Michael A. Peters · Jeff Stickney *Editors*

A Companion to Wittgenstein on Education

Pedagogical Investigations

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ISBN 978-981-10-3134-2 ISBN 978-981-10-3136-6 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-981-10-3136-6

Library of Congress Control Number: 2016957487

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Printed on acid-free paper

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The registered company is Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd.
The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore

Foreword

Wittgenstein and Education

Wittgenstein's Relevance to Education: A Sceptical Introduction

The claim has often been made that the work of the later Wittgenstein is, or ought to be, of paramount importance to the philosophy of education. This might seem puzzling. Philosophical studies of education aspire to elucidate the place of education in the human condition. If we are to characterize the sort of thing that human beings are, and the kind of lives they lead, what significance should we give to the fact that human lives are marked by learning from and teaching others, in myriad contexts, informal and formal? This question is one of more than purely theoretical significance. Most philosophers of education seek to address it in a way that illuminates and advances the practice of education. They want to understand the nature of teaching and learning with a view to determining what can be taught and learnt, what ought to be taught and learnt, and how best to teach and learn. What reason is there to think that Wittgenstein's thought is particularly relevant to this enterprise?

It is tempting to answer that Wittgenstein's philosophy abounds with reference to learning and teaching. Wittgenstein opens *Philosophical Investigations* by quoting Augustine's account of how a child learns her first language, a conception Wittgenstein proceeds to reject. His famous reflections on rule-following have as their centrepiece examples of the teaching and learning of mathematical concepts designed to explore how, on the basis of exposure to a finite set of instructions or examples, learners can acquire concepts, the understanding of which encompasses how those concepts bear on an infinite number of as yet unencountered cases. Indeed, whenever Wittgenstein considers what it is to possess a particular concept or family of concepts—such as those we use to report and express mental phenomena—his technique is to ask how such concepts can be taught or learnt. Yet this is not enough in itself to establish that Wittgenstein has something to teach us about education. For his motives in these discussions are to get to the bottom of the concepts in question, not to elucidate teaching or learning as such. As Hamlyn

(1989) points out, Wittgenstein might reflect on situations of teaching and learning, but his interest lies elsewhere, in the nature of what is learnt rather than the learning of it.[1]

So, however many remarks there may be about teaching and learning in his later philosophy, Wittgenstein cannot be parlayed into a theorist of teaching and learning. And there should be no surprise in that, for Wittgenstein explicitly rejects the idea that philosophy done properly involves building substantive theories of anything. Philosophy done right is a therapeutic rather than constructive enterprise, a "struggle against the bewitchment of our understanding by the resources of our language" (PI §109). Philosophy's aim is to "dissolve" philosophical problems rather than solve them (PO, p. 183); that is, instead of answering philosophical questions by proposing theoretical solutions, we are to work to dispel the confusions that generate the questions in the first place. We thereby make ourselves room to say everything it comes naturally to say and thus, in this sense, philosophy leaves everything as it is (PI §124).[2]

From the fact that Wittgenstein's work offers no theory of education, we might naturally conclude that it is unlikely to contain insights to inform educational practice. Of course, there is a sense in which Wittgenstein's philosophy is applied. For him, philosophy is an *activity*, and one that has profound practical significance. It involves working upon oneself to quieten conceptual anxieties so that we see things aright (CV 16) and liberate ourselves from debilitating perplexity. But such a project is unlike what most philosophers of education have in mind when they claim their discipline is, or ought to be, applied. They mean that it ought to help solve practical questions about educational policy, the content of curricula, effective teaching strategies, classroom dynamics, student motivation, and so on. But such questions are remote from the substance and style of Wittgenstein's writings, and any attempt to build a bridge from the one to the other is likely to be buttressed by theoretical structures of which Wittgenstein would have disapproved.

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[1]Hamlyn writes, "At various places in his works there are remarks about learning and teaching, but they are generally incidental, in my opinion, to other issues on which he thinks they cast light… The references to teaching and learning are all heuristic. The main issues are about what language is and what understanding a language presupposes" (1989: 213).

Meredith Williams seems to disagree with Hamlyn's view. In her 1994 paper, "The Significance of Learning in Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy" (see also Williams 2010), she explicitly departs from those who maintain that Wittgenstein's references to teaching and learning are merely expository or heuristic, and extols the significance of his account of initiate learning. Yet its importance, she argues, lies in the light it casts on his "conception of language, concept mastery, and his contrast between the grammatical and the empirical" (1994: 203). So although Williams clearly takes Wittgenstein's views of initiate learning to illuminate the human condition, she does not maintain it advances our understanding of education as such.

[2]Following convention, titles for Wittgenstein works are abbreviated (PI = Philosophical Investigations, PO = Philosophical Occasions, CV = Culture and Value), with section (§) or page number (p.), with full citation and initials in the References.

Contrasting Views

So why, in the light of this, do some philosophers see Wittgenstein as an important resource for philosophy of education? It is instructive to consider some examples.

David Hamlyn, in the paper cited above, argues that it is not so much what Wittgenstein says about teaching and learning that is significant. His importance for education lies rather in his opposition to Cartesian conceptions of mind and knowledge (1989: 216). Wittgenstein teaches us that it is a precondition of learning that human children are participants in a shared form of life—"a shared form of reaction and behavior" (218)—that constitutes the common ground underlying the possibility of language and thought. In Wittgenstein, this view takes the form of (something like) a transcendental argument, but a similar position finds empirical expression in the writings of L.S. Vygotsky.[3] Together they disclose the short-comings of Piaget's individualistic genetic epistemology, the then-dominant paradigm in developmental psychology, highly influential among educational theorists. So, Hamlyn concludes, we have much to gain from applying to philosophy of education what Wittgenstein "has to say in philosophy in general" (221).

In 1995, one of the editors of this volume advanced a more radical vision of Wittgenstein's significance. For Michael Peters, Wittgenstein's critique of Cartesianism, so admired by Hamlyn, represents a wholesale rejection of the philosophy of modernity. Wittgenstein's later thought is thus best seen, not as an intervention within the analytic tradition, but as allied to continental thinkers who urge us to "shift away from a single, universal and formal model of rationality motivated by considerations of logic, to informal, historical and sociological models that more closely approximate the 'rationalities' employed by agents in their practices and in their active construction of social reality" (Peters 1995: 316). If we follow the lead of Rorty and Lyotard and bring Wittgenstein into dialogue with postmodernism and post-structuralism, we can liberate philosophy from its tired preoccupations with the foundations of knowledge and turn it into a vehicle of cultural criticism. All this has enormous significance for educational theory and practice, for it puts into question the very conceptions of knowledge, reason and self that are central to education as modernity understands it.

The critique of modernity figures just as centrally in Alven Neiman's vision of Wittgenstein's significance for education, published in the same volume as Peters's paper. Wittgenstein's assault on Cartesian rationality exposes the arrogance of science's preoccupation with the mastery of reality "to fulfil instrumental human needs" and its propensity to reduce existence to "a set of riddles to be solved or dissolved" (Neiman 1995: 204). But for Neiman (influenced by Alasdair MacIntyre among others), this should awaken us to the wisdom of premodern conceptions, rather than serve as an invitation to postmodern cultural criticism. Wittgenstein's

[3] A transcendental argument is one that moves from the existence or nature of some phenomenon to the obtaining of its necessary preconditions (this style of argument was made famous by Kant). The congruence between Wittgenstein and Vygotsky was also noted by Williams (1989). I bring the two thinkers into dialogue in Bakhurst (1986).

philosophy emancipates us from scientism and turns us towards human problems of community and meaning in a way that discloses the centrality of faith and mystery. First, Wittgenstein shows us that human lives begin with initiation into a tradition that provides the basis of all inquiry. It follows that "[a]ll human activity, including teaching and learning must begin in faith" (1995: 208). Second, we find ourselves constantly confronting the limits of what can be thought and said, "running up against the walls of our cage", to invoke the metaphor Wittgenstein uses in the "Lecture on Ethics" (PO p. 44). For Wittgenstein, this propensity is not to be ridiculed in positivist fashion, but acknowledged and respected as disclosing the reality of mystery. Like Peters, Neiman aligns Wittgenstein to continental philosophers, but it is Kierkegaard and Hadot, rather than Lyotard and Derrida, that provide the parallels. Neiman finds in Wittgenstein the means to reconceive and rejuvenate liberal education as a profoundly philosophical engagement that aspires to "see the spiritual dimension of what exists before our eyes", and "to follow what Heidegger calls the summoning of the mysteries towards us and us towards the mysteries" (Neiman 1995: 344–5). Liberal education must embody philosophy, understood as a mode of life that aspires to "an epiphany of the individual moment which may allow us to truly live in the present" (345).

Finally, Paul Smeyers, writing in 1998, shares Neiman's admiration for Wittgenstein's critique of scientific rationality, which he also sees as a defence of the spiritual against the technocratic sicknesses of the age. For Smeyers, it is vital that education begins from, and continues to foster and sustain, a "seeing of the world as an occasion for wonder" (1995: 307). But he also takes important lessons from Wittgenstein's conception of the alternatives to scientific explanation. When it comes to understanding the human, "[a]ll *explanation* must disappear, and description alone must take its place" (PI §109). That is, social scientific research in education must not ape natural-scientific explanation by causal law, but seek instead an appreciation of the reality of the phenomena before us in all their particularity, complexity and diversity. The task is to see connections and differences, carefully comparing and contrasting instances, in a way that discloses, discovers and elucidates. Smeyers cites another philosopher much inspired by Wittgenstein, Paul Standish, on the topic of understanding teaching. Standish argues that teaching involves the exercise of "a complex and flexible range of skills" that enable "responsive adjustment to context". To research these skills, we need to be alive to "the particularity and diversity" of the practice of their deployment, which cannot be understood solely in terms of concepts imported from theories "but must involve the ways of speaking internal to the classroom and to the subjects which are taught". This is at odds with the kind of systematic accounts favored by psychologists of education and curriculum theorists. But what we gain is "a perspicuous description of a limited part of what is going on in school", a result far more

illuminating than empty attempts at causal explanation (Standish 1995: 280–281).[4] Thus, for Smeyers, the significance of Wittgenstein's philosophy for educational research is methodological as much as it is doctrinal.

Wittgenstein's Legacy for Education Affirmed

These four papers, which are by no means the only examples from the time, are remarkable for the unanimity of their regard for Wittgenstein's legacy, and for the diversity of ways in which they affirm its relevance to education. There is a danger, however, that they will strike the contemporary reader as quaintly outmoded. The follies of Cartesianism,[5] Vygotsky versus Piaget, the postmodern condition, the hegemony of scientific naturalism, explanation versus description, etc., these are all topics that have grown old, and, in some cases, stale. Thinkers like Rorty and MacIntyre remain stars in the philosophical firmament, but the galaxies in which they are situated are receding from us. How should this influence our view of the present volume? The contributors inhabit a different philosophical space, yet they too insist on Wittgenstein's relevance to education. Is Wittgenstein just one of those prophetic figures whose devotees are prone to think his ideas relevant to the problems of the day, whatever they happen to be, so that each generation writes papers urging us to heed his wisdom, while the issues go on evolving regardless? Or are there deep continuities here that demand to be addressed?

I think the latter is the case. If one looks carefully at the issues that motivated Hamlyn, Peters, Neiman and Smeyers to invoke Wittgenstein, we can see that they are very much alive today, even if they have evolved to take rather different forms. For example, while there is now almost universal agreement about the need to transcend the legacy of Cartesianism, we are far from a satisfying understanding of the bodily character of our mindedness that could inform a suitably rich account of child development. Naturalism is still the philosophical orthodoxy in Britain and America, even if confidence in the more positivistic versions has waned as richer understandings of science have come to the fore. And though divisions between analytic and continental philosophical traditions are gradually beginning to erode, there remains plenty of stupefyingly one-dimensional philosophy on both sides of the old divide. Wittgenstein's thought remains pertinent to these issues, which all bear on the conceptions and methods that inform our thinking about education.

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[4]William James, a thinker much admired by Wittgenstein, would have agreed: "You make a great, a very great mistake, if you think that psychology, being the science of the mind's laws, is something from which you can deduce definite programmes and schemes and methods of instruction for immediate classroom use. Psychology is a science and teaching is an art; and sciences never generate arts directly out of themselves. An intermediary inventive mind must make the application by using its originality" (James 1958: 24). I am grateful to Paul Fairfield for drawing this passage to my attention.

[5]In this usage, "Cartesianism" is understood to embrace a dualism of subject and object (epistemic as well as metaphysical), a foundationalist conception of knowledge and a rationalistic allegiance to the authority of scientific explanation.

For example, scientism pervades contemporary educational thinking like never before, with the current obsession with evidence-based teaching practices and measurable learning outcomes, on the one hand, and faddish interest in technology-enhanced learning, "brain-based pedagogy" and "neuroeducation", on the other. Wittgenstein's legacy is undoubtedly important if we are to understand and resist such trends, so that our educational thinking should be informed by pictures of the relation of mind and world, and by conceptions of what matters, that are genuinely illuminating, morally enriching and liable to inspire educational visions of subtlety and substance.

The chapters in this book pursue the latter aim in myriad ways, offering us a range of contemporary perspectives on the significance of Wittgenstein's thought for education, exploring questions of doctrine and method, as well as Wittgenstein's own pedagogical style and technique. Of course, it is not just Wittgenstein who is important, but what has been made of his thought by some of the philosophers who have been inspired by him, such as Stanley Cavell, John McDowell and Cora Diamond, and their work is also invoked on these pages.[6] I will let the chapters speak for themselves and restrict myself to presenting briefly my own preferred way of expressing Wittgenstein's relevance to education. I shall focus on two matters. The first concerns the relevance of his arguments to our understanding of human development; the second is about the educational import of the manner of his philosophizing.

In my view, the most critical moment in Wittgenstein's philosophy lies in his reflections on following a rule. These passages leave us with the view that, ultimately, the understanding of a rule, or a concept, must simply be *grasped* by the learner. This understanding cannot consist in mastery of a further rule that provides an interpretation of the one to be learnt, because that further rule must itself be understood in the right spirit. Nor can the understanding consist simply in the inculcation of a disposition to behave in a certain way, for a disposition could manifest itself without understanding. What is needed is neither an interpretation of the rule nor a behavioural mechanism. Rather, the child just has to "get it", to understand "the perspective of use" of the concept, so that she is able to judge how it should be used in future hitherto unanticipated circumstances.[7] This immediately introduces the sociality of mind. For, as Hamlyn observes, it is a precondition of the possibility of teaching and learning concepts that the learner shares with others the propensity to react in similar ways in situations, to see similar patterns of sameness and difference, to share a range of sensitivities and sensibilities, so that she and

[6]There are also less direct ways in which Wittgenstein has had an important influence. Dunne (1993: 232), for example, writes perceptively that "it was only when English philosophy was released by him [Wittgenstein] from the classic obsessions of the modern tradition of epistemology that the power of Aristotle's ideas on practical knowledge could become apparent". Those ideas in turn are of considerable significance to the proper understanding of a range of educational concepts, as Dunne shows.

[7]The question, "But how is this even possible?", is one that must be resisted rather than answered. Wittgenstein's appeal to "forms of life" is designed to help us in this. See Bakhurst (1995).

others will agree in judgement. Our mindedness is inherently social, not because (as on some readings of Wittgenstein) the behaviour of the community constitutes the standards of correctness to which the child must conform, and not because (as on some readings of Wittgenstein) the child's getting it is the outcome of "training". It is social because what our mindedness rests upon is something inherently shared, an expression of the form of life of a *kind* of being. Training plays a role in language learning, but no more than many other modes of interaction, including the child's fundamental desire to engage her caregivers, to imitate and resonate with them, to make herself like them, to be one of us. The child brings sociality to her engagement with others as much as others bring it to her.[8] This sociality infuses the subsequent development of the child's powers of reason. With the acquisition of language the child acquires a conception of the world, the "inherited background" which informs all her thought and action, and this of course takes a particular sociocultural form. But to be at home in language is not just to acquire a world view, or a means of communication, it is also to become a self-conscious being that can express itself in thought and action and thereby commune with other minds. One might say then that to acquire language is to acquire a world, a shared world.

The view we inherit from Wittgenstein is not a radical nurturism or social constructionism. But it is, to use John McDowell's expression, a naturalism of second nature, wherein the child's powers of reason are cultivated, enhanced and refined through education in the broadest sense. Education is therefore not about (or not only about) giving already-finished beings the tools to lead successful lives. It is a matter of opening beings up to life. In this way, education is constitutive of the human condition.[9]

My second point takes us to Wittgenstein's style of philosophy. By this, I mean not so much to recommend his distinctive conception of philosophical method, but to reflect on what it is to experience his way of doing philosophy. In the early 1990s, Peter Strawson gave a paper at my university on his conception of philosophy. In the question period, he was asked about the initial reception of Wittgenstein's ideas and he spoke, with great feeling, about what it was like to read the text of the *Blue Book* when it was first circulated in typescript. This was, he said, an encounter with "thought, naked on the page". Strawson had in mind, I believe, not just the raw brilliance of Wittgenstein's words, but the way Wittgenstein draws us into the movement of his thought—the unstinting struggling, questioning, doubting, proposing, conjecturing, agonizing—in a way that is profoundly authentic and unaffected. There is an existential drama in Wittgenstein's writing, with its blend of intense analytic rigour and poetic sensibility. To enter into this drama is unlike anything else in philosophy. There is a unique blend, in Cavell's words (1979: 46), of "utter humility and absolute arrogance" in its relentless thirst

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[8]Wittgenstein's controversial notion of training (*Abrichtung*) has recently been much discussed and is considered in a number of contributions to this volume. In addition to those, and to the works of Williams cited above, see Bakhurst (2015) and Rödl (2016).

[9]This, in a nutshell, is the position I seek to defend in *The Formation of Reason* (2011).

to set philosophy aright and its simultaneous recognition of the enormous difficulty, perhaps futility, of the task (PI §133). This is real, rather than "professional", philosophizing, and this is why it is an education to read Wittgenstein—an education in thinking. In this way, his writing serves as a model for what an education should be—not a process in which the learner assimilates the tried and tested, but a sincere and disciplined engagement with its subject that seeks tirelessly to see things anew, to innovate, to expose the limits of our thinking and to consider what it might be to think beyond them. That attitude is exemplified throughout Wittgenstein's philosophy. It does not reveal everything an education should be—Wittgenstein was the first to recognize that doing philosophy as he did it could be a bane and he counselled many of his students to do different, more menial and more honest work,[10] but something of the ethos of Wittgenstein's passion for thinking should lie at the heart of any practice deserving to be called education.

Conclusion

Many philosophers of education, including many of the contributors to this volume, will disagree with my appraisal and with the ideas and sentiments that inform it. But that is to be expected. I leave it to the reader of this timely volume to decide where the paths of insight lie. There are rich resources here to breathe life into old debates, to bring into view much that we have not yet reckoned with, and to shed fresh light on vexed questions about the meaning of education and its significance in our lives.[11]

July 2016

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[10]Wittgenstein in no way disparaged doing philosophy well, but he loathed those who do it poorly. He felt that bad philosophy is not just intellectually misbegotten, it is frequently dishonest, pretentious and self-deceiving. And so it is better to do almost anything than bad philosophy. In an engaging recollection of Wittgenstein as a teacher, Gasking and Jackson write: "He felt, apparently, that the life of a philosopher was a very strenuous and a very, very exacting one, not be entered upon lightly but soberly and advisedly. He had a horror of slickness—of philosophical opinions arrived at by any process other than an honest wholehearted strenuous endeavor to find out the truth for oneself. He had no time for those who held philosophical opinions because they were fashionable, or because some eminent philosopher had advanced them—especially no time for those who held opinions for the reason that Wittgenstein had advanced them" (Gasking and Jackson 1967: 53–54).

[11]Thanks to the members of Queen's EPiC research group, particularly Michael Vossen, Lesley Jamieson, Jacquelyn Maxwell, Kate Mackrell and Paul Fairfield, for helpful discussion of the themes of this paper. I am also very grateful to the Spencer Foundation for funding and supporting my research.

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Preface

Recounting the origins of this book may seem unnecessary: parentage and family history belonging to the *bedrock* certainties we need not claim to "know" or explain because they are not under any doubt. Being "ceremonial animals", however, we often revel in background stories that acknowledge our labours and give meaning to our projects. In the lengthy Introduction (Chapter "Journeys with Wittgenstein: Assembling Sketches of a Philosophical Landscape"), we try to convey some of this historical setting as context for the work contributed in this book. What is not commonly known is that the impulse for this book came from working together on an interview with Nicholas Burbules for Michael Peters' festschrift, discussing among other things the first meeting of a group of Wittgenstein scholars in New Zealand in 1996 that appear now to have been the "fellowship of the ring": James Marshall, Paul Smeyers, Nicholas Burbules and Michael Peters. After this first meeting, sponsored by Marshall, Burbules and Peters offered a course on Wittgenstein at University of Illinois (1998), leading to further collaborations in 1999 and 2008.

Shortly after writing this bio-history, Peters and Stickney began discussing a special edition of *Educational Philosophy and Theory*, calling upon Paul Smeyers, Stefan Ramaekers and Paul Standish to suggest names of graduate students working on Wittgenstein within philosophy of education. We later turned to Christopher Winch, Lynda Stone, Naoko Saito, Gert Biesta and James Tully for additional suggestions. With the support of Nick Melchior, Lay Peng Ang, Praveenkumar Vijayakumar, Henry Pravin, Seethalakshmi and Thirumavalavan Subramanian at Springer, this project grew beyond our initial conception to include forty-five authors, delivering almost fifty new works.

Sensing it would be timely to reopen and broaden this topic, we conducted an ERIC search (*Institute of Education Sciences* database) and then personally invited those in philosophy of education who had previously written on Wittgenstein. Some declined our invitation due to demanding writing schedules, and others accepted in spite of them. We also put out the call widely through PhilEvents and the subject associations: *Philosophy of Education Society* (PES), *Canadian*

Philosophy of Education Society (CPES), *Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain* (PESGB), *Philosophy of Education Society of Australasia* (PESA), and the *International Network of Philosophy of Education* (INPE). We were pleased to gather submissions from authors residing in twenty countries (fourteen are finally represented in the book), including many more female authors than previously represented in the literature and despite a rigourous review procedure several emerging scholars (a few working on or recently finishing dissertations).

The title "Pedagogical Investigations" had been a favoured title that Michael Peters had entertained when he was at the University of Illinois and took hold soon after he had investigated the "pedagogical turn" of Wittgenstein's life and writings that became the basis on an interpretation with Marshall, Burbules and Smeyers over the course of a couple of publications. The title reveals not only the pedagogical turn broadly advertised in the notions of "philosophy as pedagogy" and Wittgenstein as a "pedagogical philosopher", but also a trope that provides room to contest old interpretations and to contemplate new links and connections with Continental philosophy and culture.

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Acknowledgements

Attending the *Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain's* annual meeting in 2016 (New College, Oxford), David Bakhurst, appointed PESGB's 50th Anniversary Research Fellow (2015–16), was asked at lunch if he would contribute the Foreword, for which we are very grateful. Aptly raising the question of Wittgenstein's relevance to philosophy of education, we are appreciative that he concluded in the affirmative. Bakhurst lends insightful background and critical perspective on this seemingly obvious and yet disturbing question, challenging us to consider carefully our appropriations of Wittgenstein and his philosophical thinking within the field.

Appreciation goes to Nicholas Burbules and Paul Standish for filling gaps in the history of Wittgenstein studies in philosophy of education and to Standish for reviewing and editing earlier drafts of the Introduction. Of course, any errors or omissions are no fault of theirs.

Ten of the authors also did double-duty by contributing shorter versions of their chapters to the Wittgenstein section of the *Encyclopedia of Educational Philosophy and Theory* (EEPAT, Springer, 2016), coedited by N. Burbules & J. Stickney (M.A. Peters, Chief Editor). In addition to the three editors, Michael Luntley, Paul Smeyers, Richard Smith, Paul Standish, Steinar Bøyum, Renia Gasparatou, and Claudia Schumann contributed to the Encyclopedia. Again, this group of authors from seven countries represents both established and newer voices. In the spirit of philosophy conferences, Standish also contributed a response to Smeyers's chapter, bringing into the book a scholarly conversation among colleagues for which we are very grateful.

As expected, much of the work included in this volume originates in the confluence of ideas at conferences. The account here is incomplete, but it will give an idea of how work originates and circulates, paying debts to our philosophical societies. Standish contributed a paper he delivered at the *European Conference on Educational Research* (ECER) annual meeting and Maruyama a paper he gave at the *International Wittgenstein Society* annual meeting in Austria (2009). Having met several presenters at the *International Network of Philosophers of Education*

meeting at University of Kyoto (2008; hosted by Naoko Saito), we had hoped to gather more submissions from the Japanese arena of Wittgenstein scholarship that Maruyama, L. McCarty, Saito and Standish (2010) have inspired.[12] We invited presenters to the *Nordic Wittgenstein Society* annual meeting on the themes of *Wittgenstein, the Philosophy of Education and the Education of Philosophy* (University of Southern Denmark, 2012; hosted by Anne-Marie Søndergaard Christensen), bringing in Hoyt, Toivakainen, Quinn, and Johansson. [See Introduction: Standish (2012b) delivered a keynote and Stickney (2014b) also presented at the NWS meeting.]

PESGB's 2015 *Gregynog* conference (Wales; hosted by Standish and Naomi Hodgson) entitled "Orientations Towards Wittgenstein", which was so named in honour of Ieuan Lloyd's contribution to the field over a period of some fifty years, brought in papers from several authors on the programme: Burley, Gibbs, Stickney, and Moyal-Sharrock (President of the *British Wittgenstein Society*), as well from those in attendance: Harris and Skilbeck. Three of our authors presented at the conference, *Education and the Figure of the Child in Wittgenstein and Cavell* (University of Lausanne, Switzerland, 2016) organized by *Cours de vacances (UNIL) & EXeCO (Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne)*: Bøyum, Johansson and Peters. Burly and Carroll both presented papers at the Woolf Institute Conference on *Wittgenstein and Interreligious Communication* (Cambridge, 2015).

Interpreting Wittgenstein's remark (*Zettel* §419) that, "Any explanation has its foundation in training. (Educators ought to remember this.)", became the focus of a symposium at the *Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain's* annual meeting in 2016 (Oxford), with Smeyers, Luntley, Standish, Smith and Stickney (with other contributors to this volume in attendance: Bakhurst, Johansson, Gasparatou and Van den Berge). O'Loughlin and Mahon were also at PESGB giving papers. Weeks earlier the same team, with Burbules instead of Smith (and contributing authors Dharamsi and Gardner present), addressed the topics of conservatism and agency in education through the lens of Wittgenstein's later philosophy at the *Philosophy of Education Society's* annual meeting (Toronto, 2016), but the training issue crept in there too, partly in response to Norm Friesen's (2016) controversial paper on the brutality of training conveyed by the German term *Abrichtung*[13] (see Luntley, Chapter "Wittgenstein and the Path of Learning"; Standish, Chapter "Seeing Connections: From Cats and Classes to Characteristics and Cultures", nt. 2; Doyle, Chapter "Engagement, Expression, and Initiation";

[12]There was a Round Table session at INPE in Kyoto entitled "Possibilities of Wittgensteinian philosophy of education: in Japanese Context", consisting of Yasushi Maruyama, Yoshitsugu Hirata, Hirotaka Sugita, Kenichiro Yamagishi and Fukutaro Watanabe. When we contacted Watanabe about contributing, he had recently completed his dissertation, "Educational Study on the Later Wittgenstein's Philosophy" (University of Tokyo, 2015); he is currently pursuing publication of his dissertation.

[13]Presented at PES (2016), and published as: Friesen, N. (2017). Training and Abrichtung: Wittgenstein as a tragic philosopher of education. *Educational Philosophy and Theory, 49*(1), 68–77.

Burwood, Chapter "“A Spontaneous Following”: Wittgenstein, Education and the Limits of Trust"). Responding to the make-up of the "expert" panel and the themes they addressed, Ramaekers boldly offered the critique that this appeared to be familiar voices finalizing their stance on earlier conversations rather than ground-breaking or diverse approaches. Welcoming the call to account (but unapologetic about being white male authorities wizened with age), we noted that a specific aim of this book project was to expand the conversation in terms of geography, gender and career-stage.

We hope that you will agree that here we have succeeded, and leave you now to read and assess the work collected. We are most appreciative of the sacrifices our authors have made in devoting precious time to the writing of their chapters, completing within a year a large and we hope inspirational project. Echoing the concluding remarks in the Preface to Wittgenstein's *Investigations*, we hope that readers are inspired by our contributors, starting with Bakhurst's challenge in the Foreword, to think for themselves how Wittgenstein's legacy has a bearing on education, bringing new voices into the expanding conversation.

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Abbreviations

BB	Blue and Brown Books
BT	Big Typescript
CV	Culture and value
LC	Lectures and Conversations
LFM	Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics
LPP	Wittgenstein's Lectures on Philosophical Psychology 1946–47
LW1 or 2	Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology
LRKM	Letters to Russell, Keynes and Moore
N	Notebooks 1914–1916
OC	On Certainty
PG	Philosophical Grammar
PI	Philosophical Investigations
PO	Philosophical Occasions
PR	Philosophical Remarks
RFGB	Remarks on Frazer's Golden Bough
RFM	Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics
ROC	Remarks on Colour
RPP 1 or 2	Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology
TLP	*Tractatus Logico-philosophicus*
WL	Wittgenstein's Lectures, Cambridge 1930–1932
WN	Wittgenstein's Nachlass: The Bergen electronic edition
WV	*Wörterbuch für Volksschulen*
Z	Zettel

Part I
Introduction

Journeys with Wittgenstein: Assembling Sketches of a Philosophical Landscape

Jeff Stickney and Michael A. Peters

Abstract In this introductory chapter, the co-editors, Jeff Stickney and Michael Peters, first survey the background of Wittgenstein scholarship in philosophy of education. Their hope is that these snapshots of earlier writers, movements and themes in the literature will provide context for better receiving the wide array of work contributed to the present volume. As a qualifier, the authors note that the review of this previous literature is not comprehensive but sufficiently complete to assist in the appreciation of how we have come to where we are today, seeing also in this family history the earlier contributions of some of our more distinguished authors in the book. The second section of the Introduction then provides an overview of the organization of the book into its other four parts, summarizing briefly the chapters we have gathered and continuing to link some of the themes or topics to previous literature on Wittgenstein and education.

Keywords Wittgenstein · Liberal-analytic philosophy of education · Therapeutic readings · Relativism · Post-foundationalism · Theory of mind · Non-essentialism

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M.A. Peters and J. Stickney (eds.), *A Companion to Wittgenstein on Education*,
DOI 10.1007/978-981-10-3136-6_1

1 Surveying the Background

Calling for contributions to the present volume, we reminded prospective authors that considerable time had lapsed since the last collections appeared on the theme of Wittgenstein and education (1995, 1999, 2008). Nobody has fathomed the numerical rule allowing confident prediction of the next volume: calculation of which requires recognition of the many papers our assembled authors and others have contributed over the years. Before going into the organization of this book, a gloss on previous work in philosophy of education will provide some context for its reception. There is always risk in doing this of excluding people who over the years contributed to this literature, such as Stefaan Cuypers (1995) or Ramaekers (2008) working alongside the luminary figure of Smeyers in Belgium, or of omitting entire regions: for instance, passing over the Japanese or Scandinavian contributions, or specific locales within the UK such as Wales, where 'Swansea Wittgensteinians'[1] convened since the 1960s and continue to meet at the *Gregynog* conference (PESGB) under the founding leadership of Ieuan Lloyd (D.I. Lloyd). Recognizing the 'infinite regress' problem in the foreground, here is a set of snapshots intended to give readers adequate sense of the genealogy or 'lay of the land' without diminishing its scope.

This first period of Wittgenstein appropriation in philosophy of education (following his death in 1951) occurred in the 1960s–70s during the burgeoning analytic tradition in the UK and elsewhere, most notably the voices of Robert F. Dearden, Paul Hirst and Richard S. Peters (see Archambault 1965). These conceptual analyses were directed to the task of delineating educational terminology, focused primarily on the 'teaching' concept within the parameters of contemporary 'liberal education': what amounted to a concerted attack on indoctrination and conditioning in favor of teaching as the evidentially grounded activity of 'giving of reasons.' These philosophers appealed to and drew upon Wittgenstein to warrant both a general account of the 'revolution' in analytic philosophy and also wrongheadedly to propose a method in philosophy called 'conceptual analysis.' On both counts, these were based on serious misinterpretations that, contra Wittgenstein's own ideas, informed analytic philosophy of education in its attempt to picture itself as a second-order discipline removed from empirical questions and concerned with the conceptual hygiene of our language.

A partial critique was sustained, however, in the work of Ieuan Lloyd, whose readings of Wittgenstein served as an influential and practically focused correction to these tendencies. In part through Lloyd's efforts, Wittgenstein was a significant presence, even if that presence was as something of a gadfly, in the British philosophy of education scene during the 1970s and 1980s. R.K. Elliott, Editor, *Journal of Philosophy of Education,* from 1981 to 1991, had also drawn heavily on

[1]Rush Rhees, D.Z. Phillips, Ieuan Lloyd, Peter Winch, Richard Beardsmore, Ilham Dilman, Cora Diamond, and Howard Mounce; and later David Cockburn and Mario von der Ruhr.

Wittgenstein in his writing and teaching on education, aesthetics, and the imagination, and he also contributed to this climate.[2]

Similar analytic work appeared in North America, with Paul Komisar, B.O. White, and Israel Scheffler (see Maruyama 2006a), but with the exception of several like C.F.B. Macmillan, Kazepides (1983, 1987, 2010),[3] and Thomas Green, it was not as committed to interpreting Wittgenstein and, although concerned with Ryle's distinctions between 'knowing that' versus 'knowing how,' was less overtly tied to ordinary language philosophy. Green's 'Topologies of the Teaching Concept' (1968, 29) dissolved the nagging problem by calling for greater acceptance of blurry boundaries between 'cousined' activities bearing family resemblance (conditioning, training, advertising, proselytizing, indoctrinating, teaching, etc.). That authors for this volume directed little attention to the liberal-analytic problem of mapping teaching concepts is either a tribute to the success of this earlier work or an indication that it is now considered a dead end for inquiry.

In the 1980s, analytic philosophyof education (APE) appeared to wane, but it might more accurately be said to have been so internalized within the discipline, like its Oakeshottian commitments to liberalism (see Oakeshott 1972, 1975), as to no longer stand out from the background.[4] Something of a shift in focus was signaled; for instance, by White (1983) deliberately setting aside conceptual approaches in rethinking the practical and moral aims of education. There was a backlash against the perceived elitism in APE's focus on liberal education, as seen in Pring's (1993) criticism that Hirst's 'forms of knowledge' excluded the domain of vocational education (cf. Hager 2001). Christopher Winch made this a focus in some of his early Wittgenstein-inspired research, culminating in a more inclusive view of education that does not eschew vocational training in the pursuit of encouraging critical thinking (see 2002, 2006a, b; cf. Siegel 2008; Huen 2011). C.J. B. (James) Macmillan (1981) advanced Wittgenstein scholarship, questioning for instance (1995) whether learning disabilities (i.e., different spontaneous reactions) might constitute marginalization within a form of life, and conducting more careful exegetical work: distinguishing conceptual from empirical matters that carry into the writings of Luise and David McCarty (1995), and even Maruyama (see 2006b) studying with Macmillan at Florida State University. Marshall (1985) reopened inquiry into the role of authoritarianism within rule-following (see also Cuypers 1995), and later shifted this conversation (1995) by bringing Foucault's *games of truth* into relation with Wittgenstein's *language-games* (see Shaw 2005). The Marshall & Smeyers collection (1995) was, in part, building on this earlier work in

[2]Paul Standish was most helpful in rounding out this story, and in reviewing and editing earlier drafts.

[3]Thanks to Nicholas Burbules for pointing out Kazepides' contribution.

[4]Analytic philosophy continues to inform how many philosophers of education see and assess arguments when reviewing papers. Something of the lingering analytic-continental divide contributes to the clash of perspectives, seen between Denis Phillips and both feminist or poststructuralist philosophers; and at PESGB 2010, between Harvey Siegel (keynote) and Paul Smeyers (respondent), which carries into Paul Standish's chapter on *contextualism* in this volume (Ch 12).

the 1980s to which they contributed (e.g., see Smeyers 1986a, b, 1988, 1991) while drawing newer voices in the 1990s such as Peters and Standish. Peters (1984) completed his PhD on Wittgenstein—'The Problem of Rationality'—having specialized in Wittgenstein's work in an MA in Philosophy at the University of Auckland (NZ), and has been working through the consequences of his thought for educational theory and practice ever since (see Peters 2014). Expanding on a keynote paper at the Annual Conference of the PESGB in 1985, Standish (1992) published *Beyond the Self: Wittgenstein, Heidegger, and the Limits of Language*. Peters (1995) brought Foucault and Lyotard into conversation with Wittgenstein, marking a turn away from what he characterized as the 'pithy Wittgensteinianism' of those obsessed with rule-following (see Stickney 2014a) and later posed the question of post-analytical philosophy of education as a choice between Rorty or Lyotard (Peters 1997).

Much of the work appearing in the 1990s was devoted to reshaping the conversation (see Neiman 1995), addressing problems of interpretation in earlier attempts at employing Wittgenstein within the 1960s–70s, and bringing the influences of continental philosophy and culture into consideration. In *Wittgenstein: Philosophy, Postmodernism, Pedagogy*, Peters and Marshall (1999) read Wittgenstein as a philosopher of the Austrian counter-Enlightenment, against the background of Viennese modernism. This reading emphasized its sympathy with many of the main concerns of French post-structuralism and was developed as an expressed intention to deconstruct the appropriation of his 'method' by the London school. By contrast, seeing Wittgenstein in conversation with Foucault and Lyotard (see also Burbules 2000), the book was directed toward understanding the most pressing problems facing philosophy and education in the postmodern condition focused on ethico-political lines of inquiry after the collapse of the grand narratives. *Wittgenstein: Philosophy, Postmodernism, Pedagogy* examined Wittgenstein's notion of self in relation to Nietzsche, Schopenhauer, and Freud and commented upon the central importance of philosophical style in Wittgenstein's *Investigations* linking it to questions of pedagogy. In 'Wittgenstein, Styles, and Pedagogy' and 'Philosophy as Pedagogy: Wittgenstein's Styles of Thinking' (in Peters and Marshall 1999), the question of style was linked to the method of composition of both the *Tractatus* and the *Investigations* and a conception of philosophy that no longer sought foundations or certainty but relied on a metaphorical approach to help shift from 'the picture that held us captive' (paraphrasing PI §115).[5]

Shortly after Peters went to the University of Illinois to join Burbules and Fazal Rizvi (2005), together in 2007 they invited Smeyers to convene a Wittgenstein reading group over the semester to tackle new issues by different approaches. The result was both a special edition of *Educational Philosophy and Theory* (2008) entitled

[5]Following convention, titles for Wittgenstein's works are abbreviated (PI = Philosophical Investigations, Z = Zettel, OC = On Certainty, CV = Culture and Value), with section (§) or page number (p.), with full citation and initials (e.g., RFM) in the References.

'Wittgenstein's Legacy for Education' (coedited by P. Smeyers & N. Burbules) and a joint volume called *Showing and Doing: Wittgenstein as a Pedagogical Philosopher* (2008; repub. 2016). These works included Burbules' (2008) investigation of tacit teaching and further development of Smeyers & Burbules' (Burbules 2005, 2006) thinking in terms of education as 'initiation into practices.' Following Macmillan, the 2008 collaboration also traced the 'pedagogical turn' of Wittgenstein's thinking during the period from 1920 to 1926 and suggested learning and initiation into practices are fundamental to understanding his philosophy. Most importantly perhaps were the ways in which this inquiry produced modulations on the theme of Wittgenstein as a 'pedagogical philosopher,' building from a broader approach called 'philosophy-as-pedagogy' (Preface to the paperback edition). This new approach was influenced by Janik and Toulmin, Cavell, and the postmodern reading developed in Peters and Marshall (1999) based on an anti-representationalism, and an anti-foundationalism (or better post-foundationalism) that rejected truth as correspondence to reality. This move was accompanied by a general suspicion of transcendental viewpoints and arguments (what Lyotard referred to as metanarratives), and clearer focus on questions of subjectivity (that reflected a long tradition going back to Kierkegaard and had been taken up afresh in a different way by Foucault, among others).

Coming out of the 1990s and its 'culture wars'—probing the significance of Kuhn's 'paradigm shifts' and 'incommensurability' for natural and human sciences (see Kuhn 1962; Issac 2012; Sherman Heckler 2016)—was a great deal of reflection on the implications of the 'linguistic turn.' Within philosophy of religion, D.Z. Phillips applied Wittgenstein's concept of language-games and *forms of life* to contemplation of the various roles religion plays within human life (see Burley 2012; see also McLaughlin 1995), and Kerr (1998, cf. 1986) inquired into the epistemological question of whether those on the outside can truly understand or appreciate a religious *form of life*. Concerns were raised over misinterpretation of thinkers like Wittgenstein, as in pressing his credentials in support of the notion that 'anything goes' (see Smeyers 1988, 1993; Cooper 1998; Blake et al. 1998). Defense of Wittgenstein against accusations of relativism abound in this period (see Scheman 1996; Standish 1995; Burbules 2000; Stickney 2006, 2008), but this once heated debate found diminished attention among the authors of this present volume—though brought up in relation to skepticism by Simpson (Ch 30), by Mahon (Ch 15) and Stickney (Ch 32) in connection with Rorty's 'solidarity,' by Standish with regard to contextualism and holism (Ch 12), by Olssen (Ch 20) with respect to constructivism, and by Maruyama (Ch 23) and Carroll (Ch 50) in relation to the *otherness* of students. Although the specter of relativism might have haunted Luntley's (2003) inquiry in *Meaning and Judgement*, it was not the central metaphysical concern he set out to untangle by exploring both the subject's abilities and *perspectival* limits in reading the intentions of others. Standish (2012), on the other hand, brings Levinas into the question of how we bridge these gulfs that so often divide us, expanding upon his earlier work on the 'limits of language' (on 'if a dog could talk,' see Smith 2011).

Another concern during this time of re-reading Wittgenstein was the degree of quietism or conservatism implied by his adage that 'philosophy leaves everything as it is' (PI §§124 & 126), coupled with the deflationary view that rather than solve

our problems his *Investigations* helps us to stop doing philosophy when we want to (PI §132). For some, this opens doors onto ethical concerns of the 'self' and forms of moral education (see Maruyama 2000a; Marshall 2001; Smeyers 2002; Burbules and Smeyers 2003; Stickney 2010; Standish 2012b); additionally, it leads to considerations of what is apparent, before us on the rough ground of language usage instead of being mysterious or hidden (see Standish 2010, 2015). Much has been written on the 'therapeutic reading' of Wittgenstein and its relationship to philosophy of education (see Standish et al. 2007), asking anew what we can speak of meaningfully and 'whereof we should remain silent' (see Ramaekers and Smeyers 2002; Burbules and Peters 2003; Smith and Burbules 2005). Some of this earlier conversation is carried into the present volume, centrally in Hoyt's chapter (Ch 49) and tangentially in a dialogue between Smeyers and Standish (Ch 16 & 17).

Since these earlier periods of Wittgenstein studies in philosophy of education, some continue to develop or expand their lines of inquiry, and many new scholars have entered the field despite a general decline in university support for such programs in the humanities. There is continued interest in the ways in which Wittgenstein's philosophy informs our understanding of learning (see Lidar et al. 2006; Bøyum 2007, 2009; Beckett 2009; Stickney 2014c), as well as how it changes the way we see philosophy of education (see Smeyers and Marshall 1995; Smeyers 1998; Peters and Marshall 1999; Aparece 2005; and Standish 2012c). Without actually closing this photo-album on Wittgenstein's place within philosophy of education, we turn to offer a précis of the works contributed in the present volume. More definitive statements of intent are provided by the authors in their abstracts; any distortion of positions is no fault of their own.

2 Overview of the Chapters

2.1 Part II: Biographical and Stylistic Investigations

The book starts with Michael Peters (Ch 2) discussing the distance between his own thinking about Wittgenstein and that of R.S. Peters. In doing so, he establishes a post-Cartesian, non-essentialist view of the self informed by post-structuralist thinking that draws both on Sluga's (1996) reading of Wittgenstein in relation to Foucault and reaching back into Peters' early writing on Wittgenstein in relation to Lyotard (Peters 1995). Here, he also dwells on Cavell's discussion of Wittgenstein's many 'scenes of instruction' (see Peters et al. 2008; Cavell 1979). The third chapter by Jeff Stickney traces the boundaries Wittgenstein drew between conceptual and empirical matters, and between the domains of 'philosophy' as he conceived of it—grammatical inquiry that unravels conceptual confusion—and those of applied maths or sciences (including pedagogical inquiries into causes of learning). Within this discussion of who is responsible for resolving the problems of language or of mathematics (or of education) is the question of what is arbitrary and

open to negotiation, and where there is room for agency among philosophers or practitioners (see Stickney 2005; Burbules 2005).

Biographical elements in Chap. 3 (see also Robins 2015) are extended most authoritatively in the fourth by Savickey (see 1999), who was asked to lend her critical insight into Wittgenstein's commitments to educational reforms in vogue in Austria when he trained and taught as an elementary school teacher (cf. Maruyama 2001; LeGrange 2009), and later as a professor of philosophy at Cambridge (see also Quinn, Ch 45; Gasking and Jackson 1967). Emma McClure (Ch 10) illustrates this relationship between the early and late teaching styles of Wittgenstein by breaking down or exemplifying the role of exercises in his philosophical writing. Political scientist Darius Rejali, an expert on state-sponsored torture, shares (Ch 5) his trying sojourn to Wittgenstein's remote hut on the coastline of Norway, exploring the themes of *diasporic* and hermetic philosophy (see Peters 2008), opening a window onto Wittgenstein's reclusive love relationships and asking us to consider the price of genius. Michael Peters later (Ch 14) probes and reconstructs the inquest into Wittgenstein's use of corporal punishment in his classroom to question and reassess Cavell's romantic emphasis on the 'child' and like Rejali pushes boundaries on what we talk about when discussing philosophy in relation to education by opening to us the literature on Wittgenstein's sexuality. Stephen Burwood (Ch 11) offers a refreshingly non-hagiographic look at Wittgenstein as a pedagogue, where even at Cambridge his students showed a willingness to follow unquestioningly. Burwood unpacks the concept of 'trust' in order to critique the claim that in *On Certainty* there is a 'fundamental attitude of trust' or a 'basic form of trust,' where trusting itself is understood as a primitive reaction. He argues that these pedagogical scenes reveal instead a form of 'spontaneous following.'

Few authors in this volume focused their attention on the early work; however, Yasushi Maruyama (Ch 7) contributes an exegetical paper on Wittgenstein's concept of 'elucidation' in the *Tractatus,* revealing the pedagogical significance of this illuminating theme. Maruyama retraces Wittgenstein's movement from elucidation as ostensive teaching to 'synopsis' or oversight in his later writings, where learning to see things perspicuously means 'commanding a clear view' of our language. Richard Smith (Ch 6) focuses our attention on the metronome: heeding the slow tempo at which Wittgenstein preferred we read his *Investigations*, contrasting this philosophical adagio with contemporary movements toward rapid learning. Smith compares and contrasts Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* with his later writings, showing how (despite continuities) scientific explanation lost its primacy as Wittgenstein made his 'therapeutic turn' toward receptive understanding of things as they are on the ground. Examples of slower and deeper learning are provided through wonderfully attentive and erudite readings of poetry. Nicholas Burbules (Ch 8) investigates Wittgenstein's prolific use of metaphors in both the early and later works, noting the contradiction in speaking of 'pulling up ladders' while adhering to the *Tractatus'* picture theory of meaning. As he notes, in the later works metaphors more comfortably give his writings a persona, but also act as 'tools' useful in the many educational processes depicted. Burbules unpacks the pedagogical aspect of Wittgenstein's usage of metaphors, taking us into Wittgenstein's spatial and navigational imagery where learners 'find their way

about.' Suzy Harris (Ch 9) explored the central role of imagination across Wittgenstein's later writings, bringing aesthetics powerfully into consideration while reading a philosopher who wished to be read as a poet. Harris enriches our understanding of Wittgenstein's use of religious imagery, and then, reading Wittgenstein through Cavell explores the use of imagination in bringing children into language. Like so many chapters in this collection, her account of Wittgenstein's writing style could also reside in parts three or four of the book.

Spinning off a remark by Michael Peters on Wittgenstein as 'a philosopher of context *par excellence*,' Paul Standish (Ch 12) weighs the theme of *contextualism* in Wittgenstein's later philosophy by taking us into a friendly debate he had with Harvey Siegel over how we recognize a cat as a 'cat.' The ontological question of how we identify things and distinguish differences is of significance to education, first in terms of the way we come to follow these rules without rigid inculcation, and second in considering the way assessment criteria (see Davis 2009) or curriculum 'expectations' come to stand for things (signposts for content, skills, and attitudes) educators want students to adopt (cf. Stickney 2009). Concluding the first section (though like Standish's defying classification by easily belonging in all three), Adrian Skilbeck (Ch 13) looks at seriousness and silliness as complementary counter-motifs in Wittgenstein's thinking, applying this couplet (Janus face) in his collected remarks to education in dramatic arts (cf. Fleming 2000) through Cavell's writings on sharing criteria as grounds for inclusion into communities.

2.2 *Part III: Wittgenstein in Dialogue with Other Thinkers*

The third part of the book combines a diverse set of chapters that look at Wittgenstein through the lens of other thinkers, bringing him into conversation with their philosophies. The first set addresses Cavell's relationship to Wittgenstein and education, with Michael Peters (Ch 14) first investigating the image of the child (see Peters 2001; cf. Maruyama 1998; Frank 2012; Lesnik-Oberstein 2003; Johansson 2013). Peters' biographical treatment takes us back to the opening chapters, but also anticipates the final chapters in this section by intensifying the question as to how Wittgenstein's own childhood and suicidal impulses influenced his visions of psychology, philosophy, and education. Áine Mahon (Ch 15) brings Cora Diamond and Stanley Cavell into opposition with Richard Rorty, critically questioning the accusation that Wittgenstein is 'a romantic thinker open to the disappointments and the difficulties of our lives in language.' Mahon finds instead of a default, a 'peculiarly romantic salience' in Cavell and Diamond, bearing on epistemologies of teaching and learning that deliver an alternative version of education. In highlighting the romantic tenor of Wittgenstein's writings, Cavell and Diamond show, Mahon argues, a way forward for teachers and learners that aligns somewhat with contemporary critical thinking initiatives. Education on this schema, she claims, fosters independent thought and careful consideration. It is less a matter of passively accepting what has come before and more a matter of conscious activity and critique.

In a two pronged attack, Paul Smeyers (Ch 16) first distinguishes Wittgenstein's pronouncement that 'philosophy leaves everything as it is' (PI §§124 & 26) from political conservatism. Wittgenstein's interest was to conserve the regular and often reliable ways we have learned to operate—in ordinary language usage and in the practices that characterize our *life form,* against the intervention of logicians seeking external order. Secondly, he surveys and critiques passages drawn from Cavell and from Cavellians writing in philosophy of education, distinguishing between our early initiation into rudimentary techniques from higher forms of learning as adepts or adults. Seeking to redress what he sees as an imbalance, Smeyers places stress on prior, less autonomous forms of training we undertake as children that enable, experientially and logically speaking, more liberal forms of learning as we grow into adults. Paul Standish (Ch 17) kindly wrote a response to Smeyers' critique, shifting the meaning of 'learning to be an adult' and lowering the putative age at which we begin non-authoritarian processes of learning by initiation: children sometimes accepting, contesting, or varying the different forms passed down, telling or showing them how to become fully human. The topic of education as initiation takes Standish into the terrain of Hirst & Peters' earlier attempt to delineate 'forms of knowledge,' offering critical assessment of their views. He also explores how Cavell came to Wittgenstein through Emerson and Thoreau—seeing in the *Investigations* more than a text to be interpreted faithfully, but an interrogative style of writing that prompted him to think for himself the problems of philosophy. Throughout these lines of inquiry Standish gently reminds readers of the need to read Wittgenstein's and Cavell's words carefully, taking them in context and averring the dangers of flexing them to advance other interests. Interestingly, to some extent both authors share a great deal about our initiation into practices, yet respectfully see in each other's appropriation of Wittgenstein a slightly romantic or sentimental element.

Outside of this friendly exchange, Renia Gasparatou (Ch 18) also addresses the theme of conservatism in Wittgenstein's philosophy, arguing for a positive role in some forms of conservation and everydayness that protect us from dangers frequently encountered in education when promoting the radical or new (cf. Smith, Ch 6; Stickney, Ch 32). At the risk of becoming conservative, common sense is shown to be an antidote to the mental discomforts we find when straying from the community, offering an educational ideal that contrasts with the positivistic impulse in educational science. Michael Temilini (Ch 19) describes the use of exemplary cases in the political philosophy of James Tully, a political thinker and activist who uses Foucault primarily (with Gandhi, Freire, Said, and others) to 'reciprocally illuminate' Wittgenstein. Tully's work addresses ways in which disenfranchised groups, including indigenous peoples, can negotiate 'freedoms within the rules' by sometimes *going against* the rules (see PI §201). Responding to our request, Mark Olssen (Ch 20) shares a paper (1995) in which he *problematizes* Foucault's and Wittgenstein's relationship to idealism and relativism, proceeding from James Marshall's claim that Wittgenstein's social constructivist view of mathematics is not 'idealistic,' 'relativistic,' or 'subjectivistic' but rather is 'non-idealistic and objective.' Olssen's discussion of the tendency to prioritize internal mental states

versus linguistic accompaniments anticipates discussions in the following part of the book, while focusing our attention here on the epistemological problems around truth, objectivity, and relativism through the case of discursive mathematical constructions. The 'invented or discovered' aspect is also relevant to the papers on mathematics in the following section, but his central contribution is to show how Foucault complements Wittgenstein, stopping us from straying into robust anti-realism. Instead of idealism or subjectivism, either, in a move similar to Hacking's (cf. 2002), Olssen points toward 'dynamic constructivism' in Foucault's and Wittgenstein's anti-foundational philosophies.

James Garrison (Ch 21) graciously accepted our request that he tackle the under-researched topic of Wittgenstein's relationship to the founding pragmatists. Wittgenstein frequently referenced James, prompting Garrison to interpret what Wittgenstein may have meant in questioning whether he was 'doing something akin to pragmatism.' Discussing Dewey, Pierce, and James resulted in a mutually rewarding exchange over their respective differences from empiricism, dwelling on the muted role of experience as *under-determining* ground for meaning (see PI, p. 230). Incidentally, Garrison studied and was on an NSF grant with Jaakko Hintikka, a student of von Wright (editor of several of Wittgenstein's texts). James Macmillian, who studied Wittgenstein at Cornell with Norman Malcolm, brought Garrison into philosophy of education and they collaborated in conceptual analyses of education (see Macmillan and Garrison 1988). Viktor Johansson (Ch 22) also compares Dewey and Wittgenstein, addressing the role of dogmatism as a negative influence on education. More generally, Johansson asks the question: 'What is it to learn something?' Reminiscent of analytic philosophy, he examines what it means for a child to 'learn,' in ordinary language and within Dewey's and Wittgenstein's philosophies. Yasushi Maruyama (Ch 23) delivered contrasting portraits of Hegel's and Wittgenstein's views of *otherness* (cf. Maruyama 2000b), drawing on Wittgenstein's remark that Hegel wants to treat everything as though they were the same whereas he 'wants to teach us differences' (see also Standish, Ch 12). Maruyama raises political and philosophical concerns over power relations that resonate with some critical theorists such as Giroux. Although Cavell and Dewey are frequently mentioned (see also Österman, Ch 34), nobody (except Bakhurst) too up Vygotsky or Marx (see, however, Tomlin et al. 2013), and Austin and Ryle are seldom mentioned (see, however, Peters, Ch 2; Standish, Ch 12; and Gasparatou, Ch 18).

Claudia Schumann (Ch 25) investigated Wittgenstein's relevance to feminism: well represented in philosophical feminism (cf. Hekman, Code, Zerilli, Tanesini, Scheman, Alcoff, etc.) but scarcely taken up in philosophy of education. In seeking authors to cover this topic, we wrote to Naomi Scheman, Cris Mayo, Claudia Ruitenberg, and Lynda Stone to assist in our search. Schumann reflects on practical changes in daily curriculum (as opposed to off-ground, legalistic frameworks and policies) that would help remedy the disease of sexism in the classroom. Reviewing recent feminist interpretations of Wittgenstein, Schumann concludes that they not only lend insight into our reading of Wittgenstein and feminist philosophy, but can also inspire new approaches for philosophy of education. Apparently in agreement

with this claim, Karim Dharamsi (Ch 24) shares Alessandra Tanesini's reading of the *Tractatus* and of Simone de Beauvoir, bringing her non-essentialist perspective into relation to potentially emancipatory aims in education. A view of Wittgenstein emerges as an anti-modern thinker opposed to modern notions of self-determination and of realism.

Deborah Orr (Ch 26), who contributed to Naomi Scheman and Peg O'Connor's collection, *Feminist Interpretations of Ludwig Wittgenstein* (2002), exemplifies 'mindfulness' (using a narrative counter-strategy to traditional forms of argumentation) by meditating on the subject of boy's inculcation into masculine forms of emotional expression, showing the potential in a Buddhist retraining program to unsettle and thus assist youth (see also Standish 2013b). Finally, blurring the boundaries between the ethical, political, and aesthetic, Heesoon Bai (Ch 27) offers a personal, multilayered reflection on her journey with Wittgenstein, pondering the shock of his proclamation that 'philosophy leaves everything as it is': as a philosopher of education and teacher, as a Buddhist, and later retraining and practicing as a psychotherapist.

2.3 Part IV: Training, Learning and Education

The fourth part encompasses a large topic space: rule-following and training forming an axis around which much work in philosophy of education has traditionally revolved. Although it could easily have been subdivided (e.g., a section on neuroscience or the arts alone), this is another case of blurry boundaries and the many family resemblances that potentially unite a set. Steiner Bøyum opens (Ch 28) with a prosaic inquiry into how we are trained from infancy into holding certain dispositions or emotions, as in learning the refrains of musical scores. Comparison between learning how to recognize emotional patterns and learning how to distinguish styles of music sets the stage for examining 'the education of the self,' constituted, he argues by an interplay between taking a first-person and a third-person perspective on oneself. Positioned here, his insightful reading of Wittgenstein compliments Orr's prior exemplification of boys learning *language-games* of emotion and anticipates Simpson's look at second-person perspective. As with Bai and Peters, these chapters also remind us of Wittgenstein's preoccupation with psychology (see Marshall 2008).

Just how 'training' fits into the later Wittgenstein's philosophy is both an enduring and unsettling question (see Friesen 2016), refreshed here by Michael Luntley (Ch 29) from a friendly polemic (Luntley 2007, 2008; Stickney 2008). Here, Luntley uses Descartes' concept of the ego (contra Peters in Ch 2) in developing an answer to the problem of what enables training to take hold in the first place ('stimulus-response plus what,' he asks?), finding an answer within the individual's latent rational and artistic/imaginative capacities. This stance creatively sets him apart from those adhering to the social adoption mode, or the 'initiation through training' camp spearheaded by Smeyers (see also Bakhurst 2011, 2014,

2015, approaching through McDowell). David Simpson (Ch 30) also diverges from Luntley on this question (see Simpson 2014), but instead explores different responses to the grammatical and skeptical problems around how we develop perspective needed to be reflective practitioners. Simpson avers the more traditional approach of seeing learning processes as cases of disciplining or forming an other—a first-to-third-person interaction, adopting instead a second-person perspective of shared, cooperative, and normative activities into which children or novices are being welcomed. Addressing the 'transformational' view of learning through initiation found widely in Bakhurst, McDowell, Williams, Heumer, Smeyers, and Stickney, Casey Doyle (Ch 31) unties the knot in the slogan, 'education is a meeting of minds.' Paradoxically, the child's mind is not yet formed in preparation for this meeting. He concludes that 'the crude idea of training so often invoked will not suffice, no matter how often one chants the mantra about the dawning of light on the whole' (OC §141). Instead, we must take seriously and try to understand the picture of engagement hinted at in Wittgenstein's suggestive remarks about imitation, mimicry, and primitive reactions to the minds of others. Although paired here with Luntley because of his challenge to the 'social initiation camp,' his chapter also bears on later discussions (e.g., Standish, Forsberg, Gardner and Segerdahl) of our capacity to copy our mentors: a trait, he argues, that 'exploits our natural tendency to share and identify with the minds of others. It is this natural, primitive attunement that allows for initiation into a form of life and the development of rational capacities.'

Michael Peters conducted an interview with Sharon Rider for the *Encyclopedia of Educational Philosophy and Theory* on Wittgensteinianism and mathematics, giving occasion to discuss her involvement in the book. Rider (Ch 33) raises the question of what distinguishes math as an activity and as a body of knowledge, wanting to see how we can initiate students into forms of mathematical thinking through everyday applications. Rider sees math as an intrinsic part of intellectual formation, or *Bildung*. Her interest in math education resulted in a useful exchange of ideas with Stickney (Ch 32) on the 'math wars' between the paradigms of 'discovery learning' and 'back to fundamentals,' raising concern for how teachers commit to training in these pedagogies when they cannot step outside the linguistic circle and background certainties we share to objectively assess their validity in the world. Tove Ösertman (Ch 34) picked up on this conversation, also writing on mathematics education in Sweden but adding a Deweyan lens in relaying concerns about overly prescriptive curricular documents and training that may limit teachers' experimentation. To some extent each are dealing with epistemological and skeptical problems around expert training: how teachers 'take-up' training and exemplify 'best practices'; how administrators or teachers negotiate responsibilities and degrees of professional autonomy in choosing curricula; and, how the educational community judges some forms of education to be better than others (cf. Silva Vilela 2010; Knijnik 2012).

Coming at Luntley and Doyle's topic of *nativism* from another angle, and responding to Moyal-Sharrock's (2004) invitation to see in *On Certainty* a third stage in Wittgenstein's thinking, we have Paul Standish (Ch 37) pursuing the

significance of Wittgenstein's remarks on regarding humans as animals (OC §475). Responding to Cavell's question of how children come to share our words, he first turns to Malcolm's distinctions between causation and instinct, investigating what Wittgenstein intends by repeatedly pointing to our primitive reactions as a basis for linguistic and cultural behavior. Here, the distinctions between nature and convention blur, without reducing our inspection of humans to naturalistic terms. Wittgenstein shows, as Standish notes, that while so much is learned, it later becomes embedded in a fabric of reactions and responses that have the spontaneity of instinct. Standish then brings us to the abyss of 'epistemic vertigo' by following the paths, or myriad ways of thoughtfully attending them, offered in *On Certainty's* many portrayals of how we go about without raising doubts. He is preceded by Niklas Forsberg (Ch 35) who touchingly narrates the process through which his young daughter came to terms with the meaning of her pet bird's death. Foreshadowing Gardner's query, Forsberg asks: 'How do we know when learning has taken place? When is a teacher's job done?' One answer drawn from Wittgenstein's work and exemplified by his daughter's initiation into our concepts is: *when the pupil is able to go on alone*. Also preceding Standish's 'Something Animal' essay is Pär Segerdahl (Ch 36), who with primatologist Sue Savage-Rumbaugh crosses species boundaries by incorporating the voices of Bonobo chimpanzees as coauthors. Segerdahl considers what it means to become human using the primatologist's laboratory, where practices and protocols are improvised to bridge our human and chimpanzee *forms of life.* Remarkably, the chimpanzees they interviewed want similar treatment to our students.

Emergent fields such as neuroscience have drawn attention from those working on questions in the theory of mind (see Bakhurst 2008; Standish 2012d, 2013a; Kotzee 2014),[6] bringing new angles of inquiry to a familiar topic of innate (nativist) versus acquired or learned capacities. These matters are taken up here with different foci by four authors. Danièle Moyal-Sharrock (Ch 38) confronts Chomsky's universal grammar and computational model of language acquisition, following instead the path to mastery through training set out by Wittgenstein.[7] Turning to Rebecca Saxe, cognitive scientist at MIT, Moyal-Sharrock investigates the exceptional qualities our species has for teaching and learning, not shared to the same extent by other primates—making it harder for them (or feral children) to build upon training or ostensive teaching. Looking into our *form of life*, she throws further light onto the earlier discussions of Standish and Segerdahl. Ian O'Loughlin (Ch 39) addresses a problem also taken up by Moyal-Sharrock (2009), seeking to free us from antiquated pictures of 'memory storage.' Abreast of recent changes occurring in cognitive science, he argues that the remodeling of older concepts—encoding, storage, and retrieval—follows more closely Wittgenstein's footsteps

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[6]William Kitchen, PhD candidate in philosophy of education (School of Education, Queen's University, Belfast), runs a blog on "neuromania" in education. https://williamhkitchen.wordpress.com/.

[7]"To understand a language means to be master of a technique" (PI §199).

than those entrenched in the computational model. If human memory does not operate like a computer—if we do not store coded input that is later retrieved, but instead we change our deeply embedded states in highly complex ways—then memory science, O'Laughlin argues, has a number of important if preliminary lessons for education and learning. Luc Van den Berge (Ch 40) critiques the claims made in a parenting book that promises to enhance children's brains. Refreshing in that he is actually inspecting one of the trendy books on brain-based child rearing, he uses Wittgenstein's distinction between empirical and methodological propositions: the former inviting verification (true-or-false); the later serving as rules or paths we are invited to follow (or initiated into accepting subconsciously). Playing on the notions of *liminality* and aspect-dawning, Van den Berge argues that the advice given to parents reads like empirically validated steps (a recipe for genius), whereas the charm behind these phrases flows from their origins in our *bedrock certainties*: matters we do not doubt or justify, and therefore cannot 'know.'

Drawing both on experience in professional training settings and his reading of the literature (such as Shön and Fodor), Sam Gardner (Ch 41) uses Wittgenstein to dissolve the Meno paradox in relation to professional training: the quandary of how learners first perceive their own needs and then pursue courses of action to remedy their shortcomings, apparently bootstrapping learning without the aid of others guiding them. Reading Wittgenstein on rule-following and mastery of techniques, differently from either Luntley or Doyle, Gardner also questions: 'How do professionals simply learn to 'go on'?' Sébastien Chaliès and Stephano Bertone (Ch 43) have been utilizing Wittgenstein's concept of rule-following in relation to professional training in a different 'laboratory' since 2009. Using empirical frameworks along with qualitative methods in teacher training institutes makes them stand out, perhaps for some readers pushing the empirical/philosophical boundaries described earlier (in Ch 3) by employing a different methodology and holding more practical aims than typically found in the exegetical or grammatical work within philosophy of education (see also Holmboe on computer training 2004).

Exceeding his fascination with science and mathematics, Wittgenstein loved the arts: no doubt stemming from his rich enculturation in Vienna. Based on her earlier publications (see Carmona Escalera 2012), Carla Carmona was invited to write about training in dance (Ch 44). Carmona inquires into how dance instructors convey complex movement sequences (i.e., rules), drawing on Wittgenstein's concepts of *seeing aspects* and the *background* for ascertaining meaning in movements (see also Stickney 2014b). Reading through Cavell and others (Merleau-Ponty), Alexis Gibbs (Ch 45) contributes rich examples on how we can learn through film, even if its depictions are not taken as a mode of explanation or reduced to icons of readily discovered themes. His central aim is to release us from the Cartesian spell of *psychologism*, and in doing this explores controversial claims of discovering 'male gaze' as a hidden intention within some films deemed to be sexist (see also, above, Skilbeck, Ch 13 on drama and Bøyum, Ch 28 on music; Yu 2013, on literature; Cunliffe 2006 and Richmond 2010, on art). When we contacted Tracy Bowell (2001) about contributing her pedagogically focused paper on Jarman's film *Wittgenstein*, we were fortunate to receive from her a new paper

(Ch 42) interpreting Wittgenstein's thought on teaching and training in rules. Proceeding from the terms Wittgenstein uses to express his observations and depictions of the teacher–learner relationship, Bowell's examination seeks to show that Wittgenstein viewed processes of teaching and learning the rules as being less about the kinds of self-formation traditionally associated with *Bildung*; beyond those elements, she sees Wittgenstein's cases of learning as being more deeply dialogical and pedagogical, and as a reminder that our entire network of practices—of ways of being in the world and with each other—are embodied and thus are learned and taught in embodied ways.

2.4 Part V: Religious and Moral Education

Wanting to include discussion of the significance of religion for Wittgenstein and of his philosophy for religious and moral education (see Priestly 2005), we initially contacted Fergus Kerr (retired; see 1986). We were grateful that Patrick Quinn responded to our call, opening the fifth section (Ch 46) with a look at how Wittgenstein inspired his students by exemplifying learning processes as both critical and spiritual dimensions of our lives. Wittgenstein is depicted on the one hand as struggling to free us of the human tendency to want to see things otherwise than they are, and on the other as carrying religious beliefs he often struggled with: self-scrutinizing and confessional tendencies that informed his stance on ethics and shaped his personal demeanor (see also Harris, Ch 9). Through 'The Setting,' by Dublin poet Rory Brennan, Quinn ends with poignant images reminiscent of Wittgenstein: 'The philosopher folded himself into a deckchair…' From the perspective of somebody disappointed with standard methods in world religions courses, of surveying or critiquing the truth claims, Mikel Burley (Ch 47) first takes us on an anthropological tour of the varieties of religious education, explaining along the way their relative weaknesses. He then demonstrates how Wittgenstein-inspired modes of investigation can facilitate interdisciplinarity, bringing deeper engagement with religions and expanding the cultural range of philosophy of religion. Following a line of inquiry started with Quinn, Niklas Toivakainen (Ch 48) explores the destructive nature of Wittgenstein's philosophy, trying to show that its central contribution to clarity of thought lies in its ability to expose our temptation to misunderstand and hence our personal involvement and responsibility for it. Instead of religious life, however, he looks into the moral dynamics underpinning the very conventions that allow clarity to be reached, reading Wittgenstein's mission to 'bring words back to the everyday' as an example of what it means to take personal responsibility. Toivakainen also evaluates Raimond Gaita's reflections on goodness and evil, unraveling the relationship between thinking and moral responsibility.

Chris Hoyt (Ch 49) entertains the claim that (at least in principle) Wittgenstein's manner of examining and healing himself through the process of philosophical reflection demonstrates the soundness of therapeutic education. Against its critics,

Hoyt argues that Wittgenstein's own example shows that open-ended examinations of self, morality, and one's conception of the world are essential to the development of moral depth and spiritual well-being, rather than being antithetical to the goals associated with therapeutic education. Thomas Carroll (Ch 50) closes the book with careful consideration of how Wittgenstein's philosophy may prove to be helpful for understanding and addressing challenges to cross-cultural communication within educational contexts. In particular, Carroll unpacks philosophical terms from *On Certainty*, showing how together with Wittgenstein's dialogical style in the *Investigations* they may be instrumental in identifying and overcoming cultural differences. Carroll hopes (perhaps more optimistically than Wittgenstein himself) that Wittgenstein's philosophy offers strong resources for curbing some of our human tendencies to misunderstand other persons.

3 Conclusion

With a clearer understanding of the background leading up to this volume, we hope readers will better appreciate both the work already conducted around Wittgenstein's philosophical thinking in relation to education, and where our authors found their own entry points into this ongoing stream of thought within the discipline. As many will attest, gaining some understanding of Wittgenstein's philosophy requires many years of study, reading and re-reading hundreds of collected (often non-sequential) remarks in his corpus until 'light dawns gradually over the whole' (OC §141). It also requires careful scrutiny of the secondary literature on Wittgenstein within Philosophy, sensing in this vast literature what may appear to be triumphal moments of insight worth sharing and made relevant within the specialized discipline of philosophy of education.

One lesson from Wittgenstein's *On Certainty* (OC §§94–98), pertinent to the shifting currents of thought, is that what seems permanent often erodes over time and washes downstream. It may be best, therefore, to carry these inspirational, resolute readings with some humility: recognizing that there are many reasonable interpretations of Wittgenstein instead of a single, rational take or firm stance on the subject (see Toulmin 2001; Standish 2013c, & Ch 17 in this volume). One of Wittgenstein's aphorisms (CV, p. 27e) is that on a long hike it is best not 'to stand for too long on one leg, so as not to get stiff,' and to even try walking backwards for a while in order to revive oneself. If we heed Wittgenstein's advice, as shared by Smith, Maruyama and Burbules (Ch 6, 7 and 8), in undertaking philosophical investigations, the reader should also proceed slowly and cautiously, meandering and often doubling back in order to see the same landmarks anew from a slightly different perspective. It is in these rare moments that one may find 'oversight' or a 'perspicuous view' of the topic space we have tried to survey.

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Part II
Biographical and Stylistic Investigations

Subjectivity After Descartes: Wittgenstein as a Pedagogical Philosopher

Michael A. Peters

Abstract This brief introduction is designed to introduce the reader to the man and his work through a reading that emphasizes a broadly cultural approach to his intellectual background, context, and life, recording the influence his thought has exerted on the disciplines, including education and pedagogy. The introductory chapter makes the case for reading Wittgenstein as a pedagogical philosopher that points to a non-foundational approach to traditional philosophical problems that does not proceed by trying to discover essences or eternal forms but rather progresses through commanding a clear view of our concepts and by raising interesting questions. It is therefore an approach that deviates from the foundations of modern philosophy in that it does not base itself on the *cogito*, in the individual thinking; insofar as it avoids this centered Cartesian figure of the subject and of subjectivity the approach adopts an anti-foundationalist stance, an anti-epistemological standpoint and entertains a suspicion of transcendental arguments preferring instead to accept a naturalism grounded in culture and social convention—in what we do and what we say.

Keywords Subjectivity · Descartes · R.S. Peters · Postfoundationalism · Cavell · Pedagogical philosophy

1 Introduction

Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951) is considered by many to be one of the most important philosophers of the twentieth century. His work in the philosophy of logic, mathematics, mind, and language established him as one of the founders

A shorter version appears in the Wittgenstein section of the *Encyclopedia of Educational Philosophy and Theory* (Springer, 2016), co-edited by Nicholas Burbules & Jeff Stickney (Michael A. Peters, Chief Editor).

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M.A. Peters and J. Stickney (eds.), *A Companion to Wittgenstein on Education*,
DOI 10.1007/978-981-10-3136-6_2

of two movements—logical empiricism (the Vienna Circle) and Oxford-style ordinary language analysis. The impact of his work has been felt in the arts, humanities, and social sciences and strongly influenced the directions of both analytic and post-analytical philosophy. His work is difficult to read and interpret, and there are many competing interpretations of his philosophy. This brief introduction is designed to introduce the reader to the man and his work through a reading that emphasizes a broadly cultural approach to his intellectual background, context, and life, recording the influence his thought has exerted on the disciplines, including education and pedagogy. The introductory chapter makes the case for reading Wittgenstein as a pedagogical philosopher that points to a non-foundational approach to traditional philosophical problems that does not proceed by trying to discover essences or eternal forms but rather progresses through commanding a clear view of our concepts and by raising interesting questions. It is therefore an approach that deviates from the foundations of modern philosophy in that it does not base itself on the *cogito*, in the individual thinking and insofar as it avoids this centered Cartesian figure of the subject and of subjectivity the approach adopts an anti-foundationalist stance, an anti-epistemological standpoint and entertains a suspicion of transcendental arguments preferring instead to accept a naturalism grounded in culture and social convention—in what we do and what we say.

This highlights Wittgenstein's anti-Cartesian standpoint, noted by Sluga (1996: 321) who suggests Wittgenstein had "an enduring hostility to the idea of an individuated, substantive self" that was already evident in the *Tractatus* (TLP)[1]:

> 5.631 There is no such thing as the subject that thinks or entertains ideas. If I wrote a book called *The World as l found it*, I should have to include a report on my body and should have to say which parts were subordinate to my will and which were not, etc., this being a method of isolating the subject, or rather of showing that in an important sense there is no subject; for it alone could not be mentioned in that book.

For Wittgenstein of the *Tractatus,* there is no such thing as the thinking or representing subject. David Stern expresses the point this way:

> The central negative point in the *Tractatus* treatment of the self is the denial that there is a self to be found *within* immediate experience by means of introspection, "a thinking representing subject" that both possesses my experiences and is experienced. (p. 73)

Wittgenstein's anti-Cartesian view of mind is based on the fact that "our language creates the illusion that the word 'I' refers to "something bodiless, which, however, has its seat in our body" (Sluga 1996). The denial of Cartesian mentalism is a position that Wittgenstein sustains in the *Philosophical Investigations* when he states "I" is not the name of a person…" (PI §41) and Sluga (1996: 341) reminds us that "the private language argument can be read as directed against the objectivism in the Cartesian conception of mind."

[1]Following convention, titles for Wittgenstein's works are abbreviated (PI = Philosophical Investigations, TLP = Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Z = Zettel, PG = Philosophical Grammar, OC = On Certainty, CV = Culture and Value), with section (§) or page number (p.), with full citation and initials (e.g., RFM) in the References.

Bax (2009) describes how Wittgenstein simultaneously rethinks the Cartesian inner-outer and the Cartesian self-other schema and in particular how in Wittgenstein "mind and body are intrinsically connected instead of almost accidentally related, and the self, far from being a self-enclosed and self-sufficient entity, from day one depends upon its fellow men to develop its inner life beyond its basic state." Bax (2009: 181) maintains that Wittgenstein "situates mental matters on the outside rather than the inside of the subject, and in the interspace between a community of subjects…." Bax (2009) explains that the emergence of anti-Cartesianism undoubtedly has its roots in a line of thinking that culminated in Heidegger's (1927) *Being and Time* and that "after" Heidegger:

> terms like "subject" and "subjectivity" came to be used almost exclusively to refer to the worldless, Cartesian-style Ego: to the idea that man can, on final analysis, be understood as a thinking substance whose inhabiting a (social) world and a body accordingly do not pertain to its essence. (p. 3)

Those following Heidegger—in particular French thinkers like Derrida, Lyotard, and Foucault—are thought of as having delivered the final blow to the Cartesian Ego. "By deconstructing the concept of subjectivity, writing it off as one grand narrative among others, or presenting the subject as a contingent product of power relations, each contributed to or even explicitly predicted the so-called "death of man" (Bax 2009, p. 3). According to Bax, while Wittgenstein is typically not thought of as a Continental philosopher embracing these themes "he can for several reasons be held coresponsible for the demise of the Cartesian Ego" (p. 5).

2 Wittgenstein, Subjectivity, and Philosophy of Education

The analytic revolution in philosophy of education, what Cuypers and Martin (2009) call "a singular analytical paradigm for puzzle-solving in the philosophy of education," was conceived by R.S. Peters as "conceptually foundational" in the sense that it involved "the analysis of concepts [constitutive of education] and with questions about the grounds of knowledge, belief, actions, and activities" as a "necessary preliminary to answering other philosophical questions" (p. 5). In the same volume dedicated to a sympathetic re-reading of R.S. Peters, Laverty (2009: 33) maintains "Peters was clearly influenced by the revolution of post-war philosophy, particularly Wittgenstein's original contribution; but he also strove to establish the revolution's continuity" with the history of philosophy. Laverty (2009: 30) indicates that "Peters rarely theorized his analytic approach to philosophy of education" and that although he appealed to Wittgenstein on linguistic usage and the concept of games, "Peters held that Wittgenstein was wrong to overlook the possibility of a 'general principle' that distinguishes all games." It is not clear on what grounds Peters makes this assertion. Peters' contribution to the analytic paradigm was based on a commitment to a form of conceptual analysis that implied

a view of philosophy as a second-order discipline that casts philosophers of education as “underlabourers in the garden of knowledge” (Peters 1966: 15).

The argument is that R.S. Peters’ analytic paradigm was based on an appeal to Wittgenstein that was misplaced and represents a grossly mistaken reading of Wittgenstein. By contrast, this paper proposes a reading of the work of the later Wittgenstein which both unsettles the view of Wittgenstein as a placeholder in the analytic tradition and provides interpretive grounds for viewing him closer to the tradition of Continental philosophy and as a thinker deeply influenced by Krauss, Spengler, Nietzsche, and Freud who embrace the notion of philosophy as a form of cultural criticism (Peters and Marshall 1999; Peters 2002a, b; Peters et al. 2008). The “postmodern” appropriation of the later Wittgenstein marks him out as a philosopher who anticipated central aspects of the re-evaluation of the culture of modernity. This chapter broadens this interpretation to outline a view of subjectivity, knowledge, and representation “after” Wittgenstein, a position that provides a more appropriate platform for philosophy of education in the age of globalization, preserving a link to Wittgenstein and his philosophy while speculating on the sources for a notion of education as openness, engagement, and *co-poiesis*. This chapter provides an account of the Cartesian philosophy of subjectivity and Wittgenstein’s attempt to provide a break with the Cartesian worldview that is much more important for contemporary philosophy of education than reference to a method of conceptual analysis that views philosophy as a meta-discipline. In the next section, Wittgenstein’s anti-Cartesianism is explored as a basis for deconstructing Descartes’ view of mind, human beings, and modern philosophy.

3 Descartes, and the Philosophy of Subjectivity

The philosophy of subjectivity has been one of the crowning achievements of Western philosophy that has helped to shape and define modern philosophy, the foundations of science, liberal political and educational thought, and the culture of modernity. Of all philosophers responsible for the subjective turn and for the subsequent epistemological foundations and direction of modern philosophy, René Descartes deserves special mention. In his own lifetime, his reputation rested on his contributions to mathematics and cosmology, and only in the nineteenth century did his metaphysics and epistemology contribute to the Kantian project of reconstituting the nature of philosophy. His scepticism became important in the revival of Anglophone empiricist epistemology in the twentieth century, and his idea of the self as a locus of subjectivity independent of the world—its ethical and political implications—began to impact French and German philosophy from the 1930s with philosophical engagement of his work by Husserl, Heidegger, and Wittgenstein, among others (Gaukroker 2008).

Descartes’ “epistemological turn” (after Bergmann) is one of the centers of his works that lead him to counter scepticism by locating certainty in subjective consciousness setting modern philosophy on a path intimately connected to theory of

knowledge that was later embellished by Kant's transcendental argument concerning synthetic *a priori* knowledge. Stroud (2008: 513) suggests "The philosophical, mathematical, and scientific influence of Descartes is now so deep and so pervasive in our culture that its full extent can no longer be measured with certainty or precision." Descartes' philosophy of mind embraced a mind/body dualism, individualism about mental contents, and adherence to a strong doctrine of privileged first-person access that holds introspective judgments about one's own mental states enjoy a privileged epistemic status of infallibility and immunity to error. Descartes was acknowledged by Husserl as "the genuine patriarch of phenomenology" and christened his own phenomenology a new Cartesianism. Heidegger, by contrast, saw the Cartesianism as a fundamental wrong turn and rebelled against its legacy, suggesting that the *cogito sum* had to be "phenomenologically destroyed" (see Martin 2008: 496).

The words "subject" and "subjectivity" have many different meanings. The word "subject" comes from the Latin word "*subjectum*" which means something under or constituting the foundations of other things. In Aristotle, "subject" is not a philosophical category that belongs to human beings and does not function as a philosophical category nor is it considered to have any kind of precedence over the concept of substance. "Subject" in addition to the use that Descartes firms up as a metaphysical dominant category meaning the mind, ego, or agent that sustains or assumes the form of thought or consciousness, also carries the medieval political meaning of "vassal"—someone who owes fealty to a monarch or one who lives in a territory and owes allegiance to a sovereign power. This is the double political and ethical meaning of subject that Michel Foucault exploits in his studies of subjectivity. Subjectivity has been used to mean many things: consciousness, intentionality, the will, individual volition, and introspection.

An understanding of the significance of Wittgenstein's work as *breaking with* and offering a critique of the Cartesian model of subjectivity is more significant to philosophy of education than the method of conceptual analysis that R.S. Peters and other analytical philosophers of education extract in an appeal to the work of Wittgenstein. It is both more fundamental and provides a basis for a critique of various claims of essentialism in the philosophy of the subject, which is so important in the age of globalization when claims to identity and difference have come to the fore. The Cartesian model of subjectivity arises out of a certain picture or image of the knowing subject deeply embedded in the medieval culture of theology and scholastic philosophy (even though it tries to break with these influences) and a mathematical conception of certainty that is seen as providing appropriate foundations for knowledge. As Wittgenstein (PI §115) suggests (speaking of the "picture language" and the general form of a proposition in the *Tractatus*), "a *picture* held us captive, and we could not get outside it, for it lay in our language and language seemed to repeat it to us inexorably." The question so important to philosophy and the nature of education is how to disassemble this metaphysical Cartesian world picture that comprises the foundations of modern philosophy through the binary oppositions from mind/body, subject/object, inner/outer to word/object, signifier/signified, self/other, and male/female. On this view, Wittgensteinian philosophy of education is an approach in part dedicated to

the unpacking and critique of the Cartesian dualist theory of mind and the foundational epistemology that appeals to "certainty" and to accurate representation. On a Wittgensteinian approach, the dualist theory of mind gives way to the study of subjectivity as a result of cultural and historical influences where both knowledge and learning are not seen as wedded to foundations in any sense but rather are a bundle of contingent practices. The Wittgensteinian view is thus both anti-foundational and anti-representational (of a independently existing reality).

In the *Investigations* and later works, Wittgenstein wrestles with the Cartesian picture of subjectivity and its implications for knowledge and representation, providing us with an alternative vocabulary to discuss the Cartesian picture of mind as objects which possess properties and as a non-physical substance that thinks, famously referred to as *the ghost in the machine* by Gilbert Ryle. Wittgenstein takes on this philosophical struggle to unseat Descartes' view of mind as both an essentialist and dualist conception—internalist, private, non-physical—that arises from his view of nature and science as proceeding from mechanistic ("mechanics") principles and a view of knowledge that embraces a form of epistemic internalism that holds that "the difference between true belief and knowledge consists in some form of justification and, crucially, that justification consists in factors that are, in some sense, internal to the subject of the belief" (Rowlands 2008: 6). The Cartesian picture of mind involves many different threads, not just a conception of mind, but also a view of knowledge and representation, an image of philosophy, and a view of the nature of human beings. Dislodging this picture by disassembling it and describing it as *mythology* (as legitimating a certain world picture) requires something more than argument or conceptual analysis. Wittgenstein demonstrates that dislodging the deeply embedded culture of Cartesianism is not a matter of proposing better arguments or of argumentation per se but rather rests on a variety of other rhetorical strategies. This point has a clear set of implications for Wittgensteinian pedagogy—simply put, teachers must engage with the emotions and imagination of students.

It is worth noting in passing that the appeal to Wittgenstein by R.S. Peters on the "revolution in philosophy" does nothing to justify the method of conceptual analysis he advocates but rarely spells out: Wittgenstein contra Peters does not see philosophy in any way as a foundational, second-order activity based on the clarification of concepts. While the early Wittgenstein of the *Tractatus* may have seen philosophy as a critique of language using logical analysis to reveal the general form of the proposition "in order to see the world rightly," it does not result in linguistic hygiene or the ultimate meaning of concepts. His later conception of language games, family resemblance, and "meaning as use" further distances Wittgenstein from anything like Peters' conceptual analysis. Against any conception of conceptual analysis in Peters' sense Wittgenstein teaches us: First, we must look to the variety of uses to which the word is put which is purely descriptive rather than explanatory or prescriptive; second, we must be aware of the diversity and multiplicity of uses that only have life within a language game and form of life; third, a concept or word only has meaning in the context of a sentence and sentences within the network of judgments and practices; fourth, while language games have rules, these cannot be learned theoretically but only in practice; fifth, by

following the use, we discover only "a complicated network of similarities, overlapping, and criss-crossing" (PI §66), a family resemblance, that resists all explanation and definition in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions; sixth, the rules of grammar liberated from the bounds of strict logic express the norms of language and tell us what kind of object anything is (PI §§371, 373) for they are embedded in the culture and "the *speaking* of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life" (PI §23). No reading of Wittgenstein validates or justifies anything like Peters' version of conceptual analysis. Wittgenstein would only accept a form of analysis as a kind of therapeutic activity of "assembling reminders for a particular purpose" (PI §127). As he writes in the *Investigations,* "there is not *a* philosophical method, though there are indeed methods, like different therapies" (PI §133). The aim of philosophy is "to shew the fly out of the fly-bottle" (PI §309).

It is significant that for Wittgenstein in *On Certainty* (1969), language is not the foundation—words and justifications come to an end (OC §192) on the base of "hinge propositions" which are neither true nor false but "remain firm" for us. When Wittgenstein writes: "Giving grounds, however, justifying the evidence, comes to an end;—but the end is not certain propositions' striking us immediately as true, i.e., it is not a kind of seeing on our part; it is our acting, which lies at the bottom of the language game" (OC §204) Wittgenstein is suggesting that there is only cultural practice at the bottom of our language games, an ungrounded way of acting. Contrary to Descartes' starting point of the indubitability of the self-reflecting *cogito* as offering the foundations of knowledge based on a mathematical model of certainty that ultimately leads to a self-stultifying solipsistic self, Wittgenstein both naturalizes and socializes cognitive processes locating them first in language and then as part of the activity of a culture. He is thus not a foundationalist in any accepted definition of the term. For him, certainty and the very possibility of meaning lies in the background context without which propositions could not even be enunciated: "…I want to conceive [certainty] as something that lies beyond being justified or unjustified; as it were, as something animal" (OC §359).

The notion of philosophy as a kind of therapy has a set of links and references that take us back to the beginnings of philosophy and certainly to the Stoics who held "that emotions like fear or envy (or impassioned sexual attachments, or passionate love of anything whatsoever) either were, or arose from, false judgements and that the sage—a person who had attained moral and intellectual perfection—would not undergo them". The therapeutic notion of philosophy was intimately tied to the pursuit of the good life and philosophy as a therapy of emotions. Gordon Baker, among others, provides a therapeutic reading of *Investigations* that positions Wittgenstein as attempting to break us free of the impulse to metaphysics through an elaborately structured dialogue where the reader is encouraged to think for himself or herself. The work of Stanley Cavell, James Conant, and Cora Diamond regards Wittgenstein's philosophy as entirely therapeutic, rather than as having any theoretical or metaphysical aspects. Certainly there are a range of comments by Wittgenstein scattered throughout his work where he uses the notion of therapy to describe his activity of doing philosophy such as "In philosophizing we may not terminate a disease of thought. It must run its natural course, and slow cure is all

important" (Z §382). Wittgenstein also extends this conception to education when he says "I trot out all the problems that education represses without solving. I say to those repressed doubts: you are quite correct, go on asking, demand clarification" (PG, p. 382). The justification of R.S. Peters' approach to philosophy of education by means of a distinctive and foundational method of conceptual analysis does not hold water, and its justification cannot be found in Wittgenstein.

By contrast, the "new Wittgenstein" coalesces around a series of common interpretive protocols: Wittgenstein is not advancing theories in philosophy but rather employing a therapeutic method to deconstruct philosophical puzzles; he is helping us to work free of the conceptual confusions that become evident when we begin to philosophize; at the same time, Wittgenstein is disabusing us of the notion that we can stand outside language and command an external view, and that such an external view is both necessary and possible for grasping the essence of thought and language. On the new reading, Wittgenstein encourages us to see that our intuitions about meaning and thought are best accommodated "by attention to our everyday forms of expression and to the world those forms of expression serve to reveal" (Crary and Read 2000: 1). This new schema for reading Wittgenstein puts less emphasis on the decisive break in his thought, represented by the *Tractatus* and the posthumous *Investigations*, to emphasize, by comparison, significant continuities of his thought centring around his therapeutic conception of philosophy. The new reading that emphasizes the therapeutic character of Wittgenstein's philosophical aims and method is sympathetic to and consistent with the "postmodern" view of Wittgenstein (Peters and Marshall 1999) which explicitly provides an emphasis on a literary, cultural, and (auto)biographical reading of Wittgenstein's works, their intertextuality, the expression of the spirit of European (Viennese) modernism in the *Tractatus*, and the anticipation of certain "postmodern" themes in his later works which, on the one hand, cast him in close philosophical proximity to Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, and Heidegger and, on the other, project his writings into an interesting engagement with poststructuralist thought (Peters and Marshall 1999: 19–20).

This cultural reading, in part, was inspired by Cavell's work, which serves as an exemplar both in reading Wittgenstein in relation to the movement of *modernism* and against Wittgenstein's Viennese cultural background where the influence of Nietzsche, Schopenhauer, and Freud is evident. Cavell's writings draw widely upon the philosophical tradition and emphasize the parallels between Wittgenstein and many contemporary thinkers, including both Derrida and Foucault. It is a view that sits well with Wittgenstein as a pedagogical philosopher (Peters et al. 2010). In the "postmodern" reading, the *Tractatus* is seen to be *modernist in its formalism*, while the *Investigations* anticipates certain "postmodernist" themes including anti-foundationalism and anti-representationalism (Peters and Marshall 1999). The distinction is principally a matter of the style of *doing* philosophy, and it is reflective of the impact of larger cultural forces upon Wittgenstein and, significantly, also the seven years Wittgenstein spent as an elementary school teacher in rural Austria. It does not deny that there are significant continuities in his thought, say, for instance, in his view of philosophy. In this reading, it is possible to argue that the therapeutic aim became more manifest in

Wittgenstein's "pedagogical" style and in a view called "philosophy as pedagogy" (Peters and Marshall 1999). This view does not entail necessarily an account of "social constructivism," or imply that "postmodernism" (whatever that elusive term means) necessarily entails social constructivism in any of its versions. In one sense, "postfoundational" is a better term that serves to provide a general philosophical direction in epistemology, learning and ethics.

The cultural and postmodern reading of Wittgenstein, like much of postmodernism, considered as a whole, tends to emphasize a number of overlapping cluster concepts focusing on its openness and lack of essentiality, including the following characteristics:

- antifoundationalism;
- anti-essentialism;
- anti- or post-epistemological standpoint;
- anti-realism about meaning and reference;
- suspicion of transcendental arguments and viewpoints;
- rejection of the picture of knowledge as accurate representation;
- rejection of truth as correspondence to reality;
- rejection of canonical descriptions and final vocabularies;
- suspicion of metanarratives.

The list is taken from Bernd Magnus' (1989) discussion of Nietzsche in relation to postmodern criticism. To Magnus' list, it is relevant to add what Rorty (1979) calls "antirepresentationalism" and also to add, "suspicion of metanarratives" and the turn to narrative and narratology. More generally we can talk of *petite récits* pitted against metanarratives by Lyotard (1984) who significantly makes central use of Wittgenstein in a creative misappropriation to emphasize the conflictual or dissensual nature of language games. We might add an emphasis on linguistic use and *therapeutic view of philosophy*—that is, an embodiment of many of the features of the list above and an ethos, above all, concerning philosophy as a critique of language summed up best in the famous quotation from the *Investigations*: "Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language" (PI §109). This is a view that underlies the development of social sciences and cultural studies in the latter half of the twentieth century; perhaps, sloganized in the twin methodological imperatives: the linguistic turn, the significance of representation, and turn to social practices, on the one hand; and, the attempt to overcome the dualistic thought, the search for certainty and essences, and the subjectivism that are the legacies of the Cartesian thought, on the other. Encouraged by Wittgenstein's expert disassembly of the Cartesian worldview and model of subjectivity we might entertain a model of education as openness, engagement, and *co-poiesis*, one that is more suited to the global, networked, and digital environment we live in. This notion also would lay the groundwork for a notion of Wittgenstein as a pedagogical philosopher that comprises some of the dominant themes of this collection.

4 Reading Wittgenstein as a Pedagogical Philosopher

This collection explores Wittgenstein not so much as a philosopher who provides a method for analyzing educational concepts but rather as one who approaches philosophical questions from a pedagogical point of view. The analytic impulse to want to extract a theory or method from Wittgenstein or to use his method to clarify concepts in the manner of R.S. Peters is only one way of viewing the educational significance of Wittgenstein's philosophy. Perhaps more importantly, his styles are *essentially pedagogical*: he provides a variety of rhetorical strategies as a means to shift our thinking, to help us escape the picture that holds us captive. In this regard, it is also possible to see connections between other aspects of Wittgenstein's life, his cultural orientation, and his styles of philosophizing, including, for example, his interest in architecture and his preference for certain musical and poetic styles and forms.

Wittgenstein's later writing is dialogical, but not in the Socratic sense: The aim is not the search for an adequate definition of a concept. Indeed, if we keep in mind the multiplicity of language games, we will not be inclined to ask questions such as "What is the meaning of…?" (PI §24). Moreover, the kinds of questions Wittgenstein asks, and the way he asks them, is different from those of Socrates. Fann (1969: 109) notes that Wittgenstein asks himself (and his readers) in the order of eight hundred questions in the *Investigations*, yet he only answers one hundred of them and of these the majority (some seventy) he answers deliberately wrongly. If a dialogical work, the *Investigations* is not a conventional dialogical work, for Wittgenstein—by asking questions and answering them wrongly—wants to stop us from asking certain kinds of questions—the sort of "philosophical" questions which require that we provide a theoretical answer abstracted from the context of use and social practice. Philosophy does not make progress because "our language has remained the same and keeps seducing us into asking the same questions" (CV, 15e). Moreover, the questions asks are frequently posed by an imaginary interlocutor *to himself*—linking his approach again with a confessional mode in which the primary dynamic is of an inner dialogue (Finch 1995: 76).

This mode of dialogue, then, is not one of *demonstration* (as it often was for Plato) but of *investigation*. Wittgenstein's use of imagined interchanges, thought experiments, and frequently cryptic aphorisms were meant to engage the reader in a process that was, in Wittgenstein's actual teaching as well as in his writing, the externalization of his own doubts, his own questions, and his own thought processes. Hence, his philosophical purpose was manifested, shown, in *how* he pursued a question; his style was his method, and his writings sought to exemplify how it worked. His concern with matters of composition and form were not only about the presentation of an argument, but about the juxtaposition that would best draw the reader into the very state of puzzlement he himself felt. Therefore, an appreciation of Wittgenstein's style leads us directly to an understanding of the fundamentally *pedagogical* dimension of his philosophy.

Paul Engelmann (1967: 114), in his memoir of Wittgenstein, warns us not to underestimate the influence of Wittgenstein's teaching experience on his philosophical works. Wittgenstein, Engelmann maintains, "used the acquired art of asking questions with consummate skill, and the crucial simplicity with which he accomplished this in his most profound mental probings constitutes his great new philosophical achievement" (p. 115). Engelmann suggests that Wittgenstein moved to the Socratic form of questions in his later work in order to correct the reflective monologue of the *Tractatus* which were written in the form of categorical propositions.

There is more than a family resemblance between Wittgenstein's styles of teaching at Cambridge and his styles of philosophizing. They represent to all intents and purposes a profound and complex continuity: The dividing line between Wittgenstein's teachings and his posthumously collected and edited works are blurred to say the least. The oral performance runs into and sometimes constitutes the written corpus. Many of his "works" are transcriptions, discussions, notes, or lectures recorded by his students and colleagues. His "notes," at another level of composition, are sometimes reworked even in the process of dictation. His styles of teaching and thinking in performance therefore comprise, perhaps more than any modern philosopher, a significant proportion of his extant works.

The accounts of his teaching by his students confirm an *intensity* of thinking that shows itself in his writings; this intensity is driven, in large part, by the ethical and aesthetic requirements of *arranging* or composing his thoughts. His writings mirror his approach to teaching philosophy and vice versa. Above all, they reflect his *honesty* as a thinker and teacher. And if he was unforgiving in his treatment of his students, it is because he was unforgiving with himself. The long painful silences that interspersed his classes, his disregard for institutional conventions in pedagogy at the time and his relentless (self) criticism were an essential part of his style as a "great educator" (in Nietzsche's sense).

Accounts of Wittgenstein as a teacher of philosophy are now legendary. D.A.T. Gasking and A.C. Jackson (1967: 51) report the following description Wittgenstein gave of his own teaching:

> In teaching you philosophy I'm like a guide showing you how to find your way round London. I have to take you through the city from north to south, from east to west, from Euston to the embankment and from Piccadilly to the Marble Arch. After I have taken you many journeys through the city, in all sorts of directions, we shall have passed through any given street a number of times—each time traversing the street as part of a different journey. At the end of this you will know London; you will be able to find your way about like a Londoner. Of course, a good guide will take you through the more important streets more often than he takes you down side streets; a bad guide will do the opposite. In philosophy I'm a rather bad guide….

Janik and Toulmin's (1973) Wittgenstein's Vienna was the first to demonstrate the significance of a historico-cultural approach to understanding Wittgenstein and the importance of the Viennese cultural milieu to understanding his work. Adopting a Kantian interpretation of the early Wittgenstein, they argued he was addressing the problem of representation, a problem that arose in the culture of Viennese

modernism. Janik and Toulmin argued that Wittgenstein was extending in his own way the critique of language and culture initiated by Karl Kraus (and Fritz Mauthner) and they emphasized a romantic and ethical interpretation of the *Tractatus* where, as they assert, “Only art can express moral truth, and only the artist can teach the things that matter most in life” (Janik and Toulmin 1973: 197).

Alan Janik (1981: 85) identifies Wittgenstein with the spirit of the Austrian counter-enlightenment characterized by a focus upon the limits of reason, in the tradition of Lichtenberg, Kraus, Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard, Weininger, and Nietzsche. Wright (1982), in an influential essay, argues that Wittgenstein displays a Spenglerian attitude to his times: Wittgenstein understood himself to be living in “an age without culture,” an age where modern philosophy was no longer able to provide the metalanguage which united the family resemblances of culture’s various manifestations.

Erich Heller (1988) suggests that Wittgenstein in many respects resembled Nietzsche:

> in his homelessness, his restless wanderings, his perpetual search for exactly the right conditions in which to work, his loneliness, his ascetism, his need for affection and his shyness in giving it, his intellectual extremism, which drove thought to the borders of insanity, the elasticity of his style, and… in one philosophically most important respect. Like Nietzsche he knew that philosophical opinion was not merely a matter of logically demonstrable right or wrong… it was above all a matter of authenticity… (Heller 1988: 143–4)

Stanley Cavell (1988) views Wittgenstein as a “philosopher of culture” and provides a reading of the *Investigations* as a depiction of our times, agreeing with von Wright’s assessment of Wittgenstein’s attitude as Spenglerian suggesting that Spengler’s vision of culture as a kind of Nature is shared in a modified form in the *Investigations*. Cavell (1988: 261–2) argues that the *Investigations*” diurnalizes Spengler’s vision of the destiny toward exhausted forms,” toward the loss of culture and community. Cavell draws our attention to the way Wittgenstein’s uniqueness as a philosopher of culture comes from “the sense that he is joining the fate of philosophy as such with that of the philosophy of culture or criticism of culture.” By doing so, he argues, Wittgenstein is calling into question philosophy’s claim to a privileged perspective on culture that could be called the perspective of reason.

In line with this reading, Wittgenstein’s work, broadly speaking, may be given a cultural and literary reading which focuses upon his *styles*. Such a reading legitimates both the importance of Wittgenstein—the person—and the significance of his (auto)biography in a way that analytic philosophers might find hard to accept. The question of style is a question inseparable from the reality of his life and the corpus of his work. Wittgenstein himself actively thought this to be the case and that this belief is *shown* in his work. This reading also throws into relief questions concerning his appropriation as a philosopher who had something to contribute to education: Wittgenstein not as a philosopher who provides a *method* for analyzing educational concepts but rather as one who approaches philosophical questions from a *pedagogical* point of view. *Wittgenstein style of* “*doing*” *philosophy is pedagogical.* His styles are *pedagogical*; he provides a teaming variety and vital

repertoire of non-argumentational discursive forms—pictures, drawings, analogies, similes, jokes, equations, dialogues with himself, little narratives, questions and *wrong* answers, thought experiments, gnomic aphorisms, and so on—as a means primarily to shift our thinking, to help us escape the picture that holds us captive. It is this notion of *philosophy as pedagogy* that is a defining feature of Wittgenstein's later thought.

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Wittgenstein as Educator

Jeff Stickney

Abstract In Wittgenstein's later writings, he occasionally notes (parenthetically) that his remarks pertain to grammatical problems instead of psychological or causal ones (Z §§318 & 419). Briefly discussing Wittgenstein's own elementary teaching experience to provide background, contrast is drawn between issues of efficacy in teaching and normative training into regular patterns or customs of usage. Following Josè Medina, I bring home a point of particular significance to analytic philosophy of education concerning adept initiation into practices: what Wittgenstein refers to as 'mastery of techniques' (PI §199) requires facility and autonomy within the rules not explicable on causal terms, nor diminished by its origins in normative training. Realizing this avenue through training does not however undermine the rational elements of teaching and learning—the space of reasons—sought by the analytic school. Etiological problems connected to teaching and learning are then distinguished from philosophical issues surrounding ranges of meaningful use and degrees of arbitrariness in relation to rule-following. The conclusion, earlier articulated by Standish (1995), is that Wittgenstein's later philosophy draws a sharp distinction between any possible 'science' of education and his therapeutic concept of philosophy as the dissolution of grammatical problems.

Keywords Wittgenstein · Education · Causes · Empirical · Philosophical · Pedagogy

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A portion of this paper was given at the PESGB *Gregynog* Conference, 'Orientations Towards Wittgenstein' (Wales 2015), hosted by Paul Standish and Naomi Hodgson. A shorter version appears in the Wittgenstein section of the *Encyclopedia of Educational Philosophy and Theory* (Springer, 2016), co-edited by Nicholas Burbules & Jeff Stickney (Michael A. Peters, Chief Editor).

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M.A. Peters and J. Stickney (eds.), *A Companion to Wittgenstein on Education*,
DOI 10.1007/978-981-10-3136-6_3

> I cannot describe how (in general) to employ rules except by teaching you training you to employ rules. (Z §318)[1]

> Any explanation has its foundation in training. (Educators ought to remember this.) (Z §419)

1 Introduction

Sage advice is not to look for educational theory in Wittgenstein's writing but to see his later philosophy as pedagogical (Peters 1995; Peters and Marshall 1999; Peters et al. 2008), or as therapeutic (Smeyers et al. 2006). *A Companion to Wittgenstein on Education: Pedagogical Investigations* does not seek to extract pedagogical theory from Wittgenstein's philosophy; rather, authors were invited to address a wide range of applications of Wittgenstein's philosophy to issues related to teaching and learning, and to philosophy of education. Acknowledging established boundaries, here I set Wittgenstein's later remarks on training against the background of his own elementary school teaching in rural Austria (1920–26), sorting empirical matters related to education from his philosophical concern with the acquisition and judgment of meaning. Interested in securing learning in his elementary classroom, he later came to distinguish such causal inquiries from philosophical inspection of grammatical problems (PI §122). In this move, training is the avenue leading us into felicitous performance of language-games (including math and music notation), but meaning (an ontological concern with significance) is socially governed in terms of our usage and judgment, and is neither reducible to its prerequisite nor closed from change.

As Glock (1996, 111–2) explains, in his later philosophy Wittgenstein attends to how words are taught not to 'engage in armchair learning-theory' or to offer any 'empirical genetic theory', but to show conceptually that teaching by explanation presupposes basic linguistic skills we are not born with, but acquire by means of training. Early training provides a (non-rationalist) foundation for explanations as well as our basis for judging whether explanations are clear or not. Hunter (1985) illustrates this beautifully through the case of a frustrated mathematics teacher struggling with the problem of 'retelling' (not merely repeating) instructions in such a way as to clarify intended rules for the perplexed student. How does the teacher know when the pupil 'gets it'? Adeptly employing words or rules within their appropriate connotative, axiomatic and grammatical ranges of usage, the pupil demonstrates learning achievement as a criterion for successful initiation into conventional practice or mastery of techniques (PI §199). Attention to training as

[1]Following convention, titles for Wittgenstein's works are abbreviated (PI = Philosophical Investigations, RFM = Remarks on the Foundation of Mathematics, OC = On Certainty, WL = Wittgenstein's Lectures, CV = Culture Value, PO = Philosophical Occasions), with section (§) or page number (p.), with full citation and initials (e.g., RFM) in the References.

the basis for judgment (PI, p. 227) sidesteps the vicious circularity, leaving shared practice as our 'ground' in an otherwise post-foundational epistemology.

In the final section, I attend to another boundary issue drawn by Wittgenstein: between philosophy conceived as a way of dissolving problems caused by running up against the limitations of our grammar, and the practical concerns of disciplines like linguistics or mathematics. The issue is most dramatically illustrated in his conflict with Alan Turing over contradictions in mathematics. By way of extension, Wittgenstein also differentiates his philosophical remarks from the interests of child psychology (Z §412), making it very clear, once again, that he was not trying to advance any theory of learning.

2 Elementary School Teaching

When Wittgenstein moved to rural Austria to teach elementary school (1920–26), his sister (Margarethe Gretl Stonborough) protested that this 'was like using a precision instrument to open crates', to which he replied that it was a better alternative to suicide —the unfortunate demise of two of his older brothers (Bartley 1985, 37). Perhaps taken on as an escape from the world, like his subsequent gardening work in a monastery, he nevertheless embraced the challenge to become an educator and even wrote with enthusiasm to Russell about being 'happy in my work at school' (Monk 1990, 193). The difficult task often proved to be frustrating, however, partly because the cultivated aristocrat was out of place among rural, poor folk who found him 'strange' (Monk 1990, 194, 197; cf. Janik and Toulmin 1973). His teaching career ended after six years with an inquest into his well-documented use of corporal punishment (see Monk 1990, 194–5, e.g. accounts of pulling girls' hair and cuffing boys' ears). Wittgenstein's rather Nietzschean views of education appear untimely now.

> I think the way people are educated nowadays tends to diminish their capacity for suffering. At present a school is reckoned good 'if the children have a good time'. And that used not to be the criterion. Parents moreover want their children to grow up like themselves (only more so), but nevertheless subject them to an education quite different from their own – Endurance of suffering isn't rated highly because there is supposed not to be any suffering – really it's out of date. (CV, p. 71e)

Despite strict discipline, students later described Wittgenstein as a highly devoted if demanding teacher (see Bartley 1985; Monk 1990). In his elementary classroom, Wittgenstein assiduously compiled words students used, forming a reference dictionary. Edmonds and Eidnow (2001, 61) note that 'his dictionary was in keeping with the [reform] movement and the position in the *Investigations* that rural dialects could be in perfect order as they are'. Phillips (1977, p. 8, citing Bartley 1985, p. 117; cf. Bartley 1974) claims that by keeping their own dictionary Wittgenstein's students gained an appreciation of 'the ambiguity of their own usage of the language'. In this sense, Wittgenstein was conservator of the child's quotidian language: pedagogy congruent with his later philosophy—meaning-as-use (OC §61).

Wittgenstein's practical approach to teaching was somewhat in keeping with child-centred movements in Austria, in vogue while attending Vienna's Teacher Training College (1919–20; Phillips 1977, 7–10; cf. Savickey 1999, 2017, this volume). Bartley, however, recalls Wittgenstein joking about these reforms: perhaps embracing the anti-scholastic spirit and practices, but amused by campaign rhetoric. Edmonds and Eidnow (2001: 61) also recall that "Wittgenstein poked fun at the programme's more vulgar slogans and projects." Wittgenstein was cautious about 'language gone on holiday' (PI §38): '…Don't let yourself be seduced by the terminology in common currency' (CV, p. 74e).

That early teaching experience influenced later thinking at Cambridge is apparent from Wittgenstein's use of orthography as a paradigmatic case.

> One might think: if philosophy speaks of the use of the word "philosophy" there must be a second-order philosophy. But it is not so; it is, rather, like the case of orthography, which deals with the word "orthography" among others without being second-order. (PI §121)

Remarks on orthography adduce Wittgenstein's general attitude towards foundations, and our later flexibility within rules and practices—some of which may be arbitrary and open to revision.

> Just as in writing we learn a particular basic form of letters and then vary it later, so we learn first the stability of things as the norm, which is then subject to alteration. (OC §473)

Appealing to his superintendent's attention, Wittgenstein says his *Dictionary for Elementary Schools* (1926) has the goal 'to fill an urgent need with respect to the present teaching of orthography' (PO, p. 15). Prefacing the dictionary 'to make intelligible his general plan', he justifies violating standard rules of alphabetical order, recognized for efficiency and logic. As though making a philosophical refutation, he argues it reduces slippage in learning:

> But if the purely alphabetic order inserts a heterogeneous word between two closely related ones, then in my opinion the alphabetic order demands too much from a child's power of abstraction. Thus, because of the comprehension of words and the highly important saving of space, the purely alphabetic order often cannot be recommended. Equally, each instance of clinging to a dogmatic principle leads to an arrangement that does not suit our purpose and has to be abandoned – even if this would make the author's work much easier. Rather, it is necessary to compromise again and again. (PO, p. 23)

Acknowledging age-appropriate ranges for more demanding, abstract concepts, Wittgenstein's pedagogy sought to reduce what we may see through *On Certainty* as failure to concretize, or erosion of, *bedrock* (OC §94–98). Breaking convention, simplifying better secures learning, showing that teaching technique is not arbitrary. In courses requiring sequential learning, like math and language, it matters greatly whether and when certain content or skills are covered: indeed, mastered through a variety of means reaching students with diverse needs. As a practical art, teaching is closer to cooking in this regard, requiring savoir faire that teachers would find hard to articulate or pass onto novices undergoing teacher training (see PI, p. 227 on demonstrating or giving tips at best).

> Why don't I call cookery rules arbitrary, and why am I tempted to call the rules of grammar arbitrary? Because 'cookery' is defined by its end, whereas 'speaking' is not.... You cook badly if you are guided in your cooking by rules other than the right ones; but if you follow other rules than those of chess you are playing another game; and if you follow grammatical rules other than such-and-such ones, that does not mean you say something wrong, no, you are speaking of something else. (Z §320; cf. PI §§496–499).

Not just any game of learning-enhancement or engagement will do, but too often Ministries of Education (whether in 1920's Austria or those today) attend to creating new menus instead of actually improving the cooking.[2] Wittgenstein wanted to address this problem, first in his own classroom, and then widely in distributing his *Dictionary for Elementary Schools*. From what he refers to as his 'subjective view' it was pedagogically better to group families of words sharing etymological roots, even if this method 'clashes with the generally held principle of alphabetic order' (PO, p. 21). Under alphabetic order, the words alt and Alter are broken up by a heterogeneous word, Altar:

alt, das Alter	old, old age
der Altar	altar
D[d]as Alterum, altermümlich	antiquity, antique

As a 'good' teacher,[3] Wittgenstein was concerned with discovering effective techniques to enhance student learning, and he reflected on his own success. Pondering students' learning-slippage, he later remarked (1940):

> A teacher may get good, even astounding, results from his pupils while he is teaching them and yet not be a good teacher; because it may be that, while his pupils are directly under his influence, he raises them to a height which is not natural to them, without fostering their own capacities for work at this level, so that they immediately decline again as soon as the teacher leaves the classroom. Perhaps this is how it is with me; I have sometimes thought so. (CV, p. 38e)

3 Philosophically Questioning Certainty: Distinctions Between Empirical (Causal) Inquiries and Grammatical Concerns

Wittgenstein later (c. 1950) reflected on his certainty when professing the validity of his pedagogic techniques.

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[2]Karl Popper did his doctorate in educational psychology in Vienna at the same time and concluded that most education reforms were ideological rather than scientific (a case of employing his famous demarcation principle, showing teaching to be something not easily tested) (see Fuller 2004).

[3]Putnam (2002: 34) addresses the problem of the ethically thick concept of the 'good teacher': one who might be cruel, and yet achieve great results.

> I myself wrote in my book that children learn to understand a word in such and such a way. Do I know that, or do I believe it? Why in such a case do I write not "I believe etc." but simply the indicative sentence? (OC §290)

Weighing grammatical suitability in applying the concept 'believing' versus 'knowing' when no doubt occurs in *the flow* of teaching: Wittgenstein distinguishes his philosophical from pedagogical remarks. Repeatedly, Wittgenstein notes that reflections on students 'taking things together' in arithmetic or learning the multiplication table are observations or "remarks about concepts, not about teaching methods" (PI, pp. 208, 227).

> How does one teach a child (say in arithmetic) "Now take these things together!" or "Now these go together"? Clearly "taking together" and "going together" must originally have had another meaning for him than that of seeing in this way or that. And this is a remark about concepts, not about teaching methods. (PI, p. 208)

> "We all learn the same multiplication table." This might, no doubt, be a remark about the teaching of arithmetic in our schools, but also an observation about the concept of the multiplication table. (PI, p. 227)

> Am I doing child psychology? I am making a connexion between the concept of teaching and the concept of meaning. (Z §412)

He was philosophically concerned at Cambridge with ontological problems of meaning instead of earlier training in pedagogy. It is highly unlikely that Wittgenstein saw teaching as a legitimate 'science' (Standish 1995); his philosophical methods aver scientific approach, employing instead ethnography and attending to enculturation (Smeyers 1995, 2008).

> When I write down a bit of a series, that you then see this regularity in it may be called an empirical fact, a psychological fact. But, if you have seen this law in it, that you then continue the series in this way—that is no longer an empirical fact. (RFM, VI.26; cf. PI §109)

Adumbrated here, (empirical) science and (grammatical) philosophy are like passing trains:

> The existence of the experimental method makes us think we have the means of solving the problems which trouble us; though problem and method pass one another by. (PI, xiv, p. 232)

Answering his interlocutor's accusation that emphasises on training amounts to operant conditioning, Wittgenstein again shifts attention from science to grammar.

