

Perspectives in Cultural-Historical Research 2

Ekaterina Zavershneva
René van der Veer *Editors*

Vygotsky's Notebooks

A Selection

 Springer

Perspectives in Cultural-Historical Research

Volume 2

Series editors

Marilyn Fler, Peninsula Campus, Monash University, Frankston, Victoria, Australia

Fernando González Rey, Department of Psychology, University of Brasília, Brasília -DF, Brazil

Elena Kravtsova, Russian State University for the Humanities, Moscow, Russia

Nikolai Veresov, Faculty of Education, Monash University, Frankston, Australia

There is growing interest in the work of LS Vygotsky internationally, but also in finding new ways and perspectives for advancing cultural-historical theory for solving contemporary problems. Although Vygotsky has become one of the most influential scholars in education and psychology today, there is still a need for serious studies of his work because so much remains unexamined.

The books in this series draw on the collected works of Vygotsky as a primary source of authority. They go beyond secondary sources and discuss Vygotsky's original ideas in the context of a system of concepts or through the elaboration and theorisation of research findings so that contemporary problems can be addressed in new ways.

This series collectively brings together under one umbrella a more equal representation of works from scholars across both the Northern and Southern continents. In the context of a large volume of contributions to cultural-historical theorisation and the empirical work from North America, there is an urgent need for making visible the works of scholars from countries who reside in countries other than North America.

More information about this series at <http://www.springer.com/series/13559>

Ekaterina Zavershneva · René van der Veer
Editors

Vygotsky's Notebooks

A Selection

 Springer

Editors

Ekaterina Zavershneva
Moscow State University
Moscow
Russia

René van der Veer
Faculty of Education
Leiden University
Leiden
The Netherlands

ISSN 2520-1530 ISSN 2520-1549 (electronic)
Perspectives in Cultural-Historical Research
ISBN 978-981-10-4623-0 ISBN 978-981-10-4625-4 (eBook)
<https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-4625-4>

Library of Congress Control Number: 2017941068

© Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2018

This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed.

The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.

The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

Printed on acid-free paper

This Springer imprint is published by Springer Nature
The registered company is Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd.
The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore

Preface

It is ironic that Lev Vygotsky, who claimed for many years that mental development is about the internalization of external signs and that external signs must be replaced by inner ones during the course of such development, made notes throughout his life. It seems he was always making notes on whatever was at hand (e.g., cards, maps, pieces of paper, forms) and whatever he was doing (e.g., visiting museums, attending lectures, reading books, examining patients). Subsequently, these notes formed the basis of lectures, articles, and books. This book contains a selection of these notes found in Vygotsky's personal archive. They were meticulously studied and deciphered by the first editor and, in cases of doubt, by both editors. The second editor provided a first translation of the text, and together the editors tried to solve the remaining linguistic and conceptual problems.

Elsewhere one of us has argued that the fact that Vygotsky became popular long after his death causes problems for the modern reader (Van der Veer 2014, p. 4). We know so little of the psychology of the early 20th century that it is easy to attribute ideas to Vygotsky that were common at the time or fail to see the novelty of the ideas he advanced. In the words of Boring (1950, p. ix): "Without such knowledge he [the reader] sees the present in distorted perspective, he mistakes old facts and old views for new, and he remains unable to evaluate the significance of new movements and methods." This is why the editors have supplied introductions and what may seem an excessive number of notes to the text. It is their hope that these will allow the reader to at least partially reconstruct the historical context of Vygotsky's ideas. In writing these introductions and notes, they relied on the usual encyclopedias (notably, Wikipedia), read scores of articles and books by Vygotsky and his contemporaries, and were especially pleased with the existence of digitalized older books. The editors were also morally supported by colleagues and friends (e.g., Tatyana Akhutina, Igor Arieivitch, Irina Kazakova, Peter Keiler, Alexandre Métraux, Maksim Osipov, Yakov Sinichkin, Natal'ya Stoyukhina, Anton Yasnitsky) and felt free to bother them with silly or difficult questions. In rare cases, they believed they knew something themselves. The result

of this effort is what Vygotsky regarded as typical for the modern Western person: borrowed knowledge, e.g., knowledge that is transmitted from expert to novice. Few readers have been in the Sahara; yet most of them believe it is a hot and sandy place in the daytime.

Even with the introductions and the footnotes, this volume requires some hard work by the reader, and the editors do not claim that they fully understand each and every part of the text. After all, a large part of this text was written for private use, and arguments were not spelled out. Moreover, sometimes it is not even clear whether Vygotsky gives his own point of view or summarizes the view of a colleague. Hopefully, discussions of this volume in the scientific press and on the Internet will help to solve the remaining problems of comprehension.

The publication of private notebooks always involves some modifications, and we wish to explain the procedure we followed. First, the text was deciphered and typed. This in itself is no easy task because Vygotsky's handwriting was not always clear, and he frequently used abbreviations of his own invention (e.g., "m.r." for "mental retardation" or "hndwrtnng" for "handwriting"). One might say that his notebooks have several of the properties that Vygotsky himself ascribed to inner speech: abbreviations, references to things that are only clear to someone who has the same knowledge (e.g., "See my talk"), etc. In typing the text of the notebooks, we lost the typical typographical features of a manuscript, that is, the underlining, the crossing out, the arrows, the writing upside down or backwards, the added remarks in the margins, and so on. Rendering these features in the book would have made it very unpleasant to read, but in the comments we have indicated what readers cannot see for themselves. In addition, we have corrected the mistakes in foreign words, expressions, citations, and names. Although Vygotsky read several languages, his active use of them left much to be desired. Words underlined by Vygotsky, book and journal titles, poetry lines, and foreign words are rendered in italics. In the rare cases that Vygotsky himself used English words or expressions, these are given in bold script. Punctuation has been mostly left intact—unless this made the understanding difficult—and we added quotation marks when Vygotsky was citing a poet or writer verbatim. Vygotsky was in the habit of repeatedly writing up the outlines of the same talk or chapter and had a stock of pet expressions and ideas to which he came back time and again, as the reader will see in the present edition. For this reason, in rare cases, we left out part of the text when it became excessively repetitive. These suppressed passages have been indicated with angle brackets and ellipses. Insertions and comments by the editors are given in square brackets (i.e., []) and/or small script. Words that were difficult or impossible to decipher are given in angle brackets (i.e., < >) with either our best guess or the word "illegible."

Finally, this book was edited by two authors who have never met each other and communicated solely through email. There is no doubt that this caused some disadvantages—e.g., written speech needs to be much more elaborate than oral speech—and it is better not to speculate about the possible advantages. However, we

sincerely believe that the present result once more shows the truth of Feuerbach's dictum, that what is impossible for one person is possible for two.

Moscow, Russia
Leiden, The Netherlands

Ekaterina Zavershneva
René van der Veer

References

- Boring, E. G. (1950). *A history of experimental psychology*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Van der Veer, R. (2014). *Lev Vygotsky*. London: Bloomsbury.

Contents

1	A Tragicomedy of Strivings	1
2	Jewry and World History	11
3	The Book of Fragments	21
4	The Jewish Question	41
5	Genres of Writing	51
6	The Trip to London	57
7	From the Zakharino Hospital	71
8	Toward Cultural–Historical Theory	107
9	The Instrumental Method	115
10	Concepts and the Systemic Approach	129
11	The Anomalous Development of the Child	155
12	From the EDI Clinic	177
13	Spinoza and the Problem of Higher Emotions	209
14	Observing Asya	237
15	The Study of Consciousness	243
16	From Sign to Meaning and Sense	251
17	The Problem of Consciousness	271
18	The Semic Method	291
19	The Result of Many Years of Work	311
20	Disintegration and Schizophrenia	319

21	Thinking and Speech	353
22	Psychology as a Science	367
23	Dubious Moves	383
24	The Conference of October 27–29, 1933	391
25	The Semantic Field: Sparring with Lewin	403
26	Neuropsychology	419
27	Difficult Children	437
28	The Playing Child	459
29	The Rest is Silence	483
	Author Index	503
	Subject Index	513

Introduction

The reputation of Vygotsky as presently known is based on the re-publication of a selection of his articles, books, and manuscripts. It is known that the family archive contained many more texts with ideas for research, discussions of other researchers' work, excerpts of books, outlines for presentations, articles, and books, etc. Until now, however, very few of these archived materials had been published. The present volume is the first book dedicated to a large number of these hitherto unpublished writings. Together they cover a considerable period, from 1912 to 1934, and they would fill an appreciable number of pages if published in their entirety. Despite the fact that a large number of notes may have been lost (judging by the uneven representation over the years), there are still more than 500 items left. Some of these are extremely brief and others are illegible or have not stood the test of time: For this edition, we have selected what we think are the most interesting ones from both a private and a scientific perspective.

Reconstructing the texts was no easy task and took several years: The hundreds of cards, pieces of paper, forms, etc. were in complete disarray, and their order could sometimes only be established by such external characteristics as the type of paper, the color of the ink, or the quality of the handwriting. It seemed at first an impossible task: The notes are replete with abbreviations, quotations in various languages without mention of the source, long forgotten terms and concepts, foreign words, first names and surnames, addresses and telephone numbers, schemas, arrows, exclamation marks, etc. Moreover, the paper tended to be yellowed or soiled, and the text may have faded or was crossed out. Sometimes we kept staring at an illegible word for days or even weeks until its meaning suddenly popped up or we finally understood an abbreviation after having read some obscure German paper. In sum, we felt like paleontologists who try to identify a dinosaur by a tiny fraction of its hip bone or like archeologists who reconstruct the form of an amphora using the two or three pieces that were left. Fortunately, many of the notes had a clear *Aufforderungscharakter* (valence or affordance; see the text) and, as it were, urged the editors to uncover their hidden meaning. The outcome surpassed our expectations: The family archive revealed the other side of the moon, the unknown Vygotsky. It was the same strong-willed, passionate, young man with the

exemplary career known from many historical psychological descriptions, but now he spoke to us without leaving things unsaid, without reservation, as if we had had an intimate and very frank conversation with him.

The result is a new Vygotsky. For the first time, we see Vygotsky discussing Jewish issues; for the first time, we see Vygotsky the psychotherapist at work; for the first time, we witness Vygotsky discussing the value of playing with toys for mental development, the problem of chess thinking, etc. The present book is also one of the few Vygotsky publications that are based on a thorough study of original manuscripts. The Russian edition of Vygotsky's work in six volumes was an abysmal failure in many respects (Van der Veer and Yasnitsky 2016; Zavershneva and Osipov 2012), which is tragic because many Russian re-publications and foreign translations are based on that edition and thus repeat its many errors and falsifications. With few exceptions, Vygotsky's private notes were not published at all and thus fell beyond the horizon of the researcher, although their importance can hardly be overestimated. In order to understand these notes, we should not just follow the dynamic course of Vygotsky's thinking—tracing its sudden twists, its ramifications, and its dead ends—but also hold in mind the plans and motives behind them. Gradually, while reading the subsequent chapters of the book, we get to know the problems that haunted Vygotsky, the goals he wished to achieve, the set of ideas and convictions that guided him in his search process, and the socio-historical and scientific context in which he worked. It becomes clear that Vygotsky wanted to develop a view of the human personality that took the emotional and motivational as well as the intellectual sphere into account but that he never was fully satisfied with the intermediate results of his efforts. The remaining notebooks are less clear about Vygotsky the person: Very few of them contain remarks of a personal character, which makes them even more valuable (e.g., chapter 6) because they give us a unique insight in who Vygotsky was and what moved him.

Summarizing the results of our study of the notebooks, we may conclude that their content allows us to reconstruct Vygotsky's enormous and extremely diverse involvement in psychology at both the theoretical and practical levels. They also provide us with the possibility to, as it were, penetrate the process of Vygotsky's thinking, into his living and ever-changing world of ideas, and into the many plans he failed to realize (e.g., a theory of emotions, a general theory of consciousness and mind, a model of free and meaningful action, etc.). We now can take an intimate look at the plans for books that were never written, the summaries and evaluations of presentations by his colleagues at informal meetings, the planned experimental set-ups, the diaries of his work in the clinic, the case histories of his patients, the points he wanted to discuss during talks and lectures, and much more. We now also have a much better idea about the people with whom Vygotsky cooperated, and fortunately we were able to identify a great number of the bibliographical sources that played a fundamental role in Vygotsky's writings but that had been left unidentified or unnoticed in previous editions of Vygotsky's writings.

To enable the readers to find their way in the wealth of new findings that this book contains, we will point out their connection with the fundamental ideas that characterized each stage in Vygotsky's thinking.

The pre-psychological period (1912 to 1922)

The volume begins with the oldest manuscript we found in the archives, "The tragicomedy of strivings," written in 1912 and dedicated to an analysis of the book of Ecclesiastes (chapter 1). The propositions for the talk about the psychological and spiritual portrait of Ecclesiastes, prepared by the gymnasium student Lev Vygotsky, in many ways anticipated not just his future master's thesis, "The tragedy of Hamlet," but also foreshadowed the fate of Vygotsky the scholar who as a student lived on the brink of the new era when "the time went out of joint" (*Hamlet*). At the core of the talk is the feeling of the incompleteness of being, a state of despair and decline, but at the same time the perspective of its overcoming by accepting life with its impalpable diversity. Vygotsky was well acquainted with this Hamletian situation: striving for integrity—in both his personal life and in theory—he was more than once forced to fight duplicity, deceit, and despise caused by the fact that he was a Russian citizen of Jewish descent and an unorthodox follower of Spinoza and Marx in the land of victorious socialism. He had every reason to accept the truth of the maxim that freedom is the appreciation of necessity, but his path to freedom was tortuous and did not begin with Marx at all.

The documents presented in chapters 2 to 4 give an unprecedented insight into what moved Vygotsky during his student years. The notes and manuscripts from 1915 to 1918 testify of the fact that, as a student, Vygotsky opposed Marxism, tried his hand at writing essays about national politics, and advocated the renaissance of Judaism (Zavershneva 2012a). The Jewish question was to the forefront of his mind and central to his thinking, which at the time was clearly eschatological: His texts were dedicated to the future of the Jewry, which he deemed inseparably connected with the impending end of times. Vygotsky's friend in Gomel', the artist Aleksandr Bykhovsky, was not far from the truth when he nicknamed Vygotsky "the prophet": It seemed as if Vygotsky's notes predicted the tragic events connected with the October Revolution and the Holocaust. Thus, in early fall 1917, Vygotsky wrote, "the times of the inquisition have passed, but they will seem paradise compared to what is still to come... The hatred of enlightened and civilized people is worse than the hatred of brutes and fanatics. All sorts of deaths and horrors are impending. The punishment and wrath of God are dreadful. All that happened will seem insignificant compared to what is happening, is on its way, is near. Everything goes down into the abyss. Doom is impending" (chapter 3). These were passages from a text called "The book of fragments," one of the most striking documents of that period that was meant to be a book of edifications not unlike the Jewish *Aggadah* but which remained unfinished.

The reflections about the future made him acutely aware of his own forced idleness and uselessness (Zavershneva 2013). “The fate of an idle man with abilities, a prisoner is happier, a poor man is happier—this is my lot,” he wrote in the unsent letter to his co-author of the book *About the new Jewry* (chapter 4). The preserved book plan shows that its idea was to criticize all contemporary currents in Jewish politics, but Vygotsky offered no other solution than resignation and trust in the Messianic role of the Jewish people. However, in the revolutionary years of 1917 to 1918, a sudden and decisive change in Vygotsky’s worldview took place: He switched from having sympathy with Judaism to accepting Marxism, which became one of his main sources of inspiration. It is likely that the difficult process of re-evaluating his ideals was connected with the decision of the new socialist government to abolish the “Pale of Settlement,” the area beyond which permanent Jewish residency was prohibited. For the first time in his life, Vygotsky could hope to broaden his horizons and to live and work in a city of his own choice. The expectation of the second coming of the Messiah, who restores justice and brings salvation to the humiliated and insulted, now became projected onto the socialist revolution, and soon the tragic overtones and citations from the Torah disappeared from Vygotsky’s writings. He first spent several years working as a theater critic in Gomel (Van der Veer 2015) and then, in 1924, he returned to Moscow, where he quickly became a highly visible figure in Soviet psychology and pedology. From now on his published books and papers emanated a cheerful and active mood.

The “reactological” period (1923 to 1925)

In the beginning of his academic career, Vygotsky studied all of the existing psychological theories and toyed with the concepts of the reflexologists (Pavlov, Bekhterev), the behaviorists (Watson, Lashley), and the reactologists (Kornilov). Soon, however, he rejected both their terminology and their methodology. Vygotsky argued that psychology was in a state of crisis and could not continue with the mere gathering of “data.” Instead, he suggested to create the “new science of a superman” (Zavershneva 2012b), which would combine all of the achievements of the other theories and become a sort of *Capital* of the future psychology. As usual with Vygotsky, the transition to a new and more personal viewpoint took place suddenly, in a short time, and under difficult circumstances. In fall 1926, after his discharge from the hospital where he spent half a year in connection with his recurrent tuberculosis, Vygotsky formulated the first theses of his cultural-historical theory in his private notes; in early 1928, they would appear in the scientific press. The theoretical switch was in part prepared by his work on *The psychology of art* in which artistic creation was considered as a social-cultural technique to manipulate feelings or, even, as a means to create higher emotions.

The relapse and the theoretical break-through were anticipated by what seems to have been another existential crisis (chapter 6). During his one and only trip abroad in July and August 1925, Vygotsky, who was not yet 30 years old, experienced

states of elation and pride as well as states of anxiety and depression when he felt that his days were measured (Van der Veer and Zavershneva 2011). His stay in England and Germany was filled with existential reflections about himself and his young wife, Rosa. In the time left, he wandered about London, visited museums and galleries: “No Rafael, da Vinci or Michelangelo, no French and no Dutch, even no Dührer. The Spaniards Greco, Goya, Velázquez. I am sitting before Goya’s portrait and Greco’s pink-black Christ. My soul is full of flashes of burnt out passions.” Greco’s famous *Agony in the garden*, which depicts Jesus’ anguish (“let this cup pass me by”), struck a chord in Vygotsky, but the London weather and the constant emotional stress undermined his health. After his return to Moscow, Vygotsky was hospitalized with a collapsed lung and an inauspicious prognosis.

The notepad from the Zakharino hospital (chapter 7) contained “the key to the psychology of man.” This was the subtitle that Vygotsky gave to his planned book “Zoon politikon” (“The political animal,” i.e., Aristotle’s definition of man). This book remained unfinished, and its first critical part would become known as “The historical meaning of the psychological crisis” (Zavershneva 2012c). But as we can see from his notes, the book promised to contain much more: the outlines of a theory of consciousness based on the leading role of communication and words in cognitive human development of the higher type, the earliest traces of the cultural–historical approach including the principle of sign mediation, additions to *The psychology of art* (see also chapter 5), and reflections about the nature of the word and the psychophysical problem. This is all the more remarkable because Vygotsky had no opportunity to write longer texts and could just jot down ideas in his tiny notebooks both because of his very weak physical condition and because of the appalling circumstances in the overcrowded hospital. On the day he was discharged from the hospital, he summarized his personal feelings as follows: “In the half year spent in this home, where death was as ordinary and common as the morning breakfast and the doctor’s round, I absorbed so many impressions of death that I am inclined to death just like a tired person is inclined to sleep.” Nevertheless, he quickly more or less recovered, resumed work with his colleagues, and made the step to a new psychology which—especially initially—bore the clear stamp of Marx’s conception.

Instrumental psychology (1926 to 1929)

The principle of sign mediation now became the foundation of Vygotsky’s approach. As is known, it was realized in the studies that used the “sign” operation as the equivalent of tool use, which was connected with Marx’s idea about the mastery of nature and oneself (chapter 9). In this stage of the development of the cultural–historical theory, the research focus was on the main function of the sign, i.e., to serve as a means of transformation of the elementary natural function into a higher, specifically human one. The concept of the higher psychological function was introduced and defined as a function that is mediated, voluntary and social in

origin, and the method of double stimulation was introduced to investigate all higher psychological functions. This period is represented by such publications as the talks “The instrumental method,” and “The problem of the higher intellectual functions in the system of psychotechnical research,” the book *Studies on the history of behavior* (with Luria), and the manuscript “The history of the higher psychological functions.” Incidentally, the publication of the latter manuscript in Vygotsky’s collected works, based on an unidentified source (we did not find a text with this name and content in the family archives), has led to questions about its authenticity and date of composition.

Historically, Vygotsky’s ideas of “instrumental psychology” have become most widely accepted by Vygotsky’s followers, and to this day most researchers primarily refer to the principle of sign mediation. Ironically, we found few archival notes from this “instrumental” period, but fortunately they contain information about a number of issues that so far remained unclarified (chapter 9). We found, for example, a number of notes about Leont’ev memory studies using the technique of double stimulation (one of them, dated October 1927, is included in chapter 9), plans for the manuscript “The history of the higher psychological functions,” which together with other documents show that parts of it were created in the period from 1928 to mid-1930, and also a note about what Vygotsky planned to call his theory (until now we had no information about that). The variant “The historical theory of the higher psychological functions,” which he preferred toward the end of 1928, cannot be accepted as the final one, however, because Vygotsky kept developing his theory and adding new principles to its core.

Introduction of the systemic principle: A transitional period (1930 to 1931)

Already in 1929, in his notes on “The concrete psychology of man,” Vygotsky submitted his previous strategy to study the higher psychological functions in isolation to criticism and moved on to the problem of the personality as the highest unity, as the coherent hierarchical system of psychological functions. Seen from the new viewpoint, the sign operation was a means of self-organization of the person, and although the theme of the person or personality soon disappeared again, the emphasis on the higher psychological functions as an organized whole remained in the form of the systemic approach, which Vygotsky introduced in 1930 in the article “About psychological systems.” He began the study of the interfunctional connections established through the sign and focused on the process of the socio-cultural development of new functional systems that are impossible in the animal mind: artificially organized, flexible, and voluntarily guided systems (chapter 10). According to Vygotsky, the composition of these systems is radically different in different stages of ontogeny, and their possibilities are determined by the more developed, dominating higher psychological function. The system principle

was used in “Tool and sign in the development of the child” (with Luria), which was created around this time (its dating in the collected works is incorrect), and also in the *Pedology of the adolescent* (1931), the main work of that period, where the principle was not just applied to developmental psychology but also to clinical psychology.

Exactly these areas were characteristic of the transitional period. On one hand, Vygotsky proposed ways to experimentally study the development of psychological systems in children (chapter 10); on the other hand, he successfully applied the new principle in what was called “defectology” in the practical work with special-needs children, whether mentally retarded, maltreated, or neglected. The notebooks “The anomalous development of the child” (chapter 11) and “From the EDI Clinic” (chapter 12) contain propositions for talks and internal meetings about the problems of child development as well as the description of case histories of children who were seen by Vygotsky personally. Until now, none of the cases from Vygotsky’s clinical practice had been described in the literature. In chapter 12, the first two cases are presented, which show that the analysis of (1) the influence of hereditary and environmental factors in the development of children takes the children’s personality as its point of departure and (2) the possibility of compensation and growth is considered in the context of the development of a cultural superstructure including the tertiary personality and character connections. In chapters 11 and 12, we also present material from the internal meetings about the problem of emotions, the discussion of the results of the research performed by Luria’s team in Uzbekistan, etc.

The theory of dynamic semantic systems and the psychology of experience (1932 to 1934)

The ultimate period began with a radical theoretical innovation: Vygotsky introduced the principle of the semantic structure of the mind. Although retaining the principle of sign mediation, Vygotsky considerably broadened its concept by transitioning from the study of the external structure of the sign operation in its instrumental function to the study of its internal structure, i.e., the meanings. This theoretical step was prepared by the numerous studies of the development of word meaning using the Sakharov–Vygotsky method and received a new interpretation in 1932. Vygotsky once again went through a period of acute self-criticism and explicitly stated that the collected data required a radically new theoretical interpretation (see chapters 15 to 17).

The principle of the semantic structure of mind was first mentioned in mid-1932 and regarded the problem of schizophrenia (chapter 20). By the end of the year, however, it became more prominent when Vygotsky and his associates held several internal meetings, among which was the famous meeting of December 4 and 5, when the main line of development of the cultural–historical theory was established. The content of this meeting was already known through the summaries by

Leont'ev and Zaporozhets and published as 'The problem of consciousness (cf. the recently published summary by Luria 2014), but we here publish Vygotsky's own notes as well as a great number of notes related to the problem of consciousness, which reflect the discussions with his colleagues at the internal meetings and the growing theoretical divergence with Leont'ev, which began around this time (chapter 17). On the whole, this year was so productive that the notes cover seven chapters (chapters 14 to 20).

It is worth noting that the breakthrough in 1932 is reminiscent of the situation mid-1926 when Vygotsky also began creating a new approach with the elaboration of a theory of consciousness. The plans for unwritten books were preserved in the archive and are presented in chapter 17. The analysis of these and other documents shows that *Thinking and speech* was just an intermediate step toward a more ambitious book about consciousness (Zavershneva 2014). The archival research also confirms our hypothesis that the greatest part of *Thinking and speech* was created before 1933. For example, all of the major statements of its final chapter were already literally present in the notes from 1932 (chapter 21). Constant reflections about a new method to study mind and consciousness, which Vygotsky called the "semic method," also belong to this pivotal year (chapter 18) when meaning was declared to be the unit of investigation of verbal thinking and consciousness as a whole.

Apart from the main themes of *Thinking and speech*, the plans for the unwritten book about consciousness also dealt with other themes, for example, the study of Velimir Khlebnikov's poetry or the problem of the freedom of the person. And indeed, from 1931 onward the problem of freedom acquired a new and special meaning. Previously Vygotsky had dealt with this problem under the heading of "the voluntary nature of the higher mind," but this time he focused on freedom as a generic concept of which voluntariness formed a particular case. Vygotsky studied Lenin's *Philosophical Notebooks*, the works of Marx and Engels (chapter 10), and also Spinoza's philosophy, to which he kept returning since his years as a gymnasium student (chapters 13 and 22). He managed to create an original synthesis of these ideas, which he projected upon psychology. Developing the ideas of his predecessors, Vygotsky reached the conviction that freedom of behavior is the distinguishing feature of the human being, based upon his capacity for verbal thinking, and so he decided to study the disturbance of this capacity in all cases of anomalous development or dissolution of mind (Zavershneva 2015a). "Spinoza's theory *implicite* contains the whole Acmeist psychology, the whole theory of concepts, affects and volition, the semantic and systemic structure of consciousness, which we *explicite* developed," Vygotsky wrote in 1933 (chapter 22). Another philosophical source of innovation of the cultural-historical theory became German classic linguistics, i.e., the research tradition of Wilhelm von Humboldt, with which Vygotsky became acquainted through the writings of Aleksandr Potebnya (Bertau 2014; Zavershneva 2016). His unabated interest in linguistics and its newest currents led to the rethinking of the ideas of Potebnya, Yakubinskiy, Yakobson, Paulhan, and Vossler as well as their inclusion in the fabric of his theory (chapters 17 and 21).

For various reasons, however, many of Vygotsky's plans never materialized. One of these reasons may have been the growing ideological pressure in the academic world. For example, during a discussion of his book *Thinking and speech* at a Party meeting, Vygotsky was severely criticized. "Creeping empiricism + mechanicism" and "idealism along the lines of Marxism–Leninism" were some of the terms used to disqualify his work; these terms were not at all innocuous and in those years frequently led to serious consequences. The archive contains notes that Vygotsky made during such meetings as well as a justificatory letter he wrote to the purge commission that had judged his scientific activity to be anti-Marxist (chapter 19). All of this showed that it had become increasingly difficult for Vygotsky and his associates—and for many of their colleagues—to work in freedom.

Nevertheless, during the years 1933 to 1934, the events followed up each other with dazzling speed. Vygotsky understood that the study of consciousness per se was a limited task because consciousness is open to the world and is unthinkable outside the multifarious connections between the world and the person. He realized that consciousness essentially fulfills the role of an instrument that mediates the active relationship of the person with the environment and that this relationship must be studied in the first place. It was now that Vygotsky introduced the concept of experience as the integrative unit of environmental and individual aspects. This concept has only recently drawn attention in the scientific press, and therefore even the few remarks that are present in the notebooks have indisputable value (chapter 24). The theory of consciousness never left its embryonic state, and Vygotsky discarded it and began elaborating what may be called the theory of dynamic semantic systems. During this period, he was most influenced by Kurt Lewin, with whom he had conducted an intensive and fruitful dialogue not just in correspondence but also during personal meetings (chapter 25). Vygotsky revised a number of theoretical tenets of dynamic psychology, but he also used and modified the experimental set-up elaborated by Lewin's scientific group (see chapters 28 and 29). In October 1933, Vygotsky remarked, "Cf. Lewin's data: an amazing coincidence. But new is that not the external field, but the inner, semantic field is taken into account." The concept of the semantic field developed from the transformation of the two Lewinian concepts of the "psychological field" and the "level of irreality" and was defined as a semantic plane of generalization (Zavershneva 2015b). Studying it genetically, Vygotsky showed how in various stages of development it performs its fundamental function of mediation of the relationship between the person and the world and, in particular, allows the person to transform the fluid dynamics of thought into the dynamics of action and thus forms the basis of volitional behavior (chapters 25 and 29).

In the last series of documents from that period, which so far have received little attention, Vygotsky tried to solve the problem of the unity of affect and intellect by distinguishing several planes of analysis—the affective systems, the semantic field, and the practical action—and showing that they determine the general regularities of mind both structurally and dynamically. The dynamic processes that connect these planes were described by the model of the free meaningful action, which directly led the cultural–historical approach to the problem of activity, to the

theoretical description of the three main spheres of mind—i.e., feelings, thinking, and will—in the framework of a single theory of the development of mind. We have no more than the rough outlines of such a theory, however, and after Vygotsky's death it was not even continued in the work of his closest followers. In this connection Vygotsky's paper "The problem of mental retardation," which was published posthumously, may be considered the manifesto of the final version of his approach, although it is only superficially known by modern Vygotsky students.

The new ideas were shaped in both experimental studies of the development and dissolution of mind and in the field of clinical practice, and a new branch of psychology was developed: neuropsychology (chapter 26). Among the central works of this period are the many lectures on child psychology and pedology and a number of pathopsychological and neuropsychological papers. The notebooks also contain previously unknown data about Vygotsky's work with adult patients suffering from psychotic disorders and forms of dementia (the cases of patients Z. and K. in chapters 22, 26, and 29), neuroses (the case of patient O. in chapter 20), and neuropsychological disorders (the case of patient D in chapter 26). However, perhaps most interesting is the notebook, titled "The Donskaya Clinic," which consists of notes about Vygotsky's consultation work in the clinic in the last months of his life (the notes break off at May 20, 1934). The nine complete case histories of "difficult" children published here (chapter 27) offer a gruesome social-psychological portrait of the disadvantaged Soviet child of the early 1930s and also provide a characteristic cross-section of the diagnostic methods and curative measures used in pediatrics in the USSR of that time.

We should not forget the unique notes about the psychology of chess: Vygotsky was an inveterate amateur player and at least once spoke publicly about chess together with the well-known chess master Benjamin Blumenfel'd as seen in chapter 23. In addition, new are the materials from an internal conference held in October, 1933 (chapter 26), which was dedicated to a number of practical issues. The exercise book, with notes about the conference, contains Vygotsky's suggestions to reinterpret psychoanalysis in the framework of cultural-historical psychology and his idea about unconscious processes. Vygotsky also discussed psychomotor behavior as meaningful movement and character in light of the idea of experience. A separate chapter (chapter 28) deals with events that were thus far completely unknown: Vygotsky's involvement in the work of the Toy Committee of the Narkompros of the RSFSR. In the end of 1933 to the beginning of 1934, he participated in committee sessions with critical remarks but also with talks about the theory of play and toys. However, his efforts hardly influenced the ideological course of the committee, which planned to create the "right" toy for the communist upbringing of children of all ages. The chapter allows us to get a glimpse of Vygotsky's many social activities: Vygotsky was not just a researcher, lecturer, and clinician, but he also worked for publishing houses, gave public talks, took part in committees, edited scientific journals, organized conferences, etc.

Then we have the final document, as it were his last will and testament, in which the second hero with whom Vygotsky identified makes his appearance, the figure

from the Old Testament who led his people from the desert to the land of milk and honey: “This is the last thing I have done in psychology and I will die at the summit like Moses, having glimpsed the promised land, but without setting foot in it. Forgive me, dear creatures. The rest is silence.” In these farewell words, we hear no longer youthful sadness, nor ambivalence or desperation, but resignation or, who knows, even happiness about the fact that he did everything, or almost everything, that lay in his power (chapter 29).

However, where Vygotsky stopped, psychology must move on. A psychology that does not want to suffer from historical myopia would do well to study Vygotsky’s notes and published writings. They allow us to enter the next round of dialogue with him: The unruly and aphoristic nature of the ideas expressed for himself may create touch points where our thoughts flare up like a match that lights when rubbed against an uneven surface. It seems to us that this “roughness” was characteristic of Vygotsky’s style that radically differed from the usual dry formal scientific language: Rather it was often emotionally laden, tense, and polemic. Vygotsky knew how to see the question behind an answer or, in the words he borrowed from Goethe, how to “change the postulate into a problem.” His contribution to psychology consists not just in the creation of the cultural–historical theory (as if this were not enough to gain a place in the “hall of fame” of psychology) but also in the problematization of the ontological basis of psychology. Vygotsky raised the questions of psychology’s subject matter and methods, questions that keep haunting our science, which is still looking for its distinguishing characteristics, its methods, and its unique ideas about the human mind. However, apart from the purely scientific aspect, there is another no less important aspect: the happy combination of the researcher with the person, which to this day works as a magnet that keeps attracting new researchers to his ideas. It is to be hoped that the present notes—which reveal unknown facets of the personality of the eminent psychologist, his goals and aspirations—will become the beginning of a new period in the study of his legacy and will be instrumental in creating the general psychological theory that Vygotsky wished to create.

References

- Bertau, M.-C. (2014). Inner form as a notion migrating from West to East: Acknowledging the Humboldtian tradition in cultural-historical psychology. In A. Yasnitsky, R. van der Veer, & M. Ferrari (Eds.), *The Cambridge handbook of cultural-historical psychology* (pp. 247–271). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Luria, A. R. (2014). Konspekt doklada L. S. Vygotskogo ‘O soznanii’. In E. Yu Zavershneva, T. V. Akhutina, & L. A. Reshetova (Eds.), *Voprosy Psikhologii*, 6, (pp. 75–88).
- Van der Veer, R. (2015). Vygotsky, the theater critic: 1922–3. *History of the Human Sciences*, 28(2), 103–110.
- Van der Veer, R., & Yasnitsky, A. (2011). Vygotsky in English: What still needs to be done. *Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science*, 45(4), 475–493.

- Van der Veer, R., & Yasnitsky, A. (2016). Translating Vygotsky: Some problems of transnational Vygotskian science (pp. 143–174). In A. Yasnitsky, & R. van der Veer (Eds.), *Revisionist revolution in Vygotsky studies*. London: Routledge.
- Van der Veer, R., & Zavershneva, E. (2011). To Moscow with love: Partial reconstruction of Vygotsky's trip to London. *Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Sciences*, 45(4), 458–474.
- Zavershneva, E. Yu. (2012a). Evreyskiy vopros v neopublikovannykh rukopisyakh L.S. Vygotskogo. *Voprosy Psikhologii*, 2, 79–99.
- Zavershneva, E. Yu. (2012b). Investigating the manuscript of L.S. Vygotsky's 'The historical meaning of the crisis in psychology.' *Journal of Russian and East European Psychology*, 50(4), 42–63.
- Zavershneva, E. Yu. (2012c). The key to human psychology. Commentary on L.S. Vygotsky's notebook from Zakharino Hospital (1926). *Journal of Russian and East European Psychology*, 50(4), 16–41.
- Zavershneva, E. Y., & Osipov, M. E. (2012). Primary changes to the version of 'The historical meaning of the crisis in psychology' published in the Collected Works of L.S. Vygotsky. *Journal of Russian and East European Psychology*, 50(4), 64–84.
- Zavershneva, E. Yu. (2013). Molyus' o dare dushevnoy usiliya: Mysli i nastroyeniya L.S. Vygotskogo v 1917–1918. *Voprosy Psikhologii*, 2, 112–133.
- Zavershneva, E. Yu. (2014). The problem of consciousness in Vygotsky's cultural-historical psychology. In A. Yasnitsky, R. van der Veer, & M. Ferrari, M. (Eds.), *The Cambridge handbook of cultural-historical psychology* (pp. 63–100). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Zavershneva, E. Yu. (2015a). Problema svobody kak otlichitel'noy kharakteristiki cheloveka v rabotakh L.S. Vygotskogo. *Voprosy Psikhologii*, 5, 89–105.
- Zavershneva, E. Yu. (2015b). Predstavleniya o smyslovom pole v teorii dinamicheskikh 346 smyslovykh system L.S. Vygotskogo. *Voprosy Psikhologii*, 4, 119–135.
- Zavershneva, E. Yu. (2016). Soznanie bez slova: L.S. Vygotsky o dorechevom gorizonte cheloveka. *Voprosy Psikhologii*, 5, 71–87.

Chapter 1

A Tragicomedy of Strivings

“A tragicomedy of strivings” is the oldest manuscript found in the Vygotsky archive. Its text was jotted down in an exercise book with the following text printed on its cover: “This exercise book belongs to the pupil... of the ... class in the year 191...” A handwritten “2” was added, so that we can date the manuscript to 1912. The text is written in the pre-revolutionary spelling and comprises 20 pages. L.E. Tuzovskaya did a preliminary preparation of the document.

The manuscript contains several outlines of a talk dedicated to the interpretation of the book of Ecclesiastes. The book of Ecclesiastes (Koheleth or Preacher) is arguably one of the most enigmatic books of the Bible. Experts disagree about its author(s), its date of writing, its composition, the reason for its inclusion in the Bible, and its message. Presumably, the gymnasium pupil Lev Vygotsky wanted to give his talk at one of the meetings of the Circle for the Study of Jewish History and the Philosophy of History (cf. Feigenberg 2000, pp. 7–11). Style and content of the notes remind us of Vygotsky’s later analysis of *Hamlet*.

The view of Ecclesiastes as the hero of a literary work by an unknown author. The incorrectness of this view. The psychological justification of this view. The three periods in the spiritual life of a person according to Belinskiy.¹ Their acceptability to explain Ecclesiastes (Ecclesiastes “in time”). Their meaning as “psychological frameworks.” The first period. The spirit’s infancy. The cause of the radical change. The imperfection of being. The gradual disintegration. The second period. The disintegration of theological, cosmological, and psychological ideas. The search for the meaning of life. Conclusions. General denial, the joy of life. The search for the “justification of the world.” The third period. Return to the first period. The similarity and difference between them. The philosophical and psychological meaning of the third period.

The eternal symbol. The inevitability of the first period. The inevitability of radical change and disintegration. The cause of disintegration. Complete denial. Two outcomes. Suicide. Eternal contradictions. The tragicomedy of strivings.

“The world must be completely justified,
To make it possible to live.”

(Balmont, *Burning Buildings*)²

“Lord, I do not accept your world!”

(Dostoevsky, *The Brothers Karamazov*)³

For many centuries the book of Ecclesiastes was an enigma for humanity. Its dark, obscure, and unclear language; its philosophy, the ideas that seem utterly disconnected; finally, its anonymity, which nevertheless compels us to ascribe it to a very specific author, a mysterious and fantastic person surrounded by legends. All this prompted popular fantasy to work in a certain direction, it [prompted] popular fiction to create an implausible but psychologically seductive and charming image. The great king crossed out: [the king of kings], the wisest of all people who ever lived, are living, and even of those who will ever live; who possesses all the riches of the East; who abdicates and surrenders his kingdom in his old age, saying that “all is vanity of vanities, all is vanity”; the happy layman, the great hermit—this is the image of popular legend.

Centuries passed. And the critique that is incredulous and checks everything, that is non-poetic and destroys all fairytales, erased this fascinating image as well. And gave nothing in return for it. The critique separated the mysterious work and its imaginary author by centuries,⁴ it approached the <tender> fiction with the formula “two times two is four, and not five,” and nothing was left of the poetic image of the hermit-king. Poetic fictions fear arithmetic. But, I repeat, having destroyed the legend, the critique gave nothing in return to re-establish the integrity of the work, to show the living person behind it. It says about the work that “These notes, which Ecclesiastes made for himself from time to time, are not connected at all” (S. Bernfeld, “Kohleth,” *Hebrew Encyclopedia. Vol. IX*).⁵ Arithmetic is sometimes outrageous. “Two times two is four is an unbearable thing anyway. Two times two is four seems to me simply a piece of insolence. Two times two is a fop standing with arms akimbo barring your path and spitting” (Dostoevsky, *Notes from the Underground*).⁶ What remains after this is just to find the philological and logical meaning of the various “notes,” to find their author, but we will not find the integral image, the living person, for two times two is still four and not five. But, after all, for a fairy-tale there is neither time nor space: “Far away, beyond the seas” is where the event takes place; “long ago in the mists of time” is when it happened.

And even when we know for certain that a fairytale is untrue, does it really lose its interest for us? Can a lie not be charming? But if arithmetic is so essential, so be it: The book of Ecclesiastes is poetic fiction. The author, whoever he was, took as the hero of his novel a rich king who loved luxury and who toward the end of his life, having experienced all of the blessings of this world, reaches the conclusion that it is worthless. This is no literary forgery but a literary image to express oneself in the best possible way (*ibid.* Steinthal, *Zu Bibel und Religionsphilosophie* <II>).⁷ This is also the view of the new critique; true, it has little plausibility (two times two is four after all!), but it tries to reconcile the legend with the critique that destroys it.

Yes, two times two is four! I firmly believe that. But, obviously, there is something in this mysterious book that for centuries compelled us to see a living person in it. It has, obviously, all psychological characteristics of a living unitary human spirit. It is these psychological characteristics that give rise to the view of Ecclesiastes as a living person, as the hero of a literary work, who has all the characteristics of spiritual life. I will try to understand this spiritual life and, setting myself an entirely different purpose, thus show the presence of these psychological characteristics.

“For each person there is a period of infancy or unconscious harmony of his spirit with nature, as a result of which for him life is bliss even though he is unaware of this bliss”... “This state is a state of moral infancy, which is inevitably followed by disintegration”... “The person is no longer satisfied with natural consciousness and simple feeling: He wants to know”... “This is an immutable law... for man”... “To find spiritual harmony from this disharmonious disintegration, by inner struggle and consciousness, is only for the best of people.” (Belinskiy, Vol. I[II]. “Hamlet, the drama by Shakespeare and Mochalov in the role of Hamlet”).⁸ These are the three periods of spiritual life: infancy and spiritual self-indulgence; disintegration and disharmony; spiritual harmony. In various forms all people experience these three periods. And these same three periods of spiritual life I distinguish in Ecclesiastes. All contradictions are explained and a clear inner link appears when we consider the Ecclesiastes not of one period, but of three periods; when we consider him “in time” so to speak. It is this inner connection that I will try to detect.

I hasten to make a reservation. We should not, of course, attach any particular significance to these periods. They serve only as psychological frameworks to see Ecclesiastes “in time.” It is a division for the convenience of the study. And, of course, the periods have no exact boundaries. These are the infancy, adolescence, and maturity of the spirit. I now turn to the consideration of the three periods in the life of Ecclesiastes.

The king of Israel undertook great things: He built palaces, he planted vineyards; he made gardens and orchards and planted in them trees of all fruit; he made cisterns of water to water the gardens; he acquired servants and maids.⁹ <...> He magnified and increased wisdom more than all who were over Jerusalem before him; and his mind observed a wealth of wisdom and knowledge.¹⁰ And with all that—the great joy of the heart, the spiritual cheerfulness, the azure serenity.

But the period of the spirit's infancy and self-indulgence, because of its harmony with nature, must inevitably be followed by disintegration, by disharmony between the spirit and nature.

This is an immutable law for man. And the stronger the bliss and self-indulgence of the spirit, the more horrible the disintegration, the more grievous the inner struggle. And the root of this disintegration is in that very bliss and integrity. Ecclesiastes looked at all his works that his hands had wrought, and on the travail he had labored to do, and behold, all is vanity and there is no profit in it. And he hated all his labor for which he had travailed under the sun because he had to leave it unto the man that would come after him.¹¹

The first blow is the hardest; the first thunder the most frightening. Gone is the great joy of life. In his troubled and confused anguish, he set his mind to seek and explore by wisdom concerning all that has been done under heaven. It is a grievous task which God has given to the sons of men to be afflicted with.¹²

And the king saw that there is no meaning for man in all labor, that he labors under the sun, for one generation goes and the other comes, but the earth stands forever. There is a boundary fixed for every being and death is relentless. To all things there is an appointed time, and a time to every purpose under the heaven. For words are weak and man cannot utter all; the eye is not satiated by seeing, nor is the ear filled by hearing.¹³

This is the cause of disintegration: the imperfection of being.

The three parts of the talk. Popular legend. The view of the critique. The view of the hero of a literary work by an unknown author. The psychological justifications of this view. The three periods of spiritual life according to B[elinskiy], their acceptability to explain Ecclesiastes. Ecclesiastes "in time." Their meaning as psychological frameworks. The first period. The spirit's infancy. Wealth, wisdom, joy of life. The causes of the radical change: wealth—imperfection of being; wisdom—Faustian tragedy. The second period. Disintegration. Disappointment. Knowledge.

The tragicomedy of strivings. Your world, Lord, I cannot accept! "I love the sticky leaves in spring."¹⁴ Ivan Karamazov.

The tragicomedy of strivings is the essay's general name.

Epigraphs: "*All this would be funny*

If it were not that sad!" (M. Yu. Lermontov)¹⁵

"Es ist eine alte Geschichte

*Doch bleibt sie immer neu!"*¹⁶

The first part: Ecclesiastes.

The second part: The eternal symbol.

This way Ecclesiastes arrived at complete, general denial. “Vanity of vanities, all is vanity” is not a complex philosophy, not a broad worldview, and not a deep understanding. But it is a terrible one. Ecclesiastes was horrified. Here we have this “mystic wall,” beyond which we cannot go. Here we have two roads or an endless number of roads. Many different paths lead to this wall, here all paths intersect and then diverge to never meet again. I talk about Ecclesiastes as an eternal symbol and about Ecclesiastes’ path from the “mystic wall” to death, about the horrifying path to spiritual death, the death of strivings; and in the end, by connecting all the paths to the wall with Ecclesiastes’ path (with an insignificant exception for suicides), I will show that the path from the wall to death is, in essence, a single path, shared by all, namely, Ecclesiastes’ path. In this sense I might call my talk “The eternal symbol.” I will show that Ecclesiastes’ tragicomedy of strivings is the eternal general tragicomedy of our strivings.

Two eras in the life of the human spirit, the eras of disintegration and ultimate harmony, interesting not so much in the culmination points of their development, not in the moments of complete disintegration and not in the moments of ultimate reconciliation, but in their origin. I investigated the origin of the era of disintegration and attach great importance to it, because it determines the nature of the next era, and now I will consider the origin of the era of reconciliation.

I want to digress a bit and say a few words about the psychological law of the attraction of opposites. It will then be easier for me to explain Ecclesiastes’ radical change, because I see it as one of the particular applications of this law. Having done this, I will try to connect this radical change with the other, first radical change, and point out their common cause, and subsequently connect all periods of Ecclesiastes’ life with a single general thread that links all of Ecclesiastes’ spiritual life.

The law of the psychological attraction to the opposite—we cannot give this strange phenomenon in spiritual life another name. It very frequently repeats itself with mathematical precision.

If you are a convinced atheist crossed out: [devout skeptic], then, according to Dostoevsky, you are a deeply religious person. Dostoevsky himself, after Ivan Karamazov’s rebellion, seeks complete humility. “Your world, Lord, I cannot accept,” he exclaims with the words of Ivan Karamazov. “Humble yourself, proud man,” he says to himself (Ivan Karamazov) in his Pushkin talk.¹⁷ Garshin, a madman with a soul, poisoned by the poison of a red flower, his soul possessed by madness and chaos as Chukovskiy observed, wanted to become a bookkeeper.¹⁸ He was always drawn to figures, to calculations. He was drawn to numbers because chaos reigned in his soul. “You say that I am mad, but the number of private Ivanov’s rifle was 18375”¹⁹ (Chukovskiy’s words). I hasten to repeat: This law, as is also apparent from my examples, is somewhat one-sided, it pulls man from the back to the front side of the coin, from madness to number, from rebellion to submission, but not the other way around.

We know, however, that first another law is at work, from peace to madness, from submission to rebellion. In the end, speaking about the eternal symbol, I will try to show that this law is not an independent, in itself existing law (just like the

first, to which the phenomena of spiritual life are subordinated), but that both these laws go from approval to denial and from rejection of the world to its approval.²⁰

“The world must be completely justified to make it possible to live.”

It does not matter whether death must be justified or the “tear of the tortured child.”²¹ The world must be completely justified to make it possible to live. We arrived at two formulas: Vanity of vanities, all is vanity, and “the light is sweet and a pleasant thing it is for the eyes to behold the sun,”²² or, speaking in modern language, the language of Ivan Karamazov: “Your world, Lord, I cannot accept!” and “I love the sticky leaves in spring, the blue sky.” If the latter statement at a certain moment is weaker than the first, people kill themselves. Suicides find themselves at this point of their psychological development. If we stay alive, another law will affect us. The world must be completely justified. If I stay alive, then I cannot endure a further split. I must justify the world. And the justifications of the world in such cases tend to be ridiculous and insignificant. In conclusion: I deny the first and the second position, create a new one for myself in which I cannot believe, because I experienced the first two with my whole being and I exclaim: Blessed is life!

There are utterly insignificant questions and simple formulas. The biggest platitudes, when we feel them, are the deepest philosophy. *Omnia sua dicere.*²³ To repeat common things from one’s experience, from one’s observation.

If you ask me then, ultimately, why there are people who are not looking for justification, it is because they are still in the process of experiencing the formation of both things, denial and affirmation, but have not yet completed it.

However, even those who have found justification and believe in it cannot liberate themselves from the split, do not escape the common fate. Why are we alive after all? Because the split is unified. Because we do not experience denial as such but have a longing for the eternal, a yearning for the absolute. If we say, “Vanity of vanities, all is vanity” or “Your world, Lord, I cannot accept,” then this means: All is vanity, because everything will die, but truly the light is sweet and if only there would be light forever...

Ecclesiastes’ tragedy of strivings is an eternal tragedy of strivings, and Ecclesiastes is an eternal symbol.

I want to retrace the third period in Ecclesiastes’ development. Again, I repeat, what is interesting is not this period itself, but its birth and origin in the second period.

Actually, the second period is one of disintegration of previous integrity and the working-out (its process) of the formulas “vanity of vanities, all is vanity” and “the light is sweet.” When after the inner disintegration the integrity is finally destroyed and these two positions become clearly defined, the second period is finished. The third period arrives, which, essentially, does not add anything new, but uses these two formulas, unites them, or <as it were> replaces them by another, while always retaining the previous two, living in eternal dissociation, eternal disharmony. Thus, the third period, like the first, is static and not dynamic. As soon as these two positions have become clear for Ecclesiastes, he begins to search for a new one. To search for the resolution of these apparently mutually exclusive formulas.

The question is how he can search for it, and the very fact of the existence of the third period proves that he found the answer. The point is that these positions do not exclude one another, but that the one contains the other.

The second is already contained in the first. Hence, it is possible. The world must be completely justified, etc.

We ask, knowing in advance that we will not be given; we knock the door of knowledge that is forever closed, knowing in advance that it will not be opened to us; we seek, knowing in advance that we will never find.²⁴

I presented Ecclesiastes as a tragicomedy of strivings, funny and sad, sad because it is funny; I wanted to show, with the words of the poet, that “*es ist eine alte Geschichte, doch bleibt sie immer neu.*”

Georg Brandes’ quote about mysterious books.²⁵ There are clear and simple books; and there are mysterious, obscure, unsolved ones. The latter excite, entice and lure us (approximately). Ecclesiastes is such a mysterious and exciting book.

The second period. Disintegration of cosmological ideas. Ecclesiastes saw that the world was based on boredom: the rivers and the sea, the wind.²⁶ There is nothing new under the sun. First chapter.

The collapse of psychological ideas. The human soul—the animal soul. There is no <illegible>, no freedom of will, but all are subordinated to fate and chance. Nothing can be known.

The collapse of theological ideas. If God exists, why are there sinners?

“Captivating is the green planet, where man tasted his first moment, in the space of lots of air and light”... and further: And women’s lips are full of tenderness, and vivid are the thoughts of the elected men, but since they all are tired in the hour of death, and life was understood by none, and I do not know its meaning, I curse the brightness of the days, the colorfulness of the pictures, the splendor of the suns and moons.²⁷

No one has <disentangled> life.

Explanation: Why there is a tragicomedy of strivings in Ecclesiastes: This we often see in history. A period of decline, weariness of life.

Finish the first part with this.

Show at the end of the second that since Ecclesiastes’ tragedy is an eternal thing and not temporary, we cannot exclude explanatory historical causes. Where are these causes? Strivings without God.

For only strivings... in God [lead to the truth], it is said in the book in which many seekers in fact found the answers to these “vexed questions,” only “religious strivings.” The Gospel says: “Seek, and ye shall find!”²⁸ (Finish this).

For the beginning of the second part about the eternal symbol: The Hebrew writer Peretz Smolenskiy²⁹ wrote an article about European literature, where he argued that Hamlet and Faust are Ecclesiastes...

Notes

1. Vissarion Grigoryevich Belinskiy (1811 to 1848). Famous Russian literary critic and public figure.
2. Konstantin Dimitriyevich Balmont (1867 to 1944). Russian poet and translator. Vygotsky cites his poem, “The world must be completely justified,” from the volume *Burning Buildings* (1900).
3. Ivan Karamazov’s words in Dostoevsky’s *The Brothers Karamazov* (Part 1, Book 5, Chapter 3).
4. Vygotsky refers to the fact that the dates of the estimated reign of King Solomon (between 970 and 930 BC), the putative author of the Book of Ecclesiastes, do not correspond with the estimated date of its writing (between 450 and 200 BC).
5. Hebrew *Encyclopedia* (*Evreyskaya Entsiklopediya*) (1911, pp. 597–611). (In Russian)
6. Quoted from Dostoevsky’s *Notes from the Underground* (Chapter 9).
7. Hermann Steinthal (1823 to 1899). German philologist and philosopher. Vygotsky probably refers to Steinthal (1890, p. 1): “The poet or artist, who wants to touch and move us, must really have felt and experienced himself what he wants to present: In that case he will find the right expression immediately.”
8. Possibly Belinskiy (1901).
9. Ecclesiastes 2:4–7.
10. Ecclesiastes 1:16.
11. Ecclesiastes 2:11; 2:18.
12. Ecclesiastes 1:13.
13. Ecclesiastes 1:3–4; 3:1; 1:8.
14. “I have a longing for life, and I go on living in spite of logic... I love the sticky leaves in spring, the blue sky—that’s all it is. It’s not a matter of intellect or logic, it’s loving with one’s inside, with one’s stomach. One loves the first strength of one’s youth.” Dostoevsky, *The Brothers Karamazov* (Part 1, Book 5, Chapter 3).
15. Mikhail Yuryevich Lermontov (1814 to 1841). Russian poet and writer. Vygotsky cites his poem “To O. Smirnova” (1940).
16. It is an ancient story, yet it remains forever new (German). Citation from Heinrich Heine’s (1797 to 1856) poem “Ein Jüngling liebt ein Mädchen” (“A young man loves a girl”) from the volume *Buch der Lieder* (*Book of Songs*) (1827).
17. Speech delivered on June 8, 1880, at the meeting of the Society of Lovers of Russian Literature on occasion of the unveiling of the Pushkin monument in Moscow and published August 1, 1880, in *Diary of a Writer*.
18. Korney Ivanovich Chukovskiy (1882 to 1969). Journalist, literary critic, and writer of poetry and prose for children. In Chukovskiy’s (1909) article, he analyzed Vsevolod Mikhaylovich Garshin’s (1855 to 1888) story “A red flower” (1883). Garshin was a Russian author of short stories who suffered periodical bouts of mental illness and eventually committed suicide.

19. Refers to Garshin's story "Memories of private Ivanov" (1883) where the soldier remembers the number of his rifle.
20. Unclear in the original. Perhaps Vygotsky meant to write: but that both these laws—from approval to denial and from rejection of the world to its approval—are connected.
21. Non-verbatim citation from *The Brothers Karamazov* (Part 1, Book 5, Chapter 4).
22. Ecclesiastes 11:7.
23. To say everything one wants (Latin).
24. Allusion to Matthew 7:7–8 (or Luke 11:9): "Ask and it will be given to you; seek and you will find; knock and the door will be opened to you. For everyone who asks receives; the one who seeks finds; and to the one who knocks, the door will be opened."
25. Georg Morris Cohen Brandes (1842 to 1927). Danish literary critic and scholar. Vygotsky probably refers to Brandes (1898, p. 384; Russian translation 1899): "We all know that kind of well-written book which is blameless in form, obvious in intention, and in which the characters stand out sharply defined. We read it with pleasure: but when we have read it, we are done with it. There is nothing to be read between the lines, no gulf between this passage and that, no mystic twilight anywhere in it, no shadows in which we can dream. And again, there are other books whose fundamental idea is capable of many interpretations, and affords matter for much dispute, but whose significance lies less in what they say to us than in what they lead us to imagine, to divine. They have the peculiar faculty of setting thoughts and feelings in motion; more thoughts than they themselves contain, and perhaps of a quite different character."
26. Ecclesiastes 1:6–7.
27. Vygotsky literally cites three lines from the beginning of Balmont's poem "Renunciation" from the volume *Only love. The menorah* (1903) and after "and further" continues with a non-verbatim quotation of the last 6 lines.
28. Matthew 7:7.
29. Peretz Moiseyevich Smolenskin or Smolenskiy (1842 to 1885). Russian Jewish novelist writing in Hebrew.

References

- Belinskiy (1901) 'Gamlet'—drama Shekspira i Mochalov v roli Gamleta. In: Vengerov SA, Belinsky VG (eds) *Polnoe sobranie sochineniy*. Vol 3. St. Peterburg: Tipografiya M.M. Stasyulevicha, pp 186–283
- Brandes, G. (1898). *William Shakespeare* (Vol. 2). London: William Heinemann.
- Chukovskiy, K. I. (1909). O Vsevolode Garshine. *Russkaya Mysl'*, 12, 117–141.
- Feigenberg, I. M. (Ed.). (2000). *Ot Gomelya do Moskvy: Nachalo tvorcheskogo puti L'va Vygotskogo*. Lewiston, NY: The Edwin Mellen Press.
- Steinthal, H. (1890). *Zu Bibel und Religionsphilosophie: Vorträge und Abhandlungen*. Berlin: Druck und Verlag von Georg Reimer.

Chapter 2

Jewry and World History

This theme can be found in three exercise books numbered with the Roman numbers III, IV, and V. They are written in black ink and use the pre-revolutionary spelling. Exercise books I and II have not been found, and the editors invented the title of the chapter. On the inside of the back cover of exercise book V there is the inscription “Spring (April) 1915,” which, presumably, corresponds with the date of its completion. In the same exercise book the manuscript is designated as a talk. Here we publish selected fragments from the exercise books IV and V.

Until recently, historians knew just a few newspaper writings about the Jewish issue published by Vygotsky in 1916 to 1917, but research in the family archive revealed approximately 10 new manuscripts. They are dedicated to the analysis of the Jewish question against the background of the political situation in Russia and Europe in the beginning of the 20th century (e.g., “Judaism and socialism,” “Spiritual zionism (about Ahad Ha’am),” “About zionism”). Vygotsky reached the conclusion that genuine support for the spiritual renaissance of the Jewish people could only be found in Judaism and, until at least the end of 1917, he fiercely opposed Marxism (cf. Zavershneva 2012).

The present manuscript, created in the midst of World War I, discusses the historical fate of the Jewish people and its unknowable, irrational nature. Judging by the text, at the time Vygotsky was strongly influenced by the works of the Russian religious and political philosopher Nikolay Aleksandrovich Berdyaev (1874 to 1948). Vygotsky criticizes the radical anti-Semitic and pro-Jewish political currents (in particular, parliamentarism, nationalism, and autonomism), which, in his opinion, excessively rationalize Jewish history and forget that it is first of all the history of the relationship of the Jewish nation with God. The manuscript abounds with elaborate quotes from the works of philosophers, politicians, journalists, and writers who dealt with the Jewish question (e.g., Judah Halevi, Chaim Bialik, Nikolay Berdyaev, Semen Dubnov, Daniil Pasmanik). Pasted on the last page of the fifth exercise book there is a clipping from the newspaper “Russkoe Slovo” (see later text), which relates a tragic episode about two Jewish soldiers. Subsequently, the episode entered Vygotsky’s (1916a) paper “Thought and moods (Some lines about Hanukkah).” Other ideas from the manuscript were used in articles dedicated to the Jewish question and the fate of the Jewry in Russia, both published (Vygotsky 1916b, c, 1917) and unpublished (cf. Zavershneva 2012). In 1915, Vygotsky also worked on the draft of “Hamlet.” There is much overlap between the above-mentioned writings; what they have in common is a certain tragic and exalted tone and an emphasis on preternatural and mystic phenomena.

[From exercise book IV].

The fact that I am a Jew gives me mystic inner experiences that have their roots in the remote past and are connected by invisible threads with the supra-rational and transcendental life of the people's soul in its past and present; it gives me an inner grievous mentality, "the seal of the living God,"¹ and I always experience and feel that I am "marked," that *I am a Jew!* "The nation is the *historical in us* (the *Historische in uns*), <...> the historical in us is the nationality in us, says Otto Bauer, the nation manifests itself in the *nationality* of each fellow citizen, that is, in the fact that each fellow citizen's character (mentality, L. V.) is determined by the joint fate shared with all other fellow citizens and experienced in constant interaction."² That is why I am a Jew: not because I *want* to be one, I am not a nationalist, not by my own choice; I am a Jew—this is the most mysterious, inexplicable and enigmatic thing, that I am me, the absolutely irrational. "We understand the nation as a process," he adds.³ This is extremely important: The nation is not just the people of the present; the Jewish people is not just the present-day Jews, but it is a historical process—the lives of all Jews who ever lived and will live—they are all knit together in the popular soul. *But then the concept of Jewry merges with the concept of Jewish history.*

If we understand the nation this way, merging the people with its history, it becomes impossible to rationalize nationality, because the fact that I am a Jew is, I repeat, absolutely irrational. And so "with the help of positivistic, i.e., sociologically flavored philosophy," Jewish history is built on a "bio-sociological foundation" Remark in the margin: [Ahad Ha'am]⁴ to give it strength and stability, because, as they see no support on *earth*, in history, and are not able to ascend the idea to the pre-historical and supra-historical, they fear for it and it seems to them illusory. But the fragility of their earthly, sociological foundation will soon be discovered and Jewish history is still hanging in the air, for "the fate of the Jewry cannot be rationally explained"—it is "madness for reason"⁵—and Jewish history is in need of a supra-rational, *transcendental* explanation. They fear perdition and seek warranties for the immortality of the Jews on *earth*, in *history*, and forget that the whole meaning of history is in the transient and mortal and that the Jewish people explained its eternity in a *different* way. They do not understand this great verse:

"Belief what the heart tells you,

There are no warranties from heaven."⁶ <...>

Contemporary scientific historiography objects to the "theological view of Jewish history" as a theory of the predetermination of the historical process, whereas a genuine scientific worldview not only does not contradict this belief in and conviction of predetermination but accepts it as an essential part... The whole future is the result of a process of combining existing forces and movements and this combination is already predetermined. The next moment is fully contained in the preceding moment, develops from it, etc. Hence, the whole future exists; it is predetermined. "The present, Laplace claims, is *just* the effect of the *whole* past and

the cause of the *whole* future. A person who would know the *whole* past would be able to predict the future” (N. Kablukov).⁷ This is why we should not dismiss as unnecessary but deeply absorb this ancient feeling of the Jewry: the *feeling of the predetermination of world history and the Jewry’s participation in it* <...>. This is why both the nationalists, these supporters of empty forms which they regard as the ultimate salvation, with their ideal to turn the Jewry into “ethnographic material” and the “philosophers of Judaism” (H. Cohen,⁸ Ahad Ha’am) (by tradition connected with the reformists), who extracted an abstract, dry extract from the living Jewry in the form of Judaism, are equally wrong and far from the truth in their attempts to fully rationalize the Jewry. <...>

“All flesh is grass, and all its beauty is like the flower of the field. The grass withers, the flower fades when the breath of the Lord blows on it; surely the people are grass. The grass withers, the flower fades, but the word of our God will stand forever.”⁹ This is where that horrible inner feeling of emptiness and instability comes from: Having lost their God, they lost their people as well. Just like once their predecessors did: Having lost their people, they lost God as well.

Contemporary Jewry sees no curse in the *golus*,¹⁰ it does not think that “the people strayed from the path and, tired of roaming, lost the thread in the centuries of wandering.”¹¹ No, they perceive this eternal suffering and sorrow as the right path. “God blessed the Jewish people, says the Aggadah, by scattering them over various countries.”¹²

O, Israel, Israel! You *must* wander in this world: “Tribe of the wandering foot and weary breast, says Byron [above the word Byron is written Lermontov]. How shall ye flee away and be at rest? The wild-dove hath her nest, the fox his cave, Mankind their country—Israel but the grave!”¹³ But the grave... However, the whole *אבה מלוע*,¹⁴ the whole “world to come,” is promised to the Jews!

Jewry knew this impotence but for the Jews it is a bright impotence, a holy lack of will. Behind the impotence of the Jews always glimmered the Supreme Power, and behind the apparent *lack of will* the Supreme will. This is why the prayer says so many times: “Thy will be done!”... Written in the margin: [“דינפלמ ויצר יהי”].¹⁵ For this lack of will establishes the connection between Jewry and world history. They all talk about the slavery of the Jewry, about its “slavery in the revolution.” Yes, Jewry is the slave of history, it accomplishes its *will*. But already Isaiah established the reverse link, the dependence of world history upon Jewry: The events of the first (the history of the Persian empire, Cyrus)¹⁶ were determined by the fate of the Jewish. This is what Renan says about the Book of Daniel: “Its author, a genuine creator of the philosophy of history, was the first to have the courage to regard historical development and the succession of empires as phenomena subordinated to the fate of the Jewish people.”¹⁷ Since the earthly destiny of the Jews is connected with the fate of the Torah—the divine teachings (the Aggadah tells that God turned to all people but that only the Jews *connected their fate with the fate of the Torah*)—this faith is really and truly the highest faith. <...>

The Jews do not create and realize their proper will in history—as it seems from the outside—but obey the complex and blind play of obscure historical forces and energies, the will of world history and the insurmountable forces of the events, and

behind it God's will. And God said with the words of the prophet: *You are My slave, Israel!*¹⁸ Let this slavery to some speak of doom and dying. There is no *earthly, historical* necessity for the existence of the Jewry (on the contrary, according to the *earthly* laws it should have disappeared a long time ago), but there is something Divine in Jewish history—"there are no warranties from Heaven." Instead of the *earthly* necessity of its existence, the warranties they seek today, the Jewry always claimed its *unearthly* but global, cosmic necessity. <...>

Let the torments be horrifying, let them become a hundred times more horrifying; let it be the reflection of madness, let this idea be madness itself, but Jewry will not renounce it and will always be madness amidst reason, for otherwise it loses its meaning and the Divine tragedy turns into "a vaudeville of devils."¹⁹ Let it be madness but this madness is immeasurably more valuable and dearer to us than the rational attempts to deny oneself, to resemble other people. Just like the ancient people, who demanded a king to govern them מִיִּגְגֵה לְכֶכֶךְ²⁰—"like all the nations"—now the radically assimilated Jews and the nationalists who lead us to assimilation (for assimilation means resemblance: to become like all other people) demand from their people to refrain from madness and to be rational "like all nations." Let it be madness, but it has a tragic and solemn majesty, it has something unearthly, otherworldly, Divine. If only we can preserve this madness! <...>

[From exercise book V].

<...> there is no doubt that we now experience important, very significant and historical days. Not just because historical destiny moved the enormous Jewish masses of Russia, Poland, and Galicia into the center of the unparalleled events that now take place, that their houses, homesteads and stalls became the site of unprecedented bloodshed. All this raises what I would call a number of *particular* Jewish questions: Russian, Polish, Galician questions about the juridical and economic, partly also cultural, situation of the Jews in these countries. Questions that are very important, very painful, deeply tragic, but hardly *global*, because global is just the *general* Jewish question, which is not covered by the various particular questions, not even by their sum. This *general* Jewish question is the question about the very essence of Jewish history and about Jewry as its bearer. By the whole course of events it is raised more acutely than it may seem, for in such eras, which are marked by an accelerated rate of historical development, the essence of the preceding processes is revealed and completed. History is created before our eyes, a forward movement of the historical process takes place, one feels the movement of history—it is clear that now willy-nilly all values must be reassessed, that all principles and slogans must be tested and verified in practice. <...>

A genuine storm broke out and seemingly swept away what was claimed loudly and publicly by the theorists of the "global Jewish nation." "The united Jewish nation" was split into as many parts as there are belligerent and neutral countries, and these parts formed the alliances that we find in the coalitions of powers. We

have seen a visible disintegration of the apparently united Jewish nation. <...> Of course, individual persons who have nothing in common and are scattered without a joint cultural core (the population of Russian villages, French counties, etc.) do not form nations, but the nation does not cease to be a nation, or, at least, until now did not cease to exist, even though it lost this [common core. The contemporary] events once again showed that the Jewry is either not entirely a nation or not just a nation, more precisely: That showed that it is a unique people with an unparalleled inner structure and refuted both the nationalists and the theoreticians of the dying (or disintegrating) Jewish nation. <...> In the maelstrom of contemporary events, the principle of autonomism suffered an equally disastrous defeat. The events clearly showed that the Jews, while fighting in all armies of the world and fulfilling someone's inscrutable will, someone's higher design, fight a fratricidal war.

They were pushed into these events as the blind tool of some obscure and mysterious forces, and this war is the moment of the highest manifestation of the national lack of will. The Jewry as such do not want anything in this war and do not *will*, to put it in juridical terms (their will is not involved). It is worth remembering at the threshold of which events we are and what are the possible consequences of this war (after all, it can start a horrible emigration with radical changes in the course of Jewish history...)—they are immense!—but is not up to us to turn the helm of the ship of history—a lack of will—the future course of Jewish history will be determined by a complex combination of historical conditions. We do not create our history with our own hands but as obscure slaves we fulfill someone's Will. <...>

What then is the meaning [of what happened]? First, of all the verse by Judah Halevi: "Whether Ismail will win or Edom will prevail, my fate is just to suffer"²¹ ... This we must remember in the search for the meaning of the contemporary events, this must guide us. <...> Their meaninglessness is the genuine meaning of these events. I am not just playing with words: The genuine meaning of this meaninglessness is clear to any Jew. And, thus, when we ask:

"[Sons, my sons!] Whose lips will tell us,

Why, why, why death was looming over you?

Why, in whose name did you fall? *Death is meaningless,*

Just like life, just like your life was spent without meaning..." (Bialik)²² [Vygotsky's emphasis]

This is the way the Jews fought against Amalek: When they raised their hands to heaven, Israel won; when they lowered them, Amalek overcame.²³ In the hands raised to heaven is the meaning of this meaninglessness. "He who can measure the age-old past of mystery and distance will perfectly help the eternal, will manage servile grief, will understand that fate has many faces, and that the storms of discord and war are as inevitable as great, and must be accepted" (Rafalovich).²⁴ This meaninglessness is rooted in the secularization of the Jewish national idea—with secularization the Jewry lost its meaning in both life and death. <...>

To conclude, I will present a small episode from the war, which in light of the great events is lifted to the height of a general symbol. [A newspaper clipping is glued in the text].

Brother against brother.

In one of the last battles near the river San, a Jewish soldier killed an Austrian rifleman with a blow of his bayonet and was himself wounded on the spot. When he was brought to the field hospital, he refused to leave the wagon. He asked the nurses and the doctor not to touch him and refused to answer any questions. The rabbi was called, and to him the dying man told: “When I hit the enemy in the chest with my bayonet, he fell and cried: ‘*Shma Yisrail!*’ (‘Hear, O Israel!’)—the words that the Jews pronounce when they die or are in terrible danger. I then decided that although I fought as my duty and military conscience demanded, I could no longer live.” (*Russkoe Slovo*)

Text under the clipping: [Bulletin of literature and life.]

In this symbol-fact, all sides of Jewish history emerge as if in a focal point, are refracted, and glow in the light of the great events. Two Jews (“whoever says ‘Shma Yisrael’ is a Jew.” says the Talmud, and from the desperation of the one and the pain of the other it is clear that both are Jews; here Jewry lives in pain) act in this insoluble tragedy as blind tools of dark forces—one is killed, the other driven crazy—and from the grave and from insanity (from beyond the usual) they shout the meaning of this tragic meaninglessness. The point is that “Hear, O Israel!” has a specific meaning: [The name of] the Jehovah of the Jews is not pronounced, He is unknowable, but in relation to Israel He is Adonai, a specific religious form, the proper name from “Lord.” Akiva,²⁵ who died with these words, accomplished His will, like all martyrs: His will was accomplished by both soldiers, who in their impotence and unwillingly killed each other. For in such moments of death and loss of reason appears an unearthly illumination, and from there, from beyond the grave, from beyond madness, from the “*other world*,” sounds the sobbing proclamation of the meaning of these events, the meaning of Jewish history, that turned into a “vaudeville of devils,” into a Divine Tragedy: “Sh’mā Yisrael Adonai Eloheinu Adonai Eḥad!”²⁶

אֱהָדָה יְהוָה אֱלֹהֵינוּ יְהוָה יִשְׂרָאֵל שְׁמַע²⁷

Notes

1. Revelation 7:2.
2. Otto Bauer (1881 to 1938). Austrian social democrat and leading leftist thinker. Freud’s famous case study “Dora” was based on the analysis of Otto’s sister Ida. Vygotsky quotes Bauer (1907, pp. 108/111).
3. Bauer (1907, p. 105).

4. Asher Zvi Hirsch Ginsberg (pen name Ahad Ha'am) (1856 to 1927). Jewish writer and philosopher, founder of cultural Zionism. While a student at Moscow University, Vygotsky dedicated an (unpublished) article, entitled "Cultural Zionism (about Ahad Ha'am)," to his views (see Zavershneva 2012).
5. Vygotsky refers to Berdyaev (1912, pp. 133–134).
6. Vasiliy Andreyevich Zhukovskiy (1783 to 1852). Russian poet, translator and literary critic. Vygotsky quotes his poem "Desire" (1811).
7. Pierre-Simon de Laplace (1749 to 1827). French mathematician, physicist, statistician, and astronomer. Through Kablukov, Vygotsky paraphrases Laplace (1814, pp. 3–4). Nikolay Alekseyevich Kablukov (1849 to 1919) was a Russian economist, statistician and public figure. It is unclear to which of Kablukov's books Vygotsky refers.
8. Hermann Cohen (1842 to 1918). German Jewish philosopher, founder of the Marburg School of Neo-Kantianism. Cohen opposed Zionism and claimed that Germans and Jews could live together to their mutual profit. When in May 1914 he learned that the Russian authorities had introduced a quota for Jews in the higher educational system, Cohen gave a series of lectures in St. Petersburg, Moscow, Riga, Kovno, and Warsaw about the need for a Jewish educational system.
9. Isaiah 40:6–8.
10. The Jewish exile or diaspora.
11. Chaim Nahman Bialik (1873 to 1934). Ukrainian Jewish poet, who later emigrated to Israel. Vygotsky cites a fragment of his "Like withered grass, like a felled oak..." (1897).
12. The Aggadah is a compendium of exegetical texts concerning folklore, historical anecdotes, moral exhortations, and practical advice. Vygotsky refers to the following fragment: "The Holy One, blessed be He, showed mercy unto Israel by scattering them among the nations" (Pesachim, 87b).
13. Georges Gordon Byron (1788 to 1824). British romantic poet. Vygotsky cites Byron's poem "Oh! Weep for those" from his *Hebrew Melodies* (1864, p. 14). Byron's work inspired Lermontov, who translated another poem of the *Hebrew Melodies* (cf. Vygotsky's paper on occasion of the Lermontov's 75th dying day; Vygotsky 1916b).
14. The world to come (Hebrew). That is, the world that will replace the present flawed world.
15. Thy will be done (Hebrew).
16. Cyrus the Great (576 to 530 BC). Persian King who created a vast empire.
17. Joseph Ernest Renan (1823 to 1892). French writer, philosopher and historian. Vygotsky cites Renan (1863, p. 28). It is unknown which of the many editions (French or Russian) Vygotsky used. Renan's *Histoire du peuple d'Israël* (5 vols.) (1887 to 1893) was also discussed in the Circle for the Study of Jewish History and the Philosophy of History (cf. Feigenberg 2000, p. 10).

18. Isaiah 49:3. In most English translations the text is rendered as “You are My servant, Israel!,” which is more correct because the word, as used in the Bible, is more neutral.
19. Vygotsky cites the words of Aleksey Kirillov in Dostoevsky’s novel *Demons* (1871 to 1872). Speaking about Christ’s death, he claimed that: “If the laws of nature did not spare even Him, have not spared even their miracle and made even Him live in a lie and die for a lie, then all of the planet is a lie and rests on a lie and on mockery. So then, the very laws of the planet are a lie and the vaudeville of devils. What is there to live for? Answer, if you are a man.”
20. Like all of the nations (Hebrew). Cf. Deuteronomy 17:14.
21. Judah Halevi (1075 to 1141). Spanish Jewish poet, philosopher, and physician, who eventually emigrated to Israel. Vygotsky cites from his *Songs of Zion*. The Biblical names “Ismail” and “Edom” symbolized the Muslims and the Christians.
22. Cites Bialik’s poem, “The legend of the pogrom,” (1904) is about the infamous pogroms in Kishinev on April 19 and 20, 1903.
23. Amalek, grandson of Esau and progenitor of the Amalekites, who launched an attack on the Israelites after the Exodus. In Judaism, the Amalekites came to represent the archenemy or anti-Semitist.
24. Sergey L’vovich Rafalovich (1875 to 1944). French–Russian novelist, poet, and playwright. Born in France, he wrote in both French and Russian.
25. Akiva ben Joseph (40 to 137). Tanna of the latter part of the 1st and the beginning of the second century, also known as Rabbi Akiva. Leading contributor to the Mishna and Midrash Halakha. Tortured and killed by the Romans after the Bar Kokhba revolt. According to tradition, he died reciting the Shema, a prayer originally based on Deuteronomy 6:4. Since then, it has been traditional for Jews to say the Shema as their last words.
26. The first line of the Shema, meaning “Hear, O Israel, the Lord is our God, the Lord is one.”
27. The first line of the Shema in Hebrew.

References

- Bauer, O. (1907). *Die Nationalitätenfrage und die Sozialdemokratie*. Vienna: Verlag der Wiener Volksbuchhandlung Ignaz Brand.
- Berdyaev, N. (1912). Natsionalizm i antisemitizm pered sudom khristianskogo soznaniya. *Russkaya Mysl*, 2, 125–141.
- Byron, G. G. (1864). *Hebrew Melodies*. Leipzig: W. Drugulin.
- Feigenberg, I. M. (Ed.). (2000). *Ot Gomelya do Moskv: Nachalo tvorcheskogo puti L’va Vygotskogo*. Lewiston, NY: The Edwin Mellen Press.
- Laplace, P. S. (1814). *Essai philosophique sur les probabilités*. Paris: Bachelier.
- Renan, E. (1863). *Vie de Jésus*. Paris: Callman-Levy.

- Vygotsky, L. S. (1916a). Mysli i nastroyeniya (stroki k Khanuko). *Noviy Put'*, 48–49, 49–52 (signature: L. S.).
- Vygotsky L. S. (1916b). M.Yu. Lermontov (k 75-letiyu so dnya smerti). *Novyy Put'*, 28, 7–11 (signature: L.V.).
- Vygotsky, L. S. (1916c). Traurnye stroki (Den' 9 ava). *Novyy Put'*, 27, 28–30 (signature: L. Vygodskiy).
- Vygotsky, L. S. (1917). Avodim hoinu. *Novyy Put'*, 11–12, 8–10.
- Zavershneva, E Yu. (2012). Evreyskiy vopros v neopublikovannykh rukopisyakh L. S. *Vygotskogo. Voprosy Psikhologii*, 2, 79–99.

Chapter 3

The Book of Fragments

The present chapter contains a collection of short chapters written in an impressionistic style and was meant for a book about the Jewish question, but it was never finished. The notes were written in pre-revolutionary spelling in black ink and pencil on strips of paper with a width of 10 to 12 cm. Several fragments have been abridged. More than 100 fragments with a length of 0.5–2 pages have been found; approximately one quarter of them have a complete text; for others Vygotsky just wrote down the title and left an empty space. The notes were made in Gomel and Samara in 1916 and 1917. By the end of 1917, work on the manuscript had stopped. (cf. Zavershneva 2013).

Vygotsky set two epigraphs at the beginning of the text (the manuscript just gives their location in the Holy Book): 1. “And he said unto them, I am an Hebrew; and I fear the Lord, the God of heaven, which hath made the sea and the dry land” (Jonah 1:9); 2. “The fool hath said in his heart: There is no God” (Psalms 53:1). Vygotsky considered two titles for the book: *Without Title* (with the subheadings “Jewish stuff” and “I am a Jew”) and *The Book of Fragments*, which was used by the present editors.

[Written in ink:]

The poor in spirit¹

<...> In our time we do not harvest enough ideas. We are all somehow convinced we know everything. If you go to a Jewish street and ask any adolescent he will very accurately and faultlessly enumerate all of the 10 commandments of his creed. Do we not value nowadays those who wonder, who simply do not know, who have not yet found the definitive and soothing answers, those who are not convinced, who do not teach? Should not those persons be dear to us for whom the Jewish problem is still an unresolved problem, who do not routinely mark all days and affairs with a positive “+” or “-.” who lost their way in the maze, who are confused by the omnipresent mysteries, who are not enlightened, who do not know? In our time we confidently bind shapely, truncated sheaves, our harvest of the field of ideas. We confidently go along the furrows and boundaries and bind everything—even the smallest ear—into a single sheaf.

Those who are still wondering must feed themselves with the *leket*, etc. of the field of ideas, the ears that have not been gathered and bound.²

For the poor in spirit (not the meek ones but the poor who do not know), are these scattered ears of the literary borderlands—the poor of the *leket*, *shich'chah*, and *pe'ah*?

Frolicking (Samara) [Written in pencil in an empty space]

This is an expression by Rozanov that I heard about Jewish literature.³ It seems to him that with Sholem Asch and Sholem Aleichem, Jewish literature is frolicking behind the Russian, the European one.⁴ Does not this expression also define almost all new Jewry? Frolicking. This is not just about literature, it is broader: the national politics. And as long as the leaders of the new Jewry seek salvation in the imitation of Europe, the bulk of the population will abide in frozen rigidity. It penetrates the literature and life of the Jews.

[Written in ink:]

Ashrei haom⁵...

This is pronounced daily by all prayers; praying Jews still exist.

But hardly anyone takes it seriously. *Ashrei haom schekaha lo*? Blessed is the people for who it is *so*?

The average ordinary Jew would be the last to say this. On the contrary, the *point de départ* of all Jewish philosophies of our days—and of many, many past ones—is the complete rejection of this *so*, a thousand-fold rejection, in a thousand ways, and for a thousand reasons.⁶ Otherwise, why would there be Zionists, nationalists, autonomists, the struggle for equal rights and self-determination, territorialism, Bialik, Chernikhovskiy, Berdichevskiy, etc., etc., that is, all that for which the Jews both outwardly and inwardly have lived for so many years?⁷ And those who are praying, do they assert this *so* with all their heart? *Ashrei haom schekaha lo* implies to renounce an ancient tradition, age-old customs and habits.

Blessed? On the contrary, we have become used to complaints. And therefore the anti-Semitists justly criticize us. Dostoevsky: “There is probably no other people in the whole world that complains so much about its fate, with its every step and every word. About its humiliation, about its suffering, about its martyrdom.”⁸ In a word, he is completely right in noticing the hatred to this *so*.

Ashrei means to assert that *so*, that is, to introduce sheer nonsense from the political, national, and very many other viewpoints. We need the courage to question dogmas and rules, to change all signs, and to mark with a “+” what for ages was burdened by a “-.” Does not consistency compels us to do the reverse as well: to mark all plusses of our days with a “-”? After all, this is the way the algebraic laws of factoring work.

Well, let it be. While they do not assert this *so* in politics, in the plane of practical action where one needs a criterion of practical use, it is proclaimed in non-committal, unpretentious passages, scattered notes, semi-lyrical fragments.

It is here the *Ashrei* belongs. No one will be confused. For these leaflets are not addressed to those who know and think but to the poor in spirit. And if the poor in spirit are blessed, so is the people for who it is *so*.

The whole point is how to understand “blessed.” I am far from considering with anti-Semitism that the complaints of the Jews are unfounded, that the Jews actually live well. <Illegible>, wealth, influence, <of the press>, and so on. I neither wish to defend Plato’s well-known philosophical thesis that it is better to be beaten than to beat, that is better to suffer whatever insult than to inflict it.⁹ Let the missionists take comfort in that thesis: It suits their doctrine.¹⁰ All this is too magnificent and rich for the poor in spirit. <...>

Poor prophets (Samara) [Note made in fall 1917 written in pencil around an encircled older note dated “Gomel, Summer 1916.”]

“C.N. Bialik is not really a prophet when you have Isaiah before you, but when you compare him with the last prophets, with Habakkuk, with Malachi, even with Ezekiel, then this comparison no longer seems exaggerated to the enthusiast fan of Bialik.” Bal-Makhshoves.¹¹

Not at all. It is more a relegation of the prophets than a promotion of Bialik. What is here the exaggeration? Really, why be shy?

And indeed, what kind of poets are Ezekiel and Habakkuk? I would rather call Bialik a prophet.¹²

About the center

Feierberg called the *beis ha-midrash* “the central point of the Universe.”¹³ You think that is the exaggeration of a poorly educated Jewish young man? But no matter how immense the Universe is in your eyes and no matter how insignificant the *beis ha-midrash*, the center remains a neutral and even dimensionless point in an enormous circle.

About optimists

 (Samara, autumn 1917)

Daily life causes muddy waves in the stream of optimism. He who does not bring confidence to the solution of a problem cannot claim attention. We just need those who give hope for prosperity, an answer, development. Who needs non-soothing words? They may drive you crazy. There are enough bad things in reality. Who needs them in theories and books? That is what a *theory* is for, to improve reality.

The first and last word of all theories is: It will be okay. You think this is a vulgarization of the current theories? Absolutely not. It even inadequately reflects the divine optimism by which all live in these cold days. It will be okay. Will it?

No. It will be very bad.

And I even think it will be worse than ever. True, the times of the inquisition have passed, but they will seem paradise compared to what is still to come. Can we concretely imagine the form this evil will take? The hatred of enlightened and civilized people is worse than the hatred of brutes and fanatics. All sorts of deaths and horrors

are impending. The punishment and wrath of God are dreadful. All that happened will seem insignificant compared to what is happening, is on its way, is near.¹⁴

Everything goes down into the abyss.

Doom is impending.

Then you will search for words and will not find them. And perhaps then this will remind you of Ezekiel: “And when I looked, behold, an hand was sent unto me; and, lo, a roll of a book was therein; And he spread it before me; and it was written within and without: And there was written therein lamentations, and mourning, and woe.”¹⁵

And then you will not believe that that roll on which were written “lamentations, and mourning, and woe” was sweet in his mouth: “Then did I eat it; and it was in my mouth as honey for sweetness.”¹⁶

<...> And it will be hardly sweet as honey for you. If the optimism does not turn rancid.

But what is the sense of being the messenger of the bad news?

That is neither sweet. But sweeter than optimism.

About great poets (Samara, September 7, 1917)

J. Klausner called L. O. Gordon “the greatest Jewish poet of all time.”¹⁷ This we can only accept in the sense that the Jews never had any great poets and if we firmly believe that what is said is true. For me that is not self-evident. But I prefer to understand it in this *sense*.

Judaism and Europe

Appearance is misleading: Surfaces are easy to touch.

Do not believe it.

About human strength and comfort

Nietzsche’s madman felt the interplanetary cold and the darkness of despair when he learned that God was dead. He lit a lantern in clear daylight and asked: Has it not become colder?¹⁸

For Jews it was quite different: This discovery caused their hearts to fill with feelings of human strength and comfort. To settle down on earth, solidly, firmly, without God. Indeed, can an enlightened people *live*, organize its whole life according to a book? <...>

For that reason the first idea after the discovery of the old God’s death was the feeling that life is illusory, ethereal, as if it only seems to exist, is just imagined, hangs in the air. Are we a people? Are we alive when what we lived for has died? Are we a phantom? We do not exist. The Jews only seem to exist.

The second idea was to settle more solidly on earth without God, according to all the mundane laws of sociology, ethnography, jurisprudence. A crazy thirst for mundane safeguards, security, solidity and comfort. The human “no shepherd, one flock.”¹⁹ We will manage. We will protect ourselves.

Common sense instead of God. So far the Jews behaved like madmen. Now we will be sensible, practical.

God, the old God died for all of us. But it was no tragedy.

On the contrary, it became clearer, brighter.

Who needs a lantern in the clear daylight of atheism?

Everything is clear, counted, and weighed.

Order.

Heine caught a shimmer of madness in the eyes of the prayers in a Venetian synagogue on the Day of Atonement.²⁰ He lived for Judaism and abandoned it. Forever.

We must hold on to more rational utility, proceed to mundane solidity.

In general, the Jews felt warm, solid, comfortable. We will do it all ourselves. God is an illusion. "If I am not for myself, who will be for me?"²¹ In learning they discovered their terrible strength: organization, the cooperation of persons, development.

You think this was a theomachist revolt?²² No, the Jews' attitude to the dying God was one of contemptuous sympathy, as if He were a bankrupt debtor: After all, there was no longer anything to be got from Him. Read Bialik if you do not believe it.

For the sake of appearances and to observe the decencies, God is still invited to ceremonies. But no one takes him seriously into account.

Indeed, in our age... Positive means solid. Everything else is from the evil one. God hindered man: Read in Gordon about the children, fighters, widows, the poor Jews tormented by God.²³ In His name they were tormented by prophets, Talmudists, rabbis. The result was weakness, political feebleness, debility. The Jewry is decaying, disintegrating. A bit of revival, light, warmth, comfort, strength.

And "I am a stranger on earth"; "I am dust and ashes?"²⁴

The voice said, 'Cry.' And he said, 'What shall I cry'? All flesh *is* grass, and all the goodness thereof *is* as the flower of the field: The grass withereth, the flower fadeth: because the spirit of the Lord bloweth upon it: Surely the people *is* grass. The grass withereth, the flower fadeth: But the word of our God shall stand for ever...²⁵

And this is, of course, what science also says: death. There is a limit to human strength and the comfort of peoples. And beyond that limit, where a living people dies, the dead old God raises from the dead, for what kind of human strength and comfort can exist if there is expulsion, punishment, death... <...>

[Written in ink:]

Who created whom?

God the Jews, as told in the Bible? Or the Jews their God, as the eloquent Darmesteter says?²⁶

Certainly not a futile question. Much depends on the answer. How the first took place we all know: This is told in the Bible. It is also known how the latter took

place: God is the idea of justice projected onto heaven, he developed like all popular culture (the Bible and God form part of popular culture as well), and from an obscure, evil, jealous nationalist idol he became a good, humane God of all mankind. This is how the Jews developed their idea.

Whom to believe? <...>

To many people, the second God is more appealing: He does not stop developing. For Hermann Cohen he has become a fully European, civilized, philosophical, <illegible>, idealist God. And then further and further: an endless progress. He is more convenient as well: He does not lead into exile; he does not send down punishments; he is not jealous for His people. And that is why he is always in the hands of reliable persons whose goodness, most importantly, is beyond doubt.

But there—even good persons are in His hands.

What is better you must judge yourself. There is just one unquestionable proof. We tend to think that the power to create is also the power to destroy. The Jews killed their God. That is, they developed him to the point that he became no more than a good idea. And the vestiges of prejudice and superstition all disappeared.

The Jews killed their God; this means they created him as well.

And if God created the Jews, let Him kill them.

About biographical Jewry

Nowadays the Jews have become so fragmented that if you wish to grasp their mystery you must study them biographically: “Who bear their Jewishness and how”.

H. Kohen bears it as the “virtue of loyalty.” Being a rational virtue, it is not closer to an empirical virtue than the Platonic idea [of a table] to a table; it is a philosophical virtue. We, contemporary Jews, *preserve our Jewishness* as the belief in a unique God! That is, he preserves it as a certain philosophical conviction. He speaks with disdain about those who cannot reconcile Europe and Judaism. His Jewishness he bears as an ethical *Adelsbrief*.²⁷ And all is well in his country. He feels European for it combined both things. About traditional Judaism: He calls its “despotic ritualism” its “downside.”²⁸ He would like to get rid of it. The virtue of loyalty does not require loyalty to ritualism. But in this way, apart from this virtue, Jewry becomes humanism as such, a category of universality and generality.

But not all is well in the land of <“ethics”>. Kohen suffered from his Jewishness: For a long time Germany kept quiet about him. The Germans know the virtue of loyalty to one’s origin as well. And so the Jew is “offended in his honor”—The Jews set their hope on the state and its historical development? In the “rational state of the future,” the hurt feelings of honor will be cured. Kohen knows no other states. But neither he is happy, not to speak of “honor.” Loyalty to... ritualism? No. But then, what kind of loyalty? By the way, you must bear your virtue of Judaism via the “offended honor” to the “rational state of the future.”

Lazarus also settled in the happy country of <ethics> where Judaism is focused on rational generalities.²⁹ When he talks about an exclusively Jewish people, then exactly in the sense of its generality. That which unites and does not divide the Jews

is dear to him. That is why he says that the ethical Torah has no equal. His ideal is: *treu und frei*.³⁰ But after all, *treu* is what binds us. That is no longer *frei*. And *frei* is no longer *treu*. <...>

“We are Germans, Germans and nothing but Germans,” says Lazarus in line with his views on the nation.³¹ Listen to his *frei*: “We, German Jews, have no other history as the history of the German people; we share their joy and sorrow, worries, struggles, and triumphs since the national constitution made us into full citizens... Together we fought on the battlefield, together we sat in parliaments and town councils, together we worked in laboratories, together we cured and nursed in hospitals, together we taught at universities. But we also participate in the national freedom efforts; for a long time—and more and more—we have been widely and fully contributing to the ideal interests of the people. Trade and industry, art and science fill our life and what we do and how we do it, whether we like it or not, we do it like Germans.”³² This is *frei* and *treu* is: “Loyalty is the root of our religion just like our religion is the root of our loyalty. Providence made us into Jews, the first duty of each man of honor is to *remain with the flag!* [Vygotsky’s emphasis]. A flag which has been carried for 3000 years and which is flawless; blood enough but our own! It is the flag with the inscription: “Adonai nissi! The Everlasting is my banner!”³³ To remain with this flag is a point of honor. And not just honor: This community and this loyalty gives the moral world of the person something that is irreplaceable. And when we nowadays turn to all other sciences, it is crucial that also the scholars, the philosophically learned men of Israel, whose inner life is no longer fully determined by the religious worldview of the Jewry but by the general culture and the general world of ideas, which determines the core of their life—when these men, I say, nevertheless stay with their fellow men, because their light shines on the others. It matters whether a person belongs to one group or another when he is much more free and much higher in his inner life than some denomination could make him. For the group is judged by its members and that is why those who in whatever way climb high—through social position, through talent, through performance—have the duty to stay with their fellow men.”³⁴

This is the founder of the scientific *Völkerpsychologie*!!! The meaning of *frei* is ideas shared with all mankind, which provide the meaning of life. The meaning of *treu* is a flag, Jewry as a banner. What kind of *Adonai nissi* if “inner life is not determined by the religious worldview of the Jewry but by general culture”? Neither *frei* is *frei*, nor *treu* is *treu*. *Neither one nor the other*. And he bears his Jewishness as one who is appointed in a high position, as an honor, as a duty.

But Gornfeld’s characteristic of Lazarus is interesting.³⁵ He recommends Lazarus to “his fellow believers” (obviously, either according to their passport or fellow believers in the empty, weathered *Adonai nissi*), because the “special structure of this thinking... I would not hesitate to call Jewish...”³⁶ We cannot say that his Jewishness falls under that “immense capital of ideas and sentiments, characteristic of the modern thinker,” the analysis is weak, but intuition tells Gornfeld that the “unconscious religiosity of theoretical thought, the exquisite subtlety of the distinctions, the search for moral principles in issues seem of a different order”—“This is what Lazarus tells me about the Jew.”

How will it all end?

Did you never, albeit once, wonder how it will all end? <...> Or did you think there will be no end whatsoever? An endless development, energy that cannot be destroyed, transformation, and so on. But then you are ready to admit that it neither had a beginning. The same endless development. In a word, you prefer to live like that—without a beginning, without an end—right from the middle. But do not you feel that already now something is <...> dying, is ending in you? But what if it already ended a long time ago? That is why you do not feel the end. <...>

Perhaps you do not want to drink from the cup that you were now ordered to drink from? But God said: “Ye shall certainly drink.”³⁷ The same with walking. You walk away *from* the sword, away *from* famine, away *from* death, away *from* captivity, but you will go yonder. For “O Lord, I know that the way of man *is* not in himself: *It is* not in man that walketh to direct his steps” (Jeremiah).³⁸ <...>

Whither?

This is the title of a novel by Feierberg. The most painful question for the wondering Jewish mind is: Where to go? It can be said with confidence that the pain of this question destroyed his whole life. But he endured the tragedy of all of us. True, nowadays everybody prefers answers to questions. But many, secretly, so as not to reveal their weakness and uncertainty, would like to know where to go.

And so, secretly:

“If they say unto thee, whither shall we go forth? then thou shalt tell them, thus saith the Lord: Such as are for death, to death; and such as are for the sword, to the sword; and such as are for the famine, to the famine; and such as are for the captivity, to the captivity” (Jeremiah 15:2).

You are not satisfied? But, after all, even without asking you know where to go: some away from death, some away from the sword, some away from famine, some away from captivity. So the only thing to do is to turn around and go in the opposite direction. <...>

M. Chagall

The most terrifying thing he ever painted was *death*. Where did he see it? Among the Jews. In the painting of this name we see a dead man. A stocking or a boot is hanging somewhere. Daily life. A woman threw her head backward. On the roof is a violinist. Jews. The same death we see in his red and green Jews.³⁹ ... “A living death” is the most horrible. The *Dead Souls*, the “Living relics” of Russia are nothing compared to Jewish life, which “died a long time ago.”⁴⁰ From the paintings they look at us as corpses.

Without title

The question is how long you will “halt on both knees”? (serve both Jehovah and Baal)?

Elijah—to serve God means to halt on one knee (1 Kings, chapter 18).⁴¹

God is God of the mountains but not of the valleys (chapter 20).

“The new Jewry will then settle down in the valley. In the valleys they will overcome.”⁴²

The meekness of peoples is a sin

<Isaiah> 14, 34⁴³

This is interpreted in various ways. In Hebrew the sin and the sacrifice that atones for the sin are designated with the same word. This is interpreted as: for peoples, meekness replaces the sacrifice that atones for the sin, which is commanded to the Jews. Fully in the spirit of “the ethics.” “The Ethics.”⁴⁴ But the meaning of this is simple and clear or—more exact—very complex and obscure and does not allow such interpretations. The meekness of peoples is a sin. This means that if they are meek to Israel, this is a sin. God raised their anger, aroused it against Israel. And their meekness is a sin. You always thought there is one law for all, but even to Israel it is commanded: “Remember what Amalek did unto thee.”⁴⁵ And against Israel and Saul meekness was counted as a sin more than once. But you think that meekness is always a virtue? Hillel? But do you know that Hillel is a sin of the Jewry, like the meekness of peoples is a sin. And the commandment of the Jewry is Shamai.⁴⁶

About honor

The triumphant march of the new Jewry first stumbled across pogroms, across reality. Here the march was interrupted and fell apart. Gordon is the singer of the inalienable human rights, <the plaintiff> who demands from God and the rabbis the human happiness of the rabbis⁴⁷—he complains that he fell from heaven upon earth, that his soul is empty, that he felt like a sheep (*Eder Adonai*).⁴⁸ Bialik cannot get over the meaninglessness of the impotence and the pogrom: The Jew was killed together with his dog, like mice, like bugs, no... the Jew was never considered human.⁴⁹ Shylock’s famous monologue about the humanity of the Jew would be funny and elementary if it meant what is written in it.⁵⁰ But if he exposes the lie of humanism for which a human being is that which laughs when it is tickled, has pain when it is stabbed, etc.—god...

The meaning of Shylock’s [monologue]: A Yid is a dog, not a *homo*.

The same in Russian literature: Gogol, with his humanism, a Yid is not a human being (*Dead Souls*), *Taras Bulba*—the pogrom.⁵¹ He [Yankel] is really ridiculous, pitiful <faces>, funny legs, like a chicken, if it is a Yid it is not a human being⁵² Zhabotinskiy’s indignation is in vain!).⁵³

Dostoevsky [about the Jew]—a pet, a parrot, a chicken, but not a human being.⁵⁴ Turgenev—execution, smile, challenge.⁵⁵ Gogol—the pogrom. A Yid is not human. The idea of a “Yid” is correct. It is the same as a Jew but with a minus sign. After all, the Jew is neither a *homo* but a transformation, he is higher, a *homo +*. The Yid is a belittling, a distortion, a *homo-*. Pushkin’s “despicable Jew” is the

necessary seal of contempt.⁵⁶ I have always felt this attitude that is so horrible to a man, the seal of contempt. Just these words, dropped in passing, burn brighter in memory than all pages in the literature. And I cannot reread them for the hundredth time without strong emotion, even if read it for a scientific work, etc.

Nowadays they propagate *pride* for the human Jew, [they wish to] straighten his curved back, deliver him from slavery, inculcate human dignity. Zhabotinsky, who is proud of his Jewishness, Gidoni, who challenged someone to a duel.⁵⁷ But the possibility of human dignity has been taken away: We turn impotence into something funny. Gidoni's challenge was not accepted. Or did Bialik talk about self-defense? R. Yu. solves the question as follows: If the Jews had been proud, they would not have survived.⁵⁸ Is it not courageous of Yankel to live amidst the Cossacks? But the healthy part of their relationship is that Yankel despises Taras Bulba; for him he is not a human being but part of nature, a beast. We must hide like bugs, etc. How would such a man survive with Bialik's psychology?

But this means that the problem is not solved. Fully European: If the Jew were a worthy man, honor would be the same as in Europe: *Besser Ehre ohne Leben als Leben ohne Ehre*.⁵⁹ But—correction—he is not human. Wrong: Yankel does not recognize Taras as a person; he licks his boots: This is still funnier. No: Either we must acknowledge the cowardice of bugs, or...

And more in general, in this interpretation humiliation is abolished, but it is not explained how we must bear it. This "abolished sorrow of the Jews" is one of many. R. Yu.: I did not bear my Jewishness as a humiliation, as a defilement of my honor. You cannot live that way. It was demoralizing, yes. But *between the peoples* I always bore my Jewishness *as a humiliation*. And it cannot be denied that the Jews always knew that this is humiliation, this has been clearly said. Proud Jews do not hide. R. Yu.: To hide and not see it as humiliation. Bialik: To hide and see it as humiliation, to sob and tear one's hair and see the immense shame. This is all wrong. We must hide and demean ourselves. Or more correct: If he did not hide, they would kill the Yid with his dog. To hide is unimportant. But we must bear the most ordinary humiliation, to feel it precisely as humiliation. Or do you doubt that? Well, try not to bear it. If Kohen, who is happy with his Jewishness, is "defiled in his honor"... But Kohen dreams of assimilation. Insofar as he is hurt he set his hope on the state. The Jews answered with isolation, separation from the world. Insofar as they form part of the world they are "dogs," and they accepted the humiliation and accepted that "the meekness of peoples is a sin."

About honor. In Nordau's drama a Christian, who had called the Jews "cowards," is killed in a duel by a Jew.⁶⁰ A proud Jew? Simple: no honor. We must borrow it somewhere. Ahad Ha'am condemns it: According to the ethics of Judaism, human blood is worth more.⁶¹ And honor? This problem Ahad Ha'am does not know. Although he is proud, too: slavery in freedom!!! <...>

And Mendelssohn with his "be a man in the street and a Jew at home."⁶² This is separating the man and the Jew. Moreover, being a Jew is something for at home, something intimate. This separating and combining of the man and the Jew in oneself is perhaps even less feasible than *treu und frei*. Humanism never made peace with the Jewry nor the Jewry with humanism. <...> And the Jew demanded to regard himself, a *homo*, as *nothing*. <...>

About politicians. *Contradictio in adjecto*⁶³

It never amazed you that there are so many Jewish politicians in the European chaos? Beaconsfield, Winawer, Lassalle, yes any Jew in the synagogue between *mincha* and *maariv* is an excellent politician on a European scale, but the Jewish politics themselves are so talentless!⁶⁴ Sometimes this means that Jewish politics are unrealizable, that a Jew can be a politician but that Jewish politics are impossible. Or do you connect it with the fact that there are many Jewish thinkers, artists, scientists, musicians, writers in Europe but that there is no Jewish philosophy, literature, art? I am even ready to admit that Jewish philosophy, literature, and music are impossible, just like Jewish politics. It sounds like “dry water” and a “round square,” a *contradictio in adjecto*. But now we talk about the Jewish politician. The Jew is an object of politics, not a subject. The meaning of Jewish history is the atrophy of politics. Katzenelson says that it was precisely religion that caused the political weakness of the Jews.⁶⁵ We can talk about it with sadness or joy, let it be blessed weakness or a curse, but Jewish history crushed the Jewish politicians, the State, independence. The zealots were the last politicians.⁶⁶ This is a historical fact of crucial importance: There never were Jewish politicians in Jewish history after the destruction of the state; the apolitical nature of Jewish history is a fact. But you wish to turn back the wheel of Jewish history, to correct the historical mistake, to begin from scratch, to rationally make your life yourself? And while in the eyes of the “Jews the passive observation of a history that was not created by us was the best of political systems,” you wish “to actively participate in history,” take it into your own hands.⁶⁷ We must destroy Jewish politics because it is, like all the new Jewry, “frolicking.” Now you understand the secret of its lack of talent.

“The history of the Jews was not the history of what they did but the history of what was done to them” (Heman).⁶⁸ Must politics become our religion?⁶⁹ These words of Feuerbach you know. Marx: The philosophers unfettered the world enough; it is time to undertake its reorganization.⁷⁰ Your politics is to reorganize the Jewry, to give it a “substitute for a state-like structure,” to politically organize its will. You wish to realize the political Jewry? But you yourself with the words of the poet speak about the dust and ashes of the Jewry.⁷¹ Its impotence and lack of will—this is its entire history. “Without the sword of its power.”⁷² Powerlessness. Jewish politics: “Stand ye still and see”... (the Bible).⁷³ For politics there is nothing to hold on to in Jewry. The Jews are so far from what moves the world and the world is so far from the Jews. But you wish to overcome Jewishness to make it political. The *adjectum* is so dear to you that you sacrifice the Jewishness. But you should know that political Jewry stops being a *contradictio in adjecto* when it stops being Jewry. <...>

About life and death

It never struck you that the enigma of Jewish immortality is that the Jews have *died* long ago? The *tallis* and the shroud, life and death in one.⁷⁴ During their lifetime the Jews wear the *tallis*, a shroud. They are dead. This is the secret of the immortality of mummies, as Heine said.⁷⁵ The immortal died. This is why the Bible calls death the

return to one's people. The living life will die, but what is dead no longer dies. It decays, disintegrates. You are not filled with horror at a certain thought? You never felt that because you are a Jew—you're dead? This is why paganism [and daily] life say that the Bible severs you from your people. We cannot see God and live.⁷⁶ Did you see God face to face? *Ergo*. So, the Jews will not die for the simple reason that they are dead already: The Talmud is the killing of everything— <years>, passions—all that is alive is *destroyed*—that is its meaning. In the Shulchan Aruch it is said about someone that he with such fear and horror went to his wife, that he seemed bent by a hump.⁷⁷ This is an example. No communication, no restriction, no asceticism, but destruction.

Do not all peoples know that their future life will be a bathhouse with spiders?⁷⁸ No. The Jews. Horrifying is the “bobok” of the Jews (Dostoevsky), i.e., that *nothing* has changed for the “bobok” of the Jews.⁷⁹ What is poetically alive in the Jewry is disgusting; it is “bobok.” How repulsive are the conversations of the dead about passion, women, etc. The same with the Jews. But one thing you have noticed; that death is *not just* the destruction of life but something else. That death is not just denial; that it has something positive, that *death exists*. But you already know the next question: What comes after life—no, beyond death, after death—decay, disintegration?

[Written in pencil:]

Bialik

None of the monastic rules has such “trifling” (leaving out none of the trifles of life) subtlety. Everything—from big to small—is regulated; it is ordered *how* to act. No questions whatsoever. Who is exhausted by the burden of “himself,” who waits for or seeks a yoke, comes here. Here we have no longer life, here we have the discharge of life, here we have no freedom but submission to the law, here they do not live but execute life, for here they do not come to know, to understand, to ask but to execute life. And the rebellious and cheerful Bialik: “We bow our neck: Where are the iron yoke and the stretched hand.”⁸⁰

Laws! Everything is in need of the Talmud, Shulchan Aruch, Halakha, Hammer's Law.⁸¹ To the monastery, to the monastery—just this pushes to Judaism under the terrible power of the law. Go there yourself as well.

Take your life there—instead of ghastly and ineffable sin. For it does not belong to *you*. Get to know the sweetness of the monastery, the idea of “you may not” and the law, for “here is the *whole person*,” in the monastery.

About the monastery (Gogol)

To my sister. Your monastery is Judaism. Its walls (Shulchan Aruch) are separated from the world more than walls of the most impenetrable stone. Not one sound of the world passes these walls. In the monastic cells they read, there are scholars; here we have the renunciation of the whole world.⁸²

[Written in ink:]

Who is wise?

Jewry as a problem of biography, of personal destiny. Rozanov: Nationality is destiny.⁸³ The Christian Bible adds that Someone, while struggling with Israel, replied when the latter asked his name: Why do you ask for my name? It is secret.⁸⁴ But the Jew does not know this. The Jew likes to answer a question with a question. Yes, I think that you can answer a question with just a question. But then Someone was also a Jew? And he does not have a name? The Jew = Someone? But also this question I answer with a question. Why you want His name?

The Jews are in general unquestioning. There is no Book or people more unquestioning than this one. [They have no] strivings. Seek and you will find? No: They discovered me without enquiring about me, they found me without seeking for me. Thus, if you wish that you as well will discover—Do not enquire, if you wish to find, do not seek. Do not ask—the Jews never ask. ... And not because they know. The Jews knew more about not knowing. What is secret is just for God, and what is revealed is for us and our children. But do not ask because “thou doest not enquire wisely of this thing.”⁸⁵ Thus: Do not enquire. What to do? You know the Jewish virtue: “Blessed is he who waits...”⁸⁶ What is commanded? To wait, fear God, multiply and breed, do not kill, not a small matter... a whole life is not enough for that. And, after all, the most important is: Do not ask about birth, about death. Why enquire: God did not answer <his sons>, question him (Ezekiel 20).⁸⁷ But answer all questions with a question and thereby expose their vanity.

Notes

1. Matthew 5:3.
2. Gifts to the poor when a person harvests his field based on the Torah: Pe’ah (“corner”), the portion of the crop that must be left standing for the poor; Leket (“gleanings”), ears of grain that fell from the reaper’s hand or the sickle while the grain is being gathered during the harvest; Shich’chah (“forgotten sheaves”), sheaves left and forgotten in the field while the harvest is being brought to the threshing floor.
3. Vasily Vasilyevich Rozanov (1856 to 1918). Russian literary critic, journalist, and philosopher of religion. Rozanov’s writings were often paradoxical and sparked controversy. He readily passed from praise of Judaism to unabashed anti-Semitism. Although Rozanov himself denied that he was an anti-Semite, Vygotsky analyzed his writings in this context.
4. Solomon Naumovich Rabinovich (pen name “Sholem Aleichem”) (1859 to 1916). Ukranian Jewish novelist and playwright who later moved to the USA; one of the founders of modern Yiddish literature. Sholem Asch (1880 to 1957). Polish Jewish novelist and playwright who wrote in Yiddish and eventually became an American citizen.
5. Ashrei (Hebrew) (“Happy are they who dwell in Your house; they will praise You, always!; Happy is the people for who it is so; Happy is the people whose

God is Adonai”) is a prayer that is recited at least three times daily. The prayer is composed primarily of Psalm 145. Vygotsky cites and discusses the second part with the words “for who it is so.”

6. Point of departure (French).
7. Vygotsky lists some of the important movements in the national Jewish movement around the turn of the century and the best Jewish writers of his time: Bialik (see note 11 in chapter 2); Saul Gutmanovich Chernikhovskiy (1873 to 1943). Russian Jewish translator and poet who wrote about the renaissance of Jewry through Zionism; Micha Josef Berdichevskiy (1865 to 1921). Ukrainian Jewish writer who urged the Jews to free themselves of religious dogmas and collected and popularized Jewish legends and folktales.
8. Quoted from Dostoevsky’s paper “The Jewish question” (1877), which was also discussed in Vygotsky’s early work “The Jews and the Jewish question in the writings of F.M. Dostoevsky” (Feigenberg 2000, p. 89).
9. Plato, *The State*, II 358e (Glaucón’s argument and Socrates’ reply).
10. The missionists of the 19th century believed that Israel as a people was dead but that the Jewish church had the mission to live on until its religion was spread all over the world.
11. Israel Isidor Elyashev (pen name “Bal-Makhshoves”) (1873 to 1924). Lithuanian Jewish neurologist, Yiddish literary critic, newspaper editor, translator and pioneer of the Zionist movement.
12. Vygotsky’s cousin, David Isaakovich Vygodsky (1893 to 1943), a philologist and translator, was of a similar opinion. In 1915, the journal *The Jewish Student* published his review of Bialik’s volume *Songs and Poems*. David Vygodsky wrote that “Bialik is a deeply national, popular poet but absolutely not in the usual sense of the word. He does not talk about his love for the people, about their needs and sorrows, he curses his people, curses it for the misfortunes that befall it, for its disgrace, for the unquesting obedience with which all terrible things are accepted. This he does to stir up, to arouse the people.” According to Vygodsky the poet was a “prophet, who longs for God” and it seemed to him that “in Bialik revived one of the ancient prophets of Judeah” and that his curses were caused by his “immense love” (cf. Kotik-Friedgut & Friedgut 2008).
13. Mordecai Ze’ev Feierberg (1874 to 1899). Russian Jewish writer of short stories and journalist who died from tuberculosis. His long story “Le’an?” (“Whither?” 1899), about a young Jew who fights orthodoxy but at the same time suffers because of his loss of faith, left a strong impression on Vygotsky (cf. the fragment of the same name in this document). Beis ha-midrash (Beth midrash) (Hebrew). House of learning. Place of Torah study.
14. These apocalyptic words seem loosely based on the Book of Revelation.
15. Ezekiel 2:10.
16. Ezekiel 3:3.
17. Joseph Gedaliah Klausner (1874 to 1958). Lithuanian Jewish historian, linguist, and specialist in literature, who later emigrated to Israel. Vygotsky probably refers to his *Ziyyun la-Meshorer Gordon* (1895). Yehudah Leib Gordon (1830 to 1892) was a Lithuanian Jewish poet who wrote in Hebrew and Yiddish and also was an active proponent of the Enlightenment among the Russian Jews.

18. Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche (1844 to 1900). German philosopher, cultural critic, poet, composer, and Latin and Greek scholar. Vygotsky refers to his *The Gay Science* (1895, §125).
19. This may refer to John 10:16: “and there shall be one fold, and one shepherd.”
20. Refers to Heine (1838) where he discusses Portia from *The Merchant of Venice*.
21. Aphorism from Rabbi Hillel (cf. note 45): “If I am not for myself, who will be for me? If I am not for others, what am I? And if not now, when?”
22. A theomachist is a person who fights or resists God or the Divine will.
23. Semyon Markovich Dubnov (1860 to 1941). Historian and journalist. In his papers and poems, Gordon criticized the traditional way of life of the Jews, their lack of education, the dogmatism of the Rabbis, and the oppression of the poor. Cf. his volume of short stories *The World as it is* (1876).
24. Genesis 23: 3–4: “And Abraham stood up from before his dead, and spake unto the sons of Heth, saying, I am a stranger and a sojourner with you: give me a possession of a burying place with you, that I may bury my dead out of my sight.” Genesis 18:27: “And Abraham answered and said, Behold now, I have taken upon me to speak unto the Lord, which am but dust and ashes.”
25. Isaiah 40:6–8.
26. James Darmesteter (1849 to 1894). French Jewish orientalist and philologist. Argued that the Jewish monotheistic religion fits best with the idea of progress in human development and that it can serve as the foundation of a religion of justice and peace, which would combine the achievements of both religious faith and scientific knowledge. Cf. his *Coup d’oeil sur l’histoire du peuple juif* (1881) and *Les prophètes d’Israël* (1892).
27. Patent of nobility (German).
28. Vygotsky often misspelled foreign names and words, and there is every reason to believe that he is still discussing Hermann Cohen and not some Kohen. The editors went through the three volumes of Cohen’s Jewish writings—not exactly page-turners—and could not find the text Vygotsky is referring to, but the themes touched upon are very much like those of Cohen.
29. Moritz Lazarus (1824 to 1903). German Jewish philosopher and psychologist and founder, along with Hermann Steinthal, of comparative psychology (*Völkerpsychologie*).
30. Loyal and free (German).
31. Cites p. 70 of Lazarus (1887).
32. Cites pp. 78–79 of Lazarus (1887).
33. The Lord [Jehova, Adonai] is my banner (Hebrew). Cf. Exodus 17:15–16: “And Moses built an altar, and called the name of it Jehovahnissi: For he said, Because the Lord hath sworn that the Lord will have war with Amalek from generation to generation.”
34. Cites pp. 150–151 of Lazarus (1887).
35. Arkadiy Georgiyevich Gornfeld (1867 to 1941). Russian literary scholar and critic, translator, and author of many papers about the Jewish question. Attended Lazarus’ course on psychology in Berlin and wrote an extensive introduction to the Russian translation of his *Die Ethik des Judenthums* (1898). Vygotsky extensively cited Gornfeld’s writings in both *The Tragedy of Hamlet* and the *Psychology of Art*. The present citations have not been located.

36. From 1932 to 1997 the Soviet Russian passport mentioned Jewish descent as one of the possible nationalities (e.g., Armenian, Jew, Russian, Tartar).
37. Jeremiah 25:28.
38. Jeremiah 10:23.
39. Marc Chagall (Moishe Khatskelevich Shagal) (1887 to 1985). Russian–French Jewish painter. Vygotsky refers to his paintings “The death” (1908), “Jew in bright red” (1915), and “Jew in green” (1914).
40. Refers to Gogol’s novel *The Dead Souls* and to Turgenev’s story “A living relic” in *A Sportman’s Sketches. Vol. 2* (1874).
41. 1 Kings 18:21: “And Elijah came unto all the people, and said, How long halt ye between two opinions if the Lord be God, follow him: but if Baal, then follow him.”
42. 1 Kings 20:28: “The Lord is God of the hills, but he is not God of the valleys.” 1 Kings 20:23: “And the servants of the king of Syria said unto him, Their gods are gods of the hills; therefore they were stronger than we; but let us fight against them in the plain, and surely we shall be stronger than they.”
43. Cf. Matthew 5:5.
44. Probably refers to Lazarus’ *Die Ethik des Judenthums [The ethics of Jewry]* (1898).
45. Deuteronomy 25:17. Jews are supposed to think of this phrase regularly. For Amalek, see note 23 to chapter 2.
46. Hillel and Shamai (first century BC to first century AD). Jewish sages who founded opposing schools of thought. Their discussions were instrumental in shaping the oral law.
47. A puzzling sentence.
48. “The pogroms of the early 1880s caused a marked deterioration in Gordon’s mental health. “Nothing is left, he complained in 1882, of all my dreams... And after the great catastrophe and the enormous sufferings I immediately fell from heaven to earth... My soul is empty (Naphschi reka),” the poet often complained.” (*Jewish Encyclopedia, Evreyskaya Entsiklopediya*, 1910, entry 695) (in Russian). In this connection, Gordon wrote the bitter poem “Eder Adonai” (“The Flock of the Lord”), in which he excoriated the Jews for their weakness and resignation (Vital 1999).
49. The reference is to Bialik’s poem “The legend of the pogrom” in his volume *In the City of Carnage* (1904) where he describes the scenes of horror after the pogrom (with piles of dead Jews together with their dead pets lying in the streets).
50. Refers to Shakespeare’s *The Merchant of Venice* (1596) where Shylock says: “He hath disgraced me... and what’s his reason? I am a Jew. Hath not a Jew eyes? hath not a Jew hands, organs, dimensions, senses, affections, passions? fed with the same food, hurt with the same weapons, subject to the same diseases, healed by the same means, warmed and cooled by the same winter and summer, as a Christian is? If you prick us, do we not bleed? if you tickle us, do we not laugh? if you poison us, do we not die? and if you wrong us, shall we not revenge? If we are like you in the rest, we will resemble you in that. If a Jew wrong a Christian, what is his humility? Revenge. If a Christian wrong a Jew, what should his sufferance be by Christian example? Why, revenge. The villany

you teach me, I will execute, and it shall go hard but I will better the instruction.”

51. Nikolay Vasilyevich Gogol (1809 to 1852). Russian writer, playwright and literary critic. Vygotsky refers to chapter 4 of his novel *Taras Bulba* when the cossacks throw the Jews into the Dnepr: “They seized the Yids by the arms and began to hurl them into the waves. Pitiful cries resounded on all sides; but the stern Zaporozhians only laughed when they saw the Jewish legs, cased in shoes and stockings, struggling in the air.”
52. Vygotsky refers to Yankel’s words in chapter 10 of *Taras Bulba*: “for everyone takes a Jew for a dog; and they think he is not a man, but only a Jew.”
53. Ze’ev Jabotinsky (Vladimir Yevgen’evich Zhabotinskiy) (1880 to 1940). Russian Jewish writer, poet, translator, and Revisionist Zionist leader. Co-founder of the Jewish legion. In his paper “Russian kindness” (1913), Zhabotinskiy commented on the previously mentioned scene in *Taras Bulba*: “Such cruelty exists in none of the other literary traditions. It cannot even be called hatred or sympathy with the Cossack’s violence against the Jews, it is worse: it is thoughtless, unadorned festivity, unobscured by even the slightest thought that those funny legs kicking in the air were the legs of living human beings, it is an incredible simple and wholesale contempt for an inferior race, not even worthy of animosity.”
54. Cited from chapter 10 of Dostoevsky’s *Notes from the Dead House* (1860 to 1861): “Luka, who had known many little Yids when he was at liberty, often teased him, less from malice than for amusement, as one plays with a dog or a parrot.”
55. Ivan Turgenev (1818 to 1883). Russian writer of novels, short stories and plays. Vygotsky refers to Turgenev’s story, “The Yid” (1847), and the scene of Hirschel Tropman’s execution: “He was really ludicrous in spite of all the horror of his situation. The intense anguish of the forthcoming parting with life, his daughter, his family showed itself in the unhappy Yid in such strange and grotesque gesticulations, shrieks and wriggles, that we could not help smiling, however sad the scene.”
56. Aleksandr Sergeevich Pushkin (1799 to 1937). Russian poet and prose writer. Vygotsky refers to a line from his verse “The black shawl” (1820): “A despicable Jew knocked my door.” See also pp. 74–98 of Feigenberg (2000).
57. Refers to the following event related in *The Jewish Chronicle* (June 10, 1914): “At St. Petersburg, a Jewish lawyer, M. Gidoni, has challenged Prince Kochubey to a duel for referring to the Jews as timid people. The Prince was afraid to accept the challenge.” Internet sources provide more detail and state that the incident took place in a restaurant between Prince Mikhail Mikhailovich Kochubey and Aleksandr Iosifovich Gidoni. Gidoni (1885 to 1943?) was a Russian Jewish lawyer, art critic, playwright, and prose writer who later emigrated to France.
58. R. Yu. (R. Yu. E.). Vygotsky’s co-author and mentor with whom he corresponded in the early 1920s. Cf. chapter 4.

59. Death with honor is better than life with dishonor (in German).
60. Max Simon Nordau (Simon Maximilian Südfeld) (1859 to 1923). German Jewish Zionist leader and writer. Vygotsky refers to his play *Doctor Kohn* (1898).
61. We were unable to find this reference.
62. Moses Mendelssohn (1729 to 1786). German Jewish philosopher and translator of the Bible into German who co-founded the Jewish enlightenment movement, the Haskalah. The text “Sei ein Mensch in den Strassen und ein Jude zu Hause!” (“Be a man in the street and a Jew at home!”) has often been attributed to Mendelssohn but actually comes from Yehudah Leib Gordon’s poem “Erwache, mein Volk!” (“Wake up, my people!”) (1863).
63. Contradiction between parts of an argument, self-contradiction, oxymoron (Latin).
64. Benjamin Disraeli, earl of Beaconsfield (1804 to 1881). British conservative politician and prime minister. Maxim Moiseyevich Winawer (1863 to 1926). Russian lawyer and politician, co-founder of the Constitutional-Democratic Party. Ferdinand Lassalle (1825 to 1864). German philosopher, lawyer, politician. *Mincha* and *maariv* (Hebrew). Afternoon and evening prayer.
65. Yehuda Leib Katzenelson (pen name “Buki Ben Yogli”) (1846 to 1917). Ukrainian military doctor, writer, and publicist of Hebrew Literature who grew up in Gomel. Vygotsky seems to be paraphrasing a text on the Zealots.
66. The Zealots were a radical political movement in Judaea that sought to incite the people to rebel against the Roman Empire, most notably during the First Jewish-Roman War (66 to 70). The Zealots were of the opinion that only the Messiah could rule Jerusalem.
67. Vygotsky cites Zhabotinskiy’s introductory article “On Bialik” in Bialik’s (1911) volume *Songs and Poems*. The same citation, but this time without quotation marks, appeared in Vygotsky’s (1917) article “Avodim hoinu.”
68. Refers to p. 2 of Heman (1908) where the author writes that Jewish history is “less a history of what the Jews have done, but much more of what was done to them.” Cf. Vygotsky’s (1917) paper “Avodim hoinu” (“The will of the Jewry”) was connected with the history of the Jewry, says P. Heman, “seldom the history of actions, but more often the history of sufferings, much less the history of what the Jews did, and much more the history of what was done to them.” (In the paper Vygotsky quotes the preceding sentence as well and he writes P. Heman because he made a mistake with the Gothic capital letter “F,” which resembles a capital letter “P”).
69. Ludwig Andreas von Feuerbach (1804 to 1872). German materialist philosopher and anthropologist. The aphorism is from his *Vorläufige Thesen zur Reform der Philosophie* (1842).
70. Karl Marx (1818 to 1883). German philosopher, economist, and socialist. His *Capital* (1867) was for many years the uncontested number one on the list of famous unread books until it was eclipsed by *Ulysses* (1922). Vygotsky refers to the 11th thesis of his *Theses on Feuerbach* (1845/1888): “Philosophers have hitherto only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to change it.”

Actually, where we have the word “unfettered,” Vygotsky used the nonexistent verb *pereraskovyvat*, which may be understood as repeated, unsuccessful unfettering.

71. Refers to Judah Halevi’s *Kitab al Khazari (Kuzari)*, which was completed around 1140. Halevi accused the Jews of a lack of will and predicted that “The building of the Holy City will be finished only when our sons want that so passionately that its stones and its dust will become dear to them.”
72. An expression taken from Rozanov (1901): “Until now the Jews are the only people, who can be called preserved by God, for it already lives and rules some 2000 years without the sword and is preserved thanks to its Love of God; the Jews’ faith really saves them!”
73. 2 Chronicles 20:17: “Ye shall not need to fight in this battle: set yourselves, stand ye still, and see the salvation of the Lord with you to morrow go out against them: for the Lord will be with you.”
74. Prayer shawl (Yiddish). The tallis or tallit (Hebrew) is worn over the outer clothes during the morning prayers.
75. We were unable to find this citation.
76. According to the Old Testament, God was neither to be seen nor was his name to be pronounced: “Then Manoah knew that he was an angel of the Lord. And Manoah said unto his wife, We shall surely die, because we have seen God.” (Judges 13:21–22). One rare exception was the case of Jacob: “for I have seen God face to face, and my life is preserved.” (Genesis 32:30, cf. note 83).
77. Shulchan Aruch (Hebrew for “set table”). Code of Jewish Law authored by Yosef Karo in 1563. Together with its commentaries, it is the most widely accepted compilation of Jewish law. We proved unable to find the episode described by Vygotsky.
78. In Dostoevsky’s *Crime and Punishment* (Part IV, Chapter 1), Svidrigaylov wonders why a future life must be vast and suggests it might be “one little room, like a bath house in the country, black and grimy and with spiders in every corner.”
79. Refers to Dostoevsky’s short story “Bobok” (1873) where the protagonist overhears the indecent conversations of the recently deceased on a cemetery. The word “bobok” stands for the last word that a dead person can say before he or she, after some 2 or 3 months of posthumous life, is completely decomposed.
80. The exact reference has not been found.
81. Halakha (Hebrew). Collective body of Jewish religious laws derived from the written and oral Torah. It is unclear what Hammer’s Law (*Molota zakona*) refers to and it may be a mistranslation.
82. Refers to a letter by Gogol to count A. P. Tolstoy (1801 to 1873) (“It is necessary to travel through Russia”) in the volume *Selected Passages from Correspondence with Friends* (1847): “There is no higher title than that of monk, and God honors some of us with a day when we can don the humble black chasuble, which is so desired by my soul that the very thought of it is a joy for me. But it cannot be done without the call of God... No, for you as for

me the doors of this desired cloister are locked. Your monastery is Russia! Mentally clothe yourself in the black chasuble and, completely mortifying yourself for yourself, but not for her, go forward to work within her.” In “Advice to my sisters,” in the same volume, he writes: “If my sisters do not marry, they will turn their house into a monastery and build a shelter for poor homeless girls in the courtyard.”

83. Vygotsky cites Rozanov (1913): “For each nation nationality is its destiny, its fate; perhaps its dark fate. Fate rules. ‘You do not escape your destiny’: and neither can you escape the ‘fetters of your people.’”
84. Genesis 32:24–29: “And Jacob was left alone; and there wrestled a man with him until the breaking of the day... And he said, Let me go, for the day breaketh. And he said, I will not let thee go, except thou bless me. And he said unto him, What is thy name? And he said, Jacob. And he said, Thy name shall be called no more Jacob, but Israel: for as a prince hast thou power with God and with men, and hast prevailed. And Jacob asked him, and said, Tell me, I pray thee, thy name. And he said, Wherefore is it that thou dost ask after my name? And he blessed him there. Or Judges 13:18: “And the angel of the Lord said unto him, Why askest thou thus after my name, seeing it is secret?”
85. Ecclesiastes 7:10: “Say not thou, Why is it that the former days were better than these? For thou doest not enquire wisely of this thing.”
86. Daniel 12:12: “Blessed is he that waiteth, and cometh to the thousand three hundred and five and thirty days.”
87. See the epigraph taken from Ezekiel 20 in chapter 4.

References

- Feigenberg, I. M. (Ed.). (2000). *Ot Gomelya do Moskvy: Nachalo tvorcheskogo puti L'va Vygotskogo*. Lewiston, NY: The Edwin Mellen Press.
- Heine, H. (1838). *Shakespeare's Mädchen und Frauen*. Paris: H. Delloye.
- Heman, F. (1908). *Geschichte des jüdischen Volkes seit der Zerstörung Jerusalems*. Calw-Stuttgart: Verlag der Vereinsbuchhandlung.
- Kotik-Friedgut, B., & Friedgut, T. (2008). A man of his country and his time: Jewish influences on Lev Semionovich Vygotsky's world view. *History of Psychology*, 11(1), 15–39.
- Lazarus, M. (1887). *Treu und frei. Gesammelte Reden und Vorträge über Juden und Judentum*. Leipzig: Wintersche Verlagsbuchhandlung.
- Rozanov, V. V. (1901). *Iz neyasnogo i nereshennogo*. St. Peterburg: Tipografiya M. Merkusheva.
- Rozanov, V. V. (1913). *Opavshie list'ya. Korob I*. St. Peterburg: Tipografiya Tovarishchestva A. S. Suvorina'Novoe Vremya'.
- Vital, D. (1999). *A people apart: A political history of the Jews in Europe 1789–1939*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Vygotsky, L. S. (1917). Avodim hoinu. *Novyy Put'*, 11–12, 8–10.
- Zavershneva, E Yu. (2013). “Molyus’ o dare dushevnoy usiliya”: Mysli i nastroyeniya L.S. Vygotskogo v 1917–1918. *Voprosy Psikhologii*, 2, 112–133.

Chapter 4

The Jewish Question

This chapter contains three notes written in pre-revolutionary spelling. The documents reveal the idea of the book *About the New Jewry*, which Vygotsky called his “spiritual testament.” In the book he planned to give a critical analysis of the new political currents and the way of life of the contemporary Jews.

About the new Jewry

[This note was written in black ink on five sheets presumably in 1916.]

R. E., L. V.
(*Misnaged*)¹

About the new Jewry
(against—contra...)

Epigraph: “1. And it came to pass in the seventh year, in the fifth month, the tenth day of the month, that certain of the elders of Israel came to enquire of the Lord, and sat before me. 2. Then came the word of the Lord unto me, saying: 3. Son of man, speak unto the elders of Israel, and say unto them, Thus saith the Lord God; Are ye come to enquire of me? As I live, saith the Lord God, I will not be enquired of by you. 31. And shall I be enquired of by you, O house of Israel? As I live, saith the Lord God, I will not be enquired of by you. 32. And that which cometh into your mind shall not be at all, that ye say, “We will be as the heathen, as the families of the countries, to serve wood and stone.” 33. As I live, saith the Lord God, surely with a mighty hand, and with a stretched out arm, and with fury poured out, will I rule over you... 37. And I will cause you to pass under the rod, and I will bring you into the bond of the covenant. [38.] And I will purge out from among you the

rebels, and them that transgress against me... 39. As for you, O house of Israel, thus saith the Lord God; Go ye, serve ye every one his idols, and hereafter also, if ye will not hearken unto me..." (Ezekiel 20)

The meaning of the epigraph: (1) the new Jewry—to become like other peoples, (2) to worship wood and stone,² (3) will not be realized according to their ideas, (4) God will exercise dominion—the whole transcendence of this dominion: not the Jews as a religiously talented people, [not] the search for God, religious creativity, mystical experience, [but] "the Jews created their God," (5) the hand, the muscle—Divine Providence in Jewish history, (6) by the outpouring of fury—in contrast with the optimism of the new Jewry—the expectation of a catastrophe, of fury, (7) not the Jews will return to God, but God will return the Jews, (8) the purging of the unruly, (9) general framework—a time, when there are no instructions, no answers from God, anti-proselytism—"Go ye, serve your idols, if you will not hearken unto Me," (10) in the chapter—the whole history of Jewish paganism. It is a particular case of paganism.

The preface (together)³—the practical side, the goal, the nature of the work. Not literature, imperfection, incompleteness, hasty release.

I. About the new Jewry (against). The individual, the family, biographical Jewry.

The general paper⁴ and everything that does not go into the separate paragraphs.

[Space has been left empty for supplementary propositions.]

II. Jewish stuff (classic).

[Space has been left empty for supplementary propositions.]

III. Politics and the community. (a) Zionism, (b) socialism, (c) nationalism, (d) autonomism, (e) political parties, (f) the community (what kind of community they want to accomplish). The so-called intelligentsia. The older Jewish society. The *person* in the new Jewry.

[Space has been left empty for supplementary propositions.]

The problem of the new Jewry

[This note dates probably from 1916 and was written [in pencil on one sheet of paper.]

The problem of the new Jewry. Outside.

<Olya, R. M.>⁵

*The truth of anti-Semitism*⁶

(About F. M. Dostoevsky and his attitude to the Jews).⁷

Epigraph: *Our enemies are judges.* Deuteronomy 32, 31.⁸

(1) The themes: the interest from the viewpoint of the study of Dostoevsky and the Jewish question. It is crucial for the self-knowledge of the Russian and Jewish society. (2) The general opinion about Dostoevsky. The liberal Russian society and the Jewish intelligentsia. Zhabotinskiy. (3) Theme—the *truth* of anti-Semitism. The reassessment of generally accepted values. V. Solov'ev or Dostoevsky. (4) Russian literature, its anti-Semitism (Bikerman).⁹ (5) The literature about Dostoevsky and the Jewish question. (6) Dostoevsky's literary works. (7) Dostoevsky's anti-Semitism and his formulas. "Rubbish" and essence. The truth about the fate of the Jews. (8) <Illegible>, his anti-Semitism and Russia. (9) The influence of Rozanov, Berdyaev, Bulgakov.¹⁰ (10) Russian enemies: V. Solov'ev, *Shield*,¹¹ philosemitism, journalism, the liberal intelligentsia. Who is right? (11) The enemies of the Jewry: a mistake. (12) The fate of the Jews and Russia (a nation is not empirical ethnic material, not an idea but fate [a people = what befalls the clan]).¹²

The fate of anti-Semitism and its prophet Dostoevsky. The past. The present. The future. *Gogol's "Parting words"* (correspondence)—about the "despise of the despised," "honor," human dignity.¹³

Acceptance of the truth of anti-Semitism—we.

Declaration in the Mogilyev District Court; the unsent letter to R. E.

The note consists of two layers: (1) the text of the declaration written in black ink in the middle of a big sheet of paper and (2) the text around it written on both sides of the sheet, i.e., the unsent letter to R. E. Pre-revolutionary spelling. The document abounds with abbreviations and passages that are difficult to decipher.

The present document gives us reason to assume that on the eve of the October Revolution (October 24 according to the old calendar corresponds with November 6 [new style]), Vygotsky found himself in Samara. Moreover, it suggests that already in 1917 Vygotsky was ailing, although the medical certificate mentioned in the declaration was not found in the archive. Until now it was believed that Vygotsky contracted tuberculosis around 1919 to 1920 (Feigenberg 2000, p. 57). Apparently, the declaration was indeed written in Samara in fall 1917 and the letter to R. E. half a year or even a year later during the German occupation of Gomel (Vygotsky stored all his papers and sometimes—if space permitted—used them for new notes several years later). Thus, this document so far represents the only note from the least studied period of Vygotsky's life: the period of his return to Gomel after the October Revolution.

This note, written around the declaration, is one of the very rare notes of a private nature found in the archive. It shows that Vygotsky acutely felt the impossibility to fully realize his abilities and worked on a book *About the New Jewry*. Apart from that, the note also testifies of the fact that in those years Vygotsky had a co-author who shared his views. Her initials were R. Yu. E., but her identity has not yet been established. Vygotsky's unsent letter to R. E. and another letter from R. E. to Vygotsky, dated April 14, 1922, show that their cooperation was quite important for Vygotsky on the eve of the revolution and that

their correspondence was interrupted in the early 1920s. In our estimation, the book about the nation, mentioned in the letter to R. E., was the book *About the New Jewry*. For a detailed analysis of the document and a conjectural portrait of R. E., see Zavershneva (2013).

Text of the declaration:

To the Mogilyev District Court
(visiting session in Gomel)

From Lev Simkhovich Vygodsky¹⁴

Declaration

Because, due to an illness which deprives me of the possibility to arrive in time in the city of Gomel, I cannot appear in the hearing of the District Court on 30 October this year about the case of Artur Milyaev,¹⁵ accused by me in accordance with Art. 1535 of the Penal Code,¹⁶ I ask to postpone the hearing of the matter and move it to another session.

On the grounds of Art. 388 of the Code of Criminal Justice I ask to consider my failure to appear legitimate.

I enclose herewith a medical certificate of the doctor I consulted.

L. S. Vygodsky
Samara, October 24, 1917

[Text written around the declaration and continuing on the other side of the sheet:]

The “prophecy” of Zionism is wrong. Not only will we not go to Palestine, we have not even completed the *golus*. It is still going on. The era of the flowering of the *golus* and not its end. The anti-prophetism of the era. The words of Ezekiel: “I will not be inquired of.”

Ahad Ha’am.

Disintegration is what threatens the Jews, and not assimilation, not destruction. Schism: the purging out of those who transgressed—Ezekiel.

Fragmentary thoughts connected to many things and which I would not like to lose.

1. Dostoevsky. *Incorrect* in chapter 3 and perhaps in chapter 9. Gogol, the Yid, Yankel. Not Yankel resembles a chicken but the other one.¹⁷ *Taras Bulba*, p. 258.
2. Yankel to the Hajduk (watchman, soldier): Your Royal Highness.¹⁸
3. From the unsent letter to R. Yu.:

We are connected by fate, and our relationship forms the core of my person but with persons other than you I have just some superficial everyday relationship (except for <I.> K.)¹⁹ and a *moral* connection I have only with you. The book about the nation = a look at the fate of this generation (nation = fate), the present

connected with the person, a “passionate commitment,” a calling, *not* literature. The idea of the book (as an element) penetrates the core of my person and destiny deeper and deeper. In case my lethargy remains the same, if there was—honestly speaking—*no* voice that compelled me, no duty, there would be something else: a complete, boundless devotion to you. I *believe* in you in another, higher sense. In the sense of your teaching me, your participation in my destiny, my person, your instructions. I will do everything *in accordance with your words*, because I will consider that this is *necessary for me*. You are the only voice *outside* me, if not inside me. Moreover, (a) this is not an idealization of you, my *high* opinion about you has nothing to do with it, you can also be an ordinary person. It is about your instruction, participation in my destiny, work; (b) the external work on the book is not important, not the main thing, it will first be done in the mind.

The book must be as much about *me* as it is about others. Its preface must be if not a *testament* then something in that spirit. On the whole, Gogol (I just read this one idea, *nothing* else) gave me much for the book: his superior view on the present, the link with himself, the spirit, style, tone, form of the book. Even its form is very instructive. For example, “Parting words” <,> about literature²⁰—we could use these *articles* directly for our book. There is no need to conceal this. But most important is the *spirit*. In general, make the book more concise, as usual—its content elementary, logical—I have no *other* strength. But the essence, the author’s confession about *himself*, must be put in a few sparing, concise, and sound words of the preface.

An idle, impossible, monotonous, impracticable dreaminess, in no way connected to my fate and life, has taken hold of me (seven–eight hours per day, 12–13 hours sleep, two hours simple ideas with my sister,²¹ two hours of reading, fragmentary thoughts, conversations, work). I do not think about myself, my core, person, its metaphysics and psychology, its nature and triviality, ... I am *glad* with the instructions of my father, my family. Work, <illegible>, average well-being <illegible>. Nothing unusual. No writing. It is terrifying to contemplate my *fate*. The relationship with you is important, *decisive*, ambiguous, crucial for my fate. Failure. <illegible>. <Shakespeare> talked about it.

I could not reconcile (did not <want> it artificially) the everyday relations with the other, higher ones. We need to be far away. To overcome, remove the petty, trivial interest. Far away, isolated from you, I am more devoted to your guidance, influence, words. This is (there are no words for our meeting, union, friendship, etc., for <illegible> our relation) the most important, central to my fate. I will subordinate everything from my life to that.

I want you to understand me well. No enthusiasm, no idealization, which you will reject—that’s not in order, because everyone can see one’s insignificance, etc. But if I am not mistaken *this is the same* from your side, you will understand because you are no dead guidance in my fate (after all, when you collide with, hit a

pole, it forces you to change direction, it guides you), but a living, moral one, although it is mysterious, inexplicable. And if <not>, if you will not understand, it is a mistake. But in one case or the other, for the *core* of the person this is the most important; the question is just how to realize it. <...> (The *fate* of Jewish literature).

Whence the *pain*, the burden in “*this*”? I do not know. I do not ask. The “failure” of S.,²² the external paths that do not depend on us—this is not yet *all* the pain. The impracticability? Is everything I will do repulsive to me? No, neither this is all. There is pain in what is most important and most essential. I do not know in what. I believe because it touches on a basic pattern in my destiny, life, and everything connected with it (even superficial thoughts) is pain. Gogol’s parting words are addressed to me.

Wait for defeats, quite unexpected ones. Pray to receive mental strength (strength = to be a warrior = to act) and be worthy.²³

4. The book is in some sense an autobiography.

Our language (Russian), meaning, spiritual life, psychological stuff (the triviality of our means of passing the time, our interests, tastes, aspirations, <judge> oneself), the talks with Emma.²⁴ Make mention of the circle, which was inspired by the reflection about the fate and meaning of the Jews, about our generation, oneself, the searching for one’s destiny.²⁵ This is the spirit of the book. It brought *me many things*.

5. The fate of an idle man with abilities, a prisoner is happier, a poor man is happier—this is my lot.

6. I cannot reconcile the historical in Christianity with Christ. There is no history in Christianity—no mankind, church, proper <cause>. It is *ideology* (Hegel: a very noble impulse of the human spirit, etc.). Jewry: the reality of the divine in Jewish history, a fact of the history of the Jews. The Jewish religion is no ideology but the fate of a living people; the Jewish religion is the Jewish history. God’s hand is Providence in history.

Ezekiel, chapter 20 Epigraph.

Notes

1. The Misnagdim (Hebrew for “opponents”), nowadays known as Livish or Yeshivish, were the representatives of an orthodox Lithuanian current in Judaism that strongly opposed the spread of Hasidism until the mid-19th century. The Misnagdim insisted on rabbinic learning, scrupulous study of the Talmud, and the exact observance of the commandments of the Torah, whereas the followers of the Hasidic movement put more emphasis on immediate religious experience in prayer and engaged in more ecstatic practices with claims of visions and miracles. The Misnagdim were strong in Lithuania and White Russia.

2. About the neo-paganism of cultural Zionism and its “worshipping of nature,” see passages of Vygotsky’s paper “Cultural Zionism (About Ahad Ha’am)” in Zavershneva (2012, p. 87).
3. Probably together with R. E.
4. Here and elsewhere Vygotsky uses the term “paper” or “article” to designate a book chapter.
5. We have been unable to identify these persons.
6. Original footnote: “The present article is a chapter from the book *Against the New Jewry* that has been prepared for publication. It was somewhat modified and reworked for publication in this journal.”
7. Dostoevsky’s anti-Semitism has been well documented. Once he mistook Pavlov’s wife for a Jewess (because she was called “Sarah” in daily life) and treated her quite coldly. When he learned that her real name was Serafina, his whole attitude changed and he exclaimed: “How could you exchange such a marvelous, pure Orthodox name for a Yid name!” (Todes 2014, p. 79). In many of his novels (e.g., *Demons*, *Notes from the Dead House*, *The Adolescent*, *The Brothers Karamazov*) and in his journalistic work and correspondence (*Diary of a Writer*), the Jewish characters play a negative role, and instead of the neutral term “Jew,” he often used the denigrating “Yid” or “little Yid.” See Vygotsky’s early paper “The Jews and the Jewish question in the works of Dostoevsky” (Feigenberg 2000, pp. 74–98).
8. Deuteronomy 32:30–31: “How should one chase a thousand, and two put ten thousand to flight, except their rock had sold them, and the Lord had shut them up? For their rock is not as our rock, even our enemies themselves being judges.”
9. Iosif Menassievich Bikerman (1867 to 1942). Russian Jewish historian, writer, journalist, and supporter of the movement for the Jewish enlightenment. Bikerman was critical of Zionism and argued for an alliance with the progressive Russian intelligentsia. After the October revolution he emigrated to Berlin and, eventually, France and co-founded the group *The National Union of Russian Jews*, which urged Jews to fight the Bolsheviks.
10. Sergey Nikolayevich Bulgakov (1871 to 1944). Russian religious philosopher, theologian, orthodox priest. He welcomed the idea of Zionism, which in his view would facilitate the conversion of the Jews to Christianity. After 1917, his writings became notably more anti-Semitic.
11. A volume dedicated to the Jewish question and its interpretation in Russian culture first published in 1916. Among its contributors were notable authors such as Dmitriy Merezhkovskiy, Zinaida Gippius, Leonid Andreev, and Ivan Bunin.
12. In Russian, Vygotsky is playing with words: *narod* = to, *chto na rod*.
13. The chapter “Parting words” in Gogol’s *Selected Passages from Correspondence with Friends* (1847) had a personal meaning for Vygotsky, and he mentioned it more than once. Sympathizing with his unknown correspondent, Gogol encourages him: “Your sufferings are immense. To endure such rude accusations with such a tender soul; to live with such elevated

feelings amidst such rude, awkward people as the inhabitants of this vulgar little town where you settled... to see... the daily abominations and endure the despise of the despised! ... You will suffer countless new defeats, totally unexpected ones. In your almost defenseless profession and with your insignificant appointment anything may happen... But remember: We are not at all summoned to this world for celebrations and feasts. We are called here to battle; we will celebrate the victory *there*... The heavenly Commander watches all of us and not the slightest thing escapes His eye.”

14. Vygotsky’s original name.
15. Artur Solomonovich Milyaev (1879 to ?) was an entrepreneur in the Gomel of the early 20th century who published the local newspaper “The Gomel Kopeck.” He was also head of the fire brigade and owner of a printshop, the bookbinding firm “Dawn,” and a mansion in Zamkovaya street with the hotel and restaurant “Continent” (*Pamyatnaya knizhka* 1910, pp. 145, 153, 169). According to local historians, Milyaev was quite a colorful figure, who “was always in the center of all sorts of scandals” (Glushakov & Novikov 2005).
16. Article 1535 of the Penal Code dealt with libel.
17. Refers to chapter 11 of *Taras Bulba*: “The red-haired Jew drank a small cup of liquor infusion, threw off his half-kaftan, and betook himself—looking in his shoes and stockings a good deal like a chicken—with his Jewess to something resembling a cupboard.” Vygotsky refers to an error in Gogol’s text (Yankel is mixed up with a nameless character, a “Yid”). One of Vygotsky’s early unpublished papers, entitled “Notes in the margin: From the notebook of a reader,” written during his university years in Moscow, was entirely dedicated to the analysis of such cases.
18. Refers to Yankel’s words in chapter 11 of *Taras Bulba*: “Your Royal Highness, silence! Silence, for God’s sake! cried Yankel, “Silence! We will pay you for it in a way you have never dreamed of: We will give you two golden ducats.”
19. Unidentified person.
20. Gogol’s *Selected Passages from Correspondence with Friends* also contains letters about literature.
21. This probably refers to Zinaida Semenovna Vygodskaya (1898 to 1981), a linguist and the author of English–Russian and Russian–English dictionaries. Zinaida and Lev were very close, especially during their university years in Moscow: they shared a room and visited plays and concerts together. According to Vygotsky’s daughter, Gita Vygodskaya, they also attended the seminar of Gustav Gustavovich Shpet (1879 to 1937), the Russian philosopher, psychologist, art critic and translator (Vygodskaya & Lifanova 1996, p. 39).
22. This may be the “S” of the Russian *Sionizm* (Zionism).
23. Cited from Gogol’s “Parting words.”
24. Possibly David Vygodsky’s wife, Emma Iosifovna Vygodskaya, née Kheifets (1899 to 1949), a children’s writer born in Gomel. David and Emma married in 1922 in Moscow in the year Emma graduated at the Historical–Philological Faculty of Moscow University. This would imply that the conversations took

place when Emma was still David's fiancée and during their post-revolutionary life in Gomel.

25. This refers to the Circle for the Study of Jewish History and the Philosophy of History mentioned in chapter 1.

References

- Feigenberg, I. M. (Ed.). (2000). *Ot Gomelya do Moskvy: Nachalo tvorcheskogo puti L'va Vygotskogo*. Lewiston, NY: The Edwin Mellen Press.
- Glushakov, Yu & Novikov, A. (2005). "Kopeyka" pradedu. *Rossiyskaya gazeta. Soyuz. Belorussiya–Rossiya*, 291. <http://www.rg.ru/2005/06/16/rozenbaum.html>.
- Pamyatnaya knizhka Mogilevskoy gubernii na 1910g.* (1910). Mogilev: Gubernskiy statisticheskiy komitet.
- Todes, D. P. (2014). *Ivan Pavlov: A Russian life in science*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Vygotskaya, G. L., & Lifanova, T. M. (1996). *Lev Semyonovich Vygotsky: Zhizn', deyatel'nost', shtrikhi k portretu*. Moscow: Smysl.
- Zavershneva, E Yu. (2012). Evreyskiy vopros v neopublikovannykh rukopisyakh L.S. Vygotskogo. *Voprosy Psikhologii*, 2, 79–99.
- Zavershneva, E Yu. (2013). "Molyus' o dare dushev'nogo usiliya": Mysli i nastroyeniya L.S. Vygotskogo v 1917–1918. *Voprosy Psikhologii*, 2, 112–133.

Chapter 5

Genres of Writing

These notes, written in black ink on seven narrow strips of paper, date from the time of writing of *The Psychology of Art*. The ink has faded badly, and various words could not be deciphered. Obviously, the text was written for *The Psychology of Art*, in which Vygotsky analyzed various genres of writing (e.g., the fable, the short story) and the way they cause aesthetic reactions in the reader. For some reason, however, it was not included.

The spell, the riddle, and the tongue-twister

Spells

(cf. A. Blok's paper)¹

Not strictly poetic works (like the fairy-tale, the riddle, the *bylina*)² but applied ones. That is why there often is poetry in them, but accidentally. It can also be absent. The totally unpoetic fairy-tale does not exist (it is not alive; who needs it?); unpoetic spells exist. Hence: *not all* in the spell is poetic and subordinated to the "laws of the poetic form," i.e., its poetry is often fragmentary, diluted. Rarely the spell is a perfect poetic model from the beginning to the end.

But they nevertheless exist. What makes the spell more similar to poetry?

1. Spells are based on the belief in the magical power of the word; words are things, events; to say the word means to do what it designates. For the Romans, the *carmen* was a spell, song, poem.³ Such a feeling of the word and its use (not ordinary, not terminological) is akin to the poetical.
2. The mythological worldview that gave rise to spells is also akin to the poetical and easily turns into poetry. All the phenomena of the world are connected in an artificial, supersensual link (the Sun, the Moon, and the myths about them) [that] combines the representations, images, events not in a natural, but in an artificial manner (The sun—the spokes of a wheel, the devil <illegible>, the thunder—Elijah the prophet in a chariot).⁴ A new, impossible reality; a new world, not the one that exists. The myth is basically an image, but taken in its real material

sense. For us the myth became a poetic image, a plot. Thus, the Greek tragedies were dramatized myth for the Greeks, i.e., they all knew and believed in Oedipus and Prometheus. For us it is poetry. This is how poetry develops from myth.

3. Finally, the spell is throughout lyrical. Lyric is neither simply the expression of *genuine* feeling. Go and try to express your *genuine* boredom and all will be bored. It is not in this sense that lyric elicits feeling. Neither thought nor feeling *can* be expressed by poetry, and they should not be. “A thought once uttered is untrue.”⁵ With “*measured verse and icy words*” (that is what poetry is: icy words) you do not convey *their* meaning (of the feelings). Lermontov.⁶ Lyric is to interconnect, couple, combine a stream (one note is not music but their connection is) of artificially manipulated feelings so that this combination brings about a brilliant artistic form (a melody from sounds). *Remember the meaning and <style> of the lyrical (the difference with the graphic)*. The images in lyric are not the same as in an epos. On the “ethereal ocean.”⁷ In its “silvery blue snow.”⁸

[Possibly one page was lost. The previous pages were numbered “1” and “2”; the next page has a number “4”.]

The spell is always based on a strong, artificially manipulated feeling. Cf. the examples of spells. A *spell is not a prayer*, not a relic of pagan prayers. The form of the spell: “a verbal depiction of the *comparison* (absolutely! i.e., the coupling, confrontation, melody of feelings) of a given phenomenon with a desired phenomenon, with the goal to produce the latter” (Potebnya).⁹ That is, *both* phenomena are lyrical images in the spell,—cf. Lermontov and the silvery blue—and the *desire*, *the strength of the spell*, the “*let there be*” is the lyrical emotion that unites them. The difference between the image and the myth is *only in our attitude*: whether we believe in its reality or know that it is just poetry. For example: crossed out: [love] a bleeding heart, a broken heart, a heart of gold, are images. A myth: Moscow burned due to enchantment—Glinskaya took the human heart, put it in water, sprinkled it riding through Moscow, Moscow burned.¹⁰ In the myth the image is objective and real (we believe it); in poetry it is a means to convey meaning, an allegory.

The tongue-twister

The comical effect is also a pure effect of style (what is funny in poetry is not the same as what is funny in life). They are composed so as to make pronunciation very difficult. *Style through sound*. <Often> hardly make sense. A play with sounds, alliteration, assonance, rhythm. <...> *Primitive poetry*.

*The priskazka. The pribautka*¹¹

Even these minor forms of poetry have their own tale; a *priskazka* is not a fairy-tale. It is no more than *design, illumination, decoration, ornament* (verbal, *story-like*) to the *fairy-tale*. The remarkable: My mustache dripped but my mouth remained dry—

all banquets in fairy-tales end this way. *The ironic*: I was there too. In fairy-tales the honey does not reach the mouth. The story pattern: The king had a court, etc.¹²; a meaningless standstill of the action. The *pribautka* ≠ *priskazka*. It is something else. More like a joke of a professional yarn spinner for the audience when the fairy-tale is interrupted. The *pribautka* is not *part* of the fairy-tale, tears it apart, intrudes. The *priskazka* forms part of it; in the beginning, in the end, in the middle.

The riddle

A remarkable form of poetry: (1) practically, in the applied sense, totally unnecessary; harmful; obscures the meaning and the thing; weird, inaccurate description; (2) neither religiously needed nor for the feelings; (3) as a riddle is a test of the intellect, a trick (our rebus, charade), a test of shrewdness? *Not true either* because they combine phenomena that are so *remote* (that's what makes them poetic) that nobody can guess it. The riddle is either told by someone who knows the solution (there are riddles where the solution is in the text itself or is given in advance), or the effect is reserved for the end, when the solution is given.

"The black *joker* hops into the fire"—who guesses that it is a *p-oker*? "A golden spindle from window to window" (a sunbeam in the window); "two bulls butt each other but are not alike" (heaven and earth), etc. Cf. the 5–6 excellent riddles in Smirnovskiy.¹³ They are not to test wisdom, as a stupid textbook writes referring to Solomon and the queen of Sheba. They forget that this is just a fairy-tale. *Only* in fairy-tales they solve riddles for this reason, but this is a story technique; it is introduced as necessary material, or woven into the pattern of the plot. That is why the riddle <illegible> has not definitely separated itself from the fairy-tale [but] may return there in the ceaseless composition and decomposition of folklore. And the riddle is solved just like the fairy-tale is told, for its own sake. Pure unalloyed poetry. The adduced riddles are excellent. Others are even better.

Again they have their own external form, their own tale: They are guessed as they are presented. Imagery, acoustic abundance. "Voiceless it cries, wingless it flutters, toothless bites, mouthless mutters"—what is this other than the pure requirements of poetic language?¹⁴ But their artistic essence is: *poetic* imagery. Unpoetic imagery exists ("standing on the shoulders of giants"; this is imagery—standing, shoulders—but no poetry). The poetic image is a riddle, i.e., it is an *illogical* combination (that *cannot be guessed* directly) of representations with a brilliant result. The forms of oral literature develop various pure techniques of genuine poetry: the song—a harmony; lyric, the fairy-tale—a story; the riddle—an *image*. But this image is close to the fairy-tale or song: story-like or lyrical, or epic (the *bylina*). "Two bulls butt each other" is a complete story, fully understandable as an image. As can be seen, one and the same material, "two bulls butt each other": In the style of the fairy-tale it is a story; in the style of the riddle it is an image; in the style of the epos it is a description.

