Fuenlabrada, a satellite town of Madrid. In 1991, Extrastar became the first Chinese company to set up an office and workshop there. After 2000, more Chinese moved to the area, where real estate was much cheaper and transportation relatively convenient. After 2006, Chinese wholesale stores transferred from Lavapies to Fuenlabrada. Very quickly, hundreds of Chinese wholesale stores sprang up there. By 2008 the Chinese commercial center in the district was the biggest not only in Spain but in the whole of Southern Europe. In 2012, Chinese firms in the area did business worth EUR870 million a year. Of the 800 businesses there, 377 were Chinese-run, employing about 3000 people.[12]

In addition to Lavapies and Fuenlabrada, there are a couple of other large-scale Chinese commercial centers in Spain. In Barcelona, a Chinese commercial center arose in Trafalgar; in Valencia, there is one in Ruzafa; and there is another in Elche, a commercial center in the El Carrus district. They are wholesale centers selling products Made in China products at low prices.

The redistribution chain is formed by thousands of Chinese-run street shops. These are called Bai Yuan Dian in Chinese and *tiendas de todo a cien* in Spanish. The area of each shop is around 100 sq. m and the price of each item was supposed to be less than 100 pesetas (before the appearance of the Euro).[13] The operating costs of such shops are low because their owners

obtain the merchandise from Chinese wholesale centers on credit. Often the owner of a Bai Yuan Dian orders merchandise from a relative's wholesale company. Each wholesale company is supported by a network formed by the owner's relatives, fellow villagers and close friends. Often deals are done in cash to avoid tax. Since the late 1990s, Bai Yuan Dian have spread across the whole of Spain. A review by a Chinese association shows that there were more than 10,000 in 2014. After 2010, when the economic crisis in Spain deepened, Bai Yuan Dian started expanding again. Since the beginning of 2010, some occupy up to 3000 sq. m of space. The decor has improved. In February 2011, the largest ever Bai Yuan Dian was opened in Cobo Calleja in Madrid, occupying 600 sq. m. However, within a month, another even larger one opened in Galicia, occupying an area of 11,000 sq. m.

This business model is a double-edged sword from the perspective of the local authorities. Spaniards benefit more or less from the range of products but the grey economy, both of sellers and buyers, breaches Spanish trading rules. Chinese business people have encountered serious challenges in recent years, as I show in the following section.

These Chinese commercial centers, together with the thousands of Bai Yuan Dian, symbolize the Chinese economic presence in Spain. In each center, dozens or hundreds of wholesale shops and stores stand side by side. An estimate made in 2010 by a local Chinese association leader pointed out that the turnover value of all these shops had reached at least RMB5 billion per year.

Newly Emerged Economic Sectors

In addition to the large Chinese commercial centers and retail shops, new Chinese immigrants have joined other economic sectors.

In Usera, a Chinatown in Madrid, south of Lavapies, almost all the businesses deal in wholesale clothing. Alongside a couple of Bai Yuan Dian are all kinds of services needed by new Chinese immigrants. Most are provided by the Chinese for the Chinese. In Usera, and in other Chinese commercial centers, shop signs in both Chinese and Spanish advertise Chinese mobile phones, computers with Chinese software, Chinese printing services, wedding photography, Chinese bookstores, beauty salons designed to suit Chinese hair and skin, and decor items for Chinese restaurants and Chinese households. Chinese travel agencies selling airplane tickets have existed for decades, but now they also provide tourist services all over the world. More Chinese immigrants, particularly members of the younger generation, now enjoy worldwide travel. Chinese clinics sell herbs,

and provide acupuncture and massage services. Chinese law firms, accounting firms and broker agencies provide services in Chinese. Translation and consultant agencies advertise that they are willing to provide any official documents needed. Even Chinese gambling parlors can be found here and there.

Vegetable farms have been set up by new Chinese immigrants in Spain. The immigrants rent farms from Spanish people and plant Chinese cabbage, cucumber, water spinach, bitter gourd and other vegetables that Chinese people like. They meet the needs of Chinese restaurants and Chinese migrant families.

Language education, both teaching Chinese to local-born Chinese and Spanish to adults, has become a business. I visited one private Chinese school in Madrid in 2014. The founders are a Chinese couple. The wife, a primary-school teacher before migrating to Spain, is president and her husband is legal representative. The school has recruited a few hundred students in different age groups. Two three-storey residential buildings were rebuilt to meet the needs of the school. In Barcelona I visited another Chinese school, said to be the largest in Spain. It has just bought an old warehouse to be renovated as a school building with 14 classrooms and a big meeting hall. It seems that both schools are making big profits.

Some Chinese enterprises have established their own brands in Spain. The following are among the successful brands set up by new Chinese immigrants: Extrastar, Artesolar, Kde, Newness, Muralla, Modelisa, Patriot Sport and Livefish. An Extrastar battery costs more than a Sony battery because of its high quality; the Muralla clothing brand store has been named as the Chinese Zara in Spain.

New Chinese immigrants in Spain are highly entrepreneurial. In 2013, 22,400 Chinese adults lived in Madrid. Some 46.72 % (10,471) had registered as self-employed or entrepreneurs.[14] A report published in September 2015 pointed out that the number of Chinese entrepreneurs has kept on rising, despite the economic crisis. In 2008 the number of Chinese registered as self-employed was 22,631. This increased to 47,174 in September 2015. Among these self-employed Chinese immigrants, some 70 % are in commerce while most own clothing shops, Bai Yuan Dian and grocery shops.[15]

Social Challenges and Adaptation Strategies

Before the end of the Cold War, most Chinese in Spain preferred to lead their social lives out of sight of Spanish society. Their contacts with Spanish people were mostly limited to the interiors of Chinese restaurants. They

remained a silent group, not only because the community was rather small but because it tried to solve its problems by itself. However, new Chinese immigration and Chinese economic strength have made new Chinese immigrants more visible. The Chinese came with empty hands but accumulated much wealth and property in a short period of time. Spanish manufacturers say that cheap Chinese imports have damaged their businesses; much blame is attached to Chinese immigrant business people because the goods they import are often untaxed and sold illegally. Sensational press reports talk of a "Chinese Mafia."

Chinese business people in Spain face tough challenges. Two incidents serve as examples. One is the "Burning Chinese shoes" episode in Elche in September 2004. Spain used to be a world leader in the manufacture of shoes, Elche, in southeastern Spain, is the capital of Spain's footwear industry. Since 2000, Spanish manufacturers of shoes have been hard hit by imported Chinese shoes, so they have become angry. In September 2004, some footwear manufacturers staged a demonstration with banners reading "Chinese Out." The protest turned into a riot, and two Chinese-owned warehouses and a lorry were set on fire. This incident was blamed by Chinese immigrants on racism.

Another was the so-called "Operation Emperor" launched by Spanish police in October 2012, when police staged raids on alleged Chinese mobsters. Gao Ping, who owned the biggest wholesale business in Fuenlabrada and two art galleries in Madrid and Beijing, and was regarded as one of the most successful new Chinese immigrants from Qingtian, was arrested and charged. More than 80 people were arrested across Spain, 53 of them reportedly Chinese. Spanish police seized EUR6 million in cash in hundreds of raids. A top anti-corruption prosecutor announced that the Chinese mobster network was laundering between EUR200 million and EUR300 million a year, dodging taxes, bribing officials and forging documents. Chinese business people in Fuenlabrada were shocked and scared. A spokesperson for the PRC government said that China was "deeply concerned." On November 3, 2012, Chinese business people in Fuenlabrada staged a strike in protest against the police crackdown on alleged money laundering. They said that Operation Emperor had stigmatized all Chinese immigrants in Spain.

These two events can be seen as representative of the serious challenges facing Chinese immigrants, alongside numerous raids on Chinese businesses, shops and companies by police officers, tax collectors and other officials. It seems that the Chinese immigrants still face formidable obstacles that derive from cultural differences.

There is no doubt that much Chinese economic activity in Spain is in cash transactions, which is unlawful. Dodging taxes, bribing officials and forging documents is also not unusual among Chinese, although the talk of a Chinese mafia is exaggerated. What causes these phenomena?

Most Chinese in Spain come from rural areas such as Qingtian and are economic migrants. They emigrate simply to escape poverty and become rich. They dream of making enough money to return home. But how much is enough? To satisfy their endless ambition, they pile up ever more wealth to banish the memory of poverty. They define success primarily in monetary terms. Deviant activities may become normal, particularly when success is posed in terms of a market narrative. These values persist among first-generation economic migrants of all nationalities.

Their strategy, like that of many other migrant groups, is to challenge existing rules and avoid punishment. They rely on cash transactions, dodge taxes, and forge documents. If illegal migration practices can be legalized, why not economic activities in fields regarded as illegal or even criminal? Some of these activities are undertaken together with Spanish entrepreneurs. A report published by the Spanish National Financial Ministry points out that the country's underground economy accounted for 17.8 % of GDP in 2008 and 24.6 % in 2012. The World Bank reports that it accounts for 20 % of world GDP and more than 40 % in developing countries.

The underground economic activities of Chinese in Spain are closely connected with the clan, co-villager and friendship network, which is hard to track. The amounts accumulated are very large. One Chinese entrepreneur claimed that the Chinese have studied Spanish law and know where the loopholes are, so they are able to make extra profits and escape conviction in a cat-and-mouse game with the Spanish authorities.

Some difficult challenges have to be resolved through greater interaction and mutual development. After the Elche incident, Chinese business people took three countermeasures to meet the challenge, including hiring a lawyer to sue for human rights violation, organizing a Chinese footwear trade association for self-protection, and suggesting that Chinese shoe firms employ more Spanish workers. However, the situation had not improved by 2008, when the demand for shoes in Spain decreased but increased in China, particularly for high-quality shoes made in Spain. In 2008 the total turnover of Spanish-made shoes in China reached EUR9.6 million, then EUR31.5 million in 2012. In other words, while Chinese shoe firms sell EUR10 shoes in Spain, the amount has reached EUR47.8 in China. Does the future of Spanish footwear manufacture lie in China? A new trend is for

cooperation between Spanish and Chinese footwear manufacturers to explore the new market in China. Spanish red wine and olive oil have found a market in China as a result of the activities of Chinese business people in Spain. In 2009, Spanish ham valued at about EUR20,000 was imported to China, and this reached more than EUR90 million in 2012. In 2011, China imported 74 million liters of Spanish red wine, and 100 million liters in 2013. "Nowadays Chinese immigrants help us profit from China's huge market. Spanish business people should leap at this money-making opportunity," said a Spanish businessman in November 2013 when interviewed by a Chinese journalist in Madrid.[16]

Conclusion

Spain, a non-traditional destination for Chinese migrants, has become one of their major targets. In the past, far fewer Chinese went to Spain than to the UK, France or the Netherlands. Spain only after the 1980s became an attractive destination. The economic boom and the amnesties have formed obvious pull factors.

The theory of labor-market segmentation suggests that foreign workers often accept relatively dirty, dangerous, difficult and demeaning jobs in the secondary sector. The purpose of the continual redefinition of immigration policy in Spain is to attract the manual laborers that the country badly needs. They are expected to work in agriculture, construction, household services, street cleaning and so on, like the Romanians and Moroccans in Spain. Among the new Chinese immigrants, however, as many as 23.89 % are *autónomo* (i.e., "their own boss"). Among Chinese adults in Madrid, 10,471 are bosses, representing 46.72 % of the local Chinese adult population.[17]

The new Chinese immigrants in Spain want not simply to escape poverty but to achieve upward social mobility. Their strategy is to set up their own businesses, no matter how difficult it is to do so. Chinese immigrants do not fill the labor vacuum as expected, and even dare to challenge existing laws by importing cheap made in China goods and trading in a semilegal way. This is a challenge to the conventional Spanish market. The campaigns against the so-called "Chinese mafia" are not conflicts between immigrants and natives but signs of rising competition in business circles. The new challenges facing Chinese immigrants in Spain cannot be met simply by improving cultural

integration; they must be studied from the point of view of economic competition. It is easy to call transnational activities illegal, but more effort is needed to explore whether or not they are acceptable.

Notes

1. I should like to thank Ma Zhuomin, a Chinese amateur historian in Barcelona, for providing me with his unpublished manuscript, "A Brief History of Chinese in Spain" (in Chinese), and letting me quote from it.
2. It is said that quite a number of these students went to the USA after spending some time in Spain, but direct written records need to be identified.
3. The statistics are from the *Overseas Chinese Economic Yearbook*, published by the Overseas Chinese Economic Yearbook Compiling Committee, Taiwan.
4. The relevant statistics were compiled by the author from Antolin (1998); *Ouzhou shibao* (Chinese newspaper published in Paris), August 4, 2000; *Puhua bao* (Chinese newspaper published in Lisbon), January 2, 2007.
5. Thanks to Mr. Xu, honorary chairman of the Association of Chinese in Spain, for providing me with the report.
6. Arup Banerji and economist Mukesh Chawla of the World Bank predicted in July 2007 that half of Spain's population will be older than 55 by 2050, giving Spain the highest median age of any nation in the world (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ageing_of_Europe#Spain).
7. *Yu Xibanya zishen jizhe tan Huayi yangnv beisha an* [《与西班甩资深庭审记者谈华裔养女被杀案》Talk with a Spanish journalist about the murder of an adopted Chinese girl] *Ouhua Bao* November 6, 2015 (http://chinatown.ouhua.info/news/2015/11/06/2083183.html). Recheck on 14 August 2016.
8. Report provided by Mr. Xu Songhua, honorary chairman of the Association of Chinese in Spain.
9. Fieldwork notes in November 2014; consulted with Mr. Ma Zhuomin, a Chinese amateur historian in Barcelona.
10. When I did my fieldwork in Spain in November 2014, I was frequently welcomed by the owners of Chinese shops. They often ordered coffee or soft drinks for me from a nearby Chinese Café by phone.
11. Zhongguo Xinwen (China News) (June 11, 2006) *Shinian chuangchu yipian tian* [《十年闯出一片天》 Set up successful business in ten years], (http://www.chinanews.com/news/2006/2006-06-11/8/742345.shtml), accessed on July 30, 2016.
12. "Spain Raids Chinese Mob, Arrests 80", *South China Morning Post*, October 17, 2012. http://www.scmp.com/news/world/article/1062995/spain-raids-chinese-mob-arrests-80, accessed on May 4, 2016.
13. When Spain entered the Eurozone in 1999, the exchange rate was 168 Pesetas to EUR1.

14. News published by GQB website (国务院侨务办公室网站新闻) (August 29, 2013)*Xibanya Madrid Huaren laoban guowan, zhan Huaren banshu* [西班甩马德里华人老板过万,占华人总数过半More than 10,000 Chinese in Madrid are bosses, formed nearly half of the Chinese community] (http://www.gqb.gov.cn/news/2013/0829/30916.shtml), accessed on July 30, 2016.
15. Zhongguo Xinwen (China News) (September 22, 2015) *Xibanya guoban Huaren zuo laoban, jingji weiji hou zizhu chuangye zeng 109%* [《西班甩过半华人做老板 经济危机后自主创业增109%, More than half of the Chinese immigrants in Spain are bosses. The number of Chinese who have set up their own businesses has doubled since the economic crisis] (http://www.chinanews.com/hr/2015/09-22/7537193.shtml), accessed on July 30, 2016.
16. Ou Hua Wang (www.ouhua.info) (November 16, 2013) *Lv Xi Huaren: Cong yimin dao tozizhe* [《旅西华人:从移民到投资者》 Chinese in Spain: From immigrants to investors] (http://chinatown.ouhua.info/news/2013/11/16/1957714.html). Recheck on 14 August 2016.
17. News published by GQB website (国务院侨务办公室网站新闻)(August 29, 2013)*Xibanya Madeli Huaren laoban guownag, zhan Huaren zongshu guo ban* [《西班甩马德里华人老板过万,占华人总数过半》. More than 10,000 Chinese in Madrid are bosses, forming nearly half of the Chinese community] (http://www.gqb.gov.cn/news/2013/0829/30916.shtml). Recheck on August 14, 2016.

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CHAPTER 14

Chinese Student Migration and Community-Building: An Exploration of New Diasporic Formation in England

Bin Wu

Introduction

Thanks to the globalization of higher education (HE), we have witnessed accelerated growth in the number of international students globally, from 2.1 million in 2000 to 4.3 million in 2011. More than three-quarters (77 %) of them are in countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD 2013). Leading global HE markets, the USA and the UK hosted 17 % and 13 % of international students, respectively, in 2011. Meanwhile, international students contribute 19.8 % of the university student population in Australia, 16.8 % in the UK and 3.4 % in the USA (Wang and Miao 2013: 8). As a leading supplier in the global HE market, mainland China accounts for one in six internationally mobile students (Maslen 2014).

The unprecedented growth in the number of international students raises questions about their social lives and their impact on their host societies. While overwhelming attention has been paid to their intercultural adaption and special needs in classrooms or on university campuses, little is known about their connections with local communities, including their

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coethnics. Can international students be viewed as a part of diasporic communities in host countries? If so, in what ways are they similar to and different from their coethnics? And how do such connections influence their social lives in host countries?

For the links between international students and coethnic groups in host countries, Chinese students in the UK offer a good opportunity for research, not only because of the simultaneous growth in the number of both Chinese students and local Chinese residents since the start of the century (ONS 2012; HESA 2013) but also because of the relationship between the students and the resident group and between diverse Chinese communities and the host society (Wu 2016). According to a recently published report by the Migration Policy Centre of the European University Institute (Unterreiner 2015), of those born in mainland China and registered in the 2011 UK Census, three-quarters were new migrants, having arrived since 2001, while the majority entered the UK as students. This contrasts with Indian residents, among whom students form a smaller proportion (less than one in five). The report indicates (Unterreiner 2015: 12), furthermore, that 152,498 Chinese migrants from mainland China lived in England and Wales in 2011, exceeding the number from Hong Kong (102,241) in the same period. Two observations can be made. First, Chinese student migration has become an important source driving the growth of the Chinese population in the UK. Second, the growth of Chinese student migration from mainland China might have also contributed to the transformation of Chinese communities in the UK, in terms of changes in demographic profiles, Chinese "dialects" spoken and community organizations. This phenomenon warrants further exploration.

The significance of the research focusing on the connections between Chinese students and coethnic Chinese groups in host societies can be analyzed in terms of segmentation or fragmentation, meaning the lack of communication and cooperation among different Chinese groups. This happens, according to Benton and Gomez (2011: 61), because "different groups of Chinese have reached Britain along different paths, by different means, and with different projects," and "interrelations among Chinese groups and individuals were based less and less on an expectation of reciprocity and more and more on calculation of separate self-interest." This raises important questions about the impact of Chinese students on two local settings: the local Chinese community and the wider community in destination countries. Does the large scale of Chinese student migration contribute to or disrupt existing diasporic Chinese communities? What

changes does it cause in the two local settings? How do the changes affect the ways in which Chinese student migrants interact with one another, with other Chinese migrants and with local residents? How do interaction patterns affect community cohesion and integration with reference to increasing communication, interaction and cooperation between different groups internally (with other Chinese groups) and externally (with non-Chinese groups)?

To address the above questions, this chapter focuses on patterns of interpersonal interaction or social networking by Chinese students in their communications internally (different student groups from mainland China and from Hong Kong, Singapore and Malaysia) and externally (local Chinese and non-Chinese residents in the wider community). For this purpose I propose the concept of Chinese student diaspora, which can be understood as follows:

- Chinese students as an integral part of the diasporic Chinese community, contributing to the growth and transformation of the greater Chinese community in host countries;
- Chinese students as agents for change by way of social networking with different groups, both Chinese and non-Chinese, both on campus and in the wider community, leading to the formation and transformation of the local Chinese community;
- Chinese students as multiple groups in terms of national identity (e.g., mainland Chinese, Hong Kong Chinese or Singapore Chinese) and cultural diversity, revealing similarities and differences in terms of behavior and networking patterns both on campus and in the wider community.

I argue that Chinese student migration has provided not only a new momentum for the growth of diasporic Chinese communities in major HE destinations but also opportunities and a positive impact on Chinese community cohesion and integration. The chapter is split into three parts. First, I review the relevant literature on student migration to identify research gaps and offer a conceptual framework. I then analyze patterns of diasporic formation in England using both official data and my own survey data and offer a discussion of survey findings in light of the concept of Chinese student diaspora.[1] Third, I conclude by noting some theoretical and policy implications.

Chinese Student Diaspora: Why Does It Matter?

Perspectives on Student Migrants

The study of Chinese student migrants should be put in the broader context of Chinese diaspora today. Despite the lack of research on the direct links between international students and coethnic communities in destination countries, the existing literature explains the phenomenon from three perspectives: international migration, global diaspora and social networking.

From the perspective of international migration, international students are a special group with a temporary resident permit. Their mobility and their decision either to stay in host countries or return to their home countries after graduation can be analyzed according to a push–pull model, involving factors such as human capital, career development, affordability, social mobility, global market competition, quality of HE provision and services, and government policies in both home and host countries (Findlay 2011; Robertson 2011; Shen 2009; Wiers-Jenssen 2008; Xiang and Shen 2009). Despite differences in the terms and theories used, scholars share a more or less common belief that international student mobility and migration is a rational choice made by individuals as bearers of human capital (Raghuram 2013). It is too simple to view international students from the same country as a homogeneous group in terms of their motivation for studying abroad and their choice of either staying or returning to their home countries after the completion of their studies.

Beyond pull–push factors, the decisions might also have to do with the students' social lives and personal experiences in host countries. In this regard, many scholars discuss the multiple roles that international students play in host societies, including as members of families, temporary workers in local markets, participants in church activities and volunteers in local community organizations (King and Raghuram 2013; Mosneaga and Winther 2013; Neilson 2009). Students' choice about staying or going home is also influenced by migration policies, which may vary greatly across host countries (BIS 2013; Sovic and Blythman 2013). For instance, Hawthorne (2012: 417) talks of a "two-step migration" of international students as "an integral part of transnational migration systems, which undergird skilled labor circulation in a burgeoning global knowledge economy." As for national governments in host countries, we can see "the increasing incidence of national programs for student recruitments with a special view towards long-term or permanent settlement."

From the perspective of global diaspora, the heterogeneity of international students can be understood in terms of the variation in their contacts and connections with and social impact on local communities, including their coethnic groups in host societies. In this regard, the term "diaspora" is relevant. This refers to a group of people (e.g., Jews or Armenians) who have had to leave their historic homeland and live in other countries. In the era of globalization, as the growing mobility of people across national boundaries results in the growth of immigrant populations, the term "diaspora" has become increasing popular and harder to define. Emphasizing the sharing of common features and characteristics such as country of origin and collective identity, Cohen (2008: 18) divides global diasporas into five types: victim (Jews, Africans), labor (Indians), trade (Chinese), culture (the Caribbean) and imperial (British).

Broadening the definition of diaspora, furthermore, there is an increasing emphasis on hybridity, global flows (of people, knowledge and finance), transnational identities, and differences within diasporas (in terms of gender and class) (Dufoix, 2008: 22–34). For instance, "knowledge diaspora" or similar terms (e.g., "diaspora of the highly skilled," "migrants of talents" and overseas professionals) have frequently been used by international organizations (e.g., the United Nations, the International Organization for Migration, the World Bank) and national governments of sending countries such as China and India for the purpose of promoting return migration and in order to make better use of knowledge diasporas (Xiang 2005; Yang and Qiu 2010). However, the emphasis has been on transnational networks, and little is known about the links and contributions of knowledge diasporas to coethnic communities. Can international students be inserted into the category of knowledge diaspora, given that the latter refers by definition to those who have completed their degrees and hold professional posts in host countries (Xiang 2005: 6)? The situation of international students is more complicated in terms of interconnections with and consequences for local communities than that of knowledge diasporas in host countries owing to uncertainty about their future. In the case of Indian students, Kumar et al. (2009) distinguish between three groups: (1) those who "extend their stay in the host country and join the workforce in order to compensate for their dissatisfaction about the quality of education"; (2) those who "stay and work at least for a couple of years in order to repay their heavy education loans"; and (3) those who "use the student visa to migrate and later on settle in the destination countries as it is an easy way to acquire permanent residence."

International students, like other immigrants, need to establish and maintain a social network for their communication and interaction with other cultural groups both on campus and in the wider community. Tian and Lowe (2010: 291–304) identify four types of social networking by Chinese students: (1) separation/marginalization ("a very restricted social network of a small number of Chinese students"); (2) integration/separation ("a Chinese social network, though generally remaining open to the possibility of friendships outside this network"); (3) integration/identity retention ("aim[ing] to participate closely in the host society[and] maintain [ing] close friendships with other Chinese"); and (4) integration/assimilation ("extend[ing] their social network with British people, commonly diminishing their association with other Chinese"). Looking beyond campus, Gao (2016) offers valuable observations about how Chinese students engage with the local Chinese community in Australia by way of part-time employment and entrepreneurial activities in order to develop their knowledge, experience and skills to the mutual benefit of both the students and the local Chinese community. Along the same lines, Su (2013) suggests that experience involving part-time employment in Chinese restaurants or voluntary work in local communities is helpful for students "planning to work in the UK after their study," enabling them to learn "how to handle working relationships with colleagues of different cultures" (Su 2013: 237).

By bringing together global diaspora and social networking perspectives, the connections and interaction between international students and coethnic groups can be understood as not only a new dynamic in diasporic communities but a way of establishing and developing the students' identities in host countries. Recounting the history of Chinese communities in the UK, Benton and Gomez (2011: 47–48) suggest that Chinese students form a substantial minority of the country's Chinese population and often take up part-time jobs in the ethnic enclave. They remind us of the differences between ethnic Chinese from current or former British colonies, Taiwanese and mainland Chinese. These differences can be seen from various angles, including connections with local Chinese business, lifestyles and relations with the Chinese embassy. Students from mainland China and their dependents "retain the *liu xue sheng* label, which denotes a fixed social identity separate from that of 'overseas Chinese', an identity they tend to look down on and reject" (Benton and Gomez 2011: 47–48).