> "Are you not really a behaviourist in disguise? Aren't you at bottom really saying that everything except human behaviour is a fiction?" – If I do speak of fiction, then it is of a grammatical fiction. (PI §307)

Not throwing out empirical studies on the basis of this distinction, Wittgenstein advised not waiting for a future science of 'mental states' to answer our questions about what makes sense philosophically or pedagogically:

> Sometime perhaps we shall know more about them—we think. But that is just what commits us to a particular way of looking at the matter. For we have a definite concept of what it means to learn to know a process better. (The decisive movement in the conjuring trick has been made, and it was the very one that we thought quite innocent.) (PI §308)

Deflating expectations, waiting for educational psychology to solve our problem of what constitutes 'sound' teaching is like anticipating 'science' to explain what is beautiful or tasteful.[4]

> You might think Aesthetics is a science telling us what's beautiful—almost too ridiculous for words. I suppose it ought to include also what sort of coffee tastes well. (CV §2, p. 11)

Equally, however, Wittgenstein is not anti-etiological; recall that he came to Manchester to study aeronautical engineering (see Monk 1990). Demonstrating that interpretations of rules seem to 'hang in the air', unable to support or determine meaning, Wittgenstein draws an illustrative connection.

> "Then can whatever I do be brought into accord with the rule?"—Let me ask this: what has the expression of a rule—say a sign-post—got to do with my actions? What sort of connexion is there here?—Well, perhaps this one: I have been trained to react to this sign in a particular way, and now I do so react to it.
>
> But that is only to give a causal connexion; to tell how it has come about that we now go by the sign-post; not what this going-by-the-sign really consists in. On the contrary; I have further indicated that a person goes by a sign-post only in so far as there exists a regular use of sign posts, a custom. (PI §198)

His distinction shifts emphasis from etiological inquiries into learning, to inspection of training into culturally sanctioned practices and customs.

> "How am I able to obey a rule?" – If this is not a question about causes, then it is about justification for my following the rule in the way I do. (PI §217)
>
> Here we are not asking ourselves what are the causes and what produces this impression in a particular case. (PI, p. 201, on seeing something *as*, say, a triangle)

Pragmatic learning-theory as inquiry into causal processes (e.g. 'teaching by means of indirection') attends, fallibly but instrumentally, to causal learning-conditions. Contrast Dewey's interest with Wittgenstein's:

> Growth in judgment and understanding is essentially growth in ability to form purposes and to select and arrange means for their realization. The most elementary experiences of the young are filled with cases of the means-consequences relationship. …The trouble with education is not the absence of situations in which the causal relation is exemplified in the relation of means

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[4]Of course when he wrote we did not have the neuroscience of music, allowing Daniel Levitin at McGill University (author of *This is your brain on music,* New York: Penguin, 2006) to monitor the parts of the brain activated by music and even to use an algorithm to predict (using Boolean probability) 'hit clusters' in the songs submitted by aspiring artists. I sometimes worry that philosophers of education today want to throw out this entire field of science, which draws the boundary too sharply I think between pedagogy and neuroscience. I mean to say simply that this field is not irrelevant or uninteresting for education, even if not giving us the map to ideal teaching techniques.

> and consequences. Failure to utilize the situations so as to lead the learner on to grasp the relation in given cases of experience is, however, only too common. (Dewey 1938, 104–105)

Although Wittgenstein too appears to have been rearranging conditions to effect learning in his elementary classroom and dictionary, his later philosophical pursuit concerns how—once meaning is secured through training—it ranges 'sensibly' within our grammar. For Wittgenstein, causal relationship securing learning—an educational psychology topic of possible importance in teaching—is not a philosophical (ontological) issue, whereas degrees of arbitrariness and grammatical entanglement in educational language are ostensibly 'philosophical' (PI §§124–126).

Medina (2002, p. 158) notes this separation from causes was made too insistently in the early 1930s, softening in Wittgenstein's thinking after 1938. Contrast his 1930s Cambridge lectures with 1940s emphasis (*RFM* and *PI*) on training securing rules.

> The process of learning does not matter; it is history and history does not matter here.... This laying down of a rule is exactly analogous to learning language. The laying down of the rule is not contained in following the rule; the laying down is history. (WL, #2, p. 55)

> When we learn the meaning of a symbol the way in which we learn it is irrelevant to our future use and understanding of it. The way in which I learned my A B C and learned to read is irrelevant to my future understanding of written symbols—it is a matter of purely historical interest. But something does as it were adhere to the symbol in the process of my learning its meaning, and this becomes part of the symbol. (WL, #3, p. 117)

Williams (1999, 216) explains that 'The normativity of our practices involves non-causal necessity, that is, logical or grammatical necessity'. By this curious phrase, she means to say that learning to follow directions (ostension or rule-following) presupposes a common background of what is 'obviously the same' for all participants in the learning. This common background for judgment is acquired in the process of training, or in mastering techniques, making the process of learning techniques constitutive of what is learned and enabling learners to recognize sameness, carrying on in the same way as others do.

> The schoolboy believes his teachers and his schoolbooks. (OC §263)

> What we believe depends on what we learn.... (OC §286)

4 Wittgenstein's Emphasis on Training

Wittgenstein's numerous remarks on 'training' support the view that linguistic, mathematical and musical practices are grafted onto our animal reactions; such second-nature 'continuations' are in themselves 'an extremely important fact of nature' (Z §355; cf. BB, pp. 79–80, re: the same training techniques applied to animals).

> By nature and by particular training, a particular education, we are disposed to give spontaneous expression to wishes in certain circumstances. (PI §441)

> Being sure that someone is in pain, doubting whether he is, and so on, are so many natural, instinctive, kinds of behaviour towards other human beings, and our language is merely an auxiliary to, and further extension of, this relation. (Z §545)

Reading Wittgenstein's 'scenes of instruction' for pedagogical technique is potentially hazardous: they illustrate scaffolding needed for rule-following, giving a basis for determining rule 'accordance' (or going-against, PI §201).

Medina (2002, p. 159) concurs, noting that in Wittgenstein's later reflections on learning, 'He emphasizes that, through training processes, our behaviour becomes, not causally determined, but normatively structured; that is, we acquire the ability to engage in self-regulating behaviour'.

> So, for Wittgenstein, our training into techniques is more than an inductive process or a process of conditioning: it is a process of structuring behaviour until it becomes self-regulated. Learning processes of this kind endow us with more than behavioral dispositions or empirical certainties. These processes lead to the adoption of normative standards…. (Medina, p. 159)

Addressing this normative aspect of training, Medina recalls Wittgenstein's descriptions of cajoling students during training: 'The words 'right' and 'wrong' are used when giving instruction in proceeding according to a rule. The word 'right' makes the pupil go on, the word 'wrong' holds him back' (RFM, VI.39; cf. Medina, pp. 164–5). Through drilling-and-instilling, students acquire, blindly, the normative attitude of their mentors.

> When I obey a rule, I do not choose. I obey the rule blindly. (PI §219).

As Hunter (1985, 83) concludes from Wittgenstein's case of the deviant pupil who invents his own rules (PI §§185, 201): '…Once we have shaken loose a little from our fascination with the rule-following theory of mathematical competence, we can begin to show how large a role simply 'being told' plays'. Medina (2002) notes that Wittgenstein underscores this normative compulsion: 'If I have grasped a rule I am bound in what I do further. […] I am bound in my judgment about what is in accord with the rule and what not' (RFM, VI.27). Having internalized the rules or mastered the techniques (PI §199), teachers are in a position to offer demonstrations guiding student performance, as well as judge the suitability of the student's response (re: judging musical performance, CV, pp. 69–70; Z §164).[5]

[5]From the case of the 'harried mathematics teacher':

> The instruction by insistence that seemed to be the way out of the impasse depicted in 185 suggests two important points: (i) That whatever rules the teacher may cite in pressing his case, the hard fact about him is that he is simply not prepared to brook any other continuation of the series than 1002, 1004…. He may adduce various rules in his desperation, but his colours show when the rule proves useless and he simply insists. … (ii) What the student primarily learns is what the teacher insists on: to do it this way—this is what we do here. The practices that he learns in this way can be symbolized, and various of them can be represented in a formula that he comes to be able to use as he advances, but the bedrock of his understanding consists of those things he has simply been told (or, if he has proved recalcitrant or careless, the things that have been insisted upon or drilled into him). (Hunter, 81–82)

Medina (p. 164) notes that for Wittgenstein, the teacher must treat the child with 'courtesy', as though he/she is capable of making correct usage of the rules. 'The teacher treats the pupil's correct responses as indicative of an incipient competence and her incorrect responses as 'mistakes' (cf. RFM, VII.61). But the learner's reactions to the training are invested with normative significance only when viewed against the background of the whole rule-governed practice (cf. RFM, VII.47)'.

> Our children are not only given practice in calculation but are also trained to adopt a particular attitude towards a mistake in calculating.
>
> What I am saying is that mathematics is normative. But "norm: does not mean the same thing as "ideal." (RFM, VII.61)

The teacher checks and corrects the students' responses until self-correction takes over, thus normatively structuring the pupil's behaviour. But this inculcation into norms is not simply conditioning or what liberal-analytic philosophers have eloquently opposed as the 'suppression of reason'. Medina offers important qualification: that the higher goal of initiate-training is to open possibilities rather than merely fix them. Training students into normative attitudes, teachers create regularities, a 'consensus of action' leading towards mastery of techniques (PI §199); adept pupils, however, show more autonomous, self-corrective behaviour within the rules.

Gradually through normative training we respond 'naturally' as most others do (PI §185). Specific techniques of training in different *language-games* lend nuance and relative 'degrees of certainty' (PI, p. 224) to words such as 'prediction': e.g. anticipating moves in gymnastics routines, versus chemical reactions (PI §630). Wittgenstein reminds educators (Z §419, frontispiece) that we know a pupil has mastered the technique for using the word 'red' when he/she responds 'spontaneously' after seeing something we agree is red. Customarily, showing something red affirms its meaning, though calling anything 'red' does not make it so (OC §429).

> The agreement, the harmony, of thought and reality consists in this: if I say falsely that something is *red*, then, for all that, it isn't *red*. And when I want to explain the word "*red*" to someone, in the sentence 'That is not red,' I do it by pointing to something red. (OC §429).

Wittgenstein's point is not that human agreement makes things red, but that we are taught to regard them *as* such (Z §422–32).

> For I describe the language-game 'Bring something red' to someone who can himself play it. Others I might at most teach it. (Relativity.) (Z §432)

The former elementary teacher pauses to note, however, that it would be rather silly to begin the teaching-process this way with school-age children: pointing to things and saying 'That looks red' (Z §418). Infants absorb concepts from their

surroundings; for instance, at an early age they come to see spoons *as* ‘cutlery’ (PI, p. 195). Characteristically, he distinguishes these remarks as bearing on philosophy rather than pedagogy, in this case is not dabbling in cognitive psychology.

> Am I doing child psychology? I am making a connexion between the concept of teaching and the concept of meaning. (Z §412)

Philosophically, the case of learning language-games of ‘red’ takes us back to our grounding within a common *form of life*, and the educationally relevant processes of initiation by which we come to share such judgments. Pupils indicate uptake of immersive training by reacting appropriately and fluently, but ‘this reaction, which is our guarantee of understanding, presupposes as a surrounding particular circumstances, particular forms of life and speech’ (RFM, VII.47). Musing on how ‘one belief hangs together with all the rest’ and how it either accords or breaks with ‘our whole system of verification’, he remarks:

> This system is something a human being acquires by means of observation and instruction. I intentionally do not say ‘learns’. (OC §279)

Similarly, we pick up background-context needed to interpret facial expressions and pain behaviour, but we do not explicitly learn this through formal instruction, nor can we easily impart expert judgment to others (PI, p. 227–8). Needed background for making inferences and judgments comes through tacitly in the process of instruction, rather like learning the significance of ‘making a mistake’ in the course/flow of normative training in mathematics (RFM, VII.6). In this post-foundational epistemology, the rational, autonomous subject of Enlightenment and Analytic philosophy is re-immersed in the ‘flow of life’, where background and training set the stage for meaning.

> What determines our judgment, our concepts and reactions, is not what one man is doing now, an individual action, but the whole hurly-burly of human actions, the background against which we see any action. (Z §567–69)

Sharing a *form of life* means being socialized into accepting certain customs or commands (PI §206; PI, p. 226), giving us also shared ‘agreement in judgments’ (PI §§241–2) upon which we can also challenge and advance claims: including the suitability of explanations delivered in the course of teaching.

> Instead of the unanalysable, specific, indefinable: the fact that we act in such-and-such ways, e.g., punish certain actions, establish the state of affairs thus and so, give orders, render accounts, describe colours, take an interest in others’ feelings. What has to be accepted, the given—it might be said—are facts of living//forms of life. (PI §630; cf. PI, p. 226)

Despite these frequent scenes of training in the *Investigations*, they are not to be taken as his ‘teachers’ guide to pedagogy’. By contrast, Wittgenstein’s teaching style at Cambridge was a dialogical exercise in critical thinking through problem-solving.

> I should not like my writing to spare other people the trouble of thinking. (PI, viii; cf. CV, p. 61 on changing the way people think rather than gathering followers)

Exchanging and critiquing ideas, however, presupposes commonly held, normatively enforced linguistic and mathematical practices acquired through rudimentary training (PI §§5–6). 'It is essential for communication that we agree in a large number of judgments' (RFM, VI.39). Instead of closing space for contestation, training establishes its possibility: pre-conditional avenues for later self-regulation and improvisation within-and-against the rules (PI §201), or customs for our *way of life*.

5 Wittgenstein on Contradictions and the Boundaries of Philosophy

Debating effects of contradictions within mathematical systems (e.g. 1 = 0, or anything can be derived from a contradiction: p and ∼p), Wittgenstein drew sharp rebuttal from Alan Turing, attending his seminars and also lecturing on the foundations of mathematics at Cambridge (1938–9). Initially intending to train as an engineer but not a mathematician of Russell's or Turing's calibre, Wittgenstein explored this topic by dealing with rudimentary cases: calculations familiar with students six-to-fifteen, bearing on normative training into meaningful linguistic and mathematical practices (language-games; cf. PI, p. 232 on an investigating the foundations of mathematics without looking at actual calculations, and not being logistic). To Wittgenstein's query, 'Why are people afraid of contradictions?' when 'nothing has been done wrong. …where will the harm come?' Turing replied: 'The real harm will not come in unless there is an application, in which a bridge may fall down or something of that sort' (LFM, XXI–XXII). If a bridge falls down, it is due to violation of some natural law, Wittgenstein rebutted, drawing a boundary between outside applications and contradictions internal to mathematics. Seeking to formalize mathematics and anticipating real-life applications, Turing saw internal contradiction as potentially catastrophic: 'You cannot be confident about applying your calculus until you know there is no hidden contradiction in it'. As my vignettes illustrate, however (see Stickney 2009, and 2017 in this volume), educators do not always act on policy absurdities: teachers often work effectively in spite of contradictory rules. Cora Diamond interprets Wittgenstein's reply as suggesting such hidden contradictions either go unnoticed or can be ignored in practice.

> In particular, as Wittgenstein suggests, there is in fact no way that a 'hidden contradiction' can vitiate a calculus as it is actually used. For if the contradiction remains 'hidden', it has no effect on our actual practice of calculation; and if it is 'discovered', then we need not act on it, and so again it can cause no harm.
>
> You might put it: There is always time to deal with a contradiction when we get to it. When we get to it, shouldn't we simply say, 'This is no use—and we won't draw any conclusions from it?' (Diamond 1976 in LFM XXI, p. 209)

Philosophical Investigations finds Wittgenstein lingering here a decade later, still arguing with Turing—his imagined interlocutor.

> It is the business of philosophy, not to resolve a contradiction by means of a mathematical or logico-mathematical discovery, but to make it possible for us to get a clear view of the state of mathematics that troubles us: the state of affairs before the contradiction is resolved. (And this does not mean that one is sidestepping a difficulty.)
>
> The fundamental fact here is that we lay down rules, a technique, for a game, and that then when we follow the rules, things do not turn out as we had assumed. That we are therefore as it were entangled in our own rules.
>
> This entanglement in our rules is what we want to understand (i.e. get a clear view of).
>
> It throws light on our concept of meaning something. For in those cases things turn out otherwise than we had meant, foreseen. That is just what we say when, for example, a contradiction appears: "I didn't mean it like that."
>
> The civil status of a contradiction, or its status in civil life: there is the philosophical problem. (PI §125)

Reading five indentations as musical notation—'bars' delivered from a philosopher wanting to be read adagio (CV, pp. 57&68)—this densely compacted cluster of staccato remarks hammers out tones resonating through several interrelated aspects of Wittgenstein's later philosophy: each of critical significance to the public lives we carry out within educational institutions. Frequently passed over in Wittgenstein commentary, this passage intervenes more familiar sayings: Philosophy 'leaves everything as it is' (PI §124); it 'simply puts everything before us, and neither explains nor deduces anything. Since everything lies open to view there is nothing to explain', and therefore anything hidden 'is of no interest to us' (PI §126).

Occurring midway into the rule-following argument, he is more narrowly responding to his earlier project in the *Tractatus* and deflating aspirations of Russell, Turing and the logical positivists in contending that philosophy cannot provide foundations for language or mathematics (cf. PI, pp. 224–32). Instead of providing a logical foundation with 'crystalline purity', Wittgenstein discovers one on the 'rough ground' (PI §107): wonderfully flawed, but operating well enough in the flow of life. Often taken as indication of Wittgenstein's latent conservatism, philosophical non-intervention clears the path for normative training and mastery of techniques to appear (§§185–201) as the only ground remaining for appraising 'correct' reactions to rules. Wittgenstein joins the closing passages on rule-following (§§241–2) with the topic of expert judgement: comparing relative certainty in mathematical truths (calculations) and reading emotions or intentions in faces (PI, pp. 224–27). In both rule-following and expert judgment, something has to remain stable as 'given', and this ungrounded-ground (OC §§166, 253) is forms of life or 'agreement in judgments'.

Here we find political aspects dwelling alongside the epistemological, applicable to the way we talk about improving educational policy, student learning and teacher training. So often we find ourselves bewildered at how our pedagogical games turn out (PI §109). Entangled in rules governing education, we are caught in shallow contradictions nobody on the outside can rectify—least of all indifferent philosophers. At most posting these to our attention, philosophers are 'not sidestepping difficulty' by withholding resolution: something agents must negotiate or improvise

themselves. Upon inspection, contradictions reflect back on the realization that in most cases, 'meaning is found in use' and is 'sometimes explained by pointing to its bearer' (PI §43), as when we see our policies or curricula interpreted differently than intended and flag our intentions. The weight or value we give to contradictions, sometimes ignoring them and at other times falling out, can have immense significance in public life—certainly of interest to philosophers, as are deviations in ways people react to the rules and training (PI §185; Z §355). When philosophers try to enter into these problems, they risk imposing an external order that distorts rather than clarifies the ground of meaning (see PI §107 on the traction-less, 'crystalline purity' of logic versus the pliable, 'rough ground' of language-in-use). Wittgenstein conveys this external imposition in a Kafkaesque scene of 'philosopher-kings' arranging furniture for a town hall meeting.

> A philosophical problem is similar to one about the constitution of a particular society. —And it would be as if a society came together without clearly written rules, but with a need for them; indeed also with an instinct according to which they observed//followed// certain rules at their meetings; but this made it difficult by the fact that nothing is clearly expressed about this and no arrangement is made which clarifies//brings out clearly//the rules. Thus they in fact view one of them as president, but he doesn't sit at the head of the table and has no distinguishing marks, and that makes doing business difficult.
>
> Therefore we come along and create a clear order: we seat the president in a clearly identifiable spot, seat his secretary next to him at a little table of his own, and seat the other full members in two rows on both sides of the table, etc., etc. (PO, Philosophy, p. 173)

Heeding Wittgenstein, philosophers seek the synoptic or perspicuous view (PI §122) of the linguistic and practical situation out of which such contradiction arises, surveying the grammar of what possibly makes sense for us—at this juncture in our history and culture. Ingloriously, 'destroying houses of cards' (PI §118): '… the results of philosophy are the uncovering of one or another piece of plain nonsense and of the bumps that the understanding has got by running its head against the limits of language' (PI §119). From this perspective, philosophy of education does not aim at solving the problems internal to education (rearranging its furniture), but to reveal where educational language has 'gone on holiday'.

> What we find out in philosophy is trivial; it does not teach us new facts, only science does that. But the proper synopsis of these trivialities is enormously difficult, and has immense importance. Philosophy is in fact the synopsis of trivialities. (WL, #2, p. 26)

Likewise, on Wittgenstein's account, philosophy does not fix problems internal to mathematics, nor interfere with actual usage of language (PI §126, 132). 'A "leading problem of mathematics" is for us a problem of mathematics like any other' (PI §124). Philosophically, this means that gaining overview results neither in refinement or completion of rules/systems (PI §133), but therapeutic dissolution of the problem haunting us; it 'gives philosophy peace', helping us to 'stop doing philosophy when we want to'.

Not that solution is impossible or ineffable: a conclusion leading to defeatism or quietism. Linguists and mathematicians develop solutions on their own.

> Such a reform for particular practical purposes, an improvement in our terminology designed to prevent misunderstandings in practice, is perfectly possible. But these are not the cases we have to do with. The confusions which occupy us arise when language is like an engine idling, not when it is doing work. (PI §132).

More constructively, Wittgenstein describes practical solutions to contractions as opening alternate avenues to roadblocks, or bridgework (cf. RFM, I.163–66; Medina, p. 154).

> Contradiction is between one rule and another, not between rule and reality. One feels that a wrong rule is an obstruction in the way, but in fact it is only another different way. If you give the wrong rule, you give a different rule. If you feel unable to get over the obstruction, it is not in the physical sense 'unable'. In the physical sense you can try to remove the obstruction. In the other sense it is a choice between one or other calculus. (LC, pp. 93–4)

The lesson drawn from contradictions is that rules embed no deeper than in their teaching, giving surficial ground for judging correct application; open to interpretation, instructors and administrators nonetheless do not countenance rule-deviation. Pupil and teacher incorrigibility leads educators to consider causes: bad habits of teaching/learning, or lacking capacities to learn (cf. PI §144). Wittgenstein directs us instead to witness the instruction, or avenue, securing felicitous performance: 'Once you have got hold of the rule, you have the route traced for you' (RFM, VI.31).

> …What is the criterion for the way the formula is meant? Presumably the way we always use it, the way we were taught to use it. (RFM, I.1-2)

Frequently using scenes of learning to free us from assuming there is only 'one right way', Wittgenstein constructs an imaginary word ('Boo') to depict training into common use through ostensive definition (e.g. 'that coat's colour'):

> The point is that one only has to point to something and say, "This is so-and-so", and everyone who has been through a certain preliminary training will react in the same way. (LFM, XIX, pp. 182)

And when we automatically follow rules of usage, regarding the colour as 'Boo', what then? His interlocutor (Turing) questions whether there are 'right rules' for usage, or ten thousand meanings. Wittgenstein rebuts:

> –It sounds as if your learning how to use it were different from your knowing its meaning. To know its meaning is to use it in the same way as other people do. "In the right way" means nothing.
>
> You might say, 'Isn't there something else, too? Something besides the agreement? Isn't there a more natural and a less natural way of behaving? Or even a right and a wrong meaning?'…
>
> This hangs together with the question of how to continue the series of cardinal numbers. Is there a criterion for the continuation – for a right and wrong way – except that we do in fact continue them in that way, apart from a few cranks who can be neglected?…

> One might say, 'But are you saying, Wittgenstein, that all this is arbitrary?'—I don't know. Certainly as children we are punished if we don't do it in the right way. (LFM, XIX, pp. 182–83)

So-called cranks respond differently to training, as though having different natural reactions (PI §185).

> Following a rule is analogous to obeying an order. We are trained to do so; we react to an order in a particular way. But what if one person reacts in one way and another in another to the order and the training? Which one is right?…
>
> The common behaviour of mankind is the system of reference by means of which we interpret an unknown language. (PI §206; cf. §207)

Of course, people differ without being 'cranks'. 'We' do not always share the same bedrock certainties or reactions. Mouffe (2000, §27), citing Tully (1989), warns against inscribing homogeneity into Wittgenstein, inviting ready accusations of conservatism. Entertaining alternatives offers promise that, 'Our way of seeing is remodelled' (RFM, IV.30). Macmillan (1995) cautions that students with learning disabilities may find themselves outside 'normal' reactions, living alternate forms of life. Their questions or doubts may be unintelligible to the frustrated teacher (OC §310).

> For how can a child immediately doubt what it is taught? That could mean only that he was incapable of learning certain language-games. (OC §283)

Instead of ruling-out possible sense on external or logical criteria, Wittgenstein asks us to consider 'surroundings' where usage finds a home: inventing or adapting language-games where a technique could be practiced, and thus a context to which its sense and degree of certainty is relative (PI, p. 214). 'If someone wanted to alter the number series to read 12, 14, 13', he remarks, 'This would be immensely impractical, inconvenient—but not wrong' (LFM, VIII, p. 83). Questioning whether it would be useless or uninteresting to leave 13 out of mathematics, he remarks:

> … It may under certain circumstances be very useful to count differently….
>
> There is discovery that 13 follows 12. That's our technique—we fix, we teach, our technique that way. If there is a discovery—it is that this is a valuable thing to do. (LFM, VIII, p. 83)

Admittedly 'sounding-like pragmatism' (OC §422: see Garrison, 2017, this volume), Wittgenstein grounds 'reasonableness' in sustainable, communal practices. Arguing with Turing over the flexibility of the word 'analogous'—an identity term needed for other teachings to be effective—Wittgenstein counters:

> The point is indeed to give a new meaning to the use of the word 'analogous'. But it is not merely that for one is responsible to certain things. The new meaning must be such that we who have had a certain training will find it useful in certain ways. (LFM, VI, p. 66)

Finding ourselves at loss to explain why techniques or models suit given purposes, we easily fall back on shared perspective, pointing to what seems obvious to most: 'A good ground is one that looks like this' (PI §483). We can never articulate fully the circumstances or holistic-context for judging meaning and appropriateness (Taylor 1995). Nor can we teach someone explicitly how to judge suitability of

teaching practices, though they can learn gradually through practice and with guidance (PI, p. 227).

> It is not only difficult to describe what appreciation consists in, but impossible. To describe what it consists in we would have to describe the whole environment. (CV §20, p. 7)

Explanations for rule-following lead to an infinite regress problem (each explanation begs further clarification, PI §198). Like social dancing (Taylor 1995), cultural context forms the basis upon which we interpret innovations to the rules or appraise new 'steps'. Having the wrong look or misstep registers as 'impractical' or 'unhandsome' (Cavell 1990) against the background of collected techniques or rules within the educational community. Being accustomed to rules and meanings provides comfortable range (ethos) within which to dwell, also rendering occupants vulnerable to reaction when someone deviates from expected patterns.

> A poet's words can pierce us. And this is of course causally connected with the use that they have in our life. And it also is connected with the way in which, comfortable to this use, we let our thoughts roam up and down in the familiar surroundings of the words. (Z §155)

Accepting contingency without excluding diversity, *forms of life* limit ranges of rule-alteration in education: referring back to utility or sensibility apparent for communities of practitioners.

> "We are sure of it" does not just mean that every single person is certain of it, but that we belong to a community which is bound together by science and education. (OC §298)

6 Conclusion

The goal of this chapter has been to highlight some of the boundaries drawn by Wittgenstein in his later philosophy, some of which have precedents in his earlier thinking in the *Tractatus* (e.g. boundaries between the empirical and philosophical, and between what can be said sensibly and what passed over in silence). Inquiries into Wittgenstein's thinking about pedagogy, a subject broached in many chapters of this book, may risk transgression of these boundaries. Here the reader will have to think for him or herself whether his cases of learning and training have been stretched from their philosophical purpose within Wittgenstein's grammatical investigations, perhaps to leverage empirical or pedagogical claims. On his own advice, we need to weigh each case carefully, 'staving off the craving for generality' (BB, p. 18). We also have to ask what the consequences are of breaching these limits. As Wittgenstein (the Hermes-like 'trickster') warns and his earlier *Tractatus* powerfully illustrated when it comes to remaining silent about ethics and aesthetics, sometimes lines are established in order that we cross over them (OC §499).

> To say 'This combination of words makes no sense' excludes it from the sphere of language and thereby bounds the domain of language. But when one draws a boundary it may be for various kinds of reason. If I surround an area with a fence or a line or otherwise, the

> purpose may be to prevent something from getting in or out; but it may also be part of the game and players supposed, say, to jump over the boundary; or it may shew where the property of one man ends and that of another begins; and so on. So if I draw a boundary line that is not to say what I am drawing it for. (OC §499; cf. §500)

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Wittgenstein's Philosophy: *Viva Voce*

Beth Savickey

Abstract Wittgenstein was a passionate and inspired teacher and philosopher. He taught elementary school in rural Austria from 1920 to 1926 and philosophy at Cambridge University from 1929 to 1949. His early pedagogical practices exemplified Austrian school reform principles. Rote learning was replaced by *Arbeitsschule* or 'learning by doing', a method that guided students to self-activity through integrated instruction. 'Learning by doing' could also serve as an apt description of Wittgenstein's later philosophy, a philosophy he composed *viva voce* while teaching in Cambridge. Although it is commonplace to speak of Wittgenstein's early and later philosophy, it is not yet common to speak of his early and later teaching. While the former is defined by difference, the latter is surprisingly consistent and coherent. This suggests that one of the most fruitful ways to approach Wittgenstein's life and work is not through attempts to render his early and later philosophical texts more consistent or coherent, but to recognize the continuity and development of his early and later pedagogical practices. While the relationship between Wittgenstein's philosophical and pedagogical practices remains controversial, there is growing recognition of its significance and importance.

Keywords Wittgenstein • Teaching • Austrian education reforms • Glöckel • Philosophy

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M.A. Peters and J. Stickney (eds.), *A Companion to Wittgenstein on Education*,
DOI 10.1007/978-981-10-3136-6_4

1 Wittgenstein's Elementary Teaching Experience and Its Significance

At the end of the First World War, Wittgenstein was held in a prisoner-of-war camp in Cassino, Italy. While there, he met Ludwig Hänsel and decided to become an elementary school teacher.[1] He was released from Cassino on 21 August 1919, and enrolled in a teacher-training college in Vienna in September. He attended the *Lehrerbildungsanstalten* in the Kundmanngasse, which was the first to operate under the general direction of Otto Glöckel (Bartley 1974b: 317). After the First World War, and the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, the Austrian republic adopted new goals and methods of educational instruction. Austrian school reform attempted to express and enact nascent democratic interests and ideals.[2] Otto Glöckel, Austria's Secretary of Education (1918–1920), led the development of a new school system. It replaced rote learning with *Arbeitsschule* or learning by doing:

> In place of rote learning, the child now had the '*Arbeitsschule*' – learning by doing: the teacher had to step down from his podium and move among his pupils. He could no longer talk down to them as an undisputed authority, but must now be their guide and friend. (Mandl 1962: iii)[3]

Austrian school reform was introduced in 1919 and implemented across Austria until 1926. When the Christian socialists gained control of Austria in 1927, the movement ceased (except in Vienna). Wittgenstein's first teaching career corresponds to these years.

Wittgenstein received his teaching certificate for elementary schools on 5 July, 1920, having completed his year of teacher training.[4] On September 16, he took his first position as a temporary elementary school teacher in Trattenbach (near Kirchberg am Weschel), where he remained for two years. In 1922, he moved to a school in the village of Haßbach but remained for only a week, before becoming a substitute teacher in Neunkirchen. He began a position in Puchberg am Schneeberg later that fall. Wittgenstein was appointed a permanent teacher in elementary

[1]Hänsel was later to become a well-known educator in Austria, and he remained one of Wittgenstein's close friends. For further details and discussion, see Monk (1990).

[2]Foremost among these was the conviction that a democracy required citizens capable of critical thinking. Although not the dissemination of specific doctrines or bodies of knowledge, encouraging and enabling critical thinking for both boys and girls (of all backgrounds) was not without political, economic, and social implications. Bartley notes that 'the majority of the villagers among whom [Wittgenstein] lived came to regard him and his new teaching methods as dangerously threatening to their way of life' (Bartley 1985: 80). For example, in rural farming communities, school often came into conflict with farm work.

[3]This paper is indebted to Ernst Papaneck's study, *The Austrian School Reform: Its Bases, Principles and Development—The Twenty Years Between the Two World Wars*. Papaneck was a young teacher during the years of Austrian school reform. He later settled in the United States, where he taught at City University of New York (CUNY), Queens College (Kilpatrick 1962: vii).

[4]He was allowed to enter at the fourth and final year of the training program.

schools after having passed his teacher's exam by December 1922. He continued teaching in Puchberg (1922–1924), and then in Otterthal (1924–1926).[5]

Wittgenstein was, by all accounts, an enthusiastic, dedicated, and gifted teacher. According to Georg Berger, the provisional headmaster of Trattenbach at the time of Wittgenstein's arrival:

> He asked me to help him if necessary. I willingly promised to do so, but it was not necessary. He was very diligent at the school. For every class he painstakingly wrote a lesson plan in a book large and thick enough to be a school register. The school hours were always too short for him. (Hausmann 1982: 19)[6]

According to two students, Emmerich Koderhold and Oskar Fuchs, Wittgenstein's teaching methods were often unforgettably effective, and his enthusiasm for passing on his knowledge knew no limits (Hausmann 1982: 17, 21). Wittgenstein's sister, Hermine, captures the spirit of his teaching in the following passage:

> He is interested in everything himself and he knows how to pick the most important aspects of anything and make them clear to others. I myself had the opportunity of watching Ludwig teach on a number of occasions, as he devoted some afternoons to the boys in my occupational school. It was a marvelous treat for us all. He did not simply lecture, but tried to lead the boys to the correct solution by means of questions. On one occasion he had them inventing a steam engine, on another designing a tower on the blackboard, and on yet another depicting moving human figures. The interest which he aroused was enormous. Even the ungifted and usually inattentive among the boys came up with astonishingly good answers, and they were positively climbing over each other in their eagerness to be given a chance to answer or to demonstrate a point. (Wittgenstein 1984: 5)

With everything he taught, Wittgenstein attempted to arouse in the children the same curiosity and questioning spirit that he himself brought to everything in which he took an interest (Monk 1990: 195).

Wittgenstein's teaching was consistent with the school reform's method of learning by doing (*Arbeitsschule Methode*).[7] The philosophy of 'work education', or learning by doing, was articulated by Eduard Burger, who was appointed to the

[5]Bartley notes that other teachers also moved frequently between schools in the district (Bartley 1985: 87–88).

[6]Many of the first-hand accounts of Wittgenstein's years as an elementary school teacher (provided by former students, colleagues, administrators, and friends) were collected and recorded by Luise Hausmann, a retired secondary school teacher from Kirchberg am Weschel. In response to a letter from the district school administration requesting information about Wittgenstein shortly after his death, she gathered information from her neighbours in Otterthal and Trattenbach over a ten-year period and made several journeys to Puchberg am Schneeberg (Hausmann 1982: 16). Some of her work appears in Bartley's publications during the 1970s before it was translated and published in English in 1982.

[7]*Arbeitsschule* means 'work school' and *Arbeitsmethode* 'work method', but they are usually translated as 'learning by doing' and 'activity method', respectively. *Arbeitsschule* was contrasted with *Drillschule* (which emphasized drill without advance preparation) and *Lernschule* (which stressed memorization or rote learning).

Education Reform Division in 1919. (He was responsible for drafting school reform laws in the administrative section for elementary schools.) Burger's basic philosophy of work education was expressed in his claim that 'what the pupil can do should be done by the pupil, not the teacher' (Papaneck 1962: 61). According to Papaneck, 'instead of handing out ready-made knowledge to rather passively receptive students, the schools undertook as their first task the training of young minds for critical thinking' (Papaneck 1962: 118). Further, education was seen as an unending process of continuous growth. Quite broadly, it was understood that education was not just the acquisition of knowledge and skills, but the development of certain attitudes, traits, and habits of life (Papaneck 1962: vii, ix). Austrian school reform grew out of a variety of social, psychological, political, and educational theories. Thus, the aims, methods, and curricula of the new school system were based on a combination of existing theories and ideas.[8]

Arbeitsschule or 'learning by doing' was founded on three basic principles: (i) the nature of the child, (ii) self-activity, and (iii) integrated instruction. Children were understood to have a faculty of logical thinking that could be developed. And it was suggested that when children came to an understanding of a problem, through investigation, they would be eager to continue learning. Unlike rote learning, education was now to involve learning through activities. As Bartley notes, '"*Sich etwas erarbeiten*" suggests in German acquiring knowledge by working or puzzling something out for oneself' (Bartley 1985: 79). According to Glöckel, the methods used for the assimilation of subject matter were as important as the subject matter itself. The role of the school was to guide a child to self-activity. He writes:

> Youth must learn to question, to doubt, to meditate – and to enjoy it – that they may not do homage to false authority! They must mature through their own thinking and their own inquiry; they must labor for and work out their own convictions and face intelligently the great problems that agitate our times. Only what the child works out for himself, only the knowledge he earns by his own efforts and through his own experience can become his undisputed property. (Papaneck 1962: 2)

Children were guided to self-activity through the principle of integrated instruction. Integrated instruction involved two central methods: *Bodenständigkeit*, or the rooting of education in the environment, and *Gesamtunterricht*, in which there was no strict division of subject matter and hours of instruction. In the first case, knowledge was gained not only through books, but also from the students' world. Teachers gathered material from the children's environment so that they could learn about their own home surroundings, in order that they might then find their way outside (Papaneck 1962: 53). Model-making and the use of illustrative materials also contributed to the rooting of education in the environment. In *Gesamtunterricht*, there was no strict division of subject matter and hours of instruction. Rather, the teacher focused 'all branches of instruction on one central

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[8]These included the theories and ideas of the Freuds, Adler, the Bühlers, Aichhorn, and Birnhaum (Papaneck 1962: xi).

topic. Language, writing, drawing, and handicrafts, the child's conception of his environment, arithmetically and geometrically, must all flow naturally from the particular topic being treated' (Papaneck 1962: 55). The subjects of instruction were connected and interrelated without any strict demarcation. Among the activities used in connection with these methods were drawing, music, physical culture (games, dance, and sports), and school walks. School walks were considered one of the most important methods of instruction:

> The students were told to keep their eyes and ears open so as to be able to use, next day, what they had seen and heard. The children's experiences and observations on such outings became rich teaching material. The school walk – with all its preparations, incidents and follow-ups – was not planned simply for the sake of what the children might learn about their environment – trees, flowers, animals, people at work, their working habits. These observations became the subject matter of writing, reading, arithmetic, drawing, singing, calisthenics and of special work projects. (Papaneck 1962: 90)

The principles of self-activity and integrated instruction were both evident in Wittgenstein's pedagogical practices during this period. He was familiar with these principles not only through his training and interaction with colleagues, but also through the school reform's two leading periodicals *Die Quelle* and *Schulreform* to which he subscribed. He also referred to these principles in reports that he was required to submit on a regular basis (Bartley 1974b: 77).

Wittgenstein's teaching activities included model-making and the use of illustrative materials. During his daily pedagogical discussions with Norbert Rosner in Puchberg, he often stressed the value of models as illustrative examples (Hargrove 1980: 455).[9] He made many teaching aids, and 'with the help of the children: a model steam engine, a model iron works, mammal skeletons, etc.' (Hausmann 1982: 19).[10] Fuchs (his student) notes that Wittgenstein took great trouble to guide the children to find out for themselves what was possible. He also took students on walks, taught them astronomy at night and led excursions to Vienna. On one occasion, Wittgenstein took his Otterthal students to Vienna for three days at his own expense. 'In addition to the visit to Schönbrunn, were a steamboat ride to Klosterneuberg and a visit to a school gym where the children were permitted to romp around on the equipment to their hearts' content' (Hausmann 1982: 25).[11] The following description of one of Wittgenstein's excursions from Trattenbach to Vienna clearly demonstrates the practice and ideals of rooting education in the environment:

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[9]These daily discussions, which took place over the period of almost a year, attest to Wittgenstein's active and ongoing engagement with pedagogical issues. His position in Puchberg represents the midpoint of his Austrian teaching career.

[10]The skeleton of a cat Wittgenstein assembled at Puchberg was still in use as late as 1953 (Hausmann 1982: 23).

[11]According to Bartley, such excursions (as well as the expenses being covered by the teacher) were not uncommon in Austria at this time.

> As they hiked through the woods to catch the train from Gloggnitz, Wittgenstein required them to identify local plants and stones, samples of which they had already studied in class. While they wandered through the streets of Vienna, he threw a barrage of questions and information at them, calling their attention to machines, architectural styles or other things they had already learned about at school. (Bartley 1974b: 80)

Wittgenstein was sometimes criticized for going beyond the aims and methods of Austrian school reform. For example, he successfully taught advanced algebra, geometry, natural history (biology, botany, and geology), and literature. Rosner describes how he 'often went on his own way, wanting to find new methods of teaching and education' (Hausmann 1982: 22)[12] Rosner refers not only to Wittgenstein's success at teaching advanced subjects, but also to innovations such as the building and use of a potter's wheel. One of Wittgenstein's pedagogical innovations was to begin with interesting and unusual examples (rather than standard or ordinary ones) not only in mathematics, but also in grammar and other subjects:

> Wittgenstein argued that the child should learn the principle of a thing through an interesting, though possibly difficult specific case; even if other standard examples were easier to learn, there was no point in cluttering up the mind of the child with them unless he understood and could apply the principle behind them. Thus one went from the unusual to the ordinary rather than – as many had hitherto supposed – from the ordinary to the unusual. (Bartley 1974b: 79)

Students learned through investigation, and their active participation involved acquiring knowledge by working or puzzling things out for themselves. Such practical exercises played an important role in Wittgenstein's teaching (Monk 1990: 193). In other words, the meaning of specific operations was discovered while their techniques were being acquired (Bartley 1985: 98).[13]

While an elementary school teacher, Wittgenstein published a *Wörterbuch für Volksschulen* or *Dictionary for Elementary Schools*.[14] The dictionary was a direct result of his teaching experience:

> Under Wittgenstein's guidance the children themselves produced a 16 × 10 cm booklet of the following appearance: it consisted of three so-called *Vokabelheften* (a standard form of vocabulary book for use in schools). Those three vocabulary books were sewn together

[12]According to Bartley, 'Wittgenstein often poked fun at the reform program's more vulgar slogans and projects' (Bartley 1974b: 61). It is worth noting that he also made similar comments about philosophical slogans. For example, Redpath writes: 'Wittgenstein intimated that the dictum 'in a great number of cases it is advisable to put "use of a word" for "meaning of a word"' is a slogan. Sometimes the slogan is ridiculed, sometimes it is boosted: in both cases, in his opinion, wrongly…Slogans are easy and stick in the memory. If the use of the slogan goes, but the slogan remains, it is ridiculous' (Redpath 1990: 85). Papaneck also notes that Austrian school reform was 'in the best sense of the word, eclectic…[and] creative in its own right' (Papaneck 1962: 68).

[13]Bartley quotes this passage from Robert Dottrens's *The New Education in Austria* (1930) (New York: The John Day Co.) p. 59.

[14]His dictionary does not contain definitions, so it is more accurately described as a word book or spelling book.

> through their black cloth backs with a strong thread. The finished product contained 64 sheets. The cover is made of brown cardboard which bears a pattern that resembles the grain of wood…The little word-book fabricated by the children has a wrapper made of stiff black paper which exhibits a pattern of grey wavy lines. It contains somewhat more than 3000 words…This booklet is written in *Kurrent* (German or "Sütterlin" script): Wittgenstein had to learn this kind of script as an adult for his career as a teacher. (Hübner 1977: xix)[15]

Wittgenstein notes in a preface to his dictionary that 'when, after several months of work, this little [dictated] dictionary was finished it appeared that the work had been worthwhile: the improvement of spelling was astonishing. The orthographic conscience had been awakened!' (WV, xxxii).[16] However, the disadvantage of being time-consuming and difficult outweighed the advantages which, without doubt, such a self-composed dictionary would have had over a ready-made and purchased one (WV, xxxiii).

To publish the dictionary, Wittgenstein contacted Latzke, his former principal at the *Lehrerbildungsanstalt*. Latzke contacted Hölder–Pichler–Tempsky who, in a letter dated 13 November, 1924, informed Wittgenstein that they would be willing to publish the dictionary (WV, xix-xx). Wittgenstein received a reader's report (requesting minor changes) and a set of proofs (that included the original version and a new arrangement requested by Wittgenstein). The proofs were sent on 7 February 1925, and Wittgenstein received a contract in November of that year. The book was printed in 1926.[17]

The dictionary (or word book) was described by its publisher as an orthography book of everyday life for use in rural schools (WV, xx). According to Eduard Buxbaum, the district school inspector who reviewed the book prior to publication: 'the work principle has made the use of a dictionary in the upper classes of the elementary schools and in the Burgerschule the most pressing question of the present time' (WV, xxi). The use of the dictionary was consistent with Glöckel's method of learning by doing, for reasons Wittgenstein outlines in his preface:

> The goal of this dictionary is to fill an urgent need with respect to the present teaching of orthography. It is the result of the author's practical experiences: In order to improve orthographical writing in his class, and in order to enable students to inform themselves

[15]The production and binding of this spelling book foreshadows the composition and binding of *The Blue and Brown Books*. The Blue Book and the Brown Book were originally composed of remarks dictated to students, which were then mimeographed and bound together. They got their titles from the colour of their covers.

[16]Following convention, titles for Wittgenstein's works are abbreviated (Lectures and Conversations = LC, Philosophical Investigations = PI, The Blue and Brown Books = BB, Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics = LFM, Wörterbuch für Volksschulen = WV, Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology = RPP, Wittgenstein's Lectures = WL, Culture and Value = CV, Zettel = Z, Philosophical Grammar = PG, Lectures on Philosophical Psychology = LPP, Philosophical Occasions = PO), with section (§) or page number (p.), with full citation and initials in the References.

[17]The speed and relative ease of publication stands in stark contrast to the travails associated with the publication of both the *Tractatus* and the *Philosophical Investigations*.

> about the spelling of a word, the author found it necessary to supply them with dictionaries. Firstly, such a dictionary should enable the student to look up a word as quickly as possible. Secondly, the way in which the dictionary informs the student should enable him to retain the looked-up word permanently. The spelling of words becomes an interesting and urgent problem for the student mainly when it comes to the writing and correcting of compositions…Only a dictionary makes it possible to hold the student responsible for the spelling of what he has written because it furnishes him with reliable measures for finding and correcting his mistakes, provided he has a mind to do so. It is, however, absolutely necessary that the student corrects his compositions on his own. He should feel that he is the only author of his work and he alone should be responsible for it. (WV: xxxi)

In the preface to his dictionary, Wittgenstein also discusses the challenges he encountered when writing it.[18] Difficulties include the selection and arrangement of words. In terms of selection, he suggests that only words familiar to students in Austrian elementary schools should be listed and that no word is too common to be entered. One of his criticisms of the two dictionaries used in the elementary schools (one large and one small) involves the large number of foreign words they include. He notes that 'the short edition was entirely useless because it lacked most of the common and important words of everyday life' (WV, xxxii). Further, he writes that compounds should be entered if it is either difficult for a child to recognize them as such, or if looking up the base word easily leads to mistakes. Foreign words should be entered if they are used universally, and dialectal expressions should be entered only insofar as they have been admitted into the educated language (WV, xxxiii). Further, 'instead of campaigning against the use of dialect, Wittgenstein himself [includes and] uses dialect in order to teach grammar' (Bartley 1985: 97).

Questions concerning the arrangement of words prove even more difficult (WV, xxxiii). On first reading, this is surprising for dictionaries or word lists—by their very nature—usually present their entries alphabetically. However, a purely alphabetical order cannot be justified by Wittgenstein:

> If the purely alphabetical order inserts a heterogeneous word between two related ones, then in my opinion the alphabetical order demands too much from a child's power of abstraction. Thus, because of the comprehension of words and the highly important saving of space, the purely alphabetic order often cannot be recommended…In each case I have pondered the groupings thoroughly for a long time. Again and again psychological principles (where will the student look for the word, how does one guard him against confusions in the best possible manner) clash with grammatical ones (base word, derivative) and with the typographical utilization of space, with the well-organized appearance of the printed page, etc. Thus it happens that the superficial critic will meet with seemingly arbitrary inconsequences everywhere, but those inconsequences are caused by compromises between essential viewpoints. (WV: xxxiv–xxxv)

He asks, for example, how he ought to arrange words like *alt* [old, etc.], *Altar* [altar], *Alter* [old age, etc.], *Altertum* [antiquity, etc.], and *altertümlich* [antique, etc.]. He arranges the words in the following manner:

[18] His preface is dated 22 April 1925 (Otterthal). It was omitted from the final printed version.

alt, das Alter
der **Altar**
D[d]as **Altertum**, – tümer, altertümlich (WV: xxxiv)

Thus, in addition to the principle of alphabetical order, Wittgenstein uses the principle of etymological or morphological order for the words of his dictionary. He also makes decisions concerning particular cases based on considerations of where students are likely to look (and where, therefore, a word is most likely to be found). Such decisions involve an understanding of, and familiarity with, the kinds of mistakes students are likely to make. Wittgenstein also includes additional information in his word book to prevent or avert misunderstanding when the meaning of a word is unfamiliar or easily confused with another. He uses the following techniques of clarification: (i) the use of synonyms or partial synonyms, (ii) an indication of changes in phraseology (involving propositions, for example), (iii) the use of opposites to clarify possible misunderstanding, (iv) the use of short semantic phrases or definitions, (v) the use of dialect to explain meaning, and (vi) the pronunciation of foreign words.[19]

> One can crystallize certain viewpoints for the arrangement of the dictionary, above all the principle of analogy, the accentuation of graphemic and phonemic oppositions, and the lexical cross-connections ("word families"). (Hübner 1977: xxiii)[20]

Wittgenstein's dictionary for elementary schools is innovative and unconventional. In its aims and methods, it exemplifies his own teaching practices, as well as the general principles of Glöckel's Austrian school reform.

There are four main responses to Wittgenstein's early teaching career. The first dismisses this period as an interesting biographical interlude, with little or no philosophical significance. This dismissal would be more plausible if his early and later philosophy were not so remarkably different. This response often involves scepticism that someone as gifted as Wittgenstein would (i) willingly choose to teach elementary school in rural Austria, (ii) be (and remain) actively engaged in pedagogical issues while teaching, and (iii) learn (or take) anything of value from his experience. Monk captures this attitude well:

> His family was dismayed by the changes they saw in him [after the war]. They could not understand why he wanted to train to become a teacher in elementary schools. Hadn't Bertrand Russell himself acknowledged his philosophic genius, and stated that the next big step in philosophy would come from him? Why did he now want to waste that genius on the uneducated poor? It was, his sister Hermine remarked, like somebody wanting to use a precision instrument to open crates. (Monk 1990: 170)

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[19]For further examples and a discussion of Wittgenstein's dictionary, see Burkhardt (1984: 30–41).

[20]These viewpoints are strikingly similar to those found in his later philosophy, including the concept of family resemblance.

This attitude was (and continues to be) shared by many in the academic community. However, such choice, engagement, and insight are characteristic of Wittgenstein throughout his life.[21]

A second response claims that his experience teaching children precipitates a reconceptualization of language and accounts for differences in his early and later philosophy. This is the position taken by Paul Engelmann, for example who writes that:

> Unfruitful as Wittgenstein's teaching experience appears to have been for him, its influence on his development from the author of the *Tractatus* to that of the *Investigations* should not be underestimated, even though he would probably not have admitted it himself. When the man, who until then – for all the depth of his insight into the essence of life and humanity – had been frighteningly unworldly and hopelessly foreign to human society, was suddenly brought face to face with its grisly reality, he was luckily also brought into direct contact with children…
>
> For a number of years he was compelled to seek to translate the questions he had to ask as a teacher into a language which he could assume to come close to the children's language (their real one, not a pseudo-pedagogical one, which he would have abhorred). It seems to me that his much later attempt to convey in a new form the philosophical results of the *Tractatus*, corrected by fresh insights, bears witness to the influence of that period. (Engelmann 1967: 114–116)

Such a response approaches Wittgenstein's years as an elementary school teacher on a rather abstract or theoretical level. Engelmann's description reads as if Wittgenstein's time in the classroom provided an opportunity for him to draw theoretical or epistemological insights from practical and pedagogical concerns. (The nature of philosophy itself does not change under this interpretation.) This response would be more persuasive if Wittgenstein's later philosophy did not explicitly eschew theory and explanation in both word and deed. A related interpretation dismisses Wittgenstein's later philosophy precisely because of its relationship to his teaching experience (and the subsequent rejection of theory and explanation). For example, Nieli finds Wittgenstein's use of the figure of the child philosophically insulting and contemptuous. He writes that:

> It has often been remarked that the view of language offered by Wittgenstein in his later philosophy has been greatly influenced by his experiences in Austria teaching language to rural school children. And this, one might say, is precisely what is wrong with it: in essence, it presents a view of language fit for a child, rather than for a critically thinking, morally and intellectually mature adult. (Nieli 1987: 243)

This interpretation reads the later work as presenting a philosophy of language influenced (appropriately or inappropriately) by Wittgenstein's pedagogical experience.

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[21]Bartley suggests that Wittgenstein did not abandon philosophy after the First World War but attempted to put into practice the ethical portion of his earlier writings, while at the same time beginning to formulate the concerns that were to dominate his later philosophy (Bartley 1974b: 4–5).

A third response sees the influence of Wittgenstein's elementary school teaching in his remarks about children. Hargrove, for example, concludes that:

> We can see influence of Wittgenstein's time as a teacher on almost every page of the *Investigations*, for there are very few pages in a row that do not make some reference to children. Throughout his later philosophy, Wittgenstein often supported the points he was making by citing personal observations about children. It is these observations, which he made as a school teacher and used as a pool of data later, that, as I see it, are the true influence on Wittgenstein's work, and not principles taught at the teachers college or waived in his face by school reformers. (Hargrove 1980: 461)

This claim is similar to the previous interpretation only less abstract. Cavell writes, for example, that the emphasis of Wittgenstein's later writings falls, 'not on the acquisition of the grammar or structure of a language, but on the scene of instruction in words' (Cavell 1988: 132). While the figure of the child and scenes of instruction are distinctive features of Wittgenstein's later philosophy, he consistently denies that he is making claims based on his experience. For example, when introducing a possible scene of instruction in §6 of the *Investigations*, he writes: 'I say that it will form an important part of the training, because it is so with human beings; not because it could not be imagined otherwise' (PI, 6). In other words, the role or function of such a scene is no different from that of imagined, invented, or fictitious language games. He explains:

> One thing we always do when discussing a word is to ask how we were taught it. Doing this on the one hand destroys a variety of misconceptions, on the other hand gives you a primitive language in which the word is used. (LC: 1)

Although Wittgenstein often describes scenes of instruction in his investigations, he insists that they ultimately fall out of consideration as irrelevant. (Thus, they are not presented as grounds or data for philosophical claims.) For example, he writes: 'teaching as the *hypothetical* history of our subsequent actions (understanding, obeying, estimating a length, etc.) drops out of our consideration. The rule which has been taught and is subsequently applied interests us only so far as it is involved in the application' (BB, 14 emphasis added).[22]

A fourth response recognizes the pedagogical similarities between his early and later teaching (as well as the philosophical implications of such practices). Bartley notes that although Wittgenstein never slavishly followed Austrian school reform, it is possible to argue that his encounter with Austrian school reform made an important difference in his thinking. As he explains:

> There is another kind of influence which consists in the critical and passionate confrontation with a point of view, in the course of which one absorbs the point of view – i.e. one is able to understand and think in terms of it, and seriously tries it out; withdraws from it whatever is of value – whether theoretical, practical, or in conception of problems; and

[22]Elsewhere he speaks of 'auxiliary lines' of investigation: 'In these considerations we often draw what can be called "auxiliary lines". We construct things like the "soulless tribe" [or children learning]—which drops out of consideration in the end. That they dropped out had to be shown' (RPP: II 47).

> rejects what is false or useless, and whatever, for any reason, one is incapable of absorbing. In the process one may tremendously clarify and enrich the original idea. (Bartley 1985: 113)[23]

It is in this sense that we can approach Wittgenstein's later philosophical and pedagogical practices, practices that are both influenced by, and ultimately go beyond, his experience as an elementary school teacher.

2 Wittgenstein's Teaching at Cambridge

Wittgenstein returned to Cambridge in 1929 and taught there until he retired in 1949 (a period interrupted only once for service as a volunteer during World War II). His *Dictionary for Elementary Schools* was the last book he ever published. It is important to note that he developed and disseminated his later philosophy through teaching. Wittgenstein's classes consisted mainly of dialogue. After a brief summary of a previous gathering, he would start where he left off and try to advance the investigation with fresh thoughts. These were, according to Malcolm, *occasions of original research* (Malcolm 1984: 23).[24] Further, dictations and transcriptions made from these classes were not merely a means of documenting and archiving particular philosophical occasions, but of presenting them as points of departure for further philosophical activities (including our own). In other words, Wittgenstein's later philosophy was composed *viva voce* in England.[25] *The Blue and Brown Books* (originating out of these classes) were dictated to students and circulated in mimeograph form. Additional notes and transcriptions were also published by a number of students after his death.[26] These are important works in their own right and form an integral part of Wittgenstein's later philosophy. His own posthumous publications (based on numerous notebooks, manuscripts, and typescripts) also attest to the reciprocal nature of his teaching and writing. When placed side by side, the transcriptions and publications share a similar tone, form, and content.

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[23]Bartley's interpretation remains more theoretical than the one presented in this chapter, but he does acknowledge the methodological influence of Wittgenstein's teaching on his later philosophy in broad terms.

[24]'He, of course, never read his lectures; he had not, in fact, written them out, although he always spent a great deal of time in thinking out what he proposed to say' (Moore 1993: 50–51 and 113–114).

[25]This is the description provided on the dust jacket of the 1964 (second) edition of *The Blue and Brown Books*.

[26]These include *Wittgenstein's Lectures: Cambridge 1930–1932, Wittgenstein's Lectures: Cambridge 1932–1935, Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief, Wittgenstein's Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics 1939, and Wittgenstein's Lectures on Philosophical Psychology 1946–1947*. G.E. Moore also wrote notes on classes he attended.

Cambridge students describe Wittgenstein as a passionate and inspired philosopher and teacher. Von Wright writes:

> As might be expected, his lectures were highly 'unacademic'. He nearly always held them in his own room or in the college rooms of a friend. He had no manuscript or notes. He thought before the class. The impression was of a tremendous concentration. The exposition usually led to a question, to which the audience were supposed to suggest an answer. The answers in turn became starting points of new thoughts leading to new questions. It depended on the audience, to a great extent, whether the discussion became fruitful and whether the connecting thread was kept in sight from the beginning to end of a lecture and from one lecture to another. (von Wright 1984: 15–16)

Malcolm concurs and confirms that Wittgenstein commonly directed questions at various people and reacted to their replies (Malcolm 1984: 25).[27] Redpath describes Wittgenstein's style of lecturing as unlike anything he had experienced and acknowledges that although he was not wholly unprepared to find Wittgenstein's lectures unconventional in form, he had not realized 'how personal and, in some important sense "natural" they would be' (Redpath 1990: 19–20).[28]

Barrett describes Wittgenstein's ability to bring things into the open and make them clear:

> [He] had a genius here that he was to carry over into his later writings, which exhibits a tireless capacity for inventing models and examples – a quality that makes at once for the unusual richness of his thought and the despair of anyone seeking an easy summary of it. (Barrett 1978: 59)

This tireless capacity for inventing models and examples is reminiscent of the practices used to encourage self-activity and learning by doing in Austrian school reform. Wittgenstein introduces examples (and language games) that are described as interesting, unusual, extraordinary, absurd, bizarre, fascinating, queer, astonishing, unnatural, puzzling, mysterious, and nonsensical. His philosophy is filled with invented or fictitious cases and strange anomalies:

> Laughing cattle, eyes that see despite being attached to the ends of tree branches, people who feel pain in the mouths of other people, cheese that shrinks or grows spontaneously, and tribes of men who do not dream: This is the world of Wittgenstein. (Peach 2004: 299)

Although the unusual or difficult nature of his examples is often acknowledged, their pedagogical significance is rarely questioned. However, remarks quoted verbatim (or almost verbatim) by students (in notes written not only during class, but also over a period of several decades) attest to how striking and effective Wittgenstein's teaching could be. By contrast, Wittgenstein scholarship tends to

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[27]Fann notes that Wittgenstein emphasized that his method could not be learned by hearing lectures: discussion was essential. Fann compares this to the Socratic method and also draws attention to the fact that the *Investigations* takes the form of a dialogue (Fann 1969: 54).

[28]Wittgenstein became acquainted with members of his classes by having them individually to tea (Malcolm 1984: 28). Anyone could attend his gatherings if they arrived on time and made the commitment to continue attending throughout the year, but it was not possible to do so anonymously.

repeat the same few analogies or examples, and rarely displays the full breadth and richness of his work.

Consistent with his earlier pedagogical practices of using interesting, though possibly difficult, specific cases (and going from the unusual to the ordinary), Wittgenstein often replaces standard philosophical examples with unusual, even bizarre, cases. He also takes ordinary cases that are not immediately philosophically puzzling, makes them puzzling, and then renders them ordinary once again. When viewed pedagogically, his classes and texts are creative, imaginative, humourous, poetic, challenging, responsive, generous, and engaging (all important pedagogical and philosophical traits). Malcolm writes:

> A curious thing which I observed innumerable times, was that when Wittgenstein invented an example during his lectures in order to illustrate a point, he himself would grin at the absurdity of what he had imagined. But if any member of the class were to chuckle, his expression would change to severity and he would exclaim in reproof: "No; no; I'm serious." The imaginary events and circumstances were so odd and so far beyond the reach of natural possibility that he himself could not help being amused; yet the intention of the example, of course, was serious. (Malcolm 1984: 28)

Malcolm suggests that Wittgenstein's reproof was a reaction to academic cleverness, and notes that he could not tolerate a facetious tone in his class; 'the tone that is characteristic of philosophical discussion among clever people who have no serious purpose' (Malcolm 1984: 28).[29]

Consistent with Austrian school reform, Wittgenstein describes himself as a philosophical guide (LFM, 44). And there is no better description of his method than learning by doing. As late as 1948, he echoes Burger's work philosophy when he writes: 'Anything your reader can do, leave to him' (CV, 77e). In the preface to the *Investigations*, he also states: 'I should not like my writing to spare other people the trouble of thinking. But, if possible, to stimulate someone to thoughts of his own' (PI, xe). The principles of self-activity and integrated instruction are exemplified in the participatory nature of Wittgenstein's classes and texts. Students and readers alike are called upon to reason and puzzle things out for themselves. '[Wittgenstein] remarked to the effect that it did not matter whether his results were true or not; what mattered was that "a method had been found"' (Fann 1969: 109–110).

We can also recognize the rooting of education in the environment in Wittgenstein's use of ordinary language and everyday examples. His experience writing a dictionary for elementary schools focused attention not only on the complexity of ordinary language, but also on the pedagogical significance of particular cases and family resemblances. He also remains acutely aware not only of the form and content of his later writings, but also of his readership. The

[29]Malcolm also acknowledges that Wittgenstein could sometimes be a frightening person during class (impatient and easily angered), but he attributes this severity to a passionate love of truth: 'Primarily what made him an awesome and even terrible person, both as a teacher and in personal relationships, was his ruthless integrity, which did not spare himself or anyone else' (Malcolm 1984: 26).

unconventional form of the *Investigations* (which Wittgenstein describes as the *precipitate* of sixteen years of philosophical investigations) exemplifies the ideal of integrated instruction. As he explains in the preface:

> It was my intention at first to bring all this together in a book whose form I pictured differently at different times. But the essential thing was that the thoughts should proceed from one subject to another in a natural order and without breaks…my thoughts were soon crippled if I tried to force them on in any single direction against their inclination…And this was, of course, connected with the very nature of the investigations. (PI: ixe)

Wittgenstein further adopts and adapts the activities associated with integrated instruction in his later philosophy. For example, he writes:

> We could perfectly well for our purposes, replace every process of imagining by a process of looking at an object or by painting, drawing, or modelling; and every process of speaking to oneself by speaking aloud or by writing. (BB: 4)

Painting, drawing, modelling, speaking aloud, or writing are activities not only described throughout his remarks, but also activities through which his philosophy is (and can be) presented and expressed. Wittgenstein writes, 'I might say to my pupils: When you have been through these exercises you will think differently' (PG: 172).

Thus, one of the most fruitful ways to approach Wittgenstein's life and work is not through an attempt to render his early and later philosophical texts more consistent or coherent, but to recognize the continuity and development of his early and later teaching. Returning to Cambridge in 1929, Wittgenstein brings with him a wealth of pedagogical insight and experience and continues many of his earlier pedagogical practices. Our understanding of his philosophy is enriched through an acknowledgement of its pedagogical dimension.

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Wittgenstein's Hut

Darius Rejali

A man's paradise is his own good nature.
From the *Maxims of King Kati to His Son Merikara*
(2025–1700 BC); Requoted in Ezra Pound's Canto XCIII
(1942, 623).

Abstract This is a reflection on Wittgenstein's life by way of a journey to find Wittgenstein's hut in Norway in 2004. The journey weaves together Wittgenstein's notebooks, his biographical relationships with others, and the journey toward, across, and away from the physical terrain around the hut. I try to recover the connection between the two central injunctions of a philosophical life: the Delphic maxim that we should know ourselves, and the Socratic advice that we should take care of ourselves. I consider implicitly how these two philosophical injunctions played out in Wittgenstein's life, the ways he tried to answer them, the ways in which he failed, succeeded, and above all learned about this relationship, and what can be recovered from this experience for us today.

Keywords Wittgenstein · Norway · Barthes · Exile · Intimacy · Detachment · Dependence · Homosexuality · Love · Recollection · Melancholy · Writing · Humility · Abstinence

1 Introduction

In 1913, Ludwig Wittgenstein announced that he was going to Norway, to a distant place where he could concentrate more clearly. Here he built a place he called "Wittgenstein's hut."

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M.A. Peters and J. Stickney (eds.), *A Companion to Wittgenstein on Education*,
DOI 10.1007/978-981-10-3136-6_5

In 2004, I arrived in Oslo and set out to find Wittgenstein's hut. Why? Because when I visit a foreign country, I like an unusual task. This teaches me about the country and about myself. I chose the hut for two reasons. For one thing, one important thesis from Wittgenstein dominates what I do these days. Briefly put, the thesis is that to know your pain is to be able to express it to yourself and others. I'm an expert on modern torture, and I had just given a paper on this theme in Oslo.

This theme, as it turned out, would also help clarify parts of Wittgenstein's life that had remained in shadow to me. For the hut was the place where Wittgenstein thought, loved, and suffered intensely. In this hut, Wittgenstein wrote notes in preparation for the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* in 1913–1914, the first 188 paragraphs of the *Philosophical Investigations* in 1936, and what now forms Part I of *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics* in 1937.

The hut also sheltered Wittgenstein's happiest memories of love. Here, in 1936, Wittgenstein spent ten days with his lover, Francis Skinner. And it was here that he returned in September 1950 with his last lover, Ben Richards, just before he died.

It was the only place Wittgenstein ever felt, however briefly, he belonged. Here in 1913, he didn't doubt why he was there and whether he was doing the right thing. Afterward, Wittgenstein would say of this time in Norway, "*Then* my mind was on fire!" (Monk 1990, 94). If Wittgenstein had an ancestral village, it was there. And I wanted to talk to the ancestor.

2 Why Norway?

Wittgenstein had two reasons to leave Cambridge in 1913: the first had to do with greatness and the other with love. If you're going to act like Beethoven, then you must produce great work. And great work was demanded of him. But to do that, he concluded, he couldn't afford to do it at Cambridge with its irritating, superficial relationships.

"He feels," wrote David Pinsent (1990, 80), "he has no right to live in an antipathetic world (and of course to him very few people are sympathetic) – a world where he perpetually finds himself feeling contempt for others, and irritating others by his nervous temperament – with some justification for that contempt etc.; such as being a really great man and having done really great work."

But his relationship with Pinsent, the aspiring lawyer, did matter. They had traveled to Norway together in September 1913. Throughout this trip, Pinsent spent hours cheering up the young temperamental philosopher. "He is always saying that he is certain he will die within four years – but today it was two months" (Pinsent: 75). They worked in the mornings, walked, rowed or sailed in the afternoons, and played dominoes at night. Pinsent loved their friendship, but he was blissfully unaware how much Wittgenstein loved him.

For his part, Wittgenstein seemed to feel he couldn't afford to be distracted by his sexual desire for Pinsent. He could love Pinsent more easily from a distance, say from Norway. One month after they returned, Wittgenstein announced he was going back to Norway for an uncertain duration with an uncertain agenda.

Pinsent was surprised but understanding. "The great difficulty about his particular kind of work is that – unless he absolutely settles all the foundations of Logic – his work will be of little value to the world… So he is off to Norway in about ten days!" (Pinsent: 85). Bertrand Russell, on the other hand, thought Wittgenstein was insane and tried to change his mind. "I said it would be dark, & he stated he hated daylight. I said it would be lonely, & he said he prostituted his mind talking to intelligent people. I said he was mad & he said God preserve him from sanity. (God certainly will.)" (Monk: 91).

Wittgenstein went to Birmingham on October 8 to say good-bye to Pinsent. He spoke of seeing him the following summer of 1914. But then there was war; this was the last time they saw each other. While saying his good-byes, he also dictated thoughts which became "his first philosophical work," *Notes on Logic* (Monk: 92). Then, Wittgenstein went on and caught a ship to Norway.

Why did Wittgenstein choose Norway? It was familiar. The previous year, he and Pinsent had sailed on the Sognefjord. Pinsent had hoped for a warm sunny place (Spain) but Wittgenstein gave him three choices: Andorra, the Azores, and Bergen in Norway. Wittgenstein clearly favored Norway; Pinsent (58) wanted the Azores but Wittgenstein feared running into American tourists "which he can't stand."

From Norway, Wittgenstein wrote Russell (Monk: 87), "I am sitting here in a little place inside a beautiful fiord and thinking about the beastly theory of types… Pinsent is an enormous comfort to me here. We have hired a little sailing boat and go about with it on the fiord, or rather Pinsent is doing all the sailing and I sit in the boat and work." In Norway, he could work.

3 Looking for What We Lost

Where was Wittgenstein's hut? No one seemed to know exactly where in Norway. Colin Gordon made the most accurate observation "Finding the Wittgenstein hut is a task for one of your intrepid research assistants I would think. I once went to the seminars of Miss Anscombe, who held Wittgenstein's hand when he died; but she didn't divulge that info." The biographer Ray Monk might be worth asking."[1] This rang true. Wittgenstein's heirs fiercely protected their master's private life. I suspect Miss Anscombe would have loved to press a button to make people like me disappear.

[1] Correspondence with Colin Gordon, 31 May 2004.

But I reasoned that Norwegians might know. And so I went to Google, typed "Wittgenstein, hut, Norway" and got 9 hits.[2] One yielded answers. "The Wittgenstein Hut, Skjolden, Norway." Guy Moreton, a photographer, had produced a photograph series suggesting "a darkness and austerity of a life journey and a philosophical journey. The photograph is of the stone foundations of Wittgenstein's hut overlooking Lake Eidsvatnet. This is the culminating motif—a basis and bedrock for thought and contemplation." It was labeled. I wrote Colin a telegraphic email:

> Mystery solved. The internet is a marvelous thing…
> The hut no longer exists, but the foundation still is there.
> It's in Skjolden Norway, up at the end of a very long fjord from the coast from Bergen.[3]

So it was in Skjolden, pronounced Shulden. And the map revealed where it was, at the end of the great Sognefjord far to the north.

In Ray Monk's biography, I found that Wittgenstein had sent two photographs of the hut in 1936, one taken looking down on the hut's rear and a broader view across the Eidsvatnet in which the hut's face looked as if it had been pasted onto a cliff. It appeared to be near a tall, white waterfall. Monk also reproduced a map Wittgenstein drew for G.E. Moore. The easiest way to get to the village of Skjolden, Wittgenstein explained, was by rowing across the lake. It was a crude map, but it would have to do.

4 The Approach

How Wittgenstein got to Skjolden isn't clear. This much is clear. Wittgenstein sailed to Bergen, the old capital of Norway. From this city once dominated by German merchants of the Hanseatic League, ran a rail line to Oslo, but a spur goes up the eerie, empty, mountainous landscape and down to Flåm on the Sognefjord. Wittgenstein kept postcards of the Bergen train station, as well as that surreal landscape. From Flåm, he could have taken a boat or he could have crossed to Sognedal and carted to Skjolden.

We know this is how Wittgenstein approached the fjord in his earlier trip to Norway with Pinsent. The train ride marked a turning point in their relationship; after this ride, Pinsent referred to Wittgenstein as Ludwig in his diary. They stayed at a small hotel in a tiny village called Öistesö, on the Hardanger fjord.

On that trip, it's likely Pinsent sailed Wittgenstein into Skjolden. When Wittgenstein returned a second time, he went to Skjolden directly. He resided at first with the postmaster, Hans Klingenberg. Soon he had new friends: Halvard Draegni, the owner of a local crate factory, Anna Rebni, a farmer, and Arne

[2]Today one gets 2310 hits for the same search terms.

[3]Correspondence with Colin Gordon 2 June 2004.

Bolstad, then a thirteen-year-old schoolboy. They were the simple people Wittgenstein loved, but felt he couldn't know: rough, austere, and practical.

Once he had settled in Skjolden, Wittgenstein started studying Norwegian. His letters show that he communicated reasonably well with his Skjolden friends. They display the direct exchanges he liked best, "Dear Ludwig, how are you? We often think of you" (Monk: 93).

But there were misunderstandings too. For example, in 1937, Wittgenstein found that Anna Rebni, the "tough elderly Norwegian farmer,"[4] had suddenly grown cold toward him. When he inquired, he was surprised at her answer. "He had threatened her with his stick." And then he explained (Edmonds and Eidinow: 202), it was his "habit, when I like someone very much and have a good relationship, that in a jolly mood, in the same way I might pat someone on the back, I make threatening gestures with a fist or a stick. It is a kind of cuddle ('eine Art der Liebkosung')."

How to get to Skjolden now? Fortuitously, Glenn Darras, an old school friend with Norwegian roots, heard I was going to Oslo. He gave me "unsolicited travel tips – after all, it's been almost 30 years since I last told you where to go ☺."[5] Spend time exploring Oslo and its museums. I wrote back and asked him how to get to Skjolden.

"Skjolden eh? Had to consult my mother and her map collection, it's a bit off the beaten track, about 400 km drive NW of Oslo… Good luck if you decide to go and be prepared to spend double what you think it should cost, Norway is expensive and August is peak season. At first I thought you were crazy but then I remembered that once upon a time I visited the site of Thoreau's cabin at Walden Pond so I guess you're entitled, besides it's a beautiful part of the world."[6]

He suggested several roads, none of which I took. More importantly, he suggested I check out Vassbakken camping at skjolden.com. Vassbakken Kro and Camping was a half hour walk from Wittgenstein's hut. I wrote them, and an authoritative voice replied from the email bank in English. A cabin was available for those dates. The price was reasonable, so I booked my hytte at Skjolden and asked for directions. They offered a sharp simple roadmap; it will take 6 hours. Be there by 6, Vassbakken said, or else call. They were skeptical I would make the drive.

My ascent to Skjolden began by heading north from Oslo through the warm southerly valleys over gentle slopes. Soon hay farms gave way to pine forests and then mountains. I drove between deep valley walls and past long lakes on either side fed by bridal veil falls. Then, I glimpsed ice and snow.

The photographs I had seen of Skjolden suggested it was beyond the treeline. But nothing prepared me for the landscape I saw crossing the mountains to Øvre Ardal at the end of the Sognefjord's southeastern fork. This terrain looked bleak

[4]Monk cited in Edmonds and Eidinow (2001, 202). What Monk (318) actually says is "A tough seventy-year-old woman who lived with her hundred-year-old mother."

[5]Correspondence with Glenn Darras 16 June 2004.

[6]Correspondence with Glenn Darras 19 June 2004.

even at summer's end. Cold winds blew and snow lay on distant peaks. An upright stone with what seemed like a RUNE stood by the road. This was a land of cold gods.

The descent into the Sognefjord came as shadows deepened in the fjord. Above was light, below Øvre Ardal lay in murk, near blue water that seemed to glow from the fjord's depths. My time seemed to collapse into other times; it was 1941, and I imagined a German patrol boat approached the quiet village.

From Øvre Ardal, I took the mountain road—a barely single-lane road with several scary hairpin turns up the fjord wall, then across the high plateau. I began to think this wasn't a toll road, until I encountered a booth and barrier on the moonscape. A young man charged me 50 krona. "I'm replaced tomorrow," he smiled. The trail led downwards then, past rockpiles marking ancient footpaths, now followed by powerlines.

I drove down the Fortune valley. At the crossroads, the sign pointed suggestively to Fortuna. I took the other road, arriving at Vassbakken as the late white night gave way to darkness. "Huts (hytte) were available," a sign declared. It had taken seven hours. I rolled to my single-room hut at the foot of another enormous bridal veil waterfall. Somewhere beyond, lay Skjolden and Wittgenstein's hut.

5 Taking a Walk

Early morning, a fly kept landing on my hand as I wrote. If one believed in reincarnation, would Wittgenstein return as a fly? He might like that. The buzzing fly is the philosopher's visage, restlessly, irritatingly questioning our assumptions. And then like flies in a bottle, we often spend our lives captivated by what we see transparently and yet inexplicably can't reach. Only the careful fly escapes the bottle.

This was how Wittgenstein characterized his later work criticizing philosophical solipsism, as an attempt to show the fly the way out of the fly-bottle.[7] But it also splendidly captured Wittgenstein's emotional solipsism. Wittgenstein too spent his life with his face pressed against the glass, looking at other people's lives and wondering what it would take to live like that.

How then to proceed? "The way to solve the problem you see in life is to live in a way that will make what is problematic disappear. The fact that life is problematic shows that the shape of your life does not fit into life's mould. So you must change the way you live, and once your life does fit into the mould, what is problematic will disappear" (CV, p. 27e).[8]

So he wrote again while in Norway. Then, he offered the immediate objection. "But don't we have the feeling that someone who sees no problem in life is blind to

[7] I'm aware the fly-bottle passage applies to behaviorism and private objects as well as solipsism; emphasizing the latter was apt here.

[8] Following convention, titles for Wittgenstein's works are abbreviated (PI = Philosophical Investigations, CV = Culture and value), with section (§) or page number (p.), with full citation and initials (e.g., RFM) in the References.

something important, even to the most important thing of all? Don't I feel like saying that a man like that is just living aimlessly – blindly, like a mole, and that if only he could see, he would see the problem?" (CV, p. 27e).

Then comes his resolve. "Or shouldn't I say rather: a man who lives rightly won't experience the problem as *sorrow*, so for him it will not be a problem, but a joy rather; in other words for him it will be a bright halo round his life, not a dubious background" (CV, p. 27e).

So the grounded man stands on the other side of the glass from life, but doesn't feel the lack of fit as sorrow. He surrounds life with a penumbra of acceptance. Ideally. Too often Wittgenstein felt his life as inescapable sorrow. "He was quite cheerful all today. But he told me that all his life there had hardly been a day, in which he had not at one time or other thought of suicide as a possibility" (Pinsent, 81). In 1919, for example, he wrote his friend Paul Engelmann that he had contemplated suicide several times, "not from my despair at my badness, but for purely external reasons" (Edwards and Eidenow: 196; cf. Monk: 186–187).

It would be too easy to give this a sexual reading, i.e., how should a homosexual behave? Should he compromise and live as a heterosexual? Should he refuse and affirm himself, but then what? He stands outside, unable to participate in the joys that others have, experiencing his life as pointless sorrow. If he didn't fit, why not commit suicide? If only he could surround his life with hope.

It's a plausible reading except that a far greater demon haunted Wittgenstein. For the plain fact was that he knew he had been called upon to do great things (to settle absolutely the Foundations of Logic, as he put it), and that he was, he sometimes thought, capable of this. And when people are so called, they always feel apart. Even later, when Wittgenstein had loving homosexual relationships, he couldn't reconcile these with his work.

Everyone of Wittgenstein's relationships was a *ménage a trois*: him, his work, and his lover. Ray Monk (94) sometimes presents the work as equivalent to Wittgenstein's identity, "He could devote himself entirely to himself – or, rather, to what he felt was practically the same thing, to his logic." But it's clear Wittgenstein felt his work as a burden, a burden he did not choose, and that is not the same thing as identity. His work was as jealous a lover as one could have. He/it exhausted him, maddened him, isolated him from men he loved, and demanded greatness.

As a young man in Norway, he thought he would die young or that what he wrote was worthless. "He is morbidly afraid he may die" and "all his work in Logic was no real us" (Pinsent: 75 & 77). Torn between doubt and romantic fate, he spoke to others about laying all his thoughts down on paper before he died. But death did not come. Pinsent (77) had this right: "There is no obvious reason that I can see why he should not live yet for a long time." Over long years, Wittgenstein came to understand the demands on his life differently. No romantic death, but the constant struggle with exhaustion, anxiety, despair, and madness as he wrote.

He reproached God for this condition, and then relented for this was to his mind superstitious. But he wanted redemption, salvation, an escape, to live life if not like others, at least with less sorrow, and more faith. "The horrors of hell," he wrote in 1937 (CV, p. 26e), "can be experienced within a single day: that's plenty of time."

To work his way beyond these thoughts, Wittgenstein took long walks. In the cold and dark, these walks through Skjolden's farmlands produced in him a meditative state, allowing him to reconceptualize his work. Traces of these walks appear in his notebooks (CV, p. 26e): "Thinking too has a time for ploughing and a time for gathering the harvest." "Ideas too sometimes fall from the tree before they are ripe." "I find it important in philosophizing to keep changing my posture, not to stand for too long on *one* leg, so as not to get stiff. Like someone on a long up-hill climb who walks backwards for a while so as to revive himself and stretch some different muscles."

These walks also induced humility. "If you offer a sacrifice and are pleased with yourself about it, both you and your sacrifice will be cursed." "The *edifice of your pride* has to be dismantled. And that is terribly hard work" (CV, p. 26e).

Where did he walk? Maybe up the Fortune valley, or along the narrow path on the south side of the Sognefjord to Urnes with its magnificent Viking Stave Church. He certainly traveled along the Sognefjord's north side, for he once delivered Francis Skinner to a boat at Sognedal.

One path he *did* take routinely: across the lake to the village. In summer, he rowed. In winter, the lake froze over, and Wittgenstein walked over the ice. So I drove to the lake. A worn wooden board on the shoreline "marked the spot," as they say, in German, Norwegian, and English:

The eminent Austrian philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951) owned a hut here in Skjolden from 1914. Remaining traces of his hut can be seen on the other side of the Eidsvatnet. In that hut, Wittgenstein worked on his manuscripts for *Tractatus logico-philosophicus* and *Philosophical Investigations*.

As I was snapping a photograph, a car ground to a halt at the gravel edge. A man leaped out with a big camera and snapped a photograph of the sign and the opposing shore. Then, he returned to his smiling wife and the car sped away.

"We *regard* the photograph, the picture on our wall, as the object itself (the man, landscape, and so on) depicted there," writes Wittgenstein. "This need not have been so. We could easily imagine people who did not have this relation to such pictures." They might judge shrunken images of bodies as inhuman or even fail to regard a two-dimensional photograph as depicting a three-dimensional space. To see a photograph as something, say Wittgenstein's hut, requires training. But pay attention: "What I expect from you will be pretty different from what I expect when you merely know what it is meant to be" (PI, p. 205e). Or as he put it to Pinsent once at the fjord at Öistesö, "It seemed, my keenness to take that photo: had disgusted him – 'like a man who can think of nothing – when walking – but how the country would do for a golf course.'" (Pinsent: 67).

The philosophical tourist saw what was meant to be. A sign captivated him, suggesting a picture, which he snapped and stole away. He will display the photograph of the north shore, saying, "Here was Wittgenstein and his hut." But something was wrong. The opposing shore, the north shore, looked inhospitable. There was no WAY one could build anything on that slope.

Reflecting further on Wittgenstein's map and photograph, I realized that the hut had to be on my right, on the far eastern side. And could it be that the Vassbakken waterfall was the waterfall in Wittgenstein's photograph?

It was only a matter of angles. I drove along the shore snapping photographs on the digital camera. I compared each to the original, and soon I was certain. Here the path, from that shore to Skjolden, was a straight line. You could imagine Wittgenstein rowing or, in winter, walking on water.

6 Losing Your Way

At breakfast, I asked the old lady who ran the kitchen. Oh yes, she explained in broken English, Wittgenstein's hut was here. We have a picture in the hall! It was a clearer version of the photograph Wittgenstein took in 1936.

Can one walk there? Her forehead wrinkled. Yes, but, it's hard to find. She drew a map. A path, a bridge, a field, you lose the trail there but find it afterward, there's a stream, then you go up the hillside. "I hope you find it." She sounded doubtful.

I tried once, got nowhere, and returned. "I will have my son explain it to you." The cook appeared, yes, it's this path here, 30 m from the house. I hadn't seen it. "Don't give up, when the trail ends, look for the path. It's about 45 min."

Now I had the end of the string. I packed a lunch, my Xeroxes from Monk's book, and a little scotch to share with the master. I crossed a bright blue river filled with glacial silt. A tractor passed in the opposite direction. The mud road got muddier. It winded toward the lake and then ended in a deeply plowed field. Everything smelled of fertilizer.

On the far side, a small meadow bordered the lake, and on its far end was a Wittgenstein puzzle. On the right was a wooden sign with a red W and an arrow pointing left. On the left was a wooden sign pointing right announcing "WITTGENSTEIN" in caps. Two arrows point in opposite directions. How then to proceed?

"How does it come about," wrote Wittgenstein, "that this arrow >>>----→ *points*? Doesn't it seem to carry in it something besides itself? – 'no, not the dead line on paper; only the psychical thing, the meaning, can do that.' – That is both true and false. The arrow points only in the application that a living being makes of it" (PI §454).

And here I was, a living being, what was I to make of it? Wittgenstein makes a similar point regarding mathematical progressions (PI §184). What number follows in the sequence 2, 4, 6, 8? 10 perhaps, but only if the rule was add 2 to the previous number. But it could be add 2 till 8 and after 8 add 4, or 1000, or practically any number. What then is the "correct" answer?

Once again, how a living being applies the sequence furnishes the rule, the user criterion ("that's the way to do it!"). Nothing inside us gives the rule; no "hocus-pocus which can be performed only by the soul" (PI §454). The way we live

tells us how to proceed, and we don't question what arrows mean until we meet conditions like this: split arrows in the middle of the woods. Then, we must ask.

Here the sequence ended with a "surd." 2, 4, 6, ! or an infinite number like pi. Customary practice no longer helped me.[9] I had to plunge into the woods, and I found the answer: Neither left, nor right, but split the middle, and find bare traces of a path. Almost at once I encountered an old wooden shack, with W in red letters on it. The shack? I think not. Didn't resemble the photographs. I proceeded. The trail hugged the lakeside over moss-covered boulders and then plunged again into the trees. Giant boulders rested at the foot of a landslide. I found no stream. The trail ended inexplicably—one couldn't go further along the cliff face.

Someone had marked the boulders with a red "W" and over it, a "T." Meaning what? Was this it? Didn't look like it. The old lady had said, "You go up." Not a T! I climbed. Breathless, 30 feet up, I saw what looked like a human construction, a line of rocks. Was this the foundation? No, it was the path, I discovered.

Now the trail was clear: a steep, rising switchback. I found rusted poles; long ago, cables linked them to assist the traveler. In winter, I realized, this wouldn't be a trail but a slide. Then, high up on the rocks, as I looked up, I saw Austria.

The morning sun lit a white flagpole. The Austrian colors fluttered in the breeze. Ah yes. I shared with Wittgenstein one more thing. We were both exiles.

In 1979, I watched the world that I knew disappear from the USA. During the Islamic Revolution in Iran, I lost contact with my parents briefly and then we spent years piecing together a life for ourselves abroad. But I also experienced the revolution as relief. I came from a prosperous middle-class family but with aristocratic history. There were expectations, or at least, I believed I had a life predesignated for me once I completed my Ph.D. The revolution swept that world away and released me.

Wittgenstein grew up in Vienna, heir to an Austrian industrial fortune. When his brother Paul liquidated the family holdings after *Anschluss*, it amounted to a staggering 1.7 tons of gold, equivalent to 2% of the Austrian gold reserves absorbed by Berlin in 1939 (Edmonds and Eidinow: 138).

This fortune allowed Wittgenstein, among other things, to construct the hut. Wittgenstein often mourned leaving his retreat to see his mother, or, later, his sisters in Vienna. When the Nazis occupied Austria, that world ended. Wittgenstein became anxious he might be interned in England as an alien. Although he had often declared he would not want to be "a sham-english-man," now he applied for British citizenship (Monk: 395).

And with good reason. Shortly after Britain declared war, police ordered Wittgenstein to report at once to the local station. While visiting a friend at Pontypridd, a hotel manageress had reported him because he had a foreign name and his friend joked about the blackout. It reminded me of how during the Iran Hostage Crisis of 1979, I was told to report to US immigration for an interview,

[9]For more on this condition of uneasy paralysis, see Brison (2003: 104).

even though I had been an American citizen since birth. My college counselor at Swarthmore apologized, but asked me not to rock the boat.

After gaining British citizenship, Wittgenstein went immediately to Vienna to save his sisters. Then he checked into a very fashionable, expensive Berlin hotel, met with Reichsbank officials who were impressed with his command of financial details. Then, Wittgenstein left for New York on the Queen Mary, where he met his brother. Shortly after Wittgenstein left, Paul Wittgenstein directed his lawyer to liquidate the family holdings and make a deal with the Reichsbank.

Though Wittgenstein did his duty, I think Wittgenstein experienced the passing of that world as relief. Viennese society, like academic society, involved compromises, irritating demands, and superficial relationships. This consumed energy that he needed to devote elsewhere. *Finis Austriae*. He didn't like American society any better. He later remarked that he had only met one New Yorker whom he liked, an Italian shoeshine boy in Central Park. The boy cleaned his shoes twice; Wittgenstein paid double the asking price.

Wittgenstein had other things on his mind. The hut in Norway wasn't just a place of isolation, as it is often interpreted. It was a condition of exile. Exile was his natural condition. "He swears," wrote Pinsent (85), "he can never do his best except in exile…So he is off to Norway in about ten days! To a small village at the bottom of the Molde-fjord—about which he made enquiries at Bergen—where he will stay in a little inn and probably be quite alone."

7 The Bedrock of Philosophy

So this was it. The bedrock of philosophy, as it turned out, was soft and mossy. I ate a pleasant lunch there, remembered the master, and hoped he rested in peace now.

Here was the view identical to Moreton's photograph. This was the view Wittgenstein had in fair and stormy weather. This was where he sketched the *Tractatus* to set straight the foundations of modern logic and from where he wrote G.E. Moore asking if Cambridge would accept it as fulfilling his B.A. requirement.

When Moore replied that the rules required Wittgenstein to meet basic formalities, such as a Preface, Wittgenstein lost it. He wrote bitterly (Monk: 103): "If I am not worth your making an exception for me *even in some STUPID details* then I may as well go to HELL directly; and if I *am* worth it and you don't do it then – by GOD – *you* might go there." Moore had no blame in enforcing the rules. He had asked on Wittgenstein's behalf, and Wittgenstein had killed the messenger. This ended his relationship with Moore for years. Wittgenstein later apologized, but it came too late.

Such had been Moore's devotion that the distinguished don had traveled at his student's insistence to Bergen in 1914 to discuss Wittgenstein's ideas. The voyage made Moore violently seasick. And when he got to the cobblestoned Hanseatic

port, Wittgenstein reduced him to a mere secretary. The student dictated and then checked his professor's notes. "*He* discusses," wrote Moore in his diary (Monk: 102). If Moore failed to understand him, Wittgenstein fell into "a terrible rage" (Edmonds and Eidinow: 59).

I wandered along the bedrock. There was a large pit, whose purpose I couldn't fathom. I realized immediately how harsh conditions were there. How did Wittgenstein shower or piss? It wasn't clear where one could build an outhouse. How did he carry firewood or water up here? Did he pay others? In bitter weather, it must have been exceedingly difficult. Wittgenstein reproached himself differently (Monk: 373–374): "I have now become so *soft*, that it would perhaps be good for me to have to live alone. Am now extraordinarily contemptible."

The house was probably warm enough. Wittgenstein had contracted workers to build the house in Skjolden in 1914. Soon, Halvard Draegni wrote to say that they had completed the hut as specified, but it had been costly. "If one wants to build as solidly as you have made it made, it will always be more expensive than one initially reckons" (Monk: 125). Wittgenstein promptly sent him money to pay the workers. Draegni was surprised; he hadn't expected that until Wittgenstein returned to Skjolden.

Wittgenstein returned to Norway in 1921 (July–August) and 1931 (September).[10] We know more about his next departure in August 1936. Again, he went to Skjolden to write and wasn't sure when he would return. Again, he left behind someone he loved.

Francis Skinner had come to Cambridge in 1930 as a promising mathematician, but within a year, he was uncritically and obsessively devoted to Wittgenstein. He became Wittgenstein's constant companion, trusted confidant, and valued collaborator. He was also shy, unassuming, handsome, and, what seems to characterize Wittgenstein's type, extraordinarily gentle. He combined a first-class intelligence with a child-like innocence.

In 1936, Wittgenstein resolved to leave for Norway again. Francis, who had just finished his postgraduate degree, took work as a mechanic in a factory, a career Wittgenstein chose for him. Francis adopted it unenthusiastically, though he enjoyed his workmates more than those from his own class. What he really wanted was to live with Wittgenstein in Norway. Shortly after Wittgenstein left, Francis wrote (Monk: 361), "When I got your letter, I wished I could come and help you clean your room." This Wittgenstein denied him.

By then, Francis had realized that he couldn't share fully in Wittgenstein's work. "Sometimes his silence infuriates me and I shout at him, 'Say something Francis!' But Francis isn't a thinker. You know Rodin's statue called *The Thinker*, it struck me the other day that I couldn't imagine him in that attitude" (Wittgenstein, cited in Monk: 359). And Francis was self-critical. "I don't think I have ever understood your present work thoroughly, and I think it would be good for me to try and

[10] For a month by month chronology of Wittgenstein's life, see Nedo (1993: 141–145).

understand it better" (Monk: 373). And like many who found working lives after university study, Francis now found philosophical problems to be distant ones.

This did not deter Francis. He knew he could be useful (he had helped Wittgenstein dictate the *Blue* and *Brown* Books). He feared the physical distance would separate them emotionally. And how would they fare if an impending war separated them further? "I am so deficient in courage. I long for you often. I do feel you are near me in whatever state of mind I am in, and would feel so even if I did something very bad. I am always your old heart. I love to think about you" (Skinner, in Monk: 372). He repeatedly wrote Wittgenstein, "I think of you with great love." And from the tone of Francis' letters (Monk: 362 cf. 367), Wittgenstein appeared to doubt whether Francis loved him. "My feelings for you haven't changed at all. This is the honest truth."

Wittgenstein was beginning to think that perhaps "I would now like to live with somebody. To see a human face in the morning." He could move into the hut, but his own space struck him as alien and unfriendly. He lodged with the farmer Anna Rebni, but he felt living elsewhere was "weird ['unheimlich']" when he had a home. Anxiety ["die Sorge"] overcame him. He felt he imposed on Rebni. Should he move back? He felt too "frightened of the sadness that can overcome me there" (Monk: 373–374). And the difficult walk up the hill daunted him. Feeling too weak, he was reluctant to do it.

After a year spent mainly alone in Norway, he invited Francis to Skjolden.[11] "May it go well. And may it be given to me to be halfway decent" (Monk: 375). Francis had also become bolder. Would it be "of any help to you if I come to see you? You know I would come and would love to come" (Skinner, in Monk: 375). He leaped at Wittgenstein's invitation. Wittgenstein couldn't sleep. He had sexual fantasies.

Wittgenstein was soon working again, and on September 12, 1937, he met Francis at Bergen. Once they arrived at the hut, Wittgenstein was "sensual, susceptible, indecent" with him. "Lay with him two or three times. Always at first with the feeling that there was nothing wrong in it, *then* with shame. Have also been unjust, edgy and insincere towards him, and also cruel" (Wittgenstein, in Monk: 376).

If Wittgenstein and Francis made love at any other time, we don't know. For the ten days Francis stayed, Wittgenstein wrote only one phrase in his diaries, "Am very impatient!" But when Francis left, Wittgenstein wrote (Monk: 377), "The last five days were nice: he settled into the life here and did everything with love and kindness, and I was, thank God, not impatient, and truly I had no reason to be, except for my own rotten nature. Yesterday I accompanied him as far as Sognedal; returned today to my hut. Somewhat depressed, also tired."

Francis, however, gave himself over to the intimacy of their first night in Wittgenstein's hut without any fear of losing his love. When he thought of

[11]Except for brief trips to Vienna (December–January, May) and Cambridge (January, June–July), Wittgenstein stayed in Norway from August 1936 through to November 1937 (see Nedo 1993: 143–144).

Wittgenstein and what they had done, "this makes me long for you sometimes very violently." He repeatedly expressed his gratitude. "It was so lovely being with you and living in the house with you. It was a wonderful gift to us." And he constantly affirmed Wittgenstein's generosity (Monk: 377), "How wonderful it was being with you and looking at the landscape with you. You were most wonderfully good to me. It has done me a lot of good being with you."

In a mimicry common between lovers, Francis started adopting Wittgenstein's habits. Wittgenstein had a horror of uncleanliness. Wittgenstein's floor cleaning method involved throwing wet tea leaves to soak up the dirt and sweep the leaves up. He did this frequently; he refused to have a carpet anywhere he lived. Now Francis wrote (Monk: 378), "when I got back I decided I wouldn't put my carpet down even though it had been beaten because I know I can't keep it properly clean. I now have to sweep my room."

Likewise Francis adopted Wittgenstein's voice when describing events at Cambridge. His mild-mannered voice gives way to the uncharacteristic fierceness typical of Wittgenstein (Monk: 378): "I must say I thought Braithwaite was most revolting in the discussion. He took away all the seriousness from it." Wittgenstein ate it up. When Francis wrote a disapproving letter about Fania Pascal's lectures on Modern Europe, Wittgenstein wrote her a "harsh and hectoring letter" (Fania Pascal, cited in Monk: 378).

But Wittgenstein feared loss. No sooner was Francis gone than he wondered why he had not heard from him. "God how much misery and wretchedness there is in this world." He ruminated on decay. "[I] just took some apples out of paper bag where they had been lying for a long time. I had to cut half off many of them and throw away. Afterward when I was copying a sentence, I had written the second half of which was bad, I at once saw it was a half-rotten apple." He worried whether something feminine characterized how he thought (CV, p. 31e): "Everything that comes my way becomes a picture for me of what I am thinking about at the time."

He wondered whether he would finish his book, about his relation to Anna Rebni, and now about his sensuality. He started recording how often he masturbated. "How bad is it? I don't know. I guess it is bad, but I have no reason to think so." Again he felt trapped by pictures. "Masturbated last night. Pangs of conscience. But also the conviction that I am too weak to withstand the urge and the temptation if they and the images which accompany them offer themselves to me without my being able to take refuge in others" (Wittgenstein, in Monk: 380).

This language reappears in the work he wrote at the time, in which he tries to show how philosophical problems arose out of "the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language" (PI §109). There he proposed his anthropological method to dissolve these apparent problems. But he found himself unable to do the same with the pictures that tormented him in the dark. When custom surrounds you like a glass bottle, a fly has a hard time getting out. One could imagine Wittgenstein considering and dismissing every reason against masturbation and homosexuality, and still judging that he lived life impurely.

"How *could* a man, the ethical in a man, be *coerced* by his environment? – the answer is that even though he may say, 'No human being has to give way to

compulsion,' yet under such circumstances he *will* as a matter of fact act in such and such a way. 'You don't HAVE to, I can show you a (different) way out, - but you won't take it.' " So he wrote in 1950 (CV, p. 84e).

Psychoanalysis resolved nothing. It was part of the problem, or rather, it replaced one set of problems with another. "In a way having oneself psychoanalysed is like eating from the tree of knowledge. The knowledge acquired sets us (new) ethical problems, but contributes nothing to their solution" (CV, p. 34e).

Soon Norway became hell for him. His writing faltered. "All my thoughts are short of breath." He became nervous, slept little, and spent days without seeing the sun. The fjord froze. "The ever-changing, difficult weather, cold, snow, sheet ice, etc., and the darkness and my exhaustion make everything very difficult" (Wittgenstein, in Monk: 382). The lake iced over. Now he had to walk to the village. Francis wrote (Monk: 383) urging him to "be very careful going across the lake." He wondered if he should leave.

During the violent storms in the fjord, he was tempted to curse God and then chastised himself. It was "just wicked and superstitious" (Monk, 383). But when he left Norway, on the boat from Bergen, he considered it further. He wondered if Christ died like any other man. If so, if he was a teacher like any other, then he could "no longer *help*; and once more we are orphaned and alone. So we have to content ourselves with wisdom and speculation." And if that is so, "we are in a sort of hell where we can do nothing but dread, roofed in, as it were, and cut off from heaven" (CV, p. 33e). The only solution to this, from the hell of being alone and consciousness of one's sins, he thought, was to love with one's heart and soul. But to do this required a special grace. It seemed like a vicious circle. He could strive, but only God could get him to see farther, and he was dead.

Francis died of polio on October 11, 1941. Wittgenstein was distraught, behaved like a "frightened wild animal" (Skinner's sister, cited in Monk: 427). He felt guilty, not because he was judged by others (Francis' mother refused to speak to Wittgenstein at the funeral), but because he judged himself faithless in his heart. "His life and death seem only to accuse me, for I was in the last 2 years of his life very often loveless and, in my heart, unfaithful to him. If he had not been so boundlessly gentle and true, I would have become *totally* loveless towards him" (Monk: 428).

Wittgenstein's solution was one known to many a gay man. Feeling vulnerable, he withdrew to loving at a distance, in this case his student. It was an old solution; as a young man, he had done this with Pinsent. It didn't matter that his beloveds didn't love him or couldn't reciprocate. He could love them safely at a distance, and safety now seemed to matter. If love was a solution, then one could have it by minimizing risk.

8 A Good Walking Stick

The way down from the hut was treacherous. A walking stick would have helped, but I saw nothing helpful on that rocky slope. I stumbled not once, but twice, the second time spectacularly, heels over head, a good ten feet, tearing my pants.

My fall gave me another opportunity to explore the flora face to face. I had found wild strawberries on the hut floor, and my second tumble landed me in a patch of raspberries, bright, red and rich in the autumn sunlight. They were delicious. I found acorns on the forest floor and pocketed them.

> We may say that people who have never carried out an investigation of a philosophical kind, like, for instance, most mathematicians, are not equipped with the right visual organs for this type of investigation or scrutiny. Almost in the way a man who is not used to searching in the forest for flowers, berries or plants will not find any because his eyes are not trained to see them, and he does not know where you have to be particularly on the lookout for them. (CV, p. 29e)

Similarly, "someone unpracticed in philosophy passes by all the spots where difficulties are hidden in the grass, whereas someone who has had practice will pause and sense that there is a difficulty close by even though he cannot see it yet. And this is no wonder for someone who knows how long even the man with practice, who realizes there is a difficulty, will have to search before he finds it. When something is well hidden it is hard to find" (CV, p. 29e).

I looked up the narrow goat path trail that had evaded me. It was barely visible in the moss and leaves. How Wittgenstein climbed this path in snow, alone, astounds me. Soon after Wittgenstein returned to Norway in January 1937, he broke a rib in an accident.

For once Wittgenstein had to focus on his physical rather than his moral condition, but even this he turned into a commentary on his life. "I thought of having it [the rib] removed & of having a wife made of it, but they tell me that the art of making women out of ribs has been lost" (Monk: 372). Ha ha, but revealing too. How often had people asked if he was married? And would he have rather been married to himself, since if nothing else, he was deserving of that.

The trail was hard on my knees going down. I could only imagine the old man climbing down with his walking stick. How unsurprising that he got hurt. I couldn't begin to imagine this treacherous trail in winter. Wittgenstein may have been part mountain goat. In his last trip to the hut though, from October through November 1950, even he leaned—on Ben Richards, his last lover.

Richards was an undergraduate in medicine at Cambridge. He was forty years younger than Wittgenstein, and he was, like Francis, devoted to Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein knew he was receiving a "great and rare gift" (Monk: 492). It comforted him and helped force out other torments.

But typically, he feared he would lose this gift just as swiftly. "Can you reject a warm heart?" Well, he wondered (Monk: 504) "is it a heart that beats warmly for me?" As he waited to hear from Richards on any particular day, he felt unbearable anguish. After all, why wouldn't Ben just grow out of his love for him, "just as a boy no longer remembers what he had felt as a young child" (Monk: 491). "How it will fade I don't know of course. Nor do I know how some part of it might be preserved, alive, not pressed between the leaves of a book as a memento" (Monk: 504).

Briefly Wittgenstein seems to have realized that true love didn't involve just thinking about what *might* happen, that one might be left alone again. "It is the

mark of *true* love that one thinks of what the *other* person suffers. For he suffers too, is also a poor devil" (Monk: 492).

The same broader understanding of love seems to shine through in his anxiety about how others would use his philosophical work. Why worry? He would illuminate them from above. "And if that happens – why should I concern myself that the fruits of my labors should be stolen? If what I am writing really has some value, how could anyone steal the value from me? And if the light from above is lacking, I can't in any case be more clever" (Monk: 492).

Finally he realized that "I am easily hurt and afraid of being hurt, and to protect oneself in *this* way is the death of all love. For real love one needs *courage*." And he conceded, "In love, I have too little *faith* and too little *courage*." For to love like this means "to endure a mortal wound. But I can only hope to be spared the worst." He struggled to affirm that "love is a *joy*. Perhaps a joy mixed with pain, but a joy nevertheless" (Monk: 504).

Ben reassured him. "I'll rather do anything than to hurt the soul of friendship" (Richards, cited in Monk: 504). Wittgenstein wanted to affirm this (Monk: 505), "I must know: he won't hurt *our friendship*." But then Wittgenstein couldn't be content with friendship any more. Time was running out. He demanded love and he was no longer prepared to compromise.

"A person cannot come out of his skin. I cannot give up a demand that is anchored deep inside me, in my whole life. For *love* is bound up with nature, and if I became unnatural, the love would have to end.- Can I say: 'I will be reasonable and no longer demand it?'…I can say: Let him do as he pleases, - it will be different some day. *Love,* that is, the pearl of great price that one holds to one's heart, that one would change for *nothing,* that one prizes above all else. In fact it shows, if one has it – what great value is" (Wittgenstein, in Monk: 505).

Wittgenstein had to know he could rely on Richards and, typical W, he kept on testing him. When it came to love, Wittgenstein wanted something so firm he could put his whole weight on it. "The walking-stick that looks pretty as long as one carries it, but bends as soon as you rest your weight upon it, is worth nothing" (Monk: 506). But what qualified as a similar test for love?

In September 1950, Ben Richards passed his qualifying exams, and he joined Wittgenstein on their long-planned trip to Norway. In early October, they set out to Wittgenstein's hut. The weather wasn't favorable, nor was Wittgenstein's health. As they walked up the treacherous path, Wittgenstein lay his weight on Richards' shoulders.

But it was Ben who grew sick first, developing bronchitis. They moved from the hut to a nursing home up the fjord and then to Anna Rebni's farmhouse, where they spent the remainder of their time. Ben had brought a recent translation of Frege's *Foundations of Arithmetic*, and they spent much time discussing it. Wittgenstein again thought he might be able to live alone in Skjolden working on philosophy.

Some months later, in England, on April 27, 1951, Wittgenstein lost consciousness, the day before his sixty-second birthday. When Mrs. Bevans, his caregiver, wished him "Many happy returns," he stared hard at her and replied,

“there will be no returns” (Bevans and Wittgenstein, cited in Monk: 579). The next day, Ben was among those gathered at the Bevans’ home when Wittgenstein died.

9 The Hut

So that was it. Or nearly. For the next morning, I was talking with the cook and he said, “Yes, how terrible it is that the hut isn’t a museum.” Wait a minute. The hut still stands? Oh yes, he said, in the village. A villager bought it after Wittgenstein’s death, disassembled it, and reassembled it. It’s private; he uses it.

Could one take a picture? Yes, but I had to ask the manager of Vassbakken how to get there. When I asked, she took me to the photograph. And I said, no, the actual hut, it exists? Yes, she said. Can I take a picture? Yes. How do I get there?

Her eyes widened slightly. She said, “Yes, here are the directions.” She and the old lady tried to recall the houses in sequence. You go past the hotel, turn here, turn again, and then up the hill, three houses on the right, two white, one red, two white houses on the left, then a bank of green mailboxes. It is opposite them on the left.

I left Vassbakken wondering if this was really true for it was my last day and I had to make it to the ferry by noon. I wouldn’t be coming back if the directions were wrong.

As sun lit the valley floor, I drove into town around 9. I climbed a road that soon turned to dirt. And then suddenly behind a short orchard to my left, Wittgenstein’s hut appeared. It was unmistakably the building. And what a sturdy roof, identical to the roof in the photograph taken ninety years ago. Now I could see, it wasn’t a hut at all, but a charming cottage. The roof, which looked so absurdly out of proportion in the photograph, housed a second floor. Now that I could see the front, I could see the second floor window.

It was well-cared for, clean, painted, with a rose in the flowerpot by the door. I imagined Ludwig and Francis sleeping peacefully there. But odds were, they’re already up and cleaning the floor.

10 The Journey Home

“Found the hut!”, I wrote to Colin. He replied, “Last week I heard a BBC radio documentary about Wittgenstein’s other cottage in Connemara. It’s now a hostel. He lived on baked beans. A farmer there was asked how many visitors asked him about Wittgenstein - answer ‘too many’.”[12] I am glad I was discrete.

[12]Correspondence with Colin Gordon, 24 August 2004.

On the fjord ferry to Gudvangen, I heard that Munch's "Scream" had been stolen from an Oslo museum.[13] As I looked down, the eddies in the waters behind the ferry in the Narrow Fjord swirled in huge elliptical figures, as if the scream ran through the waters. I drove through the huge tunnels Norwegian oil money had built from Gudvangen to Flåm and Aurdal and then said good-bye to the fjords. Another long drive over the wastes that trains traveled, down the valley to Oslo, followed by a frustrating morning driving to the Oslo airport and then homeward.

In the final leg of my journey from Minneapolis, the businessman next to me noticed I was tired. "I'm coming from Norway." And then he looked at my cap. "Fargo Country Club?" he said. "Are you from Fargo?"

"No, I have a good friend there. He just moved back; it's difficult but he's resolved to stay." Oddly, six months previously, I had visited him, seen the Stave Church at Fargo, and now I had seen the oldest one in Urnes. People in Fargo are proud of their Norse heritage. In 1982, they built a Viking ship and sailed from Lake Superior to Norway.

He smiled. "Yes, I know. Actually, my name is Flåm. I live in Eugene but I grew up in Fargo and all my relatives are still there. My family is originally from Flåm. But we spell it Flom. That's the way they heard it when we came over. It's amazing how people can get such a simple name wrong, dinner reservations for Flume and Flame."

I collapsed blissfully into sleep after that. I was exhausted. I had driven almost 1000 km in a foreign country in 3 days, and some very difficult driving including *Fjords* and finding one's way through a perplexing *European City* without the *Knowledge*. What is it that Wittgenstein compared philosophy to? Finding your way through a city, he said. And a teacher is like a guide; he shows the way down the broad avenues. But, he said, he wasn't a really good guide. A good guide would show also the quiet neighborhoods, the intimate little bistros.

So here was a small intimate part of the city that is Wittgenstein. And what did my visit teach me?

You always take your problems with you, even to Norway. Money can't buy you love, nor can reason. Experiencing loss makes one distrust the world or other people. It's not differences in age, Ludwig; it's the quality of the relationship. It's not how long you two endure together; it's what you make of the time you have. When you don't love yourself, how can you love others? And when you do, can you demand too much of others? And if you can't be vulnerable, what then is the purpose of one's love?

What did I learn in the end that isn't a platitude?

Many times along the journey I could have given up satisfied and returned—at the lake, at Vassbakken, at the meadow, at the base of the hill, and at the foundations on the ledge. At each point, I could have snapped a photograph and claimed the object. But that wasn't the point was it? The point was to walk several kilometers in a philosopher's shoes. I rethought Wittgenstein's life as a constant cure

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[13] And was later recovered (see Sullivan 2006).

for myself, approaching the peaks with as much humility as I could, and in this way, hoped to recover what I had lost.

Wittgenstein recommends something like this himself in 1937 while in Norway (CV, p. 31e): "In doing this work I find myself in a position like that of a man who is unsuccessfully struggling to recall a name; in such a case we say: 'think of something else, then it will come to you' – and similarly I had constantly to think of something else so as to allow what I had been searching for a long time to occur to me."

To recall Wittgenstein's name, I walked to his hut. And the journey to Wittgenstein's hut was not unlike living Barthes' *Lover's Discourse* first hand. Barthes' account describes the lover's inner discourse as he speaks, reproaches, begs, beseeches, bargains, and chastises the beloved within the mind. Anyone who is in love will recognize the expressions. They aren't my or your expressions, but a series of postures, what Barthes (1978: 3–4) calls "figures" after dance routines, that one takes relative to what one loves. This is what is disturbing *and* liberating about Barthes' figures. The postures are a cure when one is in love, but bitter lessons if one is falling out of it.

Something similar happened on the way to the hut. I experienced Wittgenstein's life as postures he adopted facing tragic situations, hopeless desire, or impossible demands. He proceeded even when what was good was not useful to him and what was useful was rarely good for him. Often the ways he proceeded were, writ large, postures that many, including myself, have adopted. Some were those gay men played out everywhere. Others belonged to a far rarer discourse, what someone says who is held also to a jealous master that is thinking, someone who doesn't write because he chooses or wants to, but because he must. This person too has an inner discourse rich in postures.

I realized what the gods of philosophy demanded of Wittgenstein must have been truly harsh, even if they rewarded him richly for it afterward. Wittgenstein must have felt the demands of greatness intensely to choose this cold, hard place. This was one posture: to choose somewhere that forced oneself back into one's body constantly, in which thought was an achievement not an accessory. I did not understand that clearly until I was tumbling down the slope.

It would be too easy (indeed foolish) to say that he might have been happier if he had been accepting of his sexual desires. He could certainly reason his way to seeing there was nothing wrong with them. Still, Wittgenstein's dilemmas would not have been solved if he had lived in an age where gay posturing was available.

Too much of what wore him down was not tied to being a homosexual in a hostile age. Even gay men today suffer anxieties when their lovers are considerably younger than them. After having struggled so hard to win an identity separate from society's judgment, they still worry about how others will judge them. And the fear of loss is a real one; after all, young people must seek out their lives too.

And then there is the problem, felt by so many exiles, of *unheimlichness*, that seeps into everything. One doubts constantly whether one could or should make a life here, impose on that person, be-here-doing-this-thing-right-now. Wittgenstein,

like many others, could never shake this feeling of unbelonging. And so he chose, or rather created, his own exile, his hut.

Wittgenstein also wanted an answer to the problem of theodicy, to the problem of suffering, particularly of *his* suffering. Rather than accepting a general explanation or despair over the human condition, Wittgenstein's theological posture seemed to be one of constant *argument* with God. "If you do exist, then you would stop this. But you obviously don't, so never mind, *I* proceed." Or as the Young Werther said of his beloved: it isn't either/or; it is rather that I have no hope, but nevertheless I strive (Barthes: 62–64). This form of devotion is closed to the pious man, whose life "fits into the mould" as Wittgenstein said and who doesn't experience the relation to God as one of argument and sorrow. It is a thoroughly modern piety.

These problems, common to many, were intensified for Wittgenstein by an even deeper crisis, the demand placed on anyone who senses he is uniquely capable of great acts, who can't prevent himself from writing, thinking or composing, and who recognizes how much sacrifice is demanded of him. It is the dawning realization that one's life will not be a typical one, like others one knows. Nor, frighteningly also, it won't be a classic *atypical* life: lonely yes, but one won't be dying at a young age leaving behind a remarkable but unfinished body of work.

This life is the constant fight with depression; intellectuals, as Renaissance scholars said, are born under the grim sign of Saturn. It's the bitter realization that the person one loves cannot follow you where you go, share in your work, or appreciate your compulsion. It is the lonely understanding that the kind of person who brightens up your nights will not be the person who will stay in a *ménage a trois.* And if he stays, you will reproach yourself for being faithless and loveless to him.

Then, there is the genuine, urgent problem of energy. Writing and creativity require a certain economy of energy. This isn't always clear in Monk's book. Monk constantly presents the problem as an opposition between purity and sexual desire. Perhaps Wittgenstein expressed it that way sometimes, but too often Wittgenstein appears to have imagined it rather differently: as a problem of energy, of subtraction, and of addition. Like a football coach advising players, Wittgenstein seemed to think that he could only win games if he abstained.