Notes

1. Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Blok (1880 to 1921). Russian poet. Vygotsky refers to his essay on magic and spells in which he argued that “ancient spells, and with them the whole realm of folk magic and ritual, are for us an ore in which the gold of authentic poetry glints, the gold that guarantees all the ‘paper’ poetry of books, including that of our own day. This is why charms and spells have acquired psychological, historical, and aesthetic interest, and why they are painstakingly collected and studied.” Cf. Blok (1908).
2. Russian traditional heroic poem.
3. In ancient Rome, the word “carmen” usually referred to a song, poem, or ode. In the context of magic and religion it designated a chant, hymn, spell, or charm.
4. According to folk tradition, the prophet Elijah produces thunder and lightning by riding in a chariot drawn by horses of fire. The background of this belief is the Biblical story about the prophet, who “went up by a whirlwind into Heaven” in a chariot of fire (2 Kings 2:1–12).
5. Fyodor Ivanovich Tyutchev (1803 to 1873). Russian poet. Vygotsky quotes a line from his famous poem “Silentium” (1830): “How can a heart expression find? / How should another know your mind? / Will he discern what quickens you? / A thought, once uttered, is untrue” (translation by Vladimir Nabokov).
6. Cited from Lermontov’s poem “Do not believe yourself” (1839).
7. Cited from Lermontov’s poem “The demon” (1829 to 1839): “On the heaven’s ethereal ocean / Rudderless, without a sail / Starry choirs in ordered motion / Calmly float through vapour’s veil.” Cf. Johnston (1983).
8. Maksim Gorky (real name “Aleksy Maksimovich Peshkov”) (1868 to 1936). Russian writer, poet, founder of socialist realism. He and his son were possibly killed by the Soviet secret police. Vygotsky quotes his novel, *Ispoved* (1908), which translates as *The Confession* (1916). Vygotsky quotes the sentence: “I walked to the churchyard wall and looked out into the distance. The monastery stood on the mountain, and before it Mother Earth was spread out, richly dressed in its silvery blue snow.” See p. 84 of Gorky (1916).
9. Aleksandr Afanas’evich Potebnya (1835 to 1891). Russian–Ukrainian linguist, philologist, philosopher. The idea of the inner form of the word, developed by Potebnya on the basis of Wilhelm von Humboldt’s theories, exerted enormous influence on Vygotsky and is visible in, for example, *Thinking and Speech*, and in his studies of the development of word meaning. “Vetukhov, a student of Potebnya, according to lectures written in 1875, introduced a transitional stage to the new view which found its expression in the article “Little Russian folk songs.” The propositions of the notes are completely identical with the propositions of the article and only differ in the formulation of the definition of the spell. It is as follows: “The spell is a verbal depiction of the comparison of a given phenomenon with a desired one, a comparison which has the goal to produce the desired phenomenon.” This formulation was somewhat changed in the article, “Little Russian folk songs.” There Potebnya says: “If we stick to the opinion that spells are in general relics of pagan prayers, that the more a spell resembles a prayer, the more primordial it is, we are mistaken” ... a significant

- part of the spells has no more in common with the prayer than the wish that something will take place” (Poznanskiy 1917, pp. 26–27).
10. On April 12 and 20, and again on June 24, 1547, Moscow was struck by terrible fires. The sovereign was told that Moscow burned by magic. The boyars assembled the people on the square and asked who set Moscow on fire. “The Gliniski’s!” the crowd answered; it was said that their mother, princess Anna, took the hearts from the dead and put them in water, which she then used to besprinkle the streets of Moscow” (*Encyclopedian Dictionary*, 1983, entry 865–866).
 11. The *priskazka* and *pribautka* are two literary genres that can accompany the telling of a Russian fairy-tale. The *priskazka* is a short, funny addition to a fairy-tale, which is unconnected to its plot. It can also refer to recurrent words or expressions in fairy-tales (e.g., “and if they have not died, they are still alive”). In the text, Vygotsky refers to a standard rhyming end of Russian fairy-tales: *Ya sam tam byl, med i pivo pil / po usam teklo, v rot ne popalo / na dushe p’yano i sytno stalo* (“I was there too, drank honey and beer / my mustache dripped but my mouth remained clear / I felt drunk and satisfied”). A *pribautka* is comical expression or nonsense verse (e.g., “One bright morning in the middle of the night / Two dead boys got up to fight / Back-to-back they faced one another / Drew their swords and shot each other”).
 12. Refers to a “circular” nonsense rhyme of the form: “The baseball player Stinning / Hates to lose an inning / That’s why he’s always winning / Return to the beginning.” In the Russian rhyme the first words are: “The king had a court.”
 13. That heaven and earth are represented by bulls in this well-known Russian riddle probably has its origin in mythology, where the bull (Taurus) can be a symbol of strength, causing the thunder (heaven), but also a symbol of fecundity (earth). Smirnovskiy’s book was a textbook used in the highest classes of the gymnasium that went through many editions. We do not know which edition Vygotsky used.
 14. Solution: the wind. Borrowed from J. R. R. Tolkien’s *The Hobbit*. Vygotsky cites a poetic Russian riddle.

References

- Blok, A. (1908). Poeziya zagovorov i zaklinaniy. In E. V. Anichkov, A. K. Borodin & D. K. Ovsyaniko-Kulikovskiy (Eds.), *Istoriya russkoy literatury*. V2t.T.1 (pp. 81–106). Moscow: Izdatel’stvo I.D. Sytina i Tovarishchestva ‘Mir’.
- Gorky, M. (1916). *The confession*. New York: Frederick A. Stokes Company.
- Johnston, Ch. (Ed.). (1983). *Narrative poems by Aleksandr Pushkin and by Mikhail Lermontov*. New York: Random House.
- Poznanskiy, N. F. (1917). *Zagovory: Opyt issledovaniya proiskhozhdeniya i razvitiya zagovornyyh formul*. Petrograd: Tipografiya D.V. Orlova.

Chapter 6

The Trip to London

This chapter is based on a small notebook with a black leather cover and contains notes written in ink as well as in pencil, which may reflect the time of writing. It is a unique document in that it shows Vygotsky's personal impressions of the only trip he ever made outside the Soviet Union. Vygotsky was the Soviet delegate to the 8th International Conference on the Education of the Deaf, which took place in London from July 20 to July 24, 1925. It is known that he travelled by train and that his first stop was Berlin, where he spent several days. Elsewhere (Van der Veer & Zavershneva 2011, 2012), we have reconstructed the second part of Vygotsky's trip and shown that Vygotsky's involvement with the London conference was minimal: He neither participated in discussions nor presented a talk. The notebook makes clear, however, that it was a major event at a personal level.

Unfortunately, the notebook is in bad shape: With the exception of a few pages where the text is written in black ink, the notes are very hard to decipher. The pages are soiled, and the text written in pencil has faded to the extent that it is impossible to copy or scan them. The great number of abbreviations do not make it easier; nevertheless the greatest part of the notebook (the London part and the diary) has now been deciphered. The remaining part concerns the stay in Berlin and still poses a challenge to the editors. Just like the notebook that was used in chapter 12, the present notebook contains a considerable number of names, telephone numbers, and addresses. All of these addresses have been checked and although they still exist, we suspect that the house numbers are not always correct. Of the approximately 20 names in the notebook, we managed to identify slightly more than half. It remains unclear whether the remaining names were correctly spelled and neither can we say with any certainty who of the persons on the list Vygotsky actually met.

[Written in ink:]

*“Never mind that you are rude and ill-natured,
Never mind that you love others,
Before me I have the golden lectern,
And with me my grey-eyed fiancée.”*

(From A. Akhmatova)¹

Roza
June 16, 1921

[Written in pencil:]

G.y.a.a.w.m.²
July 15, 1925

London N<E>5 2440
Stoke Newington, N16
67 Manor Road
Marc Tcharny
Telephone: Clissold 39-16³ (home)
Holborn 6584

Pavel Mikhaylovich Linitskiy⁴
London EC2
31-35 Wilson Street
c/o Arcos Limited⁵

[Crossed out:]
Avgusta Mikhaylovna
146 Fellows Road
Hampstead NW3

M-me F. Ellis, 117 Holborn
London EC (next door to Gamage's)⁶
Miriam Aleksandrovna Vol'fson

[The address is crossed out:]
6 Chalcot Gardens
Hampstead NW3
London

David Vladimirovich Fel'dberg⁷
Berlin Prof.
g. Brühl, Karlstraße 27
Tel: Norden 1.18.46

Berlin – dr. Al. <illegible>
Shtange, 1st secretary of the embassy⁸

Dr. Erich Baron⁹
Generalsekretär – <illegible>
Berlin – Pankow
Kavalierstraße 10 <illegible>

Paris Embassy¹⁰
Chlenov

London Dr. Polovtseva¹¹
Varvara Nikolayevna WC1
150, Southampton Row

[Written in ink:]

Embassy Tel.
Chesham House Victoria
Chesham Place 1109
1st Secretary Bogomolov¹²

[Address crossed out:]

177 County Hall
Westminster Bridge, 7
Tavistock Square
45/44 M <illegible> sensky

Dr. Paul Schumann¹³
Leipzig <Rol> str. <2>

Miss D. Lipshitz
<8> Newton Rd
Bayswater W2

[Written in ink:]

“Freeland Steamship Company”
Greener House 66/68
Haymarket SW1

Consulat Général de France
51 Bedford Square WC1

[Written in pencil:]

Melichar Bednářick¹⁴
Directeur de l’Institution des Sourds-Muets
Plzeň, République Tchèque

Museum B85
Dr. Al. Mikh. Orlova

Vol’fson
14 Gladstone Park Gardens, Cricklewood

Linsky
34 Geary Rd
Dollis Hill

Moorgate 49
Arcos Bank
Moorgate Str. 49
Financial Department
of the Trade Delegation

4454 Home

Willesden

Vol'fson Boaz Borisovich¹⁵

Office Holborn 2440

A. Sazonova

Willesden

4143 From 6 o'clock.

[Written in ink:]

Aleksandra Mikhaylovna Sazonova

Brondesbury

14 Exeter Road

Molchanov Embassy

Holborn

Chansery Lane 46

center <illegible> Vol'fson

Piccadilly 117

Secretary of the Society for Maternal Care

V. Polovtseva

<48> Grove Park Road¹⁶

Chiswick W4

Tel: Chiswick 2013

[Written in ink:]

County Council

Department of Mental Hospitals

[Written in pencil:]

Vigotsky or Vy

or

Wigotsky or Wy¹⁷

[Written in ink:]

County Hall Room 159

Westminster Bridge Road

Mr. Newton (**physical detective**)¹⁸

Museum 9701–Tel.

H. Stainsby¹⁹

National Institute for the Blind

224 Great Portland Street W[1]

[The page is crossed out in pencil.]

[Written in pencil:]

I visited V. between 7 and 8, as agreed, and between 10 and 10½, as I was told to. Unfortunately, I cannot go there again until Sunday. Would you be so kind to call me around 10 (I will wait until 10½). When can you come to us? You need not call—you can simply come around 10–10½ a.m.

45, Tavistock

Jacob Chakow W 62

Kurfürstenstr. 125 [crossed out: W 62 Kurfürstenstr. 125]

Nollendorf[platz] <86>–63²⁰

Königin Augusta Strasse 22²¹

August 1, 12 p.m.²²

I ride to the Westminster and the Parliament.

Today my heart again felt relieved somewhat, somehow more joyous.

1:20 p.m. The Westminster Abbey. The soul is lost in the open, enormous and bleak spaces and is looking for something to grasp in order not to <illegible>.

G.

August 4, 10 p.m.²³

I am reading G. the whole day. The whole day <illegible>. Rose of my Jericho (my heather).²⁴ How amazing <illegible> the reading fills me with calm, proud, despair. Rain all day.

[Written in ink:]

Al. Luria

Königstein (Janus)

Elmühlweg

Villa Germania 13²⁵

Rankestr. 19²⁶

Therese Rubinstein

Wilmsdorf

Berliner Lehrer-

[Ver]zeichnis

Versammlung

Kurzestr. 3–5²⁷

Prof. Feld'berg

Pension Violetta

Joachimstahlerstr. 17²⁸

[Written in ink:]

August 21. The night after the letter. *Aus Hotel Magdeburg*.²⁹

My Gokha. My golden birthday person. The first whole year of your life with me. At best we shall have no more than 20 to 30 of these. It is horrifying to think—this is what I thought during the trip—20 days. And young and vigorous and courageous we may have only 5 to 10. And maybe at a certain moment it will come to an abrupt stop. Let it last until our very death.

[Written in pencil:]

Bentheim.³⁰

<Sta[tion]> July 18, 7 a.m.

We are standing in Holland for two hours. I am inexpressibly lonely; it is hard and joyous at the same time. G.I.I.y.³¹ Instead of air, they have some sort of milky whitish steam here. It is warm, sunny. They have chubby, kind, white, round faces—especially the women. They just checked my passport for the hundredth time. These medieval regulations, are they theirs or others'? The astonishing material comfort [and] the military conditions create a strange contradiction.

G.I.I.y. Be faithful to me. My Gi. In Berlin I was thinking of you all the time. I am convinced that enormous ordeals lie ahead for us (Russia–Europe)—will you be happy and joyous? My darling.³² My light.

In a foreign country, in the fresh air (an airplane)³³ at sea, you feel a strange aloofness of everything. A reconsideration of your whole life, a revision of the soul. Suddenly you look at your whole life from aside, as in the minute of death.

How excruciating.

My words in this unforgettable journey—"I myself set the rules of the game."³⁴ The unforgettable Berlin is like a sign of my courage. I became more cour <ageous and> (again the passport—Oldenzaal—memorize!!!) only after this bleak, excruciating, and wonderful day in B[erlin].

In my destiny, this is the sign of enormous future ordeals.

Am I afraid? Of course, I am afraid, I feel terror, but keep it in check.

I still have my strength and power.

Let be. Gokha. Gi. I am with you.

2:50 p.m. The ship just left from Vlissingen.³⁵

Sea. Fog. I <illegible> G.

2:55 p.m. The shores disappeared. Before the eye and in the soul is the same.

3:30 p.m. As is known, in medicine there are allopaths and homeopaths, of the latter there are very few left. I perceive Europe homeopathically, i.e., so that it leaves no traces in the organism, but the homeopaths say that the minimal doses are the strongest.

If G. would watch these enormous <lines> of the sea with me—this would straighten out our love (again homeopathy—the hope for a tiny fragment).

5:25 p.m. A very strong wind.

The sun. A rainbow.

The enormous sea.

Delight. All my sorrow and my fear sink in this enormous [space]. The white crests of the waves. [The boat is] rolling.

Infinity is with me. G.y.a.a.w.m.

Friday 20, 10:15. a.m.

In 15 min, the conference will be opened. I was presented to the President and I was moved from the 4th to the 1st row.³⁶ In <illegible>. I am alone. Slightly cold. Calm. I am a stranger to myself in the mirror and in feeling, but your name, G., is with me and I am calm. Not without reason the ancients believed in the name as a reality (*res*³⁷)—a genius. In your name, G.m.b.w.³⁸ *Let be.*

1:50 p.m. Break—we drink tea.

Anxiety, what is the matter with you G., why are you depressed?

Monday. I sit on the terrace of County Hall on the very Thames. Just opposite the Parliament and the Westminster Abbey. The fog thickens, like a veil.

Calm. Some minutes it is slightly absurd, other minutes it is as if I have been for 5 years in London and in this company. You cannot think of a loneliness that is more severe and awful. How is Gi, how is G.? Is she with me? Frailty <illegible>.³⁹

If only we could tear out minutes of our live.

“*Verweile doch,*”⁴⁰ not because it would be beautiful, but because it would be bliss.

Malisch died 2 weeks ago.⁴¹ My journey is astounding and its purport is much more important and larger than just its work aspect. Success, good fortune, I <recover/depart> <illegible> and more than I see myself: These minutes will illuminate my whole life. G.y.a.a.w.m.

Tuesday, 10:20 a.m.

The cardinal opened the meeting. Not very approving of non-Christians. Hansen is reading.⁴²

Loss of strength. I am tired. Indifference, almost despair.

My trip yesterday revealed its main contradiction. I am extremely tense (the language, the responsibilities, the suit, the foreign countries), on the other hand I am outside time and space and free of everything as never before (aloof).

The former pushes aside everything that yesterday was still dear to me and excited me (the apartment⁴³ and other things). The latter is a huge entrance to the basic undercurrents of life. A journey is a “trial of oneself.” This is life, shattered in moments, but also *sub specie aeternitatis*.⁴⁴

In essence, Russia is the first country in the world. The Revolution is our supreme cause. In this room only one person knows the secret of the genuine education of the deafmutes. And that person is me. Not because I am more educated than the others, but [because] I was sent by Russia and I speak on behalf of the Revolution.

My Gokha. Be faithful to me. My heart is restless, there is some warm dampness outside and in my soul.

[Written in ink:]

11 o'clock. The embassy. An enormous waiting-room. Gi probably feeds for the second time today. How did it go last night? G.y.a.a.w.m.

[Written in pencil:]

Wednesday, July 22, Margate.⁴⁵

5 p.m. I am lying on the playing field. 250 deafmute children perform "The Bohemian girl."

The lords with golden chains. Tea.

Walked around, saw the sea—enormous and amorphous, the coast is *awful* (a health resort).

I shall, of course, never in my life be in Margate again.

So be it. So much the easier.

The time has passed when I thought that this depreciates everything. Gokha, you alone I need until my death. And, maybe, Gi.

Friday 24, 10:50 a.m.

The last day of the congress. A boring talk.

A humid, incomparably mild morning and a very special grief. And I am waiting for something all the time, am looking for some words, for at bottom I no longer want anything. I myself set the rules of the game.

Gokha. Gi. Your names are with me.

[Elsewhere on the page there is the signature "L. Wygotsky," the name Vygotsky used to sign the visitors' book.]

3:40 p.m. The last session is taking place. Tonight is the farewell dinner and everything will be over. So be it.

4:32 p.m. I said the final words *au nom*, etc.⁴⁶ Ahead is an enormous freedom, emptiness, solitude and melancholy.

I'll wait for you. G. My wife.

July 28, 3:20 p.m.

The National Gallery: no Rafael, da Vinci or Michelangelo, no French and no Dutch, even no Dührer. The Spaniards Greco, Goya, Velázquez.

I am sitting before Goya's portrait and Greco's pink-black Christ.⁴⁷

My soul is full of flashes of burnt-out passions.

In my mind is nothing—or an appraisal. I am searching confirmation of the theory on the portrait and the overcoming of the body.

July 29, 3 p.m. British Museum. In the morning there was a telegram.

How far away I am each minute something <illegible> with me, my Roza, that all this I <drink> alone, and not together with you. Who once saw Egyptian skeletons and mummies (one with hair) in a simple chest made of planks with cement, already views the world in *another* way. How I would <like to> <illegible> with you!

[Until the end of the page and on the back the text is corrupted; the whole sheet is soiled and worn.]

Today I am anxious and in <pain> all day.

It seems to me that I am on the point of <illegible> on this terrible <illegible>.

Philip Michels

VIII. Festetics – <L.> 3.

Budapest. Exchange of ed.⁴⁸

July 31, 1925. 9:35 p.m.

Lion's Tea Piccadilly. Tea. Inexpressibly sad.

Why is G. not happy? <For> you believed in your happiness. Oh, how I would love to see you⁴⁹ happy! More than anything I want that.

I am already almost free of personal longings. I saw the planks and the Egyptian putty, my brothers.⁵⁰

Oh, how we must despise and respect life at the same time in order to live. The main thing is to be above life, to deal with it slightly condescendingly (Chekhov) and to be free of it.⁵¹ I am independent.⁵² My passions have again burnt out.

I arrived on the 20th during the day.

1 ale, 1 supper.

1 ale – beer. 1 siphon.⁵³ Dinner. **Lunch**. Crossed out: [1 ale – beer. 1 siphon]

1 glass of seltzer. Dinner. **Lunch**.

1 siphon **Dinner**

1 siphon

from August 5

for the Deaf,

Derby Hill and Ainsworth Ltd.

Notes

1. This is the second half of a poem by Anna Akhmatova written in 1913 and published in her second volume of poetry *Chetki (The Rosary)* in 1914 (cf. Akhmatova 1977). It was evidently copied and undersigned by Vygotsky's future wife, Roza Noyevna Smekhova. The fragment is dated June 16, 1921, which is rather early given that Vygotsky and Smekhova married only in 1924. It indicates that Vygotsky began using tiny notebooks long before he entered psychology as an independent thinker.
2. Presumably, the Russian abbreviation stands for "Gokha, you are (always) with me" (*Gokha, ty (vsegda) so mnoj*) where Gokha is Vygotsky's wife Roza. The abbreviation was possibly inspired by the communication between Kitty and Levin, the protagonists of Tolstoy's *Anna Karenina*, to which Vygotsky referred in the last chapter of *Thinking and speech*. In the continuation, Gokha is

- indicated with “G,” whereas “Gi” stands for Gita L’vovna Vygotskaya (1925 to 2010), Vygotsky’s oldest daughter, who was just a few months old at the time.
3. UK numbers had no letters except for those in the Director areas, where the first three of the seven digits were assigned letters, and written “**ABB**ey 1234” or “**WHI**tehall 1212,” for example. A lack of pronounceable words, and the fact that most telephones world-wide had no letters on the dial, led to the abandonment of letter usage in directory numbers.
 4. Pavel Mikhaylovich Linitiskiyy (1885 to 1938). Soviet Party official and tradesman. Arrested in 1937 and accused of a being a spy and member of a terrorist organisation. Convicted and shot.
 5. Arcos (an acronym for All-Russian Cooperative Society) Limited was a trading organization that the Soviets created in 1920 to encourage trade between the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union. Similar organizations had been created in other countries. Many of their employees were suspected to be spies who gathered intelligence under the cover of the trade organizations. On May 12, 1927, almost 2 years after Vygotsky’s visit, the British police—working on information gathered by the Security Service MI5—stormed the Arcos building at 49, Moorgate. All personnel were detained; locked rooms and strongboxes were opened with drilling machinery; and many documents were removed from the building. The Soviet Embassy handed in an official note of protest, to which the British government replied with the accusation that Arcos was being used for military espionage and subversive activities. Shortly thereafter, diplomatic relations and trade agreements between the Soviet Union and the UK were dissolved. Subsequently, the whole episode became known as the Arcos Affair. On another page of this notebook, Vygotsky again mentions Linitiskiyy and gives 49 Moorgate as the address of the Arcos Bank. After that he lists the same address for the Trade Organization’s financial department. Perhaps, then, Arcos also served as a bank to provide Soviet citizens visiting the UK with British pounds.
 6. Gamage’s was a huge department store at 116 to 128 Holborn. Founded by Arthur Walter Gamage in 1878, the store quickly grew to cover almost a block. The store sold just about anything (bikes, cars, furniture, clothing), but was famous for its toys and its Christmas toy catalogue.
 7. David Vladimirovich Fel’dberg (1873 to 1942). Russian speech therapist and specialist in the education of the deaf. From 1908 onward, he was professor at the Faculty of Speech Therapy at the Psychoneurological Institute in Saint-Petersburg; in 1919 he founded the OFI (Otophonic Institute), which specialized in the study and treatment of hearing and speech disorders. On Fel’dberg’s initiative, Leningrad organized classes for deaf children, centers for speech therapy in schools, etc. See also chapter 18.
 8. Presumably, Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Shtange (1885 to 1927). Member of the board of the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, first secretary of the Trade Delegation of the SSSR in Germany, and participant in political negotiations between the SSSR and Germany to establish military-technical cooperation in the 1920s (cf. Gorlov 2001).

9. Erich Baron (1881 to 1933). German Jewish lawyer, journalist, and leftist politician. From February 1, 1924, onward, he was the general-secretary of the *Gesellschaft der Freunde des neuen Rußlands* (Society of the Friends of the New Russia) and editor of the journal *Das neue Rußland* (*The New Russia*). Baron was arrested and tortured after the Reichstag fire in February 1933 and died in prison shortly thereafter. Wikipedia claims the address of the journal was Kavalierstraße 22.
10. There is a story (cf. Van der Veer & Valsiner 1991, p. 45; Vygodskaya & Lifanova 1996, p. 85) that Vygotsky during his trip visited Germany, Holland, England, and France. We now know with certainty that Vygotsky visited Berlin and London and that his stay in the Netherlands lasted no more than the time it took for a train to travel from the German border to the North Sea, that is, approximately 3 hours. The story about a visit to France remains unclear, however. Timewise, it can only have taken place in August after the London stay and on the way back to Moscow; the fact that Vygotsky mentions both the French embassy and the French consulate in his notebook seems to confirm this possibility. However, in a letter to the American philosopher Horace Kallen (dated August 4, 1930), Vygotsky wrote that in 1925 he spent 2 months working in England and Germany, and made no mention of France.
11. Varvara Nikolayevna Polovtsova (Polovtseva) (1877 to 1936). Russian biochemist, philosopher, and member of the Moscow Psychological Society. In 1918, she moved to London where she represented Soviet organizations, the Russian Red Cross, and the All-Union Society for International Cultural Connections. Perhaps Vygotsky wanted to meet Polovtsova because she had authored an excellent translation of *The Ethics*, the main work of Vygotsky's favorite philosopher Baruch Spinoza (Benedicto de Espinosa) (1632 to 1677), which he received as a present from his father. See chapter 13.
12. Dmitriy Vladimirovich Bogomolov (1890 to 1938). Soviet diplomat. "When the SSSR and Great-Brittain established diplomatic relations (February 1, 1924) we received the former building of the Tsarist embassy with the address Chesham House, Chesham Place, W. This was an enormous mansion of six floors looking unto Chesham Place... The important function of first secretary of the embassy was fulfilled by Dmitriy Vladimirovich Bogomolov, a man of about 35, intelligent, enterprising, an able administrator. In World War 1 he served as an officer and spent a long time in a prison camp together with Englishmen. Here Bogomolov learned to speak good English. After the war he began working for the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs and was sent to London. Bogomolov turned out to be a very good diplomat and later, after London, occupied the position of ambassador in Poland and China" (Mayskiy 1971, pp. 8/10). In 1937, Bogomolov was called back to Moscow and arrested. In 1938, he was sentenced to death for anti-Soviet terrorism and shot.
13. Paul Schumann (1870 to 1943). German expert in the education of the deaf and head of the German Museum for the Education of the Deaf and Dumb (*Deutsche Museum für die Taubstummenebildung*) in Leipzig from 1924 to 1944. Rolstraße did not exist in Leipzig, so perhaps Vygotsky wrote Roßstraße.

14. Melychiar Bednarik (1888 to 1980), as he was called in the proceedings, was one of the presenters at the conference who discussed the contemporary state of the education of the deaf in his country. He was the superintendent at the Institution for the Deafmutes in Plzen and president of the Society of Teachers for the Deaf in Czechoslovakia. It was probably Bednarik himself who wrote down his name and address in French in Vygotsky's notebook.
15. Boaz Borisovich Vol'fson (1883 to ?). Russian revolutionary from Gomel'. In the late 1890s, he used a hectograph to print proclamations for the Gomel Organization of Social-Democrats. Subsequently he graduated from the Faculty of Law of Moscow University and began working for the Vysotsky Tea Company. In London, Vol'fson organized the tea delivery (Al'tshuler 1924). Boaz Vol'fson was a brother of Miron (Meier-Shmer) Borisovich Vol'fson (1880 to 1932), one of the founders of Russian library science and chief editor of the State Publishing House of the RSFSR, which published major encyclopedias and Lenin's collected works.
16. According to A. Maydanskiy (personal communication), Polovtsova lived in a mansion at 70 Grove Park Road.
17. Vygotsky tried out various spellings of his name. In the proceedings he figures as "Mr. Vigotsky," "Mr. L. Wygotski," and "Leo Vygotsky" (*International conference 1925*).
18. A puzzling reference. The police historians we consulted believe that Mr. Newton was a school inspector of some kind and that Vygotsky mixed up the terms.
19. Henry Stainsby (1859 to 1925). British expert in the education of the blind and, at some time, secretary-general of the National Institute of the Blind. Inventor of many useful appliances for the blind such as a machine for writing Braille shorthand.
20. This is an address in Berlin.
21. Perhaps the empress became a queen. There is a Kaiserin-Augusta straÙe in Berlin.
22. The notes are not in chronological order. The first note about the trip to London is from July 18, and the notes from early August describe the last days of his stay.
23. For all we know, this was the last day Vygotsky spent in London (Van der Veer & Zavershneva 2011).
24. "Heather" is not a Russian surname. Vygotsky is playing with his wife's name Roza (Rose) and refers to the rose of Jericho or resurrection plant (*Anastatica hierochuntica*), a plant that can survive almost complete desiccation and revives in the rainy season. He may also indirectly refer to Bunin's (1924) volume of short stories published in Berlin under the title *Rose of Jericho*.
25. Aleksandr Romanovich Luria (1902 to 1977). Russian psychologist, founder of neuropsychology, and Vygotsky's closest collaborator. In the summer of 1925, Luria travelled through Germany in the company of his father (Luria 1994, pp. 43–44); this was probably one of his temporary lodgings.

26. This is an address in Berlin.
27. The index or register of teachers working in Berlin (German). *The Lehrer-Verzeichnis Berlin, 1925*, was published in Berlin in 1925 by Comenius-Verlag and can be consulted on the Internet. A *Versammlung* is a meeting. Kurzestraße is an address in Berlin.
28. This is an address in Berlin.
29. In German: “From Hotel Magdeburg.”
30. Bentheim is a German railroad station close to the Dutch border where in the past the locomotives were changed. Oldenzaal is the first Dutch railroad station after the border.
31. Possibly “Gokha, I love you.”
32. The text has *nitochka moya* (“my thread”), which may express the idea that his wife was the thread that connected him with life.
33. Presumably, Vygotsky saw a plane in the sky while sailing. This was still an unusual sight in the 1920s and hence noteworthy.
34. Vygotsky quotes the poem “I myself set the rules of the game” (1922) by Fyodor Sologub (real name “Fyodor Kuzmich Teternikov” [1863 to 1927]), the Russian poet, novelist, and dramatist, who also wrote *The Petty Demon*.
35. A small harbor in the south of the Netherlands where the trains from Berlin arrived and from which the ferries departed for England. Cf. Van der Veer & Zavershneva (2011) for details.
36. On the first day of the conference, July 20, 1925, Lord Charnwood welcomed the delegates. Apparently, Vygotsky was introduced to him and, as the formal representative of the Soviet Union, was moved to the first row.
37. Thing (Latin).
38. Presumably, “Gokha, my beloved wife.”
39. Vygotsky cites Shakespeare’s *Hamlet*: “Frailty, thy name is woman.”
40. Citation from Goethe’s *Faust*: “Tarry a while! You are so fair!”
41. Konstantin Malisch (1860 to 1925) was an Austrian specialist in the education of the deaf to whom Vygotsky referred in his conference paper and who died on July 11, 1925.
42. The second day of the conference was opened by the Roman-Catholic Cardinal Francis Bourne, and then A. Hansen from Denmark read a paper about the classification of deaf children.
43. Not long before he left for London, Vygotsky and his wife moved from Gomel’ to an apartment in Moscow (Vygodskaya & Lifanova 1996, p. 259).
44. “Under under the aspect of eternity” (Latin). Phrase introduced by Spinoza to describe what is universally and eternally true.
45. On the third day of the conference, Wednesday, July 22, the delegates took a special train to the Royal School for the Deaf in Margate. The deaf-mute students of the school there performed Michael W. Balfe’s opera *The Bohemian Girl*, which was based on a story by Cervantes. Cf. Van der Veer & Zavershneva (2011).

46. In the name of (French). According to the conference proceedings, “Mr. Vigotsky” spoke the following words: “I salute the conference in the name of the Socialist Soviet Republics of Russia and in the name of the Commissioners of the Russian People for Public Education. I thank the committee for the reception in London, and I trust that the discussions of the conference will have real success” (*International Congress*, p. 211).
47. Presumably, Vygotsky tried to interpret the artistic affect of Goya’s portrait (either *Doña Isabel Cobos de Porcel*, or *Don Andrés del Peral*, or *The Duke of Wellington*) and Greco’s *The Agony in the Garden of Gethsemane* in light of his own theory of art.
48. It is unclear what this refers to.
49. One sheet was torn out; the next sheet begins with the isolated French words “du succès réel” (“real success”).
50. “To prepare sarcofagi one often used sycamore timber. Irregularities of the surface were polished with pumice (planes did not yet exist), then they were luted with putty and painted with oil paint; sometimes they were first covered with linen and then painted with rich colorful ornaments and hieroglyphs; paintings were covered with protective varnish” (Kes 1981, p. 26).
51. Possibly referring to Chekhov’s story “The Bet” (1888).
52. “Independent” written like in English but in Cyrillic letters.
53. Probably a soda siphon or seltzer bottle, which was popular in the 1920s. It was a device to dispense soda water that made use of a valve to maintain the pressure inside the bottle.

References

- Akhmatova, A. (1977). *Stikhotvoreniya*. Moscow: Sovetskaya Rossiya.
- Al’tshuler, I. (1924). K istorii rev. dvizheniya v Gomele. Lichnye vospominaniya. *Izvestiya Gomeľ’skogo gubkoma*, 75, stlb. 80–83.
- Bunin, I. A. (1924). *Roza Ierikhona*. Berlin: Slovo.
- Gorlov, S. A. (2001). *Sovershenno sekretno: Al’jans Moskva—Berlin, 1920–1930 gg.* Moscow: OLMA-Press.
- International conference on the education of the deaf*. (1925). London: W.H. Taylor & Sons.
- Kes, D. (1981). *Stili mebeli*. Budapest: Akadémiai kiadó, Izdatel’stvo Akadémii Nauk Vengrii.
- Luria, E. A. (1994). *Moy otets A.R. Luria*. Moscow: Gnosis.
- Mayskiy, I. M. (1971). *Vospominaniya sovet’skogo diplomata (1925–1945 gg.)*. Moscow: Nauka.
- Van der Veer, R., & Valsiner, J. (1991). *Understanding Vygotsky: A quest for synthesis*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Van der Veer, R., & Zavershneva, E. (2011). To Moscow with love: Partial reconstruction of Vygotsky’s trip to London. *Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Sciences*, 45(4), 458–474.
- Van der Veer, R., & Zavershneva, E. (2012). To Moscow with love: Rekonstruktsiya poezdki L.S. Vygotskogo v London. *Voprosy Psikhologii*, 3, 89–105.
- Vygodskaya, G. L., & Lifanova, T. M. (1996). *Lev Semyonovich Vygotsky: Zhizn’, deyatel’nost’, shtrikhi k portretu*. Moscow: Smysl.

Chapter 7

From the Zakharino Hospital

This notepad, with a cardboard cover and the text “Notepad № 204,” contains 19 pages plus 4 loose pages torn from the notepad. Vygotsky began writing the document during his stay in the Zakharino hospital in 1926, where he spent half a year for the treatment of his tuberculosis (cf. Van der Veer & Valsiner 1991; Vygodskaya & Lifanova 1996). The notes were written in ordinary pencil and completed in violet crayon after his discharge on May 18, 1926. The text sheds light on a period in Vygotsky’s intellectual career that is hard to interpret: the period of the development of the cultural–historical theory. As far as we know, it contains the earliest statements about the concept of sign mediation and the psychophysical problem. The notebook also contains some notes of a more private character, which are exceedingly rare in the personal archives. Despite their brevity, they give some idea of his mental state during that difficult period when he hovered, in his own words, “between life and death” (Vygotsky 2004, p. 8).

A substantial part of the notepad is dedicated to issues related to *The Psychology of Art*, which suggests that Vygotsky kept collecting material for this monograph despite the fact that it had already been accepted as a doctoral dissertation on October 5, 1925 (Van der Veer & Valsiner 1991, p. 46). This was connected with his unmaterialized plans to publish the dissertation as a commercial book, for which he had already reached an agreement with a publisher judging by a letter to his colleague Sakharov,¹ dated February 15, 1926. As we know, no book would see the light, and not all of the material in the notepad was included in the versions of *The Psychology of Art* that were eventually published more than 40 years later (e.g., Vygotsky 1965, 1971).

The notepad also contains notes about the plan for a monograph, provisionally called *Zoon Politikon*, which would spell out his conviction that consciousness has a social origin and that speech plays a fundamental role in its development. The plan for the book contains the germs of the cultural–historical theory, which would later branch off in various directions. Vygotsky began his search for the subject matter of psychology where *word*, *consciousness*, and *social interaction* intersect and still lacked the appropriate words and the proper units of analysis. It is interesting to see that he talked about a *theory of consciousness* 1 1/2 years before he would formulate his theory of the higher psychological functions, which was theoretically considerably narrower in scope. Vygotsky was looking, primarily in the work of Marx, for the essence of the person as a social being. The concept of *zoon politikon* (political animal), the ancient definition of man, and the addition of “a key to the psychology of man” designate one of the possible provisional answers. The phrase “political animal” refers to the combination of cultural (political) and biological (animal) factors in human behavior (see note 15). The search for the relationship between the cultural and the

biological would become the leitmotiv in Vygotsky's further writings in connection with the themes of consciousness and speech and the characteristics of higher psychological processes. The first answers to the questions raised in 1926 would only appear around 1930 in such works as *Tool and Sign in the Development of the Child* and *Pedology of the Adolescent*.

Also of special importance are Vygotsky's reflections about the nature of the word. He emphasizes the tool-like nature of the word and remarks that an artificially created stimulus organizes our behavior. Already in Vygotsky (1925), he remarked that words are social stimuli that determine behavior from the outside, but now his ideas became more specific. In the years to come, he would do his little experiments with the method of double stimulation to show that artificial stimuli indeed can organize our behavior in, for example, tasks that require our sustained attention. He first presented the results at the All-Union Pedological Congress in December 1927 to January 1928 (Vygotsky 1928). Thus, the present text shows an interesting stage in his thinking about the regulatory function of words.

Another part of the notepad is dedicated to the themes that would become part of his manuscript *The Historical Meaning of the Psychological Crisis*. It is fascinating to watch Vygotsky's thinking *in vivo*, how he was toying with ideas and chose paths that he would later reject again. Some of the themes discussed in the text appeared in his *Crisis* in similar form; others did not make it or were explicitly rejected. Both the problem of a *general psychology* and that of the *psychophysical problem* would be extensively discussed in his *Crisis* as well. Vygotsky here suggested the person as the subject matter of psychology, probably not without a certain influence from Stern.² However, this came at a price: Mind became the "substance of the societal relationships within the body," and psychology was conceived of as an abstract science analogous to political economy. This was contrary to the *Crisis*, in which Vygotsky criticized Binswanger³ exactly for his idea of general psychology as an abstract logical discipline. Moreover, the present version, to an extent, conflicted with the conclusions in the *Crisis* about the leading role of practice in the development of psychological knowledge. The notebook was published in its entirety in the Russian Internet journal *Gefter* (Vygotsky 2014) with elaborate references by the first editor to parallel texts in Vygotsky's writings. Detailed analyses of the text were also published in Zavershneva (2012b).

[Presumably the beginning of the note. Inserted sheet. Written in pencil:]

Publishing House Practical Medicine, Leningrad⁴

Prospekt Volodarskogo, № 49.

Medical Journal

Encircled: [Voronkiy.]⁵

The driving forces of his creative work are based on the clash of these opposite emotions and moods.

Encircled: [Babel]⁶

Pan Apolek: "I then vowed to follow the grand example of Pan Apolek... (The sacrilegious truths: the prostitutes, the poor, etc., who were proclaimed icons and saints—L. V. "Reeking flesh"—about a "soldier, reeking of soot, blood and human remains") ... and the sweetness of dreamy malice, bitter contempt for the dogs and swine of humanity, the fire of silent and intoxicating vengeance—I sacrificed them all to this new God."⁷

p. 107. A. Voronskiy. Literaturnye Tipy. Krug.⁸

1926. "I. Babel." "As the editor of the book in which Babel is printed, the author of this article had to put up with a number of very sharp reproaches from certain very prominent military workers in the Red Army... The writer was accused that in his miniatures he does not picture the Red Cavalry but genuine anarchy, that at times they contain libel and slander against the Red Cavalry, that only a White Guard and notorious counter-revolutionary could write about our army in this way and so on," *ibid.*, p. 109.⁹

(They saw the "reeking flesh" but not the icons. Neither Voronsky is capable of explaining that *everything* is disgusting in *Red Cavalry*; what the counter-revolutionary might see, *is there* in Babel, but elevated to an icon). L. V. (He justifies Babel's veracity but not his agitation.)

Ibid.:

They like to compare the fabulist D.¹⁰ with Krylov.¹¹ Bednyy is indeed connected with Krylov and with Aesop, but connected just formally, p. 89. D. Bednyy.

(D. B.'s fables are formally subordinated to the same law as those of Krylov. They are based on affective contradictions, contradictory feelings.¹² L. V.). For example:

1. "*The clarinet and the horn.*" The clarinet is boasting that everybody is dancing to his tune: "the ordinary man but at times also princes and counts." The horn: That's right, said the horn, we are not related to counts. But mind you: One day they will dance to my tune as well. "The horn turned out to be a prophet (the fable dates from 1912). In the years 1917–18 the princes and counts danced to the horns' tune, my oh my!" Voronskiy, p. 87.

L. V.: Here everything is based on the ambiguity of the words: to dance to the tune (Cf. the dragonfly and the ant) and the last words are *ambiguous*.

2. "*Saplins.*" The landowner consults his coachman Fil'ka whether to bring a birch rod as a warning for the peasants and praises the saplings in his forest. Fil'ka:

– Ahem, yes – Fil'ka muttered, looking away. –

Ahem, yes... first-class birches...

Saplins... rod...

When they have grown bigger, they will be staves.

L. V.: Again an ambiguity: birches for the peasants, staves for the landowners, Fil'ka feigns to agree, in reality he opposes the landowner.

[Beginning of a new fragment written in violet pencil:]

Individual and social psychology. Thinking and speech. The analysis of acts of empathy forms the development of one theme: 1. The methodology of bio and socio; 2. The concrete, central problem, speech is consciousness, the individual is organized according to the type of the social structure; 3. Its mechanism is *empathy for objects*, the objectification of internal conditions.

The creation of speech

Encircled: [*The skeleton of psychology. Its schema.*]

Thinking and speech

1. Hunter distinguishes the vocal reaction from the speech reaction, as does Watson.¹³

The **principal difference**, the distinguishing characteristic: the *symbolic nature* of the speech reaction (cf. Bekhterev).¹⁴ In the psychological context, this means next to nothing; the capacity of the word to replace other stimuli (an object, an action) is a general property of all conditional stimuli.

Cf. for the dog a light serves as a “symbol” for food. The prick with a sharp object is a sign for it: Now they will give food; the light and the injection have a symbolic, replacing, substitute “meaning” and sense. The word “symbol” does not mean anything in the relationship between stimuli or between stimuli and reactions that warrants placing symbolic stimuli in a special group (speech), nor does it explain something. The symbol is a connection (bread–word = bread–object) of two stimuli and the capacity of one to represent the other; this is a general property of the conditional stimulus. The symbol, thus, is a relationship between stimuli, between things, which equalizes the effect on one and the same reaction.

2. The distinction between vocal and speech reactions is not in their symbolic nature, which they have in common: the conditional vocal and speech stimuli are both symbolic; the unconditional ones of both types are non-symbolic. The difference is not at all in the relationship between things. The word is not a relationship between the sound and the object it denotes. It is a relationship between a speaker and a listener, a relationship between people directed toward an object, it is an interpsychical reaction, which establishes the unity of two organisms in one direction toward the object. Linguistics makes the word into a fetish; the psychologist reveals that behind the visible relationships between things are relationships between people (cf. Marx, commodity fetishism).¹⁵ It denotes the unity of the reactions of two persons or two reactions but not of two stimuli.
3. Consciousness is speech for oneself, it originates in society with language (Marx). The unconscious is what is separated from the word (Freud),¹⁶ consciousness is verbalized behavior (Watson).¹⁷ A risky idea: Bio is unconscious, socio is conscious. Speech is always a *dialogue* (Shcherba).¹⁸ Consciousness is a dialogue with oneself. Already the fact that the child first listens and understands and then acquires verbal consciousness points out that: (1) Consciousness develops from experience; (2) Speaking with himself = consciously acting, the child takes the position of the other, relates to himself as to another person, imitates another person speaking to him, replaces the other person in relation to himself, learns to be another person in relation to his proper body. Consciousness is a double. Thence the child does not know “I”: “Bobby” fell, instead of “I” fell. This is possible thanks to the reversibility of the word: The reaction is a stimulus. But this is called imitation. All speech is imitation. (?)

4. Hence, the distinguishing characteristics of the word: It is an *artificially* created stimulus (cf. technique), it is a *tool* of behavior, it presupposes two subjects and an object. Verbal behavior differs from nonverbal behavior like labor does from the adaptation of animals (the tool is also outside the organism, i.e., it is an organ of society). The tool has its prototype in the organ (the foot—the mortar, the hammer—a fist) just like the word has its prototype in the conditional stimulus. But its peculiarity is that each stimulus either exists by itself or is created for something; the word is a special stimulus for the regulation, the organization of behavior; of the other's behavior and our own. What makes the tool different: It is a thing that in itself is not necessary for use, but for the production of other things; similarly, speech behavior is not necessary in itself but to evoke other behavior. But this is what tool use, what word use is, and the ax is a thing amidst things, the word a stimulus amidst stimuli. The tool-like nature of the word. But here nothing is supernatural. Technique is not the introduction of new forces but the use of existing ones. In the same way, the word is the artificial use of existing nervous forces. Speech stimuli have no adequate reactions.
5. The meaning of the word (**meaning of word**) is not the object it replaces but a dialogue (the function of listening—of speaking for oneself); the relationship between people—speech; between objects—symbol; between each of the speakers and the word (thing)—empathy.

= Each chapter should end with the formulation of a problem for the next one. The epigraphs to the whole book: forms and essence according to Marx; I—*Zoon politikon*,¹⁹ II—Freud, word and consciousness, III—Lipps,²⁰ empathy makes organisms social. The name of the whole book: *Zoon politikon*. The key to the psychology of man.

= According to Watson, the formation of speech reactions is not social; in conditional reactions a replacement of stimuli (light—food) takes place, in speech—the *replacement of the reaction with one and the same stimulus*. Its reduction to conditional reflexes (the analysis of *toto*)²¹ is contrived. pp. 291–2.²²

= The definition of behavior as a system of reactions involves a crucial misunderstanding. It presupposes that man adjusts passively to the environment, that he just responds to stimuli, that the situation rules the behavior. But this is wrong. The behavior changes the situation and aims to do that. My action changes the situation and is not just determined by the previous situation, but by the process of change as a whole—both externally and internally. “Adjustment” is a good term for animals, but even for them it is suitable just for morphological changes (a response to environmental conditions). In man—and in general—behavior is *activity*, and not a *response*; it is primary. Cf. Watson, pp. 249–250 (no habit whatsoever is formed without internal activity). Perhaps, we should speak of acts as the basic units of behavior?

= To the previous p. 6. The muscle is at the same time a sensory and a motor organ. Watson. But the movement of my hand I feel in another way than the hand of another. However, my *speech* I hear in the *same* way. Hence, the similarity of my speech for myself with that of others.

= All three papers are united by their structure: I will take the classic propositions of empirical psychology (a psychology of just individuals; thinking is speech; empathy) and put them upside down.

Human behavior [differs] from *animal behavior*: (1) artificial stimulus—natural one (the puppy and the son of the landowner),²³ (2) the apparatus is brought outside (empathy), (3) artificial reactions—speech, etc. The dog salivates to any stimulus but cannot read, write, or talk.

“(My oath as wolf) that I...” this “hangs in the air” in Tynyanov’s terminology—it is isolated from the environment by the unity of the verse. Cf. “The problem of poetic language.”²⁴

[Beginning of a new fragment written in pencil:]

1. Marx about appearance and essence²⁵—the epigraph to Empathy <illegible>
2. Marx about analysis and the microscope—preface to Vol. 1 of the *Capital*.²⁶ See also there about abstraction.
3. Marx: “The anatomy of man is a key to the anatomy of the ape. Allusions to more advanced forms in lower species of animals can only be understood when the more advanced forms are already known. Bourgeois economy provides a key to the economy of antiquity, etc.” Introduction (pp. 27–30) to *Critique of Political Economy*.
4. The method of *The Psychology of Art* is analysis, abstraction (that is why there is not a word about the fable as such; I ignore its specific traits); let the historian show *which* feelings were experienced in which eras and in *what* form.
5. Mind is just as objective as digestion. It is subject-bound (Eichenbaum),²⁷ but not subjective. It becomes subjective (Koffka—glasses, attention).²⁸ It is not at all directly given (the prejudice about states of consciousness—James).²⁹ It may become objective (Pearson).³⁰ It sometimes is objective (Lipps’ *Einfühlung*, Blonskiy—to see another’s sorrow).³¹ It is intra-corporeal (proprioceptive and introceptive), perhaps the intranervous excitation of the **sensorium**, i.e., mental phenomena of non-peripheral origin; spontaneous, central ones (Lazarev³²—spontaneous reactions of the brain, the dissociation of calcium salts). But, generally, mind is the perception of intracorporeal and intranervous experience, it is the organization of intracorporeal experience. Therefore, fear is to paleness as the sensation of sweetness is to the solution of sugar; fear and sweetness are secondary, reflected, subject-bound, i.e., intra-organic phenomena. The special properties of mental phenomena can be fully explained from their experiential origin. For example, the non-spatial nature of mental phenomena (Chelpanov³³—the round, sharp, thick; Kornilov³⁴—the non-extended) is completely determined by the conditions of the intracorporeal experience, which does not correlate with external experience; the concept of the experiential spatial extension (the eye, touch, movement, in mind the proprioceptive paths); space deals with separate things, objects, borders, but mind with an undifferentiated multitude of variously located, simultaneously occurring and merging processes (cf. fear); finally, the most important: we do not *know* our body inside (*intime*)³⁵ in its spatial sense, and

it would be a *miracle* if we could localize the internal stimuli (if we simply localize them, then we have kinesthetics and the complex internal-external conclusion: My stomach hurts). It is very understandable that spontaneous, central mental processes cannot be localized.

[Note in the left upper corner. Underlined in pencil; made before the main text, which runs around it. Written in violet pencil:]

May 29, Weight 59 kg.; 3 *pood*, 24 lb, 7 *zlotnik*³⁶

[Continuation of the note. Written in pencil:]

Because all spatial experience we attribute to the brain, [but] the brain itself is for itself as it were outside space, it is an extraspatial point, like a pole outside the rotation of the earth. But (1) round, thick is neither applicable to sound, electricity and so on, and (2) all mental phenomena nevertheless have a certain extension, but a diffuse one (heavy-hearted, light-minded, I think doubtless with my head); finally, a strong, negative spatial characteristic: the sensation of a red color is *not* in my ear, not in my leg; the approximate and, perhaps, erroneous localization (the sensation of color on the forehead near the eye). So that the non-spatial nature of mental phenomena is experiential and not a matter of principle. They are unobservable by external senses (Chelpanov's textbook about the distinguishing characteristics of mental phenomena), but neither electricity is observable because it is an internal process in matter; we simply cannot physically *see* intranervous processes. The fact that they belong to the "ego" is secondary, experiential, initially the mental stream is indivisible (Binswanger, the third theory)³⁷; I think *another's* thought; the fact alone that I observe the mind of other "egos," proves that mind is not necessarily subjective. Koffka: In introspection the psychological phenomena are inserted into the system of the "Ego."³⁸ The child has no "ego." In direct sensation, far from every mental phenomenon is mine (for example, the idea about the sun). Finally, the doubling of personality, hallucinations, hypnosis, the person as an observer of his emotional experience (Bergson, Meinong).³⁹ Finally, the special mental nature of psychological phenomena is a special relationship: I and my body: This duality exists because for me my body simultaneously forms part of two series of experience: the intracorporeal one and the external object one (it is both "ego" and a body amidst bodies); hence, the idea that there is something that is me, while it is not my body. But the primary experience of the child, which is not related to the external world, does not distinguish between "ego" and "not-ego." For example, the sensation of white that is not connected with paper is not different from fear. The peculiarity of mental phenomena is that it is a quite special world of experience, not correlated with the external one (one experience, considered twice from two viewpoints—James). Fear is a quality of the living organism just like color is a quality of the physical body; I can directly perceive another person's fear.

Mind is the perception of intracorporeal processes, just like we perceive the external world. Only the dogmatically trained brain of some special compiler of textbooks, such as Chelpanov, can refuse to think about mental phenomena in spatial terms. I can perfectly well think of emotions in the subcortical centers and

the periphery of the body and of attention in the cerebral cortex; *think*, but not *imagine*, as I can *think* of the electrical current in the wire, but cannot *imagine* where and how it runs, for you can only *imagine* what you can—albeit in principle—sensibly perceive, but think one can considerably more. We cannot perceive and imagine an electrical current, a thought, but we can think it (L. V.). (Incidentally, Chelpanov is no enemy, he is a popularizer, he will wait until there is a generally accepted core in the new psychology, he will be our popularizer and say that he knew it all along. Cf. the essays and the reaction).

The subjective absolutely presupposes the objective. Consequently, what is S with respect to a given O_1 , itself may be O_2 , if considered either irrespective of O_1 and O in general, or with respect to O_3 or S_2 .⁴⁰ Consequently, is it perfectly legitimate to ask what the objective meaning of the subjective part is? After all, that it is S, is not its nature or essence, but its relationship to some O, but in itself it can be thought of as objective. There is nothing that by its nature would be subjective in itself, a “left eye” has a meaning, but a “left nose”? In empirical psychology (Chelpanov), the mind was not recognized as subjective. Here two meanings of the word “S” are mixed up: (1) the logical-abstract meaning (cf. left, right), a quality of the concept, (2) the physical-real meaning (digestion), a quality of the thing. The second is subject-bound but not subjective. The same with Plekhanov⁴¹: Mind is the internal aspect of physical processes; internal in the physical sense, the spatial or the epistemological-logical; in the first case the internality of mind does not distinguish it *one bit* from material processes but indicates that it is located inside; in the second case, the concept correlates with the external, and what is internal in one respect can in other respects be considered as external with respect to something else, or just *in itself*, outside these categories.⁴² Why is mind non-material, does not resemble anything (it is suprabodily), because it is an absolutely special *type* of experience. Cf. the review in *Pechat' i Revolutsiya* of the paper about consciousness. On the whole, what can we demand from Marxist philosophy? Certainly not the solution of the problem of mind, not the formula that concludes and summarizes the results of scientific truth. This cannot be found in Plekhanov's citations for the simple reason that neither Marx, nor Engels,⁴³ nor Plekhanov had such a truth. Hence, the contradictoriness, the shakiness of many formulations, their provisional conjectural nature,⁴⁴ their meaning within the context, and their meaninglessness outside the context. Such a formula can never be given in advance, before the scientific study of mind, and must appear as the result of centuries of scientific work. Cf. Marx about the essence of things and their appearances.

Then science would be superfluous (or adopt the formula from empirical psychology: psychophysical parallelism). What can be found in the teachers of Marxism beforehand is not the solution of the question of the mind but a methodological directive for the elaboration of a working hypothesis: I do not want to learn what mind is for free, by clipping some citations, but I want to learn from Marx's *whole* method how to approach the study of mind, which assumption to choose as the least contradictory. In this respect, it is absolutely not Marx's accidental psychological statements that are important but his general doctrine about method. The assumption about the social nature of mind; the mental phenomenon is a relationship between

two social individuals (interpsychology) or between the body and “ego” (as the social in us). We must uncover consciousness, the fetishism of mental phenomena just like the fetishism of commodities. The mental phenomenon is, just like a commodity, a sensory-supersensory thing; the super-sensory part is the social, reified, social relationship projected onto a thing (onto the word). Just like the commodity is a commodity not because of its physical properties but because of the societal relationships behind it, the physiological process in the nerves in itself is no behavioral act but the social relationships behind it, which give it that meaning. The ego is a fiction from the physical viewpoint and adds nothing to the sum total of the physical properties of our body, just like the commodity value is a fiction and adds nothing to the sum of its physical properties. But it is a reality as a sign, a name of the social relationship of our intracorporeal life. The “ego” is the social in us (cf. the neo-positivists), a certain societal connection and the organization of intracorporeal and nervous processes. The “ego” is formed after the model of the relationships between people. The “ego” is to the body as the “ego” is to you. The “ego” is to the body as the price is to value. Hence, the mental nonmaterial nature of mind—It derives from societal relationships. Marx: The essence of man is the ensemble of societal relationships⁴⁵ (in- and outside the body). The child is not yet an “ego”; the ego develops from social experience on the basis of speech. That this is so is evident from (1) the fact of the perception of others’ “ego.” (2) the fact that the psychological phenomena themselves must be objectified before we can observe them (cf. imageless thinking is the unconscious). Actually, only the unconscious is subjective, but precisely the unconscious is unobservable, and what we are aware of is what meets the “ego” as an object (cf. the unconscious is outside speech, Freud and Watson). Consciousness is *objective* (the doctrine of the thing-like nature of mind—Meinong and Freud), the unconscious consists of non-sociologized nervous processes, but consciousness is sociologized.

Here is where the “weightlessness” of mind comes from, the law of the preservation of energy, even psychophysical parallelism. The mind does not consume energy because it is no physical process but the societal qualification of nervous processes; it is not a thing and not a process but a relationship between processes; to look for its expenditure of energy is the same as to look for the number of oscillations of a melody apart from the sounds or for the pressure of the architectural plan on the foundation of the building: It’s the materials that exert the pressure, but the law of their pressure is determined by the plan. That is, mental processes are not the introspective expression of physiological processes but the societal relationship of nervous processes; their social expression and introspection in the second place because introspection is an activity of the “ego,” i.e., a social activity. Hence, the price of introspection—It allows us to approach the psychological phenomena while abstracting them (cf. Marx about the microscope) from the neural processes, from the other side. The observer must have introspection, and not the observed (heuristic value, Ivanovsky).⁴⁶ The “ego” and the body form a duality: In biology, physiology—an organism; in psychology—a person. *Psychology is the science of the person* (not of behavior and not of mental phenomena, since it does not study any particular phenomena, but of the soul, understood socially—a return to rational psychology).

The soul is the substance of the societal relationships within the body. Just like religion is man's projection onto heaven. The real core of the concept of soul is the "ego." Hence, psychology is a general basic theoretical *abstract* science like political economy and not a concrete one (geology—neopositivism). To accuse psychology of spiritualism is as unfounded as to accuse political economy that it ignores the physical qualities of things. Psychophysical parallelism, not as a principle of reality, but as a provisional method of investigation: In this view something physiological corresponds to each psychological phenomenon, but no energy is spent on mind, just like in political economy in the production of a *commodity*, no additional energy is spent over and above that spent on the production of boots. Psychology does not study physical but social realities. We can study mind *from the viewpoint of* psychophysical parallelism. The "ego" is a perfectly real fact of behavior. Possibly are only biopsychology and socio-psychology. *Zoon Politikon* = the person, "ego." The unconscious is biological; the conscious social; the vivid cooperation of these two principles is the person.

[Beginning of new a fragment written in regular pencil:]

Person und Sache: How can things be *Personen*? Stern's metaphysics.⁴⁷ The "indivisible social thing." Things become persons when they come into contact with man (we weave a melody from a series of tones).

Stern's self-development is real: The infant's growth cannot be explained by adaptation (self-preservation). If this is true ontogenetically, something must correspond to it in phylogeny as well, albeit population growth.

The organism hides many persons; Education chooses one of them. The theory of pedagogical psychology.

Personalism as a philosophy of the world is unacceptable (God). As a philosophy of values as well, but as a philosophy of man it remains. Stern's error (Shpet, Binswanger, Stern himself): The *Person* is an organism; hence, the underestimation of man, the overestimation of things. One of Stern's ideas is valuable: The family, the people are for him a *Person*; let us say, the other way around, that the *Person* is formed as a family = a community within oneself.

[Beginning of new a fragment written in regular pencil:]

1. *The idea of overcompensation*. Adler about Beethoven and Demosthenes⁴⁸; a progressive complex of ideas from natural science and sociology: smallpox, white blood cells, strength from weakness, from (active) inability = falling, walking. Scientific socialism (antithesis: utopian, <illegible>): everything that is opposed to socialism leads us further away from socialism, for example, capitalism: For Marx and Engels socialism is capitalism that has been overcome. Apply the same course of ideas in art. What was understood about art by those who looked for sorrow in the tragedy, for melancholy and other feelings in music, for morals, etc. in the comedy? (Even the formalists did not go beyond the range of associative perception and other categories of the *psychological meaning of form*,⁴⁹ its understanding). Much like someone who would see the

work of the poison in the *vaccination* against smallpox but not the immunity. (The defect is either “–” or “+,” as a stimulus for overcompensation, but not the norm). Art is vaccination, i.e., overcompensation (*in every* sense of the word: poison + immunity), i.e., weakness that creates strength, disease that generates super-health, and previously it was considered as just disease. But is the vaccination with smallpox really a vaccination of disease rather than health? It is both, but the meaning of disease is in super-health. This is the central complex of ideas that I adopted in the *Psychology of art*, and not *Freud*, not the *formalists*. At bottom, this is a dialectical principle of a philosophical epistemological nature.

Thus, in formalism, they looked for everything that corresponded with the smallpox poison, the vaccination with disease but not health. That is, a totally distorted picture. For example, the chorus in a tragedy, the lyrical digressions in Gogol in their positive over-compensatory, but not in their negative meaning (dragging out, hampering, etc.).

2. For art *feeling* is important, the impression, the emotional experience of the thing, but not the thing and not its image, i.e., its place and meaning in a structure but not a copy. A work of art is a structure. Compare Heine. “*Es war ein alter König.*”⁵⁰

1. 2. “*Sein Herz war schwer, sein Haupt war grau.*”

1. 6. *Blond war sein Haupt, leicht war sein Sinn.*”

In these verses, the *feeling* of contrast, i.e., of the *structural* meaning (structure is form) of the page and the king, is achieved—notwithstanding the full parallelism of the 1st and 5th line in the beginning of each strophe: *Es war* and *Es war*—using *three types* of oppositions, of which the semantic one is just *one* amidst *others*; consequently, the goal is the *feeling* of contrast, i.e., the *structural function* of the given location (the formal meaning). Here they are: (1) the semantic [opposition] (*grau* > *blond*, *schwer* < *leicht*), (2) the asymmetrical transposition of the hemistiches (*Herz – Haupt* < *Haupt – Sinn*),⁵¹ (3) the syntactic transposition of the subject and the predicate (inversion?) within the sentence (2 *Haupt – grau*, 1 *Herz – schwer* > 2 *Leicht – Sinn*; 1 *blond – Haupt*). Cf. the three dreams in Lermontov: in the midday heat in a valley in Dagestan.⁵²

3. Two functions of the word: anger and the object of anger, i.e., the communicative (signifying) and the expressive—determine by their artificial relationship the semantics of artistic speech and not Potebnya’s meaning and inner form. For Potebnya, the sign of art is imagery, which is common to art and non-art, i.e., nonspecific, just like *all* theories of art. Cf. Wundt about the unity in diversity: this is true for a textbook of algebra, a steamer, and art.⁵³ The same with Borsuk⁵⁴: saving forces—mathematical formula; Yevlakhov⁵⁵: sublimation—Philosophical creativity is also sublimation. It is the same as saying that food generates art, but it generates all other activities as well. It was believed that *form* is the distinguishing

characteristic of art (the formalists), but Gestalt psychology showed that the chicken reacts to a structure = form (Köhler's experiments).⁵⁶ Where then is the specific feature; *in a special meaning of the form*, in its aesthetical meaning?

4. They recommended La Fontaine to write prose; a natural conclusion from a utilitarian theory of art.

[Written in violet pencil:]

Literature about the fable:

Lebmann, Grammont, Taine, Walzel, La Fontaine, Wundt, Tomashevsky, Weddigen, Bryusov

Written in ordinary pencil: [Uzin, Stoll, Ruegg, Wihan, Hausenstein.]⁵⁷

[End of the notes in the first half of the notepad.]

[Beginning of the notes in the second half of the notepad, which go in the opposite direction.

Written in pencil:]

August 12, 1859

“Essentially, the only actor whose talent is indisputable, absolute as mathematics, or better, as a *salto mortale*, because here there can be nothing “like talent”; “you fall or you do not fall.” The diary of the brothers Goncourt.⁵⁸ Publishing house Severnyj Vestnik, St. Petersburg, 1898, p. 17.

Shklovskiy about the circus (just half of the weight is real—the weights must be lifted *easily*).⁵⁹

Trotsky, *It happened in Spain*.⁶⁰ The toreador spits on the bull—This is what it's about: To kill is not important; important is to overcome your fear.

[Written in the left margin:]

The sexual act is to lyric as the gladiator is to the acrobat. Encircled: [*Krasnaya Nov', 1.*]

[Written in the right margin:]

In both cases, we have the abreaction of the instinct of struggle, of death, but in the one directly, in the other it is overcome.

Crossed out: [F. Buslayev about ritual lamentations. *Krasnaya Nov', 1*, 1926, p. 163.⁶¹]

About the circus: Bryusov remarks that the “flights of acrobats” are close to the “gladiator games” of the Romans—“through the spectacle of genuine struggle and death.”

“The artists who walk on a rope under the roof of the circus [tent], and the tamers who enter the cage with tigers, need not necessarily die but they *can* die in any of the performances. The Roman wanted to see real death; modern man is enticed by the possibility of death” (= the difference = the “refinement of the feelings”).

Art is different (death is overcome)!
 Completely opposite to the gladiator games.
 Cf. overcompensation.
 The Vol. *Vetv'. Miscellanea*,⁶² §16, p. 221.

Bryusov, *ibid.*, § 31, pp. 228–229.

Points out *that* the textbook definition of the fable as an animal epos is “absurd and incorrect” and is refuted by the “fables of Aesop, Phaedrus, La Fontaine, Krylov, and Potebnya himself.”

“The fable is a symbolic story in which the characters embody a *single* character trait, a *single* feeling, whether in the image of a person, an animal, a plant, or an inanimate object.”

Additional text: [p. 305.]

This is the misguided wish to explain the characters, to interpret their actions, to accept their inconsistency as if they had a real existence on earth and were not the fabrication of a human brain. We speak about Hamlet the man instead of Hamlet the hero of the drama, the *dramatis persona*; about Hamlet created by God instead of Hamlet created by Shakespeare.

Wundt. *Physiological Psychology*, Vol. 3. Unity in diversity—algebra, steamer. Cf. economy of forces, sublimation. Utitz.⁶³ The need for a specific *definition of art*.

Edgar Poe. Vol. 2. Articles, aphorisms.⁶⁴

(Sadness is a necessary feeling in art. Cf. *Post coitum omne animal triste est*)⁶⁵
 Here then the poem may be said to have its beginning—at the end where *all* works of art should begin, p. 202. A philosopher of creativity.

With the denouement proper—with the Raven’s reply, “nevermore,” to the lover’s final demand if he shall meet his mistress in another world—the poem, in its obvious phase, that of a simple narrative, may be said to have its completion. So far, everything is within the limits of the accountable—of the real.

(Follows a re-telling, rationalizing *The Raven*).

Two things are invariably required: some under-current, however indefinite, of meaning (Cf. Stanislavsky).⁶⁶

It is the rendering this the upper instead of the under-current of the theme which turns ... poetry ... into prose.

To pervade all that has been previously narrated, pp. 206–207.

№ 69. Punctuation marks, p. 291.⁶⁷

To anyone who has ever looked on the face of a dead child or parent, the mere fact that matter *could* have taken for a time that precious form, ought to make matter sacred ever after.

W. James⁶⁸

Juan Belmonte... is a torero who can spit on the bull in the very last moment. Why? What for? To show that he did not get a dry mouth of anxiety—the highest sign of sang-froid!⁶⁹

For my analysis, I have chosen the most *difficult* fables. There are hundreds of fables where this contradictory feeling, to speak with Pushkin, is obvious. To enumerate one line of 10 to 20 of them. For example, The Pike⁷⁰—so the pike was flung into the river = they justified, condemned. One might say: they judged, justified, and even rewarded, but it would not be a fable. The analysis presupposes the abstraction from concrete traits of the fable as a genre, and the concentration of the force on the essence of the aesthetic reaction. In the first volume of the *Capital*, Marx says that in the social sciences the force of abstraction plays the role of the microscope.

[Beginning of new a fragment written in pencil:]

Art gives form, i.e., direction to our emotional feelings; the content we attach to it is subjective.

I abreact *my sorrow* in Hamlet, and you *yours*. But the direction of the emotional experience is predetermined by the structure of the work of art (i.e., by the system of stimuli).⁷¹ This is why only form is an objective datum for investigation. Cf. Bukharin. In the civil war, on both sides of the barricades, the *form* of the psychological feelings was similar. Cf. Blok's "The twelve"—the success of the leftist SRs and Purishkevich.⁷²

NB! What is done in the Marxist literature about psychology is apologetics (cf. Philo of Alexandria).⁷³

It is just as impossible to *compose* a person from nervous processes as it is to compose a society from Robinsons⁷⁴; on the contrary, we must understand the nervous processes from the person and the person from society. (Cf. social class is a reality, although physically, apart from the individual people there is no expenditure of energy in the actions of a social class). The same with commodity. Like the *commodity* has no extension and does not spend energy *except* as a thing.

Rites are the social expressive movements of man (the corresponding mimicry, trembling, crying—natural—biological)

Bialik about Halachah and Aggadah⁷⁵
Veresaev, *Krasnaya Nov', 1*

Hamlet's death is a psychological necessity for the spectator. It is not the endpoint of two lines in the story (that is a *detail* of the plot and the denouement), but of the line that joins them in the emotional experience of the spectator. In the outburst, our identification with the hero was burnt, destroyed (feeling—expenditure)⁷⁶—emptiness, devastation, Hamlet died in our heart before he died on the scene, because we could no longer attribute our feelings to him, the physiological end (like after the coitus). Death is the sign of this psychophysiological devastation.

The emotional experience of art is an affective conflict. That is exactly why it attracts (accumulates) former conflicts.

[Beginning of new a fragment written in violet pencil:]

In the half year spent in this home, where death was as ordinary and common as the morning breakfast and the doctor's round, I absorbed so many impressions of death that I am inclined to death just like a tired person is inclined to sleep.

Before departure, May 18, 1926

[Beginning of new a fragment. Crossed out and written in pencil:]

If the essence of things would coincide with their external appearance, science would be pointless (Marx). *Pedagogical psychology*: Childhood is tragic.

To the *Psychology of art*.

[Beginning of new a fragment written in pencil:]

The contrasting emotional lines of the other plane show through each of the wolf's words,⁷⁷ just like the black lines of black-lined paper shine through white paper, so that the whole action develops simultaneously in two opposite directions. For example, "Friend"—"Thieving"; why raise this den?—one with a gun, the others with cudgels, hellish; peace is my wish today—with glaring eyes; I love not altercations—the scene rose hellish (they rush to fight); harmony—grinding its teeth; I other wolves shall school—he thought he climbed into a sheepfold; and his oath—grinding its teeth.

In general, there are two planes of the fable each of which each has its projection, its representation, of each point in the other plane. But contrast this:

the hunt down—the first plane,
the negotiations—the second plane.

The death of the wolf is clear from the first words, his attitude toward the kennel and the kennel's attitude toward him. If we had to invent something with a completely opposite emotional tone, it would be the negotiations where everything is the other way around: peace, friend, the wolf defends the sheep. The answer of the huntsman is also in the plane of *negotiations* but also has an ambiguous meaning, although the struggle of forces results in an opposite outcome: In the wolf, the negotiations (peace) dominate, in the huntsman the hunt. But hunting down in the form of negotiations is no *hell*, no *fight*. Incidentally, each word here has a double meaning. Also the catastrophe of the fable, the merging of both planes, in the phrase:

caught ... peace
to take ... skins away

This phrase means simultaneously:

*peace has been concluded
the hunting down has begun.*

The final words⁷⁸ (his dogs) reveal, by picking out one of the two *meanings* [Above “meanings” the variant “lines”] in pure form (after the catastrophe, *one plane*), they give a special meaning to the *whole* struggle of planes. Cf. *The wolf and the lamb*,⁷⁹ not an ironic (fear) but a *tragic* answer.

The sentence liberates the development of the line from the negotiations laid upon it by the second line, but how *all the horror* of hell and the *fear* have been driven into a corner, have died down. Here the sentence is like an epitaph: calm, about the wolf it is completely vague and silent. About the huntsman: calm (In this phrase, in its style, all the *negotiations* are invisibly present with their grandeur. In this laconic, epic, exact, dry phrase is the respect for death and its grandeur), no hell, no fight. And, after all, according to its exact meaning, this sentence leads to “their skin away” and then to “peace.” But the sentence wipes away *everything*—both hell and fight and the grinding teeth (erased, liquidated). And it throws new light on the negotiations: Not just the lines of the *first plane* appear (the first scene) but also the wolf’s pride: *The hunt appears as a detail of the negotiations*: According to their direct meaning the last words belong to the first plane—the hunt, according to their style, as a detail of the negotiations, joining them and preserving their tranquility, they belong to the second plane, to the negotiations. Here the *whole* meaning of the *whole* fable and the struggle between two planes is realized. The hunt is transformed into heroic death. The *wolf* dies while triumphing.

During the negotiations one feels the invisible hunt (the black-lined paper), here it is revealed (the white sheet shows the lines of the black-lined paper), but it is only a *detail* of the negotiations.

The wolf dies but this death is not (1) impudent (thief), (2) terrible (grinding). The wolf’s cowardice and the huntsman’s insolence have been overcome.

If the last sentence would be absent, the wolf’s words would be insolence and boasting, but in light of them they are tragic.

[Written in the left-lower corner:]

<illegible>

Evening twilight

April 2

Crossed out: [Saturday] Friday.

Passover⁸⁰

Written in the right-lower corner: [Terribly sad and in tears. Pulse 110.]

Whereas the wolf’s words lead us away from death, the words of the huntsman, which stop the negotiations, fill the wolf’s words with other meaning: These are no negotiations about peace but about a dignified death.

The words of the huntsman give the first line strength and, as it were, diverge from the wolf’s words (the second plane), but the last sentence gives the *clearing up/the solution of the dissonant, the catastrophe*:

their skin away (exclusively hell, does not take the bait)
peace (exclusively Crossed out: [peace] general harmony).

[Beginning of new a fragment written in pencil:]

The word has an expressive and an objective meaning

(*Ausdruck* and *Sinn*).⁸¹ One and the same word can enter in various semantic series—interference of meanings (Derzhavin).⁸² [To the right of the text are two parallel broken lines.]

Cf. Macbeth, the Birnam Wood: objectively soldiers with branches, subjectively death.⁸³ Both meanings can diverge. In “The wolf in the kennel,” we can depict the wolf’s speech and its objective meaning with curves and the area between the curves will be the expressive equivalent of the wolf’s mind.

To the *Psychology of Art*:

Vol. 1 poetical language,⁸⁴ p. 25, p. 29.

That “the emotions of the content cannot contradict the emotions of the form” is a widespread prejudice, which determined the meaning of all my work (its denial—no harmony of form and content)—*absolutely use this*.

Ibidem, p. 42.

The material does not matter? This is true with *physical* material and with the physical *form* (a table), but applied to art, *material* and *form* are aesthetic concepts. For example, the material of a painting is not the paint, but *color* (paper, mosaic, etc.).

In art form is superform.

[Beginning of new a fragment. Crossed out and written in pencil:]

To the article on method.⁸⁵

To *directly* apply the theory of dialectical materialism to the questions of natural science and, in particular, to the group of the biological sciences, is *impossible*, just like it is *impossible* to directly apply dialectical materialism to sociology and history.

Just like the latter is in need of the *intermediate* special theory of *historical materialism*, which clarifies the *concrete* meaning for the given group of phenomena of the *abstract* laws of dialectical materialism, we need the not-yet-created but inevitable theory of *biological materialism* as an *intermediate* science that explains the *concrete* application of the abstract tenets of dialectical materialism to the given domain of phenomena. To accomplish that, we must reveal their *essence*, the law of their changes, the quality and quantity of their characteristics, their causality, in a word, we must create *our own* “*Capital*.” Dialectical materialism is not historical materialism. The first is universal and abstract, the second historical and concrete. Cf. Vishnevskiy, *Pod Znamenem Marksizma*, p. 262.⁸⁶

To *directly* apply dialectical materialism to the biological sciences and psychology, as they do nowadays, is no more than *subsuming* particular phenomena, whose inner meaning above the line: [and relationship] is unknown, under general, abstract, *universal* categories in a formal-logical (scholastic, verbal) manner. The same role as Engels' *examples*. But there the goal is to clarify the idea, but here? Water–ice–steam and subsistence economy–feudalism–capitalism from the viewpoint of dialectical materialism is *one and the same*, but for *historical* materialism—what a *qualitative* wealth in feudalism–capitalism!

Kornilov and others want to skip a trifle: historical materialism, the “Capital!”

According to Stepanov,⁸⁷ it (the theory of biological materialism) is already present in the mechanistic conception of the natural sciences. But this is wrong.

A textbook of psychology explained from the viewpoint of dialectical materialism (Kornilov). This is the same as saying: a textbook explained from the viewpoint of formal logic. Cf. Trotsky, Freud and Marx. Einstein. Not solved. Why not? Exactly because there is no “Capital” (he mentions it), i.e., an intermediate, all-encompassing theory of concrete phenomena.

The way they now determine in the assay office whether one or the other doctrine is in agreement with Marxism comes down to the method of “logical superposition,” i.e., the formal-logical coincidence of texts or characteristics (or properties—monism, materialism) and so on. But also in geometry they know that a translation in the superposition changes the figure's property, all the more so here. The sign and the text play a different role in different contexts.

[Beginning of new a fragment written in pencil:]

M. Ol'minskiy. About questions of literature.⁸⁸

Articles from 1900–1914. Priboy. Leningrad, 1926.

G. Lelevich. Preface, p. 8.⁸⁹ A radical reconsideration of the question and a destruction of the legend... The articles categorically refute the in that time widespread opinion that Chekhov was a realist... (Cf. Izmaylov,⁹⁰ The girl from Novozybkov. Preface to Goslitizdat—L.V.)

O. ascertains that Chekhov's work is through and through symbolic...

p. 46. About Ovsyaniko–Kulikovskiy⁹¹ and A. Chekhov.

We cannot apply the standard for a real story and must find the key to the explanation of its success elsewhere.

(In the ravine) (Music—Chekhov's story—L.V.)

Chekhov's story “In the ravine” is in its own way also a work of art with diffuse associations (= music, L.V.), pp. 49–50.

There is no need to demand a particular worldview from Chekhov, nor from a musician or an architect, p. 51.

The story violates the principles established by aesthetics... Perhaps, its originality is precisely that he brought together two categories of art which until then were sharply isolated and thereby increased the number of modes of aesthetic enjoyment, p. 50. Music transmits neither image nor feeling, but just the character of the movement, p. 49.

Literary contradictions (in Chekhov's "Three sisters"). Chekhov's play, from the realistic viewpoint, does not stand up to any criticism, p. 52.

The reviewer was struck by unnatural and gratuitous behavior (*Russkie Vedomosti*, 33, 1900). Why, he asks, are the characters of the play languishing and pining? Why do not they undertake active steps to reach their resplendent Moscow? p. 53.

As a matter of fact, Moscow is not an ideal in the drama but a symbol of the irretrievable past. The sisters' idea of Moscow is not connected with a plan or with a dream about new life conditions in Moscow but just with memories of the past, p. 58.

Moscow as a symbol of the past was not a really happy choice. Moscow must be unattainable just as there is no return to the past; but the real Moscow is a place that can be very easily reached by the rich inhabitant of a provincial town with a railway station (*Ergo*, Moscow is not *just* the past. L. V.), p. 59.

At the end of Chekhov's drama is a similar combination of two motives (as in Dostoevsky: the *Marseillaise* and *Mein lieber Augustin*.⁹² L. V.): the suffering is on the verge of reaching the culmination point when from outside the sounds of a merry March are heard, p. 60.

Numerous incongruities and exaggerations, which strike the eye when one applies realistic standards, p. 61.

1. What is the full name (maybe edition) of the book or the articles by Edwin Thomas, who in 1916 advanced the theory of the transmission forms?⁹³ Is this book or article available in Moscow?
2. A bibliography of the main (foreign) works about the poetics of the fable (or the works of specific authors with a large theoretical part) and the works of the last decades.

[Fragmentary note in the center of the sheet; the rest of the sheet is empty.]

Practical medicine. Medical journal.
 Prospekt Volodarskogo, 49.⁹⁴

[Written in large letters; the handwriting may be Vygotsky's, but it is difficult to say. Between the sheets is a dried leaf of clover.]

Our dearest papa

[Beginning of new a fragment written in pencil:]

The mental does not influence the physical—Plekhanov, Frankfurt,⁹⁵ Sarab'yanov.⁹⁶ Okay. But the architect's representation of the result does not influence the building of the house?

The mental is the objectified objective: I can operate with my representations as with beams when building a house. This is all there is to it; the spider cannot do this. Red \neq ether wave, but both ether wave and red are equally objective. If the ether wave would be equivalent to the red color, there would be no science, but just registration of subjective perceptions.

[Written on a free spot in black ink:]

Mind is objectified proprioception and makes language possible.

[Continuation of the note written in normal pencil:]

The mind's property, its action, is sensation. But this is idiocy. Sensation is *pati*, and not *agere*,⁹⁷ Frankfurt. After all, action is influencing another person.

[End of the notes of the second part of the notepad.]

[Notes on inserted sheets.]

Sheet 1. [Written in normal pencil:]

Psychology belongs to the number of sciences that do not permit the direct study (perception of the material) but require reconstruction (cf. Ivanovskiy, history, Portugalov⁹⁸ about behavior and the psyche of anger).

Activity (epiphenomenon?) and significance, the cooperation, functional dependency.

[Additional text, written in violet pencil on a free area of the page:]

The question of the mirror. The table is to the reflection of the table as being is to consciousness.

But the reflection of the table is to the refracted beams as consciousness is to phys[iology], the brain.

[Continuation of the note written in normal pencil:]

Contra Frankfurt:

1. Lenin says that mind, as the property to reflect, is inherent to *all* matter.
2. Frankfurt (1) identifies physiology with matter, mind with spirit; (2) mixes them up and contrasts them: Both mind and physiology are properties of *matter*, p. 47.

The possibility of sensation is to the possibility of action as *agere is to pati*.

He says: The idealists and the crude materialists perform the same operation with the antinomy "*matter–mind*."

The idealists eliminate *matter*—the otherness of mind; the materialists eliminate mind—the "*otherness of matter*" (Bukharin!!!).

"The idealists transformed matter into mind, the materialists mind into... (not into matter)—into *physiological* processes."

We can avoid merging mind with motion, with *physiology*, and nevertheless understand it *materially*. Cf. sociology!

Plekhanov in polemics with Petzoldt—the *epistemologist*.⁹⁹

Frankfurt mixes up two goals: to study Plekhanov and to study *mind*.

The mental influences just the mental. *Schattentheorie*.¹⁰⁰

A and B shake hands in front of the mirror.

Plekhanov denies the reality of the mind.

How can one work with such a view, what for?

Where can we really trace the addition of the shapes of two $\Delta\Delta$? *In the mirror.*

Therefore, *geometry* is an abstract science, not a causal one = *phenomenology*. But who would create a natural scientific geometry (induction, cause, law).

Bolshaya Prolomnaya Street, 39

Kazan'

A. R.

Yashin¹⁰¹

[Written in blue pencil:]

The mental cannot be reduced to the physical; perfect, let's see then from what the so-called non-physical is made? From human relationships (commodity).

[Written in violet pencil:]

Bergson. Art gives satisfaction to nature for what was done to it by society. That is a theory of art that perfectly solves the bio-socio problem of psychology with the example of art. Art is no mechanical mix of socio + bio (60 + 40%), but for the full 100% bio (we abreact the unrealized, severed, socio part of the person; satisfaction of nature) and for the full 100% socio (we abreact this part in artificial social forms, according to the laws of socio). Bio and socio dialectics and not their addition.

[Written in normal pencil:]

The hero's downfall in a tragedy does certainly not inevitably follow from the external laws of dramatic structure. It is impossible to prove that a tragedy should have a course of events that inevitably leads to destruction. On the contrary, the majority of deaths in tragedies are accidental and do not result from the course of events: Othello, Hamlet, Macbeth. Then it is said that death results from the hero's character, but what does that mean? No more than that the death of the hero, his destruction, is an external sign, a projection of the spectator's psychological expenditure (the outburst of non-abreacted emotions): Something died in me, exploded and burnt out in Hamlet and Othello, this must be marked outwardly through the death of the hero (cf. Aristotle). The hero's death is a phenomenon of the spectator's psychology.

We have personal psychology and here also impersonal psychology (art)—the doctrine of the person as a social phenomenon, about the *general* laws of social associations; the psychology of concrete social groups (social class, profession) is *differential* psychology. Contra Kornilov (how can they precede the individual, i.e., the personal). The content (i.e., not the formal but the material) but not the mechanisms of mind?? Just in differential psychology?

Sheet 2. [All paragraphs of the text are crossed out. Written in normal pencil:]

Encircled: [*Plekhanov. Cowardly idealism*].

- (1) If we would see (be conscious of) everything, we would see nothing (Stern).
- (2) If each of us had just reactions that ... (Koffka's paradox).¹⁰²

Thus: (1) Weber–Fechner's law is biologically useful. Mind is the formation of something stable amidst the streaming. It is a selection organ, a sieve, which changes the world so that we can act. This is its positive role—it is not about reflection—the non-mental also reflects (the thermometer), but about *incorrect*, i.e., subjective reflection. To distort reality to the advantage of the organism.

If we would see all things, all changes, *all* properties of the drop in the microscope, and a river?¹⁰³ But the selection of really higher forms is achieved in mind. The red, the blue, the loud—we cut the world into portions so that I can eat it and not break my teeth.¹⁰⁴

(2) Each of us must watch inside as he does outside; to have one's outside inside. Uzin, Ruegg, Wihan.

A stone reacts to *everything*; man as a stone (a corpse, a physical body) also to *everything*; but the higher forms of reaction—the funnel becomes more and more narrow.¹⁰⁵

Stolyarov's coefficient of specification¹⁰⁶ (*Pod Znamenem Marksizma*, 6)—the psychological meaning of each organ.

Is it useful to see microbes?

An analogy—Ivantsov—spectral analysis.¹⁰⁷

In principle, physics extends experience just like psychology does (the invisible in optics, the unconscious): We are forced to conjecture.

The elephant with the internal voice mechanism (Gita's toy).¹⁰⁸

What nonsense! But all animals are like that; the conclusion: Animals have a voice mechanism. Gitka squeezes people like she does Zhaka, the child looks for the voice mechanism in the cat's belly. How much smarter is the fiction of the fairy-tale!¹⁰⁹

Sheet 3. [Written in normal pencil:]

Additions to the *Psychology of Art*.

1. Skaftymov about the *bylina*.¹¹⁰
2. Shklovskiy about the circus.
3. Aseev about the plot, *Pechat' i Revolyutsiya*.¹¹¹
4. Christiansen about the differential sensations to a verse.¹¹²
5. Utitz about the fact that a pure reaction in art does not exist.
6. Hamlet in *Pechat' i Revolyutsiya*. New literature.
7. Hamlet. My own work?
8. About the dialectics of the image. Militant materialism.

Yesenin, *Maria's keys*.

Yesenin, *Krasnaya Nov'*, № 2,¹¹³ about rhythm.

9. Adalis¹¹⁴—about the new school (Browning).¹¹⁵

[The text of point 10 is crossed out:]

10. Why do I deduce the principle of art from the fable and so on and do not test it on music, etc. What gives me the right to extrapolate the conclusions? But this is the methodological path of any explanatory principle. Pavlov, Sherrington,¹¹⁶ Ukhtomskiy (why only the dog and the frog, check it with the horse, the raven, etc.). Delta rhythm (only <illegible>). Engels, the law of uninterrupted action (the scene in Shakespeare).

[Crossed out:]

This is done insofar as the thing, to which we generalize our conclusions, has to do with *the same elements*, and we lean on similarities established in advance (the innate reflex in animals, nervous system—form and material in man).

Pavlov discovered a *general* biological law, while studying the *dog*. Maybe he should have said “higher nervous activity of animals and *dogs*?” But he studied in the dog what is the basis of *animals*.

And I studied in literature what is the basis of all art: the aesthetic reactions.

Notes

1. Leonid Solomonovich Sakharov (1900 to 1928) conducted part of the group's concept-formation research using the modified method of Narziss Ach (cf. Van der Veer & Valsiner 1991).
2. Wilhelm (William) Louis Stern (1871 to 1938). German psychologist, author of the conception of critical personalism. Specialist in developmental, general and forensic psychology.
3. Ludwig Binswanger (1881 to 1966). Swiss psychiatrist, pioneer in existential psychology.
4. The Publishing House *Prakticheskaya Meditsina* (“*Practical Medicine*”) was located at Volodarskiy Prospekt 49 (now Liteynny Prospekt) in Leningrad (now St. Petersburg). In 1926 it published, among other things, *Voprosy Biologii i Patologii Evreyev* (*Questions of the Biology and Pathology of the Jews*).
5. Aleksandr Konstantinovich Voronskiy (1884 to 1937). Russian revolutionary, literary critic and publisher. He was the initiator of the literary movement *Pereval*, the editor of the literary magazine *Krasnaya Nov'* (*Red Virgin Soil*) and his publishing house Krug published Trotsky's diaries about Spain (see later text). Politically close to Lunacharskiy and Trotsky, Voronskiy was eventually arrested and shot in 1937.
6. Isaak Emmanuilovich Babel (real name Bobel') (1884 to 1940). Russian writer of short stories, dramaturg and translator from Yiddish. Accused of espionage for France, he was arrested in 1939, tortured, and shot in 1940.

7. Vygotsky cites a sentence from “Pan Apolek,” a story from Babel’s *Red Cavalry*. The book pictures the atrocities of the civil war and the crimes committed by marauding Red Cossacs. The tone of the book contrasted with the existing propaganda and it took the influence of the proletarian writer Maxim Gorky (real name Aleksey Maksimovich Peshkov) (1868 to 1936) to get the stories published. After Babel’s execution, his book was forbidden until the beginning of Krushchev’s Thaw.
8. Vygotsky refers to Voronskiy (1925).
9. The stories of Babel’s *Red Cavalry* were first published in the journals *Lef* and *Krasnaya Nov’* in 1924, the volume appeared in 1926. The editor of *Krasnaya Nov’* in those years, the above-mentioned Voronskiy, was harshly criticized for the publication of Babel’s stories. Here Vygotsky probably refers to Voronskiy (1926).
10. Dem’yan Bednyy (real name Efim Alekseyevich Pridvorov) (1883 to 1945). Russian writer, poet, satirist. Bednyy was some sort of Party poet who applauded the politics of his friends Lenin and Stalin. Eventually, he fell into disgrace and was expelled from the Party and the Union of Soviet Writers. Bednyy owned more than 30,000 books and Stalin was known to borrow books on occasion. Bednyy’s complaint about the dirty fingermarks that Stalin left in his books is said to have led to Mandel’shtam’s infamous poem.
11. Ivan Andreyevich Krylov (1769 to 1844). Russian poet, fabulist, and publisher. Many of his lines have become part of the Russian language.
12. Here, and in other chapters, Vygotsky uses the rare word *protivochuvstvie*, which he borrowed from Pushkin, who used it just once in his verse “On the bust of a conqueror” (1829). Cf. p. 168 of Wachtel (2011).
13. Walter Samuel Hunter (1889 to 1954). American psychologist in the tradition of behaviorism (which he suggested to call anthroponomy). John Broadus Watson (1878 to 1958). American psychologist, founder of behaviorism. Hunter published a series of papers in *Psychological Review* on consciousness. In this case, Vygotsky refers to pp. 489–490 of Hunter (1924), where Hunter compares his view with that of Watson. Actually, Hunter and Watson used neither “speech” nor “reaction” but referred to vocal and language habits.
14. Vladimir Mikhaylovich Bekhterev (1857 to 1927). Russian neurologist, psychiatrist, and founder of objective psychology or reflexology, established the first laboratory of experimental psychology in Russia in 1886. Bekhterev discovered many neurological structures and phenomena and simultaneously with Pavlov discovered what is now called classical conditioning.
15. Commodity fetishism. The perception of the subjective social relationships involved in production as objective economic relationships among the money and commodities exchanged in market trade.
16. Sigmund (Sigismund Schlomo) Freud (1856 to 1939). Austrian neurologist, psychotherapist, founder of psycho-analysis. In his view unconscious, latent, repressed ideas could become conscious again by formulating them in words.

17. See, for instance, p. 280 of Watson (1924): “being ‘conscious’ is merely a popular or literary phrase descriptive of the act of *naming our universe of objects both inside and outside.*”
18. Lev Vladimirovich Shcherba (1980 to 1944). Russian linguist, lexicographer specializing in phonetics and phonology, elaborator of the concept of “phoneme.” Vygotsky refers to p. 4 of Shcherba (1915): “Language shows its genuine face only in dialogue.”
19. Political animal (Greek). One of the definitions of the human person by Aristotle (384 to 322) in his *Politics*. The term “political” means “belonging to the polis,” the ancient Greek city-state or community of citizens.
20. Theodor Lipps (1851 to 1914). German philosopher, psychologist, specialist in aesthetics. Central to his theory was the idea of “empathy” (*Einfühlung*), which said that a person appreciates another person’s reaction or a work of art by the projection of the self into the other or the object.
21. Whole (Latin). Possibly this refers to *pars pro toto*.
22. The page numbers in this passage may refer to Watson (1926), which was the Russian translation of Watson (1919).
23. This may refer to a poem-fable by Bednyy (1912), entitled “The son (The landowner went bankrupt).”
24. Yuriy Nikolayevich Tynyanov (1894 to 1943). Russian writer, literary critic, translator, and member of the Russian formalist school. Vygotsky refers to Tynyanov (1924). The phrase “And I swear on the word of a wolf” is from Krylov’s fable “The wolf in the kennel,” which is discussed later in this chapter.
25. Refers to Marx’s words in the third volume of *Capital*: “If the form of the manifestation and the essence of things would coincide all science would be superfluous.”
26. Refers to Marx’s words in the preface to the first volume of *Capital*: “In the analysis of economic forms, moreover, neither microscopes nor chemical reagents are of use. The force of abstraction must replace both.”
27. Boris Mikhaylovich Eichenbaum (Eykhbaum) (1886 to 1959). Russian linguist, co-founder of Russian formalism.
28. Kurt Koffka (1886 to 1941). German-American psychologist, co-founder of Gestalt psychology and participant in Luria’s second expedition to Uzbekistan in 1932. Vygotsky refers to p. 151 of Koffka (1924): “Just as when we cannot read a letter we turn on the light, or rely on the help of a magnifying lens, so, according to this way of psychological thinking, the light and magnifying power of attention are utilized in introspection. This analogy reveals the chief assumption of the doctrine under examination. We light up the room and use the lens because the object examined is not altered by these procedures. In the same way the introspective method under discussion supposes that a mere change of attention does not really alter the contents.” Koffka’s paper was later published with an introduction by Vygotsky (1926) in a volume edited by Kornilov.

29. William James (1842 to 1910). American philosopher and psychologist, co-founder of pragmatism and functional psychology. James discussed states of consciousness extensively in James (1890, 1892).
30. Karl Pearson (1857 to 1936). British mathematician and biometrician, proponent of eugenics. Vygotsky probably refers to chapter 2 of Pearson (1892), in which the author discussed the possibility of objectively perceiving another person's consciousness. Pearson defended the idea that what is now merely a hypothetical construct or "eject" might in the future be measurable. Cf. Pearson (1892, p. 61): "I see no logical hindrance to our asserting that in the dim future we might possibly obtain objective acquaintance with what at present appears merely as an eject... Psychological effects are without doubt excited by physical action, and our only assumption is the not unreasonable one, that a suitable physical link might transfer an appreciation of psychical activity from one psychical centre to another." Pearson's book was read with profit by the young Albert Einstein.
31. Pavel Petrovich Blonskiy (1884 to 1941). Russian Marxist philosopher, psychologist, pedologist, and educationalist. Blonskiy, one of Vygotsky's teachers at Shanyavskiy University, considered psychology to be a natural science, in particular, a science of behavior. In his view, another's sorrow could be known without taking recourse to empathy but by observing its behavioral manifestations (facial expression, etc.). His work fell into disgrace after the Pedology Decree of 1936.
32. Pavel Petrovich Lazarev (1878 to 1942). Russian physicist, biophysicist and geophysicist, author of the ionic theory of excitation. Lazarev claimed that the dissolution of calcium salts in the nervous system could give rise to spontaneous, endogenous reactions of a non-reflex type.
33. Georgiy Ivanovich Chelpanov (1862 to 1936). Russian philosopher, psychologist, educationalist, founder of the Shchukina Psychological Institute of Moscow Imperial University, the predecessor of the Moscow Institute of Psychology. Chelpanov was a student of Wundt and Stumpf and the teacher of, among others, Blonskiy, Kornilov, Leont'ev, and Shpet. In Russia his brand of Wundtian theory was known as "empirical psychology." Apparently, Chelpanov posited that mental states are different in that they cannot be described in spatial terms such as round, sharp, or thick.
34. Konstantin Nikolayevich Kornilov (1879 to 1975). Russian Marxist psychologist, Chelpanov's successor as the head of the Institute of Psychology, author of the conception of reactology. Kornilov's was Vygotsky's immediate boss at the Institute of Psychology and for some time believed—possibly, rightly—that Vygotsky shared his reactological views. Their relationship deteriorated rapidly and on December 19, 1928, Vygotsky wrote an open letter to the collaborators of the Institute in which he asked their support and complained about Kornilov's public declarations that Vygotsky's views were non-Marxist and idealist. Several years later, in 1932, however, he co-signed an open letter to the journal *Front Nauki i Tekhniki* (*The Front of Science and Technique*) to defend Kornilov against the accusation of being a bourgeois

- scientist. In his turn, Kornilov signed a letter in 1955 to demand the publication of Vygotsky's writings and lift the ban on them. This letter, co-signed by Leont'ev, Luria, Rubinstein and Teplov, was recently found in Luria's archive.
35. Inside (French).
 36. The date and weight (in kilos but also in the old Russian measures of poods, pounds and zolotniks) must have been added after Vygotsky's discharge from the hospital on May 22, 1926.
 37. Vygotsky refers to Binswanger (1922).
 38. Cf. p. 151 of Koffka (1924).
 39. Henri-Louis Bergson (1859 to 1941). French philosopher and Nobel Prize (1927) winner. Defended the value of intuition, immediate experience and the so-called vital impetus (*élan vital*). Alexius von Meinong (1853 to 1920). Austrian philosopher, author of a philosophy of mind, student of Brentano.
 40. "S" and "O" refer to subjective and objective, respectively.
 41. Georgiy Valentinovich Plekhanov (1856 to 1918). Russian revolutionary and Marxist theorist. Founding member of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party and the central bolshevist newspaper "Iskra" ("The Spark"). Fierce opponent of Lenin's democratic centralism.
 42. Vygotsky refers to Frankfurt (1926).
 43. Friedrich Engels (1820 to 1895). German journalist and political theorist, with Marx founder of Marxist theory.
 44. This passage appears in "The historical meaning of the crisis in psychology: A methodological investigation" as well, but the Soviet editors of the Collected Works decided to replace "contradictoriness" and "shakiness" by the more friendly "fragmentary nature" and "brevity." See p. 331 of Vygotsky (1997).
 45. Marx's sixth thesis on Feuerbach: "The essence of man is no abstraction inherent in each single individual. In reality, it is the ensemble of the social relations."
 46. Vladimir Nikolayevich Ivanovskiy (1867 to 1939). Russian philosopher, proponent of "scientific philosophy," which he conceived as a methodology that would reveal the foundations of knowledge and culture. Author of one of the first books on the philosophy of science in Russia, called *A Methodological Introduction to Science and Philosophy* (1923) (in Russian).
 47. Vygotsky refers to Stern (1906), in which Stern developed the distinction between persons (*Personen*) and things (*Sachen*). The person is a complex whole (*unitas multiplex*) that forms a unity and strives to accomplish a goal. The thing is a complex whole that lacks these properties. One of Stern's metaphysical moves was to apply the concept of person to non-human forms of existence such as large institutions (e.g., the church).
 48. Alfred Adler (1870 to 1937). Austrian medical doctor, psychotherapist, founder of individual psychology. Known for his concept of the inferiority complex, which sometimes leads to paradoxical superiority. Demosthenes (speech defect) and Beethoven (deaf) were among Adler's favorite examples

- of persons who overcame a physical problem (organ inferiority) and excelled in their field.
49. Original footnote: “Yes, yes. After all, form is not a natural scientific fact and neither is the word. It has a certain *meaning*, is psychological, despite the fact that the formalist refused to have anything to do with it. The unconsciously introduced these psychological categories of meaning into the classification, the description, the analysis of forms. Cf. Shklovskiy—automaton, Yakubinskiy—conscious sound in the verse, Eichenbaum—to spin out the torment of feelings in the tragedy, the doctrine of inhibition, discharge, and so on.”
 50. Fragment from Heine’s poem “Es war ein alter König” (1845): “Es war ein alter König./ Sein Herz war schwer, sein Haupt war grau;/ Der arme alte König./ Er nahm eine junge Frau./ Es war ein schöner Page./ Blond war sein Haupt, leicht war sein Sinn;/ Er trug die seidne Schleppe/ Der jungen Königin./ Kennst du das alte Liedchen?/ Es klingt so süß, es klingt so trüb!/ Sie mußten beyde sterben./ Sie hatten sich viel zu lieb.” Or in English: “There was a king, now ageing/ With heart of lead, and head so grey./ He took a wife, the old king./ A young wife too, men say./ There was a handsome pageboy/ With hair of gold, and thoughts so free:/ He bore the silks with joy/ That trailed behind the queen./ Do you know the ancient singing?/ It rings so true: it rings so sweet!/ Both had to die, of loving./ Of love that was too deep.” Translated by A. S. Kline (2004). Retrieved September 2, 2015, from <http://www.poetryintranslation.com/PITBR/German/Heine.htm>.
 51. Grau—gray; schwer—heavy; leicht—light; Herz—heart, Haupt—head; Sinn—feeling (German).
 52. Refers to the first line of Lermontov’s poem “Dream” (1841), written several months before the poet’s death in a duel. The first and the last lines describe the same scene but from a different viewpoint.
 53. Cf. Vygotsky (1927): “This principle, Wundt says, cannot be called incorrect but it provides nothing specific for the aesthetic object. The solar system, the steam engine, a textbook of algebra, and many other objects represent unity in diversity without being an object that gives aesthetic pleasure (*Foundations of Physiological Psychology*, Vol. 3, p. 241).”
 54. See Vygotsky’s footnote 61 in Vygotsky (1965): “Recently, prof. A. K. Borsuk again defended the principle of saving strength. “Aesthetic experiences are determined by the process of orientation that forms part of them and which takes place in accordance with the principle of the least expenditure of strength” (“the aesthetic” and “the beautiful” in light of biopsychology) (in *Questions of the education of the normal and defective child*. Moscow-St. Petersburg, 1924. p. 31). But then a geometrical theorem would give the highest aesthetic satisfaction, not to speak of a carefully composed business telegram. And why does the aesthetic experience cause so much excitement?”
 55. See Yevlakhov (1917). In Vygotsky (1927), he wrote that he had heard the talks of Borsuk and Yevlakhov at the 2nd All-Russian Congress of Psychoneurology in Petrograd in 1924. Cf. Yevlakhov (1925).

56. Wolfgang Köhler (1887 to 1967). German psychologist, co-founder of Gestalt psychology. Wolfgang Köhler's experiments with chimpanzees and chickens and his theoretical arguments formed an important reference point for Vygotsky and he repeatedly discussed the achievements and limitations of Gestalt psychology. Vygotsky's personal contacts with Gestalt psychologists have been discussed elsewhere (Van der Veer & Valsiner 1991; Yasnitsky & Van der Veer 2016). In the text Vygotsky refers to Köhler's experiments showing that chickens can learn to peck to the darker of two colors.
57. It is difficult to know to which sources Vygotsky refers, but likely sources are Bryusov (1925), Grammont (1913), La Fontaine (1885), Hausenstein (1914), Taine (1922), Tomashevsky (1925), Uzin (1924), Walzel (1923), Weddigen (1893), and Wundt (1908).
58. Edmond de Goncourt (1822 to 1896) and his brother Jules de Goncourt (1830 to 1870) were French writers who published a famous diary, which offers many insights into the French cultural life of their time. On the date mentioned by Vygotsky (August 12, 1859), they entered three observations of which the following seems most relevant: "Yesterday I was at one end of the big table of the castle. Edmond was at the other end and talked with Thérèse. I heard nothing but when he smiled, I smiled involuntary and held my head in the same pose... Never was an identical soul placed in two bodies." Vygotsky's text "Essentially, the only actor whose talent is indisputable, absolute as mathematics, or better, as a *salto mortale*, because here there can be nothing "like talent"; you fall or you do not fall" was copied from an observation on November 15, 1859.
59. Cf. Shklovskiy (1919).
60. Lev (Leon) Davidovich Trotskiy (Trotsky) (real name Bronshteyn) (1879 to 1940). Russian Soviet politician, member of the Politburo, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and founder of the Red Army. After he lost his struggle with Stalin, he was expelled from the country and eventually killed by one of Stalin's agents in Mexico. In this case Vygotsky, who frequently quoted Trotsky, refers to Trotsky's account of his stay in Spain in 1916. Expelled from France, Trotsky spent several months in Spain until the Spanish authorities expelled him again and put him and his family on a ship to New York. Trotsky's diary about this period was first published in the Russian journal *Krasnaya Nov'* and subsequently as a book (Trotsky 1926). The Spanish version of this book came out as Trotsky (1929) in the translation of Andrés Nin. The same Andrés Nin later translated the writings of Vygotsky and his colleagues (see Kornilov 1935).
61. Cf. Buslayev (1861). Vygotsky quotes this reference from Veresayev (1926).
62. Vygotsky presumably made an error in the book title. His source was Bryusov (1918).
63. Emil Utitz (1883 to 1956). German Jewish philosopher, psychologist and theorist of art. Utitz rejected the ideas of sublimation and overcompensation as the distinguishing characteristic of art. Cf. Vygotsky (1927).

64. Edgar Allan Poe (1809 to 1849). American writer, poet, editor, and literary critic. Vygotsky is quoting (the Russian translation of) Poe's article "The philosophy of composition" (1846), in which Poe discussed his famous poem, "The Raven" and claimed (perhaps jokingly) that it owed nothing to "ecstatic intuition" but was constructed according a meticulously detailed, preconceived plan.
65. All animals are sad after sexual intercourse (except the cock and the woman) (Latin). Attributed to Galen of Pergamum.
66. Konstantin Sergeyeovich Stanislavskiy (Stanislavsky) (1863 to 1938). Russian theater director, actor, author of an original system to train actors. Co-founder of the Moscow Art Theater. In the last chapter of his *Thinking and Speech* Vygotsky refers to Stanislavsky's notion of subtext in a dialogue.
67. Vygotsky probably refers to (the Russian translation of) Poe's (1848) article in *Graham's Magazine*, where he wrote, among other things: "That punctuation is important all agree; but how few comprehend the extent of its importance! The writer who neglects punctuation, or mix-punctuates, is liable to be misunderstood—this, according to the popular idea, is the sum of the evils arising from heedlessness or ignorance. It does not seem to be known that, even where the sense is perfectly clear, a sentence may be deprived of half its force—its spirit—its point—by improper punctuation."
68. Vygotsky cites p. 95 of James (1907).
69. Cites from what would become chapter 9 of Trotsky (1926). Juan Belmonte Garcia (1892 to 1962) was a legendary Spanish bullfighter, whose feats were later described in a book by his friend Ernest Hemingway (1932). Trotsky did not actually witness a bullfight by Belmonte but relates what a person told him.
70. "The Pike" is another one of Krylov's fables.
71. Cf. the critique of Gornfeld's idea in chapter 2 of *The Psychology of Art*.
72. SRs, members of the Socialist Revolutionary Party. Blok's poem "The Twelve" was first published in the Socialist Revolutionary newspaper *Znamya Truda* (*The Banner of Labor*) and enjoyed immediate popularity. Vladimir Mitrofanovich Purishkevich (1870 to 1920) was a Russian right wing politician in Imperial Russia, noted for his ultra-nationalist and anti-Semitic ideas and his participation in the murder of Rasputin.
73. Philo of Alexandria (Philo Judaeus) (ca. 25 BC to ca. 50 AD). Jewish Hellenistic theologian and philosopher, who tried to combine religion (Moses) and philosophy (Plato) in one system. Philo regarded the Torah as of divine origin, even its letters and accents, which should be interpreted to reveal their deeper truth behind their allegoric form.
74. This example is neither in the *Psychology of Art* nor in *The Historical Meaning of the Psychological Crisis*.
75. Refers to Bialik's famous article "Halachah and Aggadah" ("Law and Legend") from his book *Halachah, Aggadah and Ethics: A Volume of Articles*.

76. Cf. *The Psychology of Art*, where Vygotsky referred Kornilov's law of unipolar energy expenditure.
77. Vygotsky quotes fragments from Krylov's fable "The wolf in the kennel" (1812) to show it can be read on two planes. To help the reader, the text of the fable, in the translation of C. Fillingham Coxwell, is given here in full: "At night a wolf with thoughts on sheepfolds centered / A kennel entered / And swift aroused the angry pack / That scenting near hand the grey and hard bully / Barked against each other, struggled, felt the insult fully / The huntsman cried: Lads, we're on his track / Prepared to meet the strange attack / Forthwith the kennel's scene rose hellish / Men up with cudgels run or load a gun / A light there, bring a light! 't is quickly done / The wolf retreats, the prospect does not relish / But grinds its teeth and sits with bristling hair / Pressed in a corner while his eyes with fury glare / Perceiving that no lambs the scene embellish / That he has indeed at last to settle for his thieving past / He opens all aghast negotiations / Thus proudly begins: My friend, why raise this den? / I'm of your kids and ken / Peace is my wish today, I love not altercations / Let us forget the past, and I'll observe this rule / Not only toward your blocks will my ardor cool / But for their benefit I other wolves shall school / My oath as wolf, I promise and am willing / Always, o neighbor, patient list / But says the huntsman with raised fist / Fellow, I'm greyer than you, whist / In wolfish matters, I a serious part am filling / And therefore, 't is my custom, aye / In no respect with strolling wolves to play / Except to take their skins away / And instantly his dogs the visitor are killing." As Vygotsky argued in *The Psychology of Art*, the first plane of the fable is the infernal situation in which the wolf finds himself after his entrance. The second plane is formed by his conciliatory speech in which he tries to assure the dogs and the huntsman that he came with friendly purposes. The fable is believed to represent Napoleon's adventures in Russia. In the text we partly use the English translation, which does not exactly follow the Russian text.
78. "With that he let go the pack of dogs on the wolf."
79. Another of Krylov's fables.
80. April 2, 1926, was a Friday. It corresponded with Nissan 18 (Nissan being the first month of the Jewish year) and the fourth day of Pesach (Passover, Easter), which in Jewish tradition lasts for 7 or 8 days.
81. Utterance (expression) and sense (German).
82. Konstantin Derzhavin (1903 to 1956) was a Russian literary and theater critic, translator, and writer.
83. In *Macbeth*, the apparition tells Macbeth that he will not be defeated until the Birnam Wood marches against him. Later his enemies send soldiers camouflaged with branches and Macbeth believes the Birnam Wood is approaching. The example is not in the *Psychology of Art*.
84. "The volumes about the theory of poetical language" was a periodical edition, published from 1916 to 1923 by OPOYAZ, the Society for the Study of Poetic Language, which was led by the formalist Shklovskiy. In chapter 2 of *The Psychology of Art* (1925), Vygotsky criticized the formalist approach in a

- paragraph that borrowed its name from an early article by Shklovskiy (1916): Art as technique.
85. What follows was elaborated in the manuscript on “The historical meaning of the psychological crisis” (pp. 329–331 in Vygotsky 1997), but Vygotsky did not yet know that his “article” would grow into a book-length manuscript. A careful study of all relevant archival documents reveals that the manuscript of “Crisis” was not written in the Zakharino hospital; probably just the idea originated there (for details, see Zavershneva 2012a).
 86. Cf. Vishnevskiy (1925). In “Crisis” Vygotsky refers to this page.
 87. The discussion between Vishnevskiy and Stepanov is discussed in “Crisis.”
 88. Mikhail Stepanovich Ol’minskiy (real name Aleksandrov) (1863 to 1933). Russian revolutionary, journalist and literary critic. Ol’minskiy’s book was published by the Rabochee Izdatel’stvo “Priboy” (The Worker’s Publishing House “Breakers”).
 89. Grigoriy Lelevich (real name Labori Gilelevich Kalmanson) (1901 to 1937). Russian critic, poet, organizer and member of the VAPP (All-Union Association of Proletarian Writers), and author of the preface to Ol’minskiy’s book. See also the discussion between Lelevich and Vygotsky in *Nash Ponedel’nik*, 1922, 6–7 (“About the Lunacharsky Museum,” “The Decembrists and their poetry”).
 90. Aleksandr Efimovich Izmaylov (1779 to 1831). Russian journalist and writer of fables.
 91. Dmitriy Nikolayevich Ovsyaniko-Kulikovskiy (1853 to 1920). Russian linguist, specialist in the study of literature and follower of Potebnya.
 92. Refers to a scene in chapter 5 of Part 2 of Dostoevsky’s novel *The Devils* where both the “Marseillaise” and the popular German song “Oh, du, mein lieber Augustin” are heard. Dostoevsky considered the latter song to be the limit of vulgarity.
 93. Unfortunately we cannot provide an answer to this question.
 94. See Note 2.
 95. Yuriy Vladimirovich (real name Yudel’ Vul’fovich) Frankfurt (1887 to 1940?). Russian philosopher and psychologist, employee of the Institute of Philosophy and leader of the Deborin group in psychology. Became the subject of attacks in the press after the Deborin group lost the struggle for power and stopped publishing. Was repeatedly arrested and disappeared in 1940. See also Vygotsky’s criticism of his views in the *Crisis*.
 96. Refers to the discussion between Vl. Sarab’yanov and A. K. Stolyarov and A. M. Deborin’s school in *Pod Znamenem Marksizma*, 1925, № 11; 1926, № 1–2, 6, and also to the criticism of G.V. Plekhanov’s viewpoint by Yu. V. Frankfurt in this journal (1926, № 6).
 97. *Agere*—to act, *pati*—to undergo (Latin).
 98. Yuliy Veniaminovich Portugalov (1876 to 1932). Russian psychologist and psychiatrist. Vygotsky cites Portugalov (1925) in “Crisis” and other writings.

99. Plekhanov carried on polemics with Petzoldt in Plekhanov (1909). Joseph Petzoldt (1862 to 1929) was a German philosopher and adherent of empiriocriticism.
100. Theory of shadows (German). This same passage can be found on p. 315 of the “Crisis” manuscript (Vygotsky 1997). It may be an allusion to Plato’s allegory of the cave.
101. This was Luria’s address in his native town Kazan’. It is unknown who Yashin was.
102. Vygotsky refers to p. 13 of Koffka (1925): “To put it paradoxically: if each of us had just reactions that all others could observe, then nobody could observe anything.” The sentence forms part of a passage in which Koffka criticizes the strict behaviorist viewpoint.
103. “If we were to see everything (i.e., if there were no absolute thresholds) including all changes that constantly take place (i.e., if no difference thresholds existed), we would face chaos (remember how many objects the microscope reveals in a drop of water). What would be a glass of water? And a river?” (Vygotsky 1997, p. 274).
104. Original footnote: “Planck: The eye is nothing amidst other instruments. Psychology’s task is to clarify *what* is the advantage of the fact that the eye does not *see* what optics established.” Max Karl Ernst Ludwig Planck (1858 to 1947). German theoretical physicist, author of quantum theory, and Nobel Prize winner in 1918. Vygotsky probably refers to the first chapter of Planck (1915), in which Planck developed the idea that physics should rely less on the sense organs (e.g., eye, ear) and become less anthropomorphic.
105. Vygotsky borrowed the funnel metaphor from Sherrington (1904). It essentially expressed the idea that the nervous system receives many stimuli (the wide ingress of the funnel) but selects just one response (the narrow egress). Cf. p. 70 of Vygotsky (1997).
106. In “Crisis,” Vygotsky attributes the coefficient of specification to Hegel (cf. p. 275 of Vygotsky 1997). Perhaps this was an indirect reference via Stolyarov’s article.
107. Nikolay Aleksandrovich Ivantsov (1863 to 1927). Russian biologist and philosopher of science, translator of Spinoza’s *The Ethics* (this was the translation Vygotsky used). The analogy is mentioned in at least two of his publications: on p. 40 of Ivantsov (1892) and on p. 19 of Ivantsov (1893).
108. Refers to Vygotsky’s daughter Gita (diminutive Gitka).
109. The handwriting is difficult to decipher. It is possible that Vygotsky wrote or meant to write: “How much smarter than the fiction of fairy-tales!”
110. Refers to Skaftymov (1924).
111. Aseev (1925, pp. 67/70) complained that “our prozaists have lost the feeling for plots... the reader demands a plot.”
112. Broder Christiansen (1869 to 1958). German philosopher and linguist, student of Ludwig Klages, who specialized in art and graphology. His *Philosophy of art* (Christiansen 1909) came out in a Russian edition in 1911 and became

- popular among the Russian formalists, who selectively borrowed from his book.
113. Sergey Aleksandrovich Yesenin (1895 to 1925). Russian lyrical poet. Yesenin wrote his volume of verse *Klyuchi Marii* (*Maria's keys*) in 1918 (Yesenin 1920). The journal *Krasnaya Nov'* published Yesenin's verse cycle "Persian motives" with a review by F. Zhits. Three of his poems were also published (*Krasnaya Nov'*, 1926, 2): "Do not smile wily, while fidgeting with your hands...", "Farewell Baku! I will not see you again ...," "To Kachalov's dog." It is unclear to which text Vygotsky refers.
 114. Adelina Adalis (real name Adelina Alekseyevna Viskovatova) (1900 to 1969). Russian poetess, writer, translator.
 115. Possibly, Robert Browning (1812 to 1889). English poet and playwright.
 116. Charles Scott Sherrington (1857 to 1952). British neurophysiologist, histologist, and pathologist. Winner of the Nobel prize for showing that reflexes require integrated activation and for his work on the reciprocal innervation of muscles.

References

- Aseev, N. (1925). *Klyuch syuzheta. Pechat' i Revolyutsia*, 7, 71–81.
- Binswanger, L. (1922). *Einführung in die Probleme der allgemeinen Psychologie*. Berlin: Springer.
- Bryusov, V. (1918). Miscellanea (pp. 211–232). In *Epokha. Kniga pervaya*. Moscow: Tovarihshestvo Skoropechatni A.A. Levenson.
- Bryusov, V. (1925). Sintetika poezii (pp. 9–30). In V.Ya. Bryusov (Ed.), *Problemy poetiki*. Moscow-Leningrad: ZiF.
- Buslayev, F. I. (1861). *Istoricheskie ocherki russkoy narodnoy slovesnosti i iskusstva* (Vol. 1–2). St. Petersburg: O.K. Kozhanchikov.
- Christiansen, B. (1909). *Philosophie der Kunst*. Hanau: Clauss & Feddersen.
- de Lafontaine, J. (1885). *Fables, précédées de la vie d'Ésope*. Tours: Alfred Mame et fils.
- Frankfurt, Yu. V. (1926). G.V. Plekhanov o psikhofizicheskoy probleme. *Pod Znamenem Marksizma*, 6, 35–60.
- Grammont, M. (1913). *Le vers français, ses moyens d'expression, son harmonie*. Paris: Champion.
- Hausenstein, W. (1914). *Vom Künstler und seiner Seele*. Heidelberg: Verlag Richard Weissbach.
- Hemingway, E. (1932). *Death in the afternoon*. New York: Charles Scribners Sons.
- Hunter, W. S. (1924). The symbolic process. *Psychological Review*, 31, 478–497.
- Ivantsov, A. N. (1892). Geksli i sovremennoe nauchnoe mirovozzrenie, V-VI (Okonchanie). *Voprosy Filosofii i Psikhologii*, 3(14), 37–74.
- Ivantsov, A. N. (1893). Problema bytiya vneshnego mira. *Voprosy Filosofii i Psikhologii*, 4(18), 11–26.
- James, W. (1890). *The principles of psychology*. New York: Henry Holt and Company.
- James, W. (1892). *Psychology: Briefer course*. New York: Henry Holt and Company.
- James, W. (1907). *Pragmatism*. New York: Longmans, Green, and Co.
- Koffka, K. (1924). Introspection and the method of psychology. *British Journal of Psychology*, 15, 149–161.
- Koffka, K. (1925). *Die Grundlagen der psychischen Entwicklung: Eine Einführung in die Kinderpsychologie*. Osterwieck am Harz: Verlag van A.W. Zickfeldt.

- Kornilov, K. N. (Ed.). (1935). *Los problemas de la psicología moderna*. Madrid: Aguilar.
- Pearson, K. (1892). *The grammar of science*. London: Walter Scott.
- Planck, M. (1915). *Eight lectures on theoretical physics*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Plekhanov, G. V. (1909). Trusliviy idealizm: Iosif Pettsol'd (pp. 448–480). In P. Yushkevich (Ed.), *Problema mira s tochki zreniya pozitivizma*. St. Petersburg: Shipovnik.
- Portugalov, Yu.V. (1925). Kak izuchat' detskuyu psikhiku (Obzor refleksologicheskikh techeniy v otnoshenii ikh k psikhologii voobshche i k detskoj psikhologii v chastnosti) (pp. 1–126). In Yu.V. Portugalov (Ed.), *Detskaya psikhologiya i antropologiya: Sbornik statey. Vol. 1*. Samara: Krasnyy Oktyabr'.
- Shcherba, L. V. (1915). *Vostochnoluzhitzkoe narechie* (Vol. 1). Petrograd: Tipografiya A.E. Kollins.
- Sherrington, Ch. S. (1904). The correlation of spinal-brain reflexes and the principle of the common path. *Nature*, 8, 460–466.
- Shklovskiy, V. (1919). Iskusstvo tsirka. *Zhizn Iskusstva*, November 4–5, № 284/285.
- Skaftymov, A. P. (1924). *Poetika i genezis bylin: Ocherki*. Moscow-Saratov: V.Z. Yaksanov.
- Stern, W. (1906). *Person und Sache. Erster Band*. Leipzig: Verlag von J. A. Barth.
- Taine, H. (1922). *Lektsii ob iskusstve. Filosofiya iskusstva*. Moscow: GIZ.
- Tomashevskiy, B. V. (1925). *Teorii literatury. Poetika*. Moscow-Leningrad: GIZ.
- Trotsky, L. (1926). *Delo bylo v Ispanii: Po zapisnoy knizhke*. Moscow: Krug.
- Trotsky, L. (1929/2012). *Mis peripecias en España*. Madrid: Reino de Cordelia.
- Tynyanov, Yu N. (1924). *Problema stikhotvornogo yazyka*. Leningrad: Academia.
- Uzin, V. S. (1924). *O povestyakh Belkina: Iz kommentarijev chitatelya*. Petrograd: Akvilon.
- Van der Veer, R., & Valsiner, J. (1991). *Understanding Vygotsky: A quest for synthesis*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Veresayev, V. (1926). K khudozhestvennomu oformleniyu byta (ob obryadakh starykh i novykh): doklad, chitaniy na plenumе Gosudarstvennoy Akademii Khudozhestvennykh Nauk, 30 noyabrya 1925 g. *Krasnaya Nov'*, 1, 160–177.
- Vishnevsky, V. A. (1925). V zashchitu materialisticheskoy dialektiki. *Pod Znamenem Marksizma*, 8–9.
- Voronskiy, A. K. (1925). *Literaturnye tipy*. Moscow: Krug.
- Voronskiy, A. K. (1926). *Literaturnye zapisi*. Moscow: Krug.
- Vygotskaya, G. L., & Lifanova, T. M. (1996). *Lev Semyonovich Vygotsky: Zhizn', deyatel'nost', shtrikhi k portretu*. Moscow: Smysl.
- Vygotsky, L. S. (1925). Soznanie kak problema psikhologiya povedeniya (pp. 175–198). In K.N. Kornilov (Ed.), *Psikhologiya i marksizm. T. 1*. Moscow-Leningrad: GIZ.
- Vygotsky, L. S. (1926). Po povodu stat'i K. Koffka o samonablyudenii: Vmesto predisloviya (pp. 176–178). In K. N. Kornilov (Ed.), *Problemy sovremennoy psikhologii: Sbornik statey sotrudnikov Moskovskogo gosudarstvennogo instituta eksperimental'noy psikhologii*. Leningrad: GIZ.
- Vygotsky, L. S. (1927). Sovremennaya psikhologiya i iskusstvo. *Sovetskoe Iskusstvo*, 8, 5–8.
- Vygotsky, L. S. (1928). Instrumental'nyy metod v pedologii (pp. 158–159). In A. B. Zalkind (Ed.), *Osnovnye problem pedologii v SSSR (po tezisam Pervogo vserossiyskogo pedologicheskogo s'ezda 27/XII-1927 g.-3/I-1928 g.)*. Moscow: Izdanie Orgbyuro S'ezda.
- Vygotsky, L. S. (1965). *Psikhologiya iskusstva*. Moscow: Iskusstvo.
- Vygotsky, L. S. (1971). *The psychology of art*. Cambridge, MA: M.I.T. Press.
- Vygotsky, L. S. (1997). *The collected works of L.S. Vygotsky. Vol. 3. Problems of the theory and history of psychology*. New York: Plenum Press.
- Vygotsky, L. S. (2004). Pis'ma k uchenikam i soratnikam (Edited by A.A. Puzyrey), *Vestnik MGU. Ser. 14. Psikhologiya*, 3, 3–40.
- Vygotsky, L. S. (2014). Bloknot iz bol'nitsy 'Zakhar'ino' (1926) (Edited by E.Yu. Zavershneva), *Gefter*, 17.01.2014 (<http://gefter.ru/archive/11094>).
- Wachtel, M. (2011). *A commentary to Pushkin's lyric poetry, 1826–1836*. Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press.
- Walzel, O. (Ed.). (1923). *Handbuch der Literaturwissenschaft*. Potsdam: Athenaion.

- Watson, J. B. (1919). *Psychology from the viewpoint of the behaviorist*. Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Company.
- Watson, J. B. (1924). The un verbalized in human behavior. *Psychological Review*, 31, 273–280.
- Watson, J. B. (1926). *Psikhologiya kak nauka o povedenii*. Moscow-Leningrad: GIZ.
- Weddigen, F. (1893). *Das Wesen und die Theorie der Fabel und ihre Hauptvertreter in Deutschland*. Leipzig: Gebhardt & Wilisch.
- Wundt, W. (1908). *Völkerpsychologie. Eine Untersuchung der Entwicklungsgesetze von Sprache, Mythos und Sitte. Dritter Band. Die Kunst*. Leipzig: Engelmann.
- Yasnitsky, A., & Van der Veer, R. (Eds.). (2016). *Revisionist revolution in Vygotsky studies*. London: Routledge.
- Yesenin, S. (1920). *Klyuchi Marii*. Moscow: Izdatelstvo Trudovoy Arteli Khudozhnikov Slova.
- Yevlakhov, A. M. (1917). *Vvedenie v filosofiyu khudozhestvennogo tvorchestva. Opyt istoriko-literaturnoy metodologii. V 3 t. T. 3*. Rostov-on-Don: Tipografiya N.A. Pastukha.
- Yevlakhov, A. M. (1925). Psychologiya tvorchestva kak biologicheskaya problema. *Zhurnal teoreticheskoy i prakticheskoy meditsiny. Vol. 1, Book 3–4*. Baku: Izdatel'stvo Azerbaydzhanskogo Gosudarstvennogo Instituta.
- Zavershneva, E. Yu. (2012a). Investigating the manuscript of L.S. Vygotsky's 'The historical meaning of the crisis in psychology'. *Journal of Russian and East European Psychology*, 50(4), 42–63.
- Zavershneva, E. Yu. (2012b). The key to human psychology. Commentary on L.S. Vygotsky's notebook from Zakharino Hospital (1926). *Journal of Russian and East European Psychology*, 50(4), 16–41.

Chapter 8

Toward Cultural–Historical Theory

This chapter contains three notes written between 1926 and 1928. The notes discuss the need to define the object and method of the new Marxist psychology, whose creation Vygotsky deemed essential in “The historical meaning of the psychological crisis.”

They ask and dispute whether mind is dynamogenic

This note was written on a narrow strip of paper and it presumably dates from the time of writing of the *Historical meaning of the psychological crisis*. Vygotsky repeats several of the statements from chapter 7, in particular, that it is the person who is the subject matter of psychology. The document is remarkable in that it shows the first use of “psychological function” as one of the key terms, although it does not yet have the meaning it would acquire 1 year later in the cultural-historical theory. It is as if Vygotsky does not yet notice the heuristic value of the concept that would make his conception well known.

NB! They ask and dispute whether mind is dynamogenic, i.e., whether it has mechanical force. For example, can the pleasure of success reinforce and again elicit a movement. This way to phrase the question, however, is radically wrong. Precisely in the area of mechanical regulation (reinforcement, inhibition, etc.) we absolutely do not need mind for the explanation. The very phrasing of the question *implicite*¹ implies either panpsychism (all nature is mental) or psychovitalism (all organic nature is psychic, psychoid).² In actual fact, mind is only connected with the *highest* form of organic matter. *Ergo*, we must ask about its function in *this domain* (the higher, the clearer. “The anatomy of man is the key to the anatomy of the ape. Allusions to more advanced,” etc.),³ in social behavior, in the structure of personality, in the mastery of nature and oneself, in cognition, in orienting activity (in itself and for itself), in the freedom of will, etc. We must ask (1) about its specific functions and not about general ones, (2) about the *psychological* functions.

The knots that tie together biology and physics (life), chemistry and physics (the atom), the social and the biological, are unknown. But we boldly begin by singling

out the basic quality: bio, socio, etc. Cf. Hegel—mechanical, chemical, and organic.⁴ In the same way, while leaving the question open,—the complex of the psychological, biological, and sociological—, we can single out the main form: the psychological as a real datum. The person for psychology=the organism for biology.

Marx regards mind as a property that arises at the highest level of organic development.⁵ (1) A property does not give rise to a science, cf. a quality. *Ergo* psychology has no basis in mind (a property). (2) We do not ask for the biological functions of mind; we must find its psychological function. The organism can be understood without mind (contra psychovitalism), but not the person. (3) The idea of psychological biology (physiology). Psychology *above* sociology. (4) Cf. is the commodity form dynamogenic? An inadequate question. All societal relationships are mental or physical (they are social. Cf. Bukharin’s mistake⁶—the real arrangement in space as the basis of the production relationships). Are the categories of political economy possible with a theory of the conditional reflex without mind?

*Psychologica psychologica.*⁷

On the definition of psychology’s subject matter

The present note was written in violet ink on two strips of narrow paper and repeats several of the claims of chapter 7 about the investigation of mind with the help of Marx’s “reverse method.” It also contains explicit references to the essay on the crisis (e.g., the concept of the primary abstraction), which apparently had already been finished. It is one of the few documents that can be approximately dated to the first half of 1927 and it reflects a transitional period from test experiments in existing areas of investigation to the creation of his own conception. The note shows that at the time of writing of “The historical meaning of the psychological crisis” Vygotsky did not yet consider the concept of the higher psychological function to be central to his conception. Interestingly, the idea to make the psychological functions the subject matter of psychology is criticized and instead of the “person,” as in chapter 7 and the first note, Vygotsky now suggests the concept of “highly organized life” as psychology’s subject matter, which hardly seems an improvement. On the other hand, thinking about what is highly organized and typical for humans may have led him to his cultural-historical approach.

NB! On the definition of psychology’s subject matter

1. If it is correct that mind is a property of highly organized matter, this implies that (a) highly organized=manifesting higher forms of life, (b) this property is inherent in matter in so far as it is living matter, highly living, i.e., it is a property of life itself, as a state of this matter, (c) the forms of life in which this property manifests itself represent, obviously, special, unique, higher manifestations of life, i.e., my definition is the only materialist formula of psychology. Psychology’s subject matter is the highly organized life that has this property.
2. The tendency to make psychology realistic is there in Bergson (psychology and the vital),⁸ here he and all descriptive psychology are *right*, but he makes other

mistakes: (a) He denies the connection with vital life (the brain is an automaton: According to Descartes the intellect is *outside* life)⁹; (b) for him the vital is not above, not before, but above and after the psychological.

3. Engels' schema justifies my definition. Cf. p. 19 (like forms of motion pass into one another, the sciences arise out of one another)+p. 80 (biology is the chemistry of proteins: the transition, connection, distinction of the two sciences; special fields of science via the next lower one+a new quality).¹⁰
4. Why are the functions insufficient as psychology's subject? Because we must know *what* is functioning; the structures; because apart from the functions there are mental phenomena (cf. Stumpf),¹¹ because in psychology the concept of function itself is a *particular* and *very* complex one, which itself depends on the definition of what psychological is and therefore cannot enter in the definition.
5. It is assumed that psychology's subject matter must be determined *before* psychology itself, in its *beginning*, and not in the end. *But this is incorrect*. In assuming that, they think that science's subject matter is formed by the empirical objects whose names determine its subject matter (plants, animals, water, etc.). This is not true. Science's subject matter is in a certain sense created by *science itself* from its basic abstraction (cf. *The meaning of the psychological crisis*), for example, the subject matter of physics, chemistry, and the world in astronomy. If the essence of things would coincide with their appearance science would be superfluous: This is fully applicable to the subject matter as well; if it lay in the world of appearances (=the empirical object), the science about it would be superfluous: This is fully applicable to the subject matter as well. *This is why not the empirical object determines the name of the science, but the name of the science the subject matter*: physical, physiological phenomena, the psychology of Raskolnikov.¹² The subject matter of science is a part of reality, represented in concepts, and this comes in the end. *That is why it is worthwhile to give the definition not at the beginning but at the end of the course*: Then it will be rich in content. The first definition provides a viewpoint that must be accepted at face value: You must believe me that there is something vital, psychological, etc. Soon we will see what it is. *From this first definition through the whole course* (each new piece of knowledge stands for a definition of the subject matter) *to the final complete definition*, which must end psychology.

Cf. the role of the primary abstraction (The Crisis).¹³ We define the subject matter to the extent it is known by science. Physics defines clearer than psychology not because it is clearer, but because it is a more advanced science. The (first) definition is an equation in which the predicate is an X, which will be disclosed in successive approximations during the entire course. Psychology is the science of mental life. But what is mental life? The answer is psychology as a whole.

On the question of the methodology of pedology

This note was written in green ink on two sheets of paper torn from a notepad, and the title is the editors' invention. Despite the fact that Vygotsky favored the experimental method, he defends observation's importance and recommends a multi-method approach. This may

have had something to do with his growing awareness of the new research approach developed by Kurt Lewin and his associates (e.g., Dembo, Zeigarnik)¹⁴ in Berlin. Judging by the text (e.g., the remark “I will mention Köhler’s and Jaensch’s experiments”), the note was not meant for publication but for a talk he was to give. We surmise that the note was somehow connected with Vygotsky’s participation in the First All-Union Pedological Congress, which was held from December 27, 1927 to January 4, 1928, where he presented a talk about the method of double stimulation (Vygotsky 1928).

It seems to me that our work in this part went astray. The debate to a considerable degree diverged from the crux of the matter, lost its objective meaning, and its poignancy is doubtless exaggerated and inflated. We can debate, we must debate implacably and sharpen all viewpoints to the extreme when there is something to debate *about*. When they debated about what psychology should be, subjective introspective or materialist objective, then the debate about methods was necessary, fruitful, ruthless, and, most importantly, inevitable. To fight introspection as the main method now is equivalent to fighting a dead man. For us this is the past. There will be ruthless, inevitable and fruitful debates in the future. But now this debate does not lead to the point, to the plane where it should be. It must be carried further but we remain at the threshold of <illegible> of pedology and we are debating —“<illegible> in the same place.” These debates have been fought, solved, tested in work, clarified in life, and to renew these debates is to go backwards.

We cannot have it two ways, <illegible>: *either* yesterday’s declarations and <illegible> of Soviet pedology are no more than the usual and non-committal <illegible> politeness—then they are very harmful because they obscure the genuine state of the matter. *Or* these declarations are responsible, but then *how can* these debates *take place* on the platform of principles? Either there is no single platform, or the debate is unsound. I think the latter is correct.

The first thing we must avoid is to consider methods in a purely abstract way, outside time and space. The role of methods in this or that particular science is always subservient, subordinated to the goal. What is most important for the carpenter—the saw or the hammer, and for the pedagogue—anthropometrics or the method of the conditional reflex? There can be no general answer to this question. *It depends on the goal*. There are problems that can only be solved with the method of the conditional reflex, and we would above all like to hear how to apply this method in the context of age, to use it truly pedologically. There are problems that can only be solved with a psychological method and no other method is capable of solving them. Finally, I can neither agree with the opinion that observation is a relict of the past. Nothing is more incorrect, anti-historic than the following historical reasoning: Because these methods originated earlier than others in the history of science, they have become more obsolete than the others; the very best is the very youngest. Historical age is not the most important criterion to judge a method. After all, to communism <illegible> also objected, referring to primitive communism, that it lies past and not ahead of mankind’s historical path. But this *primitive* observation has as little in common with the present and the future (for only the future will create this method) as the communism of the future with primitive communism. The specific role of observation is growing, particularly, *within* the experimental

method. In the methodical approach of <P.>,¹⁵ observation plays an insignificant role: It is the subject himself who is observing, the experimenter registers what the equipment indicates, the experiment has been mechanized. Nowadays the experimental psychological methodological approach continues more and more on a path where the role of the observer becomes immense, especially the observation, which itself grows into an experiment. <I am referring to> Köhler's and Jaensch's¹⁶ experiments, the filming of experiments,¹⁷ etc. Psychologists will agree with me. Not a hierarchy of methods, but the cooperation of all those methods, the foundations of matter and dialectics in principle. This is not the way to put the question: One method is qualitative, the other quantitative, a third subordinate. I myself am convinced that the experiment will play the same role in pedology as it did in the natural sciences, but I would not like to be “part of the fight” and defend this opinion. We must respect others' scientific work, we must respect our own work and avoid the peremptory condemnation of all methods but our own, and we must not try to prove others' weakness in words, but our own strength in practice. The future will decide whose historical merit in the creation of a genuine Marxist pedology will be more substantial. The task of the present is to use all scientific, ideologically sound methods of good quality while not quarrelling in advance, like bad workers, about who will do most. We must be glad that there are many methods; *There should be still more*; we are poor because there are few methods so far; we must be glad, I say, for otherwise the collective creative work will turn into the slavish execution of one and the same task.

Notes

1. Implicitly (Latin).
2. Paul Eugen Bleuler (1857 to 1939). Swiss psychiatrist who coined the terms “schizophrenia,” schizoid,” and “autism.” Bleuler used the term “psyche” to refer to mental processes and “psychoid” to refer to vegetative processes. In his view, these processes took place in plants and animals as well and were fixed in the “mneme” of each cell (Bleuler 1925). Another psychologist who made ample use of the term “schizoid” was Hans Driesch (see chapter 9).
3. Vygotsky quotes Marx. See chapter 7.
4. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770 to 1831). German philosopher known for his philosophy of the spirit and dialectical idealism. Mechanism, chemistry, and organics are the three increasingly complex forms of existence according to Hegel. The first two were inherent to matter; the biological entered matter as the result of the “lightning of life.”
5. That mind is a property of highly organized matter formed part of the Marxist–Leninist worldview. Cf. 50/72 of Lenin (1968): “Matter is primary. Sensation, thought, and consciousness are the product of matter that is organized in a special way.”
6. Nikolay Ivanovich Bukharin (1888 to 1938). Russian Soviet politician, revolutionary, economist, and journalist. Arrested in 1937 in the case of the “Anti-Soviet bloc of rightists and Trotskyites” and executed after a show trial

- 1 year later. Bukharin (1925) wrote: “Under production relationships I understand the labor *coordination of people (considered as ‘living machines’) in space and time*. The system of these relationships is as ‘*psychic*’ as the system of the planets with their sun. That a place is determined in each chronological point is what makes the system a system. From this viewpoint, all that is psychical in the basis disappears. And the circumstance that psychic elements form the mediating moment, does not for one bit destroy or harm the harmony of our argumentation: any of the superstructures serves as a mediating moment in the process of joint production of societal life” (pp. 365–366, original italics).
7. Eduard Spranger (1882 to 1963). German philosopher and psychologist. Spranger’s dictum *Psychologica psychologicè* implied that psychological phenomena should be investigated with psychological methods. Cf. p. 25 of Spranger (1925).
 8. Vygotsky refers to Bergson’s concept of *élan vital*, or vital impetus, impetus of life, vital force. According to Bergson (1922, p. 265), the impetus of life drives creative evolution and “consists in a need of creation. It cannot create absolutely, because it is confronted with matter, that is to say with the movement that is the inverse of its own. But it seizes upon this matter, which is necessity itself, and strives to introduce into it the largest possible amount of indetermination and liberty.”
 9. René Descartes (1596 to 1650). French philosopher and mathematician, famous for his dualistic theory of mind. Descartes suggested that the mind is nonmaterial, has no extension, whereas the body functions like a machine. Mind and body interacted at the pineal gland.
 10. Vygotsky refers to the bilingual edition of *The Dialectics of Nature* (Engels 1925). The relevant passages are: “Classification of the sciences, each of which analyses a single form of motion, or a series of forms of motion that belong together and pass into one another, is therefore the classification, the arrangement, of these forms of motion themselves according to their inherent sequence, and herein lies its importance. ... But since the general evolutionary connection in nature has now been demonstrated, an external side by side arrangement is as inadequate as Hegel’s artificially constructed dialectical transitions. The transitions must make themselves, they must be natural. Just as one form of motion develops out of another, so their reflections, the various sciences, must arise necessarily out of one another...If I term *first of all* physics the mechanics of molecules, chemistry the physics of atoms, and furthermore biology the chemistry of proteins, I wish thereby to express the passing of each of these sciences into another, hence both the connection, the continuity, and the distinction, the discrete separation, between the two of them” (pp. 529/531). Retrieved from the Internet on September 3, 2015. Cf. https://mecollectedworks.files.wordpress.com/2014/04/marx-engels-collected-works-volume-25_ka-karl-marx1.pdf.
 11. Carl Stumpf (1848 to 1936). German psychologist, philosopher, expert in the psychology of tones, student of Brentano, and teacher of Koffka and Köhler. Stumpf anticipated the main ideas of Gestalt psychology; in his theoretical writings, he distinguished between phenomena (tones, colors, images) and

mental functions suggesting that phenomena are either sensory or imaginary. Vygotsky read the Russian translation of Stumpf (1907), which appeared in Lossky and Radlov (1913). For Vygotsky, the concept of psychological functions was an important issue. In Vygotsky (1930), he argued that the subject matter of psychology was not mental functions nor physiological functions but the unitary psycho-physical phenomenon, which we should call the “psychological function.” In all subsequent writings he seems to have used the term “psychological functions” (cf. Vygotsky 1997, p. 120).

12. Raskolnikov is the protagonist of Dostoevsky’s novel *Crime and Punishment*.
13. The primary abstraction or fundamental concept refers to the way the psychologist conceives of human behavior, e.g., as reflecting responses to environmental stimuli, as the manifestation of unconscious wishes, etc. See p. 238 and further of Vygotsky (1997).
14. Kurt Lewin (1890 to 1947). German–Jewish psychologist, member of the Berlin school of Gestalt psychology with Max Wertheimer, Wolfgang Köhler, and Kurt Koffka. Lewin became famous for his field theory or topological psychology. In 1933, he emigrated to the USA where he became an important figure in social psychology and created new research approaches including action research. Lewin influenced such diverse figures as Lev Vygotsky, Eric Trist, Fritz Perls, and Abraham Maslow. Tamara Dembo (1902 to 1993). Russian psychologist who studied with Buytendijk and wrote her doctoral dissertation about anger under the supervision of Kurt Lewin in Berlin. She emigrated to the US in 1930 and became an expert in the psychology of rehabilitation. Blyuma Wulfovna Zeygarnik (Zeigarnik) (1901 to 1988). Russian psychologist who wrote her doctoral dissertation about the memory for non-interrupted and interrupted tasks under the supervision of Kurt Lewin in Berlin. She returned in May 1931 to Moscow and became part of Vygotsky’s research group. Later she became a specialist in psychopathology. Cf. Dembo (1931), Van der Veer (2000), Van der Veer and Lück (2002), Zeigarnik (1927).
15. The letter is probably a capital “P,” which may stand for “Protopopov.” See Vygotsky’s talk on January 6, 1924, called “The methods of reflexological and psychological investigation” (Vygotsky 1997, pp. 35–49).
16. Erich Rudolf Ferdinand Jaensch (1883 to 1940). German psychologist, one of the founders of the Marburg School, known for his theory of eidetic perception and memory. For some time Vygotsky actively and positively referred to his work (e.g., Jaensch 1923, 1925), but this changed with Jaensch’s growing involvement with national-socialism (e.g., Jaensch 1933).
17. It is unclear to which filmed experiments Vygotsky refers. Different researchers were experimenting with film at the time (e.g., Watson, Gesell, Charlotte Bühler, Lewin). It is theoretically possible that Vygotsky already knew of Lewin’s famous film “Hannah sits on a stone,” which was first shown in Germany in 1927.

References

- Bergson, H. (1922). *Creative evolution*. London: MacMillan and Co.
- Bleuler, E. (1925). *Die Psychoide als Prinzip der organischen Entwicklung*. Berlin: Springer.
- Bukharin, N. I. (1925). K postanovke problemy teorii istoricheskogo materializma. In *Teoriya istoricheskogo materializma* (pp. 359–374). Moscow: GIZ. Izd. 4-e.
- Dembo, T. (1931). Der Ärger als dynamisches problem. *Psychologische Forschung*, 15, 1–144.
- Engels, F. (1925). Dialektika prirody. In D. B. Ryazanov (Ed.), *Arkhiv K. Marksa i F. Engel'sa. V20t.T. 2*. Moscow-Leningrad: Institut K. Marksa i F. Engel'sa.
- Jaensch, E. R. (1923). *Über den Aufbau der Wahrnehmungswelt und ihre Struktur im Jugendalter*. Leipzig: Verlag von Johann Ambrosius Barth.
- Jaensch, E. R. (1925). *Die Eidetik und die typologische Forschungsmethode*. Leipzig: Quelle und Meyer.
- Jaensch, E. R. (1933). *Die Lage und die Aufgaben der Psychologie: Ihre Sendung in der Deutschen Bewegung und der Kulturwende*. Leipzig: Verlag von Johann Ambrosius Barth.
- Lenin, V. I. (1968). *Polnoe sobranie sochineniy* (Vol. 18). Moscow: Politizdat.
- Losskiy, N. O., & Radlov, E. R. (Eds.). (1913). *Novye idei v filosofii. Sb. 4. Chto takoe psikhologiya*. Sint Petersburg: Obrazovanie.
- Spranger, E. (1925). *Psychologie des Jugendalters*. Leipzig: Quelle und Meyer.
- Stumpf, C. (1907). *Erscheinungen und psychische Funktionen*. Berlin: Verlag der königliche Akademie der Wissenschaften.
- Van der Veer, R. (2000). Tamara Dembo's European Years: Working with Lewin and Buytendijk. *Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences*, 36(2), 109–126.
- Van der Veer, R., & Lück, H. (2002). Berliner Gestaltpsychologie in Aktion: Zur Diskussion der Experimente von Tamara Dembo. *Geschichte der Psychologie*, 10, 40–55.
- Vygotsky, L.S. (1928). Instrumental'niy metod v pedologii. In A. B. Zalkind (Ed.), *Osnovnyye problem pedologii v SSSR (po tezisam Pervogo vserossiyskogo pedologicheskogo s'ezda 27/ XII-1927g.-3/I-1928g.)* (pp. 158–159). Moscow: Izdanie Orgbyuro S'ezda.
- Vygotsky, L. S. (1930). Psikhika, soznanie i bessoznatel'noe. In K. N. Kornilov (Ed.), *Elementy obshchey psikhologii: Osnovnye mekhanizmy chelovecheskogo povedeniya* (pp. 48–61). Moscow: Izdanie Byuro Zaochnogo Obuchenieya pri Pedfake 2 MGU.
- Vygotsky, L. S. (1997). *The collected works of L.S. Vygotsky. Vol. 3. Problems of the theory and history of psychology*. New York: Plenum Press.
- Zeigarnik, B. (1927). Das Behalten erledigter und unerledigter Handlungen. *Psychologische Forschung*, 9, 1–85.

Chapter 9

The Instrumental Method

The documents in this chapter date from the years 1927 to 1930 and are connected with the creation of the theory of the higher psychological functions and its method of double stimulation. Publications about this new theory first appeared in 1928 in, respectively, congress proceedings (Vygotksy 1929a), the fundamental article “The problem of the cultural development of the child” (Vygotksy 1928a), and the textbook *Pedology of the school age* (Vygotksy 1928b). The roots of the method of double stimulation go back to the experiments carried out by Vygotksy in Gomel in 1923 (Vygotksy 2013; Zavershneva 2013): Subjects were asked to memorize a list of words with the help of a list of names of famous writers (the so-called “method of loci”). Another source of the method of double stimulation were Köhler’s (1921) experiments with chimpanzees. Köhler’s findings caused quite a stir in psychology, and many psychologists all over the world studied young children to check whether they could repeat or improve the chimpanzees’ performance (cf. Van der Veer & Valsiner 1991). Vygotksy, for example, carried out little experiments with his eldest daughter Gita, who was born in 1925 (Vygodskaya & Lifanova 1996, pp. 276–277). Soon, however, he and his associates switched to the massive study of children and adults in more intellectual tasks. Whereas Köhler provided the chimpanzees with sticks, etc. to see whether the animals could use them as tools in solving practical problems, such as reaching a banana, Vygotksy and his co-workers provided children with objects to see whether they could use them as signs in solving intellectual tasks such as memorizing, decision making, and focusing attention. To study the origins of the higher psychological functions the subjects were provided with two series of stimuli: (1) stimulus-objects, which formed the focus of the subject’s activity; (2) stimulus-means, which could be used as an instrument to organize the subject’s activity. From 1927 Vygotksy and his associates e.g., Sakharov, Leont’ev,¹ Morozova, Zankov) began applying the method of double stimulation and over the years many dozens, if not hundreds, of children and adults of varying age and intelligence were studied with this technique. Unfortunately, many of the results have never been published, and Leont’ev’s (1931) book on the development of memory is the most complete presentation we have. Elsewhere we have argued that Vygotksy’s manuscript, *The history of the development of the higher psychological functions* (cf. Vygotksy 1997), was essentially an elaboration of the article published as Vygotksy (1928a) and that Vygotksy began writing it in 1929 (Van der Veer & Valsiner 1991). Since then, research has continued (e.g., Yasnitsky 2011; Yasnitsky & Van der Veer 2016) and we now believe it possible that the *The history of the development of the higher psychological functions* was a compilation of unfinished manuscripts and articles by later editors and that its earliest parts date from 1928. Clear parallels between the present notes and that possible compilation will be indicated.

Kolya Sv. October 28, 1927

This note, dated by Vygotsky himself, shows that in the latter half of 1927, Vygotsky worked at the Krupskaya Academy of Communist Education and that the method of double stimulation was already in use. It is interesting to note that Vygotsky mentions that the method does not measure memory, whereas Leont'ev used exactly this technique in his monograph *The development of memory* (Leont'ev 1931). This seems to indicate that Vygotsky realized that the active creation of new semantic structures in memorizing requires more than just memorizing (the creation of a new association) but also imagination, attention, and creativity. In other words, Vygotsky may have realized that the higher psychological functions work as a system and that a systemic approach is to be preferred. It would take years, however, before he explicitly formulated the systemic principle. The young boy's attempts to create a link between the provided cards and the words to be memorized were used in *The history of the development of the higher psychological functions*.

NB. Kolya Sv., 9 yrs.

Psychological Laboratory of the KACE²

October 28, 1927

Memory experiments

1. *Free choice of the pictures:*

- (a) death—picture “a camel” (a camel in the desert, the traveller dies of thirst).
- (b) to shoot—picture “a lion.” Reproduction <illegible> (they shot the lion).

2. *Forced choice of the picture (following the card):*

- (a) a spade—picture “the chickens are pecking” (instead of a spade, they use their beak to dig the earth).
- (b) theater—picture “a crab at the seaside” (it looks at the pebbles on the bottom of the sea; that is beautiful, for the crab that is theater).
- (c) to wish—picture “an airplane” (below are people, they *wish* to fly).

Conclusions

1. It is not memory that is being investigated, but the active creation of structures.
2. Excellent structures.
3. The law of Gestalt theory but not association. What is created is not the contiguity of the two stimuli but their structure; the better it is, the better the memorizing.
4. For associationism it is inexplicable that simply “theater–crab” is worse than a structure.
5. Erroneous reproductions—from the same structure.
6. The difference between the processes in forced and free choice: In the first case, you must form, create a structure from two different elements; in the second, you must find the easiest one (all cards elicit older structures—the best one remains).
7. Standardize the pictures!³

The history of the cultural development of the child

This is a note on the back of a form of the Russian Commercial and Industrial Bank (Birzhevaya square, №2/7). Possibly written for a talk about his new cultural–historical theory on April 28, 1928, at the Institute of Scientific Pedagogics at the Second Moscow State University.

April 3, 1928

The history of the cultural development of the child

Epigraph: *Natura parendo vincitur*. Bacon.⁴

To the preface: Behavior can be understood as the history of behavior. Blonskiy.⁵

History in the strict sense of the word, i.e., development without organic change (evolution). There are *two types of development*: evolutionary–biological and historical. These two types also exist within *ontogeny*.

In Marxism, the idea of the superman (Kautsky, Trotsky: Man is chaos, <like> nature and society, he will master himself),⁶ but also on the preceding *levels it is impossible to master nature without mastering oneself*. Each level in the mastery of nature corresponds with a certain level in the mastery of oneself.

Volition (the central idea)

Text written in black ink on stationary of the Osborne Hotel where Vygotsky possibly stayed in summer 1925 (see chapter 6). It is impossible to date the fragment with any accuracy because Vygotsky was in the habit of using paper months or years after it came in his possession. Vygotsky's first publication on volition was an entry in the *Big medical encyclopedia* (Vygotsky 1928c). He there argued that volition is the highest stage of mental development (after instinct, training, and intellect) and that it is about the mastery of one's behavior. Theoretically, however, there was not yet a trace of the sign theory, the casting of lots to make decisions, etc., and the problem was still framed in reflexological terms. The present note seems more recent (cf. the reference to Janet 1929), and the theme of the note is connected with *The history of the development of the higher psychological functions* and subsequent attempts to connect volition, emotion, and thinking into a unified system.

NB. Volition (the central idea) must not be deduced from the coordination and mutual regulation of centers (cortical, subcortical) and processes (the dominant, the subdominant) but from *social relationships that have been transferred inward and have become embodied in the activity of the centers during natural, organic subordination* (a superseded category, executive mechanism, *parendo vincitur*). What kind of relationships are they?

Commands of subordination.

Cf. Blondel: The mechanism of volition and a maximum of obedience coincide.⁷

Written in the margin in pencil: [Nietzsche: the *affect of commanding*.]

[Written on the back of the page:]

Nietzsche (Vol. 9, p. 321)

“Willing” is not desiring, striving, demanding: It is distinguished from these by *the affect of commanding*.⁸

Cf. Janet. The word in the chief and the subordinate, the role of the word in volition.⁹

The instrumental method and volition

This note was written in black ink on one side of a sheet and is thematically connected with Vygotsky talk “The instrumental method in psychology” from 1928 and chapter 12 (“Self-control”) of *The history of the development of the higher psychological functions*. It is Vygotsky’s first writing that introduces the instrument or sign in the context of volition, and it explicitly considers volition as the mastery of one’s behavior with the help of cultural instruments.

NB!

1. Why the Instrumental Method is important for teaching, for the abnormal child, etc.

We find in the instrumental function of sign use the common root of all cultural (=higher) intellectual development. Who is incapable of the instrumental function, is also incapable of arithmetic, language, writing, mnemotechnics and so on, and so forth. Let us call this X, this function, volition, i.e., intellect that has reached such a level that it can be applied to itself.

Cf. Spinoza: *Intellectus et voluntas idem*.¹⁰

2. The root of all investigations of volition is to create a situation where the volitional operation is *necessary*, just like Köhler created a situation in which the intellectual reaction is *necessary*, and adjustment cannot be accomplished without it (refrain from instinct and training).¹¹ This is the “will to remember something” (three years, Stern),¹² the need to master one’s behavior.

The verbal thinking of cultural man

This note, written in violet ink on one sheet, concisely states the basic ideas of “instrumental” psychology. The four stages (natural/primitive, naïve, external, and internal sign use) were first mentioned in Vygotsky (1928a), which was in many ways a manifesto of cultural-historical psychology.

All (verbal) thinking of cultural man is a system of external speech mechanisms ingrown in consciousness, the fourth stage of the instrumental acts. Cf. Compayré¹³: Language is a mnemotechnic tool; memorizing the verbal (the verbal type of memory). Cf. judgment—the mechanisms of thinking = the syntax mechanism of speech (Wertheimer?).¹⁴ Preverbal thinking and pre-intellectual speech is the first stage. *Before* the moment they meet (Stern: the greatest discovery in life)¹⁵—the inability to think with the help of speech—the second stage (to a certain extent until 14 yrs.—before the abstract concepts). *Naive Psychology*.¹⁶ The moment they meet—the third stage, the instrumental method (Ach)¹⁷ (perhaps the shortest stage). Verbal thinking—the fourth stage, when the external mechanisms (speech) become internal (intel[lectualized]). The advantage of speech for thinking is that (1) in

making thinking an external activity, it makes it possible to master thinking, and (2) *most importantly*, by creating external mechanisms subordinated to the will, it makes them grow into consciousness and converts them into internal mechanisms. Man masters himself from the outside and changes his whole inner world. The mistake that must be avoided and which we committed: (1) the instrumental act creates what the natural acts cannot provide, a *neoformation* (rhythm according to Groos)¹⁸; (2) each stage gives something *new* (the new thing of the fourth stage is that an enormous amount of tools is available) and not just in another way.

The fourth stage is the *environment in us*, culture that has been absorbed, language that has become thinking, history within psychology.

The material basis of the intentional act

The note was written in pencil on the back of two sheets with a typed text about “Lev Tolstoy and village children.” Given the references (e.g., Khoroshko 1929) and the theme, it was written approximately 1929 to 1930. Interesting is that the document discusses the concept of word meaning as intention, as referring to an object or its attribute. Although Vygotsky would later change his views, the concept of word meaning remained central to his thinking (cf. Zavershneva 2015).

NB! The material basis of the intentional act is the pointing gesture. The pointing gesture points, *refers*, picks out, directs, fixes our attention on some object or attribute. Intention is (just metaphorically) described in the same manner but, after all, intention is not innate, the infant does not have it (cf. Piaget’s experiments),¹⁹ it originates in the child’s experience. According to the principle of the fourth stage: All the internal comes from the external (cf. <all> reflection from discussion),²⁰ intention from external referring. This explains the particular nature of the phenomenological experience of intention itself as vision through the word, the relation of the word to meaning, the focus on meaning (cf. the role of the index finger).

Conclusions

- (1) In Thorndike²¹: The situation in arithmetic does not take into account that it is a reaction to stimuli that *refer to something, to signs*, via the numbers. *Double stimulation*.
- (2) Thinking in Sakharov’s experiments. It is accomplished by the *fingers* ([by pointing to] the models and to the objects, joining them with two fingers). The task is to pick out the nonsense word (the unrelated word), the primary function of the word is to point to a number of objects and signs.
- (3) The formation of word meaning—not by the *substitution* of an absent phenomenon or attribute but by pointing to phenomena or attributes that are present.
- (4) The content of the psychological experience: develops *from* what the words-signs *refer* to, from what they indicate. Hence, the content revives the situation. The animal has no content but signals.

In general, *there is no content in mind without signs*.

But eidetics?

- (5) Strengthening the *clarity* (catalization) of the experience and its incomplete resurrection (reviving), <illegible> *attribution*, the operation with the sign, analogous to its *turning*. Understanding is *illumination*, a dynamic reaction.
- (6) The transfer in Sakharov's experiments: the role of the word as a sign for attention. Ach: words are *Wegweiser*²² for attention. The word <illegible> indicates the presence of the object and attribute and *illuminates them*.
- (7) Driesch's example,²³ Khoroshko,²⁴ and the psychophysical problem of speech—they solve it incorrectly: *m* and *d*—the difference is *insignificant* but it *points* to different things. *One and the same* finger points to various stimuli. Through pointing, *mein* and *dein*²⁵ introduce different stimuli. There is no need for a vitalistic interpretation.
- (8) A judgment is always only possible with an intention, i.e., with the pointing operation of signs. There can be no practical judgments (there we have trial and *Einfall*)²⁶ as in Hobhouse.²⁷
- (9) The pointing function of the word is analogous to the finger. Only afterwards appears the function of substitution. Pointing+substitution = the function of the word. Pointing to absent objects, cf. Marr.²⁸
- (10) When we use words absent-mindedly, we do not *refer* and for this a separate *act* is needed. "I did not understand what they *pointed out*." Cf. analogous with the finger.
- (11) Verbal syncretism in Piaget—lack of intention: The words are assimilated but not what they refer to. The proverb and the sentence designate the same (=according to their meaning), but the child does not assimilate them, thus, does not see what they indicate, does not relate them.
- (12) Cf. understanding = grasping
intention = content (grasping)
pointing from grasping
grasping = orientation
- (13) Cf. intention in the mentally retarded in a special work.

How to explain ingrowing?

This note was written in pencil on one sheet of paper, and it dates from the period when Vygotsky tried to generalize the results of the experiments with the method of double stimulation, which had been applied by many of his associates and students (e.g., Leont'ev 1931; Zankov 1935). It is interesting to see that Vygotsky makes a distinction between the internalization of a specific tool and the internalization of the type of activity. In decision making, for example, one can always use a specific procedure or instrument (e.g., casting lots), but one can also realize that any random process (e.g., I will divorce him when the first number I see is odd) can help in making a difficult decision.

NB! How to explain ingrowing (the fourth stage)? During the experiments, we saw one and the same: The instrumental act changes when it is repeated.

1. In voluntary choice—casting lots is used less and less and not more.
2. The choice reaction—the cards become unnecessary, the time diminishes.
3. Mnemotechnics—the same, time diminishes.

Result: The tool becomes unnecessary. *The activity turns inward.*

It seems to return to the first stage (natural), but it is *essentially different*: The tool is taken inside (the child *learned* the mnemotechnic card by heart, he casts lots within himself).

Two types: (1) The whole tool is imagined—internal reconstruction of the external experience; or (2) the *type* of activity is mastered (and there are infinitely many tools inside). Example: casting lots.

Arithmetic

An example. The natural observation of quantities, naïve psychology (the child counts on his fingers or aloud, but is not able to use it [the tool]—magic. Gita + <Asik>).²⁹

The child really *counts* on his fingers—the instrumental stage.

Counting for oneself—the ingrowing of this mechanism.

(An example of magic: to Gita—can you repeat the instruction?—runs away).

Only in the beginning, ingrowing fully repeats the instrumental act internally, then abbreviations, a short circuit, and profound changes.

The name that we lack

This note was written in dark-blue ink on three small sheets and presumably dates from 1929. It is the first proof that Vygotsky gave serious thought to the name of his conception. In the note, Vygotsky opts for ‘the historical theory of the higher psychological functions,’ but this was only temporarily. Soon the concept of higher psychological function lost its instrumental character, although it remained in the conceptual framework of the theory. Criticism of the instrument metaphor is already voiced in the present note (“the idea of the analogy with an instrument = just scaffolding, more essential is the dissimilarity”).

NB! The name, the designation that we lack. It should not be a signboard ([as, for example,] intuitivism). *Not* instrumental, *not* cultural, *not* signifying, *not* constructive, etc. Not just because of the mixing up with other theories, but also because of its intrinsic obscurity: For example, the idea of the analogy with an instrument = just scaffolding, more essential is the *dissimilarity*. Culture: But where does culture itself come from? (it is not primary, but this is hidden). *Thus*:

1. the designation of the method: *the method of double stimulation*;
2. of the theory as a whole:
 - a. the psychology of higher functions, i.e.,
 - b. the historical psychology or
 - c. the historical theory of the higher psychological functions.