Having reviewed relevant literature, the following research gaps can be identified. First, the links between international students and local communities are unclear, although they are important for international students'

understanding of and interaction with the host society, and for researchers' understanding of the diversity of international students regarding the decision to migrate and attitudes to integration. Second, there are the students' connections with coethnic groups and their impact on the coethnic community. The ethnic links with the local community can help us understand whether international students are part of a global diaspora and in what ways they differ from their coethnics. I am also interested in the mechanisms that international students use to maintain contact with coethnics and other groups in the host society. I address these questions in the rest of this chapter.

Conceptual Framework and Research Design

Chinese students as a part of Chinese diaspora can be analyzed and understood from the angle of students' social networking, a process that brings together different groups of students on campuses as well as Chinese students and local residents (both Chinese and non-Chinese) in the wider community. The term "social networking" has two dimensions:

- ethnically (or horizontally): the connections of Chinese students within the group (e.g. mainland China) or between Chinese groups (e.g. mainland China vs. Hong Kong, Singapore, etc.) or between Chinese and non-Chinese groups;
- civically (or vertically): networking between Chinese students and local groups (both Chinese and non-Chinese) on campus and in the wider community.

The scope of social networking, including the spread of Chinese students' communication and interaction, can be measured on three levels:

1. communication within or across different groups of Chinese students;
2. communication between Chinese students and international students of other nationalities;
3. communication between Chinese students, local Chinese residents and non-Chinese residents.

The function of social networking, defined as a set of conditions geared to eliciting mutual respect, trust and support within and between groups, can be observed in two ways: (1) community cohesion: bringing together

individuals or different Chinese groups in order to increase their common interests; (2) integration: opening up the Chinese community to allow different people or groups to share resources and opportunities with the wider community to the mutual benefit of both Chinese and non-Chinese groups.

Bringing together the scope and function of social networking, the term “Chinese student diaspora” can be defined as a group of Chinese students from different countries or regions who share common characteristics (e.g history and culture) and interests in social networking internally (within or between different groups among Chinese students) and externally (with local Chinese residents and non-Chinese groups, both students and local residents).

The concept of Chinese student diaspora provides a useful framework within which to observe and ask more specific questions about the social lives of Chinese students in local communities. For example, taking into account the variety of Chinese students from mainland China or other countries or regions, how are different groups of Chinese students interconnected, and to what extent are they a community? Are there any links between Chinese students and local Chinese residents and, if so, to what extent can Chinese students be viewed by local Chinese residents as part of the Chinese community? How are Chinese students connected with non-Chinese groups in local communities, and what contributions do Chinese students make to Chinese community cohesion and integration?

This framework might not have been developed but for a pilot project that has been running in Nottingham since 2011, with, as its theme, global citizenship in the Chinese community. More than 200 Chinese and non-Chinese students participated in a training and outreach program involving local councils, civil-society organizations and Chinese community representatives. Besides attending lectures and workshops, students were asked to prepare project proposals addressing the specific needs of the local Chinese community and to make full use of the available resources. A Chinese community survey was conducted in the summer of 2013. It had two parts: official data analysis on changes in Chinese communities in the UK and their relationship to Chinese student growth; and a questionnaire survey focusing on Chinese community cohesion and integration in Nottingham.

The official data analysis is based on two sources: the UK Census, which contains data on the distribution of Chinese in 326 districts or boroughs across England in 2001 and 2011; and Higher Education Statistics Agency

(HESA) data, covering international students annually and by nationality since 2000. By bringing the two datasets together, the impact of Chinese students on local Chinese communities can be measured. The questionnaire was designed to cover all groups, both Chinese students and local Chinese residents(Wu 2013).[2] Its results were compared with those of a previous survey conducted by Nottingham City Council (2002) on changes in Nottingham's Chinese community.

The Impact of Chinese Student Migration on Local Chinese Communities

Chinese Students and Coethnic Residents across England

The contribution of Chinese students to local Chinese communities in the major HE destinations can be analyzed by comparing the growth in the number and distribution of the Chinese students and local Chinese residents in the UK. Defining Chinese students as a sum of students from mainland China (denoted in yellow) and other Chinese from Hong Kong and Singapore (shown in blue), Fig. 14.1 shows rapid growth of Chinese students in the UK from fewer than 20,000 in 2000/2001 to more than 80,000 in 2011/2012. The share of mainland Chinese students increased from about a half to more than 80 % over the same period. This indicates that mainland Chinese were the driving force behind the rapid growth in the number of Chinese students in the UK during that decade.

Table 14.1 illustrates the growth in the number of students from mainland China compared with other categories of student in the UK. Their share of the total increased from 5.5 % to 18.8 % from 2000/01 to 2011/12 (focusing only on mainland Chinese) or from 11 % to 23 % (if Chinese from Hong Kong and Singapore are included). It is worth noting that students from Malaysia, the Philippines, Indonesia and Thailand are excluded, although ethnic Chinese may form a significant proportion of their number.

Focusing on the growth in the number of and the relationship between Chinese students and local Chinese residents, Table 14.2 shows that the distribution of HE resources in England has a significant influence on the Chinese population.[3] Of 326 local-authority areas (districts or boroughs), more than three quarters (77 %) have no university, 15 % have just one university, and the rest have two or more universities. A correlation can be identified between the average number of Chinese students and that of local



Fig. 14.1 Growth of Chinese students by region of origin (Source: Created by the author based on information provided by the HESA. The number of students is full-time equivalent)

Table 14.1 Internationalization of higher education and position of Chinese students in the UK

Year	*All students*	*International students*	*Mainland Chinese*	*All Chinese*	*Share %*		
	(1)	*(2)*	*(3)*	*(4)*	*(2)/(1)*	*(3)/(2)*	*(2)/(4)*
2000/2001	1,454,949	180,563	9899	19,908	12.4	5.5	11.0
2011/2012	1,923,274	364,699	68,385	83,771	19.0	18.8	23.0
Growth	1.32	2.02	6.91	4.21	–	–	–

Source: Created by author based on the information provided by the HESA. Figures are numbers of full-time equivalent students

Chinese residents, and also between the growth rates of both groups from 2001 to 2011. Table 14.2 estimates the proportion of Chinese students to the local Chinese population, which varies from 21 % in single-university boroughs to about 30 % in boroughs with two universities. The greater the number of Chinese students, the greater the number of Chinese residents and the higher the rate of growth of the local Chinese population. The

Table 14.2 Distribution and growth of Chinese residents and students by university resources, 2011

Number of universities	*Number of districts*	*%*	*Chinese students*	*Chinese residents*	*Resident growth % (2001–2011)*	*Students as % of total (2011)*
0	252	77.3	–	636	52.7	–
1	50	15.3	529	1968	93.2	21.2
2	17	5.2	1724	4101	147.4	29.6
≥3	7	2.1	2342	6336	87.2	27.0
Total/ average	326	100	966	1164	65.1	–

Source: Created by the author based on a combination of UK Census and HESA data

exception is bigger cities like London, Birmingham and Manchester with three or more universities, where the growth in the number of Chinese students is only one of many factors contributing to the growth of the Chinese population.

Transformation of the Chinese Community in Nottingham

According to the latest UK Census, 8,930 Chinese lived in Nottingham County in 2011, two-thirds (or 5,988) of them in the City of Nottingham. The proportion of Chinese in the total population was 0.82 % in the county and 1.96 % in the city. Compared with 2001, the Chinese population has more than doubled in size (2.4 times) in the county and tripled (3.5 times) in the city.

As elsewhere in England, the rapid growth of the Chinese population in Nottingham cannot be separated from the internationalization of HE over the last decade. The two universities—the University of Nottingham and Nottingham Trent University—have played a leading role not only in attracting and recruiting Chinese students but also in developing business links with China, including the establishment of an overseas campus in Ningbo by the University of Nottingham. The number of Chinese students in the two universities has, according to the HESA, increased eight-fold since 2001 and reached 2,819 in 2011. Bringing together two pieces of statistical information, Chinese residents (via the UK Census) and Chinese students (via the HESA), we estimate that the real number of Chinese in

Table 14.3 Comparison of two surveys on Nottingham's Chinese community

Item	*2002 survey*	*2013 survey*
Sample size	620	311
Students (%)	48.1 %	52.1 %
From mainland China	39.6 %	70.0 %
From Hong Kong	39.1 %	13.4 %
Age 18–24	32.9 %	44.9 %
Living in the city >10 years	30.8 %	14.7 %

Source: Wu (2013: 18)

Table 14.4 Response to "Do you know the following organizations?" (%)

Name of organization	*2013*	*Resident*	*Student*	*2002*
EECA	21.2	38.3	5.6	54.0
NCWA	20.9	30.2	12.3	43.1
CSSA	50.2	47.0	53.1	–
SCCS	41.5	34.2	48.1	10.2

Source: 2013 survey conducted by the author

Nottingham City is probably more than 10,000 and the share of students in the Chinese community could be more than 40 % (Wu 2013:15).

Regarding changes in Nottingham's Chinese community since the 21st century, Table 14.3 compares the survey I conducted in 2013 with the previous survey conducted by Nottingham City Council in 2002 (NCC 2002). Of a total of 311 participants in the 2013 survey, 52.1 % (or 162) were students, similar to the 48.1 % in the 2002 survey. Significant changes in Nottingham's Chinese community are revealed by changes in the profiles of respondents, including their home country or region and their age and length of residence in Nottingham.

In addition to changes in demographic profiles, a big challenge facing Nottingham's Chinese community today is perhaps the decline of traditional Chinese community organizations in terms of their ability to attract and influence new immigrants from mainland China. Table 14.4 shows that Chinese student organizations (e.g. the Chinese Students and Scholars Association [CSSA]) and university institutes (e.g. the School of Contemporary Chinese Studies [SCCS][4]) have overtaken traditional associations (e.g. the East England Chinese Association [EECA] and the Nottinghamshire Chinese Welfare Association [NCWA]) in terms of influence.

Table 14.5 Response to "Are you aware of and have you participated in the following local community activities?" (%)

Name of event	*Know*	*Participate*	*Residents*	*Students*
Chinese Spring Festival Gala	62.4	22.8	55.7	68.5
Chinese community events	38.6	5.8	29.5	46.9
Chinese community organized tourism	36.7	7.7	25.5	46.9
Local church activities	37.0	8.0	23.5	49.4
University Community Open Day	40.5	5.5	27.5	52.5
Local cultural festivals	30.2	5.8	26.8	33.3
Local social events (e.g., New Year's Eve)	33.8	6.8	21.5	45.1
Local sport event (e.g., football)	32.5	2.6	18.8	45.1
Local music event	32.5	6.1	18.8	45.1

Source: 2013 survey conducted by the author

With respect to Chinese community cohesion and integration, Table 14.5 provides a list of major social events organized by local Chinese groups (upper three rows) or non-Chinese organizations (all other rows). It shows a low participation rate (less than 10 %) for all events except the Chinese Spring Festival Gala, which was jointly organized by the CSSA and the SCCS at the University of Nottingham. The low level of awareness and participatory rate would seem to indicate the poor state of Chinese community cohesion and integration. Comparing the differences between Chinese students and local residents, however, the students' knowledge of those events was significantly greater (by more than 20 % in most cases) than that of local residents. This seems to suggest that there is a potential for university students to participate in and contribute to Chinese community projects in future.

Scope and Function of Social Networking among Chinese Students

In the questionnaire, social networking was measured by a question about the scope of social contacts or friendships. The term "friends" was defined as those the respondent might meet frequently or regularly call on. Chinese student respondents were asked to tick boxes underneath four types of friendship both on campus and in the wider community (see Table 14.6). For example, three-quarters claimed friendships within the same group (e.g. from mainland China). Despite the stereotype that Chinese from the same region stick together (Type 1), the survey seemed to indicate that

Table 14.6 Distribution of friendship or social contact by location and ethnic group (%)

Category	*Type 1*	*Type 2*	*Type 3*	*Type 4*	*N*
Within campus	Chinese: same group	Chinese: different group	International	Domestic	162
	74.7	32.1	45.7	30.9	100
Wider community	Relatives	Chinese: same identity	Chinese: different identity	Non-Chinese	113
	9.3	39.5	21.6	32.1	69.8

Source: 2013 survey conducted by the author

Table 14.7 Student networking and interest in participating in local events (%)

Name of event	*External networking?*		*Total*	*chi-square*
	No	*Yes*		
Chinese community events	8.8	32.4	25.8	0.032
Local church activities	11.4	24.5	20.7	0.003
Local cultural festivals	14.7	15.3	15.1	0.078
Local social events (e.g., New Year's Eve)	11.5	36.1	28.9	0.003
Local sport event (e.g., football)	8.8	16.3	13.8	0.049

Source: 2013 survey conducted by the author

some Chinese students includes students of other nationalities in their social networks (Type 3 and Type 4). In contrast, respondents paid less attention to their counterparts in other Chinese student groups (Type 2).

Table 14.6 shows that the majority (113 out of 162) of students had social connections with the wider community, while 30 % had none. The results seem to show that a large number of Chinese students are to some extent involved with local communities and that they network quite a lot with the wider community, both Chinese and non-Chinese, and within Chinese groups, both from same (Type 2) and different (Type 3) groups.

The rest of this section explores the impact of social networking on Chinese community cohesion and integration. Table 14.7 confirms that students who network externally are more likely to be involved in both Chinese and non-Chinese community activities.

To discover the differences between Chinese students in terms of social networking profiles, the sampled students were divided into two groups:

Table 14.8 Contrast in social networking between mainland Chinese and other Chinese students (%)

Location	*Group*	*Chinese 1*	*Chinese 2*	*Non-Chinese*
Campus	Mainland Chinese	82.5	27.2	37.7
	Other Chinese	56.3	43.8	63.6
Outside	Mainland Chinese	36.0	17.5	26.3
	Other Chinese	47.9	31.3	45.8

Note: 36 % of respondents from the mainland Chinese group and 17 % from the other Chinese group don't have social contact/friends outside of campus
Source: 2013 survey conducted by the author

Table 14.9 Scope of social networking of local Chinese residents (N = 149, %)

Job type	*Chinese 1*	*Chinese 2*	*Chinese 3*	*Non-Chinese*
	Similar dialect	*Different dialect*	*Different identity*	*Other ethnic*
Similar	45.0	28.2	23.5	24.2
Different	26.2	21.5	26.8	20.1

Source: 2013 survey conducted by the author

those from mainland China (mainland Chinese) and those from Hong Kong and Singapore (other Chinese). Table 14.8 illustrates significant differences between the two groups in terms of both the scope and pattern of social networking. Generally, students from Hong Kong and Singapore are more balanced in their social networking with different groups both on campus and in the wider community than mainland Chinese students, who are more closed and confined to their own group. Both groups pay more attention to non-Chinese than to their counterpart Chinese groups.

Using the same principle, I asked respondents among local Chinese residents in the survey to indicate who their friends are. Taking into account the differences between and influences of the subcultures of sending communities in mainland China (e.g., north and south Chinese, Wu-dialect and Yue-dialect Chinese), I used dialect as a variable in the questionnaire. Respondents were asked to identify any one or more types of friend with a similar dialect (Chinese 1), a different dialect (Chinese 2) and a different identity (Chinese 3, e.g., mainland Chinese vs. Hong Kong), or friends who were not Chinese. Friends were further divided into two categories according to job: whether it was a similar job or a different one. Table 14.9 provides an outline of the scope and variety of social networks among local-resident respondents.

A number of observations can be made base on Table 14.9. First, local Chinese residents are rather diverse in terms of social contacts because no common pattern emerges. Nonetheless, people who share the same or a similar dialect are more likely to become friends than people of different dialect or identity groups. Second, the scope and strength of social networking among local residents is much narrower, weaker and less likely to be across occupational or social-class boundaries than among Chinese students (see Table 14.6).

Regarding challenges and opportunities in the local Chinese community, students and local residents were asked to evaluate four policy recommendations made by focus groups. Table 14.10 shows that all suggestions scored highly, and the statement "Universities should encourage and support students to engage with local communities" scored best. While both students and local residents supported the recommendations, they differed slightly in the extent of their support and their priorities. The local residents tended to favor any project related to Chinese community development and gave high priority to Chinese cultural and social events, whereas students put their priority on university support for their participation and local engagement.

Another important indicator of the common needs of both students and local residents is the percentage of respondents to the last item on the questionnaire asking for personal contact details. The survey shows that roughly half of respondents were willing to be involved in future projects

Table 14.10 Response to "To what extent do you support the following statements?" (%)

Statement	*Total*	*Resident*	*Student*	*N*
Communication/cooperation should be enhanced between different Chinese groups in Nottingham	4.16	4.33	3.97	230
Chinese students should be treated as an important part of Nottingham's Chinese community	4.03	4.05	4.02	236
Universities should encourage and support students to engage with local communities	4.32	4.31	4.33	242
More social events should be organized on traditional Chinese festivals to promote Chinese culture and community integration	4.24	4.45	4.01	242

Notes: Ranging from 0 (totally disagree) to 5 (totally agree)
Source: 2013 survey conducted by the author

and that a third would offer voluntary support. While the intention to get involved was at similar levels in both groups, students outdid residents if one remembers that a third of them were going back to their home country.

Discussion

The following findings are of interest. First, from the perspective of the "Chinese student community," the connections between Chinese student groups are weaker than those with non-Chinese student groups. This matches the observation of Benton and Gomez (2011: 47–48), who observed a division between students from mainland China and Chinese from other countries or regions. However, "Chinese student community" is still a useful term, given the connections and interactions between these groups, which leave room for further development and enhancement. More importantly, the evidence confirms differences between Chinese students: mainland Chinese have stronger internal ties, while "other" Chinese have more balanced relationships, both internal and external.

Second, not all Chinese students can be viewed as part of the local Chinese community, partly because a large number (30 %) of respondents have no social contacts in the wider community and partly because their contacts are more likely to be confined to the small group of local Chinese residents who share an identity with them. The connections with local residents vary significantly between student groups. For instance, around 40 % of "other" Chinese students have social contacts with local Chinese residents, which is twice as many as their counterparts from mainland China. Taking into account the fragmentation of the Chinese community, however, the above results confirm the existence and function of ethnic links, albeit weak, between Chinese students and local Chinese residents. Furthermore, the survey would seem to support Gao's (2016) conclusion, although the links between Chinese students and the local Chinese community in Nottingham are weaker than those in Melbourne. The differences can be explained partly in terms of the differences between the two cities (population size and business opportunities, including ethnic Chinese business) and partly by differences in survey design.

Third, taking into account the fragmentation within the Chinese community in Nottingham and beyond, our survey shows the positive contribution that Chinese students make to community cohesion and integration. This can be seen not only from the fact that more students network than local residents (Tables 14.6 and 14.9) but also from their greater participation in community events (Table 14.5). The participation rate of "other"

Chinese student groups is better than that of those from mainland China (Table 14.8). The conventional interpretation cites either pull–push factors at the macrolevel (Findlay 2011; Wiers-Jenssen 2008) or acculturation (Berry 1997; Tian and Lowe 2010) at the microlevel, but my findings suggest there are mutual benefits in student networking and local engagement for both students and coethnic community development, an under-researched field in international education studies.

Bringing together the growth of the Chinese student population and its social networking, internally and externally, I argue that students from mainland China have had a growing impact on the growth of the Chinese resident population in England and on its transformation in terms of structure and organization. Despite the many differences between Chinese students and local residents in terms of needs and priorities, all Chinese groups in our survey share a common view: universities and Chinese students could contribute more to Chinese community cohesion and integration. Such findings shed new light on the roles of global universities in local communities, a potential new research area in the debates about global citizenship education and university–community partnership (Caruana 2010; Olson and Peacock 2012).

Conclusion and Implications

This chapter aims to map out and discuss Chinese students' links to and impact on local communities in England. Viewing Chinese students as a special segment of Chinese diaspora, I have analyzed their attitudes, performances and contributions to local communities from the perspective of their social networking among Chinese students in university and between Chinese students, local Chinese and non-Chinese in the wider community. Reflecting on the research questions posed at the beginning of this chapter, I draw a number of conclusions.

First, I show the correlation between the growth in the number of Chinese students since the turn of the century and changes in local Chinese communities in university towns or cities across England, in both quantitative and qualitative terms. In connection with the debates about global diasporas (Cohen 2008; Dufoix 2008), the case of Chinese international students usefully points up that of the "international student diaspora," thus broadening our understanding of the links and contribution of international students, including Chinese students, to local communities in the host society. The contribution of international students to local communities is

not solely economic but has many other dimensions, including social, cultural and ethnic.

Second, the evidence I have presented seems to suggest that despite differing from local Chinese residents or conventional "Chinese diaspora" in many respects, the term "Chinese student diaspora" is useful for analyzing their participation in and contribution to the wider community, both Chinese and non-Chinese, in the host society. In that sense, this chapter sheds new light on the contribution that Chinese student migration and integration make to the ongoing transformation of diasporic Chinese communities in major HE destinations globally.

Third, the variation among Chinese students of perceptions and experiences of local engagement can be analyzed through the lens of their social networking, which comprises two dimensions: ethnic (same Chinese, different Chinese and non-Chinese) and civic (on campus or in the wider community). Based on the analysis of the survey in Nottingham, this chapter illustrates the correlations between students' social networking and their performance in local communities. The social networking and local engagement of Chinese students in the host society have a positive impact on local Chinese communities. This can be seen from the growing influence of Chinese student associations and their events, which are better organized than those staged by local traditional Chinese community organizations, and from the many high-profile public events organized by local non-Chinese groups in Nottingham, which attracted more students than local Chinese residents. However, it is perhaps too early to identify the precise role of Chinese students in local communities owing to the ongoing transformation of Chinese communities in the UK on the one hand and students' social networking on the other.

Fourth, the evidence from the survey shows that Chinese students have provided a new momentum for Chinese community cohesion and integration in general, students from Hong Kong and Singapore more so than those from mainland China. There is a policy implication for international student recruiters and supporters, university teachers, Chinese student leaders, and government agencies both in China and the host countries. Chinese students should be encouraged to develop their respect and mutual support for other Chinese student groups. A strong and united "Chinese student community" could be beneficial both to the students themselves and to local Chinese communities, and maximize its positive impact in the wider community in host countries.

Notes

1. This chapter is based on a combination of official data analysis and a questionnaire survey in Nottingham. The official data are used to reveal the co-relationship of growth and distribution between Chinese international students and local Chinese residents across England from 2000 to 2011. The questionnaire survey was conducted in Nottingham's Chinese community in 2013 to reveal the impact of Chinese student migration on that community.
2. Two versions of the questionnaire were designed for Chinese students and local Chinese residents, with some common questions in order to identify the commonalities and differences in terms of perceptions, networking and social behaviour. For the student survey, owing to constraints caused by examinations and summer holidays, the questionnaire was mainly conducted online (Survey Monkey), and the survey message was disseminated to targeted Chinese students via the International Office of the University of Nottingham to all Chinese students from mainland China, and via a Singapore Chinese student society to "other" Chinese students from Hong Kong, Singapore and Malaysia. Students from Taiwan were not included owing to their small numbers.
3. No data were available for the Chinese population in Scotland, Wales and North Ireland in 2013 when we collected data from the UK Census 2011.
4. "In 2002 survey, the name of SCCS was "Institute of Contemporary Chinese Studies." Unfortunately, SCCS has been inclosed down since August 2016.")

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PART V

New Chinese Diasporas in the Americas

CHAPTER 15

New Chinese Migrants in Latin America: Trends and Patterns of Adaptation

Weinong Gao

Background and Trends

Latin America was a major destination for Chinese migrants outside Southeast Asia in the nineteenth century. After World War II, and especially from the 1950s, Chinese emigration changed significantly in two main ways. First, between 1949 and 1979, many Chinese chose to migrate to Latin and South America and other countries because of wars, political turmoil and fear of persecution at home. During that period, Chinese migrants came mainly from Taiwan and Hong Kong. Their economic status and education levels were comparatively high. This changed the image and social standing of Chinese migrants, previously represented by those who had migrated before 1949. Second, migration from mainland China stopped after 1949 because the country was closed off from the outside world. Since mainland China was originally the prime source of migration to Latin America, this changed its configuration in terms of both origin and destinations. For a while after 1949, Chinese in Latin America were mainly from Macau, Taiwan and Hong Kong. Soon afterwards, the new trend normalized. Chinese migrants were few in number and exercised scant influence on Latin America's immigrant landscape. Few countries experienced notable influxes. Argentina wanted to develop its economy by

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tapping into the capital and talent of the emerging "Four Asian Dragons" in the 1980s, and it implemented an "amnesty" program to grant some 400 illegal Chinese migrants resident permits. Between 1983 and 1984, there was a sudden spurt of immigration to Argentina from Taiwan, Paraguay and Bolivia. These migrants soon swelled into a population of tens of thousands, concentrated in Buenos Aires, and formed new Chinatowns (Bai 2002). Compared with other immigrant groups in Latin America, however, the number of Chinese was vanishingly small between the 1950s and the 1970s. Few countries welcomed Chinese migrants from Taiwan or other areas outside mainland China, and there were almost no migrants from there. So the Chinese diasporic community in the region sustained itself mainly through natural accrual in the form of descendants, whose ethnic identity faded with time.

