

# **JAPANESE IMPERIALISM: POLITICS AND SPORT IN EAST ASIA**

**REJECTION, RESENTMENT, REVANCHISM**

EDITED BY  
**J.A. MANGAN,  
PETER HORTON,  
TIANWEI REN AND  
GWANG OK**



# Japanese Imperialism: Politics and Sport in East Asia

“This is a well-researched piece of scholarship that offers original research on a theme not often studied in international politics and sports diplomacy. Read this book and you will have acquired a unique and thoughtful lens through which to view the 2020 Olympics in Tokyo, as well as East Asian international relations more broadly. A great contribution to the field.”

—Victor D. Cha, *D.S. Song-KF Professor of Government and International Affairs, Georgetown University and Senior Adviser, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington D.C. Author of Beyond the Final Score: Politics and Sport in Asia (2008)*

“*Japanese Imperialism* is an interesting and attractive study, especially for Asian historians. I am confident this collection will be successful: it is a wonderful work of scholarship. Reflections on the Tokyo Olympics of 2020 as an agent of regional reconciliation are constructive and important contributions to the future of East Asian politics.”

—Ikuo Abe, *Emeritus Professor, University of Tsukuba, Japan*

“This collection is the best compilation of scholarly work available in English on the relationship between Japanese imperialism and sport; thus is a seminal work in the field. The well-constructed addresses the overarching theme that sport was used in the Japanese Empire as a form of indoctrination, but for Japan’s subject peoples in China, Taiwan, Korea, and Malaya it was a form of resistance. Sport during the Japanese Occupation has left a lasting legacy. Its consideration adds to the uniqueness of the collection. This book will be valuable for both scholars of the cultural history of the Japanese Empire and for students covering the history of modern Japan and the Japanese Occupation of East Asia.”

—Kevin P. Blackburn, *Associate Professor, National Institute of Education, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore and author of The Sportsmen of Changi (2012)*

J.A. Mangan · Peter Horton · Tianwei Ren  
Gwang Ok  
Editors

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palgrave  
macmillan

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ISBN 978-981-10-5103-6      ISBN 978-981-10-5104-3 (eBook)  
<https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-5104-3>

Library of Congress Control Number: 2017945784

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Printed on acid-free paper

This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by Springer Nature

The registered company is Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd.

The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

‘I look upon all the world as my parish’<sup>1</sup>

This collection is multi-national in creation: an English, Australian, Chinese and South Korean editorial compilation. In a departure from modern ‘soft upper-lip’ excess to ancient ‘stiff upper lip’ restraint, I shall simply state that it has been a pleasure to work with such industrious, capable and collegiate international colleagues. My Chinese and South Korean editorial colleagues will understand if I express special appreciation for our Collating Editor, Peter Horton. He drove *Japanese Imperialism* forward with exceptional ability, energy and commitment. However, my East Asian editorial colleagues had their special informed contributions to make: Gwang Ok, a former student of mine, enhanced my considerable respect for him by virtue of his reliability, industry and performance. Ren Tianwei, from the Chinese university publishing system, has exceptional promise: her conscientiousness, acumen and capacity auger well for her future.

It is more than appropriate at this point to quote W.B. Yeats:

Think of where man’s glory most begins and ends,  
And say my glory was I had such friends.<sup>2</sup>

Finally, I would like to express my profound thanks to the exceptional set of international contributors for their insightful and original essays.

‘Albion’  
Swanage, England  
April 2017

J.A. Mangan

## NOTES

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2. W.B. Yeats, *The Municipal Gallery*, St. 7. In, *The Oxford Dictionary of Quotations* (3rd Edition) (Oxford University Press, 1990), 586.

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PART I

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# Prelude

# Empires: Dead, Dying and Dormant

*J.A. Mangan*

## PAST EMPIRES: IMPACT

We live in a world that empires have made. Indeed, most of the modern world is a relic of empires: colonial and pre-colonial, African, Asian, European and American.<sup>1</sup>

## FAILED EMPIRE: GRANDIOSITY

It is Japan's mission to be supreme in Asia, in the South Seas and eventually the four corners of the world.<sup>2</sup>

## FUTURE EMPIRES: INEVITABILITY

The age of the west is at a crossroads, if not at an end.<sup>3</sup>

...as empires come and empires go, at some stage the power of the United States will wane and another great power will rise up to fill the vacuum. This ambition, and an impatience to force events, has made Asia an unpredictable and dangerous place for all of us.<sup>4</sup>

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*Past Empires: Relics Revisited*

There is no longer need to turn away from the Empire... It no longer has that power to seduce the young...We can look at it directly, because it is only a moon now, not a sun. We can look up into the heavens, and study it, as a burned-out star, or rather a constellation of stars.<sup>5</sup>

CLOSE CIRCLE: *FROM THE RUINS OF EMPIRE TO JAPANESE  
IMPERIALISM*

Pankaj Mishra's impressive *From the Ruins of Empire: The Revolt Against the West and the Remaking of Asia*<sup>6</sup> tells only part of the story of the remaking of Asia. It omits the legacies of Japanese imperialism with the longevity of regional resentment now expressed inter alia through the powerful political medium of modern sport. This potency was considered briefly in *The Olympic Games: Prism for East Asian Politics and Geopolitics*.<sup>7</sup> It is considered more fully in *Japanese Imperialism: Sport as Regional Resistance, Rejection and Revanchism—Past into Present*. During the period of Japanese Imperialism, sport was used as a statement of resistance and a declaration of rejection. In Japanese post-imperialism it is used now as an avowal of revanchism. Sport as imperial regional demonstration and post-imperial remonstrance has been strangely overlooked in studies of East Asian political relationships. Its aspects are not without political resonances. They reveal the power of political memory. They transmit messages of political significance. With Tokyo the location of the 2020 Olympic Games *Japanese Imperialism: Sport as Regional Resistance, Rejection and Revanchism—Past into Present* is especially relevant. Perhaps Tokyo 2020 presents the prospect of reconciliation in accordance with Olympian idealism. Perhaps the unclosed door of memory will be closed. Perhaps!

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3. Niall Ferguson, *Empire* (London: Penguin Books, 2004), 215.
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5. Martin Green, *Dreams of Adventure: Deeds of Power* (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980), 344.
6. Pankaj Mishra, *From the Ruins of Empire: The Revolt Against the West and the Remaking of Asia* (London: Picador, 2012).
7. J.A. Mangan, Qing Luo and Sayuri Guthrie-Shimizu, (Eds.) *The Olympic Games: Prism for East Asian Politics and Geopolitics – London 2012 and Tokyo 2020* (Beijing: Communication University of China, forthcoming).

PART II

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## Prologue

# Empires: West and East—Curious Conjunction and Contemporary Consequences, Complexity and Circumstances

*J.A. Mangan*

W.G. Beasley declared in his carefully nuanced *Japanese Imperialism 1894–1945*,

I do not believe in mono-causal explanations of complex historical phenomena, especially those which endure over long periods of time. Even a concept as broad as economic determinism, central though it is to this subject, does not seem to me a sufficient basis on which to analyse imperialism, either in the case of Japan, or more generally. Hence I do not find it necessary to make a choice between the theories of internal ‘push’ and external ‘pull’. Both are relevant.<sup>1</sup>

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© The Author(s) 2018  
J.A. Mangan et al. (eds.), *Japanese Imperialism: Politics and Sport in East Asia*, [https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-5104-3\\_2](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-5104-3_2)

And added aptly,

I do not believe that the human impetus towards imperialism needs explaining. Men, acting individually or in communities, have always sought to establish dominion over others, where they could. What the character of a society, or the international circumstances with which it has to deal, does indeed determine is the timing and direction of the impetus, the degree of its success and failure, the kind of advantages that are sought, the institutions that are shaped to give them durability. That is what I understand by the nature of imperialism. That is what I propose to examine with respect to Japan.<sup>2</sup>

William Dalrymple wrote shrewdly of British colonialism in India,

Many historians blithely use the word ‘colonialism’ as if it has some kind of clearly locatable meaning, yet it is increasingly apparent that at this period there were multiple modes and very different ways of inhabiting, performing and transgressing the still fluid notion of Britishness.<sup>3</sup>

Complexity, of course, has wider imperial application. There is a need for only one eye to appreciate this. However, not only is complexity important in any consideration of imperialism but so also is circumstance. It underpins every political action.

Complexity and circumstance are given appropriate emphasis in *Japanese Imperialism*.

## A TALE OF TWO EMPIRES: JAPANESE ADAPTATION AND BRITISH INSPIRATION

### *Adaptation: The Japanese Empire Circa 1940*

Did he live his life again in every detail of desire, temptation, and surrender during that supreme moment of complete knowledge? He cried in a whisper at some image, at some vision, - he cried out twice, a cry that was no more than a breath - ‘The horror! The horror!’<sup>4</sup>

This extract from Joseph Conrad’s *Heart of Darkness* refers to the appalling atrocities of the Belgian imperialist in the Congo. It applies equally to the Japanese imperialist in East Asia (Fig. 2.1).





Fig. 2.2 British Empire circa 1890 (Source <http://college.saintebarbe.pagespro-orange.fr/victoria/empire.htm>)

a simple imperial world view made up of patriotic, military and racial beliefs only vaguely located in specific imperial settings, and based on assured self-belief!<sup>6</sup> Geopolitical certainty encased in a hard moral shell (Fig. 2.2).

The outcome was a huge imperial Enterprise. The edifice of this Enterprise possessed an astonishingly strong ‘transom of widespread control’.<sup>7</sup> However, its cement was subject to cracks. Not only were there cracks beneath the imperial wallpaper but also the fissures grew wider and wider. Eventually, the Enterprise collapsed. While it was a seemingly strong construction, it served as a model for Japanese imperialism. Similarities are self-evident: solid self-belief, imperial ambition, impressive success, ultimate collapse.

### THE MAKING OF BRITISH IMPERIAL MASCULINITY

A point of substance should be noted before a direct consideration of Japanese ethnocentrism, nationalism and imperialism: late nineteenth British imperial martial masculinity. The making of a confident martial

manhood was an ideological construct manufactured on the late nineteenth century playing fields of the by then extensive public (private) upper middle class schools—greatly expanded on the back of the wealth created by a combination of industrialization and imperialism,<sup>8</sup> caught confidently in this extract,

Lord Granby, who was in many aspects the type of Englishman formed out of school life and our sports; ...one of the results of the ideals in school life and in sport being to raise all training, mental and bodily, to the level of the higher classes ... Every Englishman, as Mr Rudyard Kipling has told us in verse and prose, is an aristocrat when among the inferior races; and from the rare insight Kipling has into the many sided character of our national life', that great genius has risen to be the laureate of England, (celebrating) the English as formed by the hunting field, the cricket pitch, and the football ground.<sup>9</sup>

And even more confidently in this one,

Many a lad who leaves an English public school disgracefully ignorant of the rudiments of useful knowledge, who can speak no language but his own, and writes that imperfectly, to whom the noble literature of his country and the stirring history of his forefathers are almost a sealed book, and who has devoted a great part of his time and nearly all his thoughts to athletic sports, yet brings away with him something beyond all price, a manly straightforward character, a scorn of lying and meanness, habits of obedience and command, and fearless courage.

The alleged confident consequence,

Thus equipped, he goes out into the world, and bears a man's part in subduing the earth, ruling its wild folk, and building up the Empire; doing many things so well that it seems a thousand pities that he was not trained to do them better, and to face the problems of race, creed and government in distant corners of the Empire with a more instructed mind... however, with all his defects, (he) has done yeoman's service to the Empire; and for much that is best in him our public schools may fairly take credit.<sup>10</sup>

The distinguished historian of Victorian England, Geoffrey Best has stated, that the Victorian public school had a wide impact in society, '... recognition in *the non-public school world* (emphasis added) ... of the diffusing power of the public school ethos is provided by the extraordinary

popularity of “public school” fiction—frequently found at *immense and ridiculous removes from reality* (emphasis added)—among boys in “state” elementary and secondary schools {and} by the fact that the British Borstal institution, a successful device for the disciplining of juvenile criminals...was modelled expressly on the public school house system and ideals of personal conduct’.<sup>11</sup>

### PLAYING FIELD AND BATTLEFIELD: SYMBIOSIS

Numerous versifiers of the imperial period saw the closest connection between playing field and battlefield. For them the mortar of moral association was solid. One self-confidently sang this patriotic siren-song of the imperial duty of the privileged English public schoolboy.

Hark the Empire calls, and what we answer give?  
 How to prove us worthy of the splendid trust?  
 Lo! We serve the Empire by the lives we live;  
 True in all our dealings, honest, brave and just,  
 Training mind and body for the Empire’s need.<sup>12</sup>

Proselytizers were not troubled by mists of moral uncertainty.

Norman Gale, a prolific period versifier and assured exponent of imperial homiletics, observed canonically of the school cricket field of the privileged,

See in bronzing sunshine  
 Thousands of good fellows,  
 Such as roll the world along,  
 Such as cricket mellows!  
 These shall keep the Motherland  
 Safe amid her quarrels;  
 Lucky lads, plucky lands,  
 Trained to snatch at laurels.<sup>13</sup>

Numerous verses of the time were paeans to a predominant period educational ideology which obsessed the British imperial schools for the privileged: Athleticism,

...a neologism born of moral passion. Physical exercise was taken, considerably and compulsorily, in the sincere belief of many, however, romantic,



misplaced or myopic, that it was a highly effective means of inculcating valuable instrumental and impressive educational goals; physical and moral courage, loyalty and co-operation, the capacity to act fairly and take defeat well, the ability to both command and obey... the famous ingredients of character training which the public schools considered their pride and their prerogative.<sup>14</sup>

It is crystal clear, and beyond dispute, that for many imperialists of the period, team games became ‘the wheel round which ... moral values turned. It was a genuinely and extensively held belief that they inspired virtue; they developed manliness, they **formed character**’ (emphasis added).<sup>15</sup> To embrace appropriate complexity, however, it is sensible to recognize that there were some who sowed tar among the wheat, cynical casuists who used moral argument as a cover for simple pleasure. In addition, there were opportunists, especially housemasters, who saw games in terms of control and publicity. The truth of the matter is that the ideology involved virtuousness, indulgence and expedience; it embraced idealism, casuistry and opportunism. ‘It was ... a complex manifestation. And its origins ... were equally complex’.<sup>16</sup> Nevertheless, even E.C. Mack, the mid-twentieth century doyen of the history of the public school but no starry-eyed advocate, in his monumental two-volume study,<sup>17</sup> discovered virtue in the imperial consequences of cricket pitch and rugby field. He argued that ‘the training largely acquired on the games field was the basis of courage and group loyalty that created responsible, honourable boys, willing to give their lives unquestionably to the preservation and expansion of Empire’.<sup>18</sup> The self-sacrificial ideals of Athleticism were ‘anthemed’ in an astonishing plethora of ‘carols of chauvinism:’ inspirational hymns praising militant masculinity. During the Great War hysterical chauvinistic admiration for the martial self-sacrifice of the public schoolboy as imperial warrior became corybantically frenzied: the outcome of extreme cultural metamorphosis,

They fronted the storm and the flame  
They laughed in Death’s face as they fell  
They rejoiced in red strife as a game:  
They sang as they strode into Hell.<sup>19</sup>

The public school game *par excellence* of cricket took on a bizarre militaristic metastatic and metaphysical transformation.

On Flanders's fields the public schoolboy faces, wrote one magniloquent versifier, the Hun demon bowler, his field gun trained upon the stumps pumping Krupp's shells from 'a concrete grandstand far beyond the boundary'. He continued, 'The stars blink down from the pavilion and the conditions are atrocious—no screen and too much mud for cricket lovers;' but he adds there was is no appealing against the light in this match!<sup>20</sup>

The supreme songster of public school martial self-sacrifice was Henry Newbolt:

Our game was his but yesteryear;  
We wished him back; we could not know.  
The self-same hour we missed him here  
He led the line that broke the foe.

The outcome was predestined,

'To-morrow may well bring'; we said,  
'As fair a fight, as clear a sun'.  
Dear lad, before the word was sped,  
For evermore thy goal was won.<sup>21</sup>

Over and above being deluged by unremitting verse outpourings, the public schoolboy was submerged under unrelenting prosody from chapel pulpits and speech day podiums.

Geoffrey Best has stated that the exhortatory language of the public school playing field was a marked feature of public school speech writing on military matters, 'a curious phenomenon that provides a *graphic* (emphasis added) example of the connection between sport and war in the public school mind, is the sports terminology which is *such a noticeable feature of all public school speech and writing on military matters...*'

To drive home the point, he added,

Churchill remarks in his *Early life* that war seemed to him at Harrow and still seemed to him in India, an extension of school games (emphasis added).<sup>22</sup>

While Baden—Powell declared in his *Sport and War* published in 1900, "What sort of sport did you have out there?" is the question which

men, have as a rule, greeted one another on return from the campaign in Rhodesia; and one could truthfully say, “We had excellent sport”. (Emphasis added)’. He added that the military operations were sufficiently sporting as to be most enjoyable.<sup>23</sup>

### COMMENTS AND CAVEATS

Cautionary comment is now in order to correct any inclined to naivety of perception regarding the impact of the poetry and prose of exhortation into public school martial self-sacrifice. Academics who have made the effort to accumulate extensive literary evidence of the obsession of the late Victorian and Edwardian public school system with the creation of playing fields have accumulated extensive associated evidence of the extent of the rhetoric of literary indoctrination into a martial mindset via these fields. This was no specious rhetoric. Failure to appreciate its significance is to be guilty of academic myopia. The rubric of indoctrination was a manifesto of martial self-sacrifice.

Two informed caveats are also in order,

The first,

...as the distinguished American cultural anthropologist, Edward Sapir noted, ‘**The real world is to a large extent built upon the language habits of the group** (emphasis added) ... we hear and see ... and perceive **very largely** (emphasis added) because the language habits of a community predispose certain choices of interpretation’.<sup>24</sup>

The second,

...it is now a **familiar argument** (emphasis added) that the ‘speech’ of a culture, namely all forms of its language including poetry, song and prose orders the experience of its members, shapes their view of reality and determines their actions.<sup>25</sup>

A comment by Basil Bernstein, the distinguished sociologist of language, too, has pointed relevance. He has argued that language is a major process in the transmission of social genes and both shapes and reflects collective values, collective action and indeed, social structure.<sup>26</sup> Aldous Huxley, the acerbic social commentator, has written, ‘Words have power to mould men’s thinking, to canalise their feelings, to direct their willing

and acting'.<sup>27</sup> Finally, these self-evident truths, of course, are equally understood by men of letters. The respected poet of nostalgia, William Cory doubted whether in human experience an idea becomes complete until it has found words in which to embody itself. He added the warning that not to be aware of this fact is a form of self-indulgence and a '*peculiarly idle form of self-deceit*' (emphasis added).<sup>28</sup> It might be usefully added in passing to provide a sense of perspective that language in all these regards, has the edge over statistics!

To press home the point for the mythologically myopic, these 'myths of manliness', myths with a profound purpose, were replete with carefully constructed moral calculi. Myth, of course, 'is an essential tool for exploring, mapping and delineating the world of experience'.<sup>29</sup> Terence Hawkes in his insightful *Structuralism and Semiotics* argued, 'Man constructs the myths, the social institutions, virtually the whole world and in doing so he constructs **himself** (emphasis added)'.<sup>30</sup>

The literary extracts above are selected from scores, indeed hundreds, of metaphorical icicles in 'a huge ice-flow' born along in a surging imperial ocean of exhortatory poetry and prose. Its power should not be foolishly underestimated. The 'ocean' and its icicles require thoughtful and informed consideration. Its currents formed emotions: shaped minds; moulded youth.

### *Cultural Stereotypes: Cultural Consequences: Crucial Resonances*

Cultural stereotypes reveal the ideological priorities of a culture. These 'icons of representation', set hard in firmly cemented mental constructions invariably determine ideological preconceptions. Societies need stereotypes in order to structure their universe, manage the 'flux of reality', consolidate apparent truths, and create an ordered world. All cultures have their functional stereotypes; purposeful products of the culture that creates them: '...None is random: none is isolated from the historical context'.<sup>31</sup> The reason is not hard to find, the yearning for order is an indispensable and indisputable part of the human condition as is the inclination to yearn for firm lines and clear concepts. When we have them, of course, we have to face the fact that some realities elude them. Nevertheless, societies have the need

...to organise the world in controllable patterns, to employ root metaphors: explanatory word images, to allow them to make sense of the

world. They perceive the world through such historically determined metaphors. These stereotypic constructions allow an accommodating “perceptual blindness”. They protect cultures from ‘counter-information likely to produce confusion’.<sup>32</sup>

There is nothing exceptional in the creation of stereotypes for control—political, social *and* ethical. It is a *commonplace* of culture; the sheet anchor keeping a culture from dangerous shoals.

Cultures transmit ideological imperatives created in an attempt to control its cultural world. Both British *and* Japanese imperial cultures were no different from other cultures in this respect. However, British imperial culture was exceptional in its devotion to *one* ethical imperative: Athleticism. The imperial playing fields were locations for image construction in an attempt to control the colonized. There was an ‘imperial obsession’ with the Playing Field as the source of ‘character’ formation—the essence of the superior moral entitlement to rule. This obsession resulted in consistent and careful attempts to project a unique imperial stereotype: *homo ludens imperiosus*, central actor in an imperial ‘morality play’ with an allocated destiny: the Civilizing Mission. The certainties implicit in this ethnocentric moral myopic construction provided protection from a paradox: despotism abroad and democracy at home. Above all, the stereotype offered for many, a secure sense of superior ethnic ethical identity.<sup>33</sup> However, this imperial stereotype was both a secure and insecure construction. In the British Empire, it was a source of assimilation and dissimulation: Similarities with the Japanese Empire are self-evident.

### *Athleticism and Bushido: Mutuality: The Way of the Warrior*

Similarities to Athleticism are transparent in the long established tradition of Japanese Bushido, a moral, heroic concept of martial manhood, ‘...The first objective of *samurai* education was to build up character. The subtler faculties of prudence, intelligence, and dialectics were less important... a samurai was essentially a man of action’.<sup>34</sup> And again, ‘Bushido [is] an outstanding characteristic of our national Morality ... In effect, man tries to fulfil true life by way of death’.<sup>35</sup>

Japan in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries moved impressively with the times. In consequence, it used *both* traditional and contemporary sport with their martial purposes as a means of imperial cultural consolidation.

The ‘Way of the Warrior’ was intrinsic to Japanese culture. Its ethical purpose is evident in this self-delusionary statement,

Our nation is one that holds **Bushido** in high regard ... This martial spirit ... tries to give life to all things and it is not that which destroys ... Here lies the martial spirit of our nation.<sup>36</sup>

It constituted a stereotypical cultural construct in an attempt to control the world: the self-sacrificial warrior.

English ‘sportsmanship’ led directly to a Japanese late nineteenth century concept of ‘sportsmanship’ linked closely to traditional Japanese concepts of education, nationalism and militarism to create strong bodies for a strong state. English ‘sportsmanship’ was admired because it was perceived as the source of British Imperialism: global power achieved by strong bodies of a strong state.<sup>37</sup>

Similarities between Athleticism and Bushido are vividly clear in this statement:

‘**Bushido**’ is a modern term rather than a historic one. The ‘way’ itself originates from the samurai moral values, most commonly stressing some combination of ... loyalty, martial arts mastery and honor until death.<sup>38</sup>

The British imperialist used sport as a means of hegemonic control. The Japanese imperialist inspired by the success, grandeur and extent of the largest land and sea empire in the history of the world, did likewise: a posteriori subscription to a perceived effect and cause!

Japan’s use of sport as imperial enculturation as was the British use was confronted. British and Japanese imperialism left legacies but of a rather different kind; in the case of Japan exceptional long lasting embittered resentment born in part by sustained recollection of a brutal use of militaristic sport.

### IMPERIALISM: ‘CAVEAT EMPTOR:’ CONTINUITIES AND DISCONTINUITIES

One thing should be made very clear. Any claim that these ‘civilized’ imperialists were able to impose their sporting ethical values completely on the ‘uncivilized’ should never be pressed too strongly. There was never a monolithic cultural response to the use of sport for imperial

control on the part of the colonized. It is time for a sophisticated analytical agenda and for a nuanced approach to imperial sport. Again, it is time for caveats: in all cultural, imperial settings involving modern sport, ‘we should certainly appreciate the independent, creative capacities of (de facto) politically inferior societies and individuals, while at the same time recognizing the effectiveness, due to the ideological and institutional advantages possessed by imperial agents and agencies of hegemonic control’.<sup>39</sup> One major issue any analyst of imperial proselytism and its cultural consequences should confront is the nature of interpretation, assimilation and adaptation and the extent of resistance and rejection by the proselytized. In the assessment of the extent of attempted cultural implementation any analyst worth his salt must be aware of cultural discontinuities as well as continuities. The advantage is real,

In the consideration of the imperial spread of modern sport ... cultural encounters between dominant and subordinate cultures provide an excellent opportunity to place ... colonial knowledge and control in the context of their partial *and ironic realisations*.<sup>40</sup>

Sport as a form of cultural imperialism could help bring about political ‘marriage;’ *equally* it could help bring about political ‘divorce’ between colonizers and colonized.

Nevertheless, in the fullness of time, ‘Imperial sport {transmuted and transformed} has been a potent cultural global force with both direct and indirect influences, highly visible in its modern interpretations, amazingly influential in its evolutionary outcomes and astonishing widespread in its modern consequences’.<sup>41</sup> A major driving force in this astounding global modernization was the British Empire, it ensured... the transmission of much of modern sport played in the modern way to many parts of the world where it was mostly assimilated, frequently adapted, and only infrequently rejected. The outcome has been a contemporary cultural revolution of gargantuan size. The world, at one level, is now a vast playground but its play has become much more than sport. The political, economic, cultural and emotional resonances... are stupefying deafening... sport is now part of politics, economics and culture—within nations and across nations. Modern sport played globally, politicized globally and, last but not least *enjoyed* globally—whatever the local variations, interpretations and nuances—‘... is an obsession’.<sup>42</sup> It owes much to the British Empire and its *Homo Ludens Imperiosis*. One modern

empire greatly influenced by Him and all he was thought to personify, was the Japanese Empire.

### A FRESH LENS AND A NEW FOCUS

It is time for a fresh lens and time to slide its focus eastwards to concentrate its ‘eye’ on Japanese imperialism. It is time for a close scrutiny of Japanese cultural imperialism and the use of sport. The point must be made immediately that it is crucial to be aware of the complexities involved in any consideration of the influence of Japanese *homo ludens imperiosus*. There are two fundamental requirements:

We should fully recognize that dominant elites in empire did seek ‘in purposive fashion to engineer the conformity of subordinate groups’ through sport, [but] we should also recognize that sport was an area of negotiation. The tensions inherent in all hegemonic relations should not be overlooked. We should also be wary of carelessly patronizing indigenous cultures and at least attempt to be sensitive to the dangers of stereotyping, reductionism and global generalization. Above all, we should be prepared to confront fully the possible disparities between ideological assertion, intention and realization.<sup>43</sup>

### JAPANESE COMPLEXITY

**There are... good reasons... to reject the simplistic identification of modernization** (emphasis added) with ‘Westernization’ and the use of ‘Westernization’ as a generic term to denote the large - scale cultural transformations engulfing the non-Western world. ... In various instances, indigenous needs and resources have produced in combination such phenomena as business mentalities, specialized occupational roles, centralized nation – states and rationalized culture.<sup>44</sup>

... and it can be usefully added, specific interpretations and outcomes of modern sport.

### JAPANESE IDIOSYNCRASY

The Japanese... have become obsessive about defining themselves; Who are We? Why are we so different from everybody else? ...Out of this national navel-staring has grown ... Nihonjinron, literally the Theory of the Japanese.<sup>45</sup>



## JAPANESE IRONY

By 1964, the chief Japanese symbol of wartime suffering, and subsequently of Japanese pacifism was the bombing of Hiroshima. As a reminder of Japan's peaceful intentions, and perhaps in a fit of self-pity of Japan's own suffering in the past, the young man chosen to light the Olympic flame was born in Hiroshima on the day it was obliterated by the A-bomb. As the flame was lit, fighter planes of the Japanese Self-Defence Forces scrambled over Tokyo with the entirely pacific intent of drawing the five Olympic rings in the sky.<sup>46</sup>

## JAPANESE IMPERIALISM: DISTINCTIVENESS AND DISPARITY, DISLIKE AND DISTRUST

### *Distinctiveness and Disparity*

... by 1930 Japanese imperialism comprised three disparate elements: a network of colonies and spheres of influence, protecting the approaches to the home islands and guaranteeing certain food supplies; membership of an international system based on treaty rights, conferring trade and investment privileges throughout East Asia; and an incipient special relationship with China, geared in particular to the needs of Japan's industrial economy. The events of the next decade were to bring these ingredients together in such a way as to make Japan's case distinctive in the history of empire.<sup>47</sup>

### *Dislike and Distrust*

... it is legitimate for us to note ... that the consequences of Japanese imperialism did not end with surrender in 1945. Nor did the emotions it aroused. Those who look back in bitterness on the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere can easily persuade themselves, or be persuaded, that Japan's close association with the United States, following military occupation, is a variant of 'dependent' imperialism; that commercial success in Asia signals an attempt by Japan to restore the inequalities of 'co-prosperity'; and that militarism remains just below the surface of Japanese life. Such suspicions are a price Japan continues to pay for fifty years of imperialist endeavour.<sup>48</sup>

Memories of a malign domination have not faded from the minds of the victimized. Accusations of a collective Japanese amnesia have not been convincingly answered to the satisfaction of the oppressed.

... Events of the past cannot but be deplorable.<sup>49</sup>

## JAPANESE NATIONALISM

Japanese nationalism for some 200 years can be divided into two components: cultural nationalism and political nationalism. With regard to cultural nationalism, there has been conjunction and confrontation. Cultural nationalism embedded in folkloric traditions, for example, was traditionally hostile to political nationalism. However, in the Meiji period (1868–1911) cultural nationalism was a composite of indigenous and imported political ideologies; initially, a bulwark against the global waves of Western colonialism, ultimately, to secure parity of political power with those threatening waves. In the Taisho (1912–1926) and Showa (1926–1989) eras, it evolved progressively into a system of internal totalitarianism and into a system of external imperial domination. An evolutionary progression resulting in Japanese imperial militarism. A new Japanese identity resulted from the Meiji Restoration of 1868. The old feudal order was dismantled in the name of modernization. Samurai had to dispense with swords and topknots. Commoners, who had previously been forbidden from carrying weapons on pain of death, were now required, if necessary, to die for the state. Manufacturing a martial sense of national identity became essential. As Japan's imperial ambitions grew, Japanese identity became more enmeshed in psychological preparation for war.<sup>50</sup>

The path to a despotic imperialism was laid.

## ETHICAL ETHNOCENTRISM

The Meiji Constitution of 1889 declared that allegiance to the Emperor was the citizen's higher duty. While the Constitution was a blend of Japanese political idealism and Western political pragmatism, it stressed the uniqueness of the Japanese people (*Kokutai*).<sup>51</sup> It was characterized by a self-righteousness ethnocentricity. In 1890 the *Imperial Rescript for Seamen and Soldiers* presented Japan as a 'sacred nation protected by the Gods', while the *Imperial Rescript on Education* in the same year became a sacred text, and was memorized by students who swore to offer themselves 'courageously to the State and to protect the Imperial family'.<sup>52</sup> During the second Sino-Japanese War the *hakko ichiu* came to be viewed by militarists as a doctrine that placed the Emperor at the centre of the phenomenal world providing a religious impetus to the idea of Japanese territorial expansion.<sup>53</sup> The result was a strong national identity

reinforced by spiritual conviction. Education now included official textbooks reinforced with a variety of cultural activities. Simultaneously, a strong emphasis on school ‘texts such as the *Kotutai-no-hongi* stressed the centuries—old “uniqueness” of Japan. Cultural courses were supplemented ‘with military and survival courses’.<sup>54</sup>

The path to despotic imperialism was extended further.

### VICTOR AND VICTIM

In due course, the self-perceived Western victim had turned Eastern victor. There was an ironic outcome. The victor would again become victim. In the Second World War, over one million military and nearly half a million civilians died: a total of over two million dead, while in the period of ruthless imperial rule in East Asia millions of East Asians died. There was a further irony. As noted earlier, Asians learnt the harsh truth that liberation from Western imperialism promised by the Eastern imperialism led only to new imperial masters far worse than the old ones. A brutal, martial Eastern imperialism born of a warrior tradition, and seeking to emulate a global Western imperialism characterized Japan’s Asian invasions.

Our present mission as a people is to build up a new Japanese culture by **adopting** (emphasis added) and sublimating Western cultures...to the advancement of world culture.<sup>55</sup>

### IMPERIAL EDUCATION: SELF-SACRIFICE EXALTED

The creation of a loyal, patriotic masculinity owed much to the education system before and during the fascist period. The system reveals a marked similarity between British imperial education and Japanese imperial education in instilling self-sacrificial patriotism. Models and myths of military heroism filled Japanese schoolboy novels, schoolbooks and juvenile verse.

Saburo Ienaga stated in his *The Glorification of War in Japanese Education*, ‘textbooks, even from the lowest grades, included militaristic content (emphasis added)’. He further observed that ‘After 1904 elementary school texts were compiled by the national government; all Japanese children were taught from books produced by the Ministry of Education, a ruling elite needs a modern education system to get its

message across'. He concluded, 'There is no doubt that the emphasis on militarism in the curriculum, combined with the media's glorification of war and the government's suppression of pacific and liberal views, was a major factor in socializing the great majority of Japanese to support aggression enthusiastically'.<sup>56</sup>

In the Introduction entitled 'Imperialism, History and Education' to *Benefits Bestowed? Education and British Imperialism*, it is stated 'that the central role of imperialism should be noted on all debates about culture, media and society between the 1870s and the 1940s'.<sup>57</sup> The comment attracted a correction in response, 'sound advice, yet surely incomplete. In *the full context of empire* (emphasis added), the list should certainly include education'.<sup>58</sup> The role of education in creating and controlling compliance to Japanese imperial political principles and priorities was crucial. The alleged Jesuit maxim, 'Give me the child until he is seven and I will give you the man' seldom had greater pertinence. By the 1930s through the committed efforts of Sadao Araki,<sup>59</sup> a former army general who became Minister of Education in 1931 martial indoctrination engulfed young Japanese. Araki played a crucial role ensuring the doctrine of *seishin kyōiku* (spiritual training) as an ideological backbone for army personnel. As Minister of Education he supported the integration of the samurai code into the national education system. He built upon the political and economic reforms following the Meiji Restoration. From 1937 the Emperor was supreme commander of all armed forces. Under Sadao Araki, education became a vehicle for single-minded indoctrination into a militarized mindset and for the inculcation of a militaristic masculinity. In schools, minds were shaped by military orientated textbooks and bodies by military-style training. College students were indoctrinated into a martial culture. Male students received advanced military training, female students received first-aid training. The Imperial Youth Federation was established to perpetuate a martial culture. The Yasukuni Shrine, established in 1869, received state patronage. Agencies were set up to enforce compliance to militaristic nationalism by both the police and the army, while a series of Peace Preservation Laws were implemented banning freedom of expression and freedom of assembly. By the early 1930s the State was controlled by the military. Democratic institutions set up in the 1890s were side-lined and ineffective. In 1936, the army obtained the right to nominate the Army Minister in the civilian government. What this progression illustrates was

that analyses of imperialism should never be treated as static.<sup>60</sup> Japanese imperialism had now gone through various stages of development ending in despotic military control.

The path to despotic imperialism was complete.

### ASYMMETRICAL IDEOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION: JAPANESE PROSELYTIZERS OF 'ANGLO-SAXON' ATHLETICISM

Japanese proselytizers of Athleticism convinced of its value for physical, mental and moral health and martial qualities included several influential Japanese; in particular, Chiyosaburo Takeda, an acolyte of an English advocate of Athleticism, Frederick William Strange. His advocacy was typical of a far-flung imperial caste. Late-Victorian and Edwardian British imperial advocates of Athleticism with total sincerity and absolute self-confidence 'took as means of acquiring [the perceived] precious instrumental commodities [of Athleticism] to, among other places, the lush tropical rain forests of Africa, the verdant islands of the Pacific, the parched plains of India and the windswept prairies of Canada. Whatever the aims of other missionaries from the diverse sects and organizations which attempted to spread the Christian message, their first purpose was to create a universal Tom Brown: loyal, brave, truthful, a gentleman and, if at all possible, a Christian'.<sup>61</sup> They journeyed far beyond the British Empire. One of these moral missionaries, Frederick William Strange (1853–1889) reached Japan, He became a teacher at the school attached to Tokyo University together with Kikuchi Dairoku, who later became first the President of Tokyo University and then Minister of Education. Takeda, for his part, became a committed apostle of Strange. He once recalled the moral message Strange proclaimed,

The aim of the exercise is not only to discipline the animal spirit of the human being, but also to cultivate the intelligence and morality of man. Exercise is not an aim but an instrument. The aim of the training of the body does not solely rest upon the preservation of health or longevity, but it does reside in more than that; the moral training of the playing field evokes human qualities far more than the disciplines of the class room.<sup>62</sup>

Strange was a notable sportsman and 'the personification of sportsmanship'. He was also a relentless proselytizer. His book *Outdoor Games*

made this clear. His ambition was to interest Japanese youth in outdoor games. Such was his success that in 1888 the Meiji government awarded him a decoration for his publication. He died the following year. His obituary in the *Japan Weekly* recorded that,

During the last six or seven years of his career, he devoted himself to the task of encouraging a love of athletic sports and out-door exercise among the students of Tokyo University and its Principal Schools, with results of **permanent value** (emphasis added) to the nation.<sup>63</sup>

Strange was Takeda's lifelong inspiration. Takeda considered him 'the founding father of our country's exercise'.<sup>64</sup> Takeda was his committed panegyrist. He promoted the concept of *Kyogi undo*—Athletic Exercise. It had a special emphasis: subscription to the western sport. His book *Riron Jikken, Kyogi Undo* (Tokyo: Hakubunkan, 1904)—a homily layered and embroidered with both the idealism and pragmatism of Athleticism, made it clear that 'Athletic Exercise' was the key to the capacity of nations. The term for Takeda represented social Darwinistic 'survival of the fittest', and 'an imperialist symbol for the struggle for dominance between races and nations in pursuit of conquest and control'.<sup>65</sup> He coined the term *kyogido*. Its virtue lay in the instrumentality of exercise. 'Athletic Exercise' was to produce 'a manlike man, trained sinews, toughened nerves, improved intellect, disciplined emotions'. 'Athletic Exercise' excluded Japanese martial arts. They failed to create the strongest. They were not able to ensure that a nation's physical qualities were comparable to those of the best races in an age of imperialism. Ironically, however, his inspiration was part drawn from Japanese history. His model, de facto, replicated the traditional *shugyo* or *musha shugo*—the endurance of hardship and suffering. He updated it and dressed it in 'Darwinian clothing'. He was a committed cultural synthesist. He attempted a confident syncretism of East and West. His 'sportsmanship' was an antiphonic response to Western and Eastern values; a blend of West and East. 'Kyukudo was a modern notion of *bushido* with the modern purpose of creating a hegemonic imperial nation in imitation of the English and their empire'.<sup>66</sup> It should not be overlooked that Takeda wrote a book for boys, *Shinshin Tanren, Kyogi Undo* (Training of the Body and Mind: Boy's Athletic Exercise) (Tokyo: Hakubunkan, 1904) published significantly at the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War

(1904–1905) and at the moment Japan signed the first Korean-Japanese Agreement (1904). ‘Sportsmanship’ was, for Takeda, the inspiration for founding the *Dai Nihon Teikoku* (the Empire of Greater Japan). Takeda’s imperialistic ambitions are conspicuous in this book: ‘You know the reason why I often call you boys of the hegemonic country’, he wrote, ‘because, as our *Dai Nihon Teikoku* becomes an even stronger nation of the Axis powers, I want you to rouse yourself and make ours one of the hegemonic country of the world. Boys of a good hegemonic country! How happy you are to be born in this good age!’<sup>67</sup> Those who were influenced by Strange and Takeda included Kikuchi Dairoku, mentioned earlier, who advocated English Athleticism in his *Spirit of Exercise* (1899). He stated the virtues of ‘English Athleticism’ were analogous to those of Japanese *Bushido*. He was infected with a curious spiritual pseudo-anthropomorphism.

In the final analysis, as Ian Boruma has caustically noted, of the period Japanese Anglophilia,

Coubertin’s quasi-platonic brand of Anglophilia, with its worship of the muscular English gentleman, the Corinthian sportsman, the spiritual aristocrat who rules a world without politics by dint of his moral superiority, cultivated by cricket ... is **dangerously naïve (emphasis added)**. Ideals of unity unchecked by democratic politics lead to tyranny ... the final consequence of a noble vision that took **Tom Brown’s Schooldays** too seriously.<sup>68</sup>

Flattery by way of exhortation reached back across the globe,

General Sir Ian Hamilton, on unveiling the Boer War memorial tablet at Glenalmond College, exhorted the boys to be ready to ‘fight for ‘Glenalmond, Scotland and the Empire’ and urged on them **the Japanese spirit of self-sacrifice: a willingness to meet a patriotic death ‘as a bridegroom goes to meet his bride’**. (Emphasis added)<sup>69</sup>

He visited many public schools to stress to their pupils the necessity of duty and the need for a subscription to martial self-emulation.<sup>70</sup> He had influential media support. The outspoken war correspondent, Charles a Court Repington, educated at Eton and The Royal Military College, Sandhurst, and former officer and writer of several studies of war including *The War In the Far East 1904–1905* (1905), a widely read author,

praised ‘the moral strength and sentiment of collective self-sacrifice which distinguished the warriors of Japan’.<sup>71</sup>

## NEMESIS

In summary, Japan’s imperial progression unfolded as follows,

Japan began with what might be called a period of ‘dependency’, when a strength recognizably greater than that of the country’s neighbours was combined with weakness vis-à-vis the other powers. In the after 1894 alignment with Britain and the United States was the necessary concomitant of putting together the rudiments of a Japanese empire. In the second stage, starting in 1905, Japanese imperialism became more self-assertive. Like Bismarck’s Germany a generation earlier, Japan behave after the Russo-Japanese War as an abrasive latecomer, seeking equality of esteem not only through an insistence on treaty rights, but also through the acquisition of spheres of influence. Finally, after 1930 – though there had been indications of it as early as the First World War – Japanese leaders set out to substitute a Japan-centred system of imperialism in East Asia for that which they had inherited from the nineteenth-century West.<sup>72</sup>

However, the empire ended as ‘an irrelevance:’

From July and August 1944 when American forces captured Saipan and Guam, the naval and air defences of the Japanese home islands had been in peril. With the loss of Iwo Jima in March 1945 and of Okinawa in June, they crumbled. Japan was thereafter in a state of siege. And battered by air attack, Japanese industry could no longer have made use of raw materials from the southern region, even if it had been able to obtain them. Indeed, some weeks before the atom bomb brought Japanese surrender, the scale of conventional bombing had demonstrated that the enemy’s ability to destroy Japan’s industrial heartland from the air made possession of an empire an irrelevance.<sup>73</sup>

‘The Sword of Damocles descended on Japan with ... catastrophic force in 1945’.<sup>74</sup>

Now ‘Japan lay in ruins... Japan had left Asia. But the price of doing so was to become a subordinate to another power—the United States’.<sup>75</sup>



## A LONG AND DARK SHADOW

Imperial progression had reaped the whirlwind. Fresh storms, albeit with lesser intensity but no less real, would come in the post-imperial period. Refracted Revanchism lay ahead.

## NOTES

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8. See, J.A. Mangan, *Athleticism in the Victorian and Edwardian Public School: The Emergence and Consolidation of an Educational Ideology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).
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10. Mangan, 'Prologue', in, *Athleticism in the Victorian and Edwardian Public School*, 9.
11. Geoffrey Best, 'Militarism and the Victorian Public School' in, Brian Simon and Ian Bradbury (Eds.), *The Victorian Public School: Studies in the Development of an Educational Institution* (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1975), 130.
12. Quoted in, Mangan, *Athleticism in the Victorian and Edwardian Public School*, 137.
13. Mangan, *Athleticism in the Victorian and Edwardian Public School*, 9.

14. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
17. Edward C. Mack, *Public Schools and British Opinion 1780–1860* (London: Methuen, 1938) and *Public Schools and British Opinion Since 1860* (New York: Octagon Books, 1973). (Mack is without equal as a public school historian with his encyclopaedic coverage of the evolution of world-famous British Public (private) School System.)
18. Quoted in Mangan, *Athleticism in the Victorian and Edwardian Public School*, 8.
19. Quoted in Mangan, *Athleticism in the Victorian and Edwardian Public School*, 194.
20. Ibid.
21. Henry Newbolt, ‘The Schoolfellow’ in, *Poems New and Old* (London: John Murray, 1912), 88.
22. Best, ‘ Militarism and the Victorian Public School’, 140.
23. Baden-Powell was consequently extremely keen that cadet corps as well as games were part of public school life. See, Mangan and McKenzie, *Militarism, Hunting and Imperialism*, 153.
24. See, J.A. Mangan, ‘Play up and Play the Game: the Rhetoric of Cohesion, Identity, Patriotism and Morality’ in, *Athleticism in the Victorian and Edwardian Public School*, 181.
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid.
27. Aldous Huxley, *Words and Their Meanings* (The Ward Ritchie Press, 1940), 9.
28. Cory was along with other creations, the composer of the ‘jolly’ but movingly evocative *Eton boating Song!*
29. See, J.A. Mangan, “‘Muscular, Militaristic and Manly’”: The Middle-Class Hero as Moral Messenger’ in, J.A. Mangan (ed.), *‘Manufactured’ Masculinity: Making Imperial Manliness, Morality and Militarism* (London: Routledge, 2013), 159.
30. Ibid.
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33. Ibid.

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60. For a discussion of this point see, Mangan, ‘Epilogue: Imperial Complexities’ in, Dyerson, Mangan and Park (Eds.) *Mapping an Empire of American Sport*, 215–217.
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62. See, Abe and Mangan, “‘Sportsmanship’”, 99–128.
63. Ibid., 101.
64. Ibid., 111.
65. Ibid., 115.
66. Ibid., 119.
67. Ibid.
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## APPENDIX ONE

## Sadao Araki



<b>Native name</b>	荒木貞夫
<b>Born</b>	26 May 1877, Komae, Tokyo, Japan
<b>Died</b>	2 November 1966.
<b>Allegiance</b>	Empire of Japan
<b>Service/Branch</b>	Imperial Japanese Army
<b>Years of Service</b>	1898–1936
<b>Rank</b>	General
<b>Commands held</b>	6th Division
<b>Battles won</b>	Russo-Japanese War Siberian Intervention Second Sino-Japanese War World War II
<b>Awards</b>	Order of the Sacred Treasures (1st class) Order of the Golden Kite (2nd class) Order of the Rising Sun (1st class)
<b>Other work</b>	Minister of War, Minister of Education

After graduation from the Imperial Japanese Army Academy in November 1897, he was born into the Bushido tradition. His father

‘was an ex-samurai retainer of the Hitotsubashi branch of the Tokugana family’. Sadao Araki had a distinguished military career which included Deputy General of Military Training. In 1933 he was promoted to full General. He was appointed Minister for War in 1931. From 1932 ‘he became more outspoken in promoting totalitarianism, militarism and expansionism’. He fully endorsed the ‘philosophy of *Kodoba*’ (‘The Imperial Way’), which linked the Emperor, the people, land and morality as one indivisible entity, and which emphasized State Shintoism. Araki also strongly promoted *Seishin Kyoiku* (spiritual training) for the army. He resigned his post as War Minister in 1934 due to ill health. When the *Kodaba* army officer rebellion failed in 1936 he was forced to retire. However, in 1938 he was appointed to the powerful position of Education Officer. He was now in ‘an ideal position to promote militarism ideals through the national education system and in the general populace’. Araki proposed the incorporation of the *samurai* code in the national education system. He promoted the use of the official academic text *Kokutaino Hongi* (‘Japan’s Fundamentals of National Policy’), and the ‘moral national bible’ *Shinmin no Michi* (‘The Path of Subjects’), an effective catechism on national, religious, cultural, social and ideological topics’. He used his official government position to good effect to indoctrinate the nation’s young into a martial culture.<sup>76</sup>

## APPENDIX TWO

### The Public Security Preservation Laws

Between 1894 and 1925 Japan implemented a series of laws designed specifically to suppress political dissent.

1. The **Safety Preservation Law of 1894** (保安条例 *Hoan Jō Rei*) was the most drastic of a number of laws introduced after 1875, imposed as ‘stringent restrictions on the press, public speeches and political meetings’. The Law was repealed in 1898 to be replaced in 1900 by an even more draconian law.
2. The **Public Order and Police Law of 1900** (治安警察法 *Chian Keisatsu Hō*) was directed specifically against the organized labour movements. In addition to restrictions on freedom of speech, assembly and association, it also specifically prohibited workers from organizing and going on strike. A provision banning women from political associations was deleted in 1922.

3. The **Public Security Preservation Law of 1925** (治安維持法 *Chian Iji Hō*) was directed specifically against socialists, communists and anarchists. An immensely significant law underpinning imperialist, fascist Japan, it was not repealed until after the First World War. In 1941 it was wholly revised. Penalties for communist sympathizers were increased, religious organizations were now included in the remit of the Thought Police and the appeal court for Thought crimes was abolished. Totalitarian control was now complete.<sup>77</sup>

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PART III

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Regional Reactions  
and Responses: Korea

## Japanese Imperial Sport as Failed Cultural Conditioning: Korean ‘Recalcitrance’

*J.A. Mangan, Kyongho Park and Gwang Ok*

### INTRODUCTION

Throughout the period of Japanese colonization from 1910 to 1945, Japan attempted the systematic ‘Japanization’ of Korea. The outcome was the complex interaction of three components: colonization, nationalism, and modernity. In pursuit of ‘Japanization’, initially from 1910 to 1920, inter alia all forms of indigenous sport—the legacies of Tradition and ‘Westernization’—were proscribed except for YMCA activities (mostly non-Korean organized). ‘Japanization’ produced in response, the Korean March 1919 Independence Movement. The Japanese modified their repression. They permitted inter alia the Korean controlled Joseon Sport Association (JSA) to exist within the Japanese overall controlling organization, the Joseon Sport Foundation (CSF). For a time

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this compromise between oppressor and oppressed was tolerated by both Koreans and Japanese. However, Japan became both more aggressively imperialistic and militaristic in the 1930s. Korea now endured ‘the full brunt of Japanese ... subjugation’. Sport became militaristic in purpose and practice. Control reverted totally to the Japanese. The JSA was closed down. Sport became an instrument of military preparation. Nevertheless, in various ways, now more covert than overt, sport remained a means of the expression of a national identity. In 1945, this expression was vigorously reincarnated in the post-imperial period with intense national enthusiasm and with vivid memories of the pre-1930s when sport was the only means by which the Korean could dominate the Japanese—and, on occasion, did! In summary, the Japanese use of sport as a means of cultural imperialism ultimately in marked contrast to the British use of sport as cultural imperialism it was characterized by hard power, not soft power. Together with the other ruthless cultural imperial means employed by the Japanese in Korea, this has left a legacy of lasting resentment and a powerful predilection for revanchism. Finally, it should be noted, however, that not all Japanese cultural imposition was negative. Sports new to Korea were introduced: imperial and international.

### COLONIZED KOREA

Physical education is the most important education ... because the body is the root and the mind is the branch of a tree. The purpose of physical education is to promote the mind through training of the body. Therefore, physical education is not only linked to the development of an individual but also significantly influences national destiny<sup>1</sup> (Figs. 3.1 and 3.2).

The success or failure of the nation is not dependent simply on politics and economics, it also depends on sport. ... Until today, sport in our society had not been ... important. Physical education is not only just a skill, but also a subject in the school system and a practice in society. It is an important fact that sport in our society ..., can create strong mentalities and social stability. Sport for all is definitely useful for our society, especially, under Japanese colonization.<sup>2</sup>

...our athletes going abroad to participate in international sporting events and achieving splendid records have achieved more than hundreds of other foreign countries spending large budgets.<sup>3</sup>



**Fig. 3.1** Japanese military parade in Seoul after the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War in 1904 (*Korean History Research Association*. ‘Japanese Military Parade in Seoul after the Outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War in 1904’. Accessed on 15 June 2015.)



**Fig. 3.2** Korean students had to pay respect to the Imperial Japanese flag (Mokdo Elementary School in Gyoisan, Chungbuk in 1943, sourced from, The Institute for Research in Collaborationist Activities, available at: <http://www.minjok.or.kr/>. Accessed, 12 June 2015.)

## INTRODUCTION

Modern sport was first introduced to Korea in the late nineteenth century in conjunction with the global tsunami of Western imperialism. The modern sports culture grew out of an existing traditional sports culture to which newly introduced Western sport was added.<sup>4</sup> After the Japan–Korea Treaty of 1905 was forced upon Korea by Japan, however, the sovereignty of the Korean nation was greatly diminished. Full Japanese colonial rule lasted from 1910 to 1945. Korean sport could not remain free from Japanese colonial policies. An analysis of Korean colonial history reveals the clash of nationalism and imperialism in modern sport as ... tools of both resistance and domination.<sup>5</sup>

The Japanese colonial occupation and administration of Korea can be divided into three periods. The first was Military Rule between 1910 and 1919. Among other actions, the Japanese prohibited political associations abolished Korean-language Hangul newspapers and arrested Korean loyalists in order to crush the Korean independence movement—and introduced brutal military rule based on the military police. The second period was Cultural Rule between 1919 and 1931. Japan replaced military control with more conciliatory colonial policies. During this period Japan abolished military police policies, permitted the publication of Korean newspapers and conducted other placatory policies. It felt threatened by the Korean March 1919 Independence Movement.<sup>6</sup> Reform, however, was highly deceptive and aimed at fragmenting Korean unity. The third was Wartime Mobilization between 1931 and 1945. During this time, Japan used the Korean Peninsula as a military supply base after the Manchurian Incident<sup>7</sup> in 1931, forcibly mobilizing all human and material resources to supply resources for the Sino–Japanese War in 1937 and the Pacific War in 1941.<sup>8</sup>

In short, Japanese colonial policies changed in response to internal and external politically perceived imperial needs. These changes included sport: *an important instrument of colonial conditioning*. Colonial Korean sport evolved in response to colonial crises and was dictated by imperial intentions.

These intentions clashed with Korean counter-attempts to strengthen nationalism through sport<sup>9</sup> and to use sport to sustain an impetus towards national independence.<sup>10</sup> Initially, this essay considers Korean sport during the colonial period when Korean politics, economics and culture were tightly controlled by Japan. In addition, the essay identifies

the origins of anti-Japanese sentiments that are profoundly embedded in modern Korean society and Korean sport: ‘a nation that forgets its past has no future’.

### JAPANESE COLONIAL SPORTS POLICIES, KOREAN SPORT AND KOREAN REACTIONS DURING THE THREE COLONIAL PERIODS

From 1910 onwards, after colonizing Korea, Japan consistently practiced the so-called Policy to Obliterate the Korean Nation,<sup>11</sup> through which it intended to transform Koreans into Japanese. This intended transformation was encapsulated in the phrase, ‘The Unity of Japan and Korea (or Japan and Korea as One or the Japanization of Koreans)’.<sup>12</sup> All institutions of Korean society were dominated by Japanese imperialism and for good reasons to be discussed, sport was no exception. This essay will focus on how sports policies of each period changed in accordance with shifting Japanese colonial policies, how Koreans reacted and how all policies encountered resentment, resistance and recalcitrance. Sport became a symbol of Korean deliberate and desperate self-assertion.

#### *Sport Policies in the Japanese Military Rule Period 1910–1919*

Japanese colonial policies towards Korea involved a concentration on education<sup>13</sup> in order to suppress nascent Korean nationalism in the young and to ‘Japanize’ Koreans in childhood. It existed in conjunction with the brutal repression of national assertion expressed by adults. The first Japanese Governor General of Korea, Terauchi Masatake<sup>14</sup> (1852–1919) conducted a Rule of Terror utilizing military police to anticipate and prevent organized resistance. In this first phase of colonial occupation, the Japanese consistently crushed independence organizations arresting nationalists, abolishing Korean newspapers, prohibiting open-air meetings and forcing teachers to wear imperial uniforms and carry swords.<sup>15</sup> Japanese colonial sport policies within the wider framework of educational and cultural conditioning were imposed with the explicit intention of inculcating Japanese beliefs, manners and mores (Fig. 3.3).

The late nineteenth century is when the first elements of modern sport started to appear in Korea. The Korean government used it to build the foundation of a secure national sovereignty by establishment of

**Fig. 3.3** Terauchi Masatake (1852–1919) (*Wikipedia*, ‘Terauchi Masatake’. [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Terauchi\\_Masatake](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Terauchi_Masatake). Accessed on 29 September 2015.)



a powerful national military—fit physically to defend the nation: strong bodies for sovereign security.<sup>16</sup> The goal of the Korean government following the Gabo Reform of 1894 (July 1894–February 1986)<sup>17</sup> had been to make the nation rich and powerful and to nurture bodies fit for war. The Korean government promoted sport to this end. Modern western physical activities sponsored by government agencies were viewed as the basic foundations for a strong, secure independent nation.<sup>18</sup>

The Japanese colonial rulers, well aware of this tradition, were quick to announce the First Joseon (Korea) Educational Ordinance (第一次朝鮮教育令) during Military Rule. Through this ordinance, they introduced specific sport policies with the aim of eliminating Korean practices.

First, Japan established physical education in line with colonial policies by restructuring school physical education. In fact, this had already been implemented in part by the Japan–Korea Treaty of 1905<sup>19</sup> after which Japanese officials adapted all schools curricula and textbooks.<sup>20</sup> Militant-style physical education was already a major component of the indigenous Korean physical education curriculum and intended, as mentioned above, to imbue Korean youth with both intense nationalism and powerful bodies. The Japanese revised the Enforcement Rule of the Common School Act in July 1909 and replaced military-style physical education with an emphasis on school gymnastics to prevent physical



education from creating young anti-Japanese Koreans. In 1911, school physical education was replaced by common physical education for all to further prevent Korean youth being trained covertly to assist the restoration of Korean sovereignty.<sup>21</sup> In short, Japanese policies were designed to repress any competences that would assist a national independence movement.<sup>22</sup>

Second, Japanese military personnel now replaced Korean military personnel who had been in charge of physical education in Korea since the late nineteenth century. The Japanese were only too aware that school physical education during the early period of colonial rule was a means by which many Koreans were taught covert national attitudes. They concluded rightly that Korean teachers were subverting Japanese colonial policies. They removed all teachers with a Korean military background.

Third, sports events such as athletics meetings were now regulated. Sport meetings were locations for the demonstration of nationalism. At the meetings, the national flag of Korea was waved and the rallying cry of ‘Manse’ (a call for independence) was heard. There were several noted events at which the calls for independence were heard. At the Seoul YMCA Athletic Meeting, three calls were heard: ‘The Great Imperial King manse, the Crown Prince manse, the YMCA manse’.<sup>23</sup> Students who participated in the athletics meeting of the National Hansong Secondary Schools in 1906 sang an independence song ending, ‘... brothers and sisters if combined together...an independent nation would be the number one in the world’.<sup>24</sup> Furthermore, these meetings were accompanied by speeches openly in support of independence.<sup>25</sup> Consequently, such sport meetings were considered by the Japanese as inflammatory. They were, therefore, abolished. The last combined sports meeting of private schools was in Seoul on 10 May 1912, although sport meetings at individual schools were allowed to continue.<sup>26</sup> The result was predictable. Sports meetings lost significance as nationalistic gatherings. They became simply individual school events. A fundamental element of Korean ‘recalcitrance’ was inescapably lost. Close integration of sport and nationalism was reduced. Nonetheless, Korean sport maintained its tradition as an established national symbol—through the YMCA.<sup>27, 28</sup>

Independence movement activists now joined YMCA activities in large numbers. The YMCA now contributed significantly to both the growth of modern sport in Korea and to the perpetuation of



Fig. 3.4 Seoul YMCA c. 1910 (Available at: [https://m.alibaba.com/guide/shop/photo-korea-seoul-y-m-c-a-building-1910-1920-young-mens-christian-association\\_52495085.html](https://m.alibaba.com/guide/shop/photo-korea-seoul-y-m-c-a-building-1910-1920-young-mens-christian-association_52495085.html). Accessed and purchased, 15 January 2015.)

nationalism.<sup>29</sup> After 1910, when the holding of combined sports events was restricted by Japan, 61 baseball games, 206 Judo matches, 93 soccer games and 18 basketball games were held by the YMCA between September 1911 and September 1912 alone.<sup>30</sup> De facto, the YMCA contributed substantially to maintaining not only Korean sport during the period of Japanese Military Rule but also to *sustaining* the nationalist cause. The costs of sports events organized by the YMCA almost doubled from 684 won in 1909 to 1123 won in 1912.<sup>31</sup> The YMCA now served as a location for nationalistic expression protected by its American origins and personnel (Fig. 3.4).

The Military Period also saw the rise in movements to preserve *gukgung* (Korean traditional archery), *ssireum* (Korean traditional wrestling) and other traditional Korean sports.<sup>32</sup> Sagunghoe an organization with the goals of fostering national spirit and preserving traditional sport especially through *gukgung*, a symbol of traditional Confucian Korean scholastic culture over many centuries, became hugely popular. Sport was now a central component of the expression of a living traditional Korean heritage.

Indeed, *gukgung* survived both as one of the leading traditional sports during the Japanese colonial occupation and as a determined nationalist statement despite occasional Japanese suppression which included the celebrated Joseon Archery Joint Competition in 1916.<sup>33</sup> *Ssireum* continued to spread along with *gukgung* and *ssireum* competitions. These were especially popular in traditional markets across the country. A *ssireum* competition was held at Dansung Theatre in Seoul in October 1912 by Yugakgwongurakbu.<sup>34</sup> This was the *first ssireum* competition held by a specific organization in modern times.<sup>35</sup> The competition became an annual event. *Ssireum* both sustained Korea's indigenous traditional sport and symbolized nationalist expression.<sup>36</sup> Traditional and 'renovated sports' now became indirect 'weapons of war': psychological, physical and emotional.

These sports were simply too widespread to be successfully eradicated by the Japanese and were performed in open defiance of Japanese political repression. Japanese Military Rule, as stated above, was a policy to eradicate nationalist manifestations of Korean thought and action. It contributed to a degree in imposing colonial dominance—but only to a degree. More to the point, it aroused and stimulated acute nationalist feelings. Anti-Japanese sentiment speedily increased. Predictably, the repressive sports policies of the Japanese, especially the attempts to destroy traditional cultural sporting legacies, ultimately strengthened anti-Japanese sentiment and increased both overt and covert nationalism. They were ultimately doomed policies: crude in composition and implementation. More than this, they 'backfired' as crass cultural attempts to hasten the process of 'Japanization'.

### *Sports Policies During the Cultural Rule Period (1919–1931)*

The nationwide March 1919 Independence Movement from March 1919 to April 1919 was a momentous event that openly proclaimed the collective national desire for an independent Korea. It was supported by businessmen, intellectuals, students and workers. Japanese colonial policy based initially on harsh military oppression now changed tack. The result was so-called Cultural Rule (1919–1931). Its most significant elements were calculated policies in deception.<sup>37</sup> There was the appearance of greater freedom for Koreans. Japan had already completed the establishment of political, economic, social and cultural systems to ensure the permanent occupation of the Korean Peninsula. Cultural politics became

the new way to rule and to disguise the more brutal aspects of colonial control: a velvet globe hid an iron fist.

During this period, freedom of assembly, association and publication were allowed—to a degree. In addition, carefully vetted Koreans were included in the administration.<sup>38</sup> Such policies were part of a new psychological warfare to consolidate permanent colonial occupation: soft power now conjoined with hard power.

Sport policies of the period reflected the new cultural approach. These policies divided into two: first, policies to promote modern sport. There were three reasons: Japan hoped to seductively distract the population, especially the young, with increased modern recreational opportunities. In this way, Japan intended to weaken an interest nation wide indigenous Korean sport, as already noted, a source of nationalist expression. Finally, Japan intended to promote interregional confrontation and thus reduce a national sense of unity.

One thing Japan earnestly hoped to achieve through the promotion of modern sport was to divert students the attractions of socialist ideology. The Russian Revolution in 1917 presented hope to many small weak nations of the period including Korea. Socialism with its aim of distributing wealth equally was an attractive ideology to those of vulnerable social status, but it also had a powerful attraction for idealistic university students. Geographic proximity with Russia helped socialism take root rapidly in Korea.<sup>39</sup> Utopian liberty as envisioned by socialism was the antithesis of colonial control, thus socialism was a combustible which combined with nationalism could trigger a Korean explosion. The Japanese intended to distract the student population from this inflammable political mixture using sport and its hedonistic attractions as a lure.

Japan now simultaneously made ever more strenuous efforts to suppress the holding of traditional sports events. It was evident to the Japanese that these events created a tight unity among the Korean people. Japan, therefore, now attempted to ban the holding of these events. Yut, Juldarigi (tug-of-war), Korean seesaw, *ssireum* and other traditional Korean folk games had proliferated across the nation under their own indigenous titles. They were large-scale events. Huge numbers of people gathered as spectators—thousands to tens of thousands. The events clearly had the potential to sustain Korean patriotism, nationalism and solidarity. These events were totemic fortresses of tradition and Pacific battering rams of independence. Consequently, Korean folk events were now proscribed or cancelled<sup>40</sup> by Japan. Two examples must suffice: the

Dongrae Juldarigi Competition held annually on the 15th of the first lunar month (January) in Busan was terminated on Japanese instructions. The First Lunar Month Folk Game, a joint folk event in which young girls participated in Jeju-do,<sup>41</sup> was banned with the excuse that such events were of no value.<sup>42</sup> By such actions, Japan intended to prohibit large-scale indigenous cultural events. Cultural events were now to celebrate Japanese culture. Proscription resulted in protest.

The Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea was founded in Shanghai after the Korean March 1919 Independence Movement in order to organize resistance to the Japanese colonial occupation. At the same time, radical movements were started by domestic nationalists to strengthen the ability of Koreans to resist Japan. One spin off was the creation of a national organization that was to play a critical role in promoting Korean sport. Joseon Sports Association was founded by Koreans on 13 July 1920. Incidentally, it is the forerunner of the present Korean Olympic Committee (KOC).<sup>43</sup> In its wake, the Joseon Football Tournament was established in 1921 and lasted until 1940.<sup>44</sup> In addition, various large and small modern sports events were held by the Association involving tennis, baseball and track-and-field such as the one held on 13 June 1929.<sup>45</sup> Eventually, in 1938, the Japanese established its own central sports organization for Koreans in opposition to the Joseon Sport Association—the Joseon Sport Association. It was to promote Japanese introduced modern sports events during the later Cultural Rule period to divert the ever increasing attention of the population from nationalistic modern sport activities organized by the JSA. It must be acknowledged that the CSA did contribute considerably to the development of modern Korean sport. Thus, Koreans and Japanese with very different motives moved modern sport forward in pre-second World War Korea.

Nevertheless, despite proscription, indigenous sports more than held their own. *Ssireum* but especially *gukgung*, as noted earlier, attracted more and more attention as indigenous national sports after the Korean March 1919 Independence Movement. They preserved a unique Korean identity and nurtured Korean national feelings. As for *gukgung*, whenever events were held, various other cultural events—both traditional and modern—were also held including *ssireum*, *yut*,<sup>46</sup> tennis, marathons, volleyball, singing tournaments and *namsadangpae* (travelling entertainers or theatrical troupes).<sup>47</sup> There were no less than 242 events of this kind from 1920 to 1940.<sup>48</sup> It is very clear that the Japanese attempted

suppression of traditional Korean sport *failed*. At the same time, sport in all its forms, as an integral and important national form of expression, contributed to the spiritual survival of the Korean nation, though Japan attempted to utilize modern sport as a distraction while suppressing traditional sport as a heresy, during the Cultural Rule period, Koreans, in response, successfully promoted and participated more keenly than ever in Korean traditional sport. Serendipitously, the Joseon Sport Association also helped to prepare the way for the later organized development of modern Korean sport. In addition, during the Cultural Rule Period opportunities there were international opportunities for Korean athletes such as the marathon runner Son, Gi-jeong (1912–2002),<sup>49</sup> who won in the marathon at the Berlin Olympic Games in 1936, and Kim, Yong-sik (1910–1985),<sup>50</sup> who pioneered Korean soccer. Such men became emblematic representatives of the Korean people. See the conjoined figures 9/10 below:

In summary, the strengthening of nationalism through sport is beyond dispute. Sport helped to overcome the frustrations of colonial rule, promoted a strong nationalist consciousness and sustained a sense of national identity. It was a significant tool of cultural resistance in the period of Cultural Rule.

### *Sports Policy and Wartime Mobilization (1931–1945)*

Whereas Japanese colonial policy in Korea prior to 1931 emphasized the permanent occupation of the Korean Peninsula, after the Manchurian Incident in 1931,<sup>51</sup> there was a distinct shift in emphasis to ensure the mobilization of human and material resources to realize a wider imperial empire. It was the beginning of the so-called transformation of Korea into a supply and mobilization ‘depot’.<sup>52</sup>

Japan enforced the politics of terror during the Military Period, the initial phase of the Japanese colonial occupation of Korea as already made clear, then later pursued a more tractable policy to turn Koreans into ‘Japanese’ in order to implement the eradication of a Korean national and independent identity. Recognizing the danger of too oppressive policies after the Korean March 1919 Independence Movement, Japan introduced, as also noted above, more propitiatory policies during the period of Cultural Rule.

The sports policies of this ‘cultural’ period reflected these new priorities. They had two complementary components: the disintegration and

integration of sport organizations. As again noted earlier, indigenous Korean sport advanced steadily after the foundation of the Joseon Sport Association regardless of Japanese efforts to suppress it. Furthermore, national pride was bolstered by modern sports events in which Koreans beat Japanese rivals. One notable example was when the college soccer team of Waseda University of Japan in the eighth Far East Olympic Games lost a ‘friendly’ match held in 1927 against the Korean Yonhi College.<sup>53</sup> Koreans momentarily ‘forgot’ the national frustration caused by colonial occupation. The morale of the nation momentarily soared. Then again, the soccer team of Pyongyang Soongsil High School made up of Korean nationals entered the Japanese Student Soccer Championship in January 1928. The team Korean, *de facto*, represented the nation in an early symbolic confrontation with its hated oppressor. These triumphs, however, were pinpricks on a thick Japanese colonial skin textured with layers of impenetrable imperial certainty, righteousness and arrogance.

And for the Koreans, these victories were but mole hills on a mountainous terrain of sustained humiliation. The Japanese intention to make the Korean Peninsula a base for invading Mainland China during the Supply Base and Wartime Mobilization period put them savagely in perspective and blatantly exposed an intention to exploit Korean resources, human and material: neither people nor place had equal standing to Japan in Japanese eyes.

Reprise: from the earliest moments of occupation, Japan introduced policies to control Korean sport: its potential for patriotism was blatantly obvious to them. The most dramatic action was the disbanding of the Joseon Sport Association in 1938—the controlling centre of Korean sport from 1920 to 1938. It was integrated into the Japanese Joseon Sport Association. This was a major blow to the expression of Korean nationalism on sports fields and in sports arenas. In the period of Military Rule, Japan had made school physical education part of Japanese military training. After initially removing Korean physical education teachers and replacing them with Japanese military-style physical educators, and in 1911 Japan passed the First Joseon Educational Ordinance (第一次朝鮮教育令) and then introduced Japanese militaristic physical education in schools. The Act was in part of a carefully planned Japanization educational policy. Then much later, in 1937 came the Unity of Japan and Korea Act (內鮮一體). The 4th Joseon Educational Ordinance (第四次朝鮮教育令) of 1943<sup>54</sup> put school education onto

a wartime footing.<sup>55</sup> Schools became preparatory training centres for engagement in war.

After the commencement of the Pacific War following the attack on Pearl Harbour in 1941 Japan fully controlled all school sports events and prohibited all ball games in colleges. All students now participated in military physical training.<sup>56</sup> In effect, Japan transformed schools into military training camps. It reformed the Hakgyokyoryeon Gyosuyomok (Syllabus for School Drilling, 學校教練教授要目) in 1942. The emphasis was now strongly on military type drill. It also made drill compulsory in colleges and universities. Imperial Subjects Gymnastics became compulsory in sports clubs. In 1942, Japan also utilized the young as military assets to be mobilized at any time by conducting national physical fitness assessment tests thus ensuring wartime readiness and thus paved the way for conscription.<sup>57</sup> It also installed Public Health Services to manage policies related to public health and sanitation to reduce disease. It required a healthy society for a healthy army.<sup>58</sup> Japan announced student mobilization on 20 October 1943 and introduced conscription on 23 August 1944. Finally, Japan transformed the entire Korean Peninsula into a military base by announcing the Student Troop Act (October 1944, 學兵動員令) and then the Subjects Work Mobilization Act (6 March 1945, 國民總動員令) (Fig. 3.5).

Korean society, culture and sport lived through a Dark Age as a result of the education policies during the period of Military Supply Base and Wartime Mobilization (to give the period its full title). Korean 'sport' was now militarized as the whole country engaged in wartime mobilization. The last Games of Jeon Joseondosidaehang chukgudaehwe (Whole Joseon Intercity Soccer Contest) held during this period were the 4th Games in April 1941 and the 5th Games in May 1942: the last indigenuous events under Japanese colonial occupation. The system of transforming Korea into a military base, not only threatened the existence of Korean sport but also ensured unwelcome militaristic elements in school physical education even after liberation from Japan in 1945. Some commentators believe a militaristic culture still exists Korean sport—the direct result of Japanese influence: an unfortunate legacy!<sup>59</sup>

Thus, it is an ironic reality that modern sport that sustained Korean self-pride during Japanese colonial rule until recently still retained militaristic elements; a regrettable vestige of Japanese imperialism. Japan's sports policies and the transformation of school physical education into military drill can be said to have had a long-term influence on the





**Fig. 3.5** Military Drill, Kendo training at Hongseong Elementary School in 1939 (*Hongseong Shinmun*, ‘Military Drill, Kendo Training at Hongseong Elementary School in 1939’, 27 April 2007.)

structure of modern Korean sport, especially in schools. After Korea became independent, there were many physical education teachers who used the militaristic teaching styles they had learned from their experiences during the Occupation especially while serving the Japanese army. Other teachers who did not experience Japanese army training but had learned militaristic sport during the Occupation often also practiced militaristic teaching styles. Thus the militaristic character of physical education teachings continued for a long time in part due to the Korean War which broke out in 1950 and military trained presidents who dominated politics until the early 1980s.<sup>60</sup>

Nevertheless, it should never be forgotten that sport was means of sustaining national pride and promoting patriotism for much of the occupation period. Games against Japanese teams were proxy wars for Koreans, and Koreans were ecstatic when Korean teams beat Japanese teams.