The figure of abstinence is a rather intimate defense against the realization that life promises to be constantly disappointing. How much safer to love at a distance and less demanding? A skilled thinker can mine depression and tension wisely, using it to generate enormous work rather than letting it immobilize him. This seems to have been Wittgenstein's solution sometimes, and he was neither the first nor the last to think this.

Only late in life did Wittgenstein discover that life wasn't better on the other side of the glass and that satisfying sexual desire wasn't a zero sum game with the right person. It might even lead to confidence, clarity, and achievement. Wittgenstein was unlucky in that such a person didn't arrive until late in his life. And even then, he feared the consequences.

These were the main postures one can see in the diaries: abstinence, exile, forcing oneself back into one's body, and reproaching the divine as an act of piety. But I think it omits two other postures which lie in the shadows, which are not so explicit in the diaries, but which are part of the way to Wittgenstein's hut: walking and cooking.

The Wittgenstein I met in Skjolden learned that life is a long walk, and on this walk, we are so dependent on the kindness of others that it will not do to protract long-term fights by waving sticks. He also learned, in the end, that while preparing food for thought is important, the greater duty and sacrifice is nourishing one's fellow man, particularly training them to see and hear as they walk in the woods.

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Slow Learning and the Multiplicity of Meaning

Richard Smith

Abstract A major theme both in Wittgenstein's early work, the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, and in his later work, especially the *Philosophical Investigations*, is the question of how language can be meaningful. Although there are major differences in the earlier and later treatments, in both there is an emphasis on the need for intuition, for 'waiting for the penny to drop': there is a limit to what can be achieved by the giving of explanations. In both treatments, Wittgenstein also asks us to think of philosophy as a kind of therapy that can release us from conceptual confusion, and in his later work, the humanities, especially art and literature, replace the natural sciences as his model site of learning. I suggest that these features both imply a necessary slowness in fundamental aspects of learning and that this has the potential to be a corrective to our modern world of education which is obsessed with quick fixes and programmes of accelerated learning.

Keywords Wittgenstein · Meaning · Interpretation · Understanding · Educational assessment

1 Wittgenstein's Early 'Picture Theory' of Meaning

Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951) wrote virtually nothing about education in the conventional sense of the word. Nevertheless, some of his central ideas bear interesting educational implications. Prominent among these is his view—or rather than his changing views—on the way language has meaning. What is at stake here is the extent to which it is possible to fix language down and be certain about the meaning

A shorter version appears in the Wittgenstein section of the *Encyclopedia of Educational Philosophy and Theory* (Springer, 2016), co-edited by Nicholas Burbules & Jeff Stickney (Michael A. Peters, Chief Editor).

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M.A. Peters and J. Stickney (eds.), *A Companion to Wittgenstein on Education*,
DOI 10.1007/978-981-10-3136-6_6

of language in some domains of human activity at least. An important implication of this is that if language can be fixed, there is less room for interpretation; there is more room for interpretation if language is a fluid thing, its meanings always multiple and in flux so that there is seldom any finality to be reached and little absolute certainty to be achieved. This might be unsettling, but it holds out the offer of a kind of freedom: freedom for argument, discussion and conversation, for possibilities of suggesting different frameworks and metaphors for us to live by.

Let me give an example. In the small university town where I work, the local citizens tend to be ambivalent about the university students. While they appreciate the economic benefits they bring to the town and often say they find the students generally likeable, they are quick to say that compared to taxi-drivers and shop assistants, the students ‘don’t live in the real world’. Overhearing students in one of the pubs discussing poststructuralism (let us suppose that they do), most of us might be inclined to agree. But what is this thing called ‘the real world’ to which people appeal with such confidence? Do they have some privileged insight into what constitutes it? Someone who had worked in a factory might well say it was the shop assistant, working in a clean and relatively safe environment, who was not living in the real world. Then, a coal miner might want to say the same of the factory worker (‘Huh! You call that the real world?’) and so *ad infinitum*. There is no fixed thing called ‘the real world’, in the sense appealed to here, only different uses of the idea, deployed for rhetorical purposes. And of course, it is possible to challenge the notion that something mysteriously becomes more ‘real’, the more dirty and dangerous it is.

Why was Wittgenstein absorbed by the question of how language has meaning? He inherited from some of his philosophical forebears and near-contemporaries (especially Bertrand Russell) the ambition to formulate a clear and unambiguous language (one of ‘crystalline purity’, it is sometimes said) with which to make sense of the world, such that it would be possible for language to have definite meanings, rather than the web of confusion and muddle that it so often consists of. An example (mine, not Wittgenstein’s) may be helpful. What is the meaning of the word ‘cause’? If we say that one thing caused another, such as that a driver’s inattention caused a traffic accident, we seem to mean that in this particular case, the accident would not have occurred if the driver had been properly attentive to the road and the other vehicles. At the same time, though, we do not appear to want to say that inattention behind the wheel is always or necessarily followed by an accident, since we are aware that this is not the case. So the kind of causation that is at issue here is not the same as when we say the white billiard ball’s hitting the black one caused it to go into the pocket. In this example, we do seem to mean that any ball, hitting the black one in the same way, would have caused it to go into the pocket. This leads to difficulties which such statements as ‘smoking causes lung cancer’. Since it is not like the case of the billiard ball (not everyone who smokes gets lung cancer) nor like that of the traffic accident (such accidents can be caused by other factors than a driver’s inattention), some people have wanted to say that the claim that smoking causes cancer is false. Yet the statistical correlation between smoking and lung cancer is strong: roughly, 50% of long-term cigarette smokers contract lung cancer, and it is relatively seldom caused by other factors.

(The causation denier will here complain, with some reason, that 'cigarettes' and 'long term' were not in the original claim.) Moreover, a correlation of 50% is stronger than that between inattentive driving and traffic accidents, yet most people would probably say that here the one causes the other. These examples show that there is a considerable degree of confusion in our ordinary notions of causation. Accordingly, many philosophers have seen it as their role to attempt to give an account of causation that does not suffer from these confusions. (Mackie 1965 is a well-known approach to a solution.) Such an account would show, among other things, how we can quite sensibly say that smoking causes lung cancer (with qualifications concerning 'long term' and 'cigarettes') without having to give ground to such causation denials as 'My Uncle George has smoked a packet of cigarettes a day for 60 years without getting lung cancer'.

In his early book, the dauntingly titled *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, which was his only book to be published in his lifetime, Wittgenstein wants to go much further than clearing up the kind of conceptual confusions that I have just illustrated in the case of causation. He is concerned with the *general* relationship that must obtain if language is to tell us anything about any particular state of affairs, that is, about the world. He holds that any proposition, such as 'there is a red car parked on the road outside my window', must share a logical structure with the relevant state of affairs (that there is indeed a red car, etc.) if language is to be meaningful. The logical structure is thus one in which language mirrors or pictures the world, and it is this that satisfies the demand for language to be clear and unambiguous.

There are three points to be made here about this 'picture theory of meaning'. First, the *Tractatus* does not offer any *argument* in support of the theory. While this may seem a significant weakness, it is deliberate on Wittgenstein's part and it is entirely consistent with his theory. While language may represent reality, it cannot represent the logical form that language has to share with reality if it is be meaningful. That logical form is intended to be *shown* by the *Tractatus*, so that as the reader makes her way through the book, she begins intuitively to *see* this logical relation. Explanation would not help, not least because there is hardly anything that can be said by the way of explanation in any case. Either the reader 'gets it' or she does not. All the writer of such a text can do, or the teacher who takes the reader through the text, is offering the opportunity for the penny to drop. As we shall see later, this is an insight about certain kinds of understanding that Wittgenstein appears to have thought was significant even after he had repudiated the framework in which he first formulated it, that is the *Tractatus*.

Secondly, this theory of meaning gives the natural sciences a unique status, since the natural sciences largely consist of what Wittgenstein called genuine propositions, that is propositions that represent states of affairs. Wittgenstein writes that 'Newtonian mechanics, for example, imposes a unified form on the description of the world … [it] determines one form of description of the world by saying that all propositions used in the description of the world must be obtained in a given way from a given set of propositions—the axioms of mechanics' (6.341). It is these propositions—and not the axioms of mechanics themselves—that represent states of affairs. But if the natural sciences have this unique and, it is tempting to say,

superior status, then what is the status of the other disciplines? Kenny (1973, p. 99) asks, 'What has happened, one wonders, to such disciplines as history?' Do not its propositions purport to represent states of affairs in the past? We might wonder too what has happened to sociology, ethics, psychoanalysis and indeed philosophy itself. Wittgenstein's view is an austere one. About philosophy, he writes that 'Most of the propositions and questions to be found in philosophical works are not false but nonsensical' (4.003). Does this, then, apply to the *Tractatus* too? Wittgenstein explicitly accepts this in the final paragraph of the book. It is not worthless, however: the propositions it contains are 'elucidations', rather than a 'body of doctrine' (cp. 6.13). They are not themselves 'philosophical propositions' but an exercise in 'the clarification of propositions' (cp. 4.112). Anyone who understands the *Tractatus* eventually recognises its propositions as 'nonsensical, when he has used them—as steps—to climb up beyond them … He must transcend these propositions, and then he will see the world aright' (6.54), when, as I put it earlier, the penny has dropped.

Wittgenstein's description as 'nonsense' of vast areas of discourse—the subject matter of a large percentage of books published every year and of what is studied in schools and in university's faculties of arts and social sciences in virtually every country in the world—is, to say the least, disconcerting. It is tempting to say that what Wittgenstein means here by 'nonsense' is simply that the propositions of sociology, ethics and so on do not give a picture of the world in the same way that the propositions of natural science do. But this is to miss the radical nature of Wittgenstein's thinking in his early work. It was broadly welcomed by the respected and influential members of the 'Vienna Circle', a group of philosophers, scientists and logicians who met and published in the 1920s and 1930s. They took a similarly critical view of metaphysics and other nonscientific subjects and formulated the theory known as 'logical positivism' which insists that only propositions that are empirically verifiable are meaningful. The Vienna Circle was in turn a strong influence on A.J. Ayer, who in 1936 published the groundbreaking book, *Language, Truth and Knowledge*. He too describes such nonscientific discourses as metaphysics and poetry as nonsense, although he sometimes concedes that they are an important kind of nonsense, as when they consist of attempts to persuade people in a particular direction, rather than purporting to prove anything in a logically rigorous way.

If this chapter seems overly concerned with revisiting ideas and theories from the past which are of no great relevance today, the reader needs only to reflect on the current state of education. The quality of schools has become a matter of their relative standing in national league tables, while the quality of education in any particular country is widely understood to be established by universal testing through the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA). Thus, the kind of human flourishing and development that has widely been thought to characterise the enterprise of education become a question of whether the UK is positioned higher or lower than China in maths tests for 15-year-olds or where it

stands in tests of their literacy by comparison with Finland. Immense amounts of data are gathered and analysed, in an exercise that can appear statistically sophisticated, properly objective and thus as scientifically reputable as anyone could wish. Journalists and government ministers tend to be impressed by this. However, as opponents of PISA and similar forms of testing have pointed out, by focusing on a narrow range of measurable aspects of education, such testing ignores what is less easy to measure or is simply immeasurable. A literacy test, for example, may reliably show how well or badly a child performs on the literacy test, but it says nothing about her wider capacities here: how much she reads for pleasure, scrutinises the media for propaganda and forms of distortion, and can hold her own in a lively discussion of controversial ethical and political topics. Educational objectives that cannot be measured at all include moral and artistic development, the growth of civic consciousness and concern for the natural world and much else.

In the field of educational research, broadly similar trends are clear. The mantra of 'what works', the assumption that randomised control trials constitute the 'gold standard', the fashion for the use of large data sets—the prevalence, that is, of 'scientific' approaches to research in education and in social sciences more generally—is positivistic in a way that shows a clear line of descent from Wittgenstein's early work and from the members of the Vienna Circle. (We should also pause to reflect on what is built into, and what flows from, the phrase 'social science'.) One consequence of all this, naturally, is that educational research that does not conform to the scientific or pseudo-scientific paradigm is easily dismissed or marginalised. In a disturbing example of this, many colleagues from Anglophone countries whose research is theoretical, especially in sociology or philosophy of education, tell me of university research managers who describe their publications as 'thought pieces'.

The third important point to make about the picture theory of meaning is that it is seriously flawed. The criticism is made by Wittgenstein himself. In his later work, especially the writings brought together and published in 1953 as the *Philosophical Investigations* (TLP, PI)[1] after his death, he realised that he had been too quick to see the essential or primary function of language as representing reality, that is of giving a picture of the world. He now writes with some exasperation of 'the author of the *Tractatus*' as if he were someone else (PI §23), criticising him for thinking that 'The general form of propositions is: This is how things are' (PI §114, quoting *Tractatus* 4.5). He realises that 'A *picture* held us captive. And we could not get outside it, for it lay in our language and language seemed to repeat it to us inexorably' (PI §115). This was precisely a consequence of his earlier focus almost exclusively on language in scientific contexts or at least ones where language properly does claim to represent reality. Now, he is concerned to emphasise that there are not just many kinds of sentences and many different ways of using words,

[1]Following convention, titles for Wittgenstein's works are abbreviated (TLP = Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Z = Zettel, PI = Philosophical Investigations, OC = On Certainty, CV = Culture and Value), with section (§) or page number (p.), with full citation and initials (e.g., RFM) in the References.

but '*countless* kinds: countless different kinds of use of what we call 'symbols', 'words', 'sentences'. And this multiplicity is not fixed…' (PI §23).

Among what he calls 'the multiplicity of language games', that is, the various and different things we do with language, Wittgenstein lists 'giving orders and obeying them'; 'play-acting'; 'guessing riddles'; and 'asking, thanking, cursing, greeting, praying' (ibid.). None of these is a way of picturing the world. To give someone an order or to thank them and, we might add, to apologise, or to say 'I do' in a wedding ceremony, is to do something with language—and something different in all these instances—rather than to polish the mirror of language, as it were, in order for it to represent accurately something outside of language. Furthermore, the doing here—the asking, apologising and so on—admits all kinds of nuance. One might ask someone to close the door when they go, where the asking could be a polite request in order to preserve one's privacy after they left, while the very same words, said differently, could be a peremptory way of telling them to leave the room. To apologise covers at one end the automatic way that in many cultures, we say 'sorry' to people when we come too close to them in the street (or even when they come too close to us) and at the other end the heartfelt 'sorry' we say to someone we have inadvertently offended. (Possibilities of irony add further levels of complexity. The implications of irony for theories of language remain relatively unexplored.) In perhaps, his most well-known formulation of this new way of thinking about language Wittgenstein writes, 'For a *large* class of cases – though not for all - … the meaning of a word is its use in the language' (PI §43).

The views of commentators on Wittgenstein's writings are divided over the extent to which his account of language and meaning in the *Philosophical Investigations* marks a radical break with the *Tractatus* or shows at least elements of continuity with it. On the one hand, as I have noted, the Wittgenstein of the *Philosophical Investigations* is often sharply critical of his own early work. On the other hand, this later Wittgenstein often writes as if the philosopher's task is to construct a kind of map, not so different from a kind of picture, of the proliferating language games that we play with words. Again, as in the *Tractatus*, this is not because it will give us the certainty we seem to crave about the meaning of language. It is rather than in this way we will grasp that 'this is what we do': these are the language games that we play, and there is no hope of penetrating to anything that lies beneath and justifies any particular language game. There is no space here to pursue the question of the continuity or otherwise of Wittgenstein's ideas over the course of his philosophical career, though it is worth noting that the most recent trend has been to emphasise their continuity.

2 Wittgenstein's Later Remarks on Slow Learning

In the second half of this chapter, I want to emphasise just one element of this continuity. It consists in the important insight that sometimes arrival at understanding can only consist in, as I put it above, the 'dropping of the penny', where

the learner has to 'get it' intuitively, to *see* what is the case, and where to give her explanations is not only of little or no help but may even get in the way of the moment of intuition. It is striking too that this process of intuition seems to be inevitably a slow one. We have to work our way through the whole of the *Tractatus* (and more than once, as most of its readers will testify) before we can 'see the world aright' and dispense with the ladder that it constitutes (*Tractatus* 6.54). In the *Philosophical Investigations*, as we undertake the mapping of the various language games and note how words are used differently in different contexts, 'we see a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing: sometimes overall similarities, sometimes similarities of detail' (PI §66) and the network does not stand still, because 'new types of language, new language games, as we may say, come into existence, and others become obsolete and get forgotten' (PI §23).

In his later works, Wittgenstein offers some remarks that seem to point to the importance of slowness in various kinds of learning and in particular, naturally, the making of progress in philosophy. In *Culture and Value* (CV: 80e), we read that philosophers should greet each other by saying 'Take your time!' and that 'In philosophy the winner of the race is the one who can run most slowly. Or: the one who gets to the winning post last' (34e). Wittgenstein notes that his own writing—his own 'sentences', as he puts it, which here must mean his philosophical writing—is 'all to be read *slowly*' (57e, emphasis in original). His other remarks on the importance of slowness include, in the collection of fragments published as *Zettel* (Z), the warning that 'In philosophy we may not *terminate* a disease of thought. It must run its natural course, and *slow* cure is all important' (§382). The emphases are in the original: they seem themselves to enjoin a slow reading. About learning more widely, Wittgenstein writes in *On Certainty* (OC §141) that 'When we first begin to *believe* anything, what we believe is not a single proposition, it is a whole system of propositions. (Light dawns gradually over the whole.)', a remark that echoes his comments (above) on the need for patient mapping of the ways we use language.

It would be quite wrong to attribute to Wittgenstein a theory of learning, still less a theory of all learning. That would go against the efforts he made throughout his work to insist that he was not offering philosophical doctrines of any kind. He writes in the second sentence of the Preface to the *Tractatus* (p. 3) that this 'is not a textbook' and in the first paragraph of the Preface to the *Philosophical Investigations* (p. vii) that the book consists of 'the precipitate of philosophical investigations', as if it were almost an accidental outcome of an ongoing process rather than the final results of research that he has seen to a conclusion. In that same paragraph, we read that he has 'written down all these thoughts as *remarks*': that term was picked up and used for the publication of various notes from manuscript material that Wittgenstein left behind under the title of 'miscellaneous remarks' (*Vermischte Bemerkungen*). The edition of a translation of these under the title of *Culture and Value* is unfortunate in suggesting something more coherent, when the emphasis on 'miscellaneous remarks' warns us neither to expect to find a systematic theory here nor, by implication, to construct one on the basis of them. It is nevertheless interesting to ask—to investigate—whether what Wittgenstein writes largely about the learning of philosophy and the mapping of language and language

games may have some wider bearing. I shall do this by considering possible connections between ‘slowness’ and some of Wittgenstein’s other central ideas, particularly the idea that art, rather than science, might be a model for understanding and his well-known conception of philosophy as a kind of therapy. Why and in what ways might all this seem to require or involve a kind of slowness?

The reflections that I offer on these questions are lent topicality by the tendency of educational systems throughout the developed world today to emphasise the very opposite of slowness. ‘New and improved’ education must instead constantly be, as Fendler notes (2008), ‘faster, more powerful and longer lasting’. For instance, why should a university student not complete a bachelor’s degree in two years rather than three? Such accelerated programmes are usually designated ‘fast-track’, to trade on the associations of elite athletes or first-class train travel; at the same time, advertisements tend to foreground the advantages of paying only two years’ worth of fees and entering the job market sooner (Staffordshire University, n.d.). In education in schools, but now increasingly in higher education too, PISA (Programme for International Student Assessment) with the cooperation of the OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) is widely held to be responsible for the manic demands for quick solutions and immediate results. Its three-year assessment cycle is blamed for causing ‘a shift of attention to short-term fixes designed to help a country quickly climb the rankings, despite research showing that enduring changes in education practice take decades, not a few years, to come to fruition’ (Andrews et al. 2014). This leads to ignoring the ‘important role of noneducational factors, among which a nation’s socio-economic inequality is paramount. In many countries, including the US, inequality has dramatically increased over the past 15 years, explaining the widening educational gap between rich and poor which education reforms, no matter how sophisticated, are unlikely to redress’ (ibid.). The first step towards a better understanding of nation states’ relative educational performance is clear: ‘slow down the testing juggernaut’ (ibid.). The emphasis on ‘short-term fixes’, by contrast, leads to the desperate search for the philosopher’s stone of ‘accelerated learning’, versions of which generally rely on a few dubious or discredited shibboleths such as talk of ‘brain learning’, Howard Gardner’s theory of multiple intelligences and the idea that we each possess a ‘personal learning style’ (see Accelerated Learning Systems Limited (2001) for an example that includes all of these).

What does Wittgenstein mean by *slow* learning, then, and on what grounds does he value it? His remarks on this in *Culture and Value* occur in the context of reflections on art, especially poetry and music. At 34e, where we also find his remark about the winner coming last to the winning post, he quotes Longfellow’s poem *The Builders*:

> In the elder days of art
> Builders wrought with greatest care
> Each minute and unseen part,
> For the gods are everywhere.

This stanza was so important to Wittgenstein that he considered adopting it as a motto for the *Philosophical Investigations* (Brenner 1999, p. 11). In fact, the last line is not Longfellow's: he wrote 'For the gods see everywhere'. The alteration may be intentional (Baker and Hacker 2005, p. 32). Wittgenstein's version of it strongly recalls a remark attributed to the early Greek philosopher, Heraclitus, usually quoted as 'there are gods everywhere'. The next stanza seems to confirm that Wittgenstein had this in mind, whether he changed the wording in the previous stanza deliberately or unconsciously:

> Let us do our work as well,
> Both the unseen and the seen;
> Make the house, where Gods may dwell,
> Beautiful, entire, and clean.

It is worth recalling the context which supposedly occasioned Heraclitus's famous remark. Some visitors had come to see the celebrated philosopher and were disconcerted to find him warming himself at his stove, as if such an everyday activity was incompatible with his status and reputation. The story is told by Aristotle (*De Partibus Animalium* I 5.645a15-23): Heraclitus 'urged his visitors to come in without fear, for there were gods there too'. We might express this by saying he reminded them that the element of the sublime that they expected to find was indeed present in the room, in the most mundane particulars (Gregoric 2001). There is thus a nice irony in that Heraclitus denies them the kind of profound philosophical observation that they seek (of the sort that they could proudly relate to their friends back home) and in doing so offers them one worth their visit, if they have the wit to see it.

We are to take our time then and run the race slowly, by being prepared to engage, to wrestle, with the details of the ideas that puzzle us—the 'minute and unseen parts', as it were—thinking them through for ourselves rather than expecting to find, even to have served up to us, ready-made answers of a recognisably philosophy kind, or literary or historical kind depending on the context. We might compare Wittgenstein's insistence that philosophers have to 'go the bloody *hard* way' (Rhees 1969, emphasis in original). The point is not that philosophy inevitably involves drudgery. It is more that going the hard way is essential in order to proceed against the tendency to seek comfort or stimulus (ibid.).

Although Wittgenstein generally has philosophy in mind when he recommends the virtues of slowness, it is not difficult to think of everyday examples from formal education. We might imagine a class of sixth-formers learning to read a poem: in this case one by James Fenton, whose title is *Nothing* (2013). It is necessary to include the poem here in full.

> I take a jewel from a junk-shop tray
> And wish I had a love to buy it for.
> Nothing I choose will make you turn my way
> Nothing I give will make you love me more.
>
> I know that I've embarrassed you too long
> And I'm ashamed to linger at your door.
> Whatever I embark on will be wrong
> Nothing I do will make you love me more.

I cannot work. I cannot read or write.
How can I frame a letter to implore.
Eloquence is a lie. The truth is trite.
Nothing I say will make you love me more.

So I replace the jewel in the tray
And laughingly pretend I'm far too poor.
Nothing I give, nothing I do or say,
Nothing I am will make you love me more.

It is no disrespect to the beginning student of poetry to say that she is likely to identify the speaker of the poem with the poet and to assume that the poet has been rejected by someone he or she is in love with. One Internet version encourages this, declaring that it is 'a poem about unrequited love in honour of Valentine's day. James Fenton speaks of that simple, sad truth which most of us have to accept at some point in our lives—the fact that we just aren't wanted'. The confident connection to Valentine's day and to the alleged 'simple, sad truth' attempts to fix the meaning of the poem in place by nailing it to reality, as if the meaning of the poem could be fixed and grasped easily and, of course, quickly.

A slower and more attentive reader may notice a problem here. The speaker of the poem addresses someone he or she calls 'you', and the second stanza indicates a relationship that has a past ('I've embarrassed you too long'), an unhappy present ('I'm ashamed to linger at your door') and a future, even if it is an empty or frustrating one ('Whatever I embark on will be wrong'). These sound, we might think, like real pasts, presents and futures. They encourage the identification of the speaker with the poet and the assumption that the poem is autobiographical. However, the literary figure of the lover shut out at the door of the beloved is one of the oldest in poetry, so common in the poetry of classical Rome and Greece that it has its own technical term: the *paraclausithyron.*[2]

Once the reader is alerted to the distinctively literary quality of the poem and is thus released from the expectation of finding a simple meaning located in autobiographical fact, she might notice and enjoy the paradox of a line of poetry that declares 'I cannot work. I cannot read or write'. She might even explore the possibility of a reading in which nothing will make the speaker more loved because he is already as loved as he can be, in which case he is not so much desperate at being wholly unloved but in search of the impossible guarantee of perfect love. In that case, so far from pitying himself for being unloved, he is gently laughing at himself (final stanza) for his search for that guarantee, and then the last two lines register his realisation that he is loved as much as can be reasonably hoped for.

One reader treats such explorations with impatience, wanting to nail down 'the meaning' and move on. Another reader relishes the play of interpretation. Something similar is often the case in the study of history: one student expects to be able to conclude, fairly quickly and with a degree of finality, that Germany held or did not hold imperialistic ambitions in 1914 and these were (or were not) among the

[2]See Smith (2014) for an earlier version of this discussion of the poem.

causes of the First World War. The more sophisticated historian understands and even relishes the way that interpretations change, so that it is hardly possible to state with finality just what the causes of the First World War were.

A comparable contrast can be found in different approaches to the experience of art. On the one hand, there is the long contemplation and repeated revisiting of an artwork that yields dawning recognition of its complexities. On the other, to take a particular example, in 2014 Amsterdam's Rijksmuseum hosted an exhibition called 'Art is Therapy'. It is intended to show 'what art can mean to visitors. And not so much from an (art-)historical point of view, but focusing rather on the therapeutic effect that art can have and the big questions in life that art can answer' (Rijksmuseum Amsterdam 2014). The usual labels, which often give little more than the name of the artist and the date of the painting, are variously replaced or upstaged by enormous yellow Post-it notes. For example, a painting of a tumultuous naval battle 'is frank about pride in achievement', according to its accompanying Post-it, and stands as a reproof to our tamer and less spirited world where we often lack 'the sheer courage and force of character' to see things through. The message is that 'Goodness should be strong' (ibid.). Here, everything there is to say about the painting is readily known in advance, without the need for any real engagement with it, without the effort and slow struggle of interpretation. The visitor only needs to glance at the Post-it and move on. It is not hard to see that the nature of teaching in the arts is at issue here (Smith 2015).

There is a familiar philosophical distinction between *Erklären* (explanation) and *Verstehen* (understanding) that registers much of the contrast sketched above. *Erklären* has its principal home in the natural sciences, as when we seek to explain the phenomenon of the rainbow. *Verstehen* points to the interpretative element in understanding a poem, painting or indeed a person. While there should be no implication that explanation in the natural sciences is typically a quick matter, still less a rushed one, nevertheless an explanation that is arrived at speedily (an explanation of an outbreak of typhus, say) is clearly desirable; once the correct explanation has been arrived at, there is usually no need for further research, at least as far as the simple explanation of the particular phenomenon is concerned. Things are different with *Verstehen* or understanding. One's understanding of a poem or sculpture is always provisional or, in the title of this chapter, cautious: the reader may want to revise her interpretation of a particular poem or artefact at some point in future, and another critic may offer an interpretation that she will concede is an improvement on her own.

One way to think of the difference between the earlier and the later Wittgenstein —roughly, between the author of the *Tractatus* and the author of the *Philosophical Investigations*—is that the earlier Wittgenstein is strongly inclined to take scientific and mathematical knowledge and its acquisition as the model for all knowledge and its acquisition. This is perhaps one reason why the later Wittgenstein remarks that mathematicians make bad philosophers (Z §382).[3] This Wittgenstein is far more

[3]Caution is necessary here: most but not all of the fragments that make up the collection known as *Zettel* date from the period 1945–48.

hospitable to the idea that there are many kinds of knowledge and many ways of learning or—what comes down to much the same thing—that metaphors from a wide range of human experience, or a broader variety of language games, may prove illuminating here. The regular references to art and music in *CV* seem to play this role, in part. They draw attention to the emotional and volitional aspects of cognition. Thus, shortly before his remark that philosophers should greet each other by saying 'Take your time' (80e), Wittgenstein writes:

> I may find scientific questions interesting, but they never really grip me. Only *conceptual* and *aesthetic* questions do that. At bottom I am indifferent to the solution of scientific problems; but not the other sort. (79e, emphasis in original)

Some brief remarks about Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy as a kind of therapy (PI §133 and elsewhere) will serve as a conclusion. First, a particular 'disease of thought' in our time that stands in need of therapy is our expectation that there will always be quick answers, easy routes to comfort or satisfaction. Secondly, the therapist—one working in the traditions of psychoanalysis and psychotherapy—works slowly. (Naturally, in our impatient age, just six sessions of cognitive behavioural therapy, usually abbreviated to CBT, are the fashionable treatment.) The patient is not to be offered solutions, but helped to learn how to go about finding solutions. Wittgenstein regards this as an essential feature of therapy, writing that 'In philosophy we may not *terminate* a disease of thought. It must run its natural course, and *slow* cure is all important' (Z 382, original emphasis). It should be unnecessary to add that quick answers are indeed desirable in many areas of life and that perspicuity and quickness of apprehension are in most cases significant intellectual virtues. The cautious teacher simply bears in mind Wittgenstein's reminder that there are by contrast areas—most prominently what he calls 'conceptual and aesthetic' ones—where 'bloody hard' and slow is the only way to go.

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Elucidation in the Transition of Wittgenstein's Philosophy

Yasushi Maruyama

Abstract 'Elucidation' was an important concept for Wittgenstein's early philosophy. It is argued that he carried over some features of Tractarian elucidation in his transition from the early to the later philosophy. His consideration of ostensive teaching as elucidation and *Übersicht* as an elucidating method is shown to be crucial for the development and consistency of his philosophy.

Keywords Wittgenstein · Elucidation · *Tractatus* · Ostensive teaching · 'Synopsis' (*Übersicht*)

1 Introduction

Wittgenstein never talked about 'elucidation' in the later period. He used the term only three times even in the *Tractatus*. 'Elucidation' is, however, an important concept of his early philosophy. It is 'elucidation' that he appealed to when he characterized his philosophy in the *Tractatus*. Then, does it mean that elucidation is never important in his later philosophy? I will argue that he carried over some features of elucidation as crucial elements in his transition from the early to the later philosophy.

Originally delivered as a paper at the *International Wittgenstein Society* Annual Meeting (Austria, 2009), published in the conference proceeds: Editors Volker A. Munz, Klaus Puhl, Joseph Wang. *Language and World*: Papers of the 32nd International Wittgenstein Symposium August 9–15, 2009, pp. 248–250. (Kirchberg am Wechsel: Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Volume XVII.)

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M.A. Peters and J. Stickney (eds.), *A Companion to Wittgenstein on Education*,
DOI 10.1007/978-981-10-3136-6_7

2 Elucidation in the *Tractatus*

Despite its importance, interpreters of Wittgenstein have been puzzled with his uses of 'elucidation'. It is partly because what he means by elucidations is not clear, partly because his three cases seem inconsistent. 'Elucidation' appears in the following sections in the *Tractatus*:

> 3.263 The meanings of primitive signs can be explained by means of elucidations. Elucidations are propositions that contain the primitive signs. So they can only be understood if the meanings of those signs are already known.
>
> 4.112 Philosophy aims at the logical clarification of thoughts.
>
> Philosophy is not a body of doctrine but an activity.
> A philosophical work consists essentially of elucidations.
> Philosophy does not result in 'philosophical propositions', but rather in the clarification of propositions.
> Without philosophy thoughts are, as it were, cloudy and indistinct: its task is to make them clear and to give them sharp boundaries.
>
> 6.54 My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who understands me eventually recognizes them as nonsensical, when he has used them—as steps—to climb up beyond them. (He must, so to speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed up it.)
> He must transcend these propositions, and then he will see the world aright.

Elucidations are propositions that include primitive signs, which are explained by means of elucidations. Max Black is puzzled with this relation between elucidations and primitive signs: only if primitive signs are already known, elucidations are understood while such primitive signs are explained by means of elucidations (Black 1964: 114–115). It is mysterious, according to Black, how speaker and hearer achieve common reference because the meanings of primitive signs are only shown in propositions without explicit explanation. He assumes that Wittgenstein points out a fact concerning mutual understanding in psychology or sociology, and that there can be no philosophical concern. In Sect. 4.112, however, Wittgenstein states that elucidations are essential for philosophy that aims at the logical clarification of thoughts. Moreover, in Sect. 6.54, he illustrates his philosophical propositions with elucidations, which are nonsensical, but with which he helps someone see the world aright. Then, how can we have a consistent picture of

Wittgenstein's uses of 'elucidation'? P.M.S. Hacker tells us to notice the difference between the first case and the last two cases (Hacker 1975: 605, fn. 1). On the other hand, James Conant demonstrates a consistent view of Tractarian elucidation by focusing on its nonsensical but therapeutic role (Conant 2000). I shall discuss what Wittgenstein finds common to the uses of 'elucidation' in the three cases.

'Elucidation' is not original to Wittgenstein. He critically takes it over from Gottlob Frege, who committed himself to a program known as logicism. This was an attempt to reduce mathematics to a logical system. In order to accomplish his program of logicism, Frege allows only two ways to introduce terms into the system. One is definition and the other is elucidation. Definition can introduce the logically complex but not the logically simple. Only elucidation can reach something primitive.

Elucidation is given a limited but necessary role in Frege's logicist program. He excludes elucidation from a system because elucidation is not precise. But he claims that it necessarily comes before constructing a system (Frege 1997: 313). Elucidation is carried out in ordinary language, in which precise meanings are not always indicated. Thus, elucidation is not suitable for science. At the beginning of constructing a discipline, however, a scientist needs to have a basis for communication with others. Even though elucidation is not precise enough, it is required for that pragmatic reason. Elucidation sets out a system but should not belong to the system because of its vagueness. Elucidation relies on someone else's guessing. It is accomplished by 'an understanding willing to meet one halfway' (Frege 1969: 254).

Wittgenstein critically takes over 'elucidation' from Frege. Indeed he objects to the fact that Frege considers categorical notions and pieces of logical equipment as indefinables (TLP: 4.1272 and 5.4)[1] and claims that only *Names* are primitive signs (TLP: 3.202 and 3.26). They still share the idea that elucidation differs from definition and explains the meanings of primitive signs.

While both Frege and Wittgenstein also agree that elucidations are not included within a science, the roles are different. The Fregean elucidations are necessary as a propaedeutic to a science. Since elucidations cannot be precise, they have to rely on someone else's guessing. For Wittgenstein, elucidations are required only when the logic of thought is not clear or is misunderstood. Elucidations are used temporarily and to be thrown away after the logic is understood because they are nonsensical pseudo-propositions.

Thus, the whole picture of the Tractarian elucidation can be illustrated with the motif of showing. The task of the Tractarian elucidation is to show what can not be said. In TLP 3.263, the unsayable is the meanings of primitive signs. In order to show the meanings of primitive signs, elucidations talk about the signs. In TLP

[1]Following convention, titles for Wittgenstein's works are abbreviated (TLP = Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, PR = Philosophical Remarks, PO = Philosophical Occasions, PI = Philosophical Investigations), with section (§) or page number (p.), with full citation and initials (e.g., RFM) in the References.

4.112, it is emphasized that philosophy is an activity of clarifying thoughts. Philosophy makes the boundary of thoughts clear by talking about the sayable and showing the unsayable. Since the way of clarification essentially includes showing, Wittgenstein believes that propositions in a philosophical work should be elucidations. In TLP 6.54, quoted above, he explains his propositions in particular, that is, the work of the *Tractatus* itself. The propositions of this work are nonsensical—he attempts to talk about the unsayable, but they are allowed to be used because they serve as an activity of clarification. Not what is said but what is (being) done is essential for philosophy. But again, since his propositions are nonsensical, they are to be thrown away after his readers get the point. Elucidations are used only when you have the intention of showing. Showing is working on someone who does not see what you see; philosophy teaches one to see the world aright. Wittgenstein describes the only correct method of philosophy: to say nothing except what can be said, and to show (*nachweisen*) that someone failed to give a meaning to certain signs in his propositions whenever he wants to say something metaphysical; 'he would not have the feeling that we were teaching him philosophy—*this* method would be the only strictly correct one' (TLP: 6.53).

3 Ostensive Teaching as Elucidation

When Wittgenstein restarted philosophy at the beginning of the early thirties, he was developing a new and deeper thought about elucidation:

> If I explain the meaning of a word 'A' to someone by pointing to something and saying 'This is A', then this expression may be meant in two different ways. Either it is itself a proposition already, in which case it can only be understood once the meaning of 'A' is known, i.e. I must now leave it to chance whether he takes it as I meant it or not. Or the sentence is a definition. (PR, sec. 6)

The first case is quite similar to the Tractarian elucidation. Whether or not an elucidation can be understood depends on the previous knowledge of the person to whom you are talking. The second case, however, is not a definition in the Tractarian sense. It is another characteristic of elucidation even though he calls it a definition. He continues:

> Or the sentence is a definition. Suppose I have said to someone 'A is ill', but he doesn't know who I mean by 'A', and I now point at a man, saying 'This is A'. Here the expression is a definition, but this can only be understood if he has already gathered what kind of object it is through his understanding of the grammar of the proposition 'A is ill'. But this means that any kind of explanation of a language presupposes a language already. And in a certain sense, the use of language is something that cannot be taught, i.e. I cannot use language to teach it in the way in which language could be used to teach someone to play the piano. —And that of course is just another way of saying: I cannot use language to get outside language.

Wittgenstein later calls the second case as *ostensive teaching*. The characteristic of the second case is what the early Wittgenstein implied in his Tractarian elucidation, but he was unaware of it at that early date. Wittgenstein has not yet reached an

answer in the passage above. But he recognizes that in the *Tractatus* he did not think enough about how he can show the unsayable. The early Wittgenstein may have implicitly believed that when someone does not know the meaning of a Name we can make him know the meaning by showing him the object. But now in the early thirties, he suspects that showing the object may not fix the meaning. The example of the difficulty of teaching suggests that the function of showing in elucidation is not certain. His consideration of the difficulty of teaching came to dominate his discussions in the later period. The case of ostensive definition or teaching is a major example of them.

4 *Übersicht* as an Elucidating Method

According to G.E. Moore, Wittgenstein found a new method of philosophy in the early thirties (PO: 113–114). He did not fully explain what it was. He merely said that he was not teaching new facts but telling what you already know. Telling those things, he tried to have students get a synopsis of them in order to remove their intellectual discomfort; he wanted to teach (or show) how to get a synopsis of trivial things.

The original German word of 'synopsis' is *Übersicht*. There is no one appropriate word in English, and it is not easy to understand *Übersicht* as a method. The interpreters claim, however, that the notion of *Übersicht* is prominent in all Wittgenstein's later philosophy and is of paramount importance (Baker and Hacker 1983: 296).

Wittgenstein's discussion on *Übersicht* appears in his objection to Frazer's attempt to explain primitive rituals in terms of scientific, historical, or causal explanation. The problem with the scientific explanation, according to Wittgenstein, is that it makes the magical and religious views of primitive people look like errors (PO: 119). For example, Frazer explains that a savage stabs the picture of his enemy apparently in order to kill him. Frazer finds stupidity in their way of thinking. But it is only because he attempts to explain rituals from his own scientific view. Wittgenstein gives an example of someone who kisses the picture of his beloved. This is not based on the belief that it will have some specific effect on the object, but it rather aims at satisfaction. In the same way, rituals are not instrumental but symbolic or expressive.

Wittgenstein claims that every explanation is only a hypothesis. It is one of many different ways of seeing collected facts. He wrote:

> "And so the chorus points to a secret law" one feels like saying to Frazer's collection of facts. I *can* represent this law, this idea, by means of an evolutionary hypothesis, or also, analogously to the schema of a plant, by means of the schema of a religious ceremony, but also by means of the arrangement of its factual content alone, in a '*perspicuous*' representation.
>
> The concept of perspicuous representation is of fundamental importance for us. It denotes the form of our representation, the way we see things. (PO: 133)

Scientific explanations have an assumption, such as ‘progress’ or ‘evolution’ as a secret law. Facts are explained by means of progress or evolution. Wittgenstein does not deny the possibility of an explanation. There are different approaches to the collected facts, for example, morphological representation, which Goethe had, and perspicuous representation, which Wittgenstein recommends us to have. Then, how can perspicuous representation be an alternative to see strange forms of life?

Perspicuous representation is made by the arrangement of factual contents alone, without adding any explanation to it. Then, how can we have a clear view by arranging the facts? Wittgenstein’s answer is that we can find connecting links between the facts. By finding the links between the seemingly isolated facts, we understand them.

Wittgenstein holds *Übersicht* as a philosophical method in the *Philosophical Investigations*. He describes many different language games as examples in the *Investigations* and expects readers to command a clear view of them. ‘The [philosophical] problems are solved, not giving new information, but by arranging what we have already known’ (PI, sec. 109). Wittgenstein encourages us to find a link among trivial things in order that we can see the world differently and that we can be freed from pictures that we are held captive. How to show/teach the way out of a current dominant situation is the main concern of his philosophy, as he wrote, ‘What is your aim in philosophy?—To shew the fly the way out of the fly-bottle’ (PI, sec. 309).

5 Conclusion

The Later Wittgenstein never used the term ‘elucidation.’ As we have seen, some features of Tractarian elucidation are crucial in his later philosophy. Elucidation is one of keys to understand not only his early philosophy, but also the development and consistency of his philosophy.

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Wittgenstein's Metaphors and His Pedagogical Philosophy

Nicholas C. Burbules

Abstract This chapter explores Wittgenstein's use of metaphors throughout his work, but especially in his later work. I argue that metaphors serve an essential function in language, and that Wittgenstein relies on metaphors to explain some of his most basic ideas. Many of these metaphors refer to tools, and this indicates a growing pragmatism in his view of language. Finally, these metaphorical accounts highlight the central role of learning in his later work.

Keywords Wittgenstein · Language · Metaphor · Pragmatism

1 Metaphors in Wittgenstein's Early Philosophy

Ludwig Wittgenstein's *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (TLP)[1] is an argument for an austere, literal view of language. Its core argument can be summarized by the following propositions:

This chapter is a revised and expanded version of "Wittgenstein's Pedagogical Metaphors," in the *Encyclopedia of Educational Philosophy and Theory*, Michael A. Peters, Ed. (Springer Publishing, 2016). Like all my writings on Wittgenstein, it has grown out of countless conversations and co-authored papers over the years with Jim Marshall, Michael Peters, Paul Smeyers, and Jeff Stickney. This version benefited from direct comments from Jeff Stickney and Joyce Tolliver.

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[1]Following convention, titles for Wittgenstein's works are abbreviated (TLP = Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, OC = On Certainty, CV = Culture and Value, PI = Philosophical Investigations), with section (§) or page number (p.), with full citation and initials (e.g., RFM) in the References.

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M.A. Peters and J. Stickney (eds.), *A Companion to Wittgenstein on Education*,
DOI 10.1007/978-981-10-3136-6_8

(TLP: 2) What is the case—a fact—is the existence of states of affairs.
(TLP: 4.1) Propositions represent the existence and non-existence of states of affairs.
(TLP: 4.11) The totality of true propositions is the whole of natural science …

The logical empiricists of the Vienna Circle took this argument as the basis for *positivism*: the view that language is a means for expressing true statements about the world. Their "verification principle" asserted that a statement is meaningful only if there is a procedure for verifying whether it is true or not. Statements that do not fit this criterion are "nonsense." Under such a definition, virtually all statements outside the realm of pure logic, mathematics, and empirical science are nonsense.

Wittgenstein believed, in fact, that a good deal of philosophy *was* nonsense (TLP: 4.003), and that philosophy, by this definition, does not offer "propositions":

(TLP: 4.112) Philosophy aims at the logical clarification of thoughts. Philosophy is not a body of doctrine but an activity. A philosophical work consists essentially of elucidations. Philosophy does not result in "philosophical propositions," but rather in the clarification of propositions. Without philosophy thoughts are, as it were, cloudy and indistinct: its task is to make them clear and to give them sharp boundaries.

Philosophical mistakes occur, Wittgenstein believed, when problems are phrased in ways that are not answerable, as formulated. The book ends with a simple assertion that reads like a koan from Zen Buddhism:

(TLP: 7) What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence.

As many commentators have pointed out, however, this austere view of language is not supported by the *Tractatus* itself (see Gill 1979; Maruta 2003; Nyíri 2010). Several of the key claims in the text are phrased in figurative language: One might call them analogies or similes, but in this essay, I will use the most commonly used term, *metaphors*.

The active use of metaphors in the text suggests that the account of language given in the *Tractatus* is seriously incomplete: that even on its own terms, it is not possible to maintain a purely literal language, and that the philosophical task of "elucidation" or "clarification of propositions," as Wittgenstein carries it out, itself relies on metaphors.

Here are three examples from the text. The first is Wittgenstein's famous "picture theory," that a proposition is true if and only if it offers an accurate representation of the world:

(TLP: 2.1) We picture facts to ourselves.
(TLP: 2.11) A picture presents a situation in logical space, the existence and non-existence of states of affairs.
(TLP: 2.12) A picture is a model of reality.

The most basic function of language—its essential function, on Wittgenstein's account—can only be explained by comparing it to a non-linguistic example, a picture (*Bild*). The following sections go into great detail about the way in which a

picture represents the world. At this crucial point (the question of truth), Wittgenstein relies on yet a further metaphor, a measure or ruler:

> (TLP: 2.1511) That is how a picture is attached to reality; it reaches right out to it.
> (TLP: 2.1512) It is laid against reality like a measure.
> (TLP: 2.15121) Only the end points of the graduating lines actually touch the object that is to be measured.

In this sense, the famously called "picture theory" of language is not exactly a *theory*. Its account of the form and representational capabilities of language is fundamentally based on a series of images or analogies that are suggestive in nature: indicative of meaning, but not unambiguous or determinative. And then, in the penultimate passage of the book, there is another famous metaphor:

> (TLP: 6.54) My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who understands me eventually recognizes them as nonsensical, when he has used them—as steps—to climb up beyond them. (He must, so to speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed up it.) He must transcend these propositions, and then he will see the world aright.

Here Wittgenstein acknowledges, in a strikingly self-referential way, that the very endeavor of elucidation, as he practices it, relies on the "nonsensical" (including, it appears, the use of language that directly violates the theory of referential truth argued for in the text). Even here, he relies on a metaphor, the ladder that, once it has served its purpose, we must "transcend," or throw away. Or can we? Gill (1979, pp. 273–274) summarizes this apparent paradox as follows:

> Wittgenstein's well known way of treating this difficulty is to take back with his left hand what he had offered with his right hand… Clearly the main feature of the difficulty is that metaphorical expression is the necessary foundation for more explicit expression. The ladder that enables us to move from no expression to explicit expression is metaphoric expression. Thus it is not the sort of ladder which can be kicked over. For we are still and always standing on it!

One might push this line of argument even further (see Ortony 1975) and suggest that while the traditional view of language suggests that its literal, referential functions are primary and the figurative a special, poetic use of language, the situation may often be reversed: that meanings can begin in imagistic, metaphorical, or analogical expressions, and over time become literalized (i.e., become "dead metaphors"). We forget the original figurative sources of the expression as it becomes familiar and codified, though the figurative associations can be revitalized (dead metaphors can come back to life). As I am emphasizing here, along with Gill, even in the most idealized kind of propositional, literal language, the figurative is indispensable—it keeps coming back, and we keep seeing the nonliteral behind the literal meanings.[2]

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[2]Given W.V.O. Quine's famous "gavagai" example, even the most literal use of language imaginable—ostensive reference—still involves guesswork (see Quine 2013).

2 Metaphors in Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy

In his later work, Wittgenstein relies even more extensively (and, one might say, more unapologetically) on metaphors of many types.[3] He says, in the *Philosophical Investigations* (PI §112), "A simile that has been absorbed into the forms of our language produces a false appearance, and this disquiets us." And he writes in *Culture and Value* (CV, p. 1), "A good simile refreshes the intellect" and (CV, p. 19) "What I invent are new similes." It appears from these comments that certain similes (or metaphors) inhibit thought; I regard PI §112 as closely linked with PI §115, "A picture held us captive. And we could not get outside it, for it lay in our language and language seemed to repeat it to us inexorably." Certain figurations in language become clichéd, so familiar that their original intent becomes invisible to us (that is how they become "dead" metaphors). A cliché becomes an encumbrance to thought, whereas a new or fresh metaphor can cause us to view the familiar in a new light. Wittgenstein's goal, he says, is to invent new similes. This again suggests an indispensable role for figurative language, such as metaphor.

In Wittgenstein's famous metaphor (PI §309), "What is your aim in philosophy?—To shew the fly the way out of the fly-bottle," the fly-bottle is both a trap from which one is trying to escape, but also—because we are *inside it* and because it is *transparent*—a trap that we must first of all *recognize as such* (like the old saying that a fish is the last to recognize the existence of water). Here again there is a self-reflexive moment: You draw people's attention to the fly-bottle they are in by using a metaphor; the novel figuration highlights the clichéd, static language that "holds us captive." Whereas the conception of language advocated for in the *Tractatus* suggests that figurative language is an aberration from the representative function of propositions (because as a proposition a metaphor is, literally speaking, false), in the *Investigations,* it is more explicit that figurative language is just another "language game," one that operates by different rules from the literal—and constitutes an important, complementary, corrective to it.

Many have commented on the plethora of metaphors (analogies, similes, etc.) Wittgenstein uses in his later work. I will not try here to review them all.[4] I want to focus on two aspects of these metaphors: The first is Wittgenstein's frequent use of *tools* as his metaphorical objects; the second is the way in which these metaphors frequently are used to depict *educational* processes.[5]

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[3]The definitive work on this topic, expanded from his earlier essay (1979), is Jerry H. Gill, *Wittgenstein and Metaphor* (1996).

[4]A far more comprehensive treatment is offered by Gill (1996).

[5]This view of Wittgenstein's central educational concerns is developed at length in Michael A. Peters, Nicholas C. Burbules, and Paul Smeyers, *Showing and Doing: Wittgenstein as a Pedagogical Philosopher* (2008, revised 2010). See also, Meredith Williams (1994).

Benfey (2016), in a wonderful essay entitled "Wittgenstein's Handles," draws attention to the work that Wittgenstein did in helping to design his sister Gretl's house in 1926. Benfey quotes from Ray Monk's biography (1990, p. 236) of Wittgenstein:

> His role in the design of the house was concerned chiefly with the design of the windows, doors, window-locks and radiators. This is not as marginal as it may at first appear, for it is precisely these details that lend what is otherwise a rather plain, even ugly, house its distinctive beauty. The complete lack of any external decoration gives a stark appearance, which is alleviated only by the graceful proportion and meticulous execution of the features designed by Wittgenstein… The details are thus everything, and Wittgenstein supervised their construction with an almost fanatical exactitude.

It is not very surprising that Wittgenstein, trained as an engineer, would have an imagination that turned toward metaphors of handles, hinges, rulers, hammers, ladders, and spades. This much more pragmatic worldview is captured in his famous aphorism (PI §43), "For a large class of cases—though not for all—in which we employ the word 'meaning' it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language," and the less well-known (PI §97): "Whereas, of course, if the words 'language,' 'experience,' 'world,' have a use, it must be as humble a one as that of the words 'table,' 'lamp,' 'door.'" Wittgenstein makes the analogy of words with tools explicit:

> (PI §11) Think of the tools in a tool-box: there is a hammer, pliers, a saw, a screw-driver, a rule, a glue-pot, glue, nails and screws.—The functions of words are as diverse as the functions of these objects. (And in both cases there are similarities.)

The last parenthetical comment is significant, because even the term "use" in the case of tools is not unambiguous. There is more than one way to use a tool, and more than one purpose to which a tool can be put; likewise, different tools can be used in similar ways. In *On Certainty*, Wittgenstein asks, (OC §351) "Isn't the question 'have these words a meaning?' similar to 'Is that a tool?' asked as one produces, say, a hammer? I say 'Yes, it's a hammer. But what if the thing that any of us would take for a hammer were somewhere else a missile, for example, or a conductor's baton? Now make the application yourself." Therefore, describing meaning as use does not straightforwardly settle the matter, since we still need to ask "What use?" and "For what purposes?" Wittgenstein highlights this problem with yet another tool metaphor:

> (PI §12) It is like looking into the cabin of a locomotive. We see handles all looking more or less alike. (Naturally, since they are all supposed to be handled.) But one is the handle of a crank which can be moved continuously (it regulates the opening of a valve); another is the handle of a switch, which has only a brake-lever, the harder one pulls on it, the harder it brakes; a fourth, the handle of a pump: it has an effect only so long as it is moved to and fro.

The handles all look alike, but they work in different ways and they accomplish different things. And here is the key point: The only way to learn these differences is by handling them and seeing the way they work. So if it is true that the meaning of a word is its use, then a corollary is that we learn the meaning(s) of a word *by* using it, and we can learn to use the same word in different ways, for different purposes.

3 Metaphors of Learning in Wittgenstein

This discussion of learning introduces the second theme I want to highlight about Wittgenstein's metaphors: They often have a pedagogical component, they ask us to reflect on how we learn something, or learn to do something. In fact, the *Investigations* famously starts with a passage from Augustine about how he learned language—an account that Wittgenstein goes on to question.

Here again we encounter a range of metaphors. The best known from the *Investigations* is the idea of a "language game":

> (PI §23) There are *countless* kinds: countless different kinds of use of what we call "symbols," "words," "sentences." And this multiplicity is not something fixed, given once for all; but new types of language, new language-games, as we may say, come into existence, and others become obsolete and get forgotten.… Here the term "*language-game*" is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the *speaking* of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life.
>
> Review the multiplicity of language-game in the following examples, and in others:
>
> * Giving orders, and obeying them—
> * Describing the appearance of an object, or giving its measurements—
> * Constructing an object from a description (a drawing)—
> * Reporting an event—
> * Speculating about an event—
> * Forming and testing a hypothesis—
> * Presenting the results of an experiment in tables and diagrams—
> * Making up a story; and reading it—
> * Play-acting—
> * Singing catches—
> * Guessing riddles—
> * Making a joke; telling it—
> * Solving a problem in practical arithmetic—
> * Translating from one language into another—
> * Asking, thanking, cursing, greeting, praying.
>
> —It is interesting to compare the multiplicity of the tools in language and of the ways they are used, the multiplicity of kinds of word and sentence, with what logicians have said about the structure of language. (Including the author of the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*.)

In this summary, we see the key elements of Wittgenstein's view of language: that whereas in the *Tractatus* language is for making propositional assertions about the world, in which the aim is to state the truth (and where all else is "nonsense"), here language has an enormous variety of uses, and purposes—*games*, each governed by different rules and different criteria of success.

If language games are of such an enormous variety, one asks, what make them all *games*? What do they have in common? Wittgenstein replies:

> Instead of producing something common to all that we call language, I am saying that these phenomena have no one thing in common which makes us use the same word for all,— but that they are related to one another in many different ways.… For if you look at them you will not see something that is common to all, but similarities, relationships, and a whole series of them at that.… And the result of this examination is: we see a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing: sometimes overall similarities, sometimes similarities of detail. I can think of no better expression to characterize these similarities than "family resemblances"; for the various resemblances between members of a family: build, features, colour of eyes, gait, temperament, etc. etc. overlap and criss-cross in the same way.— And I shall say: "games" form a family. (PI §65–67)

In contrast with what might be called the Platonic sense of definition—to find the essence, the pure form of X that makes it X—this notion of definition is more indefinite, suggesting that the pragmatics of common usage create a relative sense of shared characteristics, but one in which there will be borderline cases and disagreements about when something counts as an X or not (see, for example, "democracy").

Furthermore, this indefiniteness is not an unfortunate imperfection in language, but a benefit: "One might say that the concept 'game' is a concept with blurred edges.—'But is a blurred concept a concept at all?'—Is an indistinct photograph a picture of a person at all? Is it even always an advantage to replace an indistinct picture by a sharp one? Isn't the indistinct one often exactly what we need?" (PI §71) There could not be a conception of language more opposed to the one laid out in *Tractatus* 4.112, quoted earlier, in which it is the purpose of philosophy to make our thoughts "clear and to give them sharp boundaries." (Notice also that the function of a picture as a representation of reality is changed from something that can be "laid against reality like a measure" to something *usefully* "indistinct.") The metaphors of "crisscross" similarities and "family resemblances" highlight yet again the essential indeterminacy of language. Indeed, these are basically accounts of how metaphor itself works: looking for points of comparison, contrast, and similarity against apparently different things to determine a meaningful association between them. This suggests yet again that the sharp delineation between literal and figurative language is overdrawn.

The "language game," Wittgenstein says, consists of (PI §7) "the whole, consisting of language and the actions into which it is woven"—not just words, but activities in which language plays a part (what is sometimes termed in other contexts discourse or *parole*). Learning the "language game" entails learning not only words, but also their uses in the context of human doings.

How does this learning occur? Here, not surprisingly, we encounter another metaphor. We learn to participate in a language game, as with any game, by learning the rules. But what does it mean to follow a rule?

> (PI §85) A rule stands there like a sign-post.–Does the sign-post leave no doubt open about the way I have to go? Does it shew which direction I am to take when I have passed it; whether along the road or the footpath or cross-country? But where is it said which way I

> am to follow it; whether in the direction of its finger or (e.g.) in the opposite one? –And if there were, not a single sign-post, but a chain of adjacent ones or of chalk marks on the ground– is there only *one* way of interpreting them?– So I can say, the sign-post does after all leave no room for doubt. Or rather: it sometimes leaves room for doubt and sometimes not. And now this is no longer a philosophical proposition, but an empirical one.

A signpost is, like other tools and objects, something that can be used in different ways: some of those uses straightforward, others ambiguous. One might say, "just follow the signpost" (or follow the rule), but Wittgenstein says, there might be more than one way of doing that. This is one consequence of viewing language games in the context of human doings. One might say that in order to engage successfully in an activity one must follow the rules—but it is sometimes just as true to say that we learn what it means to follow the rules from learning to engage in the activity successfully (and, through learning from mistakes, unsuccessfully). And to add a further layer of complexity, Wittgenstein says (PI §83): "And is there not also the case where we play and make up the rules as we go along? And there is even one where we alter them—as we go along." The key, for Wittgenstein, is to be able to say "Now I can go on" (PI §179), that is, to *show* through successful participation in the activity that one has learned and understands the rules.

This model of learning is nicely illustrated by another metaphor, how one learns one's way around a new city. The image occurs several times in his work:

> A philosophical problem has the form: "I don't know my way around". (PI §123)

> In teaching you philosophy I'm like a guide showing you how to find your way round London. I have to take you through the city from north to south, from east to west, from Euston to the embankment and from Piccadilly to the Marble Arch. After I have taken you many journeys through the city, in all sorts of directions, we shall have passed through any given street a number of times—each time traversing the street as part of a different journey. At the end of this you will know London; you will be able to find your way about like a Londoner. (Wittgenstein: quoted in Gasking and Jackson 1967, p. 52)

> Our language can be seen as an ancient city: a maze of little streets and squares, of old and new houses, and of houses with additions from various periods; and this surrounded by a multitude of new boroughs with straight regular streets and uniform houses. (PI §18)

> Language is a labyrinth of paths. You approach from one side and know your way about; you approach the same place from another side and no longer know your way about. (PI §203)

Notice what is not mentioned here: a map. For Wittgenstein, you do not learn your way around a city by studying or memorizing a map; you learn it only by traversing it, walking its streets, approaching the same intersection from different directions, coming to recognize and remember landmarks (one might say, traveling "criss-cross" in many directions). A guide can show someone around a city, but they only learn "how to go on" by leaving the guide behind (there is that ladder again). Part of this learning too involves getting lost, retracing your steps, exploring side streets that may be shortcuts, or may be dead ends. Like the famous idea of giving someone a fish versus teaching them to fish, a map can only take you so far (I won't explore here the experience of using a GPS to travel, which gives you precise

directions for how to get from A to B, but does not *teach* you your way around—and may even impede learning it).

This notion of learning, and learning through participation in a pattern of activity, stands against another key Wittgensteinian idea, that of a "form of life." This central concept is never given an explicit formulation, and it has been widely debated; my sense is that it comprises the network of cultural assumptions, values, and ways of living that constitute the unquestioned (and in a key sense unquestionable) framework that provides a context for understanding language games: "to imagine a language means to imagine a form of life" (PI §19). Here again, in *On Certainty* (OC §97, 99), this central notion is described via a metaphor—the image of a riverbed:

> The mythology may change back into a state of flux, the river-bed of thoughts may shift. But I distinguish between the movement of the waters on the river-bed and the shift of the bed itself; though there is not a sharp division of the one from the other.… And the bank of that river consists partly of hard rock, subject to no alteration or only to an imperceptible one, partly of sand, which now in one place now in another gets washed away, or deposited.

A form of life is learned by being brought up in it, through participation and activity. It is learned through living, and like a riverbed shapes and guides the flow of life. A riverbed can change and shift over time, but slowly and in relation to the activities it comprises. Kazepides (2010, pp. 111, 81) explains the educational underpinnings of this notion:

> Being educated is a way of being in the world and a way of living one's life… [Riverbed assumptions are inculcated] by means of examples and by practice, not by intellectual demonstrations, definitions, or sermons. This means that children must be participants in a form of life in order to acquire the prerequisites – not merely spectators or listeners.

We can reflect upon and question the form of life into which we have been brought up, but only within limits, since these implicit background assumptions and understandings constitute the very conditions for being able to question or doubt. And here again Wittgenstein relies on a metaphor: "That is to say, the questions that we raise and our doubts depend on the fact that some propositions are exempt from doubt, are as it were like hinges on which those turn" (OC §341).

A key part of this view of learning is that, for Wittgenstein (PI §1), "Explanations come to an end somewhere." An explanation, in order to *explain* satisfactorily, assumes a field of shared assumptions that, according to Wittgenstein, cannot themselves be explained (or at least cannot be fully explained). I have written about the importance of this space of *tacit* teaching and learning (see Burbules 2008). This is not a model of learning like direct instruction, in which all steps can be made explicit and learned sequentially. Indeed, even the successful practitioner of an activity may not be able to fully articulate how they are doing it, or the context of implicit understandings that give it meaning and direction:

> (PI §217) "How am I able to obey a rule?"—if this is not a question about causes, then it is about the justification for my following the rule in the way I do. If I have exhausted the justifications I have reached bedrock, and my spade is turned. Then I am inclined to say: "This is simply what I do."

Bedrock: My spade is turned. Another tool metaphor, and another moment of reflexivity, because it might be that some of these tacit, framework assumptions can only be alluded to indirectly, through tacit and not overt reference. Figurative language is open-ended and suggestive. It exceeds the boundaries of explanation: To attempt to fully explain a metaphor is to kill it. A metaphor is not a proposition that makes an assertion, but an invitation to consider the ways in which a comparison opens up an exploration of similarities and differences that shed light on the objects of comparison. Metaphor does not come with instructions, and there are different ways to use it and understand it. This open-endedness and indeterminacy are its virtue.

And that, I am arguing here, is why Wittgenstein uses metaphor, especially in his later work, because it highlights a key point about language use as a kind of doing, and as directed to other important purposes than just the assertion of propositional truths. His tool metaphors especially highlight these questions of uses, purposes, and doings; and these in turn raise the question of how we *learn* these uses, purposes, and doings—an exploration which itself relies on a series of metaphors (games, signposts, and ladders that need to be thrown away after one has climbed them).

Metaphors, and how we come to make sense of them, exemplify the very processes of (usefully) indistinct pictures; of signposts that can be understood in more than one way; of labyrinths through which we move, variously; and of explanations which can never fully exhaust our sense-making. These are both metaphors of learning and at the same time images of learning that manifest some of the characteristics of metaphor.

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Imagination and Reality in Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy

Suzy Harris

Abstract This chapter is concerned with the notion of imagination in the work of Wittgenstein beginning with his comments and thoughts on aesthetics: the meaning or use of aesthetic words needs to be understood in the context of ways of living. The centrality of imagination, however, becomes clear later in *Philosophical Investigations* (PI) and *On Certainty* (OC); indeed, Wittgenstein's method depends on imagination. For Wittgenstein, imagination is not limited to the arts, and the later sections consider its importance for education, arguing that imagination is there at the beginning when a child comes into language. Imagination is at the heart of our thought; it extends to all things and is necessary in a child and an adult's learning.

Keywords Imagination · Aesthetic judgement · Language · Play · Education

> People nowadays think that scientists exist to instruct them, poets and musicians, etc. to give them pleasure. The idea *that these have something to teach them*—that doesn't occur to them. (*Culture and Value*, 1939–40, p. 36e)

1 Introduction

This chapter is concerned with the notion of imagination in the work of Wittgenstein. The above remark, recorded in *Culture and Value* (CV),[1] is one of many that Wittgenstein made regarding the value of the arts; it also reflects his

[1]Following convention, titles for Wittgenstein's works are abbreviated (LC = Lectures and Conversations, OC = On Certainty, RFGB = Remarks on Frazer's Golden Bough, CV = Culture and Value, Z = Zettel, PO = Philosophical Occasions, PI = Philosophical Investigations), with section (§) or page number (p.), with full citation and initials in the References.

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M.A. Peters and J. Stickney (eds.), *A Companion to Wittgenstein on Education*,
DOI 10.1007/978-981-10-3136-6_9

perennial concern with contemporary faith in science and scientism, by which he meant the idolatry of science. We find this, for example, in his remarks on Frazer's anthropological account of primitive ritual and magic in *The Golden Bough* (1922). Wittgenstein believes that Frazer goes wrong in trying to find explanations and origins for the ceremonies and rites of the people he studied. Rather than explaining the "errors" (or "bad science") underpinning the rites, we need to recognise that the rites express something important in the lives of the people (RFGB). Elsewhere, Wittgenstein notes that we should not look to science to find meaning in life: "Man has to awaken to wonder—and so perhaps do peoples. Science is a way of sending him to sleep again" (CV, p. 5e). In his lectures on aesthetics, which he gave during 1938 and which were later published on the basis of notes taken by some of his students, Wittgenstein examines the notion of aesthetic judgement and the words that are used to convey aesthetic judgement about, for example, a piece of music or a painting or the cut of a suit. "We don't start from certain words, but from certain occasions or activities" (LC, p. 3).

The *centrality* of imagination to his thought, however, becomes clear in *Philosophical Investigations* (PI) and *On Certainty* (OC), and this will be the focus of sections two and three. Indeed, Wittgenstein's method depends on imagination. He was not concerned with putting forward theories but wanted rather to draw attention to particulars and give examples of how words are used within a framework of beliefs and everyday practices. He provides a style of thought, examining the way that human beings use language, and does so not in any kind of systematic way, but through painstaking attention to segments of our experience. The reader is asked constantly to imagine a setting or a scenario where a sentence or verbal exchange takes place; often these are mundane, ordinary things (although, as we shall see later, what Wittgenstein draws the reader's attention to is complex) but sometimes they are things which are unlikely to have been imagined before, or are surreal. On other occasions, he carries out something like a thought experiment, for example the case of the builders, which is strange and makes the reader unsteady and unsure what is going on. Wittgenstein's own imagination is everywhere evident in the style of these works, with his striking examples, vivid imagery and aphorisms. The opening epigraph may, as we shall see later, give the wrong impression; imagination for Wittgenstein is not limited to the arts. In the last two sections, we shall consider the importance of imagination for education, arguing that imagination is there at the beginning when a child comes into language; there is a playfulness in the way that the child learns words, where fantasy and reality operate in tandem.

Before going further, it is important to say, first, that in Wittgenstein's work, the imagination is to be understood not as synonymous with fantasy in the modern sense. On the contrary, imagination is at the heart of our thought and it is needed in our orientation, in our lives and through our education, to the truth. Secondly, there are overlaps in Wittgenstein's treatment of imagination in the publications that are referred to in this paper.

2 Imagination in *Philosophical Investigations*

It is in *Philosophical Investigations* and *On Certainty* that we see the centrality of imagination for Wittgenstein. In the *Investigations*, for example, there is a narrator and interlocutor to convey a quasi-dialogue, with the interlocutor playing different voices at different times. In his thought-provoking study of the central role music played in Wittgenstein's life and thought, Szabados (2014) makes an important point that the former's love of music is not merely of biographical interest external to his philosophical activity.[2] Szabados brings out the effort and labour which Wittgenstein expended on how he arranged his remarks. According to Szabados, the lack of references and footnotes in Wittgenstein's writing is not a display of arrogance but rather a deliberate strategy reminiscent of music where a particular theme is struck and improvised and elaborated. In the space available, I shall look at a few of the classic examples and consider how these are helpful in thinking about learning. Before doing so, however, it is important to say some more about Wittgenstein's conception of language.

Wittgenstein wants to show the complex ways in which we use language and that it has to be understood within a context of practice. He considers the importance of *how* language is used. This in effect challenges assumptions behind epistemology which, in Western philosophical tradition, has sought to explain the relation of thought to the world in terms of an underlying logic to be discovered. Wittgenstein challenges this and wants us to think differently and to focus on what we do with words rather than try and get beneath them as it were to something more essential or fundamental—"in the beginning was the deed"—what we do with words is central.[3] As he says in *On Certainty*, the claim to knowledge is never a guarantee of truth; "One always forgets the expression 'I thought I knew'" (§12).[4] He wants to resist the view that sees truth as correctness and the emphasis on categorisation and abstraction and the search for the essence, which are found in the analytical tradition; unlike Russell, his view of truth is far broader and is similar to Heidegger's view of truth as revealing although in Wittgenstein it is not stated so bluntly.

In order to draw attention to the variety of human practices, Wittgenstein coins the phrase "language game". The expression is not in any way intended to trivialise what we do (say, as mere games) but rather is designed to show the non-systematic variety of what we say and do, borrowing from the fact that real games—such as

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[2]Szabados stresses the extent to which Wittgenstein thought through philosophical issues 'through the ears of music" (p. 23). There are numerous remarks relating to this in *Culture and Value*, including: "I squander an unspeakable amount of effort making an arrangement of my thoughts which have no value at all" (CV, p. 28); "Sometimes a sentence can be understood only if it is read at the *right tempo*. My sentences are all supposed to be read *slowly*." (CV, p. 57, italics in original); "My style is like bad musical composition" (CV, p. 39).

[3]Goethe used the phrase, "*In Anfang war die Tat*", which was later picked up by Wittgenstein.

[4]This contrasts sharply with Russell's view where truth is correctness.

tennis, cricket, football, badminton, bridge, word games, dressing-up games—have various overlapping features and are readily recognisable as games, yet have no necessary common quality (see PI §§69–71). Also, playing games is not just about the kinds of games noted here but the role of play in life more generally; the boundary between play and "real" life is not always clear or fixed. I shall return to this later.

The appeal to imagination that Wittgenstein asks of his reader is different in the various examples and scenarios that he gives. The first example is that of the builders which comes at the beginning of the *Investigations.* We are asked to imagine a language which resembles Augustine's description, where language is meant to serve as communication between builder A and an assistant B (PI §2). A number of questions immediately come to mind: Why use builders as an example, where Wittgenstein asks us to imagine a builder and his assistant? There are only four words and we are told that the assistant is building with the following building stones: "block", "pillar", "slab" and "beam". It is difficult to distinguish between a noun and a verb, and it is not easy to imagine a language that consists of only these four words. To what extent can these words be part of a world? Is it a primitive language or is Wittgenstein suggesting the primitiveness of the builders? It is only in the process of trying to imagine this scenario that we find it is actually impossible to do so; we impose our language on the language of the builders. There is, in one sense, a failure in imagination because we can only imagine it so far and no more. In another sense, however, the example fires the imagination, opening up various lines of thought. Indeed, once these lines of thought are initiated, it is difficult to hold back. Given Wittgenstein's description of himself as always being inclined to see things from a religious points of view, thoughts of a certain kind naturally unfold—the foundation stone as the foundation of a new way of life: "The stone the builders rejected has become the cornerstone", (Psalm: 118:22) and "According to the grace of God given me, like a skilled master builder I laid a foundation … For no one can lay any foundation other than the one that has been laid; that foundation is Jesus Christ", (Cor. 3:10,11).[5] Of course, it need not go quite like that. Another line of thought might be to think of foundation in terms of the beginnings of something—the foundation, for example, of a language or a community.

Wittgenstein is not concerned with whether the builders' language is complete or primitive[6]; his purpose is to show that language use is far more complex than Augustine's picture theory suggests and to draw attention to psychological and

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[5]Wittgenstein also uses the example of buying "five red apples" (§1). It is interesting why he chose this particular fruit rather than a banana or grapes. Surely, it cannot be accidental that he chooses the apple with its connotations of the forbidden fruit, from the tree of knowledge.

[6]Mulhall (2001) outlines Stanley Cavell's suggestion of at least three ways of interpreting the concept of the primitive. The first is that the builders are not quite fully human, but primitive human beings; secondly that the language of the builders is primitive but the builders are not—they are using the language necessary on a building site; and third that is being used as an allegory of how we speak today. Primitive can also mean an early form or the first form.

ontological limits. There is always more going on than just the words; there is always a background to a language game. Our words do not get their meaning by standing for something independent of language. Our grasp of the meaning of language depends on a background of common behaviour and shared practices, hence the connotations and connections that come to mind when we think of the builders' example. It is not a case of getting *behind* the words but rather, seeing the meaning *in* the words. Human forms of life are forms of life with words.

There is one further comment about the builders which is relevant as it relates to learning, and this is the way in which we use the imagery of building blocks in children's learning, and I mean this not only metaphorically but also literally, so for example, often through play children learn to count using a range of objects such as the abacus or the Cuisenaire rods; and to make things with plasticine and play dough, as well as Lego. The metaphor of scaffolding is used to describe one approach to learning, for example, in using joint picture book learning. Play is also an important aspect of learning for young children; in playing at going shopping or playing with a baby doll or teddy bear the child acts out putting them to bed or dressing them. They copy what they see adults do. In play as in "real" life, they learn what to do; they learn the rules.

The last example of interest here is found in Part Two of the *Investigations* where Wittgenstein makes the following remarks: "A new-born child has no teeth."—"A goose has no teeth."—"A rose has no teeth." (PI, II, p. 221). These are all true statements, they all have the same grammatical structure, but they are not all the same. It is the juxtaposition of them that strikes the reader as odd. Wittgenstein is appealing to the reader's imagination. What do they invoke? The first, the newborn baby has no teeth but develops them as she grows, first the "milk" teeth and then the second teeth. Why follow this with a statement about a rose? It is odd to think of a flower as having teeth although some plants such as the Venus flytrap kills insects by closing their leaves around them so they cannot escape, and so in a sense, it mimics a mouth closing on a piece of food. Why does Wittgenstein think of a rose and not any other flower? It is hard to ignore the symbolism of the rose—love and beauty, but it has other connotations too, such as in Christianity, its five petals represent the wounds of Christ and the blood of Christian martyrs. It is also the case that a rose has thorns and again we are reminded of the imagery of the crown of thorns. The rose is also used symbolically in poetry and literature.[7] And then why does he move from the statement about the rose to one about a goose? Birds used to have teeth but as they evolved these disappeared; although in some species of birds, there can be tooth-like structures in their beak such as the goose which are used to chew grass. Someone might look at these and call them teeth but technically they are not as geese do not produce enamel which is necessary to develop a tooth. A goose can be aggressive and attack humans or other animals if its young are in danger. A goose is, in some countries such as Wittgenstein's Austria, traditional at

[7]For example, Blake's, "A rose thou art sick" and Oscar Wilde's "The nightingale and the rose".

Christmas. Are these extensions too specific? But then, how can we hold back? The examples Wittgenstein gives are not random; he also considered the connotative range of words or surroundings as we see in the following remark from *Zettel*.

> A poet's words can pierce us. And this is of course causally connected with the use that they have in our life. And it also is connected with the way in which, comfortable to this use, we let our thoughts roam up and down in the familiar surroundings of the words. (Z §155)

Wittgenstein makes the reader think of the ways in which these words are used and the wider associations we have of them. Imagination is part of the human condition. Things are conditioned by what has been said before, but also the endless possibilities of language and what I shall call new directions of projection. We shall come back to this a little later.

3 Imagination in *On Certainty*

Imagination is also central in the notes that comprise *On Certainty*, which are in part a reaction to Moore's, "Proof of an external world" (1939). Wittgenstein thinks that Moore does not distinguish between claiming to believe and claiming to know, and that the claim to knowledge is never a guarantee to truth. Moyal-Sharrock (2004) has advanced the view that this text constitutes a distinct departure from the *Investigations*, and while this is less radical than the earlier change in his views, it nevertheless warrants being referred to as the "third Wittgenstein". This chapter does not seek to take a position on whether such a claim is justified. It does, however, draw on the extensive attention Wittgenstein gives in this phase of his work to beliefs that stand fast for us but for which we do not normally require demonstration or proof. As Moyal-Sharrock puts it in her detailed study of *On Certainty*, Wittgenstein rejects knowing as the "ultimate empowering assurance underlying our acts and thoughts" (2004, p. 181). He argues that belief precedes doubt, logically and psychologically—the child learns by believing the adult; she begins by trusting her parents and teachers. "But I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its correctness" (OC §94). Imagination and beliefs are part of a way of living and giving meaning in life.[8] I do not mean to suggest that things that stand fast for us are products of the imagination. Take, for example, the following two statements: "God's in heaven and all is right with the world" and "Earth has existed for more than five minutes". The former can be said to be part of a world view and does involve the imagination of the believer whereas the latter is not usually thought of and is not part of a person's world view in the same way as the first statement clearly is for the person who holds a particular religious belief.

[8]H.J. Richards says of myths: "they are the poetry in which we express our deepest insights about ourselves and our universe" (1986, p. 3).

For Wittgenstein a belief, religious or otherwise, is not an isolated proposition but part of a wider network of propositions and practices that make up a world picture; beliefs are inherent in such networks, not merely in the obvious sense that they relate to specific propositions but also in the way that they reflect a broader orientation to life, and it is this that provides the background and gives the framework for enquiry. One difficulty Wittgenstein observes is "to realise the groundlessness of our believing" (OC §166). He illustrates this in terms of the work of the scientist:

> Think of chemical investigations. Lavoisier makes experiments with substances in his laboratory and now he concludes that this and that takes place when there is burning. He does not say that it might happen otherwise another time. He has got hold of a definite world-picture – not of course one that he invented: he learned it as a child. I say a world-picture and not hypothesis, because it is the matter-of-course foundation for his research and as such also goes unmentioned. (OC §167)

What he intends by world picture here is to defuse the belief that there must be a secure foundation in the sense of a foundation of certain beliefs. Later he writes:

> You must bear in mind that the language-game is so to say something unpredictable.
> I mean: it is not based on grounds. It is not reasonable (or unreasonable).
> It is there – like our life. (OC §559)

It is not reasonable or unreasonable because something other than ratiocination must be at work here.

Religious belief needs to be understood in terms of a way of living; a religious belief provides guidance for life. In *Lectures on Religious Belief,* the following is recorded:

> Suppose someone were a believer and said: "I believe in a Last Judgment", and I said; "Well, I'm not sure. Possibly." You would say that there is an enormous gulf between us…
>
> It isn't a question of my being anywhere near him, but on an entirely different plane, which you could express by saying: "You mean something altogether different, Wittgenstein."
>
> The difference might not show up at all in any explanation of the meaning."
>
> Suppose somebody made this guidance for life: believing in the Last Judgment. Whenever he does anything, this is before his mind. In a way, how are we to know whether to say he believes this will happen or not?
>
> Asking him is not enough. He will probably say he has proof. But he has what you might call an unshakeable belief. It will show, not by reasoning or by appeal to ordinary grounds for belief, but rather by regulating for all in his life. (LC, pp. 53–54)

Wittgenstein's target here is scientism. He argues that there is no empirical method by which we could settle the matter. The statement "I believe in the Last Judgment" is not a belief that is assessable on a truth table, nor is it the result of a calculation. It expresses an attitude towards human life. For Wittgenstein, philosophy does not begin with the process of questioning and with the suspension of assent. He argues that assent must come first. To doubt something is already to take something for

granted. This example is another illustration of how Wittgenstein's method is intended to help us see the limits of intellectualising and over emphasis on the role of reason in understanding human ways of life.

4 Imagination in Education

The last two sections will consider the importance of imagination for education, arguing that imagination is there at the beginning when a child comes into language; there is a playfulness in the way that the child learns words, where fantasy and reality operate in tandem; while the dog cannot lie (PI, II, §1), the child's ability to lie is internal to the possibility of her telling the truth. Before doing so, however, it is important to say something about rules. The child is developing in relation to rules while she is still an infant. For example, a baby learning to sit up. This is not natural but something that the adults do and which the growing baby learns to do for herself. It is part of a broader range of behaviours and gestures that human forms of life take part in. Learning language is not merely learning names of things but learning what a name is, for example, "mother", is to know what a mother is, or what love is. You cannot, as Cavell puts it, "use words to do what we do with them until you are initiate of the forms of life which give those words the point and shape they have in our lives" (p. 184). So what is the nature of rules? It is reasonable to draw a distinction between rules that are self-contained as a system and those that are open to further development and are "loose" in some sense. A dog, for example, is thrown a ball and it will run after it and continue to do so each time its owner throws it to fetch, but a similar exercise with children or adults and they would get bored, they would start doing different things, expanding on it and doing new things. Even in following rules, there is an openness to be creative (e.g. musical riff). "Uttering a word is like striking a note on the keyboard of the imagination" (PI §6). Wittgenstein also uses an example of a sequence of numbers such as 2, 4, 6, 8…. Here, he does not mean thinking there is something out there that is fixed but rather that there are all sorts of possible ways of going on. But, the going on means that it will have meaning and be understood by others, just like with a conversation. There is variation, different lines of thought or discussion but people can follow it and make sense of it. So, by rule-governed, Wittgenstein means knowing how to go on but not in a predetermined way; language opens up.

It is important not to think that in Wittgenstein's work the importance of imagination is to do with creativity and the arts. Of course, he was very interested in the arts, as we find in Ray Monk's biography of Wittgenstein (1990, p. 299) and the story of his anger at a display window in Vienna which showed pictures of great scientists instead of celebrating the works of great composers such as Schubert and Chopin, a view we also see in the opening quotation. There is then no question of the importance he attaches to the arts, in particular, appreciation to education. The point is, however, that the significance of the imagination is far more pervasive; it extends through the sciences and other subjects. Indeed, it is there at the heart of our

thinking generally; it is internal to language and rule-following itself. It is helpful here to turn to Cavell's *The Claim of Reason* (1979), for elaboration and elucidation. In Chapter VII, Cavell explores what it is to *learn* a word or to *know* a word. Following Wittgenstein's method, the reader is asked to imagine the following scenario: he points to a kitten and says to his baby daughter, "kitty", and she repeats the word kitty. Days later, she points to a piece of fur and says kitty. When next she sees a cat she gets excited and says kitty, squatting to try and touch it. What, Cavell asks, did she learn in order to say kitty? But he adds a further question: what did she learn from having done it? The baby is beginning to make connections with the things in her world, she tries out words, testing them and playing with them. We can see how imagination is at work here. Cavell puts this in a particularly powerful way:

> If she had never made such leaps she would never have walked into speech. Having made it, meadows of communication can grow for us. Where you leap depends on where you stand. (ibid. p. 171–172)

The baby has not yet acquired the forms of life which contain the word kitten or other words which adults have. Cavell also writes that "any form of life and every concept integral to it has an indefinite number of instances and directions of projection; and that this variation is not arbitrary" (ibid. p. 185). By "arbitrary", he means that things have been conditioned by what has been said before, and in this sense, it is not arbitrary. By the "projecting" of a word, Cavell means its availability to new usage, its projection into new circumstances. In a sense, the learning never ends—for child and adult—as there are always new possibilities. This is the antithesis of Kripke's conception of rule-following in Wittgenstein. Kripke puts the emphasis much more on the child being disciplined to follow the rule, which of course is there in a sense in Wittgenstein in that he uses the word *Abrichtung*, which is the word used for horse-breaking and the like. So Kripke would be one voice in the kind of conservative, i.e. non-radical, interpretation of Wittgenstein, as stressing the child's being brought into conformity with the behaviour and values of the tribe.

5 Conclusion

Seeing connections and the relationship between things is crucial for Wittgenstein; our understanding depends on seeing connections. We must therefore in some sense accept and affirm the interconnectedness of world and human being. He expresses this quite powerfully in the following:

> It was not a trivial reason, for really there can have been no *reason*, that prompted certain races of mankind to venerate the oak tree, but only the fact that they and the oak were united in a community of life, and thus that they arose together not by choice, but rather like the flea and the dog. (If fleas developed a rite, it would be based on the dog.)
> One could say that it was not their union (the oak and the man) that has given rise to these rites, but in a certain sense their separation.

> For the awakening of the intellect occurs with a separation from the original *soil*, the original basis of life. (The origin of *choice*.)

This section appears in the extended version of *Remarks on Frazer's Golden Bough* published in *Philosophical Occasions 1912–1951* (PO, p. 139). Connection also presupposes separation, and this occurs partly through language. This awareness of separation opens up the experience of self-consciousness and the realm of choice. Does it ask also what I am to do with my life?

Towards the end of the *Investigations,* he refers to Jastrow's duck-rabbit (PI, II, p. 194). Here, the images are quite straightforward—a duck and a rabbit. In a sense, there is nothing controversial or difficult about these. An intriguing aspect of the drawing is that some will immediately see a duck and others will see a rabbit. Some will be able to "flip" the image easily, while for others it may require an effort of the will or being given the right tip: try seeing the dot of the rabbit's nose as the eye, looking to the right; picture the tips of the rabbit's ears as the end of the duck's beak. With such prompts, the image will flip, until perhaps we can turn it back and forth at will. But, Wittgenstein wants to draw attention to something more complex than just a visual puzzle picture. In this case of aspect dawning, you cannot see the duck and the rabbit at the same time; the example provides a useful lesson in the perspectival nature of experience. It weakens the grip of the picture of perception as a visual image that is produced in me by objects on my sensory surfaces. In this and other examples such as the Maltese Cross and the right-angled triangle that has "fallen over", Wittgenstein tries to show the more pervasive nature of "aspect-seeing"—and its failure is apparent in "aspect-blindness". It is all too easy, as he reminds us, to forget the glasses on your nose and that your vision is already framed, just as our views of the world are framed. That there can be such failure opens the way to seeing the imagination's role—even its essential role—in seeing what we commonly hold as true (OC §380–382, §603). It is of far more than incidental significance then that imagination is there, unavoidably, in the *Weltbild* within which we see the world.

As this exploration of Wittgenstein's use of the notion of imagination has shown, the importance of imagination goes far beyond the arts and humanities as one may have surmised from his comments in the opening epigraph. It extends to all things and is necessary in a child and an adult's learning and being in the world.

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Do Your Exercises: Reader Participation in Wittgenstein's *Investigations*

Emma McClure

Abstract Many theorists have focused on Wittgenstein's use of examples, but I argue that examples form only half of his method. Rather than continuing the disjointed style of his Cambridge lectures, Wittgenstein returns to the techniques he employed while teaching elementary school. *Philosophical Investigations* (PI) trains the reader as a math class trains a student—'by means of *examples* and by *exercises*' (§208). Its numbered passages, carefully arranged, provide a series of demonstrations and practice problems. I guide the reader through one such series, demonstrating how the exercises build upon one another and give us ample opportunity to hone our problem-solving skills. Through careful practice, we learn to pass the test Wittgenstein poses when he claims that something is 'easy to imagine' (§19). Whereas other critics have viewed the *Investigations* as merely a diagnosis of our philosophical delusions, I claim that Wittgenstein also writes a prescription for our disease: Do your exercises.

Keywords Practice · Active participation · Wittgenstein's method

1 Introduction

Wittgenstein once began a lecture by chastising his audience (quoted in Drury 1984, p. 79):

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M.A. Peters and J. Stickney (eds.), *A Companion to Wittgenstein on Education*,
DOI 10.1007/978-981-10-3136-6_10

> the hearer is incapable of seeing both the road he is led and the goal which it leads to. That is to say: he either thinks: 'I understand all he says, but what on earth is he driving at?, or else he thinks 'I see what he's driving at, but how on earth is he going to get there?'

Drury (1984) makes a similar complaint about contemporary interpretations of *Philosophical Investigations*: either Wittgenstein's method is clarified or his goal is made clear—but not both. This breakdown remains as true today as it was 30 years ago. Since Drury's time, Peters and Marshall (1999, p. 189) have articulated Wittgenstein's goal: 'The aim of the great educator is to teach us to think for ourselves'. If we take this as our endpoint, however, we still have to discover the path that leads us there. Many theorists gesture towards the reader's 'active involvement' (Heal 1995, p. 76) in Wittgenstein's text, but their claims are vague and largely unsubstantiated. No one has yet been able to pinpoint the 'fundamentally pedagogical dimension of his philosophy' (Peters and Marshall 1999, p. 169). Although the goal is clear, the path remains murky.

I can shed some light. Whereas other theorists have focused on Wittgenstein's use of examples, I argue that examples form only half of his method. Rather than rehashing his Cambridge lectures, Wittgenstein returns to the techniques he employed during his years as an elementary school teacher. *Philosophical Investigations* trains the reader like a math class trains a student—'by means of *examples* and by *exercises*' (§208). Its numbered passages, carefully arranged, provide a series of demonstrations and practice problems. I will guide the reader through one such series, demonstrating how the exercises build upon one another and give us ample opportunity to hone our problem-solving skills. Through careful practice, we learn to pass the test that Wittgenstein poses when he claims his examples are 'easy to imagine' (§19).

At the end of this path, we will be able to say what makes Wittgenstein's method uniquely active and pedagogical. For now, however, let us see where some of my predecessors have gone astray.

2 Alternative Accounts of Wittgenstein's Method

Even a cursory glance through the *Investigations* reveals the originality of Wittgenstein's writing, but his unique style is surprisingly difficult to describe. Many attempts to specify his pedagogical method make the *Investigations* sound almost commonplace. To give just a few examples: Burbules and Peters (2001, p. 21) discuss Wittgenstein's 'thought experiments', and Peters and Marshall (1999, p. 175) add a 'vital repertoire of non-argumentational discursive forms—pictures, drawings, analogies, similes, jokes, equations, dialogues with himself, little narratives, questions and wrong answers, thought experiments, gnomic aphorisms, and so on'. Perhaps Wittgenstein is notable for the sheer number of non-discursive forms he uses, but he is far from the first to employ a 'method of philosophical investigation that involves the use of examples' (Savickey 2011, p. 671). Nor is he

the only one to master 'the art of asking questions' (Engelmann 1967, p. 115) where '*your* answers are suggested or implied and then explained, criticized, or expanded' (Leiber 1997, pp. 235–236). Moreover, any cryptic philosopher can lay claim to 'forcing the reader into the work of self-demystification' (Eagleton 1993, p. 9). Thought experiments, rhetorical questions, and diagrams are all popular philosophical tools that Wittgenstein shares with many other authors. None of these methods would make the *Investigations* a distinctive or uniquely pedagogical text.

Several of these authors do identify one stylistic feature that separates Wittgenstein from other philosophers: he writes 'dialogues with himself' (Peters and Marshall 1999, p. 175) and 'imagined interchanges' (Burbules and Peters 2001, p. 21). In addition to being distinctive, dialogues are inherently interactive. Savickey (2011, p. 676) neatly captures this participatory experience: 'The *Investigations* can be read as a script—one in which we enact, embody, or voice the examples we encounter'. Similarly, Heal (1995, pp. 72–73) writes: 'the part of "you" is to be played by whoever is reading the *Investigations*. Thus, "you" is me, *if* I find myself nodding when "you" speaks… And it is you, if you are similarly willing to join in'. Both these theorists describe how Wittgenstein invites us to participate in his text. Perhaps we have found our pedagogical path.

Savickey and Heal offer a good starting point, but on closer inspection, both descriptions of reader engagement seem oddly passive. Listening to a conversation, following a script, or nodding while someone else speaks require very little activity on the part of the reader. Moreover, as Heal herself points out, all philosophy papers demand this minimal degree of 'active participation' (1995, p. 77). Readers must pay close attention to follow subtle argumentation or parse proofs written in symbolic logic. We must consider counter-examples and objections. We may even find ourselves nodding or shaking our heads. Once again, it is surprisingly difficult to specify what makes Wittgenstein's method uniquely interactive.

This objection leads Heal (1995) to abandon her attempt and turn instead to a therapeutic reading of the *Investigations*, which focuses on dismantling philosophical puzzles. Savickey (2011, p. 676) goes a few steps further along the theatrical path: she considers the possibility of reading the *Investigations* as 'improvisational exercises'. As Savickey points out, Wittgenstein often invites us to go beyond the examples he has given, 'to add imaginatively to the variations already recorded' (p. 677). She thinks this invitation is a key for both the interactive reading experience and Wittgenstein's pedagogical aims: 'When we play out these examples, we become participants (not merely spectators) in the investigation. And once we are participants, these examples aid us in developing our own creativity and conceptual imagination' (p. 677).

Savickey is not alone in following this path. Lesnik-Oberstein (2003, p. 390) also sees the *Investigations* as training our creative capacities. She highlights the numerous students who feature in Wittgenstein's examples and describes 'the slipping between reader ("you") and "pupil" ("him"): reader and pupil become one and the same'. We read about students learning to read, and the second personal narration makes us speak in their place. If we step back and consider the 'meta-language' of the *Investigations*, we find that we, too, are learning a new skill:

we are being 'inculcated in 'analogy' (390). Thus, Savickey and Lesnik-Oberstein agree: Wittgenstein teaches us to reproduce 'a certain play of the imagination' (§216) and create an ever-growing multitude of examples.

This path seems to fulfil our desiderata: the reading experience is both active and pedagogical. Moreover, this interpretation has the advantage of making *Philosophical Investigations* continuous with Wittgenstein's earlier pedagogical style. As Savickey (1999, p. 3) points out: 'The similarity between his teaching and his writing is striking'. The memoirs of his former students are filled with references to examples and analogies. Gasking and Jackson (1967, pp. 50–51) remember: 'The technique was at first bewildering. Example was piled up on example… Always the case was given in concrete detail, described in down-to-earth everyday language'. Another former student, Mays (1967, p. 81), claims that Wittgenstein based his later work directly on lecture notes from this period: 'It never occurred to me then that these notes were destined to become parts of the *Philosophical Investigations*'.

Wittgenstein's university lectures featured a pedagogical method like the one Savickey and Lesnik-Oberstein see in the *Investigations*. Given this overlap, we can use student memoirs to test whether his method had the effect that Savickey and Lesnik-Oberstein propose. We can see whether a method based exclusively on examples inspired active participation; whether Wittgenstein was satisfied with the results of his method; and most importantly, whether he avowed the goal that these later theorist assign to him.

3 Wittgenstein's Cambridge Lectures

Student memoirs reveal that Wittgenstein's Cambridge lectures were not very interactive. King (1984, p. 71) speaks of feeling inhibited in Wittgenstein's classes: 'I wished to ask yet feared to do so'. Similarly, Pascal (1984, p. 16) writes: 'He would talk for long periods without interruption, using similes and allegories, stalking about the room and gesticulating. He cast a spell'. Even Gasking and Jackson (1967, p. 52) agree that class participation was sparse: 'Members of the class would chip in briefly from time to time, though usually to make a suggestion in response to some question which was posed'. This is a mark against the improvisational interpretation of the *Investigations*. Examples and analogies featured in Wittgenstein's lectures, but his pedagogical method did not foster audience participation.

Nevertheless, his lectures did have the effect that Savickey and Lesnik-Oberstein expected. As Burbules and Peters (2001, p. 16) report: 'It is well known, for example, that he taught in a highly idiosyncratic manner, and that for years after young philosophers at Cambridge mimicked his habits and style'. Students learned to imitate Wittgenstein's style of doing philosophy. They would conduct

grammatical investigations through concrete examples. Wittgenstein's method taught them to reproduce his analogies and to 'add imaginatively to the variations already recorded', just as Savickey argued it would (2011, p. 677).

Wittgenstein, however, was not pleased with these results. In *Culture and Value* (CV, p. 38),[1] he agonizes over the possibility that he is merely teaching his students to mimic his philosophical style:

> A teacher may get good, even astounding, results from his pupils while he is teaching them and yet not be a good teacher; because it may be that, while his pupils are directly under his influence, he raises them to a height which is not natural to them, without fostering their own capacities for work at this level, so that they immediately decline again as soon as the teacher leaves the classroom. Perhaps this is how it is with me; I have sometimes thought so.

Peters and Marshall (1999, p. 179) discuss Wittgenstein's worries, but quickly dismiss his doubts with a quote from his friend, Britton: 'He said that many of his pupils merely put forward his own ideas, and that many of them imitated his voice and manner; but that he could easily distinguish those who really understood'. Other friends of Wittgenstein were less sanguine about the effect he had upon his students. As von Wright (1967, p. 26) records: 'He thought that his influence as a teacher was, on the whole, harmful to the development of independent minds in his disciples. I am afraid that he was right'. Similarly, Pascal (1984, p. 33) laments: 'Alas, he was no pedagogue'.

My aim is not to settle whether Wittgenstein was an effective teacher. I only wish to call attention to the form that his doubts about his teaching took. He feared his students would learn to imitate his method, rather than developing their own capacities for independent thought. This anxiety poses a problem for the improvisational interpretation. Wittgenstein worried that his students would mimic his style, so we can conclude: he wanted his students to learn something else. Therefore, Wittgenstein's pedagogical method must be something more substantive than 'improvisational exercises' that teach us to mimic his mannerisms. His goal—and the path he takes to reach it—lies elsewhere.

4 A New Approach: Wittgenstein's Classroom

Wittgenstein is not repeating his Cambridge lectures; instead, he returns to the methods he employed as a schoolteacher in Austria. The *Investigations* is filled with examples of students learning to calculate (§143–55), to read (§156–171), and to perform numerous other skills we are 'all taught at elementary school' (§351). Many theorists agree that these vignettes are drawn from Wittgenstein's time as a schoolteacher (Engelmann 1967; Savickey 1999; Peters and Marshall 1999). I go

[1]Following convention, titles for Wittgenstein's works are abbreviated (CV = Culture and Value, PO = Philosophical Occasions, PI = Philosophical Investigations, WN = Wittgenstein's Nachlass), with section (§) or page number (p.), with full citation and initials in the References.

one step further. Wittgenstein not only describes how he taught his students; he simultaneously demonstrates the methods he is using to teach us, his readers.

Whereas Wittgenstein's university students were silent and afraid, his elementary students were 'climbing over each other in their eagerness to be given a chance to answer or to demonstrate a point' (Wittgenstein 1984, p. 5). Bartley (1985, p. 100) recounts Wittgenstein's 'stunning results in mathematics, teaching ten- and eleven-year-old boys advanced algebra and geometry'. Even his critics described him as an 'excellent educator' whose 'teaching objectives overshot the marks prescribed for the elementary school level' (Kund, quoted in Hargrove 1980, p. 457). Moreover, Wittgenstein—who, as we have seen, was not inclined to brag about his teaching—felt so confident in his technique that he compiled a textbook for use in other rural classrooms. He boasts (PO, p. 19): 'the improvement of spelling was astonishing. The orthographic conscience had been awakened!'

How did Wittgenstein achieve these extraordinary results? Rigorous practice. He devoted 'the first two hours of each morning' to mathematical instruction (Monk 1990, p. 195); he spent 'several months' teaching his students how to spell (PO, p. 19). Instead of lecturing, he demanded student participation. As Monk (1990, p. 195) emphasizes, 'practical exercises played a large part in his teaching':

> The children were taught anatomy by assembling the skeleton of a cat, astronomy by gazing at the sky at night, botany by identifying plants on walks in the countryside, architecture by identifying building styles during an excursion to Vienna.

Similarly, Bartley (1985, pp. 99–100) describes one of these excursions:

> While they wandered through the streets of Vienna he threw a barrage of questions and information at them, calling their attention to machines, architectural styles, or other things they had already learned about at school. For instance, at the Technical Museum the children had to explain the models of steam engines, block-and-tackle, pulleys, and other mechanisms by reference to what they had studied in class.

These accounts reveal a pedagogical method that is interactive and highly effective. The students were asked to apply the concepts they had learned in class to new cases. These 'practical exercises' forced students to practice their skills and test their knowledge.

Taking Wittgenstein's classroom techniques as our model, we can now return to *Philosophical Investigations*. We will find that this text, too, contains a series of exercises.

5 Exercises in *Philosophical Investigations*

Of course, I am not the first to use the term 'exercise' to describe Wittgenstein's method. As noted above, Savickey (2011, p. 676) compares the *Investigations* to 'improvisational exercises… in which we enact, embody, or voice the examples we encounter'. I will follow Savickey in highlighting the active nature of these

exercises. Whereas she has theatrical exercises in mind, however, I take mathematical exercises as my model. Like a math teacher, Wittgenstein assigns exercises to test our understanding and allow us to practice the skills we have learned in previous sections. By completing these problem sets, we master the techniques and concepts that are presupposed by later passages.

Sometimes, Wittgenstein explicitly assigns these problem sets. For instance, §182 is almost indistinguishable from a homework assignment in a grammar workbook:

> The grammar of "to fit", "to be able" and "to understand". Exercises: (1) When is a cylinder C said to fit into a hollow cylinder H? Only as long as C is inside H? (2) Sometimes one says that: C has ceased to fit into H at such-and-such a time. What criteria are used in such a case for its having happened at that time? … (5) Someone asks me, "Cay you life this weight?" I answer, "Yes". Now he says, "Do it!" – and I can't. In what kind of circumstances would one accept the excuse "When I answered 'yes' I *could* do it, only now I can't"?

Baker and Hacker (2005, p. 353) provide solutions to these exercises, so I will not work through them methodically here. Notice, however, that all these exercises involve imagining a situation in some detail. You read through a phrase like 'C has ceased to fit into H', and then you are asked to imagine the kinds of circumstances in which those words would be appropriate to say. The reader is forced to supply the missing context that makes the phrase make sense. Perhaps C is rolled up bread dough that has expanded in the oven until it no longer fits in its packaging, or maybe H is the sleeve of a sweater that has shrunk in the wash until it no longer fits your arm. As Baker and Hacker (2005, p. 353) point out: 'Many variants can be imagined'. Don't just read my answers; come up with your own solutions! Wittgenstein presents these exercises as problems that must be solved before the reader can continue. By completing them, you'll discover for yourself: 'The criteria which we accept for 'fitting', 'being able to', 'understanding', are much more complicated than might appear at first sight' (§182).

Often, Wittgenstein is less explicit about assigning these problem sets. For example, in §27, he gives a similar series of tasks without labelling them 'exercises':

> in fact we do the most various things with our sentences. Think just of exclamations, with their completely different functions.
>
> Water!
> Away!
> Ow!
> Help!
> Splendid!
> No!
>
> Are you still inclined to call these words "names of objects"?

Baker and Hacker (2005, p. 91) answer the question: 'The range of speech activities is manifold. This is true even of one-word exclamations'. However, they gloss over the process that leads us to this conclusion. Here, as previously, Wittgenstein

proceeds by listing phrases and asking us to think about the contexts in which each of them would be appropriate. Ask yourself: Why would you exclaim 'Water!'? Is there a fire, or are you whispering the order because your throat is so parched? What about 'Splendid!'? Do you find yourself smiling, or are you rolling your eyes sarcastically? Do you cringe in fear while you shout 'Help!' or are you giggling as you imagine being tickled? I don't know how you'll interpret these exclamations—but you do, if you've done your exercises. So only you can answer Wittgenstein's final question: 'Are you still inclined to call these words "names of objects"?' (§27).

Thus far, I've focused on mental exercises that deepen our understanding of our linguistic practices, but some exercises diverge significantly from this model. In §33, for instance, Wittgenstein gives us an action to perform:

> And what does 'pointing at the shape', 'pointing at the colour', consist in? Point at a piece of paper. – And now point at its shape – now at its colour – now at its number (that sounds odd). – Well, how did you do it? – You'll say that you 'meant' something different each time you pointed. And if I ask how that is done, you'll say you concentrated your attention on the colour, the shape, and so on. But now ask again: how is *that* done?

Baker and Hacker (2005, p. 107) claim that in this section 'W[ittgenstein] asks us to reflect on what counts as pointing to the colour rather than to the shape or the number'. I disagree. I don't think Wittgenstein is asking us to *reflect* on what counts as pointing; I think he is asking us, quite literally, to *point.* We're reading his *Investigations*. Therefore, we have a piece of paper in front of us. Without even closing the book, we can follow his directions: point at the paper, its shape, its colour, and even its number. Only afterwards are we encouraged to reflect on our actions, when Wittgenstein asks: 'Well, how did you do it?' Viewed this way, we begin to see the uniquely participatory demands of Wittgenstein's text. First, we perform the physical actions; then, we complete the rest of the exercise. Like the children in Wittgenstein's classroom, we must do our own work.

Now that we have some idea of what to look for, let us try a more difficult problem set: exercises that are—Wittgenstein claims—'easy to imagine' (§19).

6 'Easy to Imagine'

Garver (1990, p. 180) alerts us to the problematic nature of these passages: 'I have regularly stumbled over these passages because I am unable to imagine what Wittgenstein says one can "easily" imagine'. Baker and Hacker (2005) share this worry. When Wittgenstein claims in §19: 'It is easy to imagine a language consisting only of orders and reports in battle', Baker and Hacker write (p. 73):

> W[ittgenstein] is arguably too hasty here. Is it really possible to imagine a society, and a form of life, sufficiently well organized to engage in battle and to give orders and reports in battle — *and to have no other uses for words*? How would this language be taught to children? How are we to envisage a use for orders or reports in battle, but no use for the same forms of words outside a battle?

These are legitimate questions. Initially, it seems impossible to conceive of such a language, and even if we did ultimately succeed, we would need to invest a great deal of careful thought before we could answer Baker and Hacker's questions. How can Wittgenstein claim that 'it is easy'? Perhaps it is easy for him to imagine these cases, but does he expect it to be easy—or even possible—for us to do so?

I think he does. Moreover, I think his demand is perfectly reasonable. §19 is a test: at this point in the text, you should be able to imagine a language comprised entirely of orders and reports in battle. I am not claiming that Wittgenstein expects us to already have this ability before we begin reading the *Investigations*; the challenge appears in §19, not in §1. Rather, I am claiming that Wittgenstein is assigning an exercise to see whether we have been paying attention to the previous 18 sections. If we stumble over §19, we should do what all student should do when faced with a problem that they do not know how to solve—turn back to the beginning of the chapter and review the relevant skills.

In this case, the relevant skill is imagining a primitive language. Wittgenstein begins to teach us this skill in §2:

> Let us imagine a language for which the description given by Augustine is right: the language is meant to serve for communication between a builder A and an assistant B. A is building with building stones: there are blocks, pillars, slabs and beams. B has to pass him the stones and to do so in the order in which A needs them. For this purpose, they make use of a language consisting of the words 'block', 'pillar', 'slab', 'beam'. A calls them out; B brings the stone which he has learnt to bring at such-and-such a call. — Conceive of this as a complete primitive language.

Notice that Wittgenstein says, 'let *us* imagine'. Like a math teacher working through practice problems on the board, he teaches us how to imagine a primitive language by working through these early problems along with us.

The first difficulty we might have is one Garver (1990, p. 181) articulates: 'I have trouble conceiving whether creatures whose use of language is so constrained would really be speaking a language, or would still be human beings'. Like any good teacher, Wittgenstein has anticipated such a reasonable objection. In §3, he shows us how to overcome this difficulty. Immediately after he asks us to 'conceive of this as a complete primitive language', Wittgenstein clarifies his request: he is using 'language' to 'describe a system of communication; only not everything that we call language is this system'. Like the word 'remainder' in long division, 'language' is being used in a specialized way during these exercises. Thus, the task is easier than we might at first suppose. Wittgenstein is asking us to imagine what Baker and Hacker (2005, p. 55) call a 'proto-language'—a primitive form of communication that lacks many of the features we tend to associate with more complex languages, like syntax or truth conditions. We would not be able to use this kind of proto-language to debate political issues or bet on a wrestling match; but call-and-response works well enough if we are building with blocks. Although we might—like Garver (1990)—initially deny that the builders 'would really be speaking a language', we should be able to conceive of their interaction as a simpler form of communication. Similarly, when we look ahead to §19, it should be easier to 'imagine a language consisting only of orders and reports in battle' if we imagine

the call-and-response between a war chief and a warrior as a proto-language akin to the one in §2. Before we can complete the assignment, we must first understand the vocabulary.

We might also make the task more difficult for ourselves if we import later concepts into these preliminary exercises. Garver (1990, p. 181) gives a good example of this kind of mistake. When he discusses other scholars who struggle with §2, he says of Rhees:

> He does not explicitly mention form of life, but it is clear that one of the reasons he finds it difficult to conceive the verbal signals of the builders as a language is that he has difficulty imagining their form of life.

'Form of life' is a contentious topic, and if Wittgenstein were claiming that it was easy to imagine an entire way of living centred around such a limited use of language, Rhees and Garver would be justified in their objections. At this point, however, Wittgenstein has not yet introduced the term 'form of life'. In fact, he does not introduce this concept until partway through §19—*after* he assigns the test of imagining 'a language that consists only of orders and reports in battle'. Thus, our confusion about its definition should not prevent us from completing the exercises assigned here. Instead of being distracted by future problems, we should stay focused on the task at hand. §5 further clarifies the structure of these early exercises:

> the general concept of the meaning of a word surrounds the working of language with a haze which makes clear vision impossible. – It dispenses the fog if we study the phenomena of language in primitive kinds of use in which one can clearly survey the purpose and functioning of the words. A child uses such primitive forms of language when he learns to talk.

Like children learning a new skill, we are 'studying' 'primitive kinds of use'. Wittgenstein is not asking us to come up with an explanation of how these proto-languages evolved or a realistic depiction of the day-to-day lives of the society that speaks them. At this point, the builders may be anything from imaginary proto-humans to toddlers playing with blocks. We should not confuse the issue by skipping ahead in the textbook; we should complete the exercises in the order they were assigned.

Even if we avoid these misinterpretations, however, we might still have trouble completing the exercise assigned in §19. If we accept the claim in §5 that 'a child uses such primitive forms of language', then the next natural question is the one Baker and Hacker (2005, p. 73) ask about §19: 'How would this language be taught to children?' Wittgenstein responds directly to this worry. In §6 he describes how a proto-language would be taught to children:

> We could imagine that the language of §2 was the *whole* language of A and B, even the whole language of a tribe. The children are brought up to perform *these* actions, to use *these* words as they do so, and to react in *this* way to the words of others.

An important part of the training will consist in the teacher's pointing to the objects, directing the child's attention to them, and at the same time uttering a word; for instance, the word 'slab' as he displays that shape.

Once again, in this section, Wittgenstein introduces a practice problem, and he works through it with us: '*We* could imagine that the language of §2 was… the whole language of a tribe'. In order to imagine a tribe like the builders, we have to start with precisely the problem that Baker and Hacker have raised—we must begin by imagining how the language would be taught. In §7, Wittgenstein further elaborates his answer:

> In the practice of the use of language (2) one party calls out the words, the other acts on them. However, in instruction in the language the following process will occur: the learner *names* the objects; that is, he utters the word when the teacher points at the stone. – Indeed, there will be an even simpler exercise: the pupil repeats the words after the teacher — both of these being speech-like processes.

If we apply this same technique to §19, we can begin to describe how trainees would be taught a language 'consisting only of orders and reports in battle'. When the language is practiced on the battlefield, the war chief calls out the words and the warrior acts on them. When the language is taught to new recruits, however, the words would be used in a different way. The chief would point to an object—a club, a captured enemy—and say a word. The recruits would repeat the word after the chief. Later, they would learn to follow orders—swing the club, hit the enemy—and to report on the success or failure of their mission: 'The enemy is running away' or '10 of our warriors were captured'.

Wittgenstein considers one final impediment. Perhaps, like Garver (1990, p. 180), we are unable to 'imagine the 'language' of the two builders in *PI* 2 as the *whole* language of those people'. Wittgenstein teaches us to overcome this difficulty in §18:

> Don't let it bother you that languages (2) and (8) consist only of orders. If you want to say that they are therefore incomplete, ask yourself whether our own language is complete – whether it was so before the symbolism of chemistry and the notation of the infinitesimal calculus were incorporated into it; for these are, so to speak, suburbs of our language. (And how many houses or streets does it take before a town begins to be a town?)

Here, Wittgenstein assigns us a set of optional exercises. If we are having trouble conceiving of a proto-language as a 'complete' language, then we should ask ourselves the following questions: (1) Is our own language complete? (2) Was it complete before the symbolism of chemistry or the notation of infinitesimal calculus? (3) Think of our language as a city and these additions as suburbs: how many houses or streets does it take before a town begins to be a town? (How far does a system of communication have to extend before it counts as a complete system?) Baker and Hacker (2005, p. 72) give the solution to these optional exercises:

> That a language *can* be extended does not show it to be incomplete prior to its extension. If the possibility of extending a language proved that it was incomplete, there would be no such thing as a language that was not incomplete, and hence the phrase 'incomplete language' would be meaningless.

Just as our language was not incomplete before we could discuss calculus or chemistry, a proto-language is not incomplete merely because it is limited to a particular type of interaction. Returning to §19, we should not be bothered by the

fact that a proto-language consists 'only of orders and reports'. If we have already accepted that the builders' language is complete, then a language that contains both commands and assertions should be relatively easy to imagine.

Now we can see how §19 is a test. Wittgenstein is employing the same techniques he used to teach his elementary school students (Bartley 1985, p. 100):

> at the Technical Museum [in Vienna] the children had to explain the models of steam engines, block-and-tackle, pulleys, and other mechanisms by reference to what they had studied in class. In Trattenbach, Wittgenstein had taught his pupils the laws of the lever; now he asked them to apply those laws to specific examples.

Similarly, we are asked to imagine the specific examples in §19 by reference to what Wittgenstein has already taught us in the opening sections of the *Investigations*. He has demonstrated the techniques we must apply in order to imagine this new case. Once we have worked carefully through §§2–18, §19 will no longer pose a problem for us: 'It [should be] easy to imagine a language consisting only of orders and reports in battle.—Or a language consisting only of questions and expressions for answering Yes and No—and countless other things.' I've worked through the first example. With the same tools, we can solve the remaining problems—but I leave these as exercises for the reader.

7 Conclusion

The method I have outlined captures the 'fundamentally pedagogical dimension' (Peters and Marshall 1999, p. 173) of Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations*: the reader must work through the assigned exercises. In fact, Wittgenstein makes the same claim. In an early draft (WN, p. 64), Wittgenstein wrote: 'This book could be called a textbook. But not a textbook in that it imparts knowledge, rather in that it stimulates thinking' (my translation). Since Wittgenstein could not teach the class in person, he left behind a textbook that enables us to teach ourselves.

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“A Spontaneous Following”: Wittgenstein, Education and the Limits of Trust

Stephen Burwood

Abstract It is now commonly argued that trust is fundamental to numerous and varied sorts of human relationships and activities and that education takes place within a fiduciary framework: that a basic trust is essential to child development and the very possibility of initiate learning. It has also been suggested that Wittgenstein’s remarks in *On Certainty* describe a “fundamental attitude of trust”. I argue that accounts of a generalized, background attitude of trust misuse the term “trust” and that no such notion is to be found in Wittgenstein’s remarks. Rather, Wittgenstein’s soft naturalism suggests that the phenomenon described is better understood as *ein spontanes Mitgehen* (a spontaneous following), something that he appears to have relied upon in his own, idiosyncratic approach to teaching.

Keywords Basic attitude of trust · Initiate learning · *On Certainty* · Soft naturalism

1 Introduction

Wittgenstein is not the first philosopher to spring to mind for insights into teaching and learning, especially given his own, now infamous, interlude as an elementary school teacher in rural Austria, ending with the so-called Haidbauer incident.[1]

[1]During a lesson in April 1926 in the Austrian village of Otterthal, one of Wittgenstein’s students, Josef Haidbauer, may have collapsed unconscious after being repeatedly hit on the head by Wittgenstein (Bartley 1973, 107–116; Hausmann 1982: 24; Monk 1990: 232–233; Waugh 2008: 156). Wittgenstein’s post in Otterthal was the last in a succession of teaching positions in the villages of Schultz am Semmering, Trattenberg, Hassbach and Puchberg am Schneeberg. It is fair to say that this unhappy episode was not an entirely isolated incident of physical chastisement marking his short career.