Because for us the central concept is the concept of the *higher function*. This involves a theory about:

(a) its development, (b) its psychological nature, c) the method of its investigation.

“Historical” because we have metaphysical psychology (mind outside nature), we have biological psychology, but no historical psychology.

*And the essence of the whole idea is in the historical development in the origin and nature of the higher functions. The epigraph to the work as a whole: Engels a) eternal laws + b) the theory itself = in history.*³⁰ “Historical” further refers to the fact that—further I must point out that history does not evolve from mind, but mind from history... *Historism in psychology contra psychologism in history.* Historical psychology is dialectical (development and the basic unity of opposites—man = historical nature, Marx). Historical but not *social*, because [it is] social psychology in another sense: the psychology of society.

Engels’ idea that mind + brain developed is incorrect (cf. Serebrovskiy),³¹ but its true core: The brain has the conditions and the possibility for the historical development of psychology.³² Plekhanov is right when he places *psychology before ideology*³³: For the *new psychological functions* must arise as a *pre-requisite* for the development of ideology.

Our whole doctrine is contained in the phrase: the *historical* theory of the *higher* psychological functions.

(It is a particular and not a *universal* psychological doctrine: a *chapter* about the higher functions but not a psychology *in toto*,³⁴ i.e., particular and not a general psychological theory).

Further: Historical is also applicable to phylogeny and *ontogeny*.

We can also say “the historical theory of the higher psychological functions” in the sense of “*the history of the development of the higher psychological functions*” (for history is theory), thereby designating the whole doctrine.

Functions are questionable in Stumpf’s sense, as purely mental functions, but as *psychological* functions they are indisputable.

Why does not “cultural” do? It is at the same time *narrow* and too *broad* (for not all *cultural* development is covered by our doctrine but [just] the most *important*. *In connection with that*, there are two points:

- (1) How, then, is the part of cultural psychological development that we study (=the theory of the higher functions) different from cultural development as a whole (where is the distinguishing characteristic)? *After all*, essential is what *distinguishes* this part from all the other parts;
- (2) Psychological development in history is not simply a *part* of cultural development as a whole (labor + everything that is not nature) but stands in another relationship to cultural development as a whole than as its part (for example, [it is] partly a pre-requisite).

Thus: Cultural development also rests upon a *hidden analogy*, just like instrumental theory. Here we have an *analogy* with cultural development and not cultural development.

Notes

1. Aleksey Nikolaevich Leont'ev (1903 to 1979). Russian psychologist, student of Chelpanov, from 1931 member of the Kharkov group, and co-founder of activity theory. Leont'ev first was Vygotsky's closest collaborator after Luria, but he gradually steered his own course, which led to an estrangement between the former allies.
2. The Krupskaya Academy of Communist Education. Among Vygotsky's collaborators at the psychological lab were A.R. Luria, L.I. Bozhovich, A.N. Leont'ev, R.E. Levina, N.G. Morozova, L.S. Slavina, and A.V. Zaporozhets. The laboratory was closed in 1931.
3. Kolya's explanations were used as examples by Vygotsky in chapter 10 of Vygotsky (1997). The child's task was to reproduce a long list of words using pictures provided by the experimenter. If successful links were established, the child could list the words by looking at the pictures, although sometimes a good structure (e.g., to shoot-lion) might lead to an erroneous reproduction (e.g., "gun" instead of "shoot"). Vygotsky emphasized that children create entirely new links between the words and the pictures by inventing stories, i.e., by creating new structures.
4. More exact: *Natura non vincitur nisi parendo* (Nature to be commanded must be obeyed) (Latin). See p. 39 of Bacon (1620/1960). One of Vygotsky's favorite quotes.
5. Refers to p. 139 of Blonskiy (1927).
6. See Zavershneva (2012) for an analysis of Vygotsky's references to Kautsky and Trotsky. Trotsky repeatedly claimed that we should improve the human being by cleansing him from all that is chaotic or spontaneous. Our subconscious, our breathing, and even our organs should be brought under conscious and collective control. This theme of overcoming chaos and mastering the self he shared with Vygotsky who often quoted him. Karl Johann Kautsky (1854 to 1938). Czech Austrian journalist and Marxist theoretician who was critical of the Bolshevik revolution.
7. Charles Aimé Alfred Blondel (1876 to 1939). French philosopher, psychologist, physician, and student of Durkheim and Lévy-Bruhl. Specialist in the field of social psychology known for his theory of the social emotions. In his *La Conscience Morbide* (1914), Blondel developed the idea that the disturbed mind is fundamentally different from the normal mind but nevertheless follows social models.
8. Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, aphorism 668.
9. Pierre Maria Felix Janet (1859 to 1947). French psychiatrist and psychologist, expert in dissociation, co-founder of dynamic psychology, and early critic of Freud. Janet exerted considerable influence on French-speaking psychologists (Piaget, Wallon) and on Vygotsky's ideas about the social origin of mind

(cf. Valsiner & Van der Veer 2000). Vygotsky's famous law of sociogenesis, i.e., the idea that intrapsychological processes have their origin in relationships between people, in extrapsychological processes, was borrowed from Janet. The idea that human speech has grown out of commands was developed in Janet (1929).

10. *Voluntas et intellectus unum et idem sunt* (Will and mind are one and the same) (Latin). Reference to the Corollary of Proposition 49 in Part 2 of Spinoza's *The Ethics*.
11. Following chapter 1 of Karl Bühler (1922), Vygotsky distinguished three levels of cognitive functioning: instinct, training, and intellect. Instinctive behaviors are innate and rigid but serve the organism well in a stable environment. Training involves trial-and-error learning such that successful behaviors are reinforced and unsuccessful ones are eliminated. This allows gradual adaptation to changing circumstances. Intellect or intelligent behavior requires reflection and insight and must be resorted to when instinct or trained skills do not provide the solution.
12. It is unclear what Vygotsky refers to. Stern claimed (1927, p. 191) that until the age of 6 years, children rarely have the deliberate intention to learn something.
13. Jules-Gabriel Compayré (1843 to 1913). French pedagogue, psychologist, and politician. Author of numerous books on the history of educational psychology and educational reformers. Vygotsky refers to the Russian translation of chapter 6—called “Memory before and after the acquisition of language”—by Compayré (1896), which was published as Compayré (1912).
14. Max Wertheimer (1880 to 1943). Austro-Hungarian psychologist who moved to the US because of the Nazis, co-founder of Gestalt psychology with Köhler, Koffka, and Lewin.
15. See pp. 135–136 of Stern (1927) or pp. 190–197 of Stern and Stern (1928/1981) where the authors claim that when children discover that “all things have names,” that this is the greatest discovery of their life, and that it implies that they understand the relationship between sign and object. Vygotsky repeatedly discussed this idea, first neutrally (Vygotsky 1928b), then critically (Vygotsky 1929b, c; 1930a, b). With Piaget, he believed that for young children words are not yet signs or symbols but a property of the object. Stern, however, did not deny this. He added (1927, p. 136): “This does not mean that they [the words] get... a purely conventional relationship to the object... No, the name has at the same time a much more original and primitive relationship to the thing: It becomes a property of the thing.”
16. Written in German because the concept of naïve psychology was borrowed from Lipmann and Bogen (1923). Cf. pp. 228–229 of Van der Veer and Valsiner (1991).
17. Narziss Kaspar Ach (1871 to 1946). German psychologist and representative of the Würzburg school. His method to investigate concepts (Ach 1921) was

- adapted by Vygotsky and Sakharov. Cf. chapter 11 of Van der Veer and Valsiner (1991).
18. Karl Groos (1861 to 1946). German philosopher and psychologist, specialist in developmental psychology, known for his theory of play. Chapters 14 and 15 of Groos (1904) were dedicated to concept formation and word meaning in children and were read with profit by both Piaget and Vygotsky. It is unclear where Groos used the concept of rhythm.
 19. Jean Piaget (1896 to 1980). Swiss biologist, developmental psychologist, author of a stage theory of cognitive development, and founder of genetic epistemology. Vygotsky refers to *The Language and Thought of the Child* (Piaget 1923). The Russian translation of Piaget (1923) and Piaget (1924) came out in one volume in 1932 with a long critical introduction by Vygotsky. Cf. Piaget (1932).
 20. That reflection in children finds its origin in discussion between children had been argued by Piaget (1923, pp. 20/74–75) and (English translation) in Piaget (1928, p. 204).
 21. Edward Lee Thorndike (1874 to 1949). American psychologist, educationalist, and author of the theory of connectionism, which was the precursor to behaviorism. Thorndike investigated animal intelligence and helped lay the foundation for educational psychology. Vygotsky refers to Thorndike (1922), in which Thorndike argued that “Reasoning or selective, inferential thinking is not at all opposed to, or independent of, the laws of habit, but really is their necessary result under the conditions imposed by man’s nature and training... no principles beyond the laws of readiness, exercise and effect are needed to explain it... Nothing is less like the mysterious operations of a faculty of reasoning transcending the laws of connection-forming than the behavior of men in response to novel situations.” In his *The History of the Higher Psychological Functions*, Vygotsky opposed this view (e.g., Vygotsky 1997, p. 112/224).
 22. Sign-post (German). Vygotsky refers to p. 310 of Ach (1921): “The name, respectively, the word, is at the same time a sign-post for attention.”
 23. Hans Adolf Eduard Driesch (1867 to 1941). German biologist, embryologist, philosopher, and founder of neovitalism. For a critique of the hypothesis by Driesch and his followers that the child’s early speech is purposeful, see pp. 244–245 of Vygotsky (1997). Driesch (1929) also wrote about the crisis in psychology.
 24. Vasily Konstantinovich Khoroshko (1881 to 1943). Russian neuropathologist, developed a philosophy and methodology of medicine, and introduced Bergson to the Russian public. Khoroshko published many books on the pathology of the central and peripheral nervous system and about the functional relationship between the frontal lobe and mind. Vygotsky probably refers to Khoroshko (1929).
 25. Mine and yours (German). Vygotsky possibly refers to Driesch’s (1920). Driesch used to argue that there is a fundamental difference between the experience of my body and my soul and those of others.

26. Idea, brainwave (German). Perhaps Vygotsky meant to write *Irrtum* (error) as in *Versuch und Irrtum* (trial and error).
27. Trelawny Hobhouse (1864 to 1929). British sociologist, comparative psychologist, social liberal politician, and journalist. In his political writings, he argued that property is acquired not just by individual effort but by societal organization. This implied that those with property had some obligation to others and that wealth could be redistributed through state pensions. Vygotsky refers to chapter 8 of Hobhouse (1901). In that chapter, Hobhouse argued that between the level of a learned association between A and B (which does not require any conscious insight) and the level of a logical, analytical judgment that A and B are related, there is an intermediate level of “practical judgments.” Cf. p. 148: “Thus, seeing one side of the house, I can mentally affix the unseen sides to that which I see, and recollecting, for example, on which side the door is, can direct my steps accordingly. Here the relations of unseen parts to one another and to what is seen are grasped, as before in perception, now in idea, and this is what I mean by the Practical Judgment... It is more than Association, because the relation between the “revived” idea and the given perception is an essential part of it, and it is less than analytic thought, because the relations involved are not dissected out as distinct elements in consciousness.”
28. Nikolay Yakovlevich Marr (1865 to 1964). Russian orientalist, historian, archeologist, linguist, and ethnographer. Author of the Japhetic theory, which stated that the Kwartelian languages (e.g., Georgian) are related to the Semitic languages. This theory received official support and became propagandized as the only truly Marxist theory. Ivanov (1976, p. 66) has claimed that Vygotsky, Marr, Luria, and Eisenstein planned to open a scientific laboratory for the study of film language. In the text, Vygotsky refers to an idea that can be found in Marr (2001, p. 181): “Once the possibility had been considered that the sound complex, the element, could signalize albeit one object, whatever it was, invisible or abstract, there was no longer any hindrance to think about the transition from linear to sound speech; the path was discovered for the creation of a new language that could express invisible objects, including absent and abstract ones.”
29. “Asik” presumably was a friend of Gita’s, Vygotsky’s oldest daughter, and not her younger sister Asya, who was born in 1930.
30. Refers to Engels’ statement in the *Dialectics of Nature* that the “eternal laws of nature become more and more historical as well.” Cf. p. 505 of Engels (1925/1978).
31. Aeksandr Sergeyeovich Serebrovskiy (1892 to 1948). Soviet geneticist and author of a theory of gene geography. Serebrovsky was a Marxist and fierce opponent of Lamarckism, who participated in philosophical debates in the press. In his paper, “An attempt to characterize the process of organic evolution qualitatively” (Serebrovskiy 1929), he rejected Engels’ theory about the origin and development of humans.

32. Here “psychology” does not refer to the science but rather to mind or mentality.
33. Citation from Plekhanov’s (1908) *Main Questions of Marxism*, which was republished many times: “All ideologies have one common root—the psychology of the given era.” (cf. Plekhanov 1957, p. 180).
34. As a whole, overall (Latin).

References

- Ach, N. (1921). *Über die Begriffsbildung: Eine experimentelle Untersuchung*. Bamberg: C.C. Buchners Verlag.
- Bacon, F. (1960). *The New Organon and related writings*. New York: Macmillan Publishing Company.
- Blondel, Ch. (1914). *La conscience morbide: Essai de psychopathologie générale*. Paris: Félix Alcan.
- Blonskiy, P. P. (1927). *Psikhologicheskije ocherki*. Moscow: Novaya Moskva.
- Bühler, K. (1922). *Die geistige Entwicklung des Kindes*. Jena: Verlag von Gustav Fischer.
- Compayré, G. (1896). *L'évolution intellectuelle et morale de l'enfant*. Paris: Librairie Hachette et Cie.
- Compayré, G. (1912). *Umstvennoe i nnavstvennoe razvitie rebenka*. Moscow: Izdanie M. i S. Sabashnikovyxh.
- Driesch, H. (1920). *Leib und Seele: Eine Untersuchung über das psychophysische Grundproblem*. Leipzig: Verlag von Emmanuel Reinicke. (second, revised edition).
- Driesch, H. (1929). *Grundprobleme der Psychologie: Ihre Krisis in der Gegenwart*. Leipzig: Reinicke. (second edition).
- Engels, F. (1978). Dialektik der Natur (pp. 307–572). In *Karl Marx. Friedrich Engels. Werke. Vol. 20*. Berlin: Dietz Verlag.
- Groos, K. (1904). *Das Seelenleben des Kindes: Ausgewählte Vorlesungen*. Berlin: Verlag von Reuther und Reichard.
- Hobhouse, L. T. (1901). *Mind in evolution*. London: Macmillan and Co.
- Ivanov, V. V. (1976). *Ocherki po istorii semiotiki v SSSR*. Moscow: Nauka.
- Janet, P. (1929). *L'évolution psychologique de la personnalité*. Paris: Chahine.
- Khoroshko, V. K. (1929). Metod psikhologicheskogo profilya v prilozhenii k izucheniyu povrezhdeniy i funktsiy lobnykh doley golovnogo mozga. *Zhurnal Nevropatologii i Psikiatrii im. Korsakova*, 3–4, 315–326.
- Köhler, W. (1921). *Intelligenzprüfungen an Menschenaffen*. Berlin: Julius Springer.
- Leont'ev, A. N. (1931). *Razvitie pamyati. Eksperimental'noe issledovanie vysshikh psikhologicheskikh funktsiy*. Moscow-Leningrad: Uchpedgiz.
- Lipmann, O., & Bogen, H. (1923). *Naive Physik*. Munich: Verlag von Johann Ambrosius Barth.
- Marr, N.Ya. (2001). Yazyk. In V.P. Neroznak (Ed.), *Sumerki lingvistiki. Iz istorii otechestvennogo yazykoznaniya* (pp. 177–187). *Antologiya*. Moscow: Academia.
- Piaget, J. (1923). *Le langage et la pensée de l'enfant*. Neuchatel: Delachaux et Niestlé.
- Piaget, J. (1924). *Le jugement et le raisonnement chez l'enfant*. Neuchatel: Delachaux et Niestlé.
- Piaget, J. (1928). *Judgment and reasoning in the child*. New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Company.
- Piaget, J. (1932). *Rech' i myshlenie rebenka*. Moscow-Leningrad: Uchpedgiz.
- Plekhanov, G. V. (1957). *Izbrannye filosofskie proizvedeniya* (Vol. 3). Moscow: APN SSSR.
- Serebrovskiy, A. S. (1929). Opyt kachestvennoy kharakteristiki protsessa organicheskoy evolyutsii. *Estestvoznaniye i Marksizm*, 2, 52–73.
- Stern, W. (1927). *Psychologie der frühen Kindheit*. Leipzig: Quelle & Meyer.
- Stern, W., & Stern, C. (1981). *Die Kindersprache*. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft.

- Thorndike, E. L. (1922). *The psychology of arithmetic*. New York: The Macmillan Company.
- Valsiner, J., & Van der Veer, R. (2000). *The social mind: Construction of the idea*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Van der Veer, R., & Valsiner, J. (1991). *Understanding Vygotsky: A quest for synthesis*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Vygotskaya, G. L., & Lifanova, T. M. (1996). *Lev Semyonovich Vygotsky: Zhizn', deyatel'nost', shtrikhi k portretu*. Moscow: Smysl.
- Vygotsky, L. S. (1928a). *Problema kul'turnogo razvitiya rebenka*. *Pedologiya*, 1, 58–77.
- Vygotsky, L. S. (1928b). *Pedologiya shkol'nogo vozrasta*. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo BZO pri Pedfake 2-go MGU.
- Vygotsky, L. S. (1928c). Volya i ee rasstroystva (pp. 590–600). *Bol'shaya Meditsinskaya Entsiklopediya*, Vol. 5. Moscow: GIZ.
- Vygotsky, L. S. (1929a). Anomalii kul'turnogo razvitiya rebenka. *Voprosy defektologii*, 2(8), 106–107. (Tezisy doklada na zasedanii Otdela Defektologii Instituta nauchnoy pedagogiki pri 2-m MGU 28 aprelya 1928 g.).
- Vygotsky, L. S. (1929b). Geneticheskie korni myshleniya i rechi. *Estvestvoznaniye i Marksizm*, 1, 106–134.
- Vygotsky, L. S. (1929c). [Review of] C. & W. Stern. *Die Kindersprache*. *Estvestvoznaniye i Marksizm*, 3, 185–192.
- Vygotsky, L. S. (1930a). Strukturnaya psikhologiya. In B. Fingert & M. Shirwindt (Eds.), *Osnovnye techeniya sovremennoy psikhologii* (pp. 84–125). Moscow-Leningrad: GIZ.
- Vygotsky, L. S. (1930b). O svyazi mezhdru trudovoy deyatel'nost'yu i intellektual'nym razvitiem rebenka. *Pedologiya*, 3(5–6), 588–595.
- Vygotsky, L. S. (1997). *The collected works of L.S. Vygotsky. Vol. 4. The history of the development of the higher mental functions*. New York: Plenum Press.
- Vygotsky, L.S. (2013). Eksperimental'noe issledovanie vospitaniya novykh rechevykh refleksov po sposobu svyazyvaniya s kompleksami (logicheskoy pamyati). *Voprosy Psikhologii*, 3, 119–124.
- Yasnitsky, A. (2011). Vygotsky circle as a personal network of scholars: Restoring connections between people and ideas. *Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science*, 45(4), 422–457.
- Yasnitsky, A., & Van der Veer, R. (Eds.). (2016). *Revisionist revolution in Vygotsky studies*. London: Routledge.
- Zankov, L. V. (1935). *Ocherki psikhologii umstvenno-otstalogo rebenka*. Moscow: Uchpedgiz.
- Zavershneva, E Yu. (2012). Investigating the manuscript of L.S. Vygotsky's 'The historical meaning of the crisis in psychology'. *Journal of Russian and East European Psychology*, 50 (4), 42–63.
- Zavershneva, E Yu. (2013). Prototip metodiki dvoynoy stimulyatsii: Pervoe eksperimental'noe issledovanie L.S. Vygotskogo (Gomel', 1923). *Voprosy Psikhologii*, 3, 125–142.
- Zavershneva, E Yu. (2015). Dve linii razvitiya kategorii "smysl" v rabotakh L.S. Vygotskogo. *Voprosy Psikhologii*, 3, 116–132.

Chapter 10

Concepts and the Systemic Approach

This chapter contains notes written from 1929 to 1931 connected with the introduction of the systemic principle into cultural–historical theory. In Vygotsky’s publications, this principle was first discussed in his article “About psychological systems” (October 1930), but the present series provides the broader historical context of Vygotsky’s rethinking of the concept of higher psychological function. Instead of the function, it is now the inter-functional connections that become the focus of attention. Various systems develop in various stages of development, but the vector of development can be given as follows: The primary, innate connections between the functions that first form an undifferentiated mass are destroyed, and with the help of the sign (primarily, the word) new, artificial, flexible connections are created, which form a system that can be deliberately steered and in which one function dominates and guides the others. The highest development is reached after the adolescent crisis when the dominating function becomes conceptual thinking.

Toward 1930, the problem of personality and its role in the formation of the psychological system came to the fore (cf. “The concrete psychology of man,” 1929). No less important was the theme of the development of thinking: Vygotsky generalized the system principle to the question of the nature of concepts. The documents of this series show the evolution of Vygotsky’s views on the formation of conceptual systems, their connection with speech, the person, and volitional factors. In a sense, these notes prepared the way for the writing of the newer parts of Vygotsky’s most well-known work: *Thinking and Speech*.

Concept and volition

This note was written in pencil in fall 1929 when Vygotsky worked on his manuscript, “The concrete psychology of man” (September 1929). The emphasis is on the connection between volition and concept formation and not on the person as a unifying agent (see later text). Subsequently, these ideas were developed in the talk, “On psychological systems” (Vygotsky 1997a, pp. 91–107) and in *Pedology of the adolescent* in connection with the concept of hypobulia (Vygotsky 1998, pp. 125–127).

1. Concept and volition. The magical act is a form of volition in the domain of volition that corresponds with complexive thinking in the domain of the intellect.

2. There is inactive love, i.e., love which has not been put in the position of the Kafir's dream.¹ The same conviction.
3. The disturbance of volition in schizophrenia is not hypobulia, the play of impulses, as in hysteria,² [but it resides in] shifts in the mechanisms "<illegible> *J'en rêverai*"³: The motor system is mastered by another leading function. <...> Who thinks like *that*, will act like *that*.

Vocational capacity: judges, etc.⁴ = possess a number of dynamic mechanisms <illegible> "*J'en rêverai*." To study the same via the volitional function, etc.

In the changes of the visual field (=in the distortions, the errors) is a grain of practice (=changes of reality).

For us, concepts are the processes of establishing connections, thinking.

[Written in the margin in ink:]

Sakharov and I have a *central idea*: not abstraction, <but> the establishing of connections leads to concept formation.

On the question of concept formation

This note was written in violet ink on the back of three pages of the announcement of the opening of a new ambulatory clinic for children with nervous and mental diseases and mental retardation at the Institute of Child Psychology and Neurology (Bol'shaya Gruzinskaya street, 22). The announcement was written in pre-revolutionary spelling. The name of the document was added in ballpoint pen by an unknown person. The note dates from the period when Vygotsky was re-interpreting the results of the concept formation research performed with the Sakharov–Vygotsky method (presumably mid 1930). The results are still interpreted in the framework of instrumental theory, and the words "sense" and "meaning" have restricted interpretation, but the outlines of the systemic viewpoint become visible.

The breakdown of the process into frames.

Uznadze.⁵

The functional method: Each time the course of the experiment changes.

1. The difference with Ach's method. Not an advantage in general but for us. <...> The experimental word, the experimental concept.
2. The dialectical and formal–logical concept.
3. Goldstein⁶: To have the concept or the word is one and the same.
4. Natural processes (attention, abstraction, etc.), but the sign is for the product.
5. The concept develops in the process of an intellectual operation. Not association. A unique combination of all elementary intellectual functions.
6. Meaning is given ready-made. The conditional-reflex function of the word is secondary, and the indicative function is primary.
7. The significative function is not primary. A *Grundfunktion*⁷ of a physiological order—Goldstein.
8. Meaning is intention, referring. Freedom.

The volitional factors of thinking. *Meaning is an ideal construction: sinnlos*⁸ from the viewpoint of the concrete situation.

A question: How does the visually perceived become sense or meaning? How is this meaning extended, *transferred—in a figurative sense*: cf. the Paris Commune, a Pugachevian rebellion?⁹ All words were originally meant metaphorically in ontogeny and phylogeny.

What is a heap, a complex—participation, a concept?¹⁰ The relation of the general to the particular—according to criterions. *But behind this stands the different functional use of the word*, [which is] genetically necessary: the proper name, the family, the concept.

[Written in the margin:]

Eliasberg, the visual concept.¹¹

How did the schema justify itself? What are our mistakes: Pure types do not exist. No diagnosis.

[Written on the back:]

Content and form.

Proceed from the adult: The higher form is the point of departure. The vast diversity of forms of thinking [is caused] by the general concepts.

Questions: A. N. [Leont'ev]

1. A doubt: The degree of activity of the subject who is elaborating a concept is insufficient. The concept develops in the process of concept use. *True: Concepts do not exist outside thinking*. A remnant from Ach. The concept “is formed” is incorrect: The person forms the concept. The person *steers* his attention, abstraction, memory etc., with the help of the sign.
2. Thinking aloud—This method changes the behavioral process. We must pay attention.

True: This is our version of Ach's functional moment,¹² not a message.

We do not accept Watson's [concept of] speech as a means to discover what is hidden. *Speech is not glass*.¹³ Speech is a second series of signs that change perception, action, and thinking. This is the answer to the *first question about activity*: *Tsev, lag*,¹⁴ *are included in the system of Russian speech (of active verbal thinking)*; XYZ—in the system of abcd; n, t—in the system of thinking.

The practical conclusion. This solves the problem of introspection: It is *not a verbal account*.

Most important: We do not have *tsev, lag*, etc., but we have these words in the system of verbal thinking!!! The subject, while thinking aloud, includes *tsev* and *lag* in the processes of problem solving.

A. R. [Luria]

1. A series of stages: concept formation before our eyes.
The new meaning of the genetic method; cf. Werner: All processes develop.

Are the dynamics of the stages different for children, adults, persons from a different social background?

What are the laws of the genesis of the concept—the factual and the logical course of the stages.

Skipping.¹⁵

2. [If we] abstract from the role of the word. Without *tsev* and *lag*, how will the process proceed then?

A process of a totally different character or a hidden one; cf. memorizing without cards.

The natural analogue of concepts—Jaensch, Lévy-Bruhl.¹⁶

Our subjects do not use the word all the time; we will see what comes out of this.

With aphasiacs, with children.

The laws of the stages (we have *no* classification) are for us the historical laws of concept formation (not eternal laws of nature: For Goldstein it is a basic physiological function). The laws of the formation of concepts are the laws of the history of concepts.

Gr. Ef.¹⁷

The analogue of what exists in scientific thinking. The complex is a hypothesis that steers the course of the processes of attention and abstraction. A cell of thinking.

The prototype of concept development is there in ontogeny and phylogeny: In the course of an hour, the subject covers the path of mankind and man.

And at the same time: the higher forms of scientific thinking.

The higher and history in one experiment. cf. Blonskiy: In the daily behavior of the person, we see the reflection of levels created in millenniums.

[Written in the margin in pencil:]

The most important: contra Goldstein.

For Goldstein the most important is [this]: The significative function is a basic *physiological* function. That is, concept formation is excluded from cultural development. The concept is a brain function, i.e., an innate eternal law.

[The text is continued in pencil:]

But for us the concept is a historical category and not a biological category in the sense of a function that produces it. cf. Primitive people have no concepts (Lévy-Bruhl). The aphasiac shows the same in the field of *thinking as the primitive*, i.e., a lowering to a lower level of cultural, historical development of behavior and *not to what we see in animals*, i.e., a lowering to a lower biological level: cf. the Babinski reflex,¹⁸ a symptom of the disinhibition of lower brain centers, a return to archaic ancient functions in biological evolution. But the concrete thinking of the aphasiac is a symptom of a return to primitive functions in the historical evolution of behavior.

The historical and the contemporary theory of concepts

Note written around 1930 on four sheets in green ink (or black ink that lost its color). Its main source is Bergson's (1911) *Matter and memory*, which Vygotsky may have read in French because we could not find the exact equivalent of his quotations in the Russian translation (Bergson 1914). In criticizing Bergson, Vygotsky refers to Lenin's *Philosophical notebooks* (1930). Similar texts from Lenin can be found in *Pedology of the adolescent*, in *Thinking and speech*, and in other posthumously published works (Vygotsky 1935; Samukhin, Birenbaum, and Vygotsky 1934). The idea of the zig-zag-like nature of the free semantic action would become more prominent toward the end of 1933 to the beginning of 1934 (cf. Zavershneva 2015). The manuscript also contains what seems to be the first formulation of the notion of the generality of concepts, which Vygotsky would subsequently discuss in chapter 6 of *Thinking and speech*. Because of the references to Bergson, whose ideas are no longer widely known, and to Lenin's incoherent notes, this is a rather dense text.

NB! All historical and contemporary theories of concepts vary between two extremes: (1) to ascribe concepts to animals (Bühler,¹⁹ reflexology?), to reduce them to a differential reflex, a motor reflex, a motor habit, orthoscopic vision, etc., and (2) to reduce them to pure mind. Since the times of Plato, the general and its carrier, the concept, have not been considered as things of nature but as things of the mind (=general ideas).

Cf. S. A. Alekseyev²⁰ (Askol'dov, *Epistemology*. Publishing House "Science and School." Petrograd 1919, p. 7): "Plato's basic idea is irrefutable: Because our general concepts insofar as they are true have objective content, we must accept the existence of the universal (the ideal or the existence of ideas) next to the particular things."

[Note in the margin:] Cf. Shestov: concepts in animals.²¹ See Kroh: abstraction in animals.²²

Cf. also Lenin in connection with Aristotle's critique of the Pythagorean theory of numbers (and Plato's theory of ideas) as being isolated from perceptible things: Generalization is the root of idealism (Lenin's *Notebooks*, XII, pp. 370–371): "Primitive idealism: The universal (concept, idea) is a *particular being*. This appears wild, monstrously (better: childish) stupid. But is not modern idealism, Kant, Hegel, the idea of god, of the same nature (*absolutely* of the same nature)? Tables, chairs, and the *ideas* of table and chair; the world and the *idea* of the world (God); thing and "noumen," the unknowable "thing-in-itself"; the connection of the earth and the sun, nature in general—and law, logos, God. The dichotomy of human knowledge and the *possibility* of idealism (=religion) are *given already in the first, elementary abstraction* ("house" in general and particular houses). The approach of the (human) mind to a particular thing, the taking of a copy (=a concept) of it *is not* a simple, immediate act, a dead mirroring but one which is complex, split into two, zig-zag-like, which *includes in it* the possibility of the flight of fantasy from life; more than that: the possibility of the *transformation* (moreover, an unnoticeable transformation, of which man is unaware) of the abstract concept, idea, into a *fantasy* (in the final analysis = God). For even in the simplest generalization, in the most elementary general idea ("table" in general) *there is* a certain bit of *fantasy*."²³

[The continuation of the quote on the backside of the page is encircled:]

“Vice versa: It would be stupid to deny the role of fantasy, even in the strictest science: cf. Pisarev on useful dreaming, as an impulse to work, and on empty daydreaming.”²⁴

A philosophical discussion is inevitable when we investigate such a psychological problem as the problem of concepts. Ach’s subject says: *This is experimental philosophy*.²⁵ Our investigation turns into experimental philosophy as well. And therefore it is necessary to trace the beginnings and the ends, the sources and the continuations of the processes we investigated *sub specie philosophiae*.²⁶ And these beginnings and ends rest upon philosophy. Hence, the inevitable philosophical excursions (cf. psychopathology, on the other hand, shows that the concept is the key to all human, genuinely human: the perception of reality, the person’s self-awareness). Thus, from this theory of concepts clearly depart two lines: one to the theory of freedom contained in the concept (in the idea); the other to Bergson’s theory of concepts.

The first line: We cannot put it more clearly; the concept already contains all freedom, just like the cell contains the whole body. cf. Köhler: Animals are slaves of their visual field.²⁷ The concept = the recognition of necessity = freedom.²⁸ If the elementary concept contains the *possibility* of idealism, this means that it includes the rational core of idealism, i.e., freedom (the break with life—the *flight*—the liberation). [If] there is a certain bit of fantasy in the general concept, this means that there is [also] a bit of freedom (cf. in my work: freedom – <aphasia>, in Cassirer also fantasy).²⁹ The theory of the intellect’s indirect, zig-zag-like, twofold approach in the taking of a copy (a concept) implies: *toward* the real thing and *away from* it, i.e., toward the dialectics of *necessity and freedom*, i.e., the unity of the particular and the universal, of the thing and the idea. It *includes* the flight from life (i.e., toward freedom). *The genuine meaning of idealism, which turned concepts into isolated beings (numbers, ideas), free from material necessity, consists in the theory of the freedom that is contained in the most elementary concept* (just like the rational core of the theory of the freedom of will is the recognition of necessity). (According to Lenin, idealism is not just nonsense. cf. his *Notebooks*, XII, p. 361). *Thus: the central idea:* In the simplest generalization, in the most elementary general idea there is a certain bit of fantasy = freedom. In the concept, *there is* freedom.

The rational analogue of the idealist theory of concepts (they are not things but ideas) is the theory of the freedom from the thing contained in concepts (=in the idea of the thing). This is the genuine meaning (and a great one!) of Plato and of all idealism.

Idealism is not nonsense: “Philosophical idealism is *only* nonsense from the standpoint of crude, simple, metaphysical materialism. From the standpoint of *dialectical* materialism, on the other hand, philosophical idealism is a *one-sided*, exaggerated *überschwengliches*³⁰ (Dietzgen) development (inflation, distention) of one of the features, aspects, facets of knowledge into an absolute, divorced from matter, from nature, apotheosized” (p. 361). What is this real feature, aspect, facet of knowledge in the idealist theory of concepts? For Plato and Pythagoras, concepts

are separate essences. Is this *just* nonsense, untruth? *No*. For Lenin: In concepts, *there is* a bit of fantasy, which is *necessary* in the zig-zag-like act of human knowledge. But is fantasy just nonsense? Again *no*. It is *necessary* in the concept, not as a necessary evil, the product of delusion, etc., but for the *whole zigzag* (*toward* the object and *away from it*). cf. Lenin: Science needs fantasy. cf. Pisarev, *Blunders of immature thought* (1864): “My dream may explain the natural course of events, or it may fly off in a direction where no natural course of events ever can occur... (If man could not dream and anticipate, he could not undertake and finish strenuous work). If there is some connection between dream and life, then all is well. Then either life gives into the dream, or the dream disappears when confronted with the facts and arguments of life” (p. 343).

Thus: The idealists in the theory of concepts saw a bit of fantasy, just like Lenin. But their dream may fly off in a direction, etc. and Lenin understood the *danger* and the *benefit* of this bit of fantasy. What is it? *The freedom that is included in the concept*.

The second line. But however that may be, one thing is beyond doubt: precisely *the general ideas*, the concepts include the possibility of plus the real support for idealism. That is why we must pay particular attention to everything that makes the endeavor rational; we must explain the origin of general concepts in a non-idealist way. (But alas! In doing so, concepts are ascribed to animals. If it is not spirit, then it is animals). Here we see an unexpected move. He [Bergson] does not found his idealism *on general concepts* but on *particular memory images*, which he regards as genuine spiritual things. This is his central idea. That is why he is original compared to the Platonists and—o, paradox!—unmasks the idealist theory of concepts from a materialist viewpoint. It is *essential* to understand his theory according to the scheme:

- (1) ++³¹ concept formation=the joint work of mind and body (the bodily aspect of the general idea is stressed) (p. 207): The motor habit extracts the similarity (p. 208), the *need* and its role in concept formation; the *concept as a natural thing*: the concept in itself [and] for itself: p. 207—hydrochloric acid.³² The individual concept only via the general one, the beginning is not the individual and neither the general: p. 214. *Two* roots in concept formation: true, but *which* two: here— —.

[Written in the margin:]

Cf. Groos' potential concepts. The potential concept is the concept *in itself*.

For Bergson: the memory of matter = a motor habit (here also speech and its role) + the memory of mind (=individual images). That is, concepts are a function of memory and not of thinking. Thinking and the role of the word are neglected. A fundamental delusion. In reality, *totally* different psychological mechanisms participate in concept formation.

- (2) – –For Bergson not general ideas, but memory images = the kingdom of the mind. And the general idea *is* the movement *from mind to matter*: *ergo* idealism. cf. While for Plato the general idea = mind, for Bergson it is: an individual image = mind. But because the *individual* is the *internal part of the*

- concept, of the general*, for Bergson, in the concept there is spirit (idealism). Bergson *does not see* the unity of the general and the particular in the concept.
- (3) He reduces the role of the word to the automatic motor habit (p. 208), which extracts similarity (a depreciation of the role of the word in concept formation: It is true, the word organizes a number of motor processes and elementary processes, but he does not see the *logos in the word*. For Bergson: The word is a secondary aspect, *an imitation of nature's reason* (this is the major minus, p. 208); it does not participate in the higher nature of the concept but forms its natural basis. For Bergson, the *supranatural* (=the historical) role of the word is unclear because he is anti-historical. In Bergson's own terms: For him the concept = a mixture of spirit+ matter, freedom + necessity. But for him the word is necessary and nature, and for us it is freedom.

We can concisely formulated it this way: For Bergson, the word and its participation in the process of concept formation is reduced to the purely *natural aspects of the concept* (cf. the analogy: hydrochloric acid—motor habit—word), but for us it is the historical aspect (i.e., the supranatural) in the concept. It (the word) creates in the concept what distinguishes it from its natural analogue, from the potential concept, from blind habit, from the concept in itself, i.e., it creates its higher nature, which Bergson deduces from the spirit. For him the word is exclusively a means to generalize. This Bergson took from Hegel (cf. Stolpner).³³ cf. Lenin, conspectus of Hegel, Notebooks XII. “*This individual cannot be expressed*” (Hegel). “*Every word already universalizes*” (Lenin) p. 272.

And further: “*In language there is only the universal*” (Lenin).

Hegel: “*Language in essence expresses only the universal; what is meant (meint), however, is the special, the particular. Hence what is meant cannot be said in speech*” (p. 275).

Lenin: “*It*”? The most universal word of all. [p. 275]

[Written in the margin:]

Cf. Marr. *The first word designated everything*; cf. myself about the role of the pointing gesture in the development of the word and in generalization.

Everyone is “*this*.” [p. 275]

But Lenin contra Hegel and I contra Bergson: “*Why can the particular not be named? One of the objects of a given kind (tables) is distinguished by something from the rest*” (p. 275). If the word could be subsumed under a *single* concept, Hegel would be right, but [there is] the possibility to say: The round card-table that stands there, etc. That is, the inclusion of the object in an *intersecting network* of concepts, of which it is the center, allows the word to name the particular.³⁴

The essence of everything:

Bergson's claim that the word cannot address the individual follows from the fact that the particular = spirit and the general = matter. The idea (=the concept) moves from spirit to matter. *But, in actual fact, the unity of the general and the particular in the concept rests upon the word*, for even Bergson himself [says]: The individual is known via the general. In Bergson, the individual and the general are first torn apart and then united again.

Contra Bergson + Hegel (the word only expresses the general):

- (1) In itself, Bergson's memory of the spirit (dates, individuality, the historical memory of what once was) is possible as Janet showed on the basis of cultural memory (perhaps concepts?). cf. Bergson about mnemonics. The memory of the spirit is not a primary but a secondary phenomenon. Itself it is only possible as a synthesis of verbal memory with the memory of images.
- (2) In and of itself the reconstruction in memory of the individual image (the immediate data of consciousness) *without* the word and *outside the general* (i.e., outside the concept) does not have the sign of individuality. cf. the experience of *déjà vu*, etc.

Bergson himself: The individual is not primary and presupposes knowledge of the general. But instead of taking the individual + the general *in the unity of the concept*, Bergson tears them apart and compels the concept to *move* from one pole to the other and forgets that these poles cannot exist independently: The particular without the general is as unthinkable as the right without the left. Furthermore: Just like in the motor habit what a number of stimuli potentially have in common \neq a general concept (the similarity \neq a concept \neq the general), the *individuality of the memory image* outside the concept is an unconscious, blind individuality: cf., for example, the return of a traumatic situation in neurosis: i.e., "this" objectively belongs to the individual, but its individuality is not realized without the word.

Bergson is right: The past is created in two forms: motor habits and images. But *both* forms are equally immediate and *play* the past—without dates, without individuality. Eidetics—the purest form of the memory of images—shows, contra Bergson, that:

- (1) The memory image *is* weakened perception.
- (2) This image lacks dates, individuality, and a relation to a certain historical time point, i.e., to all the properties of Bergson's memory of the spirit. And these properties—in so far as they are real and not primary—owe their origin to the word, verbal memory, thinking, intellect, concepts, etc.

Giftedness

This is a note written toward the end of 1930 in green ink on the back of three pages of an unidentifiable French article on intelligence research with the twin method. The document has similarities with chapter 14 of *The history of development of the higher psychological functions* (Vygotsky 1997b) but also with Vygotsky's French paper for the Fifth International Congress of Psychotechnics in Barcelona (23 to 27 April 1930). From his correspondence with Emilio Mira y López,³⁵ we know that Vygotsky never arrived in Barcelona, but his talk was published in the proceedings, and he also (in July) submitted the Russian version to *Psychotechnics and the Psychophysiology of Labor*, where it was published that same year (Vygotsky 1930a, b). In the present note, Vygotsky refers to his critique of Thorndike and then states his own view of giftedness as a "formation of a higher order, analogous to characterological formations." The document is remarkable in that it

uses the expression “zone of proximate possibilities,” which seems to anticipate Vygotsky’s later concept of the zone of proximal development. Presumably, it reflects an informal meeting where Vygotsky presented his criticism of Thorndike’s viewpoint to collaborators and Ph.D. students and advanced his own view of giftedness.

1. *Giftedness, Intelligenz*,³⁶ and *Begabung*.³⁷ I cannot understand what they talk about when they contrast it with memory. *Intellect*.
- [In the margin:] *Translations*: 1. intelligence, 2. wits, 3. giftedness, 4. intellect.
2. Thorndike’s and Blonskiy’s *theory* of the teleological,³⁸ dynamic, general factor. Structural theory. Special gifts.
 3. *Investigations. Nature and nurture*³⁹: twins and their study—simple and complex formations of intellect and character. Löwenstein.⁴⁰
 4. Theory (of Stern and others) ↔ practice (of Binet⁴¹ and others)
 5. *Previously* giftedness was equated with one or the other particular function (=memory for Ebbinghaus)⁴²; nowadays we return to the same viewpoint (cf. Thorndike: intellect = giftedness; Blonskiy: intellect = conditional reflexes; Spearman: plasticity⁴³; Lipmann: practical intellect and gnostic intellect.
 6. Contra: Thorndike’s monistic tendency—from the earthworm up to the American student.⁴⁴ cf. the article in *Psychotekhnika*. The correlations *inter se* + the lower and the higher. The internal contradiction: (1) everything = associations, i.e., A, (2) habits in arithmetic ≠ solving problems.
 7. The *diagnostics* of development and the practical conclusions + its pathological forms: a single or a five-factor⁴⁵ syndrome of high IQ and low IQ. Contra Blonskiy’s symptomatic diagnostics (against *Difficult school children*).⁴⁶ What are Binet’s mistakes? Mistakes of interpretation. The dynamics of the high and the low IQ.
 8. The *tasks* of constitutional diagnostics: (1) Blonskiy; (2) Kretschmer; The viewpoint of differential psychology + the viewpoint of age. Mental development in its individual formula.
 9. NB! *Discussion*: Giftedness = thinking. But thinking = not verbal thinking. Speech and thinking do not coincide. Torn away from practical activity. *The low IQ of the farmer’s child = the low IQ of the retarded child*: This is the central *error of symptomatic pedology*. It is incorrect to proceed from memory, attention, and thinking; we [must proceed] from *practical* activity.

Written in the margin: [*Molozhavy*.]⁴⁷

Are two weeks instructive?⁴⁸ Thinking in the *concrete experience of the child*. The change of the content in Binet’s tests. We cannot ignore *analysis*. The laboratory study is admissible: *What* does “natural” mean according to Lewin?⁴⁹ *Not attention, thinking as a psychological function*, but understanding the practical activity: *Ortenberg*.⁵⁰ Are nonverbal and verbal tests different? identical? [To present] a task that *appeals* to the child—who will doubt it. Everyday orientation = giftedness. *Giftedness is not a psychological function* but understanding practical activity.

Written in the margin: [*Practicism. Disarmament in methodology. Orientation.*]

[Boxed in the left margin:]

What is Stern's error? If socio and bio, then it can be easily corrected.

The encephalitic is a counter-example; Milyavskaya⁵¹: Not capable of working means not talented. Theoretical works he will not produce.

Written in the margin: [Productivity.]

[Boxed in the left margin with "NB!":]

Cf. *on age*: Eliasberg—Children are smarter than adults, smart naivity, the explanation was quite simple.

Cf. *Blonskiy*. "Just intellect" does not exist—correct but incorrect: the single syndrome of IQ.

Cf. *Séguin*: The idiot is lonely, he does not will, mental retardation = volition.⁵²

10. *Most important:*

[Boxed in pencil with four vertical lines in the left margin:]

The zone of proximate possibilities.

The distinction between extracting and processing matter.

Quantity–quality. Differentiation–integration.

What is Stern's mistake: (1) vitalism, the conception of forces, (2) development; (3) theologism, (4) thinking concisely, etc.

Giftedness is a characterological concept of intellect applicable to other aspects of the personality, for example, to the affective aspect of the personality.

11. To understand giftedness, we must take two points into account that determine giftedness: intellect and personality (the suffix in *intelligence*—cf. "...ness").

[Boxed in pencil in the left margin:]

Intellect as a personality trait: the characterological conception of intellect.

Possibly the same in other contexts: cf. *Pedagogical psychology: Love requires talent.*⁵³

Highlighted with a vertical line in the left margin: [*Sehr wichtig!*⁵⁴]

Giftedness is not a trait of intellect (depth, power, capacity), not its aspect or condition (germ). Neither is it intellect as a whole, nothing *new* in the center. It is intellect from the viewpoint of personality. cf. the development of giftedness with age—the relationship between the personality and intellect changes and, to be exact: There is something like a *proper* development of giftedness, which neither coincides with the development of intellect, of the intellectual functions, nor with the development of the personality in a broad or a narrow sense (the feeling of "I," etc.).

The systemic viewpoint of giftedness.

Cf. *Stern*: The essence is not thinking but its disposal, its mastery, its use, i.e., the personality characteristic of intellect.

[The end of the sentence is highlighted with a vertical line in the left margin:]

Here Milyavskaya is right: Giftedness is not determined by the height of isolated functions, it is not a function but a *formation of a higher order*, analogous to characterological formations.

Our conception of giftedness in the *Studies* (essential is the mastery) essentially states the question of the *practical* use of the intellectual functions as a unique *psychological practice*, the intellect in the activity of the person: the use of one's natural gifts, the *complex dynamics and structure*.⁵⁵ *Everything can be replaced*. Binet: This guarantees unlimited development. Binet's calculator.⁵⁶

[The next passage is marked with a vertical line in the left margin:]

Therefore, the key to the complex structure of giftedness lies in development: how it developed.

There are, essentially, two ways out of the deadlock of giftedness: either *creative activity*, i.e., productivity (talent and genius), or what I say, i.e., intellect in the personality, the aspect of creativity is included in the second statement of the question, and the first one hangs in the air.

Questions: Thorndike and I—how do we differ.

Memory and cultural development.

Functions and giftedness.

[Added in pencil:]

NB! Character traits from the viewpoint of giftedness: *productivity* of the traits of the child's character (sociability, reticence, in the negative stage).

Cf. we all have attention.

Sociability as well, but giftedness differs.

About systems

This note was written in blue ink on 10 catalogue cards that are similar in size and form to library cards. It was written around the time of Vygotsky's talk, "About psychological systems" (October 1930), but goes considerably further. It contains one of the first formulations of the system principle and introduces the concept of the person as the unifying agent of the higher psychological functions.

NB! About systems

Not a psychology of partial (autonomous) operations of separate functions or processes (cf. it is not the muscle that works, but the person; contra the psychology of processes, Politzer)⁵⁷ of the type *Es denkt*, as if it were physiological processes. The whole problem is that logical analysis—the end point of every phenomenological introspective analysis that takes the link between the phenomena of consciousness for the link between causal–dynamic essences (this is why it is so difficult to separate logic from psychology in phenomenology)—does not establish the progress, the course, but the result of the process. Plums drop into your mouth in psychology (Feuerbach).⁵⁸ *This is the whole point*. A classification and a system of functions is created in a purely logical fashion and on the basis of the *results*: attention, memory, etc.

*Inde*⁵⁹: Attention as a result is identical in emotional "attention" (to what caused the fear, anger, or passion) and in [solving] a problem of geometry. But the course

of the process that led to the result is absolutely different. Then they equate two heterogeneous processes on the basis of their similar result and postulate their identity, distinguishing voluntary from involuntary attention, but thinking that it is the same thing expressed differently. The same with memory, etc. The unity in the activity of the functions was postulated and accepted as an empirical fact, but the connections and relationships of the functions were not studied. But the whole point is that two phenotypically similar processes can be absolutely heterogeneous from the genetical–conditional side (Lewin), one and the same result can be reached along different paths, all functions can be simulated and replaced by ones that seem similar and have the same end result but are heterogenous in nature (Binet), etc. Thus, there are no fixed functions (prescriptions): the preservation of experience (memory), selection (attention), etc. by the processes. On the other hand, our mouth breathes, eats food, takes part in conversation, etc. But this is just a *comparaison qui n'est pas raison*.⁶⁰ It is a peculiarity of *psychological* operations (there is no link with an organ or a constancy of the function). This is the error of functional psychology (Claparède),⁶¹ which distinguishes and identifies processes (for example, emotions and feelings) from the viewpoint of their function, on the basis of the result, and implicitly postulates the fundamental similarity of psychological and physiological functions, incidentally, which function in the system of biological adaptation? But then it is absurd to ask about historically developed functions. This is the basis of the systemic viewpoint. Not the psychology of operations, “of thoughts that are thinking themselves” (Belyy),⁶² but the operation itself acquires its meaning and function in the whole of which it forms a part (thinking in memory, etc.); perhaps, therefore, the term “function” is incorrect. Actually, I’m sure it is. A function is an organ in action.

Hence, about *all* psychological activity we can say that it is a function of the brain. But that is a metapsychological designation. The intrapsychological designation must be another one. Which? The system is the basic concept of psychological analysis. Memorizing always fulfills some function in something more complex and changes when it is a part of different wholes. The eternal problem: *Ich denke* or *Es denkt*.⁶³ Who is thinking? Consciousness and its owner.

The postulation and hypostatization of consciousness in the study of the functions (Stumpf). The fact that the personal pronoun was ignored—that mind was as a matter of principle placed on the same footing as the physical world-gravity = associations, atoms = sensations. Even *Gestalttheorie* ignores the concrete person. In the systemic viewpoint, this eternal dilemma—atomism or spiritualism—finds its essential and unexpected solution in a third possibility.

The dilemma is rejected as false. *Tertium datur*,⁶⁴ at least this time. The answer: the function (operation, activity) in the system. We always covertly assumed the person in the mediated processes. Systems are the key to the person. In any case, the person does not consist of functions but of systems: The person has no organic but a supra-organic structure. The organic forces are combined in a synagogical⁶⁵ unity of a new sort and a higher order.

On the problem of systemic investigation

The note was written around 1930 in green (or faded black) ink and is dedicated to the problem of the development of practical intelligence in connection with the development of speech. Vygotsky discusses the analogue of complexive thinking in the solution of practical problems, and the text includes a drawing of one of the problems: a disk with weights attached at various distances from the center). It is possible that the figure illustrates a study by Vygotsky's collaborator, Lidiya Bozhovich,⁶⁶ which was begun in 1929 and lasted for approximately 3 years (cf. Bozhovich 2006).

NB! On the problem of systemic investigation

1. *Hegel*: What is given in impression as particular, is given in the word as universal.

My usual: Every word meaning is a hidden generalization, *the development of meanings*—and *their role* in the structure of consciousness and thinking as a whole—resides in the development of a structure and a method to generalize and in the fact that the experience of reality and oneself is given at different stages in different systems of connections and relationships. Leont'ev applies this to the problem of practical intellect. The idea is that practical intellect in early (preverbal) stages is a function, [whereas] in later stages it is a psychological *system*. The role of the word is in the *generalization* of one's intellectual operations, in the *transfer*; this is the essence of Lipmann's physical structures, which are impossible without the word.⁶⁷

Ergo the *transfer* of practical intellectual reactions is an important indicator of the *system*: Without the word they are one thing; with the word they are another thing and vary in the different stages of the development of word meaning: syncretism, complexive thinking, and concepts. cf. the experiment with the disk: The child equilibrates the *symmetrical* radius with an equal load, i.e., he considers both *distance* and *weight*, but for the physicist this is a *special case* of a more general rule, which is beyond the child, who has no generalization in his concept: He transfers to another opening, another radius, etc., but not to nonsymmetrical radiuses. This is a typical example of complexive thinking in practical thinking.⁶⁸

[In the left margin is a drawing of a disk and the forces that work on it:] For each radius there are two openings where weights can be attached [see Fig. 10.1].

2. The collision of optic and physical structures: With a pulley, a weight must be lifted in order to lower the goal; we must push something away in order to bring it nearer; the transfer of various types, etc.



Fig. 10.1 The forces working upon a disk

3. The moving contradictions of psychological development: the fact that the problems (=the environment, what must be remembered) do not correspond with the methods and the functions (=how to remember). See Leont'ev and I myself in the *Adolescent*.⁶⁹ But *apart from that* and more *importantly*: the problems and requirements presented by one function to the other, for example, by thinking to memory, attention, etc. That is, the changing interfunctional connections, the systems, their contradictions contain a contradiction [sic] as a source of development. We have shown that this is possible but not mandatory in development when lower functions develop into higher functions. New is: the self-movement in the development of the higher psychological functions + the new aspect in the life of systems—the internal contradiction as a source of development, the system as the driving force of development (the unity of the motive (the motor) and the function (mechanism) in the system).⁷⁰
4. Why does speech move the action out of its dead end? Because it generalizes and thereby liberates the action.
5. Correction: Recall my talk about form and content. It is absurd to think that the general structure and the *psychological nature* (composition, structure, way of functioning, development) of some function (for example, an intention) is its form, and a particular case, a concrete variety (the intention to kill a woman, to write her a letter, etc.), is its content. It's rather the opposite. Or it is the relationship between the abstract and the particular, the concrete, but not between between form/content. *Form = types* of psychological activity.
6. But *pro* Leont'ev: Piaget's child for a long time has these "how" in his thinking (methods, forms) because [they are] not *problems* for his thinking (=not working hard is, according to Piaget, the main trait⁷¹; cf. our child, cf. Stolpner's introspection—he was smarter with 7 years).
7. Psychological development is *not the shadow* of historical development.

[Added in pencil:]

Experiments

The first series

A. Köhler: to reach the goal with a stick.

B. The stick is attached with a string wrapped around a pin on the table but not fastened; The stick is short and will slide off by chance after some manipulation.

C. The same but the string is fastened, and careful, serious, thoughtful deliberation is required in order to free the stick.

The third problem can only be solved when the action is copied in words.

The second series

A disk—see above.

The third series

A pulley: to *lift* a weight in order to *lower* the goal.

The fourth series

To push the lever away in order to bring the goal nearer.⁷²

The introduction of the concept of the third link

This note was written in violet ink on two pages of a small notepad and presumably dates from 1930 to 1931. It contains criticism of instrumental psychology as conceived in the years 1927 to 1929. Vygotsky now turned from the study of the external structure of the sign operation to its internal structure: meaning.

NB! The introduction of the concept of the third link in the instrumental (sign) operation, the mediating between the sign and the object (=meaning), is in particular *necessary* from the viewpoint of the *whole* problem of internal sign use and ingrowing. It is often said that the *concept* in internal processes mediates thinking about objects and, consequently, is an internal sign. *This is totally wrong.* It is also incorrect [to state that] that the internal form of the word (=its representation or soundless utterance), is a sign in the *same* sense as the external word. In general: (1) the internal transference of the sign in ingrowing is not a mechanical process, but its [the sign's] use *sui generis*⁷³; (2) in the internal mediated processes the role of meanings is enormous, and they reveal the *function of the sign in its internal use* (cf., for example, logical memorizing: after all, there is no internal card; what we have is the construction of meanings. True, with the help of words, but words serve memory via their meanings, which the knot does not do).

2. We have defended the thesis: Psychologically, speech (the word) is a sign (a knot). That is correct. But not every sign is a word. That is, a word is a sign *sui generis*, which has *everything* that the sign has in general but also its *own*, which the non-word sign does not have. So far we studied what sign and word have in common; now we must study *what is specific for the word*. Because on the basis of the experiment, we *transferred the function < of critique > to the word* (i.e., all signs were experimentally created prototypes of the word). For example, in his book Leont'ev studies verbal memory through cards. But the real word has always meaning.

Notes

1. Refers to p. 172 of Lévy-Bruhl (1922/1976), where he discussed an account by reverend Macdonald about the Magololo (Makololo) people in Southern Africa. Vygotsky referred to this passage at various occasions and discussed it at some length in *Pedology of the Adolescent* (cf. Vygotsky 1998, p. 183): "The missionaries insist that the chief of the tribe send his son to school and he answers them: "I will dream about it." Lévy-Bruhl rightly says that the answer of the leader of the primitive tribe completely expresses the state of his psychology. A European would have said: "I will think about it," and the Magololo leader answers: "I will dream about it." Thus, we see that in such a primitive person the dream fulfills the function that thinking fulfills in our behavior... Hence the different personality structures that manifest themselves in the interconnections between the separate functions. That is why we say "I dream"; the Kafir would have to say: "I see a dream."

2. Ernst Kretschmer (1888 to 1964). German psychiatrist who is famous for his theory of character based on body types. Kretschmer (1920; 1927) interpreted hypobulia as a lower level of volitional function. In his view, the negativity, impulsivity, and catalepsy of patients with hysteria were hypobulic symptoms. In *Pedology of the Adolescent* (Vygotsky 1998, pp. 124–126), Vygotsky quoted Kretschmer (1920, p. 260): “Everyone carries in himself not only his hysteria, but also his aphasia and his schizophrenia, that is, those stages we left behind but that were preserved in a superseded, hidden form and will reveal themselves again in disease... The hypobulic type of will represents an ontogenetically and phylogenetically lower stage of the purposeful will.”
3. “I will dream about it” (French). See previous text.
4. “The social role (judge, physician) determines the hierarchy of functions: i.e., *the functions change the hierarchy in different spheres of social life. Their collision = a drama. cf. my scheme of interests... judge* (professional complex)... As a person I sympathize, as a judge I condemn” (Vygotsky 2005, pp. 1031–1032).
5. Dmitriy Nikolayevich Uznadze (1876 to 1950). Georgian psychologist and philosopher and author of the theory of set. Vygotsky made ample use of Uznadze’s German publications about his concept formation research (1924; 1929; 1930), which was also inspired by that of Ach (1921).
6. Kurt Goldstein (1878 to 1965). German Jewish neurologist, representative of Gestalt psychology, co-founder of psychoneurology, who was forced to emigrate to Holland and, eventually, to the US by the Nazis in 1933. Vygotsky followed Goldstein’s work carefully and referred to several of his publications, e.g., Gelb & Goldstein (1920, 1925), Goldstein (1924), and Goldstein & Gelb (1920).
7. Basic function (German).
8. Meaningless (German).
9. Vygotsky probably means that the Paris commune was not literally a commune but a short-lived revolutionary government and that other insurrections have been called “Pugachevian rebellions” after Yemelyan Pugachev’s (1742 to 1775) revolt against the tsarist government. Hence, these terms are used metaphorically.
10. Refers to the stages in concept formation first described in *Pedology of the Adolescent* (1931) and republished in chapter 5 of *Thinking and Speech* (1934).
11. Wladimir Gottlieb Eliasberg (1887 to 1969). German Jewish psychotherapist and psychiatrist who moved to the US in 1938. Vygotsky probably refers to Eliasberg (1925), in which Eliasberg presented children of different ages and various groups of adults (e.g., aphatics, people suffering from dementia) with colored sheets. Cigarettes were hidden under one or more colors, and the subject’s task was to discover all sheets with cigarettes. For a description, see p. 194 of Vygotsky (1997b).
12. Ach’s functional moment. Refers to pp. 120–125 of Ach (1921) where Ach, under this heading, argues that in the course of the experiment the subject changes the direction of his attention and becomes more focused on task characteristics that are essential for problem solution.

13. Original footnote: “See my talk at the congress.” This possibly refers to Vygotsky (1930a, b); see also note 39. According to Vygotsky, “Stern assumed that speech as a neutral medium (glass) via *itself* permits us to perceive without changing it [perception] in any respect. But experiments with play showed that perception is *changed* by speech” (see chapter 15). Cf. p. 29 of Vygotsky (1999) where Vygotsky shows that it makes a difference whether a child is asked to describe a picture in words or to show the picture by pantomiming what is depicted.
14. Names of artificial concepts used by Sakharov, Kotelova, Pashkovskaya, and Vygotsky to investigate concept formation in children and adults (cf. chapter 11 of Van der Veer & Valsiner 1991, and chapter 6 of Van der Veer & Valsiner 1994).
15. Possibly in the sense of “skipping a stage.”
16. Lucien Lévy-Bruhl (1857 to 1939). French philosopher and anthropologist; with Durkheim, founder of the French sociological school. He became famous for his study of primitive mentality, which he believed to be pre-logical. “Lévy-Bruhl has performed an indisputable service in that he was the first to advance the problem of the historical development of thought. He demonstrated that the type of thought in and of itself is not a constant quantity, but historically changes and develops” (Vygotsky & Luria 1993, p. 87).
17. The initials are difficult to decipher, but most probably Vygotsky refers to Grunya Efimovna Sukhareva (1891 to 1981). Soviet psychiatrist, defectologist, and founder of child psychiatry in the USSR. Sukhareva specialized in schizophrenia and oligophrenia, introduced a number of nosological categories, and, for example, first described the autistic spectrum disorder in children long before the classic works of Kanner and Asperger.
18. A reflex elicited when the sole of the foot is stimulated with a blunt instrument. An upward response of the big toe is normal in infants, but the response can be used to identify disease of the spinal cord and brain in adults.
19. Karl Ludwig Bühler (1879 to 1963). German psychologist and linguist, co-founder of the Würzburg school, who emigrated to the US in 1938. Bühler was one of the most profound theorists of his time, and Vygotsky read his books with profit. Bühler’s observation, i.e., that children learn concepts in everyday life and that word meanings only become fully clarified and fixed in scientific thinking, was empirically studied by Vygotsky. See p. 380 of Bühler (1922) for an elaborate example of an everyday concept as well as a scientific concept. The term “orthoscopic vision” refers to the tendency to see or draw things as they are and not as they appear to the eye (e.g., the tendency to disregard perspective distortion or to draw parts that are known to exist but remain invisible in a particular situation).
20. Sergey Askol’dov (real name Sergey Aleseyevich Alekseyev) (1871 to 1945). Russian religious philosopher who developed the theory of pure experience as the basis of knowledge, which in itself cannot be known.

21. Lev Isaakovich Shestov (real name Yehuda Leib Schwarzmann) (1866 to 1938). Russian existentialist philosopher. Vygotsky refers to his *Potestas clavium* (*The power of keys*): “The capacity to see what objects have in common is not at all an exclusive human capacity: all animals perceive what objects have in common and the lower ones to a greater degree than the higher ones. For the wolf or lion a lamb is just food; and in this sense all lambs are just lambs in general... I’m not even talking about the lower organisms for whom obviously only the most general representations exist: food and non-food.” (cf. Shestov 2007, p. 64)
22. Oswald Kroh (1887 to 1955). German child psychologist, follower of Jaensch. cf. the fragment in *Thinking and Speech*: “Kroh seems to have been fully justified in opposing the widely accepted assertion that abstraction appears for the first time in adolescence. He maintains that the isolating abstraction can already be found in animals” (Vygotsky 1987, p. 158). This refers to p. 21 of Kroh (1928), which was republished in Ariamov, I. (Ed.) (1931), *Pedologiya Yunosti*. Moscow: Moscow–Leningrad: Uchpedgiz. By “isolating abstraction,” Kroh meant the ability to order things using one of their properties (e.g., size or color) and ignoring the others.
23. Here and in the following Vygotsky quotes from Lenin’s *Philosophical Notebooks* (1976), which consist of Lenin’s amateurish scribbles in the margins of the books he read.
24. Lenin quotes from *Blunders of Immature Thought* by the Russian literary critic and writer Dmitriy Ivanovich Pisarev (1840 to 1868). The same passage was quoted in more detail in Lenin’s (1902) *What is to be done?*
25. Refers to p. v in the preface of Ach (1921).
26. From the philosophical viewpoint (Latin).
27. Refers to a remark on p. 19 of Köhler (1930): “They are much more the slaves of their sensorial field than adult humans.”
28. Freedom is the recognition of necessity. Also: freedom is the insight into necessity. The quotation is from chapter 11 of Engels’ (1877) *Anti-Dühring*.
29. Ernst Cassirer (1874 to 1945). German philosopher, student of Hermann Cohen, and representative of the Marburg School of Neo-Kantianism. Cassirer argued that man is a symbolic animal. Whereas animals perceive their world by instincts and direct sensory perception, humans create a universe of symbolic meanings. This was a view sympathetic to Vygotsky, and in *Pedology of the Adolescent* and *Tool and Symbol in Child Development* he used examples taken from Cassirer (1929, 1977). See Van der Veer & Valsiner (1994) for details.
30. Exaggerated, excessive (incorrect German); the word was borrowed by Lenin from Peter Joseph Dietzgen (1828 to 1888), a German socialist philosopher and journalist.
31. This should be read as two plus symbols, whereas point 2 lists the two minuses (– –) of Bergson’s approach.
32. Here and in the following Vygotsky refers to Bergson (1911, pp. 208–209), who argued that “Hydrochloric acid always acts in the same way upon carbonate of lime... yet we do not say that the acid perceives in the various species

the characteristic features of the genus... In short, we can follow from the mineral to the plant... from the animal to man, the progress of the operation by which things and beings seize from out their surroundings that which attracts them... without needing any effort of abstraction...: this similarity of reaction following actions superficially different is the germ which the human consciousness develops into general ideas... In order to generalize, we said, we have to abstract similarity, but in order to disengage similarity usefully we must already know how to generalize. There really is no circle, because the similarity, from which the mind starts when it first begins the work of abstraction, is not the similarity at which the mind arrives when it consciously generalizes. That from which it starts is a similarity felt and lived; or, if you prefer the expression, a similarity which is automatically acted. That to which it returns is a similarity intelligently perceived, or thought.... This idea of generality was, in the beginning, only our consciousness of a likeness of attitude in a diversity of situations; it was habit itself, mounting from the sphere of movement to that of thought. But from genera so sketched out mechanically by habit we have passed, by an effort of reflexion upon this very process, to the general idea of genus; and when that idea has been once constituted, we have constructed (this time voluntarily) an unlimited number of general notions... the understanding, imitating the effort of nature, has also set up motor apparatuses, artificial in this case, to make a limited number of them answer to an unlimited number of individual objects: the assemblage of these mechanisms is articulate speech.” From this we can conclude that Bergson defended a viewpoint not unlike the one defended by Shestov (see above), i.e., that the capacity to feel or see what individual objects have in common is a very basic one. Vygotsky argued that the word (i.e., language) adds something basically new to this process and is distinct from its natural precursors.

33. Boris Grigor'evich Stolpner (1871 to 1937). Russian philosopher who first translated Hegel into Russian. Stolpner was born in Gomel and befriended Vygotsky (Vygodskaya & Lifanova 1996, pp. 192–193).
34. This may be the first formulation of the idea of the degree of generality of concepts (cf. chapter 6 of *Thinking and Speech*).
35. Emilio Mira y López (1896 to 1964). Spanish psychologist and psychiatrist who studied the connection between mental and physiological states (e.g., muscle tone). After the civil war, he had to emigrate and eventually made a second career in Brasil. In a letter of March 22, 1930, Vygotsky asked to be part of the congress program; in a letter of May 10, 1930, he included his text, stated that he had not been able to come, and asked that the proceedings with his published text be sent to him.
36. Written in German. See Vygotsky's translations.
37. Talent, intelligence, giftedness (German).
38. Earlier Meumann had claimed that Stern's definition of intelligence as “general adaptability to the new problems and conditions of life” was teleological, so Vygotsky probably had something similar in mind.

39. Written in English. The expression “nature vs. nurture” was introduced into scientific parlance by Francis Galton (1822 to 1911).
40. Otto Löwenstein (1889 to 1965). German pediatrician who specialized in the genetics of psychiatric diseases. In 1933, he left Germany and eventually emigrated to New York. Vygotsky refers to Löwenstein (1929), in which he measured simple and complex intellectual skills in identical twins.
41. Alfred Binet (1857 to 1911). French psychologist, student of Charcot, and specialist in hypnosis and suggestion. Author of the first intelligence scale with Simon. Vygotsky was particularly fond of his book on chess players and human calculators (Binet 1894), in which Binet defended the idea that higher psychological functions can be simulated (cf. Van der Veer & Valsiner 1991).
42. Hermann Ebbinghaus (1850 to 1911). German psychologist, who studied for years the memory of his single subject and enriched psychology with the forgetting curve and the nonsense syllable. His monography, *Über das Gedächtnis* (1885), exerted a profound and lasting influence on memory research.
43. Charles Spearman (1863 to 1945). British psychologist known for his work in statistics and intelligence theory. Spearman claimed that the score of a person at a mental test can be divided into two factors, one of which is always the same in all tests (the general factor or G), whereas the other varies from one test to another (the specific factor or s). In statistics, Spearman is known for his work on rank correlation and factor analysis.
44. According to Vygotsky, Thorndike claimed that intelligence could be measured on a single scale “from the earthworm up to the American student.” This refers to p. 342 of chapter 10 of Thorndike, Bregman, Cobb, & Woodyard (1927), called “The absolute zero of intellectual difficulty” where the authors discussed the need for a ratio scale of intelligence and suggested that the intelligence of the earthworm may be close to zero. The rest of point 6 is Vygotsky’s cryptic discussion of chapter 15 of the same book. The authors argued that “the higher forms of intellectual operation are identical with mere association or connection forming, depending upon the same sort of physiological connections but requiring *many more of them*.” (p. 415) In order to check that hypothesis, Thorndike and his colleague J. W. Tilton calculated correlations between scores on tasks supposedly measuring higher abilities and tasks supposedly depending on mere association. Their conclusion was that the “higher” abilities correlate as closely with the associative abilities as the higher do *inter se*, or as the associative do *inter se*.” (p. 424) Vygotsky did not accept this conclusion because he did not believe that Thorndike’s so-called lower, associative tasks measured just associations. In addition, he believed that his own research and that of others had proved the existence of several, qualitatively different, levels of intellectual functioning. See the much longer criticism of the viewpoint of Thorndike and his colleagues that appeared in the journal *Psikhotekhnika i Psikhofiziologiya Truda* (Vygotsky 1930a) and in the French version of this paper in the proceedings of the Barcelona congress (Vygotsky 1930b).

45. This may be a reference to five intelligence factors that Thorndike, Bregman, Cobb, & Woodyard (1927) distinguished. They spoke of Intellect CAVD or CAVDI, where “C” was the ability to supply words so as to make a sentence true; “A” was the ability to solve arithmetic problems; “V” was the ability to understand single words; “D” was the ability to understand connected discourse; and “I” was the ability to understand and answer questions about cultural facts.
46. Cf. Blonskiy (1930).
47. Stepan Stepanovich Molozhavyi (1879 to 1937). Russian pedagogue and pedologist, representative of the sociogenetic school, and one of the leaders of the pedological movement in the SSSR.
48. Possibly Vygotsky refers to the conventional time interval between a first and second testing of a child with the Binet–Simon scale.
49. Vygotsky refers to Lewin (1926), in which Lewin discussed, among other things, in what sense experiments should be realistic (*Lebensnähe*) and the difference between a phenomenal and a causal–dynamic analysis of behavior.
50. We are unable to establish to whom or what Ortenberg is referring.
51. In a notebook from 1932, there is a list of students at the Herzen State Pedagogical Institute in Leningrad along with the grades they each scored. The list mentions “Milyavskaya, presch. X.” where “presch[ool children]” was the theme of her thesis and “X” (“good”) the grade.
52. Édouard Séguin (1812 to 1880). French physician and pedagogue, specialist in mental disabilities, established a systematic program to educate the “feeble-minded” at Salpêtrière Hospital in Paris and later emigrated to the US. Vygotsky frequently referred to Séguin’s idea that the cause of retardation was an underdevelopment of volition and to his observation that the word “idiot” literally means “a lonely person.” See, for example, § 14 of chapter 3 of Vygotsky & Luria (1930) or, in an English translation, p. 222 of Vygotsky and Luria (1993).
53. Refers to p. 115 of Vygotsky (1926) or, in an English translation, to p. 108 of Vygotsky (1997c).
54. Very important! (German).
55. Refers to the very last pages of *Studies on the History of Behavior* (Vygotsky & Luria 1930), in which Luria argues that giftedness consists first and foremost in the capacity to rationally use one’s innate abilities using cultural means.
56. Refers to the phenomenal human calculators discussed in Binet (1894). Cf. p. 230 of Van der Veer & Valsiner (1991).
57. George Politzer (1903 to 1942). Hungarian–French philosopher and Marxist who criticized contemporary schools of psychology, notably psychoanalysis. His main argument was that traditional psychology analyzed the person’s concrete actions from a third-person viewpoint as if they were objective faculties or functions (cf. Politzer 1928). However, mental functions do not marry, nor do the frontal lobe or the limbic system. Vygotsky referred to Politzer’s statement on p. 182 of Vygotsky (1998). Politzer may have been inspired by Feuerbach, who wrote: “It is not thought that is thinking but man” (cf.

- Vygotsky 2006, p. 1028). On the other hand, Vygotsky tended to stress the difference between the active thinking of adults and the passive behavior of animals and infants. In that context he quoted, for example, the aphorism of Georg Christoph Lichtenberg (1742 to 1799), the German physicist and satirist: “Es denkt, sollte man sagen, so wie man sagt: es blitzt.” (“We should say ‘it comes to my mind’, just like we say ‘it is lightning.’” (cf. Vygotsky 1997a, p. 289). Lichtenberg’s text can be found in Lichtenberg (1844 p. 99).
58. Plums will not drop into your mouth. In other languages (e.g., German, Russian, French) the saying is “Fried pigeons/larks/geese, etc. do not fly into your mouth” See pp. 213–214 of Feuerbach (1955).
 59. Thence (Latin).
 60. A comparison is no proof (French).
 61. Edouard Claparède (1873 to 1940). Swiss neurologist, child psychologist, and pedagogue married to the daughter of the Russian philosopher Afrikan Spir. Claparède distinguished feelings from emotions, claiming that feelings reflect adaptive adjustment, whereas emotions develop in situations where adaptation is difficult.
 62. Andrey Belyy (real name Boris Nikolayevich Bugayev) (1880 to 1934). Russian novelist, poet, literary critic, and author of *Petersburg*. Vygotsky refers to chapter 64 of Belyy (1922).
 63. I am thinking; it thinks (German).
 64. A third possibility is given (Latin); derived from “tertium non datur” (no third possibility is given); also called the law of the excluded middle (either the proposition, or its negation, is true).
 65. “Synagogical” here means “combined,” i.e., “developing together and in connection with each other” (from the Greek *syn* (συν)–together, and *ágō* (ἄγω)–bring, lead; cf. the Greek *συναγωγή*, *synagoge*–assembly).
 66. Lidiya Il’inichna Bozhovich (1908 to 1981). One of Vygotsky’s collaborators, e.g., at the Krupskaya Academy of Communist Education. In the late 1920s, Bozhovich studied, among other things, children’s imitation.
 67. Vygotsky refers to Lipmann & Bogen (1923), who studied practical intelligence in children. The authors concluded that human children to some extent (i.e., naively but not theoretically) understood the physics of the problem situation, whereas the behavior of apes is determined by their visual field (cf. Van der Veer & Valsiner 1991, pp. 228–229).
 68. Cf. part 4 of Bozhovich (2006).
 69. Cf. his *Pedology of the Adolescent*: “As the adolescent develops, in conjunction with his maturation and the change in his environment, he is confronted by the task of mastering new content, and strong stimuli are created that nudge him along the path of developing the formal mechanisms of his thinking as well. The new content, which confronts the adolescent with a series of problems, leads to new forms of activity, to new forms of combining elementary functions, to new methods of thinking” (Vygotsky 1998, p. 42).

70. We owe the idea of self-movement as the result of inner contradictions to Lenin's reading of Hegel. Anderson (1995) argued that Lenin's ideas actually mean something.
71. This refers to Piaget (1928, p. 203), in which Piaget argued that children are like savages "impervious to experience" because "the child never really comes into contact with things because he does not work. He plays with them, or simply believes them without trying to find the truth."
72. These experimental conditions were inspired by pp. 23–26 of Lipmann & Bogen (1923), who, in their turn, took inspiration from various chapters of Köhler (1921).
73. Unique, of its own kind (Latin).

References

- Ach, N. (1921). *Über die Begriffsbildung: Eine experimentelle Untersuchung*. Bamberg: C.C. Buchners Verlag.
- Anderson, K. (1995). *Lenin, Hegel, and Western Marxism: A critical study*. Urbana-Chicago: University of Illinois Press.
- Belyy, A. (1922). *Glossolaliya. Poema o zvuke*. Berlin: Epokha.
- Bergson, H. (1911). *Matter and memory*. London: George Allen and Unwin.
- Binet, A. (1894). *Psychologie des grands calculateurs et joueurs d'échecs*. Paris: Librairie Hachette et Cie.
- Blonskiy, P. P. (1930). *Trudnye shkol'niki*. (2nd ed). Moscow: Rabotnik Prosveshcheniya.
- Bozhovich, L. I. (2006). Rech' i prakticheskaya intellektual'naya deyatel'nost' rebenka: Eksperimental'no-teoreticheskoe issledovanie. In I. A. Korepanova (Ed.), *Kul'turno-istoricheskaya psikhologiya*, 1, 65–76; 2, 121–135; 3, 101–113.
- Bühler, K. (1922). *Die geistige Entwicklung des Kindes*. Jena: Verlag von Gustav Fischer.
- Cassirer, E. (1929). *Philosophie der symbolischen Formen* (Vol. 3). *Phänomenologie der Erkenntnis*. Berlin: Bruno Cassirer Verlag.
- Cassirer, E. (1977). The philosophy of symbolic forms. In *The phenomenology of knowledge*, Vol. 3. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Ebbinghaus, H. (1885). *Über das Gedächtnis: Untersuchungen zur experimentellen Psychologie*. Leipzig: Verlag von Duncker & Humblot.
- Eliasberg, W. (1925). Psychologie und Pathologie der Abstraktion. *Zeitschrift für angewandte Psychologie*, Beiheft 35. Leipzig: Verlag von Johann Ambrosius Barth.
- Feuerbach, L. (1955). *Izbrannyye filosofskie proizvedeniya* (Vol. 1). Moscow: Gospolitizdat.
- Gelb, A., & Goldstein, K. (1920). *Psychologische Analysen hirnpathologischer Fälle*. Leipzig: Barth.
- Gelb, A., & Goldstein, K. (1925). Über Farbenamnesie nebst Bemerkungen über das Wesen der amnestischen Aphasie überhaupt und die Beziehung zwischen Sprache und dem Verhalten zur Umwelt. *Psychologische Forschung*, 6, 127–186.
- Goldstein, K. (1924). Das Wesen der amnestischen Aphasie. *Deutsche Zeitschrift für Nervenheilkunde*, 83, 324–339.
- Goldstein, K., & Gelb, A. (1920). Psychologische Analysen hirnpathologischer Falle auf Grund von Untersuchungen Hirnverletzter. *Zeitschrift für Psychologie*, 83, 1–94.
- Köhler, W. (1921). *Intelligenzprüfungen an Menschenaffen*. Berlin: Julius Springer.
- Köhler, W. (1930). *La perception humaine*. *Journal de Psychologie*, 27, 5–30.

- Kretschmer, E. (1920). Die Willensapparate des Hysterischen. *Zeitschrift für die gesamte Neurologie und Psychiatrie*, 54, 251–280.
- Kretschmer, E. (1927). *Über Hysterie*. Leipzig: Verlag von Johann Ambrosius Barth.
- Kroh, O. (1928). Über die intellektuelle Entwicklung der reifenden Jugend. *Zeitschrift für pädagogische Psychologie*, 29, 10–34.
- Lenin, V. I. (1902). *Chto delat'?* Stuttgart: J.H.W. Dietz.
- Lenin, V. I. (1976). *Philosophical notebooks*. In V. I. Lenin. Collected works, Vol. 38. Moscow: Progress Publishers.
- Lévy-Bruhl, L. (1922/1976). *La mentalité primitive*. Paris: Retz.
- Lewin, K. (1926). Vorbemerkungen über die psychische Kräfte und Energien und über die Struktur der Seele. *Psychologische Forschung*, 7, 294–329.
- Lichtenberg, G. K. (1844). *Vermischte Schriften. 8 Bände. Bd. 1*. Göttingen: Dieterich.
- Lipmann, O., & Bogen, H. (1923). *Naive Physik*. Munich: Verlag von Johann Ambrosius Barth.
- Löwenstein, O. (1929). Zwillingpsychologische Untersuchungen im Hinblick auf die Probleme der Erziehbarkeit. In E. Lesch (Ed.), *Bericht über den vierten Kongress der Heilpädagogik in Leipzig. 11.-15. April 1928*, (pp. 227–239). Berlin-Heidelberg: Springer Verlag.
- Piaget, J. (1928). *Judgment and reasoning in the child*. New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Company.
- Politzer, G. (1928). *Critique des fondements de la psychologie*. Paris: PUF.
- Shestov, L. (2007). *Potestas clavium (Vlast' Klyuchey)*. Moscow: AST, AST Moskva, Khranitel'.
- Samukhin, N.V., Birenbaum, G.V., & Vygotsky, L.S. (1934). K voprosu o dementsii pri bolezni Pika: klinicheskoe i eksperimental'no-psikhologicheskoe issledovanie. *Sovetskaya Nevropatologiya, Psikiatriya i Psikhogigiena*, 3, 97–135.
- Thorndike, E. L., Bregman, E. O., Cobb, M. V., & Woodyard, E. (1927). *The measurement of intelligence*. New York: Bureau of Publications, Columbia University.
- Usnadze, D. (1924). Ein experimenteller Beitrag zum Problem der psychologischen Grundlagen der Namengebung. *Psychologische Forschung*, 5, 24–43.
- Usnadze, D. (1929). Gruppenbildungsversuche bei vorschulpfflichtigen Kindern. *Archiv für die gesamte Psychologie*, 73, 217–248.
- Usnadze, D. (1930). Der Begriffsbildung im vorschulpfflichtigen Alter. *Zeitschrift für angewandte Psychologie*, 34, 138–212.
- Van der Veer, R., & Valsiner, J. (1991). *Understanding Vygotsky: A quest for synthesis*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Van der Veer, R., & Valsiner, J. (Eds.). (1994). *The Vygotsky Reader*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Vygotskaya, G. L., & Lifanova, T. M. (1996). *Lev Semyonovich Vygotsky: Zhizn', deyatel'nost', shtrikhi k portretu*. Moscow: Smysl.
- Vygotsky, L. S. (1926). *Pedagogicheskaya psikhologiya*. Moscow: Rabotnik Prosveshcheniya.
- Vygotsky, L. S. (1930a). Problema vysshikh intellektual'nykh funktsiy v sisteme psikhotehnicheskogo issledovaniya. *Psikhotehnika i Psikhofiziologiya Truda*, 3, 374–384.
- Vygotsky, L. S. (1930b). Le problème des fonctions intellectuelles supérieures dans le système des recherches psychotechniques. In *Analys d'orientació Professional*, (Vol. 4, pp. 332–341). VI^a conferència internacional de psicotècnica (Recull dels treballs presentats). Barcelona: Escola de Treball.
- Vygotsky, L. S. (1934). Thought in schizophrenia. *Archives of Neurology and Psychiatry*, 31, 1062–1077.
- Vygotsky, L. S. (1935). Problema umstvennoy otstalosti (opyt postroeniya rabochey gipotezu). In L. S. Vygotsky & I. I. Danyushevskiy (Eds.), *Umstvennootstalyye rebenok*, (pp. 7–34) Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe Uchebno-Pedagogicheskoe Izdatel'stvo.
- Vygotsky, L. S. (1987). *The collected works of L.S. Vygotsky. Vol. 1. Problems of general psychology*. New York: Plenum Press.
- Vygotsky, L. S. (1993). *The collected works of L.S. Vygotsky. Vol. 2. The fundamentals of defectology*. New York: Plenum Press.
- Vygotsky, L. S. (1997a). *The collected works of L.S. Vygotsky. Vol. 3. Problems of the theory and history of psychology*. New York: Plenum Press.

- Vygotsky, L. S. (1997b). *The collected works of L.S. Vygotsky. Vol. 4. The history of the development of the higher mental functions*. New York: Plenum Press.
- Vygotsky, L. S. (1997c). *Educational psychology*. Boca Raton, FL: St. Lucie Press.
- Vygotsky, L. S. (1998). *The collected works of L.S. Vygotsky. Vol. 5. Child psychology*. New York: Plenum Press.
- Vygotsky, L. S. (1999). *The collected works of L.S. Vygotsky. Vol. 6. Scientific legacy*. New York: Plenum Press.
- Vygotsky, L. S. (2005). Konkretnaya psikhologiya cheloveka. In *Psikhologiya razvitiya cheloveka*, (pp. 1020–1038). Moscow: Smysl; Eksmo.
- Vygotsky, L. S., & Luria, A. R. (1930). *Etjudy po istorii povedeniya: Obez'yana, primitiv, rebenok*. Moscow-Leningrad: GIZ.
- Vygotsky, L. S., & Luria, A. R. (1993). *Studies on the history of behavior: Ape, primitive, and child*. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers.
- Zavershneva, E Yu. (2015). Dve linii razvitiya kategorii "smysl" v rabotakh L.S. Vygotskogo. *Voprosy Psikhologii*, 3, 116–132.

Chapter 11

The Anomalous Development of the Child

This chapter is based on a notepad with a hard green cover with an illustration of a caduceus and the heading “Notes.” Part of the pages have been lost, and a number of the statements have been crossed out, which in all likelihood means that they found their way into manuscripts that were to be printed. Paragraph headings in bold script have been added by the editors. The notepad presumably dates from the end of 1930 to early 1931. It shows that Vygotsky and his associates worked in various directions using the system principle. Of special importance are the comments on Vygotsky’s talks on anomalous development. It is unknown when and where exactly these talks were given, but it seems likely they were so-called internal talks for a small group of colleagues. The questions and comments are interesting because they were seldom published. One of the few exceptions was Vygotsky (1931a), which showed that his audience absolutely disagreed with his plea for a discipline of pedology.

These were the themes discussed in the notepad:

- (1) The plan for a talk that formed the basis of the article “The collective as a factor in the development of the anomalous child” (Vygotsky 1931b). The plan differs from the printed article as follows: (a) the printed version has “anomalous” rather than “abnormal”; (b) the points 3D through H did not make it into the published text; and (c) Vygotsky did not use the quote from Feuerbach as an epigraph to the article. Vygotsky’s talk was followed by the comments of the leading defectologists D.I. Azbukin, A.G. Basova, and P.P. Pochapin.¹ Judging by Vygotsky’s concise notes, their criticism was relatively mild.
- (2) The propositions for a so-far-unknown talk in which Vygotsky claimed that development and disintegration are ruled by the same laws. Among the experts present were S.V. Krays, I.D. Sapir,² and others who remain unidentified. Here the audience was more critical: Vygotsky was accused of formalism and empty theorizing, and several of the commenters were of the opinion that Vygotsky’s general laws covering both development and disintegration did not exist and that his theoretical position was flawed.
- (3) A list of notes for a talk about the problem of emotions (discussing, among other things, Down syndrome, and probably based on his work at the EDI).³
- (4) The discussion of a talk (or text) by Vera Schmidt⁴ dedicated to the psychoanalytic approach of emotions in child development.
- (5) Reflections about the nature of the concept and the issue of the distinction between meaning and sense.

- (6) A brief discussion of Walter Cannon's theory and the problem of higher emotions, which is similar to Vygotsky's published lecture on emotions (see later text).
- (7) Remarks about a book by Chuchmarev⁵ dedicated to the analysis of emotions with the use of the galvanometer.
- (8) Fragmentary descriptions of disease histories of children from the EDI not given here.

The collective as a factor of development of the abnormal child

Written in violet ink: [*The collective as a factor of development of the abnormal child*]
Epigraph. "What is absolute impossible for one man alone, is possible for two."⁶

- + 1. General laws of development for the normal and abnormal child and the unique expression of these laws in both cases. This is why we proceed from general laws of child development and subsequently study their unicity in the application to the abnormal child.
- + 2. The great fundamental law of psychology—Janet.⁷ The collective origin of the higher psychological functions. About their twofold appearance on the scene in the process of the development of the higher functions: as inter- and intrapsychological categories.
- + 3. Speech. The beginning and end. Clarification of the ways and methods to convert the collective function into an individual one:
 - A. Egocentric speech and its intellectual character.
 - B. Verbal syncretism and its elimination.
Shein⁸—Leont'ev.
 - + C. Argument—reflection. Piaget. Baldwin.⁹
 - D. Practical intellect—Levina.¹⁰
The growth of the intellect [results] from socialized practice.
 - E. Perception—Geshelina,¹¹ Stern.
 - F. Attention + memory.
 - G. Socialization is the path of the development of child logic. Piaget.
Play—labor. Bozhovich.
 - H. Imitation—Bozhovich. Slavina.¹²
 - + J. Play with rules. Groos.
4. The development of the person and the collective. *Résumé.* Convergence.
Extracortical connections.
The defect and the underdevelopment of higher functions are related to one another in a different way than the defect and the underdevelopment of elementary functions.
The complex picture of mentally retarded and other children.

[Points 5 to 10 have been crossed out in regular pencil.]

5. Divergence as the basis for the origin of the accessory syndromes of the abnormal child. Andrey + imbeciles-mongoloids.¹³ Primitivism. The paradox: more possibilities in the domain of development.
Contra Ribot—the higher functions [disintegrate earlier] than the lower ones.¹⁴

6. The collective as a factor of underdevelopment. It is in our hands!
7. The mentally retarded child: the law of the formation of collectives. De Greeff: self-appraisal + Krasusskiy. A genius for the imbecile.¹⁵
The law of the composition of groups.
The formal bias in the study of the collective: (1) the motor activity of the lower extremities + (2) acoustic reflexes + (3) is disinhibited.
The pedagogy of the collective: the same goals, unique paths. The value of general collectives.
8. The blind child. Representation + concept. *Alles-wissen-können*—Petzelt.¹⁶
What is the concept in formal logic and in dialectical logic. The connection—a system of judgments. The compensation from above—from the side of the concepts. The danger of verbalism.
The role of cooperation in the methodology of teaching the blind.
9. The deaf and dumb child.
Speech! What we take away from the person's social interaction, he will lack in thinking.
A vicious circle: society—political education → the person (speech) → the collective.
Mimicry, polyglossia. The study of the collective of persons. The possibility of a joint collective with the normal [people].
10. The introduction into the immense field of study is my goal. And only that.
The pedagogy of the collective is communist pedagogy.

[Written in pencil then crossed out:]

Questions:

Basova

1. *The conception of the collective* is physiognomy.¹⁷
A work collective, a collective of people supporting an appeal, a productive collective. Which form, which is better.
2. *The children's home*—from early childhood. It delays development. The collective is a minus.
The crèches are all the same. The collective has no magic force.
3. *The accessory syndromes*—the relocation, empirically an influence. The school reform toward the polytechnic system—abstract. The relationship of the mentally retarded to the normal children in the system of *polytechnic education*.¹⁸

Pochapin

1. The concept and the representation of the blind person.
2. The pedagogical neglect of the problem child. Perhaps the total neglect as well.
3. Do deaf and dumb children show *egocentric speech*?
Progress.

Azbukin

4. The achievements of the special schools—[with the instruction] of just the feeble-minded are not altogether favorable.
5. The opinion about the difficult child in a separate group.
6. In [more] detail—there is nothing that the blind person could not understand.
The concepts will not coincide—pseudoconcepts—to regulate.
Separate schools for the blind.
7. *The picture:* [of the development of] the child from polyglossia to oral speech.

[Crossed out in pencil:]

[Written in black ink:]

NB!

1. The gap between contemporary psychology and psychopathology. [Added in violet ink]: The relationships between the sciences are the relationships between the phenomena.
2. Three viewpoints on the relationship between the psychological and the pathological:
 - A. = Comte.¹⁹ Kretschmer. Bleuler.²⁰ Minkowski.²¹ Freud.
Digression: Tool. Ribot.
 - B. ≠ Blondel,²² *sui generis*. The old [viewpoint].
Scalpel + magnifying lens.
 - C. The special form of change has its own laws, but the general psychological laws cover both development and dissolution. *Psychologica psychologica*—dissolution follows psychological laws.
3. Development and dissolution.
The reverse relationship. Jackson, Ribot.
Impossible to compare.
The one is the key to the other. Cf. adolescence + schizophrenia.²³
4. The task of pathological psychology.
Structure + functional dep[endency?] + genesis + primary and secondary [disturbances, symptoms].
What will be of psychology when they will determine schizophrenia in the test-tube.
Shift the center of gravity.
5. Our hypothesis. The nature of the higher psychological functions. Their development and dissolution.
6.

Localization	+	classification
↓		↓
Wernicke ²⁴		Head ²⁵

Higher functions.

Norm and pathology

[Beginning of a note written in pencil. The name of the speaker is not given:]

1. *The last idea.*
2. Three directions—the third one connects the laws (but does not identify them) here and there with genuine science: the psychology of man, the psychology of animals, general—special, others.
The foundation: both psychology and psychopathology. Do certain foundations exist.
3. [The talk should] not [be] based on a viewpoint but on content—I did not use it, no content but history. There was no content. I moved away from the first [direction], but in the end joined the first [direction].
4. Pavlov's place?
5. They dealt with—all sides of psychology—of the psychological form—the aspect of content.
6. The social aspect.
7. Apart from the forms of thinking there is the emotional side.
8. Psychological analysis—localization. In psychiatry—*concrete regularities*—deeper—physiological laws.
9. The first are organic, physiological; the second psychological. Both are psychological, but are they not in essence physiological?
10. The general is the same for the mind of normal and abnormal persons—the new psychology—what they have in common is pathophysiology.
11. The connection between psychopathology and social psychology.

[End of crossed-out text.]

Krayts

1. *It is unclear* among psychiatrists what is normal and what is psychopathology. Everyone is described as a psychopath. < ... > Normality is an abstraction.

Normal and abnormal is not applicable to psychopathy.

Written in the margin: [*Animal–Plant.*]

The border—Lenin. Some are considered normal, others abnormal.

What health and disease have in common. Abstract. Cannot be defended from this viewpoint. Various psychological forms—animals, various people, stages, types. Are suitable for all cases—from organic chemistry to the psychopath and the psychology of *animals*. *The general + the specific.*

General pathology is general physiology and pathology.

Nobody put it [this way]. *General* physiology, whose laws are inevitable.

Two ideas: no boundaries—nothing in common.

A contradiction.

??? [The name of the speaker is not given.]

The first theory—Kretschmer, Freud = from what does this follow. Pathology was deduced from the normal, but not = [not equated]. The second? Storch?²⁶ Shares Blondel's view—no fundamental agreement, criticizes—a return to the normal level.

The third viewpoint is eclectic: takes everything together—*like biology*. The psychology of the future does not exist. What is there from normal psychology. How are 1 and 2 combined: *a synthesis*. Where is it?

Common laws—*is there even a single explicit law*.

Sapir

- (1) Psychology's sides—form, content, social.

This is the defect. An abstract, formal formulation of the question. [*Der springende Punkt*²⁷ of the fruitful contemporary [psychology]

Meaning:

- (2) To summarize: *great diagnostic significance*.

With the test-tube: exactly, psychology has no diagnostic meaning.

Psychological phenomena as such: a special realm of reality. It must be studied.

Vygotsky's note in the margin: [A legitimate viewpoint, but not mine.]

- (3) In another way: pathogenesis, etiology—a psychological study may shed light.

Differential formulation—the content, the social aspect.

Vygotsky's remark in the margin: [These are all tasks for psychiatry.]

- (4) The person—various regularities for various persons. The biological aspects.

Kretschmer. Jung. Ontogeny.

First of all speak about Spain.

Suggest to give a talk about Spain.

Richer in content: formally and from the form side.

How are the differential aspects in development and dissolution explained. *Monakow*²⁸—formally.

One-sided: What psychopathology gives psychology historically and practically.

Sharp and without compromise: the difference between the psychological and the Pavlovian approach. Develop the first part. Explain why Pavlov's approach of psychosis is incorrect.

*Fridman*²⁹

Critique of what was said but not of what he did not say.

The first view = to exclude *Freud*.

Freud: Do not apply to normality.

The implicit general psychology. They all apply *pathology to the norm*. *There is no solution in abstract form*.

The general solution is incorrect: the regularities of the [formation of] neurotic symptoms cannot be applied to normality, the pathogenetic conditions are absent. Regularities *sui generis* do not exist in normality.

*Bleuler: autism +. There is no autism—dereistic.*³⁰ *Kretschmer—a particular viewpoint.*

Freud: Normality and pathology, psychology and psychopathology. *To smooth over the regularities.*

The third viewpoint—general laws. Animal behavior + pathology + the normal person—*ill or healthy.*

Psychological regularities or physiological ones.

The development of thinking and affect. Can you show: psychopathology. I do not fully agree.

What kind of psychology—a system of knowledge about the whole mind, but not about the functions.

Normality and pathology—no functions.

The implicit error: (1) identifying normality with pathology; (2) identifying [my viewpoint] with contemporary psychology—still *untenable*.

There and here.

1. The general psychological laws [must be derived] not from normality but from psychology.
2. How valid are they for normality. Normality is a reduction of pathology. Normality is pathology.
3. Pathogenesis, etiology—the system of dependencies between psychopathological phenomena.

Untenable.

Delirium tremens—other physiological conditions. We cannot avoid explanation. Brain from psychology.

4. *Desiderium: science based on psychopathology and psychology.*³¹

By the application to psychopathology. Organically.

[Here the note stops. Possibly, one or more pages have been lost.]

The talk about emotions

[Written in violet ink:]

NB! From the discussion of mongoloids to the talk about emotions.

EDI

1. Indestructible complacency. A young Patachon.³² *Enormous strength.* De Greeff's phenomena are not contra *the Minderwertigkeitsgefühl*³³ but *its result.* Aron's embarrassment and De Greeff's [symptom].
2. Funktionslust.³⁴
3. Cf. De Greeff and Gita and other mongoloids—how judgment is emotionally determined. Autistic thinking of the purest sort: Cf. Gita's syncretism, but behind it: clever = nice.
4. Polygenic inheritance. Different functions are needed in a different way; that is why they are preserved and develop in a different way. Ribot (to underdevelopment).

5. *Gespräche, Katz*³⁵: *the consciousness* of feelings. How can we educate the feelings—by becoming aware of them. Cf. Spinoza. *Catathymia*.³⁶
For the debile, Katz: feeling versus intellect.
The passions lead thinking, but can thinking lead the passions.
6. De Greeff—foresight and emotions.
7. Do not rank by age.
8. We must not traumatize: the *EDI*. Cf. Tsyrlina's boy. Cf. S. Yak.³⁷ about the *Minderwertigkeitsgefühl*.
9. A complex structure: it is not all directly connected with an embryonic defect.

V.F. Schmidt. Emotions

1. The study of emotions is fettered by the ideological biases of religion and ethics: It was not done to derive emotions from drives.
2. Adler + Freud.
3. Sucking the fingers: active pleasure seeking.
4. Repression + sublimation + compensations + displacement.
5. Cf. sublimation: besmearing oneself with feces ↔ drawings. Where is the internal connection?
6. Aggression is sublimated in physical labor.
7. Possession—learning to know. He gets it fast.
8. Who do you love? Lika (herself), mama, and Lyalik.
A whole number of emotions develop from self-love: perversions, vanity.
The first love—the person himself.
9. Self-love is earlier than love of the mother: cf. Watson.
10. Incorrect: Before 10 years the question of the importance of the other person is viewed from an egoistic viewpoint. Real friendship, etc. *after* 10 years??
11. Social emotions [develop] from sensory stimuli. The whole variety of emotions develops from a small core—sensory stimuli and self-love.
12. Adler's theory: an *emotional superstructure* on the inferior organ. Food interests become more pronounced when there is a weakness of the digestive tract.
13. The compensation mechanism works independently of the organ inferiority. What distinguishes us from Adler:
In the margin: Cf. De Greeff contra or pro Adler.
 - (1) for us via the social realization of the defect,
 - (2) for him via the *Minderwertigkeitsgefühl*,
 - (3) for him [it does not exist] in mentally retarded [persons],
 - (4) for us chiefly in defective [persons].
14. Sublimation and compensation do not contradict each other.

Pathological underdevelopment

1. We can see the syndrome of emotional underdevelopment in N[ormality], in mentally retarded, in deaf and dumb children and others.

2. A decisive role—the environment when there is underdevelopment of the emotions.
3. Three groups:

Written in the margin: [With that I do not agree.]

1. Underdevelopment = a halt.
2. Antisocial development.
3. Pathological forms of emotion.
4. A. Emotional underdevelopment = [characteristic for] the infantile.
The gormandizer is emotionally a 3-year-old, but not qua intellect.

An arrow is drawn to the next phrase with the following remark: [I do not agree with this]

Thinking at the service of the emotions!!!

- B. Emotional underdevelopment is compensated by intellectual development.
- C. There is no proportionality between emotional + intellectual development.
- D. Character traits correspond with emotional stages of development.

Cf. the psychomotor system, the psychosensory system, psychosexuality.

From the neurological side all this is the inclusion in a more extensive and higher system. Cf. the mental corresponds with the gesamtphysiologische Struktur des Gehirnprozesses.³⁸ Cf. psycho-emotional.

5. The reaction to a pleasant or unpleasant environment. The reactive conception of the emotional set.
6. Conflict.
7. The third group: *repression is fast*—faster than sublimation. Repression changes the emotional attitude.

His father slapped him—*he drags his foot!* Hysteria.

From the moment he fell ill, the emotional atmosphere changed: a complete change of personality. A conflict between aggression + hatred ↔ love + fear. The sick child behaves better: but he is inhibited. An experiment of psychoanalytical disinhibition: aggressive play. During play (with bricks), the father is killed in a disaster, in a raid, etc.

The disease is a hysterical symptom: to punish the father.

8. Repression: emotions are excluded from consciousness.
Sublimation: the emotion is there, the goal is different.
Cf. Systems and sublimation, repression: There is some truth in the transference to other systems.
Cf. Watson contra psychoanalysis: The viscera are not connected with speech.³⁹
9. Fear. There is normal fear, and there are phobias. *Watson: fear is overcome by joy.*⁴⁰

The anxiety is a reaction formation to a conflict. Cf. A horrible dream. The boy is anxious to be alone, the ceiling will come down, etc. He talks about anxiety, about murderers. His emotional behavior is changed. *That the ceiling would*

crush his father: repressed; reactively: his anxiety. A grudge against his mother.
The ceiling really came down: the child was frightened, but now no longer.
 There is no pathological anxiety.

10. The child himself explains the anxiety, 6½ yrs. Thunder—no fear. Suddenly fear of the thunder: it may kill me, punish me, because it is obedient and I am not. He wished for one minute that the thunder would kill his mama. And is afraid himself.

Cf. The dialectics of Gita's fear.

<...>

Concepts

Questions about concepts

1. Understanding is more than the word.
 Exclude all other aspects (the expressive aspects).
2. The change of meanings in language and the child's development of language—no psychological regularities—the weight of this argument.
3. What is a concept? The logical concept of science also in practice.
4. Meaning is sense?⁴¹ Is it enough: meaning is concept?
5. Several types of concepts: Do the paths to a clear concept coincide?
 Development, Werner. *Realizable in the experiment—yes.*
6. Conclusions? Do the childish forms or ingredients disappear in the adult?
7. The non-coincidence of the indicative and the semasiological function.⁴²
 The scientist and the naïve person: *objects* < illegible > – < or > outlines. *The things do not coincide.* Just for the child? Or for the adult? Because it is a rudiment.
8. Concept formation—essential features. *The discovery of concepts?* Meaning itself develops, the discovery is the last instant. For the child it his discovery.

Potential concepts. *Nonverbal concepts.*

The concept is polygenetic: from the complex, from the pseudoconcept.

<...>

Cannon's theory

[Written in black ink:]

Iv. Mikh. [⁴³*Solov'ev*]: How do the sensible and sensory sensations⁴⁴ (Gefühlsempfinde <n>)⁴⁵ acquire their emotional tone from Cannon's viewpoint.⁴⁶
 The paths through the thalamus.

The traditional viewpoint—James-Lange—Mental subtraction—Practical subtraction⁴⁷—*The biological significance of organic changes.* Cf. Freud, fear < Kant >.

There are no constant relationships—the change of these and other relationships is what constitutes the content of emotional development. The same with pathology—in the relationships: underdevelopment.

The internal organs are not very sensitive: cf. the lungs and the painfulness of the deeper organs.

Cannon has no thalamic theory. Who created a thalamic theory: Head, Sherrington, Bekhterev, Müller, Küppers.⁴⁸

There is thalamic laughter, and there is cortical laughter.⁴⁹ Cf. **mentalization** + *prise de conscience*.⁵⁰

The schema of Cannon's theory. Contra Head, Küppers. "Two souls." Two possibilities. There is no alternative.

Cannon, the theory of the double control and development: Where is the development of emotions phylogenetically and ontogenetically?

Higher emotions. Or are just the crude emotions, emotions? Can we call Cannon's theory a thalamic theory?

Chuchmarev's book

Zakh. Iv. Chuchmarev. Galvanometrics.⁵¹

1. To demonstrate that this registers an emotional state: with the curves.
The study of emotions *post mortem*: First we kill them, then we study them.
2. Language was not created for emotions. This is why it is difficult to express and study emotions. *Does it have to be so???* But naming the emotion changes the emotion (*prise de conscience*), not just in the sense of "untrue" (Tyutchev),⁵² but also in the sense of changing its course: i.e., behind this difficulty there is a real phenomenon of change: *emotion—word!*
3. [To do] Cannon's experiments with galvanometrics!
4. *Emotions and the tests of Rives, Yakobsen.*⁵³ Cf. *the domkom.*⁵⁴ *What is psychology's task. A social reaction is an emotional reaction.*
The power of psychologists. If we develop psychology to the end: mastery.
5. The emotion—a subjective reaction to an objective impression.
Emotions and intellect: a unified but opposite process.
Affect and irresponsibility!! Volition is a synthesis of emotion (anti-thesis) and intellect (thesis).
6. The connection and the difference between the sciences in the theory of emotions: mechanics—sociology.

Résumé

1. In essence, we discuss a simple and well-known fact.
We cry when we are sad and rejoice in gladness.
NB! The relationship crying—sadness + how does the abnormal child cry and grieve + the relationship of the structural, genetic, and functional *crying—sadness* to the behavior as a whole + the methods in the normal and the abnormal child.

2. Emotions, the unconscious (Freud), consciousness, self-awareness.
Thalamic laughter + cortical laughter. **Mentalization** + *prise de conscience*.
Bühler—three levels—our demonstration. The system. *Autistic thinking and realistic thinking*.
3. As a subordinate element, the emotion (thalamus) forms part of every cortical behavioral process. But sometimes the cortex serves the subcortex.
4. Philosophical roots: Descartes, Spinoza.

[Point 5 is missing.]

6. The psychological study of emotions—interview: What do you feel?
Completely wrong. Cannon is described incorrectly: more adrenalin—more emotion.
7. Distinguish endogenic and exogenic electricity <illegible >.
8. The main question: How do the galvanometric curve and temperament change—with age—in *underdevelopment*. For example, Bühler's three genetic levels of emotion can quantitatively give one and the same galvanic index. But where *is* this pleasure, what is the systemic location, the *locus*, of this *End-, Funktions-, and Schaffenslust?* (The affect is the fluctuation between the lethal index and the highest one. Right?)
9. "There are as many emotions as there are things"—the false intellectualistic classification of emotions. *Wundt, the three-dimensional theory*.⁵⁵
10. Galvanometrics: (a) temperament (tomorrow's emotion), (b) excitement-calm, (c) affects.
11. How does Chuchmarev's theory relate to James-Lange?
What does a subjective reaction mean for Z. Iv.—*for psychology as a whole*—a mental or a psychological one?

NB! Relationships

- I. The usual formula: We cry because we are sad.
- II. James: We are sad because we cry.
- III. Cannon: We cry because we are sad or glad.
- IV. Freud: If we run, we are not afraid.⁵⁶ *Both together*.
- V. Claparède: If we are afraid, we do not tremble. If we are sad, we do not cry.

Notes

1. Dmitriy Ivanovich Azbukin (1883 to 1953). Russian defectologist, physician, neuropsychologist, and specialist in the field of oligophrenia. From 1925, he worked in increasingly important positions at the Faculty of Defectology of the Second Moscow State University. Antonina Gavrilovna Basova (1900 to 1998). Russian defectologist, specialist in the education of deaf persons, and historian of that discipline. Pavel Pavlovich Pochapin (1892 to ?). Russian defectologist, pedologist, and one of the founders of Russian defectology in the 1920s. Pochapin worked under the supervision of the People's Commissar of Education Lunacharsky and was the editor of various books in the area of defectology.

2. Sergey Valentinovich Kravtsov (1894 to 1956). Russian psychiatrist who worked under P.B. Gannushkin. In the 1930s, he was director of the Gannushkin Scientific-Research Institute of Neuro-Psychiatry in Moscow. Isay Davidovich Sapir (1897 to 1976). Russian psychiatrist, psychoneurologist, and author of a number of psychoanalytic books. Sapir worked in the Clinic for Nervous Diseases under the supervision of G.I. Rossolimo and E.K. Sepp and in the Institute of Philosophy when this was closed down for political reasons. In 1938, he was accused of anti-Soviet activities and banned to Yakutsk.
3. The Experimental Defectological Institute (EDI) of Narkompros developed in 1929 from the Laboratory of the Psychology of Abnormal Childhood at the Medico-Psychological Station (the laboratory was founded by Vygotsky in 1926). Vygotsky was the scientific head of the EDI from its foundation until his death.
4. Vera Fyodorovna Schmidt (1889 to 1937). Russian psychoanalyst and pedagogue. From 1917 onward, she worked at the preschool department of Narkompros, and from 1921 to 1928 she headed the kindergarten *International Solidarity* (see Van der Veer & Valsiner 1991, pp. 82-84), which provided many of the case histories for Vygotsky's and Luria's writings. From 1930 onward, Schmidt was a scientific collaborator at the EDI. Her husband, Otto Yul'evich Schmidt (1891 to 1956), was a polar traveler, mathematician, geophysicist, astronomer, director of the State Publishing House, and chief editor of the *Great Soviet Encyclopedia*. Vygotsky was befriended by the Schmidts, and shortly before his death he received a letter from Vera Schmidt who wished him a speedy recovery (cf. Zavershneva 2016).
5. Zakhariy Ivanovich Chuchmarev (1888 to 1961). Russian psychologist, and specialist in general psychology, psychophysiology, and the psychology of work.
6. Quoted from §12 of Feuerbach (1923) *Principles of the Philosophy of the Future*. The note gives outlines of Vygotsky's (1931a, b), which appeared without this epigraph. Vygotsky did use Feuerbach's aphorism in his preface to E.K. Gracheva's book. See Vygotsky (1993) for details.
7. Janet's so-called sociogenetic law was formulated in his later books and inspired by the ideas of Royce and Baldwin. See, for example, Janet (1928, p. 22): "Internal thought is a way of talking to oneself, a way to inform oneself. All forms of social conduct performed vis-à-vis others have their private repercussions. All things we do vis-à-vis others, we do them vis-à-vis ourselves; we treat ourselves as another." Also Janet (1929, pp. 334/521): "Let us not forget... the general rule...: it is that *after* having constructed the personage of our fellow-man we construct our personage for ourselves in the same way... all social psychological laws have two aspects: an exterior aspect concerning other people, an interior aspect concerning ourselves. Almost always... the second form is posterior to the first one."
8. A.A. Shein (? to ?). One of Vygotsky's collaborators around 1930, who investigated concept development (replicating Piaget's findings) and the transition from external to internal speech.

9. Piaget (1928, p. 204) argued, referring to Janet, that reflection results from the need to justify one's point of view in an argument with peers and that "logical reasoning is an argument that we have with ourselves, and which reproduces internally the features of a real argument." He added that Blondel had shown that "pathological thought is the result of the given individual's inability to submit to social habits of thought." James Mark Baldwin (1861 to 1934). American philosopher and developmental psychologist. After his move to Paris, he became acquainted with Janet and he exerted great influence on both Janet's and Piaget's thinking. See Valsiner & Van der Veer (2000) for the connections between the thinking of Baldwin, Janet, and Vygotsky.
10. Roza Yevgen'evna Levina (1908 to 1989). Russian psychologist, pedagogue, and one of the founders of Russian logopedia. Levina belonged to Vygotsky's inner circle and after his death specialized in the rehabilitation of patients who suffered speech problems as a result of brain lesions.
11. Liya Solomonovna Geshelina (1892 to 1972?). Russian pedagogue, specialist in preschool education, and collaborator of Vygotsky.
12. Liya Solomonovna Slavina (1906 to 1988). Russian psychologist, specialist in educational psychology, belonged to Vygotsky's inner circle. From 1930 she worked at various scientific institutes in Moscow. Later she cooperated with Bozhovich.
13. Vygotsky uses the term "mongoloid," which was introduced by the British physician John Langdon Down (1828 to 1896) to refer to trisomy 21. It is no longer in use. Andrey was probably one of Vygotsky's patients.
14. "For a long time the law of Ribot, Jackson, and others has been recognized, which says that the order of pathological destruction is opposite to the order of the construction of the functions. That which appears latest in the developmental process suffers first" (Vygotsky 1993, p. 198).
15. Étienne De Greeff (1898 to 1961). Belgian psychiatrist and criminologist. De Greeff worked for some time in the Belgian village Geel (Geel), where there is a centuries-old tradition of taking care of psychiatric patients and mentally backward persons in host families. He there interviewed backward children to see whether they felt inferior or unhappy, to check how they regard others, etc. De Greeff showed that mentally backward children do not consider physicians or other normal people as most intelligent (they are beyond their understanding) but are rather pleased with themselves. This is why De Greeff (1927 p. 419) concluded that "for an imbecile, genius must find itself within the limits of mental debility." Cf. Vygotsky (1993) for Vygotsky's references to De Greeff. About Krasusskiy, Vygotsky wrote in 1931: "The observations published by Krasusskiy showed that... most collectives are composed by children who are backward to a different degree... From the social perspective they as it were mutually support each other. The intellectually most gifted child acquires the possibility to display more social activity with respect to the less gifted and active one. The latter, in his turn, derives from his social relationships with the more gifted and active child that which is still beyond him and which often acts

as an unconscious ideal toward which the intellectually defective child strives” See Vygotsky (1993, p. 217).

16. Alfred Petzelt (1886 to 1976). German pedagogue who was first repressed in Nazi Germany and subsequently in the GDR. Vygotsky frequently referred to Petzelt in his defectological writings to argue that there are no fundamental limits to the blind person’s intellectual development. Blind people are capable of knowing everything or, in Petzelt’s (1925, p. 172) words *sein wissen-können ist ein Alles-wissen-können*. Cf. Vygotsky (1993) for Vygotsky’s references to Petzelt.
17. Possibly the term “physiognomy” here refers to an inadequate analysis of the collective based on superficial features.
18. Throughout the note, Vygotsky uses “N” and “notN” to denote normal(ity) and abnormal(ity), respectively.
19. Auguste Comte (1798 to 1857). French philosopher and founder of the discipline of sociology and the doctrine of positivism. Comte was critical of psychology as a discipline for methodological reasons: “Man can observe what is external to him and also certain functions of his organs, other than the thinking organ. To a certain extent he can even observe himself as regards the passions he feels, because the cerebral organs on which these depend are distinct from the observing organ properly so called. It is, however, evidently impossible for him to observe his own intellectual acts, for the organ observed and the observing organ being in this case identical, by whom could the observation be made? ... To render this possible the individual would have to divide himself into two persons, one thinking, the other observing the thoughts. Thus man cannot directly observe his intellectual operations; he can only observe his organs and their results. There is therefore no place for psychology, or the direct study of the soul independently of any external considerations” (quoted by way of Bodenhafer 1923).
20. Vygotsky discussed Bleuler (1912) in *Thinking and Speech* and was also familiar with Bleuler’s work on the understanding of schizophrenia.
21. Eugène Minkowski (1885 to 1972). Russian-born psychiatrist and philosopher, who emigrated to Switzerland and eventually became a French citizen, and founder of the phenomenological approach in psychopathology. He worked under Bleuler and was influenced by the work of Husserl, Binswanger, and Jaspers. Vygotsky probably refers to his book on schizophrenia (Minkowski 1927).
22. Vygotsky attributed the following idea to Blondel: “The first thing we notice about psychological loss in the psychiatric clinic is the dissolution of those systems which on the one hand developed last and on the other hand were of a social origin” Cf. p. 102 of Vygotsky (1997).
23. Kretschmer (1921) compared the tempestuous process of sexual maturation with a mild form of schizophrenia. Vygotsky argued that schizophrenia and adolescence are inversely related and that what we see in schizophrenia is the dissolution of systems that were formed in adolescence. Cf. pp. 101–102 of Vygotsky (1997).

24. Carl Wernicke (1848 to 1905). German neurologist and psychiatrist. Although Wernicke discovered many things, he is primarily known for his study of deficits in language comprehension caused by damage to the left posterior, superior temporal gyrus. This region is now referred to as Wernicke's areas, and the associated syndrome is known as Wernicke's aphasia.
25. Sir Henry Head (1861 to 1940). British neurologist who performed pioneering work into the somatosensory system and sensory nerves. Much of this work was performed on himself and in collaboration with the equally famous psychiatrist W.H.R. Rivers.
26. Alfred Storch (1888 to 1962). German Jewish psychiatrist, who was fired in 1933 by the Nazis and emigrated to Switzerland. Storch was interested in existentialism and was personally acquainted with Karl Jaspers, Martin Buber, and Paul Tillich. Vygotsky read Storch (1922), in which Storch argued—drawing on Freud, Krüger, Lévy-Bruhl, Werner, and others—that the schizophrenic mind shows similarities with that of primitive people. See pp. 138–145 of Vygotsky (1998) for Vygotsky's discussion of Storch's view. Cf. Storch (1926).
27. The crux of the matter (German).
28. Constantin von Monakow (1853 to 1930). Russian-born Swiss neuropathologist and anatomist who studied in Zurich. He is known for the discovery of several brain structures and advanced the concepts of “chronogenic localization” and “diaschisis.” The latter concept referred to a reversible general disbalance of the brain as a result of damage to one part of it. The concept of “chronogenic localization” referred to the brain's fundamental organization in time-dependent network constellations, which may vary in phylogeny and ontogeny. This idea was adopted by Vygotsky and Luria, as well as their followers, although Monakow was seldom mentioned.
29. Boris Davidovich Fridman (1895 to ?). Russian psychiatrist, psychoanalyst, and member of the Russian Psychoanalytic Society. In 1924 to 1925, he worked at the State Psychoanalytic Institute in Moscow. Vygotsky considered his blend of Freudo-Marxism to be eclectic (Van der Veer & Valsiner 1991).
30. Living in imagination or fantasy with illogical thoughts.
31. Wish (Latin).
32. Pat and Patachon (known als Ole and Aksel in the US and Long and Short in the UK) were two Danish comedians who performed in countless silent films in the 1910s and 1920s. Just like Laurel and Hardy later, they were very dissimilar in appearance and behavior. Pat was the tall and thin one, whereas Patachon was short and fat.
33. Inferiority feeling (German).
34. *Funktionslust*, *Schaffenslust* or *Schaffensfreude*, and *Endlust* (see later text) were terms used by Karl Bühler. *Funktionslust* is pleasure derived from the performance of an act; *Schaffenslust* is pleasure derived from creative work; and *Endlust* is pleasure derived from the consummation of an act. The latter term goes back to Freud. See Vygotsky's lecture on emotions for his discussion of these terms (Vygotsky 1987, pp. 333–334).

35. David Katz (1884 to 1953). German Jewish psychologist, specialist in perception, and member of the Berlin group of Gestalt psychologists. Fired by the Nazis in 1933, he left for London and eventually settled in Stockholm, Sweden. His wife, Rosa Katz (née Heine) (1885 to 1976), was a Russian Jewish psychologist and pedagogue specialized in the Montessori system. Vygotsky refers to their joint book (Katz & Katz 1928, 1936), which presents conversations with their own children.
36. The change of mental processes as a result of strong emotions.
37. We have not been able to identify Tsyrlina. Sof'ya Yakovlevna Rabinovich (? to ?) was a Russian psychiatrist and one of the founders of child psychiatry in the USSR. She was a student and collaborator of G.I. Rossolimo and worked under his guidance in the Institute of Child Neurology and Psychology in Moscow, which later became part of Moscow University. Rabinovich specialized in mental retardation, oligophrenia, and deafness. She was the first to use the epidemiological approach in the USSR and with E.A. Osipova published an account of the frequency of the major mental disturbances in children in the USSR.
38. The total physiological structure of the brain process (German).
39. For example, in Watson (1924a) and on pp. 211–213 of Watson (1924b), the author argued that for social reasons we do not learn to talk about “our visceral organization” and suggests that this “unverbalized organization makes up the Freudian’s unconscious.”
40. It would be Mary Cover Jones (1897 to 1987), the American psychologist and “mother of behavior therapy,” who showed that fears can be diminished by techniques such as systematic desensitization. See Jones (1924).
41. As far as we know, this is the first time Vygotsky raised the question about the difference between meaning and sense, a difference that would later become important for him.
42. The term “semasiological” is approximately the same as the term “semantic.”
43. Ivan Mikhaylovich Solov'ev (1902 to 1986). Russian psychologist, defectologist, and collaborator of Vygotsky. Studied the influence of education on children with a developmental delay, the problem of will and motivation, and the psychophysiological aspects of the cooperation of the senses in children with visual and hearing impairments.
44. Possibly, Vygotsky used the term “sensible” here to indicate a heightened sensitivity to stimuli.
45. This probably refers to the German term *Gefühlsempfindung* or to the verb *Gefühlsempfinden*. A *Gefühlsempfindung* is the bodily sensation that accompanies a subjective feeling. For example, hot flashes during anxiety attacks.
46. Walter Bradford Cannon (1871 to 1945). American physiologist who developed the Cannon—Bard theory of emotion and the concept of homeostatis.
47. Vygotsky stated in his lecture about the development of emotions: “The experiment refuted James’s famous statement about the substraction of emotional symptoms. According to James, if we mentally substract shivering, the bending of the knees, the slowing heartbeat etc. from the emotion of fear, we

will see that nothing remains of the emotion. Cannon attempted to do this subtraction and showed that the emotion nevertheless remained intact. Thus, the crucial aspect of Cannon's research was that he showed the presence of the animal's emotional state in the absence of the corresponding vegetative reactions." See p. 330 of Vygotsky (1987).

48. The same names figure in Vygotsky's *Theory of Emotions*. It is there claimed (Vygotsky 1999, p. 107) that Vygotsky referred to Johannes Peter Müller (1801 to 1858), the famous German physiologist and comparative anatomist. This is impossible, however, in view of Vygotsky's statement on the same page that "Even before Müller, Head came to similar views" and taking into account that Head lived from 1861 to 1940. This makes it more likely that Vygotsky was referring to Max Müller (1894 to 1980), a Swiss psychiatrist who wrote about schizophrenia and the neurobiological study and treatment of nervous diseases. Egon Küppers (1887 to 1980) was a German psychiatrist who published about schizophrenia, its physiological and neural background, and its treatments such as electroshock and insulin shock. Elsewhere Vygotsky referred to Küppers (1922) and wrote: "In his opinion, an anatomically reverse course of the history of the brain leads to psychological regression, a return to archaic, primitive thinking and behavior." See p. 140 of Vygotsky (1998).
49. In his *Theory of Emotions*, Vygotsky explained that Cannon's theory "pre-supposes the existence of dual control—cortical and thalamic—over bodily processes... For example, we can laugh spontaneously in a funny situation (thalamic laughter), but we can also laugh as the result of a deliberate act (cortical laughter)... With dual control, cortical neurons under normal conditions evidently dominate and may keep from action the excited neurons of the thalamus (although we sometimes cry or laugh against our will). Therefore, a conflict between the higher and lower control of bodily functions is possible." See p. 118 of Vygotsky (1999).
50. Becoming aware, realizing (French). This was the term introduced by Claparède (1918), which was frequently used by Piaget (and Vygotsky). In Claparède's view, one only becomes conscious of the situation when automatic adaptation fails. See Arievich & Van der Veer (2004).
51. With the galvanometer, Chuchmarev investigated the difference between intellectual and emotional processes as well as individual differences between subjects, which he connected with their temperament and various conditions (e.g., depression, exhaustion). Cf. Chuchmarev (1928a, b, 1930).
52. Refers to a poem by Tyutchev. See chapter 6.
53. Solomon Markovich Rives (1892 to 1953). Russian pedagogue who invented an approach to educate homeless children (*bezprizorniki*) in Odessa. From 1924 onward, he taught in the Krupskaya Academy of Communist Education and other Institutes. Rives published his approach with his colleague N.M. Shul'man (e.g., Rives & Shul'man 1924; Shul'man & Rives 1922). The idea was that one first had to create feelings of joy, togetherness, and friendship in child collectives before other, corrective measures could be effective (Rives & Shul'man 1922, pp. 10–11). Vygotsky was quite positive about this approach

and in a book review he wrote: “Especially fortunate is the author’s use of the method of tests (or little tasks as the author himself calls them) in his studies. With the help of this method the children’s reactions to a concrete and complex real-life situation are studied and analyzed. This method combines the merit of the experimental test approach with the concrete, realistic, and practical nature of the simple interview” (Vygotsky 1929, p. 646). For Rives’ “method of collisions,” see Stoyukhina 2016, pp. 259–263. We were unable to find more information about the tests used by Yakobsen.

54. Abbreviation of *Domovyy Komitet* or Housing Committee of an apartment building in the Soviet Union. Housing Committees were very powerful and could decide, for example, that a family had to share its two-room apartment with one or two other families to solve the housing problem.
55. Wundt’s three-dimensional theory of emotion claimed that emotional quality results from the combination of six basic feelings organized in three bipolar dimensions (tension–relaxation, excitement–calm, and pleasure–displeasure).
56. See, for example, p. 371 of Freud (1920): “The condition of fear is in all cases purposeless and its lack of purpose is obvious when it reaches a higher level. It then disturbs the action, be it flight or defense, which alone is purposeful, and which serves the ends of self-preservation... Furthermore, you do not really believe that we flee *because* we experience fear? On the contrary, we first are afraid *and then* take to flight from the same motive that is awakened by the realization of danger. Men who have survived the endangering of their lives tell us that they were not at all afraid, they only acted.”

References

- Arievich, I. M., & Van der Veer, R. (2004). The role of nonautomatic processes in activity regulation: From Lipps to Galperin. *History of Psychology, 7*(2), 154–182.
- Bleuler, E. (1912). Das autistische Denken. In E. Bleuler, S. Freud, & C. G. Jung (Eds.), *Jahrbuch für psychoanalytische und psychopathologische Forschungen, Band 4* (pp. 1–39). Leipzig-Wien: Deuticke.
- Bodenhafner, W. B. (1923). Comte and psychology. *Papers and Proceedings of the American Sociological Society, 17*, 15–26.
- Chuchmarev, Z.I. (1928a). *Marksizm, psikhofiziologiya, uslovnye refleksy*. Khar’kov: Gosizdat Ukrainy.
- Chuchmarev, Z.I. (1928b). *Podkorkovaya psikhofiziologiya. Eksperimental’noe izuchenie povedeniya entsefalitikov-parkinsonikov*. Khar’kov: Gosizdat Ukrainy.
- Chuchmarev, Z. I. (1930). *Marksizm, psikhofiziologiya, uslovnye refleksy*. Moscow-Leningrad: GIZ.
- Claparède, E. (1918). La conscience de la ressemblance et de la différence chez l’enfant. *Archives de Psychologie, 17*, 67–78.
- De Greeff, É. (1927). Essai sur la personnalité du débile mentale. *Journal de Psychologie, 24*, 400–434.

- Feuerbach, L. (1923). Osnovy filosofii budushchego. In L. Aksel'rod-Ortodoks, A. Deborin, & D. Ryazanov (Eds.), *Sochineniya* (Vol. 1, pp. 76–140). Moscow-Petrograd: Institut K. Marksa i F. Engel'sa.
- Freud, S. (1920). *A general introduction to psychoanalysis*. New York: Boni and Liveright Publishers.
- Janet, P. (1928). *L'évolution de la mémoire et la notion du temps*. Paris: Chahine.
- Janet, P. (1929). *L'évolution psychologique de la personnalité*. Paris: Chahine.
- Jones, M. C. (1924). A laboratory study of fear: The case of Peter. *Pedagogical Seminary*, 31, 308–315.
- Katz, D., & Katz, R. (1928). *Gespräche mit Kindern: Untersuchungen zur Sozialpsychologie und Pädagogik*. Berlin: Julius Springer.
- Katz, D., & Katz, R. (1936). *Conversations with children*. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., Ltd.
- Küppers, E. (1922). Über den Sitz der Grundstörung bei der Schizophrenie. *Zeitschrift für die gesamte Neurologie und Psychiatrie*, 87, 545–552.
- Kretschmer, E. (1921). *Körperbau und Charakter: Untersuchungen zum Konstitutionsproblem und zur Lehre von den Temperamenten*. Berlin: Springer.
- Minkowski, E. (1927). *La schizophrénie: Psychopathologie des schizoïdes et des schizophrènes*. Paris: Payot.
- Petzelt, A. (1925). *Zur Frage der Konzentration bei Blinden: Eine psychologisch-pädagogische Studie*. Leipzig: Akademische Verlagsgesellschaft M.B.H.
- Piaget, J. (1928). *Judgment and reasoning in the child*. New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Company.
- Rives, S.M., & Shul'man, N.M. (1924). *Opyt kommunisticheskogo vospitaniya: Ot shkoly-kommuny k detskomu gorodku im. Oktyabr'skoy revolyutsii. Ser. 3. № 2*. Moscow: GIZ.
- Shul'man, N.M., & Rives, S.M. (1922). In V.P. Potemkin (Ed.). *Opyty i problemy sotsial'nogo vospitaniya: Ot shkoly-kommuny № 1 k detskomu gorodku im. Oktyabr'skoy revolyutsii. Vyp. 1*. Odessa: Izdatel'stvo Narkomprosa Ukrainy, Odesskiy GubONO.
- Storch, A. (1922). *Das archaisch-primitive Erleben und Denken der Schizophrenen: Entwicklungspsychologisch-klinische Untersuchungen zum Schizophrenieproblem*. Berlin: Verlag von Julius Springer.
- Storch, A. (1926). Über den psychobiologischen Aufbau der Schizophrenie. *Zeitschrift für die gesamte Neurologie und Psychiatrie*, 101, 748–769.
- Stoyukhina, N Yu. (2016). *Psikhologiya vozdeystviya v sovetskoy psikhotehnike: 1920–1930-e gg.* RIO YaGPU: Yaroslavl'.
- Valsiner, J., & Van der Veer, R. (2000). *The social mind: Construction of the idea*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Van der Veer, R., & Valsiner, J. (1991). *Understanding Vygotsky: A quest for synthesis*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Vygotsky, L.S. (1929). [Review of] S.M. Rives (1929), O metodakh pedagogicheskogo vozdeystviya: Besedy s uchitelyami. *Pedologiya*, 2(4), 645–646.
- Vygotsky, L.S. (1931a). Psikhotehnika i pedologiya. *Psikhotehnika i Psikhofiziologiya Truda*, (2–3), 173–184.
- Vygotsky, L.S. (1931b). Kollektiv kak faktor razvitiya anomal'nogo rebenka. *Voprosy Defektologii*, 1–2, 8–17; 3, 3–18.
- Vygotsky, L.S. (1987). *The collected works of L.S. Vygotsky Vol. 1. Problems of general psychology*. New York: Plenum Press.
- Vygotsky, L.S. (1993). *The collected works of L.S. Vygotsky Vol. 2. The fundamentals of defectology*. New York: Plenum Press.
- Vygotsky, L.S. (1997). *The collected works of L.S. Vygotsky Vol. 3. Problems of the theory and history of psychology*. New York: Plenum Press.
- Vygotsky, L.S. (1998). *The collected works of L.S. Vygotsky Vol. 5. Child psychology*. New York: Plenum Press.

- Vygotsky, L.S. (1999). *The collected works of L.S. Vygotsky Vol. 6. Scientific legacy*. New York: Plenum Press.
- Watson, J.B. (1924a). The unverballed in human behavior. *Psychological Review*, 31, 273–280.
- Watson, J.B. (1924b). *Behaviorism*. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., Ltd.
- Zavershneva, E Yu. (2016). Vygotsky the unpublished: an overview of the personal archive (1912–1934). In A. Yasnitsky & R. van der Veer (Eds.), *Revisionist revolution in Vygotsky studies* (pp. 94–126). New York: Routledge.

Chapter 12

From the EDI Clinic

This chapter is based on the notes Vygotsky made while working in the EDI clinic in 1931. The notes were found in a notebook with a black leatherette cover and written in pencil as well as in ink of various colors. On the first page is a deleted text written in ink: “The Second Moscow Medical Institute, Faculty of the Protection of Motherhood, Infancy and Childhood.” This is followed by the pencilled words “Book 1.” It is possible, then, that the present notebook belonged to a longer series of notes from the EDI Clinic. On the pages 2–13, all notes have been crossed out. They all had more or less an administrative character. There are names and telephone numbers, (e.g., I. M. Solov’ev,¹ L. V. Zankov,² and the psychiatrist V. M. Bانشchikov, who in 1931 headed the administration of the medical training in the RSFSR People’s Commissariat of Public Health) but also work schedules from January 1931, budget estimates for 1931 (equipment, teaching costs), and the plan for a course of 15 lectures in the Institute of Red Professors in Moscow. These have been left out in the present edition. From p. 14 onward there are notes about internal conferences, clinical demonstrations, and consultations. Among those present were Akkerman,³ Arkin,⁴ Birenbaum,⁵ Boskis,⁶ Gurevich,⁷ Leont’ev, Luria, Morozova,⁸ Ozeretskiy,⁹ Pevzner,¹⁰ Solov’ev, and Zankov. Other individuals, whose identity we could not establish, are mentioned as well: Vasilii Fedorovich, O. Vas., Ekaterina Kuz’minichna, Lidiya Konstantinovna, Dmitriy Ivanovich, M. Vl. Nevskaya, Tkachev, Lebedeva, A. Iv. (possibly A. I. Meshcheryakov or A. I. D’yachkov). Thirty-seven case histories of children are described in more or less detail. The majority were from disadvantaged families and were diagnosed as mentally retarded, but other diagnoses—such as epilepsy, post-encephalitic syndrome, hydrocephaly, microcephaly, Down syndrome, schizophrenia, and alexia—were present as well. Vygotsky spent considerable time in the clinic: In the interval from the end of September to the end of November, 1931, he had 15 appointments, i.e., approximately 2 appointments per week. The notebook contains one note from April 1932, and its final pages are dedicated to the exchange of books between Vygotsky’s collaborators. Among the names mentioned are Chuchmarev, El’yashev, Fel’dberg, Geshelina, Leont’ev, Libedinskiy, Luria, Pevzner, Schmidt, Shein, Solov’ev, Stupochenko, Veresotskaya, Zankov, and Zeigarnik.

The notebook is not published in its entirety, and the order of the fragments has been reconstructed. M. E. Osipov helped with the first deciphering of the text. We have selected the most valuable and most complete fragments connected with two meetings about Luria’s findings in Uzbekistan and two elaborate case histories. At the first meeting, part of the results of the first expedition to Uzbekistan were presented, which took place in May through July, 1931 (cf. Van der Veer & Valsiner 1991). These meetings were presumably held in June, and it is likely that the first meeting dealt with the first report that Luria sent to

Moscow.¹¹ The notes give us an invaluable insight into the initial reception of Luria's findings by his nearest colleagues and also mention some details (e.g., the use of the Rorschach test) that were hitherto just known from Vygotsky's correspondence (Rückriem 2008). The second meeting presumably dealt with a later report. Both texts should be compared to Vygotsky's lecture on perception (Vygotsky 1987), to Luria's own much later account of the results of the expeditions (Luria 1974, 1976), and to chapter 5 of Luria's daughter's memoirs (Luria 1994).

A considerable part of the notebook was dedicated to the case histories of special-needs children. Although it was known before that Vygotsky was involved in clinical consultation, we know of no previous descriptions of his practical involvement in the treatment of children. We here present two cases of boys diagnosed with mental retardation: Kolya S. and Naum P. In the case of Kolya S., we can see that Vygotsky, although amply using Kretschmer's terminology, in the end rejects an explanation based on heredity and constitution and points to the environmental triggers (school, a strict father) that caused the boy to develop his deviant behavior as a neoformation. The prospects for Naum P. seem to have been bleaker, but even here Vygotsky considered the possibility of a rehabilitation "from above," that is, by lifting the boy's cultural development to a higher level. In both cases, it is interesting to see that the experts, for example, the psychiatrist Akkerman, rejected Vygotsky's initial presentation of the cases along the lines of Kretschmer's theory as being schematic and contrived. Again, we see that even Vygotsky's closest colleagues were far more critical of his ideas than Vygotsky's present-day followers. The paragraph headings in bold script were added by the editors.

Results from Uzbekistan I

[Written in blue ink:]





The laboratory

A. R. [Luria] *The talk about perception*

1. What is a system. Psychologist reached false conclusions about the elementary functions, for they only function in systems.

[Written in pencil:]

2. Under other cultural conditions—another psychology.
3. Thinking has another function for them than for us: Instead of new connections and relationships, there is the reconstruction of whole situations. Cf. the adolescent—in phylogeny. *It is graphic, complexive, situational.*
4. A bus: big, red, many seats, a man is driving, sit down and you will see.¹²
5. Perception in the system of concepts and outside of it. *The historical components of perception. The illusions. The theory of perception is independent of the theory of the higher psychological functions—a false dogma.*

A drawing of  and  with the remark: *Physically or conceptually these unfinished structures are  and .*

Goldstein: *the disturbance of the concepts results from the Grundfunktion or vice versa.*

Simpler: *The higher suffers because of the elementary or the other way around.*

6. How do they *call* the figures, how do they assess them, how do they relate to them, how do they reproduce them. *The connection between perception and the*

word, and thinking, and memory. How do they operate with graphic perception; classification, a free relationship.

(1) *The perception of colors*; (2) *The perception of figures*; (3) *Illusions*

(1) *The perception of colors*

A. Color is an emotion, anti-intellectualism. The primitive and the civilized person have the same color perception—physiologically, but not psychologically. The primitive has a richer color vocabulary. Color aphasia.¹³

E[periment]. 27 silk skeins of various colors.

(a) naming; (b) divide into groups (active); (c) passive classification.

Spontaneous figure names (spontaneous or ethnographic names?)

Classification. Refusal—they are all different, some are dark, others are bright, in order of brightness.

(2) *The perception of figures*

Naming, classification, forced classification.

[Added in ink:]

Rorschach: the poverty of what they see. The subject regards it as a painting. One meaning suppresses the others. She points: I have not seen these before. They guess as if it were a riddle. One of two interpretations is correct.

[Written in pencil:]

0. The highest “+” evaluation: (a) rich material, (b) the novelty of phylogeny, (c) the novelty of the system.

1. What is a system—and the question of the term.
2. The question of the developmental perspective: up (*kolkhoze*), down (primitiveness).
3. Adolescence in phylogeny.
4. The graphic, concrete, situational, complexive nature.
5. Cf. the connection: the complex instead of the concept, *because* thinking relies on memory. Previously, both of these facts were established separately; now they are connected. The complex is an inevitable form of thinking, which relies on memory.
6. Perception is graphic thinking. But thinking has various forms.
7. My inadequate color perception. Eliasberg about colors. Stumpf’s son.¹⁴
8. Forced classification. A *selection* of colors (a collection) or syncretically (delicate colors).

[Written in black ink:]

9. It is interesting that our perception is much *purser* and that theirs is much more connected with thinking. I think that for animals and for us a \triangle and a $\triangle\triangle$ are equal, whereas for primitives 1 = a *tumar*¹⁵ and 2 = a clock (minute marks).

Köhler's laws remain [valid]. But illusions of relationship do not exist, i.e., their perception is purer.

10. Why the Δ = a suitcase? Cf. Kohs¹⁶ in children: something red and white.

[Continued in black ink on a free spot of the previous page:]

There are no abstract names for the form of the figures!!! Instead of a circle—the moon, money. \square is a bowl (the opening), \diamond is a wheel, \blacksquare = the moon: all these inappropriate names point to the fact that they do not perceive a form, but a meaning (a faint resemblance, a symbol).

11. There is no alternative: a metaphor—he sees the moon in the \circ .
12. A remarkable fact: they attach meaning to the nonsense figures (\circ is the moon), but attach no meaning to the Rorschach [inkblots]. A. R.'s hypothesis: They are guessing as in a riddle; they relate to the blot as if it were a meaningful figure. One meaning suppresses the others. Cf. Bleuler's experiments with schizophrenics and the Rorschach.¹⁷
13. Contra: Rupp's experiments.¹⁸ Why the figure may be reproduced in concepts. Because [they are] relationships, but relationships and their perception are the most primitive, preconceptual form. Cf. Volkelt's spider and the chicken in Jaensch and Köhler.¹⁹ There is no = [identity] between concepts and relationships.
14. Cf. Charpentier's²⁰ and Thurnwald's illusion.²¹
The students at the teachers' school + [have] illusions in 80%; those who do not study—[do not have] illusions in 80%??²²

[Written in pencil:]

15. Let us not make this mistake: Psychologists try to deduce intellect from the perception of relationships (Köhler and his apes), and we [deduce] perception from intellect.
16. Köhler—reject or demarcate while leaning on him? His regularities are pseudoregularities ($\sphericalangle = \triangle$),²³ i.e., what is historical is presented as eternal or as something that is lying in another plane (cf. *Gestalt* and *difficulty*). New factors. *Perception and meaning*—i.e., the interfunctional connections of perception. All transitions from merging *<Wahrnehmung> und Sinn*²⁴ to *<distinguishing them>*.
17. My introspection: Grass is both blue and dark.
18. Before the concept there is the pseudoconcept. For example, $\circ\circ\circ$, the primitive *should know* the circle.
19. [Here the note breaks off.]

[Written in black ink:]

The reproduction of figures.

Rupp's figure. Is reproduced as a flower.

The classification of figures (Fig. 12.1).

Only when they have the same name they go into the same group:

a is a *tumar*; b is a bucket; c is a bottle. "B" and "c" together and "a" separate.

1 is a window, 2 is a ruler, 3 is a *<frame>*. Impossible to classify.




Fig. 12.1 The classification of figures

Complexive classification.

(3) *Illusions*

Demoor's symptom.²⁵ Charpentier's illusion + optical illusions. The classic theories of illusions. Illusions of perspective do not exist.

Students at the teachers' school 47%, course members 53%, activists 60%, *dekhkany* 33%, women 27%.²⁶

There are no illusions of relationships.

[Written in pencil:]

Color naming.

Blue + green. It is interesting that he finds the right similarity: + – the color of pistachios.

Cf. Gelb and Goldstein: We can talk about the general while having in mind the concrete (cf. "this") and vice versa.²⁷

What is the concept of a \triangle . *All* connections. How difficult it was for me.

A. N. [Leont'ev] Not perception *in the system* but perception as a system. We do not have a name for the system itself nor for other systems.

Leading and secondary functions.

[All lines with a "!!" are boxed:]

!! Köhler and we: system and structure. A special type of structure, but an important one. The specifically human in the structures.

!! Perception depends upon a connection (a structure). The concept is a unique system of connections (a structure). Within this system, perception is *different* from what it is in the system of complexive connections. The use of "system" in a general and in a specific sense.

!! Animals are more slave of their perception than we are.

A. N. [Leont'ev]:

Generalization: According to A. R. the functions work in a different way in different systems;

According to A. N. the functions work in a different way at different levels.

Not perception in the system, but perception as a system.

The contrast: the *physical* and the higher.

G. V. [Birenbaum]:

Gestalt[theorie] is not refuted.

Why in the system of thinking and not in the affective-volitional sphere.

The primitive's and the aphasiac's description in the explanation of words is a functional definition. The primitive perceives concrete objects? Perception before concepts, the nature of primary perceptions.

N. G. [Morozova]:

System is a word with many meanings. Better less experiments but with clearer proofs.

Results from Uzbekistan II [Written in blue ink]

A. R. [Luria]

The elementary psychological functions in the system of concepts.

1. Elementary functions are the stones from which the higher processes are built and they themselves are immutable: traditional psychology. This is incorrect: They depend upon the higher systems.
2. The definition of concepts and the relation to the word. The definition via the connection of this meaning with other meanings. Cf. Selz, Roloff.²⁸
3. It is not true that the complex is the reconstruction of connections and the concept the establishment of new ones. Reproductions occur with a concept; productive thinking occurs with a complex.
4. When the word refers to an object, various meanings can easily develop: The word realizes its meaning in a concrete situation, as a synonym. Cf. Marr—the primary word, compare “this,” a definite article. The word of the person indicates the thing but does not mean it. Indicating and meaning are different psychological operations. The child makes the greatest discovery—not how to connect meaning and sign but how to *indicate a thing with a word*. These are different things. Hence, various word meanings may create a *similarity* with the metaphor. Cf. likeness: Every word is a metaphor. But this is a pseudo-metaphor, although exactly thanks to the possibility of indicating various objects by one word, the possibility of the transfer of meaning and its extension is created.
5. The subject creates a field, interpreting the definition of the concept (if a blind man asks me what the sun is, I give an answer).
The word has another function for the subject; The concept cannot be explained in words. For the subject, the function of a word is the reference to an object, not its meaning. It is possible to explain the word by referring to the graphic situation—to *show its “meaning”* but not to define it. One can explain its meaning: (1) only to someone who has not [sic] seen the sun; (2) by pointing to the sun or *near it* in the same area. If you had not seen mountains and I would tell you, you would not understand.²⁹ To understand means to see. Cf. Petzelt: word meaning for the blind. *Alles-wissen-können*: For the blind, black is just as black as for us.

7. For the subject, the definition of a concept is the reproduction of the situation and not the relationship in a system of connections. I was the first to pay attention to the fact that *for children the definition of concepts is either the verbal equivalent of a motor habit (a pseudoconcept)—a so-called functional definition—or a memory, i.e., complexive thinking.*
Cf. Golyakhovskaya.³⁰ It is incorrect that the concept is a generalization. Cf. Bergson. Cf. Isolating abstraction and generalization exists in animals.
8. The relationship exists in the family name as well: the son of this person, the brother of the other person, etc. But these are other relationships.
9. Judgments—instead of one predicate to the subject a whole story. It is difficult for the subject to *single out a beliebiges*³¹ *feature*, the predicates are verbose. Cf. the stories of concrete people, I phoned.
10. Part–whole: They mention the thing that comes closest: dog–cat.
11. New connections: It is not true that they are absent. The subjects are incapable of forming meaningless judgments not because there are no new connections but because there is no freedom and abstraction. This way a cock can write a letter, i.e., talk nonsense. Cf. the aphasiac: I cannot say “no.” Interpreting as foolishness. The task is meaningless and [the problem is] not that there is no limit to the meaningless judgments.
12. *Comparison.* A rose and a cucumber. Instead of subsuming them under one genus the creation of a situation in which both fit. Cf. the fish and the crow. The crow can peck the fish.³² *The comparison is a hidden generalization* via the genus. The person sits on the horse—This is the similarity. A typical complex. The poplar and the mountain. If we plant a poplar on a mountain, it will not grow. *Remarkable experiments: the indirect discovery of complexive thinking.* Cf. my research: We can distinguish the pseudoconcept and the concept by their functional results. We can exchange the names of the cucumber and the rose when they bloom. Cf. the schema of comparison in the concept (1) and the complex (2) (See Fig. 12.2).
The fish and the crow: The crow wants to drink in the water they share.
13. Instead of a (conceptual) *comparison*, we see a (syncretic) *mixture*. What is earlier, similarity or difference, cf. Claparède.³³
14. Choosing word meaning (justification) (my text)—all answers correct. Classification—everything correct.




Fig. 12.2 The schema of comparison in a concept and a complex

15. *Memory is impervious to contradiction.* Cf. my explanation of participation and the imperviousness to contradiction (Lévy-Bruhl and Piaget): They are inevitable in complexive thinking.
16. A. R.'s own example about the earthquake speaks against him: not the memory of a bull or vapors,³⁴ but the establishment of new connections of another type. Cf. Gita: a trifle this, a trifle not this. A little bit good, a little bit bad.

<...>

Clinical considerations I

The EDI Conference

16–10–1931. *The problem of the anamnesis.*

1. Myasishchev. Character and the past (the method of obtaining the anamnesis).
2. Yudin. Psychopathic constitutions (collecting data about heredity).
3. Sukhareva. About psychopaths-schizoids (anamnesis and catamnesis).³⁵

Clinical considerations II

[Written in violet ink:]

The nervous clinic

Two themes:

1. *In aphasia*—the study of intellect. Broaden the range of nosological forms of *schizophrenia*.
2. Complexive thinking (affective). Somatic neurotics. *Psychoneuroses*—affect and behavior.

The problem of character formation. Neurotics—psychopaths. The morbid-like condition [and] the role of consciousness in the structure of the reaction, how consciousness is overflowed with certain emotional experiences. Not nosological forms (a fiction), but syndromes (conditions).

[Written in pencil:]

Morbid-like reactions in psychopaths.

Psychoneuroses = sympathoses³⁶ + *psychopathic reactions*.

The case of Kolya S.

[Written in black ink:]

V[asilij] F[edorovich] and O. Vas.

Kolya S., 10 years.

Mentally retarded. Diagnosis: sch?³⁷

Mood changes: reticence and aggression (*bzw.*³⁸ dullness—quickness). Mendacity. Steals money for the *cinema*. In school he was silent. Answers only to questions he knows. *Suddenly a change of mood*: does not study, is pugnacious, behaves in an affected manner, does not control himself. *Attachment to the teacher*.

Hereditary taint in his character. Around three years he began speaking two words. Until 5 to 6 years spoke little and badly (seven words). Irritability from the age of eight. Why? His grandfather beat him in the head. A caring family, but they punish him. The influence of the street. *His younger brother began speaking earlier*. His physical development is below the norm (1–2 sd). Tbc intoxication. Pintner is 1,1.³⁹ He does not give the impression of a mentally retarded child, but there is underdevelopment. He became part of the collective, behaves well. *Bashful since he entered kindergarten. Is silent (moving his lips) in response to a question*. Becomes embarrassed, blushes. Mischief on the sly. Blushes when reprovved. Keeps his word. Reticent, does not share his feeling. *Bashfulness*. A big inferiority feeling. Alleviate. The family is backward, uncivilized. He reads, writes+.

Sch? Mental retardation?

What does he want? What motivates him? The mood changes are in which periods?

[The next three phrases are boxed:]

For the conference: (1) Not Adler; (2) anankastic⁴⁰—tertiary connections, self-concept, his father's severity, a deliberate mask; (3) [consider] the theory of conflict and development; (4) his ethics.

Clarify further: (1) the fixation mechanisms (the *Hemmungen*)⁴¹ of the secondary backwardness; (2) the demonstration, (3) the explanation of words and concepts.

The most important is his age: a seven-year-old; this is the leitmotif.

It is all very superficial there (before this two children [were examined])—here [he has] a hidden thorn in the flesh. *Ermutigung*.⁴²

Keeps his word—a symptom of the development of the personality (contra schizo). A sensitive child. An age syndrome. The reaction to school. *Minderwertigkeitsgefühl. Ausdruck*.⁴³

24–9. *Reasoning is difficult. Binet*—The failure strongly affects him, if he does not know *he is silent* or insecure. “You see, I know nothing,” with sadness. Minuses of 10, 9, and 8 years.

!60 words in three minutes! Not a single word. I cannot do it.

The conflict with O.V. <...> He reacts to O. V., plays the fool. He rushed to greet V. F.

4–10. No sch. Neurotic phenomena.

O. V., two reproofs during dinner: left the table, cried bitterly, Kolya beat him, he did not react. Behaves worse when O. V. is on duty. She talked it over with him: He behaves well. Kolya is a copy of his father. <...>

The association experiment. Kohs is okay. Protesting attitude.

[Written in pencil:]

!!*The combination: underdevelopment of speech + vital unsociability. Cf. dumbness and muteness. The characterological meaning of speech and muteness.*

Heredity and environment. *Minderwertigkeitsgefühl*—downtrodden. The difference between the nonverbal tests and Binet. Mental retardation? Sch? *The child has*

two faces, a characterological symptom. *No mood changes*. Environmental *neglect*. Physical development. A reaction to school. Borderline condition. Sensitive—keeps his word. A normal school or a special one?

[Written in violet ink:]

No mood changes, but two faces, their polarity and unity. The *Minderwertigkeitsgefühl* and the reaction to it, caprice, aggression, desorganization. Feebleness and the reaction to it. The three roots of the inferiority: objective inferiority, the beating, the school.

[Written in black ink:]

Many causes of the inferiority. A merging of motives, a bundle of motives, see Kretschmer, temperament and character.⁴⁴

The inferiority feeling is not an acute emotional experience but a character trait. Complexes. Mental retardation. Reflection, tries to improve himself, childish morals. Sensitivity to praise and reproof. “I can do it.” You may, you can, you must.

Three questions about his character: How does it function, how does it develop, what is its structure.

The mother: K. behaves well in the group because the others are worse. Towards the end Kolya himself: Here I learned the easy things and now I can do the hard things as well.

29–10. Outbursts. Talks defiantly, rudely. Mischief on the quiet. Becomes very agitated. He behaves well and wants to be released as soon as possible. He behaves well and wants that *everybody* knows it. The sensitive traits diminish, the expansive traits appear—another side of his personality. The same picture as at school. <Additional> requirements give good results, he begins to demand more [from himself].

What happened, what we provided.

19–11–1931

- (1) Underline the methodological aspects: heredity + anamnesis, etc.
- (2) The reaction to school: The autism in school developed from the psychaesthetic proportion + the *splitting* (the investigation), from which the proportion developed situationally (as a compensation, an accentuation) and the splitting as well.
- (3) Was silent—normal—was behind with counting, was bad at arithmetic. Group 1 = group 2—very good,⁴⁵ retardation, mischief, desorganization. Attachment, to be the first, keenness, a small capricious child, touchiness: attachment—stygma, defenselessness.
- (4) 3 m–3 years. In the crèche, 3 years—kindergarten, 1.5 years—in the village (the beating), 7; 9—school. Return to the complaints, explain them, and put an end to them.
- (5) He was brisk, lively, calm until three years. [He began] to understand [speech] when he was around one year old, the first words with three years, talks well around six years. From three years shyness and reticence. *Was ashamed of his*

speech. He was teased in the kindergarten. His younger brother was earlier—they were ashamed of Kolya. After the village, he was even more shy, reticent. He kept silent at school because he was afraid to make mistakes. The doctor: abnormal, the children tease him. “He became used to the children and became combative.” At home he is silent—a grudge. He can be happy for many days in a row. Reacts with mischief when people are strict and the other way around.

- (6) Children’s homes. The mother raised him in a strict way: [standing] in the corner for 2 hours, they beat him. He scolds his mother, unfair. The father neither fondles him nor beats him.
- (7) Pedagogical description. Blushed and answered what the children prompted. *Bends his head during the lessons: That is useful. The long underdevelopment left no traces.* **Sex** not noticeable. Unstable mood: *Grief upsets the routine.* His whole behavior depends upon how he feels about himself, upon his confidence. Feels a reprimand keenly: stops working. Does not set himself to work—I cannot do it, takes fright at what he did. “*Now it’s all the same: So be it.*” *A reproof strengthens* the reaction, no reproof and simple praise as well (they reveal his inferiority). Pedagogics of *Ermutigung*. *After his “now it’s all the same,” everything is ruined.* There are no affects. *He never cries.* Kolya, Vova, and Shura (a selective company). He teases the boastful mentally retarded (Naum) but not Vanya. He is not frank. *An inner boundary:* does not miss his family—remembers them sometimes lively, sometimes disdainfully. *Independent.* Responsibility and inferiority: *I must but I cannot: a conflict.* There is no stable interest. Inquisitiveness. Arithmetic was bad: *More success and he does it with great pleasure.* Caught up. He was pleased with the success: *And I can do this and that. A reproof works out well:* One can demand things. You may; you must. *Tires easily.*
- Freely read poems at the party. Adroit, musical, he loves to sing. *Given to acrobatics.* Overcomes difficulties: fights persistently. *Enthusiastic.* Indefatigable in repetition. Focuses on what went wrong. Tries to improve himself during the day as well. Resourceful. His motor skills are more developed by way of compensation.
- A child who turned asthenic. Tbc intoxication.
- (8) Mental **status.** Seems affable, *shy. Sad expression.* Poor vocabulary. Calm, happy, quickly excited. Emotional excitability. Morbid reaction to his inferiority. Suppression and delay of emotions. *Heightened self-esteem and ambition.* No impulsivity. Delay. More often an asthenic reaction, [but] to reproof a sthenic one.
- (9) Synkinesias—a retardation. General motor retardation.
- (10) Jung—family complex + speech = IQ—0.86. Pintner: IQ = 1.1, Kohs: IQ = 1.29.

Cultural development—the higher functions. Manages attention without mistakes. Mediated memory is high. The similarity in Volkelt’s test: color. Mystical worldview, soil is the basis of everything. The body is a bag with blood. Geography

is not *his* knowledge. Practically knows the solstice. Does not know the meaning of patronymic, meter, a lesson is 2 h, a full day, is not able to tell the time, the month. His domestic knowledge is better, but he does not know where butter and flour come from. The calendar shows the weather. A worker and a farmer are the same: because of his father. *He knows domestic life and the street.* Only elementary, essential comparison. Does not understand abstract words. *Deceit and mistake;* does not know the difference. Does not define or generalize. Does not understand deductions.

De Greeff—[he thinks] they are all alike—Vova, Yekat. K., he himself. Naum is at a lower level. He and O. Vas. are the same. Demoor is absent. Bogen is okay. He is not used to, is not capable of thinking. Artificialism. Practical attitude. *A narrow frame of mind:* He does not generalize in Pintner's test. *Self-contained.*

The diagnostic of development: hyperaesthetic and sensitive⁴⁶ (does not abstract). *A sthenic pole in a sensitive development.* *A merging of motives:* the polygenetic nature of the feeling of weakness. He compensates—at home it's no use. *Adroit* to counterbalance his (would-be) clumsiness. Bad at school. Intellectual inferiority. *Explain why arithmetic is difficult.* Read and spoke well; in the beginning he compensated, later he did not. *At school he was silent—a relapse: he is silent during hysteria.* In the clinical group the others are worse, he is better. *Fortified himself.* Asthenic constitution—hyperaesthetic temperament, sensitive type of development: heredity. Conflict (delay of affect), inferiority—a sthenic reaction (the opposite pole and a c[ompensa]tion. *Emphasize the neoformations.* Bad children and their role: the *passion for the cinema.* After a flogging, the antisocial acts disappear. *The cinema is the most typical compensation. That he goes to the cinema and was silent at school is connected.* "My brother is an ape, my father a swine." The relationship with his father has to do with the bad experiences.

Intellect—primitivism (the environment). Not low normal. The inferiority feeling is a characterological formation.

- (11) The prognosis. The prescription—a school for psychoneurotics. He attended our school. *A happy compensation: Placing him in the EDI did not hurt, but on the contrary helped him.* Which is not in line with Adler.

The demonstration. Good: He energetically reads the poems. Good: freely looks at all familiar and unfamiliar people. In the mornings he wants to go home, to study at school, but after dinner he wants to come to us.

L[idiya] K[onstantinovna]. The description makes him better and richer than he is. The street left hardly a trace—*he steals and incites the weaker children to steal.* He teases and offends those who are weak. Kolya dresses Anya and Vanga with pleasure, but vents his anger on the children. Buttoned up Anya's coat and kicked her. The oldest submits to the strongest. *His moral behavior is elementary.* A big fish in a small pond. The morals of a Kafir.

Aleks. Nik. [Leont'ev] A liar. Stirs up the others. Everything on the sly. This is an episode—not always. *To do things on the sly is his constant method, outwardly sweet, inwardly bad. Rotten to the core. He developed a mask: to be and to appear.*

A cycloid is outwardly bad, inwardly a pure sinner. *A tendency to automatization*: the law of habit in hysteria. Hysteric habituation, a tic, the *fossils of a neurotic reaction*, an elementary stage in the development of relationships with the external world.

Yekat. Kuz'minishna. Kolya does not systematically do things on the sly; [only] when he is distressed.

The double polarity in his character: elementary and secondary. The combative side of his nature according to Tolstoy.⁴⁷ *The delay of development of his character and intellect*. For a ten-year-old, he is a baby. This is the main difficulty.

M. Vl. [Nevskaya.] The positive content in his character is not exaggerated. The misdeeds are naughtiness and irritability. *The dividing line with infantilism*: instead of that a developmental delay at six years in one thing, at 10 years in another; a baby (as I wrote above), how he behaved here, with the teacher, etc. *Two faces*.