## CONCLUSION

In summary, although Japan after colonizing Korea proclaimed the Unity of Japan and Korea—in reality, Japan consistently maintained repressive discriminatory colonial policies of subjugation to exploit human and material resources, especially when the Korean Peninsula was used as a ‘beachhead’ to invade Mainland China. Japan’s colonial policy shifts in Korea can be divided into three phases—Military Rule between 1910 and 1919, Cultural Rule between 1919 and 1931 and Military Supply Base and Wartime Mobilization between 1931 and 1945. Fundamentally, however, Japanese policy was consistent throughout the 35 years of domination—the eradication the Korean nation as an independent nation and the permanent occupation of the Korean peninsula.

Japanese policies involving sport and physical education during each of the three periods of Japanese colonial rule of Korea had a considerable impact on Korean society: mostly negative *and* partially positive.

In the final analysis, the Japanese use of sport and physical education was a cultural instrument of colonial indoctrination into Japanese political mandates, morals and manners. As such it failed.

## A FINAL REFLECTION

Korean sport in the period of Japanese colonial subjection was metaphorically a ‘double-edged sword’ used by *both* the oppressor and the oppressed. For the Japanese sport it was a means of moulding minds, spirits and bodies into a Japanese dictated imperial docility: an action of an extraordinary confident political and psychological arrogance. For the Koreans sport became a means of demonstrating desperate ‘recalcitrance’. For a sustained period, inter alia, it helped underpin Korean nationalism. It was an emotional and spiritual bond cementing patriotism in a time of extreme vicissitude, suffering and humiliation. It has proved a durable cement sustaining an ‘edifice’ of national loathing of Japanese imperial expansionism that still reveals few cracks. The regrettable ramifications and resonances of the Japanese occupation are seen and heard today.<sup>61</sup>

They may well carry over to the forthcoming Tokyo Olympics. The Koreans have long memories and pressing demands—not least a full apology from Japan for the imperial period and a full recognition of the Japanese atrocities and abuses of the time. Korean memories have been,

and are, carried over into both the politics and geopolitics of East Asian sport *and* East Asia.

Sport is a contemporary global obsession.<sup>62</sup> International sports fields and arenas today provide powerful opportunities for revisiting and remembering the past. Victims remember—vividly. Forward to Tokyo 2020. Memory holds the door open for the re-entry of the past.<sup>63</sup>

## NOTES

1. *Taegeuk Hakbo*. ‘Hoam Mun Il-pyeong’s Theory of Physical Education’, no. 21, 24 May 1908.
2. *Donga Ilbo*, 26 September 1925; Gwang Ok. ‘The Political Significance of Sport: An Asian Case Study—Sport, Japanese Colonial Policy and Korean National Resistance, 1910–1945’, *The International Journal of the History of Sport* 22, no. 3 (2007b), 232.
3. Nam-gil Ha and J.A. Mangan, ‘Ideology, Politics, Power: Korean Sport-Transformation, 1945–92’, *International Journal of the History of Sport* 19, no. 2 (2002), 231.
4. Nam-gil Ha, *Cheyuksa Shinron [The New History of Physical Education]*, (Jinju: Kyung Sang National University, 2010).
5. Ok, ‘The Political Significance of Sport’, 649.
6. The 1 March Movement is also known as Samil Movement. It is recorded as the first public protest of Koreans against Japanese colonialism. It was held on 1 March 1919.
7. The Manchurian Incident was a staged event strategically designed by Japanese military personnel as a pretext for the Japanese invasion in 1931 of northeastern China, Manchuria. Peter Duus. (Ed.) *The Cambridge History of Japan, Vol. 6: The Twentieth Century*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 294.
8. *Doopedia*. ‘Japanese Colonial Era’, available at: <http://terms.naver.com>, accessed 20 December 2014.
9. Kyoung-ho Park, ‘Development and Ideology in Korean Football’, unpublished Doctoral thesis, Chungbuk National University, Cheongju, Korea, 2013; Gwang Ok, ‘Cultural Diffusion, National Assimilation, Imperial Resistance and Independent Assertion: The Origins and Evolution of Modern Sport in Korea’. Doctoral thesis, University of Strathclyde at Glasgow, 2004; Gwang Ok. ‘Cultural Transformation and Modern Sport in Late Nineteenth Century Korea’, *Korean Journal of Physical Education* 44, no. 5 (2005), 21–31.
10. Gwang Ok, *The Transformation of Modern Korean Sport*. (New Jersey: Hollym, 2007c).

11. It was colonial policy for Japan to control Korea legitimately, to exterminate Korean resistance and finally to ensure Korean cooperation for Japanese imperial war. Hae-dong Yun and Jeong-hwan Cheon et al. *Geundae reul dasi ingneunda [Re-read the Modern]*, (Seoul: Ryeoksa Bipyeongsa, 2006), 51–57.
12. It meant that Japan and Korea was united. In fact, it was designed to exploit Korea during the colonial period.
13. It is interesting to compare the British imperial use of education with the Japanese imperial use of education as a means of socialization. See, J.A. Mangan. *The Games Ethic and Imperialism: Aspects of the Diffusion of an Ideal*. (Harmondsworth: Penguin/Viking, 1985) (Also published in softback by Cass in 1998). See also J.A. Mangan. (Ed.). *'Benefits Bestowed?' Education and British Imperialism*. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988); J.A. Mangan. (Ed.). *Making Imperial Mentalities: Socialization and British Imperialism*. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1990); and J.A. Mangan. (Ed.), *The Imperial Curriculum: Racial Images and Education in the British Colonial Experience*, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993). This trilogy was also published by Routledge in 2012.
14. Terauchi Masatake was an army officer who later became a politician and a diplomat and eventually became the first Japanese Governor General of Korea. He was responsible for the Rule of Terror in Korea in 1910. Dae-won Yun. *The Illegality of Annexation of Korea and the Forceful Annexation Plan of the Colonial Ruler, Terauchi Masatake*. (Seoul: Somyeong Publisher, 2011).
15. *Doopedia*, 'The 1st Age of Japanese Colonial Era', <http://terms.naver.com>, accessed, 26 December 2014.
16. Duck-soo Park, 'A Study of the Generation and Development of Sports Activities Embodying Korean Nationalism in Imperial Japan's Forced Rule Era', unpublished Masters' thesis, Busan National University of Education, 2008.
17. The Gabo Reform was a reform movement carried out by Korean government from 1894 to 1895. The Reform Council introduced various changes affecting the nation's politics and government. They marked a departure from the traditional society. Inoue Kaoru, the new Japanese minister came to Seoul on 20 November 1894. He presented twenty items of reform to the king and ministers. On 7 January 1895, King Kojong took an oath before his ancestral shrine in Seoul. It involved 14 articles of the constitution. The articles included: dependence on China should be abandoned and independence secured, 'a code of the royal household should be enacted to clarify the line of succession and the distinction between the royal family and those related to the royal family

by marriage’, the king should monitor political affairs, consult his ministers and decide upon matters of state, palace matters and the government of the country must be separate, the duties and powers of the cabinet and ministers should be clearly defined, taxes should be regulated by law, and the Finance Department should take charge and control them, the expenses of the royal household should be reduced and an estimation of the royal household’s expenditures and officials should be arranged before spending, local government shall be reformed speedily and the powers of the local officials should be restricted, young intelligent men should be sent abroad to study foreign science and industries, ‘instruction of military officers and the recruitment of soldiers should be regulated in order to secure the foundation of the military system’, law must be strictly decided and employment should be regarded to their origin. Jong-guk Lim. *The Annals of Pro-Japanese*. (Seoul: Dolbaegae, 1991).

18. Hyun-sook Kim. ‘The Representations of Athletic Games during the period of Daehan Empire’. *Journal of East Asian cultures* 48 (2010), 7–31.
19. The Japan–Korea Treaty of 1905 is also called the Protectorate Treaty. Japan presented to the Korean government its true imperial face through this treaty. This stated that Japan was to be responsible for Korea’s international relationships. King Kojong would be safely guarded by Japanese military forces, however, he would play virtually no part in politics. Korea had lost its sovereignty. In this tragic political situation, King Kojong tried to inform the world about the nation of Japanese colonization by sending a secret mission to the Second International Peace Conference held at the Hague in the Netherlands in 1907. Japanese response was to impose the ‘New Agreement’ on the Korean government. It included the abolition of the Korean Army.
20. Seung-jae Kim and Kun-jick Yoo, ‘Focus on the Evaluation of School Gymnastics: Historical Examination on School Physical Education at the Choson Dynasty’, *Research Bulletin of Research Institute for Physical Education & Sport Science Kangweon National University* 20 (1996), 173–188.
21. Tae-woong Lee, ‘A Study of the Physical Culture under Japanese Imperialism’, *The Journal of Pukyong National University* 31 (1989), 45–54.
22. Su-kyun Kim, ‘Ideology of Physical Education of Colonialism Presented as a Moral Textbook under Japanese Occupation’, unpublished doctoral thesis, Kyungpook National University in Daegu, 1992).
23. *Hwangseong Shinmun*, 13 June 1906.
24. *Ibid.*, 29 October 1906.

25. Park, 'A Study of the Generation and Development of Sports Activities Embodying Korean Nationalism in Imperial Japan's Forced Rule Era'; Kim, 'The Representations of Athletic Games during the period of Daehan Empire'.
26. Seong-ho Byeon, 'A Study of Nationalist Elements of Sport Meetings during Late Joseon Period', *Korean Studies Quarterly* 36, no. 1 (2013), 185–215.
27. In October 1903, the Korean YMCA was founded under the name Hwangseong (Colonial name of Seoul) YMCA. It offered various sports programmes. The YMCA had a profound effect on the development of Korean sport in the pre-liberalization period by introducing and popularizing sport and modernizing traditional sport. Many modern sports including football, boxing and track-and-field were popularized through events held by the YMCA. The Korean YMCA was the backbone of the adoption of modern sport in occupied Korea and the only place where Koreans could play sport. Jae-Woo Kim. 'A Study on the Process of Sport Introduction, led by the Korea YMCA before the Independence', *The Korean Journal of History for Physical Education, Sport and Dance*, no. 19 (2007), 100.
28. Hak-rae Lee, 'A History of Sport and Physical Education in Modern Korea', unpublished doctoral thesis, Dongguk University, Seoul, 1985.
29. Jae-won Yoo, 'Japanese Colonial Policy and Korea YMCA Athletic Activities in the Japanese Colonial Era', unpublished masters' thesis, Kyungpook National University at Daegu, 2012.
30. Young-moo Lim, *Cheyuk & Sport Yeoksa Gyoyuk Jaryojip [The Historical Education Source book of Physical Education & Sport]* (Seoul: Taegun, 2001).
31. Seung-deok Choi, 'A Study of the Influence of the YMCA Movement on Social Sport of Korea', unpublished masters' thesis, Pusan National University of Education, 2005.
32. The representative traditional sports and games played during the colonial times included Juldarigi (tug-of-war), Jegichagi (Kicking the shuttlecock), Neolttwigi (Board jumping seesaw), Swinging, Tuho (Throwing the arrow), Yutnori (Board game with throwing sticks), Jachigi (Measuring with stick and hitting).
33. The traditional archery competition was led by the Gyeongseong (Imperial Seoul) Archery Association (also called Gwandeokhoi) founded in July 1916. Jung-eung Jo was elected as the President and the association hosted several competitions at Hwanghak Jeong, Cheongryong Jeong and so forth, *Maecil Shinbo*, 'Gyeongseong Gungsulhoi, Gwandeokhoi', 15 July 1916.

34. Yugakgwongurakbu was established on 7 October 1912 by the film companies, Gwangmudae and Danscongsa's Seung Pil Park to organize boxing, judo, and ssireum competitions.
35. Sang-geun Min and Gwang Ok, 'The Origin of *Ssireum* and Its Evolutional Process', *Journal of Korean Society for the Study of Physical Education*, 14, no. 1 (2009): 15–28.
36. Gwang Ok, Seok-gyu Choi and Hee Surk Jeong, 'The Disturbance of War: The Ancient Origin and Development of Korean Archery', *The International Journal of the History of Sport* 27, no. 3 (2010), 523–536.
37. Cultural Rule in Korea between 1919 and 1931 was intended to reduce Korean resistance which strongly increased after the 1 March Independence Movement. This Rule was in a certain degree deceptive. The colonial government pretended to alleviate discrimination against Koreans but the numbers of imperial police officers, in fact, increased and controls over the Korean national media became more severe than before.
38. *Doopedia*, 'The 2nd Age of Japanese Colonial Era', available at: <http://terms.naver.com>, accessed, 27 December 2014.
39. Sang-hun Shim, 'Confucian Scholars' Acceptance of Socialism and Nationalist Movement during the Period of Japanese Occupation', *Korean Thought and Culture* 70 (2013), 263–288.
40. Dongrae tug-of-war was abruptly banned from 3 pm on the 8 February 1930 by the Japanese colonial government. The New Year festival, which included various traditional games, among them swing, ssireum, sea-saw and yut was banned by the colonial government in 1930. Daehwa Sakjeon Daehoi also was banned by Japanese police officers from the 6 February. See, *Joseon Ilbo*, 11 February 1930; 13 March 1929.
41. Jeju is the biggest Island located at the southern end of the Korea peninsula and it is self-governed.
42. Nan-ju Kim and Jae-yong Song. 'The Indigenous Entertainment Promotion Policy and the Situation of Folk Entertainment during the Japanese Occupation by Force', *Bigyominsokhak* 44 (2011), 397–425.
43. Ha, *Cheyuksa Shinron [The New History of Physical Education]*.
44. Jae-hoon Jang, Kyoung-ho Park and Gwang Ok, 'The Introduction of Modern Football in Korea and Ideology, 1882-1910', *The Korean Journal of Physical Education* 52, no. 5 (2013), 45–55.
45. Ha, *Cheyuksa Shinron [The New History of Physical Education]*.
46. *Yut* existed during the Shilla Dynasty (57–935), although there are various traces that shows that *yut* existed from around fourth century these traces includes wall paintings throughout the Korean peninsula and some part of China in territories once occupied by Korean dynasties. The Korean ancient pastime of *Yut* was introduced to Japanese ancient society in the eighth century. The names of *yut* sticks, *Do*, *Gae*, *Geol*, *Yut* and

*Mo* represent common animals. Finally, the original purpose of *yut* was closely linked with agriculture. The four spots on diagrams represent the subdivisions of the seasons.

47. Seok-gyu Choi, 'The Social Cultural Functions and Transformation of Korean Traditional Archery', unpublished masters' thesis, Chungbuk National University, 2009.
48. Ibid.
49. Son was born on 29 May 1912 in Sineuiju in North Korea and he decided to be an athlete during his schooling at Gojuk Common Elementary School by his teacher, Il-sung Lee encouraged him. He showed exceptional talent from year 6 in elementary school and won the 5000 meters in the Aneuijeon Athletic Event in which adult athletes participated. He won his gold medal participating as a Japanese athlete—his Japanese name was Kitai Son—in the marathon at the 1936 Berlin Olympics with a world record, 2 hours 29 minutes 19.2 seconds and his last sport of 100 meters in the marathon took 11 seconds. He was the first Korean athlete ever to win a gold medal in the Olympics. Gil-yong Lee, a *Donga Ilbo* reporter, removed the Japanese flag from Son's uniform on the photo of the medal award ceremony shown to the Korean public at that time. This act contributed strongly to promoting independent assertion among Koreans. Lee and several executives of the *Donga Ilbo* were imprisoned due to his action. This was one of the classic of expressions of independent assertion by the Korean press during the colonial times. (*Donga Ilbo*, 'Our Son of Glory', 13 August 1936, in, Ok, *The Transformation of Modern Korean Sport*, 235–237).
50. Yong-sik Kim was the first Korean soccer player to participate in the 1936 Berlin Olympics wearing the Japanese strip. He participated also in the 1948 London Olympics as a Korean soccer player after independence in 1945. Later in the 1950s, he became coach for national soccer team. *Ilgan Sports*. 'Korean Soccer's Legend, a Lonely 100th Memorial for Kim Yong-sik's Birth'. 27 July 2010.
51. See note 8.
52. Gwang Ok, 'Coercion for Asian conquest: Japanese militarism and Korean sport, 1938–45' *International Journal of the History of Sport* 24, no. 3 (2007a), 338–356.
53. Yonhi College was founded in 1885 and later merged with Severance Union Medical College as Yonsei University which is one of the most prestigious universities in South Korea, available at: <http://yonsei.ac.kr/eng/>, accessed on 15 June 2015.
54. The Act was announced by the Japanese colonial government in Korea in March 1943.



55. Mi-yang Kim, 'A Study on the Physical Education Policy of the Japanese in Korea and a Resist—Japan Movement at the Close of the Japanese Imperialism', *Journal of Sport and Leisure Studies*, 4, no. 1 (1995), 241–250.
56. Korea University, *Koryeodaehakgyo 70nyeonji [70 year's History of Korea University]* (Seoul: Korea University Press, 1976).
57. Hak-rae Lee, *Hankukcheyuksayeongu [The Study of Korean Sport History]*, (Seoul: Kookhakjalyowon, 2003).
58. Ju-back Sin, 'Militarisation and the Disappearance of Physical Education: Japanese Physical Education Policy and Fitness Policy Enforced on Koreans', *Society & History* 68 (2005), 252–280.
59. The remnants of Japanese colonialism in Korean schools have links with the militarism which continued with the modern Korean politics in the 1960s and the 1970s. The saluting to the national flag, military drills, school uniforms, hierarchical class system and so forth existed until the early 1990s. Most of them now have disappeared but some of practices related to the Japanese colonialism and militarism still exist behind the scenes. See, *Kyunghyang Shinmun*, 'Still following Colonial Practices Which Have Even Disappeared from Japan', 13 February 2015.
60. Kun-Jick Yoo, 'A Study of the Influence of Physical Education during the Colonial Period of Japan on Korean Physical Education in Public Schools after Independence', *The Korean Journal of Physical Education* 40, no. 2 (2001), 40–42.
61. See, Boria Majumbar and Fan Hong. (Eds), *Modern Sport: The Global Obsession, Politics, Religion, Class, Gender. Essays in Honour of J.A. Manga*, (London: Routledge, 2007).
62. J.A. Mangan, Sun-Yong Kwon, and Bang-Chool Kim, 'London 2012 – Site for Political Animosities: South Korea and Japan in Confrontational Rational "Irrationality" (Part One: Long Memories)', *The International Journal of the History of Sport*, 30, no.15 (2013a), 1113–1129; J.A. Mangan, Sun-Yong Kwon, and Bang-Chool Kim, 'London 2012 – Site for Political Animosities: South Korea and Japan in Confrontational Rational "Irrationality" (Part Two: Long Gestations)', *The International Journal of the History of Sport* 30, no. 15 (2013b), 1796–1809.
63. J.A. Mangan and Sun-Yong Kwon, 'The Unclosed Door-South Korea's Post-Colonial Revanchism: Japanese Imperial Legacies and Anti-Japanese Sentiments' in, J.A. Mangan, Qing Luo and Sayuri Guthrie-Shimizu Eds.) *The Olympic Games: Prism for East Asian Politics and Geopolitics*, (Beijing: Communication University of China Press, forthcoming).

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- , 26 September 1925.
- , 5 May 1927.
- , 'Winning for Soongsil Middle School', 14 January 1928.
- , 'Our Son of Glory', 13 August 1936.
- , *Megazine Sindonga*, 1 November 2005.
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- , 'The 2nd Age of Japanese Colonial Era', available at: <http://terms.naver.com>.
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# The Unclosed Door: South Korea's Postcolonial Sport as a Revanchist Reaction to Japanese Imperial Legacies

*Sun-Yong Kwon and J.A. Mangan*

## SPORT AS A SYMBOLIC SITE OF POSTCOLONIAL REVANCHISM

Revanchism can be described in the specific context of South Korean recent history as a political expression of the former colonized will to expose, delegitimize and dismantle its colonizer's imperial legacies; an act of postcolonial revenge and act of postcolonial reconstruction. South Korean contemporary anti-Japanese sentiment is a collective manifestation of a persistent postcolonial revanchism.

It is unquestionably the case that compared to other national forms of expression such as, film, music, arts and literature, sport has provided the most puissant opportunities for collective emotional effervescence resulting in outpourings of unforgotten memories. Sport contests effectively summon up deeply laden colonial memories which then provoke

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contemporary tension and friction between former colonialists and colonized. Furthermore, when present political and territorial disputes and past historical contentions come to the fore, it is invariably sports contests between the involved parties that are readily selected to serve as sites of symbolic commentaries on those non-sporting conflicts and controversies. Moments of sport confrontation immediately and effectively compress, catalyze and revive a deep-seated refractory anti-colonial rejection and resentment.

For South Koreans losing against the former oppressor is a profoundly humiliating experience. Postcolonial South Korean sport sites have provided memorable occasions where the nation has triumphed over Japan. There have been no other comparable postcolonial confrontations. Sport has a special position as a form of postcolonial triumphalism. In sport South Koreans regularly regain and sustain national prestige by defeating Japan, its former colonial oppressor. Modern sports sites have become recent sites of postcolonial revanchist expression.

As a favoured vehicle of the popular media, sports contests are utilized to publicize and dramatize a legacy of postcolonial resentment. It is a simple task because the sports field is readily turned into a symbolic battlefield on which to express residual hatred born of colonial shame. As such, long-standing memories of colonial maltreatment make sports meetings between the two countries, particularly dramatic occasions. The media, only too happy to capture the intensity of the dramas, dwells on the historic aspects of colonialism because the mediated narratives and images speak evocatively, directly and emotionally to the nation. It is the media's deliberate strategic choice to summon up and keep alive Korea's colonial history and its legacies.

The South Korean media have diligently striven to emphasize the significance of colonialism. The reason most frequently given is present 'pride is on the line' in contemporary sports contests against Japan. The sport-war connection is pointedly made by the use of references to the old enemy, the arch-rival and the need for victory in the 'battle'. The dominant format of media representation demonstrates a clear intention to highlight and not infrequently exaggerate past historic Korea-Japan hostilities. Accordingly, media reporting offers a useful source of evidence for South Korean postcolonial sporting revanchism. In this essay revealing incidents of selected sports clashes between South Korea and Japan are recorded and discussed arguably providing exemplary evidence

of postcolonial South Korean revanchism through sport and transmitted enthusiastically by the media.

A review of the evidence, it is claimed, will demonstrate the virulent legacy of Japan's colonial control over Korea from 1910 to 1945 which has led to a lasting revulsion and a present predilection for revanchism. During the 1960s and 1970s after Korean independence, South Korea's postcolonial animosity towards Japan was repeatedly refracted through the medium of media-transmitted sports events against the Japanese: in particular, football, boxing and professional wrestling. After the 1980s, South Korea's postcolonial anti-Japanese sentiment expanded to include sports celebrities and the hosting of mega-sports events. During recent decades, South Korea's anti-Japanese revanchism has shown no sign of abatement—rather the reverse. It has been vigorously expressed on a variety of sports and sports occasions. Recent cases include: a series of South Korea-Japan baseball games at the 2006 and 2009 World Baseball Classic; the controversy created by the South Korean footballer Park Jong-woo at the football semi-final match at the 2012 London Olympics; the concerted media construction of sports rivalry between sports stars including the South Korean figure skater Yuna Kim and the Japanese figure skater Asada Mao at the 2010 Vancouver Olympics; and the intensive bidding competitions between South Korea and Japan to host mega-sports events such as the 2002 FIFA World Cup Korea/Japan.

#### 'GETTING BACK AT' THE NEIGHBOURING ENEMY

As made clear above, the postcolonial persistence of anti-Japanese hostility has been most evident in sport contests between South Korea and Japan. It has been well documented that the South Korean sports tradition of anti-Japanese sentiment has its deep roots in the sour soil of colonial oppression and resistance during the Japanese imperial occupation of Korea. It continues to spread as a postcolonial anti-Japanese sporting tradition—succinctly summarized in the following analysis.

... the Japanese colonial government employed oppressive and exploitative policies with regard to the political as well as cultural, economic, social and religious {existence} of the Korean population throughout the entire colonial occupation between 1909 and 1945.... sports competitions between Korean and Japanese players and teams implied a lot more than athletic



games. Athletic figures became national folk heroes who represented the entire national populace, and their success against Japanese players symbolized payback for the oppression that the colonial regime inflicted on the Korean people.... the wounds from Japanese colonial rule (has) had lasting effects on Korean-Japanese relations even after the independence of Korea in 1945.<sup>1</sup>

The analysis continued,

The collective historical memory of the subjection to compulsion under Japanese colonial rule has long been the basis of the underlying rivalry between the nations. In sports, any Korean athlete or team who played against a Japanese counterpart would have an added motivation to defeat their opponent. The media played important roles in perpetuating the mentality of rivalry by advocating that national pride was at stake in any athletic competitions that involved the two countries.<sup>2</sup>

This anti-Japanese revanchist tradition is manifest in South Korea's major modern sports including baseball, basketball, football, wrestling, weightlifting—and indeed others—revealing homology across most modern sports in South Korea. In this way, the South Korea-Japan sports contests are commonly viewed as opportunities for the nation's reconstruction of self-belief by the means of a specific manifestation of postcolonial anti-Japanese sentiment. During the 1960s and 1970s, it was professional wrestling, boxing and football that had provided most prominent symbolic stages for sporting revanchism. These stages have increased in number in subsequent decades.

After the introduction of television in the early 1960s professional wrestling and boxing became highly popular South Korean televised events. It was during the primitive stage of TV's development during the 1960s and 1970s that the two sports were especially suitable to the needs of both the South Korean popular entertainment and TV's technical capabilities; the size of the playing field—the ring.<sup>3</sup>

A professional wrestler, Il Kim, was one of the significant early popular icons of postcolonial sports revanchism against Japan. With his ring nickname, 'The Headbutt King', Kim became well-known in both Korea and Japan and succeeded in winning worldwide championships—Kim's first world title was at the Worldwide Wrestling Associates World Heavyweight Championship held in Los Angeles in the US in 1967.

Later with his historic duel against his all-time rival, Antonio Inoki, a Japanese wrestler and Kim's close friend outside of the ring, Kim rose to the status of national heroic sports star during the 1970s. His fights against Inoki, in particular, attracted huge attention. In one media interview, Kim recalled the intensity of anti-Japanese sentiment captured in the Kim-Inoki fights in South Korea,

... Anti-Japanese sentiments were very severe. Inoki said one day, 'when-ever I have matches in Korea, I feel that I get blamed and stigmatized because they think I am the enemy one who invaded and colonized Korea.... I even don't feel like eating because it seems that I am always full with words of curses and hatred.'<sup>4</sup>

To compliment Kim's victory against Japanese and Western wrestlers, President Chung-hee Park in his congratulatory remarks in telephone calls to Kim stated, 'Il Kim! Thank you for upholding the honour of our country'.<sup>5</sup> Recently Kim's wrestling gown was exhibited along with the Corinthian helmet of Kee-chung Sohn, the marathon gold medalist at the 1936 Berlin Olympics and a baseball glove of Chan-ho Park, a former Major League Baseball player at an exhibition hosted by the Korea Sports Promotion Foundation to celebrate the seventieth year anniversary of Korean Independence from Japanese imperial occupation.<sup>6</sup>

Like professional wrestling, fights between South Korean and Japanese boxers were fierce and attracted many stadium spectators and television viewers. Boxing was one of the few manageable sports that promoters and players could afford in a time of political conflict and public poverty.<sup>7</sup> In the 1960s, Japanese boxers were a step above South Korean boxers. However, from the early 1970s onwards South Korean boxers won the majority of matches against Japanese opponents.<sup>8</sup> Throughout the 1970s, there were a total of nine boxing matches against Japanese fighters, and six were won by South Korean fighters. The first world title match between the two hostile rival nations was held in 1975 between the South Korean Jae-doo Yuh and the Japanese Koichi Wajima. Yuh won the title with a KO in the seventh round becoming the South Korea's third world champion following Ki-soo Kim and Soo-hwan Hong.<sup>9</sup> In 1976, a South Korean daily newspaper, *Dong-A Ilbo*, began to refer to Jae-doo Yuh as the 'Japanese Killer' as he won both matches against the Japanese title contenders Koichi Wajima and

Masahiro Misako. The paper declared, ‘...Without further ado, we have witnessed Yuh’s explosive punches and overwhelming victory... knocking the challenger to the ground’.<sup>10</sup>

Two years later, Soo-hwan Hong defended his World Boxing Association (WBA) Super Bantamweight title by defeating the Japanese Kasahara Yu at the title match event held in Kokugikan—also known as the Ryougoku Sumo Hall—in Toyko. The South Korean media headlines portrayed ‘Kasahara Being Knocked Out’ with the following image which was taken after one of Kasahara’s five ‘downs’ during the match.

Provocative media comments on South Korea-Japan boxing matches contained descriptions of ‘literally beating up’ Japan. Terms such as ‘knocking out’, ‘knocking down’ and ‘killing’ in Japanese encounters were used purposely to indicate technical boxing terms as well as sarcastic ways of beating—‘pinning down’—the opponent. From 1975 to the late 1980s, South Korea-Japan fights comprised a total of 39 bouts with South Korea winning 24 (18 matches with KOs) and losing 15.<sup>11</sup> Boxing bouts between the South Korea-Japan became representative ‘battlefields’ by proxy on which the people of South Korea expressed their still virulent resentment towards Japan stimulated by the South Korean media.

Football has been a major outlet for South Koreans to express their deep-rooted animosity towards Japan. On 7 March 1954, the first international football match between South Korea and Japan was held in the 1954 FIFA World Cup qualifying round in Tokyo.<sup>12</sup> It was a worldwide surprise that South Korea could make up a team such a short time after the Korean War which had only ended in 1953. Prior to the last qualifying match, Syung-man Rhee, the first President of South Korea refused to issue visas for the Japanese national team to enter South Korea. He stated that ‘the Japanese should never touch Korean soil’.<sup>13</sup> Furthermore, the President did not allow the South Korean players to go to Japan to compete in the final matches announcing that it would be a ‘nationwide disgrace’ if the South Korean national team was defeated on Japanese soil. However, the former head coach Yu-hyeong Lee won over the President and pledged an oath stating that ‘if the national team did not win he would throw himself in the *Hyunbaetan* (the local sea area located between the Korean Straits and Kyushyu, Japan)’.<sup>14</sup> Eventually, both matches were held at the Meiji Jingu Stadium in Shinjuku, Tokyo. The South Korean players were ‘fighting’ for their country in order to

regain the pride the nation had lost during the Japanese colonial period, and *especially* because the games were on Japanese grounds.

In the first match, South Korea won 5-1 and a week later the two national teams competed again. The match ended in a 2-2 draw. In addition to the great victory against Japan, it was also a historical moment for the South Korean national team because it was the first time it qualified to participate in the FIFA World Cup.<sup>15</sup> Thirty years later during the qualifying rounds for the Mexico World Cup, South Korea and Japan were competing against each other again. And South Korean football player Soon-ho Choi, later a Korea Football Association vice-chairman, also compared this match as a battle by stating, 'It wasn't a stadium we fought on, it was a battlefield'.<sup>16</sup>

Throughout the history of Korean football, South Korea has been superior to Japan. In particular, from the 1970s to 1980s in the matches between South Korea and Japan, South Korea was dominant: the record was 22 wins, 6 draws and 4 losses. Every match against Japan has been played as if it were an opportunity to demonstrate anti-Japanese sentiment. Each victory was a historical moment for the South Korean nation. Each victory helped ease the pain of a brutal occupation.

During the 1970s, the South Korean football players Lee-chun Park was known as the 'Japan Killer' and Hoe-taik Lee as 'The Century's Hero Striker'. They became 'heroes' for their outstanding performances in South Korea-Japan matches. A South Korean Football magazine, *the Best Eleven*, reported that the 'Japan Killer' Park scored four goals in the South Korea-Japan matches.<sup>17</sup>

This nickname has been passed on into the present—and transferred to the football players Chung-min Choi, Bum-kun Cha,<sup>18</sup> Sung-hwa Park and Sun-hong Hwang who all scored five goals respectively in South Korea-Japan football 'showdowns'.<sup>19</sup> The South Korean media rejoiced in giving them all aggressive nicknames in recognition of their successes over Japan and as players who 'beat' the Japanese (Fig. 4.1).

On 28 September 1997, a South Korea-Japan football match, a preliminary round game in the 1998 France World Cup Final, offers an outstanding example of sports revanchism. The game was held at the National Stadium in Tokyo. Expectations were very high and feelings were acutely intense as South Korean players as well as stadium fans and television audience prepared for what they called a 'war'. The match was broadcast live by MBC (Munhwa Broadcasting Corporation) and



**Fig. 4.1** Bum-kun Cha known as one of the ‘Japanese Killers’ (The title ‘Japanese Killers’ are given to those who scored more than 2 goals in Korea-Japan matches) in South Korean football history (Available at: <http://news.joins.com/article/18717224> accessed, 13 November, 2015)

attracted the highest viewing ratings (56.9%) by a single TV channel up to that time.<sup>20</sup> The nation had high hopes of victory. Feelings against Japan were at boiling point. Japan took a one-goal lead in the first half. In the second half, however, with only seven minutes left on the clock, South Korea scored two goals in rapid succession to win the game.

As the second goal was scored, the TV commentator Jae-ik Song shouted 'Mount. Fuji is falling down'.<sup>21</sup>

This comment has passed into sports-reporting legend. It was a powerful allegory which the entire nation will not forget. Mountain Fuji is a universal symbol of Japan known worldwide. To rejoice at the metaphorical collapse of this majestic landmark revealed the strongest loathing of Japan. The expression delighted the South Korean people. This football match has been nicknamed 'Tokyo Daechup (Great Victory in Tokyo)'—as if it were a battle in which where the national team had occupied the Japanese capital. Bum-gun Cha, the head coach of the national team, became a national hero and an online football community site, *Footballist*, even named him, 'the new President' at a time of upcoming national elections.<sup>22</sup>

More than 50,000 South Korean supporters were present in the Tokyo National Stadium. The 'Red Devils (Bulgeun Akma)', the 'South Korean Football Supporters' were also there to cheer on their national 'warriors'.<sup>23</sup> The South Korea-Japan football match was conceived as a supporters' 'battle' between the two nations. The South Korean media published stories about the 'Red Devils' and 'Ultra Nippon' (the Japanese national football team supporters group). For example, *Hankyoreh*, a South Korean daily, published an article entitled, 'South Korea-Japan Football Match Is Also a Cheering Battle'.<sup>24</sup> Another article from the same newspaper, entitled 'Red Devils Beat Ultra Nippon!' illustrated a story of cheering war, referring to historical wars and confrontations between Korea and Japan. The article compared the Red Devils cheering formation positioned behind the officials' bench to '*Hakik-jin* (Crane Wing Formation)'—a semicircular battle formation similar to a shape of a crane's wings.<sup>25</sup> The '*Hakik-jin*' was designed and used by Sun-sin Yi, a Navy commander who won every battle (23 victories in 23 battles) during the Japanese sixteenth-century invasion: the Imjin War (1592–1598).

When the South Korean media covered rival meetings against Japan, the war metaphors were effectively and emotionally used again and again to suggest proxy battles in open verbal display of postcolonial revanchism. And it was not only the media that portrayed such hostility. Fans were also open to exhibitions of apparent revanchism.

In 2010, at the Saitama stadium in Japan, the South Korean football player Ji-sung Park scored during a friendly game against Japan. Right

after Park scored he ran towards the 'Ultra Nippon' group and stared into the crowd expressionless. It became known by both South Korean media and fans as 'A Walk in Saitama Ceremony' or 'A Gaze Ceremony' and interpreted joyfully as Park single-handed dominating and intimidating the Japanese football fans as well as the players.<sup>26</sup>

In 2011, during the game between South Korea and Japan in the East Asian Cup, 'Ultra Nippon' supporters wore 'Devil Yuna Kim' masks and mocked South Koreans while waving the 'Rising Sun Flag'.<sup>27</sup> This deeply offended the South Korean football player Sung-yueng Ki and on scoring a goal he performed his own 'monkey ceremony' to ridicule the Japanese. The Japanese fans were disconcerted. Ki later stated, 'I am a Korean citizen before I am a national football player', and continued, 'When I saw the "Rising Sun flag" being waved in the stadium, I felt a lump in my throat and wanted to cry'.<sup>28</sup> After the game he posted on his *Twitter* account, 'All my fellow players, thank you for not giving up, you are all heroes to me. And my heart shed tears when I saw the "Rising Sun Flag" in the stands'.<sup>29</sup> This was far from being the only acrimonious encounter between the two countries involving the flag which remains the most hated symbol of Japanese imperial militarism.<sup>30</sup>

In 2012 at the London Olympics, South Korean patriotism was once more dramatically exhibited and on a world stage when the South Korean player Jong-woo Park held up a sign 'Dokdo Is Our Land' after winning the match against Japan and the team Olympic bronze medal (See Fig. 4.2).<sup>31</sup> The International Olympic Committee later announced that Park was to be denied his bronze medal.<sup>32</sup> In a recent interview on *SBS News* Park stated that people called him an independence fighter and that he was proud they acclaimed him.<sup>33</sup> Later that year, there was a U-20 Women's Football match between South Korea and Japan where the Japanese fans once again waved 'the Rising Sun Flag'. This was interpreted by South Korean fans as an act of revenge for the Dokdo incident at the 2012 London Olympics.<sup>34</sup>

It has been pointed out by the South Korean media and fans that South Korea has not been the only side reenacting history albeit symbolically. The 'Ultra Nippon', Japanese football supporters, as noted above, have waved the 'Rising Sun Flag' inside stadiums during South Korea-Japan 'showdowns' on more than one occasion. In response, also as noted above, the South Korean 'Red Devils' have depicted historical events relating to Japan in the football stadium. Recent cheering performances by Red Devils using historical heroes and stories was viewed by



**Fig. 4.2** Jong-woo Park's 'Dokdo ceremony' (Available at: <http://sports.news.naver.com/general/news/read.nhn?oid=001&aid=0005968836/>, accessed, 22 January 2017)

both the South Korean media and the fans as a means of 'getting back at' the Japanese for holding up the hated 'Rising Sun Flag'. This 'Rising Sun Flag' historically, culturally and politically, provokes all neighbours of Japan but in particular the Koreans and China. Both suffered exceptionally under Japanese imperial occupation.

As seen in Fig. 4.3, in protest against Japanese fans holding up the 'Rising Sun Flag', Korean Football Association (KFA) allowed fans to





**Fig. 4.3** KFA display offensive banners during the match against Japan. (Available at: <http://sports.news.naver.com/general/news/read.nhn?oid=001&aid=0006398715>, accessed 22 January 2017)

hold up a banner acclaiming that there was, ‘No Future for a Nation That Has Forgotten Its History’. This specific game was hosted by the East Asian Football Federation, and the Vice-President of the KFA asked the supporters to remove the banners stating, ‘this stunt can end up as a politically controversial issue’. However, for South Korean fans (and the media), ‘the stunt’ was perceived as simply an active response to what could cause an even bigger controversy, the displaying of ‘The Rising Sun Flag’. A public TV SBS network’s sportscaster Seong-jae Bae once commented during a match between Japan and Greece at the 2014 Brazil World Cup, ‘Frankly, in Europe, people are not familiar with the “Rising Sun Flag”, so maybe that is why there aren’t as many restrictions, however, in Asia, that flag is no different from the Nazi swastika’, and continued, ‘They (the Japanese) waving the flag) should all be asked to leave the stadium’.<sup>35</sup>

Interestingly, *KBS News*, another public TV network in South Korea, hosted a talk show in 2015, ‘Sports Daebaekgwa (Sports Encyclopedia)’ with Young-pyo Lee, a former national football team player and current football commentator, and Ki-bum Kim, a sports journalist. In the show, Lee talked of his experiences in international football games against Japan, and remarked, ‘When the national anthem is played and I have my right hand on my chest I think to myself, I am going to die here,

and I believe that other players are thinking about the same thing, especially when it's a match against Japan'. Kim elaborated on this statement by mentioning a press release about a South Korea-Japan game, 'Even though I'm a journalist ... when writing a report, it's not easy to maintain balance because of the strong emotions aroused by the opponent'.<sup>36</sup> Lee's commentaries became increasingly appreciated by his South Korean audience for his excitement every time Japan lost, regardless of which country the Japanese were playing. South Korean listeners could relate to his comments. What his reports reveal is that those working in the media want South Korea to win every encounter with Japan. He is not the exception. And in turn, this general attitude reveals how deeply South Koreans feel about their colonial past.

The media is the purposeful excavator of memories. In this role, it has carried and carries nationalistic reports and stories for public consumption reminding its audiences continuously that sports events between South Korea and Japan are substitute wars of revanchist purpose and stadiums are substitute battlefields for redemptive possibilities.

Despite football's greater popularity, for decades South Koreans have also been passionate about baseball. Consequently, baseball has provided a further puissant possibility for postcolonial sports revanchism as exemplified in this media tongue—in cheek quote, 'maybe there is more to the two countries' baseball showdown than just baseball'.<sup>37</sup> Baseball, as in the case of football, has offered contemporary chances for political confrontations involving enduring animosities—illustrated graphically all recent baseball games between the two East Asian rivals. The complex South Korea-Japan political relationship has been cobwebbed over time with the threads of annexations and geopolitical disputes but above all has found yet another sports medium for surrogate military struggle: baseball.

World Baseball Classic (WBC) events offer persuasive evidence. Of course, baseball tension between the two countries existed before the World Baseball Classic. In the 1982 Amateur World Series, South Korea and Japan were playing at the final round. Japan was winning by one point (1-2: South Korea-Japan) when a South Korean player, Jaepak Kim, performed the famous 'frog bunt' play which tied the score.<sup>38</sup> Later in the game, Dae-hwa Han hit a homerun that eventually let South Korea win against Japan as well as win the series.

An intense South Korea-Japan baseball rivalry continued when 'South Korea suddenly shot to international prominence in the sport

by beating Japan to win the bronze medal in a 2000 Sydney Olympics baseball match'.<sup>39</sup> Soon afterwards, South Korea was placed second in the 2002 Intercontinental Cup and achieved a quarter-final victory over Japan in the 2005 Baseball World Cup in the Netherlands. The rivalry intensified further in 2008 during the Beijing Olympics, the most recent Olympics to include baseball as an official Olympic sport, when 'South Korea rolled through the Beijing Olympic tournament unbeaten',<sup>40</sup> humiliated Japan sending its rival home without a medal, a rarity repeated only once previously in Japan's long and successful Olympic baseball history. Ironically, it was reported at a 2006 WBC South Korea-Japan game that for some Japanese players, their main mission 'was to prove that South Korea won't be able to beat Japan "in the next 30 years"'.<sup>41</sup> Strongly attacked as inflammatory by South Korean fans, the comment was made publically announced by Ichiro Suzuki, Japan's most celebrated baseball star. The emotional crescendo created rose even higher when Ichiro Suzuki commented that the loss to South Korea in the 2006 WBC was the 'most humiliating day of my career'.<sup>42</sup> Resentful heated outbursts often fill baseball arenas when the two nations meet. Here once more, as in the football stadiums, South Korean fans hold up banners in protest, most recently over territorial disputes involving East Sea islands.<sup>43</sup> Any cooperative relationship between South Korea and Japan is entirely pragmatic: an economic necessity. Political historical loathing has acquired contemporary origins in recent years.<sup>44</sup> Baseball provides yet another sports outlet for present as well as past political battlefields.

Baseball has become more than a local 'bragging right' for South Korea and Japan. The two countries are using international sports competitions as a way of demonstrating national strength and international standing. Success is manifestly a modern demonstration of projected soft power. The soft power objective is simply in the eyes of the world to regionally 'subdue a despised rival'.<sup>45</sup> In the wake of this subjection flows positive national image, enhanced regional esteem and international respect. Consequently, governments have intervened to ensure success. For instance, the South Korean government exempted those participating in the WBC from the country's mandatory 2 year military service to allow for maximum preparation. Piquantly, interest of the games between the two nations has been so high and nationalistic interest so deep that 'the (South Korean) government has even allowed prisoners to watch'<sup>46</sup> the sports confrontations.

The media reports compared South Korea-Japan baseball as a rivalry so fierce that it is illustrated similarly to ‘the Cold War-style showdown between the Russian and the U.S. hockey teams’. The reference is to the American hockey team’s victory over the more talented Russian team during 1980 semi-final Olympic game in Moscow. The hockey game was the emotional zenith of the Cold War with US and USSR both eager to demonstrate their power on an international stage with the world as the audience. Similar situations have recently resurfaced in East Asia via baseball.<sup>47</sup>

When the Major League Baseball (MLB) originally created the World Baseball Championship (WBC) as a means of gaining more international fans and a bigger commercial market to offset the declining US market, the rivalry between South Korea and Japan was a clear target for commercial expansion.<sup>48</sup> The WBC claims that the rivalry between the two nations compares to a classic baseball relationship between the Yankees and the Red Sox, and such an electrifying atmosphere was exactly what the WBC wanted. It ‘crystallized in ... (2006) WBC Semifinal moments’. The WBC record-setting attendance of 54,846 at the Dodgers Stadium for the match between South Korea and Japan was a statistical testament to the commercial success—but also the national significance—of the game.<sup>49</sup>

In 2006, the WBC decided to host its tournament games between South Korea and Japan in Los Angeles—home to the largest South Korean population outside of Korea and with one of the largest Japanese communities in the USA. The game effectively heightened tension between South Korea and Japan. If there is a single defining moment that captured the confrontation, it was on March 16 when Gap-yong Jin planted a South Korean flag on the mound after beating Japan in the quarter-final ‘much to Japan’s anger’.<sup>50</sup> This was later repeated at a later game against Japan during the 2009 WBC tournament.

The WBC was obviously another venue that South Koreans could use to continue a national narrative about South Korea determination to crush a historically dominant Japanese baseball culture: a clear act of contemporary revanchism. Analogously, the domination correlated with the improving economic conditions and strengthening the political power of South Korea when compared with the stagnating, recession-weakening economy and declining political power of its historically more powerful neighbour. Baseball was yet another ineluctable symbol and symptom of an intransigent friction between the two countries.

## SPORT CELEBRITIES: SUSTAINING PAST HISTORIC CONFRONTATION: YUNA KIM AND ASADA MAO

It was in the early 2000s that the South Korean media began to follow diligently two young female figure skaters, Yuna Kim and Asada Mao. Yuna Kim, the South Korean gold medalist at 2010 Vancouver Winter Olympics in the figure skating ladies' singles subsequently has been constantly in the headlines. She has won every 'grand slam' title figure skating has to offer including the World Grand Prix Final, Four Continents Championships and World Championships. Her media nickname was elevated from 'a nation's sister' or 'a fairy of figure skating' to 'Queen Yuna' after the Vancouver Olympics. This royal appellation was followed by being listed in TIME's 2010 list of the 100 most influential people in the world. Asada Mao, the Japanese skater's senior career took off earlier Kim's when she won her first Grand Prix at the age of fifteen in 2005. During her junior and early senior career, Mao built up an unchallengeable reputation as a top female figure skater. While Mao also won World Championships, the Four Continent Championships and World Grand Prix Finals, the young prodigy's star was on the wane, diminished in brightness when Yuna Kim began her senior career in 2006.

Kim and Mao first competed at 2004 International Skating Union (ISU) Junior Grand Prix of Figure Skating Final. Mao won the title and Kim took second place. Kim won her first international junior champion title in 2005 after Mao began her senior career. Kim won her first senior title of Grand Prix Final in 2006. Both regularly advanced to final rounds to compete for international championship titles. Since then the South Korean media has routinely highlighted the Kim-Mao rivalry as a major headline story in sport pages and cover pages. The South Korean press frequently presents their clashes as national 'showdowns' between South Korea and Japan. *Dong-A Ilbo*, a major South Korean daily, invariably ran reports with titles, 'Korea and Japan's Rivalry Match on the Ice', 'Korea-Japan War: Season Two'.<sup>51</sup> Likewise, another major daily, *Chosun Ilbo* printed the following headlines, 'Yuna Kim VS. Asada Mao, Korea-Japan Duel for Pride'<sup>52</sup> and 'The War Has Been Sparked between Yuna Kim and Her Rival, Asada Mao'.<sup>53</sup> On many occasions, the popular media transmuted the personal Kim-Mao rivalry into a national conflict with the 'Nation's Pride on the Line'. The South Korean media eagerly seized on foreign media headlines to underline the appropriateness of its approach. *Yonhap News* reproduced an article from *Le Monde*, the French

daily newspaper entitled ‘Between Asada and Yuna, a Rivalry amid Diplomatic Tensions’.<sup>54</sup> The article made much of the fact that their duel on ice ‘implies more than just rivalry on the skating rink, but also tension in a diplomatic relationship between South Korea and Japan’. They became ‘diplomatic representatives’. Mao was even asked by the media what she could do to improve up the poor relationship between the two countries.<sup>55</sup>

The South Korean media repeatedly presented the Kim-Mao rivalry through a political prism. The political significance of the rivalry was given additional weight by continual media references to the politics—both explicit and implicit—inherent in other South Korea-Japan sports clashes especially on football fields and baseball pitches. The 2009 ISU World Figure Skating Championship was portrayed as an extension of the war between South Korea and Japan at the 2009 World Baseball Classic.<sup>56</sup> When South Korea lost a game the South Korean media drew attention to the national expectation that Yuna Kim would ‘take revenge’. In an article entitled, ‘National Baseball Team Brothers, Do Not Worry! Revenge Is Yuna’s’, Kim declared, ‘Because the national baseball team lost the game against Japan, this time it’s my turn to be the best ...’<sup>57</sup> In another article in the same daily paper, entitled ‘Korea-Japan “Cold War” 6th Battle Is on the Ice! Yuna Kim’s “WBC Revenge”’, it asserted that ‘Yuna Kim is determined to untangle the Korean national baseball team’s *Han*<sup>58</sup> through her dominating performance’.<sup>59</sup>

Then, on winning her championship title against Asada Mao, the paper declared, ‘Yuna Kim neatly liberated her homeland from WBC *Han*’.<sup>60</sup> With this heading, the implacable revanchist mood of modern South Korea was caught perfectly.

#### RIVALRY BEYOND THE STADIUM: BIDDING AND HOSTING COMPETITION

Mega-sports events, it is optimistically and piously hoped, promote global harmony, reconciliation and goodwill, and at the same time serve as catalysts for diplomatic cooperation and conciliation between specific countries.<sup>61</sup> As the first FIFA World Cup finals hosted in Asia, the 2002 Korea/Japan World Cup was an exceptional occasion. The two co-hosting countries, while sharing a bitter past as the colonized and colonial

respectively, jointly worked together for the first time in the history of the Football World Cup. The event was regarded as offering a unique opportunity for close regional neighbours to overcome their unhappy history of fraction and enmity and embark upon a fresh history of unity and amity in a spirit of regional cooperation and conciliation.

However, as this essay provides witness, for South Koreans sports competitions against Japan have been ‘battlefields without gunfire’. And of all sports, football has been and still is, a sport at which South Koreans do not want to lose, above all to Japan. During the early 1990s, the two arch-rival’s new battle ground was outside the football stadium. It was the decision-making arena for international football events and the bidding battle for obtaining the hosting right for the World Cup final.

Both countries struggled lobbied hard to promote their individual bids. Japan had been preparing as early as 1989 to host the 2002 FIFA World Cup while carefully ensuring the growth of its professional football league, the J-League. In consequence, for years Japan had been the strongest host candidate.<sup>62</sup> South Korea expressed its desire to host the World Cup only in 1990. Initially, FIFA officials were firm in their wish that the first World Cup of the twenty-first century would be held in Japan.

However, the tables were slowly turned. Mong-joon Chung, a South Korean corporate entrepreneur became the president of the Korea Football Association in 1993 and announced that South Korea would bid for the 2002 FIFA World Cup.<sup>63</sup> A triggering event was the qualification match between South Korea and North Korea played at the same time as Japan was playing Iraq. As the two matches approached the last minute, it seemed that South Korea was to be pushed out of the 1994 World Cup finals. However, Iraq scored ten seconds before the end. South Korea, instead of Japan, would participate in the 1994 US World Cup. This moment was famously called the ‘Doha’s Miracle’ or the ‘Miracle of Doha’ in the South Korean media. The Japanese media called it, the ‘Tragedy of Doha!’

South Korea’s winning the right to enter the 1994 FIFA World Cup finals became the catalyst for the nation to enter the bidding race for the hosting rights for the 2002 World Cup—the first FIFA World Cup to be held in Asia. In 1994, Mong-joon Chung became the ‘Asian’ vice-president of FIFA. According to an interview with *Dong-A Ilbo* after the election, Chung commented, ‘It may feel unfair to Japan, but I believe

in playing a fair game. And as ... Asian vice-president of FIFA, I do not think that there is anything wrong in an international bid'.<sup>64</sup>

The South Korean press was adamant that it was national pride that aggravated the consequent hostility between the two countries.<sup>65</sup> The media made much of the fact that the closest competitor in the bid to host the 2002 FIFA World Cup was Japan. *Dong-A Ilbo* votes stated emphatically that 'Japan is the competition'.<sup>66</sup> As the voting date approached, the South Korean press was packed with dramatic and aggressive headlines. In addition, *The Kyunghyang Shinmun* published an article entitled, 'Hosting the 2002 World Cup—a Confrontation of National Pride'.<sup>67</sup> The rivalry between South Korea and Japan was persistently highlighted in the media. Media reports yet again spelt out the historic rivalry between the two countries concluding that above all else South Korea must not lose to Japan.

In June 1996, South Korea and Japan were announced as joint hosts of the 2002 FIFA World Cup—a well-meaning diplomatic strategy intended to reduce the heated intensity of the bidding battle. However, the South Korean media implicitly pointed out that South Korea, de facto, was the winner of the bidding battle. For example, *Yonhap News* mentioned that 'it seems as though the two countries are now holding hands, yet Japan is still recovering from the shock', while highlighted that 'though the two countries are rival nations, now they are partners and need to prepare to successfully joint host the World Cup'.<sup>68</sup>

In spite of the diplomatic peaceful co-hosting accomplishment between the two rival countries, however, South Korea's anti-Japanese revanchism was increasingly and vigorously stimulated as Japan continued to show its desire for political and historical restoration of its imperial legacies. Conflicts and controversies had been created during the preparation period of the FIFA's joint event due to Japan's recurrent insensitive political campaigning justifying imperialistic wrongdoings involving various postcolonial issues—in particular those of history textbooks and comfort women. A few days after the FIFA announcement of co-host, for example, it was reported in the South Korean media that Japanese conservative politicians thoughtlessly stated 'Comfort women were not forced to participate in the activity rather a voluntary action .... There is no need for the nation's concern about this practice'.<sup>69</sup> In response to the shameless comments, the South Korean ruling party made an official statement that 'South Korea and Japan need to establish



a future-oriented friendly relationship before the joint-hosting of the 2002 World Cup' and 'it is dangerous even for the future of Japan if they continue to forcefully justify such remarks'.<sup>70</sup>

The South Korean media further questioned, 'Will there be reconciliation between the two nations?', by pointing out that '... in the year of the 50th anniversary of Korean Independence, Japan announced absurdly that the Japan-Korea annexation treaty was signed legitimately and that the practice of comfort women was a system of licensed prostitution'.<sup>71</sup> The article went on, 'due to historical encounters and a hurtful past colonization, it is clear that the two countries are in a delicate situation and political decisions should be made prior to Japan visiting South Korea for the opening and closing ceremony'.<sup>72</sup>

Moreover, a year before the 2002 FIFA World Cup, controversies related to the distortion of historical facts in Japanese school textbooks were surfacing.<sup>73</sup> On 22 February 2001, the South Korean government declared its concern and stressed that relationships between the neighbouring countries could be damaged in the future.<sup>74</sup> According to *KBS News*, Foreign Minister Jung-bin Lee stated that there could be severe harm done to the friendly relationship between South Korea and Japan if the controversies over Japanese history textbooks remained fundamentally unresolved.<sup>75</sup> With this political crisis coming to a head, the two countries continued planning the joint hosting of a world sports mega-event!

As the opening ceremony of the co-hosting event approached, in spite of Japan's consistent justifying display of imperial legacies, the South Korean media overall expressed and maintained a placatory tone. It delivered stories and reports of hopeful expectations that the first FIFA event in Asia would serve as a valuable opportunity for the two neighbouring countries to overcome their past animosities and promote mutual reconciliation.<sup>76</sup> This optimistic tone of media persisted during the competition.<sup>77</sup>

However, it was also suggested in the South Korean media that Japan was upstaged by South Korea in almost all aspects of the event. On the one hand, the co-hosted event was overall perceived by the South Korean media as providing a series of moments and occasions for promoting regional reconciliation and cooperation as well as international harmony and goodwill; on the other hand, the event was also partly utilized by the South Korean media as a global stage on which to display

South Korea's triumphant achievements over Japan: a somewhat ambivalent stance.

### RECONCILIATION WITH ITS FORMER COLONIAL AGGRESSOR?

This essay has explored some of the evidence showing ways in which South Korea's anti-Japanese revanchism has been illustratively expressed in a variety of sports and on a number of sports occasions. During the 1960s and 1970s South Korea's postcolonial animosity was vigorously demonstrated through the medium of sports events against the Japanese: in particular, professional boxing, professional wrestling and football. Obviously, the collective feeling of anti-Japanese resentment after Korean independence was rooted in the virulent legacy of Japan's colonial control over Korea from 1910 to 1945. Japanese imperial and colonial legacies remain deep in South Korea's collective consciousness. Its postcolonial revanchism expressed in sport shows no sign of abatement—rather the reverse. Indeed, this recent intensification of South Korea's postcolonial animosity mushrooms when present political and territorial disputes and past historical contentions come to the fore—in particular when it is perceived that Japan deems itself to have no responsibility for its ex-colonies' historic wounds and legitimate claims for regret, apology and compensation. Since the 1980s, South Korea's postcolonial anti-Japanese resentment expressed with bitter intensity in sport has diversified to include not only South Korea-Japan sport confrontations and but also embraced the mobilization of sport celebrities and bidding for hosting mega sporting events.

The year of 2015 marks the 70th anniversary of Korea's independence from the Japanese colonial occupation and also the 50th anniversary of the normalization of South Korea-Japan diplomatic ties. In recent years South Korea's anti-Japanese sentiment has been vigorously stimulated as Japan has openly and increasingly showed its desire for political territorial restoration of its imperial legacies. Furthermore, conflict and controversy have been extenuated due to Japan's recurrent insensitive political campaigning to justify imperialistic wrongdoings involving various postcolonial issues including history textbooks, imperial comfort women, Yasukuni shrine worship and territorial claims.

Is it possible for South Korea to dispel its engrained enmity towards Japan? What steps should be taken to move beyond historical hatred to

a productive relationship with its former enemy? Could sport contribute to any positive move in this direction? Sport has been a modern medium for the outpouring of South Korean national feelings of resentment—a means of expressing bitter historical memories. It seems at the moment that only the simplistic, the sentimental and the sanguine would claim for sport in East Asia the capacity to bring nations together in lasting ludic harmony. Will Tokyo 2020 contradict history? Will Tokyo 2020 presents the prospect of reconciliation in accordance with Olympic idealism? Time will tell.

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PART IV

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Regional Reactions  
and Responses: China

## A Living Legacy (Part One): Japanese Imperialism and Chinese Revanchism— Modern Sport as a Modern Medium

*Jinxia Dong, Tianwei Ren and J.A. Mangan*

... Asian nations' increasing use of sports for national branding and regional rivalries are all signs of Asia's new profile.<sup>1</sup>

The historical legacies of Japanese imperialism throughout East and Southeast Asia, the mid-twentieth century conflicts that produced territorial divisions of mainland China and Taiwan and the two Koreas have fueled sporting contests as ways of continuing these bitter rivalries.<sup>2</sup>

China and Japan are the two major nations in East Asia well-known for recent dynamic economic expansion in the past half century. Their

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relationship to a large extent will determine coming regional order, stability and security.

For much of the first half of the twentieth century, China and other East Asian nations were the targeted victims of a brutal Japanese Imperialism. For much of the second half of the twentieth century, Japan led East Asia economically and became one of the leading nations in the world in a meteoric recovery from the devastation of modern warfare and its weaponry. By early twenty-first century, however, China had overtaken Japan economically in an equally meteoric rise after experiencing the destruction of international and internecine war. Its resurgence, it is widely accepted, will continue, 'China as the region's largest economy will no doubt continue to lead the region's economic growth and shape the pattern of economic relations among the EA economies',<sup>3</sup> and it might be added of the world. The changed and changing order of East Asia has implications for the stability of the region, its security, the national and international policies and strategies of both Japan and China and their relationship to each other, the region and the world. While implementing very different strategies of regionalism to support their own interests, both Japan and China are interested in keeping their links with the West but within a framework of inclusive regionalism.<sup>4</sup> This incisive insight is striking in its recognition that the power politics of the globe have changed. The world is moving east geopolitically—with all that implies, '...Modern sport is part of this transition and this transition is a significant component of global geopolitical contemporary deconstruction and reconstruction'.<sup>5</sup>

Partly because of this, Japan and China have competed to bid and host the Olympic Games—the most prestigious and visible mega-sports events in the world—the one after the other. Japan successfully bid for the 1940, and bid for and staged the 1964 and will stage the 2020 Olympic Games. China successfully bid for and staged the 2008 Olympics and has bid successfully for and will stage the 2022 Winter Olympics. The acquiring of these global sports mega-events are contemporary geopolitical straws in the wind,

In this vast world region, the burgeoning populations, the dynamic economies and the rising political clout of East Asia have opened up new fields of play for sports participation, spectatorship and sponsorship. At the same time the five present East Asian nations – Japan, China, Taiwan, South and North Korea – have discovered sports as a new field for nationalism,

inter-regional competition and global assertion. The global geopolitics of sports is being upended by-and in- East Asia...<sup>6</sup>

The purpose of this essay is to explore the interaction between Japanese imperialism and Chinese nationalism, to survey the legacies and the respective pursuit of surrogate sports success—historically and contemporaneously—in the context of the rise of two Eastern superpowers, regional power politics, regional nationalism, regional stability and regional security. Chinese and Japanese symbolic political confrontation on sports fields and in sports arenas is the close focus of this essay as a mirror held up to the past, present and future geopolitical and political antagonisms.

### JAPANESE IMPERIALISM, WAR AND SPORT (LATE NINETEENTH CENTURY TO MID-TWENTIETH CENTURY)

The late nineteenth century to the mid-twentieth century was characterized by conflict between China and Japan with Japanese imperialism eventually dominating much of China. Imperialism is defined here as the direct or indirect domination of a nation over a controlled colonial territory: ‘Imperialism occurs when a strong nation takes over a weaker nation or region and dominates its economic, political, and cultural life’.<sup>7</sup>

Geographically, China is west of the Korean Peninsula and the islands of Japan. Prior to 1840 when the Opium War broke out, for centuries China—a massive land block—saw itself as the centre of the world because of its five millennia of advanced civilisation and two millennia of powerful centralized rule. As a mountainous island nation, Japan is physically a dwarf coexisting next to a giant. For centuries as a consequence, Japan has been heavily influenced by China. This is reflected among other things in Han Zi (Chinese Character), Confucianism, Buddhism and architecture.

Before the mid-nineteenth century, China and Japan were mostly self-sufficient and self-contained. However, this state of affairs was altered after the Western imperialist powers forced them open from the 1840s onwards. Between 1840 and 1842 the first Opium War<sup>8</sup> was fought between China and Britain. It resulted in the signing of the Treaty of Nanking in 1842<sup>9</sup> and the forced opening of several Chinese seaports including Shanghai and Tianjin. The treaty was a humiliation



for China. Almost at once, various Western powers including the USA, forcibly occupied ‘concessions’ and gained special commercial privileges. Dissatisfied with the feebleness of the Manchu dynasty, peasants in the south of China rebelled and launched the Taiping Revolution between 1851 and 1864 which resulted in the establishment of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom in Nanking in 1853. However, the revolution was eventually repressed by the Qing government aided by French and British forces. Arguably, the opportunity to save China from remaining a semi-feudal society and becoming a ‘semi-colony’ was lost.

Western imperial power, ideas and ideals took firm hold in Japan. In 1854 the ‘Japan–US Treaty of Peace and Amity’<sup>10</sup> granted foreigners in Japan extraterritoriality in legal cases and imposed on Japan low tariff rates. The imperialists did not grant reciprocal rating concessions. Japan took note. To strengthen its national security Japan introduced the policy of *fukokukyōhei* (rich country, strong military) in the 1860s. Emulating the Western imperialistic powers, Japan began in 1868 with the Meiji Restoration to industrialize and modernize in reaction to potential colonization by Western powers, and to attain industrial and military equality. Intelligent adaptation has been a Japanese quality, ‘Throughout their history {the Japanese} have shown a gift for rapidly assimilating new ideas and practices, a boldness in executing large projects and, above all, a talented and frequently exercised capacity for organization’.<sup>11</sup> Accompanying Western-type imperial expansion was western cultural assimilation. Western sports were manifestations of this cultural emulation. Baseball, cricket and rowing were introduced to Japan. An elite modern sports system was gradually set up as part of cultural westernization. The Japanese incorporated not only Western industrial and military practices but also cultural usages including sports of the West.

By the late nineteenth century Japan had rapidly transformed itself into the only industrial powerhouse outside Europe and the USA. Japan admired western imperialism and in particular, its acquisition of colonies for resources to sustain its industrial momentum and retain its world domination. Perhaps imitation is the most sincere form of flattery but there was cold logic involved as well. Japan began to acquire colonial territories in Asia to acquire the resources to maintain its industrial advance and to further its now imperial ambitions. In consequence, Japan invaded and defeated China in 1894–1895.<sup>12</sup> The result was the Treaty of Shimonoseki on 17 April 1895. The Treaty ceded to Japan,

the island of Taiwan and the Liaodong Peninsula in southern Manchuria together with several other territorial concessions and permitted the Japanese to live and trade in China. The 1894–1895 Sino-Japanese War created a great divide in the modern history of the relationship between the two countries. It was a traumatic Chinese experience psychologically more devastating than Western aggression. Japan had been considered an insignificant and inferior regional country. In terms of the immediate focus of this essay, this trauma was the initial source of a lasting national bitterness towards the Japanese later compounded by later further psychological, physical, emotional and national traumas inflicted by the Japanese. Here are to be found the sources of the modern surrogate wars now fought on sports pitches and in sports arenas. As George Orwell presciently declared, sport can be ‘bound up with hatred, jealousy, boastfulness, disregard of all the rules and sadistic pleasure in witnessing violence. In other words, it is war minus the shooting’<sup>13</sup>; a neat summary of sports confrontations between modern China and Japan.

Geographically Japan had an advantage over Europe and America in terms of targeting Asia in its imperial ambitions. Eventually, the Japanese occupied and controlled much of East Asia. Its overseas colonies provided it with resources, wealth and prestige. The Japanese revelled in their new Asian expansion, in their regional dominance and their national ascendancy.<sup>14</sup>

Defeat by the Japanese taught the Chinese a harsh lesson. Modern science, technology and weaponry were crucial for national security. To learn from the West and from Japan, the Qing government decided to send selected youths to the advanced, industrial countries to study. 120 students were at once sent to the USA to study. Because of the geographical convenience and lower cost, however, Japan became the chosen destination for many Chinese students. From 1900 onwards some 6000 to 10,000 Chinese went to Japan every year. 1906 was the peak year with about 20,000 Chinese students studying in Japan.<sup>15</sup> ‘Within the first decade of the 20th century, the number of Chinese journeying to Japan to study was probably the largest student relocation in the world at the time. The first generation of the leaders of the Republic of China were among them’.<sup>16</sup> These oversea Chinese students learned not just science and technology but also western-type sport and physical education. They had an immense impact on the development of Chinese physical education and sport in the first half of the twentieth century and laid the foundations for the eventual triumphs of Beijing 2008.<sup>17</sup>

The term 'Tiyu', which means physical education and sport, de facto, was borrowed from Japan. Qiu Jin, the revolutionary female who studied in Japan, inspired by her experience and set up a sports centre in Ningbo in 1907.<sup>18</sup>

Between 1895 and 1900, the imperial powers of France, Germany, Russia and Britain divided up China into spheres of influence,<sup>19</sup> which included special railway and mining concessions, leased territory and promises from China that comparable privileges in specified areas would not be granted to other countries. After the Opium Wars between China and Britain finally ended in 1898, Britain obtained a 99-year lease of the New Territories, significantly expanding the size of the Hong Kong colony. China was in the humiliating embrace of Western invasion and partial and indirect colonization.<sup>20</sup>

As part and parcel of Western imperialism, western-type competitive sports were introduced to China mostly by missionaries and foreign traders and were mostly played initially in the treaty ports, schools and other institutions set up by foreigners. Gymnastics was introduced to China in the 1860s and mainly adopted in schools and the army from the end of the nineteenth century as a form of fitness training. Basketball and athletics were introduced in the late nineteenth century and football and volleyball in the early twentieth century. In schools, these were a form of cultural colonialism with moral and ethical connotations.

The defeats by the Western Powers and Japan were a huge humiliation to the Chinese proud of their ancient civilization. To revive their ancient and humiliated nation, radical Chinese intellectuals and officials represented by Kang Youwei and Liao Qichao<sup>21</sup> advocated a National Reform Movement in 1898. The movement was suppressed by Empress Ci Xi.<sup>22</sup> China had missed another opportunity to catch up with the Western and Japanese powers. Two years later the Boxer Rebellion or Yihetuan Movement<sup>23</sup> took place in China. It was an anti-imperialist uprising. The Boxer fighters, convinced that they were invulnerable to foreign weapons, converged on Beijing with the patriotic slogan 'Support the Qing government and exterminate the foreigners'. The Rebellion was crushed by the combined force of 8000 Japanese and 9000 Western soldiers. The defeat of Boxer Rebellion fatally weakened the Qing dynasty (1644–1911). It collapsed in October 1911 and was formally replaced by the government of the Republic of China in February, 1912. However, lack of strong central control led to regional fragmentation, warlord rule and civil war in the following two decades.

Among other things, this had a negative impact on the evolution of western sport in China.

By the early twentieth century, Japan had become a fully fledged member of the imperial powers club. Between 1904 and 1905 Japan fought a celebrated war with Russia over territorial disputes in Korea and southern Manchuria. After destroying the Russian fleet at the last battle of Tsushima the war was over. The signing of the Portsmouth Treaty in 1905 granted Japan the control of Korea and the Kwantung Leased Territories.

The Chinese tried lamely to resist Japanese and Western imperialism. In 1908 they boycotted Japanese-made products. Eleven years later an anti-Japanese and anti-government strike was organized by university students in Beijing in opposition to the Treaty of Versailles in 1919 by which the West arrogantly gave Germany's concessions in China to Japan. China was once again the victim of Japanese aggression. Resentment was being heaped on resentment. The slogan 'Never forget our national humiliation' (Wuwan Guochi) was voiced during the Strike which turned into a political and social movement—the May Fourth Movement (1919). This Movement had a far-reaching impact on Chinese modernization bringing about political and cultural changes. China continued to oppose Japanese imperialism as best it could. Due to a Chinese boycott, imports of made-in-Japan goods decreased from 44.9% of the total imports in 1918 to 24.5% in 1921.<sup>24</sup> Nevertheless, China was in the political and geopolitical doldrums. Modernization made only slow progress. Westernization was largely on hold and, thus, so was the modernization of sport. Beijing 2008 economically was a very distant prospect.

In contrast, in keeping with economic and military success, Japan wanted at an early date to use international sport events as the symbolic stage on which to flaunt its political and geopolitical power. As early as 1928 Japan sent a delegation to the ninth Olympic Games and ranked 15th in the total medal count. At the subsequent Berlin Games Japan climbed to 5th place in the medal count. In sport as a reflection of national prestige reflected in international participation and performance China was out in the cold, frozen out of international involvement externally by its domination by Japan and internally by its domestic problems.

By the 1930s encouraged by the victories of the Japanese Empire, the Japan-Russia War and the First World War, Japan's military was displaying ever more arrogant and imperialist ambitions. War between

Japan and China became unavoidable and when it came brought appalling misery to the Chinese. Hatred of Japan intensified. Japan invaded Manchuria in 1931 and the next year established the puppet government of Manchukuo. The last Emperor of China, Puyi, was installed by the Japanese as the token leader: a powerless figurehead. The central government of China, impotent and weak, issued yet another feeble resolution to boycott Japanese-made goods.<sup>25</sup>

Physical education and sport were emphasized in Manchukuo (Manzhouguo). Martial arts were especially promoted as preparation for military service. A national soccer team was set up in an attempt to develop a sense of national consciousness in Manchukuo. Liu Changchu, the first Chinese Olympian at the 1932 Olympic Games, came from Manchukuo. He refused to represent it. Liu made a clear political statement: 'I am of the Chinese race, a descent of the Yellow Emperor. I am Chinese and will not represent the bogus Manchukuo at the Tenth Olympiad', but his ability to participate in international sport made an equally clear statement regarding the lack of competence of Chinese athletes from other parts of historic China. In 1934, Japanese proposed to allow Manchukuo athletes to participate in the Far Eastern Games, but it was rejected by other member nations. In 1938, physical education classes became compulsory in schools and a standard textbook 'A Teaching Programme of Physical Education' was issued in 1944. Manchukuo became significant in Asia in terms of sport.<sup>26</sup>

Hosting international sports competitions—then as now—could provide the host country with a springboard from which to leap confidently onto the world stage. In the 1930s, the Japanese economy suffered less from the Great Depression than most of the other industrialized nations. In 1936, Tokyo successfully bid for the 1940 Olympic Games. There was a direct connection. The Games was intended to showcase to the world Japanese prosperity, modernity and power. However, the invasion of China had depleted national resources and in addition as a result of Japanese military aggression, an international boycott had been threatened. 'Ironically, but by no coincidence, the desire to host an international event to demonstrate modernity along Western lines {was} ended by colonial expansion'.<sup>27</sup>

Prior to World War II, Japan built an extensive empire that included Taiwan, Korea, Manchuria and parts of northern China. Japan had successfully implemented its own form of regional imperialism by controlling great swathes of Asia. Supported by its strong industrial-based

economy, Japan expanded its war effort effortlessly in the Pacific, Southeast and South Asia and became a major world power. The clash between Chinese and Japanese troops outside Beiping (today Beijing) on 7 July 1937 marked the beginning of full-scale war between Japan and China. At the end of the year, the Nanjing Massacre committed by Japan allegedly claimed over 300,000 lives. This atrocity planted the seed of hatred towards Japan ever deeper in China. It grows strongly to this day. Resentment had become Loathing. In 1940, Japan announced that it would form a Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere to encourage Asian nations to resist western imperialism. It would, of course, also serve to meet the industrial needs of the Japanese war machine. The Japanese regarded this East Asia sphere of influence as a political and economic necessity, preventing foreign states from strangling Japan by blocking its access to raw materials and crucial sea lanes. By 1942, most of East Asia was under Japan's control. However, by 1945, the Japanese had suffered an unbroken string of defeats at the hands of the allied forces led by the USA for nearly two years in China and other Asian countries. In 1945 Japan surrendered unconditionally when the first atomic bombs in world history were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

Reprise: Japanese imperialism from the late nineteenth century to first half of the twentieth century in China gave rise to Chinese hatred and humiliation there. In China, in addition, it retarded modernization—not least in cultural and educational activities involving the evolution of modern sport—but it provided the immediate motivation to build a new modern identity when political stability was eventually established. The construction of this identity took time but the end result was to reduce Japan politically, economically and culturally, and a further end result not to be overlooked in China's modern ascendancy to general global notice, respect and admiration in conjunction with its astonishing economic resurgence, was Beijing 2008—a glittering talismanic event in the projection of a successful, prosperous and confident modern China. The world, including Japan, watched in wonder at the most expensive Olympics in modern history.