The influx of new migrants from mainland China after the country opened its door to the world significantly altered the profile of Chinese immigration to Latin America. The year 1979 was a milestone. Before then, emigrants from mainland China were few in number, and even fewer went to Latin America. Yet after 1979, more and more Chinese with a diverse range of socioeconomic characteristics began to migrate to different parts of the world, giving rise to a new phenomenon—the new Chinese migrants, or *xin yimin*. Latin America has once again become a key destination.

According to present scholarship, new Chinese migrants fall into several groups (Bai 2002; Gao 2012a, b; Xia 2013): family members, including marriage migrants (mostly women), who join or reunite with existing migrants; student migrants; employer-sponsored migrants, skilled and unskilled; business people; and tourists. During China's reform era, most new Chinese migrants in Latin America were lower-class workers, many of whom were driven by family reunions. There are Chinese students in some countries in Latin America, but their numbers are tiny and those who choose to settle after graduation are even fewer. As for investors and business people, most have limited capital and education and tend to be from villages and small towns in China.

Since the 1980s there has been a constant influx of Chinese migrants to Latin America as part of Chinese global migration. The origins of the new immigrants are much more diverse than those of previous migrants. The latter came mostly from Guangdong, whereas the former come mainly from developed coastal areas of Guangdong, Fujian, Zhejiang, Jiangsu, Shandong, Shanghai and Beijing. Some are from the central and western provinces of China, but they comprise only a small percentage of the overall

Chinese migrant population. In fact, new Chinese migrants come from all over China. Their destinations include most countries and islands in Latin America, whether or not those places have established diplomatic relations with mainland China or Taiwan.

Most new Chinese migrants in Latin America are in the categories of family reunification, business people or "abnormal" migrants. They are largely dependent on local or clan networks. They tend to cluster, supporting each other and forming "networked" clan associations. Migrants try to bring their relatives and friends, and thus the pattern repeats itself. Relatives and friends from the same town or village gather together in their new places of residence. The basis for identification varies. The most common unit is the county, often known as *yi*, such as Taishan, Zhongshan, Enping and Jinjiang. In some cases it is dialect. The dialect area usually comprises several counties, such as the Siyi (four counties) in Guangdong, the Shiyi (ten counties) in Fuzhou, Southern Fujian and the Hakka region in northern Guangdong and Western Fujian. When the number of immigrants from a single place is small, the unit is extended. It can be based on a province in cases where there are few people from the same county or dialect region. Today in Latin America (mainly in its big countries), many of the associations set up by new Chinese migrants are based on provinces, which suggests that the migrants originate from all over China. In cases where the number of people from a single province is too small, people from different provinces end up together. For example, one association in Brazil comprises migrants from several provinces in southeast China.

In summary, new Chinese migrants in Latin America and other places commonly cluster in clan associations. Even though these migrants in some countries come from all over China, they still gather in clan associations, the unit of which is mainly the county or the province. Their residential areas in the host countries are sometimes concentrated, sometimes not. More important than residential areas are networks based on cities in the country of destination. If there is a clan building in the city, migrants usually gather in it. Otherwise they gather in a member's company building, or members take turns in playing host. The main function of the network is to provide a platform for members to help each other at work and in their daily life. The dates of gathering are usually settled in advance, but they are sometimes rescheduled. The gatherings are never merely formalities, since members need each other's help and support. Given the ease and ubiquity of modern transportation, the decrease in racial discrimination and the high prices of real estate in cities, new Chinese migrants rarely form highly centralized

Chinatowns of the sort that were common in the past. However, networks based on a common place of origin in China are still prevalent, not only for Cantonese and Fujianese.

Family Migration

Like their earlier counterparts, new Chinese migrants rely on social networks to help them adapt to local circumstances and to facilitate future migration. There are two types of social network. One is place-based and builds on longstanding diasporic networks. One reason why some new Chinese migrants choose to settle down in a particular country in Latin America is that, before 1949, many migrants from the same place in China had already gone there. A typical example is Venezuela. Most of the earlier Chinese there were from Enping in Guangdong. After China's economic reform and opening up, new migrants from Enping moved to Venezuela in great numbers through social networks, established with earlier compatriots from the same villages or towns. Although the waves started to recede in the mid-2000s, they have not ebbed entirely. Now in Venezuela the number of new migrants from Enping is far greater than the number of those who arrived in earlier times. Migrants from Enping make up more than 80 % of all Chinese migrants in Venezuela (Gao 2011). Another example is French Guiana. More than 85 % of Chinese migrants there are from Guangdong, and they are mostly Hakkas, although the total number of migrants is not huge. In Cayenne, the capital of French Guiana, there are around 1300 immigrants from Henggang district in Shenzhen, amounting to a sixth of Chinese migrants there. The same applies to Paraguay where most new and old Chinese migrants are from Taiwan. In Paraguay, they cluster in Ciudad del Este, which borders on Brazil.

The other type of social network is also place-based but is established by new Chinese migrants. In such cases, they bring other new migrants from their home villages or towns to the host countries. In Argentina, most new Chinese migrants are from Fujian and arrived after 1990 (their exact number is unknown). By 2011 there were around 80,000 Chinese in Argentina, more than half of them from Fujian. They engage mainly in retailing and the grocery trade, like most Chinese in Latin America. Regardless of whether a country has a tradition of Chinese immigration, new immigrants bring over more and more people from their own sending towns and villages.

Among new Chinese migrants in Latin America, blood ties and ties of place play an important role in migration, as they do in other continents. This results in a pattern of family migration. Broadly speaking, family migration means one person, usually a man, migrates first, leaving his wife and children behind. Once successfully resettled, he sends for his family members in the name of family reunion. Thus a nuclear migrant family emerges. This is the primary level of family formation. When the family has achieved financial security, usually after several years of hard work, they try to help close relatives, such as siblings, to migrate by making use of the family reunification policies in their host countries. These relatives later bring their own wives and children, representing a secondary level of migrant family formation. The second-level migrant families repeat the process, and so on to the nth degree (Lu and Feng 2004). In Latin America it is hard to estimate how many families have repeated this pattern. In theory, migration accelerates after second-level families are set up. What is described above is migration based on blood ties. Complementary to the blood ties are ties of place. The two kinds of tie are the bases for the increase in volume of Chinese immigration to Latin America. Migration based on blood ties is relatively regular, normative and predictable. Migration based on locality ties is relatively extensive and unpredictable.

In Latin America, family migration is very common. One person migrates and settles down, and then draws other immigrants to their place of settlement. This can happen within ten, five and sometimes even just two or three years. Family migration is intertwined with ties of place, since the family members and relatives usually come from villages in the same dialect area. This type of migration can also be called place-based. It is not surprising that the migrant associations established in host countries are family-like.

Although migration is focused on family or kin, occupations are not. Different families choose different forms of livelihood, mainly to avoid competition. It is possible that ties of place bring a greater number of immigrants, but detailed surveys and comparisons are lacking. In reality, it is hard to separate blood ties from ties of place. The latter often encapsulate the former.

Chinese migrants in Latin America have strong connections to the USA as a result of geographical proximity. Miami, a transportation hub between North and South America, has around 60,000 Chinese. Most came by way of Latin America, where they still have relatives and friends. It would not be an exaggeration to say that in Miami any Chinese can bring you into contact

with Latin America. Some 90 % of Chinese traders in Miami engage in trade between Latin America and China (Zhu and Guangdong Overseas Chinese Resource Research South America Team 2013).

Migration along Abnormal Paths

Many new Chinese migrants in Latin America arrive along "abnormal" paths. Such people are usually called "illegal immigrants." Most fall into one or more of three categories: illegal departure, illegal arrival and illegal stay. In reality the situation is more complicated. While many Chinese migrants may lack proper documents for their departure, arrival or residency, few of them are "illegal" on all three counts. Many have proper departure and arrival papers and entry visas but overstay the latter. Thus a more appropriate name for them might be "migrants along abnormal paths" rather than "illegal" migrants. "Abnormal migration" is a common form of migration, yet it is appropriate to group "migrants along abnormal means" together because of the similarities in their circumstances. They are usually from the same place, usually rural, they belong to the lower classes and they have limited education. Because of their common provenance, common experiences and common needs, they usually bind together in a group largely isolated from local society or from better-off Chinese. "Illegal immigration" therefore describes not only their manner of migration but also their group; for some people it is a symbol of identity. They are more isolated in countries with relatively strict laws against "illegal immigrants." Most countries in Latin America, including territories controlled, more or less loosely, by European countries such as France and the Netherlands, are quite tolerant of "illegal migrants." Latin American countries usually assume that "illegal immigrants" will be economically active. They offer them humanitarian support and sometimes even grant them "amnesties." There have been plenty of "amnesties" in some big Latin American countries. The police departments in those countries are usually "indifferent" about "illegal immigrants" and as long as they do not engage in crime or wrongdoing they are allowed to live and do business in the same way as other immigrants. In developed countries, "illegal immigrants" are often pressured by their host societies, but far less so in Latin America. Of course, the leniency extends only to the terms of their stay. The control each country exercises over the arrival of illegal immigrants is still tight. Because of this relative tolerance, the internal self-identification and binding among illegal migrants is usually not particularly strong. In most cases they live

together with other Chinese migrants and can hardly be distinguished even by Chinese communities, let alone by members of other communities. Worldwide, different countries react differently to "illegal immigrants." The impact of "illegal immigrants" differs from place to place. In some they make a contribution to the host country through their economic or (far more rarely) political activities. "Illegal immigration," including by Chinese, is a complicated worldwide phenomenon. In the context of today's globalization, its complexity is particularly salient.

Many illegal Chinese migrants in Latin America see their current host country as a temporary stage on a hopefully longer journey. They are called "staged migrants" and there are two kinds. The first sees a Latin American country as an initial stage on the way to a country outside Latin America, mainly a developed country such as the USA or Canada. The second kind stays in one Latin American country at first and then tries to move to another. Today there are fewer and fewer of the latter kind. Some members of both kinds, for different reasons, choose to settle down in what was originally seen as a temporary stage. Their onward journey was never more than a dream. Some migrants maintain multiple places of residence and nationalities. In theory, they are also "staged migrants." The same happens in non-Chinese communities in Latin America, but whether it happens along exactly the same lines as in Chinese migrant communities is unknown.

There is no consensus about the exact number of new Chinese migrants in Latin America or in each individual country. The Overseas Chinese Affairs Office in Guangdong sent a research team to South America between June 29 and July 16, 2011. This reported a total of around 2 million Chinese in Latin America. Peru alone had around 1.5 million according to measurements commonly adopted nowadays. Other approaches put the number in Peru as high as 3 million and as low as 1 million (usually 3 million refers to the number of people with Chinese ancestry). The number in Brazil is 200,000, in Argentina 50,000, in Venezuela 150,000, in Guyana 20,000, in Surinam 13,000, in Ecuador 20,000, in Bolivia 12,000, in Paraguay 10,000 and in Chile, Uruguay and French Guiana 10,000 in aggregate (Gao 2011; Zhu and Guangdong Overseas Chinese Resource Research South America Team 2013). These numbers are rough estimates and include both new and old Chinese migrants.

New and Old Chinese Migrants

New Chinese migrants differ from old Chinese migrants in many ways. Today, one might even say that it is those differences that make an overseas Chinese community what it is. They also shape the survival and development of both new and old Chinese migrants in significant ways. In general, it takes a long time for new migrants to merge into an existing diasporic community, but less time in Latin America. Because new Chinese migrants have only arrived recently, the differences between them and old migrants are obvious. In a continent the size of Latin America, the contrasts are naturally stronger in some places than in others.

The ratio of new to old migrants (including, in the latter case, the descendants of migrants) differs greatly across countries. It is relatively balanced in countries such as Peru, Mexico, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Panama, Costa Rica and Honduras. There are more new migrants than old in Venezuela, Argentina, Chile, Surinam, French Guiana and Jamaica. There are more old than new migrants in Cuba, Trinidad and Tobago, Guatemala, Salvador, Martinique and Puerto Rico (these countries have relatively few new Chinese migrants in part because some have diplomatic relationships with Taiwan, so there are some new immigrants from Taiwan in these countries, though their numbers are limited). In some other countries such as Belize, Haiti, Dominica, Antigua, Barbuda, Barbados, Grenada, St Lucia, Guadeloupe, the Bahamas, the Cayman Islands and the Lesser Antilles, there are only new Chinese migrants. Before China's reform and opening up, few if any Chinese had ever been to these places. In some destinations it is still hard to say whether there are any Chinese, let alone to describe their lives and activities.

The different history of Chinese migration to different countries explains the different ratios of new to old immigrants. In countries such as Trinidad and Tobago and Brazil, Chinese have been present for around 200 years—even longer in Mexico and Peru. The difference can amount to hundreds of years. Some countries, mainly Caribbean island countries, only began receiving Chinese migrants since 2000, and some have still not done so. Before China's reform era, in Latin America the main places with Chinese migrants or their descendants were Mexico and some big countries in South America, Central America and the Caribbean. In general, the longer the history of Chinese migration, the larger the number of old migrants and their descendants, and the greater the attraction for new migrants through the "networks" of kinship and clanship that join old and

new immigrants. So it is the passage of time that generates the differences in the numbers of Chinese in different places. This explains why some places have many and others few or none.

In any case, times have changed. New and old Chinese migrants view the notion of home and belonging differently. For old immigrants and their descendants, the prevailing ethos is "returning to the roots as fallen leaves do." While young and strong, migrants work hard overseas to make as much money as possible. When old or sick, they go home. Their dream is to strike rich and return home in triumph, purchase properties, have children and lead a decent life, to which end they are willing to suffer humiliation overseas.

My research suggests that the notion of "returning to the roots" is not limited to one generation but, more often, encompasses several generations. When a migrant (usually male) reaches around 60 years of age or feels he has made enough money or lacks further energy, he goes home and is replaced in business overseas by one or more of his sons' generation. They in turn are followed by the grandsons' generation, and so on. Since World War II, however, the notion of "returning to the roots" has been replaced by one of "growing roots in the new land of settlement."

This change seems to have influenced Chinese migrants' business style greatly. "Returning to the roots" means there is no enduring plan and the overseas business of Chinese migrants stops when they get home. "Developing roots in the new land of settlement," however, means they invest, strive for long-term development and make efforts to integrate into the host society. Relations between Chinese migrants and their host country's economy and society are also reshaped.

Unlike old immigrants, new Chinese immigrants today aim to leave China for good. They want to "strike roots in the new land of settlement" at the outset, although they might still acknowledge China as their homeland, love the country where they grew up and received their schooling, and appreciate its traditions.

"Choosing to be rooted in the new land" seems to be the trend among new migrants. This is largely true for new Chinese migrants in Latin America but it is still hard to say if it is always true. At least in some countries, the issue requires further study. It will almost certainly continue to be discussed in the future and may shape China's migration policies and overseas Chinese affairs.

Most of today's new Chinese immigrants in Latin America are first-generation immigrants from rural areas. They have a strong attachment to

China and carry much cultural baggage. Many are still uncertain about their final destination. Of course, the longer an immigrant stays, the less likely they are to remain uncertain. The choice of final destination for new Chinese migrants in Latin America depends largely on the environment in the host country compared with that in the sending place. Most new Chinese immigrants in Brazil deem their host country "agreeable." As a big country, Brazil has good economic prospects, a high level of happiness, and a diverse and relatively tolerant social environment. There is relatively little racial discrimination. Thus most new Chinese migrants do not plan to go back to China. In contrast, more and more new Chinese migrants in Venezuela do because state policies, leaning toward the left, do little to promote economic development. Venezuela, rich in oil, minerals and farmland, faces economic bankruptcy, political instability, social upheavals and a deterioration in security. More and more Chinese migrants feel their businesses are dying. Venezuela might be a special case, but the harsh reality of the situation there is not easy to change. New Chinese migrants in other countries cannot be indifferent to what is happening there. They also wonder about their own backup strategy should they be confronted with a similar situation. The notion of "final destination" for new Chinese migrants in Latin America keeps changing, although it tends to stabilize and become more realistic as they age. Currently, most prefer to "sink roots in the new land." Migrants do not necessarily decide on their "final destination" by means of a thorough evaluation of all factors, including the complexity of legal procedures. In many cases, the decision is subjective and random—people follow the crowd, and the family. Moreover, "the final destination" is not limited to China or the current host country. It might be another country, ideally the USA. Remigration is much more attractive than returning to China.

Glimpses of New Chinese Migrants' Lives

Many new Chinese migrants, especially those in the global north, are highly educated and "Westernized," with strong labor market skills and an awareness of the legal situation in the host country. They often actively and directly engage in the development of both their host and home countries. These characteristics set them apart from rural old-timers with low socioeconomic status, but this is not necessarily true of new immigrants in Latin America.

Most of the latter reach Latin America to pursue family reunification and entrepreneurial investment. Regardless of whether their migration is "normal" or "abnormal," they follow a similar life pattern in their host countries. Business people who migrate to Latin America by "normal" means usually first open a grocery store. Most start out as "junior boss" of a small business. If their business and capital grow, they become "big bosses," extending their investments to different areas. Most migrants who migrate by "abnormal means" start out as wage laborers, usually in supermarkets. Some may achieve legal status and become successful entrepreneurs and investors. No matter whether as successful businessperson or as denizen of the lower reaches of society, they join clan associations, particularly in the case of lower-class immigrants.

New Chinese migrants in Latin America are quite different from those in developed countries in Europe, North America and so on. Many are investors who previously lived in villages and received little education. They include few students, hardly any skilled workers and next to no high-tech talent. They are not as "Westernized" as many Chinese migrants in Western countries. They do not have the critical spirit characteristic of modern intellectual elites. However, they do have a strong legal awareness. Although the legal systems of their host countries might be relatively backward, they know how to protect their rights, despite problems in that field. The legal awareness of Chinese associations in Latin America is as strong as in other places. Like Chinese elsewhere, they are not heavily involved in politics. Despite the emergence of a handful of Chinese political elites (mostly locally born ethnic Chinese) in some countries, their influence among members of their own ethnic group is limited. New Chinese migrants in Latin America have a strong attachment to their sending places, exemplified in frequent business transactions, supporting relatives at home, paying close attention to major events in China, sending donations for disaster relief and supporting China's unification with Taiwan. They are also happy to act as bridges between their host and home countries.

Unlike new Chinese migrants in developed countries, who quickly adopt Western values and cultures, new Chinese migrants in Latin America largely hold on to their home culture while being slow to integrate into the host culture. New Chinese migrants in Latin America have stronger ties to China than do other overseas Chinese. The admiration for rising China in the host country makes them prouder of being "Chinese." In their own circles, they maintain their local dialects and rules of behavior, but they are also far more likely to be able to speak standard Chinese than their earlier counterparts.

In the host countries, new Chinese migrants either join a family business or start up their own. Many have little education, cannot speak the local language and have no special skills. They usually start with restaurants or small workshops. Some have education, capital, special skills and business knowledge. Such people tend to engage in imports and exports, or set up business enterprises immediately after arriving overseas.

Trade is the main business of new Chinese migrants in the twenty-first century. Compared with their earlier counterparts, however, new Chinese migrants are less able to endure hardship. New Chinese migrants are usually overambitious and fail to make a thorough evaluation of their situation. Many dream of making a fortune but there are often huge gaps between dream and reality, especially during economic crises. New Chinese migrants in Latin America have been involved in cases of corruption and bribery, which has had a bad influence on Chinese migrants and on local society. However, new Chinese migrants and their earlier counterparts share one thing: they live in a relatively enclosed circle and have little contact outside of it as a result of the limitations of their education, social status and profession.

Locally born ethnic Chinese in Latin America mostly operate restaurants, grocery stores, money shops and jewelry shops, mainly as a result of inheritances and education. Some engage in imports and exports, plantation management, animal farming, supermarket operations, the petrochemical industry and ceramics. Their dominant livelihoods remain catering and trade, especially in the case of those from Guangdong. Before new Chinese migrants began arriving, Chinese were generally less well off in the West Indies than in South America, Central America and Mexico. In the West Indies, most engage in catering, tourism and trade.

Chinese business in Latin America today, mainly trade and catering, is generally labor intensive. Many Chinese migrants in developed countries such as the USA are students turned professionals who are highly educated and employed in big companies. By comparison, few Chinese in Latin America work in big companies. Most have little education, and their ideas and business habits are quite different from those of Chinese in developed countries. Latin American markets differ from Chinese markets in language, culture, customers' mentality, business practices and other respects. Only through constant localization can Chinese businesses survive in Latin America. Besides coveting rootedness, Chinese business people should strive to improve their after-sales service, negotiate finance leases and localize their management teams. This might be difficult for people

with little education. However, as long as they are willing to make the effort, tackle problems as they arise, and accumulate and groom talents, they will in the end succeed, just as many of their predecessors have.

In Latin America, especially in non-Spanish- or non-Portuguese-speaking parts of South America, where the economy is relatively developed, associations of new Chinese migrants are very active. Many have been set up by first-generation immigrants and therefore resemble the earliest overseas Chinese associations, which provided the needy with support and mutual protection of each other's rights. As mentioned earlier, associations based on clan and provenance are a vital element in new Chinese migrants' social lives. There are different kinds of Chinese association in different countries, and most have different functions. They work together to protect Chinese migrants' rights and wellbeing. The same goes for Chinese associations in Latin America, where they are diverse and foster mutual reliance. What distinguishes Chinese associations in Latin America from those elsewhere is the dominance of those based on place of origin.

Chinese business associations are also be important in Latin America. Key figures in business associations can influence clan associations and vice versa. The two kinds of association often speak with one voice. Leading figures in the associations speak out on major issues, mobilize the whole community and speak to the government on its behalf. However, my research shows that Chinese communities in Latin America sometimes experience conflicts among, themselves.

Chinese migrant business associations are often closely tied to the local economy. They work to win the recognition and support of local society and to build a good business environment for Chinese migrants. They sell daily necessities, their prices are cheap and they often have sales and lottery draws. They are largely welcomed by local residents. Business associations communicate with the authorities to protect Chinese migrants' interests. They support education and disaster relief in the immigrants' home towns and villages, and they encourage members to support local welfare programs and charity events. By sponsoring local welfare programs, they exert a positive influence and act as a bridge between Chinese migrants and their host society.

Business associations also unite small businesses against attempts at monopolization by big companies. They unify member's supply of goods, price-setting and advertising, thus avoiding unnecessary competition and strengthening discipline and solidarity. In this way, business associations defend their members' economic interests and protect their rights. As a

result, they are able to attract new members, develop a good business environment and create job opportunities for incoming immigrants.

Chinese associations do not always form. In Latin America, Chinese migrants are at the same time both highly "centralized" and "dispersed." They therefore develop differently in different areas of settlement. In areas where there are many Chinese migrants, there are many interlinked and multifunctional associations. Associations are hard to form in areas with few Chinese migrants. On the South American mainland, there are many mountains and valleys. Transportation and telecommunication are difficult, so Chinese migrants cannot easily interact with each other, hence associations are hard to form. If people run into difficulties, they seek the help of the esteemed and active members of their communities. It is different with island nations. If the island is big enough and has many Chinese migrants, it is easy to form associations. However, in the Caribbean region where there are many small and underdeveloped islands with few Chinese migrants, associations are hard to form. Chinese on such islands usually gather in groups rather than establish associations. The groups consist of migrants, project workers sent by the Chinese government or Chinese companies, overseas students and the staff of the local Chinese embassy (if the island is a country).

Remote areas also have few associations. After inheriting the older generation's business, Chinese there usually lead a prosperous and stable life, and they are reluctant to embrace change. Some have little education and live largely in seclusion. Others are too occupied with their businesses to interact with the outside world. For whatever reason, many are narrow in outlook. In general the environment is peaceful and local people are affable. There are few disputes about rights. Consequently, the need for Chinese associations is weak. Even if there are such associations, most are not particularly active, and their leaders maintain no more than a "symbolic existence" by showing up now and then on important occasions. Some have not organized any events for a long time owing to the loss of members and funding.

The arrival of new Chinese migrants has greatly energized Chinese diasporic communities in Latin America and brought new opportunities for the promotion of Chinese culture. Most of the new migrants are from rural areas in China. They carry with them "provincial" traditions and customs that merge with the culture of the old diasporic community. They remain attached to China and practice Chinese culture as embodied in their "provincial traditions." What's more, new Chinese migrants in Latin

America are usually on good terms with local residents. They value education and have made remarkable progress in educating their children in Latin America. However, like new Chinese migrants in other continents, they exhibit low levels of political engagement.

Concluding Remarks

New migrants from mainland China's underdeveloped countryside have shown themselves to be highly adaptable. Like the old migrants, they tend, at least initially, to have low socioeconomic status. However, they quickly adapt and establish themselves by doing whatever jobs come their way, and they are thus able to support their entire family, including those left behind in China. Some get rich quickly, while others hope to do so in good time. Everything depends on their hard work and tenacity. Most work for a small business owned by a relative or fellow villager (who has usually helped them migrate) for a contracted period (usually three years) before starting up their own businesses.

New migrants have benefited significantly from the ethnic division of labor characteristic of most Latin American countries. Local people are less determined than the Chinese to be self-employed and don't mind working for foreigner-owned businesses, factories or stores, including those owned by Chinese. This ethnic division of labor suits the mobility strategies of new Chinese migrants. They prosper in occupational niches shunned by natives, partly owing to a lack of serious competition from native-owned businesses.