Vasilii Fedorovich: Is interested in the process of activity—without a plan. Takes no interest in the results. No effort, interest, stability, advanced only technically. No interest in the concrete.

[Presumably, the next phrase, written on the back of the page, also belongs to Vasilii Fedorovich's characterization of Kolya:]

I am leaving: he sings and drums for me on his own initiative. That which I asked him to do and what he did not do during the [demonstration].

Why do we disagree? Methodologically: the facts and their interpretation; scientifically: the elucidation of the facts.

The main thing: primary and secondary infantilism. From the very beginning there is a delay in development. There is fixation, freezing because of the conflict in development, in childhood.

Omitted: (a) *speech development (underestimated)*, the primary developmental delays; (b) the constitutional aspects are being overestimated. Much is deduced from the temperament, no division into primary and secondary (simple and complex) character properties; (c) there is no emotional experience, but there is the character and the situation⁴⁸; (d) there is no secondary infantilism; (e) the neoformations of his character are underestimated (the feeling of inferiority, the automatization, the duality–polarity in the structure and functioning of his character; (e) what is the sthenic pole—heightened self-esteem and ambition; (f) the duality; (g) *the accentuation of the sch traits* is an acquired trait; (+) (h) the sensitive type of *development* is not hereditary. I demonstrated him as an *example of a neoformation despite the heredity*; (i) an authoritarian tone does not work; (k) *Zudeckende Psychotherapie*⁴⁹ and remedial education; (l) remedial education to remove both causes and symptoms; (m) *his locomotion is uneven*—he is static, poor qualities, synkinesias⁵⁰; (n) *the causes of his autism* (speech, the psychaesthetic proportion, and the splitting)—the good attention—a symptom of splitting; (o) *anankastische Psychopathie*⁵¹—*the fatalistic nature of his character* (without fixed ideas)—the tertiary connections. Busemann⁵² about the genetic structure of the character, p) the complexes and the fixed idea. *A mosaic*: the extrapyramidal system is good,

synknesias [come from] the pyramidal system. Infantile are the preschool motor skills, the gracility. We did not cure the child: We did not remove the fixation in development or the secondary infantilism, but [we removed] the temporary reactions.

We must evaluate the result of the pedagogical work: We did not cure but removed (symptom treatment).

[Written in blue ink:]

Kolya S.—on the conference

The formula of development is a pedological diagnosis.⁵³

He wants to be a good boy—the polarity to the asthenic tendencies.

The enthusiasm in mathematics and the lack of attention in manual labor: *two faces*.

I cannot—you can. The conflict creates *Hemmungen* in his development. *Age is the main thing: As a preschool child he reacts differently, as a school child he becomes sthenic: We must not disregard age and proceed from the logic of the abstract development of a conflict; the course of development unwound the conflict. Hence, we can locate the [origin of the] conflict at the age of seven (he did not manage the big change).*⁵⁴

[Written in black ink:]

Kolya S.

27–11–1931. Conference.

There is a sentence written in blue ink between the date and the word “conference,” which perhaps does not belong here: [The material penury in light of the hereditary condition.]

1. The theoretical meaning of heredity. A structural analysis. The connection between the properties. The constitutional hereditary (genotypic) form.
2. Emphasize the study’s methodological principles.
3. Yesterday’s demonstration: acrobatics. There we saw in condensed experimental form Kolya’s two faces (the schizo-silent one and the joyful-confident) separately. Today he guessed the course of the experiment: You are asking difficult things all the time. Today *both* faces together—in one moment—the *ambivalence* of his behavior here: he both wants and does not want. *Reads poems* (after we left). *A preschool, superficial* offense (he very rapidly forgot about it, *schizo* painful). But a *childish* radiance, *ambition* and *pride* with childish bashfulness, timidity (a sthenic pole with an asthenic character). The two faces are not those we see in Vasilij ‘Fedorovich[’s account].’

What did we see? Childishness. A seven-year-old who combines preschool and school traits. Ambivalence, two faces. A contradictory feeling. A conflict: the counter-tension of his character. The heightened self-concept is a trait of the school age. What have we done?

Kolya's developmental schema

The formula of development (the diagnosis of development).

[The text is accompanied by a figure with several numbered circles connected by lines. The first circle represents the primary core of the disease symptoms. Points 1 to 3 belong to these "Primary core of difficulties"; points 4 to 6 to the "The crèche period. Secondary aspects of development"; point 7 (and, possibly, points 8 and 9 as well) belong to the "Tertiary aspects. The preschool period." An added note says: "*Finish it: the formula of development + take the comments into account.*"]

1. Primary infantilism (the delay of development).
2. A special delay of speech and the developmental disposition it creates (demands ↔ possibilities).
3. The asthenic–schizothymic (genotypical) structure of the body, temperament, and intellect and psychophysiological-constitutional infantilism.
4. The infancy complex.
5. The mental and physical retardation.
6. The primary conflict.
7. The general conflict: a general deficiency, a defeat on all fronts, the accentuation of the asthenic character, he is overwhelmed by helplessness.
8. The compensatory development of opposite forces, the sthenic pole.
9. The secondary delay of development of the intellect and the character. Secondary infantilism.
10. The fixation of development when he was seven years old (a transitional age period).
11. The syndrome of mental retardation
12. The exogenic syndrome, sch.
13. A desorganizer, the aggression of the school age.
14. The tertiary character connections: the self-concept, a fatalistic syndrome.

Conference: Kolya S.

Akkerman: 1. Sympathy for the path of the study. 2. There is a gap between the methodological approach and the interpretation of the case. 3. The use of ready-made categories. We are the captives of Kretschmer and Adler. A flattening of the personality. 4. The social neglect is regarded as a sthenic reaction. Not because the boy tempted him [to steal money]. A methodological mistake. 5. *Sch* is not most important. Infantile: a hysteroid demonstrative and primitive reaction. The distinguishing characteristic. There is no sch. A narrowing of the concept – *schizothymia*. *Ewald*⁵⁵: Kretschmer constructed sch. based upon characterology but the cycloids along the lines of the temperament. Hence the precipice. The schema: sthenia and asthenia. Less dogmatic. Interpret the social behavior, the supra-characterological, more cautiously.

Arkin: It is all about where you put the emphasis: *sch. reaction* + conflict, or *conflict* + *sch. reaction*.

NB! *My answer*. NB! The boy tempted him to steal money.

1. What is the methodological core: (a) complex structures, (b) the laws of structure are the laws of development. The pedological point of view [must be applied] to the psychoneurological subjects as well.
2. Why not Kretschmer and Adler: (1) *the structure of development*, (2) why not infantilism + neurotic reaction. (2a) In the demonstration I will use [them].
3. Why not ready-made categories—[for me] systematization [comes] in the last place. We deduce nothing from it. Boxed: In favor of the environment contra heredity.
4. Why is it not a matter of emphasis: The point is multidimensionality, concreteness, geneticism, and structural properties.
5. *What is the fundamental discussion*: heredity and environment. Development repeatedly exceeds what is primary (but not what is fundamental). Boxed: Motor skills and manual labor.
6. Where do we rely on Adler and Kretschmer—(1) the empirical material, (2) we cannot make up everything, (3) Kretschmer [is valuable] where he deviates from his doctrine.
7. What is the main thing with Kolya: (1) a secondary delay of development, (2) a fixation of development, (3) the development of mental retardation, (4) the development of sch. (autism).
8. The gap between methodology and research.

Written in the margin: [There are two simplifications: Kretschmer's schema and mine. They more often accused me of complicating things.]

[Written in blue ink:]

On Kolya S.: at school, how *developed* the psychoaesthetic proportion (the hypersensitivity and apathy) + splitting (on the sly, the external mask, at home [the reaction] to the severity—his withdrawal), which caused the autism (the silence, reticence). All these aspects are not simply an accentuation of constitutional traits but a characterological neof ormation in the full sense of the word. Cf. the autodiagnosis of his character with me in the clinic: the psychoaesthetic proportion + splitting = autism.

A note that runs along the text but was written before the description of the case history: [*Lewin, tests. Kretschmer. <illegible>. Introspection <illegible> and Ermutigung.*]

Concepts and complexes. The systemic analysis of character. The level of emotionality *according to Bühler. The qualitative analysis of tests.*

The case of Naum P.

L.V[ladimirovich Zankov] and Al. Nik. [Leont'ev]

Naum P., 14 years (14;2)

Retardation. Kind, obedient. Damages things, steals money (does not spend it). Good hearing. Nervosity, fearfulness, irritability. Lissom. Dexterous. Dances.

The special school sent him off. Three years therapy with Azbukin: poor progress. Physical development is normal. Binet is 0.47; 0.53 (?), Kohs 14+.

Imbecilitas. Sch?

7 children. *Enuresis*. The children mock him, tease him. His reaction is calm: There is nothing to be amazed about, I am a backward boy, I wet myself everyday. Sometimes he cries.

Compensation of the defect through speech. Solid reasoning, a philosophizer. A heightened self-esteem: [He wants to be] director of a factory, earn well, live the good life.

[His] calculation [is bad]—but [he shows] intuition for calculation.

He does not make friends with the children, a disorganizer. He hangs around with the preschool girls. He loves to talk. *Enuresis + pride*. He wants to go home. He reads haltingly, his writing is bad. Persistently talks about home. A vulture, not children but devils. *Onanism*. He exposed himself with pleasure. Sleeps badly. Ambivalent reactions when undressing.

“I know more than you, and you will teach me?”

Asks to wake him up because of his enuresis. Is joking.

The syndromes:

Imbecilitas. Sch. De Greeff. Enuresis. Compensation. Thinking?? Locomotion. Verbalism. Cultural development. Quick in practical things. Character. Reaction formations to teasing, *enuresis*. Secondary *schizo* symptoms—a clinical *<res>*.

The pedagogical conclusion: a weak link. Sexual manifestations. Psycho-orthopedia from the higher floors.⁵⁶ The dynamics: development and disintegration.

No concreteness, no syncretism. Obsessiveness. Dissatisfaction. “He does not want to go down.” He wants to go home. A dream: A black man touched [his father?]. His father beat him. The negro or madman *began to kill* his father. “A nice dream!” See V. F.’s note.

24–9. V. F.’s note about the family drama.

4–10. The same horrible dream, he does not want to have such dreams.

His father beat his sister. He is a troublemaker. He [the father] is afraid of him, he punishes his father. He is a hero. He quarrels with Lyosha: *Your father is a troublemaker, a cheat, a thief.*

5–10. *During the lessons at the Medical Institute.*

“I am *not* stupid” at every turn (cf. *not* as in Freud). They *all* think that I am stupid, but I think that I am clever. Verbal villainy. *In incoherent words.*

The analysis: (1) an emotional logic in his incoherent words. A fool for [the] psychoa[nalyst], and [a] psychoa[nalyst] for the fool! Consciousness and the unconscious.

29–10. Laughing: Your father died.⁵⁷ Complains to his brother that he does not feel comfortable.

[L.V.] Zankov. *Naum P.* (continued)

Naum is an expansive schizoid <illegible>, the “characterological traits are more clearly expressed in relatives than in the patient himself” (Kretschmer).⁵⁸ He

stopped walking at the age of 1.5. Walked again with five years. They beat Naum. His father asked to poison him. *Sprechlust*.⁵⁹ The children frightened him—anxiety attacks. Rossolimo⁶⁰—mental retardation. Fears, alarm. His father: Let him drop dead. He does not bring his father⁶¹—He lies. The anger at his father is spite.⁶² *Meaningful activity because of the motor agitation*. He loves to doll himself up, learned to dance. Smoked. Is ashamed of his enuresis. “I study in the third group.” Explains his mother why he talks like that.

On the interpretation: De Greeff contra Adler: false. At the basis of his high self-esteem is frustration + stupidity (an uncritical attitude) as a contributing factor (explicit autism—the boundaries between consciousness and the unconscious have shifted). Contra Adler: The (**hyper**)compensation comes from an inner purposefulness, from richness. Sch. Imitated manners? Naum *wants* to be (seem) intelligent. The disguise and the depreciation of the question form a complex strategy: The stupidity is not stupidity but strategy. The debate whether Naum is sthenic or asthenic (i.e., expansive or sensitive) is decided on the basis of the primary and the secondary. Primary are his kindness and fear, secondary the protest, the activity. Cf. [below] its hygienic meaning.

The demonstration 31–10

Verbal villainy. “What happened to your father will happen to you.” Depreciates the question. Who is more intelligent as in De Greeff: the e[xperimenter] tries to depreciate his judgment. Naum: “If I compare you with my mate, he is intelligent, and you are stupid.” A clear tendency to reverse the real situation: “They are all stupid, I am smart.” Also is clear: The self-concept is not the result of placid stupidity but caused by frustration; ambivalence—When you ask about his self-concept (1) you touch the sore spot; it is a self-concept with a fissure, (2) but at the same time he is satisfied with it, balm on the wound. *Gioconda’s mysterious smile*. What does it mean: the *formula of his development*. (1) I am stupid: This is unbearable; you are stupid—I am a clever boy; (2) I am afraid of everything: this is unbearable; I am a scoundrel, you are all afraid of me. *An expansive and sensitive character?* A **quasi**-delusional system, but he himself both believes it and does not believe it: like a children’s game. Ambivalence during the demonstration: frustrated (angry) + glad (because the deficiency + the boasting manifest themselves simultaneously). He goes under and does not want to go under: desperately tries to break loose, clutches at a straw, gets stuck. A tragic sight. A forced, spasmodic development of various functions.

But is it desintegration or underdevelopment of the personality? Another system. *A complex or a fixed idea*—his emotional attitude. Is the *leit motiv* (purposefulness) objective or subjective? He is suffering. He tries to rise above his nature. The secret of his failure: There are no concepts and there is no *mastery of the self*, i.e., *emotionally there is the drive to get out, but refracted through the prism of a complex and not a concept, without understanding himself, in the dark, in the twilight of consciousness, without the path to volition through the concept—he does not arrive at a fixed idea*. Cf. Basov,⁶³ *two types of fixed ideas. The Freudian complex and the complex in thinking*. Boundless meaning for the study of character,

an inexhaustible source of knowledge. In his tendency, “*I want to go home,*” manifest themselves two unconscious tendencies: 1) I do not feel comfortable (here), I do not want it to be like this, it is painful and 2) a fit of *Sehnsucht*,⁶⁴ a rush—away from here, obsessive restlessness. For the child, this is to go home, for the adult to go to the otherworld. But it is the same metaphysics: away from the world into the surreal.

Moreover, he complains: It is bad here, they do not teach = I feel bad.

How it all fits *together*: In his hygienic utterances (I must not cry, it harms the heart) there is not just the philosophizing but also the inclination to and the susceptibility to what is anxious-suspicious, cautious, and timid. Cf. sthenic or asthenic (of the indirect symptoms). The dislike for his father is felt as a complex or a fixed idea and sthenically or asthenically.

[Added in a box:]

The unpleasant feelings when he thinks about himself are additional symptoms to De Greeff: a positive emotional evaluation of the test, a negative one, and a mixed one.⁶⁵

*Catathymic thinking—the weak are the day-dreamers (according to Blonskiy).*⁶⁶ Another symptom: what is hidden, is secondary: for the sensitive person it is pride; for the expansive one it is frustration. Naum has a <sthenic> [reaction].

The change of his emotional evaluation when he dreams about his father. The dream: The whole group burnt.

Naum in the collective: (1) The collective does not treat him well, (2) but Naum to them is arrogant, disdainful, he derides and depreciates them.

Encephalitis—not typical?

The etiological analysis is not an etiological analysis in the old sense.

The structure of his personality: The basis is a lowering of the intellect, a characterological superstructure. The primary symptoms: attention, stereotypy, combining, the superficiality of the associations. Motor idiocy (!). Memory + high capacity for imitation. Constitution: belongs to the expansive schizoids, schizothymic sthenic temperament. Cultural development—a retardation according to his age. *Primitiveness* (mnemotechnic memorizing is lower than natural memory, judgments). In general: a larger retardation of the higher functions compared with the lower ones. Not like a preschool child: The structures are there, but there are no functions. Arithmetic. The defect has a double meaning: The compensation is speech because he is sthenic, active, strives to show his worth; he is not indolent, apathic, not passive, like mentally retarded children; his speech is the weak spot, where the chain of defectiveness is broken [sic]. The speed test with images⁶⁷ exists for deaf-mute children because of speech; Naum has speech, but fails nevertheless. *Naum's speech and thinking are in different systems.* Practical intellect is the line of real compensation, but practical intellect without speech. *The inferiority feeling is accentuated by a schizo character.* Naum does not have a pure character in the constitutional sense. Qua character he is a dysplastic, i.e., the mix of asthenic and sthenic traits does not follow the laws of composition of the temperament.

There are no neurotic superstructures. De Greeff: He deduces his self-concept on the basis of his understanding (i.e., from logic), the feeble-minded is a genius for the imbecile. De Greeff: Where there seemingly is just one symptom, there is a bunch of them; We must differentiate them. *Autism and speech*—Piaget, Bleuler, Freud: concepts and feelings.

Twelve of such histories of development [and] the victory is guaranteed.

My joy. (3)–(4) the higher functions and the lower ones. Methodologically closer to the proposition. What is most important: (1) defect and compensation, which already *implicite* contains the second idea; (2) the complex structure of mental retardation, its laws of composition are the laws of development, which include the laws of pathology as a subordinate element; and (3) the systems. Naum develops *as someone who is doomed*, not as a fighter with a destiny. *Fate and personality*.

Written in the margin: [Clear and understandable.]

For Naum, the function of speech is catathymic: a servant of the passions. An autistic wish fulfillment. While solving a test, he praises himself: “Hey, well done by that boy, no fool could do that.” In the collective they treat him badly, but he is also intolerable in the collective.

From the same test—fixed ideas in love and politics, in poets and madmen.

Sensitive and expansive [types of] !development!

The buffoonery. A paranoid attitude without intellectual possibilities. The superstructures are active, i.e., not a superstructure, not a superposition, but a *neoformation*; Basov about volition⁶⁸: the evaluation of the functions according to his age, *the last are the most important*.

The epigraph to the whole work: There is system (method) in this madness—Polonius. There is meaning in his meaninglessness.⁶⁹

During eurhythmics, while investigating his motor skills: He thinks this is unworthy of him, below him; it causes a secondary inhibition.

Compensation follows fictive paths (but not in his dreams), but [the result is?] a disguise. The line of real compensation is practical intellect.

The prognosis: unfavorable. But dissolution or development? His self-concept: the result of his activity, his intellect develops, his character diminishes. A violation of Terman’s rule.⁷⁰ His IQ grows, but his cultural underdevelopment points to a bad prognosis; He owes everything to his residual natural and compensatory possibilities. He reads. A good prognosis (?)

Pedagogical questions: switch to real compensation. Removal of the inferiority feeling without mechanical training. Aufdeckende or zudeckende Psychotherapie?⁷¹ The splitting. A cloak. Proceed from the Idealbild.⁷²

Psycho-orthopedia⁷³—reconsider: to reach the deeper layers of the personality, the higher functions and especially the *personality*. The collective. A special school for the feeble-minded. In a collective of more intelligent children, his development is inhibited (despite the difference in levels). Among the stupid ones he also sinks. Our children will not do.⁷⁴

Ivan Mikhaylovich [Solov'ev]: Naum is stuck in an armor of optimism, complacency, and gaiety. It is not true. *His varnish is tragic.* Last year, the mongoloid Kolya had an infrangible shell.

M. S. [Pevzner?]: As a schizothyme, Naum after the encephalitis did not become anti-social or immoral but remained within the boundaries of his personality. His speech and thinking are schizothymic. Rational psychotherapy?

[Written in blue ink:]

Naum P.

27-9-31. Conference.⁷⁵

1. Naum's emotionality is vented in the paradoxical form of a complex and fulfills the functions of a fixed idea (because of the shifting border between consciousness and the unconscious). On the one hand, it is a complex, but on the other a fixed idea. If he were more intelligent, he would be a paranoiac.
2. Enuresis and pride (Freud): the divergence between his chronological age (14 years) and his real age (1 year—he wets his bed).

[The continuation of the note was not found.]

Naum P.

Final conference. 27-11-1931

Remark above the text: [Write down everything]

1. Finish the formula of development, the diagnosis and the *schema*. Take the objections into account. See the schema on the preceding page.
2. Accentuate the demarcation and the fundamental conception of the study in all its uniqueness.
3. Cf. the debate between Freud and Bleuler about the primacy of the *Lust-* and the *Realitätsprinzip*.⁷⁶ Cf. the role of speech in the development of autistic thinking: contra the thesis about the nonverbal, graphic nature of autistic thinking. Contra the thesis about the egocentric nature of child speech in Piaget.
4. How he behaved during the demonstration: (1) the depreciation of the question; (2) the ostentatious intelligence, better, the disguise of his stupidity, his pungency; (3) the pose of independence and superiority; (4) the combative, strategic attitude whose meaning was: I am not stupid and I do not allow you to depict me as stupid; you are stupid, I am intelligent; (5) sometimes his talking is more intelligent, sometimes less (cf. a fish has wings).

Akkerman: (a) Particularly interesting for oligophrenia. The psychiatrist works with structures. Compensation by the brain (speech) and not psychologically. *Not one bit of schizoidity*. More likely, the syndromes (where there are no genetic connections) form an epileptoid syndrome (the outbursts, emotionally tense, the explicitness of his drives). He fits the collective of mentally retarded psychopaths.

(b) Why the misunderstanding: The *core* of his personality are the epileptoid traits. We claimed that the sch. is primary, but it is *not the core*. This is the point.

The main attitude: spite, vindictiveness, I will set [everything] afire. That does not point to genetic connections but to syndromes.

S. Ya. Rabinovich. His speech is unusual for an imbecile—the uniqueness of the case. His whole behavior [follows] from his intellect—no sch. traits whatsoever—it cannot be fitted into this framework. <...> A Procrustes bed.

The difference is that for you behind the sch. is the whole person [and] for us a primary piece of protoplasm.

Notes

1. Ivan Mikhaylovich Solov'ev (1902 to 1986). Russian psychologist, defectologist, and collaborator of Vygotsky. Studied the influence of education on children with developmental delay, the problem of will and motivation, and the psychophysiological aspects of the cooperation of the senses in children with visual and hearing impairments.
2. Leonid Vladimirovich Zankov (1901 to 1977). Russian psychologist, defectologist, and collaborator of Vygotsky. Author of a program for developing education, researcher in the areas of memory, educational and special psychology, the psychology of the deaf, etc.
3. Vladimir Iosifovich Akkerman (1890 to 1972). Russian psychiatrist and specialist in the field of forensic and military psychology. Worked from 1927 in the Serbsky State Scientific Center for Social and Forensic Psychiatry and at the First Moscow Medical Institute. From 1933 onward, headed faculties of psychiatry at medical institutes in Irkutsk, Minsk, Izhevsk, Samarkand, and Grodno.
4. Yefim Aronovich Arkin (1873 to 1948). Russian psychologist, pedagogue, and physiologist. Studied the physiology, neuropathology, and psychology of preschool children. Originated a theory of iatrogenetic pathology and first described the signs of iatrogenetic disease as an independent nosological unit. Organized and headed the first Faculty of Preschool Pedagogy of the Second Moscow State University.
5. Gita Vasil'evna Birenbaum (1903 to 1952). Russian psychologist and co-founder of Russian psychopathology. Studied in Berlin and wrote a famous dissertation about the forgetting of intentions under the supervision of Kurt Lewin. Moved back to the USSR in 1930 and began studying psychopathology in the Moscow Institute for the Study of Higher Nervous Activity of the Communist Academy (later part of VIEM). Later she did research in the Solov'ev Psychiatric Hospital in Donskaya Street (cf. the notebook "The Donskaya Clinic" in chapter 27) and in the Ul'yanovsk and Ryazan hospitals.
6. Rakhil Markovna Boskis (1902 to 1976). Russian pedagogue, defectologist, and surdopedagogue. Began working at the EDI in 1931. Authored publications in the field of anomalous child development, the teaching of children with hearing impairments, and methods to alleviate the problems of special-needs children.
7. Mikhail Osipovich Gurevich (1878 to 1953). Russian psychiatrist, psychoneurologist, and one of the founders of Russian child psychiatry. From 1925 to 1934, she headed the Morphological and later the Clinical Department of the Institute for the Study of Higher Nervous Activity at the Communist Academy

and worked as professor (1931 to 1937) at the Faculty of Psychiatry of the Second Moscow Medical Institute.

8. Nataliya Grigor'evna Morozova (1906 to 1989). Russian psychologist, defectologist, and pedagogue. Close collaborator of Vygotsky. Subsequently worked at the Institute of General and Educational Psychology of the APN RSFR. Studied, among other things, the development of speech and anomalous child development.
9. Nikolay Ivanovich Ozeretskiy (1893 to 1955). Russian psychiatrist, student of P. B. Gannushkin, specialist in child psychiatry and forensic psychiatry, and author of a method to diagnose the motor development of children and adolescents. From 1929 onward, he was the head of the Faculty of the Psychopathology of Childhood of the Herzen State Pedagogical Institute and from 1933 onward the head of the Faculty of Child Psychiatry. Author of a popular handbook, *Textbook of Psychiatry* (1937).
10. Mariya Semenovna Pevzner (1901 to 1989). Russian psychologist, psychiatrist, pedagogue, and founder of Russian clinical defectology. After her talk, "Difficult children," at the First All-Union Congress on the Study of Human Behavior (Leningrad 1930), she was invited by Vygotsky to come to the EDI to work as a psychiatrist. Later she became a researcher and studied child psychopathology. Pevzner proposed an approach to the clinical-genetic and psychological diagnosis of abnormal child development based on Vygotsky's ideas and also advanced a new classification of oligophrenia.
11. It is known that Luria communicated his results to Vygotsky in the form of short reports sent by mail and that Vygotsky reacted very enthusiastically. So far, the following letters dealing with the results of the expedition are available: Vygotsky to Luria, June 1; June 12; June 20; July 11, August 1 (cf. Rückriem 2008) and Luria to Vygotsky, June 12 (report 2) and July 13 (report 5). In his letter of June 12, Vygotsky acknowledges the receipt of a letter by Luria and mentions that he presented the part that dealt with experimental findings (presumably, report 1) to their colleagues. He also mentioned some details (e.g., work with the tests of Rorschach, Kohs, and Rupp) that make it likely that the account of the first meeting reflects the discussion of Vygotsky's presentation of Luria's findings and took place between June 1 and June 12. However, we cannot establish this with any certainty, and it remains theoretically possible that both meetings took place somewhere in September or October when Vygotsky and Luria had both returned from vacation.
12. The definition of a bus by one of Luria's subjects. See p. 87 of Luria (1976). Cf. the definition of an omnibus by a child on p. 602 of Binet (1890): "There are soft seats. You have three horses, they run; you hear "din.""
13. Color aphasia may refer to the inability to classify colors into different groups (e.g., reds, greens, etc.) or to the inability to produce their names (*Farbennahmenaphasie* or anomia). In both cases, the colors as such can be seen and distinguished.

14. Refers to Stumpf (1900). Elsewhere Vygotsky described this example in more detail. For example, in his lecture “The crisis of the first year of life,” read on December 21, 1933, at the Herzen State Leningrad Pedagogical Institute, he wrote: “The meaning of the word did not yet have an objective constancy. We have a similar example from observations of Stumpf’s son, who called one and the same color by different names. Green against a white background and green against a black background had different names depending on the structure in which the color was perceived.” See pp. 255 of Vygotsky (1998). See also his lecture on perception (Vygotsky 1987). That Vygotsky was colorblind was known from a letter to Luria dated June 20, 1931. Cf. Rückriem (2008).
15. In Central Asia, a *tumar* is a special case, usually made of silver, to carry an amulet that protects the person against evil. It is worn from birth to death and often has the form of a triangle. Cf. Chvyr’ (1986).
16. Samuel Kohs (1890 to 1984). American psychologist who developed the Block Design Test, a non-verbal IQ test for use with children and adults with language or hearing disabilities. Subjects were asked to replicate patterns displayed on a series of test cards using 16 colored cubes. Scores were based on completion time.
17. Cf. Vygotsky’s lecture on perception on pp. 294–295 of Vygotsky (1987) taking into account that all names are misspelled. Hermann Rorschach (1884 to 1922), a Swiss psychiatrist, discovered that schizophrenics gave other reactions to inkblots than healthy people. Both Rorschach’s teacher, Paul Eugen Bleuler (1857 to 1939), and his son, Manfred Bleuler (1903–1994), were Swiss psychiatrists and specialists in the study of schizophrenia. Vygotsky refers to Manfred.
18. Hans (actually Johann Baptist Carl) Rupp (1880 to 1954). Austrian-born German psychologist and founder of German applied psychology (or psychotechnics). With his teacher, Carl Stumpf, he established a Division of Applied Psychology at the Psychological Institute of Berlin University in 1921. Vygotsky may refer to Rupp (1927), the Russian edition of Rupp (1919).
19. Hans Volkelt (1886 to 1964). German psychologist, specialist in developmental psychology, and political education; politically, a national-socialist. In his dissertation (Volkelt 1912), he showed that “the spider goes through accurate movements when trying to get its prey from the web into the nest, but becomes lost when the same prey is removed from the web—that is, from the total complex situation to which the spider is accustomed—and placed directly in the spider’s nest.” See p. 317 of Van der Veer & Valsiner (1994). Vygotsky argues that seeing a circle as a moon does not require real conceptual thinking but instead relies on visual similarity or the perception of visual relationships. In that connection, Volkelt’s spider is an example of not recognizing a prey as prey outside of the usual context.
20. Augustin Charpentier (1852 to 1916). French physician, specialist in the physiology of vision, and author of a number of publications about (non-existing) N-rays. In Charpentier’s illusion, or “size–weight illusion,” of two objects with equal weight but different size, the smaller object is perceived

- to be heavier than the larger one. The illusion is not fully understood. Cf. Vygotsky's lecture about perception (Vygotsky 1987).
21. Richard Thurnwald (1869 to 1954). Austrian lawyer and anthropologist. In the early years of his career, Thurnwald investigated the thinking processes of people in various non-western cultures. Like W. H. R. Rivers, he studied color vocabulary using threads of wool that had to be named or grouped together. Vygotsky made ample use of Thurnwald's ethnographic examples and was strongly influenced by his theorizing (Van der Veer & Valsiner 1991).
 22. These numbers do not correspond with any of the numbers provided on p. 44 of Luria (1976).
 23. Refers to the law of closure. On the basis of Luria's results, Vygotsky argues that the Gestalt laws of perception are not general and based on properties of the brain or visual system but are culture-bound. Koffka, who participated in the second expedition to Uzbekistan and repeated Luria's experiments, fundamentally disagreed with this interpretation. See pp. 249–250 of Van der Veer & Valsiner (1991). The whole idea of investigating the occurrence of visual illusions in "primitive" cultures goes back to William Halse Rivers Rivers (1864 to 1922), the British neurologist, psychologist, psychiatrist, and founder of anthropology who worked with Henry Head and who with William McDougall participated in the famous Torres Strait expedition of 1898. Rivers found, contrary to the expectation of his contemporaries, that "primitives" were less susceptible to illusions, such as the Müller-Lyer illusion, than European subjects.
 24. Perception and meaning or sense (German).
 25. Jean Demoor (1867 to 1941). Belgian physiologist, educator, and organizer of the first special schools in Belgium. Published several books about the rearing and teaching of anomalous children, which were translated into German and Russian. Demoor's symptom is the absence of the above-mentioned size-weight illusion in mentally retarded children.
 26. Again, these percentages do not correspond with the data for optical illusions provided by Luria (1976). Perhaps Luria summarized the data of the two expeditions. A *dehkan* (plural *dehkany*) was a peasant who worked his land or tended his cattle in the traditional way, i.e., without western technology.
 27. Refers to pp. 182–183 of Gelb & Goldstein (1925).
 28. Otto Selz (1871 to 1943). German Jewish philosopher and psychologist who elaborated the ideas of the Würzburg school and developed a non-associationist theory of problem solving. In his view, productive thinking is connected with the completion of incomplete structures. His ideas influenced such notable thinkers as Adriaan de Groot, Karl Popper, and Herbert Simon. Selz was arrested in Holland, where he had sought refuge, and killed in Auschwitz. Hans Paul Roloff (1883 to ?). German developmental psychologist who lectured in Hamburg. Vygotsky refers to Roloff (1922).
 29. Vygotsky is paraphrasing the answers of the subjects to Luria's tests on the definition of concepts. Subjects were asked to explain the meaning of a car, the

- sun, a tree, a mountain, etc. to an imaginary person who had never seen them. See pp. 86–90 of Luria (1976).
30. Vygotsky mentions A. Golyakhovskaya's research in "Pedology of the adolescent" on p. 71 of Vygotsky (1998). She asked Kazakh children why objects have the names they have and found, just like Piaget did, that up to a certain age the name is considered a property of the object.
 31. Arbitrary (German).
 32. Luria's subjects were asked to say what two objects (e.g., crow and fish, rose and cucumber, poplar and mountain) had in common. Rather than stating a higher-order category (e.g., animals, plants, big objects), they would include the objects in a general situation (e.g., the crow pecks the fish, or "when the cucumber grows, it blooms and so does the rose"). See pp. 82–83 of Luria (1976).
 33. Claparède (1918) demonstrated that children detect differences between objects long before they can see their similarity. Luria (1976, p. 80) argued that detecting differences requires seeing physical attributes, whereas establishing a resemblance sometimes requires abstract thought.
 34. In mythological stories, earthquakes were sometimes viewed as the result of vapors escaping from underground cavities. Another popular explanation was that the earthquake was caused by the activity of a giant underground animal such as a whale or a bull.
 35. Anamnesis is the medical history or case history of a patient which, together with the physical examination, enables the physician to form a diagnosis and treatment plan. Catamnesis is the follow-up history of a patient after they are discharged from treatment or a hospital. Vygotsky refers to the following three books: Myasishchev & Feoktistova (1930), Sukhareva (1930), and Yudin (1926).
 36. A now uncommon term to indicate vegetative dysfunction.
 37. Somewhat surprisingly, in discussing his patients Vygotsky makes use of the classification and terminology introduced by Kretschmer (1921). Because Kretschmer's terms are no longer in use and/or acquired a different meaning, we will supply notes where necessary. Basically, Kretschmer believed that we can distinguish personalities (characters) on the basis of body types and that specific personalities are prone to specific mental disturbances. Persons with a frail, rather weak (asthenic) physique as well as persons with a strong, muscular (athletic) body build are more often found among the schizophrenic patients, while persons with a short, rotund (pyknic) body more commonly develop a manic-depressive (cyclothymic) disorder. Because Kretschmer believed in a dimensional theory of insanity, where all people vary on a scale from less to more insanity, he could observe more or less outspoken signs of the schizoid and cycloid personality types in healthy people as well. In fact, any person who was somewhat aloof, timid, or introvert could be described as a schizothyme and/or autist, and any person who was more active (sthenic) and extravert, or showed mood swings, could be described as a cyclothyme. Persons who showed a mixture of these properties were called dysplastic. In his *Physique*

and Character (1921), Kretschmer described these personality types and their alleged physiological (hormonal) background in great detail and provided analyses of the characters of several famous persons as illustrations of his theory. Given this background, the reader will understand that, for example, the term “autism,” as used by Vygotsky to characterize his patients, has little to do with the modern concept of autism. Rather, it was meant to describe the fact that some patients live in their own secluded world of delusions with little contact with reality. Neither would we today describe an active, extraverted child as cyclothymic, i.e., as having a personality type that in its more extreme form predisposes to a bipolar disorder. In addition, because Vygotsky abbreviated terms, each time he writes “sch” or “schizo,” we must choose whether he meant “schizoid,” “schyzothyme,” or “schizophrenic.”

38. Respectively; more correctly (German abbreviation).
39. Rudolf Pintner (1884 to 1942). British–American psychologist who developed testing methods for persons with special needs. Vygotsky may have used his non-verbal Pintner–Paterson Performance Scale (Pintner & Paterson 1917), which was originally meant to measure the intelligence of deaf children. IQ scores must be multiplied by 100 to get the modern scores (i.e., 1.1 becomes 110).
40. Excessively pedantic, now often viewed as part of the obsessive-compulsive or anankastic personality disorder.
41. Inhibitions (German).
42. Encouragement (German).
43. Expression, manifestation (German). Kretschmer (1921, p. 57) wrote that younger pyknic people often have a friendly facial expression.
44. This was the title of Ewald (1924) (see later text). Perhaps Vygotsky meant to refer to Kretschmer (1921).
45. Possibly the child was moved from group 1 to group 2, which gave good results.
46. Kretschmer (1925) claimed that within each personality type, opposite tendencies are present in various proportions. Thus, the cycloid personality combines hypomanic (gay) and melancholic (sad) elements in what was called the diathetic or mood proportion (p. 127). The schizoid personality combines hyperaesthetic (sensitive) and anaesthetic (cold) elements in what Kretschmer called the psychaesthetic proportion (p. 154). It was characteristic of Kretschmer’s book that he on the one hand claimed that the three basic personality types exist and have a lawful relationship with mental disease and on the other allowed for all sorts of combinations of the basic types and the proportions of tendencies within them.

In his description of the psychopathic character, Kretschmer noted that these are more likely than other persons to show, among other things, expansive and sensitive reactions. An expansive sthenic person “proceeds energetically among the most direct lines, resisting obstacles, but avoiding them when they are not to be removed.” Sensitive reactions “point to a defect on the side of the dischargeability of the experience. Compulsion ideas are the result of the stalling

- of this process. Anxiety and scrupulosity are the attending states” (Roback 1931, pp. 274–275). Sensitive persons, then, in modern terms, tend to internalize their problems. In the continuation, Vygotsky uses all of these terms, thus showing a detailed knowledge of Kretschmer’s ideas. Given the German terms, Vygotsky probably read Kretschmer (1921), but he may also have used Kretschmer (1930), which is the second Russian edition. Cf. Eysenck (1950).
47. In Volume 4, Part 4, Chapter 13 of *War and Peace*, Tolstoy writes that the princess “had shown him only the combative side of her nature” and not the “hidden, kindly sides of her character.”
 48. Refers to the notion that the person (the character) experiences the environment (the situation) in a specific way depending on his or her stage of development and mindset. This notion of (emotional) experience (Russian: *perezhivanie*) became important for Vygotsky in the final years of his career. The concept has recently drawn attention from scholars (e.g., Roth & Jornet 2016; Veresov & Fleer 2016).
 49. *Zudeckende Therapie* (from *zudecken* or to cover). Supportive therapy that avoids exposure to unconscious conflicts when this seems too painful or not helpful (German).
 50. Synkinesis is involuntary muscular movements accompanying voluntary movements. For example, voluntary smiling may induce an involuntary contraction of the eye muscles. The cause may be a miswiring of the nerves after trauma.
 51. Anankastic psychopathy (German). See note 40.
 52. Adolf Hermann Heinrich Busemann (1887 to 1867). German psychologist. In his talk “On psychological systems,” Vygotsky discussed Busemann’s idea about the existence of three types of connections (primary, secondary, tertiary) between the functions in a psychological system. Primary connections are hereditary; secondary connections are imposed by the environment; and tertiary connections develop in adolescence on the basis of self-awareness. See p. 101 of Vygotsky (1997).
 53. Original footnote at the bottom of the page: “The diagnosis must be subdivided into a number of diagnostic formulas: character, intellect, personality. Purposefulness.”
 54. This was the age when children entered elementary school.
 55. Gottfried Ewald (1888 to 1963). German biological psychiatrist and neurologist. In his *Temperament und Charakter* (1924), he developed a personality theory of 16 personality types inspired by Kretschmer. During the Nazi regime, Ewald participated in the program for forced sterilization of mental patients but publicly criticized the practice of killing them. Cf. Ewald (1925, 1927, 1931a, b).
 56. That is, therapy that makes use of the higher psychological functions.
 57. Semen L’vovich Vygotsky died in October 1931 and was buried at the Vostryakovskoe Cemetery in Moscow.
 58. Vygotsky rephrases a passage on p. 112 of Kretschmer (1925): “It is far more the case with characterology, as with physique, that the typical characteristics of a constitutional type may sometimes be more clearly delineated in the nearest

relations than in the patient himself. Moreover, where several constitutional types are crossed in one patient, we may recognize the individual components under certain circumstances clearly isolated and split up among other members of his family.”

59. Logorhea, excessive speech, abnormal talkativeness (German). More often: *Sprechdrang*.
60. Grigoriy Ivanovich Rossolimo (1860 to 1928). Russian neuropathologist, psychologist, and defectologist, founder of the Institute of Child Psychology and Neurology, co-founder of The Psychological Society of Moscow State University, and director of the Kozhevnikov Neurological Institute. Rossolimo studied the morphology of the nervous system and invented various medical instruments (e.g., the dynamometer, the clonograph). He was the author of the first Russian mental test, which was widely used at the time (Rossolimo 1910).
61. It is unclear what this refers to.
62. Vygotsky uses the word “ressentiment” (spelled in Cyrillic), which is originally French.
63. Mikhail Yakovlevich Basov (1892 to 1931). Russian psychologist active in personality psychology, pedology, and educational psychology. Introduced a structural–dynamic perspective into Russian child psychology and was a careful empirical researcher (Valsiner 1988). Basov left psychology after sharp political critique (“a most dangerous anti-proletarian theory”) and began working in a factory. He suffered an accident there and died a few months later (Boguslavskiy 2002, p. 114).
64. Longing (German).
65. Original footnote: “Ergo: What is sthenic in Naum is one pole, which stimulates his asthenism. Cf. his father (he is afraid, hid his revenge). *He abreacts in his dreams*: a weakness. The sensitive person reacts with a delusion of reference, the expansive one reacts actively.”
66. Cf. p. 105 of Blonskiy (1927): “We may assume that it is usually the weak (children, old men, the hungry, prisoners, etc.), who are day-dreaming. The content of the day-dream is one’s strength (social, physical etc.) and success. Apparently, the day-dreams become more eidetic as the person is a weaker and more primitive subject and as (to a certain extent) he is more dissatisfied with his situation in the given case. The most eidetic day-dreams are, or so it appears, the day-dreams of an offended or dissatisfied child.”
67. Possibly refers to Kohs’ test. Cf. note 15.
68. Basov regarded the will as the basic factor responsible for the regulation of the psychological functions as well as the relationship between them. The control of one’s mental states is only possible, he wrote, when there is “some *regulative factor*. In reality the healthy person always has such a factor. And its name is volition” (Basov 1922, p. 14).
69. See *Hamlet*: “Though this be madness, yet there is method in ‘t.” Cf. p. 135 of Samukhin, Birenbaum, and Vygotsky (1934).

70. Lewis Madison Terman (1877 to 1956). American psychologist known for his revision of the Stanford–Binet IQ test and for initiating the longitudinal study of children with high IQs. These studies revealed that, as a rule, gifted children are not sickly social misfits with inferior characters, as was previously thought, but in fact are generally taller, in better health, and better adapted socially than other children.
71. *Aufdeckende Therapie*. Therapy meant to disclose (*aufdecken*) unconscious conflicts (German).
72. The ideal self (German). A term now primarily used in person-centered therapy.
73. A form of psychotherapy in which the therapist doesn't just talk with the patient but also prescribes rules of life such as the regular practice of gymnastics, etc.
74. Original footnote: "What is new in Zankov's studies: how the higher functions are woven into the living history of development, from the general abstract theories to the concrete development, his practical slant in the identification [of problems] in education."
75. The date has been crossed out. The correct date was probably a day in November.
76. Pleasure principle and reality principle (German).

References

- Basov, M. Ya. (1922). *Volya kak predmet funkcional'noy psikhologii*. Petrograd: Kul'turno-Prosvetitel'noe Kooperativnoe Tovarishchestvo 'Nachatki Znaniya'.
- Binet, A. (1890). Perceptions d'enfants. *Revue Philosophique*, 30, 582–611.
- Blonskiy, P. P. (1927). *Psikhologicheskie ocherki*. Moscow: Novaya Moskva.
- Boguslavskiy, M. B. (2002). *XX vek Rossiyskogo obrazovaniya*. Moscow: Per Se.
- Chvyr', L. A. (1986). Sravnitel'nyy ocherk traditsionnykh ukrasheniy Uygurov i sosednykh narodov Sredney Azii (pp. 211–250). In B.A. Litvinskiy (Ed.), *Vostochnyy Turkestan i Srednyaya Aziya v sisteme kul'tur drevnego i srednovkovogo Vostoka*. Moscow: Nauka.
- Claparède, E. (1918). La conscience de la ressemblance et de la différence chez l'enfant. *Archives de Psychologie*, 17, 67–78.
- Ewald, G. (1924). *Temperament und Charakter*. Berlin: Verlag von Julius Springer.
- Ewald, G. (1925). Krankheitseinheit und Reaktionsform. *Zeitschrift für die gesamte Neurologie und Psychiatrie*, 99, 777–782.
- Ewald, G. (1927). Das Verhältnis der 'Degenerationspsychosen' zu den grossen Formenkreisen des Irreseins. *Klinische Wochenschrift*, 6, 881–883.
- Ewald, G. (1931a). Zwangskrankheit und Paranoia: Ein Vergleich. *Zeitschrift für die gesamte Neurologie und Psychiatrie*, 131, 33–43.
- Ewald, G. (1931b). Über die Notwendigkeit einer pathophysiologischen Unterlegung der psychiatrischen Krankheitseinteilung. *Zeitschrift für die gesamte Neurologie und Psychiatrie*, 131, 18–32.
- Eysenck, H. J. (1950). Cyclothymia and schizothymia as a dimension of personality. 1. Historical review. *Journal of Personality*, 19(2), 123–152.
- Gelb, A., & Goldstein, K. (1925). Über Farbenamnesie nebst Bemerkungen über das Wesen der amnestischen Aphasie überhaupt und die Beziehung zwischen Sprache und dem Verhalten zur Umwelt. *Psychologische Forschung*, 6, 127–186.

- Kretschmer, E. (1921). *Körperbau und Charakter: Untersuchungen zum Konstitutionsproblem und zur Lehre von den Temperamenten*. Berlin: Springer.
- Kretschmer, E. (1925). *Physique and character: An investigation of the nature of constitution and of the theory of temperament*. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., Ltd. (Second edition).
- Kretschmer, E. (1930). *Stroenie tela i kharakter*. Moscow–Leningrad: GIZ.
- Luria, A. R. (1974). *Ob istoricheskom razvitii poznavatel'nykh protsessov: Eksperimental'no-psikhologicheskoe issledovanie*. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Nauka.
- Luria, A. R. (1976). *Cognitive development: Its cultural and social foundations*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Luria, E. A. (1994). *Moy otets A.R. Luria*. Moscow: Gnosis.
- Myasishchev, B. H., & Feoktistova, E. P. (1930). Kharakter i proshloe (k voprosu o metodike anamneza) (pp. 142–169). In *Pedologicheskie issledovaniya. Trudy Instituta im. A.I. Gertsena*. Moscow-Leningrad: Rabotnik Prosveshcheniya.
- Pintrner, R., & Paterson, D. G. (1917). *A scale of performance tests*. New York–London: D. Appleton and Company.
- Roback, A. A. (1931). *The psychology of character: With a survey of personality in general*. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company.
- Roloff, H. P. (1922). *Vergleichend-psychologische Untersuchungen über kindliche Definitionsleistungen. Beiheft zur Zeitschrift für angewandte Psychologie, 27*. Leipzig: Johann Ambrosius Barth.
- Rossolimo, G. I. (1910). *Psikhologicheskii profili. Metod kolichestvennogo issledovaniya psikhologicheskikh protsessov v normal'nom i patologicheskom sostoyaniyakh. Ch. 1. Metodika*. St-Petersburg: Tip. M.A. Aleksandrova.
- Roth, W. M., & Jornet, A. (2016). *Perezhivanie* in light of the later Vygotsky's Spinozist turn. *Mind, Culture, and Activity, 23*(4), 315–324.
- Rückriem, G. (Ed.). (2008). *Lev Semënovic Vygotskij: Briefe/Letters 1924–1934*. Berlin: Lehmanns Media.
- Rupp, H. (1919). *Probleme und Apparate zur experimentellen Pädagogik und Jugendpsychologie*. Leipzig: Quelle & Meyer.
- Rupp, H. (1927). *Problemy i apparaty eksperimental'noy pedagogiki i detskoj psikhologii*. Moscow-Leningrad: S.n.
- Samukhin, N. V., Birenbaum, G. V., & Vygotsky, L. S. (1934). K voprosu o dementsii pri bolezni Pika: klinicheskoe i eksperimental'no-psikhologicheskoe issledovanie. *Sovetskaya Nevropatologiya, Psikiatriya i Psikhogigiena, 3*, 97–135.
- Stumpf, C. (1900). Eigenartige sprachliche Entwicklung eines Kindes. *Zeitschrift für pädagogische Psychologie, 2*, 1–29.
- Sukhareva, G. E. (1930). K problem struktury i dinamiki detskikh konstitutsionnykh psikhopatii. *Zhurnal Nevrologii i Psikiatrii, 6*, 21–36.
- Valsiner, J. (1988). *Developmental psychology in the Soviet Union*. Brighton: The Harvester Press.
- Van der Veer, R., & Valsiner, J. (1991). *Understanding Vygotsky: A quest for synthesis*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Van der Veer, R., & Valsiner, J. (Eds.). (1994). *The Vygotsky Reader*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Veresov, N., & Fler, M. (2016). *Perezhivanie* as a theoretical concept for researching young children's development. *Mind, Culture, and Activity, 23*(4), 325–335.
- Volkelt, H. (1912). *Über die Vorstellungen der Tiere: Ein Beitrag zur Entwicklungspsychologie*. Leipzig: Krueger.
- Vygotsky, L.S. (1987). *The collected works of L.S. Vygotsky. Vol. 1. Problems of general psychology*. New York: Plenum Press.
- Vygotsky, L. S. (1997). *The collected works of L.S. Vygotsky. Vol. 3. Problems of the theory and history of psychology*. New York: Plenum Press.
- Vygotsky, L. S. (1998). *The collected works of L.S. Vygotsky. Vol. 5. Child psychology*. New York: Plenum Press.
- Yudin, T. I. (1926). *Psikhopatische konstitutsii*. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo M. and K. Sabashnikov.

Chapter 13

Spinoza and the Problem of Higher Emotions

This series contains documents that are connected with the unfinished work on the “Theory of emotions” (Vygotsky 1999) and dates from approximately the end of 1931 to early 1933. They are difficult to read both because the text borders on inner speech and because it contains gaps, parts that are illegible, and crossed-out parts. The latter are the result of Vygotsky’s habit to cross out notes when their content had been published in an article or chapter (cf. several notes to this chapter). The series not just refers to the first part of “The theory of emotions” but also to the second, unwritten part of that monograph. Its main topic is the theory of higher emotions, which Vygotsky planned to derive from Spinoza’s philosophy. Vygotsky believed that *The Ethics* contain a number of postulates that allow us to develop such a theory but that these need to be reconsidered, among other things, in the light of Marxist thought. However, he never managed to develop this belief into a genuine theory, possibly because a theory of emotional development from lower to higher emotions cannot be derived from Spinoza’s ideas (see Van der Veer & Valsiner 1991, pp. 349–359). Nevertheless, the study of Spinoza may have served Vygotsky well in that it led him to posit the ideas of the unity of affect and intellect, as well as that of freedom, both of which became prominent in the last years of his life.

The lightnings of Spinozian thought

This is a note written in pencil on one sheet. The phrases criss-cross over the page, and the editors reconstructed their order. A first English version was published in Zavershneva (2010).

NB! The lightnings of Spinozian thought illuminate...

Freud: a cure by becoming aware, the connection with the affect and the drives.

Written in the margin with an arrow pointing to “Freud”: [*Our studies of the concept along Spinozian lines.*]

Krüger, Köhler: the affect in perception.¹

To understand the affect is an active condition and is *freedom*.

Freedom: the affect in the concept.

Autistic thinking. Schizophrenia is *the disintegration of the affects*.

The grandiose picture of personality development: the path to freedom. To revive Spinozism in Marxist psychology.²

Written in the right margin: [The picture of *development* is rigorous and majestic (the joy!!), *bright* (but not cold).]

Written in the left margin: [*The central problem* of all *psychology*: Freedom.]

Intellectualism in the theory of the intellect. Voluntarism in the theory of volition—to explain something by means of itself. Spinoza explained volition—Lewin.

Spinoza was not an intellectualist. *The affect* is overcome by the *affect*. And the basis is not *thinking but desire*. But *affect, desire, thinking, and volition* are not integrated. Concept and affect and will.

Written and boxed: [*No development—no history, no sense and no meaning.*]

Kuno Fischer: Spinoza is impossible.³ *On the contrary*: personally, he was the confirmation of his theory. *A free man and not a <ghost>*. He began with the fear of death—[man] least of all things thinks of death.⁴

Written in the margin and boxed: [*Natura parendo vincitur. Amor Dei intellectualis.*]⁵

Written further in the margin: [Hypobulia ↔ [through] the concept [becomes] will.]
As Hamlet says about his father: [He was a man in the full meaning of the word.⁶
Ecce homo.]⁷

The current state of the psychological theory of emotions

The text is written on the back of two sheets with the regulations of the Psychotechnical Society. The beginning is written in pencil and continued in violet ink, which was also used for corrections and insertions. The note contains criticism of the then-existing theories of emotion (James–Lange, Cannon). Possibly its content reflects one of the informal workshops with Vygotsky's colleagues and students mentioned in Luria's archive: 1. "The problem of emotions in contemporary psychology" (October 21, 1930); or 2. "A contemporary theory of emotions" (January 3, 1931).

The current state of the psychological theory of emotions

[Written in pencil:]

The role of Nevskiy's note.⁸ Previously, I had nothing to say. And now more than I can say.

[Written in pencil:]

- (1) The primitivism and obsolescence of the currently popular ideas about emotions, which came to a halt in the last quarter of the nineteenth century: Ribot,⁹ James, Wundt. These I will not expound. We will take them as a starting point.
- (2) James' theory, which is the same as Bergson's theory (two poles of a single whole, the cerebrum = the spinal cord, which is a telephone station¹⁰: This is the thesis of both Watson and Bergson). On the higher emotions—James. Written in ink: [On the question: Is James' theory the only path to a material understanding of the emotions?]
- (3) Cannon—the first work—the discussion with Zavadovskiy.¹¹ The second work: a synopsis.

Three conclusions: (a) it is unsupported by the facts; (b) [Boxed] the visceral changes are inessential, their genuine biological meaning, the mechanism of the emotions.

- (4) *In general, methodologically:* what is the meaning of the neural mechanism in the theory of emotions—Lashley¹²: psychology and neurophysiology. Contra: mythology. The conclusion: Why do we cry and why are we sad? Their relationship?
- (5) *Most important:* There is no permanent relationship, valid for all times and cultures, between the organic and psychological aspects of the emotion. There is no universal, absolute answer to this question [written in black ink] just like there is no single answer to the question about the relationship between thinking and speech *and neither [to the question] about all other relationships between psychological functions and reactions. This should be kept in mind. There are no absolute, immutable relationships! This applies to what follows:* [It is] the key to all problems, including the emotions; we must study this relationship from the viewpoint of development or motion. There is no single formula valid for all relationships between the emotion and its organic basis in all stages of development and all forms of disintegration. Cf. speech; NB. James and the others do state the problem in an absolute manner.
- (6) *But even with respect to the biological roots of emotions in the cat—sehr wichtig!*—the organic changes of a peripheral nature do not play a decisive role but form a superseded category. Cf. Socrates sat in prison because the muscles of his legs contracted and led him there.¹³ Socrates calmly drank the poison cup because of the peristalsis of his intestines, etc. *Cause and effect in one plane:* for study and [to exert] influence. To influence the emotions through the *viscera*; development via the *viscera*, but they are immutable and eternal. The question of [the relationship between] the emotions and the organs is the question [as to whether] the eternal laws of nature or the historical laws govern the emotions?
- (7) Therefore, the starting point for further investigations in Cannon's studies, which *liberates* us from the materialist–idealist metaphysics, is broader: to overcome James' theory. Because (1) an emotion \neq a visceral reaction, that is, there is a possibility of *development* and historical development, in particular, of the *emotion of man*; (2) [marked off to the left with “!!!”] *in its connection* with other functions: because if the emotion *takes place* in the stomach, intestines, heart, or vegetative system (its essential, decisive *main* link; the *primacy of the vegetative changes*), *and not in the cortex*, [then] it has *no connection* with the other functions, is completely in a different system. Because the lungs and the heart play the role of a subordinate part, a superseded category in all other mental functions [end of marked passage], and here they are the decisive link, which, according to James, determine the *quality of the process (the object is what it is—Hegel, i.e., the essence of the emotions)*. The possibility of change of its relationship with other systems, of entering neopsychological (and not just paleopsychological) systems, the domain of

exopsychological systems, the role of the emotions *in the new psychology of man*; the socialization, intellectualization, and spiritualization of the emotions (Paulhan)¹⁴; (3) *there is the possibility to study emotion in motion*, in disintegration (what disintegrates?) *On the basis of James' theory neither a genetic, nor a clinical, nor a differential, nor a social psychology of emotions is possible*. In order to study motion, we must move away from the heart: *We do not feel with our heart*; (4) the possibility of practice as a criterion of truth, education, therapy, not through valerian.

- (8) Examples: (1) Human and animal emotions according to the theory of James; (2) do emotions develop or diminish; (3) what disintegrates in emotions.

For example, an actor. Written in pencil: [The function of an emotion (enables flight, but what about the higher mental structures?). Outside the stream of consciousness. A simple weakening: cf. whispering.]¹⁵

- (9) Go further: the adult person ("the anatomy of man" etc.),¹⁶ primitive man, biological evolution, ontogeny, disintegration.

Not a theory but material for the solution of the problem.

[On the back of the first page:]

<...>

"*Odi et amo*"¹⁷

"The grief King David left"¹⁸

In Descartes and Spinoza, there is logical instead of genetic analysis and connection.

<...>

Boxed text: [Freedom is bliss.]

Freedom in <illegible> is not an emotionless state. The imperturbability of the philosopher. *A special philosophical emotion. Amor Dei intellectualis*. The central question: How are emotions capable of changing.

A theory of emotion. Preface, epigraph, dedication

This document contains brief notes connected with a first draft of the "Theory of emotions." The first note was written in violet ink on a notebook sheet, and the others were written in pencil on narrow sheets of paper of a width of no more than 3 cm. Discussed are the title, preface, epigraph, and dedication. It is unclear whether the final manuscript of the "Theory of emotions" contained a dedication, but in the version published in the *Collected Works* it is absent (Vygotzky 1999).

L. S. V.

Spinoza's theory about the passions.

In loving memory
of my father S. L. V.

Even as light displays both itself and darkness,
so is truth a standard both of itself and of falsity.

Spinoza. *The Ethics*.¹⁹

The beginning:

The truth of Spinoza's theory of the passions has somehow paled in contemporary scientific consciousness, obscured by the errors of both Spinoza himself and those accumulated in the three centuries after his death.

The end:

The truth of the Spinozian theory of the passions is an indisputable testimony of both itself and of all the falsity of Spinoza himself and the falsity of three hundred years of psychological thought. As light reveals both itself and darkness.

L. S. V.

Spinoza's theory about the passions in light of contemporary psychology
Prolegomena to a psychology of man

The epigraph: We would like to form an idea of man, which can serve as a type of human nature.

Spinoza. *The Ethics*. Preface to Part 3.²⁰

Beginning and end.

Truth is testimony of itself and falsity.

Conclusion

Spinoza succeeded in creating an idea of man, etc. This idea can be leading for the psychology of man as a science. It is a true idea because it corresponds with its object, because it shows man—in Shakespeare's words—in the full meaning of the word. Thereby it shows the psychology of man, its genuine subject matter. *Ecce homo*.

To the preface

The path of investigation:

The first two parts prepare the *problems* in the two planes (modern and historical psychology) that stand before Spinoza's theory, in order to cut the knots of three centuries with one stroke of the sword of Spinoza's theory about the passions, and show this theory in its own plane (contra Descartes) and in the plane of contemporary psychology. *Pro* and *contra* Spinoza's theory: Why and against what he is fighting.

The first two parts against something, the third *for what?*

<...>

The first part: the evil of the day.²¹

The struggle <with> what must be in the textbook.

The second part: behind this are Descartes' problems.

Scientific and religious <thinking>

The third part: how Spinoza solved [these problems].

In order to form an idea of man, which might serve as a typology of human nature, i.e., in order to create the prolegomena of the psychology of man, we must critically expose²² the fundamental statements of Spinoza's theory of passions while transforming them according to Fischer's third type,²³ [and making] *explicite* what is *implicite* in his psychology.

But Spinoza, like everybody, fought a struggle, which was "for something" and "against someone," [which had] its *pro* and *contra*.

Spinoza's central point: the translation of Shakespeare (according to Goethe) into the language of concepts.

The science of mental life provides what Bergson and Freud provide—*life* against a deadly pale psychology of abstractions. Cf. Engels' definition: Biology is the chemistry of protein.²⁴

End of the preface

A book such as this²⁵ cannot be other than personal. What I took from father and to whom I dedicate it. Cf. the autobiographies of psychologists.²⁶ An unusual book. Investigations. From outside. Prolegomena. The preface is also unusual.

<...>

My position with regard to Spinoza: Spinozian but not Spinozist. My attitude to contemporary psychology. To the motive for the investigation—my own viewpoint, my relationship to myself!

The book of all my life, badly written, but its ideas are mine. What is of the *evil of the day* will become obsolete. (I am not writing it at the heights of my mind but overwhelmed by the evil of the day. Something will remain for the future. The seed are my children and students to whom I would dedicate it if I would value its prospects higher. But the past, in whose power I am, is stronger. That is why <labor>).

Maybe dedicate it to Roza?²⁷ Alive?

Outlined: [The greatness of what is mortal and perishable.]

What is new in the book: Its ideas in a few words that become comprehensible after reading the book and to which—to the last words of the preface—the thoughtful reader will return if he wishes.

Spinoza's supreme idea

This note is written in pencil on narrow sheets of paper. Vygotsky examines Spinoza's theory in light of the psychophysical problem and argues that he is not a parallelist. The note's core idea is that knowledge changes life, which is no longer ruled by emotions but becomes free under the guidance of reason.

How is this possible: Consciousness changes life, [i.e.,] life changes in such a way that consciousness necessarily participates—[if] there is no pure (substance) of consciousness? <...>

The problem of the higher in the plane of individual life and in society. One man is no automaton (you can run from the battlefield as a free man and led by reason)²⁸ and people communicate so that mediately (exactly because their life includes a mental aspect) my magnanimity overcomes another mind. That is, that the psychology that is necessary for sociology, for the *Geisteswissenschaften*,²⁹ and which gives a *single* result (a certain way of life), *is impossible without knowledge*, this is the center of Spinozian theory: *knowledge changes life*. The core of parallelism is that it is impossible that parallel lines, which *never meet each other*, intersect, *that it is impossible that one parallel line acts upon the other*, that it is impossible to have a unified result without the other parallel, i.e., the core of parallelism is that *consciousness cannot change life*.

Three propositions deal with parallelism. They must be examined:

- (a) The order of ideas is the order of the body.³⁰

This is the first idea of parallelism—the *connection*, the structural identity. Cf. the idea of *Gestalttheorie* about the psychophysical problem³¹—and *is it really false?*

Knowledge through the body. *And this is incorrect?*

What is fallacious of parallelism is *not* the common order but that the *interaction* is impossible, and its strong side (i.e., the grain of truth) is in the *connection*, in the order.

- (b) Mind cannot [determine] body to motion, neither can body [determine mind] to think.³² Contra *mechanical causality*, contra Descartes with his mechanical interaction, but this is *incorrect*.

The second important idea of parallelism is the exclusion of *mechanical interaction*. Who said that mind can only exert influence, *induce motion*, as a mechanical force, but not in another way, and that it cannot influence the body while changing together with the body.

- (c) The order of the body is the order of ideas³³ *but this is incorrect*.

Why this is possible, because the order of ideas—*part of a single thing*—of the drives, of the affects, and knowledge is an affect; the *hypothesis of the unity of consciousness* (concept = affect = will) and the hypothesis of the *unity of mind and body* explain this. *Spinoza teaches the power of reason*, ergo he is not a parallelist. On the contrary, Spinoza shows the influence: knowledge depends upon the body, but not mechanically; the way of life upon the order of ideas; the free flight, i.e., behavior, upon magnanimity.

This is what gives Petzoldt reason to say that Spinoza can study the pure connections of mental conditions.³⁴

Spinoza's whole theory is permeated with the idea of the identity of the *order and connection of ideas* and the bodily states, so that, when we examine the motion and fate of the affects, <illegible> we *eo ipso*³⁵ study the way of life, behavior, etc.

Spinoza teaches how we can study the mental psychologically, he makes *the problem the postulate*³⁶ (contra us: the postulate became the problem in the theory of the connection of the functions), i.e.,

- (a) The usual *postulate*: mind is not extension, *toto genere*³⁷ separated;
- (b) The usual *problem*: How does this powerless consciousness, which is separated from matter, isolated from extension, move my hand?

In Spinoza:

- (a) The postulate—there is no idea without affect and will, but will (desire) is a single mind–body thing and they must be studied as such, their existence as extended thinking things, as *psychological* things (*psychologica psychologicae* instead of *psychica psychice*; this latter abstraction is possible in logic, etc.), as a mind–body unity.
- (b) The problem—*How* does man, because of the fact that he is a *res cogitans*,³⁸ really change his destiny as an extended thing (his way of life and behavior), how is the real life of the joint mind and body possible—as slavery and freedom, its motion from slavery to freedom, its development, strength and weakness, etc. One must be blind in order not to see that Spinoza shows that it is meaningless to ask by what means mind moves the body (p. 147),³⁹ and that he all the time investigates the question as to how the *motion* toward freedom *really* takes place: toward a *life guided by reason*—and this is freedom.

His central idea is the power of reason.

Why parallelism, if a *life* (not thinking, but a *life*) guided by reason is possible. This phrase alone and the whole idea of *freedom* based upon a life guided by reason, completely refute parallelism.

We might say that the *whole content* of *The Ethics* (a theory about the *real possibility of freedom*) is a theory about the real possibility of a life guided by reason, i.e., about the influence of the mind on the body and that it is the strongest—actually the only—refutation of parallelism.

Spinoza's supreme idea, which liberates all psychology, is the idea of the relative (this Spinoza accepts) but not absolute (this Spinoza denies) power of mind over the body, i.e., the relationships between mind and body (*life* and *reason*) are not absolute and immutable but *variable*, relative. *Inde*, this is not the postulate, but the problem (i.e., Spinoza made the problem the postulate and the *postulate the problem*). *Inde*, the *real possibility* of a psychology (a special form of motion, of development) of the changing contribution of mind to the life of the body, of reason/life.

This is real; this is accessible; this moves.

Every thing in Spinoza struggles with mechanical causality, with immutability (no development), with incoherency, with parallelism and *demands* to transcend its boundaries. This is Spinoza's strength and weakness: a strength, because he created what leads to this; a weakness, because it is not yet there.

Experience continually literally refutes Descartes' *postulate* that consciousness [and] extension are immutable and separated; neither parallelism, nor interaction (practically impossible) stand up to criticism. <...>

On the contrary, experience continually teaches the correctness of Spinoza's postulate and the fruitfulness and solvability of *his problem*.

To make the problem the postulate

This note is written in violet ink on narrow strips of paper and continues the theme of psychophysical parallelism in the context of Spinoza's theory.

NB!

- (1) Mechanical categories are not suitable for the analysis of the psychophysical relationship. Consciousness is considered as a $n + 1$ mechanical force.⁴⁰ Cf. Descartes and the cerebral gland.⁴¹ Here Spinoza is absolutely right: Body cannot [determine] mind, neither can mind [determine] body. But this is a purely negative solution of the problem. If we stop there, if we restrict ourselves to a purely negative connection (i.e., the *absence of a connection*) between mind and physiology, this will be parallelism. But Spinoza goes further; exactly because of that he is not a parallelist.

For white \neq black because neither of them is red. If some theory coincides with parallelism only in that it is *not* Descartes' theory of mechanical interaction, this does not make it yet parallelism. Høffding understood this.⁴²

- (2) But the question must be put in another way. *Mechanical motion is itself a particular case of motion*. Cf. Engels' statements in logical connection with the viewpoint we need.⁴³
 1. Motion is not mechanical motion, change of place; but change in the general sense; the higher forms are connected with the lower ones, but these are secondary and the higher ones are the main ones. Thinking is molecular motion in the brain, but this is its essence. p. 16.
 2. Motion is the change of quality *without* quantitative changes. Thinking in this sense is motion. p. 80.

All motion (*ergo* thinking as well!) includes mechanical motion. pp. 80/130. (Engels: interaction is motion; the Spinozian substance is the *causa sui*.⁴⁴ He beautifully describes interaction). p. 15.

Thus, the *concept of motion* itself is reconsidered: When Bergson ([and] Descartes) speak about thinking and motion (relegating the first to mind, the second to the brain), they have in mind *mechanical motion*. Spinoza as well when he denies that the mind moves the body. But motion is all change in the brain from change of place to thinking. p. 130.

Ergo: the relationship between thinking and motion changes in three [aspects]:

- (a) We do not have to add a connection with motion to thinking so that it will not be an epiphenomenon because it primordially contains mechanical motion as a secondary form, i.e., thinking never lost its connection with motion.

- (b) The change of quality without quantity leads to a reformulation of the whole question, which was discussed from the viewpoint of the preservation of energy; the *transition from quality into quantity*; Fechner’s sensation—the transition from quantity into quality,⁴⁵ but the dynamogenic role of consciousness—quality into quantity (a military formation of 100 men—go through the example of Napoleon,⁴⁶ *ordo et connexio*⁴⁷ + time according to Spinoza).
 - (c) The thinking–motion relationship [involves] not two mechanical forces but one includes the other as a secondary form.
3. But we do not know this connection (of thinking and motion) like we do not know the last secret of life. This occurs only because the transformation of one form of energy into another one—physical, mechanical, warmth, electricity, etc.—does not include the *transformation* of inorganic motion into organic motion; here the conditions of the transition are more complex. Even more complex with mind. We cannot artificially create life and consciousness; thus, we do not know the law of the transition from inanimate into living [matter], from living into thinking [matter]. But we accept this connection as a fact, as a postulate. Cf. Spinoza: *What is the body capable of doing*⁴⁸ (his secret thought: of the same as mind, since it functions—builds temples).
 4. *Ergo* the usual arrangement of the problem and the postulate changes.

Usually	Spinoza
<p><i>The problem</i></p> <p>How can there be a connection between substances that exclude each other?</p>	<p>How does thinking not repeat the body, what are its own laws: Spinoza just talks about mind. But there should be a treatise about the body.</p>
<p><i>Postulate</i></p> <p>There is no connection between the physical and mind.</p>	<p>There is a connection.</p>

Spinoza has changed the traditional problem into a postulate, and he proceeds from the unity of the mental and the physical (*una res*).⁴⁹ But he turned the usual postulate about the irreducibility of mind to matter into the problem: What is the real uniqueness of mind, what is the specific character of the human mind.

Only here does psychology as a science begin. *Methodologically*, Spinoza created the only prolegomena of the psychology of man, *implicite*; we [did it]—*explicite*. How mistaken was Høffding when he reduced everything to identity: Body and mind are not two languages.⁵⁰ *Spinoza speaks about the laws of mind* and only about them. Petzoldt is right that he takes pure psychology, creates a mathematic of the mind like Dilthey. Psychology is impossible with the identity hypothesis.

[Continued in the margin:]

To make the problem the postulate (the connection with life).

The affect: The unity of the mental and the physical

These are six brief notes written in pencil on narrow sheets of paper and dedicated to the nature of the affect in the context of the psychophysical problem. In his search for the real study of emotion and the understanding of its connection with life, Vygotsky discovers in Spinoza the idea of the dynamic identity of the processes traditionally ascribed to body and mind. This idea of the study of mind from a dynamic viewpoint, which he later found confirmed in the work of Lewin, led Vygotsky not just to the theory of the dynamic semantic systems (1932 to 1934) but also indirectly played a role in the elaboration of the theory of the chronogenic localization of higher psychological functions.

What is the *ordo et connexio* in Spinoza—a special order is a special form of motion; an order (*Gestalt* structures) transferred from the physical series to the mental one (cf. Lewin—*(Handlungspsychologie)*⁵¹ accomplishes the unity of experience and behavior), there is a dynamic correspondence between the two series (Wertheimer—rhythm, etc.)⁵² and not an atomistic one.

Not the brain cell corresponds with a representation, but the rhythm, the *ordo et connexio*, the dynamics are *unified*, the structure is unified, i.e., the path, the course is unified. This is Spinoza's idea. Cf. Humboldt.⁵³ The *Ordnung*⁵⁴ of the passion is not naturalistic.

Not the mental influence on the body but the dynamic of bodily processes, which include the mental as their inner essential aspect (we call them psychological processes) [; it] proceeds in another way (assumes the occurrence of other real events with another causal connection) than purely bodily processes.

This and this alone is the meaning of mind—contra epiphenomenalism.

Here lies the path of real investigation (the concept allows us to foresee the affect and gives it another course).

*Video meliora probogoe, deteriora sequor*⁵⁵ is the formula of our slavery.

The problem of action along the path of the greatest resistance.⁵⁶

Spinoza—the highest bliss—the highest activity.

Saints (Dumas) and idiots feel the highest joy—passive (Mignard, Janet).⁵⁷
Cripples are happy.

[Crossed out:]

Of course, without muscles Socrates would not have come, but the event would have taken place, and these muscles might have led him away.

How completely analogous to sadness without crying.

With crying (not prison)—joy.

J[ames] himself <referred> to physiology and history.

[Crossed out repeatedly:]

It is remarkable that in the *Short treatise*⁵⁸ there is *nothing* from the *Traité des passions*⁵⁹ in its basic content, but there is *the other side of the Moon*, which Descartes does not have: The basic content is different—contra naturalism, the problem of descriptive psychology. What regards its origin, the Spinozist theory about the passions is remarkable in that it *began* from a *position opposite* to Descartes.⁶⁰

The Bol'shevik:

Just as Hegel is the antithesis to Spinoza, Spinoza was the antithesis to Descartes: Behind them are thousands of years of struggle between materialism and idealism.⁶¹

Spinoza opposes Descartes in the theory about the passions (*this is the core*) as truth—falsity, light and darkness. This they see—blind people about colors—*Short treatise*—102.⁶²

They mention Spinoza and Descartes *in the same breath*, although this is impossible,

Written in the margin: [This is why it is not in vain that we investigate the incarnation of his ideas in contemporary [psychology].]

But we must still clarify to what extent the claim that James–Lange comes from Descartes is true; we must lay bare its Cartesian essence.

This idea that not Spinoza but Descartes [inspired James–Lange] begins to penetrate contemporary psychology, although its genuine meaning is not understood.

The critique: dualism, naturalism, *no development*, *no phenomena*, *no structure*, *no function*, its metaphysical nature.

Why is it important to overcome it.

[End of crossing out.]

The current state of the question. The door is open to chaos: *all formulas*.

In the center the mind–body relationship. The door is open to descriptive and explanatory psychology—Jaensch.

To begin Spinoza with the development of psychophysical monism, from the connection of all parts of his theory: epistemology, ethics, ontology, and psychology.

[Crossed out:]

NB!

In the theory of the development of the passions, there is epiphenomenalism. Two affects developed, met, [and] develop further independently; if the mind would not be there, everything would be the same.

Written in the margin: [Outside life.]

In the theory about volition: Passion is just a bodily phenomenon.

Thus, parallelism is also the basis of the theory about the passions. In the passion, nothing is extended or thinks, etc. The parallels intersected for one moment and again continued as parallels until the next lightning intersection.

Written in the margin: [*All parallelists—interaction*: This is indisputable.]

Where is the passion as a phenomenon of the duality of human nature?

Conclusion

The hostility of passions and ideas to development.

The psychophysical problem: the *connection* with life in the passions.

In Descartes the *soul* is *outside life*.

[End of crossing out]

The ethics is impossible in Descartes.

In Spinoza, the role of the mind in life (man and his life is the main problem).

To preserve life is the main function of the passions. To change life is the main function of consciousness.

Orientation by the stars is most primitive. But contemporary psychology, which has no compass or map, must rely on the stars: on Spinoza.⁶³

On the definition of psychology as the science of mental life: not the phenomena, because

- (a) not the phenomena but that which manifests itself in the phenomena,
- (b) no isolated phenomena but something coherent,
- (c) not independent phenomena but as a part of something,
- (d) not all phenomena and not from all sides (right, logic, pedagogy) but in a certain relationship,

– All this is contained in the concept of life.

This applies particularly well to animals (biopsychology) and *man* (*human* life is a historical phenomenon, but especially the life of a *person*, who is born, lives and dies, and not that of a statistic social unit).

The theory about the passions justifies and requires this definition. The definition involves monism and the meaning of the mental, which is not severed from life in advance. With that definition, the Spinozian theory preserves the basic problems of *man in his life*.

The main thing:

The mental does not exist outside life. It is part of life, its special form (species, genus). From the very beginning it breaks with parallelism (two lives—one above the other, *Schattentheorie*) and interaction (outside life—another animal within *man*—cf. Titchener).⁶⁴

Inde, the problem of human life—The living, real, individual person and his destiny forms the fundamental problem of psychology.

How the higher is possible in man

This note is written in pencil on two narrow strips of paper (the first document) as well as the back of a sheet from a notebook (the second document). Discussed is the idea of the scientific knowledge of higher phenomena of human life: free, rational will, and conscious activity (cf. pp. 232–233 in Vygotsky 1999). The notes contain the plan for the second, unwritten part of the “Theory of emotions.” The reference to the principle of the systemic semantic structure of consciousness suggests that the note was written after the symposium of December 5, 1932 (cf. chapter 17).

NB.

- (1) In essence, in his *Ethics*, Spinoza was all the time trying to solve one problem. This single problem was the following: How is the higher possible in man, when we assume that man does not disturb the laws of nature, thereby, as it were, creating a kingdom within a kingdom, but himself forms part of nature [and is] necessarily subordinated to its laws.⁶⁵ How is the higher in *man* really possible? This was the central question of his whole theory. Spinoza answered: *the freedom of will*, but he tried to find out how freedom—genuine, real, practical freedom—is possible for this creature, which necessarily forms a link in a chain of necessary causes and effects; a creature, which is necessarily subject to the force of the affects, which by its nature is destined to impotence in the curbing of his passions or to slavery. Spinoza rejected the *goal* as a supreme illusion and self-deception, but he tried to find out how it is possible to really, rationally strive for this goal and to truly reach what is for man the highest of all goals, how everything can be subordinated to the achievement of this single goal. Spinoza rejected the power of thought but searched for the might of reason, etc. (develop this!). He rejected metaphysical absoluteness; he searched for a freedom of will that is *relative* but really psychological.

For him, only this stood for the idea of man—a type of human nature.

This is expressed well in the word: the higher (the relativity).

Here, in this unique problem, which Spinoza tried to solve—in the *discovery of the higher* [Above the word “higher” is the word “really”] *in the psychology of man*—is Spinoza’s victory and defeat. A victory, because here he is higher than himself [and] rose above fatalism and mechanical causality. A defeat because the metaphysic could not solve these dialectical problems (Spinoza himself calls this higher the *salvation*).⁶⁶

Written in the margin is written a comment to the word “salvation”: [Not just a religious term, but it is impossible to live.]

Thus, Spinoza wishes to subordinate mind in order to save it. He saw how others, in their attempt to preserve mind at all costs, lost it.⁶⁷

This leads to what is most important in the preservation of the life of Spinoza’s theory. In his search for the higher, Spinoza had to continually compare and establish differences; he had to distinguish the lowest from the highest, the higher from the very highest. This is a very [important] aspect, the classification in the theory of knowledge, in the affects—development. This is not a Spinozian idea but a Spinozist one, i.e., his truth and falsity together. A frozen panorama of development: cf. the animal species (the product of development). He proposes transitions, changes, development: motion (mind undergoes many changes). Thus, development is our principal method: to make the panorama move, to transform the classification into a historical one, co-existing in development. *Spinoza’s system requires development. This is its strength but its weakness as well (he does not provide it).*

While devoting himself to the higher, Spinoza in essence solved a problem opposite to the problem of Descartes and descriptive psychology. *The unity of explanatory and descriptive [psychology]*. Dilthey.

The mathematics of the mind. Stern: <Spinozism:> natural-scientific ideas, humanity and will. *The role of mathematics for natural science* is [equivalent to] the role of Spinoza’s theory about the passions for contemporary psychology (the *idea of man*).

- (2) The interconnection of all parts of Spinozism: the ethics, the epistemology, etc., *inde* the relationship, the connections + the mutability of the eternal things, which were absent in the system.

Hence the contradictions of the system: The solution of the problem required to go *beyond* the boundaries of mechanical causality and psychophysical parallelism, etc. These concepts did not exist: *inde* the contradictions. But what is most important: a general definition or a vital problem? It was considered that the main thing is parallelism: that which contradicts the mystery.⁶⁸ In reality, the most important is: the vital connection of mind and body, but there *was no adequate concept*, and parallelism was Descartes’ cracked hoop.

The inadequacy of the method for the problem: The history of mind is as it were hidden behind Spinoza’s grandiose deduction.

- (3) Finally, there is no parallelism. Affect as a unity. The relationships of mind and body change (James).

The next chapter

If the only problem that Spinoza tried to solve was: “How is the higher possible in man,” then the only answer was the axiom “man thinks.”⁶⁹

The epigraph to his theory in its vital part but [also to] all of Spinoza’s and the contemporary theory about the passions. Cf. *cogito*: the same place, the same Archimedean fulcrum. This axiom is a constructive fact. It allows to explain man from himself (Engels), we would say—from self-motion.

Struggle, conflict, contradiction.

Further three chapters

- (1) Knowledge has levels (concepts).
- (2) The affect has levels (the [level of the] concept corresponds with the [level of the] affect).
- (3) Freedom has levels (the [level of the] concept corresponds with the level of freedom).
- (4) My study. Consciousness has a semantic and systemic structure.
- (5) Height psychology. *Ecce homo*.

NB! But this higher is not given from the very beginning. It must be achieved with difficulty. It is a path through steep summits. It is as difficult as it is rare.⁷⁰ Not all reach the end. If people would be born free. Obviously, they are not born both powerful and <illegible>. It is what they become. *Ergo*, the task to *prove how the higher is possible in man* requires the motion from lower to higher, it requires development.

Discussion of Vygotsky’s talk about emotions. Fear under war conditions

These notes, written in pencil and in red ink on four sheets, summarize the discussion of a talk about the problem of emotions. Vygotsky’s text has not been found, and neither do we know when and where the talk took place. Judging by the discussion, Vygotsky criticized the existing emotion theories and presented his own view, i.e., the mastery of the emotions “from above,” through the intellect. Possibly, he also discussed the concrete theme of “Fear under war conditions,” mentioned in the discussion, although we have no further evidence for this conjecture. Among those present were two well-known experts in military psychology—Akim Edel’shteyn⁷¹ and Lev Rozenshteyn⁷²—and two “militant Marxists”—Aleksandr Talankin⁷³ and Aleksandr Vedenov⁷⁴—who at the time served as ideological gate-keepers (they also participated in other discussions of Vygotsky’s work [cf. chapter 19]). As usual, his opponents rejected what they saw as Vygotsky’s overly theoretical approach, but this time the criticism had an outspoken political flavor. It is not impossible that their reactions (e.g., “It is theoretical and does not deal with the Red Army,” “without a clear class analysis”, etc.) played a role in the fact that Vygotsky did not pursue the theme of the higher emotions any further. Vygotsky’s reactions to the criticisms can be inferred from his scarce remarks in the margin and the “+” signs, which presumably reflect his agreement with the speaker.

[Written in pencil:]

Talankin

1. Criticism of James–Lange +
2. The practical aspect of the talk: How can the commander and the political worker concretely master their emotions. This explains the popularity of James–Lange.
3. Military psychology is odious. Military psychology is unmasked.⁷⁵ The psychological conception is a *theory about war*. A theory about war: attention + fear. The conflict of the individual fighter. *Invariable*: The imperialist war and Cannae⁷⁶ are the same.
4. What is important? Can fear ruin the system of habits? How can we re-establish it, overcome the disorganization. *Collective fear is panic*.
5. Exercise is necessary to overcome disorganization. The manual of arms—the overcoming of fear (Skobelev).⁷⁷
6. In practice—an example: Exercise overcomes fear.
7. Assume the offensive: *before*—fear, *in time*—[beginning of red ink:] It stops. In the experience of the commander this is correct, but in science?
8. The problem of habit—automatize the habits—a reliable remedy against fear.
9. A practical objection: *War is not [waged by] the <present> regular troops*.
10. *His point of view*: Fear is connected with the problem of the personality of the Red Army soldier. It is dynamic under various circumstances.

Fear in the soldier of the old army before October.

Fear in the Red Army—He begins to fear in another way.

The bad soldiers are abroad; here we have brave persons.

[The text of point 11 is boxed:]

11. The general interpretation of the class nature of the army; the Red Army man is educated under the conditions of the Red Army. *Meets my claims halfway, which were not carefully stated*: The fear is not the background but a function of the general attitude.
12. The second aspect, how can we develop it: the intellectualization of the fear.
13. To state the question of fear historically. To fight fear not via the automatization of habits, but via the *class* education of the Red Army soldier.

Boxed: [!]

In historical development, fear is mediated by the intellect, becomes something else, a *human fear*, and is no longer a vital adaptive reaction. *The fear operates in another way*.

14. The struggle with the feeling of fear *on one pre-condition*: via the intellect.
15. In the system—a historical moment—the emotion is mediated by the intellect. *If we develop this further it may bring benefit*.
16. The theory of emotions gives no tangible results for the direct army practice. Over-emphasize in elaborating the psychological problems. The emotions are nowhere. Pedagogically, practically, from the viewpoint of military education. Change focus. *Actualize it!*

The text of point 16 is boxed along with the following remark: [*I make no progress*].

L. Mark. Rozenshteyn

1. Was a regimental physician. Saw the emotions during the war.
2. A theoretical construction, but there is no person, no totality. The problems of the person in the collective, which changes the emotion.
3. The manifestation of fear: neurosis, contusion. *The [mental] material of the injury [should be studied] on a level with the wounds.*
4. A military doctor—field surgeon, field epidemiologist (before the war); psycho-hygienist (after the war).
5. From theory to practice is incorrect. Theories [must come] from practice. Not the details (not the **thalamus**), [they are] *part of the whole personality*. In different situations, people react in a different way. *Fear need not arrive.*

[This phrase has a crossed-out “?”:]

I said that fear is inevitable. [That is, Vygotsky]
The sound stimulus [connect]—With the person.

We have seen the transition: neurotics from the hospital—brave Red Army soldiers.

- (6) Emotion is a complex reaction, not visceral: *a totality*; positive emotions: enthusiasm, purposefulness.
 The person in the situation, his preparation.
 The military training in general education.
Immunize.
- (7) Not the intellectualization of fear—They do not speak about that. Important is to prevent the morbid reaction.
 Questions of personal health and hardening. The hygienics of education. +
- (8) War is a humdrum thing: telephone, completion, order, *everyday heroism*. An inner purpose. Harmful production in the factory—in peacetime in poisonings. *An earthquake is the same*. These reactions should not be there.

This statement is boxed with “??” and the following remark:

[Not true. *War is not an earthquake.*]

- (9) Emotions in our country and in capitalist countries are qualitatively different. Outside space.⁷⁸ *Proceed from belletristic descriptions.*

There is a vertical line next to point 9 with the following remark: [But why?]

- (10) The question of habits and their destruction. Duration. Changes. Successes and failures. *Emotion and fatigue. Routine.*
 There is no solution outside the situation.
- (14)⁷⁹ Differentiate by character and personal purpose.
 Personal life—without interest in life.
Courage is chronic suicide.

Vvedenov [sic]

- (1) The meaning of emotions for the pedagogical practice. Emotion in the socialist *competition, in the system of udarnichestvo*.⁸⁰ *But other emotions than fear. The education of positive emotions.*
- (2) They tried to solve it incorrectly. Artistic material for the illiterate—interest, it is captivating, etc.
- (3) *We must educate the emotion via consciousness: What matters is the direct work of consciousness in emotion. Panic, fire, cinema: There is no consciousness.*
- (4) Through a politically conscious treatment of each phenomenon discipline the emotional side. Behavior—*by special factors*—through consciousness. The education of consciousness is the education of emotions.

Dr. Edel'shteyn

- (1) It is time *for not just* the criticism of James–Lange.
- (2) The time is ripe to bury Cannon's theory. Several years ago—Zavadovskiy. *A mechanistic interpretation.* Emotion is a purely social act.
- (3) *The vulgar extrapolation from cat to man.* Crude.
- (4) *The theme: fear and war.* The talk just outlined approaches but did not specify them. *It is theoretical and does not deal with the Red Army.* The dissatisfaction of the military workers.
The further discussion.

[Point 5 is in boxed.]

- (5) We should not approach the principle of fear in a non-class manner without a clear class analysis. Not engage in the class criticism of the older psychologists. From the viewpoint of the ruling class. The review of Svechin⁸¹ = everyone has a fear reaction—*the class orientation, enthusiasm, energy.* About the collective system. *The prevention of panic* in the Red Army *differs* from the German approach.

To order emotional enthusiasm: If it does not obliterate the fear, it will at least force us to approach the fear in another way.

Notes

1. Cf. p. 300 of Vygotsky (1987): “Volkelt, Krüger, and other researchers of the Leipzig school have shown that, in the early stages of perception's development, it is equally inseparable from emotional reactions. Krüger has suggested that in these early stages perception should be called “sensual” or “emotional” perception. His studies have shown that only with the passage of time is perception gradually liberated from its connections with the child's immediate affect or emotion.”
2. See, for a detailed analysis, Zavershneva (2015).
3. Ernst Kuno Berthold Fischer (1824 to 1907). German philosopher, historian of philosophy, and author of the six volumes of *Geschichte der neuern*

Philosophie (History of Modern Philosophy). Vygotsky refers to p. 577 of the last chapter of Fischer (1865) where the author listed what he saw as logical and epistemological inconsistencies in Spinoza's system of thought. One of his conclusions was that "In the order of things, which Spinoza conceives as the truly real one, as the only true one, everything is possible except for himself, except for Spinoza, who acknowledges this order." See also Vygotsky's "Theory of Emotions" on pp. 121–126 of Vygotsky (1999) where he contested Fischer's view of Spinoza as a Cartesian philosopher.

4. *The Ethics*, Part 4, Proposition 67: "A free man thinks of death least of all things; and his wisdom is a meditation not of death but of life."
5. Intellectual love of God (Latin). See *The Ethics*, Part 5, Proposition 32, Corollary.
6. Refers to *Hamlet*, Act 1, Scene 2: "He was a man. Take him for all in all. I shall not look upon his like again."
7. Behold the man (Latin). Cf. John 19:5.
8. Vladimir Aleksandrovich Nevskiy (1888 to 1974). Russian library scientist, pedagogue, and high official in the Ministry of Education who was responsible for the correspondence courses for librarians at the Faculty of Education of the Second Moscow State University. In this context, he contracted Vygotsky and other leading psychologist to edit books for librarians, which listed the major publications in the field (cf. Dobrenko 1997). His publishing company also published several of Vygotsky's textbooks, and Nevskiy has claimed that a book about the psychology of reading, edited together with Vygotsky, "was not printed, although we held the galley-proofs in our hands" (Sandler & Etlis 1991, p. 396). It is unclear to which note Vygotsky refers.
9. Théodule Armand Ribot (1839 to 1916). French philosopher and psychologist who defended psychology as an empirical science based on experiment. In Ribot (1896), he developed a theory of emotions similar to that of James-Lange. According to Ribot, emotions are the result of adaptation to the environment during the process of evolution and find their basis in motor and visceral reactions. Ribot believed this was true for the higher (e.g., moral, aesthetic, religious) feelings as well.
10. The metaphor of the brain as a telephone station was present in James as well. See p. 26 of James (1890).
11. Refers to the discussion with Boris Mikhaylovich Zavadovskiy (1895 to 1951), a Russian biologist, physiologist, and popularizer of science who introduced and edited Cannon (1927). Zavadovskiy claimed that Cannon's experiments confirmed the James–Lange theory, which Vygotsky denied. Cf. p. 329 of Vygotsky (1987) and p. 76 of Vygotsky (1999).
12. Karl Spencer Lashley (1890 to 1958). American psychologist and adherent of behaviorism. Searched in vain for the engram by systematically destroying parts of the cortex of rats and initially defended a holistic viewpoint in the debate about the localization of mental processes in the brain (cf. Lashley 1930).

13. Refers to Plato's "Phaedo," 98c: "and did not assign any real causes for the ordering of things, but mentioned as causes air and ether and water and many other absurdities. And it seemed to me it was very much as if one should say that Socrates does with intelligence whatever he does, and then, in trying to give the causes of the particular thing I do, should say first that I am now sitting here because my body is composed of bones and sinews, and the bones are hard and have joints which divide them and the sinews" Cf. Plato (1966).
14. Frederic Paulhan (1856 to 1931). French associationist philosopher with a special interest in the problem of character. His main work was Paulhan (1889). In *Thinking and Speech*, Vygotsky refers to Paulhan's distinction between meaning and sense in Paulhan (1928).
15. Possibly refers to the idea, criticized by Vygotsky, that thinking is some weakened (shortened) form of speaking with whispering as an intermediate link.
16. Is the key to the anatomy of the ape. See chapter 7.
17. I hate and I love (Latin). From Catullus 85, a poem by the Roman poet Catullus (84–54 BC). Cf. "I hate and I love. Perhaps you ask why I do this? / I do not know, but I feel it happen and I am torn apart." Here mentioned to express an ambivalent feeling.
18. Quoted from Akhmatova's poem "May snow" (1916): "A see-through shroud now disperses / And melts unnoticed on the sod. / The spring, so very cold and merciless, / Is killing off each swelling bud. / So frightful of the early death, / That I can not look at God's creation. / I feel the grief King David left, / Millenniums of desolation" (translation by Andrey Kneller). This is a reference to Psalm 6:7: "Mine eye is consumed because of grief; it waxeth old because of all mine enemies."
19. *The Ethics*, Part 2, Proposition 43, Note.
20. Actually, the Preface to Part 4: "as we desire to form an idea of man as a type of human nature which we may hold in view."
21. Refers to Matthew 6:34: "Take therefore no thought for the morrow: for the morrow shall take thought for the things of itself. Sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof."
22. Original footnote: "With the help of the study of the contemporary psychology of emotions and in light of our own studies learn how the task of the prolegomena originated."
23. Fischer (1865) repeatedly discussed various interpretations of Spinoza's theory, and it is unclear to which passage Vygotsky refers.
24. See Appendix 1 of *Dialectics of Nature*: "If I term physics the mechanics of molecules, chemistry the physics of atoms, and furthermore biology the chemistry of proteins, I wish thereby to express the transition of each of these sciences into the other, hence both the connection, the continuity, and the distinction, the discrete separation."
25. Original footnote: "Work out: Where are the questions of *life and personality*."

26. This may be a reference to Murchison (1930).
27. That is, his wife Roza Noyevna Vygotskaya.
28. *The Ethics*, Part 4, Proposition 69, Corollary: “The free man is as courageous in timely retreat as in combat; or, a free man shows equal courage or presence of mind, whether he elect to give battle or retreat.”
29. Approximately similar to “humanities” (German). The term was introduced by Dilthey in opposition to the natural sciences. See Dilthey (1992) and chapter 7 of Van der Veer and Valsiner (1991).
30. *The Ethics*, Part 2, Proposition 7: “The order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things.”
31. Refers to the principle of isomorphism introduced by Köhler (1920). See also Luchins and Luchins (1999) on the various notions of isomorphism within the Gestalt movement.
32. *The Ethics*, Part 3, Proposition 2: “Body cannot determine mind to think, neither can mind determine body to motion or rest or any state different from these, if such there be.”
33. Possibly refers to *The Ethics*, Part 2, Proposition 13: “The object of the idea constituting the human mind is the body, in other words a certain mode of extension which actually exists, and nothing else.”
34. Refers to the Russian translation of 1909 of Petzoldt’s text on positivism. Cf. Petzoldt (1921).
35. Thereby (Latin).
36. Allusion to Goethe’s words: “The greatest art in theoretical and practical life consists in changing the problem into a postulate; that way one succeeds.” From a letter, dated August 9, 1828, to Carl Friedrich Zelter. See p. 296 of Mandelkow (1967).
37. In every respect, entirely (Latin).
38. Thinking thing (Latin). Cf. *The Ethics*, Part 2, Definitions: “By *idea*, I mean the mental conception which is formed by the mind as a thinking thing.”
39. Possibly a reference to the Russian edition of *The Ethics* (1892).
40. It is unclear to what Vygotsky refers.
41. Cf. Descartes’ *The Passions of the Soul*, Part 1, 31: “There is a little gland in the brain where the soul exercises its functions more particularly than in the other parts of the body.” Cf. also Vygotsky’s “Theory of Emotions” on p. 188 of Vygotsky (1999): “We tried to study the hypothesis of the interaction between the spirit and the body originating in the cerebral gland and the consequences following from that hypothesis. But, as we have said, assuming a direct action of the spirit on the body and the body on the spirit is the exception rather than the rule in Descartes’ system. It is in irreconcilable contradiction to the basic thesis of his whole system, according to which thought and space represent opposite substances that exclude each other. The true basis of Cartesian psychology for this reason is not the hypothesis of interaction, but the theory of psychophysical parallelism.”

42. Harald Høffding (1843 to 1931). Danish positivist philosopher and psychologist. His “law of relationships,” which said that each element of consciousness is determined by the totality of connections and relationships, in a way anticipated the systemic approach of consciousness. Høffding’s books were translated into many languages, notably *Den nyere filosofis historie (History of Modern Philosophy)* (1894) and *Psychologi i Omrids paa Grundlag af Erfaring (Outlines of Psychology Based on Experience)* (1892). Høffding is repeatedly quoted in “Theory of Emotions,” in particular, in the context of the problem of psychophysical parallelism.
43. Cf. Chapter 3, “Basic forms of motion,” in Engels’ *Dialectics of Nature*: “Motion in the most general sense, conceived as the mode of existence, the inherent attribute of matter, comprehends all changes and processes occurring in the universe, from mere change of place right to thinking.” All page numbers given in the text refer to an unknown Russian edition of Engels’ text.
44. Cause of itself (Latin). Cf. *The Ethics*, Part 1, Definitions: “By that which is *self-caused*, I mean that of which the essence involves existence, or that of which the nature is only conceivable as existent... By *substance* I mean that which is in itself, and is conceived through itself: in other words, that of which a conception can be formed independently of any other conception.”
45. According to Gustav Theodor Fechner (1801 to 1887), the German philosopher and experimental psychologist, the quality of the sensation changes when the upper absolute threshold is reached (e.g., very loud sounds cause pain).
46. The reference to Napoleon is enigmatic. French infantry battalions used to have six companies with each company consisting of approximately 100 men. It is also known that Napoleon attached great importance to the uniform training and formation of his troops. Cf. the chapter on infantry in Ashby (2010).
47. Order and connection (Latin). The real and necessary order that exists between ideas or things, or cause and effect, and which differs from the imaginary order that humans presuppose. Cf. Van Bunge, Krop, Steenbakkens, and Van de Ven (2014).
48. *The Ethics*, Part 3, Proposition 2, Note: “No one has hitherto laid down the limits to the powers of the body.” This text was also used as part of the epigraph to *The Psychology of Art*.
49. One thing (Latin).
50. Vygotsky refers to a Russian translation of a passage on p. 73 of chapter 2 of Høffding (1892): “The *identity hypothesis* views the two worlds [i.e., the spiritual and the material world] as two... expressions for one and the same being. We cannot reduce the two languages in which the same thought has its expression... etc.”
51. The psychology of action or act (German).
52. This may refer to Wertheimer’s text: “Imagine a dance, a dance full of grace and joy. What is the situation in such a dance? Do we have a summation of physical limb movements and a psychological consciousness?” Cf. Wertheimer (1925) and Ellis (1938).

53. Friedrich Wilhelm Christian Karl Ferdinand von Humboldt (1767 to 1835). German philosopher, diplomat, and founder of the philosophy of language and linguistics. Through his Russian follower, Aleksandr Potebnya, he exerted great influence on Vygotsky. See the chapters by Marie-Cécile Bertau and Anke Werani in Yasnitsky, Van der Veer, and Ferrari (2014) and in Zavershneva (2016).
54. Order (German).
55. I see the better way and approve it, but I follow the worse way (Latin). Medea's words in book 7 of the *Metamorphoses* by Publius Ovidius Naso (Ovid) (43 BC to 17 AD).
56. See chapter 25.
57. Cf. the following fragment from "Theory of Emotions" on pp. 184–185 of Vygotsky (1999): "Dumas, studying the history of the development of the teaching on affective hallucinations, says that the physiological experiment not only fails to confirm the James-Lange theory, but serves as its direct refutation; psychological and clinical observation is a basis for taking a more negative position with respect to this theory, since it has at its disposal a number of facts that the peripheral theory cannot explain at all... From these facts, we can draw a serious argument against the peripheral theory of joy. In these cases, introspection usually observes a seemingly cataleptic state." Saint Teresa describes her state thus: "Even at moments of greatest rapture, the body frequently seems to be dead and completely impotent: it remains in the position in which this state finds it, standing or sitting with hands open or folded... Janet described in great detail the pathological state of ecstasy in which mental experience of joy was accompanied by a slowing of all vital functions... Mignard investigated clinically the state of passive joy that he observed even in idiots, patients suffering from senile dementia, and in progressive paralytics" (a number of serious mistakes in the translation have been corrected). Vygotsky refers to Janet (1926, 1928) and to Mignard (1909).
58. Refers to Spinoza's *Short Treatise on God, Man, and his Wellbeing* (appr. 1660). Vygotsky may have used the Russian edition, Spinoza (1929).
59. *Treatise on the passions* (French). Cf. Descartes' *The passions of the soul* (in Vol. 1 of Cottingham, Stoothoff, & Murdoch 1985).
60. Cf. the following fragment from "Theory of Emotions" on p. 124 of Vygotsky (1999): "the remarkable fact that has not yet been given due study: even in the first draft of Spinoza's teaching on the passions in the *Short Treatise* there is nothing of Descartes" *Treatise on the Passions* in its basic content, but there is something completely new. Spinoza turns the problem itself to quite another side. If in Descartes the problem of passions appears primarily as a physiological problem and a problem of the interaction of soul and body, then in Spinoza, the same problem appears from the beginning as a problem of the relation of thought and affect, understanding and passion."
61. Vygotsky refers to the theoretical and political journal *Bol'shevik* (continued as *Kommunist*). In connection with the 300th anniversary of Spinoza, a great number of articles appeared in various journals in 1932. We assume that

Vygotsky refers to Kammari and Yudin (1932), which contained a passage that is quoted in “Theory of Emotions” (see p. 127 of Vygotsky 1999): “Just as Hegel later developed the metaphysical and rationalistic bases of the Spinoza philosophy giving the only possible refutation to Spinozism, that is, by converting the substance of Spinoza into an absolute idea, into the absolute spirit, and in this way, presented an antithesis to Spinozist teaching, so in his time, Spinoza presented an antithesis with respect to Descartes, but a materialistic antithesis. Behind the relations that we disclosed of the two philosophical teachings stands a thousand-year-old struggle of two basic trends in philosophical thought, idealism, and materialism.” The reference to Kammari and Yudin (1932) is absent in Vygotsky’s published text.

62. See chapter 1 of the *Short Treatise*, in which Spinoza speaks about opinion, belief, and knowledge: “This one merely forms an opinion, or, as is commonly said, believes through hearsay only... he still made his calculations accordingly, and he did so without having acquired any more knowledge of the Rule of Three than a blind man has of colour, so that whatever he may have said about it, he simply repeated as a parrot repeats what it has been taught.” Apparently, this refers to the paper in *Bol’shevik*; cf. Vygotsky’s other critical remark: “They mention Spinoza and Descartes in the same breath, although this is impossible.”
63. A. V. Surmava discovered the following note in the margin of Vygotsky’s copy of *The Ethics*: “The light of Spinoza’s great works traverses various centuries like that of remote stars. Only the psychology of the future can realize Spinoza’s ideas.”
64. Edward Bradford Titchener (1867 to 1927). English–American psychologist and student of Wilhelm Wundt. Vygotsky refers to the Russian version Titchener (1914, p. 9) of Titchener (1910, p. 11): “These statements all point to a view of mind which is not often expressed outright, in so many words, but which is very generally held: the view, namely, that mind is a living being, with all the qualities and powers that are possessed by material living beings; an immaterial animal, so to say, that dwells within the material animal; an inward man, manifesting itself in the behaviour of the outward man.”
65. *The Ethics*, Part 3, Preface: “Most writers on the emotions and on human conduct seem to be treating rather of matters outside nature than of natural phenomena following nature’s general laws. They appear to conceive man to be situated in nature as a kingdom within a kingdom: for they believe that he disturbs rather than follows nature’s order, that he has absolute control over his actions and that he is determined solely by himself.”
66. *The Ethics*, Part 5, Proposition 36, Note: “From what has been said we clearly understand, wherein our salvation, or blessedness, or freedom, consists: namely, in the constant and eternal love towards God, or in God’s love towards men.”
67. Allusion to Matthew 16:25: “For whosoever will save his life shall lose it: and whosoever will lose his life for my sake shall find it.” Cf. Luke 9:24, Mark 8:35.

68. Possibly meaning that by assuming parallelism we do not have to explain the mysterious interaction between mind and brain.
69. *The Ethics*, Part 2, Axioms.
70. “All things excellent are as difficult as they are rare.” Cf. *The Ethics*, Part 5, Proposition 42, Note.
71. Akim Oskarovich Edel’shteyn (1897 to 1967). Russian psychiatrist, military physician, participant in the Civil War, and student of P.B. Gannushkin. His publications dealt with, among other things, military psychiatry, psychohygienics, schizophrenia, and the history of Russian psychiatry.
72. Lev Markovich Rozenshteyn (1884 to 1934). Russian psychiatrist, organizer of a system of social psychiatry, founder of psychohygienics, and student of V. P. Serbskiy. Published on mental health, schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, etc.
73. Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Talankin (1898 to 1937). Russian psychologist and militant political worker, member of the Party cell of the Institute of Psychology, head of several institutes, and very active participant in the debate about reactology. In this quality, he criticized Vygotsky and Luria (see Van der Veer 2000 and chapter 16 of Van der Veer and Valsiner 1991). Talankin was also an active critic of the members of the Debordin group such as Frankfurt, Sapir, and Kurazov. He was eventually shot during the repression of the persons working for the Workers’ and Farmers’ Red Army.
74. Aleksandr Vasil’evich Vedenov (1901 to 1970). Russian psychologist and educationalist and head of the Faculty of Psychology at the Krupskaya Academy of Communist Education. Like Talankin, he was an active participant in the debate about reactology.
75. Talankin published a book, entitled *Military Psychology and Questions of Military-Political Education in the Workers’ and Farmers’ Red Army* (1929), in which he suggested to liquidate military psychology as a bourgeois science in favor of a new approach.
76. The battle of Cannae (2 August 216 BC) was a major battle of the Second Punic War. In World War I, the German field marshall, Count Alfred von Schlieffen, borrowed its name for his operation against the Russian troops, which resulted in a complete German victory. The decisive battle on August 13–14, 1914, was lost by the Russians because general Leonid Artamonov panicked and ordered his First Army Corps to retreat, which allowed the encirclement and destruction of the Second Russian Army led by Aleksandr Samsonov.
77. Refers to a maneuver by general M. D. Skobelev (1843 to 1882) during the Russian–Turkish War. When one of his battalions panicked, Skobelev gave orders to carry out the manual of arms, which restored the order (see Masal’skiy 1998).
78. Rozenshteyn presumably claimed that Vygotsky’s presentation was too abstract, i.e., neglected local and historical differences.
79. The points 11 to 13 are absent in the note.
80. Shock working (Socialist newspeak). Individual workers and teams of workers were forced to participate in a race against other workers to over-complete the already unrealistic economic plans. Because the responsible officials always

reported that the plan had been (over)completed, this led to higher and increasingly surrealistic targets, which could only be satisfied with cheating and double accounting.

81. Aleksandr Andreyevich Svechin (1878 to 1938). Russian military commander and participant in the Russian–Japanese War and World War I. Author of more than 500 publications about military matters. Repeatedly arrested in the 1930s and executed in 1938. Figures in Solzhenitsyn’s *The Red Wheel*. It is possible that Edel’shteyn refers to one of the politically motivated critical reviews of his work published in 1931 (cf. Dunayevskiy 1931).

References

- Ashby, R. (2010). *Napoleon against great odds*. Westport, CT: Praeger.
- Cannon, W. (1927). *Fiziologiya emotsiy*. In B.M. Zavodovskiy (Ed.), *Telesnye izmeneniya pri boli, golode, strakhe i yarosti*. Leningrad: Priboy.
- Cottingham, J., Stoothoff, R., & Murdoch, D. (Eds.). (1985). *The philosophical writings of Descartes* (Vol. 1). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Dilthey, W. (1992). *Gesammelte Schriften. Vol. 7.: Der Aufbau der geschichtlichen Welt in den Geisteswissenschaften*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.
- Dobrenko, E. (1997). *Formovka sovetskogo chitatelya*. St. Petersburg: Akademicheskii Proyekt.
- Dunayevskiy, V. (1931). Vreditel’skaya teoriya ‘permanentnoy ekonomicheskoy mobilizatsii’ Svechina: Kritika strategicheskikh i voenneo-istoricheskikh vzglyadov prof. Svechina. Stenogramma otkrytogo zasedaniya 25 aprelya 1931 g. In *Leningradskoe otdelenie Komakademii pri TsIK SSSR. Sekstiya po izucheniyu problem vojny* (pp. 65–81). Moscow: Gosvoenizdat.
- Ellis, W. D. (Ed.). (1938). *A source book of Gestalt psychology*. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co.
- Fischer, K. (1865). *Geschichte der neuern Philosophie. Band 1(2). Descartes und seine Schule*. Mannheim: Verlagsbuchhandlung von Friedrich Wassermann.
- Høffding, H. (1892). *Psykologi i omrids paa grundlag af erfaring*. Copenhagen: P.G. Philipsens Forlag.
- James, W. (1890). *The principles of psychology*. New York: Henry Holt and Company.
- Janet, P. (1926). *De l’angoisse à l’extase* (Vol. 1). Paris: Félix Alcan.
- Janet, P. (1928). *De l’angoisse à l’extase* (Vol. 2). Paris: Félix Alcan.
- Kammari, M., & Yudin, P. (1932). Spinoza i dialekticheskii materializm. *Bolshevik*, 21, 39–60.
- Köhler, W. (1920). *Die physische Gestalten in Ruhe und im stationären Zustand*. Braunschweig: Vieweg & Sohn.
- Lashley, K. S. (1930). Basic neural mechanisms in behavior. *Psychological Review*, 37, 1–24.
- Luchins, A. S., & Luchins, E. H. (1999). Isomorphism in Gestalt theory: Comparison of Köhler’s and Wertheimer’s concepts. *Gestalt Theory*, 21(3), 208–234.
- Mandelkow, K. R. (Ed.). (1967). *Goethes Briefe* (Vol. IV). Hamburg: Christian Wegner Verlag.
- Masal’skiy, V. N. (1998). *Skobelev: Istoricheskiy portret*. Moscow: Andreevskiy Flag.
- Mignard, M. (1909). *La joie passive: Étude de psychologie pathologique*. Paris: Félix Alcan.
- Murchison, C. (Ed.) (1930). *History of psychology in autobiography. Vols. 1–2*. Worcester, MA: Clark University Press.
- Paulhan, F. (1889). *L’activité mentale et les elements de l’esprit*. Paris: Félix Alcan.
- Paulhan, F. (1928). Qu’est-ce que le sens des mots? *Journal de Psychologie*, 25, 289–329.

- Petzoldt, J. (1921). *Das Weltproblem vom Standpunkte des relativistischen Positivismus aus historisch-kritisch dargestellt*. Leipzig-Berlin: Verlag von B. G. Teubner (third, revised edition).
- Plato (1966). *Plato in twelve volumes, Vol. 1*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Ribot, T. (1896). *La psychologie des sentiments*. Paris: Alcan.
- Sandler, A. S., & Etlis, M. M. (1991). *Sovremenniki GULAGA: Kniga vospominaniy i razmyshleniy*. Magadan: Knizhnoe Izdatel'stvo.
- Spinoza, B. (1929). *Kratkiy traktat o Boge, cheloveke i ego blazhenstve*. Leningrad: Priboy.
- Talankin, A. (1929). *Voennaya psikhologiya i voprosy voenno-politicheskogo vospitaniya v RKKA*. Moscow-Leningrad: Voenizdat.
- Titchener, E. B. (1910). *A text-book of psychology*. New York: The Macmillan Company.
- Titchener, E. B. (1914). *Uchebnik psikhologii*. Moscow: Izdanie Tovarischestva 'Mir'.
- Van Bunge, W., Krop, H., Steenbakkens, P., & Van de Ven, J. (2014). *The Bloomsbury companion to Spinoza*. London: Bloomsbury Publishing.
- Van der Veer, R. (2000). Vygotsky criticized. *Journal of Russian and Eastern European Psychology*, 6, 3–9.
- Van der Veer, R., & Valsiner, J. (1991). *Understanding Vygotsky: A quest for synthesis*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Vygotsky, L. S. (1987). *The collected works of L.S. Vygotsky. Vol. 1. Problems of general psychology*. New York: Plenum Press.
- Vygotsky, L. S. (1999). *The collected works of L.S. Vygotsky. Vol. 6. Scientific legacy*. New York: Plenum Press.
- Wertheimer, M. (1925). *Drei Abhandlungen zur Gestalttheorie*. Erlangen: Verlag der Philosophischen Akademie.
- Yasnitsky, A., Van der Veer, R., & Ferrari, M. (Eds.). (2014). *The Cambridge handbook of cultural-historical psychology*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Zavershneva, E. Yu. (2010). Two fragments of personal notes by L.S. Vygotsky from the Vygotsky archive. *Journal of Russian and East European Psychology*, 48(1), 85–89.
- Zavershneva, E. Yu. (2015). Problema svobody kak otlichitel'noy kharakteristiki cheloveka v rabotakh L.S. Vygotskogo. *Voprosy Psikhologii*, 5, 89–105.
- Zavershneva, E. Yu. (2016). Soznanie bez slova: L.S. Vygotsky o dorechevom gorizonte cheloveka. *Voprosy Psikhologii*, 5, 71–87.

Chapter 14

Observing Asya

Like so many psychologists, Vygotsky observed his own two children and performed little experiments with them. This chapter contains two documents with his observations of his youngest daughter, Asya, who was not yet 2 years old in the summer of 1932. For Vygotsky, these observations were important, and he planned to devote a chapter to them in his future book about consciousness (see chapter 17).

Observations of Asya

This note was written in violet ink on the back of a page of an unidentified French paper about child psychology. The pages of the paper were cut into pieces of the size of notebook pages. The text shows that Vygotsky connected his observations of child development with findings from animal research and psychopathology.

NB! Observation of Asya. *May 4, 1932.*

The two- and three-(?)word sentences appeared (under the influence of the instruction to repeat them?). Roza Noevna asks her: “Can you say ‘the chicken does cluck, cluck, cluck?’” and she repeats it. The same with her aunt, uncle, Bobik [a dog], and other absent objects. But: [when] R. N. [says]—*Esya*¹ *is walking*, Asya looks at the *sitting* *Esya* and says: *Esya sits*. Cf. the impossibility for the aphasiac to repeat something without distortion in the sense of correction: I can write well with my *right* hand.²

That we have an analogy here, is clear from the fact that: (1) Asya is not *consciously* intent upon repetition, but her activity is repetition *in itself*, (2) on the other hand, cf. Hochheimer (*Psychologische Forschung*) and the aphasiac; if he is intent upon *pure* repetition, he repeats things, but he can only repeat something when he has *another* attitude to the repetition (as it were a naive-realistic attitude to repetition: To repeat is to verify the utterance and to agree with it).³

Ergo: The aphasiac as well has an *essentially* other attitude to the act of repetition itself (a naive-realistic one).

On the problem of semasiology in psychological research

The text is from a small notebook with a bright violet cover and a red back. Approximately half of the pages were torn out. Theoretically, these notes are interesting because of the introduction of the terms “semic” and “semasiological,” which are connected with the new principle of the semantic structure of consciousness. It implies that the idea of the semantic structure of consciousness originated halfway through 1932 and not by the end of that year as was previously assumed. The manuscript also contained excerpts from books by Rolland, Semkovskiy, Shpet, Sombart, and Spengler, two of which are reproduced here. These fragments show once again that Vygotsky was in the habit of copying passages from novels and other books for use in his scientific writings.

NB! On the problem of semasiology in psychological research:

Romain Rolland, Collected works, Publishing House Vremya in Leningrad, Vol. 3.⁴

Jacques-Christophe. Transl. edited by A.A. Smirnov. Book 4. <...> p. <2>37.

The small apartment of the Reinharts was as *gemütlich* as they themselves were. It was a somewhat talkative *Gemüt*, a *Gemüt*⁵ with inscriptions, etc.⁶

cf. the question of the expressiveness of the (meaningful) thing.

<...>

NB! From the observations of Asya

July 1–19, 1932.–1; 9.⁷

1. Rich egocentric speech before the second year!
2. Rich autistic thinking, which clearly advanced after the appearance of speech (pro Bleuler,⁸ contra Freud).
3. When she says something to one of those present (mama), she repeats it for the other (papa) as if he had not heard it. Speech is a communicative function *à deux*.⁹
4. The remarkable structure of the affect, which exactly reminds us of the structure of perception and the choice between two shades of grey in animals (this makes us assume that it is based upon an affective structure, upon the repelling and attractive properties of the shades; perhaps at the basis of the perception of relationships there generally is an affective structure of that type?): *papa is very sweet, but as soon as mama comes, papa is bad* (without any reason, just because of the arrival of a new person!) + completely automatically, the same attitudes and the same actions, and the same spatial relationship (Lewin would

say: the same field vectors) to this new person. And she inevitably *declares* it aloud. *Prise de conscience*? The summit of the affect changes position: The plus is replaced by a minus. The relativity of the affect and the problem of the constancy of the affect as perception, etc. Perhaps, it is only in the concepts that the affect reaches stability and absoluteness.

5. The questions about names are there. But they are questions about things and not about names. The name just satisfies the question about the essence of the thing. To name a thing is to learn what it is. The proof: These questions are lost amidst the others: What is in the carafe, what in the box, where is he going, where has he been, etc.?

The first period of questions is the natural continuation of the visible situation in questions that address what is not immediately given, not visible: Where does he go; where is the person who is usually with him; what is in the closed thing (a box), etc.? On the whole, as a rule: There is no perception of an object, there is perception of a moving situation. *About everything*: Where does it go? On the drawing there is a cockerel: Where does it go?

6. Marvelous attention (cf. memory). cf. Piaget's idea that children's direct attention is better than ours, like their memory: She herself looks for berries (strawberry), finds them, selects the green from the red, etc.
7. About the idea that negativism is the beginning of volition, differentiated from the affect and contradicting the affect (contra Kretschmer); at every turn in the hypobulic reactions:

- (a) she found sugar, I take it away, bring other sugar, she lies on the floor, does not accept it, although she desperately wants it, later accepts it from the nanny;
- (b) is lying on the floor. Clearly does not want to do that, clearly wants what is used to tempt her to stand up, but only does it with rare exceptions, when the affect is very strong (+ or -).

In addition: As in all genuine negativism, by suddenly changing our demands, we can cause a change of her attitude, and this clearly proves that the affect is not the *core*.

For example: (1) You must go to sleep—I do not want to go nighty-night; (2) it is forbidden to sleep—I want to sleep, etc. The same when she throws herself on the ground: You must not stand up—she wants to stand up. A symptom that shows that the hypobulic reactions are negativistic. Negativism is the beginning of will, it is genuine hypobulia!

8. In the crisis of the first year we clearly see negativism, stubbornness, and willfulness. Its meaning: the emancipation and development of the personality. Two reactions: goes (runs) away—a trait of a more mature age—and falls on the ground—regression.

August 2. Asya is a tracker: she reconstructs the whole picture on the basis of the tracks. Faced with a pile of crap: Moo-moo did it, cluck-cluck did it? Then the questions: Where is moo-moo, where is cluck-cluck? In general: She *clearly*

completes and continues the whole visible world with verbal questions and inferences: (1) Where does the cockerel run, even on a drawing; (2) what is there in that closed thing? (3) where do you go, etc.? That is, the given field of perception is considered as a system of sections whose beginning and end [are invisible], <...> separated from it and given in the acts of thought: The invisible is added to what is visible in perception; the (simplest) meanings + names are added to the sensory [data]. Added to perception is thinking; added to what is given is what can be added by thinking.

August 12.

- (1) Egocentric speech in the form of a *dialogue* develops earlier than as a *monologue*: talking with a doll, with an imaginary conversation partner—from the autistic complex situation.
- (2) cf. with adjectives the comparative degree often comes *before* the positive degree: the structural, relative nature of properties. If Asya is smart, then inevitably someone must be bad, she tries to find out whom; otherwise the inference is unfinished.

August 17. The question “What is that?” is of a semasiological nature, it is a question about *sense* (*eo ipso* also about the word; not the name but the *logos*); its function is comprehension + becoming consciously aware (*prise de conscience*). Hence the play with meanings: magic games, their beginning (the unriddling of child play lies in its semasiological nature) + lie + autism + future time. *In particular, the worry* about what will happen when Asya is not there (about the immutability of the situation): Let’s go to mama. But Tomka [her doll] will stand here? Stay here, Tomochka, etc. <...>O. Spengler. *The decline of the west. Vol. 1. Form and actuality.* Translation by N. F. Garelin. Publishing House L. D. Frenkel. Moscow-Petrograd, 1923, chapter IX.

Soul-image and life-feeling. I. On the form of the soul. p. 299. Is an abstract science of the spiritual possible at all? Is that which one finds on this path identical with that which one is seeking? Why has psychology—meaning thereby not knowledge of men and experience of life but *scientific* psychology, always been the shallowest and most worthless of the disciplines of philosophy, a field so empty that it has been left entirely to mediocre minds and barren systematists... Of the thousands of psychologists of today, not one can give an actual analysis or definition of “the” Will—or of regret, anxiety, jealousy, disposition, artistic intention.¹⁰

Notes

1. Probably Vygotsky’s sister Esya (Esther) Semenovna Vygodskaya (1899 to 1969).
2. The example is borrowed from p. 254 of Cassirer (1929, 1977): “Another psychic blindness patient... had suffered a serious hemiplegia and was unable to move his right arm. He could not repeat the sentence: “I can write well with

my right hand.” He always replaced the wrong word “right” with the correct word “left.”” Vygotsky also mentions the example in his “Play and its role in the mental development of the child.”

3. Hochheimer’s subject could not repeat false sentences (e.g., “the sky is blue” when it was raining) unless he deliberately focused on the mechanical repetition of the words, while disregarding their content. But even this proved difficult. See pp. 30–31 of Hochheimer (1932). See also a patient described on p. 254 of Cassirer (1977).
4. Romain Rolland (1866 to 1944). French dramatist, novelist, and art historian who won the Nobel Prize for literature in 1915. Rolland was befriended by Freud, visited Moscow in 1935 on the invitation of Gorky, and was so naïve to believe that he could convince Stalin, whom he admired, to save the lives of his enemies. Vygotsky refers to the third volume, called *The Adolescent*, of his 10-volume novel, *Jean-Christophe*.
5. Cozy and coziness (German).
6. Vygotsky cites a passage from *The Revolt*, volume 4 of the *Jean-Christophe* series. See p. 296 of Rolland (1904). Roland describes that the objects in the apartment of the Reinharts were full of texts, such as “for our beloved guest” and “have another one.” Hence, the use of the word “talkative.”
7. That is, his youngest daughter was 1 year and 9 months old.
8. In chapter 2 of *Thinking and Speech*, Vygotsky cites Bleuler’s argument that autism is not a primitive condition and that speech creates favorable conditions for autistic thinking. See pp. 62–64 of Vygotsky (1987).
9. Between two individuals (French).
10. Oswald Arnold Gottfried Spengler (1880 to 1936). German historian and philosopher of history best known for his *The Decline of the West*. “Soul-image and life-feeling. I. On the form of the soul” is the title of chapter 8 of that book. For Vygotsky’s quote, see p. 299 of Spengler (1926).

References

- Cassirer, E. (1929). *Philosophie der symbolischen Formen* (Vol. 3). *Phänomenologie der Erkenntnis*. Berlin: Bruno Cassirer Verlag.
- Cassirer, E. (1977). *The philosophy of symbolic forms. The phenomenology of knowledge*, Vol. 3. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Hochheimer, W. (1932). Analyse eines “Seelenblinden” von der Sprache aus. Ein Beitrag zur Frage nach der Bedeutung der Sprache für das Verhalten zur Umwelt. *Psychologische Forschung*, 16, 1–69.
- Rolland, R. (1904–1912). *Jean-Christophe* Vol. 10. Paris: Ollendorff.
- Vygotsky, L. S. (1987). *The collected works of L.S. Vygotsky. Vol. 1. Problems of general psychology*. New York: Plenum Press.
- Spengler, O. (1926). *The decline of the West: Form and actuality*. (C. F. Atkinson, trans.). New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

Chapter 15

The Study of Consciousness

This chapter is based on the content of a notebook without a cover. Its text is written in violet ink and runs from two sides. The first and last pages are dated “October, 1932,” which suggests that all notes were written in that month. The text consists of three parts: (1) the plan for the unwritten book *On the question of the study of consciousness*, (2) notes about the psychophysical problem, and (3) reactions to talks by Solov’ev and Leont’ev that were presented at one of the internal meetings. The latter two parts start on the last page of the notebook. The document is interesting because it marks the transition to the dynamic semantic approach. Vygotsky formulates the theoretical goal and the research program, which, however, was not accepted by Leont’ev (Zavershneva 2016). It is against this background that Vygotsky’s reactions to the talks by Solov’ev and Leont’ev become especially relevant. Solov’ev talked about the first results of his replication of the study by Anitra Karsten (1928),¹ which would only be published in Solov’ev–Elpidinskiy (1935). The content of Leont’ev’s talk cannot be fully reconstructed because Vygotsky primarily wrote down his objections to its content. However, judging by the first point, Leont’ev planned to study the transitions between cognitive and practical intellect in a way that make us think of his later activity theory. Vygotsky viewed this as a divergence of the main line of research and the loss of the systemic principle. Their views diverged most about the topic of meaning. Vygotsky believed that Leont’ev underestimated the role of speech in the development of consciousness and had an inadequate, non-systemic view of the relationship between thinking, speech, and action. His own view on these matters was still in development and would be formulated, for example, in his paper “The problem of mental retardation” (1935). The notebook was first published in Russian in *Novoe Literaturnoe Obozrenie* (Vygotsky 2007), but the present version is newly annotated.

NB! On the question of the study of consciousness

1. On the question of the study of consciousness in psychology. The formulation of the basic hypothesis. Its place in the system of psychological knowledge.
2. Our previous works on the study of mediated processes in light of the new hypothesis.²
3. The new formulation of the hypothesis and the analysis of the basic working concepts.
4. The basic problems of the study of consciousness.
5. The principle and the method of the study.

6. The preliminary data of the study.
 - A. The study of exceptional memory.
 - B. The study of children's first questions.
 - C. The study of the disintegration of the system in schizophrenia.
 - D. The study [here the note breaks off]
7. General conclusions.
8. Luria's investigation.³
9. Leont'ev's investigation.⁴
10. The theory of psychological systems.
11. The study's philosophical problems.
12. Belletristic illustrations. Velimir Khlebnikov's problem.⁵
13. The conclusion. Our word in psychology.

[Added at the bottom of the page:]

Fate becomes a conscious part of personality. The Spinozian power of reason and the freedom of slavery are not yet the highest. This is the *amor fati*.⁶ cf. the experiments by Dembo—Koffka.⁷

“For me this knowledge is enough.”⁸

The psychophysical problem⁹

1. Its latent development and its central meaning in all psychological systems. *Our hypothesis*.
2. The beginning of the crisis: the disintegration of parallelism. Parallelism is a product of scientific comprehension, contra interaction: a compromise between the religious and the primitive scientific viewpoint. *A reflection of the epistemological problem*.
3. Two forms of parallelism. Phenomenology. Where parallelism proved untenable:

[Space left for completion of the point]

The concretization in the problem of development, in localization, and in the psychophysiological [problems].

4. The revival of the interaction hypothesis fatally drifts into parallelism. Stumpf, catalyzation.

[Space left for completion of the point]

5. *New theories: Psychoid, emergentia*,¹⁰ *Gestalttheorie*. *The main flaw of Gestalttheorie*.¹¹ Mnemism.¹² Goldstein: the equality of structures.¹³ Pavlov—generalization: a function of the frontal lobes.

[Space left for completion of the point]

6. *Our viewpoint*: contra parallelism, contra interaction, the *unity and supremacy*. Most important: the possibility of a new movement¹⁴—a new change of the psychophysiological processes, new connections, a new type of development, in particular, a historical one. The example: the word and its meaning.

Inde, the change of systems.

Lashley.

Other paths

Bergson, Binet, *Psychoid*, *emergentia*, *Gestalttheorie*, Head

The dynamic understanding and the structural one

The schema:

1. The pre-scientific viewpoint—interaction.
2. Parallelism—a compromise between mathematical–physical thinking, introduced from the natural sciences into psychology, and the prescientific, religious, church understanding. From Descartes and not from Spinoza (Stumpf).
3. The disintegration of parallelism: (1) Instead of the hypothetical brain, neurology advanced the real brain; (2) animal psychology and evolutionary thinking posited that mind *develops* and is not primordial and that consciousness has a *biological function* instead of merely coinciding in time; (3) the impossibility *to completely* apply the parallelist viewpoint *in practice* in view of its absurdity (Wundt about creative syntheses).¹⁵ The death of parallelism. The role of the law of conservation of energy.
4. The revival of the interaction hypothesis and the drifting back to parallelism: the assumption of special mental energy; the theory of double effects and double causes (Stumpf); the theory of catalysis. It returns to spiritualism and parallelism.
5. New paths—not the revival of interaction theory. Three groups of theories:
 - A. The Bergson–Binet controversy (the division and merging of the epistemological and the ontological problem). In Bergson: The brain is a motor organ, but perception is pure spirit; in Binet the brain is a sensory organ, and perception is materialistic.
 - B. Theories of development: *Psychoid* (Driesch, Bleuler), mnemism (Semon, Bleuler), *emergentia* McDougall,¹⁶ (Koffka, Chelpanov).
 - C. Psychophysically neutral theories: the unity of the structural and dynamic traits of the psychophysiological processes (Wertheimer). Neutral qualities in the psychophysical relationship—Stern. The unity and identity of physical, physiological, and mental structures—Köhler.
6. The main flaw of these theories:
 - A. Developmental theories without development, in particular, without historical development.
 - B. *Gestalttheorie*—returns to parallelism = Spinozism (and not to Descartes), i.e., parallelism on the basis of the unity and identity of structure (*ordo et connexio*) in extension and thinking. In Spinoza himself there is a contradiction in the parallelism: He does not put it into practice. Cf. *Nec anima*, etc.,¹⁷ <new> intellect changes their *ordo et connexio*. The same contradiction we find in *Gestaltpsychologie*. Bühler's¹⁸ reproach of parallelism is

correct. From yet another side a lapse into parallelism: If the structures are identical, the mental structure does not structurally change anything in the physiological process—*what do we need mind for*, is it not the *Schattentheorie*? Do they not coincide in time? Finally, *Gestalttheorie* creates a hypothetical world. Cf. the physiological *Grundfunktion des Gehirns*¹⁹ (Goldstein) as a physiological structure, which is identical to conceptual, categorical thinking.²⁰ Cf. in Pavlov generalization is a function of the frontal lobes.

7. The main shortcoming of these developmental theories: There is no key to the historical development of consciousness, and it comes as no surprise that there is no idea of the historical development of consciousness in these psychological currents.
8. *Our point of view*: the unity of the psychophysiological processes and the supremacy of the mental aspect; the study of *psychological* processes; the height viewpoint in the psychophysical problem. *Most important*: the possibility, introduced by consciousness, of a new movement, a new change of the psychophysiological processes, of new connections, of a new type of development of the functions, in particular, of *historical* development with a change of the interfunctional connections. This is an *impossible event in the plane of organic development*: the psychological systems. An example: the word and its meaning. The inadequacy of the physiological and psychological structures. Cf. the inadequacy of chemical and physiological structures. The possibility of *social* conscious experience, and hence also the primacy of the conscious structures built from the outside through social interaction: What is impossible for one is possible for two. The concretization of this viewpoint lies in the problem of psychological development and localization: Cf. the extra-cerebral connections. The idea of psychological physiology.

Solov'ev's talk: About mental satiation

1. The positive meaning of the study: in general and for mental retardation. Theory and [practice?].
2. The unfortunate modification of Lewin's method: They shy away from the attempts at variation.²¹
3. Satiation changes its function depending on whether the activity has a goal or not: in the one case it slows down the work, in the other it speeds it up (to be done with it quickly). Thus, the structures of satiation are subordinate aspects in the structure of the higher processes.
4. Outside development. The analogy with instinct.
5. All this is more complex: Cf. Koffka–Dembo's experiments with meaningless actions: to liberate one's meaningless action.

6. But what if the work itself hides the sources of a new appetite?
7. Adults on the level of a seven-year-old: clearly a reaction to the meaningless action and the dominion of the *Funktionslust*.
8. Cf. the pathological data.

Leont'ev's talk

1. The unity of the gnostic and the practical intellect: in the genesis and in the transitions of cognitive thinking into practical activity and of practical activity into cognitive thinking. This is a systemic problem but without a center: the beginning of a system.
2. Transfer is the central problem. It is a question of *generalization*, i.e., of meaning.
3. Contra: [Thinking: speech]²² = the structure of the atom: spectral analysis. Speech is the self-disclosure of thinking. Speech is not a glass medium but a real participant in all the events that take place in the change of thinking.
4. *Contra*: The system concept is not introduced in the study. *Contra* neutralism, the position in the preface to Piaget,²³ a rejection of the new phase.
5. *Contra*: the disorderliness of the study.
6. *Contra*: The word brings us in one blow immediately from planimetry to stereometry—and that's it. Exactly as in Stern. Development is ignored. Everything is moved to the beginning. But then everything [is moved] to the conception. The most important thing does not take place in the beginning, but in the end, for the end contains the beginning.²⁴ The height viewpoint. [He] should not all the time work near the lower boundaries.
7. *What is the pledge of the unity of the work*: to work on *the same thing* with *the same* methods and going to a *single* goal and not just starting from the same position. *Ergo*: how to change A.N.'s research to a unity *of this type*.
8. Why do we raise the question of the *unity of the work*. Because each made *his step* independently, starting from shared positions. But *where* did he step?
9. *The main thing*: All the older authors took speech as the *subject matter of the study*, while perception, thinking, and the other functions serve as the subject matter of knowledge: Cf. Stern's study of the image and our experimental critique. For us the main thing is that we discovered a *new* approach to speech—making it the subject matter of knowledge next to, precisely *next to*, the function of perception, etc. Stern assumed that speech *through itself*, as a neutral medium (glass), permits to discern perception and changes nothing in it. But the experiments with play showed that perception *is changed* by speech.²⁵
10. The connection between the *systemic* and the structural *meaning* of the word, i.e., between the semantic and systemic structure of consciousness, is incomprehensible.
11. [The note breaks off here.]

Notes

1. Anitra Karsten (1902 to 1988). Finnish psychologist and gerontologist, student, and co-worker of Kurt Lewin. Under the supervision of Lewin, Karsten wrote her doctoral dissertation about mental satiation, i.e., the tendency to become fed up with a boring task. Karsten (1928) showed that subjects will resume a boring task when a new instruction is given (e.g., “this is actually a test of your stamina”). Karsten explained this in the Lewinian terms of mental energy and quasi-needs, but this explanation did not satisfy Vygotsky (see the text).
2. That is, the hypothesis of the systemic structure of consciousness.
3. Probably his expeditions to Uzbekistan.
4. Probably his study of mediated memory.
5. Velimir (real name Viktor Vladimirovich) Khlebnikov (1885 to 1922). Russian poet and playwright and member of the Futurist Movement in Russian literature. Khlebnikov experimented with the Russian language (creating what he called “trans-rational language”) and invented scores of neologisms.
6. Love of fate (Latin). Term used by the stoics and Nietzsche to designate the need to accept and welcome life as it comes.
7. The subjects received either no instruction at all or were asked to perform a very difficult or impossible task. See Van der Veer (2000). Vygotsky mentions Koffka’s name in this context because it was Koffka who told him about Dembo’s experiments when he visited Moscow. See p. 356 of Vygotsky (1987), although there the translator erred saying that Vygotsky told Koffka about the Berlin experiments.
8. Vygotsky cites the baron in Pushkin’s poem “The covetous knight.” See p. 329 of Pushkin (1984).
9. A first version was published by A.A. Puzyrey (1982). The present version is based on a renewed study of the original manuscript.
10. Refers to emergentism, i.e., the idea that a system may produce new properties dependent on its other properties and/or their interaction but not reducible to them. Cf. the idea of Gestalt theory.
11. Vygotsky’s favorite argument against Gestalt theory was that the Gestalt concept had no discriminative power, i.e., could not explain the various levels of development from animal intelligence to human thought. See Van der Veer (1997). Cf. note 13.
12. Mnemism assumed that all organisms could learn from their environment, i.e., save a memory of it in the form of an engram and pass it on to next generations. The theory influenced Bleuler and Freud. See Semon (1920).
13. In one of his last talks, at the All-Union Institute of Experimental Medicine on April, 28, 1934, Vygotsky criticized Goldstein’s view as follows: “The higher psychic functions do not just turn out to be structurally identical with the elementary psychic functions, but also turn out to have the same localization in the brain, in which regard they do not even differ from the nonpsychic functions... In structural psychology, the analysis leads to the general principle of structure, which covers both higher and lower psychic functions and is equally

applicable to both... we are deeply convinced of the specific nature of the series of brain structures and of the specific relationship of the higher psychic functions to the series of systems of the cortex; this thesis is directed against the theories of Lashley and Goldstein” (Vygotsky 1995, pp. 413–414).

14. Here and in the continuation Vygotsky often uses the word *dvizhenie*, which can mean motion, movement, or development but can also denote the eternal fleeting nature of matter. As Lenin (Lenin 1909, chapter 3) wrote: “The dialectical materialist not only regards motion as an inseparable property of matter, but rejects the simplified view of motion and so forth.” See also Engels’ notion of “motion” as a property of matter in chapter 8. We have decided to translate the word as “movement,” but the reader should hold in mind the philosophical connotation as well as the idea of development.
15. Wilhelm Maximilian Wundt (1832 to 1920). German physiologist, philosopher, and founder of experimental psychology. His concept of “creative synthesis” posited that the brain may combine elementary sensations into qualitatively new and unpredictable qualities. Cf. emergentism.
16. William McDougall (1871 to 1938). British–American psychologist, and one of the founders of social psychology, who argued that behavior was generally goal-oriented and purposive, an approach he called “hormic psychology.” Vygotsky may refer to McDougall’s book *Modern Materialism and Emergent Evolution* (1929) or to his autobiographical account, in which McDougall wrote: “I continued to hold the view... that the psychical qualities are engendered by (or as would now be said ‘emerge from’) the complex conjunctions of brain processes (now called ‘configurations’) not as mere epiphenomena, but rather as synthetic wholes that react upon the physical events of the brain or have causal efficacy within the whole complex of psycho-physical events.” See pp. 205–206 in Murchison (1930). See also note 22 in chapter 12.
17. We have not been able to establish which of Spinoza’s statements Vygotsky had in mind.
18. In his book, *Psycholog’s Crisis*, Bühler observed that both Spinoza and the Gestalt theorists (he mentioned Wertheimer and Koffka) defended a form of parallelism and criticized this view. See p. 119 of Bühler (1927/1978).
19. A basic function of the brain (German).
20. Categorical thinking was Goldstein’s term for conceptual thinking. When asked to sort colors, for example, healthy subjects treat colors as representing color categories and disregard such aspects as their brightness, etc.
21. Karsten (1928) found that subjects in the satiation experiment would introduce variations in the task performance to make it less boring.
22. This is a conjecture. Actually, the notebook just gives the cyrillic equivalents of the letters “T” and “s,” which we interpreted as “Thinking: speech.” Vygotsky rejected Leont’ev’s proposition that the relationship between thinking and speech is like the relationship between the structure of the atom and spectral analysis. That proposition seemed to imply that speech is just a means to objectively reflect (part of) thinking. Vygotsky believed this approach was one-sided and claimed that speech actively participates in thinking and

- accomplishes it: “Thought is not expressed but completed in the word.” See p. 250 in Vygotsky (1987).
23. Refers to Vygotsky’s preface in Piaget (1932), which was re-published as chapter 2 in *Thinking and Speech*. In that preface, Vygotsky criticized Piaget’s view that the development of children’s thinking proceeds from autistic thought by way of egocentric thought to socialized, logical thought. In the final part of that preface, Vygotsky argued that Piaget underestimated the role of practical experience in the development of the child’s thought. It is difficult to say, however, what exactly Vygotsky had in mind with his reference to the preface.
 24. See note 16 in chapter 9. In chapter 3 of *Thinking and Speech*, Vygotsky argued: “The transition to sign operations (i.e., to the signifying functions of speech) is not the product of a sudden discovery or invention by the child. This transition does not occur all at once or only once in the child’s life as Stern suggests... On the contrary, this is an extremely complex genetic process” Cf. p. 95 of Vygotsky (1987).
 25. See note 13 in chapter 10.

References

- Bühler, K. (1978). *Die Krise der Psychologie*. Frankfurt/M: Ullstein.
- Karsten, A. (1928). Psychische Sättigung. *Psychologische Forschung*, 10(1), 142–254.
- Lenin, V. I. (1909). *Materializm i empiriokrititsizm*. Moscow: Zveno.
- Murchison, C. (Ed.) (1930). *History of psychology in autobiography. Vols. 1–2*. Worcester, MA: Clark University Press.
- Piaget, J. (1932). *Rech’ i myshlenie rebenka*. Moscow-Leningrad: Uchpedgiz.
- Pushkin, A. S. (1984). *Sobranie sochineniy v odnom tome*. Moscow: Khudozhestvennaya Literatura.
- Puzyrey, A. A. (1982). Iz zapisnykh knizhek L. S. Vygotskogo. *Vestnik MGU. Ser. 14. Psikhologiya*, 1, 60–67.
- Semon, R. (1920). *Die Mneme als erhaltendes Prinzip im Wechsel des organischen Geschehens*. Leipzig: Verlag von Wilhelm Engelmann.
- Solov’ev-Elpidinskiy, I. M. (1935). O tak nazyvaemom ‘psikhicheskom nasyshchenii’ i ego osobennosti u umstvenno-otstalykh detey. In L. S. Vygotsky & I. I. Danyushevskiy (Eds.), *Umstvenno-otstalyy rebenok* (pp. 97–174). Moscow: Uchpedgiz.
- Van der Veer, R. (1997). Some major themes in Vygotsky’s theoretical work: An introduction. In R. W. Rieber, & J. Wollock (Eds.), *The collected works of L.S. Vygotsky* (Vol. 3, pp. 1–7). New York: Plenum Press.
- Van der Veer, R. (2000). Tamara Dembo’s European years: working with Lewin and Buytendijk. *Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences*, 36(2), 109–126.
- Vygotsky, L. S. (1987). *The collected works of L.S. Vygotsky. Vol. 1. Problems of general psychology*. New York: Plenum Press.
- Vygotsky, L. S. (1995). Problema razvitiya i raspada vysshikh psikhicheskikh funktsiy. In *Problemy defektologii* (pp. 404–418). Moscow: Prosveshchenie.
- Vygotsky, L. S. (2007). Zapisnaya knizhka. Oktyabr’, 1932g. In E. Yu. Zavershneva (ed.), *Novoe Literaturnoe Obozrenie*, 5(87), 91–99.
- Zavershneva, E. Yu. (2016). The way to freedom. In A. Yasnitsky & R. van der Veer (Eds.), *Revisionist revolution in Vygotsky studies* (pp. 127–140). New York: Routledge.

Chapter 16

From Sign to Meaning and Sense

This chapter contains documents connected with the transition from the older view to the systemic semantic analysis of consciousness in which meaning became one of the key concepts. The notes shed light on the events reflected in the previous chapter and also return to Luria's findings from the expeditions to Uzbekistan. It becomes clear from the notes that Vygotsky's colleagues, in particular Leont'ev, did not always agree with the new research direction that Vygotsky advocated. In his efforts to argue the new view, Vygotsky criticized both his colleagues (Leont'ev, Luria, and Levina) and himself. Interestingly, several parts of the text are virtually identical to passages in the seventh chapter of *Thinking and speech* and to parts of the talk "The problem of consciousness," which was delivered on December 5, 1932 (see also chapter 17). This shows that chapter 7 of *Thinking and speech*, although dictated in the spring of 1934, relied at least partially on ideas that had already crystallized by the end of 1932 (see also chapter 19).

The psychophysical problem

These notes were written in violet ink on five library cards with the year "1931" printed on the back. They form part of a larger collection of such cards, most of which were used in 1932. As we have seen before, for Vygotsky the psychophysical problem (or the psychophysiological problem) was the central philosophical problem of psychology, which also explains his fundamental interest in the classic works of Descartes and Spinoza. However, in 1932 he changes his perspective: Instead of the mind-body relationship, he now proposes to study the relationship between speech and thinking. It is possible that the document consists of further reflections on Vygotsky's talk about the psychophysical problem, which was presented in the previous chapter.

NB!

The psychophysical problem (the acute questions about the spiritual and material in human consciousness) consists (if we understand it not as the abstract-static {Fechner, Spinoza}, i.e., the parallelist correlation of the *previously* severed

attributes of thinking and extension, but in the functional dynamic and concrete plane) not in the relationship between the brain and mind (can thought move the brain atom by one micron without spending energy?) but in the relationship between thought and speech, which is its materialization, its objectivation, its embodiment, which *continually* accomplishes the transition of the external into the internal and the internal into the external, the real and not imaginary unity, and struggle of oppositions (perhaps the main thing in the historical development of consciousness). Cf. *Marx*: the material nature of consciousness in its connection with speech. This is historical materialism (its concrete principle) in psychology and *thinking and speech is the central problem and the via regia¹ of all historical psychology. Only* via this problem thinking and the brain can be connected, like we can only via the brain and its movement (which also contains the mental aspect) connect:

thinking and the law of conservation of energy,

thinking and the change of direction of a moving point without energy expenditure,

thinking and Catalytic processes.

It is curious that the whole psychophysical problem was usually formulated as a problem of the *foreign* policy of psychology in its relation with other sciences and was solved in an *undifferentiated* manner for mind *as a whole* (indiscriminately) and for nature *as a whole* (also indiscriminately). *For example*: mind and the law of conservation of energy (i.e., the psychochemical problem), mind and morphological brain structure (localization); it is assumed (*two hidden postulates*) that (a) *everything* in mind belongs to the material *in the same manner*. For example, the instinct and the idea; (b) that *within* psychology there is no psychophysical problem (this is how the behaviorists also solve it); those who attempt to *introduce* the psychophysical problem *into* psychology (Wundt—*psychophysiology*—does not do it), like *Gestaltpsychologie* (Koffka with his expressive behavior as the subject matter of psychology, and with his functional and descriptive concepts),² again solve the problem within psychology in a parallelist spirit (Goldstein—concepts are a *Grundfunktion des Gehirns*, Köhler—the structure of the brain is the structure of experience, Koffka—two series of concepts).

This way the psychophysical problem becomes an empty abstraction *bereft of any content*. This is why a psychology (Krylov, Kurazov,³ Talankin) that does not make the *word-thought* problem its center and tries to solve it will not come one step closer to a materialist understanding of mind. The materialist principle must be found *within* psychology and not beyond its borders: The latter is a premise and not the pivot on which the research hinges. Cf. the relationship between the basis and the superstructure in the history of materialism and not the geographical environment or *behavior*, i.e., people's movements instead of their thoughts. Historical materialism, according to the recipe of the *quasi* Marxist psychology of Krylov and others, would look more or less like this: Idealism said that ideas make history; we say that movements, whose reverse side is consciousness, i.e., reactions, move history. Nonsense!

In animal psychology, all problems, including the *whole psychophysical problem*, have different relationships and stand in a different light, i.e., *different* from human psychology. *All* the errors of zoopsychology follow from the fact that *this* is unknown.

Buytendijk⁴ + Meyerson–Guillaume.⁵

Cf. *Marx*: The curse of matter on pure consciousness are the moving layers of air, i.e., communication with the help of speech, and not the connection with the brain! *Sehr wichtig!*⁶

I. M. Solov'ev's talk

These notes were written in violet ink on a library card. Unfortunately, the ink has strongly faded because of the card's prolonged exposure to daylight. It seems that Vygotsky reflects on the same talk by Solov'ev as related in the previous chapter. Possibly he took minutes during the presentation of his colleagues' talks and then afterwards went through them another time.

NB. I. M.'s talk

- (1) The positive meaning of Lewin's works: the structural regularities in the psychology of action + the pheno- and genotypical approach + the causal approach and the problem of motivation.
- (2) I. M.'s work: (1) development, (2) the dependency on the IQ, (3) the IQ of imbeciles and debiles, (4) the revision of the traditional viewpoint, (5) the creation of scientific psychological foundations for the method of the work—with interest, fatigue, etc., (6) the culture of the experimental fact, but the method is changed unsatisfactorily. It diverges from the work's curve.⁷
- (3) The key to the problems of motivation but not the mechanisms. Cf. today's case.
- (4) *From below and from above. The primary and the basic.*
*But development itself: more—less*⁸; the same with the debile and the normal child.
The higher [forms of behavior] are explained by the instinct.
- (5) *But the explanatory strength of the analogy with needs*, in particular, the disposing of attention after Rubin.^{9,10}

The method of double stimulation and the semasiological method

This note was written on two small pieces of paper in faded green or blue ink. Vygotsky asserts the need for the introduction of the semasiological method and criticizes the older memory research with the method of double stimulation.

NB! Double stimulation in the memory experiments does not just contain the root of the semasiological method, *but without it, just like without the concept of system and meanings* (but they are correlative concepts, like right and left), it is impossible to study: (a) the development from the operation with the *knot*, where intellectualization is minimal, to the operation of writing abstracts, where it is maximal; (b) the description of the factual diversity of the sign operations (we asked: What do the knot and the word have in common. But to go further we must ask: Where do they differ); (c) the development of memory itself in an explanatory analysis because *simply* showing the different curves of unmediated and mediated memory is not yet sufficient: It requires explanation just like ingrowing, etc., and cannot be explained on the basis of a principle but [requires] a concrete explanation. A. N. explains it by intellectualization, the growing role of semantic memory, etc., i.e., essentially by *systemic* concepts but *superficially* and in an *abstract-theoretical* way because he, on the whole, conceived of memorizing as a non-semantic operation, a construction of meanings. That is, memory *itself* cannot be studied further without adopting the systemic viewpoint and semasiological analysis.

Propositions to Luria's talk (internal conference)

This note was written in violet ink on the pages of a notepad. The text begins on the second page and the first one, with points 1 through 12, was not found. The document was written in fall 1932 or later because it contains a discussion of results found by Luria during his second expedition to Uzbekistan. Content-wise, the note is related to the personal remarks made in December 1932 (see chapter 17) to the seventh chapter of *Thinking and speech*, to the talk “The problem of consciousness,” and to a number of other statements from *Thinking and speech* that here appear for the first time it seems. The notes also document the debate between Vygotsky and Leont'ev, which became more outspoken. They primarily differed about the nature of word meaning and inner speech, and in his future monograph—*Activity, consciousness, and personality*—Leont'ev (1978) would claim, just like in the present notes, that meaning is an ideological category and cannot be studied psychologically. As we know, Vygotsky insisted that word meaning is the only adequate unit of analysis in the psychological research of verbal thinking. Leont'ev argued that Vygotsky overestimated the role of speech in the formation of consciousness and called it “logocentrism.” In his view, action is the main topic of psychological study. Except for the polemic with Leont'ev, Vygotsky's notepad also contains criticism of Luria, Levina, and himself.

13. *Continuation*: and not just by ascertaining it. This is *patently* clear: “together” in classification = together in the shed, to wrap the spectacles in a piece of paper.¹¹ Cf. *Shereshevskiy*.¹² *Everything is in word meaning*: That is *the full-fledged, sound explanation: psychologica psychologica*.
14. The reproductive nature of thinking is the solution to this problem. By the way, for A. N. (the old in the new, the analogy, the transfer), the center is in the *modified* memorizing, just like I previously solved another problem.

15. *What is remarkable* in A. R.'s experiments, where the subjects categorize *everything* under the name "aspop" ("instrument"): manure, land, head; land is the main instrument. *It has three explanations*: (1) *fire-vessels, clear proof of this graphic character*. Are spectacles vessels? Yes, they are vessels for the eye. We say: Take off your glasses [above "glasses" is written "glass"], I will break your glasses. A pure complex (i.e., a non-vessel thing is added to the vessels); (2) a metaphorical sense (we have the same: a word is a tool, a thought is a tool, *diamat*¹³ is a tool); (3) there is no *differentia specifica*,¹⁴ but they understand the idea of a *species*, i.e., a *subspecies*; a generalization, not connected from above. *He doubts* <illegible> whether this can be called a vessel.
16. The intimate relationship with practice, but their practice is poor. Wisdom in stupidity is one of the motives of Ivanushka-durachka.¹⁵ Dostoevsky's *Idiot*.¹⁶
17. *Conclusions*: (1) another movement of the senses,¹⁷ (2) another word meaning and its other role: *The word does not analyze—the word is related to the object*¹⁸; (3) another (systemic) structure of thinking.
18. *Memory*: The *meanings* in mediated memorizing are *other meanings* than in thinking. Memory is intellectualized. *This is far from all, the main thing is*: The intellect is subordinated to memory. These meanings are bizarre, monstrous, do not meet any of the requirements of thinking. Instead of the category of correctness—the *category of functional suitability*.

A. R.'s talk:

19. *A sign operation without an analysis of meaning does not say anything*. Memorizing with the help of a knot can genetically be both the lowest or the highest: a symbol of a higher order.

In memory (Zankov's problem).

20. *Two things are remarkable*: that we *can* think in such a *monstrous* and bizarre way, that we are prepared to do that; (2) that as Shereshevskiy says: this is not me, this is him, because it is childish (he is ashamed). *All adult subjects are ashamed to say* how they memorized something (except we), they embellish the process, logically correct it. But this is here and not in Uzbekistan.¹⁹
21. There is no figure and ground in remembering.
23. A *paradox*: in a system, where memory has the leading role, *memory* is the most helpless and limited, + and its weakness is caused by the fact that *thinking* (its intellectualization) is applied in earnest. Cf. intellect is helpless in the theory of intellect—Köhler.²⁰ I [claimed that] voluntarism [is helpless] in the theory of volition, [just like] mnemism is in the theory of memory.
24. This is a bird, and you call it a "teacher." I can better take a pencil: the ideal example of the *restrained nature* of the meanings (Cf. the restrained nature of the situations in Gelb).
25. Where is the *natural analogue* of the memory experiments? In children's play (Morozova's experiments), the child remembers that the stick is a doll.
26. The complexive nature of the system is clearest in memory (i.e., the system dominated by memory). This is seemingly a paradox, but actually it is natural

- and comprehensible: Memory cannot transcend its boundaries and limits; it is restrained by what is remembered.
26. [sic] The semic relationships and their analysis: *asyntax*²¹ in the disintegration of the relationships between the senses; the emptiness is filled with “myths.”
 27. [With an !] Cf. most important is that we saw confirmed that something is wrong with the theory and not with the facts: The facts flew down from all directions, but they were contradictory; we were not able to explain them. Our hypothesis—a very simple one—is that the aphasiac has no speech, *ergo* all his disturbances are due to speech. But sometimes the sclerotic²² had the same disturbances with speech; sometimes the aphasiac without speech did not have them. *We had to find something* that could vary, something inside *speech itself*, that would permit us to find an explanation: *It was found in the change of meanings*. Without that, there is no psychological analysis of speech, otherwise refer to the divine function of speech (in Hegel).²³
 28. Why do we not see in the artificial experiment what we see in ordinary speech? The whole point is the tie to the object, whose boundaries the word must transcend, in order to make the analysis of its meaning possible. This applies to all operations. In particular, the metaphor in life is +, but in the experiment it is -. *But there we have the metaphor in itself* in the plane of the tie to the object [above the last two words is written “*analogy*”], and we have *ambiguity*, for ourselves, in the plane of meanings.
 29. *arras*²⁴: On the square stood a guard, who protected the depot where the arms were kept. *Repeats*: on the square stood a guard plus *something about a weapon* (disease of the predicate).
 30. Syllogisms don’t work: I must not lie, I have never been there.²⁵ But they themselves spontaneously form syllogisms. On the right side of the protocol, the subject is smart, [but] compared with the left side he is stupid. The difficulty of the syllogism is the difficulty of the assumption, the impossibility of operating in the abstract verbal plane of meanings. It is the same attitude to thinking, which the primitive manifests in his attitude to the counting of more than 60 pigs. The counting of pebbles would go further.²⁶
 31. The repetition of syllogisms when its logical structure disintegrates. *The rephrasing* of the syllogism. Thinking that is not consciously aware of its reasons is not reflective. Hypothetical thinking and the hypothetical assumption are most separated from the practical action.
 32. *The same* with mathematical problems: They do not solve them on the basis of what is given in the problem but from experience. But when the conditions did not correspond with reality, it became impossible to *start* the problem solving.
 33. *Fantasy as a special plane* of the movement of sense for wish fulfillment (Bleuler: The concept and the word are a stimulus to the development of autistic thinking). It was assumed that (1) autistic thinking [or] fantasy is *free* and (2) is primary (Piaget). But there is no *free* movement in fantasy, no renunciation of reality; there is restraint. A deliberate *break* with practice, and reality is impossible. This proves: (a) that there is no difference between

wanting and wishing (I want to catch the train; I wish I would live until the end of the second five-year plan)²⁷; there is no free *wanting*; (b) that fantasy is not free and not primary and depends on a semantic structure; and (c) that Bleuler is right contra Freud: *The concept* frees the wings of the dream, of autism, gives freedom to wanting and fantastic thinking, i.e., *imagination* depends on the *concept*.²⁸ “If I would win, then I would consider what to do.” The wish does not run ahead of reality. Cf. *If I were a king*²⁹ is zero fantasy, and *Hey, do not break his back (a slap)* is more of *the same*, the same zero; fantasy leads to a slap, i.e., in fantasy he behaves as if he were in a real situation.

But the *most remarkable* is that we too in our dreams are tied to reality (the inner reality of wishes): Cf. (a) nobody dreams that he is a woman, a child, etc., i.e., fully changing *himself*; (b) everybody dreams starting from a situation [and] changing and continuing it. But there is a completely different *Spielraum*,³⁰ *a zone of freedom*, in our and their fantasy.

34. Why did you say in the problem that the bike, etc.,—because he has a strong car.³¹ *The justification of his ideas by factual motives*: The justification of the meanings is replaced by the justification of the fact. *What is the sun? How can I say it when it is far away.*

A. R.

35. *The difficulties of the study*: (1) the low level of the experimental methodology; (2) the fact that the experiments do not discover but describe and establish facts; (3) the complexive function [ing] of thinking in the aphasiac, the child, the Uzbek; (4) practice—meaning—system; (5) the *stability* of these facts; (6) a vicious circle. Does it exist? No, it does not. [Boxed and connected with point 37 by an arrow:] Each discovery, ours as well, is the discovery of a new movement, a new variable.
36. *A. R.’s main shortcoming*: the attitude to *Lévy-Bruhl*, Thurnwald, etc., is not made clear, i.e., what is there in A. N. regarding Piaget and Lipmann. What is the essence of our attitude to *Lévy-Bruhl*, etc.? *In the analysis of word meanings and systems*: They were understood as constants, but they were found to be a variable. That’s the main thing.
37. *A. N.* Are the change of meanings and the change of the systemic connections the same thing, the same idea in different words; if not, then what depends on what. A. R.’s answer is incorrect: The meanings reflect reality; they are primary.

The correct answer:

Not the same, but connected. The sign is the most important factor in the creation of the system, but the sign is just a *part* of the whole process, whose other pole, whose integral inner part is *meaning*, without which there is *no* complete understanding of the sign operation.

38. [With a vertical line in the margin and !!] *A. N.*: *Is the change of meanings* caused by the fact that meaning is not constant: In one operation the word acts with one

meaning, in another operation with another meaning; the dynamics of meanings; is the polysemantic nature of the word and its change not dependent on the movement along the genetic ladder but on the situation and the operation? *This is not the center of the change of meanings.* But it exists as well. The movement of the senses is their change.