In addition, China's performance at the Beijing Games, coming top of the medals' table winning an amazing fifty one Gold medals well ahead of the USA which came second with thirty six, brought it global admiration, applause and esteem at a time when success in sport was a reflection

of national capability, wealth and success. Japan's earlier Olympics had been sidelined.

### POST-WAR RECONSTRUCTION AND INTERNATIONAL SPORT (1946–1989)

As a defeated nation Japan lost its colonies as a result of World War II. In spite of the collapse of the economy after defeat, the Japanese economy recovered impressively in the 1950s. To build a new cosmopolitan Japan, to project a new humane image and regain its reputation in the world, Japan expressed its wish in 1956 to host the 1964 Olympic Games in which Japan invested 3 billion US dollars and employed 100,000 to build the required infrastructures. Tokyo 1964 was 'a peak moment of collective accomplishment'.<sup>28</sup> Various economic development policies and national reconstruction strategies were implemented in preparation for the 1964 Games,<sup>29</sup> which generated explosive economic growth. Between 1953 and 1965 Japan's GDP expanded by more than 9% per year. From the 1960s to the 1980s, overall real economic growth was substantial—10% average in the 1960s, a 5% average in the 1970s and a 4% average in the 1980s.<sup>30</sup> Japan became the world's second-largest economy by 1968. By any yardstick, this was an impressive national reconstruction.

The hosting of the 1964 Games was regarded as an opportunity for Japan to be re-integrated harmoniously into the international community. Tokyo 1964 was praised by the then President of the IOC Avery Brundage as not just a 'general success, but great success'.<sup>31</sup> After the Games Japanese international status grew and its voice in international organizations was heard with respect. It is no surprise that Tokyo 1964 was, and is used 'as a frame of reference to evoke... hope that connected the past Tokyo Olympics with the present and the future'.<sup>32</sup>

Olympic performances also won glory for Japan. By the 1960s Japanese sports achievements reached their peak. Japan ranked third both at the 18th and 19th Olympic Games in terms of the total medal count. It led the Asian countries. China achieved this thirty six years later!

In China, a protracted communist revolution led by Mao Zedong won the bitter civil war against Chiang's nationalist government and People's Republic of China was established in October, 1949. Significant

changes occurred in virtually every aspect of Chinese society. To create a new global identity—one characterized by esteem and respect—became the goal of the new regime. International sport was considered a valuable component of a reconstructed image. As Mao Zedong said in 1956,

We have lots of weaknesses. Our economy does not work, our culture is outdated, and our sport is not developed. In the past the institutional mechanism was not good. (We adopted) a feudal system, was a semi-colony nation and invaded by imperialism. Now, (we must) re-establish the economy, and develop culture and sport.<sup>33</sup>

The New China was dragged into the Korea War from 1950 to 1953<sup>34</sup> but nonetheless for the first time, it sent athletes to the 1952 Helsinki Games.<sup>35</sup> Though China made preparations for the 1956 Olympic Games in Australia, at last minute it decided to boycott the Games: the IOC did recognize of the People's Republic of China as the sole representative and the only 'China'. It withdrew from the International Olympic Committee (IOC) and eight other international sports federations in 1958 insisting implacably on 'One China'.<sup>36</sup> On the world sports stage, it became to an extent invisible but only to an extent.

While China withdrew from 'the Olympic family' and other major international organizations from 1958 onwards, China continued to participate in international competitions including the World Table Tennis Championships in 1961. To guarantee victory in the Championships, the first big world event ever to take place in China, 108 best of the players from all over China were assembled to practice for a year. They were given every priority from food to facilities while China was experiencing a most difficult period due to natural disasters and the unrealistic Great Leap Forward in the late 1950s. China won the men's team and single events and women's single event. In 1963, China sent 229 athletes to the Games of the New Emerging<sup>37</sup> Force that was initiated by Indonesia and China to protest against IOC's policy on the 'two Chinas'.<sup>38</sup> Over 2000 athletes from 48 countries attended and China came first in terms of performance. It was an omen of things to come. China was not to be denied in its desire to use sport as national rehabilitation.

After the Japanese Women's Volleyball team won the 1964 Tokyo Olympic Games, China's Premier Zhou Enlai invited the team's head coach Daimatsu and seven team members to China to 'teach Japanese volleyball to our Chinese athletes'.<sup>39</sup> Sport, it appeared, might lead the



way to build a new amicable relationship between the two countries. This early contact led to later sports interchanges.

International competitions and exchanges were cancelled during the early years of the decade-long Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) that brought severe damage to the Chinese economy, culture and society; a self-inflicted trauma. It set back progress in sports development. However, in 1971 Chinese table tennis players went to Japan to participate in the Tennis World Championship. This paved the way for the internationally well-known Ping-pong diplomacy<sup>40</sup> that led to the formal visit of President Richard M. Nixon to China in 1972.

Relationship between Japan and China normalized in 1972,<sup>41</sup> six years earlier than the Sino-US relationship. Thereafter, trade between the two countries expanded over time. The volume of imports and exports between them increased from 1.03 billion US\$ in 1972 to 20.28 billion US\$ in 1990.<sup>42</sup> In the improved bilateral atmosphere, sports exchanges between China and Japan increased steadily. And exchanges were set up with the West as well. China was now a full member of the United Nations following World War II.

This assisted in its international acceptance. In 1974, China regained its membership of the fencing, volleyball, swimming and ice hockey international federations.<sup>43</sup> In the same year following a proposal by Japan and Iran, Chinese athletes were invited to participate in the Seventh Asian Games at which the Chinese won second place in the medal count, just behind Japan. This participation was a prelude to Chinese re-admission to the International Olympic Committee in 1979. China was now back on the international ladder to global recognition and acceptance in world sport.

After the policy of economic reform and ‘opening-up to the outside’ was introduced in China in December 1978<sup>44</sup> trade and business contacts between China and Japan accelerated. Japan provided China with a five-year (1979–1984) term low-interest loan of 330 billion Yen. It was the first country that provided such a loan to the Chinese government. This loan was repeated twice: the total amount was 1610.9 billion Yen. Since 1981 some 38.45 billion yen was given to China by Japan as non-reimbursable assistance. Japanese enterprises had invested 2.6 billion US\$ in China by 1991. Between 1973 and 1990 China introduced 930 technologies from Japan.<sup>45</sup> As a result, by the early 1980s, made-in-Japan commercial goods were seen everywhere in China. While the Chinese enjoyed the quality and convenience of Japanese products,

they also felt humiliated. They were ‘losing face’ (Diulian). In this heated atmosphere of humiliation, sport was a useful means of raising national moral. When the Chinese women’s volleyball players were losing against Japanese counterparts at the 1981 World Volleyball Cup final in Japan, the head coach of the Chinese team Yuan Weimin bellowed at the Chinese women.<sup>46</sup>

Think of where you are playing—Japan, the home of Japanese invaders who killed hundreds of thousands of Chinese in the Second World War. You are representing the Chinese nation. People on the motherland need you to risk your life to fight and to win all the rounds. If you don’t win this game, you will regret it all your life.<sup>47</sup> Old memories had resurfaced; old humiliation had reemerged; old hatred had reappeared.

Sport for modern China is an allegorical statement of political rebirth, a metaphorical declaration of political renaissance and an anagogical assertion of future regional political dominance but also of contemporary regional revanchism: ‘serious sport has nothing to do with fair play. It is bound up with hatred’.<sup>48</sup>

After New China reoccupied its seat at the IOC in 1979, ‘Go beyond Asia and join the advanced world ranks’ became its goal. China surpassed Japan at the Asian Games of 1982 in terms of the medal count. This victory gave China especial pride, dignity and confidence. Sport is ‘War without Weapons’ is a famous aphoristic mantra. It seldom had more significance. Since then China has dominated the Asian Games. While at the Los Angeles Olympic Games in 1984, the Chinese won fifteen gold medals *and* buried the humiliating ‘nil’ record in the Olympics once and for all. It was a moment to be savoured. It is a truism that ‘the Chinese government sees sporting success as important to the country’s status and prestige’.<sup>49</sup> To become an Olympic power an Olympic Strategy was issued in 1985. Since then Olympic medals have become the primary focus. Successful acquisition has had a lasting impact on Chinese sport. They are ‘battlefield’ medals won in a global sports ‘war’ for political and geopolitical athletic preeminence.

The Chinese are nothing if not pragmatic. With the continued gap in modern industrialization and living standards between China and Japan, in the 1980s, Chinese attitudes and government policy accommodated reality and the tilt towards Japan increased. Many Chinese went to Japan to study or work. Chinese students in Japan increased from 23 in 1972 to 19,000 in 1990.<sup>50</sup> Some athletes and coaches also followed the trend. He Zhili, the 1987 world table tennis champion, is a noted

example: an ultimate pragmatist disappointed at her disqualification for the 1988 Olympic Games—a result of violating her coach’s instructions at a competition a year earlier—she migrated to Japan in 1989. She married a Japanese into the bargain. In 1994, she represented Japan at the Asian Games and defeated her former Chinese team-mates winning a gold medal in the women’s single event. In the post-match interview, she stated that ‘It is the happiest moment in my life to defeat the Chinese’,<sup>51</sup> which poured salt on defeated Chinese wounds. As a result, she was considered as a Chinese traitor. Her story reflects a direct and specific relationship between sport and nationalism and the lingering resentment of the Chinese towards the Japanese—born or adopted. This intense, unforgiving approach towards Japan, as this essay has made clear, has extensive historical roots nation-wide. The savage invasion of China by Japan has planted seemingly deep-rooted, still widely spread and still strongly growing anti-Japanese sentiments, ‘The national-humiliation narrative is painstakingly reproduced in textbooks, museums, popular history books, virtual exhibits, feature films, dictionaries, journals, atlases, pictorials and commemorative stamps’.<sup>52</sup>

In summary, after World War II both Japan and China used sport to build a respected national image and an earned status in the world, but at a different pace. Japan led the way. Their relationship during this period was relatively tranquil, but the resentment and distrust resulting from the past still pervaded the collective Chinese consciousness and unconsciousness. Sport was utilized by China at times as a symbolic ‘war’ of revenge: revanchism by proxy.

### RISE OF CHINA, FALL OF JAPAN AND SPORT (1990–2014)

In spite of the world criticism of China following its harsh crackdown of the student movement in 1989, Beijing successfully hosted the 1990 Asian Games and China harvested a crop of medals.<sup>53</sup> Through sport China made a further political statement.

Although Japan joined the seven Western powers in imposing economic sanctions against China in response to the crushing of the student movement, Japan still sent a delegation to the Asian Games in 1990. This action bore witness to the fact that China was Japan’s most formidable opponent in the region. China could not be ignored. And in part because of a continuing sense of guilty over the past, Japan has provided China with aid worth 3641.2 billion Yen from 1979 to 2009. This Japanese loan has been the largest of Official Development Aid,

loans, and about 40% of the total foreign investment was from Japan.<sup>54</sup> Japanese support helped Chinese economic development in the 1980s and 1990s. It was also an intelligent investment, of course, in an emerging economic superpower!

The success of the Asian Games in 1990 encouraged the Chinese to bid to host an even larger and more influential international sports event: the Olympic Games. In 1991, Beijing submitted its application to the IOC for the 2000 Olympic Games, but unfortunately, Beijing lost its bid by two votes to Sydney, Australia in 1993.<sup>17</sup> This failure dealt a blow to Chinese esteem, and at the same time stirred up Chinese nationalism that reached its pinnacle in 1996 as reflected in the publication of the book: *China Can Say No and China Can Still Say No*. This nationalist sentiment was clearly demonstrated in sports competitions. Though Chinese men's football teams hardly won when playing against Japanese in the 1990s,<sup>55</sup> there was an exception: the Beijing Guoan Club defeated the Quidditch team of Japan in the Asian Cup Winners' Cup in 1997. In the pre-match preparation meeting the head coach Jin Zhiyang reminded the players of the modern humiliating history of China and asked them not to forget the Sino-Japanese wars in 1894–1895 and 1937–1945, and the Massacre of Nanking. 'In today's match you have to play out the spirit of China... You can be worse than the Little Japanese in skills but not in humanity'.<sup>56</sup> The hundreds of Chinese spectators who were studying in Japan sang songs from the beginning to the end of the match to cheer on the Chinese team. 'What they watched is football, but what they thought is state and nation'.<sup>57</sup> This once again indicates that sport between China and Japan, to make the point again without apology, is 'war without weapons'. Against this background, Beijing made its second Olympic bid in 1999 for the 2008 Olympic Games. This time it succeeded! Into the twenty-first century, Chinese nationalism continued but to a less extent due to the effect of preparing for the international megasport: Olympic Games in 2008 and Chinese closer integration with the world through trade, tourism and education. However, violent behaviours of players at the matches between China and Japan were occasionally reported in the first decade of the twenty-first century, for example, the 2004 Asian Cups and the 2008 Four Asian Powers Tournament.<sup>58</sup> A special note should be taken of the 2004 Asia Cup. Because of the historically bitter relationship between China and Japan, Chinese fans displayed intense anti-Japanese behaviour. Whenever the Japanese played, Chinese fans would support its opponent to the improvised song, 'Chop the Japanese devil to death'. In a Reuters' interview immediately after

the China-Japan Final, one 35-year-old man who described himself as a patriot said it was important to remind the Japanese not to forget history. 'We're seeing their old fascism starting to come back a little. For example, they are sending troops abroad'.<sup>59</sup> Fans even clashed after some matches.<sup>60</sup> Reconciliation between China and Japan on such occasions seems a distant prospect.

Beijing's successful Olympic bid was based on the rapid social and economic development of China in the last decade of the twentieth century. China embarked on the fast economic development track after its market-oriented economy was introduced. By 2001 China had achieved social stability and economic prosperity. Between 1993 and 2001, per capita annual disposable income for urban households was boosted from 2577 yuan (US\$452.1) to 6860 yuan (US\$830.5), net income for rural households rose from 921.6 yuan (US\$ 161.9) to 2366.4 yuan (US\$286.5).<sup>61</sup> This laid a foundation for Beijing to successfully launch the Olympic bid in 1999 with pledged full support from the government to its citizens.

While China's economy and influence grew inexorably in the 1990s, Japan's economy stagnated. Though Japan was the world's second-largest economy from 1978 until 2010, it suffered a long-term recession after 1992. The growth rate in Japan throughout the 1990s was 1.5%, slower than the rate in other major developed economies.<sup>62</sup> Undoubtedly, China posed a challenge to Japanese position as the pre-eminent power in East Asia. The rivalry between China and Japan became intensified economically, militarily and sportingly.<sup>63</sup> Chinese GDP rose from 1,096,551.7 billion yuan (US\$132,754.4 billion) in 2001 to 3,006,700 billion yuan (US\$433,242.1 billion) in 2008 and per capita GDP increased from US\$1042 to US\$3266.8.<sup>64</sup> The Japanese economy increased in much lower rate in the first decade of the new century. It was further hit badly by the global financial crisis of 2008–2009, with its economy shrinking by 6.3%.<sup>65</sup> Thus, in 2010 China surpassed Japan to become the second world economic power.<sup>66</sup> The gloomy economy in Japan was further affected by the Great East Japan Earthquake that led to significant accidents at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant complex in 2011. Although as the World Bank estimated the total economic cost suffered by Japan was US\$235 billion, the Japanese people responded with typical stoicism however, protests began to erupt particularly from more idealistic students: Figs. 5.1, 5.2.



**Fig. 5.1** Protesters hold placards during the anti-nuclear March in Tokyo, Japan, 2011. (Photo by Koji Sasahara, AP. *Source* ‘Thousands march against nuclear power in Tokyo.’ Original from AP, posted on, USA Today, 19 September 2015, available at: <http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/story/2011-09-19/japan-anti-nuclear-protest/50461872/1>. Accessed, 25 September 2015)



**Fig. 5.2** Anti-nuclear protesters attend a rally in Tokyo March 10, 2013. (Photo by Reuters/Issei Kato. *Source* ‘Thousands in Japan anti-nuclear protest two years after Fukushima.’ *Reuters*, 10 March 2013, available at: <http://www.reuters.com/news/picture/thousands-in-japan-anti-nuclear-protest?articleId=USBRE92903Y20130310&slideId=711324442>. Accessed, 25 September 2015)

Coinciding with Beijing's successful Olympic bid was China's entrance into the World Trade Organization, which greatly speeded up Chinese integration into the global community. In 2002, China's total inflow of Foreign Direct Investment reached US\$400 billion making it the world's largest recipient of FDI.<sup>67</sup> Non-financial FDI inflows increased from US\$46.9 billion in 2001 to US\$92.4 billion in 2008.<sup>68</sup> The total value of imports and exports in 2008 reached US\$2,561.6 billion.<sup>69</sup>

In the context of globalization a number of foreign coaches were employed in the preparation for the Beijing Games. In the Chinese delegation to the 2008 Games, there were 28 foreign coaches from 16 countries. One of them was Imura Masayo, the internationally well-known Japanese female coach for Synchronized Swimming. She began to coach the Chinese national team in 2004 and helped the team win a bronze medal in 2008 Olympics. It seems that the China has been assimilated more and more fully into the world scene. Nationalism and globalization coexist in today's China. This is shown clearly by the case of Ren Yanli. Ren was the former captain of the Chinese softball team in the early 1990s. She changed her nationality from Chinese to Japanese in 1996. She represented Japan twice in the Olympics. At the Athens Games, she defeated the Chinese team she once served. She was branded a 'traitor' by some Chinese. However, four years later she was invited back to China as a special guest for the CCTV's programme 'My Olympics' (Wo De Ao Lin Pi Ke). The U-turn change to some extent mirrored the changing Chinese society and culture: more open, and tolerant and integrated into the world.

While Beijing was preparing for staging the 2008 Olympic Games, Tokyo bid for the 2016 Games in 2004. It ended in defeat. William Kelly has argued that the bid was embedded in East Asian politics. Tokyo wanted to preserve its status as a global city especially after Beijing's glorious arrival on the world stage. China's rise meant acute political and economic challenges for the Japanese.<sup>70</sup>

Since 2006, the relationship between Japan and China has undergone fundamental changes from nascent friendship to national self-interest. Four factors are associated with the change: new leadership, national strength, national interest and international circumstance. It has not helped that since 1985 China has frequently condemned the visits of Japanese Prime Ministers to the Yasukuni Shrine, an honoured place for Japanese war dead who served the Emperor of Japan during

wars from 1867–1951 and including the convicted Second World War criminals. China, and other Asian countries such as South Korea, sees it as an attempt to legitimize Japan's past militarism. Then there is the issue of Japan's refusal to present a full version of the atrocities of World War II in its textbooks. This is 'a continuing source of resentment for many of its neighbours... Many Japanese feel that what was bad was militarism and that ordinary Japanese did not do anything bad, but were, in fact, the victims'. Clearly, there is a shocking lack of awareness among the Japanese that they were ruthless and brutal regional aggressors. In marked contrast, 'among the German people, there is the feeling of guilt that not only were the Nazis bad, but that they also were wrong and committed mistakes. For that reason, what they have done is to construct museums that describe their wartime aggression. German leaders continue to bow their heads and offer apologies'.<sup>71</sup>

Confrontation between China and Japan has occurred occasionally, especially since the Beijing Games. After 1949, China made a considerable effort to create a new national identity by defending the country's territorial integrity. Dispute over the sovereignty of a cluster of islands known as the Diaoyu in China and the Senkaku in Japan in the East China Sea has intensified considerably since 2012, with increasingly antagonistic action taken by both countries. China established an Air Defence Zone (ADIZ) around the islands in 2014, which greatly heightened tension between the two nations.

It should be pointed out that this territorial dispute occurred in the context of an increasingly interdependent economic relationship between the two East Asian countries. Total trade between China and Japan was almost \$334 billion in 2012,<sup>72</sup> trebling in the course of 14 years.<sup>73</sup> However, with the growth of China and the recession of Japan, the economic and political power structure in East Asia has changed. For the first time in history, the two giants of Asia are now considered to be on relatively equal standing on the world stage with increasingly China in the ascendance.

#### FUTURE PROSPECTS: TOKYO GAMES AND CHINESE REVANCHISM

In recent years a myriad of domestic concerns, such as 'the Great East Japan Earthquake, nuclear accidents, reconstruction, (and) reform of the social security and tax systems'<sup>74</sup> have preoccupied Japan. The triple disaster of an earthquake measuring 9.0 on the Richter scale,



leading to a tsunami and nuclear accidents in 2011 had a grave impact on the Japanese people and on Japan's national psyche. To 'resuscitate national confidence and redress the widespread pessimism of the present moment',<sup>75</sup> Tokyo made its bid for the 2020 Games with the theme 'Discover Tomorrow'.<sup>76</sup> Studies have shown repeatedly that 'the Olympics are an important means for cities to build an appealing and progressive image and enhance their position in a largely post-industrial economy by attracting investments, residents, and visitors'.<sup>77</sup> Given that the 1964 Tokyo Games acted as an engine for Japanese economic take off, it is expected that the 2020 Tokyo Olympics will do the same. After winning the bid, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe asserted that Tokyo 2020 would be an 'explosive agent for the stagnant Japanese economy'.<sup>78</sup> It is predicted that hosting the 2020 Games 'could produce positive economic effects of more than \$40bn and create more than 150,000 jobs'.<sup>79</sup> As a result, public support for hosting the Olympics increased drastically from 56% for Tokyo 2016 to 70% for Tokyo 2020. Japan will invest 409 billion yen (\$4.1 billion) for the sports infrastructure needed for the 2020 Olympics.<sup>80</sup>

China, from the general public to the high-level officialdom protested loudly against the 2020 Tokyo Olympics Games. Before IOC's final result came out, the Chinese media had already adopted a strongly critical position. Tianya, one of the oldest and most influential Chinese online forums, published a post quoting Lang Xianping, a famous Taiwanese scholar and economist who fiercely criticized the Chinese government's attitude to Japan's determination to win the 2020 Games:

... On Tokyo's bid for the 2020 Olympics, the Chinese media is ... ignorant. When the Chinese media announced that Japan was taking the lead among the three cities bidding for holding 2020 Olympics, the anchors ... quoted the Japanese people's own words to compliment Tokyo. This kind of seemingly ill-informed ignorance was in sharp contrast to the active determination of China's opposition to Japan over the Diaoyu Island and the maintenance of territorial integrity. This attitude displayed somewhat China's poor judgment regarding national interests at the strategic level of national contests, and inadequate observation and assessment of specific events...this time Japan has taken advantage of the opportune chance that no US cities are bidding for the 2020 Games and it attempts to win ... sympathy by utilizing the earthquake, tsunami and nuclear disaster. It tightly links the two (bidding and these events) and has named the Games as a 'revitalizing Olympics', attempting... to turn sympathy into votes...

China should not let Tokyo win on 7 September when IOC holds the 125th general meeting in Argentina's capital Buenos Aires to decide which country will hold the Games.<sup>81</sup>

He considered that this chance of holding such a prestigious mega-sport event will help Japan overturn its disadvantageous position in the two countries' strategic relationship, thus, harm the Chinese national interest. In fact, the government that Liang Xiping condemned of ignorance was less than enthusiastic about the Japanese success. After the Buenos Aires IOC meeting, China refused to offer official congratulations to Japan. 'We have noted the decision by the International Olympic Committee', coldly announced Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman, Hong Lei said. He stated that comment on the decision should be directed to the Chinese Olympic Committee.<sup>82</sup> In contrast, 'Although the Sino-Japanese relationship entered its worst period in the last 40 years, we still want to offer our congratulations to Japan, and wish the Olympic Games a success', declared a *Global Times* (China) editorial.<sup>83</sup> It was not a view widely shared in China. Greater resentment was displayed by the Chinese media. In the *People's Daily*, the mouthpiece of the Chinese official media, Kai Zhu raised three questions regarding Tokyo holding the Games:

1. How much political interference was there in the Tokyo 2020 decision?
2. Can funding be guaranteed?
3. How complete is the control of nuclear leakage?<sup>84</sup>

From Zhu's comments, it was clear that Chinese officialdom considered that there was much to be done if Tokyo wants to organize 'good' Games.

Simultaneously with Japanese people celebrating the winning of the bid, Japanese right wing societies held an anti-Korean demonstration calling for 'Japan to break off diplomatic relations Korea' and to 'resolve the Korean people's problems with Japan once and all'.<sup>85</sup> Zhu said it is considered by some<sup>86</sup> that winning the bid is regarded by the Japanese right wing a support even praise for Japan's increasing leaning to the right, 'Some are concerned that if the Japanese government insists on working hand in glove with the right wing, the Tokyo 2020 Olympics might become a reproduction of the 1936 Berlin Olympics under the

German Nazis'. Again for some in China, Japan purposefully intends to choose to expand its military power by taking advantage of any economic recovery brought about by this Olympic chance.<sup>87</sup>

The nuclear leakage is perhaps an even more salient problem bothering China and the region. As the neighbour of Tokyo, China suffered greatly from the 2011 Fukushima nuclear incident. Although Abe has guaranteed that the situation has been brought under control and will have a detrimental impact on Tokyo 2020, this widely disputed, 'The "key" to the mist of Japan nuclear problem, is perhaps the key to what kind of 2020 Olympic Games Tokyo will be presented to the world', Zhu said.<sup>88</sup>

Chinese voices critical of Abe's attempt to revitalize Japan's economy by utilizing the Games have been heard. On 8 September 2013, after Tokyo won the bid, Abe held a press conference in Buenos Aires, at which he stated that 2020 Tokyo Olympics would stimulate Japanese economic growth: '...just as happened in the 1964 when Japan held the Olympics for the first time'.<sup>89</sup> And Abe stated further when he spoke the journalists immediately afterwards, that that he hoped Japan would get rid of 15-years of deflation by using the Olympic Games as a catalyst. In response, one Chinese commentator commented judiciously, 'It is obviously not realistic to compare the 1964 glory with the 2020 possibility. Yet ... Abe needs urgently to revitalize the economy, and by taking advantage of the Tokyo 2020 Olympics, there is definitely more good done than harm'.<sup>90</sup> This cautious and less than enthusiastic comment reflected China's essentially polite but clearly negative attitude to Tokyo 2020.

This negativity was starkly revealed in an online poll result announced by Sina Sports created on 9 September 2013, only 17.3% of 163,277 voters believed that Japan deserved the chance of holding the 2020 Olympics, while 48.7% of a total 151,052 voters thought Tokyo's greatest advantage in winning the bid was that both its competitors had serious weaknesses rather than Tokyo having obvious advantages!<sup>91</sup>

In summary, China did not favour Japan winning its bid and was determined to keep a close watch on Japan's economic, political, environmental future, 'Japan should learn how to behave itself. China is eager to see Japan and East Asia experience the next seven years in a stable and positive manner'.<sup>92</sup> Resentment, suspicion and dislike are never far below the surface in China's responses to Japanese initiatives in the region.

The reasons are once again rehearsed below.

The year 2015 was the year for China—it is the year of The 70th Anniversary of The Victory of the Chinese People’s War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and The World Anti-Fascist War. Memorial events were held throughout the year. In 2014, China also announced an Annual Memorial Day for the Nanjing Massacre. The two China’s national memorial occasions were at the time that China–Japan relations fell into a deep crevice. The Japanese media have stated that the Chinese government is using World War II history to seize the moral high ground in territorial disputes. For China to recall these histories in such a public manner is ‘a matter for China’ and no one else, and an action demonstrating the maturity of the Chinese nation and its victory over the past.<sup>93</sup> When the Chinese President Xi Jinping made his speech on the Tiananmen Tower he summed up this maturity with powerful and dramatic succinctness. Of victory over Japan, he stated, ‘This great triumph crushed the plot of the Japanese militarists to colonize and enslave China and put an end to China’s national humiliation of suffering successive defeats at the hands of foreign aggressors in modern times’.<sup>94</sup>

Was China simply commemorating its past triumph? Was President Xi Jianping simply looking to the past? Was he giving voice to a living revanchist legacy?

History has shaped current East Asia. For many, memories are full of enmity, humiliation and victimization. It is said that Sino-Japan relations have reached a recent nadir,<sup>95</sup> symbolized in the 3 September 2015 Memorial Commemoration.

Some commentators consider that the Tokyo 2020 Games will alleviate regional tensions, will result in a slow ascent from the political depths, bring China and Japan together and be the harbinger of a relatively peaceful period of mutual development.<sup>96</sup> Perhaps, only time will tell if the past aggressive Japan and the present revanchist China will bury history in the coming Tokyo Olympics Games. History is not on their side.

By 2020, as widely predicted, China might surpass the USA to become the first economy in the world.<sup>97</sup> China’s rise is unavoidable, but China’s message of a ‘peaceful rise’ has not been unequivocally accepted in East Asia. China’s relations with Japan will continue to be ‘hot in economics and cold in politics’. The ever present political and strategic role of the USA in the region has further complicated China’s relations with Japan. For years to come, China’s geopolitical leverage in East Asia will remain limited as opposed to its expanding geoeconomic influence,<sup>98</sup>

but perhaps not forever! Ezra Feivel Vogel claimed that the ‘Japan-U.S. alliance played a role in resolving various difficult issues around the world’.<sup>99</sup> With growing military and economic power, China tends to hold increasingly confident views on international issues very different from those held by Japan and the USA. No doubt those issues in the future will not be tackled without China’s involvement.

Having fought two wars against Japan (1894–1895 and 1931–1945), China’s long-standing concern about the level of Japan’s military strength has surfaced periodically and has resurfaced strongly, especially since after the Abe administration changed the constitutional interpretation regarding the exercise of the right to collective self-defence in 2015. Japan’s Constitution of 1947 forbids an offensive military force. It is speculated that change will have a massive impact on the relationship that exists at present between Japan, America and China. Japan might exercise more independent and autonomous diplomatic and military policies.<sup>100</sup>

By 2020 will Japan be well in the shadow of a growing Sino-centric East Asia? Will it use the 2020 Olympics as a springboard to jump back to the dominant position in East Asia in contradiction of Olympic idealism? Any definitive answer is problematic. With regard to China there are sound reasons for this. First, China’s economy is slowing down and it is faced with numerous domestic and international problems and challenges, from the unbalanced development of regions and the huge income gap between rich and poor to environmental pollution and official corruption. Second, after the Beijing Games Chinese paid less attention than before to athletic victories in international competitions because there has been a call from society that more investment should go to grass-root sport and sport for all. Third, at the same time with regard to Japan the ageing society and limited resources of Japan make it hard, if not impossible, to stop China from playing a leading role in East Asia.

Regional order is often undermined by bilateral discord and regional conflict. This is true of East Asia and of the relationship between China and Japan. Historically there have been zigs and zags, advances and retreats in the relationship between China and Japan. It is necessary for the stability of East Asia that the two countries be reconciled politically and integrated economically—and compete pacifically in sport so often the barometer of hot and cold political temperatures. They are inescapably part of each other’s destinies with a long historical interrelationship.

However, ‘This long historical relationship has created a still unyielding psychological tension that is ever present as each country interacts with the other’.<sup>101</sup>

Will Tokyo 2020 be a thermometer announcing a warmer relationship?

## NOTES

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2. *Ibid*, 5.
3. John Wong, ‘Commentary: A China-centric Economic Order in East Asia’, *Asia Pacific Business Review* 19, no. 2 (2013), 286–296.
4. Maria Elena Romero-Ortiz, ‘Asia Pacific Regionalism: The Strategies of Japan and China in the Region’, *Latin American Journal of International Affairs* 2, no. 3 (2010), 1.
5. Kelly and Mangan, 3.
6. *Ibid*.
7. See ‘Introduction’. Regents Prep. <http://regentsprep.org/Regents/global/themes/imperialism/index.cfm>.
8. The First Opium War (1839–42), also known as the Anglo-Chinese War, was fought between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and the Qing Empire. The Opium Wars arose from China’s attempts to suppress the opium trade. Foreign traders (primarily British) had been illegally exporting opium mainly from India to China since the eighteenth century. See ‘Opium Wars’ on Encyclopaedia Britannica, available at: <http://www.britannica.com/topic/Opium-Wars>, accessed, 23 September, 2015.
9. Treaty of Nanking, or Treaty of Nanjing, signed in 1842. This treaty ended the first Opium War, the first of the unequal treaties between China and foreign imperialist powers. China paid the British an indemnity, including ceding the territory of Hong Kong. See ‘Treaty of Nanjing’ in Encyclopaedia Britannica, available at: <http://www.britannica.com/event/Treaty-of-Nanjing>, accessed 23 September 2015.
10. On March 31, 1854, ‘Japan–US Treaty of Peace and Amity’, or Kanagawa Treaty (神奈川条約, or Kanagawa Jōyaku) was signed between Commodore Matthew C. Perry of the US Navy and the Tokugawa shogunate. The treaty did establish a foundation for the Americans to maintain a permanent consul in Shimoda. The arrival of the fleet would trigger the end of Japan’s 200-year policy of seclusion.

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12. The First Sino-Japanese War (1 August 1894–17 April 1895) was fought between the Qing Empire of China and the Empire of Japan. The Qing government sued for peace in February 1895.
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17. See, J.A. Mangan and Jinxia Dong, (Eds.), *Beijing 2008: Preparing for Glory: Chinese Challenge in the 'Chinese Century'* (New York and London: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2008).
18. See, J.A. Mangan and Fan Hong, (Eds.) *Freeing the Female Body: Inspirational Icons* (London: Frank Cass 2001).
19. Russia acquired a 25-year lease at Lüshun (Port Arthur), and Germany acquired control over Jiaozhou Bay at the south of the Shandong Peninsula. Britain leased Hong Kong for 99 years and took control of Weihaiwei in the north on Shandong Province, agreeing to stay there as long as the Russians remained at Lüshun. France also took control of a piece of the Shandong peninsula and took control of Guangzhou (or Canton) in southern China.
20. As agreed in the Treaty of Nanjing after the First Opium War, the Qing Dynasty of China ceded Hong Kong Island to the British. And after the Second Opium War, the Qing Dynasty of China was defeated again and signed the Beijing Convention and ceded to the British the southern portion of the Kowloon Peninsula adjacent to Hong Kong. See 'Opium Wars' in Encyclopaedia Britannica, available at: <http://www.britannica.com/topic/Opium-Wars>, accessed, 23 September 2015.
21. Kang Youwei (1858–1927), politician, educationist; and Liang Qichao (1873–1929), politician, historian, ideologies. They are the main leaders of the Hundred Days Reform in 1898 in late Qing Dynasty of China.

The Hundred Days Reform was a significant political reform in the modern Chinese history, and an important ideological enlightenment movement, introducing the developed capitalist thoughts into China's society and the ruling system.

22. Empress Ci Xi (1835–1908), or Empress Dowager Cixi of Qing Dynasty of China, mother of the Emperor Tong Zhi. When Empress Ci Xi's Husband, he Emperor Xian Feng Died in 1861, Emperor Tong Zhi was still a child. So she took the reign and effectively controlled the Qing government for 47 years from 1861 until her death in 1908.
23. 'Yihetuan' Movement, or Boxer Rebellion was an anti-imperialist uprising in late Qing Dynasty in China towards the end of the Qing government between 1899 and 1901.
24. 'Zhongyang Guanyu Dizhi Rihuo de Jueyi [The Central Government's Resolution on Boycotting Made-in-Japan Goods]'. Original from 'Zhongyang Dangan Yuanyou Yin Jian Kan Yin [The Central Archives Printed in Crude Oil] [1]', *Xinhua*, 27 August 1932, see at: [http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2002-03/04/content\\_2272687.htm](http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2002-03/04/content_2272687.htm).
25. *Xinhua*, 'Zhongyang Guanyu Dizhi Rihuo de Jueyi [The Central Government's Resolution on Boycotting Made-in-Japan Goods]'.
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32. Andreas Niehaus, 'Spreading Olympism and the Olympic Movement in Japan: Interpreting "Universal" Values' in, William W. Kelly and Susan Brownell Eds.) *The Olympics in East Asia: Nationalism, Regionalism,*



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33. Department of Regulations and Law, National Sports Committee, *Collection of Main Leaders of the CCP and the Nation Talking about Sports Undertakings* (Internal Reference Report), 22, cited in, Ben Cao, 'A Study of Physical Ideology by Chinese Communist Party Leaders', an unpublished PhD thesis, Shaanxi Normal University, 2007.
  34. The Korean War (25 June 1950–27 July 1953) refers to a period of military conflict between North Korea and South Korea arising from the attempts of the two Korean powers to re-unify Korea under their respective governments. The USA and China on behalf of South Korea and North Korea respectively, intervened and shifted the balance of the war. In China the war is called 'Anti-American and Aiding Korean War'. With the sign of an armistice in July 1953, the original boundaries between North and South Korea was restored.
  35. Due to the delayed invitation from the IOC which was thrown into confusion by the political reality of 'two Chinas'—Taiwan and China, most Chinese arrived in Finland too late to compete.
  36. In May 1957, the Americans installed on Taiwan Matador missiles capable of carrying tactical nuclear weapons against the Mainland China. In August 1958, forces of the PLA bombarded the Nationalist base on Jinmen Island, near Xiamen. See, Yongjin Zhang, *China in International Society since 1949: Alienation and Beyond* (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1998), 23.
  37. Games for the New Emerging Forces (GANEF0), were set up by Indonesia and ran as a counter to the Olympic Games since it made clear in its constitution that politics and related with sport. See, Jinxia Dong, *Women, Sport and Society in Modern China: Holding Up More Than Half the Sky* (New York and London: Routledge, 2002).
  38. The 'Two Chinas', sometimes used by people outside China especially after the founding of the People's Republic of China till 1980s, usually refers to the mainland China—the People's Republic of China—governed by the Communist Party, and Taiwan—the Republic of China—governed by the Nationalist Party.
  39. Olympian Voices, Legacy 1964 Former captain of the Japanese national women's volleyball team, Masae Kasai, available at; [http://www.tokyo2016.or.jp/en/olympics/2008/01/legacy\\_1964\\_no\\_7\\_masae\\_kasai.html](http://www.tokyo2016.or.jp/en/olympics/2008/01/legacy_1964_no_7_masae_kasai.html), accessed, 25 September 2015.
  40. In 1971 and 1972, the Ping-pong teams of China and the USA visited each other's countries and interacted friendly, which largely helped promote the two countries' relationship and normalize the diplomacy. The Series of activities and visits was given the name of 'Ping-pong

- diplomacy'. For more information on the Ping-pong diplomacy and US-China Relationship, see, Jiang Qian, *The Whole Story of the Ping-pong Diplomacy* (Oriental Publisher, 1987).
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  42. Xianshan Zhang. 'Fu jiao hou zhong ri guanxi fazhan jiqi jingyan jiaoxun [Development of the relationship between China and Japan since normalization of relationship and the lessons learned from it]', *Ri Ben Xue Kan* [People's Academic Journal], no.5 (1992), 5.
  43. David B. Kanin, 'Ideology and Diplomacy: The Dimension of Chinese Political Sport' in, Benjamin Lowe (Ed.) *Sports and International Relations* (Campaign, Ill.: (Stipes Publishing Company, 1978), 273.
  44. In 1978, under the guidance of Deng Xiaoping, the China Communist Party raised and began to carry forward the policy of 'reform and opening-up'. It is the first opening-up policy of the People's Republic of China.
  45. Zhang, Xianshan, 'Fu jiaohouzhongriguanxi de fazhanjiqijingyanjiaoxun [Development of the relationship between China and Japan since normalization of relationship and the lessons learned from it]', 4-10.
  46. The final game was between China and Japan. China would have become the World Cup Champion providing it won two sets no matter whether it defeated Japan or not. The Chinese girls won the first two sets of the game, becoming too excited to concentrate on the remaining part of the game. As a result, they lost two sets in a row, which put them in a crucial position.
  47. Rong, & Gaotang, (Eds.) *Dandaizhongguotiyu* [Contemporary China's Sport] (Beijing: zhongguoshehuikexuechubanshe (China Social Sciences Press, 1984), 198.
  48. George Orwell, *The Sporting Spirit* (London: Tribune, 1945).
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52. William A Callahan, 'Chinese Visions of World Order: Post-hegemonic or A New Hegemony?' *International Studies Review*, 10, no. 4 (2008), 749–761.
53. At the Games Chinese athletes won 183 out of the 310 gold medals (60%) in 29 sports, and broke several world records and over 100 Asian records.
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A Living Legacy (Part Two): Japanese  
Imperialism—Residual Resentment and an  
Unforgiving China: The Sports Cartoon  
as Political Aide-Memoire

*Tianwei Ren and J.A. Mangan*

*Serious sport has nothing to do with fair play. It is bound up with hatred ... In other words, it is war minus the shooting.*

George Orwell<sup>1</sup>

*[The Chinese People's War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression] was a noted spectacle in the entire war history, a feat of the Chinese nation, a tremendous undertaking.*

Mao Zedong<sup>2</sup>

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J.A. Mangan et al. (eds.), *Japanese Imperialism: Politics and Sport in East Asia*, [https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-5104-3\\_6](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-5104-3_6)

*Past experience, if not forgotten, is a guide for the future'... from the end of the last century (nineteenth century) to the middle of this century (Twentieth century), in these fifty years, Japanese militarism has launched multiple aggressive wars against China, which have caused great damage to the Chinese people, which also have given the Japanese people very painful lessons... China and Japan can only develop a long-term friendship only if we take history as a mirror and prevent the tragedy from happening again.*

Jiang Zemin<sup>3</sup>

*Forgetting history means betrayal. Denying crime means committing crime. We should not hate a nation only because a minority number of the nation's militarists started the aggressive war. The crime of the war falls on the minority militarists not on its people. But people should never forget the serious crime the invaders committed.*

*All the ignorant attitudes to the aggressive war history, all the beautified words for the nature of the aggressive war, no matter how many times they are expressed, no matter how impressively they are expressed ...are a hazard to human peace and justice.*

Xi Jinping<sup>4</sup>

## PROLOGUE: HISTORIC HOSTILITY: THE PAST

In the long Twentieth century, memories of the Sino-Japanese relationship have been infected with the incubi of attempted imperialism and militarism, invasion and conquest. The pre-1949 years were especially poisoned by martial incursions and unequal treaties. The outcome has been a lasting hostility on the part of modern China to Japan. Hostility is not just reflected and recorded by politicians, the military and the people, but by the modern media. Not least of the expressed instruments of media antipathy has been the political cartoon. Direct, compelling and simplified images of loathing have been hypnotic, dramatic and searing instruments of national and ethnic propaganda, war motivation and 'recall' education: an unremitting, unforgiving visual attack on a despised enemy.

The 1937–1945 Sino-Japanese War was perhaps the foremost event that symbolizes this deep-seated animosity to Japanese imperialism and militarism. The late 1930s was the first 'high tide' of China's cartoon depiction.<sup>5</sup> Many cartoon magazines were published during this time including *Modern Sketches* (*Shi Dai Man Hua*), *Salvation Cartoons* (*Jiu Wang Man Hua*), *Resistance Cartoons* (*Kang Zhan Man Hua*), and *Cartoon World* (*Man Hua Jie*).<sup>6</sup> Initiated by Lu Shaofei,<sup>7</sup> the



**Fig. 6.1** VIP ticket for the First National Cartoon Exhibition (Yongjie Lv, ‘In Memory of the Famous Cartoonist, the Master of Cartoon, Wei Te’. Available at: [http://news.cartoonb2b.com/News\\_Info.aspx?id=9578](http://news.cartoonb2b.com/News_Info.aspx?id=9578). Accessed 27 August 2015.)

editor-in-chief of the *Modern Sketches* (*Shi Dai Man Hua*) and by other cartoonists of the times, The First National Cartoon Exhibition, which was the first nationwide cartoon exhibition in China’s history, was held in Shanghai on 4 November 1936 (Fig. 6.1).

Figure 6.2 was one of a number of impressive cartoons in the exhibition by Mu Yilong.<sup>8</sup> It was entitled ‘Winding Down to the South (Wan Yan Nan Xia)’ demonstrating that the Japanese army had crossed the Great Wall and was attacking China’s like a striking viper. Such cartoons appeared in profusion. They had the purpose of informing, educating and above all, motivating the many Chinese illiterates of the time.<sup>9</sup>

When Zhang Leping,<sup>10</sup> the famous Chinese cartoonist, worked in the Cartoon Propaganda Team Resisting Japan set up in August 1937,<sup>11</sup> his drawings were especially plain, penetrative and popular.<sup>12</sup> Figures 6.3a and 6.3b were a part of a remarkable cartoon series created by him and named the *Enemy’s Facial Masks* (*Di Kou Lian Pu*) depicting 42 different types of Japanese soldiers’ faces. It portrayed with graphic revulsion the imperialistic invaders’ brutal and besotted faces. No words were necessary. The enemies were animalistic ogres. His cartoons caught and reflected perceived images of inhumanity. Their effective impact as patriotic propaganda needed no verbal emphasis. They served their purpose pictorially.

The famous cartoon character, the orphan boy San Mao created and drawn by Zhang Leping in 1935, was welcomed widely by the public. It was victim imagery of Japanese imperialism. San Mao was an orphan



**Fig. 6.2** 'Winding down to the South (Wan Yan Nan Zia)', cartoon by Mu Yilong. Originally exhibited at the First National Cartoon Exhibition in the first place, was published by the 'First National Cartoon Exhibition special issue', November 1936, *Cartoon World (Man Hua Jie)* ('The First National Cartoon Exhibition in the Republic Of China Time: All Works were Destroyed by a Japanese Bomb'. Originally published on *Southern Metropolis Daily*, tencent news, 26 August 2011. Available at: <http://news.qq.com/a/20110826/000793.htm>. Accessed 29 August 2015.)



**Fig. 6.3** Part of the cartoon series ‘Enemy’s Facial Masks (*Di Kou Lian Pu*)’. Originally published in number 2, January 1940, *Sabre and Pen* (*Dao Yu Bi*). Cartoon by Zhang Leping (Ke Huang. ‘Shanghai cartoonists participated the anti-Japan activities.’ Shanghai literature & art. Available at: <http://www.shwe-nyi.com.cn/renda/shwl/node4174/u1a1510937.html>. Accessed 19 August 2015.)

who lived through the Sino-Japanese war, was forced to join the army of conquest, survived and was eventually freed from Japanese slavery. Figure 6.4 depicts the orphan boy quite alone. Everywhere he went, he noted farm animals with families with jealousy and longing. The small dogs had their mother to protect them, yet there was no family to protect him. The set of stories of early San Mao has a clear historical trajectory. San Mao was a representative symbol of the suffering of the Chinese people. He explicitly demonstrated the tragedy of ordinary life under brutal, military occupation; a pathetic human consequence of an atrocious aggression. He inspired both pity and anger. He represented all Chinese children travelling their wartime *via dolorosa*.

In addition to the cartoons’ themes that castigated Japanese military aggression and portrayed the tragic lives of Chinese people under the crushing Japanese imperial boot, another cartoon theme was the






Fig. 6.4 'All Alone', one cartoon from the Series Cartoon *Wanderings of San Mao*. Cartoon by Zhang Leping ('All alone'. Sanmao Cartoon. Available at: <http://www.sanmao.com.cn/father/artwork/comic/sanmao/04liulang/01.htm>. Accessed 22 August 2015.)

valiant Chinese army and its brave fight against the imperialist intruder. Figure 6.5 depicts a scene from a guerrilla skirmish with the Chinese intelligently making use of terrain with which they were familiar to fight the better equipped Japanese soldiers and defeating them. The role of the cartoon in this instance was to sustain national determination, to offer hope of the defeat of a well-trained, well-equipped enemy by means of superior field craft and the courage of men and women.

Is the cartoon a strong medium for the maintenance of morale? In the *Resistance Cartoon (Kang Zhan Man Hua)*, Issue 8, published 16 April 1938, the cartoonist Feng Zikai<sup>13</sup> in the article 'The Cartoon is the Vanguard of the Resistance of the Pen' provided the answer:

The cartoon is the vanguard of the resistance of the 'pen'. Its capability as propaganda is the sharpest. There are two reasons for this sharpness: First, the cartoon can be 'read' at a glance, without taking up much



Fig. 6.5 'Guerrillas Soldiers'. Cartoon by Liao Bingxiong (Gan, *The History of Chinese Cartoon*, 181.)

time. Resistance articles, even if short and snappy... take a few minutes to read. It only takes a few seconds to read a cartoon, absorb its message and understand its purpose. In times of pressure this form of propaganda is the most effective. Second, the cartoon is in a universal language any nationality can understand. The cartoon requires no study. Even the illiterate can decipher it. Thus its capability as propaganda is the greatest.<sup>14</sup>

Thus the cartoon bequeaths a universalistic political legacy capturing the past in indelible imagery. In the case of modern China and Sino-Japanese hostilities, graphic images are remembered. They lodge in the collective memory. One commentator, He Xuli, has noted its present functions as

a powerful aide-memoire, ‘Thanks to the cartoon journals and publications of the time, we can see with our eyes today the propaganda masterpieces of yesterday...’<sup>15</sup> Memories of Japanese provocations remain extant in a striking form accessible to all.

As Lv Yongjie has further remarked, ‘The pre-1949 cartoon is a history of the war of resistance per se’.<sup>16</sup>

This tragic history with or without the cartoon cannot, and should not, be erased from the Chinese collective consciousness. The cartoon is only one form of retaining unforgiving and unforgiven memories. In China, museums are built to prolong this memory, such as the Massacre Memorial Museum in Nanjing, The Chinese People’s War of Resistance of Japan Memorial Museum in Beijing, the Weifang Museum together with the recreated Former Concentration Camp Site in Shandong Province. Documentaries, films and books ubiquitously and unrelentingly remind people of the war. Some of the most famous films shown both China and internationally include *The Tokyo Trial* (2006), *City of Life and Death* (2009), and *Back to 1942* (2012). In 2015, to celebrate the 70th Anniversary of The Victory of the Chinese People’s War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and enrich the memorial activities, the SARFT (State Administration of Radio Film and TV) of China announced an extensive range of productions including 10 films, 12 TV dramas, 20 documentaries, 3 cartoon films/series and some 100 associated publications.<sup>17</sup> Memory is living organ.

### THE LONG MEMORY: THE LABYRINTHINE ROAD FROM THE PAST: CHINA AND JAPAN

Although the political cartoon was widely used as a propaganda medium prior to 1945, the political sports cartoon did not emerge until later. This was consistent with the country’s social circumstances. The Sino-Japanese War left the country in chaos. Modern sport in China ‘stepped into a complex period with an uneven development’.<sup>18</sup> The Communist Party ruled parts of China but the Nationalist Party ruled others and the Japanese controlled others. All held sport events and retained sports activities. However, sport was merged totally into the need for physical fitness for war. Wushu (Chinese Kongfu) and bayonet exercises were the sports programmes favoured in this period.<sup>19</sup> Military-type activities took precedent. In short, when China faced internal strife and foreign aggression, sport was shaped to fit the military requirements of the era.

The first significant post-war Chinese sports cartoon as non-military propaganda appeared in 1978 when Zhang Leping depicted the much-loved character San Mao engaging in non-martial sport. The cartoon was named *San Mao and Sport* (*San Mao Yu Ti Yu*) and portrayed San Mao's insistence on long-distance running every day of the year throughout the four seasons. His persistence and determination were rewarded and eventually he beat all other competitors in a race<sup>20</sup> (see Fig. 6.6a). The cartoon is in two parts. The other part shows San Mao weightlifting using two empty bottles and four bricks being mocked by a watching boy. He ignored him, graduated to lifting heavy stone barbells and his developed muscles burst open his shirt (see Fig. 6.6b). The imagery was allegorical. A weak San Mao under the Japanese dominations was now a strong San Mao under Communist freedom.

San Mao became an iconic figure representing the transformation from the Old China to the New China. After the Sino-Japan War (1937–1945), the subsequent Civil War (1945–1949) and the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949, Chairman Mao Zedong revived and revitalized China and gave sport priority in this transformation to rid China—once and for all—of the notorious label: the 'Sick Man of East Asia'.<sup>21</sup> In the 1970s, China urgently needed thorough reform to renew its image and rebuild its strength after the Culture Revolution. The war




Fig. 6.6 San Mao and Sport (*San Mao Yu Ti Yu*). Cartoon by Zhang Leping (Ibid.)

oppressed cartoon character San Mao was thus re-born as a post-war messenger: 'a representative of rebirth'. The message was transparent: the weak, hungry and emaciated child in servitude to an indifferent, brutal despotism can be strong, nourished and powerful in an independent, benevolent communism.<sup>22</sup>

The road to the modern Olympic Games travelled by China has not been smooth. In 1904, when the 3rd Olympics was held in St. Louis, USA, the event was little reported in Chinese newspapers. The reports made little impact due to people's ignorance of modern sport. In 1908, *Tientsin Young Men* asked three questions of the Chinese people:

When can China send a candidate to participate in the Olympics?  
 When can China send a team to participate in the Olympics?  
 When can China hold the Olympics?<sup>23</sup>

These were the famous 'Olympics Three Questions' in Chinese sports history. And the three ambitions explicit in the questions were not easily realized. From 1932 to 1948, China got a 'Zero Record' in the three Olympic Games. This was not helped by political circumstances. In 1932, political confrontations between the Republic of China and the 'Manchukuo'<sup>24</sup> caused the athletes' identity confusion: The government of the Republic of China was facing national calamity so decided not to send athletes to Los Angeles for the Games. Yet Manchukuo claimed it would send two Northeastern Chinese athletes, Liu Changchun and Yu Xiwei. China strongly protested and with the government's efforts Liu Changchun finally attended as a representative of the Republic of China.<sup>25</sup> This identity wrangle also happened in 1952. Three years after the founding of the People's Republic of China, the country's national basis was not solid. Influenced by confusion over the 'two Chinas'<sup>26</sup>, the IOC refused athletes from the People's Republic of China to participate the Helsinki Games. Then just two days before the opening of the games, the IOC passed a resolution inviting athletes from the People's Republic of China. The Chinese athletes could only participate the men's 100-metre-backstroke plus two friendly activities.<sup>27</sup>

Not until 1980 did any athlete enter the Winter Olympics in the name of People's Republic of China and participated the full Olympic Games.<sup>28</sup> The labyrinthine path to a strong political power as well as a strong sports power was jammed with historical and political barriers and obstacles.

By comparison, regardless of its hardships, Japan was 'luckier' seeking and obtaining more opportunities. Tokyo was selected as the host of the 1940 Olympics. However, when it launched itself on the road to imperial hegemony and invaded other countries, the IOC invitation was withdrawn. Later,

while China struggled to establish a new nation, Tokyo was awarded the 1964 Olympic Games in 1959 in a gesture of forgiveness after the devastation it caused in World War II. It was a momentous moment, in more ways than one, ‘The fifth ring in the Olympic symbol has been completed. The Olympic Games had finally come to Asia’.<sup>29</sup> Although Japan did well: 16 gold medals and 29 medals in total, which was considered a sports triumph not only in Japan but throughout Asia, the Games were considered highly political rather than neutrally apolitical in China.

After winning the right to hold the Olympic Games, the Japanese government treated the holding of the Olympics as a national enterprise: the 1964 Olympics was a ‘whole nation Olympics’.<sup>30</sup> The Japanese government incorporated the Olympics into the National Income Multiplication Plan. The entire country’s image has been promoted.<sup>31</sup>

One of the most politically crucial functions of the 1964 Olympics was to free Japan from wartime associations, to restore national pride and to rebuild an international national image.<sup>32</sup> Yet reviving nationalism via the Olympic Games was accompanied by a revival of Japanese political conservatism. One of the main movers of this revival was the Ministry of Education, the governing body in control of sport of Japan; ‘a conservative beacon both prior to 1945 and after Japan’s defeat in the Asia-Pacific war’.<sup>33</sup> Figure 6.7 reveals the Ministry’s indisputable and crucial role in the organization of the Games. The Ministry of Education was right at the heart of the ‘cauldron’ of Olympic momentum together with the Tokyo Metropolitan Government and the Tokyo Olympic Organizing Committee.

Under the guidance of the Ministry of Education, the revival of Japanese nationalism was carried forward via a contentious set of national symbols including the *tennō* himself (the emperor), the *hinomaru* (the Rising Sun) flag, the *kimigayo* (‘His Majesty’s Reign’) and the army.<sup>34</sup> These symbols considered as having the strongest associations with Japan in World War II were ironically and provocatively strategically portrayed and presented as symbols of peace! The *hinomaru* flag arguably had the strongest connection of all with the country’s imperial past. When it was seen next to the Olympic Five-ring flag as well as the other nations’ flags, the image purposefully, and as far as the Chinese were concerned, ironically linked as a symbol of peace!

Only after several decades, have these actions been critically discussed and analyzed for their strong political overtones, undertones and intentions and attacked as right-wing deviationist political gestures. Interestingly, there were few critical voices at the time. Placation presumably was the priority.

Only recently has Christian Tagsold argued:



Fig. 6.7 The Ministry of Education of Japan in the centre of the bubbling cauldron of the Olympic Flame together with the Tokyo Metropolitan Government and the Tokyo Organizing Committee (*Asahi Shinbun*, 1959, cited in Tagsold, *ibid.*)

...we must wonder just why the official Japanese political agenda was so little noted at the time, both within Japan and abroad, and the ceremonial apparatus was even applauded by normally critical voices. For example, in accordance with IOC procedures, marching bands played and young soldiers from the Self-Defense Forces (*jieitai*) handled most of the ceremonial tasks, such as carrying the Olympic flag into the stadium... Given the debates of the time about whether the Self-Defense Forces violated Article 9 of the constitution, one might expect there to have been an outcry from liberal intellectuals and other progressives. But even future-Nobel Prize laureate Ōe Kenzaburō praised the soldiers' efforts during the Opening Ceremony... Nor did he or others criticize the use of Sakai Yoshinori's as the final sacred torch runner, even though the gesture subtly emphasized Japan as victim rather than perpetrator of the events of World War II.<sup>35</sup>

China too ignored its neighbours' Olympic behaviour due to its lack of strength. It looked the other way—until the late 1980s when Japan was a leading global economic power. The 1988 Seoul Olympics and the 2008 Beijing Olympics attracted international attention to East Asia.<sup>36</sup> This brought about a reconsideration of Japan and its neighbours. These sport mega-events brought about not only a surge in South Korean and Chinese self-confidence aided and abetted by a surge in economic growth and a

decline in the economic strength of Japan but an openly critical attitude to Japan, its unapologetic stance to the humiliations and agonies inflicted by Japanese imperialism and its more recent territorial provocations.<sup>37</sup> Hidden resentment, which had never disappeared, resurfaced. As China moves steadily towards super-power status, historical hostility had been openly revived. Now China is remembering openly the pain of the past and ensuring openly that remembering will be part of the future.

### RESIDUAL RESENTMENT: SPORT AS CONFRONTATION

In East Asia, tensions are always high between China and Japan. The history of invasion and occupation has been clearly the main reason and certainly the lingering main reason. China accuses Japan of failing to face up its past and to distorting regional history—over and over again. Japan seems unmoved and counter-accuses China of dwelling on and exaggerating the past (see Fig. 6.8). Other issues too rile China. Cartoons, as will be considered shortly, address these aggravations bluntly, clearly and sharply.



Fig. 6.8 Source Lianhe Zaobao–Singapore (Cartoon provided by CartoonArts International/The New York Times syndicate. Group: views Asia. Credit: HENG. See, New York Times (news service and syndicate). Available at: [https://www.nytsyn.com/cartoons/cartoons?media\\_type=cartoons&search\\_id=3895179&start\\_date=1901-01-01#183669](https://www.nytsyn.com/cartoons/cartoons?media_type=cartoons&search_id=3895179&start_date=1901-01-01#183669). Accessed 2 October, 2015.)



## THE CHINA-JAPAN FOOTBALL MATCH: A 'BLACK WHISTLE' STORY

In 2004, the 13th Asian Football Confederation (AFC) Asian Cup was held in China. Football had finally returned to its country of origin.<sup>38</sup> As the host team, the Chinese team performed well. It won first place in its group. Then it beat two strong Asian rivals, Iraq and Iran, and made it to the final. Since football is regarded as China's 'traditional weak' sport, this accomplishment brought great satisfaction to the Chinese people.

But the Chinese people expected more! China was the host and the opponent in the final was Japan, the defending champion: the enemy. Before the game, as Sohu—the Chinese official website of Asian Cup stated euphemistically, 'An unfriendly atmosphere was pervasive.'<sup>39</sup> Twenty minutes into the second half, the Japanese Koji Nakata scored to make the score 2–1 in favour of Japan. However, the goal was the result of a 'black whistle'.<sup>40</sup> The ball was clearly handled into the net. The referee held to his decision. Chinese resentment rose to fever pitch, '... Any mistake by a Japan player earned cheers, while a tide of derision hit the defending champions every time they fell to the ground or feigned injury.'<sup>41</sup>

To add insult to injury,

{Before the start of the match} The crowd booed so loudly that Japan's national anthem was drowned out, but the biggest outpouring of jeers came with the final whistle. After Japan's third goal, the atmosphere in the stadium turned hostile and the stadium's PA system blasted static at full volume to drown out a constant wave of obscenities from the crowd during the cup presentation ceremony at the end of the match.<sup>42</sup>

After the game, the crowd anger grew to fever pitch. Hundreds of Chinese fans blocked the traffic, rushed the Japanese team coach, set fire to Japanese flags and threw bottles and hurled abuse at Japanese spectators. A later satirical cartoon immortalized a shocking decision (see Fig. 6.9): Two men, representing the Japanese and Chinese captains, are struggling for the Asian Cup. One man's head—the Japanese—is replaced by a black whistle. Most reports in the Chinese media expressed frustration and irritation at the referee's obstinate decision and vented their anger on the Japanese team. One article went further and drew attention to the fact that 7 out of the 10 sponsors of the 2004 Asian Cup



**Fig. 6.9** *Source* Tianya (Posted in a comment by Gushuihe, see, ‘Why Not Fight the Hand Ball’, posted by Zi Shanren. Tianya. Available at: <http://bbs.tianya.cn/post-no04-1238580-1.shtml>. Accessed 4 October 2015.)

were Japanese and concluded that ‘the Asian Football Confederation would go out of its way to back Japan.’<sup>43</sup> Other articles upbraided the Chinese team for not stopping the game and walking off the field and then Chinese football officialdom for not challenging the referee’s decision in the law courts.<sup>44</sup> A bitter remark was published that ‘If the Chinese players insisted it was a handball... the result may be totally different.’<sup>45</sup> The occasion was truly one of ‘war without weapons’.

Other critics pointed in a different direction. One bravely voiced the opinion that ‘the “handball” was only an excuse...Every time when we lose we always tend to find some reason other than ourselves. Chinese football never faces up to its own shortcomings.’ The author gave his reasons:

The football watershed between China and Japan began to develop after the 1999 FIFA World Youth Championship. In 1998, led by the British coach Bobby Houghton, the China national team defeated Japan by 2-0... in 1999..., China met Japan four times and lost 3 times. Japan demonstrated great practical skill at passing and controlling the ball. The whole of Asia was impressed.<sup>46</sup>

He continued, ‘China’s and Japan’s professional football developed over a similar time period. Yet the relative developments have been quite different... The fact is that the Chinese football has not moved forward for a long time.’<sup>47</sup>

Football is China’s sports weakness. Adam Minter commented in the *Japan Times* that:

...the [Chinese] team had hit rock bottom in 2013, when its team lost a match to a Thai team comprised of seven youth players. Social media users wondered whether the team had thrown the match and even hard line Communist Party newspapers denounced the team as a national embarrassment.<sup>48</sup>

Recently, China has begun to take action. Humiliation by Japan is the sharpest spur. After the ten years of what Houghton described as ‘an obvious setback’,<sup>49</sup> and after the most influential Chinese football fan Xi Jinping became the President of China, the sport has finally been subjected to the spotlight of exposure. Xi Jinping has declared that ‘it is not enough to be the biggest economy in the world and a global power. China also wants to be a footballing giant’.<sup>50</sup> One unspoken but pressing reason is to end defeat at the hands (feet) of Japan. The wheels of revolutionary reform are rolling ruthlessly forward. Metaphorically the tumbrils are being constructed for the incompetent and the corrupt. In a Solomonic statement by President Xi at the State Council Meeting on 15 February 2015, he announced,

It is the desperate desire of the people... to develop and revitalize soccer. To develop and revitalize soccer, China must overcome its ‘defective system’, which has impeded the development of the game, and provide better ‘institutional guarantees’ for its progress. We must abide by the principles of soccer development, combine state circumstances with international experience, combine the search for success in the long-term with the consolidation of the foundations in the short term, combine innovation and rebuilding with problem solving and create a whole-nation system with modern marketing mechanisms.<sup>51</sup>

In a further candid statement, President Xi stressed that,

The ‘Chinese dream’ to realize the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation at football is closely linked with China’s dream of sports supremacy - in East Asia and beyond: soft power politics, geopolitics and soccer in combative and creative combination. Developing and revitalizing soccer has become a fundamental requirement to ensure the establishment of a strong sports nation as an analogous projection of a strong regional and global nation.<sup>52</sup>

In March 2015, reform recommendations were put in place. Importantly, corruption was rooted out. It has been long considered that corruption has permeated soccer leagues from top to bottom and travelled to very top of the state-run federation.<sup>53</sup> And on 19 August 2015, soccer reform made a huge step forward and ended the separation of the China Football Association (CFA) from the General Sports Administration. An article in *The Japan Times* observed cautiously, ‘It’s too early to make a definitive judgment on the success of these reforms, but China’s national team is certainly playing as if a burden has been lifted from its shoulders’.<sup>54</sup> Reforms were widely welcomed. This is evident from Figs. 6.10a and 6.10b.

These are cartoons from a Series called ‘Xi and Football (Da Da Yu Zu Qiu)’ created by the Chinese netizens illustrating general support for the President’s actions on football reform. Football is closely interconnected with the Chinese people, the country’s leader, and above all, with the glory of the nation, hence its soft power significance, especially in East Asia and not least in continual soft power, struggles with Japan. After being second best to its loathed neighbour for more than 15 years, reform is not just about holding the FIFA World Cup or bringing the



**Fig. 6.10** Cartoons from the cartoon series ‘Xi and Football’ (‘Da Da Yu Zu Qiu’). The picture says: ‘Revitalising football! This dream will come true for sure!’ (‘Xi and Football (Da Da Yu Zu Qiu)’). Ikuang.com, 2 July 2014. Available at: <http://www.lkuang.com/Haha-3517.html#p=1>. Accessed 3 October 2015.)

FIFA World Cup back at last to the home of football, it is about present revenge on football fields for defeat on past battlefields.

### THE OLYMPICS: NEW GAMES AND OLD RIVALS

Zhang Boling (1876–1951), a pre-communist educator, who was among the first to bring the concept of the Olympics to China, is regarded as the spiritual founder of China’s Olympic movement and ‘the first man of China’s Olympic’. He is quoted as saying: ‘a great nation must first strengthen the race’.<sup>55</sup> The Olympics for him was to a means of achieving this patriotic ambition.

Although for China, the path to the Olympics was a contorted zigzag, China eventually proved its potential strength through its eventual participation. The first Olympic medal of China was earned by Xu Haifeng, the shooter, in the 1984 Los Angeles Olympics. The Chinese teams’ performances won the world’s attention. They now hold the world’s attention. From the beginning of the 1990s, China actively sought the chance to hold the Olympics. After the failure of China’s bid in 1993 to host the 2000 Olympics, won by Sydney by two votes, the 2008 Olympics was finally awarded to China. ‘What unified enough people behind China’s bid—and it was the largest vote in favour of a city ever—was

its economic and technical soundness. People had confidence that this Games would happen as proposed'.<sup>56</sup> China did not let the world down. Subsequent evaluations from all parts of the globe spoke highly of the Games (Fig. 6.11).

In 2013, after bidding with Madrid and Istanbul, Tokyo earned the second chance to host the Olympics. This result, as noted above, caused critical outbursts not only from neighbouring countries but from around the world. This was partially but predominantly due to the Fukushima nuclear power-plant-radiation water leakage following the March 2011 tsunami. This resulted in environmental and safety problems. Remedial actions were widely criticized at the time at home and abroad, yet the IOC considered Tokyo 'a safe pair of hands'<sup>57</sup> and finally judged it the most appropriate candidate for the 2020 Olympics. Media everywhere pointed out that over 16,000 had people died, more than 2000 were still missing, presumed dead, and thousands of prefectures were still living in



**Fig. 6.11** The picture has a caption: 'I ride on the dragon, going around the globe and making friends all over the world'. Cartoon by Zhu Genhua (Shuiming Liu, Tian Wang and Benjian Xin, 'A Friendly Feat, A Global Wonder.' *People's Daily*, August 2008, 16, 25. Available at: [http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrb/html/2008-08/25/content\\_89323.htm](http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrb/html/2008-08/25/content_89323.htm). Accessed 20 October 2015.)

temporary housing.<sup>58</sup> Shinzo Abe, the Prime Minister of Japan, however, stated in his presentation to IOC that the ‘contaminated water is entirely blocked’<sup>59</sup> and assured the IOC that ‘the situation is under control’.<sup>60</sup> The IOC appeared convinced.

Unlike the IOC, the Chinese people were not convinced. In Jon Day’s article in Xinhuanet, the official Chinese news agency’s online portal, for example, it was pointed out that at the time of the IOC Buenos Aires meeting, Japan’s nuclear crisis ‘marked the highest crisis level since the reactors melted down after the massive tsunami wiped-out key cooling functions at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear facility in March 2011’ and the current leak is ‘the fifth-largest since the tsunami hit and the worst since last year.’<sup>61</sup> An article in the *People’s Daily* condemned Japan’s winning bid for another reason: political undertones.

...The winning of the bid is regarded by the Japanese right wing as international acquiescence in, even praise for, Japan’s ‘right leaning’. Some people are worried that if the Japanese government insists on working hand in glove with the right wing, the Tokyo 2020 Olympics might become a reproduction of the 1936 Berlin Olympics under the rule of the German Nazis.<sup>62</sup>

Harsh words indeed!

Chinese cartoons were weapons of savage condemnation. Figure 6.12, from the *Man Man Hua* website, pictured Abe with a long nose making it clear that he was lying about the situation in Fukushima radiation leakage and contaminated water in his statement to IOC—an uncompromising and sarcastic representation, while in Fig. 6.13 ‘Applying the Olympics by Money?’, the Chinese cartoonist Wang Yuan caricatured the IOC rings using the four elements—funding, Doraemon (the cartoon ‘diplomatist’ created by Japan’s Ministry of Culture), Radiation, and Toyota (major sponsor of the Olympics). His Tokyo 2020 rings replaced four rings of the famous IOC five rings. His message was brazenly unnuanced and undiplomatic: Japan had severe environmental and safety issues due to the Fukushima power plant leakage, but it seemed to have sufficient funding to hold the Olympics. Was the reason, he clearly implied, for the IOC’s approval of the Japanese bid inexcusable ignorance of the leakage and should the IOC have recommended that funds for the Olympics be better used to cope with the nuclear leakage crisis?




**Fig. 6.12** ‘Lie’ (Man Man Hua, 19 September 2013. Available at: [http://www.l99.com/EditText\\_view.action?textId=1007331](http://www.l99.com/EditText_view.action?textId=1007331). Accessed 24 October 2015.)

Chinese criticisms of Japan on this issue continue to this day. In August 2015, there were claims that food was being exported to China from the nuclear-contaminated areas in Japan. After the 2011 nuclear leakage, China had passed rules forbidding the importation of food from Japan’s 12 contaminated areas.<sup>63</sup>

Competition between the two nations to hold mega-sport events is intense. On 31 July 2015, Beijing together with the city of Zhangjiakou in Hebei province won the bid to hold the 2022 Winter Olympics. Beijing, thus, became the first city to host both summer and winter





**Fig. 6.13** ‘Applying the Olympics by Money?’ Cartoon by Wang Yuan (‘Applying the Olympics by Money?’, *Legal Evening News*, 9 September 2013. Available at: [http://news.ifeng.com/gundong/detail\\_2013\\_09/09/29444815\\_0.shtml](http://news.ifeng.com/gundong/detail_2013_09/09/29444815_0.shtml). Accessed 24 October 2015.)

Olympics. While this achievement provoked no controversy worldwide compared to the furore accompanying Japan’s selection to the 2020 Olympic Games, China’s neighbour, found grounds to criticize Beijing’s joint selection to host the 2022 Winter Olympics. An article in the *Japan Times* pointed out that there was little snow in the area where the skiing events were to be held. It further pointed out there were few top-class facilities to cater for outdoor winter events, and ‘even less of a tradition in winter sports’.<sup>64</sup> It mocked the Chinese’s government’s promise to develop adequate facilities and conditions with a tongue in cheek comment saying that ‘...officials have outlined a bold plan to carve world-class skiing facilities into desolate mountainsides and weave a bullet train system through the rugged terrain’... and added for good measure that, ‘...There is virtually no bobsleigh infrastructure in China at present, nor does it have a national team.’<sup>65</sup>

It quoted Fabio Ries, the general manager of the Dolomiti Mountain Resort, that there was much concern that the Olympic hosts did not have the capacity to build an entirely new stadium and facilities.<sup>66</sup> Ries added, sardonically for good measure, ‘...For some disciplines, you can’t move mountains’.<sup>67</sup>

Beijing’s lack of both snow and facilities has attracted further sarcasm. Fred Varcoe has stated laconically, ‘the IOC moves in mysterious ways’.<sup>68</sup> Such predictable sarcasm is ‘simply water off the Chinese back!’ To the Chinese, ‘The Olympics carry a degree of prestige...which makes them highly appealing to grassroots Chinese nationalism’.<sup>69</sup> Holding the Olympics is not just a way to stimulate investment, to undertake impressive building projects or to further the economy, it is a way to continue to change the world’s perceptions of Chinese potential, power and prestige. China welcomes a further chance to replicate the astounding success of the 2008 Olympic Games and is confident of doing so. Incidentally, one reason for embracing the challenge is to demonstrate to the world that it can now match and even outmatch, Japan in all its attempts on the world stage in sports performances and sports events—summer and winter.