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M.A. Peters and J. Stickney (eds.), *A Companion to Wittgenstein on Education*,
DOI 10.1007/978-981-10-3136-6_11

Assessments vary as to his performance as a teacher. On the one hand, he was described by one of his headmasters as a diligent—if not punctual—teacher, generous with his personal time (Hausmann 1982: 19–21), and by another teacher who was acquainted with him during this period as passionate and innovative (ibid.: 22). He clearly inspired admiration in some of his students (ibid.: 17), and his sister Hermine loyally describes him as "a born teacher" (Wittgenstein 1984: 5). On the other hand, his first school inspector was not enamoured of his methods and his attempts to teach advanced mathematics to elementary school children were regarded as "insane" by some (Waugh 2008: 156) and remembered with horror by several of his students, particularly the less gifted or less enthused (Monk 1990: 195 and 228). So, although he appears to have taken to heart elements of the *Arbeitschule*, "learning by doing" teaching style of the Austrian School Reform Movement in which he was trained (Bartley 1973: 38), he could also be wilfully unorthodox and make unrealistic demands of his students, as well as being a bit too fond of "corporal encouragement". One former student from the period, Emmerich Koderhold, described his teaching methods as "unforgettably effective"—though in context this is undoubtedly meant euphemistically: Koderhold recalls how, when giving the wrong answer in a history class, the correct answer "was indelibly imprinted on his memory by hand" (Hausmann 1982: 21). Despite the several positives, therefore, a reasonably consistent picture emerges that Wittgenstein was "too strict as a teacher, concerned himself too little with the less gifted children and did not spare the rod if it was necessary" (ibid.: 18). Perhaps it was inevitable, as well as for the best, that his career would be short-lived.

Despite this substantial earlier setback, did he go on to be a good university teacher? F.R. Leavis clearly found it difficult to believe that he did. Although Leavis admitted that he was never present at a Wittgenstein lecture, he remained confident that these were "discussions carried on *by* Wittgenstein" (Leavis 1984: 63)—presumably teaching in the same manner that he argued, where "he exercised a completeness of command that left other voices little opportunity" (ibid.: 51). For Leavis, "the wonder and the profit for the lecture-audience lay in the opportunity to witness the sustained spontaneous effort of intellectual genius wrestling with its self-proposed problems" (ibid.: 63). The value of such an encounter was therefore more heuristic rather than pedagogic, with Wittgenstein's approach to teaching philosophy seemingly conforming to what John Wisdom referred to as the "practice method". This is a style of teaching in which "performing philosophers", as Wisdom called them, proceed to "perform philosophic antics in front of their students" (Wisdom 1934: 2). With this method, students are expected to follow the lead of the performer, with the "good students" being those who tacitly learn to imitate these performances.[2]

[2]Nicholas Burbules has characterized Wittgenstein's indirect, heuristic style of classroom teaching as "tacit teaching" (Burbules 2008), something that clearly mirrors his "pedagogical style of writing" (cf. Savickey 1999: 61–62), and is continuous with his therapeutic approach to philosophizing (Peters 2012: Chap. 1). Wisdom himself was a prominent exponent of the practice method (cf. Dilman 1993). In conversation, a former student of Wisdom's has told me that he would often entreat them to "Copy me!".

Imitation is an important and often neglected aspect of learning.[3] However, the dangers in a pure practice method approach are evident. Leavis bemoaned what he saw as the bad influence Wittgenstein had on his students—"the immense vogue generated by Wittgenstein's genius, which was so manifest and so potent, wasn't in general the kind that has its proof in improved understanding of the influencer and his theme, or in fortified intellectual powers" (Leavis 1984: 62)—though Wittgenstein himself was well aware of his own limitations as a university teacher (CV 38, cf. Bouwsma 1986: 11–12 and 36; von Wright 1982: 31)[4] and how bare imitation may misfire, so that students copy merely the superficial aspects of a performance (Britton 1967: 61). Nonetheless, without the pedagogic relation involving something like the idea that Rush Rhees discerns in Wittgenstein and characterizes as *ein spontanes Mitgehen* ("a spontaneous following") (Rhees 2003: 93), it is difficult to see learning taking place at all, even at higher levels. It appears that Wittgenstein relied rather heavily on our natural and instinctive readiness to follow in his own approach to teaching.

The idea of a spontaneous following is mentioned by Rhees in the context of a discussion with Norman Malcolm on the latter's paper "Wittgenstein: The Relation of Language to Instinctive Behaviour" (Malcolm 1982). Wittgenstein often speaks of our primitive reactions, or our primitive behaviour, or of the natural, instinctive types of behaviour we have towards other human beings and the world. In a passage in *Zettel*, which Malcolm cites, he speaks of the primitive reaction to tend and treat another's pain and the part that hurts. Here, he glosses "instinctive" as "prelinguistic" (*vorsprachlich*) and suggests that "a language game is based *on it*, that it is the prototype of a way of thinking and not the result (*Ergebnis*) of thought" (Z §541). What Rhees objects to in Malcolm's use of this sort of soft, Wittgensteinian naturalism is what he sees as a residual tendency to offer an explanation or, at least, to say something that could be misconstrued as a prototype naturalistic explanation: that our language is "the outcome of instinct, or 'emerged' from instinct" (Rhees 2003: 95).[5]

These sorts of remarks in Wittgenstein are part of the strategy to "bring back words from their metaphysical to their everyday use" (PI 1 §116), to recover the practical role they play in our lives and to remind us of how language is continuous with our lives—"Language is a phenomenon of human life" (RFM VI §47). "Our interest certainly includes," Wittgenstein therefore says, "the correspondence between concepts and very general facts of nature. (Such facts as mostly do not strike us because of their generality.) But our interest does not fall back upon these possible causes of the formation of concepts," and he reminds us, "we are not doing

[3]Efforts to pay more heed to imitation take their cue from the work of Michael Polanyi (e.g. 1958).

[4]Following convention, titles for Wittgenstein's works are abbreviated (PI, PI 1 and PI 2 = Philosophical Investigations, Z = Zettel, RFM = Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, OC = On Certainty, CV = Culture and Value), with section (§) or page number (p.), with full citation and initials (e.g., RFM) in the References.

[5]Peter Strawson distinguished between a "soft (catholic or liberal) naturalism", which he detected in Hume and Wittgenstein, and the "hard (strict or reductive) naturalism" of much contemporary philosophy (Strawson 1985: 1, cf. McDowell 1996: 88–89; Overgaard et al. 2013: 54–60).

natural science; nor yet natural history—since we can also invent fictitious natural history for our purposes" (PI 2: 195). Such general facts of nature (*Naturtatsachen*) form part of a contingent—but not arbitrary—"stage setting" (PI 1 §257) or background of intelligibility for our concepts and practices. So when Wittgenstein says, "Our talk gets its meaning from the rest of our proceedings" (OC §229), this is not to suggest that its meaning is causally determined by our actions (*Handlungen*); but that our talk and our acting form an intelligible whole.

Another important part of this background, of course, is the means by which we learn our talk and the behaviour and actions that facilitate this, hence the prevalence of examples of learning and teaching in his later thought (cf. Williams 1994, 2010). This too does not always immediately strike us because of its generality, and also because learning itself involves a form of forgetting, so to speak, where aspects of learning—particularly the processes of learning, if they are explicit—become necessarily tacit and second nature in their productive application. Reminding us of how we learn our talk is thus another important part of Wittgenstein's strategy of bringing words back to their everyday use, making language human and emphasizing how our linguistic practices, notwithstanding the foregoing injunction against scientistic hypothesizing, "are as much part of our natural history as walking, eating, drinking, playing" (PI 1 §25). Reflecting on this brings into focus aspects of the stage setting and background that concretely place language in our lives. This relationship is mutually illuminating so that how we understand the nature of this background also informs our appreciation of the learning process.

It is in this context that I wish to examine what is widely regarded as a key aspect of the learning and teaching environment, trust, and argue that recent suggestions that this is a widespread feature of life or that there is some form of generalized, background attitude of trust are mistaken. In particular, the relationship of the young child to its parents and then with its teachers is not one of trust as this is not as central to initiate learning in the way often supposed. I am sceptical that the so-called unconditional trust of the child is a form of trust at all and, rather than being regarded as *Urvertrauen* or "basic trust" (Erikson 1950), is more usefully understood as a natural attitude that is a prelude to trust. In this vein, I suggest that this is better characterized as *ein spontanes Mitgehen* rather than as a relationship or attitude of trust.

2 Unchaste Trust

It is sometimes said that a classroom is a learning community knitted together by relationships of trust between the student and teacher and, in particular, trust by the pupil or student in the teacher. This may encompass a number of aspects of this relationship, but how far does it extend? In addition to aspects of social integration and pastoral care, does it also include other aspects of learning? Does it, crucially, also extend to the very early stages of learning? Many would now argue that

learning takes place essentially within a fiduciary framework (e.g. Kitchen 2014); but is this as fundamental as sometimes supposed?

In recent years, the place of trust in public as well as private life has received greater recognition than it once enjoyed. This is at least true in academic discussion and at the level of what sociologists term ordinary social actors—such as teachers, nurses or doctors, as well as employees in other professions—and this recognition is in no small part due to the fact that there has been at the same time a general growing public "culture of suspicion" (O'Neill 2002: Lecture 1) and a corresponding and often manufactured erosion of trust in public institutions, with its consequent replacement at the level of public policy formation and implementation by increasingly *dirigiste* regimes of inspection and accountability.[6] In particular, there has grown a deep suspicion of the discretionary judgement exercised by many professionals and experts, educational and otherwise, the defence of which is often presented as special pleading and the mystification of subject matter or process.

In response to this development, it may be argued that such discretionary judgement is irreducible and ineliminable, so that trust in the exercise of such judgement is central to the fulfilment of a professional role (e.g. Frowe 2005) or that trust is needed because "all guarantees are incomplete" so that "measures to ensure that people keep agreements and do not betray trust must, in the end, be backed by —trust" (O'Neill 2002: Lecture 1; cf. Shapiro 1987: 649). Governments and regulatory authorities thus need to rediscover trust in the professionals they employ. Another important part of the response, however, has been to show just how fundamental trust is and must be to numerous and varied sorts of human relationships—and, consequently, just how diffused and widespread the place it has in our lives is. This is one of the points, for example, that Onora O'Neill makes in *A Question of Trust*.

> For all of us, after all, trust is the most everyday thing. Every day and in hundreds of ways we trust others to do what they say, to play by the rules and to behave reasonably. We trust other drivers to steer well; we trust postal staff to deliver letters efficiently—well, more or less; we trust teachers to prepare our children for exams; we trust colleagues to do what they say; we even trust strangers to tell us the way. (ibid.: Lecture 2, §1)

These are examples of what she calls "daily trust", further examples of which include the use of roads and trains, the consumption of water and food, as well as of medicines and pharmaceutical products, and the use of medical services such as

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[6]I cannot here defend the more conspiratorial aspect of this statement but should probably add that I have previously argued that in education it is related to the promotion of a number of interrelated political and economic agendas (González Arnal and Burwood 2003; Burwood 2007). It is also indubitably the product of the technological rationality Marcuse anticipated (Marcuse 1964). It may be argued that regimes of accountability, with a focus on transparency and the provision of information, are a means of *enhancing* trust; but this has to confront the well-known paradox that the more our confidence in something is grounded in the explicit products of audit and inspection, the less trust is required or, perhaps, even conceptually possible. Furthermore, as Onora O'Neill has argued, there are good reasons to think that a "culture of accountability" actually damages trust rather than promotes it (O'Neill 2002).

hospitals and surgical operations or media services such as newspapers and broadcast news. "We constantly place active trust in others", she says, and points out that this is so even when we say otherwise—so that how we in fact act, where we have genuine options to act otherwise, is a much better measure of trust than our grumbles to pollsters (ibid.: Lecture 1, §3). So, although opinion polls apparently show dwindling levels of trust, in varying degrees, in the members of diverse professions as well as public office holders, the evidence of how and where we actually place our trust suggests a quite different picture. "We constantly place trust in others," she argues, "in members of professions and in institutions" (ibid.).

We find that similar remarks about the ubiquity and central importance of trust in our lives sometimes preface discussions of trust in education. For example, in his defence of professional discretionary judgement in education, Ian Frowe has argued that "[f]or those concerned with education, the notion of trust must play a central role in their thinking and action" and offers a preliminary account of trust that emphasizes how "[i]n many areas of life we have little choice but to trust other people" (Frowe 2005: 34 and 35). We may not always be consciously aware that trust is involved in these relationships as, again, this may not immediately strike us because of their very generality and ordinariness. "Because these are mundane aspects of our lives," he continues accordingly, "we may not think of them in terms of trust but essentially it is trust that is involved because we are 'letting others take care of something we care about'" (ibid.: 35). Examples of what he calls "non-voluntary trust" include the same sort of examples as O'Neill's cases of daily trust. The lack of choice that may characterize many of these situations does not, he insists, mean the concept of trust is redundant here, but it may mean—deviating slightly from O'Neill—that it is unresolved, as overt behaviour may be informed by a complexity of reasons or motives.

In general, I do not wish to take issue with the aims or, indeed, much of the substance of these discussions; but I do wonder whether many of these examples of what has been termed daily or non-voluntary trust best serve the use to which they have been put. Such broad-based or generalized conceptions of trust cast their nets wide enough to bring into their compass sorts of relationships the professional may have other than with an employer or an overseeing authority. For example, it may be said that not only do employers and parents trust teachers to fulfil a role, but perhaps their pupils or students are also engaged in a non-voluntarily trust relationship with their teachers. Clearly, pupils—especially the young—are not in a position to challenge the truth of what they are told, so surely what they are told is taken on trust. And yet something is not quite right about construing many of these mundane situations, including this one, as examples of trust relationships. As a response to the claim of the omnipresence of trust in our lives, one is therefore inclined to say, liberally paraphrasing Wittgenstein, that we just do not see how very specialized the use of "I trust" is (cf. OC §11).

Of course, both O'Neill and Frowe are well aware that trust may mean different things and that genuine trust, as Annette Baier clarified three decades ago, can be distinguished from simple reliance (1986: 234). Genuine trust is something that can be betrayed—its violation marked by normative judgement and its observance by

the trustee, or its offer by the truster (depending on circumstances), considered virtuous—whereas simple reliance may merely result in disappointment or displeasure without *moral* censure. The difficulty with ordinary usage is that this is sometimes fuzzy. Nonetheless, these examples do form a rather heterogeneous assortment and whether its usage is appropriate in any given instance stands, as Wittgenstein would have said, in need of more precise determination (OC §§348 and 372): after all, words make sense only in quite definite surroundings (RFM VI §43) when specific determinants (*Bestimmungen*) are in place. I may or may not trust other road users or postal staff to deliver my letters. Motoring, for example, is a well-regulated activity—unlike, say, rock climbing or Morris dancing. So, yes, my safety depends on other drivers following the rules of the road, but I simply expect them to do this: it does not follow that I trust them any more than I trust the engineers that built or maintain the bridges over which I drive, or those who designed and built my car, or all the myriad other things on which my safety depends—contingent, of course, on where I am driving and who the engineers are.

O'Neill rightly speaks of "the complexity of our real judgements", such that we should not "smooth out the careful distinctions we draw between different individuals and institutions, and average our judgements about their trustworthiness in different activities" (2002: Lecture 1, §2). We might trust a professional in some respects and not others: e.g. "to teach my child arithmetic but not citizenship" (ibid.). But, if this is so, it will be because of specific contextual determinants that *make trust an issue*. The problem with examples of so-called daily trust is that, in the absence of case-specific contextual determinants, it is impossible to do justice to the complexity of our real judgements or establish whether an attribution of trust—whether genuine trust or trust in some other sense—is appropriate at all in any given instance. Given the almost limitless range of examples where something we care about (usually our well-being) depends on the behaviour of others, to speak of such a heterogeneous assortment of examples as all instances of trust can seem a rather unchaste application of the term.

Of course, to say that I do not generally trust other road users or the engineers that designed my car is not to say that I generally mistrust them either (Hawley 2012), but that the question of trust, other than bare reliance, is not in play and has not been determined—all things being equal. Needless to say, all things may not remain equal, as Volkswagen have recently discovered. The circumstances that determine the appropriate employment of the term "trust" can change and things come to light that may put into question the trustworthiness of someone or an institution whose dependability or character was previously unquestioned: thus I may come to trust or distrust them. However, "previously unquestioned" does not entail that hitherto they enjoyed our trust. By themselves, our unvoiced, positive expectations—perhaps formed by experience—do not constitute any trust on our part. As Wittgenstein remarked:

> One cannot make experiments if there are not some things that one does not doubt. But that does not mean that one takes certain presuppositions on trust (*auf guten Glauben hinnimmt*). When I write a letter and post it, I take it for granted that it will arrive—I expect this. (OC §337)

Although it is widely commented that the absence of trust does not indicate mistrust or distrust, it is also the case that the mere absence of either mistrust or distrust is not by itself an indicator of trust. The question then is whether in the absence of such determinants we can speak of a generalized, tacit, background attitude of daily trust. This notion would seem to imply a curious, context-free form of trust with almost unbounded application, whereas, again to liberally paraphrase Wittgenstein, I would like to reserve the expression "I trust" to contexts where trust may be an issue (cf. OC §260).

3 The Seeds of Trust

In response, it may be argued that there is a widely recognized form of generalized trust that is precisely one where there is no context for it: what many would consider to be children's unquestioning trust in their parents (e.g. Sharpe 1997: 38). This would appear to be the very paradigm of a generalized, tacit, background attitude of daily trust and of key significance for education. This idea is central, for example, in the work of Otto Friedrich Bollnow, in which the focus is children's unconditional trust in their parents and the shift of this trust to someone else such as the teacher (e.g. Bollnow 1989).[7] But this almost total dependence by children on their parents and their unquestioning acceptance of what they tell them and decide for them is quite unlike the many forms of trust we find in the adult world. Although young children's behaviour in this respect has been termed "basic trust" (*Urvertrauen*), drawing on Erik Erikson's (1950: 247–250) famous eight stages of psychosocial development, calling this trust looks very much like an extension of these other practices rather than an Ur-form of them, and while it has been referred to as a fundamental attitude of trust or a more basic form of trust (Hertzberg 1988), the use of the term "trust" in this context may be liable to mislead us.

Following Pestalozzi, Bollnow's concern is the provision of a secure and happy environment as a necessary precondition for learning and the proper development of the child. Central to this is the role of the parent, particularly at early stages of child development, as "the embodiment of the Absolute for the child"—that is, an "omnipotent" and "omniscient" presence, the provider of a protected, sheltered domain and the source of the child's admiration—who gives the child "an unconditional footing and a lasting refuge in this confusing world" (ibid.: 15). The function of the parent as an "Absolute" is possible because a "seed of trust is sprouting in the child" from its earliest relation with its mother. Bollnow argues that, consequently, the significance of this trust is of "fundamental importance for

[7]Bollnow's philosophy of education shares features, such as its existential phenomenological approach and the emphasis on trust, with the ethics of the Danish philosopher and theologian Knud Ejler Løgstrup, whose major work *The Ethical Demand* places the child's trust central to his understanding of ethics. These parallels between the two, including the influence of *Lebensphilosphie*, may not be accidental as both were students of Hans Lipp (see Böwadt 2009).

pedagogy in general” (ibid.: 13). This is because such trusting is characterized by thankfulness and an attitude of obedience in the child, which are transferred to the teacher who takes over the place of the parent as what Bollnow calls the child’s “life circle” expands. Of course, he recognizes that such extreme and complete trusting will eventually be lost, and argues that it must be, “as the youth graduates from the sphere of childhood into the domain of free determination and appreciation” (ibid.: 32). Still, a residual sense of security endures such that “the significance of a felt sphere of trust remains—even if it no longer has quite the unconditional character as before” (ibid.: 17). In later life, the initial unlimited trust that the child feels towards “one special person”, the parent, transforms into “a less absolute sense of trust in life” and becomes “a more generalized sense of trust in the world” (ibid.). The pedagogic relationship, however, requires us to recapture a lost sense of trust: “educators must forever set themselves the fundamental task of restoring this original pedagogic atmosphere; for pedagogy cannot succeed without fulfilling these preconditions” (ibid.: 31).

Although such sentiments appear rather anachronistic (if not politically suspect), they are not entirely without merit.[8] It should go without saying, for example, that a secure and loving childhood is a prerequisite for developing significant attachments later on. However, some confusion is evident when Bollnow goes on to describe the gratitude and obedience that characterize this trusting and which constitute the structure of the child’s life as “the virtues of a child” (ibid.: 29). Even if we accept the questionable claim that the child has a sense of gratitude, it makes no sense to describe this or the child’s total dependence on the parent as a virtue (*pace*, for example, Slote 1983 or Spieker 1990) and thus something praiseworthy or commendable. When we speak of “childlike trust” in an adult, this is usually a synonym for an inappropriate and neotenized innocence and never usually a mark of a virtuous character—except perhaps in a religious context.[9] In fact, it is normally seen as an intellectual deficiency, if not a vice. In a child, it is neither a virtue nor a vice but simply a fact of child development. To speak of this bond of dependence as a virtue is to imply confusedly that the child’s relationship with the parent, because it is close and personal, can be understood in terms of the normatively rich sense of trust. But a trusting that is absolute and complete as this is, and which cannot be tempered or withdrawn, is not trusting at all in any sense. Similarly, although seemingly “less absolute” in some sense, what Bollnow calls a “trust in life” or a “trust in the world”—unless merely a figurative expression—is also too generalized and context free to be a recognizable mode of trust. Something like this general background conception of trust has also been dubbed “basic trust” (Jones 2004) and, needless to say, I share a recently expressed scepticism about the idea of

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[8]At one point, Bollnow himself seems to be aware that his view may be considered rather *démodé* or fogeyish and opines, “Yet this childlike obedience is not acknowledged today as something natural or self-evident” (1989: 30). Even though undoubtedly invidious, I confess that it is difficult not to think of his early political affiliations while reading his work.

[9]Even in the religious context, this is contestable. It is certainly questionable, for example, that this is what is meant by the counsel of Matthew 18:3 that we should “become as little children”.

trusting where one apparently has no options—at least if one is to get out of bed in the morning—as such a conception is simply too comprehensive to be informative (cf. Hartmann 2015).

Bollnow is nearer the mark in his analysis when he speaks of the child's attitude of obedience as a "natural fitting-in" (1989: 31). This is, he explains, not "the kind of obedience which is forced from without", but rather "the quiet, natural obedience which is not even experienced as such" (ibid.: 30), and which is an attitude of the child that arises "as a matter of course in an accommodating, orderly world" (ibid.: 30) and "out of a sensitive communion with a particular person" (ibid.: 32). What Bollnow refers to as "a natural fitting-in" corresponds to a notion that Rush Rhees detects in the later Wittgenstein and terms *ein spontanes Mitgehen* ("a spontaneous following"): that is, an instinctive and tacit cooperative attitude in relation to others. Where Bollnow is right is that this natural attitude of fitting-in or spontaneously following is an indispensible precondition of later social cooperation in general and of the possibility of pedagogy in particular.

4 Spontaneously Following

In this respect, Bollnow's thinking touches base with Wittgenstein's condensed set of remarks on learning and teaching in *On Certainty* and elsewhere. These typify the soft naturalism one encounters in Wittgenstein's thought and which, although eschewing generalized, naturalistic (and certainly reductive) explanations, suggests that our understanding of more complex social relations, institutions and practices should be set against a background of very general facts of nature, among which are prelinguistic and non-cognitive human traits—such as our instinctive attitude of following and fitting-in. This behaviour constitutes *ein primitivs Verhalten* ("a primitive reaction") and, just like reacting to someone in pain, is an example of our "natural, instinctive, kinds of behaviour towards other human beings," a relation and form of primitive behaviour that "our language is merely an auxiliary to, and further extension of" (Z §545). In saying this Wittgenstein is not speculating on the origins of language: he leaves open the question of how language developed in humans, except to say that it was not a "result of thought" and "did not emerge (*hervorgegangen*) from some kind of ratiocination" (OC §475). Similarly, the first steps in learning are also not a "result of thought". "I want to regard man here as an animal," Wittgenstein says in the context of learning, "as a primitive being to which one grants instinct but not ratiocination. As a creature in a primitive state" (ibid.).

We need not here adjudicate between Rhees and Malcolm on whether or not Wittgenstein's soft naturalism implies that there is a development from something prior to our language games; but the fact that human beings *spontan mitgehen* certainly says something about how the nature of our more complex social relations, institutions and practices have the character and structure that they do. "The primitive reactions," as Rhees says, "may become important *within* a *Sprachspiel*, they show in the character of certain moves in the *Sprachspiel*" (2003: 96). And

they may also, of course, show in the way certain moves are not, in fact, moves within the language game. One way in which our natural, instinctive following and fitting-in manifests itself, for example, is in the development of a *Weltbild*.

In *On Certainty*, what constitutes a world picture is the more or less coherent system or structure (*ein System, ein Gebäude*) of our interdependent convictions (OC §102) and which forms our frame of reference (*Bezugssystem*) (OC §83) or the scaffolding (*Gerüst*) of our thoughts (OC §211). These convictions are generally unquestioned and are the substratum of all my enquiring and asserting (OC §162), seem exempt from or immune to doubt and so form the ground for all judgement (OC §§492–494) and the basis of action and thought (OC §411). “They lie apart from the route travelled by enquiry” (OC §88). Among the many examples of such are G.E. Moore’s “truisms” (Moore 1925): the propositions he claims that he knows, with certainty, to be true and which form the foil for the opening sections of *On Certainty*—for example, “There exists at present a living human body, which is my body”, “Ever since it was born, it has been either in contact with or not far from the surface of the earth the earth”, “The earth has existed also for many years before my body was born” and, less artificially, “I am a human being”. Wittgenstein says of such propositions and their *Weltbild*:

> But I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its correctness; nor do I have it because I am satisfied of its correctness. No: it is the inherited background against which I distinguish between true and false. The propositions describing this world-picture might be part of a kind of mythology. And their role is like that of rules of a game; and the game can be learned purely practically, without learning any explicit rules. (OC §§94 and 95)

The world picture is thus not acquired explicitly or as a result of ratiocination: I inherit the constituent certainties from early childhood by means of a tacit initiation by those such as my parents who already live within its frame of reference. This process relies on *ein spontanes Mitgehen*, our automatic and unconscious predisposition to follow and fit-in, and continues later in more formal education, where the convictions are sedimented by subsequent learning in which everything speaks in their favour and nothing against (OC §§4 ff.). As an inductee into the world view I cannot judge its correctness because, among other things, without a world view I cannot judge at all: so, it seems, “I must recognize certain authorities in order to make judgements at all” (OC §493).

It has been suggested that what Wittgenstein describes here is also a “fundamental attitude of trust” or a “basic form of trust”, where trusting itself is understood as a primitive reaction—although at the same time it is conceded that it would be quite misleading to use that word (Hertzberg 1988). Indeed[10] “What is in question,” Hertzberg explains, “are simply the child’s natural ways of reacting to

[10]I have considerable sympathy for Hertzberg’s self-confessed difficulty in finding an adequate way of speaking about the sort of phenomena Wittgenstein also struggles to describe (see Hertzberg 1988: §VIII and Endnote 5). I have less sympathy with the subsequent heroic contention that, nonetheless, trust “is implicit in many of the primary reactions of one human being to another” (ibid.: 317).

other people" (ibid.: 316). The argument turns on a strict distinction between the grammar of trust and the grammar of reliance; but this does not do justice to the range of language games of trust, including those that express mere reliance. It is true that scattered throughout the English translation of *On Certainty* are examples where Wittgenstein speaks of trust and trusting: e.g. someone trusting his senses (OC §34), trusting my eyes (OC §125), trusting a universal law of induction (OC §133), trusting my or anyone else's judgement (OC §§150, 434), trusting facts we learnt as a child (OC §159), or evidence (OC §275, 672), calculations (OC §§303, 337), memory (OC §337), text books (OC §§275, 434, 599, 600), or simple cases of two-placed trust where someone trusts me (OC §§668, 671).

The word "trust" is doing a lot of work here, for interspersed with these examples are an equal number of others where he simply speaks of relying or depending on things, sometimes with reference to many of the same sorts of cases. In these instances, "rely" is most usually a translation of *verlassen*, which does express mere reliance, but in some other instances is also translated as "trust"—for example where Wittgenstein declares, "I really want to say that a language game is only possible if one trusts (*Verläßt*) something (I did not say 'can trust (*verlassen*) something')" (OC §509). As well as *verlassen*, "trust" is also used to translate *vertrauen* (the verb trust), *Vertrauen* (the noun trust), *gutten Glauben* (good faith) and *gläubig* (faithfully or with faith). Given our fuzzy use of the English word "trust", I have no quibbles with the translators' choice—to speak of trusting one's senses or memory, or to question whether one (*qua* adult) should trust the testimony of another or a textbook, seem perfectly normal usages of the term—but there is nothing here on which to base a "Wittgensteinian" account of some more fundamental form of trusting.[11] Indeed, what is noticeable about Wittgenstein's examples is that in those that come closest to describing the situation of the child he tends to use the terms *verlassen* or *gläubig* rather than *vertrauen*.

"If there is a difference in quality between the infant's dependence and the trust of the maturer individual, we might say," Hertzberg goes on to suggest, "it simply consists in the fact that, while the relation itself remains the same, it has now become conceivable for it to be different" (ibid.: 317). But, it becomes conceivable only because the relation changes and the context and the determinants adjust accordingly. It would be simpler to admit that it is not a fundamental attitude of trust or a form of trusting at all, just a fact about our natural history—it being one of the very general facts of human nature, one might say, that constitute our *Lebensform*.[12] "The child, I should like to say," Wittgenstein avers in relation to knowing, "learns to react in such-and-such a way; and in so reacting it doesn't so far know anything. Knowing only begins at a later level" (OC §538). The same, I

[11]In fairness to Hertzberg, he does claim that his paper is not exegetical (1988: 308).

[12]Although *Lebensform* is commonly translated as "forms of life", I would argue that a better and less ambiguous translation would be "life form". In the revised 50th Anniversary Edition of the *Philosophical Investigations* (PI 1 and PI 2), it is translated in both ways, though the reason for the choice of English phrase in each instance is not clear from the context.

would like to say, is equally true of trusting. After all, trusting is a language-game that needs to be learned like any other one (cf. PI 1: §249).

Similarly, labelling these spontaneous and instinctive responses as "obedience" in the absence of that term's usual determinants, *à la* Bollnow, is also quite misleading.[13] "Ungrateful individuals," Bollnow remarks, "as long as they remain in this state, cannot be cared for" (ibid.: 31). If by "ungrateful" Bollnow means that such individuals are not receptive, and whose manner and behaviour will not allow them to be guided by their parent or teacher, then what he describes—construing "cared for" broadly—is something akin to Wittgenstein's imaginary and, in many ways, rather unrealistically precocious pupil who continually interrupts the teacher with illegitimate questions and doubts about basic issues (OC §§310–317; cf. RFM VII: §26); for example, questions in a history class about whether the earth really existed at all a hundred years in the past. We may forgive the teacher's mild impatience, as such questions are illegitimate: the apparent doubt they express "isn't one of the doubts in our game" and merely demonstrates that "this pupil has not learned how to ask questions" (ibid.). "The child learns by believing the adult. Doubt comes *after* belief" (OC §160). But "believing the adult" is not obedience as we would normally understand it, any more than the unruly questioning is disobedience. This degree of unruliness would be pathological: treatment rather than chastisement would be the appropriate response.

All this suggests a conceptual and not merely a practical limit on the pupil's capacity to question the teacher and entertain doubts about what is being explained. At a certain stage of learning, a pupil's "doubts"—if indeed the behaviour in question could be called an expression of doubt—would be hollow and senseless and disruptive of learning. This is certainly true for the child-pupil but may be similarly true for the adult-neophyte, though to a lesser degree.[14] To engage in any learning is to participate in a process in anticipation of understanding, which may then subsequently form grounds for questioning. This participation must be unquestioning to some degree, even at higher levels of learning, and so the asymmetry between neophyte and the practised participant is often captured in terms, as Polanyi says, of submission to an authority or to the rules of the art and mastery of the practice (Polanyi 1958; cf. Williams 1991). But this is not all or nothing: the wider experience and status that come with age and one's development in the rules of the art allow a developing autonomy, and allows that the process

[13]Something acknowledged by Williams (2010: 22). Her use of the metaphor "blind obedience" appears to be strategic and, as she says, "is to resist all attempts to reinvest the background or bedrock of our linguistic practices with reasoning, rules, interpretation or knowledge" (ibid.: 22–23). It is misleading nonetheless—not least as she links it with the "implicit trust and certainty with which the novice accepts the structuring of the adult" as well as what she calls Wittgenstein's "radical explanations" of normativity and certainty (ibid.: 22).

[14]Teachers of philosophy at higher levels may also recognize this as an occasional problem, although here the questions may not be illegitimate as such but nonetheless equally disruptive: the student gripped by Pyrrhonian scepticism or spellbound by the Cartesian method of doubt and who cannot move on to discuss any other topic until the possibility of real, certain knowledge has been established.

becomes collaborative (cf. Burwood 2009)—something speaking of obedience and submission obscures.[15] We should remember the different ways one may be guided (PI 1: §172): sometimes education is like being led with our eyes bandaged, sometimes it is like a dance. Slowly, *ein spontanes Mitgehen* changes from a spontaneous following to a spontaneous accompanying.

5 Concluding Remarks

Was Wittgenstein's imaginary teacher impatient with the disruptive questions of the pupil, a kind of involuntary and unconscious memoir, as Nietzsche would have said? We will probably never know the full story of what led to Wittgenstein's resignation from his teaching post in Otterthal. In many ways, it appears he was a model teacher (imaginative, interesting, engaging and ambitious for his students), whom some of his students loved and were eager to please. "Even the ungifted and usually inattentive among the boys came up with astonishingly good answers," his sister reports, "and they were positively climbing over each other in their eagerness to be given a chance to answer or demonstrate a point" (Wittgenstein 1984: 5). Unfortunately, it also appears he was highly strung, over-demanding and sometimes bullying, engaging in a good deal of ear-boxing and hair-pulling, especially if a student was unable to follow him. What is certain is that many of the parents did not trust him. In the incident that led to his departure, was this mistrust justified by an eventual violation of trust on his part?

From what we know of the facts of the matter, we would have to say there was and that there was undoubtedly a violation of the trust invested in him, even though low-level violence and physical intimidation were more of an accepted feature of the educational environment then, in rural Austria and elsewhere—and despite Otto Glöckel's school reform movement, to which Wittgenstein appears to have been committed to some degree. The children were entrusted to his care by his employer and by their parents (even by those who did not trust him) and perhaps by the community at large. What there was not was a violation of the children's unquestioning trust—not in his overzealous physical encouragement, nor by his more extravagant excursions into advanced mathematics. To be sure, in general, for someone to exploit a child's vulnerability—either physically or, for example, to deliberately and systematically teach untruths—can be regarded as an act of unconscionable wickedness; but we can decide this without regarding it as a violation of trust.

[15] A recent example that tests the limits of the novice's obedience in higher education concerns the university teaching of economics. Demand from students has grown for a more pluralist approach, a demand supported by some professional economists in the UK such as Ha-Joon Chang and Andy Haldane. It is, nevertheless, a student-led movement. For example, see the Post-Crash Economics Society at the University of Manchester (http://www.post-crasheconomics.com/).

Fortunately, there were no reports of ear-boxing and hair-pulling in Cambridge. If there had been, that would have been unprofessional and a breach of his students' expectations, but not necessarily their trust. Betraying a secret or providing personal information to a third party would have been a violation of trust. Similarly, his idiosyncratic methods of teaching may or may not have been a disappointment of expectations—and they were unlikely to have helped or enthused the ungifted and usually inattentive—but they too were not a violation of anyone's trust. His method, a pure example of Wisdom's practice method, appears to have relied almost exclusively on his students' willingness to follow unquestioningly. But to portray even this process as one fundamentally based on a form of trust would seem to mischaracterize it.

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Seeing Connections: From Cats and Classes to Characteristics and Cultures

Paul Standish

Abstract This paper examines the idea of Wittgenstein as a philosopher of context in the light of his preoccupation with seeing connections. The importance of this is considered in relation to more deductive and inductive forms of reasoning, unduly constrained notions of what it is to follow a rule, and ideas of defining characteristics and identity. The implications of contextualist views are examined, as well as the consequences of the application of the familiar lumper-splitter distinction, which emerges originally in disputes in the taxonomical sciences. The relation between seeing connections and imagination is brought to the fore. The paper provides further reason to challenge dominant conceptions of assessment in education and their pervasive effects on curricula.

Keywords Analogy · Aspect-seeing · Connection · Identity · Induction · Lumpers and splitters · Wittgenstein

1 Context, Anthropology, Connections

In an Editorial in *Educational Philosophy and Theory* from 2012, entitled "Educational Research and the Philosophy of Context", Michael Peters identifies Ludwig Wittgenstein as the philosopher of context *par excellence*. He begins with two quotations:

Earlier versions of this paper were given at the *European Conference on Educational Research* (2015) and as a keynote at the Annual Conference of the *Philosophy of Education Society of Australasia* (2012). I am grateful to those present for their responses.

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M.A. Peters and J. Stickney (eds.), *A Companion to Wittgenstein on Education*,
DOI 10.1007/978-981-10-3136-6_12

> How could human behavior be described? Surely only by sketching the reactions of a variety of humans, as they are all mixed up together. What determines our judgments, our concepts and reactions, is not what *one* man is doing *now*, an individual action, but the whole hurly-burly of human actions, the background against which we see any action. (Z §567)[1]

And:

> The background is the bustle of life. And our concept points to something within *this* bustle. (RPP §625)

To appeal to context seems, at least, to make a plea for attention to the particular. But it is also to emphasise the nature of connections. Peters provides the following gloss:

> Contextualism is an epistemological doctrine that holds that in a non-trivial sense meaning truth, knowing, and justification are to be understood relative to a context. This context-dependence also has relevance with regard to ethics and sometimes is seen to lead to a "situationist ethics", that some scholars argue faces the threat of relativism… It is possible to distinguish a metaphysical view of holism that holds all entities are connected from an epistemological view; that an entity cannot be known without knowing the full context of its connections to other entities. (Peters 2012)

Now while this may be congenial enough to some, there is enough here, as Peters appreciates, to ring alarm bells in others, most obviously the "threat of relativism". My own concern is rather with aspects of the last sentence, especially regarding a metaphysical holism in which all entities are connected and the idea of the "full context" of connections, in ways that I hope will become clear.

I want to complicate matters by setting these opening quotations against two other remarks of Wittgenstein. In the first place, one thing that Wittgenstein says that militates against notions of relativism is the following response to the interlocutor's question:

> PI §241. "So you are saying that human agreement decides what is true and false?"—It is what human beings *say* that is true and false; and they agree in the *language* they use. This is not agreement in opinions but in form of life.
> PI §242. If language is to be a means of communication there must be agreement not only in definitions but also (queer as this may sound) in judgements.

"Agreement in judgements" refers not to the kind of agreement that we might come to through discussion—say, that Angela Merkel is on the whole a better president than François Hollande. It has rather to do with something more basic, with our responses at a more or less physiological level: the human response to temperature range, for example, which is different from that of polar bears or rattlesnakes, or the sense of what is edible and what is not, where we are different, for example, from

[1]Following convention, titles for Wittgenstein's works are abbreviated (PI = Philosophical Investigations, RFM = Remarks on the Foundation of Mathematics, Z = Zettel, RPP = Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology; PO = Philosophical Occasions), with section (§) or page number (p.), with full citation and initials (e.g., RFM) in the References.

lions—which is one of the reasons why if a lion should speak, we would not understand what it said.[2] It is a universal truth then that there is, in this sense, agreement in judgements. But how the response to those judgements is realised is always cultural. Human beings are inevitably faced, primarily, with the need to attend to more or less primitive needs and desires, but how that need is attended to is always culturally specific. “Human being” is not, first and foremost, a *biological* category, which is another way of saying that if you are thinking biologically, you are surely leaving something out.

The second point relates to a passage towards the end of the *Investigations*:

> We… say of some people that they are transparent to us. It is, however, important as regards this observation that one human being can be a complete enigma to another. We learn this when we come into a strange country with strange traditions; and, what is more, even given a mastery of the country’s language. We do not *understand* the people. (And not because of not knowing what they are saying to themselves.) We cannot find our feet with them. (PI, II, p. 223)

Wittgenstein speaks of coming to a “strange country”, but the point, I think, is wider, relating to a more general opacity in the human condition.

His most direct writing about other cultures is to be found in his *Remarks on Frazer’s* Golden Bough. In some ways, Frazer found other cultures a mystery. In some, however, he suffered from the opposite problem—that is, he assumed that the normal lenses through which he looked would present these other tribes in appropriate clarity. Wittgenstein pours scorn on the anthropologist who interprets certain practices of an alien culture as so much bad science while remaining blind to their ritual, religious, or symbolic intent: Frazer cannot imagine a priest who is not basically an English parson of the time “with the same stupidity and dullness” (PO, p. 125). What Wittgenstein suggests as an alternative is that we look for analogous patterns in our practices, especially in our responses to critical moments or turning points in our lives. This prompts some sense of the multiple ways that we can see connections, and indeed this is a signal theme of Wittgenstein’s later work. Let me illustrate this in two ways.

First, there is the idea of “noticing an aspect” or “seeing aspects”, which Wittgenstein ponders in the course of some thirty-six pages in the second part of the *Investigations*. The pivotal example that provides a convenient entrée into this is, of course, that of the duck-rabbit (PI, II, pp. 194–196). The interest in this figure goes well beyond the novelty value of an ambiguous image. A person can be aspect blind —culpably so, in the case of Frazer. We can help the rabbit-blind person by giving them the right tip (“Try seeing the extensions on the left as the ears, the kink in the line on the right as a mouth…”) or by setting the duck-rabbit in a field of rabbits. We might consider how deficiencies in Frazer’s education might be rectified. The point in these cases would be not to reveal inherent characteristics in the objects of concern so much as to show how things might be taken up in a different way—or, say, how the lines in the drawing might be followed by making different connections.

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[2]“If a lion could talk, we could not understand him” (PI, p. 223).

Second, there is the question of what it is to follow a rule. When Wittgenstein was planning the *Investigations*, he did not envisage that such psychological matters as aspect-seeing would figure in it as they do, for his intention had been to conclude the book with developments in his thinking regarding mathematics. Crucially the pursuit of the theme of mathematics was to have taken up and to have accentuated the idea of rule-following, which is enormously significant early in the book, but the discussion of aspects in Part II turns this in a different direction. How exactly is this to be read? It is true that the young learner must be guided into the rule-following behaviour that characterises human practices. Many people have given an authoritarian interpretation to this, providing depressing support to the idea that education is the inculcation in learners of the norms or traditions of society.

Of course, Wittgenstein's use of *Abrichtung*[3] has for long been cited as evidence in support of such a view, but really this misses the point. We are not talking about pedagogical practice here but rather about what it is into which the child is initiated. The authoritarian reading, then, fails to attend to the fact that the following of a rule can proceed in unforeseen ways. Our inclination is to see the series 2, 4, 6, 8 as extending in steps of two into infinity, as if it were already laid out for us. But we can coherently extend the pattern as 2, 4, 6, 8, 11, 14, 17, 20 or 2, 4, 6, 8, 4, 16, 36, 64, through an infinite range of possibilities. In order to follow the rule in each case, one would need to know how to go on, and one could expand or complicate the sequence by developing new possibilities. This makes rule-following seem less like a matter of mute conformity and more like a creative articulation. The rule provides the necessary basis for the creativity. The musical forms of theme-and-variations or the jazz standard—think of John Coltrane's iterations of *My Favourite Things*—illustrate just such possibilities. The point could be extended in a more abstract way with examples from painting too. In Wassily Kandinsky's *Point and Line to Plane* (Kandinsky 1979), he illustrates the effects of patterns of repetition and variation in developing the rhythm of the painting.

So in mathematics and in music, in art too, we see pattern and variation, and these produce newly elaborated patterns and new possibilities of variation. But the point becomes all the more telling and all the more pertinent to a "realism without empiricism"—the phrase of his younger colleague, Frank Ramsey, that Wittgenstein so admired—when it is acknowledged that this applies also to our use of words, our

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[3]*Abrichtung*, translated as "training", can refer to the way in which animals are trained, with possible connotations of severity. Wittgenstein's usage of it may well be pointed, in resistance to intellectualist accounts of learning. In the *Investigations* he uses the word in connection with the early learning of language and ostensive definition (§§5, 6), learning to read a table representing building-stones (§86), and in a comparison of the giving of instructions for the performance of bodily movements (say, in gymnastics) and the prediction of the reactions of different metals to acids (§630). At a more biographical level, it is of course the case that Wittgenstein the school-teacher was severe, even brutal, with children at times—particularly with those who were intelligent but did not try—so much so that one of the parents was driven to calling him an animal-trainer, not a teacher. How far Wittgenstein's experience as a school-teacher—including his shame at his behaviour and at the way that his career ended—was to shape his life and subsequent philosophy is beyond the scope of the present discussion.

very wording of the world. Following a rule does not rule out new departures from that rule, and in the learning of language this is so from a remarkably early stage. What is true of the number series is true in a different way of words themselves, for their use can never be fully circumscribed in advance. To use a word is to project it, sometimes reinforcing its received, perhaps clichéd sense but often opening new connections, projecting it into new contexts. Consider Stanley Cavell's extended riff in *The Claim of Reason* on the everyday word "feed", where "feed the cat" connects with "feed the metre", with "feed in the film", and with "feed his pride" (Cavell 1979, p. 181). Or, again, think of the young child learning the word "pumpkin", which must presumably be connected with "pumping" and perhaps with "Mr Popkin" who lives next door. These are associations that depart from the word's apparent immediate use, indeed that extend beyond immediacy itself, opening the way most crucially for imagination. The child riffs on the words she acquires, sometimes meaningfully, sometimes aimlessly, and hits upon new associations and possibilities. Do we not find that even small children learning to speak *play* with words contemporaneously with their coming to "use" words to "refer" to "things"? They test possibilities of sound and sense. In fact, if we can accept that this generally *is* how words *are*, then the way we use them acquires a sharper edge of responsibility, for this will shape possibilities, not only for ourselves but for our community. It is a responsibility, let's say, for thought itself.

Wittgenstein is avoiding the fantasy that we just make it up as we go along, but he is also weaning us away from the idea that our thought merely traces articulations already inherent in reality. "Not empiricism and yet realism in philosophy", he writes, "that is the hardest thing" (RFM, p. 325). To teach someone these things, to show them how to go on, would not be to present them with information so much as to refine their technique, helping them to make connections where they had not seen them before and to acquire confidence in making connections. This would be simultaneously a refinement of criteria. Crucially it would require exercise of the imagination.

Let me emphasise the following: what is at stake here is not seeing common properties or characteristics but noticing aspects, overlaps, and analogies. Seeing connections would contrast, on Wittgenstein's view, with what he sometimes referred to as *Merkmal*-definition—that is, identification in terms of defining characteristics. Later I shall draw the significance of this out more specifically in terms of the role of these factors—identity and defining characteristics—in intercultural understanding. But first a short anecdote, partly at my own expense, in order to make clearer what is *not* being said. In the paragraphs that follow, then, and to convey what happened, let me adopt a more personal register.

2 Teaching Differences

Some years ago Tone Kvernbekk invited Harvey Siegel and me to co-teach a doctoral course at the University of Oslo. The topic assigned to us was pragmatism, which was intriguing as neither Harvey nor I are card-carrying pragmatists, though

probably for roughly opposite reasons. The course was a pleasure to teach. It was a pleasure except perhaps for one moment, when, at the end of quite a long discussion of Dewey's *Experience and Nature*, Tone asked me the following question: "It's sometimes said that philosophers are divided into lumpers and splitters. Which one are you?" Lumpers, as is well-known, are those thinkers who are inclined to emphasise overlaps and commonalities, and, Dewey-fashion, to resist the drawing of sharp boundaries; splitters are those who cut and divide, who identify distinguishing characteristics and compartmentalise. Now Harvey, I knew, would have no trouble with this question: he was as committed a splitter as you could find. So—foolishly—I played my part and signed up reluctantly as a lumper, which was surely the answer Tone wanted.

I was immediately frustrated with myself for doing this. Tone's question was, after all, a splitter's question, in fact, a binary-divider's question: Are you this or that? Which is it? Tell us. Now! There is even a wanton violence in the term "splitter", which suggests logic-chopping and no nonsense about it. But phrase this differently as "the drawing of distinctions" and its implications begin to look rather different. There is that line in *King Lear*, "I'll teach you differences", that Wittgenstein referred to (see Malcolm 1981) as expressing what his work was about—that is, of course, especially his later philosophy, where the approach is very much the piecemeal examination of segments of our practice. So if he, this teacher of differences, is a splitter, I now ask myself, how did I manage to put myself on "the other side"? And what of Jacques Derrida, who interests me also, and who has surely taken preoccupation with difference to a new level? I suppose he, alongside Harvey, would be a splitter too. Perhaps they could split their differences.

Given that the philosophers I refer to here are keen to elucidate differences, and given that this has quite a lot going for it philosophically, it is difficult to see the attractions of the lumper. Dewey, I suppose, must be a candidate lumper for the reasons I have just acknowledged, but in fact his resistance to dichotomies is based not so much on anything that could be called a lump but rather on the fluidity of our lives and practices, where growth can lead to growth and where the number of a society's forms of interaction might be a measure of its democratic worth. This goes to the heart of Dewey's conception of thought and reality themselves, and again this does not really sound like lumping, does it?

The upshot of this is that the lumper-splitter dichotomy seems tilted from the start in favour of the splitter, and perhaps the connotations of the metaphors that it employs are already a giveaway that this is not going to be a fair fight exactly. Better be a lumberjack than a lump. Ironically though, accepting these terms, we end up with a peculiar "lump" of people on the splitter side—including Harvey, Wittgenstein, and Derrida, just on the strength of this brief investigation. So, if nothing else, there is room for drawing some finer distinctions, in which such terms as, for example, "analogy", "similarity" and "connection" are given closer examination.

About two years after the course that Harvey and I taught in Oslo, he kindly stepped in at short notice to provide a keynote at the annual Oxford conference of the Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain, when the speaker who had

been booked for the occasion had had to withdraw. His address to the conference lived up to expectations, and the session was a lively one. In the course of it he spoke recurrently about the role of analogy in reasoning. Unsatisfied by what he was saying, I raised a question (I thought he was glossing over a distinction between analogy and induction), but he seemed non-plussed by what I said. We agreed to set the matter aside for another day, and a year or so later the opportunity arose. We were sitting in a café in San Francisco, halfway through the same argument, and a cat came through the door. Harvey said that we knew it was a cat by analogy. It bore certain resemblances to other cats we had seen. We had seen other animals like this in the past and been told that they were cats, so we should come to the conclusion that this was a cat too. Analogy was no different from induction. Now this flew in the face of the point I had been pressing, which was that analogy functioned through difference. It was not just another name for induction. We draw analogies between things that are *not* the same but where there are similarities or related aspects, lines of connection, one might say. The cat, by contrast, was identifiable as a cat in virtue of certain characteristics—in fact, properties that it essentially shared with other cats *qua* species-members. Now if, while this was going on, a cat-burglar had shimmied up the building opposite, sprung onto the balcony, and slipped through the open window, her feline qualities would have impressed me by analogy, but my realisation that the animal in the café was a cat was owed simply to induction.[4]

So when offered the choice of being a lumper or a splitter, I should have declined and politely begged to differ. In any case, although there have been attempts to revive the lumpers-splitters dichotomy in philosophy, it originates in the biological sciences precisely as a difference between taxonomical approaches. And this really is a matter of class. Lumpers and splitters are not at odds with one another over the appropriateness of *Merkmal*-definition. What they disagree about is whether it is better to think in terms of a limited number of *genera* or a larger number of *species*. These are the major competing organisational categories in their taxonomies, respectively, putting emphasis on common characteristics and differentiating features. (How many kinds of cactus are there? Do you want to emphasise the 50 genera or the 1000 species? How many kinds of giraffe?) Both genera-theorists and species-theorists are inclined to abstract from or to freeze experience. I take Wittgenstein, by contrast, to be drawing attention to a way of thinking that is mobile and extensively invested in the very nature of words: not a classificatory system but a method or technique, of seeing connections, of knowing how to go on.

Wittgenstein's aversion to excessive faith in *Merkmal*-definition is born in part of a suspicion of its metaphysical intentions—that is, a faith that language provides

[4]For present purposes I shall pass by the point that this already looks odd in Wittgensteinian terms. Is it really the case that I go through any kind of reasoning process in order to arrive at the "conclusion" that this is indeed a cat?

labels for properties that are simply there in things, a variation of which is there in Wittgenstein's own early work. Such a way of thinking could also be found (several decades later) in the work of some leading philosophers of education. Thus, more or less consistently in the course of numerous books, John Wilson was committed to the view that the primary and probably the only role for philosophy of education was logically to analyse the key concepts of education in order to uncover its essential components. Discovery of these would provide the building blocks upon which educational practice in the future would be based. These concepts were not to be thought contestable. Few would adhere to such a view now.

Plainly contextualism would be fundamentally opposed to this, as Peters' Editorial makes abundantly clear. But this is the point at which I would like to take up the reservations I indicated at the outset about some aspects of that initial quotation from Peters.

3 The Right Tip

The "metaphysical view of holism that holds all entities are connected" loads rather more onto holism than the term needs to imply. Holism can apply to the various strands that, for example, comprise a practice, none of which can be understood without reference to others. This is neither to isolate the practice nor to attempt to define the strands of connection that lead beyond it. It is to view things as patches within a wider fabric, with no attempt to survey that fabric as a whole. Furthermore, the looseness of the metaphorical term "strand" here avoids the metaphysical charge of the philosopher's word "entities": entities are things that putatively "exist"; and maybe we do not need to determine in quite this way all that there is to a practice. By the same lights, when it comes to the "epistemological view", it is difficult to see what could be meant by "knowing the full context". Indeed, the spirit of this phrase seems at odds with the idea of the textual. Textuality draws attention to the way that our experience and understanding of the world is thematised or framed or worded in particular ways, and this inevitably means that that understanding is perspectival and partial. How in the light of this could a context be *fully* known? What would a complete description of any context be like? What would full knowledge be?[5] Does it not seem that a stray metaphysical impulse has found its way into this wording? Some of the literature that the Editorial helpfully draws attention to and

[5]The idea of "the full context" presents problems similar to those that attach to the idea of a complete description. What could be a complete description of this room? The furniture and the people? The nature of the decoration? The dimensions? Its location? Its chemical composition? The nature of the conversation taking place here? The idea makes no sense without some further specification and thematization.

summarises[6] is striking for its dissimilarity to the nature of Wittgenstein's writings, and I think the reason for this can be identified quite simply in terms of its theoretical ambitions, which contrast with Wittgenstein's general wariness regarding the advancing of theories.[7] So to the extent that Wittgenstein is seen as a contextualist, a claim that on the face of it seems reasonable enough, the implications of this *stylistic* difference need to be taken more to heart.

Thinking in terms of identity and defining characteristics is inevitably prominent in any consideration of intercultural understanding, but if the argument drawn here from Wittgenstein is sound, these factors can easily come to be over-emphasised. One consequence of this would be a reification of cultural identity, of a kind that is reinforced by commercial and media forces, as well as by some forms of social science research. Emphasis upon seeing connections, by contrast, avoids any aspiration towards full understanding in favour of receptivity to the exploration of connections, sometimes for pragmatic purposes but often without an agenda. The experience of translation is particularly pertinent. Understanding in terms of defining characteristics is sometimes foiled by differences between languages. The experience of the gap between meanings, and of the practical necessity of choosing a word or phrase, of finding a way to communicate, involves the seeing and exploitation of connections in an exemplary way.

Wittgenstein illustrates the point that one human being can be a complete enigma to another by referring to the experience of coming to a strange country, with strange traditions. But the image can scarcely work today in the manner he intended, in a world where the "strangeness" is progressively muted and where, for many, a sense that one has a well-developed understanding of at least some friends and acquaintances from cultures different than one's own is probably well justified. Conversely, it seems likely that there are ways in which our next-door neighbours have become more remote from us. This new intercultural confidence is also acquired at a cost of another kind. This is that new technology has promoted the kinds of interaction facilitated by, for example, Facebook, where the technology itself plays a crucial role in shaping the way that identity and difference are conceived. New technology is manifestly a means of seeing and making connections, but it would be rash to suppose that it supports the seeing of connections that Wittgenstein came to think important. Wittgenstein had in mind something other than being wired.[8]

The problem of the fixing of identities that we have seen in contexts where there is a need for intercultural understanding is in fact part of a more pervasive distortion attaching to the very nature of concepts. In this context Wittgenstein speaks of the

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[6]Peters refers, for example, to constructivist theories.

[7]For example: "And we may not advance any kind of theory. There must not be anything hypothetical in our considerations. We must do away with all *explanation*, and description alone must take its place" (PI §109).

[8]This is emphatically not to be negative about the actualities and further possibilities of connection through new technology, but these benefits are other than the obsessive connectedness that can burden contemporary life.

way that "super-concepts" and their shadows burden our thought. "Thought is surrounded by a halo", he writes. "Its essence, logic, presents an order, in fact the a priori order of the world: that is, the order of *possibilities*, which must be common to both world and thought" (PI §97). But against this crystalline picture, with its super-order of super-concepts, Wittgenstein insists that the if "language", "experience", and "world" have a use, it must be as humble as that of "table", "lamp", and "door". The halo of thought represents a reified notion of possibility, as where the possible movements of a machine are somehow imagined to be built into it, like shadows already there (PI §194). Moreover, our persistent, even habitual "subliming" of thought turns *subject* and *object* into metaphysical categories that obliterate clear perception of their reality in language games. Cavell has ventured to suggest that Wittgenstein's "teaching is in service of a vision that false views of the inner and of the outer produce and sustain one another". He would have been happy, he adds, to have suggested that "the correct relation between inner and outer, between the soul and its society, is the theme of the *Investigations* as a whole" (Cavell 1979, p. 329). One way in which the *Investigations* works to dispel such a metaphysical picture is in its persistent preoccupation not only with how a concept is used but with how it is learned. Let me press the point about concepts and how they are learned by adverting to an aspect of the earlier discussion of seeing aspects.

The starting point here is the thought that someone might be led to overcome their inability to see an aspect by being given "the right tip". I appropriated this helpful phrase from a passage late in Wittgenstein's discussion of aspect-seeing. The topic in connection with which he uses the term has to do with how it is possible to acquire good judgement, and this in respect of a complex matter: judgement of the genuineness of expressions of feeling. It is worth considering how Wittgenstein lays the way for this in the immediately preceding text. On this same page, he revisits examples of learning in relation to the acquisition of mathematical and colour concepts, drawing attention to differences in the relative place of rule-following, technique, and experience, and considering the nature of the concepts themselves. Thus, the idea that "We all learn the same multiplication table" might be taken as a remark about the teaching of arithmetic in schools, but it might also be an observation about the *concept* of a multiplication table (PI II, p. 227). This is the way we do mathematics. By contrast, although there is such a thing as colour-blindness, there is in general complete agreement in judgements of colours amongst those with normal eyesight, and this characterises the *concept* of colour. The former stresses an activity and techniques; the latter a regularity of experience where the object of recognition elicits a response that is common to nearly all and readily reinforced. There are, Wittgenstein says, "evidently differences of degree here" (PI II, p. 226).

It seems, however, that there is a gravitational pull, as we near the end of Wittgenstein's lengthy consideration of aspect-seeing, towards the far more troubling matter of judgement of the genuineness of an expression of feeling. Here there is in general no such agreement; nor are there obvious or ready-made techniques. Wittgenstein asks:

> Is there such a thing as "expert judgment" about the genuineness of expressions of feeling? – Even here, there are those whose judgment is "better" and those whose judgment is "worse".
>
> Correcter prognoses will generally issue from the judgments of those with better knowledge of mankind.
>
> Can one learn this knowledge? Yes; some can. Not, however, by taking a course in it, but through "*experience*" – Can someone else be a man's teacher in this? Certainly. From time to time he gives him the right *tip* [den richtigen *Wink*]. – This is what "learning" and "teaching" are like here. – What one acquires here is not a technique; one learns correct judgments. There are also rules, but they do not form a system, and only experienced people can apply them right. Unlike calculating rules.
>
> What is difficult here is to put this indefiniteness, correctly and unfalsified into words. (PI II, p. 227)

Experience may be relevant to the two preceding examples in some degree and in different ways (e.g. practice in arithmetic, apprenticeship as a graphic designer). Judgements of the genuineness of expressions of feeling, however, demand experience of complex particular cases (unlike that of colour samples). This will involve appeal to rules or techniques of a kind (but unlike the system of techniques that constitutes arithmetic). It will typically be more difficult to put this judgement into words. The words will matter all the more.

That there are differences in degree may be read also as suggesting that the idea of giving someone the right tip has relevance across a broader range of circumstances than the complex one that is foregrounded here. The dismissal of the idea that one might do a course to acquire such knowledge is balanced by the assertion that one can be taught by someone else, precisely by being given the right tip. It is worth calling to mind the many courses in schools and at university where the knowledge in question and teaching appropriate to this overlap with what Wittgenstein is describing here. Two areas of study stand out. First, there are those vocational fields in which knowledge is not reducible to purely technical terms and that demand some wider appreciation and understanding of context and human nature. Medicine, the law, hairdressing, social care, physiotherapy, and teaching itself could all be taken as examples, though the list could easily be extended to include forms of engineering too. The thoughts presented here point to aspects of teaching and learning that are obscured by the obsession with skills and technique. Second, there are the humanities, where whatever else one learns this should encompass some progress in the understanding of human beings, including judgements of the genuineness of expressions of feeling. This is evident in subjects such as history or philosophy, but it might be extended also across the range of arts education. A good education in these practices will depend upon the drawing of attention to relevant details or aspects of the object under consideration, where the teacher says, in effect, "Try looking at it from this angle", "Pay attention to this aspect of the picture, perhaps one you have not noticed before", "Consider the contrast between this and that aspect of the work", "Attend to this aspect of the text", "Compare this case with that one", and so on—through which the learner not only receives examples of informed or, say, correct judgements but illustration of

what judgement pertinent to these practices consists in. The attention is drawn. Reasons are given. Transitions of thought are effected. Particular instances like this can then coalesce so that a sense of what there is to attend to and why it matters is developed and strengthened. Familiarity with particular cases, knowing one's way around these, will build towards a larger perspective, developing confidence and forming grounds for better judgement. Something similar is there also, I suggest, in the sciences. The significance of *familiarity* with particular cases and the kinds of judgments exercised in relation to them helps to show a significance of knowledge-by-acquaintance that is wider than is ordinarily understood. It goes without saying here that such knowledge is remote from anything along the lines of the unconditioned deliverances of the senses. The experienced person brings to the new occasion for judgement a knowledge of successions of related contexts, where the attention has been drawn and judgement focused and refined.

Early in the *Investigations* Wittgenstein ponders the thought that concepts are instruments (PI §169), and later, in one of the many moves he makes to prise the idea of the concept away from any idea of a true form, he writes: "Concepts lead us to make investigations, are the expression of our interest, and direct our interest" (PI §570). The placing of concepts in forms of activity and in relation to human motivation elaborates further the idea of the extension of the rule in new ways. The fantasy that those possible new connections are built into the concept, the model and its shadow, would be a further relic of Platonism. On the contrary, the correct use of the concept will open it to unforeseen contexts and connections. To mean something is like aiming: sense is movement. And the teaching of concepts proceeds by examples and practice:

> I do it, he does it after me, and I influence him by expressions of agreement, rejection, expectation, encouragement. I let him go his way, or hold him back; and so on.
>
> Imagine witnessing such teaching. None of the words would be explained by means of itself; there would be no logical circle. (PI §208)

In the dynamism of teaching and learning, concepts both express our interest and direct our interest. And in this they inevitably lead into new contexts.

Questions of context and how it is to be understood abound in the secondary literature on Wittgenstein. The arguments that arose in the wake of Winch's *The Idea of a Social Science* (1958) between "individualists" and "communitarians" seemed to lead to a kind of impasse.[9] Attempts to finesse or elide this have generally rested on versions of quietism. The ladder is kicked away after we have climbed up, and the questions that troubled us are revealed as empty or senseless. But the contrast between the individual and the community needs to be weakened on the grounds that both depend upon language and, specifically, conversation.

[9]For a very helpful discussion, see Stern (2004, Chap. 6).

Cavell returns to this repeatedly in his writings, thematising what is at issue in terms of voice. His insistence that philosophy has suppressed the voice is in no way—and contrary to the impression he sometimes somewhat mischievously gives—a defence of phonocentrism, the object of Derrida's attack, but rather an acknowledgement of the extent of mutual dependence: the community, if it is not to be moribund, depends upon the expression of individual voices, offered in conversation; the individual, if her life is not to be stunted, depends upon the exercise of her voice, in offering her thoughts and judgements to others. This venturing of her voice constitutes the best possibility for community, and it is the condition of her autonomy. The argument becomes all the more compelling when one considers the nature of words (and other human signs) themselves, elaborated especially, as we saw earlier, in the celebrated passage in *The Claim of Reason* on "projecting a word". In fact, Derrida's early account of the iterability of the sign, which lays the way for so much of his later thinking, expresses a view that moves in a similar direction: the sign, by its very nature, must be available to unforeseen uses. Drawing attention to these features of language, and hence of the very stuff of conversation, contributes towards a better understanding of both the individual and the community. The implications for education abound.

4 Conclusion

Wittgenstein demonstrates a way of thinking that is mobile and extensively invested in the very nature of words: this involves neither a classificatory system nor analysis as conventionally understood but a method or technique of seeing connections, of knowing how to go on in the variety of ways this implies.

I have emphasised how criteria are developed in the innovations of practice. I shall close, however, with the more sombre thought that emphasis on the identification of defining characteristics has reached a new nadir in education because of the way that assessment practices have developed. Of course, this is to generalise in order to highlight this pernicious trend. The specification of learning outcomes is often tied to a debased notion of criteria, reduced to checklists of competences, and this has cast its shadow back across conceptions of teaching and learning, as well as on the selection of content. Such approaches penalise the teacher or the student who strays away from the most efficient means to realise the prescribed ends. They inculcate a conception of education that reduces it to these terms. Ultimately they frustrate the seeing of connections upon which, if Wittgenstein is right, the most important aspects of our thinking depend. This is a loss of criticality and creativity that in the end threatens not only the humanities but the sciences and technology too.[10]

[10]On the fate of the humanities, see Kwak and Standish (2014).

The potential of seeing connections that I have emphasised is not a matter of bringing disparate groups or points of view into greater conformity or of placing them taxonomically within an over-arching scheme: it lies rather in attending to splitters and lumpers and realising the limitations of the dichotomies on which they insist, and then of turning these thoughts of difference towards new possibilities, not in replication or accumulation or extension, but rather, through the laying of cases alongside one another, in forms of learning characterised by a transition of thought. Such points of transition are, I have tried to show, there in any case in the language we use and in the thinking this generates—however much our desire to manage and plan will sometimes suppress this potential.

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Wittgenstein, Cavell and the Register of Philosophy: Discerning Seriousness and Triviality in Drama Teaching

Adrian Skilbeck

Abstract Throughout his life, Wittgenstein regarded philosophy's attraction to science with suspicion. In *Culture and Value,* he wrote, "People nowadays think, scientists are there to instruct them, poets, musicians, etc. to entertain them. *That the latter have something to teach them;* that never occurs to them" (CV, p. 36e). As if to demonstrate his shrewd and mischievous ear for the serious and the absurd, Wittgenstein chose a quote from the Austrian playwright Johann Nestroy, a writer renowned for his comedies, as the epigraph for *Philosophical Investigations*. Framing his work with the words of a farceur suggests Wittgenstein wanted to resist his work being read with a toneless literalism akin to the reasoning of science, the epitome of serious thinking for associates like Russell. Careful attention reveals the play of voices heard in the text not only mark out contrasting positions in various arguments but also allow for the expression of different registers of philosophical seriousness, including humour and irony. Wittgenstein's attention to voice has had a profound influence on the work of Stanley Cavell. Via reflection on Cavell's association of voice with Wittgensteinian criteria, the essay argues for the value of drama education in providing aesthetic perspectives from which young people can critically engage with their culture whilst acknowledging its significance in their lives.

Keywords Seriousness · Humour · Voice · Criteria · Drama education

The author wishes to acknowledge the assistance of Paul Standish in reading drafts of this paper.

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M.A. Peters and J. Stickney (eds.), *A Companion to Wittgenstein on Education*,
DOI 10.1007/978-981-10-3136-6_13

> I am sitting with a philosopher in the garden; he says again and again “I know that that’s a tree”, pointing to a tree that is near us. Someone else arrives and hears this, and I tell him: “This fellow isn’t insane. We are only doing philosophy”. (OC §467)[1]

1 Introduction

There are various points in his life and writings at which Wittgenstein comes back to questions about the seriousness of philosophy. Perhaps the best known is the comment in the *Philosophical Investigations* (PI) that “philosophical problems arise when language goes on holiday” (PI §38). The humour apparent in the above remark from *On Certainty* is present here also as Wittgenstein invites us to imagine a philosopher trying to fathom the relationship between a name and the object named “by staring at the object in front of him and repeating a name, or even the word “this” innumerable times” (PI §38). Elsewhere in the *Investigations,* you can almost hear the cry of frustration in his comment that “in the end, when one is doing philosophy, one gets to the point where one would like just to emit an inarticulate sound” (PI §261) to which he matter-of-factly replies, “But such a sound is an expression in a particular language game, which now has to be described” (PI §261). Then, there is his teasing assertion at the end of the *Lecture on Ethics* (1993) that “Ethics so far as it springs from the desire to say something about the ultimate meaning of life, the absolute good, the absolutely valuable, can be no science…But it is a document of a tendency in the human mind which I personally cannot help respecting deeply” (1993, p. 44). In his life too, there is evidence of his ambivalence towards philosophy. Monk’s biography (1990) recounts Wittgenstein’s refusal to engage in philosophical conversation during meetings of the Vienna Circle, preferring instead to recite the works of the Indian poet Tagore with his back to the room.

My point is not that Wittgenstein’s wit and humour have been underappreciated but that his seriousness is not to be understood in terms of a literal earnestness and sincerity that solemnly strips away the play of the language game in an overly academic philosophical style. When Wittgenstein remarks in *Culture and Value* (CV), “Someone is *imprisoned* in a room if the door is unlocked, opens inwards; but it doesn’t occur to him to *pull* rather than push against it” (CV p. 48e), the philosophical point is leavened if we imagine the Simpsonesque “Doh!” that might accompany the realisation. However, its lightness is not exhausted by its humour: relief and joy could just as easily be imagined. The philosophical significance of

[1]Following convention, titles for Wittgenstein’s works are abbreviated (OC = On Certainty, CV = Culture and Value, PI = Philosophical Investigations), with section (§) or page number (p.), with full citation and initials in the References.

Wittgenstein's observation is not diminished by our imaginative engagement with it but made more vivid. Humour is just one of the ways through which Wittgenstein shows how we can be led astray in our philosophical language, hence the ambiguity in the remarks he makes about the depth he finds in grammatical jokes when he writes,

> The problems arising through a misinterpretation of our forms of language have the character of *depth*. They are deep disquietudes; they are as deeply rooted in us as the forms of our language, and their significance is as great as the importance of our language. – Let's ask ourselves: why do we feel a grammatical joke to be *deep*? (and that is what the depth of philosophy is). (PI §111)

For the reader, the meaning of the text will be revealed not just through the semantic content of its language but through responsiveness to possible variations in tone and pitch. If one can hear it, one could read Wittgenstein's comment as ironically implying there is no depth in either grammatical jokes or philosophical disquiet. This would need to be argued for, but it depends upon attention to literary qualities of tone and description in the Wittgensteinian text, to uses of language that are not necessarily literal, which may even be playful and ironic, but which nevertheless have a serious purpose. It requires a good, improvisatory ear as much as a good eye. Perhaps it is no coincidence that Wittgenstein had perfect pitch, despite not being a professional musician. We can hear his sense of how language can personally resonate beyond the merely formal when he writes that "uttering a word is like striking a note on the keyboard of the imagination" (PI §6) and "I believe I summed up where I stand in relation to philosophy when I said: really one should write philosophy only as one writes a poem" (CV p. 28e).

In being alive to questions of seriousness, Wittgenstein is alive to the close proximity, for better or worse, of the serious and non-serious and of genuine and false profundity. Philosophical understanding progresses by revealing what is ridiculous and what is worthy of respect. Wittgenstein notes that "the results of philosophy are the discovery of some piece of plain nonsense and the bumps that the understanding has got by running up against the limits of language" (PI §119). His remarks raise complex questions about seriousness, a theme that has surfaced in the work of a number of philosophers influenced by him. It is a theme that also emerges with a particular accentuation in my own work as a teacher—that is, in the nature of seriousness in drama and drama education. As the ambiguity in the words "acting" and "play" indicates, drama, perhaps more than any other art or literary form, raises questions about the nature of what is serious and what is not. Wittgenstein suggests a kind of mutual conditioning of these aspects of our being, in that "if people did not sometimes commit stupidities, nothing intelligent at all would ever happen" (CV p. 57e), not forgetting his exhortation that we should "always come down from the barren heights of cleverness into the green valleys of folly" (CV p. 86e).

2 Coming into a Strange Country: On Being an Enigma

Gaita (2012) has described Wittgenstein's relationship to academic philosophy as "tense". It would be a mistake to think of this uneasiness as simply indicative of a continental sensibility at war with the perspective and practices of anglophone analytical philosophy, although there is certainly an element of that in some of the criticism directed towards the tone of Wittgenstein's philosophy, which is tantamount to questioning its seriousness. A good example of this can be found in the introduction to a collection of essays entitled *British Analytical Philosophy* (1966). The authors, Bernard Williams and Alan Montefiore, associate Wittgenstein with "the darker more intense note… struck by much writing on the continent" (p. 5) as distinct from the matter-of-fact tone present in the British style. However, this distinction was not solely one of academic tone and style. The divergence, the editors argued, reflected "a genuine disagreement about what constitutes seriousness in philosophy" (p. 5). Williams and Montefiore were concerned with identifying what was philosophically serious and distinctively British about how academic practices were understood and therefore how British philosophers took their understanding of philosophical seriousness to be reflected in both their methods and style of philosophy. It could be said that this was not so much how their philosophy appeared or even how it was organised but how it sounded. What mattered was how the demands, responsibilities and limitations on those involved were to be interpreted. It was here that Williams and Montefiore detected differences of tone and pitch and, by implication, of seriousness. One particular focus was the notion of intensity and its relation to the literary. Their accusation was that continental philosophers were driven to "heighten the intensity of our awareness of what we see and feel in certain situations by description of what is in fact an intense awareness of such things" (p. 14), whereas in contrast,

> Seriousness and intensity are for the British outlook certainly different: …a serious representation of the world is not the representation of the world of intensity. On the contrary, it is a representation of the world which takes seriously the way that the world presents itself to ordinary, practical concerns of common life. (p. 15)

Wittgenstein's deep personal commitment, which manifests itself in the "powerfully individual and pungent quality of his writing", (p. 12) is viewed with similar suspicion to the continental. From the British perspective, philosophical seriousness allows for "the availability of the subject in objective instruction and rational discussion… a view whose emphasis is on the colleague rather than on the master" (p. 13). It is perhaps, in its unstated and understated assumption, an idea or ideal of conversation, and it is not best served by an agonised and agonising temperament, i.e. Wittgenstein's. What is required is a sober, humdrum style and objective form of argument which "responds to the demands, not just (as some critics urge) of academic respectability, but of a professional conscience" (p. 13). Not only are other forms of philosophy viewed as histrionic and melodramatic but also dishonest. However, one area where Williams and Montefiore were willing to concede that questions of tone and passion might legitimately be taken to play a part in the

expression of philosophical seriousness was in the expression of moral and aesthetic experience. Here, they are willing to concede, albeit it in an uptight, grudging tone, that the intensity of consciousness is worthy of being taken seriously.

3 Seriousness, Voice and Meaning: Possessing a Good Ear

Arguably, Williams and Montefiore were not sufficiently attuned to the more subtle aspects of Wittgenstein's writing, of which his humorous side and the role that humour played was but one aspect. The way in which Wittgenstein allows different voices to emerge in his writings is not simply a dialogical exercise in the expression of contrasting points of view. It is important to attend to how these views are expressed in order to give us a sense of what is at stake in the raising of a problem, not just that there is a problem but why it is a problem to which we should attend. Perhaps the philosopher who has been most alive to that urgency in the Wittgensteinian voice is Stanley Cavell. Twenty or so years after Williams and Montefiore made their case for wearing one's seriousness lightly, Cavell observed of Wittgenstein's philosophy that,

> the spiritual fervour or seriousness of his writing is internal to his teaching, say the manner (or method) to the substance, and that something in the very professionalisation of philosophy debars professional philosophers from taking his seriousness seriously. (1989, p. 30)

In 2010, Day and Krebs drew on Cavell's observation to make the claim that for recent Wittgensteinian scholarship, particularly in areas relating the philosopher's life to his ethical and aesthetic concerns and the re-evaluation of each in terms of the other, Wittgenstein's fervour and seriousness are no longer seen as obstacles to his philosophy but a means of engaging with it. It is not the place here to evaluate whether the contributors to Day and Krebs' edited collection achieve this, simply to note how radically different a response it is to the literary qualities of Wittgenstein's philosophical writing and therefore to what might constitute philosophical seriousness. The pungent and individual tone is no longer reason to be suspicious of the work, the significance of the ethical and aesthetic in Wittgenstein's work is recognised, and its seriousness is acknowledged.

In making his own comments, Cavell is careful to place himself at a distance from both those who would neglect Wittgenstein's fervour and seriousness as philosophical impertinence and those who would insist on it, from detractors who will decry Wittgenstein's seriousness "as a matter of psychology or at best an aesthetic phenomenon, a stylistic excess" (pp. 30–31) and from followers who "are more likely to feel it as an abiding moral or religious demand, an unmarked—perhaps unmarkable—abyss" (p. 31). Nevertheless, Cavell claims that in its spiritual fervour, Wittgensteinian seriousness is "internal" to the teaching. It is a picture of a certain kind of personal presence in writing and in teaching. It is also a picture of the tension that Gaita referred to with regard to the outlook of academic philosophy.

Bearn (1998) has highlighted how Cavell's own work has been guided from the beginning by a concern with the serious. It is apparent in Cavell's early comments on sincerity and seriousness towards the end of "Music Discomposed" in his first collection, *Must We Mean What We Say* (Cavell 1969), where he writes that "The task of the modern artist, as of the modern man, is to find something he can be sincere and serious in; something he can mean. And he may not at all" (p. 212). Cavell would address the problematical status and significance of the seriousness more explicitly in *A Pitch of Philosophy* (Cavell 1994) when, looking back to the time when he was seeking to orientate himself in academic philosophy, he recollected that,

> Austin's teaching was the occasion for me on which to ask… whether I was serious about philosophy – not quite as measured by its importance (to the world, or to my society, or to me), but as measured by a question I felt a new confidence in being able to pose to myself, and which itself posed questions, since it was as obscure as it was fervent. It presented itself as the question whether I could speak philosophically and mean every word I said. (p. 60)

Cavell's words, twenty-five years apart, reflect a set of concerns whose paths intersect and interact throughout his writings: concerns about the relationship of language to the world, the human voice, the criteria of judgment as well as the development of ethical understanding and the role of rationality and expression in philosophical thought. What can we glean from these initial thoughts? Note that in the first quote, the task of finding our own seriousness is the work of the modern individual, artist or not. That it is a task to find our seriousness in "something" suggests it is active and relational, an engagement in human practice with others and with oneself, in making, doing, thinking and living. The reference to the modern man as distinct from the artist suggests it is not solely located in one's work but in one's existence and the living of a life. It is a concern with meaning and meaningfulness. As such, it both touches upon what is generally taken to be the realm of the personal and what is impersonal. The association of seriousness with sincerity calls forth an idea of presence in what we do but how are we to understand this? It suggests a responsiveness and sensibility towards our own experience that could appropriately be described as serious. It is also, importantly, something we might not succeed in finding. Perhaps one of the burning questions for Cavell as he matured was to offer a philosophical account of how one might secure some notion of one's seriousness in the face of the sceptical challenge to it. It is in his work on voice that we may detect an answer to this.

For the later Cavell looking back on his earlier self, seriousness, voice and meaning are importantly brought together in the question he was able to put to himself about whether his sense of his own seriousness as a philosopher was conditioned by the extent to which he could speak philosophically and mean what he said. This was to be his task as a modern man (leaving open the question of his also being an artist), and philosophy was to be that "something" in which he would try to find his seriousness. Cavell is aware that he might fail as the question of seriousness becomes a double-edged doubt as to whether it is he who is betraying the seriousness of philosophy as practised in the Anglophone analytic tradition in

which he was trained or whether it is philosophy as it currently stands that betrays his seriousness.

It is tempting to think of the connection between seriousness, voice and meaning as an intimate one but to do so would fail to acknowledge the possibility of instability that Cavell inscribes in significant aspects of our experience of existence and the way in which our words might go astray. It would also be a mistake to assume that it is only in those passages where Cavell discusses seriousness that he is being serious. As Bearn says (1998), it has served as a guide throughout Cavell's work and one form of guidance lies in our having or developing an "ear" for the pitch of philosophy. It is the "ear" that allows us to hear, in Austinian terms "what we should say when, and so why and what we should mean by it". The double sense of pitch as the attempted selling of something and a quality of the voice enables Cavell to present the claims of ordinary language thought in opposition to the perceived emptiness of metaphysical speculation. Bearn comments that such thought requires us to develop "an ear for the serious and the not serious" (p. 66). He continues, "For Cavell, there can be no (serious, authentic) philosophy apart from this ear, apart from listening for the sound of a (serious, authentic) philosophical voice, the pitch of philosophy" (p. 66). It is the ear that enables us to know what we are saying and its attunement is manifested in our "accepting responsibility for what we say: of meaning what we say, seriously" (p. 66). What is significant is that Cavell uses the ear as the image of the mind and consciousness, not the eyes, shifting the metaphorical perspective from an implicit detachment, disinterest and disengagement to one of engagement and interest, seriousness and non-seriousness as things to be detected in pitch and tone.

If the contested nature of seriousness has been a guiding feature of Cavell's life and work throughout his career, so too has the concept of voice. Whilst the concept is "latent but obscured" (Gould 1998, p. 62) in Cavell's early work and it would also be wise to counsel against seeing the Cavellian voice as a new iteration of phonocentricity, questions of voice and its returning to philosophy vividly emerge in Cavell's reading of the later Wittgenstein in *The Claim of Reason* (1979). This reading later extends to his attempts to rehabilitate the philosophical reputations of Emerson and Thoreau as well as to his engagement with film, theatre and opera. By the time *The Claim of Reason* is published with its avowed aim "to help bring the human voice back into philosophy", voice not only is playing a more substantial part in the development of his own philosophical thinking but is also contributing to the emergence of the distinctive Cavellian philosophical voice and its Wittgensteinian inheritance.

Cavell's concern with voice is also a concern with seriousness. Against such influential interpretations as Kripke's (1982), Cavell seeks to displace the emphasis on what it is to follow a rule with an extended account of criteria. Cavell identifies seven functioning elements in the ordinary idea of a criterion. Among them are the idea of criteria as providing sources of authority, the mode of acceptance of an authority, an epistemic goal and what he calls the "status concept". He glosses his own ideas as follows,

> On this lay-out, criteria are specifications a given person or group sets up on the basis of which (by means of, in terms of which) to judge (assess, settle) whether something has a particular status or value… Certain specifications are what a person or group mean by (what they call, count as) a thing's having a certain status. (Cavell 1979, p. 9)

Cavell's claim is that Wittgenstein's insight is "that all our knowledge, everything we assert or question (or doubt or wonder about…) is governed not merely by what we understand as 'evidence' or 'truth conditions', but by criteria" (p. 14). In keeping with Cavell, it is my contention that criteria can be understood as an expression of our seriousness, in that, as Cavell says "without the control of criteria in applying concepts, we would not know what counts as evidence for any claim, nor for what claims evidence is needed" (p. 14). These will be the contested grounds on which judgments are made and crucially voiced. Furthermore, Cavell argues that for Wittgenstein, it is "always *we* who 'establish' the criteria under investigation" (p. 18), criteria that are "ours" and whose authority is established by "the human group as such, the human being generally" (p. 18). As such, says Cavell, "when I voice them, [the criteria] I do so, or take myself to do so as a member of that group, a representative human" (p. 18).

Voice thus becomes part of the contested nature of criteria in both establishing one's right to speak for others as well as oneself and the possibility of that voice being denied and one's right rejected. Part of what it is to take something seriously and be taken seriously by others lies in the projection and reception of that voice. For Cavell, "the philosophical appeal to what we say, and the search for our criteria on the basis of which we say what we say, are claims to community" (p. 20). It is in part through voice that one comes to discover one's position with regard to who speaks for me in a given community, for whom I can speak and the nature of consent and its refusal in a society. Through this I come to know "with whom I am in community, and to whom and to what I am I fact obedient" (p. 25). Furthermore, Cavell argues, "to speak for oneself politically is to speak for the others with whom you consent to association, and it is to consent to be spoken for by them—not as a parent speaks for you, i.e. instead of you, but as someone in mutuality speaks for you, i.e. speaks your mind" (p. 27). This raises the question of whether finding your own voice includes the discovery of that part of one's voice that enables you to speak for others or is it initially about finding one's own voice as an individual, a voice that for whatever reason strikes one as one's own and from there finding out what its points of contact are with others, voicing the secrets (and desires) of others as well as revealing one's own, as Cavell says of Wittgenstein's achievement.

Cavell suggests that "there are directions other than the political in which you will have to find your own voice—in religion, in friendship, in parenthood, in love, in art—and to find your own work" (p. 27). As in his earlier work, he reprises his warning about the risks involved, advising that

> the political is likely to be heart-breaking or dangerous. So are the others. But in the political, the impotence of your voice shows up quickest; it is of importance to others to stifle it; and it is easiest to hope there, since others are in any case included in it, that it will not be missed if it is stifled i.e. that you will not miss it. (p. 27)

For Cavell, the acquisition of a voice is possible through the acquisition of a language, one's mother tongue, and in acquiring a language, one acquires a community in which one finds one's voice. To acquire a voice in a community is to be both recognised and to take responsibility. However, it is also to engage in the contesting of those things in which one has chosen to have a voice. Cavell writes,

> I would like to say: If I am to have a native tongue, I have to accept what my elders say and do as consequential; and they have to accept, even to applaud, what I say and do as what they say and do. We do not know in advance what the content of our mutual acceptance is, how far we may be in agreement. I do not know in advance how deep my agreement with myself is, how far responsibility for my language may run. But if I am to have my own voice in it, I must be speaking for others and allow others to speak for me. The alternative to speaking for myself representatively (for someone else's consent) is not: speaking for myself privately. The alternative is having nothing to say, being voiceless, not even mute. (p. 28)

Part of that sense of voice lies in the almost miraculous nature of agreement in judgement, not in coming to agreement on a particular occasion, "but of being in agreement throughout, being in harmony, like pitches or tones" that a group of humans "are mutually voiced… mutually attuned" (p. 32).

This idea of attunement, the tuning of voices in order to pitch them perfectly, is returned to in *A Pitch of Philosophy* (1994), a series of essays that Cavell called "autobiographical exercises". The son of a musician mother, perfect pitch eluded Cavell (unlike Wittgenstein). Perhaps this explains his incessant questioning of how the seriousness of philosophy and its concerns are made manifest and expressed in the tone or pitch of the philosophical voice. Cavell's voice thus finds its own expression in "the tone of philosophy and about my right to take that tone" (Cavell 1994, p. 3). This tone is one that he recognises has long been at odds with mainstream Anglophone philosophy. At this point, in his later work, Cavell is less concerned with situating the voice in its social context, the first person plural, but is considering the autobiographical nature of philosophy in the face of philosophy's ambivalence towards such a construal of its voice. Cavell cautions that philosophy, or rather, philosophers, has sometimes been tempted to conflate the importance of philosophy, its seriousness, with their own self importance and have perhaps been guilty of taking themselves too seriously. Cavell is here giving voice to a tension between the claim to philosophical seriousness of the personal voice—the autobiographical voice—and the impersonal voice—the voice that is expressed in terms of universality and generality. Thus, the question of what gives me a right to a voice in my own history will, for the philosopher who takes this question seriously, become a question of what gives me a right to speak philosophically from within an autobiographical sense of my relation to my words that my seriousness is expressed through a certain kind of attention to my personal voice rather than attempting to repress any trace of it in seeking an ideal impersonal tone which is generally taken to be the appropriate tone for philosophy. This raises the question as to whether this is a problem shared by many. If, for example, one sees philosophy as a series of problems to be encountered, pondered and solved, then the autobiographical presence of the voice in one's philosophical words is irrelevant. If the dictates of

formal reason are the means to solving those problems, then any consideration of feeling in speech and conduct will be external to the nature of the problem, perhaps providing a heightened sense of what is at stake but otherwise irrelevant. If the question of a personal voice in one's writing is not regarded as philosophically important, then questions of style will not be important as distinct from an over-riding concern for clarity and rigour as qualities in a text.

4 Let Us Be Human: Ethics, Aesthetics and Expression

What emerges in Cavell's Wittgensteinian inheritance is an aesthetic, ethical and philosophical concern with language and human expression, with questions of personal and impersonal voice, with the significance of presence and meaning in our relationships with others and with the importance to our sense of our humanity that we are expressive beings who can be claimed by others in serious response. What he shares with Wittgenstein is a sense of the value of the arts and the value of the teacher–student relationship in learning to be human. In his essay "Love and Teaching: renewing a common world" (2012), Raimond Gaita, another philosopher influenced by Wittgenstein, describes how we grow into our humanity by "rising to its requirements, necessarily with others" (Gaita 2012, p. 762). In the light of this, I am turning my attention to the part that drama education can play in helping students grow into their humanity and, as Tilghman (1991) says, make a space for the "distinction between what is truly important and what is trivial" (Tilghman 1991, p. 16). An example from *Culture and Value* helps bring this out. Wittgenstein invites us to reflect on the following,

> Nothing could be more remarkable than seeing someone who thinks himself unobserved engaged in some quite simple everyday activity. Let's imagine a theatre, the curtain goes up and we see someone alone in his room walking up and down, lighting a cigarette, seating himself etc. so that suddenly we are observing a human being from outside in a way that ordinarily we can never observe ourselves; as if we were watching a chapter from a biography with our own eyes, - surely this would be at once uncanny and wonderful…We could be seeing life itself. – But then we do this every day and it makes not the slightest impression on us! True enough, but we do not see it from that point of view…The work of art compels us – as one might say – to see it in the right perspective, but without art the object is a piece of nature like any other. (CV p. 6e)

We are asked to imagine the sight of someone whose actions are nothing out of the ordinary. There is nothing unusual or peculiar about what is happening in front of us. But in viewing these actions on stage, both what we see and the attention we pay are transformed. We look and watch differently. We observe and attend in a way that is not our normal mode of seeing. Seeing it in this way is "at once both uncanny and wonderful". And yet, Wittgenstein says, this is available to us all the time —"we do this every day and it makes not the slightest impression on us". The point is we do not normally see what is in front of us or attend to ourselves in this way. It is available to us at any time but we, in general, do not take the opportunity to do

so. We may not even realise this until we see it from the perspective of art and then something revelatory strikes us. We may realise we have missed its significance or meaning. What may strike us is that we have failed to distinguish between what is important and what is trivial and failed to see something in a face or a look or a gesture. Equally, what may strike us is something altogether more joyful.

However, it is not just that the work of art directs our attention to everyday things that we would not otherwise have noticed or are unfamiliar with or which leads to something extraordinary but that it does so in ways that intensify and bring out a significance that might otherwise not strike us. The artist places before us those things that strike him or her in ways that enable us to feel and respond to the nature of this impact, its meaning and its force. In seeing something from the perspective of art, we are asked not only to notice and attend to it but to do so through a specific medium. We are being invited to discern something in what lies before us and to respond to it. Our response may be thoughtful, reflective, delight, shock, amusement and so on.

This is what the teacher does or should be doing. In selecting materials for teaching and learning, the teacher is saying, "look at this", "have you ever noticed…?", "this struck me" and "what do you think about this?" The drama teacher has an array of strategies and techniques available for use in the classroom but just as important is how the teacher directs the attention of students towards what he or she takes to be important and of interest towards what is striking. The challenge for the teacher is twofold. One is to develop the discernment and understanding that will equip students with the means to recognise such perspectives. The second is to provide them with the means to create perspectives for themselves and for others, with students not only learning to appreciate the difference between what is imaginative and dull, well-executed and poorly executed in their own and other people's work but also to discern what is serious and what is trivial.

It is somewhat ironic that after years of questionable educational status, the championing of drama through its recently discovered associations with cognitive psychology and the neurosciences has led to a greater acceptance of it in mainstream education. For example, drama is seen to possess an instrumental value in theories of embodied learning and in the cognitive management of emotion. It is this kind of scientific explanation that Wittgenstein is trying to resist. The right perspective is not one given to us via a scientific account of the instrumental nature of, in the case of drama, the expressive human voice and body. Underpinning drama practices with scientific research lends the subject a spurious seriousness that belies what I take to be its real seriousness.

The best expression of this is taken from Stanley Cavell' s reflection on what he wanted from philosophy, namely that,

> What I require is a convening of my culture's criteria, in order to confront them with my words and life as I pursue them and as I may imagine them; and at the same time to confront my words and life as I pursue them with the life my culture's words may imagine for me: to confront the culture with itself, along the lines in which it meets in me.

> This seems to me a task that warrants the name of philosophy. It is also the description of something we might call education'. (Cavell 1979, p. 125)

I want to suggest that this can also be a task for drama education, imagined as something akin to the conditions of a Cavellian marriage. Cavell (2005) expresses this as follows,

> What makes marriage worth reaffirming is a diurnal devotedness that involves friendship, play, surprise and mutual education, all manifested in the pair's mode of conversing with each other (not just in words). (Cavell 2005, pp. 121–122)

In drama, students discover what means are available to them to both reaffirm and rediscover what binds them together in community, in playfulness as well as seriousness, as well as convene in critical examination the culture that they are inheriting, in order to articulate their place in it and assert what they will and will not consent to. In order to do so, the drama has to be constantly brought alive, must be constantly engaging, must be something new, but must also allow for echoes of past work and for what seemingly lies beyond the educational framing of the activity to animate its presence—friendship, play, surprise and mutual education—learning from each other, responding to ideas, developing and discovering forms of expression. These are not hypothetical preconditions but the very means by which drama education embodies the coming together of individuals to imaginatively test and explore the conditions under which they live, what the world is and what reality is. This depends upon an openness and intimacy reflected in conversation in which the making of claims takes centre stage. The challenge for the teacher is to create the conditions under which students feel willing and prepared to expose themselves to the risks involved in making claims through their art. How are we to understand this? Wittgenstein's comment about Shakespeare might be illuminating in this respect. He writes, "Shakespeare, one might say displays the dance of human passions. For this reason he has to be objective, otherwise he would not so much display the dance of human passions—as perhaps talk about it. But he displays it to us in a dance, not naturalistically" (CV, p. 42e). This represents a quite different picture of the value of drama education to that championed by the advocates of "embodied learning" and the "management of the emotions".

5 The Trouble About Progress: Framing Philosophy with Comedy

As an epigraph for the *Philosophical Investigations*, Wittgenstein chose to quote a line from his fellow countryman Johann Nestroy's play *Der Schützling* (*The Protégé*). "The trouble about progress is that it always looks much greater than it really is" (PI, epigraph). Commentators have speculated on the reason for its inclusion; for example that it was intended as a reference to certain features of his thought, his concept of progress, or, as Malcolm (2001) believed, that Wittgenstein

felt the importance of any advances he had made in philosophy to be over-exaggerated by those who were close to him (Malcolm 2001). Others have taken it to reflect Wittgenstein's response to the Jewish and nuclear holocausts. Baker and Hacker (1980) gave a collective shrug of the shoulders to the purpose of the motto. Even more high-handedly when the English-only edition of the investigations appeared, the epigram had been completely dispensed with, only to reappear in the Schulte edition of 2001.

Perhaps there are other reasons why Wittgenstein might have turned to this particular theatrical text. The play opens with the main character Gottlieb Herb in a small, whitewashed room with only a bed and a table, the kind of spartan setting Wittgenstein might have sought for himself. Herb has recently given up his job as a village schoolteacher and vents his frustration at not being able to educate his pupils to his own satisfaction, again offering a parallel with Wittgenstein's own life in the 1920s. Barker (2013) offers the thought that Wittgenstein is inviting his more curious readers "to refer to a play in which he saw so much of himself reflected" (Barker 2013, p. 143). But refer to it in what way? The ambiguity of the title—"The Protégé"—would be a good place to start. Wittgenstein came to attention as the protégé of Bertrand Russell, the young man who would carry on the older man's work. Instead, he reacted against it, making his own distinctive mark and setting philosophy on a different path, rejecting what Russell took to be requisite for philosophical seriousness, its proximation to the language of science. Perhaps, in the light of certain failures in his life, for example his time as a school master, Wittgenstein was cautioning his followers against seeing him as a master philosopher, that in order to progress, one may need to view oneself as a beginner, with all the uncertainties this implies. Another is to see it in the light of the aforementioned example from *Culture and Value*. In seeing something on stage, we may see ourselves from a changed, unaccustomed perspective. We may, in effect, see ourselves. Is Wittgenstein asking us to see ourselves differently or see ourselves more clearly through our reading of his work or even to see the work differently? Elsewhere in *Culture and Value* (CV p. 24e), he tells us "work on philosophy… is really more work on oneself. On one's conceptions. On how one sees things. (And what one expects of them)". Might he not be seeking to offer us a way of seeing ourselves through a method that is akin to the right perspective of art rather than the correctness of science?

One other possibility is to see the epigraph in the context of the play itself. The play is a farce. Wittgenstein, by now a towering figure in philosophy and renowned for his serious disposition, was taking a line from a comedy as a motto for what he knows will be an important, serious piece of philosophical writing. It is an extraordinary thing to do. Perhaps his doing so was too much of a challenge for those early translators who omitted it. If Wittgenstein is inviting us to reflect on the nature of progress, or his own progress, he does so by stepping outside the seriousness of the philosophical and framing it through the comedic. In doing so, he is inviting us to reflect on the nature of its seriousness. Is he serious? Or is he playing with us? I suggest he is doing both. I do not mean to imply that we should approach his philosophy playfully. I mean that questions of seriousness and non-seriousness

are features of language that defy the idea of progress as something linear and must always be returned to as an ever-present flux in language games, of which philosophy is one and drama another. Philosophy represents one locus for questions of seriousness and non-seriousness, drama and the arts another. Wittgenstein himself remarked "A typical American film, naive and silly, can—for all its silliness and even *by means of* it—be instructive. A fatuous, self-conscious English film can teach nothing. I have often learnt a lesson from a silly American film" (CV p. 57). Wittgenstein is challenging the idea that coming to see what is serious can only to be achieved through the use of language based on the procedures of science or that there is only one tone in which one can be educated. One expression of his attitude to this is the following, "People nowadays think, scientists are there to instruct them, poets, musicians, etc. to entertain them. *That the latter have something to teach them;* that never occurs to them" (CV, p. 36e). What better way to do so than by framing the spiritual fervour of his own philosophical seriousness with a line from a comedy!

Drama engages us in deliberation as to what is important and what is trivial and how this is revealed to us. Its art lies in articulating our sense of the precariousness of what things mean. The same words may admit of seriousness and non-seriousness and may be laughed at or wept over. The same action in one context may be viewed as tragic but in another becomes farcical. Drama does not assume the superiority of one response over another but calls them into question. It does so playfully and seriously, and it is in the different registers of our play and seriousness that we learn what it means to be human.

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Part III
Wittgenstein in Dialogue with Other Thinkers

Wittgenstein's Trials, Teaching and Cavell's Romantic "Figure of the Child"

Michael A. Peters

Am I doing child psychology? I am making a connexion between the concept of teaching and the concept of meaning.
Ludwig Wittgenstein (Z §412)

I have said the idea of the child keeps coming back in what I do.
Stanley Cavell (2008, p. 55)

Abstract In "Time And Place For Philosophy", Cavell (2008) discusses the "political reading" of Wittgenstein (attributed to Kripke) illustrated by the so-called scene of instruction in the *Investigations*, at § 217 and "moments in Wittgenstein's biography that can seem to substantiate such a reading". Cavell refers to "a well-known story of his striking a pupil" where power resides purely on the side of the teacher. Wittgenstein attended teacher training in Vienna in 1919 and taught in Austrian rural village schools until 1926 when he abruptly resigned after an incident involving hitting a pupil that led to a court trial held in Gloggnitz beginning on 17 May 1926 and lasted several over several months. The court judge called for a psychiatric examination of Wittgenstein, a report that has gone missing. The so-called Haibauer incident constitutes a central and smouldering episode in Wittgenstein's own psychological make-up and ethical self-development—one that he returns to many years later as the basis for his "confession". In contra distinction to Cavell's romantic reading of the figure of the child and Matthews' (2006) philosophy of the child, I embrace an historicist reading of Wittgenstein on the figure of the child arguing for a position that attempts to avoid both *essentializing* the

Presented at *Education and the Figure of the Child in Wittgenstein and Cavell*, University of Lausanne (Switzerland; March, 2016). Workshop organized by: *Cours de vacances (UNIL) and EXeCO (Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne).*

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M.A. Peters and J. Stickney (eds.), *A Companion to Wittgenstein on Education*,
DOI 10.1007/978-981-10-3136-6_14

child and forms of "adultism" by historicizing child subjectivity (Peters and Johansson 2012). This argument is advanced by focusing on and exploring the biographical incident to which Cavell refers in more detail for the light it casts on Wittgenstein's teaching sensibilities and his state of mind (especially his suicide ideation) in the period he was a teacher, including his relationships with the Austrian children he taught. The effect of this historicist approach is to relativise Wittgenstein's teaching and his "discipline" to the cultural context of his time—1920s Austria dominated by the Glöckel educational reforms that introduced pedagogy based on social democratic principles. This paper also imagines what the psychiatric report contained entertaining the diagnosis of Wittgenstein's childhood autism and adult Aspergers as a means to understand Wittgenstein's early language difficulties during his "solipsistic" phase, his lifelong struggle in sustaining reciprocal social interactions and his philosophical interests in language learning.

Keywords Wittgenstein · Cavell · Figure of the child · Wittgenstein's teaching · Wittgenstein's trial

1 Introduction: Reflecting on Cavell's "Figure of the Child"

Stanley Cavell is one of the few philosophers who is both instructive on the question of style as reason in Wittgenstein's works and the *Investigations*[1] as a *pedagogical* text rather than a set of philosophical problems or arguments to be worked through. While there are problems, Wittgenstein does not approach them in traditional philosophical ways: he does not employ standard or recognizable forms of argumentation nor does he propose theories about them. Rather he engages in a pedagogical and confessional style to educate the reader using a wide variety of dialogical and other literary techniques including the dialogue form and thought experiment to free us from "the picture that holds us captive" (PI §115).[2] His styles are quintessentially pedagogical; he provides a teaming variety and vital repertoire of non-argumentational discursive forms—pictures, drawings, analogies, similes, jokes, equations, dialogues with himself, little narratives, questions and wrong answers, thought experiments, gnomic aphorisms and so on—as a means primarily

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[1]Wittgenstein's (PI) p. for Part II.

[2]Following convention, titles for Wittgenstein's works are abbreviated (PI = Philosophical Investigations, N = Notebooks, Z = Zettel, OC = On Certainty, LRKM = Letters to Russell, Keynes and Moore, CV = Culture and Value), with section (§) or page number (p.), with full citation and initials in the References.

to shift our thinking (Peters 2001, 2002). This new way of writing a philosophical text is meant to emulate Wittgenstein's own struggles for clarity to command a clear view of language against its bewitchments and not designed to save the reader time or effort (PI §§122 and 109).

Reflecting on a paper called "Deranging the *Investigations*: Cavell on the Figure of the Child" (Peters 1998), I now realize how I had accepted Borradori's (1994) positioning of Cavell too easily. I wrote that Borradori pictured Cavell as a *neo-romantic or neo-transcendentalist* who self-consciously attempts to heal the rupture of American public intellectualism and culture that was caused by a diasporic Viennese strain of analytic philosophy. These thinkers of *Mitteleuropean* (and mostly Jewish) origins were a part of the Vienna Circle and had migrated to the USA to escape persecution by the Third Reich. It is perhaps ironic that Cavell himself rediscovered his own Jewish roots to focus on them in his late autobiographical work. When I met him—and Hilary Putnam—at Harvard in the mid-2000s at a seminar convened for Saito and Standish's collection, I remarked that I found his writings "Jewish" even "Talmudic" in his meta-commentary and labyrinthine sentence structure. He did not flinch and actually seemed genuinely to accept this observation.

In the 1990s fresh from completing a PhD on Wittgenstein and "the problem of rationality" (Peters 1984) I was utterly enthralled by Cavell's work and in particular *The Claim to Reason* (which had been a basic text in philosophy courses at Auckland University) largely because he made a revaluation of Wittgenstein's starting point for his own engagement with both American transcendentalism and the Continental tradition. He wrote in an expansive and generous style that reminded me of Wittgenstein's own style of reasoning and way of doing philosophy. In the 1998 paper, I suggested that Cavell rescued an "aesthetic-ethical" Wittgenstein, "contextualised in a European intellectual milieu, located at the intersection of romanticism and scepticism and in relation to the question of modernism in the arts". (I had also fallen under the spell of Janik and Toulmin's (1973) remarkable book, *Wittgenstein's Vienna* that helped to dislodge a view of Wittgenstein as place-holder in the Cambridge tradition of analytic philosophy and as the inventor of something called "ordinary language" philosophy.)

Some years before reading Hadot (1995, 2002, 2004) who adopted Wittgenstein's approach in the early 1960s as a methodology for studying the history of ancient philosophy,[3] I was impressed with how Cavell reimagined Wittgenstein as a man who lived his philosophy—as I put it at the time "as someone whose philosophy is impossible to understand without understanding the man, and whose style is aesthetically speaking central to the meaning of the *Investigations*".

[3]As Laugier (2011: 322) claims "in working out a general model of ancient philosophy as an ethics, a praxis of discourse and an activity of self-perfection, Hadot opened Wittgenstein interpretation to new, original readings for example those of Stanley Cavell and Cora Diamond". This ethics of self-transformation also applies in some measure to not only Wittgenstein but also his references to St Augustine, and to Tolstoy. It is precisely this aspect of spiritual practices that Michel Foucault picks up on from Hadot in his later work on *bios* and the aesthetics of self.

This textual and literary interpretation of Wittgenstein and his work spoke to me. It also gelled with Cavell's emphasis on autobiography as a way of coping with the difficulties of philosophy in the modernist condition—autobiography as philosophical confession (Peters 2002).[4] It seemed like a living example of what Richard Rorty called "philosophy as a kind of writing" that was also close to Derrida's way of practicing philosophy. Only later did Hadot's focus on *bios* and philosophy as a way of life seem to make many of these connections transparently manifest.

Regarding the *Investigations* as a text rather than a set of problems to be worked through was indicative to me of the change in practice that Wittgenstein had worked in philosophy itself. I also remarked that this approach is not to deny that there are *problems* as Wittgenstein says in the *Investigations*, "the concepts of meaning, of understanding, of a proposition, of logic, the foundations of mathematics, states of consciousness, and other things" (1972: Preface, p. vii), but these were not advanced on the basis of arguments or theories as I previously mentioned.

These reflections had led me to Cavell's (1995) "Notes and Afterthoughts on the Opening of Wittgenstein's *Investigations*", where I argued:

> Cavell's reading provides a basis for a Wittgensteinian pedagogics: not only does it hold up the figure of the child as central to the *Investigations* but it does so in a philosophical style that, though distinctively Cavell's own, comes closest to the spirit of philosophizing in Wittgenstein's sense.

What interested me in particular as someone who had followed the philosophy of the subject and its postmodern readings was that Cavell presented the *Investigations* as a modernist work concerned with the modern self or subject (Cavell 1996: 381). I found this suggestion theoretically fruitful even though I was inclined to see the formalism of the *Tractatus* as modernist and the *Investigations* as prefiguring postmodernist conceptions of subjectivity no longer based on mind/body dualism, but rather self as a multiplicity with no essence or necessary psychologically stable core (see Sluga 1996; Peters and Marshall 1999). Cavell'swork certainly propelled me to develop a notion of "philosophy as pedagogy", and it was essentially a Cavellian reading that motivated Burbules, Smeyers and I to see Wittgenstein as a "pedagogical philosopher" (Peters et al. 2008).

I now see Cavell's neo-romanticism more clearly in his picture of Wittgenstein's philosophy as a classical preoccupation with the human soul's struggle with its own estrangement and illusions working toward a state of clarity free from all confusion. This tendency flows over to his discussion of the figure of the child itself, to Augustine's and Wittgenstein's philosophical reminders and autobiographical memories that take a literary form, and to the way that the *Investigations* echoes the

[4]Here, I differ from Cavell in that I want to draw connections between Wittgenstein's confessional style—his confessions—and his life or *bios*. Wittgenstein's quest for spiritual purity was a lifelong preoccupation as adduced by his comments to Russell during the course of their discussions on logic in 1913 (LRKM): "My life is *full* of the most hateful and petty thoughts and acts (this is *no* exaggeration)". "Perhaps you think it is a waste of time for me to think about myself; but how can I be a logician if I am not yet a man! *Before everything else* I must become pure". See also Shields (1993).

beginning of life and of philosophy with the child's early languaging and transition into community and speech. Cavell remarks how the figure of the child is absent from analytic philosophy preventing it from recognizing psychoanalysis as one of its others. Not so for the Continental philosophy where philosophical approaches to education and pedagogy considerably predate Rousseau's *Emile* and have furnished child developmental psychology and the psychology of childhood with much of its theoretical infrastructure from Piaget's "cognitive" child to Tomasello's "socialized" child with its focus on shared intentionality ("reading intention") and social interaction.[5]

Identifying the child's voice as child-like, sceptical and *mad* Cavell draws on the rich tradition of psychoanalysis—Klein's stage of preverbal development tied to depression, paranoia and violence—but also the classical description of philosophy as born of the traumatic shift from animal and the state of nature to the state of reason, from a kind of madness (as rage and destruction) and irrationality to the tranquil state of civilizing reason. On this view Wittgenstein's contribution to the classical trope is to naturalize the transition into the learning of one's native language and to emphasize the relation between concepts of teaching, learning and language.

The closest Cavell comes to a definitive statement on the figure of the child is in the passage:

> Haunting the entire *Investigations*, the opening scene and its figure of the child signals the question 'Where did you learn – what is the home of – a concept?' may at any time arise (and not only in the couple of dozen sections in which the child explicitly appears), that the inheritance of culture – the process of cultivation (or what is the point of spading?) – comes not to a natural end, or rather to its own end, but to one ended, by poor resources, or by power; that when explanations in particular circumstances run out, teaching becomes heightened while control over what it is that is taught, say shown, is lessened. (Cavell 1995: 169–170)

In this passage, as I observed, Cavell is led to comment on the child's isolation in Augustine's description and perhaps in everyday life: "the absoluteness in its initial incapacity to make itself known leads me to understand the child as mad, not exactly deranged, but in the *condition of derangement*" (my emphasis; 1995, p. 170)—hence the title of my 1998 essay.

I mention in the 1998 paper that I do not make enough of the textual problematic of the *Investigations* as structured by a set of interlocking figures—we might call them *language others*, all of whom are like the child, or take on the status of the child to throw into relief examples at the margins of language learning. This texture or architecture is made up of the figure of the child, the figure of the tribal and "primitive" cultural other (a child of civilization), the figure of the "foreigner" learning a new language that serves to highlight the cultural familiarity and strangeness of our own form of life, and the figure of animals who cannot speak—

[5]See Tomasello's videoed lecture to 5th Annual Conference of the British Wittgenstein Society (BWS) Wittgenstein, Enactivism and Animal Minds, University of Hertfordshire, 7–8 July 2012 at https://vimeo.com/49186447.

among them the famous lion ("If a lion could talk, we could not understand him", PI, p. 223). This complex *figurality* decentres the child even if it remains the guiding motif.

Since writing the paper I became more distanced from Cavell's writing especially after living in the mid-West for six years and holding a position at the University of Illinois (Urbana-Champaign) in a department that was strongly oriented to Black struggle and Black Civil Rights. This may seem unrelated, but I became aware of the fact there were few Black philosophers in the USA and Blackness did not appear in philosophy of education until relatively recently. The reason in part was historically that Black people have been treated philosophically as children incapable of thought and incapable of doing philosophy. What is more the American academy made little room for them. I was impelled to write an essay entitled "White Philosophy in/of America" (Peters 2011) which discussed Rorty and Cavell as two leading and distinguished philosophers and post-Wittgensteinian scholars who explored the question of philosophy in the post-philosophical culture of America, after the end of analytic philosophy. In arguing this thesis I wrote:

> This lack is not just an excusable occluding of the social or ignorance of the political but rather reflects a consistent and continuing failure of American philosophy in its own self-understanding and in its social and political awareness of itself. Such an interpretation is consistent with the historical approach to the rise of Black consciousness, culture and philosophy, the rediscovery of the racist nature of much Western philosophy, and the recovery of early Black philosophy in the figure of DuBois among others, the reconstruction of the Black canon and its anthologizations. It is also an interpretation open to challenge on grounds of the development of liberal political theory by Rawls, Nussbaum, and others, and even sits uneasily with critical legal studies and critical race theory which arises out of the philosophical engagement with the cultural history of America. I christen this kind of colour-blind philosophy, that which is unaware of its own philosophical historicity, "white philosophy", a concept which I explore below in conjunction with the idea of America philosophy.

I became somewhat disenchanted with both Rorty and Cavell, not to mention Dewey and the pragmatist tradition, for its colour-blind philosophy based on a philosophical inheritance of much European philosophy that treated other races as children, as undeveloped and unable to speak for themselves or to determine what was in the own best interests. There are many historical descriptions that view Blacks or Afro-Americans as children, not to mention First Nations and indigenous peoples around the world.[6] Even some of the most benign picture Black culture as emerging from a state of childhood. This is Said's Orientalism turned inward, reflecting a deep and abiding split in American society that has raised its head in events in Ferguson and in the campaign of "Black lives matter". Philosophy plays a double role here as Cornel West indicates when he argues that the structure of

[6]Infantilization of indigenous peoples was a common aspect of imperial power that often resulted in statements of cognitive superiority on the part of colonizers and attacks on indigenous sovereignty or autonomy, on the other—indigenous peoples as "big kids" who were too politically immature to govern. In this regard see the global movement Idle No More, at http://www.idlenomore.ca/. My thanks to Jeff Stickney for the expansion of this point and reference.

oppression is philosophically maintained yet through the portals of existentialism and historicism (where he mentions both Wittgenstein and Heidegger), from which the universalism of "white philosophy" is brought into question. Paradoxically, philosophy is also the bootstrap means by which systematic racism can be defeated. I don't have the space to pursue these living questions or to defend these claims here if I am to make a contribution to this volume.

What of the figure of the Black child? Or for that matter the figure of Syrian refugee child? To what extent does the notion of "figure" and "figurality" in their literary and philosophical generality occlude the cultural or historical specifics of different language groups? When we talk about the connections between concepts of "language", "learning", "teaching" and "meaning" in the language game (or play) are these specific to our Western form(s) of life? Is there a necessary connection between concepts of "teaching" and "meaning" or the figures of the "teacher" and the "learner"? Does the concept "learning" presuppose "teaching"? To what extent do these conceptual connections indicate something about our *natural* history or form of life? What of the historical period in the West *before* the introduction of formal schooling? And so on.

In this historicizing of the figure of the child, I want to take into account unequal structures of power between the teacher and the child within education institutions and their effects on learning.

2 The Significance of the Haibauer Incident (*der Vorfall Haibauer)*

In "Time And Place For Philosophy", Cavell (2008) takes on what he calls the "political reading" of Wittgenstein (advanced by Kripke 1982) illustrated by the so-called scene of instruction in the *Investigations*, at § 217, and dismisses "moments in Wittgenstein's biography that can seem to substantiate such a reading" by referring to "a well-known story of his striking a pupil" where power resides purely on the side of the teacher. In contra distinction to Cavell's romantic reading of the figure of the child and Matthews' (1994, 2005) philosophy of the child, I embrace an historicist reading of Wittgenstein on the figure of the child arguing for a position that attempts to avoid both *essentializing* the child and forms of "adultism" by historicizing subjectivity in child studies (Peters and Johansson 2012). This argument is advanced by focusing on and exploring the biographical incident to which Cavell refers in more detail for the light it casts on Wittgenstein's teaching sensibilities and his state of mind in the period he was a teacher (especially his suicide ideation) including his relationships with the Austrian children he taught. In one sense, to anticipate an argument, the period Wittgenstein spent teaching might be usefully viewed in terms of a trope (rather than retrospective psychiatric assessment) that pictures Wittgenstein in a deeply ethical struggle to make the personal self-transformation exemplified by the shift in his work from the

"solipsism" of the *Tractatus* to the "social being" of the *Investigation* (Fitzgerald 2004). The effect of this historicist approach is also in part to relativize Wittgenstein's teaching experience of rural village children and the discipline and punishments he administered to the cultural context of his time *circa* 1920s Austria —a time when corporeal punishment of boys and girls was part of the tradition of the drill school.