In particular, the *change* of meanings and the *movement of the senses* is an *experimental method* to study the *systems* and their internal structures and dynamics. The *change of meaning* is a deeper, more *essential*, more *internal analysis of the sign operation*. Cf. the structure of the atom. *It is a new way to experiment with the sign operation.*³²

39. *Nat. Grig.* [Morozova]. The problem of will in these studies. *My answer:* It is present *all* the time but [is] carried inward. It is about the inner will (the motives + wanting + the preparation of the action, etc.). The *mastery*, etc., are lifted upward and inward. The *problem of the internal voluntariness*, the *freedom*, and *restraint of consciousness*.
41. [Written in the margin a square bracket:] *The most important thing that we lacked:* an analogue of the method of double stimulation. We find it in semic analysis. *This is its role and place* in our work.
42. *A. N.* *It is incorrect that meaning belongs to ideology*, it leads to the system. *The sign supports the system* thanks to the fact that the sign has meaning. The sign supports the system because it has meaning.
43. [Vertical line in the left margin:] *Meaning* is the first social thing that is introduced into consciousness by the *sign* in its communicative function. *Further, the sign, by creating meaning and at the same time calling into life a new system, creates the conditions* under which *meaning internally* mediates the given joint group of psychological processes *in consciousness* (= the higher psychological function, the system).
44. *The complex, the syncretic whole and the concept:*
 (1) The syncretic whole generalizes a *series* of impressions and their connections; (2) the complex [generalizes] a *series* of memory images; (3) the concept [generalizes] a *series* of inferences, and an inference is the relationship of two ideas with a logical emphasis, i.e., with a psychological predicate, Cf. *the clock fell*.³³
45. *A. N.* The word moves from meaning to meaning (no!), or meaning moves around the word? Yes. The word creates, better, consciousness creates meaning with the help of the word. Is the word *just* the carrier or *logocentrism*? Everything depends on what we understand by the word (the phoneme or the unity of the phoneme and meaning). The *movement of meanings* is a very simple thing: *It is the internal dynamic of the sign operations*. The word means one thing in technique and another in poetry. The meaning of the word is just in the context. *But most important is: The thought is not identical with the straightforward meaning of the words.* "The clock fell" is a meaningless phrase, just like "the lamp." [From here to point no. 44; 2) there is a vertical line] *The meanings mediate the thought on its path to verbal expression*, i.e.,

the *path from thought to word is an indirect, internally-mediated path*. Moreover: (1) The word is a sign, i.e., a means and method to mediate psychological processes and master them on the basis of their communication (their influence); it nevertheless has something of the knot; (2) one and the same thought can be expressed not only in different words, but also with the help of different meanings. That is why the direct sense of speech never expresses its genuine sense (sense is a blend of meanings). Speech always has an ulterior motive, all speech is allegory.³⁴ Cf. Stanislavsky's subtext.³⁵

46. *Nat. Grig*. My studies with meanings in children, and hers come close to this.
48. *Roza Yevg. [Levina]*. The material and the methods that substantiate the conclusions are not convincing. We hear A. R. speaking instead of his data.
49. The relationship of Al. Rom.'s study to the developmental and the clinical experiment? The logic of the dekhkan is presented cross-sectionally: there is no development. Incorrect. The meaning of various expressions is discovered, but that is logical analysis; there is no development. That is incorrect. There is no explanation. This is incorrect as well.
50. *Lid. I'lin. [Bozhovich]*. The action has meaning: to knock on the table, but not in the air.³⁶ The meaning of a thing: The aphasiac can see the book as a book, but not as a stick. The meaning of the word is not just the word and we must study word meaning in connection with the meaning of the word and the action. This is correct. But these meanings are derived from word meaning: That is one. Two: they are meanings that mediate perception and action. See above: the meaning of one's own processes.
51. [Vertical line in the left margin, slightly different ink color:] We were engaged in the external analysis of the sign operation. We must take up the internal analysis of this function. The semic analysis is this internal analysis of sign use. Previously we were interested in the effect of memorizing to expose the internal course of development. Now we are interested in going inward, into the internal atomic structure of the word, because ingrowing cannot be understood from repetition but from internal mediation. How did we understand it? As a representation of the word. This is incorrect. Meaning in the psychological sense is the internal structure of the sign operation. The sign mediates through meaning. We understood it as an aspect of behavior; we must understand it as an aspect of consciousness.
52. "The clock fell." "The clock fell": (1) He wants to explain why the clock stopped; (2) he wants to explain why this sound or noise of something falling was heard, i.e., an answer to two different questions. The fact that the semic and phasic sides of speech do not coincide is the first that the analysis establishes. Secondly: The thought and the meanings do not coincide. Behind this is the thought: I am not guilty. The same thought could be expressed as: I am not in the habit of touching other people's things. I was dusting, etc. All these meanings mediate the thought, which without the word is incorporeal and a Stygian shadow (Mandel'shtam)³⁷—the vague wish to justify oneself, and perhaps, thought most of all contains all these mediations as a cloud.³⁸ But most important is: "They mediate" means they create a structure, which plays

the same role with regard to thought as the semantic structures between the word and the card with regard to memory. The fundamental equation: The thought (I am not guilty) is to the meaning (the clock fell) what memorizing (theater) is to the formation of the connection (the crab watches his theater).³⁹ The formation of meanings is the basic function of the sign, i.e., the formation of sense in consciousness. The whole point is that direct communication between one consciousness and another consciousness (to communicate the idea “I am not guilty”) is impossible not just in the technical sense (physically) but also psychologically: it can only be achieved in an indirect, mediated way. This internal mediation must be studied. But without the word, we ourselves do not understand our thought—when “the word remains unconscious.”⁴⁰

53. Each thought strives to connect something with something, has a movement, a course, a development, strives to establish a relationship between something and something, in a word, fulfills some function, does some work, solves a task, like memory. In all this work of the thought, the semasiological structures are the same as in the creation of a semantic structure that unites the sign with the word-to-be-remembered in memorizing.
54. [Written in green ink:] Logical memory. [Written in violet ink:] The condition for its development is the ability to form an alogical construction: Cf. the Uzbeks only remember what is logical and poor.
55. [Written in green ink:] Inner speech [Written in violet ink:] does not come after external speech. Internal mediation is there from the very beginning of speech, which is an undifferentiated unity of external-internal speech.⁴¹
56. [Written in green ink:] The ingrowing is [Written in violet ink:] impossible without a semantic analysis of the mnemotechnic operation: The internal mediation is also present in externally mediated memorizing.
57. [With an “!”; added in green ink in the space left:] The thought is not expressed in the word but completed in the word.⁴² We might speak about the becoming (the unity of being and nonbeing) of the thought in the word. Cf. Mandelshtam: about the nonverbal thought from the kingdom of shadows. [Written in violet ink:] Uspenskiy’s petitioner⁴³ did not complete his thought just as sometimes one doesn’t complete one’s thought, as sometimes memory fails. Cf. Uspenskiy’s petitioner. Did he know what he wanted to think? He knew like people who want to remember something. Had he begun to think? He had begun as people begin to remember. Had his thought succeeded as a process? It had not, just like when one cannot remember something.⁴⁴
58. Cf. Khlebnikov—Bely with his punctuation marks. The prosodic elements of speech and its sense.
59. Because the thought does not coincide with the meanings, and there is an ulterior motive because the path from the thought to the word lies through meaning, and speech is allegory. Exactly because of that: (1) the complaints about the imperfection of speech, about the inexpressability of the thought, but “the flight of the poor heart ends with mere impotent lassitude”⁴⁵; (2) to overcome these complaints—the attempt to fuse words and to create new paths

- from the thought to the word via new word meanings (Khlebnikov himself compared this work with the construction of a road from one valley to another, talked about the (more) direct road from Moscow to Kiev and not via New York, called himself a language engineer—“there is language—a tissue of mind units, a tissue of concepts”)⁴⁶; (3) to overcome these complaints—the play with tortuous paths and the expression of the inexpressible—Pasternak⁴⁷ and others.
60. The problem of the internal mediation by meanings. What is meaning? A hypothetical concept about the internal formation, whose psychological nature is not intimately known but whose reality is beyond doubt, whose location is unknown (Cf. the calculation of undiscovered planets),⁴⁸ whose effect we can and must study, without which the life of consciousness is as impossible as the life of an organism without vitamins or hormones.
61. Behavior and consciousness as the central problem in the transition from the older to the new stage of work.

Answers to A. R. and A. N

This note, written in violet ink on one sheet, contains some criticism of the views of Vygotsky's associates Luria (A. R.) and Leont'ev (A. N.).

A. R. The change of meanings

[The whole passage is circled]

Most Important

The shortcoming of both Piaget and Lévy-Bruhl is not only that they isolate action, just like Lipmann isolates speech. All take speech for a constant, but it is a variable. We must add action to Piaget and speech to Lipmann.

But this is not all, this is just the beginning, on the pages of the preface, but most important is the other understanding of speech.

The central fact is that the child is bad in realizing and remembering what he himself did! Ergo, he recalls. That is, for him his actions have no meaning.

[In a separate box]

NB! Reply to A. N.

1. It remains the question whether there is transfer (= analogy), i.e., to see the old in the new: the core of intellect. But psychologically, in the very act of transfer, there is an intellectual process in vivo⁴⁹ or its product or outcome (one of the many).
2. Where is the second driving force of thinking, in addition to practice, socialization? An exaggeration of the meaning of practice. The action is not the subject matter of knowledge: Where is the connection.
3. How to introduce an internal analysis, how to tear the mask of the pseudoconcepts.

Comments on Leont'ev's talk

The text is written on the back of two fragments of a French paper, the pages of which were cut into parts. It is the same paper as was used in the plan for the book "The problem of consciousness" (see chapter 17) and, probably, "Observation of Asya, May 4, 1932" (see chapter 14), and we can see thematic connections with the book plan. There is no doubt that Vygotsky discusses the same talk as was discussed in the previous chapter, but this time his discussion is less descriptive and more critical.

NB! (1) A. N.

1. The unity of the practical and the intellect: in its genesis and in the transitions of cognitive thinking into practical activity and practical activity into cognitive thinking.
2. A. N.'s study and my experiments + the ideas about Piaget (Levina's experiments).
3. Transfer is the central problem:

[Points 4 through 9 have square brackets in the margin]

4. The object of psychological knowledge and the subject matter of psychological study.

This is correct⁵⁰: the system is not the object of direct study.

5. [Remark no. 1 in the margin: This is incorrect. Against this.] The controversy "thinking vs. speech" disappears when the object of knowledge and the object of study are separated. They are incomparable. That is, the one is the process of self-disclosure of the other. That is, the relationship of thinking to speech is like that of atomic structure to spectral analysis. That is pragmatism.
6. Speech has always been observed, but it was rejected as a *quantité négligeable*.⁵¹ Here it is remarkable that speech is experimentally elicited.
7. The general before the particular: Cf. Bergson contra Hegel.
8. What is essential: not egocentric and socialized [speech], connected and not connected with the action. This is not generally so but only in the present case, *hic et nunc*⁵²: on the whole a fundamentally incorrect question. Inner speech is connected with the action in another way than socialized speech.

[Remark no. 2, written in the margin with an arrow pointing to points 9 and 10: Against this.]

9. Not the socialization of speech, but of experience through speech. But not the socialization, but the egocentrization or the interiorization of speech is the center. In Piaget, the logic of action rules in the logic of thought: This means that thinking borrows from the action.

[The text of point no. 10 was not available to the editors]

11. McCarthy.⁵³

12. Not the polemic part, but the fundamental positive part is insufficiently developed: a threat—the neutralism of the study.

13. The facts prevail, it is + or –. Decisive is the question and the facts [will say]: yes-yes or no-no.

[Points no. 14 through 17 are boxed]

14. Remark no. 3, written in the margin: [Against this.] Between the sensory generalization and the generalization in the word, there is an intermediate level: The deaf and dumb understand naive physics, they do not hold a chest against the wall⁵⁴; while not formulating a rule, they generalize. On the other hand, the primary generalization in the word is not this divine function of speech according to Hegel.

After all, in the experiments with floating and sinking things, with soluble and insoluble substances, with a verbal formula the child will act syncretically in generalizing and not feel the contradiction.⁵⁵

15. Remark no. 4 written in the margin: [says Against this.] Speech and action are there, where they move each other and [form] the ends of a spiral (separated).⁵⁶ Speech is no longer spectral analysis, but the object of study coincides with the object of knowledge. And the “thinking and speech” controversy is not removed but becomes a real problem for the study. Which was to be proved.

16. Remark no. 5 in the margin: [Contra against this.] A mistake in the assessment of Sakharov’s experiments: (1) artificiality + (2) as if there was one concept and not their system: when “tsev” is solved, all the others are immediately solved in one fell swoop: not inductively from the figures “bik,” “lag,” “gur,” but deductively from “tsev.”⁵⁷

17. Six exclamation marks in the margin: [The path of the study of meaning is the central question of the study. The plan [i.e., Leont’ev’s plan] looks backward, does not make a decisive step forward to a new level of work, to the semic analysis. What does the meaning of the action mean?]

Notes

1. Royal road (Latin).
2. Refers to pp. 3–9 of Koffka (1925) where the author argues that we need both *Vorgangsbeobachtung*, (the objective description of the child’s behavior) and *Gebarensbeobachtung* or *Erlebnisbeobachtung* (the interpretation of the behavior of a particular child). In the interpretation of behavior, we can distinguish between inferences that any observer might make (e.g., this person seems hungry), expressed in so-called functional concepts, and phenomena that can only be observed by one particular person (e.g., I feel hungry), expressed in so-called descriptive concepts. This is why Vygotsky several times, in connection with Koffka, refers to two series of concepts. See also Koffka (1924) about descriptive and functional facts.

3. Ivan Fedorovich Kurazov (1898 to 1937). Russian reflexologist, and specialist in philosophical problems of psychology who worked at the Leningrad section of the Philosophical Institute. Kurazov was a militant Marxist who actively participated in the ideological debates from 1928 to 1930 (Loginova 2005; Umrikhin 1991). Originally an adherent of Deborin, he switched sides but could not escape political repression. He was first arrested in 1934 and eventually shot in 1937 (Korsakov 2012, p. 138).
4. Frederik Jacobus Johannes Buytendijk (1887 to 1974). Dutch physician, animal psychologist, and proponent of phenomenology. Vygotsky referred to him in his lecture on imagination: “In an excellent and extremely interesting experiment carried out by the Dutch researcher, Boitendeik, it was demonstrated that there are few elements of autistic thinking or true fantasy in the animal world.” See p. 344 of Vygotsky (1987).
5. Vygotsky refers to Guillaume and Meyerson (1930; 1931), who, together with many others, replicated Köhler’s investigations of chimpanzees’ tool use with different species of monkeys and apes. See pp. 226–230 of Van der Veer and Valsiner (1991). Paul Guillaume (1878 to 1962) was a French psychologist, adherent of the Gestalt school, and specialist in imitation. Ignace Meyerson (1888 to 1983) was a French psychologist of Polish origin who fulfilled important administrative functions in French psychology and opposed positivism in favor of a comparative-historical approach.
6. Vygotsky cites a famous passage from Marx’s *The German Ideology* (1845): “From the start the ‘spirit’ is afflicted with the curse of being ‘burdened’ with matter, which here makes its appearance in the form of agitated layers of air, sounds, in short, of language. Language is as old as consciousness, language is practical consciousness that exists also for other men, and for that reason alone it really exists for me personally as well; language, like consciousness, only arises from the need, the necessity, of intercourse with other men. Where there exists a relationship, it exists for me: the animal does not enter into ‘relations’ with anything, it does not enter into any relation at all. For the animal, its relation to others does not exist as a relation. Consciousness is, therefore, from the very beginning a social product, and remains so as long as men exist at all.” See <https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/german-ideology/ch01a.htm>.
7. Possibly the divergence from our main line of research.
8. “Development itself: more—less.” Probably meaning that development was considered to be a quantitative process and not a process of qualitative transformation.
9. Edgar John Rubin (1886 to 1951). Danish psychologist and specialist in perception known for his studies of the figure-ground phenomenon and optical illusions. The German translation of his doctoral thesis, Rubin (1921), influenced the Gestalt theorists. In the preface to that book, Rubin (p. 9) argued that he had problems with the existing conception of attention as a beam of light that does not change the objects it is focused upon as if one just switches the light on or off. He therefore decided to avoid the concept of attention in his study.

10. Original footnote: “From our viewpoint, to say that an interest is a quasi need is the same as saying that will is a quasi affect (Wundt), or the intellect a quasi instinct (Bergson).”
11. Luria presented his subjects with four objects and told them that one of the four did not belong in the group. For example, in the series “glass–saucepan–spectacles–bottle,” the subjects were supposed to pick out the spectacles because the other three objects are vessels. This proved very difficult, and one of the subjects said: “You can put the bottle and the glass together, but not the spectacles—they’ll get rusty. You’ve got to wrap them up in some paper.” See p. 64 of Luria (1976).
12. Solomon Veniaminovich Shereshevskiy (1886 to 1958). Russian journalist with a phenomenal memory largely based on synaesthesia. Shereshevskiy was studied by the physiologist L. A. Orbeli and by Luria, who wrote a book about him (Luria 1987). Vygotsky valued the case of Shereshevskiy highly (see chapter 17).
13. Dialectical materialism (Socialist newspeak).
14. Distinguishing characteristic (Latin).
15. The hero of many Russian folk tales who combines laziness, enterprise, wisdom, and stupidity.
16. The protagonist of Dostoevsky’s novel, *The Idiot*, is Prince Myshkin, a good and simple person, who does not [want to] understand the evil world around him.
17. Here and in the continuation, Vygotsky uses the plural of the word “sense.”
18. Here and elsewhere, Vygotsky uses the linguistic expression *predmetnaya otnesennost*, which he borrowed from the American–Russian linguist Roman Osipovich Jakobson (1896 to 1982). In his talk, “About the newest Russian poetry,” which was published in 1921, Jakobson discussed poets such as Khlebnikov and pointed out, among other things, that poets often coin neologisms and invent words that do not refer to anything in particular but evoke feelings and senses. Specifically, he wrote that: “An important possibility of the poetic neologism is its lack of an object [Russian: *bespredmetnost*]. The law of poetic etymology is operative, what is felt is the verbal form: the inner and the external form, but what Husserl calls ‘dinglicher Bezug’ is absent” (Jakobson 1921, p. 47). Thus, the Russian term *predmetnaya otnesennost* was Jakobson’s translation of the German *dinglicher Bezug*, and both expressions refer to the relation to a thing. Words may or may not refer to abstract or concrete things, and thus we may say that words are not “thing-related” or have no “thing-relatedness” or “object-relatedness.” For the later Vygotsky, this notion was important because it showed the developmental difference between children’s words, which often denote concrete objects, and the poet’s subtle play with sound and sense. See also note 17 on pp. 384–385 of Vygotsky (1997), which slightly misses the point. In the continuation we will avoid, where possible, the awkward term “object-relatedness” but will use constructions such as “the word has no relation to an object” or “the word refers to an object.”

19. Remark by Vygotsky: “22. If the expedition would have discovered nothing else, it would still be completely justified (i.e., the serious attitude to the connections with memory).”
20. Refers to p. 166 of Köhler (1921): “Even insightful behavior, intellectual achievement, resists ‘intellectualist interpretations.’” What he meant was that we cannot beforehand, by pure reasoning, predict what is difficult and what is easy for problem-solving animals. Vygotsky repeatedly referred to this statement, for example, in his Preface to Koffka (Vygotsky 1997, p. 216) and in *Tool and Symbol* (Van der Veer & Valsiner 1994, p. 115).
21. Possibly refers to asyntactical comprehension. Some aphasiacs have difficulty interpreting reversible sentences (e.g., “The cat chased the dog”) but not with non-reversible ones (“The cat drank the milk”). This is called “asyntactical comprehension” because the subject cannot use semantic or pragmatic inferences and must rely on syntactical clues such as word order.
22. It is unclear what Vygotsky meant by “a sclerotic.” Possibly he was thinking of a patient suffering from what was then called an “arterio-sclerotic psychosis”. Patients suffering from multiple sclerosis do not usually show serious cognitive problems.
23. Hegel speaks about the divine function of language in his *Phenomenology of the Spirit*.
24. Probably the name of a patient suffering from aphasia.
25. Luria presented syllogisms of the sort “In the far North, all bears are white. Nova Zembla is in the far North. What color are bears there?” A typical answer would be “I don’t know, I have never been there.” Cf. chapter 4 of Luria (1976).
26. Luria’s fifth report from Uzbekistan (July 13, 1931) dealt with counting. To his surprise, he found that for his subjects, counting was not a formal operation but an operation tied to concrete objects. For example, when he asked how much was four plus four, his subjects would ask: “Four *what* plus four *what*?” Likewise, his subjects found it impossible to count more than 60 pigs because no one can own so many pigs.
27. The five-year plans were nationwide centralized economic plans in the Soviet Union. The second five-year plan lasted from 1933 to 1937.
28. See footnote 4 of chapter 14.
29. A Ukrainian saying, which Vygotsky might have read in Jabotinsky’s (1930) *Causeries: Pravda ob ostrove Tristan da Run’ya*. Speaking about his youth, Jabotinsky wrote: “That was a psychology, brilliantly expressed in the anecdote about the fantasy of a Chigirinskian peasant: “If I were a king, I would steal one hundred rubles and run away.” At that time, even the social dreams of the organized proletarian collectives, despite the audacity of their political slogans, essentially, went not much further than these one hundred rubles.”
30. Margin, scope (German).
31. This may refer to reasoning problems of the following form: “It takes thirty minutes to go by bike to Ak-Mazar, or six time slower by car. How long will it take by car?” See chapter 5 of Luria (1976).

32. Remark by Vygotsky: “40). This is our central formula. When we stood at the border—natural and mediated processes [–] we worked with the method of double stimulation. When we became interested in the movement inside the development of mediated processes, we switched to semic analysis. About the word: we worked on the phasic side of speech, now on the semic side (cf. the classification of aphasia). Then we were interested in what the knot and logical memory have in common (we described development from the formal, external side, from the side of the affect). Now we are interested in what is different between the knot and logical memory. This switch is needed in order to solve a number of older problems. For example, ingrowing cannot be explained by mere repetition, i.e., without a semic analysis.”
33. Points 44 to point 59 show many textual similarities with chapter 7 of *Thinking and Speech*. As explained in Van der Veer and Valsiner (1991), this chapter relied heavily on the ideas of the linguistic thinkers of his time and their predecessors, notably Paul (1886), Polivanov, Potebnya (1989), Vossler (1923), and Yakubinskiy (1923). The distinction between a psychological and a grammatical predicate, for example, was quite common in the late nineteenth century, and Vossler (1923) gave many examples of such.
34. Quoted from Potebnya’s “From the notes about Russian grammar.” Cf. p. 134 of “The problem of consciousness” in Vygotsky (1997).
35. Remark by Vygotsky: “47). This is what distinguishes naive consciousness (the naive person), who tells the whole truth in the comedy, and the child from culturally developed consciousness, their speech shows no ulterior motive and allegory.” Stanislavsky’s ideas about subtext are discussed on the final pages of *Thinking and Speech*. See pp. 282–283 of Vygotsky (1987).
36. Probably meaning that some patients suffering from a particular type of aphasia are able to knock on a table, but cannot feign to do this in the absence of a table. Cassirer (1977, p. 276) discussed one of Goldstein’s patients who was no longer able to knock a door when he was removed as much as one step from the door.
37. Vygotsky cites the poem “The swallow” (1920), published in the volume *Tristia* (1922), by the Russian poet Osip Emil’evich Mandel’shtam (1891–1938). Vygotsky was personally acquainted with the Mandel’shtams and owned a copy of *Tristia* with a dedication by its author. See Van der Veer and Valsiner (1991). In the final chapter of *Thinking and Speech*, Mandel’shtam is quoted again but this time without mentioning his name, perhaps because in the spring of 1934 the poet had already been arrested. Crucial lines of the poem are: “I have forgotten the word that I wanted to say /... And the incorporeal thought will return to the palace of the shadows.”
38. This may be one of the first uses of the “wind–cloud–rain” metaphor, which stands for motivation, thought, and speech and figures in the last chapter of *Thinking and Speech*.
39. See chapter 9 where the boy Kolya S. picked the picture of a crab at the seaside to memorize the word “theater.”

40. The last five words form another quotation from “The swallow.”
41. This is the type of claim that Leont’ev might have called “logocentrism.” It is connected with the no less radical claim that “inner speech exists already primordially.” Cf. p. 134 of Vygotsky (1997).
42. This idea was repeatedly expressed by the Russian linguist, Aleksandr Afanas’evich Potebnya (1835 to 1891), and goes back to Wilhelm von Humboldt’s language philosophy. See, for example, p. 156 of Potebnya’s *Thought and Language* (1989): “Language is not a tool to express an already completed thought, but to create it.” This book formed a rich source of inspiration for Vygotsky, who used many of its concepts and examples.
43. Gleb Ivanovich Uspenskiy (1843 to 1902). Russian writer. Vygotsky refers to his story *The petitioners* (Khodoki).
44. The text of point 57 is virtually identical to a passage in the final chapter of *Thinking and Speech*. See p. 282 of Vygotsky (1987).
45. Vygotsky cites two lines from the poem “How difficult it is to repeat vital beauty” (1888) by the Russian lyrical poet Afanasiy Afanas’evich Fet (1820 to 1892).
46. See the similar passage on p. 282 of Vygotsky (1987). Khlebnikov asked in *Nasha Osnova* (1919): “Who would travel from Moscow to Kiev via New York? And what line of modern bookish language is free of such excursions? This is because there is no science of word formation.” The fragment “there is language—a tissue of mind units, a tissue of concepts” is from a text written in 1911 to 1912 and was first published in the volume of Khlebnikov’s poems edited by Stepanov: “In response to the group of problems clearly indicated by Tyutchev in *Silentium*, Humboldt wrote: Man feels and knows that language is for him just a means, that outside language there is an invisible world, which man tries to master only with its help. Language appears insufficient for the expression of the most everyday feeling and the deepest thought, and people look at that invisible world as a far-away land, where only language can lead them, although they will never reach the goal. In a deep sense, all speech is a struggle with thought. Khlebnikov answers Humboldt and Tyutchev: We point out that apart from the language of words, the sound units, there is language as a tissue of mind units (a tissue of concepts that guides the former)” (Stepanov 1928, p. 57). It is likely that Vygotsky used this volume as his source of information about Khlebnikov.
47. Boris Leonidovich Pasternak (1890 to 1960). Russian poet, novelist, and translator who won the Nobel Prize for literature in 1958. Characteristic of Pasternak’s early poetry is the play with associations, alliterations, unusual rhythm, and syntax, etc. This is why Vygotsky refers to “tortuous paths and the expression of the inexpressible.” Vygotsky loved Pasternak’s poetry and owned one of his books with a personal dedication by the poet (Vygodskaya & Lifanova 1996, p. 293).
48. The planet Neptune was first observed in 1846, but its existence had already been inferred by Alexis Bouvard (1776 to 1843) and its position calculated by

- Urbain Le Verrier (1811 to 1877), who both had noted irregularities in the orbit of its twin planet Uranus.
49. Within the living, as they take place (Latin). Here Vygotsky refers to the distinction between process and product.
 50. Original footnote: “But it is not right that the system concept is not a single time introduced into the study—no—not right!”
 51. A negligible amount (French). Said of things that for all practical purposes can be ignored.
 52. Here and now (Latin).
 53. Dorothea McCarthy (1906 to 1974). American psychologist and specialist in normal language development. Vygotsky referred to her in connection with the concept of the zone of proximal development, but a clear link has never been established. At the time Vygotsky had access to McCarthy (1929a, b, 1930, 1931).
 54. Unlike some of Köhler’s (1921) chimpanzees, who tried to climb on a chest that they themselves held against the wall.
 55. In chapter 6 of his book on the child’s conception of physical causality, Piaget asked children from 4 to 11 years old why certain objects sink while others do not and distinguished four stages in their thinking. See Piaget (1927, 1930).
 56. Presumably meaning that action and speech form some sort of double helix and, although intertwined, remain separated until a certain moment.
 57. These were nonsense syllables used in Sakharov’s concept development research. See note 14 of chapter 10.

References

- Cassirer, E. (1977). *The philosophy of symbolic forms*, Vol. 3. *The phenomenology of knowledge*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Guillaume, P., & Meyerson, I. (1930). Recherches sur l’usage de l’instrument chez les singes. I: Le problème du détour. *Journal de Psychologie Normale et Pathologique*, 27, 177–236.
- Guillaume, P., & Meyerson, I. (1931). Recherches sur l’usage de l’instrument chez les singes. II: L’intermédiaire lié à l’objet. *Journal de Psychologie Normale et Pathologique*, 28, 481–555.
- Jabotinsky, V. (1930). Causeries. *Pravda ob ostrove Tristan da Run’ya*. Paris: d’Art Voltaire.
- Koffka, K. (1924). Introspection and the method of psychology. *British Journal of Psychology*, 15, 149–161.
- Koffka, K. (1925). *Die Grundlagen der psychischen Entwicklung: Eine Einführung in die Kinderpsychologie*. Osterwieck am Harz: Verlag van A.W. Zickfeldt.
- Köhler, W. (1921). *Intelligenzprüfungen an Menschenaffen*. Berlin: Julius Springer.
- Korsakov, S. N. (2012). Politicheskie repressii v Institute Filosofii (1930–1940). *Filosofskiy Zhurnal*, 1(8), 120–170.
- Leont’ev, A.N. (1978). *Activity, consciousness, and personality*. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
- Loginova, N.A. (2005). Perestroyka struktury i deyatel’nosti Instituta mozga posle smerti V.M. Bekhtereva. In *Opyt chelovekoznaniiya: Istoriya kompleksnogo podkhoda v psikhologicheskikh shkolakh V.M. Bekhtereva i B.G. Anan’eva* (pp. 83–97). St. Petersburg: SPbGU.

- Luria, A. R. (1976). *Cognitive development: Its cultural and social foundations*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Luria, A. R. (1987). *The mind of a mnemonist: A little book about a vast memory*. Harvard: Harvard University Press.
- McCarthy, D. (1929a). A comparison of children's language in different situations and its relation to personality traits. *Journal of Genetic Psychology*, 36, 583–591.
- McCarthy, D. (1929b). The vocalizations of infants. *Journal of Genetic Psychology*, 36, 583–591.
- McCarthy, D. (1930). The language development of the preschool child (No. 4). Minneapolis: Institute of Child Welfare, Monograph Series.
- McCarthy, D. (1931). Language development. In C. Murchison (Ed.), *A handbook of child psychology* (pp. 278–315). Worcester, MA: Clark University Press.
- Paul, H. (1886). *Principien der Sprachgeschichte*. Halle: Max Niemeyer.
- Piaget, J. (1927). *La causalité physique chez l'enfant*. Paris: Félix Alcan.
- Piaget, J. (1930). *The child's conception of physical causality*. London: Kegan Paul.
- Potebnya, A.A. (1989). Mysl' i yazyk. In *Slovo i mif* (pp. 17–200). Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Pravda.
- Rubin, E. J. (1921). *Visuell wahrgenommene Figuren: Studien in psychologischer analyse*. København: Gyldendalske Boghandel.
- Stepanov, N. (1928). Tvorchestvo Velimira Khlebnikova. In V. Khlebnikov, *Sobranie proizvedeniy v 5 tomakh* (pp. 31–66). Tom 1. Leningrad: Izdatel'stvo Pisateley v Leningrade.
- Umrikhin, V.V. (1991). "Nachalo kontsa" povedencheskoy psikhologii v SSSR. In *Repressirovannaya nauka* (pp. 136–145). Leningrad: Nauka.
- Van der Veer, R., & Valsiner, J. (1991). *Understanding Vygotsky: A quest for synthesis*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Van der Veer, R., & Valsiner, J. (Eds.). (1994). *The vygotsky reader*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Vossler, K. (1923). *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Sprachphilosophie*. München: Verlag der Hochschulbuchhandlung Max Hueber.
- Vygotskaya, G. L., & Lifanova, T. M. (1996). *Lev Semyonovich Vygotsky: Zhizn', deyatel'nost', shtrikhi k portretu*. Moscow: Smysl.
- Vygotsky, L.S. (1987). *The collected works of L.S. Vygotsky. Vol. 1. Problems of general psychology*. New York: Plenum Press.
- Vygotsky, L.S. (1997). *The collected works of L.S. Vygotsky. Vol. 3. Problems of the theory and history of psychology*. New York: Plenum Press.
- Yakobson, R. (1921). *Noveyshaya russkaya poeziya. Nabrosok Pervyy*. Prague: Politika.
- Yakubinskiy, L.P. (1923). O dialogicheskoy rechi. In L. V. Shcherba (Ed.), *Russkaya rech'*. *Sbornik statey* (pp. 96–194). Sb. 1. Petrograd: Foneticheskiy Institut Prakticheskogo Izucheniya Yazykov.

Chapter 17

The Problem of Consciousness

The chapter contains various documents connected with the problem of consciousness: accounts of internal conferences, book plans, and reflections. The crucial events of this period were the internal symposium “About the perspectives of our research,” held on December 4, 1932, and Vygotsky’s 7 hour long talk about consciousness on the next day, of which two versions have reached us: Leont’ev’s summary with additions by Zaporozhets (Vygotsky 1997, pp. 129–138), and Luria’s summary (Luria 2014). The symposium and the talk marked the theoretical transition from sign to meaning and to the study of consciousness as a whole, and it immediately led to plans for new research and new books that would testify of the new “height” psychology. It becomes increasingly clear that *Thinking and speech* was just an intermediate stage on the road toward a much broader, much more ambitious book. In the preface to *Thinking and speech*, Vygotsky writes that he considers the problem of thinking and speech as being the key to a new theory of consciousness, but, as we know, the book contained primarily older material and very little of the newer ideas. Elsewhere we have analysed the outlines of this new theory of consciousness on the basis of published fragments and personal notes (Zavershneva 2014). As will be seen later in the text, Vygotsky found the evidence for this new theory in four groups of facts: Asya, Shereshevskiy, schizophrenia, and Khlebnikov. “Asya” refers to children’s first questions, which in Vygotsky’s opinion were about sense, not meaning, and marked an important transformation of the child’s mind. The case of Shereshevskiy represented a case of anomalous development where the psychological system is primarily based upon memory. Schizophrenia illustrated the disintegration of the semantic structure of consciousness, and the case of the futurist poet Khlebnikov was an example of exceptional development in the form of poetic creativity.

Consciousness without the word

This is a note written in violet ink on two sheets of an exercise book and dated October 25. Although the year is not indicated, we can almost be sure it was written in 1932 because a number of formulations coincide with those of “Propositions to Luria’s talk” (see the previous chapter) and “The problem of consciousness.” The text comes after the symposium in October and prepares the symposium in December. We see that Vygotsky touches upon an essential problem of his theory: the question of the beginning of consciousness, its preverbal origin. From point 24 onward, the ink color slightly changes, and we suspect the rest of the text is a later addition, possibly written early 1933. If this is true, Vygotsky’s reference to “last year’s talk” is a reference to his talk about consciousness on December 5, 1932.

Consciousness without the word

NB!

1. *Mandel'shtam*: "I have forgotten the word": When the word is unconscious, the thought is a shadow from the afterlife or an unborn shadow. The word and consciousness.
2. *Consciousness* and its functions: according to St[umpf] not attention, not memory, but the *functions of consciousness*: the noticing of the phenomenon; the diversity of psychological formations; Lewin—the abolishing of functions in mental systems.
3. The word plays a central role in *consciousness but not in its individual functions*. Cf. attention is a central function of consciousness; its *Nichtexistenz*¹ follows from the *Nichtexistenz* of consciousness itself; cf. the role of the word in attention. Syncretism and splitting are basic functions of consciousness: Köhler. If the psychosis of schizophrenia did not exist, this function should be called schizothymic. Amnesias are diseases of consciousness.
4. *Gestalttheorie* (*sense*: to make the postulate the problem)²: Structure is a property of consciousness *itself*, but consciousness is rejected. Perception as the basis of all functions.
5. Outside consciousness, a *change of systemic relationships* is unthinkable. We can find no analogue whatsoever of this phenomenon in organic life because the mental organism itself changes (St[umpf]). Further: There is *nothing similar*, no analogue whatever, for this movement in consciousness without *meanings*, without senses, without Feuerbach's second person (the word does this, it duplicates consciousness), i.e., the animal does not have it; it exists only in historical development.
6. Consciousness without the word = activity and perception. The second level is the memory of both. Cf. <illegible><ear: dream>.³ Only we can think without stimuli: without activity and perception.
7. Like with Sakharov. We *unwittingly, spontaneously got* what we have in *The adolescent*. He died without suspecting it.⁴ This is not the way to proceed, but the *problem of meanings* and the *system was forced upon us* by this study.
8. Cf. with A.R. arras—the guard, etc., and something about a depot. *Disease* of the predicate.
9. Cf. Shereshevskiy (1) yesterday on the telephone, (2) two times one list of words, (3) the meaning of words is memory and perception, (4) his consciousness. Asya's questions, schizophrenia, normal adults.
10. Equivocation and distinction.⁵
11. Poetry—words outside their *dinglicher Bezug*.⁶
12. Shereshevskiy must be polished as a diamond; a bright precious one that will cut through the structure of our problems and solve them like a diamond cuts glass.
13. The complaints about the inadequacy of the word. But how are they stated *in the word*: "O, if the soul could express itself without the word,"⁷ "a thought

once uttered is untrue”: But this thought has been uttered, i.e., it is untrue (cf. the sophism about the Cretan who lies).⁸ Where is *truth*: The word does not introduce an idyll in consciousness, but drama, even (*insoluble*) tragedy. In general, the life of consciousness is unlike the life of an organism (this is why consciousness stands *outside* organic life), it is not an idyll, not Spinoza’s peace, but tragedy: *amor fati*.

14. “If we recall, o, if we forget”⁹—this is the same. By the way: an example of an asyntactic construction.
15. Voluntarism is inadequate in the theory of volition, mnemism in memory, intellectualism in intellect.
16. It would be useful to return to memory to delineate things. To discuss each other’s problems.¹⁰

[The next point is marked with a square bracket:]

17. *Our shortcoming is not a shortage of facts but the inadequacy of the theory*: This is the main difficulty in the analysis of our crisis and not the divergence from the facts. *This* contra A. N. [Leont’ev]. *Thus*: Salvation is *not in the facts* but in *theory*. We introduced the systemic viewpoint *too late*. Cf. the *pictogram*, memory in A. N. Morozova’s experiments. *Now* I understand this better.
18. *Shereshevskiy* memorizes two lists—one has other *mistakes* than the other.
19. Are the functions of consciousness itself primary with respect to the psychological functions (i.e., dissociation and merging exists *before* memory)? No, each of these functions must be considered as a function of *consciousness as a whole*, in its new quality: *what memory means for consciousness*: this was in a distorted form present in the theory of intellectualism, voluntarism, and mnemism. In essence, in organic life we always distinguish function and organism. Here it is function and consciousness.
20. Yesterday *Shereshevskiy* on the telephone (October 24): (1) words + <narrow> from the program of the p[erformance?] of January <8>, 1930 and from another list (<narrow>, etc.) + and –; 2) the exact reproduction of the *whole* situation; (3) he is ashamed of the childishness of his methods + claims that therefore it is “he” who *sees* this and not “me”¹¹; (4) he changes his methods—in forgetting manages without a curtain¹²; (5) how he studied *diamat* and *histomat*¹³; (6) he sees everything; (7) in order to understand he must see (he sees me during a conversation by telephone); (8) in order to understand he must see (for [example?], memorize); concrete words—a concrete image + abstract words—allegories. Without a special class *he did not understand diamat*; [after that] I [*Shereshevskiy*] developed abstract thinking.
Most important: All that was previously said about Me and He + the two lists and the different errors + the interferences from one list to the other list. His world. *Consciousness by memory*. He knows, but he does not know that he knows. Cf. a child who solved a problem but does not understand how he solved it.
21. Consciousness without the word is Stygian speech. The word (cf. Asya’s questions) in consciousness is what is inaccessible for one and accessible for two. Two in one consciousness: to understand oneself. The mediation by the meanings (abstraction and consciousness) of the functions. What is meaning—(1) either a memory image (2) or something else.

22. The connection between system and meaning: (1) both [result] from the sign; (2) both [result] from the communication between one consciousness and the other (the word), this genetically; (3) structurally; (4) in activity.
23. Who were the first to run into the problem of the non-coincidence of the phasic and semic sides of speech? Actors, who must not just create the words but also the thoughts behind them. Cf. Stanislavsky's system—the subtext: What does Chatskiy want to say by these words? The theory of the *indirect* expression of thoughts in words. Hence, the complexity and difficulty of understanding (i.e., the path from indirect expression to thought) and formulating the thought (i.e., the indirect path from thought to word).¹⁴
24. The development of the semic and the phasic sides of speech and their non-coincidence—cf. last year's talk.
25. Poetry = words without relation to an object, i.e., compositions of pure meanings (Yakobson, Khlebnikov). It is a remarkable fact that we can think one and the same thing *through* different meanings. "This fog, this ice, this absolute perfection"—it means: she, my beloved.¹⁵
26. "Meaning is vanity and the word just noise when phonetics is Seraph's maid."¹⁶ What does this mean. Phonetics itself becomes the carrier of other meanings—functional ones: cf. "rrrevolutionary,"¹⁷ Annenskiy's "Impossible": "In these m's, these p's, these s's I could discern a puff of wind."¹⁸
27. Cf. Pavlov: the "what is it?" reflex¹⁹ and Asya's first questions: What's that? It is a semantic orientation in consciousness.

The symposium of December 4, 1932

The following three texts deal with an internal conference that figures on a list of such conferences compiled by Luria (found in the Luria family archive) as "Symposium—About the perspectives of our research. Moscow. December 4, 1932." The notes were written in violet ink on library cards; the first note consisted of eight cards and the second and third notes of just one card. The documents provide previously unknown information about the first, introductory part to the talk, "The problem of consciousness" (December 5, 1932). Bozhovich, Leont'ev, Luria, Slavina, and Zaporozhets²⁰ were among those present. Vygotsky's sharply criticizes his previous views and underlines the need for a new research direction. This is followed by an account of the discussion that followed, which dealt with themes also discussed in the last chapter of *Thinking and Speech*.

December 4, 1932 *Symposium*

NB!

1. The *need for a new stage* in the research does not follow from the fact that a new idea came up, because a new idea became interesting, but because the development of the research itself required it. The new facts impel us to the search for new, more complex explanations. The limited, conventional, narrow nature of the older viewpoint led to an incorrect assessment of the central aspects, which we have taken for secondary ones: the interfunctional

connections. We have focused our attention on the sign (on the tool) to the detriment of the development of the operation with the sign and presented it as something *simple* that goes through three stages: magical, external, and internal. But the knot is external, and the diary of the adolescent is external. Thus, we have lots of poorly explained facts and wish to look deeper into the facts, i.e., we wish to re-interpret them theoretically.

2. *The higher and lower functions* are not built in two floors: their number and names do not coincide. But neither our previous conception [is correct]: the higher function is the mastery of the lower one (voluntary attention is the subordination of involuntary attention), for this also implies two floors.
3. *The most important thing*, which has no equal in the organic world, is: (a) the change of the interfunctional connections, i.e., the change of the <illegible> organism and its material organ in the process of functional development: The organism and the organ are determined (subordinated) by the functions. (Consciousness is a pure activity that has a *special* relationship with the organism and the organ); (b) one and the same function is performed by different processes, *ergo* functions are not tied to activities, they are *polyvalent*, *polyfunctional*, pure, free, and auxiliary unbound activities of consciousness. *Ergo*: The function is no longer a function! An activity *sui generis*.²¹
4. *The system is the purely psychological side of culture*: cf. written speech—an object of historical culture—psychologically: (a) the processes that participate in written speech—a skill, a mediated process; (b) it is adequate [to compare] written speech and inner speech.

December 4, 1932 *Symposium*

A. Nik. [Leont'ev]

1. *In arithmetic*, A. N. made two steps—(a) a *wrong* one: the development of arithmetic was put off to 15 years, (b) a *true* one: he differentiated the sign at various levels—everything is disclosed from the viewpoint of *meaning* and *its change*.
2. The *system* is the higher psychological function. Right? The lower and higher functions not in two floors.
3. Marked with a vertical line and the word: [Incorrect.] *The changes of the meanings can* be revealed in characteristic sign uses. The purely verbal study of this phenomenon is a *special case*. *Semic analysis is analysis that proceeds in the verbal plane*. It is impossible with a young child.
4. The introduction into psychological analysis of the nonverbal plane [has] two advantages: (1) *the problem of the relationship between speech and action*; (2) it introduces the extrapsychological foundation of psychological processes.
5. *Incorrect in A. N.*: The verbal and the nonverbal experiment are not identical with the study of *speech and action* and the *concepts* of pure speech. This is a problem, but the research method comes first. *Ergo*, the place of A.N.'s own work is also incorrect The remark in the margin of points 4 to 5: [in the general system] apparently is meant to clarify this statement.

6. *The theory and the facts*: The theory suppresses the facts; [we must] *create new facts*. Which means to interpret the older ones. To *swim* and to know how to swim.
7. We must liquidate the reluctance to let theory progress from research and avoid that research is defended against theory.
8. *The general tendency*: from the outside inward, from behavior to consciousness.


A1. Rom. [Luria]

1. The system is an *artificial* creation, a product of active actions: *cum grano salis*²²: This is not the goal of these actions. *Not everything is a system* but just the *higher psychological functions*. We study perception *only through the analysis of factors that lie outside perception*.
2. *Meanings* are the key to the reflection of reality in consciousness. *Psychology and epistemology*. *Lenin*: the dialectical transition from sensations to thinking.²³ *Ergo*: thinking reflects reality in *another way* than sensation does. Sensation in another way than irritability.²⁴ *The reflection of reality in consciousness and its development*.
3. *What changes is meaning*: What changes is our *relationship* to reality; practice is not [just] operating with things.

The relationship with personality *eo ipso* changes. The modality: conventional and auxiliary meanings. Not just word meaning changes but also the relationship with reality and with personality.

Cf. my own:

the concept



consciousness

self-consciousness

4. *The lability of the meanings*: perhaps not meanings, but knowledge? *Not like that*. But there is lability in the driver: *This is the strength—the enormous sensitivity of the new research apparatus*. The next two sentences are marked by a vertical line with the word: [Incorrect.] *Conceptual and complexive are not sufficient categories for the material*. *The role of speech in the reflection of reality*. The next three sentences have a double vertical line with the remark: [Correct.] *That is, speech is a phenomenon of consciousness: It is a synonym*. There is no reflection of reality without speech, i.e., without its social reflection: *these are synonyms*. *Verbal analysis is everywhere: Each nonverbal test is a verbal test*. There is a non-verbal way, but there is no direct relationship between practice and speech: the internal comparison of symbols, the relationship of word meaning with the *operations* that depend upon it.

5. In the margin a vertical line is written with the word: [Correct] *Semic analysis* is a task for the e[xperiment], but not for the i[nvestigation], i.e., [it is] not just a direct analysis in the verbal plane. The meaning of words [lies] in their remote consequences.

Semic analysis must become a system of working tools, to find *one's own* style of experiments. *Semic analysis is not analysis of speech but of consciousness as a whole.*

Al. Vlad. [Zaporozhets]

1. The creation of a system represents a process of destruction of *older* inter-functional connections in the natural plane: a sensorimotor unity.²⁵
2. The system is a historical formation through the sign.
3. The sign creates the systems through *meaning*.
4. Practice in the broad sense: The mastery of oneself is practice.
5. In the sign operation, we asked the question about *meaning* (magical use = the person's attitude; *who masters?*), *but just about one meaning* From here to the end of the propositions to Slavina's (?) text there is a vertical line with the words: [Very true], about the meaning of the sign itself. *Correct*: We wanted to deduce everything from *one* meaning: Is there a mediated operation or not—and that's it.
6. The sign means: a synonym—It has a relationship with reality. *Ergo*, practice is no *special case* but pervades everything.
7. Against the disregard of the method (transfer): The methods reflect the basic regularity: *The method of double stimulation* is to *the basic law of mediation* what the method of transfer is to the law of the relationship between thinking and practice, between thinking and reality. Transfer is as much a fundamental question for the methods as for the methodology.

Lidiya Solom. [Slavina?]

The cloud above speech: also a cloud above the action. To do research via action is as complex as via speech.

Questions: (a) *word meaning and the concept*, do they blend at the end of the road, but not along the road; (b) form and content; (c) the cloud of thought and motivation (the wind)—except word meanings; the question of *volition—motivation*.

Lidiya Il'in. [Bozhovich]

1. From outside inward, but the question about the *method*: How can we study the hidden inner processes in a *mediated way*. The next two propositions are highlighted with a vertical line and the words: [This is incorrect] *Thinking reveals itself in speech and action*. Why are exactly action and speech essential; where is the criterion for essential revelations.

Boxed text: [*This is very wrong*: This is what distinguishes us from all the older psychology—Speech is not a discovery.]

2. *The cloud* is thinking? Or becomes thinking when it pours into speech. Thinking, gn[ostic intellect],²⁶ is *its* action? How does the inner mental relate to behavior: *the psychophysical problem. This is the problem of thinking and speech.*

Boxed text: [This is terribly important: Speech/thinking is like the psycho/physical problem.]

What is intrapsychological and verbal: the concept as a potential system of judgments or the “concept in the judgment.” The psychological is only the potential.

On the symposium

1. Form and content. Form is appearance. Form is activity and function. Form is law, exterior, a vessel, morphology—a function. The general–particular is not form–content. *The (intent[ional] objects of mental processes.* Mental phenomena and functions.
2. If the *thought* is a cloud that pours a *shower* of speech, then (1) the clouds have their movement, the raindrops have their own, although they are connected: The rain moves with the cloud, the cloud sheds rain, etc. The speech motives are the *wind* that brings the cloud into movement: It has its own movement, which is also connected. There are clouds that do not pour a shower (Uspensky’s petitioner); there is powerless wind and other wind that dispels the clouds and does not gather them.
3. We do not distinguish sign and meaning in order to return to the idea that speech is the garment of thought. Everything is full of distinctions and transitions.

An observation

The drunk: “The driver skipped three stops without a stop”—on the complexive meaning of the everyday word “stop” (the location and the action).

Cf. What does that word mean? That is something from geography, something like a meridian, etc.

NB! On the talk about consciousness.

- (1) The problem of classification—neglecting it—is a symptom of not understanding consciousness, its formations, and its relationships with them.
- (2) The *Uzbek*: *Through* the word he directly sees the things while not noticing them, as through a transparent medium: They ask [him] about *meeting* (a comparison) and he talks about a meeting (not [about its] meaning).²⁷
- (3) Syntax—intraverbal connections. The word—extraverbal connections.

On the question of the historical current in psychology

These notes, written in dark-blue and blue ink on 10 sheets of paper (forms with the printed heading “Office memorandum. Telephone No”), form the plan for an unwritten longer text, possibly a book. Space is left free under each paragraph or chapter heading. The text gives the initials of three authors—Vygotsky, Leont’ev, and Luria—but because Aleksandr Luria and Aleksey Leont’ev had the same initials, the order of the authors cannot be established.

The fact that Leont'ev figures as a potential author suggests the text was written before the end of 1932, that is, before their the scientific disagreements between Vygotsky and Leont'ev became more acute.

[Written in dark-blue ink:]

On the question of the historical current in psychology

L.V., A.L., A.L.

Propositions

NB! Man thinks

Spinoza, *The Ethics*, II, Axiom.

- §1. *The beginning and the first stages of the work*
- §2. *The transition to a new stage of work*
- §3. *The basic content of the work (the problems)*
- §4. *The problem of functional systems in psychology*
- §5. *The problem of sense in psychology (sign and meaning)*
- §6. *The problem of consciousness*
- §7. *The method of investigation*
 - The problem of unity and the units of investigation
 - Psychologica psychologica*
 - Abstract and concrete psychology
 - The experimental and the clinical method
 - The semic method
- §8. *Our attitude to other psychological currents*
- §9. *Our attitude to other currents in Soviet psychology*
- §9a. *Our attitude to psychology's neighboring sciences*
- §10. *The study of the phylogeny of human mind*
- §11. *The study of the historical development of the human mind*
 - The postulates: the constancy of systems, the constancy of meanings, the constancy of the functions.
 - The problem of neoformations.
- §12. *The study of ontogeny (the problem of children's thinking; the problem of instruction and development)*
- §13. *The study of the adult mind*
- §14. *The study of morbid changes of mind*
- §15. *The study of anomalous development*
- §16. *Tasks and perspectives of the work on the development of the historical direction in psychology.*

NB! *On A. N.'s remarks*

1. The psychonomic and the apsychnomic²⁸ in the double orientation of the concept. Why no unity and no multitude, but two aspects.
2. Why does this refer to the concept and not to psychology as a whole.

3. The unity and the units: meaning and the units of gnostic and practical intellect.
4. For psychology instruction and development are not two but one.
5. Practical intellect above the word “practical,” the initials: [A.N. are written] What comes from what—the transfer from the speech mould or the other way around—we cannot put it [this way]. *Ergo*—(1) [Above “*ergo*,” the word “*Incorrect*” is written] there is no *double* orientation; (2) we must know what is essential, what depends upon what.

[Written in blue ink:]

What to accentuate:

1. The functions of the system are formed in the process of *history*; their development is a development of the *historical* type.
2. The research approach: to study what is psychological *as such*, i.e., not by “objectivizing” what is subjective.
3. The genetic (in the broad sense of that word) method dominates *on principle*; development and disintegration, their laws are the *key* to the understanding of the laws of activity, of the connections, of the relationships.
4. Consciousness: We must *not* ignore the problems; consciousness *develops*; *an elementary definition, it determines itself*. Hence, the task to *study* consciousness.
5. Written in dark-blue ink: [The development of thinking follows *psychological* laws; it is the development of practical and verbal thinking, not as two different functions, not as two correlating sides, i.e., <illegible>, [but] as a *single* one (what is shared in the diversity).]

The concept is not just limited in reality (by things and so on), is not the reflection of this reality in social consciousness. Not Ach, not Piaget.

Instruction *is* development, i.e., appears in psychological research *as development*.

Ethnopsychology and <psycho-ethnology>.

Ethnopsychology and the psych[ology] of the <illegible> ethn[os].

The plan for the book on the problem of consciousness

This a note was written in pencil on a sheet of paper and with a number in the upper left corner (the number 5), which presumably was the page number. However, no other pages were found.

- I Introduction
- II Philosophical problems
- III Historical prerequisites
- IV The structure of consciousness
- V The reverse movement (consciousness—life)
- VI The direct movement (life—consciousness)
- VII A synthesis: the direct and the reverse movement—Spinoza’s problem

VIII The internal structure of <our> field

IX Marxism

[Fragmentary remarks in the margin, whose order has been reconstructed:]

One becomes consciously aware of the function not of the word. Becoming consciously aware is a reverse movement. Contra Claparède. Spontaneous [and] scientific concepts. The difference in conscious awareness. Communication with <oneself> [and] <generalization>.

The problem of consciousness (a psychological study)

These notes, written on 13 library cards, represent a plan for a book about consciousness. Each card contains no more than the topic of the chapter and a brief clarification. The plan partly coincides with the last chapter of *Thinking and speech*, but it also discusses psychopathology, child development, and philosophical matters.

The problem of consciousness. A psychological study

1. On the question of the study of consciousness in psychology. The formulation of the basic hypothesis. Its place in the system of psychological knowledge (from outside).
2. Our previous works on the study of mediated processes in light of the new hypothesis (from within).
3. The problem of animal consciousness in light of the new studies (after Köhler) (from below).
4. The problem of word meaning, semic analysis in the narrow sense. The phasic and semic sides of speech (inside).
5. Meaning in inner speech (still more inside).
6. Thought and word meaning. A thought once uttered is untrue (still more inside).
7. The motivation of speech and word meaning (still more inside).
8. The problem of the semantic structure of consciousness. Semic analysis in the broad sense of the word (in breadth and afar).
9. The problem of the systemic structure of consciousness (around).
10. The principle and method of the study of consciousness. Conclusions (into the depths).
11. Preliminary findings of the study. The study of exceptional memory. The study of children's first questions. The study of the splitting of consciousness in schizophrenia (backwards).
12. The theory of the psychological systems (forward).
13. The philosophical problems of the study (upward).
14. Conclusion. Our word in psychology. Depth psychology and height psychology. For me this knowledge is enough: after the results summed up by the various meanings of the idea of consciousness in the present study.
 1. From the plane of behavior to the plane of consciousness, etc. Flectere si nequeo superos Acheronta movebo²⁹ (upward).

The idea of the study of consciousness

This is a text written on six library cards (not all cards have been found) first deciphered by L.E. Tuzovskaya. The numbering of the propositions is distorted: In the first part, Vygotsky himself may have made a mistake; in the second part, the other cards were missing. The text describes a previously unknown talk about the study of consciousness in normal and pathological development. Vygotsky proposes a broad plan of study, in which he wanted to involve Zankov, Slavina, and presumably also Boskis, Veresotskaya,³⁰ and the pedologist Torbek.³¹ Among the listeners was a certain Vayros, who criticized the methodological approach of Vygotsky's research collective and defended a behaviorist view. Vygotsky and Leont'ev replied to his criticism.

<[L.]V.> *Themes: The idea of the study of consciousness.*

I *The psychological theme:*

The problem: Psychological systems in the development of the normal and abnormal child.

The theme: Thinking and speech in the structure of consciousness. L. VI. [?]

- (a) Speech and practical intellect.
Speech and graphic thinking.
Kohs—the cards—Eliasberg—<illegible>.
- (b) The phasic and semic sides of speech <Boskis>.
- (c) Egocentric speech and inner speech. <illegible> Torbek.
- (d) Thickly hatched: Speech, logical thinking, and autistic thinking. Ks. Iv. [Veresotskaya?], L.S. [Slavina?].
- (e) The motivation of speech (on autistic and logical thinking and egocentric speech). L.S. [Slavina?].
- (f) Speech and logical memory. L.VI. [Zankov?], L.S. [Slavina?]
- (g) Written speech (or various forms of speech and their relationship in connection with inner speech).
- (h) Expressive speech, its structure and functions.
 - (i) In prospect:
play—graphic thinking;
labor—practical intellect and speech;
school work—written speech.
- (k) Speech and the drawing.
- (l) Speech and motor behavior:
 - (a) or higher motor behavior, word, and movement;
 - (b) or *Sprachphysiognomik*³²—the expressive side of speech (mimicry, the gesture, motor behavior in speech—the articulation of themes, <illegible>). Handwriting and its expressive side (or this under written speech??).

The problem of inner speech—its completely special function: Ergo, it is a neo-formation of central interest to us. For it is the transition of an external, mediated operation into an internal one, i.e., it is the prototype of all historically formed functions. In a certain sense, it is opposite to external speech: contra <illegible>: Inner speech is what precedes external speech. No: External speech is the process of transforming a thought into words, its materialization and objectivation; what the direction concerns, here we have the reverse process—from outside inward, the process of the evaporation of speech in thought (there [it was] rain from the cloud, i.e., the steam of mind turns into material liquid). Inde <illegible>: the telegram style, the influence of senses as the basic form of syntax, the idiomatisms. The essence of the influence of the senses is that meaning becomes enriched in the context, absorbs the sense of the preceding words, and does not become limited and grow scarce. Cf. “we’ll go and dance”³³—words without a relation to an object; Jakobson about poetry. Speech with a fundamentally other relationship between the phasic and semic elements. But speech does not at all disappear. Consciousness does not completely evaporate and does not disappear in pure spirit. But whereas in external speech the thought becomes embodied in the word, in inner speech the word dies and gives birth to the thought: thought by pure meanings. “Strangers to the sky soon tire.”³⁴ Thought and word in inner and external speech move in opposite directions.

[One or more cards is missing.]

3. *Sign and meaning.* At a certain level, there is meaning without the sign. The sign is assigned to the meaning. In the complex, a system of judgments is possible but without the sign.

M. Samuil. [Vayros]

1. The problem of theory—the methodological basis of the study.
2. The problem of meanings. We [Vygotsky’s group] err *pars pro toto*: A special methodological principle is passed off as a general one.
3. From behavior to consciousness—a more general attempt—to organize.
Does this provide a firm base: What is the object of psychological study: today behavior, tomorrow meaning, the day after tomorrow something new again?
 This is not the way to build a science. Do they outwardly reveal thinking. This is the right [question]. Metaphysical signs, whereas it is *united*. Behavior is the best definition of the subject matter of psychology (including mind). *From outside inward* in a very restricted sense.
4. What is *meaning*—not a general theory of research, not a methodology, just one of the basic research topics.

Answers to Vayros’ criticism:

Al. Nik. [Leont’ev]

The crude, behaviorist solution is incorrect: *There is nothing in the subject matter of psychology that could not be the object of direct study.*

L.V.) In speech, we study (as in all external behavior) its inner connections, the internal aspect, the internal structure, which the linguist ignores.

[Several cards are missing.]

The deafmute and mental retardation. *What is crucial*: the distinction between what is primary and what is secondary (Bleuler). *Design and canvas*. The laws of the building of a complex structure are genetic laws.

8. The dynamic typology of difficult childhood and the paths of the pedological clinic of difficult childhood. Not *all* typology at once. The dynamic accumulation of syndromes. There is no direct connection without changes with etiology. For example: <illegible> topical diagnosis: not *was*, but *wo*.³⁵ The same in development: *we must not disregard the symptom*.

9. The unity of research and practical work in the pedology of difficult childhood. The practical meaning of *what* I am talking about. Fundamentally, research and practice follow two opposite ways: the general law [or] the diagnosis. Against the consumerist approach in pedology. *They are not the same*: research and practice what regards their goal and method, but *exactly* for that reason they [must be] together: two poles of a single dynamic whole.

[Several cards are missing. What follows is Vygotsky's answer to Vayros' critique.]

19. *Vayros M. Samyulovich*

Semic analysis in the *narrow and the broad sense* of the word: if in the broad sense—*what is new here*—everybody who studied speech, studied its meaning (the ink pot is all materiality); *all the novelty* and the fruitfulness of semic analysis is in its *particular* meaning (in the theory of speech). *What does semic analysis mean in the study of consciousness and in the study of speech*, i.e., how are the *narrow and broad* conception of semic analysis connected: the problem of *speech and consciousness*.

Marked by a vertical line in the margin: [The central question of my whole talk.]

The place of the new studies in the psychological system of knowledge

This note was written on the back of a French text whose pages were cut in two. Four sheets are stapled together. The first part of the text presumably represents a talk by Vygotsky that was presented at an internal conference, and its content differs from the talk presented on December 5. At the same time, the present text clearly resembles the plans for a book about consciousness presented in this chapter. The second part deals with a discussion in which Bozhovich, Luria, and Zaporozhets participated.

NB!

1. The place of the new studies in the psychological system of knowledge.
2. The connection with the previous studies and the need to move on.
3. The analysis of the basic concepts of the systemic viewpoint in the study of consciousness.

4. Shereshevskiy, Asya, schizophrenia, normal adults.
5. The methods of investigation.
6. Crucial problems in developmental, clinical, ethnological, and general psychology.
7. Basic problems in the study of consciousness.
8. The principles of the study.
9. Our word in psychology: not depth but height psychology. Beginnings and ends.
10. "Quare id faciam." "Ich weiß nicht was soll es bedeuten."³⁶
11. *Spinoza. Truth and delusion*. Epistemology. The psychophysical problem.
12. About human slavery and human freedom.
13. Khlebnikov. Senses.
14. Proceed from consciousness as a whole.
15. Is everything in consciousness meaningful? No. It is dynamic. Not everything is bright. But the light shineth in darkness; and the darkness comprehended it not.³⁷ Pascal about the greatness of consciousness.³⁸ [This point is connected with point 18 by a large bracket in the margin].
16. On the postulates of the older psychology. In essence, they all assumed some system of consciousness: for associationism, consciousness is the laws of memory; for Jaensch it is between perception and memory; for *Gestalttheorie* it is perception; Lewin—something else (the affect).
17. How can comrade Leont'ev be fertilized by the light of the problem of consciousness?
18. "For me this knowledge is enough."
Pushkin, Spinoza, Koffka.
19. Cf. the § to the propositions by A.N.: of course, the meaning of the action is *not the same* as the meaning of the *word*, but they are connected: The process of consciousness, which moves in the plane of meanings of one or the other sort, itself acquires meaning, i.e., *becomes speech*???. *Is it like that?* No, it is not like that. But I understand my actions. *Ergo, they have meanings.*

The process of referring to the word and assigning the word to an object (its signification), are they different processes?

A.N., i.e., the second is the *transfer of meaning*. Since the processes themselves are named (*odi et amo*), they acquire meaning, i.e., *consciousness mediates its relationship with them by the meaning* it gives to them: Hence, the conflict between the *meaning* of a process and its genuine role. This is *the point Heine tries to make*: Consciousness knows its sorrow and what haunts it, but it is not able to mediate it *by meaning*: *Ich weiß nicht. Hence the experience is incomprehensible*. Cf. the schizophrenics who do not understand themselves, cf. Shereshevskiy (cf. *compulsive actions*, cf. the patient does not talk because he has no teeth (<illegible>): the meaning of his aphasia). In the process of the *creation of these meanings, quite a number of pathological formations [develop]*—In schizophrenia, in a sort of delirium. *Thoughts change when we become consciously aware of them*. The non-correspondence of the meanings with their real role in consciousness. Cf. the propositions of the first lecture in the GIEP.³⁹

18. Because sign + meaning are *first* in conscious communication, i.e., I do not communicate *sorrow*, but *its meaning*, all processes are fused with meaning: *A thought once uttered is untrue*—the same thing from the other side. *Meaning does not coincide with thought.*
19. The diverse formations of consciousness and its sides.
20. Thinking cannot be placed on the same level with speech and action. *But* neither is it [like] the body + garments.
21. *Most important is: Word meaning and thought* do not coincide in consciousness. Meaning is the *path from word to thought and from thought to word*. I have a thought: a cloud that is hanging above my speech, which sheds it like rain. Thought is reorganized *in meaning*—Thereby *the word* is found. Thus, in the thinking–speech problem, meaning is *part of the word* and not part of thinking, i.e., it lies *in the sphere of speech*.

Lidiya Il'in. [Bozhovich]

Two words about societal practice—*nonsense*. <Sapir> and Lebedinskiy.⁴⁰

The *schema: egocentric speech*—two lines: the development of speech and the development of thinking and egocentric speech. In the first, naming is intellectual functioning. We must combine: the schema of egocentric speech and *The adolescent: concept formation in intellectual <illegible>*. Why: *Egocentric speech clashes with movement at a higher level*. Why before two years. *Thinking: old experience in a new situation*—is this most important in intellect.

1. Speech is a social function, communication. Preverbal intellect, pre-intellectual speech. *The meeting: convergence in later stage when speech plans action, [around] 4–5 years.*
2. How to speak about intellectualization. Only with 4–5 years. With the first names there is already *intellectualization*—the path to the concept. *Convergence with 8–9 months. Outside practical activity*. In the very *beginning* the development of the concept as practical activity. Convergence adequate. *Labor in childhood*. The unhappy children of the bourgeoisie.

The whole point is development and the beginnings and ends of development.

Did we *neglect* the socialization of practice?

The overcoming of syncretism—the *positive role of connections with collective thinking*.

NB! [Points 1 and 2 are boxed.] Two things:

- (1) In complexive thinking the transfer itself, i.e., the generalization, proceeds at the expense of memory, with concepts it is different;
- (2) Is it correct to *isolate* the whole course of the study from our ideas—about complexive thinking, etc.—“once bitten,” etc.;
- (3) We must proceed from consciousness as a whole + the relationship of speech with thinking, speech with action—no *spectral analysis*.

Al. Vlad. [Zaporozhets]

The weakest part—Köhler's experiments are *here*: what do you *add* to Köhler.

[Each of the following three parts is boxed:]

To find the old in the new *is not the main route* of intellectual development. The problem of the analogy. Transfer is not the nerve of intellectual activity but one of its essential aspects.

The lever is very felicitous. Experimentally, the stick is neutral in psychological respect but *here* a mechanism, i.e., the psychology of the tool itself.

The formula of the concept, of abstraction: to lose something in order to find something.

A.R. [Luria]

They ignore the most important—not speech + action, but the change of the meanings of speech and action themselves: correct. *The discovery of the change of word meanings and their development is our most important discovery. Social experience is not adequately mastered by the child but through pseudoconcepts.*

Wertheimer: 1 man + 1 man = 2 men; 1 horse + 1 horse = 2 horses; 1 man + 1 horse = 1 rider. <illegible>: what man and horse have in common = a rider.⁴¹ *Not just practice dictates development: grammar as well.*

[Boxed:]

Without abstraction, there is no conscious awareness of the experience which overwhelms us. Cf. poetry. This is the meaning of one's experience.

Notes

1. Non-existence (German).
2. "The problem of consciousness." Cf. p. 130 of Vygotsky (1997).
3. It is unclear what to what the text refers.
4. Sakharov committed suicide on May 10, 1928, and his work was published posthumously (Sakharov 1928, 1930).
5. Equivocation is the misleading use of a term with more than one meaning or sense, as in "A feather is light. What is light cannot be dark. Therefore, a feather cannot be dark."
6. Reference or relation to a thing (German).
7. Cites Fet's poem "Like midges at dawn" (1844): "O, if the soul could express itself/ Without the word!"
8. The liar's paradox in Eubulides' variant: "The Cretan Epimenides said: All Cretans are liars."
9. Cites Pasternak's poem "The soul" (1915): "O, freedwoman, if we recall/O, if we forget, the captive of years./ According to many, a soul and pilgrim./ According to me, a shadow without particular marks."

10. Vygotsky refers to the need for an internal meeting where all theoretical problems can be discussed in light of the theory.
11. Cf. point 20 of “Propositions to Luria’s talk” in chapter 16.
12. A method used by Shereshevskiy to forget things. Shereshevskiy tried many methods to get rid of his memory images, covering them with a “thick canvas,” erasing them from a mental blackboard, writing down what he wanted to forget, etc. See pp. 55–59 of Luria (1987).
13. Dialectical materialism and historical materialism (Socialist newspeak).
14. The text about Chatskiy and Stanislavsky corresponds with pp. 282–283 of *Thinking and Speech*. Cf. Vygotsky (1987).
15. Cites Pasternak’s poem “Marburg” (1916): “When I kneeled before you, finally having seized, / This fog, this ice, this absolute perfection” (translation by J. Kates).
16. Cites Mandel’shtam’s poem “We cannot stand strained silence” (1912).
17. “The problem of consciousness.” Cf. p. 135 of Vygotsky (1997).
18. Cites Innokentiy Fedorovich Annenskiy’s (1855 to 1909) poem “Impossible” (1907).
19. Another term for the orientation reflex, which was studied by Sechenov, Pavlov, Sokolov, and others.
20. Aleksandr Vladimirovich Zaporozhets (1905 to 1981). Russian psychologist, representative of the Kharkov school, specialist in developmental psychology, and one of Vygotsky’s close collaborators. After having worked at the Academy of Communist Education (1929 to 1931), Zaporozhets moved to Kharkov and worked as the head of the psychological laboratory at the Ukrainian Psychoneurological Academy. From 1933 onward he also worked in various qualities at the Gorky Pedagogical Institute of Kharkov and investigated perception and voluntary movements from an action theoretical viewpoint.
21. “The problem of consciousness.” Cf. p. 130 of Vygotsky (1997).
22. With a grain of salt (Latin).
23. Cf. the footnote on p. 79 of Vygotsky (1998).
24. Possibly, Leont’ev’s much later doctoral dissertation on the origin of psyche was inspired by this distinction. Cf. Leont’ev (1959).
25. Refers to the idea that the original (innate) sensorimotor unity is transformed by speech, which creates new, secondary connections and a new hierarchy in consciousness. Hence, the older, natural structures are not destroyed but enter into new, socio-historically conditioned systems.
26. See the previous chapters (e.g., chapters 10 and 15) for the distinction between practical and gnostic intellect.
27. Vygotsky’s remark: “*About 2*): the semantic field included in the phrase does not emerge *at all*, what emerges is a *real field*—but without *bees* (they were not able to do it like bees). Cf. the index finger draws attention to something but not to the finger.” It is unclear to the editors what the bees are doing here.
28. Psychonomics literally means the science that aims to discover the laws (Greek: *nomos*) of the mind. Nowadays it is a common term to describe an approach

- within experimental psychology that studies cognition, but in Vygotsky's time the term must have been rare.
29. If I cannot bend the will of Heaven, I shall move Hell (Latin). Quoted from Virgil's "Eneid" (29 to 19 BC). The lines were also used by Freud as the motto for his *The Interpretation of Dreams*.
 30. Kseniya Ivanovna Veresotskaya (1904 to 1993). Russian psychologist and defectologists working at the Experimental Institute of Defectology (EDI) and the Lenin Moscow State Pedagogical Institut. Under Vygotsky's supervision, she studied the visual perception of mentally retarded and deafmute children (cf. Veresotskaya 1940).
 31. Vera Maksimova Torbek (1893 to 1938). Russian pedologist and developmental psychologist who worked as a pedagogue at the EDI and as a teacher at the Central Institute for the Advanced Training of Personnel working in Public Education (TsIKKNO). Torbek specialized in the preschool development and publicly acknowledged her ideological mistakes and criticized others in the early 1930s (Torbek 1931, 1932a, 1932b).
 32. This may refer to Heinz Werner's research in this area and, in particular, to his book on the physiognomy of language published as Werner (1932). Werner claimed that words have an objective denotation but also a subjective connotation that differs between language communities. The Russian word *zhít* (to live), for example, is more directionless and dark than the joyful German word *leben* (to live), and the Russian *vor* (thief) is a far nicer fellow than his German colleague, the *Dieb* (thief). See Van der Veer (2005) for a more elaborate discussion of Werner's thinking in this area.
 33. The quotes from Krylov's fable "The dragon-fly and the ant" are given in chapter 7 of *Thinking and Speech*. The frivolous dragonfly spends the summer singing and has no food when the winter arrives. Asked for help, the ant advises the dragon-fly to "go and dance." See pp. 253/276 of Vygotsky (1987).
 34. Cites from Tyutchev's poem "The gleam" (1824 or 1825): "Strangers to the sky soon tire/We are common dust/ We cannot breathe such fire" (Translation: F. Jude). Part of this quote is in *Thinking and Speech*. See p. 280 of Vygotsky (1987).
 35. Not what, but where (German). "Topical diagnosis" (German: *topische Diagnose*) is a term used in neurology and other branches of medicine to refer to the process of establishing the exact locus or origin of the disease in the brain or body. It is unclear whether Vygotsky quotes a specific author or just refers to the principle, which was quite common at the time in German neurology.
 36. Why do I? (Latin). This is the continuation of the "odi et amo" text repeatedly quoted. The German text is the first line from Heine's "The Lorelei" (1824): "I know not if there is a reason/Why I am so sad at heart/A legend of bygone ages/Haunts me and will not depart." Translation by A.Z. Foreman.
 37. John 1:5.
 38. Blaise Pascal (1623 to 1662) was a French mathematician, inventor, and philosopher. Vygotsky probably refers to Pascal's propositions about consciousness and thought, for example: "Man is but a reed, the most feeble thing

- in nature, but he is a thinking reed.” See propositions 347 and 397 of section 6 of his *Pensées (Thoughts)*.
39. Perhaps a slip of the pen: Meant is not the State Institute of Experimental Psychology (called the Psychological Institute from 1924 to 1930), but the GINP, the State Institute of Scientific Education at the Leningrad State Pedagogical Institute (1927 to 1934).
 40. Mark Samuilovich Lebedinskiy (1894 to 1980). Russian psychiatrist who collaborated with Luria. Along with Vygotsky, Luria, and Leont’ev, he moved to Kharkov, where he founded a laboratory for medical psychology. Later he moved back to Moscow and worked as a professor in the field of traumatology and medical psychology.
 41. This refers to Wertheimer’s text “Numbers and numerical concepts in primitive peoples.” See p. 266 of Ellis (1938/1999) for Vygotsky’s example. See also the next chapter.

References

- Leont’ev, A. N. (1959). *Problemy razvitiya psikhiki*. Moscow: APN SSSR.
- Luria, A. R. (1987). *The mind of a mnemonist: A little book about a vast memory*. Harvard: Harvard University Press.
- Luria, A. R. (2014). Konspekt doklada L. S. Vygotskogo ‘O soznanii’. *Voprosy Psikhologii*, 6, 75–88.
- Sakharov, L. S. (1928). Obrazovanie ponyatii u umstvenno-otstalykh detey (referat). *Voprosy Defektologii*, 2, 24–33.
- Sakharov, L. S. (1930). O metodakh issledovaniya ponyatii u skhol’nika. *Psikhologiya*, 3, 3–33.
- Torbek, V. M. (1931). Obshchestvenno-politicheskie ustanovki proletarskogo rebenka-doshkol’nika. *Doshkol’noe Vospitanie*, 2, 30–34.
- Torbek, V. M. (1932a). O moikh oshibkakh v knige ‘Pedologiya v doshkol’nom vozraste’. *Pedologiya*, 1–2, 42–45.
- Torbek, V. M. (1932b). Protiv idealisticheskogo biologizatorstva i vul’garnogo mekhanizma. (O knige E. A. Arkina ‘Lichnost’ i sreda v svete sovremennoy biologii’). *Pedologiya*, 3, 31–36.
- Van der Veer, R. (2005). The making of a developmental psychologist. In J. Valsiner (Ed.), *Heinz Werner and developmental science* (pp. 75–105). New York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers.
- Veresotskaya, K. I. (1940). Uznvanie izobrazheniy predmetov v zavisimosti ot izmeneniya ikh v prostranstve. In L. V. Zankov & I. I. Danyushevskiy (Eds.), *Voprosy psikhologii glukhonemykh i umstvenno otstalykh detey* (pp. 94–113). Moscow: Uchpedgiz.
- Vygotsky, L. S. (1987). (1987). *The collected works of L.S. Vygotsky. Vol. 1. Problems of general psychology*. New York: Plenum Press.
- Vygotsky, L.S. (1997). *The collected works of L.S. Vygotsky. Vol. 3. Problems of the theory and history of psychology*. New York: Plenum Press.
- Vygotsky, L. S. (1998). *The collected works of L.S. Vygotsky. Vol. 5. Child psychology*. New York: Plenum Press.
- Werner, H. (1932). *Grundfragen der Sprachphysiognomik*. Leipzig: Barth.
- Zavershneva, E. Yu. (2014). The problem of consciousness in Vygotsky’s cultural-historical psychology. In A. Yasnitsky, R. van der Veer, & M. Ferrari, M. (Eds.), *The Cambridge handbook of cultural-historical psychology* (pp. 63–100). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Chapter 18

The Semic Method

In 1932, Vygotsky declared the semic (semantic, semasiological) method to be the principal method in the study of mind and consciousness, but nowhere did he give an elaborate description of this method. The fullest description can be found in his notebooks. Generalizing, we might say that the semic method meant the study of the inner structure of sign operations, i.e., the analysis of mental phenomena based on their meaning rather than on their external characteristics. The semic method is not limited to the study of verbal behavior; intellectual acts or practical actions that involve no speech also have meaning and can be studied from their semic side (cf. chapter 23). The method rests upon the idea that speech, being the principal means to transform natural mind into human mind, penetrates mind and creates humans' meaningful relationship to the world and to themselves: "If language is practical consciousness that exists also for other people and, therefore, for me personally as well, then it is obvious that it is not just the development of thought but the development of consciousness as a whole that is connected with the development of the word. ...*thinking and speech are the key to understanding the nature of human consciousness*. ...studies consistently demonstrate that the word plays a central role not in the isolated functions but in the whole of consciousness" (Vygotsky 1987, p. 285). The semic method has something in common with the so-called psychosemantic approach in personality research, although it does not coincide with it; the latter maps the subject's subjective, psychological ideas about reality, i.e., his or her conceptual understanding of the world.

Vygotsky planned to apply the method on a large scale. In Luria's archive, a number of documents have been found dated between 1932 and 1933, which contain plans for experimental studies ("semic experiments") with various groups of subjects: students, workers, farmers, illiterate persons, mentally retarded people, etc. These plans were only partially realized with the method of classification, the interpretation of proverbs, etc.. (e.g., Birenbaum 1934; Zeigarnik 1934).

On the problem of speech

This text is based on a notebook with a bluish-grey carton cover and contains notes, written in black and blue ink and in pencil, from different periods. Many pages are absent. The cover has a printed slogan: "Our difficulties, are difficulties of growth. Let us strengthen the fight for the five-year plan." Apart from the text about the problem of speech published here, the notebook contains notes of an administrative character: a calculation of the total number of teaching hours in the third year, and a number of names of lecturers: Berman,

Bro, Vasil'chikov, and Zinchenko.¹ Presumably, given the similarities with the talk about the problem of consciousness delivered on December 5, 1932 (see pp. 129–138 of Vygotzky 1997), the notes were not written before the end of 1932.

On the problem of speech:

1. Inner speech gives *the same* to speech as speech gives to external action, i.e., a new field and a new “system of freedom” in the speech field: the voluntariness of speech and the conscious awareness of it (the theory of glass).² Its guidance and regulation (for example, during a talk) originate here. Cf. during a long (external) speech inside me there is its theme, its titles, simultaneously *merged* in a single word (the influence of the senses),³ thoughts, clouds above the rain;⁴ there is an <illegible> *inner speech field*. *Inde*, the phenomena of *Leeres Sprechen* and *Automatensprechen*⁵—when speech leads according to the laws of its field—are symptoms of a disturbance of inner speech. If inner speech were built according to the same laws as external speech (speech minus the sound, a mold), it could not act in the function of an *inner independent field*, just like speech which directly reflects the external action and the situation without flying away from it. Inner speech is a new flight from speech, a new level of abstraction.

NB! Six basic propositions that are involved in the initial stage of work:

- (1) The internal side of the sign operation (*sign, meaning, sense*).
- (2) Interfunctional connections and relationships (*psychological systems*).
- (3) The change of the general attributes of consciousness in development and disintegration; the higher psychological functions as a special plane of consciousness—mastery, freedom, conscious awareness, self-knowledge (the *hypostization of consciousness*).
- (4) Semic analysis as the only adequate method of investigating human consciousness (*semic analysis*).
- (5) *Ecce homo* (*the psychology of man*).
- (6) Who wishes to preserve his mind, will lose [sic] it; and who wishes to lose [sic] mind, will preserve it (*height psychology as opposed to depth psychology*). Acmeist psychology.⁶

NB.

1. *Piaget* has no theory of development. A container with red water, which is cleaned with a stream of white water: a pink liquid that becomes whiter and whiter.⁷
2. How to connect the *The adolescent* with *Piaget*: micro- and macro-analysis. The first explains the second. *Piaget's* postulate: words are immutable, the operations change; a hidden associationism.

[The next point is marked with a square bracket:]

3. The unity of speech and thinking is in meaning—the *logos*, in the old sense of the word: one word, which designates the indivisible unity of thought and word.

4. The positive meaning of syncretism, syncretism as a source of development, <illegible> thinking, light and shadows. The mentally retarded thinks syncretically.
5. The steamer sinks, the steamer floats: meaningful perception.⁸
6. Remarkable: syncretism develops again in the explanation of a previously correctly explained phenomenon. The definition from above. Height psychology is a new type of movement, which I did not understand: from concept to perception.
7. Syncretism—abstraction: general attributes of consciousness (division and merging).
8. *Cf. Lévy-Bruhl*: In primitive thinking there is participation⁹: generalization of another sort. But what was forgotten: Word meaning itself is a generalization. *Ergo*, it is also of another sort. *Ergo*, generalizations *in the operations of thinking* (in the logical operations of the primitive and the child) in their macroscopic analysis are *generalizations of the second order*, and their special sort is not primary, but derivative. Consequently, not the logic is different, i.e., *the operations are different, but the material is the same*; not prelogical thinking and the autistic logic of the mirage and the dream. Participation itself is an effect. True, the operations as well are *different*, but this is a dependent and *not an independent* value and difference.
9. For the psychologist, the concept is movement. The psychologist and the logician study various forms or types of the movement of the concept: The first [studies it] in the head and <illegible> of human consciousness, and disregarding that, it moves in the system of objective knowledge; the second [studies it] in the system of objective knowledge, and disregarding the unique *hic et nunc* of consciousness, disregarding *who is thinking* (and dismissing the connections of the concept with the other functions of consciousness, but for the psychologist exactly the latter are most important). Lévy-Bruhl and Piaget, in particular, mix up logic and psychology.
10. *The world of consciousness and the freedom of the senses*: In the research, consciousness as the common denominator was factored out and did not participate in the operations with the psychological values that formed the research topic. We see that everything comes from consciousness; all the rest is derivative: grammar and arithmetic.
11. A. N. In *The adolescent*, the central idea is the dominion of the concept over all consciousness. A. N. showed how this dominion works. Correct.
12. The change of consciousness is primary, the change of the functions secondary, but consciousness has no special strengths with the help of which it transforms its functions, like a conductor, a highest function, Wundt's apperception, etc. No, this primary change of consciousness itself develops from its own internal movement, in which the functions participate.¹⁰ The functions do not lie outside consciousness; consciousness is not a mental space, not Gesell's scene on which the actors play the drama but the drama itself, which by its course determines each movement of every actor.¹¹

[Written in pencil in free order:]

Asya, to test:

1. To show *how* she <combs> her hair.
2. The repetition of absurdities.
3. The transference of names.

[To] detach oneself from Cassirer's world of the functional symbols: <One must> detach oneself from one's perception.¹²

Play is an abstraction of the action from the concrete field. In *Asya* it is absent.

To knock an imaginary door: perhaps a transitional level from the real door to emptiness—a real, different object.

The *patient* who can make use of a fork and a knife during dinner cannot show how he does it in another context: a disturbance of the function of the formation of a *voluntary* intention (an abstraction) *outside the situational motivation*. The problem of every intention.

Sign, meaning, and the semantic method

This text is based on a small notebook with a black leatherette cover that dates from the second half of 1932 and is connected with Vygotsky's activities in Moscow and Leningrad. The cover is pasted all over with fragments of another document, written in red ink on squared paper, which cannot be deciphered. The only legible part is: "The slowing down of the problem solving process when we refrain from external speech is a symptom of mastery. The function of speech <illegible>—in the slowing down of thinking (for mastery). Cf. Potebnya.¹³ The word as a source of error = nonsense, is only possible in man."

The first part of the text is written in violet ink and has an administrative character: addresses and telephone numbers of colleagues from Leningrad, a list of books lent out to colleagues (mentioned are El'konin,¹⁴ Shif,¹⁵ Mnukhin,¹⁶ Konnikova,¹⁷ Zeyliger,¹⁸ Fel'dberg) and lists of post-graduate students. These lists are of importance to reconstruct the "Vygotsky circle," and they contain names of people who previously were not known to have contact with Vygotsky (cf. chapter 6). The second part is written in green ink and contains observations of his daughter *Asya* and other persons (examples of parapraxia or the misunderstanding of words) as well as remarks about arithmetic thinking, written speech, poetic sense, and the semantic method. The notes were written in free order: from the beginning to the end, from the end to the beginning, and from the middle to the beginning. The reconstruction of the fragments' order is provisional. Two fragments were published before by Puzyrey (1982), but the present version and the footnotes were made by the editors based on a new study of the original text.

[Written in violet ink:]

Addresses:

David¹⁹ 5.97.33

Dasha 2.42.89

Fel'dberg, D.B. 1.78.88, OFI 2.28.60²⁰

Basova, Nat. Konst. 2.09.43

The Aleksandrovs 5.40.92

Ozeretskiy 2.80.25

Levina, M.A.²¹
 Moyka 48/33, Pedol. dept.
 The Herzen Institute 4.67.12
 Zeyliger [E. I.] Herzen str. 48/19, 1.91.97
 Knyazeva, Yevg. Vikt.²² 30
 Lodi: Pedol. Dept. Lodi 36–90
 Nik. Dmitr. <Shch> eykin
 <...>onya—Belyaev,²³ Office 99–41, Home 5.83.84
 Mosc. v.²⁴ +3.34
 Ligovka 44, apt. 311
 Anna Fedorovna Yakobson, Office 1.90.27, Home 1.17.76
 Rubinshteyn, Sergey Leonidovich,²⁵ The 3rd July str. 18, apt. 21a
 Extension number tel. 429.48
 Rozenfel'd, Fanni Sem. and Jos. Mikh.²⁶
 Kirochnaya str. 41, room 20, Tel. 5.52.52
 or: Grecheskiy prospekt 17, apt. 2, Tel. 30–91
 Clinic 58–57
 Aksel' 48–50
 Cheranovskiy, Roman Ivanovich²⁷ 34.01
 GINP²⁸ 4.44.54
 El'konin, Daniil Borisovich
 Krasnye Zory str. 59, apt. 17, 6.30.57
 Shif, Zhozefina Il'ichna
 Lesnoj prospekt 18, apt. 21
 Vagner, Vladimir Aleksandrovich²⁹
 Chernyshov pereulok 9, apt. 6
 Golant, Raisa Yakovlevna³⁰
 Petr Lavrov str. 50, apt. 7, 5.63.04
 Mnukhin, Samuil Semenovich
 Zhelyabov str. 17, apt. 12, 5.22.06
 Epshteyn, Abram L'vovich,³¹ 5.90.02
 Svetlov, David Semenovich³²
 Home 2.55.57, Office 4.72.71
 Polina Osipovna Efrussi³³
 Vasil'evskiy Ostrov, 4th liniya 23, apt. 4
 Tel. 5361
 Ya. K. Tsveyfel'³⁴ Leningrad, Marat str. 3, apt. 2
 Anan'ev, B. G.,³⁵ 1.62.97
 Leningrad 14, Nekrasov str. 46, apt. 10

Gin<z>burg, Samuil Isaakovich
Home 79–40, Office 6.00.21

Nevskiy, Al. [VI.?] Al.
Obvodnyy kanal 103, apt. 40, IVth floor

Yevgeniya Anatol'evna Ivan'shina,³⁶ 2.79.32

Gendelevich, Samuil Il'ich,³⁷ 5.68.73

<...>onya 5.88.76

Ediger, Vera Petrovna (the mnemonist) 6.27.33
Lyuba Smekhova³⁸ Baskov [pereulok] 21, apt. 10

[Three pages skipped.]

<...>

Post-graduate students

(research themes)

[Points 1 through 3 are crossed out:]

1. Latysheva—delay (thinking in civics)
2. Shif
3. Kurtenkov
4. Konikova [sic]
5. Rutshteyn
6. Kogan
7. Zhilina
8. Fedorenko

[Three are pages skipped.]

Herzen second-year post-graduate students

1. Nikitin, N. Difficult childhood	
2. Il'in, Ya. The adolescent	
2. Pobozhey, G. Difficult childhood	S ³⁹
4. Lop<o>tukhin, I. The schoolchild	V.G
5. Pakhlo, E. The adolescent	<V>S
6. Konikova, T. Infancy	G
7. Bochkareva, E. The preschool child	
8. Sakovich, E. The schoolchild	G
9. Yenikayev, Kh. The adolescent	
10. Gorbunov, P. Early [childhood]	G
12. Milyavskaya. The preschool child	G
13. Chernitsyna. The preschool child	G-

[About 50 pages are skipped.]

[Written in green ink:]

NB. *Observation*

In the café with David, May 23, 1932.

I must pay 2 rubles 82 kopecks. I give three rubles. The waitress (absent-minded, stunned, hurried): takes 15 kopecks and intensively searches for three kopecks in her purse; does not find them. Asks me for three kopecks (I give them), and she thus gives me $15 - 3$ instead of $15 + 3$. This is a mistake typical for aphasia: She knows she has to find three more kopecks in addition to the 15. She knows as well that when there is no change, she must find a roundabout way (instead of $15 + 3$, give $20 - 2$, ask me for two kopecks). But having forgotten the direction and syncretically *forging* together (this is the main thing!), both aspects (the three kopecks from the first operation and the 15 kopecks given by her + the demand from me—in order to settle up—to add change to the change), she commits a contamination. Cf. Grünbaum.⁴⁰

[On a new page, the heading is written in blue ink:]

NB! 1. Asya:

[Written in green ink:]

- (a) pu-fu = an example of a complex = a bottle, iodine, a bruise, a cigarette, a match, to put out, to give;
- (b) In her one-word sentence, the meaning of pu-fu changes both in the relation to the object (an empty bottle is not suited for a bruise, it can be used for whistling, i.e., sometimes: iodine; sometimes: vessels, a bubble) and in the general sense; this is the general law of the word and the one-word sentence in early childhood: Meaning is variable not just in the sense of transient meanings but also in the sense of its functioning. Sometimes: pu-fu = give the bottle and blow in it. Sometimes: pu-fu = the doll hurt herself; disinfect it with iodine;
- (c) Her one-word sentence clearly shows the advantage of semantic differentiation of speech over phasic non-differentiation. Hence, the discrepancy: There are more meanings than words. The difficulty is in communicating: they do not understand her, she gladly welcomes the right question: yees... = right! Compare “pu-fu.” Give pu-fu? Blow? No. Becomes angry. To disinfect the head of the doll with iodine (bobo, disinfect?). Yees... (= right!). Her two-word sentence develops from that (from the suggestive questions of the adults: Pu-fu!—Give?). The schema:
 1. Pu-fu!—Give?—Yees... (Here the two-word sentence is divided between her and me, but practically while thinking—psychologically it is already completely felt by her).
 2. Give pu-fu. Hence her explanatory words: Asya, to me, write, etc.
- (d) Asya in front of Buddha names all his body parts and points at them with her finger. Three aspects are remarkable here:
 1. The relation to the object, word meaning is realized in the literal sense of the word by attributing the sound to the object indicatively; meaning is thrown by her finger to the body parts.

2. Speech breaks up perception, pushes it toward analysis; she does not see ears + eyes, etc., but nevertheless enumerates them this way. First, the verbal (analytic) enumeration was taken for the atomistic nature of perception itself (from parts to whole), now it has been clarified (Gestalt theory), that this is wrong, that perception goes from the whole to the parts. *Our problem*: Why does Asya, while seeing the whole, in speech mentions the parts. Thinking contains the whole Buddha (her conversation topic, her speech intention; it is not a chain reflex, she demands to place Buddha in front of her on the table and foresees the *whole* activity—compare: A cloud [is a] thought, a shower of words.
3. The undifferentiated nature of this speech—of egocentric and social speech: She speaks both for others and for herself: It is the *Urwir*.⁴¹

[On a new page:]

2. [sic] *Arithmetic*

- a. Most important in life is to construct the problem, to find the data, to throw away what is unnecessary, to create the conditions of the problem, to formulate the question, etc. Life never presents ready-made problems. In arithmetic, it is the other way around, everything is given ready-made. Problem solving of this sort absolutely does not require intellect because the solution necessarily follows automatically. It deserves the name “intellectual skill,” i.e., it is an intellectual operation that sank to a lower level. Cf. the proportion: The volitional act is to the automatism of the anxious act what the intellectual operation is to the intellectual skill.

Ergo, our arithmetic does not develop thinking, but its auxiliary parts are intellectual skills, thinking habits, which play the same role as the training of habits in the development of volition. That is, we miss the goal. Cf. in algebra: forming equations and solving equations. The latter is a skill. The first is closer to thought. But still closer is not the forming of the equations but the formulation of the problems themselves.

- b. The development of arithmetic thinking in the semantic levels of the word: syncretism (Asya—five is much, although each time it indicates a specific number. For example, two pencils, she gets one, she says: “five”, requiring two), a complex, concepts. At school age: pseudoconcepts.

See Lezan, K. A. *New ways to familiarize children with mathematics*. RSFSR. GIZ. Berlin, 1922.

[Followed by an excerpt from the preface to this book]

[On a new page:]

NB. *On the problem of arithmetic: an abstract*

1. The phasic and semic sides of arithmetic development.⁴²
2. *The main thing*: reveal the most important internal *variable* (*word meaning*, which is *not* a simple associative structure, as in the dog, as a matchbox)⁴³ in the development of arithmetical thinking.

3. The extremes of the development of the meanings of the arithmetic vocabulary: *Numeral-Gebilde*⁴⁴ and the concept (new properties of the number in the concept; concept formation not from (empty) abstraction but from a wealth of connections and relationships).
4. On arithmetic semantics:
 - (a) according to Vossler,⁴⁵ there are two poles in language: fantasy and mathematics; how does the mathematical system of concepts differ from other concepts;
 - (b) Luria's experiments in Central Asia, Wertheimer's experiments (60 pigs, 1 man + 1 horse = 1 rider), Koffka (two ducks ahead of two ducks, two ducks behind two ducks, and two ducks in the middle);
 - (c) The remarkable fact with *El'konin's trick* (to guess the number a child has in mind, based on the result of a series of actions on that number and the reverse operations)⁴⁶: Children who at school regard numbers and the operations with them as the most ordinary and self-evident thing, i.e., without *surprise*, begin to regard *these same numbers* and *these same operations* as a miracle, as something supranatural, when they learn about an *unknown* property of numbers and the operations with them. This property reveals itself, like all connections, in a concept, and *consists in the reversibility of arithmetic operations*. This fact best of all characterizes to what extent the schoolchild's development of arithmetical notions remains incomplete, unfinished, and non-conceptual.
5. Concepts and numerical operations are indissolubly connected with each other: The first is not the pre-condition of the second (first the representations and then the operations with them), the relationship here is *exactly the same* as the relationship between the concept and the judgment.
6. The question (by Groos) in the independently composed problem is a symptom of the degree to which the child mastered the category (% , subtraction, "red"), to which his question belonged.⁴⁷

[Added in violet ink:]

7. See James: how to explain the distance from the earth to the sun. My observation: the length of the equator plus the price of a glass of sunflower seeds.⁴⁸

[Written on a new page:]

NB.

1. *The dependency of understanding upon the situation*: I specify a telegram. By telephone [I dictate] the sender: Vygotsky. "With Victor?"—I hear: he kicked her, still stricter, constrictor?⁴⁹
2. *The divergence of the motives and meanings of speech*:
The anecdote: but it is allowed for members of the TsIKá?⁵⁰
3. *Here as well*: the dialogue heard by Sereyskiy⁵¹:
 - "That will cost Uchstrakh⁵² half a million."
 - "So what, even half a million is not much for Uchstrakh."
 (The interlocutor understands it as a promise to give half a million)

4. Cf. 1. I can forget *what* I wanted to say or about what I wanted to speak: (a) or simply not say what I wanted to say, i.e., forget my intention; (b) remember that I wanted to say *something* but forget *what*.
 2. Forget the *word*, how it is called what I want to say (corrosion of metal).
 3. Forget how I wanted to develop this theme—*using which meanings*.
5. The shift of evaluative aspects: Who are you laughing at?⁵³ An anecdote: If everything here is so good, and there [abroad] so bad, why is it here so bad and there so good?
 We can laugh at the inquirer or at the speaker. The anecdote of the fool who laughs at the clever person. Cf. the subtle poison and Krylov's fables.⁵⁴ Don Quixote: a semantic experiment.
6. From the viewpoint of the *motives of speech*, the sense of the whole work of art can change while the meanings, their composition, and the whole stylistic part of speech remain the same.

[Written on a new page:]

NB!

1. The sign has meaning. The study of the sign in its real psychological role necessarily requires the study of meanings. This is the center of the semantic method.
2. Until now we have disregarded sense and meaning. That is (in the experiments with memory), we made no distinction between the knot and the word, i.e., with the word we focused on what it has *in common* with the knot and not what is specific for it. This was a legitimate, necessary abstraction, of which we must be proud. It was important to show the *essence* of the higher psychological function: the rudimentary functions suited this goal best; it was necessary to show the psychological mechanism of the sign. In order to do this, logical memory in a certain sense had to be reduced to the knot.

Now the task is to study the movement of the sign itself. That is, the question is how logical memory differs from mnemotechnical memory, the word from the knot (previously: how are word and knot alike). This was done in the study of concepts and first of all in Zankov. The impasse was to a considerable extent caused by the fact that: (a) On the one hand, we moved from showing that the higher psychological functions result from the elementary ones and proving their common origin and nature (voluntary attention is logical memory with a transposition of the epithets) to the study of forms of movement *within the higher psychological functions*, (b) on the other hand, we remained intent on finding the similarity and not the difference.

3. The essence of the transition to the problem of the psychological systems and the connection between the new and the old level is in the formula: sign—meaning.

Hence, the significative method (= both sign and meaning) best expresses both the unity of the two levels and what is new: semantics and the system.

4. What is the essence of the systemic viewpoint:
 - a. To make the postulate the problem (contra Goethe and *Gestalttheorie*).
 - b. The interfunctional connections are variable and essential for psychological development.
 - c. This change corresponds with its own localization, its own physiological basis.
 - d. The structure of consciousness and the system depend upon the leading form of thinking: Syncretism, the complex, [and] the concept are three levels in the development of thinking (in word meanings) and simultaneously three levels in the development of consciousness and the psychological systems.
 - e. As we have shown, the systemic change of functions is already present in the sign: mastery, substitution, another relationship to the personality, the cooperation of the functions, etc. Now we must reveal system formation in psychology through the analysis of meaning.
 - f. Meaning is the highest problem of the sign operations. Just like there is no higher behavior without the sign (without the function of the sign), there is no psychological system without meaning.

[Written on a new page:]

2. [sic] Poetic sense.
 - a. The whole poetic tissue of a given poetic work represents a closed semantic system where the words have their meaning in the given system. See Lavretskiy,⁵⁵ the word “love” in Pushkin, Hamsun,⁵⁶ Turgenev, etc. In this sense, Gershenzon (*Pushkin's wisdom*)⁵⁷ is right, but he focuses on the mystic philosophical and not on the poetic semantic aspect. He looks at wisdom and not at semantics: i.e., a particular case of the publicistic emasculation of content through the method of rendering poetry in prose (cf. Ovsyaniko–Kulikovskiy). But the task is to give structure to the meaning of the poem, the fable and its verbal articulation (does not poetic syntax exist [?]), and the semantic system in its dynamic growth.
 - b. Rather than elementary poetry, Khlebnikov created poetic elements. A pure culture of poetic senses and phonetics.
 - c. Create a study of comments to individual works: fables, poems, etc. Pushkin: the problem of translation.

[On a new page, the text runs in reverse order as in Japanese:]

About written speech⁵⁸

NB!—Why is written speech difficult for the school child and less developed:

- (a) the vocabulary of written speech is not poorer than that of oral speech;
- (b) the syntax and grammatical forms are the same. What is the root of the underdevelopment?

According to me, it is that:

- (1) Written speech is *more abstract* than oral speech (without the prosodic, intonation, expressive sides of speech: *without an interlocutor*. Cf. Hochheimer's patient, who cannot speak without a question, there is no conversational situation: without real sounds, but with the symbolization of sound symbols, i.e., with symbolization of the second order, i.e., written speech is the *algebra of speech*).
- (2) The *motives* of written speech are inaccessible to the child, but the motivation of speech stands *at the beginning* of the development of speech in the ontogenetic plane (the need to talk: its underdevelopment—delay of speech development), and in conversation, motivation precedes every phrase (the reason I speak, the *Energiequelle*⁵⁹ according to Lewin); the situation of oral speech constantly creates the *motivation* for each new turn of speech, of conversation (dialogue, you need something and request it, etc.); in oral speech motivation does not have to be *created*; in this sense, the course of oral speech is regulated by the *dynamic situation*; with written speech, we are forced to create the situation ourselves, in a sense to *über der Situation stehen*,⁶⁰ we must (a) act *voluntarily*, i.e., written speech is *more voluntary*; (b) act *more intellectually*, i.e., create the motivation, look after its development in the meanings, i.e., written speech is *more abstract* (to speak with a white sheet of paper, *with an empty field*, which symbolizes the non-situational motivation of written speech); (c) act while we are *more consciously aware* of the process of speaking itself, i.e., written speech moves in the plane of self-consciousness, the *motives* themselves of written speech are more abstract, intellectualist, voluntaristic, remote from the needs; therefore, it is easier for me to speak in a lecture-hall than to write: I do not have to trouble volition (I *must* speak) and to abstract myself from the whole live intonation structure of speech; written speech is the shadow of speech, the most abstract speech.
- (3) Written speech stands in *another* relationship to inner speech: Whereas external speech comes *before* inner speech in development, written speech comes *after* inner speech, and already requires its presence; according to Head, written speech is the key to inner speech because written speech is not motivated by the situation, its course is determined by (a) inner motivation—for memory, for communication, for oneself (a diary), etc., an absolutely different functional system of motivation and speech setting; (b) the inner structure of the semantic field—it is required to *create* the field in order to write: This is why written speech requires tremendous inner effort; (c) the syntax of inner speech, which is entirely *different* from the syntax of oral speech; the *influence of the senses*—inner speech is maximally reduced speech, written speech is maximally expanded, formally more finished than oral speech (it has no ellipses, inner speech is full of them); it is a translation of inner speech, which is not intelligible for the interlocutor, because he does not know the mental field in which it flows, exactly for that reason written speech is *more extended* than oral speech: The field of a white page is more difficult to understand than that of a graphic situation or live conversation. *Everything* must be made explicit; (d) the

motivational proximity of written speech to inner speech finds its expression in diaries and in all *mihi ipsi scripsi*⁶¹; *summa summarum*,⁶² written speech is an *entirely other* process (from the viewpoint of the psychological nature of its constituent processes) than oral speech, [and] changes also its phasic and semic side in comparison with oral speech. The main difference: Written speech is the *algebra* of speech and the most difficult form of complex volitional activity. This, and not the number of adjectives and nouns, causes the divergence between oral and written speech.⁶³

[Written on a separate page in violet ink:]

NB! December 11, 1932. In the evening on the way to Mokhovaya⁶⁴ agreement with El'konin about play and work.

Notes

1. Petr Ivanovich Zinchenko (1903 to 1969). Russian psychologist, representative of the Kharkov school of psychology—where the so-called activity theory originated—and author of a well-known study about involuntary memory. Cf. Yasnitsky and Ferrari (2008).
2. See note 13 in chapter 10.
3. In the last chapter of *Thinking and Speech*, Vygotsky compares this phenomenon with agglutination in external speech. See p. 277 of Vygotsky (1987).
4. Cf. the last chapter of *Thinking and Speech*, where Vygotsky states that “what is contained simultaneously in thought unfolds sequentially in speech” and compares thought with a “hovering cloud which gushes a shower of words.” See p. 281 of Vygotsky (1987).
5. Empty talk and automatic speech (German).
6. From acme (Greek: peak, zenith). Thus, acmeist psychology was a synonym to “height psychology.”
7. This example can be found in *Thinking and Speech* as well. See p. 262 of Vygotsky (1987).
8. See note 54 in chapter 16.
9. Lévy-Bruhl introduced the term “participation” for the phenomenon that persons, whom he considered to think in a prelogical fashion, do not clearly distinguish themselves from certain objects or animals but are bound to them by a relationship which amounts to partial identity. A famous, and contested, example is that of the Bororo, who allegedly considered themselves to be parrots.
10. Leont'ev's much later definition of consciousness seems inspired by Vygotsky. In his view, human consciousness is “not a plane, not even a volume filled with images and processes. It is neither the connections of its individual ‘units,’ but the inner movement of its generative factors, which forms part of the general movement of the activity that brings about the human being's real life in society” (Leont'ev 1978, p. 157).

11. Arnold Lucius Gesell (1880 to 1961). American developmental psychologist known for his maturational view and his developmental schedules and norms. As far as we could establish, Gesell repeatedly spoke of the drama of development, but not of a stage on which the actors perform a drama. In his talk, “The problem of consciousness,” Vygotsky himself attributed this latter view to Jaspers. See p. 129 of Vygotsky (1997).
12. See note 28 in chapter 10.
13. In *Thought and Language*, Potebnya cites the German philosopher and logician Rudolf Hermann Lotze (1817 to 1888) as saying: “Inner speech, strictly speaking, slows down the course of thought, by spreading out in a successive row, what was first simultaneous.” Cf. p. 118 of Potebnya (1989).
14. Daniil Borisovich El’konin (1904 to 1984). Russian psychologist and specialist in developmental and educational psychology. From 1929 onward, El’konin worked under Vygotsky at the Herzen State Pedagogical Institute and studied child play. Later he developed a system of developing education.
15. Zhosefina Il’nichna Shif (1904 to 1978). Russian psychologist, defectologist, and co-founder of Russian special education. Shif was one of Vygotsky’s doctoral students in Leningrad, and Vygotsky discussed her study of scientific and everyday concepts (published as Shif 1935) in the sixth chapter of *Thinking and Speech*.
16. Samuil Semenovich Mnukhin (1902 to 1972). Russian psychiatrist, student of Bekhterev, and one of the founders of Russian child psychiatry. He specialized in childhood autism and other psychiatric disturbances with a strong organic background.
17. Tat’yana Yefimovna Konnikova (1907 to 1975). Russian pedagogue, pedologist, psychologist, and member of a Leningrad group of researchers lead by El’konin.
18. Yevgeniya Iosifovna Zeyliger–Rubinshteyn (1890 to 1969). Russian psychologist and student of N. N. Lange. In the 1920s, she worked under Basov at the Herzen State Pedagogical Institute, and after his death she led the Faculty of Pedology and Methods of Pedological Observation founded by Basov.
19. Probably Vygotsky’s cousin, David Vygotsky.
20. See chapter 6 for information about Fel’dberg and the OFI.
21. Mira Abramovna Levina (? to ?). Russian developmental psychologist, pedologist, and co-worker of Basov at the Herzen State Pedagogical Institute. Vygotsky may have met her at the First Pedological Congress (December 27, 1927 to January 3, 1928) where she and Yevgeniya Zeyliger gave a talk about preschooler’s play. Cf. Zeyliger and Levina (1928).
22. Yevgeniya Viktorovna Knyazeva (? to ?). Russian pedagogue and defectologist who worked for the Social-Juridical Protection of Minors (SPON) and as chair of the Commission on Juvenile Affairs in the Leningrad district.
23. Boris Vasil’evich Belyaev (1900 to 1968). Russian social psychologist, pedagogue, reflexologist, and follower of Bekhterev and Kornilov in the 1920s. After the reflexology discussion, he announced “the beginning of the end of

- reflexology” (Belyaev 1930). Later he specialized in foreign-language education.
24. Possibly the Moscow Railroad Station (*Moskovskiy Vokzal*) in Leningrad.
 25. Sergey Leonidovich Rubinshteyn (1889 to 1960). Russian psychologist, philosopher, and co-founder of activity theory. On the invitation of Basov, in 1930 he moved to Leningrad to become the head of the psychological section of the Herzen State Pedagogical Institute. Author of several famous textbooks, one of which won the Stalin prize.
 26. Fanni Semenovna Rozenfel'd (? to ?). Russian developmental psychologist and researcher at the Bekhterev Brain Institute. Iosif Mikhaylovich Rozenfel'd (1890 to 1977). Russian otolaryngologist and head of the Faculty of Otolaryngology at the Kirov Leningrad State Institute for the Advanced Training of Physicians.
 27. Roman Ivanovich Cheranovskiy (1893 to 1943). Russian pedagogue, psychologist, and reflexologist. From 1930 onward, he was a researcher at the Bekhterev Brain Institute and later specialized in the psychology of art. During WW II, he participated in the resistance but was caught by the Nazis and killed.
 28. The State Institute of Scientific Education (GINP) was founded in Leningrad in 1924. In April 1933, it was reorganized and became the Leningrad Section of Education. In May 1934, it was renamed Institute of Scientific Education at the Herzen State Pedagogical Institute. Vygotsky, Basov, and Rubinshteyn were among its employees.
 29. Vladimir Aleksandrovich Vagner (1849 to 1934). Russian zoologist and founder of Russian comparative psychology. See Valsiner (1988) and Van der Veer (2007) for an elaborate account of Vagner’s ideas and his professional and personal contacts with Vygotsky.
 30. Raisa Yakovlevna Golant (1885 to 1953). Russian psychiatrist and neuropathologist, student of Bekhterev, and specialized in mental disturbances as a result of brain lesions or organic diseases. From 1928 to 1948, she worked at the 2nd Leningrad Medical Institute.
 31. Abram L’vovich Epshteyn (1886 to 1966). Russian psychiatrist and specialist in sleep disturbances and schizophrenia. Head of the Medical Section of the Balinskiy Psychiatric Hospital in Leningrad from 1930. It was in that hospital where, in 1931, Pavlov’s famous “Wednesdays” took place.
 32. David Semenovich Svetlov–Safronovich (1902 to ?). Russian child psychiatrist who worked at the Balinskiy Psychiatric Hospital. Developed a system of ergotherapy based on Marxist ideas. In 1937, he was accused of participating in the Trotskyist opposition, was exiled from Leningrad, and subsequently was arrested and condemned in 1943.
 33. Polina (Perl) Osipovna Efrussi (1876 to 1942). Russian psychologist and pedagogue who worked at the Bekhterev Brain Institute and published on, among other things, child psychopathology and forensic psychology. In 1942,

- she was evacuated from Leningrad to the North Caucasus but was caught there by the Nazis and shot.
34. Ya. K. Tsveyfel' (? to ?). Russian defectologist and specialist in the education of deafmute children who collaborated with A. N. Graborov and I. A. Sokolyanskiy. Vygotsky wrote a preface to Tsveyfel' (1931). Cf. pp. 209–211 of Vygotsky (1993).
 35. Boris Gerasimovich Anan'ev (1907 to 1972). Russian psychologist and student of Bekhterev who subsequently distanced himself from reflexology and turned to Marxism (cf. Anan'ev 1931). Criticized Vygotsky and Luria, in particular, their *Studies in the History of Behavior*.
 36. Yevgeniya Anatol'evna Ivan'shina (? to ?). Russian child psychiatrist and researcher at the Bekhterev Brain Institute.
 37. Samuil Il'ich Gendelevich (1900 to 1973). Russian psychiatrist and professor at the Faculty of Psychiatry of the Second Leningrad Medical Institute. In 1949, Gendelevich participated in the investigation of a person who pretended to be the son of the tsar (in reality he was murdered by the Bolshevik secret police). Cf. http://www.trud.ru/article/23-05-2002/40905_on_nazyval_sebja_tsarevichem.html.
 38. Possibly the sister of Vygotsky's wife.
 39. The list provides both the students' themes and Vygotsky's assessment, possibly of the defence. (*S* satisfactory; *G* good; *V. G.* very good; and *V. S.* very satisfactory or excellent)
 40. Anton Abraham Grünbaum (1885 to 1932). Russian developmental psychologist who worked in Germany and eventually moved to the Netherlands. Vygotsky may refer to Grünbaum (1930), which was a case history of a patient who suffered brain damage and subsequently had difficulties with, among other things, simple arithmetic problems.
 41. Primeval we (German). This refers to the notion that infants possibly originally do not distinguish themselves from their mother or the rest of the world. See also pp. 233–236 of Vygotsky (1998).
 42. The terms “phasic” (*fazicheskiy*) and “semic” (*semicheskiy*) have been translated in different ways in the scientific literature. The term “phasic” refers to the concrete, external, or syntactical aspect of an utterance, whereas the term “semic” refers to its semantic, semiotic, or meaning aspect. In many contexts, “semantic” can function as a good alternative for “semic,” but sometimes the term “semantic” or “meaningful” is already in use as the translation of “smyslovoy.” In Roth (2013) and chapter 10 of Yasnitsky and Van der Veer (2016), one can find discussions of the translation problems with such terms as *znachenie* (“meaning”), *smysl* (“meaning” “or sense”), and *soznanie* (“consciousness”) and their derivatives.
 43. The matchbox was an image Vygotsky sometimes used to indicate a whole consisting of disconnected parts without structural, systemic properties.
 44. Number products/creations (German). The term was introduced by Wertheimer to describe the quantity concept in primitive people, which is not formal but

- very much tied to concrete objects. Koffka (1925, pp. 251–254) adopted the term to describe the concept of quantity in children before they can count.
45. Karl Vossler (1872 to 1949). German linguist, historian of literature, and leading Romanist. Vossler propagated a sociological and comparative study of language phenomena. In 1937, the Nazis forced him to emigrate. In Vossler (1923), he argued that grammatical categories and rules can never fully coincide with psychologically ones and that they at best lay down existing practice. In that context, he mentioned mathematics as a system of rules where a concept, for example 100, can be expressed in a number of ways (e.g., $50 + 50$, 4×25), each of which is entirely clear. Language, however, is the result of fantasy and can transcend all existing categories and rules. He attributed this concept of the creative role of fantasy in language to Vico. The comparison of mathematics with fantasy is on pp. 149–151. It is likely that Vygotsky used the translation from Vossler (1928).
 46. Refers to a popular “mind-reading” trick. For example, the child must think of a number, add 5, square both the original number and the new number, and then subtract the first square from the second. The “mind reader” then asks the child for the result and calculates the number the child had in mind by subtracting 25 and dividing by 10.
 47. Groos (1904) discussed the properties of children’s spontaneous questions, but here it seems as if children had to define such concepts as “percentage,” “counting,” and “red.”
 48. Vygotsky refers to footnote 36 (or 35 in other editions) to chapter 19 of James (1890). James discusses how to make things interesting for students and quotes K. Lange as saying: “If the teacher is to explain the distance from the sun to the earth, let him ask... ‘If anyone there in the sun fired off a canon straight at you, what should you do?... You may quietly go to sleep in your room, and get up again, you may wait until your confirmation-day, you may learn a trade, and grow as old as I am, *then* only will the cannon-ball be getting near, *then* you may jump to one side! See, so great as that is the sun’s distance!’”
 49. The spelling alphabet in Russian is different and after mentioning his name, Vygotsky was asked whether it began with “Vasiliiy.” He then mis-hears and produces three interpretations that rhyme with “Vasiliiy.”
 50. The TsIK SSSR was the Central Executive Committee, the highest political organ in 1922 to 1938, elected by the All-Union Congresses of Soviets. It is unclear which (political) joke is intended.
 51. Mark Yakovlevich Sereyskiy (1885 to 1957). Russian prominent psychiatrist, student of Gannushkin, and head of faculties of psychiatry at various institutes in Moscow and Rostov. Sereyskiy excelled in various areas and published (with Gurevich) a famous textbook called *Textbook of Psychiatry*.
 52. Probably an insurance office that was operational in a certain district (e.g., in a large town).
 53. Implicit reference to the Governor’s words in Act 5, Scene 8 of Gogol’s play “The Government Inspector.”

54. Refers to chapter 6 of *The Psychology of Art*. The “subtle poison” refers to the line “he poured subtle poison into his writings” from Krylov’s fable “The writer and the robber.”
55. Fedor Ivanovich Lavretskiy is the main protagonist of Turgenev’s novel *Home of the Gentry* (1859).
56. Knut Hamsun (real name Knud Pedersen) (1859 to 1952). Norwegian writer and winner of the Nobel prize for literature in 1920.
57. Mikhail Osipovich (real name Meylikh Iosifovich) Gershenzon (1869 to 1925). Russian linguist, philosopher, and translator. Authored books about Pushkin (*Mudrost’ Pushkina*, 1919) and other novelists. Gershenzon was the initiator of the famous *Vekhi* (1909), a collection of essays by Russia’s most prominent philosophers, which would be published in many editions.
58. The term “written speech” sounds a bit awkward in English, but it was used by the linguists of that period. In fact, Vygotsky’s reasoning about the distinction between oral and written speech was almost entirely based on Yakubinskiy (1923). The text is very similar to § 4 of chapter 6 of *Thinking and Speech*. See pp. 201–205 of Vygotsky (1987).
59. Source of energy (German). The term was used, for instance, in Lewin (1926b).
60. Stand above the situation (German).
61. I have written for myself (Latin).
62. All in all; on the whole (Latin).
63. Cf. chapter 6 of *Thinking and Speech*. See pp. 201–206 of Vygotsky (1987).
64. That is, on the way to David Vygotsky’s apartment (Leningrad, Mokhovaya str. 9, apt. 1) where Vygotsky probably stayed when he was in Leningrad.

References

- Anan’ev, B. G. (1931). O nekotorykh voprosakh marksistko-leninskoy rekonstruktsii psikhologii. *Psikhologiya*, 4(3–4), 325–344.
- Belyaev, B. V. (1930). Nachalo kontsa refleksologii. *Psikhologiya*, 3(1), 47–58.
- Birenbaum, G. V. (1934). K voprosu ob obrazovanii perenosnykh i uslovnykh znacheniy slova pri patologicheskikh izmeneniyakh myshleniya. In M. Krol’ & N. Propprer (Eds.), *Novoe v uchenii ob agnozii, apraksii i afazii* (pp. 147–164). Moscow-Leningrad: Medgiz.
- Groos, K. (1904). *Das Seelenleben des Kindes: Ausgewählte Vorlesungen*. Berlin: Verlag von Reuther und Reichard.
- Grünbaum, A. A. (1930). Aphasie und Motorik. *Zeitschrift für die gesamte Neurologie und Psychiatrie*, 130, 385–412.
- James, W. (1890). *The principles of psychology*. New York: Henry Holt and Company.
- Koffka, K. (1925). *Die Grundlagen der psychischen Entwicklung: Eine Einführung in die Kinderpsychologie*. Osterwieck am Harz: Verlag van A.W. Zickfeldt.
- Leont’ev, A. N. (1978). *Activity, consciousness, and personality*. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

- Lewin, K. (1926). Vorbemerkungen über die psychische Kräfte und Energien und über die Struktur der Seele. *Psychologische Forschung*, 7, 294–329.
- Potebnya, A. A. (1989). Mysl' i yazyk. In *Slovo i mif* (pp. 17–200). Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Pravda.
- Puzyrey, A. A. (1982). Iz zapisnykh knizhek L.S. Vygotskogo. *Vestnik MGU. Ser. 14. Psikhologiya*, 1, 60–67.
- Roth, W. M. (2013). An integrated theory of thinking and speaking that draws on Vygotsky and Bakhtin/Voloshinov. *Dialogic Pedagogy: An International Online Journal*, 1, A32–A53.
- Shif, Zh I. (1935). *Razvitie nauchnykh ponyatiy u shkol'nika*. Moscow-Leningrad: Uchpedgiz.
- Tsveyfel, Ya. K. (1931). *Ocherki osobennostey povedeniya i vospitaniya glukhonemogo rebenka*. Moscow-Leningrad: Uchpedgiz.
- Valsiner, J. (1988). *Developmental psychology in the Soviet Union*. Brighton: The Harvester Press.
- Van der Veer, R. (2007). Vygotsky in context: 1900–1935. In H. Daniels, M. Cole, & J. V. Wertsch (Eds.), *The Cambridge companion to Vygotsky* (pp. 21–49). Cambridge, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Vossler, K. (1923). *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Sprachphilosophie*. München: Verlag der Hochschulbuchhandlung Max Hueber.
- Vossler, K. (1928). Grammaticheskie i psikhologicheskie formy v yazyke. In V. Zhirmunskiy (Ed.), *Problemy literaturnoy formy. Sbornik statey* (pp. 148–190). Leningrad: Academia.
- Vygotsky, L. S. (1987). *The collected works of L.S. Vygotsky. Vol. 1. Problems of general psychology*. New York: Plenum Press.
- Vygotsky, L. S. (1993). *The collected works of L.S. Vygotsky. Vol. 2. The fundamentals of defectology*. New York: Plenum Press.
- Vygotsky, L. S. (1997). *The collected works of L.S. Vygotsky. Vol. 3. Problems of the theory and history of psychology*. New York: Plenum Press.
- Vygotsky, L. S. (1998). *The collected works of L.S. Vygotsky. Vol. 5. Child psychology*. New York: Plenum Press.
- Yakubinskiy, L. P. (1923). O dialogicheskoy rechi. In L.V. Shcherba (Ed.), *Russkaya rech'. Sbornik statey. Sb. 1* (pp. 96–194). Petrograd: Foneticheskiy Institut Prakticheskogo Izucheniya Yazykov.
- Yasnitsky, A., & Van der Veer, R. (Eds.). (2016). *Revisionist revolution in Vygotsky studies*. London: Routledge.
- Yasnitsky, A., & Ferrari, M. (2008). Rethinking the early history of post-Vygotskian psychology: The case of the Kharkiv School. *History of Psychology*, 11(2), 101–121.
- Zeigarnik, B. V. (1934). K probleme ponimaniya perenosnogo smysla predlozheniya pri patologicheskikh izmeneniyakh myshleniya. In M. Krol' & N. Propper (Eds.), *Novoe v uchenii ob agnozii, apraksii i afazii* (pp. 132–146). Moscow-Leningrad: Medgiz.
- Zeyliger, E. I., & Levina, M. A. (1928). Strukturnyy analiz i vnutrennie mekhanizmy igrovoy deyatel'nosti detey doskol'nogo vozrasta. In A. B. Zalkind (Ed.), *Osnovnye problemy pedagogii v SSSR* (pp. 69–71). Moscow: Izdanie Orgbyuro S'ezda.

Chapter 19

The Result of Many Years of Work

This chapter gives an idea of the ideological atmosphere in the Soviet academic world of the early 1930s. The first part of the text is based on a note written in violet ink and in pencil on seven notebook pages fastened together by a paperclip. Part of the pages have been lost. The manuscript documents, among other things, Vygotsky's presentation of the content of his planned book, *Thinking and speech*, to a small committee and shows that the initial plan was broader and included a chapter about the freedom of will. The committee was composed of members of the Party cell of the Psychological Institute, notably Gershonovich,¹ Kolbanovskiy,² Vedenov and Shemyakin,³ and a certain Akimov, whose identity remains unknown. The book plan was severely criticized on ideological grounds. Such criticisms could be largely formal and ritualistic, and much depended on accidental factors (e.g., individual persons involved in the publication process, sudden changes on the political front). In Vygotsky's case, the book eventually came out posthumously and in slightly different form.

We do not know for certain when and where the presentation and discussion took place. Vygotskaya and Lifanova (1996, p. 261) mention a similar discussion in the Leningrad Institute of Education on April 2, 1932. On several grounds, we think it likely that the present event took place in the Psychological Institute not earlier than fall 1932. First, Vygotsky uses the term "experience" (*perezhivanie*) no longer as "emotional experience" but as a unit of analysis in investigating the development of mind (cf. his definition "experience is inside what sense is outside").⁴ Second, another part of the document deals with the connection between word, meaning, and sense, which went further than the more cursory treatment of "sense" that was characteristic of notes from summer 1932 (see chapter 14). Third, the presence of Vygotsky's colleagues of the Psychological Institute makes it likely that the meeting took place in Moscow. Judging by the text, Vygotsky took minutes of the meeting as it occurred. This explains the first-person constructions such as "How did I establish the development of meaning," etc. and explains the oral character of the text. This part of the text is followed by the fragment of a letter that Vygotsky wrote after a purge commission condemned his work as being "anti-Marxist" and "bourgeois."

[Written in ink:]

The result of many years of work: the use of older stuff⁵ + the system, i.e., the theory of the question.

NB!

1. *The problem.* Thinking and speech in the plane of historical psychology. In the physiological plane—from the outside.
2. *The method:* a cross-sectional experiment.
3. *Theoretical premises:* consciousness and its functions.
4. *What is new in this book:*
 - (a) the development of concepts = word meanings, phylo- and ontogeny;
 - (b) the phasic and semic sides of speech;
 - (c) word, meaning, and sense as the unity of speech and thinking, the problem of *logos*;
 - (d) the change of the functional connections between speech and thinking;
 - (e) the reappraisal of Köhler's experiments;
 - (f) the semantic field in its connection with the visual field and the problem of the freedom of will;
 - (g) the word and its meaning as a cell of the semantic structure of consciousness.
5. *Conclusions:* The semantic and systemic structure of consciousness, the role of speech and thinking in its construction.

[Written in the margin, in pencil, is what seems to be the outline of a presentation:]

Introduction: The other side of the moon.

The internal analysis of speech.

Speech as motion and as sense.

The unity of speech and thinking in meaning.

Conclusion: The practical meaning—meaning—environment for me.

Questions:

1. The methodology of the work.
2. The critical part of the work.
3. The linguistic and the psychological positions.
4. The experimental work. Types of experimental work.
5. The criticism of the bourgeois currents in psychology. Remark: Not everything is well.
6. Japhetic theory⁶—the historical changes of the word.
7. Marx and Engels.
8. The word as generalization or generalization apart from the word.

[Remark to the left of the questions:]

Discuss the ideal book.

“The most beautiful girl of France cannot give”⁷

With all my weaknesses I could not promise it.

Kolbanovskiy

The book does not yet exist. Is it consistent from the viewpoint of Marxist theory? Not a declarative character. To advance psychological theory.

[Remark:] How do I solve the question of the brain.

Where it is not Marxist.

Historism from the viewpoint of Marxism. With labor. With the brain.

It is not Marxist psychology in the proper sense of the word.

The nature of the historism + the *biological basis*: [Here the sentence breaks off; apparently one or more pages are missing.]

Gershonovich

Unconsciously I occupy linguistic positions. I must realize that.

Language as a superstructure. Societal consciousness and individual consciousness—What is leading? This is relevant for linguists as well. The critique of the psychologizing of speech—the *connection* between the linguist and the psychologist: Marr clashes with Lévy-Bruhl.⁸ The question cannot be avoided.

A historical approach to speech and thinking—an *experimental work with sov-citizens*.⁹ *The regularities of socialist construction*. Far back in history—which concrete materials.

[Remark:] I have abstractions.

The criticism [should be] broader: not the Würzburg school—*Bühler and others*. *The latest works*.

[Two pages have been torn out.]

<*Gershonovich*>

The propositions were unclear. One does not feel dialectical materialism in the analysis.

The individuality of the person: a limited task. Unthinkable outside the social environment: to *choose a position in the study*. *The permanent* relationship between speech and thinking—[analyze it] *historically*: It cannot be done on the basis of the individual. *There is no dialectic* in the definition of thinking: how to define it—emotional, volitional.

Individual studies outside time and space: the class aspect and the progressive aspect. This was lacking.

They were not acquainted with the methodology: How did I establish the development of meanings; introspection and other things. The methodological flaw of the experiment. *Creeping empiricism + mechanicism*. [He would prefer] more detailed propositions.

Vvedenov [sic]

Part of the material has been published: We can use that for our judgment. The unacceptable positions of the older works are here as well. The experiments with concept formation do not show the *process* of concept formation. He [the child] does not form them himself but masters them.

The experimental material does not confirm this: [The study was done] with artificial concepts, which obviously form no part of practice. The idea is correct, but

it is not supported by the experimental method. <It leads> to the tenets about the intrapsychological birth of the word and the concept.

I will not submit it to criticism.

The definition of thinking—word and thought: There is no phylogenetic material (where should I get it!)¹⁰ from various historical eras. Modern man can be studied historically.

The relationship between speech and thinking cannot be solved without the history of language.

[Remark:] *On the contrary:* It is impossible to unravel history in passing. A problem of understanding.

Shemyakin

Thinking and speech—a dim question. The classic answer will not do. *Does it* [the book] *help to construct a Marxist–Leninist theory of thinking and speech, or does it muddle things.* On the whole, idealism along the lines of Marxism–Leninism. This will be a phase. *Its details are debatable.*

Concept formation: *show how the child forms concepts.*

The gap between thinking and speech: as two independent functions; harmful. *The unity of both:* It develops and is not given from the very beginning. *A trace of the gap remains:* the unity and indissolubility.

The connection of word meaning with the object.

Akimov

The work is basically known. *Commissioned to the author.*

Gaps remain— just a phase—can be questioned. The opinion of the present section: a certain part of the section.

Methodologically careless.

[End of the note about the discussion.]

[Written in pencil:]

NB! The pedagogical analysis of the pedagogical process

1. The pedagogical analysis of the pedagogical process = instruction and development.
2. The independence [of instruction and development] (Piaget's level) and [their] identity (achievement tests, Thorndike).
3. The main proposition: Instruction and development do not proceed in parallel.
4. The formation of phasic structures is not the end but the beginning of development. The *latent level*. The school does not begin from scratch.
5. Arithmetic and the three fields.
6. The various paths of one and the same operation—grammar and speech, written and oral speech. The geno- and phenotype.
7. The zone of proximal development.
8. Three things: the level, the paths, the zone.

9. The formal and the special meaning of objects. Herbart and Thorndike. The structure of objects from the viewpoint of the development and change of the main course.

[Written in ink:]

Goldstein

NB!

1. Amnesic aphasia [does not belong] to the speech disorders, nor to the disorders of thinking, but to the relationship between them.

NB! *Correct*: i.e., the unity of word and thought that chemically cannot be further broken down into its constituent parts, i.e., the word meaning or concept. *Significative speech and categorical behavior* are the same thing.

2. The path of verbal analysis is ruled out—either visually or with the object present.
3. The point is not the color sensation but the *concepts*.
4. The patient shows: (a) the forgetting of words + (b) disturbed classification. Both are due to the *disturbance of generalization*.
5. [sic] What is the *categorical attitude*. How is it connected with the significative function of speech. The *problem: word, meaning, and sense*. What is novel in our approach: the development of word meanings (*ergo* of senses as well), the description of various structures of generalization, which lie at the basis of the main developmental levels of word meanings. *Ergo*, the development of senses as well. We must build levels of meaningful perception corresponding with the levels of word meaning!

Four rows

Syncretic wholes	X	X'	X''	X'''
Complexes	Y	Y'	Y''	Y'''
Pseudoconcepts	Z	Z'	Z''	Z'''
Concepts	θ	θ'	θ''	θ'''

Cf. the chessboard at various levels of the development of playing ability, i.e., at various levels of the development of the meaning of the chess pieces and their actions.

Brain and function: defect and anomalous development.

In schizophrenia, the semantic relationships of experience are disturbed, and inner freedom is lost: “*Ich weiß nicht was soll es bedeuten.*”

The word meanings in childhood schizophrenia have their effect on the *disturbance of the semantic experience*. The struggle in the *experience* and the polarization of the symptoms and counter-symptoms¹¹ in schizophrenia. *Experience is inside what sense is outside.*

Declaration to the director of the Herzen State Pedagogical Institute

This is a fragment written in blue ink on the back of a form that was torn in two; the second part has not been found. The form has the following German text: “Zur Teilnahme laden herzlich ein: FÜR DEN SCHWEIZ. VERBAND FÜR SCHWERERZIEHBARE: Der Präsident: O. Baumgartner, Birr. Der Aktuar: H. Hanselmann, Zürich.”¹² The fragment clearly illustrates the ideological climate in the academic world on the eve of the Great Terror. Vygotsky tries to defend himself against the allegations of the purge commission consisting of Party officials that had concluded that his ideas and publications were not in line with the official ideological views. Purges took place on a regular basis, but one of the most well known “general purges” started in January 1933 and lasted that whole year. Approximately 400,000 Party members were purged as well as numerous officials who were not members. It is likely that Vygotsky became the victim of this purge, and it is possible that its outcome is connected with an incident related many years later by Blyuma Zeigarnik. Zeigarnik remembered that Vygotsky once was quite upset and exclaimed “I cannot live when the Party considers that I am not a Marxist” (Yaroshevskiy 1993, p. 16).

To the director of the Leningrad Herzen Pedagogical Institute.

From a copy of the resolution by the commission that purges the Psychological Institute in Moscow that I received, I learned that all my theoretical views, which I use in all my work, are qualified in this resolution as “idealist and bourgeois theory” (p. 1) and as an “anti-Marxist conception” (p. 11). Since this decision of the purge commission was made without any substantial prior discussion of my theory and is exclusively based on declarations made by collaborators of the Psychological Institute during the purge, I suppose that the accusations leveled against my theory are based on misunderstandings and do not correspond with reality.

I have always considered my work to lie within the system of Soviet science and not outside it. I subjectively felt that with my work I concretely participated in the construction of a Marxist psychology and until today I continue to think that my work also objectively had some positive significance in the struggle with [“with” crossed out] against idealist and bourgeois theories. [Here the text breaks off]

Notes

1. L. Gershonovich (? to ?). Russian psychologist and militant Marxist who subjected his “idealist” colleagues to criticism in the scientific press. See Shemyakin & Gershonovich (1932a, b).
2. Viktor Nikolaevich Kolbanovskiy (1902 to 1970). Russian psychiatrist and psychologist, who specialized in personality theory and educational psychology, and head of the Psychological Institute (from 1932 to 1937) and as such Vygotsky’s immediate superior. Kolbanovskiy was the author of a preface and an introduction to *Thinking and Speech* (Kolbanovskiy 1934a, b) and a necrology (Kolbanovskiy 1934c), in which he suggested that the older Vygotsky had overcome his previous (ideological) mistakes and was worthwhile reading.
3. Fedor Nikolaevich Shemyakin (1899 to 1980). Russian psychologist, and participant in both expeditions to Uzbekistan, who specialized in thinking,

speech, memory, and perception. Supplied material to the committee that investigated the expeditions (see later text), which was used to discredit Luria (Van der Veer & Valsiner 1991).

4. From here to the end of the book, the word “experience” (with very few exceptions that cannot cause misunderstandings) stands for the Russian word *perezhivanie* and not for the word *opyt*. See note 48 in chapter 12.
5. *Thinking and Speech* was to a large extent based on previously published articles, prefaces, and chapters in textbooks. See Van der Veer and Yasnitsky (2011) and chapter 4 of Yasnitsky and Van der Veer (2016).
6. See chapter 9.
7. “... more than she has.” French saying repeatedly quoted by Marx in letters and articles. In the sense of “I can do no more than I am doing.”
8. Marr (1930) criticized Lévy-Bruhl in the introduction to the Russian translation of his *Primitive Mentality* for the absence of dialectics in his comparative research and for his mysticism in explaining the development of thinking. According to Marr, there should be an intermediate stage between pre-logical and logical thinking, which Lévy-Bruhl missed. Marr continued his critique in the talk “Language and Thinking,” which was delivered during an extraordinary session of the Academy of Sciences of the SSSR (Marr 1934).
9. Soviet citizens (Socialist newspeak).
10. It should be remembered that a committee of the Workers–Farmers’ Inspection studied the material of Luria’s second expedition to Uzbekistan, interviewed the participants, and published a devastating account of its procedures and results (Luria 1994, p. 67; Razmyslov 1934; Van der Veer 2000; Van der Veer & Valsiner 1991).
11. Countersymptom (German: *Gegensymptom*) is originally a Freudian term. Freud claimed in 1896 that the memory of a sexual trauma may be conscious first, but then is repressed, and leaves in consciousness a memory trace that he called the “countersymptom.” The countersymptom seems to have no direct relationship with the original problem, but the astute psychoanalyst recognizes it immediately. Vygotsky uses the term more loosely to denote opposite symptoms (e.g., merging and splitting). See also the next chapter.
12. The German text means: “We cordially invite you to participate. ON BEHALF OF THE SWISS SOCIETY FOR DIFFICULT CHILDREN: The President: O. Baumgartner, Birr. The Secretary: H. Hanselmann, Zurich.” Otto Baumgartner (1887 to 1952) was a Swiss pedagogue and head of the Swiss Pestalozzi Institute Neuhof from 1914 until his death. Neuhof was a home for “difficult” children and/or children from poor families who received education or learned a trade. Heinrich Hanselmann (1885 to 1960) was a Swiss pedagogue specialized in special-needs children. In the late 1930s, he protested against the ideas to sterilize such children.

References

- Kolbanovskiy, V. N. (1934a). Predislovie redaktora. In L. S. Vygotsky, *Myshlenie i rech'* (pp. iii–v). Moscow: Sotsekgiz.
- Kolbanovskiy, V. N. (1934b). Problema myshleniya i rechi v issledovaniyakh L. S. Vygotskogo. In L. S. Vygotsky, *Myshlenie i rech'* (pp. vi–xxxv). Moscow: Sotsekgiz.
- Kolbanovskiy, V. N. (1934c). Lev Semenovich Vygotsky. *Sovetskaya Psikhotehnika*, 7, 387–395.
- Luria, E. A. (1994). *Moy otets A. R. Luria*. Moscow: Gnosis.
- Marr, N. Ya. (1930). Preface. In L. Lévy-Bruhl (Ed.), *Pervobytnoe myshlenie*. Moscow: Ateist.
- Marr, N. Ya. (1934). Yazyk i myshlenie. In *Izbrannye raboty V5t. T.3* (p. 106). Moscow-Leningrad: Sotsekgiz.
- Razmyslov, P. (1934). O “kul’turno-istoricheskoy teorii psikhologii” Vygotskogo i Lurii. *Kniga i Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya*, 4, 78–86.
- Shemyakin, F., & Gershonovich, L. (1932a). Kak Trotskiy i Kautskiy reviziruyut marksizm v voprosakh psikhologii. *Psikhologiya*, 1–2, 7–10.
- Shemyakin, F., & Gershonovich, L. (1932b). Protiv trotskistskikh i kautskianskikh pozitsiy v voprosakh psikhologii. *Za Marksistko-Leninskoe Estvestvoznanie*, 3–4.
- Van der Veer, R. (2000). Vygotsky criticized. *Journal of Russian and Eastern European Psychology*, 6, 3–9.
- Van der Veer, R., & Valsiner, J. (1991). *Understanding Vygotsky: A quest for synthesis*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Van der Veer, R., & Yasnitsky, A. (2011). Vygotsky in English: What still needs to be done. *Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science*, 45(4), 475–493.
- Vygodskaya, G. L., & Lifanova, T. M. (1996). *Lev Semyonovich Vygotsky: Zhizn', deyatel'nost', shtrikhi k portretu*. Moscow: Smysl.
- Yaroshevskiy, M. G. (1993). *L. S. Vygotsky: V poiskakh novoy psikhologii*. St. Petersburg: Izdatel'stvo Mezhdunarodnogo Fonda Istorii Nauki.
- Yasnitsky, A., & Van der Veer, R. (Eds.). (2016). *Revisionist revolution in Vygotsky studies*. London: Routledge.

Chapter 20

Disintegration and Schizophrenia

Like many of his contemporaries, Vygotsky repeatedly claimed that the study of mind should be based on the data of comparative psychology, developmental psychology, and clinical psychology. The first two disciplines help us to understand the phylogeny and ontogeny of certain psychological systems; the third pictures their disintegration. The prime example of disintegration was schizophrenia, and Vygotsky hoped it would provide a key to understanding mind. On December 29, 1930, Vygotsky and his colleagues held a first meeting around the problems of schizophrenia, and in the years to follow they would repeatedly return to the problem as can be seen from various publications (e.g., *Pedology of the adolescent*, cf. pp. 136–146 of Vygotsky 1998; “K probleme psikhologii shizofrenii,” Vygotsky 1932, 1934; and “The diagnostics of development,” cf. pp. 263–274 of Vygotsky 1993) and from the fact that the group held another meeting on March 9, 1934, about schizophrenia in children. However, most of the factual material in publications was borrowed from other authors, and until now we had little knowledge of Vygotsky’s own clinical work with children and adults. Although much may have been lost, the private archives still retain several dozens of case histories of patients with diagnoses such as schizophrenia, pre-senile psychosis, reactive psychosis, neurosis of fixed ideas, etc. Unfortunately, they are mostly extremely concise and cannot be fully understood outside the context. One of the best-described cases is that of patient O., which we publish in this chapter.

Naturally, over the years Vygotsky changed his view of schizophrenia like he changed so many of his other ideas. The central idea that the phenomena of schizophrenia are caused by a breakdown in conceptual thinking gave way to a broader view of schizophrenia as a global disorder of consciousness and personality. That latter view is present in the talk “On the problem of the psychology of schizophrenia,” which was delivered in June 1932 at a schizophrenia conference in Moscow organized by Gannushkin.¹ A large part of the current notes relate to that talk, which was published 1 year later in the proceedings. Content-wise, the talk was very similar to Vygotsky’s informal presentation on “The problem of consciousness”—delivered in December, 1932—which once again confirms the idea that the transition to the theory of consciousness and dynamic system theory took place in the first half of 1932. The chapter ends with two notes about replication studies performed by Gita Birenbaum and Blyuma Zeigarnik, which addressed the finding that mentally disturbed persons may have trouble understanding figurative speech (Birenbaum 1934; Zeigarnik 1934). These notes show that Vygotsky directly supervised the research projects of his group even if he was not always mentioned as a co-author.

On the problem of schizophrenia

What follows is based on two notes written in violet ink on two library cards with the printed date 1931. The first note introduces the key idea that schizophrenia is a disease of the “heights” of the person. The second one is written around the name “Kapustin” and addresses Vygotsky’s reaction to the ideological critique of Basov in March 1931. The collaborators of the Herzen State Pedological Institute attacked Basov during a meeting at the Institute, and their critique was published in a volume edited by V. I. Kapustin and M. A. Levina (1932). The debate was covered in the press; Basov was pressed to reply, but his reply in the journal *Pedology* appeared only after his sudden death (cf. Yaroshevskiy 1994). Presumably, Vygotsky’s note was written immediately after the publication of the volume.

*NB! On the problem of schizophrenia*²

Is schizophrenia a disease of the heights or of the depths of the personality? This depends upon our view *on autism*: if autistic thinking is a primordial, deep phenomenon (*Freud*, *Piaget*), schizophrenia is a disease of the instincts; if it is a product of high development (specifically, of words and concepts—*Bleuler*), schizophrenia is a disease of the heights. *A caveat*: at the basis may be an undermined life instinct (*Minkowski*), but what we observe in the disease is the *life of a consciousness torn from its vital roots*: i.e., the shipwreck of consciousness, of its heights, as if it struck a submarine cliff in the depths.

NB!

(1) *Themes for schizophrenia*:

1. Splitting and the countersymptom (merging everything with everything).³
 2. Autistic and logical thinking
 3. Communication and understanding.
 4. Speech in schizophrenics and schizophasia.⁴
- (2) All occupational therapy (and *Kretschmer*’s therapy) is built upon the principles of splitting (encapsulation).⁵ Autism and realism.
 - (3) The schizophrenic’s love for numbers and abstractions: the constraint by the semantic field and the empty attempts to leave it by flying away or jumping out (cf. *Yasha L’vovich*⁶—14, etc.).
 - (4) Point 4 is boxed and has the name “Kapustin” next to it: [In the construction of Marxist psychology, we must not proceed from citations but from the general spirit and sense of the theory—in particular, in the solution of the question of the historical development of mind. In the citation: *Bukharin*—the mental [is] the other side of the physical: *Ergo*, in history the morphological + physiological + psychological structures developed in parallel. It seems correct, but actually—from the viewpoint of contemporary science—it is a monstrous absurdity, which fundamentally contradicts the whole spirit of Marxism: The historical process, of which the historical development of man forms a part, is equated with biological evolution. Or another example: (1) Thinking is a brain function. Correct. Hence, the seemingly correct (from the viewpoint of the citation) conclusion, which

however diverges from the spirit and sense of Marxism in a monstrous fashion: Thinking in history developed in parallel with brain development, whose functions, in their turn, develop in parallel with the morphological structure of the brain. Again: The reduction of historical development to biological development. But this is a racist theory! (2) Engels—thinking developed in parallel with the mastery of nature. Marx: The history of the industry is the open book of the psychology of man.⁷ But industry did not develop *in parallel* with the *brain*. Most important is: *another relationship* between brain and mind.]

This from the viewpoint of the whole spirit of Marxism.

The starting position

This note was written on a narrow strip of paper in pencil and has occasional additions in violet ink. The reference to a communication by Ozeretskiy returns repeatedly in Vygotsky's notes, but its exact content remains unknown. In one document, not published here, Vygotsky mentions a meeting with Ozeretskiy on April 19, 1932, but we do not know its connection with the present reference. Presumably, Ozeretskiy observed that patients suffering from schizophrenia no longer understand the figurative meaning of proverbs (cf. Hadlich 1931), an observation that was subsequently tested by Gita Birenbaum and Blyuma Zeigarnik (see later text). On the other hand, the use of exactly this proverb, "Don't count out a prison cell, a begging bowl may come as well," may also indicate that Ozeretskiy and Vygotsky (like Kretschmer and others) believed in the dimensional viewpoint, i.e., that each of us may become schizophrenic under certain circumstances and that the difference between normality and madness is a gradual one (cf. Vygotsky's claim that "each of us carries his own latent schizophrenia with him" [Vygotsky 1933]).

The starting position

NB.

1. The fact communicated by Ozeretskiy: "schizophrenia—Don't count out a prison cell, a begging bowl may come as well."
2. First: the coercive character of the proverb—He does what the proverb orders him to do. Cf. the joke: advertising—Persons carry out its orders.
3. But the joke shows that the strangeness of the fact is deeper and more subtle. It is time for analysis. Advertising also guides our actions; its relation to action is not the sad privilege of schizophrenia. But *in another way*, in another system: It helps us to realize a free act, it *advises*. A borderline case is: Advertising *convinces us* to buy what we do not need. And the proverb relates to action in another way: Its *Imperativ*⁸ makes it akin to advertising and the slogan. *Agitation* is a concise rule of behavior.
4. The behavior of a person who gives a kopeck to an arrested person or a beggar is also guided by this proverb. The difference is deeper and more subtle—It is not the fact itself that the proverb is transformed into action.
5. Not the fact but the *form* of this transformation seems absurd to us.
6. The literal understanding of metaphoric meaning. The experiment with proverbs. Piaget.⁹ The aphasiac and nonsense.

7. *The schizophrenic understands the proverb literally.* But this is *not all*; it is the prerequisite. The kernel, the core of the fact lies not here, but in something analogous.¹⁰
8. The schizophrenic *literally*, i.e., in an unfree manner, relates the *word to the action*. He has no general rule as a guide to action. *The word and the act*—that is the problem: There is no freedom because there is no concept.
9. System. Complex. Concept. Constraint.
10. *What is shared with the normal person:* the dream of the Kafir. Blondel: It is not the delusion that distinguishes us from the mentally ill. Splitting, autism.
11. Perception and other functions in the schizophrenic.
12. Minkowski and Bleuler about autism. Kretschmer, the article about psychotherapy¹¹—the *ideal* of the schizophrenic personality: the machine and the wise man.¹²

Conclusion: Let us once again come back to the fact mentioned in the beginning. It now appears in a new light, and I do not know (I cannot find it) a better way to summarize the results of the whole analysis than to return to it: The thought–word becomes estranged from the person himself—*possession*—he is their slave. Kretschmer’s and Storch’s sovereign autism: the flight, i.e., *the specter of the absolute freedom of thought from reality* when it becomes *separated from the person*—it strives upwards, breaks away, and disappears—*into a radiant void*—a fall. *Es denkt* and *Ich denke*. This is a schism in the genuine, deepest, and most exact sense. If anything deserves the name of something tragic in the classic sense, it is the schizophrenic experience, which takes place at the very borders of what is human. Those who believe in the gods, as the Greek tragedians, or in a superman, as Nietzsche, sing hymns. Who does not believe is Annenskiy: “Blessed are the gods who preserve our consciousness even in agony. But the spider of oblivion is... more kind.”¹³ Or “We want no tears, and neither songs or flowers. We quietly and silently go up the hill: a man is being tortured.”¹⁴ Pure tragedy. He *suffered*, the schizophrenic who tormented his son. The highest and worst type of constraint: not by passions but by thoughts. Once it has been said it is a law: cf. the judge and the fanatic and the letter of the law,—the verse from the Bible—the word weighed down on man¹⁵—whole cultural types of personality have been created according to this model: the *Domostroy* about beating.¹⁶

Shereshevskiy: Me and He.

[Text added in violet ink:]

NB! It is remarkable that the mechanism of external asociality (autism) and the disintegration of the personality (the social in us) are two sides of the same: the nature of the higher psychological functions is social (cf. their genesis). Feuerbach: one and two. *Marx*: Even in private we act socially. It is this *social in us* that disintegrates in schizophrenia. Gilyarovskiy: The social Ego is the center in schizophrenic phenomena.¹⁷

On the problem of the psychology of schizophrenia

This note was written in black ink, with corrections in violet ink, on a half sheet of paper. Presumably, it is a draft of Vygotsky's talk at the conference on schizophrenia in June 1932.

L.S. Vygotsky

On the problem of the psychology of schizophrenia

Propositions

1. The most urgent tasks of the psychological study in the psychiatric clinic are: (1) the psychological qualification of the pathological symptoms; (2) the elucidation of the psychological mechanism of symptom formation; [and] (3) the determination of the dynamic structure of the syndromes in the picture of the pathological process and the internal structure of the symptom complex.
2. The comparative study of the development and disintegration of psychological functions must not in the first place serve the finding of analogies and the comparison of the formal characteristics of the individual levels of development and disintegration in the interest of the theory of regression but [must assist] the more integral and full clarification of the inner dependencies and connections of consciousness that are being discovered—from various sides—in the creation and disintegration of psychological formations.
3. In particular, in the first place it belongs to the tasks of the psychological study of schizophrenia to study the connections, relationships, and dependencies between the individual syndromes that form the total morbid picture.
4. It would be at least premature and risky, on the basis of the experimental and clinical data at hand, to undertake the creation of a psychological theory of schizophrenia now, but we can quite likely, based on the performed psychological studies, advance the hypothesis that from the psychological viewpoint central in the structure of the schizophrenic syndromes and in the picture of the schizophrenic consciousness as a whole is a *pathological change of the formation of meaning* (of the semantic system of connections and the organization of consciousness) and a *disturbance of the interfunctional connections in consciousness*.
5. This disorder is most directly felt and finds its direct expression and, perhaps, its source as well, in a disturbance of the semantic side of speech (the semantics of speech) in a pathological change of word meaning, in a disruption of the function of concept formation. The theory of speech disturbances in schizophrenia must be re-assessed and reconsidered from this viewpoint.
6. Connected with this is the disruption of the complex psychological formations that recently have been highlighted and deserve the name of psychological systems, which have as their basis a specific structure of interfunctional connections and relationships between the individual types of conscious activity.
7. We may surmise that a pathological change of consciousness, depending on the disturbance of its semantic and systemic structure, is decisive in the whole psychological picture of schizophrenia. In schizophrenia, we detect such

fundamental changes of the dependencies in the structure of consciousness that their psychological study must give us the key to understanding the psychological nature of personality.

About schizophrenia. Propositions

This note was written in black ink on two sides of a page from a notepad. Points 7 through 9 are missing. Presumably, it is another outline of Vygotsky's planned talk at the conference on schizophrenia in June 1932.

NB! Propositions. Schizophrenia

Appendix:

Many problems of a formal–methodological nature: normal and abnormal, development and disintegration, etc.

1. *Many concrete problems.*
2. *But about everything = about nothing.*
3. *Therefore about [just] one thing. Non multa, sed multum.¹⁸ About the central problem.*
4. *Or proceed from Ozeretskiy's proverb and using concrete examples. The dream of the Kafir.*
5. *Or otherwise: each symptom of schizophrenia has its shadow:*
 - (1) *Splitting ↔ mergings (connectionless connectedness).¹⁹*
 - (2) *The non-comprehension of symbolic meaning ↔ its dominion.*
 - (3) *No formation of new senses ↔ neoformations. [The urge to] attach meaning to everything.*
 - (4) *There is no nonsense ↔ there is just nonsense.*

<...>

10. *Against the background of the low level of general psychopathology, there are the brilliant achievements of the clinic in the area of concrete psychology. But, alas, even Bleuler proceeds from the older psychology. The fruitlessness of the former and the latter results from an overly logical analysis (without psychology). Reflection is a social attitude to oneself. A division in two. Autism + the social character of the higher psychological functions.*
11. *A pathological change of consciousness determines the whole picture of the schizophrenic syndrome but not (contra) the unconscious determines; it is determined outside consciousness—an apparatus without a driver²⁰ (there it is inside); consciousness is preserved.*
12. *Splitting is an intellectual function and characteristic of normal consciousness in concept formation.*
13. *Actually, the disturbance of activity (the primary factor according to Berze)²¹ is the result of the disturbance of the semantic structure of the personality: cf. Spinoza, affect, idea, activity–passivity.*

The conference on questions of theory and practice of schizophrenia. Propositions

This note was written in pencil on 13 sheets torn from a notepad. The document consists of two parts: (1) the notes Vygotsky made during the congress on schizophrenia in Moscow in June, 1932 and (2) notes about the structure of consciousness in mental illness connected with the critique by other participants on Vygotsky's talk. The first part summarizes the talks of several of the speakers: N. P. Brukhanskiy, L. G. Chlenov, M. O. Gurevich, Yu. V. Kannabikh, A. S. Shmaryan, V. A. Vnukov, and T. I. Yudin. Among the other speakers were T. A. Geyer, V. A. Gilyarovskiy, A. G. Ivanov-Smolenskiy, O. V. Kerbikov, E. K. Krasnushkin, L. M. Rozenshteyn, and G. E. Sukhareva. Then we have the fragmentary notes of the discussion that followed Vygotsky's talk with the participation of V. P. Protopopov, N. A. Bernsteyn, and others. Their brevity is caused by the fact that Vygotsky had to reply to his critics. The notes we found are connected with just 1 day of the conference.

The notes show that the Russian psychiatrists were very well aware of the newest, primarily German, scientific literature, mostly published in the *Zeitschrift für die gesamte Neurologie und Psychiatrie*, and actively made use of it in their talks. The experts in that journal gave excellent descriptions of the psychotic phenomena, suggested many different classifications of the symptoms, quarreled about the relevance of the content of delusions (some believed it was totally irrelevant; others thought it provided the key to understanding), posited schizophrenia was one disease, or many diseases, or no disease at all, believed it was primarily an organic disease or were convinced it was triggered by environmental circumstances, etc., but none of them had any real idea about what caused the patients' severe problems. Almost all international experts believed there was some genetic predisposition; most believed in some organic background; some even thought they could identify specific brain parts that were damaged; and a few believed they could relate illness to body build. When it came to curing the ailing patients, the experts were equally divided and helpless. The existing therapies (e.g., occupational therapy, psychotherapy, the sleep cure, hydrotherapy, some drugs such as Luminal and Veronal) could at most temporarily alleviate the symptoms of a tiny portion of the patients. In sum, the psychiatry of that time was almost as helpless as modern psychiatry with the only difference being they did not yet have the modern drugs that can relieve the symptoms of those of part of the present-day patients. In the company of these well-informed Russian psychiatrists, the pedologist Vygotsky was the odd one out, and it comes as no surprise that his talk was met with a good deal of skepticism.

(1) *Shmar'yan*. Further paths of the study of schizophrenia.²²

1. The somatic current starting with Kraepelin (Gruhle: This current does not touch upon personality and its fate).²³ The psychological one (psychoanalysis, Jaspers,²⁴ Bleuler, Kant)²⁵ Storch, Otto
2. Ewald—the crisis and misfortune of psychiatry in psychology, back to Wernicke.
3. Berze—Gruhle are closer to us in that they state the structural-psychological problem of the personality.
4. Horenwald, Schilder, Hoche—from aphasia and apraxia to schizophrenia (the *Körperschema*).²⁶ The principle of intensity—*heterogeneous and homogenous syndromes* (i.e., of Bonhoeffer's²⁷ type and the schizophrenic type).

5. In all forms of schizophrenia, we are talking about the person in the concrete historical plane. The concept is the center. The unity of form and content: (but no uniformity). The subtle disturbances of the thinking in concepts is the main thing.

6. [Point 6 is without text.]

(2) *Vnukov. On the psychopathology of schizophrenia.*²⁸

1. The unity in the diversity of schizophrenia—where is it?
2. The world became foreign + the whole environment has some relation to me, to Ego: *a double series of complaints. With a clear,*²⁹ *formal consciousness* (Mayer–Gross)³⁰—the specific feature of schizophrenia.
3. Consciousness itself participates in the formation of symptoms: This is the key.
4. The schema: the hebephrenic–catatonic forms are the *core group* (*schizophrenia without schizophrenia* according to Gannushkin)—the paranoid forms. [Next to the prefix “para” is written “hypochondr.”] What has the core group (the only symptom is *inactivity*) in common with the other two groups? *The system and its construction* in the third group. *Rozensteyn*³¹: the hypochondriac is dangerous either for himself or for others. The *contradiction* in the pathophysiological process is the basis of the unity of schizophrenia.
5. What kind of process is it? The *Ich-Störung*³² is the central point. An *objective contradiction*: This is the specific feature of schizophrenia.
6. It [the contradiction] develops because the process gives rise to (*archaic*) mechanisms that reorganize the personality.
7. In the reorganization of the personality, the contradiction is a specifically human element (the differentiation in consciousness: Ego as part of the collective and Ego as an individual). *The loss of this aspect is a universal symptom.* The loss of the differentiated (socio-individual) personality. *In which local psychological domain can we find this contradiction?* The personality is reorganized, and that determines the symptoms.
8. This is why the nosological groups of schizophrenia do not matter; *it is all about* this contradiction.
9. Formally, is there clear consciousness? No, we must reconsider it. From the viewpoint of intensity, the formal clearness is not the leading problem.
10. The process and development of personality. *Überwertigkeit.*³³ *Examples from the clinic*: Its sudden pathological manifestation is prepared by the whole development of the personality.

(3) *Yudin: Heredity and schizophrenia.*³⁴

1. *Rüdin*³⁵: The hereditary formula is heterozygotic and not monozygotic. Hence: (1) Kretschmer’s theory about schizoids, (2) the problem of dynamic heredity (different phenotypic expression, mixed forms, uniting, and splitting off). This led further to Berze: There are no isolated psychoses; each psychosis is an intersection of a number of tendencies.

2. Exogenic aspects in schizophrenia—Rüdin: The percentage of children with schizophrenia is higher in parents with alcoholism, with other psychoses, etc.³⁶
 3. Genetics and the psychology of schizophrenia: from the phenotype to the genotype.
 4. The nosology of undifferentiated schizophrenia³⁷ made it difficult to do genetic analysis, to obtain Mendel's formula, but genetic analysis will reveal the nosology of schizophrenia.
- (4) *Brukhanskiy. Demarcating various groups of schizophrenia.*³⁸
1. Schizoidia, the schizophrenic syndrome and organic schizophrenia.
 2. Character is a complex structure that results from the person's development.
 3. With inferiority, the new formations <develop> in the spirit of the inferior structure.
 4. Schizoidia is a type of reaction that we all have. The character, where it is schizoid, is the result of development with a conflict. Schizoid = *Verschrobenheit*³⁹ = Bleuler's schizopathy, the structure of the psychological development of the personality with a developmental defect. The mechanisms are normal, but the type of development [results] from an organic defect: an inborn weakness connected with *consciousness and thinking*: philosophizing, eccentricities.
2. [sic] The organic in schizophrenia is heterogeneous: [We must] distinguish (a) a subdevelopment or change = a malformation caused by weakness of the neurophysiological mechanisms+ (b) organic processes of a non-schizophrenic nature + (c) an endogenous psychosis *sui generis*.
 3. Group A leads to *Verschrobenheit* + the reaction of a psychotic eruption. Cf. an inborn heart disease with a compensation–decompensation process.
 4. Group A includes the paranoid form and part of the simple form. The remitting form. The outcome is complete compensation ↔ steady dysregulation. *A defect of development: the transition of the schizoid (not Kretschmer's)*—a defective structure + accentuation.
 5. Group B (for example, the patient suffering from encephalitis)—development to schizoids, *Verschrobenheit*, the tone of the neuropsychological mechanisms of the personality. They can manifest themselves as schizoid or schizophrenic (lues with + e. e.).⁴⁰ *Many years after the encephalitis in the stage of Parkinsonism*: development.
 6. An endogenous process—group C—not according to Bumke⁴¹: catatonic–hebephrenic forms. Amimia⁴² + *disturbances* of the personality in consciousness and thinking, the self-identification with new symptoms: prodromic, but it can stop with a *Defekt*⁴³-symptom. Plus and minus symptom. New development of the person with a defect, new reactive formations.