It seems that China and other East Asian countries’ obsession to host the mega-sports events is somewhat puzzling to the West. In the near future, the 2018 Winter Games will be held in PyeongChang, South Korea, the 2020 Summer Games will be held in Tokyo and the 2022 Winter Games in Beijing-Zhangjiakou. However, the mysterious East is no mystery to itself. For China, Japan and other East Asian countries, mega-sports events are an effective political and geopolitical means to enhance national confidence, resolve domestic insecurities and improve the international image, and in the case of China to labour its inexorable progress to the centre of the world stage.<sup>70</sup> This is an understandable need born of present geopolitical pride and past geopolitical inferiority: ‘...sport creates changes in nations that goes beyond the physical to the political... sport is not just a {pleasant} spectacle: it is a powerful political agent that generates internal and external pressures for change that are difficult to ignore... sport matters politically...’<sup>71</sup> The Olympic Games, and other sports mega-events certainly matter to the rising East Asian nations, politically and geopolitically, and increasingly they have the wealth to ensure their successful implementation. This fact results in a new form of regional competition and confrontation!

## RIVAL GIANTS: TENSION WITHOUT END?

Japan, unquestionably, is, at present, the only developed country in East Asia, and one of the most developed countries in the world. China is ‘sprinting’ successfully to overtake it. China and Japan are in a race for hegemonic control of East Asia. Image is crucial. Close neighbours geographically, the two countries are far from close politically: history has seen to that.

### *Economic Competition*

Economically, China recently overtook Japan. It is now the second largest global economic power.<sup>72</sup> In recent years, the world has watched the slow subsidence of Japan’s economy. When Shinzo Abe came to power again in 2012, the Japanese expected a surge in the national economy. Time has revealed the so-called Abenomics as ‘a rolling economic disaster’.<sup>73</sup> *The China Daily* on 25 August 2012 printed a vitriolic cartoon (Fig. 6.14) entitled simply, ‘Japan’s Economy’, depicting it metaphorically as a sinking ship, and mocking Abe’s actions as playing with fire.

China, in turn, has been mocked by Japan as a huge economy bubble about to burst similar to Japan’s burst bubble in the early 1990s.<sup>74</sup> In 2015, China’s stock market has experienced a steep rise and a steep fall, fluctuating drastically. The largest slide since the financial crisis of 27 February 2009<sup>75</sup> happened at the beginning of the year, which saw China something less than a charging fire-belching dragon; ‘A moderate sell-off can easily turn into a stampede’,<sup>76</sup> commented the economist Linda Yueh. This state of affairs highlighted the disastrous potential of the China’s stock market’s volatility. Japan did not fail to take notice. China’s predicament occasioned a derisively pitiless cartoon in *The Japan Times*, depicting Xi’s shocked face when saw the bull (market) had smashed the (China) shop to smithereens! (see Fig. 6.15).

There is no love lost between China and Japan in sport, in economics, in politics!

### *Territory Disputes*

The territorial dispute over the islands of Diaoyu or Senkakus as called respectively by the two nations, presently sours the bilateral relationship. This issue has been protracted and cannot be resolved in the foreseeable



Fig. 6.14 Japan's economy. Cartoon by Luo Jie (See, *China Daily USA*, 25 August 2012. Available at: [http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2012-08/25/content\\_15705221.htm](http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2012-08/25/content_15705221.htm). Accessed 17 September, 2015.)



Fig. 6.15 Source *The Japan Times* (Ibid.)

future. China and Japan both claim sovereignty for strategic and economic reasons.<sup>77</sup> Both parties harshly condemn each other over their

respective intransigence. The situation changed marginally in 2014. In order to secure a meeting with Xi, Abe conceded to Chinese demands on the Diaoyu Islands during the 2014 APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation).<sup>78</sup> Chinese national anger has played a significant role with the Chinese government playing the history card once again. The government claims that the Diaoyu Islands have been Chinese as far back as the end of the nineteenth century. The Chinese people agree profoundly and passionately and are fully behind their government. They consider Japan is invading their motherland once again. Before the 2014 APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation) conference, supportive grass-root comments dominated the Chinese media and the Internet condemning Japanese aggression and gave the Xi government unqualified backing in its claim for the islands. The pressure of modern, confident Chinese nationalism is never to be underestimated, as Fig. 6.16 crudely and threateningly demonstrates; miscalculations could have the most serious of consequences.

The plain fact of the matter is that tension between the two regional rival giants appears to have no end. The resentment of China towards Japan has been long lasting and it lingers and will continue to linger for



**Fig. 6.16** Source Lianhe Zaobao–Singapore (CartoonArts International/The New York Times syndicate. group: viewsAsia. Credit: HENG. see New York Times (News Service and Syndicate). Available at: <https://www.nytsyn.com/cartoons/cartoons/828014.html>. Accessed 17 October 2015.)

an unforeseeable time as long as historical scars do not heal and fresh wounds are inflicted.

### CODA: WAR MEMORIAL: A LIVING LEGACY

The Chinese People's War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression and the World Anti-Fascist War were a decisive battle between justice and evil, between light and darkness, and between progress and reaction... In defiance of aggression, the unyielding Chinese people fought gallantly and finally won total victory against the Japanese militarist aggressors, thus preserving China's 5,000-year-old civilization and upholding the cause of peace of mankind. This remarkable feat made by the Chinese nation was rare in the history of war.

The victory of the Chinese People's War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression is the first complete victory won by China in its resistance against foreign aggression in modern times. This great triumph crushed the plot of the Japanese militarists to colonize and enslave China and put an end to China's national humiliation of suffering successive defeats at the hands of foreign aggressors in modern times. This great triumph re-established China as a major country in the world and won the Chinese people respect of all peace-loving people around the world. This great triumph opened up bright prospects for the great renewal of the Chinese nation and set our ancient country on a new journey after ... rebirth.<sup>79</sup>

The year 2015 was the year of The Seventeenth Anniversary of The Victory of the Chinese People's War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and The World Anti-Fascist War. Preparations had been long in the making and ceremonies were held constantly throughout the year in every corner of China, and the last and grandest ceremony was the Commemoration and the Military Parade in Beijing on 3 September 2015. This Anniversary was the country's media showpiece of the year.

The above quotation above was from the stirring address made by the Chinese President Xi Jinping from the Tiananmen Tower on the day of the parade. The entire speech relentlessly reminded the Chinese that Japanese Imperialism and Militarism that once threw a dark shadow over China, was defeated by the blood spilt by the Chinese people with the help of the world. The sacrifice was a heavy one. It will never be forgotten. There are enduring reasons for this.

The more than seventy years of hostility of China towards Japan continually expressed towards Japan and recently culminating in the Beijing Memorial Parade emerged substantially out of the horrific Sino-Japanese war of 1937–1945. The war was the opening act of the drama of the Modern Bilateral Relationship and set the tone for long lasting acts of antipathy past, present, and possibly, future.

...the Japanese government has never offered an apology to any country that it invaded in the last seventy years. This displays the resistance of the Japanese to reflect on their past conduct. It is this very attitude that has fuelled feelings of great indignation and distrust towards Japan from other Asian countries...<sup>80</sup>

In addition, territorial disputes, mentioned briefly above, in recent years have constantly functioned as hammers to fracture any temporary peace and to renew the tension. Past injuries have never been removed from the nation's psyche—generation after generation. It has never healed. The present has continually witnessed the continued festering of old and deep wounds.

China, after 35 years of astounding development following 'opening-up' reform, has banished a past of impoverishment, debility and inferiority. The current globalized world has given the rising China opportunities for strategic choices and strategic ambitions and China has seized them, but China must remain alert to alarms that sound warnings of the need to monitor and control Japanese political ambitions.<sup>81</sup> In short, China must always be equipped in the future to deal, if necessary, with its regional neighbour, Japan.

The cartoon (Fig. 6.17) is a disarming repository of political memory but also an incisive contemporary commentary on a lasting political anxiety. It demonstrates the power of the cartoon as an influential medium through which to transmit a living legacy. The cartoon has been nowhere more potent in dramatic potential than as a visual aide-memoire of the searing wartime struggle between China and Japan. This now sublimated struggle will continue on sports fields and arena and in economic, political and cultural interaction despite close trading ties.<sup>82</sup>

In summary, the cartoon is a visual armament loaded with political statements, political reminders and political projections. In China, it ensures the



Fig. 6.17 China is always wary of Japan. Cartoon by Liu Rui (Ibid.)

retention of an existential experience will persist in the Chinese collective memory in an uncomplicated form but with a profound message.

#### CODA

The cartoon in Chinese scholarship is a barely tapped vein of rich historical nuggets glittering in a scholastic darkness promising unexplored wealth. The eye of the academic surveyor is drawn to it with special force with its compressed shining images of visual intensity. Inter alia, it makes use of sport, the global modern obsession<sup>83</sup> using sharp prismatic imagery to resurrect the past, to reflect present glory and to point to a putative successful future.



## NOTES

1. Quoted on the back page of ‘*Serious Sport: J.A. Mangan’s Contribution to the History of Sport*, edited by Scott. A.C.M. Crawford (London: Routledge, 2004).
2. MAO Zedong the founding father of the People’s Republic of China, Chairman of China and the Communist Party of China from 1949 until his death in 1976, core figure of the first generation of national leaders. See ‘Mao Zedong’s Arguments about the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression’ available at: [http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2004-07/03/content\\_1568148.htm](http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2004-07/03/content_1568148.htm), accessed, 12 August 2015.
3. JIANG Zemin, Chairman of the People’s Republic of China from 1993 to 2003, core figure of the third generation of national leaders since 1989. Extracted from Kuhn, Robert Lawrence. *The Man Who Changed China: The Life and Legacy of Jiang* (Shanghai: Shanghai Translation Publishing House, 2005), quoted from, ‘What Jiang Zemin did that Sacred Japanese Officers when He Visited Japan?’ Ifeng.com, 18 November 2013. [http://news.ifeng.com/history/zhongguoxiandaiishi/detail\\_2013\\_11/18/31336316\\_0.shtml](http://news.ifeng.com/history/zhongguoxiandaiishi/detail_2013_11/18/31336316_0.shtml).
4. XI Jinping, President of the People’s Republic of China, Chairman of the PRC Central Military Commission from 2013 till now. See, ‘Xi Jinping’s 27 Important Arguments about China-Japan Relationship in the Last 8 Years’, available at: [http://news.ifeng.com/a/20150813/44421363\\_0.shtml](http://news.ifeng.com/a/20150813/44421363_0.shtml), accessed, 20 August 2015.
5. Yiding Liu. *The Chinese News Cartoon* (China Youth Publishing Group, 2003).
6. Xianfeng Gan. *The History of Chinese Cartoon* (Shan Dong Pictorial Publishing House, 2008).
7. LU Shaofei (September 1903—February 1995), cartoonist, editor. Initiator of the Chinese Cartoonists Association. Regarded as the ‘good judge of cartoon talents’, and the ‘originator of the Chinese modern cartoon.’ He insisted that choosing cartoon should be paid attention to their recording of the times. Note from Jianzhong Shen. ‘Lu Shaofei and Modern Cartoon’, originally from *Wenweipo*. *Xinhua*, 11 November 2004, available at: [http://news.xinhuanet.com/book/2004-11/11/content\\_2197846.htm](http://news.xinhuanet.com/book/2004-11/11/content_2197846.htm), accessed, 24 August, 2015.
8. MU Yilong (other used name ZHUANG Hongshuo), born in 1915, cartoonist and photographer, from, ‘The First Journal of the Photography of the Republic of China, *China Photography*, no. 8, May 1947, available at: [http://www.997788.com/pr/detail\\_auction\\_2\\_8940270\\_0.html](http://www.997788.com/pr/detail_auction_2_8940270_0.html), accessed, 27 August 2015.
9. Gan, *The History of Chinese Cartoon*.

10. Zhang Leping (November 1910—September 1992), famous Chinese cartoonist, artist. Engaged in drawing for 60 years. He was called the ‘Father of San Mao’ since he created the well-known cartoon character San Mao, the boy with three hairs. Note from ‘Modern and Contemporary Chinese Painter and Master: Zhang Leping. Famous Chinese Character Painting and Cartoon Painter’, available at: <http://www.artchina100.com/goods-1479.html>, accessed, 26 August 2015.
11. The Cartoon Propaganda Team Resisting Japan was set up right after the break out of the Sino-Japan war. The leader was Ye Qianyu, and Zhang Leping was the vice leader. There were 7 other team members. It was the second move that the Shanghai Cartoon Salvation Association initiated to resist Japan through cartoon. The first move was the launch of the *Salvation Cartoons (Jiu Wang Man Hua)*, which acted as a vital platform of China’s resistance of Japan. Note from Ke Huang. ‘The Wartime of the Cartoon Propaganda Team Resisting Japan’. Originally published on *Oriental Morning Post*. Tencent Culture, 11 August 2014. <http://cul.qq.com/a/20140811/027076.htm>.
12. Gan, *The History of Chinese Cartoon*, 182–83.
13. FENG Zikai (November 1898—September 1975), painter, essayist, music educator. Notes from, ‘The Humanistic Concern in Feng Zikai’s Cartoon’, originally published by *Guangming Daily*. *Xinhua*, 13 February 2012, available at: [http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2012-02/13/c\\_122690791.htm](http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2012-02/13/c_122690791.htm), accessed 14, August 2015.
14. Gan, *The History of Chinese Cartoon*, 200.
15. Tencent News, ‘The First National Cartoon Exhibition in the Republic of China Time’.
16. Lv, ‘In Memory of the Famous Cartoonist, the Master of Cartoon, Wei Te’.
17. ‘The 70th Anniversary of The Victory of the Chinese People’s War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression has been Confirmed 32 Key TV Dramas and Documentaries.’ People.cn, 6 July 2015, available at: <http://politics.people.com.cn/n/2015/0706/c1001-27259703.html>, accessed, 7 August 2015.
18. Zhi Wang and Jun Liang. *The Twentieth Century China—Volume of Sports and Hygiene* (Lan Zhou: Gansu People’s Publishing House, 2000), 119.
19. Liu, *The Chinese News Cartoon*.
20. Tianwei Ren and J.A. Mangan. ‘Soft Power Projection: The Cartoon as An Instrument of Political Projection and a Celebration of Arrival: Beijing 2008, London 2012, Tokyo 2020’ in, J.A. Mangan, Qing Luo and Sayuri Guthrie-Shimizu Eds.), *The Olympic Games: Prism for East Asian Politics and Geopolitics: London 2012 and Tokyo 2020* (Beijing: Communication University of China Press, forthcoming).
21. Ibid.

22. Ibid.
23. ““Zero Record” and “the Sick Man of East Asia””, China.com, January 2003, available at: <http://www.china.com.cn/chinese/zhuanti/262825.htm>, accessed, 12 September 2015.
24. Manchukuo, meaning the ‘State of Manchuria’ was a puppet state in Northeast China and Inner Mongolia before the Sino-Japan War (1937–1945) after Japan’s invasion of China and under the domination of Japan, It lasted for two years.
25. Ibid.
26. The ‘Two Chinas’, sometimes used by people outside China especially after the founding of the People’s Republic of China till 1980s, usually refers to the mainland China—the People’s Republic of China—governed by the Communist Party, and Taiwan—the Republic of China—governed by the Nationalist Party.
27. Xiao Li. ‘China and the Olympic Movement’. China.org.cn, 5 January 2004, available at: <http://www.china.org.cn/english/null/116819.htm>, accessed, 20 September 2015.
28. China.com, ““Zero Record” and “the Sick Man of East Asia”.”
29. Ed Odeven. ‘A Look Back at When Tokyo was Awarded 1964 Olympics’, *Japan Times*, 24 August 2013, available at: <http://www.japantimes.co.jp/sports/2013/08/24/olympics/a-look-back-at-when-tokyo-was-awarded-1964-olympics/#.VaO-l3hLeyc>, accessed, 22 September, 2015.
30. It means that the Japanese government incorporated the Olympics into the National Income Multiplication Plan. The government has invested a vast sum to improve and build the infrastructure and public facilities, including the Tokaido Shinkansen (bullet train), capital high ways, elevated monorail electricity, Tokyo subways and so on. Also, lots of luxury hotels were built to welcome foreign tourists. All these made Tokyo one of the most advanced cities in the world.
31. ‘1964: Olympics Made Japan Have Good Manner’, Sina News, 7 April 2008, available at: <http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2008-04-07/105315304730.shtml>, accessed, 23 September 2015.
32. Christian Tagsold, ‘The 1964 Tokyo Olympics as Political Games’, *The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus*, available from: <http://www.japanfocus.org/-Christian-Tagsold/3165/article.html>, accessed, 22 September, 2015.
33. Ibid.
34. Christian Tagsold, ‘The Tokyo Olympics: Politics and Aftermath’ in, William W. Kelly and Susan Brownell (Eds.), *The Olympics in East Asia: Nationalism, Regionalism, and Globalism on the Center Stage of World Sports* (New Haven, Connecticut: Council on East Asian Studies Yale University, 2011), 64.
35. Tagsold, ‘The 1964 Tokyo Olympics as Political Games’.

36. J.A. Mangan, Sandra Collins and Gwang Ok, (Eds.), *The Triple Asian Olympics—Asia Rising: The Pursuit of National Identity, International Recognition and Global Esteem* (New York: Routledge, 2012).
37. Ibid.
38. Cuju, an ancient China's version of football, is regarded as the origin of football by some scholars. But there was a dispute of this since some considered Cuju failed to develop into modern football. See, Wenjun Qian. 'Exploitations on Cultural Reasons for Chinese Cuju's Failure to Become Modern Football', *Journal of Wuhan Institute of Physical Education*, 12–2005.
39. '3–0 Japan Beat the Host. The Defending Champion Won', *Sohu Sports*, 7 August 2004 available at: <http://sports.sohu.com/20040807/n221414331.shtml>, accessed, 3 October 2015.
40. 'Black whistle' is a term to describe the judges' misjudgment and miss-actions which are against the fairness of the races. The audience thought the goal was a clear hand-ball, yet the judge ignored it and let the race continue. So this is called a 'black whistle'.
41. 'Chinese Riot after Japan Win Final'. CNN, 7 August 2004, available at: <http://www.cnn.com/2004/SPORT/football/08/07/china.japan/>, 3 October 2015.
42. Ibid.
43. 'Over 70 Percent of Fund to AFC Came From Japan. There was no Use to Appeal for Re-judgment'. Sina Sport, 8 August 2004 available at: <http://sports.sina.com.cn/n/2004-08-08/10411052034.shtml>, 3 October 2015.
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PART V

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Regional Reactions  
and Responses: Taiwan

# Japanese Cultural Imperialism in Taiwan: Judo as an Instrument of Colonial Conditioning

*Dong-Jhy Hwang and J.A. Mangan*

## TAIWAN: JUDO: EARLY EVOLUTION

Judo may be considered a mirror in which Japan's half-century rule over Taiwan is reflected. It is a record of the struggles, sufferings and compromises of the Taiwanese under Japanese colonial control. However, despite the fact that Judo has existed in Taiwan for a century, the exploration of Judo's political, cultural and social history in Taiwan is regrettably sparse: a major analytical omission. Judo once played an important role as an instrument of militarism in the Japanese colonial era. In this period Judo closely scrutinized, is revealed, indeed exposed, as more than a sport; it was a component of martial cultural colonialism. There have been significant studies of sport, politics and colonization by Western scholars. Some, by general acknowledgement, have made

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notable contributions to the study of sport in colonialism as a means of cultural conditioning, moral indoctrination and social control.<sup>1</sup>

No such noted studies are available in Taiwan. They are needed. This essay is, first and foremost, both a synthesis and summary of the dynamics of the evolution of Judo in Taiwan during the period of Japanese imperialism. It covers Judo as ‘Japanization’—culturally, militarily and ethically, together with a brief review of its subsequent post-imperial development as a manifestation of assertive nationalism.

### SPORT, IMPERIALISM AND MEMORY

Bukharin once observed trenchantly, ‘Imperialism remains an everlasting miserable memory and a fact that will exist in perpetuity in mankind’s history. Thus, the history and theories of imperialism have become particularly precious records’.<sup>2</sup> This is true of Taiwan under the Japanese. The spread of imperialism, invariably backed by armed force, pillaged resources from nations lacking in effective military technology. This is true of Taiwan under the Japanese. Imperialism relied on cultural strategies to reinforce military superiority, emphasize ethical preeminence and secure compliant control. This is true of Taiwan under the Japanese. In this reinforcement, cultural imperial strategies had a close and calculated connection with sport.

### ‘JAPANIZATION’: BEGINNINGS


On 28 July 1898, the Taiwan governor’s office issued the Taiwan Public School Directive<sup>3</sup> stipulating that physical education Taiwan’s state schools and national language centres were to be compulsory under the title, ‘gymnasium course’. Japanese, composition, reading, calligraphy, mathematics, singing and various other subjects were also listed as required elementary school subjects. National language centres and state schools now all adopted gymnastics. The main purpose of the ‘gymnasium course’ ostensibly was to promote physical posture, health and a positive outlook. It also emphasized team spirit and punished uncooperative Taiwanese. The course was certainly conceived to ensure ‘correct posture’. It had embedded in its implementation, an encoded political transition that began with the body. The course, *de facto*, ‘embodied’ political control.





**Fig. 7.1** Japanese Colonial Education for Taiwanese. (Available at: <http://www.tonyhuang39.com/tony0562/tony0562.html>. Accessed 20 September 2015.)

In fact, every aspect of ‘Japanized’ sport was intended to turn the Taiwanese into ‘healthy’ (in body, mind and attitude), obedient and industrious Japanese subjects by means of prescribed behaviour and enforced compliance. Sport (a generic term here embracing physical education, gymnastics, games and track and field) in Taiwanese schools was locked into rituals designed to reshape bodies, minds and emotions. It was replete also with symbols of reconstruction. The purpose was to transform young Taiwanese into young ‘Japanese’. Parading the Japanese flag, pupils marched, sang the Japanese anthem and martial songs and wore sports ‘uniforms’. ‘Uniformed’ teams were systematically moulded by music, marches and team games into model young ‘Japanese’. Sport was a political performance staged with opening and closing ceremonies. Its calculated purpose was to inculcate respect, discipline and team spirit, with the ultimate objective of reshaping cultural identity and infusing into the Taiwanese a Japanese mindset of compliance, docility, obedience and regimented fitness. Action was complemented by a process of indoctrination (Figs. 7.1 and 7.2).



**Fig. 7.2** Reconstructed Taiwanese: Drafted Taiwanese soldiers in the Japanese Imperial Army during World War II. (Available at: <https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E5%8F%B0%E7%B1%8D%E6%97%A5%E6%9C%AC%E5%85%B5>. Accessed 20 September 2015.)

The Taiwanese did not immediately succumb unconditionally to the Japanese assimilation policy detesting the Japanese colonial government especially for banning the Taiwanese from voluntary physical sports organizations and forbidding them to challenge any tangible and intangible entity representing the ruler's authority or their new 'national' identity. In time, Taiwanese attitudes to the colonialists mellowed up to a point especially in the case of the middle class.

This essay will concentrate on Judo as an *exemplar* of the Japanese imperial intention to reconstruct Taiwanese identity by means of a cultural implement shaped in the image of a 'sport' demonstrably containing the physical and psychological ingredients for national reconstruction: the objective, the 'Japanization' of Taiwan.

## JUDO, COLONIZATION AND MODERNIZATION (1895–1918)

The statements above offer an initial insight into the relationship of Japanese colonialism with its colony, Taiwan. In summary, a component of Japanese traditional culture, Judo was introduced to Taiwan early in Japan's colonial reign. In the long term, it played a major role not only in Japanese ambitions for Taiwan but also in Taiwan's modernization. Tsai Zhen-hsiung has stated, 'To explore Taiwan's modern history, the history of Taiwan did not begin in 1895, but... in the 50 years period of Taiwan history from 1895 to 1945...this is not to be overlooked'.<sup>4</sup> An examination of how the Japanese government promoted Judo in Taiwan's society will allow an understanding of the modernization process of Taiwanese society under colonial rule; it will also shed a brief beam light on the role of Judo in modern Taiwanese society.

A central component of traditional Japanese martial arts, Judo *per se* encompasses the elements, attitudes and attributes of traditional Japanese culture. Following the Meiji Reformation (1868–1912), the structure of Japanese society had undergone drastic change and its traditional culture was massively impacted by the Western world. The enforcement of social order in a time of change provided Judo with a new cultural role. By 1885, Judo had become a required course in Japanese police education. Japanese police training stipulated that all sergeants needed to possess elementary Judo qualifications to advance. It was further required that every policeman needed to undergo Judo training sessions twice a week.<sup>5</sup> Japanese police were required to possess a certain level of Judo skill when assigned to various imperial locations. This requirement the Japanese empire brought with it on invading. The initial reason: Judo, inter alia, was a means of maintaining social order in Taiwan as in Japan. To appreciate fully the importance of this component strategic of cultural warfare, it is necessary to set the introduction of Judo into Taiwan in fuller cultural context.

Prior to 1915, Taiwan lacked a modern social system and its haphazard infrastructural development had resulted in living, health and transport standards that some way behind those in Japan. These shortcomings had limited Japanese desire to immigrate to Taiwan. In addition, Taiwanese's early dissatisfaction with Japan's repressive rule resulting in anti-Japanese and counter-Japanese movements also reduced the appeal of Taiwan. The Japanese colonial government in a bid to control and contain Taiwanese resentment had to turn to deploying martial

arts-trained military and police forces to secure its colonial reign, to maintain law and order and to promote its political objectives. In 1915, the Tapani Incident occurred. This was a major uprising.<sup>6</sup> Thirteen smaller armed uprisings also took place. There were other uprisings. Furthermore, in many cases, conspirators were discovered and arrested before planned uprisings could occur. These are discussed briefly in the Conclusion. In response, the Japanese police in Taiwan took the opportunity to encourage the Taiwanese to take up Judo as a recreational distraction and to win over hearts and minds. These police were ‘seedling instructors’ during the early evolution of Judo in Taiwan.<sup>7</sup> There was no shortage of ‘seedling instructors’. The Taiwan Governor’s Office to counter deficiencies in the Taiwan’s police reserve in August 1896, had established a training centre for police providing the trainees with relevant martial arts training and martial arts lectures.

In Taipei, for instance, the police were required to undergo four hour or more of martial arts training and two hour or more of wrestling and equestrian skills per week. In Hsinchu, it was further stipulated that Judo, Kendo, wrestling (capture) and drilling courses were to be conducted on Sundays and Mondays.<sup>8</sup> In addition, to evaluate the effectiveness of the training, routine Judo competitions were staged. ‘Taiwanese’ Judo athletes also visited mainland Japan, Manchuria, Korea and Karahuto (Sakhalin) to attend ‘martial arts friendship meets’ and to participate in ‘Judo enhancing travel’.<sup>9</sup> Reciprocally, avid Judo followers in mainland Japan frequently participated in martial arts friendship competitions via delegations to Taiwan.<sup>10</sup> Meanwhile, the Taiwanese police routinely selected outstanding athletes annually to represent Taiwan in the ‘Budoku Festival Competitions’ held in Kyoto, Japan (Table 7.1).

As made clear in the table above, Judo representatives who travelled to Japan to participate in competitions in the early moments of Japanese rule were all Japanese and most were Japanese inspectors assigned to stations in Taiwan. The main reason is that in the early days of Japanese rule, the Governor’s Office was busy maintaining law enforcement and containing anti-Japanese activities. Japanese police were the enforcers. As yet, the Taiwanese were still little influenced by Japanese culture, not least because education which was still at a rudimentary stage. Furthermore, Judo as a sport was a highly skilled activity requiring extended training in order to produce competent performers. In short, it required extensive training and competition experience before the accumulation of high-level competition skills, thus outstanding athletes

**Table 7.1** Table of statistics on Japanese returning to Japan to participate in the national Judo competitions, 1929–1940’ Guang-zhe Chou and Yu-wei Luo. ‘The Introduction and Development of the Judo Sport in Taiwan during the Japanese Occupation Era (1895~1945)’, *The Competitive Sports 12* (2005), 7

<i>Name</i>	<i>Time</i>	<i>Competition title</i>	<i>Venue</i>	<i>Remarks</i>
Ooki Ichizou (Level IV)	May 4, 1929	The Imperial Commemorative Budoku Competitions	Nippon Seimenkan	Inspector, Kaohsiung prefectural nominee
Yoshiura Kiyochi (Level VI)	Nov. 1930	The first national Judo athletes nomination competitions	Sumo wrestling ring in Meiji Shrine outer court	The general adult section
1. Onohara Hiroshi (Level IV)	May 4, 1934	Imperial heir birth celebratory Budoku Competition	Doshin-bansho Guardhouse martial arts site	1. Prefectural county-designated nominee, Hsinchu district inspector 2. Designated nominee, Tainan district inspector Hsinchu, Taiwan
Kubo Moritsugu (Level IV)	Sept. 23, 1934	The first red-white rivalry contests	Sumo wrestling ring in Meiji Shrine outer court	1. Taichung Department inspector 2. Kaohsiung Department designated nominee inspector
1. Teraura Masuo (Level V)	Sept. 22, 1934	The first red-white rivalry contests	Sumo wrestling ring in Meiji Shrine outer court	3. Tainan Department inspector County office-level general nominees contests (2nd runner up)
2. Ooki Ichizou (Level V)				
3. Iwabuchi Shin (Level VI)				
Yoshiura Kiyochi (Level VI)	Oct. 29~31, 1935	The 8th Meiji Shrine National Sports Games, Judo Competitions	Japanese Youth Hall in Meiji Shrine outer court	

(continued)

Table 7.1 (continued)

<i>Name</i>	<i>Time</i>	<i>Competition title</i>	<i>Venue</i>	<i>Remarks</i>
1. Sato Ma (Level IV)	Apr. 7, 1940	Kashihara Jinguu 2,600th Anniversary Celebratory National Budoku Competitions	Special performance venue in Miyaki outdoor open-air court	1. Tainan Division
2. Kawakami Kumiharu (Level V)				2. Taipei governor's office
3. Tsuchiyama Satoru (Level V)				3. Tainan governor's office
Yoshiura Kiyochi (Level VI)	June 1940	Imperial year 2600 emperor celebratory Budoku competitions	Qingning Hall	Taiwan Administration director, Judo department/county nominee
Iwabuchi Kitsu (Level V)	Oct. to Nov. 1940	The 11th Meiji Shrine National Sports Games Judo Competitions	Lecture Hall Grand concourse	Police officers county rivalry contests (1st runner up)

during this early period invariably came mainly from the inspectors stationed in Taiwan and Japanese Judo teachers who had volunteered for teaching missions. These inspectors and teachers stationed in Taiwan became pioneers of Judo and through their efforts Judo became part and parcel of Taiwanese culture. Today its militaristic overtones are now a thing of the past but it is now fixed firmly in Taiwanese competitive sport: a present positive legacy of a mostly negative past.

### JUDO AND 'ASSIMILATIONISM' (1918–1945)

In post-1918 Taiwan, the colonial government adopted the strategy of 'gradualism and separatism' in an attempt not only to strengthen Japanese control over the colony but also to steadily and surreptitiously strip Taiwan of its resources and wealth to service the Japanese empire. To achieve this, importantly, however, the strategy was devised to condition acquiescent Taiwan to stay loyal to the emperor: a revisionist 'Hearts and Minds' campaign. To this end, simultaneously the Japanese introduced an 'assimilation-based' education as they sought purposefully to strengthen their hold on the content of Taiwan's middle class education and to shape it along desired Japanese lines. The strategy was not without success.

Shunsuke Tsurumi (1922–2015) has pointed out that not all influential and well-educated Taiwanese rebelled against the colonizer's policies. They appreciated modernization involving those Western practices central to the Japanese strategy of assimilation. For this reason, it has to be recognized that Japanese cultural values and an emperor-oriented nationalism were comprehensively and unrelentingly pressed on the educated population with some success. The carrot was coupled with the stick. As the last resort, individuals, communities and organizations were compelled through punishment for non-compliance to 'turnaround'. The circle was tightly closed.

During this phase the Japanese assumed a more subtle attitude in their assimilation policy with Judo as a central component of the political, social and personal process of integration into 'Japanization'. It was a symbol of acquired Japanese cultural identity and a pragmatic manifestation of the colonialists' strategy of inculcating order, obedience, fitness and controlled energy. The concern here is to make it clear that Judo evolved under the tutelage of, and in accordance with the designs of the Japanese strategists. Essentially, it was a form of politicization not recreation.

As in the case of Korea (see essays 2 and 3), Japanese imperialists closely monitored the reactions of the Taiwanese to imperial control. And as in the case of Korea, an initial iron fist was gradually enclosed in a velvet glove. There was a global reason for this. By 1918, independence movements throughout the world influenced by the Wilsonian ideals of Woodrow Wilson pressed for national independence. The Wilsonian ramifications for politics and sport in East Asia have been considered by J.A. Mangan in *The Olympic Games: Prism for East Asian Politics and Geopolitics*.<sup>11</sup> See especially his Prologue, ‘Eurocentric Lens Removed: Wilsonianism Re-ordered’ and his Epilogue, ‘Eurocentric Lens Replaced: Wilsonianism Re-orientated’.<sup>12</sup> Taiwan was no exception to the influence of Wilsonianism sweeping the globe in the 1920s. The outcome was a loosening of a brutal grip of Japan on Taiwan—at least overtly—and greater emphasis on cultural assimilation. This included the expansion of Judo as a method of the soft power induction of the Taiwanese into the ultimate ambition of the Japanese—the total ‘Japanization’ of the Taiwanese. Sport, including Judo, became an internal ‘soft power system’: part of a ‘gentler’ coercion. Judo in this soft power role had distinct imperial advantages: it was Japanese in philosophy and practice and it was a form of covert military training.

#### ‘ASSIMILATIONISM’: A VELVET GLOVE APPROACH

In 1919, the Haratakashi government (1918–1921), led by the 10th Prime Minister of Japan, Hara Takashi (原敬, 1856–1921), first moved to reform the colony’s militaristic system by cancelling the policy of exclusively appointing a military officer as the Governor, and proposed a softer ‘gradual inland “extensionism”’<sup>13</sup> as the fundamental approach of Japanese colonization. Upon taking office, in 1919, Governor Baron Den Kenjiro (田健治郎, 1855–1930), 8th Governor-General 1919–1923<sup>14</sup> of Taiwan and the first civilian to hold that position, sought to implement ‘gradual inland “extensionism”’. He promoted new policies of social and political assimilation and discriminatory laws in education were repealed. Several additional major reforms were carried out during Den’s tenure, including various administrative changes, expansion of the public education system, reduction of police involvement in local administration and the legalization of Japanese-Taiwanese inter-marriage. Den’s stated goal was that the Taiwanese were to eventually enjoy the same political rights as the Japanese in ‘the Home Islands’. The



Taiwanese would be fully assimilated into Japanese society. He emphasized that Taiwan, de facto, was part of Japan, hence rule over Taiwan needed to be about Taiwanese being effectively educated to be loyal to the Japanese government and imbued with the ideal of commitment to national obligations. At the same time, he devoted his efforts to ensuring not only that education standards reached a level comparable to that for the Japanese, but also to ensuring that Taiwanese political education was equal to that of the Japanese (Fig. 7.3).



**Fig. 7.3** Governor Den Kenjiro (田健治郎, 1855–1930). (Available at: <http://www.ndl.go.jp/portrait/datas/560.html?cat=47>. Accessed 12 April 2015.)

In spite of the fact that educational reforms on various levels were comprehensively installed, *de facto*, the treatment that the Taiwanese received still differed from the Japanese because education for the Japanese was implemented according to Japanese inland laws and regulations whereas the Taiwanese's educational system was not: a dual model resulted. In particular, as far as Japan was concerned, there was no necessity to develop middle to higher management skills. Consequently, the Japanese intentionally concentrated on the implementation of elementary education. This exposed the very essence of colonial education. Its purpose was to ensure an education to achieve control and to realize the Japanese interpretation of 'Japanization'.<sup>15</sup> It clearly highlighted the paradoxical nature of Japanese colonial education. Assimilation did not mean *equality*. In reality, the Taiwanese, regardless of the policy of assimilation into the imperial way of thinking and living, were not entitled to a fully equal education to achieve this!

#### BUDOKO AND BUDOKENS: JAPANESE-LED JUDO

The Japanese government on 17 April 1895 founded the 'Dai Nippon Butoku Kai' (DNBK)<sup>16</sup> in Kyoto to propagate the Budoku philosophy and in 1900 introduced the 'Dai Nippon Butoku Kai' to Taiwan. It also created the 'Butoku Kai Taiwan local council department' at the Taiwan governor's office police administration headquarters. In this way, Butokudens were installed throughout Taiwan's departments and counties utilizing official resources and police officers to press the Taiwanese to both donate to and to build infrastructure such as Butokudens as the venues for developing martial arts such as Judo. This enabled students and the public to practice Judo at these Butokuden thus ensuring the expansion of Judo across Taiwan. The means by which the Taiwanese learned Judo, apart from the Taiwanese educational system, was predominantly via the mentorship of Japanese residing in Taiwan, at Japanese schools or as members of Taiwanese Butokudens.<sup>17</sup>

#### THE JAPANIZATION MOVEMENT

'Japanization' (こうみんかせいさく, 皇民化政策, (the Japanization Movement) to ensure the Taiwanese became loyal subjects of the Japanese emperor) became part of three major policies: 'Japanization, industrialization, and southward movement' as proposed by the Taiwan

governor-general Kobayashi Seizo (1877–1962) in 1936. This triple policy strategy became strongly emphasized when the second Sino-Japanese war broke out in July 1937. Taiwan adopted a wartime system leading to the formation of a citizens national spiritual mobilization movement. The citizens spiritual mobilization movement ‘*inter alia*’ chanted patriotic slogans such as, a united front, a united national goal and patriotism to promote a movement, to strengthen the unification of inner (Japan) Taiwan and to ensure the imperial subjects’ acceptance of their obligations.

### THE JAPANIZATION MOVEMENT: RUTHLESS IN INTENT AND IMPLEMENTATION

The ‘Japanization’ Movement was ruthless in intention and implementation. It forbade the use of Mandarin characters, altered dress, cancelled Han education, Han-related religions, customs and folklore, abolished temples and deities, banned freedom of speech, publishing, gatherings and organization. In addition, the Taiwanese were pressed to take up Japanese surnames, to adopt the Japanese language, written characters, costume, temples and deities and to join imperial organizations. These mandates comprised a comprehensive brainwashing programme to bring about a total ‘state-projected’ emperor-led mindset and full imperial subject obedience. Eventually, it had the following comprehensive components:

#### 1. Re-oriented Imperialized Education: the Japanization Movement Reformed:

In 1939, when Japan was in need of significant manpower and resources, Governor Kobayashi introduced a thorough reform of the Japanization Movement in Taiwan to make Taiwanese conditioning even more complete through even more intensive social and school education. This was coupled with rewards for appropriate family name changes and Japanese language-speaking households. These brought increased social status and better material benefits. The purpose, as ever, was to persuade the Taiwanese to become ‘fully assimilated’ Japanese citizens, to encourage them to make required sacrifices and to contribute comprehensively to the glorious empire. The essential nature of this glory was

given prominence by raising the Bushido philosophy to a policy pinnacle to underscore the Japanese empire's espousal of self-sacrificial militarism. Punishments for non-adjustment and absence of zeal were introduced.

## 2. The Annihilation of Taiwanese Ethnic Awareness and Identity:

The Japanese language, of course was central to imperial cultural expression. It reflected deeply held values, beliefs and feelings. Conversely, the replacement of indigenous language was an attempt to eradicate those values previously in place. Renaming took away long-established identities whilst religious replacement eliminated spiritual customs, rituals and credos. 'Japanization' was the attempted destruction of the essential elements that define national identity, culture and religion: the foundations of a people's moral, mental and emotional uniqueness. The Japanese conquest of Taiwan amounted to attempted moral, mental and emotional 'genocide'.

## 3. Mobilization for War:

Towards the end of the Second World War, Japan experienced an increasing shortage of military manpower and materials. Japan increased Taiwanese taxes. It increasingly redirected the island's resources more completely to imperial military operations. The result was serious food shortages. To secure enough even for basic survival became increasingly difficult. By now, Taiwan was fully mobilized for war. The pressure to identify with the Japanese and to adopt the Japanese language, family nomenclature, attire and spiritual beliefs was further increased. In 1937, as noted above, with the beginning of the Japanization Movement, the government had pressed *inter alia* for Shintoism and the restriction of other religions. This pressure now increased.

## 4. Judo: Major Instrument of Japanese Imperialism and Militarism:

On 15 August 1939, the Taiwan Military Commander in Chief of the Taiwan Army District, Moto Furusho (古莊幹郎, ふるしょうもとお, 1882–1940) issued a 'Directive to all Taiwanese residents' (告臺灣全島居民) putting the Defense of Taiwan on a war-footing.

On 10 September 1939, the Taiwan Governor's Office established a 'Spiritual Mobilization Headquarter' (國民精神總動員本部). It set out

new 'Elementary and Public School Rules' (小學校及公學校的武道指導要目). Senior male pupils were now to be taught Judo (and Kendo) outside as well as during school hours. On 4 August of the same year, the Governor's Office had issued a directive 'Elementary and Public Sector of Martial Arts Guidance Guidelines'. This stressed, seemingly unprovocatively, the importance of training children's bodies and spirits to produce an 'all rounded citizen's character'! In fact, it was a directive promoting a militaristic education. The main content laid stress on the traditional Japanese martial arts in order to create the 'Bushido' warrior.<sup>18</sup> Taiwanese education was now wholly reshaped in the image of 'Japanese Militarism' and now comprised military-oriented training. Judo became a primary element of a martial arts military programme and linked to 'physical training' as preparation for military service. It now replaced 'gymnastics' in school education. Judo was now a central plank in a 'Japanization' platform of preparatory military training.

A complete national system of military education was now in place. Furthermore, the more aggressive the militaristic emphasis became, the more drastic the 'brainwashing' in schools became. 'Bowing to the North' during morning assembly and praying for the emperor now became part of school indoctrination as Benedict Anderson has observed to forge a perceived shared identity,<sup>19</sup> and to create a sense of oneness and ensure loyalty to the Emperor ruler.

##### 5. The Butokuden: Tangible Symbol of Power:

Amongst the over one hundred public buildings in Taipei built during the Japanese occupation, the most imposing was the Taiwan Governor's Office (the ultimate symbol of power and leadership), which made it absolutely clear to the Taiwanese that the Japanese planned to stay in Taiwan permanently and to rule Taiwan indefinitely.

The Taiwan Shrine, however, was the largest building in architectural scale with the most colonial characteristics and the most imperial symbols of significance. The colonial ruler's devotion to architectural form was the most blatant evidence of the intention to awe the Taiwanese with solemn and imposing physical manifestations of power. The colonial ruler's ultimate objective was to project the dominance of its presence through the dominance of its architecture. The Governor's Office and the Shrine in architectural form, layout, style, façade and spatial configuration were

intended to send a combined overpowering monumental message of the colonial ruler's ambition and authority.<sup>20</sup>

Similarly, the Dai Nippon Butoku Kai (だいにっぽんぶとくかい, 大日本武徳会, 'Greater Japan Martial Virtue Society') Butokuden architecture was created to strengthen Taiwanese 'Japanization', to create a sense of ownership of, and even devotion to Judo. The unique architecture was an important visual statement in stone and slate. The Butokuden's external configuration, its location, style and size, and its interior display and etiquettes were crucial manifestations of Judo as an 'imaginary shared identity', an emotional bond. The Butokuden was the physical venue for demonstrating absorbed identity and even more, for demonstrating a shared identity. As far as Japanese 'Imperialism' was concerned, the Butokuden projected physical proof of the Taiwan's militaristic identification with Japan and Judo.

Frantz Fanon has argued that the colonized, as an outcome of colonization's subservient/dominant relation, would adopt self-hatred and loathe those 'with dark skin' and would be compelled to be rid of those whose skin colour symbolized inferiority in lifestyle, language, cognitive style and cultural expression, and unconsciously adopt a 'bleached' appearance (the so-called white mask) and abandon their own culture expressions and ethic feelings. Under such self-denying circumstances, even when the colonizer had long gone severing any direct ruling ties, a colony still could not truly jettison its self-destructive tendency and inherent cognitive perception of the colonizer's cultural superiority and their own colonial cultural inferiority. Japan did its best to establish just such a mindset in Taiwan.

Japan in its bid to colonize Taiwan forced the Taiwanese, bodily, mentally, morally, spiritually, emotionally and politically, to accept its rule. It attempted nothing less than the physical, cognitive, religious, ethical, sentient and governmental transformation of Taiwan. Ironically and willfully Japan called unequal subjected Taiwanese, 'equal subjects'. The 'label' was essentially duplicitous propaganda. It camouflaged Japanese intentions to exploit the Taiwanese people, assets and resources for its greater imperial ambitions. It cynically offered the 'inferior' Taiwanese the chance to be 'superior' by becoming 'Japanese'. One cultural aid to transformation was Judo—impregnated with Japanese values and a perfect value-laden instrument of colonial control; a means of inculcating both subservience and suitability stressing individual and collective

discipline as well as controlled aggression and physical fitness: qualities essential for military exploitation.

## CONCLUSION

Subjected to Japanese colonial rule from 1895, Taiwan was forced to accept an oppressive Japanese colonialism. It was also, however, through Japan's colonialism that the modern educational system and modern sports were introduced to Taiwan including baseball, Kendo and Judo. In Taiwan, Judo penetrated all levels of society through the Japanese assimilation policy whilst spearheading the promotion of the Japanese martial culture. The state-run Butokudens and private-run Butokudens provided venues for the Taiwanese to take up and learn Judo. Following the introduction of 'gradual inland extensionism', a large number of Taiwanese learnt Judo in Japan's inland schools or in lecture halls eventually becoming indigenous pioneers of Judo's promotion in Taiwan. Whilst the Taiwan Governor's Office energetically promoted its 'assimilation' policies and encouraged its colonial subjects to become 'Japanese', *de facto*; it retained an unequal relationship between 'born Japanese' and 'converted Japanese'. This point is stressed yet again. Nevertheless, the imperialist assimilationist colonial policies had a positive impact on the long-term development of Judo in Taiwan. In tracing the relationship, political, cultural and social, between Japanese imperialism and Taiwanese Judo the following summarizing points are pertinent:

1. Judo originated in Japan and was brought during the early period of Japanese colonization to Taiwan. The Taiwanese were given the opportunity to learn Judo. It has remained a positive contribution of the Japanese colonization of Taiwan. Judo has become a major Taiwanese sport.
2. The colonial government used schools, clubs, police and quasi-official private organizations of the 'Dai Nippon Butoku Kai' to promote Judo.
3. The colonial government also sought to convince the Taiwanese people to subscribe to permanent Japanese rule. To this end, the Japanese built majestic, imposing public buildings as symbols of Japanese authority and statements in stone of its intention to rule in perpetuity over Taiwan. The main architectural declarations of

intent with pronounced Japanese features and symbolic designs included the Taiwan Governor's Office, the Taiwan Shrine—and Butokudens for Judo.

4. The Japanese colonization of Taiwan that resulted in the Judo movement was intended to inculcate in the Taiwanese Budoku aggression, self-sacrificing loyalty to the Japanese emperor and a nationalism in which all citizens were soldiers.

Finally, during the Japanese era, Taiwan underwent unprecedented change and was subjected to comprehensive oppressive political, economic and cultural domination resulting initially in armed and unarmed anti-Japanese protests across the whole island occasioning serious confrontation between the colonizer and the colonized. This widespread discontent prompted the Japanese colonial government to introduce, 'progressivism, assimilationism and inland extensionism', in a comprehensive cultural reengineering programme. Many of the middle classes now embraced colonialism willingly. In their view, the advantages outweighed the disadvantages. Nevertheless, the reality was that Taiwan's manpower, resources and finance were swallowed up by the Imperial Machine.

Essentially, Japanese Imperialism was militaristic in purpose and practice. Judo was a tool of this militarism. The Butokuden were imposing visual manifestations of military power.<sup>21</sup>

Serendipitously, however, owing to Japanese rule, Judo was part of a modernization that outlived Japanese intentions, and Judo became part of Taiwan's cultural existence, with the result that Judo has exerted a profound influence on the development of Taiwan's sport in the post-imperial period. In the final analysis, a pragmatic imperial militaristic innovation has become a personal recreational pleasure and a modern source of national pride.

#### CODA: RESIDUAL MEMORIES

Memories of Japanese colonialism have not faded; they remain vivid in the present. Judo competitions between the two nations can be tense. What was intended as a form of colonial conditioning has become a manifestation of aggressive contemporary nationalism.



## NOTES

1. See, J.A. Mangan, *The Games Ethic and Imperialism: Aspects of the Diffusion of an Ideal* (London: Viking /Penguin, 1986 and London: Cass, 1998 (reprinted 2001 and 2003)); J.A. Mangan, *The Cultural Bond: Sport, Empire and Society* (London: Cass, 1992); J.A. Mangan. (ED.) *The Imperial Curriculum: Racial Images and Education in the British Colonial Experience* (London: Routledge, 1993 and Routledge library Edition: Education, 2002); and J.A. Mangan and Fan Hong. (Eds.) *Sport in Asian Society: Past and Present* (London: Cass, 2003). See also, Allen Guttmann. *Games and Empires: Modern Sports and Cultural Imperialism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994).
2. Nikolai Bukharin, *Imperialism and World Economy* (London: Merlin, 1988).
3. Article 1 stipulated, 'The public school is to administer disciplinary education to the islanders' offspring by teaching them to learn to accumulate citizen characteristics and also to achieve the objective of familiarizing the national language, with the enrollment qualification being those aged over 8 and up to 14, and the teaching subjects encompass discipline, national language, composition, reading, calligraphy, mathematics, singing, gymnastics, totaling eight subjects, with specified study cap being 6 years'. Cited from Zhen-hsiung Tsai, *The History of on the Development of Taiwan's Elementary School Physical Education during the Japanese Occupation Era* (Taipei: Normal University Publishing, 1995), 42.
4. Zhen-hsiung Tsai, *The History of on the Development of Taiwan's Elementary School Physical Education during the Japanese Occupation Era* (Taipei: Normal University Publishing, 1995).
5. Chang-lung Huang and Zhou-zhe Lee, *The Art of Judo*, (Kaohsiung: Liwen Publishing, 1969).
6. Paul R. Katz, *When Valleys Turned Blood Red: The Tapani Incident in Colonial Taiwan* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2005), 110.
7. 14,000 Taiwanese (0.5% of the population) were killed by the time anti-Japanese activity amongst the ethnic Chinese population had died down in 1902. Later, the armed resistance recommenced with the Beipu Uprising in 1907 in which Saisiyat and Hakka peoples revolted against the Japanese. Perhaps, the most famous of all of the anti-Japanese uprisings, the Wushe Incident, occurred in the aboriginal region of Musha in Taichū Prefecture. On 27 October 1930, following escalation of an incident in which a Japanese police officer insulted a tribesman, over 300 Seediq aborigines attacked Japanese residents in the area. In the ensuing violence, 134 Japanese nationals and two ethnic Han Taiwanese were killed, and 215 Japanese nationals injured. Several members of the

- government resigned over the incident, which proved to be the most violent of the uprisings during Japanese rule. It was ruthlessly put down.
8. The Taiwan Governor's Office, *The Police Officer Skill Seminar Rules, the Taiwan Government's Office Police Officers Academic Lecture on Martial Arts Rules Implementation Details* (Taiwan Governor's Office official document compendium, 1905).
  9. The Taiwan Police Association, 'The Cover and Contents', *The Taiwan Police Association Magazine*, 1 (1917); The Taiwan Police Association, 'The Martial Arts Master (Choharu) of Kyoto, Butoku Study Excursion', *The Taiwan Police Association Magazine* 24 (1919), 67; The Taiwan Police Association, 'The Martial Arts Master (Choharu) of Kyoto, Butoku Study Excursion', *The Taiwan Police Association Magazine* 26 (1920), 51; and The Taiwan Police Association, 'The Martial Arts Master (Choharu) of Kyoto', *The Taiwan Police Association Magazine* 100 (1925a), 159.
  10. The Taiwan Police Association, 'The Kansai College Student Corps Island Martial Arts Study Excursion', *The Taiwan Police Association Magazine* 24 (1925b), 188–189.
  11. J.A. Mangan, Qing Luo and Sayuri Guthrie-Shimizu. (Eds.) *The Olympic Games: Prism for East Asian Politics and Geopolitics* (Beijing: Communication University of China Press, forthcoming).
  12. See, J.A. Mangan, 'Prologue: Eurocentric Lens Removed: Wilsonianism Re-ordered' and J.A. Mangan, 'Epilogue: Eurocentric Lens Replaced: Wilsonianism Re-orientated' in, J.A. Mangan, Qing Luo and Sayuri Guthrie-Shimizu (Eds.) *The Olympic Games: Prism for East Asian Politics and Geopolitics* (Beijing: Communication University of China Press, forthcoming).
  13. The programme literally meant that Taiwan and its people would eventually become an extension of 'inland' Japan. However, in practice, the colonial regime discriminated against ethnic identity especially in the case of the Chinese and the aborigines. See, Timothy Ka-ying Wong, 'From Ethnic to Civic Nationalism: The Formation and Changing Nature of Taiwanese Identity' *Asian Perspective* 25, no. 3 (2001), 175–206.
  14. He was a Japanese politician and cabinet minister in the pre-war government of the Empire of Japan. He was also the eighth Japanese Governor-General of Taiwan from 29 October 1919 to September 1923, and the first civilian to hold that position.
  15. Shu-ke Yeh, *The Sunset in Taipei City: The Taipei Urban Development and the Taiwanese's Daily Life during the Japanese Occupation Era (1895-1945)* (Taipei: the Independent Evening News Publishing, 1993).
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- of classical martial cultures and promotion of international peace and harmony through the education and training in the traditional martial arts disciplines.
17. Yung-jeh Lin, *The Recent State of Judo in Taiwan* (Tokyo: the Lecture Hall, 1967).
  18. Yuan-huei Lee, *An Empirical Study on Taiwan's Elementary Education under the Japanese Rule* (Tokyo: Suihodo, 1981).
  19. Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, (London: Verso, 1991).
  20. Shu-keYeh, *The Sunset in Taipei City: The Taipei Urban Development and the Taiwanese's Daily Life during the Japanese Occupation Era (1895–1945)* (Taipei: the Independent Evening News Publishing, 1993).
  21. After 1945, the Butokudens were adapted to multiple uses including judo practice courts, police offices, police or teacher's accommodation, school's assembly halls, private houses or temples. Recently, some of the non-governmental organizations and local government are planning to retain some butokudens as memorial cultural heritage sites.

**Acknowledgement** The authors would like to express their appreciation to Professor Gwang Ok for his assistance in ensuring this essay was completed. His logistical support has been exceptional.

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# Taiwan under Japanese Colonial Control: Sport as a Component of Cultural Conditioning, Political Domination, and Militaristic Imperialism

*Chien-Shing Lee, J.A. Mangan and Gwang Ok*

## INTRODUCTION: HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Due to its important geographic location, Formosa had been occupied by various different foreign powers including Spain, Holland, China, and Japan. Japan ruled Taiwan (Formosa) from 1895 to 1945. In 1895, the Chinese Qing Dynasty signed The Treaty of Shimonoseki on April 17,<sup>1</sup> and ceded Taiwan to a victorious Japan after defeat in the First

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J.A. Mangan et al. (eds.), *Japanese Imperialism: Politics and Sport in East Asia*, [https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-5104-3\\_8](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-5104-3_8)

Sino-Japanese War. With the end of World War II under General Order No. 1 signed by General Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Taiwan surrendered to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek,<sup>2</sup> who was the de facto head of the Chinese Nationalist's Republic of China (ROC). The then present had become once more the past.

Taiwan's Japanese colonial involvement in Taiwan, in fact, began during the Meiji Era (September 8, 1868–July 30, 1912), when Japan turned from the Bakufu isolationism of the Tokugawa Shogunate (1603–1868) and adopted the 'Datsu-A Ron' Policy (Breaking Away from Asia and Merging into Europe) due to an enthusiastic embrace of Westernization.<sup>3</sup> With the Meiji Era came military victories over China and Russia. Under Japan's governance of Taiwan during the Meiji Era, Japan exploited the colony for its resources, while the Taiwanese were expected to demonstrate loyalty and fidelity to the Emperor of Japan.

Prior to Japanese rule, Taiwan, as noted above, had been a territorial outpost of Qing Emperors and as a consequence, was heavily influenced by Confucianism, Buddhism, and Taoism.<sup>4</sup> The island's earliest inhabitants were Austronesian aborigines. Later the Europeans arrived. Thus, during Japan's authoritarian rule, a complex island culture existed. This resulted in a confrontation with Japanese officialdom from both aborigines and the early Chinese settlers. In time, sport eventually played a central role in attempts by the Japanese to overcome resistance from these unappreciative antagonists.

### TAIWAN BEFORE JAPANESE RULE

The earliest evidence of man on Taiwan dates back to the Paleolithic Age (2.6 million years to 12,000 years ago).<sup>5</sup> Later in the Neolithic Age, Taiwan became the cradle of Austronesian cultures that subsequently spread across Southeast Asia and the Pacific,<sup>6</sup> whilst Taiwan's aboriginal peoples share similar languages with peoples throughout Southeast Asia.<sup>7</sup> Today, the Republic of China government recognizes and lists sixteen tribes: the Atayal, SaiSiat, Puyuma, Amis, Paiwan, Bunun, Tsou, Rukai, Yami, Thao, Kavalan, Taroko, Sakizaya, Seediq, Hla'alua, and Kanakanavu.<sup>8</sup> Long before Japanese rule, Taiwan was a geographical pivot in the political, economic, and military strategies of many countries. Taiwan served as a transport hub for European, Japanese, and Southeast Asian vessels and their goods. As world trade increased,

Taiwan attained ever greater geographical significance. Geopolitically, Taiwan was a link to the Pacific Ocean.

In the seventeenth century, Taiwan's local aborigines established the central kingdom in Taiwan. In the first half of the seventeenth century, the Dutch occupied southwest. From 1626 to 1642, Spain briefly had a foothold of Taiwan's northwestern shores. The Dutch later expelled the Spanish and controlled most of western Taiwan.<sup>9</sup> In April 1661, the half-Chinese, half-Japanese Koxinga or Zheng Chenggong (1624–23 June 1662)<sup>10</sup> led troops on behalf of the declining Ming Dynasty (1368–1644) to expel the Dutch from Taiwan. On February 1, 1662, Koxinga established a Han Chinese regime in southern Taiwan. Then, three generations later, the Qing Dynasty (1644–1911) took the reins of power in China, and Han Chinese immigrants came to the island in large numbers.<sup>11</sup> Before long, the Han Chinese controlled the agricultural plains of western Taiwan, and the aboriginal tribes occupied only the mountainous areas or far reaches of eastern Taiwan.

Taiwan, therefore, was a melting pot of cultures long before the arrival of the Japanese in 1895. Equally important, due to two centuries of rule in China by the Ming Dynasty (1368–1644) and Qing Dynasty (1644–1911), Taiwan was greatly influenced by the 3000-year-old culture of China, especially its political despotism and its Confucian philosophy. This paved the way for Japanese authoritarian political, economic, military, and education policies to ensure its colonial control. Although initially relatively benign, Japan became increasingly authoritarian, militaristic, and arrogantly imperialistic.

#### PARADOX AND IRONY: THE SPREAD OF WESTERN CULTURE UNDER JAPANESE AUTHORITY

In 1868, the Japanese Emperor Meiji abandoned the isolationism policy of the Tokugawa Shogunate and adopted Fukuzawa Yukichi's 'Datsu-A Ron' theory (Breaking away from Asia and merging into Europe), and implemented total westernization<sup>12</sup>, not least in education and lifestyle. This 'cultural' revolution was eventually replicated in Taiwan. Among other things, Japanese officials attempted to introduce Western sports from England and America as strategies to reduce Taiwanese resistance and assimilate them into Japanese culture. Recent Taiwanese educational and cultural scholars have described Japan's half-century colonization of

Taiwan as 'a dark era'. Furthermore, they have emphasized the humiliation of the Taiwanese at the hands of Japanese and the consequent emergence of anti-Japanese organizations.

In May 1895, Japanese troops attacked Taiwan to extend the Japanese empire. It was an important strategic possession. The occupation of Taiwan cost over 4800 dead and 27,000 injured. In order to preserve Chinese culture, Taiwan's national bourgeoisie and intellectuals led by Lin Hsien-tang and Chiang Wei-shui launched a counter-Japanese movement. Historians have recorded the struggle against Japan.<sup>13</sup>

Yet, in fact, Japanese rule in Taiwan was less brutal than in Japan's colony of Korea.<sup>14</sup> The Taiwanese never offered the level of the composite resistance of the Koreans, thus different attitudes on the part of the Japanese in the two colonized countries emerged gradually.<sup>15</sup> Certainly, like the Koreans, the Taiwanese had to pledge loyalty to the Japanese Emperor and adopt Japanese language and culture as their own during Japan's rule from 1895 to 1945, but, at the same time, the Taiwanese were offered a seductive comprehensive program of positive Japanese-style westernization, which includes western sports, coffee-shops, bathing beaches, sea swimming, bicycling, zoos, and the like. Many middle class Taiwanese found these cultural innovations attractive and were more inclined to embrace them than middle class Koreans putting modernization before nationalism.<sup>16</sup>

The introduction of Western-style bathing beaches is symbolically significant. In the West, bathing beaches appeared in England in 1796 and became popular on the European continent in the nineteenth century. Bathing beaches were introduced to Japan in 1878. The first was constructed in Kanagawa in 1885. At the time, medical scientists believed that sea-bathing was helpful in the treatment of tuberculosis. Promoted by Matsumoto Jun (1832–1907), the Director of the Japanese Imperial Army Medical Corps, sea-bathing in Taiwan became popular.<sup>17</sup>

In 1920, the Railway Bureau introduced special train services to the beaches for visitors. Soon Taiwan beach facilities featured other western-style innovations such as children's pools, slides, swings, electric carousels, shower rooms heated by natural gas, lounges, VIP rooms, cinemas, and even pay toilets. In 1928, pupils of Keelung First Public Primary School and Keelung Second Public Primary School took sea swimming classes at Big Sand Beach.<sup>18</sup> Twenty-nine were awarded a proficiency award for swimming more than three kilometers (Fig. 8.1).





**Fig. 8.1** The Big Sand Beach in the 1920s ('The Big Sand Beach in Ji Long', 8 November 2009, available at: <http://blog.sina.com.tw/stampinged/article.php?entryid=588301>. Accessed on 15 October 2015.)

Taiwan, at least with regard to bathing beaches, had become a little Japan.

### BASKETBALL: AN IMPERIAL MEANS OF CULTURAL SEDUCTION

Pertinent also to the theme of Japanese recreational seduction, is basketball, the sport invented in 1891 in America and widely spread by American Christian missionaries. Omori Heizou, a Japanese who attended the Young Men's Christian Association (YMCA) in Springfield College, Massachusetts in America in 1908 introduced basketball to Japan.<sup>19</sup> In 1914, the YMCA sent Franklin H. Brown<sup>20</sup> to Japan and he promoted the game in Kyoto, Osaka, and Kobe. Although in 1922 Brown was invited by the Taiwan Sports Association to teach Track and Field, he was more successful in introducing basketball and volleyball. He recruited both students and the staff of the Railway Bureau. He taught volleyball and basketball in 228 parks in Taipei.<sup>21</sup> Basketball was introduced to Keelung High School, Taipei First High School, Taipei

Second High School, Taipei Business School, Tamsui High School, Tainan Teachers School, and Taipei Imperial University. Basketball was popular among women. It was played in The First Girls' High School, The Second Girls' High School, The Third Girls' High School, Blessed Imelda's School, Hsinchu Girls' High School, Taichung Girls' High School, Changhua Girls' High School, Taipei Industrial School, Taipei First Teachers' College, and Taipei Second Teachers' College. The First Girls' High School played a crucial role in the adoption of basketball. The school not only became one of the earliest and most competitive basketball teams it also hosted a national Taiwanese basketball seminar on January 24th and 25th, 1927.<sup>22</sup> Although evidence is limited, some valuable and rare photographs still exist illustrating the early involvement of women in basketball in Taiwan.<sup>23</sup> Due to, the successful adoption of Western ball games, female students became interested in Western sport generally; not least because it promoted their healthy development.<sup>24</sup> Although Western sport gain widespread popularity among the Taiwanese, it was not until 1940 that the first Taiwanese team participated in a competitive game of basketball game in Japan. In fact, the 'Taiwanese Team' was comprised entirely of native Japanese clearly reflecting Japan's tight control over Taiwan and a reluctance to fully assimilate the Taiwanese into Japanese culture. Taiwanese were purposely 'Westernized' under Japan's cultural assimilation policy but only to a certain degree! Nevertheless, what they were permitted they greatly enjoyed (Fig. 8.2).

### THE JAPANESE COLONIAL SYSTEM

Japanese officialdom's colonial system in Taiwan operated on three levels. First, at the highest level—the Governor-General's Office oversaw executive, legislative, judicial, and military affairs. Second, the Governor-General's Office adopted a top-down approach in order to extend its power generally in all administrative areas. Third, a 'Police Society'<sup>25</sup> was established to exercise total control over the Taiwanese. In sport, the 'Police Society' advocated martial ethics, introduced and organized by the police and involved the inculcation of Japanese martial values.<sup>26</sup> As such, it was a preparation for eventual military service.<sup>27</sup> The government was in charge of both national and international sports arrangements. It also issued a monthly sport journal that advocated that Taiwan's sport organizations were divided into the Japan Sports



Fig. 8.2 Franklin H. Brown in Taiwan, 1924 ('The Father of Volleyball of Taiwan: Franklin Hantwell Brown'. Available at: <http://catalog.digitalarchives.tw/item/00/45/a2/45.html>. Accessed on 15 October 2015.)

Association, the Meiji Shrine Sports Association, and the Sports Section of the Ministry of Health. The fundamental ideology that underpinned this was the concept of submission to the will of the Japanese Emperor. The journal's title was *Sports and Interest* (運動と趣味) and was published by 'The Society of Sports Reward' (體育獎勵會).

The Meiji Shrine Sports Association was in charge of all Taiwan Games from 1924 to 1942. During this period, it held 13 major Games in more than 30 sports. At each Games, more than 20,000 athletes participated. Through these carefully controlled and continuous Games, Japan's imperial policy was culturally cemented into place with an inflexible emphasis on the Japanese values of respecting the Emperor,

exercising the body collectively, forging and promoting the replication of the (Japanese) national spirit that the Japanese colonialists wanted to see inculcated.<sup>28</sup> Meanwhile, throughout the island, the sports section of the Ministry of Health conducted physical fitness tests involving sprinting, long jump, shot putting, force measuring, and mean motion resonance.<sup>29</sup>

The top three competitors in each of these types of tests were rewarded. Although the physical fitness tests were presented as recreational events, they had another purpose. Japanese officials were preparing the Taiwanese for military service. From 1920 to 1932, the senior staffs of the Taiwan Sports Association were all Japanese government officials. Various ministry officials oversaw specific sports such as tennis, baseball, track and field, Judo, Sumo wrestling, and swimming, in conjunction with others from disparate government bodies such as the Interior Bureau, Shokusan Kougyou (Breeding and Business Promotion Industry), the Culture and Education Bureau and the Central Research Institute. Taiwanese held no important positions in these organizations. To extend Japan's reach to sports events held at the local level, school officials were also included. In the Taichung area, for example, the school principal or a lecturer served as the head in these organizations.

### SPORT AS A SOFT POWER STRATEGY

Sport was given special emphasis from the earliest moments of the colonial era. On August 1, 1895, The Act of the Implementation for Sports Disciplines was proposed. Because Taiwan's climate was warmer than Japan's, the Act carefully set out guidelines for sensible physical activity. In 1900, branches of martial ethics associations were established in Taipei, Taichung, and Tainan. In April 1902, the first Martial Arts Demonstration was held in Tamsui. On October 27, 1902, the Taipei Martial Arts Hall was built. In 1906, the Taipei Branch of the Japan Martial Ethics Association was established. In 1903, Gotō Shinpe (24 July 1857 to 13 April 1929), and the Director of the Police Bureau (*Takushokukyoku*) jointly inaugurated the Sports Club and on November 19, 1905, the Club's first Autumn Games was held. During this decade, swimming competitions, tennis, track and field, basketball, rugby, and football were introduced. The Basketball Association was founded in Taipei on January 24, 1915 and was followed in 1920 by the creation of the Taiwan Sports Association. In January 1921, an American professional basketball team was invited to Taiwan and played all over

the island. The next year, in 1922, basketball teams from Keio University and Hosei University came to Taiwan, and the exchange was strengthened in 1925 when Taiwan's aboriginal basketball team visited Japan.

Gotō Shinpei, a Japanese statesman and cabinet minister, served as the head of civilian affairs of Taiwan under Japanese rule between July 25, 1857 and April 13, 1929. He was the director of the civil administration (1894–1895) in Taiwan. Based on his policy, playing games were added to the original inflexible, mechanical, and militaristic physical education classes to attract the interest of more students. His wider physical education program had encouraged more female students to do various kinds of sports but the imperial emphasis remained on military resource objectives.

### TAIWANESE RESISTANCE AND REJECTION

The colonization of Taiwan began with military suppression and the rapid exploitation of natural and agricultural resources. During and after First World War, however, a wave of the self-determination swept the international community of nations.<sup>30</sup> Japan now put more emphasis on civilian rule and attempted to assimilate the Taiwanese through a series of 'benevolent' decrees and regulations involving culture, language, and education rather than by a continued emphasis on coercion. The decrees or regulations included: The Aboriginal Public School Regulation (1914); Public School Physical Education Teaching Details Coercion (1914); Taiwan Higher primary school teaching subjects and principles (1915) and, The Guide to Physical Education (1917).<sup>31</sup>

In its approach to education, Japanese imperialism adopted a two-pronged approach: from central to local' (from Japan to Taiwan) and 'top to bottom' (from the Governor-General's Office to local schools). That, the school was a vehicle for Japan's national defense strategies and a source of manpower for the labor force. Education was centered on the adoption of the Japanese language. In the initial stage of Japan's colonization of Taiwan, Isawa Shūji (30 June 1851–3 May 1917), the Director of Student Affairs, initiated in 1895, The Taiwan Education Act that promoted the use of the Japanese language to ensure the Japanization of the Taiwanese.<sup>32</sup> Next, The Act of Taiwan Public Schools was enacted in 1898 by the Governor-General's Office to implement education policies. Inter alia, it required local government to pay for the educational budget. Later, to accelerate the cultural assimilation of the Taiwanese,



**Fig. 8.3** Isawa Shūji (30 June 1851–3 May 1917) (Available at: <https://ja.wikipedia.org/wiki/伊沢修二>. Accessed on 15 October 2015.)

The Taiwan Education Order was announced in 1922. According to this law, Taiwanese were allowed to study with Japanese students in Taiwan schools for the first time. During the early and middle stages of the colonization process, Japan's educational policies were designed essentially to create a labor force that understood Japanese orders. However, with the outbreak of the Pacific War, the focus shifted to education for military and national defense purposes (Fig. 8.3).

Japan's colonization policies strongly affected the Taiwanese, especially in the Japanese language primary schools, which to encourage enrollment, pupils could attend free. In this initial stage, from 1895 to 1945, physical education was part of the curriculum. For teachers and pupils alike, physical education in school was a new innovation. At that time, it was called gymnastics, and the emphasis was on a physical culture aimed at correcting posture, but there was also a military component. Parents were well aware that physical education in schools was

de facto preparation for military conscription. Physical education, was strongly opposed and they were eventually victorious in their protests, took a backward step. Physical education classes offered instead general fitness training and even theatrical performances. Sports events were held and the parents of pupils were invited as spectators; a gesture of conciliation. Various Western sports were eventually introduced extensively into primary schools and thus introduced widely into Taiwan during the Japanese colonial period. Sport was now part and parcel of a wider Taiwanese public schooling policy. There was not only sport in schools but also walking tours, community activities, and ultimately and importantly, the Kominka Movement.<sup>33</sup> By way of the Kominka Movement, the Japanese initiated a series of carefully orchestrated political and cultural mobilization projects to transform the Taiwanese into 'authentic Japanese'. Nevertheless, there can be no doubt whatsoever that Japan used sport in conjunction with other cultural activities as a means of indoctrination the Taiwanese into Japanese habits and practices—*but only up to a point*. For their part, the Taiwanese did not relish the pressure to adopt a Japanese identity. However, pleasure and enjoyment from sport attracted many Taiwanese. Public participation increased. To this extent, the Japanese attempt to win hearts and mind—and bodies was successful.

The second stage of physical education policy for public schools in Taiwan focused more emphatically on the promotion of Japanese health ethics via sport. Indoctrination workshops for physical education teachers were held, physical education classes were used to create a fit labor force. To achieve these ends, physical facilities were gradually improved. During the third stage, the Governor-General's Office adopted a more civilian stance to the Taiwanese population and implemented a fully Japanese civil system of decrees and regulations. In 1917, Principles for Teaching Physical Education were announced in Taiwan just four years after the Standards for School Physical Education had been implemented in Japan in 1913. In 1927, Principles for Teaching Physical Education were modified and a standard curriculum for physical education classes was established.

### THE MOTIVES BEHIND A SHIFTING JAPANESE IMPERIALISM IN TAIWAN

During the early phase of the colonization of Taiwan, the Japanese relied on force to achieve their goals and exhibited an arrogant attitude of superiority toward the Taiwanese. It provoked resentment.

This approach was modified in the late 1920s. The Taiwanese were given a larger role in society. Instead of viewing Taiwan as a colony, Japan now considered Taiwan as part of its homeland—politically, economically, and culturally. When the Second World War broke out in 1941, Japan's basic intentions were exposed. As part of the war effort, the Taiwanese were asked to fully contribute and make sacrifices as though they were genuine Japanese citizens. This was the long-term plan for which Japan steadily prepared Taiwan during its colonial period.