Success in business is also a result of the great demand for Chinese consumer goods since China's reforms. These help maintain the position of the Chinese in the local business chain. How long this will last is a matter for further study. The economic interdependence of China and Latin America over the past two to three decades has promoted the development of Chinese businesses in Latin America considerably. Compared with new Chinese migrants in other parts of the world, those in Latin America have depended on strong family networks, which strengthens geographically oriented resettlement patterns. On the basis of provenance, they live clustered in this or that city or country, all the while strengthening the family migration network based on ties of blood and place. As a result, place-based associations dominate the Chinese diaspora in Latin America. Chinese business associations deal mainly with the authorities to protect Chinese business interests. The close cooperation between place-based associations and business associations strengthens the formation and development of

new diasporic Chinese communities and migrants' adaptation to their host countries. However, coethnic interdependence has also contributed to greater self-segregation in Latin America than in other relatively developed host societies such as the USA, given the migrants' generally lower level of education, the greater impact of subcultures imported from home towns and villages in China, and the greater tolerance shown by people in Latin America to migrants and even to undocumented migrants.

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CHAPTER 16

The Chinese Presence in Cuba: Heroic Past, Uncertain Present, Open Future

Evelyn Hu-DeHart

A Heroic Past

Between 1847 and 1874, some 140,000 young Chinese men were loaded onto Western steamships and frigates bound from China and Macao for Cuba. Just under 125,000 landed after long, arduous voyages lasting up to six months through the Indian Ocean, around Africa's Cape of Good Hope and up the Atlantic to the Caribbean. They went under invariable eight-year contracts, with some 80 % destined for sugar plantations to work alongside a dwindling African slave labor force. Cuba provided a unique laboratory in the history of human migration and labor history to study racial formation and race relations, and to also ask about the critical transition from slave to free labor in the history of global capitalism.

It is easy to demonstrate and argue that Chinese contract labor—*la trata amarilla* or the yellow trade—constituted a barely disguised form of slavery, that it was an extension of slavery that Cuban planters had practiced for three centuries, or that it was a new form of slavery, or neo-slavery. Lisa Yun makes a persuasive argument for the equivalency of coolie and slave, as do other scholars (Yun 2008; Jiménez Pastrana 1983). After all, coolies were sent to plantations to supplement slave labor, doing the same jobs, living

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under the same conditions, subjected to discipline, punishment and abuse by the same majordomos, overseers, administrators and planters. In fact, in some ways their daily lives might have been even more miserable, their sorrow more unrelenting, as they were bereft of spousal and familiar relationships, being almost all male, and they experienced severe language and cultural barriers. So it is not at all surprising that scholars tend to conflate the two. When one reads the thousands of gut-wrenching testimonies of coolies working on plantations presented to the Qing fact-finding commissioners in 1873, it is difficult not to draw that conclusion (Cuban Commission Report 1876). Indeed, on a daily basis the coolies' work and lives on the plantations while under contract certainly appeared comparable to slavery, although a more fine-tuned analysis reveals significant divergences, as I go on to show.

On the other hand, a close examination of the coolie system as actually practiced uncovers signs suggesting that coolies constituted the beginning of the transition from slave to free labor, and that many of them succeeded in gaining the right to live and work as free men in Cuba well before the end of the coolie trade and the total abolition of slavery there at the very end of the nineteenth century.

Coolies were recruited from the two southern coastal provinces of Guangdong and Fujian with treaty ports in Canton (Guangzhou) and Swatow (Shantou) in the former, and Amoy (Xiamen) in the latter. There, local authorities and merchants were experienced at dealing with Europeans and Americans. Nearby is the Portuguese colony of Macao, taken in the mid-sixteenth century as an entrepôt for trade with China, and the newly acquired British port of Hong Kong, ceded after China was defeated in the First Opium War (1839–1842). Southern Fujian and especially the Pearl River Delta of Guangdong were densely populated regions experiencing tremendous social turmoil, including the Red Turban Rebellion and especially the Taiping Rebellion of the 1850s, which uprooted many young men from their villages. In addition, the regions suffered periodic natural disasters such as famine and floods. However, the hardy and hardworking villagers were highly skilled in agriculture and crafts, having developed for centuries the sericulture that had helped undergird China's silk trade with the West since the sixteenth century, not to mention the back-breaking work of wet-rice cultivation, planting two, even three, crops per year. Furthermore, they were quite familiar with sugar cane cultivation and the technology of cane sugar manufacture, even exporting sugar to USA in the eighteenth century. The hot and humid weather in South China and Cuba were also quite comparable. In many ways, Cuban plantation owners could not have found a more propitious labor pool to draw from.

Chinese immigrant labor was recruited to capitalist enterprises around the world in the nineteenth century—the western USA, Australia and New Zealand, Southeast Asia and even Africa from the mid- to late nineteenth century. Those sent to the Caribbean went with formal contracts, and only those sent to Cuba (and Peru in South America) were armed with bilingual Spanish and Chinese versions. Migrant labor from the British colony of India to the Caribbean also had contracts. These testified to the central role played by the colonial state in organizing, regulating and supervising an indentured labor system.

In the Chinese case, the formal contract of indenture was technically a civil contract between equal parties: the contracting agent in China and the prospective migrant, with the obligations of each party clearly spelled out. With some variation over time, the contracts assumed a standard form (Look Lai 1993, ch. 3). The Spanish and Chinese versions of the coolie contracts to Cuba diverged in language and orientation in one critical way, as we shall see.

The Cuban government agency charged with overseeing the coolie trade was the supremely misnamed Comisión de Población Blanca (Commission of White Settlement), an agency of the powerful Real Junta de Fomento y Colonización (Royal Board of Development and Colonization). It was presided over by one of the island's leading sugar planters, Julian Zulueta, whose uncle, Pedro Zulueta, in the London office of the family's multinational enterprise first went to China to set up the coolie trade from that end. When the commission's original plan to attract Spanish or other Catholic European immigrants—white and free—to work on Cuban plantations failed dismally, the colonial government turned to China for indentured labor but kept up the illusion of colonization and settlement.

Officially, the contracts in Spanish invariably titled the project "Libre emigración china para la isla de Cuba" ("free Chinese immigration to the island of Cuba"). Accordingly, in the contract the Chinese labor recruit was termed a *colono asiático*—Asian settler or colonist. Things become interesting, however, when examining the Chinese version of the contract, which clearly labels it a labor contract (*gugong hetong* 雇工合同 or *gongzuo hetong* 工作合同). Individuals signed on to work overseas (出洋) on the island of Cuba (often identified as Luzon or Manila by recruiters, invoking a familiar place not far from home, whereas Cuba was a totally unknown entity), and they went "voluntarily" (*ziyuan* 自愿). The recruit was correctly identified as a "contract signer"—the contracted person (*li hetong ren* 立合同人)—who signed his name in Chinese to signal his willingness to accept and abide by the contract.

The rest of the Spanish contract, as with the Chinese contract, spelled out the exact terms of work in Cuba, indicating in some detail the obligations of both worker and employer during the eight years of indenture. In other words, it was difficult, if not impossible, to keep the illusion of immigration and settler consistent because, in fact, the Chinese were sought after and tolerated precisely and only for their value as cheap labor, not as colonists leading to citizens. Thus the so-called *colono* (settler) had to obey a Cuban *patrono* (boss or employer). The Chinese translator made the necessary adjustment, where the worker (*gongren* 工人) was required to obey the employer (*dongjia* 东家).

Throughout the 25 years of the coolie trade, the basic terms of the contract remained constant: the eight years of servitude never varied, nor did the wages of 4 pesos a month. In addition to salary, the coolie received food (salt meat, sweet potato or other "nutritious vegetable," rice, fish), clothing (two changes of work garments yearly, a wool shirt or jacket and a blanket), housing and medical attention. He got three days off at New Year and Sundays, except during the critical harvest season. The contracts made clear that during the indenture period the coolie was under the total control of his employer, who was responsible for discipline and punishment for the coolie's failure to meet his labor obligations. How the coolie spent his time, even when not working, was left to the discretion of the boss. Some contracts even included a clause that baldly asked the coolie "to renounce the exercise of all civil rights which are not compatible with the fulfillment of contract obligations." He lost all freedom of mobility, being forbidden to leave the estate without permission, or risk being branded, pursued and arrested as a *cimarrón* (runaway).

Things became worse in 1860 when new regulations required coolies who had completed the original eight-year term to recontract with the same or another employer or leave Cuba at his own expense, two months after contract expiration. Practically none was able to save enough from their paltry wages for the return fare, so most stayed and recontracted. At first glance, this new regulation seemingly nailed the coffin for coolies, as it consigned them to an unremitting life of toil alongside slaves on plantations. There is no doubt that Cubans compelled recontracting in order to keep as many members as possible of this semicaptive, foreign labor force working on plantations for as long as possible by, in effect, creating a new labor pool. Had the recontracting requirement been scrupulously followed, it would have resulted in the Chinese being kept in servitude in perpetuity, which

would have lent further credence to the equivalency of this system of labor to slavery.

Through successive recontracting, some Chinese might have been entrapped to extend servitude well beyond eight years. However, a large number managed to get out of contract labor permanently after recontracting just once. They began applying for and receiving the valuable residency paper—*cédula de vecindad* or *carta de domicilio*—and registered as "foreign residents." A few years after receiving the residency permit, some went on to achieve naturalization (*carta de naturalización*) and become Spanish subjects (*súbdito español*), Cuba being a Spanish colony at the time. By the 1870s, another option became available to ex-coolies to regularize their status in Cuba: they applied to the newly established Chinese Consulate of Imperial China (serving the Qing government) to certify their Chinese citizenship.

Living like slaves and in the proximity of slaves, Chinese coolies were nevertheless not slaves. Despite not knowing Spanish and being isolated on the plantations, many of them did know their rights and appealed to courts and authorities local and national to obtain them. They were aware that slaves and free blacks were fighting to end slavery as part of seeking independence from Spain, and hundreds of them joined the *mambí* (freedom fighter) ranks in the decades leading up to Spanish surrender in the early twentieth century (García Triano and Eng Herrera 2009). Juan Jiménez Pastrana, a Cuban historian who studied Chinese coolies closely, argued that the coolie was "theoretically not a slave because he was waged. As such, he represented an early step in the rise of our working class. The Chinese *colono* was really an agricultural worker, on a miserable wage, whose socio-economic situation must be included in the history of the Cuban labor movement" (Jiménez Pastrana 1983, pp. 2–4).

Manuel Moreno Fraginals, Cuba's pre-eminent historian of sugar, added: "The Chinese constituted the first step in solving the labor problem, a step that permitted the beginning of the industrialization of sugar; that brought about the transition from manufacturing to industrial production" (Moreno Fraginals 1978, p. 155). He was referring to the noticeable differentiation of plantation tasks between Chinese coolies and slaves. Ramón de la Sagra noted in his account of the workforce on his plantation La Ponina as early as 1860 that 430 coolies worked in the *casa de calderas* (boiler house) of the *ingenio* (factory), compared with only 252 slaves, and that 250 coolies compared with only 28 slaves worked in the *casa de purga* (purging room), both tasks that were mechanized and required more skills.

By contrast, slaves vastly outnumbered coolies, by 189 to 35, in the unskilled manual labor of transporting cane from field to factory (De la Sagra 1862, p. 95).

The ever-observant and often amused American Eliza McHatton-Ripley, who followed her husband from the south of the USA to own and manage the plantation Desengaño ("Disillusionment") in central Cuba, noted in her diary in 1866:

> The Chinese, when once acclimated and accustomed to the routine, were docile and industrious; they could not stand the same amount of exposure as an African, but they were intelligent and ingenious; within-doors, in the sugar factor, in the carpenter-shop, in the cooper-shop, in driving teams, they were superior to the negro.

Furthermore, after completing their contract terms, "they were allowed to flock into cities and villages [...] and readily found employment as brakemen on railroads, or in any occupation other than digging in the ground" (McHatton-Ripley 1896, p. 177).

There is irrefutable evidence that after the original eight-year service as a captive labor force alongside slaves on plantations, Chinese migrant laborers' experience began to diverge from slavery in concrete and discernible ways. They followed a clear path to earning a living as legal free residents, earning market-determined wages to support families, or, as many of them did, establishing little businesses in towns big and small. By the late 1850s and 1860s, coolies in the first shipments of the late 1840s and 1850s had completed their eight-year contracts and moved away from the plantations to provincial towns and to Havana, where they established the first *barrio chino* (Chinatown) just outside the city wall, along the *zanja* (trench) that carried water into and out of the city. While changes in the coolie regulations forced them to recontract indefinitely, beginning in 1860, enough had won their freedom to live in Havana, where they worked as employees or set up their own small businesses, married and formed families.

By 1867, Havana Chinatown had enough critical mass for the Chinese to form the first associations or *huiguan*. These urban Chinese often provided leadership for others, especially those still under contract and those about to complete their contract and seeking the all-important residency permit, or those trying to escape continuous recontracting. By 1872 a remarkable

14,409 ex-coolies had become naturalized Cubans or registered as foreign residents. The first *huiguan*, Kit Yi Tong (The Union), was formed to bring together all the Chinese residents of Havana. Founding members bore quintessentially Spanish names such as Saturnino Saez, Marcos Portillos and Juan Lombillo, an indication of baptism and assimilation, or at least a willingness to appear assimilated. This was soon followed by the Hen Yi Tong (Brotherhood), which included not only Havana residents but all the Chinese in Cuba, including those still under contract (Chuffat Latour 1927, p. 8).

Hakkas must have felt less than fully welcomed, for they responded with their own association, which they named pointedly the Yi Sen Tong (Second Alliance) (Chuffat Latour 1927, p. 18). All three associations had affiliations with Hung men (a major triad organization) in Guangdong (Helly 1979, p. 204).

While Chinatowns were forming in Havana and throughout the island, Cuban patriots embarked on a long and tortuous path toward independence from Spain. Not surprisingly, many slaves answered the call to join the revolution and with it gain an end to their bondage, and so did hundreds of Chinese coolies. During the first major push for independence, the Ten Years War (beginning 1868), the first major battle between rebels and colonial forces took place in Las Villas province, the site of major plantations employing thousands of slaves and coolies. It was recorded that most of the 500 Chinese who fought in this battle were Hakkas from Fujian, and their leader, Lam Fu Kin (Lin Fujian林福建), known locally by his Spanish name Juan Sánchez, had fought with Hong Xiuquan in the Taiping Revolution (García Triano and Eng Herrera 2009, p. 5; Chuffat Latour 1927, p. 28), so he "knew about war" (*conocía la guerra*)—that is, he was an experienced warrior.

Also reported was the generous assistance of Carlos Cartaya Chung Yuen (Zhong Yuan钟元), a Hakka merchant known as a philanthropist, in the town of Remedios in Las Villas province. As president of the Sociedad Asiática (Asia Society), he fed up to two meals a day to as many as 800 rural residents who were forced by colonial policy to concentrate in the town so they could not give aid and support to the rebel fighters, thus depriving them of access to food. In 1902, after independence (1895), Cartaya Chung remained in Remedios where he opened several businesses, including a money exchange, and was appointed honorary governor of Las Villas province by the new Cuban government and honorary consul when the Qing government briefly located its consulate in his hometown of

Remedios. He also received an imperial degree. He sent his four sons born in Cuba to his Chinese wife back to China for their education (Chuffat Latour 1927, p. 112; López 2013, p. 131; García Triano and Eng Herrera 2009, p. 22). Cartaya Chung was one of a growing number of successful Chinese merchants in Cuba who were active Cuban citizens while at the same time remaining attached to the Chinese government, in his case the Qing.

In other independence struggles during the Ten Years War, stories circulated of runaway coolies who engaged in "guerrilla warfare" learned from their past participation in the Taiping Rebellion. "Not a few had been bandits in their homeland" (Corbitt 1971, p. 22).

In the next major battle, the Little War (La Guerra Chica) in 1879, many Chinese veterans of the previous Ten Years War again served the rebels. They included the military leader José Tolón (Lai Hua 赖华), who was reputedly also Hakka and also a Taiping, given his exceptional military prowess and strategic mind. He shared a surname with Hong Xiuquan's wife. Tolón went on to distinguish himself militarily in the final and successful push for independence in 1895–1898, after which he married a Cuban woman and had two daughters and a successful business career (García Triano and Eng Herrera 2009, p. 13).

A few so distinguished themselves as leaders on the battlefield that when independence was won, they earned the right to be candidates for the presidency of the new republic. Notable among them was José Bu (Hu De 胡德). A monument was erected to these Chinese *mambises* (freedom fighters), carved with the stirring tribute that "There was no Chinese deserter; there was no Chinese traitor" (*No hubo chino desertor; no hubo chino traidor*).

An Uncertain Present

Despite the eligibility of a few heroic independence leaders, no Chinese ever sought the Cuban presidency. Instead, they spread themselves from Havana to all the provinces, big towns and small, building a *barrio chino* (Chinatown) wherever a critical mass was reached. More Chinese associations, or *huiguan*, were formed in Havana, with chapters in many provincial towns across the nation. The Chee Kung Tong (Zhigongdang) was established in 1902, and the Kuomintang (Guomindang) in 1921. Together these were the main overarching organizations that complemented the Casino Chung Wah (Zhonghua Huiguan) established in the waning days

of the colonial period in 1893 (López 2009). Located just outside historic Old Havana (where the Chinese were forbidden to reside or operate businesses), by the 1920s, Havana's Chinatown had grown to 44 city blocks, making it the largest in Latin America.

During the 1920s, a particularly prosperous time fueled by prodigious sugar harvests, Cuba attracted some 20,000 free immigrants from Guangdong—mainly the Siyi counties (Taishan, Xinhui etc.)—at a time when China's economy was racked by continuous civil war and social calamities. Fathers, uncles, sons and nephews, mostly men, came to set up small businesses in Havana and the sugar-rich provinces, sending money home regularly through established remittances channels. Eventually, women and families migrated as well, so that the Chinese communities took on the semblance of normal community life, with schools, newspapers, recreation centers and clubs. Much of the growth in families was the result of Chinese men and Cuban wives producing the next generations of mixed-race *chinos cubanos* or *chinos mestizos*.

Havana's Chinatown participated actively in Cuba's growth as a prime Caribbean tourist destiny. In addition to the perpetually warm and sunny weather, the pristine beaches and crystal blue waters, Cuba's attraction for North American tourists relied heavily on gambling, prostitution, opium and other illicit thrills, with Havana's Chinatown serving as a main site for bordellos, cabaret shows, strip clubs, porno theatres and so forth. During the 1950s, close to 0.5 million tourists flocked to Cuba annually, and tourism became the country's second source of national revenue after sugar (Hearn 2012b). During this time, much of Chinatown's businesses, both the above-board and below-board kinds, operated in the informal economy or black market.

Given the essentially petit-bourgeois nature of Cuba's Chinese communities—their entrepreneurial spirit and the family labor behind the small business-driven prosperity—and the turn to communism and an alliance with the Soviet Union by Fidel Castro's anti-US imperialist revolution, the two soon clashed. At first, some young Cubans supported the revolution, forming the Chinese militia known as the José Wong Brigade. In October 1968, the militia, led by the trade unionist Pedro Eng, occupied the Nationalist Party (Kuomintang [KMT]) building and raised the flag of the People's Republic of China (PRC) for the first time in Cuba. They also closed down the brothels, gambling dens and opium dens in Chinatown. In 2015, the Alianza Socialista de China en Cuba (Socialist Alliance of China and Cuba) occupied the old KMT building. In the 1960s, the revolutionary

regime began nationalizing big and small businesses—from the large plantations to the small shops and truck farms of the Chinese communities throughout the island, a process that was completed in 1968. Their businesses shuttered and their livelihoods shattered, most Chinese Cubans left the country, moving mainly to Miami, New York City and other points in the USA, while some returned to China.

In 1980 the Casino Chung Wah's own census counted only 4302 Chinese, most of them Cuban-born and of mixed heritage. By 2002 that number had dwindled to 2866, and only a handful, few more than 100, were Chinese-born and spoke Chinese (mostly Taishan or Xinhui dialect; a few had learned Mandarin), most of whom are now in their late 60s or older. Very few new immigrants have arrived to revitalize the population, in part because the state-directed command economy has created practically no incentives for individual Chinese to migrate to Cuba, a situation exacerbated by the cool relationship between Cuba and China for the long period of Cuba-Soviet Alliance, 1960–1990. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 plunged Cuba's economy into deep despair when Soviet subsidies ended, but that moment also signaled an opportunity for the Sino-Cuba freeze to begin to thaw (López 2009; Hearn and Alfonso 2012; Hearn 2012a).

During the difficult days of the "special period" in the 1990s, a group of young Cuban Chinese leaders created a new state enterprise named the Group to Promote Chinatown (Grupo Promotor del Barrio Chino). Led by university student Yrmina Eng of the mixed-race second generation, and Carlos Alay and his two brothers, whose parents were both Chinese and who themselves spoke Chinese, the group labored for a decade to revitalize Chinatown on the basis of tourism, centered on a small restaurant lane off the old Chinatown thoroughfare of Zanja Street. They marshaled what limited community resources remained, together with some investment from family members in China, to open new restaurants, bars and nightclubs, and to provide language classes in Mandarin. They established a home for the elderly, and promoted festivals and celebrations directed by the Casa de Artes y Cultura Tradicionales (Center of Traditional Arts and Culture) (López 2009). An enterprising mixed Cuban, Roberto Vargas, having studied martial arts in China, opened the Wushu academy in the barrio, next to the Min Chi Tang building, and that is one of the major successes of the revitalization project. Meanwhile, the Cuban government also allowed the 13 or so remaining *huiguan* to open their own restaurants and earn some income from tourism. The group persuaded the PRC to

finance the erection of a new gateway to the barrio. In 2006, the Office of the Historian of the City took over the Grupo Promotor, presumably to assert greater state control over the development of Chinatown. Since then, not much has happened there.

In 2015, probably every Cuban in Havana had a daily encounter with China, as did most foreign tourists. That is because Cubans and tourists ride the thousands of Chinese Yudong (中国宇通) buses that provide most of the public transport in the city, as well as all the modern, brightly colored, air-conditioned tourist buses roaring through the city streets of historical Old Havana and the upscale hotel neighborhoods of El Vedado and Miramar. Cubans and foreign residents with an account at a Cuban bank withdraw money from Chinese ATM machines, some of which are emblazoned with Chinese characters.

The relatively small number of Cubans who own cell phones likely use a China-made Huawei apparatus. Some of the even smaller number who own a car may drive a China-made Geely. Cuban television has several CCTV channels, including a Spanish-language one.

The University of Havana has enrolled a relatively large number of Chinese and other Asians (primarily Vietnamese), and the Confucius Institute affiliated with the university provides the larger Havana community with Chinese language and culture classes for all age groups. There are now more than 300 Chinese medical students on the campus.

Almost every Cuban household has one or more Chinese-made appliances, including refrigerators, washing machines, pressure cookers, rice cookers and televisions, as well as smaller products such as a water filter systems and espresso coffee makers.

The last time China had such an obvious presence in everyday Cuban life was in the mid-1990s, during the times known as the *período especial* (the "Special Period in a Time of Peace," as Fidel Castro called it), when Cuba suffered after the withdrawal of Soviet and Eastern bloc subsidies (notably food and petroleum) after the Soviet Union collapsed and the Cold War came to a close. The public transport system practically fell apart until China came to the rescue with up to a million Chinese bikes.

In 2015 I found it extremely difficult to do research on the new, revitalized Chinese presence in Cuba, which at one time had a large and vibrant Chinatown. This Chinatown was established slightly before those of San Francisco and New York, and rivaled them in size and prosperity. It survived the initial phase of Castro's revolution, but when the revolution began nationalizing their properties and businesses in the 1960s, most

Chinese left for the USA or returned to Hong Kong and China. The old Chinese community now consists mainly of old men living out their remaining days in the government-run retirement home, or in their own homes, whiling away their time in the remaining associations, such as the Min Chi Tang, which provide them with breakfast and lunch with money from the Cuban government. Most of those who identify with the Chinese community are mixed-blood descendants of Chinese men and Cuban mothers. On major holidays, such as Spring Festival/Chinese New Year and *Dia de los Muertos*/Qing Ming, the community and the descendants spread out through the city to celebrate, and then retreat back into their daily routines around the city and in the provinces.

An Open Future

Today (2015) the Chinese embassy occupies a whole city block in the upscale Vedado neighborhood. A fellow socialist country that became estranged from Cuba when Cuba allied with the Soviet Union in the early days of the Castro revolution, China has now re-emerged on the scene, more confident and assertive than ever, as a rising power. Chinese-Cuban state-to-state relations have warmed since the 1990s, when Castro sought China's help, given Cuba's economic woes. Relations have deepened in the course of the last decade or so. President Hu Jintao visited Cuba in 2008, and in July 2014 President Xi Jinping also stopped by to greet Fidel, by then in poor health and retired, and his younger brother, Raúl, currently in charge of the Cuban state. The Chinese foreign minister, Wang Yi, also visited the island in April 2014. China is Cuba's second trading partner behind Venezuela (although that may soon change given the near collapse of the Venezuelan economy), and Cuba is China's leading partner in the Caribbean, with bilateral trade of a little over USD2 billion, according to Chinese government data. China imports nickel from Cuba and may in future import petroleum, although Cuba's petroleum deposits are far from developed. China's relationship with Cuba is economically driven, as is the case with all of Latin America (Hearn and León Manríquez 2011). It is similar in many ways to China's growing relationship with Africa, where large-scale migration followed massive Chinese investment. In Cuba and the rest of Latin America, migration and small-scale private investment are also likely to follow Chinese state investment.