(5) *Gurevich. The pathophysiology of schizophrenia.*⁴⁴

1. Experimental data, patho-anatomical, the organic in schizophrenia + schizophrenic syndromes in organic processes.
2. Poisons (mescaline)—schizophrenic syndromes. Not just mescaline but also hormones (adrenaline). Mescaline is related to adrenaline.⁴⁵ Pieces of schizophrenia but not fully schizophrenia.
3. Organic processes with schizophrenic symptoms—pieces but not fully schizophrenia. And the similarity is incomplete (in chronaxie).⁴⁶
4. *Duration* <illegible> plays a role in the manifestation of schizophrenic syndromes (Jakob),⁴⁷ i.e., *development*.
5. In schizophrenia, primarily the *frontal*, temporal, and inferior parietal lobes are affected, i.e., the specifically human lobes.
6. A diffuse process—What matters is the intensity and the duration.
7. The organic symptoms in schizophrenia are *primary* symptoms. The comparative topical study of schizophrenia in the organic processes. Psychomotor (catatonia) and psychosensory disturbances. Extrapyramidal symptoms: not the *striatum*,⁴⁸ the frontal lobes (this is the *difference* with the organic symptoms). Speech must not be explained pathophysiologically but psychologically. Hallucinations—temporal lobe. The interparietal syndrome of schizophrenia (the gnosis of the proper body and metamorphopsia).⁴⁹

(6) *Kannabikh. The unity of schizophrenia.*⁵⁰

1. *Bleuler*: Schizophrenia is not a **species** (species), but a **genus** (genus).⁵¹
2. Kleist,⁵² by destroying the unity of schizophrenia, returns to the symptomatic viewpoint.
3. The mixed character of the symptoms does not point to a specific picture. *Contra the unity of schizophrenia*: It can be explained *from age-specific features + features of the content of the person's consciousness*.
4. A single circle in this multitude. The core of schizophrenia undoubtedly exists, but the peripheral zones are debatable.
5. Structural analysis, multidimensional diagnostics is the solution to the problems.
6. Pro unity: (1) some states can be mixed up with others, (2) the family shows other conditions, (3) the nature of the initial pictures.
7. Splitting in the pathological–anatomical sense: a rupture between the cortex and the subcortex.
8. The unity of etiology: a reaction of the brain or a hereditary process or a predisposition, which needs exogenic factors.

[The name of the speaker is crossed out:]

(7) *Sereyskiy. About schizophrenia without a change of character.*⁵³

1. Kleist—about epilepsy and schizophrenia: [Separate] the core from the peripheral groups. Splitting up the group of schizophrenia. *Gannushkin*.

2. After several years the symptomatic process is hardly visible, but it can *only* be diagnosed as schizophrenia.
 3. Endogenous feeble-mindedness, i.e., schizophrenia without schizophrenia.
 4. The abiotrophic process⁵⁴ did not affect the systems that result in the schizophrenic pictures. A peripheral group according to its clinical form (it borders on organic dementia), a core group according to its pathogenesis.
 5. The organic nature of mental disturbances without emotional dullness.
 6. Headache in schizophrenia. Memory. Insomnia.
- (8) *Chlenov. The clinical neurology of schizophrenia.*⁵⁵
1. The organic symptoms in schizophrenia often repeat themselves. There is no co-morbidity. Not a syndrome, but a series of symptoms.
 2. The *thalamic hand* in schizophrenia (a thalamic disorder). It is not a contraction, but a typical pose, a tonic condition.⁵⁶
 3. Perspiration increases spontaneously and thermogenically, decreases with emotion. The plethysmographic curve⁵⁷ does not change in emotion (Bumke).
 4. Stigmata or symptoms? Unstable or asymmetrical, i.e., the symptoms. Toxic or anatomical failure? Rather the former.
 5. Does the *Grundstörung*⁵⁸ unite these symptoms? Yes: the dystonia.⁵⁹
 6. Indicators of the essence of the process: <delicate>, cortical and subcortical, organic, diffuse, chronic course.

Discussion

Protopopov⁶⁰

If my [Vygotky's] attempt remains without a material base—without physiology—it will degenerate into what I myself [in the critical part of the talk] described about consciousness. *Bernstein.*⁶¹

- (1) Vnukov and I talked about consciousness *but about different things*: I [i.e., Vygotky] equated consciousness with thinking; that which psychiatrists distinguish. Define more precisely—the muddledness, the confusion, the *Gedankenzug*.⁶² *Consciousness in the narrow, psychiatric sense of the word.*
- (2) Thinking—each time schizophrenia confirms this method; clinically there is no picture of a thinking disorder, but the experiment reveals it. Differentiate the methods. *Distinguish a schizophrenic thinking disorder from organic schizophrenic diseases.* Joint investigation with psychiatrists. Akkerman—Schizophrenics and schizoids do not think in the same way (not dialectical). Boxed and crossed out three times: [The symptom of splitting in a four-year old girl—we must not apply the secondary symptoms of adults to children. The girl has no split personality.]

Chuchmarev: Agrees. The unity of oppositions—Schizophrenics and children are diametrically opposed.

The influence of foreign attitudes. Concepts with 13 years. The influence of the West. Pseudothinking before 13 years.

On the 13th day, all forms of thinking and the concept are there. For such support—thanks.⁶³ Stumpf: the concepts are torn from the sensations. Wau-wau⁶⁴ with 13 years. He does what Engels said. On the contrary. *Intellectualism. Perception contains thinking. But Lenin has the opposite.* He makes it too logical. 13 days, 1 year 13 days. He will arrive at 13 years—good. *The concepts are there, but they are different:* an argument about words. Logic does not deal with pathological thinking.

Gurevich. The problem is narrower than the title. The older concepts of consciousness received more attention than the new ones. The *new* concept remained unclear as to the methods and the concepts. “Abstract” thinking is not abstract thinking. The *shriveling of the concept (Krisch)*⁶⁵ is distraction but not abstraction. *The pathology of abstract thinking, with which logic does not busy itself. The function of splitting cannot be a pathological concept: the allocation of attention—Zerspaltung.*⁶⁶ *A positive function.* The term. No heights without depths. *Contradictio.*⁶⁷ [From “contradictio” there is an arrow to “function”].

*Shevalev.*⁶⁸ The flight into reality in psychoanalysis. *The overcoming of the psychosis by the personality.*

My last opponent is a paranoiac.

[Vygotsky’s] *Final word*

1. Four aspects. No separation from physiology.
2. Consciousness and its new formulation. Vnukov and I [are talking about] the same consciousness.
3. I do not equate consciousness with thinking. But apart from the muddledness, the confusion, etc. [there are] other disturbances of consciousness. [We must] not impoverish but enrich the psychological approach.
4. But about thinking—<a note>.
5. Gurevich. About splitting. No translation error, but an error of the study and the thinking. But an error? It is caused by the fact that what is new is incomprehensible, a misunderstanding.

The first: abstraction and the pathology of abstraction.

The flight.

The second: psychology and logic (does not study pathological forms of thought).

*Simson*⁶⁹—*it cannot exist in children.*

The functions of splitting cannot exist. Why.

Compensation. Kretschmer and psychotherapy.

Child play. Different distances.

A positive function. No heights without depths.

Kannabikh. The intellectual part is a secondary disorder. I am talking about what is primary and basic. This dominates the structure of consciousness. Not just the pathoplasticity is different.⁷⁰ But I spoke about heights only with respect to the reactions.

The center is thinking + practice.

Chuchmarev. A throwback to formalism.⁷¹ Does not endorse it. 13 years and 13 days. Everything is there from the beginning. Lenin. Remark above this passage: Not schizophrenia, but a manic-depressive psychosis.] Apart from the trash—the intellectual sloppiness. The higher [comes] late. If there is a meaning, it will not contradict me. Stern, intellectual [thinking], pseudo thinking and formal logic. *Wau-wau* is correct.

Akkerman. Formal–logical thinking to the detriment of dialectical thinking. There was no disturbance of *meaning*; <...>

[Second part of the note:]

Consciousness has a semantic and systemic structure basically determined by the dominating form of thinking in its sense-making, significative function. *Marx*: Language is as old as consciousness and practically exists also for other men and, consequently, also for me.⁷² The syncretic, complexive, conceptual meanings of the word are not just levels in the development of thinking but also in the composition of the system and in the semantic structure and the organisation of consciousness. Every pathological disorder and disturbance of the systemic and semantic structure of consciousness is a most essential disorder of consciousness. For example, (1) three tables in a café and the end of the world⁷³ (systemic disturbance), (2) Ozeretskiy's case (semantic disturbance). Splitting is a constrained force, a superseded category within word meaning. *The word is a means to understand oneself.* Two aspects are most important: (1) in the examination, we judge consciousness by its meaning (clear, etc.) + by the normal structure of the basic activities; [and] (2) in schizophrenia, in contradistinction to other psychoses, the *para-semasiological disorders* (there is no motivation) are highlighted.

1. The concept is not a picture but a readiness (Gruhle).⁷⁴ But not the picture, but the melody (the chronogenic localization)—the unfolding in time—is the most essential characteristic of this structure. Cf. with this Berze's and Gruhle's *Denkstörung*.⁷⁵ There is no unified act of thinking that unfolds in time. Cf. the narrowness of the *Spannweite* of the intentional curve.⁷⁶
2. Vnukov—a double series of symptoms—*positive and negative*. Cf. my *shadow, the double*: This is a particular case.
3. Development and the role of the active personality in psychosis—the basis of our work in general + compensation in particular.
4. Cf. Kannabikh: The *sole* symptom of the fabrication of thought—provides the basis for the diagnosis: schizophrenia. Cf. Shereshevskiy: *Me and He*.
5. *Kannabikh*: on Java and in the SSSR schizophrenia is the same; what differs is the expression, but, he says, this is unimportant, just like the ravings of an Englishman are in English and those of a Russian in Russian. *Incorrect*.⁷⁷
6. Thorndike's reading problems—contra the arithmetic problem: The data are given and not given.⁷⁸

On the problem of the psychology of schizophrenia

This note was written on a long strip of paper in violet ink and with occasional additions in pencil. The beginning of the note repeats the first passages of the published version of Vygotsky's talk at the conference in Moscow in June 1932 (Vygotsky 1933). In general, there is considerable overlap, although a number of points in the manuscript are absent in the printed version of the talk. Presumably, then, what we have here is a draft of the published version. The reference to Vnukov may be to the latter's talk at the same conference. Remarkable is that in point 1, Vygotsky criticizes his previous idea, which stated that the core of schizophrenia is a disturbance of conceptual thinking and suggests that it is a more general disturbance of the patients' consciousness and personality.

[Above the note in pencil:]

Consciousness is a substrate, a space Jaspers' scene), abstract.⁷⁹

[Written in violet ink:]

NB! *On the problem of schizophrenia*

1. In the schizophrenia clinic, the psychologist finds the exceptional and almost unique case (not comparable with anything previously described) of a pathological development and a change of consciousness and its functions, which sheds light on the normal organization of consciousness, its relationship with the functions, and its normal course of development. The key to the structure of consciousness lies to a considerable extent in the psychological study of schizophrenia, at any rate [there is a possibility] to formulate [the question of] the comparative method anew. The shortcomings, the provisional nature, and the limitations of the path that we followed previously: the concepts.
2. About the relationship between consciousness and the functions and, consequently, about the organization of consciousness: [There is] something *outside* its functions, either as an abstract feature characteristic of all functions or as some sort of mental space that contains them and is a priori to them: continuity, unity, clarity, etc. Formally consciousness. A pre-condition of the functions. The immutability of consciousness itself. The postulate—consciousness in the functions, in activity.
3. The functions apart—[to turn] the postulate of their joint activity into the problem. The system and the interfunctional connections. Even the holistic current in psychology⁸⁰ did not formulate the problem of consciousness anew. The same in psychiatry. *Consciousness is the postulate but not the problem.* Schizophrenia with clear consciousness. Dementia.
4. Nowadays: Consciousness and its structure, its movement are in the center. Added in red pencil between the lines: [The missing consciousness and functions in schizophrenia—the instrumental link. I can follow two paths: either beginning from psychology or from schizophrenia.]
5. The second path: from schizophrenia.

Added in red pencil between the lines: [Thinking, but the higher-order structure is insufficient.]

6. Not a theory but a hypothesis: *sense*.
7. *What is next*: new, metaphorical, nonsensical.
8. The *semasiological side of speech*. The pathological change of word meanings. The disintegration of concepts. Concepts are no images but [exist] in time. Above the last words: [Hamlet.] Further added in red pencil: [Reflection in concepts.]
9. Illustrations: (1) El'konin, (2) Thorndike. Other categories: Berze. Added in red pencil: The grammatical and the psychological predicate.] The reconsideration of aphasia and schizophrenia. Reflexive thinking instead of instrumental thinking + the master.
10. How can the schizophrenic solve an arithmetical problem.
11. The adolescent. Further: Genetic paths lead from the concept to (categorical) perception, to memory, etc. But [also] to the action.
12. In the experiments, we have trouble to elicit a voluntary intention in the schizophrenic, the choice between *complex* experimental[ly presented] motives—the decision and the execution. *Clearest of all in the clinical case*: Ozeretskiy. The literal understanding of proverbs. But not everything: the literal relationship to the action. The semantic structure of the action: The action in concepts is a rational and free action. *The dream of the Kafir. A dream instead of thinking*.
13. Written in red pencil: [Self-analysis, reflection. The affectional structure of personality. Introspection.] Consciousness and self-consciousness: He does not understand himself. Other categories + autism. The social character of the higher psychological functions. Even privately we act consciously.
14. Boxed: [In conclusion about splitting.]
 - (1) *Splitting is inherent to normal consciousness. It is intellect[ual]. Abstraction and concepts*.
 - (2) In the schizophrenic's consciousness, it is accompanied by the countersymptom: merging everything with everything. Added in red pencil: [This follows from the positive character of the analysis.]
 - (3) On the whole, all symptoms have their doubles: affective-graphic and abstract thinking; metaphoric meaning and symbolism. Vnukov: a complex structure. There are no new senses, no neoformations. There is no nonsense, there is just nonsense.
 - (4) *What is the point*—the systemic and semantic change and *the role of the active personality: psychologica psychologica*. The connections of development. In particular, the splitting of the complex. Cf. Kretschmer about psychotherapy.
 - (5) As a primary function, splitting is not autonomous, but in concepts [it exists].
 - (6) Me and He in Shereshevskiy's structure: an example of splitting that goes quite far in a unique structure of consciousness: the historical meaning of consciousness and its fate. A certain splitting is a pre-condition for *self-consciousness*: Feuerbach.

(7) This is why—labor—not as in Kretschmer.

Added in red pencil: [Labor in my thinking—contra Kannabikh?] Yushchenko's example⁸¹: The laws are always and everywhere the same. In particular, [what he writes] about children. Somatic illness—the organism.

(8) Personality and its fate is the alpha and omega of all psychology of schizophrenia.

Added in blue pencil: [Heights contra depths.]

On the articles by Birenbaum and Zeigarnik

These are three documents with comments to the papers by Birenbaum and Zeigarnik (Birenbaum 1934; Zeigarnik 1934), which came out in the volume *New in the theory of agnosia, apraxia, and aphasia*. The notes were written in violet ink; in the case of Birenbaum on a library card, and in the case of Zeigarnik on two cards. The latter note has faded considerably, and its text could not be fully reconstructed. Added to these two notes is a note on a small piece of paper.

NB! On G. V. [Birenbaum's] article

In the experiments with the pictogram, we do not study the essence of memory but *another* process that *replaces* memory and that is carried out in the form of, i.e., in the functional framework of memory (in the sense of the starting and the final point—the problems + results—and in the sense of the functional justification of the whole operation).⁸² In actual fact, this process is the process of the *double movement of word meaning*: from the general word meaning to the particular meaning of the drawing and from the general meaning of the drawing via its particular meaning to the general word meaning.⁸³ The zone of the general word meaning is *wider* than the drawing like the zone of the general meaning of the drawing is *wider* than the word meaning. Two intersecting circles (See Fig. 20.1): This requires from the subject: (a) to discover the sensitive point in word meaning, i.e., to restructure it around the point, through which it can be signified in the drawing, [and] (b) to restructure everything around the same point in the meaning of the drawing. Sequentially, our two circles can be drawn in the following way (see Fig. 20.2):




Fig. 20.1 The zones of the shared meaning of the word and the drawing




Fig. 20.2 The genesis of the zone of shared meaning of the word and the drawing

Ergo we are dealing with a specific operation of meaning formation.

NB. B.V. [Zeigarnik]

1. We must not tear apart form and content.
2. A part of the whole—the higher intellectual processes connected with speech.
3. In the schizophrenic, the content is disturbed, in aphasiacs the form.
4. The connection of concepts with metaphorical thinking, which is an indicator of concepts.
5. Schneider,⁸⁴ Hadlich⁸⁵—The specific properties of the given operation are lost.

The groups:

- (1) Absolute incomprehension = the literal meaning.

Remark before point 1: [<Unsatisfactory> A disorder of abstraction].

- (2) Understands metaphorical sense + literal understanding.

Remark written in the margin before point 2: [The upper floors have not been removed, but he cannot keep them up.]

- (3) The metaphorical sense is intertwined with concreteness: i.e., the metaphor itself slides down to a concrete situation. Sly philosophizing: a concrete situation. This also disturbs the literal understanding of the proverb.

Note written in the margin next to point 3: [Qualitatively different thinking, but the lower floors are not preserved.]

[The note on the next card is illegible.]

The main psychological property of the word almost evaporates: that in <meanings> it can represent a *field*, i.e., create the *equivalent of perception in thinking*. We have all of Lewin's <problems> <illegible>: (1) the semantic field has *other* laws than the external field; (2) the discovery of *different* levels in the development of word meaning implies the development of different fields as well: with the indicative, nominative, complexive, and conceptual <forms> of these meanings; (3) the main problem: the *concept and the freedom of will, über der Sache stehen*.⁸⁶

There is so much *freedom* in the simple paraphrase: Who studies the *paraphrase*, studies the problem of human freedom.

7. New functions in pathology. Goldstein's idea is *very* important: <illegible> not a new function but a new system. *Inde*, the function proceeds in another way as well. Here we do not have changes of the functions (by analogy with the vital

functions) but a change of the <illegible> organism, a mental one, for which there is no analogy in organic life. This is why mental diseases distort the functions *more* than this is possible in somatic disease: the transformed organic substrate.

8. How the meanings do not get connected through a system of diffuse reproductions—two problems: The meanings neither follow the laws of association nor the laws of the syllogism. *Hic Rhodus, hic salta!*⁸⁷ *This* I should <generalize>.
9. How the meanings get connected not logically but according to the structure of the semantic field, which is different from both the associative course and from the logical course of the syllogisms.
10. Inner speech continually creates a field of meanings, a *psychisches Feld*,⁸⁸ which differs from the external situation; *this is the strength of abstraction and freedom*—we are incapable of changing the field of forces and the *external Aufforderungscharakter*,⁸⁹ but, by changing the *inner field*, we change its impact on us also from the outside. *The problem of will is transferred from outside inwards*, from the plane of behavior to the plane of consciousness: the creation of inner fields, for which the presence of meaningful speech is indispensable. Shereshevskiy is a perfect example: In his imagination he changes the situation (not <“dusk”>, but <“grove”>), his voice (his wife instead of the assistant), etc.

[Added to the previous notes⁹⁰:]

The present work [Zeigarnik's], like Birenbaum's work, which is directly connected with it and published hereafter, forms part of a wider circle of studies dedicated to the problem of the development and disintegration of the higher psychological functions. These studies, which were performed over the last years by Vygotsky, Luria, and others, led the researchers to conclude that *word meaning* occupies a relatively central place in the whole organization of the intellectual processes and higher psychological functions of man. Essentially new in these works is the attempt to probe into the inner structure of *word meaning*, which is studied experimentally by means of the widely different intellectual operations that are carried out with the help of the word, but also the discovery of the mutability of *word meaning* in the process of the child's speech development and in the processes of the pathological disturbance of thinking. *Word meaning*, these studies showed, has a different structure in different stages of the development of speech and in different forms of psychopathological processes. That is why the idea naturally arose to study the change of word meaning in the pathological disorders of thinking and its consequences for the whole intellectual activity of the patient. As indicators of the preservation or disturbance of word meaning, we have chosen—among many other things—the understanding of metaphorical meaning, which forms the theme of the present study, and the formation of conventional and metaphorical meanings, which forms the theme of Birenbaum's work and article.

The trip to the headquarters (the case of patient O.)

This document of four notes represents Vygotsky's discussion of the patient O. The first fragment is written in black ink on the back of a form of the publisher ONTI; this document also contains concise descriptions of two other cases. The other fragments are written in pencil: the second on the back of the announcement of a congress at Moscow State University and the Institute of Experimental Psychology; the third on the back of a geographical map that was cut into three pieces (on the other side is printed: "Map for the geography test in the 9th semester (grade V). Editor-in-chief: El'konin. Lenoblit—31/12, 1931"); and the fourth on a small sheet of paper in an almost illegible handwriting. The latter notes are extremely concise and spread over the page in free order; they are published here with insignificant abridgements. Judging by the notes, patient O. worked as a courier and delivered secret mail for some military headquarters until she lost her position and was no longer allowed to do this work. Nevertheless, she made another trip but did not receive a package with mail; she then imagined that she had lost the package on the road (which at the time could have serious consequences including legal prosecution and even the death penalty). She declined to discuss the matter with the physician, denied the loss of her position, and gave confused explanations of her behavior. In Vygotsky's view, the patient was not experiencing a psychotic episode but construed an event that helped her to overcome the loss she suffered. Paradoxically, that imaginary event (the loss of the mail) returned her to reality and her inner conflict.

O.: She lost the secret mail: a reactive condition <illegible>? Now she does not remember whether she lost the mail or not? A defensive [reaction], *pseudodementia*, tendentious. Where has my memory gone—there is no memory at all. Flies fly in the eyes: *mouches volantes*.⁹¹ Her husband was run over by a streetcar, the offense at the factory: everything *came back to life*, everything accumulates, everything is concentrated in one place: the specters of the past came back to life. *The children worry her*. Avoids talking about the loss of the mail.

Avoids the subject. How I lost the mail I do not remember. *Three tendencies: a remarkable child, an offended woman, a patient. She remembers the meaning of what happened but not the fact.*

NB!

1. To go home *implies* to agree, to become reconciled to a thing against which she protests with all her heart (to go to the execution—her legs will not carry her).
2. To go to the headquarters (the automatism) *means* that nothing had happened, for the catastrophe began with the fact that they ordered her *not* to go to the headquarters and took away the package. This is the *core*: The catastrophe began with the package that was taken away; *there is no package = a catastrophe* (semantically).
3. In the headquarters, *there was no package*; that *means* there was no point in going to the headquarters, it was *autistische Wunscherfüllung*⁹² for half an hour. Further there is no place for an illusion, but *there is no package* means (cf. point 2) a catastrophe: This is the real motive, but instead another one is substituted (the global merging of motives)—*the fear to lose the package that accumulated over the years*. Thus, *the loss of the package* has a double meaning and *one is substituted by the other*: the illusion of the trip to the headquarters is continued—it becomes clear that there is no package because it

was taken away. The meaning of the whole scene is: *It would have been better if I lost it!* Thus, the reaction of substituting the meaning helps the repression, but out of the frying pan into the fire, for this reaction means: What I feared has happened: execution for the loss of the package.

That is, the loss of the package means: The worst thing has happened; now I am lost. The loss of the package means: Everything has collapsed just like walls collapse.

The paradox in the center of the whole analysis:

- (a) she behaves as if she lost the mail;
- (b) but in fact: it is a reaction to another situation—the lowering of her salary.

Thus: a reaction to an *imaginary situation* and she *behaves accordingly*, i.e., an *imagined* situation (*to seem*: a false motive) is put between the situation (*to be*: the genuine motive) and the reaction, as the decisive aspect. That is, a reaction to what? To a real or to an imaginary situation?

Vnukov: The trip to the headquarters was an automatism (Janet)—*nothing happened*.

The emotional experience appears—of the loss of the package—she fixates it, the emotional experience is arrested; hence' the *imaginary situation results from self-deceit*: Otherwise it is incomprehensible.

LV[ygotsky]: With a double vertical line in the margin: [The situation is *created* to abreact her whole life (“dance, Gipsy, my life”).⁹³ The walls collapse is an affective symbolism. It is a substitution of motives of the following kind:]

- (1) the motive of the lowered salary: the cause that affects *the whole* network of misfortunes, a signal, the catastrophe she expected all her life;
- (2) the motive of autistic wish fulfillment in hyponoic⁹⁴ consciousness: Nothing has happened, the trip to the headquarters (although she was ordered not to go); the trip to the headquarters was an automatism, but *directly connected* with the lowered salary: Not going signifies the transfer to another function and the change of work responsibilities: Not going means to go home, *to agree*, but she cannot agree with the transfer. *Inde*, the trip;
- (3) but *there is nothing to give to her*, there is no *package*—the clash with *reality*: This *means* there was no point in going to the headquarters—a reaction to *the loss of the package*—*ergo*, it was a reaction to the *real situation*, which is repressed from consciousness, a reaction to what *is the symbolic meaning of the loss of the package*:

Until “№ 1” there is a double vertical line with two exclamation marks in the margin: [The loss of the package in her language means: There was no point in going to the headquarters, i.e., again motive № 1 instead of reaction № 2—the reaction of sadness, ruin, oblivion. Thus, the goal of the substitution of the motive is to return to the real motive: the reaction to the real and not the imaginary, situation.]

The passage is highlighted in the margin: [*The problem of the symbolic semantic connections in consciousness and the systems: what the unconscious borrows from consciousness—It shines with reflected light, like the moon: the critique of Freud from the viewpoint of height psychology.*⁹⁵]

Dementia—organic dementia—means that in important matters she does not behave as the situation requires.

O. (the loss of the mail). Her husband was run over by a streetcar—a brain concussion. He drinks, beats her. She was tired of life. [The situation] improved. She wanted the transfer, *she did not lose* the mail.

<The main> conclusion is that she is in hospital (why spend money on her—a noble motive). The disease she suffers is not the one that should be cured. <...>

She is young. A serious condition. <illegible> The fits!

<Illegible> roots, the primary gain from the disease.

[Provisional diagnoses:]

Hyponoic and hypobulic states, debile + hysterical.

An epileptoid or an epileptic personality.

An acute twilight state,⁹⁶ pseudo-dementia. Hysterical.

A reactive twilight state, epileptic.

Incorrect perception of the spatial proportions.

Fear + a defensive reaction

Unbearable affect, emotional experience, a *complex* of overrated ideas⁹⁷ + <illegible>.

A unique depression—the *form of expression*—the flight into weakness.

What happened? Fear. Not all sensations are organic. *The walls collapse* symbolically: Life collapses: This is the realization of a metaphor. My heart is burning.

[Marked with two vertical lines in the margin:]

NB! The history with the package: a later rationalization and legalization—a mental shock—*one motive substitutes the other: The real motive* is the lowering of the salary; the *apparent motive* is the loss of the package. The trip to the headquarters—an automatism in a twilight state—is repressed: nothing has happened. I am working as if nothing has happened. *Paradoxically, it is different: She behaves as if she lost a package. After all, this is an imaginary situation—pro hysteria.* The arrest of the emotional experience and its use.

Spinoza

Most important:

Passion is only overcome by a stronger passion—reason that has become a passion. Where does this bliss *come from: i.e., the neoformation of a passion.*

V. Abr. [Vnukov]

[The case] is interesting for both the psychologist and the clinician: It is permeated with *conceptual connections* between the pivotal emotional experiences.

Two questions:

- (1) What do we *have clinically*—simulation and distress. *The status?* What happened? *The basis, the development?*
- (2) The theme is *to get life back on track*; *unmask* the grievance-mongering that developed reactively and is determined psychologically.

[In the structure of the patient's personality there are] Two–three motives.

Epileptic—The viscosity,⁹⁸ narrowness, captures the whole personality. *Poverty with extreme tension of two themes*. The *leitmotiv* is the *complex of overrated ideas* in epilept[ic character]. Not just in pathology but also in normal consciousness: [Her] mother nurses *at fixed times*.

Not a delusion, but a complex of overrated ideas.

She adequately experiences the situation: a psychological and not a psychopathological development.

The inferiority undergoes [a change through the] complex of overrated ideas <illegible>.

The *genesis of inferiority*—ruin—life fades away.

The *hysterical character causes epileptic traits*.

<...>

Affect/motivation: the merging of *motives, the global function*.

<...>

Notes

1. Pyotr Borisovich Gannushkin (1875 to 1933). Russian psychiatrist, specialist in personality disorders and social psychiatry, and student of Korsakoff, Kraepelin, and Serbskiy. From 1918 onward, he was professor at the Department of Psychiatry of the Moscow State University and director of the University Psychiatric Hospital. Gannushkin was one of the first to describe the schizoid reaction type as well as somatogenic and psychogenic reactions of schizoids. He also discovered the so-called epileptoid reaction type, which is usually characterized by repeated temporary reactions caused by psychogenic factors and unfavorable situations. This reaction type is expressed by symptoms of dysphoria, i.e. maliciousness combined with anger, anguish, and fear (cf. borderline personality disorder). Gannushkin also created a system of psychoneurological dispensaries and initiated the development of extramural psychiatric care in Russia.
2. Throughout the chapter Vygotsky just writes “sch,” but when no misunderstanding was possible, we replaced it with the term “schizophrenia” or “schizophrenic.”
3. The term “splitting” (German: *Spaltung*) was used quite loosely in the 1920s and 1930s. Kretschmer (1928) used the term also for the ability to hold two or more things in mind simultaneously without mixing them up. For example, when one must count objects and afterward tell how many were, respectively, red, blue, or green. In this sense, splitting was a quite useful and normal skill

that developed abnormal proportions in the schizophrenic. E.g., Bleuler (1911) discussed “splitting” in schizophrenics in terms of dissociation, i.e., the ego is intermittently connected with mutually disconnected complexes of ideas. Cf. Gruhle (1913) and Vygotsky (1933).

4. In schizophasia (word salad), the sentence structure is preserved, but the words are not meaningfully connected. It is considered a sign of a severe thought disorder. The term was introduced by Kraepelin in 1913.
5. On p. 261 of Vygotsky (1993), the conclusion of Vygotsky’s discussion of Kretschmer’s paper on therapy can be read, although the reader should hold in mind that the term “splitting” is somehow replaced by “disengagement”: “Thus, we see again that the capacity for disengagement is a characteristic of the normal as well as the unhealthy mind. In this connection, Kretschmer’s idea is significant: Whenever treating schizophrenia and related conditions, nature itself indicates the path for psychotherapy to us. Kretschmer suggests making use of whatever disengagements the patient has so that he internally distances those things [fantasies, daydreams] as much as possible, crystallizing them, and separating them from the sphere of other activities, and begins gradually to relate to them as we do. In other words, we should reinforce disengagements psychotherapeutically, but in the particular way required to separate day-dreams from reality.”
6. Possibly one of Vygotsky’s patients.
7. Marx wrote: “We see how the history of industry and the established objective existence of industry are the open book of man’s essential powers, the perceptibly existing human psychology.” See p. 302 of *Marx–Engels Collected Works* (1975). It is interesting to note that in his paper, “On the socialist alteration of man,” Vygotsky (1930) referred to the same passage without a trace of criticism. See pp. 175–184 of Van der Veer and Valsiner (1994).
8. Imperative command (German).
9. Piaget studied children’s understanding of proverbs in the fourth chapter of *The Language and Thought of the Child*. Until a certain age, children have no idea of their metaphorical meaning, and Piaget claimed that their syncretic thinking was an intermediate stage between autistic and logical thought. Incidentally, in the second edition of that book, Piaget mentions Vygotsky’s and Luria’s research into egocentric speech.
10. Original footnote: “If this were all, the fact would give the impression of an anecdote: [on the] shoulder blade—woman—mustard plaster, or the comical impression of a proverb interpreted syncretically.” Vygotsky refers to the traditional way to cure a cold by putting hot wet mustard plasters on the patient’s shoulder blades. Possibly the syncretic interpretation involved understanding the Russian word *lopatka* (“shoulder blade”) as “a small spade,” which linguistically is also possible.
11. Refers to Kretschmer (1929) in which he argued that some schizophrenics can benefit from individually adapted forms of psychotherapy. See note 5.

12. Refers to pp. 222–223 of Kretschmer (1929) where Kretschmer argues that we can train a portion of schizophrenic patients to become useful machine-like workers but that some schizophrenics can also become very original and wise persons. Cf. pp. 272–273 of Vygotsky (1993).
13. Quotes the final lines of Annenskiy’s play “Famira the cittern player” (1906, published 1913).
14. Quotes the final lines of Annenskiy’s “King Ixion” (1902), which is also quoted in Vygotsky (1923, p. 3). In Greek mythology, Ixion was the king of the Lapiths who, after a series of misdoings, was bound to a burning solar wheel for all eternity. The analogy may be that patients suffering from schizophrenia are being tormented by their own delusions throughout their lives.
15. This may be an allusion to 2 Corinthians 3:6: “Who also hath made us able ministers of the new testament; not of the letter, but of the spirit: for the letter killeth, but the spirit giveth life.”
16. The *domostroj* was a set of rules for Russian Christians of the 16th century somewhat comparable with the Puritan ethic. It prescribed how to behave in family life and how to apply, for instance, corporal punishment. In retrospect, the rules seem overly strict or harsh, but in the context of that time they were not. Excessive violence, for example, (e.g., to beat a child or relative on the ear) was strictly forbidden.
17. Vasilii Alekseyevich Gilyarovskiy (1875 to 1959). Russian neuropathologist, psychiatrist, and student of Korsakov. From 1923 to 1952, he headed the Faculty of Psychiatry of the Second Moscow State University and from 1920 onward he worked in various qualities at the Donskaya Psychoneurological Clinic. From 1934 to 1936, he was director of the Psychiatric Clinic of the VIEM. Author of the handbook *Psychiatry* (1931), to which Vygotsky refers. Gilyarovskiy argued, before Jung and Storch, that the disturbance of systems that developed later in ontogeny may lead to the dominance of earlier, lower systems in schizophrenia and referred to the work of Lévy-Bruhl in that context.
18. Not many (words) but much (content) (Latin), From Pliny the Younger’s *Letters* (VII, 9), meaning “better quality than quantity.”
19. A characteristic of child thinking borrowed from Blonskiy and mentioned in *Thinking and Speech*. Cf. p. 134 of Vygotsky (1987).
20. Metaphor for schizophrenia. Cf. Kraepelin—“an orchestra without a director”; Khaslin—“a car without fuel”; Minkowski—“a building with intact bricks but with destroyed mortar”; Gruhle—“a machine without an operator.”
21. Josef Berze (1866 to 1957). Austrian psychiatrist and specialist in forensic psychiatry and schizophrenia. Berze posited that the cause of schizophrenia is a loss of energy (hypotony of consciousness) that affects the higher faculties and allows lower layers of mind to reign the mind. Vygotsky referred to him in *Pedology of the Adolescent*. Cf. pp. 145–146 of Vygotsky (1998). See also Berze (1924, 1925, 1932, 1942) and Berze and Gruhle (1929).

22. Aleksandr Solomonovich Shmaryan (1901 to 1961). Russian psychiatrist and co-founder of Russian neuropsychiatry. Shmaryan studied the psychopathology of tumors, traumatic brain damage, and the localization of mental disturbances. From 1932 onward, he worked as a consultant at the Institute of Neurosurgery under Burdenko, and from 1933 onward, he was also vice-director of the Psychiatric Clinic of the VIEM. See Shmar'yan (1933) in the proceedings.
23. Hans Walter Gruhle (1880 to 1958). German psychiatrist, student of Wundt and Kraepelin, co-editor of *Psychologische Forschung*, and representative of understanding psychology. Advanced the hypothesis about the lack of initiative or activity as a primary schizophrenic disorder. In the joint book with Berze, he criticized Kraepelin's theory. See also Gruhle (1913, 1922, 1923, 1926, 1930).
24. Karl Theodor Jaspers (1883 to 1969). Swiss–German psychiatrist and philosopher who introduced the biographical method into psychiatry and advocated to focus on the form and not the content of delusions. In his philosophical thinking, he was influenced by Nietzsche and Kierkegaard.
25. Otto Kant (1899 to ?) and Fritz Kant (1894 to ?). German brothers, psychiatrists, experts in schizophrenia, and psychoanalysts from Tübingen who emigrated to the USA in 1933. Otto considered schizophrenic psychosis to be a compensatory reaction, an attempt to re-establish the lost connection with the environment. Otto continued publishing on “simple” schizophrenia after his emigration. Cf. Kant (1948).
26. We have been unable to identify Horenwald and may have misspelled the name. Paul Ferdinand Schilder (1886 to 1940) was an Austrian–American psychiatrist, psychoanalyst, and student of Freud. Schilder is considered one of the founding fathers of group psychotherapy and proposed the concept of “body image” (*Körperschema*) to describe persons' perceptions of their own body. Schilder explored the role of changes in body image in schizophrenia with special reference to feelings of depersonalization. Alfred Erich Hoche (1865 to 1943) was a German psychiatrist, neurologist, eugenicist, poet, and critic of Kraepelin and Freud. He published about periodic psychoses, sleeping and dreaming, hysteria, epilepsy, etc. He co-authored a book, in which it was argued that it is the state's duty to kill persons who are deeply retarded or disturbed (“mentally dead”) (Binding & Hoche 1920). Married to a Jewish woman, he resigned his post when the Nazis came to power, became increasingly depressed, and presumably committed suicide.
27. Karl Bonhoeffer (1868 to 1948). German psychiatrist, neurologist, and student of Westphal. He published about, among other things, exogenic psychosis and forensic psychiatry. Bonhoeffer opposed the ideas of Freud and Jung and, and—although initially in favour of sterilization programmes—refused to participate in the Nazi-sponsored sterilization programme started before World War II.
28. Vol'f Abramovich Vnukov (1889 to 1937). Russian psychiatrist who specialized in social psychology and psychiatry including forensic psychiatry. Vnukov was head of the Kramer Medical Institute for Neuro-Psychiatric Prophylaxis in

Moscow. Vygotsky refers to Vnukov in the proceedings of the conference: “Side by side with splitting, which is very outspoken, we as it were run into the negative of this symptom, or its double, about which Vnukov spoke when he pointed out the presence of internally contradictory symptoms in the psychopathological picture of schizophrenia. In the psychological laboratory we run into this all the time, and the clinical picture leaves no doubt that each central symptom of schizophrenia has its countersymptom—its negative double, its opposite” (Vygotsky 1933).

29. It was argued by some experts that genuine schizophrenics are clearly conscious and aware of their surroundings, i.e., they are alert and react to questions etc., unlike other patients who, for example, seem to experience a sleep-like state. Cf. Krisch (1930a).
30. Wilhelm Mayer–Gross (1899 to 1961). German psychiatrist and collaborator of Jaspers and Gruhle. When the Nazis came to power, he emigrated to England where he created the modern English school of psychiatry. Mayer–Gross studied such phenomena as depersonalization, hallucinations, aphasia, agnosia, and apraxia and supervised studies of experimentally elicited psychosis through intoxication with mescaline and cocaine. Like Krisch, he observed that delusions and hallucinations may exist with clear consciousness. Author of the handbook *Clinical Psychiatry* (with Slater and Roth). Cf. Mayer-Gross (1930).
31. Lev Rozenshteyn was one of the participants of the conference; cf. Rozenshteyn (1933).
32. Disturbance of the ego (German). Term used to characterize the difficulties schizophrenic patients may have to distinguish themselves from the environment, to know who they are, and sometimes the idea that they are being manipulated by forces that have taken possession of their mind.
33. Overrating, the dominance of certain ideas (German). The term “overrated idea” or “overvalued idea” (*überwertige Idee*) was coined by Wernicke and refers to certain complexes of fixed, affect-laden ideas that, however, in and of themselves are not always irrational. Cf. Jossman (1921).
34. Tikhon Ivanovich Yudin (1879 to 1949). Russian psychiatrist, student of Serbskiy, co-worker of Gannushkin, founder of the Russian genetic approach of mental illness. From 1924 to 1932 onward, he was the head of the Faculty of Psychiatry of Kazan University, and from 1932 onward he was the director of the Ukrainian Psychoneurological Institute in Kharkov. Specialist in psychopathy, schizophrenia, and psychoses as well as the history of psychiatry. He emphasized the unity of all forms of schizophrenia and assumed they were caused by primary brain damage. Initially he was an adherent of eugenics, but he recanted after the official criticism of this movement and also renounced his previous ideas about the nature of mental illness.
35. Ernst Rüdin (1874 to 1952). Swiss-born German psychiatrist, geneticist, eugenicist, and Nazi. A student of Bleuler and Kraepelin, Rüdin was one of the founders of psychiatric inheritance studies. In 1932, he became president of the International Federation of Eugenic Organizations. One year later, he became a member of the German Expert committee on Questions of Population and

Racial Policy. Rüdin advocated the obligatory sterilization of “dead-weight existences” (*Ballastexistenzen*) and the euthanasia of children of “lower quality” and wrote a guideline for the obligatory sterilization of persons suffering from schizophrenia. After the war, he was interned in the US, where he underwent a “de-Nazification” trial. However, he was supported by Max Planck and released in 1947.

36. See, for example, Rüdin (1930), in which he argues that reproduction is undesirable in the case of alcoholics and refers to monozygotic schizophrenic twins.
37. A form that shows symptoms of both paranoid, disorganized, and catatonic schizophrenia.
38. Nikolay Pavlovich Brukhanskiy (1893 to 1948). Russian psychiatrist, specialist in schizophrenia and related disorders, one of the founders of Russian forensic psychiatry, and author of the first handbook, *Forensic psychiatry* (1928). From 1923 onward, he worked at the Serbskiy Institute of Forensic Psychiatry. In 1936, at the Second Congress for Psychiatrists and Neurologists he was severely criticized by V.P. Osipov for his proposal not to prosecute mentally ill offenders and for his view on schizophrenia. Soon after he was arrested, his books were removed from the libraries, and in 1945, after an exceedingly long judicial investigation, he was sentenced to 10 years of prison camp, which he did not survive.
39. Eccentricity, crankiness (German).
40. Syphilis with, possibly, encephalitic epilepsy (or epidemic encephalitis).
41. Oswald Bumke (1877 to 1950). German psychiatrist, neurologist, and student of Hoche. Bumke was skeptical of Kraepelin’s disease concepts and, following Hoche, preferred to speak of syndromes or “symptom–complexes.” He was a critic of psychoanalysis (Cf. Bumke 1931) as well as the relevance of experimental psychology in psychiatry. In 1923, he spent 7 weeks with other international medical experts in Moscow in an attempt to cure Lenin and became acquainted with, among others, Trotsky and Radek.
42. Amimia is the inability to communicate thoughts or emotions by gestures or facial expression.
43. Defect (German).
44. Cf. Gurevich (1933).
45. Currently mescaline is believed to be a serotonergic psychedelic that produces its effect by acting as strong partial agonist at a specific type of serotonin receptor, i.e., the 5-HT_{2A} receptor.
46. Chronaxie is the time required to double the strength of the minimal current necessary to cause depolarization of the cell membrane.
47. Alfons Maria Jakob (1884 to 1931). German neurologist and student of Kraepelin, Nissl, and Alzheimer. Jakob studied concussion, multiple sclerosis, and neurosyphilis and first described what was subsequently called “Creutzfeldt–Jakob disease.”
48. The striatum is a subcortical part of the forebrain that plays a critical role in the reward system.

49. The interparietal syndrome seems to have been Gurevich's contribution to psychiatry. His German papers, Gurewitsch (1932, 1933) are still occasionally mentioned in the literature. The syndrome involves a distorted body image (patients show, for example, an inability to distinguish between left and right and upper and lower body parts) and metamorphopsia (distorted vision in which lines appear wavy and a flat surface may seem curved [there is no known connection with mental illness]).
50. Yuriy Vladimirovich Kannabikh (1872 to 1939). Russian psychiatrist, psychoanalyst, and student of Kraepelin as well as organizer of a system of sanatoriums for the mentally ill in the SSSR. From 1924 to 1929, he worked in the Psychiatric Clinic of the First Moscow State University, and from 1929 to 1936 he was head of the Department of the History of Psychiatry in the Institute of Neuropsychiatric Prophylaxis; he subsequently headed the Faculty of Psychiatry of the Third Moscow Medical Institute. He specialized in cyclothymia, schizophrenia, and psychotherapy. He authored the fundamental *History of Psychiatry* (1929). In addition, he wrote satirical verse under the name "Yuriy Svetogor" See Kannabikh (1933).
51. This may be a direct quote from Bleuler (1911, p. 228) or an indirect one via Gruhle (1913, p. 117). Bleuler meant that schizophrenic psychopathology varies in degree (schizoid, latent, and full schizophrenia) and that one may speak of a group of schizophrenias. Hence, his preference for the broader category of "genus" rather than "species."
52. Karl Kleist (1879 to 1960). German neurologist, psychiatrist, and student of Wernicke. He rejected Kraepelin's division of the functional psychoses into two divisions: dementia praecox (later renamed "schizophrenia") and manic-depressive insanity and attempted to isolate a large number of disease entities (e.g., post-operational psychoses, episodic twilight states) that he believed were due to focal brain lesions. Cf. Kleist (1921, 1926, 1928).
53. See Sereyskiy (1933). It is possible that Vygotsky crossed out Sereyskiy's name because the talk mentioned was given by another speaker.
54. Abiotrophy is the progressive degeneration of tissue leading to disorders; the term is often applied to hereditary diseases of late onset.
55. L.G. Chlenov (? to ?), Russian neurologist who worked at the Neurological Institute of the Academy of the USSR and published on wide variety of neurological subjects until at least 1960. Cf. Chlenov (1934).
56. The thalamic-hand or Dejerine-hand phenomenon can develop after a stroke that effects the thalamus and results in contraction of the flexors of the hand.
57. In plethysmography, one measures changes in volume within an organ or the whole body to determine fluctuations in the amount of blood or air.
58. The underlying disturbance (German).
59. Dystonia is a disorder in which muscle contractions cause twisting and repetitive movements or abnormal postures.
60. Viktor Pavlovich Protopopov (1880 to 1957). Russian psychiatrist, student of Bekhterev, founder of the pathophysiological school in the SSSR, and specialist in the pathophysiology of psychoses. Headed the Faculties of Psychiatry of

- Perm University (from 1921 onward), the Kharkov Medical Institute (from 1923 onward), and the Kiev Institute of the Clinical Union of Physicians (from 1944 onward). Protopopov, among other things, advocated sleep therapy and developed a conception of schizophrenia and circular psychoses.
61. Presumably Nikolay Aleksandrovich Bernsteyn (1896 to 1966). Russian neuropsychologist and Vygotsky's colleague at the Institute of Psychology who studied movement and locomotion, especially how the CNS can control the degrees of freedom of the many muscles involved in a movement. His work remains very influential in neurology.
 62. Thought deprivation (German). The patient complains that his thoughts are taken away from him when he wishes to think or say something. It is considered a form of *Ich-Störung* and a sign of schizophrenia.
 63. Probably an ironic remark just like "he does what Engels said," "he will arrive at 13 years," and "my last opponent is a paranoiac."
 64. First meaningful word spoken by the son of Heinrich Anton Idelberger (1873 to 19?), a German psychologist, who published on the language development of his son. Vygotsky refers to this example in *Thinking and Speech*. See pp. 148–149 of Vygotsky (1987). Cf. Idelberger (1903).
 65. Presumably refers to p. 118 of Krisch (1931) where Krisch quotes a patient as saying that his concept of the school he visited had "shriveled" (German: *zusammengeschrumpft*) to a closet. Hans Krisch (1888 to 19?) was a German biological psychiatrist. See also Krisch (1930a, b).
 66. German has two words—"Spaltung" and "Zerspaltung"—that can be translated as "splitting" (Russian: *rassheplenie*). In the previous chapters, *rassheplenie* was translated as "splitting" or "dissociation" because Vygotsky primarily focused on Kretschmer, who used *Spaltung* (e.g., Kretschmer 1928). However, *Zerspaltung* can also be translated as "splintering" or "fragmentation," and, in fact, Eugen Bleuler made a distinction between *Spaltung* and *Zerspaltung* in his theorizing about schizophrenia. In his view, *Zerspaltung* denotes the first fragmentation of consciousness, i.e., the loss of all previous associations, and *Spaltung* refers to the subsequent formation of mutually separated "islands" of ideas or associations. It is possible, then, that the speaker is referring to Bleuler's notion.
 67. Contradiction (Latin).
 68. Yevgeniy Aleksandrovich Shevlev (1878 to 1946). Russian psychiatrist, student of Bekhterev, reflexologist, and specialist in psychopathology. From 1920 onward, he worked at the Odessa Medical Institute, and in 1925 he founded the Clinic of Small Psychiatry in the Odessa Psychoneurological Institute. Shevlev published on neuroses, reactive psychoses, dementia, and pathological thinking. During the German occupation Shevlev hid Jews as patients (with invented disease histories and diagnoses) in his clinic.
 69. Tamara Pavlovna Simson (1893 to 1960). Russian psychiatrist and specialist in child psychiatry. From 1925 to 1940, she taught at the Second Moscow Medical Institute, and from 1932 to 1944 she headed the psychiatric clinics for children of the Central Institute of Pediatrics and the Regional Medical Institute

- for Early Childhood. Simson wrote about juvenile schizophrenia, neuroses, and mental disturbances caused by infections in children.
70. Pathoplasticity refers to the influence cultural variations or personality characteristics may have on the course and symptoms of mental health disorders. The term was introduced by the German–American psychiatrist and neurologist Karl Birnbaum (1878 to 1950).
 71. Soviet newspeak to indicate that the opponent is splitting hairs. Apparently, in his reply Vygotsky had pointed out that children develop concepts with 13 years and not with 13 days.
 72. Quotes *The German Ideology*: “Language is as old as consciousness, language is practical consciousness that exists also for other men, and for that reason alone it really exists for me personally as well.”
 73. Presumably refers to p. 464 of Gruhle (1922) where the author discusses a patient who sees three marble tables in a café and suddenly knows that the world is lost.
 74. See *Thinking and speech*: “When we name a particular concept (e.g., ‘mammal’), the network of latitude and longitude places us at a specific point. In our thought, we have, in effect, occupied a definite position. We have received an initial point of orientation and we experience a readiness to move in any direction from this point. Any concept arising in isolation in consciousness forms a group of dispositions toward particular movements of thought” Cf. p. 227 of Vygotsky (1987).
 75. Thought disorder (German).
 76. This may be a reference to p. 110 of Krisch (1931) where he mentions that Beringer defends the idea of the *verminderte Spannweite des intentionalen Bogens* (“diminished span of the intentional curve”) in schizophrenia.
 77. The cultural variation in mental disturbance is still a hotly debated issue, and researchers have introduced the distinction between “illness” and “disease” to address it.
 78. This seems a reference to Thorndike et al. (1927), which discusses reading and arithmetic problems, but its meaning remains unclear.
 79. Cf. p. 129 of Vygotsky (1997) for the remark on Jaspers.
 80. The term “holistic current” probably refers to the *Ganzheitspsychologie* of the Second Leipzig School with Hans Volkelt, Friedrich Sander, and Albert Wellek (cf. chapter 7 of Valsiner & Van der Veer 2000).
 81. Aleksandr Ivanovich Yushchenko (1869 to 1936). Ukrainian psychiatrist and pedagogue, student of Kovalevskiy, Bekhterev, and Pavlov, and co-founder of the biochemical approach in psychiatry. In the 1920s, he headed the Faculties of Psychiatry at the Universities of Tartu, Voronezh, and Rostov-on-the-Don, and from 1929 onward he worked in Kharkov, among others, at the Ukrainian State Institute for Clinical Psychiatry and Social Hygiene as well as at the Ukrainian Psychoneurological Academy. He advanced a theory about constitution and corresponding “psychotypes” and published about, among other things, evolutionary–genetic processes in mental illness.

82. Original footnote: “Here we have as much memory as when we write down an idea and read it, only here it is an indirect note, because not its sound is new, but its meaning.”
83. Vygotsky is talking about Leont’ev’s memory experiments, discussed in chapter 9, in which children could use drawings or pictures to remember a list of words.
84. Kurt Schneider (1887 to 1967). German psychiatrist and specialist in schizophrenia and psychopathic personality. Schneider introduced a number of concepts and distinctions, e.g., endogenous and reactive depression, first-rank and second-rank symptoms in schizophrenia, and prepared the way for the DSM. His handbook *Clinical Psychopathology* (1931) went through 15 editions. Vygotsky referred to him in his paper, “Diagnostics of development.” See pp. 250–251 of Vygotsky (1993). Cf. Schneider (1932).
85. Presumably refers to Hedwig Hadlich (1931), who used fables and proverbs (e.g., “a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush”) to test the thinking abilities of (mildly) schizophrenic patients and found they were unable to understand their abstract meaning and interpreted them in a concrete way (e.g., “if you don’t hold the bird in your hand, it will fly away”).
86. To be above something (German). The term was used by Lewin (1926) to indicate that a person can control the situation to a certain extent and is not fully determined by the field.
87. Here is Rhodes, jump here (Latin). From Aesop’s fable “The boastful pentathlete” in which an athlete brags that he once achieved a stupendous long jump on the island of Rhodes and that there were many witnesses. A bystander then challenges him to dispense with the reports of the witnesses and simply repeat his accomplishment on the spot. Used more generally in the sense of “You say you can do it? Just show it!”
88. Psychic, mental, or psychological field (German).
89. Stimulating character, demand character, valence (German). The term was used by Lewin and Koffka.
90. This seems like a formal introduction to the papers by Birenbaum and Zeigarnik meant for publication.
91. Floaters, literally “flying flies” (French). Spots or threads in the visual field caused by material in the vitreous humor of the eye, usually consisting of aggregations of cells or proteins that have detached from the retina. The relevance of this observation is unclear.
92. Autistic wish fulfillment (German).
93. Citation from Blok’s poem “Once I was proud and haughty” (1910).
94. A term introduced by Kretschmer, which designates the archaic mechanisms of behavior in cases of double consciousness, dreams, fits, and twilight states. Kretschmer calls these mechanisms “hyponoic” when they have to do with representations (i.e., thinking) and “hypobulic” when they have to do with emotional–volitional phenomena. The distinguishing characteristic of hyponoic processes is that they are ruled by the logic of affect, i.e., by desires and fears.

95. Cf. p. 138 of Vygotsky (1997).
96. A condition of disordered consciousness during which actions may be performed without the conscious volition of the affected person and with no memory of such actions. The term (German *Dämmerzustand*) was introduced by Richard von Krafft-Ebing (1840 to 1902), the German psychiatrist who specialized in sexual deviations.
97. Here the original has the Russian term (*sverkhtsennoe obrazovanie*) for Wernicke's concept of *Überwertigkeit*. See note 33.
98. This was a term borrowed from Lewin's group. Affective stickiness or viscosity is a pathological rigidity of the emotional reactions, the inability to switch to other emotions and, especially, the tendency to remain stuck in negative ones.

References

- Berze, J. (1924). Zur Frage der Lokalisation psychischer Vorgänge. *Zeitschrift für die gesamte Neurologie und Psychiatrie*, 71, 546–580.
- Berze, J. (1925). Beiträge zur psychiatrischen Erblichkeits- und Konstitutionsforschung. II. Schizoid, Schizophrenie, Dementia praecox. *Zeitschrift für die gesamte Neurologie und Psychiatrie*, 96, 603–652.
- Berze, J. (1932). Störungen des psychischen Antriebs. *Zeitschrift für die gesamte Neurologie und Psychiatrie*, 142, 720–773.
- Berze, J. (1942). Geschichtliches und Kritisches zur Theorie der Schizophrenie. *Zeitschrift für die gesamte Neurologie und Psychiatrie*, 175, 256–282.
- Berze, J., & Gruhle, H. W. (1929). *Psychologie der Schizophrenie*. Berlin: Julius Springer.
- Binding, K., & Hoche, A. (1920). *Die Freigabe der Vernichtung lebensunwerten Lebens. Ihr Maß und ihre Form*. Leipzig: Felix Meiner.
- Birenbaum, G. V. (1934). K voprosu ob obrazovanii perenosnykh i uslovnykh znacheniy slova pri patologicheskikh izmeneniyakh myshleniya. In M. Krol' & N. Propper (Eds.), *Novoe v uchenii ob agnozii, apraksii i afazii* (pp. 147–164). Moscow-Leningrad: Medgiz.
- Bleuler, E. (1911). *Dementia praecox oder Gruppe der Schizophrenien*. Leipzig-Wien: Deuticke.
- Bumke, O. (1931). *Die Psychoanalyse. Eine Kritik*. Berlin: Julius Springer.
- Chlenov, L. G. (1934). Skhema tela i ee narushenie. In M. B. Krol' & N. I. Propper (Eds.), *Novoe v uchenii ob agnozii, apraksii i afazii* (pp. 62–91). Moscow-Leningrad: Medgiz.
- Gruhle, H. W. (1913). Bleulers Schizophrenie und Kraepelins Dementia praecox. *Zeitschrift für die gesamte Neurologie und Psychiatrie*, 17, 114–133.
- Gruhle, H. W. (1922). Die Psychologie der Dementia praecox. *Zeitschrift für die gesamte Neurologie und Psychiatrie*, 78, 454–471.
- Gruhle, H. W. (1923). Historische Bemerkungen zum Problem Charakter und Körperbau. *Zeitschrift für die gesamte Neurologie und Psychiatrie*, 84, 444–449.
- Gruhle, H. W. (1926). Der Körperbau der Normalen. *Zeitschrift für die gesamte Neurologie und Psychiatrie*, 77, 1–31.
- Gruhle, H. W. (1930). Die psychologische Analyse eines Krankheitsbildes (Schizophrenie). *Zeitschrift für die gesamte Neurologie und Psychiatrie*, 123, 479–484.
- Gurevich, M. O. (1933). K postanovke voprosa o patofiziologicheskom issledovanii sindromov i simptomov pri shizofrenii. In P. B. Gannushkin, V. A. Gilyarovskiy, M. O. Gurevich, M. B. Krol', N. I. Propper, & A. S. Shmar'yan (Eds.), *Sovremennye problemy shizofrenii: Doklady na konferentsii po shizofrenii v iune 1932*. Moscow-Leningrad: Medgiz.

- Gurewitsch, M. (1932). Über das Interparietale Syndrom bei Geisteskrankheiten. *Zeitschrift für die gesamte Neurologie und Psychiatrie*, 140, 593–603.
- Gurewitsch, M. (1933). Weitere Beiträge zur Lehre vom interparietalen Syndrom bei Geisteskrankheiten. *Zeitschrift für die gesamte Neurologie und Psychiatrie*, 146, 126–144.
- Hadlich, H. (1931). Schizophrene Denkstörung. *Psychologische Forschung*, 15, 359–373.
- Idelberger, H. A. (1903). Hauptprobleme der kindlichen Sprachentwicklung. *Zeitschrift für pädagogischen Psychologie, Pathologie, und Hygiene*, 5(241–279), 425–456.
- Jossmann, P. (1921). Das Problem der Überwertigkeit. Vergleichend-kritischer Überblick über die Geschichte des Problems. Psychologische Analyse der Überwertigkeit als Erlebnis. *Zeitschrift für die gesamte Neurologie und Psychiatrie*, 64, 1–82.
- Kannabikh, Yu. V. (1933). Problema edinstva shizofrenii. In P. B. Gannushkin, V. A. Gilyarovskiy, M. O. Gurevich, M. B. Krol', N. I. Propper, & A. S. Shmar'yan (Eds.), *Sovremennye problemy shizofrenii: Doklady na konferentsii po shizofrenii v iune 1932* (pp. 39–51). Moscow–Leningrad: Medgiz.
- Kant, O. (1948). Clinical investigation of simple schizophrenia. *Psychiatric Quarterly*, 17, 141–151.
- Kapustin, V. I., & Levina, M. A. (Eds.). (1932). *V bor'be za marksistsko-leninskuyu pedagogiyu. Diskussiya po rabotam prof. M.Ya. Basova 25–29 marta 1931g.* Moscow–Leningrad: Uchpedgiz.
- Kleist, K. (1921). Autochthone Degenerationspsychosen. *Zeitschrift für die gesamte Neurologie und Psychiatrie*, 69, 1–11.
- Kleist, K. (1926). Über zyklode Degenerationspsychosen, besonders Verwirrtheits- und Motilitätspsychosen. *Archiv für Psychiatrie und Nervenkrankheiten*, 78, 100–115.
- Kleist, K. (1928). Über zyklode, paranoide und epileptoide Psychosen und über die Frage der Degenerationspsychosen. *Schweizer Archiv für Neurologie und Psychiatrie*, 23, 3–37.
- Kretschmer, E. (1928). Experimentelle Typenpsychologie. Sinnes- und denkpsychologische Resultate. *Zeitschrift für die gesamte Neurologie und Psychiatrie*, 113, 776–796.
- Kretschmer, E. (1929). Psychotherapie der Schizophrenie und ihrer Grenzzustände. *Zeitschrift für die gesamte Neurologie und Psychiatrie*, 121, 211–223.
- Krisch, H. (1930a). Schizophrene Symptome bei organischen Hirnprozessen und ihre Bedeutung für das Schizophrenieproblem. *Zeitschrift für die gesamte Neurologie und Psychiatrie*, 129, 209–232.
- Krisch, H. (1930b). *Die organischen einschliesslich der exogenen Reaktionstypen: Entwurf einer psychiatrischen Syndromenlehre auf klinisch-biologischer Grundlage.* Berlin: S. Karger.
- Krisch, H. (1931). Die Interpretation schizophrener Symptome als Funktionsabbau. *Zeitschrift für die gesamte Neurologie und Psychiatrie*, 138, 109–121.
- Lewin, K. (1926). Vorsatz, Wille und Bedürfnis. *Psychologische Forschung*, 7, 330–385.
- Mayer-Gross, W. (1930). Primäre und sekundäre Symptome in der Schizophrenie. *Zeitschrift für die gesamte Neurologie und Psychiatrie*, 124, 647–672.
- Rozenshteyn, L. M. (1933). Problema myagkikh form shizofrenii. In P. B. Gannushkin, V. A. Gilyarovskiy, M. O. Gurevich, M. B. Krol', N. I. Propper, & A. S. Shmar'yan (Eds.), *Sovremennye problemy shizofrenii: Doklady na konferentsii po shizofrenii v iune 1932* (pp. 86–96). Moscow–Leningrad: Medgiz.
- Rüdin, E. (1930). Praktische Ergebnisse der psychiatrischen Erbllichkeitsforschung. *Die Naturwissenschaften*, 18(13), 273–280.
- Schneider, K. (1932). Zur Psychologie und Psychopathologie der Trieb- und Willenserlebnisse. *Zeitschrift für die gesamte Neurologie und Psychiatrie*, 141, 351–362.
- Sereyskiy, M. Ya. (1933). Somatologicheskije problemy shizofrenii. In P. B. Gannushkin, V. A. Gilyarovskiy, M. O. Gurevich, M. B. Krol', N. I. Propper, & A. S. Shmar'yan (Eds.), *Sovremennye problemy shizofrenii: Doklady na konferentsii po shizofrenii v iune 1932* (pp. 49–58). Moscow–Leningrad: Medgiz.
- Shmar'yan, A.C. (1933). K postanovke nekotorykh teoreticheskikh problem shizofrenii. In P.B. Gannushkin, V.A. Gilyarovskiy, M.O. Gurevich, M.B. Krol', N.I. Propper, & A.S. Shmar'yan

- (Eds.), *Sovremennye problemy shizofrenii: Doklady na konferentsii po shizofrenii v iune 1932* (pp. 6–13). Moscow–Leningrad: Medgiz.
- Thorndike, E. L., Bregman, E. O., Cobb, M. V., & Woodyard, E. (1927). *The measurement of intelligence*. New York: Bureau of Publications, Columbia University.
- Valsiner, J., & Van der Veer, R. (2000). *The social mind: Construction of the idea*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Van der Veer, R., & Valsiner, J. (Eds.). (1994). *The Vygotsky reader*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Vygotsky, L. S. (1923). Zapozdalye otzyvy. *Nash Ponedel'nik*, 22, 3.
- Vygotsky, L. S. (1930). Sotsialisticheskaya peredelka cheloveka. *VARNITSO*, 9–10, 36–44.
- Vygotsky, L. S. (1932). K probleme psikhologii shizofrenii. *Sovetskaya Nevropatologiya, Psikhiatriya, Psikhogigena*, 1(8), 352–364.
- Vygotsky, L. S. (1933). K probleme psikhologii shizofrenii. In P. B. Gannushkin, V. A. Gilyarovskiy, M. O. Gurevich, M. B. Krol', N.I. Propper, & A. S. Shmaryan (Eds.), *Sovremennye problemy shizofrenii: Doklady na konferentsii po shizofrenii v iune 1932* (pp. 19–28). Moscow–Leningrad: Medgiz.
- Vygotsky, L. S. (1934). Thought in schizophrenia. *Archives of Neurology and Psychiatry*, 31, 1062–1077.
- Vygotsky, L. S. (1987). *The collected works of L.S. Vygotsky. Vol. 1. Problems of general psychology*. New York: Plenum Press.
- Vygotsky, L. S. (1993). *The collected works of L.S. Vygotsky. Vol. 2. The fundamentals of defectology*. New York: Plenum Press.
- Vygotsky, L. S. (1997). *The collected works of L.S. Vygotsky. Vol. 3. Problems of the theory and history of psychology*. New York: Plenum Press.
- Vygotsky, L. S. (1998). *The collected works of L.S. Vygotsky. Vol. 5. Child psychology*. New York: Plenum Press.
- Yaroshevskiy, M. G. (1994). Marksizm v sovetskoy psikhologii. In *Repressirovannaya nauka. Vyp. 2* (pp. 24–44). St. Petersburg: Nauka.
- Zeigarnik, B. V. (1934). K probleme ponimaniya perenosnogo smysla predlozheniya pri patologicheskikh izmeneniyakh myshleniya. In M. Krol' & N. Propper (Eds.), *Novoe v uchenii ob agnozii, apraksii i afazii* (pp. 132–146). Moscow-Leningrad: Medgiz.

Chapter 21

Thinking and Speech

This chapter contains documents connected with *Thinking and speech* written not before 1933. As mentioned previously, this book contained much older material: chapters 2 to 5 were written before 1930 and are included more or less intact; chapters 1, 6, and 7 were written after 1932 on the basis of existing lectures, notes, etc.. (Yasnitsky & Van der Veer 2016). The exact circumstances of the final composition of the book are not fully known (cf. Van der Veer & Valsiner 1991), and recently Mecacci revealed that just part of the original draft was preserved (Mecacci 2015). Neither do we have many personal notes about the work on the book. Part of them have been used in chapters 15 to 19 of this volume, and here we present two documents connected with chapters 3, 6, and 7 of *Thinking and speech* plus a document that deals with its main theme.

The unity of communication and generalization

This section combines four notes dedicated to the problems of word and consciousness, and communication and generalization, with part of them directed to Luria and Leont'ev. The first note was written in pencil on the back of a geographical map (see the previous chapter). The other notes were written in pencil on the back of three cards with the text "The psychology of art. State Institute of Experimental Psychology. L. S. Vygotsky. The psychology of art. An analysis of aesthetic reactions. Moscow. 1925." Presumably the cards were printed in 1925 in connection with the planned dissertation defense, which never took place (Van der Veer & Valsiner 1991). Many of such unused cards with Vygotsky's notes on them were found in the personal archive. The notes were made not before 1933, and the second and third of the notes possibly formed one whole.


To the propositions by A. R. and A. N.

1. Communication not just through signs but through meanings (generalizations).
2. Why does the communication of an idea change it? Because it leads down the path of generalization.


3. The sign–meaning unity (phonology, the *differentiation* of the meanings through the sign).
4. Meaning has to do with every function, not just thinking. That being the case, not *arbitrary* functions in *arbitrary relationships* can be mediated by a *single* semantic structure but only *specific* functions in a specific relationship. The system dictates the semantic structure *et vice versa*. The system is reproduced in every meaning like the capitalist system in the commodity operation.
5. Inter and intra from the new viewpoint—the interaction of the ideal and the initial form + communication as the uninterrupted permanent cooperation of thought: The unity of inter and intra.¹ Explained is the transition from inter to intra through differentiation.
6. Stern’s shortcoming, Koffka: person—thing (without the person). Piaget’s shortcoming: person—person (without the thing).² We: person—thing—person (the unity of communication, generalization, and sound).
7. *The most important thing* that follows from §§ 1, 2, and 5: In each generalization, the person communicates with himself, i.e., he acts within himself in a social way; the social inside the personality. *Inde, the transition* from inter to intra and from outside inward (the ingrowing).³
8. A. N.: Meaning builds consciousness or becoming consciously aware creates meaning. *Becoming consciously aware is communication with oneself about inner reality*. Becoming consciously aware in accordance with the communication, the generalization, communication within oneself. The relationship to the person with a relation to the object is replaced by the relationship to oneself concerning < the concept >.

That is, in becoming consciously aware, the person *falls apart* [*divides himself into three*], and acts as subject + object (the cause for communication, inner experience) + the object of the relationship (the other person).

The *schema of external communication*



The *schema of becoming consciously aware*



9. [sic] Engels is right that the need created speech⁴: but not right that it created the *organ* of speech—it made use of the organ (cf. Köhler, Yerkes).⁵
10. The place of the theory of affects in the system of psychology—Spinoza’s psychology.

Thinking life.

1. Engels is right that the need created the organ: The need stands at the origin of the emergence of a new acquired activity. He was wrong that it created the organ (the organ was there, Köhler, Yerkes; the organ of speech was not—Sapir),⁶ it created a new function, a *new* use of the organ.

Engels is right that the domestic animal (the dog) needs speech but wrong that there is a need for *communication* in the human sense.

[Written underneath:]

Henri de Régnier. The heroic day-dreams of Tito Bassi.⁷

The choice determines the strength of the motive, but the strength of the motive does not determine the choice.

9. Of course, the cell's development depends upon the organism. Meaning depends upon consciousness, consciousness upon life. But meaning changes consciousness, consciousness changes life. *The reverse movement from consciousness to life*. Spinoza.
10. Generalization is inevitably rational and free: *Ergo*, reason and freedom follow from communication, like generalization. But *internal* meaningfulness (reason) and freedom result from conscious awareness, from communication with oneself.
11. When arises the necessity to find causes: In the concrete problem—with the patient, the child of a certain age (the dependency of life from consciousness).
12. The direct movement (from life to consciousness) is only important to the extent that it allows us to understand the *reverse movement* from consciousness to life (consciousness changes life), the dependency of life from consciousness.

A. N. About spontaneous and scientific concepts

A. N. The concepts mastered at school have their fate.

	<i>Exam</i>	<i>Use</i>
I year	5	2
II year	4	3
III year	3	4
IV year	2	5

The run inward. The strength and weakness of the spontaneous and scientific concepts are *different*. How the scientific concepts run the path downward, become *spontaneous*. *The problem* of internal ingrowing (of the *meaning*) analogous with the external ingrowing (of the *sign*). A *new plane* in comparison with Stern.

When teaching according to the program had ended, development began. When the child had mastered the meaning of the word at school, development just began.

Claparède's law.

Animals have no zone of proximal development (Köhler); the relationship between instruction and development is specific for man. Man can do more in cooperation than independently; the animal can do in cooperation as much as it can do independently (imitation = the actual level of intellect). That is why we cannot teach an animal to speak.

My remarks

This note was written in pencil on both sides of a form of the publisher ONTI and on a small sheet. Additions to the text are written in red ink. Other documents on the same forms could be dated May 1933. The present document also contains fragmentary organizational notes about lectures at the Herzen Pedological Institute (mentioned is M. A. Levina) and about meetings with Aleksandra Usova⁸ on the research of Ph.D. students, which are not published here. Presumably, in his theorizing, Vygotsky returned to chapter 3 of *Thinking and speech*, which was based on a slightly abbreviated version of a book review of the book by the Sterns (Vygotsky 1929). Possibly Vygotsky wanted to re-think the issue of the “discovery” of meaning by the child against the background of his newer ideas about the various forms of speech (written, external, egocentric, inner) and their alleged interconnections.

My remarks:

NB!

- (1) Stern: speech = sound + consciousness of the meaning + *intention*. *Is that true?*
- (2) Stern: speech [results] from *merging*—babbling, imitation, understanding. *Is that true?*
- (3) Stern: the stages—according to phasical indications. *Is that true?*
- (4) The greatest discovery + Koffka—Wallon. The meaning of questions: *Naming* and *designating* is no speech; Stern’s *discovery*.

The general concept.

- (5) Two exclamation marks are written in the margin: [*The most remarkable is: Why does the dog not understand speech; because it is an object and not a subject of speech. Cf. the current debate about animal language.*]
- (6) *Actually*, the stages do not follow Stern: *Grammar* is a new level in the relationship between the semantic and phasic sides; *syntax* as well.
- (7) The work on speech development is finished before 5 years. *Contra*.
- (8) *Remarkable according to Stern:*

contra intellectualism;

the first *questions*—the connections with the greatest discovery, near the *boundary* of the stage;

the second *questions*—at the boundary of the *fourth stage*.

What does this mean??

- (9) To warn *against one thing*: In the attempt to *distinguish* the semantic and phasic sides of speech (i.e., to present in a more complex way what was previously considered to have a simple structure), we must *not tear them apart*: *We must not forget the unity*. Cf. *the complete analogy*: the reproofs about the gap between elementary and *higher memory*. *The hypothesis*.
- (10) The fate and function of egocentric speech → from the external to the internal. McCarthy. Before 3 years there is *only* dialogue. *Dialogue* until 3 years, i.e., before egocentric speech. Cf. Asya.

- (11) Kern in the *Zeitschrift für Kinderforschung* about reading.⁹
- (12) About written speech. Wundt, Head, and I.
- (13) Written in the margin there is a bracket with the text: [*Meaning is separated from thought.*] *What develops after what* Stern considers the *finished* work on the development of speech:
1. The semantic side (i.e., the meanings);
 2. The functions—autistic, egocentric;
 3. New forms;
 4. Structure;
 5. The differentiation → of all processes connected with speech: cf. Paulhan, intention, consciousness. And how this development *after the end* sheds light on the complexity of the processes of its development *before the end* (i.e., the early stages)—its motivation, its functions, its being intertwined with conscious processes, etc. *The other side of the moon*: cf. *autism before 3 years*.
[Remark written above the line: [1½ years.]
Remark written under the line: [Stern.]
- (14) Predicativity, agglutination, fragmentation, and idiomatism unite *egocentric speech* and *inner speech*: the properties of inner speech *in statu nascendi*.¹⁰
- (14a) Egocentric speech is the *key* to the study of inner speech. The natural experiment of the type we have done in the objectifying experiment. Externalize the inner processes.
- (15) Phasic speech *ahead of* semantic speech? Not always, not as a general rule.
- (16) The processes that are *inflexibly and uniformly* connected (intention, conscious meanings, sound) become *flexibly* connected. From an undifferentiated structure to a differentiated one. *One and many systems of freedom*. Speech is more subtly intertwined with the conscious processes.
- (17) The beginning of speech out of necessity, *its inner roots*.
- (18) Meaning—generalization. Between the lines: [*The flying away. The role of fantasy.*] We have laid bare its levels. *The separation of meaning from the other subjective elements of thought*. Cf. Paulhan's *sens et signification*.¹¹ The first words are phrases, *purely subjective and purely situational*, like Köhler's apes: Subjectively they mean little, and objectively they require interpretation, without which they are incomprehensible.

Written in the margin: [What the animal lacks is a piece of fantasy.]

- (19) *The central image: the other side of the moon*, the semantic and the whole internal side of speech (which is turned away from us—inside the personality). The phasical side of speech is that side of the moon that is turned to us.
- (20) The communication between consciousnesses is only possible through meaning. Cf. *comprehension in two of Köhler's apes*, the agnostic¹²—the carafe with water. And via the *meaning* of the object, the object is mobile in a different, situational way. A historical continuation—the constancy and the orthoscopic nature of perception.

(21) *Contra*

Krupskaya¹³—Children think terribly concretely. James about the dog.¹⁴ Asya: Asya sit down. *Repetition*. In the word, the child flies away from reality.

- (22) To separate the meaning from the sound, the word from the thing, etc., is a necessary condition for the development of the concept.
- (22) The text of point 22 is written in red ink: [Insufficient: Speech [comes] from the social environment. Explain the turning points *concretely*.]
- (23) *Inner and egocentric speech is forgotten: inde, the experiment “think, tell us, and do it”—how to memorize.*¹⁵
- (24) On the whole in experiments: The general goal and the *first step* (the repetition, etc.)
- (25) *The law. Subordination*. Chuchmarev and others, they usually [assume]: The law is given, the executive mechanisms are given, what is studied is the *subordination*. In actual fact: If there is a *law*, then according to the *sense of the word* it is already subordinated to the *concept and the freedom of action [appears] through the law*. Ergo, *how the law emerges is the central problem*.

<...>

- (26) Written in red ink: [*“The law”—subordination.*]
1. The concept—inner speech. [Added in pencil:] [The action of mind according to Spinoza and not the *passiones*.¹⁶ *Activity inside* oneself: The animal is active in the open. And activity of a *new type*. Its source are two persons—Feuerbach. *New brain structures*.]
 2. Written in red ink: [Inner speech is forgotten.] Added in pencil: [Egocentric speech. *Inde* the experiment.]
 3. Written in red ink: [On the book about school labor.] Written in pencil: [Change the title. By school labor, one also meant a lower level—thinking, attention, memory. We mean by psychological function—a lower level—*activity*. Play, labor—Where do they come from (*play, the law*). This is the difference between the *pedological argument* and the *psychological* one. The general idea—*school labor as a whole* (not mathematics, Russian) is a *new developmental type of activity*. Establish the corresponding threads of connection—written speech—the “law” in labor, etc.]
- (27) Explain object-relatedness and meaning and that they do not coincide. The understanding between the *child* and the *adult*—generalization—connections in all directions. The *horse*.
- (28) *Written speech* has another function, another structure (intention, consciousness)—The “law” *participates in it*.
- (29) *Defining concepts*—banal, according to Luria—is out of place, but it is not banal as a symptom [encircled:] of becoming consciously aware of the meanings and the development of the operation with them. Maybe this is our central method (through meaning) like association is the central method in the study of unfocused thought.¹⁷

- (30) Grillparzer¹⁸—*Ich möchte ein Drama (eine Tragödie) in Gedanken schreiben.*¹⁹ Cf. the idiomatizations of inner speech—*absolute in < illegible > syntax*—and Tyutchev’s “How should another know your mind? How can a heart expression find? A thought once uttered is untrue” is the truth. *Dichtung und Wahrheit.*²⁰ Tyutchev’s poetical truth (the feeling of sadness that the thought was not expressed by the word) is untrue from the viewpoint of scientific truth. Science must *explain*: (1) why the thought, once uttered, is untrue, (2) why Tyutchev’s thought is understandable and true, i.e., did not become untrue, and that (3) exactly because of that, it is *untrue*, i.e., an incomplete truth. There is truth to the sophism of the Cretan liar.

To § 30. Only the uttered thought is true, i.e., the thought that passed the boundary of subjective consciousness, but not necessarily uttered *aloud*, perhaps internally uttered.

“A thought once uttered is untrue” (Tyutchev).²¹ Only what is uttered *can be* untrue, *ergo*, only the utterance can be true. A thought that is not uttered is always true for consciousness, objectively it is untrue. Young children do not *lie*. Asya (the experiment with the study of lying). What is not uttered is outside the categories of untruth and truth. Language is given to hide thought—the conscious use of the untruth of the thought that is uttered. But this a *high* stage of development (the diplomat); the animal does not lie.

In one sentence: When we say “thinking and speech,” we for the first time introduce “truth untruth” (a renunciation, a sacrifice, the death of the personal core). A thought, once uttered, is untrue, but it may also be true, while an internally unuttered thought is neither true nor untrue.

A thought, once uttered, is untrue *or* the truth. *Or* a thought, once uttered, is untrue *and* the truth.

- (31) Vossler’s examples: The *bon soldat*,²² the boy is not stupid, did you lose something here, *can you check whether you are in the other room, close the door from the other side*—the child is deceived by the external side of speech.
- (32) *Questions*: (1) At what age does egocentric speech increase with complications? (2) after the second year *contact with the environment* and interaction (via the < phrase >); contradiction—age and names. The word is in [a piece of paper is torn off] *estina*,²³ truth: that, which is.
- (33) We have determined the end of egocentric speech, now the beginning: 3 years, before that there is a dialogue.
- (34) The non-correspondence of the psychological and the grammatical structure *in mathematics*—*It exists*, but *in another way*. Vossler is wrong that they do not exist.²⁴
- (35) Thought—consciousness (*what* comes from *what*). Thought—sensation—consciousness.
- (36) What is inner speech—Does inner speech come before external speech? After all, the *first premise* is: Understanding speech is apparently inner speech (is that true? For here we have loud speech); the *second premise* is that understanding comes before, is prior to speaking. *Conclusion*: Inner speech is prior to external speech. This is incorrect.

- (37) Autistic thinking also about unpleasant things: About death—“wandering the noisy streets... I am lost in my *thought*.”²⁵
- (38) In the stages of distinguishing [between ego and non-ego], the penultimate one is the separation of one’s operation from oneself.
- (39) Question: the sequence of speech in onto- and phylogeny. Boxed: [The schema of what I said. The neoformations of the school age: *La loi du décalage*²⁶—verbal <syncretism>.]
- (1) a semantic change in the creation of word meaning—pseudoconcepts, pre-concepts: the level of abstraction.
 - (2) Inner speech [results] from abstraction.

[Separate note written in pencil, across the second part of the sheet:]

Encircled: [On the schema of what I said.]

- (1) contra *associationism* as the theory of sign-meaning (the relationship), not a matchbox—the structure of the word. *Written speech as well* is not an associative connective + a written sign. *Reading* is not association (Thorndike). Inner speech is switching off the sound, i.e., a minus-association.
- (2) but *not structure* instead of association: Koffka, Stern, and others understood that sign-meaning is not an associative connection. *But according to Stern*, the child’s concept [appears] with 1½ years, *and the first concept is the concept of the word; in actual fact, it comes last; this is pure intellectualism*, there is no development; Ach: The meaning of the word is the concept. Koffka: The sign stands to meaning like the stick stands to the fruit. *This is incorrect*.

This is the *central* idea for the book about school labor. *I must not omit it*. Nothing is more important than the *modus dicendi*.²⁷

- (3) Written speech [results] from abstraction. The *internal analysis of speech*: The unity—the conversation.
- (4) oral speech—from abstraction.

Levels of speech, levels of abstraction, levels of consciousness.

NB! Books [All points are repeatedly crossed out in violet ink]

1. Kern
2. Stanislavsky
3. Gornfel’d
4. Dostoevsky
5. Early childhood
6. James

[Separate notes written in red ink:]

[With a drawing of a birdhouse viewed from the front and from the side.]

The birdhouse.

Designing < which > holes [to locate where].

Planning, drilling a hole using which instrument?

Only from the combination of designing + planning in inner speech in the concept of the “birdhouse.”

Labor, speech, thinking.

Activity and speech in the school child.

Designing—the goal, the path, the *planning*, the technological process.

The external execution—realization, the assessment, the *checking*.

<...>

Designing—the *concept*.

Designing + technological planning are combined in inner speech.

The “law” *is formed*.

About the degree of generality of concepts

This note is written in violet ink on the back of the reproduction of an aerial picture cut into parts (caption: “Drawing 3. A plot of flood-lands (reduction from a picture of 18 × 24 cm, height 3000 m”). Just two parts (2 and 3) have been found; the text begins with point 6. Other notes on the same reproduction and in the same ink were presumably written in 1934 (see chapter 25). The document contains propositions that were elaborated in chapter 6 of *Thinking and speech* regarding the law of the equivalency of concepts and the degree of generality of concepts. Some passages literally repeat the text of *Thinking and speech* but there are differences as well: In particular, the order of exposition of the material differs (the propositions 6–10 are elaborated in sections 6 and 7 of chapter 6, proposition 11 in section 2), and not all of the present examples are in the final text of *Thinking and speech*. If the present text is a draft for part of chapter 6, this confirms the idea that that chapter was one of the last chapters to be written.

6. For a long time (and in vain), we have sought for a (reliable) symptom to qualify the structures of generalization in real word meanings (syncretic wholes, complexes, etc.) and thereby for a bridge from the experiment to the real concepts: Apparently, it lies in the *degree of generality* because this (the degree of generality) is the most basic and essential feature of each meaning (*to be a meaning is to stand in certain relations of generality to other meanings, i.e., to have a specific degree of generality*), which can be a most reliable criterion of the structure of generalization of real concepts: the relationship of the *Ober-* and the *Unterbegriff*.²⁸
7. The method of defining concepts (+ Selz’s method), when modified and re-cast from our point of view, may be one of the basic methods to determine the structure of the concept. [Boxed:] The disintegration of the unity of the concrete and the abstract in meaning is the disintegration of the degree of generality. *Inde* the symptom (abstract) and the countersymptom (concrete). For the schizophrenic, the figure becomes the ground. For the *epi*[leptic patient] the background becomes the Figure.
8. The disintegration of the *degree of generality: figure and ground*. In normal meaning, its degree of generality (longitude and latitude) is given, i.e., the relation to the *Ober-* and *Unterbegriff* (the longitude) and to the concepts of its own level, i.e., of the same generality (the latitude). The intersection of the longitude and the latitude is the figure; the longitude and latitude are the background. *A new degree of generality for each structure of generalization: a*

new figure and ground (for example, a flower in a two-year old child *without the background*—a rose is an *Unterbegriff* and a plant is an *Oberbegriff*—is *another concept* than in a seven-year old).

9. The adult preserves the possibility to move in the plane of complexive generalizations. Cf. the reverse movement from the concepts of algebra to arithmetic. It would be foolish to orientate oneself in everyday situations conceptually. Cf. complexive thinking is adequate in memory, but in complexive thinking one can only memorize what is logically true (the Uzbeks). A complex descent along the levels of generality.
10. Neither associative nor structural (*Gestalt*) connections determine the movement of the concepts. But which ones do? For example, which non-associative connections determine the memory for ideas in Bühler's experiments? These connections were described phenomenally and non-psychologically: end-means (Selz). What is memory of meaning, a connection based upon meaning? We must turn from the study of the cell (= the concept) to the study of the tissue of thought. Then it will become apparent that the concepts are connected not as an aggregate and not by threads (associations) but according to the very essence of their nature—according to the principle of generality. Cf. Wertheimer's psychology of the syllogism²⁹: The usual syllogism is unproductive; it is necessary that X, which is part of structure A, also enters structure B. *Ergo*, restructuring³⁰ is a basic requirement for thinking (cf. Köhler). How is this possible and that X entered the structure of A and B? Through the highest degree of generality, through the *Oberbegriff* (remembering in Wertheimer): We as it were rise above A, the background becomes the figure, we descend to B. Cf. in perception < figure/ground > voluntariness + *Denkstruktur*.³¹
11. We have always seen that *meaningful* and *active* (in the sense of what Spinoza says about the active affect) memory is the same thing, the reverse from different sides; that we can with the same right as we speak about voluntary attention and logical memory, speak about logical attention and voluntary memory; that the higher psychological functions are simultaneously and to the same degree intellectualized and volitional functions; that conscious awareness and mastery go hand in hand³²: All this (which is one of the most central tenets of our theory of the higher psychological functions) *implicite* fully includes the unity of the dynamic-semantic systems: our correction of Lewin and Lewin's correction of us. This must be developed *explicite*. Before §11 I disclosed one shortcoming of *The Adolescent*; in §11 a second shortcoming, and the third shortcoming is³³:
12. The problem of generalization (and the degree of generality) and communication: various structures of generalization have various degrees of generality; in the communication between the child and the adult with various structures of generalization the degree of generality, which is the basic condition for adequate understanding, will be different; *ergo*, comprehension will always be miscomprehension, specific for the communication with *every* age level.
13. [Here the note breaks off.]

Notes

1. Vygotsky wrote repeatedly about the ideal form and its interaction with the real or initial form as a phenomenon specific for child development. Cf. Vygotsky (2001), pp. 80–88; Vygotsky (1998), p. 307.
2. This criticism may sound strange to all Vygotskians who have accused Piaget of ignoring the social aspect of child development. The point is that the early Piaget paid much attention to the role of interaction and communication in the child's intellectual and moral development.
3. Ingrowing (*vrashchivanie*) was Vygotsky's term for internalization or interiorization. Many scholars have tried to formulate that concept in ways that avoid dualistic connotations.
4. Refers to chapter 9 of Engels' *Dialectics of Nature*: "The development of labor necessarily helped to bring the members of society closer together by multiplying cases of mutual support, joint activity, and by making clear the advantage of this joint activity to each individual. In short, men in the making arrived at the point where *they had something to say* to one another. The need led to the creation of its organ; the undeveloped larynx of the ape was slowly but surely transformed by means of gradually increased modulation, and the organs of the mouth gradually learned to pronounce one articulate letter after another." See <http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1883/don/ch09.htm>.
5. Robert Mearns Yerkes (1876 to 1956). American psychologist who specialized in comparative psychology. In 1929, Yerkes visited Moscow where he met Nadezhda Ladygina-Kohts.
6. Refers to p. 8 of Sapir (1921): "There are, properly speaking, no organs of speech; there are only organs that are incidentally useful in the production of speech sounds... speech is not a simple activity that is carried on by one or more organs biologically adapted to the purpose. It is an extremely complex and ever-shifting network of adjustments—in the brain, in the nervous system, and in the articulating and auditory organs—tending towards the desired end of communication... Physiologically, speech is an overlaid function, or, to be more precise, a group of overlaid functions. It gets what service it can out of organs and functions, nervous and muscular, that have come into being and are maintained for very different ends than its own." Edward Sapir (1884 to 1939). American linguist and anthropologist, student of Franz Boas, and in psychology chiefly known for the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis—developed with his student Benjamin Lee Whorf—which says that the structure of language affects the speaker's worldview or cognition. Amidst the cards dedicated to *The Psychology of Art*, we found a summary of Sapir (1921), which Vygotsky had read in the original.
7. *Lillusion héroïque de Tito Bassi* (1916) is a novel by the French writer and poet Henri de Régnier (1864 to 1936).
8. Aleksandra Platonovna Usova (1898 to 1965). Russian pedagogue and specialist in preschool education. Usova taught at the Herzen State Pedological Institute from 1926 and headed the Faculty of Preschool Education at that Institute from 1932 to 1941.

9. Artur Kern (1902 to 1988). German educationalist and psychologist specialized in reading instruction who worked in Freiburg and published together with his brother Erwin Kern (1897 to 1988), who also was an educationalist. Vygotsky refers to Kern (1929), in which Kern asked children of various age groups and intelligence levels to practice silent reading in an effort to study innerspeech.
10. In a nascent state, just emerging (Latin).
11. Sense and meaning (French).
12. Probably refers to a patient suffering from agnosia, who does not experience the carafe as an integral whole with meaning but as a conglomerate of disconnected physical properties. For similar examples, see Zeigarnik and Birenbaum (1935).
13. Nadezhda Konstantinovna Krupskaya (1869 to 1939). Russian revolutionary and Deputy Minister of Education from 1929. Krupskaya was actively involved in the reform of Russian education and also improved the public library system. Over the years, she lost much of her initial revolutionary fervor and became a vocal defender of literary censorship and central control. She was married to Vladimir Ulyanov from 1898 onward.
14. Probably refers to the section “The intellectual contrast between brute and man” in chapter XXII of James (1890): “And if the most prosaic of human beings could be transported into his dog’s soul, he would be appalled at the utter absence of fancy which there reins. Thoughts would not be found to call up their similars, but only their habitual successors. Sunsets would not suggest heroes’ death, but supertime.”
15. Perhaps refers to the instruction in an experiment.
16. Passions (Latin).
17. In several studies carried out by Vygotsky and his associates, patients were asked to define concepts. Cf. Samukhin, Birenbaum, & Vygotsky (1934), and Birenbaum & Zeigarnik (1935).
18. Franz Seraphicus Grillparzer (1791 to 1872). Austrian poet and dramatist, whose best plays are still popular in German-speaking countries.
19. I would like to write a (a tragedy) in thought (German). Actually, Grillparzer wrote “I would like *to be able* to write a drama in thought. It would become a masterpiece!” Cf. Stein (1955).
20. Fiction (or poetry) and truth (German). Title of Goethe’s autobiography but now a common expression in German.
21. In the whole passage, Vygotsky simply gives the first letters of the words of Tyutchev’s line.
22. Vossler gives examples of cryptic sentences or expressions than can mean various things. The French saying *bon capitaine, bon soldat* (“good captain, good soldier”), for example, does not mean that a good captain is a good soldier but that a good captain *has* good soldiers. “The boy is not stupid” is a euphemism for “that boy is really smart,” and the phrase “Did you lose something here?” is said by Germans to someone who comes too close or is importunate. See p. 108 of Vossler (1923). The other Russian expressions are used to get rid of a person.

23. An older form of the Russian word *istina* (truth).
24. As explained before, Vossler (1923) argued that normal language varies between the extremes of, on the one hand, artistic creation, which can violate many grammatical rules, and, on the other hand, mathematical notation, which is, in a way, pure grammar that leaves no degrees of freedom.
25. Refers to the beginning of Pushkin's poem "Wandering the noisy streets" (1829): "Wandering the noisy streets / Entering the crowded church / Sitting among wild young men / I am lost in my thought." In the poem, the protagonist walks around, realizes he will eventually die, and looks at the things and persons that will survive him. See <http://www.poetarium.info/pushkin/noisystreets.htm>.
26. The law of or discrepancy (French). This law was formulated by Claparède, and it is the same as his law of the "prise de conscience." As we saw before, Claparède used this law to express the idea that children are first able to carry out certain operations and only later become consciously aware of them. In Piaget's theory, this notion became known as "vertical" . In addition, Piaget introduced what he called "horizontal" décalage. This refers to fact that when children have mastered a certain operation, they cannot immediately apply it to all similar problems, as one would expect in a strict stage theory. Vygotsky refers to the law in "The concrete psychology of man" (Vygotsky 2005, p. 1022).
27. The formulation, the way the idea is expressed (Latin).
28. Superordinate and subordinate concept (German). Cf. *Thinking and speech*. See p. 192 of Vygotsky (1987).
29. Refers to chapter 3 of Wertheimer (1925), in which Wertheimer discussed under what circumstances the Barbara syllogism can be productive, i.e., yield really new information.
30. Here Vygotsky (1987, p. 233) has "destruction," but Wertheimer is talking about what he calls *Umzentrierung* i.e., seeing something from a new perspective, so the terms "restructuring" or "transformation" seems more adequate.
31. Structure of thought (German). Cf. *Thinking and speech* See p. 233 of Vygotsky (1987).
32. Cf. *Thinking and speech*. See p. 191 of Vygotsky (1987).
33. The *Pedology of the Adolescent* came out in three volumes in three successive years. In the next chapter, Vygotsky again explains that he saw three shortcomings of the book.

References

- Birenbaum, G. V., & Zeigarnik, B. V. (1935). K dinamicheskomu analizu rassstroystv myshleniya. *Sovetskaya Nevropatologiya, Psikhatriya i Gigiena*, 4, 75–98.
- James, W. (1890). *The principles of psychology*. New York: Henry Holt and Company.
- Kern, A. (1929). Vom inneren Sprechen: Eine experimentelle Untersuchung. *Zeitschrift für Kinderforschung*, 35, 420–447.
- Mecacci, L. (2015). Vygotsky's reception in the West: The Italian case between Marxism and communism. *History of Human Sciences*, 2(28), 173–184.

- Samukhin, N. V., Birenbaum, G. V., & Vygotsky, L. S. (1934). K voprosu o dementsii pri bolezni Pika: klinicheskoe i eksperimental'no-psikhologicheskoe issledovanie. *Sovetskaya Nevropatologiya, Psikiatriya i Psikhogigiena*, 3, 97–135.
- Sapir, E. (1921). *Language: An introduction to the study of speech*. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company.
- Stein, G. (1955). *The inspiration motif in the works of Franz Grillparzer*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
- Van der Veer, R., & Valsiner, J. (1991). *Understanding Vygotsky: A quest for synthesis*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Vossler, K. (1923). *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Sprachphilosophie*. München: Verlag der Hochschulbuchhandlung Max Hueber.
- Vygotsky, L. S. (1929). [Review of] C. & W. Stern. *Die Kindersprache. Estvestvoznanie i Marksizm*, 3, 185–192.
- Vygotsky, L.S. (1987). *The collected works of L.S. Vygotsky. Vol. 1. Problems of general psychology*. New York: Plenum Press.
- Vygotsky, L.S. (1998). *The collected works of L.S. Vygotsky. Vol. 5. Child psychology*. New York: Plenum Press.
- Vygotsky, L. S. (2001). *Leksii po pedagogii*. Izhevsk: Izdatel'skiy Dom 'Udmurtskiy Universitet'.
- Vygotsky, L.S. (2005). Konkretnaya psikhologiya cheloveka (pp. 1020–1038). In *Psikhologiya razvitiya cheloveka*. Moscow: Smysl; Eksmo.
- Wertheimer, M. (1925). *Drei Abhandlungen zur Gestalttheorie*. Erlangen: Verlag der Philosophischen Akademie.
- Yasnitsky, A., & Van der Veer, R. (Eds.). (2016). *Revisionist revolution in Vygotsky studies*. London: Routledge.
- Zeigarnik, B. V., & Birenbaum, G. V. (1935). K probleme smyslovogo vospriyatiya. *Sovetskaya Nevropatologiya, Psikiatriya i Psikhogigiena*, 4, 57–74.

Chapter 22

Psychology as a Science

The present chapter is based on texts written in pencil and in ink of various colors on sheets torn from two different notepads. The sheets were kept together presumably because they are thematically connected and written around the same time. Not all of the content of the notepad is published here, and the order of the notes has been reconstructed. The text on the sheets of the first type, the more narrow ones, are partially damaged where they were torn from the notepad. Thematically they resemble parts of the text of chapter 6 of *Thinking and Speech* (the development of word meanings, the degree of generality of concepts, the zone of proximal development, written and oral speech, the analysis into elements or units), but others are not considered there (the problem of freedom, the semantic field, the self-movement of concepts, etc.). Several of the topics are also clearly related to the lectures Vygotsky gave in Leningrad in 1933. Not published here is an excerpt from Lewin, called “Die mathematische Darstellung psychischer Felder” (“The mathematical presentation of mental fields”) and a summary of a communication by Abram Epshteyn¹ entitled “About oneritic consciousness,” dated June 30, 1933.

The sheets of the second type, from a somewhat broader notepad, contain notes about lectures on puberty or adolescence,² methodological notes for Leont’ev and Luria, observations of patients, consultations in the EDI and Donskaya Clinics, and administrative entries: addresses, telephone numbers, bills from the typist, corrected proofs for the publisher, etc. Among the addresses and telephone numbers, we find the names of persons living in Moscow (Blyuma Zeigarnik, Oleg Flerov,³ Klavdiya Poltavskaya,⁴ Vladimir Kristman,⁵ Aleksey Likhachev,⁶ V.S. Uzin), Leningrad (Daniil El’konin, Yevgeniya Zeyliger, David Vygodsky), and Kharkov (A.P. Vasil’chikova). All addresses have been crossed out, which may mean that Vygotsky visited those persons. Of special interest among the observations of patients are the notes on patients Z. and K., who formed the topic of Vygotsky’s posthumously published paper on Pick’s disease (Samukhin, Birenbaum, & Vygotsky 1934). Vygotsky attached great value to these cases and followed up the patients until his death, as is apparent from his last notes (see chapter 29). Among the notes is also a brief summary of a communication by Shmaryan about the problem of anosognosia (the unawareness of one’s disability or disease). Yet another brief note is called “Bromural 0,3–0,5,” which indicates that Vygotsky had a private or professional interest in that (at the time) rather popular sedative.

[Sheets of the first type. Text written in blue ink:]

NB! On the definition of psychology as the science of mental life.

1. Life not in the biological sense, but in the sense of a biography, a life description. After all, it is not breathing and blood circulation that form the topic of a biography, of one's existence, of a drama, of a novel, but the events of a human life, i.e., the problem of the *psychologie concrète*⁷ comes first.
2. It would be possible to define psychology as the science of psychological life (Bergson has such an expression), but that would be a tautological definition. Tautological definitions are the most exact definitions (identity) but not the most fruitful ones. One might say that [the note is continued in pencil] psychology is the science of psychological processes, or that psychology is the science of psychology, because language wisely calls the object of psychology (mind) "psychology." That is true. It is the best of all possible definitions.

But it is fruitless, because it does not bring us one step closer to the solution of the question. That is why it is better to have a definition that is less exact, that does not fully reveal its object, that is not mathematically identical to the left part of the equation but only partially reveals it, albeit in a one-sided way, and provides a fraction, an approximate solution, but one that concentrates on the essentials. That is why in the first stage the tautology must be avoided at all costs; we must fight our way through it, but not in order to reject it, but to return to it. For we will use the left part of the equation (i.e., the psychological part), and not the right one, not what is disclosed. Thus, we must for a moment move away from the tautology in order to return to it. The task of a definition is very modest: At the beginning of a course or a scientific study, it must *make it possible* to accumulate the content of the tautology. In essence, each chapter of psychology provides something for the definition (for the satiation with content) of the concept "psychological." In other words, a definition must provide a general direction, a tendency, a point of view, that makes everything that will be studied (investigated) a psychological fact. The first definition, thus, must not be exhaustive but should rather give an indication. At the end of the course, it must make the tautological definition informative.

<That is why> we must determine, disclose what *psychological* is, *ergo*, in the definition of psychology, this term must be avoided. To say that psychology is the science of psychological life also *implies* to disclose the meaning and essence of what "psychological" is. For psychological life is the psychological. The study of the mental processes from this viewpoint (from life) of psychological science differs from that of logic and law. This is better than to define the psychological as the psychophysiological. The phenomenon of mental life and the psychological fact are synonyms crossed out: [of mental life].

NB!

1. Meaningful perception: (a) generalization (*Denkstruktur*), (b) communication (about it), (c) a social object according to Marx, (d) the stage of the free attitude to the situation.

The same—a, b, c, and d—in relationship with the semantic action. On § (c): Marx—the conscious attitude to one's properties and activity as [to] a social activity.

Semantic actions in play and other creative activities⁸ (drawing + labor).

NB! The three main shortcomings of *The Adolescent*:

- (a) The three parts—*affect*, *concepts*, *growing into culture*—are formulated correctly. But there is no connection—The direct movements (from the *affect*) from being to consciousness and the absence of dynamic–semantic connections and a system in the concepts, *inde*, in that there is neither a connection in the reverse movement from consciousness to being: *volition*.
- (b) There is no connection (from communication—*generalization*) between the second and the third part: *concepts–ingrowing in culture*, like in (a) there is no connection between the first and the second part.
- (c) But the main shortcoming is in the second part in the history of the development of the concepts: [continued with pencil] Each time in every stage (*syncretic wholes*, *complexes*, *concepts*), we studied the relationship “*word–meaning–object*” *anew*, disregarding that each new stage in the development of *generalization* rests upon the *generalizations* of the preceding stage, i.e., upon *generalizations of generalizations* (upon an idea of an idea), i.e., the new structure of *generalization* does not emerge from the *generalization of objects* but from the *generalization of objects generalized in the previous structure* (in *complexes*). That is why there is no real *self-movement* in the development of the concepts, no *inner* connection between the stages. We have been accused of the opposite: that we present *self-development*, but that we should, they say, deduce each stage from a new external cause. In actual fact, there is no *self-movement* to the end. An external one—in the communication (cause and effect, which change places). This followed from the experiment and its conditions: The concepts came simply *after* the complexes but did not result *from* them. We might conclude from our experiment, analyzing as in XX [see the Addenda]. That is why we arranged the stages as a series of circles moving in a single plane, whereas we should have arranged them as a spiral, as a series of connected and ascending circles. Cf. General representations develop from *generalized perceptions* and not from *isolated representations*. The *isolated representation* [comes] *later* than the *general representations*.

Cf. the schema:

	Not like this	But like this
Early childhood	Preschool age	School age
Isolated perception	Isolated representation	Generalized perception
Generalized perception	Generalized representation	Isolated representation Generalized representation

Cf. arithmetic and algebra: The preconcept is an abstraction of the number from the object; the concept is an abstraction from the number (each number). The abstraction and generalization of *one's thought* differs fundamentally from the abstraction and generalization of things.⁹ This is not a further movement in the same direction, not its completion, but the *beginning* of a new direction. Cf. in civics: One thing is *generality* and its growth *within* each group of concepts (isolated, general, categories); the other difference is *in the mutually shared generality* of the groups themselves: Categories are the generalization of general concepts and *through them* of phenomena, etc. The mutual connection between these groups.

XX. *Addenda.*

How does *one and the same* subject in solving a problem (of concept formation), from the beginning to the end, pass or move from complexes to concepts, etc. when we depict and study *the curve of development* of concept formation in the course of the experiment, i.e., when we study the *connection*, the *order* and the transition from one type of generalization to another (from one reaction to another)? This is our old and still largely unsolved problem of the *curve* (the dynamics) of concept formation, of the process as a whole. We provided a qualification of the individual reactions torn from the integral process, which we presented as having the same structure *irrespective* of their place and the process of development. This is a big shortcoming. Undoubtedly, it would turn out that (a) a subject, who gave three complexive reactions, in the fourth reaction would go by the discovered four figures and his previous reactions and *generalize* his complexes, and *via them*, and only via them, generalize the objects; (b) that, consequently, there is a connection between and a transition from one form to another; (c) that the new reaction is still determined, apart from the discovered and undiscovered figures, by the previous reactions; (d) that this must cause *leaps* in the transition from one structure to the other; (e) that this connection must make itself felt in dealing with incorrect solutions.

NB! 1. When we study the dynamics of the high (low, average) IQ, we see: I = IQ > 110, II = IQ from 90–110, III = IQ < 90.¹⁰

A Zone of proximal development > 4.

B Zone of proximal development < 2.

Let us compare:

1. IA In the dynamics of the IQ, there is not more similarity between 1 and 2, 3 and 4,
2. IB but between 1 and 3, 2, and 4. *Ergo*: Teaching depends more upon the zone of
3. IIIA proximal development than upon I[IQ]
4. IIIB

2. Further: Let us compare.

1. IA In the dynamic progress and development of the IQ, there is not more
2. IB similarity between 1 and 2; 3 and 4, but between 1 and 3; 2 and 4.

- 3. IIIA *Ergo*, not the absolute IQ is important, but the relationship between the actual
- 4. IIIB level and the level of the demands of school instruction: This relationship requires an *optimum* and not a maximum or minimum.

[Written in the margin:]

- A literates between literates, illiterates between illiterates.
- B literates between illiterates and illiterates between literates.

School age

I Beginning	Internal activity	Introspection	Systemic structure	Semantic structure	Perception	Activity	
	Internal activity connected with external activity	Nonverbal introspection ¹¹	Memory	Complexes	Constraint by the sensory field	Situationally constrained	The social situation of development at the end of the age
II End	Independence from external activity and coordinated with it	Verbal introspection	Intellect	Preconcepts	Voluntary change of figure/ground	Situationally free	period, which changes the personality, changes its relationship with the environment — <i>ergo</i> creates a new social situation of development

Written in red ink. [Part of the text is illegible because a damaged sheet:]

<illegible> two additional problems:

- (a) the child masters “flower” earlier than “rose”; but his “flower” is *narrower* than our “rose.” We must study *how* we move concretely from general to particular concepts and from particular to general concepts, i.e., concretely study the movement from two sides of the pyramide of concepts (Vogel)¹².
- (b) to explain the relationship—they do not coincide, but how are they connected —*two things*: (1) the movement along the lines of the generalization of generalizations in the development of the structure of meanings (complex, pre-concept, concept) and (2) isolated, general, categorial concepts (algebra, arithmetic, civics). In §1 about the structure, in §2 about the content. Perhaps a *different* structure (complex, preconcept, concept) in *one* group of concepts (isolated, general, categories) and vice versa: Are all the groups of these concepts on the same structural level?? This is the main thing. Is it true that the concept differs from the preconcept (the structure) like the algebra of concepts differs from the arithmetic (the general and the particular group)? If not, *which* connection is there between the stages in the structural development of concepts and (a) the degree of generality of the concept within the given group of

spontaneous or scientific concepts (rose—flower, the writing of numbers—the decimal system); (b) the generalization of generalizations in the saltatory transition from one group of concepts to another group (arithmetic—algebra; isolated—general—categories).

Is it correct that the concept is the conscious (generalized, self-conscious) pre-concept? Becoming consciously aware = generalization = mastery = communication with oneself = self-consciousness.

[Written in pencil:]

Cf. Goldstein—amnesic aphasia—it is possible to use both words, which have a very concrete meaning: The child says “flower” before “rose.” On the dialectic of the child’s general and particular concepts: the difference between the genetic and psychological relationship and the psychological one.¹³ But the meaning of “flower” is narrower than that of “rose.” This is possible because for the child and the adult the object-relatedness is the same, and one and the same object can be designated with an infinite number of expressions (meanings). The independence of the relation to the object from its meaning. But the child does not repeat the adult’s roundabout path from meaning to object but just the end of this path.

[Written in violet ink:]

NB. Apart from the *inter-stage movement* in the development of concepts (complex, preconcept, concept), there exists also an *intra-stage* movement (associative complexes—collections).¹⁴ The principle of the generalization of generalizations remains in force here as well, but it is expressed *differently*: The growth of the generalization within a given level and during the transition from level to level is *different*: Here there is a closer relationship with the object and the living direct–reverse movement from the general to the particular, the running across [to another level]; there [between the stages] it is a leap. We must bring together the development of thought with thought itself, but they wanted to make us search the causes outside thought. But if the generalization of generalizations did not exist, our previous work would be for nothing. They (Selz) have studied the *logical* relationship between the general and the particular, but we must study the *genetic* and *psychological* relationship between these types of concepts. In civics, we took various categories (stages), in natural science the intra-stage movement. Cf. <causality> in physics in Piaget: The most general category is directly connected with the object (the physical phenomenon), like in the experiments by Sakharov and myself irrespective of the primary, etc. generalizations of the phenomena themselves (in the complexes, preconcepts, concepts, etc.), but meanwhile the category is not a generalization of the phenomena (a direct one) but a generalization of thoughts (the algebra of thought). It is exactly these *intermediate*, mediating generalizations that we must study: We must disclose the *inner psychological and genetic* connection and movement of the concepts and categories. Cf. the arithmetical preconcept and the algebraic concept: (a) the inter-stage connection of the concepts; (b) the intra-stage connection; (c) the parallel growth of the freedom of the operation (just like the generalization of arithmetical thoughts differs

from the generalization of objects, the liberation from the constraint by the visual field differs from the liberation from the constraint by the number field); (d) the explanation of freedom from the reverse movement from the higher level to the lower level; the lower operation is a particular case of the higher one.

What is the difference between the adult's arithmetical concept and the child's? There is an algebraic concept behind it, it is a particular case, the operation with it is free, it is derived from a general formula, it is voluntary, it is a reverse movement from below¹⁵; in the child, it is the completion of the stage, a direct movement from below; there is nothing behind it. Just like the school child arrives at school with preschool arithmetic, and in the second grade arrives with *his* algebra, which grew from his arithmetic (conscious arithmetic = algebra; becoming consciously aware = generalization; generalized arithmetic = algebra). The child first masters the decimal system, i.e., he acts in the decimal system, and only then becomes consciously aware of it, but in so doing the child does not master the system but is bound by it. Becoming consciously aware of the decimal system is to act voluntarily in that system and in other systems (in whatever system: The criterion of conscious awareness is the possibility to switch to whatever other system). *This is the most important* because it means to *generalize the decimal system*, to understand it as a particular case of a general numerical system, to *form a general concept* in the decimal system.¹⁶ That is why the transition to another system is an index of the *generalization* of the decimal system. The child moves from the decimal to the pentimal system *in another way* before [the introduction of] the general formula (the direct path)— $100ax + e$ ¹⁷—than after its introduction: the reverse movement from the formula to the operation.

Examples: Add 5 plus 5.

For the adult: $a + b / 5 + 5$ \ the conditions of the problem. The *zigzag*¹⁸ mediated generalized meaning.

For the child: $5 + 5$ \ the conditions of the problem. *Without zigzag*, without mediation.

The counting of numbers is a real movement of the concepts within arithmetic. To count a number, abstracting from it, is something else than to count things: The connection of the higher generalization with the lower one and through that with the object. They suggested to us to causally explain concept formation *from outside* (to find the external moving force). Unfortunately we left the door open to such a question. But this is our shortcoming. In actual fact, we must substantiate the inner part of thought—the self-movement of the concepts. External forces, to the extent that they influence the development of the higher stage of the concept, function in the closest preceding stage, and act upon it, through it, but not apart from it. That is why the immediate cause of a new stage [is] the preceding stage in its real change in the interaction with external reality and inner activity as a whole. The arithmetic of the adult always functions on the basis of algebra, from above, according to the principle of the reverse movement, but the arithmetic of the child always functions on the basis of the arithmetical field, from below, according to the principle of the direct movement (Lewin). *Ergo*, the adult and child have two different fields, which

include the same arithmetical operation. Generalization (including algebra) always means the inclusion in a new *Denkstruktur*.

S.V. Shereshevskiy

The memory technique that he now uses: (a) He placed Spinoza's portrait in a niche, did not notice it, lost the word; gets into the dark corridor, does not notice the word; now breaks the window or moves the wall—the *Allmächtigkeit des Gedanken*¹⁹; (b) he forgot in the Academy of Communist Education the word *Dzholdash*: before that Syrma, before that, long before that Soldash.²⁰ In order not to mix them up, he took a pencil,²¹ but Dzholdash—he sees yellow (*Dzholdash*) splatters around the pencil; in the situation of the fence around the cathedral, a yellow fence (geographically), he lost the yellow pencil. It *merged* with the background, but the cow drew his attention immediately. It was necessary to make the pencil larger than the fence or to take a pencil that was *not yellow*: It is memory for thoughts according to the laws for objects. *The thought (the pencil) is forgotten according to the laws for objects that go unnoticed* (it merges with the background). Cf. the dream—The objects mesh according to the laws for thoughts (unrealistic illogic); in the dream, thoughts are transformed into objects. In schizophrenia, the objects are transformed into thoughts about them: *inde* the illogic and irreality here. In S.V. we see in vivo the transformation through visualization of thoughts into objects and objects into thoughts (into a memory image).

NB! On Spinoza.

1. According to the laws of nature, man is not a free being: People are not born free. In the nature of man as a natural being, there is no necessity to move from bondage to freedom. Freedom is not given; it is taken. It is not primordial but achieved in a difficult inner struggle. Man can become free, but this is as excellent as it is rare.²² The path to freedom leads through steep summits. Freedom does not lie in the plain; it is not accessible and within easy reach for everyone. It lies not at the beginning but at the end of a person's path. It is inaccessible to the child. It is not located in the depths but in the summits of the mind. But neither is freedom something supernatural for man; it is not something that lies beyond the boundaries of nature, and rather violates its laws than that it conforms to them, not a state within the state of necessity, but a possible change of the very nature of man (through life and not through mere contemplation of the good—*Video meliora*: The concept that became an affect, has its analogon in freedom that became life (a way of life) following its own laws—conscious, free necessity. The *amor intellectualis (Dei)* is so much higher than the simple fatalistic submission to necessity, which leads to the person's impotence and passivity: The *Amor Dei intellectualis* leads to the highest manifestation of human nature, to the power of the spirit (wisdom is more powerful than hope), to the activity of the autonomous free person. In essence, this is the *amor fati*: the love of fate. Incidentally: Nietzsche's idea of tracing the essence of culture in the individual (Krueger).

It is surprising that people saw (Bergson) the mechanicism, the human bondage, in Spinoza's theory but not the freedom that follows from the bondage: The pedestal (the theory of bondage) was noticed, but the statue (the theory of freedom) was not seen. The highest manifestation of this blindness reaches K. Fischer when he says that Spinoza himself is impossible in Spinoza's world. The opposite is true: Spinoza and his life are the actual realization of his theory of freedom.

2. Spinoza's idea of clarity as a criterion of truth, if we reject its epistemological content, is fully vindicated from the psychological side. Clarity belongs to the nature of consciousness as it belongs to the nature of light. Cf. the obfuscation of consciousness, obscure, twilight states of consciousness. In this sense, there is hardly anything that surpasses Spinoza's definition of the affect as a confused idea²³ that prevails in the presence of inadequate ideas and leads the blind person along the paths of his passions. The development of concepts, affects, and volition goes through stages of increasing clarity: Consciousness develops from as it were accidental, blind, foggy experience to excellent (solar) clarity. Consciousness is light.
3. Spinoza's theory *implicite* contains the whole acmeistic psychology, the whole theory of concepts, affects and volition, the semantic and systemic structure of consciousness, which we *explicite* developed. Spinoza has the *idea* of man, which can serve as a model for human nature: This makes his theory of the passions the prolegomena for a psychology of man.

[Written in pencil:]

NB! About Spinoza.

James: Spinoza's philosophy rests upon *quatenus*,²⁴ about the meaning of conjunctions, etc.

Most important in Spinoza is *sive*,²⁵ the play with synonyms: beginning with *Deus sive natura*²⁶ and continuing with bondage or the strength of the affects and freedom or the power of reason or bliss; compare with Rubinshteyn's French book.²⁷

In these *sive* lies the essence of Spinoza's theory about every question.

[Sheets of the second type. Text written in violet ink:]

A.N.'s and A.R.'s propositions.

Epigraph

1. The definition of psychology. Note in the margin: [The unconscious.]
2. The fundamental epistemological problem of psychology. Note in the margin: [Psychophys.]
3. The fundamental ontological problem of psychology. Note in the margin: [The unconscious.]
4. The fundamental logico-methodological problem of psychology.
5. The fundamental anthropological problems of psychology.

[Note added to points 4 and 5: [Causality. Explanation and understanding. Pheno- and genotype. Analysis into elements and units.] Added in pencil: Form and content.]

[Points 6 and 7 are added in pencil:]

6. [sic] Consciousness and its systemic and semantic structure.
7. The schema.
8. The theory of the environment. Relationships. Communication. Instruction and development. Consciousness and external reality. [An arrow connects the end of this sentence with point 7.]
9. Consciousness and dynamics. Affect and intellect. Spinoza's problem. Lewin.
6. [sic] The historical and philosophical perspectives of psychology.
7. Depth, superficial, and height psychology.
8. But mental life is no longer life; like the chemistry of proteins is not chemistry, but biology, the biology of mental life is not biology but psychology. *A new science: a connection and a rupture.*²⁸
9. The epistemological problem: The definition must be *general*—what is alive: Cover all diversity.
10. The definition of psychology *is a real fact*. This is the main thing: There is mental life, and mind exists only as mental life.
11. *The psychophysical problem via the unconscious (Hartmann).*²⁹
12. *Units*: Units have another relationship with the whole than elements. Units are not other elements, and the cell is in another way connected with the organism than hydrogen is with the Pacific.³⁰ That is, the meaning of the analysis is *another*.

[Written in blue ink:]

NB! On adolescence.

1. My mistake in *The Adolescent*—I did not bring together concept formation and the choice of a profession, ideology, worldview, personality development, etc. through communication—generalization.
2. Until now we have studied: why the child understands the adult *notwithstanding* the difference in generalization; now our focus is that communication develops according to the stages of generalization—it is insufficient in the earlier stages.
3. The preconcept and the concept: Cf. the arithmetical and the algebraic concept.
4. The school child abstracts the number from the names of the number (from the object); algebra [abstracts] from the number.
5. The developmental history of neoformations in adolescence:
 - A. Personality development—three paths: (a) splitting, (b) communication with the <mental> life of others, (c) introspection.
 - B. Ingrowing into the culture—from graphic concepts and new possibilities of communication.
 - C. The plan for life [results] from the autistic plan and its relationship to reality—Splitting is necessary—*Otherwise* the autistic plan is realized according to the <illegible> type: It does not pertain to the future but to the present.

Cf. *The Adolescent*. Veresotskaya: it is without the splitting of the autistic and the realistic plane.

[Written in pencil:]

Adolescence. [Part] I

NB. Lectures. *The negative phase*.

Normal pathology? The negative and positive content of the crisis. The neofor-
mation: splitting: It is the key to the negative and positive content of the crisis:
[They result] from one principle. Wolpert: the *Agnostik* is guessing.³¹

Normal pathology: Bleuler: Schizophrenia–Normality, not a typological age
characteristic, Bleuler himself from <illegible> -schizophrenia. Kibler.³²
Kretschmer. Lewin. *Ergo*, splitting is typological in the predominance of (hyper or
hypo) and pathological in morbid change (qualitative or quantitative).³³

Normal functions (blood pressure). *Splitting as a pre-requisite for the higher
syntheses of adolescence* (Cf. autonomous speech—normal speech). A constrained
force in concept formation, imag[ination].

Adolescence. [Part] II

Algebra = the arithmetic of concepts. Concepts and precepts.

Generalization and communication—concepts and precepts: The similarity is
abstract; the difference of precepts as real, graphic, thing-like. Cf. verbal syn-
cretism, the constraint by the number series, etc.

*The concept is communication of a higher type: indeingrowing into culture, into
progress, into ideology, into a worldview, into art, into a plan for life. The ego and a
plan for life: the person and his worldview.*

Why does splitting disappear: It does not disappear but is included as a con-
strained force in the higher functions. In the negative phase, it shows itself from the
negative side, in adolescence from the positive side: It exists in the higher syn-
theses. The transfer of the higher psychological functions inward (ingrowing).

The categories of time, space, and causality.

Patient Kh.

1. Imagery dominates everything. Eidetic-like phenomena.
2. The change of the *Erscheinungsweisen der Farben*³⁴ (Katz—Gelb).
3. Graphic memory + weakness of the abstract concepts; categorical thinking + its
situational nature.
4. The graphic (visual) change of word meanings (dream? schizophrenia?).
5. *Hidden* disturbances of the schizophrenic type?
6. The disturbance of categorical perception in schizophrenia (the disintegration of
categorical perception, its splitting, the splitting of color, the emotional tone of
the color is hypertrophied).
7. Asthenic condition. Gains weight <quickly>—everything goes by.

8. Drops off during meetings and lectures but heard and remembered everything; reconstructed the protocol with stenographic precision. A special condition of Schneider's type of *Ermüdungszustände*³⁵ and dozing off.

[Patient] Z.

1. Irrreality, fictitiousness, a tendency to *psychotic constructions and reworking in delusion*.
 2. Speech—*Ersatz* actions.³⁶
 3. Life in the past + Ribot's law.³⁷
 4. Catathymic reworking of reality: My father is alive.
 5. Speech is changed in the sense of a rupture with the object-relatedness (schizophrenia).
 6. There is no predicate (about what, but not what); her answers: repeats the question in the affirmative form.
 7. Amnesic phenomena of the gnostic but not the aphasic type. K. has the opposite. A unity of agnostic and aphasic disturbances (*optische Aphasie*).³⁸
 8. The opposite of K.: In his speech he is an aphasiac, she a schizophrenic, real—unreal.
 9. The relationship with the situation—She is tied to the field more than K.: Cf. the clock. Qua speech she is better.³⁹
 10. Agraphia, agnostic disturbances, apraxia.⁴⁰
 11. Resonator⁴¹—the principle of the experiment.
 12. The thought operations—the reconstruction of a structure.
 13. Aphasic disturbances: Words she translates into German but a sentence she repeats without translating it.
- (1) Experiments without instruction.
 - (2) Experiments in a conversation (speech).
 - (3) Experiments with *Ersatz*—speech and action.⁴²

[Patients] K. and Z.

She speaks with him as with us. She knows K., *but not him*, but about him. She asks who he is. *Communication and generalization*: She felt comfortable, she came home. He: Well, that means, everything is okay. She is speaking. He does not ask one question. She very easily switches to German and does not realize that her interlocutor does not understand her. *The semblance of a pleasant conversation*. (1) Who are you? (2) I know [sic] K. when he was young, I know him well, (3) tells *him* about K. and does not understand that he is K. To apply [her knowledge] to a person is impossible. But (4) I knew you, i.e., *alternately* knows him and knows K. To include it in the situation of a conversation between two people, to argue [–] speaks with herself and whispers.

A fragment. An adequate dialogue:

He: That's quite a while ago. *She*: Yes, that's what is called long ago. *He*: Of course, you can't remember everything.

How he consciously absorbs all this nonsense: It is quite a while ago, he forgot it.

Notes

1. Vygotsky may refer to “Sleep and its disturbances” (Epshteyn 1928), but it is also possible that he attended a talk that was subsequently published in Epshteyn (1934).
2. The notes are rather similar to the content of a lecture Vygotsky presented at the Herzen Pedagogical Institute on June 26, 1933, and may have served its preparation. Cf. pp. 233–255 of Vygotsky (2001).
3. Oleg Vsevolodovich Flerov (1899 to 1952). Russian physician, pedologist, and author of works about the hygiene of school children.
4. Klavdiya Vasil’evna Poltavskaya (? to ?). Russian pedagogue and director of the First Experimental Demonstration School of Narkompros, which was unofficially called the “School of Joy” (Vygotsky gives the exact address: Vadkovskiy str, 5–1). The school was the experimental platform for pedagogical innovations; children were approached individually; classes had no more than 20 children, etc.
5. Vladimir Ivanovich Kristman (? to 1975). Russian physician and specialist in internal diseases.
6. Aleksey Sergeyeovich Likhachev (? to ?). Russian pedagogue, at the time the head of School № 7 in Moscow.
7. Concrete psychology (French). Refers to the work of Politzer mentioned in chapter 10.
8. See chapter 28.
9. *Thinking and Speech*. Cf. pp. 230–231 of Vygotsky (1987).
10. This section about IQ, literacy, mixed classrooms, and the zone of proximal development is very similar to the content of a lecture that Vygotsky gave on December 23, 1933, at the Bubnov Pedagogical Institute in Moscow. It was published posthumously in Vygotsky (1935, pp. 33–52). For an explanation, see pp. 336–341 of Van der Veer and Valsiner (1991).
11. Vygotsky’s remark: ‘Cf. the nonverbal perception of the external situation with 8 months, the verbal perception with 3;8: the experiments with the pictures’
12. *Thinking and Speech*. Cf. p. 158 of Vygotsky (1987), but Vogel is called Fogel.
13. A cryptic sentence, possibly meaning that ontogenetically the word “flower” comes first and is used properly to designate various flowers but is still based on complexive thinking. The real scientific concept of “flower” comes much later, but to see the difference one needs to do a genetic analysis and not just a psychological one.
14. *Thinking and Speech*. Cf. p. 232 of Vygotsky (1987).
15. Meaning that the adult, when solving an arithmetical problem, finds a mathematical principle (goes upward) and applies this principle (reverse movement downward) to the problem.
16. *Thinking and Speech*. Cf. p. 231 of Vygotsky (1987).
17. The meaning of this formula is unclear. The usual formula is $x = x_k a^k + \dots + x_2 a^2 + x_1 a^1 + x_0 a^0$.

18. For the zigzag of free action, see “The problem of mental retardation” in Vygotsky (1993).
19. The omnipotence of thought (German). Apparently, Shereshevskiy made use of the classic method of loci.
20. *Dzholdash* (male, Kazakhstan) and *Soldash* (female, Chechnya) are rare first names, and *syrma* is a Tatar word meaning “quilted” (*Syrma* is a town in Moldavia).
21. The Russian word for “pencil” is *karandash* and thus has the same ending as the words to be remembered. The *dzhol* of *Dzholdash* makes Shereshevskiy think of *zholtyy* or “yellow.”
22. Allusion to the last sentence of *The Ethics*. Cf. chapter 13 for a similar passage.
23. *The Ethics*, Part III, General Definition of the Affects: “An affect that is called a passion of the mind is a confused idea.”
24. In the quality or capacity of (Latin). Refers p. 14 of James’ *A Pluralistic Universe* (1909): “Spinoza was the first great absolutist, and the impossibility of being intimate with *his* God is universally recognized. *Quatenus infinitus est* he is other than what he is *quatenus humanam mentem constituit*. Spinoza’s philosophy has been rightly said to be worked by the word *quatenus*. Conjunctions, prepositions, and adverbs play indeed the vital part in all philosophies; and in contemporary idealism the words “as” and *qua* bear the burden of reconciling metaphysical unity with phenomenal diversity. *Qua* absolute the world is one and perfect, *qua* relative it is many and faulty, yet it is identically the self—same world—instead of talking of it as many facts, we call it one fact in many aspects.”
25. Or (Latin).
26. God or nature (Latin).
27. Presumably Rubinshteyn lent him a French book.
28. Vygotsky’s remark: “But behind something new in science is something new in reality: this new thing, which transcends the boundaries of life, is freedom, <like protein—mental life>.”
29. Karl Robert Eduard von Hartmann (1842 to 1906). German philosopher, follower of Schopenhauer, and author of a rather incomprehensible book about the unconscious, which enjoyed great popularity at the time and may have influenced Freud.
30. *Thinking and Speech*. Cf. p. 45 of Vygotsky (1987).
31. Refers to p. 404 of Wolpert (1924) where the author describes that a patient has difficulty with reading and guesses the words he missed. Simultanagnosia is a rare condition characterized by the inability of an individual to perceive more than one single object at a time. The term was coined by Wolpert, and the syndrome is now associated with bilateral lesions to the junction between the parietal and occipital lobes. In Vygotsky’s personal archives there is an account of an internal conference fully dedicated to this syndrome.

32. Presumably Max Kibler (1900 to 1973), a German psychiatrist, writer, and collaborator of Kretschmer. Vygotsky may have read Kibler (1925).
33. This is a somewhat obscure passage, but its meaning seems to be that normality (N) and pathology are the extremes of the same scale and that the phenomenon of splitting or dissociation can be both normal and useful and take pathological forms. This was a position defended by, among others, Kretschmer, that Vygotsky apparently shared.
34. Modes of appearance of color (German). Refers to a study from 1911 by Katz, which was republished in Katz (1935). Katz extensively studied the phenomenological appearance of colors, studying shadows, different degrees of illumination, distinguishing between film and surface colors, and so on.
35. States of fatigue (German).
36. An action that can replace another action, be its surrogate. From *Ersatzhandlung* (German). See also chapters 25 and 26.
37. Ribot's law says that in retrograde amnesia, recent memories are more likely to be lost than more remote ones.
38. Optic aphasia (German). The inability to provide the name of an object while recognizing it. See note 23 of chapter 26.
39. Patients Z. and K. suffered from different disturbances: Z. suffered from reality loss and incoherent speech; K. showed an exaggerated form of object-relatedness, which resulted in overly concrete, situationally bound speech.
40. See chapter 26 for an explanation of the terms.
41. Unclear. Possibly Vygotsky meant to say that the patient strongly reacted to outside influences.
42. Patients Z. and K. were subjected to several tests concerning the emotional system, verbal thinking, and voluntary action. Cf. Samukhin et al. (1934).

References

- Epshteyn, A. L. (1928). *Son i ego rasstroystva*. Moscow: GIZ.
- James, W. (1909). *A pluralistic universe*. New York: Longmans, Green, and Co.
- Katz, D. (1935). *The world of colour*. London: Kegan Paul.
- Kibler, M. (1925). Experimentalpsychologischer Beitrag zur Typenforschung. *Zeitschrift für die gesamte Neurologie und Psychiatrie*, 96, 524–544.
- Samukhin, N. V., Birenbaum, G. V., & Vygotsky, L. S. (1934). K voprosu o dementsii pri bolezni Pika: klinicheskoe i eksperimental'no-psikhologicheskoe issledovanie. *Sovetskaya Nevropatologiya, Psikiatriya i Psikhogigiena*, 3, 97–135.
- Van der Veer, R., & Valsiner, J. (1991). *Understanding Vygotsky: A quest for synthesis*. Oxford: Blackwell.

- Vygotsky, L. S. (1935). *Umstvennoe razvitie detey v protsesse obucheniya*. Moscow-Leningrad: Uchpedgiz.
- Vygotsky, L. S. (1987). *The collected works of L.S. Vygotsky. Vol. 1. Problems of general psychology*. New York: Plenum Press.
- Vygotsky, L. S. (1993). *The collected works of L.S. Vygotsky. Vol. 2. The fundamentals of defectology*. New York: Plenum Press.
- Vygotsky, L. S. (2001). *Leksii po pedologii*. Izhevsk: Izadatel'skiy Dom'Udmurtskiy Universitet'.
- Wolpert, J. (1924). Die Simultanagnosie. *Zeitschrift für die gesamte Neurologie und Psychiatrie*, 93, 397–415.

Chapter 23

Dubious Moves

These are three documents connected with the presentations by chess master Benjamin Blumenfeld¹ and Vygotsky about the psychology of chess. The paragraph headings were added by the editors. The presentations were given in March and, because there is a reference to a late journal issue of 1931, they cannot have taken place before March 1932. Theoretically, Vygotsky's analysis relied strongly on Gestalt principles such as figure-ground, embeddedness, demand character, and so on. Vygotsky's personal archives contain more notes about chess, for example, excerpts from Richard Rétí's chess classic *New ideas in chess*.² This suggests that Vygodskaya and Lifanova (1996, pp. 247–249) were right when they wrote that Vygotsky not just knew how to move the chess pieces but was a more or less skilled player.

Psychology and chess 1

This note is written in green ink and in pencil on one sheet of paper. On the front side is the announcement of the talks in the House of Scholars; on the back side are the notes.

On March 30 at 7:30 p.m. there will be a talk-lecture about the theme “What can chess offer psychology and what can psychology offer chess” in the Movie Hall of the Moscow House of Scholars (Kropotkin str. 16, entrance №2 from Mervvy street).³

Speakers—prof. L.S. Vygotsky and master B.M. Blumenfeld.

PROPOSITIONS (master Blumenfeld)—Lapses in the thinking of the strongest chess players. What is their cause. Two elements in the process of chess thinking. Their distinguishing characteristics. Illustrations with examples where intuition prevails in chess thinking and the connection with lapses. The wide horizons in the scientific study of the question. The final task of the study, etc.

The talk is illustrated with examples from chess games on demonstration boards.

PROPOSITIONS (prof. Vygotsky)—The history and sources of chess. The perception of the chessboard. The law of figure and ground. The psychology of the chess move. The Buridan situation⁴ in chess. Understanding the opponent's plan. The laws of thinking, etc.

Admission by invitation

The chess bureau of the Moscow House of Scholars

[On the back:]

Alekhine⁵ did not count to 10: a draw, but he could have won.

An example: The game with Ryumin⁶—nobody saw that the q[ueen] could take the knight—he lost. This blindness [occurs] not just with traps note above the word traps: [blunders], etc., but always—from the positive or negative side: how he sees it.

*Marshall*⁷ does not see it: The queen takes the rook; he replies with the move he prepared in advance.

*The fool's mate*⁸: Wertheimer's structure A and B. *Generalization.*

Reasoning on the basis of the situation + the leap into the *invisible situation*. Not experience.

	<i>Es denkt</i> [in pencil]	<i>Ich denke</i> ⁹ [in pencil]
	<i>Intuitive</i>	<i>Reasoning</i>
	Synthesis [in pencil]	Analysis [in pencil]
(1) Source	Experience	Schema
(2) Awareness	Unconsciously (deep down we know the result—Plums will not drop) ¹⁰	Consciously (on the surface)
(3) Time	Very fast Sometimes there are brilliant combinations in a <i>Blitzpartie</i> ¹¹	Enough to reason aloud
(4) Volitional tension	Does not depend upon volition Depends <i>indirectly</i> Look for similarity: James' rule about a forgotten name ¹²	Enormous tension
(5) The subjective aspect. Emotions	Big role Excitement—better	Insignificant role (suppress it by volition)
(6) Individuality	Big role	Unimportant role
(7) Memory	Depends upon memory and pops up itself Written to the left in pencil: [If we formulate intuition logically, it will remain in memory!]	I do not remember how it was, and I repeat one and the same reasoning as many times as necessary

Psychology and chess 2

The summary of the talk is written in green ink, and the handwriting is unknown. On the back of the sheet are a printed chessboard and a name and telephone numbers written in pencil by Vygotsky:

Ul'yanov, Sergey Aleksandrovich.⁹
 Home [tel.] K21410
 Office 10 – 40 + 6.33
 The 30th 7.30
 Movie Hall, H. of Sch.

The theme (speakers L.S. Vygotsky and B.M. Blumenfeld)

What can chess offer psychology and what can psychology offer chess?

Blumenfeld's propositions

Lapses in the thinking of the strongest chess players. What causes them? Two elements in the unified process of chess thinking: reasoning and intuition. Their distinguishing characteristics (the source, the dependency upon the individuality and moods, the relation with volition and emotions, the ability in reconstructing positions, the duration of the process, its conscious nature). Illustrations with examples where intuition dominates in chess thinking and their connection with lapses. The wide horizons in the scientific study of the question. Favorable conditions for the study: laboratory conditions in a natural setting (the intensive thinking, the creative character, the dramatic nature of thinking, the chess clock). The final goal of the study: establishing the interaction of both elements of thinking and the mastery of the creative elements of intuition. *Vygotsky's propositions*

The history and sources of chess study. The perception of the chessboard. The law of figure and ground. The psychology of the chess move. The Buridan situation in chess. Understanding the plan and the combination of the opponent. Laws of thought (the graphic and the abstract in chess thinking). Various forms of chess play (correspondence chess, *à l'aveugle*,¹⁰ speed chess, and so on). Its emotional nature. Psychoanalysis.¹¹ Chess training.

[Followed by the name, address and telephone numbers mentioned previously.]

Psychology and chess 3

This note is written in green ink on two narrow strips of paper. From the third side the text is continued in pencil, and the lower part is creased.

NB! On the psychology of chess

1. *Lasker*¹⁶ the name is boxed: [My latest achievement in the area of chess was the play of equal positions. For a long time this was a very difficult task for me.

Such positions did not stimulate my fantasy, because they did not allow decisive combinations and they bored me.]

The fact is true. The explanation is incorrect: a Buridan situation.

2. The players spend time in the stage after the opening, when there are many possibilities—neutralize each other: this tires them.
 3. An experiment: Blumenfeld reconstructs an example that was already decided and lost by him (the decision of the game with Alekhine: just its meaning). Immediately reconstructs the figure (the meaning, the idea of the combination). [From here and to the end of the passage, the paper is creased and torn.] He reconstructs the background slowly (it does not take shape)—reconstructs the usual structures (the castling, the next, probably the queen, etc.), but in principle all the pieces necessary for its realization. An example of figure-ground.
 4. *An example of the difficulty of choice*: hesitating 40'¹⁷—various possibilities with \pm motives. All the time a diffuse mist: uncertainty. Was glad that he found the motive: He moved the pawn that he sooner or later had to move anyhow: got a bad game, but knew why it was bad, and played well, but all of a sudden 40'—the feeling: I am lost, I will lose the game.
 5. *An example of understanding the opponent's move* <Kapa>—Bernstein¹⁸ (a trap, pretending to have another plan). The chess player is a *dreamer*: He thinks: If this was not there, etc. Creates the desired position in his imagination, then realizes it on the board: the destruction of the structure is the *sine qua non* of chess thinking. The problem of productive thinking and generalization.
 6. *An example of the emotional aspect* (Lewin). Blumenfeld–Rosenkrantz.¹⁹ One stopped thinking where the other began (*Entspannung*).²⁰
 7. *Aufforderungscharakter* —not play the queen, but the rook.
 8. Example: Nimzowitsch.²¹
- (a) an elementary structure against an intricate background, (b) the unity of the whole structure, (c) the action along the line of the most resistance (weakens his position and thereby improves it, gives away his advantage—the exchange + pawns).

[The note continues in pencil:]

This is very unlikely to cross one's mind: This means that if it comes to mind, any fool would play it; the affect hinders this idea to cross one's mind, and it must be introduced—*volition in thinking*, the line of the most resistance. The player must be *free* from the *Aufforderungscharakter* of the pieces: to reassess the values when there is *Einbettung*²²—*the idea of the meaningful action in chess*: the meaning of the sacrifice depends upon the *Einbettung*.

9. This point is crossed out: [Blumenfeld's example: The chess king and <queen> are *eingebettet*²³ in one structure and cannot be seen in another structure. For yourself you see it better than for another.]
10. *An example* of figure-ground: Botvinnik—the Pole.²⁴
11. <Flohr>²⁵—Botvinnik: When the problem structure had been exhaustively studied, thinking stopped until the end.

[The following title is crossed out:]

<Author name illegible> (1923). About chess and checkers. *Vsemirnaya Illyustratsiya*, 9.

S.F. Golubev (1931). About “checkers mathematics” and about “checkers space.” *Shaski v Masse*, 9–10, p. 145.

Notes

1. Benyamin Markovich Blumenfeld (1884 to 1947). Russian master whose name lives on in the Blumenfeld Gambit in the Benoni Defense. Blumenfeld was a strong master who played against the best players of his time including Lasker, Nimzowitsch, Alekhine, Capablanca, Najdorf, Chigorin, and Rubinstein. He later studied psychology and wrote his doctoral dissertation about the nature of blunders in chess.
2. Richard Réti (1889 to 1929). Austro–Hungarian, later Czechoslovakian grandmaster, and with Nimzowitsch founder of the hyper-modern school of chess.
3. The Central House of Scholars of the Russian Academy of Science is a scientific and cultural center where researchers can meet in an informal setting and which serves a role in the popularization of science. It is still at the same address, although the street names have changed.
4. The French philosopher Jean (Johannes) Buridan (1295 to 1358) supposedly described the situation of an ass caught between two equally attractive bales of hay. Not knowing what to choose, the animal died from starvation. This was one of Vygotsky's favorite examples. See p. 239 of Van der Veer & Valsiner (1991).
5. Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Alekhine (1892 to 1946). Russian grandmaster and fourth World Champion who reigned from 1927 to 1935 and from 1937 until his death.
6. Nikolay Nikolayevich Ryumin (1908 to 1942). Russian chess master who was several times champion of Moscow and participated in the Russian championships.
7. Frank James Marshall (1877 to 1944). American grandmaster and US champion from 1909 to 1936.
8. The fool's mate results if White plays two extraordinary weak moves, i.e., 1. f3 e5 2. g4 Qh4#.
9. See chapter 10 for the German words. It is likely that the terms in the left column reflect the thought process during a blitz game, when pattern recognition and automatisms dominate and deliberate reasoning is scarce, whereas in

the right column we see the characteristics of the thought process in a regular game

10. See chapter 10, Note 57
11. Blitz game (German). In blitz games each player has 10 or (mostly) 5 min. Currently, with the use of Fischer clocks, there may be a time increment of several seconds per move
12. This refers to chapter 14 on association in James (1890) where the author discusses the fact that although we may have forgotten a name, we still have a dim idea about its properties, such as the number of its syllables or its sound, and can immediately dismiss the ridiculous suggestions by our partner. James then compares this situation with that of finding a solution to a problem and argues that we can only systematically crack our brain and then hope for the “spontaneous workings of Similarity” to produce the solution
13. We were unable to identify this person.
14. Blind (French). Refers to blindfold chess, where the player does not see the board.
15. Ruben Fine (1914 to 1993). This American grandmaster, who was one of the best players of his time and later turned psychologist, would be the first to write a book about the psychology of the chess player from a psychoanalytic viewpoint (Fine 1956). The first scientific monograph about thinking in chess was *Thought and Choice in Chess* (1965) by Adrian D. de Groot, who had grandmasters think aloud while solving chess problems. The heuristics thus found were subsequently tested in computer-simulation studies.
16. Emanuel Lasker (1868 to 1941). German grandmaster, second World Champion, who reigned for 27 years (1894 to 1921) when he was finally defeated by Capablanca. Vygotsky quotes the Russian edition (Lasker 1925) of Lasker’s (1922, p. 21).
17. Minutes.
18. Possibly José Raúl Capablanca y Graupera (1888 to 1942). Cuban grandmaster and third World Champion who reigned from 1921 to 1927. Ossip Samoylovich Bernstejn (Bernstein) (1882 to 1962). Russian grandmaster who fled to France after the October Revolution. Capablanca and Bernstein played four games, of which Bernstein lost three. The editors reviewed these games, but it remains unclear which game is indicated.
19. Karl Wilhelm Rosenkrantz (1876 to 1942) was a Russian master born in Latvia who played at quite a high level.
20. Relaxation, alleviation of tension (German).
21. Aron Isayevich Nimzowitsch (1886 to 1935). Russian grandmaster born in Latvia, Russian champion in 1913, and famous for his innovations in chess theory.
22. Embedding, embeddedness, integration (German).
23. Embedded (German).
24. Mikhail Moiseyevich Botvinnik (1911 to 1995). Russian grandmaster born in Finland, fifth World Champion, who reigned from 1948 to 1963 with two short

interruptions (he lost matches against Smyslov and Tal). Rubinstein, Tartakower, and Najdorf were possible Polish opponents.

25. Salomon Mikhaylovich Flohr (1908 to 1983). Ukrainian–Czechoslovakian grandmaster who later took the Russian nationality.

References

- De Groot, A. D. (1965). *Thought and choice in chess*. Amsterdam: Mouton.
- Fine, R. (1956). *Psychoanalytic observations on chess and chess masters*. New York: National Psychological Association for Psychoanalysis.
- James, W. (1890). *The principles of psychology*. New York: Henry Holt and Company.
- Lasker, E. (1922). *Mein Wettkampf mit Capablanca*. Berlin-Leipzig: Walter de Gruyter & Co.
- Lasker, E. (1925). *Moy match s Kapablankoy*. Leningrad: Nauka i Shkola.
- Van der Veer, R., & Valsiner, J. (1991). *Understanding Vygotsky: A quest for synthesis*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Vygodskaya, G. L., & Lifanova, T. M. (1996). *Lev Semyonovich Vygotsky: Zhizn', deyatel'nost', shtrikhi k portretu*. Moscow: Smysl.

Chapter 24

The Conference of October 27–29, 1933

This chapter is based on notes written in violet ink in an exercise book with a cream-colored cover. The name of the conference is written on the cover. The internal conference was dedicated to themes that are rarely discussed in Vygotsky's published writings. Vygotsky presents a plan for the study of child neuroses that differs substantially from the psychoanalytic approach; suggests an approach to the study of character development based on a new unit of analysis, the unit of experience; offers ideas for the study of psychomotor skills viewed as meaningful movements; and, finally, discusses the problems of difficult childhood (the upbringing of children who suffered from epidemic encephalitis). Among the persons who attended the conference were Vera Schmidt, Roza Averbukh,¹ Mariya Pevzner, and an unidentified person by the name "Ekaterina (Katya) Mikhaylovna." The majority of Vygotsky's propositions about these topics are little known and are just partially reflected in the lectures he read at the Herzen State Pedological Institute in Leningrad in the academic year 1933–1934.

[Written in violet ink:]

The conference on research themes of 1933
October 27–29, 1933.

Vera Fedorovna Schmidt. The problem of the development of the psychoneurotic child

1. Repression to the unconscious means in the first place exclusion from the general course of development: an immobile point in development. The unconscious does not develop. At any rate, it does not participate in the developmental course of consciousness.
2. The relationship consciousness-the unconscious takes shape around the age of seven years. The history of suppression, censorship, etc. The history of child morals is the history of the basic suppressing agent.
3. Depth, superficial, and height psychology. The external world is a hostile external force or a source of higher development (the ideal forms). The dominance of the early stages of development. The borrowed light of the

- unconscious. Development for Freud is the realization, modification, and combination of inherited dispositions. Neoformations.
4. Age is not just a pathoplastic factor in psychoneurosis. The development of the affective and volitional personality sides. The development of character and intellect.
 5. Complexes do not just exist in childhood (Kretschmer).
 6. There is no psychoneurosis without neurotic symptoms. The distinguishing features: a disturbance in the development of the drives; the (unsuccessful) repression to the unconscious; the organic and mental symptoms; specific developmental disturbances.
 7. On Adler: the study of the affective, but not the instinctive roots of psychoneurosis and + and –; the organ inferiority; the primacy of the drive for self-affirmation; development as a system of reactive formations and not as self-motion.
 8. On Benjamin²: a step back to superficial psychology; a step forward to development; there is nothing new in development (the crisis at age three); the (phenotypical) identification of genotypically different symptoms.
 9. The main tenets of height (acmeist) psychology *contra* the *Tiefenpsychologie*³ (sometimes *implicite* present in the latter but *explicite* developed by us): The relationship between Ego and Id, disturbed in the psychoneurosis, is derivative from the (conscious) development of the Ego and its relationship with the external world; *contra* the *Lust- und Realitätsprinzip*⁴: their unity; *contra* naturalism and metaphysics—pro historicism (humanized nature); the unconscious evolves from the development of consciousness; becoming consciously aware of the affect; the immobility of autistic thinking; not the depth regularities, but the height regularities, determine the fate of the personality; *contra* the history of the higher from sublimation; *contra* consciousness = perception.
 10. The main psychological problems of the psychoneurosis: splitting; affect and meaning; the dream (and the daydream) and its verbal basis; becoming consciously aware of the affect; *si superos nequeo*; Lewin's problems—*Ersatz*,⁵ unconscious motives, affective conflicts; the theory of the internal activity of the personality; inner blindness and unfreedom; the complex did not become an experience. *The experience*.
 11. The basic developmental problems in a psychoneurosis: neuroses in very early childhood, there is no neurosis before five years; character and intellect; the problem of the development of the affect; the problem of the child's ethical development; the history of the relationships between consciousness and the unconscious and the basic agents; the reaction of the personality to the psychoneurosis; the immediate causes of the illness according to age. Psychoneurosis in the mentally retarded, organic [disturbances], etc. in schizophrenia not from the clinical-medical viewpoint. The developmental change of the psychoneurosis.

12. The practical problems of the study and cure of psychoneuroses: the methods of investigating the core and the separate zones of psychoneuroses; education as the path to self-recovery + therapy. The practical diagnostics of psychoneuroses: This word lost every scientific meaning in practice.
13. Perspectives: preservation of Freud's basic thesis (a psychoneurosis is the result of unsuccessful repression, the conflict between Ego and Id,⁶ the higher and lower layers of the mind in the new system: Freud examines consciousness in light of the theory of the unconscious; we examine the unconscious in light of the theory of consciousness. *The new theory of child psychoneurosis*. Neither discover America anew nor consider it undiscovered.

Who wants to build a scientific psychology must follow another path: Freud did not provide a theory of consciousness; we cannot simply supplement Freud by adding a theory of consciousness; we must re-shape his facts and theories in a new whole.

14. Neurotic reactions relate to psychoneurosis just like schizophrenic reactions do to schizophrenia *mutatis mutandis*⁷: There we have the difference between organic and psychogenic—We don't have that here; but also there it is not essential, essential is the nature of the process and its fate. The reactions are not necessarily monosymptomatic; the psychoneurosis can also be monosymptomatic and the reaction can be polysymptomatic; the crux is in their different nature: the partial use of vomiting for the flight into disease, for the struggle after weaning. The flight is broader than the psychoneurosis. Added between the lines: [Neuroses are rare in children; neurotic reactions are *very* frequent: this is no accident. But determined by the child's age. The mentally retarded have *only* neurotic reactions!?!]
15. Psychosis and neurosis: Freud—In the psychosis there is a conflict between Ego and the external world (in addition the Ego and Id get involved); in the psychoneurosis there is a conflict between Ego and Id (additionally, external persons and the Ego get involved); the psychosis is a disease of consciousness, the neurosis a disease of the unconscious.
16. In infancy there is no psychoneurosis; in early childhood there is no psychoneurosis but something else; at preschool age there is psychoneurosis. Added between points 16 and 17, refers to point 17: [The affective disturbances of thinking:]
17. The neurosis also gives the diagnosis: debility and accelerated development. It is important to study motivation, intellect + temp[erament] and the type, etc. The non-intellectual aspects of the intellect. The mental capacity for work and productivity suffer.
18. Because Benjamin defends the symptomatic viewpoint, he lumped together psychopaths, neurotic reactions, psychoneurosis, mental reactions of development, primitive reactions, conflicts, etc., etc.

19. The problem of the psychoneurosis and early childhood: (a) They also fall ill at a later age, and as adults—and this is not just the *immediate cause* but also the cause in the proper sense of the word—the repression continues to function also later, instinctual life is disturbed also later; (b) it stands to reason that the history of childhood determines this situation to a certain extent, of course, but also no more than that; (c) but the unconscious does not develop, *ergo* there the relationship between the past stages and the newer ones is more *tight*, they merge and fuse together more easily than in consciousness, in which the *unchanged experiences* are not preserved *in their real form*. In the unconscious—the only agent!—a real interaction between the structures (experiences) of the adult years and the earliest years of childhood is possible, *inde* it is an *illusion* that the essence of a psychoneurosis always lies in the Oedipus complex and other formations of very early childhood.
20. We followed a path opposite to that of Freud (he [began with] the theory of the unconscious, we [with] the schema of consciousness), [but] arrived at the same problem. The different paths must make themselves felt (we arrived enriched at the same point), but neither can we simply begin our study from scratch.
21. The dominance of (early, past) stages of development.
22. Constitution and neurosis: the constitution of the drives. Another problem: neurosis because of various constitutions.
23. We try to clinically distinguish the concept of difficult childhood; meanwhile, in the theory of childhood psychoneurosis the opposite tendency became manifest—in diagnosis and in practice the = sign is put between the psychoneurosis and the difficult child (Benjamin + the school for psychoneurosis) or a related condition. The same with theory: We try to create a theory of difficult childhood, the conference on neuroses made a heroic effort to manage without any theory and to put a brave face on a sorry business (represented in Simson's talk—Benjamin's theory).⁸
24. The comparison with adults is a necessary aspect.
25. *The traumatic war neurosis!*
26. One can imagine the difference between a neurotic reaction and a psychoneurotic symptom easiest from the viewpoint of the essence of the symptom (it is a compromise between unconscious and conscious tendencies, has meaning, etc.) Can we really say that about the neurotic reaction? Does the child, for example, react with vomiting after weaning? That is *not a symptom*, but a *reaction*, i.e., a struggle for the lost pleasure. The means of the neurotic struggle, the flight into disease, etc. may form part of a psychoneurosis but may also exist outside it.
27. Contra *preformism* in the theory of psychoneurosis: It develops in childhood, the immediate cause revives it. Cf. Kretschmer: the complexes of adolescence—the fate of mature conflicts: The neurosis is not primordial—the possibility to explain the fusion of the psychoneurosis with infantile residuals (cf. № 19 above), but their role is like the role of the *Tagesreste*, the daytime residuals in the dream.

28. The *history of child dreams* would show when and how the relationship between consciousness and the unconscious takes shape, i.e., give the key to the history of these systems; on the other hand, it would demonstrate that the dream develops in accordance with the development of consciousness, of speech, i.e., it shines with borrowed light: (a) the dream has not a primitive character—contra Blonskiy; (b) the mechanisms of oneiric thinking develop with speech, develop later, just like speech (cf. the flow of speech).

R.A. Averbukh. Environment, experience, and character

1. The fundamental change of the pedological analysis. What is the holistic approach? Holism and analysis (*Gestalttheorie*). To replace the analysis into elements that transcend the boundaries of science and lose the properties under study (H₂O does not extinguish a fire) by analysis into units. Meaning is the unit of speech and thinking, the unit of play. Experience as the unit of the personal and the environmental aspect in the development of the character.
2. Macro- and microscopic processes in development. Experience is a microscopic, molecular, inner phenomenon in the development of the character. The complexity of the character structure. Simple and complex character traits.
3. We must first of all subtly analyze the relative and not the absolute indices of the environment. What is the existential task the child faces in the family? *The internal aspects of the environment*: Its ideology and psychology, its attitude to the children, the expectation (of what?), the guiding principle, the upbringing, i.e., *the internal but objective position of the child in the environment*, do not reside in the physical conditions (the cubic content⁹). The structure of the environmental influences (the whole and the parts, the guiding principle): It must be pedocentric. The interaction with the ideal form. The subjective and objective meaning of the ideal form.¹⁰
4. *The structure of experience*: the internal structure (the meaningfulness and its various degrees + the various degrees of inner freedom + the passive and active side of experience—*passiones* and *actiones*—in the experience the unity of suffering and functioning) + the systemic connection of experience (i.e., the tissue, in which the cell is present). The essence is the systemic and semantic structure of experience.
5. *The structure of the character*: the complex structure of the character and its various components: Id, Ego, and Super-Ego. Character is a function of the Ego. Contra: Character is just an armor, just a defense. It is true that the character stands at the border of the Id and the external world. Three types of characterological connections. Contra preformism in the theory of character (in Adler with 4 years). The center in the study of the structure of character: It emerges from a struggle and emerges geologically from co-existing genetically heterogeneous layers and strata. It is deposited development in contradistinction to the stable acquisitions. Character is individual.¹¹
6. *Most important and primary is the connection* between the environment and the character through experience. Character develops from experiences.

7. *About Kretschmer*: Ewald–Kretschmer mixed up the criteria for character and temperament; Bleuler—*Ich* and *cyclothymia*—general human mechanisms. Contra the sociologizing of Kretschmer’s types. Cf. the French work about the epileptoid nature as a feature of the peasant way of life.¹² The lack of structure and the juxtaposition of the character traits are to blame for the confusion. Strictly speaking, Kretschmer has Bleuler’s idea: There are three solutions for the problem of life: retreat, attack, and autism (the expansive, sensitive, and autistic character development), but in what relationship do they stand to the cyclo and *schizo*? Character transcends the borders of the Ego, is not exhausted by the conscious part of personality.
8. From the physical viewpoint, the resolving of water into H₂ and O[₂] is *not at all* analysis but ascent to the general: As a result of the “analysis,” we get more and not less than [exists] in the object of study: H₂O is suited for both the Pacific and the raindrop—It is about water *in general* and not about its individual properties (the extinguishing of fire, Archimedes’ law). The same in pedology: To say about a concrete particular issue (character) that it [results] from environment and heredity means not to break it down into its component parts (it is not an analysis).

Ek[aterina] Mikh[ajlovna]. The analysis of the psychomotor system

1. Recording, architectonics, sense. Inner speech and the motor system. The *psychomotor* system for the first time. The unit of the psychomotor system: the meaningful movement and not sense + the motor mechanism. Microanalysis. Internal analysis (the internal side of the motor system—the hidden sense). Cf. Ozeretskiy’s scale.¹³
 For <Katya,> “we” and the gesture of embracement of the grandiose (inflated) Ego—expresses the same: the unity of meaning and movement. The visible and invisible meaning of the movement: Visible is the movement toward the goal (mechanically necessary), and *this meaning* without which the movement is incomprehensible; but we never make only necessary and exact movements, therefore, movement always has a hidden inner meaning, which always expresses the *attitude of the person to the goal*, an inner obstacle, a struggle, a hesitance, a supplementary goal, a hidden tendency or motive, the zeal, the weakness, the exaggeration of the goal, the attainment of the goal as a demonstration, etc.
 We do more or less than is necessary from the viewpoint of the situation; in this *more* and *less* lies the key to the hidden meaning. The interpretation of the motor system.
2. Three paths to the study of the motor system: the empirical (Binet–Ozeretskiy, without analysis); the analytical—systemic—breaks down into elements, loses the properties under study, does not study movement (water) but the functions of the individual parts of the nervous system (H and O); the holistic analysis of O.B.¹⁴ Löwenstein’s analysis, Jung–Luria, etc.—the *tremor*, a meaningless movement, a disturbed movement.

3. Cf. Lewin's data: an amazing coincidence. But new is that not the external field, but the inner, semantic field is taken into account.
4. What is the holistic approach in the motor system: the *whole* child from the point of view of the motor system but not the *whole* motor system; the motor system as a *part* from the viewpoint of the personality. That part (the motor system as such) we do not know how to include in the whole, but here we have a cell in the tissue.
5. This is *not Ausdruckspsychologie*,¹⁵ not graphology: In handwriting the properties of the character are accidentally reflected, in breathing the emotions, but *how* is unknown. The handwriting (the letter) itself we read, the breathing itself we understand *without their* expressive equivalent (incidentally, we do not measure the mental side, but a pneumogram, the movement and its curve), here we should not compare things with graphology but with the non-understanding of a foreign language, with the inability to read a handwriting, with the interpretation of hieroglyphs.

*M.S. Pevzner. The development of the child after encephalitis*¹⁶

1. On the structure of the consciousness of the post-encephalitic:
 - (a) because character is *not acquired*, like forms of thinking, but a stratification of the geological type, deposited development, i.e., individuality (in acquisitions, i.e., products of development, there are individual traits and peculiarities, but they themselves—speech, thinking—are not individuality); the post-encephalitic has no character; (b) because there is no differentiation between consciousness and the unconscious, repression, etc. The structure of consciousness is close to that of a child of 5–7 years old (check this on the dreams of these children); products of development (acquisitions) they partly have.
2. On the theme of O.B.: These children show listless and aimless, i.e., senseless psychomotor acts; this must be understood in a double sense—(a) there is no *hidden* (inner) *sense*, (b) neither is there an external goal (the *Drang* finds its object—Thiele).¹⁷ Consequently, in these children, the *psychomotor* system is disturbed not in the sense of just psychomotor unrest but in the sense of a disturbance of the unity of the psychomotor act; the unity of motive, sense, and movement, of the semantic side of the motor system, of the proportions of the *psychomotor system*; *inde* these children's developmental path of the psychomotor system is totally different. In pure form this can be seen in nocturnal unrest. In light of the data of O.B., we should re-assess our judgement of the post-encephalitic syndrome as a lower disease as compared to schizophrenia as a higher disease.
3. The study of sleep and dream in these children (the history of dreams; sleep and schizophrenia, etc.).
4. The adult clinic. The comparison with adults is absolutely essential here.