Following the Mukden Incident<sup>34</sup> in Manchuria on September 18, 1931, Japan's international relationships underwent a profound change. In Taiwan, the *Kominka* policy was implemented with rigor forcing all Taiwanese to pledge loyalty to the Japanese Emperor and Taiwan underwent a period of rapid industrialization to prepare for the coming anticipated war. Taiwan would serve as Japan's base for its incursion into Southeast Asia. The role of education was nakedly to serve military ends. Education policies in Taiwan were revised in 1933. A new physical education curriculum was outlined in Japan in 1936 and simultaneously implemented in Taiwan. Gymnastics now included gymnastics, team training, and athletics. In 1939, martial arts became a required school course. In 1941, a National Order was announced and education became compulsory in Taiwan. Taiwanese were now trained for the war effort, and 'gymnastics' was renamed 'rigid physical education class'. It included gymnastics, team training, athletics, hygiene, judo, and kendo. Male pupils were required to take a 6-hour course every week; female pupils, a 4-hour course. Teachers had to undertake rigorous physical education and martial arts courses. These courses were intended to fully condition the Taiwanese in mind and body to ensure an obedient population prepared for war. In short, school physical education was merged with the *Kominka* Movement. Compulsory education, incidentally, was only partially successful. Although primary education had been made compulsory, a rate of only 70% attendance was achieved before the Japanese were defeated and lost Taiwan. Opposition to enforced militaristic schooling was widespread.

### BASEBALL AS SOFT POWER SEDUCTION

Baseball was a favored instrument of soft power. It was introduced to Japan and Taiwan in 1895. It quickly became a popular recreational sport among the Japanese who immigrated to Taiwan. Subsequently,




baseball was introduced to Taiwanese schools and met with great enthusiasm. In 1906, Kian Kok Middle School formed a baseball team as did the Taipei Teachers' College. This paved the way for inter-collegiate games. Later, these schools' alumni and the staff of Japanese government offices and enterprises formed a baseball league. Baseball mania spread around the island. In 1910, the Taiwan Sport Association controlled by the Japanese established a baseball unit, with regularly scheduled games, ballparks, and enthusiastic spectators. Spectators at these events eventually reached 10,000. Baseball teams from Japan's Waseda University, Keio University, Hosei University, and Meiji University visited Taiwan, and Taiwanese players learned advanced skills and strategies during these visits.

On January 8, 1921, an American professional baseball team played a few games in Taipei, Taichung, and Tainan. In 1931, the Chiayi Forestry School's baseball team went to Japan and participated with 630 teams in the national Japanese High School Competition. Pleasingly and surprisingly for the Taiwanese, the Taiwanese team won second place. Recently, in 2014, this story was filmed under the title 'KANO'<sup>35</sup> and became extremely popular in Taiwan. The reasons are not hard to find, above all, lingering resentment over Japanese colonialism was the cause. The Chiayi Forestry School's success has deep nationalistic connotations today. The team's players came from Taiwan's three ethnic groups—the aboriginal people, the Han Chinese, and Japanese nationals living on the island—and they were brought together through the sport of baseball. Second, it was a 'battle' of cultures conducted via sport: Japan ruled Taiwan using baseball among other sports especially Judo as a form of cultural indoctrination and control, but the Taiwanese responded by defeating the Japanese on the baseball field if not on the battlefield. This would be the climax of baseball's short reign on Taiwan. With the outbreak of war in the Pacific, the baseball expansion was halted.

Scholars' interpretations of the half century of militarism, racial discrimination, and assimilation during Japan's rule of Taiwan are mixed. Tsai Tzen Hsiung blandly sees Japan's shifting policies as a series of dynamic adaptations to colonial practices and its changing diplomatic situation on the world stage<sup>36</sup> (Fig. 8.4).

Others are more critical—with good reason.<sup>37</sup> Japanese scholars have commented specifically and candidly on the adverse repercussions of the invasion of Taiwan.



**Fig. 8.4** A Taiwanese aboriginal student went to Japan to study and played baseball in the late 1930s (the left one is Chen, Geng Yuan). (1935) (Available at: <http://www.epochtimes.com/gb/14/3/23/n4113326.htm>. Accessed on 15 October 2015.)

The Japanese, Mamiko Toshiro in his book *Aggression or Development: on the Colonizing China of Japanese Capitalism* (1988) stated that Japan failed to win over a colonized nation.<sup>38</sup> Hirokazu Hirai in, *History of Japanese Colonization of Land and Finance Administration*<sup>39</sup> declared that military force and policy repression and the rule of terror typified Japanese imperialism. Furthermore, he added that rail and marine transportation were developed purposely to convey resources to Japan from colonized countries. While Japanese imperialists attempted to ‘Japanize’ the Taiwanese, Chen Tri-lian in his book, *Resistance and Identification of Taiwanese* (2008)<sup>40</sup> stated that the Taiwanese deprecated attempts at ‘Japanization’ but appreciated the modernization of Taiwan by the Japanese. In short, the introduction of sport was appreciated—but not the efforts via sport to make the Taiwanese into second-class Japanese citizens. In the eight years before the Japanese fully colonized and controlled Taiwan, more than 32,000 resistant civilians were slaughtered.

Furthermore, rebellious Taiwanese leaders surrendered on agreed conditions accepted by the Japanese government. These promises were broken. They were all shot during the surrender ceremony.<sup>41</sup>

The reality was that Japanese Imperialism employed savage military force and systematic repressive political action in an attempt to eradicate existing cultures and implemented wholesale educational strategies including the use of sport to ensure the 'Japanization' of the population in five distinct stages. First, from 1895 to 1905, the Japanese tempered extreme harshness with calculated mercy (Those who bow to me will prosper and those who resist will perish)! Second, from 1906 to 1913, discriminative policies in school and society were employed. Third, from 1914 to 1931, discriminative policies were gradually reduced. Fourth, from 1931 to 1940, Japanese officialdom promoted non-discrimination in order to strengthen the sense of Japanese identity. Fifth, from 1940 to 1945, Japanese imperialism in Taiwan emphasized and promoted an increasingly militarized culture to prepare the Taiwanese for war putting an emphasis on traditional Japanese martial arts—Wudao, Kendo, and especially Judo to help ensure a competent Taiwanese military force.<sup>42</sup>

As early as 1895 in Taiwan, the Takenori Association<sup>43</sup> was not only founded as an organization for controlling and monitoring the behavior of the Taiwanese after the Sino-Japanese War, but also to organize Judo competitions. Moreover, the main intention of introducing Judo techniques to the Japanese police force in Taiwan was to eliminate and defeat Taiwanese resistance to promote Japanese militarism and cultivate Taiwanese fighting skills for war. Judo became a physical education subject in 1911 and was developed as a compulsory subject in middle schools in 1931. Meanwhile, Judo was further converted into a significant military training section after the outbreak of Pacific War.<sup>44</sup>

### MOUNTAINEERING: METAPHOR FOR IMPERIAL OCCUPATION

In the middle of its half-century occupation, Japan introduced yet another Western pursuit to Taiwan, mountain climbing. It serves as a metaphor for Japanese colonization. In 1786, mountain climbing began in Europe at Mount Blanc and other peaks in Alps. It would travel along with the many Western scientific ideas, social customs, and practical activities imported to Japan during the Meiji Revolution. Before that time, few Japanese had adopted European-style mountain climbing.

In Taiwan, it became a conscious symbol of the power of Japanese Imperialism.

The Japanese had scant knowledge of the Taiwan's mountains inhabited by aboriginal peoples who were hostile to outsiders. The Japanese sent scientific expeditions to explore these mountainous domains and employed military and police to subdue the inhabitants. Eventually, visits of Japanese royalty to Taiwan would include a trip to these new highland territories, thus demonstrating that the Japanese had total control over Taiwan. The conquest of Taiwan was, in every nook and cranny, complete and thus, the Japanese royalty were safe everywhere. In due course, Taiwanese schools included mountain climbing activities in their physical education curriculum. It was not only a part of a Japanese aesthetic education but it also had ulterior purposes linked to other educational pursuits including the teaching of an appreciation of the island's snow-capped peaks, instructional walking tours, and plant collecting. All these activities reflected the European Civilization that Japan admired, emulated, and now introduced to Taiwan. In 1926, the Japanese founded the Association for Taiwan Mountain Climbing. Later when the Japanese incorporated militarism into education, mountain climbing was included in schools and other social organizations as a form of advanced fitness training and military preparation. In their joint roles, mountain climbing and walking were manifestations of cultural control and martial conditioning. In addition, and not to be overlooked, mountain exploration paved the way for the exploitation of mineral and forest resources in the highlands. In short, it underscored the completeness of Japanese colonial control, both aesthetic and pragmatic, in Taiwan.<sup>45</sup> It is a most appropriate metaphor for the ascendance of a rapacious imperialism.

## CONCLUSION

During Japan's colonization of Taiwan, the Governor-General's Office adopted a top-down approach to the imposition of cultural control including control of sport. Sport served colonial ends. Western and Eastern sports were introduced and promoted throughout society in schools and in sports clubs and administrative organizations. However, anticipating the Second World War, the Japanese authorities implemented the Kominka policy and the Taiwan Sport Association adjusted its approach more specifically to meet the needs of war. In Taiwan, initially Japanese officials duplicated what it had learned from its study of

the West and its history of colonial rule. Sport was initially a significant component of soft power persuasion and later became more overtly an instrument of military preparation and propaganda. In theory, in both Japan and Taiwan, sport was strongly promoted by the Japanese authorities as a common element of undifferentiated citizenship. In reality, Taiwanese athletes were never able to throw off the actuality of clearly being second-class citizens.

The arrival of the Japanese in 1895 was a culture shock for Taiwan despite the island's long history of intrusion from outsiders. During the fifty-one years of colonization by Japan, Taiwan experienced dramatic cultural, social, and economic change and much of it had a negative effect, however, not all of it. The legacy of Japan's introduction of Western sport into Taiwan was to have both negative and positive outcomes. Initially, sport was essentially a carefully deliberate means of meshing the Taiwanese into Japanese culture: a calculated form of cultural integration through 'Japanization'. Ultimately, however, it has served to establish and emphasize Taiwanese distinctiveness. The promotion of Western sport had advantages in terms of health and entertainment long into the future. However, it should never be overlooked that it was implemented by means of military pressure, militarized discipline, and mind control through school physical education and societal sport. In the final analysis during the era of Japanese imperialism, sport was essentially a tool for ensuring Japanese imperial control. It was successful in that eventually non-resistance with sport as a calculated distraction was largely the constrained response of the Taiwanese people toward Japanese authority. But at the same time, it must be recognized that heavy-handed coercion was used on occasion and but was never out of mind and sight. Ultimately for the Taiwanese, it became a sword of Damocles with its sharp edge being of martial purpose and intent.

#### CODA

Japan attempted to change Taiwan's culture radically through the implementation of colonial measures in the interests of Japan. This attempt to ensure Japan's national priorities failed to succeed. Instead of forging submissive, subjugated Japanese colonial citizens, it molded quietly resentful Taiwanese nationalists and has served as a source of a continuing confrontational nationalist assertion. One illustration of this was, and

is, baseball—past and present In the past, on occasions it was a statement of national competence, assertion, and pride in the face of imperial ‘superiority’, arrogance, and domination. An imperial tool of colonial control then became a national tool of quiet defiance. In the present era, on occasions, it is the source of continued remembered and retained resentment of Japanese Imperialism.

## NOTES

1. The Treaty of Shimonoseki in which China ceded its sovereignty over Taiwan in perpetuity was signed in April 1895, at the end of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894, in which the modernized Japanese imperial army defeated the antiquated Chinese Ching dynasty army. See Ming Shi. *The 400-year History of Taiwan*. (Taipei: Pun Tao Culture, 1980).
2. Chiang Chung-cheng or Chiang Chieh-shih was a Chinese political leader of the Republic of China between 1928 and 1975, and led China in the Chinese theater of World War II. See, Jiaying Zhao. *A Diplomatic History of China* (Taiyuan: Shanxi Universities Associated Press, 1994).
3. ‘Datsu-A Ron’ is an unsigned editorial of a newspaper published in 16 March 1885. The writer is thought to be author and educator Fukuzawa Yukich, arguing that Meiji Japan should give up the conservative governments of Qing China and align itself with the West.
4. Bin Ku. *Chinese literati view of nature* (Shanghai: Shanghai People Press, 1990).
5. Sandra Olsen. ‘Taphonomy’ in, *McGraw-Hill Yearbook of Science and Technology* (New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1992), 129–160.
6. David Blundell. (Ed.) *Austronesian Taiwan: Linguistics, History, Ethnology, and Prehistory* (Berkeley, CA: Phoebe A. Hearst Museum, University of California, 2000).
7. Cheng-ching Li. ‘It is Time to Do Planning in the Teaching of English in the Elementary School’. *Min-sheng Daily*, 2 January 1988.
8. Taiwan’s 16th aboriginal tribes were approved and announced by the Cabinet Premier Jiang Yi-huah in Taipei. Retrieved ‘Gov’t officially recognizes two more aboriginal tribes’. *The China Post*, 27 June 2013, available at: <http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/national/national-news/2014/06/27/411066/Govt-officially.htm>, accessed, 15 October 2015.
9. See, J. Borao, *The Spanish Experience in Taiwan 1626-1642* (Hong Kong University Press, 2009).
10. Source from [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Matsumoto\\_Jun\\_\(physician\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Matsumoto_Jun_(physician)), accessed on 22 September 2015.

11. Ariel Rubinstein. 'Experience from a Course in Game Theory: Pre and Post-Class Problem Sets as a Didactic Device', *Games and Economic Behavior*, 28, no. 1 (1999), 155–170.
12. Yu-Ju Lin and Yu-Zhong Lee, *Postwar Studies on the History of Taiwan* (Taipei: National Science Council, Taiwan Executive Yuan, 2003).
13. Yang, Wang, and Zhang wrote historical books to reveal that Taiwanese had the continuing various styles of resistance in the process of Japanese imperial colonization. Weng explored the scenario that the most population of Taiwanese resisted the rule of Japan from 1895 to 1902 and focused on the incidents supplied with arms. See Jia-Yin Weng, *The Study on the History of Taiwan's Han Chinese How to Equip with against Japanese Ruling* (Taipei: National Taiwan University, 1986); Bi-Chuan Yang, *The History of Taiwanese against the Rule of Japanese* (Taipei: Dao-Xiang Press, 1988); Xiao-Po Wang, *Taiwanese against the Japanese Fifty Years* (Taipei: Zheng-Zhong Publishing, 1997); Hai-Peng Zhang. 'The Retrocession of Taiwan is the Veto for Japan's colonial rule', *The Xinhua News Agency*, 22 August 2015.
14. Peixian Xu, 'Explanation of Wartime National Language Readers' in, Rizhi shiqi (Ed.). *Taiwan. Common schools and citizen schools and national language readers in Taiwan under Japanese rule: explanations, contents, index* (Taipei: Nantian Shuju, 2003), 1–9.
15. Chen, Ya-Jing, 'Compare with those affections to Japan in Korea and Taiwan', unpublished Masters' Thesis: Chinese Culture University, 2013, 4.
16. *Ibid.*, passim.
17. He was a physician and medical pioneer of the Japanese public health movement. After retiring from his official medical duties, Matsumoto settled in Oiso and asserted the medical benefits of sea-bathing to help Oiso as a sea resort town. The Big Sand Beach was located in Keelung, the northernmost city. It has become the Keelung Port Office since 1966.
18. The Big Sand Beach was located in Keelung, the northernmost city. It has become the Keelung Port Office since 1966.
19. Allen Guttmann and Lee Thompson, 'The Arrival and Diffusion of Western Sports, Japanese Sports: A History', *Journal of Japanese Studies* 29, no. 1 (2003), 234–237.
20. Franklin H. Brown served in Japan as Honorary Physical Education Secretary of the National Committee of the YMCA between 1913 and 1930. He provided the motivation and leadership training that brought volleyball, basketball, and mass games to the Japanese. He contributed to training the Japanese athletes to be international competitors. He also served as: the Honorary Contest Secretary of the Third Far Eastern Championship Games, Tokyo, 1915–1917; Honorary Technical

- Adviser of the Japan Amateur Athletic Association 1917–1923; Technical Representative for the International Olympic Committee to the Far Eastern Championship Games held in Japan; Honorary Secretary Far Eastern Athletic Association and the Honorary Contest Secretary Sixth Far Eastern Championship Games, Osaka, 1921–1923; and Member of Foreign Relations Committee and Record Committee for Ninth Far Eastern Championship Games, Tokyo, 1930. See also, Arnold W. Flath, *Franklin H. Brown - A Lover of Sports with a Desire to Lead School of Health and Physical Education* (Oregon State University Corvallis, Oregon), available at: [http://library.la84.org/SportsLibrary/NASSH\\_Proceedings/NP1980/NP1980zv.pdf](http://library.la84.org/SportsLibrary/NASSH_Proceedings/NP1980/NP1980zv.pdf), accessed on 15 October 2015.
21. Ibid.
  22. Zo-Chin Chen. *Interesting Merry Celebrations of Taiwan History*. (Taipei: Kai Chi Culture, 2009).
  23. See, ‘The basketball ball team of the First Girls High School’ and ‘The basketball ball players of the Lan-Yang Girls High School’ in. *ibid*.
  24. See, E. P. Tsurumi, *Japanese Colonial Education in Taiwan, 1895-1945* (Boston: Harvard University Press, 1977).
  25. During Japanese colonization, Japanese Police Chief suggested to establish policing in Taiwan in order to enforce laws and orders. Two troops of Japanese police had been dispatched to Taiwan, formulating Taiwan’s earliest policing system. The most basic level policing institutes were police substations; they were located on major roads to monitor the activities of Taiwanese people.
  26. From, Cheng, Kuo-Ming, *The History of Sport Organizations in Taiwan Society during the Japanese Colonial Era*, unpublished doctoral Dissertation, National Taiwan Normal University, 2009, NP.
  27. This dealt with in more detail in, Mangan J. A. & Dong Jhy-Hwang, ‘Japanese Cultural Imperialism in Taiwan: Judo as an Instrument of Colonial Conditioning’ in this collection.
  28. See, Chieko Irie Mulhern, *Heroic with Grace: Legendary Women of Japan* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1991).
  29. ‘Force measuring’ was to test strength of the body and ‘mean motion’ was one kind of gymnastic to cultivate body’s balance through the motion of hands and legs.
  30. See, J. A. Mangan, ‘Prologue’ and ‘Epilogue’ in, J. A. Mangan, Qing Luo and Sayuri Guthrie-Shimizu (Eds.) *The Olympic Games: Prism for East Asian Politics and Geopolitics – London 2012 and Tokyo 2020* (Beijing: Communication University of China Press, forthcoming).
  31. See, Tzen-Hsiung Tsai, *The Development of the Physical Education in Taiwan Primary Schools during the Japanese Colonial Era* (Taipei: Shi Ta Publication, 1995).



32. Isawa Shūji helped Japan establishing the Taiwanese public school system since 1895 during the early Meiji period. See, Tzen-Hsiung Tsai, *ibid*.
33. The purpose of Kominka movement was to let people become subjects of the Japanese emperor. It directly encouraged the soldiers in the front-line, stabilized citizens' mind, and complied with militarism. It indirectly forced Taiwanese to learn Japanese spirit Wudao (Judo, Kendo, and Archery), so that the society could identify itself with Japanese crusade. Wudao became the tool to assist colonial government to propagate.
34. The Mukden Incident was a dispute near the Chinese city of Mukden (Shenyang) precipitated events that led to the Japanese military personnel as a pretext for the Japanese invasion of China, on 18 September 1931.
35. The film depicts the multiracial Kano baseball team representing the island to overcome extreme odds in the 1931 Japanese High School Baseball Competition.
36. Available at: <http://www.17movie.com.tw> accessed on 22 September 2015.
37. Yu-Ju Lin, an authority researcher works for the Taiwan history, Academia Sinica. After Lin cooperated with Dr. Yu-Zhong Lee to review the most of Taiwan historical researcher's papers and books since 1945 regarding Taiwan, they indicate the topics and results are influenced by political atmospheres (Lin and Lee, 2003, 92–134). However, the mainstream interpretations of the half century of militarism, racial discrimination and assimilation during Japan's rule of Taiwan are mixed. Tzen-Hsiung Tsai blandly sees Japan's shifting policies as a series of dynamic adaptations to colonial practices and its changing diplomatic situation on the world stage (Tsai, 1995).
38. Toshiro, Mamiko, *Aggression or Development: on the colonizing China of Japanese Capitalism* (Tokyo: Ochanomizu Study, 1988).
39. Hirokazu, Hirai, *The History of Japanese Colonization of Land and Finance Administration* (Tokyo: Minerva Publishing: 1997).
40. Chen, Tri-lian, *Resistance and identification of Taiwanese* (Taipei: Yuan-Liou Publishing, 2008).
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42. Judo was established by Jigoro Kano in 1882 (December 9th, 1860 to May 4th, 1938).
43. *Taiwan Zi Zi Shin News*, 28 September, 1926, A2.
44. *Ibid*.
45. Lin, Mei-Chin, 'Taiwan Mountain Climbing Activities under Japanese Imperialism', unpublished doctoral dissertation, National Taiwan Normal University, 2004.

**Acknowledgements** My thanks go to Professor J.A. Mangan for his invitation to me to contribute to this important Collection on Japanese Imperialism.

I am most grateful for his early drafts advice and recommendations. And I am especially grateful to Dr. Peter Horton and Professor Mangan for their significant contributions to the production of the final draft.

*Chien-Shing Lee*

## APPENDIX ONE: A CALCULATED COMPLEXITY

Modern ‘Imperialism’ became global after the European (and American) colonization of the world. Military, cultural, and economic imperialism was a stratagem to enforce subjugation by military force, to exploit resources, and eliminate the existing culture of a colonized nation. One modern American historian, Andrew D. Morris (2010) agrees that games, introduced as a colonial policy—might have given the Taiwanese an attractive glimpse of sport on the other side of the coin and thus aided the assimilation of the Taiwanese.

Of course, the purpose of implementing Japanese colonialism in Taiwan by utilizing an imperial sports culture—to substantial extent of western origin but also of eastern derivation—to ‘Japanize’ the Taiwanese was not simply as a means of seductive imperial socialization, it was also a means of military conditioning through the teaching of Japanese martial arts. The motivational imperial approach was multifaceted. This is made clear in this essay.

## APPENDIX TWO: A JAPANESE VOICE CRYING IN THE WILDERNESS

Tadao Yanaihara, (January 27, 1893–December 25, 1961) was a pious Christian and a committed *liberal*. He was an economics professor of Tokyo Imperial University before WWII and became the principle of Tokyo University from 1951 to 1957. In 1937, he argued that war violated justice and peace; that war not only defeated the vulnerable but destroyed the destroyer—ethically. He wrote a book, ‘Taiwan, under the Control of Imperialism’: it was officially banned. He was a severe critic of Japanese economic imperialism in Taiwan.

He argued that during the era of Japanese colonialism in Taiwan, Japanese officialdom employed police to ensure the plundering of Taiwan and calculatedly engineered education in Taiwan to sustain Japanese rule. He pointed out that the reality was that the Japanese dominated school enrollment. Furthermore, the Japanese authorities carefully controlled entry to higher education. Thus, adopting a deliberate ‘top-down’ selective approach in order to control Taiwanese education.

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PART VI

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Regional Reactions and Responses:  
Hong Kong and Singapore

# A Clash of Colonialisms: Sports Culture in Hong Kong Under the Japanese Occupation

*Brian Bridges and David R. Phillips*

## INTRODUCTION

Christmas in 1941 was celebrated far from normally by the local and expatriate communities in Hong Kong. Barely 18 days after the Japanese had launched an invasion of the British colony, the British Governor was forced to surrender in the early evening of Christmas Day. Almost devoid of air and naval support, out-numbered and out-maneuvred by the fast-moving and well-supported Japanese forces, the surviving British and supporting Commonwealth troops, laid down their arms and were marched off to spend the remainder of the war in prisoner of war (PoW) camps.<sup>1</sup> The victorious Japanese announced the end of British colonialism and the start of

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J.A. Mangan et al. (eds.), *Japanese Imperialism: Politics and Sport  
in East Asia*, [https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-5104-3\\_9](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-5104-3_9)

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a new era under Japanese guidance. Yet, the Japanese occupation of Hong Kong was to last just three years and eight months, before the defeat of Japan allowed the British to return to administer the territory.

The Japanese entered Hong Kong in 1941 convinced that they needed to ‘cleanse’ the colony of British—and Western—influences in order to make it a valuable and confirmed member of the new Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere being promoted by the Japanese leaders. Once the horrors of the immediate fighting and post-victory excesses had passed, the newly installed Japanese administration tried hard not just to control and administer the territory, but also to convince its residents, who overwhelmingly were Chinese, that they should conform to and indeed welcome this new system. As will be shown, the various political, economic and sociocultural policies that were implemented, even if unevenly organized and occasionally haphazard, were designed to inculcate pro-Japanese ideals (albeit frequently disguised under the rhetoric of pan-Asianism) and anti-Western attitudes. Sport was to be used as one tool in the new armoury of socio-cultural policymaking.

Although sport has been famously described by George Orwell as ‘war minus the shooting’, and the interchange between sporting and warlike metaphors continues to feature in everyday discourse and media analysis,<sup>2</sup> sport *during* war might seem at first sight to be a contradiction in terms. Yet, despite the horrors of wartime deprivation and military conflict, sport, albeit in attenuated forms, has frequently continued to be played within countries at war.<sup>3</sup> The existing literature suggests two motivations that have been at work within wartime governments in allowing, even encouraging, some form of sporting activity to continue despite ongoing conflict. One would be to use sport as a means for the government to demonstrate to its own people that some degree of ‘business as usual’ or ‘normal’ life was still possible by providing recreational opportunities during what might be a long drawn-out war.<sup>4</sup> But, given the close relationship between sport and national identity, a government might also wish to use sport to inspire its people to be more united, patriotic and, by extension, more committed to the (military) cause.<sup>5</sup> Even if such approaches have had a degree of success with a state’s own people, can the same be said when that state conquers and administers foreign populations?

In the case of Hong Kong, once it had been seized and forcibly pacified by the Japanese, the residents were not directly involved in fighting, although a few small guerrilla groups did operate ferociously on the northern fringes of the colony. However, needless to say, the majority of

the non-incarcerated population, whether Chinese, Indian, Eurasian, or non-combatant Europeans, certainly suffered the deleterious privations, starvation, abuse and exploitations of wartime occupation, to which later, after mid-1943, were to be added the effects of regular bombing by Allied forces pushing to recover territories from the Japanese. In such circumstances, the Japanese efforts to revive and sustain sport can be a test case of how far maintaining a semblance of 'normal' life contributed to the broader Japanese aims of winning the hearts and minds of a conquered population, in this case, Hong Kong citizens.

Although Philip Snow's extensive and well-documented study of the wartime years has superseded earlier accounts in English,<sup>6</sup> the impact of certain specific policies of the Japanese military administration in Hong Kong still remain much understudied. A number of harrowing accounts by survivors of the prison camps have appeared in recent years,<sup>7</sup> but there are few such memoirs by Hong Kong Chinese citizens or by Japanese present at that time about life *outside* the camps.<sup>8</sup> Amongst the gamut of educational, health and sociocultural policies instituted by the Japanese and discussed in earlier works, very few analyses touch on the extent to which sport was utilized by the occupiers as a means to inculcate Japanese values into the resident population. There is as yet no comprehensive study in English of sports development in Hong Kong prior to 1945, although some individual sporting clubs and sports associations have published commemorative histories which cover that period. Similarly, the definitive history of Japanese sport in English is unable to cover Japanese sporting activities in the wartime empire.<sup>9</sup>

Given the destruction of many primary records during and at the end of the war, this chapter draws principally on two newspapers supervised and published by the Japanese administration: the *Hong Kong News*, in English, and the *Honkon Nippo*, published in Japanese. The *Honkon Nippo* had existed prior to the war, primarily for circulation amongst the Japanese expatriate community and its English and Chinese language supplements only started in 1941.<sup>10</sup> However, as a fully fledged English language newspaper, the *Hong Kong News* only began regular daily publication in January 1942, utilizing the printing presses, facilities, and even some staff from the major pre-war English language newspaper, the *South China Morning Post*. In June 1942, the *Honkon Nippo*, in a more expanded form, began regular daily publication. Both newspapers continued to be published until the end of the war in August 1945, albeit much truncated from 1944 as wartime shortages impacted more severely.

## JAPANESE PLANS FOR HONG KONG IN THE GREATER EAST ASIA CO-PROSPERITY SPHERE

Unlike China, which in the nineteenth century became increasingly unable to resist foreign intervention (in which the British too played their part by seizing Hong Kong), Japan responded to the arrival of the 'West' by embarking on an impressive programme of modernizing its economy, society and military. Then, wanting to be recognized as a great power in the world community, colonizing Taiwan and Korea and invading northern China. However, as Japan became bogged down militarily in China, some factions within the leadership began to look further south, particularly after the outbreak of war in Europe had left resource-rich European colonies in Southeast Asia exposed and unprotected. In mid-1940, the Japanese government decided to promote the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere through expansion into Southeast Asia.<sup>11</sup> The Japanese proclaimed this move as essential for national self-defence and maintaining 'peace', but in reality, they were thinking not just of destroying European colonial forces in the region but also erasing Western influences and replacing them with their own value systems.<sup>12</sup>

Hong Kong's role within these plans was rather ambiguous, with some planners arguing for it to be treated as part of future China operations, whilst others saw it as a staging post and logistical centre for military operations further south.<sup>13</sup> But, deposing British rule there was a given as far as Japanese policy thinking was concerned. In late November 1941, the Army and Navy finally agreed on the division of labour in terms of the military administration of future occupied territories: in Hong Kong the Army was to be in charge, a decision with important implications for the nature of the occupation regime.<sup>14</sup>

The pre-war Japanese community in Hong Kong was not large (numbering only around 2200 by 1931), of whom the vast majority were employed by big Japanese corporations, although small shopkeepers were also ubiquitous. However, from the late 1930s, as Japanese actions on the Chinese mainland led to occasional calls for boycotts of Japanese products, Japanese businessmen began to pull out—by 1941, fewer than 400 Japanese remained.<sup>15</sup> Many of those who remained in Hong Kong were involved, directly or indirectly, in political and espionage activities.<sup>16</sup> Although the fateful decision to invade Hong Kong was only taken one month before the actual attack, undoubtedly Japanese intelligence organizations had been checking out Hong Kong—and British defences there—for some time prior to December 1941.<sup>17</sup>

## HONG KONG SOCIETY AND SPORT, 1941

In order to assess how far the Japanese occupiers were able to unpick British colonial institutions and restructure the Hong Kong 'way of life', it is necessary to note that on the eve of the Japanese attack, Hong Kong was still very much the colony it had been for the past several decades. Relatively remote from London, its administrators appointed from London 'got on' with the job as best they could. Contemporary accounts relate fairly rigid social conventions being adhered to, rank and status often outweighing financial resources amongst individuals. In social, educational, health and sporting terms, different ethnic groups lived in almost totally separate worlds.

Social snobbery and divisions within the British and other European and American groups of residents are well documented though such divisions in pre-Second World War society were common elsewhere and were not unique to Hong Kong. However, locally, they were perhaps amplified by the small numbers and disproportionate influence of the Western residents. Some Westerners came to Hong Kong only for short postings, notably within the navy and army, whilst many senior civil servants were posted to and from other parts of the Empire. Indeed, the Governor on the eve of the Japanese attack, Sir Mark Young, had only arrived in 1941, with little Asian experience except as a cadet in Ceylon, and with 'little training useful for leading a Chinese community under attack'.<sup>18</sup> Westerners involved in business sometimes became longer term residents, although those in major companies such as the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank were recruited principally in Britain and came to Hong Kong as a career posting, to leave at the end of the post or on retirement. These circumstances naturally fostered a transient attitude for the expatriate majority and the feelings of impermanence may well have underlain the segregated social activities that went on.

Wealthy and educated Chinese were tolerated and included in many activities but the vast bulk of the local Chinese population lived very differently. Various forms of social discrimination in pre-war Hong Kong included, for example, prohibitions on owning properties such as on the Peak and from using certain beaches. Hospitals were provided for the 'general Chinese' population, and sporting clubs were on the whole closed except to those ethnic groups for whom they were established. Lethbridge notes that some hotels allowed Chinese guests to use only certain public rooms and others prohibited overnight stays.<sup>19</sup> People of

Eurasian backgrounds sometimes lived in an intermediate world; many were long-term residents, who could speak Cantonese in addition to English or other European languages, notably Portuguese. Indeed, those who could claim neutral nationalities such as Portuguese and Irish would sometimes be in a better position during the Japanese occupation to remain outside captivity and perhaps maintain some semblance of sporting activities. Some did decamp to Macau for the duration (such as the later Hong Kong Olympic Committee President, A. de O. Sales).<sup>20</sup> Many took up occupation activities assisting the Allies with great fortitude and acted as go-betweens during the period of Japanese occupation.<sup>21</sup>

By the 'late nineteenth century sport lay close to the heart of British imperial culture' and this facet of the Imperial project was to continue throughout the first half of the twentieth century.<sup>22</sup> In sporting terms, in the late 1930s, Hong Kong was an active and vigorous place, even if many of the activities were divided along social and ethnic lines. Europeans often participated in the same sports and recreations as they would have liked to enjoy 'at home'. The various British forces, including army and navy, ran many sports teams, including polo and cricket. Until the divisive and unpopular government decision in August 1940 to evacuate many European women and children to Australia in anticipation of hostilities,<sup>23</sup> life had gone on much as it had for most of the inter-war years.

### SPORTING AND SOCIAL CLUBS IN THE PRE-WAR ERA

Given that sport was a significant element in British cultural imperialism, it was not surprising that, for many civilian Westerners, their social lives revolved around clubs. Some of these focused on specific sports, such as the Victoria Recreation Club (VRC, the oldest sporting club, established in 1849, rowing and swimming), Hong Kong Football Club (established in 1886), Hong Kong Cricket Club (the oldest cricket club in Asia, 1851, located in the Central area of Hong Kong island, adjacent to the banking area), Kowloon Cricket Club (1904, formerly incorporating the Amateur Athletics Association), the Royal Hong Kong Yacht Club (1894, for sailing and rowing), the Hong Kong Jockey Club (1884) and Hong Kong Golf Club (1889) and sporting associations such as the Hong Kong Lawn Tennis Association (1909). Other clubs catered for certain occupational groups, such as the Stanley Club

(prison officers), the United Services Recreation Club (USRC) (military), the Police Officers' Club/Police Sports and Recreation Club and the Ladies' Recreation Club (1884). Some served the needs of specific ethnic groups, such as Club de Recreio (then Portuguese, founded 1906), Chinese Recreation Club (1912), Indian Recreation Club (1917), American Club (1925 as a social business club), Filipino Club (1916) and the Craigenhower Cricket Club (1894). Some were formed for more business-oriented reasons, the foremost being the Hong Kong Club, founded in 1846 and until the 1970s admitting only Europeans and banning women from some areas.

Specifically, cross-racial sporting clubs in the pre-war era were rather few. The South China Athletic Association developed in the early 1920s from an earlier (1908) group of footballing Chinese students. The club grew to incorporate activities such as athletics and bathing, and also primary education, opening its current site in Caroline Hill. It operated until the Japanese occupation, and reopened in 1946, to grow into an important sporting organization with sites on both sides of the harbour and providing venues for East Asian Games events. The pre-war functions and wartime uses of some of the major clubs, insofar as they are known, are shown in Table 9.1.

One of the premier sporting cum social clubs, the Hong Kong Jockey Club (HKJC), like the other old-established club the VRC, initially had no Chinese members. This snobbery persisted until well into the twentieth century. The HKJC itself was famously difficult to gain entry to, being limited by election and generally only established moneyed members at the time admitted. The Club archives note that a Chinese racing enthusiast was admitted from 1927.<sup>24</sup> This is significant since horse-racing and especially its betting aspects united the interests of almost all social and ethnic groups.

As suggested by the evolution of the above clubs, a hallmark of many inter-war sporting activities tended to be social and racial segregation. This is important in retrospect as it provided the Japanese with a propaganda opportunity to extend sport across all Asian groups, though in practice their over-bearing attitude towards the local ethnic Chinese prevented this being really effective. As Lim and Horton remark about society and its sporting basis when the Japanese occupied Singapore, 'while the communities making up Singapore society were not unified socially, the social division of functions regulating their relations was fairly advanced'.<sup>25</sup> Approximately the same can be said of Hong Kong in

**Table 9.1** Uses of selected sports clubs during the Japanese occupation

<i>Club and location</i>	<i>Sports/social functions in 1941</i>	<i>Use during occupation</i>	<i>Comments</i>
Hong Kong Club, Central Hong Kong Jockey Club, Happy Valley Royal HK Yacht Club, Kellert Island Chinese Recreation Club, Tai Hang	Business, social Horse racing, social Sailing, various sports Games, athletics, social	Japanese Naval HQ Racing (dwindled by 1945); gardening; food production Occupied by Japanese officers Sports club for Japanese forces	Most records lost Membership opened; Chinese chairman Ho Kom-tong Club premises opened in 1940 at Kellert Island 'survived war comparatively unscathed'
Club de Recreio, King's Park Kowloon HK Cricket Club, Central	Tennis, soccer, lawn bowls, athletics, hockey; Portuguese community Cricket	Unknown; premises badly damaged Used as a Japanese sports club; also training ground for local troops	1927 clubhouse was badly dam- aged during occupation Ground recovered quickly; an informal cricket match took place in late 1945
Club Lusitano, Central Stanley Club, Stanley	Social, sports, horse racing; Portuguese community Prison Officer's mess, club in 1949; bowls, tennis, swimming	Defence centre in battle; then refugee centre Used by Japanese forces	Watched by Japanese, suspect- ing spying. President Henry Basto executed Next to Stanley civilian prisoner-of-war camp

(continued)

Table 9.1 (continued)

<i>Club and location</i>	<i>Sports/social functions in 1941</i>	<i>Use during occupation</i>	<i>Comments</i>
Hong Kong Football Club, Happy Valley	Football, rugby, hockey, bowls, etc	Looted; used as stables for mules. Part of grounds used to grow food	Sports maintained by internees in camps
India Club Kowloon	Tennis, badminton for Indian community	Clubhouse used as stables for horses and mules	
Kowloon Bowling Green Club; Kowloon	Lawn bowls, tennis	Clubhouse used as accommodation for Japanese officers; grounds planted with sweet potatoes	Records lost; items looted
Kowloon Cricket Club	Cricket, bowls, tennis, badminton	Ground used as stabling for mules	Impossible to play any form of sport until 1947
Kowloon Tong (Club) Garden City Association	Social, badminton, billiards, tennis, lawn bowls	Club building used as offices by Japanese	

*Sources* Neville Chesney. *The clubs of Hong Kong*. Hong Kong: Illustrated Magazine and Publishing Co, 1981; assorted club publications; Peter Hall. *150 Years of Cricket in Hong Kong*. Lewes: Book Guild, 1999; Snow, *Fall of Hong Kong*. Note Club names are as in 1941



1941. Lethbridge goes even further and says ‘Hong Kong’s population in 1941 was split into two main groups, Europeans and Asians, poised against each other’.<sup>26</sup> However, within both groups, there were numerous sub-groups, not always in agreement. Lethbridge, for example, notes that the Government of Hong Kong before 1941 was in an ‘invidious position, often facing hostility or obstructiveness from business. It had to deal with two ‘at times truculent opponents’, those from the British Isles, and a Chinese population ‘with strong emotional though not always patriotic ties’ to China. Both groups wanted the government to be ‘their’ government.<sup>27</sup>

On the evening of Christmas Day 1941, after a bloody but relatively short 18 days of fierce fighting, the Allied forces in Hong Kong surrendered to the Japanese Imperial forces under Lieutenant-General Sakai Takashi at his headquarters in the Peninsula Hotel, Kowloon.<sup>28</sup> This surrender then may well have represented the end of Britain’s ‘last foothold’ in China, as one Japanese writer triumphantly put it the following year.<sup>29</sup> But, it also set the scene for the infamous ‘three years and eight months’ of Japan’s occupation, which included a clash of sporting colonialisms just as in so many other spheres of Hong Kong life where the Japanese ambition to impose a ‘New Order’ came up against the remnants of British colonial practice as well as the passive resistance of the ethnic Chinese population.

## INITIAL OCCUPATION POLICIES, DECEMBER 1941–1942

### *Control, Imprisonment, Some ‘Business as Usual’ and Humiliation of the Colonists*

In the days and weeks after the surrender to Japan, there was naturally considerable disorganization and chaos. Japan found itself occupying a mixed population of many different nationalities, some neutrals, some Allied nationalities, and most of course highly suspect to the occupying forces. Allied combatants, troops and other armed forces personnel, were to be interned in PoW camps, but it has been widely reported that the Japanese had few if any plans for the Allied civilians. Emerson’s excellent account discusses the opening and life in Stanley Prison and environs as a civilian camp, noting that ‘the Japanese, in their meticulous planning for establishing their empire, neglected to formulate plans for dealing with enemy civilians’; an unpreparedness confirmed by Japanese

historians writing in the 1980s.<sup>30</sup> Indeed, the treatment of enemy civilians varied considerably from place to place in Asia and even within the same places.<sup>31</sup>

This chapter can only focus on sport and Japanese treatment of the civilian populations in Hong Kong who remained outside the internment camps. The military PoW camps, for example at Sham Shui Po and later Argyle Street, did have some of their own organized sports and education insofar as prisoners' energy and food rations permitted although conditions were inevitably bleak. Similarly, the Stanley civilian camp did run many of its own activities but, for most inmates, the main issues as the war progressed became survival in the face of starvation, disease, mistreatment and executions.

In the final days of December 1941, civilians of all nationalities were left shocked and dazed at the fall of Hong Kong. Damage from bombing, artillery and during the fighting had disrupted power and water services, so sanitation was failing and many bodies were to be buried or cremated. Food supplies and all types of rations were already starting to become scarce, a situation that would only deteriorate until the Japanese surrender in 1945, and looting and black-marketeering became a norm. During the immediate days after the surrender, security was generally lax and some escapes from Hong Kong were made by Allied civilians and military personnel.<sup>32</sup> However, at the same time, cruelties, torture and executions were meted out to many in the local Chinese population.<sup>33</sup> One local doctor, Dr Li Shu-fan, has left vivid descriptions of the pillage, murder and rape by the victorious forces Hong Kong in the three days' celebration after the surrender, as well as robberies and looting by other members of the population.<sup>34</sup> Shortly after, there was a systematic looting of the colony of useful military and other materials including vehicles, metals and the emergency stocks of rice to aid the Japanese war effort.<sup>35</sup> The scene was rapidly being set for a very bleak period during the occupation.

Some accounts state that the Japanese administration's first priority was the drastic reduction of the Chinese population to avoid the necessity of feeding them. Harris's memoirs, appearing in Lindsay's 2005 book, note that a steady stream of local people was moving northwards to China every day. This was the start of the attrition of the local populace, which was to become increasingly forceful.<sup>36</sup> 'In the face of starvation, unemployment, reduced educational and other social services, over

one million Chinese fled to China during the occupation, leaving only 650,000' by 1945.<sup>37</sup>

In the following early months of 1942, whilst the military and civilian internment camps were becoming established, there was a somewhat unusual reliance on existing Allied civilian personnel to keep a tick-over in fields such as policing, banking, health and even printing. This was uncomfortable for the both sides. For example, the hated British had to be incorporated temporarily and some British police were still used as guards for the Japanese consulate buildings up to the end of January 1942. Ironically, the reverse arrangements obtained after the Japanese surrender in Hong Kong in 1945 when, ahead of the arrival of sufficient British troops, the re-emerging Hong Kong Government relied on 'the reluctant efforts of Japanese troops to prevent total anarchy in the Colony'.<sup>38</sup>

However, liberation was still over three and a half years away and, in early 1942, more problematic to Snow was 'the inability of the (victorious) 23rd Army to form a cohesive regime' and exert authority as they became involved in struggles for positions with other branches of the Imperial forces, in particular the Navy.<sup>39</sup> More sinister yet was to become the influence of the Japanese military police, the *Kempeitai*, whose gendarmes would shortly countermand both Army and Navy in many areas of post-conflict power. Indeed, as Lethbridge notes, the Japanese 'never succeeded in setting up a unified administration in Hong Kong; several administrative structures existed at one and the same time; there were a number of competing authorities .... The armed forces, the civil administration, the gendarmeries—each clung to its own autonomy'.<sup>40</sup> One Japanese army officer later recalled that the conquering army had no knowledge about how to organize a civilian administration and they were particularly worried about how to keep the influential Chinese on side.<sup>41</sup> Such inexperience, coupled with the ongoing internecine struggle within the Japanese occupiers, influenced the practical extent to which any serious Japanization policies could be implemented in the years of the occupation.

Some defeated colonialists were also retained in banking. Several senior members of the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank were kept in Victoria (Central) to liquidate resources of the Bank and to counter-sign bank notes that were then used by the Japanese Yokohama Specie Bank.<sup>42</sup> Welsh notes that under these arrangements they were able to develop links with the British Army Aid Group (BAAG) which operated

in China, and thereby pass news to internees and intelligence to the allies. They also smuggled sums into camps and assisted in escapes, but were inevitably betrayed and the Bank's chief manager, Sir Vandeleur Grayburn, died in Stanley prison in August 1943, possibly from infection or gross neglect or possibly as a result of excessive interrogation.<sup>43</sup>

The other notable area in which British personnel were employed was medical services, and in maintaining some semblance of public health. The most renowned individual was Dr Selwyn-Clarke, a 'high-minded Victorian liberal', who persuaded the Japanese to allow him to continue as Director of Medical Services. He felt a duty to take care of the entire un-interned populace, particularly in attempting to maintain sanitation and water supplies and his efforts were endorsed by the Japanese 23rd Army's chief medical officer, Colonel Eguchi, whom he had met with civility in Hong Kong prior to the war.<sup>44</sup> Selwyn-Clarke's works before and after the battle for Hong Kong were given personal endorsement by the influential writer Emily Hahn, who lived with the family for a whilst.<sup>45</sup> Whilst some interned prisoners suspected his motives, he certainly passed funds to internees, and also encouraged the International Red Cross for relief supplies.<sup>46</sup> He was assisted by many supporters of the Allies such as an Eurasian chemist Arthur Rowan who helped find medicines, and Dr T J Hua, in charge of Kowloon's Kwong Wah Hospital who 'hived off quantities of food, soap and vitamins for Selwyn-Clarke to supply the POW camps'.<sup>47</sup> He worked through the years to 1943 when he was eventually betrayed, arrested by the *kempeitai*, imprisoned, and sentenced to death, although he was not executed.<sup>48</sup>

### *The New Civil Administration, 1942*

The new civil administration of Hong Kong effectively began with the arrival of Lt-General Isogai Rensuke to become the first Governor-General in February 1942. Japanese military as well as civilians gradually took over all the key senior positions within the new administrative structure, but the middle and lower ranks were manned by Chinese. In marked contrast to the previous British system, Chinese civilians also took up the vast majority of positions within the newly established network of 18 district bureaux and 3 area offices, with the latter serving as the main means for Japanese policies to be passed on to and implemented by district bureaux.<sup>49</sup> Although the district bureaux enabled the new Japanese rulers to have contact down to the ordinary people,

the more 'elite' Chinese community proved more difficult to manage, as various factions emerged.<sup>50</sup> In addition, in the view of one 'neutral' observer, the military officers enthusiastically tried out new ideas but without following through effectively.<sup>51</sup>

The arrival of Isogai certainly led to stronger efforts to eradicate the 'decadent' and 'undesirable' British influences from Hong Kong society and replace them with the Japan-centred Imperial way. A 'general propaganda barrage' against British incompetence, racism and snobbery, through the *Hong Kong News* and other organs, was followed up by a 'series of vivid symbolic gestures' such as dismantling the statues of Queen Victoria and other colonial figures, renaming many streets with Japanese names, banning Western-style dancing and jazz music, the opening up of clubs and other colonial institutions to the 'subject communities' and taking steps 'to organize a new Jockey Club whose committee would be composed, for the first time, of wealthy non-Europeans'.<sup>52</sup>

Japanese policy, therefore, involved both the removal of previous 'British' symbols and practices as well as the active promotion of their Japanese counterparts or 'Japanization' in the broadest sense. This cultural policy involved not just introducing Japanese festivals and commemorating victories but also using popular culture, such as films, opera and music, as a means of social education.<sup>53</sup> Most importantly, the Japanese language replaced English as the official language and all schools were required to introduce Japanese into their curricula. However, it should be noted that the education system coverage diminished rapidly. Whereas around 120,000 children were in school before the war, after the elementary schools reopened progressively from May 1942, the total pupil numbers actually shrank to barely one-tenth of that level and, by 1945, there were probably only around 3000 schoolchildren.<sup>54</sup>

The Japanese were not averse to linking sporting activity to their initial war successes, arguing that 'the physical superiority and surpassing vitality of the Japanese people are revealed in sports and gymnastics.... and are being proven before the eyes of the world in those meritorious feats of arms'.<sup>55</sup> Consequently, their new subjects in Hong Kong, it was argued, would surely also benefit from learning more about Japanese sporting styles and capabilities.

In sporting terms, however, Japanese policy was not without its contradictions and even confusion. The Japanese authorities did allow the

British and local Chinese favourite activity of horse-racing to begin again at the Happy Valley racecourse (now renamed as Aobadani) in late April 1942, no doubt to reassure the local Chinese population that normality was returning and the media carried frequent stories about horse-racing from June onwards.<sup>56</sup> Yet, at the same time, the administration tried to encourage more 'Japanese' sports such as kendo and kyudo, by arranging public viewing events. Even a sumo wrestling exhibition was arranged at a military hospital in Repulse Bay on Hong Kong Island in September 1942.<sup>57</sup> By November 1942, there were sufficient practitioners of kendo for a tournament to be held on the military parade ground on Hong Kong Island.<sup>58</sup>

An American-invented sport enthusiastically adopted by the Japanese, baseball, also began to be popularized in a systematic manner; by July 1942, a local Chinese team was able to compete against a Japanese team.<sup>59</sup> The local media carried detailed explanations of the rules of baseball and supplied coverage of any matches that occurred, whilst publicity was also given to the results of baseball matches still being carried on back in Japan. Indeed, an official Japanese publication in 1943 was still able to state that 'baseball is the most popular and most widely played game in Nippon' and professional baseball in Japan itself continued until late 1944.<sup>60</sup> A major baseball tournament played over several rounds and initially featuring 16 teams was conducted in Hong Kong during September–October 1942, with the championship eventually won by team Otani.<sup>61</sup>

Some sporting events, such as swimming competitions in July 1942 for the officials of ward offices, seemed aimed purely at the Japanese or associated groups.<sup>62</sup> However, as part of the process of trying to win the hearts and minds of the Chinese community efforts were also made to include the broader public.

One of the priorities of the new administration was public health, as noted above, so encouraging swimming in the summer months of 1942, adopting healthy diets (with severe rationing in place this seemed to revolve mainly around promoting the consumption of wild herbs and seaweed), regularizing vaccination campaigns, and praising the benefits of hiking, became increasingly visible policies propagated through the media.<sup>63</sup> Clearly, sport or physical exercise were felt to be an important component of these public health campaigns. But, for a population in which the daily necessities of survival were becoming increasingly

paramount, many of these healthy exercise campaigns were irrelevant at best and impossibly unrealistic at worst.

### WAR WEARINESS (1943–1945)

By the beginning of 1943, the Allies had begun to recover from the shocks of the initial Japanese advances across Southeast Asia and the Americans, in particular, had begun to push back strongly. With defeat in the Battle of Midway in June 1942, the Japanese lost supremacy over the high seas and, with the military evacuation of Solomon Islands in February 1943, the Japanese were forced on to the defensive for the first time in the Pacific War.

Such setbacks were, of course, kept from the Japanese public and indeed from the Hong Kong public too. However, the Japanese-controlled Hong Kong media did begin to devote more coverage to the war situation (albeit mostly on the European front) rather than domestic issues within Hong Kong. In terms of administration of the occupied territory, the Japanese found that their efforts from the previous year to improve public health conditions and rebuild the economy were being ‘cancelled out by the slow strangulation of the colony’s overseas trade’<sup>64</sup>. Consequently, the food situation began to deteriorate significantly. The Japanese leadership in Hong Kong tried harder to ensure that such supplies that were available went to the military garrison and the growing Japanese civilian community; the local Chinese community just suffered.<sup>65</sup> More vigorous efforts were employed to reduce the population of Hong Kong; Governor-General Isogai announced plans to reduce the population—around 980,000 at the end of 1942—by around 300,000 during 1943 by repatriation to the mainland (and, of course, many residents fled to China anyway). At the same time, efforts were also made to increase food production, especially in the more rural New Territories areas.<sup>66</sup> A racetrack in Fanling, in the northern New Territories, was converted into an experimental rice-growing site, but apparently failed due to inadequate water supply.<sup>67</sup>

Given the daily struggle to survive, the Chinese community showed only limited enthusiasm for the sporting activities being arranged by the occupying authorities. Consequently, whilst the first year or so of the occupation saw sporting activities driven by the need to persuade the Chinese community to carry on life as normal, in the later war years,

apart from horse-racing, those sporting activities which were allowed increasingly had either a martial arts or a public health focus.

With the war situation slowly beginning to turn against Japan, full-scale military mobilization became paramount. At the same time, most Western sports were banned in the Japanese homeland.<sup>68</sup> Important in this context was the announcement in March 1943 by the Ministry of Education in Tokyo about which sports could provide relevant training during the wartime.<sup>69</sup> Martial arts, swimming, and a version of rugby qualified, whilst baseball, which ironically had been promoted actively in Hong Kong in the first year of occupation, did not. Although it is not clear how fully this new policy was implemented in the Hong Kong context, certainly there was declining use of baseball competitions, whilst martial arts did receive more attention. Nonetheless, friendly baseball games against teams from Guangdong did continue as well as tournaments within the Japanese community, but only with the creation of a softball league in December 1943 was there any real attempt to keep the local communities actively involved.<sup>70</sup> After commenting on how the formation of the league during wartime conditions was ‘an excellent thing’, the Japanese Chief of the Propaganda Section of the Information Bureau pitched the first ball of the initial match, between Indian and Chinese teams, ‘amidst thunderous cheers’ in January 1944.<sup>71</sup> Ten men’s teams competed in two divisions, whilst four ladies’ teams registered. The inaugural ladies softball championship was won in February 1944 by a team known as the ‘Rangerettes’, with Lily ‘Sunshine’ Mar as one of their star batters.<sup>72</sup>

Instead, martial arts achieved greater prominence. Many kendo and judo events were held in the dojos that had been established during 1942; although most of the participants appear to have been either from the Japanese military or experienced practitioners, several short-term (frequently 10-day) courses were opened for beginners. In two locations, the local Chinese were specifically encouraged to join in. One was the Chihaya-juku in Kowloon, which was private school owned by a Japanese, but aimed at teaching Chinese students the Japanese language, culture and martial arts.<sup>73</sup> The other was the Wing On company, which also opened a dojo for Chinese young people; the manager believed his employees would benefit from judo training and thereby learning more about the Japanese mind.<sup>74</sup> An exhibition of sumo wrestling, held in a special ring erected for the purpose on the Garden Road parade ground on Hong Kong Island, formed one of the key events of the celebrations



in December 1943 of the second anniversary of the Japanese victory.<sup>75</sup> However, there is no evidence that this traditional Japanese sport gained many Chinese adherents.

Swimming, which was allowed, also received some support, with special promotions for students and children during the summer, although these sessions were designated as 'training'.<sup>76</sup> In addition, radio calisthenics, a popular practice in Japan since the late 1920s and which had started in Hong Kong in October 1942 as a healthy morning practice, became more regularly organized as a community activity by utilizing the ward offices to promote it. For example, in August 1943, the Hong Kong ward office organized a 'Radio Calisthenics Week' in which 20,000 Chinese employees participated.<sup>77</sup> Although the Japanese did not set up any equivalent organization to the Syonan Sports Association that was established in Singapore to coordinate all sporting activities,<sup>78</sup> the Japanese did utilize the Overseas Chinese Association, which reportedly had 350 members in mid-1943, as an additional means of not only arranging sporting events for the Chinese community but also for channelling the profits from such activities into the war effort.<sup>79</sup> Nonetheless, the Japanese-led area offices and the largely Chinese-manned district bureaux remained more important ways of linking to the local community. For example, in September 1943, the Eastern and Western district bureaux on Hong Kong Island organized male and female basketball matches, whilst in late July 1944, the Hong Kong area office organized a sports event at the Chinese Recreation Centre in Causeway Bay in which 700 young Chinese took part.<sup>80</sup>

During 1944, however, the war situation worsened for Japan and the living conditions within Hong Kong continued to deteriorate. In April 1944, the media resorted to running articles advocating the benefits of morning walks as a way of building up strength for the war effort.<sup>81</sup> Far fewer sporting events were arranged for the local population and most activities were aimed at the Japanese population, such as swimming across Victoria harbour or kendo competitions, which were framed as 'training' for war. Table tennis competitions between the various wards (districts), in which both Chinese and Japanese competed equally, however, did take place. Still aspiring to win the hearts of the remaining residents, one Japanese sports commentator was quoted as saying: 'The mingling of players from various districts is sure to lead to the establishment of numerous friendships, thus enabling the carrying-on of work on a smoother basis'.<sup>82</sup>

The only sporting activity that seemed to continue regularly was horse-racing even though, in the words of the HKJC's official history, 'racing under the Occupation was partly sham and often farce'.<sup>83</sup> Previously, in pre-war years, horses had been imported from China and Australia. No longer an option by July 1943 it was reported that only 60 ponies were deemed fit enough to race.<sup>84</sup> A British intelligence report in October 1943 noted that 'a number of racing ponies which had been condemned as unfit for further racing had been slaughtered for food' and that a Japanese veterinary expert had been brought into try to make the remaining horses fit.<sup>85</sup> On one race day in November 1943, only 5 horses actually managed to start one of the major races despite initially there being 32 entries.<sup>86</sup> In December 1943, 18 horses were imported from Japan but, by April 1945, horses were in such short supply (most had died or been eaten) that the Race Club organizers had to resort as a variation to races for wooden horses 'made of three-ply, 15½ inches long and 8½ inches high' that 'galloped' down a contraption of wires in front of the grandstand.<sup>87</sup> But these did not prove popular with the punters; even the pro-government *Hongkong News* described the first such race as only 'moderately successful'.<sup>88</sup> With attendances being insufficient to cover expenses, in May 1945 the Happy Valley (Aobadani) racecourse was closed again.

Blockaded effectively by Allied ships, bombed on a frequent basis, unable to provide adequate food supplies and inevitably facing law and order problems, Hong Kong in 1945 showed signs of returning to the chaos that had followed in the immediate aftermath of victory in early 1942. The much-vaunted hygiene regimes were breaking down, even as the population continued to dwindle. Food was scarce, the yen currency in collapse and personal security deteriorating. A confidential 1946 British report estimated that, as of mid-1945, 80% of the population had shown 'signs of malnutrition in some form or other'.<sup>89</sup> Although Governor-General Isogai was posted back to Japan, to be replaced in January 1945 by Tanaka Hisakazu, who represented the old China faction of the Army, and strategically implied the absorption of Hong Kong into the broader Guangdong military region, it was nonetheless clear to the Japanese authorities—and the alert members of the ethnic Chinese community—that the end was close.<sup>90</sup>

With the dropping of the two atomic bombs on the Japanese mainland and the Emperor's subsequent announcement of defeat on 15 August 1945, Hong Kong became one of the prize objects in the region,

with the Nationalist Chinese as eager as the British to take over the territory. Released British prisoners, led by Franklin Gimson, the former Colonial Secretary who had been incarcerated in Stanley camp throughout the war, set up as planned a provisional administration. However, it was not until 30 August that Rear Admiral Cecil Harcourt's naval task force sailed into Victoria Harbour and the arrangements had begun for a British Military Administration, which was to last until May 1946 when civilian administration was restored.<sup>91</sup> Although with difficulty the Nationalist Chinese were dissuaded from sending troops into Hong Kong, the British nonetheless found themselves in control of a Chinese population that had differing expectations from pre-war days—the old mystique of the British colonial presence (the *status quo ante*) was impossible to fully restore.

### POST-1945 HONG KONG, BRITAIN AND JAPAN

After 1945, the resilience of the Hong Kong Chinese population was shown by the comparatively rapid way that the Hong Kong economy recovered. Although minor war crimes trials were held, overt signs of the Japanese presence (such as the war memorial) removed and almost all Japanese repatriated, the Hong Kong administration also realized that the territory's future prosperity, with mainland China in turmoil and revolution, ironically depended on some measure of restored commercial links with Japan.<sup>92</sup> The Japanese opened a Consulate in Hong Kong once the San Francisco Peace Treaty was concluded and slowly during the 1950s commercial links were revived.<sup>93</sup> But although trade and investment grew steadily from the 1960s and Japanese popular culture began to permeate Hong Kong from the 1970s, the past remained a sensitive issue. Many Hongkongers remained deeply suspicious of the Japanese and anti-Japanese demonstrations became a regular, albeit mainly a small-scale, feature of Hong Kong life from the early 1970s, particularly over the disputed Diaoyutai/Senkaku islands. But, in the view of one veteran journalist, this was a 'vicarious patriotism' for 'to feel anti-Japanese is a vivid yet cost-free advertisement that you are Chinese, a Hong Kong Chinese maybe, but Chinese all the same'.<sup>94</sup>

As a commercially-driven city, indeed, Hong Kong did become an important trading and investment partner of Japan and remained so, even after China began its 'open door' policy. By the 1990s, fascinated by Japan's popular culture and its consumer culture, Hongkongers

had not only become major consumers of Japanese products but also had become regular visitors to Japan for sight-seeing or shopping.<sup>95</sup> Nonetheless, memories of the harsh Japanese occupation could not be so easily assuaged especially amongst older residents. Both during the final years of British rule and subsequently after the handover, anti-Japanese demonstrations or even limited boycotts of Japanese shops and goods have occurred, usually linked to either the territorial dispute or actions by Japanese leaders which seemed to imply an unwillingness to admit to past aggression. In 1996, one Hong Kong protester drowned when trying to land on the disputed islands, whilst 2010 and 2012 saw a number of street—and media—protests again focused mainly on the islands.<sup>96</sup> In post-handover Hong Kong, even though the so-called pro-China groups and the pro-democracy groups find themselves on opposite sides over democratic reform in Hong Kong, they often adopt similar critical attitudes when dealing with Japan's past and present politics. Nevertheless, in recent public opinion polls, pragmatic Hongkongers seem to distinguish between a Japanese government (negative perception) and the people and culture (positive).

The Japanese sporting culture and legacy proved very transitory. After 1945, most of the old clubs reopened and went back to those sports which had previously been popular. The social make-up of club membership was certainly in a process of flux, but it was nonetheless the traditional British sports that re-surfaced, once grounds and facilities were restored to usable conditions (see Table 9.1). Japanese martial arts-related sports largely disappeared and even judo took time to be restored as an acceptable sporting activity. When the Hong Kong Amateur Athletic Federation convened a meeting in 1950 to plan for the setting up of Hong Kong's first ever Olympic committee, 24 clubs and sports associations were invited, but judo, kendo and even table tennis were not amongst those sporting associations invited.<sup>97</sup>

Immediately after the restoration of contacts with Japan in the 1950s, the Hong Kong government 'forbad Japanese football teams from entering the colony on the grounds that such spectator sports might inflame rather than mend ties', although it seems that a kind of informal 'ping-pong diplomacy' did help to promote some sporting—and even political—links between Hong Kong and Japan.<sup>98</sup> Attending international sporting events in Japan were not a problem; a Hong Kong sporting delegation participated in the Third Asian Games in Tokyo in 1958 (where the Hong Kong football team had the satisfaction of beating Japan 2-0)

and, when the Olympic Games were held in Asia for the first time, in 1964 in Tokyo, the Olympic flame passed through Hong Kong *en route* to the host country. Indeed, it was whilst attending an Asian Games Federation meeting in Japan in 1957 that one of the Hong Kong participants was so impressed by the sporting festival organized by the Japanese that he decided to plan a comparable Festival of Sports in Hong Kong, which subsequently became an annual event.<sup>99</sup>

The Hong Kong sporting community has continued to see and indeed respect Japan as one of its major Asian rivals in most sports, but competitions on the playing fields have largely been treated as sporting events rather than reincarnations of past political struggles or instruments of revanchism. Probably the most famous of these sporting clashes was the 2009 East Asian Games football final, when the host Hong Kong to the collective euphoria of a packed stadium managed to beat the much-fancied Japanese team 4-2 in a dramatic penalty shootout after the match had finished as a 1-1 draw after extra time.<sup>100</sup> One of the authors attended that final; whilst clearly the crowd was overwhelmingly supporting Hong Kong and the atmosphere was tense towards the end, it was not 'anti-Japanese' in a political sense. Booing to distract the Japanese players as they ran up to take the penalties was mixed with general cheering at the excitement of the moment. In analysing Hong Kong football fans' reactions to an earlier 2004 Asian Cup final in which China was beaten by Japan, Francis Lee argues that many Hongkongers seem to adhere to a vision of 'civilized sporting nationalism',<sup>101</sup> arguably the same tendency was reflected in Hongkongers watching the East Asian Games final. The Japanese Consul-General in Hong Kong, Sato Shigekazu, who himself attended the final, afterwards praised the 'sporting spirit' of the Hong Kong footballers and crowd.<sup>102</sup>

## CONCLUSION

Writing on the 60th anniversary of the end of the war one American journalist noted, 'in Hong Kong, residents have shown a surprising willingness to put the war behind them'. He ascribed this phenomenon to the fact that the majority of Hongkongers are not descendants of wartime survivors, but part of families that fled Mainland China later as communism prevailed.<sup>103</sup> Revanchism, in the sense of retaliation or revenge, which became evident in some other parts of Asia, has consequently remained muted in Hong Kong. Whilst the scars,

physical and metaphorical, of the harsh occupation policies carried out by the Japanese do still remain with the most elderly generation of Hongkongers—and those war memories undoubtedly have been passed down generationally—these emotions have not played an undue role in the sporting and non-sporting relations with Japan in recent decades. Moreover, whilst some ‘patriotic’ Hongkongers are disturbed by Japan’s foreign and defence policy strategies, including current Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo’s actions and policies, anti-Japanese demonstrations have been relatively small scale compared to those seen in certain mainland Chinese cities in 2010 and 2012. On 3 September 2015, Hong Kong celebrated a one-off public holiday for the 70th anniversary of the ‘victory of the Chinese people’s war of resistance against Japanese aggression’, but this seemed to owe much to Mainland Chinese prompting; pre-1997 Hong Kong had celebrated 30 August as Liberation Day.<sup>104</sup> Thus, Japan remains Hong Kong’s third largest trading partner, Hong Kong youth’s interest in food, fashion and dramas from Japan is high and in 2015, over 1.5 million Hongkongers visited Japan, almost 65% more than in 2014.

From surveying sporting activities before, during and immediately after the Japanese occupation, it can be shown that the Japanese policies almost totally failed to provide a lasting change in sporting priorities in Hong Kong. Certainly, in line with the pan-Asiatic ideology promulgated to justify their military advances, the Japanese tried hard to reduce British cultural influences including British-style sporting activities. Cricket, rugby and other quintessential ‘British’ sports were either banned or restricted during the occupation, but paradoxically the Japanese found it necessary to promote baseball whilst trying to keep horse-racing going as a sign to the local Chinese community that their interests were recognized. But, the Japanese were unable to win the hearts and minds of the ethnic Chinese population; life could not continue as normal and such sport as there was proved unable to make a difference.

In the post-war years, sports associated with Japan, such as judo and kendo, gradually revived in Hong Kong, but they have never become major sports for the ethnic Chinese community. On the other hand, neither have ‘British’ sports such as cricket or rugby, for which the expatriate and/or local South Asian communities remain the main players. Badminton, tennis, swimming and the ‘universal’ sport of football have much greater attraction for Hongkongers as participants. Yet, for

spectators—and gamblers—horse-racing remains paramount. In that respect at least, by trying to maintain a semblance of normality, bizarre though it became in the later stages of the war, the Japanese did at least understand one part of the psychology of the Hong Kong Chinese residents that they controlled and, in vain, sought to convert.

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**Acknowledgements** The research on which this chapter is based was supported by Lingnan University Hong Kong internal grant no. DS14A2. We acknowledge this support and also the excellent research assistance of Takagi Kohei in the investigation of Japanese language newspaper sources.

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The Ambivalence of the Reaction, Response,  
Legacy and War Memory: The Japanese  
Occupation of the Malayan Peninsula: The  
Consequences for Sport of the Imperial Past  
and the Democratic Present

*Peter Horton*

PROLOGUE

In late 1941, in a coordinated series of attacks in the Pacific and Southeast Asia, the armed forces of Imperial Japan made it very apparent as to their intent to further expand its Empire into the resource-rich territories of Southeast Asia and beyond into the Pacific Islands and even beyond into Australia and New Zealand in the South and West to India. Their advance was facilitated by the annihilation of the USA's Pacific Fleet as it lay virtually defenceless in Pearl Harbour. The catastrophic attack thus allowed the seaborne forces (17,000) of the 25th Army, commanded by the infamous General Tomoyuki Yamashita<sup>1, 2</sup> to land on the northern and north-western coasts of Malaya on 8 December 1941, with

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J.A. Mangan et al. (eds.), *Japanese Imperialism: Politics and Sport in East Asia*, [https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-5104-3\\_10](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-5104-3_10)

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the aim of capturing the airfields in the north of the Malayan Peninsula. With the neutralization of the air-support for the 88,000 poorly trained and ill-equipped ground forces of the Allies, that had been left to defend Malaya, were effectively neutralized.

The Japanese infantry, though unskilled in jungle-warfare,<sup>3</sup> swept through the Malayan Peninsula aided by a catalogue of strategic blunders and poor preparation by the Allied Force's military leaders, in particular, Winston Churchill. Decisions made by the iconic British wartime leader are now widely considered as being the major contributing factors that led to the ease with which Yamashita's forces were able to take possession of the entire Malayan Peninsula. Various high-level decisions not to divert troops and material to the Southeast Asian front and most importantly his decision not to action the well-conceived battle-plan code-named 'Matador', which was based upon the concept of 'forward defence' of the eastern coastline of Thailand and the Isthmus of Kra in the northeast of Malaya.<sup>4</sup> Churchill continually declined to deploy troops, planes and arms to protect the Malayan Peninsula preferring to direct these to the Middle East and Russia—arenas which he believed were more critical to the defence of the homeland.<sup>5</sup> Churchill is now heavily implicated in being central to the collapse of Singapore following the comparative ease with which Yamashita's forces swept aside the Allied forces in Malaya. This view was supported in 1997 by Correlli Barnett, war historian and past Keeper of the Churchill Archives, who, in an interview in Singapore whilst discussing Ong Chit Chung's then recently published work, *Operation Matador: Britain's War Plans Against the Japanese 1918–1941*, maintained that he had 'no doubt at all that the author of this complete disaster was Winston'.<sup>6</sup> Which makes Churchill's mortified indignation, as he labelled the fall of Singapore as the worst disaster in British military history and 'the largest capitulation in British history' all the more disturbing considering the subsequent horrors that befell all those captured, executed, imprisoned, tortured and abused during the Occupation of Malaya and Singapore in 1941–1943. Barnett's summation of Churchill's commentary half a century later would also not have ameliorated the pain and enduring suffering that even to this day remains; knowing the 'great man' as he did, he opined that: 'Winston had a remarkable capacity for distancing himself from mistakes and disasters that had his name all over them.'<sup>7</sup>

By the 7th of January 1942, the Allied forces had lost Kuala Lumpur and withdrew to Central Malaya, and their inglorious retreat back

over the Causeway to Singapore eventually took place on the 30–31st of January 1942.<sup>8</sup> The Japanese had taken just 54 days to capture the Malayan Peninsula and on 8 February 1942, Yamashita's bedraggled forces crossed the causeway from the southern tip of Malaya, from the shore of Johore Bahru, ready to invade what was mythically believed to be the 'impregnable fortress' of Singapore, the unassailable Gibraltar of the East.<sup>9</sup> In just over a week, on 15 February 1942, the leader of the British forces, Lieutenant General, Sir Arthur Percival surrendered; the 25th Army of Imperial Japan had overrun 130,000 Empire troops capturing 100,000, in what was the largest-ever surrender in British military history.<sup>10</sup> Two days later during the night of 17 February 1942 Major General Kawamura Saburo, an infantry brigade commander, was given the role of overseeing Japan's Singapore Garrison. The next day General Yamashita Tomoyuki, as Commander of the 25th Army gave Saburo the orders to proceed with the mopping-up operations; thus began the *sook ching* (purification by purging) with the subsequent massacres of thousands of Chinese men. Whatever enemies the Japanese faced where ever the theatre of war was the Chinese, who had and still have an utterly different relationship with the Japanese, would face a particularly intense level of force and opposition. During the invasion of the Malay Peninsula because of the 'deep rooted and intense' animus between them, 'the Chinese as victims in Malaya (including Singapore) were a qualitatively different kind of victim. They were victims not so much of Japan's war in Malaya, but much more of Japan's war in China'.<sup>11</sup> And the tragic irony is that many, if not most cared little or nothing, about the war in China and were caught up in it simply because of their ethnicity.<sup>12</sup>

In Singapore, the purge was undertaken by the *Kempeitai*, a military police force that became a most apparent and terrifying epitome of the use of explicit and direct coercion. A major dimension of the *sook ching* was a mass screening of all Chinese males between the ages of 18 and 50 which began just three days after the British surrender. Any indication that a Chinese male presented a threat to the Japanese, which was randomly and arbitrarily decided upon; it may have been their height, attitude, a tattoo, being excessively confident or merely just nervous,<sup>13</sup> they were seized, tortured and taken away loaded onto lorries and taken away to the East Coast beaches or to other isolated places, at the East Coast they were tied together with wire led into the sea, machine-gunned and bayoneted to death and left to rot.<sup>14</sup> As Chief of Staff of Japan's North China Area Army in 1938–1939, Yamashita, later known as 'the Tiger

of Malaya',<sup>15</sup> had formulated a system of 'mopping-up' anti-Japanese activists and guerrillas and his forces embraced similar practices involving summary executions; a practice he had adopted in Manchuria as Supreme Adviser to the Military Government Section of Manchukuo as it was known whilst under Japanese rule.<sup>16</sup>

Thus, as Japanese scholar, Hayashi Hirofumi suggested, 'Yamashita was the link that connected Japanese atrocities in Manchuria and North China with those in Singapore'.<sup>17</sup> During the Japanese invasion of the Malayan Peninsula and during the land-grabs in Manchuria and the Chinese Eastern seaboard provinces during the Sino-Chinese war (1937–1945) the main target of Yamashita's mopping-up was, obviously, the ethnic Chinese and in the same manner in Malaya and Singapore there appeared to be no limit to which his forces and his despised *Kempeitai*, the purveyors of terror in Singapore and indeed in Malaya, would go to terrorize the ethnic Chinese. Hirofumi made the point in 2009 that the Singapore massacres of ethnic Chinese were not mere aberrations or the acts of 'a few evil people, but were consistent with approaches honed and applied in the course of a long period of Japanese aggression against China and subsequently applied to other Asian countries'.<sup>18</sup> It was an instituted and managed form of action conducted by the 25th Japanese Army under Yamashita's command to facilitate the imposition of Japanese rule by removing any potential anti-Japanese elements. It was a well-planned<sup>19</sup> and calculated policy to destroy the power and influence of the ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia and was ominously foreshadowed in one of the first declarations made by the Japanese commander, Tomoyuki Yamashita in *The Syonan Times* (*The Straits Times*) shortly after the British surrendered:

Nippon armies hereby wish Malayan people to understand the real intention of Nippon and to cooperate with Nippon army toward the prompt establishment of the New Order and the Co-prosperity Sphere. Nippon army will drastically expel and punish those who still pursue bended delusions as heretofore, those who indulge themselves in private interests and wants, those who act against humanity or disturb the public order and peace and those who are against the orders and disturb the military action of Nippon army.<sup>20</sup>

The last sentence was a stark and most ominous warning of what would befall anyone who disrupted, in any way, the activity of the

Japanese military but, as Wai Keng Kwok suggested it could also have merely been an ‘excuse’ that could have been cited ‘later used to justify the army’s severe military policies against the ethnic Chinese population of Singapore’.<sup>21</sup> However, one wonders if the Japanese, particularly Yamashita, the Tiger of Malaya, at this stage would have felt any need to justify their actions in what for them had long become a ‘holy war’.<sup>22</sup> It is distressing to note that the Japanese soldiers and especially the *Kempeitai* who dispensed the summary ‘justice’ during the *sook ching* in Singapore did so with both relish and enthusiasm.