Since the late 1990s, China has invested USD1.3 billion in Cuba, mostly in large-scale projects such as onshore and offshore oil exploration (there

has been no drilling yet), the expansion of Cuba's largest oil refinery in Cienfuegos (Cuba currently produces a small quantity of low-quality crude oil) and the development of the new deep-water port in Mariel (near Havana), which has been declared a "free trade zone" and whose large container port (not yet fully operating) has been developed with Brazilian capital. China is modernizing the eastern port city of Santiago, building entire dock facilities, new restaurants and so on. Chinese state companies are building different kinds of power and energy plant throughout Cuba, from the traditional kind to wind energy. China is building hospitals, and in May 2015 the Beijing Enterprise Group signed an agreement with the Cuban Ministry of Tourism to build a golf course as part of a large-scale tourist resort complex of hotels, condos, amarina, shopping malls and so forth. Currently, Cuba has only one 18-hole golf course but it plans to have at least 12 (Frank 2015).

As a result of this investment, Chinese engineers, business managers, technicians, translators and other experts have arrived in Cuba. In April 2015 I had lunch in Havana with Seaman Dai, business manager of the China Machinery Industry Construction Group, Inc., of Beijing and Guangzhou, and six engineers (hydraulic, mechanical) plus one interpreter. The team travels periodically to Cuba to check on the energy plants they are constructing in collaboration with Cuban engineers, who have also visited China. Dai visits Cuba four or five times a year for two weeks at a time to check on the energy projects in progress. Chinese design and import the machinery; other materials, such as cement, may be imported from Mexico.

Cargo ships from China (Cosco and subsidiaries) deliver machinery and other parts to the port of Mariel. They are few in number but visible in Santiago and other places where big Chinese projects are located. On May 2, 2015 in Havana I met Captain Li of the Guangzhou Ocean Shipping Co. Ltd., a subsidiary of Cosco. He had just delivered a shipment of construction machinery to Mariel.

However, Cuba today has few of the non-governmental Chinese immigrant entrepreneurs, tourists and labor migrants found throughout Latin America, notably in Brazil, Argentina, Peru, Mexico, Venezuela, where they have arrived in large numbers in the wake of bilateral development and trade agreements, and state and private Chinese investments, following a pattern already well established in Africa, parts of Europe and the USA. An estimated 750,000 Chinese live in Africa. They are mostly entrepreneurs and shopkeepers but include some workers (*mingong*) attached to Chinese state-sponsored development and infrastructure projects. In Argentina, to

give just one example, an estimated 75,000 *xin yimin* (new immigrants) are now residents and they have taken over the supermarket sector (they own and operate some 8900 supermarkets, and have formed their own trade association) (Cardenal and Araújo 2013, p. 68).

Cuba, however, is different. It lacks this "army of tireless entrepreneurs, [...] astonishing human beings with an unlimited capacity for self-sacrifice who venture out into the world driven only by the dreams of success and who go on to conquer impossible markets which Westerners never dared to tackle" (Cardenal and Araújo 2013, p. 5). In Cuba, only a handful of new Chinese immigrants have followed in the wake of Chinese state-funded development projects.

So far, the closest thing to new Chinese immigrants in Cuba are the thousands of Chinese students who have arrived since 2006. Between then and 2013, 3584 Chinese students studied Spanish in Cuba on Cuban government scholarships at a special campus on the north coast just outside Havana (Talala, near Guanabo). Since then a handful of self-funded students have arrived to study tourism, journalism, architecture and other subjects. Medical students have continued to arrive in Cuba for its vaunted medical education. In 2015 there were still 474 medical students on Cuban government scholarships (Eng 2016). One of the language graduates of the Talala School is Patricia Chan, who now works for Seaman Dai and the Chinese Energy Company. However, most of the students who have studied in Cuba will probably return to China, as Chan plans to. At present there are few economic opportunities for Chinese graduates of Cuban higher education, but some will elect to stay.

I also made the acquaintance of Wu Qingli (吴庆利) and Han Qingshan (Antonio), who co-own and manage the Tianbo International Travel Agency (天博) in Havana and Beijing. Wu of Urumqi has been in Cuba for 18 years, traveling back and forth to China, and Han for 12 years, married to a Cuban. Recently his brother Raúl, younger by about 10 years moved to Cuba to work with him in the travel business. According to them about 30,000 Chinese visitors entered Cuba in 2014, and their company handled about half of them. Nearly all the visitors are Chinese government and business clients rather than tourists in the traditional sense. They are representatives of Chinese companies with large projects in Cuba who come to check on these projects. A small number come as "tourists" to scope out investment opportunities, even though, as foreigners, they are not currently able to invest in property and small businesses.

Like other foreigners, they find opportunities blocked by Cuban government policies regarding property ownership. Big investors such as the Spanish hotel chain Meliá "co-owns" 22 hotels in Cuba with the Cuban government, the government owning the hotels proper and the Spanish company managing the hotel business. In other words, these are joint ventures. So it is with all other large foreign investments, including the big Chinese development and infrastructure properties. At present, only Cubans can own property, including—and this is significant—Cuban immigrants to the USA, Spain and elsewhere who have held on to their Cuban passports and nationality, or who have family in Cuba who serve as their business partners. These are the only people outside Cuba who are buying up choice real estate and opening up fancy restaurants serving the growing tide of tourists and Cubans with access to dollars. Apart from hotels and restaurants, and a few companies selling machinery (Chinese) and construction materials (Italian), there are no retail businesses or storefronts selling consumer goods other than government-owned stores. With the normalization of USA–Cuba relations, starting with the re-establishment of embassies and the exchange of ambassadors, and the lifting of the US-led embargo, these restrictions would have to be softened if not eliminated, or foreign investors would be reluctant to trade with Cuba and establish businesses there, and US banks would be unwilling to extend credit to Cuba or to US businesses in Cuba. When these changes take place, not only Americans but Chinese and other entrepreneurs will be poised to jump into Cuba, one of the last remaining frontiers to capitalist expansion in the Americas and in fact the world.

Each year some 350,000 Cubans from the diaspora (primarily in the USA but also in Spain and other parts of Europe and Latin America) visit their families in Cuba. They constitute the largest flow of visitors. Another 100,000 non-Cuban Americans visited Cuba in 2014, and the number was growing fast as Barack Obama continued to relax travel restrictions. In the wake of the imminent end of the US embargo, more tourists from Europe and Canada (already the largest tourist sending nation) were about to flood into Cuba.[1] With the widening of the Panama Canal near completion (2015), and with the container port and deep-water harbor of Mariel, as well as the free trade zone, ready for business anytime, Cuba would be ready for takeoff if and when the state removes restrictions on foreign investment and property ownership. To attract new Chinese immigrants to Cuba, the same kind who have been going to Africa, Eastern Europe and Latin America, these are the necessary changes. Many, but not all, of the tourists

from the USA, China, Europe and Latin America are business or entrepreneurial tourists, interested primarily in scoping out investment and business opportunities.

In preparation for that day, a few Chinese *xin yimin*, who label themselves as such and who are conscious of their pathbreaking role, can be found in Cuba in 2014:

1. Kagita Chen (陈秀连) is an attractive woman in her 40s who wandered around Europe before discovering Cuba 14 years ago. She is from Zhongshan. She drives a beautiful late model Mercedes and lives in an upscale neighborhood far from Old Havana and old Chinatown. With her Cuban residency status and Spanish fluency, she and her older sister operate a fancy Chinese restaurant outside Chinatown in the University of Havana neighborhood. To maintain ties with the old Chinatown, they also manage a restaurant there, as well as serving as officials of the Zhongshan Association (huiguan).[2] Kagita has built relationships with important revolutionary figures, and cultural and art institutions far beyond Chinatown, including the former minister of culture, Armando Hart, who is currently president of the Cuban Cultural Society José Martí. She has also cultivated relationships with some of Fidel's sons, several of whom have visited China and like Chinese food. She calls herself a *xin yimin* who makes a unique living for the moment as a "business entrepreneur" and acts as intermediary between prospective Chinese investors and as a consultant on behalf of Chinese companies doing business in Cuba.
2. Leo Xiang (向) from Chongqing went to Cuba seven years ago, around 2007, to study medicine. After receiving his MD he would like to stay in Cuba to do an MA in public health and then, with Kagita Chen as a role model, open up a consultancy (*agencia informativa*) to promote private Chinese businesses in Cuba, especially in pharmaceuticals, medical equipment, medicine, and products and services related to public health.

Other Chinese students similarly aspire to stay in Cuba and pursue business opportunities for themselves and other Chinese investors, using the cultural capital they have acquired in the country as their calling card.

Finally, what of the Cuban Chinese, not necessarily the 100 or so very elderly Chinese immigrants but their descendants? How has a rising China affected their prospects in a changing Cuba? Since most are of mixed

Chinese heritage with very little Chinese cultural capital, are they equipped to capitalize on the developing relationship between Cuba and China?

Among the Cuban-born generation, Carlos Alay, an exceptional Chinese-Cuban entrepreneur who owns three restaurants in Chinatown, speaks Mandarin and Cantonese and sent his two mixed-heritage children to Tianjin to study for three years. With a degree in food sciences from the University of Havana, he worked in a food science lab before going to Havanatur (the largest of several state tourist agencies) to work as a tour guide for Chinese tourists for a few years. Today, with his restaurants, he continues to hustle for tourist "businesses" with Havanatur and other places (although he would not be specific with me). He lives well by Cuban standards but earns far less than Wu and Han earn from their China travel agency.

Carlos still lives in Chinatown, but other mixed-heritage Cubans living outside have made names for themselves and developed contacts with China. Foremost among them are probably the Cuban Chinese artist Flora Fong and her son and daughter, Li and Liang Dominguez Fong (their father is a well-known Cuban artist who runs his own gallery where the children also exhibit.) All three have made numerous trips to China and exhibited in galleries in Shanghai, Beijing and elsewhere there.

José Antonio Choy is an eminent contemporary Cuban architect and painter who has also visited China, land of his father and father-in-law. Like the Fong family, he and his wife and two daughters, all architects, live far from Chinatown in an upscale neighborhood. However, he is proud of his Chinese heritage and has some entrepreneurial abilities. If the opportunity arises, he, the Fong family artists and Carlos Alay may be among the Cubans who can profit from the further development of China–Cuba relations, but they have relatively little capital to invest in a new Cuban economy, and the inability of most of them to speak or read Chinese may limit their usefulness as intermediaries and consultants, let alone as partners, of future Chinese investors, who are more likely to turn to the likes of Kagita Chen and Leo Xiang.

Postcript

Since this chapter was finished (September 2016), Cuba's revolutionary leader Fidel Castro has died on November 25, that year. This came shortly after Donald Trump became the president-elect of the United States on November 6. His position on the normalization of relations with Cuba is

undoubtedly influenced by the anti-Castro position of most Cubans in Florida, which he narrowly won with the help of their vote. A reversal by Trump of Obama's détente with Cuba would constitute a setback to the renewal of trade and commercial relations between two historical partners separated by only 70 miles of water in the Gulf of Mexico. According to the *Wall Street Journal* of November 30, should this happen, China is best positioned to expand its growing economic presence on the island in the absence of serious competition from US investors and businesses (*Wall Street Journal* 2016). Moscow is unlikely to return to Cuba in any serious way to resume its old partnership. Thus in the near future the coast appears clear for China to forge ahead with plans to increase its presence in Cuba, continuing with state-sponsored investment projects, likely to be followed by streams of entrepreneurial *xin yimin* with private capital to invest, the pattern that is already well established in other parts of Latin America and Africa.

Notes

1. The US embargo, which was imposed as executive action by President Eisenhower in 1960, has since been taken over by Congress in the Helms-Burton Act of 1995. This means that the president cannot unilaterally lift the embargo; only Congress has the power to do so. The act also imposed sanctions on third countries doing business with Cuba if they wanted also to do business with the USA. As Stipulated by the embargo, Cuba remained on the US list of terrorist-sponsoring nations, along with Syria, Iran and Iraq, until a few weeks ago . While Cuba remains on the list, US banks cannot extend credit or open up branches in Cuba, and US credit cards are not accepted. Thus one of the great burdens and risks of American tourists and study abroad programs such as the one I directed for Brown University is that most businesses are transacted in cash. (Exceptions can be granted by the US Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control, which enforces the embargo. From the Cuban perspective, the embargo is called a "blockade."
2. The Chinese restaurant that the sisters operate in Chinatown, named in true Orientalist fashion Los Dos Dragones (The Two Dragons), belongs to the Zhongshan Association. As with all surviving *huiguan* in Havana Chinatown, the association owns and operates restaurants that sell a mixture of Cuban and Chinese food, from pizza to fried rice.

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CHAPTER 17

The Making of New Chinese Immigrants in Canada

Eva Xiaoling Li and Peter S. Li

Introduction

Canada is home to about 1.5 million Chinese (Statistics Canada 2011a), who have settled either in their own generation or in past generations but trace or claim their ancestry to Chinese. Historically, most Chinese in Canada were from China's southern provinces of Guangdong and Fujian, but from the end of World War II to the 1980s, Hong Kong became the main source. The term "new Chinese immigrants" refers to those who have immigrated from the People's Republic of China (PRC) to Canada since the 1980s. Throughout the 1980s, direct immigration from the PRC to Canada was relatively limited. Since the mid-1990s, however, the PRC has replaced Hong Kong as the main source. In the 24-year period between 1990 and 2014, 647,728 immigrants from the PRC arrived in Canada, according to official statistics.

This chapter raises two questions. First, what forces explain the rise in the number of new Chinese immigrants in Canada? Second, how have they performed in the country's labor market since their arrival?

Two main factors account for the rapid increase in the number of new Chinese immigrants in Canada. The first has to do with the country's growing emphasis on admitting immigrants with educational credentials

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and skills as a means of strengthening the information-based economy. The second relates to China's reform of the university system after the 1990s, which resulted in a substantial increase in university enrolment over a short period of time. The oversupply of university graduates in China, and the rising number going abroad to study and remaining abroad, created a surplus pool of highly trained potential workers which easily met the new immigration demands of Canada and other developed countries. Thus the combination of Canada's demand for highly trained workers and China's abundant supply of university graduates produced the conditions that facilitated the rise of the new Chinese in Canada.

To address the two questions, this chapter makes use of several types of data. The first is based on landing records of immigrants collected by Citizenship and Immigration Canada that have background information on all immigrants who have landed in Canada. The second type is from the Census of Canada up to 2006, and, after 2006, the 2011 Canada Household Survey, a national survey used to collect the detailed information formerly covered in the national sample of the census. The census data are used to estimate the economic performance of the new Chinese immigrants compared with other types of Chinese immigrant who immigrated from elsewhere and at other times. China's university enrolment data are also used to show the growing supply of university graduates in China.

Landing data in Canada indicate that the new Chinese immigrants from the PRC who came to Canada between 1990 and 2009 were better educated and younger than their predecessors, and more likely to be admitted under the economic class. The 2011 National Household Survey indicates that there were 653,012 Chinese, measured by Chinese visible minority status, in the Canadian labor force. Of these, 21 % were Canadian-born Chinese Canadians, 24 % were Chinese immigrants who came to Canada before 1990, and 54 % were Chinese immigrants who immigrated between 1990 and 2009. In Canada's 2011 labor force, PRC-born immigrants accounted for 29 % of those who moved to Canada before 1990 and 65 % of those who immigrated between 1990 and 2009. In short, PRC-born immigrants made up about two-thirds of Chinese who immigrated to Canada between 1990 and 2009 and participated in Canada's labor force in 2011.

The impact of PRC-born immigrants on the Canadian labor force is evident. About 60 % of these new Chinese immigrants were in middle-class higher-paying occupational groups including management, business, natural and applied sciences, health, and social sciences and education.

However, sales and service occupations continued to account for about a quarter of the new Chinese in Canada's labor market in 2010. The self-employment rate was higher among Chinese men (14.6 %) than among women (9 %), and Chinese employees earned more than Chinese self-employed persons in the case of both men and women.

Like other Chinese before them, the new Chinese immigrants tended to reside in the metropolitan centers of Canada; Toronto and Vancouver alone accounted for 72 % of all Chinese in the country (Lindsay 2001). Their arrival altered the social and economic composition of the Chinese community in Canada. Historically, Cantonese was widely used in the Chinese community but, after the 1990s, Mandarin was commonly adopted. Data on linguistic characteristics from the 2011 Census indicate that 25 % of the Chinese in Toronto and 30 % in Vancouver spoke Mandarin most often at home (Statistics Canada 2011b). *Singtao* and *Mingpao*, the two leading Chinese daily newspapers in Canada, frequently run advertisements for services provided in Mandarin and Cantonese. Professionals such as lawyers, real estate agents and automobile dealers often say in advertisements that they can provide both Cantonese and Mandarin language services. This further indicates the linguistic influence of immigrants from mainland China in the Chinese-Canadian community.

Chinatown has long ceased to be the area where most Chinese reside in the major metropolitan centers. The new Chinese immigrants, mostly middle class, tend to reside in more affluent areas of cities traditionally dominated by white Canadians. Affluent suburbs or areas such as Richmond in Vancouver and Markham and Richmond Hill in Toronto attract many middle-class Chinese as choice locations. Geared to the affluent Chinese clientele, the number of upscale restaurants and shops as well as professional services has grown rapidly in these areas. The arrival of new Chinese immigrants has contributed to an emerging image of an affluent Chinese community able to afford luxurious homes in desirable urban neighborhoods. In reality, despite their middle-class status, many new Chinese immigrants encounter obstacles in the Canadian labor market, such as difficulties in finding jobs to match their credentials and receiving remuneration lower than that of other Canadians.

Early Chinese Immigration and Racialization

The history of Chinese immigrants in Canada dates back to 1858 when gold mining shifted north from the USA's west coast to British Columbia. During the completion of the trans-Canadian railroad between 1881 and

1885, large numbers of Chinese workers were shipped from China to Canada. Economic development in British Columbia required a large labor supply. Fresh workers, mainly from south China, provided low-cost labor to satisfy the industrial needs of Canada's west. However, the Chinese in British Columbia quickly became racial targets of white workers and politicians, who sought to exclude them. When the Canadian Pacific Railway was completed in 1885, the federal government began to impose a Head Tax of $50 on every Chinese entering Canada. The Head Tax was raised to $100 in 1900 and to $500 in 1903. British Columbia imposed other restrictions on Chinese, barring them from various livelihoods and restricting their civic and political rights. Between 1886 and 1924, a total of $22.5 million in Head Tax was collected from 82,379 Chinese entering Canada (Li 1998: 42). From 1924 onwards, Chinese were essentially barred from entering Canada, until 1947. The Chinese population in Canada shrank from 46,519 in 1931 to 32,528 in 1951 (Li 1998: 67). The gender imbalance remained high during the exclusion period: the ratio of Chinese men to Chinese women was 12 to 1 in 1931 and 9 to 1 in 1941 (Li 1998: 67). As a result of the gender imbalance and the absence of fresh immigration, there was a serious delay in the growth of a second generation among the Chinese. As a result, the proportion of foreign-born Chinese remained high throughout the exclusion period: 88 % of the Chinese were foreign-born in 1931, 80 % in 1941 and 69 % in 1951 (Li 1998: 67).

Before the twentieth century, more than 90 % of the Chinese in Canada lived in British Columbia (Li 1998: 55). After 1901, the Chinese in British Columbia began to move east and settled in other provinces. The early Chinese were mainly manual workers. Records of the Chinese entering Canada between 1885 and 1903 indicate that most were workers and laborers, with merchants and shopkeepers making up fewer than 6 % (Li 1998: 24). In the face of racial discrimination and exclusion from many jobs in the mainstream economy, the Chinese community used improvised means to survive, retreating to the Chinese enclave, moving to ethnic businesses in the service sector, relying on voluntary organizations for self-help and revitalizing the image of Chinatown to meet white expectations (Li and Li 2011).

Restrictions on Chinese immigration were removed after World War II, and the Chinese in Canada began to gain civic and political rights. However, the migration of the Chinese to Canada, mainly through Hong Kong, was limited during the Cold War era. It was not until 1967 that Canada adopted a universal "points system" of immigrant selection, allowing Chinese immigrants to be assessed on the basis of equal criteria.

The 1970s and 1980s witnessed a surge of immigration from Hong Kong, which eventually peaked shortly before the return of Hong Kong to China in 1997 (Li 2005). Thereafter, immigration from mainland China began to rise, first slowly and then rapidly, after the 1990s (Li and Li 2008). Since the 1970s there has been a conspicuous growth in Canada's Chinese population. It was 124,600 in 1971, 633,933 in 1991, 1.03 million in 2001 and 1.22 million in 2006 (Li and Li 2011; Statistics Canada 2008). By 2011 the number of Chinese in Canada had reached 1.48 million (Statistics Canada 2011a).

Emergence of Canada's New Chinese Immigrants

Different waves of Chinese immigrants arrived in Canada over time, regulated by conditions in China and Canada's admission policy. These waves brought different types of Chinese, and the development of the Chinese community was shaped partly by Canada's policy of admission and integration of the Chinese and partly by the composition of the Chinese arriving there.

Three Waves of New Arrivals

Three types of Chinese immigrant arrived in Canada over time. From the second half of the nineteenth century until the end of World War II, the Chinese who migrated to Canada were mainly peasants and workers from Fujian and Guangdong. Between the end of World War II and the mid-1990s, Hong Kong was the main source. These post-war Hong Kong immigrants were more diversified in occupation than their predecessors. After the 1980s, immigrants from mainland China to Canada, many of them highly educated, began to replace those from Hong Kong. This latest wave produced what is often referred to as the "new Chinese immigrants" in the overseas Chinese population, to distinguish them from earlier waves.

The conclusion of World War II put an end to Canada's policy of excluding Chinese, and limited numbers, mainly relatives of those already in Canada, were allowed to enter. However, the Cold War of the 1950s and 1960s made direct immigration from mainland China difficult. Despite the establishment of formal diplomatic relations between Canada and the PRC in 1971, the volume of immigration from the PRC to Canada remained small in the 1970s and 1980s. Between 1968 and 1976, immigrants from Hong Kong accounted for more than two-thirds of the total number of

immigrants from Hong Kong, Taiwan and mainland China to Canada (Li 1998: 99).

Immigrant landing data indicate that the level of immigration from Hong Kong was several thousand annually in the early 1980s but began to rise after the mid-1980s, eventually peaking at more than 44,000 in 1994 before dropping to 22,000 in 1997 (Fig. 17.1). Thereafter, immigration from Hong Kong to Canada kept falling and remained insignificant, at a level of fewer than 1000 a year after 1999. In contrast, immigration from the PRC was below 5000 a year between 1982 and 1989 but rose to more than 14,000 in 1991, largely because Canada allowed several thousand visa students from the PRC at Canadian universities at the time to remain as permanent residents in Canada as a result of the 1989 student protest and crackdown in China. After 1993, the immigration level from the PRC continued to rise, reaching almost 20,000 in 1998 and more than 40,000 in 2001, before falling back to 33,231 in 2002. The number continued to exceed 36,000 in 2003 and 2004, and was more than 42,000 in 2005. The annual number of immigrants from the PRC has declined slightly since but



Fig. 17.1 Immigrants from the PRC and Hong Kong admitted annually to Canada by landing year, 1980–2009 (Source: Data from 1980 to 2009 compiled from microdata file of Permanent Immigrants Data System, 1980–2009, Citizenship and Immigration Canada; data from 2010 to 2013 updated from Facts and Figures: Immigrant Overview Permanent Residents, 2014, Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 2015)

remains at a relatively high level, close to 30,000 per year (Fig. 17.1). In the 24 years (1990–2014) after 1989, 647,728 immigrants arrived in Canada from the PRC, accounting for 11 % of the total number of immigrants admitted. Immigrants from Hong Kong made up only 4.6 % of Chinese immigrants to Canada between 1990 and 2014, and only 0.25 % of the total between 2000 and 2014.

Forces in the Making of New Chinese Immigrants

Immigrants to Canada are admitted under three broad categories: family class, economic class and refugee class (Statutes of Canada 2001).[1] Admissions under the family class are usually restricted to close family members of a resident or citizen of Canada, such as a spouse, common-law partner, child, parent or other prescribed family member. Economic-class admission is premised on education, labor-market skills, or financial or investment capacity. Refugees are admitted based on the United Nations' criteria of refugee or on humanitarian grounds. Between 1980 and 2000, the component of family-class immigrants made up about 36 % of all immigrants, and economic-class immigrants 46 % (Li 2003: 82). After 2000, the proportion of economic-class immigrants increased relative to the family class. Between 2001 and 2010, economic-class immigrants made up 55 % to 66 % of all immigrants annually while family-class immigrants declined to 22% to 27 % per year (Citizenship and Immigration Canada 2011).

Two forces, related to the rising demand for skilled immigrants in Canada and the oversupply of university graduates in China, explain the rise of new Chinese immigrants in Canada. The emergence of what is called the new economy or information-based economy has increased the demand for skilled workers in Canada. Virtually all jobs created in Canada in the 1990s were knowledge-based (Zhao 2000). Canada also faced the problem of a brain drain to the USA throughout the 1990s. However, it managed to bring in an even larger number of immigrants with university degrees to offset out-migration: a ratio of four immigrants coming to Canada to one lost to the USA (Zhao 2000). Thus admitting well-educated immigrants allowed Canada to recuperate its human-capital loss and to sustain continuous growth in the country's knowledge-based sectors. It responded to this rising demand by investing heavily in higher education (Zhao 2000) as well as by focusing more closely on the human-capital dimension of new immigrants.