5. The complex structure of the defect condition that emerges in the course of development and is built according to genetic laws. The primary and secondary. The change of the meaning of the primary in course of development: I know only two direct factual confirmations of the law of superseding in development: the variability of the divergence of the coefficients of similarity of MZ and DZ¹⁸ (the change of the role of heredity in development) and the analysis of the type of post-encephalitics. This—a clinical model of a certain anomaly of development + a model of the <medical> -pedagogical approach—is a theory of the education of the post-encephalitic.
6. The clinical method in the pedology of difficult childhood and in general. Contra the symptomatic approach. The quintessence: the relationship with the special sciences. The essence of our clinical method: Cf. §5 + the clinic of development. Here we differ from Thiele; in our contra [i.e., opposition to] the symptomatic approach, we differ from Gesell.
7. The main task: the *unit of the unhealthy and the genetic*; contra the breaking down into elements of pedology and pathology; for the post-encephalitic, this unit has been found, although we cannot define it exactly; the same in psychoneurology. That is why the problem of development is *formulated* here.
8. Conclusions: The post-encephalitic syndrome was considered to be the most immobile and intractable form (cf. psychopathy); in actual fact, there is an enormous range of developmental variants in the unity of the developmental path: Sterligov and <Kolya> Terekhov¹⁹ more or less follow the same path and are complete educable. The factual possibility of the “*ideal child*” with the post-encephalitic syndrome has been shown (Sterligov), but *everything* that is typical for the post-encephalitic syndrome is preserved to the same extent as in **moral insanity**²⁰: From the traditional viewpoint this is unexplicable, from our viewpoint fully explicable. This means we are right.
9. What in the rapid progress of our work do we owe to Thiele, and what distinguishes us from Thiele.
10. The fundamental importance of the work is enormous: The post-encephalitic syndrome gave much to psychoneurology but led to reactionary conclusions: the soul is in the subcortical area; **moral insanity** in the organic terrain; the brain theory of morals, etc., the localization of psychopathies. In actual fact, there is no connection between the unethical symptom complex and the post-encephalitic syndrome, it has been shown that the unethical symptom complex does *not* develop and arise *from a subcortical defect*: They are equally likely to become hypermoral (Sterligov) and amoral and *besides along the same path*: In this respect one incident is decisive. Again we come up against the problem of the history of child morals, without which one cannot work in the area of children with behavioral problems. Collect literature: Albrecht²¹ + Piaget + <Nel.> Dm.’s German book.
11. The facts of autonomous growth (the tumor of the intellect without a connection with the organism, with the personality).

12. We say “inferiority feeling” as if that is always the same. In actual fact, the inferiority complex is one thing, general inferiority another, etc. The structure (complexity) and functions of this feeling are infinitely diverse.
13. The underdevelopment of the character is a direct result of (a) the primary disturbance of the semantic side of the psychomotor system, which eliminates the “hidden sense” of motion and *ergo* the behavior based on character, because this is rich in semantic structures (the higher it is, the richer in the semantic respect, the more a movement or action is based on character), (b) the whole developmental path of the *Drangbewegungen*²² from the merging (interference) with intentions, i.e., the acquisitions of the sense of the movement from without. Who rejects this conclusion must reject these arguments as well.

Notes

1. Roza Abramovna Averbukh (1883 to 1940). Russian medical doctor who, with Luria and B.D. Fridman, participated in the Kazan Society and in the Russian Psychoanalytic Society and in that context defended rather ridiculous ideas (cf. Van der Veer & Valsiner 1991, p. 80). Later both Luria, Fridman, and Averbukh were hired by Kornilov to become his assistants at the Psychological Institute in Moscow.
2. Erich Benjamin (1880 to 1943). German Jewish pediatrician, pedagogue, and founder of juvenile psychiatry who in 1937 fled to the USA, where he could not continue his career, and eventually committed suicide. Benjamin was the head of a sanatory for children until 1935 when his life was made impossible by the Nazis. The observations in his sanatory formed the basis for Benjamin (1930), which paid special attention to environmental causes of difficult behavior, neuroses, etc., in children and was very well received. He also published a textbook with Hanselmann.
3. Depth psychology (German).
4. The pleasure and the reality principle (German).
5. See, for example, (Lewin 1932).
6. See Freud (1924).
7. The necessary changes having been made (Latin).
8. We have been unable to establish to which meeting this text refers.
9. As a measure of the housing conditions.
10. The ideas mentioned in points 3 and 4 were elaborated in Vygotsky’s course “Lectures on Pedology,” which was read in 1933 to 1934 at the Herzen State Pedological Institute in Leningrad (Vygotsky 2001).
11. Vygotsky’s remark: “But that does not exclude general laws of character formation and the typological study, but we should not begin with them, but with individuality.”
12. Possibly the French book borrowed from Rubinshteyn mentioned in chapter 22.

13. The metric method of assessing motor skills, or the Ozeretskiy Scale, is a method to investigate the motor skills of children and adolescents. The scale measures static coordination, dynamic coordination, and the harmony of movements, speed, strength, and the presence of synkinesis. The scale can be applied individually or group-wise and is applied outside Russia in various forms (e.g., the Lincoln–Ozeretskiy Test).
14. We have been unable to identify this author (see also later notes).
15. The psychology of expressive behavior (German). The approach was introduced by Karl Jaspers, who believed that a person's character expresses itself in his gestures, movements, handwriting, etc., which can then be intuitively grasped by the observer.
16. The study was published 2 years later (Pevzner 1935).
17. Rudolf Thiele (1888 to 1960). German psychiatrist and neurologist. *Drang* (German) can mean “drive.” Presumably the reference is to Thiele (1926).
18. Monozygotic and dizygotic twins.
19. Presumably patients with the post-encephalitic syndrome seen by Vygotsky.
20. A term popular at the time and written in English by Vygotsky. The concept was introduced by the English psychiatrist, James Cowles Prichard (1786 to 1848), in 1835 to designate mental patients whose intellectual faculties were unaffected. Subsequently, the concept was (erroneously) adopted to refer to patients suffering from what is now called a “psychopathic disorder.” Vygotsky wrote one brief note about moral insanity, presumably around 1927. Cf. pp. 150–152 of Vygotsky (1993).
21. Possibly refers to Kurt Albrecht (1894 to 1945), the German psychiatrist and student of Bonhoeffer, who was the last rector of the German University in Prague. In 1927, he published a paper on rhythmic movements in patients suffering from Encephalitis epidemica (Albrecht 1927).
22. Cumpulsive movements (German).

References

- Albrecht, K. (1927). Rhythmische Tretbewegungen bei Encephalitis epidemica. *Monatschrift für Psychiatrie und Neurologie*, 62, 330–337.
- Benjamin, E. (1930). *Grundlagen und Entwicklungsgeschichte der kindlichen Neurose*. Leipzig: Verlag V.G. Thieme.
- Freud, S. (1924). Neurose und Psychose. *Internationales Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse*, 10(1), 1–5.
- Lewin, K. (1932). Ersatzhandlung und Ersatzbefriedigung (pp. 382–384). In G. Kafka (Ed.), *Bericht über den XII Kongreß der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Psychologie in Hamburg vom*.
- Pevzner, M.S. (1935). Razvitie rebenka-postentsefalitika (epidemicheskii entsefalit). *Nevropatologiya i Psikiatriya*, 5.
- Thiele, R. (1926). *Zur Kenntnis der psychischen Residuärzustände nach Encephalitis epidemica bei Kindern und Jugendlichen, insbesondere der weiteren Entwicklung dieser Fälle*. Berlin: Verlag von S. Karger.

- Van der Veer, R., & Valsiner, J. (1991). *Understanding Vygotsky: A quest for synthesis*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Vygotsky, L. S. (1993). *The collected works of L.S. Vygotsky. Vol. 2. The fundamentals of defectology*. New York: Plenum Press.
- Vygotsky, L. S. (2001). *Leksii po pedagogii*. Izhevsk: Izdatel'skiy Dom 'Udmurtskiy Universitet'.

Chapter 25

The Semantic Field: Sparring with Lewin

This chapter contains documents connected with Vygotsky's reception of Kurt Lewin's field theory. It is well known that the work of Lewin—together with those of Wolfgang Köhler, Kurt Koffka, Karl Bühler, and Jean Piaget—formed a major source of inspiration for Vygotsky and that he borrowed many of their ideas. Much of the empirical work of Vygotsky's group consisted of conceptual replications of the findings of these scholars. In designing these replication studies and in theoretical reflections about their results Vygotsky aimed to find the strong and weak points in the works of his colleagues. The work of Lewin became increasingly important in the early 1930s, also because of the close personal contacts between Vygotsky and Lewin and his (former) students. Vygotsky's group not just used Lewin's (modified) research techniques but also adopted the conditional–genetic methodological perspective, the field–theoretical perspective, the focus on affective–volitional processes, etc.. (Van der Veer & Valsiner 1991). On the basis of Lewin's ideas about the psychological field and the sphere of irreality, Vygotsky also introduced the concept of the “semantic field,” by which he understood the plane of the generalization, of the mediated relationship to the world. In similar contexts, Vygotsky also used other terms, such as the “semic field,” the “field of meanings,” the “situation in thought,” and so on (Vygotsky 1999, p. 344; Vygotsky 2001, p. 79). See, for a more detailed account of the notion of the semantic field, see Zavershneva (2015).

The Kurt Lewin lectures

These notes were written on the back of a form from the publisher ONTI (“List of manuscripts submitted to the technical editors”), on the left part in pencil and on the right part in black ink. They were written during Lewin's stay in Moscow in spring 1933. Lewin had worked for a few months as a visiting professor at Stanford University in the US and planned to return to Berlin via Tokyo and Moscow where he had agreed to give some talks. In the US or Japan, Lewin heard that Hitler had become chancellor, and while travelling by train to Moscow he realized that the situation in Germany was getting increasingly dangerous for Jews and decided to emigrate. From Moscow, he sent several telegrams to colleagues in the US inquiring about job vacancies, and eventually the Lewin family

emigrated to the US where Kurt had received a position at Cornell University (Heider 1983; Yasnitsky & Van der Veer 2016; Yaroshevskiy 1988).¹ During his stay in Moscow, he frequently met Vygotsky, presented talks at the Institute of Psychology, and showed his famous film about Hannah, a girl of 1 year and 7 months of age who tries to sit down on a stone (see later text). It is likely that during Lewin's stay, Vygotsky served as his host, interpreter, and organizer of his professional activities. The first part of the notes gives a sort of summary of one or more lectures presented by Lewin: Given the wealth of German words, it is clear that the language of presentation was German. The second part is a sort of critique of Lewin's position and is dated May 3, 1933. It is possible that the notes were written on the same day.

[Written in ink:]

NB! Lewin. Lectures.

1. The field forces and the submission (the *Zuwendung*) to them are not sophisticated things: They are present in the infant and in the mentally retarded. Activity \neq maximal. *Zuwendung: aktive und passive.*²
2. The *Kleinkind's*³ conscious experience of the situation: It does not exist in the infant, that is why there are no barriers.⁴
3. The *sachliche Situation* \leftrightarrow the *persönliche*⁵: a piece of chocolate⁶—the person (an instrument or this is what he did). The social connection with the *Vl.*⁷
4. Highlighted in the margin with a square bracket: [The *soziales Feld.*⁸ The + and—change. The *Aufforderungscharakter* in social induction: the *paths to the barriers.*]

The induced field⁹ and the primary field are in conflict: The lie is an honest means; it suits both fields. The induced field is not an independent source of energy but changes the *Aufforderungscharakter* of the <things>.

5. *Tool—Induktion:* (the goal—the string from the parcel). *Realität und Irrealität*¹⁰

[Written in pencil:]

NB! K. Lewin May 3, 1933

1. Why do concepts liberate the action?

Two problems:

- (1) the relationship of thinking to the real plane,
- (2) shifts in the plane of thinking.

Highlighted in the margin with a square bracket: [When they fantasize, this is a shift in the same plane as in *Irrealität*, in thinking it is a shift in a more realistic plane.]

Encircled: [In thinking—leaving the forces.]

2. Why does thinking over the years acquire ever more meaning?

Encircled: [*Concepts*—the relationships in reality (numbers)—the *relationships of systems.*]

The main thing in thinking is freedom: *Ich kann was ich will.*¹¹ *From there* it is transferred to action. But freedom is born in thought.




Fig. 25.1 Switching between the plane of reality (R) and the plane of irreality (I)¹²

Encircled: [In thinking—leaving the vector field.] (Fig. 25.1)

Concepts—a new relationship + a liberation. Leaving the vector field.

The role of the semantic field

This is a note on the upper part of a form from the publishing house ONTI (see previous text), the lower part has been torn off. It was presumably written in green ink, but the quality of the paper makes exact conclusions hazardous. Only the first part is published here; the second part consists of brief excerpts from the writings of Melanie Klein and Charlotte Bühler.

[Written in ink:]

NB! The role of the semantic field:

“And all the while it seems and I remember and methinks
That the autumns of the past were not that sad.”¹²

Is this not the main aspect in the structure of a lyrical play: cf. “Wandering the noisy streets”¹³:

Everything gets filled with meaning.

In the infant: *Everything is in me and I am in everything.*

Always when a person sees, it seems and he remembers and he thinks.

[Highlighted in the margin with a square bracket:]

Meanings are no *psychische Gestalten* but *sozio-Gestalten*¹⁴: *the relationship—consciousness: my relationship to my environment.*

Written in pencil: [the *Nur-Gedachtes* in Köhler.]¹⁵

Two paradoxes

[Written in pencil on 1 library card (part of a series of 10 cards that is not reproduced here).]

Two paradoxes of thinking:

- (1) Why is thinking \neq associative reproductions;
- (2) Why is thinking \neq logical figures.

Barbara Celares.¹⁶

Because it [thinking] *takes place* in the struggle of the voluntary tendencies with the semantic fields and in the creation of these fields (cf. inner speech creates the field—external speech uses these fields).

A.N. Leont'ev. The problem of transfer

The note is written in pencil on three small sheets of paper that formed one whole. On the back of the first sheet is a typed text about the education of the blind; on the back of the third sheet there is a printed text about the editorial board of the journal *Nashi Dostizheniya* (*Our Achievements*) with the following address and telephone number—Moscow, Spiridonovka street 2, tel. 3-79-54—plus a fragment of a letter signed by, presumably, the members of the editorial board. The content of the note is connected with the text of the preface to the Russian translation of Koffka's *Foundations of mental development*. Cf. pp. 195–232 in Vygotsky (1997a).

A.N. December 10, 1933

NB! (1). Transfer is the central problem: the structural transfer and the semantic transfer. The insufficiency of the structural theory of transfer.¹⁷ Transfer in the semantic field has its own laws, which differ from the laws of the optical field and the *Naive Physik*. This is the key to everything: the transfer (the action) in the semantic field. Its freedom, its rationality. *Man thinks*—That is the new thing that distinguishes the child from the chimpanzee in the practical field: The *Nur-Gedachtes*, which according to Köhler determines *nothing* in the chimpanzee's behavior, determines *everything* in human behavior. This *also* includes the tool in its *Dingkonstanz*,¹⁸ and the meaning of the whole situation and the action, and its moving forces (the *Energiequelle* + Koffka's problem: The chimpanzees' actions are instinctive). The point is that the chimpanzee's *Intelligenzhandlungen*¹⁹ are *no Willenshandlungen*,²⁰ but in man they are *Willenshandlungen*. Köhler's *Nur-Gedachtes* is the semantic field with just one difference: For Köhler it consists of *representations*, for us of concepts of generalizations.²¹

NB! (2) The word does not develop from the needs of thinking but from the needs of communication, but the process of mental communication *eo ipso* leads to the objectivation of thought, to the reform of thinking, etc. That is, communication does not leave the one who communicates unchanged. Apart from the understanding of

the other, which is the main goal of the word, *eo ipso* develops the understanding of oneself. The communication of a thought changes the thought. Communication with another (an interpsychological function) is always *eo ipso* communication with oneself (i.e., an intrapsychological function): The latter is *implicite* contained in the first. That is, what is possible for two at the same time becomes possible for one. That is, in communication, not just the relationship with the other person changes but also the relationship with oneself. *All communication is extracortical activity—a brain transcending its boundaries. Communication is possible in generalizations and not otherwise:* in contradistinction to instinctive communication (which, incidentally, also has its generalization).

(3) The fate of scientific and spontaneous concepts according to A.N.'s data:

<i>in the beginning</i>	(a) the scientific concept—4 (Archimedes' law), (b) its transfer—2;
<i>in the end</i>	(a) the scientific concept—3, (b) transfer—3.

A remarkable fact that from the viewpoint of development fully confirms our data. Cf. your native language and a foreign one, development from above and from below. Who does not know a foreign language, does not know his own (*Goethe*).²²

Cf. Ivanovskiy: Latin and Belarusian are equivalent for children.²³

On the semantic theory of perception

This section combines two notes that are dedicated to the dynamics of higher (semantic or meaningful) perception. The first note is written in violet ink on one sheet and has an addition in pencil on the other side. The note states the need to create a semantic theory of perception as an alternative to the structural approach of Gestalt psychology. The "paper about Koffka" is Vygotsky's preface to Koffka's book mentioned previously. The second note was written in blue ink on a small sheet. On its back are calculations that may have to do with the salaries of Vygotsky's co-workers. The note is dated February 2 (no year is indicated) and contains the description of a dream in which a person is recognized with great confidence although his physical appearance is completely different.

Very important:

The first questions—the development of the object world (Asya)—real consciousness—early childhood—the law of the shift: the coincidence of the semantic and the visual field; the situational constraint in the semantic field.

The first questions are the key to (and the symptom of) the development of consciousness.

Most important is that the first questions are not about names but about meaning.

The truth lies in between the intellectualism of Stern and the structuralism of Wallon and Koffka.

Remark in the margin: [*In the paper about Koffka.*]

Higher perception (visual, semantic) and lower perception—smell—no classification, etc.

Purely primitive designations: The smell of Antonov apples,²⁴ the color of blood, instead of “red.”

We must overcome *Gestalttheorie* step by step and create in its place a psychology of man with the contrast between *Sinn* and *Gestalt* as the constant leitmotiv.

I must write *La perception humaine*²⁵ contra Köhler.

In what consist the slavery of animal perception and the freedom of man (the psychology of animals and before one year of age)

Encircled: [Early childhood—*Wille, Vorsatz* and *Bedürfnis*²⁶—voluntary intentions, semantic tool use—contra Köhler (10 months).]

Contra Wertheimer with his *psychophysiological* structuralism.

The paradox: They began with the rejection of nonsense words in memory and arrived at nonsensical perception.²⁷

[Written in pencil:]

If we take the extreme points: In the word you cannot fly away from what you see.
Lewin, the child, the stone.²⁸

A remarkable phenomenon. NB!

The dream in the night of February 2. Leningrad. At daybreak.

Is. Bo[risovich]²⁹ tells a funny story, imitating someone: I am absolutely sure it is I. B. (in my experience he is exactly the same as in day-time; the given person merges with him from the side of meaning → perception), but he does not look like him at all. *It is remarkable that perception can be combined with whatever meaning and merge with it.*

Written at the bottom of the page in violet ink: [*NB!* The connection with yesterday's talk.³⁰ The thesis...]

[The note breaks off.]

The action along the path of the greatest resistance

This document consists of four notes written around the end of 1933 or the beginning of 1934. The first note is written in black ink on a small sheet and the second on the back of the cards that were printed in connection with Vygotsky's dissertation defense (see chapter 21). Presumably they formed one whole. The subtitles of the propositions of the second note are written in violet ink and the text of the propositions in black. The handwriting is irregular and almost illegible, which is characteristic of the notes written in the last months of Vygotsky's life, and the number of abbreviations is high. The third note is written in violet ink on the back of a geographical map (see previous chapters) and the fourth in violet ink on the back of a small sheet with the text “Ambulatory of the Solov'ev Nervous-Psychiatric Clinic.” What the notes have in common is that they deal with a number of examples traditionally used in the discussion of the problem of free will:

- (1) The Buridan situation (see chapter 23) of making a rational choice between two identical positive alternatives. This situation had already been analyzed by Spinoza in several of his writings (*Metaphysics*, *The ethics*).
- (2) The patient on the operating table. The patient desperately needs an operation, which is performed without anesthesia and while the patient is conscious, and he thus has to choose between suffering excruciating pain and sure death. The example is borrowed from a letter by William James to Karl Stumpf and may have been inspired by the amputation of the leg of James' father. Vygotsky mentions the example in chapter 12 of *The history of the development of the higher mental functions*. See pp. 216–217 of Vygotsky (1997b).
- (3) Socrates' death in prison (see chapter 13). Socrates refuses to flee from prison and drinks the poison cup.
- (4) The saint who voluntarily takes goes to the stake, a situation that Vygotsky designates as "Sherrington's problem" (see the note).

Vygotsky had dealt with the problem of free will before (cf. "The problem of will and its development" in Vygotsky 1987; and chapter 12 of "The history of the development of higher mental functions" in Vygotsky 1997b), but the new treatment of these problems was inspired by Lewin's study of volition and the possibility to "be above the field." Although Vygotsky emphasized the intimate connection between affect and intellect, he attached more importance to the role of intellect than Lewin did. Thematically they are connected with *The theory of emotions* and the posthumously published paper "The problem of mental retardation" (Vygotsky 1935).

NB! Affect and intellect

1. The Buridan situation: Man differs from the ass not because (Descartes) he violates necessity by his free will but by the fact that he will act with the same necessity, but *his* necessity, one that is determined in another way: recognized necessity. For him the choice is not <the same> because of the generalization: Perish or stay alive (man thinks—*pro re cogitante*).³¹ The stronger affect (the preservation of life) is brought into play and overcomes the equilibrium of the two weaker ones because man understands the *meaning of his inertia and the equilibrium and the danger*: Something must be decided. The ability to make *whatever* decision, to find the motivation *not in the field* but *above* it; the choice that determines the strength of the motive here decides the matter. *Ergo*, in man as a *res cogitans*, develops a *new relation to the situation* in comparison with the animal. The novelty is that thinking (the semantic field) *introduces a new affect*, reorganizes the relationships of the affects, seemingly violates the laws of affective necessity, but in actual fact leads to a higher form—to recognized necessity. Thinking preserves but reorganizes the affects, their *ordo et connexio*.
2. James' problem: It is an action along the path of the greatest resistance (the patient—the surgeon) only from the viewpoint of the momentary situation. In the semantic field (the idiot cannot be convinced to stretch out his arm to the surgeon), the choice is not between giving or not giving his arm but between dying or perishing (from cancer).³² Included in the generalization, the *meaning* of giving the arm is different, *and behind the meaning is a different affect*, a stronger one: so that not just from the physical viewpoint, but also from the

psychological viewpoint (contra James), the volitional act is an act along the path of the *least* resistance. The stronger affects defeat the weaker one—Spinoza. Cf. Claparède, Lewin: the ergograph³³—fatigue—volition wins; but this is a new affect that changes \pm the *Aufforderungscharakter* (cf. Lewin *Sättigung*³⁴ + El'konin, labor in socialist contests). Cf. With a child we change the *Energiequelle* so that he will agree to have a tooth pulled out: candy, or you will die; we elicit a stronger affect.

3. It is not true that the dynamic of the field (Lewin) is preserved in thinking—Zeigarnik and Birenbaum. If that were true, there would be no problem whatsoever: *Man thinks*, nothing would be new. The dynamic semantic field would be the mirror [image] of the dynamic of the external field and would change nothing in it.

Written in the margin: [See § II [of the *Cogitata metaphysica*]. Genuine will. Starvation is possible as well.]

4. *The motivation of thought*: the *general* dynamics of the field which force us to think (the need); perhaps there is also a specific dynamics (motivation, needs) of thinking (the need for movement).
5. *Dynamics in thinking*: *freedom is born in thought*; more and more *flüssig*.³⁵ *Ergo*, thinking has its *own* dynamics; thoughts get on with each other but brutally clash with things; in thinking there are remnants of the emotions about things: the reservations in Jewish parlance³⁶; the thought about death; it is horrifying to think, etc. But most important—it is *another* dynamics: It is absurd if a person is afraid to think about something awful, i.e., when he transfers the emotion caused by real things to thinking: Imagined dogs do not bite.³⁷
6. *The descendance*. The new transformation of the dynamics of the field, [first] transformed into the dynamics of thinking, [and then back] into the dynamics of the field. The difficulty is precisely to transform the dynamics of thought with its freedom into the dynamics of the action.
7. *Three phases of the dynamics and three problems*: (1) The dynamics of the field—motivation; (2) the dynamics of meaning (the semantic field): *Meaning is a dynamic system sui generis with complex dynamic relationships* (the *Aufforderungscharakter*, etc.) with other parts of the semantic field and with the external field and the action in that field; Sapir—words *struggle for ideals*³⁸ because *words* are dynamic systems; (3) the transition to, the descendance to the dynamics of the action.³⁹
8. *The choice determines the motive*: the *ego affect*. In whatever choice, etc. The whole problem of the making of a decision depends upon it: It stands to reason that the dynamics of thinking, which is weaker than the action, <strongly> determines the structure of the affects (*ordo et connexio*).
9. *Things do not change because we are thinking of them*, the affect in the concept becomes active (cf. perception and the breakup of the structure): It becomes part of another relationship thanks to the fact that the thing acquires meaning when it becomes part of the structure of the generalization: Recognized cowardice determines our attitude to it (shame).

10. *Z. and K.*: Z.—the concept (meaning) of a dynamic system (syphilis, to draw the young child),⁴⁰ i.e., *the dynamics of the field in the dynamics of thinking: There is no meaning that has changed the affect.* With K. the same. Cf. Voytonis⁴¹ who was glad with tbc (in the *sense* of: The choice was not between health and tbc, but between tbc and cancer). Papa would have been happy had they found *lues*.
11. The *problem* of Sherrington (the saint—the stake)⁴² and Spinoza (*video* + a way of life), Socrates in the dungeon (why?⁴³), *starvation in the situation of Buridan's ass*. Let us return to the Buridan ass: It is not a conditional reflex, but it completes the *meaning* of his whole life with its affects and needs. Socrates did not sit [in prison] because he thought it was just but [because it corresponded with his] way of life (his students would not have stayed but would have run away).

Thus: Begin and end with Buridan's ass.

NB! 1. The action along the path of the greatest resistance (Claparède and James) is an action along the path of the least resistance from the viewpoint of the semantic field, but along the path of the greatest resistance from the viewpoint of the situational field. *Ergo* the problem of the volitional act is the problem of the relationship affect—intellect and semantic field—situational field.

2. Now we know the law of interest: why we approach a research theme with another affect (a book, an event) than a practical issue: another *Energiequelle*.

Cf. Spinoza about the problem of two sorts of dynamics (of thinking and of action): The affect motivates to act and think in a certain direction: *Ergo* there is another dynamic of the affect in the plane of thinking than in the plane of the real field.

Lewin's fourth dimension

This section consists of two notes on the back of two pieces of a reproduction of an aerial photo (see chapter 21). The first was written in violet ink and the second in strongly faded black ink. The content of the notes is connected with the theme of the degree of generality of concepts (see several of the previous chapters) and with the paper "The problem of mental retardation."

NB! About Lewin

It is remarkable that Lewin himself, when talking about the defect in the dynamics of the mentally retarded child, considers the absence of abstraction, fantasy, and concepts + the concreteness as the central trait of his mind: *ergo affect and intellect in unity*.⁴⁴

Lewin's only mistake is [the claim that] that *Starrheit*⁴⁵ and non-differentiation are the cause and the intellectual defect is the effect. In actual fact, the systemic relationships determine everything: *a special unity*. The defect is not a mechanic,

passive effect, but the *fact* of the correspondence between the affect and intellect is *true and undisputable*.⁴⁶

NB! Lewin's fourth dimension and the problem of the *Oberbegriffe*: The multi-level structure of the thought situation is completely analogous to the four-dimensional structure of the real one. Just like there the subject leaves the field to enter the fourth dimension, in thought, when he is confronted with barriers, he either escapes into *Irrealität*—The demarcation of *Realität* and *Irrealität* retains its meaning for thought—or into the *Oberbegriffe*: To switch to the *Oberbegriffe* = to think in the real field; to [switch to] *Irrealität* = added in violet ink: [the same in the real field.]⁴⁷

NB! We must study the little known properties of the complex, the preconcept, etc. In each of these spheres of thought, there is another relationship with the object and another act of grasping the object in thought, i.e., the two fundamental aspects that characterize the concepts. *Inde* the nature of these concepts and all their properties are different. From the other relationship to the object → in each sphere [there are] other possible connections and relationships between the objects established in thought; from the other act of grasping → other connections of thoughts, another type of logical operations. Within these spheres, the properties that determine the nature of the concept are: a) the relationship with the object-meaning (Freud: schizophrenia + K. and Z.; [b]) other relationships of generality; another circle of operations; another communication of the systems.

Notes

1. The exact dates of Lewin's journey from the US to Asia and Europe and back again have not yet been fully clarified, and the different sources flatly contradict each other. It is certain that he planned to leave Moscow on May 6, 1933, and he possibly arrived from Japan several weeks earlier. It has also been established that by the end of May, Lewin was in Holland (probably staying in the house of his mother's sister in The Hague) where he worked on the book that would come out in English as Lewin (1935) and from where Lewin, his wife, and their two children eventually emigrated to the US in what seems to have been the summer of 1934. His mother, his aunt, and his sister—who stayed behind in Holland—were captured by the Nazis and died in different concentration camps (Benjamin 2006; Schönpflug 2007).
2. Attention, both active and passive (German).
3. Toddler (German). The word "experience" here stands for *perezhivanie*.
4. Lewin and his students used specific terms (and schematic drawings) to describe the dynamics of the experimental situation. For example, if the experimenter presents a piece of chocolate to a child, this chocolate has an *Aufforderungscharakter* (is appealing; has valence); when the experimenter takes the chocolate away she creates a *Barriere* (barrier) between the child and the chocolate (see later text), and when the angry child turns her back to the experimenter, this was called *Aus-dem-Felde-Gehen* (leaving the field). In Lewin (1933a), the reader can find the first English translations of many of Lewin's concepts.

5. The actual material situation and the personal situation (German).
6. In her doctoral dissertation, Lewin's student, Sarah Sliosberg (1934), studied under which circumstances children 3 to 6 years old are willing to accept a picture of a piece of chocolate printed on a card as an *Ersatz* (replacement or surrogate) for the real thing. She found, among other things, that children do not accept the surrogate in what was called the sphere of reality (i.e., as real candy to eat) but may accept it in the sphere of irreality (e.g., as would-be candy to feed a doll). Sliosberg did her actual experiments already in 1930 and 1931, so it is quite possible that Lewin presented some of her procedures and findings to his Russian audience.
7. Common abbreviation of *Versuchsleiter* or experimenter (German). Sliosberg emphasized that it is important to be on good terms with the child before one can begin the experiment.
8. The social field (German).
9. Lewin discussed motivational conflicts in terms of *Appetenz-Appetenz Konflikte* (approach-approach conflicts), *Aversions-Aversions Konflikte* (aversion-aversion conflicts), and *Appetenz-Aversions Konflikte* or *Ambivalenz Konflikte* (approach-aversion conflicts or ambivalent conflicts). The classical examples discussed at the end of this chapter form typical examples of each of these conflicts. When the conflict was introduced into the person's *Lebensraum* (living space) by another person, Lewin spoke of *Induktion* (induction) or induced forces.
10. Reality and irreality (German). According to Lewin, children live in two not yet fully differentiated worlds, spheres, or layers (*Schichten*): The childish world of irreality (fantasy and dreams), which is flexible (*flüssig*) and where everything is possible and the adult world of reality with its rigid (*starr*) laws. In adults, these spheres still exist but are more differentiated; adults usually know in which sphere they are operating.
11. I can do what(ever) I want (German). Sliosberg (1934, p. 123) quotes Dembo (1931) as saying that a characteristic of the world of irreality is "that one can do what one wants," i.e., in fantasy there are no rigid rules.
12. This drawing is very similar to figures 8 and 10 in Sliosberg (1934) and to figure 18b in Lewin (1931), but it seems that for Vygotsky the plane of irreality was more the plane of thinking than the plane of fantasy and dreaming and that he equated the planes of irreality and reality with, respectively, thinking and acting, which was not quite what Lewin's students had in mind (cf. Sliosberg, p. 136).
13. Quotes Blok's poem "Autumn Elegy" (1900).
14. See Pushkin's poem mentioned in chapter 21.
15. Psychic structures, social structures (German).
16. What is just imagined, exists merely in thought (German). Refers to Köhler (1921, p. 192): "We do not examine here... to what extent the chimpanzee can be ruled by something which is not present, whether it ever occupies itself to a certain degree with what is 'just imagined'... the fundamentally limited nature of the most important *material* for the intellect, the so-called 'representations',

- could be the reason for the fact that the chimpanzee does not even succeed in the slightest beginnings of cultural development.” Cf. p. 181 of Vygotsky’s preface to the Russian translation of Köhler’s book in Vygotsky (1997a).
17. Refers to two classic syllogisms: Barbara and Celarent.
 18. Here the term “structural theory” refers to Gestalt theory.
 19. Perceptual constancy or thing constancy (German). The term was coined by Karl Bühler.
 20. Intelligent act (German).
 21. Volitional act (German). The terms *Intelligenzhandlung* and *Willenshandlung* were used by Koffka in discussing Köhler’s chimpanzee experiments. Koffka wondered whether the chimpanzee’s behavior was perhaps instinctive and not intelligent or volitional. See p. 206 of Vygotsky (1997a) and Koffka (1925).
 22. For references to Köhler’s “Nur-Gedachtes,” see Samukhin, Birenbaum, and Vygotsky (1934, p. 125), and p. 186 of Vygotsky (1997a).
 23. *Thinking and Speech*. Cf. p. 179 of Vygotsky (1987). In 1821, in his journal *Aus Kunst und Altertum*, Goethe wrote: “*Wer fremde Sprachen nicht spricht, weiß nichts von seiner eigenen.*” (“Who does not speak foreign languages, knows nothing about his own language.”)
 24. We were unable to establish the source of this quotation.
 25. The Antonov apple or Antonovka is a late fall or early winter apple cultivar with an acid flavor and strong aroma popular in Russia and Poland. Vygotsky may have known Bunin’s melancholic story, “Antonov apples” (1900).
 26. Human perception (French). This was the title of Köhler (1930).
 27. This is an (inaccurate) reference to the title of Lewin (1926).
 28. This phrase also appears in Vygotsky’s introductory essay to the Russian translation (1934) of Koffka’s *Foundations of Mental Development* (1925). See p. 222 of Vygotsky (1997a).
 29. Refers to the famous film that can be seen on YouTube with the following commentary: “Hannah is one year and seven months old. The stone has a positive valence in the momentary living space of the child. The child is attracted by the stone. In order to sit down, the child has to turn around, that is, away from the goal. This detour to reach the goal is extremely difficult for children.”
 30. We were unable to identify this person.
 31. According to a document found in Luria’s archive, on February 2, 1934, Vygotsky gave an internal talk about autonomous speech.
 32. Part of Spinoza’s discussion of the Buridan problem in his *Cogitata Metaphysica*: “*Si enim hominem loco asinae ponamus in tali aequilibrio positum, homo, non pro re cogitante, sed pro turpissimo asino erit habendus, si fame et siti pereat.*” (“For if we assume that a human being instead of an ass were in such a position of equilibrium, the human being would be regarded as a thoroughly stupid ass, and not as a thinking human being, if he were to die of hunger and thirst.”). In *The Ethics* (Part 2, Proposition 49, Note), Spinoza discussed the same problem.

33. Here one would expect: “between suffering severe pain and perishing (from cancer).”
34. The ergograph was a simple device developed by the Italian physiologist Angelo Mosso (1846 to 1910) to graphically register muscle movements. The resulting graph could be used to study the effect of fatigue.
35. Satiation (German). Refers to the work of Anitra Karsten mentioned in chapter 15.
36. Liquid, flexible, fluent, fluid, mobile (German).
37. Cf. the Yiddish idioms (e.g., “toi toi toi”) to ward off evil spirits after discussing something serious like death.
38. See p. 235 of “The Problem of Mental Retardation” in Vygotsky (1993). Vygotsky there attributes the idea that we are unable to think systematically about our own death to Eugène Minkowski (spelled “Minkovskii”).
39. Possibly refers to p. 17 of Sapir (1921): “Would we be so ready to die for ‘liberty,’ to struggle for ‘ideals,’ if the words themselves were not ringing with us?”
40. According to Vygotsky, one can distinguish three basic phases in the transition from the dynamics of thought to the dynamics of action and back again: “(1) the transformation of the dynamics of a psychological field or of a situation into the dynamics of thought; (2) the development and unfolding of the dynamics processes of thought itself, its reverse transformation into the dynamics of action; (3) the action, reflected through the prism of thought, is transformed into another action, one that is meaningful, conscious, and hence voluntary and free, i.e., it stands in a fundamentally different relationship to the situation from action which is directly conditioned by the situation and which has not gone through this direct and reverse transformation of the dynamics.” See p. 235 of “The Problem of Mental Retardation” in Vygotsky (1993). See also chapter 10.
41. The patients Z. and K. suffered from Pick’s dementia. In her youth, Z. gave birth to a stillborn child but in the hospital she claimed he was alive and told the physicians long stories about the child’s achievements. This was the central theme in her delusions. There is no mention of syphilis in the cases of Z. or K. Cf. Samukhin, Birenbaum, & Vygotsky (1934, pp. 107, 109–110).
42. Nikolay Yur’evich Voytonis (1887 to 1946). Russian animal psychologist, student of Vagner, who studied primates in the Sukhumi Simian Nursery, in particular their solution of “two-stage problems,” which first require preparation (e.g., of a tool) and subsequently execution (e.g., getting food with the tool). Nadezhda Ladygina-Kohts (1949) mentions Vojtonis’ malady and premature death without specifying the disease.
43. This refers to a visit that Sherrington paid to Pavlov’s laboratory in 1912. He there witnessed dogs that were trained to salivate to an electric shock. According to Pavlov, Sherrington exclaimed: “Now I understand why the Christian martyrs could withstand torture. Apparently, by a certain concentrated thought one can achieve this—that pain will not exist.” See p. 346 of Todes (2014). Sherrington’s own memory was slightly different: “One animal he (Pavlov) particularly wanted me to see; its training confronted it with a

- dilemma; its anxiety was pathetic to watch. Remembering my good host's aversion to any mention of the word 'mind'—which his laboratory doctrine excluded—I answered, when he still pressed me for an opinion, that the animal seemed to me in a state of persecution best comparable with that of a Christian martyr. Pavlov was delighted. He laughed and laughed again; he repeated it to others." See p. 31 of Hardcastle (2005). Vygotsky used this anecdote at least twice (Vygotsky 1928; Vygotsky & Luria 1930; 1993), but in yet another version based on Frolov (1925, p. 155), which stated that Sherrington compared the dog to a Christian saint who happily takes place at the stake.
44. See note 13 to chapter 13. Cf. p. 197 of Vygotsky (1999) where Vygotsky discusses the same situation in his essay about emotions.
 45. Vygotsky presumably refers to Lewin's (1933b) chapter in the Festschrift for Decroly, republished in English in Lewin (1935). In that chapter, Lewin argues that the feeble-minded child is less flexible and that this causes part of his problems. Insight, for example, Lewin defines as restructuring the field, seeing new connections between things that were previously disconnected. Such restructuring is difficult when a child is not flexible. Hence, his claim that functional rigidity is the ultimate cause for the feeble-minded child's intellectual problems (p. 321). Likewise, the backward child shows little fantasy and creativity because fantasy presupposes flexibility (*Flüssigkeit*). Lewin's other hypothesis was that the mind of feeble-minded children is less differentiated, by which he meant that the child participates in fewer and less diverse activities and shows less variation in his behavior than normal children (or adults) do.
 46. Rigidity, inflexibility (German).
 47. See, for example, p. 230 of "The Problem of Mental Retardation" in Vygotsky (1993).
 48. See note 12.

References

- Benjamin, L.T. (2006). *A history of psychology in letters* (2nd ed.). Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.
- Dembo, T. (1931). Der Ärger als dynamisches Problem. *Psychologische Forschung*, 15, 1–144.
- Frolov, Yu P. (1925). *Fiziologicheskaya priroda instinkta*. Leningrad: Vremya.
- Hardcastle, J. (2005). Of dogs and martyrs: Sherrington, Richards, Pavlov, and Vygotsky. *Changing English*, 12(1), 31–42.
- Heider, F. (1983). *The life of a psychologist. An autobiography*. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas.
- Koffka, K. (1925). *Die Grundlagen der psychischen Entwicklung: Eine Einführung in die Kinderpsychologie*. Osterwieck am Harz: Verlag van A.W. Zickfeldt.
- Köhler, W. (1921). *Intelligenzprüfungen an Menschenaffen*. Berlin: Julius Springer.
- Köhler, W. (1930). La perception humaine. *Journal de Psychologie*, 27, 5–30.
- Ladygina-Kohts, N.N. (1949). Predislovie. In N. Yu. Voytonis, *Predystoriya intellekta. K probleme antropogeneza* (pp. viii–x). Moscow: AN SSSR.
- Lewin, K. (1926). Vorsatz, Wille und Bedürfnis. *Psychologische Forschung*, 7, 330–385.
- Lewin, K. (1931). *Die psychologische Situation bei Lohn und Strafe*. Stuttgart: S. Hirzel.

- Lewin, K. (1933a). Environmental forces. In C. Murchison (Ed.), *A handbook of child psychology* (pp. 590–625). Worcester, MA: Clark University Press.
- Lewin, K. (1933b). Eine dynamische Theorie des Schwachsinnigen. In *Hommage au Dr. Decroly* (pp. 313–350). Brussels: S.n.
- Lewin, K. (1935). *A dynamic theory of personality: Selected papers*. New York-London: McGraw-Hill Book Company.
- Samukhin, N.V., Birenbaum, G.V., & Vygotsky, L.S. (1934). K voprosu o dementsii pri bolezni Pika: klinicheskoe i eksperimental'no-psikhologicheskoe.
- Sapir, E. (1921). *Language: An introduction to the study of speech*. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company.
- Schönpflug, W. (Ed.). (2007). *Kurt Lewin—Person, Werk, Umfeld: historische Rekonstruktionen und aktuelle Wertungen*. Frankfurt: Peter Lang.
- Sliosberg, S. (1934). Zur Dynamik des Ersatzes in Spiel- und Ernstsituationen. *Psychologische Forschung*, 19, 122–181.
- Todes, D. P. (2014). *Ivan Pavlov: A Russian life in science*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Van der Veer, R., & Valsiner, J. (1991). *Understanding Vygotsky: A quest for synthesis*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Van der Veer, R., & Yasnitsky, A. (2016). Translating Vygotsky: Some problems of transnational Vygotskian science. In A. Yasnitsky, & R. van der Veer (Eds.), *Revisionist revolution in Vygotsky studies* (pp. 143–174). London: Routledge.
- Vygotsky, L.S. (1928). Psikhologicheskaya nauka. In V.P. Volgin, G.O. Gordon, I.K. Luppol (Eds.), *Obshchestvennye nauki v SSSR (1917—1927 gg.)* (pp. 25–46). Moscow: Rabotnik Prosveshcheniya.
- Vygotsky, L. S. (1934). Thought in schizophrenia. *Archives of Neurology and Psychiatry*, 31, 1062–1077.
- Vygotsky, L.S. (1935). Problema umstvennoy otstalosti (opyt postroeniya rabochey gipotezu). In L.S. Vygotsky & I.I. Danyushevskiy (Eds.), *Umstvennootstalyy rebenok* (pp. 7–34). Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe Uchebno-Pedagogicheskoe Izdatel'stvo.
- Vygotsky, L.S. (1987). *The collected works of L.S. Vygotsky. Vol. 1. Problems of general psychology*. New York: Plenum Press.
- Vygotsky, L.S. (1993). *The collected works of L.S. Vygotsky. Vol. 2. The fundamentals of defectology*. New York: Plenum Press.
- Vygotsky, L.S. (1997a). *The collected works of L.S. Vygotsky. Vol. 3. Problems of the theory and history of psychology*. New York: Plenum Press.
- Vygotsky, L.S. (1997b). *The collected works of L.S. Vygotsky. Vol. 4. The history of the development of the higher mental functions*. New York: Plenum Press.
- Vygotsky, L.S. (1999). *The collected works of L.S. Vygotsky. Vol. 6. Scientific legacy*. New York: Plenum Press.
- Vygotsky, L.S. (2001). Igra i ee rol' v psikhicheskom razvitii rebenka. In *Psikhologiya razvitiya* (pp. 56–79). St. Petersburg: Piter.
- Vygotsky, L. S., & Luria, A. R. (1930). *Etjudy po istorii povedeniya: Obez'yana, primitiv, rebenok*. Moscow-Leningrad: GIZ.
- Vygotsky, L. S., & Luria, A. R. (1993). *Studies on the history of behavior: Ape, primitive, and child*. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers.
- Yaroshevskiy, M. G. (1988). V shkole Kurta Levina (Iz besed s B.V. Zeigarnik). *Voprosy Psikhologii*, 3, 172–179.
- Yasnitsky, A. & Van der Veer, R. (2016). Translating Vygotsky: Some problems of transnational Vygotskian science (pp. 143–174). In A. Yasnitsky, & R. van der Veer (Eds.), *Revisionist revolution in Vygotsky studies*. London: Routledge.
- Zavershneva, E Yu. (2015). Predstavleniya o smyslovom pole v teorii dinamicheskikh smyslovykh system L.S. Vygotskogo. *Voprosy Psikhologii*, 4, 119–135.

Chapter 26

Neuropsychology

This chapter combines several documents dealing with neuropsychology, a topic that fascinated Vygotsky in the last months of his life. The notes overlap with the content of Vygotsky's last two presentations about, respectively, the problem of systemic–dynamic analysis and the chronogenic localization of the higher psychological processes (Vygotsky 1997, chapters 6 and 10, respectively). Both in these talks and in his notes, Vygotsky polemicizes with the older and contemporary neuropsychological approaches e.g., the theories of Jackson, Head, Goldstein, and Pötzl), and he proposes to replace the functional and structural analysis by the systemic approach, “which for each form of activity finds the interfunctional connections and relations that determine it” (Vygotsky 1997, p. 143). The documents contain reflections about the law of the upward transition of functions, the nature of aphasia, agnosia, and apraxia, and also the description of a patient observed together with Gita Birenbaum and Blyuma Zeigarnik.

In aphasia, schizophrenia, and other pathological changes

These notes are written in violet ink on nine library cards of the type that Vygotsky used by the end of 1932. The overlap with chapter 17 suggests that the notes were indeed written around that time (the end of 1932 to the beginning of 1933). The notes show how Vygotsky tried to combine the systemic–semantic approach of consciousness with the ideas about the role of inner speech and the problem of the localization of the higher psychological functions. Later he would formulate his critique of the Gestalt approach to the localization problem in his talk, “Psychology and the theory of localization of mental functions” (Vygotsky 1997), but in a rather different way.

NB!

1. In aphasia,¹ schizophrenia, and other pathological changes of the psychological processes, the main point that needs to be analyzed is the fact that one and the same function, operation, etc. *sometimes appears and sometimes disappears*: This clearly shows that the function is possible in one plane and impossible in

another plane. This fact itself is remarkable because it shows that one and the same effect can be reached *along different paths* (cf. the memory experiments). All the expedition work is based upon this. The voluntary operation is *the same* operation in another plane.

2. Inner speech—cf. Leonov’s *Skutarevskiy*²—acquires an *individual* character: Just like the French language is incomprehensible for Russians, the language of Paul (inner speech) is incomprehensible for Paul.³ This is the pole of fantasy in speech (Vossler) and not that of mathematics. It fully consists of *idiomatisms*. Cf. “mountain” for Skutarevskiy.
3. Our difference of opinion with Goldstein and Head about the central disturbance in aphasia: *For Head* it is the symbolic formulation and expression, but we must prove that it is a *simple* and *real* function (the *facultas signatrix*, cf. Cassirer)⁴; *for Goldstein* it is the intuitive indeterminate experience (immediate intuition), but *this* experience changes and is not immutable. The dogma about the immutableness of meaning. *We* [defend flexible] *meaning*.
4. Our differences of opinion about inner speech: (1) For Goldstein it is the *speech motives*, the subtext, i.e., *not speech*, but a volitional thought structure and a central speech experience, i.e., *the inner side of external* speech (everything that comes *before* speaking); (2) for Head–Jackson it differs from external speech by degree and not by nature. Both are incorrect. Inner speech is a structure with a *specific* psychological nature: *It makes a difference* whether I speak to myself or to another person—it is not about vocalization.
5. Our differences of opinion about the classification of aphasia: for Head the word and speech (syntactically do not coincide); that is why his schema is⁵:

in the phasic plane Verbal – Syntactical

▼ ▼

In the semic plane Nominal – Semantic

▼ ▼

word – speech

This is incorrect: takes no account of *phasic* and *semic* disorders + *endophasia*.⁶

Goldstein: pure aphasia and central aphasia. A single aphasia—incorrect. We: semics and phasics; exo- and endophasia. Here belongs the problem of mutism as well⁷: *from the disturbance of the speech motives*.

6. Our differences of opinion about the question of localization: For us, central in localization are the extracerebral connections. Cf. Jackson: In understanding, another person stimulates the connections in my brain—I am his victim; in understanding oneself, one part of the brain communicates with another part via the periphery. Mediation creates fundamentally new types of connections in the nervous system. What is impossible for one person is possible for two. Regulation via the periphery is a frequent principle in the organization of the nervous system.


The main thing contra Goldstein and Head's localization: contra—the *hypothetical* brain (in Pavlov—the frontal lobes—generalization) *modo psychologicae* and the hidden psychophysiological parallelism—the *Grundfunktion des Gehirns*. We: In the brain and its functions there are no and cannot be structures *in the naturalistic plane* that correspond with speech, they develop from above—from psychological structures (two brains interacting via the historical-cultural environment). In the word lies the source of new brain structures, and not all possibilities of the operations with the word are laid down in the morphological structure of the brain.

7. Speech and consciousness. First we thought: speech and thinking, further: through intellectualization—speech to memory, attention, and perception. That is, we extended speech to all consciousness. More important: to deduce it from the same change that it creates in consciousness. *The first word is a change of consciousness long before [it is] a change of thinking: the prise de conscience*, cf. the problem of the first questions.
8. The sign does not just mediate the operation *from outside* (**intercalation**, interposition, *inter-legere*),⁸ like a knot, i.e., the sign does not just stand between the object to be remembered and the person but also *internally* mediates the memory process: i.e., it leads to memory via a *new* meaning, via a chain of other processes: imagination, thinking, etc. *Inde* the sign via the meaning is the path to the creation of systems. The next two sentences have a question mark in the margin: [This does not coincide with the internal sign (the ingrowing of the knot). *This* internal mediation exists already *in the external* sign operation.]
9. That is, the systems of psychology (*Gestaltpsychologie*) that ignored the functional division of faculty psychology, actually proceeded from the functions:

Associationism	From memory
Intellectualism	From intellect
Voluntarism	From volition
Freudianism	From instinct
<i>Gestaltpsychologie</i>	From perception, etc., etc.

In particular, Lewin's systems, in which the differences between the functions (attention, memory, and so on) were lost, are *momentary* systems of intention: *hic et nunc*. Not our systems.

10. The problem of the functions and the phenomena of associative psychology, faculty psychology, Wundt, and Stumpf. *Intentionality*. The special nature of mental processes: They have an immanent purposefulness. *Inde*, meanings are directed at ideal objects.
11. Thinking without words (the meanings are abstracted from the phonetics). Cf. Bernstein—another pole: “meaning is vanity.” “There is talk whose meaning is unclear.” “These m’s, these p’s, these s’s.” “*Phonetics is Seraph’s maid.*”⁹ [The next sentence has a question mark in the margin:] *This is the same*, but from two different sides; that is why it seems the opposite, but the unity is hidden.
12. *My opinion during the symposium*. The next sentence has a question mark in the margin: [Orientation is necessary *outside* when the goal—like America—is invisible: three points: (1) two types of currents in psychology: the functional (faculty psychology) and the a-functional (associative) ones. The solution of this question is necessary for the problem of *meaning*: Is it the activity or its content, the properties of the mirror and the properties of the reflection; the form and the content, (2) all afunctional systems proceed from *one* function and *extend* it all consciousness. From *this* and the preceding viewpoint, *Gestaltpsychologie* is close to associationism; the solution of this question *for the problem of the system* (the relationships between functions); (3) Stumpf and the conscious realization of this historical contradiction: after him the functionalists and the structuralists via James, behaviorism, phenomenology, intuitionism, experience (Dilthey).¹⁰ Applied to our problem: the relationship between the change of word meanings and reality. Here as well: the problem of intentionality.]
13. *Contra*: Wundt—Natural science is knowledge mediated by concepts; psychology is speculative, direct knowledge. *Absolutely incorrect: In a certain sense the opposite is correct.*
14. *Our stages, which we followed to ascend to the inner world: in the clinic, etc. A. N.*: The whole history of psychology is a *struggle for a psychology in psychology* (cf. Spengler: psychology is a shallow science. Dilthey: Spengler has more psychology than all psychologists taken together). From the external to the internal.
15. How is the problem of *meaning* solved by Freud and *Gestaltpsychologie* (*everything is meaningful*). Cf. *Lashley and Pavlov*: Extremes meet.
16. Word meaning



17. *Cf. the word family:*

speech—adolescent—fate
*fari—infans—fatum—infandum*¹¹

18. Encircled: [A.N.'s question]

What shall we call a system: The fact that logical memory is imagination, thinking, attention, etc. Written in the margin and circled: [Here: *Logical memory retains a certain function*] or the fact that memory can serve the *function* of attention, imagination, thinking, etc. Written in the margin and circled: [Here: The system loses its unitary functional role.]

In the *first case*, the system remains a *higher psychological function*. In the *second case*, the system ceases to be a function.

To which of the two facts (=concepts) should we assign the word: *system*. The second is a genetic moment in the development of the first: *contradiction and negation in development*.

20. Semic analysis in the broad (consciousness) and the narrow sense (speech).
*How they are connected.***About the law of the upward transition of the functions**

This note was written in violet ink on two small sheets of paper: the first on the back of an aerial reproduction (see previous chapters) and the second on the back of an invitation to a ceremony with the following printed text:

Proletarians of all countries, unite!
 DEAR COMRADE!

The directorate, the Party committee, the professional and social organizations of the 2nd Moscow Medical Institute and the 1st Pirogov City Hospital invite you to participate on the 28th of February 1934, at 7 o'clock sharp, in the celebration of the professors of the Institute: AVERBAKH, M.O., BERKENHEYM, A.M., DESHIN, A. IGNATOV, N. KISEL", A. SVERZHEVSKIY, L.O., and SPASOKUKOTSKIY, S.I., on occasion of the 40th anniversary of their scientific, medical, and social activity.

The celebration takes place in the 9th auditorium of the Institute—Malaya Pigorovskaya Street, № 1.

After the celebration there will be a concert and a banquet.

Mosoblit February 25, 1934

500 copies

Stalin Typographical All-Union Academy of Supply

Order 1109

On the invitation form, there is a round stamp with the text "People's Commissariat of Health at the Second Moscow State Institute" and the penciled text "For prof. Vygotsky" followed by an illegible signature. The note is replete with abbreviations. Vygotsky discusses various clinical examples (agnosia, aphasia, apraxia) in light of his law, which he

formulated in his last talk, “The problem of development and dissolution of the higher mental functions” (April 28, 1934). A preliminary variant was presented at an internal conference on March 2, 1934, as we know from a note in the Luria archives (“L.S. Vygotsky. Brain—semantic systems—dissolution—development”). The overlap in content suggests that the talks were given on the basis of these notes.

NB! About my law contra Jackson–Ribot:

1. The agnosia¹² of adults and children: (a) In adults vision suffers more (+the functions of the <nervous> system) than the concepts; the higher function—contra Kretschmer—compensates for the lower one—the upward transition of the functions. Cf. Hochheimer’s case (the concepts vicariate for¹³ meaningful perception); (b) in children inborn agnosia leads to the underdevelopment of meaningful perception, *ergo* of speech as a whole. Cf. Wolpert’s¹⁴ problem of simultaneous agnosia. Dementia and semantic aphasia¹⁵ (Head, Pötzl) leads to simultaneous agnosia in adults, but in children simultaneous agnosia leads to dementia.¹⁶
2. Localization and the problem of idiocy, imbecility, and debility: The localization determines the degree of oligophrenia, *ergo* it is not a degree but a type of underdevelopment. The occipital lobe (+central blindness) = idiocy; the frontal lobe = debility.
3. *Post-encephalitis*: The thing with children is not that there are no connections between the cortex and the subcortex (Bonhoeffer); what plays a role is my law. In adults, there are no emotions, no changes of character and personality, it is the lower that is changed: The motor reaction is slowed down and impeded, the higher compensates (to knock –, what age +). In children the lower—the reaction—does not suffer, but in the first place suffers the higher—character, intellect (the frontal lobes). The lower affect takes the place of the higher; in adults, the higher one vicariously replaces the lower one.
4. Sensory alalia in children also leads to total-motoric alalia¹⁷; in adults with sensory aphasia, motoric speech is preserved. Agnosia in adults does not lead to apraxia; on the contrary, praxia leads to gnosis; apraxia—agnosia = apractognosia¹⁸: in children, agnosias lead to apraxias.
5. How do the functions of the higher centers develop when the lower ones are underdeveloped: (a) They either extremely imperfectly develop *from above* (speech in deafmutes); (b) or they—also inadequately—develop by themselves, autonomously, outside the system or in another system; intellect in the post-encephalitic syndrome. The fact itself of the *development from above* in normal and anomalous children is the proof of the law of the upward transition of functions in anomalous and normal development and the substitution of the lower centers by the higher ones + of the independence of the higher from the lower at a certain level of development. [We should] study the speech of deafmutes from the viewpoint of *conscious awareness + voluntariness and a-spontaneity*, i.e., as opposite to the path of normal development; the analogy is not with the mother tongue, but with a foreign language.

6. If agnosia would cause the higher centers to suffer, we could never distinguish agnosia and aphasia from dementia. But the patient suffering from dementia speaks well and recognizes things. Why is there no inborn agnosia in childhood although there is sensory and motor alalia, alexia,¹⁹ etc. *Because they lead to idiocy and get lost in it.* This is an argument of enormous strength in favor of my law.
7. Dysgenesis²⁰ (Monakow)—the disturbance of development.

Pötzl

These notes were made on the back of six parts of an aerial reproduction. Parts 1–3 are written in pencil and the remaining parts in violet ink. The text is replete with abbreviations, and its topic is Otto Pötzl's²¹ view on the nature of agnosia. It is likely that patients K. and Z. were the same persons as those mentioned in Samukhin, Birenbaum, and Vygotsky (1934) and that patients D. and A. are equivalent to the patients analyzed in Birenbaum and Zeigamik (1935). The archives contain individual notes on A. (not included here) and D. (see the next section).

(1)

NB!: Pötzl [Encircled]

1. <Ekonomo>.
2. *The borders of the weitere Seesphäre*²² with the higher centers (in agnostics not just perception suffers, but also the concepts, i.e., the functions of the higher center and not just of the lower one).
3. *The remarkable overlap between our idea and that of Pötzl*: The same structure of perception that we found in development was found by Pötzl in pathology and expressed in anatomical terms.
4. What we must revise in our theory.
5. Primary autism + splitting. Freud.
6. *Optische aphasie*.²³ Agnostic disorders are closer to the verbal ones than to the optic ones.
7. But it is remarkable that the agnostic preserves the possibility to think about objects in *words*. However, the concepts of these objects are changed—there is no intentional object.
8. *Wolpert* [An arrow connects his name with the end of the preceding sentence] and the three tasks of clinical investigation Added in violet ink: [(see further).]
9. *Three errors*: (a) Agnosias are disorders of vision without relationship with aphasia, (b) as aphasia, (c) as a centripetal disorder distinguished from apraxia. In fact, *between them*, between speech and optics.
10. Structural and semantic agnosia—Wertheimer: The laws of thought are the laws of perception in *Gestaltpsychologie*. Back to association psychology, to the pre-Würzburg period.
11. *Amnesic aphasia*²⁴ is diametrically opposed to *optical* aphasia.

12. *Pötzl's drama*: without adequate psychology. What is *implicite* in him we must make *explicite*.
13. *Three parts of Pötzl*—against three errors: (1) *agnosia* contra blindness; (2) *verbal and color blindness* contra aphasia with preserved vision; (3) *visual paralyzes Bálint*)²⁵ contra—the centripetal nature of the disturbance.
14. Three tasks of the psychological study in the clinic:
 - (a) Wolpert's problem: \pm symptoms from one principle (one disorder—the guessing; the defect and its compensation; the incomplete suffering of the functions) but [we must find] the more *general*—for example, conscious awareness + voluntariness—both broader and narrower than the function;
 - (b) structure and the reduction to the unity to the *hidden* disorder. The regularity + the explanation in the real sense of the word of *all* words (proverbs, stories, definitions of words in [patient] A.) from a single principle;
 - (c) the transition via the <illegible> -symptoms and my schema to explain clinical disorders—personality and the way of life (delirium, autism, oneiric states, depersonalization—[the patients] S., A., K., Z.).
15. *The law of the suffering of the higher and the lower centers* in development and dissolution (Jackson). The disinhibition of the lower center + paralysis.
16. [The patients] Ch. + D.: They mix up thought with perception (what will you do? From the poster—96% of the plan)²⁶—an agnostic disorder of the *diaphragm*,²⁷ the *weitere Seesphäre*—they see more than is necessary: cf. hypnagogic hallucinations²⁸ in the tachistoscope + the latent vision in the tachistoscope.
17. *To distinguish contra Pötzl*: structural and semantic agnosia, where is the function of structuring located in the *engere*²⁹ or the *weitere Seesphäre*? The three forms (object agnosia, simultaneous agnosia, and apperceptive agnosia³⁰ correspond to the noun, the verb + the voluntariness of speech (?))—*not* three degrees but three different disturbances.
18. The narrow and broad meaning of Pötzl for us:—perception + the whole systemic and semantic viewpoint.
19. Amnesic aphasia *at first* goes together with optic aphasia (agnosia). *What is optic aphasia?* Freund.³¹
20. Interpretation instead of meaningful perception: a case when the higher center takes over the functions of the lower one (Hochheimer)—contra Kretschmer.
21. There must be inborn agnosias, but by virtue of my law they are idiocies—We must find them in idiocies; Löwenstein—smart idiots). Agnosias within other [clinical] pictures.
22. In agnosias secondarily also the higher functions (the concepts) suffer. The lower *structural perceptions* suffer, but the higher ones (the concept) less (+color, i.e., form + spatial dislocation).
23. The laws of the coupling and connecting the meanings are not the laws of the coupling and connecting of perceptions, i.e., they are no structural laws. The root of Pötzl's errors.

24. *Wolpert* is not a weakened *Objektagnosie*: pictures but not things: reading the drawing. The syntax of optical perception is disturbed. *Simultaneous agnosia is always present in aphasia (Head—semantic aphasia): Ergo*, what suffers is not perception but thought. *Our understanding of the experiments with the cards and the development of perception: Gerke's experiments*³²—In all stages of development there are all stages of description: *generalization*. The revision of the older experiments. The same with dementia. The stage of enumeration and the *Und-Verbindung*³³—Where does it come from in the agnosias of the child. *Dementia, aphasia, Wolpert's agnosia* are three different forms of suffering from the same thing.
25. Pick's apperceptive agnosia³⁴—*a disorder of optical attention* (voluntary attention depends upon thoughts, upon meaning, i.e., semantic attention, the semantic formation of form, structuring, the function of the structure, and attention are identical; figures and ground, the *Nichtexistenz der Aufmerksamkeit*, actually the *Existenz der Aufmerksamkeit*).³⁵ She sees if a bundle of light singles out the object (cf. Köhler's apes) if it strikes the eye: There is *structural* (involuntary) but no *meaningful* attention. Fixation of the parts of the object (the infant). The movement of objects is disturbed.

Written in the margin: [Perception and the chessboard.]

26. Chronogenic localization.
27. Do smell, taste, touch, and hearing have agnosias? Optic aphasias and olfactory aphasia? p. 3.
28. Optical aphasia for color and *Farbennamenaphasie*. Amnesic and optic aphasia.
29. Development and subdevelopment and disintegration. The centrifugal paths of perception. The feeble-minded shows *Wolpert's simultaneous agnosia*.
30. [Patient] Shch.—optical aphasia: the apple—She does not say that [one] can sleep, but [that it can be] eaten; on the picture—she gets confused, the relation to the object is hampered. The reverse in amnesic aphasia.

Patient D.

This note was written in violet ink on the back of three parts of an aerial reproduction of which the last part was not found. The document is replete with abbreviations and contains observations of patient D., who presumably was analyzed in Birenbaum and Zeigarnik (1935) as well. In that article it was claimed that the patient's thinking was fully replaced by perception and that she was extremely dependent upon the visual field: "If in P. we saw... the purely verbal side of speech, in D. not even this verbal side is preserved. D. does not even operate with the word as such, purely verbal connections without the corresponding objective content do no longer play a role in her utterances, perception determines her whole semantic field" (p. 91). Vygotsky cryptically discusses the results of all the tests the patient was subjected to, many of which were borrowed from Lewin and his students.

[Patient] D.

1. *Verbal tests, phenomena*: (a) the merging (the diaphragm)³⁶ with what was perceived, with sensations, with what she saw in the corridor; (b) she grasps the meaning of the story for 1 moment, after 1 moment [produces] nonsense; if she sees the cubes she adds them [to the story]³⁷; (c) there is no *object constancy*—[if] we turn the picture its meaning changes.
2. *Actions*: drawing, cubes, the *Wiederaufnehmen*,³⁸ the intentions. The *Sättigung*—All [her motivation] is spent in the activity.
3. *She gives things arbitrary names*: She persists (a key is a case): a mixture of amnesic aphasia and agnosia; merging and the diaphragm?
4. Calendars of pregnant women are posted in the corridor. Question: Will they give birth soon?
5. She has no conscious perception: She reads the cards but does not know what she reads: It is written in a foreign language.
6. *Writing some words*—She just writes sentences—with merging.
7. *Drawing*—a little house—She sees a card with a duck, adds the legs of a duck to the house, says: Do you have clean hands? Adds hands. *Merging with speech, with perception, with action*.
8. *The description of the pictures*: either an exact description or an arbitrary accidental word.
9. In a story she transcends its limits—not like [the patient] K. (adequate end and continuation) but with merging.
10. *Ichnähe*,³⁹ Feuchtwanger, Eliasberg.
11. *Spannung*⁴⁰—*a free situation*: passivity, she got caught up in a book as soon as they entered the room; started going from one thing to another: Alone she freezes, when there is *contagion* she acts. The experimenter writes, she writes; when the experimenter stops, she stops.
12. To copy a clock: She draws the hands and sometimes the card itself: either V or □: She really directly reproduces the picture as perceived.
13. *Contagion*: [Without it] a nonsensical action is impossible: “He wrote with the wrong side of the pen”—she presses, “with a cigarette”—She wets it with saliva; but you only have to show her how to do it and she imitates it, she begins (“rub your nose with glue”), she cannot stop and rubs herself. Through *contagion* she can be led to [commit] whatever nonsensical action. *Instead of communication [there is] contagion*.
14. There is no *Wiederaufnehmen*. She returns because of the unfinished structure if *die Sache schreit*.⁴¹ The structures are strong—if G.V. [Birenbaum arrives] without B.V. [Zeigarnik], it is like with a one-eyed person: Where is the second eye?
15. Cf. *Lewin*: the absence of concepts = *Starrheit*. The unity.
16. *Sättigung*—She drew lines for a long time, they suggested variations—merging.

17. *Intention*: She signed—later so firmly that she could no longer not sign: she signed without realizing it.⁴² Once another person's name [the next page was not found].

NB.

1. Global aphasia? Amnesic aphasia? Speech and affect form dynamic-semantic systems, i.e., the center of our theme: Lewin—What [develops] from what? But de facto there is unity: This must be proved. *Agnostic disorders*. The essence is that the nature of the disorders is *dynamic*. Sometimes they are there; sometimes not. *The relationship between the word and the thing is disturbed, i.e., the knot of dynamics and meaning*. The exo-localization⁴³ of the speech disorder. Hochheimer's patient cannot speak about a magnet when it is not present⁴⁴: There are no independent dynamics of thought. He and D. [show] the opposite but along the same lines: word-object. *Speech and thinking: The internal planes and transitions are disturbed. The path from the thought to the word is disturbed*. The conscious realization of the word, the differentiation of the planes. A revision of the theory of the *kategoriales Denken*⁴⁵ from the viewpoint of the theory of thinking and speech and from the viewpoint of [the unity of] the affect-intellect. *Nothing in the mind: anendophasia*⁴⁶ + *amnesic aphasia*.
2. *The pictogram*—understands the instrument, draws well—forgets, reads the drawing.
3. From the viewpoint of localization—figure and ground: both here and there division + unity. Contra the theory of the two functions of the center Lashley, Goldstein).⁴⁷
4. *Classification*: metal, wooden, inanimate.
5. *Lewin*: the tendency to *Wiederaufnehmen*.
6. The influence of figure and ground (the equivalent function—nonspecific—of the center)—via the affect, via the dynamics. Affect-intellect: the central problem of localization—part and whole—the formation of the whole from the dynamics.

About aphasia

The first note was made on the back of a page (“Fig. 1. The fibers of a chorion”) from the *Big Medical Encyclopedia* cut into four parts, of which only part 3 was found. The second note was made on the back of a form with the text “To the saving account №__.” The headings of both notes are written in violet ink and the rest in green ink. The third note is written in violet ink on one sheet. The topic is the nature of aphasia and the splitting between objective and semantic representations as its possible cause.

§2. About global aphasia⁴⁸ (the end)⁴⁹—It emerges from motor, sensory, and amnesic aphasias, which eventually intersect in one point and cause global aphasia. *Ergo*, it is not the sum of the lesions of the individual centers, not the interruption of

the paths, not one center, but a unitary system. From this viewpoint, each aphasia is global but not a *complete* suffering of the whole system; there is an aphasia, but not aphasias (*die Aphasie*—Marie and Goldstein).⁵⁰ But to make it develop into a global aphasia, *its central point* must necessarily suffer: It is the center of Goldstein's aphasia. Extracerebral connections.

§3. About structural psychology and the formula “the brain as a whole” (the end). The formula of structural psychology is “the whole”; there are no relationships between the structures; the higher and the lower are structural. Just like structural psychology cannot transcend the confines of the whole itself, it cannot lead localization away from this deadlock. But psychological analysis runs into the whole (the homogeneous) as against a wall and will break through it, just like clinical analysis [runs into] the formula “the brain as a whole” and cuts it into pieces.

NB!

1. *About amnesic aphasia and agnosia*: Why does the *memory* for words suffer [and manifests itself] as the central symptom. The mnemonic base of thinking and the word is damaged—the *meaningful representation* (cf. Hegel: memory [as] the external side of intellect—via words). The splitting of the objective and the verbal representation lies at the basis of amnesic aphasia + agnosia: in the latter case suffers the word in the first the object. Where memory and thinking meet.
2. *Are alexia and color agnosia analogous to object agnosia?* The difference is tremendous: The perception of an object + the perception of a symbol (<of a printed> word)⁵¹ + the perception of a quality that is most difficult to generalize (color) are different things. Why does alexia go hand in hand with color agnosia? He who psychologically solves this [question] unriddles one of the most difficult enigmas.

<...>

- (1) *The anterior parts of the speech zone* (Wernicke)—the speech–thinking relationship. There is no trace of nervous dynamics. Youth. No cancer (no tumor).
- (2) The posterior speech zone—Apart from speech, thinking is damaged due to the disturbance of the elementary processes.
- (3) Grünbaum—not aphasics—with a disorder of the posterior zone.
- (4) The physiology of the parietal area—Why is it important for thinking. A defect of the inferior parietal zone—the registration system (the psychosensory system)—The operations performed by the whole mass of the brain lose their concrete content. Empty logical forms—When it [the parietal zone] is weak, primitive neurodynamic mechanisms are disinhibited.

Two aspects:

- (1) a local disorder of the neurodynamics causes the disturbance of the higher functions;
- (2) a disturbance of the higher function of the cortex unties and impairs the elementary neurodynamics of all brain processes (not in the damaged lobe).

[The continuation of the note was not found.]

Notes

1. Aphasias are caused by local brain damage and affect the patient's auditory comprehension, verbal expression, reading and writing, and functional communication.
2. *Skutarevskiy* (1932) is a novel about a physicist written by the Soviet writer and representant of social realism Leonid Maksimovich Leonov (1899 to 1994). The "mountain" mentioned by Vygotsky is an image that haunts the protagonist during his disease: "The idea that in the last months with difficulty and hesitatingly matured in him now materialized in definitive and almost fantastic visions... He looked as if from a high mountain, from which the muddled geography of the world was simpler and easier to grasp. An avalanche of people arrived from the smoky and dismal foothills; they fearfully huddled together near the rocky pass, blinded by the intense and almost mercury light of the valley... this image frequently repeated itself, each time more acute and powerful, more convincing than death and more and more difficult to catch in unstable, tiny words... The mountain followed him persistently, as his fate."
3. Refers to chapter 1 of Marx's *Capital*: "In a sort of way, it is with man as with commodities. Since he comes into the world neither with a looking glass in his hand, nor as a Fichtian philosopher, to whom 'I am I' is sufficient, man first sees and recognises himself in other men. Peter only establishes his own identity as a man by first comparing himself with Paul as being of like kind. And thereby Paul, just as he stands in his Pauline personality, becomes to Peter the type of the genus homo." Possibly the second time Vygotsky meant to write "Peter." Although Paul needs Peter to understand himself, his inner speech acquires thoroughly individual properties that would make it well-nigh incomprehensible for Peter even if it could be registered.
4. The faculty to signify (Latin). Vygotsky refers to this term coined by Immanuel Kant via chapter 6 of volume 3 of Cassirer's *The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms* (1977), which he read in the German original (Cassirer 1929). See also "Tool and symbol" in Van der Veer and Valsiner (1994). In this chapter, Cassirer—who was personally acquainted with Gelb and Goldstein and was able to see several of their patients—gave an overview of theories of aphasia, agnosia, and apraxia. Cassirer concluded on p. 277 that aphasiacs have lost what is typical of man: "In language as in the instrument, man gains a new fundamental trend of mediated behavior that is specific and peculiar to him. In his representation of the world and in his action upon it he now becomes free

from the compulsion of the sensory drive and the immediate need. The direct grasp gives way to new and different types of acquisition, of theoretical and practical domination: man has entered the path from physical to conceptual ‘grasping’ [from *Greifen* to *Begreifen*].”

5. Here Vygotsky probably refers to the final pages of Head (1920) where the author distinguishes verbal, nominal, syntactical, and semantic aphasia.
6. Endophasia is (1) inner speech, (2) the execution of movements without vocalization.
7. A disorder in which a person who is capable of speech does not speak in specific situations or to specific people.
8. It is unclear to what exactly these terms refer. *Legere* in Latin is “reading,” which seems not appropriate.
9. Here Vygotsky combines verses from different poets. The first part—“meaning is vanity”—and the last part—“phonetics is Seraph’s maid”—are from Osip Mandel’shtam’s poem “We cannot stand strained silence.” The part “there is talk whose meaning is unclear” is from Lermontov’s poem “There is talk whose meaning” (1841). Finally, the part—“These m’s, these p’s, these s’s”—is from Annenskiy’s poem “Impossible.” See also chapter 17, Notes 16 and 18.
10. Experience is a key term in Dilthey’s theory. Cf.: “Humanity, understood by observation and conclusion, would be a physical fact for us, and such would be accessible only to natural-scientific knowledge. It becomes an object for the humanities (*Geisteswissenschaften*), however, insofar as human situations are *experienced*, insofar they are *expressed* in vital expressions and insofar these expressions are *understood*” (Dilthey 1992, p. 87).
11. To speak—infant—fate—inexpressible (Latin). The word *fatum* goes back to the verb “to speak” and an infant is literally someone who cannot speak. Likewise, the word for “fate” (*rok*) is connected with the old-Russian verb *rechi* (“to speak”) and the word *ompok* (“adolescent”), which indicates that one has no right to speak.
12. The term “agnosia” was first used by Freud. It is caused by local brain damage and results in the inability to process sensory information while the specific sense is not defective nor is there any significant memory loss.
13. Here in the more general sense of “to replace temporarily.” Cf. “vicarious conditioning.”
14. See chapter 22, Note 31.
15. There have been many attempts to classify the different forms of aphasia. The term “semantic aphasia” may refer to the inability to understand the meaning of nouns, verbs, or complex grammatical constructions describing spatial or quasi-spatial relationships (e.g., “the brother of my father” vs. “the father of my brother”). The latter form was studied by Luria and found to be related to problems in arithmetic and spatial reasoning. The problems are associated with damage in the Brodmann areas 37 and 39.
16. Cf. pp. 414–416 of Vygotsky (1995).

17. Alalia is the inability to understand or produce speech. In motor alalia, the person cannot produce intelligible speech. In sensory alalia, the person does not understand speech despite intact hearing. Alalia is associated with damage in the Brodmann areas 22, 41, and 42.
18. Apraxia is a disorder of motor planning, which causes the person to have difficulty in carrying out tasks or movements when asked, even though the request is understood and the muscles are intact. It is most often due to a lesion in the frontal and parietal lobes of the dominant hemisphere, but it can also be caused by lesions in other areas of the brain including the non-dominant hemisphere.
19. Alexia is the loss of the ability to read, which makes the person dyslexic.
20. Abnormal development.
21. Otto Pötzl (1877 to 1962). Austrian neurologist and psychiatrist, student of Bonvicini, and co-founder of what is now called “neuropsychology.” Pötzl’s (1928) first monograph was published in Prague where he was the successor of Arnold Pick at the Karl–Ferdinand University. He published many works on many psychoneurological topics (e.g., agraphia, aphasia, alexia) but also showed an active interest in psychoanalysis. In 1930 and again in 1941, he joined the Nazi Party NSDAP.
22. The broader visual area (in the cortex) (German). Refers to what is now called the “visual association cortex” (Brodmann areas 18 and 19). Lesions of these parts may lead to impaired visual recognition. An example is associative visual agnosia, which the German neurologist Heinrich Lissauer (1861 to 1891) regarded as an inability to connect the mental representation of what is being perceived with its related semantic information stored in memory such as its name, use, etc. (Lissauer 1890).
23. Optic aphasia. (German) Optic aphasia or visual anomia is the inability to name visually presented objects, while tactile recognition, for example, is retained. It is associated with lesions in the lower parts of the Brodmann areas 21 and 37.
24. Luria distinguished two disorders in amnesic aphasia: (1) optic-mnesic aphasia, and (2) acoustic-mnesic aphasia. In the latter case, the patient cannot retain a spoken sentence in memory although comprehension is intact. It is associated with damage in the Brodmann areas 21 and 37.
25. Bálint’s syndrome is a combination of three impairments: the inability to perceive the visual field as a whole (simultanagnosia), difficulty in fixating the eyes (oculomotor apraxia; called “psychic paralysis of gaze” by Bálint), and inability to move the hand to a specific object by using vision (optic ataxia). The syndrome is usually due to damage to the parieto-occipital lobes on both sides of the brain.
26. The patients intertwine their speech with information from a poster that apparently dealt with the 5-year plan.
27. Here and in the continuation it is not clear in what sense Vygotsky uses this term.
28. The hallucinations that may occur in the transitional state from wakefulness to sleep.

29. Narrower (German).
30. Pötzl (1928) distinguished three groups of agnosias: (1) object agnosia and Wolpert's simultanagnosia; (2) color agnosia and letter agnosia; and (3) optical-spatial agnosia (loss of spatial orientation).
31. Carl Samuel Freund (1862 to 1932). German psychiatrist and neurologist who studied hysteric phenomena and the results of brain pathology. Vygotsky refers to Freund (1889), who conducted one of the first studies of optic aphasia.
32. This may refer to the studies of the development of thinking carried out by Basov's co-workers at the Leningrad Institute of Scientific Education (Shapiro & Gerke 1930). Vygotsky's critique of this work (i.e., underestimation of the role of speech and systemic connections in the development of thinking) was voiced in *Pedology of the Adolescent* (Vygotsky 1998, pp. 113–116) and *Tool and Sign* (Vygotsky 1999, pp. 7–8).
33. And-connection, simple summation (German). Wertheimer's (1925) term to distinguish between aggregates that are the result of simply adding parts on the one hand and wholes with emergent properties on the other.
34. Arnold Pick (1851 to 1924). Jewish Czech psychiatrist and neurologist. The term "apperceptive agnosia" usually refers to visual and object agnosia, but it may occur in other sensory areas.
35. The non-existence and existence of attention (German).
36. The patient is asked to define things, but her definitions are merged with completely arbitrary things from the environment, thus resulting in gibberish, that is, her verbal definitions or stories are strongly determined by whatever things happen to be in the visual field. Cf. pp. 90–91 of Birenbaum & Zeigarnik (1935).
37. That is, the subject adds arbitrary things (cubes on the table) to a story she was asked to tell about a certain topic.
38. To resume (an activity) (German). The term is borrowed from Kurt Lewin's student, Mariya Ovsiankina (1928), who first found that subjects feel a strong urge to resume interrupted, unfinished activities.
39. Ego proximity (German). Presumably a term to indicate to what extent a person identifies with a thing or cause.
40. Tension (German).
41. When the matter admits of no delay (German).
42. Refers to the behavior of patient D. described in Birenbaum (1930). The subject was asked to carry out written tasks and each page. In one variant, the task was to draw her monogram, and she then forgot to sign the pages. Birenbaum interpreted this in Lewinian terms: Signing had become a quasi-need (a *Quasibedürfnis*) but could be replaced by drawing the monogram (the *Ersatzhandlung*) because this was sufficiently similar.
43. The translation of *vnelokalisatsiya*. Possibly referring to speech disturbances that are not caused by brain damage.
44. See pp. 21–22 of Hochheimer (1932).

45. Categorical thinking (German).
46. Presumably Vygotsky's term to refer to patients who have little or no inner speech and carry out all actions, including speech, in the external plane.
47. See p. 140 of "Psychology and the Localization of Mental Functions" in Vygotsky (1997).
48. Global aphasia affects both receptive and expressive language skills, which means that patients understand little of what is said to them and are unable to speak much.
49. The words "the end" were sometimes added because Vygotsky was writing on various scraps of paper and wanted to retain their order.
50. This is an indirect reference to Cassirer (1929, 1977) who discussed the aphasia theories of, among others, Pierre Marie and Kurt Goldstein.
51. A criticism of Pözl, who, as we have seen, classified color and letter agnosia into one group.

References

- Birenbaum, G. V. (1930). Das Vergessen einer Vornahme. *Psychologische Forschung*, 13, 218–284.
- Birenbaum, G. V., & Zeigarnik, B. V. (1935). K dinamicheskomu analizu rasstroystv myshleniya. *Sovetskaya Nevropatologiya, Psikiatriya i Gigiena*, 4, 75–98.
- Cassirer, E. (1929). *Philosophie der symbolischen Formen. Bd. 3. Phänomenologie der Erkenntnis*. Berlin: Bruno Cassirer Verlag.
- Cassirer, E. (1977). *The philosophy of symbolic forms. The phenomenology of knowledge*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Dilthey, W. (1992). *Gesammelte Schriften. Vol. 7.: Der Aufbau der geschichtlichen Welt in den Geisteswissenschaften*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.
- Freund, C. S. (1889). Über optische Aphasie und Seelenblindheit. *Archiv für Psychiatrie und Nervenkrankheiten*, 20(276–297), 371–416.
- Head, H. (1920). Aphasia and kindred disorders of speech. *Brain*, 43, 87–165.
- Hochheimer, W. (1932). Analyse eines "Seelenblinden" von der Sprache aus. Ein Beitrag zur Frage nach der Bedeutung der Sprache für das Verhalten zur Umwelt. *Psychologische Forschung*, 16, 1–69.
- Lissauer, H. (1890). Ein Fall von Seelenblindheit, nebst einem Beitrag zur Theorie derselben. *Archiv für Psychiatrie und Nervenkrankheiten*, 21, 222–270.
- Ovsiankina, M. (1928). Die Wiederaufnahme unterbrochener Handlungen. *Psychologische Forschung*, 11, 302–379.
- Pözl, O. (1928). Die Aphasielehre vom Standpunkt der klinischen Psychiatrie. Vol. 1. Die optisch-agnostischen Störungen (Die verschiedenen Formen der Seelenblindheit). In G. Afschaffenburg (Ed.), *Handbuch der Psychiatrie. Spezieller Teil 3,2,2,1*: Leipzig-Vienna: Deuticke.
- Samukhin, N.V., Birenbaum, G.V., & Vygotsky, L.S. (1934). K voprosu o dementsii pri bolezni Pika: klinicheskoe i eksperimental'no-psikhologicheskoe issledovanie. *Sovetskaya Nevropatologiya, Psikiatriya i Psikhogigiena*, 3, 97–135.
- Shapiro, S. A., & Gerke, E. D. (1930). Protsses prisposobleniya k usloviyam sredy v povedenii rebenka (pp. 73–112). In M.Ya. Basov, *Ocherednye voprosy pedologii*. Moscow-Leningrad: GIZ.

- Van der Veer, R., & Valsiner, J. (Eds.). (1994). *The Vygotsky reader*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Vygotsky, L. S. (1995). Problema razvitiya i raspada vysshikh psikhicheskikh funktsiy (pp. 404–418). In *Problemy defektologii*. Moscow: Prosveshchenie.
- Vygotsky, L. S. (1997). *The collected works of L.S. Vygotsky. Vol. 3. Problems of the theory and history of psychology*. New York: Plenum Press.
- Vygotsky, L. S. (1998). *The collected works of L.S. Vygotsky. Vol. 5. Child psychology*. New York: Plenum Press.
- Vygotsky, L. S. (1999). *The collected works of L.S. Vygotsky. Vol. 6. Scientific legacy*. New York: Plenum Press.
- Wertheimer, M. (1925). *Drei Abhandlungen zur Gestalttheorie*. Erlangen: Verlag der Philosophischen Akademie.

Chapter 27

Difficult Children

The present chapter is based on a notebook with concise descriptions of children seen at the Donskaya Clinic. The notebook has a leatherette cover with 36 pages, and the notes were written in violet ink. Stuck on the front cover was a piece of paper with the penciled text “About volition.” L.E. Tuzovskaya helped with the first deciphering of the text. The text is replete with abbreviations, and the handwriting is bad (large, irregular), especially between March 16 and March 26. The section headings were invented by the editors.

The text gives us another opportunity to meet Vygotsky, the clinical psychologist at work. The Donskaya Clinic still exists and is presently called the Solov’eva Specialized Clinical Hospital No. 8. From 1920 onward, the hospital formed the location for the Pirogov Second Moscow Medical Institute, which was headed by professor Vasilii Gilyarovskiy, who also was the hospital director. As transpires from the text, all children were examined by a team of specialists, which presumably consisted of one or more psychiatrists, a pedologist (for the mental testing), and Vygotsky himself. Among the names we find Gilyarovskiy and others who are just mentioned by their initials (E.D., Yu. M., M. Vas., M.A., and Yel. Yak.). The children discussed were between 5 and 15 years old, and the notebook contains the names of 34 children, some of whom were seen several times. The first case dates from December 18, 1933, and the last from May 4, 1934; the most intensive day was January 10, 1934, when 8 children were seen.

It is interesting to see that the Russian specialists still largely worked in the continental, German tradition, i.e., they looked for genetic causes and identifiable disease entities and paid attention to the immediate environment of the patient and his or her family circumstances. We do not see the strictly psychoanalytic approach, according to which all mental problems can be traced back to events that took place in the pressure cooker of the nuclear family and are primarily of a psychosexual nature. Nor do we see a broader social view in which the problems of the children and their parents are in part explained by their socio-economic conditions (e.g., inadequate education, low wages, crowded apartments) and in which families as a whole are seen as in need of help and education. Meanwhile, the 9 case histories gathered in this chapter show that the Soviet Union was not yet the socialist paradise that its leaders wanted it to be: Homeless children were roaming the streets; millions of people died from hunger; housing conditions in the cities were appalling; and the country had its fair share of problem families, alcoholic parents, domestic violence, and so on. Looking at these nine cases, one is inclined to think there was a good deal of truth to the claim once made by the famous British psychologist Sir Cyril Burt: “Nearly every tragedy of crime is in its origin a drama of domestic life” (cf. Van der Horst & Van der Veer 2010). The least one can say is that it is not totally surprising that the children described here developed the psychosocial problems they had.

A gifted dreamer

Mikhail is a talented, romantic boy who finds normal life too boring. He does not like school, steals, plays cards, and fights. Vygotsky describes his case with sympathy, thinks that the boy may have a cycloid personality, but concludes that he is so fantastic and novelistic that he defies rational analysis.

December 28, 1933 *Mikhail P.* (12;2)

Expelled from school because of theft and hooliganism; spent two years in a school for psychoneurotics after the normal school. Exceptionally gifted, kind, affectionate, defends his mother and father, <illegible>. “A father would offer his son his last outlet.” <illegible>. Heredity: a brutal grandfather, a hot-tempered father, who afterwards is sorry. At home they cannot handle him. Restless, loud, he cried <illegible>. Capricious, <violent>, fidgety, he offended, fought. Affable, infantile, childish type (“I don’t want it”), childish motivation. <illegible>.

The mother: He has his father’s character, is characterless; domestic, prepares dinner; does not carry through things; reads, but not much; at school he said he has been smoking for two years already, that he carried an axe to kill his father; that his father is a drunkard: He fought in order to be expelled [from school]. He attended a normal school; after a year the psychoneurological school, [then] the normal one again: Here he fell through. He hit his father with a poker when the latter wanted to beat his mother. At home he cheats. Invents far-fetched stories. At school he stole a season ticket¹ and a book. He does not steal at home. Hits out freely at the least provocation: hits if someone dips a pen in his inkpot before him. His brother: Vova 11 years—hooliganism, carries a knife, beats up the children, cynical swearing, is influenced by his older brother. Crossed out: [Social neglect and epileptic traits.] Neuro <illegible>. IQ = 0.82. He is not a Pioneer,² was expelled on account of his intentional mischief. Undisciplined. <illegible>. Harassed the best female student. They broke up the group because of him. They ask to place him in a boarding school, he does harm to the school.

The demonstration: His sister is a commodity expert, and he would not mind becoming a metal worker, a turner, or a commodity expert; brave; talked a lot about the axe that he carried to kill his father (“where do I leave it—in my pocket?”). Spontaneous tone, openly speaks about everything. It was very nice at the psychoneurological school. He stole the season ticket—tells it as if it were a merry, amusing thing. Charming direct. He sold the season ticket for 13 rubles, bought cigarettes. He played cards for money when he did not feel like studying. With another boy he stole coal and firewood, but better alone: “When I team up with you, I will get half a bucket and you one small piece of coal, but we have to share the money.” He knows the criminal affairs of the street. Tells a funny story: a boy steals coal, hides it in the snow. <illegible> steal the firewood. The boy: “Hey, wait, it will get cold, you should ask: ‘Boy, give us firewood’”. Picturesque language: childish + popular + intrepid.

NB! How he began to steal: They bring water-melons—you steal and eat them; they hide them in the warehouse—if you want, you sneak in (“the holy truth”). “I love to tell my brother fairy-tales, a story. I don’t know, it’s a fact, how to court the girls; when I grow up I will know.” He courts them: copies the lesson for them, copies drawings from a book for their album. They call him Makar the pathfinder.³ “It’s a fact, I don’t know how to do it.” *Romance: describes how he will steal apples in the desert—I will climb ve-e-ery high.* Read books but gave up. He saw various films: Miss Mend.⁴ Tells his *brother improviso* fairy-tales: “*The words come one after another by themselves.*” The fairy-tales did not exist, he made them up. “When you are fed up, you cut it short: and they lived happily ever after.” A genuine *naive* epos of childhood, not worse than Tolstoy’s *Childhood, boyhood, youth*⁵: with its poetry, its chastity, its excitement about girls, its artistic touch (draws in albums, improvizes fairy-tales), its poetry of the hut,⁶ its humoristic touch; everything is amusing, a generous person. Says: “They will soon put me in prison as well” (and when they catch me, they will tie my hands and shoot me: poetry).

NB.

1. The life that became his fate he lives with talent. Life is not interesting: *This is the key to everything: He is looking for what is interesting in life.* Lightness —“*Gentle breathing.*”⁷ *A gentle character made from airy tissue.*
2. In my view, cycloid. Infantile.
3. In Yakimanka⁸ <illegible>: the combination of school with playing cards—He [wants to be] both at school and with his mates in the street.
4. Even in a fight he is looking for poetry: He hit two boys on the arm and drowned their Finnish knives. He does not look like a living child, but like an artistic image, as if someone described him in a book (the child hero); that is why he cannot be rationally analyzed.

Written in the margin: [Cries often without reason because of a trifle: “That’s not your spoon.” “Sometimes I wanna sing, sometimes I wanna cry.”]

A strong-willed, jealous girl

Lyolya is shocked by her mother’s new marriage with a much younger lodger and becomes psychotic, hears voices, and so on. Vygotsky believes the girl is wrestling with her own unacknowledged erotic feelings for her stepfather and her need to be in the limelight. Her strong character and hysteric traits explain the pathological phenomena.

From the hospital: See the note.

January 20, 1934 *Lyolya O.* (10;11)

See the note: a hysteric psychosis. Her tone is obstinate, capricious, answers only to questions. Happily talks about neutral themes. “I won’t say anything.” She did not want her mother to marry: The step-father, whom she drove away, was merely a

lodger of 20 years old. Her tone is capricious, but her eyes moisten. An ambivalent attitude to her mother. A capricious, coquettish, egocentric, wilful girl.

She is in love with herself and demands the same from others. Haughty to the boys, but she herself makes advances. *Obstinacy*. Does not obey rules which she does not like. I[ntellect] is normal.

The examination: IQ = 100. <Vasil.>+,⁹ the child Sakharov +, the third trial.¹⁰ Proud. She wants to be in the limelight. A contemptuous tone when she fails. *Conceitedness and indecisiveness*. Kohs—18;3. Before she falls asleep she needs to sort out the whole day: If something seems offensive she cries. They all treat her badly. Call her crazy. Touchy. Cries a lot. The association [test] failed: *resistance*. She told her mother: I am not against you being married, but he is no match for you (the nurse [said] the step-father is 20 years old, the mother 40 years old). It was <illegible> with the step-father when he was a lodger. [The mother is] an electric sewing-machine operator¹¹: She reproached her mother that the step-father eats their bread. When the mother was not there [and] the step-father was ill, she looked after him affectionately, brought him an egg directly from the chicken. When her mother arrived, she became rebellious. Commanding, commanded the little ones: [wanted] to be the little mama. Sometimes capricious, sometimes nice.

The diary: Runs to the boys in her underwear, complains that they harass her.

The demonstration: She heard voices every day when going to the toilet—as if from the kitchen: They call her, ask her where do you go; threaten her: you will end up badly. She does not want to be anyone. She wants to be grown-up so that she can leave mama and do what she wants. She talks readily, but this is a secret, that is a secret, and so on. She will make her mama's life difficult, spite her. A reaction to the irritation but not the motives. Weak-willed and unambitious.

NB!

1. A hysteric *stratification of the mind*: two wills, the splitting of a hypobulic. Not a Kretschmer-type hypobulic: not volition, the nondifferentiation from the affect, but negativism and stubbornness. The difference between splitting and being torn apart. An inadequate reality adjustment. Neither is she unambitious, but she sets her goals hypobolically and fulfils her purposeful volition. After all, she drove away her step-father.
The stratification predetermines the development. The hysterical p[icture] follows from the stratification.
2. The essence of hysteria: to be and to seem? The hysterical reaction, the symptom, the character and the psychosis: a general change of consciousness. Amnesias, twilight states, hallucinations.
3. Why is she reticent and does not show her feelings: schizophrenia contra intentional and purposeful secrecy. She herself fears to glance inside. An unconscious *resistance—inner strength and prohibition*.
4. She is not jealous because of her mother's attachment to her step-father but because of her step-father's attachment to her mother.

5. Hallucinations: threats: You will end up badly. Depersonalization; a demon or a counterpart of the purposeful will; hypobulic, possessed, stratification. She is tormented and torments herself. Fictitious, unattainable goals—*inde* the autistic thinking <illegible> or (hysterical) pseudologia¹² or hypobulic behavior. Volition is the slave of the unacknowledged affect. She would like to be in her mother's place.
6. *Erotics* rather than sexuality.
7. Psychosis and neurosis according to Freud: The neurosis is a conflict between Ego and Id; the psychosis between Ego and the external world. The psychosis develops from the psychoneurological hysteria: Consciousness as a whole gets involved (a neurosis is unconscious, a psychosis is a disease of consciousness), i.e., the relationship with the external world. The strength— <the sthenic nature> from her strong will—the lack of ambition.
8. There is a psychosis: at home <fell ill>. Episodic psychoses of a hysterical nature.
9. What is a hysterical neurosis in development: the unconscious = the undeveloped fixated point of development. No epithymic nature.¹³ The mother has a hysterical character.
10. She is direct and does what she wants but does not know what she wants: cf. how the hysteric holds on to his symptom, the *resistance*. Written in the margin: [Hysterics, and she as well, are both realists and irrealists: The <pseudologics> have poor fantasy.]
Conclusion: Commanding, sthenic. Heredity: a mood disorder and psychasthenia. *The conflict:* the loss of her mother + a sexual trauma (jealousy because of the step-father). There is no hysterical psychosis. Here [in the clinic] her external behavior is correct. Hysterical and epithymic traits. Sewing-machine operator. Landlady. Thrifty. She lives for her chickens. Sex. The stickiness¹⁴ of the affect and the experience. A delay of two years, fixated upon one experience. The death of her father was a trauma. A strong character from her childhood; the mother is weak (agoraphobia).

A rebellious boy

Misha did an almost unbelievable and very dangerous thing: He threw stones at a portrait of Stalin and shouted anti-revolutionary slogans. On further inspection, it turns out that the boy is disobedient both at home and at school, plays truant, and is given to pilfering. The fact that a new "uncle" arrives does not make things better.

January 28, 1934 *Misha A.* (11; 9)

After school he smokes with the homeless children.¹⁵ Steals. Gives back <illegible>. Mendacious. Sociable in the collective. Difficult <illegible> but worse at school. Mental development is normal. Until 7 years old he was obedient. From 8 years old he changed. *Heredity:* the mother—tbc, nervous; the father—tbc, an asthenic. Approachable. I[ntellect] is normal? Chvostek [sign].¹⁶

Gilyarovskiy: the reactive nervousity of the child with somatic <illegible> active in the school setting. He was in the Donskaya hospital. Plays truant, all marks unsatisfactory, a tense situation. The mother is nervous, he stole from acquaintances—40 rubles. I[ntellect] is 0.86. The hospital: not concentrated during his school work, quarrels, unstable mood, loves technique, [masters] new things with difficulty. Strengthen discipline + the Forest school.¹⁷ Cardial <illegible>, *tbc intoxication* of the second degree. Furunculosis.¹⁸ Improvement after the clinic. Entered the second grade when he was 9 years old. Advanced [to the next grade]. Now in the fourth grade. Threw stones at Stalin's portrait with the boys: Down with the Politburo,¹⁹ down with Stalin. Was moved to the parallel group. In the first term, five unsatisfactory marks. The school complained about his bad discipline. In the second term, behavior satisfactory, three unsatisfactory marks. When they placed him under supervision, things became better. His father spoiled him, did not allow that he was punished. After the [theft of] 40 rubles, they flogged him. He took the death of his father with indifference.

The demonstration: He threw chalk at Stalin <illegible> and bothered the other boys: down with the Soviet power. As if they wanted to shoot their captives with a catapult. Now he is a Pioneer. At home now lives an "uncle," who is angry about this story and does not talk [with him?]. The uncle is bad: Before him it was better, the uncle nags him. If they would give him the tools of his father, a table, a corner, he would be busy, would make an airplane. He gives his word as a Pioneer: (1) not to lie, (2) not to steal, (3) not to kick up a row, (4) to study. Watch him at home and at school. <illegible> At home there are five people [sic]: his mother, he, the maid, the dog, and the uncle. *A new family*: the boy reacts with an aggravation of his symptoms.

Between two mothers

Tamara's parents have divorced, and she now lives with her father and step-mother. Her mother is not pleased and sets her against her step-mother. The girl develops nervous problems and does not know to whom to be loyal.

January 28, 1934 *Tamara E.-Kh.* (8 yrs)

The girl's family name is Kh., but she stubbornly wants to use the name of her *step-mother* E. She took the divorce equanimously, does not want to live with the mother: With her father it is better. Development is normal. Measles. Inflammation of the inguinal gland.²⁰ Asthenic. Enlarged lymphatic glands. Chvostek [sign]. To the Crimea (sanatory regimen) for half a year +. Falls asleep with difficulty, cries out, whines, irritable, appetite -, the mother sets her against the step-mother, she did not break with the mother, but does not want to live with her. Noticeably traumatized.

Does not love her mother, makes up to the step-mother. The new mother reads books to her, helps her to study. She is silent to the question whether she does not want to move to her mother. Her parents want to move to another town—the brother is 4 years old (normal). Problems with the divorce. The mother traumatizes

her. She sleeps badly, plays up during meals, furious, stubborn, restless, whining. At school she is the downtrodden child, studies satisfactorily. At home the opposite: happy, sings, lively. Has lots of dreams, talks about them: terrible, cheerful but without content. Sleeps six hours: for two–three hours does not fall asleep, hums, mutters. The mother sets her against the step-mother: she is a Yid. *She does not share* everything with her step-mother. The mother keeps interrogating her. Sociable. When the passport system was introduced,²¹ she insisted to be registered in the passport of her mother and under her name—She checked it. The same at school and at the out-patients department. Studies at school. Everything started half a year ago when the tormenting began. After [the visit to] the mother, the girl [said] to the step-mother: You have been seeing papa for a long time—My old mama told me. She asked: How did you meet papa? But mama says otherwise. “What? Yes, whatever.” An envious, egoistic child, demanding, does not share things with her brother; smooth-tongued and affectionate when the step-mother brings her something; when not it is worse. She says the mother goes drinking in a house where they call the father a Yid and a fool.

The demonstration: She loves to dress up, the new mama buys her attires, the older mama is worse. Question: why not three surnames—I don’t like that name. She is afraid: They killed a cashier in the neighbourhood. She does not drink bitter medicine and will not drink it. *Infantile.* About herself: I am stubborn.

E.D.: The character may change. A neurotic condition. Physically weak. Hysterical-like girl. Best is to move [to another town]. *Yu.M.:* cf. with Sh. (cf. note). The sleeplessness began. Sch[izoid]—dreams and forgets the dreams immediately. Traumatization.

Her fate is at stake, she must decide, choose herself. Even an adult would get confused.

NB!

1. A Homburger-type of conflict²²: with the step-mother ±. The affective relationship with the step-mother is based upon profit: the presents.
2. Nervosity because of her mental condition: She does not fall asleep, bad appetite, the dreams, the whims, bursts into tears. She mobilizes everything, is burdened by the affect like a hysteric.
3. The very beginning of the conflict: no character polarization, no **double motivation**, no mood swings (from negative to positive reactions), there is general nervousness—this is the typical initial stage.
4. The core is hypocrisy, pretence, double secrecy: playing with the mother and the step-mother, the mutual strengthening of the two tendencies: The love of the step-mother and the (demonstrative) affection are too emphatic; she shows affection here, the surname.
5. Maybe a neurosis and a real conflict along the lines of consciousness—the unconscious or just consciousness.
6. Psychotherapy: Everything is unhealthy in that family; both love and hate toward the mother.

The tragic case of a dead scared boy

Volodya witnesses how his cousin commits suicide by jumping under a car and is held responsible by his uncle who threatens to kill him. The boy is terrified and develops pains in his leg, refuses to eat meat, sleeps badly, has nightmares and auditory and visual hallucinations. Vygotsky suggests that the boy has no conversion disorder but identifies with his cousin, feels guilty, and has suicidal tendencies.

From the hospital

February 20, 1934 *Volodya K.* (12;6)

Complaints: He proclaimed hunger strikes. A day or two the last three months: He is dizzy, warned about it that evening, a headache, does not sleep, sat for hours in the dark, separated himself from his mother with a blanket, threatened <illegible> at school from the fifth grade to the fourth.

The father—a tram driver, a grave person, gets on your nerves, worries about himself, no contact with relatives, accurate at his work, drinks; *the mother*—The grandfather was an alcoholic †?, the grandmother †?, the uncle is accurate, demanding, the aunt has fits after her marriage, the mother—upset, was happy, fits: during the night—the toilet, <illegible> on the floor, sleep, headache, a dull ache—9 years, memory weakened. *Nine pregnancies.* Three abortions,²³ four siblings + one [who died] of meningitis. <Volodya> + a sister. A lone person. Birth, early development was normal. He was quiet, on his own. Scarlet fever, <illegible>, whooping cough; from 4 years old in the kindergarten: remained aloof. With 8 years attended school + in the third grade unsatisfactory marks, in the fourth grade weak, pain in the leg, had difficulty studying. Until 1932 he was happy, talkative, played with the children, they <adored> him. The aunt arrived with his cousin, they went out for a walk with a note in his pocket with the address and the instruction: Watch Seryozha. The latter got hit by a car. He cried for three days, Seryozha's father rebuked him. The complaints about the hunger [strikes] began after a year. Seryozha's father arrived after a year (for three months <illegible>); accused him, interrogated him how he pushed him under the car. *Hunger strikes and symptoms before the arrival.* Orientation is complete. **Psychological status:** became afraid to sleep; [dreamt about] a shaggy uncle with a knife, dreamt about Seryozha, dreamt about Seryozha's father who wanted to kill him because he pushed him [Seryozha] under the car. Sleeps badly, remembers Seryozha wounded. Began to eat badly: "I dreamt of my cou... my uncle, I mean my uncle, of Seryozha." Feels pain in the leg; his leg gives way, is twisted. *The same injury as he saw in Seryozha.* *Auditory hallucinations:* Don't sleep or I will eat you; I will cut your throat. Lost consciousness when he went home after Seryozha's death. He is short, *drags with his right leg: The joints wobble during walking.* The pupils +.

In the hospital: calm, quiet; makes contact with the children, does not react to the bruise, makes friends, talkative, reads, studies +, finishes things. Sleeps +. Categorically refuses to eat meat, eats a cutlet with the other children, but tiny bits, suspects it is human flesh. *The leg hurt before the trauma.* He talks without reservation, in a dull manner, without emotion, about Seryozha, his death, the

hallucinations, and home. *For the umpteenth time denied that during his hallucinations* he sees people he knows (the uncle, Seryozha's father, and Seryozha); later he admitted it. *Vas. Al.[Gilyarovskiy]*: schizophrenia, but not a neurosis: Seryozha does not enter the hallucination, and everything was there before Seryozha, but this is *incorrect*: Seryozha is present in the hallucination + everything [began] *after* Seryozha. A second traumatization: The uncle arrived and threatened to kill him. He remembers Seryozha in remote associations (the village), during his hospital stay he forgets about him.

The demonstration: Before he left for Moscow, Seryozha told his sisters: I will die in Moscow, I will not return to you, I will throw myself under something. He was quiet. His father beat him with a saddle girth. His leg began hurting *after* Seryozha—It is twisted, Seryozha had his leg shattered; Seryozha's other leg was <by the dragging>; they cured <illegible>, Volodya's other leg sometimes hurts as well. He sees three uncles: Seryozha's father (rarely) and two unknown persons, I'll kill you, I'll cut your throat because of my last son. Everything started after the uncle's second visit. The father to the uncle: You can't prove that. The uncle: I don't need proofs. To avoid that, Seryozha's father would kill him, he spent the night with the neighbours. He always dreaded the dead. It always seemed: a gown is a dead person. During the day, when he imagines Seryozha, it is *as if* he sees him. Pathetic, misses him. His dreams he does not remember. *Three forms of memory*: (a) the hallucinations during the night, (b) an image (eidetic) during the day, (c) during the night it seems Seryozha comes to fight with him.

Two times he cries: during the examination of his leg—the pain is connected *with fear* (he does not bend his knee, is cautious with his leg, does not bend it to the end); during the conversation about the conflict with his mother: says that he loves her, but that they quarrel. He did not eat meat—when his mother was there neither bread, nothing, and in her absence he ate black but not white bread. Here he eats everything except meat. He cries when it is discussed that he eats nothing in the presence of his mother. In his hallucinations the uncle says: I will eat you, don't move. He is afraid to eat. If the children eat (he gives away half of his cutlet), he eats himself. He does not agree that this is just his imagination. A critical attitude is absent. He saw the uncle himself, perhaps they also eat human flesh—in the Ukraine.²⁴ *I don't know for sure. Why he does not eat bread when his mother is there*; it is white like a dead man, porridge too, tea is bile (they told that at school). *Would he start eating meat under the condition that the children eat it as well*: under no circumstances. A day or ten he does not eat, forgets it, begins to eat, again becomes afraid: flesh of his cousin. That is why he eats, two days hunger, again eats, etc., etc. Behaves as he wants. If I want I will study, if not—not. Depression. *Refuses to admit* that there was no uncle in the hallucination and that there can be no human meat [for dinner]. For the night, the boys (they know he is anxious) told him to read “Viy”²⁵: He does not know whether it really happened. Terrible, unpleasant, did not stop reading when it became horrifying because he wanted to know how it ends.

M. Vas. The mother is epileptic or [suffers from] *luetica dementia*,²⁶ the cousin had ulcers. The father has a pathological personality. A schizophrenic reaction. Pathological personalities. *He does not trust his father and his mother.* The uncle will carry out his threat; he finishes up everything, he can come as well: an argument to prove that the hallucinations are true.

The pathological reactions are delayed.

1. The trauma and the delusion are separated by a year: after the second trauma (the second arrival of the uncle). Pulls his cousin to the sidewalk, did not realize [what happened], loses consciousness on the staircase.
2. Heredity (alcoholism)—pathological parents—the boy is a “degenerate.”
3. A schizophrenic reaction or an outburst? A reaction but not necessarily schizophrenia.
4. *The formation of the delusion*: positive in reality—the *transfer of meaning because of the affect* (the cousin’s flesh—the interpretation of all meat). The affect accumulates—an *unbearable experience*.
5. *Without depression*—speaks calmly about Seryozha, about the hallucinations, but cries when he fears pain in the leg, when talking about the conflict with his mother.
6. *A reaction of a changed consciousness* after three months (little fool) at school—together with the hunger.
7. “Viy.” He knows about the soap,²⁷ the cannibalism, the fear of the dead.
8. Three forms of memories—see above—each corresponds with its own affect: (a) the memory image—pity, depression; (b) the hallucinations—fear, horror; (c) during the night it seems as if Seryozha comes (interpretation), the fear of meat—“the thoughts come to him”²⁸—depression.
9. *The psychology of the trauma*—the anxiety of the event and the horror, the self-accusation, the fear of revenge. Some relationship of the trauma with the mother (father). Perhaps identification with the cousin’s suicide (his father and mother beat him as well).
10. *The psychology of the delusion*—The *positive* of reality is in the mechanism of the increased dreaming—the delusion (it originates in his dream); the bottle; <illegible>; the threat to kill him + the reproduction of the situation; the *negative of reality*—cries when he remembers that he ate no bread when the mother was there.
11. *Delusion at all levels of consciousness*: from oneiric hallucinations to interpretation (“the thoughts come to him”) in one and the same boy.
12. The hallucinations are combined with the fear of food: In the plate he sees his uncle. The unity of the hallucination and the interpretation.

Oligophrenic? Neustadt’s *Debilitätspsychosen*.²⁹

If the delusion is *Irrealität*, then the relationship with reality is of the irreal type: <i.e.> a double one: positive–negative. He is afraid to part with the fear and the pain in the leg, talks about Seryozha with pleasure, but the pain in the leg and his mother are traces.

Four forms of delusions (levels of consciousness from the unconscious to complete consciousness): (a) the pain in the legs, (b) the hallucinations, the oneiric (they can be dreams as well) delusion, (c) the delusive images (eidetic images), (d) the delusive interpretations.

Every delusion is a flight into *Irrealität*: a <false> idea that has become a passion. What kind of passion lies behind it? The culmination point of affective thinking, of the logic of feelings.

They brought him a year ago after Seryozha's death: leaps up, raves in his sleep, is nervous, headaches, is reading much, fears the devil, afraid to go to the toilet: a typical reaction.

The whole picture: (a) the trauma—the loss of consciousness + the <illegible> nervousity, the fears (a reaction) +; (b) the news about the suicide, the identification—a delusion, not excluded—the *suicide* attempts.

My interpretation: The center of the delusion is the identification with the deceased cousin. The positive of reality are the threats; the negative is the suicidal tendency: I should have died.

Evidence: (1) The legs are not a hysterical conversion but identification: One of Seryozha's legs was shattered—that is how he sees him in his hallucinations—since that time one of his own legs is twisted, the other one hurts a little bit like Seryozha's leg; (2) cries when it is mentioned that he does not take bread and water when he is with his mother (eats when alone). When talking about Seryozha he is indifferent; the affect is here; (3) the hunger strike when he is with his mother is a suicide; (4) he cries about <the leg>—identification; (5) remarkable: does not eat meat; in the Ukraine they eat human flesh, for soap, i.e., he fears his *own* death. The proof: He sees his uncle with a knife (his own death) in the plate with meat.

Dreaming of the marshal's baton

Abram is a contrarious boy who likes to go against the grain and derives some sort of satisfaction from the negative attention he receives. Even when prompting other children at school, he makes deliberate mistakes and as a result he is frequently beaten up. Vygotsky believes the core is the satisfaction the boy derives from his strange behavior and suggests a form of psychotherapy, which reveals this underlying mechanism, plus placement in another school.

February 28, 1934 *Abram B.* (12; 01)

Fifth grade: does not study, chats, shoots with his catapult, does not prepare his lessons, [after] reprimands: "So what, I don't like it." Runs from one place to another, does not work during the lessons.

The conversation. Engages in hooliganism; haughty. Tall for his age and his group. Has a high opinion of himself. Self-confident. A weak character. Knows little. Undisciplined. Behaves well with mathematics. *Contemptuous attitude to the school grades*. There were cases of truancy. Does not get along with the children. *Spoiled: the main thing*. *Constantly cries, complains that the children offend him*.

At home has no regard for his mother. [Only does things] under compulsion. Reads non-stop about geography, which fascinates him. Reads whole days. Mendacious, smoked. *Einzelkind*.³⁰ <illegible> rarely. Fell – broke a tooth. Attends school from age 7½. From the first day complaints about his writing. From the second grade about his behavior. The mother beats him. An egoist. No [sense of] duty. *Heridity*: The mother had fainting spells after angina. *Wrong upbringing*—did everything he wanted—draw him into social work, discipline. The father took a holiday, deprived him of the reading, kept a tight rein. Joined a Pioneer group for five–six days: had words with the young leader—to hell with you. Was expelled. *They beat him up during the breaks, boys and girls*: He threatens that he will come with the boys from the Danilovskiy Market³¹ and will beat them up. Constantly in tears, [arrives] home with ragged clothes. With geography prompts incorrectly, gets an unsatisfactory mark. (He knows geography but refused to <illegible>). Does not get along with the children. New <illegible> every day: He goes to them, but the children do not like it. He is the most mature. Behaved childishly (they took away a knife). Spent the whole lesson lying. His progress, except for nature study and geography (good), literature (satisfactory), the rest unsatisfactory. Pathetic, dependent, merry. Is afraid to appear as a goody-goody in front of the other children: [if] they tell him “you are a goody-goody,” he does mischief, upsets the lesson. But he is not hot-tempered or irritable but equable. He will never say who beat him. He does not quarrel with those who beat him up, he himself talks and deals with them. *Innerly satisfied with his position*: He is winning the game, a *Quasibedürfnis*. Satisfaction, *Befriedigung*,³² the boys and the educators talk about him.

The father: He does not sleep, he does not eat, he reads, reads non-stop. Beats him. He was difficult the last year. *The boy*: loves to read, eat, sleep, the rest is so-so. A good book instead of dinner, he wouldn't say no. While reading, he dreams, identification. He dreamt about *After 10 years*³³: they will present him the marshal's baton. He would not like to give up the rowdyism. With his father and mother prefers to be silent. Loves to boast about unusual adventures. He reads something terrible [and] wants to copy it. He kicks up a row to boast about it. When the children beat him, he does not defend himself to avoid getting involved with them. Mathematics is the most uninteresting subject and does not come easily to him. Geography is interesting. *No friends*. *Yu. M.: an unstable constitution*. *Characterless mother*. *Unbalanced father*.

NB! The boy is beaten both at home and at school: failure everywhere. The helplessness—*leaving the field* (the books, the dreams, the *Irrealität*, the bragging), narrowed his living space. The dreams about the marshal's batons. The compensatory nature of the misconduct is self-assertion: The situation satisfies him, there is *Befriedigung*. It is *refractoriness as distinguished from stubbornness and negativism*. The high opinion of himself. Wins the game: Is he satisfied? Yes, afterwards hesitates. You do not want to talk? <Confirms> it. They spoiled him, indulged him in everything. Sexual maturation <illegible>.

NB.

1. The beginning of the negative phase. *Inde* the *quasi* schizophrenic traits. *Befriedigung* from two tendencies: against home (no inner rule) and against school + self-assertion. Reconciled himself to his father's punishment (he was beaten as well)³⁴ because the protest followed the unconscious path. He is not befriended with the disorganizers; they wanted to become friends with him. This is a symptom that he is not interested in the disorganizing itself but that there is another motive *behind it*. *It is not the core but a hetero-motivated activity*.³⁵ To do what you want; to show that you do what you want, and not what your father wants you to do—this is good. Thus: the father beats him—the tears—made it up with him and justifies it. At school he [deliberately] does what he gets punished for.
2. They tease him for being a Jew: the children ill-treat him? *The contemptuous attitude* is the center of everything. With geography he wants to prove his worth. *Haughtiness*. (To the head: What do you want, what's the problem?).
3. *An asthenic mind*: sensitive psychopathic development: the secret ambition. The sthenic *quasi* behavior follows from this. The father says: He is touchy. *Inde*, a mixture of sthenic and asthenic traits. *An enttrohntes Kind*.³⁶
4. When he leaves I propose to help him to reform—not needed, tomorrow he himself will improve. Promises to come on the 10th to give an account. We will see. Psychotherapy.
6. *His answer*: He loves to read, sleep, eat = I have no pleasant things in life. *Inde*, he gets partial satisfaction from the misconduct: It is an *Ersatzhandlung*.
7. The refractoriness—even with respect to the rules of the schoolchildren (he prompts incorrectly—let them unlearn it).
Against the school discipline—against his father: the internal rule of his father (Piaget).³⁷
8. *Aufdeckende Psychotherapie—an asthenic reaction*. He has no immediate wish to reform—*He will not give up the* trouble making without a fight—Without it he has nothing to live for, it gives him partial *Befriedigung*. [We must] create a turning-point—an experience—then move him to another school. With psychotherapy. Sokol'niki.³⁸

About mother love and incessant talking

Larisa is a childish, somewhat backward child who loves dramatic gestures and cannot stop talking. Her school results are disastrous, and her parents and siblings do not love her. She makes pathetic attempts to please them (cleaning their overshoes) and to improve her school results. Somewhat surprisingly, it seems she succeeds.

April 4, 1934 *Larisa G.* (14 yrs.)

Laziness, mendacity, cries–laughs, studies worse every year, affectionate, kind, frivolous, loves to give orders. The mirror, spins round [in front of it], impress the men, frivolous. [The mother had] 17 pregnancies, 14 abortions. Early development was normal. Alcoholism of the grandfather; the brother of the grandfather is stupid, like a child of 18 years old. *Onanism. Menses absent.*³⁹ Eunuch-like build. Coquettish. Diminished critique and intellect. Two years in grades III and V; she decided they would expel her from school for her lack of progress, she decided to run away from home to a school in the village. She spent one night with acquaintances, did not sleep, not a painful experience: The motivation for the running away is infantile: She heard that they expell you with three insufficient marks. The main difficulty is that she constantly talks at school. She tried to poison herself when she failed at school. The letter to her mother when she ran away: She gets along well, when I have finished school I will come back, I am not a baby. A child: I will bring good marks, I eat other people's bread like a parasite, I want to be an educated person. A verbose letter with the mail. IQ normal, but there are deviations. IQ = 0.76; 10 years 8 months.⁴⁰ Attention absent-minded, sluggish, unproductive.

The mother: She poisoned herself because of the school, after she ran away she changed—She began studying well—only satisfactory marks; gentle, affectionate, she hates it that her mother loves her sister, who she holds up as a model; she gave her word, gets up at 6 o'clock in the morning—I will reform; to the mother: you hate me. Sexual maturation +, *menses* for the first time. Onanism with 7–8 years. She cried after she ran away. *She is not like other children.* Frequent headaches since she started school. Loves to play the patient: pretended that her leg was paralyzed; the children carried her, when she saw her father, she began to walk. A love affair at school, a letter: Do not think I am jealous that you date another girl, just date. Rivalry with her sister. Her brother of 21 and her sister of 16 get along well, but she does not. Submissive, serves them, even cleans their overshoes, they would never think of doing that; but she quarrels with them. The mother loves the older children more. She loves to help in the household. She is a bit stupid.

About the girl: a cunning girl—she can delude an adult. Laughs loudly, says improper things. Started walking at the age of 2½: rickets. Speech with 1 year old. *Makes up things:* mom, that woman died, they buried her—a lie; so-and-so has a small child; then says she herself saw the grave; embellishes the stories. Takes sugar without asking. The girl: says the same. She cannot multiply 11×11 : 10×10 plus 1×1 . Gets embarrassed. Her friends persuaded her to run away from home. Dissimulates the problems in the family. Does not know what is 6% of 100. Reads Charskaya,⁴¹ Lermontov. Remembers nothing. <illegible>, the thyroid gland is enlarged. Diminished pharyngeal reflex. Mild Basedow.⁴²

NB!

1. Just like early development was delayed (walking at 2½), she is delayed later: She is infantile. Charskaya. Childish mind. Low IQ.
2. Running away, poisoning, recovery in 10 days by fits and starts.
3. Instability. A reactive-unstable girl. Shallow, superficial experience. Hysterical-like reactions.
4. The negative phase of adolescence: a change of the relationship with the parents; dreaminess—makes up stories *for herself*.
5. Hysterical-like character traits.
Hysterical development: invents things; unambitious; complaisant; infantile. Interest in householding. Headaches. Understanding and memory bad; laziness. One minute she laughs, next minute she cries. Diminished critique.
6. [The mother's] organic weakness because of the deliveries. Her position in the family: The mother hates her. The main problem is she cannot stop talking. Her childhood is over: The crisis was at school. It passes: 10 days solved the problem. Symptoms of physical and mental weakness (headache). Fantasies. The laziness results from weakness. Adler. Mechanisms. Emerged victorious. Weakness—asthenia of the nervous system—*inde* the intellect and the character. The *menses* is a turning point.

Reactive–unstable. To be distinguished from hysteria: There is no stratification. She is reactive–unstable. *At the basis is weakness, primitiveness, and the position of the weakest.* A negative phase—a crisis. *A weak character*: cries–laughs. Cleans the overshoes, submissive, asserts herself in dreams and fantasies. It is more the behavior than the character that is hysterical-like. An inconspicuous personality with diffuse traits and primitive reactions. The weakness and the superficiality of the experience: follows the first impulse. Weakness and the position of the weakest: panic, easily gets into a situation of helplessness—a defensive reaction and self-assertion. Thoughtless, easily yields to others' influence and in general to her first impulse. Weak decision making: She left and returned. The lack of will contra the hysteria, pro reactive instability: i.e., she is not weak-willed.

Leave her at school. Watch her—consultation after a month.

Did the school lower the requirements out of fear that she poisons herself? Clarify. An unlucky person—a foolish girl, the youngest—[but works] in the household: compensates, even in her love affairs. But even in the love affair there is a touching submissiveness: I am not jealous because you date another; just do it. Submissiveness to her brother: cleans his overshoes; my brother is right, I am a parasite.

[Written in violet ink:]

Larisa (continued)

April 16, 1934 *Larisa G.* (14 yrs.)

The second time—See first note.

At school they said that the good marks were real, they were not given because they fear her suicide. She studies well, no insatisfactory marks, attends extra lessons, although she does well. Profuse *menses*. At home everything is well with her. *Come again toward the end of the year.*

Growing up in a failed family

Aleksey fails miserably at school and would prefer to do manual labor. The family circumstances are disastrous (violence, incest), and it is no wonder that the boy develops problems (e.g., bedwetting) and is not happy and friendly at home. Aleksey cannot face his problems and dreams of future wealth and getting even with his parents.

April 16, 1934 *Aleksey S.* (10 yrs.)

Second grade. Refuses to read aloud—for two years he did not read—one time < with an axe>. At home irritated, bad-tempered; one of the desorganizers, excitable, interested in manual labor, persistent like his father: what he wants he does. Not interested in studying. The father is difficult, they separated and moved together again because of the 16-year-old daughter: The father lived with her. The daughter married—he resumed the relationship with the mother. The children know. The father is dull, does not like children, does not care, reticent, silent, good at his work. Railway worker (distributor).

Heridity: mother nervous, fits, fainting spells; grandfather alcoholic, hot-tempered; the grandmother—hysteria, fits; uncle—tbc. One miscarriage at 7 months because of the weight. Five extra-uterine pregnancies. One daughter is nervous, hot-tempered, the second a psychopath, the seventh after the miscarriage. Starvation during pregnancy, asphyxia, breast[ed] until 9 months. Speech, toilet-trained from 1 year old. Until 1933 *enuresis*. Calm as an infant. At school he was talkative, [now] quiet. Is silent with reading: blushes, hangs his head. Worries about his health, wants to put on weight, [they must] feed him better than his brother: The brother will be thin anyhow. Memory diminished. IQ = 76. Neurology is normal. Reads badly if you force him: haltingly, does not read long words. *The mother:* The boy is inhibited in the presence of other people; says: (a) don't send my sickly brother to the sanatory, he has bad appetite, he must die, let them send me, I have good appetite so that I will have fat legs, a fat belly; (b) I will study well, my brothers will do badly, I will be rich, he will be poor, he will come to me, I will not receive him, and you older people will sleep on the trunk, I will marry and sleep in a bed; (c) the reason I do not read at school is that I want them to let me stay in the second year, the children will know nothing, but I will be the best student and a shock-worker. Malicious, stubborn, nervous. The sister also for a long time did not

read, did not read aloud. Timid, shy in the presence of strangers. Now the tears. The father had two fits?? Organic problems, epileptic patient? *The boy*: turned away, *aus den Felde gehen*, keeps silent. *The pedologist*: About school he was silent, about the rest he talks, during the Binet said nothing. Some sort of heightened defensive reaction. *Is silent, turned away*. In the classroom he does nothing— <busy with other things>, does not read. Mature in worldly things. Began to read, whispering and with difficulty, by the end of the year. Kept silent since the autumn. He does not want to work in the group—speaks with pleasure in the corridor. Does badly in all subjects. Among his friends he is not timid, not shy, participates in the pranks: they bought cigarettes in the co-operative store; other boys sell them. With adults he is silent. The mother beat them severely. The older brother ran away from home at midnight, was afraid. He is not bad-tempered. Obstinate with adults. In other subjects somewhat lags behind, below average. At home he is bad-tempered. Happy among the children.

Analysis: a low IQ, proud, avoiding the difficulties, conceals his shortcomings, hiding. The mother is hysteric. The father has organic problems. Biological inferiority. The reaction formation of a child with low normality. Bad heredity + bad family situation.

NB! 1. The mechanism of *aus den Felde gehen*, to hide + the compensation in dreams: the best student, as a rich man he will chase away his poor brother, will humiliate his parents, he will be healthy. But the child himself is unclear. Perhaps intellectual inferiority (debile); perhaps alexia; perhaps hysteria. Better at work than at study. Everything in the family results from the *Leseschwäche*;⁴³ a reaction formation to the *Leseschwäche*. The main symptom: Here he says nothing at all, at school he is silent with reading. Maliciousness. Not *epilepsy*, but *hysteria*.

*To Tkachev. To the KhDU.*⁴⁴

The special school.

Abram B. (continued)

April 16, 1934. *Abram B.* (12;1)

The third time—see the previous notes.

He was expelled from school because he does not want to study. Does nothing. Is reading, constructing things. I will not go: in answer to the threats to send him away. *The boy*: laughs; I did not keep my word because of my step-father; laziness, no perseverance. Will stay for the second year—under the threat of getting a negative evaluation he will behave. It is easy to say “I wanted”—he did nothing; nothing came of it. Five days he studied—gave up: the writing.

[Written in red ink:]

Perhaps *tbc* inertia.

Forest school.

A coach, a member of Komsomol.⁴⁵

Outside school: involve in sport, in social life. Admit to hospital.

An excursion: written in violet ink: [diversion.]

Misha goes berserk

Misha rebels against the situation at home: an overcontrolling, strict mother and a father who has two families. He steals, deliberately underperforms at school, and uses excessive violence against other children when teased. Vygotsky suggests his behavior is primarily a protest against an intolerable life situation.

May 4, 1934. *Misha K.* (11 yrs.)

Passive, lazy, especially in mathematics, discipline -, theft, greedy for other persons' things, loves civics and nature studies,⁴⁶ good relationship with his friends and teachers. He and his friend sold a purse—they took his red scarf, he does not regret it and does not want [it back?]. [Guilty] of the theft of 38 coupons⁴⁷ (four of them from the pencil-box of a girl). Stole five rubles from his mother. At home takes other persons' things, his own, whatever he needs. Studies satisfactorily, is lazy. He spent a lesson idle, handed in an empty exercise book. They wanted to detain him after school, then he solved the problems. Characterless, gentle. Pregnancy, delivery, and development normal. *Malaria*, scarlet fever, whooping cough. There were no fits. There were no complaints in the crèche. In kindergarten he was nice. The last year he ran wild: He beat everybody unmercifully, with that he entered school. The mother is healthy, the father—hysteria, <illegible>, defends his son against the mother. The aunt is unstable, marriages—separations. Neurology is normal, physical development is normal. Lively, jaunty. The mother is small-minded, checks him—he protests.

Pedological description: the same. *The mother:* They kept him for another year in kindergarten; Since that time [he is] difficult, at school there is no <discipline>. The mother beats him. She found money in his overshoe (hides things, stole from the neighbor, lies, said he found it in a puddle). Gambles it away and spends it on food. He can do anything if he wants; when he is not in the mood he does nothing, cannot bring himself to do something. Calm, not sad, even-tempered, lively, not sluggish, is interested in everything but school. Sociable, loves the other children. To punish him his mother locks him up for a whole day—until 6 o'clock. He threatens them and bangs the door, they should not lock him in. For the mother, the thefts are the most terrible. *The boy:* interested in nature studies and civics. There are no books about that; the mother cannot get after him and with the subjects where she does get after him, he does not do well, does not like it, and lags behind. My mother beats me, my father defends me, I plan something, but I do not carry it out, <illegible> I sit down, but I do not do it. Forgets everything. If they hit him, he hits back with whatever is available: If there is a brick, with a brick. [Do] the father and the mother treat him the same? He does not know. [The father] spent two nights elsewhere. He is not on a business trip: Papa dates with an aunty, I saw it myself, and I went to Durov's Corner⁴⁸ with them—he has a girl there, he spends the night

there. The father introduced him in that family; they were nice to him. Admits the theft: declares he took the money. What did he do with the five rubles? Holds his tongue. Did bad things with it.

Analysis: a disputable case; not a simple case; the child and the mother's tense state; they kept him another year in kindergarten, but it was perpetuated by the domestic problems; the drama with the father—he has another family. The boy's protest: Where the mother checks him, he lags behind. The thefts are unclear, petty: Is it allowed to take money? He did not answer. Lots of things are forbidden (the father has another family). He does not know what is allowed and what not.

In my opinion: a pathological character development—psychopathisation of the personality—characterlessness, passive protest + aggression (since kindergarten) + hits with a brick. The conflict in the family. The passivity—overwhelmed by some experience + aggressively protesting.

Soften the discipline—come back after the 20th.

To the school sanatory in Sokol'niki.

[Here the note ends on the penultimate page of the notebook.]

Notes

1. Possibly a season ticket for public transport, but it also could have been some sort of subscription.
2. Like many other countries, the Soviet Union organized a child movement to socialize the youth into the desired direction. The Pioneer organization was founded in 1922 and was largely modeled after the scouting movement (e.g., children wore a uniform and a red scarf). Membership was part of Soviet life and became virtually obligatory.
3. *Makar the pathfinder* (1925) was an adventure story for children written by Lev Yevgen'evich Ostroumov (1892 to 1955), a Russian poet, translator, and children's writer. Possibly the girls called Mikhail a "pathfinder" (or "tracker") because he kept following them.
4. "Miss Mend" (1926) was a popular spy film directed by Boris Vasilyevich Barnet (1902 to 1965), a Russian film director of British descent.
5. Tolstoy's trilogy about his childhood and youth published between 1852 and 1857.
6. Probably refers to Bunin's (1906) poem "Near the hut."
7. Refers to Bunin's (1916) story "Gentle breath," which Vygotsky studied for a number of years. See Van der Veer & Valsiner (1991) and Van der Veer (2014).
8. Yakimanka is one of Moscow's districts.
9. This may refer to a test of mental and technical ability developed by S. M. Vasileyskiy, A. A. Gayvorovskiy, and S. M. Verzhbolovich. See Vasileyskiy (1929).

10. This suggests there was a child version of the Sakharov concept-formation task. Cf. Towsey (2009) for recent empirical examples.
11. Given the child's age, we assume that the mother is meant, although the girl may have taken sewing lessons at school. Child labor was formally banned in 1922, although it continued in the form of mandatory unpaid work by children on Saturdays and vacations. Children worked on collective farms as well as in forestry and industry in the context of what was called "work education."
12. Pseudologia fantastica (mythomania) is chronic and compulsive lying. The lying may be deliberate when the person believes his or her life is unpleasant or boring.
13. A term used by Kretschmer. The term "epithymic" refers to desires (but some dictionaries claim it can be used as a synonym of epileptoid). Cf. Gurewitsch & Oseretzky (1930).
14. See chapter 20, Note 98.
15. The so-called *bezprizorniki* or *beznadzorniki* (unattended children) formed a huge social problem for the Soviet state. As a result of the war years, the revolutions, the civil war, epidemics, and famines in the Ukraine and Volga regions, millions of homeless children roamed the streets of the big cities. In 1927, the *Big Soviet Encyclopedia* estimated there were seven million *bezprizorniki* who survived by begging, stealing, prostitution, etc. The living conditions of these children were appalling, and alcohol and drugs abuse was rampant (Ball 1994). The problem was not yet solved, although greatly diminished, in 1934 and new waves of *bezprizorniki* were to come.
16. The Chvostek sign is an indication of low calcium levels in the blood. It refers to an abnormal reaction to the stimulation of the facial nerve. When the facial nerve is tapped at the angle of the jaw, the facial muscles on the same side of the face will contract momentarily.
17. The Forest school was located in the Sokol'niki park in Moscow. It was the first of its kind and meant for the schooling and treatment of whitenoses and sickly children. Founded in 1918, it offered open-air lessons (if permitted by the weather), good food, healthy exercise, and medical treatment.
18. Recurring boils.
19. The Politburo (from "Political Bureau") was the executive committee of the Communist Party. It subsequently became the international term for any committee or board that rules with iron hand.
20. A lymph node in the groin.
21. On December 27, 1932, and April 22, 1933, the Soviet authorities issued decrees about the establishment of a unified passport system. Passports were introduced for all citizens at least 16 years old residing in the larger cities and towns. It was the only valid personal identification document, and without a passport one could not move into other towns without permission.
22. Refers to a chapter in Homburger (1926) about children's conflicts, e.g., between the desire to eat a cookie and the promise not to eat it. August Homburger (1873 to 1930) was a German child psychiatrist and head of the Psychiatric University Clinic in Heidelberg. He was one of the first to combine

- a biological and an environmental approach in pediatrics and a proponent of psychotherapy.
23. In the Soviet Union, abortion by medical doctors in hospitals or clinics was legal and free from 1920 onward. Abortion rates were enormous because no other means of birth control were available.
 24. During the Holodomor, the massive famine in the Ukraine in 1932–1933, when several millions of people died from starvation caused by Stalin’s policy, more than 2500 people were convicted of cannibalism. Eating the remains of relatives or neighbours was virtually the only way to survive. It is possible that the boy heard some rumors.
 25. “Viy” is a horror story published by Nikolay Gogol in 1835, in which a student—during three consecutive nights—is tormented by a dead witch and her devilish helpers until he dies of fright.
 26. That is, dementia caused by lues or syphilis.
 27. During the Holodomor, soap was made of dead animals, and it is possible that the boy heard rumors that human corpses were used for that purpose as well. Similar rumors were heard during World War I and II.
 28. Here Vygotsky uses the Russian equivalent of *Es denkt*. See Note 56 in chapter 10.
 29. Psychoses connected with mental retardation (German). Neustadt (1928) claimed that mental retardation and schizophrenia exclude each other, but others posited that mental retardation and schizophrenia can co-exist and that mental retardation can even be a pathogenetic factor leading to psychoses, the so-called *Debilitätspsychosen*.
 30. Only child (German).
 31. A food market where the local farmers sold their products. It still exists but now resembles a supermarket.
 32. Satisfaction (German).
 33. Refers to Alexandre Dumas’ novel *The Vicomte of Bragelonne: Ten Years Later* (1847–1850). It is the third and last of the series that began with *The Three Musketeers* and *Twenty Years After*.
 34. Meaning that the father had also beaten when he was a child.
 35. That is, an activity motivated by the wish to please or annoy another person.
 36. Dethroned child (German). A term coined by Alfred Adler to refer to a child who lost his or her privileged place in the family, usually the first child.
 37. This refers to Piaget’s (1932) discussion of the development of moral rules in the child and his distinction of a morality of constraint (by the father and mother) and a morality of cooperation.
 38. Refers to the Forest school mentioned previously.
 39. No menstruation.
 40. This means that the old method of determining the IQ by dividing the mental age (10 years 8 months, or 128 months) by the chronological age (14 years, or 168 months) was used. Of course, an IQ of 76 is below normal.

41. Lidiya Alekseyevna Charskaya (real name Churilova) (1875 to 1938). Russian actress and prolific writer. Her books dealt with adventurous girls and women who seek diversion from everyday routine. In 1920, her books were officially banned, but young girls continued to read them. In Vygotsky's opinion this showed they were immature.
42. Also known as Grave's disease, an autoimmune disease that frequently results in an overactive thyroid.
43. Dyslexia (German).
44. We were unable to identify the person and to unriddle the abbreviation.
45. The Komsomol (from *Kommunisticheskiy Soyuz Molodezh* [Communist Youth Union], with members from age 14 to age 28 years, was a Communist organization for younger people and as such was the last and final stage of the trajectory that led to the model Soviet citizen. A member of Komsomol was chaste, abhorred alcohol, tobacco, religion and other drugs, and simply loved to do unpaid work for the Party and the fatherland.
46. A mixture of geography, biology, knowledge about the natural environment, etc.
47. Presumably used to get free meals in the school cafeteria.
48. *Ugolok Dedushki Durova* (Grandfather Durov's Corner) is a still-existing theater for children where the roles are played by animals. It was founded in 1912 by the circus artist Vladimir Leonidovich Durov.

References

- Ball, A. M. (1994). *And now my soul is hardened: Abandoned children in Soviet Russia, 1918–1930*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Gurewitsch, M., & Oseretzki, N. (1930). Die konstitutionellen Variationen der Psychomotorik und ihre Beziehungen zum Körperbau und zum Charakter. *Archiv für Psychiatrie und Nervenkrankheiten*, 91, 286–312.
- Homburger, A. (1926). *Vorlesungen über Psychopathologie des Kindesalters*. Berlin: Julius Springer.
- Neustadt, R. (1928). *Die Psychosen der Schwachsinnigen*. Berlin: S. Karger.
- Piaget, J. (1932). *The moral judgment of the child*. Glencoe, IL: The Free Press.
- Towsey, P. M. (2009). Wolves in sheeps' clothing and other Vygotskian constructs. *Mind, Culture, and Activity*, 16, 234–262.
- Van der Horst, F. C. P., & Van der Veer, R. (2010). The ontogeny of an idea: John Bowlby and contemporaries on mother–child separation. *History of Psychology*, 13(1), 25–45.
- Van der Veer, R. (2014). *Lev Vygotsky*. London: Bloomsbury.
- Van der Veer, R., & Valsiner, J. (1991). *Understanding Vygotsky: A quest for synthesis*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Vasileyskiy, S. M. (1929). *Kommentarii i instruktsii k postanovke ispytaniy po "Osnovnomu kompleksu testov," sostavlennemu prof. S.M. Vasileyskim, A.A. Gayvorovskim i S.M. Verzhbolovichem*. Nizhny Novgorod: Tipografiya 'Kollektiv Pechatnikov'.

Chapter 28

The Playing Child

The present chapter is based on notes that were primarily made on cards with the heading “Processing the manuscript.”¹ These were the cards Vygotsky used in the last months of his life (see also the next chapter). The main theme of the notes is play as a leading activity in the preschool period and the semantic field as an independent plane of the child’s free action. A special part form the notes made on occasion of the sessions of the Toy Committee of the Narkompros of the RSFSR in November and December 1933. The notes reveal the hitherto-unknown fact that Vygotsky was a member of this committee.

The development of the child’s labor activity

The note is written in black ink on the two sides of an empty library card. The text deals with play, labor, practical intellect, and the role of semantic action.

NB! *The development of the child’s labor activity*

1. Labor has been studied little (cf. play) but developed more.
2. Development and labor. Piaget: The child does not work.² Marx: the crippling of development + the method of raising fully developed human beings.³ Theoretically: Labor created man.⁴ *Ergo*, in labor all higher, specifically human, functions [exist].
3. But there is no parallelism between onto- and phylogeny: speech and labor.
4. The problem of practical intellect: <meaning> <illegible>. Apes and the young child do not use tools. Combinations of thinking and action as the basic form of practical intellect. *The semantic action is the unit of practical intellect.*
5. But practical intellect is still situated; labor is not situated.
6. Concrete labor: polytechnic work + educational work at school.
7. What does the separation of mental and physical labor mean in the school age: It is the other side of their combination at a higher basis.

8. *What characterizes the child's labor: the change of nature, a thought transformed into a thing, the supremacy of the semantic field over the object field: the goal that in its ideal form was formed in the mind determines—like a law—the way of acting: the subordination of oneself and one's behavior to a law; the motives of labor are social and surmount the personal interest (the more volition is needed, the less the labor itself is interesting).*

Cf. labor—play. In both cases, the semantic and the visual field diverge, but here [in play we have] the realization of the semantic field in the visual field.

Cf. labor—practical intellect. In both cases, there is a realization in the situation, but in practical intellect we see the coincidence of the semantic and the visual field; in labor there is a *Diskrepanz*.⁵

The Toy Committee of the Narkompros of the RSFSR

These notes were made in November and December 1933, although it cannot be excluded that some undated notes were made in early 1934. With the exception of two fragments, which could not be deciphered, the full text is published here. From 1932 to 1933, the toy was considered an instrument in the education of the model Soviet citizen, and toys that did not fit the ideological requirements were declared harmful. The history of the Toy Committee begins in August 1933 with the First National Conference on Toys in Gorky. The committee was formally installed on January 21, 1934, by a decree of the Soviet of People's Commissars. Despite Krupskaya's efforts, who headed the committee from April 1936 onward, the committee ceased to exist on May 20, 1938. Its assignment was to supervise the creation and production of toys as well as to coordinate the activities of institutes, firms, and the Toy Museum. The committee consisted of representatives of the Ministries of Education, Health, and Light Industry of the SSSR, the Central Committee of the All-Union Leninist Young Communist League, artists' associations, and so on. Judging by Vygotsky's notes, the Toy Committee already functioned several months before its official installment. Already in March 1934, the Committee published a first list of recommended and forbidden toys. The doll, in particular, suffered harsh critique by one of the main members of the Toy Committee, Yevgeniya Flerina (Flerina 1936a).⁶ The committee warned that firms or organizations involved in producing or spreading forbidden toys would be held legally responsible. Mechanical toys and everyday things dominated the list of toys that were recommended as "especially valuable." The top 20 of responsible toys consisted of "(1) an engine with a clockwork; (2) a crane; (3) washing things; (4) a teapot; (5) a Budyonnyj soldier;⁷ (6) a turkey; (7) a goose; (8) a cock; (9) a woolen hedgehog; (10) a beaver hedgehog; (11) a big monkey; (12) a small monkey; (13) a bulldog; (14) a grey mouse; (15) a conveyer; (16) a crane truck; (17) a minelayer; (18) a speed-boat; (19) truck № N-64; and (20) a small tractor." (*Spisok igrushek* 1934) Unfortunately, the activity of the committee had no positive influence on the production of Soviet toys. Although these toys may have met the ideological requirements, their aesthetic level and technical quality could not compete with their capitalistic counterparts.

The documents give an example of Vygotsky's intense involvement in various utterly unproductive social activities. It is interesting to see how Vygotsky attempted to interpret the rather empty rhetorical talks (Rozanov's talk may have been an exception)⁸ from the viewpoint of his own theoretical framework. That framework was presented in his lectures on the psychology of play at the Herzen State Pedological Institute in 1933 (Vygotsky

2001) and at an internal conference on June 7, 1933 (according to Luria's archive). See also El'konin (1978) and "Early childhood" (Vygotsky 1998, pp. 266–268). As always, the notes form a mixture of statements by the speaker and Vygotsky's personal comments.

[Written in black ink on four cards:]

September 4, 1933 NB! *The Toy Council*

Construction sets

Themes:

Points 1 to 2 have braces in the margin with the following remark: [Fundamental themes, the basis.]

1. Children's work with iconic and schematic construction sets.⁹
2. Age-specific features in constructing.

Points 3 through 6 have braces in the margin with the following remark: [Theoretical themes, conclusions.]

3. What kind of construction set is needed for the preschool age.
4. The classification of existing construction sets.
5. The method of presenting construction sets.
6. The assessment of the existing manuals for the construction sets.
7. The study of an iconic construction set and of a construction set for the pre-school age.

These are all subthemes of one theme: the work with a construction set in the preschool age.

Encircled: [The first theme.]

The *iconic* construction set = *Endlust*. To make it play, to include it in the play. Here everything begins when it is assembled.

The *schematic* [construction set] = *Funktionslust* (*Vorlust*)¹⁰—assembled and it is over.

Encircled: [The second theme.]

About "Matador" (a schematic construction set).¹¹

From 3 years until the end.

Tbc children (osseous [tuberculosis]) the whole year.¹²

Preschool age—kindergarten plus hospital.

Age-specific features in the technique of work, in the methods of work.

Stages: 1. The mechanical and the toddler (inserting the rods—the field of the *Aufforderungscharakter*, corresponds with the procedural period,¹³ the scribbles).

2. The rhythmic period—the play with the parts (cf. the drawing). The imageless complex construction.

3. *How does the image appear*—technical thinking—away with the adornment, the complexity. Airplanes, etc., without a plan, not preconceived.

There is comparative material in modeling clay and drawing: the *non-simultaneity* of the appearance of each stage in every activity.

Copying is more fascinating than drawing (drawing—20', copying—1.30') with 3–4 years. In the preschool age they like to copy most of all; they need stimulation, help, [otherwise] it becomes boring.

The drawing—the image: Did the image resemble the construction: Did it result from the construction? *Different material—osseous tbc and children from the kindergarten.*

The theme:

1. From the motor, visual–motor, iconic–motor, technical construction.
2. Does the result of the construction allow conclusions?
3. The construction method—the process.

The goal: the practical creation and use of construction sets; theoretically, age-specific features.

The hypothesis: to what extent the stages of drawing are repeated in the construction set. *The general and the specific.*

Encircled: [What comes further.]

1. Neubauer's paper¹⁴

Pfahler's paper (cf. the material in the notebook)¹⁵

Piaget

Lipmann—Bogen

Lopotukhin¹⁶

2. The psychological analysis and the qualification of constructive activity.
3. Experimental construction sets and the <illegible> method.
4. The hypothesis of the age development of constructive activity: not goal–plan–execution; not nonverbal specific thinking; not *Naive Physik*; *the semantic (abstract) action.*

[Written in black ink on three cards:]

November 19, 1933 *The Toy Council*

The development of speech and the toy

1. The doll and the hobby horse—the animation of the toy substitutes for the collective: egocentric speech.
2. Speech and the toy in the preschool age. The role of speech in playing with a toy. The role of play in the development of the operations with meaning: In play the child plays with meanings as with things. The developmental path of speech: (a) the semantic side, which is not parallel to the physical side; (b) inner speech—in both cases there is play.
3. Immediately from the end: the practical application—we need research + theory.

4. Games in the preschool and school age—from an obvious imaginary situation with an implicit rule to *vice versa*.
5. The cognitive role of the toy—the play content (cf. in a problem, the content is the rule of three,¹⁷ not the price of apples).
6. What is the essence of speech development at school? The relationship between oral and written speech.
7. *Most important*: Why is the toy connected with speech (through play—an imaginary situation). The toy contains the stimuli for *spontaneous* speech, and this is the most important at school because there they teach deliberate speech, which is poor in spontaneous expression.
8. How the playing child easily creates a dialogue (for himself and for the doll) and reproduces a dialogue because he does not know indirect speech.
9. *The basic problem is not clear*: What kind of activity is *speech with the toy at school*; is it correct to return to play with the forms of the lesson at school?; where—in their native language or in a foreign one? To introduce the doll in the school is something strange. Cf. Volkelt—arithmetic and play.
10. Tolstoy advised not to correct the spelling errors in school essays.¹⁸
11. Grade zero¹⁹—the transitional form from play to the lesson: play + the language lesson. *But play and educational activity are different things* + play outside the lesson.
12. What is the erratic talk's significance for us? It pays attention to speech, which is an indispensable—and essential—aspect of each analysis of the toy (through play—the imaginary situation).
13. *Most important*: The relationships of speech (and its developmental paths) with play activity are *specific*, just like the relationships of speech with the picture are specific (cf. my experiments).
14. I would use this theme in Leningrad and in the EDI: play and speech.
15. Cf. Shif: What is the weakness of scientific concepts and (foreign) speech—in the spontaneous use, *ergo*, play is an irreplaceable way to cover the *preschool* part of speech and scientific development (to descend via play).

Written in the margin: [Two themes: the toy and speech + the toy at school.]

[Speaker unknown; written in black ink on one card:]

November 19, 1933 *The Toy Council*

The happy toy

1. What is a happy toy?
2. Hypotheses: The more primitive, the shorter the use, but quality +; the caricature and absurdity in the preschool age—abnormality only in older children—comprehension. Misses the point.
3. The psychology of happiness, laughter, humor, comicality in childhood. In the toy a genre—in the analysis—play *sui generis*. A contradiction.
4. Verifying and observational work but not experimental.
5. A magic trick, a drum. The division and qualification of psychological different types of the happy toy. Divide the psychological happiness by age.

Hide-and-seek at an early age + but not at an older age. The surprise, the fright, the laughter. A jumping frog toy.

6. Laughter and happiness as the relaxation of *Spannung*, as an affect *sui generis*.
Boxed: [Wish fulfillment is related to relaxation.]
6. [sic] Not the happy but the specifically unserious toy: A drum can be more merry than a roly-poly toy, but [it is] serious. The funny toy fulfils a certain aesthetic, psychological, and ludic function (play the fool, laugh).
7. The child's activity with the happy toy—*It is sensory*, that is why it is short. Laughter in the specific meaning of the word. Written in the margin: [Not accidental: The toy sometimes frightens, sometimes causes laughter. The relaxation: It both frightens and causes laughter.]

Flerina's talk [written in black ink on four pages:]

December 1, 1933 *The Toy Committee*

Flerina. The design of the toy.

1. *Design principles and requirements.*
Toys of different types—for different age groups—on the basis of socialist realism—the first year: *preschool age—the iconic toy.*
2. The design is not just the sum of the material properties (size, coloring) but the design of the image itself (the facial expression).
Not true: the presence of the image.
3. The iconic toy is an artistic (?) work. This requires a psychology of art in the toy, i.e., contradiction, seriousness and its overcoming. Lermontov's *lullaby*.²⁰
Not art because it is for play.
4. *With [increasing] age*, the toy [should be] more realistic: in adolescence the model, the textbook = a toy.²¹
5. Toy—not <illegible> (a jumping cat that never jumps). Neutral. Not a tense pose. The mobility of the parts at an older age.
6. *A dynamic scale model*—in older age. The stage director of play. The toddler is an actor.
7. *The hypothesis:* The young child is an actor while playing; the older child a stage director (a more visual and steering attitude to play). The design corresponds with that: the conventions that stimulate the child's activity (a horse on wheels; a siren in a truck that the children honk themselves is suitable for the youngest children, not for the older ones) at a younger age. *A steamer* with sand molds, a shovel, and wheels to play with sand?
8. *The problem of the image*—visual perception in the action, the drawing and play (the imaginary situation)—*imagination. The creative character of play.* Let there be, *fiat*: To preserve this is the most important.
9. *The sculptural toy:* (a) form—the choice of different forms before, during, and after play, (b) natural, realistic, and theoretically rhythmic (autonomous colors), (c) construction—a dog in an immobile pose; for the toddlers—the legs move, this paralyzes his activity, (d) uniform or diverse material, (e) the

mechanism of movement and sound, (f) the scale: types of play—as a stage director or actor, contrasting.

10. *Design and expressivity*: the heroic horse; the solemn, ceremonial, festive horse; the everyday, domestic, childish horse; the comical horse; the epic, lyrical, tragic horse.
11. *The main thing: structural analysis*, figure and ground. Is there a general law of size, form, etc. for all types?
- 11a. Color is indissolubly connected with form (a three-dimensional form does not fully express itself without color: the difference with sculpture): If you study them separately, you get hybrids: natural horses with a fantastic coloring. *It is impossible to mechanically make a Vyatka horse²² both big and naturalistic: the structural role of color and form will be changed.*
12. Perhaps we should not proceed from the beginning but from the *Endprodukt*.²³ We must give design principles, but we must not give them separately—about form, size, coloring, etc.—but *structural-aesthetically*: the construction principle of the iconic form. This rests upon two questions: (a) the structure (the principle of the analysis into units), (b) the design of the image itself.
13. Gorlov's horses²⁴ are integral designs but with a different coloring, a different form, and different sizes. Then it makes no sense to ask which ones are better, *what is better*: strawberry ice-cream or to pass an examination.
14. The semantic and the expressive function of the image.

[Written on three cards in black ink:]

December 7, 1933 *The Toy Council*

Didactic games (preschool <program>).

1. The analysis of the didactic material, Montessori's, Tikheyeva's,²⁵ of the toys.
2. The requirements and the themes of the new toy—10 projects (<5>).
3. What is a didactically + toy (not the material). Types: color, form, etc.
4. The didactic toy is a diet for the patient and the doctor: For the child it is play, for the pedagogue it is didactics. Volkelt's task: the didactics of tomorrow, the preparation for school, domino. *Cf. mental retardation. The goal of the experiment*: Does didactic play accomplish its didactic goal + by the same means (i.e., is it genuine play).
5. Color, form, size, touch, and sound. *Needed*: [encircled:] reading, writing, and counting. Tikheyeva, Montessori, Fröbel, the unsystematic [theory?] created by Decroly's pedagogues.²⁶
6. The main difficulty of all investigations, the difficulty that I have summarized, is the test criterion. Here this is *doubly* true, <illegible> easily solved. All ages—the same toys—incorrect.
7. The question rests upon the formal discipline of play and the toy:²⁷ It exists in every toy. Every toy teaches something, develops something. But the didactic toy is a particular case of the formal discipline. Teaching reading and writing and counting; that is clear. But the rest not fully. What is the play content? The *typical didactic* toy in counting and reading. *What kind of thought activity of the*

preschooler is affected by this or that didactic play—this is its goal and specific character (?). The analysis from the viewpoint of the psychology of the child: Claparède—becoming consciously aware [is] *the law of didactic play in the preschool age*: similarity acts earlier, is consciously realized later; difference acts later, is consciously realized earlier.

8. *Verbal games* are very important: They also exist with a toy. *The formative role of the toy*: <illegible> in Africa.

Kvasnetsky's talk [written in black ink on six cards:]

December 25, 1933 *The Toy Council*

*Kvasnetskiy*²⁸

1. *Select a working hypothesis* [and] directives to assess the material.
2. *Constructing*: (a) the play content, (b) the combination of details, (c) the presence of three-dimensional details, (d) a purposeful single image, (e) experience that introduces the image into consciousness.
3. *The playing activity and construction*: to give a copy of reality? Conventional constructions with conventional details—freedom in constructing.
NB! Boxed: [I count the drawing as play: the creation of an imaginary situation, of semantic fields, a toy house on a sketch.]
The isolation of the construction set from real life. Dramatic construction.
4. The text of point 4 is boxed with the following remark in the margin: [No Is there a direct transition from construction to play? To make a car and to play with it. To play garage.]
The playing possibilities of the construction set have not been used in the preschool age.
5. Every construction is alternated with another activity.
6. Its use for pretend play is minimal with 3–4 years. With 11 years there is the use of the assembled object—8' out of 60'.
7. Children's constructions have to do with [play] = introduce the world of play, but not the world of things, into the structure.
8. The connection between construction and play grows or falls from 3 to 11 years—this is the most important.
Written in the margin: [It falls because in the beginning there is no play.]
9. The special feature of construction compared with other plays: to make something, the work attitude (cf. Bühler: *Werk*²⁹ with 5–7 years). The child takes the screwdriver—*I will repair it* (a play action)—turns to the construction: *I will do it* (does not say it, but does it; but [in the first case] says it: I will repair it).
10. Boxed: [In the preschool age, the child learns the descent from the dynamics of thinking to reality—the non-realized dynamics of thought in semantic actions in play; what changes is the imaginary but not the real situation.]
11. The combination of details is absent in the beginning.

12. *From the viewpoint of the imaginary situation constructing lies between play and labor. Cf. the bush of creative activities from one spring: play, drawing, modeling, construction, and labor. Cf. the mosaic.*³⁰
13. *To play while constructing is impossible:* for example, playing garage. Because the actions in play combine according to the laws of thought, but in construction they are tied to the material. The figure in play is to be the skilled workman, the ground is to make what the skilled workman is supposed to make; the figure in construction is to make something, the background is to be a skilled workman. Figure and ground change places.

NB!

1. *Not psychological but descriptive symptomatic distinctions.* There are too many of them. Better one but essential characteristic. A vicious circle: from the observation of the construction sets of types A and B to the generalization: What is constructive activity; from this generalization to the assessment of the construction sets. *We need an analysis to pick out the core.*
2. *What is constructive activity and how does it differ from other types of activity?* The differentiation and integration of activities in the preschool age.
3. *Integration:* The bush of creative activities from one spring—from the fundamental change of the relationship with the situation: the semantic action: play, drawing, modeling, constructive activity, and labor: *from the plan to its realization*—the transformation of the dynamics of thought into action: <illegible> the child first acts, then thinks; here he first thinks and then acts. *The relationship between the action (and its motive) and the thought changes: the systemic viewpoint.*

Written in the margin: [When the child dramatizes (an imaginary situation), constructing as such disappears. But this is very rare: *Ergo*, constructing is not play.] Blonskiy about play.³¹ If a construction set is play, it is not used as a construction set.

4. *Differentiation:*
 1. *The basic forms*

	Play	Labor
In common: the creation of imaginary and real things		
1.	The imaginary situation. The rule	The ideal situation. The law
2.	The supremacy of the semantic field over the real field without a change of the real field	The supremacy of the semantic field over the real field with a change of the real field
3.	The semantic action without transformation into a real one	The semantic action transformed into a real one
4.	<i>Handlung</i> without realization = <i>Funktionslust</i>	<i>Handlung</i> , realization of the intention = <i>Vorlust</i>
5.	<i>Ernstspiel</i> ³² (before - and after - play)	Self-service
6.	Play with a toy	<i>Play sui generis</i>

II. *The transitional forms*

	Drawing	Constructing
<i>In common:</i> the creation of form, form formation		
1.	The schema—not reproduce the object but <i>create</i> the object: the semantic action, the play form—the lines designate, but do not depict the house. The creation of a symbolic situation (form) <i>in a special relationship</i> with the real situation— <i>Vorlust</i> <i>Here:</i> all graphic art (modeling).	The creation of a formal situation (a model), which symbolizes the real one: again a <i>special</i> relationship between the formal situation and the real one— <i>Vorlust, Funktionslust</i> <i>Here:</i> all building games (blocks)

Written in the margin: [The things teach how to assemble them.]

1. Rozanov: *Constructing is the algebra of things*—you cannot make anything, not a single thing with it; *ergo, the building in constructing is an algebraic operation, an algebraic action (an abstract action) with things: What is created is not a thing, but its constructive, algebraic (tangible) formula.* If the child introduces the arithmetic of things and actions into this algebra of things, he solves the algebraic problem with arithmetical means (a red flag on the steamer, connect two parts with a thread, etc.); he does not use the construction set as such.
2. To the extent that children *freely* operate with the construction set, they operate not with the construction set *as such* (plays with the doctor’s horn³³ as if it were a spoon).
3. Serious (labor) and non-serious activity (play) = an incorrect demarcation. A grain of truth is that play and other activity [have] *different* structures, but both are serious *in their own way*. But *what* is more serious and *how*??
4. What Iv. Grig. calls the *algebraic nature* of the construction set, Kvasnetsky views as the absence of materiality [(it does not belong) to the world of things but to the world of play], but this is a purely *negative feature*, and according to their positive features *algebra and an imaginary character* are different things.
5. Two forms of connecting the construction set with play:
 - (a) creates a thing—then plays in it—this is the non-use of the construction set as such, the introduction of arithmetic into algebra (they consider a less than b by analogy with $1 < 2$ or what is more—a or b);
 - (b) play with a construction set (the roles + the construction set), cf. §13 on p. 2.³⁴
6. *Flerina:* play and the drawing: he crushes or crosses out the house because they left. But this is in an undifferentiated drawing. The drawing is not introduced into the play. The connection between play and the drawing is a double one: at first the drawing [comes] from play; play—fantasy—the drawing at the end. But the drawing does not enter the play.

7. *Kvasnetskiy*: With technical construction in the school age there is algebra; with iconic construction in the preschool age there is no algebra. Actually, there is pre-algebra, but this is the X in an arithmetical operation, which is immediately substituted by an arithmetical quantity.

Written in the margin: [But the crux is that the child goes from the form to its construction.]

Rozanov's talk [written in pencil on one card:]

December 31, 1933 *The Toy Council*

Rozanov. *The types of toys that develop the child's constructive creativity.*

1. A remarkable talk in the sense that the question about the requirements to a toy is formulated correctly and in a new way: the *formal discipline*—what does the given toy develop. In didactic games this is clear, but in all other games we must seek and find.
2. The problem of the relationship between play and development by analogy with instruction and development. Stern: Play anticipates ability.³⁵ The zone of proximal development and play.
3. Stages in the development of the construction of an “*airplane*”: There must be a correspondence with the development of activity from the viewpoint of the *semantic action*: from play to creative labor. A construction set according to age groups.
4. The top-down path to the toy—from man to ape: from serious construction to its germ in play.