It has been well recorded, that the Japanese were always far harsher on the ‘Chinese, killing “hundreds of them” while their treatment of Indians was “better” (*leibih baik*) and their relationship with Malays was “good” (*baik*).’<sup>23</sup> The men who were considered by the *Kempeitai* to be of no threat, subsequently ‘lived on tenterhooks with their receipt of the title of, ‘examined’.<sup>24</sup> The inconsistency and sheer unbridled force with which the Japanese issued their summary ‘justice’ terrorized Singaporean civilians, the central focus of the purge being the Chinese, however, Eurasians and Jews were also targeted.<sup>25</sup> The Indian and Malay communities on the other hand, ‘were looked after by the Japanese Army very kindly’<sup>26</sup> as they surrendered without resistance when approached and also represent no threat to the Japanese either in the immediate sense or in terms of their political resistance to the expulsion of the British albeit at the ‘cost’ of becoming a territory in expanding Japanese Empire. The threat the Chinese represented to the Japanese in Singapore and Malaya stemmed from not only in their political, economic and commercial power but also historically as China was and remains Japan’s nemesis. The Chinese in the North East of Japan’s Empire were proving to be a major drain on the military forces and resources well before Japan’s ‘declaration of war’ on the USA in the form of its shattering attack upon Pearl Harbour. And, as the Japanese switched its major war energy to Southeast Asia the ethnic Chinese as well as the Allied Forces resisting their advance, bore the brunt of the terror dealt out by the Japanese Imperial forces. To a significant degree but not exclusively by any means, it was the variable levels of sheer unimaginable and grotesque violence meted out to the ethnic Chinese during the Occupation of the Malaya peninsula that embedded the differing levels and forms of ‘war memory’ in Malaysia and Singapore. As the war advanced and Japan’s military forces rapidly began to fall behind, the extent and nature of the terror they wrought became increasingly inconsistent, irrational and utterly

horrendous. In the end, the Japanese could not seem to be able to stop the increasing levels and dreadful consequences of what has been described as immoral policies.<sup>27</sup>

### JAPAN'S MOTIVATION TO WAGE WAR

Deriving from traditional ideas of the Edo period (1603–1868), the concept of a Japanese hegemony in East Asia, seeking to challenge the traditional role of the 'Middle Kingdom—China (Chûgoku, 中国)',<sup>28</sup> by adopting a notion of a revolutionary form of Pan-Asianism in response to the increasing advance of Western imperialism in the East.<sup>29</sup> This idealistic cultural construct of Pan-Asianism (a justification for Japanese Imperial territorial expansionism) continued throughout the Meiji period (1868–1912) was, as has been suggested, to have created for the first time a sense of an Asian identity for the 'Japanese as well as Chinese, Korean, and others'.<sup>30</sup> A key shift in the nature of Pan-Asianism as promoted by Japan was the shift away from a being benign regional model to that which carried the implicit condition of Japan as the being the leader of the movement cast in the role of the 'Middle Kingdom' (*Nihon chûka-ron*, 日本中華論).<sup>31</sup> The ideology of Pan-Asianism was, throughout Japanese history, invariably a feature of the mandates of revisionist groups and, as a policy, was initially connected to the policies of opposition parties in Meiji Japan. It was not until the 1930s that it became government policy with its adoption aimed at 'regional integration and Asian self-assertion against the West'.<sup>32</sup> The definition of Asianism is, as has been shown, to be inconsistent if not problematic.<sup>33</sup> However, at all times Japanese politicians firmly cast their nation as the leader and saviour of the East Asian nations that were being exploited politically, economically and culturally by European imperialists. Japan's political leaders positioned their nation as driving the 'revolt' East Asian nations would embrace to resist this menace politically, economically, culturally, and militarily. The creation of the union of nations, as Takeuchi suggested, may well have had to be achieved using 'aggression; (*shinryaku*)... as a means for reaching its aims or not'.<sup>34</sup>

As Japan was planning its entry into the Pacific War the on-going war with the various Chinese forces in North East Asia would have had become a major problem for a nation at war that was not well-endowed with natural resources of minerals and oil. It is at this juncture that there emerged an underlying 'ideological matrix' that would

drive the next stage of the expansion of the Japanese Empire, the concept of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere (*Daitōa Kyōeiken*) (GEACPS) surfaced. The brain-child of a supremely influential consortium made up members of the military, technocrats, and right-wing bureaucrat-reformists all of whom were highly motivated nationalists led by Kishi Nobusuke, the ex-vice minister of the Manchukuo (occupied Manchuria) government's industrial department.<sup>35</sup> In 1940, Kishi became Commerce and Industry Minister in the national cabinet of Tōjō Hideki, and shortly after the Pearl Harbour attack on 19 December 1941 in his ministerial role as Industry minister, he made a radio broadcast in which he clearly enunciated what the *actual* place in, and purpose of the Southeast Asian territories and the Pacific Islands would have in the GEACPS once they were occupied:

The Philippines possessed superior iron ore, abundant flax, as well as coal, chrome and manganese ore. Malaya was the world's largest producer of rubber, tin, iron ore, coal, manganese, tungsten, fluorite, and bauxite. The Dutch East Indies had rich supplies of oil, rubber, tin, coal, iron ore, bauxite, copper, manganese, lead, zinc, chrome, tungsten, mercury, bismuth, and antimony. As for the South Seas, Kishi described it as a treasure house of minerals that have yet to be mined. He noted that there were only a few resources in which Greater East Asia was not self-sufficient. Through science and technology, Japan would create substitutes for these resources.<sup>36</sup>

The fundamental motivation for the Japanese to precipitate and engage in the Pacific War was part of its centuries-long aim to be the hegemon of East Asia, and to do so it would have first challenge China's traditional status as the 'Middle Kingdom'—China, *Zhongguo* (中國/中国/*Chūgoku*, 中国)<sup>37</sup> and second, to comprehensively defeat China. The mid-twentieth century manifestation of Japan's imperial ambitions are widely viewed as being a direct response to what they perceived to be an increasing menace from the Western Imperialism,<sup>38</sup> though strangely during this period, a debate was raging domestically as to whether Japan should actually further modernize and 'Westernize'.<sup>39</sup> The fundamental principle that should underpin the discussion of Japan's motivation to wage war in the Pacific and Southeast Asia is that the war was a war between empires, those of the West and Japan's, who were, in fact, the last imperialists in Asia and it was they who had been attempting to 'change the shape of Asia' throughout the early to mid-twentieth century.<sup>40</sup>



On 1 August 1940, well ahead of their attack on Pearl Harbour, the Japanese government announced its intention to express its imperial ambitions in the form of the GEACPS. The new commonwealth was overtly outlined and implicitly included the annexed territories it already held dominion over and also ambitiously signalled a number of future military targets:

The term Greater East Asia implied that in addition to the core region of Japan, Manchukuo, and China, the sphere would include Southeast Asia, Eastern Siberia, and possibly the outer regions of Australia, India, and the Pacific Islands.<sup>41</sup>

Following Nazi Germany's victories over France and the Netherlands in the European Spring of 1940 in order to vastly expand its imperial territories Japan advanced into the French and Dutch colonies in Southeast Asia unopposed. Thus, with the formalization of Japan's alliance with Germany and Italy in the Triple Axis Pact, the way was open for Japan to initiate its most audacious gambit that would facilitate the establishment of the GEACPS—its audacious attack on the US Pacific Fleet whilst it was at-dock in Pearl Harbour on 8 December 1941. This precipitated the Pacific War, which was immediately characterized by the Japanese propaganda machine as a 'war of liberation', a 'war of racial awakening, and as a 'war of national emancipation'.<sup>42</sup> It is clear that such rhetoric embodied the main principles that underpinned the justification for the establishment of the GEACPS. The increasing pressure of waging war on a widening front soon obfuscated any 'realistic' notion of bringing 'Asia back to Asians' and it became part of a cynical plan to get the support of the various ethnic groups to justify the expansion of the Japanese Empire by creating a sense of a collective identity of an Asian *bloc* based upon; "mutuality," "cooperation," "solidarity," "co-existence," and "co-prosperity".<sup>43</sup> Not surprisingly, the GEACPS was regarded with contempt by most foreign commentators during and after the Second World War, most suggesting that the plan was nothing more than a propaganda slogan to cover up the invasions, land grabs and Occupation of resource-rich territories that could also provide free labour for the array of military-related operational projects, such as, road works and the construction of the infamous Burma-Siam railway.<sup>44</sup> The treatment of the so-called 'liberated' Asians, such

as the estimated 100,000 Malays and Burmese labourers, that died as consequence of horrendous working conditions and brutal treatment by the Japanese during the construction of the Burma–Siam railway and the hundreds of thousand Chinese and Koreans that became enslaved labourers, (*rōmusha*) pressed into the labour camps, was manifestly contraindicative of a benign mogul state leading its newly acquired citizens out of the tyranny of their erstwhile imperial rulers. Indeed, it has been long asserted that the extension of the GEACPS into Southeast Asia was solely underpinned by the needs of the military and had little to do with the beneficent ambition of liberating the oppressed Asian communities from the yoke of European imperialism.<sup>45</sup> In fact, Pan-Asianism, in the context of the Occupation of Southeast Asia, it was a *faux* cloak, merely propaganda and largely an ‘accidental’ outcome and not part of a long-term policy.<sup>46</sup>

The horrific events and conduct of the Japanese Occupation forces in Malaya and Singapore do not reflect in any way the supposedly ‘worthy’ aspects of the plan, nor did the brutal, callous and duplicitous treatment of the hundreds of thousands of Chinese, Burmese, Thais, Indians, Malays and Eurasians who in 1942 were either tricked or pressed into taking jobs constructing the Burma–Siam Railway.<sup>47</sup> Clearly, these were the actions of a nation desperately building an empire and acquiring vital resources not one that was meaningfully ‘liberating’ their fellow Asians; ironically, as we now know the period of Japanese Occupation of Southeast Asian territories did indirectly lead to the emergence of a number of independent states. The invasion obviously broke the pattern of the continuity of the form of colonial governance in the territories of Britain, France, Portugal and Holland and this acted as a catalyst for the acceleration of the inevitable end of Western rule in Southeast Asia. Once the Occupation ended new politicians with new ideologies emerged in these states and rapidly recast the political landscapes in the region.<sup>48</sup>

This was certainly apparent in post-war Malaysia and Singapore as both gained independence from Britain following torturous political journeys subsequent to the cessation of Japanese Occupation. It is ironic to note that although each had ‘endured’ the relative tyrannies of British and Japanese imperialism only to become themselves independent states governed by authoritarian rule, though benign by comparison with their immediate previous rulers, the Japanese.<sup>49</sup>

## AMBIVALENT MEMORIES FROM THE OCCUPATION OF THE MALAY PENINSULA

Although the people in all Southeast Asian countries agree the Japanese were cruel conquerors, it is important to note that Southeast Asia's response towards the Japanese role in the war differed among these countries. Indonesia and Burma acknowledge that Japanese rule was crucial in advancing their nationalist movements against European colonialists. Thailand did not undergo the harshness of the Japanese Occupation and was allied to Japan at one stage. Only the Philippines (where the Americans had promised independence before the Japanese conquest) and Singapore (where the population had a Chinese majority) were outwardly critical of the Japanese Occupation.<sup>50</sup>

A central part of the manipulation of the various community groups during the occupation was the manner in which the Japanese propaganda machine skilfully embraced a discriminatory policy that seemingly bequeathed freedom from the yoke of British imperialism to the Malays and Indians with the claim that they had 'launched the war to rescue the local peoples from Western colonialism'<sup>51</sup> whilst simultaneously 'othering' all ethnic Chinese; the Chinese were still Japan's 'main' enemy and had been so since the Sino-Japanese war of 1894–1895, and certainly after the second Sino-Japanese war of the 1930s. China to this day still sees Japan as the 'Other' upon which it defines its own identity and meaning and remains as China's most bitter enemy.<sup>52</sup> In the post-World War II, a diplomatic arena the mention of this fraught relationship was never accidental and in recent years, as illustrated with the on-going and apparently escalating tensions between China and Japan emanating from the sovereignty feud over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, the associated discourse is always highly charged, very political and multi-layered.

Following their liberation from the tyrannical rule of the Japanese both Malayan states briefly reverted to British rule though Singapore became a separate Crown colony in 1946 and remained so after the Federation of Malaya was established in 1948. Malaya was granted independence in 1957 and a year later the British Parliament granted independence to Singapore. Following the first election of the independent Federation of Malaya in 1957, the United Malay National Organisation (UMNO) led by Tunku Abdul Rahman adopting the strategy of adopting Malay candidates in Malay-dominated areas, Chinese candidates in Chinese areas and Indian candidates in Indian ones, gained power and

have maintained leadership ever since. Similarly, in Singapore, once the People's Action Party (PAP), under the leadership of Lee Kuan Yew, gained full power in the Legislative Assembly in May 1959 it has never been seriously challenged.<sup>53</sup> On 9th August 1965 following a brief and exceedingly turbulent period of membership of the Federation of Malaysian States, Singapore parted from the Federation, which upon reflection always seemed inevitable.<sup>54</sup> Fundamentally, because the Malaysians believed that the Chinese would soon dominate the Federation, economically, politically and culturally, whilst the Chinese simply did not 'trust' the Malaysians,<sup>55</sup> in part due, it is conjectured, considering the memories of the treatment of the Chinese during the Japanese Occupation and the sense that the Malays were favoured by the Japanese in both Malaya and in Singapore.<sup>56</sup> This was, it is suggested, a very 'real' manifestation of the impact of a collective war memory at work two decades after the Second World War ended. However, following a further 50 or so years, the prevailing perceptions of the Japanese Occupation of Malaya (as it was) and Singapore continue to be divergent and consistent. This is not merely because of the nature of these, now highly developed nations, although linked as they are geographically and historically, they are now very different in terms of demographics,<sup>57</sup> development, culturally and in regard to their individual and enigmatic forms of their 'democracies'.

The excavation of war memories from any context and particularly from such complex and varied populations as found in Malaysia and Singapore will always be fraught. The variability of the form of the memories recovered from histories written, oral and photographed or from cinematographic sources obviously reflects the nature of the victims' experiences under the Japanese and, in many ways, this was determined not only by their actions but by the extent to which their communities represented a threat to their Japanese conquerors. The most defining factors were unquestionably ethnicity and location whilst education, wealth and overt political activity and expression, irrespective of other factors, attracted the attention of the *Kempeitai*, who it must be said, arrived in Singapore with lists of previously identified targets!

Reflecting upon the nature of the memories that emerge from experiencing war, or as in this case study, the Occupation of their homeland, it can be suggested using a starkly, if not odious logic that the 'actors' in the theatre of war may well have experienced similar incidents but they have emerged from the action with an utterly different set of memories.

And, in this case, it was the result of the utterly different treatment meted out to the various communities and importantly, as Lim maintains, also because ‘the perception of (this) war among these communities also differed... (and because) ... there was not one war but several wars that took place simultaneously’.<sup>58</sup> For example, for many Indians in Malaya the invasion by the Japanese represented an opportunity to strike a blow against British Imperialism per se and especially so for the Indian estate workers who were harshly treated and exploited by the British estate owners and managers, and many supported the ‘fight’ against the British by donating to or in fact by joining the Indian National Army (INA).<sup>59</sup> Many Indians from Malaya, including Singapore, fought with the Japanese on various fronts of the Japanese advance through Burma into India. A force of some 40,000 volunteers from Malaya and Burma plus thousands forcibly conscripted estate labourers and Indian prisoners from Malaya and Singapore had been assembled by the charismatic leader of the Indian Independence movement, Subhas Chandra Bose<sup>60</sup> to fight with the Japanese in its attempt to invade India. The INA was part of the siege-force that attempted to wrest control of Imphal, the capital of the state of Manipur in Northeast India.<sup>61</sup> If this had eventuated it would almost certainly have led to the capture of East India by the Axis forces.<sup>62</sup> However, the advance into India was repelled; this represented the first defeat for the Japanese forces in Southeast Asia and, combined along with their defeat at Kohima, signalled the collapse of Japan’s hold of Burma. On 18th July, the Japanese drive to Delhi was halted and they retreated back into Burma having lost 55,000 men in a disaster that was deemed by the Japanese government officials to be, ‘perhaps the worst of its kind yet chronicled in the annals of war’.<sup>63</sup> This notion was supported by Peter Fay who believes that this was the tipping-point that led to the eventual defeat of Japan in 1945.<sup>64</sup> In 2013, the joint battle of Imphal–Kohima was adjudged in a survey and final debate conducted by the UK National Army Museum to be the greatest battle ever fought by the British based upon its ‘political, cultural and social impact, as much as its military impact’.<sup>65</sup> The historical significance of the battle, as assessed by this expert audience, can be gleaned by the fact that the joint battle of Imphal–Kohima gained 50 of the 100 possible votes; in second place with 25 votes was D-Day and the Normandy landings of 1944, which was closely followed by the Battle of Waterloo, 1815, with 22 votes.<sup>66</sup>

## REACTIONS AND RESPONSES: MALAYS, INDIANS AND CHINESE IN MALAYA

From a review of a wide range of primary and secondary sources reflecting upon reported memories from Malaysia and Singapore, an apparent dichotomy emerges as to the extent and reasoning behind the opinions expressed regarding the Occupation and, not surprisingly, it is particularly polarized as to the more positive statements made. An interesting tone emerges as one delves into the recollections of Malays recorded some 50 years after they experienced life under the rule of the Japanese invaders. The analysis of the positive comments regarding the Japanese Occupation shows that far more positive sentiments came from Malay and Indian residents of Malaysia than from Singapore and that none were found to have come from Chinese reports from either nation. In support of this notion, the eminent Malaysian historian Cheah Boon Kheng maintained, writing as an ethnic Chinese person who lived 1943–1945 as a 4 to 6-year-old child with his foster-mother in occupied Kuala Lumpur,<sup>67</sup> that the ‘themes of suffering, fear and terror dominate most of the personal memories, both oral and written, of people who lived through the Japanese Occupation’.<sup>68</sup> He added, that from his analysis of the Japanese Occupation, he concluded that it ‘had produced more negative than positive effects for Malaya and Singapore’.<sup>69</sup> The ambivalence of the responses from recollected memories of the Japanese Occupation can be appreciated from an examination of the varying images gleaned from the childhood memories of Malays compared with those of ethnic Chinese. For example, the stark comparison of the very poignant comment Cheah Boon Heng, offered in 1995, of the single most ‘outstanding, unforgettable’ feature that the occupation still arouses in most people, is that of ‘fear and terror’<sup>70</sup> compared with, ‘the warm memories of the period’ many Malays of the older generation still have of the Occupation.<sup>71</sup> Many can still recite the ‘*Kimigayo*, the Japanese national anthem and other songs as well as phrases in Japanese that they had picked in their school days’.<sup>72</sup>

As benign as this may seem, the teaching of *Nippon-go* and the teaching of contrived songs in *Bahasa Malaysia*, the official language, was patently very carefully constructed as part of Japanese propaganda. From the vast collection of oral evidence derived from his overview of the research on the Japanese Occupation of Malaya Abu Talib has

shown that many interviewees (ex-teachers and students) could spontaneously give renditions of a ‘few bars of Japanese songs’ which clearly were taught to inspire hatred of the West.<sup>73</sup> For example, he cites the following:

Beware of Britain–America,  
 Enemy of the whole world,  
 Both want to make a fool of us  
 in their wanton ways.  
 Destroy, destroy, our enemy, our enemy  
 Which are Britain and America

What had the British done,  
 Plant rubber  
 that cannot be consumed.  
 The Japanese are clever,  
 The British are stupid.<sup>74</sup>

The almost nostalgic toned reflections elicited from these interviews with elderly Malays are somewhat disturbing, yet in an attempt to soften this impression Abu Talib points out that such commentary does not indicate that all Malays took the atrocities committed by the *Kempeitai* and their local agents ‘lightly’.<sup>75</sup> By way of further amelioration, he draws from his review of a number post-war novels that depicted the suffering and harsh treatment dealt out by the *Kempeitai* to Malays, including, resistance fighters, intellectuals, politicians, government administrators and scores of wrongly accused ordinary citizens.<sup>76</sup> As edifying as this may be to more sympathetic readers looking at the tone of comments that have been evoked from a close consideration of statements made after the War from both ‘ordinary’ Malays and Indian Malays as well as those from major political figures it is most apparent that a significant dichotomy existed and likely still exists in regard to a final moral judgement of Japan’s behaviour during the Occupation of Malaya and Singapore.

The retrieval of war-time reminiscences by military veterans, non-combatant victims and, of course, the perpetrators of war crimes is not simple nor do they actually reflect either the ‘truth’ or a completely realistic recollection of the extent of the trauma experienced or equally of the suffering caused.<sup>77</sup> It is most apparent that as has been shown oral history studies using interviews from ‘actors’ that were personally

involved in the 'action' the narrative of their memories are not only very subjective and context-specific many also appear to have been tempered through time so as to ameliorate the suffering that recalling the full nature of their traumatic experiences.<sup>78</sup> However, in the accounts from people involved in the occupation of Malaya and Singapore the variance of the attitudes, tone and the sentiments expressed in the recollections from varied ethnic groups do, for the most part, reflect long-held political and moral positions. As Lim pointed out, in her research into the war memorials and monuments commemorating the sacrifices of people from various ethnic communities in the southern Malaysian state of Johor including Malays, Chinese, Indians *and* Japanese; some never wavered from their long-held anti-British stance:

Malays feel that three and a half years of hardship was a small price to pay. One of them said to me, 'the Japanese fought our war for us. If they had not done so, we would have to fight the British ourselves.'<sup>79</sup>

The British imperialists were clearly remiss in their supervision and infrastructure development in the rural areas of Malaya prior to the Japanese Occupation, though as Talib Ahmad points out in regards to his study of the Kedah rural area, the neglect was equally the fault of the 'Kedah élites,' as it was of the British administrators.<sup>80</sup> Thus, when the Japanese, upon their occupation, began to show a significant interest in the agricultural practices by way of introducing, new crops, including sweet potatoes, tapioca and cotton, along with new irrigation techniques and 'double cropping'<sup>81</sup> it was well received by the local farmers. Consequently, some recent studies undertaken in villages in rural areas of modern Malaysia, including Perak and Kedah on the western seaboard of Malaysia, have produced several very 'positive' memories of the Japanese Occupation. Student researcher Siti Zubaidah Kassim cites a local community leader from Sungai Acheh, Ibrahim Cheek, who made a typical comment of the impact of the influence of the Japanese upon the work-ethos of the Malay agricultural workers:

The Japanese period taught us (Malays) to be more hard working, the bad ones fear the Japanese, and the love of this country was slowly being instilled as the Japanese kept reminding Malays of their rightful place here.<sup>82</sup>



Abu Talib opens his chapter almost provocatively with this following comment drawn from a term paper from another of his undergraduate students, Teh Koon Hoo in his 1994 study on, 'The Arrival of the Japanese in Yan, 1941-43':

If only the Japanese did stay much longer in Yan<sup>83</sup> (Kedah) they could have taught us more. They were not stingy like the whites. What a pity! They did not stay long in Yan. They had done a lot of things for the people of Yan. Compared to the British, they (British) could not care less for our village.<sup>84</sup>

Abu Talib suggests, that although this sentiment conveys an apparently entrenched sentiment that is still held by many Malays, he felt somewhat sceptical as to the veracity of the statements in Teh Koon Hoo's survey because the period of the study was too short and he was thus unable to make 'any meaningful comparison.'<sup>85</sup> It can also be suggested that Teh Koon Hoo's rather strident conclusion to his paper reflects a significant element of personal bias, which may well have resulted in the scepticism of his supervisor.

Even though the period of the Occupation is less than 2 years (*After 2 years this area was granted to Thailand by the Japanese*), the Japanese had demonstrated their seriousness to bring benefits and good deeds to the people of Yan especially in the economic, social and spiritual development. This means that the Japanese administration is far better than the British administration. The Japanese lived in simple manner and examples easy to be understood compared to the "sophistry" of British officials. The British with their soft approach only managed to deceive the Malays whereas the Japanese behind their forceful ways, wanted the locals to work hard, be disciplined and self-supporting to develop their own self, their society and the country.<sup>86</sup>

The immediate responses to the Occupation of Malaya from the indigenous Malay communities and the middle-class and the clerical class of the established Indian community were manifestly different to those of the established ethnic Chinese. Although all 'victims' and the military or resistance fighters were subjected, in varying degrees, to Japanese brutalities and atrocities it was, as Abu Talib states, the ethnic Chinese 'that bore the brunt of the Japanese physical, and often deadly assaults'.<sup>87</sup> This can be seen as an indication that the Malays and the Indians were, in

the main, not regarded as ‘enemies’ by the Japanese but rather as future citizens of the GEACPS, with both communities having been supposedly ‘liberated’ from the tyranny of British imperialism. However, as has previously been asserted, the invasion of Southeast Asia, including the Occupation the Malayan peninsula, was, in fact, part of a war *between* imperialists, Britain and Japan; thus, all the futuristic promises of independence and freedom made to the Malays and the INA by the Japanese were questionable and, as Wang Gungwu so sanguinely says, there was to be ‘no beautiful ending on the horizon because the Japanese clearly intended to replace the Westerners as (*the*) imperialists of Southeast Asia. They were there to stay.’<sup>88</sup>

Both Malays and Indians were not only victims of a ‘dubious ideal’<sup>89</sup> but also of a gross deception by their not too-benevolent so-called saviours. Whilst the Chinese were not merely victims of a ‘future illusion’ they were also being punished for past wars dating back centuries and, as Wang opines, which were ‘recast in local terms’.<sup>90</sup> For Wang, talking as an ethnic Chinese scholar who had spent three and a half ‘claustrophobic’ years of the Japanese Occupation in a small Chinese community near Ipoh (the capital of the state of Perak) the experience was frightening and dramatic. On one occasion he watched the public execution of a group of ‘robbers’ and later while tending a market stall with some friends he ‘sat for four days opposite a public display of three recently chopped off heads of criminals’.<sup>91</sup> Soon, however, other victims were to become regarded by the Chinese as ‘heroes and patriots’, no doubt an unintended consequence of the terror campaign of the Japanese.

The wealthier and more educated Indians in occupied Malaya and Singapore were treated far more mildly by the Japanese largely due to their compliance and because of their participation in anti-British nationalist organizations. The strength and activity of the anti-colonial movement in India were an important factor in the softening of the attitude of the Japanese towards the Indian community. Furthermore, the local Indian Independence League, established in 1943, was a highly effective means of reaching the Indian community and the Japanese used this nationalist organization as a means of obtaining Malayan Indian cooperation. However, so-called ‘voluntary’ contributions were demanded of wealthier Indian individuals whilst many thousands of the labouring classes, particularly estate workers were ‘forcibly’ recruited to work on the various road and railway making projects in Siam (Thailand). The Indian *kiranis* (clerks), who were in the main Malayalees and Ceylonese,

with the help of the *kangani* (foremen) who then controlled the various food and rubber plantation estates for the Japanese also selected which estate labourers were to 'volunteer' to go to work on the infrastructure projects in Thailand. The *kiranis* had managed the estates with a firm hand prior to the Occupation, but once given full control by the Japanese they assumed an ever-increasingly zealous manner and 'the more tyrannical the staff became, the more successful they were in the eyes of the Japanese'.<sup>92</sup>

After the Occupation the labourers who did return, naturally maintained their loathing of the estate *kiranis* however, they had even more distaste for the European bosses because when they returned after the war, much to the labourers' disgust, they heaped praise on the 'Asian staff for their positive contributions for saving the estates from total ruin.'<sup>93</sup> The sense of injustice they may have felt and so-called 'hypocrisy'<sup>94</sup> displayed in light of the suffering they had endured at the hand of the *kiranis* let alone the Japanese must have been mortifying for them as they returned to their station at the bottom of the pecking order; nothing had changed for them.

However, as suggested, this entire discussion is multi-layered and is utterly imbued in ambivalence, paradoxes and pragmatic double-standards so much so that describing the judgement as being 'hypocritical' hardly touches the full extent of the duplicitous nature of the interactions of the whole figuration. The reality of the convoluted dynamics of the Indian response can be gleaned from the tone of the testimony given by Jayamani Subramaniam, who was a former aide of the Indian nationalist leader Subhas Chandra Bose, which includes his description of the evacuation of British civilians from Kuala Lumpur ahead of the Japanese advance:

What I and my friends saw at the Kuala Lumpur railway station cannot be erased from our memories. Thousands of British - men, women, and children arrived at the station. They all looked sad. The women especially were crying and trying to wipe their tears. Babies were crying for milk. These men and women who had received high salaries were now finding it hard to even obtain a piece of bread. When we gave them some bread and cigarettes, they received them with much gratitude - as though they have never seen these things before. Even for a cup of coffee they would thank us many times. The sufferings and tears of Indian workers have now reduced the Europeans to mere beggars!<sup>95</sup>

Jayamani Subramaniam, in his discussion of the Indian working classes involvement in the INA, views their activity as a ‘great joy embracing memory of nationalism and heroism’<sup>96</sup> because as he says it gave the Indian working classes a chance to get ‘revenge against the British for their exploitation and ill-treatment of labour.’<sup>97</sup> The defeat of the British in Malaya was welcomed by the Indian workers, himself included, which is all too apparent in his closing comment above, oddly, however, his opening thoughts, upon first reading, tended to suggest some level of sympathy, perhaps this should have been read as being malevolently cynical?

However, the manner in which Malay Indian communities readjusted and succumbed to the new political, economic and social reality that emerged following the surrender of the Japanese in 1945, certainly indicates a most pragmatic appreciation of the *realpolitik* at work in post-war Malaysia. This was certainly to be most apparent in the emergent new independent states of the ASEAN region; definitively so in the cases of Singapore and Malaysia. As it became a necessity in post-World War II Europe and with the collapse of the Soviet Bloc, in Southeast Asia, just as memories were erased, so too were collective memories fabricated to serve political necessities: however this is yet to be seen *vis-à-vis* the ongoing and the apparently hardwired Sino-Japanese impasse. Which was such a central element of the Pacific War and which remains a critical feature of the geopolitics of Southeast Asia, if not globally.

### THE POLITICS AND PRAGMATICS OF THE MEMORY OF THE OCCUPATION

Upon the extensive and at times distressing reading of the unspeakable acts that were undeniably perpetrated by the Japanese during their Occupation of the Malayan Peninsula it is difficult to retain a high degree of objectivity. Yet, one is required to accept that the position of the ‘belligerents’ from all sides of the conflict, remembering that there were more than just two flanges to this aspect of the war, would naturally be neither fair nor objective.<sup>98</sup> Just as the intensively subjective accounts of the victims of the atrocities of the ‘reign of terror’<sup>99</sup> which the Occupation certainly was for so many, particularly, but not exclusively, the ethnic Chinese, must also be accepted.

As Cheah Boon Keng, so eloquently opines, ‘no historian can detach himself completely from the age and society in which he lives, nor avoid the use of language which is not completely free of value-judgement.’<sup>100</sup> However, this aspect of the overall analysis, which involved the review of the seemingly mercenary process of ‘settling’ the so-called ‘blood debt’ owed to the people of Malaysia and Singapore subsequent to the war-time acts of the Japanese military was a problematic undertaking from a distance of half a century. To a certain extent the war crimes trials that began in May, 1946 and concluded on 4 November 1948 which resulted in the execution and/or imprisonment of Japanese military personnel found guilty of war-crimes in Malaya and Singapore may well have assuaged, to some degree, the collective and individual trauma, of the victims of Japanese war-crimes. Whilst the campaigns for the financial reparations and the manner of the settlement of the ‘blood-debt’ was somewhat odious. The negotiations and disputes regarding the nature of the settlement of the amount, the distribution and the form (be it a grant, loan or a gift) was ‘commercial’ if not exceedingly mercenary. The whole process, which took over 20 years to settle, saw Singapore finally receive S\$50 million from the Japanese government on the 25 October 1966, which was made up of a ‘grant’ of S\$25 million and a loan S\$25 million at a suitably profitable interest rate!<sup>101</sup> At the same time the Malaysian government, on behalf of their people, also received its blood money. In words that utterly understate the horrendous nature of the Japanese Occupation of the Malayan peninsula, the Malaysian Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman, accepted the M\$25 million ‘gift’, as it was termed, saying that the gift indicated ‘a final and *complete settlement of the unpleasant events* (emphasis added) of the World War II’.<sup>102</sup> However, some pecuniary claims have never been settled.

### FINANCIAL ‘RAPE’ OF CHINESE DURING THE OCCUPATION

It is difficult to contemplate that the atrocities committed by the Japanese military that reached the most unpardonable levels of inhumanity which even included cannibalism,<sup>103</sup> could have ever been wiped from the slate of moral responsibility by the ‘gifting’ of S\$75 million. The overall treatment of the ethnic Chinese throughout the Occupation including the pre-planned and mercilessly executed *sook ching* represented a manifestation of revanchism centred on the long-term inter-ethnic conflict between the two major Sinitic nations in retaliation against

the Chinese Diaspora living in Southeast Asia for its financial support and, for many, actual military involvement in the persistent and irksome resistance put up by both Nationalist and Chinese Communist Party forces which had halted the further expansion of Japan into eastern China in the late 1930s.<sup>104</sup> The obscene policy of *sook ching* and the attempt to completely destroy the status and place of the Chinese in the governance and business in Malaya and Singapore could be considered as nothing short of a form of sub-ethnic cleansing.

Forgotten, at least at a governmental level in Malaysia upon receipt of its 'blood-money' however, on a far more pragmatic level many Chinese Malaysians and those in Singapore did not forget. Indeed, claims for monetary compensation were still being made by the Federation of Chinese Associations in Malaysia with the support from Chinese Singaporeans as recently as 2012.<sup>105</sup> This claim for compensation does not relate to the physical atrocities or such activities as the forced enlistment of Chinese women in Malaya and Singapore as 'comfort women' or war damage to property but for what amounted to 'theft' by deceit under the threat of death. In March 1942, the Japanese military administrators demanded that the Chinese on the Malayan peninsula should 'donate' \$50 million to the military administration to support its activity as the 'new government' of the territories on the Malayan peninsula which, was now the southern part of the GEACPS. It was also maintained by the Japanese that the 'gift' was also an 'offering' by way of an apology for the role the Malayan Chinese had in supporting the war-effort of the Chinese against the Japanese in North East China prior to the Pacific War had commenced. The Chinese were 'encouraged' to make these donations under the threat of death and loss of their homes and property. On the 2 March 1942, eight of the most prominent leaders of the Malayan Chinese community were called to a meeting by Colonel Watanabe, the Chief Military Administrator, and his adviser, Toru Takase and were told, under veiled threats, of their appointment to the committee of the OCA. Dr Lim Boon Keng, a most highly regarded Straits-born Chinese 'physician and scholar, educator, entrepreneur, community leader, social reformer and philanthropist'<sup>106</sup> in colonial Singapore was appointed under duress to lead, it was suggested that harm could well befall his wife if he did not accept the office and Watanabe also promised to release Lim Boon Keng's son who was being held by the Japanese following the initial *sook ching* arrests in Singapore.<sup>107</sup>

To facilitate the payment of the ‘donation’ the Japanese used the Overseas Chinese Association (OCA) made up of influential and wealthy Chinese it had been established by the Japanese to act as a facilitating go-between between them and the Chinese community, to act as the collectors and the conduit through which the money and other valuables was to be deposited in nominated banks. They had one month to raise and deposit the money. Not surprisingly the OCA was unable to raise the whole amount but ‘generously’ the Japanese administration was able to arrange for a bank loan to be given to the OCA to pay the outstanding amount at a rate of interest of 6%.<sup>108</sup>

The official settlement made by the Japanese government on the 25 October 1966 to the Malaysian and Singaporean Chinese did not address the return of the \$50 m raised by the OCA to the Chinese community. And, remarkably the attempts to reclaim this amount and, one would think, any interest owing still waged as late as 2012. Following, the latest appeal the Federation of Chinese Associations in Malaysia felt optimistic as magnanimously the Japan’s Foreign Ministry, through the Japanese Ambassador to Malaysia, ‘has promised to look into the matter.’<sup>109</sup> Whether the lack of what must be viewed as a due and appropriate response is a strategic approach is a matter of judicious procrastination made in the hope that eventually the whole irksome issue will quietly fade from the memories of the ever-decreasing number of litigants or is the manifestation of a more sinister motive, that if they do actually acknowledge the claim, then they will have moved closer to a final acknowledgment of their guilt. If the purpose is to avoid this awakening, it will not obfuscate the true picture of the horrors that they perpetrated for, as Cheah Boon Cheng maintains the enduring post-war amnesia of the past governments of Japan is in essence ‘a self-admission that it (Japan) wishes to forget this dark image of itself’.<sup>110</sup>

### SPORT IN SYONAN: NIPPONIZATION, CENTRALIZATION, SPORTIZATION

For the ethnic Chinese in Singapore (Syonan—the Light of the South) memories of the cultural aspects, long traditions, social mores and respected behaviour extended into the nature of the governance of the Japanese during their occupation of Malaya and Singapore are largely obfuscated by the memories of the horrors and atrocities that befell them

throughout the Occupation. As has been graphically illustrated above the manifestation of their attitudes and style of governance in their attempts to subjugate and marginalize the ethnic Chinese, physically, spiritually and economically was all but absolute. The Japanese dismantled most institutions of British governance establishing rule by state centralization, by savagely establishing a monopoly on the use of physical violence, which they believed was a required precondition for pacification which would then extend the people's dependency on the state; for the Chinese, this was largely through the agency of fear.

However, somewhat ironically, the Japanese adopted Western sport including the traditional British game of Football (soccer) as one of the cultural elements of the Nipponization process of the non-European citizens of Singapore. This could be viewed as somewhat paradoxical, however, sport in Imperial Japan at this juncture both in the form of its modernized *budô* (Japanese martial arts) and Western athletic forms, including track and field athletics, swimming, football (soccer), Rugby football, boxing and baseball had long been part of Japan's 'modernization' since the Meiji Period (1868–1912) and, it has been suggested, during its early shifts to Westernization.<sup>111</sup> The educational ideology of athleticism, and all associated notions of the ethos of amateur sport including 'sportsmanship'<sup>112</sup> had also been adopted by the leading universities, such as, Tokyo, Meiji, Keio and Waseda as well as throughout the secondary education system.<sup>113</sup> In the late 1890s, Rugby football was introduced into Japanese universities as part of a direct political move to make male Japanese students more robust so as to steel them as part of the campaign to increase national confidence and military power. In 1899, Rugby football was initially introduced at Keio University by an Englishman, Edward Bramwell Clarke<sup>114</sup> and fellow Cambridge University alumnus Ginnoy Tanaka. The game's vigour and it demands that players should be courageous, physically and morally strong and be able to 'work' in a team suited the now desired modern masculinity, which was a fusion of the traditional Japanese samurai spirit and Western athleticism was soon widely adopted in the 'leading' Japanese universities.<sup>115</sup> The game flourished in the early twentieth century and significantly the Japanese Rugby Union as a national centralized controlling body was established in 1926, Rugby football, as had all Japanese sport had clearly been viewed with 'seriousness' well before the Occupation.



Japan had been a highly respected member of the Olympic Movement having first competed in the Summer Games in 1912 and after competing most successfully in the Berlin Olympics in 1936, Tokyo was also awarded the hosting rights for the 1940 Summer Games that never eventuated. Japan's political and military leaders fully appreciated the power of sport. So much so that in Syonan during the Occupation they infused 'Western' sports with the Japanese spirit of *wakon* of *budô* to such an extent that sport became highly political and was a fully embedded in the activity of the military Occupation and as a consequence following the defeat of Japan the war-time forms of the *budô* and its organizing body the *Butokukai* was banned by the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Forces in 1946 being viewed as ultra-nationalistic and extremely militaristic; *budô* had to be re-sportized!<sup>116</sup>

### *Sport in Colonial Singapore*

Sport in Singapore had gradually become entrenched in society from settlement by the British in 1819, until the occupation of the island-state by the Japanese in February 1942 and obviously closely followed the British model but the uptake by the majority of the population was slow and the resultant sporting scene was quite idiosyncratic. This was largely due to the highly complex ethnic make-up of the vast majority of the populace. The British and other Europeans though holding power were always one of the smallest subgroups never being more than 5% of the total population of the colony. There were no truly indigenous people on the island when it was first settled *all* settlers can be regarded as being migrants with, as is still the case, the Chinese representing approximately 70% of the total population made up largely of Hokkiens, Cantonese, Teo-Chews and Hakkas, most coming from the South-East seaboard provinces of China then known as Kwangtung (Guangdong) and Fukien (Fujian).<sup>117</sup> Thus, for the majority of the settlers in Singapore throughout the nineteenth century Western sport meant absolutely nothing, this lack of interest as well as the fetid climate and its locality did not facilitate a smooth uptake of the most robust aspects of British culture. However, horse racing or, perhaps it should be said, the gambling associated with it, rapidly became fiercely and rabidly supported by the Chinese in the colony.<sup>118</sup> The Singapore Turf Club, known originally as the Singapore Sports Club, held its first race meeting in 1842 just 23 years after the British settled on the island named Singapura<sup>119</sup> and it remains the

controlling body for horse racing and not surprisingly it also controls and manages the county's totalisator body.<sup>120</sup>

Once the government, administrative, financial, commercial, educational and religious institutions of the British were established and a layered social structure evolved the British, who initially considered themselves as sojourners, first took part in personal recreational leisure pursuits on the central common, the Padang and then by the 1850s they began to organize social sporting events and then established institutionally exclusive sports clubs. The development of sport globally was at this time in what, as Maguire has described as the second phase of the global sportization process which lasted from the 1750s until the 1870s.<sup>121</sup> The spread of sport which implicitly occurred with the advance of the British Empire during this phase saw the traditional English games and the accompanying ethos of amateur sport and also, it may be said that of the educational ideology of athleticism became part of the bedrock of British Imperialism.

The diffusion of sport in Singapore followed in what became a typical pattern in colonies throughout the territories of the British Empire as the British attempted to recreate the cultural practices and institutions of their homeland including sport. As they established their traditional games and sporting and leisure practices the British not only 'simultaneously and knowingly introduced racialized practices'<sup>122</sup> into them they also 'replicated life at "home" (in which) class systems and attitudes to gender prevailed, setting the discursive conditions and practices of a racialized and gendered community'.<sup>123</sup> Sport as with all other aspects of social and cultural engagement were conducted along quite strict ethnic, as well as gender lines and although competitive sport diffused from the middle-class Europeans to the lower social classes it was the middle-class non-Europeans who were quick to mimic the leisure practices of the middle-class Europeans particularly in regard to the establishment of their own 'exclusive' social and sporting clubs. One factor previously outlined was the fact that during the pre-Second World War colonial period, there was generally limited state-centralization and no efforts were made to unify the disparate ethnic and class groups in a single national entity. The establishment of sports clubs in Europe and later formation of clubs is central to the development of the sport, embodying and propagating the practices, ethos, identity and the sport itself. But in the colonies of Britain, even in sport obsessed colonies of Australia no attempt was made by the British to unify or use sport to

directly promote a sense of Britishness; it was apparently assumed that if you played such games as football and cricket that represented you *were* being British. However, as witnessed in the Australian context beating the English at their own games rapidly became a focus of the emergence of an Australian national identity.<sup>124</sup> This never became an issue in Singapore under British rule as all settlers in colony viewed themselves as sojourners.

The earliest clubs to be established in the settlement of Singapore were fraternal clubs for men formed in the tradition of gentlemen's social clubs that promoted the free association of gentlemen in the fashion of the social life of the upper echelons in England in the eighteenth century. The first 'sports' clubs established in Singapore were more social than sporting, the Raffles Club, formed in 1825, was the first male fraternal club in Singapore; its central purpose was to organize the annual celebration of settlement's foundation. During the initial stage of the establishment of sports clubs in Singapore, the British did not consciously attempt to proselytize their sports culture to the other settler groups they were solely concerned with creating familiar social institutions, of which sport and other recreational pursuits such as hunting were prominent. All such activities and their settings were largely racialized and gendered and exclusive to the very small population of male British and other European settlers.<sup>125</sup> The iconic Singaporean sporting institution the Singapore Cricket Club (SCC), established in 1852 is undoubtedly the most 'famous' sports club in Singapore and prior to Japanese Occupation it both literally and symbolically represented the nature of sport in colonial Singapore, standing as it does on the Padang, the spiritual heart of the nation.<sup>126</sup> Established in 1852, and rapidly became the model which other ethnically based clubs in Singapore, be they European, Eurasian, Chinese, Malay and Indian all emulated. In 1852, the SCC had a meagre membership of 30,<sup>127</sup> but there were at that time fewer than 500 Europeans in Singapore.<sup>128</sup> By 1901, it had 518 members and the European population had grown to approximately 4200.<sup>129</sup> Established by the European mercantile community<sup>130</sup> the SCC epitomized Victorian middle-class chauvinism.<sup>131</sup>

### *The Sporting Scene in Singapore Immediately Prior to the Occupation*

The British sports' model prevailed and flourished in the clubs of all communities in Singapore for 90 years right up to the dramatic events

of the 15 February 1942, when the Japanese forces invaded Singapore; prior to this sport in Singapore had penetrated all social strata and ethnic communities although the clubs were individually still largely segregated on lines of race, class and gender.

By far the most popular sport with the working-class Malays and Chinese was Association Football (Football) and a number of ethnically based football associations, such as, the Malays Football Association (est. 1909) and the Straits Chinese Football Association (est. 1911) had long been a significant and largely unheralded features of colonial Singapore's sporting landscape, each association had close to a hundred constituent clubs.<sup>132</sup> Under the influence of the American-led Young Men's Christian Association (YMCA) the sports of Volleyball and Basketball had however by the late 1930s had also become very popular in the Chinese community and their vernacular schools.<sup>133</sup>

Prior to the Japanese invasion and its subsequent occupation, Singapore had become an important and wealthy entrepôt, coined by Sir Frank Athelstane Swettenham, ex-Governor of the Straits Settlements, as, 'The Clapham Junction of the Eastern Seas'.<sup>134</sup> The population of Singapore as per the last census was undertaken before the Occupation in 1936 indicated that the population was approximately 490,155, of which 8338 were European, 45,077 Malaysian and 374,117 were Chinese, and interestingly there were also 3695 Japanese living in Singapore.<sup>135</sup> Thus, the Chinese represented 76% of the total population, which in fact is close to the current ratio, yet today the power they have is virtually absolute.

Under British rule Singaporean society was highly dichotomous, with the vast majority of the population living in squalor,<sup>136</sup> whilst the Europeans, particularly the British, who ruled the colony, were said to have 'developed a swollen-headed "Singaporitis."'<sup>137</sup> The upper echelons of the European, the Chinese and the Eurasian communities lived stress-free lives with the best imported food and drink on-offer at the newly established Singapore Cold Storage Company outlets<sup>138</sup> and working and playing comfortably with club-life being a central dimension of the highly active (and necessary) social scene with the elite sports clubs, which included, the SSC, STC, the Singapore Golf Club, the Singapore Yacht Club and the most-exclusive Singapore Polo Club being the leading social hubs for the British and other 'acceptable' Europeans.<sup>139</sup> As the 'war' approached sport, as with all social, business and educational of life had assumed a highly segregated classed character with the wealthy

Chinese and Eurasians mimicking the attitudes and behaviour of the British exacerbating the sense of being ‘othered’ for the working classes from all other communities. Life may well have been very ‘comfortable’ for the affluent Asians however, for the poor working-class Asians (Chinese, Malays, Indians and Buginese) it was tough, dangerous and utterly sordid. Working conditions for the labouring classes, even for those working in factories, were horrendous thus, in general terms, life in Singapore for the lower sections of society was desperate with gambling, opium-smoking, crime, gang-fights, legalized brothels which abounded and, even child-stealing for prostitution or to work as skivvies, was commonplace.<sup>140</sup>

As Japanese aggression in China accelerated in 1937 anti-Japanese sentiment became rife amongst the Chinese in Singapore and they began to boycott Japanese goods and shops and held protests and street-meetings, and ironically the Singapore government was most concerned as Japanese trade in 1937 fell by 70%. In 1938 when Japan advanced into South-east China the British administration banned street meetings fearing they were being organized by Malayan Communist Party activists.<sup>141</sup> A darker and far more dangerous ‘enemy’ was nigh and all aspects of life in Singapore, including sport, were soon to be in turmoil; never to return to its British imperial form.

### *Sport Revised, Centralized, Nipponized*

At the heart of Japanese governance in Syonan was the establishment of an absolute monopoly, this was emphatically established with the control of taxation and violence. The British had ruled the island-colony for the previous 120 years using free competition, private monopolies and a *laissez-faire* form of governmental control and relied upon a variegated collection of migrants to create Singapore’s unique entrepôt economy.<sup>142</sup> The Japanese invaded a developed settlement, although, in social terms, it was morally dysfunctional. After gaining almost complete compliance and control of the ‘bodies’ of the residents of Singapore after they had crushed the inept defence of British and Allied forces the Japanese sought to gain social control through a process of Nipponization and indoctrination; and sport was rapidly enlisted along schools and all forms of the media as key resources in the propaganda activities of the *guns-eikan-bu* (the Central Military Administration) through its propaganda

department, the *Sendenbu*, which was responsible for managing propaganda as well as forming the enculturation programmes.

The monopolization of the overseeing of sport through the centralization and bureaucratization of the governance of sport through the creation of the Syonan Sports Association (SSA) coupled with the simultaneous dismantling of all sports clubs meant that individual clubs and the various sports associations such as, the Malays Football Association and the Straits Chinese Football Association, would lose their autonomy: sport was to become controlled directly by the centralized power of the State. Sport, as illustrated above, had long been a central dimension of Japanese imperialism and, as such, its power as social-change agent was well appreciated and it was readily embraced in the initial Nipponization efforts of General Yamashita in his attempts to inculcate *Nippon Seishin* (Japanese Spirit) which implicitly implies loyalty and a sense of filial obedience to the Emperor and during the Occupation of Malaya and Singapore all actions in schools and on the sports field were aimed at the inculcation of *Nippon Seishin*.<sup>143</sup> Yamashita called upon the Singaporeans to shed their loyalty to the British as they had clearly demonstrated their weakness in their faltering defence of Singapore and, by adopting *Nippon Seishin* and a wide range of Japanese cultural practices, including sport, *Nippon-go* and the spirit of the Samurai, *bushido*, they would 'sweep away the arrogant and unrighteous British elements' becoming a part of the GEACPS.<sup>144</sup> In April 1942, in the wake of the invasion and the *sook ching* and with the awfully effective establishment of military power, the Japanese announced that they had approved of the formation of the government body that would assume total control of sport with the formation of the SSA. The SSA was formally constituted under the token-leadership of the Mayor of Syonan, G.H. Kiat (head of a publishing company) but the strong representation of the *gunseikan-bu* and *tokubetsu-si* indicated the real source of the controlling power of the SSA as with all official bodies in Syonan was the military command.<sup>145</sup>

Prior to the establishment of the SSA competitive sport did not exactly 'burst back' into action but reappeared with two rather contrived events. Firstly, just 5 months after the Occupation began a football game was set up by the Japanese in which a team of Eurasians played an Indian XI lauded as the 'auspicious' beginning to a new era in Syonan sport.<sup>146</sup> Interestingly, a more significant event held in August 1942 included all non-European ethnic groups including Eurasians *and* the Chinese.<sup>147</sup> The Mayor's Football Cup, a competition organized and conducted by

the *gunseikan-bu* involved a series of matches involving the four major races in Syonan, the Chinese, Indians, Malays and Eurasians.<sup>148</sup> This tournament as contrived, as it must have been, was indicative of the overall centralization of the control that had swept through all domains life in Syonan illustrating that the political power and dominance of the *gunseikan-bu* was apparent even in sport.

The centralization of sport as with all socially orientated policies of the Japanese was designed to wrest control of all the important areas of social engagement and, in doing so they were able to reform them and integrate them directly into their government bureaucracy. This was couched in somewhat duplicitous terms by the *gunseikan-bu* through the *sendenbu* as a way of creating ‘harmonious co-operation and good fellowship between sportsmen and sports lovers of all races in *Syonan-to*’.<sup>149</sup> This was consistent with the primary purpose of Nipponization process which was to essentially indoctrinate the people and unifying them as citizens of Syonan which, following their ‘expected’ victory in the Pacific War, was to become the South-eastern hub of the GEACPS.<sup>150</sup>

As illustrated above prior to the Japanese occupation sport in Singapore was utterly dichotomized on the basis of race, class and gender. Although, it could be said that under the Japanese it instantly became ‘massified’ but by the same token massified sport under the centralized control of a totalitarian fascist regime with 78% of the population, the ethnic Chinese, being bereft of any real agency whilst the only sport available for the captured British and their Allies being in Changi Prison does not suggest an ideal climate for sport. However, the discourse that the Japanese constructed around state-centred sport rather than individual clubs continually attempted to create a ‘we’ identity with the people in an attempt to integrate the people with the state through their agonistic successes in ‘friendly’ competition emphasizing a sense of camaraderie across the various racial groups.<sup>151</sup> This demonstrates, as Norbert Elias reflected, the manner in which the centralization of control, in this case in sport, shifts the opportunities’ offers from ‘open’ to ‘closed’ forms thus explicitly intensifying the people’s dependency on the state.<sup>152</sup> In this instance, the centralized control of the sport, as in all other aspects of life in occupied Singapore emanated from a physical force not funding or care. The nature of the form of sport actual promoted by the *gunseikan-bu* was soon to become hardly palatable as it rapidly shifted its focus from playing games and individual sporting activities to one aimed at fitness through an array of militarized

fitness-building exercise programmes promoted by the *Senden-bu Cho* in the *Syonan Times* and on street posters demanding individuals should take responsibility for their own health and fitness.<sup>153</sup>

The same emphasis was placed on the Physical Training (PT) programmes in the schools once a limited number (under 50%) were reopened in April 1942; schools were required to have between one and three hours per week of PT with a limited amount of sport but a heavy emphasis on callisthenics, military drills, marching and manual labour including market-gardening. Similarly, once the teacher training programmes resumed all student-teachers were required to engage in PT and also to become proficient in conducting PT lessons once they completed their much-skewed courses. Teachers were to be the promoters of *Nippon-go* and all aspects of Japanese culture, its aims, practise and products, whilst the children became, by definition, promoters of it in their families. *Nippon-go* and Malay were the only official teaching languages but the limitation of Japanese language-based resources available for all subjects meant that it was impossible to actually ban teaching in English, Malay and Tamil.<sup>154</sup> Schools thus had three functions under the Japanese: indoctrination, the emasculation of the Chinese and European communities (Malay and Indian schools received privileged treatment) and the *Nipponization* of all. All instruction and communication was grounded upon a command and obey edict which ironically became the form in post-occupation Singapore, particularly, in the vernacular schools.<sup>155</sup>

Women who had been typically marginalized in the 'sporting' activity in occupied Singapore were suddenly 'called to arms' as the Japanese began to see the efforts of the SSA in inculcating in *all* the people the importance of their individual fitness in the future productivity of Syonan was not succeeding if not actually failing and the propaganda machine became involved:

In Syonan and other places in Malai, there are a good number of idlers, especially women who have been notably lacking in spirit of service. This is really an unpleasant state of affairs during wartime when there is a general shortage in materials and food and labour is especially needed for production and reconstruction.

This apparent new interdependence of women and men in general terms, even if on the basis of guilt, did lead to some specific interaction between



the genders in sport, though it simply meant that the mass callisthenic displays became 'mixed' and, as in school PT, the emphasis of the culture of 'sport' became even more oriented to the disciplining of the body which was to become the dominant discourse of the government's initial campaigns in independent Singapore with the establishment the Singapore Sports Council (SSC) which was the centralized controlling body of Sport established by Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew in October 1973. As part of his authoritarian rule Lee Kuan Yew furthered the idea of the 'seriousness' of the purpose of sport by emphasizing personal and community fitness programmes as part of the policies of the PAP government. He adapted elements of both the entrenched British sports model and that of the Japanese, which was far more draconian, in his social engineering attempts to create a healthy, prosperous and stable society; looking at the 'red dot'<sup>156</sup> fifty years after it won independence it must be said he was clearly very 'successful' in his quest.

Sport in Singapore under the Japanese and that of the Lee dynasty, to this day, bear many structural similarities which surprisingly is similarly motivated. Centrally governed in both eras sport was and remains characterized by regulation and achievement and as such both were very important features of the creation and, in the current epoch, the maintenance of the wider social hegemony and in both it was regarded as a powerful social medium. In the more specific high-intensity domain of elite athletic performance as well as in the domain of community sport the centralized control of the SSA and currently the SSC created an institutional dependency through monitoring performance, training and competition. In Singapore today the funding of athletes such as SSC elite athletes is seriously enhanced by its very generous rewards programme for success in high-level competitions, such as the Olympic Games, World and Asian championships; an individual Olympic Gold medal victory would net an athlete S\$1 million, whilst a South East Asia Games individual Gold is valued at S\$10,000. Sports clubs and sport associations are similarly funded on a performance basis. Both then and now the increasingly high expectations regarding sporting performance were matched by the increasing competitiveness of the sport, though in the Occupation the nature of the motivation and the consequences were utterly different. However, the preparation of athletes to perform in the international arena as national representatives in both periods was based upon the ambitions of both governments to create a sense of 'national' identity and as disparate as the character of the regimes were

both appreciated the power and the potential of sport to facilitate social change.

### *Sport, The Occupation, Sportization*<sup>157</sup>

The centralized governance of sport established by the Japanese in Singapore is a manifest illustration of the sportization process of sport, recreation and physical training in schools. The *gunseikan-bu* through the SSA laid down what would be played or experienced, who would engage in it, and how, where and when it would be played. They also ascribed what the fundamental motivation for it would be, whether it was physical, cultural, social, economic and, of course, political (nation building).

Japan's shift towards Western sport during the Meiji Period took place during the Third Global Sportization Phase<sup>158</sup> which parallels the 'Take-off' phase of globalization.<sup>159</sup> Sport was a major globalizing force during this period and, as we have seen, an energetic carrier of the cultural imperialism of the British and the Japanese. Sport's importance was recognized by the Japanese and it became a central feature of its modernization and an important element of the cultural imperialism of the expanding Japanese empire as it had been in the growing territories of the British; in both the expansion of sport was impacted upon by hegemonic power structures and the associated cultural diffusion of the dominant ideologies an effect that continued in independent Singapore and later, far more emphatically in the People's Republic of China. However, the form and motivation and the underlying philosophy for its promulgation that Japan adopted were far-removed from that of the British; theirs was a far more deliberate, pragmatic, functional and political model. A model that was readily adopted by the PAP government of Lee Kuan Yew when he assumed power in 1965.

Sport in Singapore with its authoritarian system of government is centrally governed, however, it is a product of both its heritage as a British colony and of legacies of the Japanese Occupation. Lee Kuan Yew, the father of independent Singapore, the ultimate pragmatic, drew from a wide range of political doctrines, philosophical dogma and the harsh life experiences he had personally experience in the formulation of foundations upon which this prodigious nation developed. Lee drew from Athleticism, Fabianism, Confucianism and no doubt he shrewdly employed neoliberalism. Amongst the array of heady policies,

he employed to drive Singapore's amazing development many related to sport, health and wellness both at an elite and a community level. Both domains are central elements of the PAP's social engineering policies being prominent features of the government's efforts to create a sense of national identity and pride. One thing that underpinned Lee Kuan Yew's political ideology stemmed from the Japanese Occupation and he often referred to it during after his term as Prime Minister, figuring largely in his autobiography, was the power violence and terror has to change the way people think and the way they act:

The three-and-a-half years of Japanese occupation were the most important of my life. They gave me vivid insights into the behaviour of human beings and human societies. My appreciation of governments, my understanding of power as the vehicle for revolutionary change, would not have been gained without this experience. The Japanese demanded total obedience and got it from nearly all. They were hated by almost everyone, but everyone knew their power to do harm and so everyone adjusted...

Japanese brutality, Japanese guns, Japanese bayonets and swords, and Japanese terror and torture settled the argument as to who was in charge, and could make people change their behaviour, even their loyalties. The Japanese not only demanded and got their obedience; they forced them to adjust to a long-term prospect of Japanese rule, so that they had their children educated to fit the new system, its language, its habits and its values, in order to be useful and make a living.<sup>160</sup>

It is to be wondered to what extent such ideas framed his own belief in authoritarian governance, it certainly reflects his single-minded self-belief and his reputation as a pugnacious politician with an incredible intellect and the style of a 'street-fighter'. Reflecting upon some of his most memorable comments below it would seem he may well have gained many of his political traits from his experiences under the Japanese but his natural talents and amazing pragmatism that drove his passionate belief in the future of the 'little red dot' were monumental.

### *Lee Kuan Yew's Thoughts*

#### *On Opinion Polls*

'I have never been over-concerned or obsessed with opinion polls or popularity polls. I think a leader who is, is a weak leader. If you are

concerned with whether your rating will go up or down, then you are not a leader. You are just catching the wind ... you will go where the wind is blowing. And that's not what I am in this for'.

'Between being loved and being feared, I have always believed Machiavelli was right. If nobody is afraid of me, I'm meaningless'.

'You take a poll of any people. What is it they want? The right to write an editorial as you like? They want homes, medicine, jobs, schools.'

#### *On his Iron-Fisted Governing Style*

'Anybody who decides to take me on needs to put on knuckle-dusters. If you think you can hurt me more than I can hurt you, try. There is no way you can govern a Chinese society.'

'If you are a troublemaker... it's our job to politically destroy you... Everybody knows that in my bag I have a hatchet, and a very sharp one. You take me on, I take my hatchet, we meet in the cul-de-sac.'

#### *On Justice*

'We have to lock up people, without trial, whether they are communists, whether they are language chauvinists, whether they are religious extremists. If you don't do that, the country would be in ruins'.<sup>161</sup>

## CONCLUSION

The content of any recollected war memory of the Japanese Occupation of the Malay Peninsula from the temporal distance of 70 years remains as it was from the end of the war constructed by consensus. From research undertaken in both Singapore and Malaysia, it has been shown that if an incident had not directly affected an individual's community then it was not likely to have impacted upon the individual's personal memories of the traumatic events that happened around them. As Kevin Blackburn suggests the memory of the 'incidents' that occurred to people from 'other' communities, even if witnessed, tended to be ignored. In relation to the *sook ching* massacres in Singapore this was most apparent in the recollections of an interviewee, Mohammad Anis bin Tairan, from the Malay community who, as a ten-year old, witnessed the slaughter of between 1500 and 1600 Chinese men,<sup>162</sup> in what was to become known as the 'Valley of Death' *sook ching* massacre at Kampong Siglap on the East Coast<sup>163</sup>; the killing began with the first salvos of bullets being heard at 9.30 am and ended with the last burst of machine-gun fire,

‘well after three in the afternoon’.<sup>164</sup> At the age of 70, Mohammad Anis recalled the incidents in a very relaxed and at times ‘matter of fact manner’, confidently correcting Blackburn’s idea of where the massacre site actually was.<sup>165</sup> Throughout the extensive interview, it was apparent that Anis was ‘personally’ utterly emotionally detached from the impact of the massacre; all victims were Chinese:

Anis did not see himself as a victim nor did the Malay community; thus his story was different from the Chinese accounts of the Japanese Occupation, although he was a witness to the massacre of thousands of Chinese men at Kampong Siglap on February 22, 1942...it was clear that the social networks that he had as part of the Malay community ensured that the event was downplayed and rationalized as part of the Japanese settling scores with the Chinese, in which the Malays had no involvement...the Malay community emphasized this conflict was one in which it was best to stay out of.<sup>166</sup>

Interestingly, after the initial investigations for his 2009 article Blackburn discovered that Mohammad Anis had been previously interviewed in-depth in 1992 as part of the Singapore Government-sponsored war memory project conducted by the Oral History Centre of the Malay Community.<sup>167</sup> The interview, which lasted over six hours, obviously went into considerable detail and, to Blackburn’s amazement, throughout the entire interview Anis did not make a single reference to the massacre of the Chinese he witnessed at Kampong Siglap.<sup>168</sup> Even if the absence of this horrific memory did, in fact, reflect the manifestation of some previously adopted coping-mechanism its enduring status as a non-memorable event within the Malay community, even to current times, is more likely to be confirmation that at the time of the massacre even Singaporean Malays looked towards the Japanese as their saviours who were liberating them from the yoke of British Imperialism as per their espoused ‘mission’ of returning ‘Asia back to Asians’. Just as in Malaya the Malays in Singapore did not see themselves as ‘victims’ of Japanese aggression; they were not being oppressed, they were in fact comparatively being well-treated by the Japanese, which as we know was simply an insidious part of the discriminatory policy that was a central feature of the Japan’s occupation management strategy. Clearly, the collective memories of the Malay community also dominated in the establishment of their personal recollections however horrendous they may have been.

During the Occupation and long after it (if not to this day) the indigenous community groups of Southeast Asia never shared the ‘outrage and indignation’<sup>169</sup> of the Chinese; neither did they appear to express any collective regret or moral condemnation, as Mohammad Anis suggested, the massacres of the Chinese and other atrocities perpetrated on them by the Japanese were just part of long-standing feuds, with the Japanese merely ‘settling scores with the Chinese’ and, as such, it was best for Malays to stay well out of it.<sup>170</sup>

This seemingly indifferent attitude of this individual Singaporean Malay citizen, who had been brought up in the colony of Singapore that was initially intentionally structured by the British on the lines of racially designated areas.<sup>171</sup> Throughout British rule the major racial groups were all essentially migrants to this ‘Spirited and Splendid Little Colony’ and, as the population grew, the separate ethnic groups developed socially, culturally, educationally and economically quite separately.<sup>172</sup> By the onset of the Pacific War, the Chinese had numerically and financially become the most significant group of the non-European communities resident in Singapore, however, though representing well over 50% of the population, they were still not, in the wider sense, politically powerful. A sizeable group of Malays lived semi-rural lives, though many were seamen, labourers, taxi-drivers and fishermen.<sup>173</sup> And as Turnbull reflects, at the height of Singapore’s Imperial splendour, ‘...The mass of the population still lived in squalor... (even so) in the 1930s most Europeans could lead a life oblivious to poverty, slums and crime (meanwhile) ... Singapore was (also) a comfortable place also for the affluent Asian’.<sup>174</sup> When the Japanese took control of Singapore in 1942 driven by the wave of the mantra—‘Asia for Asians’—and considering their obvious detestation of the ethnic Chinese, coupled with the relatively ‘friendly’ attitude they had towards the Malays and Indians in Singapore, as they had done on the Malayan mainland, it is little-wonder that the Malays did not associate with the traumas issuing from the atrocities wrought upon the ethnic Chinese. As Blackburn commented, that the ambivalence of the ‘matter of fact’ nature of the recollections of the war memory of the Malay Singaporeans illustrates what, Halbwachs maintains, is the primary way in which the memories of social networks, in this case, ethnic groups, are shaped and internalized (and used) by the individual members of a group and how the ‘individual calls recollections to mind by relying on frameworks of social memory. In other words, (he added), the various groups that compose society are capable at every

moment of reconstructing their past.<sup>175</sup> Even so, it was not merely that they had reconstructed their memory because they were ‘not’, as the collective memory had told them, involved in the incidents *but* that they were also collectively and individually significantly to benefit from the *realpolitik* that was being acted out before them. It is suggested that these actions or inactions represented passive demonstrations of their support for the Japanese, after all as all saw it, they had long been subjugated under British Imperialism and the Japanese Occupation was supposed to be ‘liberating’ them from the tyranny of British imperialism. One can only imagine what their situation would have eventually become had the GEACPS become reality.

### CODA

The significance of the ambivalence of war memory in this discussion was that it was unquestionably a consequence of the very specific motivation Japan had to wage war and the subsequent nature of the strategies and methods used to expand its Empire under the guise of its ‘munificent’ ambition to establish the GEACPS with the attendant ‘selfless’ desire to give ‘Asia back to the Asians.’ Underpinning these arguments was Japan’s on-going historical preoccupation (obsession it could said) with conquering its Sinitic sibling, China, as part of its seemingly unrelenting ambition to become *the* ‘Middle Kingdom’, which in postmodern parlance and meaning means the ‘East Asian Hegemon’. This frantic obsession was fundamentally the source of the shameless treatment of the ethnic Chinese during Japan’s occupation of the Malayan Peninsula and the island colony of Singapore, the reason being the Chinese were perceived by the Japanese to be their nation’s nemesis; the one force in Asia that could halt Japan’s quest for dominance in East Asia.

The continual invocation of the most fractious feature of its war memory by the Chinese, has been most savagely used by China and, has become an institutionalized element of the political discourse of East Asia. China will not, it appears, ever leave this ‘juicy’ political bone alone, the possible reason for this being, that the neo-nationalism of recent and current Japanese political leadership can never bring itself to beg for forgiveness for the atrocities committed by the invading Imperial military forces of Japan throughout both the Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945) and the Occupation of Malaya and Singapore (1941–1943); importantly

this would also mean its Emperor and his subjects would also have to unequivocally beg for forgiveness.

The memories of the atrocities that occurred involving ethnic Chinese during these deplorable eras in Japanese modern history remain dormant beneath the surface of all on-going and any new relationships between the two major East Asian nations and it is apparent that they continue to undermine any real chance to assuage this current impasse. These war memories are lying beneath the surface like the ‘critical’ fuel rods beneath the crumbling Fukushima nuclear power plant and are waiting to burst out into the atmosphere with malevolent intent. Unfortunately, the political power generated by the continual recourse to use the ‘moral-judgement card’ remains far too valuable a geopolitical strategy for the Chinese to abandon, and knowing this, the Japanese, currently in the form of Shinzu Abe, feel that they must never ‘blink’ or show any acquiescence for fear of being finally morally defeated by their nemesis.

No hatred is as deep as that of disaffected siblings and invariably none are so ridiculously pointless; but neither party can be told this, thus they have to come to this realization themselves. Unfortunately, in the mean-time all other members in such a ‘family’ oft-times have to bear the brunt of such animus. It is to be hoped that this near century-long and perniciously vexatious matter does not escalate and, that the ‘big brother’ can be strong enough to ‘back down’. The essence of the moral judgement involved in this deplorable matter and the apologies required have, in all truth, lost their force, value and meaning. It is suggested that it is in China’s best interest to ‘finally’ assume the maturity of the great global power it is and to accept a meaningful declaration of responsibility by the Japanese for the suffering, known and unknown, experienced by the ethnic Chinese victims of both the Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945) and World War II (1941–1945). If such an apology, the substance of which would, by necessity, have to have been established previously following earnest and transparent diplomatic negotiations between both parties, could ever be fashioned and remorsefully submitted by the Japanese and then be graciously accepted by the Chinese a unified East Asia and the entire Asia-Pacific region could continue to advance.

If China can achieve this it will create a moment in history that will allow it to become geopolitically, economically and culturally not only the leading nation of Asia but that of a unified Asia. In the event that China could assume the mantle of leadership in Asia it will also gain the potential to lead the regional, if not global, fight against the threats



associated with political and religious extremism and global issues, such as, poverty, disease, human rights and global warming. The creation of a harmonious and militarily stable, if not united East Asia, would be a most positive and productive first step for China and Japan to take. To facilitate the relaxation of stubborn in-grained stances China and Japan have assumed as a consequence of the embrace of the politics of forgetting and those of strategic remembering of the ‘dark role’ of Japan during the Imperial thrusts during the Sino-Japanese War and World War II and its direct impact upon the ethnic Chinese. It is suggested that the example of Lee Kuan Yew who was able to straddle the schism between on one side his personal feelings of repugnance and detestation for the Japanese military who ordered and committed the atrocities to the Chinese in Singapore and on the other his political instincts based on his consummate pragmatism that enabled him to learn from his experiences during the most dire of circumstances of the Japanese Occupation. The case-study presented on the sportization of sport and recreation in independent Singapore and the perspicacity of Lee Kuan Yew in embracing the most appropriate and valuable dimensions of the sporting culture of both of Singapore’s imperial rulers to engineer the future development nation and the people is an oft times forgotten feature of his monumental impact upon the geopolitics and social advance of his beloved ‘Singapura’ *and* the entire Southeast Asia region.