Revamping Canada's immigration system at the beginning of the twenty-first century led to a growth in the number of economic-class immigrants—that is, those admitted on human-capital grounds and to

meet labor-market needs. Both the Immigration Act of 2001 (Statutes of Canada 2001) and the revised immigration regulations of 2002 (Privy Council 2002) reinforced immigrant selection on the basis of educational qualifications and work experience. The 2002 points system used to assess prospective immigrants allotted up to 70 of the 100 points to education, knowledge of languages and work experience, as opposed to 39 points in the old system (Li 2003: 41). Canada had been increasing the intake of economic-class immigrants ever since the late 1990s, even before the new system was implemented. Subsequent changes, including broadening the Provincial Nominee Program and introducing the federal immigration category of Canadian Experience Class to facilitate those on temporary visas to apply for permanent residency, further expanded the admission of skilled immigrants needed in the Canadian labor market (Li 2012).

Immigrant landing records indicate that between 1980 and 1986, annual economic-class immigrants made up 30 % to 40 % of all categories of immigrants admitted to Canada, although the percentage for immigrants from Hong Kong was larger (Fig. 17.2). From 1987 to 1994, economic-class immigrants accounted for 40 % to 50 %. After 1995, annual economic-class immigrants made up more than 50 %, and after 2007 more than 60 %,

Fig. 17.2 Percentage of economic class immigrants from the PRC, Hong Kong and other regions, as county of last permanent residence, admitted annually to Canada, by landing year, 1980–2009 (Source: Data from 1980 to 2009 compiled from microdata file of Permanent Immigrants Data System, 1980–2009, Citizenship and Immigration Canada)

of all immigrants arriving in Canada. This increase in the proportion of economic-class immigrants reflects Canada's growing emphasis on admitting immigrants with skills and credentials as it seeks to strengthen the information-based economy. Figure 17.2 shows that after 1993 the percentage of immigrants from the PRC admitted under the economic-class criterion rose rapidly every year, from 20 % in 1993 to 80 % in the early 2000s, and remained at a level of between 60 % and 70 % from 2002 to 2009.

As the share of economic-class immigrants rose over time, the proportion of immigrants arriving with a university degree also increased. Immigrant landing data indicate that those from the PRC were more likely to have a university degree than those from other regions. Figure 17.3 shows that before 1989, fewer than 10 % of immigrants from the PRC arrived in Canada with a university degree. The percentage of PRC immigrants with a degree rose sharply in 1990 and 1991, probably as a result of Canada accepting PRC students in Canada as permanent residents after the 1989 student protests. The number of PRC immigrants with a degree continued to grow proportionally after the mid-1990s, from 27 % in 1995 to 39 % in



Fig. 17.3 Percentage of immigrants with a university degree from the PRC, Hong Kong and other regions admitted to Canada by landing year, 1980–2009 (Source: Data from 1980 to 2009 compiled from microdata file of Permanent Immigrants Data System, 1980–2009, Citizenship and Immigration Canada)

1997, and to nearly 50 % in 1999, 2000 and 2001. From 2002 to 2009, the number of PRC immigrants with a degree declined but continued to account for 30 % to 40 % of all immigrants from the PRC annually. The proportion of university-educated immigrants from all sending countries has also been rising since the mid-1990s. However, the proportional increase for the PRC tended to be substantially larger for most years after the early 1990s.

China's University Graduates and Chinese Students as Potential Immigrants

The rise of the new Chinese immigrant in Canada was also facilitated by the growing supply of university graduates in China since the 1990s. China substantially modernized its higher-education system in the 1990s. The changes were essentially components of market reform to widen university funding options, including increasing direct state investment, decentralizing central financing, allocating more power to local governments, diversifying financing sources to allow universities to generate revenue, and shifting much of the financial cost to students (Li et al. 2007; Wang 2001). Along with changes in university financing, the state also stopped providing free university education and guaranteeing job assignment in 1997 (Li et al. 2007). Reforms in higher education resulted in universities accepting more students and raising tuition fees to generate revenue.

Before 1993 some 600,000 students graduated at undergraduate and postgraduate levels in China annually. By 2001 the number had increased to 1.1 million (Fig. 17.4). The number continued to skyrocket, rising to 2.5 million in 2004, 4.8 million in 2007, 6.5 million in 2011 and more than 7 million in 2014. Other sources indicate that the gross enrolment ratio for tertiary education in China increased almost by three times from 8 % in 2000 to 23 %, compared with a global increase from 19 % in 2000 to 26 % in 2007 (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 2009).[2]

Expansion in universities after the 1990s produced an abundant supply of university graduates every year. Even before the 2008 global financial crisis, employers' demand for new graduates in China increased only marginally while supply shot up, resulting in fresh undergraduate degree-holders facing a highly competitive job market (Chen 2004; Ding 2004). Prevailing market pressures compelled many university students to consider further study at home or abroad to increase their chances on the job market (Li et al. 2007).



Fig. 17.4 Number of students graduated from institutions of higher education, undergraduate and graduate levels, the PRC, 1985–2014 (Source: Data between 1985 and 2013 are from the *China Statistical Yearbook, 2014*, chapter 21, Education, National Bureau of Statistics, China Statistics Press; data for 2014 were retrieved from http://data.stats.gov.cn/english/easyquery.htm?cn=C01)

Data on the number of students from China going abroad to study and returning annually indicate a substantial pool of highly trained students remaining abroad (Fig. 17.5). Before the mid-1990s, fewer than 20,000 students went abroad annually, but by 2001 the number had reached 84,000, and by 2006 it was 134,000. After that the number rose rapidly to 229,000 in 2009, 400,000 in 2012 and 460,000 in 2014. In contrast, the number of students returning to the PRC annually rose at a much slower rate between 2000 and 2011 (Fig. 17.5). The space separating the two curves in Fig. 17.5 indicates the cumulative stock of students staying abroad as a result of the disparity between students going abroad from the PRC and returning home. Between 2002 and 2014, the difference between PRC students going abroad and returning added roughly 1.4 million students to the number of PRC students abroad.

Data on PRC students enrolled in Canada also indicate a rising trend since the 1990s. Between 1994 and 1999, visa students from the PRC in Canada numbered fewer than 7000 (Fig. 17.6). This increased to 29,739 in 2002, 40,021 in 2005, 50,446 in 2009 and 95,731 in 2013. Before



Fig. 17.5 Number of PRC students who went abroad to study and number returned annually, 1985–2014 (Source: Data between 1985 and 2013 are from the *China Statistical Yearbook, 2014*, Chapter 21, Education, National Bureau of Statistics, China Statistics Press; data for 2014 are retrieved from http://data.stats.gov.cn/english/easyquery.htm?cn=C01)



Fig. 17.6 Total number of international students from the PRC in Canada with a valid permit by year end, 1994–2013 (Source: Compiled from Facts and Figures, 2003 to 2013 (yearly), Temporary Residents, Citizenship and Immigration Canada)

the changes in immigration regulations in 2001 and 2002, international students who had completed their studies in Canada typically had to return to their home country if they wanted to apply for immigration. The changes in immigration regulations in early 2002 allowed them to apply for permanent residence in Canada after graduation. Thus international students became a fresh pool of human capital from which Canada could draw economic immigrants.

The number of university graduates in the PRC and of PRC students staying abroad has been growing since the mid-1990s. The surplus of university graduates, both graduates from the PRC and PRC students abroad, produced a pool of potential immigrants for Canada. A combination of Canada's renewed demand for human capital and China's surplus of university graduates created the conditions for a rise in the number of new Chinese immigrants in Canada.

PRC Immigrants in Canada's Labor Market

Between 1980 and 2009 more than 0.5 million immigrants from the PRC arrived in Canada, accounting for 51 % of all Chinese immigrants from the PRC, Hong Kong and Taiwan in this period (Citizenship and Immigration Canada 2010). However, between 2000 and 2009, PRC immigrants made up 89 %. The proportion going to Canada as economic-class immigrants also increased among PRC immigrants. For example, 43.4 % of those arriving in Canada between 1980 and 1999 were economic class. The number increased to 56.8 % between 1990 and 1999, and to more than 70 % between 2000 and 2009 (Citizenship and Immigration Canada 2010). This rise reflected the growing emphasis in Canada on admitting immigrants with credentials and skills.

Thus far, data for PRC immigrants to Canada are based on the PRC as the country of last residence, as recorded on landing records in Canada. The profile of PRC-born immigrants may also be constructed from the 2011 National Household Survey.[3] However, Canadian Census data, including this survey, report only immigrants' country of birth. Using the PRC as the country of last permanent residence produces a smaller number of PRC immigrants in Canada than does using the PRC as country of birth, especially for the 1980s and 1990s. The reason is that some PRC-born immigrants moved elsewhere, notably to Hong Kong, before immigrating to Canada.

Table 17.1 Number of PRC immigrants, landed in Canada, 1990–2009, estimated from Permanent Residents Data System, and National Household Survey

	Immigrants from the PRC as country of last permanent		
	Residence	*Birth*	*Birth*
Source of data	Permanent resident data system	Permanent resident data system	2011 National household survey
Date data collected	Landing year	Landing year	2011
Number landed in Canada, 1990–2009, all ages	497,041	557,145	392,403
% female	53.3	53.1	55.0
Mean age at landing	30.9	33.6	30.5
Mean age in 2010	39.4	42.8	39.4
% with university degree	37.7	34.6	41.0
% admitted under economic class	66.1	63.6	–
% destined to Toronto, Vancouver, Montreal	78.3	79.2	–
% residing in Toronto, Vancouver, Montreal, 2011	–	–	81.8
Number of PRC-born immigrants, 1990–2009 landed, ages 20–64 in 2010	–	–	293,273
Number of PRC-born immigrants, 1990–2009 landed, ages 20–64 in 2010 worked in non-primary sector with 2010 employment income	–	–	211,525

Source: Calculations based on microdata file of Permanent Residents Data System, 1980–2009, Citizenship and Immigration Canada, and microdata file of 2011 National Household Survey, Statistics Canada

Table 17.1 indicates the number of PRC immigrants in Canada in the period between 1990 and 2009 using different estimates. Landing data show that 497,041 PRC immigrants went to Canada between 1990 and 2009, based on the PRC as the country of last permanent residence, compared with 557,145 based on the PRC as the country of birth. However, the 2011 National Household Survey reported only 392,403 PRC-born immigrants for the same period. In short, about 70 % of PRC-born immigrants who immigrated to Canada between 1990 and 2009 may be retrieved from the 2011 National Household Survey. The

discrepancy can perhaps be explained partly by deaths and return migration of PRC-born immigrants.

Table 17.1 indicates that of the 392,403 PRC-born immigrants who landed in Canada between 1990 and 2009 and were still in Canada in 2011, 293,273 were between 20 and 64 years of age in 2010. Of these, 211,525 worked in non-primary sectors in Canada's labor market in 2010 and earned an income from employment. In other words, the participation rate in the non-primary sectors in Canada was 72 % among PRC-born immigrants between 20 and 64 years of age in 2010.[4]

Profiles of New Chinese Immigrants

Landing records show that the proportion of PRC immigrants going to Canada with a university degree increased from 5 % in 1980–1989 to 33% in 1990–1999, and to 40 % in 2000–2009. More recent immigrants from the PRC tended to be younger at the time of immigration. The mean age was 59.5 for immigrants who landed between 1980 and 1989, 45 for those between 1990 and 1999, and 35 for those between 2000 and 2009 (Citizenship and Immigration Canada 2010).

Data from the 2010 National Household Survey show that the average age of PRC-born immigrants was 30.5 at the time of landing and, at the time of the 2011 survey, 39.4, very similar to findings from the landing records. As expected, the 2011 National Household Survey indicates a higher proportion of PRC-born immigrants with a degree in 2011 (41 %) than the landing data, since the former was collected in 2011. By 2011, some immigrants may have obtained a degree after arriving.

Data from different sources confirm that PRC immigrants who came to Canada between 1990 and 2009 tended to be better educated, slightly younger than their predecessors at the time of immigration and more likely to be admitted as economic-class immigrants. The question remains as to how well these new Chinese immigrants perform in the Canadian labor market.

Table 17.2 shows the occupational distribution and selected labor-market features of PRC-born immigrants in non-primary sectors of Canada's labor market in 2010.[5] The data indicate that occupations in management, business, finance and administration accounted for about 27 % of PRC immigrants (Column 6 in Table 17.2). Another 24 % were in occupations related to health and to natural and applied sciences. In other words, more than half of the PRC immigrants were in these four

Table 17.2 Occupations and selected labor market features of PRC immigrants, landed in Canada 1990–2009, and in 2010 Canada labor force, non-primary sector, ages 20–64, by employment and self-employment status, and by gender

	Male		*Female*		*Total*	
	Employed	*Self-employed*	*Employed*	*Self-employed*		
	[1] %	*[2]* %	*[3]* %	*[4]* %	*[5]* *N*	*[6]* %
Occupations in:						
Management	8.2	31.3	5.6	23.8	19,703	9.4
Business, finance & administration	10.8	9.6	26.2	13.5	37,735	17.9
Natural and applied sciences	29.3	15.6	12.3	4.4	40,614	19.3
Health	1.7	3.8	7.7	8.2	10,380	4.9
Social Science, education, government service & religion	5.3	4.5	8.4	10.4	14,513	6.9
Art, culture, recreation and sport	1.5	2.4	1.9	4.4	3935	1.9
Sales & service	24.3	17.9	27.7	31.7	54,212	25.8
Trades, transportation & equipment operators	11.6	14.6	1.7	2.4	14,311	6.8
Processing, manufacturing & utilities	7.2	0.4	8.6	1.3	14,876	7.1
Total % by column	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0		100.0
All occupations (*number of cases*)	*88,263*	*15,131*	*97,232*	*9653*	*210,279*	
Selected labor market features						
% self-employed		14.6		9.0	11.8	
Mean employment/ self-employment income	$44,326	$25,293	$32,786	$17,138		

Source: Microdata file of 2011 National Household Survey, Statistics Canada

occupational groups. Sales and service occupations accounted for 25.8 % of occupations. This high concentration reflects the continuing importance of service and sales occupations among the Chinese in Canada. When the occupational distribution is classified by gender, and employment and self-employment status, the data show some similarities and differences among the four groups (Columns 1 to 4 in Table 17.2). For example, the first five occupational groups, consisting mainly of middle-class high-paying jobs, accounted for 60 % to 67 % of the Chinese, depending on gender, and employment and self-employment status. Sales and service occupations continued to account for more than a quarter of all jobs, except for men who were self-employed.

Income Level of New Chinese Immigrants

To assess the economic performance of PRC-born immigrants in Canada's labor market, their income is compared to that of immigrants from other regions who immigrated in the same period. Table 17.3 shows the mean yearly employment income for employees and self-employed persons for 11 immigrant groups from different countries and areas, separated by gender. Column 1 indicates that PRC male immigrants who were employees earned $1877 a year less than the mean income of $46,203 for all groups and $13,346 a year less than white immigrants from the USA and Europe. The income disparity between the two groups was $15,223 a year. PRC male employees earned less than those from Hong Kong, though at a much smaller magnitude of $3824 a year, but more than those from the Philippines, West Central Asia, the Middle East, Central and South America, Africa and some parts of Asia. Female employees from the PRC earned less than white female employees from the USA and Europe, but since women tend to have a lower income than men, the difference was smaller, at $6598 a year. PRC female employees earned $3824 less than their counterparts from Hong Kong but more than those from most parts of Asia, Central and South America, and Africa.

Self-Employment among New Chinese Immigrants

Historically, Chinese immigrants entered self-employment to avoid unequal competition in the labor market, although it has been suggested that

Table 17.3 Actual mean yearly employment income of PRC immigrants and other immigrant groups, landed in Canada 1990–2009, and in 2010 Canada labor force, non-primary sector, ages 20–64, for employees and self-employed persons, and by gender

	Dollars above (+) or below (−) grand mean			
	Employed		*Self-employed*	
	Male	*Female*	*Male*	*Female*
	[1]	*[2]*	*[3]*	*[4]*
Immigrant groups				
White, USA and Europe	13,346	6726	7054	2043
White, other area	9644	3707	11,259	10,573
PRC	−1877	128	−7119	−5154
Hong Kong	1947	3952	−2670	−3723
Philippines	−6558	1254	1686	1186
India	1152	−1886	−185	−2469
West Central Asia and Middle East	−2909	−5243	−6420	6193
Central and South America	−6039	−2025	−6115	−3662
Africa	−2867	−2866	−4146	19,623
Other Asia	−7071	−5917	−984	−4303
Other	−5652	1313	1588	13,173
Grand mean (all groups)	46,203	32,659	32,412	22,292
Number of cases	794,950	778,766	112,568	54,875

Source: Microdata file of 2011 National Household Survey, Statistics Canada

immigrant enclave businesses in more recent times may bring lucrative economic opportunities for immigrant entrepreneurs (Li 2000).

The 2011 National Household Survey indicates that the Chinese self-employment rate tended to be higher among men than women; 14.6 % of PRC-born men, compared with 9 % of women, were self-employed. Those who worked for pay earned more than those who were self-employed. The mean income was $44,326 a year in 2010 for male employees and $25,293 for self-employed men. Female employees earned $32,786, about 25 % lower than their male counterparts, but higher than self-employed women, who earned only $17,138 a year. For PRC male immigrants, those who were self-employed earned $19,033 less than their counterparts who were employed. Self-employed women from the PRC also earned $15,012 less than female employees from the PRC.

Self-employed PRC immigrants earned less than immigrants from other places, as shown in Table 17.3. For example, PRC male self-employed immigrants earned $14,173 a year less than white immigrants from the USA and Europe, $18,368 less than white immigrants from other regions, and $4449 less than those from Hong Kong. Female self-employed immigrants from the PRC also earned $7197 less than white female immigrants from the USA and Europe, and $15,727 less than white female immigrants from other regions, but only $1431 less than their counterparts from Hong Kong.

The relatively high rate of self-employment among new Chinese immigrants who arrived in Canada between 1990 and 2009, and their lower returns to self-employment as compared to the Chinese who worked for pay, suggests that some new Chinese immigrants probably chose self-employment as an alternative to employment as a result of employment obstacles in Canada's labor market. That self-employed Chinese immigrants, men and women, earned less than immigrants from other regions who entered Canada in the same period indicates that even in self-employment new immigrants from the PRC faced marked inequalities.

Income Disparity between PRC Immigrants and White Immigrants

The yearly income difference between PRC immigrants and other immigrants has two probable sources. The first has to do with the fact that different immigrant groups have, on average, different levels of schooling; the number of weeks worked in a year; the length of time in Canada within the landing period of 1990 to 2009; and other factors. The difference in the distribution of these factors across incomes will result in different income levels. The second source has to do with different groups having unequal returns to the same level in each factor. For example, a percentage increase in immigrants with a bachelor's degree may increase the average income of white immigrants more than that of PRC immigrants, in the same way as a university degree may bring a higher return for men than for women. Thus the income difference between two groups may be partitioned into two components: an explained difference resulting from differences in levels of influencing variables, and an unexplained difference owing to unequal returns.

To further explore the components of income disparity, the employment income of PRC immigrants is compared with that of white immigrants from

the USA and Europe. The former may be seen as an income-disadvantaged group, while the latter is an advantaged group.

The mean (for scale variables) or proportion (for variables coded 0 and 1) of the following variables are given in Table 17.4 for male immigrants and Table 17.5 for female immigrants:

1. The highest level of schooling (13 categories, omitted “no certificate, diploma or degree”);
2. The number of weeks worked in 2010 (6 categories, reference category “1 to 9 weeks worked”;
3. Worked full time or not in 2010 (2 categories, reference category “part time”)
4. The number of years in Canada since landing (scale variable)
5. The age at immigration (scale variable)
6. The city of residence (4 categories, reference category “other cities or areas”)

The first two columns of Table 17.4 show the mean or proportion of different variables for white male employees from the USA and Europe, and male employees from the PRC. The figures indicate similarities and differences in the mean or proportion of variables. For example, both groups had about 16 % with a high-school diploma as the highest level of schooling, but white immigrants from the USA and Europe had 8.1 % with medical degrees and 13.9 % with master’s degrees, compared with 4.0 % with medical degrees and 18.2 % with master’s degrees in the case of PRC immigrants. PRC immigrant employees were more likely to reside in Toronto and Vancouver, and they had on average 1.7 years less experience in Canada since landing than white employees. Similarly, white male self-employed persons from the USA and Europe and male self-employed persons from the PRC show both differences and similarities in variables (Columns 3 and 4 in Table 17.4). PRC self-employed men were more likely to have a bachelor’s degree or master’s degree than white self-employed men, but the former had spent, on average, two years less in Canada since landing and tended to immigrate to Canada when two years older. Undoubtedly, differences in the mean and proportion of variables for the two groups produce some of the differences in average income.

Table 17.5 also indicates differences in the mean and proportion for female immigrants in the two groups. PRC female employees were more

Table 17.4 Mean (or proportion) of variables for USA and Europe white immigrants and PRC immigrants, landed in Canada 1990–2009, and in 2010 Canada labor force, non-primary sector, ages 20–64, male

	Male employed		*Male self-employed*	
	US and Europe white immigrants	*PRC immigrants*	*US and Europe white immigrants*	*PRC immigrants*
	[1]	*[2]*	*[3]*	*[4]*
High school diploma	0.1659	0.1624	0.1952	0.1800
Trades certificate or diploma	0.0491	0.0092	0.0769	0.0214
Registered apprenticeship certificate	0.0451	0.0121	0.0396	0.0171
<1 year non-university certificate/diploma	0.0093	0.0033	0.0024	0.0064
1–2 years non-university certificate/diploma	0.0668	0.0224	0.0598	0.0171
>2 years non-university certificate/diploma	0.0908	0.0380	0.1125	0.0296
University certificate/ diploma below bachelor	0.0553	0.0743	0.0624	0.0893
Bachelor's degree	0.2103	0.3146	0.1727	0.3370
University certificate/ diploma above bachelor's	0.0677	0.0312	0.0668	0.0278
Medical degree	0.0081	0.0040	0.0157	0.0043
Master's degree	0.1388	0.1822	0.1116	0.1363
Earned doctorate degree	0.0389	0.0522	0.0228	0.0278
10–19 weeks worked	0.0421	0.0579	0.0238	0.0536
20–29 weeks worked	0.0535	0.0629	0.0617	0.0642
30–39 weeks worked	0.0460	0.0601	0.0856	0.0961
40–48 weeks worked	0.1643	0.1846	0.2793	0.2643
49–52 weeks worked	0.6770	0.5940	0.5377	0.4874
Worked full time or not	0.9098	0.8852	0.8680	0.8479
Number of years in Canada since landing	10.7314	9.0599	11.5990	9.5745
Age at immigration	28.9752	31.1429	31.1861	33.4437
Montreal	0.1898	0.0646	0.1758	0.0795
Toronto	0.4187	0.4792	0.4893	0.5177
Vancouver	0.1086	0.2661	0.1218	0.3190
Mean employment income	59,558	44,318	39,423	25,293
Weighted N	142,052	88,197	26,997	15,132

Source: Microdata file of 2011 National Household Survey, Statistics Canada

Table 17.5 Mean (or proportion) of variables for USA and Europe white immigrants and PRC immigrants, landed in Canada 1990–2009, and in 2010 Canada labor force, non-primary sector, ages 20–64, female

	Female employed		*Female self-employed*	
	US and Europe white immigrants	*PRC immigrants*	*US and Europe white immigrants*	*PRC immigrants*
	[1]	*[2]*	*[3]*	*[4]*
High school diploma	0.1447	0.1648	0.1025	0.1389
Trades certificate or diploma	0.0372	0.0137	0.0612	0.0235
Registered apprenticeship certificate	0.0131	0.0097	0.0197	0.0067
<1 year non-university certificate/diploma	0.0194	0.0098	0.0144	0.0139
1–2 years non-university certificate/diploma	0.0903	0.0396	0.0887	0.0302
>2 years non-university certificate/diploma	0.0990	0.0600	0.0693	0.0579
University certificate/ diploma below bachelor's	0.0738	0.1063	0.0928	0.1281
Bachelor's degree	0.2580	0.3156	0.2310	0.3256
University certificate/ diploma above bachelor	0.0697	0.0315	0.0566	0.0134
Medical degree	0.0111	0.0113	0.0332	0.0168
Master's degree	0.1260	0.1212	0.1865	0.1162
Earned doctorate degree	0.0204	0.0152	0.0197	0.0067
10–19 weeks worked	0.0581	0.0749	0.0257	0.0848
20–29 weeks worked	0.0686	0.0803	0.0870	0.0772
30–39 weeks worked	0.0591	0.0687	0.0757	0.0973
40–48 weeks worked	0.1653	0.1658	0.2266	0.1795
49–52 weeks worked	0.6134	0.5620	0.5451	0.5085
Worked full time or not	0.7736	0.7870	0.6118	0.6625
Number of years in Canada since landing	11.0686	9.0262	11.1328	9.2014
Age at immigration	27.7461	30.1864	31.6695	32.2265
Montreal	0.1787	0.0667	0.1792	0.1174
Toronto	0.4546	0.4718	0.5247	0.4960
Vancouver	0.1146	0.2702	0.1243	0.3182
Employment income	39,309	32,818	24,916	17,090
Weighted N	139,709	97,232	13,173	9654

Source: Microdata file of 2011 National Household Survey, Statistics Canada

likely to reside in Toronto and Vancouver, and were two years older than white employees from the USA and Europe at the time of immigration. PRC self-employed women were more likely to have a bachelor's degree but less likely to have a master's degree, and had also spent two years less in Canada since landing than their white counterparts.

To assess the differences in returns of variables, separate regressions are used to estimate the coefficients for PRC immigrants and white immigrants from the USA and Europe, controlling for employment and self-employment as well as for gender (Appendix 1). The regression coefficients for men are reported in Appendix 2 and those for women in Appendix 3.