The Glöckel educational reforms of the 1920s broke with the Hapsburg disciplinarian tradition to introduce social democratic principles and socialist pedagogy. Otto Glöckel, who worked with Karl Seitz (who later became head of state), developed reforms as Under Secretary of State for Education, to make "Red Vienna" a centre for progressive socialist pedagogy in Europe. Austro-Marxist Social Democratic reforms in education were based on three main demands:

1. Insure all students acquired knowledge appropriate to his abilities;
2. Insure for the state that the population reached a minimum educational standard;
3. Independence of the school and teachers from all classes, creeds and parties (cited in Rusinow 1978).

The Glöckel reforms also reformed teacher training of *Volksschule* (Rusinow 1978), under which Wittgenstein qualified as an elementary teacher. Part of these reforms insisted on "disciplinary procedures for teaching … on the basis of a law which corresponds to modern legal principles" alongside "complete freedom of pedagogical method" (p. 8). This represented a shift from the authoritarian and discipline-focused method of the Hapsburg era when physical punishments were common and the teacher's position as disciplinarian was relatively unchecked.[7]

Wittgenstein's decision to train as a teacher had a strong vocational (in the sense of *vocation* as "mission") and enduring spiritual basis. On the outbreak of war, Wittgenstein served in an artillery battalion and was captured. He spent over ten months as a prisoner of war in Italy. During his war years, he pursued his work on logic writing what was to become the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* which he believed provided the final solutions to philosophy. While professing not to be a religious man (in an institutional sense), as Malcolm points out "Wittgenstein had developed an intense desire for moral and spiritual purity" (Malcolm RPV, p. 23).

[7]In this context, it is interesting to remember Foucault's (1975) *Discipline and Punish* that provides an account of a new disciplinary technology focusing on the body that emerges with the birth of the prison and a humanitarian concept of consistent punishment used in schools and other institutions. The abolition of corporeal punishment in most Western schools only took place very recently starting in the 1980s with a shift away from disciplinary policy to "detention," "positive reinforcement," "school counselling," "suspension," "classroom management," "parenting styles" and in the US "zero tolerance" (Reagan anti-drug policy). One of the core issues to emerge recently concerns punishing students whose misbehaviour is a manifestation of their disabilities. The psychopathology of school "disorders" (mentioned in the DSM) has occasioned drug treatment of children with behavioural and emotional disorders, especially stimulant medications (e.g. ritalin) for ADHD, that lend itself to a Foucaultian "biopolitics" analysis.

He carried around Tolstoy's *The Gospels in Brief* during his war years claiming it had "virtually kept him alive" (Letter to Ficker: 24.7.15). At Cassino, Wittgenstein met Dario Antiseri and Franz Parak, both teachers, who made up a circle of friends that had formed around him to read Dostoyevsky's *Raskolnikov*. Parak (1978) writes:

> I was already a schoolteacher, and he confided to me that he also wanted to become a teacher. Obviously he believed that with his *Tractatus* he had brought his philosophical task to its end, and that now he should think about looking for a profession suited to him intellectually and morally. "In reality," he told me, "I would have preferred to become a priest, but also as a teacher I shall read the Gospel together with the children".[8]

When released from being a prisoner of war Wittgenstein returned to Vienna, he gave away his fortune to brother and sisters and *within ten days* registered at the teachers training college in Vienna in 1919.

There is an argument for considering the years that Monk (1991) in his otherwise splendid biography calls "Years in the Wilderness" as a *critical* episode in Wittgenstein's life determining his philosophical development, rather than "timeout" or transitional years between early and late philosophies. The years from 1919 when Wittgenstein attended training college in Vienna through to 1926 when he abruptly resigned from teaching after an incident involving a pupil that led to a court trial constitute in many ways a central and smouldering episode in Wittgenstein's own psychological make-up, disposition and ethical self-development—one that he returns to many years later as the basis for his "confession". These seven or so years spent as a teacher not only informed the development of his thinking in the *Philosophical Investigations* with an emphasis on a philosophy of language that focuses on a cultural account of learning words but also link biographically to a set of attitudes and self-dispositions that characterized Wittgenstein's unsuccessful early schooling years, his university studies leading up to his engagements with Frege and Russell, his experience as a university professor of philosophy at Cambridge including his attitude to academia, and his distinctive "styles" of thinking (Peters 2001).

In 1920, Wittgenstein took up his first position as an elementary school teacher in Trattenbach, a village of just a few hundred people. In September 1922, Wittgenstein transferred to a secondary school in Hassbach, a village nearby. A month later he took up a position in Puchberg, a primary school in the Schneeberg mountains. In September 1924, he moved again to a school in Ottenthal, near Trattenbach. In each location, he was regarded with suspicion by the villagers and made fun of by his pupils. He spoke in an aristocratic High German accent and tried to cover up his background as belonging to one of the richest families in Austria. He was partly in consequence the object of mistrust and considerable gossip. Wittgenstein regarded his pupils with contempt and often resorted to corporal punishment. He was miserable and still suffering from his experience of war and from the reception and misunderstanding of his magnum opus the

[8]Translated by Robert Wesley Angelo at http://www.roangelo.net/logwitt/.

Tractatus in which he thought he had solved all the problems of modern philosophy. He often thought of himself as worthless and a moral failure with a degree of self-criticism that verged on self-loathing and was constantly agitated and suicidal. At the same time, he was an inspiring and demanding teacher who was determined to teach the village children in his charge *everything* of which he was capable by all available means. Wittgenstein's unhappy consciousness as a schoolteacher is revealed in remarks to Russell early in his teaching career. He reports to Russell first that he is "hopeful" and "happy at his work" and that "I need it badly, or else all the devils in Hell break loose inside me". In October 1921 a year later he writes to Russell again: "I am still at Trattenbach, surrounded, as ever, by odiousness and baseness. I know that human beings on the average are not worth much anywhere, but here they are much more good-for-nothing and irresponsible than elsewhere". Clearly, the Tolstoyan romance of education of Austrian village children was already wearing thin. In response to Russell, he acknowledges that the "Trattenbachers are not uniquely worse than the rest of humanity". Somewhat later, he indicates how depressed he has been "Not that I find elementary school distasteful: quite the contrary". He senses hopelessness in part because there is no one he can talk to. In his next position, he complains it is no better than the last and exclaims: "Living with human beings is hard! Only they are not really human, but rather ¼ animal and ¾ human".[9]

There are a string of minor incidents where children report Wittgenstein to their parents for "hair pulling" and "boxing their ears".[10] Things came to a head in April 1926 in an incident known as *Der Vorfall Haibauer*, an incident involving an 11-year-old boy, Josef Haibauer, described as a "slow learner". Wittgenstein reportedly hit him on the head several times, and the boy collapsed unconscious. Carrying the boy to the headmaster's office Wittgenstein bumped into Herr Piribauer, a parent whose daughter, Hermine, Wittgenstein had previously punished pulling her so hard by the ears that they bled. Piribauer was outraged, and when he met Wittgenstein in the hall, he "called him [Wittgenstein] all the names under the sun" saying he was "an animal trainer not a teacher" and tried to call the police to have him arrested, but the office was unattended. When Piribauer tried to contact the police again next day, Wittgenstein had disappeared and he resigned from his teaching post on April 28. In May, proceedings were initiated against him and he

[9]All quotations have their source in Wittgenstein (LRKM), *Letters to Russell, Keynes and Moore*. On the last remark see Norm Friesen's "Lost in Translation: Ludwig Wittgenstein, Education and the Question of Abrichtung" (presented at the *Philosophy of Education Society* annual meeting, Toronto, 2016) at http://blogs.ubc.ca/nfriesen/files/2015/08/wittgenstein-training.pdf. Friesen examines Wittgenstein's insistence on "training"and what he calls the apologetics of Monk and others and advances a more troubling analysis that follows Luntley's (2008: 696) allegation of "the brutal tone" of the term and of children as animals.

[10]See the picture of Wittgenstein with his pupils in Puchberg am Schneeberg, circa 1922: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Haidbauer_incident.

was summoned to appear before the court. The acting judge suspecting he was mentally ill ordered a psychiatric examination of Wittgenstein. Waugh (2010: 148–149) reports that Wittgenstein lied about his ill treatment of his pupils and that he wrote to Rudolf Koder "I'm curious to know what the psychiatrist will say to me, but I find the idea of the examination nauseating and am heartily sick of the whole filthy business". Proceedings continued into August, but then nothing further is known about the case, the psychiatric examination or the outcome of the trial except that it seems Wittgenstein was exonerated and went free. There is also the suggestion that the Wittgenstein family and family money had a hand in a cover up (Waugh 2011: 149).

In what did the psychiatric report consist and what did it establish in relation to the Haibauer incident, Wittgenstein's culpability, his attitude towards his pupils and his state of mind? More broadly, would the report if it still exists provide insight into how Wittgenstein viewed children, pupils or learning a language? This paper surmises in outline some topics of what the psychiatric report might contain. Working from Wittgenstein's letters and notes and contemporary historical sources, this paper in a preliminary way seeks to demonstrate the relevance and significance of an assessment of Wittgenstein's temperament and states of mind sparked by the Haibauer incident and its possible significance to Wittgenstein's teaching and philosophy.

3 The Psychiatric Examination of Wittgenstein

The topic is fraught with difficulty partly because Wittgenstein himself reflected and wrote about psychology, "mental states" and the emotions not only *Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology* that make it into Part 2 of the *Investigations* but also in a variety of other texts where he tried to develop a clear survey of problematic psychological concepts (Hacker 2010; Bellucci 2013; Rosenman and Nasti 2012). He also saw himself in a kind of relationship to Freud (who analysed Wittgenstein's sister), as he says at one point Freud's "disciple" even although Wittgenstein increasingly divested himself of the tradition of scientific rationalism to which Freud belonged. At the same time, there is a huge secondary literature dealing with these issues.

If we were to imagine notes for a psychiatric examination of Wittgenstein what would they look like? Here is a rough list of some of the items it might contain up to the Haibauer incident supplemented with some relevant diary entries from Wittgenstein.

Notes for a Psychiatric Examination of Ludwig Wittgenstein:

Ludwig did not speak until he was well after 4 years old; withdrawn; had difficulty from the start in engaging in social relationships, little by way of reciprocal social interaction with peers. Evidence of child autism?

[“We tend to take speech of a Chinese for inarticulate gurgling. Someone who understands Chinese will recognize language *in what he hears. Similarly I often cannot discern the* humanity *in a man” CV, p. 1e 1914].*

Dysfunctional family – domineering, cold, distant, unforgiving, demanding, father; anxious and insecure mother; large family of nine children (4 girls, 5 boys); Suicide ideation – three brothers commit suicide as do Weininger and Boltzmann. Ludwig and Paul often talk about suicide.

Social isolation, loneliness, school failure, bullied at school, treated as a social and class misfit. Some evidence of autism/Aspergers in children, especially Hans and Ludwig and also in the father.

Growing up with a double identity crisis on Jewish and sexual identity. Baptized and brought up a Catholic; aware of his Jewish family origins but forced to lie about them on occasion. Describes the mere “reproductiveness” of Jewish thinkers (CV, 1931-2, 18e-22e – “I don’t believe I have ever invented *a line of thinking.” Feelings of Jewish self-hatred). Reads Schopenhauer, Nietzsche and Weininger at school which may contribute to his loss of religious faith. Retains a belief in confession.*

Sexual orientation as homosexual which was very difficult in Vienna at this time especially given its the social perception and its criminalisation. Difficulties in relating to members of the opposite sex.

War trauma of fighting and serving in the front line (July 1914–1919); stopped from leaving Austria he volunteers for army service despite being officially exempt and is immediately consigned to artillery regiment on the Eastern front; reads Tolstoys’ Gospels in Brief. *His private diary records the horrors of war but also his contempt for comrades who he describes as “wicked” and “rogues”.*

Each of these issues requires more discussion than what can easily be provided in this space. The complexity surrounding Wittgenstein’s identity is legendary. His Jewish background has been written about but really needs contextualization within European anti-Semitism, the Christianization of the Wittgenstein family and the growing Nazification leading up to the Holocaust. Wittgenstein’s feeling of self-loathing is well known and surface in his diaries and notes reaching a kind of resolution in the 1930s around the notion of “genius” and “reproductive thinking” in relation to himself.[11]

The issues of Wittgenstein’s uneasy sexuality, his relationships to David Pinsent, Ben Richards, Francis Skinner, his proposed marriage to Marguerite and even his non-sexual relationships with his disciples all point to the complexities inherent in approaching this topic. For all its significance philosophers have been noticeable by their reluctance to tackle this topic. Bartley III notoriously treated Wittgenstein’s homosexuality in a few pages of his (1973) book *Wittgenstein* based on coded

[11]See Schwarzschild (1979), Levi (1978–79), Szabados (1999), Stern (2001); Chatterjee (2005) and Abramovitc (2006). And even more controversially Cornish (1998). Stern writes: “There is reason to think that Wittgenstein’s uneasy relationship to his own racial identity, a relationship framed in terms of the prevalent anti-Semitic discourse of his times, also figures in his relationship to his sexuality” (p. 262).

remarks in his diaries and was lampooned and called a "liar". Wittgensteinians anxious to protect Wittgenstein's reputation closed a circle around him—some denying the very possibility and others threatening legal action. Bartley's record of this reception is given in his paper "Wittgenstein and Homosexuality" which was a revised version of his (1983) "Afterword". Bartley reports that the angry reception and nastiness have continued with many still denying that Wittgenstein was homosexual. Bartley reports that M.O.'C Drury, one of Wittgenstein's closest friends and a psychiatrist, flatly denied that Wittgenstein was tormented by his homosexuality (Bartley's claim). If the issue was incendiary for Bartley in the 1970s, it must have been even more calamitous and dangerous for Wittgenstein himself growing up in an environment where homosexuality was both a crime and a sin. The furore that accompanied Bartley's revelations is interesting in itself, showing how philosophy has difficulty in examining its own saints and heroes. Today in the era of gay rights, there are few who wish to deny Wittgenstein's active homosexuality.

Clearly, Wittgenstein's homosexuality is of central importance in understanding the man. The more difficult question is the effects of his homosexuality on his philosophy and on his relationships when he was a teacher.[12] Bartley uses the concept of façade to talk of its disguised effects of his inner states. Psychoanalytically, much could be made of this personal secrecy and the need to preserve confessional material from prying eyes that might be very damaging. Bartley also refers to Steiner on *eros* and language—"sex is a profoundly semantic act" (p. 13). The question is fundamental, yet there is no extant work that risks analysis in relation to Wittgenstein to my knowledge except for Bartley's brave assertions (and Darius Rejali's in this volume). Sex and language as a particular focus of a wider debate on the issue of gender and language now seems almost commonplace. Wittgenstein may have taken some relief from Freud's analysis of the bisexual nature of human beings where everyone is attracted to both sexes, yet Freud's determinism in ascribing biological and psychological factors on the basis of deep libidinal sexual drives making it difficult to change would have raised questions for Wittgenstein at the point he was trying to change (see Freud 1905, 1923).

One thing is certain, homosexuality in 1920s Vienna was a crime. While gay male culture began to flourish in the late nineteenth century (sodomy was still an imprisonable offence) and Krafft-Ebing and Freud had begun to codify homosexual identity and to see it as a "perversion", there were still very strong taboos in place when Wittgenstein was a teacher. It was not until the 1970s after the "Gay Holocaust" that gay and lesbian activism saw a resurgence. Had Wittgenstein's homosexuality been known at this time, it would almost certainly have led to his vilification. This anti-gay environment in general society and in teaching forced Wittgenstein's sexual identity ruminations underground. Derek Jarman's witty depiction of the gay "Wittgenstein" in his 1993 movie is a pathbreaking dramatic analysis of Wittgenstein's opening up as a gay man.

[12]See Levi (1978–79) who sees Wittgenstein's ethics as a reflection of his guilty homosexuality.

Both aspects of what I have called Wittgenstein's "double identity" crisis requires much more study, careful analysis, empirical investigation and thought than I can devote to it here, but I think there is enough of a case to call attention to the question of *teacher subjectivity* as a substantive issue in teaching and learning, and its relevance to the question of the philosophical figure of the child.

The issue of suicide has a central place in an analysis of Wittgenstein's life as both an experience and ethical theme that runs through his life as someone who feels morally worthless and is tormented by his own thoughts and dispositions. We might say that for Wittgenstein the problems of philosophy and the meaning of life are inextricably intertwined which helps explains the "double coding" of the *Tractatus* and *Investigations* and the peace that comes with dissolving these problems. In the concluding paragraphs to his *Notebooks 1914–16* written while a soldier at war Wittgenstein (N) reflects:

> If suicide is allowed then everything is allowed. If anything is not allowed then suicide is not allowed. This throws a light on the nature of ethics, for suicide is, so to speak, the elementary sin. And when one investigates it it is like investigating mercury vapours in order to investigate the nature of vapours. Or is suicide in itself neither good or evil? (January 10, 1917)

For Wittgenstein suicide is the paradigmatic case for ethics and while he seems to have entertained suicide as an idea from when he was a boy he steadfastly refuses to give into his despair.[13] Suicide is an evasion of life and God's will demands that we should come to terms with the facts as a moral task despite the sheer enormity of it and the difficulties of confronting one's own nature. In his letters 30 May and 21 June 1920, during his first teaching placement Wittgenstein (LRKM) writes:

> I feel like completely emptying myself again; I have had a most miserable time lately. Of course only as a result of my own baseness and rottenness. I have continually thought of taking my own life, and the idea still haunts me sometimes. *I have sunk to the lowest point*.

And,

> I am beyond any outside help. – In fact I am in a state of mind that is terrible to me. I have been through it several times before: it is the state of *not being able to get over a particular fact*…. I know that to kill oneself is always a dirty thing to do. Surely one cannot will one's own destruction, and anybody who has visualized what is in practice involved in the act of suicide knows that suicide is always a *rushing of one's own defenses*. But nothing is worse than to be forced to take oneself by surprise.

One wonders about the state of mind of a man suffering from continual torment and living daily with the threat of suicide and his capacity to teach children under such circumstances. He writes to Keynes in 18 October 1925 just before the Haibauer incident:

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[13]It is interesting to compare Wittgenstein to both Shcopenhauer and Camus who both take suicide very seriously. For Schopenahauer, suicide is the supreme assertion of the will and one's ultimate right to take one's own life. For Camus, suicide is the only philosophical question and is a deep recognition of the absence of any profound reason for living, the insane habitual routine of everyday life and the uselessness of suffering.

> I have resolved to remain a teacher as long as I feel that the difficulties I am experiencing might be doing me some good. When you have a toothache, the pain from the toothache is reduced by putting a hot water bottle to your face. But that works only as long as the heat hurts your face. I will throw away the bottle as soon as I notice that it no longer provides that special pain that does my character good. (LRKM)

Suicide could not be the answer for Wittgenstein. He had decided to learn to live with it as a test of his moral character.

Perhaps, the most telling aspect of any psychiatric report is that to do with Wittgenstein's putative child autism and his alleged Aspergers. Cavell calls psychoanalysis philosophy's other and is prepared to countenance its use of individual case studies against the generality of philosophy. What does this imply for psychiatry that proceeds on the basis of science or systematic knowledge? We know that Wittgenstein himself was sceptical of both. This report might be considered neither as an approach that looks for mental states to explain his philosophy or breaks with Wittgenstein's insistence that the inner is shown in the outer but rather focuses on first person reports (dairies, notes, correspondence) and observed behaviour.[14]

There is now a significant literature and discussion beginning in the 1980s among psychiatrists about Wittgenstein's "schizoid" state, child autism and Aspergers. Whether true or not, it provides a useful discourse about the autistic child as precisely that child that does not learn language easily (perhaps the child who doubts too much to learn in OC, §283, or who goes against the rule in PI §201), is not properly socialized, reluctant to speak, is withdrawn, distant and unable to engage in reciprocal social interaction or imaginative play with others. Ironically, if we accept Wittgenstein's childhood autism as a hypothesis it goes some way to explaining his antisocial behaviour, his lack of empathy for others and especially the children he taught, his social awkwardness, his inability to return love and affection and famously his inability to make "small talk". Wittgenstein's own child biography and his experience as a child putatively suffering autism provides the best philosophical antidote to the romanticism of the philosophical figure of the child.

Wittgenstein's own social isolation—his "solipsism"—and his childhood autism may also help to explain why he became interested in such philosophical topics, in the child learning his own language. Wittgenstein own experience as a child who suffers autism is ironically the very case that provides the counterfactual or counterargument in cases of language learning, even although Wittgenstein does not use child autism as a limit case in language learning or make reference to his own difficulties in learning language. Perhaps, this is not surprising given that the term "child autism" was not coined until 1943 by Leo Kanner to name a

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[14]I owe this point to Jeff Stickney.

neurodevelopmental disorder. The term "autism" itself was coined by Paul Bleuler in 1912 who also coined "schizophrenia". Leo Kanner at Johns Hopkins talked of "refrigerator mothers" who were "cold" to their children and did not interact or play with them. Of course, the literature has moved on considerably since then.[15]

There is a small but growing biographical and psychiatric literature that deals with Wittgenstein the philosopher-patient and his temperament including his suicidal thoughts and his autism. Fitzgerald (2000), a leading authority on autism at Trinity College, Dublin, claims Wittgenstein had higher functioning autism or Asperger's syndrome (AS). Fitzgerald notes that Gillberg (1991) suggested that Wittgenstein (and Bartok) had Asperger's syndrome and Wolff (1995) suggested that he had a schizoid personality. He reviews Wittgenstein's behaviour against six diagnostic criteria to conclude: "Wittgenstein meets Gillberg's criteria for Asperger's syndrome except for the motor clumsiness, evidence of which is not available" (p. 64).[16] In his book *Autism and Creativity: Is there a link between autism in men and exceptional ability?* (2004), he claims that Wittgenstein's work from the "solipsistic" *Tractatus* to the "social" dimension of language in the *Investigations* represents a process of social maturation common in AS sufferers. Fitzgerald (2004) takes issue with Monk over the status of psychobiography and the genetic fallacy that insists of a strict separation between the man and his work.

Griswold (2007) in his book *Autistic Symphony* devotes a chapter to Wittgenstein entitled "The World as Wittgenstein Found It: The *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* as a Model of Autistic Cognition" in which he makes the strong assertion "Ludwig Wittgenstein was almost certainly autistic" on the review of evidence by notable psychiatrists. There follows an exposition of the *Tractatus*

[15]Anan (2007: ix) in the Foreword to *The Encyclopedia of Autism Spectrum Disorders* writes: "Autism spectrum disorders are pervasive developmental disabilities in which the core impairments have a profound influence on children's development. A relative or total absence of reciprocal social interactive skills is the primary symptom seen in young children with autism spectrum disorders". Autistic children "make less frequent eye contact and direct fewer facial expressions toward their parents. They also fail to share their interest in things they see through pointing and holding up objects for their parents to see". By comparison the "autistic child has trouble initiating a shared focus of attention". Communication is another core problem: "Preschoolers diagnosed with autism may demonstrate delays in spoken language or may be completely nonverbal. They may simply echo what is said to them without meaning. Some children may be able to speak but demonstrate a lack of pragmatic communication skills. In other words, they may be able to respond to direct questions but cannot engage in back-and-forth conversations.

[16]See Clapham's (2011) response to Fitzgerald by emphasizing Wittgenstein's critique of "inner world" built into the theoretical formulations of psychiatry and psychology at http://www.philadelphia-association.org.uk/documents/WittgensteinandAspergers.pdf. See also Ishisaka (2003) who concludes that Wittgenstein had AS classification ICD-10 with the following characteristics: egocentric; lack of empathy for others; lack of sense of social interaction, detached; daily life was obsessive, stereotypic, persistent; clumsiness; strange accent and intonation.

which in model of autistic cognition the external world forms the locus of their mode of perception Griswold (2007) writes:

> This experience of the world as self is, by Wittgenstein's logic, impossible to analyse and a tremendous challenge to represent. That the *Tractatus* makes the attempt to capture the experience in its entirety is remarkable, and that it nearly succeeds is nothing short of miraculous.[17]

The child autism hypothesis and diagnosis are helpful in explaining Wittgenstein's difficulties with social relationships, his contempt for others, his loneliness, his need for long periods of social isolation and perhaps even Wittgenstein's philosophical interest in solipsism, his solipsistic phase and solipsism as a philosophical disorder. Most importantly, the child autism and Aspergers double hypothesis provides a counter to "the figure of the child" and a failed case of a child who does not learn language and is not well integrated into the community, form of life or language game. The autistic child is the limit case and the exception that *deromanticises* the figure of the child by focusing on when things go wrong and the disastrous psychological consequences when things go wrong with socialization, growing up and learning a language.

Wittgenstein went to trial in 1926. Some say that he lied both to the principal of the school and to the court about the severity of the punishments he administered to the Austrian village children in his care. During this period as an elementary school teacher, he suffered suicidal ideation and torments about himself and his character. He had engaged in considerable violence against children in some instances treating and training them like animals in order for them to learn and *become better people*. Irrespective of his motivations, it is very unlikely that anyone in such a state of mind would be knowingly put in charge of children today. The cultural relativity of school discipline and punishment tends to undermine the figurality of children learning. Once kids at school were beaten if they did not learn, today increasingly corporal punishment (in our form of life) is forbidden on the understanding that physical violence toward children is inexcusable and tends to interfere with learning. Under the new social democratic reforms introduced when Wittgenstein was a teacher, Austrian schools were in transition from the old disciplinarian ideology to legal-based forms of discipline and punishment.[18]

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[17]In this regard hear the Motet Op. 27 (PI) for choir by Elizabeth Lutyens ("Excerota Tractati Logico-Philosophici") an English composer who based her twelve tone motet on the *Tractatus*, at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6tVjyYY4hRg. See Parson (1999).

[18]Most Western countries have abolished corporal punishment in schools (Poland was first in 1783) except for a few states in Australia and the USA. The abolition is incomplete and very recent —New Zealand only legislatively abolished corporal punishment in 1990. In states that still practice corporal punishment black children are twice as likely as white children to be subject to corporal punishment. Clearly, the cultural practices have changed and are changing further as are the concepts governing these changes.

Ten years after, the Haibauer incident and court trial Wittgenstein returned to Otterthal to personally apologize to the children he had physically hurt. Obviously, he had been troubled in retrospect by his own indefensible behaviour. While some accepted his apology, others were apparently still bitter against him and his indiscriminate use of force. These apologies were part of his process of confession in 1936 which was written, read and recited first to his family members in Vienna and then to a circle of close friends including Maurice Drury, G.E. Moore, Paul Engelmann, Fania Pascal and Francis Skinner at Cambridge. Fania Pascal remembers there were two major "sins": what Wittgenstein saw as his attempt to cover up his Jewish ancestry and the action where he lied to his school headmaster denying he hit a girl pupil in his charge (Monk 1990: 367–372). If Pascal's memory of Wittgenstein's confession is correct, I am surprised that Wittgenstein resort to violence against children was not the important part of his confession. In 1931, Wittgenstein makes an entry in his diary: "A confession has to be part of your new life" (CV, 18e), and in 1946 he writes: "A man can bare himself before others only out of a particular kind of love. A love which acknowledges, as it were, that we are all wicked children" (CV, 46e). Wittgenstein understood that lying to himself or deceiving himself has a harmful effect on one's style and compromised authentic philosophy as something lived and experienced as a spiritual way of life.

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Wittgenstein, Education and Contemporary American Philosophy

Áine Mahon

Abstract Stanley Cavell and Cora Diamond are two contemporary American philosophers deeply influenced by the work of the early and the late Wittgenstein. Cavell and Diamond read Wittgenstein, particularly, as a romantic thinker open to the disappointments and the difficulties of our lives in language. For Cavell, the *Philosophical Investigations* is remarkable for its call to meaningful and responsible expression; in recognising the fragility and disappointment of everyday expression, Wittgenstein in fact calls his reader to linguistic and bodily responsiveness. For Diamond, both the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* and the *Philosophical Investigations* recommend a distinctively "realistic spirit", one where we are aware of our finitude, aware of our fleshiness, aware always that we inhabit a body and that we are never immune from pain. It is the purpose of this chapter to explore further these romantic interpretations of Wittgenstein and to consider particularly their important educational implications.

Keywords Education · Wittgenstein · Stanley Cavell · Cora Diamond · Richard Rorty

1 Introduction

In his landmark publication, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* (1979), Richard Rorty proclaimed that Dewey, Heidegger and Wittgenstein were the most important philosophers of the twentieth century. "Unique, unclassifiable, original", he later wrote, this trio for Rorty were "the richest and most original philosophers of our time" (Rorty 1982: 51). As they debunked conventional paradigms of "truth" and "necessity", these figures prioritised not philosophy but cultural change and

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M.A. Peters and J. Stickney (eds.), *A Companion to Wittgenstein on Education*,
DOI 10.1007/978-981-10-3136-6_15

Wittgenstein, in particular, ridiculed the very possibility of philosophical answers to philosophical questions. Indeed, Wittgenstein for Rorty was not a theorist but a satirist. He heralded the end of a particular set of problems conceived as eternal and immutable, and he heralded the beginning of a particular practice of philosophy conceived as quietist and therapeutic.

As a pragmatist, of course, what Rorty is concerned with is the utility of Wittgenstein's writings, their ability to inspire new vocabularies and novel directions of thought. In the same vein as his radical redescriptions of Dewey and Heidegger, Rorty avows that he is less in the business of "getting Wittgenstein right" and more in the business of setting his ideas to work. It hardly needs stating that the Wittgenstein as represented in *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* is not the Wittgenstein as variously understood in the broader context of Contemporary American Philosophy. Nevertheless, in this very same context, the inspiration of his work has been significant and long-lasting. Particularly with reference to the anti-metaphysical impetus of the *Philosophical Investigations*—the idea, most crudely put, that language is not a fixed abstract system but a negotiable social practice—Wittgenstein's work remains a vital touchstone for thinkers of contemporary America. His work has exerted a tremendous impact on several of Rorty's key contemporaries, from Donald Davidson and Burton Dreben to Hilary Putnam and Thomas Kuhn.

I am concerned in this paper with the reception of Wittgenstein's work in the writings of two further Rortyan contemporaries, namely Stanley Cavell and Cora Diamond. More specifically, I am concerned with the significance of this reception for philosophers of education. If, for Rorty, Wittgenstein is a thinker entirely happy to slough off the traditional problems of academic philosophy, a thinker fully sanguine that "philosophy can never be more than therapeutic—can never set out positive conclusions" (Rorty 1991: 57), this version of Wittgenstein is certainly not in harmony with that elaborated on by Cavell or Diamond. Rather, and perhaps more interestingly, theirs is a Wittgenstein deeply engaged with the perennial problems of the epistemological and the moral. Theirs is a Wittgenstein fully committed to the difficulties and disquietudes of our lives in language. And crucially, it is in seeking to maintain and not to resolve this disquietude that Cavell and Diamond show a particular way forward for teachers and learners.

2 Wittgenstein and Cavell

In style and content Cavell's handling of Wittgenstein is unique. The American philosopher is keen throughout his philosophical career to stay within earshot of the analytic school, to speak directly to the tradition which trained him, and yet, this much allowed, there is a literariness to his philosophical approach undoubtedly more in harmony with his continental contemporaries. As Cavell reads Wittgenstein, the *Philosophical Investigations* is remarkable for its existentialist tenor. It is remarkable in its recognition of the modern subject as riven and exposed

and remarkable for its engagement with the problem of scepticism as fully alive and fully compelling. Whether the self can ever truly appreciate the other's pain and whether the self can enjoy complete conviction that the other's experiences are as complicated or as profound as theirs are lines of inquiry doggedly pursued in Cavell's response to the *Philosophical Investigations*. Wittgenstein, on this understanding, recognises both our profoundly human desire to transcend our humanity and our profoundly human disappointment in accepting such transcendence as impossible.

According to Cavell, what is offered in the *Philosophical Investigations* is a radical destabilising of the Cartesian view of knowledge. With a revolutionary emphasis on everyday contexts of language and behaviour, Wittgenstein for Cavell shifts the entire focus of epistemology from knowledge as statements of fact (and the accumulation of true facts as the only path to certainty) to knowledge as a matter of judgment (of skill, getting to know, or learning). Wittgenstein urges that our knowledge is governed not by evidence but by knowing in the first place *what would count* as evidence. What Wittgenstein focuses on, in other words, is *criteria*—the everyday means by which the existence of something is established or denied. Things criteria are called on to determine range from whether someone really feels pain to whether they really hold such and such an opinion. In such everyday cases, as Wittgenstein reminds us, the inquiry shifts from "Can we be certain?" to "what would it take to convince us?"

Fully taking in the significance of this Wittgensteinian revolution, Cavell follows his emphasis on judgement and criteria to completely recharacterise the problem of external world and other minds' scepticism. In theory, the most that criteria can provide is near certainty. What finds emphasis in Cavell's reading of Wittgenstein, however, is not the limitations of criteria but the extent to which we are in agreement in them, the astonishingly complex background against which our everyday judgements take place: "We learn and teach words in certain contexts, and then we are expected, and expect others, to be able to project them into further contexts. Nothing insures that this projection will take place […] That on the whole we do is a matter of our sharing routes of interest and feeling, modes of response, senses of humor and of significance and of fulfillment, of what is outrageous, of what is similar to what else, what a rebuke, what forgiveness, of when an utterance is an assertion, when an appeal, when an explanation—all the whirl of organism Wittgenstein calls 'forms of life'" (Cavell 1976: 52).

In other words, although we might be hard pressed to account for these pedagogies rationally—to ground them in theories of mind or knowledge—they nevertheless reveal an extraordinary depth of mutual attunement. Wittgenstein's manner of phrasing this is to say that we agree *in* rather than on language. What is in question here is our ability to judge well, or judge badly, and of course these practices of judgment can only take place against a backdrop of individual fluency or expertise. For Cavell the complexity of such practices takes in the full spectrum of human speech and gesture: "In judging (saying something true or false) you have to be able or willing to judge a contraction of the face as a wince, to recognize a smile as forced, to find a slap on the forehead to express the overcoming of stupidity

by insight, a fist to the heart to express the overcoming of stiff-neckedness by contrition, a tone of voice to be that of assertion" (Cavell 1979: 35). Thus, on this reading, it is only by the establishment of shared criteria (understanding something *as* something) that we are empowered to think and to communicate in language. This absence of definite foundation does not necessitate outright scepticism but a recognition of our agreements as at once powerful and delicate.[1]

Understanding this, we can see why Cavell would be uncomfortable with Rorty's Wittgenstein as quietist philosopher, one viewing philosophical problems in need of sloughing off or rejecting. That criteria and language are profoundly problematic—are profoundly *disappointing*—is the alternative moral Cavell draws from the *Investigations*. As he writes, "That the justification and explanation we give of our language and conduct, that our ways of trying to intellectualize our lives, *do not really satisfy us*, is what, as I read him, Wittgenstein wishes us above all to grasp" (Cavell 1979: 175, emphasis mine). Elaborating on this point in *Must We Mean What We Say?* Cavell writes that Wittgenstein "wishes an acknowledgement of human limitation which does not leave us chafed by our own skin, by a sense of powerlessness to penetrate beyond the human conditions of knowledge". On this understanding, "[t]he limitations of knowledge are no longer barriers to a more perfect apprehension, but conditions of knowledge *uberhaupt*, of anything we should call 'knowledge'" (Cavell 1976: 61). Wittgensteinian criteria do not confer certain knowledge but they do confer the conditions that make knowledge possible. There is a "necessity" to criteria, indeed, "a concept of necessity", as Cavell writes, "not tied to the concept of certainty" (Cavell 1979: 40). In line with this emphasis on necessity, Cavell will claim for Wittgenstein "the sense in which human convention is not arbitrary but constitutive of significant speech and action" (168).

The important point here is that Cavell's Wittgenstein is fully aware of human limitation. He is fully aware that our ordinary ways of thinking and speaking are both essential and disquieting. This limitation is not conceived in his work as an obstruction to knowledge, however, but as actively constitutive of how we think and communicate.

3 Wittgenstein and Diamond

Trained like Cavell in a notably analytic and technical tradition and moved, like Cavell, to reimagine this tradition from within, the philosopher Cora Diamond is widely recognised as one of the most influential inheritors of Wittgenstein's work. Importantly, Diamond develops an interpretation linking the early and the late writings, one that elaborates a meaningful continuity between Wittgenstein's

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[1]This reading of Cavell is rehearsed and developed in more detail in Áine Mahon, *The Ironist and the Romantic: Reading Richard Rorty and Stanley Cavell* (London: Bloomsbury 2014). See especially "Cavell and Scepticism", pp. 17–24.

Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (published in 1921) and Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations* (published posthumously in 1953). In contemporary Anglo-American philosophy, this interpretation is known as "the resolute reading" or "the new Wittgenstein". Given the serious philosophical interest these readings have inspired, Diamond has been retrospectively credited with a groundbreaking role in Wittgenstein scholarship.

Typically, of course, a distinction is drawn between Wittgenstein early and late. The author of the *Tractatus* is described as a philosophical realist. He is taken to be developing a view of thought and language in which the meanings of words depend upon a prior reality. In other words, he is taken to be developing a view whereby language successfully hooks us up to an external world. When the later Wittgenstein in the *Philosophical Investigations* is then described as exchanging realism for anti-realism, he is understood as claiming that actually, there is no objective connection between words and the world. The idea instead is that meaning is determined by public practices of language and gesture. Meaning is not a function of what *is* but a function of what *we do*. Meaning is determined by language games, by grammar, by criteria—by "forms of life".

What is interesting and quite radical about Diamond is her stark opposition to this standard narrative. Diamond reads Wittgenstein as having an anti-metaphysical agenda in both the early and the later works. She argues in other words for a meaningful continuity between the *Tractatus* and the *Philosophical Investigations*. Confusingly, however, she terms this anti-metaphysical agenda Wittgenstein's "realistic spirit". What Diamond means by "the realistic spirit" is not easy to follow but at least part of her claim involves the Wittgensteinian impetus to return us to our everyday and existing methods, to encourage us all to stop worrying about some kind of transcendent or metaphysical perspective. On this picture, meaning is a matter of use but this is not tantamount to saying that meaning is only a matter of use. Human imperfection is the best we have, in other words, and making peace with this imperfection involves acknowledging it as both limiting and constitutive. The links with Cavell's interpretation are already apparent.

When Diamond turns to ethics, interestingly, it is significant to note how this metaphysical picture plays out. When considering the moral life, Diamond following Wittgenstein urges us to be "realistic" in her very particular understanding of that term. Given the disappointments of language—given the impossibility of transcending our human perspectives for a perspective transcendent or objective—she urges us to appreciate the limits of what we can think, the limits of what we can know and the limits of what we can capture in language. And interestingly, she draws a profound connection between these epistemological limits and our limited condition as human—as finite, as vulnerable and as mortal beings.

I turn in this context to Diamond's 2008 essay, "The Difficulty of Reality and the Difficulty of Philosophy". Here, Diamond builds towards the thought that it is not only characteristic but definitive of the human to be curtailed both by what we can know and what we can be. Referring in this context to "the difficulty of reality", what Diamond is concerned with here are those moments in our lives where we

simply cannot get our heads around human practices in the world. These are moments of blinding beauty or of abject horror, when our experiences are so extreme that they simply cannot be accommodated by everyday frameworks of thought. One example is our treatment of non-human animals in industrial practices such as factory farming and systematic slaughter; another is the horrifying early death of innocent youth in the First World War.

Countenancing or attempting to countenance such "difficulties of reality", we find in these experiences that our normal modes of understanding and expressing are completely overwhelmed. Accosted and exposed, we simply cannot take them in. Succinctly, for Diamond: "It is wholly inexplicable that it should be; and yet it is" (Diamond 2008: 60).

So compellingly captured in Diamond's late essay, "[the] coming apart of thought and reality" (Diamond 2008: 78) is a characteristically human experience. And, importantly for her work, it is a characteristically human experience characteristically resisted by moral philosophy. Diamond has urged throughout her writings that it is typical of moral philosophy to present moral concepts as straightforwardly given, as moving within a world that is "hard" and fully prior to moral thought and life (Diamond 1991: 367–83). The view in other words is that reality easily yields to our rational modes of understanding it, that moral thought goes on in a space of fixed possibilities.

In place of this view, Diamond invites us to consider our moral concepts as "cloudy and shifting", as brought into view only by the exercise of our own moral capacities. In Diamond's assessment, the description or appreciation of facts is itself a moral task, an everyday undertaking "for which moral energy, discipline, imagination, creativity, wit, care, patience, tact, delicacy … may be required" (Diamond 1991: 377). This same expressive struggle is not a guarantee of moral insight but it is in fidelity to the realistic spirit that Diamond via Wittgenstein encourages. Getting our minds around reality might indeed be torturous and painful but this epistemological struggle is a crucial aspect of the moral life. Strikingly in sympathy with Cavell, the moral Diamond draws from Wittgenstein's work is that our human forms of life are vulnerable, limited, exposed—and that they necessitate, correspondingly, everyday effort and response.

4 Wittgenstein and Cavell, Diamond, Rorty

Cavell and Diamond read Wittgenstein as a romantic thinker open to the disappointments and the difficulties of our lives in language. For Cavell, the *Philosophical Investigations* is remarkable for its call to meaningful and responsible expression. In recognising the fragility and disappointment of ordinary language, Cavell urges, Wittgenstein in fact calls his reader to linguistic and bodily responsiveness. For Diamond, both the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* and the *Philosophical Investigations* recommend a distinctively "realistic spirit", one where we labour to countenance the lack of objective connection between our words and

the world. In the moral life, crucially, this labour translates to a working hard with concepts when "cloudy and shifting"; moral concepts are not straightforwardly given but in need of conscious and careful elaboration. A person is "realistic", on this understanding, when she worries less about the objective reality underpinning her expression and more about her responsibility for intersubjective relationship.

Thus, if Cavell and Diamond concur with Rorty that Wittgenstein is one of the most important philosophers of the twentieth century, they do so with a very different sense of his philosophical remit and concern. Theirs is a Wittgenstein fully appreciative of the extraordinariness of our lives in language and a Wittgenstein fully cognisant of the frailty of our communicative agreements. Yes, in life and in language we are fully in tune with those persons around us but this attunement, importantly, is as delicate as it is powerful. It involves most crucially a working hard to make ourselves understood by those around us, even if full understanding by others can never be guaranteed. In Cavell's words, what we are given in the language of the *Philosophical Investigations* is an elaboration of the human subject in difficulty and in disquiet. Our ordinary human experiences are those "of strangeness, sickness, disappointment, self-destructiveness, perversity, suffocation [...] and torment" (Cavell 1996: 381).

In this final section, I wish to explore further these romantic interpretations of Wittgenstein and to consider particularly their significance for education. My argument here is that in highlighting the romantic tenor of Wittgenstein's writings, Cavell and Diamond show a very particular way forward for teachers and learners.

I turn in this context to one particular catch-cry of the contemporary educational scene: that we educate our learners not for content knowledge but for critical thinking. Education on this schema fosters independent thought and careful consideration. It is less a matter of passively accepting what has come before and more a matter of conscious activity and critique. Twentieth-century philosophy of education is replete with thinkers who champion his point, from John Dewey in *Democracy and Education* to Paulo Freire in *Pedagogy of the Oppressed.* Education for both Dewey and Freire is problem-posing and dialogical; students come forth as cocreators of knowledge and wisdom. They appreciate that there are no final truths but a multitude of shifting and alternative perspectives.

In this championing of knowledge as creation rather than discovery we are reminded, of course, of Rorty and his neo-pragmatist call for new vocabularies and novel directions of thought. In Rorty's anti-foundationalist picture, there are no ultimate truths to which philosophy might offer privileged access and there are no ideal descriptions of the social world. The best we can do, when making moral or political choices or when deciding between scientific theories or religious convictions, is to work out as coherent a story as we can. The best we can do is to move away from our obsession with norms and principles and to move towards the actual solidarity that makes us act with empathy towards others. It is for this reason that Rorty champions the value of imaginative literature over philosophical theory. "Redescribing" outworn and pernicious vocabularies, offering transformative narratives rather than fixed descriptions, constantly and creatively "changing the

subject": these are the markers of the Rortyan "liberal ironist" or "strong poet". She is a critical thinker markedly confident and creative.

To charges of epistemological relativism, of course, Rortyan "redescription" is highly vulnerable. If the Rortyan ironist constantly rewrites and refigures the world around her, then it seems that she is worryingly devoid of epistemological or moral responsibility. It seems that she might claim that any state of affairs is as good or as worthy as any other, and that she would have no reasonable defence were certain heinous worldviews to win out because of surface "attractiveness" or rhetorical sway. Rorty would respond, of course, that his central concept of irony is entirely independent of epistemological commitment. There is no theory of truth here, Rorty would say, not even a relativist one. In defence of "irony" and "contingency" as key attitudes in the liberal democracy, Rorty would plead for a companion emphasis on "solidarity", for the shared recognition that cruelty to each other is the worst thing that we can do. On this model, those who are democratically educated are brought together not by theoretical or philosophical grounding but by a shared commitment to the expansion of our imaginative sympathies, to our careful appreciation of "one of them" as "one of us" (Rorty 1989).

Revisiting the educational scene, this Rortyan take on epistemology and morality is nonetheless worrying for any learner-in-formation. Recall again that knowledge on the Rortyan schema is coconstructed in the space between teacher and student and in this pedagogical space there is no objective arbiter of the good. This does not necessarily mean that "anything goes" in terms of facts as well as values but it does mean that a certain sloughing off of communicative responsibility is more likely to take hold. Rorty's account of redescription and transformation is couched in terms of creativity and play, but it fails to adequately acknowledge the *hard graft* necessitated in making ourselves fully understandable to each other. It fails to adequately acknowledge the communicative realities of vulnerability and disappointment, of our attunement in language as fragile, delicate and continuously to be won. This gap in Rorty's thought is rooted quite firmly in his reading of the *Philosophical Investigations*. As rehearsed in the pages of *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature,* Wittgenstein for Rorty is a satirist encouraging a "sloughing off" of "truth" and "necessity". Content to leave philosophical problems to one side, Wittgenstein for Rorty is a cheerful redescriber. He is entirely sanguine that human communication is a matter of possibility and play.

An alternative version of Wittgenstein and, importantly for our purposes, an alternative version of education are offered in the writings of Cavell and Diamond. In their romantic rendering of Wittgenstein's philosophy of language, the threat of scepticism is not fully refuted but fully reconceived. True, we are bound together as users of language and we are called upon to communicate responsively and carefully in our everyday speech. Nevertheless, there is yet the possibility that our shared language can fail, that our agreed-upon words will not offer satisfactory expression or desired connection with the external world. There might still remain an immeasurable gap between you and I; I might never fully appreciate let alone speak your pain.

What this necessitates for educators, and here I paraphrase the title of Cavell's earliest book, is the practice and the encouragement of *really meaning what we say*. Because any answers we offer can never be objectively ratified—because any answers we offer are a matter of creation rather than discovery—we need to consider carefully the words that we use. We need to draw more deeply from ourselves and to take ever more responsibility for our relationships with other texts and other persons. Demonstrating both willingness and ability to stand by these observations and judgments, we must articulate precisely and comprehensively the seeming vagaries of our subjectivity. Again, this does not mean that "anything goes" but it does mean that in offering our readings or interpretations of the world we do so in a stance markedly humble and open to revision. Here, we are returned to Cavell's idea of the ordinary not as achievable ideal but as romanticised quest—as something to be continually worked towards.

Thus, Cavell and Diamond, via Wittgenstein, bring to epistemologies of teaching and learning a peculiarly romantic salience. Cavell and Diamond teach us that there is nothing underneath or beyond our linguistic and behavioural structures conferring a non-human meaning upon them. There is only ourselves. Crucially, however, the moral they draw from this Wittgensteinian insight is that the "uncertain necessity" of criteria brings in train heavy responsibilities for the education of ourselves and others. The world is not straightforwardly given but something we must take responsibility for in every new encounter; the responsibility for meaning, for *making* meaning with others, therefore rests on our shoulders alone. Thus, to offer a final paraphrase of Diamond, expressive struggle is a central component of the moral life. In the elaboration of the everyday—in the classroom as well as the community—the educated person is called to imagination, to creativity, to delicacy and to care.

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“This Is Simply What I Do.” on the Relevance of Wittgenstein’s Alleged Conservatism and the Debate About Cavell’s Legacy for Children and Grown-Ups

Paul Smeyers

Abstract Given the unity of language-and-world and of what-we-say-and-do at the level of the language-game, it is easy to see how Wittgenstein’s “It [Philosophy] leaves everything as it is” gave occasion to the reproach of conservatism. The chapter discusses this criticism and argues that given Wittgenstein’s profoundly anti-foundational stance this is not what his position embraces. That “Doubt comes *after* belief” refers to the embeddedness of our acting in a matrix of certainty; therefore, the child is initiated in the form of life. I then focus my attention on the reception of Cavell’s position in philosophy of education debates. Questioning some of the turns this debate has taken (by stressing for example departure from, practicing freedom differently), it is argued that some authors model every relationship between a grown-up and a child along the lines of the way the grown-up is always in a process of attaining a further next self. Ignoring the distinction between the latter process and initiation results in confusions which do neither justice to Cavell or Wittgenstein; moreover, they obfuscate relevant distinctions of the nature of education and child-rearing.

Keywords Conservatism · Practice · Training · Initiation · Cavell · Wittgenstein

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A shorter version appears in the Wittgenstein section of the *Encyclopedia of Educational Philosophy and Theory* (Springer, 2016), co-edited by Nicholas Burbules & Jeff Stickney (Michael A. Peters, Chief Editor).

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M.A. Peters and J. Stickney (eds.), *A Companion to Wittgenstein on Education*,
DOI 10.1007/978-981-10-3136-6_16

1 Introduction

Given the unity of language-and-world and of what-we-say-and-do at the level of the language-game, it is easy to see how Wittgenstein's "It [Philosophy] leaves everything as it is" gave occasion to the reproach of conservatism. The chapter discusses this criticism and argues that given Wittgenstein's profoundly anti-foundational stance this is not what his position embraces. That "Doubt comes *after* belief" refers to the embeddedness of our acting in a matrix of certainty; therefore, the child is initiated in the form of life. I then focus my attention on the reception of Cavell's position in philosophy of education debates. Questioning some of the turns this debate has taken (by stressing for example departure from, practicing freedom differently); it is argued that some authors model every relationship between a grown-up and a child along the lines of the way the grown-up is always in a process of attaining a further next self. Ignoring the distinction between the latter process and initiation results in confusions which do neither justice to Cavell or Wittgenstein; moreover, they obfuscate relevant distinctions of the nature of education and child-rearing.

2 Philosophy Leaves Everything as It Is

In Sect. 124 of the *Philosophical Investigations*, Wittgenstein writes: "Philosophy may in no way interfere with the actual use of language; it can in the end only describe it. For it cannot give it any foundation either. It leaves everything as it is". Given the unity of language-and-world and of what-we-say-and-do at the level of the language-game, it is easy to see how it gave occasion to the reproach of conservatism —particularly in education and philosophy of education where the rhetoric of change has always been fashionable. Philosophy is all caught up with how we think about ourselves; thinking and reflection belong to our life. Thus, our life is at least *partly* correctly characterized as permeated by thinking, and hence changed by thinking. How can coming to understand something *not* make a difference? According to *The New Oxford Dictionary of English* as an adjective "conservative" means "averse to change or innovation and holding to traditional attitudes and values, typically in relation to politics or religion" and as a noun "a person who is averse to change and holds to traditional values and attitudes, typically in relation to politics" (1998, p. 391). It is doubtful that in any of these senses Wittgenstein's philosophical work is conservative. Such a justification could not be offered according to Wittgenstein's own profoundly anti-foundational stance (see further). His remark is part of his more general hostility towards "the craving for generality" (BB, p. 18).[1] This distaste for theories and explanation seems to put not only philosophy, but also any social

[1]Following convention, titles for Wittgenstein's works are abbreviated (PI = Philosophical Investigations, OC = On Certainty, PO = Philosophical Occasions), with section (§) or page number (p.), with full citation and initials in the References.

science under pressure (i.e. an eternal paralysis as far as action is concerned). So again one is pressed with the issue what Wittgenstein could have meant.

Taking §124 out of context implies the impotence of philosophy; instead, let us consider that Wittgenstein's point had to do with language alone. Wittgenstein does not say that everything in our understanding remains the same nor that everything in the world remains the same, only the language. The latter line of interpretation may find its analogy in "Physics leaves the world as it is." The part of the *Philosophical Investigations* that deals with "philosophy" identifies the aim "*complete* clarity" (PI, I, §133). This result is to be reached by specific methods in specific cases. Wittgenstein states his anti-theoretical position where he starts his discussion of "philosophy":

> And we may not advance any kind of theory. There must not be anything hypothetical in our considerations. We must do away with all *explanation*, and description alone must take its place.…These [philosophical problems] are, of course, not empirical problems; they are solved, rather, by looking into the workings of our language, and that in such a way as to make us recognize those workings; *in despite of* an urge to misunderstand them. The problems are solved, not by giving new information, but by arranging what we have always known. Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language. (PI, I, §109)

Elsewhere he writes, "The work of the philosopher consists in assembling reminders for a particular purpose" (PI, I, §127). A number of questions can be asked: How are descriptions related to generality and to theories? What is their particular contribution to understanding future cases? Is there a place for the general anywhere in Wittgenstein's work and thought at all? If the quoted remarks were supposed to describe how philosophy is in fact done by professional philosophers, the remarks are obviously false. Explaining, deducing, drawing conclusions, advancing and debating theories are what philosophers continually do. But it is important to get clear about what counts as "theory" here. Wittgenstein characterizes a theory as something hypothetical, that explains rather than merely describes, such as causally explanatory generalizations, which are testable by experiment or experience in general. Though something can be explanatory (such as a mathematical proof) without being hypothetical, it seems impossible to do philosophy without theorizing, if something is to count as theoretical when it involves deduction or drawing conclusions rather than just description. However, if we take it that Wittgenstein wants to reserve "theory" primarily for causal explanations that permit hypotheses and testing, his investigations are theoretical in a different sense, in a way he clearly does not want to object to. In what is called the *"Big Typescript"* one can find some support for this interpretation: "As I have often said, philosophy does not lead me to any renunciation, since I do not abstain from saying something, but rather abandon a certain combination of words as senseless.…Philosophizing is: rejecting false arguments" (BT, §§ 86 and 87, PO pp.161 and 165). Wittgenstein's anti-theoretical stance is therefore first and foremost an attack on the subsumption of philosophy

under science. Philosophical problems cannot be decided by experience; they are conceptual and the result of lack of understanding of the way we talk. Therefore, it has to be demonstrated of philosophical positions ("theories") that they are flawed in more fundamental ways (that they are meaningless, nonsensical or incoherent). By pointing out that there is an incompatibility between the use a philosopher makes of a word and the account (the reason why) he provides for its use, a philosophical position can be criticized undogmatically—teaching you "…to pass from a piece of disguised nonsense to something that is patent nonsense" (see PI, I, §464).

Wittgenstein's intent was to show that the criteria of grammaticality are *not* the universal validity and necessity characteristic of the a priori. A philosophical method has to *describe* the language-game itself as the source of meaning of the terms used in it, without more ado. Therefore, *the* description that can establish *the* only possible order does not exist (PI, I, §132). It is only possible to reform language "for particular practical purposes" (PI, I, §132). For Wittgenstein, philosophy is not a set of doctrines but an activity, and philosophical results are not found in "philosophical propositions" but in making propositions clear. He insists always on asking whether a word is ever actually used in a particular way in the language-game that is its original home (PI, I, §116) and proclaims that what we are destroying in doing so is nothing but house of cards, clearing up the ground of language on which they stand (PI, I, §118). Thus, as *critique of language*, philosophy is not a reformative undertaking but a descriptive one, which should show us for instance when language is merely idling. The solution of a philosophical problem is offered by reference to what lies open to view—once we are reminded of it (grammar). "Grammar" is lacking in perspicuity, and "perspicuity" basically means nothing other than an understanding consisting of seeing connections (PI, I, §122).

It is Wittgenstein's hope that from reflection upon the very general facts of nature and the formation of different concepts a change in attitude will emerge towards the concepts we in fact possess. This is a change of attitude in which we stop thinking of our concepts as being either "absolutely correct" or otherwise entirely arbitrary, and instead light upon them as bound up with our life, and so no less arbitrary or correct than it is. This is a kind of illumination that can be no less important (or urgent or necessary) than the kind that can be provided by empirical research. In philosophical inquiry what we are trying to do is not to discover something of which until now we have been ignorant, but to know better something that in one sense we knew already. Descriptions of the actual use of expressions ("grammar") provide neither a foundation nor a (causal) explanation of linguistic behaviour. What lies at the basis of the language-game, and therefore, it is presupposed to ground it, surely includes the regularity of custom; this represents a foundation only insofar as the network of convictions inside of which we carry on must rely upon it. And the fact that one takes over forms and concepts is not itself conditioned by forms and concepts, but by modes of acting. Again, by indicating that language-games are to be understood within a practice, this should not be understood as implying that they must be justified by something else. It is merely a

different way of indicating how language-games cannot be spoken of other than with or within the context of a particular human practice. Therefore, philosophy does not put us in a position to justify or to criticize what we do by showing that it meets or fails to meet requirements we lay down in our philosophizing. In this sense, as Cora Diamond argues, philosophy leaves everything as it is (Diamond 1995, p. 69).

3 Practice, “Training” and Education

Wittgenstein provided a conception of human life in which the idea that man is a cultural being is taken seriously. Language is, on this way of looking at the matter, a constantly expanding and shifting set of cultural practices. They are ways of behaviour that grow out of natural life through the creative efforts of human beings. “…[P]ractice has to speak for itself” (OC §139). The concept of “practice”, as Kjell Johannessen argues, points not only to the ways in which the unity of our concepts is formed, but also comprises the skills involved in *handling* the conceptualized phenomena, our pre-reflective *familiarity* with them, expressed in the sureness in our behaviour towards them, and the *judgmental power* exercised in applying or withholding a given concept on a particular occasion (see Johannessen 1988). These factors are all relevant to the establishment of knowledge, but they cannot themselves be fully and straightforwardly articulated by verbal means. It should be noted not only that we have taken over certain ways of judging the empirical world from earlier generations, but also that, in this context, judging is a way of acting. The child’s coming to act according to these beliefs cannot be learned by learning rules (see OC §144). It has to be picked up by examples and by training, which is importantly different from conditioning in that the association is structured by a practice (which is for Wittgenstein rule-governed, that is, normative: not the mere reinforced association of word and object). Training is successful if it results in the initiate learner becoming skilled and thereby an autonomous practitioner, and thus hereafter performing within, and thus adding to, a practice—maybe even contributing to a partial change in it. A necessary support both logically and physically for the novice’s linguistic actions is the structuring provided by the community. It is logically necessary because it provides the system of background beliefs, actions and competencies. This complex pattern is necessary for the token utterance to have significance and so to be an utterance. This is not to say that these practices are forever fixed: they are always open to new developments. These practices are not deliberately chosen conventions but are constituted by the harmonious “blind” agreement in words and activities of a group of people over a period of time. It is “blind” only in the sense that it does not result from the self-conscious or explicit application of rules (PI, I, §219), though this does not mean that people are unconscious automata.

Only within a “language-game” will we be able to justify a certain inference, a certain behaviour, can we can speak of (lack of) justification, evidence and proof, of

mistakes and good and bad reasoning. Investigations and criticisms of the reasons and justifications are brought to an end when we come upon something that we regard as a satisfactory reason, and that we do so shows itself in our actions. We are initiated into "language-games" (reference is made to "normal cases") and thus into judgment(s). He writes: "… always ask yourself: How did we *learn* the meaning+ of this word ("good" for instance)? From what sort of examples, and in what language-games? (PI, I, §77)". Wittgenstein argues that dealing with meaning must always come down, at some point, to a recognition that people just *do* accept this or that, just *do* agree about what actions count or do not count as following a certain procedure. Yet at the same time the inherent nature of the language-game is such that meaning cannot be spelt out in terms of essence or in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. This "leap," however, has nothing to do with deliberately looking for a different meaning (wanting to surpass or abandon a previous meaning), instead with not wanting to legislate future use.

Values, customs and traditions cannot and should not be explained, as Nyíri (1992) argues. Every "explanation" is, as it were, a judgment of reason—but reason itself, as Wittgenstein in his later philosophy sets out to prove, is in the last analysis, grounded in "our acting," in "what we do," which in some sense is what "tradition" amounts to. Therefore, if freedom is incompatible with being bound by real tradition, it is incompatible with "reason," and not conforming must be seen as an anthropological folly—this, Nyíri argues, is Wittgenstein's underlying thought. Certainly, in Wittgenstein's work, one finds a respect for what is *there*, what is historically given. This is present not only in the conception of the task of philosophy as description, but also as the recurrent theme of the analyses: the acceptance of the authority of everyday language—here we reach bedrock, or "the riverbed." Moreover, Wittgenstein's "Remarks on Frazer's *Golden Bough*" suggest that he came to think that ethics cannot be unitary. Taken out of context, this might appear blatantly conservative. His arguments, however, seldom address issues capable of being approached conservatively as opposed to, say, radically or liberally—it is not clear that the distinction applies. Not that his work is not normative or that it is value-free. Wittgenstein is preoccupied by problems that are of a different, or more rudimentary, nature than those on which the conservative-radical distinction gains purchase. Furthermore, as Mark Cladis argues, his position endorses internal criticism. And though this may seem unduly limited, it *is* honest, and in contrast to supra-historical criticism, it is not illusory. Becoming aware of the historicity of the society and all that this means that can assist us in reforming society. This attitude has about it something of the humble wisdom of Socrates: the problems of life have more to do with learning *from* something than with solving a problem and then going on to the next one.

For Wittgenstein, "The child learns by believing the adult. Doubt comes *after* belief. (OC §160)". The bedrock of our "language-games" is the "form of life". These unjustified and unjustifiable patterns of human activities can be seen as the complicated network of rules which constitute language and social life. This "given" is a whole: it is the "language-and-the-world"; we cannot place ourselves outside of it. Our acting is embedded in a matrix of certainty that precedes our

knowledge (the matrix of knowing-and-doubting and knowing-and-“making a mistake”). The ordinary certainties are the roads on which we walk without hesitation. They are not the only possible ones, and not, perhaps, the correct ones (not even those which have worked in experience). Therefore, in general, “education” from a Wittgensteinian position can be conceived as a dynamic initiation into a “form of life”; parents are seen as the “first educators” and the responsibility of the state concerning schooling can be seen as an extension of this. Educators offer the child what they stand for: what moves them, appeals to them, what supports the idea of “human being” they offer to the child hoping that she or he will participate. Thus, the child is immediately grasped in the human order, structured by certain relationships, and identified by language. If education ought to provoke new ideas, it nevertheless has to start from somewhere. Its aim being a personal way of dealing with “what matters”: how people have struggled in the past with what troubled them most and how they dealt with it (a process in which one gets acquainted foremost with questions rather than with answers).

Does the practitioner need a philosophy or a theory of education? There is no reason to doubt what Wittgenstein’s answer to this question would have been. As with any practice, theoretical, or philosophical insights are not needed for those involved in order to be able “to go on.” And it is not as if causal explanations would be of any help. But at the same time, he would not deny that if one engages in reflection upon these practices, after being involved in particular activities, this might give us a better understanding about what one is doing. Freeing us from the idea that education must have a fixed and unified meaning will change what we want to do in education. This might generate, for example, a different perspective on research concerning day care for young children (now primarily focused on the “effects” this has on the very young), and highlight the way parents see themselves. And philosophy of education might address questions to do with means-end reasoning or cultural pluralism. One has to bear in mind, however, that according to Wittgenstein, we do not encounter philosophical problems in practical life. We encounter them only when we are guided not by practical purpose in forming our sentences, but when certain analogies within our language lead us astray (BT §91, PO, p.189). Careful reading in this way would not lead to the development of theoretical views, or any such thing, but it would change the *researcher*: the world would come to be looked at differently. And coming to see the world differently is changing oneself.

4 Cavell’s Return to the “Ordinary” and Philosophy as an Education for Grown-Ups

Recently, over a decade, Wittgensteinian insights have found anew their way into the educational debate through discussions of the work of Stanley Cavell. Amongst others Paul Standish and Naoko Saito have addressed Cavell’s insights and have used these to write on Emersonian perfectionism and more generally on Cavell’s understanding

of ordinary language philosophy and its potential for understanding education. Standish's ideas have then inspired amongst others Naomi Hodgson and Stefan Ramaekers. In what follows, I will first identify what has been taken up from Cavell before outlining the direction the debate has taken and the challenges it presents.

Addressing Cavell's resistance to the view that the *Philosophical Investigations* expose the problems raised by the sceptic only to solve or dissolve them without remainder, Standish discusses Cavell's understanding of ordinary language:

> In contrast to the impersonal metaphysical voice of modern philosophy, which states or questions what is the case, ordinary language philosophy characteristically proceeds with expressions, as we saw, of the form "When we say … we mean …". The verbal form here is first person, which authorizes the judgement, and plural, which binds the speaker to the community. And this statement is made not as some kind of empirical generalization; a survey of usage, for example, would be beside the point. It is made rather as something closer to a commitment or an expression of assent, depending both upon the sincerity of the speaker (how it seems *to her*) and on her affirming her alignment or community with others (her faith that she shares this judgement *with them*, can speak for them). In this, then, Cavell mitigates any tendency towards the "subliming" of rules by throwing emphasis on the location of rule-following practices in the hurly-burly of the form of life, the cohesion of which depends upon agreement in judgements. Moreover there is something projective about such assent because the rule-following of language does not finally determine future usage but is always open to new development. Assent here is not only obedience to a rule, but connects with something like membership in a *polis*, a common world in which judgements are shared, in which (together) we find things the same, in which we project things (together). (Standish 2004, p. 94)

Standish's interest, however, quickly develops into another direction. First, he reiterates the point that in making such judgments, the speaker exercises a kind of responsibility (speaking for herself and for others) and that she only comes to this position through her inculcation into the practices of her community. He qualifies further that to the extent that this is how she finds things herself, her obedience is obedience to her own laws. Thus, he argues: "Criteria then come to be seen not just as something into which the potential speaker is inculcated, but ultimately as something that depend upon her for their sustenance. Criteria are not the cause of her judgement so much as the result. They depend upon her for their sustenance. The maintaining of criteria requires this continual giving of assent by the members of a culture, and this can be done in creative and in moribund ways." (Standish 2004, p. 95) He then draws attention to the fact that the words that I must inherit can impel me towards conformity and refers approvingly to Cavell:

> What I require is a convening of my culture's criteria, in order to confront them with my words and life as I pursue them and as I may imagine them; and at the same time to confront my words and life as I pursue them with the life my culture's words may imagine for me: to confront the culture with itself along the lines in which it meets in me … The anxiety in teaching, in serious communication, is that I myself require education. And for grownups this is not natural growth but change. Conversion is a turning of our natural reactions; so it is symbolized as rebirth. (Cavell 1999, p. 125)

Standish argues that the individual must find herself, not once and for all but continually, through the vocabularies and the possibilities of confrontation that a

good curriculum provides: "The importance of reception, indeed its inevitability, underlines the ways in which reading, in both literal and metaphorical senses, can serve as an indication of what might be entailed by the kind of perfectionist education considered here. … Our friends, our teachers, the books we read and the films we see, especially where these are dear to us, will at their best function in this way" (Standish 2004, p. 104). The learner is thus seen in terms of an open-ended process of growth. For Standish, Cavell's writings make clear that the very act of reading (in which reception and construction, passivity and activity are endlessly involved) "itself becomes a metonym of the human condition" (Standish 2007, p. 85). Thus, he argues that when growing up, we learn to speak and acquire our mother tongue (our common schooling, our schooling into community); later, we need to acquire the "father tongue" which he, following Cavell's writing on Thoreau, associates with the written word: "Finding one's way depends upon the father tongue. This is an uncommon schooling, but it is one upon which the community and the culture ultimately depend. … The reserved and select expression that we confront in reading well requires us to return to words as through a condition of estrangement, to choose our words and see how their meaning measures us" (Standish 2006, p. 150). The receptiveness (or openness) requires us, being ready to leave what you think is yours, and so a readiness for departure, a receptiveness to the new, and a release from the hold of the past. Standish argues that the distinctions between the mother tongue and the father tongue, and between common and uncommon schools, might be thought to map on to Richard Rorty's well-known division between the socializing role of compulsory schooling and the critical function of higher education. But such a division is according to him not correct; it is so he claims "wilfully simplistic" (Standish 2006, p. 154). Thus, he argues in his elaboration of Thoreau's building of his house, that

> … contrary to popular readings of Thoreau, it is not this particular place that is the heart of the matter: what is more important is the possibility, or perhaps the principle, of this combination of particular attachments (the regimes of living attuned to them, the commitment appropriate to them) with a readiness for departure – before, as it were, they fossilize or perhaps come to be romanticized or to parody themselves. … Unlike the ideas of "mineness" and belonging that recur in Heidegger, there is here some sense of the "essential immigrancy of the human"… Reading well, as we saw, requires us to return to words as through a condition of estrangement, as though we have still to arrive at our words. Education, the education of grownups, requires our discovery of our immigrancy to ourselves. (Standish 2006, p. 156)

Resonances of this are also found in several studies by Ramaekers and Hodgson. In discussing Wittgenstein's idea of "agreement in judgements," Ramaekers following Cavell argues that it is a misunderstanding to conceive of this agreement in judgements as a kind of constructivism or a kind of contractualism; the nature of a human being's initiation into a community is not one of coming to agree about things but one of entering into agreements. Thus, he stresses that the passivity implied here is accompanied by a certain kind of activity: "… what Wittgenstein teaches us is that the continued existence of intersubjective shared meanings crucially depends on

their being sustained by the individual's commitment" (Ramaekers 2010, p. 60). For him too, "… assuming responsibility for the words we express and mean is not just speaking for ourselves, it is at the same time presenting ourselves as an exemplar of the community we are initiated in, by virtue of the simple fact that we are employing meanings which are shared in a community. Having a voice is going on intelligibly with our concepts" (Ramaekers 2010, p. 62). Yet in discussing Wittgenstein's saying "If I have exhausted the justifications I have reached bedrock, and my spade is turned. Then I am inclined to say: 'This is simply what I do.' (PI §217)" he interprets this being thrown back upon oneself first not necessarily as marking a termination of all dialogue, but as presenting of oneself as "ground". He then continues to interpret Cavell's suggestion as "…to try to cover different ground, to try to put our spade elsewhere, perhaps doing something altogether unexpected. "This is simply what I do" can thus be understood as a site of (the possibility of) critique, of change, of newness" (Ramaekers 2010, p. 62). Further clarification of "unexpected" is certainly desired for and more needs to be said as well about what exactly is meant by "presenting of oneself as 'ground'". However, the danger lurks already around the corner to give into the pervasiveness of the discourse of change present in so many educational debates (see Burbules 2016; Smith 2016), a position only one step away. Is this change, this critique, this newness something to be strived for or is it to be conceived as something that is always there, unavoidably as according to Wittgenstein's and Cavell's position, we are always in a situation that is in a logical sense "new" (never identical with a previous one—which is a consequence of Wittgenstein's critique of the calculus model of language embracing the meaning-as-use). Clearly, as long as "If I have exhausted the justifications" is kept in mind, no harm will be done, but it may be tempting to forget this.

Is this "forgetting" happening in the position of Hodgson? Dealing with citizenship she writes: "This relates to the sense in Foucault's work that there is no outside, no originary freedom to return to or state of freedom to be achieved through emancipation. Critique consists in seeking ways to practice our freedom differently and thus both Foucault and Cavell affect the simultaneous critique of self and of society. This form of critical attitude is reflected in the sense in both Cavell and Foucault of not making judgements about how to live by appealing to a moral theoretical philosophical framework, but in relation to the conditions in which we find ourselves" (Hodgson 2011, p. 86). Clearly, this passage can be read in several ways: first, that there is no outside; yet second, stressing that one has to practice one's freedom differently. Hodgson offers a Foucauldian reading and invokes *parrhesia*, i.e. free speech and frank speaking and argues that "The simultaneous critique of one's self and of society is expressed in both the form and the content of the writing considered here, and, thus entails a form of truth-telling (Hodgson 2011: 87). She continues:

> Cavell's. account illustrates the way in which the self may come to be understood in an Emersonian sense through forms of work on the self undertaken continuously, and they destabilise us continually. Such work on the self is not a process of a singular, cathartic, coming-to-terms, from which stable point one continues on an inevitable linear trajectory,

> but an exercise through which one comes to know the self to which one is answerable. This answerability arises in me as a moral agent, but also comes to me from the other – from what is not me and from what is unknowable in me. Cavell’s autobiographical account—realized in relation to forms of thought through which ways of reading and voicing oneself have been found – is not narcissistic. Such Emersonian work does not seek an insularity of the individual, nor can it be complacent or self-congratulatory. Instead it points to a form of citizenship in which the idea of community understands the individual’s acknowledgement of his relation to others as where the formation of the individual occurs, in what is closest to us. The finding of voice is not the autonomous finding of one’s true self but is a response. It is the displacement and reclamation of the language, and hence our relation to thought and to the world, that we are bequeathed. (Hodgson 2011, pp. 93–94)

Quoting approvingly Naoko Saito she further argues that for Cavell how, we relate to the language we use is part of our becoming political. Reiterating the point that we do not use words only for ourselves (to exercise our right to self-expression, to make ourselves heard), but that when we speak, we also speak for others we thus participate. The polis is the field within which I work out my personal identity, and it is the creation of (political) freedom. Hodgson then goes on to say: “Participation in this sense is not, therefore, something for which there is a preparatory stage. We are from the beginning of our lives called upon to participate by our living in community with others. Not to acknowledge this as we become aware of this, as we find our own way of voicing ourselves in the world, is to deny a condition of our subjectivity” (Hodgson 2011, p. 94). More about this is claimed in another study where Hodgson addresses what it means to be an educated person with the help of the concept of negotiation. There one reads:

> Similarly to Foucault’s perspective on the necessity of continual negotiation of the operation of power, Cavell’s reference to sublimation suggests the use of one’s judgment (in the sense emphasized by Cavell) in coming to terms with the world as we find it, in a way that is informed by a moral imperative. Foucault’s account of Socratic parrhesia gives an illustration of this ethical relation to self and other in pointing to the condition that the account that one gives of oneself must be commensurate with how one acts. This, and his understanding of critique as implying an ongoing negotiation of the location of the self in the operation of power, draws attention back to the ethical implications of our use of language and our accountability to ourselves and others in a democracy. (Hodgson 2010, pp. 121–122)

5 Confusions and Their Antidote: Returning to Wittgenstein and Cavell

I am worried about some of the elements touched upon in the above mentioned discussions, which could be misleading when dealing with the bearing of Wittgensteinian and Cavellian insights for education and child-rearing. Here are some of these:

- a readiness for departure, a receptiveness to the new and a release from the hold of the past (Standish);
- the routes of initiation into this meaning-making are never closed (Standish);

– critique consists in seeking ways to practice our freedom differently (Hodgson);
– participation in this sense is not, therefore, something for which there is a preparatory stage (Hodgson); and
– doing something altogether unexpected and presenting of oneself as "ground" (Ramaekers).

What I wonder about is whether and to what extent this implies that there is:

– an absence of the distinction between the initiation into the meaning of words and the development of their use and appropriateness later on;
– a use of "education of children" and "education of grown-ups" (and what is implied, i.e. change and conversion) in an almost identical manner; and
– and finally, an overlooking of Wittgenstein's insight that we follow rules blindly.

Let me reiterate a point made by Saito who summarizes the characteristics of Emersonian moral perfectionism and who draws attention amongst other things to perfection as perfecting with no fixed ends, "…the endless journey of self-overcoming and self-realization whose central focus is on the here and now in the process of attaining a further, next self, not the highest self" (Saito quoted by Hodgson 2011, p. 87). She too speaks of the issue of initiation and departure:

> Cavell's sense of the tragic is tied up with the moment of hope for departure. … Philosophy as autobiography will call for an education that kindles the light of the nonchalant boy and the silenced child in the classroom. This, however, cannot be a matter of purely personal satisfaction: it is a legitimation neither of child-centred education nor of the "freedoms" of choice of life-long learning conditioned by consumerism. Rather its foremost task is that of rejoining the child's voice in the language community so that he can (re)discover his place in culture and community. In other words, education along the lines of Cavell's philosophy as autobiography will guide the child to express his "insatiable desire" but in such a way that he puts his words on trial in the language community. Finding one's voice is an eternal and ongoing process of deviation from a language community as much as it is of initiation. Yet deviation is not the refusal of participation. … The rift within the self—say, between one's gleam of light, on the one hand, and one's inheritance from the past of constraints given by culture, on the other—cannot be fully overcome. One has to live in and through this rift. (Saito 2009, pp. 265–266)

This seems to be in the same line as what Standish argues for when talking about the projective imagination which reiterates a particular idea about "initiation":

> There is something projective about language because the rule-following of language does not finally determine future usage but is always open to new development … The routes of initiation into this meaning-making are never closed. Though ""in a sense" we learn the meanings of words and what objects are, the learning is never over, and we keep finding new potencies in words and new ways in which objects are disclosed" (Cavell 1979, p. 180). Although we may limit meaning stipulatively, in confined circumstances, it cannot all be pinned down, and neither could this be otherwise because words are always available to unforeseen uses; hence the "fierce ambiguity" of ordinary language. This is not only a question of obedience to a rule; it connects with something like membership in a polis, a common world in which judgements are shared, whose projective possibility is precisely the condition of my autonomy, the field in which I work out my personal identity; it is the "creation of (political) freedom". (Cavell 1979, p. 23) (Standish 2007, p. 86)

I would like to add to these passages some of Cavell’s own writing to get clearer about what in his position “initiation” comes down to—this requires, given Cavell’s style of writing, some lengthy quotations of his elaborations:

> To summarize what has been said about this: In “learning language” you learn not merely what the names of things are, but what a name is; not merely what the form of expression is for expressing a wish, but what expressing a wish is; not merely what the word for “father” is, but what a father is; not merely what the word for “love” is, but what love is. In learning language, you do not merely learn the pronunciation of if sounds and their grammatical orders, but the “forms of life” which make those sounds the words they are, do what they do – e.g. name, call, point, express a wish or affection, indicate a choice or an aversion, etc. And Wittgenstein sees the relations amongst *these* forms as “grammatical” also.
>
> Instead, then, of saying either that we *tell* beginners what words mean, or that we *teach* them what objects are, I will say: We initiate them, into the relevant forms of life held in language and gathered around the objects and persons of our world. For that to be possible, we must make ourselves exemplary and take responsibility for that assumption of authority; and the initiate must be able to follow us, in however rudimentary a way, *naturally* (look where our finger points, laugh at what we laugh at, comfort what we comfort, notice what we notice, find alike or remarkable or ordinary what we find alike or remarkable or ordinary, feel pain at what we feel pain at, enjoy the weather or the notion we enjoy, make the sounds we make); and he must *want* to follow us (care about our approval, like a smile better than a frown, a croon better than a croak, a pat better than a slap). “Teaching” here would mean something like “showing them what we say and do”, and “accepting what they say and do as what we say and do”, etc.; and this will be more than we know, or can say. (Cavell 1999, pp. 177–178)

In this passage Cavell argues that we initiate beginners into the relevant forms of life held in language and gathered around the objects and persons of our world. This means, so he continues, that the initiate must be able to follow us naturally and wants to follow us. And when he talks about the concepts formed in human forms of life, he further specifies the need for “inner” constancy:

> I am trying to bring out, and keep in balance, two fundamental facts about human forms of life, and about the concepts formed in those forms: that any form of life and every concept integral to it has an indefinite number of instances and directions of projection; and that this variation is not arbitrary. *Both* the “outer” variance and the “inner” constancy are necessary if a concept is to accomplish its tasks – of meaning, understanding, communicating, etc., and in general guiding us through the world, and relating thought and action and feeling to the world. … The aspect of meaning I am trying to get at, that condition of stability and tolerance I have described as essential to the function of a concept (the use of a word), can perhaps be brought out again this way: to say that a word or concepts has a (stable) meaning is to say that new and the most various instances can be recognized as falling under or failing to fall under that concept; to say that a concept must be tolerant is to say that were we to assign a new word to “every” new instance, no word would have the kind of meaning or power a word like “shoe” has. Or: there would *be* no *instances*, and hence no concepts either. (Cavell 1999, pp. 185–186)

It is also worth mentioning that in dealing with the purport of what philosophers say, he uses again “initiation”: “In such appeals such a philosopher is voicing (reminding us of) *statements of initiation*; telling himself or herself, and us, how in fact we (must) go about things, not predicting this or that performance.” (Cavell 1999, p. 179).

There is a loose way in which “This is what I do” can be given a place in our discussions of meaning. However, it is useful to see how Cavell himself developed this idea to appreciate its bearing more fully. He says:

> When my reasons come to an end and I am thrown back upon myself, upon my nature as it has so far shown itself, I can, supposing I cannot shift the ground of discussion … it may be learning enough to find that I *just do*; to rest upon myself as my foundation … I may find my answers thin, I may feel run out of reasons without being willing to say “This is what I do” …, and honour that. Then I may feel that my foregone conclusions were never conclusions *I* had arrived at, but were merely imbibed by me, merely conventional. I may blunt that realization through hypocrisy or cynicism or bullying. But I may take the occasion to throw myself back upon my culture, and ask why we do what we do, judge as we judge, how we have arrived at these crossroads. … In philosophizing, I have to bring my own language and life into imagination. What I require is a convening of my culture’s criteria, in order to confront them with my words and life as I pursue them and as I may imagine them; and at the same time to confront my words and life as I pursue them with the life my culture’s words may imagine for me: to confront the culture with itself, along the lines in which it meets in me. This seems to me a task that warrants the name of philosophy. … In this light, philosophy becomes the education of grownups. … The anxiety in teaching, in serious communication, is that I myself require education. And for grownups this is not natural growth, but *change*. Conversion is a turning of our natural reactions; so it is symbolized as rebirth. (Cavell 1999, pp. 124–125)

And on the appropriateness of a projection he writes:

> If words and phrases *must* recur (which means, as I put it, that they must they must be projected into new context, which means that new contexts must tolerate or invite that projection); and if there are no rules or universals which *insure* appropriate projection, but only our confirmed capacity to speak to one another; then a new projection, though not at first obviously appropriate, may be made appropriate by giving relevant explanations of how it is to be taken, *how* the new context is *an* instance of the old concept. If we are to communicate, we mustn’t leap too far; but how far is too far? If two masters of a language disagree about the appropriateness of a projection, then it cannot be obvious who is right. If this is a linguistic conflict, then one side will win out. Language does not develop every way it *could* develop; and any wait it develops, which becomes shared, will be “natural”. But in the philosophical conflict about “what should be said” the peculiarity is that neither side just “wins out”. As long as there are “sides” here, each must remain convinced that it alone is right. Then each party to the conflict will find his or her personal solution to an intellectually intractable historical crossroads. (Cavell 1999, p. 192)

Notwithstanding this, I take the point that in some passages, Cavell sees education foremost as self-education, for example when talking about the teaching of the theory of the social contract he argues:

> But whether the private motive of the theorist is to justify his conviction that the present is one of those few moments at which a dismantling of the artefact is called for, or whether to justify his view that this is never called for, the philosophical significance of the writing lies in its imparting of political education: it is philosophical because its method is an examination of myself by an attack upon my assumptions; it is political because the terms of this self-examination are the terms which reveal me as a member of a polis; it is education not because I learn new information but because I learn that the finding and forming of my knowledge of myself requires the finding and forming of my knowledge of that membership (the depth of my own and the extent of those joined with me). (Cavell 1999, p. 25)

It is, however, a further step to focus exclusively on this use of education and to forget wilfully what he argued for concerning "initiation" and the need for a constancy of meaning. He talks of philosophy as the education of grown-ups. Does this not presuppose that there is also a use of education more generally? That there are likely to be similarities between a general use and in the context of grown-ups should not commit us to abstain from all the differences. Of the education that I require (i.e. as a grown-up) he says that it is about change and rebirth, not natural growth, does this not suggest that it has to be distinguished from the way to conceive education for not yet grown-ups? Evidence of this can also be found in his use of "masters of language" (see above) and more generally in what he says about initiation (when he deals with the philosopher's voice). His talking about the father tongue should I think therefore be seen in a context of self-education, a derivative use of education to identify that there is never an attained self, that the self is always *en route*, the endless journey of self-overcoming and self-realization as Saito identifies this. That words that I must inherit can impel me towards conformity cannot bracket that a particular meaning is and needs to be passed on when one gets embedded in, a form of life. Such is the case also for Wittgenstein when he says that doubt comes after belief. That every situation is in some sense new (different from a previous one—even when it has all the similarities of the previous one, if that is possible, it comes *after* a previous one which the first situation lacks) is the price to be paid for the meaning-as-use position which tackles the idling of language when an essence is invoked. That cannot mean, however, that because every situation is new the self and is compelled to speak and act in that sense differently (for whatever reason such as to avoid conformity). It is such shifting of the balance that necessitates Cavell's treading lightly. To me, his insights are very far removed from the preoccupation of Foucault with power and the dealing with that, according to Hodgson, by way of negotiation. It is of course not the case that we cannot depart from the hold of the past, but it is questionable I think that this characterizes education and child-rearing in general. When it is argued that the routes of initiation are never closed, that concept is used for two different things: initiation and (by definition) newness in every situation. From the insight that critique consists in seeking ways to practice our freedom, it does not follow that all speaking and acting has to be conceived in that way, i.e. is critique. That the subject is committed in what she says is not quite the same as Foucault's truth-telling (one thing being not clear here is what truth comes down to if it is different from embracing solipsism). The authors interpreting the Cavellian stance dealt with above seem to downplay the difference between initiation and the sophisticated further development of use and appropriateness of words and as a consequence they deny the so-called preparatory stage.

Finally, I want to draw attention to a passage where Cavell deals with the teacher who recognizes that he has exhausted justifications; here, Cavell's move is not to jump straightforwardly to doing something altogether unexpected; this is what he writes:

> …when the teacher recognizes that he has exhausted the justifications, and concludes that further explanations are useless, he has various choices: to express his exasperation; to quit the scene; to wait, as it were to lean upon his spade; or to turn back to whatever he was doing before this impasse, perhaps to use the spade on nearby ground, or to show why he was digging, say by replanting a young tree, or by sinking a post, which may or may not elicit further interest and response from the pupil. (Cavell 2005, pp. 113–114)

This should not be interpreted as an incentive to escape the given:

> The gap, or distorted relation, between intention (or wish or feeling) and its execution, and between execution and consequence, is what the sense of "absurdity" is a response to. But then how does the gap or distortion appear, and how can it be closed? In Wittgenstein's view the gap between mind and the world is closed, or the distortion between them straightened, in the appreciation and acceptance of particular human forms of life, human "convention". This implies that the *sense* of gap originates in an attempt, or wish, to escape (to remain a stranger to, alienated from) those shared forms of life, to give up the responsibility of their maintenance. (Cavell 1999, p. 109)

What Cavell stresses is the "*sense* of the gap", the attempt, wish to escape from the shared forms of life and the way Wittgenstein deals with this. The importance here of the appreciation and acceptance of particular human forms of life cannot be underestimated.

6 Embedded in a Form of Life: The Grown-up, the Educator, the Parent and the Child

For Cavell, the return to the ordinary is required to close the gap. What does this mean in the context of the parent and the child, where education is at stake, when the subject, the one who says "I" and the "Other" is focused on and responsiveness is invoked? Both the adult and the child have to take responsibility for what they say. Yet this cannot mean that both of them find themselves in the same position. Can the relationship between the parent and the child be modelled after the relationship between adults, and if so, to what extent? What is the nature of the resistance towards the given (including what Cavell identifies as the shared forms of life)? Is there always a need to escape conformity, for departure? For the sake of not conforming? Could the assent to what is given not also evoke a positive appreciation the worthwhileness of what is passed on? In order to avoid that things get out of proportion what is required I think is a more subtle, balanced view.

That the grown-up's self cannot be thought of as an attained self but always has to be seen in the process of attaining a next self and what this implies for her relationship with other grown-ups does not mean quite the same thing for the child and her relationship with a grown-up—and though there are in some situations certainly some resemblances this does not imply that one can talk about the child along the same lines as one talks about the grown-up in this matter. Here are some examples. Raising children requires the parent in many situations to explain why certain things are the case, why certain things need to be done, why restraint is

required and demanded, why the child should behave in a particular way. When there are no more sandwiches with cheese left, it makes sense to offer the child another sandwich when she insists she is still hungry and why so; being taught to say "thank you" is not only more well behaved but contributes possibly also to a more pleasant way of dealing with each other; and the answer to the question, over and over again whether we are almost at our destination or not when travelling by car, may relax the child (by being initiated into the "grammar" of space and time) when she is explained how far or close we are. There are situations where reasons are and have to be given why certain behaviour is disruptive for others such as when screaming, shouting and jumping up and down in the car happens for example on the way for a visit to the zoo; and when asking (again) whether the cheese (for a spaghetti) will arrive or not, the parent may explain why it is rude to behave in such a way. Obviously, there will be resistance on behalf of the child when she finds herself rebuked, yet it is to be hoped for that the reasons that are offered will ease the pain. Isn't growing up to a large extent to be characterized by such a kind of initiation? And isn't this what characterizes the parents' responsiveness towards their children? This is at stake when it is asked whether parents have done enough or whether they should have done something else. Similarly, the child's initiation into the form of life, into the setting of what makes sense (is the case, is valuable etc.) should not be seen as to be resisted or to depart from right from the very beginning but at least be given some time to be able to appreciate it (to understand better what is passed on), possibly to be continued, possibly to be changed (and resisted). Because they care for their children, love them, parents put up with the difficulties of the daily living together; this makes their life more encompassing; this is what being a parent is about. It may create joy and fulfilment, as well as a good amount of frustration, but it is never easy, and they cannot walk away from it. Is this not what being a parent is about? What would it mean in this context to talk of departure, doing something unexpected, or to practice freedom differently? Can the child? Can the adult? Without questioning the adult can be surprised by what the child says or does and this may press the parent to reconsider her position—such a disruption by the child does not question, however, the importance of initiation. But what would change, departure and practicing freedom differently mean for the child, who may not as yet have realized what is possibly at stake? At this point conformity, resistance and doing something different may not make sense as there is not yet something that has been taken up and that because of that can be resisted.

Closing the gap requires initiation, for being able to speak oneself, for becoming part of the polis, for understanding what it means to say "I", and at the same time for being responsive towards the other. Though none of the authors I have dealt with above when discussing how they make sense of Cavell's insights would I trust deny the importance of this, they seem to stress much more the other side of the coin, i.e. the never ending process of attainment of the self. Indeed, there is no end to that, but surely being initiated is required to be able to speak of the never ending of the possibility of initiation. Yet the latter becomes, it seems to me, a derivative use, not the way one uses initiation naturally. Cavell insists: what is required is

inner constancy; and for that one needs to be initiated. There may be of course different stances about what needs to be done concerning a particular case, even conflicts or dilemma's, yet justifications can and should be given, up to the point of their exhaustion. And it may in some situations not be possible to resolve these. But all of that does not push me to give up even before such an exercise has begun. A distinction should therefore be made between the grown-up's relationship with others, and with her "self" on the one hand and the relationship of a grown-up with a child (either as a teacher or a parent). Being responsive to the child requires of us to take up responsibility for her initiation into the world (which has cognitive but also normative dimensions) in a way that is not the same in relationships with other grown-ups.

To appreciate what is given requires us to take seriously the purport and the standing of those reasons, those arguments, as well as to appreciate how a present situation differs from a previous one—if it is not that what would the meaning of an argument be? It cannot be about the change for the sake of change: in a logical sense change is unavoidable, in its directional sense a case needs to be made every time again and again.

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This Is Simply What I Do Too: A Response to Paul Smeyers

Paul Standish

Abstract This essay offers a response to Chap. 16 by Smeyers (2017), entitled: *"This is simply what I do." On the relevance of Wittgenstein's alleged conservatism and the debate about Cavell's legacy for children and grown-ups.* It answers to Smeyers' critique of what he identifies as a trend in the reception of Stanley Cavell's work in the philosophy of education, especially in terms of the bearing this has on the understanding of Wittgenstein. Through their preoccupation with the themes of practising freedom differently and departure, and through unrealistic characterisations of the relationship between adults and children, Smeyers claims, authors such as Naomi Hodgson, Stefan Ramaekers, Naoko Saito, and Paul Standish have generated confusions that do justice neither to Wittgenstein nor to Cavell. In particular, they have failed to understand the nature and importance of cultural initiation. The present response takes issue with these claims. It agrees with Smeyers about the importance of cultural initiation but—revisiting questions of authority, training, childhood, and community—argues for a reading of Wittgenstein, in part informed by Cavell, that more accurately accounts for the relationships involved. It also indicates ways in which Cavell moves beyond Wittgenstein and thereby revisits the question of what it is to be a grown-up.

Keywords Authority · Conservatism · Initiation · Training · Cavell · Wittgenstein

1 On Context

At a relatively late stage, in Sect. 5, of Smeyers' (2017) interesting critique of a recent trend in the interpretation of Wittgenstein, he includes no less than seven lengthy quotations from Stanley Cavell. He justifies this on the grounds that there is a need to "get clearer about what in his position 'initiation' comes down to", and "this requires,

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M.A. Peters and J. Stickney (eds.), *A Companion to Wittgenstein on Education*,
DOI 10.1007/978-981-10-3136-6_17

given Cavell's style of writing, some lengthy quotations of his elaborations" (Smeyers, this volume). It is necessary to return to the words of Wittgenstein and Cavell as an antidote to the confusions in this recent trend. He finds such confusions in my own work, as well as in that of Naoko Saito, Stefan Ramaekers, and Naomi Hodgson—in writings that have extended this line of interpretation in relation to Cavell's readings of Emerson, Thoreau, and ordinary language philosophy, and to Foucault. The quotations present rich paragraphs from Cavell. They are, I might playfully suggest, the most compelling parts of Smeyers' paper, though he brings together an array of fine quotations from Wittgenstein too. Yet—a more serious point —so much of what is at stake here depends heavily on context: Smeyers is right that we need to see more of what Cavell says in order to gain a better idea of what he means. Indeed, his work has suffered through being quoted selectively, with the effect that his writings are cherry-picked and turned towards something other than he intends. To quote extensively is in effect to acknowledge the risk that things may be taken out of context. Yet this is a risk that Smeyers' criticism does not always avoid in respect of the work that is his concern. This, in my view, is part of what is happening in the misunderstanding I find in his account, which is not to deny the points where we are more simply in disagreement. His criticism is not just of my work, but of course, in what follows, I speak primarily for myself.

The misunderstanding that arises from selective quotation attaches especially to Smeyers' central concern: this is that the interpretation in question underestimates, or misconstrues the significance of, cultural initiation. I take it that the following conception of what this means will be common ground between us. Cultural initiation is to be understood, first and foremost, at quite a basic level: the shaping of the child's behaviour, right down to the level of the guiding of her body, and her inculcation into rule-following practices. A major part of this initiation will mean that the child knows how to go on in an appropriate way, appropriateness being determined by the community in which she is brought up. She does this not as the result of a process of deliberation but rather as a matter of course. Such embedding in the patterns of the community forms the basis for her later development. It is integral to those powers of reasoning and deliberation that will gradually develop, the necessary condition for her later autonomy, crucial to the progressive sophistication of her sensibility and judgement—this and so much more.

Smeyers begins his paper with a discussion of Wittgenstein's conservatism, and indeed, this figures in his subtitle: "On the relevance of Wittgenstein's alleged conservatism and the debate about Cavell's legacy for children and grown-ups". In part, this focuses on Wittgenstein's somewhat enigmatic remark: "Philosophy may in no way interfere with the actual use of language; it can in the end only describe it. For it cannot give it any foundation either. It leaves everything as it is" (PI, I, §124).[1] Again Smeyers is right about the dangers of taking things out of context. As he puts this:

[1]Following convention, titles for Wittgenstein's works are abbreviated (CV = Culture and Value, PI = Philosophical Investigations, OC = On Certainty), with section (§) or page number (p.), with full citation and initials in the References.

> Taking §124 out of context implies the impotence of philosophy; instead, let us consider that Wittgenstein's point had to do with language alone. Wittgenstein does not say that everything in our understanding remains the same nor that everything in the world remains the same, only the language. (Smeyers, this volume)

If this is Wittgenstein's stance *tout court*, it is obviously wrong: philosophy does change the language we use, as the widespread effects of Cartesian dualism and logical positivism clearly show (see Standish 2012). It is surely the case that Wittgenstein hoped that his own philosophy would undo the knots in our understanding or release us from pictures that hold us captive as manifested in the language we use: that is, a proper reading of his philosophy *would* alter this language. But Wittgenstein's stance *is* anti-theoretical and opposed especially to the advancing of theories in philosophy. Philosophy is not a set of doctrines but an activity providing a critique of language. While language can be reformed "for particular practical purposes" (PI, I, §132), by asking whether a word is ever actually used in that particular way in the language game that is its original home (PI, I, §116), philosophy, as critique of language, is said not to be "a reformative undertaking but a descriptive one, which should show us for instance when language is merely idling" (Smeyers, this volume). Smeyers is right to say that Wittgenstein's anti-theoretical stance is an attack on the subsumption of philosophy under science. My view is that his remarks in §124 need to be seen rather more specifically in this light (see Standish 1992, 1995). Plainly it is not the case that philosophy leaves everything as it is if "philosophy" is taken to refer to the ("non-scientific") kinds of enquiries that Plato was engaged in, including at their heart questions about how one should live and about the constitution of the *polis*. The remarks have their most obvious purchase against much of the philosophy that was current at the time that Wittgenstein was writing, the ("scientific") philosophy with which he had been most engaged, and they are surely directed in part at the author of the *Tractatus*. Probably the returning of words to the language games that are their original homes works better as a heuristic than as a guarantee of good sense.

Smeyers' position with regard to the idea that Wittgenstein is conservative seems in the end to be somewhat equivocal, and this is right in a way. There were surely conservative aspects to Wittgenstein's general outlook, as indicated for example by his aesthetic tastes. But the pertinence of this question to the present discussion is mainly to do with what Smeyers says in the following remarks about initiation:

> What lies at the basis of the language-game, and therefore is presupposed to ground it, surely includes the regularity of custom; this represents a foundation only insofar as the network of convictions inside of which we carry on must rely upon it. And the fact that one takes over forms and concepts is not itself conditioned by forms and concepts, but by modes of acting. Again, by indicating that language-games are to be understood within a practice, this should not be understood as implying that they must be justified by something else. It is merely a different way of indicating how language-games cannot be spoken of other than with or within the context of a particular human practice. Therefore, philosophy does not put us in a position to justify or to criticize what we do by showing that it meets or fails to meet requirements we lay down in our philosophizing. (Smeyers, this volume)

At the end of this paragraph and section, Smeyers adverts to Cora Diamond's view that it is in this sense that philosophy leaves everything as it is (Diamond 1995, p. 69). In fact, Cora Diamond is among those who have resisted most strongly the idea that Wittgenstein is a conservative thinker, particularly in the light of the major changes in his thinking about mathematics. Nevertheless, the broad point stands: children are initiated into ways of doing things as a precondition of what they will later go on to do.

But where in the literature that Smeyers criticises is this denied? I do not presume to speak for my colleagues, but I can say that I do not see them denying the background in initiation in the way that is claimed. It also needs to be acknowledged that they are not just trying to provide a scholarly exegesis but to do something with the ideas in question that is relevant to education. So how do these differences in perception come about?

The word "freedom" and its cognates appear recurrently in Smeyers' paper, and it is obvious that this is a volatile term—both volatile and of immense importance in accounts of education. Its potential emotive force can easily carry connotations that lead the reader astray. Without appropriate reference to context, the emphasis on "departure", "newness", and "next steps" may easily become distorted. Two figures of freedom haunt the wider literature pertinent to the philosophy of education. The first is the Sartrean hero, whose recognition of his freedom is exemplified in the celebration of the *acte gratuit*. A cartoon version of this creation identifies an ideal of human being in free-wheeling independence of others, unconstrained by roots or responsibility (other than to themselves), and bold in the exercise of their freedom of choice. The second is the iconic figure of Emile, which has been such a powerful influence in progressive education and in the understanding of childhood (Rousseau 1979). If in Sartre's hero, freedom is something to be achieved through being exercised, taken up for oneself in the recognition of one's radical responsibility, for Rousseau it is there from the start and natural to the young child, requiring only that society leaves it unfettered. Pointing up the dangers through caricature here is intended to help in clearly differentiating the more subtle positions to be found in the texts under criticism. Conversely, it should work to prevent the takeover of such important matters by simplistic notions of freedom. Whatever is being said in the texts in question, it is something different from what is embodied in either of these figures, and it is not at odds with the acknowledgement of cultural initiation.

But there is room also for considering the range of interpretation that the idea of cultural initiation admits. This brings to the fore complex questions about rule-following and authority, and about the nature of thought, language, and meaning, through which cultures and worlds are constituted. Indeed, these are critical points around which so much interpretation of Wittgenstein has turned. So it will not do for any of us to appeal to these terms as stopping points in the discussion, any more than it will suffice to sloganize "receptiveness", "departure", "the father tongue", "the next self", "the leap", or "the unexpected". In other words, there are dangers on all fronts, and it is in a sense a problem that the texts of Wittgenstein and, in a different way, Cavell include phrasing that is so amenable to quotation and repetition, often in the absence of proper sensitivity to the wider

context. Long quotations from Cavell help to ease the difficulty; selective quotation from the authors under fire tends to make matters worse. What needs to be shown is that the threads of thought these highlighted expressions bring together offer ways of clarifying and substantiating the ideas of cultural initiation that are rightly Smeyers' concern. In what follows, the implications of these expressions should become evident in the line of interpretation I shall pursue. But before this there are certain things that need to be set out more clearly.

2 On Cavell's Wittgenstein

First, there is a difference between Wittgenstein and Cavell. Some of the topics that are at issue in Smeyers' paper are found explicitly in Cavell but not in Wittgenstein. Cavell stands in a relation to Wittgenstein that is different from what is found in much Wittgenstein scholarship. He read the *Investigations* soon after it was published, but it was not until some years later that he came back to it and was affected more deeply. In the meantime, he had encountered J.L. Austin, whose work and influence laid the way for his own appropriation of ordinary language philosophy. As with other educated Americans of his generation, he knew Emerson and Thoreau from his school days, but it was in writing his little book *The Senses of Walden* (1972)[2] and through his later writings on Emerson, from the 1980s onwards, that he became more deeply involved in their ideas—ideas in which the common, the low, and the everyday are recurrently present. Emerson and Thoreau have at most a marginal role in research on Wittgenstein, and where they are present, it is mostly through Cavell's influence. In analytical philosophy, they are virtually invisible. Hence, the diverse origins of the ideas in question in Smeyers' discussion need to be taken into account. But the larger point is really that Cavell is not so much a scholarly interpreter or exegete of Wittgenstein but someone who stands in a more dialogical relationship with his work. More specifically, he reads the *Investigations*; it is perhaps eccentric that he does not read *On Certainty*, even though that text is so much more obviously about scepticism—for Cavell a central theme. He reads the *Investigations* because he finds that he can work with it and that he can do this to produce something new. Yes, of course, he is concerned to explore and attend to what that work means, but he moves through it and beyond it in various ways. As Wittgenstein himself puts it in the Preface to the *Investigations*, "I should not like my writing to spare other people the trouble of thinking. But, if

[2]Cavell wrote *The Senses of Walden* (1972) in a period of some six weeks in the summer of 1971, roughly at a mid-point in the sixteen years that it took him to produce *The Claim of Reason*. Written in part in disgust at the US involvement in the Vietnam War, it is a book that follows Thoreau in asking, in effect: where do we find ourselves? It is a book that ponders the significance of the USA into which he has been initiated and what it is that the USA has become.

possible, to stimulate someone to thoughts of his own" (PI, p. viii). Thus, Cavell's reading is not exploitative in any way: it is reading in a high sense.[3]

One of the obvious ways in which he moves beyond the *Investigations* is in his writings about film and literature. The kind of attention to ordinary language that he found in Austin, and the sense of the ordinary found in Emerson and Thoreau, is here turned to careful examination of film sequences or sections of dialogue in a way that one plainly does not find in Wittgenstein. The dialogical form of Wittgenstein's later writings relies on a provocation to the reader that disturbs thought, often because what is being said is somewhat uncanny, even surreal. This is other than the attention to ordinary interactions that film (especially) and literature can foreground.[4]

It is also the case that Emerson and Thoreau openly address questions concerning how one should live and, hence, what a good society might be. They raise ideas that connect at times with the wider range of Wittgenstein's remarks, and so it could be said that these are themes that are there recessively in Wittgenstein's philosophical work. Consider, for example, his concern to reorient the investigation so that it turns around the axis of our real need.[5] Consider also what it is to be aspect-blind (PI, II p. 214) and how, as is completely obvious, this extends beyond responses to puzzle pictures to point to the kind of blindness that blinkers our approach to philosophy itself or that blights our moral lives. Such blindness can arise where someone is stuck, where they are not ready to let go or to leave their accustomed view.

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[3]Thoreau writes: "The works of the great poets have never yet been read by mankind, for only great poets can read them. They have only been read as the multitude read the stars, at most astrologically, not astronomically. Most men have learned to serve a paltry convenience, as they have learned to cipher in order to keep accounts and not be cheated in trade; but of reading as a noble intellectual exercise they know little or nothing; yet this only is reading, in a high sense, not that which lulls us as a luxury and suffers the nobler faculties to sleep the while, but what we have to stand on tip-toe to read and devote our most alert and wakeful hours to" (Thoreau 1983, p. 149). The implications of these remarks can be updated so that the target would be the kind of professionalised philosophy with which both Wittgenstein and Cavell have found themselves at odds. The alternative is an engagement in which one finds oneself continually challenged and stretched.

[4]Smeyers takes me to task for my endorsement of Cavell's remark that the routes of initiation are never closed. In a salient passage in *The Claim of Reason*, Cavell describes statements in ordinary language philosophy along the lines of "When we say … we are implying …" as "*statements of initiation*" (Cavell 1979, p. 179). I take this to be wholly other than an arbitrary, deliberative, or legislative move: it is not predicting or even exactly prescribing this or that performance. The philosopher is trying to find herself in relation to the language into which she has been initiated, the place she has come from: in this sense, it is a retrieval of that language, an acknowledgement of that place—in a sense, a continuing initiation. But that language is and always was projective, as we shall shortly see. This is there in the dialogue of the films to which Cavell gives such careful attention.

[5]In the *Investigations*, Wittgenstein writes: "One might say: the axis of reference of our examination must be rotated, but about the fixed point of our real need" (PI §108). And in *On Certainty*: "I do not explicitly learn the propositions that stand fast for me. I can *discover* them subsequently like the axis around which a body rotates. This axis is not fixed in the sense that anything holds it fast, but the movement around it determines its immobility" (OC §152).

3 On Departure

Smeyers is troubled by the insistence on the importance of readiness for departure, yet departure is always *from somewhere*. In any case, the need for departure is implicit in Wittgenstein's reminder of how a certain picture can hold us captive (PI §115). Later, he remarks that language sometimes conveys a picture to us—say, of the evolution of the higher animals. The crucial thing is what we do with this picture, how we explore it. The danger is that the picture seems to spare us the work: "it already points to a particular use", Wittgenstein writes. "This is how it takes us in" (PI, II, p. 184). The tenor of the *Investigations* is such that such things appear not as problems to be solved once and for all—say, in the manner that the younger Wittgenstein believed that he had solved the problems of philosophy: on the contrary, philosophy is now addressed to an overcoming of recurrent difficulties, in which problems are not so much solved as dissolved (PI §132). The therapeutic dimensions of this have to do with undoing the knots in our understanding, with the restoring of language to its everyday use, and with the finding of peace. But this, like peace on this earth, will be temporary and provisional. There are questions about the nature of philosophy here, but the idea of therapy to which appeal is made can have a bearing on our lives as a whole. There *is* a kind of responsibility, a responsibility to change one's life.[6]

There is, moreover, a logical point to be made: far from the caricatures of freedom sketched above, departure, as we saw, can only be from somewhere, and that somewhere is *inter alia* the place into which we were culturally initiated. In a sense, as Cavell's autobiography[7] shows, this is a departure to which we inevitably return. Our relation to our past is not just to a chronology that stretches back in linear fashion: the past, including the form and character of our early cultural initiation, loops back into our present and projects into our future. Is it too far-fetched to find something of this nonlinear looping movement in a text so obviously different from autobiography as ordinarily understood, in the *Investigations* itself? Perhaps the movements of thought sketched in the Preface do indeed imply something like this. Taken out of context, such a thought may strain credulity, yet this is, of course, one to which Cavell is drawn: that the writing of philosophy—philosophy of a certain kind, at least—involves a confessional element, as the opening of the *Investigations* seems to signal and to which Wittgenstein's often tortured involvement in his task seems to testify. Knowing how to go on will often involve some kind of retracing of

[6]"Working in philosophy—like work in architecture in many respects—is really more a working on oneself. On one's own interpretation. On one's way of seeing things. (And what one expects from them.)" (CV, p. 16).

[7]Cavell's memoir, as he prefers to call it, *Little Did I Know* (2010), uses a double-time scheme. The text is written as a series of diary entries spanning the years during which the book was written, and contemporary details—say, about medical appointments or the difficulties of getting to sleep the previous night—intersect with recollections and reflections on the past.

one's steps, the better to know where we find ourselves. But this leads me to what, I think, is crucial in the interpretation of the idea of initiation, and to divergences in interpretation of Wittgenstein that do not really surface in Smeyers' account. Much of this turns on the notion of following a rule.

4 On Rules and Authority

There are rules, such as the rules of chess, that have a particular authority because they are fixed. To play chess, you must accept the rules. Not to accept the rules would be not only not to play the game but also in a sense not to understand what the game was. There is no room for questioning here. Of course, it may come about over time that a decision is made to change the rules. Then, it will be a different game.[8] But to see the rules of social practices and, especially, to see the nature of language in this way is to make an important mistake. One point about language games is that it will be impossible to legislate in advance about what will constitute an intelligible move in the game. This is so because there is fluidity and open-endedness to the game, as there is to the signs of which it is in large part constituted. This is emphatically not to rule out notions of appropriateness and correctness. "This is the way we do this, you can't do that like that", and so on will inevitably figure in the language game: How else will the newcomer be initiated into it? Sometimes, they will be guided in this by being given a rule; often, they will learn through being given examples of good practice. And it is important that it could scarcely be otherwise: it is in the nature of signs themselves that they are open to new uses, to use in unforeseen ways, just as nothing ultimately determines what will constitute a meaningful, and hence potentially appropriate, continuation of the mathematical series (see Standish 2016, Chap. 12 in this volume). This open-endedness of use does not deny the authority of the elders in the community into which the child is brought. Indeed, the child will be shown what to do, initially by being guided in quite basic physical ways, and then led through a variety of different practices in which language will progressively come to the fore. There is indeed a kind of violence to this, if the interruption of natural instinctive behaviour can be characterised as violent: there is nothing natural about toilet training. Or, to take a more benign example, learning to sit up will involve the child's initially being held up, then propped up until she learns to balance, and then picked up when she falls over, while later more culturally specific standards will come to be emphasised, across a vast range of our social world ("Sit up straight. Don't slouch.").

The phrase "cultural initiation" is somewhat elastic, and a newcomer to the discussion might well assume that this refers primarily to an initiation into the cultural inheritance understood as comprising the traditions and values of a society,

[8]Questions of degree do apply.

rather along the lines of those expressed in the notorious British Citizenship Test or of an unquestioned celebration of the culture's highest achievements. So this would be to see conservatism in the manner of the dictionary definition that Smeyers quotes: the conservative person is "averse to change or innovation and holding to traditional attitudes and values, typically in relation to politics or religion" (Smeyers, this volume). Tradition of that kind in education has of course produced its reactions, in the development of child-centred or progressive education, though I take it that this is not the nub of Smeyers' concerns.

My impression of progressive education, especially as this was manifested in its heyday in the 1960s and 1970s, was that in spite of its significant achievements in overcoming the mindless imparting of facts and unnecessary authoritarianism, and in attending to children as people, as individuals with their differences, it lacked a realisation of the importance of what was being passed on. It gave too much attention to the manner and insufficient to the matter of education, in R.S. Peters' phrase, and it sometimes sought to sustain itself through the reiteration of worthy principles and apparently right-minded precepts, although these easily degenerated into slogans and sentimentality. To some extent, the restatement of a liberal education that was made partly in response to this, by Peters and his colleagues, Paul Hirst, and Robert Dearden—and the parallel arguments that were advanced by Israel Scheffler in the USA—addressed the problem well. But my sense was that although they claimed to be influenced by Wittgenstein, they failed properly to think through the implications of his philosophy and its legacy. A part of what was needed was a clearer sense of what cultural initiation might mean. In the work of these philosophers of education, there is advanced an influential account of education as initiation into the "forms of knowledge" (Hirst 1965)—that is, ways of understanding the world that are part of the cultural inheritance. The inheritance they have in mind is common to human kind in that a form of knowledge (such as history, mathematics, literary appreciation) is in principle available and relevant to all. A key aspect of the epistemology of this conception of the curriculum is that knowledge is not all-of-a-piece, and this is an idea that was evidently supported by Wittgenstein's conception of the language game. Each of the forms of knowledge was taken to enable the learner to think in a different way. As the variety of forms could be shown, on this view, to be limited (to about seven ways of enquiry into and understanding of the world), it followed that a properly rounded liberal education would introduce the learner to all of these. An education lacking in one or the other would be tantamount to a restriction on the learner's possibilities: it would be a limitation of their developing freedom; it would limit their development of mind.

But this was a distortion of Wittgenstein's thinking especially because of the way that it intellectualised the language game and as a result obscured the far more radical implications of his work. One cannot simply read off Wittgenstein's work any immediate recommendations for the construction of the curriculum, which is not to say that it cannot serve to expose the errors in so much policy-making and curriculum theory. In fact, in 1995, Smeyers himself, in collaboration with James C. Marshall, produced a collection of essays that showed that this was so.

My point here, however, is slightly broader than this in that inattention to Wittgenstein's placing of rule-following, correction, and authority, as is illustrated in the case of Peters, Hirst, and Dearden, can lead to the use of these notions as a means of legitimation in ways he did not intend. This is not to deny the place of authority at higher levels of education, but it is to press the point that these will depend upon something rather different from the authority of the elder in the newcomer's initiation into the language game at the more basic level that is Wittgenstein's main concern. What constitutes authority in, for example, eating practices—that is, how to hold the chopsticks, pick up the food with your hand, and hold the fork—is different from what constitutes it in the study of history or physics. If we are not to eat like animals, we must eat somehow, and that somehow will be arbitrary in some degree. The elders in a community will tell you what to do and that is the end of the story. But the authority of the historian or the physicist will depend upon developed reasoning and a relation to the truth that is of a quite different order. It will also depend upon a tradition of enquiry in which criticism and original thought are of the essence. Forms of authority of more complex practical kinds extend from these examples. When it comes to schooling, it may turn out that old-fashioned, strictly "disciplined", highly authoritarian methods are the best way forward, but there is nothing in Wittgenstein's account of language games that would directly underwrite this.[9]

One thing that Cavell draws attention to in this initiation is that the learner will make original connections at a very early stage—for example, deviating from the rule, as it were, but finding new uses for a word, sometimes amusing extensions that are passed down in family history ("When I was very small, I used to call furry rugs 'kitty'."[10]). The point is that it is the very nature and structure of signs that makes this possible. None of this would be possible if the child had not been brought into the community. But it is very early on that variations on those patterns are found. Is there ever a time when they are not there? It is helpful to see the spark of originality that is there, even in the infant, as produced not by some natural power so much as by its participation in what is already a language world, with all the potentiality for the new

[9]With regard to Wittgenstein, it is true that his use of the word *Abrichten* (training) suggests techniques that would overlap with the training of animals. It is also notoriously the case that in his own career as a teacher, he was sometimes brutal in his treatment of children. This is hardly sufficient to suggest, however, that he had formulated such approaches in anything like an explicit pedagogy! Nor should it be surprising that the training of young children, at least, should have overlaps with the training of animals, as some of my examples perhaps help to show. The young child needs to be initiated into the language game, and in some cases, this will involve a guiding of the body and a correction of its movements. The model holds in some degree, literally and metaphorically, for more sophisticated kinds of practice. But this does not explain exactly how this should be done. Hirst also is at pains to say that the "logic" of education that he describes carries no necessary prescriptions as to how this should be carried out (see, e.g. Hirst and Peters 1970). Once again, it is likely to be the case that context is all important.

[10]I borrow from Cavell's example in *The Claim of Reason* (Cavell 1979, pp. 171–172). Further discussion is provided in "Seeing connections: from cats and classes to characteristics and cultures" (Standish 2017, this volume).

that signs necessarily have. The fallacy would be to think of this cultural initiation simply as one of moulding the child: the child is not as malleable as this would imply, and the culture (with its signs) is more open, less under authoritarian control, itself less like a mould into which the child is to be shaped.

5 On Grown-Ups

The picture that is emerging is one in which boundaries are blurred, but where a particular vocabulary can work overtime to reinforce prejudices that the substance of the text does not otherwise sustain. Taking the line I have followed thus far has inevitably led me to stray beyond the letter of Wittgenstein's texts. But those texts are such as to prompt questions about what Wittgenstein means, what Cavell thinks, and what indeed is the case in human life, and these can interact fruitfully. Once again, this is to go beyond purely scholarly exegesis.