## NOTES

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  13. The *Kempeitai*, who oversaw the *sook ching*, also 'supposedly' used nine categories to assess Chinese men who it was thought were a threat to the Japanese Occupation:
    1. Persons who had been active in the China Relief Fund;
    2. Rich men who had given most generously to the Relief Fund;
    3. Adherents of Tan Kah Kee, the leader of the Nanyang National Salvation Movement; school masters, teachers, and lawyers;
    4. Hainanese, who, according to the Japanese, were Communists;
    5. China-born Chinese who came to Malaya after the Sino-Japanese war;
    6. Men with tattoo marks, who, according to the Japanese, were all members of secret societies;
    7. Persons who fought for the British as volunteers against the Japanese;
    8. Government servants and men who were likely to have pro-British sympathies, such as Justices of Peace, members of the Legislative Council; and

9. Persons who possessed arms and tried to disturb public safety'. Cited in, Yoji Akashi, 'Japanese Policy Towards the Malayan Chinese, 1941-1945,' *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 1, no. 2 (September 1970): 68.
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- neutrality and after the War he was exonerated of all complicity in the war crimes of the Japanese. See, in *ibid.*
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  114. Edward Bramwell Clarke who was born in the treaty port of Yokohama, the son of a baker, who studied at Cambridge University graduating with a BA after which he returned to Japan in 1899 as an *oyatoi gaikokujin* (a foreign government advisor for the Meiji government). He later gained a position at Kyoto Imperial University in 1916 until his death in 1934.
  115. Y. Ikeguchi, 'Kindai no Ragubi Hyaku Nen Kan (A Hundred Years of Modern Rugby)', Baseball Magazine Co., Tokyo, 1981,10, cited in, Light, 'A Centenary of Rugby and Masculinity in Japanese Schools', 91.
  116. *Ibid.*, 91.
  117. Horton, P., "'Padang or Paddock": A Comparative View of Colonial Sport in Two Imperial Territories' *The International Journal of the History of Sport*, Vol. 14, No. 1, (April 1997) Frank Cass: London, 4.
  118. *Ibid.*, 8–9.
  119. For an excellent early portrayal of Singapore see, Turnbull, C. M., *A History of Singapore 1919-1988*, Second Edition (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1992), 1–32.
  120. Horton, P. 'Sports clubs in colonial Singapore: Insiders, outsiders, aspirants' *International Sports Studies*, Vol. 35, No. 1, 2013, 39.
  121. Maguire, J. *Global Sport: Identities, Societies, Civilizations* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999), 80.
  122. Horton, P. 'Imperialism, race and the history of sport', in Pascal Delheye (ed.), *Making Sport History: Disciplines, identities and the historiography of sport* (London: Routledge, 2014), 170–204.
  123. *Ibid.*, 173.

124. Horton, P. 'The "green" and the "gold": the Irish-Australians and their role in the emergence of the Australian sports culture, *The International Journal of the History of Sport*, Vol. 17, Nos.: 2–3, 67–71.
125. Horton, 'Sports clubs in colonial Singapore', 36–8.
126. The *Padang* (which literally means 'field' in Malay) was established as a public common in June 1819 by William Farquhar under the instructions of Thomas Stafford Raffles. Farquhar however allowed commercial interests to use the area but upon his return to the settlement in 1822 Raffles immediately countermanded all the permits Farquhar had given the merchants and returned the Padang's to its planned use as the green centre of the colony around which all major government buildings have since been built: it is now the spiritual heart of the nation.
127. Makepeace *et al.*, 'A Century of Sport', 323.
128. Sharp, *The Singapore Cricket Club*, 13.
129. Sharp, *The Singapore Cricket Club*, 31.
130. Makepeace, Brooke, and Braddell, "A Century of Sport", 324.
131. Horton, "'Padang or Paddock'", 9.
132. Oon, D. 'Government Involvement in Sport in Singapore, 1959-1982', unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Queensland, 1984, 59.
133. Horton, P. 'Complex Creolization: The Evolution of Modern Sport in Singapore', *European Sport History Review*, 3, 2001, 91 (77–104).
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136. Turnbull, 138.
137. *Ibid.*
138. *Ibid.*, 136.
139. Horton, 'Sports clubs in colonial Singapore', 37–43.
140. Turnbull, 138–9.
141. *Ibid.*, 146–7.
142. L.K. Lim & P. Horton, (2011) 'Sport in Syonan (Singapore) 1942-1945: Centralisation and Nipponisation', *The International Journal of the History of Sport*, 28: 6, 898.
143. Abu Talib Ahmad, 'The Malay Community and Memory of the Japanese Occupation', 48.
144. T. Yamashita, 'Declaration of the Commander of the Nippon Army', *The Shonan Times*, 20 February, 1942.
145. 'Mayor to be Honourary President of Syonan Sports Association', *The Syonan Times*, 9 September 1942, 4, cited in, Lim & Horton, 'Sport in Syonan', 908.

146. 'Soccer Makes Auspicious Start on Syonan Esplanade', *The Syonan Times*, 3 July 1942, 4, cited in, Lim & Horton, 'Sport in Syonan', 908.
147. Lim & Horton, 'Sport in Syonan', 908.
148. 'Mayor's Football Cup Still to Be Competed For', *The Syonan Times*, 18 August 1942, 4, cited in, Lim & Horton, 'Sport in Syonan', 908.
149. 'Sport and Universal Brotherhood', *The Syonan Times*, 16 October, 1942, 2, cited in, Peter Horton, 'Singapore: Imperialism and Post-Imperialism, Athleticism, Sport, Nationhood and Nation-Building', *The International Journal of the History of Sport*, Vol. 30, No. 11, 1223 (1221-34).
150. Hughes, C.W. *Japan's Security Agenda* (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc., 2004), 39-42.
151. As the membership of the SSA grew to over 3000 by the end of 1943 many new interdependencies and after the Occupation and long after Singapore gained independence in 1965 many of these relationships formed the basis of the Singapore Sports Council which was the centralized controlling body of Sport established by Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew in October 1973 by merging the National Sports Promotion Board (NSPB) and the National Stadium Corporation (NSC). See, 'The Establishment of the Singapore Sports Council, 1st October 1973'. Available at: <http://eresources.nlb.gov.sg/history/events/d0072ea4-1667-4aaa-bfca-8df9b591700d>. Accessed 11/08/2015.
152. Elias, N. *The Civilizing Process*, translated by E. Jephcott. 2 vols. Vol. 2: State Formation and Civilization. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1982, 269, cited in Lim, L.K., 'The Development of Sport in Singapore: An Eliasian Analysis', unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, James Cook University, 2004, 153.
153. See, 'Health Is Wealth Vii', *The Syonan Times*, 30 May 1942; 'Health Is Wealth Viii,' *The Syonan Times*, 6 June 1942, and 1942, cited in, Lim & Horton, 'Sport in Syonan (Singapore) 1942-1945', 912.
154. Lim & Horton, 'Sport in Syonan', 917.
155. Ibid', 916-7.
156. 'Former Indonesian President B.J. Habibie, who led his country during the Asian currency crisis of 1997, is believed to have been the first to use the term, though he later denied saying it. In the 4 August 4 1998 edition of the *Asian Wall Street Journal*, he was quoted as saying, "It's OK with me, but there are 211 million people [in Indonesia]." He continued, "Look at that map. All the green is Indonesia. And that red dot is Singapore. Look at that." See, Yasuhiko Ota, "Little red dot' inherits Lee's pragmatic diplomacy", *Nikkei Asian Review*, August 4, 2015. Available at: <http://asia.nikkei.com/Politics-Economy/>

[Policy-Politics/Little-red-dot-inherits-Lee-s-pragmatic-diplomacy](#). Accessed 11/08/015.

157. Elias's original concept of sportization with the embrace of the Robertson's 'minimal phase model' (Robertson, 1992), Maguire suggested that progressively a 'global sports formation' emerged, evolved and continues to do so. In the fourth (1920s–1960s) and fifth global (1960s–1990s) sportization phases, the role and impact of non-Western nations has become ever-increasingly significant. (See, Horton, 'The Asian Impact on the Sportisation Process', *The International Journal of the History of Sport*, Special Issue: Sport in a Changing Asia: Politics, Policies and Practice, Vol. 29, Issue 4, 2012, 511–34.)
158. See, Maguire, *Global Sport: Identities, Societies, Civilizations*, 81–4.
159. Robertson, R. (1992), *Globalization: social theory and global culture*, 59.
160. Lee Kuan Yew, 'The Singapore Story', Time-World, Thursday, Mar. 03, 2011, excerpted from, Lee Kuan Yew, *The Singapore Story* (Singapore: Times Editions, 1998). Available at: <http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,2056737,00.html>. Accessed 12/12/2011.
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163. For an excellent discussion of this event see, *ibid*, 236–42.
164. Mohammad Anis bin Tairan, cited in *ibid*, 241.
165. *Ibid*, 239.
166. *Ibid*, 244–5.
167. *Ibid*, 243.
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169. Wang Gungwu, 'Memories of War: World War II in Asia', 19.
170. Mohammad Anis bin Tairan, cited in, Blackburn, K, 'Recalling War Trauma of the Pacific War', 245.
171. C.M. Turnbull, *A History of Singapore 1819-1988*, 20–1.
172. *Ibid*, 33–75.
173. *Ibid*, 138–50.
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175. Halbwachs, M., *On Collective Memory*, (Trans. Lewis, A. Coser) (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1992), 38, cited in, Blackburn, K, 'Recalling War Trauma of the Pacific War and the Japanese Occupation in the Oral History of Malaysia and Singapore', 243.

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PART VII

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Revanchism or Reconciliation?

# Towards the Construction of a New Regionalism? The End of East Asian Colonialism: Japanese Responses and Reactions to the Games of Asia

*Keiko Ikeda and J.A. Mangan*

## INTRODUCTION: CULTURAL SHIFT

Cultural and religious values inherited from Asia were replaced to an extent by Western values in the late nineteenth century. This shift to a new cultural influence was reflected idiomatically. ‘WAKON-KANSAI’ (a fusion of Japanese spirit and Chinese knowledge) became ‘WAKON-YOSAI’ (a fusion of Japanese spirit and western knowledge).<sup>1</sup> W.G. Beasley has pointed out in his *Rise of Modern Japan* (Tokyo: 1990) that abandoning Chinese traditions did not mean the rejection of Japan’s indigenous culture but replacement of Chinese elements by Western

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ones reflected in the pursuit of ‘the spirit of civilization’ promoted by intellectuals such as Fukuzawa Yukichi and Tokutomi Soho.

As Beasley has explained,

...there was [...] a concern with ‘civilization and enlightenment’ (*bunmei-kaika*), reflecting a belief in the superiority of Western culture, which Japan, it was argued, had reason to emulate. The outstanding examples of this viewpoint in the middle and later Meiji years were... Fukuzawa Yukichi (1835-1901) and Tokutomi Soho (1863-1957).

Beasley added,

[Fukuzawa’s *Bunmei-ron no Gairyaku* (*An Outline of a Theory of Civilization*) published in 1875] identified Japan in Social Darwinist language as one of the semi-civilized countries of the world, together with China and Turkey; recognized that she was, therefore, inferior to those of the West in literature, the arts, commerce, or industry, from the biggest things to the least; and argued that in order to move forward into the next higher stage of evolution she would need to acquire, not just technology and military strength, but also ‘the spirit of civilization’. To this end ‘the first order of business’, Fukuzawa claimed, ‘lies in sweeping away blind attachment to past customs’. Specially, he meant by this ‘the absolutist and authoritarian traditions of Confucianism’.<sup>2</sup>

In addition to embracing ‘the spirit of civilization’, some influential Japanese were convinced that emulating British sports’ ethical values would build a strong modern nation-state able to resist Western imperialism.<sup>3</sup> The Japanese royal family had an important role in the Japanese modernization of sport for political purposes. A picture of the crown prince riding a horse adorned the frontispiece of the first issue of *The Physical Education and Athletics* (Vol. 1 No. 1, March 1922) and highlighted his enthusiasm for the western sport. Moreover, the whole of the journal’s first column was about the Prince and the notion of sportsmanship.<sup>4</sup> There was a manifest purpose in representing the crown prince as a modern sportsman at that time. Britain was thought to be the model of a democratic modern nation. Giichi Masuda, a member of Parliament and famous journal publisher, believed that ‘true democracy is the thought which demands the equality of the living activities based on liberal, egalitarian and humanitarian love... It is Britain where democracy is prosperous and... the country is a constitutional monarchy with no conflict in

society...'. He also encouraged the ideals of Baden-Powell's 'Scouting for Boys' and the development of character, in his view, fostered by Athleticism in his various publications.<sup>5</sup>

This ambition—to embrace western sport—was not confined to Japan. It was adopted as a common countermeasure against the western powers by other Asian countries. 'Reform nationalism' characterized those states 'that proved inferior in certain economic, technical and military respects when confronted by western powers'.<sup>6</sup> The same arguments for example, was to be found elsewhere in East Asia, Chinese nationalism, it has been asserted, belonged to this category.<sup>7</sup> Liang Qichao (1873–1929), one of the most renowned Chinese political reformers of the period, believed, 'nationalism that had come from the West and could be applied to enhance social cohesion and make China powerful',<sup>8</sup> while another well-known Chinese reformer insisted that sport was a crucial instrument for preserving the power of the nation by 'improving people's physical strength, enlightening their intelligence and promoting their morality... the three most urgent tasks for China'.<sup>9</sup>

What then was the difference between Japan and other East Asian countries? Social Darwinism promoted by western engineers and educationalists and Japanese elites who had studied in Western countries, stimulated Japanese state policies in sport and physical education. In this context, moral education based on 'the spirit of civilization' was considered a significant means of producing the leaders of the Japanese elite, who would confront western politicians, military and intellectuals. The successful promotion of modern sport, at the very least, could convince westerners that Japanese culture was worth admiration and respect.

*Ichikō's* Athleticism was promoted specially for this purpose by school-masters deeply influenced by their experience of studying abroad, in particular, at British public schools and universities.<sup>10</sup>

The headmaster of Tokyo's 'First Higher Middle School' (usually referred to simply as *Ichikō*), educated at an English public school from 1889–1897 and then a graduate of Tokyo University, was especially struck by the morality, both explicit and implicit, in the high-minded ethos of English fair play. Later, he became a famous Principal of Kyoto University (1897–1907).<sup>11</sup>

Many Japanese officials in government ministries and many teachers in state schools went overseas for the purpose of study and inspection between 1861 and 1911. By 1911, the number had risen to more than 4199. Most went to universities and schools (including vocational

and military schools) in the West. In addition, 2299 foreigners were employed in Japanese ministries and state schools between 1868—1889: 928 from Britain and 374 from the USA. They appear to have reinforced the diffusion of both the western ideas of civilization and its sports' ethical values.<sup>12</sup>

While Japanese sports education mostly stressed moral education, Chinese education laid the emphasis on military prowess through sport; an emphasis caused by defeats in the first and the second Sino-Japanese Wars and invasion by Japan. Japanese aggression, of course, brought in its wake, long-lasting and intense 'anti-Japanese' antagonism. Repercussions are felt to this day in sport—a form of refracted revanchism. This hostility has far exceeded national resentment against the Western foreign colonial powers that invaded China in the mid-nineteenth century.<sup>13</sup> Similar bitter national anti-Japanese sentiment, of course, was created among the Korean people well before and during the Second World War.

#### THE FAR EASTERN CHAMPIONSHIP GAMES: IMPERIAL HEGEMONIC CONFRONTATION

As mentioned earlier, Japan subscribed to the ideals of the moral educational values embedded in Athleticism but also to the perceived imperial assets of Athleticism. This inspired, at least in part, Japan's struggle for supreme hegemony in Asia.

Subscription to the ideals of athleticism was evident at the 7th Far Eastern Championship Games held in Manila<sup>14</sup> in 1925 and provided a noteworthy illustration indicating how deeply *some* Japanese athletes respected these ideals. According to the athletes' memoirs edited in a volume of a sports-journal, *The Physical Education and Athletics* (1925), after a 400 metre race, a Japanese athlete was disqualified. However, there was interference, in fact, by an athlete from the Philippines. The Japanese were innocent. The Philippine athlete won and the Japanese athlete finished second. The Japanese athlete did not protest. The referees were all from the Philippines. Participants had already protested against dishonest judging by the referees from the Philippines—more than 30 times! Therefore, the Japanese athletes concluded that the sacred arena of sport and the concept of fair play had been 'greatly profaned' and resolved to walk out. The Japanese Imperial Society of

Physical Education rejected the athletes' decision and ordered them to continue to participate, stating that the *ultimate* aim was to win the championship. The Japanese athletes were squeezed between the hegemonic ambitions of American Imperialism and Japanese Imperialism. Regardless, they insisted that 'Amateurism is ours...Even if the Japanese Imperial Society of Physical Education sent us back to Japan...we should stick to the principle of amateurism and the important spirit of fair play'. The JISPE, in turn, declared that 'if they should walk out, they would be left in Manila. Serious punishments would be implemented'. In fact, due to the good offices of the Japanese Consulate in Manila, all Japanese athletes returned to Japan.<sup>15</sup> Clearly then, some Japanese athletes inspired by British idealism proved resistant to the orders of officials motivated by imperial ambitions. Studies of the Far Eastern Championships have been used to illustrate political conflict among three countries: Japan, China and the Philippines (USA) in a struggle for the imperial control in Asia.<sup>16</sup> However, the Games have provided an example of Japanese athletes inspired by idealism and indifferent to imperial politics and attached to the ideals of the period English moral sports code and its spirit of fair play enshrined in the values of Athleticism—in its purest form!

Volleyball at the same Games provides a contrasting example of subscription to pragmatism rather than principle. Until the 7th Far Eastern Championship Games, volleyball was played irregularly by 12 players in each side (twelve-versus-twelve volleyball). However, Japanese delegates suggested nine-versus-nine players.<sup>17</sup> Although the Philippines and China agreed in principle with the idea, it was rejected as premature. 'Nine-versus-nine volleyball' was established as the official style at the 8th Far Eastern Championship Games. It was adopted by the international committee responsible for the Far Eastern volleyball rules. The committee was composed of delegates from Japan, China and the Philippines who gathered at the Tokyo YMCA hall and Japanese Youth Hall in Tokyo.<sup>18</sup> It was later asserted that change was probably intended to *ensure* Japan won the event.<sup>19</sup> In passing, it should be noted that, 'nine-versus-nine volleyball' is little known in the West. However, it is popular in Japan, Taiwan and Korea. In Japan, the annual 'All Japanese nine-versus-nine volleyball Championships' has been held continually since 1927, even when after the 1964 Tokyo Olympics 'six-versus-six volleyball' was officially established as the international game-style. Today few Japanese are aware that 'nine-versus-nine volleyball' is one of the consequences of the Far Eastern Championship Games. Some believe

that it was introduced from the USA as volleyball is of the western origin. Thus volleyball is evidences of a Japanese contribution to East Asian regional sport: a harbinger of things to come as East Asia flexes its global muscle in modern sport?

‘Nine-versus-nine volleyball’ as an East Asian volleyball style implemented by Japanese initiatives proved unacceptable to the USA controlled Philippines. The Philippines countered Japanese initiatives to include volleyball in the Far Eastern Championship Games and, instead, recommended that boxing should replace it in 1930. It argued that ‘boxing, wrestling and fencing’ are the three official events in the Olympic Games. Volleyball was initially intended to introduce the elements of the popular sport but ‘nine-versus-nine rules’ were specialized with advanced techniques.<sup>20</sup> This alternative, in turn, was rejected by the delegates of Japan and China. ‘Nine-versus-nine volleyball’ continued as an event in the 10th Far Eastern Championship Games. The regional indigenous recommendation won favour. Again, could this be a constructive omen in the era of a New Asia confident in its culture and seeking global recognition?

#### POST SECOND WORLD WAR ‘INDIFFERENTISM’: JAPANESE ATTITUDES TOWARDS ASIA DURING THE AMERICAN OCCUPATION

The defeat of the Second World War brought drastic change to Japan and resulted in cultural ‘indifferentism’ towards Asia. The Japanese invasion of Asia under the influence of militarism and nationalism was vehemently criticized in Japan after the war. The public had enough of Asia.

The American occupation did not follow a linear pattern: policy changed several times, and during each of these phases there were contradictions; sometimes serious and sometimes less serious. With this important proviso, it should be stressed: that America made a major attempt to draw Japan away from contact with Asia, particularly socialist Asia after 1949, and bind it into the American-dominated ‘Western’ world; Japanese currency was not convertible and the Japanese were not allowed to travel abroad in the early post-war years. During the entire period of the occupation, the USA provided nearly two-thirds of Japan’s imports, while taking less than a quarter of Japan’s exports—in short, Japan was turned into a huge captive market for US exports.<sup>21</sup>



The occupying power thus made a sustained effort to draw Japan away from contact with Asia. This policy was closely related to post-war Japanese ‘indifferentism’ to Asia. A new ‘western’ education—‘democratic education’ was implemented to ‘bury’ the pre-war ideology of fascism and all sociocultural politics related to it. Furthermore, the Japanese nation lost confidence in its cultural supremacy in Asia. The ‘Kyoto School (*Kyōto-gakuba*)’, one of the most influential sects of the Japanese philosophical movement centred at Kyoto University historically had formulated religious and moral insights unique to the East Asian cultural tradition. It was now dismissed philosophically as ‘absolute nothing’<sup>22</sup> linked as it was to past imperialism and to the idea of ‘a Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere’, which had justified the invasion of Asia. American hegemony, with its policy of ‘indifferentism’ to Asia, was reinforced by economic, philosophical and scientific strategies which included the denial of most academism existing before the Second World War. The dismissal of pre-war science was fully achieved through the fact of defeat, and resulted inter alia in the astonishingly ironic idea of the promotion of the ‘peaceful use of nuclear energy’. The origin of ‘the peaceful use of nuclear energy’ was part of ‘Atoms for Peace’, a policy that the American President Dwight D. Eisenhower launched at the UN General Assembly in December 1953. Japan was encouraged to construct nuclear reactors in earthquake-prone Japan; the only nation to be subjected to the tragedy of the Atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki!<sup>23</sup>

Of course, regional isolation cannot be claimed exclusively as a consequence of post-war American geopolitical policy. It is a consequence of long-standing Japanese ethnocentrism and long-standing imperial atrocities. One consequence of the American policy of the isolation and reduction of Japan in East Asia, of course, especially its pacifist policies, rebounded against America spectacularly. ‘Now that Japan was forbidden from fighting, it could concentrate on building a strong economy’.<sup>24</sup> And the Korean War, ironically, was a regional cause of eventual economic rebirth. Such are the ironies of history!

While any sociocultural and economical concerns about Asia envisaged by the Japanese, were tactically excluded by USA policy, various East Asian countries became increasingly anti-Japanese in sentiment in response to increasing economic power and patriotic education in the 1990s. Before then, such sentiment existed only at an underground level due to the more ameliorative politics in the 1970s, typified by the

accommodating political principles symbolized in ‘The Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Japan and the People’s Republic of China’ on 12 August 1978. Then Mao’s Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) gave rise to a Chinese anti-western xenophobia that served to further consolidate ‘defensive nationalism’ and again, ‘sport in the first half of the 1960s was heavily influenced by this defensive nationalism’.<sup>25</sup> More importantly, however, the change of attitude was influenced by Sino–American relations:

By 1993, world politics had been reshaped following the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. The US began to re-evaluate its strategy toward China, which it had considered a card to be played against the Soviet Union during the Cold War.<sup>26</sup>

#### THE RISE OF CHINA: SYMBOL OF ASIA ASCENDANT

Partly in view of this new relationship between the USA and China, together with a fierce nationalism born of past humiliation, and the remarkable growth of the Chinese economy, the Chinese government’s budget for sport increased dramatically in the mid-1990, and throughout the late 1990s and 2000s, China was determined ‘to catch up with the developed countries in the west’, not least in sport—the totemic symbol of ‘racial’ superiority. This resulted in gold medal fever. The 2008 Beijing Olympics was the outcome with China topping—the gold medal table.<sup>27</sup>

Then the 2010 Guangzhou Asian Games bought 416 medals to China, 231 to Korea and 216 to Japan. In Japan, the media was cool in its response to China’s success. Its face remained averted. Few Japanese wanted to acknowledge that the astounding 199 gold medals won by China were symptomatic of the marvellous economic growth of China and its potential for hegemonic control in East Asia.

One of the most influential Japanese newspapers, *The Asahi Shimbun* contained an article on 28 November 2010 about Kōhei Uchimura (Nippon Sport Science University), a Japanese top gymnast, who was not sent to the Asian Games by the Japan Gymnastic Association. Uchimura then won at the London Olympic Games of 2012.<sup>28</sup> The newspaper gave the reasons why Japan did less well compared to China in Guangzhou. It reported that:

Kōhei Uchimura (Nippon Sport Science University), a Japanese Top Gymnast, was not sent by Japan Gymnastic Association. Women's volleyball also sent only one of 34 players registered as the members of The All Japan team. Both cases were caused by the importance of the event for each World Championship planned just before the Asian Games, while the members of Chinese teams were composed of the strongest members as well as those for World Championships. Therefore the result was obvious before beginning the Games. JOC (Japan Olympic Committee) which administrates all national sports federations considers The Asian Games as the second most important competition match next to the Olympic Games... some national sports federation attach more importance to the World Championships and not all federations attach importance to the Asian Games.<sup>29</sup>

The explanation might read to the impartial as a defensive rationale. In sport, China was supreme in Asia. Absent Japanese athletics would not have significantly affected that supremacy!

Uchimura won six consecutive world titles including the World Championships held in Glasgow on the date of 30 October 2015. However, there was no mention of his winning in Glasgow in an article of *The Japan Times* next day. Although the article provided details of the gold medallist ('nine in total in World Championships and the sixth consecutive world title'), it was not at all jingoistic. It reported almost nonchalantly,

Uchimura remains a man apart. He is Japan's version of LeBron James, a superstar who is a fixture in commercials and in some ways a national treasure. It's a position Uchimura has become well aware of, one he's trying to pay forward as his unparalleled career reaches its peak.<sup>30</sup>

Other major newspaper adopted the same tone. *The Asahi Shimbun* simply reported the modest comments made by Uchimura-himself, 'happy to perform at the Olympics three times as I was nominated for Rio as a result'.<sup>31</sup>

The fact of the matter is that post-war Japanese media reporting of Japanese performances is very different from the pre-war media reporting and the 'fevered' reporting of the Chinese media. The former is low-key, modest and restrained. Perhaps this is a useful model for other East Asian nations as they establish an impressive East Asian profile in regional and world sport: perhaps Japan is making a virtue out of a necessity!

## ANTI-JAPANESE SENTIMENT AND JAPANESE 'INDIFFERENTISM'

Chinese hostility to modern Japan is well documented<sup>32</sup>:

Although foreign colonial powers had invaded China in the mid-19<sup>th</sup> century and the Eight-Nations Alliance's forces even took over the capital of the Qing Empire in 1900, none of these incidents compared with the actions of the Japanese invasion of China between 1931 and 1945.<sup>33</sup>

Hatred was immediate and reflected immediately in sport!

The invasion of Manchuria by Imperial Japan in September 1931 and the Japanese invasion of Shanghai in January 1932 made the Chinese 5<sup>th</sup> National Games a highly patriotic event... At the opening procession, when the athletes from Japanese-occupied Manchuria entered the stadium... Many of the spectators were deeply moved and burst into tears. They shouted: 'Restore the Northeast! Recover Our Lost Territories! Fight against the Japanese! Save China!'<sup>34</sup>

A 'patriotic hunger for Olympic glory' intensified as the Games approached and caused the government in Beijing to worry about outbreaks of violence, were Chinese athletes to falter - or the nation's most despised adversaries, the Japanese, to triumph - in the competition for medals.<sup>35</sup>

Hostility to Japan has not abated to this day.

Unquestionably, antipathy towards Japan has solid foundations in recent history. In the history of the two nations hostility, however, is not the whole picture. China as a nation was initially not hostile to Japan for this reason:

...the notion of nation state and nationalism were still ambiguous in China at the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century... [then] Liang Qichao (1873-1929), one of the most renowned reformists of that period, argued that it was nationalism that had made Europe strong since the 16<sup>th</sup> century. He believed that a lack of collectivism was one of the most significant reasons for China's failure and that the ideas of nation state and nationalism that had come from the West could be applied to enhance social cohesion and make China powerful'.<sup>36</sup>

As intense nationalism evolved in East Asia so did intense national rivalries. The ever heightened hostility between the two countries can be traced back to China's defeat in the Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895). However, the need to adapt their moral values and modernize their intellectual ideas through the assimilation of western concepts was common to both countries. In China Yan Fu, a well-known period Chinese reformist introduced Charles Darwin's theory of 'natural selection' linked to sport.

...the power of a nation state is based on people's physical strength. Sport is a crucial way to 'preserve the nation' and 'preserve the race'. To improve people's physical strength, enlighten their intelligence and promote their morality are the three urgent tasks for China'.<sup>37</sup> Arinori Mori (1847–1889), a Japanese statesman and reformist echoed the same messages as Fu. In 1885, on his induction as Minister of Education, Mori declared that martial gymnastics (*heishikitaisō*) should be mandatory 'in order to foster human beings who embrace the three elements of "obedience", "friendship" and "dignity"'. He used the general term, 'martial gymnastics' but stressed that aspect which contributed to education for character as well as the requirement to improve Japanese physical robustness to a level comparable with western powers.<sup>38</sup>

However, reform policies in China and Japan diverged in four phases. The first phase occurred after the First Sino-Japanese War and the historical image of Japan as the enemy began to take shape in Chinese nationalism. The second phase was the period 'when, in 1915, Japan urged the Chinese government to accept its Twenty-One Demands' and it sparked huge public anger in China and gave rise to considerable anti-imperialist feeling. The third phase was occasioned by the Chinese government's weak response to the Treaty of Versailles of April 1919 which awarded German rights in Shandong Province (China) to Japan and the fourth phase was after the Second Sino-Japanese War.<sup>39</sup> Thus, anti-Japanese sentiment became an enduring nationalist phenomenon. It also characterized Korea after the enforced union with Japan in 1910. Chinese resentment was increased explosively, of course, by Japanese actions in China in the third and fourth decades of the twentieth century.

After the Second World War Japanese sport played a role in national recovery from devastated national pride largely through the 1964 Tokyo Olympiad. It convinced the Japanese that national recovery was

illustrated by economic growth, and advanced by the expansion of infrastructure such as opening the railway to Shinkansen (bullet train), the Metropolitan highways and gold medals for Japan. These were perceived as symbols of national renewal and a modernized reconnection with the world nations after the Second World War. However, the joint hosting of FIFA 2002 was a lost opportunity for post-war regional reconciliation. As is well-known, the first FIFA World Cup held in Asia, the 2002 17th staging of the FIFA World Cup was curiously organized by South Korea and Japan. It is claimed that the bid was tainted by doubtful lobbying and suspicious slush money. The conception of 'joint hosting' also involved the unrealistic concept of the event organized by both North and South Korea. However, the planned 'embroidery of peace' was unravelled, indeed pulled apart by the global soccer business. The President of FIFA, João Havelange, had originally favoured the idea of Japan as host. A South Korean deputy, Mong-Joon Chung, Honourary Vice President of FIFA, the sixth son of a founder of Hyundai, the second-largest South Korean conglomerate, lobbied parties interested in the soccer market business in Asia and with oil money. He also played a 'conscience card'. He raised the issue of the Japanese Invasion of Korea and used it to argue that 'our split nation originally resulted from the Japanese invasion. Therefore, Japan should withdraw the idea of hosting this time'. He was economical with the truth. He failed to mention that the separation was caused in reality by the Cold War. However, AFC (the Asian Football Confederation) and CAF (the African Football Confederation) were already allied with the soccer business in Asia. The FIFA President, Havelange now revealed resentment towards the Korean lobbying and, to counter it, he suggested in turn, that the Japanese Football Association should add Hiroshima to the cities holding the events. He argued, 'my demand is to attach the image of A-bombed Hiroshima recovered from the ruins, to the bid for World Cup'. UEFA did not approve of the power invoked by President of FIFA and merged the both ideas. In addition, the President of IOC, Juan Antonio Samaranch, intervened and eventually arranged for a 'joint hosting'.<sup>40</sup>

Some players welcomed the joint hosting. The famous Korean footballer, Jung-yoon Noh who had decided to play at Sanfrece Hiroshima FC in the Japan Professional Football League established in 1993, welcomed it in a book entitled *The Theory of Japanese and Korean Soccer Culture*. In the preface, Noh stated that,

I'm proud of being a Korean and I like Japan so much. Therefore I dedicate this book to both the Koreans including Koreans living in Japan, all Japanese friends and all fans of soccer.<sup>41</sup>

For Noh, there was no national boundaries in soccer. He confessed that he simply chose to play soccer in a more attractive circumstance in Japan where he could play together with Gary Lineker from England, Pierre Littbarski from Germany, Ramón Díaz and David Bisconti from Argentina (all had already decided to play in clubs in the J-league).<sup>42</sup> He also emphasized that the joint hosting was a great idea, 'now both Japan and Korea existed at the centre of the soccer world in Asia. Our rivalries will work as to advantage in both countries and contribute to Asia's greatness'.<sup>43</sup>

What was the impact of this event in Japan? A Japanese sociologist, Yoshitaka Mōri, who analyzed the event, concluded that 'although the TV media coverage ratings were beyond 60 percentage (they) mainly focused on the context of each match, the most part of Japanese intellectuals were silent on socio-cultural aspects such as nationalism'.<sup>44</sup> The Japanese political gaze remained averted.

### JAPANESE ISOLATIONISM: RARE REGIONAL RECONCILIATION

There are *rare* instances of reconciliation demonstrated and discussed in East Asian countries. On 8 November 2014, both the Chinese and Japanese media reported the tragic accident involving the famous Japanese figure-skater, Yuzuru Hanyu and the famous Chinese figure-skater, Han Yan who collided in practice just before one of the most important international skating competitions, the 'Grand prix series'. *The Huffington Post*, linked to the Japanese *Asahi Shimbun*, reported,

An ice skating competition turned brutal and bloody – even before it began. Two figure skaters collided during warm-ups at the Lexus Cup of China in Shanghai on Saturday, falling dazed to the ice. Yuzuru Hanyu of Japan and Han Yan of China did not see the other coming as they slammed into each other... When Hanyu finally got to his feet, blood could be seen dripping down his neck from a nasty cut on his chin as spectators cover their mouths in shock... But both skaters did manage to complete their skate afterward, according to outlets. Hanyu, the reigning

Olympic and world champion, finished second overall despite several falls. He could be seen sobbing afterward... Han finished sixth.<sup>45</sup>

The Chinese Central Television (CCTV) considered the behaviour of the Japanese figure-skater, Hanyu, admirable and reported that people were much impressed by his professional attitude and concerned about his injury. Many Chinese fans of Hanyu uploaded their views on the internet to state that they were concerned about his injury (Twitter).<sup>46</sup>

Another example of engagement rather than disengagement, is provided by the newspapers in Hong Kong (香港經濟日報: hket.com). They reported on 25 September 2014 that in Incheon, Korea where the 2014 Asian Games was held, the Chinese swimmer, Sun Yang had remarked that ‘the Japanese national anthem brings offensive noise to my ears’ after he won a gold medal in 400 metre relay, on 24 September.<sup>47</sup> The Japanese gold medallists, Kōsuke Ogino (4 gold medals and MVP) and Ryōsuke Irie (2 gold medals) were asked for comments on Sun’s remark by the French press, *AFP*. Irie defended Sun’s comments by saying that,

I can’t say anything as I am not informed directly by him, but I’m in good contact with him and we sometimes encourage each other. I feel, his message was wrongly reported.<sup>48</sup>

Ogino remarked, ‘I feel the same way as Irie. I don’t know the process at all... each person is just emulating individually’. Their comments were also conveyed to Sung. The Chinese media, Tencent Sports (騰訊體育) reported that ‘Irie and Ogino had commented very softly’ (on 25 September). Sung apologized, and said, ‘What I have said was mistakenly understood. I just wanted to say, all athletes wish to hear their own national anthem’.<sup>49</sup>

These are small waves of reconciliation submerged by larger waves of resentment but do they offer hope for the future?

## CONCLUSION: A JAPANESE PERSPECTIVE ON THE FUTURE

Japanese aggression in Asia has created a lasting legacy of anti-Japanese resentment. Western aggression was also a feature of Asian history. Nevertheless, resentment towards Japan is of a special order. Such fierce hostility is in part the outcome of a belief that the Japanese are thought of as fellow Asians. But it must also be acknowledged that resentment



is the result of a most brutal imperialism. It must also never be overlooked, of course, that the Japanese established links with *both* East and West in the past. British ethical values, for example, were considered to give the British Empire an imperial edge, and in consequence, as is made clear in the Prologue, the ideology of Athleticism, received as a source of this edge, influenced Japanese education in the period of imperial expansion. Emulation of western imperial practice was not well perceived in the region!

However, the past is the past. Idealism is a human impulse. East Asian now has the potential to use sport—a powerful political, cultural and social component of the modern era—to heal old wounds, repair old relationships and establish positive regional links in the future. Perhaps, Tokyo 2020 has a special regional significance. Guangzhou 2010 could be an early template. Asia, especially East Asia is *rising*, the outcome, it has been observed is,

...nothing less than revitalisation and reassertion of Eastern cultural tradition reflecting in turn a cosmological confidence. This turns recent history on its head reflecting a changing world order. Old Eastern philosophies are revisited and revived. Metaphor is repossessed: ‘Most of our expressions are metaphorical. The philosophy of our forefather is hidden in them.’<sup>50</sup>

To what extent is this metamorphosis fully appreciated or understood in the West?

It has been further observed,

Guangzhou 2010 contributed to the mesmerising marketing of modern China but *not* in an emulative Western idiom: The Games promoted Eastern sports, cultures and traditions in a way that the Olympic Games under the aegis of the International Olympic Committee would never permit. Thus not only was ‘Glittering Guangzhou’ a Statement of Cultural Modernity, it was also a Declaration of Cultural Tradition: an analogy for a newly confident and assertive East Asia secure in its own image.<sup>51</sup>

And, it should be added,

...propelled forward with astounding velocity by a newly confident and assertive China secure in its own image. Guangzhou was an analogy of East Asian identity – recovery. It was also an analogy for an East Asian and Chinese accommodation of change, assertion of change, promotion

of change and triumph over change. But it was more for China and the Chinese: a manifestation of change leaping out of a historic legacy: actualisation grounded in history. History is always 'political but nowhere more so than in China'. Sport in modern China is also invariably political, and not simply sport!<sup>52</sup>

Japan, historically and geographically, is part of Asia. However, USA policy has continuously influenced Asian relations both before and after wars. 'Indifferentism' towards Asia a product of post 1945 USA policy, was a one of the most significant policies implemented by the Americans during the period of the occupation. This made the Japanese nation quite different from the other East Asian nations. Nevertheless, now there is the potential for change in the post-occupation period, for re-assimilation, reconciliation and re-integration into the region.

Although studies of the Asian Games from individual athletes' point of views have been scarcely explored, individual sports organizations, on occasion, in recent years, have suggested that sport should be for peace and goodwill, and not for national status, prestige or glory.<sup>53</sup> It is, of course, wise to be wary of the orthodox pieties of organizations as recent disclosures concerning FIFA, which had an internationally promoted policy of 'Fair Play' preached around the globe! And then there are the more recent disclosures revealing corrupt practices on a massive scale of the IAAF!

Arguably, 'civil diplomacy' is improving East Asian relations via sport.<sup>54</sup> Will the hopes of idealistic athletes for personal expression and improved personal relations be part of the future? A 'genuine love for sport' and 'respect of fair play' has been a feature, albeit rare, of past East Asian Games. Will this be a noticeable feature of Tokyo 2020? A cautionary comment: national governments, sports organizations and chauvinistic publics wield the power in the modern sport.

However, a far more significant question is to be asked. Will Japan use Tokyo 2020 as a means of reaching out to its geopolitically and politically ascending neighbours, to seek reconciliation through the medium of Olympic idealism, to advance a unified regional consolidation? East Asia is rich in geopolitical and political prospects. These are caught perfectly in this concise title (and the tightly argued content) of a recent book, *Pacific: the Ocean of the Future*.<sup>55</sup>

At the same time, possibilities of a different order are caught with almost equal perfection on this concise statement, '...the Pacific Rim

remains the world's most dangerous fault-line. The South China Sea is on a hair trigger'.<sup>56</sup>

The lieutenant-governor of Tokyo remarked recently with regard to Tokyo 2020 that Japan needs the power of a dream. Tokyo hopes to use the Olympics to provide dreams for young generations of Japanese whose dreams had been deflated by decades of the economic slump.<sup>57</sup> Another opportunity lost! Perhaps he should have added that East Asia needed the power of a present dream to lay to rest a past regional nightmare so as to further future regional dreams of reconciliation, and he might have added that Japan needs to look outward not inward when dreaming and embrace the youth of East Asia at Tokyo 2020 to advance the long-term harmony of the region.

Promise of conciliation beyond sport? Is there hope for future understanding between China and Japan in the fact an ever increasing numbers of Chinese tourists visit Japan annually including large numbers of the better-educated? It is anticipated that some 10% of Chinese will in due course have had the first-hand experience of Japan and it has been stated with brave optimism, that 'could well spread the word about a peaceful and sophisticated society from which there is much to learn',<sup>58</sup> and thus 'the bones of contention are going to simply disappear'.<sup>59</sup> Is this desperate clutching at straws and a naïve demonstration of facile Micawberism? Is it a prophetic insight into the future?

Can sport with its long tentacles and powerful suckers packed with putative emotional, cultural and political cohesive content help bind a fractured ascendant region into a healed and harmonious emotional, cultural and political 'New East Asia', and assist its peaceful propulsion to the centre of the world stage? A tall order? Certainly. A hopeless dream? Probably.

## NOTES

1. There is a suggestion that Michizane Sugawara, who lived during A.D. 845 to A.D. 903, a famous scholar, excellent poet and politician at that time, used this idiom, 'Wakon-Kansai'. However, there is a possibility that the anecdote was inserted later at least after the Muromachi era (c1336–c1573). Even if so, the idiom expressed the state of cultural fusion in Sugawara's time. Sukehiro Hirakawa. *Keifu of Wakon-Yosai* [*Genealogy of Wakon-Yosai*]. (Tokyo: Kawade Bungei Sensho, 1976), 36.

2. W.G. Beasley, *The Rise of Modern Japan* (Tokyo: Charles E. Tuttle Company, 1990). Chapter 6. “‘Cultural Borrowing’, 1860-1912’, 84–101, in particular, 97–98.
3. This was encapsulated in the precepts of Athleticism- the nineteenth century educational, which came to dominate the educational preparation of the ‘Anglo-Saxon’ imperialist. See, in particular, J.A. Mangan, *Athleticism in the Victorian and Edwardian Public School: The Emergence and Consolidation of an Educational Ideology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), and the Cass reprint edition in 2002 which has a new introduction. See also, J.A. Mangan, *The Games Ethic and Imperialism: Aspects of the Diffusion of an Ideal* (Harmondsworth, New York, Ringwood, Markham, Auckland: Viking Penguin Books Ltd, 1986, reprinted by Cass in softback in 2002).
4. ‘Frontispiece’ in, *Taiiku-to-Kyogi* [*The Physical Education and Athletics*] Vol. 1, no. 1, edited by Japanese Imperial Society of Physical Education. (Tokyo, 1922); Yoshinori Futara, ‘The Prince Regency as a Sportsman’ in, *Taiiku-to-Kyogi* [*The Physical Education and Athletics*] Vol. 1, no. 1, edited by Japanese Imperial Society of Physical Education. (Tokyo, 1922), 2–4; Daishi Funaba and Keiko Ikeda, ‘Britain and the Development of Modern Japanese Sport: from Sporting Amateurism to Fascism during the period of Japanese Imperialism’, *Pan-Asian Journal of Sports & Physical Education* 3, no. 1 (March 2011), 9.
5. Funaba and Ikeda, op cit., 9–16; Giichi Masuda. *Seinen-shusse-kun*. (Tokyo; The Japanese Trade Company, 1925), 128–129.
6. Peter Alter, *Nationalism* (London, New York, Melbourne and Auckland: Edward Arnold, 1989 [1994, second edition]), 23.
7. Lu, Zhouxiang and Hong Fan, *Sport and Nationalism in China*. (New York and London: Routledge, 2014), 10.
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10. This point is developed more fully in the ‘Prologue’ of this book. See J.A. Mangan, ‘Prologue: Imperialism: Complexity, Circumstance, Confidence’, *passim*.
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24. David Pilling. *Bending Adversary: Japan and the Art of Survival*. (London: Allen Lane, 2014): 85.
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  26. Ibid., 105.
  27. Ibid., 108–120.
  28. Uchimura who had won silver in Beijing was not at his scintillating best but scored 92.690 to see off the challenge of German Marcel Nguyen for silver medal position with USA athlete Danell Leyva in bronze, just under two points off the lead. C.f. London 2012 News. ‘Uchimura Wins All-Around Gold - London 2012 – Gymnastics’. Olympic.org (Official Website of the Olympic Movement), August 1st, 2012 available at: <http://www.olympic.org/news/uchimura-wins-all-around-gold-london-2012-gymnastics/170440>, accessed 21 January 2016.
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  34. Ibid., 46.
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## APPENDIX: MORE LITERATURE ON JAPANESE IMPERIAL ATROCITIES

### Part One: Japanese Imperial Atrocities in China

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## Tokyo 2020: Opportunity for Regional Reconciliation or Protracted Antagonism?

*Sayuri Guthrie-Shimizu*

On September 7, 2013, President Jacques Rogge of the International Olympic Committee (IOC) solemnly opened ‘the envelope’ before the Congress of the international sport governing body assembled in Buenos Aires. Pulling out a card embossed with *TOKYO 2020*, the Belgian former Olympian and outgoing IOC chairman declared the city of Tokyo the winner of the three-way contest between the Japanese capital, Madrid, and Istanbul, for hosting the 2020 Olympic and Paralympic Games. At that moment, the delegation Tokyo sent halfway across the globe to make its final case for again hosting the Summer Olympics exploded in screaming raptures. Yuki Ota, a 2012 London Olympic fencing silver medalist and the final presenter for the Tokyo bidding team, howled into air, pumping his fists, as did his co-presenter, 2012 London Paralympian Mami Sato.

Tokyo Governor Naoki Inose, spewing victory howls of his own, embraced his comrades-in-arms in the trouble-filled bidding campaign, including former Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori and the Tokyo Bidding Committee’s chief delegate and IOC member Tsunekazu Takeda. Prime

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Minister Shinzo Abe, who had flown into Buenos Aires from the G-20 Summit in St. Petersburg in the aviation equivalent of a mad dash, was also amid Team Tokyo's tightly twined human chain of cascading tears, joyous shouting, jumping up and down, and otherwise convulsive expressions of glee and, perhaps, disbelief. The delegation bedecked with the nation's top political leader testified that it was a national project in every sense of the term, one with political significance extending far beyond the regenerative aspirations of the former Olympic city.<sup>1</sup>

Tokyo's success in the bidding for the 2020 Olympic and Paralympic Games was anything but a forgone conclusion. As of the IOC's site evaluation in the spring of 2013, even Tokyo's most sanguinely optimistic cheerleaders conceded that the city was tailing substantially behind its rivals. What was widely cited as Tokyo's biggest weakness was the public's anemic support, hovering around 50% of those polled by various organizations including the Japanese Olympic Committee (JOC). Critics of the Tokyo 2020 campaign contended that the city—or the nation for that matter—had no business undertaking such a money-draining enterprise as the modern-day Olympic Games. Was Japan not still reeling from the devastating March 11 earthquake and tsunami and the nuclear power plant meltdown resulting from the compounded natural disaster? Thus, that Tokyo bested runner-up Istanbul in the final round of vote by a comfortable margin of 60 to 36 came as a surprise to some of the most informed IOC insiders including Vice Chairman and one of the site inspectors, Sir Craig Reedie.<sup>2</sup>

Tokyo's come-from-behind victory in Buenos Aires was the culmination of a seven-year-long fractious public-private partnership to reprise the glory of the 1964 Olympic moments. At the forceful initiative of then Governor Shintaro Ishihara, the Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly voted in March 2006 to put the city's name forward as a candidate for the 2016 Olympics host city. After besting its domestic rival Fukuoka, Tokyo launched into a campaign, the third Olympic bid in 70 years, for hosting the Summer Olympics in tandem with the Japanese government fast embracing elite-level sports as a policy instrument for projecting national prestige.<sup>3</sup>

The Tokyo 2016 campaign initiated by Governor Ishihara should also be situated along East Asia's longer historical pathway. Originally, an institution of the Euro-American White Men's world, the Olympics became closely associated in East Asia with attainment of Western-style modernity. As such hosting the Olympics became synonymous with the

Asian nation's modernization and ascent in international standing. In 1964, Tokyo proved to the still skeptical world that it had reinvented itself into a peace-loving nation that had not only overcome the wartime destruction but also the ignominy of its militarist past. The 1988 Seoul Olympics gave South Korea a platform for showcasing its recent industrial progress fueled by the 'Miracle of the Hun River' and political transition to liberal democracy. The glitzy spectacles overflowing from the Beijing Olympics impressed upon the entire world China's newly attained superpower status rivaling the USA and certainly eclipsing Japan.<sup>4</sup>

Given this symbolic *and* symbiotic connection in Asia's regional politics between playing host to the Olympics and the projection of national power and prestige, the blow dealt by the unsuccessful Olympic bids by the two Japanese cities was all the more bruising to Japan. At the 1981 IOC General Assembly in Baden-Baden, Japan's third largest city Nagoya lost out to dark-horse Seoul despite its bidding team's pre-announcement hubris that the 1988 Games were theirs to lose. In 2001, the city of Osaka was eliminated in the first round of vote at the IOC Congress in Moscow with a scant six ballots cast in their favor. The sting of the humiliation that the second largest Japanese city was at the bottom of the heap further intensified when the IOC went on and awarded the 2008 Games to, of all rival cities, Beijing.<sup>5</sup>

The Olympic bid Tokyo launched in 2006 was thus Japan's 'third time the charm' attempt to replicate the Olympic-fueled splendor and to generate hope for a brighter future for the stagnant nation mired in economic doldrums lasting almost two decades. But Japan's Olympic enthusiasts were in for yet another humiliation. At the 2009 IOC meeting in Copenhagen, the IOC anointed Rio de Janeiro as the city to host the 2016 Games with Tokyo coming in as a distant third.

The unmitigated failure of the Tokyo 2016 campaign could not help but create an identity crisis of the most existential kind in the minds of Japanese sports administrators and government officials, keenly aware as they were becoming of the effectiveness of robust elite sports and the Olympic Games as a mechanism for yielding 'soft power' as exemplified by the recent South Korean and Chinese examples. Jacques Rogge's victory announcement in Buenos Aires in September 2013 thus represented the vindication not simply of Tokyo's six-year-long Olympic recruiting efforts; it was also the consummation of Japan's 32-year-long unrequited



courting of the Summer Olympics and a place in the sun in regional politics the Games might confer to the nation on the slow decline.

### JAPAN'S IMPERIAL IDENTITY AND THE MODERN OLYMPIC MOVEMENT

That Japan pinned its national identity to an inordinate degree on its place within the Olympic Movement is nothing new. As Ko Takashima's recent work on Japan's imperial sportive has demonstrated, sports became deeply embedded in Japan's military mobilization both at home and abroad before World War II.<sup>6</sup> In a separate yet interconnected historical arc, Japan's ascent as an imperial nation-state in international relations and the rise and diffusion of the modern Olympic movement shared a conjoined developmental trajectory in the first half of the twentieth century.

After winning the 1894–1895 War with China as a debutant in the game of high imperialism, Japan narrowly triumphed over Russia in the 1904–1905 War as the first non-White country to defeat a European empire. With the acquisition of colonies (Taiwan and Korea) under its belt, by the 1910s Japan began unabashedly to articulate a self-identify in world politics as 'the first-class (*ittokoku*)', or 'civilized (*bunmeikoku*)' nation that had achieved rough parity with Euro-American imperial powers.<sup>7</sup>

Japan's newly elevated status as a member of the world's imperialist club was symbolically mapped onto the international sportscape in 1912. Japan became the first country in Asia to participate in the Olympics, still very much a Europe-centered athletic platform. It sent two runners, sprinter Yahiko Mishima and marathon runner Shizo Kanaguri, to Stockholm to compete in the fifth Olympic Games. The head of the pint-sized national team was Jigoro Kano, the first Asian handpicked by Baron Pierre de Coubertin to become a member of the then-White-only IOC. Kano, the father of Judo as a modern sport, also became the inaugural head of the Japan Athletic Association (which would be reorganized and renamed the Japan Olympic Committee). As Japan's athletic-officer-in-chief, Kano would thereafter spearhead his country's self-assigned mission to serve as an apostle of Olympism outside the Euro-American white man's world until his death in 1938.<sup>8</sup>

Japanese athletes began winning Olympic medals in the 1920s, starting with Silver Medals in singles and doubles tennis unexpectedly won at the Antwerp Olympics by Kazuya Kumagai and Seiichiro Kashio, both businessmen living in New York at the time. The Japanese government did not shy away from trumpeting its overseas expatriates' surprising feats in the Western world of sports as evidence of the nation's credentials to 'lead' still benighted Asia. When Japanese triple jumper Mikio Oda and swimmer Yoshiyuki Tsuruta became the first Asians to win a Gold Medal at the 1924 Amsterdam Olympics, the Japanese, both in government and outside, touted their historic achievements, this time by student athletes training in Japan, as further validating their nation's claim of rightful leadership in Asia as the only 'first-rate' and 'civilized' nation in the region.<sup>9</sup>

Japan similarly enacted its imperial and civilizational pretensions at Asia's multination athletic meets, the Far Eastern Games. This venue of regional multi-event competition among the American colony of the Philippines, China, and Japan opened in 1913 under the leadership of American YMCA athletic director stationed in Manila, Elwood S. Brown.<sup>10</sup> The multi-event games took place biennially and the site rotated among the three Asian nations to form a regular competitive structure eventually sanctioned by the IOC as a subunit operating under its governing umbrella.

This regional sporting enterprise was short-lived, however. An irresolvable dispute between Japan and China over proposed participation by Japan's puppet state Manchukuo arose, forcing the tripartite sporting circuitry to go into abeyance in 1934. The collapse of the Far Eastern Games over the Manchukuo question foreshadowed how the crescendo of Japan's imperial expansion in Asia would impinge directly on international sport competitions. The premature death of the Far Eastern Games was one of the first casualties of Japanese colonial aggression that resumed with the Manchurian Incident and culminated in World War II.<sup>11</sup>

As Japan's militarist proclivities accelerated throughout the 1930s, the internal contradictions of its existence as an imperial nation-state were inadvertently exposed through the refractive lens of sports. At the Olympics and the Far Eastern Games, Japan's 'national' team inevitably included among its ranks athletes hailing from its colonial possessions, Taiwan and Korea. These Japanese colonial subjects were recruited with varying degrees of alacrity or resignation to demonstrate their athletic

pro prowess on the international arena. They were there to showcase Japan's imperial splendor and legitimacy of its claim of civilizational mission in Asia.

The drafting of colonial athletes for Japan's imperial muscle flexing reached its apogee in 1936, a year before the outbreak of the second Sino-Japanese War. A total of ten Korean nationals competed as athletes representing Japan in the Winter Olympic Games in Garmisch-Partenkirchen and the Summer Games in Berlin. Kim Yong Sik, a member of the Japanese national soccer team, was instrumental to Japan's utterly unexpected first-round 3–2 victory over Gold Medal favorite Sweden, a stunning upset valorized as the 'Miracle in Berlin' in the European and Japanese press.<sup>12</sup>

The irony and double-edged nature of the Japanese imperium scoring athletic points through the brawn of its colonial subjects instantiated in the intra-colonial showdown involving Korean marathon runner Soon Kee-chung. Soon and his Korean teammate Nam Sung-ying finished first and third at the Berlin Olympics, but they famously cast their eyes downward as the Japanese national flag rose on the flagpole to the tune of Japan's national anthem at the medal ceremony. The act of Korean anti-colonial disobedience was not contained to the medal podium in Berlin. In Seoul, the vernacular newspaper *Dong-a Ilbo* reported their native sons' Olympic accomplishments with a front-page picture of Soon on the medal stand, with the Japanese flag on his uniform blacked out. The Japanese colonial government in Korea immediately shut down the daily and brutally punished those responsible for this daring editorial intervention.<sup>13</sup>

The resumption of military aggression in China in July 1937 created a need for Japan to prioritize domestic resource allocation to favor military mobilization. This imperative forced Japan a year into the war with China to abandon its plans of hosting the Olympics, Asia's first, in its 'imperial capital (*teito*)'. The relinquishment of the hard-won right to host the 1940 Olympics dealt a devastating blow to the Japanese in government and the private sector alike, particularly because the event was planned as part of the yearlong celebration of the mythical 2600th year of the Japanese imperial lineage.<sup>14</sup>

Yet the foregoing of the Olympic dream did not keep Japan from coming up with a pale imitation of the coveted Olympic Games: a multinational athletic meet which the increasingly isolated empire fancied to be of, for, and by 'East Asian' athletes in the emerging regional order

crafted with the iron fist of Japanese militarism. The brainchild of Japan's hard-wired obsession with staging imperial sportive pageantry was the 1940 East Asian Games. Roughly, 2000 athletes from what the Japanese imperial state labeled 'New East Asia' competed in three locations (Tokyo, the Nara-Kobe corridor, and the Manchurian capital of Hsinking) between June and August.<sup>15</sup>

The 'allied friendly neighbors' that participated in this substitute for the aborted 1940 Tokyo Olympics included Wang Zhaoming's collaborationist Chinese government based in Nanking, Outer Mongolia, the Manchukuo, the Philippines (which sent a team mostly constituted of Japanese expatriate athletes), and the Japanese American community in Hawaii. The gerrymandered geography of the participant base spoke volumes about the outer limits of Japan's imperial influences as much as it foreshadowed the leading edges of Japan's impending military aggressions. With the beleaguered Asian empire finally descending into the abyss of all-out war with the Allied Powers by December 1941, the East Asian Games turned out to be the last hurrah of Japan's imperial sportive.

### ROAD TO THE 1964 TOKYO OLYMPICS

Japan's imperial venture came to an ignominious end in August 1945 but that meant, among other things, the germination of Japan's athletic revanchism aimed at reclaiming theaters of operation and bailiwicks in the postwar world order. Sport and its role in the nation's postwar reconstruction were among the policy questions debated at the first session of the Japanese Diet held under the postwar pacifist Constitution. In 1947, a bipartisan national parliamentarians' caucus was formed to promote 'Democratic Sport' in ways appropriate for a New Japan in the world being reshaped under US hegemony.<sup>16</sup>

Japanese sports officials and top athletes who had survived the war hoped against hope that their vanquished nation would be granted an immediate return to international athletic competition. That prize, however, remained elusive while Japan remained under Allied military occupation. Neither was the aggrieved world ready to readmit Japan into the field of peaceful competition so soon. When London hosted the first postwar Olympics in 1948, its organizing committee refused to send an invitation to Britain's erstwhile enemy. Thus, Japan had to sit on the sidelines watching wistfully its former colony Korea participate in the

revived games of international peace and friendship even before the legal status of Korea's national government was formalized in the postwar political transition.<sup>17</sup>

A chagrined Japan's drive to reclaim its lost ground in the international sporting arena went into full gear as soon as the Allied occupation ended in 1952. Two months after Japan formally regained sovereignty, it was allowed to return to the Olympic movement, facilitated by forceful intercession of Avery Brundage, the IOC's first American President and a friend of the former Allied Supreme Commander for Allied Forces in occupied Japan, Douglas MacArthur.<sup>18</sup> Within weeks of reinstatement in the IOC, Japanese sports administrators and the city of Tokyo set up an Olympic bidding committee eyeing 1960. Tokyo's hasty gambit was endorsed in the following year in a national parliamentary resolution.

The Japanese government meant business. In 1954, the House of Representative approved appropriations in the national general budget for the construction of the National Track and Field Stadium with a view to readying Tokyo to bid for the 1960 Olympics. By then, the Japanese economy had pulled through the postwar reconstruction and entered a period of sustained growth thanks in large part to a robust economic boom primed, ironically, by the war on the nearby Korean Peninsula. The Japanese government had just released its Economic White Paper that proudly announced 'we are no longer in the "postwar period"'.<sup>19</sup> Now, what better ways to impress upon the world that Japan had been rebuilt and reformed into a peace-loving nation than to host the Olympic Games, a symbol of peace and international friendship?

Tokyo was in for an ego-shattering rebuff. At the IOC meeting in Paris in 1955, only four IOC members voted for Tokyo and the honor of hosting the 1960 Games went to Rome, the capital of another former Axis power, no less. Yet giving up was not an option for the Olympic-obsessed Japanese. Within a few months of the crushing defeat at the IOC Paris meeting, the Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly unanimously voted to reset its sight for the 1964 Games.<sup>20</sup>

In this retry, Japan found a stalwart ally in IOC President Brundage. As one of the three American IOC members before World War II, Brundage had famously supported Tokyo's 1940 Olympic bid. An avid collector of the classic Asian arts, he had also visited prewar Japan and was deeply impressed with its culture and the stoic martial spirit permeating the society. Brundage engineered a decision by the IOC to choose Tokyo as the site for its 1958 Congress, affording the city a golden

opportunity to win over the unconverted skeptics within the organization still ossified with Eurocentrism and white supremacy. The Tokyo 1964 bidding team enlisted the full authority of the Japanese government to prepare for the occasion by inviting Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi (a former member of the prewar cabinet of Prime Minister Hideki Tojo and a recently depurged war criminal) to become its executive director.<sup>21</sup>

When IOC members arrived in Tokyo in May 1958, they found a city in rapid motion with a just completed national track and field stadium hosting the Third Asian Games. The visiting IOC dignitaries were ushered to see for themselves how Tokyo, and the Japanese government throwing its weight and prestige behind it, possessed the capacity and resources to organize and execute a complex multi-event sporting event. By hosting this postwar reincarnation of the Far Eastern Games, Japan also sought to enact for the IOC that the nation was now an integral part of decolonizing Asia and its regional solidarity. The construction of brand new metropolitan highways was progressing apace and the city's subway system was also undergoing massive expansion.<sup>22</sup> Clearly, Tokyo's strategy worked. At the IOC Congress held next year in Munich, the city garnered a majority 34 votes in the first vote, besting veritable Western contenders such as Detroit, Brussels, and Vienna. At long last, Tokyo was poised to live out its Olympic dream.

With the total budget of approximately 961 billion yen, supplemented by an over 20 billion yen earmarked for athlete training, the 1964 Tokyo Olympic Games were a monumental national project in every sense of the term. The lasting impact of this enterprise is still visible in Tokyo's cityscape and the fabrics of Japanese society. It was in 1964 that the world-famous high-speed 'bullet train' (*Shinkansen*) began operating, revolutionizing the nation's long distance transportation system. Tokyo's perennially congested Metropolitan Highway Network (*Shutokosoku Doro*), widely deplored for its blatant disregard of historic site preservation, was another reminder of how the city tried to accommodate a massive increase in automotive traffic during the 1964 Olympics. Tokyo's major athletic facilities such as the two sports arenas in Yoyogi and a multipurpose gymnasium in Komazawa are also the aging infrastructural legacies of the 1964 Games.

On the more intangible level, the respectable performances of Japanese Olympians in 1964 spurred the creation of youth athletic clubs and popularization of mass recreational sports across the country

now well on the way to economic superpower status. The 1961 Sports Promotion Law, a national legislative response to the upcoming Olympic Games, provided for the legal basis for government involvement in things athletic. In a clear repudiation of the way the prewar militarist state enslaved the nation's physical culture to its colonial ambitions, the law in its preamble explicitly forbade the state from forcing citizens to engage in athletic activities for purposes other than 'healthful fulfillment of individual personhood' and 'enjoyment of sports and recreations'. This 1961 law would remain Japan's enabling legislation for the next half century as far as state involvement in sports promotion was concerned.<sup>23</sup>

### ROAD TO THE TOKYO OLYMPICS REDUX

One of the overarching themes the 1964 Tokyo Olympics trumpeted for audiences at home and abroad was Japan's regeneration as a peace-loving and democratic society. Reconciliation following WW II was another. In more than an uncanny coincidence, 'Regeneration' and 'Reconstruction' were again foregrounded as the main slogans of the Tokyo 2020 campaign. The question then becomes, what is Japan going to regenerate and reconstruct itself into this time?

The answer to this question was self-evident to those Japanese eagerly jumping on the Olympic bandwagon as far as the 'Regeneration' part was concerned. In 2006, when the Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly voted to enter the race for the 2016 Games, Governor Ishihara explained that he wanted to bring the Olympics back to the city 'to restore a sense of vigor among the Japanese people and to help boost their confidence by projecting power in the international arena'. And yet this unabashedly revanchist manifesto failed to inspire the majority of Tokyo citizenry to rally behind the governor's banner. When Tokyo lost out to Rio de Janeiro, what was widely regarded as the most fundamental weakness of its candidacy was the lack of a clear popular mandate as evidenced by the low levels of local support (roughly 40%) and the absence of a compelling vision articulating 'why Tokyo again?'.<sup>24</sup>

Casting about for a new rationale around which to drum up public support, the regrouped Team Tokyo initially relied on a variant of Ishihara's original war cry: the regeneration of the sagging national spirit. Japan needed to overcome the widespread malaise and sense of hopelessness spawned by the prolonged recession and the resulting decline in its international status. Thus, among the public relations

slogans the bidding committee circulated in the early stages of the Tokyo 2020 campaign was ‘When Tokyo regenerates, so will Japan’. Yet this reworked slogan still proved insufficient to spark widespread enthusiasm among Tokyo citizenry.<sup>25</sup>

Then came a massive natural disaster that literally shook the entire archipelago. On March 11, 2011, a magnitude-9 earthquake hit north-eastern Japan (Tohoku) with deadly force, accompanied by all-sweeping tsunamis. The parallel disaster that befell the Fukushima nuclear power plants and the fear of ensuing radiation contamination consumed the nation of Japan for months, pushing any media talk of Tokyo’s Olympic bid to the back burner.

But determined Tokyo 2020 crusaders like Ishihara simply refused to let the national catastrophe get in the way. Ishihara got reelected a month after the Tohoku earthquake, and his first order of business was to renew his pledge to bring the Olympics back to the nation’s capital. The JOC was not far behind the doggedly determined Tokyo Governor. Scant three months after the Tohoku disasters, the JOC went ahead with its centennial celebration amid a public mood to refrain from festivities and gala events out of respect for the victims and still suffering. Chairman Rogge and twenty IOC members were at the top of the JOC’s guest list.<sup>26</sup> Ishihara chose to announce that Tokyo had just resubmitted its application for hosting the Olympics at the JOC centennial reception held with the IOC dignitaries as guests of honor.

Ishihara even tried to harness the tragedy that befell Tohoku to his renewed Olympic bid, arguing that what happened to Tohoku was all the more reason why Tokyo should forge ahead with its preexisting plans, so the Olympics would ‘give hope to the entire nation, but particularly to Tohoku’. ‘Assisting Tohoku’s reconstruction’—whatever that ‘assistance’ entailed in practical terms—subsequently emerged as a new thematic thread in the Tokyo 2020 campaign. The appearance of blatant opportunism outraged a sizable segment of Japanese citizenry and public support for Tokyo’s renewed bid remained anemic well into 2012, although some polls indicated popular enthusiasm enhanced by this marketing angle.

What gave a real boost to the Tokyo 2020 campaign was not the contrived link its promoters and boosters loudly touted between the reconstruction of the Tohoku region and the putative moral-raising effects of the Olympics. It was the Japanese government’s growing commitment to promoting elite-level sport as an instrument of statecraft. The



momentum for this new direction in national sport policy had been building since before the Tohoku earthquake. Sport historian Toshio Saeki has shown that the visions shaping Japanese government policy regarding sport remained fundamentally ‘diffusionist’, ‘distributive’, and in these sense ‘democratic’ for the four decades after the enactment of the 1961 Sports Promotion Law. Despite its evolving policy iterations and the Balkanization of jurisdiction among multiple national administrative entities, the underlying orientation remained constant: the idea was to disperse and equalize opportunities for and access to mass recreational sports.<sup>27</sup>

The signs of change appeared in 1999 with the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) initiating a study to formulate a comprehensive government mission statement about the sport and public policy in the new millennium. The policy study did not immediately yield visible results. The slumberous deliberation was suddenly animated after the 2004 Athens Olympics. There, Team Japan performed well beyond anyone’s expectations, winning a total of 37 medals of which sixteen were Gold. MEXT Vice Minister Toshiaki Endo, professing ‘a sense of crisis’ over the government’s fragmented and hands-off sport administration, set up a council of private advisers in 2006 to fundamentally reassess existing government policies regarding sport and athletics.<sup>28</sup>

In a report entitled ‘Sport Nation Nippon: Elite Sport as a National Strategy’, the privately appointed advisory group, constituted with former top athletes and parliamentarians concerned with sport administration, called for activist government policy in promoting world-class excellence in elite-level sports.<sup>29</sup> The widely publicized report urged the national government to identify, recruit, and train top athletes in manners equal to the world’s leading sports powers. China, South Korea, Britain, Germany, and Australia were among the nations specified as worthy of emulation. It also called on the government to aggressively seek opportunities to host high profile international sporting competitions such as the Olympics, the World Championships, and the World Cup to enhance national prestige.

The agenda-setting proposals sparked action in both the executive and legislative branches of the government. In July 2009, the ruling coalition (of the Liberal Democratic and the Clean Government Parties) acted on this report and submitted a draft Basic Law on Sport to the House of the Representatives. By then, the idea of creating a central government

agency dedicated to sport promotion had been floating among the policy-making circles and government involvement in the promotion of elite sport was gathering bipartisan support. Tokyo's failed Olympic bid and the humiliation that resulted from it only added to this political momentum unleashed after the highly satisfying Athens Olympics.

In August 2010, the MEXT rolled out its comprehensive sports strategy highlighting the importance of the Olympic medal count and hosting major international sporting events in Japan as a platform of government cultural diplomacy. In November, a bipartisan parliamentarians' group began drafting a comprehensive enabling legislation for such government-driven elite sport programs as outlined by the Sports Nation Japan report. The Sports Basic Law passed the Diet in June 2011 as the culmination of these conflating developments. The landmark legislation, superseding the 1961 Sports Promotion Law, defined sports as a 'fundamental right' of citizenry and provided for the establishment of a cabinet level agency charged with sports promotion and massive increases in government spending on sport.<sup>30</sup>

In truth, the 2011 Sports Basic Law ended up merely ratifying what had been underway in Japan's sports administration for several years. By the time the political momentum for updating the 1961 Sports Promotion Law began to build up within government circles, substantial public resources had already been poured into elite-level sports in tangible ways. The National Training Center (NTC) with top-of-the-line training facilities and support programs opened for use by the nation's top athletes in 2008 under the MEXT's jurisdiction. In terms of youth talent recruitment, the JOC's elite academy targeting young athletes in grades 7 through 12 was set up along with a national coaching academy for training and dispatching coaches to international competitions. The idea of employing elite sport as a tool for showcasing national superiority and fostering nationalist pride bears an eerie resemblance to the public discourse surrounding Japan's prewar mode of engagement with the Olympic movement. In that sense, Japan's sport policy has come a full circle, to its imperialist ideological roots.

The accelerating merger of activist government policy regarding elite sport and the use of Olympics as an instrument of cultural diplomacy was completed when Shinzo Abe inaugurated as Prime Minister in January 2013. Upon assuming premiership for a second time, Abe, never one to shy away from nationalistic rhetoric, expressed his forthright embrace of the Tokyo 2020 bid as a morale-boosting national project. Neither was

Abe bashful about expressing his personal and familial investment in the Olympics when he was appointed Supreme Advisor to the 2020 Tokyo Bid Committee. The premier drew parallels between his commitment to Tokyo's candidacy and work of his grandfather, Nobusuke Kishi, as Executive Director of the Tokyo 1964 bid committee.<sup>31</sup>

The embryonic form of the sport promotional state, gestated before the Beijing Olympics, was thus maturing quickly by the time Japanese athletes headed for the 2012 Olympics in London. Britain's spectacular ascent in the medal count at the Olympics held in its capital, widely ascribed to the government's new hands-on policy of subsidizing elite sports appeared to validate the new orientation of their government policy in the eyes of the sport-attuned Japanese public. The shift in Japanese popular perception was dramatized soon after the London Olympics where Japanese athletes won a total of thirty-eight medals. An astounding 500 thousand adoring fans showed up along the route for the Japanese Olympic medalists' victory parade sponsored by the JOC. The Tokyo 2020 Bidding Team's pitch adopted a few months before the London Olympics, 'Now, Japan needs the Power of Dream', visibly gained traction in the post-Olympics national revelry. By the time the IOC Evaluation Committee arrived in Tokyo in March 2013 for on-site appraisals, various polls indicated that public support for the Tokyo 2020 candidacy had passed the coveted 70% threshold.<sup>32</sup>

In an attempt to play up its exemplar Olympic citizenship, Team Tokyo highlighted Japan's contribution to advancing one of the IOC's key agendas in recent years: the promotion of women's sports. London Olympic medalists such as thrice-Gold Medalist wrestler Saori Yoshida and ping-pong team Silver Medalist Ai Fukuhara were foregrounded as welcome hostesses. The top Japanese female athletes showered the visiting IOC evaluators with brimming smiles and effusive hospitality. Their charm offensive was coupled with Team Tokyo's constant downplaying of pervasive concerns regarding the fallouts of the Fukushima nuclear power plant meltdown.<sup>33</sup>

That the nuclear disaster in northern Japan did not endanger Tokyo a good 300 kilometers away would become a constant refrain in the Tokyo 2020 campaign through the spring and summer of 2013. A month before the IOC Congress in Buenos Aires, another serious leak at the Fukushima nuclear power plant occurred. New Tokyo Metropolitan Governor Naoki Inose publicly vouched for Tokyo's 'absolute safety', the latest radiation contamination crisis up north notwithstanding.

Inose's categorical risk denial was echoed by Prime Minister Abe who trumpeted in Buenos Aires 'it's under control'. Team Tokyo was trying to have cake and eat it too: it had no qualms about using Fukushima's tragedy in its sales pitch while treating the widely feared fallouts of that very catastrophe as a skeleton to be hidden in the cupboard.

In the months leading up to the final reckoning in Buenos Aires, the Tokyo Bid Committee went full throttle trying to scrape up every available vote for its underdog candidacy. Among the challenges facing Team Tokyo were uncertainties surrounding 23 ballots to be cast by Asian IOC members. There, the Tokyo bidding team was extremely nervous about China's sway over this block of regional votes. Governor Inose at one point even considered visiting Beijing for the express purpose of courting its support for his city's candidacy and soliciting the votes of three Chinese IOC members.<sup>34</sup>

The greatest headache for Team Tokyo in garnering China's support was the ongoing territorial dispute over the Senkaku (Daiyou) Islands in the East China Sea. This sore in Sino-Japanese relations was the more pestilent for the fact that none other than former Tokyo Governor Ishihara was one of the protagonists in this unfolding drama. In April 2012, Ishihara announced before the Heritage Foundation, a conservative think tank in Washington DC, his intent to purchase with metropolitan government funds the disputed islands to reinforce Japan's sovereignty claim over them.<sup>35</sup>

Ishihara's gambit ultimately led to the Japanese government's purchase of the contested islands from their owner (a private citizen living in Tokyo) at 2 billion and 50 million yen in September 2012. The Chinese government predictably denounced the Japanese government's strategic real estate purchase as Japanese colonialism in a different guise. The Japanese action also sparked violent anti-Japanese demonstrations and boycott of Japanese goods across China, followed by Beijing's worldwide anti-Japan publicity campaign including a barrage of op-ed articles published in such high-profile foreign media outlets as the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post*.<sup>36</sup>

In soliciting votes by Asian IOC members against the backdrop of the China-Japan standoff over the disputed islands, Team Tokyo left no stone unturned, proving itself amply capable of transcending the ideological divide if politically expedient. Among the targets of its courtship was none other than North Korea, the neighboring nemesis and an IOC member nation with one vote to cast. Antonio Inoki, a former

professional wrestler-turned parliamentarian was enlisted in this electoral scavenger hunt. Because of his experience in heading professional wrestling tours of North Korea (done in defiance of government strictures against travel to the unrecognized communist state), Inoki was now considered Tokyo's valuable conduit to Pyongyang and its putatively sport-crazed dictator Kim Jung Won.<sup>37</sup>

Another ambassador in Tokyo's personal diplomacy was Yoshiyuki Tsutsumi, the kingpin of the successful 1998 Nagano Winter Olympics. He was invited to come on board in the final stage of Team Tokyo's bidding campaign. The idea was to tap the business tycoon's extensive personal contacts within the IOC: Tsutsumi had ingratiated himself with the then IOC President Juan Antonio Samaranch and his entourage by raising \$24 million for the construction of the Olympic Museum in Lausanne.<sup>38</sup> Whether such eleventh-hour personal lobbying paid off remains a matter of conjecture. What is certain is that Tokyo did get the 2020 Olympics and it did so much to the surprise of many including IOC insiders like Reddie and even members of the Bidding Team itself.