The data show that the returns for some variables were much higher for white male employees than for employees from the PRC (Columns 1 and 2 in Appendix 2). For example, holding other variables constant, the returns on a medical degree were $57,387 and those on a doctorate were $60,613 for white male employees, compared with $32,274 on a medical degree and $42,818 on a doctorate for male employees from the PRC. Residing in Toronto and Vancouver brought a lower return for PRC male employees than for white male employees, and age at immigration also brought unequal returns. White male employees working full time earned $30,679 more than part-time workers, while PRC male employees working full time earned $14,954 more than their part-time counterparts. A comparison of regression coefficients also indicates similar differences between the two male self-employed groups, with white self-employed men having higher returns in many similar variables than self-employed men from the PRC.

The data also show higher returns for many variables for white female employees compared with female employees from the PRC (Columns 1 and 2 in Appendix 3). Advanced degrees in general and working full time brought higher returns for the former group, and residing in Toronto and Vancouver brought lower returns for the latter group. For self-employed persons, a medical degree and a doctorate still brought higher returns for white women than for women from the PRC, but a master's degree yielded a higher return for the latter. Residing in the three metropolitan centers brought higher returns to PRC self-employed women, but working full time produced lower returns for them than for white self-employed women.

Given the data, it can be concluded that the income disparity between white immigrants from the USA and Europe and immigrants from the PRC came from two sources: differences in levels of variables as given in Tables 17.4 and 17.5, and differences in returns on variables as given in

Appendices 2 and 3. Using the Blinder–Oaxaca method of decomposition (Blinder, 2003; Oaxaca, 1973), the income difference between the two groups can be divided into (1) explained differences owing to unequal levels and (2) unexplained differences owing to differential returns.

Using the values of mean in Tables 17.4 and 17.5 and the regression coefficients in Appendices 2–4, the income difference between white immigrants from the USA and immigrants from the PRC for male employees, male self-employed, female employees and female self-employed are decomposed into explained and unexplained differences (Appendix 1).

The decomposition indicates that white male employees earned $15,240 a year more than male employees from the PRC. Unequal levels of variables in the two groups accounted for minus $2613, and differences in returns produced a difference of $17,856 a year. In other words, the PRC immigrants actually had higher levels in some variables than white immigrants that produced a compensatory effect to offset the total income disadvantage resulting from unequal returns. Put another way, having higher levels in some variables allowed PRC immigrants to make up some income disadvantages. Otherwise the income inequality would have been even greater. It can be concluded that the entire income disparity (100 %) between white male employees and male PRC employees can be attributed to unexplained differences arising from unequal returns.

For male self-employed persons, 84 % of the total income difference of $14,130 between the two groups was the result of an unexplained difference, while 16 % of the income difference had to do with unequal levels of variables or an explained difference. For female employees, 68 % of the difference of $6491 came from an unexplained difference, and 32 % from differences in variable levels. Finally, 89 % of the income difference of $7826 between self-employed women from the USA and Europe and PRC self-employed women had to do with an unexplained difference resulting from unequal returns.

Thus only a small part of income difference between white immigrants from the USA and Europe and immigrants from the PRC can be attributed to the way influencing variables are distributed in the two groups or to unequal levels in various variables for the two groups. Most of the income differences have to do with unexplained differences arising from unequal returns.

The question of what unequal returns means is often difficult to answer. In this comparison, unequal returns in credentials may be understood as PRC immigrants who have the same level of credentials not receiving the

same returns in income as white immigrants from the USA and Europe. Such a difference may be because the credentials of PRC immigrants are not valued in the same way in the Canadian labor market as credentials of immigrants from the USA and Europe, or owing to discrimination against PRC immigrants as a result of race, accent and fluency in the official languages. It has been pointed out that the problem of foreign credential devaluation in Canada goes beyond just credentials, since the racial features of holders of credentials often become inseparable from their credentials in the course of being evaluated in the labor market (Li 2001, 2008). Similarly, lower returns as a result of higher concentration in the metropolitan centers of Vancouver and Toronto suggest that local racial sentiment in cities of high Chinese concentration might negatively affect the labor market returns for Chinese immigrants, or might indicate keener competition and lower wages among these individuals in the immigrant enclaves of large cities.

It is not clear how new Chinese immigrants cope with unequal conditions in Canada's labor market. Their high rate of self-employment despite lower returns than other self-employed immigrants suggests that some new Chinese immigrants might be using self-employment as an adaptive strategy to avoid even more unfavorable conditions of employment. Other indications suggest that the new Chinese immigrants face harsh criticism in metropolitan centers such as Toronto and Vancouver, where housing prices have risen quickly in recent years, and where public demand for controls on "foreign" ownership has mounted.

Conclusion

Since the 1990s, a new wave of Chinese immigrants from the PRC has arrived in Canada, and the PRC, and not Hong Kong, has become the main source of Chinese immigration. The new Chinese immigrants tend to be better educated and more likely to be admitted into Canada as economic immigrants than their predecessors. They also tend to be more diverse in terms of place of origin and occupational background. Like other Chinese in Canada, new Chinese immigrants are likely to live in Vancouver and Toronto. The rise of this new wave of Chinese immigration has been assisted by two forces: Canada's rising demand for skilled labor in the information age and China's graduate surplus as a result of the higher education reform.

Despite arriving with better credentials than their predecessors, the new Chinese immigrants receive less income than white immigrants. When the employment income of new immigrants from mainland China was

compared with that of immigrants from other regions and countries, as listed in Table 17.3, new Chinese immigrants from mainland China fared slightly worse than immigrants from Hong Kong but much better than immigrants from Asia, the Middle East, Central and South America, and Africa. Yet they tended to do much worse than white immigrants from the USA, Europe and other regions.

A detailed decomposition of the factors that cause these differences indicates that the main source of the disparity (controlling for gender, and employment and self-employment status) is unequal returns that cannot be explained by differences in human capital and other variables in the analytical model. Intergroup differences in the distribution of education and other relevant factors account for only a small proportion of the income disparity.

Despite good credentials and relative youth at the time of arrival, new Chinese immigrants were disadvantaged in Canada's labor market compared with white immigrants from the USA and Europe. It is not entirely clear what the exact sources of income disadvantage were, but they were probably related to race, foreign credentials and language. These factors probably combine to produce complex racial inequality in the labor market. The level of educational credentials of PRC immigrants, combined with other features, produced some compensatory effects for the PRC male immigrant employees, without which the income disadvantage would have been greater.

Meanwhile, the arrival of substantial numbers of immigrants from the PRC since the 1990s has altered the composition of the Chinese community in Canada. Affluent residential areas traditionally occupied by white Canadians are becoming choice locations for many new Chinese immigrants. Suburbs such as Richmond in Vancouver and Markham and Richmond Hill in Toronto now have high concentrations of the Chinese, with expensive Chinese restaurants, shops and professional services. The Mandarin language has also become popular in the Chinese community of Canada as businesses and service workers cater to the new clientele. At the same time, there are emerging signs that the Chinese newcomers are largely being blamed for driving up house prices in major metropolitan centers to the point that houses have become unaffordable for average Canadians. There are also occasional complaints about the rapid growth of Chinese businesses in heavily Chinese neighborhoods. Complaints focus on issues such as "traditional" Canada rapidly being changed by Asian immigrants and the "excessive" use of Chinese language by Chinese businesses in public signs. As more Chinese immigrants arrive in Canada from the PRC, the Chinese community will continue to be shaped and reshaped, and public reactions to their presence will likely continue.

Finally, as Canada continues to rely on the new economy, its demand for immigrants with professional and technical skills is likely to increase. Thus far the PRC has furnished Canada with a substantial supply of university-educated immigrants, partly as a result of an abundance of university graduates in China and the large number of Chinese students going abroad to study. However, as China's transitional economy continues to undergo restructuring, its demand for professional and technical workers will also increase, and the improved remuneration offered to highly skilled professionals will persuade more Chinese to stay. The continuing improvement in economic opportunities in China and the persistence of income inequality for new Chinese immigrants in Canada may trigger return migration and a slowing down of future Chinese immigration to Canada.

Appendix 1. Regression Models and Method of Decomposition

The mean income of white immigrants from the USA and Europe and that of PRC immigrants, controlling for employment and self-employment status, and gender, may be expressed as follows:

$$\bar{Y}^{US,Europe} = a^{US,Europe} + \sum \left(b_i^{US,Europe}\bar{X}_i^{US,Europe}\right) \quad (1)$$

$$\bar{Y}^{PRC} = a^{PRC} + \sum \left(b_i^{PRC}\bar{X}_i^{PRC}\right), \quad (2)$$

where $a^{US,Europe}$ and a^{PRC} are regression intercepts; $\bar{X}_i^{US,Europe}$ and $\bar{X}_i^{PRC}$ are the mean of variable X_i for the two respective groups; and $b_i^{US,Europe}$ and b_i^{PRC} are regression coefficients associated with X_i for the two groups.

Subtracting Eq. 2 from Eq. 1 gives the total income difference between the groups as follows:

$$\begin{aligned}
&\bar{Y}^{US,Europe} - \bar{Y}^{PRC} \\
&= a^{US,Europe} + \sum \left(b_i^{US,Europe}\bar{X}_i^{US,Europe}\right) - \left[a^{PRC} + \sum \left(b_i^{PRC}\bar{X}_i^{PRC}\right)\right] \\
&= \left(a^{US,Europe} - a^{PRC}\right) + \sum \left(b_i^{US,Europe} - b_i^{PRC}\right)\bar{X}_i^{PRC} \\
&\quad + \sum b_i^{US,Europe}\left(\bar{X}_i^{US,Europe} - \bar{X}_i^{PRC}\right)
\end{aligned}$$

The first two components are differences owing to unequal returns; the last component measures differences owing to unequal levels of variables as follows:

$$\text{Explained difference} = \sum b_i^{US,Europe}\left(\bar{X}_i^{US,Europe} - \bar{X}_i^{PRC}\right)$$

$$\text{Unexplained difference} = \left(a^{US,Europe} - a^{PRC}\right) + \sum\left(b_i^{US,Europe} - b_i^{PRC}\right)\bar{X}_i^{PRC}$$

Appendix 2. Regression Coefficients on Employment Income for US and European Immigrants and PRC Immigrants, Male Employed and Male Self-Employed

	Male employed		*Male self-employed*	
	US, European immigrants	*PRC immigrants*	*US, European immigrants*	*PRC immigrants*
	[1]	*[2]*	*[3]*	*[4]*
Intercept	−23142.443	−18346.565	−23142.443	−18346.565
No certificate, diploma or degree (reference)				
High school diploma	−3698.266	5352.58	−3698.266	5352.58
Trades certificate or diploma	808.257	12376.838	808.257	12376.838
Registered apprenticeship certificate	1760.556	17636.208	1760.556	17636.208
<1 year non-university certificate/diploma	6853.875	18100.529	6853.875	18100.529
1–2 years non-university certificate/diploma	−1856.926	5383.262	−1856.926	5383.262
>2 years non-university certificate/diploma	1441.054	11443.024	1441.054	11443.024
University certificate/diploma below bachelor's	3264.984	15267.894	3264.984	15267.894
Bachelor's degree	21090.584	23213.501	21090.584	23213.501
University certificate/diploma above bachelor's	28203.972	32964.51	28203.972	32964.51
Medical degree	57386.77	32273.933	57386.77	32273.933
Master's degree	35225.516	36357.057	35225.516	36357.057

(*continued*)

Appendix 2 (continued)

	Male employed		*Male self-employed*	
	US, European immigrants	*PRC immigrants*	*US, European immigrants*	*PRC immigrants*
	[1]	*[2]*	*[3]*	*[4]*
Earned doctorate degree	60612.796	42818.253	60612.796	42818.253
Worked 1–9 weeks in 2010 (reference)				
Worked 10–19 weeks in 2010	−4332.248	1976.073	−4332.248	1976.073
Worked 20–29 weeks in 2010	5201.031	7334.847	5201.031	7334.847
Worked 30–39 weeks in 2010	3367.434	9774.074	3367.434	9774.074
Worked 40–48 weeks in 2010	20841.024	20792.51	20841.024	20792.51
Worked 49–52 weeks in 2010	27365.629	33381.226	27365.629	33381.226
Part-time work in 2010 (reference)				
Full-time work in 2010	30679.219	14953.581	30679.219	14953.581
Years in Canada since landing (scale variable)	832.165	887.966	832.165	887.966
Age at immigration (scale variable)	551.977	161.878	551.977	161.878
Resided in other areas (reference)				
Resided in Montreal	−17557.093	−14622.671	−17557.093	−14622.671
Resided in Toronto	−7408.04	−9022.756	−7408.04	−9022.756
Resided in Vancouver	2621.196	−13108.875	2621.196	−13108.875
R squared	0.137	0.288	0.137	0.288
Weighted N	142,052	88,197	142,052	88,197

Source: Microdata file of 2011 National Household Survey, Statistics Canada

Appendix 3. Regression Coefficients on Employment Income for US and European Immigrants and Regression Coefficients on Employment Income for US and European Immigrants and PRC Immigrants, Female Employed and Female Self-Employed

	Female employed		*Female self-employed*	
	US, European immigrants	*PRC immigrants*	*US, European immigrants*	*PRC immigrants*
	[1]	*[2]*	*[3]*	*[4]*
Intercept	−29919.748	−19680.22	19141.175	−22210.213
No certificate, diploma or degree (reference)				
High school diploma	9067.949	4143.369	−21826.165	11848.255
Trades certificate or diploma	7307.058	4249.67	−16675.208	16010.241
Registered apprenticeship certificate	7193.521	6430.063	−33668.486	−7249.264
<1 year non-university certificate/diploma	6723.737	10866.005	−15678.197	270.393
1–2 years non-university certificate/diploma	10113.838	11701.568	−21742.838	10985.479
>2 years non-university certificate/diploma	15716.02	8206.178	−7223.052	15876.964
University certificate/diploma below bachelor	16169.421	11386.545	−20253.867	8283.154
Bachelor's degree	23315.869	20786.518	−10263.863	16883.779
University certificate/diploma above bachelor's	26125.986	22077.889	−21580.157	9619.841
Medical degree	39553.874	30657.622	71341.18	1286.4
Master's degree	33406.297	31154.013	−7038.947	18608.326
Earned doctorate degree	44791.19	32515.69	16104.412	1684.856
Worked 1–9 weeks in 2010 (reference)				
Worked 10–19 weeks in 2010	4082.482	1020.038	5555.412	−2447.072
Worked 20–29 weeks in 2010	9917.052	5608.231	8472.108	4964.889
Worked 30–39 weeks in 2010	11943.844	8596.827	9586.668	14120.916
Worked 40–48 weeks in 2010	23294.084	15959.781	25629.204	9613.937

(*continued*)

Appendix 3 (continued)

	Female employed		*Female self-employed*	
	US, European immigrants	*PRC immigrants*	*US, European immigrants*	*PRC immigrants*
	[1]	*[2]*	*[3]*	*[4]*
Worked 49–52 weeks in 2010	29056.26	24151.544	16137.218	12564.955
Part-time work in 2010 (reference)				
Full-time work in 2010	19246.391	14771.6	11880.319	1977.42
Years in Canada since landing (scale variable)	789.043	891.121	221.407	1083.381
Age at immigration (scale variable)	200.025	149.063	−153.061	156.079
Resided in other areas (reference)				
Resided in Montreal	−6711.519	−9741.093	−17189.396	1692.075
Resided in Toronto	−1915.475	−2448.084	−2100.32	2214.615
Resided in Vancouver	−340.042	−7944.132	−3736.741	−256.706
R squared	0.235	0.305	0.229	0.106
Weighted *N*	139,709	97,232	13,173	9654

Source: Microdata file of 2011 National Household Survey, Statistics Canada

Appendix 4. Decomposing Employment Income Difference between US and European Immigrants and PRC Immigrants, for Male and Female Employed and Self-Employed

	Male employed	*Male self-employed*	*Female employed*	*Female self-employed*
	[1]	*[2]*	*[3]*	*[4]*
US and Europe immigrants' mean income: $Y^{US,\ Europe}$	59,558	39,423	39,309	24,916
PRC immigrants' mean income: Y^{PRC}	44,318	25,293	32,818	17,090
Difference in mean income: $Y^{US,\ Europe} - Y^{PRC}$	15,240	14,130	6491	7826

(*continued*)

Appendix 4 (continued)

	Male employed	*Male self-employed*	*Female employed*	*Female self-employed*
	[1]	*[2]*	*[3]*	*[4]*
Explained difference owing to distribution of levels of independent variables in the two groups	−2613	2284	2101	862
Unexplained difference owing to differential returns in unitary change of independent variables	17,856	11,842	4387	6964
% Income difference owing unexplained difference (or unequal returns)	100	84	68	89

Source: Calculated from Tables 17.4 and 17.5, Appendices 2 and 3

Notes

1. See Li (2005, 2008) for a more thorough analysis of these factors.
2. UNESCO defines Gross Enrolment Ratios or (GER) as "the total enrolment in a specific level of education, regardless of age, expressed as a percentage of the eligible official school-age population corresponding to the same level of education in a given year" (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organizations 2009: 193). For China, the number of students enrolled in post-secondary education in 2009 made up 23 % of the post-secondary school-age population in 2009, compared to 8 % in 2000.
3. In 2011 the Government of Canada replaced the compulsory Census long-form questionnaire with the non-compulsory National Household Survey. The data released under the 2011 National Household Survey are essentially the same as those released under recent past censuses, but the response rate tended to be lower in the 2011 National Household Survey. Statistics Canada releases a sample weight for each individual in the microdata file to compensate for non-responses in the 2011 National Household Survey.
4. When other variables are included in subsequent analysis, the number of PRC-born immigrants who immigrated to Canada between 1990 and 2009, ages 20 to 64 in 2010 and participated in Canada's labor market, non-primary sector, with employment or self-employment, may become slightly less than 211,525, owing to a small number of missing values in some variables.
5. Only 1003 PRC-born immigrants were in occupations unique to the primary sector in 2010. They were not included in the analysis.

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CHAPTER 18

Immigrant Entrepreneurship and Diasporic Development: The Case of New Chinese Migrants in the USA

Min Zhou and Hong Liu

From the very beginning of Chinese emigration, entrepreneurship has been a defining characteristic of overseas Chinese communities and a central force for diasporic development (Wang 1991; Zhou and Benton, this volume; Zhou and Liu 2015). In this chapter we contrast past and present trends of Chinese immigration to examine the link between ethnic entrepreneurship and diasporic development in the USA.

In our analysis, we use the concept of "diaspora" to refer to extraterritorial populations, including temporary, permanent and circular migrants, as well as their native-born descendants (Gamlen 2008). However, we are mindful that diasporas are not fixed in time and space and that they differ in changing contexts of exit and reception. We center our analysis on the role of ethnic entrepreneurship in diasporic formation and community development. We draw on data collected from two parallel research projects by us between 2008 and 2012 that included multisite fieldwork in the USA and China.[1] We argue that ethnic entrepreneurship enhances both an

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individual's economic and their sociocultural opportunities in diasporic communities. We first discuss the gaps in existing research and propose an alternative framework for analysis. Next we offer a historical overview of Chinese immigration into the USA. We then examine the effects of immigrant entrepreneurship on diasporic formation and development. We conclude by discussing the bearing that entrepreneurship has on migrant integration.

Causes and Consequences of Entrepreneurship: An Alternative Framework for Analysis

Existing research has identified cultural traits, ethnic solidarity, ethnic organization and a sojourning orientation as important cultural factors, and discrimination in the mainstream labor market, disadvantages associated with immigrant status (including lack of proficiency in the host society's dominant language and lack of transferable professional skills and educational credentials) and the availability of unpaid family labor or low-paid coethnic labor as key structural factors (Bates 1998; Bonacich 1973; Evans 1989; Light 1972; Portes and Zhou 1992; Waldinger 1986). Other macrostructural factors, such as market conditions (size of coethnic and non-coethnic consumer markets) and access to ownership, are also determining factors, even when host societies outlaw racism and racial discrimination (Aldrich and Waldinger 1990).

While the literature has generated more consensus than controversies on what causes ethnic entrepreneurship, there are disagreements. One point of difference is the preference for coethnic labor. Many contemporary ethnic entrepreneurs depend on non-coethnic immigrant workers. Another point of disagreement concerns opportunity structures. Instead of responding to existing host market conditions, many contemporary ethnic entrepreneurs proactively create new opportunities. For example, the availability of low-skilled immigrant labor allows prospective entrepreneurs to develop new businesses in the lines of work that have already been outsourced abroad, such as the garment industry, or previously taken up by unpaid family labor, such as gardening, housecleaning and childcare. The availability of highly skilled immigrant labor has also become a new source of entrepreneurship in the growing high-tech sector that redefines the mainstream economy (Saxenian 2006).

Regarding the effects, existing research addresses how ethnic entrepreneurship is associated with outcomes, most notably economic returns. Yet the findings are mixed. Some researchers demonstrate strong empirical evidence that ethnic entrepreneurship yields a significant earnings advantage over other forms of employment controlling for observable human capital and demographic characteristics among ethnic minorities (Goldscheider 1986; Portes and Bach 1985; Portes and Zhou 1996).[2] Others find that returns to human capital are significantly lower especially for immigrant groups that are highly skilled and more resourceful but lack English proficiency (Bates 1998; Borjas 1990). Nevertheless, there has been growing consensus on the findings about other positive effects. First, ethnic entrepreneurship creates job opportunities for the self-employed as well as for coethnic workers who would otherwise be excluded from the mainstream labor market (Butler 1991; Light 1972; Portes and Zhou 1992; Spener and Bean 1999; Zhou 1992). Second, ethnic entrepreneurship fosters an entrepreneurial spirit, sets up role models and offers training opportunities for prospective entrepreneurs within an ethnic community (Bailey and Waldinger 1991). Third, ethnic entrepreneurship buffers its impact on the larger labor market, relieving sources of potential competition among native-born workers and enhancing the economic prospects of group members as well as of out-group members (Portes 1994; Portes et al. 1999; Portes and Zhou 1996; Spener and Bean 1999; Zhou 2004a).

There are several gaps in the existing literature. First, it has often assumed that entrepreneurship is a forced choice for immigrants who have resettled in another country. We suggest that ethnic entrepreneurs, low- and highly skilled alike, do not react merely to constraints on the individual in the host country or unfavorable circumstances in the context of reception but also to multilayered opportunities in the diaspora, the homeland and the transnational social fields. Those with bicultural literacy, binational work experiences and access to transnational networks are more likely than others to act as agents to initiate and structure global transactions (Mata and Pendakur 1999; Popkin 1999; Portes and Guarnizo 1991). Second, the existing literature has focused on the role of entrepreneurship in individual outcomes but overlooked its effect on community formation and development. We suggest that ethnic businesses constitute the economic basis of the diasporic community and that immigrant entrepreneurs contribute to further strengthening that basis by growing the ethnic economy within and beyond the ethnic enclave. Third, the existing literature has overlooked the effect of diasporic development by way of entrepreneurship on migrants' integration



Fig. 18.1 Immigrant entrepreneurship and diasporic development: a framework for analysis

into the host society. Immigrants' active involvement with their homelands and sending states' enthusiastic promotion of transnational entrepreneurship among compatriots are regarded as creating barriers to integration.

We aim to address the gaps in the existing research by analyzing Chinese immigrant entrepreneurship in the USA. Figure 18.1 presents an alternative framework for analysis. We consider immigrant entrepreneurship to be an important driver for diasporic development, on which structural circumstances in both sending and receiving countries have an impact. Entrepreneurship, facilitated by transnational practice and promoted by homeland states, affects diasporic development both directly and indirectly. In turn, diasporic development positively affects migrant integration into the host society by generating economic and sociocultural opportunities.

Past and Present Trends in Chinese Immigration

The Old-Timers

The USA is home to the largest concentration of people of Chinese descent outside Southeast Asia. Size aside, it is an ethnically diverse but highly racialized society dominated by a white Anglo-Saxon Protestant culture with European Americans on top, African Americans and Native Americans at the bottom, and Latino and Asian Americans in between. Although assimilation was expected of immigrants from diverse backgrounds, Chinese

immigrants were excluded from assimilation for much of the period before World War II.

The history of Chinese immigration to the USA dates back to the late 1840s, initially as part of the global Chinese labor migration of the mid-nineteenth century. The trans-Pacific journey of Chinese laborers was largely financed by the credit-ticket system. Most of the old-timers hailed from villages of the Si Yi (Sze Yap) region, speaking Taishanese (a local dialect incomprehensible even to other Cantonese) in south Guangdong Province. In Hawaii, contract laborers worked on plantations (Chan 1994; McKeown 2001). In the US West, they first worked in mining, then on the transcontinental railroads and, subsequently, in select manufacturing industries (Chan 1994; Saxton 1971). A small group of merchants rose out of the labor migration process (Zhou and Kim 2001). Those who migrated to the USA mainly responded to the ethnic-specific demands for goods and services from coethnic laborers. This small merchant class nonetheless played an important role in diasporic formation in the USA (Wong 1988).

Chinese immigrants originally moved to the USA with the intention of staying for a limited time, but many could not afford to go home after their labor contracts ended because their low wages were barely enough to pay off debts while remitting to support families back home. They encountered a hostile host society. When mines were depleted, railroads were built and recession hit, they became easy scapegoats for economic distress. In the 1870s, “white” workers who experienced labor market insecurities and exploitation channeled their frustrations into racist attacks on the Chinese (Saxton 1971). The anti-Chinese movement contributed to Congress passing the Chinese Exclusion Act in 1882 (the exclusion of Chinese immigrant women stipulated in the Page Law had been implemented seven years earlier) (Chan 1994). The act prohibited the importation of Chinese labor for ten years and was subsequently extended indefinitely until it was repealed in 1943. The number of new immigrants from China plunged from 133,000 in the 1870s to a historic low of 5800 in the 1930s.