Smeyers refers to my own dismissive remarks about Richard Rorty's well-known distinction between the socialising role of compulsory schooling and the critical function of higher education. It might be said charitably that the point that Rorty is trying to bring out may be that much in education needs to be laid down before criticism can meaningfully get underway. The truth embedded here is that much criticism founders if it is not steeped in relevant knowledge of the field. In other words, there is much that just needs to be learned. I refer to Rorty's distinction as "wilfully simplistic" on the grounds that it is obvious—at least to anyone who has been a teacher or thought much about the children they are bringing up—that criticism begins much earlier and indeed is integral to what is studied. It is difficult to make sense of what good teachers in schools actually do, even with quite young children, if Rorty's division is accepted. But Smeyers also finds reason to mark a division along the following lines:

> A distinction should therefore be made between the grown-up's relationship with others, and with her "self" on the one hand and the relationship of a grown-up with a child (either as a teacher or a parent). Being responsive to the child requires of us to take up responsibility for her initiation into the world (which has cognitive but also normative dimensions) in a way that is not the same in relationships with other grown-ups.

This is in part intended as a response to contrasts he finds in the work he is criticising—between education in schools and the education of grown-ups, between common and uncommon schools, and between the mother tongue and the father tongue. Unlike the terms of the distinction that Rorty makes, these contrasts plainly employ terms of art. Properly contextualised, the terms can be seen to refer more to aspects of experience than to developmental stages. For example, it would be a mistake if education for grown-ups was equated with "adult education" as commonly understood. The latter phrase refers to the provision of education for adults, typically for those who have left formal education some time ago. The focus of the phrase "education for grown-ups" is more on the question of what it is in the course

of life that enables a person to grow up. "Grown-up" is mostly a child's word, and Cavell exploits the force of this to imply something more philosophically and culturally charged than the administrator's "adult education" could possibly imply. It puts what being grown-up is in question, and this is in part a recursion to the question: "How should I live?"

Smeyers takes me to task for my elaboration of some of these ideas in terms of an "immigrancy of the human", which phrase is intended as a further exploration of themes in Cavell. Smeyers seems to read this as a move in the arena of unfettered freedom or as a denial of roots. But why should this not be understood as involving exactly the reception that is necessary in the young child's initiation into the culture? What is evoked here is not the self-sufficient ego or sovereign freedom but a necessary dependence, in which there is a continuing return to the culture in which one finds oneself. All I know is reception, writes Emerson (1965). And Thoreau, autobiographically, and with more elaborate imagery, asserts that to build you must begin by borrowing an axe, but you can return it sharper than when you borrowed it. These are expressions of acknowledgement of what must come to us from outside. The idea of immigrancy, which is strongly present in Cavell's writings, provides a figuration of human experience that is different from though not wholly at odds with that of exodus: it implies a return to one's cultural initiation, as a penetration of self-containment, and an overcoming of complacency.

Smeyers' title for his paper recalls that famous passage in the *Investigations* in which Wittgenstein speaks of the turning of the spade: "If I have exhausted the justifications I have reached bedrock, and my spade is turned. Then, I am inclined to say: 'This is simply what I do'" (PI, I, §217). He allows the interpretation of this to develop in a particular way, it seems, through one of the long quotations from Cavell, in a reading that partly jars with familiar interpretations of this passage. For some have been struck by the finding of bedrock and paid less attention to the turning of the spade. I recall sometimes hearing the last line of the passage misquoted, as "This is what we do", with the implication that here in the practices of the community one can at last find bedrock. Here at last is the foundation. My sense, as I have explained elsewhere in this collection, is that the twisting of the hand that occurs when the spade is turned signifies a kind of frustration (which chimes with Cavell's "exasperation"). Elsewhere Wittgenstein writes of the riverbed (OC §§94–98) with its shifting sands. The shifting of the sands can occur naturally and through human intervention, where the river is dredged to make way for the movement of river traffic. Dredging needs to be done continually if the river is to be navigable. The place never quite stays the same, but a way of life is sustained.

Let me end by coming back to the main point of emphasis in Smeyers' criticism, which is expressed at the end of his opening paragraph as follows:

> Questioning some of the turns this debate has taken (by stressing for example departure from, practicing freedom differently) it is argued that some authors model every relationship between a grown-up and a child along the lines of the way the grown-up is always in a process of attaining a further next self. Ignoring the distinction between the latter

process and initiation results in confusions which do neither justice to Cavell or Wittgenstein, moreover, they obfuscate relevant distinctions of the nature of education and child-rearing.

There would certainly be something troubling about a parent who saw in their relationship with their child merely an opportunity for attaining a "next self". There is also something troubling about the parent who does not imagine (and perhaps cannot countenance the fact) that, in bringing up a child, they will themselves be changed. But this is to resort to caricature. Of course there are differences between children and adults, and these repay careful attention. I believe I have shown that the threads of thought that have provoked Smeyers' concern offer ways of clarifying and substantiating ideas of cultural initiation.

In the past—and certainly for much more than the past decade or so that Smeyers mentions—I have sometimes been struck by what I took to be a degree of sentimentality in the reception of Wittgenstein. A degree of hagiography would be less surprising (and of course that has been there too), but there is something about education that brings out the sentimental. If I have this right, Smeyers is wary of what he takes to be a similar problem in my work and the other texts he mentions. So there is a degree of irony in this. Maybe we agree about this danger of sentimentality, even though our perceptions of how it arises are different. Surely we agree in finding interest in the questions Wittgenstein's texts raise. It is frustrating to hit bedrock over what we do disagree about here. Yet there is always new ground to be dug, a young tree to be replanted, a post to be sunk. If Smeyers wants to reflect on the significance of cultural initiation for upbringing and education, this in the end is what I do too.[11]

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[11]Jeff Stickney is thanked for very helpful comments and suggestions.

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On “The Temptation to Attack Common Sense”

Renia Gasparatou

Abstract In *The Blue Book* (BB, pp. 58–59), Wittgenstein defends *common sense* as a guide for our thinking and as a relief from mental discomfort. It might stand as a powerful educational ideal. Wittgensteinian *common sense* is related to the practice of *rule-following*. While theories, practices and even norms evolve or change, the mastering of rule-following is what keeps us within the community and within the realm of reason, that is, within *common sense*. Stepping outside amounts to mental discomfort. There is, however, a downside: His attachment to ordinary language “as it is” might be considered a conservative by-product of this argument. Yet such an implication can be avoided. Common sense *is* a promising educational ideal—if only we do not take Wittgenstein too literally. It is an ideal that, in education today, is currently under attack from various sources.

Keywords Common sense · Education · Rule-following · Science · Verificationism · Wittgenstein

1 Introduction

Education happens all the time, in all places and during all our lives. We all know that. However, the moment we hear the word “education” our minds wander back to school. Schools and other educational institutions offer formal education and thus formalize the concept, turning it into a quasi-technical term that goes well with “policy,” “criteria,” “evaluation forms,” and all the rest of the modern educational

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A shorter version appears in the Wittgenstein section of the *Encyclopedia of Educational Philosophy and Theory* (Springer, 2016), co-edited by Nicholas Burbules & Jeff Stickney (Michael A. Peters, Chief Editor).

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M.A. Peters and J. Stickney (eds.), *A Companion to Wittgenstein on Education*,
DOI 10.1007/978-981-10-3136-6_18

vocabulary. The growing formalization of concepts is in line with a verificationist ideology that thrives in formal education: methods and outcomes need to be tested. Scientism lies at the root of verificationism: We need a *scientific* language that measures what students learn in a scientific way; science is a priority anyway, for it informs us of what lies beyond our ordinary conception of the world. Among the goals of education after all is to teach us a more accurate way to describe the world, leaving vulgar common sense behind.

Responding to Wittgenstein's writings, I will argue against the temptation to attack common sense. In the following sections, I will first explore later Wittgenstein's idea of common sense and then I will apply it in education. Wittgensteinian *common sense* is related to the practice of *rule-following*. While theories, practices and even norms evolve or change, the mastering of rule-following is what keeps us within the community and within the realm of reason, that is, within *common sense*. Stepping outside amounts to mental discomfort and calls for clarification practices that will ideally guide us back into common sense.

Educators today have their own share of discomforts to address. Verificationism, scientism and a growing formalization of education have their roots to confusions that are very similar to the ones Wittgenstein discusses in his writings. His ideas might help us dismantle such confusion. His defence of common sense, moreover, can give us some tools for addressing certain varieties of mental discomfort altogether. A Wittgensteinian notion of common sense then might stand as a powerful educational ideal: People should be able to walk their way through puzzlement. Education should not teach us to hide confusion behind technicalities; it should rather enable us to embrace and dismantle it.

2 Wittgensteinian Common Sense

Philosophers often appeal to common sense as a criterion that can help address philosophical problems. It supposedly provides some kind of *consensus* about what it is sensible to say, ask, or mean (Gasparatou 2010). Thomas Reid is among the pioneers who use *common sense* to refer to the sound judgment or to the views of plain men, for both can help undermine the absurd claims of the philosophers (Somerville 1987). Following the same tradition in twentieth-century philosophy, Moore (1993) gives the most well-known "Defence of common sense." His appeal targets the sceptic; he argues that there is a large set of propositions, such as "There exists at present a human body, which is my body" (p. 107), which, even though they are contingent, we all know with certainty; the sceptic also is certain of them. Common sense then refers to a list of truisms, to beliefs held by all.

When Wittgenstein writes about common sense, he has Moore in mind. According to Wittgenstein, common sense cannot provide an answer to scepticism, or any other philosophical problem (Gasparatou 2009a; Stroll 1994). However, Wittgenstein agrees with Moore that common sense needs defending:

> There is no common sense answer to a philosophical problem. One can defend common sense against the attacks of philosophers only by solving their puzzles, i.e., by curing them from the temptation to attack common sense; not by restating the views of common sense. (BB, pp. 58–59)

Wittgenstein's point of view in fact opposes most traditional appeals to common sense. Common sense does not amount to a set of beliefs. Philosophy threatens common sense, but this is not reciprocal. Common sense cannot threaten philosophy, for it cannot answer its questions. Just like it cannot answer scientific questions.

> A philosopher is not a man out of his senses, a man who doesn't see what everybody sees; nor on the other hand is his disagreement with common sense that of the scientist disagreeing with the coarse views of the man in the street. That is, his disagreement is not founded on a more subtle knowledge of fact. We therefore have to look round for the source of his puzzlement. And we find that there is puzzlement and mental discomfort, not only when our curiosity about certain facts is not satisfied or when we can't find a law of nature fitting in with all our experience, but also when a notation dissatisfies us perhaps because of various associations which it calls up. Our ordinary language, which of all possible notations is the one which pervades all our life, holds our mind rigidly in one position, as it were, and in this position sometimes it feels cramped, having a desire for other positions as well. Thus we sometimes wish for a notation which stresses a difference more strongly, makes it more obvious, than ordinary language does, or one which in a particular case uses more closely similar forms of expression than our ordinary language. Our mental cramp is loosened when we are shown the notations which fulfill these needs. These needs can be of the greatest variety. (BB, p. 59)

According to Wittgenstein then, stepping out of common sense amounts to mental discomfort. And one is forced outside its realm for two reasons: First, they may need to explain some fact that common sense does not explain. Subtler knowledge is called for. This is the realm of science. The second source of misunderstanding has to do with some conceptual knots that are created within ordinary language. Certain terms are used carelessly and lose their ordinary meaning; certain phrases are metaphorical and, if taken out of context, they project false images. If, for example, one says "I don't know what is going on in your head," then this expression may be taken to imply that the mind is some sort of private room where things happen. But if we clarify this phrase, it will become evident that all one means is "I don't know what you are thinking." In such cases, *grammatical investigation* clears misunderstandings away and brings clarity of meaning in context. This is the realm of philosophy.

Now, one should not take Wittgenstein's distinction between science and philosophy or between factual and conceptual confusions as sharp. There can be conceptual confusion within science; furthermore, our ordinary concepts may evolve as new scientific information is brought to light (OC §94–99; Gasparatou 2009b).[1] Philosophy then might enter all kinds of discussions, even scientific ones, in order to dismantle confusions. For philosophy is a *conceptual* or *grammatical* investigation (PI §89–133).

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[1]Following convention, titles for Wittgenstein's works are abbreviated (BB = The Blue and Brown Books, Z = Zettel, PI = Philosophical Investigations, OC = On Certainty, PO = Philosophical Occasions), with section (§) or page number (p.), with full citation and initials in the References.

Wittgenstein's use of *philosophy* has both negative and positive connotations; none refers to just academic philosophy. In its negative use, it signifies our temptation to go *deeper* than ordinary language, with the result that we violate it somehow. In its positive use, philosophy is the activity of clarifying language, so that conceptual misunderstandings will be resolved. Each of us can be a philosopher in both senses; everybody can potentially give into the temptation to overstep ordinary language usage; in which case, they can potentially work to dismantle the misunderstanding. The only way to cure such mental discomfort is to pay close attention to ordinary language and uncover the rules of our language games.

There is a vast multiplicity of language games:

> Constructing an object from a description (a drawing) –
>
> … Reporting an event –
>
> Speculating about an event –
>
> Forming and testing a hypothesis –
>
> Presenting the results of an experiment in tables and diagrams –
>
> Making up a story –
>
> … Singing catches –
>
> … Asking, thanking, cursing, greeting, praying. … (PI §23)

These are just some of Wittgenstein's examples. Wittgenstein's game analogy opposes the view that language has the prioritized the function of *describing* the world (PI §1–38; Baker and Hacker 2008). The idea that describing is the main function of language has been prevalent since antiquity; in Wittgenstein's era, it was revived by the *verification principle* that logical positivists held: *a sentence is meaningful only if it can be verified by sense data or formal logical analysis*. Logical positivists' interests lie in philosophy of science. Philosophy should help restore an ideal language so that science can better evolve (Ayer 1966; Chalmers 2013). Wittgenstein's later philosophy strongly objects to the very idea of language as descriptive. It is a clear example of a *mental cramp* that has held our mind rigidly in one position for too long and has given rise to a lot of confusion. In order to loosen this cramp, we have to acknowledge the fact that language is just a human activity, intertwined with all other human activities. *To describe; to give the measurements of an object; to make an experiment;* or to *solve a problem in practical arithmetic* then are just a few language games among many (PI §23). But then, science also is within the realm of our practices, not something above our language games, but a part of them.

The term *language game* cannot have a clear-cut definition. The *game* analogy signifies the flexibility of language games. *Chess* is a game, *basketball* also, *hide and seek* as well. There is a very loose *family resemblance* that ties all the things we call games. The same goes for most ordinary terms; they resist clear-cut definitions and yet we have no problem using them. After all, definitions are futile attempts to amend language, create an ideal (*precise*) meta-language and arrive at some hidden essence of what a term *really* means, but there is no such essence; a term gains its meaning by its actual use in actual contexts, i.e., by the many language games people play with it.

However, there is one thing that unifies all games: Every game involves rules. The same goes with our language games. To *describe* or to *report* or even to *show* (e.g., saying "this is an apple") are rule-governed activities. There are rules about where to look (e.g., at the end of your finger) or about how to respond. Rules are contingent; they could be otherwise. Yet, they are also necessary; if they change, the game changes. It would be plain nonsense then to believe that the many language games such as *promising, obeying and play-acting* could be reduced to a single one, i.e., *describing*. You cannot reduce one game to another; if you change its rules, you alter the game (Z §320, PI §496–499).

The game analogyfirst and foremost emphasizes the normativity of language. Language is a rule-governed activity. *Rule-following* is a central theme in Wittgenstein's later work and has given rise to many interpretations (Fogelin 1976; Kripke 1982; Baker and Hacker 1984; Cavell 1990; Diamond 1989; Miller and Wright 2002). At a minimum, rules are inner standards of correctness and meaningfulness, which we grasp by participating in the activities of our community (PI §138–242). In fact, Wittgenstein expands the notion of language to cover all human practice; the totality of human practice is rule-governed (OC §67–73, 91–99; Stern 1995; Baker and Hacker 2009). Rule-following presupposes some regularity in behaviour, but it is not automatic; it is intentional. In fact, I follow a rule only if I intend to follow a rule, consciously or unconsciously. Intending does not require me to justify, explain, articulate, or even think about the rule as I follow it. But I need to have grasped the correct application of the rule by being brought up within a community of fellow rule-followers. For example, people learn to shake hands in certain contexts. This is a human practice, involving language games and gestures, all of which are normative. The rules slightly change depending on the occasion. Grasping the normativity of this gesture within the context, we can apply it on different occasions without much thought; we can also change the rules of this activity over the course of time. Yet, it is always an intentional gesture that carries some normative habitual implications.

Rules change: old language games die and new ones are born all the time. In fact, part of being able to follow rules has to do with being able to form new language games (Tully 1989). And vice versa, in order to create a new game, one has to have grasped the rule-following practice and use it as a stepping stone for the creation of new games. If I had never played a game, it would be very hard for me to grasp the concept of a game. But now that I am a rule-follower, if you tell me: "1, 2, 3, 4; now you go on," I will go on saying "5, 6, 7…". If you tell me: "ok, that's enough, now let's try this: 2, 4, 8, 16; you go on," I will go on saying "32, 64, 128." The flexibility of our rule-following ability allows us to adjust in new contexts. Even a simple word with an exclamation mark («water!») can be used to perform different games in different circumstances (PI §27). It might be an order, a request, a translation, or a description, all of which have different, important functions within everyday life. To know how to understand and use the phrase in different contexts requires a certain amount of flexibility in our rule-following performance.

Flexibility then is a key element of this ability. However, it has its downside: We might at times mix up the rules of our language games. Instances of conceptual confusion are inescapable. It is the task of philosophy to clarify rules *whenever confusion is created* (PI §119, §125–133). The point is not to clarify all language or explain all rules. That would be impossible since rules change and new language games are created. Moreover, it would be a case of philosophical—i.e., conceptual—confusion: an overall, all-purpose clarity does not make sense. To clarify is to dismantle some specific misunderstanding *to some specific end* in some specific context. In cases of puzzlement then, we need to practice grammatical investigation and *return* to common sense.

> … for as soon as we revert to the standpoint of common sense this general uncertainty disappears. (BB, p. 45)

Wittgenstein invites common sense as an *ideal*. It is our ideal home: our starting point and our final destination. This is the ground of sanity, the time when discomforts are put to rest. It is also a *common* home; it implies a worldview and a set of rule-following practices common to us all. Starting from the language games we play, confusions arise and we may need to clarify them so that we again revert to a common ground of contentment. After all, no language and no rules are private (PI §243–275). Common sense is necessarily sharable too. And if Wittgenstein is right, and philosophical problems arise from our everyday use of language, this is a nonstop guiding norm for philosophy. Not for the academic philosopher but for the philosopher inside us all.

3 Educating for Common Sense

Wittgenstein's philosophy is full of insight about how we learn language and how important the social activity of sharing a language is for all other types of learning (Standish 1992; Smeyers and Marshall 1995; Peters and Marshall 1999; Smeyers et al. 2007). We share the grammar of our practices, and we *understand, mean, feel and act* using a variety of language games. Growing up in a community we learn to share rules or even come up with new ones (Burbules and Smith 2005; Smeyers and Burbules 2006). Wittgensteinian philosophy can explain how education, formal and informal, includes us in a *form of life* and even enables us to change it from the inside (Peters et al. 2008). I would like to propose that the Wittgensteinian notion of *common sense* could add up to such discussions.

Many have tried to emphasize common sense's authority on education (Coates 1996; Pring 2004; Barrow 2011). Yet, to claim that common sense has a certain authority on any subject is to defend a quasi-Moorean stand on common sense, i.e., restate the beliefs of common sense as an answer to a philosophical—or scientific—problem. Wittgenstein's defence of common sense goes deeper than that; it calls for a model stability we should aim at and be prepared to work for, through confusion and puzzlement. Such a sense of common sense could serve as a game-changing

educational ideal. Wittgenstein's plea demands that we learn to dismantle conceptual confusions. Since confusions arise in all human practices, education should teach us to deal with them.

In order to do that, educators first need to address their own discomforts. Philosophers of education have pointed out instances of such discomforts (Winch 2006; Davis 2009; Standish 2012). Among the concepts in desperate need of clarification is the use of *criteria*, one of the hottest topics in debates on formal education today. Much of educational policy, research and practice has blurred our discussions of *criteria* with a preoccupation with *data*. Here lies a Wittgensteinian-textbook conceptual confusion that relates to an ill-conceived verificationism: Whatever we do needs to be describable, documentable, measurable and assessable by objective data (Standish 2004; Stickney 2009). For example, if we want to see whether a teacher teaches well, we don't just go and watch them teach; we fill assessment forms, give them self-evaluation forms to fill, and since these practices are not considered objective enough, we also document how well their students perform in tests. So, we no longer talk about the *qualities* of a good teacher, but rather about their *scores*. Any decision in education today about who to hire, which method is optimal or which curriculum we should prioritize turns on data, measurements and assessment forms. Instead of discussing the qualities we ought to embrace and promote, we are preoccupied with data.

Educators' obsession with data implies that some language games are given more priority than others. Within the verificationist ideology, *describing* is the prioritized language game. Its superiority derives from *scientism*. Science supposedly describes how the world operates on a deep level; the scientific method is applicable and authorized to inform every aspect of our lives. This is the dominant perspective in formal education today. Educational policies prioritize science not only in curriculum design, but also as a method for all disciplines, including educational practice itself.

The implication is that any practice worth educating for would be reducible to the descriptive game. As a result, today education is mostly considered as providing information and skills. Supposedly, information and skills can be documented objectively by data. We can verify the information; we can measure which skills are useful and how to develop them. Guidance, advice, or the cultivation of virtues on the other hand, are subjective. Since there can be no verification of what a virtue is, or about what a good life is, no one should guide anyone about how to live or how to relate with the others. Guidance, virtues, character qualities and the like belong to a world of values and norms; such a world is subjective, unverifiable, and thus nonsensical. Information and skills, on the other hand, are objective, verifiable, and thus part of the superior world of science. From this frame of reference, education should be value-free, just like our supposedly value-free science.

Correct and useful information is indeed part of literacy and a prerequisite for the planning of one's life (Goldman 1999; Gasparatou 2016). Nevertheless, this is not reason enough to degrade all the other aims that education could include, like giving advice and support, helping with ones' character development and cultivating their virtues. It makes no sense to eliminate *arguing, advising, urging* and all

the other things we do with words in the fantasy that this would leave us free to *describe*. Wittgenstein's arguments against the idea that there is some linguistic function that stands above all the other functions of language are indeed relevant here. Even if science *did* objectively describe the world, this would not be the reason enough to stop all the other things we do with language.

Moreover, verificationism is not a value-free perspective. It includes many norms about what is right and what is wrong and about how to get there: norms, which scientists, philosophers, educators and the public ought to endorse. So, we are *advised* to be objective critical thinkers and evolve into autonomous individuals; to think for ourselves and never take something at face value; and to investigate by holding the high standards of science. There is nothing intrinsically wrong with such principles; not if we do accept them for what they are: *normative principles*, which aim to guide our behaviour. They are not neutral, nor objective, nor verifiable by sense data; they are in need of justification and clarification like all other principles that are embedded in our community's practices. And thus, they cannot exclude other types of principles from education just by accusing them of being unverifiable.

Science does not merely or *objectively* describe the world. Logical positivists, the very architects of verificationism, knew that in the realm of normativity, there could be no objective verification. At first, they would call all normative discussions nonsensical. Soon, they had to appreciate that even hard science, even the simplest collection of data, is within the realm of normativity. We incorporate all kinds of communal rules about what data we are to look for, how to describe them, what to measure about them and how to interpret them.

Scientism probably discourages the understanding of scientific research insofar it resists the idea that science is a social, cultural and creative practice (Gasparatou 2008). In fact, it is a mainstream concern in science education research today to attack naïve depictions of science as merely descriptive of nature (Lederman 2006). Effort is being made to inform teachers, students and policy makers of the nature of science and to dismantle conceptual, factual and historical confusion about the so-called *scientific method.* For one thing, even in empirical science, there is no *one* method, but a variety of different methodologies depending on the question, the mentality of the people involved, the specific domain, the era, etc. (Kampourakis 2016). Furthermore, one needs to fully acknowledge the distinction between data and their interpretation. Interpretation is not just about different ways to read the results; even before we collect data, we interpret what to count as a *datum*. One needs to appreciate the role of the community and culture or the contribution of researchers' creativity and imagination in the development of scientific theories (Lederman 2007).

Therefore, we cannot eliminate all other language games in order to describe scientifically; we rather *need* a vast variety of language games for sciences to evolve. Wittgenstein echoes again: *testing a hypothesis* or *presenting the results of an experiment* are among the many language games we play, together with *guessing riddles*, *speculating* or *describing an event*, *constructing an object* or *giving its measurements* (PI §23). All language games rest on rule-following; all are

normative and none is merely descriptive. Not even describing is merely descriptive. We might describe the very same thing in many different ways depending on the aim of our description. We cannot even have a single standard for the evaluation of a description. *Precision* for example sometimes might not be useful; a vague image can convey more meaning than a precise one, depending on the purpose of the description (Coates 1996). There are all kinds of different prescriptions then, even involving descriptions.

In education, science, and everyday life practices, we exercise our normative powers using our values, emotions, interpretations and rules. We also exercise this normative power whenever we judge what to teach, which kinds of information to prioritize, which methods are optimal, who to hire, how to score our essays, or what questions to ask our students. Evaluation forms or metrics are blind unless we put them in the perspective of an overall discussion of the dispositions, the qualities and the virtues we wish to promote. For example, teachers' favourable evaluation is taken to suggest that their students understand them: *that is why* they do well in tests. Academics' high metrics scores are taken to imply that their work is influential. It is important to realize though that this is an interpretation of the data in light of ideas and norms, which are debatable. Not everybody thinks that good teaching means "teaching to the test" (Standish 2014), nor does everybody think that *influential* research necessarily means *highly cited* research or *good* research. The idea that there might be some objective database that could spare us the process of judging, debating and clarifying is thus incoherent.

One of the major problems in education today is that instead of doing the hard work of clarifying and refining such norms, we fixate on technicalities. Policy makers and educators struggle to ground their decisions on a misunderstanding of scientific method. They misidentify the normative for the descriptive; diminish rules into formulas; portray rule-following as blindly complying with procedures; reduce inner-yet-social standards of excellence to external metrics.

We should be more confident of our natural rule-following abilities. Wittgensteinian philosophy can remind us that as natural rule-followers, we comply with criteria for every single practice or habit of ours from handshaking to scientific research; we explore new ones, we initiate others into our normative practices, etc. (Standish 2004, 2012; Stickney 2009). Within this flux, it is hard to formalize criteria. We employ more than we realize; we create new ones every day; and we impose them differently depending on the context. We judge by using our criteria while debating over such criteria at the same time. Thus, our criteria are hardly subjective, not if by "subjective" one means private; they are sharable. Neither are they *objective*, not if by "objective" one means automatic or causal. Imposing criteria is an intentional and inter-subjective practice that is open to revision, just like all human practices. There is nothing mysterious about it.

Current discussions over *criteria* in educational settings today is just an example that shows that the use of a concept may hide a series of implications that need to be explicitly addressed through Wittgensteinian investigation. Furthermore, it is a key example of how the formalization of a concept makes a whole practice seem more obscure than it really is. Formal education claims its authority by working against

common sense. The aim is to present educational research and practices as *scientific,* when in fact scientific practice is misrepresented too. For even science has its home in common sense.

Such a realization also entails that at times, and whatever activities we undertake, grammatical clarification will be required. Rules get mixed up; conceptual confusion is being created within scientific, educational, or any kind of human endeavour. Defending common sense as an ideal suggests we cannot just rest assured on our natural powers unreflectively. Wittgenstein would not suggest we rest content with our common beliefs or silence the philosopher—or the scientist—within us. It is part of our human nature to try alternative viewpoints; or wish to go deeper into a better understanding of our worldview; to live better and to create new language games for all to play; to have a more accurate knowledge of the facts and incorporate it into our practices. All the more reason why we should embrace philosophical discomfort, practice grammatical investigation, and learn to make our way through confusion, puzzlement and distortion, back to an enlightened clarity of mind. Education should enable us to move this circle from common-sense-point-one through grammatical investigation and back to common-sense-point-two; and then all over again when another discomfort arises. This temporal equilibrium he would call *common sense*.

Defending an ideal common sense then is partly a matter of social initiation and negotiation and partly an individual endeavour. We grow up in a rule-followingcommunity, and we have to negotiate both individually and with others about the future of such rules (Tully 1989). One cannot escape their community; pure autonomy is an illusion if you see it as breaking free of all communal norms. This includes a lot of disappointment (Cavell 1979; Standish 2004; Smeyers et al. 2007). It includes a lot of joy as well; communal practices can be a stepping stone for you and others to change yourself and the community and arrive at new common senses one at a time.

Thus, a Wittgensteinian notion of *common sense* should be an educationalideal altogether. Educators can start incorporating this ideal by solving their own conceptual perplexities. This would require policy makers, administrators and teachers who *engage* with confusions rather than succumbing to them or obscuring them. The catch is that only such educators can truly promote this *instinctive rebellion* (Phil., p. 185). Grammatical investigation is—or should be—one more practice among the many normative human practices we grasp while growing up. And one can learn to play the game while actually playing it with others in formal and informal educational settings.

At the end of the day, one should admit that Wittgensteinian *common sense* is a vague and elusive ideal. There can be no formula or clear-cut prescription for its defence. This is probably its most important educational advantage. We do not need formulas from education; we need to learn to notice *differences*, to uncover *pieces of nonsense* (PI §119) and to *assemble reminders for particular purposes* (PI §127).

Acknowledgments I would like to thank Paul Standish for comments that greatly improved the manuscript.

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Learning Politics by Means of Examples

Michael Temelini

Abstract My aim is to explain Wittgenstein's remarks on the epistemology of giving examples and to consider how this ramifies in the study of politics. In parts of *The Blue and Brown Books* and throughout *Philosophical Investigations*, one of Wittgenstein's central epistemological claims is that learning takes place by means of comparing examples, and by practice, rather than by essential definitions or formal abstractable rules. Comparing examples is not an inferior method of explanation, because we have nothing better. Rather, there is nothing deeper than the examples. So he says, "let the use *teach* you the meaning". To illustrate how this approach has been mobilized in the study of politics, I will consider the writings of James Tully's "aspectival" political science. Tully agrees with Wittgenstein's refutation of generality and his appreciation for particular cases. He agrees that we learn by practice, and by comparing examples in dialogue, not rules. Likewise, Tully gives examples, not theories or rules, to explain and to stimulate diversity awareness. These similarities are readily apparent in *Strange Multiplicity*, and with a sculpture called *The Spirit of Haida Gwaii*. The artwork is an object of persuasion: to invite negotiation, stimulate diversity awareness, and encourage transformative reconciliation.

Keywords Examples · Dialogical comparison · Epistemology · Aspectival · Reconciliation

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M.A. Peters and J. Stickney (eds.), *A Companion to Wittgenstein on Education*,
DOI 10.1007/978-981-10-3136-6_19

1 Introduction

One of Wittgenstein's central claims, articulated in parts of *The Blue and Brown Books* (BB) and throughout his *Philosophical Investigations* (PI),[1] is that we learn by comparing examples and by practice. We cannot explain, understand, or learn the meanings of words, actions, and forms of life by formulating generalizations, systematic and definite rules, or ostensive definitions. Rather, the best approach is comparing the multifarious overlapping similarities and differences—the "family resemblances"—in the particular cases, and in the way examples are normally or customarily used (PI §§31, 54, 66–67, 71, 80–85, 208–210, p. 227; BB, pp. 87). So, Wittgenstein counsels: "let the use *teach* you the meaning" (PI, p. 212). Wittgenstein gives various names to this comparative approach: perspicuous representation, (PI §122) survey, (PI §92) "noticing an aspect", (PI, p. 193) "seeing an aspect", (PI, p. 213–214), and "a method, by examples" (PI §133). In any case, he tells us that comparing examples is his preferred method (PI §§122, 130–133; BB, pp. 86–87). It is in fact the centrepiece of what we could call his epistemology.[2]

It is important to focus on the epistemological aspects of Wittgenstein's remarks for two reasons: as a reminder that one of his clearly stated aims was to correct some fundamental mistakes about what counts as knowledge, truth, and justification (BB, pp. 17–20)[3]; and to emphasize that he offers a realistic alternative, not just an exclusively therapeutic anti-epistemology, as is sometimes interpreted. The alternative is a comparative approach that gives a reasonably accurate but provisional understanding of others. This is an epistemology not for material objects at the mercy of independent causal forces, but about interdependent human beings who are shaped by reciprocal meaningful actions.

Wittgenstein mobilized examples for the express purpose of showing us another way of learning about forms of life and knowing each other. So, we can say that examples have an important epistemological identity or purpose. Teaching and learning necessarily entail giving examples and comparing them. There are two ways we can learn from examples: from particular cases and from those who *set an example*. "One learns the game by watching how others play" (PI §54). So an important part of this comparative approach is that it happens in exchange with others, in other words dialogically. To make sense of Wittgenstein's method, it is critically important that we see it as a practice of comparative dialogue. It is among the best paths to making sense of perspicuous representation. Another way of making sense of this method is to see how it has been actually put to use. Among its

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[1]Following convention, titles for Wittgenstein's works are abbreviated (PI = Philosophical Investigations, OC = On Certainty, BB = The Blue and Brown Books), with section (§) or page number (p.), with full citation and initials (e.g., RFM) in the References.

[2]I am using the term *epistemology* to mean of a way of knowing or evaluating the truth. My use of this term is more thoroughly articulated in Temelini (2014, 2015).

[3]Taylor (1987) calls Wittgenstein one of the most famous and influential critics of epistemology, because he situates knowledge and understanding in practices, not theories or representations.

most innovative and exemplary applications is found in the work of James Tully who mobilizes Wittgenstein's comparative dialogical method in the study of politics.

2 What Is an Example, and Its Purpose?

For Wittgenstein, an example is a particular case, or a specific aspect, activity, or instance of use, or it is an exemplary action or practice (PI §§23, 54). It can also be understood as a reminder, or a boundary drawn for a special purpose (PI §§69, 127). An example serves two connected purposes: it is a rhetorical and heuristic device employed as form of explanation and it is a particular action or practice from which we might learn in negotiation. As a form of explanation, an example is typically part of an intersubjective and reciprocal action. "One gives examples" Wittgenstein writes, "and intends them to be taken in a particular way" (PI §71). Since an intention is a point or reason, one gives an example in the context of a conversation, as means of persuasion, which is to say that the reciprocal action here is a dialogical exchange of reasons.

While the method of giving examples is an excellent way to explain things, it does not easily fit into any of the normal methods of explanation in the contemporary social sciences. An example is neither itself a formal rule nor is it necessarily part of one. An example is neither a theory, nor a model subject to verification or falsification, nor is it a precedent to be imitated or avoided. It is neither a particular part nor a simplification of something general. It is not constitutive of an inductive method of explanation, whereby one is supposed to look for a general rule or a pattern among particular cases and examples. One might reply that in the absence of such a rule or pattern, and without verification, an example has a limited and conditional explanatory value. This is true, as long as it is understood that on Wittgenstein's account, partial, provisional, and conditional knowledge is the only way we can really know other forms of life. So at best, an example serves a particular and "special purpose" (PI §69) of throwing light on certain aspects, at the expense of obscuring others (Tully 1993, p. 276; 1995, p. 57).

Despite its limitations, comparing examples is not an inferior method of explanation in default of something better (PI §71). And Wittgenstein could not be any clearer about this point. This is one of the best ways to successfully communicate our knowledge and understanding because there is nothing deeper than examples, and our understanding does not "reach beyond all the examples" (PI §209). So Wittgenstein says, "I shall teach him to use the words by means of *examples* and by *practice*.—And when I do this I do not communicate less to him than I know myself" (PI §208). The way Wittgenstein communicates by means of examples is by using them as "objects of comparison" (PI §130). His intention is to invite comparison with the example, to persuade us to see relationships, criss-crossing similarities, and differences with other cases. In so doing, the aim is to stimulate diversity awareness, which is the criterion of successful dialogue.

The point I'm making here is that the most important feature of what we might call Wittgenstein's method, perspicuous representation, is that giving examples, comparing cases, noticing aspects, is not a form of reasoning aimed at finding something general, but the contrary. As I will explain in more detail, Wittgenstein's examples are supposed to relieve us from what he famously called "our craving for generality" and "the contemptuous attitude towards the particular case" (BB, p. 18). Among the most important and influential aspects of Wittgenstein's work are replies to different varieties of such cravings and contempt. In several remarks, he responds directly to the proposition that there must be some essential or common thing (a strict rule or common definition for example) that unites various particular cases. Wittgenstein's reply is twofold: he rejects the very idea of a common, essential thing that could definitively capture diverse uses of words, and so their meanings; and he promotes a view that we must always focus on the particular cases, aspects, and examples themselves. This is evident in some comments he makes about Socrates and Augustine, and in his examples of games.

3 Plato's *Theaetetus*: Definition Versus Ordinary Use

To illustrate the craving for generality, Wittgenstein considers one of Plato's dialogues and singles out Socrates' method. Wittgenstein notices that Socrates normally interrogates the meaning of a word by looking for a definition that unites all the various examples of its use. When asked for a definition, Socrates' interlocutor often replies by giving examples. In turn, Socrates responds that he wants to know the essence of the phenomenon in question, not examples. As Baker and Hacker note (1980, p. 668), the inability to offer a definition is taken to be sufficient proof of failure to understand it, and "a scandalous demonstration of ignorance." A typical case where we can see this play out is in the dialogue *Theaetetus*. Puzzled by the meaning of the word "knowledge", for an answer Socrates turns to his pupil Theaetetus, who responds by giving examples of activities and subjects that are kinds of knowledge. He mentions the sciences of astronomy, mathematics, and music as well as "humbler crafts" such as cobbling. Socrates replies that he has not grasped the meaning of the word knowledge because he has not found what all the examples have in common. "You are over generous", he says. "I asked you for one, and you are offering many; I asked for something simple, and you respond with complexity" (Plato 1987, 145, 146c–147c).

Wittgenstein's reply to Socrates appears in *The Blue and Brown Books*. In the *Blue Book*, Wittgenstein refers to Sects. 146d to 147c of *Theaetetus* as an example of precisely the kind of philosophical approach he rejects. "When Socrates asks the question, 'what is knowledge?'", Wittgenstein observes, "he does not even regard it as a preliminary answer to enumerate cases of knowledge" (p. 20). The reason why Socrates is puzzled at all is that he "sees a law in the way a word is used, and, trying to apply this law consistently, comes up against cases where it leads to paradoxical

results". Wittgenstein disagrees with Socrates' suggestion that "there is something wrong with the ordinary use of the word 'knowledge.'" His alternative approach is to compare the cases themselves, to accept that there is "no one exact usage of the word 'knowledge'; but we can make up several such usages, which will more or less agree with the ways the word is actually used" (BB, pp. 26–7). Wittgenstein describes this tendency or compulsion "to look for something in common" (like a rule that governs all the uses of a word) as "our craving for generality" and "the contemptuous attitude towards the particular case". The "contempt for what seems the less general case" compels us to "give a definition" and "draw a sharp boundary" and "find the common element in all its applications" and find "one definite class of features which characterize all cases" of a concept rather than taking seriously what is less general: the cases and examples themselves. Wittgenstein does not hide his own contempt for this "attitude towards the more general". For him, it "leads the philosopher into complete darkness" and has "shackled philosophical investigation; for it has not only led to no result, but also made the philosopher dismiss as irrelevant the concrete cases, which alone could have helped him to understand the usage of the general term" (BB, pp. 17–20).

4 Augustine, *Language-Games*, Forms of Life

So Wittgenstein gives Socrates' dialogue on truth as an example that is supposed to make us appreciate diverse ways of knowing, what we might call epistemological pluralism. His reply emphasizes the particularity and multiplicity of truth as a kind of practical not theoretical wisdom. In this sense, he agrees with Theaetetus that his examples are indeed kinds of knowledge, and so he was correctly using the word in offering these examples rather than providing a comprehensive definition.

Another philosopher to whom Wittgenstein responds is Augustine, and here, he emphasizes the particularity and diversity of meaning as customary use. The famous analogy he makes is between language and games. When we learn language, Wittgenstein claims, we "learn the use", and understanding the meaning of a word comes from being "trained to use" (PI §§9, 35, 198, 376; BB, p. 77). The celebrated passage, and perhaps most frequently cited passage in which Wittgenstein articulates this claim, is "the meaning of a word is its use in the language" (PI §§43, 197). Because use confers meaning, a word's function is unclear when disconnected from its use. Knowing how to use a word is what Wittgenstein calls understanding it, and understanding it is also knowing how to teach others how to use it likewise. And this knowledge is an ability constituted by the customary practice of using it. Understanding the meaning of a word is an ability that comes from being trained into its normal or conventional employment. And practice does make perfect. As Wittgenstein writes, "To understand a sentence means to understand a language. To understand a language means to be master of a technique". So Wittgenstein employs analogously, because they are family

members, the words "know", "understand", "ability", "use", "technique", "custom", and "institution" (PI §§150, 198, 199, 205).

To illustrate the customary practice of language use, as well as the variety of word uses, Wittgenstein makes a number of comparisons, and most frequently between language and a collection of games. Introduced in BB and explored throughout PI, the compound word "*language-game*" is invoked to highlight "the multiplicity" of languages and the practical nature of language in the sense that "the process of using words" consists of "language and the actions into which it is woven" (PI §7). One of the important aspects of this concept, he tells us in Sect. 23 is that "the term '*language-game*' is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the *speaking* of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life" (PI §§19, 23, 241, p. 174, 226). So the two concepts of "*language-game*" and "forms of life" denote a relationship between words and uses, speaking and doing, language and action. "Words" he claims in Sect. 546 "are also deeds". This explains Wittgenstein's reply to Augustine's contention that learning entails ostensive definition or the "ostensive teaching of words" (PI, §§1, 6; BB, pp. 1–2, 77). He replies that this misrepresents the kind of learning that takes place when someone learns a language. It ignores the fact that language is part of a form of life, and so understanding rests on a background of regular customary use into which we are socialized or trained.

So the *language-game* analogy is meant to free us from the craving for generality by elucidating the irreducible plurality of languages and forms of life. Beginning with PI Sect. 65, Wittgenstein considers the objection that he has not defined "what is common" to all the activities he calls language. He replies "these phenomena have no one thing in common" (PI §65) and considers the word "games" as an example of the plurality of use. "How should we explain to someone what a game is?" someone asks, which is another way of asking how we know what the word means (PI §§69, 75). Wittgenstein replies: "Don't say: 'there *must* be something common, or they would not be called 'games'". He considers board games, card games, ball games, Olympic games, and children's games, and then asks what might be the single common or essential features that unite all the varieties of these activities: amusement, winning and losing, competition between players, skill and luck. He concludes that if we "look and see" we will not notice anything "that is common to all", no characteristics that all games and only games have in common, and no features that are uniformly applicable. Instead, we see similarities, and "multifarious relationships", and "a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing: sometimes overall similarities, sometimes similarities of detail" (PI §66).

Like "games", it is a mistake to assume that there is some common denominator or an essential feature that could unify various meanings of a word or that could reconcile contested forms of life. Rather, we should look for family resemblances: notice different aspects and figure out how they are related, their overlapping similarities and differences (PI §§65–66). To illustrate this point, Wittgenstein draws several other analogies: language must be seen as a diverse collection of tools with different functions (PI §§11, 14); an ancient city with a maze of little streets

and squares with old and new houses, and a multitude of neighbourhoods (PI, §18); the continuous overlapping of many fibres (PI §67); and a "labyrinth of paths" (PI §203). These examples are meant to stimulate diversity awareness, to illustrate the irreducible plurality and non-uniformity of *language-game* and forms of life. And he likens the inability to see diversity as a pathology of malnutrition. "A main cause of philosophical disease", Wittgenstein tells us, is "a one-sided diet: one nourishes one's thinking with only one kind of example" (PI §593).

5 Watching Others Play

Wittgenstein's analogies with the way we play games are also supposed to illustrate another characteristic of his epistemology, namely how we learn by examples, not rules. He says, "a rule is employed neither in the teaching nor the game itself; nor is it set down in a list of rules" (PI §54) and so the game "can be learned purely practically, without learning any explicit rules" (OC §95). Because meaning is regular customary use, we learn the meaning of words like we learn how to play games: by actually playing, and "watching how others play" (PI §54) which is "by means of *examples* and by *practice*" (PI §208). So he advises us to "let the use of words teach you their meaning" (PI, p. 220). This does not mean that games have no rules. But a game is neither definable nor reducible to a set of rules, and "not everywhere circumscribed by rules". Just because games are not bounded by rules, it does not render them chaotic or haphazard. To illustrate, Wittgenstein mentions tennis: there are no rules for "how high one throws the ball…or how hard" but tennis is still a game "and has rules too". The example illustrates how the rules that constitute forms of life are sometimes vague and unclear, or perhaps indefinite in that we alter them, and sometimes we make them up as we go along. So, it is a mistake to reduce a game to a set of systematic, strict, clear, or determining rules. But it is also wrong to assume that in the absence of formal or abstractable rules, our practices are unregulated, and anything goes (PI §§68–70, 80–85, 102).

One of Wittgenstein's goals was to challenge long-standing ideas about what counts as knowing the world and diverse forms of life. For this reason, I've been referring to his epistemology and the epistemological status of examples more specifically. Despite what some might think about this approach, it does not deny that there is a truth of the matter. The criterion of truth is diversity awareness. We learn the truth when we notice and compare different aspects of particular cases and examples. The goal of Wittgenstein's epistemology of examples, then, is to steer us closer to the truth by freeing us from a significant obstacle to its proper discovery, namely the craving for generality. His remarks are intended to encourage and persuade us to compare similar and different aspects, and appreciate the particular cases and examples themselves. It also emphasizes the fact that we do all this learning by practice, not by memorizing strict rules or theories.

What we have here is a strong case for customary, comparative, and particular knowledge and meaning. We know and understand by comparing actual cases and examples. Knowledge is therefore not theoretical but practical wisdom, what Aristotle called *phrônesis*.

6 Tully's Aspectivalism

Among the variety of sources James Tully mobilizes, Wittgenstein's posthumously published writings are always cited among the most influential. The Wittgensteinian aspects constitute part of the foundations of Tully's philosophy, and throughout the body of his work, Tully repeatedly acknowledges his debt to Wittgenstein's approach. Above all, Tully agrees with Wittgenstein's refutation of generality and his appreciation for the particular case, an approach Tully calls "to see and understand aspectivally" (1995, p. 25). He also agrees with Wittgenstein that we learn by practice, not rules, and by comparing examples in dialogue. Likewise, Tully mobilizes cases and examples, not theories or rules, to awaken us to epistemological pluralism and norms diversity. The similarities with Wittgenstein are readily apparent in Tully's celebrated book *Strange Multiplicity* (1995), and in it, his preferred example of a sculpture called *The Spirit of Haida Gwaii*. The sculpture is an object of persuasion that is meant to stimulate diversity awareness and transformative reconciliation.

What is exemplary about Tully's use of Wittgenstein for teaching political science and philosophy is twofold: it is interpreted as a kind of realist epistemology, albeit one that is provisional and defeasible; and with this he explains the real world of politics. The idea of a realist Wittgensteinian political philosophy might strike some as odd, particularly since it is widely held that Wittgenstein had nothing to say about politics, at least in the conventional ways in which this is understood. Rather, most commentators assume that the implications of his philosophical remarks for politics stem from a kind of therapeutic scepticism that merely raises doubts or exposes nonsense. What political implications might emerge from this are negative, contingent, or conservative (see Temelini 2015). His remarks are politically negative in that they shed no light on politics, or they recommend political indifference, or flight from politics. They are conservative in that they range from an apology for customary practices to a justification of blind obedience to authority or the status quo. They are politically contingent in the sense that political actions and ideas are largely the unintended and accidental outcomes over time. On another view, political contingency means that since Wittgenstein's remarks are apolitical, there is no particular politics that necessarily follows logically. And the commentators who typically turn to Wittgenstein's writings for political inspiration have mostly taken for granted this reading. That is, the aim of Wittgenstein's remarks is merely to free us from illusion, nonsense, or epistemological puzzles, but they are not intended to offer any new, alternative, or substantive epistemic or political conclusions in their place. Tully's

reading differs in that he reads Wittgenstein's orientation as dialogical, not therapeutic or negative. In other words, for Tully, the thrust behind Wittgenstein's approach is not just epistemological, nor is its endorsement of epistemological pluralism automatically a claim about epistemological scepticism. Moreover, its implications are also deeply political. Its aim is not only merely to free us from illusion or nonsense, but also to promote a better way of doing politics: this is a dialogical approach that makes us aware of diversity and offers a promising path to reconciliation.

Tully typically describes his dialogical orientation as "aspectival" and this derives from Wittgenstein's argument that we should resist the craving for generality, and instead acquire the ability to see particular aspects, compare examples, and learn from what is less general. The reason why we should adopt this approach is articulated in "two famous" (2008a, p. 26) anti-essentialist arguments: meaning is use, and use is an irreducibly tangled diversity of family resemblances (Tully 1995, pp. 105–108; 2008a, pp. 26–27; 2008b, pp. 244–245). In other words, meaning is constituted in practical abilities that cannot be reduced to, or circumscribed by any common, essential, implicit, or clearly defined rule or generality. According to the first line of argument, famously encapsulated in PI Sect. 43, the meaning of a word does not come from an ostensive definition disconnected from its conventional use in practice. Rather, understanding is a mastery of customary use, which is to say a practical ability to use concepts, and to give reasons and explanations why they should or should not be used in different particular ways, and in various circumstances and contexts. Tully describes this as "a form of *practical* reasoning" (2008a, p. 27).

The second line of argument is that no common denominator, essential set of characteristics, or definite list of rules can presume to circumscribe, unite, bind, govern, or capture particular cases, examples, and uses of particular words. As Wittgenstein argues in PI Sects. 65–70, the varieties of *language-game* cannot be reduced to something essential, which is to say one thing in common, because our *language-game* are too diverse, creative, tangled, and contested to be captured by any such generalizations. Consequently, the criteria for correct use are too various, indeterminate, and unpredictable to be explicated in terms of an implicit, fixed, or transcendental set of rules, or general theories that presume to unite different examples of practices. Since the uses of a concept cannot be determined by or reduced to any set of rules or theories, we must resist the temptation to look for some unitary characteristic or rule somehow abstracted from our practices. This means that it is a mistake to try to generate an explicit, exact, or definite set of rules or necessary and sufficient criteria for the correct use of concepts, or a calculus for their correct application in particular cases. And as Wittgenstein argues, we should also not assume that the essence of language is therefore something lying "*beneath* the surface". There are no definite rules hidden, implicit, or embedded in our cultural practices and forms of life (PI §§91–92, 102, 126). Embracing aspectivalism and resisting the cravings that pretend to unite diverse phenomena does not mean we are obligated to neglect or dismiss altogether what is common. It just commits us to a certain approach to what is common. What we should look for is what Wittgenstein calls "family resemblances", which is a complicated network of similarities and

dissimilarities overlapping and criss-crossing (1995, p. 107; 2000b, pp. 218–219; 2001, p. 2; 2008a, pp. 26–27, 60–61, 167–169, 186–187; 2008b, pp. 89, 159, 244, 270–271). Tully adds that we need to accept that family resemblances "change over time in the course of human conversation" (2008a, p. 27).

As I explained earlier, these concepts of family resemblance, overlapping similarities, and objects of comparison are crucially important because they point to Wittgenstein's preferred method of comparative dialogue. Recall that this method is not promoting a view that anything goes, or that our practices are completely unregulated, haphazard, and chaotic, or that there are no rules or boundaries at all. Wittgenstein's point is that our practices cannot be captured, defined, or fully articulated by rules, so we need to be clear about the limits and specific reasons for boundaries and rules. "To repeat", Wittgenstein reminds us in PI Sect. 69, "we can draw a boundary—for a special purpose". His principal claim is that our practices are primary, so "it is our *acting*" and not an implicit or explicit rule, "which lies at the bottom of the *language-game*" (OC §204). Similarly, Tully's aspectivalism does not imply we cannot differentiate correct and incorrect use. We learn in comparative dialogue. What connects a word and its correct use is the ongoing customary practice of comparing examples of regular use, which is to say that dialogical activities shape the ability to use words correctly (Tully 2008a, pp. 65–67).

So an important feature of the two aspectival, anti-essentialist arguments to which Tully draws our attention is that these practices of explanation and understanding, of using concepts and comparing different uses, "always takes place in dialogue with others who see things differently" which is to say that it is an activity that takes place "in conversations" (1995, p. 109). This practice of dialogical comparison is what Tully sees in Wittgenstein's remarks: "there is no question" (1995, p. 113) Wittgenstein intended his arguments to be used to question monological forms of reasoning, and the central point of PI is to promote the "dialogical character of understanding" (1995, p. 109). Tully cites BB pages 17–20, and PI Sect. 122 as a condensed presentation of the two anti-essentialist lines of argument, and the place where Wittgenstein introduces his "alternative philosophy of the dialogical comparison and contrast of examples in actual cases" (1995, 105–113).

7 Monologue Versus Dialogue

Monological is another way to describe the essentialist, non-aspectival approach I just talked about, which is the tendency to assign priority to a rule or general theory as the privileged source of explanation. The imperative is to develop a general procedure or conceptual framework and determine how to apply it in particular cases. This privileging of a general theory is monological because it presumes that it is not necessary to listen to others in their own terms in actual cases, and ignoring self-descriptions is a necessary requirement of explanation. What counts as a sound

explanation necessarily comes from the correct application of the rule. Another variation of monologue is to redescribe and adjudicate what others are trying to say by forcing the self-understanding into some universal principle or general theory, or as Wittgenstein says, to fit what one has heard into "a preconceived idea to which reality *must* correspond" (PI §131; Tully 1995, p. 110; Tully 2008b, p. 29). This monological step is a practice of translating, reinterpreting, comprehending, or evaluating self-descriptions into ready-made, pre-set, universal, transcendental, culturally invariant, implicit, comprehensive, or theoretical languages, categories, principles, norms, or rules "that any rational person would be compelled to accept" (Tully 1995, pp. 56–57, 110–111, 115, 131, 164).

Monologue is also finality-orientated, which means that it assumes that it is possible and desirable to search for and reach some kind final agreement that might end the conversation. This goal also presumes that there is something authoritative and comprehensive that could unite and reconcile all the different particular cases (Tully 2000c; 2001; 2004a, pp. 90–91; 2006, pp. 19–20; 2008a, pp. 300–301). Tully's reply here is that reconciliation and unity are possible, but not by finding something in common. Rather, it will be constituted in ongoing negotiation, that is in comparative dialogue. In contrast to monological explanations, a dialogical approach is aspectival in that it accepts that there is no explanation that can definitely set forth the general, comprehensive, or essential features of a phenomenon in question. Dialogue recognizes and negotiates forever, promoting explanations, understandings, and political solutions that are provisional and defeasible, which is to say that they are always open to ongoing reconsideration. The word "dialogue" is used here in the comparative sense of "a willingness to exchange and negotiate alternative descriptions" with others "who see things differently" (Tully 1995, p. 109, 115). So, comparative dialogue is an open attitude towards the particular case, an appreciation for what seems the less general, and as it were a contemptuous attitude towards generalization. Dialogue means resisting the craving for generality, and instead exchanging reasons with others who see different aspects. And all this is based on the fact that reasonable disagreement is an ordinary, unavoidable feature of everyday life, therefore an inalienable civic freedom.

A dialogical orientation assumes that if our aim is to understand the meaning of actions "we must listen" and "enter the conversation" (1995, p. 111). The key is not just talking but taking turns speaking and listening in turn, which is a "back and forth" volley of exchange that Tully compares to a game of tennis (Tully 1995, p. 133, 182). Accordingly, following Skinner's suggestion in *Reason and Rhetoric in the Philosophy of Hobbes*, Tully adopts as the "ethical watchword" (Tully 1995, p. 34) of his dialogical approach the Roman catchphrase *audi alteram partem* (always listen to the other side or listen to the voices of the others), perhaps the most commonly found catchphrase in his vocabulary, employed throughout the body of his work. Listening entails rejecting any kind of comprehensive rule, general theory, or metalanguage that redescribes, comprehends, or represents what others are saying, or that adjudicates and criticizes self-descriptions within pre-set criteria or norms. The heart of this argument is that we must listen "not only to

what" others say, but also "to the way or language in which it is said" (1995, p. 57). In listening to the voices of others in their own terms, Tully carefully suggests an important nuance in that the "other" can refer to those within or outside one's form of life, who speak in their own voice. The reason we have a duty to listen to the voices of others is because "there's always more than one side to a case" (1995, p. 110) and it is "always possible to speak on either side of the case" (1995, p. 115), and because no theory can successfully or accurately provide a comprehensive understanding of such complex diverse otherness. Since there is no methodological substitute for listening, therefore we must "always consult those on the other side" (1995, p. 110) to avoid misunderstanding their perspective, or to avoid entanglement in a partial view with universal pretensions. As Tully puts it in his Wittgensteinian fashion, it is "always necessary to enter into a dialogue with interlocutors from other regions of the city, to listen to their 'further descriptions', and to come to recognize the aspects of the phenomenon in question that they bring to light, aspects which go unnoticed from one's own familiar set of examples" (1995, p. 57). Dialogue is a practice of intersubjective conversation that enables us to see things from "a multiplicity of paths", to see different aspects of the phenomenon in question, or "to see and understand aspectivally", and so, it fosters diversity awareness (1995, pp. 25–26). The test of such dialogical awareness and understanding is a willingness to listen, to see from diverse perspectives, and an ability to change one's attitude and perhaps oneself, or to conduct one's life differently in the light of what one has heard or what one learns about others (1995, p. 25, 33, 177).

8 Political Struggles, the First Nations, and *the Spirit of Haida Gwaii*

The comparative dialogical approach provides a way of understanding others without redescribing what they are saying into something general. It also constitutes a form of political realism because this allows us to accommodate "the truth" (Tully 1995, p. 133), and this is how understanding occurs "in the real world of overlapping, interacting, and negotiated cultural diversity in which we speak, act, and associate together" (Tully 1995, p. 111). Among the principle ways Tully mobilizes, this comparative method is to explain contemporary local and global political struggles over social justice, the environment, and imperialism, and with particular attention to diverse struggles over recognition and distribution. These are political struggles over intersubjective norms, namely laws, rules, conventions, or customs that are social, cultural, legal, political, and constitutional (2000a, p. 470; 2004a, pp. 86–90; 2004b, pp. 855–856; 2006, pp. 17–19; 2008a, pp. 292–297). His understanding of such democratic and civic struggles is shaped by the two anti-essentialist arguments discussed earlier, so Tully uses a comparative dialogical approach to explain, understand, and reconcile political struggles. This approach is

aspectival, so he accepts the irreducibly tangled diversity of political struggles, and the agents engaged in them. In describing forms of life as "diverse", he means they are overlapping, interdependent, interacting, open, negotiated, and continuously contested and reimagined, rather than separate, closed, internally homogeneous, bounded, or uniform (Tully 1995, pp. 10–15, 24, 46, 186, 205; 2000a, b, p. 212; 2000a, p. 160). Because they are dialogical, their diversity does not automatically render political struggles incommensurable or incomparable, or immune to periodic reconciliation. Elsewhere, Tully describes these as hybridized identities simultaneously negotiating within, among, and between themselves (1995, p. 11; 2000b, p. 219; 2003, pp. 518–519; 2008a, p. 168). Since they are diverse, Tully uses the PI Sect. 203 metaphor to refer to the politics of recognition as a "labyrinth". Because they are aspectival, he is committed to a historically sensitive survey approach to understand political forms of life, and so he explains political struggles not with theories or generalizations but by comparing their variegated particularities.

As exemplary, that is to say particularly enlightening, cases of the phenomenon of the politics of recognition, *Strange Multiplicity* (1995) focuses specifically on the struggles of indigenous peoples for constitutional accommodation. One of the central arguments of the book is that constitutionalism should be seen from the perspective of the struggles of the First Nations, because in doing so "unnoticed aspects" of its history and its current limitations can be revealed (pp. 3–4). Therefore, *Strange Multiplicity* examines the history of constitutionalism by listening to the voices of indigenous peoples, and it details how they were either ignored, redescribed, or unjustly adjudicated, thereby offering specific cases how monologue manifests itself in the imperial imposition of norms. The central question the book poses is whether a constitution can recognize and accommodate cultural diversity, which Tully calls "one of the most difficult" (p. 1) questions of contemporary politics. His answer is that it can, if it is seen as an activity of "intercultural dialogue" in which diverse citizens negotiate over time and in accordance with three dialogical conventions of mutual recognition, consent, and continuity (1995, pp. 1–30, 183–184). If these conventions guide constitutional negotiations, those negotiations and the recognition and accommodations so constituted will be just. And so these dialogical conventions offer a way of doing philosophy and reaching mutual understanding in a way that is fit for a "post-imperial age" (1995, p. 57, 111). These conventions are not political theories, but they are evident in various historical examples of political contestation and articulated in numerous sources. One of Tully's favourites is the ancient myth of Antigone who represents the intercultural "crossing of native and newcomer cultures", who defends custom against the imposed constitutional order and its presumed universal standards, and who pleads for recognition (1995, pp. 22–23, 173–174). Tully also cites legal sources, like the writings and constitutional arrangements of agents of justice who "sought to come to terms with powerful, non-European cultures, immigrants, women and linguistic and national minorities fighting for cultural survival" (1995, p. 100). He also examines the applications of constitutional law in particular cases, especially in the common law of Commonwealth countries and international law. The "most spectacular"

(1995, p. 117) example of dialogical constitutionalism is found in treaty constitutionalism in which Crown negotiators recognized indigenous peoples as equal, self-governing nations. They did not redescribe them, but they "simply listened" (1995, p. 119) and the First Nations reciprocated, as it was their tradition to do so (1995, pp. 120–124). Tully is not saying that dialogical constitutionalism is a thing of the past: he praises some current examples, particularly multinational federalism and legal pluralism.

The most prominent contemporary examples of comparative dialogue Tully cites are found in the writings of Wittgenstein and a magnificent sculpture created by Bill Reid, *The Spirit of Haida Gwaii*. The sculpture is a black bronze canoe depicting "a 'strange multiplicity' of cultural diversity that existed millennia ago and wants to be again" (1995, p. 18). The artwork is an example of what Tully argues throughout the book: it is a symbol of the spirit of democratic constitutional dialogue (or multilogue) of mutual recognition, and the post-imperial age of normative diversity. This Haida sculpture is an invitation to engage in a kind of dialogue that has strong family resemblances to Wittgenstein's approach, in that it is designed "to awaken and stimulate" the "dialogical capacity for diversity awareness" (1995, p. 26). And the kind awareness *The Spirit of Haida Gwaii* tries to stimulate is personal, local, and global: the sculpture is an invitation to self-transformation, and moves us to live together "in mutually conciliatory and sustainable ways" (2016, p. 32); and it persuades us to "gradually become mutually aware of the cultural diversity that ought to be recognized and accommodated in the global family of constitutions and cultures" (1995, p. 182).

Looking at this beautiful sculpture cannot help but relieve the craving for generality. The observer, for example, cannot see it from one comprehensive perspective or vantage point but can only see the endless aspects of its particular interrelations. As we gaze at the sculpture, we become aware that the members of the canoe themselves are an interdependent, overlapping, interacting, entangled, and motley of indigenous and non-indigenous humans and animals who are questioning and contesting their identities in conversation and negotiation, sometimes squabbling, sometimes speaking and listening in turn, and touching and responding to each other (1995, pp. 17–29, 56–57, 202–208; 2016). Tully notes that all the passengers are vying for dialogical recognition in their own way, exchanging stories from different perspectives without "allowing any speaker to set the terms of the discussion" (1995, p. 24). The passengers themselves all have the civic ability "to see and understand aspectivally" (1995, p. 25) because they can see their association from "multiple viewpoints" and "from a multiplicity of paths" (1995, p. 25, 26). By listening to the different stories, and giving their own in exchange, the crew members come to see their common and interwoven histories together, acquiring the ability to change perspectives through "their participation in the intercultural dialogue itself" (1995, p. 25).

The canoe is also an example of what Tully now calls transformative reconciliation, which is the conciliatory relationship of gift-gratitude-reciprocity. The artwork itself, and the interdependent indigenous and non-indigenous humans and animals who are entangled passengers in the canoe, embody this "conciliatory

spirit". The sculpture is a gift to Canadians from the Haida people, so that they might be "moved in gratitude and reciprocity to let it influence their lives" (Tully 2016, pp. 32–33). In this way, this example is an object of persuasion for a harmonious relationship of all humans and non-humans.

I have been surveying Tully's dialogical, practical, aspectival approach that resists the cravings for generality and "definitive theory" (2008a, p. 26). And I have been highlighting the Wittgensteinian aspects of this approach. My point has been to show the family resemblances between these Wittgensteinian aspects and Reid's *The Spirit of Haida Gwaii*. With examples from Wittgenstein and Reid, Tully's dialogical approach describes forms of life as overlapping, interdependent, open, negotiated, contested, flexible, and practical rather than fixed, uniform, or ruled by culturally invariant or monological approaches. What these approaches have in common is their suggestion that the ability to see different aspects, to change perspectives, is acquired through participation in the dialogical activity itself. And all this has a positive influence on the study of politics, at least for Tully, because they shape his understanding of political concepts, texts, and intellectual traditions. And this orientation also offers a realistic path to achieve lasting reconciliation and sustainable non-violent political solutions.

9 Conclusion

I have been examining Wittgenstein's epistemology of examples, and how this is mobilized in Tully's aspectival political science. Like Wittgenstein, Tully promotes the idea that we know and understand in practice, and by comparing actual cases. What is clear is that for both authors, the dialogical comparison of particular examples is not an inferior method, but a very promising approach for explaining and understanding. For Wittgenstein, comparing examples teaches us the meanings of words, actions, and forms of life. Tully adds that noticing aspects and comparing them teach us the meanings of political words, political institutions, political struggles, and about strange and ancient forms of life that want to be again. They agree that knowledge and meaning are customary, comparative, and particular. Wittgenstein's favourite examples are games, while Tully's object of comparison is a beautiful artwork. For both authors, the purpose of giving examples is to shed light on a dialogical way of knowing and living in the world. The examples make us aware of the non-uniformity of truth in the sense that there cannot be a definitive rule that unites different ways of knowing. And giving examples is also supposed to help us understand the reality of others, like the Haida nation, and their entire moral ontology.

The consequences of these arguments are profoundly important for political science and political philosophy, and this stems from the fact that politics is not theoretical but practical in many ways. The meaning of political concepts cannot be given by a fixed definition, determinate rule, or general theory. The ability to understand them cannot therefore be the activity of grasping, interpreting, or

applying a definition, rule or theory to particular cases. So, the role of the political scientist, political theorist, or political philosopher should not be to render explicit some putatively implicit rule embodied in practice (be it in the form a mathematical formula or causal variable) mainly because our political practices cannot be captured by such rules. Likewise, the political scientist does not have the privileged role of working out definitive theories and applying them, like some kind of law-giver who does not engage in politics. Rather, political science is a practical and dialogical activity in the sense that the political scientists should listen to the voices of others in their own terms, and offer reasonable public arguments for discussion among free and equal citizens reasoning together (Tully 2008a; 2008b; Owen and Tully 2007). And so the problems political scientists should address are practical problems, not eternal, speculative, or theoretical problems such as looking for general and comprehensive rules and then applying them to particular cases.

So, rather than looking for explicit rules or catch-all theories that presume to uniquely, comprehensively, and definitely explain diverse aspects, Tully invites us to examine on a case-by-case basis the particular practices of politics themselves, to pay close attention to the political actors engaged in them and notice what they are actually doing, to listen carefully to the words political agents ordinarily use to describe their experiences in their own terms (what they are saying and how), and to include these vocabularies of self-description in the explanation. And all this is part of an overall practice of comparing differences as well as overall and detailed family resemblances. The culturally charitable, historically sensitive, dialogical practice of comparing similar and different examples of forms of life is what Tully means when he uses the word "aspectival", and what Wittgenstein means by his method of perspicuous representation.

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Wittgenstein and Foucault: The Limits and Possibilities of Constructivism

Mark Olssen

Abstract Marshall (1995) once argued that Wittgenstein's social constructivist view of mathematics is not 'idealistic', 'relativistic' or 'subjectivistic' but rather is 'non-idealistic and objective'. Wittgenstein is not idealistic because he attacks the prioritizing of mental states over linguistic accompaniments of those internal states. What he emphasizes is not intuition or mental process but the use of language. This, says Marshall, is an objective criterion, for although mathematics is 'invented' rather than 'discovered', the manner of its invention is in the form of discursive construction and in this sense it is independent of the individuals who use it as are the criteria of the truth and falsity of its propositions. It is thus non-foundational in the Russellian/Fregian senses. Rather, its objectivity is guaranteed by understanding mathematical objects within a formal language system. Truth in this sense depends on correct derivation in terms of the rule structure of the 'language game' relative to a 'form of life'. Truth is thus 'internal to a scheme'. In this article, I compare Wittgenstein to Foucault with respect to the issues of idealism, scepticism and language to highlight some of the main issues which seem to me central to any serious consideration of the limits and possibilities of social constructivism. These relate to (1) the central differences between radical constructivism and social constructionism, and (2) the extent to which the problem of relativism is overcome by Wittgenstein and Foucault making comparisons between the two thinkers. In completing these tasks, I will also consider some of the contributions of Foucault to the constructionist debate.

Initially published and revised from *Access: Critical Perspectives on Cultural and Policy Studies in Education*, 13(2), 1995, 71–78.

I will use the terms 'constructivism' and 'constructionism' in this chapter interchangeably. While I take them to mean much the same thing, to the extent that there is any difference, it seems to me that constructivism is more relevant to the epistemological dimension of the thesis whereas constructionism pertains more generally as a descriptor for an entire approach or paradigm.

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© Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2017
M.A. Peters and J. Stickney (eds.), *A Companion to Wittgenstein on Education*,
DOI 10.1007/978-981-10-3136-6_20

Keywords Idealism · Constructivism · Foucault · Wittgenstein · Discourse · Language

1 Social and Individual Constructions

The distinction between 'individual' and 'social' is clearly central to the difference between radical constructivism and social constructionism. Radical constructivism's model of society (if we can speak of such) is simply an aggregation of individuals, there being no recognition of distinctions between the individual and the collective, or between structure and agency. In the radical constructivist view of knowledge acquisition, there is then no recognition of the structural dimensions of knowledge development. Rather, each individual is seen as constructing their knowledge themselves. This is a far cry from the model of society adopted by the so-called social constructionists, amongst whom Wittgenstein is one, and Vygotsky, Foucault and Gramsci could be considered others. This group do not share the ontological, methodological or epistemological individualism of radical constructivism. For these writers, there is an agreement that explanations about individuals cannot be solely in terms of statements about individuals. Rather, they maintain a commitment to a model of society based on a distinction between structural processes and individual agents, and they would argue that a varied list of structural factors, including 'society', 'forms of life', 'history', 'discursive formation' or even 'mode of production' constitute important dimensions of social reality. Methodologically, they tend to be holists as opposed to individualists,[1] seeing the explanation of any event or process as dependent on its social, historical or cultural location and seeing society in some senses as more than the sum of its parts.[2] The consequences of ontologically privileging society over the individual include (1) that the contents of an individual's mental representations are social in origin, and (2) that an individual's cognitive functioning could not be fully explained in terms of purely individualistic mental constructions.

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[1]In using the word 'holism' here, I would differentiate it from traditional senses of the word as characterized, for instance, in Hegel's philosophy, but utilize it more in the sense of what might be termed 'relational holism' or even 'pluralistic holism'. This is the sense that writers like Avital Simhony speak of 'relational organicism'. For various complex reasons, mainly to do with the usage of the concept historically, I prefer to use the concept of 'relational holism'. While holist theories were anachronistic with individualist epistemologies and ontologies from the seventeenth to the late nineteenth centuries, the rise of quantum theories and of complexity sciences from the mid-twentieth century once again reinstated versions of holism, albeit of a very different sort, as central approaches in science.

[2]The whole is more than the sum of its parts in some senses but not others. In complexity physics, this is recognized in relation to concepts such as 'downward causation'. Societal structures are constituted by emergent processes and maintain some degree of efficacy and derivative autonomy in relation to parts. It is also in the sense that wholes conceptualized as open and incomplete structures are non-reducible to parts.

2 Idealism

Wittgenstein is clearly not an idealist in the classical sense of the term characteristic of Berkeley and the German idealists who articulate a thesis of the primacy of mind, which is to say they see perception as guided through divinely directed or constituted minds, and which understands physical objects in the world, in this sense, as 'mind-dependent'. In this sense, Wittgenstein clearly differs from Kant, who while he acknowledged that some sort of physical stuff was there in the external world, saw the form and intelligibility of its existence as imposed through a priori categories of the cognition. As these a priori categories included such central dimensions of space and time, there is a very important and clear sense in which Kant was an idealist. Wittgenstein clearly differed from this sort of view in a very marked way. Mental concepts for him were not derived directly or indirectly from God, nor were they a part of an individuals' cognitive make-up. For Wittgenstein, intuitivism or approaches to learning based on internal mental constructions neglect the importance of language as a socially objective structure. In their turn, these socially objective structures of language were relative to a 'form of life'. The focus upon language, which is related to a 'form of life' in one important sense, reframes ideation and mental perception in terms of material processes in the sense that languages and forms of life are linguistic and/or cultural systems which develop and change in the course of history. In an important sense, then, they are historically generated. As long as Wittgenstein can hold, which quite possibly he can, that such cultural phenomena arise themselves from historical events and developments, which themselves are originally constituted from physical and chemical processes, then he is freed from the sorts of idealism that afflicted many thinkers, all the way back to the ancient Greeks.

The hard-nosed critic of idealism may raise an important objection here. They could argue that thought is simply pushed back one stage, beyond discourse, which does not exactly get rid of thought nor of the problems traditionally associated with idealism. They could maintain that Wittgenstein, and Foucault too, adhere to a version of the thesis that the real develops, if not inside thought, then certainly inside discourse. For to go beyond or try to conceive of an existence which is outside discourse, and also therefore, outside thought, is to posit a noumenal 'thing in itself' which discourse and thought are presumed somehow to represent. What Wittgenstein and Foucault could say here, quite plausibly I suggest, is that to say that language, discourse or mind (individual or group) is a necessary medium through which all knowledge claims are made is not to say that they constitute the *prius* of all things in the sense that they constitute those things or even that they have greater reality than those things, or that they constitute the only reality. Indeed, to say that we can only know the world through discourse is not to say that the world is not there independent of discourse. The issue is not one of ontology, it is one of epistemology. We can grant that this was the error of Hegel, who took the view, now widely discredited, that because objective reality can exist only in thought, reality itself must reside in an Absolute Idea (God). The silent transition or

'jump' from the *act of conceiving* to *what is conceived*, i.e. objective being, encapsulated in Hegel's identification of the ideal (thought) and the real (objective reality, God) is certainly not made by Wittgenstein or Foucault. While they agree that a thing is only conceivable through discourse, language and thought (or minds) relative to these, nothing is presupposed about the reality of that which is conceived. For them, the matter of how knowledge is rendered reliable would work, not through introspection, digging further down into thought, or through transcendence whereby minds can link with a unified spiritual intelligence (God), but by working outwards to the objects represented through discourses, language systems and minds, despite the difficulties. The methodological task would become how we can best legitimate our knowledge claims given the frequent and uncertain lack of synchronization between discursive and non-discursive, as well as the distorting relativities associated with social structures, 'forms of life', discourses, and individual and collective 'minds', in history. Although I am not intending to do justice to such a defence here, they may have recourse to various forms of argument, of which the following two types strike me as potentially fruitful but of which neither would overcome the problems associated with uncertainty and relativism in any total sense. Firstly, both may presuppose transcendentally the necessary existence of the non-discursive objects of existence as a condition for our being able to think and know in the first place, related to survival and existence. Secondly, as with naturalists, positivists and empiricists, they could conjecture that some sort of either reliable or unreliable knowledge accrues through the methodological triangulations of multiple forms of checking and testing in history. Developing projects and technologies that appear to work would seem to constitute an indirect validation of knowledge developed. Gaining intersubjective agreement is another. It would seem initially plausible also that the twin methods of coherence and correspondence could both be fruitful in this process. What may be the outcome of such an approach, one might conjecture, is the confidence or certitude one might be able to claim in the knowledge banks we store up in history.

While this sort of defence, then, avoids the central traps and snares of classical idealism, their more discursive approach is possibly open to being criticized in relation to yet a different form of idealism. This criticism might be called discursive idealism, or linguistic idealism. It is often made by Marxists against Wittgenstein and consists in the notion that language is prioritized over the material forms of reality such as technology, labour, production, things, or, as a Marxist might say, that 'cultural superstructure is being given priority over the economic base'. A similar criticism to this has also been directed at Michel Foucault, especially in relation to his earlier writings, where discourse was considered as an autonomous realm separate and largely unaffected by material practices. In *The Order of Things* (1970), as Hacking (1979: 41–42) summarizes it, Foucault maintained that systems of thought were 'anonymous, autonomous and rule governed' elaborating a view of the 'production of things by words' (Barrett 1988: 130). During the later 1970s, when he wrote *Discipline and Punish* (1977) and *The History of Sexuality* (1978), Foucault sought to address the criticisms that discourse was considered in isolation from practice. In the later works, where he was interested specifically in the

processes of institutional surveillance and control, he sought to de-emphasize the autonomy of discourse and emphasize its relation to material practices in the world. As he explained in an interview,

> I believe one's point of reference should not be the great model of language and signs but that of war and battle. This history which bears and determines us has the form of a war rather than a language: relations of power, not relations of meaning. (Foucault 1980: 114)

Foucault's increasing interest in the relations of discourse to practice paralleled his increasing recognition in the late 1960s of the importance of *power* as it affects the development of discursive formations, meaning that all knowledge structures (or 'language games') are systems of 'power/knowledge'.

> There is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge nor at the same time any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations. (Foucault 1977: 27)

By progressively becoming concerned to explicate how material practices constrain discursive systems, Foucault sought to avoid charges of 'cultural idealism'. He never, however, disavowed a certain autonomy to the discursive but developed conceptions of strategy and power and tactics in order to express how subjects in history negotiated, sidestepped, overcame, or were thwarted by the constraints of the physical material world. In dispensing with any notion of the 'outside' and subscribing to a model of 'internal history,' at the end of the sixties he became acutely aware of the unresolved issues concerning scepticism that arise in relation to the difficulty of how one separates power and knowledge or discourse, from truth, when there is no 'God's-eye' viewpoint external to history by which neutral and objective judgements might be made. It is notable with reference to this issue, for instance, that, in *The Archaeology of Knowledge,* Foucault acknowledges that he is 'avoiding the ground upon which [his studies] could find support' (1972: 205). What is evident, however, is that discursive systems are often out of synchronization with underpinning material realities, and given that the world is always discourse-dependent in the sense that any claim about the world is mediated through discourse, the issue of how discursive and non-discursive interrelate, and how reliable judgments and assessments can be made, was for Foucault, as for Wittgenstein, an important matter.

3 Objectivity, Truth and Relativism

For Wittgenstein, mathematical propositions are 'objective', and truth criteria are unambiguous in the sense that there is a correct way of proceeding, and correct and incorrect answers to be obtained. These are internal to the language system and the form of life of the culture. Yet the notions of objectivity and truth here are simply *conventional* and this itself is not uncontentious. Truth, in this sense, depends simply on the correct derivation from the syntax of the system, or, in Donald Davidson's phrase, it is 'truth relative to a scheme' (Davidson 1985). So too with

'objectivity'—it is an objectivity guaranteed by a formal system. The important question which remains unanswered, however, is what guarantees the rationality of the formal system. This is a question to which I believe Wittgenstein has no real answer. Truth and objectivity are secure but only 'relative to a scheme', and the central problem of historical relativism is not overcome.

Can such a problem be overcome with reference to Foucault? For Foucault, like Wittgenstein, all knowledge structures are socially and historically constructed. What distinguishes the two approaches, however, is that while Foucault's approach is also inherently anti-foundational, he demonstrates a greater appreciation of the importance of history and power and of the messy interactions between social structure and discourse than did Wittgenstein. Objectivity is largely a function of power relative to the instantiation of a discourse within a particular social historical formation. In this sense, while objectivity is guaranteed by a rule ordained by the hegemonic knowledge code, Foucault's analysis too can be criticized on the grounds of relativism for it is unable, on the surface, to provide any extra-historical conception of rationality capable of grounding a particular discourse, or 'language game' or 'form of life' or 'regime of truth'. As truth itself is always internal to discourse, the extent to which such truth is indeed *the truth* (i.e. in an eternal or ahistorical sense) remains effectively and theoretically unresolved. Whether Wittgenstein and Foucault should be criticized for this is uncertain. At one level, they could claim that while there may well be eternal truths that exist, within our own location in history and life, it is never possible to know these truths in any absolute sense. Only an all-knowing God could know them. They might also say that the history of science, full of wrong turnings, blind alleys and false starts, as it has been, is living testimony to this. The status of our knowledge must remain tentative and revisable. There are many senses that this matter remains one of the central conundrums of philosophy and one which mobilizes many different types of practice and enquiry, from policy dilemmas to science to clairvoyance, all aimed at bracketing the distorting social, personal and historical lens that interfere with and frustrate our claims to know.

Like all historicists, Foucault's approach attempts to describe history while denying the existence of historical laws, of a constant human nature, of subject-centered reason or of any absolute or transhistorical values. Building on the epistemological work of Gaston Bachelard and Georges Canguilhem, Foucault is interested in explaining the discontinuities, breaks and ruptures that signal fundamental changes in discursive systems. While truth, especially as it manifests itself in terms of practical consequences, constitutes one such factor, issues such as what works, what best sustains life in the current milieu, as well as issues of power and privilege, all play a role. He is thus also interested in the interrelations and entanglements between discursive formations and the various political, economic, social and ideological practices that go to make up the social structure and which distort or frustrate our ability to see clearly. Foucault approaches ideas and values not in terms of absolute norms of truth and good but as the expression of a specific age, culture or people. If such values, ideas or knowledge systems are functions of historical conditions in which they emerge, then they may change with changes in

those conditions, and no possible evaluation of their value or truth in general is possible.

The apparent relativism of such an anti-foundational view is a problem which Foucault sought to address in his later writings. In his interviews published in 1980, he puts the view that not all discipline-based knowledge can be assessed in the same way and suggests that the epistemological 'armature' of a discipline can mature and become more objective in history. This notion parallels his later views on 'the self', which he maintained could gain increased 'objectivity' and 'detachment' by progressively extricating itself from the developing social structure in the course of its development (Foucault 1986; Deleuze 1988: 106–107).

In my view, while Wittgenstein presents a more analytically orientated assessment of semantics and language use than does Foucault, Foucault's approach suggests a more *historically grounded* concept of objectivity than is present in Wittgenstein. When Foucault compares medicine to psychology, for instance, he states that 'medicine has a much more solid scientific armature... but it too is profoundly enmeshed in social structures' (cited in Rabinow 1984, p. 51). The natural sciences like theoretical physics or organic chemistry also have 'solid scientific armatures'. Although they are also affected by power relations in the larger society, Foucault recognizes that the relations between social structure and the discipline 'can be difficult to untangle' (ibid.). With respect to forms of knowledge like psychiatry, however, Foucault maintains:

> the question is much easier to resolve, since the epistemological profile is a low one and psychiatric practice is linked with a whole range of institutions, economic requirements and political issues of social regulation. (Foucault 1980: 109)

4 The Centrality of Language and Discourse

Both Foucault and Wittgenstein maintain a similarity of approach in terms of a central focus on language. While Foucault focuses on serious formal statements in order to accurately chart the historically constituted discursive frame, Wittgenstein, at least in his later work, concentrates on ordinary language and common sense as a form of life.[3] For Wittgenstein, as for Foucault, language is not seen as an expression of 'inner states', but as an historically constituted system, which is social in its origins as well as in its uses. In abandoning the phenomenological subject, the dualism of mind and world is surpassed, as well as the intractable difficulties of positing the world as a product of mind. The rules of language are themselves seen as a bundle of interactional and public norms. Meaning is generated within the context of the frame of reference (for Wittgenstein, a game; for Foucault, a discourse). Hence, to understand a particular individual, we must understand the patterns of their

[3]I have in mind the *Philosophical Investigation*, and not the *Tractatus*, or the *Philosophical Grammar*.

socialization, the nature of their concepts, as well as the operative norms and conventions that constitute the context for the activity and the origin of the concepts utilized. If mind operates, not as a self-enclosed entity, as Descartes held, attaching words to thoughts, as if they were markers, but rather operates in terms of publicly structured rule systems, then meanings are in an important sense public.[4]

It is related to the discursive nature of meaning and the publicity of language that practices can be seen to be intelligible only in relation to existence as communal. Existence is communal in the sense that meanings are public. A communal context defines a group of beings collectively adapting public resources for their use. Yet, the implications of this are far-reaching. If meanings are linguistic, and language is public, and being public relates to individuals together, i.e. in communities, then as Hacking (2002, p. 131) says, 'we are not talking only about language, but about high politics, about the person and the state, about individual rights, about the self, and much else'. The thesis here is that the social nature of practices defines a community context in one very important sense, a sense which is fundamentally inescapable. Such a theoretical revolution, which has largely developed in the twentieth century, has rendered the classical liberal conception of the autonomous, self-interested, pre-social individual as obsolete. Todd May, in his discussion of the work of Jean-Luc Nancy, expresses the sense in which a conception of the social nature of practices presupposes a conception of community:

> An instance of a single-practice community would be people working in a particular political campaign. They are engaged in a common task, recognize their compatriots as being so engaged, and are bound by this engagement, this recognition, and the norms of their practice. Everyday talk reflects the use of term 'community' in this way: we speak of political, religious, and even economic communities in referring to communities comprising specific practices. (May 1997, p. 57)

In most cases, however, May explains that it is multiple, or what he calls 'overlapping practices' that constitute a community (p. 57). May notes that in the Continental tradition, Michel Foucault, Gilles Deleuze and Jean-François Lyotard represent such a social theory of practice and in Anglo-American philosophy, Wittgenstein, Wilfred Sellars and Robert Brandom (p. 51). The central claim is that 'a community is defined by the practices that constitute it' (p. 52). This defines, he says, what it means to be in community. Practice, he defines as 'a regularity or regularities of behaviour, usually goal directed, that are socially and normatively governed' (p. 52). While, in this sense, practices are 'rule-governed', such rules need not be formal, or even explicit. A second feature of practices is that their normative governance is social, which is to reject the idea of a private language. This is to say that not only is the *governance* of practices social, but the *practices* are also social. Even solitary practices, like diary writing, are social in this sense. As

[4]Although meaning systems are public, the agent can be seen as active and volitional in relation to the fact that life is independent of the discursive, and appropriates, utilizes and manipulates existing discursive options specific to the concerns and purposes of life in particular times and places. Unlike the systems theorists, for Foucault, the structures of life, labour and language operate in history as coterminous with the environment.

such, says May (p. 53), 'the concept of practice lies at the intersection of individuality and community'. Thirdly, he says, 'practice… involves a regularity in behaviour. In order to be a practice, the various people engaged in it must be said to be "doing the same thing" under some reasonable description of their behaviour' (p. 54). As a consequence of these three definitions, says May, practices must be seen as discursive, meaning that they involve the use of language (p. 55). This entails:

> some sort of communication between participants in order that they may either learn or coordinate the activities that the practice involves…. Moreover, this communication must be potentially accessible to nonparticipants, since without such accessibility the practice would cease to exist when its current participants dropped out. The communication required by a practice, then, must be linguistic. The idea of linguistic communication can be broadly constructed here, needing only a set of public signs with assignable meanings. (p. 55)

Such a theory of practice, says May (p. 55) 'is akin to Wittgenstein's idea that language games are central components of forms of life'. The central theoretical point concerning practices is that they embody actions organized according to rules which are both linguistic and cultural. As Theodore R. Schatzki (2001a: 48) points out, 'practices are organized nexuses of activity', and constitute 'a set of actions… constituted by doings and sayings'. In this sense, he says, (p. 45) 'the social order is instituted within practices'. Schatzki defines the social order as 'arrangements of people, and the organisms, artefacts, and things through which they coexist' (p. 43). They coexist within what Schatzki (2001b, p. 2) calls 'a field of practices' which constitutes 'the total nexus of interconnected human practices'. Such practices are 'embodied, materially mediated arrays of human activity centrally organized around shared practical understanding'. Referring to Foucault, Schatzki (p. 2) notes how 'bodies and activities are "constituted" within practices'. It can be said, further, echoing Foucault in *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, that the practices that make up the social order comprise both 'discursive' and 'extra-discursive' elements (1972, p. 68). In this way, the idea of practices highlights 'how bundled activities interweave with ordered constellations of nonhuman entities' (p. 3). In this sense, says Schatzki, 'practice approaches promulgate a distinct social ontology: the social is a field of embodied, materially interwoven practices centrally organized around shared practical understandings' (p. 3).

A similar thesis is made at the level of language by J.L. Austin (1962) and John Searle (1969, 1995), who note the 'performative' dimensions of language use within a community.[5] As performative, language is also constitutive and derives its meaning in relation to a 'form of life'. It is in this sense that possible language usage is never constrained by the actual system of rules that operate. Such a model allows for the possibility of contingency and novelty. Building on Wittgenstein in the *Philosophical Investigations*, we can say that language does not have a 'fixed and unequivocal use' (1953, p. 37) at all times and places. Names, thus, do not have

[5]Austin's key distinction was between 'locutionary acts', 'illocutionary acts' (which are performative) and 'perlocutionary' effects of actions (which are also performative).

fixed meanings but depend on their *use*. This recalls the principle of contingency where things are not determined by prior causes, in the natures of things, but depend on context, and are historical, and hence, in classical parlance, *could have been otherwise*. As Wittgenstein (PI) says:

> the application of a word is not everywhere bounded by rules…What does a game look like that is everywhere bounded by rules? Whose rules never let a doubt creep in, but stop up all the cracks where it might? (PI §4, p. 39)

Austin's speech act theory both drew on and further developed a broad system of philosophical pragmatism building on a tradition including William James, Charles Horton Cooley, John Dewey, George Herbert Mead, Charles Sanders Pierce and Alfred Schultz, all who introduced in different but related ways notions of the relative autonomy of language and the interactional character of self and society.[6]

5 Foucault as Constructivist

As Foucault told Claude Bonnefoy, 'language is what we use to construct and absolutely infinite number of sentences and utterances' (Foucault 2011, pp. 65–66). Moreover, says Foucault, 'the body itself … is like a language node' (p. 26). His constructivist approach to the autonomy of language was already clear in 1963 in his radio lecture, 'Mad Language', where he says:

> Words, their arbitrary encounter, their confusion, all their protoplasmic transformations are sufficient in themselves to bring into being a world that is both true and fantastic. (Foucault 2015, p. 28)

The nature and extent of Foucault's constructivist claims vary according to the specific propositions being made. In relation to the social sciences, the constructivist claims are stronger than in relation to the natural sciences. Not only is Foucault prepared to make distinctions between different disciplines but also he clearly sees some as having more 'solid armatures' and of being more 'mature' in their development than others, as noted above.

In relation to disciplines like psychiatry, Foucault makes reasonably strong constructionist claims. Disciplines like psychiatry can, in Foucauldian terms, be represented as discourses which, rising in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, defined new ways of relating to the world, new means of administrative control and new ways of defining and talking about people. They produced new boxes to put people in, new labels, new categories and classifications, which became inscribed in the practices of daily life and in the organizational and institutional structures of society. Although the emergence and development of such discursive systems were made possible by the material conditions of early modern

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[6]The possible list could be extended and could include systems theorists like Luhmann, as well as writers such as Garfinkel (1989), Bakhtin (1998), Putnam (1997) and many more.

society, in relation to providing a context of conditioning and limiting factors, Foucault is also of the view that a degree of happenstance and the aleatory were responsible for movements in one rather than another direction. In addition, as new developments in technology produced new ways of addressing social problems, new patterns of normalization and new bases for social authority were established. The very emergence of the knowledge discipline, says Foucault, became implicated in producing the conceptions of normality they claimed to uncover. Hence, the human sciences formulate ways of organizing the world and in doing so position people in relation to the categorizations and classifications that its theories construct. Foucault considers that the human sciences, i.e., 'the dubious sciences' (Foucault 1973), although contributing little knowledge about human beings, have attained massive importance and power in society, a fact that itself needs to be explained. In his conception, they have become complex strategic constructs and forms of domination.

In making strong constructivist claims, as he did in his earlier writings, Foucault held that the objects of which the discourse spoke were themselves constituted by the discourse, that once distinctions were made, new realities effectively came into being; that is, that the types of objects of a domain 'were not already demarcated prior to the discourse but came into existence only contemporaneous with the discursive formations that made it possible to talk about them' (Rousse 1994: 93).

In his later writings and interviews, Foucault sought to qualify the general nature of his constructionist claims in relation to the issue of realism (see Foucault 1980: 108–110). Not only were distinctions introduced between different disciplines and between knowledge claims within disciplines, but in that disciplines constructed knowledge, they did so only within distinct boundaries and limits. After 1968, Foucault became ever more sensitive to the independent status and autonomy of material practices (Foucault 1977, 1978, 1980; Smart 1983; Poster 1984).

Foucault's constructionism is thus similar to what Ian Hacking (1986: 236) calls 'dynamic nominalism'. It is a constructionism that, while recognizing the generative potential of discourses in its relation to the world, also recognizes the variations that may exist in relation to different domains of enquiry and different knowledge forms, recognizes as well the existence of real-world structures and practices and the limits and boundaries within which constructions can take place, and yet also recognizes that there are numerous kinds of knowledge claims (about types of human beings, for instance) that come into being hand in hand with our invention of the categories labelling them.

With reference to this last type of knowledge claim, Ian Hacking (1986) looks at the issue, central to the constructionist's heart, of 'making up people', and examines, using Foucauldian insights, some of the different ways, and different theories, by which people in different ages have been constituted as types. Starting with Arnold Davidson's observation that there were no 'perverts' before the latter part of the nineteenth century, Hacking goes on to consider the constitutive categories of 'multiple personality' (invented, he claims, in 1875), 'split personality' (invented in the same period) and 'possession' (a common form of renaissance

behaviour that died long ago but still survives in a few German villages). While these are different ways of 'making up people', and indicate the pertinence of the constructivist thesis when considered in a sociological sense, it cannot be asserted in any unproblematic sense that individual people simply choose to become 'splits' or 'multiples' or 'possessed' (although in some instances conceivably they could do so). These are social categories, and in any period, the hegemonic form will constitute the dominant code. As the criteria of truth and falsehood are internal to the scheme, making comparative evaluations between 'splits' or 'possessed' is not possible for they are terms from different 'discursive formations', 'language games', frameworks, etc.

While no readily apparent solution to this historical relativism is suggested by either Wittgenstein or Foucault, it seems to me that the only progress out of this impasse can be made if one asks how discursive formations relate to the real world, and whether discourses do not survive or die depending upon their usefulness to particular societies at particular times. I do not mean by this suggestion to license a 'whig' conception of history in the sense that whatever has survived must have done so because it is useful and therefore better, for it may well not be useful tomorrow, or it may have already outlived its functional importance and thus constitute a residual and disappearing category. What is being suggested is a point I have taken from Ian Hacking that discourses are in a constant process of testing themselves in terms of practice in history, and further that the mere existence of 'discourses' or 'language games' does not necessarily therefore suggest relativism. As Hacking puts it,

> It has taken millennia to evolve systems of reasoning. Some of our once favoured styles of reasoning have turned out to be dead ends and others are probably on their way. However, new styles of reasoning will continue to evolve. (Hacking 1986: 150)

Looked at in this way, the historicity of our own styles of reasoning in no way makes them less objective or less rational. Rationality and objectivity are related to context. Discursive systems have histories. Some work better than others are more useful, etc., or continue 'to deliver the goods'. Moreover, while the truth claims associated with any particular discipline (e.g. mathematics) may be internal to the formalized structure, this does not mean that human beings cannot exercise rational judgement related to their being in the world. Hacking believes this when he says,

> There are good and bad reasons for propositions about nature. They are not relative to anything. They do not depend on context. (Hacking 1985: 151)

It would seem to me that this form of simple realism about straightforward claims could also be maintained by both Wittgenstein and Foucault. This is a similar claim to that Gramsci makes when he distinguishes between 'good sense' and 'folklore' as being the two elements of 'common sense'. By such a distinction, Gramsci attempted to resolve the impasse of a blunt-edged relativism in the context of historicist and anti-foundational conceptions of the emergence and

development of knowledge. For Gramsci, 'good sense' was the criterion of evaluation generated by experience, whereas 'folklore' was knowledge handed down from generation to generation simply on the basis of custom or tradition. The task of educators was to instil 'good sense' and eradicate 'folklore' through utilizing the critical faculties.

Some commentators believe that Foucault was approaching a similar conception of the relation between discourse and practice in his later writings (see Deleuze 1988; Gutting 1989, 1994). Certainly in his later writings, as I have stated above, he moderated the general nature of his constructivist claims and became more sensitive to the constraining nature of the real world and to the overall complexity of the interrelationships between discourse and the practice. In his later work, *Care of the Self*, notably, it is evident that while changes in material context over the period of the Roman Empire were determinant of the range and limits of behaviours enabled, they still established a range of possibilities enabling freedom of choice. Discourse in this sense had a constructive potential although changes within social structure would open and limit possibilities. What distinguishes Foucault's constructivism and differentiates his position from empiricism and positivism is that whereas those perspectives assume the possibility of an 'immediate', 'pre-given' correspondence between discourse and the world, Foucault, while not denying such a possibility, problematizes it. He became increasingly sensitive to the way in which knowledge became untied from its condition of origin or from the practices it pertains to and claims to explain. Such a non-correspondence has been described by Barry Smart (1983: 94) as a routine feature of positive significance requiring analysis in each particular instance. A similar point is made by Colin Gordon, who summarizes Foucault's position in the following way:

> Our world does not follow a programme, but we live in a world of programmes, that is to say in a world traversed by the effects of discourse whose object… is the rendering rationalizable, transparent and programmable of the real. (Gordon 1980, cited in Smart 1983: 95)

For Foucault, not only is the discipline structure of knowledge constructed in history but also discourse has a 'constructive potential' in bringing new realities into existence. Just as 'labelling theories' and 'social problem' perspectives once maintained that social realities are conditioned and even created by the labels we apply, Foucault claims that many of our categorizations, including those concerning our own subjectivity, are constructed in history. Giving names to things is one aspect of this process of constitution. As Foucault says,

> We should try to discover how it is that subjects are gradually progressively, really and materially constituted through a multiplicity of organisms, forces, energies, materials, desires, thoughts, etc. (cited in Hacking 1986: 226)

With relation to the constitution of subjectivity, Foucault advances a strong constructivist programme which can be distinguished from the 'weak' constructivist programme of labelling theories and social problem perspectives. In his strong claims, as they relate to the subject, Foucault takes objects like the body and

focusses on how conceptions of subjectivity are created or invented in history. His claims have influenced many researchers advancing constructivist theses, some whom it may be considered go a little too far, for example David Armstrong's *The Invention of Infant Mortality* (1986); or Sarah Nettleton's *Inventing Mouths* (1994) where she advances a strong constructivist position, arguing that 'the mouth with teeth is not a pre-existent entity but an object that has been realized through the discourse of dentistry' (Introduction). Others, such as Nikolas Rose, in his book *Governing the Soul* (1990), presents an impressive argument for the constitution of subjects by the psy-professions in various political contexts.

It is clear that Foucault has inspired many new types of research, and that the social constructivist dimension to knowledge production is important. In many senses, the discourse does create the reality—the body analyzed for 'humours' will contain 'humours', a body analyzed for 'organs and tissues' will contain 'organs and tissues', a body analyzed in terms of 'psychological functioning' is a 'psychological object', a body analyzed for 'intelligence' will contain 'intelligence'—and these are important senses in which the 'gaze' or 'perspective' constructs the object. While this need not deny that outside of discourse, something exists, it is to highlight the role that discourse plays is giving form to and framing the way the world is understood, i.e. constructed. In other words, while it does not deny a realist ontology, it does dispute the doctrine of immediacy or sense certainty in terms of which the world is apprehended. To focus, as Foucault does, on how the domains of the body become possible objects of positive knowledge and to expose the biomedical roots of modern knowledge as expressions of power/knowledge is surely his lasting contribution. None of Foucault's claims should offend our realist sensibilities. To the extent that some of his followers appear to do so, in that they speak of the 'invention of mouths', or of 'infant mortality', etc., the ambiguities are resolved once the propositions being advanced are clearly expressed.

6 Conclusion

In conclusion, I would agree that Wittgenstein's social constructivist view of mathematics avoids idealism and subjective mental state constructivism. While anti-foundational, Wittgenstein is also not sceptical about objectivity or truth criteria. The larger problem of relativism, I claim, has not been entirely overcome, however. By turning to Foucault, we can see more clearly the different dimensions of this problem and how it might be overcome, although my suggestions should only be regarded as tentative. It is claimed, finally, that Foucault recognizes the discursive construction of knowledge and of subjectivity without completely giving up on realism, and he is prepared to alter his claims according to different fields of knowledge. This could perhaps be called 'dynamic constructivism'.

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Wittgenstein and Classical Pragmatism

Jim Garrison

Abstract My paper compares Wittgenstein to the three classical pragmatist, Charles Sanders Peirce, William James, and John Dewey. It is well known that Frank Ramsey read and cited Peirce, although we can only conjecture what, if anything, he may have communicated of Peirce to Wittgenstein or if Wittgenstein ever read him for himself. Through Ramsey, we will explore some of the similarities between Wittgenstein and Peirce, including the typically pragmatist emphasis on intelligent action and its relation to doubt. One important difference is Peirce and pragmatism's emphasis on embodied habits. We will also examine the well-documented influence of James on Wittgenstein. Many of Wittgenstein's criticisms of psychology can most likely be traced to errors he initially found in James. However, there are many likely sources of positive influence on Wittgenstein as well including perhaps the notion of an inherited world picture, his unique theory of universals along with his holism, historicism, and anti-foundationalism. While Wittgenstein has many positive things to say about James, he is entirely negative in his remarks about Dewey. Ironically, we will find that Dewey is the pragmatist with whom most commentators have identified thematic resonances to Wittgenstein.

Keywords Pragmatism · Peirce · James · Dewey · Wittgenstein

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© Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2017

M.A. Peters and J. Stickney (eds.), *A Companion to Wittgenstein on Education*,
DOI 10.1007/978-981-10-3136-6_21

1 Introduction

Ludwig Wittgenstein's tangential remarks, like the following, invite comparisons to pragmatism. "So I am trying to say something that sounds like pragmatism. Here I am being thwarted by a kind of *Weltanschauung*" (OC §422).[1] The *Weltanschauung* was likely the contempt for pragmatism expressed by his teachers and most of his friends at Cambridge, especially Bertrand Russell and G.E. Moore, whose understanding of pragmatism was limited, fragmentary, and confused. Wittgenstein's own (mis)understandings resemble those of his Cambridge colleagues.

The contemporary worldview in philosophy and education still thwarts us. However, since Rorty's (1979) widely acclaimed *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature,* the affinities between Deweyan pragmatism and the later Wittgenstein have become widely promulgated by neo-pragmatists such as Hilary Putnam and Robert Brandom, among others. Dewey's similarities to Wittgenstein extend to the other two classical pragmatists, Charles Sanders Peirce and William James. Today, it is worth trying to establish some points of contact between Wittgenstein and pragmatism for creative conversations going forward. We do not have the space to be exhaustive and must acknowledge that the degree of contact depends on how one interprets Wittgenstein and the classical pragmatists.

We confine discussion to the later Wittgenstein, Peirce, James, and Dewey; all were deceased by the time *Philosophical Investigations* appeared. We limit discussion of possible points of contact to the primacy of practice in comprehending linguistic meaning (i.e., forms of life, language games, and meaning as use), the rejection of representationalism and private language, behaviorism, the socially distributed nature of mind and self (e.g., holism), epistemological contextualism, the rejection of the quest for certainty, the refutation of essentialism, and anti-foundationalism.

2 Wittgenstein and Peirce

It appears there is no mention of Peirce in Wittgenstein's writings, which is not surprising since Wittgenstein states, "I give no sources, because it is indifferent to me whether what I have thought has already been thought before me by another" (TLP: Preface). Charles Ogden sent a copy of his acclaimed book coauthored with Ogden and Richards (1923), *The Meaning of Meaning,* to Wittgenstein who we

[1]Following convention, titles for Wittgenstein's works are abbreviated (TLP = Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, PI = Philosophical Investigations, Z = Zettel, OC = On Certainty, LR = Letters to Russell, keynes, and moore, RFM = Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, CV = Culture and Value, L = Lectures), with section (§) or page number (p.), with full citation and initials (e.g., RFM) in the References.

know read it (Nubiola 1996: 284). The book includes an appendix introducing Peirce along with a preface praising him. Ogden along with Frank Ramsey translated the *Tractatus* into English. Ramsey had considerable familiarity with and appreciation of Peirce. In his critical review of the *Tractatus*, Ramsey (1923/2013) mentions Peirce's "type" versus "token" distinction would clarify the ambiguity in Wittgenstein's use of "proposition" (274). In the preface to *Philosophical Investigations*, Wittgenstein acknowledges his "innumerable conversations" with Ramsey. These conversations are the likely source for any Peircian ideas that might have slipped into the later Wittgenstein. The points of contact we identify do not assume Peirce even unconsciously influenced Wittgenstein.

We begin with the primacy of practice in determining linguistic meaning. Peirce studied Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* extensively. In explaining the origin of the word "pragmatism" to designate this philosophy, he recalls that his friends suggested "*practicism* or *practicalism"*:

> But for one who had learned philosophy out of Kant… and who still thought in Kantian terms most readily, *praktisch* and *pragmatisch* were as far apart as the two poles, the former belonging in a region of thought where no mind of the experimentalist type can ever make sure of solid ground under his feet, the latter expressing relation to some definite human purpose. Now quite the most striking feature of the new theory was its recognition of an inseparable connection between rational cognition and rational purpose; and that consideration it was which determined the preference for the name *pragmatism*. (CP 5, §412)[2]

The Kantian origin of pragmatism should have eliminated the notion that it is concerned with mere practicalism. The Cambridge philosophers and many others fail to grasp the importance of human purposes regarding rationality.

While Peirce was an experimental empiricist, there are similarities to Wittgenstein regarding their Kantian commitments to formal logic, grammar, rules, universals, and such, as normative for language (and empirical science for Peirce).[3] Peirce is an empirical realist who thought intelligent inquiries eventually converge upon the antecedently real when pursued indefinitely. While it is best not to classify Wittgenstein as a realist (or anti-realist), he does proclaim: "Not empiricism and yet realism in philosophy, that is the hardest thing (Against Ramsey)" (RFM: vi, §23). The target here is Ramsey's essay, "General Propositions and Causality." In that essay, Ramsey (1929/1990) invokes Peirce's empirical realist notion of truth:

> We do, however, believe that the system is uniquely determined and that long enough investigation will lead us all to it. This is Peirce's notion of truth as what everyone will believe in the end; it does not apply to the truthful statement of fact, but to the "true scientific system". (161)

Since the classical pragmatists are empiricist, the difference between *praktisch* and *pragmatisch* marks a divergence from Wittgenstein. However, Wittgenstein's

[2]Peirce is here rejecting Kantian transcendentalism.

[3]It would be interesting to compare Peirce's "speculative grammar" as the division of his logic dealing with "the general conditions to which thought or signs of any kind must conform in order to assert anything" (CP: §206) to what Wittgenstein means by "grammar."

notion that the limit of language is the limit of thought resembles Peirce's notion that "man can think only by means of words" (EP §54).

There are productive points of contact between Wittgenstein's careful employment of descriptive proto-phenomenology and Peirce's own pioneering phenomenology, which lies behind his experimentalism. The greatest divergence between them concerns Peirce's emphasis on theory, empirical method, and explanation, which he shares with James and Dewey.

Wittgenstein and Peirce converge on the importance of action and the primacy of practice:

> Giving grounds, however, justifying the evidence, comes to an end—but the end is not certain propositions striking us immediately as true, i.e., it is not a kind of *seeing* on our part; it is our *acting*, which lies at the bottom of the language-game. (OC §204; see also §411)[4]

Elsewhere, Wittgenstein writes, "words are deeds" (CV §46). The word "deed" is especially cordial for pragmatists since*pragma* in ancient Greek means a deed, an act, an affair.

In a work predating the essay that inaugurated pragmatism by a decade, Peirce asserts that "my language is the sum total of myself" (EP 1: §54). He then concludes that "as what anything really is, is what it may finally come to be known to be in the ideal state of complete information, so that reality depends on the ultimate decision of the community" (EP 1: §54). For Peirce, logical norms (grammar, rules, concepts, and such) reside in communities of practice with the ideal norms known only in the ideal state of complete information. Ramsey well understood the realist, normative function found in communities of inquiry. Without the emphasis on experimentation, Peirce is highly compatible with Wittgenstein's stress on the use of words in communities of practice.

Another point of contact between Peirce, pragmatism, and Wittgenstein involves the status of doubt and belief. Both Wittgenstein and Peirce reject Cartesian universal doubt. Wittgenstein asserts:

> But the end is not an ungrounded presupposition: it is an ungrounded way of acting. (OC §110).[5]
>
> If you tried to doubt everything you would not get as far as doubting anything. The game of doubt itself presupposes certainty. (OC §115)
>
> That is to say, it belongs to the logic of our scientific investigation that certain things are *in deed* not doubted. (OC §342; see also 341)

Wittgenstein asks, "Doesn't one need grounds for doubt?" the answer is yes! (OC §122). Further, sounding like a pragmatist, he affirms, "if anyone were to doubt it, how would his doubt come out in practice? And couldn't we peacefully leave him to doubt it, since it makes no difference at all?" (OC §120).

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[4]Nowhere has emphasis been added to any citation.

[5]This passage also connects to Peirce and Wittgenstein's anti-foundationalism.

Peirce agrees genuine doubt must have an existential origin in concrete practice:

> We cannot begin with complete doubt. We must begin with all the prejudices which we actually have when we enter upon the study of philosophy. These prejudices are not to be dispelled by a maxim, for they are things which it does not occur to us *can* be questioned. Hence this initial skepticism will be a mere self-deception, and not real doubt; and no one who follows the Cartesian method will ever be satisfied until he has formally recovered all those beliefs which in form he has given up.… A person may… find reason to doubt what he began by believing; but in that case he doubts because he has a positive reason for it, and not on account of the Cartesian maxim. Let us not pretend to doubt in philosophy what we do not doubt in our hearts. (CP 5: §265)

Peirce insists doubt must have a context. Nonetheless, genuine existential doubt may vary from person to person and language game to language game.

Wittgenstein and Peirce connect their understanding of doubt and belief to epistemological anti-foundationalism, which Peirce relates to the permanent fallibility of any assertion. Indeed, when he describes the four ways thinkers block the road of inquiry he asks us to acknowledge, "we can be sure of nothing;" everything remains forever falsifiable (EP 2, §49). We can read Wittgenstein's *On Certainty* as a protracted argument asserting we cannot complete the quest for Cartesian certainty. Second, to not block the road of inquiry, we must abandon radical skepticism or the idea there is something that "never can be known" (EP 2, §49). Third, foundationalist beliefs of something "ultimate, independent of aught else, and utterly inexplicable" are also blocks (EP 2, §49). In the following two passages, Wittgenstein expresses his own anti-foundationalism:

> Philosophy may in no way interfere with the actual use of language; it can in the end only describe it. For it cannot give it any foundation either. (PI §124)

> If the true is what is grounded, then the ground is not *true*, nor yet false. (OC §205)

Finally, for Peirce there is the false assumption that "holding that this or that law or truth has found its last and perfect formulation" (EP 2, §49). If we cannot complete the quest for certainty, then we can never know if we have arrived at the final formulation of anything. The later Wittgenstein embraces one, three, and four since they acknowledge the truth of skepticism. However, given his serious concerns about the proper response to skepticism, Wittgenstein would most likely find Peirce's second obstacle insurmountable.[6]

There is one place where Peirce and pragmatism nicely supplement Wittgenstein. It involves habits. For Peirce, "the establishment in our nature of a rule of action, or, say for short, a *habit*" (CP 5, §397; CP 6, §§32 and 201). Habits are logical generalizations enabling inference (e.g., where there is smoke there is fire).

[6]While they concede, we cannot complete the quest for certainty, pragmatists are anti-skeptics that consider skepticism an impregnable fortress from whence the enemy cannot attack. If they do, they lose.

Embodied habits of action supplement Wittgenstein's thinking about social practices and rule following. Frank Ramsey (1926/1990) ends his paper with a discussion of inference that, as he indicates in a footnote, is based on Peirce whom he paraphrases: "I use habit in the most general possible sense to mean simply rule or law of behavior" (90). It is a good expression of Peirce's position.

In following a rule, Wittgenstein wonders: "How is it decided what is the correct step to take at any particular stage" (PI §186). Rules for Wittgenstein are always an abridgement of concrete practice. Agreement regarding rule following depends on agreement in customary form of life within a shared social practice:

> "Then can whatever I do be brought into accord with the rule?"– Let me ask this: what has the expression of a rule-say a sign-post?—got to do with my actions? What sort of connexion is there here? Well, perhaps this one: I have been trained to react to this sign in a particular way, and now I do so react to it… I have further indicated that a person goes by a sign-post only in so far as there exists a regular use of sign-posts, a custom. (PI §198)

"To understand a sentence is to understand a language. To understand a language means to be master of a technique" (PI §199). Understanding language, following rules, and grasping concepts involve an element of skilled "know-how" that only arises from practice. Wittgenstein's conclusion is that "When I obey a rule, I do not choose. I obey the rule *blindly*" (PI §219). Compliance with the norms of cultural custom allows us to master socially approved techniques of language usage within a form of life.

For Peirce, we embody compliance to customs individually as habits of action evincing feeling. This kind of pragmatist compliance is especially interesting to pedagogues. Peirce declares, "Our beliefs guide our desires and shape our action" and then affirms, "The feeling of believing is a more or less sure indication of there being established in our nature some habit which will determine our actions" (EP 1, §114). Notice the role of feeling in believing. Further, a "belief is a rule of action" (EP 1, §129). Peirce insists "the sense of the process of learning, which is the preeminent ingredient and quintessence of reason has its physiological basis quite evidently in the most characteristic property of the nervous system, the power of taking habits" (CP 1, §390). Wittgenstein indicates, "Any explanation has its foundation in training (Educators ought to remember this.)" (Z §419). When acting "mindlessly" our trained unconscious habits force us to follow rules blindly.

For Peirce and the classical pragmatists, we are controlled by habits we do not control. The work of intelligence and reflection is to render our habits consciously under our control. Often to secure control requires, first, comprehending the culture that socialized (i.e., trained) us and, second, transforming the culture. Here the pedagogical import of embodied pragmatism takes a political turn.

3 Wittgenstein and James

At one time *Principles of Psychology* was the only book on Wittgenstein's bookshelf.[7] Goodman (2002) remarks: "Wittgenstein refers to the book in his journals and typescripts, from the early 1930's until the end of his life" (17). Wittgenstein read James's *Varieties of Religious Experience* in 1912 writing Russell saying: "This book does me a *lot* of good" (LR, 10). Wittgenstein names James four times in the *Philosophical Investigations*, the same as Gottlob Frege; he only names St. Augustine more (five times). While we may talk about points of contact regarding Peirce and Dewey, with James we can make conjectures about actual influence.

One of the chief ways James perhaps influences Wittgenstein is the idea of an inherited world picture (*weltbild*):

> The individual has a stock of old opinions already, but he meets a new experience that puts them to a strain…. He saves as much of it as he can, for in this matter of belief we are all extreme conservatives…. The most violent revolutions in an individual's beliefs leave most of his old order standing… New truth is always a go-between…. It marries old opinion to new fact so as ever to show a minimum of jot, a maximum of continuity…. To a certain degree, therefore, everything here is plastic. (p. 34–35)

This passage expresses James's holism, historicism, and anti-foundationalism, which resonate with Wittgenstein.

For Wittgenstein, a world picture is the "substratum of all my enquiring and asserting" (OC §162). Beliefs constituting one's world picture "stand fast" in relation to other beliefs as a nonfoundational substratum for judgment. Propositions forming the world picture have a special function in which "their role is like that of rules of a game; and the game can be learned purely practically, without leaning any explicit rules" (OC §95). For pragmatists, everything that "stands fast" is falsifiable, and for some, everything is contingent in an evolving universe. One wonders if Wittgenstein would go so far. Can even hinge propositions become unhinged? (see OC §§341–343).