While Tokyo and the nation of Japan collectively basked in the afterglow of the sweet victory in Buenos Aires, responses from South Korea and China were tempered at best. China's state-run Central TV network and the Xinhua News Agency initially misreported, by mistake or not, that the IOC had picked Istanbul. The spokesman for the Chinese Foreign Ministry declined to answer a reporter's question whether the Chinese government would formally congratulate Tokyo. In an Internet survey, only 17% of Chinese polled the day after the IOC's decision welcomed the selection of Tokyo while roughly 50% found it 'deplorable'. Some South Koreans were chagrined for a different reason: that the 2020 Olympics in Tokyo effectively dashed the prospect of Pusan hosting the 2024 Summer Games.<sup>39</sup>

The ambivalence variously expressed by Japan's neighbors reflected their deep-seated sentiments towards their erstwhile colonial master/military aggressor. Overlaying these feelings were unresolved conflicts stemming from Japan's unatoned imperial past such as decades-long disputes over historical narrations in Japanese textbooks and redress for former Korean comfort women. That these two Asian neighbors were alarmed by the nationalistic and militaristic policy orientations of the new Abe government also played a part. Both South Korean and Chinese media expressed concern that Abe might ramp up his push for militarization and 'territorial aggrandizement' in the Sea of Japan and on the South

China Sea on the crest of enhanced popularity resulting from his success in bringing the Olympics to Tokyo.<sup>40</sup>

In light of the diplomatic jousting and nationalistic animosity that continues to define East Asia in the new millennium are the 2020 Tokyo Olympics doomed to become just another staging ground for these regional rivals to wage what George Orwell famously called ‘war minus the shooting’? In pondering this question, a statement issued immediately after the Buenos Aires meeting by the *Mindan*, the largest ethnic association of resident Koreans in Japan, was truly noteworthy. The organization congratulated Team Tokyo for its successful bid and pledged its support for the athletic mega-event that would take place in ‘the city many resident Koreans have come to call home’. In the lead-up to the IOC Congress, the *Mindan* had also quietly lobbied South Korean IOC members, sport officials, and parliamentarians to set aside their grievances against current Japanese government policies and support Tokyo’s candidacy arguing, ‘that will be beneficial to Asia as a whole’.<sup>41</sup>

The Korean diasporic community in Japan has a history of playing a unique bridging role along the entwined pathways of the Olympic Movement and Japanese imperialism. In the summer of 1948, the newly established Republic of Korea sent sixty-seven athletes to the first post-WW II Olympics. The cost of sending this sizable national team to far-off London was prohibitive for the infant postcolonial country. This financially burdensome athletic expedition would not have been possible without donations made by Korean residents in Japan, those who chose not to repatriate to the Korean Peninsula after its liberation from Japanese colonial rule for a variety of reasons.

These Koreans’ decision to remain and continue to live in the former imperial metropole after the war did not keep them from rooting for their home team—and in a way that counted most to the athletes who competed for their impoverished but now proudly independent nation. It took those people whose lived realities transcended the politically drawn boundaries of the nation-state to demonstrate that the Olympics, though organized by the principle of national representation, did not have to be a reason or occasion for reifying the nation-state as the only legitimate (and possible) mode of human belonging and reservoir of allegiance.

## CONCLUSION: A DIFFERENT AND BETTER WAY OF LEADING EAST ASIA?

Hosting the Summer Olympics for the second time—and at the seventy-five year anniversary of the demise of the Japanese Empire—will present both an opportunity and a challenge to Tokyo as a city and Japan as a nation. So far the Japanese government clearly contents itself with operating within the old ‘imperialist’ paradigm of sport promotion, joining the global athletic ‘arms race’ in elite sport and using government-subsidized competitive sport as a new tool of statecraft. The scope and depth of resources the contemporary Japanese state is poised to funnel into organized sport dwarf anything its pre-WW II iteration had been equipped to do. Japan’s current push for state-sponsored athletic empire building is also spurred in part by a desire to match the similarly state-driven elite sport regimes of the increasingly powerful rival powers in East Asia.

And yet these diachronic and substantive differences tend to obscure a fundamental historical continuity lurking just beneath the surface. The centrality of the willful state in structuring national athletic practices parallels the way the prewar Japanese governments commandeered Olympic sports and individual physical activity to enact the nation’s splendor and showcase at home and abroad Japan’s putative racial superiority unique among the world’s non-White population. Caged within this ‘modern’ imperialist paradigm, the Japanese government’s new activist sport policy, despite its new millennium cosmopolitan rhetoric, harbors a distinct peril of organized athletics devolving into another arena of one-upmanship among the geopolitical rivals abetted by visceral populist nationalisms and unresolved postcolonial grievances.

The 2020 Olympic and Paralympic Games in Tokyo need not tread this well-trodden path: their organizers and the populace that contributes to this enterprise might choose to adopt an alternative model of projecting and measuring national greatness on the Olympic platform. Medal count may be the conventional indicator of achievement and resulting prestige for participating nations, and particularly, for the host country. Rather than being obsessed with this familiar index, however, the Japanese might opt out of this numbers game and propose instead that their second Tokyo Olympics be tested by entirely different criteria; for example, how did the hosting of the Games help Tokyo to transform itself into a more inclusive urban space and local polity attentive to the

needs of its increasingly diverse and multiethnic population, both settled and transient, citizens and noncitizens? In other words, can Tokyo build on the Olympic experience a ‘mature’, non-expanding yet internally reorganized city reflective of the densely globalized and politically decolonized world of the twenty-first century?

The concept of the Olympic Legacy has become a vision consciously promoted by the IOC since the inclusion of the Legacy provision in its Olympic Charter in November 2002. The organizers of the 2012 London Olympics foregrounded this coordinated effort by appointing Olympic medalist Lord Sebastian Coe to spearhead this aspect of the Games planning and implementation. Team Tokyo’s 2020 candidacy file also included, as required by the IOC, detailed proposals for achieving this IOC vision.<sup>42</sup>

What was not clear from the Tokyo bidding committee’s official manifesto is how far the government and people of the city of Tokyo and the nation of Japan would actually go in effecting a positive change within, through this new IOC vision. Compared to the Tokyo of 1964, the Tokyo of the new millennium is home to a far more diverse and quickly aging population. Foreign residents, both permanent and temporary, are now tightly woven into the fabrics of the city’s civic life and local economy. How does Tokyo (or, Japan by extension) envision coexisting with foreigners among themselves? How do the city, its government and people incorporate such ‘alien’ elements and their needs and aspirations into the standard operational regime of public and private services?

As highlighted by the recent controversy involving the South Korean protest to the registration of Meiji-era Japanese industrial sites as a UNESCO World Legacy, Japan’s modern history has been deeply implicated in the movement of cheap colonial labor across its imperium. The building of the 2020 Olympic facilities and associated infrastructure development also entails the systematic deployment of cheap foreign construction labor in the age of neoliberal capital concentration and accelerated labor mobility. Once the city becomes a place of work and everyday living for people of foreign provenances, it inevitably creates new and unanticipated categories of needs in medical care and access to welfare resources. Will Tokyo’s Olympic Legacy project and its underlying idea of sports as citizens’ fundamental right extend far enough to bring resident aliens (including Koreans and Chinese now working or studying in Japan) and their school-age children into the circle of beneficiaries? Will the city’s reorganized urban infrastructure be inclusive of



noncitizens, the elderly and frail, and the physically handicapped in its concept and actual workings?

Possibilities for using the 2020 Tokyo Olympics as a platform for actuating a truly postimperial Japan are many. Since the Tokyo Bidding Committee partially linked its candidacy with the reconstruction of the disaster-stricken Tohoku, how about creating a program for disaster relief and reconstruction aid by earmarking a part of its revenues from the Olympics and making the fund available to victims of natural disasters not only in Japan but across the world? A tangible legacy like that would most certainly ‘inspire the world’ much more helpfully than the show-boating idea that Prime Minister Abe floated leading up to the IOC final vote: to ‘televise to the whole world the Olympic torch relay running through the reconstructed Tohoku region’.<sup>43</sup>

If Tokyo and Japan can take imaginative initiatives in formulating an innovative postimperial paradigm of Olympic greatness and contribution to peace and human solidarity envisioned in the IOC Charter, that is when they will be able to argue convincingly to their still aggrieved neighbors that Japan has indeed come a long way towards liquidating its imperial past. Japan would also be able to exercise enlightened leadership in transcending the East Asian model of Olympic hosting, one chained to geopolitical prestige, consumer modernity and economic development. Given East Asia’s economic growth, the region’s gravitation pull in the recruitment of mega-sports events will most likely increase in the years to come. Thus, the significance and relevance of deconstructing that traditional East Asian model and reconstituting a new one cannot be overstated.

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PART VIII

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## Epilogue

# Retained Memories, Political Pressures, Catalytic Moments Tokyo 2020: Reconciliation?

*J.A. Mangan*

## **Hubris Past, Present, Future**

### **Ancient Hubris: Warning**

The ancient Greeks defined hubris as the worst sin a leader or a nation could commit. It was the attitude of supreme arrogance ... Its consequences were invariably severe. The Greeks also had a word for what usually followed hubris ... peripeteia, meaning a dramatic reversal of fortune. It signified a falling from the grace of a great height to unimaginable depths.<sup>1</sup>

### **Western Hubris: Arrogance**

The arrogant, self-congratulatory champions of nineteenth-century ... overlooked ... the logic of their own market-driven imperialism. Just as the

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market had led British capitalists to build up the industrial infrastructure of their own worst rivals in Germany and the USA, it ... rewarded Westerners who poured capital, inventions, and know-how into the East. ...capital's relentless quest for new profits ... presented opportunities to Easterners who were ready to seize them.<sup>2</sup>

### **Eastern Hubris: Adaptation**

The militarization of Japanese physical education that began in the 1930s intensified during the course of the Pacific War ... the purpose of physical education was proclaimed to be training loyal subjects of the emperor.<sup>3</sup>

### **Hubris: Dormant Bacillus**

...as he listened to the cries of joy arising from the town. Rieu remembered that such joy is always imperilled. He knew what those jubilant crowds did not know, but could have learned from books: the plague bacillus never dies ... It can lie dormant for years ... it bides its time ...<sup>4</sup>

### **Hubris: Menacing Bacillus**

With the world facing ever more menacing dangers from ambitious leaders, from gangs of warlords and from terrorists, we should note—as the ancient Greeks did—the terrible penalties which befall those who release from Pandora's box the dormant bacillus of hubris.<sup>5</sup>

### **Hubris: Potential—Pacific Rim**

...the Pacific Rim remains the world's most dangerous fault-line. The South China Sea is on a hair trigger.<sup>6</sup>

If one can read the tealeaves correctly the Pacific theatre may well be the area for future disputes between the major world players.<sup>7</sup>

## *APOLOGIA FOR JAPANESE IMPERIALISM*

*Japanese Sports: A History* by Allen Guttmann and Lee Thompson, is 'interestingly written and enjoyable'.<sup>8</sup> However, it rarely touches deeply on political questions, even though sport is replete with them.<sup>9</sup> *Japanese Imperialism* is intended to fill an analytical void. It is concerned with the



political and geopolitical consequences of Japanese imperialism in *both* the imperial and post-imperial eras and with sport as an influential component of colonial and postcolonial purpose.

### FASCISM, SPORT AND WAR

Recent studies have painted with a bold, broad brush, the role sport has played in the Fascist preparation of men for war. There was logic in this preparation: ‘Heroes of sportsfield and battlefield have much in common. They are both viewed as symbols of national prowess, quality and virility. The warrior and the athlete are crucial to the perceived success of the state. ...sportsfield and battlefield are linked as locations for the demonstration of legitimate patriotic aggression. The one location sustains the other and both sustain the image of the powerful nation ... Throughout history, sport and militarism have been inseparable.’<sup>10</sup>

Twentieth-century Fascism, a seductive ideology for many, had the grip of an ideological limpet: The result, totalitarian sportsfield and battlefield combined to project a martial muscular superman who, it was intended, would release within himself the creative forces of his own soul and through strength of will would usher in a new world.<sup>11</sup>

Fascism was the dynamo that powered his energy. The German Superman was emulated in Japan: In the period of Japanese Fascism ‘the Volunteer Army was both a common and an uncommon army of exemplars ... their bodies were iconic instruments of Fascist imperial intention; their muscles were symbols of Fascist chauvinistic intention. They were supermen not in the Aryan sense but they were members of a “super race” ... shaped through action and imagery to be members of [an] Oriental Super Race.’<sup>12</sup> Emulation was long dying. This was made starkly clear in the writings of Hiraoka Kimitake (Mishima). His *Kamen no kukubaaku* (Confessions of a Mask, 1949) is a personal narrative of a youth who is sexually aroused by ‘death and pools of blood and muscular flesh’. Mishima did more than simply evoke images of homoerotic youth. Devoting himself to the martial arts, he ‘transformed his own body into a work of art, symbol of his extreme nationalism’. ‘He peddled the cult of the hero and a brutal nihilism ... related to a mighty body and well-tempered muscles’.<sup>13</sup>

The Fascist Superman was a creation with ‘a moral fig leaf’ covering ignominious naked aggression. Muscle was the manifestation of morality; muscularity was his *‘toga virilis’*. This should cause no surprise.

Throughout European history, sport has invariably prepared men for war. ‘On this matter the Jury is not out. Classical Greek games included martial sports as useful preparation for war ... Rome used sport as a brutal adjunct of imperial wars. Mediaeval jousts were preparation for often unchivalric battles. Renaissance Italy had its *ponte* and *pligna* to bring its foot soldiers up to scratch ... the Turnen movement was means of ensuring readiness for patriotic struggle. Late Victorian Britain prepared its middle-class schoolboys on playing fields for “civilising” warfare throughout its empire. Prussia used sport to harden its efficient officer class.’<sup>14</sup> All this is well-known and, of course, the pragmatic relationship between sport and war has flourished beyond Europe.<sup>15</sup> Indeed, it is a commonplace to state that virtually everywhere, directly or indirectly, men have been prepared for war through sport. War has offered self-sacrificial martyrdom and sport has played its part in the realization of a sacramental soldiery.

There are yet further logical reasons for the shackling of sport to war. Sport has been used to punish other nations for launching wars and used as revenge for lost wars.<sup>16</sup> More than this—sport ‘reinforces antagonism bred on battlefields, keeps alive memories of “battles long ago”, defeats deep in the past ... and as such exacerbates antipathy, [and] fuels hostility ... *Sport can be sublimated warfare* (emphasis added) kept alive year after year, in “conflicts without casualties” in national stadiums ... contributing to future conflicts with casualties’.<sup>17</sup>

East Asia has furnished a recent perfect exemplar. In 1942, sport was in the close embrace of Japanese Fascism. ‘The Japanese regime called for an even greater emphasis on the martial arts. Physical Education was now to centre on archery, judo, kendo, and rifle practice, and the approach ... was hardly playful ... in 1943 (the rules of kendo) were changed to revert to the art of real sword fighting ... games included “attractions” in which players threw hand grenades at targets inscribed ‘Annihilate England and America’.<sup>18</sup>

### MEMORY IS AN UNCLOSED DOOR

Lord Russell in his acclaimed *Knights of the Bushido* wrote a Comptian account ‘with no suggestion of sensationalism’<sup>19</sup> of Japanese atrocities in the Second World War. He stated soberly and unsensationally,

Murders, massacres, death marches, mutilation, vivisection, and even cannibalism were all practiced by the proud descendants of the Knights of Bushido of the Order of the Rising Sun – and condoned by their High Command. The mass destruction by starvation and forced labour which turned tens of thousands of healthy men into diseased skeletons was deliberate military policy. The rape of women was not enough for Japanese soldiers; their most heinous tortures were kept for victims of their animal lust.<sup>20</sup>

The International Military Tribunal in Tokyo after the Second World War reinforced his horrific conclusions. It called many witnesses ‘who testified in detail to atrocities committed in all theatres of war on a scale so vast, yet following so common a pattern that only one conclusion is possible. The atrocities were either secretly ordered or wilfully permitted by the Japanese Government or individual members thereof, and by the leaders of the armed forces’.<sup>21</sup> Lord Russell concluded his sombre survey of Japanese atrocities with these damning words, ‘... throughout the Sino-Japanese and Pacific wars, in every theatre of operations, unspeakable cruelties and merciless tortures were inflicted upon thousands of Allied prisoners of war and innocent civilians by all ranks of the Japanese armed forces, without any compunction and, for the most part, without any feelings of compassion whatsoever’.<sup>22</sup> Niall Ferguson wrote equally factually of the Japanese imperialist in China, ‘In December 1937 the Chinese city of Nanking fell to imperial forces. With explicit orders to “kill all captives”, the army ran amok. Between 260,000 and 300,000 non-combatants were killed, up to 80,000 Chinese women were raped, and, in grotesque scenes of torture, prisoners were hung by their tongues from meat hooks and fed to ravenous dogs. Imperial troops competed in prisoner-killing competitions; one officer challenged another to see who would be first to dispatch a hundred Chinese PoWs. Some of the victims were stabbed, some bayoneted, some shot, some covered in petrol and burnt to death.’<sup>23</sup> He continued, ‘Women suffered most,’ recalled one veteran of the 114th Division. ‘No matter how young or old, they all could not escape the fate of being raped. We sent out coal trucks ... to the city streets and villages to seize a lot of woman. And then each of them was allocated to 15 to 20 soldiers for sexual intercourse and abuse.’ ‘It would [have been] all right if we only raped them,’ one of his comrades confessed. ‘I shouldn’t say all right. But we always stabbed them and killed them. Because dead bodies don’t talk.’

Ferguson concluded,

With good reason, they called it the Rape of Nanking.<sup>24</sup>

He then set Japanese Imperial rule in a wider imperial context, ‘Japanese colonial rule in Korea—protectorate from 1905 and a colony directly ruled from Tokyo from 1910—was conspicuously illiberal.’ When hundreds of thousands took to the streets to demonstrate in support of Yi Kwang-su’s Declaration of Independence, the so-called March First Movement, the Japanese authorities responded brutally. Over 6000 Koreans were killed, 14,000 were injured, and 50,000 were sentenced to imprisonment.

Ferguson then declared,

This was imperialism at its very worst. But it was Japanese imperialism, not British. The Rape of Nanking reveals precisely what the leading alternative to British rule in Asia stood for. It is easy to portray the war between an old, self-doubting Empire and a new and utterly ruthless Empire – between the setting and the rising sun. But it was also the collision between an Empire that had some conception of human rights and one that regarded alien races as no better than swine.<sup>25</sup>

He added finally, ‘the rise of the Japanese empire in Asia during that decade showed that the alternatives to British rule were not necessarily more benign. There were degrees of imperialism, and in its brutality towards conquered peoples, Japan’s empire went beyond anything the British had ever done. And this time the British were among the conquered.’<sup>26</sup>

Ferguson, in short, brought a sense of perspective to the recent history of imperialism in East Asia!

### COMPREHENDING REGIONAL REVANCHISM

Sensationalism is not the purpose of this Epilogue. The *purpose is to understand current regional Revanchism in East Asia*. Past political wounds have not healed: there has been no successful ‘oncotic’ diplomatic surgery. Does this curious defensive rationalism of Japanese atrocities in Asia by Okakura Kakuzo, author of *The Book of Tea* offer one compelling reason for the absence of a successful healing process? He wrote, ‘The average westerner was wont to regard Japan as barbarous

while she indulged in the gentle arts of peace. He calls her civilized since she began to commit wholesale slaughter on the Manchurian battlefields'.<sup>27</sup> Slaughter was not the only Japanese excess. 'When the Imperial Army swept through China ... Malaya and Singapore ... Korea, the Philippines, Burma ... Java and Sumatra, members of Golden Lily followed closely behind. ... They stole everything they could lay their hands on jade and gold Buddha statues from ancient temples; cultural artefacts and antiques from museums; jewellery and gold ... emptied royal collections and national treasuries, removed bullion and priceless artworks, carvings, pottery and paper currencies'.<sup>28</sup>

### REVANCHISM, REVENGE, RETRIBUTION

Revanchism: a policy of seeking retaliation or revenge<sup>29</sup>

Regional hostility to Japan then stems, therefore, in large measure, from the memories of its imperial atrocities in the 1930s and 1940s. Insult is added to terrible injury by the fact that 'The numerous apologies that Japan has given have been little more than formulaic, while the courts have refused until recently to compensate the individual victims of crimes committed in Japan's name'.<sup>30</sup> The grudging attitude towards its Asian neighbours is, claims Jacques, symptomatic of post-Meiji Japan—respect for the West and contempt for Asia. The abiding bitter refrain coming out of East Asia is that Japan has never understood the enormity of its imperial savagery and never adequately apologized.<sup>31</sup> Lasting East Asia repugnance has spilt over into sport reflecting a proxy war without weapons with echoes reverberating down the generations.

This lasting legacy of resentment has triggered youthful rebuke, 'There is a saying ... don't try to bury your head in the sand ... It is the Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe who has attempted to cover up the atrocities committed against the "comfort women" ... His attempt is as futile as covering up the heavens with his palm'.<sup>32</sup> After further bitter excoriations, this young South Korean commentator asked this embarrassing rhetorical question, '... former enemies can form a strong alliance like the US and Japan ... Why, then has not this happened between Japan and its Asian neighbours?'<sup>33</sup>

In Japan's defence, it must be said that, 'Over the years, Tokyo has paid billions of dollars in lieu of war reparations and its leaders have issued innumerable formal apologies. Rightly or wrongly, these have never been taken as sincere'.<sup>34</sup> By way of example, in 2001, Junichiro

Koizumi, the then prime minister, offered a typical and oft-repeated statement of regret at Japan's wartime actions, 'We conducted colonization and aggressive acts based on a mistaken national policy and caused immeasurable pain and suffering. I wish, in the light of our country's regrettable history, to take this to heart, to express my deepest regret and remorse'.<sup>35</sup> However, with great insensitivity to many in East Asia, 'Koizumi followed up his contrition with a visit to the Yasukuni shrine to Japan's war dead reviled in Asia as a symbol of hated militarism'.<sup>36</sup> An astounding meta-logical action millions in East Asia see as 'laying a wreath at the tomb of Adolf Hitler'.<sup>37</sup> For them, there has been a *no* Japanese broom sweeping away the ugly detritus of the past.

The Japanese, of course, have not invariably spoken with one post-imperial voice. Ongoing dissent to perceived retained militarism in some quarters has been strongly evident; for example, in the response to the new emblem of the Japanese Defence Force. A point to also bear in mind is that during the American Occupation of Japan of the Second World War, according to some historians, the USA actively assisted in promoting post-war amnesia.<sup>38</sup> In the 1990s, 'the stance of Japanese government leaders changed significantly as a result of both domestic and international efforts, although their signals are mixed. On one hand, in the 1990s, several Prime Ministers apologized for Japan's war crimes; the government established a "private" fund to compensate former comfort women, and in 1996 Education Ministry officials approved brief mention of the military comfort women in junior high school social studies texts'.<sup>39</sup> But on the other hand, while school texts contain criticisms of war action and colonial policies, they can be 'elliptical' in coverage.<sup>40</sup> More contentiously, the right-wing Orthodoxy History Group demands a 'positive attitude' to the Second World War and resists any need for official acknowledging of Japanese wartime atrocities, let alone apologies or reparations.<sup>41</sup> Equally, it should be noted that China and other regional nations did not make a great deal of Japanese atrocities until their geopolitical, politics and economic influence was on the rise. They clearly were of the view that their voices would now be heard more widely.<sup>42</sup>

Recently Japan, at last, has offered to pay compensation over its exploitation of 'the comfort women' in the Second World War—the issue the President of South Korea, Park Geun-Hye has called 'the greatest stumbling block' to improved relations between South Korea and Japan. Professor Michael Cucek of Tokyo's Waseda University, however, has

remarked that the arrangement made under pressure from America, will certainly not please the far-right in Japan.<sup>43</sup>

The general view remains in China and elsewhere in East Asia, is that the Japanese—locked into a hermetic nationalism—have never honestly repented for their wartime aggression and that Japan remains a country in which nationalistic militarism lies dangerously close to the surface.<sup>44</sup> The rise to power of the Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has reinforced this view. His recent remark that future generations should not have to keep on apologizing for Japan's imperial past, albeit after stating that his country 'took the wrong course and advanced along the road to war' and remarking, 'I bow my head deeply before the souls of all those who perished both at home and abroad. I express my feeling of profound grief and my eternal sincere condolences', then adding further that the Japanese 'have engraved in our hearts the suffering of the nation's neighbours',<sup>45</sup> seems to have had no ameliorative effect. China and South Korea were certainly not appeased. The South Korean Yonhap news agency stated, that Mr. Abe 'did not offer his own apology clearly', while the China controlled Xinhua news agency declared that 'Mr. Abe has failed to offer a personal apology for "past atrocities"'.<sup>46</sup> Sun-Yong Kwon offers an explanation for long-lasting South Korean obduracy towards the Japanese linking directly sport to war. 'Japan ... is not even close to what Germany has done in terms of reconciling with the past. In fact, whenever a soccer match is held between South Korea and Japan, the Japanese fans always bring out the "Rising Sun Flag", a symbol of Japanese imperialism ... The "Rising Sun Flag" is an insult to the Asians in that it reminds them of painful history'.<sup>47</sup> Kwon acknowledges this could simply be the personal opinion of one South Korean, but adds that in his view, it seems '*to represent what is perceived by the majority of South Koreans*'.<sup>48</sup> (Original emphasis) He also offers a Japanese perspective, noted above, that highlights an issue that has been neglected in debates about international reconciliation: the potential dangers of contrition. '*As seen in Japan ... expressions of contrition typically prompt a backlash from conservatives. They offer a competing narrative that celebrates rather than condemns – the country's past and justifies or even denies its atrocities*'.<sup>49</sup>

Thus a cycle of seemingly endless antagonism spins and spins and spins!

## EMPIRES, CONQUEST, BRUTALITY

There is no simplistic attempt here to suggest that other empires have not indulged in appalling cruelty. Western imperialism has a bloody record. Indeed, ‘...There is no document of civilisation which is not at the same time a document of barbarism’.<sup>50</sup> European and American imperial histories are saturated in blood. This truth has been laid bare. Niall Ferguson has spoken starkly of the heinous crimes of the Russian, German and Italian empires.<sup>51</sup> And Laurence Binet has observed, other conquerors, on occasion, could be as savage as the Japanese—and specifically on occasion, on *games fields*. He offered one still unforgettable example. In 1942, the Ukraine was governed by Nazi Germany with ‘characteristic brutality’.<sup>52</sup> FC Start, a Ukrainian football team won a reputation for performances against teams from occupied and satellite local nations. The Nazis decided to arrange a match between FC Start and the Luftwaffe. Ordered to lift their arms and shout ‘Heil Hitler’, the FC Start players banged their chests with their fists and shouted ‘long live physical culture’, a slogan with Soviet connotations.<sup>53</sup> Despite losing a man injured and a warning at half-time by a German general to lose the match or they would be executed, they won 5-1. They survived, however, for a return match. The Germans strengthened their team with professionals. The Ukrainians won 5-3. In the post-match pitch invasion, three Ukrainian players slipped away. *The rest were executed*. There is a memorial to them at the Keir Stadium in Ukraine. Fascist brutishness, modern sport and ‘imperial’ hallucinations had coalesced into cruelty. Yet simultaneously, sport was a symbol of courageous nationalism, resolute rejection and self-sacrificial heroism.

## IMPERIALISM: RELATIVITY

Henry Kissinger has stated candidly that, ‘The West expanded with the familiar hallmarks of colonialism – avariciousness, cultural chauvinism, lust for glory.’ However, he has also declared,

Its better elements tried to lead a kind of global tutorial ... encouraged scepticism and a body of political and diplomatic practices ultimately including democracy. It all but ensured that, after long periods of subjugation, the colonized peoples would eventually demand – and achieve – self-determination...<sup>54</sup>



And, he has argued further that,

Even during their most brutal depredations, the expansionist powers put forth, especially in Britain, a vision that at some point conquered peoples would begin to participate in the fruits of a common global system.<sup>55</sup>

Of course, Western arrogance lingered. In consequence in, *Pacific: The Ocean of the Future*, Simon Winchester welcomes ‘the shift in the world’s geopolitical centre of gravity from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean’<sup>56</sup> stating that the American Bikini Nuclear Testing was, ‘an example of western contempt for the Ocean’s indigenous peoples’.<sup>57</sup> Winchester likewise condemns the Pacific British and French nuclear testing programmes. He applauds, in consequence, ‘the decline of western colonial influence’.

#### FROM WEST TO EAST: LINEAR PROGRESSION

At the same time, in a logical linear progression, Winchester notes, with alarm, the emergence of a possible future Chinese empire. Chinese expansionism, he considers, ‘a potent threat to regional peace’.<sup>58</sup> He observes with anxiety the fact that ‘Chinese strategists’ subscribe to an expanding national defence line ‘as far as the First, Second and Third Island chains’ taking this defence line to Hawaii. This strategy creates major problems, he argues, for smaller regional nations like Vietnam, Taiwan and the Philippines.<sup>59</sup> What of problems, it might be added, for Japan and the USA? China, it seems, is a geopolitical ‘imperial ratchet’ clicking continuously in a forward movement. To geopolitical and politic may be added trade domination, ‘As Chinese enterprises have hoovered up manufacturing contracts, minerals and markets, they have caught up with the US. Current estimates suggest China will have the world’s largest economy by 2025.’<sup>60</sup> In this regard, China is America’s principal rival in this regard in the East as revealed in Peter Frankopan’s powerful *The Silk Roads: A New History of the World*. China has obtained a tight toehold in the resource-rich nations of Central Asia. Add in hard power military supremacy, and as Mark Urban in his chilling *The Edge: Is the Military Dominance of the West Coming to an End*, has stated cold-eyed,

Many Americans do not realise that the age of a single global hyper power is over. And, actually, it’s worse than that. For it is only by combining

metrics of that decline with the growth in military capabilities elsewhere that you can gain a sense of how quickly the scales are tipping.<sup>61</sup>

The ‘metrics’ convince some on both sides of the Pacific that it is ‘very likely indeed’ and indeed ‘a forgone conclusion that there will be a showdown between China and the United States ... one side will enforce its will on the other side’.<sup>62</sup>

### SHOWDOWN: SPORT—MAGNETIC MODERN SOFT POWER SYMBOL

Just such a showdown, of course, in sport—*magnetic modern soft power symbol*—is well underway already, signifying wider political and geopolitical contemporary realities and changing circumstances: East Asia is rising rapidly.<sup>63</sup> Sport is playing a *significant* role in the shaping and reshaping of nationalistic ‘egos’! Its transformative power to restructure inferiority into superiority should not be underestimated. In this respect, the now multi-polar world soft power map reflects a new challenge to Western cultural supremacy with all the implications this carries for the future global influence of East Asia.<sup>64</sup>

To what extent does this reflect the wider reality that the scales of power are tipping to the East? Peter Frankopan has delivered a cutting rebuke to the West that provides an answer, ‘In many ways, the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries have represented something of a disaster for the United States and Europe as they have played out their doomed struggle to retain their position in the vital territories that link east with west’.<sup>65</sup> Unrelentingly, he then continued, ‘What has been striking throughout the events of recent decades is the west’s lack of perspective about global history’.<sup>66</sup>

And he then remarked reasonably, ‘...The world is *changing*’. As it moves into an era where the political, military and economic dominance of the West, as Frankopan notes, ‘is coming under pressure, (the) sense of uncertainty is unsettling. While we ponder where the next threat might come from, how best to deal with religious extremism or how to negotiate with states who seem willing to disregard international law, networks and connections are quietly being knitted together across the spine of Asia, or rather, they are being restored’.<sup>67</sup> He concludes incontrovertibly, ‘...The Silk Roads are rising again’.<sup>68</sup>

He claims with the same factual force, ‘What we are witnessing ... are the birthing pains of a region that once dominated the intellectual,

cultural and economic landscape and which is now re-emerging.’ We are seeing the signs of the world’s centre of gravity shifting – back to where it lay for millennia.<sup>69</sup>

The Red Queen Effect is evident in East Asia.<sup>70</sup>

Martin Jacques, too, in his well-argued consideration of the rise of modern China does ‘not beat about the bush’,

Global history has hitherto been essentially a Western history. With the rise of China, however, that will no longer be the case. Chinese history will become familiar not just to the Chinese, or even East Asians, *but to the entire world*.<sup>71</sup> (Emphasis added)

Jacques makes the further point that,

Chinese perceptive global hegemony will reflect the country’s particular characteristics, both historical and contemporary ... forms of hegemony are constantly shifting and mutating in response to wider cultural, technological, military, political and economic changes.<sup>72</sup>

Jacques also observes that as a consequence of Western earlier supremacy many around the globe are familiar with events in American and European history but that the future Asian ‘key landmarks will become global property’.<sup>73</sup> In the driving seat for so long, Jacques asserts, the West can neither imagine or comprehend that ‘the world *stands on the edge of a global upheaval*’ (emphasis added). An extraordinary tilt in the balance of global power, he states baldly, from West to East ‘almost by stealth’ is taking place—pushed by the elephant in the room: China.<sup>74</sup> He does not shrink from labouring the consequences, ‘Chinese modernity will be very different from Western modernity’<sup>75</sup> and that China will transform the world far more fundamentally than any other new global power in the last two centuries: This prospect has been consistently downplayed.

Jacques, as does Frankopan, accuses the West of geopolitical complacency. For Frankopan and Jacques, Western dominance is now metaphorically a well-worn carpet with frayed edges: threadbare through continuous wear and tear. In the world of reality this transformation *in the specific context of modern sport as soft power*, and a harbinger of cultural re-assertion can be witnessed in the specific form of the ‘glittering 2010 Guangzhou Asian Games’: a representation of both an East

Asian *cultural* renaissance and a talisman of an approaching East Asian Cultural Epoch. As announced in *The Asian Games Modern Metaphor for 'The Middle Kingdom' Reborn*<sup>76</sup> the convolutions of this *renaissance* will be hard for some to stomach, especially perhaps Americans. For Americans to be displaced in the Western Pacific, by Asian peoples long despised as decadent, feeble, corrupt and inept will be difficult to accept. A long established belief in a cultural supremacy will make accommodation difficult. Americans believe their principles are universal: the supremacy of the individual and free unfettered expression. They are not and never were.<sup>77</sup> Will Americans complacently continue to ignore, from their perspective, a poisonous illiberal ideological 'foam' in polluted Eastern waters! And not only Americans. As made clear above' in the recent East Asian Olympic Games, as well as the recent Asian Games a cultural renaissance is in the making in East Asia that will impact on Europe. 'Europe's assumed (cultural) centrality in accounts of world history is under attack: From the late 1970s, an intellectual movement inspired by the Palestinian—American Edward Said denounced the classics of European writing in the history, ethnography and culture of Asia (and by extension elsewhere) as 'orientalist fantasy'. Said claimed that European description has been fatally flawed by the crude attribution of predominant demeaning stereotypic qualities to Asians and a persistent attempt to portray Asians as slothful, corrupt or degenerate antitheses of energetic, masterful and progressive Europeans.<sup>78</sup> Said glides over geopolitical complexities. He apparently feels little need to fully explore the nuances of imperialism.<sup>79</sup> Kissinger's qualification, noted earlier, is lost in Said's approach but he has a point.

### *Nihonjinron: The Theory of the Japanese: Consensus?*

China's global thrust to centre stage<sup>80</sup> seems inevitable—with all the consequences for Japan in the coming decades that will follow in China's implacable surge. Japan must come to terms with this. It will not be easy; ... 'Japan is part of East Asia, however, this does not mean that it is representative of the region: on the contrary, Japan is ... in important respects unique.'<sup>81</sup> National navel-gazing has produced a plethora of books, films, magazines and television programmes, all dedicated to the *Nihonjinron*, literally the theory of the Japanese.<sup>82</sup>

Does this go some way to explaining the past brutal racist imperial attitudes the Japanese exhibited towards fellow Asians? Did Japanese

imperialism with its view of Japan as the ‘land of the gods’ convince the Japanese that other Asians were inferior to the point of being sub-humans? Throughout Asia, those ‘liberated’ by Japan’s Imperial Army discovered the new masters to be worse than the old ones. Japanese imperialism, in reality, was a ‘sepsis’ that spread throughout Asia infecting all it came into contact with. General Aung San, father of Nobel Prize winner Aung San Suu Kye, helped the Japanese to invade Burma but quickly recognised the diseased repressive reality of its Japanese ‘liberators’. ‘I went to Japan to save my people, who were treated like bullocks by the British’, he said in 1942 ‘... now we are treated like dogs’.<sup>83</sup>

The past certainly explains modern Japanese isolation. There have been two revealing examples in the opening decade of the twenty-first century. The first—Japan’s failed bid to become a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council in 2005, when China mobilized most of the region to oppose Japan’s membership. The second—the publication of a new school history textbook in Japan, also in 2005, that still failed to adequately record and acknowledge atrocities committed in China. This angered not only China but most nations in the region. It is important to appreciate that for the Chinese, to this day, ‘the Nanjing Massacre *defines the nature and identity of the Japanese* (emphasis added) ... and therefore in large measure their attitude towards Japan’.<sup>84</sup> This issue of Japanese imperial atrocities explains to a large extent the continuing antagonism to Japan which is the focus of *Japanese Imperialism*. Thus ‘Revanchism by Proxy’ in sports’ arenas and games fields not only survives, it *thrives*: a seemingly impenetrable barrier to a new regional conciliation. To press home the revanchist reality, here is a further South Korean caustic condemnation to add to those presented earlier, ‘Koreans have a very unpleasant perception about Japanese apologies ... probably the same as the Chinese ... most Koreans don’t consider Japanese apologies as apologies ...

Koreans feel Japanese apologies lack genuineness...<sup>85</sup> The truth of the matter appears to be that South Koreans have an overwhelming suspicion of an allomorphic Japanese nationalism. The Japanese Takayami Yamashita remarked regretfully in 2006, ‘It has to be remembered that the Japanese government has never offered an apology to any country that it invaded in the last seventy years.’ This displays the reluctance of the Japanese to reflect on their past conduct. It is this very attitude that has fuelled feelings of great indignation and distrust towards Japan from other Asian countries.<sup>86</sup> The same commentator has observed that, in consequence, this animosity has hindered the forward thrust of Japanese

capitalism certainly not without success, in East Asia. The 2002 World Cup provided Japan with fine opportunity to remove this hindrance. It failed to capitalise on it.

### RECONCILIATION: OPPORTUNITY LOST—THE 2002 WORLD CUP?

In his thought-provoking essay, Takayami Yamashita has suggested that the 2002 World Cup acted as a potential catalyst in a dualistic rebuilding process.<sup>87</sup> Prior to the opening of the World Cup, the Japanese and the Korean governments reached official agreement to implement an all-inclusive free trade plan between their respective countries. A ‘cooperative campaign’ was launched to express ‘a new kinship between Japan and Korea involving tailored television programmes and newspaper articles, local government and mass media symposiums and the involvement of tourist, food, music and film industries in an attempted easing of the tense relations between South Korea and Japan.’<sup>88</sup> The initiative was taken by Japanese and Korean capitalists’. There was political structural flaw in this conciliatory catalytic cooperation—adequate political reflection upon and recognition of the historical relationship between the two countries involving war responsibility. With apparent disregard for this newly capitalist cooperation and with insensitive timing, President Koizuma worshipped at the Yasukuni shrine,<sup>89</sup> a brazen insult in the eyes of millions of citizens of the regional nations.

The subsequent decades have revealed that the commercially motivated placatory wave dashed itself destructively on the sea wall of ‘revanchist nationalism’. Yamashita makes a sound point: nations will continuously remake ‘ambiguous definitions of Japaneseness, (including the Japanese).’ He dives metaphorically into deep water with conciliatory fervour, stating that ‘sport does not *necessarily* (emphasis added) revive traditional images but is always creating new myths and cults revising and adapting them to new purposes’.<sup>90</sup> The Red Queen Effect once again. Thus, he argues, swimming strenuously against the tide, that time and circumstance may permit new global friendships with *sport a glue* that cements new layers of amity.

Others are, however, balanced realists. The sensible warning has been issued by Xu Guoqi regarding modern China, the new global superpower, that in sport, especially the Olympic Games, there is a continuing threat, a new acquired Chinese can-do optimism in conjunction with an old retained ‘painful inferiority complex’ which ‘if combined with

irrational nationalism could ignite flames of violence that, ironically, the regime itself cultivated as appropriately revolutionary during the Maoist era'.<sup>91</sup> As Xu Guogqi points out in recent past, given the robust link between sports and nationalism, Chinese responses to sports events sometimes have reached bizarre and even hysterical levels!

On the evening of 19 May 1985, a men's soccer match between Hong Kong and China took place in Beijing. If China were to win, it might have a chance to participate in the Mexican World Cup competition ... The day ... proved to be a momentous one in Chinese sports history ... what happened after the game intensified to an extreme level both Chinese feelings of national inferiority and Chinese nationalism ...<sup>92</sup>

China lost. The Chinese fans rioted. A purgative explosion resulted. A British colonial team had defeated China and humiliated the nation.

To quell the anger of the fans and 'of the whole nation', the Chinese national team issued a public apology ... This was perhaps the first serious riot in PRC history, with the exception of unrest during the Cultural Revolution (sponsored largely by Mao himself).<sup>93</sup>

There was more and worse to come:

If the fan riot of 1985 caused concern among Chinese official, Chinese behaviour in a match between Japan and China in the 2004 Asia Cup soccer championship became international news. And a diplomatic fiasco for the two countries. During the Asia Cup game, Chinese fans sang an old Japanese song and yelled, 'Kill! Kill! Kill!'<sup>94</sup> Again the fans rioted, burning Japanese flags and spitting at Japanese fans. These responses to the Japanese victory alarmed both the Chinese and Japanese governments. The whole world watched in shocked fascination...<sup>95</sup>

Xu Guoqi argues provocatively, that if in the interests of a positive global image the aim is to make China a sports powerhouse, both the Chinese culture and political system have to be addressed, following orders, trademarks of the Chinese social system, may not be sufficient. As the Chinese come to realize this incongruity, their obsession with winning at sports may become an impetus, however indirect, for political reform, 'sports may become much more than games or a locus for national

pride; they may be an agent for social and political change'.<sup>96</sup> He states interestingly:

A sports revolution is very possible ... Given the widespread anger, anxiety and frustration regarding social injustice in today's China, sports, as a focus of popular interest, may bring about major changes. If such a transformation occurs, it could cause serious problems for the Communist regime.<sup>97</sup>

An ironic analysis. In China sport has produced a global renaissance; it could produce a domestic rebirth with dirigiste controlled dogmas replaced by liberal controlled mantras! Will dictatorial doctrinarism be dismantled? Sententious fantasy or sentient realism? If so, what might be the post-autocratic revanchist outcome? Perhaps the words of Victor Cha are relevant here,

...sport creates changes in nations that go beyond the physical to the political ... sport is not just a spectacle, it is a powerful agent that generates internal and external pressure for change that are difficult to ignore... sport matters politically...<sup>98</sup>

### THE SHACKLING OF EAST ASIA: THE UNSHACKLING OF JAPAN!

The Second World War, Jasmin Khan has declared, was the catalyst for the *unshackling* of South Asia from Western imperial rule.<sup>99</sup> With equal validity, it may be claimed it *shackled* East Asia to lasting memories of Eastern imperial rule. This relates to the fact that, as Jacques has noted,

For the most part, Japan has gone into denial about the rise of China, wishing that somehow it might go away or that it was perhaps a figment of everyone else's imagination.<sup>100</sup>

Then it could be for Japan, metaphorically, 'Tomorrow's rain lies on the horizon, ... high up in the sky something pale and small is descending, growing in size as it falls.'<sup>101</sup>

What is high in the sky accompanying the rain and growing in size, is China!

However, is there reason for caution regarding China's growth? Jamal Sanad Al-Suwaidi has warned of,



Predictions of imminent Chinese ascendance ignore key considerations including how the state might exercise its newfound power. Many believe that a state's strategic position is a direct consequence of economic power, because the latter enables the acquisition of military and political power.<sup>102</sup>

Jamal Sanad Al-Suwaidi further prophecies that:

Although China's continued economic rise is likely, it will not necessarily replace the United States of America in terms of running of world affairs. ...the outcome also depends on how the United States of America deals with challenges in the global arenas, as well as China's stance on unilateral leadership in general.<sup>103</sup>

Sensible geopolitical analytical sobriety or a self-contradictory argument?

### TOKYO 2020: TOWARDS A NEW REGIONALISM

Is Jamal Sanad Al-Suwaidi crystal-ball gazing accurately? Will Tokyo 2020 perhaps help shorten the voyage—politically and geopolitically—of Japan to a New Regionalism that embraces Japan, and a dark imperial 'moonless memory' be erased by a bright East Asian sunburst burnished brighter by possible increasing predominance in global sport in conjunction with possible economic and military predominance? Will modern sport bring glory, status and image, riding on the back of prosperity?

The economic prospects for East Asia, while not without problems are positive.

One of the most significant markets of the 21<sup>st</sup> century is the re-emergence of Asia as the economic powerhouse of the world. Asia was home to nearly two-thirds of the global population in 2000. By 2030, with steadily declining global fertility rates, Asia's population will start declining too, but the economic share of Asia will only increase over the next 15 years and for another few decades thereafter. ...Seen in this perspective, the last two centuries were an aberration.<sup>104</sup>

East Asia appears to be rising inexorably to pre-eminence not least—in 'glamorous global sport' with all that implies for the East Asian's new image in the world.

The triple East Asian Olympic Games ... are precursors of Asian mega-events to come; sooner rather than later. The momentum will increase year by year. The traction of the Asian engine grows increasingly more powerful ... there should be no doubts in Western minds that these events collectively are ascendant symbols of Asia Rising: differentially but emphatically across its nations – politically, economically, and culturally.<sup>105</sup>

Can, and will, Japan join the East Asian ‘team’ in Pacific, if not poly-amorous partnership in sport: surrogate ‘War Without Weapons’, on a journey to a peaceful prosperous and glamorous new East Asian World via 2020?<sup>106</sup>

No War, or Battials sound

Was heard the [Eastern] world around.

The ideal spear and shield were high up hung,

The hooked Chariot stood Unstain’d with hostile blood...<sup>107</sup>

A tall order?

## NOTES

1. Alistair Horne, *Hubris: The Tragedy of War in the Twentieth Century*, (London: Weidenfield and Nicolson, 2015), XXV.
2. Ian Morris, *Why the West Rules – for Now*. Reprint edition, (Picador, 2011), 521.
3. Allen Guttman and Lee Thompson, *Japanese Sports: A History*, (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2001), 158–159.
4. Horne, *Hubris*, 285.
5. *Ibid.*, xxv.
6. Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, *The Daily Telegraph*, 21 December 2015, 28.
7. Horne, *Hubris*, xxvii.
8. Review by Sepp Linhart of *Japanese Sports: A History* in the *Journal of Japanese Studies* (2003), 237. However, Guttman and Thompson dealt clearly and concisely with Japanese militarism as a profound political manifestation. See especially, Guttman and Thompson, *Japanese Sports*, 157–158.
9. *Ibid.*, 235.
10. This issue has been a special interest of J.A. Mangan for two decades. See, for example, inter alia, his edited *Militarism, Sport, Europe:*

- War Without Weapons* (London: Cass, 2003), *Militarism, Hunting, Imperialism: 'Blooding' The Martial Male* (With Callum McKenzie) (London: Routledge, 2010); *Sport, Militarism and the Great War: Martial Manliness and Armageddon* (with Thierry Terret) (London: Routledge, 2012) but see especially, his authored *'Manufactured' Masculinity: Making Imperial Manliness, Morality and Militarism* (London: Routledge, 2012). See also his edited *Shaping the Superman: Fascist Body as Political Icon* (London: Cass, 1999) and *Superman Supreme: Fascist Body as Political Icon* (London: Cass, 2000).
11. J.A. Mangan. (Ed.) *Shaping the Superman: Fascist Body as Political Icon – Aryan Fascism*. Series Editor's Foreword (London: Frank Cass, 1999), xii.
  12. J.A. Mangan, 'Prologue: Global Fascism and the Male Body: Ambitions, Similarities and Dissimilarities' in, J.A. Mangan (Ed.), *Superman Supreme: Fascist Body as political Icon – Global Fascism* (London: Cass, 2000), 19.
  13. Guttmann and Thompson, *Japanese Sports*, 152.
  14. J.A. Mangan, 'Epilogue' in, J.A. Mangan (Ed.) *Militarism, Sport, Europe: War Without Weapons* (London: Cass, 2003) and J.A. Mangan. (Ed.) *Making European Masculinities: Sport, Europe, Gender* (London: Cass, 2000).
  15. See, for example, J.A. Mangan, *'Manufactured' Masculinity: Making Imperial Manliness, Morality and Militarism* (London: Routledge, 2012; and London: Cass 2003) 281–282.
  16. *Ibid.*, *passim*.
  17. *Ibid.*
  18. Guttmann and Thompson *Japanese Sports: A History*, 159.
  19. 'Introduction' in, Lord Russell of Liverpool (Edward Russell) (Ed.), *The Knights of the Bushido: A Short History of Japanese War Crimes* (London: Greenhill Books, 2002).
  20. *Ibid.*, 72.
  21. *Ibid.*
  22. *Ibid.*, 242.
  23. Niall Ferguson, *Empire: How Britain Made the Modern World* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 2007), 338–339.
  24. *Ibid.*, 297.
  25. *Ibid.*
  26. *Ibid.*, 339.
  27. Kakuzo Okakura, *The Book of Tea*. (Hardcover, Classic Edition), (Clarendon: Tuttle Publishing, 1989). This is a famous Japanese publication first published in 1906. Kazuko was a Japanese scholar 'who contributed to the development of arts in Japan'. He wrote most of his

- main works in English. He wished to bring Asian culture to the attention of the world that in his time was mostly dominated by Western culture. ‘He argued that Asia is “one” in its humiliation... falling behind in achieving modernization, and thus being colonized by the Western powers’. He was an early Pan-Asianist. He was opposed to a Japan that sacrificed other Asian nations in the Russo-Japanese War in its attempt to catch up with the West. Available at: [www.goodreads.com/author/show/25563](http://www.goodreads.com/author/show/25563), accessed, 17, September 2015.
28. Fan Twan Eng, *The Garden of Evenings Mists* (London: Myremidon Books, 2012), 126.
  29. Lesley Brown (Ed.), NSOED (The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary), Vol.2 (N-Z), (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983 Edition), 2579.
  30. Mark Urban, *The Edge: Is the Military Dominance of the West Coming to an End?* (London: Abacus, 2015), 56–57.
  31. Martin Jacques, *When China Rules the World: The End of the Western World and the Birth of a New Global Order*, (Penguin Press, 2009), 307.
  32. Kim Dong-Hyun, ‘Facing up to Historical Facts’, *Korea Times*, 17 June 2015, available at: <http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/common/printpreview.asp?categoryCode=181&newsIdx=181026>, accessed, 20 October, 2015.
  33. David Pilling, *Bending Adversity: Japan and the Art of Survival* (London: Allen Lane, 2014), 246.
  34. Ibid.
  35. Ibid.
  36. Ibid.
  37. Ibid.
  38. See especially, Andrew Gordon, *A Modern History of Japan* (Cambridge: CUP, 2009), *passim*. I am indebted to Sandra Collins for this reference.
  39. For one example see, Laura Hein, ‘*Teaching War Is Not Easy: Controversies in Japan, Germany, and the United States*’, available at: <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/teaching-war-not-easy-controversies-japan-germany-and-the-united-states>, *passim*, accessed, 10 July 2015. (I am indebted to Sandra Collins for this reference.)
  40. Ibid.
  41. Ibid.
  42. See, Thomas V. Bagen, *War, Guilt and World War II*, (Cambridge University Press, 2012), *passim*. I am indebted to Sandra Collins for this source.
  43. Pilling, *Bending Adversity*, 246.
  44. Julian Ryall, ‘Japan can’t Carry on Apologizing for War’, *The Daily Telegraph*, 15 August 2015, 4.

45. Ibid.
46. Ibid.
47. Email communication to the author dated 16 November 2015 from Professor Sun-Yong Kwon. The Korean Internet source is: <https://sites.duke.edu/wcwc/2013/09/09/south-korea-vs-japan-a-rivalry-like-no-other->. The book source he provides is, Jennifer Lind, *Sorry States: Apologies in International Politics*, (Cornell: Cornell University Press, 2008), 11. Kwon links past war and present hostility *specifically* to sport.
48. Ibid.
49. Ibid.
50. Walter Benjamin, quoted in Benedict Anderson, *The Spectre of Comparisons: Nationalism, South East Asia and the World* (London: Verso, 2008), 333.
51. Ferguson, *Empires*, 297.
52. Laurence Binet. *HbhH*, (London: Vintage Books, 2012), *passim*.
53. Ibid., 112.
54. Henry Kissinger, *World Order: Reflections on the Character of Nations and the Course of History* (Harmondsworth: Allen Lane, 2014), 174.
55. Ibid.
56. Review of Simon Winchester in, 'Pacific: The Ocean of the Future', *The Daily Telegraph*, 4 October 2015, 28–29.
57. Ibid.
58. Ibid., (See also, Gideon Rachman, *Easternization: War and Peace in the Asian Century* (London: The Bodley Head 2016) especially Chap. 2, 'The Risk of War'.
59. Ibid., (See Appendix Two of this essay for fuller details.)
60. Ferguson, *Empire*, 92.
61. Urban, *The Edge*, 80.
62. Ibid., 'Conclusion' and *passim*.
63. See, J.A. Mangan, Sandra Collins and Gwang Ok. (Eds.) *The Triple Asian Olympics: Asia Rising – The Pursuit of National Identity, International Recognition and Global Esteem* (London: Routledge, 2013); J.A. Mangan and Fan Hong. (Eds.), *Post-Beijing 2008: Geopolitics, Sport and the Pacific Rim* (London: Routledge, 2012) and William W. Kelly and Susan Brownell (Eds.), *The Olympics in East Asia; Nationalism, Regionalism and Globalism on the Center Stage of World Sport*. (Yale: Yale CEAS Occasional Publications, volume 3, 2011).
64. Ibid.
65. Peter Frankopan, *The Silk Roads* (London: Bloomsbury Publishing Plc, 2015), 508.
66. Ibid., 521.
67. Ibid.

68. Ibid.
69. Ibid.
70. The Red Queen Effect also referred to Red Queen's Race or the Red Queen Hypothesis that states that organisms must constantly adapt simply to survive. It has been used to describe the global arms race, and by extension, may be used logically to describe the struggle for supremacy between political nations and regions.
71. Jacques, *When China Rules the World*, 369.
72. Ibid.
73. Jacques, *When China Rules the World*, ibid.
74. Ibid.
75. Ibid.
76. J.A. Mangan, Marcus P. Chu and Dong Jinxia. (Eds.) *The Asian Games Modern Metaphor for 'The Middle Kingdom' Reborn – Political Statement, Cultural Assertion, Social Symbol* (London: Routledge, 2014).
77. Ibid., 10.
78. Ibid.
79. See by way of contrast, Deepak Lal, *In Praise of Empires: Globalization and Order* (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004), *passim*. No one seems more certain, for example, than Martin Jacques, confident 'doomster' regarding the geopolitical descent of the West. See his, *When China Rules the World: The Rise of the Middle Kingdom and the End of the Western World*, *passim*. Others are less certain: See, Timothy Beardson, *Stumbling Giant: The Threats to China's Future* (Yale: Yale University Press, 2013), *passim*.
80. See, J.A. Mangan. 'Prologue: Eurocentric Lens Removed' and 'Epilogue: Eurocentric Lens Replaced' in, J.A. Mangan, Luo Qing and Sayuri Guthrie-Shimuzu (Eds.) *The Olympic Games: Prism for East Asian Politics and Geopolitics* (Beijing: China Communication University Press, Forthcoming).
81. Jacques, *When China Rules the World*, 48.
82. Ian Buruma, *A Japanese Mirror – Heroes and Villains of Japanese Culture* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1984), 219.
83. Pilling, *Bending Adversity*, 209.
84. Jacques, *When China Rules the World*, 48.
85. Email communication to the author from Professor Seok Won Song dated 10 November 2015.
86. Takayaki Yamashita, 'The Changing Field of Japanese Sport' in, Joseph Maguire and Masayoshi Nakayama (Eds.) *Japan, Sport and Society: Tradition and Change in a Globalizing World* (London: Routledge, 2006), 171–172.

87. Ibid.
88. Ibid.
89. Ibid.
90. Ibid.
91. Xu Guoqi, *Olympics Dreams: China and Sports, 1895-2008* (Harvard University Press, 2008), 222.
92. Ibid., 220–221.
93. Ibid., 222.
94. Ibid., 223.
95. Ibid., 223–224.
96. Ibid.
97. Ibid., 271.
98. Victor C. Cha, *Beyond the Final Score: The Politics of Sport in Asia* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), 156.
99. Jasmin Khan, *The Raj at War: a People's History of India's Second World War* (London: Bodley Head, 2015), 320.
100. Jacques, *When China Rules the World*, 11 and 65–69.
101. Eng, *The Garden of Evening Mists*, 206.
102. Jamal Sanad Al-Suwaidi, *Prospects for the American Age: Sovereignty and Influence in this New World Order*, (Abu Dhabi: Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research (ECSSR), 2015), 580–581.
103. Not least an ageing population. 'While Asia will grow economically, population in the developed countries will age rapidly. Europe, Japan and China will have the most aging population and high dependency ratios (more old and young dependents per 100 working age adults), followed by the US, Southeast Asia and Latin America, India, Africa and West Asia, on the other hand, will have a much younger population, driving their economic growth'. There is also China's appalling pollution. For a sharp, clear consideration see, 'Will China save the planet?', *The Week*, 12 December 2015, 14.
104. Rakesh Kapir, 'Asian Renaissance 2030 and the Global Future: 2030 and Beyond', *SGI Quarterly*, October 2015, 9.
105. J.A. Mangan, 'The New Asia: Global Transformation, Regional Ascendancy and Metaphorical Modernity', *International Journal of the History of Sport* 28, no. 16 (2011), 2229.
106. A far from easy task especially in the case of China. But this does not mean that relations between the two countries will inevitably be harmonious: the underlying antagonism between them is far too deeply rooted for that', Jacques, *When China Rules the World*, 311.
107. John Milton, *Ode on the Morning of Christ's Nativity: the Hymn* in the *Oxford Book of English Verse* (Oxford University Press, 1999), 161. Of Course, surely, a paradisiacal prelapsarian characteristic.

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PART IX

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Coda

## ‘The Past is a Present Country’

*J.A. Mangan*

### CONTROL OF THE SEAS: BLUE WATER POWER

#### The Modern ‘Middle’ Kingdom: ‘Imperial’ Outreach

Third Island Chain:

There have been discussions in China about a Third Island Chain. ‘The possibility, never before imagined, never before imaginable, that China could one day extend her blue-water power as far as Guam, Maybe even Hawaii, seemed suddenly within the reach of the possible’ Figs. 14.1 and 14.2.<sup>1, 2</sup>

### RECALL, RESENTMENT AND REVANCHISM

A

South Korea

This statue by the sculptor, Unseong Kim stands in front of the Japanese embassy in Seoul. The empty chair symbolises those Comfort Women who died at the hands of the Japanese and those who survived and who have died subsequently<sup>3</sup> (Fig. 14.3).

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**Fig. 14.1** First Island chain (See, ‘first Island chain’. wikipedia. [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First\\_island\\_chain](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First_island_chain). Credit to Suid-Afrikaanse, who created this on 10 April 2012 using paint. The map shows the ‘first island chain’ perimeter (marked in red). The map was taken from wikimedia commons. The ‘first island chain’ perimeter was derived from ‘Asia’s balance of power: China’s military rise’, and ‘China’s military rise: The dragon’s new teeth;’ both are articles from *The Economist*, dated 7 April 2012. Please check the link, which shows the license of the picture: [https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:First\\_island\\_chain\\_perimeter\\_\(marked\\_in\\_red\).jpg](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:First_island_chain_perimeter_(marked_in_red).jpg)) (See colour figure online.)



Fig. 14.2 First and second Island chains (Figure from, ‘people’s liberation navy—offshore defense’. [GlobalSecurity.org.http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/plan-doctrine-offshore.htm](http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/plan-doctrine-offshore.htm). (See also Holms, James R., ‘island-chain defense’, *The Diplomat*, 15 April 2011. <http://thediplomat.com/2011/04/island-chain-defense/> and Holms, James R. ‘Island Chains Everywhere’, *The Diplomat*, 16 February 2011. Available at: [http://thediplomat.com/2011/02/island-chains-everywhere/.](http://thediplomat.com/2011/02/island-chains-everywhere/))

## B CHINA

### Lest We Forget: Chinese Edition

It is beyond the expectation of the Chinese Ambassador to the UK that immediately after he published an article on the *The Daily Telegraph* in January,<sup>4</sup> he would receive a letter from a 98-year-old World War II



**Fig. 14.3** ‘My Korean grandmother’s memories of the Japanese occupation and the Korean war’ (Available at: <http://www.asiapundits.com/my-korean-grandmothers-memories-of-the-japanese-occupation-and-the-korean-war/>. Accessed 11/01/2017.)

veteran—Fred Seiker; and as decreed by destiny, it seems, was that Liu was invited to write a Foreword for a book, which is exactly the Chinese version of Fred Seiker’s monograph (Fig. 14.4).

Fred Seiker’s *Lest We Forget* described a heart-breaking period of history: During WWII, Japan occupied Thailand and Burma and forced thousands of Asian workers and prisoners of War (POWs) of Allies to build the railway connecting Bangkok, Thailand to Rangoon, Burma, known as Burma Railway. During the construction, over

LEST WE FORGET  
LIFE AS A JAPANESE PRISONER OF WAR

# 永远不能忘记

## —— 日军战俘营的岁月

[荷兰] 弗雷德·塞克 



Fig. 14.4 Fred Seiker's *lest we forget* (Available at: [https://www.google.com.au/search?q=Fred+Seiker+Lest+We+Forget,+Chinese+edition,+cover+picture&client=firefox-b&biw=1360&bih=659&tbm=isch&imgil=hg4LgJymmfoJ2M%253A%253B6wiQmu16BjWR3M%253Bhttps%25253A%25252F%25252Fwww.amazon.co.uk%25252FLest-We-Forget-Japanese-Prisoner%25252Fdp%25252F1909219150&source=iu&pf=m&fir=hg4LgJymmfoJ2M%253A%252C6wiQmu16BjWR3M%252C\\_&cusg=\\_\\_zLffNh3FLp8QfVcygZojRuHsh\\_o%3D&ved=0ahUKEwi61NSq9LjRAhULjLwKHUIIAkQQyjcIKw&ei=F4Z1WPrsIouY8gXJkImgBA#imgrc=hg4LgJymmfoJ2M%3A](https://www.google.com.au/search?q=Fred+Seiker+Lest+We+Forget,+Chinese+edition,+cover+picture&client=firefox-b&biw=1360&bih=659&tbm=isch&imgil=hg4LgJymmfoJ2M%253A%253B6wiQmu16BjWR3M%253Bhttps%25253A%25252F%25252Fwww.amazon.co.uk%25252FLest-We-Forget-Japanese-Prisoner%25252Fdp%25252F1909219150&source=iu&pf=m&fir=hg4LgJymmfoJ2M%253A%252C6wiQmu16BjWR3M%252C_&cusg=__zLffNh3FLp8QfVcygZojRuHsh_o%3D&ved=0ahUKEwi61NSq9LjRAhULjLwKHUIIAkQQyjcIKw&ei=F4Z1WPrsIouY8gXJkImgBA#imgrc=hg4LgJymmfoJ2M%3A). Accessed 11/01/2017.)

12,000 POWs and 250,000 workers were sent to their deaths under the Japan army's cruel persecution and inhumane cruelty. Among the survivors, several thousand were permanently disabled. So the railway was named as the 'death railway'. Seiker was once one of the POWs. He recorded through words and paintings the years of miserable experiences, revealing the cruel atrocity and abuse of the prisoners of the Japanese and recorded the enormity of the crime of Japanese militarism.

On 2nd January 2014, Ambassador Liu Xiaoming published in *Daily Telegraph* an article: 'Japan's refusal to face up to its aggressive past is posing a serious threat to global peace'. And on 3rd January, he received veteran Seiker's letter. Seiker praised Ambassador Liu of his eloquence and his criticism of the Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's impotence regarding Japan's adopting the path of militarism. Seiker wrote:

...as a small token of support for your article in the name of my friends who were murdered by the Japanese military whilst working on the Thai-Burma Railway. I send you my clumsy work *Lest We forget* in English. It asking for your corrections onwards. The English version is the fourth edition, apart from keeping contents of the original book, I added my personal experience of the time'.

After reading Seiker's book, the Ambassador Liu Xiaoming wrote back to Seiker. The Ambassador first expressed his deep sympathy for Seiker's sufferings experienced under the Japanese army's bayonet during WWII, and admired him for his great courage and humanitarian spirit. Afterwards, Ambassador Liu wrote:

In China, hundred thousands of my compatriots suffered the same as you did or suffered even more miserable fates. The pains of war cannot be easily healed till today, and people cannot forget the period of evil history and the outrageous crime. In order to prevent the devil of militarism to stage a comeback, we must record the true history and envisage this history correctly.



According to the commissioning editor of *Lest We Forget*, Liu Keyang, the Chinese Embassy in the UK provided great help to support the publishing of the book's Chinese version. The embassy asked Ambassador Liu Xiaoming to write the Foreword. He was very happy to do this. In the Foreword, he recalled their correspondence and sincerely hoped more Chinese and overseas readers, especially young people can learn from the evil history of Japanese militarism, and hoped they would learn from Mr. Seiker to say 'Forget? Never!' firmly when faced with efforts reversing the verdict of invasion, would publicize Japanese militarism. 'Only if like this, can we ensure today's peace cannot be threatened, and the tragedy of history will never play again!'<sup>5</sup>

## REVENGE, RETRIBUTION AND REASSURANCE

### 'Why China Wants to Make Japan Tremble'<sup>6</sup>

Katsuhiko Meshino's forthright, informative article was published in the *Nikkei Asian Review*, in 2015 and opens with what appears to be a restrained yet significant observation:

China appears to be planning to conduct a military parade in Beijing on Sept 3 (2015) to mark the 70th anniversary of what it calls Victory of Japan Day. Although Beijing has not made any official announcements, local media reports suggest preparations are underway.<sup>7</sup>

The reasons later given by Katsuhiko Meshino for China's apparent intention to make Japan 'tremble' (and not *just* Japan!) are made harshly clear but first set in a domestic, historical perspective:

After a long lull amid social upheaval caused in part by the Cultural Revolution, the practice of conducting military parades in the Chinese capital was revived on Oct. 1, 1984, to commemorate the 35th anniversary of National Day, the national foundation day.<sup>8</sup>

The next military parade in 1999 was held on the 50th anniversary of China's foundation day. It was reviewed by Jiang Zemin, general secretary of the party, chairman of the military commission and president of the country. The parade de facto announced that Jiang had taken over the reins of leadership. And a decade later in 2009, the 60th anniversary parade was reviewed by Hu Jintao who was then holder of the three powerful positions formerly held by Jiang Zemin. It had become a key instrument of the Chinese government's soft power-cum-public diplomacy platform both domestically and internationally.

The next parade held on 3 September 2015, which was stage-managed by President Xi, saw foreign dignitaries invited to attend the first time. The accompanying government propaganda proliferated on all media outlets including naturally, major organ of the Chinese government's media voice, the *People's Daily*, long referred to domestically and overseas in Chinese communities as the Chinese Communists Party's (CCP's) 'throat and tongue'<sup>9</sup> and, as such, the bellicose veiled threats were widely considered to be theatrical sabre-rattling on the part of President XI Jinping aimed at his people, the Japanese and the visiting representatives of the various Foreign governments in attendance.

The CCP on its media 'mouth-piece's' website offered four political functions of the new—styled parade:

it will demonstrate China's military might; make Japan tremble and show the world China's resolve to protect the post-war global order; heighten national pride by showing the military to the people of China and unifying them in their faith in the country; and demonstrate to 'corrupt elements' that the party and the people – the 'hilt of the nation's sword' – maintain a firm grip on the military.<sup>10</sup>

As with all such brutishly transparent military extravaganzas in totalitarian States, it implicitly demonstrated the nation's sheer military power and that it was firmly under the control of the government. The coverage of the CCP's view of the functions of the parade demonstrated the Chinese government's *realpolitik* at work as these comments and the direct threat to make Japan tremble *only* appeared on the *People's Daily* website.

Katsuhiko Meshino suggests that the 'sabre-rattling' and somewhat precipitous timing and tone of the 2015 parade was all part of President Xi's strategy to use the confrontation with Japan over control in the South China Sea, 'to reinforce his power base'<sup>11</sup> Some 2 years later we can now see that the event marked an emphatic geopolitical advance of China's long-term ambitions to become not only the East Asian hegemon, at the expense of Japan, but also the world's leading economic, military, political and cultural power. Other issues and the protestations of regional states like, Indonesia, Vietnam, Cambodia and the Philippines along with its on-going 'irritation'—Taiwan are, it is suggested now of secondary significance to China; there may well be a nemesis emerging.

### *Coda*

#### **Shadows, Substance, Survival!**

That is '...Why China Wants To Make Japan "tremble"'<sup>12</sup>

Tension in the region is intensifying. In March 2017 China warned that the USA and North Korea are like torpedo tracks set for a 'head-on collision by way of missile tests in Pyongyang and responsive United States and South Korean joint military exercises. The Chinese diplomat in Beijing, Wang Y claimed recently that China is a signalman flashing a red light and applying the brakes to both trains. He also added pointedly that the nuclear issue of the Korean peninsula is chiefly between North Korea and other regional states. The diplomat stated that as a neighbour Beijing considered that it should help to resolve tensions in the region!<sup>13</sup>

### REVIVAL, RENAISSANCE, RESURGENCE

#### **Brilliant Beijing**

Beijing 2008 was a modern 'soft power' manifestation of the rise of 'the Middle Kingdom' to political and geopolitical prominence; it was the projection of China Ascendant; the rebirth of a Global Superpower; the celebration of a Confident Renaissance.; and also the harbinger of an Asian sports revolution: a major step towards the Asianization of World Sport (Figures 14.5, 14.6, 14.7, 14.8, 14.9 and 14.10).



**Fig. 14.5** Beijing national stadium in the evening (dubbed ‘the Bird Nest’) (*Source* Wikipedia, ‘Beijing national stadium. Architect: Herzog & de Meuron, ArupSport, China architectural design & research group’. Available at: [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Beijing\\_National\\_Stadium#/media/File:Beijing\\_national\\_stadium.jpg](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Beijing_National_Stadium#/media/File:Beijing_national_stadium.jpg). Accessed 24/02/2017.)




**Fig. 14.6** Silk road segment in the opening ceremony, Beijing 2008 Summer Olympics (*Source* Wikipedia, ‘silk road segment’. Available at: [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2008\\_Summer\\_Olympics\\_opening\\_ceremony#/media/File:Opening\\_ceremony\\_of\\_the\\_2008\\_Olympic\\_Games\\_in\\_Beijing,\\_China,\\_Aug.\\_8,\\_2008.JPG](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2008_Summer_Olympics_opening_ceremony#/media/File:Opening_ceremony_of_the_2008_Olympic_Games_in_Beijing,_China,_Aug._8,_2008.JPG). Accessed 24/02/2017.)



**Fig. 14.7** Performers dance on the surface of an illuminated sphere in the middle of the Beijing National Stadium in the Opening Ceremony, Beijing 2008 Summer Olympics (*Source* Wikipedia, ‘performers dance on the surface of an illuminated sphere in the middle of the national stadium’. Available at: [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2008\\_Summer\\_Olympics\\_opening\\_ceremony#/media/File:2008\\_Summer\\_Olympics\\_Opening\\_Ceremony\\_4.jpg](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2008_Summer_Olympics_opening_ceremony#/media/File:2008_Summer_Olympics_Opening_Ceremony_4.jpg). Accessed 24/02/2017.)



**Fig. 14.8** Beijing National Aquatics Center (*Source* Wikipedia, ‘the beijing national aquatics center, dubbed “the water cube”’. Available at: [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2008\\_Summer\\_Olympics#/media/File:国家游泳中心夜景.jpg](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2008_Summer_Olympics#/media/File:国家游泳中心夜景.jpg). Accessed 24/02/2017.)



**Fig. 14.9** Beijing national stadium (*Source* Wikipedia, ‘the beijing national stadium, dubbed “the bird’s nest”’. Available at: [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2008\\_Summer\\_Olympics#/media/File:Birds\\_Nest\\_Cropped.jpg](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2008_Summer_Olympics#/media/File:Birds_Nest_Cropped.jpg). Accessed 24/02/2017.)



**Fig. 14.10** The opening ceremony, the 29th olympics, Beijing (*Source* Wikipedia, ‘opening ceremony’. [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2008\\_Summer\\_Olympics#/media/File:Beijing\\_Olympics\\_2008.jpg](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2008_Summer_Olympics#/media/File:Beijing_Olympics_2008.jpg). Accessed 24/02/2017.)

## NOTES

1. Simon Winchester, *PACIFIC: THE OCEAN OF THE FUTURE* (London: William Collins, 2015), 412.
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3. I am indebted to Professor Gwang Ok for this image.
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**Acknowledgements** I would like to express my sincere gratitude to Dr. Tianwei Ren for providing the outstanding images in this section of the chapter.

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