During the exclusion era, Chinese laborers and merchants were forced into an uneasy bond that transcended class. Anti-Chinese agitation, violence and legal exclusion pushed the Chinese into Chinatowns in major immigrant gateway cities such as San Francisco, Los Angeles, New York and Chicago. Chinese merchants, in contrast, continued to migrate legally because they were not excluded by law. However, they too were residentially segregated in urban Chinatowns and socially excluded from participating in the wider US economy and society, just like their working-class

coethnics. They used Chinatowns as a platform to launch their ethnic businesses, contributing to the formation of the ethnic enclave economy. They and their fellow workers were bonded by relationships aimed at securing mutual survival. Because US immigration laws allowed merchants to move transnationally, these individuals depended on transnational practices to grow their businesses.

The earlier diasporic Chinese community followed an organizational pattern similar to that of the diasporic communities in Southeast Asia, the center of the Chinese diaspora that concentrates three-quarters of the people of Chinese descent around the world outside China. In diasporic Chinese communities, one remarkable characteristic is the dominance of ethnic businesses, serving as the organizational base on which a range of ethnic associations (including family and kin associations, hometown associations and merchant-labor associations, or *tong*), the Chinese-language press and Chinese schools were established (Wong 1988; Zhou and Lee 2013). In the era of Chinese exclusion, the diasporic Chinese community in the USA displayed several distinctive features: (1) a small merchant class established a firm foothold at the outset of a Chinatown's formation; (2) organizations and interpersonal relations were based primarily on blood, kin or place of origin; (3) ethnic businesses were interconnected through a range of interlocking ethnic institutions that guided and controlled interpersonal and interorganizational relations; and (4) the ethnic enclave as a whole operated on the basis of ethnic solidarity internally and social exclusion by external forces (Zhou 2009). The century-old diasporic Chinese community in the USA was self-governed by an overarching organization called the Chinese Consolidated Benevolent Association.

Some 60 years of legal exclusion, between 1882 and 1943, turned Chinatowns into bachelor societies of adult males who were either single, or married with spouses who had remained in China. The shortage of Chinese women and the anti-miscegenation law that prohibited Chinese men from marrying white and other women stifled the formation of conjugal families and the natural reproduction of the ethnic population (Wong 2005). However, the contraction of immigration, combined with the "paper son" phenomenon,[3] gave rise to a small second generation, many of whom were children of merchants, that grew and became visible in Chinatown and came of age before World War II. Like their adult counterparts, the children of immigrants were also socially and culturally isolated from the larger society. Even those who had obtained a college education

experienced labor market discrimination and had to find jobs in their own ethnic enclaves (Chun 2004).

The Chinese Exclusion Act was repealed during World War II, but Chinese immigration remained insignificant because it was then subjected to an annual quota of 105, as stipulated in the National Origins Act of 1924. However, two groups of Chinese immigrants had entered in considerable numbers after the war and during the 1950s: 10,000 Chinese women who were the wives of US servicemen and more than 5000 political refugees (Daniels 2006). Chinese immigration did not pick up again until Congress passed the Hart–Celler Act in 1965. In the post-War and Cold War periods, Chinese Americans were cut off from all ties to their ancestral homeland. At the point of no return, the diasporic community gradually adjusted its sojourning orientation to become an ethnic community, and Chinese immigrants and their children were quietly assimilating into US life at the time of the immigration hiatus and the civil rights movements.

The New Arrivals

New Chinese immigration to the USA is a post-1979 phenomenon. From 1924 to 1965, US immigration was subject to the National Origins Act, which applied a per-country immigration quota based on the populations of the existing national-origins groups. The Act aimed to restrict immigration from Southern and Eastern Europe at the time when Asian exclusion legislation was already in place. With the lifting of legal barriers to Chinese immigration after World War II and the enactment of a series of liberal immigration laws after the passage of the Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1965 (also called the Hart–Celler Act), the Chinese American community had increased by 15 times, from 237,000 in 1960 to more than 3.8 million in 2010. As of 2015 the ethnic Chinese population (excluding the Taiwanese) grew further, reaching 4.76 million by official estimate.[4]

Much of this tremendous growth is the result of international migration. In 2013, China replaced Mexico as the top country of origin for immigrants to the USA. The rapid rise in Chinese immigration is due partly to US immigration policy reform and partly to China's open-door policy. Immigration from the People's Republic of China occurred only after December 1978 when the USA normalized diplomatic relations with China, and this accelerated after 1980. According to US immigration statistics, 314,896 immigrants were admitted to the USA from mainland China, Hong Kong

and Taiwan as permanent residents between 1960 and 1979. Only 10 % were from mainland China. In contrast, 1,813,312 were admitted between 1980 and 2010, nearly two-thirds (65 %) of them from mainland China. The total number admitted from 1960 to 2010 was almost five times the sum total admitted from 1850 to 1959. The 2013 American Community Survey (ACS) data also attest to the large part played by immigration. As of 2013, foreign-born Chinese accounted for nearly half of the ethnic Chinese population, 53 % of the foreign born who arrived after 2000, and 54 % of the foreign born who were naturalized American citizens (Hooper and Batalova 2015).

Post-1980 Chinese immigrants to the USA have diverse origins, unlike their earlier counterparts. Post-1980 Chinese immigrants are also much more diverse in their socioeconomic backgrounds than the old-timers. Some arrived in the USA with little money, minimum education and few job skills, which forced them to take low-wage jobs and settle in urban Chinatowns. Others came with family savings, education and skills far above the levels of the average American. The immigration of highly skilled Chinese is remarkable, especially along the student-turned-immigrant route. However, it is US businesses, rather than the government, that have been instrumental in pushing highly skilled migration. The path to permanent residency is more stringent in the USA as graduates must first secure employment there and have their employers sponsor their immigration. China sent more than 755,000 students abroad between 1978 and 2008, half of them to the USA. Less than 15 % returned. The events in Tiananmen Square in 1989 prompted the US Congress to authorize about 60,000 Chinese students and their families already in the USA to stay permanently (Zhou 2009). Passage of the H-1B legislation in the 1990s facilitating the hiring of highly skilled technicians and professionals by US firms further accelerated the flow. In 2002, for example, close to 19,000 temporary H-1B visas were granted to Chinese college graduates. They joined an additional 18,000 professionals and highly skilled workers admitted for permanent residence (Portes and Rumbaut 2006). Most highly skilled Chinese immigrants were former students studying in the USA. When they obtain their immigration visas through their US employers, most have already been in the USA for five years or more counting their time in graduate school.

Nationwide, levels of educational achievement among Chinese Americans have been significantly higher than those of the general US population since 1980 because of immigration selectivity. The 2009 ACS data showed

that half of Chinese Americans aged 25 and over had at least a college degree (25 % held postgraduate degrees), compared with 31 % of non-Hispanic whites; that 53 % of Chinese Americans aged 16 and over had a professional occupation compared with 40 % of non-Hispanic whites; and that median family income for Chinese American families was USD80,643, compared with USD69,531 for non-Hispanic white families. New Chinese migrants of diverse socioeconomic backgrounds tend to be spread out residentially. While major urban Chinatowns continue to receive new migrants, new Chinese communities have sprung up in suburbs to form ethnoburbs (Li 1997; Zhou et al. 2008).[5]

Immigrant Entrepreneurship and Diasporic Development

Demographic diversity and a more open host society allow new Chinese migrants to go beyond their traditional ethnic enclave to seek new routes to upward social mobility. While low-skilled immigrants and those without English proficiency continue to take the time-honored path of toiling at low-wage jobs in the ethnic enclave economy and moving up gradually into mainstream America, many highly educated Chinese immigrants have bypassed Chinatowns to obtain professional occupations and become incorporated into the US middle class. A significant proportion of the immigrants, both low skilled and highly skilled, have pursued entrepreneurship as their chief, or alternative, means of social mobility. The self-employment rate for adult Chinese parallels that of non-Hispanic whites. According to reports from the 2007 survey of business owners in the USA, Chinese-owned businesses there numbered 423,650, up 60 % from 1997. For every 1000 Chinese there were 140 Chinese-owned firms (compared with only 68 Filipino-owned firms, 52 African American-owned firms and 32 Mexican-owned firms for every 1000 coethnics). Chinese-owned firms, while mostly found in ethnic enclaves or ethnoburbs, offer professional services in law, finance, real estate, medicine and so forth, and are engaged in capital- and knowledge-intensive research and development in telecommunications, computer science, pharmaceuticals, biochemistry and biotechnology. For example, Yahoo! Inc., Computer Associates International (a Fortune 500 public firm specializing in computer technologies based in New York) and Watson Pharmaceuticals (a large public firm based in Los Angeles) were owned or founded by ethnic Chinese but are rarely considered ethnic businesses because the immigrant entrepreneurs successfully shed their ethnic distinctiveness and incorporated their businesses into the core of the mainstream economy. Both old

Chinatowns and new Chinese ethnoburbs serve as important centers for entrepreneurial development and ethnic life.

Entrepreneurship and Ethnic Organization

Immigrant entrepreneurship has served as the basis from which ethnic organizations emerge and grow. In the past, entrepreneurship was a force-choice strategy aiming at survival in a host society that excluded the Chinese. Old Chinatowns in the USA were dominated by an entrepreneurial class and a coethnic working class whose members were interdependent and bound up in tightly knit ethnic organizations. Traditional ethnic organizations, including family and kin associations, hometown associations and merchant-labor associations were originally developed as mutual aid societies (Liu 1998; Wong 1988; Zhou and Kim 2001).

New waves of Chinese immigration have grown and diversified the entrepreneurial class in the diasporic Chinese community. Particularly noteworthy is that a changing ancestral homeland has facilitated entrepreneurial growth beyond national boundaries. Since the late 1970s, the Chinese state has not only created an open and welcoming institutional environment but has also been proactively involved in transnational social fields. Some of the state-sponsored activities include building infrastructure to attract foreign capital investment, facilitate joint ventures and economic cooperation, and advance scientific, technological and scholarly exchange (Zhou and Lee 2013). For example, the Chinese government set up four special economic zones (SEZs) in 1980 in Guangdong and Fujian, home provinces to the majority of the people of Chinese descent all over the world, in order to tap into diasporic Chinese resources, and with great success. Between 1979 and 1987, 90 % of foreign capital investment in SEZs, mostly in labor-intensive manufacturing, came from the Chinese diaspora.[6] Since 2000 the Chinese state and local governments have changed the SEZ model to a knowledge-intensive development model, building hi-tech industrial development parks, science, technology, engineering, and mathematics laboratories, and other research and development facilities and crucibles to attract new generations of diasporic Chinese to invest in China. The hi-tech investors and technopreneurs have been disproportionately new Chinese migrants who have resettled in the USA and other economically advanced Western countries. The Chinese state has also attempted to reverse the brain drain through innovative programs and initiatives. Policy toward students abroad, which initially emphasized “return,” was relaxed in the 1990s to recognize

that returning to China is not the only way to serve the country. The Chinese government now considers returned students and scholars a leading force in areas such as education, science and technology, high-tech industries, finance, insurance, trade and management, and a driving force for the country's economic and social development (Zhou and Lee 2013).

Changes in contemporary Chinese immigration and homeland circumstances give rise to new patterns of ethnic entrepreneurship vastly different from those of the past. Although the ethnic Chinese economy in the USA is still marginal to the mainstream economy, ethnic entrepreneurs can capitalize on economic reform in China and the opportunities that come with it by way of transnational activities (Zhou 1992; Zhou and Lee 2013).

Entrepreneurial development results in the expanding and strengthening of the diasporic Chinese community. The arrival of new Chinese migrants of diverse socioeconomic backgrounds has not only replenished the membership of traditional Chinatown organizations in the USA but also given rise to a proliferation of new Chinese immigrant organizations in burgeoning ethnoburbs. Most of the ethnic Chinese organizations are transnational in outlook and practice. Although the Chinese government has become increasingly involved in transnational social fields, the vast majority of Chinese organizations have been created by immigrants' own initiatives (Zhou and Lee 2013).

Organizational development is distinct from that of the past. Three types of new organization are particularly remarkable: extended hometown associations, professional organizations and alumni associations. New Chinese immigrant organizations, regardless of type, tend to be more inclusive, recruiting members from diverse geographical and socioeconomic backgrounds. As such, their constituency is not bounded by primordial ties such as locality and kinship. For instance, new Chinese associations in the USA tend to be bicultural and take the form of a "unique hybrid" with a membership that is "resourceful, educated and literate in both Chinese and American cultures, and fluent in both languages" (Zhou and Kim 2001). The extended "hometown" associations are inclusive, with members who may have originated from all over China. The age-old concept of the "hometown" has been deterritorialized and transformed from representing a specific locality (e.g., a sending village or township) to being a cultural/ethnic symbol representing the Chinese from the mainland collectively and China as a nation-state (Liu 1998, 2012). Professional organizations are based on various professions, including science, engineering, medicine, law, and humanities and social sciences. Alumni associations are formed on the

basis of the colleges and universities and, to a lesser extent, high schools from which immigrants graduated in China.

The new Chinese organizations have the explicit dual goals of assisting immigrants to integrate into the host society and to maintain diaspora–homeland ties. However, even though many new ethnic Chinese organizations are not lodged in Chinatown or Chinese ethnoburbs, they remain distinctly ethnic. Moreover, we find that first-generation immigrants are more likely than US-born Chinese Americans to practice transnationalism across national borders, and that only a small number of new Chinese migrants routinely engage in entrepreneurial activities. Those who actively participate in transnational social fields tend to be the socioeconomically mobile—immigrant entrepreneurs in particular—who look to the ancestral homeland for *better* opportunities that would take them to a *higher* ground. Immigrant entrepreneurship, especially encouraged and enabled by economic opportunities in the homeland, becomes a choice among many and serves as one of the most effective alternative means to status attainment for those who choose it.

As in the past, community development is based on a complex array of business enterprises and organizations whose leadership is taken up by the entrepreneurial class. Responding to China's open door and economic reform, entrepreneurs are better positioned than individual migrants to engage in transnationalism because of their well-established and longstanding institutional position in the diasporic community. In turn, these entrepreneurs play an important role in community development.

Migrant Integration through Ethnicization

Migrant integration, or assimilation, refers to the process by which the characteristics of immigrant group members come to resemble those of natives in host societies. The USA is one of the largest countries in the world in terms of population and has the absolute dominance in global geopolitics and economy. It is founded in large part on the moral and philosophical wisdom of Christianity. At the founding of the nation, white Anglo-Saxon Protestants and their language and culture defined the national identity and the mainstream. For a long time in US history, the American nation promoted assimilation, or the severing of ethnic ties, among immigrants of different cultural backgrounds. However, racial minorities of non-European origins were excluded from the process.

Owing to major structural changes in the USA, such as civil rights movements, immigration reform and multiculturalism, the US mainstream is now redefined as one that encompasses "a core set of interrelated institutional structures and organizations regulated by rules and practices that weaken, even undermine, the influence of ethnic origins per se," that may include members of formerly excluded ethnic or racial groups, and that may contain not just the middle class or affluent suburbanites but the working class or the central-city poor (Alba and Nee 2003: 12). Even though the US mainstream is segmented by class, successful integration entails incorporation into the middle-class core, not into the segments of the mainstream occupied by the lower classes.

The US immigration reform of the 1960s brought about a massive influx of non-Europeans, but the state has implemented few policies to help integrate the country's newcomers. Integration is left entirely to market forces and immigrants' own efforts. Chinese immigrants and their US-born and US-raised children are experiencing a paradox in the process of integrating into US society. From my interviews with new Chinese migrants and organizational leaders, and from participant observation, I found that the majority of new Chinese migrants in the USA strive to get settled in US society and aspire to push themselves and their children to integrate. As time goes by and as the host society becomes more receptive to them, they grow roots in their new homeland, even if they retain strong ethnic identities. Mr. Zhang, one of the interviewees, who had been in Los Angeles for 25 years and worked in a software firm as an engineer, reported that, after both his parents passed away in China, he changed the verb *hui* (return) to *qu* (go) when he told people that he was going to China. He said:

> After my mother passed away [father had passed away a year earlier], I came to the realization that America is home. All these years, I grabbed, and created, any opportunity to go to China from work and spent most of my vacation time visiting my parents in China, and I went at least twice a year. … Now I can start planning our vacation trips to places around the world where my wife and I have never been to. And at work now, I'd try find excuses not to go China. It's a very long trip.

For Zhang, China suddenly became far away. Several other respondents whom I interviewed reported that, after their parents had passed away, they stopped making trips to their hometowns altogether. The experience of

growing roots in the hostland is not unique but shared by many with or without the intention of engaging in the transnational social field.

Although new Chinese migrants no longer look to China as a place to which they will eventually return, they are still drawn to the diasporic community for ethnic life. For them, their integration is intertwined with ethnicization. Zhang lived in a white middle-class suburb but would frequently go to Monterey Park, a Chinese ethnoburb less than ten miles away from downtown Los Angeles. He would also regularly participate in activities in his Chinese alumni association and professional association. He said he did so just to meet old friends and to "have a good time." Ethnic organizations offer alternative social spaces for immigrants in the USA, and organizational participation helps immigrants maintain their symbolic ties to their homeland and a sense of ethnic, rather than diasporic, Chinese identity, regardless of their occupation and the level of transnationalism (Zhou and Lee 2015).

Immigrant entrepreneurs play an important role in community-building. First, successful entrepreneurs or established professionals aspiring to become entrepreneurs are more actively involved in diasporic development through organization-building and participation (Portes et al. 2007; Portes and Zhou 2012). Leaders, rather than members, tend to use ethnic organizations as a means of building business partnerships or acting as "go-betweens" to better capitalize on economic opportunities. In many cases, leaders voluntarily form ethnic organizations and claim leadership roles in order to advance these self-interests (Zhou and Lee 2013). Once they firmly establish a foothold or reputation in the diasporic community, and earn the trust of Chinese government officials and entrepreneurs in China, they enter into partnerships with businesses on both shores to further promote entrepreneurial growth in the community. A member of an alumni association put it succinctly:

> You think they [the leaders] spend so much time and money for nothing? Oh no. An organizational leadership is a short-cut to power in China. With an organizational title and some legwork, you can get to meet high-ranking Chinese officials up close and personal. Otherwise, you cannot even make an appointment with the secretary of a local official.[7]

Second, immigrant entrepreneurship across national borders can open up better economic opportunities for immigrant entrepreneurs, contributing to local economic development by expanding existing businesses. It also

facilitates the flow of Chinese capital, making the enclave economy both local (linking to regional economies in the USA) and global (linking to the Chinese economy and beyond) (Zhou 2009; Zhou and Cho 2010).

Third, Chinese immigrant organizations are intrinsically linked to an ethnic enclave or ethnoburb—the physical or symbolic location of an American ethnic community. Growing entrepreneurship can stimulate organizational development as immigrants utilize organizations to advance their individual economic interests and meet their entrepreneurial aspirations. The proliferation of organizations in turn provides additional building blocks to reinforce the ethnic community's foundation and reaffirm a sense of ethnic identity among group members (Zhou and Lee 2013). For example, San Francisco's Chinatown, located in a low-income immigrant neighborhood, has continued to serve as a focal point for coethnic interorganizational and transnational engagement because of its longstanding institutional basis. When the Chinese government sends delegations to the USA, immigrant Chinese organizations serve as local hosts to Chinese guests by holding welcoming banquets in Chinatown or a Chinese ethnoburb that draw organizations and their members who may or may not lodge in the physical community. Likewise, Chinese professional organizations or extended homeland associations will hold regular meetings in Chinatown or a Chinese ethnoburb. Organizational involvement thus increases the basis for social capital formation beyond the physical community.

Members of the second generation, despite having attained levels of education, occupation and income equal to or even surpassing those of non-Hispanic whites and having, in many cases, moved near to or even married whites, still feel that they are not fully "American." As a Chinese American woman pointed out from her own experience,

> The truth is, no matter how American you think you are or try to be, if you have almond-shaped eyes, straight black hair, and a yellow complexion, you are a foreigner by default ... You can certainly be as good as or even better than whites, but you will never become accepted as white (cited in Zhou 2004b).

This remark echoes a commonly felt frustration among US-born Chinese Americans who detest being treated as immigrants or foreigners. Their experience suggests that the USA racializes its own people. Speaking perfect English, effortlessly adopting mainstream cultural values and even marrying

members of the dominant group may help reduce this "otherness" at the individual level but it has little effect on the group as a whole, which is associated with the foreigner image.

The China factor affects Chinese Americans. Transnational activities in Chinese America are very much a first-generation phenomenon. This is not merely because the members of the second generation have been thoroughly assimilated and lack bicultural and bilingual skills, but also because of the possible ramifications of delicate USA–China relations. The historical stereotypes, such as the "yellow peril" and the "Chinese threat," have found their way into contemporary US life, as revealed in the highly publicized incident regarding the trial of Wen Ho Lee, a Taiwanese-born nuclear scientist suspected of spying for the Chinese government in the mid-1990s (eventually proven innocent). Ironically, the ambivalent and conditional acceptance by US society has prompted Chinese Americans to align with other Asian Americans to organize pan-ethnically to fight back, which consequently heightens their racial distinctiveness while simultaneously distancing them from their ancestral homeland. But they must consciously prove that they are truly loyal Americans, especially in times when USA–China relations are in the spotlight. The pan-ethnic identity "Asian American" is invoked to distinguish themselves from their parent generation on the one hand and to assert themselves in US society on the other (Zhou 2004b).

Conclusion

Historically, Chinese immigrant entrepreneurship and Chinese diasporic communities were interconnected. Ethnic businesses and ethnic organizations constitute a key mesoinstitutional means of creating intraethnic and transnational links. These diasporic links have continued to be relevant in the age of globalization (Liu 2012). Based on the case of new Chinese migrants in the USA, we examine the relationships between immigrant entrepreneurship and diasporic development, and between diasporic development and migrant integration. We show that, while entrepreneurship has been a key defining characteristic of the Chinese diaspora, it is shaped by different circumstances of emigration in the sending country and migrant reception in the host country. We also show that immigrant entrepreneurship not only enhances an individual's economic opportunities but also creates sociocultural opportunities by way of diasporic development.

Immigrant entrepreneurship, as in the case of the Chinese in the USA, does not necessarily affect the group or the ethnic community in the same way as it does individuals or individual families, even when it boosts the rate of self-employment for the group. However, when entrepreneurship is linked to an existing enclave economy, the effect on the group becomes even more significant. On the one hand, entrepreneurship opens up international capital, labor and consumer markets beyond the constraints imposed by the host society and economy, and thus expands the economic base by diversifying industries, thereby creating potential for the enclave economy to integrate both horizontally and vertically and making it more competitive and viable. On the other hand, the expanded enclave economy provides greater material support for existing social structures of the ethnic community, which in turn strengthen the basis for social-capital formation. However, the access to social-capital resources for transnational entrepreneurship may not be the same for all group members. Networks that pivot around family or kin relations are manifested in strong trust-based ties. These may be less beneficial and of less value than the occupationally based weak ties.

Furthermore, even though immigrant entrepreneurs may conduct their routine activities across national borders, they often simultaneously maintain a sojourning orientation in terms of their economic activity on the one side and a settler's orientation in terms of host-society integration on the other. Examining two industrial sectors—hi-tech firms and accounting firms—in Los Angeles' Chinese "ethnoburb," Zhou and Tseng (2001) found that Chinese transnational activities based economically in Los Angeles stimulated the growth of other traditional low-wage, low-tech businesses in the ethnoburb. They concluded that transnational entrepreneurship necessitated deeper localization rather than deterritorialization and contributed to strengthening the economic base of the existing ethnic enclave. When immigrant entrepreneurs orient toward their ancestral homeland, they play an important role in building and strengthening social structures that help to enhance their future wellbeing in the host country.

Notes

1. Both projects relied on mixed methods that combined an in-depth survey of online listing of Chinese immigrant organizations, interviews with organizational leaders in diasporic communities and with government officials in China, participatory observations, and content analysis of major local and

community newspapers. This chapter draws from two of my published journal articles on the theme (for more detail, see Zhou and Liu 2015, 2016).

2. Portes and Zhou (1996) addressed the contradictory findings by examining how the choice of functional forms—loglinear (relative returns) versus linear (absolute dollar values)—of the earnings equations produced contradictory outcomes concerning the superior or inferior earnings of the self-employed relative to wage/salaried workers. When the loglinear form was used there was a negative, but statistically insignificant, earnings effect on self-employment. However, when the linear form was used, the effect became significantly positive. They also found that the preponderance of the self-employed was among positive outliers and thus argued that the use of the loglinear form, which was favored by most economists, sacrificed substantive knowledge about the ethnic entrepreneurship because it excluded all the outliers and evened out the earnings of the most successful entrepreneurs.
3. The "paper son" phenomenon is known as a phenomemon of illegal Chinese migration during the era of Chinese exclusion, in which young Chinese migrants entered the USA in a false identity of someone else's US-born child.
4. US Census Bureau, 2015 American Community Survey 1-Year Estimates, http://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?src=bkmk, accessed on December 1, 2016.
5. Referred to middle-class suburbs with high concentrations of immigrant groups of racial or ethnic minority status.
6. See "Overseas Chinese Guanxi and Open-Door Reform in Guangdong" (in Chinese) http://qwgzyj.gqb.gov.cn/qwhg/146/1346.shtml, accessed on December 1, 2016.
7. Interview with Mr. Wang in Los Angeles, January 2010, in Chinese, translated by Zhou.

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