James's *The Varieties of Religious Experience* seems to have had a profound personal, religious, and philosophical effect on Wittgenstein. Goodman (2002) argues James anticipates Wittgenstein's notion of "family resemblance" (53). For example, James affirms, "we may very likely find no one essence, but many characters which may alternatively be equally important in religion" (VRE: 30). The same holds for Wittgenstein's language games:

> For someone might object against me: You talk about all sorts of language- games but have nowhere said what the essence of a language-game, and hence of language, is: what is common to all these activities, and what makes them into language or parts of language…. And this is true. -Instead of producing something common to all that we call language, I am

[7]Goodman (2002: 3). Goodman provides many instances of Wittgenstein referring directly to James in his correspondence or remembrances published by friends and students or, as here, letters. This is the definitive work on the many likely influences of James on Wittgenstein.

> saying that these phenomena have no one thing in common which makes us use the same word for all, -but that they are related to one another in many different ways. (PI §65)

Again: "Don't say: 'There must be something common, or they would not be called 'games' '-but look and see whether there is anything common to all" (PI §66). More generally, Wittgenstein and James agree we cannot arrive at necessary and sufficient conditions for defining essences.

In *Investigations*, the method of looking and describing what one sees in a plethora of examples replaces the method of theoretical explanation in the *Tractatus*. Wittgenstein's proto-phenomenological method is strikingly similar to James's in *Principles* and *Varieties*. James asserts, "the connection of things in our knowledge is in no whit *explained* by making it the deed of an agent whose essence is self-identity and who is out of time. The agency of phenomenal thought coming and going in time is just as easy to understand" (PP I 348). Here, James is criticizing Kantian a priori transcendental explanations. James coined the phrase "radical empiricist" to designate his version of empiricism in which nothing is in thought that is not first in experience (including concepts, norms, and necessity), and relations are experienced as much as relata and, therefore, there was no need to posit anything transcendental to connect events. He also rejects the notion of sense data that invoked Hume's skepticism, which woke Kant from his dogmatic slumber.

James's empiricism expresses a greater appreciation for what science can offer philosophy than we find in Wittgenstein (see CV, p. 79e). The following expresses both similarity and difference from James:

> It was true to say that our considerations could not be scientific ones. It was not of any possible interest to us to find out empirically 'that, contrary to our preconceived ideas, it is possible to think such-and-such'—whatever that may mean…. And we may not advance any kind of theory. There must not be anything hypothetical in our considerations. We must do away with all *explanation*, and description alone must take its place. (PI §109)

Peirce, James, and Dewey would agree we must avoid scientism, but the classical pragmatists eschew a sharp separation between philosophy as a cultural practice and any other cultural practice such as science.

What rightly bothers Wittgenstein is James's reliance on the introspective method and his subjectivism. In spite of his typically pragmatic anti-representationalism (and rejection of the correspondence theory of truth), these assumptions sometimes lead James to sound like he is saying we have a private experience of meaning. For Wittgenstein, meanings and grammar arise from shared social practices. Rightly or wrongly, Wittgenstein reads James as advocating a private language.

James states, "*The sense of our meaning is an entirely peculiar element of the thought*" (PP I 446). Here, it seems that for James linguistic meaning is a private. The later Wittgenstein rejects the notion that meaning is an experience: "'Tell me, what was going on in you when you uttered the words….?'—The answer to this is not: 'I was meaning….. '!" (PI §675). Again, "The meaning of a word is not the experience one has in hearing or saying it, and the sense of a sentence is not a

complex of such experience" (PI, p. 181). By contrast, James believes that "even before we have opened our mouths to speak, the entire thought is present to our mind in the form of an intention to utter that sentence" (PP, I 269). Meanwhile, Wittgenstein claims: "Meaning is as little in experience as intending" (PI, p. 217). We must not confuse personal experiences accompanying a meaning with the meaning itself, which is not to deny the reality or even the significance of such experience.

For Wittgenstein: "Meaning is not a process which accompanies a word. For no process could have the consequences of meaning" (PI, p. 218). However, he also says, "The limit of the empirical—is *concept-formation* (RFM, IV, §29). How are they formed? Goodman (2002) observes that Wittgenstein struggles with the problem of "how to register both the historical and necessary in his account of logic or grammar" (29). Here, we have an instance of the tension. Whatever else he is saying, he is right to say no psychological process alone could have the consequences of meaning. The meaning of a word is its use in a shared social practice: "So you are saying that human agreement decides what is true and what is false?" – It is what human beings *say* that is true and false; and they agree in the *language* they use. That is not agreement in opinions but in form of life" (PI §241; see also PI, p. 226). However, that does not imply that embodied processes (i.e., feelings and habits) cannot contribute to meaning or that no process could have the consequences of meaning.

However poorly, what James is combating is the notion that abstract concepts are entirely separate from concrete percepts. The classical pragmatists agree we derive concepts genetically from experience. What follows is part of James's derivation beginning with flux of feeling and thinking:

> The great difference between percepts and concepts is that the percepts are continuous and concepts are discrete. Not discrete in their being, for conception as an *act* is part of the flux of feeling, but discrete from each other in their several meanings. Each concept means just what it singularly means, and nothing else; and if the conceiver does not know whether he means this or means that, it shows that his concept is imperfectly formed. The perceptual flux as such, on the contrary, *means* nothing, and is but what it immediately is. (PC 32)

The role of feelings here is one of connecting meanings, not meanings per se.

For James, concepts, meanings, discrete objects, and so on emerge from an anoetic qualitative flux of percepts. They are purely perspectival determinations derived from our human needs, desires, and purposes:

> Out of this aboriginal sensible muchness, attention carves out objects, which conception then names and identifies forever—in the sky "constellations," one the earth "beach," "sea," "cliff," "bushes," and "grass."' Out of time we cut "days" and "nights," "summers," and "winters." We say what each part of the sensible continuum is, and all these abstracted *whats* are *concepts*. *The intellectual life of man consists almost wholly in his substituting a conceptual order for the perceptual order in which his experience originally comes.* (PC 33)

When we experience, we experience existence; however poorly, we may comprehend it. Selective attention carves out data for inference (data are taken, not given)

and the construction of natural kinds. What we must do is distinguish our qualitative experience of existence from the essences (meanings, concepts, norms, rules, etc.) we construct from existence. An analogy would be distinguishing grapes on the vine from the distilled essence of the grapes for a purpose; that is, wine. Both grapes and the wine exist, but the wine, like logical essences, is a refinement of natural occurrences fulfilling practical purposes.

Classical pragmatists believe we abstract logical grammar from experience; hence, while lacking specific spatial–temporal reference logical norms and the like remain derivatively empirical. Perhaps the greatest error in the history of Western philosophy involves reifying otherwise useful hypostatic abstractions, and in so doing forgetting the concrete historical process by which we arrived at the abstract product. We could not have the product of meaning without the genetic process of meaning construction. For classical pragmatists, there are no meanings without meaning makers. This is how they reconcile the tension in Wittgenstein between historicism and the "necessity" of grammar.

James overcomes the ontological dualism between percepts (feeling, sensation, and perception) and conceptualization. However, a subtle dualism and subjectivism remains of the kind that offends Wittgenstein's rejection of representationalism. Mark Johnson (2007) notes, "Though James does not intend this, these terms [selects, etc.] suggest the need for a mental homunculus (a mini-conceptualizer in the 'mind') who does the selecting, cutting, and carving from experience" (89). The homunculus constructs things inside the "mind" that resemble mental representations.

For James, experience remains private. However, social experience such as participating in forms of life is public and shared, which is why Wittgenstein rightly condemns James's subjectivism. When Dewey took up James's later radical empiricism, in which relations as well as relata are part of experience, he reconstructed it to overcome James's subjectivism as well as his mind verses body and subject versus object dualisms. The result bears striking resemblances to Wittgenstein.

Johnson (2007) indicates, "Dewey's solution is to grant that [thoughtful] activity is a fundamental capacity of certain types of living creature, but without positing a conscious [or unconscious] inner, agent-like source of that activity" (90). For Dewey, intentionality fundamentally involves taking something in the environment and using it to refer to something else in the environment.[8] Thus,

> *As exercising the function, we may call it mental.* Neither the thing meant nor the thing signifying is mental. Nor is the meaning itself mental in any psychical, dualistic, existential sense… A probable rain storm, as indicated to us by the look of the clouds or the barometer,

[8]Of course, we may perform the activity of taking and using signs reflexively. It is worth adding that entire body performs such activity.

> gets embodied in a word… and hence can be treated *for certain purposes* just as an actual rain storm would be treated. (MW 13: 56–57)

Notice Dewey, like Wittgenstein, moves mental functioning into the world; it is no longer an entirely private experience, although it has private aspects.

In spite of errors, James joins with other traditional pragmatists in finding disembodied Kantian transcendental accounts fundamentally mistaken. We may embody cultural practices as dispositions to act; that is, habits of linguistic use and response that structure vague feelings into cognitively informed emotions. Wittgenstein lacks a robust sense of embodiment, although it is easily added.

Peirce, James, and Dewey share empirical holism, historicism, and revisability with the neo-pragmatist W.V.O. Quine's (1953) stance in his famous essay "Two Dogma's of Empiricism," which is a devastating refutation of the logical positivist's analytic versus synthetic dualism, reductionism, and foundationalism.[9] It raises serious questions about the plasticity and consistency of Wittgenstein's holism, historicism, and anti-foundationalism:

> It might be imagined that some propositions of the form of empirical propositions were hardened and functioned as channels for such empirical propositions a were not hardened but fluid; and that this relation altered with time, in the fluid propositions hardened, and hard one become fluid. (OC §96)

This is how Quine and other pragmatists imagine it. However, Wittgenstein affirms: "But if someone were to say, 'So logic too is an empirical science' he would be wrong. Yet this is right: the same propositions may get treated at one time as something tested by experience, at another as a rule of testing (OC §98). Given the second sentence, what does it mean to say logic is not an empirical science? Wittgenstein's distinction here is extremely subtle. Clearly, he is not a simple neo-Kantian defending a sharp analytic–synthetic distinction. There is something neo-Kantian, but what exactly and why is it irreconcilable with empiricism? If it is simply forms of life and "human nature" functioning quasi-transcendentally, then it is reconcilable. How does the necessity of grammar square with Wittgenstein's holistic, historicized, and nonreductive anti-foundationalism? Why is he not an empiricist all the way down like Peirce if not James or Dewey?

4 Wittgenstein and Dewey

Dewey does not mention Wittgenstein in the *Collected Works* and only once in his *Correspondence*.[10] Wittgenstein mentions Dewey held that "belief" was "an adjustment of the organism" (L §90). It is typical of Wittgenstein's Cambridge

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[9]Some believe this essay was the most important single philosophical paper of the twentieth century. According to Quine (1953), pragmatism is one of the major effects of rejecting the two dogmas.

[10]1939.07.22 (09313): John Dewey to Corinne Chisholm Frost.

pragmatism. He did comment that if Dewey was still living, he "Ought not to be" (Bouwsma 1986: 28–29). A striking statement since Dewey is the pragmatist to whom most compare Wittgenstein.

We focus on social-linguistic practice and meaning as use. First, let us locate language in Dewey's philosophy. For him, "there is a natural bridge that joins the gap between existence and essence; namely communication, language, discourse" (LW 1: 133). Essences for Dewey are simply refinements of ordinary language. H2O is no more real than thirst slaking water, although it is more useful in scientific language games.

Dewey builds on the following Jamesian insight: "*The treating of a name as excluding from the fact named what the name's definition fails positively to include, is what I call 'vicious intellectualism'*" (PU 32). The problem is not with abstraction or conceptual logic; it is with the notion that abstract concepts are somehow more real than other experiences. The error arises from reifying our abstractions and forgetting the *noncognitive* experiences from whence they derive. For James, "the *naming* of a thing" is merely for "our own petty purpose" (PP II 960–961). Thus, "the only meaning of essence is teleological, and that classification and conception are purely teleological weapons of the mind" (PP II 961). "Meanwhile," he insists, "reality overflows these purposes at every pore" (PP II 961). Existence always overflows the concepts we distil from it for our petty finite purposes. Would Wittgenstein agree? I leave this question for the Wittgenstein scholars.

"When intellectual experience and its material are taken to be primary," Dewey declares, "the cord that binds experience and nature is cut" (LW 1: 29). His naturalism also condemns intellectualism:

> [T]he great vice of philosophy is an arbitrary "intellectualism"… By "intellectualism" as an indictment is meant the theory that all experiencing is a mode of knowing, and that all subject-matter, all nature, is, in principle, to be reduced and transformed till it is defined in terms identical with the characteristics presented by refined objects of science as such. (LW 1: 28)

In his genetic philosophical method, the refined essences of science are products of a process of abstraction. Empirical genetic method "protects us from conversion of eventual functions into antecedent existence: a conversion that may be said to be *the* philosophic fallacy" (LW 1: 34). This fallacy yields Platonic transcendent essences (i.e., the Forms) and Kant's transcendental a priori categories.

Dewey titles the second chapter of his 1938 *Logic*, "The Existential Matrix of Inquiry: Biological" (LW 12). The biology of human experience is part of the genetic trace from crude meaningless existences to the refined essences of logic. There is an aspect of naturalism in Wittgenstein as well:

> I want to regard man here as an animal; as a primitive being to which one grants instinct but not ratiocination. As a creature in a primitive state. Any logic good enough for a creature in a primitive means of communication needs no apology from us. Language did not emerge from some kind of ratiocination. (OC §475)

One might argue that human animality and world pictures place quasi-transcendental constraints on thought. After all, we cannot exceed our human perspectives on existence even when we rely on the sciences to help us understand how other species experience existence (e.g., elephants communicating non-linguistically via ultrasound). Insofar as he is a naturalist, Wittgenstein lacks the pragmatist's robust sense of embodiment.

"The Existential Matrix of Inquiry: Cultural" is the next chapter of the *Logic*. There, Dewey examines the bridge from biological existence to logical essence. For Dewey, the "modification of organic behavior in and by a cultural environment accounts for… behavior marked by intellectual properties" (LW 12: 49). Furthermore, "Intellectual behavior is foreshadowed in behavior of the biological kind" (LW 12: 49). Borrowing from Peirce and James, Dewey is thinking about how feelings influence intuitions from whence inquiry commences in doubtful situations and how biological habits carry out existential inference (see LW 11: 107). When habits become consciously under our control, we may, perhaps, state them as logical generalizations regarding existences having spatial–temporal reference that we may pair with abstract, decontextualized logical universals (i.e., conceptual) propositions. However, we cannot reduce logical functioning to their biological, or social, matrices.[11]

We have already discussed Wittgenstein's anti-foundationalism. Wittgenstein states: "The difficulty is to realize the groundlessness of our believing" (OC §166). He does not mean we have no ground, only that we lack indubitable foundations. He also says, "The *truth* of certain empirical propositions belongs to our frame of reference" (OC §83). Of course, so too do certain propositions lacking direct empirical reference. Pragmatists find no sharp analytic versus synthetic difference between such propositions, only practically useful distinctions. Wittgenstein seems to agree when he compares the propositions of the world picture to a riverbed: "[T] he river-bed of thoughts may shift. But I distinguish between the movement of the waters on the river-bed and the shift of the bed itself; though there is not a sharp division of the one from the other" (OC §97).[12] Hence, "the same proposition may get treated at one time as something to test by experience, at another as a rule of testing" (OC §98). This sounds like the so-called pragmatic a priori wherein the products of prior inquiries my *function* "as if" they were transcendental a priori to future inquiry, although they never lose empirical contingency and falsifiability. Scientific revolutions often involve refuting putatively a priori assumptions (e.g., Newtonian separation of space and time).

For Dewey, acquiring linguistic meaning is a social transaction: "The bare fact that language consists of sounds which are *mutually intelligible* is enough of itself to show that its meaning depends upon connection with a shared experience"

[11]Instead, logical properties emerge from biological and social functioning and when they do they transform such functioning.

[12]Wittgenstein could have derived this metaphor from James's chapter on "The Stream of Consciousness" in Principles.

(MW 9: 19). This passage is from Dewey's 1916 *Democracy and Education*; he continues:

> In short, the sound h-a-t gains meaning in precisely the same way that the thing "hat" gains it, by being used in a given way. And they acquire the same meaning with the child which they have with the adult because they are used in a common experience by both. The guarantee for the same manner of use is found in the fact that the thing and the sound are first employed in a *joint* activity, as a means of setting up an active connection between the child and a grown-up. (MW 9: 19)

Wittgenstein and Dewey agree words derive their meaning when used within forms of life.

We turn now to Quine's (1969) influential essay, "Ontological Relativity." What he says there about Dewey goes a long way toward establishing similarities to Wittgenstein regarding the depiction of linguistic "behavior," "use," and "context." Quine finds: "Philosophically I am bound to Dewey by the naturalism… With Dewey I hold that knowledge, mind, and meaning are part of the same world…. There is no place for a prior philosophy" (26). He further adds that, like Dewey, when discussing the philosophy of mind, he turns to language to comprehend mental functioning. Linguistically, he too wishes to avoid "pernicious mentalism" (e.g., mental representations) in semantics (27).

Quine cites Dewey to support his rejection of mentalism: "Meaning… is not a psychic existence; it is primarily a property of behavior" (27; see LW 1: 141).[13] Quine states:

> Meanings are, first and foremost, meanings of language. Language is a social art which we all acquire on the evidence solely of other people's overt behavior under publicly recognizable circumstances. Meanings, therefore, those very models of mental entities, end up as grist for the behaviorist's mill. (26)

He goes on to mention that once we understand the use of language in its social context, we will realize there are no private languages. Again, he cites Dewey: "Soliloquy," he wrote, "is the product and reflex of converse with others" (27; see LW 1: 135). He cites yet another passage to enlarge the point: "Language is specifically a mode of interaction of at least two beings, a speaker and a hearer; it presupposes an organized group to which these creatures belong, and from whom they have acquired their habits of speech. It is therefore a relationship" (27; see LW 1: 145).

In making his points about Dewey, Quine comments: "Years later, Wittgenstein likewise rejected private language. When Dewey was writing in this naturalistic vein, Wittgenstein still held his copy theory of language" (27).[14] Quine reviews the usual complaints against the uncritical semantics of the picture theory of meaning

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[13]Wittgenstein writes: "When I think in language, there aren't 'meanings' going though my mind in addition to the verbal expressions: the language is itself the vehicle of thought" (PI §329). Linguistic behavior is irreducible to psychic mental functioning, although there are no doubt neurophysiological concomitants including linguistic habits.

[14]Quine's quotes are from (LW 1, 1925), but he had already shown the primacy of socially coordinated action (i.e., behavior) at least as early as 1916.

that in *Philosophical Investigations* Wittgenstein associates with his *Tractatus* (see PI §23, 97, 114).

Quine (1969) writes: "When we turn thus toward a naturalistic view of language and a behavioral view of meaning, what we give up is not just the museum figure [i.e., picture theory] of speech. We give up an assurance of determinacy" (28). Quine uses Wittgenstein and Dewey to develop his own thesis of "ontological" indeterminacy:

> When… we recognize with Dewey that "meaning… is primarily a property of behavior," we recognize that there are no meanings, nor likenesses nor distinctions of meaning, beyond what are implicit in people's dispositions to overt behavior…. If by these standards there are indeterminate cases, so much the worse for the terminology of meaning and likeness of meaning. (29)

Identical twins raised in the same happy home may never be sure they are in ontological agreement. "Reference itself,"Quine concludes, "proves behaviorally inscrutable" (35).

In one of the passages Quine's cites from, Dewey affirms: "To fail to understand is to fail to come into agreement in action; to misunderstand is to set up action at cross purposes" (LW 1: 141; see also, LW 12: 52–53). The point he makes is remarkably similar to Wittgenstein's notion of linguistic "agreement in action" (RFM, VI, §39). This is social conventionalism, but not of the crude majoritarian type. We do not have conventions to vote on meaning. It is not an agreement of opinions, but of actions.

While Wittgenstein and Dewey are naturalists and behaviorists that emphasize the primacy of practice, they are not reductivists in Quine's Skinnerian sense, which is unnecessary for his argument. Wittgenstein's asks himself, "Are you not really a behaviourist in disguise" Aren't you at bottom really saying that everything except human behaviour is a fiction?"—If I do speak of a fiction, then it is of a *grammatical* fiction" (PI §307; see also §308).

Peirce writes, "what a thing means is simply what habits it involves" (CP 5, §400). Wittgenstein condemns such reductionism:

> (And suppose it were merely our habituation to *these* concepts, to these language-games? But I am not saying that it is so.) If we teach a human being such-and-such a technique by means of examples—that he then proceeds like *this* and not *that* in a particular new case, or that in this case he gets stuck, and thus that this and not that is the 'natural' continuation for him: this of itself is an extremely important fact of nature. (Z §355)

Dewey wants to avoid reductivism by emphasizing social behavior. At the same time, he wants to retain emergent naturalistic continuity. So too does Wittgenstein:

> What does this explanation explain? Ask yourself: What sort of ignorance does it remove? —Being sure that someone is in pain, doubting whether he is, and so on, are so many natural, instinctive, kinds of behaviour towards other human beings, and our language is merely an extension of this relation. Our language-game is an extension of primitive behaviour (For our language-game is behaviour.) (Instinct.) (Z §545)

We are born with species typical instincts (impulses, reflexes, etc.). However, according to Dewey, “Habit is second nature and second nature under ordinary circumstances is as potent and urgent as first nature” (LW 13: 108). Wittgenstein wonders about “the primitive reactions with which the language-game begins” (PI, p. 218). If he is willing to include native instincts among such starting behavior, he certainly should include acquired habits. We may supplement Wittgenstein’s animality in ways discussed earlier in the section on Peirce.

Supplementing Wittgenstein need not involve us in the kind of reductive behaviorism he wishes to avoid. Dewey shows us how. In a chapter of *Human Nature and Conduct* titled, “Custom and Habit,” Dewey declares, “customs persist because individuals form their personal habits under conditions set by prior customs” (MW 14: 43). Linguistic habits provide a biological matrix for emergent linguistic behavior; indeed, unconscious habits may trigger a good deal of “mindless” linguistic behavior (clichés and such). However, it is possible to acknowledge primitive behavior without reducing linguistic or mental functioning to such action.

We have already seen that Dewey distributes intentionality and mental functioning; now we discuss the social distribution of meaning. Dewey declares: “Mind denotes the whole system of meanings as they are embodied in the workings of organic life; consciousness in a being with language denotes awareness or perception of meanings” (LW 1: 230). Linguistic meaning supervenes upon and alters organic functioning even as such functioning serves as the matrix of meaning and mental function. Such is Dewey’s naturalistic Darwinian continuity.

In a section titled “Experience as Social,” Dewey finds it fallacious “to ignore the biological aspect and to use it to determine subject-matter as the narrower form of behaviorism does. By *social* is denoted such things as communication, participation, sharing, communion” (MW 13: 382). Elsewhere, he states: “The chief objection, it seems to me, to the narrower forms of behaviorism is… their obsession against the mental, because of previous false theories about it” (LW 5: 227).[15] This is likely also Wittgenstein’s chief objection. Dewey also says, “I have no doubt that language in its general sense, or symbols, is connected with all mental operations that are intellectual in import and with the emotions associated with them” (LW 5: 227). The divergence, if any, between Wittgenstein and Dewey here is slight, but significant. Bernard Williams (1974) does not believe Wittgenstein is “thinking at all in terms of actual groups of human beings” (91). Meanwhile, Dewey is thinking in terms of contingent concrete empirical anthropological terms.

[15]Skinnerian and earlier forms of behaviorism cannot account for linguistic behavior.

5 Conclusion

Wittgenstein is not a pragmatist. However, it is easy to put him into dialogue with pragmatism. In starting this conversation, we have assumed specific readings of Wittgenstein, Pierce, James, and Dewey. There are alternative readings that bring them closer together or further apart. Neo-pragmatists, having taken the linguistic turn, and especially those that treat the norms of language as somehow necessary and transcendental, are closer. Pragmatists that continue to emphasize experience while insisting that necessity along with the norms of language and logic are only useful abstractions derived genetically from experience are further away. Peirce remains pivotal in this debate.

There is also a difference in the conception of the work of philosophy. Wittgenstein understands it as a quietist tool of clarification that leaves everything unchanged (see PI §§124 and 126). James, and especially Dewey, understand philosophy etymologically as a tool of cultural value critique in pursuit of wisdom intended to actively change the world. Again, Peirce is the more ambivalent character.

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The Weight of Dogmatism: Investigating "Learning" in Dewey's Pragmatism and Wittgenstein's Ordinary Language Philosophy

Viktor Johansson

Abstract What is it to learn something? This essay is an attempt to give a treatment of our expectations and wants from an answer to that question by placing Dewey's pragmatism and Wittgenstein's ordinary language philosophy in conversation with each other. Both Dewey and Wittgenstein introduce philosophical visions and methods that are meant to avoid dogmatic responses to such questions. Dewey presents a vision of learning based on the view of the human organism transacting in its environment and in that way being involved with education without any other end than continual growth. By suggesting possible results of a Wittgensteinian investigation of our use of the word "learning", the essay also proposes a twist on Dewey's theory of learning, which dissolves our need for a *theory* of learning as an answer to the question. This gives the child a voice in contexts where the word "learn" is used. An investigation of the use of "learn" becomes a method of releasing us from the dogmatic requirements that determine what learning is. Further, Dewey's terminology comes to comprise examples of possible uses rather than being a statement as to what learning is.

Keywords Wittgenstein · Dewey · Learning · Ordinary language philosophy · Dogmatism

1 "Attach a Weight to Your Foot"

What is it to learn something? Some would say that this question cannot be solved by philosophy, but by empirical investigations. Philosophers of education want to ask what it is we are empirically investigating. What kind of phenomenon is this? Someone may suggest that we simply define what we mean by "learning" and then

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M.A. Peters and J. Stickney (eds.), *A Companion to Wittgenstein on Education*,
DOI 10.1007/978-981-10-3136-6_22

investigate what falls under such a definition. Someone else may suggest that we specify what we mean by learning something particular, such as reading, fencing, walking, calculating, or the Aristotelean concept of virtue. Wouldn't that make the question researchable? For others what learning *is* may not be a concern. They may want to define it to set up criteria for assessing educational practices or students' achievements in schools and preschools. We want to be able to tell when a student is learning to read.

This "want" to tell what learning is can blind us. We may fall for the temptation to set ontological and epistemological requirements for how we use a word like "learning" and seek justifications for such requirements: "A dogmatism we so easily fall into when doing philosophy", as Wittgenstein put it (PI §131).[1] He describes his aim in philosophy as trying to overcome "difficulties having to do with the will, rather than the intellect" (CV, p. 17). However, since we are limited by preconceived ideas about learning, which obscures our acknowledgement of the variations in how the concept of "learning" functions in our lives, such philosophising is tough.

In this essay, I will sketch out Dewey's pragmatic view of learning as a response to our need to lay down metaphysical requirements for learning. In order to uphold a Deweyan view of learning without reverting to dogmatic metaphysics, we need a philosophical method that destabilises philosophical accomplishments. This essay places Dewey in conversation with Wittgenstein (read through Cavell) in order to dissolve our wish to say something philosophically constructive about learning.

Following Wittgenstein's turn to our use of words in ordinary language can be seen as a practice that is meant to maintain a vision uncontaminated by metaphysical assumptions. Surely, Dewey's philosophy is arguably also anti-metaphysical and anti-foundational (Rorty 1979, pp. 5–7, 228–229, 367–368). But even an anti-metaphysical and non-foundational philosophy can lay down requirements for learning. Wittgenstein's aim in philosophy goes deeper than replacing dogmatic metaphysics with anti-foundationalism. Consider this remark from 1937: "I am not thinking of these dogmas as determining men's opinions but rather as completely controlling the *expression* of all opinions". Wittgenstein not only attacks dogmatic opinions, but also dogmatic preconceptions of what can be expressed. He is not attacking one dogmatic view, say of learning as a reconstruction of a mental map or even learning as doing, but even dogmatisms in anti-foundationalist visions of learning. He continues:

> People will live under an absolute, palpable tyranny, though without being able to say they are not free. … For dogma is expressed in the form of an assertion, and is unshakeable, but at the same time any practical opinion *can* be said to harmonise with it; admittedly more easily in some cases than others. It is not a *wall* setting limits to what can be believed, it is rather like a *brake* which, however, practically serves the same purpose; it's almost as

[1]Following convention, titles for Wittgenstein's works are abbreviated (PI = Philosophical Investigations, OC = On Certainty, RFM = Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, CV = Culture and Value), with section (§) or page number (p.), with full citation and initials in the References.

> though someone were to attach a weight to your foot to restrict your freedom of movement. This is how dogma becomes irrefutable and beyond the reach of attack. (CV, p. 28)

When we think of dogmatism in our want for requirements of learning, it is not enough to struggle against the wall of metaphysical preconceptions in search of anti-foundational alternatives. We must struggle against our very need, or want, for such requirements and preconceptions. Although Dewey is helpful in tearing down walls that limit our views of learning, such tearing down may blind us to the heavy metaphysics that is attached to our foot. We may still want to assert something about learning. Hence, we need to focus our attention to our feet. In Wittgenstein's later philosophy, looking at our feet means looking at our ordinary language. To get a clear view of the role learning has in our lives, we investigate our ordinary use of words like "learning". In this essay, I practice Dewey's pragmatism and Wittgenstein's ordinary language philosophy together (cf. Hutchinson and Read 2013, p. 170).

2 Philosophy and Metaphysical Pictures

Wittgenstein admits that his philosophy may appear destructive: "Where does our investigation get its importance from, given that it seems only to destroy everything interesting: that is, all that is great and important?" His response: "what we are destroying are only houses of cards and we are clearing up the ground of language upon which they stood" (PI §118). What is Wittgenstein destroying? Consider, for example, how Deleuze and Guattari describe philosophy as artor an activity, however imprecise or historicised, of "forming, inventing and fabricating concepts" (1994, p. 2). The history of philosophy can be read in this way. In philosophy, concepts are created "as a function of problems which are thought to be badly understood or badly posed (pedagogy of the concept)" (ibid., p. 16). No wonder Deleuze called Wittgenstein "a philosophical catastrophe" and Wittgenstein's followers "assassins of philosophy" (Deleuze 2011).

Without delving more into Deleuze and Guattari's view of philosophy, one may say that the Wittgensteinian position I am proposing here, despite some other affinities with them, goes in the opposite direction. For Wittgenstein, what leads philosophers to nonsense is this drive to respond to problems by creating new concepts or transforming old ones. The problems we are dealing with, philosophical problems, arise not because we do not have the right words, but because the words we are using when forming *the problem* "arise when language is, as it were, idling, not when it is doing work" (PI §132). The problem with the concept creation view of philosophy is that it assumes that by creating concepts, we can lay down in advance what it is we are thinking about—that philosophical concepts have a particular status in that they can solve certain types of problems, as if the problems will disappear as long as we can conceptualise them in satisfying ways, like the turns of thought in solving a riddle.

If there is something to Wittgenstein's story, what *can* philosophy do? It can liberate us from metaphysical weights attached to our feet, from the laying down of requirements and the *philosophical* creation of concepts. The dogmatic bonds that we are destroying are the preconceptions of a phenomenon that make us think the phenomenon needs a philosophical explanation or that it involves a problem to be solved by philosophy (Diamond 1991, pp. 22–23, 33). Destroying those pictures allows us to leave things as they are and instead give an honest account of our lives, our uses of words, our practices. This method of ordinary language philosophy is in this sense autobiographical: it tells stories of our lives and lets those stories dissolve our philosophical problems by making visible the idleness, emptiness and nonsensicality of our metaphysical requirements.

Taking a Wittgensteinian stance on learning means to liberate the word "learning" from philosophy and metaphysics. But, Wittgenstein needs conversational partners. Although learning is a subject that is present throughout Wittgenstein's later work, the stories that he tells are in the service of liberating us from other kinds of requirements by reminding us of the everyday struggle to learn words and concepts. He is not primarily investigating the use of "learn" or "learning" or trying to dissolve metaphysical pictures of learning. Therefore, let us put Wittgenstein in conversation with Dewey.

3 Dewey's Learning Without Fixed Ends

Dewey often uses words such as "growth", "change", "experience", "adaption", "inquiry" and, of course, "education". These notions go in different directions and explicate various aspects of what Biesta and Burbules call Dewey's *experimental theory of learning*. The theory is based on the idea that the human animal, like any living being, has an "experimental way of establishing coordinated transactions" in its environment (Biesta and Burbules 2003, p. 37). Learning is a form of establishing new habits and a reconstruction of old habits. "It is learning in the sense of acquisition of a complex set of predispositions to act" (ibid.). This links Dewey's ideas of knowledge as action, transactional experience and educational practice in understanding *acquisition* of knowledge as *inquiry*—a sequential process rooted in life itself.

If human beings, like all other animals, transact in their environment and continually transform the established ways of such transactions, then learning and education become non-teleological. There cannot be a final end to such transformation since the growth it involves is in response to new happenings in the environment and as such changes the environment, which means that all habits and established practices will be disrupted. Therefore, Dewey can say: "Since in reality there is nothing to which growth is relative save more growth, there is nothing to which education is subordinate save more education" (1916, p. 58).

Dewey's emphasis on intellectual and scientific inquiry as an openness to explore the unknown redirects our attention to which abilities are conditional to a

capacity to grow. Immaturity is understood as a capacity to grow and a capacity to sustain life—which is why Dewey can say such things as "for certain moral and intellectual purposes adults must become as little children" and "[w]ith respect to sympathetic curiosity, unbiased responsiveness and openness of mind, we may say that the adult should be growing in childlikeness" (Dewey 1916, p. 55). The aim of learning is not maturity or adulthood or a final state of mastery of a technique or a practice. "When we abandon the attempt to define immaturity by means of fixed comparison with adult accomplishments, we are compelled to give up thinking of it as denoting lack of desired traits" (1916, p. 56). There is no metaphysical requirement determining the goal of growth. To be learn*ing* something is to be set on a path of growth (1916, p. 58).

In his effort to overcome the dualism between the individual and the social, Dewey argues that "full education comes only when there is a responsible share on the part of each person, in proportion to capacity, in shaping the aims and policies of the social groups to which he belongs" (Dewey 1920, p. 199). For Dewey, it is impossible to talk about an individual as growing outside an environment consisting of both the social and the physical (Dewey 1920, p. 193 cf. Read 2007, pp. 5–22). The idea is that growing in an environment not only puts into question the individual–social dualism; like Wittgenstein's notions of "natural history" and "form of life", it also dissolves the culture–nature divide. The growth of an organism, a plant, a human or other animal is a result of responding and reacting to an environment, consisting as much of stones, rocks, trees, bodies and brains as social pressures, norms and value systems. The environment of a human organism is cultural–natural and as such not a synonym for "mere nature". Not only do we have a dualism of natural or sociocultural phenomena that affect the organism, but we also have a plurality of different environments with immense variation (Read 2007, p. 14). Thinking of environments as a way of avoiding metaphysical assumptions about the individual–social and nature–culture divides also dissolves the idea of an individual learner or inquirer separate from his or her environment. As part of the environment, every inquiry involves a growth or transformation of the whole environment, however small. Determining ends for growth will be incomprehensible since the conditions for growth would always change due to the growing and evolving environment. Dewey maintains that education should involve children in the process of inquiry and in this way children can "take charge of themselves" and "not only adapt themselves to the changes which are going on, but have power to shape and direct those changes" (1897, p. 60).

Dissolving the assumptions of clear distinctions between particular learners and their environment implies a distinctive view of growth that is salient when we consider Dewey's pragmatic understating of action and the world of things. The individual and reality is a result of a transactional whole where the mind and world as separate entities are not the presumed points of departure for a philosophical exploration of the nature of reality and knowledge (1925, p. 28). The transactional whole out of which both the individual and her environment emerge establishes what Dewey calls *experience*.

Yet, this take on Dewey is so far too epistemological. Jim Garrison reminds us that experience is first and foremost a practical matter: “Experience is what happens to a sentient creature in its reciprocally transforming transactions with its natural environment, including the human created world of language and institutions we call culture” (2013, p. 7). Experience is a form of practice—a deed where we put “art and creation first”, preceding the intellectual or epistemological:

> It would then be seen that science is an art, that artis practice, and that the only distinction worth drawing is not between practice and theory, but between those modes of practice that are not intelligent, not inherently and immediately enjoyable, and those which are full of enjoyed meanings. (Dewey 1925, pp. 268–69)

Intellectual work or scientific inquiry becomes an embodied artfor Dewey. Conceptual learning becomes a practical matter. For him, learning is an open-ended art. Learning becomes a continual process of inquiry in everyday habits, a result of the immaturity of the organism *and* its environment.

4 A Wittgensteinian Twist on Pragmatic Metaphors

Dewey’s avoidance of the metaphysics of learning is interweaved with his view of an intellectual fallacy in Western philosophy.

> By “intellectualism” as an indictment is meant the theory that all experiencing is a mode of knowing, and that all subject-matter, all nature, is, in principle, to be reduced and transformed till it is defined in terms identical with the characteristics presented by refined objects of science as such. The assumption of “intellectualism” goes contrary to the facts of what is primarily experienced. (Dewey 1925, p. 28)

To Dewey, intellectualism, not to be confused with Dewey’s use of “intelligent”, leads to superficial simplifications in philosophy. In thinking about learning it presumes a foundation and a telos for learning based on a priori assumptions. Such tendencies, particularly in modern times, have become chains that are, like Wittgenstein’s weights, so natural “that they are not even felt” (Dewey 2012, p. 257). This means that in certain forms of philosophising, we are tempted to forget that “[t]he philosopher is first and last a human being with his own intellectual and emotional habits who is involved in a concrete scene having its own colour of tradition; its own occupations and dominant desires; its own overhanging problems and preferred ways of meeting them” (ibid., p. 33).

Wittgenstein shares this view of philosophy’s tendency for intellectualism. To Wittgenstein, however, the tendency to forget that the philosopher is a human being, a growing organism, is not only a problem with professional philosophy, but also a result of our lives with languages. “A picture held us captive. And we could not get outside it, for it lay in our language, and language seemed only to repeat it to us inexorably” (PI §115). Therefore, the source of philosophy’s bounds, metaphysical pictures and requirements, is not only philosophy’s tendency to forget the human animal in its cultural contexts, but also the way we are speaking and living

seems to inescapably disconnect us with that same life. Although we may resolve philosophical pictures and destroy the metaphysical buildings we build, they will reoccur in new forms.

The emphatic variance between Dewey's and Wittgenstein's view of what we can do about the philosophical tendency towards intellectualism reveals a radical difference in temperament of their thinking. In Dewey, there is still hope for philosophy to do something constructive. In Dewey, we find an attempt to form a philosophy that is free from metaphysical requirements. In Wittgenstein's later work, there is no such hope for philosophy. There the task of philosophy is not only to found a philosophy free from metaphysical requirements, but also to treat our very need for such requirements by freeing us from philosophy—to remove the weight from our feet. Nevertheless, even this task is hopeless since the very means we have to do so is the same language that inexorably repeats the pictures to us. We cannot finally escape the captivations and temptations of our own thought and language. Rather, in "philosophizing you have to descend into primeval chaos and feel at home there" (CV, p. 65).

In philosophy of education, this means that Dewey can write a new *creed*, a pedagogical credo, something constructive—a novel vision of what education can be about. In Wittgensteinian philosophy of education, there can be no such creeds, only *confession*, an honest account, of all our faults, temptations, hopes and desires, and the metaphysical presuppositions in which we are entangled.

Does Dewey's new creed, his creative and constructive philosophy, disguise other metaphysical requirements and pictures? The focus on future behaviours, say applications of concepts in further context, may seem an innocent step, a step pragmatists share with Wittgensteinians—that is, basically the pragmatic metaphor of concepts as tools that we *use* for particular purposes, for doing things, which of course is an idea that we find in ordinary language philosophy in both its Austinian and Wittgensteinian forms. Nonetheless, the different temperaments and styles brought into their writing bring the tool/use-metaphor into playin quite different ways. Consider how Dewey uses the metaphor in *Democracy and Education*: "In short, the sound h-a-t gains meaning in the same way that the thing 'hat' gains it, by being *used* in a given way. And they acquire the same meaning with the child which they have with the adult because they are used in a common experience by both" (Dewey 1916, p. 19, *emphasis added*). He continues: "The guarantee for the same manner of *use* is found in the fact that the thing and the sound are first employed in a joint activity, as a means of setting up an active connection between the child and the grown-up" (ibid.). For Dewey, the meaning of an utterance emerges out of what we do with it, in our transactions with it. Speaking is one of the many ways in which some organisms live in their environments. He is aware of the risk of meaning scepticism—if I use a word to do something, I cannot know whether others understand what I am doing or whether they use the word that same way—thus, Dewey thinks that a word is meaningful because it is "common experience". The use of a word, its value as a tool, emerges out of a practice that involves a community of speakers with shared experiences.

Similarly, Wittgenstein writes: “For a large class of cases of the *employment* of the word ‘meaning’—though not for all—this word can be explained in this way: the meaning of a word is its use in the language” (PI §43 *emphasis added*). Notice Wittgenstein’s twist on the tool metaphor. Wittgenstein investigates “meaning” not by telling us what makes something meaningful, or even for a basis of meaning in use or common action. Rather, Wittgenstein starts with how we employ or use the word “meaning” before drawing any other conclusions. He starts investigating before he can even speak of how to investigate. His investigation investigates how to investigate. Later he writes: “One cannot guess how a word functions”. Not even the word “meaning”. “One has to look at its use and learn from that. But the difficulty is to remove the prejudice which stands in the way of doing this. It is not a stupid prejudice” (PI §340).

Wittgenstein is not trying to explain that what makes words meaningful is their use. He investigates different uses of words, not only in actual practices but also in what happens when we take them outside of practices, whether they can have a point for us, for me, in different contexts, to see what we may learn from that. Such investigations are, of course, a challenging task. It is difficult to be honest about how we use words, how we think and what we do. Still, this is all we need to do. We do not need to explain anything. In Stephen Mulhall’s words, “This suggests that Wittgenstein is not proposing that we picture meaning *as* use, but rather that, if we answer the question of how a word is used, then we will have no inclination to inquire about, or to attempt to picture, its meaning” (Mulhall 2001, p. 42). Wittgenstein, unlike Dewey, does not say that the meaning of the word *is* its use. There are no metaphysical requirements for “meaning”, no claim about “meaning”, but rather referring to use is a methodological claim about how to do philosophy, a method that he actually tests in his investigations of uses of words.

As in Dewey, Wittgenstein’s child is sometimes described as learning to master a technique, but Wittgenstein’s child is also involved in philosophy’s methodological struggle about meaning. Learning words is not a matter of learning how to use words, but is more a matter of learning methods for investigating uses of words, what words may do. Learning words is like learning a philosophical method. Therefore, Dewey’s starting point is turned around; we do not start to think about what learning and meaning can be, the philosophical intellectualism both Wittgenstein and Dewey detest. We start by looking at how *we* use the words “meaning” and “learning”, where such words have a point in our actual lives. This philosophical method involves a form of dramatic struggle between looking at a linguistic community’s conventional practices and uses, and looking at my own idiosyncratic employment of words, a struggle that, if we acknowledge the autobiographical dimension of such philosophical methods, spills over into my view of myself as learner. Or to put in more Deweyan lingo, if we start with the methods of philosophical inquiry as a matter of investigating our use of words, we start with not only a realisation that we are describing human organisms transacting in environments, but also a realisation that my present philosophical inquiry is an inquiry into an environment. Philosophy (of learning) becomes personal, about my life.

Reading Wittgenstein, and reading Dewey through Wittgenstein, is not only about reading to understand theories and his reasons for rejecting theories, but is also about reading a drama—a drama of multiple voices trying to get a grip on human nature and practices, constantly losing that grip and returning to the activities themselves, feeling content in these ordinary practices, feeling discontent and moving on. By using the "protagonist's self-imaginations", Wittgenstein "moves at a level that is deeper than that of arguing about theses, as the basis of the possibility of holding any view about anything at all is continually queried and required" (Eldridge 1997, 15).

5 Towards a Grammar of Learning

If we look at how we *use* words such as "learn" and "teach", a radical vision of learning and teaching may emerge. Investigating use involves presenting "objects of comparison" that shed light on "distinctions which our ordinary forms of language easily makes us overlook", making plain our "preconceived ideas" and the "dogmatism into which we fall so easily in doing philosophy" (PI §131–32). Accordingly, we cannot presume there to be any other criteria for when learning occurs other than what we find in our own application of the concept "learn". Here is where the problem with Dewey's view lies. If the growth and processes of transactive inquiry are taken as metaphysical criteria for learning, just as "meaning as use" can for meaning, then it can become a preconceived idea that can miss other complexities in how we live with the concept of learning.

Any *theory* of mind, language or learning would, in a sense, become regulatory, dogmatic (Eldridge 1997, p. 2). A philosophical *theory* of learning, in this sense, could not recognise the struggle of testing our claims involved in using a term like "learn", since a theory would offer directions and definitions for what it means to learn something. Having said this, we should be aware of our need for such theories, which is the incitement for our theorising.

Dewey stresses the significance of both the limitations of the inheritance of the practices of adulthood and the playfulness of childhood:

> Thus the artistic capacities of the adult exhibit what certain tendencies of the child are capable of; if we did not have the adult achievements we should be without assurance as to the significance of the drawing, reproducing, modelling, coloring activities of childhood. So if it were not for adult language, we should not be able to see the import of the babbling impulses of infancy. But it is one thing to use adult accomplishments as a context in which to place and survey the doings of childhood and youth; it is quite another to set them up as a fixed aim without regard to the concrete activities of those educated. (Dewey 1916, p. 115)

Although some of Dewey's insight here seems to be correct—education is concerned both with inheritance and with newness—there is something important that is missing in Dewey's account. That is the voice of the child (Cavell 2003, p. 218).

Although Dewey scrupulously investigates different ideas about education and learning, he is not equally attentive to his style in expressing them. Although he submits to a use of "theory" of meaning, he does not always first turn to ordinary uses of words as a method for *philosophical* inquiry. In Cavell's words "It might be worth pointing out that these teachings [the impossibility of a private language and the emphasis on functions and contexts of language] are fundamental to American pragmatism; but then we must keep in mind how different these arguments sound, and admit that in philosophy it is the sound which makes the difference" (Cavell 2002, p. 35). Wittgenstein, on the other hand, though not directly engaged in educational issues, lends his philosophy to give voice to the struggles of childhood. The sound of childhood is crucial to both the style and the content of his later philosophy. For him, looking at children's struggles in finding their way into adult communities is a way to investigate what we mean by words in the context of their use. He reminds us of children's responses to instruction and the fragility of the attunement between the child, the teacher and the community. In *Philosophical Investigations* (PI), Wittgenstein explores different variants of what it can mean to follow an instruction to continue to write down series of numbers. The child can refuse to go on the way its teacher expects her to. She does not have to conform to our established use of words and numbers (PI §185). In those refusals, or misunderstandings, Wittgenstein is careful to give voice to the pupil's attempts, even describing them as "a systematic mistake", or "a variant" (PI §143).

These scenes are often taken as examples of rule following, but what Wittgenstein says he is exploring is the grammar of "know" and its relatives. A methodological remark in the midst of the discussion of these scenes clarifies the emphatic difference between Wittgenstein and Dewey further:

> The grammar of the word "know" is evidently closely related to the grammar of the words "can", "is able to". But also closely related to that of the word "understand". (To have 'mastered' a technique.) (PI §150)

The scenes of instruction and the children's voices in them in the *Investigations* connect the grammar "knowing" with "doing" or "being able to do something". For Dewey, this connection is important. Knowing is acting. In Wittgenstein, these are not theoretical remarks for an alternative to traditional epistemology, but reminders of how we use words. In giving voice to the pupil'sattempts to go on with the teacher, Wittgenstein also appropriates questions about the use of "learn"; for instance, when asking: "What do I mean when I say 'the pupil's ability to learn *may* come to an end here'?" (PI §144). The voice of the child becomes a reminder for the philosopher of the importance of looking at our use of words. Attending to the voice of the child changes our "*way of looking at things*" (PI §144). The child speaks back to philosophy and makes us aware of the fact that our *use* of "know", "learn" and "is able" is what is at stake, not metaphysical or epistemological conditions. We see grammatical rather than theoretical connections though an awareness of how the child is constrained when trying to make herself intelligible to us as much as we are to him/her. In a way, as Cavell emphasises, Wittgenstein's attention to grammar

acknowledges the child's struggle for his or her elders' acknowledgement of the child's voice (Cavell 1996, p. 288).

Wittgenstein's ordinary language philosophy will not solve any pedagogical problems. He describes our various uses of "learning", what we mean by the word and our applications of the concept. What we need in a philosophy of learning is not a doctrine, but acknowledgement of our dual need to lead our "words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use" (PI §116) and to move beyond the present state of culture towards future cultures and "project our words into new contexts" (Cavell 2002, p. 52).

As a consequence of the Wittgensteinian vision, we can never know beforehand what it would mean to learn or to have learnt something. "Learning" is not only used as a word for conforming to a fixed pattern of societal norms, and nor is it limited to being used for merely dealing with problems in our transactions. The criteria for how we use "learn" may be expressed analogously to what Wittgenstein seems to have meant when he talked about his vision of certainty and corrections of our opinions: "Here *once more* there is needed a step like the one taken in relativity theory" (OC §305).[2] In *Philosophical Investigations*, Wittgenstein famously claims that humans agree, or attune (to be more true to the German "übereinstimung"), in language, in forms of life, in judgments but not in opinions (PI §241–2).[3] Even so, to Wittgenstein the fragility in the possibility of disagreement seems equally important.[4] Dissonant moments or the threat of dissonance may tempt us to invoke metaphysical requirements, justifications and explanations (Cavell 1979: 31–3).

In an educational context, we might be tempted to say that the result of a process of learning is attunement in practice. In fact, sometimes Wittgenstein seems to say something like this.

> Instruction in acting according to the rule can be described without employing "and so on". What can be described in this description is a gesture, a tone of voice, a sign which the teacher uses in a particular way in giving instruction, and which the pupils imitate. The effect of these expressions can also be described, again without calling "and so on" to our aid, i.e. finitely. The effect of "and so on" will be to produce agreement going beyond what is done in the lessons, with the result that we all or nearly all count the same and calculate the same.
> It would be possible, though, to imagine the very instruction without any "and so on" in it. But on leaving school the people would still all calculate the same beyond the examples in the instruction they had. (RFM, VI, §45)

In most instruction of, for example, mathematical rules, an "and so on" seems to be implied. We say something to the effect of "This is how you apply the rule here and

[2]For a complementary discussion of the educational aspects of this passage, see Stickney (2008).

[3]There has been some discussion regarding how to translate Wittgenstein's "übereinstimmung". "Agreement" is common, but I follow Cavell's suggestion in my use of "attunement". See Cavell (1979, pp. 31–32).

[4]See PI §§143–148, 185 and the discussion of rule-following and private language remarks in Johansson (2013, pp. 161–181).

here and so on". What is implied is that there are inestimable ways in which we may apply a rule and an infinite number of contexts in which we can use a word. Wittgenstein shows that agreement beyond the examples is the goal of these instructions that are contained in the actual teaching activity.

This is the step like the one in relativity theory. The aim of an instruction in mathematics could not be that the pupil arrives at a certain mental state or is successful in doing something determinate, but simply an attunement in practice. We can say that someone has learnt something—that he can read—when we are attuned and expect to continue to be attuned with that pupil in how we use letters, construct meanings, and so on *in further contexts*. There are no criteria beyond our attunement in use, and in practice, that we can come to agree on. Because when we determine the movements of two bodies in relation to each other in the theory of relativity (odd as it may sound), this means that we cannot, without taking the perspective of one or the other, determine who is changing: the student's or the teacher's, the community's or the individual's. The transformation taking place in learning processes is determined by whose use we are taking as a point of reference —mine or my student's.

Does this mean that we end in learning scepticism—that we cannot know where to place learning? Or does the focus of common agreement put too much pressure on the individual to conform to the community, which makes learning a socialisation into heteronomous agreement? Not if we let go of the idea of agreement having a role in theory that justifies a certain view on learning. Remember Wittgenstein's question: "Suppose one day instruction no longer produced agreement?" (RFM, VI, §45). Of course that day is already here and has always been here. Teachers are very much aware of the fact that their instructions quite often do not lead the teacher and the pupil to go on together. In science, in artand in politics —and in all aspects of human life, we fall in and out of tune. This, one may say, is the human drama expressed in Wittgenstein's ordinary language philosophy. When our use of the word "learn" is the topic of our philosophical investigations, we cannot even determine what extent we use "learn" to refer to a change in the child, the adult or the community. We are either attuned or we are not. Stating that the child has learnt to read can mean that we can go on together with numbers, texts, words and letters.

But what does it really mean if this is a claim about how we use the term "learn"? *First,* we test our use of the word "learn" and related terms. The ordinary language philosopher tests whether his or her uses corresponds with those of others. That is what Wittgenstein does in his later writings. *Second*, we test whether our uses of "learn" are representative for how others use it. In short, we test who the "we" are when we claim that we say so and so (cf. Johansson 2015). *Third*, this is quite distinct for how we use "learn" and its cousins and how such uses seem to be a step like that in relativity theory, it seems that in many cases when we employ words and concepts like "learn", we also make claims for a future attunement with those who we claim are learning. We make claims for a future we.

An investigation of the use of "learn" lifts the weight of dogmatism from our feet. Rather than looking for requirements for determining when learning has taken

place or for what learning is, we explore how and when we use the term in attunement or dissonance. In so doing, we can see that words like "learn" are used as claims about present and future attunement that rather than individual or communal or environmental change. This transforms Dewey's pragmatism and gives children a voice in the process of their learning. If we carefully investigate the use of "learn", Dewey's idea of habit reconstruction and interaction in various environments, the dissolution of the distinction between the organism and the environment, and between the individual and the society, becomes even more radical. Looking at the use of "learn" becomes a method of releasing us from the dogmatic requirements determining what learning is. Even Dewey's terminology comes to consist of examples of possible uses rather than theoretical remarks on learning.

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How Should We Recognize the Otherness of Learners? Hegelian and Wittgensteinian Views

Yasushi Maruyama

> Hegel seems to me to be always wanting to say that things which look different are really the same. Whereas my interest is in showing that things which look the same are really different. I was thinking of using as a motto for my book a quotation from *King Lear:* "I'll teach you differences."
>
> (Wittgenstein in Drury 1984, 157)

Abstract In order to specify how the otherness of learners appears and disappears in educational situations, I will compare the discussions of Georg W. F. Hegel and Ludwig Wittgenstein. Hegel and his successors are concerned about the master–slave dialectic, in which the two reverse their relationship. Self-Consciousness is described as a struggle with the other for recognition from the beginning. Wittgenstein, on the other hand, does not describe "the other" as either a fighter or an oppressed person. He specifies grammatical features of "the other" in educational relationships. The otherness of learners appears when they make the teaching–learning language games break down. Their otherness merely disappears when they agree over our practices or forms of life, and it can appear again anytime. It is argued that it is not the Hegelian concept of Otherness but the Wittgensteinian one which explains features of "the other" in educational relationships. I will finally elaborate on what Wittgenstein's consideration could tell about the recognition of the otherness of learner.

Keywords Wittgenstein · Hegel · Levinas · Beauvoir · Other · Children · Learners · Self-consciousness

1 Introduction

"The other" or otherness is an important notion in educational research as well as contemporary thought. The notion enables us to avoid mistreating other people, especially minorities or the oppressed. Scholars have been attempting to answer the

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M.A. Peters and J. Stickney (eds.), *A Companion to Wittgenstein on Education*,
DOI 10.1007/978-981-10-3136-6_23

question of how the recognition of “the Other” is possible. Because the educational relationship between a teacher and a learner, however, is different from any other human relationships, it is misleading to apply the general concept of “the Other” to educational contexts. It has, then, not been clear what “the other” means in educational relationships. This paper will specify features of “the other” appearing in educational relationships and explore the significance of inquiry about the otherness of learners.

I will discuss briefly what is the problem of the other, and consider the difference between “the Other” questioned in contemporary thought and “the other” appearing in educational relationships. The concern of contemporary thinkers regarding “the Other” is ethical and political as well as philosophical. That view of “the Other” deals with the emancipation of oppressed people. “The other” in educational relationships, however, is not necessarily oppressed. It is easy to fail to notice the particular features of “the other” in educational relationships when we are held captive by the picture of oppression and emancipation.

In order to specify how the otherness of learners appears and disappears in educational situations, I will compare the discussions of Georg W.F. Hegel and Ludwig Wittgenstein. Hegel and his successors are concerned about the master–slave dialectic, in which the two reverse their relationship. Self-Consciousness is described as a struggle with the other for recognition from the beginning. Wittgenstein, on the other hand, does not describe “the other” as either a fighter or an oppressed person. He specifies grammatical features of “the other” in educational relationships. The otherness of learners appears when they make the teaching–learning language games break down. Their otherness merely disappears when they agree over our practices or forms of life, and it can appear again anytime. It is argued that it is not the Hegelian concept of Otherness but the Wittgensteinian one which explains features of “the other” in educational relationships. I will finally elaborate on what Wittgenstein’s consideration could tell about the recognition of the otherness of learners.

2 What Is the Problem of the Other?

I shall begin with the concept of “the other.” “The other” literally means the second of two, something or someone additional and less familiar. It is something else than the self. In terms of the use of the concept, there are at least two characteristics of “the other.” First, “the other” is used to describe something extraordinary or beyond our control. Nature, god, madness or unconsciousness can be characterized as “the other.” Secondly, “the other” is something outside our concern or to be “excluded, repressed, suppressed or concealed” (Bernstein 1992: 68). Thus, “the other” is sometimes ignored and not mentioned as “the other” at all.

Examining Husserl's "Fremdich," Buber's "Du," Heidegger's "Mitsein," Sartre's "alter ego" and others in *The Other*, Michael Theunissen claims that the problem of the other is the most prominent issue in the philosophical thought of last century (Theunissen 1977: 1; 1984: 1). Indeed, Richard J. Bernstein points out that the notion of "the other" has rarely been considered in Anglo-Saxon countries. But he still agrees with Theunissen because, according to Bernstein, the problem of the other is not a single well-defined problem but a cluster of problems related to incommensurability, alterity, singularity, difference, and plurality. It is the problem of the other that anti-eurocentrism, anti-enlightenment, feminism, postmodernism and multiculturalism share (Bernstein 1992: 57–58; 67–68).

Why, then, has "the other" become the most prominent problem in the twentieth century? Modern epistemology relied on the certainty of the self and put anything else into the area of uncertainty. The tradition of western intellectual history since the Greek philosophers has been a search for the universal. To a large degree, anything other than the essential has been ignored. During last century, however, people became aware of the violence that this tradition implied. Philosophers reconsidered ethical and political consequences of the tradition and attempted to overcome them.

Bernstein presents Levinas' consideration of the Other as the most radical example and examines Derrida's critique of Levinas (Bernstein 1992: 68–73). According to Levinas, the task of Western philosophy oriented by Greek philosophy "has always been to reduce, absorb, or appropriate what is taken to be 'the Other' to 'the Same'" (Bernstein 1992: 68). In order to overcome this perspective, Levinas introduces the idea of the "absolute other." The absolute other is not the ontological but the metaphysically independent other, which entirely refuses being reduced to the same. It is an "other with an alterity that is not formal, is not the simple reverse of identity, and is not formed out of resistance to the same, but is prior to every initiative, to all imperialism of the same. It is other with an alterity constitutive of the very content of the other" (Bernstein 1992: 70). Thus, for Levinas, the ethical attitude toward the Other is to recognize him/her as someone who is beyond the thought of Being. Derrida criticizes the possibility of Levinas' claim. For Derrida, the thought of Being is a critical element of the respect for the other as what it is. Agreeing with Derrida, Bernstein summarizes the ethics of Otherness: We need to be aware of the violence of reducing the other to the same. But the abandonment of the reduction does not mean that it is impossible to have a relationship with the other. Of course, we can never escape the real practical possibility that we would fail to do justice to the alterity of the other. Thus, it is required as an ethical attitude to pay attention to our tendency of assimilating or ignoring the other, and to attempt to recognize the other as it is (Bernstein 1992: 73–75).

Is the ethics of Otherness possible in education? How can we recognize the other in education? First, it is not clear what the problem of the other means in education. Who is the other in education? Should children from oppressed cultures be

recognized as others? Or, does to be a child necessarily mean to be the other to adults? Or, are learners the others for teachers? Then, what does the recognition of the other mean? To accept minority culture? To respect the uniqueness of each child? If they refuse to learn, is the only way of recognizing them to abandon their education? There has been little consideration of what the problem of the other means in education. For example, Henry Giroux puts a great emphasis on "difference" and "multiculturalism" in his argument against schooling in oppressive societies such as Capitalist America. He requires teachers to be intellectuals and to educate students "to take risks, to struggle for institutional change, and to fight both *against* oppression and *for* democracy outside of schools in other oppositional public spheres and the wider social arena" (Giroux 1988: xxxiii). In emphasizing that activist project, he fails to see the differences of students from the teacher himself and to question their otherness, and instead enlists them in joint political activity. Recognizing and overcoming otherness is a precondition to the alliance that Giroux desires, a precondition that escapes him. Nel Noddings, on the other hand, notices some features of the problem of the other. She compares the ethics of caring to the ethics of otherness described by Levinas and Derrida and finds some common features. "Derrida's 'letting the other be' and the confirmation advocated by the ethic of care," she writes, "both attitudes suggest an understanding of the other that respects that other's ideal. As we intervene, as we attempt to persuade, we help the other to do better *as other*, not as mere shadow of ourselves" (Noddings 1995: 194). This ethical attitude, however, is not enough for an attitude as *an ethic of teaching* because teaching has a feature of normalization into a certain form of life. In order to understand the problem of the other in education, we need to consider the educational relationship carefully. In the following sections, I will compare Hegel's and Wittgenstein's discussions about otherness appearing in human relationships, since all of the treatments of "the other" in Continental philosophy are descended from Hegel.

3 Hegelian Otherness: Strife and Reconciliation

In the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Hegel illustrates how the asymmetrical relationship between master and slave is reversed (Hegel 1994: 50–65). This master–slave dialectic has been considered as the original model that raises and even attempts to solve the problem of the Other. The main theme of the *Phenomenology* is to explicate the journey of Spirit (or mind) toward absolute knowledge. This process of the growth of Spirit is described as parallel to the history of the actual development of humankind. The master–slave dialectic at the prehistorical stage and as a step in the growth of Spirit shows how individuals acquire their publicness or communal traits through their encounter with others.

Hegel's historical description of human development is fundamentally different from Descartes' explanation about knowledge, which takes the existence of the

doubting "I" as the beginning point for certainty. Hegel considers, however, that Self-Consciousness emerges and grows only in the relation to what is not itself, that is, "the Other." The notion of recognition is quite important here. Hegel assumes that Self-Consciousness is possible only if it is recognized by the Other. This recognition is not only epistemological, but also performative. Recognition is a practical element for human growth. The ideal relationship of two Self-Consciousnesses, according to Hegel, is that "[t]he consciousnesses recognize themselves as mutually recognizing each other" (Hegel 1994: 53). The final state of the human relationship is that Self-Consciousnesses are unified through recognition. Hegel places an unequal relationship with another Self-Consciousness at the first stage. This is the relationship between the master and the slave.

The master–slave dialectic begins from the moment that a Self-Consciousness encounters another Self-Consciousness. After striving for recognition, the winner becomes the master and the loser becomes the slave in an unequal relationship. But this unequal relationship comes to be reversed. It turns out that the master is not an independent Self-Consciousness but the slave is. The master becomes aware that he cannot be a master without the slave's recognition of him. Working for the master, on the other hand, the slave comes to know that he is independent. This is the process of the dialectic. Alexandre Kojève, an influential interpreter of Hegel wrote:

> Man was born and History began with the first Fight that ended in the appearance of a Master and a Slave. That is to say that Man—at his origin—is always either Master or Slave. (If they are to be *human*, they must be at least *two* in number.) And universal history, the history of the interaction between men and of their interaction with Nature, is the history of the interaction between warlike Masters and working Slaves. Consequently, History stops at the moment when the difference, the opposition, between Master and Slave disappears: at the moment when the Master will cease to be Master, because he will no longer have a Slave; and the Slave will cease to be Slave, because he will no longer have a Master (although the Slave will not become Master in turn, since he will have no Slave). (Kojève 1969: 43–44)

While Kojève sees that the difference between master and slave disappears at the final stage of history, other scholars emphasize that the end of the master–slave relationship does not mean the final, ideal stage because it does not guarantee mutual recognition (e.g., Williams 1992: 169–170; Bernstein 1992: 303). But the important point here is that human relationship is characterized as strife from the beginning in the Hegelian perspective. Thus, further requests for recognition are seen as struggles, and the final stage is characterized by reconciliation between the Self and the Other and the unification of Self-Consciousnesses.

The Hegelian picture of strife and reconciliation has been widely accepted. We can find this picture, for example, in the feminist claim of Simone de Beauvoir. In *The Second Sex*, she characterizes women as the Other and attempts to explicate the reason why women have been alienated as the Other (De Beauvoir 1989: xxii ff.). I do not say that this picture of the other is invalid in educational situations. Education as a social phenomenon can be described well with the picture. But if we use only the picture of conflict when we try to understand what happens in

educational situations, we fail to see some features of the other appearing in education. Educational relationships are not necessarily characterized by fighting or oppression. You may believe that you recognize the otherness of learners and treat them in a right way, but you may be just unaware that there are additional elements of otherness.

4 Wittgensteinian Otherness: Qualitative Difference, Potential Otherness, and Agreement in Form of Life

I shall extract some features of the learner from children that Wittgenstein illustrates in the first half of *Philosophical Investigations*, part I.[1] Let us use instances of two children: the first child has just begun to learn language, and the second child, as a pupil, is in the process of learning basic arithmetic. The feature of the first child is that he is qualitatively different from us and that of the second is that he is the potential other. These features enable us to think of teaching as the process of normality and abnormality.

From the middle of the thirties, as Stanley Cavell points out, Wittgenstein's thought is punctuated by ideas of normality and abnormality. Cavell wrote, "in the recognition of how little can be *taught*; how, so to speak, helpless or impotent the teaching is, compared with the enormity of what is learned. As though he sees philosophical disputes as exemplifying this concurrent outsideness and fatedness to a culture. Or as dramatizing, recapitulating, the original facts of this asymmetry between teaching and learning" (Cavell 1979: 111–112). The goal of teaching is that a learner takes over and can go on by herself. We expect her to do what we would do. Thus, teaching aims at normality. But the process of teaching as normalization is accompanied by abnormal reactions of learners because of the asymmetrical feature of the relation between teaching and learning. Wittgenstein was sensitive to the unified process of normality and abnormality and examined philosophical problems through the process.

Asking how a word is taught is one of Wittgenstein's philosophical methods. His comment on this method was noted in his lecture on aesthetics:

> One thing we always do when discussing a word is to ask how we were taught it. Doing this on the one hand destroys a variety of misconceptions, on the other hand gives you a primitive language in which the word is used. (LC, 1)[2]

[1]Wittgenstein (PI), references after the abbreviation are section numbers. I have already discussed this topic in a different paper: see Maruyama (1998). More detailed consideration of children in the *Philosophical Investigations*, see Lesnik-Oberstein (2003).

[2]Following convention, titles for Wittgenstein's works are abbreviated (PI = Philosophical Investigations, BB = The Blue and Brown Books, LC = Lectures and Conversations, Psychology and Religious Belief, RPP = Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology), with section (§) or page number (p.), with full citation and initials in the References.

The method is used to demolish fallacious views of language and to provide us with primitive models of language in which we can see the functions of words clearly. Wittgenstein presumes that philosophical problems arise when philosophers are occupied with a single picture of language and they cannot see any other functions of language (PI §§109–16). Since a general theory of meaning, for example, tells that the meaning of a word is the object the word signifies, we would seek objects as meanings for any words in vain. In the highly complicated forms of our language, the misconceptions of language prevent us from having clear vision. When we see, however, how words are used in a primitive form of language, we recognize the aim and function of the words; there and then the misconceptions disappear (PI: 5). The primitive models set us free from the occupying misconceptions and enable us to see the world in another way. Wittgenstein calls the primitive models "language games" and characterizes them as the forms of language with which children learn their native language (BB: 17; PI §7). The method, describing how a word is taught, contributes to dissolving philosophical problems.

Wittgenstein's question of language teaching, thus, is not empirical but conceptual. In order to show a better picture of language, for example, he examines the logical conditions of teaching, in other words, the conceptual prerequisites for the accomplishment of teaching. Considering language teaching by ostensive definition, he concludes that, since explanation presupposes certain linguistic skills of learners, children on the first stage of language learning must be trained before they understand what is explained (PI §§6: 26–32). In *Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology*, he also states whom to teach: "I describe the language-game 'Bring something red' to someone who can himself already play it. I could only *teach* it to others." (RPP: §313) While we describe a language game to those who understand our explanations or share the language game with us, we can only *teach* the language game to those who do not understand the explanations or do not share the language game. What Wittgenstein does here by examining the logical conditions of teaching is to criticize a traditional idea of language-learning, which is misled by a philosophical need for the general theory of language: Since the meaning of a word, for example, is its object, we can teach children how to use words by pointing at objects, or since the work of language is description, we can teach children how to play language games by describing them. It should be noted that Wittgenstein gives children an important role in his arguments. They appear as those who do not understand our explanations. I shall discuss the role of his children in more detail.

One of the ways that Wittgenstein uses educational instances is to show the nature of the difference between those who know and those who do not. He thinks that we can see the functioning of language clearly in such an epistemological gap. What is important here is that his arguments rely on a *qualitative* difference, which is not the difference of mere *quantity* of knowledge. Children as learners in his writings do not understand us not only because they have less knowledge than we have, but also because they are qualitatively different from us.

The qualitative difference of the learner appears in Wittgenstein's critique of the Augustinian picture of language. The *Philosophical Investigations* begins with a

quotation from Augustine's *Confessions* in which he recalls how he learned language as a child:

> When they (my elders) named some object, and accordingly moved towards something, I saw this and I grasped that the thing was called by the sound they uttered when they meant to point it out.… Thus, as I heard words repeatedly used in their proper places in various sentences, I gradually learnt to understand what objects they signified… (PI §1)

Augustine asserts that he learned language by ostensive definition, wherein a teacher utters a word, pointing to an object that is the meaning of the word. After the quotation, Wittgenstein extracts the following ideas from the Augustinian picture of language: every individual word has a meaning; all words are names, i.e. stand for objects; and the meaning of a word is the object for which it stands.

For Wittgenstein, those ideas are misleading. He criticizes the Augustinian picture of language by showing how a child cannot learn language by ostensive definition alone. Wittgenstein questions, first, how we teach the use of words such as "yesterday," "probably," "if," or "the" by ostensive definition. The idea that all words stand for objects is so strong that it is easy to ignore words other than names and predicates of objects. He suspects, furthermore, that we can get a child to understand even words related to objects. What is taught by ostensive definition could be variously supposed: the name of the object, its number, its shape, its color, etc. It is no use saying "This color is red" because children need to know what the meaning of the word "color" is in order to understand the explanation. Can we, however, teach the meaning of "color" to the child who has never learned any color words (PI §18–29)?

By showing that a child does not learn language in such a way as Augustine describes, Wittgenstein argues against the Augustinian picture of language, that is, the misleading ideas of meaning. Since those ideas seem very plausible in explaining how language works and how an adult learns a language, it is easy for us to assume that a child learns language in the same way as an adult does. Wittgenstein concludes:

> Augustine describes the learning of human language as if the child came into a strange country and did not understand the language of the country; that is, as if it already had a language, only not this one. Or again: as if the child could already *think*, only not yet speak. And "think" would here mean something like "talk to itself." (PI §32)

Augustine's error is to think of the child as a small adult. He does not find any qualitative difference between the child, someone who is learning, and an adult, someone who has learned. He supposes that the child has not had a language, but it is able to think in the same way as a foreigner who has his language and just does not know our language. The child beginning to learn language, however, is qualitatively different. It is hard to recognize the difference or otherness when you commit yourself to teaching what you take for granted.

Wittgenstein does not assume that children will simply overcome their qualitative gap as they are growing up. They could suddenly show up as strangers who

do not share language games with us. Wittgenstein describes such a difficult situation:

> Now we get the pupil to continue a series (say + 2) beyond 1000—and he writes 1000, 1004, 1008, 1012.
>
> We say: "You were meant to add *two*: look how you began the series! —He answers: "Yes, isn't it right? I thought that was how I was *meant* to do it." —Or suppose he pointed to the series and said: "But I went on in the same way." —It would now be no use to say: "But can't you see…?" —and repeat the old examples and explanations. —In such a case we might say, perhaps: it comes natural to this person to understand our order with our explanations as *we* should understand the order: "Add 2 up to 1000, 4 up to 2000, 6 up to 3000 and so on." (PI §185) (see Kripke on rule-following, 1982)

We are teaching a pupil basic arithmetic. He was already trained in counting numbers and addition, and now seems to master them because he wrote 2, 4, 6, 8… when we asked him to continue numbers by adding 2. He writes, however, 1004 after 1000 when we get him to do the same thing beyond 1000. We correct his answer and encourage him to pay more attention. But what if he claims that he *is* doing the same thing as he goes beyond 1000? Would we say that he misunderstood what we taught, and then repeat the old examples that we already showed him even though he misunderstood it through the same examples? It is logically possible, indeed, that more than one rule is induced from a finite number of examples. While he could grasp differently what we taught, we accordingly have no way to know it until he makes a mistake in action.

Wittgenstein uses this fictional situation in attacking the idea that the understanding of a word is a mental state or process from which the applications of the word flow. The mentalist idea explains language learning and use like this: the pupil induced a rule from concrete examples that we gave; he interprets the rule whenever he acts out what was taught. The problematic situation of teaching shows us that there is something wrong with this picture of action. Do you interpret rules you have in mind in advance every time you act? If you think of teaching, according to the mentalist picture, as conveying ideas or rules from the teacher's mind/brain to the learner's, you may feel that teaching is a crucially uncertain, hopeless trial because you cannot check out the learner's mind/brain and find out what kind of ideas he deduced. Wittgenstein shows us that our practices with language are done in a different way. They are based on repetition and familiarity, but not on something fundamental, like the certainty of direct experience. We do not interpret a rule every time we act, but simply make a *natural* reaction.

This instance deals with the potential otherness of learners. The learner was trained for counting and addition and is understood to master them. It could turn out anytime, however, that he has not learned them or has learned different activities. This does not mean the impossibility of teaching. Wittgenstein's consideration on the instance implies this: teaching is not making a learner extract a rule from given examples, but getting a learner to have a natural grasp of them by repetition and explanation and, when it turns out that the reaction natural to the learner is strange enough to us, getting him to have another grasp as if he changes an aspect of the

same examples. We cannot completely remove the possibility of the potential otherness to be present. Whenever it comes present, we may teach the learner again until we arrive at an agreeable point with his reaction, that is, agreement in our form of life.

5 Conclusion

Hegel treats the Other from the God's eye view. The reconciliation with the Other is planned at the final stage of the growth of Spirit. This is because the relationship to the Other is seen as strife from the beginning. The relationship to the other in education, on the other hand, is not necessarily characterized by strife. Wittgenstein sees the other as someone whom you do not understand. The other appears as someone who keeps us from accomplishing language games and his otherness disappears in agreement in the form of life (Kripke 1982: 94, 108). Otherness may, however, reappear anytime even after it disappears. Teaching cannot be either control of learners' minds or neglect of them, but it temporarily ends in agreement over our practices.

Hegelian recognition of otherness assumes existence of a power relationship between two human beings. The two are quantitatively different but can be qualitatively the same. Potentially they are able to fight against each other for their recognition. When we consider the act of teaching, the Hegelian picture does not seem appropriate. If we hold the Hegelian picture of strife in teaching, we would miss the chance to recognize the otherness of learners as Wittgenstein sees it. This recognition of otherness in education differs from the Hegelian recognition. The recognition of otherness in education is to be expressed in sensitivity to potential otherness and an attitude of appreciating inevitable otherness, but neither detesting it nor regarding it as a failure in teaching. Otherness needs to be respected at all times because the teacher is teaching *this* form of life, a form of life that is only one of a great range of possible forms of life. Again, teaching is the process of normalization into *this* form of life. We have to teach certain skills and knowledge to our children in order that they can be independent in our community. Teaching, indeed, includes correcting deviant reactions of learners. If teachers are not careful about the qualitative difference and potential otherness of learners, they are likely to mistreat learners without noticing it. Even though we cannot avoid the process of normalization, we could understand learners when we attempt to see other possibilities. The final goal of teaching is not simply making the same person or reproducing the form of life, but rather giving the technique of aspect change which would be needed in encounters with otherness.

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Liberation from Solitude: Wittgenstein on Human Finitude and Possibility

Karim Dharamsi

Abstract In *Wittgenstein: A Feminist Interpretation*, Tanesini (Wittgenstein: a feminist interpretation. Polity Press, Cambridge, 2004) convincingly argues that Wittgenstein be read as a critic of modern philosophy. He is, in particular, she maintains, rejecting the "modern quest for autonomy and independence". Tanesini argues that these philosophical tropes of modern political and moral thought, their promises of self-determination, self-reliance and self-understanding, are responsible for generating in persons "loneliness and a separation from other human beings". Tanesini believes that what the moderns "perceive as liberating", Wittgenstein takes as being a "prison". In this paper, I am interested in Tanesini's reading of Wittgenstein and its implications for education. It is not unusual to treat Wittgenstein as defending the project of the moderns, aligning with the tradition that has him extending the work of Carnap and Russell. I defend the view that fundamental to Wittgenstein's work is a anti-modern strand, diagnosing as an ill the privileging of the individual as self-determining and its consequent pathological concerns with matching language *to* "reality". I articulate, to a first approximation, implications for our understanding of pedagogy in the context of what I take to be Wittgenstein's critique of modernity, and his descriptive account of a shared way of life.

Keywords Tractatus · Wittgenstein · Solitude · Finitude · Transcendence

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M.A. Peters and J. Stickney (eds.), *A Companion to Wittgenstein on Education*,
DOI 10.1007/978-981-10-3136-6_24

1 Introduction

Tanesini's (2004) reading of Ludwig Wittgenstein's *Tractatus-Logico Philosophicus* (TLP)[1] offers a compelling alternative to what I will refer to as the received view. Hers is an understanding of Wittgenstein as the great diagnostician of the "modern condition" (Tanesini 2004, p. 53). Contra those who see Wittgenstein as the epitome of a late modern philosophical attitude against metaphysics and history, she argues that *Tractatus* is "intended to address the problem of the meaning of life" and offers "insights into the nature of human finitude and the character of subjectivity" (Tanesini 2004, p. 53). By Tanesini's lights, Wittgenstein is a critic of modernity who rejects the "modern quest for autonomy and independence" and the epistemic consequences of such thinking, be they a defence of the *inner* or of some transcendent disembodied purity of self-understanding (Tanesini 2004, p. 1). Wittgenstein takes, she thinks, the tropes of modern political and moral thought, the promises of self-determination, self-reliance and self-understanding, as responsible for generating in persons "loneliness and a separation from other human beings" (Tanesini 2004, p. 1). What moderns perceive as "liberating", Wittgenstein, according to Tanesini, takes as being a "prison" (Tanesini 2004, p. 1). Closer to Simone de Beauvoir than to Rudolph Carnap, her self-admittedly "novel reading" interprets Wittgenstein's early work as a response to our "struggle for transcendence" and the hope of overcoming of our "situation". He is sceptical, Tanesini thinks, of any idea that involves our overcoming of our embodied existence or the materiality of the world (Tanesini 2004, pp. 53, 118). According to her, Wittgenstein's notion of the subject does not arise out of the epistemic certainty of the immaterial Cartesian interior (Tanesini 2004, p. 55). Rather, Tanesini connects the author of *Tractatus* to a thin-form historical becoming: the kind seeded in De Beauvoir, John Paul Sartre and, *of course*, Hegel. Tanesini, with remarkable ease, demonstrates that critics are right to worry about De Beauvoir's *masculine* commitments to transcendence—a form of disembodied overcoming of our worldly affairs. Wittgenstein, by way of contrast, cautions, according to Tanesini, against any desire for complete independence from empirical reality. Wittgenstein, she writes, takes any such transcendence to mean "we would be isolated from anything which could give meaning to our lives" (Tanesini 2004, p. 85). In part, this alone can separate Wittgenstein from the many late moderns who claim him as their own, while bringing him closer to the heroes of unmediated embodiment and sources of community.

In this paper, I defend Tanesini's reading of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* as she presents it in parts of her important *Wittgenstein: A Feminist Interpretation* (2004). The scope of her work is greater than the limit I place on it here; I am interested primarily in the so-called early Wittgenstein. I explore rather liberally, I admit, the

[1]Following convention, titles for Wittgenstein's works are abbreviated (TLP = Tractatus Logico Philosophicus, P = Prototractatus), with section (§) or page number (p.), with full citation and initials in the References.

possible implications her reading might have for our understanding of education. This is important to consider given that our received view of the early Wittgenstein does place him firmly in the context of late modernity; the received view treats Wittgenstein as an extension of the modern philosophical project,[2] easily traceable to the *tradition* of Kant, Frege, Russell and Carnap. I defend Tanesini's view that fundamental to Wittgenstein's work is an historical metaphysics that diagnoses as an ill two prevailing themes: firstly, the privileging of the epistemic ideal of the individual as self-determining and self-reliant,[3] and secondly, the rejection of *traditional* metaphysics—*and history*.

My hope is to imbue Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* with an historical sense and, *eo ipso*, at least a wisp of teleology—both of which seem, at least on first blush—to be at odds with the received view, but are required if we are to accept the *Tractatus* as providing an account of the human being as the *animate body* fully "minded" and free (Tanesini 2004, p. 118). Exploiting Tanesini's reading of De Beauvoir (or at least gesturing at it for this chapter) and making explicit some differences from Wittgenstein, I will attempt to defend the view that the body and its *activities* cannot be divorced from any understanding of the *subject*. If Tanesini is right, Wittgenstein stands as an important contributor to feminist epistemology, the philosophy of history and, indeed, the philosophy of education.

2 The Received View

Rudolph Carnap's *Intellectual Autobiography* (1958) clearly bears his philosophical influences by how he places Wittgenstein's work with the canon of Frege's *Die Grundgesetze der Arithmetic* (1884) and Whitehead and Russell's *Principia Mathematica* (1910, 1912, 1913). "For me personally", Carnap writes, "Wittgenstein was perhaps the philosopher who, besides Russell and Frege, had the greatest sceptical attitude towards metaphysics" (Schilpp 1978, 45). In the section titled "Pseudo Problems in Philosophy", Carnap writes:

> Even in the pre-Vienna period, most of the controversies in traditional metaphysics appeared to me sterile and useless. When I compared this kind of argumentation with investigations and discussion in empirical science or in the logical analysis of language, I was often struck by the vagueness of the concepts used and by the inconclusive nature of the arguments. I was depressed by disputations in which the opponents talked at cross

[2]The term "project" may assume a coherent and explicitly stated strand in modernity. There are, of course, many strands and, therefore, many *projects*. I use this term here (no doubt loosely) to connect, without argument, the works of Kant, Frege, Russell and Carnap because a case for thinking that these thinkers are philosophically kindred can be made. See, for an excellent account, J.A. Coffa's *The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap* (Coffa and Wessels 1991).

[3]While self-determining and self-reliant are no doubt distinctive, for the purposes of this paper I am treating them as a species of the same genus: the modern emphasis on the individual as the locus for authenticity and freedom.

> purposes; there seemed hardly any chance of mutual understanding, let alone of agreement, because there was not even a common criterion for deciding the controversy. I developed this sceptical attitude toward metaphysics under the influence of any metaphysically inclined scientists like Kirchhoff, Hertz, and Mach, and of philosophers like Avenarius, Russell and Wittgenstein. I also saw that the metaphysical argumentation often violated logic. (Schilpp 1978, p. 45)

Carnap's critique and rejection of *traditional* metaphysics amounts, ultimately, to a rejection of philosophy's history. For some, philosophy's relationship to its past is itself a significant philosophical question; important worries about moral progress and human nature are tangled up inside this relationship. However, Carnap is firm: philosophy need not have a past, nor can philosophy, as a governing assumption of the enterprise itself, be inconclusive or *provisional*. Rather, much like the empirical sciences and logical analysis, philosophical clarity arises from universalizability of decision procedures that help yield clear and conclusive arguments.[4] Later from the same section quoted above, Carnap adds:

> The most decisive development in my view of metaphysics occurred later, in the Vienna period, chiefly under the influence of Wittgenstein[5]. (Schilpp 1978, p. 45)

Carnap is referring, in particular, to the influence of Wittgenstein on the Vienna positivists. He traces the origins of positivism to Wittgenstein's "principle of verifiability" and is, presumably, exploiting aspects of *Tractatus* that seem amenable, on first blush, to a Vienna reading (Schilpp 1978, p. 45). Carnap's attraction to the early Wittgenstein is shaped not only by verifiability, but also by what appears to be the audacity of the author of *Tractatus* to wholly reject the spine of *traditional* philosophy. Witherspoon suggests in his "Conceptions of Nonsense in Carnap and Wittgenstein" that

> This dismissal of philosophy became a rallying point for the members of the Vienna Circle in their attacks on "metaphysics." The logical positivists had independent reasons for wanting to do away with metaphysics, but Wittgenstein's blanket rejection of traditional philosophy and his use of logical analysis influenced the direction of their critique. Carnap in particular acknowledged a significant debt to the *Tractatus*. He was impressed not only by the sweep of Wittgenstein's charge, but also by his diagnosis of what goes wrong in philosophy. (Crary et al. 2002, p. 315)

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[4]In his influential, *The Logical Syntax of Language*, Carnap (1937) argues for his "thesis of extensionality". The thesis of extensionality is way to achieve a form of universalizability, only in science: "*a universal language of science may be extensional; or, more exactly: for every given intensional language S1, an extensional language S2 may be constructed such that S1 can be translated into S2*" (Carnap 2014, §67).

[5]It is important to take note that later in "Pseudo Problems of Philosophy", Carnap reminds us that the Vienna Circle reformulated their controversial claim that "certain metaphysical theses are 'meaningless'". He writes: "This formulation caused much unnecessary opposition, even among some of those philosophers who basically agreed with us" (Schilpp 1978). Carnap's discussion is important; he distinguishes his position from realists such as Russell and Einstein. Carnap writes: "I maintained that what was needed for science was merely the acceptance of a realistic language, but that the thesis of the reality of the external world was an empty additional to the system of science (Schilpp 1978)".

Of course, Carnap and the Vienna positivists were not alone in exalting the virtues of *Tractatus* and the reconceptualizing of philosophy in terms friendlier to the analysis of logical syntax and the structure of language. Bertrand Russell, perhaps the godfather of analytic philosophy, does not disguise his general disdain for the "later" Wittgenstein. Russell places the author of *Tractatus* as a substantive contributor to the philosophical tradition, while charging the author of *Philosophical Investigations* with sophistry (Garver 1994, p. 77). Even with *Tractatus*, Russell had *his* reading. As Newton Garver rightly observes of Russell's introduction to *Tractatus*, the focus is "on Wittgenstein's concerns about language" (Garver 1994, p. 76). Garver adds that when "it comes to the end of the *Tractatus*, where Wittgenstein states part of this main point that he called attention to in the preface, Russell brushes aside the counsel of silence, makes no mention of anything aesthetic or moral, and references (sic) to Wittgenstein's account of the 'mystical'" (Garver 1994, p. 77). Russell avoids discussion of the mystical altogether. Garver rightly maintains that such systematic neglect in the analytic reading has distorted our understanding of *Tractatus* (Garver 1994, p. 77). Of course, histories of this sort are murky; the actors do provide us with philosophical arguments sometimes, but even philosophers are (surprisingly!) human, *all too human*. They have their friendships; and, as with any of us, their friendships fail. As recorded by Norman Malcolm:

> Wittgenstein more than once expressed admiration of the keenness of Bertrand Russell's intellect when the two of them worked together on problems of logic before the First World War. Russell was extremely '*bright*', is how he put it: Moore, in comparison, was less so. Wittgenstein recalled with pleasure that one day, when Russell and himself had finished several hours of hard work together, Russell had exclaimed, 'Logic is *hell*!' This exclamation characterized Wittgenstein's attitude towards his own philosophical labours. (Malcolm et al. 2001, p. 68)

This early intimacy and corresponding philosophical purpose was not to last. Just as Russell believed Wittgenstein's later work a failure, Wittgenstein had a poor opinion of Russell's later contributions to philosophy. Malcolm reports:

> Wittgenstein believed that the Theory of Descriptions was Russell's most important production, and he once remarked that it must have been an enormously difficult undertaking for him. But in 1946 Wittgenstein had a poor opinion of Russell's contemporary philosophical writings. "Russell isn't going to kill himself doing philosophy now," he said with a smile. (Malcolm et al. 2001, p. 68)

Perhaps of greatest importance (for my purposes) is Malcolm's report of Wittgenstein's changing attitudes about his own early work (Malcolm et al. 2001, p. 69). These remarks present challenges to those who believe *Tractatus* to be *merely* a notionally distinct earlier work from its conceptual extension in *Philosophical Investigations* or for those who believe that the earlier work is simply and unequivocally distinctive, written by a "different" Wittgenstein, *and superior*. Malcolm reports:

> Wittgenstein frequently said to me disparaging things about the *Tractatus*. I am sure, however, that he still regarded it as an important work. For one thing, he was greatly concerned in the *Investigations* to refute the errors of the former book. Also he told me once

> that he really thought that in the *Tractatus* he had provided a perfected account of a view that is the *only* alternative to the viewpoint of his later work. For another thing, he definitely wanted the *Tractatus* to be republished jointly with his newer writings. (Malcolm et al. 2001, p. 70)

Malcolm's relationship with Wittgenstein yields some insight into a thoughtful, ceaselessly curious and enigmatic thinker. While impressions might suggest an ahistorical sensibility in *Tractatus* and in some later work, Malcolm reminds us that Wittgenstein was influenced early by Schopenhauer; he read Spinoza, Hume and Kant, and he enjoyed Plato and "recognized congenial features" of "literary and philosophic method" in the dialogues (Malcolm et al. 2001, p. 21). We are given the impression that Wittgenstein was not only interested in the most formal elements of philosophy, logic and mathematics, but that his intellectual *models* came from those who grasped for human meaning through a literary and poetic enterprise, the "borderland" between philosophy, religion and poetry. Malcolm writes:

> Wittgenstein received deeper impressions from some writers in the borderland between philosophy, religion, and poetry than from the philosophers, in the restricted sense of the word. Among the former are St. Augustine, Kierkegaard, Dostoievksy, and Tolstoy. The philosophical sections of St. Augustine's *Confessions* show a striking resemblance to Wittgenstein's own way of doing philosophy. Between Wittgenstein and Pascal there is a trenchant parallelism which deserves closer study. It should also be mentioned that Wittgenstein held the writings of Otto Weininger in high regard. (Malcolm et al. 2001, p. 21)

Malcolm's Wittgenstein read widely and was not confined to any singular genre or mode for engaging the life of the mind.[6] He refines the "Wittgenstein" we receive from Carnap and Russell, and the scope of Wittgenstein's interests are widened for us; even historicized and contextualized in the Europe of the late nineteenth and early to mid-twentieth century.

For many readers, G.E.M. Anscombe's 1958 translation of *Tractatus* would be their first encounter with the text. Like Malcolm, Anscombe's introduction radiates familiarity with Wittgenstein; her language is intimate and friendly. She outlines some of Wittgenstein's earliest influences:

> As a boy of sixteen Wittgenstein had read Schopenhauer and had been greatly impressed by Schopenhauer's theory of the 'world as idea' (though not the 'world as will'); Schopenhauer then struck him as fundamentally right, if only a few adjustments and clarifications were made. It is very much a popular notion of Wittgenstein that he was a latter-day Hume; but any connections between them are indirect, and he never read more than a few pages of Hume. If we look for Wittgenstein's philosophical ancestry, we should look rather to Schopenhauer; specifically, his 'solipsism', his conception of 'the limit' and his idea on value will be better understood in the light of Schopenhauer than of any other philosopher… For the rest, Wittgenstein's philosophical influences are pretty well confined

[6]Malcolm's paper, referenced in *Wittgenstein: A Memoir* is worth a mention: "George Christoph Lichtenberg als Philosoph", *Theoria*, *VIII* (1942). Malcolm wonders aloud about how much Lichtenberg's "style" influenced Wittgenstein. Failing any direct evidence, he cites Wittgenstein's esteem for Lichtenberg and the latter's philosophical interests (Malcolm et al. 2001, p. 22).

> to Frege and to Russell, who introduced him to Frege's writings. His relative estimate of them comes out in the acknowledgement he makes in the Preface to the *Tractatus* … (Carney 1960, pp. 11–12)

Anscombe's remarks do not align entirely with Malcolm's; she confines Wittgenstein's substantive influences to Frege and Russell, noting, like Malcolm, his adolescent flirtation with Schopenhauer. Anscombe dismisses Hume's influence, while Malcolm suggests something less categorically irrelevant. Clearly, Malcolm expands Wittgenstein's intellectual and conceptual reach. Both take Wittgenstein's interests to be wider than one might think, but do these *wider* interests inform the substance of *Tractatus*? As far as I can tell, nothing in the received view betrays either Carnap's reading of *Tractatus*, which treats its statements as "purely linguistic proposals", or as a patent and wholesale rejection of traditional metaphysics (Ostrow 2002, p. 4). Other interventions into the study of *Tractatus* reject both alternatives, favouring, instead, a view inspired by *TLP* 6.54 that the text as whole is "just so much gibberish" (Ostrow 2002, p. 4). At *TLP* 6.54, Wittgenstein states:

> 6.54 My propositions are elucidatory in this way: he who understands me finally recognizes them as senseless, when he has climbed out through them, on them, over them. (He must so to speak throw away the ladder, after he has climbed up on it.)
>
> He must surmount these propositions; then he sees the world rightly (TLP).

Wittgenstein's remark here has unsurprisingly presented commentators with challenges. Cora Diamond has defended a reading of *Tractatus* consistent with the latter view in her important paper, "Throwing Away the Ladder" (Diamond 2009).[7] Diamond's position, while no doubt interesting, ultimately fails to overcome the canonical discussions inspired by the received view that I have held responsible for shaping our understanding of *Tractatus*. Tanesini is attempting a break from this tradition; her reading substantively reshapes and reinvigorates our understanding of the early Wittgenstein and the enigmatic *Tractatus*.

3 *Tractatus* and Human Finitude

In Chap. 3 of *Wittgenstein: A Feminist Interpretation*, Tanesini's "A Poem to Solitude" offers what she "takes to be a novel reading of the overall purpose of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*" (Tanesini 2004, 53). She references Simone de Beauvoir's *The Second Sex* (1953). Where de Beauvoir locates in *subjectivity* our ability to transcend our situation, Tanesini reads Wittgenstein as taking our struggle for transcendence as responsible for our conditions of loneliness and meaninglessness (Beauvoir 1953; Tanesini 2004). The *subject* in de Beauvoir is *modern*; she

[7]While I find Diamond's argument significant, I am not assessing its merits here.

is pure interiority and *ultimately* at odds with the empirical world. Tanesini sees in de Beauvoir an ironic folly: in liberating the self, and indeed *the second sex*, from her “situation”, she is confining the self to the detached, *sui generis*, solitude of the Cartesian ego. In Wittgenstein Tanesini takes there to be a fundamental breach with what she understands as being the false promise of solitary self-determination, solitary self-realization and solitary self-understanding. Indeed, it is this false promise that has pathologized the modern self, detaching her from community and Other. It is on the basis of this reading that Tanesini invites a feminist interpretation of Wittgenstein that seeks to reconnect women and men to the materiality of the world and a fully embodied subjectivity; it is also by way of this materiality that Wittgenstein, according to Tanesini, offers a way of overcoming our isolation. Given her radical engagement with the early Wittgenstein, Tanesini warns us: she is making a claim that is unusual and is breaking from the received view.

Even if we establish that Wittgenstein’s influences were *not* exclusively tethered to Frege and Russell, it does not follow that the received view of the *Tractatus*, primarily by way of Russell and Carnap, is mistaken. What if we come to the same conclusions about the text in the absence of any Vienna influence or of Russell’s authority? Indeed, nothing of the structure of *Tractatus* suggests that the received view is wrong. It seems the book itself provides us with few direct clues. Rather than argument, we have a preface, propositions and an axiomatic organizational logic reminiscent of Spinoza.

However, the “propositions”, sometimes esoteric, render *Tractatus* difficult to interpret. Wittgenstein’s larger aims, *perhaps unclear*, are, at least according to some, left open for discussion. A contest for the *Tractatus* has been relatively one-sided over the past century, and the received view has its pull. Still, questions linger and, for some, the enigmatic—or even *mystical*—elements of the text have not yet been fully and systematically examined. There *are clues* that suggest an alternative reading. The received view takes for granted, it seems, that the counsel of *TLP* 7, namely that we are to remain silent about that of which we cannot speak, has only one outcome: to treat *Tractatus* as providing a reductive prescription by which logical analysis and language, a rejection of metaphysics and of *traditional* philosophy is our only way forward. In this way, the death of philosophy is also its new life, methodologically aligned with conceptual clarification and as a handmaiden of science.

Tanesini offers a radical reinterpretation of *TLP* 7. Unlike Russell, Tanesini takes the counsel of silence seriously and concludes: “we should not rule out the possibility that the aim of the book is something which is hardly discussed within it” (Tanesini 2004, 53). Of course, Wittgenstein is recursive, echoing in the closing statement of *Tractatus* the counsel of silence in text’s preface:

> The book deals with the problems of philosophy, and shows, I believe, that the reason why these problems are posed is that the logic of our language is misunderstood. The whole sense of the book might be summed up in the following words: what can be said at all can be said clearly, and what we cannot talk about we must pass over in silence. (TLP, p. 3)

What does it mean to pass over in silence that which cannot be said? While Russell and Carnap take *Tractatus* as "containing" its thesis (if one dare associate this text with such a prosaic idea), Wittgenstein's famous letter to von Ficker lends credibility to Tanesini's intuitions about the text's overall purpose and its conceptual distance from either a Vienna reading or the received view, generally:

> [T]he book's point is an ethical one. I once meant to include in the preface a sentence which is not in fact there now but which I will write for you here, because it will perhaps be key to the work for you. What I meant to write, then, was this: My work consists of two parts: the one presented here plus all that I have *not* written. And it is precisely this second part that is the important one. For the ethical gets its limit drawn from inside, as it were, by my book; and I am convinced that this is the ONLY *rigorous* way of drawing the limit. In short, I believe that were *many* others today are just *gassing*, I have managed in my book to put everything firmly into place by being silent about it. (Tanesini 2004, p. 62; P, pp. 27–28)

Wittgenstein tells von Ficker that the point of the book is "ethical" and that he intended for a time to include a remark of this sort in his preface to *Tractatus*. What is particularly persuasive, it seems, is Wittgenstein's assertion that he has managed to "put everything firmly into place by being silent about it" and that "the ethical gets its limit drawn from the inside". What are we to make of this?

For those working in the philosophy of history, this kind of language has redolence with R.G. Collingwood's discussion of action explanation. In his important *Idea of History* (1946), Collingwood distinguishes between the "inside" and the "outside" of an action. The "outside" he argues is a "mere event", "related in space and time", to the order of nature, whereas the "inside" is thought, "bound by logical connexions", and the effort of the concept (Collingwood 1994, p. 118). In his discussion of Hegel, Collingwood prescribes to the historian a method for understanding the past, from a *human* point of view. Where the "facts" of history are simply what they are, documents and other kinds of evidence, their "value" and so "their meaning" is established by entering, the best we can with the resources we have, the *minds* of those actors who are responsible for having created the evidence. In this way, we are *re-enacting* the thoughts of those whose actions resulted in the evidence that makes up the stuff of social reality. But "re-enactment" is a specific kind of entry into the mind of the Other, bound up in norms and the logical epistemic relationship between use and meaning. Here, the limits are "inside" or "internal" insofar as the limit of thought is in an important sense normatively imposed. And it cannot be otherwise. Collingwood's language is helpful:

> By the outside of the event I mean everything belonging to it which can be described in terms of bodies and their movements: the passage of Caesar, accompanied by certain men, across a river called the Rubicon at one date, or the spilling of his blood on the loor of the senate-house at another. By the inside of an event I mean that in it which can only be described in terms of thought: Caesar's defiance of Republican law, or the clash of the constitutional policy between himself and his assassins. The historian is never concerned with either of these to the exclusion of the other. He is not investigating mere events (where by mere event I mean one which has only an outside and no inside) but actions, and an action is the unity of the outside and inside of an event. (Collingwood 1994, p. 213)

Collingwood is not Cartesian, nor is he interested in the ascendance of the transcendent subject. We are, for Collingwood, historical creatures by our nature, and our best aspirations belong to our terrestrial possibilities. Like Tanesini's Wittgenstein, Collingwood is a critic of the modern and any inner–outer divide that pits our hopes of self-understanding on overcoming the world. Let's compare Collingwood's remarks in *Idea of History* with Wittgenstein's *TLP* 6.4–6.421.

While no doubt radically different in *style* from Collingwood, Wittgenstein's distinction between the "accidental happenings" in "the world" from the "non-accidental and transcendental" that "cannot lie *within* the world" suggests a fundamental conceptual distinction between the "outside" and the "inside". We cannot "enter" by thought the "accidental" because it is only described and has no value; it is a mere "fact" like a hurricane or a light bulb. I examine *TLP* 6.4–6.421:

> 6.4 All propositions are of equal value.
>
> The sense of the world must lie outside the world. In the world everything is as it is, and everything happens as it does happen: *in* it no value exists—and if it did exist, it would have to value. (TLP, 6.4–6.421)

By *TLP* 6.4, we assume that the arrangement of the world is the arrangement of propositions (by *TLP* 1) of equal value. They are merely descriptive. There is no "value" since the world does not have an inside of the kind we enter.

> 6.41 If there is any value that does have value, it must lie outside the whole sphere of what happens and is the case. For all that happens and is the case is accidental.
>
> What makes it non-accidental cannot lie *within* the world, since if it did it would itself be accidental.
>
> It must lie outside the world.

Anything that has "value" is "outside" the world or, in Collingwood's sense, on the "inside" where thoughts and reasons gain status. Being inside the world, by *TLP* 6.41, is "accidental". It is not the product of thought and meaning; it has no value and simply "is".

> 6.42 So too it is impossible for there to be propositions of ethics.
>
> Propositions can express nothing that is higher.
>
> It is clear that ethics cannot be put into words.
>
> 6.421 Ethics is transcendental.
>
> (Ethics and aesthetics are one and the same.) (TLP, 6.4–6.421)

Ethics cannot emerge from our descriptions of the world. Propositions, as Wittgenstein understands them in *Tractatus*, express nothing higher than the facts that are the world. The ethical impulse, Tanesini writes, "which is at the root of our need to ask questions about the ultimate meaning of life is generated by a feeling that human thought and language are a cage" that "imprisons us" (Tanesini 2004, p. 70). She adds that this "illusion of being constrained is also what lies behind the philosophical impulse" (Tanesini 2004, p. 70). We intuit rather naturally that the

world, the "accidental", resists our infusion of ethical or aesthetic meaning. If Tanesini is correct, the resistance takes the form of the world pushing back at our hopes to enter it from the inside; we are doomed to alienation if we believe otherwise and fashion our ideals around this connection. The consequences are dire. We are encaged and directed to conclude that our only hope is to transcend the hard facts or, more profoundly, reject them altogether in order to grasp for something beyond language and perhaps beyond our logic.

We are through it all linguistic creatures. According to Tanesini, Wittgenstein wishes to liberate us from our cage, one that is held up by our false belief that something meaningful resides in a space outside of our linguistic and logical grasp. She is quick to point out that any such idea is incoherent since a thought that cannot, in principle, be held is not a thought (Tanesini 2004, p. 71). There are no illogical or impossible thoughts; *no prime numbers in Caesar*! Wittgenstein's aim is to demonstrate that our finitude is at once acceptable and liberating. The "facts" of the world—the outside in Collingwood or the "inside" of the language of *Tractatus* —are traps if we believe that meaningfulness requires of us a transcendent becoming entirely outside the world and, indeed, outside our embodied existence. Tanesini believes that de Beauvoir and some feminist epistemologists have embraced this epistemic attitude and Wittgenstein Tanesini sees new kind of feminist ontology. It is a liberation of the subject from a detached and solitary interior, but also a liberating embrace of our finitude and limits. This thought is not only conceptually rich, exploiting an interpretation of *Tractatus*; it is also bringing together of philosophy and conceptual change—*education*.

4 A Wisp of Teleology and Education

Tanesini argues that in de Beauvoir there is a tendency that seeks to "transcend the immanence of life" (Tanesini 2004, p. 83). The model Tanesini has just rejected is one she believes as having informed feminist epistemology—*and* feminist ontology of the body. There is agreement that the question of recognition and of subject-hood are important to feminist theory, and it is a matter of historical record that women have been denied subject-status (Tanesini 2004, p. 83). From *The Second Sex*:

> Every subject plays his part as such specifically through exploits or projects that serve as a mode of transcendence; he achieves liberty only through a continual reaching towards other liberties. There is no justification for present existence other than its expansion into an indefinitely open future. Every time transcendence falls back into immanence, stagnation, there is a degradation of existence into the '*en-soi'*- the brutish life of subjection to given conditions – and of liberty into constraint and contingence. This downfall represents a moral fault if the subject consents to it; if it is inflicted upon him, it spells frustration and oppression. In both cases it is an absolute evil. Every individual concerned to justify his existence feels that his existence involves an undefined need to transcend himself, to engage freely chosen projects. (Beauvoir 1953, pp. 28–29; Tanesini 2004, p. 83)

The individual's quest for personal freedom is a central theme in de Beauvoir's *The Second Sex*. Such a "quest" presupposes a movement through time and assumes, at least, a progressive account of self-realization. Tanesini argues that the heroic striving of the individual for meaning is echoed in Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* (Tanesini 2004, p. 84). Further, Tanesini notes that de Beauvoir, consistent with other existentialist thinkers, does not take for granted that a subject is simply born; rather, she "identifies the attainment of subjectivity as an achievement", again taking a wisp of historical teleology has given (Tanesini 2004, p. 84). In other words, the *subject* is not a sortal, an *essential* kind, fully developed and whole, when it appears on the scene. Rather, the subject is developmental, always in process and ever in a state of becoming. Lived lives lived create subjects of the sort de Beauvoir believes capable of human flourishing. While we still accept our finitude, contra-Wittgenstein, the striving noted here seeks to rise above our mortal condition, grasping at the ontologically extraterrestrial. If subject-hood is possible at all, then an individual person must, as Tanesini suggests of de Beauvoir, "strive to go beyond the limitations imposed on our freedom by human finitude" (Tanesini 2004, p. 84). Consistent with other existentialist thinkers, de Beauvoir takes our finitude as a barrier to our plans—*and to our freedom*.

De Beauvoir uses the grammar of the subject and its limits as "given". But it is in the interiority of the subject that she ultimately carves out her message of liberation. One might charge that de Beauvoir's cooptation of *masculine* conceptions of subject and object, particularly out of the modern philosophical canon, limit her own thinking about the ideals about female agency and the possibilities of human life, generally. This is not to diminish the importance of *The Second Sex* or of de Beauvoir's oeuvre. It is to suggest that the shape of her philosophical grammar is modern and it exploits many of its strengths and, *eo ipso*, its problems. If we accept, with Tanesini, that Wittgenstein is diagnosing a philosophical ill, then his assessment of the modern applies as forcefully to Descartes's interior as it does to de Beauvoir's. Overcoming, in this specific sense, means rethinking our psychological grammar, and reconceptualizing, as a consequence, our understanding of human finitude and the terrestrial scope of human flourishing. It is in this rethinking that we have an impulse to learn.

5 Conclusion

An accompanying worry that comes with accepting our finitude is that our activities on this mortal plane are, ultimately, in vain. No legacies to survive our bodies and no extraterrestrial domain for a final assessment our lives lived. Attempting to adopt a grammar to shape an afterlife can sometimes console us, but Wittgenstein, Tanesini argues, "appears to combat this temptation" (Tanesini 2004, p. 81). At *TLP* 6.4311, Wittgenstein claims that "eternal life belongs to those who live in the present" (TLP: 6.4311). This might leave us wondering if the idea of history and a wisp of teleology in the project of self-understanding belong at all to the author of

Tractatus. As Tanesini argues, "[p]hilosophy is, for Wittgenstein, a work on oneself" (Tanesini 2004, p. 22). The struggle, unsurprisingly, is with language. The task of philosophy is at once to uncover our confusion, but it is also a striving to understand ourselves (Tanesini 2004, p. 22). The kind of change that comes from such striving is only possible through self-examination. We are closer in *Tractatus* to Socrates's adage in *Apology* that the unexamined life is not worth living than we are to the received view.

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Wittgenstein and Philosophy of Education: A Feminist Re-assessment

Claudia Schumann

Abstract In the last two decades, feminist readings of Wittgenstein have produced a considerable body of work. Starting from a discussion of the challenges such endeavors meet with at a first glance, the paper will argue that these new interpretations not only prove productive with regard to our reading of Wittgenstein and feminist philosophy but can also inspire new approaches for philosophy of education. Bringing Wittgenstein into dialogue with feminist standpoint epistemology in different variations provides an interesting third path between the postmodernist rejection of objectivity and the empiricists' defense of a narrow concept of objectivity. Furthermore, with Wittgenstein's notion of language games, family resemblances, and aspect dawning, we can arrive at an understanding of feminist educational philosophy which turns from essentialist, foundationalist understandings to a more fluid, playful conception without losing sight of the importance of theory for the continuous renewal of our everyday educational practices.

Keywords Wittgenstein · Feminism · Education · Ordinary language philosophy

> The sickness of a time is cured by an alteration in the mode of life of human beings, and it was possible for the sickness of philosophical problems to get cured only through a changed mode of thought and of life, not through a medicine invented by an individual.

A shorter version appears in the Wittgenstein section of the *Encyclopedia of Educational Philosophy and Theory* (Springer, 2016), co-edited by Nicholas Burbules & Jeff Stickney (Michael A. Peters, Chief Editor).

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M.A. Peters and J. Stickney (eds.), *A Companion to Wittgenstein on Education*,
DOI 10.1007/978-981-10-3136-6_25

Wittgenstein (RFM, II.4)[1]

> It is naïve to assume that the inferiority of women's moral voice can be overcome simply by asserting its equality. Several millennia of subordination are unlikely to be overcome by little more than a proclamation.

Hekman (1995, p. 8)

1 Introduction

Why should feminist philosophers of education take an interest in Wittgenstein? In 2006, Toril Moi diagnosed feminism and feminist theory alike as having been befallen by a "feeling of exhaustion" (Moi 2006: 1735). Today, in times when Beyoncé and Emma Watson publicly (re-)claim the title of feminist and mainstream pop stars such as Miley Cyrus and Lady Gaga easily play with fluid gender expressions, feminism appears to be alive and thriving again. Above and beyond the question of how relevant these popular media examples actually are for furthering feminist politics and how deep their respective analyses cut, the impasse that Moi so poignantly described in her essay "'I am not a feminist, but…': How feminism became the f-word" is still not overcome, and her urge for feminist theory to re-engage with "women who struggle to cope with everyday problems" (Moi 2006, p. 1739) is as timely as ever. Wittgenstein's philosophy of the ordinary offers surprising tools for moving feminist theorizing into exactly this direction. Nevertheless, I chose to open this paper with two rather humbling quotes. They are fitting insofar as the task I will undertake in the following is a humbling endeavor, too. Both Hekman and Wittgenstein caution us against overweening expectations for the transformative work we can expect theory or, more specifically, philosophy to accomplish in relationship to practice, and they also caution that it is not through one singular or individual effort that such change will come about. The relationship between Wittgenstein's philosophy and feminism is a difficult one. It is in no way obvious or straightforward how the two hang together. Wittgenstein himself was not a feminist, neither did he explicitly reflect on issues of gender equality and the like; yet, if approached with care, reading feminist philosophy and Wittgenstein together can prove extremely fruitful and can lead to challenging results for both Wittgenstein and feminist scholarship. Out of the multitude of stimulating discussions of Wittgenstein's work from feminist perspectives, I have selected a few central and recurring themes which are of particular relevance to the kind of questions, problems, and challenges feminist thinking faces in educational contexts.

[1]Following convention, titles for Wittgenstein's works are abbreviated (RFM = Remarks on the Foundation of Mathematics, Z = Zettel, PI = Philosophical Investigations, OC = On Certainty, CV = Culture and Value), with section (§) or page number (p.), with full citation and initials in the References.

2 Philosophy, Theory, and Social Change: Wittgenstein on the Place of Theory and Critique

Education has not only named the processes of transformation of the life of an individual, but educational institutions have often been created and are continuously confronted with the public hope and expectation of delivering positive transformation for whole societies. It is therefore no surprise that the field of education and pedagogy has provided a welcome and important playground for critical feminist analysis as well as practical interventions for furthering girls' and women's empowerment. One apparent discord between Wittgenstein and feminist theorizing might be found in the way in which his analyses appear to draw attention to the limits rather than the possibilities of effecting change through theorizing, as when he proclaims that philosophy "leaves everything as it is" (PI I, §124). Yet, this picture is not quite correct. Even if the limits of human knowledge and individual action are distinctly Wittgensteinian topics, a feminist reading of his writings can help us understand why it is so important to make a place for these limits in educational theorizing in order to avoid naïvely overestimating the powers of feminist educational interventions and in this way undermine or even reverse their own best intentions.

One of the prominent thoughts, which have inspired feminist philosophers, is Wittgenstein's critique of the philosophical pursuit of an ideally transparent, abstract, logical language which is supposed to reveal and represent the true structure of reality beyond ordinary language: "We have got onto slippery ice where there is no friction and so in a certain sense the conditions are ideal, but also, just because of that, we are unable to walk. We want to walk so we need friction. Back to the rough ground!" (PI I, §107). In a similar vein, feminist materialist Donna Haraway states that: "Cyborg politics is the struggle for language and the struggle against perfect communication, against the one code that transmits all meaning perfectly, the central dogma of phallocentrism. That is why cyborg politics insist on noise and advocate pollution" (Haraway 1991, p. 176). Already in 1933, Wittgenstein suggests in *The Blue Book* that the philosopher's "craving for generality" produces confusions for which we need a cure. His late philosophy then understands itself as a form of therapeutic method which leads us back to the rough ground of the ordinary. The language games within which our words acquire their meaning have no ultimate, perfect, and unchangeable foundation, but they are nevertheless solidly grounded in our life forms. This has led some conservative philosophers, e.g., J.C. Nyíri and Ernest Gellner, to interpret Wittgenstein as saying that since it is impossible to determine any ultimate rational foundation for human practices beyond "that's how we do it" (RFM, II.74), we should cultivate a conservative attitude toward our own practices, and a non-judgmental, tolerant attitude toward others' traditions. However, also non-conservative authors such as Richard Rorty subscribe to a similarly relativist interpretation of Wittgenstein's late philosophy only that here it is used to defend the possibility of radical social and political change (cf. Crary 2000).

Feminist philosophers do not necessarily lean on Rortyian relativist interpretations in order to argue for social and political change from a Wittgensteinian perspective. Even if Wittgenstein's analyses lead him to point to the ultimate "groundlessness of our believing" (OC §166), this is not to say that there is no place from which to raise or justify critique. His point is rather that there is no place above, beyond, or outside of language from which we can launch such criticism of established practices. He turns our heads back on those cases in our ordinary linguistic practices in which we successfully manage to raise legitimate, justified criticism, even if there is no ultimate safeguard which allows us to secure that our critique will be heard, that our justifications will be accepted as legitimate. When we avoid, what Naomi Scheman following Cavell calls the "Manichean reading of Wittgenstein on rules" (Scheman 1996, p. 386), we can understand Wittgenstein as revealing the apparent choice between a narrow objectivism on one side or embracing relativism on the other, between "super-idealized guidance or caprice" (David Pears in Scheman 1996, p. 386), as misleading.

Wittgenstein's therapeutic endeavor to cure us from the idea of philosophy as developing theories which can then be "applied" is instead taken as an urge to understand philosophical theorizing as an effort to achieve clarity about contextualized examples and concrete situations of the infinitely varied, embodied, and lived experiences of women (cf. Moi 2015; Crary 2000; Scheman 1996). As Linda Zerilli states, the craving for generality is something that feminists are not immune to neither:

> This craving is a product of centuries of philosophical and political thinking; it is a disposition to generalize against which feminists, working with and against that inheritance, are by no means invulnerable. What drove some feminists to produce unified categories that did not attend to the particular case was in part this craving for generality, a craving that animated the hegemonic strand of the feminist theoretical enterprise through the 1980s and into the 1990s and that continues to haunt it even today, if only in the form of its nemesis, the refusal of theory, be that skepticism or radical particularism. (Zerilli 2005, 35)

When we now take a look at some central debates within feminist epistemology between feminist objectivists and feminist skeptics, we will find that Wittgenstein's broadening of our notions of objectivity and rationality offers a fresh perspective in steering these debates out of stilted and stifling oppositions.

3 Wittgenstein's Philosophy and Feminism: Between Epistemology, Ethics, and Politics

It is well known that for Wittgenstein epistemological, moral, and political reflections overlap and intersect in his writings. They are not neatly separated from each other as they have been in more traditional systematic philosophies, but for the present purpose, it seemed useful to try to disentangle some of the various lines of thought. In the following, I will mostly focus on Wittgenstein's later work in

relation to which the feminist discussion has been most prolific, even if some interesting work on the *Tractatus* can also be found (e.g., Tanesini 2004, pp. 53–88; Cohen 2002). I will give some examples respectively for how central Wittgensteinian ideas have been useful to think about feminist epistemology, ethics, and politics. While this is by no means a comprehensive summary of the feminist discussion of Wittgenstein's philosophy, I nevertheless hope to highlight some interesting points of overlap and mutual inspiration so as to encourage further engagement with his work by feminist philosophers of education.