[Encircled:] Iv. Grig. [Rozanov]

A technical attraction—a gymnast, who himself somersaults along a ladder: a riddle that cannot be solved. <Merry-go-rounds>: We must give these toys in such a way that the children will assemble them from the parts. Models—motors.

Written in the margin: [Five types of toys, but they are no toys.]

Written on the back: [*Constructive activity and constructive thinking.*]

[Written on one card in violet ink:]

NB!

I.G. Rozanov. About the types of toys that develop the child's constructive creativity.

Remarkable in I. G.'s talk is that we must lead the preschooler to polytechnism not so much from the simplest elements of the operation (to dig with a shovel) but from the *general*, from [the] *algebra of the action*, the structure, the general idea, the construction.

2. The psychological age-specific analysis of constructive activity.
3. The preschoolers must get a general idea about the transformations in inanimate matter: the transformation of energy and the indestructibility of matter.

4. The same also applies to the general idea about the mastery of the forces of nature in labor, about what labor is from the viewpoint of natural activity, and what a machine is: *This is the prototype of the general idea of the preschooler—to do everything yourself without analysis* (just general and from above) and without *know-how*: The school child goes inwards and into analysis.

Written on the back: [Constructive apraxia fully justifies Rozanov in his claim that to arrange a dinner service also requires a certain constructive activity. A person with constructive apraxia cannot do that.]

[Possibly the propositions for a talk by Vygotsky himself. Written in black ink on two cards:]

1. Technical thinking.
2. Play.
3. The principle of the analysis of H₂O.
4. The main thing: the hypothesis and the analysis of the empirical-descriptive enumeration of the stages.
5. Various types of activity: the drawing, modeling, the construction set: every stage matures in another period.
6. About the stages: from the point that things lead the child's activity to the point that the *Nur-Gedachtes* is leading.
7. Questions: (1) the goal is theory + practice; (2) the hypothesis; (3) what is the essence of construction—the method of the experiment, the analysis, and the interpretation. Or incidental difficulties, the literature, auxiliary data.
8. The action *sui generis*—a semantic or abstract action.
9. Cf. instruction and development—a specific activity and its analysis from the viewpoint of development.
10. Two directions in the construction set (check Neubauer): One is (El'konin) goal–plan–execution, the other is the semantic, abstract action. The second is a deeper plane and determines the first plane. In the first case, we would distinguish: purposeless, semi-purposeful, and purposeful. In the second case—zero abstract action, abstraction of one type, etc., abstract action. *Method: the iconic and schematic construction set* are very suitable for this second plane: In the iconic construction set, the goal can be present earlier because it is *not* abstract.

[Written in black ink on one card with the number “5”; other cards were not found:]

NB! The essence of play: The drawing is an active (creative) creation of semantic perception with an inverse fraction³⁶ compared with real perception (in one case perception/meaning; in the other meaning/perception).³⁷ The realization of a plan. Cf. games with an imaginary situation. The act of creation is mentioned but not the product.

The *analogy* with phonology, semantics, and communication: the unity of the <function> and the internal and external structure.

Proceed from: The child's meanings have changed in two opposite respects: both in the direction of object-relatedness and away from it. The latter is combined with the first. *The embodiment of an imaginary situation:* It would be a miracle if the child would draw the things as nature created them.

Molozhavaya's talk [written in black ink on three cards and three pieces of paper, which formed three quarters of a page with a printed text with recommendations for the English teacher on the back:]

E.B. Molozhavaya³⁸

The Toy Committee

Encircled: [The complexive toy.]

The oldest preschool and the youngest school age.

The principles of the construction and design of the complexive toy.

1. The toy *lacks* what is most important: the imaginary situation + the rule + the early development (the zone of proximal development) + the fulfillment of a wish.
2. The definition of the complexive toy (< illegible > and the creative lifelike content) lacks the most important psychological aspect: It is a toy for play in an imaginary situation. Everything is a complexive toy (a doll + a chair + a dress). *The complexive character resides in the fact that [it is play] without things that are brought in from outside* + the transition to board games + play with an imaginary situation without oneself (ego is the stage director, cf. Morozova's experiments + my playing with matches in childhood).

Written in the margin: [The complexive toy is a *new* and *important* form of the toy: a developmental level of play.]

3. The formal discipline of the toy, the principle of activity and development.
4. Three groups according to the stimulus: (a) a striking stimulus—active contemplation (circus), (b) a narrow, indeterminate stimulus with respect to the child's experience-play (the hutch, the animal island,³⁹ building), (c) a guiding stimulus [–] *active involvement*⁴⁰ (a fire station, a train).
5. The pedologist must proceed to internal analysis; otherwise he has no more to offer than the non-pedologist.
6. Hypotheses: (1) The more striking the stimulus, the higher the play—for whom? (2) The more diverse the relationship between the parts, the higher (3) the deeper the phenomena are touched upon, the more independent the play.
7. *The method*: the circus + the animal island + the farm. *Three situations*: free use with a general stimulus; after stimulation—a booklet, a story; after the design of the toy by adults.
The variable in the experiment is not adequate for the hypothesis.
8. The essence of complexive play is that it does not need additional material (except for water for the firefighters). That is why it is incorrect to provide it.
9. To watch play and just play with objects is higher than to play a game. To play being firefighters while not running is higher than to run and shout while quenching the fire. This is not mental play but a transition to mental play.
10. Seven years is not a preschooler but the crisis of the school age.
11. The epistemic activity is stated wrongly: About the firefighters the child learns very little in play, just like about apples in the arithmetic problem. It is *counting*

that is mastered and not the price of apples. Thus, while playing children do not learn something about the firefighters but about *something else*: about counting (play is the arithmetic of social relationships). That is, the formal discipline teaches abstractions.

12. *It is not true* that the more vitally important the theme of the play, the higher the play. Playing being the Council of People's Commissars is lower than playing dad and mom.⁴¹
13. The problem—the toy, but it is an experiment with the child; it is rather a test of the toys—it would be better to experiment with methods of presentation.
14. Egocentric speech and the toy. The semantic field. The semantic and the symbolic act.
15. The central problem of all play—the imaginary situation + the rule, *i.e.*, *the relationship between the semantic and the optic field and the action in them*: the same in complexive play—(essentially) *the only* criterion for the types of toys, the types of the complexive toy, the assessment of the play with the toy, etc.
16. Play of the second type (animal island) can be both higher and lower than play of the third type (firefighters) because the *Aufforderungscharakter* is less *definite*, *i.e.*, it will give both more constraint (*Feldmäßigkeit*)⁴² and more freedom than the firefighters: It is both more concrete and more abstract.
17. It is true that there are three types of complexive play, *but what is their psychological essence*.
18. A striking stimulus—rich pretend play. Incorrect: A piece of wood⁴³ is very rich material. I have seen how the sewing of dresses [for dolls] ousted the play with dolls.

The content of the play—but the question is what the *play* content of play is as contrasted with its everyday content. Just like the content of an arithmetic problem is not how much water runs out of the swimming pool, nor that traveler A caught up with B at the Klin station,⁴⁴ but its arithmetical content: a problem about the rule of three. The same with respect to art: the combination <illegible>.

An experiment: playing firefighters for real and as a board game.

Written in the margin: [Communist education includes the development of abstraction, and without that there is no exemplary play.]

The semantic action in the preschool age

This note was made on the back of three cards (“Processing the manuscript”). On pages 1–2, the main text is written in green ink, and the insertions are in violet ink; on p. 3, the text is in violet ink. The text discusses the dynamics of the semantic field in the preschool period and the results of replications of studies by Lewin’s scientific group about psychological satiation (Karsten), resuming an interrupted task (Ovsyankina), and the possibility to find a substitute (*Ersatz*) for an interrupted task (Lissner).⁴⁵ These issues were subsequently

discussed in Vygotsky's paper "The problem of mental retardation" in connection with the comparison between normal and retarded children (cf. pp. 237–240 of Vygotsky 1993).

The preschool age.

- I. *The formulation of the problem:* the social situation of development. The interaction of the real and the ideal forms in the preschool age.

The schema:

1. Infancy—?
2. Early childhood—spontaneous (the child does what he wants) according to his own program.
3. Preschool age—spontaneous–reactive (Rousseau). His own program + the teacher.

Three types of programs:

- (a) the associative and the episodic complex,
- (b) intermediate programs (one's own + another person's program by stages, types of activity),
- (c) Montessori an objective program for the teacher.⁴⁶

Montessori—they violate all stereotypes: The variants of the preschoolers are dependent upon upbringing.

II. *The dynamics:*

- (1) *Sättigung:* up to 3 years—the *Aufforderungscharakter* of the activity, no difference between spontaneous and instructed activity: a *spontaneous type of activity*.

After three years: The child does what he wants but wants what I want: The *Sättigung* is different depending upon whether it is spontaneous or after instruction: pauses, variations (I myself would quit). *Spontaneous–reactive*. The activity is not auto-motivated, *not for the sake of the activity*.

- (2) The *Energiequelle:* Before 3 years there is no switching. After three years, there is switching, the *support of the affect from the semantic field*.
- (3) The *Wiederaufnahme:* Before—in a graphic situation. *After*—without a graphic situation. *The independence from the situation*.
- (4) *Ersatz, the coherence of the motives:* *before*—no, *after*—yes.
- (5) *Ersatz, the semantic character of the motive:*

before: a plasticine dog⁴⁷

plasticine rails +
to draw a dog –.

after: a plasticine dog

plasticine rails –
to draw a dog +.

III. *The summary of the dynamics:*

1. The relationship between the motive and the motive §4⁴⁸
–affective generalization.
2. The relationship between the motive and meaning §5, §2
–affective generalization.
3. The relationship between the motive and communication §1
4. The relationship between the motive and the situation §3 and §2
–affective memory.

New dynamics in preschool age: the new systemic location of the affect. The center of everything: the semantic affect—*the emergence of dynamic–semantic systems (of complexes—general ideas)*.

- IV. *Two dynamics:* of the real field and the semantic field: affective generalization + the semantic action—this is the same. But the unity of the affect and the activity is destroyed: There are no auto-motivated activities.

[Written in the margin opposite points iii through iv:]

Cf. Claparède: the ergograph—the living will.

Lewin: the *Energiequelle*.

Spinoza: The affect is overcome by a stronger affect.

V. *The history of morality* from preschool age.

–affective generalization.

Two moralities. Piaget. Freud consciousness—the unconscious from 5 years.

The inner rule. Preparation for school. From communication. Kroh: at 3 years *Schulfähigkeit*.⁴⁹

The rule.

- VI. *New activities:* play—the motives of its activity: affective generalization, not a unitary wish—the conscious awareness of the vital activity and one's relationships: by the birth of volition, to study—*consciousness*—sisters play being sisters.⁵⁰

[Written in the margin opposite points v and vi:]

[Morality] interferes in the life of the affects.

The dynamics of the semantic field—the semantic action—turn *directly and without transformation* into the dynamics of the action: Play movements are embodied wishes and thoughts. The path from the semantic field to the real field: creative activities—play and drawing. *In play, the child does not master or subordinate: [This happens just in] labor*. The semantic action is *what is social* (what is generalized + the action about which one can communicate) just like semantic perception is a social object.

The collective of the crèches: contagion. The collective of the preschooler: mutual understanding. *In play, the child acts in the real field as with thoughts* (the transition, coupling). *The actions are combined according to the laws of thought*. A fundamentally new relationship with the situation: Buridan's ass in Spinoza—children's choice in a semantic action. *General ideas—the first idea about the world, society, oneself*. The first school.

VII. There is no amnesia—the first time.

VIII. Return to the programs: *spontaneous–reactive* (the zone of proximal development); the embryonal program—the first stage; differentiated teaching—the second stage. <...>

Written on the back: [Marx: “The animal is immediately one with its life activity. It does not distinguish itself from it. It is *its life activity*. Man makes his life activity itself the object of his will and of his consciousness. He has conscious life activity. It is not a determination with which he directly merges. Conscious life activity distinguishes man immediately from animal life activity.”⁵¹]

The interaction between the real and ideal form

This note was written in violet ink on the back of one card (“Processing the manuscript”). The claims that the environment is not a factor in development but its source, and that ontogeny is unique in the sense that the real and the ideal form cooperate, were elaborated in Vygotsky's posthumously published lectures on pedology. See chapter 14 of Van der Veer & Valsiner (1994). The theme “environment–experience–character” was the topic of an internal conference held on May 8 (information from Luria's archive), which was held 1 day before Vygotsky suffered the first of the three haemorrhages that would eventually lead to his death on June 11, 1934.

[Written note on the back:]

On the theme

About the environment, experience, and character.

NB! The significance of the interaction with the ideal form in child development: (a) a peculiarity of *child development, which can exist in no other type of development*; (b) it changes the whole understanding of the role of the environment in development—not external influences but a *source* of development; the child is part of the environment; (c) the moving forces of development result from this non-correspondence—they are the *main contradictions of child development*—of the ideal and the genetic (developed forms); (d) in embryonic development, the result (the ideal form) is pre-formed; in evolution it does not exist at all, it exists in the end; in child development, there is a real interaction with the ideal form; (e) this means that the ideal form interacts with the genetic one: that the latter relates to the former as part to whole, as cell to tissue: cf. the *child's one-word sentence* is part of a dialogue with the *mother's ideal speech*, i.e., in reality it is part of a whole that includes grammatization and other distinctive features, which clashes with the child's speech. Thus, grammar is not introduced into child speech from the third year, but from the very beginning grammar pulls the child's first words upward.

Notes

1. These were printed cards, on which the collaborators of a publishing house could keep track of the processing stage of a manuscript (e.g., who were the authors or editors, whether a contract was signed and on which date, whether the text was sent to the printer, how many copies should be printed, etc.).
2. See chapter 10, note 70.
3. Refers to p. 317 of chapter 15 of volume 1 of *Capital*: “The education of the future, an education that will, in the case of every child over a given age, combine productive labor with instruction and gymnastics, not only as one of the methods of adding to the efficiency of production, but as the only method of producing fully developed human beings.” Cf. <https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/download/pdf/Capital-Volume-I.pdf>.
4. Labor created man. Cf. Engels in *Dialectics of Nature*: “Labor is the source of all wealth, the political economists assert. And it really is the source—next to nature, which supplies it with the material that it converts into wealth. But it is even infinitely more than this. It is the prime basic condition for all human existence, and this to such an extent that, in a sense, we have to say that labor created man himself.” See <https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1876/part-played-labour>.
5. Discrepancy (German).
6. Yevgeniya Aleksandrovna Flerina (1889 to 1952). Russian pedagogue and specialist in preschool education. In the 1920s and 1930s, she worked at the Second Moscow University, the Krupskaya Academy of Communist Education, and the Potemkin Moscow Pedagogical Institute. She was a prominent member of the Toy Committee and published accounts of its activity (Flerina 1935, 1936b) as well as articles about topical themes (e.g., Flerina 1932). Flerina introduced the criteria of formalism, naturalism, and realism in the discussion about children’s toys (1936c) and investigated the preschooler’s verbal development and graphic creativity.
7. Soldier of the First Cavalry Army, which fought during the Civil War (1918 to 1920) under S. M. Budyonnyj.
8. Ivan Grigor’evich Rozanov (1890 to 1975). Russian pedagogue and defectologist who worked at the Krupskaya Academy of Communist Education and at the Narkompros. Author of publications about child play and the organization of school children’s leisure time (cf. Rozanov 1938; Usvayskaya & Rozanov 1940).
9. In the text, a distinction is made between two types of construction sets. The first type (e.g., “Meccano”) requires or stimulates technical insight and an understanding of its abstract parts as well as how they together can fulfill a certain function (e.g., lifting things with a crane). The second type (e.g., “Lego”) is more aesthetic and realistic and allows the child to build real-life things (e.g., houses, towers) or form nice patterns. Of course, currently there is no sharp dividing line. In the Russian text, the second type is called *obraznyj* (here translated as “iconic”), and the first type *schematicheskij* (“schematic”) or

mekhanicheskii (“mechanical”), although “realistic” and “technical” would perhaps have been clearer. The distinction is remotely similar to Flerina’s division of toys into “iconic (dolls, animals, furniture, transport), technical (construction sets, building materials, toys consisting of semi-finished products—small boards, bars, etc.), didactic, happy, musical, and theatrical ones” (Flerina 1973).

10. Anticipatory pleasure (German).
11. “Matador” is an Austrian construction set consisting of wooden parts that can be connected with rods. It was invented by Johann Korbuly, who designed versions for different age groups upward from age 3 years and also produced extension sets with moving parts driven by motors, etc. The Matador construction sets became very popular in the 1920s and drew the attention of Austrian psychologists, who used the sets to study children’s development of technical construction skills with the active support of the firm. Both Charlotte Bühler’s (1893 to 1974) co-worker, Hildegard Hetzer (1899 to 1991) and Vincenz Neubauer (see later text) published about the Matador material. See Hetzer (1931) and Neubauer (1927). Bühler herself also published a chapter on “the psychological significance of activity with material for the child” in Bühler (1935).
12. A form of osteomyelitis or infection and inflammation of the bone and bone marrow.
13. An unclear reference that may refer to the developmental theory of play.
14. Refers to Neubauer (1927). Vincenz Neubauer (? to ?) was an Austrian psychologist and student of Karl Bühler. The Matador firm organized contests for children who were asked to send in models of their own invention (e.g., a table, a windmill, a crane) plus a drawing of the model. These contests became enormously popular because the best designs were exhibited and published in the firm’s magazine and because the prize winners received additional construction sets. Under the supervision of Karl Bühler, Neubauer decided to analyze 850 of these designs (the models had already been disassembled) to see whether there were effects of the child’s age, sex, etc. He found that children from 5 to 9 years old make schematic, two-dimensional drawings; children from 9 to 12 years old make perspective drawings; and children from 12 years and older make technical drawings. What is depicted in these stages is, respectively, a characteristic feature, a realistic form, and the object’s function. On the basis of his own observations, Neubauer suggested that young children start assembling things without a clear idea, whereas older children realize carefully thought out plans, but the fact of the matter is that he had very little empirical data about children’s actual building and relied almost fully on their drawings. Vygotsky refers to Neubauer’s research into children’s building and drawing in *Pedology of the Adolescent*. Cf. pp. 110–111 of Vygotsky (1998).
15. Vygotsky presumably refers to Meier and Pfahler (1926). Gerhard Pfahler (1897 to 1976) was a German psychologist and pedagogue. He became a member of the Nazi Party and participated in its paramilitary wing, the

Sturmabteilung. Together with Erich Rudolf Jaensch, Pfahler developed a psychology based upon race.

16. Possibly the post-graduate student mentioned in chapter 18.
17. The rule that says that given an equation such as $a/b = c/d$ (where b and d are not zero), one can cross-multiply to get $ad = bc$ or $a = bc/d$. Cf. chapter 13, note 61.
18. See p. 288 of Tolstoy (1989): “(Especially important) When examining children’s essays, never reproach the pupils for the neatness of the exercise books, nor for the calligraphy, nor for the orthography, nor, most importantly, for the structure of the sentences and the logic.”
19. That was the first grade of elementary school after kindergarten. Children learned to read and count, but probably the discipline was somewhat milder than in the later grades.
20. Lermontov’s “Cossack Lullaby” (1840) became a classic Russian lullaby despite its somewhat sad content: “Sleep, my beautiful good boy/ Bayushki bayu/ Quietly the moon is looking/ Into your cradle./ I will tell you fairy tales/ And sing you little songs,/ But you must slumber, with your little eyes closed./ Bayushki bayu./ The time will come when you will learn/ The soldier’s way of life./ Boldly you’ll place your foot into the stirrup/ And take the gun./ The saddle-cloth for your battle horse/ I will sew for you from silk./ Sleep now, my dear little child./ Bayushki bayu./ You will look like a hero/ And be a Cossack deep in your heart./ I will accompany you and watch you go./ You will just wave your hand./ How many secret bitter tears/ Will I shed that night!/ Sleep, my angel, calmly, sweetly./ Bayushki bayu./ I will die from yearning./ Inconsolably waiting,/ I’ll pray the whole day long./ And at night I’ll wonder./ I’ll think that you’re in trouble/ Far away in a strange land./ Sleep now, as long as you know no sorrows./ Bayushki bayu./ On the road, I’ll give you/ A small holy icon./ And when you pray to God, you’ll/ Put it right in front of you./ While preparing for the dangerous battle/ Please remember your mother./ Sleep, good boy, my beautiful./ Bayushki bayu.”
21. Meaning that books and textbooks replace toys in adolescence.
22. Endangered breed of horse native to the former Vyatka region. Because of its endurance and speed, it was considered the best horse for pulling mail troikas.
23. Final product (German).
24. Dmitriy Vladimirovich Gorlov (1899 to 1988). Russian graphic artist, sculptor, excelled in the decorative plastic arts and was one of Russia’s best painters of animals. In the mid-1930s, Gorlov worked at the All-Union Scientific-Experimental Toy Institute, where he developed more than 100 models for toys made of wood and paper maché.
25. Yelisaveta Ivanovna Tikheyeva (1867 to 1943). Russian pedagogue, specialist in preschool education, head of the Faculty of Preschool Education, and director of the experimental kindergarten at the Herzen Leningrad State Pedological Institute. She is one of the founders of preschool education in Russia and developed a method to develop speech on the basis of Ushinskiy’s work. Tikheyeva was critical of Maria Montessori’s sensory training and

created her own system of didactic materials to develop the senses, which was based upon the principle of pairs and consisted of familiar objects, toys, and natural material. She died during the siege of Leningrad.

26. Friedrich Wilhelm August Fröbel (1782 to 1852). German pedagogue and student of Pestalozzi, he created the concept of the kindergarten and developed the educational play materials known as Fröbel gifts (geometrical forms). Fröbel emphasized the importance of the activity of the child in learning and the game's educational worth. Activities in the first kindergarten included singing, dancing, gardening, and free play with the Froebel gifts. Jean-Ovide Decroly (1871 to 1932) was a Belgian pedagogue, psychologist, and physician. Decroly created a system of didactical games to stimulate the child's sensory development and organized his teaching around the children's "centers of interest." In his lessons, the children read, sang, drew, and modeled things that were connected with a theme that was close to a center of interest.
27. Vygotsky repeatedly discussed the theory of formal discipline and Thorndike's attempts to refute it. The theory says that the study of some subjects, such as mathematics or Latin, teaches one more than just mathematics or Latin and has broader effects on cognitive development. Although plausible, it proves surprisingly hard to demonstrate such effects of the transfer of training. Applied to toys, the theory of formal discipline predicts that playing with some, presumably especially instructive, toys produces general cognitive effects.
28. G.A. Kvasnetskiy (? to?). Russian pedagogue who published about play and toys (Kvasnetskiy 1937, 1938; Kvasnetskiy & Rodin 1929).
29. Work (German).
30. Between 1906 and 1912 Matador also produced a box "for creative girls and boys" that contained colored pieces of wood that could be assembled to form mosaics. Perhaps Kvasnetskiy (or Vygotsky) is referring to this set.
31. Pavel Blonskiy proposed to refrain from the concept of play and to replace it by ideas about the child's constructive and creative art. He pointed out that this is the child's leading activity in the preschool period and that it results from the child's "activities of the working type," which develop in the interaction with adults and according to the adult model (Blonskiy 1934, pp. 108–112).
32. Serious play (German). A term introduced by William Stern (1924) to designate children's role-playing experiments in puberty. See "Pedology of the adolescent" on pp. 27–28 of Vygotsky (1998).
33. The precursor of the stethoscope was a wooden horn of the type that is now still in use by midwives (the Pinard horn) to detect the heart tone of the fetus.
34. It is unclear to which source Vygotsky refers.
35. Stern (1927) adhered to Groos' theory that play is partly a preparation for later abilities.
36. See "Play and its role in mental development": "Thus, the structure of human perception could be figuratively expressed as a fraction in which the object is the numerator and the meaning is the denominator... for the child, in the fraction object-meaning, the object dominates, and meaning is directly connected to it. At the crucial moment for the child, when the stick becomes a

- horse, i.e., when the thing, the horse, becomes the pivot for severing the meaning of horse from a real horse, this fraction is inverted and meaning predominates, giving meaning/object.” See <https://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/1933/play.htm>.
37. Cf. “The role of play in mental development” on pp. 69–70 of Vygotsky (Vygotsky 2001).
 38. Yelena Boleslavovna Molozhavaya (1886 to ?). Russian pedologist, wife of Stepan Stepanovich Molozhavyy, leader of Soviet pedology, and author of publications about preschool education and different types of toys including the complexive toy (cf. Molozhavaya 1935a, b). Molozhavaya claimed that naturalistic or overly stylized dolls were anti-Soviet and harmful for the child and suggested to design dolls inspired by fairytales or folklore.
 39. Presumably playing with sets of toy animals, either exotic animals (animal island) or domestic ones (farm).
 40. Actually, Vygotsky writes *aktivnaya deyatel'nost* (“active activity”), which sounds a bit awkward.
 41. This is an interpretation; Vygotsky just gives the Russian acronym. Ideologically, it was a highly dubious statement. Lunacharsky wrote that the best doll was a Pioneer doll, and Flerina added that marching with red flags to the sound of “The International” was an admirable form of play.
 42. Correspondence with the field (German). A term used by Kurt Lewin to refer to the fact that children’s actions are to a substantial degree determined by the forces operative in their immediate environment.
 43. Most parents could not afford to buy toys and made simple toys from pieces of wood or tissue.
 44. A railroad station in the Moscow region.
 45. See Käte Lissner (1933) and also Wera Mahler (1933).
 46. Maria Tecla Artemisia Montessori (1870 to 1952). Italian physician and educator who was famous for her new educational approach. Montessori believed that children’s spontaneous activity reveals an internal program of development and that the appropriate role of the educator is to remove obstacles to this natural development and provide opportunities for it to proceed and flourish. She equipped the schoolroom with child-sized furnishings, suggested “practical life” activities—such as sweeping and washing tables—and developed teaching material. Children were given freedom to choose and carry out their own activities at their own paces and following their own inclinations.
 47. This experiment was described in “The problem of mental retardation”: “We put the experiment together in the following fashion: As an initial activity the children were given the task of modeling a dog out of plasticine. Then this activity was interrupted, under one condition, by the substitution of another task which was similar to it in meaning (i.e., drawing a dog through glass). Under another condition, the substituting task was linked to the initial action through the character of the activity (i.e., making rails out of plasticine for the car standing here on the table). The study showed an essential difference between mentally retarded and normal children in these experimental situations. For the

- majority of normal children, the task which was analogous by meaning (drawing the dog) appeared as a substitute action much more frequently than did the task which was analogous in the character of activity (modeling rails). Among mentally retarded children, exactly the opposite relationship appeared. The task which was analogous in meaning had practically no value as a substitute, while the task which was analogous in terms of the character of the activity, in almost all cases, revealed unity of real and substitute action.” Cf. p. 238 of Vygotsky (1993).
48. It is unclear whether this refers to one of the preceding sections or to another source.
 49. School readiness (German).
 50. Refers to p. 48 of Sully (1896): “One day two sisters said to one another: ‘Let us play being sisters.’” Elsewhere Vygotsky referred in more detail to this example mentioned by James Sully (1842 to 1923), the British psychologist. “In certain cases it proved extremely easy for me to elicit such play in children. Thus, it is very easy to make a child play with his mother that he is a child and his mother his mother, i. e., what is really true. The essential distinguishing characteristic of the play described by Sully is that the child in playing makes an effort to be a sister... In normal life the girl behaves without realizing that she is her sister’s sister... In the sisters’ play of ‘being sisters’ each of the sisters constantly manifests her sisterhood; the fact that two sisters began to play being sisters leads to the fact that each of them now has a rule of conduct” (Vygotsky 2001, p. 63).
 51. Vygotsky quotes four lines from Marx’s *Estranged Labor* (1844). The translation is given at <https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1844/manuscripts/labour.htm>.

References

- Blonskiy, P. P. (1934). *Pedologiya: Uchebnik dlya vysshikh uchebnykh zavedeniy*. Moscow: Uchpedgiz.
- Bühler, Ch. (1935). *From birth to maturity: An outline of the psychological development of the child*. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co Ltd.
- El’konin, D. B. (1978). *Psikhologiya igry*. Moscow: Pedagogika.
- Flerina, E. A. (1932). V bor’be za novuyu sovetskuyu igrushku. *Doshkol’noe Vospitanie*, 4, 34–35.
- Flerina, E. A. (1935). Kratkie itogi raboty komiteta po igrushke za god. *Sovetskaya Igrushka*, 2, 2–3.
- Flerina, E. A. (1936a). Kukla i ee rol’ v vospitanii rebenka. *Sovetskaya Igrushka*, 8, 1–4.
- Flerina, E. A. (1936b). Pravil’no oboruduya pedagogicheskiy protsess, povysim kachestvo raboty (Komitet po igrushke pri NKP). In E. Flerina & V. Gorskovaya (Eds.), *Oborudovanie detskoj ploshchadki i igrushka-samodelka* (pp. 3–12). Moscow–Leningrad: KOIZ.
- Flerina, E.A. (1936c). O formalizme i naturalizme v igrushke. *Sovetskaya Igrushka*, 5, 3–4.
- Flerina, E.A. (1973). *Igra i igrushka: Posobie dlya vospitatelya detskogo sada*. Moscow: Prosveshchenie.

- Hetzer, H. (1931). *Kind und Schaffen. Experimente über konstruktive Betätigungen im Kleinkindalter*. Jena: Fischer.
- Kvasnetskiy, G. (1937). Igrushechnye armii (Pedagogicheskoe znachenie igrushek tipa olovyannykh soldatikov). *Igrushka*, 5, 3–4.
- Kvasnetskiy, G. (1938). Opytnoe proizvodstvo—Institutu igrushek. *Igrushka*, 2, 25.
- Kvasnetskiy, G., & Rodin, A. F. (1929). *Kak samim sdelat' nastol'nye igry*. Biblioteka zhurnala 'Pioner'. Moscow-Leningrad: Molodoya Gvardiya.
- Lissner, K. (1933). Die Entspannung von Bedürfnissen durch Ersatzhandlungen. *Psychologische Forschung*, 18, 218–250.
- Mahler, W. (1933). Ersatzhandlungen verschiedenen Realitätsgrades. *Psychologische Forschung*, 18, 27–89.
- Meier, H., & Pfahler, G. (1926). Untersuchung des technisch-praktischen und des technisch-theoretischen Verhalten bei Schulkindern. *Zeitschrift für angewandte Psychologie*, 27, 92–130.
- Molozhavaya, E. (1935a). Stranichki iz rabot po kompleksnoy igrushke. *Sovetskaya Igrushka*, 3, 10–12.
- Molozhavaya, E. (1935b). *Syuzhetnaya igrushka, ee tematika i oformlenie*. Moscow-Leningrad: Koiz.
- Neubauer, V. (1927). Über die Entwicklung der technischen Begabung bei Kindern. *Zeitschrift für angewandte Psychologie*, 29, 289–336.
- Rozanov, I. G. (1938). O detskoj tekhnicheskoy samodeyatel'nosti v shkole. *Sovetskaya Pedagogika*, 12, 70–85.
- Spisok igrushek, razreshennykh i zapreshchennykh komitetom po igrushke Narkomprosa RSFSR. Vyp. I.* (1934) Moscow-Leningrad: Koiz.
- Stern, W. (1924). Das 'Ernstspiel' der Jugendzeit. *Zeitschrift für pädagogische Psychologie*, 25, 241–252.
- Stern, W. (1927). *Psychologie der frühen Kindheit*. Leipzig: Quelle & Meyer.
- Sully, J. (1896). *Studies of childhood*. New York: D. Appleton and Company.
- Tolstoy, L. N. (1989). *Pedagogicheskie sochineniya*. Moscow: Pedagogika.
- Usvayskaya, A. V., & Rozanov, I. G. (1940). Rabota s naborom 'Konstruktor na urokakh truda' vo II klasse vspomogatel'noy shkoly. *Uchebno-Vospitatel'naya Rabota v Shkolakh dlya Glukhonememykh i Vospomogatel'nykh Shkolakh*, 4, 50–55.
- Van der Veer, R., & Valsiner, J. (Eds.). (1994). *The Vygotsky Reader*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Vygotsky, L. S. (1993). *The collected works of L.S. Vygotsky. Vol. 2. The fundamentals of defectology*. New York: Plenum Press.
- Vygotsky, L. S. (1998). *The collected works of L.S. Vygotsky. Vol. 5. Child psychology*. New York: Plenum Press.
- Vygotsky, L. S. (2001). Igra i ee rol' v psikhicheskom razvitii rebenka (pp. 56–79). In *Psikhologiya razvitiya*. St. Petersburg: Piter.

Chapter 29

The Rest is Silence

This chapter contains documents that were written in the first half of 1934 and that show a sudden deterioration of the handwriting (large, uneven, shaky) and an even more dense style. During that same period, Vygotsky wrote excerpts from books by other authors (for example, a summary of Freud's new lectures on psychoanalysis; cf. Freud 1933), disease histories, brief notes on developmental psychology, neuropsychology, etc., which are not presented here. The selected documents show that Vygotsky's primary interest in the last months of his life was the question of the semantic dynamics and their loss in pathology. In this respect, patients K. and Z. were of primary importance. K. was a successful and respected dentist, 51 years old, who from about the age of 43 developed ever more severe headaches, became forgetful, lost all initiative, showed a sharp cognitive decline, and eventually became incapable of caring for himself. Z. was a woman, 54 years old, who also practiced as a dentist until she at the age of 40 developed the first signs of forgetfulness, anxiety, and confusion. She gradually began confabulating and increasingly lost touch with reality speaking about an imaginary pregnancy and child. Like K., she showed a sharp decline of her cognitive abilities. Samukhin, Birenbaum, and Vygotsky (1934) provide very elaborate disease histories and adduce medical arguments to prove that both patients did not suffer from Alzheimer dementia but from Pick's disease. The psychological analysis of both patients heavily relied on the conceptual system introduced by Lewin, which the authors first briefly explained.¹ The psychological field of the subject differs from the actual situation because it is determined by the person's emotions, needs, and intellectual resources. Depending on these personal variables, the objects acquire different valence. Healthy subjects are neither dependent on their emotions nor on the environmental factors (in both cases there is field dependence and rigidity or *Starrheit*) and can flexibly switch (fluidity of *Flüssigkeit*) to other motives when they think this is necessary. In this respect, K. and Z. formed opposite cases: K.'s behavior was heavily constrained by the concrete external field, and he no longer had the capacity to "stand above the situation," whereas Z. seemed to have lost almost all contact with that concrete reality and appeared to be at the mercy of her own inner emotions and motives. Neither was able to flexibly switch from the plane of irreality (thoughts, dreams, emotions, fantasies) to the plane of reality and back again. The ability to flexibly switch between these planes Vygotsky now considered to be the hallmark of the healthy personality. The healthy person can reconceptualize his appreciation of the situation; he can resist his impulses; and he is not rigidly bound to either the concrete situation or his emotional impulses (cf. Samukhin, Birenbaum, & Vygotsky pp. 116–117). This new view seems to be a unique blend of Lewin's emphasis on concrete field vectors and the role of emotions and motives plus Vygotsky's emphasis on the role of words, meanings, and conceptualization.

Propositions on account of Likhtenshteyn's talk

This note was written in violet ink on three cards ("Processing the manuscript") and gives an account of a talk by Likhtenshteyn,² about which we have no information. It is one of the few documents we have about Vygotsky's attitude toward psychotherapy. Vygotsky argues that the psychotherapist works with the client's felt experience (the environment as experienced by the person) and that the therapist must help change that experience to allow the client to overcome his problems. Apart from that, Vygotsky argues that therapies must be based on scientific theories and methods. The theoretical inadequacy of many psychological practices was seen by him (cf. "The meaning of the psychological crisis") as one of the signs or causes of psychology's crisis. Now, ninety years later, we cannot say that psychology solved its problems.

1. *Likhtenshteyn. About psychotherapy.*
1. While abroad, psychotherapy is overestimated; here it is underestimated.
2. Psychotherapy and <outside the psychogenic>.
3. Psychotherapy is *not just* causal. Its different forms: reinforcing, stimulating, and psychosomatic.
4. Psychotherapy in special education, not just during a session. Its characteristic is the work on the inner side of the person. But psychotherapy is the key to special education. <...>
5. I welcome the beginning. We must have a theory and a method. The link with diagnostics. To use *all* existing methods: the test.
6. The theory of the complex structure of mental retardation and so on is the key to psychotherapy.
7. The problem of [the patient's] experience—the psychotherapist works with the [patient's] experience.

Written in the margin: [In what sense it is higher <than ours> (the practice) and in what sense lower (the scientific study). But we want to combine them.]

8. Is the neurosis a *revolta*?³ No. The social class meaning of the neurosis: yes (cf. V. F. [Schmidt]). But not a rebellion, but *suffering*. Vnukov: The neurosis is a bourgeois privilege.
9. Stekel⁴ about the social nature of the neurosis: Hysteria was replaced by the *Zwangsneurose*.⁵ True. Kretschmer: hysteria + schizoprenia + war.⁶
10. *The speaker does not offer a psychotherapy but a re-education.*
11. It is true that one can work with Freud's method without being a Freudian.
12. In the social development of the person, the material is not a pre-requisite. Spirit will never supersede matter, the superstructure—the basis. The supremacy of social development.
13. It does not suffice to work with the system "diamat—practice." [We need] an intermediate link. We cannot take another's theory—[we must] create our own theory, and as we are creating it, we move [forward] in practice.
14. We must know *where* it is incorrect and in order to know that we must positively know our own viewpoint. In general it is a priori non-Marxist. The terms are not suitable; they are correct, but fruitless.

15. The *Intelligenz<prüfung>*⁷ comes from psychotechnics—incorrect. *We too emphasize intellectual development and diagnostics.* The didactic and intellectual character. To work with the [patient's] experience; to create the [patient's] experience.
16. Adler does not have such a coherent system as Freud. But not the generalized experience of teachers. We are in favor of psychotherapy but not just in favor of psychotherapy.
17. A. Rühle⁸ is right with her Münchhausen claim: The person can pull himself by his hair out of the disease.
17. [sic] Add different methods: both hypnosis and Coué.⁹
[Added between the lines probably referring to point 18:] It is true that in psychotherapy also the devil is developed, i.e., the deteriorations.
18. In the example of the post-encephalitic syndrome, there is nothing other than the use of the disease, i.e., the neurotic reactions to the remnants of the disease can be removed but not the general disorders of development, which are *broader and deeper*. What is highest is taken for everything. This is a therapy without diagnostics, without age, without a disease. Neither is there a structural analysis: There is no relation between the syndromes. Psychotherapy *before* the investigation is incorrect. The helping attitude is good. <Psychopathy> is not a post-encephalitic syndrome.

[Written in the margin:] There is neither understanding of the (scientific) case nor scientific psychotherapy.

This is a secondary school teacher.

Aphasia and alalia

This note was written on two cards (“Processing the manuscript”): The first card has red text with some violet text added; the second part is written in just violet ink. The text deals with speech and speech disorders.

NB! S. Ya. Rabinovich¹⁰

Aphasias and alalias

1. *The concept of pathological speech development.*
2. *The clinic of children's speech anomalies* puts forward new diagnostics (compared with Wolpert?): the diagnostics of development.
3. *Problems:* the unity of speech (function + structure + sound structure) and the analysis into units; the essence and the interconnection of the disorders, the dynamics, the classification.
4. Liebmann's classification¹¹ mechanically applies the classification of adult aphasia to children.

5. The compatibility of the different sides of speech and the person.
6. *Two problems*: (a) the unity of the sound side and the semantic side of speech; (b) the unity of the *Grundfunktion* of speech (communication) with its structure (generalization). The *trinity*: social communication–generalization (meaning)–phonology (the word’s sound).
7. Every object of thought can be expressed in an infinite number of ways just like any quantity can be expressed in an endless number of ways (1, 2/2, 1000–999 etc.), but every meaning can be expressed in just *one way*: *In poetry, just like in mathematics, it is impossible to paraphrase.*
8. [R.E.] *Levina*: alalia and the whole structure of speech.¹²
*Yudkovskaya*¹³: the methods, the intellect.
*Pongil’skaya*¹⁴: the analysis of speech that develops in teaching.
9. Communication. The schema. The analysis of development (reactive contra spontaneous development). To learn speech, like normal children learn arithmetic.
10. Agn. Aleks., Petya N.:
 - (a) In the lessons there is one lexicon, in spontaneous speech it is not used.
 - (b) In the lessons there are grammatical structures, spontaneous speech has its own structure.
 It could be proved (in Leningrad), that the (artificial) *speech* of the alalia patient stands *higher* in certain respects than normal speech: cf. sign language. Its strength and weakness differs from the strength and weakness of normal speech. Top-down.
11. Elaborate this without waiting for the end of the data collection.

The classification of psychopathies

The classification of mental disease is an area fraught with difficulties. During the last few centuries, every major psychiatrist has offered his or her own system, and Shorter’s (2015) recent attempt to rewrite the DSM will certainly not be the last. Genetic analyses and brain studies may lead to unexpected connections between syndromes that now seem entirely independent, and re-adoption of the good old longitudinal method may show that the manifestations of one and the same disease vary greatly over time. Vygotsky’s brief note on classification reflects this ongoing process of classification. The note was written in black ink on one card: “Processing the manuscript.”]

NB! The classification of psychopathies.

1. Psychopathies—anomalies of development, partial infantilisms.
2. A classification:
 - (1) *Entwicklungspsychopathien*.¹⁵
 - (2) Organic psychopathies.
 - (3) Defective conditions.
 - (4) Premorbid conditions.

(5) Psychopathic [variants of] development.

Written in the margin: [Expansive, sensitive, and autistic development.]

(6) Symptomatic psychopathies (sexual psychopathies, hysteria).

3. A classification based upon the essence of the psychopathic condition:

- (a) underdevelopment of the character (of the complex structures).
- (b) character anomalies (of the complex structures).
- (c) character defects.
- (d) anomalies, delays, and temperamental defects.

Written in the margin: [Approximately!]

About Patients Z. and K.: Intellect and dynamics

This section is based on a text that was written in black ink on four cards of the type mentioned in chapter 21. Several parts of the text correspond with passages in “The problem of mental retardation,” but it is Vygotsky’s self-criticism that is most remarkable: Vygotsky points out the dualism in his own analyses of the patients Z. and K. If we turn to the analysis in question (Samukhin, Birenbaum, & Vygotsky 1934), we see that the analysis is conducted in several areas: verbal thinking, affective systems, and practical thinking. However, the processes observed in these areas are not submitted to an exhaustive causal analysis. The self-criticism is connected with Vygotsky’s attempt to find a criterion for the unity of intellect and affect, its “indissoluble unit” (“The problem of mental retardation”, p. 233 in Vygotsky 1993), and in this note the criterion is found: It is the free relationship with the situation, the flexible transition from affect to thought to action. This claim is characteristic of the last stage of Vygotsky’s theorizing, but this is rarely discussed in the scientific literature. Also of interest is Vygotsky’s statement about the “unconscious part of thinking,” which Vygotsky believed to be inherent to every act of thought.

NB! About Z. and K. Intellect and dynamics

1. Consciousness determines life (its style) but itself develops from life and forms one of its aspects: *Ergo*, life determines life through consciousness. As soon as we separated thinking from life (from the dynamics), we viewed it as a concept of the psychic and not as a concept of the psychological. We blocked all roads to the clarification and explanation of its most important property: to determine the lifestyle and behavior, to act, to influence.¹⁶
2. The semantic action: In play, it is not transformed into the dynamics of the real action. Semantic intentions behave *in another way* (have another relationship with the motor system, include other semantic—according to the degree of generalization—and *dynamic* systems). It is one thing to think, “I will drop this letter in this mailbox”¹⁷; it is another thing to drop it in an arbitrary mailbox, to send this letter (courier, mail, etc.), to make something known, to offend someone, etc.

3. Point 3 is highlighted in the margin with a vertical line and “!”: [The levels of development of the concept are the levels of transformation of the dynamics (of the affect) of the real action into the dynamics of thinking. Lenin’s path: from contemplation to abstraction to practice.¹⁸ The path from the most abstract and highest concept in the reverse transformation of the dynamics of thinking into the dynamics of the action is the longest: the levels of the descendance, the embodiment, the concretization, the materialization (the live action of the transition of the mental into the physical, the psychophysical problem in the action via the unity; via the affect and the will that are contained in every concept (Spinoza); via the unconscious part of thinking (Hartmann); the unconscious is in *every* conscious act).]
4. In K., the affect is more outspoken: He continually creates new *Spannungen*. *Inde*, his field action is purely in the external field, he mixes up things¹⁹; with her [we see] a law.
5. To study (a) the *Bedeutungswandel*²⁰ in the development of the affect in Lewin; (b) when there is an affect there is no border between the intrapsychological and the extrapsychological systems (Dembo)—becoming affectively feeble-minded²¹ (Lewin); (c) the new problem in connection with these §§—the functional movement downward along the levels of meanings when there is an affect (the affect is mastered by thinking, intellect is the slave or the master of the affects; the affect requires a complex?).
6. The mistake of our analysis of Z. and K. is that the analysis is conducted in two planes: In the external field and in the semantic field, there is no unity but parallelism and correspondence. We must take a *single* plane: because the dynamics of the *flüssig* type, insofar as they are present in the action, are introduced by thinking. The freedom of the dynamics in the real field and in the action is a precise measure of the participation of thinking in behavior. In the child and in Z. and K. (in generalized perception, in object relatedness), *Realität* and *Irrealität* are not differentiated.²²
7. The criterion of the unity of the intellect and the affect is the fundamental relationship with the situation in the sense of constraint and freedom: This is the genuine unit of affect–intellect. The degree of the flight of generalization from the object determines the degree of transformation of the affect of the thing into the affect of the concept.
8. K’s *concreteness* is caused by his *Starrheit*: It differs from the concreteness of schizophrenia (Hochheimer) (he preserved all vital needs and rich concreteness, in K. it is poor). *The child combines Z. and K. in the sense of the change of the dynamic–semantic systems*: There is more flight and more object-relatedness. K. is like a child (the object-relatedness) and like an old man: i.e., he is as opposite to the child as he is similar to him. The similarity is *included in another structure*: cf. In Lewin the mentally retarded is similar to a child of a younger age (no differentiation) and similar to the older person (the *Starrheit*).²³

NB! For the child the word is a property, a part of the thing, it enters the structure of the thing.

Inde (1) It is more closely connected with the thing (by the object relatedness), more concrete, the *Feldmäßigkeit*; (2) but the word simultaneously, as its part, as a tangible word, replaces the thing, it reifies it, preserves the affect (the *Aufforderungscharakter*) of the thing, it is an *Ersatz*, to say it = to do it, it *creates its activity like in a dream*.

That is, word meaning in the child lies in between meaning during the dream and meaning in generalized perception. *Inde, this causes the child's magical thinking!*

Written in the margin: [Object-relatedness. The unity: The semantic field is constrained by the visual field + it is reified (cf. play).]

Patient K.

The note was written in blue ink on one card (“Processing the manuscript”), and—along with several of the other notes in this chapter—it shows overlap with Samukhin, Birenbaum, and Vygotsky (1934).

NB! K. (Pick?)

1. The description of a picture [goes] beyond what is visible.
2. Better without text (?)
3. “He cannot stop.”
4. *Nachsprechen*²⁴: he changes the text, adds things. No deliberate speech. *It is easier to tell a story than to repeat a phrase*. The tendency to interpretation. Spontaneous speech > deliberate speech.
5. To identify meanings/the assortment of phrases with identical meaning.
6. *Like with Z., there is spontaneity!!*
7. *The tendency to reproduce the Sprachschatz*²⁵—describes the picture—instead of that: princess Tarakanova²⁶ + the pre-revolutionary work of the revolutionaries, etc.²⁷ Like with Z., his answer is spontaneous, but the *reproduction is caused by something*.
8. Two times one card—<a thunderstorm>. He counts the cards at the border several times: The form determines the counting.²⁸ The horse two times—the head and the tail. Two objects on one card he counts as two [cards].
9. It is easy to provoke complete incomprehension.
10. He cannot chose in which direction to count and stick to it. Voluntary attention: He begins to count, and where he gets confused he takes away his finger: aimless counting. With the crest, he got stuck at the intersection. To go from the horizontal [row] to the vertical [column] is impossible; where the row is interrupted, the counting is interrupted (<he cannot do it> without a finger).

Patients K. and Z.

[This note was written on two cards (“Processing the manuscript”) in dark-blue ink:]

(1)

NB. K. and Z.

Two types of *Feldmäßigkeit* – based on needs
– based on communication

On the theory

1. A local disorder: aphasia.
2. The general personality structure.
Communication
3. The hierarchy and unity of the disorders.
The *Flüssigkeit* follows from the irrealität.
4. Physiology, localization, psychology.
5. Normality and pathology: the rudiments of general psychopathology.
6. Methodologically: the experience of causal analysis.
7. Macro- and microanalysis.
8. Epigraph: There is method (system) in his madness + “**Even dementia is not wholly unintelligent.**”²⁹
9. Proverbs: a head on his shoulders + (cf. the back of a chair).³⁰
10. Autism and intelligibility: [results] from communication.³¹
11. The autistic *Wunscherfüllung*³² is a delusion.
12. The *Ärgeraffekt*³³ is an obedience affect.
13. Z.: the motivation of speech ↔ speech without thought.
14. The relative importance of the word changed, it jumps out of the grammatical hierarchy, verbal anarchism. Operations with the word (translation, explanation, definition) are impossible. There is no predicativity.
15. With similar *Feldmäßigkeit* there is opposition everywhere:
 - (1) agnosia: K., an O is the moon,
 3. Z., a dress is small circles.³⁴

Patient K., experiments

This note was written in dark-blue ink as well as in pencil on the back of five cards (“Processing the manuscript”). Judging by the numbering, one of them is missing. The document contains a description of the results of the diagnostic tests carried out with patient K., who suffered from Pick’s disease. Pick’s disease is now viewed as a type of frontotemporal dementia, a rare neurodegenerative disease that causes progressive destruction of nerve cells in the brain. The symptoms of Pick’s disease include difficulty in language and thinking (progressive nonfluent aphasia) but also behavioral changes (e.g., irrational fears, disinhibition, passivity). Vygotsky primarily focuses on the aphasia and shows its typical features such as anomia (inability to find some words), phonemic paraphasia (e.g., saying “gat” for “cat”), and agrammatism (using the wrong tense or word order). Fragments

similar to the present text can be found in Samukhin, Birenbaum, and Vygotsky (1934, pp. 117–118; 124–126).

[Written in ink:]

[Encircled:] [Patient] K.

The association experiment. A free series + a reactive series.

+ *Apraxia*: Compose a cross according to the model: he begins in the right way, but at the central point he throws down everything. The cross as a whole—without analysis: a slave of the visual field. In the analysis of the e[periment we see] something like a cross. Counting his cross: takes all sides into account although with a mistake. Reproduces “*physionomically*” according to Volkelt.

[Written in pencil:]

The *Wiederaufnahme* of the counting on the second and third day.

Speech: The repetition of words and sentences.

He does not repeat [but] associates (picture—portrait, Germany—Wilhelm). After the question: Which word did I say +, ³⁵ spontaneously repeats with a?, blue? Red. ³⁶ When repeating one phrase, it falls apart. The rephrasing (“somewhere near the raven he found a piece of cheese”). *Clouds gathered in the sky* and it started raining: two words. ³⁷ He retains the content, but not the words—glass ³⁸—*inde* the rephrasing. Fire extinguishes water—*fire* ... smothers water. Water extinguishes water—*of course not*. He understands it but cannot say it. Fire is extinguished with a hose, but what is in the hose he cannot say—fire extinguisher.

Water extinguishes a fire? Yes (after a story about firefighters). Fire extinguishes water? Silence. The identification of the meaning in different forms. ³⁹ A complete disintegration of the understanding of the phrase: “water extinguishes fire.” He is not able to judge what is right and what is wrong. With a nozzle. The stories with “fire extinguishes water” and the other way around +. White and black snow, etc. +. Snow is black when it melts (i.e., the more complex +). ⁴⁰

[Written in ink:]

NB. A remarkable experiment with counting:

1. He counts the border of a square endlessly.
2. Suddenly he forgets a finger and starts counting aimlessly. 5? There is no 5. Counts further 6, 7, 8, etc.
3. With a crest—stops at the intersection—counts endlessly ⁴¹: does not know where to go. He either counts the objects on the picture, or many times the same thing, or aimlessly.
4. Where the row is interrupted, the counting is interrupted. It is impossible to go from the verticals to the horizontals.
5. When he does not count, but names, he cannot view them in succession either, i.e., perceive them at will.

6. Do not count the cards that are turned over: three, four, “a fence.” “I said pencil,” he switches to naming: *remarkable*—here I cannot make up my mind: This is not counting—but he does not name the non-pictures. But the mechanism is: to look at the picture, *inde* to name it. Count how many animals there are: one—cat. *He names them*. Are there more non-animals (3) or animals (2)? *Names them*. Flashes [of insight].
7. In counting he is a slave of the visual field, in naming he is freer. In counting, he is a slave of the field or a slave of the row. A slave of his field in the story (T.)⁴² Suddenly he is clever: I will see—dinner. He improves with help.
8. In counting, he not just counts the pictures but also what is on the pictures (a rake and spades, two pillows). This is a symptom: a slave of the visual field. *Quite another symptom*: He counts, pointing at the horse in various places three–four times: This comes from the aimless counting, the searching for the object (where to point with the finger) for the next number. This is analogous to: 5? There is no 5. 6, 7, 8, etc. And the first is analogous to the switch to naming. When counting with the cards turned over, he looks, his attention is focused on the content of the card to decide whether it must be counted, *inde* it is naming.
9. [sic]. There are no conventional, figurative, or voluntary meanings.
10. He does not see the words, the operation with the word is hampered: glass. He sees the content and repeats it. The wife developed an eye disease: The wife’s eyesight deteriorated. Now it is a dark summer night.⁴³ Now the repetition of meaningless phrases is more difficult and worse than meaningful ones. Now the eye, eyes hurt. Now it is a bright winter day+.

A (black) tablecloth is lying on the table.⁴⁴

A (white) tablecloth is lying on the table. But it is a black <illegible>.

A (black) tablecloth on the table is lying (the phrase falls apart).

A white tablecloth is lying on the table+.

K.

- (1) A *super-long Sättigung*, satisfaction, fills the whole sheet.
- (2) The *Wiederaufnahme*:
 - (a) to cut out a cross (apraxia)—pauze—to draw a cross: There is no *Wiederaufnahme*.
 - (b) to lay a cross with small circles—pauze—to draw a cross: *Wiederaufnahme*—spontaneously returns to the first task;
 - (c) to draw no cross, which he cuts out—[cf.] §a:—to copy—the *Wiederaufnahme* of the small circles.
 - (d) *Ersatz* = 0.
 - (e) again cut out—instead of that—the *drawing of crosses*—a *spontaneous Ersatz as in the mentally retarded*.
 - (f) The naming and showing of geometrical figures—<*unstable*>.

NB!

1. The classification of geometrical figures.
2. The recognition and pronunciation of letters and syllables.

About will

This note was written in pencil on one card (“Processing the manuscript”) and contains a definition of volition that is not present in Vygotsky’s published writings.

NB! That volition is an Ego affect is clear from:

- (1) The birth of the hypobulic—negativism and stubbornness = the person’s motives;
- (2) Bergson—everything that flows from the *whole* personality is a free action; the same in Spinoza – free is what follows from the essence of the person;
- (3) The saint who mounts the stake because a refusal would contradict the basic Ego affect and his whole life;
- (4) Volition. It is a concept that has become an affect; a strong-willed person is a person who decides what to do and how to live on the basis of an Ego affect.

On the method of studying the affect, the intellect, and the will

Written in pencil on one card (“Processing the manuscript”), this text contains plans for experimental studies of the affect in the spirit of Lewin. These plans were only partially realized, for example, in the replications of the studies by Lissner (modeling with plasticine) and Karsten (including the “the support of the affect from above” with the instruction “to show another child how to solve the problem”). See the detailed description in “The problem of mental retardation” (cf. pp. 237–238 in Vygotsky 1993). We have no information about experiments, in which experimentally elicited motives clash with each other and the subject must make a choice along the path of the greatest resistance.

NB! On the method of studying the affect, the intellect, and the will.

- I. *Intentions*: general ones—particular ones: The dynamics and laws will vary depending on the degree of generality; we must change (the variable in the experiment) the degree of generality + the ascendance along the levels of the *Flüssigkeit* of the dynamic processes + the distance in the sense of the isolation from the motor system and confront these different *dynamic-semantic* systems with *different situations* (where there is a mailbox and where not, etc.) to clarify *the transformation* of the dynamics of the first sort into the second sort.⁴⁵ Clarification of the fundamental relationship with the situation from the viewpoint of the gradients of the dynamics.
- II. The *Ersatz*. *The first series*: the *Ersatz* according to the meaning and the experimental activity; different degrees of the generalization of the *Ersatz*: the complex and the concept.
See on the back + a cat + rails.⁴⁶
The second series: the semantic action—identity according to meaning, and not according to the concrete–sensory nature. Levels of generalization.

The third series: experimentally elicited unreal *Ersatz*—both in speech and in thinking. The next sentence is boxed with an arrow to the words: [Levels of generalization] The semantic action is not the same as identical themes.

The fourth series: *Ersatz* with meaningless and meaningful actions.

These experiments have one general trait: to reveal that the different structure of the dynamic–semantic systems and the different proportion in them of the dynamics of the first and the second sort will determine the *Ersatz*.

5. The *Ersatz* in thought problems (counting in one’s head).
- III. *Sättigung:* The problems of volition—Claparède, Lewin, Spinoza, and James: the action along the path of the greatest resistance. The support of the affect from above. The change of the *choice situation* when it is interpreted. I must design my experiments with experimental motives in this way: One series of actions is *pleasant according to its meaning* but includes an *unpleasant* action; another series has neutral or even pleasant actions, but its meaning is unpleasant: a choice along the path of the greatest resistance.

NB! G. Vas. [Birenbaum’s] remarkable experiment: (a) the subject is drawing a house, he cannot be interrupted, he wants to add the window; (b) *they interrupt him* and give him the opportunity to build a house; the *Wiederaufnahme:* the subject begins to draw, but not a house, but another object.

The sense and meaning of this fact: We thought that the *Ersatz* would occur *either* according to its meaning, *or* according to its sensory activity: When we model a cat from plasticine, the *Ersatz* can be *either* rails from plasticine (until 3 years) *or* to draw a cat (through glass) [after 3 years]. It turns out that a splitting is possible so that the *Ersatz* is partial: The person *draws* (a *Wiederaufnahme*, thus there was no *Ersatz*) but not a *house* (thus the *Ersatz* took place with respect to the theme).

We can interpret this from three viewpoints:

(a) There is no connection between the dynamics of thinking and action: What remains is that drawing is dynamically charged independent of the meaning; (b) the dynamics of meaning is relatively independent from the dynamics of the action: the meaning is identical and formed the *Ersatz* for the meaning of the theme, the activity is not identical, is not an *Ersatz*; (c) in general there is not just communication between systems (dynamics), but there are also other forms of mutual influence (the one modifies the other, devours the other, parasitizes on the other).

The last conference (patients Z. and K.) or: *Pro domo sua*

The document consists of the texts written on the back of eight cards (“Processing the manuscript”), which presumably formed one whole: (1) the texts on cards 1, 2, 6, 7, and 8 were written in pencil; (2) the text on cards 3, 4, and 5 were written with black ink. The note on card 8 differs from all the others. Its content is partially reflected in the article “The problem of mental retardation,” but for the biographer its last part is most interesting. It refers to two figures with whom Vygotsky identified: Hamlet and Moses. Comparing himself with the Old-Testament figure, Vygotsky hinted that he indicated the road out of psychology’s crisis and left us his tablets of stone. That would be consistent with what we

know about Vygotsky and his group of students and devoted colleagues. As we know from their correspondence, somehow they felt destined to change psychology under Vygotsky's messianic guidance: to gather the faithful and to lead them out of the desert of empty empiricism into the promised land of the "science of the new man" (cf. Van der Veer & Valsiner 1991). In this sense, Vygotsky's last lines are truly tragic: He realized he would not be able to finish his work and that he failed to set foot in that new territory. Whether he was even close to realizing his dreams, the reader can judge for himself after reading these notes as well as Vygotsky's published writings. Vygotsky himself argued there are two ways to measure a person's merits: by what the person accomplished and by his unrealized potential, i.e., by what he left undone Varshava & Vygotsky 1931, p. 5).

[Written in pencil:]

The conference

1. Z.

About what will you give a lecture?

–About what! About what!

Why the big auditorium?

–Big, of course.

2. K. His memory is disturbed because of the absence of meanings—[what is preserved is] just the object-relatedness. *But the body memory* (cf. the *Wiederaufnahme*). Memory requires the transition from one situation to another one: from the real to the semantic field. When the semantic field and the meanings perish, *there must be amnesia. The a-spontaneity results from the absence of meanings*. Cf. Hochheimer—speak, when they ask, speaks about the magnet.⁴⁷ *K.'s a-spontaneity = Hochheimer*. The same cause: semic aphasia. Highlighted in the margin with a double vertical line: [The *Starrheit* of the dynamics precludes the dynamics of the semantic field in K. because there is no fluidity.]

The center of everything:

- (a) the fundamental relationship with the situation is free or constrained;
- (b) meaning and its radical change (cf. the counting in Z. and K.).

In Z., words are an *Ersatz* action: [caused] by the isolation of the meanings from the object-relatedness.

[The sentence is connected with point 4 by an arrow and points 1 through 4 are highlighted in the margin with a vertical line:]

External critique—the *Grundstörung*.

- (1) The radical change of the word.
- (2) The radical change of the relationship with signification. <...>
- (3) The *radical change within the field* and of the action in that field. (in K. *external* activity, in Z. *internal* activity)

(4) *From the <focus> to the personality. The unity of affect and intellect.*

Written in the margin: [Here (K.) [there is] activity without actions; in Z. there is fantasy without activity.]

[Written in black ink:]

[Encircled:] *Sehr wichtig.*

[The next paragraph is highlighted with a vertical line in the margin:]

The unity of affect and intellect (*correct*)—*to find the unit.*⁴⁸ But apparently fluid dynamics do not *at all* exist *outside thinking* (this is the essence of *the unity*); ergo, insofar as they are found in the dynamics of the field, *they are introduced there from thinking. Not like this:* There exist dynamics of two sorts (fluid, free and *starre*, constrained) *independent* of the intellect (the elements: hydrogen), and there exist two sorts of activity (thinking and real activity) independent of the dynamics, and these two sorts of dynamics can mix in different combinations (oxygen and hydrogen). *But like this:* There exist two unities of *dynamic activity*: thinking and real activity. Both have their *dynamic aspect*, i.e., there is a dynamic system *sui generis* of a specific type and sort. Outside activity, the *two types of dynamics* do not exist *in abstracto*. *This is the most important and fundamental.*

Ergo, we can say that the disturbance of *thinking is primary* (*understanding thinking as a dynamic–semantic system*, as mental life). *Inde the dynamics of the specific sort that correspond with thinking disappear everywhere* and gives way to the *pure dynamics of the field*, which Lewin *in abstracto* distinguishes (actually, *thinking and activity exist together—ergo*, both types of dynamics exist in mixed form—in pure form—only in the absence of thinking (an automatic action) in the action (a *meaningless action*) or in (*unreal*) *thinking that is absolutely separated from the action*. Both these pure cases of dynamics exist in K. and Z., because in one there is absolutely meaningless action, and in the other there is absolutely unreal thinking. *To say that thinking is disturbed means to say that the dynamic processes of a specific sort are disturbed everywhere. The role of thinking in activity consists in the introduction of new dynamic possibilities in activity.* To say that thinking is disturbed means to say that subtle and complex dynamic processes in activity are disturbed. To say that thinking of the irreal type is disturbed means to say that *the dynamics of the real field are destroyed* (the things lost their characteristic affect—in schizophrenia) *secondarily* (for in Z., the external *Feldmäßigkeit* is preserved with momentary flashes).

Encircled: [Cf. Lewin: The dynamics of the mentally retarded are dynamics without thinking; *ergo*, we return to the intellect (+ *its dynamic aspect*) as the center and primary disorder of the mentally retarded.]

We must explain their capacity and incapacity from one principle: *a radical change of word meaning as a semantic–dynamic system*. *Ergo*, in K., the dynamics (*starr*) of the field are preserved; in Z., the fluid dynamics of thinking are preserved also in thinking.

[Written in pencil:]

The unity of thinking as an activity of a specific sort and the fluid dynamics as a specific sort. Encircled: [*Unified dynamics—the semantic system*. This explains the preservation of the affects: *affective memory*.]

How can they remember the affects of the past (in Z.)—It is not the *Wiederaufnahme* but a *fluid affectivity in the concepts* that is always ready to refresh itself: *the problem of affective memory*. *She gave birth once* and thought all her life [about the child]. If there would be no autistic thinking, the affect would disappear like in animals, who have no affective memory.

We cannot say, what is *more* affective.

[Written in the margin:]

Jakob: With Pick senile feeble-mindedness disappears. Ego/external world—Z.

Z. or K.: *How* are they affective. *Two different kinds of affectivity*:

With her—the dynamics of thinking (the second sort).

With him—the dynamics of the real field (the first sort).

Highlighted with a double vertical line in the margin and connected by an arrow with the next paragraph: [And these *how*, these *quale*,⁴⁹ this sort of affectivity, preserved or lost, determines the *Grundstörung*—the radical change of the meaning of the object-relatedness.]

Ergo: The disturbance of thinking determines the disturbance and preservation of the affect in its two sorts. The complete unity of affect-intellect from one principle \pm the symptoms.

Philosophical analysis, Lenin.

In K., the piece of fantasy is damaged (the first sharp bend of the zigzag); in Z., it is hypertrophied (there is no second bend—[the analogy in Lenin:] idealism, religion).

*NB! Pro domo sua*⁵⁰

This is the last thing I have done in psychology, and I will die at the summit like Moses, having glimpsed the promised land but without setting foot in it.⁵¹ Forgive me, dear creatures.

“The rest is silence.”⁵²

Notes

1. The text of Samukhin, Birenbaum, and Vygotsky (1934) contains approximately 40 German words, mostly borrowed from Lewin’s theoretical framework.
2. L.I. Likhtenshteyn (? to ?). Russian psychotherapist. Cf. Likhtenshteyn (1958).

3. Revolt, rebellion, mutiny (Portuguese). Written in Cyrillic. Vygotsky may have been inspired by the revolt of 1926, which installed a military dictatorship in Portugal.
4. Wilhelm Stekel (1868 to 1940). Austrian psychiatrist, psychoanalyst, and initially a follower of Freud. Stekel published on neuroses, dreams, and perversions. When the Nazis came to power, Stekel moved to London where he later committed suicide to end the pain caused by the diseases from which he was suffering.
5. Obsessive-compulsive disorder (German).
6. In “The diagnostics of development and the pedagogical clinic for difficult childhood” Vygotsky wrote: “While evaluating the possibility that schizophrenia is psychogenic, Kretschmer points out that, during the war when hordes of hysterics descended on hospitals, there were no schizophrenics among them. In Kretschmer’s opinion, this statistical observation shows which psychological stimuli provoke the schizophrenic process. Many life-threatening situations and vital emotions (fright, fear of one’s life, hunger, cold, thirst, pain) do not in this respect appear particularly dangerous. Schizophrenics are surprisingly unresponsive to this whole scale of feelings.” Cf. p. 271 of Vygotsky (1993).
7. Intelligence test (German).
8. Alice Rühle-Gerstel (1894 to 1943). German Jewish author of children’s books, feminist, socialist, and psychologist. Like her husband, Otto Rühle, she was an adherent of Adler’s individual psychology. After the advent of the Nazis, she emigrated to Prague and eventually to Mexico where she befriended Trotsky, Frida Kahlo, and Diego Rivera. On the day of her husband’s death from a heart attack, she committed suicide. In 1926, Vygotsky wrote a review of Otto Rühle’s (1925) *Die Seele des proletarischen Kindes (The soul of the proletarian child)*.
9. Emile Coué (1857 to 1926). French psychologist, pharmacist, and student of Liébeault and Bernheim (cf. Valsiner & Van der Veer 2000). Coué developed a method of conscious auto-suggestion based on the manifold repetition of the phrase “Every day, in every way, I’m getting better and better.” Modern research has renewed interest in such placebo effects.
10. See chapter 11, note 37.
11. Albert Liebmann (1865 to 1924). German physician and specialist in language disorders. Vygotsky probably refers to his book on speech disorders in backward children (Liebmann 1901).
12. Subsequently, Levina (1951) suggested a classification of alalias and distinguished between alalias caused by disturbances of sound perception, visual perception, articulation, and mental energy (*aktivnost*).
13. Tamara Izrailevna Yudkovskaya (1905 to 1958). Russian defectologist and specialist in the education of the deaf.
14. Anna Flerontovna Pongil’skaya (? to ?). Russian defectologist, specialist in the education of the deaf, and author of books and manuals about speech development in deaf children.

15. Developmental psychopathies (German). That is, mental disorders that originate in childhood or adolescence.
16. See p. 27 of “The problem of mental retardation” in Vygotsky (1993).
17. The example is borrowed from Lewin (1926, p. 335). Once the person has the intention of mailing a letter, the sight of the mailbox triggers the response. The mailbox now has *Aufforderungscharakter* (affordance, valence). Lewin (p. 345) wrote that the same is true for a knot in a handkerchief: It has become a sign that reminds the person to carry out a certain action. This would, of course, become one of Vygotsky’s favorite examples.
18. Cf. the section “The historical and the contemporary theory of concepts” in chapter 10.
19. Vygotsky uses a term (*soskal’zyvanie*), which refers to the inability to stick to the point and the tendency to digress into the discussion of unrelated matters.
20. Change of meaning (German).
21. Perhaps a translation of the German *affektive Verblödung*, which was a quite common term in German psychiatry at the time to designate what were seen as inappropriate emotional reactions in schizophrenic patients.
22. Vygotsky’s note: “Thinking and action: The things’ affect (the *Aufforderungscharakter*) is preserved in thinking (*inde* the problem of the child’s magical thinking!). That is, <illegible> the relationship (type of unity) between them. The dynamic semantic (conceptual) systems are moved toward generalized perception. This fully determines both the meaning and the real field in their relationship, i.e., the unity: for it determines the degree of participation of thinking in the action and the degree of the flight, of the freedom.”
23. See Lewin’s (1933) chapter on mental retardation.
24. To repeat a spoken text (German).
25. Vocabulary (German).
26. Princess Tarakanova (1745 to 1775) was a false pretender to the Russian throne.
27. The subject did not describe the content of pictures but digressed by telling irrelevant stories.
28. The subject had to count cards that were spread on the table in the form of a square (e.g., 5 × 5 cards), but he just repeatedly counted the square’s border (the 15 cards that form the outline) and forgot the 9 cards in the middle.
29. See chapter 12, note 68. The text in bold script is a quote from Lashley (1930). Lashley argued that the behavior of patients with brain damage is not totally chaotic but is carried out in an orderly fashion.
30. In *Thinking and Speech*, Vygotsky gives more examples like the “foot of a table,” the “neck of a bottle,” etc. See p. 154 in Vygotsky (1987).
31. Piaget argued that childhood autism and egocentrism disappear as a result of the communication with peers and adults who do not understand autistic or egocentric utterances.
32. Wish fulfillment (German).

33. The anger emotion (German). Refers to Dembo (1931).
34. "He reifies the geometrical figures (calls a circle a moon, a quadrangle a board, an ellipse an egg)." Z. presumably could not recognize a dress on one of the cards as such and just mentioned its details (the small circles). See p. 122 of Samukhin, Birenbaum, and Vygotsky (1934).
35. A common German name. Perhaps a reference to Wilhelm II (1859 to 1941), the last German emperor. The subject had to repeat words like "picture" and "Germany" but instead began associating. When the doctor explicitly asked "Which word did I say?" the answer was correct. See p. 124 of Samukhin, Birenbaum, and Vygotsky (1934).
36. K. spontaneously echoed words but, as we saw previously, deliberately repeating them proved difficult.
37. Often the subject was only able to repeat one or two words of a sentence.
38. "He does not notice the word as such, like we do not at all notice the transparent glass through which we see some object" (Samukhin, Birenbaum, & Vygotsky 1934, p. 123). That is, the subject focuses on what is signified by the word (e.g., a flower) without being able to reflect on the meaning of the word as such (e.g., what is a flower? What does it have in common with a tree?).
39. The subject proved unable to understand that the sentences "fire is extinguished by water" and "water extinguishes fire" are identical.
40. The subject had to select cards with a correct text (e.g., "snow is hot," "snow is white," "snow is cold," etc.) and was able to do that. On the question of the doctor whether snow is black, he replied that it can be black when it melts. This Samukhin, Birenbaum, and Vygotsky (1934, p. 124) saw as a sign of his extremely concrete form of thinking.
41. The subject had to count small colored circles that were arranged in the form of a cross.
42. A patient with dementia mentioned in other notes not published here.
43. The subject was asked to repeat the sentence "The wife developed an eye disease," but could not do it literally. The sentence "Now it is a dark summer night" he found difficult to repeat because it was a clear winter day.
44. The subject was asked to repeat the sentence "A black/while tablecloth is lying on the table" and had difficulty repeating such a sentence when it contradicted reality. See p. 126 of Samukhin, Birenbaum, and Vygotsky (1934).
45. That is, the transformation of the sluggish, sticky dynamics of the action into the fluid dynamics of thinking and vice versa.
46. See previous text. Somehow the plasticine dog has become a cat.
47. See chapter 26, note 43.
48. Vygotsky's note: "It does not correspond with the unit of meaning: There are two interfering systems of units in thinking."
49. Which (Italian) or quality (Latin).
50. In defense of one's house, for oneself (Latin). Words supposedly spoken by Cicero to recover the right to practice the profession of lawyer and to recover his house.

51. Deuteronomy 34:1–4: “And Moses went up from the plains of Moab unto the mountain of Nebo, to the top of Pisgah, that is over against Jericho. And the Lord shewed him all the land of Gilead, unto Dan... And the Lord said unto him, This is the land which I sware unto Abraham, unto Isaac, and unto Jacob, saying, I will give it unto thy seed: I have caused thee to see it with thine eyes, but thou shalt not go over thither.”
52. Hamlet’s last words.

References

- Dembo, T. (1931). Der Ärger als dynamisches Problem. *Psychologische Forschung*, 15, 1–144.
- Freud, S. (1933). *Neue Folge der Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Psychoanalyse*. Vienna: Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag.
- Lashley, K. S. (1930). Basic neural mechanisms in behavior. *Psychological Review*, 37, 1–24.
- Levina, R. E. (1951). *Opyt izucheniya negovoryashchikh detey (alalikov)*. Moscow: Uchpedgiz.
- Lewin, K. (1926). Vorsatz, Wille und Bedürfnis. *Psychologische Forschung*, 7, 330–385.
- Lewin, K. (1933). Eine dynamische Theorie des Schwachsinnigen. In *Hommage au Dr. Decroly* (pp. 313–350). Brussels: S.n.
- Liebmann, A. (1901). *Die Sprachstörungen geistig zurückgebliebenen Kindern*. Berlin: Reuther and Reichard.
- Likhtenshteyn, L. I. (1958). Opyt psikhoterapevticheskoy raboty v psikhiatricheskoy bol’nitse. In M. S. Lebedinskiy (Ed.), *Voprosy psikhoterapii* (pp. 210–212). Moscow: Medgiz.
- Samukhin, N. V., Birenbaum, G. V., & Vygotsky, L. S. (1934). K voprosu o dementsii pri bolezni Pika: klinicheskoe i eksperimental’no-psikhologicheskoe issledovanie. *Sovetskaya Nevropatologiya, Psikhiatriya i Psikhogigiena*, 3, 97–135.
- Shorter, E. (2015). *What psychiatry left out of the DSM-5: Historical mental disorders today*. London-New York, Routledge: Taylor & Francis.
- Valsiner, J., & Van der Veer, R. (2000). *The social mind: Construction of the idea*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Van der Veer, R., & Valsiner, J. (1991). *Understanding Vygotsky: A quest for synthesis*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Varshava, B. E., & Vygotsky, L. S. (1931). *Psikhologicheskii slovar’*. Moscow: Uchpedgiz.
- Vygotsky, L. S. (1934). Thought in schizophrenia. *Archives of Neurology and Psychiatry*, 31, 1062–1077.
- Vygotsky, L. S. (1987). *The collected works of L.S. Vygotsky. Vol. 1. Problems of general psychology*. New York: Plenum Press.
- Vygotsky, L. S. (1993). *The collected works of L.S. Vygotsky. Vol. 2. The fundamentals of defectology*. New York: Plenum Press.

Author Index

A

Abram, B., 447, 453
Abraham, 35, 113, 306, 501
Ach, N.K., 93, 118, 120, 124, 125, 131, 145, 147, 280, 360
Adalis, A., 104
Adler, A., 80, 97, 162, 185, 188, 191, 192, 194, 392, 395, 451, 457, 485
Adonai, 16, 27, 29, 34–36
Aesop, 73, 83, 349
Akhmatova, A.A., 57, 65, 229
Akiva ben Joseph, 18
Akimov, 311, 314
Akkerman, V.I., 177, 178, 191, 197, 198, 329, 331
Albrecht, K., 398, 400
Aleksandrov, 102
Aleichem, S., 22, 33
Alekhine, A.A., 384, 386, 387
Alekseyev, S.A., 133, 146
Aleksey, S., 278, 367, 379, 452
Amalek, 15, 18, 29, 35, 36
Anan'ev, B.G., 269, 295, 306
Anderson, K., 152
Annenskiy, I.F., 274, 322, 342, 432
Apolek, 72, 94
Archimedes, 396, 407
Arievich, I.M., 172
Aristotle, xv, 91, 95, 133
Arkin, Y.A., 177, 191, 198
Aron, 161
Asch, S., 22, 33
Ashby, R., 231
Askol'dov, S., 133, 146
Asya, 126, 237–240, 262, 271–274, 285, 294, 297, 298, 356, 358, 359, 407
Averbukh, R.A., 391, 395, 399
Azbukin, D.I., 155, 158, 166, 193

B

Babel, I.E., 72, 73, 93, 94
Babinski, J.F.F., 132
Bacon, F., 117, 123
Baldwin, J.M., 156, 167, 168
Balfe, M.W., 69
Bálint, R., 426, 433
Bal-Makhshoves, I.I., 23, 34
Balmont, K.D., 2, 8, 9
Banshchikov, V.M., 177
Barnet, B.V., 455
Baron, E., 58, 67
Basova, A.G., 155, 157, 166, 294
Basov, M.Ya., 194, 196, 205, 304, 305, 320
Bauer, O., 12, 16
Baumgartner, O., 316, 317
Beaconsfield, 31, 38
Bednarik, M., 68
Bednyy, D., 73, 94, 95
Bekhterev, V.M., xiv, 74, 94, 304–306, 346–348
Belinskiy, V.G., 1, 3, 8
Belmonte, J., 84, 100
Belyayev, B.V., 295, 304, 305
Belyy, A., 141, 151, 260
Benjamin, L.T., 412
Berdichevskiy, M.J., 22, 34
Bergson, H.L., 77, 91, 97, 108, 112, 125, 133–137, 147, 148, 183, 210, 214, 217, 245, 262, 265, 368, 375, 493
Berman, 291–292
Bernfeld, S., 2
Bernheim, H., 498
Bernstein, O.S., 329, 386, 388, 422
Bernsteyn, N.A., 325, 347
Bertau, M.C., xviii, 232
Berze, J., 324–326, 331, 333, 342, 343

- Bialik, C.N., 11, 15, 17, 18, 22, 23, 25, 29, 30, 32, 34, 36, 38, 84, 100
- Bikerman, I.M., 43, 47
- Binding, K., 343
- Binet, A., 138, 140, 141, 149, 150, 185, 193, 199, 206, 245, 396, 453
- Binswanger, L., 72, 77, 80, 93, 97, 169
- Birenbaum, G.V., 133, 177, 182, 198, 205, 291, 319, 321, 334, 336, 349, 364, 367, 410, 414, 415, 419, 425, 427, 428, 434, 483, 487, 489, 491, 494, 497, 500
- Birnbaum, K., 348
- Bleuler, M., 200, 245, 256, 396
- Bleuler, P.E., 111, 169, 200, 341, 346, 347
- Blok, A.A., 51, 54, 84, 100, 349, 413
- Blondel, Ch.A.A., 117, 123, 158, 160, 168, 169, 322
- Blonskiy, P.P., 76, 96, 117, 123, 132, 138, 139, 150, 195, 205, 342, 395, 467, 479
- Blumenfeld, B.M., 383, 385–387
- Boas, F., 363
- Bochkareva, E., 296
- Bodenhafer, W.B., 169
- Bogen, H., 124, 151, 152, 188, 348, 462
- Bogomolov, D.V., 67
- Boguslavskiy, M.B., 205
- Bonhoeffer, K., 325, 343, 400, 424
- Borsuk, A.K., 81, 98
- Boskis, R.M., 177, 198, 282
- Botvinnik, M.M., 387, 388
- Bourne, F., 69
- Bouvard, A., 268
- Bozhovich, L.I., 123, 142, 151, 156, 168, 259, 274, 277, 284, 286
- Brandes, G.M.C., 7, 9
- Bregman, E.O., 149, 150
- Bro, 292
- Brodmann, K., 432, 433
- Browning, R., 93, 104
- Brukhanskiy, N.P., 325, 327, 345
- Bryusov, V., 82, 83, 99
- Buber, M., 170
- Bühler, Ch., 113, 133, 405, 477
- Bühler, K., 124, 146, 170, 245, 249, 403, 414, 477
- Bukharin, N.I., 84, 90, 108, 111, 112, 320
- Bulba, T., 29, 30, 37, 44, 48
- Bulgakov, S.N., 43, 47
- Bumke, O., 327, 329, 345
- Bunin, I., 47, 68, 414, 455
- Buridan, J., 384–387, 409, 411, 414, 475
- Burt, C., 437
- Busemann, A.H.H., 189, 204
- Buslayev, F.I., 82, 99
- Buytendijk, F.J.J., 113, 253, 264
- Byron, G.G., 13, 17
- C**
- Cannon, W.B., 156, 164–166, 171, 172, 210, 211, 227, 228
- Capablanca, J.R., 387, 388
- Cassirer, E., 134, 147, 240, 241, 267, 294, 420, 431, 435
- Cervantes, M. de, 69
- Chagall, M., 28, 36
- Chakow, J., 61
- Charpentier, A., 180, 181, 200
- Charskaya, L.A., 450, 451, 458
- Chekhov, A., 65, 70, 88, 89
- Chelpanov, G.I., 76–78, 96, 123, 245
- Cheranovskiy, R.I., 295, 305
- Chernikhovskiy, S.G., 22, 34
- Chernitsyna, 296
- Chlenov, L.G., 58, 325, 329, 346
- Christiansen, B., 92, 103
- Chuchmarev, Z.I., 156, 165–167, 172, 177, 329, 331, 358
- Chvyr', L.A., 200
- Claparède, E., 141, 151, 166, 172, 183, 202, 281, 355, 365, 410, 411, 466, 474, 494
- Cobb, M.V., 149, 150
- Cohen, H., 13, 17, 26, 35, 147
- Compayré, J.G., 118, 124
- Comte, A., 158, 169
- Cottingham, J., 232
- Coué, E., 485, 498
- Coxwell, C.F., 101
- Cyrus, 13, 17
- D**
- Daniel, 13, 40
- Darmesteter, J., 25, 35
- Deborin, A.M., 102, 234, 264
- de Goncourt, E., 99
- de Goncourt, J., 99
- De Greeff, E., 157, 161, 162, 168, 188, 193, 194–196
- de Groot, A.D., 201, 388
- Dembo, T., 110, 113, 244, 246, 248, 413, 488, 500
- Demoor, J., 181, 188, 201
- Demosthenes, 80, 97
- de Régnier, H., 355, 363
- Derzhavin, K., 87, 101

- Descartes, R., 109, 112, 166, 212, 213, 215,
 217, 220, 221, 223, 230, 232, 233, 245,
 251, 409
 Dietzgen, P.J., 134, 147
 Dilthey, W., 219, 233, 230, 422, 432
 Disraeli, B., 38
 Dostoevsky, F.M., 2, 5, 8, 18, 22, 29, 32, 34,
 37, 39, 42–44, 47, 89, 102, 113, 255,
 265, 360
 Down, J.L., 155, 168, 177, 442
 Driesch, H.A.E., 111, 120, 125, 245
 Dubnov, S.M., 35
 Dumas, A., 457
 Dumas, G., 220, 232
 Durov, V.L., 454, 458
 D'yachkov, A.I., 177
- E**
- Ebbinghaus, H., 138, 149
 Ecclesiastes, xiii, 1–9, 40
 Edel'shteyn, A.O., 224, 227, 234, 235
 Edom, 15, 18
 Efrussi, P.O., 295, 305
 Eichenbaum, B.M., 76, 95, 98
 Einstein, A., 88, 96
 Eliasberg, W.G., 131, 139, 145, 179, 282, 428
 Elijah, 36, 51, 54
 El'konin, D.B., 294, 295, 299, 303, 304, 333,
 337, 367, 410, 461, 470
 Ellis, F., 58
 Elyashev, I.I., 34
 Emma, 46, 48, 49
 Engels, F., xviii, 78, 80, 88, 93, 97, 109, 112,
 122, 126, 147, 214, 217, 224, 231, 249,
 312, 321, 330, 341, 347, 354, 355, 363,
 476
 Enikeyev, Kh., 296
 Epshteyn, A.L., 295, 305, 367, 379
 Etlis, M.M., 228
 Eubulides, 287
 Ewald, G., 191, 203, 204, 325, 396
 Eysenck, H.J., 204
 Ezekiel, 23, 24, 33, 34, 40, 42, 44, 46
- F**
- Faust, 7, 69
 Fechner, G.Th., 218, 231, 251
 Fedorenko, 296
 Feierberg, M.Z., 23, 28, 34
 Feigenberg, I.M., 1, 17, 34, 37, 43, 47
 Fel'dberg, D.V., 58, 66, 177, 294, 304
 Feoktistova, E.P., 202
- Ferrari, M., 232, 303
 Fet, A.A., 268
 Feuerbach, L.A., vii, 31, 38, 97, 140, 150, 151,
 155, 167, 272, 322, 333, 358
 Fil'ka, 73
 Fine, R., 388
 Fischer, E.K.B., 210, 214, 227–229, 375, 388
 Fleer, M., 204
 Flerina, E.A., 460, 464, 468, 476, 477, 480
 Flerov, O.V., 367, 379
 Flohr, S., 387, 389
 Foreman, A.Z., 289
 Frankfurt, Y.V., 89, 90, 97, 102, 234
 Freud, S., 16, 74, 75, 79, 81, 88, 94, 123, 158,
 160–162, 164, 166, 170, 173, 193, 196,
 197, 209, 214, 238, 241, 248, 257, 289,
 317, 320, 339, 343, 380, 392–394, 399,
 412, 422, 425, 432, 441, 474, 483–485,
 498
 Freund, C.S., 426, 434
 Fridman, B.D., 160, 170, 399
 Friedgut, T., 34
 Fröbel, F.W.A., 465, 479
 Frolov, Yu.P., 416
- G**
- Galton, F., 149
 Gamage, A.W., 58, 66
 Gannushkin, P.B., 167, 199, 234, 307, 319,
 326, 328, 340, 344
 Garelin, N.F., 240
 Garshin, M., 5, 8, 9
 Gayvorovskiy, A.A., 455
 Gelb, A., 145, 181, 201, 255, 377, 431
 Gendelevich, S.I., 296, 306
 Gershenson, M.O., 301, 308
 Gershonovich, L., 311, 313, 316
 Gesell, A.L., 113, 293, 304, 398
 Geshelina, L.S., 156, 168, 177
 Geyer, T.A., 325
 Gidoni, A.I., 30
 Gilyarovskiy, V.A., 322, 325, 342, 437, 442,
 445
 Ginsberg, A.Z.H., 17
 Gippius, Z., 47
 Gita, 48, 66, 92, 115, 103, 115, 121, 126, 161,
 164, 184, 198, 319, 321, 419
 Glaucon, 34
 Glinskaya, A., 52
 Glushakov, Yu., 48
 Gogol, N.V., 29, 32, 36, 37, 39, 43–48, 81,
 307, 457

- Golant, R.Ya., 295, 305
 Goldstein, K., 130, 132, 145, 178, 181, 201,
 244, 246, 248, 249, 252, 267, 315, 335,
 372, 419–421, 429–431, 435
 Golubev, S.F., 387
 Golyakhovskaya, A., 183, 202
 Gorbunov, P., 296
 Gordon, Y.L., 17, 25, 29, 34–36, 38
 Gorky, M., 54, 94, 241, 288, 460
 Gorlov, D.V., 66, 465, 478
 Gornfeld, A.G., 27, 35, 100
 Grünbaum, A.A., 297, 306, 430
 Gracheva, E.K., 167
 Grammont, M., 82, 99
 Grillparzer, F.S., 359, 364
 Groos, K., 119, 125, 135, 156, 299, 307, 479
 Gruhle, H.W., 325, 331, 341–344, 346, 348
 Guillaume, P., 253, 264
 Gurevich, M.O., 177, 198, 307, 325, 328, 330,
 345, 346
 Gurewitsch, M.O., 346, 356
- H**
 Ha'am, A., 11–13, 17, 30, 44, 47
 Habakkuk, 23
 Hadlich, H., 321, 335, 349
 Halevi, J., 11, 15, 18, 39
 Hamlet, xiii, 1, 3, 7, 11, 35, 69, 83, 84, 91, 92,
 205, 210, 228, 333, 494, 501
 Hamsun, K., 301, 308
 Hannah, 113, 404, 414
 Hanselmann, H., 316, 317, 399
 Hansen, A., 63, 69
 Hardcastle, J., 416
 Hausenstein, W., 82, 99
 Head, H., 158, 165, 170, 172, 201, 245, 302,
 357, 419, 420, 421, 424, 427, 432
 Hegel, G.W.F., 46, 103, 108, 111, 112, 133,
 136, 137, 142, 148, 152, 211, 220, 233,
 256, 262, 263, 266, 430
 Heider, F., 404
 Heine, H., 8, 25, 31, 35, 81, 98, 171, 289
 Heman, C.F., 31, 38
 Hemingway, E., 100
 Herbart, J.F., 315
 Hetzer, H., 477
 Hillel, 29, 35, 36
 Hobhouse, T., 120, 126
 Hoche, A.E., 325, 343, 345
 Hochheimer, W., 237, 241, 302, 424, 426, 429,
 434, 488, 495
 Høffding, H., 217, 219, 231
- Homburger, A., 443, 456
 Hunter, W.S., 74, 94
 Husserl, E.G.A., 169, 265
- I**
 Idelberger, H.A., 347
 Isaiah, 13, 17, 18, 23, 29, 35
 Ismail, 15, 18
 Ivanovskiy, V.N., 90, 97, 407
 Ivanov-Smolenskiy, A.G., 325
 Ivan'shina, E.A., 306
 Ivanov, V.V., 5, 126
 Ivantsov, A.N., 92, 103
 Izmaylov, A.E., 88, 102
- J**
 Jabotinsky, V.E., 266
 Jackson, H., 158, 168, 419–421, 424, 426
 Jacob, 39, 40, 61, 501
 Jaensch, E.R.F., 110, 111, 113, 132, 147, 180,
 220, 285, 578
 Jakob, A.M., 328, 345, 497
 James, W., 76, 77, 83, 96, 100, 228, 307, 364,
 380, 388
 Janet, P.M.F., 117, 118, 123, 124, 137, 156,
 167, 168, 220, 232, 338
 Jaspers, K.T., 169, 170, 304, 325, 332, 343,
 344, 348, 400
 Jehovah, 16, 28
 Jeremiah, 28, 36
 John, 35, 228, 289
 Johnston, Ch., 54
 Jones, M.C., 171
 Jornet, A., 204
 Jossman, P., 344
 Jude, F., 289
 Jung, K., 160, 187, 342, 343, 396
- K**
 Kablukov, N.A., 13, 17
 Kalmanson, L.G., 102
 Kammari, M., 233
 Kannabikh, Yu.V., 325, 328, 330, 331, 334,
 346
 Kant, F., 343
 Kant, O., 343
 Kapustin, V.I., 320
 Karamazov, I., 2, 4–6, 8, 9, 47
 Karo, Y., 39
 Karsten, A., 243, 248, 249, 415, 472, 493
 Kates, J., 288
 Katz, D., 171, 377, 381

- Katz, R., 171
 Katzenelson, Y.L., 31, 38
 Kautsky, K.J., 117, 123
 Kerbikov, O.V., 325
 Kern, A., 364
 Kern, E., 364
 Khebnikov, V.V., xviii, 244, 248, 260, 261, 265, 268, 271, 274, 285, 301
 Khoroshko, V.K., 119, 120, 125
 Kibler, M., 377, 381
 Kirillov, A., 18
 Kitty, 65
 Klausner, J.G., 34
 Kleist, K., 328, 346
 Knyazeva, E.V., 295, 304
 Kochubey, M.M., 37
 Koffka, K., 76, 77, 92, 95, 97, 103, 112, 113, 124, 201, 244–246, 248, 249, 252, 263, 266, 285, 299, 307, 349, 354, 356, 360, 403, 406, 407, 414
 Kogan, 296
 Köhler, W., 82, 110–113, 115, 118, 124, 134, 143, 147, 180, 230, 252, 255, 264, 266, 269, 272, 281, 287, 354, 355, 357, 362, 403, 406, 408, 413, 414, 427
 Kohs, S., 180, 185, 187, 193, 199, 200, 205, 282, 440
 Kolbanovskiy, V.N., 311, 313, 316
 Kolya, S., 178, 184, 190–192, 267
 Kolya, Sv., 116
 Konnikova, T.E., 294, 304
 Korbuly, J., 477
 Kornilov, K.N., xiv, 76, 88, 91, 95–97, 99, 101, 304, 399
 Kotelova, Y.V., 146
 Kotik-Friedgut, B., 34
 Krüger, F., 170, 209, 227
 Kraepelin, E., 340–346
 Krasnushkin, E.K., 325
 Krasusskiy, V.S., 157, 168
 Krays, S.V., 155, 167
 Kretschmer, E., 145, 158, 160, 161, 169, 178, 186, 191, 192, 193, 202–204, 239, 320–322, 326, 327, 330, 333, 334, 340–342, 347, 349, 377, 381, 392, 394, 396, 424, 426, 440, 456, 484, 498
 Krisch, H., 330, 344, 347, 348
 Kristman, V.I., 367, 379
 Kroh, O., 133, 147, 474
 Krop, H., 231
 Krupskaya, N.K., 358, 364
 Krylov, I.A., 73, 83, 94, 95, 100, 101, 252, 289, 300, 308
 Küppers, E., 165, 172
 Kurazov, I.F., 234, 252, 264
 Kurtenkov, 296
 Kvasnetskiy, G.A., 469, 479
L
 Ladygina-Kohts, N.N., 363, 415
 Lange, F.A., 164, 166, 210, 220, 225, 227, 228, 232
 Lange, K., 307
 Lange, N.N., 304
 Laplace, P.S., 12, 17
 Larisa, G., 449, 450, 452
 Lashley, K.S., xiv, 211, 228, 245, 249, 422, 429, 499
 Lasker, E., 385, 387, 388
 Lassalle, F., 31, 38
 Lavretskiy, F.I., 301, 308
 Lazarev, P.P., 76, 96
 Lazarus, M., 26, 27, 35, 36
 Lebmann, 82
 Lelevich, G., 88, 102
 Lenin, V.I., xviii, xix, 68, 90, 94, 97, 111, 133–136, 147, 152, 159, 249, 276, 289, 331, 345, 488, 497
 Leonov, L.M., 420, 431
 Leont'ev, A.N., xvi, xviii, 96, 97, 115, 116, 120, 123, 131, 142–144, 156, 177, 181, 188, 192, 243, 244, 247, 249, 251, 254, 261–263, 268, 271, 273–275, 278, 279, 282, 283, 285, 288, 290, 303, 349, 353, 367, 406
 Lermontov, M.Yu., 4, 8, 13, 17, 52, 54, 81, 98, 432, 450, 464, 478
 Le Verrier, U., 268–269
 Levina, M.A., 295, 304, 320, 356
 Levina, R.E., 123, 486, 498
 Lévy-Bruhl, L., 123, 132, 144, 146, 170, 184, 257, 261, 293, 303, 313, 317, 342
 Lewin, K., xix, 110, 113, 124, 138, 141, 150, 192, 198, 210, 219, 238, 246, 248, 253, 272, 285, 302, 308, 335, 349, 350, 362, 367, 373, 376, 377, 386, 392, 397, 399, 403, 404, 408–414, 416, 427, 428, 429, 434, 472, 474, 480, 483, 488, 493, 494, 496, 497, 499
 Lezan, K.A., 298
 Lichtenberg, G.C., 151
 Liebmann, A., 485, 498
 Likhachev, A.S., 367, 379
 Lipmann, O., 124, 138, 142, 151, 152, 257, 261, 462
 Lipps, T., 75, 76, 95
 Lissauer, H., 433
 Lissner, K., 472, 480, 493

- Loginova, N.A., 264
 Lopotukhin, I., 462
 Lotze, R.H., 304
 Löwenstein, O., 138, 149, 396, 426
 Luchins, A.S., 230
 Luchins, E.H., 230
 Luka, 37
 Lunacharskiy, A.V., 93
 Luria, A.R., xvi–xviii, 68, 95, 97, 103, 123,
 126, 131, 146, 150, 167, 170, 177, 178,
 182, 199–202, 210, 234, 244, 251, 254,
 261, 265, 266, 271, 274, 278, 284, 287,
 288, 336, 341, 353, 358, 367, 396, 399,
 414, 416, 424, 432, 433, 461, 475
- M**
- Macbeth, 87, 91, 101
 Mahler, W., 480
 Malachi, 23
 Malisch, K., 63, 69
 Mandel'shtam, O.E., 94, 259, 267, 272,
 288, 432
 Mandelkow, K.R., 230
 Manoah, 39
 Marie, P., 430, 435
 Marr, N.Y., 120, 126, 136, 182, 313, 317
 Marx, K., 38, 112
 Marshall, F.J., 384, 387
 Mayer-Gross, W., 326, 344
 McCarthy, D., 263, 269, 356
 McDougall, W., 201, 245, 249
 Mecacci, L., 353
 Mendel, G., 327
 Mendelssohn, M., 30, 38
 Merezhkovskiy, D., 47
 Meshcheryakov, A.I., 177
 Meyerson, I., 253, 264
 Michelangelo, xv, 64
 Mignard, M., 220, 232
 Milyavskaya, 139, 296
 Minkowski, E., 158, 169, 320, 322,
 342, 415
 Misha, A., 441
 Misha, K., 454
 Mnukhin, S.S., 294, 295, 304
 Molozhavaya, E.B., 471
 Molozhavyy, S.S., 150, 480
 Montessori, M.T.A., 171, 465, 473, 478,
 480
 Morozova, N.G., 115, 123, 177, 182, 199, 255,
 258, 471
 Moses, xxi, 35, 38, 100, 494, 497, 501
 Müller, J.P., 165, 172, 201
 Müller, M., 172
- Murchison, C., 230, 249
 Murdoch, D., 232
 Myshkin, 265
- N**
- Nabokov, V.N., 54
 Naum, P., 178, 187, 188, 192–197, 205
 Neubauer, V., 462, 470, 477
 Neustadt, R., 446, 457
 Nevskaya, M.VI., 177, 189
 Nevskiy, A., 296
 Nevskiy, V.A., 228
 Newton, 59, 60, 68
 Nietzsche, F.W., 24, 35, 117, 118, 123, 248,
 322, 343, 374
 Nikitin, N., 296
 Nimzowitsch, A., 386, 387, 388
 Nin, A., 99
 Nordau, M.S., 30, 38
- O**
- Oedipus, 52, 394
 Ole, 170
 Orbeli, L.A., 265
 Ortenberg, 150
 Oseretzky, N.I., 456
 Osipov, M.E., v, xii, 177
 Osipov, V.P., 345
 Osipova, E.A., 171
 Osipovich, M., 198, 308
 Ostroumov, L.E., 455
 Othello, 91
 Ovsiankina, M., 434
 Ovsyaniko-Kulikovskiy, D.N., 88, 102, 301
 Ozeretskiy, N.I., 177, 199, 294, 321, 324, 331,
 333, 396, 400
- P**
- Pakhlo, E., 296
 Pascal, B., 285, 289
 Pashkovskaya, E.I., 146
 Pasmanik, D., 11
 Pasternak, B.L., 261, 268, 287, 288
 Paterson, D.G., 203
 Paul, H., 267, 420
 Paulhan, F., xviii, 212, 229, 357
 Pavlov, I.P., xiv, 47, 93, 94, 159, 160, 244,
 246, 274, 288, 305, 348, 415, 416, 421,
 422
 Pearson, K., 76, 96
 Peshkov, A.M., 54, 94
 Pestalozzi, J.H., 479
 Peter, 431
 Petzelt, A., 157, 169, 182

- Petzoldt, J., 90, 103, 215, 219, 230
 Pevzner, M.S., 177, 197, 199, 391, 397, 400
 Pfahler, G., 462, 477, 478
 Phaedrus, 83
 Philo, 84, 100
 Piaget, J., 119, 120, 123–125, 143, 152, 156, 167, 168, 172, 184, 196, 197, 202, 239, 247, 250, 256, 257, 261, 262, 269, 280, 292, 293, 314, 320, 341, 354, 363, 365, 372, 398, 403, 449, 457, 459, 462, 474, 499
 Pick, A., 367, 433, 434
 Pintner, R., 185, 187, 188, 203
 Pisarev, D.I., 134, 135, 147
 Planck, M., 103, 345
 Plato, 23, 34, 100, 103, 133–135, 229
 Plekhanov, G.V., 78, 89–92, 97, 102, 103, 122, 127
 Pobozhey, G., 296
 Pochapin, P.P., 155, 157, 166
 Poe, E.A., 83, 100
 Politzer, G., 140, 150, 379
 Polivanov, Y.D., 267
 Polovtseva, V.N., 58, 60, 67
 Poltavskaya, K.V., 367, 379
 Pongil'skaya, A.F., 486, 498
 Portugalov, Y.V., 90, 102
 Potebnya, A.A., xviii, 52, 54, 81, 83, 102, 232, 267, 268, 294, 304
 Pötzl, O., 419, 424–426, 433–435
 Prichard, J.C., 400
 Pridvorov, E.A., 94
 Prometheus, 52
 Protopopov, V.P., 113, 325, 329, 346, 347
 Purishkevich, V.M., 84, 100
 Pushkin, A.S., 5, 8, 29, 37, 84, 94, 248, 285, 301, 308, 365, 413
 Puzyrey, A.A., 248, 294
 Pythagoras, 134
- R**
 Rabinovich, S.N., 33
 Rabinovich, S.Ya., 171, 198, 485
 Radlov, E.R., 113
 Rafael, xv, 64
 Rafalovich, S.L., 15, 18
 Raskolnikov, 109, 113
 Razmyslov, P., 317
 Renan, J.E., 13, 17
 Ribot, Th.A., 156, 158, 161, 168, 210, 378, 381, 424
 Rivers, W.H.R., 170, 201
 Rives, S.M., 165, 172, 173
 Roback, A.A., 204
 Robinson, 84
 Rolland, R., 238, 241
 Roloff, H.P., 182, 201
 Rorschach, H., 178–180, 189, 200
 Rosenkrantz, K.W., 386, 388
 Rossolimo, G.I., 167, 171, 194, 205
 Roth, W.M., 204, 306, 344
 Royce, J., 167
 Roza, 64, 65, 68, 168, 214, 230, 237, 259, 391, 399
 Rozanov, I.G., 22, 33, 43, 468–470, 476
 Rozanov, V.V., 33, 39, 40
 Rozenfel'd, F.S., 305
 Rozenfel'd, J.M., 305
 Rubin, E.J., 253, 264
 Rubinshteyn, S.L., 295, 304, 305, 375, 399
 Rubinstein, Th., 61, 97, 387, 389
 Rückriem, G., 178, 199, 200
 Rüdín, E., 326, 327, 344, 345
 Ruegg, 82, 92
 Rühle, A., 485
 Rühle, O., 498
 Rupp, J.B.C., 180
 Rutshteyn, 296
 Ryumin, N.N., 384, 387
- S**
 Sakharov, L.S., xvii, 71, 93, 115, 125, 130, 146, 272, 287, 372, 440, 456
 Sakovich, E., 296
 Samukhin, N.V., 133, 205, 364, 367, 381, 414, 415, 425, 483, 487, 489, 491, 497, 500
 Sander, F., 348
 Sandler, A.S., 228
 Sapir, E., 363, 410, 415
 Sapir, I.D., 155, 160, 167, 234, 286, 355
 Sarab'yanov, V., 89, 102
 Sarah, 47, 413
 Schönpflug, W., 412
 Schilder, P.F., 325, 343
 Schmidt, O.Yu., 177
 Schmidt, V.F., 155, 162, 167, 391, 484
 Schneider, K., 335, 349, 378
 Schumann, P., 67
 Séguin, E., 139, 150
 Selz, O., 182, 201, 361, 362, 372
 Semkovskiy, 238
 Semon, R., 245, 248
 Sepp, E.K., 167
 Serafina, 47
 Serbskiy, V.P., 234, 340, 344, 345
 Serebrovskiy, A.S., 122, 126
 Sereyskiy, M.Ya., 299, 307, 328, 346

- Shakespeare, W., 3, 36, 45, 69, 83, 93, 213, 214
- Shamai, 29, 36
- Shapiro, S.A., 434
- Shcherba, L.V., 74, 95
- Shein, A.A., 156, 167, 177
- Shemyakin, F.N., 311, 314, 316
- Shereshevskiy, S.V., 254, 255, 265, 271–273, 285, 288, 322, 331, 333, 336, 374, 380
- Sherrington, Ch.S., 93, 103, 104, 165, 409, 411, 415, 416
- Shestov, L.I., 133, 147, 148
- Shevalev, E.A., 330, 347
- Shif, Z.I., 294–296, 304, 463
- Shklovskiy, V.B., 82, 92, 98, 99, 101, 102
- Shmaryan, A.S., 325, 343, 367
- Shorter, E., 486
- Shpet, G.G., 48, 80, 96, 238
- Shtange, A.A., 58, 66
- Shul'man, N.M., 172
- Shylock, 29, 36
- Simon, Th., 201
- Simson, T.P., 330, 347, 348, 394
- Skaftymov, A.P., 92, 103
- Skobelev, M.D., 225, 234
- Skutarevskiy, 420, 431
- Slavina, L.S., 123, 156, 168, 274, 277, 282
- Sliosberg, S., 413
- Smirnov, A.A., 238
- Smirnovskiy, P., 53, 55
- Smolenskiy, P.M., 7, 9
- Socrates, 34, 211, 220, 229, 409, 411
- Solomon, 8, 33, 53
- Solov'ev, I.M., 43, 164, 171, 177, 197, 243, 244, 253, 408, 437
- Solov'ev, V., 43
- Solzhenitsyn, A.I., 235
- Sombart, W., 238
- Spearman, Ch., 138, 149
- Spengler, O.A.G., 238, 240, 241, 422
- Spinoza, B., xiii, xviii, 67, 69, 103, 118, 124, 162, 166, 209, 210, 212–224, 228, 229, 232, 233, 245, 249, 251, 273, 279, 280, 285, 324, 339, 354, 355, 358, 362, 374–376, 380, 409–411, 414, 474, 488, 493, 494
- Spranger, E., 112
- Stalin, I.V., 94, 99, 241, 305, 423, 441, 442, 457
- Stainsby, H., 68
- Stanislavsky, K.S., 83, 100, 259, 267, 274, 288, 360
- Steenbakkens, P., 231
- Steinthal, H., 3, 8, 35
- Stekel, W., 484, 498
- Stepanov, N., 88, 102, 150, 268
- Sterligov, 398
- Stern, Cl., 124
- Stern, W.L., 93
- Stoll, 82
- Stolpner, B.G., 136, 148
- Stolyarov, A.K., 92, 102, 103
- Stoothoff, R., 232
- Storch, A., 160, 170, 322, 325, 342
- Stumpf, C., 96, 109, 112, 113, 122, 141, 179, 200, 244, 245, 330, 409, 422
- Südfeld, S.M., 38
- Sukhareva, G.E., 146, 184, 202, 325
- Sully, J., 481
- Surmava, A.V., 233
- Svechin, A.A., 227, 235
- Svetlov-Safronovich, D.S., 305
- Svidrigaylov, 39
- T**
- Taine, H., 82, 99
- Talankin, A.A., 224, 225, 234, 252
- Tamara, E.-Kh., 442
- Tarakanova, 489, 499
- Thiele, R., 397, 398, 400
- Thorndike, E.L., 119, 125, 137, 138, 140, 149, 150, 314, 315, 331, 333, 348, 360, 479
- Thurnwald, R., 180, 201, 257
- Tikheyeva, E.I., 465, 478
- Tillich, P., 170
- Tilton, J.W., 149
- Titchener, E.B., 222, 233
- Tkachev, 177, 453
- Todes, D.P., 47, 415
- Tolkien, J.R.R., 55
- Tolstoy, A.P., 39
- Tolstoy, L.N., 478
- Tomashevsky, B., 82, 99
- Torbek, V.M., 282, 289
- Towsey, P.M., 456
- Tropman, H., 37
- Trotsky, L.D., 82, 88, 93, 99, 100, 117, 123, 345, 498
- Tsveyfel', Ya.K., 295, 306
- Tsyrlina, 162, 171
- Turgenev, I., 29, 36, 37, 301, 308
- Tuzovskaya, L.E., 1, 282, 437
- Tynyanov, Y.N., 76, 95
- Tyutchev, F.I., 54, 165, 172, 268, 289, 359, 364

U

- Ul'yanov, S.A., 385
 Umrikhin, V.V., 264
 Usova, A.P., 356, 363
 Uspenskiy, G.I., 260, 268
 Usvayskaya, A.V., 476
 Utitz, E., 83, 92, 99
 Uzin, V.S., 82, 92, 99, 367

V

- Vagner, V.A., 295, 305, 415
 Valsiner, J., 67, 71, 93, 99, 115, 124, 125, 146, 147, 149–151, 167, 168, 170, 177, 200, 201, 205, 209, 230, 234, 264, 266, 267, 305, 317, 341, 348, 353, 379, 387, 399, 403, 431, 455, 475, 495, 498
 Van Bunge, W., 231
 Van der Horst, F.C.P., 437
 Van der Veer, R., v, xii, xiv, xv, 57, 67–69, 71, 93, 99, 113, 115, 124, 125, 146, 147, 149–151, 167, 168, 170, 172, 177, 200, 201, 209, 230, 232, 234, 248, 264, 266, 267, 289, 305, 306, 317, 341, 348, 353, 379, 387, 399, 403, 404, 431, 437, 455, 475, 495, 498
 Van de Ven, J., 231
 Varshava, B.E., 495
 Vasil'chikova, A.P., 367
 Vasileyskiy, S.M., 455
 Vayros, M.S., 282–284
 Vedenov, A.V., 224, 227, 234, 311, 313
 Velázquez, D.R., xv, 64
 Veresayev, V., 99
 Veresotskaya, K.I., 177, 282, 289, 377
 Veresov, N.N., 204
 Verzhbolovich, S.M., 455
 Virgil, 289
 Vishnevskiy, V.A., 87, 102
 Vital, D., 36
 Vnukov, V.A., 325, 326, 329–333, 338, 339, 343, 344, 484
 Volkelt, H., 180, 187, 200, 227, 348, 463, 465, 491
 Vol'fson, B.B., 60, 68
 Vol'fson, M.A., 58
 Vol'fson, V.B., 68
 Volodya, K., 444, 445
 von Goethe, J.W., xxi, 69, 214, 230, 301, 364, 407, 414
 von Hartmann, K.R.E., 380
 von Humboldt, W., xviii, 54, 232, 268
 von Krafft-Ebing, R., 350

- von Meinong, A., 97
 von Monakov, C., 160, 170, 425
 von Schlieffen, A., 234
 Voronskiy, A.K., 72, 73, 93, 94
 Vossler, K., xviii, 267, 299, 307, 359, 364, 365, 420
 Voytonis, N.Y., 411, 415
 Vygodskaya, E.I., 48
 Vygodskaya, E.S., 240
 Vygodskaya, G.L., 48, 66, 67, 69, 71, 115, 148, 268, 311, 383
 Vygodskaya, R.N., 230
 Vygodskaya, Z.S., 48
 Vygodsky, D.I., 34, 304, 308, 367
 Vygodsky, S.L., xiii, 1, 44, 383, 385

W

- Wachtel, M., 94
 Wallon, H., 123, 356, 407
 Walzel, O., 82, 99
 Watson, J.B., xiv, 74, 75, 79, 94, 95, 113, 131, 162, 163, 171, 210
 Weddigen, F., 82, 99
 Wellek, A., 348
 Werner, H., 131, 164, 170, 289
 Wernicke, C., 170, 325, 344, 346, 350, 430
 Wertheimer, M., 113, 118, 124, 219, 231
 Whorf, B.L., 363
 Wihan, 82, 92
 Woodyard, E., 149, 150
 Winawer, M.M., 31, 38
 Wolpert, L., 424–427, 485
 Wundt, W.M., 81–83, 96, 98, 99, 166, 173, 210, 233, 245, 249, 252, 265, 293, 343, 357, 422

Y

- Yakobsen, 165, 173
 Yakobson, A.F., xviii, 274, 283, 295
 Yakobson, R.O., 265
 Yakubinskiy, L.P., xviii, 98, 267, 308
 Yankel, 29, 30, 37, 44, 48
 Yaroshevskiy, M.G., 316, 320, 404
 Yasha L'vovich, 320
 Yasnitsky, A., v, xii, 99, 115, 232, 303, 306, 317, 353, 404
 Yerkes, R.M., 354, 355, 363
 Yesenin, S.A., 104
 Yevlakhov, A.M., 81, 98
 Yudin, T.I., 184, 202, 325, 326, 344
 Yudkovskaya, T.I., 486, 498
 Yushchenko, A.I., 334, 348

Z

- Zankov, L.V., 115, 120, 177, 192, 193, 198, 206, 255, 282, 300
- Zaporozhets, A.V., xviii, 123, 271, 274, 277, 287, 288
- Zavadovskiy, B.M., 210, 227, 228
- Zavershneva, E., xii–xv, xviii, xix, 11, 17, 21, 44, 47, 57, 68, 69, 72, 102, 115, 119, 123, 133, 167, 209, 227, 232, 243, 271, 403
- Zeigarnik, B.V., 291, 316, 319, 321, 334–336, 349, 364, 367, 410, 419, 425, 428, 434
- Zeyliger, E.O., 294, 295, 304, 367
- Zhabotinskiy, V.E., 29, 37, 38, 43
- Zhilina, 296
- Zhukovskiy, V.A., 17
- Zinaida, 47, 48

Subject Index

A

- Abortion, 444, 450, 457
Abreaction, 82, 84, 91, 205, 338
Abstraction, 76, 84, 95, 97, 108, 109, 113,
130–133, 147, 148, 159, 183, 214, 216,
252, 273, 287, 292–294, 299, 300, 313,
320, 330, 333, 335, 336, 360, 370, 411,
470, 472, 488
Acmeist psychology, xviii, 292, 303, 375, 392
Activity theory, 123, 243, 303, 305
Adelsbrief, 26
à deux, 238
Adolescence, 3, 147, 169, 179, 204, 367, 376,
377, 394, 451, 464, 478, 499
Adolescent, 21, 129, 143, 151, 199, 272, 275,
286, 292, 293, 362, 369, 333, 376, 432
Adrenalin, 166
Affect, 187, 209, 210, 216, 219, 238, 239, 339,
375, 409, 410, 441, 493
Agere, 90, 102
Aggadah, xiii, 13, 17, 84, 100
Agglutination, 303, 357
Agnosia, 334, 344, 364, 424–428, 430–434
Agnostic, 378, 425, 426, 429
Agnostik, 377
Agraphia, 378
Alalia, 424, 425, 433, 485, 486, 498
à l'aveugle, 385
Alexia, 177, 425, 430, 433, 453
Algebra, 22, 81, 83, 98, 298, 362, 370,
371–374, 376, 377, 468–469
Alles-wissen-können, 157, 169, 182
Allmächtigkeit des Gedanken, 374
Alzheimer, 345, 483
Amnesia, 272, 381, 440, 475, 495
Amnestic, 315, 372, 378, 425–430, 433
Amor Dei, 210, 212, 374
Amor fati, 244, 273, 374
Amor intellectualis, 374
Anaesthetic, 203
Anamnesis, 184, 186, 202
Anankastic, 185, 203
Anomalous, xvii, xviii, 155, 201, 271, 279,
315, 424
Anti-Semitism, 23, 33, 42–43, 47
Anti-Semite, 18, 22, 33
Aphasia, 145, 170, 179, 184, 199, 266, 267,
285, 297, 315, 325, 333, 334, 344,
372, 381, 419, 420, 424–435, 485,
490, 495
Aphasiac, 132, 183, 237, 238, 256, 257, 259,
321, 378
Aphasia, 378, 425, 430
Apperception, 293
Apperceptive, 426, 427, 434
Appetenz-Appetenz Konflikte, 413
Apraxia, 325, 334, 344, 378, 419, 423, 424,
425, 431, 433, 470, 491, 492
Arcos bank, 66
Ärgeraffekt, 490
Arithmetic, 2, 3, 118, 119, 121, 138, 150, 186,
187, 188, 195, 275, 293, 294, 298, 299,
306, 314, 331, 348, 362, 370–373, 377,
432, 463, 468, 471–472, 486
Ashrei, 22, 23, 33
Asphyxia, 452
Assimilation, 14, 30, 44
Association, 116, 126, 149, 185, 336, 358, 360,
388, 425, 440, 491
Associationism, 116, 285, 292, 360, 421, 422
Asthenic, 187, 188, 190, 191, 194, 195, 202,
377, 441, 442, 449
Attention, 72, 76, 78, 95, 115, 116, 119, 120,
125, 130, 131, 132, 138, 140, 141, 143,
145, 156, 187, 189, 190, 195, 225, 239,
253, 264, 272, 275, 288, 300, 330, 358,
362, 374, 412, 421, 423, 427, 434, 450,
489, 492

- Aufforderungscharakter*, xi, 336, 386, 404,
410, 412, 461, 472, 473, 489, 499
- Aufmerksamkeit*, 427
- Au nom*, 64
- Aus den Felde gehen*, 453
- Ausdruck*, 87, 185
- Ausdruckspsychologie*, 397
- Autism, 111, 161, 186, 189, 192, 194, 196,
203, 240, 241, 257, 304, 320, 322, 324,
396, 426, 490, 499
- Autistic, 146, 161, 166, 196, 197, 209, 238,
240, 241, 256, 264, 282, 293, 320, 341,
349, 360, 376, 377, 392, 396, 441, 487,
490, 497, 499
- Autistische Wunscherfüllung*, 337
- Automatensprechen*, 292
- Aversions-Aversions Konflikte*, 413
- B**
- Baal, 28–29, 36
- Barriere*, 412
- Basedow, 450
- Bedürfnis*, 408
- Bedeutungswandel*, 488
- Befriedigung*, 448, 449
- Begabung*, 138
- Beliebig*, 183
- Bentheim, 62, 69
- Berlin, 35, 47, 57, 62, 69, 110, 171, 248, 403
- Bible, 1, 18, 25–26, 31, 32, 33, 38, 322
- Bipolar disorder, 203, 234
- Blind, 60, 68, 157, 158, 169, 182, 220, 233,
406
- Blitzpartie*, 384
- Bobok*, 32, 39
- Bourgeois, 76, 96–97, 234, 311, 312, 316, 484
- Brain, 76, 77, 83, 90, 109, 122, 132, 141, 170,
171, 197, 201, 217, 228, 245, 252, 321,
421, 486, 490
- British Museum, 64
- Buddha, 297, 298
- Bylina, 51, 53, 92
- C**
- Capital, xiv, 27, 38, 76, 80, 84, 87, 88, 95, 431,
476
- Capitalist, 226, 354, 460
- Catalysis, 245
- Catamnesis, 184, 202
- Catathymic, 195, 196, 378
- Catatonic, 326, 327, 345
- Categorical, 88, 246, 249, 315, 333, 377, 435,
444
- Causal, 87, 91, 140, 150, 215, 216, 219, 223,
249, 253, 269, 372, 373, 376, 377, 484,
487, 490
- Cerebrum, 210
- Character, xvii, xx, 12, 83, 88, 91, 138, 140,
145, 163, 184–186, 189–192, 195, 203,
204, 226, 229, 327, 328, 340, 391, 392,
395–397, 399, 400, 424, 438–441, 443,
447, 451, 455, 475, 487
- Chess, xii, xx, 149, 315, 383, 384, 385–388
- Chimpanzee, 115, 406, 413–414
- Christ, xv, 46, 64
- Christian, 30, 33, 36, 232, 415, 416
- Christianity, 46, 47
- Chronogenic, 170, 219, 331, 419, 427
- Chvostek, 441, 442, 456
- Class, 1, 73, 84, 91, 224, 225, 227, 273, 313,
484
- Classification, 69, 98, 112, 132, 140, 166, 179,
183, 199, 202, 223, 254, 267, 278, 291,
315, 408, 420, 429, 461, 485–487, 493,
498
- Collective, 39, 111, 123, 155–157, 169, 185,
195–197, 226, 227, 282, 286, 326, 441,
456, 462, 475
- Commodity, 74, 79, 80, 84, 94, 108, 354, 438
- Communism, 110
- Complexive, 129, 142, 179, 181, 184, 276,
278, 286, 362, 370, 471, 472, 480
- Compulsive, 203, 285, 456, 498
- Concept formation, 93, 125, 129–132, 135,
136, 145, 146, 164, 286, 299, 313, 314,
323, 324, 370, 373, 376, 377
- Consciousness, xii, xv, xviii–xix, 3, 71–76, 78,
79, 90, 94, 96, 111, 118, 119, 126, 137,
140–142, 148, 184, 194, 212, 213,
215–218, 221, 222, 224, 227, 231, 237,
238, 243, 245–248, 251–254, 258–262,
264, 267, 271–276, 278, 281, 282, 285,
287–289, 292, 293, 301–304, 306, 312,
313, 317, 319, 320, 322–333, 336, 338,
339, 342, 344, 347–350, 353, 355,
358–360, 367, 369, 372, 375, 376,
391–395, 397, 407, 419, 421, 440, 441,
443, 444, 446, 447, 474, 475, 487
- Conservation, 245, 252
- Constitution, 27, 178, 188, 195, 348, 394, 448
- Constitutional, 38, 138, 189–192, 195, 204,
205
- Construction set, 461, 462, 466–470, 477
- Cortex, 78, 166, 211, 228, 249, 328, 424, 431,
433
- Cortical, 117, 165, 166, 172, 329

- Countersymptom, 317, 320, 333, 344, 361
 County Hall, 63
 Cretan, 273, 287, 359
 Cultural, 14, 15, 17, 35, 47, 67, 71, 99, 115, 117, 118, 121, 122, 129, 132, 150, 178, 193, 195, 196, 322, 348, 387, 414, 421
 Cultural-historical, xiv, 71, 107, 108, 117, 118, 129
 Cycloid, 189, 202, 203, 438, 439
 Cyclothymia, 346, 396
 Cyclothymic, 202, 203
- D**
- Décalage*, 360, 365
 Deaf, 57, 65–69, 97, 157, 162, 166, 171, 195, 198, 203, 263, 498
 Deafmute, 63, 64, 68, 284, 289, 306, 424
 Debile, 162, 253, 339, 453
Debilitätspsychose/Debilitätspsychosen, 446, 457
 Defectology, 166, 199, 289
Defekt, 327
 Degree of generality, 148, 361, 362, 367, 371, 411, 493
Dein, 120
Dekhkan, 181, 201, 259
 Delirium tremens, 161
 Delusion, 135, 203, 205, 285, 322, 325, 340, 342–344, 378, 415, 446, 447, 490
 Demand character, 349, 383
 Dementia, 145, 232, 329, 332, 339, 346, 347, 415, 424, 425, 427, 446, 457, 483, 490, 500
Denkstörung, 331
Denkstruktur, 362, 368, 374
 Depth psychology, 281, 292, 399
Der springende Punkt, 160
 Descriptive, 95, 108, 220, 223, 252, 262, 263, 467, 470
Desiderium, 161
 Deuteronomy, 18, 36, 42, 47, 501
 Dialectical, 81, 87, 88, 111, 112, 122, 130, 134, 157, 223, 249, 265, 276, 288, 313, 329, 331
 Diamat, 255, 273, 484
 Diathetic, 203
Differentia specifica, 255
Dingkonstanz, 406
Dinglicher Bezug, 265, 272
 Disintegration, 1–7, 15, 32, 44, 155, 193, 209, 211, 212, 244, 245, 256, 271, 280, 292, 319, 322–324, 333, 336, 361, 377, 427, 491
Diskrepanz, 460
 Displacement, 162
 Dissociation, 6, 76, 123, 273, 341, 347, 381
 Dissolution, 96, 158, 160, 169, 196, 424, 426
 Divine, 9, 13, 14, 16, 23, 35, 42, 46, 100, 256, 263, 266
Domkom, 165
 Double stimulation, 72, 110, 115, 116, 119–121, 253, 254, 258, 267, 277
 Drama, 3, 30, 52, 69, 83, 89, 91, 145, 193, 241, 273, 293, 304, 359, 364, 368, 385, 426, 437, 449, 455, 466, 467
 Drang, 397, 400
 Dream, 9, 30, 36, 45, 48, 72, 81, 89, 130, 134, 135, 144, 145, 163, 193, 195, 196, 205, 257, 266, 272, 289, 293, 322, 324, 333, 343, 349, 355, 374, 377, 386, 392, 394, 395, 397, 407, 408, 413, 438, 443–448, 451–453, 483, 489, 495, 498
 Dualism, 220, 487
 Dynamogenic, 107, 108, 218
 Dysgenesis, 425
 Dyslexia, 458
 Dysplastic, 195, 202
 Dystonia, 329, 346
- E**
- Ecce homo*, 210, 213, 224, 292
 Ego, 77, 79, 80, 322, 326, 341, 344, 360, 377, 392, 393, 395, 396, 410, 434, 441, 471, 493, 497
 Egocentric speech, 156, 157, 238, 240, 282, 286, 341, 356–359, 462, 472
 Eidetic, 113, 120, 137, 205, 377, 445, 447
Einbettung, 386
Einfall, 120
Einfühlung, 76, 95
Eingebettet, 387
Einzelkind, 448
 Emergentia, 244, 245
 Emergentism, 248, 249
 Emotion, 30, 52, 72, 77, 87, 91, 117, 123, 141, 151, 155, 156, 161–163, 165, 166, 170–173, 179, 209–212, 214, 219, 222, 224–233, 329, 345, 350, 384, 385, 397, 409, 410, 416, 424, 444, 483, 498, 500
 Empiricism, 313, 495
 Encephalitis, 195, 197, 327, 345, 391, 397, 400, 424
Endlust, 170, 461
 Endogenic, 166
 Endophasia, 420, 429, 432
Endprodukt, 465
Energiequelle, 302, 406, 410, 411, 473, 474
Engere, 426

- England, 67, 69, 344
Entspannung, 386
Enttrohtes Kind, 449
Entwicklungspsychopathien, 486
 Enuresis, 193, 194, 197, 452
Eo ipso, 215, 240, 276, 406, 407
 Epilepsy, 177, 328, 343, 345, 453
 Epileptic, 339, 340, 438, 446, 453
 Epileptoid, 197, 339, 340, 396, 456
 Epiphenomenon, 90, 217
 Epistemological, 78, 81, 228, 244, 245, 375, 376
 Epistemology, 125, 133, 221, 223, 276, 285
 Epithymic, 441, 456
 Ergograph, 410, 415, 474
Erlebnisbeobachtung, 263
Ermüdungszustände, 378
Ermutigung, 185, 187, 192
Ersatz, 378, 392, 413, 472, 473, 489, 492–495
Ersatzhandlung, 381, 434, 449
Erscheinungsweisen der Farben, 377
Es denkt, 140, 141, 322, 384, 457
 Ethnopsychology, 280
 Etiology, 160, 161, 284, 328
 European, 7, 22, 26, 30, 31, 144, 201
 Evolution, 112, 117, 126, 129, 132, 212, 228, 249, 320, 475
 Evolutionary, 112, 117, 245, 348
Existenz, 427
 Exogenic, 166, 191, 327, 328, 343
 Exo-localization, 429
 Exopsychological, 212
 Expansive, 186, 193–196, 203, 205, 396, 487
 Explanatory, 7, 93, 220, 223, 253, 254, 297
 External speech, 118, 260, 283, 292, 294, 302, 303, 359, 406, 420
 Extracerebral, 421, 430
 Extracortical, 156, 407
 Extrapsychological, 124, 275, 488
 Extraverbal, 278
 Extravert, 202
- F**
- Fable, 51, 73, 76, 82–86, 89, 93, 95, 101, 289, 301, 308, 349
 Fairy-tale, 2, 51–53, 55, 92
 Fantasy, 2, 133–135, 170, 256, 257, 264, 266, 299, 307, 357, 386, 411, 413, 416, 420, 441, 468, 496, 497
 Feeble-minded, 158, 196, 329, 416, 427, 488, 497
 Feeling, 3, 9, 13, 24, 26, 48, 51–53, 63, 73, 76, 80–84, 88, 98, 103, 139, 141, 151, 162, 170–173, 185, 186, 188–190, 195, 196, 225, 228, 229, 240, 241, 265, 268, 343, 359, 386, 399, 439, 440, 447, 488
- Feldmäßigkeit*, 472, 489, 490, 496
 Figure-ground, 264, 383, 386, 387
 Fixation, 185, 189–192, 427
 Fixed idea, 189, 194–197, 319
Flüssig, 410, 413, 488
Flüssigkeit, 416, 483, 490, 493
 Formal discipline, 465, 469, 471, 472, 479
 Formal-logical, 88, 130, 331
 France, 18, 37, 47, 67, 93, 99, 312, 388
 Freedom, 7, 27, 30, 32, 64, 107, 130, 134–136, 147, 183, 209, 210, 212, 216, 222, 224, 233, 244, 257, 258, 285, 292, 293, 311, 312, 315, 322, 335, 336, 347, 355, 357, 358, 365, 367, 372–375, 380, 395, 404, 406, 408, 410, 466, 472, 480, 488, 499
- Frei*, 27, 30
 Frontal lobe, 125, 150, 244, 246, 328, 421, 424
Funktionslust, 161, 170, 247, 461, 467, 468
- G**
- Galvanic, 166
 Galvanometer, 156, 172
 Galvanometrics, 165, 166
Gebarensbeobachtung, 263
Gedankenentzug, 329
Gefühlsempfindung, 171
Geisteswissenschaften, 215, 432
Gemüt, 238
Gemütlich, 238
 Generalization, 133, 134, 136, 142, 181, 183, 244, 246, 247, 255, 263, 281, 286, 293, 312, 315, 353–355, 357, 358, 361, 362, 368–374, 376–378, 384, 386, 403, 406, 407, 409, 410, 421, 427, 467, 474, 486–488, 493, 494
 Genesis, 35, 39, 40, 132, 158, 247, 262, 322, 335, 340
 Genetic, 125, 131, 149, 165, 166, 189, 197–199, 212, 250, 258, 280, 284, 325, 327, 333, 344, 348, 372, 379, 398, 403, 423, 437, 475, 486
 Genotypical, 191, 253, 392
Gesamtphysiologische Struktur, 163
Gespräche, 162
Gestalt, 82, 95, 99, 112, 113, 116, 124, 145, 171, 180, 182, 201, 219, 230, 248, 249, 264, 298, 362, 383, 407, 408, 414, 419
Gestaltpsychologie, 245, 252, 421, 422, 425
Gestalttheorie, 141, 215, 244–246, 272, 285, 301, 395, 408
 Giftedness, 137–140, 148, 150
 Gland, 112, 217, 230, 442, 450

- Gnostic, 138, 247, 280, 288, 378
 God, 4, 7, 11–14, 18, 21, 24–26, 28, 29, 32–36, 39, 40–42, 46, 48, 72, 80, 83, 133, 228, 229, 232, 233, 322, 380, 478
Golus, 13, 44
 Gomel, 21, 23, 38, 43, 44, 48, 49, 68, 69, 115, 148
 Grammar, 267, 287, 293, 314, 356, 365, 475
 Grammatical, 267, 301, 307, 333, 359, 365, 432, 486, 490
 Greek, 35, 52, 95, 151, 288, 303, 322, 342
Grundfunktion, 130, 178, 246, 252, 421, 486
Grundstörung, 329, 495, 497
- H**
Halakha, 18, 32, 39
Handlung, 467
 Hebephrenic, 326, 327
 Hebrew, 2, 7–9, 17, 18, 21, 29, 33–35, 38, 39, 46
 Height psychology, 224, 271, 281, 285, 292, 293, 303, 339, 376, 391
 Heterozygotic, 326
Hic et nunc, 262, 293, 421
Hic Rhodus, hic salta, 336
 Histomat, 273
 Historism, 122, 313, 392
 Holistic, 228, 332, 348, 395–397
 Holland, 62, 67, 145, 201, 412
 Honor, 26, 27, 29, 30, 38, 39, 43
 Hooliganism, 438, 447
 Hormic, 249
 Hormone, 261, 328
 Hyperaesthetic, 188, 203
 Hypobulia, 129, 130, 145, 210, 239
 Hypobulic, 145, 239, 339, 349, 440, 441, 493
 Hypomaniac, 203
 Hyponoic, 338, 339, 349
 Hypostatization, 141
 Hysteria, 130, 145, 163, 188, 189, 339, 343, 440, 441, 451–454, 484, 487
- I**
Ich denke, 141, 322, 384
Ich kann was ich will, 404
Ichnähe, 428
Ich-Störung, 326, 347
Ich weiß, 285, 315
 Id, 285, 392, 393, 395, 441
Idealbild, 196
 Idealism, 92, 111, 133–136, 220, 233, 252, 314, 380, 497
 Idiomaticism, 357
 Illusion, 25, 180, 181, 200, 201, 222, 337, 394, 394
Imbecile, 156, 157, 168, 196, 198, 253
Imbecilitas, 193
Imperativ, 321
Implicite, 107, 196, 214, 219, 362, 375, 392, 407, 426
Inde, 140, 216, 222, 223, 245, 283, 292, 335, 338, 354, 358, 361, 369, 374, 394, 397, 412, 421, 422, 441, 449, 451, 488, 489, 491, 492, 496, 499
Induktion, 404, 413
 Infantilism, 189–192, 486
 Inferiority feeling, 170, 185, 186, 188, 195, 196, 399
 Ingrowing, 120, 121, 144, 254, 259, 260, 267, 354, 355, 363, 369, 376, 377, 421
 Inner speech, 209, 254, 260, 262, 268, 275, 281–283, 292, 302–304, 336, 357–361, 364, 396, 406, 419, 420, 431, 432, 435, 462
In statu nascendi, 357
 Instinct, 82, 117, 118, 124, 147, 246, 252, 253, 265, 320, 421
 Instrument, 103, 115, 118, 120, 121, 146, 205, 255, 360, 404, 429, 431, 460
 Instrumental, 36, 118–122, 130, 144, 332, 333
 Intellect, 8, 53, 109, 117, 118, 124, 129, 134, 137–140, 142, 150, 156, 162, 163, 165, 180, 184, 188, 189, 191, 195, 196, 198, 204, 209, 210, 224, 225, 243, 245, 247, 255, 261, 262, 265, 273, 278, 280, 282, 286, 288, 298, 333, 355, 371, 376, 392, 393, 398, 409, 411–413, 421, 424, 429, 430, 450, 451, 459, 460, 486–488, 493, 496, 497
 Intellectual, 71, 115, 118, 130, 139, 140, 142, 149, 156, 163, 169, 172, 188, 196, 228, 261, 266, 286, 287, 291, 298, 324, 330, 331, 335, 336, 363, 364, 393, 400, 411, 416, 453, 483, 485
 Intellectualism, 179, 210, 273, 330, 356, 360, 407, 421
Intelligenz, 138, 485
Intelligenzhandlung, 414
Intelligenzprüfung, 485
 Intercalation, 421
 Interfunctional, 129, 143, 180, 246, 274, 275, 277, 292, 301, 323, 332, 419
 Interpsychological, 407
 Inter-stage, 372
Intime, 76
In toto, 122

- Intrapsychological, 124, 141, 156, 278, 314, 407, 488
 Intra-stage, 372
 Intraverbal, 278
 Introceptive, 76
 Introspection, 77, 79, 95, 110, 131, 143, 180, 192, 232, 313, 333, 371, 376
 Introvert, 202
In vivo, 72, 261, 374
Irrealität, 404, 412, 446–448, 488
 Irritability, 185, 189, 192, 276
 Israel, 3, 13–18, 27, 29, 33, 34, 40–42
- J**
 Japhetic, 126, 312
 Java, 331
 Jehovah, 16, 28
 Jericho, 61, 68, 501
J'en rêverai, 130
 Jew, 12–18, 21–39, 41–44, 46–48, 93, 347, 403, 449
 Jewish, 1, 9, 11–18, 21–24, 26–28, 30, 31, 33–39, 42, 43, 46, 47, 49, 67, 99–101, 113, 145, 170, 171, 201, 343, 399, 410, 434, 498
 Jewry, 11–16, 22, 25–27, 29–34, 36, 38, 41–44, 46, 47
 Judaism, 11, 13, 18, 24–26, 30, 32, 33, 46
- K**
Kategoriales Denken, 429
 Kiev, 261, 268, 347
 Kings, 2, 29, 36, 54
Kleinkind, 404
 Knot, 107, 144, 213, 254, 255, 259, 267, 275, 300, 421, 429, 499
 Kolkhoze, 179
Körperschema, 325, 343
- L**
Leeres Sprechen, 292
Leket, 21, 22, 33
Leseschwäche, 453
 Linguist, 34, 48, 54, 74, 95, 102, 103, 126, 146, 232, 265, 267, 268, 284, 307, 308, 312, 313, 341, 363
 Localization, 77, 158, 159, 170, 219, 228, 244, 246, 248, 252, 301, 331, 343, 398, 419, 421, 424, 427, 429, 430, 435, 490
 Logocentrism, 254, 258, 268
Logos, 133, 136, 240, 292, 312
 London, 57, 58, 63, 67–70, 171, 498
 Lord, 2, 4–6, 13, 16, 18, 21, 25, 28, 35, 36, 39–42, 47, 64, 69, 501
- Luminal, 325
Lustprinzip, 197, 392
- M**
Maariv, 31, 38
 Manic-depressive, 202, 331, 346
 Marxist, 78, 84, 96, 97, 107, 111, 123, 126, 150, 209, 224, 252, 264, 305, 311, 313, 314, 316, 320, 484
 Matador, 461, 477, 479
 Materialism, 87, 88, 92, 134, 220, 233, 249, 252, 265, 288, 313
 Mathematics, 82, 99, 190, 223, 298, 299, 307, 358, 359, 387, 420, 447, 448, 454, 479, 486
 Mechanicism, 313, 375
 Mediated, 141, 144, 187, 225, 243, 248, 254, 255, 259, 260, 267, 275, 277, 281, 283, 354, 373, 403, 422, 431
Mein, 38, 89, 102, 120
 Melancholic, 203, 414
 Memory, 30, 113, 115, 116, 118, 124, 131, 133, 135, 137, 138, 140, 141, 143, 144, 149, 156, 179, 183, 184, 187, 195, 198, 212, 239, 244, 248, 253–256, 258, 260, 265–267, 271–273, 281, 282, 285, 286, 288, 300, 302, 303, 317, 329, 333, 334, 337, 349, 350, 356, 358, 362, 371, 374, 377, 384, 408, 415, 420, 421, 423, 430, 432, 433, 444–446, 451, 452, 474, 495, 497
 Menses, 450–452
 Mescaline, 328, 344, 345
 Metaphysic, 45, 80, 97, 122, 134, 195, 211, 220, 222, 223, 233, 283, 380, 392, 409
 Metapsychological, 141
 Methodology, 73, 97, 109, 125, 139, 157, 192, 257, 277, 283, 312, 313
Mihi ipsi scripsi, 303
 Mimicry, 84, 157, 282
Mincha, 31, 38
Minderwertigkeitsgefühl, 161, 162, 185, 186
 Mnemism, 244, 245, 248, 255, 273
 Mnemotechnic, 118, 121, 195, 260, 300
Modus dicendi, 360
 Monastery, 32, 40, 54
 Mongoloid, 156, 161, 168, 197
 Monism, 88, 221, 222
 Monosymptomatic, 393
 Monozygotic, 326, 345, 400
 Moral insanity, 398, 400
 Motion, 9, 54, 90, 109, 112, 211, 212, 215–219, 223, 224, 230, 231, 249, 312, 399

- Mouches volantes*, 337
Mummies, 31, 64
- N**
Nachsprechen, 489
Naive Physik, 406, 462
Naive Psychologie, 118
Nationality, 12, 33, 40, 389
Nec anima, 245
Negativism, 239, 440, 448, 493
Neoformation, 119, 178, 188, 189, 192, 196, 279, 283, 324, 333, 339, 360, 376, 377, 392
Neopsychological, 211
Neptune, 268
Nervous, 75, 79, 84, 93, 96, 103, 125, 130, 167, 172, 184, 198, 205, 363, 396, 408, 421, 424, 430, 441, 442, 447, 451, 452
Neural, 79, 172, 211
Neuropsychology, 68, 419, 433, 483
Neurotic, 160, 184, 185, 189, 192, 196, 226, 392–394, 443, 485
New York, 99, 149, 261, 268
Nichtexistenz, 272, 427
Non multa, sed multum, 324
Nosological, 146, 184, 198, 326
Nosology, 327
Nur-Gedachtes, 406, 414, 470
- O**
Oberbegriff, 362, 412
Object-relatedness, 265, 358, 372, 378, 381, 470, 488, 489, 495, 497
Objektagnosie, 427
Occupational therapy, 320, 325
Odi et amo, 212, 285, 289
Oedipus complex, 394
Oldenzaal, 62, 69
Oligophrenia, 146, 166, 171, 197, 199, 424
Omnia sua dicere, 6
Ontogeny, 117, 122, 131, 132, 160, 170, 212, 279, 312, 319, 342, 475
Optical illusion, 181, 201, 264
Optische Aphasie, 378, 425
Ordnung, 219
Ordo et connexio, 218, 219, 245, 409, 410
Orientation reflex, 288
Overcompensation, 80, 81, 83, 99
- P**
Palestine, 44
Panpsychism, 107
Parallelism, 72, 78–81, 87, 115, 215–217, 221–224, 230, 231, 234, 244–246, 249, 314, 320, 321, 372, 421, 442, 459, 462, 488
Parallelist, 214, 215, 217, 221, 245, 251, 252
Paralysis, 426, 433
Paranoid, 196, 326, 327, 345
Parliament, 27, 61, 63
Participation, 131, 184, 293, 303
Passion, xi, xv, 32, 36, 39, 45, 64, 65, 140, 162, 169, 188, 196, 212–214, 219–224, 232, 322, 339, 364, 375, 380, 447
Passiones, 358, 395
Pathogenesis, 160, 161, 329, 457
Pathoplastic, 330, 348, 392
Pati, 90, 102
Pe'ah, 22, 33
Pedagogical, 80, 85, 110, 117, 124, 139, 150, 151, 157, 167–169, 172, 187, 190, 193, 196, 198–200, 221, 225, 227, 228, 288–290, 304, 305, 314, 316, 317, 316, 348, 363, 379, 398, 399, 465, 476, 478, 479
Pedological, 72, 96, 110, 150, 166, 190, 192, 282, 284, 289, 304, 314, 320, 325, 356, 358, 363, 379, 391, 395, 399, 437, 453, 454, 460, 471, 478, 480, 498
Pedology, xiv, xvii, xx, 72, 96, 109, 110, 111, 115, 129, 133, 138, 144, 145, 147, 151, 155, 202, 205, 284, 304, 319, 320, 342, 365, 396, 398, 399, 434, 475, 477, 479, 480
Perception, 76, 77, 79, 80, 89, 90, 94, 113, 126, 131, 133, 134, 137, 146, 147, 156, 171, 178–182, 200, 201, 209, 227, 238–240, 245, 247, 259, 264, 272, 276, 285, 288, 289, 293, 294, 298, 315, 317, 322, 330, 333, 335, 339, 341, 343, 357, 362, 368, 369, 371, 377, 379, 384, 385, 392, 407, 408, 410, 414, 421, 424–428, 430, 464, 470, 474, 479, 488, 489, 498, 499
Persönliche Situation, 404
Phasic, 259, 267, 274, 281–283, 297, 298, 303, 306, 312, 314, 356, 357, 420
Phenomenological, 119, 140, 169, 381
Phenomenology, 91, 140, 244, 264, 266, 422
Phenotypical, 141, 392
Phonetics, 95, 274, 301, 422, 432
Phylogeny, 80, 122, 131, 132, 170, 178, 179, 279, 319, 360, 459
Physiognomy, 157, 169, 289
Physiological, 79, 80, 83, 84, 90, 98, 108, 109, 113, 130, 132, 140, 141, 148, 149, 159, 161, 171, 172, 179, 198, 200, 201, 203, 217, 220, 228, 232, 245, 246, 249, 265,

- 301, 312, 320, 329, 330, 363, 415, 430, 490
- Pick's disease, 367, 483, 490
- Pictogram, 273, 334, 429
- Pioneer, 34, 93, 170, 438, 442, 448, 455, 480
- Planimetry, 247
- Play, xx, 125, 146, 156, 163, 241, 247, 255, 282, 294, 303, 304, 330, 358, 369, 395, 458–472, 474–477, 479–481, 487, 489
- Plethysmography, 329, 346
- Pneumogram, 397
- Poetry, vi, xviii, 8, 51–54, 65, 83, 102, 258, 265, 268, 272, 274, 283, 287, 301, 364, 439, 486
- Pogrom, 18, 29, 36
- Pointing gesture, 119, 136
- Polyfunctional, 275
- Polygenic, 161
- Polyglossia, 157, 158
- Polysemantic, 258
- Polysymptomatic, 393
- Polytechnic, 157, 459
- Polyvalent, 275
- Post-encephalitic, 397, 398, 400, 424, 485
- Post-encephalitis, 424
- Preconcept, 180, 360, 370–372, 376, 377, 412
- Predmetnaya otnesennost*, 265
- Preformism, 394, 395
- Pre-intellectual, 118, 286
- Pre-logical, 146, 317
- Pre-senile psychosis, 319
- Preverbal, 118, 142, 271, 286
- Pribautka*, 52, 53, 55
- Primitive, 52, 110, 118, 124, 132, 133, 144, 146, 170, 172, 179, 180, 182, 191, 195, 201, 205, 212, 221, 241, 244, 256, 290, 293, 306, 317, 393, 395, 408, 430, 451, 463
- Primitivism, 156, 188, 210
- Prise de conscience*, 165, 166, 239, 240, 365, 421
- Priskazka*, 52, 53, 55
- Pro domo sua*, 494, 497
- Prophet, xiii, 14, 23, 25, 34, 43, 51, 54, 73
- Proprioceptive, 76, 90
- Proverb, 120, 291, 321, 322, 324, 333, 335, 341, 349, 426, 490
- Providence, 27, 42, 46
- Pseudoconcepts, 158, 164, 180, 183, 261, 287, 298, 315, 360
- Pseudodementia, 337
- Pseudologia, 441, 456
- Psychaesthetic proportion, 186, 189, 203
- Psychasthenia, 441
- Psyche, 90, 111, 288
- Psychic, 107, 112, 240, 248, 249, 349, 413, 433, 487
- Psychische Gestalten*, 405
- Psychisches Feld*, 336
- Psychoanalysis, xx, 150, 163, 325, 330, 345, 385, 433, 483
- Psychoanalytic, 155, 163, 167, 170, 388, 391, 399, 437
- Psychoid, 107, 111, 244, 245
- Psychologica psychologica*, 108, 112, 158, 216, 254, 279, 333
- Psychoneurosis, 66, 98, 145, 167, 184, 188, 192, 198, 288, 340, 342, 344, 347, 348, 391–394, 398, 433, 438, 441
- Psychopath, 159, 452
- Psychopathology, 113, 134, 158–161, 169, 198, 199, 237, 281, 305, 324, 326, 343, 346, 347, 349, 490
- Psychopathy, 159, 204, 344, 398, 485
- Psychophysical, xv, 71, 72, 78–80, 120, 214, 215, 217, 219, 221, 223, 230, 231, 243–246, 251–253, 278, 285, 376, 488
- Psychophysiology, 137, 167, 252
- Psychosis, 160, 266, 272, 319, 326, 327, 330, 331, 343, 344, 393, 439–441
- Psychotherapy, 197, 206, 322, 325, 330, 333, 341, 343, 346, 443, 447, 449, 457, 484, 485
- Purge, xix, 41, 311, 316
- Pyknic, 202, 203
- Pyramide, 371
- Q**
- Quantité négligeable*, 262
- Quasibedürfnis*, 434, 448
- Quasi need, 248, 265, 434
- Quatenus*, 375, 380
- R**
- Reaction, 51, 74–76, 78, 84, 92–96, 103, 118–121, 142, 148, 163, 165, 166, 172, 173, 184–193, 195, 200, 203, 211, 224–228, 239, 243, 247, 252, 320, 327, 328, 330, 337–340, 343, 350, 353, 370, 392–394, 424, 440, 443, 446, 447, 449, 451, 453, 456, 485, 499
- Reaction formation, 163, 193, 453
- Realität*, 404, 412, 488
- Realitätsprinzip*, 197, 392
- Reflection, 14, 46, 72, 90, 92, 112, 119, 124, 125, 132, 155, 156, 168, 186, 244, 251, 271, 276, 280, 324, 333, 403, 419, 422

- Reflex, 75, 93, 96, 104, 108, 110, 130, 132, 133, 138, 146, 157, 274, 298, 411, 450
 Reflexology, 94, 133, 304–306
 Regression, 172, 239, 323
 Religion, 27, 31, 33–35, 46, 54, 80, 100, 133, 162, 458, 497
 Religious, 5, 7, 11, 16, 27, 34, 35, 39, 42, 46, 47, 146, 214, 223, 228, 244, 245
 Repression, 162, 163, 234, 264, 338, 391–394, 397
Res cogitans, 216, 409
 Retardation, 130, 139, 150, 171, 178, 185–187, 191, 192, 194–196, 243, 246, 284, 380, 409, 411, 415, 416, 457, 465, 473, 480, 484, 487, 493, 494, 499
 Retarded, 120, 138, 156, 157, 162, 177, 184, 185, 187, 195, 197, 201, 289, 291, 293, 343, 392, 393, 404, 411, 473, 480, 481, 488, 492, 496
 Revolution, 13, 43, 47, 63, 123, 388, 456
 Riddle, 51, 53, 55, 179, 180, 469
 Roman, 11, 18, 38, 51, 69, 82, 229, 265, 295, 305
 Russia, 11, 14, 28, 39, 40, 43, 46, 62, 63, 67, 70, 94, 96, 97, 100, 101, 308, 340, 400, 414, 478
- S**
Sättigung, 410, 428, 473, 492, 494
Sachliche, 404
Sachliche Situation, 404
 Satiation, 246, 248, 249, 368, 415, 472
Schaffensfreude, 170
Schaffenslust, 166, 170
Schattentheorie, 90, 222, 246
 Schizoid, 111, 193, 195, 202, 203, 326, 327, 329, 340, 346
 Schizopathy, 327
 Schizophrenia, 320, 341
 Schizophrenia, xvii, 111, 130, 145, 146, 158, 169, 172, 177, 184, 200, 209, 234, 244, 271, 272, 281, 285, 305, 315, 319–329, 331–334, 340–349, 374, 377, 378, 392, 393, 397, 412, 419, 440, 445, 446, 457, 484, 488, 496, 498
 Schizophrenics, 170, 180, 200, 202, 203, 285, 320–323, 325, 327–329, 333, 335, 340–346, 349, 361, 377, 378, 393, 446, 449, 498, 499
Schizothyme, 197, 202
 Schizothymia, 191
 Schizothymic, 191, 195, 197, 272
Schulfähigkeit, 474
- Scientific concept, 146, 281, 355, 372, 379, 407, 463
 Sclerotic, 256, 266
Seesphäre, 425, 426
Sehnsucht, 195
Sehr wichtig, 139, 211, 253, 496
 Semantic, xvii–xix, 81, 87, 116, 133, 171, 219, 222, 224, 238, 243, 247, 251, 254, 257, 260, 266, 271, 274, 281, 291, 294, 297, 298, 300, 301, 306, 312, 315, 323, 324, 331, 333, 339, 354, 356, 357, 360, 362, 368, 369, 375, 376, 395, 397, 399, 406–408, 419, 424–427, 429, 432, 433, 459, 460, 462, 465–467, 469, 470, 472–475, 483, 486–488, 493, 494, 496, 497, 499
 Semantic field, xix, 288, 302, 312, 320, 335, 336, 367, 397, 403, 405–407, 409–411, 427, 459, 460, 472–474, 488, 489, 495
 Semasiological, 164, 171, 238, 240, 253, 254, 260, 291, 331, 333
 Semic, 238, 256, 258, 259, 263, 267, 274, 275, 277, 281–284, 291, 292, 298, 303, 306, 312, 403, 420, 423, 495
 Sensation, 76, 77, 90, 92, 111, 171, 218, 231, 249, 276, 315, 330, 339, 359, 428
 Sensitive, 165, 185, 186, 188, 189, 194–196, 203–205, 334, 396, 449, 487
 Sensorium, 76
Sheba, 53
Shich 'chah, 22, 33
Shulchan Aruch, 32, 39
 Sign, xv, xvi, xvii, 71, 72, 79, 84, 88, 91, 115, 117–119, 120, 124, 125, 129–131, 144, 182, 250, 251, 254, 255, 257–258, 260, 271, 274, 275, 277, 279, 283, 286, 291, 292, 294, 300, 301, 353–355, 360, 421, 434, 486, 499
 Significant, 130, 132, 300, 315, 331
 Signifying, 81, 121, 250
Sinnlos, 131
Sive, 375
Soziales Feld, 404
 Sozio-Gestalten, 405
Spaltung, 340, 347
Spannung, 428, 464
 Speech, 8, 54, 65, 66, 71–75, 87, 94, 97, 100, 101, 118, 120, 124–126, 131, 135, 138, 145–148, 156, 157, 167–169, 186, 191, 197–199, 205, 211, 229, 241, 243, 247, 249–254, 256, 259–263, 267–269, 271, 273, 274, 276, 278, 282, 283, 286–289, 291, 292, 294, 298, 300–304, 308,

- 312–317, 319, 320, 323, 328, 336, 342, 347, 348, 353–361, 363, 365, 367, 377–381, 395, 397, 414, 420, 421, 423–430, 432–435, 450, 452, 459, 462, 463, 475, 478, 485, 486, 489–491, 494, 498, 499
- Spell, 51, 52, 54, 71
- Spielraum*, 257
- Spirit, 1, 3–5, 21–23, 25, 29, 45, 46, 90, 100, 111, 135, 136, 230, 233, 245, 252, 264, 266, 283, 320, 321, 327, 342, 374, 484, 493
- Spiritual, *xiii*, 1, 3–6, 11, 41, 46, 135, 231, 240, 251
- Spiritualism, 80, 141, 245
- Splitting, 186, 189, 192, 196, 272, 281, 317, 320, 322, 324, 326, 328–331, 333, 340, 341, 344, 347, 348, 376, 377, 381, 392, 425, 429, 430, 440, 494
- Spontaneous concept, 407
- Sprachphysiognomik*, 282
- Stages, *xvi*, *xix*, 118, 129, 131, 142, 145, 159, 163, 211, 227, 269, 275, 336, 356, 357, 360, 369, 371, 372, 375, 376, 391, 394, 422, 427, 461, 462, 469, 470, 473, 477
- Starr(e)*, 413, 496
- Starrheit*, 411, 428, 483, 488, 495
- Stereometry, 247
- Sthenic, 187–191, 194, 195, 202, 203, 205, 377, 441, 442, 449
- Stickiness, 350, 441
- Stimulation, *xvi*, 72, 110, 115, 116, 119, 121, 253–254, 258, 267, 277, 456, 462, 471
- Stimuli, 72, 74, 75, 77, 84, 103, 113, 115, 119, 120, 137, 151, 162, 171, 272, 463, 498
- Stimulus, 72, 74–76, 81, 226, 256, 471, 472
- Striatum, 328, 345
- Subcortex, 166, 328, 424
- Subcortical, 77, 117, 329, 345, 398
- Sublimation, 81, 83, 99, 162, 163, 392
- Sub specie aeternitatis*, 63
- Sub specie philosophiae*, 134
- Suicide, 2, 8, 226, 287, 343, 399, 444, 446, 447, 452, 498
- Sui generis*, 144, 158, 160, 275, 327, 410, 463, 464, 470, 496
- Summa summarum*, 303
- Super-ego, 395
- Supersede, 117, 145, 211, 331, 484
- Superstructure, *xvii*, 112, 162, 195, 196, 252, 313, 484
- Syllogism, 256, 266, 336, 362, 365, 414
- Symbol, 2, 4–7, 16, 55, 74, 75, 89, 147, 180, 255, 266, 430, 431
- Sympathose, 184
- Symptom, 132, 163, 181, 185, 186, 189, 190, 196, 201, 239, 278, 284, 294, 299, 323, 324, 326, 327, 329, 331, 344, 345, 358, 361, 394, 398, 407, 430, 440, 441, 449, 453, 492
- Syncretic, 179, 183, 258, 263, 293, 297, 315, 331, 341, 361, 369
- Syncretism, 120, 142, 156, 161, 193, 272, 286, 293, 298, 301, 360, 377
- Syndrome, 138, 139, 155, 156, 157, 162, 170, 177, 184, 185, 191, 193, 197, 198, 284, 323, 324, 327–329, 346, 380, 397, 398, 400, 424, 433, 485
- Synkinesia, 187, 189–190
- Synkinesis, 204, 400
- Syntax, 118, 256, 268, 278, 283, 301, 302, 356, 359, 427
- Systemic, *xvi*, *xviii*, 116, 129, 130, 139, 141, 192, 222, 224, 231, 243, 247, 248, 251, 254, 255, 257, 272, 281, 301, 306, 312, 323, 331, 333, 375, 376, 395, 396, 411, 419, 426, 434, 467, 474
- T**
- Tagesreste*, 394
- Talmud, 16, 32, 46
- Tautological, 368
- Temperament, 166, 172, 186, 188, 189, 191, 195, 204, 396
- Temporal lobe, 328
- Tertium datur*, 141
- Thalamic, 165, 166, 172, 329, 346
- Thalamus, 164, 166, 172, 226, 346
- Thyroid, 450, 458
- Tiefenpsychologie*, 392
- Tongue-twister, 52
- Tool, *xvi*–*xvii*, 15, 72, 75, 118, 120, 121, 147, 158, 255, 264, 266, 268, 275, 287, 404, 406, 408, 415, 431, 434
- Torah, *xiv*, 13, 27, 33, 34, 39, 46, 100
- Torero, 84
- Toy, *xx*, 66, 92, 459, 460, 462–466, 469, 471, 472, 476, 478, 480
- Tragicomedy, *xiii*, 1–7
- Transfer, 96, 120, 142, 182, 247, 254, 261, 262, 277, 280, 285–287, 338, 339, 377, 406, 407, 446, 479
- Treu*, 27, 30
- Tumar*, 179, 180, 200
- U**
- Udamichestvo*, 227
- Ulterior motive, 259, 260, 267

- Unconscious, xx, 3, 27, 74, 79, 80, 92, 94, 113, 137, 166, 169, 171, 194, 195, 197, 204, 206, 260, 272, 324, 339, 375, 376, 380, 391–395, 397, 440, 441, 443, 447, 449, 474, 487, 488
- Underdevelopment, 150, 156, 161–164, 185, 194, 196, 301, 302, 399, 424, 487
- Und-Verbindung*, 427
- Universal, 87, 88, 122, 133, 134, 136, 142, 211, 326
- Unmediated, 254
- Unterbegriff*, 361, 362
- Uranus, 269
- Urwir*, 298
- V**
- Valence, xi, 349, 412, 414, 483, 499
- Vanity, 2, 4–6, 33, 162, 274, 422, 432
- Vector field, 405
- Vegetative, 111, 172, 202, 211
- Veronal, 325
- Verschobenheit*, 327
- Versuchsleiter*, 413
- Verweile doch*, 63
- Viscera, 163, 211
- Visual illusion, 201
- Vitamine, 261
- Volition, xviii, xix, 117, 118, 129, 150, 194, 196, 205, 210, 221, 239, 255, 273, 277, 298, 302, 350, 369, 375, 385, 386, 409, 410, 421, 437, 440, 441, 460, 474, 493, 494
- Völkerpsychologie*, 27, 35
- Voluntarism, 210, 255, 273, 421
- Vorgangsbeobachtung*, 263
- Vorlust*, 461, 467, 468
- Vorsatz*, 408
- W**
- Was*, 188
- Wegweiser*, 120
- Weiter*, 425, 426
- Werk*, 466
- Westminster Abbey, 61, 63
- Wiederaufnahme*, 473, 491, 492, 494, 495, 497
- Wiederaufnehmen*, 428, 429
- Will, 13, 15, 222, 335, 336
- Wille*, 408
- Willenshandlung*, 406, 414
- Wo*, 284
- Wunscherfüllung*, 337, 490
- Y**
- Yid, 29, 30, 37, 44, 47, 48, 443
- Z**
- Zakharino, 71, 102
- Zerspaltung*, 330, 347
- Zionism, 11, 17, 34, 42, 44, 47, 48
- Zone of proximal development, 138, 269, 314, 355, 367, 370, 379, 469, 471, 475
- Zoon politikon*, xv, 71, 75, 80
- Zoopsychology, 253
- Zudeckende Therapie*, 204
- Zuwendung*, 404
- Zwangsneurose*, 484