Feminists have significantly drawn attention to how the traditional exclusion of girls and women from educational opportunities and institutions has led to limitations and biases in our scientific and historical bodies of knowledge almost exclusively produced by men and from male perspectives. Beyond claiming equal rights to education, striving to rectify the canon by lifting women's voices and contributions, and showing how women scientists and scholars cannot only produce equally valid and interesting research and scholarship as men, but broaden, enhance, and improve our knowledge by actually taking women's bodies, lives, and experiences into adequate account, feminists have also thought about knowledge in a philosophical sense. Early feminist standpoint epistemology drew on György Lukács' idea that the structural conditions of workers' lives afford them an epistemologically privileged position to gain an adequate picture of social relations in capitalist society. They argued that women similarly inhabit an epistemologically privileged position from which we can shed light on the objective reality of life in sexist societies. Hartsock's (1998) initial approach has been criticized by postmodernist, black, Latina, lesbian, and more recently queer theorists for building her theory on an essentialist idea of the category of "woman," thus overlooking and potentially excluding women who experience their lives in radically different ways due to differences in class, gender identity, sexuality, ethnicity, race, or religion. Later, feminist standpoint theorists such as Sandra Harding (1991) have therefore moved away from the idea of a unified women's standpoint to embrace a plurality of situated knowledges. In the debates between feminists who argued for the outright rejection of any claim to objectivity since they considered it tainted by flawed male ideals and those feminists who wanted to hold on to objectivity, in a reworked, broadened rendering, in order to be able to solidly ground their political demands for change, Wittgenstein has often been taken to align with the feminist skeptics and invited the charge of reducing epistemology to questions of power and politics. As Alice Crary shows, however, Wittgenstein can also be read differently, so that his "attack on an abstraction requirement is intended not to discredit the concept of objectivity per se but rather to correct what he sees as an inaccurate conception of it" (Crary 2007: 25). An objective and rational account of reality is not available from an ideal, abstract standpoint that disregards all subjective endowments. On the contrary, it might require the active and conscious cultivation of certain sensitivities, not least through education: "I want to say: an education quite different from ours might also be the foundation of quite different concepts. For here life would run on differently. […] In fact, this is the only way in which *essentially* different concepts are imaginable" (Z §§387–8).

The postmodern emphasis on the internal complexity of the category of "woman," the idea that gender is socially constructed rather than a biologically given binary identity and that "the gendered body is performative" (Butler 1990, p. 136), even if considered convincing on an ontological level, has prominently been contrasted with the need for an unified category of "woman" in order to advance feminist politics. Wittgenstein's thought can provide helpful tools for re-thinking the identity category of "woman" as a subject of and ground for feminist epistemology, ethics, and politics and for exploring the feminist foundations debates of the 1980s and 1990s from an angle which anticipates and aligns with contemporary conceptions. Nelson (2002), for example, provides an insightful discussion of Wittgenstein's concept of "family resemblance" in that regard. When we look at different instantiations of a concept, so Wittgenstein, we "will not see something that is common to all, but similarities, relationships, and a whole series of them at that" (PI §66). As feminist biologists and trans theorists have importantly brought to our attention, even the biological criteria for which kind of bodily and genetic constitutions count under the category of "woman" are much more diversified than previously thought. Of course, it is always possible to dismiss any divergences from a stipulated norm as a clinical aberrance to be dismissed as a mere exception. But current research has pushed even the medical community to take a more respectful stance toward the wide variety of intersex bodies and the interests of trans people.

The complexity increases even further if we leave these merely biological considerations and turn to feminism as concerned with the whole variety of women's experiences. The kind of kinship relations which the idea of family resemblances invokes can help conceptualize a non-essentialist notion of "woman" not based on any core identity or fixed, exclusionary boundaries, and open to continuous change of the language game (cf. Nelson 2002). Zerilli (2005, pp. 33–65) uses Wittgenstein's concept of aspect dawning in her discussion of Butler's ideas on gender performativity and the question of the boundaries of the category "woman." She takes his thoughts on aspect seeing to explain that while "under ordinary circumstances we do not doubt" (2005, p. 58) whether the woman that I see in front of me on the train actually "is" a woman, it does not imply that we can never see the same person or situation under a different aspect. She interprets Butler's account of drag as an "imaginative exercise" (ibid.) which can provoke us to question the ways in which we have been introduced to the language game of distinguishing between men and women. The discussions put forth by queer theory in the last decades provide distinct examples for the relevance of Wittgenstein's thinking to current social and political issues beyond a purely academic discourse. Following his philosophical critique carries the potential to unhinge the complete architecture of how we think about gender, sex, and sexuality.

4 Concluding Remarks: Re-focusing the Character of Feminist Critique with Wittgenstein

When Wittgenstein writes about his own role as a critic: "It came into my head today as I was thinking about my philosophical work and saying to myself: 'I destroy, I destroy, I destroy—'" (CV, p. 21), it evokes interesting parallels to Sara Ahmed's figure of the "feminist killjoy":

> Let's take this figure of the feminist killjoy seriously. Does the feminist kill other people's joy by pointing out moments of sexism? Or does she expose the bad feelings that get hidden, displaced, or negated under public signs of joy? Does bad feeling enter the room when somebody expresses anger about things, or could anger be the moment when the bad feelings that circulate through objects get brought to the surface in a certain way? (Ahmed 2010, p. 65f.)

Beyond Ahmed's point to not shoot the messenger, what unites both Wittgenstein and feminist negative critical analyses is not only that they are undertaken with an earnest intention to reveal something correct about the reality we live in, but that they ultimately open new ways of understanding and living in this world in a thoroughly positive sense. One such example of the affirmative side of Wittgensteinian feminism can be found in Zerilli's "freedom-centered feminism" (2005, p. 65). She writes:

> As important as it is to dismantle the political pretensions of epistemology that have a way of creeping back into our thinking even after the linguistic turn, then, a freedom-centered feminism needs more than that. It needs also to affirm the transformative character of human practice in the absence of any external guarantees. […] There are no 'rules laid out to infinity,' no 'line in space' and no theory to trace it, which, if only we would follow them, lead from the oppression of the past to the liberation of the present and into the freedom of the future. […] A freedom-centered feminism, after all, is concerned not with knowing (that there are women) as such, but with doing—with transforming, world-building, beginning anew. (Zerilli 65)

For Zerilli then, Wittgenstein's critique of foundational approaches in epistemology leads to the affirmative development of a feminist politics of freedom, highlighting the possibilities and transformative potential of feminist political practice.

In a similar vein, Wittgenstein's anti-foundationalism has been taken to allow for an extension of moral theory to embrace a multiplicity of moral voices (cf. Hekman 1995), or as an urge to take the cultivation of our sensitivities as an integral part of objective moral judgment, as suggested by Crary (2000, 2007). In contrast to what has been described as the "affective turn" in recent feminist theory, Wittgensteinian feminists emphasize the way in which the affective and the cognitive come together in a broader understanding of rationality. Insofar as for affect theorists, "affect and cognition are two entirely different systems" (Zerilli 2015, p. 281), they still rely on the dualistic Cartesian picture of the relation between mind and body that they intend to destabilize. Wittgenstein, in contrast, "offers feminists no new ontology but instead brings to light the misunderstandings upon which our sense of the need for this new ontology is based" (Zerilli 2015, p. 280) and demonstrates the "radical

entanglement of affect and conceptual rationality" (Zerilli 2015, p. 282). Rather than taking the negative critique of a narrow understanding of rationality as a call to abandon the enlightenment's commitment to rationality for its being anti-feminist, Crary and Zerilli emphasize the need for positively broadening our understanding of rationality in order to not falsely underestimate the importance of our sensitivities and the affective dimension in their contribution to a rational outlook on the world.

Another example for the constructive character of Wittgensteinian feminist theory can be found in Toril Moi's interpretation of ordinary language philosophy as turning our focus back on the lived experience of women:

> Wittgenstein's criss-cross philosophy helps us to see why theory as it is practiced now prevents us from fully engaging in the feminist project of paying attention to women's experience. It frees us from unproductive discussion of 'bounded' or 'exclusionary' concepts, and enables us instead to figure out new ways of thinking seriously and systematically about the infinite variety of concrete experience. (Moi 2015: 211)

This turn to the concrete is paralleled in Sandra Laugier's reading which emphasizes how Wittgenstein's philosophical thought enables a new appreciation of "ordinary life" which has been "variously denied, undervalued, or neglected […] in theoretical thought […] inasmuch as it is domestic and female" (Laugier 2015: 217). Furthermore, the focus on the concrete experiences and the ordinary life of women also includes a different perspective on the role of our bodies, which have been similarly neglected in philosophy and problematically tied up with the depreciation of the female. As Tanesini demonstrates in her discussion of Wittgenstein's "The human body is the best picture of the human soul" (PI II: iv), his way of tackling the mind–body dualism can productively enhance feminist theories of embodiment. While Wittgenstein emphasizes that the human being *is* the human body, rather than a soul *inhabiting* a body, he also avoids falling into the materialist trap in his conception of human beings as beings with a soul, as beings with a life. (Tanesini 2004, pp. 114–121) At the same time, Wittgenstein pays meticulous attention to the fragility of the human body as well as the fragility of our missing the human: "Wittgenstein's motive […] is to put the human animal back into language and therewith back into philosophy. But he never, I think, underestimated the power of the motive to reject the human: nothing could be more human" (Cavell 1999, p. 207).

What remains important in Wittgenstein's destructive gestures, then, in my view resides mainly in the fact that it is not only "students [who] often think change comes easily" (Stickney 2014, p. 209), but also educators and educational theorists who underestimate the "complexity" (ibid.) of transforming practice. If nothing else, then what Wittgenstein can help demonstrate is why formal and legal changes in the education system, while of great significance in their own right for furthering feminist objectives, remain insufficient. It is important to incorporate lessons into the curriculum which actively engage with women's struggle for emancipation and social and political equality, classes on diverse gender roles and sexualities beyond the heteronormative matrix, and courses on what constitutes sexual harassment and why it is more than a trivial offense. But even though changing the legal

frameworks and schools' policies for gender equality is a central tool, it is not enough. Ultimately, what we have to aim at is a change of our form of life together, a change in the kind of culture which we cultivate in our educational institutions, the kind of gender norms which we practice, enact, embody, and perpetuate together in our everyday lives as teachers, students, and administrators in schools, universities, and beyond.

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Meditating with Wittgenstein: Constructing and Deconstructing the Language Games of Masculinity

Deborah Orr

Abstract Through the example of ideological masculinity, this chapter examines pain language games to reveal some of the ways in which the capacity for empathy in which they are grounded is shaped by those games. Wittgenstein and the Buddhist philosopher Nagarjuna are in philosophical agreement about the nature of the human form of life. It is argued that "the change in the way people live" that Wittgenstein calls for can be most fully achieved through the use of Mindfulness meditation practice which incorporates philosophical study. David Forbes' work with high school boys illustrates the power of this practice.

Keywords Wittgenstein · Nagarjuna · Pain language games · Empathy · Masculinity · Buddhist philosophy · Mindfulness

> I am by no means sure that I shall prefer a continuation of my work by others to a change in the way people live which would make all these questions superfluous.
>
> (CV, p. 61)[1]

1 Introduction

Wittgenstein opens *Philosophical Investigations* (PI) by interrogating the naming or referential model of language and producing a counterexample, having someone go to get five red apples, where it is the *actions* of that person that shows they

[1]Following convention, titles for Wittgenstein's works are abbreviated (PI = Philosophical Investigations, Z = Zettel, CV = Culture and Value), with section (§) or page number (p.), with full citation and initials in the References.

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M.A. Peters and J. Stickney (eds.), *A Companion to Wittgenstein on Education*,
DOI 10.1007/978-981-10-3136-6_26

understand the language. In what follows Wittgenstein explores the nature of language in the context of language games, that is "the whole, consisting of language and the actions into which it is woven" (PI §7), and thus its role in human life. He held that those "actions" are aspects of the "human forms of life," which indicates the multitude of human reactions, behaviors, tendencies, and the like which are natural to us in the sense that their possibility of expression is inherent in humans (e.g., PI §25) or they themselves occur without training or socialization (e.g., Z §540–541). These forms of life are a part of "human natural history" (PI §25), things about us "that no one has doubted, but which have escaped remark only because they are always before our eyes" (PI §415). It is out of these that language games are developed (e.g., PI §23, 25). He argues that a child learns language games through "training" in the context of these "natural" "pre-linguist" givens.

This chapter will look at language games involving learning the word "pain," in order to focus on the effects of training in shaping the child at the pre-linguistic level, before any language is acquired. One purpose of this is to show that when we look at this "pre-linguistic" ground, we will see that a child undergoes much "shaping" of this before he or she even begins to acquire this language. Further, through looking at a male child's acquisition of ideological masculinity, we will see that the pain games involved here shape him even further and specifically in ways that cause pain to himself and others.

The second purpose of this focus is to explore, in the context of the pain language of masculinity, the sort of change Wittgenstein looked to philosophical inquiry to bring about. He held that once we had a clear view of how our language games work, once we achieved "complete clarity," then "the philosophical problems should *completely* disappear. The real discovery is the one that makes me capable of stopping doing philosophy when I want to—the one that gives philosophy peace." He goes on to say, however, that, "There is not *a* philosophical method, though there are indeed methods, like different therapies" (PI §133). The issue here is that the clarity we seek in order to achieve "peace" very often does not lie in the language, the form of words themselves, but rather in the human form of life into which they are woven. By invoking "the human form of life" and "human natural history" as well as specific statements he made, it is clear that his philosophy is concerned with much more that puzzles over conceptual grammar but also with the other side; human life, in addition to language, must be addressed by philosophical therapies. Consider, for instance, "The problems arising through a misinterpretation of our form of language have the character of *depth*. They are deep disquietudes; their roots are as deep in us as the forms of our language and their significance is as great as the importance of language" (PI §110). This makes philosophy an enquiry into "the human form of life" itself, not just with words but how they fit in with, fail to fit in with or change the human form of life. Thus, it would follow that our inquiry and therapy must address not just the words but also the "form of life" into which they are woven.

This chapter is an enquiry into one part of that "depth grammar," one aspect of the human form of life having to do with the complex topic of pain and suffering (PI §664). In what follows we will look at Wittgenstein's examples of learning third

and first person pain language. We will see there that the human form of life which is crucial to this language is pre-linguistic empathy but that the acquisition of these games modifies and shapes empathy in ways with profound consequences. Michael Kaufman's "The Construction of Masculinity and the Triad of Men's Violence" (1987) will provide a useful overview of the manipulation of boys' natural expressive and reactive tendencies in the course of acculturating them to the socially mandated ideology of masculinity. We will see that this ideology demands the distortion and suppression of empathy and natural pain behavior in ways that engender violence. However, Buddhist mindfulness meditation practice, which is both grounded in and incorporates the philosophical work of Buddhist thinkers, provides an efficacious technique for addressing the lived experience of those playing the pain language games of ideological masculinity. In this, it is well suited for integration into pedagogy at all levels. Finally, the work of David Forbes with high school age boys will demonstrate that when properly used mindfulness meditation can help boys achieve a greater self-understanding and more empathic awareness of others.

2 Wittgenstein on Learning Pain Language

"The origin and the primitive form of the language game is a reaction; only from this can complicated forms develop" (CV, p. 31). In what follows the "reaction" which we will look at from which pain language games develop is empathy (Coplan and Goldie 2014; De Waal 2009; Gordon 2005). *Zettel* provides us with an example of the acquisition of the third person pain language. There we find, "it is a primitive reaction to tend, to treat, the part that hurts when someone else is in pain and not merely when oneself is—and so to pay attention to other people's pain-behaviour, as one does *not* pay attention to one's own pain behaviour" (Z §540). "But what is the word "primitive" meant to say here? Presumably that this sort of behaviour is *pre-linguistic*; that a language-game is based *on it*, that it is the prototype of a way of thinking and not the result of thought" (Z §541, italics in text). This example clearly locates the use of third person pain language in the lived relationship with the other. We can note at this point that Wittgenstein's focus is primarily on learning "a way of thinking," of using pain words to "think about" the other person's pain. But there is no mention of what else, if anything, might be involved in a child's learning this way of thinking and how that learning influences his future thinking and responses. Wittgenstein continues by saying, "My relation to the *appearance* here is part of my concept" (Z §543, my emphasis), but again we need to inquire into the ways in which the child's understanding of that "appearance" may have been or is being developed beyond the immediate, instinctive empathic response to the other.

From this example, we can see that it is our "natural" reactions to others, their behavior as it evokes our behavior, that forms a part of our language game. We "tend" and "treat" them in response to their pain behavior. In earliest childhood, this

is entirely a pre-linguistic response as the child has not learned language yet. The child simply acts in response to the expression of another. It is useful here to be reminded of the behavior of infants in a neonatal nursery as an example; when one begins to cry, most or all of the others cry well. This is not simply a response to the noise, but an example of the empathy that underlies the responsiveness to the other's expression of pain into which eventually early forms of "pain" language will be woven.

While space precludes a full development of the concept of empathy, I am using it here in the sense of an unmediated, natural responsiveness to the behavior, especially the emotional behavior, of another (see Gordon 2005: 30). The example of crying in the nursery also supports the oneness of the "identity" of a child who joins in crying with the child that cries since as a newborn it has not yet learned the separation of self and other. The empathic response is an experience of oneness with the other. With very young children moving beyond the infant stage, their responding and tending to the other takes the physical form of hugging, kissing, and the verbal form of cooing, pre-linguistic baby talk, and other sympathetic noises. That is, responsiveness and communication are physical and vocal but still pre-linguistic. Words do not play a part until later. Eventually, the child will learn to use "bad" and "hurts" and the like in the context of older others responding to him and he will learn to apply these words not only to himself but also to others expressing pain. Only much later will he use "pain." Having established a distinction between self and other and the use of words such as "I" and "you," he only then begins to think about and talk about pain, his own and that of others.

Wittgenstein's discussion in PI §244 provides an example of how a child acquires first person uses of pain language. In describing this, Wittgenstein says that "Here is one possibility: words are connected with the primitive, the natural, expressions of the sensation and used in their place. A child has hurt himself and he cries; and then adults talk to him and teach him exclamations, and, later, sentences. They teach the child new pain-behavior."

For purposes of uncovering the process of teaching and learning, here again we need to go back to the earliest period of the child's development. Typically, when an infant cries, its mother or another adult will begin by comforting him. She may pick him up, rock him, sooth him, make soft noises, talk baby talk, sing, and do what is necessary to alleviate its distress such as feeding, changing a diaper, or tending a wound. Some time later if the infant has fallen and, say, scraped its knee, the knee will be examined, perhaps wiped clean, and kissed in the process. The mother may say, "aw," "baby hurts," and the like, and eventually, the baby will also say, "baby hurts." Only considerably later, he will learn the word "pain" and later yet say to his mother, "I am in pain" and also begin to apply this language to others.

I am not claiming that every use of pain words, either in the first or third person, needs to be grounded in empathy. Both words and behavior can be simply rote or be manipulated or one may speak of pain in the abstract, but these uses are parasitic on the early learning we have been exploring. What I do want to do is both to

highlight the role of empathy in developing the ability to use the word "pain" and to stress that there is a process of socialization which comes into play and molds the child's "form of life" well before that word will be used. Prior to language acquisition pain communication is primarily through physical behavior and non-linguistic vocalization. As the child matures, and indeed throughout life, this level of communication remains important. Even for adults, the concerned gaze of the other, the touch, the communication of understanding, and caring are as important as any language, if not more so. Thus, from an early age, the experiential side of the pain language game is molded by socialization. This process is powerful and ongoing.

3 Learning Masculinity

At this point we can begin to think about the construction of masculine subjectivity and the vicissitudes of empathy in that process. Our focus remains on a middle-class child receiving "normal" childcare; children who are neglected or abused, for instance, will develop differently, but we will not discuss that here. It is important to note not only that a boy is taught "exclamations" and "sentences" which will replace his crying but also to notice the specific *content*, both linguistic and behavioral, of this teaching. This will soon go beyond comforting and teaching "ouch" and "it hurts" to being taught that "big boys don't cry," "don't be a wimp," or simply "be strong," even "man up." That is, as well as words the boy child is being taught a masculine personal identity and socially appropriate gender behavior, what it is to be a boy and then a man. The teaching of pain language will affect the specifics of the boy's experience and expression of pain, that is the appropriate ways to express or repress sensations, empathy, and emotions, and also such things as how it should be expressed or responded to in relation to specific others, e.g., depending on whether these others are boys or girls, belong to a particular socially distinguished group, and so forth. In this respect, we can see that the infant and young boy is learning both to construct his sense of self as masculine by distinguishing himself from others—he's a boy, not a girl, he's a member of a specific racial group, class, and so forth—and also that pain is something he "has" and should be able to control, "big boys don't cry." In this last respect, his pain is something that is in some sense separable from him.

In "The Construction of Masculinity and the Triad of Men's Violence" (1987), Michael Kaufman argues that masculinity is an ideological construct that serves to legitimize a wide range of forms of violence and which exacts a heavy cost in pain and suffering not only for a male's victims—other men, girls, women, the natural environment—but also for the boys and men themselves. With regard to male self-violence, he argues that "Masculinity is power. But masculinity is terrifyingly fragile because it does not really exist in the sense we are led to think it exists. … The tension between maleness and masculinity is intense because masculinity

requires a suppression of a whole range of human needs, aims, feelings, and forms of expression" (13). Masculinity is not "just natural." It is constructed out of the manipulation, and especially the suppression, of what Wittgenstein calls the natural pre- and non-linguistic experiences, including empathic experiences, that ground the acquisition of this language. This suppression is one of the forms that violence against the self takes. What must be suppressed is anything designated female and feminine or simply other such as emotional expressiveness, fear, and caring for others. To exhibit these is to open himself up humiliation, ridicule, ostracism, and even violence from other males. As Judith Butler has famously pointed out, you'll be punished if you "don't do your gender right."

Bringing together psychoanalytic and sociological perspectives, Nancy Chodorow (1978) examines the effects on children's development of gender identity of this culture's asymmetrical organization of parenting in which typically the mother provides childcare while the father works away from the home. Their early development, what Freud calls the preoedipal stage, differs significantly for boys and girls. Girls tend to remain in a closer relationship with the mother in consequence of which "Girls emerge from this period with a basis for "empathy" built into their primary definition of self in a way that boys do not" (167, quotes in text). Mothers experience their sons as "male opposites." "Boys are more likely to have been pushed out of the preoedipal relationship, and to have had to curtail their primary love and sense of empathic tie with their mother. A boy has engaged, and been required to engage, in a more emphatic individuation and a more defensive firming of experiential ego boundaries" (166–167). Typically, boys are encouraged to spend time with other boys and engage in sports and other activities which will teach them to function within a hierarchical order and on the basis of established rules rather than personal interactions. Chodorow's conclusion with regard to the consequences of this for a boy's development is that "[d]enial of a sense of connectedness and isolation of affect may be more characteristic of masculine development and may produce a more rigid and punitive superego" (169).

What the work of Kaufman and Chodorow foreground for us is the degree to which a boy's development alienates him from important aspects of the "natural, pre-linguistic form of life," his capacity for empathy, in which his earliest language games are rooted. Boys are brought up to be tough guys but that persona *is* a guise. Not too far behind the mask the capacity for empathy remains. The recovery of his capacity for empathic experience is important for the health and well-being of both the male and those around him. While ideological masculinity is still socially valorized, there is a growing awareness of its negative consequences and young men are beginning to look for alternative ways of being. The next section provides an overview of some key aspects and concepts of Buddhist mindfulness meditation which will serve as a framework for understanding the groundbreaking work of David Forbes who used mindfulness meditation to help inner-city boys understand and, when they chose to do so, change their masculine identity.

4 Becoming Mindful

The question we are now faced with is, how can we support our students in their aim to "change the way they live" such that the suffering engendered by the culturally sourced (de)formations of the "depth grammar" of their language games through their acquisition and living out of the ideology of masculinity would make "further philosophical work on these questions superfluous" (CV, p. 61)? What Wittgenstein's philosophical investigations of language games reveal to us is that they are not simply a matter of words. In rejecting the picture theory of language, he placed meaningful uses of language firmly in human lived experience, how people feel, act, interact, and so forth. For language games to change that experience must change as well. Thus for a boy or man who has been socialized into ideological masculinity to change his use of pain language, he must also change his ability to access natural empathic responses to others and to feel more fully his own painful experiences.

While a Wittgensteinian philosophical examination of language games can reveal to a young man the nature of the ideology he has assimilated and the manner in which it has shaped his being and life experience, that knowledge is not sufficient to break the deeply ingrained habits which he has been developing since early childhood. As is the case generally with habits, it often takes much more than an intellectual understanding that they are a bad thing to divest oneself of them. What is required is a technique which will also address the "human form of life," the lived experience which has been socially formed to ground the ideology of masculinity. This section proposes that mindfulness meditation, which has traditionally been grounded in education and philosophical study (Dutt 1959; Thurman 2006), and thus is well suited to integration into contemporary formal and informal education at all levels, provides an integrated treatment to cure this form of suffering.

In his groundbreaking work with high school age boys, David Forbes (2004, 2005) taught them Vipassana or Insight meditation to gain greater self-understanding and to effect the changes in themselves which they wanted to make. Before we turn to his work, it will be helpful to gain an orientation to it by looking at some of the key ideas that ground mindfulness meditation practice as described in the *Anapanasati Sutta* (Nanamoli 2009: 941–948). The practice of mindful meditation as outlined in this text is attributed to the Buddha and utilized, often with variations, across Buddhist traditions.

In order to situate this practice philosophically, we will look at some central ideas of Buddhist thought which are important to the *Anapanasati Sutta*, through the philosophical lens of second-century philosopher, Nagarjuna. Like Wittgenstein, Nagarjuna's work debunked the metaphysical uses of language by returning words to their homes in conventional discourse. He argued for *sunyata* (*sunyata*, n., *sunya*, adj.), the empty or non-essentialized, nature of the things words referred to. We saw just above with the example of the role of empathy in the acquisition of pain language that the understanding of the human form of life that emerges from Wittgenstein's work is fundamentally relational; it is the natural empathic

responsiveness to others that grounds pain language games as well as others. This understanding of relatedness, *pratitya samutpada* (dependent co-arising/interconnectedness), while broader, is fundamental to Buddhist thought as well. In addition to Nagarjuna's work, these concepts have been applied to debunk notions of a reified self or philosophical egocentrism since the sixth century in ways that also parallel Wittgenstein's work on the private language problem (Thurman 1980).

In his teaching, the Buddha disclaimed propounding anything but the Four Noble Truths. These are as follows:

(1) The diagnosis that life is suffering.
(2) The etiology of suffering is the *kleshas* or impediments. These are *avidya*, ignorance or delusion with delusions about the self being the root cause of suffering; *raga* which is attachment, greed, the things we cling to such as the deluded sense of self and the behaviors which support it; and *dvesa* with is aversion, anger, or ill will.
(3) The prognosis that suffering can be overcome.
(4) The Noble Eightfold Path which is the "medicine." The Path addresses all aspects of one's life, i.e., right view, right intention, right speech, right action, right livelihood, right effort, right mindfulness, and right concentration. Thus, the path to overcoming suffering is a holistic one.

Right view, the undeluded self-understanding which shapes one's life, cannot be achieved through philosophical investigation alone. That position would demand a separation of the cognitive from the rest of one's life that neither Nagarjuna or Wittgenstein endorsed. Right view requires addressing the first *klesha*, *avidya*, in order to achieve a clear and accurate view of one's own nature. The "root delusion" is the tendency to understand the self as a reified thing, in the case of ideological masculinity as a self separate from and in competition with others. We will return to this problem below. Right mindfulness can be achieved by following the meditation practice outlined by the Buddha, and this will assist in dropping the deluded self-understanding/*avidya* which philosophy can uncover but not expunge from all aspects of one's life. The way to dissolving this suffering in its entirety is given by the Buddha and explicated by Nagarjuna; it "occurs through meditation and wisdom" (MMK: XXIV:11). Here, wisdom/*prajna* is the understanding that can be fostered but not fully realized by intellectual work alone.

We can see by this brief introduction that the teaching of the Buddha is situated in the lived experience of the person in the here and now. This orientation is further grounded by the work of Nagarjuna in his *Mulamadhyamakakarika* or *Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way* (Garfield 1995). This work critically examines a wide range of attempts to assert forms of reification, essences, or logically simple objects. When subjected to *reductio ad absurdum* argumentation, he shows them to result in stasis and nihilism (MMK1, passim). In company with Wittgenstein whose work rejects the view that all words can function as names and "*a name ought really to signify a simple*" (PI §39, italics in text), Nagarjuna agrees

with Wittgenstein who says that "When I talk about language (words, sentences, etc.) I must speak the language of every day" (PI §120). The language of everyday, or conventional language, is both *sunya* and functional, but we often tend to "read into it" metaphysical features which, if they were there would, as Nagarjuna and Wittgenstein both show, render it nonsense.

This is of central importance for the Buddhist project of liberation from suffering for, as Nagarjuna puts it,

> Without a foundation in the conventional truth,
> The significance of the ultimate can not be taught.
> Without understanding the significance of the ultimate,
> Liberation is not achieved.
>
> (MMK XXIV: 10)

Conventional truth is nothing but the truths of everyday when everyday language is used in its undistorted form, which is understood as *sunya* or empty. As Garfield says, what it is empty of is, in Western terms, "essence" (MMK, p. 89). Rather than owing their existence to such a reified core, things exist by virtue of *pratitya samutpada*; they exist in dependent co-origination with other things. *Pratitya samutpada* is often translated in English texts as interconnectedness or in Thich Nhat Hanh's much used phrase "interbeing." Thus, Nagarjuna argues the converse that "Whatever is dependently co-arisen, That is explained to be emptiness" (MMK XXIV: 24, l. 1 & 2). The phenomenal world, the things that language is about, is both *sunya* and *pratitya samutpada* and "[t]hat" Nagarjuna continues, "being a dependent designation, Is itself the middle way" (MMK XXIV: 24, l. 3 & 4). Language itself is empty and thus nothing nonempty can be smuggled in through it.

Nagarjuna has said in MMK XXIV:10 that through understanding this, that is making it a part of one's lived experience and not simply a matter of cognitive knowledge, liberation is achieved. What this means, the only thing it can mean given that his extensive argumentation has demolished all transcendental alternatives, is that one is now free to live in the here and now as a nondeluded being, without essence but interconnected. What has changed is the *sadaka*/seeker. Nagarjuna makes his point explicit when he concludes that there is "not the slightest difference" between "nirvana [liberation] and cyclical existence [*samsara*, the realm of suffering]", and their limits [*koti*] are the same (MMK XXV: 19 & 20). It is the same world, but the person has changed.

In Chapter XVIII "Examination of Self and Entities," Nagarjuna examines the "self" in terms of the empirical psychological theory of aggregates (Garfield: 245). The aggregates are the five components into which a person is analyzed. They are the physical body or form, sensation, perception, dispositions, and consciousness or cognition (Garfield: 345). Each of the component parts of an aggregate is in turn composed of components. Thus, for instance, the body is made up of bone, muscle, blood, organs, etc. These in turn exist in dependent relation to other things, e.g., one's parents, food, and the air we breathe. In Chapter IV "Examination of Aggregates," Nagarjuna has used form or physical body as a representative case to argue that all of the aggregates are *sunya*, and now, in this chapter, he argues that

the self made up of those aggregates is also *sunya.* The thrust of this chapter is to undermine the notion of a substantial self (see Sluga 1996 regarding Wittgenstein's agreement with this position, cf. Loy 1992; Orr 2002) that "has" or possesses these aggregates. Nagarjuna's opponent asks, "If there were no self, Where would the self's (properties) be?" (MMK XVIII: 2, l. 1 & 2), and Nagarjuna immediately rejects this as what Wittgenstein would call a pseudo-problem, "From the pacification of the self and what belongs to it, One abstains from grasping onto "I" and "mine"" (MMK XVIII: 2, l. 3 & 4). To "pacify the self" means to cease to cling to the notion of a substantial self. Once this is done, one will no longer attribute one's attributes to an entity above or below the *sunya* self, the self of everyday life. They are what one *is,* not what one *has* in everyday life.

The Buddha prefaces his instructions for mindful meditation in the *Anapanasati Sutta* by saying that, "When mindfulness of breathing is cultivated, it is of great fruit and great benefit…. it fulfills the four foundations of mindfulness… [which]… fulfill the seven enlightenment factors [mindfulness, wisdom, energy, rapture, tranquility, concentration and equanimity (Nanamoli 2009: 946–947)]… [which]… fulfill true knowledge and deliverance". This is followed by instructions on how to proceed with each of the four foundations and the seven factors. I will not attempt to synopsize these instructions but will stress that this process is not one of dealing cognitively with each of these but rather simply developing a focused, sustained awareness of each of them.

After working through the first three foundations, the body, mental formations, and the mind, he then instructs on impermanence. The instruction here is to contemplate the "fading away," "cessation," "relinquishment" (946), that is, the impermanence of the other three foundations. Thus, what is being developed is not simply awareness of all aspects of the self but also of the impermanence of these, that they are *sunya*. Having established this, he then moves on to investigate the seven enlightenment factors. In concluding and in answer to the question of how these seven factors "fulfill true knowledge and deliverance?" he explains that each of them "ripens in relinquishment," that is, in letting go of the reified self. This is not an all-or-nothing process but something to be practiced and developed over time. Regarding mindfulness meditation in the *Metta Sutta,* the Buddha instructs the student to practice mindfulness, "Whether he stands, or sits, or walks, Or lies down (while yet not asleep)" (Nanamoli 1992: 180–181). Mindfulness is to be practiced throughout one's life and in all of one's activities. Thus through the achievement of awareness of the self and all things as empty and interdependent, one can act morally, with *karuna*. *Karuna* is appropriately translated into English as compassion, from the Latin *cum*, with, together, as one and *patior* to experience or undergo. This returns us to our original empathic reactions.

5 From Boyz 2 Buddhas

David Forbes' study (2005, 2002), conducted with Brooklyn inner-city high school students, provides an informative example of the use of mindfulness to begin to deconstruct these young men's masculine sense-of-self and to develop alternative

ways of being. His study sample was small; nevertheless, the wealth of detailed information he obtained in the form of feedback from the boys themselves gives useful insights into the possibilities for transformative change even over a short period of time.

To participate in the study, Forbes, who teaches school counseling, attracted young black men who were inner city, working class, and around the age of 16 who wanted to play sports "in the zone." A number of well-known sports figures have advocated meditation to develop the ability to stay focused on the game and avoid choking and so this project appealed to them. They met once a week where they were taught mindful and Metta (kindness or friendliness) meditation. Most of the boys said they also practiced before a game, although only a few said they also practiced more than once a week in addition. With its multiple pressures to exhibit hyper-masculinity, Forbes says that this is "a concentrated microcosm of the larger societal problems of conventional masculinity" (2002: 74). Forbes' goal in his work was to help the students play not just football in the zone but also "to play life in the zone" (92).

In their weekly sessions, Forbes taught the boys that meditation was not about concentrating or winning. He writes, "I told them meditation instead is about noticing what passes through their mind without judgment, letting those things go, and bringing yourself back to the present moment" (102). His teaching followed the Buddha's instruction in the *Anapanasati Sutta* to focus on the breath and simply notice any thought, feeling, or sensation that arose and "gently" return to the breath. "Be gentle with your mind. The more you are able to do this, the more the thoughts diminish, the mind calms down, and you are left in the present" (104). Besides practicing mindful meditation, Forbes and the students had both private and group discussions. These ranged from feelings around losing the game to dealing with aspects of "the male code," to racism, to relationships with girls and much more (2005: 157–158). In each case, the role that mindfulness played in their experience was foregrounded.

At the end of his study and summarizing its results, Forbes considers the question, "Did the boys become Buddhas?" "Did they reach that awareness, or enlightenment, as did the Buddha? Well, no. However, if it means, are some of the young men developing along a path to becoming more enlightened (mindful) being? The answer is yes" (163). Citing the success of this study and further theory and evidence, Forbes calls for the development of school programs that will teach students not only to be intelligent and knowledgeable but how to develop the wisdom to use that intelligence and knowledge in their daily lives.

6 Conclusion

This chapter has examined the acquisition of pain language games by males to reveal some of the ways in which those games' pre-linguistic grounding in the human form of life is shaped by and thus colors them. This is vividly exemplified by the acquisition of masculinity. We saw that Wittgenstein and the Buddhist philosopher Nagarjuna are in agreement in important respects about the human

form of life, and thus, it was argued that "the change in the way people live" that Wittgenstein called for can be most fully achieved through the use of meditation practice in conjunction with philosophical study. David Forbes' work with high school boys illustrates the power of this practice.

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Meditation on Wittgenstein and Education

Heesoon Bai

Abstract This chapter is composed of a series of writing fragments that functions as personal meditations on various themes in Wittgenstein's work as they find resonance in this author's professional and personal life: as educational philosopher, educator, and psychotherapist. These themes focus on human suffering induced by being captured in reification of discursive thoughts and propositional knowledge claims, including knowledge claims based on seeing ourselves as predominantly causality bound. In commenting on numerous passages from Wittgenstein's works, possibilities of human liberation are sought through seeing ourselves anew as beings capable of exercising human freedom and responsibility. Along the way, nuanced and critical clarifications are made about the distinction between desire and craving, and between fulfillment and satisfaction; instrumental reason serving causality-bound thinking; learning that cultivates sensibility and judgment; Wittgensteinian's pedagogy that resists objectification of students; critical importance of ethics and aesthetics to human liberation and flourishing; and interconnectedness, or unity, of philosophy, therapy, and education when seen through Wittgensteinian's lens.

Keywords Causality · Object · Proposition · Therapy · Pedagogy

1 *"To Shew the Fly the Way Out of the Fly-Bottle."* (PI §309)

My still growing and evolving interest in Wittgenstein's work started when I read the following line as an undergraduate Philosophy student in what seems like another lifetime: "What is your aim in philosophy?—To shew the fly the way out of

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M.A. Peters and J. Stickney (eds.), *A Companion to Wittgenstein on Education*,
DOI 10.1007/978-981-10-3136-6_27

the fly-bottle" (PI §309).[1] Part of my fascination with the message in this passage stemmed from my recognition at that time that I was an English as a Second Language (ESL) student learning my English while at the same time I was majoring in linguistic philosophy. It felt as though I was working hard to fly out of one fly-bottle (my mother tongue, Korean) and into another (English), as a young adult ESL learner, with a keen interest in linguistic philosophy, I could see, concretely and plainly, that language shapes how one thinks and sees the world. Korean and English have two very different grammatical structures, and for me to learn English and become a fluent speaker, I had to do great deal of re-engineering my ways of thinking and seeing, even my ways of feeling, that was laid down by my primary language, Korean. It is from this visceral struggle to make such a major shift and switch at the foundational level of my being and consciousness that I resonated immediately with Wittgenstein's metaphor of the fly-bottle.

My next point of deep appreciation of Wittgenstein's fly-liberation project was his identifying this project as the aim of philosophy. This understanding of philosophy was empowering to me as I could see, perhaps simply at first, that my personal struggle as an ESL learner might very well have a bigger implication and purpose beyond my struggle to learn a new language. I saw, increasingly, that the same effort making in shifting structures of consciousness built up by language practice could be applied to helping humanity to overcome all manners of ideological imprisonment and attendant violence. I grew up in an authoritarian culture ruled by ideological practices with a plethora of dogmas and propaganda being pumped into its "citizens" in the name of education. Spoken and printed words or texts functioned as the truth to which citizens must submit and obey, or else there would be unsavory, even hideous, consequences. For me, understanding of philosophy as a Wittgensteinian's liberation project was emancipating and compelling and made total sense. I longed to taste freedom of thought and speech. If this was what the aim of philosophy was, I wanted to become a philosopher.

As I came to read more Wittgenstein, I saw how important aesthetics and ethics were to him, which had a deep influence on me as a student of philosophy. The Wittgensteinian's liberation project was not simply a cognitive venture. It had social and moral implications. Again, coming out of a Korean society and culture of the 1970s that saw violence being enacted on its citizens, the fly-bottle metaphor with its graphic imagery conveyed to me an intense degree of suffering. When human-flies in different fly-bottles encounter each other, they become very agitated and buzz around madly. They may become suicide bomber flies! I saw, and I still do, a colossal implication of the Wittgensteinian's philosophical project for the entirety of civilization that is mired in violent ideological battles. Thus, I have given

[1]Following convention, titles for Wittgenstein's works are abbreviated (CV = Culture and Value, LC = Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Beliefs, LW1 = Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology, PI = Philosophical Investigations, TLP = Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Z = Zettel), with section (§) or page number (p.), with full citation and initials (e.g., PI) in the References.

my heart to this project; indeed, I have devoted my twenty years of teaching and writing as an educational philosopher to this project.

More recently, in the last five years, I undertook a graduate study and training in becoming a psychotherapist. Here, too, I am indebted to Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein insisted in *Philosophical Investigation*, for instance, that philosophy is more about new ways of seeing and looking at ourselves than argumentation and that this new way of seeing involved imagination. Wittgenstein also believed that this way of doing philosophy is akin to, or *is*, therapy (Heaton 2010) in that it can help us to shift out of suffering-inducing ways of seeing the world and ourselves:

> I ought to be no more than a mirror, in which my reader can see his own thinking with all its deformities so that, helped in this way, he can put it right. (CV, p. 18)

Indeed, as I learnt in my education and training to become a psychotherapist, argumentation is not conducive to changing one's position or viewpoint, let alone one's self-identity. Fighting for one's point of view, even if with impeccable logic and reasoning, tends to reify one's already entrenched viewpoint further into his or her positions and ways of being. In place of propositional argumentation that seeks to establish some truths, Wittgenstein offers different ways—most often through the usage of metaphors—of seeing and hearing (and feeling, too) that may resonate with the individual person who is seeking an exit out of a fly-bottle. It was a profoundly moving discovery for me as I was studying psychotherapy that his ways of philosophizing perfectly fits with psychotherapeutic methods and tools. I am keen to study Wittgenstein again, this time with a new therapist's eye.

As well, along the way, I became exposed to other traditions and modes of inquiry, such as Buddhist and Daoist philosophies and practices, and contemporary neuroscience and neuropsychology that, for me, intriguingly, complements and supplements my understanding of Wittgenstein. That Wittgenstein's philosophical insights were validated and corroborated by these other traditions of inquiry and thought which further enhanced my appreciation of his work and helped me see Wittgenstein's work as belonging to the wisdom tradition of world philosophies.

Writing this chapter has presented me with an opportunity to re-view and re-assess Wittgenstein's work for its contribution to education, especially with help of these influences that I refer to above on my study and practice. What I offer in this chapter are my meditation fragments on Wittgenstein's philosophy as applied to education in the process of my personal and professional journey as an educational philosopher and psychotherapist in search of wisdom.

2 *"What We Cannot Speak About We Must Pass Over in Silence."* (TLP §7)

Famously Wittgenstein (TLP) concluded his *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (henceforth, *Tractatus*) with the statement: "What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence" (§7). As it is well known, Wittgenstein's work is divided into

two phases, Early Wittgenstein and Later Wittgenstein, each one considered a major new philosophical movement. *Tractatus*, a work of the earlier phase, launched the Ideal Language movement in philosophy and was considered a foundational work for Logical Positivism. The later phase began with Wittgenstein radically criticizing his earlier work, seeing *Tractatus* as an example of what philosophy should not be. The penultimate entry in *Tractatus* presents the following Zen koan-like line:

> My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who understands me eventually recognizes them as nonsensical, when he has used them—as steps—to climb up beyond them. (He must, so to speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed up it.) (TLP §6.54)
>
> He must transcend these propositions, and then he will see the world aright. (TLP §7)

Around the time I was reading *Tractatus*, I was introduced to Zen Buddhism along with Daoist studies. I was fascinated by the parallel that I discerned between these Asian philosophies and Wittgenstein's insistence on limits of language and recommendation of silence. Zen and Daoist traditions, too, put limits on what we can say and recommend silence. Chapter One of the *Dao De Jing* (or *Tao Te Ching* in Wade–Giles system of romanization) starts with the famous line: "Tao that can be spoken is not the eternal Tao; The name that can be named is not the eternal name; The nameless is the origin of Heaven and Earth; The named is the mother of myriad things …" (Lin 2006, p. 3). Its basic message,[2] captured and repeated in so many different ways and words throughout history, is that there is far more to reality than what our human intellect, however magnificent it may be, can discursively comprehend and represent. This situation is not in and of itself a conundrum. However, the problem arises invariably when we entertain the belief that what we can represent and talk about is what reality is. This problem seems to be most exacerbated in the case of intellectuals, scholars, and ideologues whose training in persuasive argumentation with sharp logic and precise language leads them to identify what is the *case* (represented in propositional language, as Wittgenstein demonstrates in *Tractatus*) with what *is* (reality). To me, the colloquial expression of "living in one's head" captures this meaning brilliantly.

It is not just heady folks (for example, philosophers!) who are "guilty" of the confusion between what is the case and what is: by virtue of being creatures whose mind or ways of thinking/feeling/seeing is inscribed by language and integrated with embodied and unconscious habituation, we all are prone to this problem. Propositional statements that we learn to make from the earliest moments of our

[2]Derek Lin, a practicing Daoist, whose translation of Dao De Jing I quoted from, elucidates the first two lines thusly: " … we can never understand the Tao through the intellect alone. We must feel it. Talking about it can be useful but never replace the actual experience of living it. Not only is the Tao beyond the power of spoken words to describe, but it is also beyond the power of written words to define. That which can be defined is limited by the definition, and the Tao transcends all limitations." (Lin 2006, p. 2)

lives as languaged beings create the illusion for us that what we picture and project onto the world are reality. To be sure, there is an incredible power to this feat. For, with this power, we believe we can *control and predict*, which is central to the operations of the empirical-scientific worldview. As we will see later in this chapter, Wittgenstein was uncomfortable with and critical of this worldview and delivered sustained criticisms against empiricism.

Zen Buddhism, too, is about overcoming the entrapment of the discursive mind that confuses reality (territory) with pictures of reality (map). Again, the basic message of Zen and Daoist teachings may be summed up as follows: Do not take pictures of reality, all of which have been imposed on you by society, culture, family, institutions, and by your own mind, as objective truths—as reality. Reality may be far more mysterious, profound, and complex than anything that any human discursive mind, however logical, penetrating, and clear, can nail down as truths, especially as "the Truth." Dogmatism as this tendency toward seeking and wielding truths and truth, whether scientific, religious, political, technological, or economic, is arguably humans' greatest nemesis.

Returning to Wittgenstein, in light of this discussion on Zen and Dao, the sense I make of Wittgenstein's enigmatic line, "What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence" (TLP §7), is this: For Wittgenstein, metaphysics is made possible by taking the chattering discursive mind seriously, that is, literally. Akin to the Zen master's training for silence of the mind in the service of "fudoshin" (Japanese, meaning, "a still and nonreactive mind"), Wittgenstein wishes to silence the philosophical chatter, taken as profound or ultimate insight into metaphysical reality: the ultimate truths and essence of things. He wishes to put a limit on what can be clearly and sensibly articulated, thereby protecting what cannot be said but only be shown and experienced. Does this mean that whatever cannot be clearly spoken of lacks reality? Not at all. On the contrary, for Wittgenstein, if anything, reality is full on and in most consequential ways is distinguished from what can be clearly said. Wittgenstein alludes, in numerous passages in both *Tractatus* and *Philosophical Investigation*, to important matters that cannot be spoken of. *Tractatus* itself has many passages that give as much, or more, "weight to [their] mysticism as to … theory of logic" (Monk 2005, p. 24). Elsewhere (LC), Wittgenstein takes a similar position that ethics, aesthetics, and religion are matters of "showing" more than matters of saying—explaining and arguing. I will come back to this point later when I address the therapeutic dimension of Wittgenstein's work.

Now, intriguingly, as well as ironically (given Wittgenstein's reservation about and caution against science), contemporary neuroscience and neuropsychology present to us a complex picture of human consciousness and experience that in effect confirms Wittgenstein's contrast of "showing" and "saying" and the Zenists and Daoists protective reverence toward the nondiscursive.

3 *"There Are, Indeed, that Cannot Be Put into Words. They Make Themselves Manifest. They Are What Is Mystical."* (TLP §6.522)

In his 2009 publication of *The Master and his Emissary: The Divided Brain and the Making of the Western World*, psychiatrist and former Oxford literary scholar Iain McGilchrist lays out the map of left–right hemispheric lateralization in human brain. According to McGilchrist (2009), the left hemisphere specializes in naming, sorting, counting, rearranging, and organizing discrete bits and pieces of information, and this function is particularly useful for manipulating and controlling the world around us and within us. The world seen through the left brain is atomistic, reductionist, quantifiable, reason and logic dominated, precise, and articulate; our primary mode of relationship to such universe is utilitarian or instrumentalist, supporting functions of manipulating and controlling. Science and technology seem to majorly rely on the left-brain function.

The right brain, in contrast, specializes in seeing the world intuitively and feelingly, in wholeness and dynamic relationality or patterns, in metaphorical connections and infinitely changing shades of qualities. The poetic, the aesthetic, the mystical, and the ethical, all depend majorly on the domain of the right-brain functionality. The world of the Cartesian clear and distinct ideas is the work of the left brain. The left brain commands the explicit, while the right brain supports the implicit and the inexpressible. Two different brains in one skull: their integration of would contribute to greater balance and health to humanity.

In light of the above characterization of hemispheric lateralization, albeit simplified for our purpose here, we may say, with some justification, that Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* is a work that spells out what the world would look like seen mostly through the left-brain linguistic function. Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* is, I would argue, a rigorous demonstration of the left-brain function. And Wittgenstein's genius lies in showing the vast shadowy region of the inarticulate and implicit surrounding the small region of the articulate and explicit by brightly illuminating and sharply focusing the latter. It is by contrast that we come into awareness of things.

The Vienna Circle, a group that sought the scientific and mathematical foundation of philosophy and led the philosophical movement called Logical Positivism was greatly influenced by Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* and made repeated invitations to Wittgenstein to join their circle. When Wittgenstein finally showed up, apparently he sat facing away from the group, reading Tagore's poetry, and after over an hour, he got up and left the room in silence (Shields 2016, Wittgenstein on Silence section, para. 10). This story demonstrates not only Wittgenstein's injunction in *Tractatus* to be silent about what cannot be said, but also Wittgenstein's positive exemplification of poetry taking us directly to the domain of experience that lies outside the limits of propositional language: "There are, indeed, that cannot be put into words. They make themselves manifest. They are what is mystical" (TLP §6.522). This ineffability thesis is further elaborated in Zettel:

> If a theme, a phrase, suddenly means something to you, you don't have to be able to explain it. Just this gesture has been made accessible to you. (§158)

> The way music speaks. Do not forget that a poem, even though it is composed in the language of information, is not used in the language-game of giving information. (§160)

4 *Our Civilization Is Characterized by the Word "Progress"*

Why does experiencing the mystical—what lies outside propositional knowledge– matter to us as educators and as educational philosophers? Implications are profound and multilayered, as I shall endeavor to show.

Inasmuch as the logical positivists of Vienna circle wanted to make Wittgenstein their patron saint, so to speak, Wittgenstein did not wish to join their club and partake in the modernist mission of making the world a better place through natural science and logic. This is not dismissal of science and logic. Rather, I would say, science and logic have their rightful and useful place in the world but their domination over, and marginalization of, other domains of human concern and practice, such as ethics, aesthetics, and the mystical has not served humanity well. Today's world has been seeing ample consequences of hegemony of science and technology and attendant marginalization of the "unsayable" in education. We have been worshipping the modernist idol of material progress through objectification and conquest of nature: "Our civilization is characterized by the word 'progress'" (Wittgenstein as quoted in Monk 2005, p. 96). Behind the march of progress has been hubris that we can name, measure, control, and exploit anything to our ends. Instrumentalist knowing, which Taylor (1991, p. 5) names it as "instrumental reason," holds supreme in today's education. Wittgenstein was deeply concerned about and opposed to such worship, characteristic of our age.

Wittgenstein holds a vision of a different world: a world in which works of art, poetry, and music teach us, not in the form of imparting to us generalizable propositions or "truths" about the world, but in the form of showing and sharing fresh impressions and possibilities, and making new connections, therefore new "pictures" of the world and of ourselves. These new pictures are not fruits of explanation, argumentation, and discussion.

In taking Wittgenstein's vision of a different world seriously, we are not to condemn or avoid science or rational discourse. Rather, Wittgensteinian protest is against hegemony of science (let's call it scientism) and our tendency to see the world solely or primarily through the lens of empiricistic causality. Science has its place in human endeavor but worship of science as the discoverer and arbiter of truths that the dominant culture engages in, and has spurred on other disciplines, including philosophy, to emulate scientific methods and has been marginalizing forms of understanding that arts, music, poetry, ethics, and religion can generate and that I believe are vital to human flourishing. As Wittgenstein noted: "People nowadays think that scientists exist to instruct them, poets, musicians, etc. to give them pleasure. The idea *that these have something to teach them*—that does not occur to them" (CV, p. 36e).

In my twenty years of teaching teachers in the Faculty of Education at my university, I have had numerous conversations about increasing marginalization of arts and poetry, and other humanities related subjects in K-12. In addition, in teaching undergraduate students who are taking my educational philosophy courses, I have heard it repeated countless times how their parents want them to become doctors, lawyers, engineers, scientists, technicians, or, failing that, accountants. To that end, they must study science and math. It has been drilled into them time and time again that studying humanities and arts does not make them competitive enough in the survival game of life.

Yet, most of these young people I teach are deeply concerned about the state of the world and the very viability of the planet. And they rightly suspect, however inarticulately at first (and I attempt to help them articulate this in my Philosophy of Education courses), that the empiricist worldviews and their progress agenda of materialistic control and gains through science and technology go hand in hand with environmental deterioration and erosion of human community (McMurtry 2013). They come to articulate, for instance, that conspicuous consumption behind consumerism driven by capitalism is a serious survival threat to all Earth communities (Wackernagel and Rees 1996), which includes human communities, and current mental health issues of all kinds are part and parcel of the modern West's social agenda of progress and development (Sacks 1992; Alexander 2008) and the progressive destruction of bonds between people, bonds that are substantial and meaningful.

A genius is typically ahead of his/her time. He sees the shape of the future to come. Wittgenstein anticipated a civilization defined by the empiricist worldview (scientism) and its materialistic progress agenda. To me, his greatest genius was to offer, through analysis of everyday language, a way to break through the empiricist delusions about ourselves. And delusions are not cured by more and better knowledge, or by medication, for that matter. This takes me to talk about Wittgenstein and therapy. My recent studies in psychotherapy that has earned me a qualification to practice psychotherapy have motivated me to explore more what Wittgenstein had to say about psychology and what new light can be shed on his work in this regard from contemporary psychotherapeutic studies.

5 *"'Joy' Designates Nothing at All. Neither Any Inward nor Any Outward Thing."* (Zettel §487)

Wittgenstein and Freud were contemporaneous and lived in Vienna. In fact, the former was familiar with most of Freud's works (see LC: 41–52: "Conversations on Freud"), and even called himself "a disciple of Freud" (Monk, p. 74) but in an ironical sense: Wittgenstein was no follower of Freud. In fact, he was a formidable critic. Freud thought of his work as a new *science* of psychology. Behind the edifice of Freud's work is fundamentally an empiricist worldview that included a

mechanistic image of human being (Heaton 2010). Central to empiricism as a worldview is the notion of causality. For example, a moving billiard ball causes another ball to change its direction when they collide. However complex their interactions might be, objects behave with predictability. Freud postulated drives, instincts, and other impulses as causal apparatus imbedded and operative in human beings and saw these to be involved in and responsible for various psychological disorders just as, according to the germ theory of disease, germs are responsible for infectious diseases. It is the job of the physician to identify the causative germs and eliminate them from the body to restore health. Similarly, it would be the job of the psychoanalyst, according to this view of psychology as science, to identify the malfunctioning psychological factors and eliminate them to restore mental health.

Freud's conception of human beings is fundamentally an empiricist view, and therefore reductive; that is, *seeing* human beings *as* objects and machinery, however complex their mechanisms may be. Note here the Wittgensteinian "aspect seeing" (Wittgenstein 1958, pp. 193e–197e) in operation. Empiricism, too, along with all other theories, is a product of human imagination and conceptualization—*a way of seeing* that has a particular use and human consequences. Empiricism is not innocent of worldview construction, despite the opposite impression it may give about the nature of its knowledge claims. Perhaps to put it in stronger terms, empiricism is, along with all other ism's, a metaphysical ("beyond the physical") picture of the world.

Once rendered as objects, human beings become measurable in terms of what makes them move and behave. And they are, by the same token, predictable in their behavior. Wittgenstein is at pains to show that we have been held captive to this mechanistic picture of humanity: "A *picture* held us captive. And we couldn't get outside it, for it lay in our language and language seemed to repeat it to us inexorably" (PI §115). Yet, this picture does not cohere with our experience, does it?

> 'I feel great joy' – Where? – that sounds like nonsense. And yet one does say 'I feel a joyful agitation in my breast'. – But why is joy not localized? Is it because it is distributed over the whole body? Even where the feeling that arouses joy is localized, joy is not: if for example we rejoice in the smell of a flower. – joy is manifested in facial expression, in behaviour. (But we do not say that we are joyful in our faces.) (Z §486)

By introducing and framing this seemingly absurd language-game of joy locating, Wittgenstein is elucidating an aspect of human experience that does not fit the causality model. It seems to me that much of human experience is not the way the modern empiricist, scientific viewpoint depicts. To emphasize, the latter is committed to seeing human beings as empirical objects that can be located, quantified, measured, manipulated, and ultimately controlled. To thus objectify humanity, a process of objectification and reductionism needs to be applied whereby humans are seen as, for instance, information processor, brain circuitry, biochemical factory, or what have you; that is, as "things."

Arguably, there are aspects of ourselves that are like "things" among other things in the world. For example, our body can be measured in height and weight. But to think that we are nothing but, or predominantly, measureable objects, even if in most minute details of complex biochemistry and neuronal signaling network, is to leave out the primary phenomenology of humanity—as subjects. And I emphasize "*the primary*" here, for herein lies the purview of human freedom. Without the latter, indeed, we are nothing but robots, however sophisticated. And we may see ourselves as and act like a robot, subject to the laws of causality. This tolls the bell for the end of human freedom.

Freud's psychoanalysis is premised upon the view of humanity as causality-bound objects (LC, pp. 41–52). Freud's drive theory imputes mechanisms of the unconscious in which there are mental objects deeply hidden but with expert help, such as Freudian psychoanalysts, we can get at them and eliminate them. The trouble with this view is that if we believed it, then we are led to think of ourselves in terms of causality and to accept consequences of doing just that—that of seeing ourselves as without fundamental freedom:

> The insidious thing about the causal point of view is that it leads us to say: "Of course, it had to happen like that." Whereas we ought to think: it may have happened *like that* – and also in many other ways." (CV, p. 37e)

We often hear ourselves saying things like: "He made me very angry," "I had to have just one more smoke," "I hit him because he provoked me," "All these exams are stressing me out" (I was hearing this from my undergraduate students throughout the semester). In all these instances, the speaker imputes a causal relationship of one thing/event inevitably leading to another, and she sees herself as being moved by this force of causality, like a puppet attached to strings manipulated by a puppeteer. The puppeteer could be a parent, teacher, politician, God or god, nation, belief system, dogma, marketing agencies, and so on. Endless choices compete for one's attention and whatever is attached to it: in this consumer culture, whoever wins your attention gets into your purse.

When one's freedom of choice comes down to choosing amongst different brands of toothpaste, for example, fundamental human freedom is lost. This is not freedom but compulsion led by the delusion that there is a direct causal relationship between desire and fulfillment. The toothpaste advertisement may first latch onto an individual's longing for intimate relationships, and then suggests that there is a way to fulfill this longing, namely buying a particular brand of toothpaste. A person who, like everyone else in this culture, is inducted into the causality mode of thinking will be susceptible to this spurious reasoning and succumb to the appeal. But since such reasoning is erroneous, that is, confusing cause and reason (Heaton 2010) to begin with, one ends up chasing after one brand after another, while vastly enriching the toothpaste company's bank account and at the same time polluting and depleting the earth. No, the relationship between one's desire for intimate relationship and its fulfillment is not a causal relationship.

Wittgenstein is at pains to show this. Consider the following elucidation: "Saying 'I should like an apple' does not mean: I believe an apple will quell my

feeling of nonsatisfaction" (PI §440). The relationship between my longing and fulfillment is not causal but "an internal one" (Heaton 2010, p. 202). Heaton goes on to explain:

> Freud's account of desire, however, is an account of craving. He subsumes the many faces of desire under one theory. When we crave we are seeking the experience of satisfaction and so an external relation will do – a bit of pleasure, a drug, an interpretation or a theory. We may become satisfied, perhaps self-satisfied … But we are not fulfilled! A person who craves has an instrumental relation to pleasure but is unable to express their desires. Both Freud's and [Melanie] Klein's accounts of desire fails to differentiate between cravings, which are mental states – they have genuine duration and are experiences – from desires and wishes which are not. (p. 202)

The above distinction between desire and cravings is extremely important in the context of the present civilization that is experiencing globalization of addiction (Alexander 2008). Graphically put, the present humanity is like the Buddhist icon of Hungry ghosts with a needle-like aperture for mouth and bloated belly that is insatiably thirsty and hungering but unable to feel fulfilled despite consuming everything in sight.

How do we end (compulsive) cravings and instead experience (freedom of) desire? How does one overcome addiction? These are, as I will discuss in the next section, most important questions that educators face today.

6 *"From Time to Time He Gives Him the Right Tip.—This Is What 'Learning' and 'Teaching' Are like There.—What One Acquires Is not a Technique; One Learns Correct Judgments."* (PI, p. 227e)

Freud did not set out to destroy humanity. On the contrary, he set out to save individuals from their afflictions. Yet, there is something of a Faustian bargain at work here. For suffering individuals to receive help and be cured, they first have to be objectified: to be seen as, and come to see themselves, as mechanisms with malfunctioning parts that need precision repair by experts like psychoanalysts. We may see a parallel process taking place in the arena of education. We objectify our students as "learning machines" lacking knowledge and information, and therefore in need of being externally filled up by experts such as teachers and instructors. Contemporary pedagogical practices that I observe around me seem to be a valiant attempt to move away from this heteronomous notion, which is laudable. Still, we have some distance to go before Wittgensteinian pedagogy can be established. Objectification of individuals as a mass phenomenon is part and parcel of the historical process in the last two hundred years that began with industrialization in the West. It is fair to say, I suggest, that Freud's work is part of this historical process of industrialization and modernization of humanity. It is against this enormous tide that Wittgenstein launched his philosophical campaign against empiricism and scientism.

Consumerism of today that is turning the planet into consumable goods and, at the same time, a waste dumpster at the end of the production–consumption cycle could not have been possible without the great transformation (Polanyi 2001) that objectified human beings and reduced them to empirical objects functioning principally on the materialist plane governed by causality. For, it is through this process that human beings see themselves as having (nothing but) causal relationships with the world in which one object causes another object to move and change. Our everyday speech is peppered with statements such as these, as I mentioned above: "He made me angry," "She made me do it," "I made him mad," and so on. In human interactions, this pattern of seeing and thinking testifies to "objectification" of ourselves: turning ourselves into objects upon which another object acts to cause things to happen and vice versa. Wittgenstein's philosophizing targets, with his analysis of the way we use our language, this phenomenology of objectification and attendant confusion of the conceptual and the empirical, reason and cause.

How do we learn to unlearn objectification? How do we dig ourselves out of the deeply ingrained habit of thinking of A causing B to happen in the context of human action and interaction. I am not here suggesting that we do not do causal thinking at all, which would be like suggesting that we do not study empirical science. Causal thinking rightly belongs to empirical science, but it is not the right form of understanding when we apply it to human beings in their interaction with self and each other. This is where Wittgenstein's validation of the way we become experienced in and good at subtle and nuanced judgment as in arts and craftsmanship. Wittgenstein (PI) asks, "Ask yourself: How does a man learn to get a 'nose' for something? And how can this nose be used?" (p. 228e). He is referring to a long process of learning to trust one's senses and their judgment as in, for instance, becoming a wine connoisseur or a perfumer. This process of learning also applies to "reading people" and getting to know them—the kind of learning in which I have been immersing during my psychotherapy practicum. For this kind of learning to advance, propositional learning must give way to attuned observation whereby what is observed is taken into one's sensing and feeling body. One must learn to *feel* "subtleties of glance, of gesture, of tone" (p. 228e), and I would add, learn to be aware of this form of knowing in the body. I would further add Yalom's advice (2005, pp. 141–142) that transformation requires experience and subsequent reflection.

My psychotherapy practicum was supervised by a psychotherapist and clinical supervisor, Dr. Chris Shelley, who was a former concert violist. The model of learning I was engaged in is apprenticeship. Indeed, my learning took the form of exactly how Wittgenstein (1958) describes: "From time to time he gives him the right tip. –This is what 'learning' and 'teaching' are like there. –What one acquires is not a technique; one learns correct judgments" (p. 227). In listening together with my practicum supervisor the recorded counseling sessions with my clients, my supervisor would often ask me, "What did you hear?" "Did you hear that …?" "What is Heesoon feeling in hearing that tone … those words …?" "What emotions and images come up for you?" and so on. I was learning to grow my "organs of perception" (Robbins 2005) to use the most marvelous Goethean phrase.

Our usual schooling experience lacks Wittgensteinian pedagogy and methodology. The results can be disheartening, as I experienced it this semester in teaching undergraduate students. Our students want to know what will be on the exam, what they have to do to get a good grade, how many marks they will lose if they do not meet the word-limit for their paper, what style of formatting I want, even, what topics they should write about, and so on. I appealed to them that I was interested in their own thoughts and feelings, that writing is not just about summarizing what the authors write and just conveying the ideas of authorities, and that through the process of writing, they could cultivate their sensibilities and ways of seeing and sensing, what Wittgenstein calls "judgment":

> On the basis of my knowledge of his character I could state reliably that he will react in such and such a way in this situation; and it would also be possible that others can rely on my judgment without however being able to demand of me that I support my judgment with verifiable description. (LW1, p. 61e)

My appeal was often met by looks of incomprehension and disbelief at the beginning. My curriculum throughout the 13-week semester then became a sustained effort in shifting their externally driven objectified mode of thinking, perception, motivation, and interaction to attending to their own thinking, seeing, sensing, and discernment. Invitations such as this tend to provoke anxiety and insecurity, if not dismay. When they indeed dip into their own thoughts and feelings, what do they often find? They face a torrent of incongruous thoughts and uncomfortable feelings and perceptions that seem to run amok. It is as though these students have been kept so busy all their lives in working in the factories (e.g., schools) producing products (e.g., grades) that others (parents, teachers, the culture) want that they did not have enough time to spend at home—with themselves, becoming intimate with their thoughts and feelings, dreams and longings, with their words and voices, and so on. Through this process of becoming intimate, one comes to experience boundlessness of human freedom beyond causality. Fulfillment is the manifestation of this freedom and is not the same as satisfaction.

7 Education as Therapy and Therapy as Education: Concluding Meditation

My interest in education and therapy is enriched by the Wittgensteinian vision: liberation of human consciousness from the fly-bottle. Education that undermines fundamental human freedom through subscribing to the empiricist view of humanity traps ordinary folks in the fly-bottle, and when they suffocate and suffer badly, some of them seek out counseling and psychotherapy. Characteristically, when they come to see therapists, they present their objectified problem (e.g., anxiety) and want the problem to be eliminated, as if anxiety is a "thing" that got lodged in their mind by an external force. I explain to my clients that anxiety, like all emotions they experience, is a now integral part of who they have become, and

they cannot just get rid of anxiety anymore than they can just get rid of the color of their eyes or their skin. Instead of getting rid of their problem, I invite them to re-search their own being—their thinking, feeling, sensing, perceiving, and voicing—intimately.

In saying the above, I am struck by the resonance that I feel in reading Wittgenstein's analogy of ordinary language as "an ancient city: a maze of little streets and squares, of old and new houses, and of houses with additions from various periods; and this surrounded by a multitude of new boroughs with straight streets and uniform houses" (PI §18). It is in intimately exploring their experience and who they have become that people gain better understanding of their delusions as well as possibilities, and they come to work on themselves.

My role in therapy is essentially playing the Wittgensteinian pedagogue, giving the "right tip," here and there, and always encouraging and creating a safe holding space, like the "temple" that Wittgenstein speaks of (CV, p. 2), within which the tricky, and most often very painful, self-work of perspicacious understanding and resonant interpretation can take place. In this regard, therapy is no different from philosophy in the way Wittgenstein conceives of the latter:

> Working in philosophy – like work in architecture in many respects – is really more a working on oneself. On one's own interpretation. On one's way of seeing things. (And what one expects from them.) (CV, p. 16)

Philosophy and therapy in the tradition of Wittgenstein are exacting, and at times excruciating work. As a philosopher–pedagogue and therapist, I strive to provide a safe, secure, encouraging, and nonreactive environment for my students and clients, within which the suffering other can come to reconstitute herself. Creating such environment, whether for therapy purpose or for education purpose, however, has everything to do with my development as a human being who is in the process of increasingly freeing herself from the fly-bottle of all manners. That is, the therapist's very presence is the environment. And this is why I engage in contemplative practices (e.g., the Four Immeasurable practices of loving-kindness, compassion, empathic joy, and equanimity, along with mindfulness meditation) whose ultimate aim is human liberation, also known as enlightenment. I am curious whether Wittgenstein perhaps came in contact with Buddhist or Daoist philosophies and was perhaps exposed to insight or mindfulness meditation: "My ideal is a certain coolness, a temple providing a setting for the passions without meddling with them" (CV, p. 2).

Acknowledgments My sincere gratitude goes to Jeffrey Stickney, Co-editor of this volume, who has been infinitely patient with me as I struggled this spring with my overwhelming work. I am also indebted to him for his invaluable help with Wittgenstein scholarship.

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Part IV
Training, Learning and Education

Wittgenstein, Learning and the Expressive Formation of Emotions

Steinar Bøyum

Abstract The topic of this chapter is Wittgenstein's view on the learning of emotional concepts. The concept of learning, however, covers a motley of processes, and we should resist the impulse to force them all into a single mold or two. Hence, the modest aim here is to explore only some of the characteristic ways in which we learn emotions. It is not meant to be complete, nor to provide much depth or detail, but seeks to introduce at least some of the elements in a perspicuous representation of the logical grammar of emotion learning. On many readings of Wittgenstein, his philosophy has most to teach us about practical learning, since he is centrally concerned with knowing-how, tacit knowledge, and practical mastery. Here, however, we emphasize Wittgenstein's comparison between learning how to recognize emotional patterns and learning how to distinguish styles of music. The leading idea will be that the education of the self is constituted by an interplay between taking a first person perspective and a third person perspective on oneself.

Keywords Wittgenstein · Learning · Emotion · Expression · First person authority

A shorter version appears in the Wittgenstein section of the *Encyclopedia of Educational Philosophy and Theory* (Springer, 2016), co-edited by Nicholas Burbules & Jeff Stickney (Michael A. Peters, Chief Editor).

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M.A. Peters and J. Stickney (eds.), *A Companion to Wittgenstein on Education*,
DOI 10.1007/978-981-10-3136-6_28

1 Introduction

For Wittgenstein, attending to how words are taught and learned serves as an antidote to philosophical misconceptions (LC I, §5).[1] Exploring the learning of psychological concepts may therefore be a way to break the hold that certain pictures of psychological states have on us. Yet learning denotes a very diverse set of phenomena. In his work on the foundations of mathematics, Wittgenstein talks about the *motley* of mathematics (RFM III, §48). Likewise, the concept of learning covers a motley of processes, and we should resist the impulse to force them all into a single mold or two. The aim of this chapter is accordingly to explore some of the characteristic ways in which we learn emotions. It is not meant to be complete, nor to provide much depth or detail, but aims to introduce at least some of the elements in a "perspicuous representation" of the logical grammar of emotion learning (PI §122).[2]

In one of his earliest essays, Stanley Cavell asks us to imagine that we come across the word "umiak" in a book (Cavell 1976). When we look up the word and read about this type of Inuit boat, will we then have learned what the word "umiak" *means* or what an umiak *is*? The answer, Cavell claims, is both, and he takes this as indicative of language learning in general. When we learn a first language, we acquire both a language and a world. Now there may be cases where we can distinguish clearly between learning the word for something and learning about that thing, but regarding emotional concepts Cavell's point seems pertinent. In our first years, and arguably even later, there is no sharp distinction between learning the meaning of "anger" and learning what anger is, and no sharp distinction between learning the concept of sadness and learning about sadness. We are learning emotions, and there is an important sense in which that learning never stops.

2 Expressions and Reports

We shall start by sketching some of the main lines in Wittgenstein's philosophy of psychology. A good place to begin is the so-called asymmetry between first and third person statements about mental states. This asymmetry has two aspects. First, I am the authority on my thoughts, feelings, and emotions. If you want to know

[1]Following convention, titles for Wittgenstein's works are abbreviated (BB = The Blue and Brown Books, LC = Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Beliefs, LFM = Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics, LW1 = Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology, Volume 1, LW2 = Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology, Volume II, PI = Philosophical Investigations, RFM = Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, RPP = Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, Z = Zettel), with section (§) or page number (p.), with full citation and initials (e.g., BB) in the References.

[2]Wittgenstein's term is "Gemütsbewegungen," which is not the same as but still quite close to "emotions," and he includes in this category both typical emotions like joy, sadness, sorrow, grief, anger, fear, and love, and less typical ones like surprise, admiration, and hope (Schulte 2009).

what I think or feel, then I am the one to ask (Finkelstein 2003). You may also ask someone who knows me well, but the validity of that person's judgments will ordinarily be conditional on my acceptance of them. Others may be mistaken about my thoughts and feelings, but I am normally not, although I may be insincere. And if I am mistaken, I am never "simply" mistaken, since being wrong about myself has a very different meaning than when others are wrong about me, and will typically involve matters of repression, self-deception, and possibly even mental illness.

Secondly, I do not usually need to back up my claims about what I think and feel with behavioral evidence (Z §472). When someone says that she is angry, we might very well ask why, but not how she knows. We take her on her word, whereas others may be asked to justify their judgments about her mental states by reference to her words, body, and actions. In special cases we may think she is wrong, but if so we have to adduce quite strong evidence, and even then her sincere avowal may cancel out the evidence. This even prompted Wittgenstein to deny that a person could be said to *know* that she is in a certain mental state, and thus apparently to deny that one's self-relation is an epistemic one (PI §246). As we shall see, though, it is doubtful that Wittgenstein intended this as a general thesis, and even more doubtful that it applies to emotions, although it is certainly true that in many contexts it would be queer to say "I *know* I am angry."

This asymmetry is deeply ingrained in our lives, and taken for granted by most people as an absolutely incontrovertible feature of the world. Yet when we are in a certain philosophical frame of mind, it might seem puzzling. How can we be said to know something simply on the basis of our saying so, without citing any evidence and sometimes even against the evidence? I do not know anything about my brain, but even when I am in an fMRI-machine I am the one to ask about what I feel and think, not the neuroscientist. And even though my wife seems to attend more carefully to my behavior than what my distracted self does, I still get to have the final say on what I feel and think. Why?

There is a natural explanation of first person authority that many philosophical accounts build on. According to what Finkelstein (2003) calls *detectivism*, I have direct knowledge of my thoughts and feelings because I, unlike others, am able to *detect* them. Analogous to our perception of the outer world, we perceive our own inner world and report on what we "see" there (contemporary versions may speak of scanning or monitoring instead of seeing). Other people do not enjoy this special access to my inner states, and therefore, they have to deduce them from more or less unreliable behavioral clues. This kind of view is a prominent target of Wittgenstein's criticism in his remarks on psychology, where he suggests that many philosophical problems about first person ascriptions of mental states can be dissolved by seeing them as expressions rather than reports.

> Psychological verbs characterized by the fact that the third person of the present is to be verified by observation, the first person not.
> Sentences in the third person of the present: information. In the first person present: expression. (Not quite right.)
> The first person of the present akin to an expression. (Z §472)

Wittgenstein's target here is just as much a view of the body as a view of the mind. It is not only the picture of the inner world that creates problems, but also the corresponding picture of the body as a mere body, according to which bodily expressions are really only physical movements, devoid of significance and in need of interpretation to invest them with meaning. Against this, Wittgenstein maintains that there is a literal sense in which we make emotions visible or audible by expressing them. When we talk about *seeing* what other people feel, this should not be dismissed as merely a metaphor for interpretation. Indeed, a child that had to learn how to interpret these expressions with the help of rules like, "If people cry, they are sad," would be missing something.

> "We see emotion."—As opposed to what?—We do not see facial contortions and make inferences from them (like a doctor framing a diagnosis) to joy, grief, boredom. We describe a face immediately as sad, radiant, bored, even when we are unable to give any other description of the features.—Grief, one would like to say, is personified in the face. This belongs to the concept of emotion. (Z §225)

Some have found this expressivism overly crude (Wright 1998). To note just one problem, if saying "I am afraid" is just like making a fearful facial expression, then that sentence cannot be truth-evaluable, since a face cannot be true or false. But if you say I am angry, and I say I am not, then it seems as though we contradict each other, that we disagree, which is only possible if the first person avowal is true or false.

However, Wittgenstein's "expressivism" should not be understood as a general theory, but rather as an illuminating analogy. If we are puzzled about first person authority, bodily expression can function as a helpful comparison. Seen in that light, it should be no more puzzling that I am the best one to ask than that my face is the best one to look at if you want to know how I feel (Finkelstein 2003, p. 101). After all, you wouldn't look at my wife's face instead of mine to know how I feel, although I admit that it might give you a clue sometimes. Likewise, if we are mystified by the fact that we do not normally need evidence for our claims about how we feel, it may help to note that neither do we need evidence for our smiling or crying.

Since Wittgenstein's view is that psychological self-ascriptions are *akin* to expressions, there may be differences, too. That they are like expressions in some respects does not mean that they cannot be more like assertions or reports in other respects. Unlike a smile, for instance, an avowal can be said to be true or false, as Finkelstein (2003) emphasizes. Still, "true" and "false" come with different logical grammars when they are used about first person expressions than when they are used about, say, claims about physical objects. The first kind is connected to matters of sincerity, deception, and self-deception in a way that the latter is not. And as we know from Wittgenstein's biography, the struggle for honesty is not a simple matter of scanning, monitoring, or detecting your inner state (Monk 1990).

That Wittgenstein's expressivism should not be taken as a general theory is also shown by his emphasis that self-ascriptions of psychological concepts are not always used expressively. Sometimes they are indeed used more like reports or

descriptions. For instance, Wittgenstein lists a number of different ways in which "I am afraid" might be used. It can be like a cry of fear, a confession, an observation, and so on (PI II, pp. 188–189). In some of these cases, it is as though one takes a third person perspective on oneself: observing one's behavior, trying to understand it, and perhaps even become surprised by it ("Hmm … I seem to be angry about something"). Usually, the context will tell how it is used, and quite often the tone of voice will be decisive. Wittgenstein also notes that there is a continuum between, on the one hand, applications that are analogous to cries and where first person authority is clearest, and, on the other hand, applications that are like reports or descriptions, where first person authority is much weaker, such as self-observations made in the psychotherapist's office. And in some cases it might not be clear at all where on the continuum a particular utterance falls.

3 Natural Expression

Wittgenstein's view of first person ascriptions of mental states is closely connected to his suggestion that psychological words are learned as replacements for natural expressions:

> Here is one possibility: words are connected with the primitive, the natural, expressions of the sensation and used in their place. A child has hurt himself and he cries; and then adults talk to him and teach him exclamations and, later, sentences. They teach the child new pain-behaviour. "So you are saying that the word 'pain' really means crying?" – On the contrary: the verbal expression of pain replaces crying and does not describe it. (PI §244)

Wittgenstein's remark is on pain, but it seems reasonable to extend it to at least some emotions. Certainly, learning emotions involves being taught to use words instead of reacting "primitively": to say that one is angry instead of raging, or to go from screaming to crying to speaking. There is here both a gradual calming (or disciplining) of bodily expressions and a partial replacement of those expressions with words. This partial replacement allows for both reflection on and refinement of emotions: reflection, in the sense that language enables the child to think and talk about emotions, and refinement, in the sense that the child's space of expression becomes infinitely more nuanced and complex with language. Hence, learning emotions also involves coming to have *new* emotions.

Note that these natural expressions include both the expressions of one's own feelings and one's reactions to the expressions of others (Z §540). Indeed, these tend to go together: We react immediately to the natural expressions of others. We should also distinguish between natural and symbolic expressions, although they are related. Quite often, natural expressions turn into symbolic expressions that are used by adults to teach children emotion words. With a marked frown and a stern voice you ask the raging child, "Are you angry?", in a partial imitation that in addition to words involves an attenuation of the child's own expression. In this way, words come to be used first along with and later instead of natural expressions.

Many have been critical to this picture of learning, both as an account of learning and for its association with a crude expressivism that many take exception to. Let us mention two problems. First, it does not seem to be valid for all mental states, not even all emotions. More complex emotions, like guilt, do not even have natural expressions in the same sense as more elementary emotions like anger or sadness. They may have characteristic expressions, like a "guilty look," but these are more symbols of guilt than they are natural expressions of it. And in general there seems to be a far greater number and variety of mental states than there are natural expressions (Rembert 1975). Secondly, it only seems capable of accounting for the present tense of first person ascriptions of psychological concepts. However, as Harris (2010) notes in a criticism of Wittgenstein from a child psychologist's perspective, from very early on children talk frequently about future and past emotions, as well as the emotions of others, in contexts separated from the natural expressions of these emotions.

Hence, the replacement-thesis looks incomplete and without empirical support. The question is what kind of thesis it is, and whether it is a thesis at all. After all, Wittgenstein introduces it by calling it a mere possibility. In a similar discussion of language learning, Wittgenstein asks, "Am I doing child psychology?", and he answers, "I am making a connexion between the concept of teaching and the concept of meaning" (Z §412). Hence, Wittgenstein's account is primarily of "what might be termed a logical order: an indication of the circumstances in which we would be prepared to say that someone has learnt verbal expressions of pain" (Hertzberg 2014). The point of words like "natural" and "primitive" is not that these expressions are inborn or genetic, but rather that our language game of sensations and emotions is based on them (Z §541). That emotions like fear and joy have natural expressions is one of those general facts of nature without which "our normal language-games lose their point" (PI §142). Children's learning of the language of emotion thus rests on these natural expressions: Without them, the grammar of emotion would be very different. Indeed, there is a sense in which there would be no such thing as fear and joy in that event.

Another fruitful way of reading Wittgenstein's remark on the primitive roots of learning emotions is provided by Kuusela (2013). The strategy of seeing certain words as an extension of natural expressions should be understood as an "object of comparison," meant to highlight some aspects of our dealing with psychological concepts, aspects that we tend to overlook and that may help us resolve philosophical problems (PI §130). More specifically, Kuusela contends that what Wittgenstein offers in §244 is a natural historical picture, in contrast to the well-known picture of language as rule-governed. Wittgenstein himself notes that this method is connected to Goethe's morphology:

> What is it, however, that a conceptual investigation does? Does it belong in the natural history of human concepts?—Well, natural history, we say, describes plants and beasts. But might it not be that plants had been described in full detail, and then for the first time someone realized the analogies in their structure, analogies which had never been seen before? And so, that he establishes a new order among these descriptions. He says, e.g., "compare this part, not with this one, but rather with that" (Goethe wanted to do something of the sort). (RPP §950)

The natural historical picture provided by Wittgenstein in PI §244, therefore, does not aim at giving an empirical account of language learning, but rather at a model that helps to clarify and bring order to the extremely complex use of the involved expressions (PI §415). It enables us to see certain connections, certain similarities and differences, not unlike how earlier theories about the origin of language (or of the state) are not best seen as literal accounts of the genesis of language, but as pictures that highlight certain aspects of it.

4 Emotions and Styles of Music

At one point, Wittgenstein compares learning how to recognize emotional patterns with learning how to distinguish styles of music (LW2, pp. 42–43). We have already touched on one aspect of this analogy: Recognizing emotions and musical styles both involve perceptual discernment rather than rule-based reasoning. One may *see* the difference between real and feigned sorrow, and one may *hear* the difference between Beethoven and Brahms. We shall now go on to explore other aspects of this analogy, starting with the implication that an emotion is more like a piece of music as a whole than a single note within that piece. And just as the character of a single note depends on its place in the piece, the character of a single expression depends on its place in a pattern of life.

In Wittgenstein's later writings, the contextuality of emotions comes out most sharply in his idea of *patterns in the weave of life*. In this perspective, emotions are seen as constituted by complex and dynamic configurations of words and gestures, actions and reactions, appearing within the stream of life. Emotions like love and grief are more like such patterns than they are like feelings in the narrower sense:

> "Grief" describes a pattern which recurs, with different variations, in the weave of our life. If a man's bodily expression of sorrow and of joy alternated, say with the ticking of a clock, here we should not have the characteristic formation of the pattern of sorrow or of the pattern of joy. "For a second he felt violent pain."– Why does it sound queer to say: "For a second he felt deep grief"? Only because it so seldom happens? (PI II, p. 174)

The importance of context is not at odds with the importance of immediacy mentioned above. Dialectically put, an expression is only immediate when mediated by context. A smile is only a smile in a face, which again is only the kind of smile it is as part of a situation (PI §583). Wittgenstein remarks that if we are to imagine a kind smile or a malicious smile we typically imagine the face, or rather, the human being as a whole, within different contexts, smiling at playing children or at suffering enemies, respectively (PI §539). Still, within those contexts we can *see* the kindness in the kind smile and the maliciousness in the malicious smile.

Acquiring concepts of emotions can therefore be understood as learning how to recognize certain patterns in the weave of life. These can be of an almost endless variety. No two patterns of grief are exactly alike—they may even be completely unlike each other. Moreover, "one pattern in the weave is interwoven with many others" (Z §569). The plasticity of emotional concepts and the variety of patterns

they cover, as well as their being intricately intertwined with each other, make it hard to understand how we can learn to recognize them. Wittgenstein suggests that we tend to learn the simple figures first and then, when recognizing these has become a matter of course, proceed to the more complicated, "the way I learn to distinguish the styles of two composers" (LW2, pp. 42–43).

Early on we learn what typically makes people happy or sad, whereas later in life we come to understand that one can become sad by happy events. Still, the concept of sadness would be very different from ours if we learned the concept of sadness in these latter circumstances. Hence, the intricate variety of emotional patterns is rooted in simpler connections. Analogously, even if we are inclined to call the letter "e" yellow, as Wittgenstein notes in his discussion of secondary sense (PI II, p. 216), our color concepts would not be what they are if we learnt them in connection with letters. As a matter of logical grammar children will have to learn the concept of sadness in the context of sad things, and may later learn to transfer it to very different cases (LW1, pp. 966–967).

With his emphasis on narrative context, Wittgenstein's view seems to concur with recent developments in both the philosophy of emotions and in child psychology. I shall not discuss these in detail, but mention two examples in order to give perspective on Wittgenstein's view. Within the philosophy of emotions, De Sousa (1990) has argued that the acquisition of an emotional vocabulary consists in the learning of paradigm scenarios, which have a dramatic structure. These scenarios include the situations, objects, and responses characteristics of the various emotions and are derived first from personal experience of daily life, and later from especially stories, but also the arts and culture in general: "The names of emotions do not refer to some simple experience; rather, they get their meaning from their relation to a situation type, a kind of original drama that defines the roles, feelings, and reactions characteristic of that emotion" (De Sousa 1990: xvi).

Within developmental psychology, one important trend is to see children's learning of emotions as the learning of a set of scripts (Harris 2010). These scripts are like rules connecting objects or situations that typically elicit a particular emotion with the actions, expressions, and consequences that typically go along with it, all collected within a narrative sequence. Since the same object or situation can give rise to different emotions in different people, and the child cannot store one script for each person, these scripts must also involve what psychologists call "appraisals," that is, references to the beliefs and desires of the involved actors. For instance, experimental studies show that smaller children will typically say that Little Red Riding Hood is afraid of the wolf because it wants to eat her, whereas older children will understand that Little Red Riding Hood was not afraid, since she thought that it was her grandmother in bed (Bradmetz and Schneider 1999). The older children have learned how to incorporate the actor's beliefs in their emotion scripts, which makes the scripts far more flexible.

There are, though, some important differences between Wittgenstein on the one hand and de Sousa and script theory on the other. First, Wittgenstein's idea of context includes far more than just the characteristic objects and situations that define emotions. In the end, emotions must be understood within the context of our

lives as a whole. Moreover, Wittgenstein's aim is different from that of de Sousa and script theory. It is not that of giving a theory or account of the emotions, but rather to dispel philosophical confusions, and one of the pictures that tends to create such confusions is exactly that of learning emotional concepts as a matter of learning rules. The concepts of scripts and scenarios seem fundamentally to be stuck with the picture of emotional concepts as being defined by rules that connect objects with responses. Wittgenstein's opposition to this picture comes out perhaps most clearly in his notion of imponderable evidence, to which we turn now.

5 Imponderable Evidence

Another aspect of the analogy between learning how to recognize emotional patterns and learning how to distinguish styles of music is the importance of what Wittgenstein calls imponderable evidence: Quite often we are not able to justify our judgments in any other way than by gesturing toward the most delicate of nuances.

At the same time as our judgments about emotions highlight extended patterns in a person's life, they may also rest on subtle overtones and ephemeral evidence. Wittgenstein remarks that judgments about sincerity and pretense are often backed up by *imponderable evidence*, which includes "subtleties of glance, of gesture, of tone" (PI II, p. 228). These nuances may be difficult to describe except in the vaguest of terms: "something about his smile," "the way he looked at her," or "it was as though a shadow came over his face." This is a kind of evidence, but not the kind that any rational being has to see or accept. True, we do not judge the sincerity of an expression merely on the basis of what is given to us in the moment, but also by the surroundings, in particular our past dealings with the person in question. Moreover, pretense will have different consequences than sincerity, and these *may* decide the issue, for instance if we hear her laughing after she thinks we have left. Then again, the question may arise again: Wasn't there something hollow about her laughter? The consequences may be just as hard to agree on as the original expression, and the imponderable evidence just as ineradicable.

The pervasiveness of imponderable evidence means that learning emotions involves learning to appreciate this kind of evidence, although the skill with which we do so vary widely. Wittgenstein suggests that there is a connection between the judging of imponderable evidence and being a "Menschenkenner" (PI II, p. 227). There is a striking illustration of this kind of knowledge in a novel by his Austrian contemporary, Robert Musil:

> Keeping company with the prince thus became a source of refined psychological pleasure for Törless. Dawning within him was the kind of knowledge of human nature that teaches us to know and appreciate another person by the fall of his voice, the way he picks something up, even the timbre of his silence and the expression of the physical posture with which he occupies a space; in short, by that agile way, barely tangible and yet the only truly complete way, of being something spiritual and human, which is layered around the tangible, effable core as around a bare skeleton, and by means of that appreciation to anticipate his mental personality. (Musil 2001, p. 8)

“Knowledge of human nature” is here the translation of “Menschenkenntnis,” the same word that Wittgenstein uses. Furthermore, the English version of Musil has “spiritual” for “Seeliches,” where the more accurate “soul” would preserve the relation to Wittgenstein’s famous dictum, “The human body is the best picture of the human soul” (PI II, p. 178).

One can learn to master the art of judging character, Wittgenstein adds, but only through experience, perhaps accompanied by an expert judge who can teach us by hints and tips. Here, we do not first learn a method and then arrive at whatever results or judgments that the method leads to. We learn, Wittgenstein says (PI II, p. 227), correct judgments (“Mummy looks a bit worried today”), perhaps helped by a few hints (“Isn’t there something distant in her eyes, as though she’s not *really* listening?”). One might call this a rule (“If people are distant in their eyes, then they are worried”), but then it is a rule that is derived from expert judgments and that can only be applied by those experts, rather than a rule that forms the basis of expert judgments and can function as a method for learning anyone to become such an expert (remember that “expert” here refers to a “Menschenkenner”). There is no method or technique involved apart from seeing for yourself, guided by the verdicts of the more experienced. Gradually, one comes to formulate judgments of this sort oneself, autonomously, as it were, judgments that may serve as guides for others: The novice has then become a teacher. “This is what ‘learning’ and ‘teaching’ are like here” (PI II, p. 227).

Like all learning, this does not start from scratch. If we were not naturally predisposed to develop an exquisite sensitivity to the human voice, eyes, and face, it would be hard to get this kind of learning going. Some of the children in the so-called autism spectrum are said to lack this disposition, which means that rule-governed interpretations will have to take the place of intuitive perception, and such rules are seldom flexible enough to take the child all the way to fully competent judgments (see Haddon (2004) for a brilliant, although literary illustration). Studies show, however, that most children are quite adept at understanding even subtle variations in expressions, although the problem with many of these studies from a Wittgensteinian perspective is that they rely on observing children’s responses to photographed faces of strangers (Gao and Maurer 2009). Yet our responses to photographs, strangers, and photographs of strangers are quite different from our responses to family and friends in the stream of life. We are less skillful at discerning subtle nuances in our dealings with strangers, although that is not to say that imponderable evidence is insignificant in those cases. When we meet new people, the imponderabilities of human expression may as it were overwhelm us and give rise to inscrutable sympathies and antipathies.

6 The Interplay Between First and Third Person

In children, at least smaller children, first person authority is not yet fully developed. They may therefore learn of their emotions simply by being told about them. When the three-year-old screams, red in the face, “I am not angry!” or “I am not

tired!”, we may straightforwardly inform them, “Yes you are.” This is a way for children to learn that their first person authority is not unconditional. As a rule, their words need to be in significant agreement with their behavior and bodily expressions.

Part of becoming an autonomous agent is to gain full first person authority. This must in a certain sense be earned. As children grow up and show others that their use of emotion words matches their behavior and thus our third person judgments of them, they are accorded more and more status as autonomous agents with strong first person authority concerning their own thoughts and emotions. When that authority has been earned, we will to a great extent take them at their word *even* when that word does not concur with what they otherwise say and do.

In this process, children must grasp how first and third person employments of the same psychological predicate are “two sides of the same conceptual coin” (Hacker 2013). Or as Barry Stroud puts it:

> We can see and hear [the child] crying, and he can come to see and hear other people crying or expressing their states of mind in other ways. That will be part of his learning to ascribe such states to others, and so part of his learning to ascribe them to himself. He must understand that what he thereby ascribes to himself is the same kind of state that he can also ascribe to others—and vice versa … [The child] learns self-ascription and other-ascription of certain states of mind simultaneously. (Stroud 2011, p. 26)

As long as we pay attention to words in isolation from their wider contexts it may seem like a mystery that children can come to understand this, since these predicates function so differently in the first and third person cases. What stops the child from coming to think that “angry” as applied to herself and “angry” as applied to others have different meanings and are as different as “bank” and “bank”? However, it is not as though these two sides of the conceptual coin are learned separately. The learning of one is intertwined with learning the other. Indeed, they are often learned quite literally at the same time. Daddy is sad when daughter is sad. Daughter gets angry when daddy gets angry. And so on. This is one important way in which we learn that they are two sides to the same coin, and one important reason why we can only learn emotions by living together, by sharing a life.

Yet even though we gain full first person authority as we grow into autonomous beings, there is a sense in which this interaction between first and third person never ends. Our self-knowledge even as, or especially as, mature persons is usually the result of an interplay between our first person judgments (what I am inclined to express) and others’ third person judgments (what they say about me). This applies first and foremost to complex emotions, like guilt, where first person authority is weaker than with more elementary emotions, like sadness. However, the interplay is not only between first person judgments and others’ third person judgments, since we are also able to take a third person perspective on ourselves.

We saw in a previous section how Wittgenstein remarked on the diversity of first person applications of emotional terms. “I am afraid” may be a cry of fear in a dangerous situation or more like an observation in a quiet moment of reflection. Whereas first person authority is fairly clear in the case of expressions, it is much

less marked in the case of reports, where we are, as it were, observing ourselves, taking a third person perspective on our words and actions, thoughts and feelings. The important part for our purposes is how learning about emotions typically proceeds by an interplay between expressions and reports.

The education of the self is thus constituted by a dialectic interchange between three different perspectives. First, the first person perspective: what we express or are inclined to express. Second, the third person perspective we take on ourselves: our observations and reports of patterns in our thoughts, sensations, behavior, and so on. Third, other people's perspectives on us: the patterns that they are able to discern in our words and actions. One might say that the regulative idea of this education is the complete harmony between the judgments delivered from these three perspectives, but that is surely impossible to achieve for human beings. The best we can hope for is perhaps some sort of reflective equilibrium between the various perspectives.

7 Intransitive Learning and Secondary Sense

The attainment of full first person authority does not mark the end of the expressive formation of emotions. We have seen that emotional terms describe intertwining patterns in the weave of life. Hence, one needs a quite far-reaching experience of the various parts of life to fully know what, say, grief is—children will usually only have a very rudimentary knowledge of it. This means that there is no sharp distinction between learning emotional concepts and learning about these patterns of life. It also means that the learning of emotions is a kind of learning that never ends. This comes to a head in a subset of what I have elsewhere called *intransitive learning* (Bøyum 2013).

The notion of intransitive learning is meant to capture cases, quite common after major life events, where we are inclined to say that we have *learned* something, but still not be able to say *what* we have learned: We just say that we have learned a lot. And if we try to specify what we have learned, we may end up simply repeating something we knew perfectly well in advance: "I learned that life goes on without me." In these cases, learning is best seen as the intensification of already existing knowledge, rather than as acquisition of new knowledge. You knew it before, but now you *really* know it.

The crucial contrast indicated by *really* may be expressed in different ways, for instance through a distinction between words and knowledge. If someone has experienced losing someone close, he may say, "It is one thing to *talk* about grief, quite another to *know* what it is." At other times the learning may be expressed as a process of coming to know what a word means: "Only now do I know what grief means." This would be a matter of making the word "grief" one's own, realizing what it *really* means. The same contrast, the same kind of learning, may also be expressed in a material mode, as coming to know the real nature of an emotion. Here we may go back two thousand years to Virgil's *Eclogues,* where Damon

laments after seeing his childhood love marry another man, "Now I know what love is" (and in some of these expressions we may also hear the implicit reproach, "*You* do not know what grief/love is") (Virgil 1999).

Although we may be inclined to express a learning experience by saying that now first do we know what a certain emotion really is or what a certain emotion word really means, these things can only be said in this sense by someone who already knows the emotion in question. Only someone who knows what grief or love is or means can learn what grief or love *really* is or means. A child that had not yet acquired these emotional concepts, or only had a rudimentary knowledge of them, for instance only associated them with crude scripts ("When someone dies, you feel grief" or "When someone makes you happy, it means you love them"), could not use these words ("Now first do I know what grief/love really is/means") in this sense.

Wittgenstein's own use of the terms transitive and intransitive occurs in his remarks on a distinctive use of certain emotional concepts (BB, p. 22). We may, he notes, be inclined to say that we have an experience of fear or longing without being able or willing to say *what* we fear or long for. He calls this an intransitive use of "fear" and "long," in opposition to the more common transitive use, where we specify an object, however vaguely, for our fear or longing.[3] What Wittgenstein points us toward here is a characteristic aspect of human experience and language, how we may apply words in radically new ways in order to express ourselves (Bøyum 2008). This is especially noteworthy in the case of the expression of emotional experience.

Usually, emotions are expressed naturally, for instance by crying, or conventionally, for instance by saying that you are sad. Sometimes, though, they are expressed creatively, and not only by artists. In what used to be called part II of *Philosophical Investigations*, Wittgenstein notes that he is inclined to say that Wednesday is fat and Tuesday lean. Importantly, he goes on to say that although "fat" and "lean" are here used differently, one can only explain their meaning in this context by referring to their ordinary use, and that it is just these words, with their familiar meaning, that he wants to use. Thus, relocating words into radically different contexts but with their ordinary sense intact he calls using words in a secondary sense.

Although using and understanding words in a secondary sense presuppose familiarity with the background of primary sense, it also transcends that background by taking words in directions that do not follow naturally from their entrenched use. For instance, one may feel compelled to employ a word belonging to one context in order to express an emotional experience in a very different context. As children we are taught the word "lonely." Later, we learn that one can be said to "feel lonely"

[3]A famous parallel and possible influence is, of course, Heidegger's concept of "Angst," which Wittgenstein said that he could very well understand (Wittgenstein et al. 1979). Whereas fear for Heidegger is always fear of something, anxiety does not have an object in the same sense: it is, as it were, a fear of everything and nothing (Heidegger 1996).

even when together with other people. Later still, we learn that the very same word can also be used to express one's existential predicament, and even say, like Sylvia Plath (2000) did, "Now I know what loneliness is," as though she didn't really know it beforehand.

In one respect, secondary sense is only a more extreme version of something that applies to language use in general, what Cavell calls *projecting* a word into new contexts:

> We learn the use of "feed the kitty", "feed the lion", "feed the swans", and one day one of us says "feed the meter", or "feed in the film", or "feed the machine", or "feed his pride", or "feed wire", and we understand, we are not troubled. (Cavell 1999)

To grasp the projection of "feed" from "feed the lion" to "feed his pride," or the projection of "lonely" from contexts where one is alone to contexts where one feels lonely even though surrounded by family and friends, the child will have to see that the second use is connected to the first, but also that they differ. If the child thought that the two uses of "lonely" were unrelated, like the homophonous "bank" and "bank," it would not understand: It would not object, for instance, to making up an entirely new word for the latter case, say "ylenol." But neither would the child understand if it did not see the difference between the two uses: They would then interpret the latter use as false or meaningless. Learning language involves grasping such connections, and not just backwards, with regard to established use, but forwards, grasping them as they are introduced, occasionally even extending words oneself this way (Bøyum 2007).

Here we may construct a natural historical picture of the kind mentioned previously. We start with crying, and then we learn to partially replace our crying with words like "sad" and "sorrow." Later we learn clichés, what might be called frozen secondary expressions, like feeling blue, burdened, or broken-hearted. Then we learn archetypical symbols: Joy is associated with light, darkness with depression (RPP §853). We are also exposed to the creative expressions of others, perhaps through literature. We can understand what Styron (1990) meant by "darkness visible" and what Churchill meant by "having a black dog on my shoulder," both referring to depression (McKinlay 2005). Later still, we meet even more surprising expressions, and some of them we understand, which means recognizing them as apt, as something we could have been inclined to say ourselves. Then, after a while, we start to make these projections ourselves, though to a varying degree. In this way, our emotional experience gets richer and ever more refined.

> It is important, however, that there are all these paraphrases! That one can describe care with the words "Ewiges Düstere steigt herunter". I have perhaps never sufficiently stressed the importance of this paraphrasing. Joy is represented by a countenance bathed in light, by rays streaming from it. Naturally that does not mean that joy and light resemble one another; but joy it does not matter why–is associated with light. (RPP §853)

Now there is a sense in which this is by its nature an advanced stage of emotional learning. Children cannot use words in a secondary sense. Only one who has mastered the primary use can do so. That is a logical point, not an empirical, since

to use words in a secondary sense is to use words in a very different way than usual, but still being inclined to say that it is used with the same meaning. As mentioned earlier, even if we are inclined to call the letter “e” yellow and sadness blue, it is essential to our color concepts that they are learned in connection with colored objects, not in connection with letters or emotions.

In the memoirs of Fania Pascal, there is an amusing anecdote about Wittgenstein, discussed by Harry Frankfurt in his work on bullshit. In the words of Pascal:

> I had my tonsils out and was in the Evelyn Nursing Home feeling sorry for myself. Wittgenstein called. I croaked: I feel just like a dog that has been run over. He was disgusted: You don’t know what a dog that has been run over feels like. (Frankfurt 2005)

As Frankfurt notes, we do not really know what disgusted Wittgenstein here: perhaps he just did not like Pascal’s moaning. Or perhaps he was not disgusted by Pascal’s phrase at all, but rather genuinely perplexed at how someone could use such an expression, and others could understand it, even though none of them knew anything about being a dog or being run over. Obviously, this biographical question is irrelevant and unanswerable, but it is a fact that Wittgenstein shows a great amount of philosophical concern for such phenomena of language in his later writings.

We also use emotional terms to describe other things than humans, for instance music (and animals). It is not part of this chapter to consider aesthetic expression, but it is remarkable how easily most children latch onto such descriptions. Indeed, we might wonder whether a child who never applied emotion terms to songs (or dogs), and who did not seem to understand such applications, really had a good grasp of what it means to apply them to *humans*. I am inclined to say that they would be missing something essential even about the primary use. In this sense, and surely others as well, aesthetic education is an essential aspect of an emotional education.

8 Conclusion

In this chapter, we have looked at some of the characteristic ways in which we learn emotions. These ways of learning are not quite methods of learning, since they partly constitute what we learn. Our emotional concepts would not be our emotional concepts if they were learned in very different ways. At this point at least I concur with Meredith Williams, who says that some “methods of learning” may play “a constitutive role in that how we learn concepts is constitutive of what we learn” (Williams 1994, p. 175). Hence, questions of learning are not always purely empirical questions in the sense of being about means to independently defined ends. One might therefore say that the characteristic ways in which we learn emotions constitute the expressive formation of human emotional life.

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Wittgenstein and the Path of Learning

Michael Luntley

Abstract In this essay, I defend an individualistic reading of Wittgenstein on learning. Many scholars (Williams, Stickney, Simpson) read Wittgenstein as endorsing a broadly social initiation model of learning (see also, Derry and Bakhurst for a Vygotskian spin on this). The social initiation model looks inevitable if you endorse the orthodox assumptions about Wittgenstein's treatment of linguistic regularity. The key assumptions are as follows: (i) linguistic regularity involves a normative practice with words; (ii) normativity is socially constituted; and (iii) learning involves acquiring these normative practices. Developing arguments started in my *Wittgenstein*: *Opening Investigations* (2015), I deny all three assumptions. Wittgenstein's treatment of linguistic regularity is naturalistic, not normative; it involves users engaging with words in ways that are patterned, patterns in which words *fit*, but the concept of 'fit' requires no more than 'primitive normativity' (Ginsborg 2011). What this amounts to is the following: learners' first encounters with things from which they acquire concepts are encounters shaped by the syntactic patterns that render things salient, patterns of rhythm, rhyme and repetition. These patterns are not the patterns of conceptual order, let alone a normative pattern; they are the patterns characteristic of aesthetic experience; they are the patterns of play and of games. In short, individuals learn by playing with the forms of aesthetic experience—playing with sounds and symbols is the basis for these things coming to bear content. This is not to deny that there is a transition from such patterns to conceptual patterns, but challenging the orthodoxy of assumption (i) leaves conceptual patterns inheriting much of the contingency of the shape of aesthetic patterns. In the *Big Typescript*, Wittgenstein compares a rule to a garden path. We walk paths with a sense of allegiance to the way to go, but without any prescriptive sense that we have to go this way rather than that. We are, in part,

A shorter version appears in the Wittgenstein section of the *Encyclopedia of Educational Philosophy and Theory* (Springer, 2016), co-edited by Nicholas Burbules & Jeff Stickney (Michael A. Peters, Chief Editor).

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M.A. Peters and J. Stickney (eds.), *A Companion to Wittgenstein on Education*,
DOI 10.1007/978-981-10-3136-6_29

authors of the paths we take. Understanding Wittgenstein on learning involves coming to learn how to share his sense of being comfortable with the contingencies of word use and to stop looking for *any* sense that there are prescriptive norms governing what we learn to do with words.

Keywords Learning · Primitive normativity · Rules · Know-how · Imagination · Aesthetic

1 Teachers and Pupils

The teacher/pupil relationship is ubiquitous in Wittgenstein's writings, but quite how he understood it and what goes on in the engagements that enable learning is not clear. The teacher/pupil relationship can seem intrinsically problematic, and in Wittgenstein's texts, it invariably is. We tell the pupil how to follow the instruction 'add 2' and then realise that it seems nothing we say and nothing we do suffices to convey to the pupil what 'add 2' means. Or we try to teach someone the meaning of 'game' and find that our explanations run out and we are reduced to saying 'this and similar things are called games' where the appeal to 'similar things' is every bit as open-ended as the limited examples we provide with adding 2.

Wittgenstein seems fascinated with the open-endedness of our explanations of meaning. The open-endedness stems from a fundamental insight that informs many of his investigations: meaning transcends its vehicle. If you think of what we say in terms of displaying a sign, then what we say never determines fully what we mean, for the display of the sign in itself does not fix meaning. Another way of expressing this insight would be this:

> (1) There is no canonical account of the meaning of a word, e.g., something that instantiates the schema, the meaning of *w* is ___.

Of course, in ordinary parlance, what we say is often enough precisely what we mean, but the challenge laid down by Wittgenstein's investigations is to understand how that is possible when it seems that what we put on offer—an articulation in speech or in writing of a sign—does not determine what we mean.[1]

If the idea of a canonical account of meaning made sense, one might then expect that there would be a privileged vocabulary, one that enabled full and unambiguous

[1]Wittgenstein also clearly endorses the common sense view that very often what we say is precisely what we mean and in striking fashion. He endorses what I call the 'disclosure thesis', see PI §§69, 71, 208 for instances for the idea that what we say as teachers is what we know; it does not fall short of that, it discloses it. It is also there in Augustine's words in §1, although in a slightly different form when Augustine speaks of how we can express (reveal) how things are with us in the natural language of gestures. Being clear that Wittgenstein endorses such disclosure is grist to the mill for the thought that what Wittgenstein is doing is investigating how this is possible, rather than offering sceptical arguments that call it into question.

expression of the meanings that our words carry. But meaning is not like that. There is no privileged vocabulary, and to appeal to platonic forms or Cartesian ideas as the privileged canonical bearers of meaning is to engage in empty speculative gestures. Wittgenstein targets the platonic and Cartesian extravagances in our thought about meaning, but it is the abstract idea of a canonical account that is the mistake at the heart of all this. In the sense needed to provide a canonical account of meaning, there is no such thing—meaning is use.

Given (1), what we say as teachers will always seem to short-change the pupil, for it will always seem to amount to less than what they need to know. How then, can the teacher make provision for an engagement of learning, an engagement in which the pupil acquires an understanding that the teacher cannot display but only partially indicate?

There is, I think, a simple answer to this question that is clearly the right answer given Wittgenstein's own text. The answer is that grasping the meaning of a word is not a matter of knowing something that instantiates the schema

(2) knowing that *w* means ___.

It is a knowing-how. It is knowing-how to go on with the use of words. And such know-how can be disclosed or shown in what we say and thereby be something with which the pupil can engage. The trouble with this simple answer is not that it is wrong, but that we have no coherent model of how it can be right.[2] In this essay, I want to sketch the beginnings of a model of what is involved in saying that the knowledge the teacher conveys to the pupil is know-how. It is, I believe, Wittgenstein's model.

It is important to note that the appeal to know-how in place of the know-that instance of (2) is not merely to replace an inarticulate propositional saying with a doing. The appeal to know-how is not just an appeal to activity in place of saying. For one thing, saying is just one type of activity. There is no reason for thinking that non-sayings are better placed than sayings for capturing what we know. Further, given the reach of 'use' in the formula—the meaning of a word is its use—then the appeal to our doings in capturing use is only ever an appeal to a finite fraction of 'use' that, as such, leaves the remainder undetermined. The appeal to activity is only ever an appeal to what we have done, and what we have done is never enough to settle which of the infinite possible continuations is the one that captures the use of the word that constitutes its meaning. The point here is familiar from Kripke's reading of the rule-following arguments (Kripke 1982). The idea that meaning transcends use is the idea that what we say has a meaning that reaches beyond what we literally did in the saying; it is what we appeal to when we say things like, 'I didn't mean that sort of game'.[3]

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[2]And having an account of how it can be right is not to deny that it can be informative, once one has that account, to say that such know-how can be represented by saying something of the form: we know that the meaning of *w* is __. But when that is the case, it is only because we have an account of what it means to say that such propositional knowing-that is, in Wiggins' felicitous phrase, the 'stepchild' of knowing-how, see Wiggins (2012).

[3]See the marginal remark between §§70 and 71 of Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations*.

The general form of the problem here is this: for any given word, the pupil's ability with the word lacks the generality characteristic of the teacher's ability. Given the restricted ability of the pupil, how does a display of the teacher's extensive ability provide them with the resources to upgrade their impoverished ability? There are many models available for characterising this differentiation of abilities between pupil and teacher, but what is central to them all is the thought that learning involves a transformation of the pupil's initial abilities into richer abilities. The alternative to this central claim about transformation is to endorse a nativism about all abilities—there is no learning.[4] If we take seriously the need to model the idea of transformation, then we need to come to a view about what the difference in abilities between teacher and pupil amounts to plus an account of where we locate the resources for transforming the pupil's ability. How do we teach activities to those who are not already party to them, which means that they lack the resources for taking part? So, even with the disclosure thesis—the thought that the teacher can disclose their know-how—we still need to account for how the pupil engages with something that is outwith the range of their abilities. What is on display discloses the rich generality of the teacher's abilities and these are abilities the pupil, by hypothesis, lacks.

The transition here is not a gradualist one in this sense: it is not that the difference between teacher and pupil abilities is a function of the extent of the generality on display in their activity—as if the teacher's use of a word were just more extensive than the pupils. That just blurs the line between how much use constitutes grasp of meaning and how little constitutes failure to grasp meaning. The point, however, is rather this: the teacher and pupil exhibit different kinds of generality to word use, the former constitutive of grasp of meaning, the latter not. The idea of a gradualist transition is an important idea, but it is not the idea we need in giving an account of learning. What the gradualist idea gets right is the thought that, for any given concept, there is no precise point that marks the divide between concept possession and lack of the concept. There needs to be no precise answer to the question: How much do you need to be able to do with word 'w' to be said to have understood it? It is compatible with such gradualism to acknowledge, however, that there is a difference between understanding the relevant concept and not understanding it. The latter condition, *ex hypothesi*, provides no resources for engaging with the sorts of things possession of the concept makes available. Therefore, for anyone in the state of pupillage with respect to the concept, what abilities do they exploit in engaging the activities that will give them grasp of the concept? That is the legitimate question that gradualism misses.

In the abstract, that last formulation of our central question can sound impossible to satisfy and then it can be tempting to appeal to know-how as a sort of fudge, an

[4]Of course, Fodor (1975) and in many places since has endorsed this nativism; that is, Fodor denies that learning is transformative. I think Fodor is wrong, but the challenge to give a coherent model of how learning is transformative is, I think, a key challenge.

appeal to something that blurs the sense that there is a real transformation on offer, a transformation that takes the pupil from a place of real inability to ability. That, however, makes no sense of Wittgenstein's repeated explorations of our sense that what we do in teaching—getting the pupil to repeat the first few steps in a series or apply the word 'game' to a few examples—falls short of what is required for the sort of know-how typical of the person who understands 'add 2' or 'game'. So, although the formulation we have is puzzling, bordering on paradoxical, I think it highlights a real difficulty and is worth persevering with. Many writers on Wittgenstein see things differently.

Most commentators read Wittgenstein as endorsing a social model of the teacher/pupil relationship: the pupil learns by being initiated into a social practice by the teacher (Stickney 2008; Williams 1994, 2002, 2011; Simpson 2014; Smeyers and Burbules 2006; Bakhurst 2011; Derry 2013). Such social readings of Wittgenstein fall into two broad camps: the social as explanatory of learning and the social as descriptive of learning. The division is not precise, although Williams is clearly in the former and Bakhurst and Simpson more clearly in the latter.

Consider the question, 'What differentiates the pupil's abilities from the teacher's abilities?' Williams has a clear answer to this. She thinks the pupil's initial abilities are characterised teleologically, while the abilities of the teacher are characterised normatively. That raises a quite general problem of how one can graft normative abilities onto a set of abilities that are non-normative. That seems to many to pose an insuperable barrier to explanatory leverage.[5] In contrast, descriptivist readings of Wittgenstein tend to take the idea of social initiation as a tool for a platitudinous description in which there is no sharp boundary between knowing teacher and ignorant pupil, just graduations of more or less understanding. But such an approach sails dangerously close to the nativist position, for it requires that the pupil is never outwith the reach of reasons and concepts, they are always party to a shared understanding of the games we play with words, always within the 'space of reasons'. And apart from the fact that the loose generics of the space of causes/space of reasons dichotomy deploys a potentially spurious metaphysics and implausible assumptions about normativity, it is at best plausible as part of a gradualist account that, as noted, misses our central question.

I want to suggest that the key to understanding Wittgenstein on learning is to understand the characteristics and skills that his remarks require of the pupil qua individual.

In Sect. 2, I briefly sketch four reasons for challenging the social reading of Wittgenstein. In Sect. 3, I outline the shape of an individualistic account of the path to learning.

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[5]See Bakhurst op cit for the influence of McDowell's (1994) appropriation of Sellars' dichotomy between the space of causes and the space of reasons for a dramatic enforcement of a claimed impossibility of explanatory potential here. See also Huemer (2006).

2 The Social Reading of Wittgenstein

There are four key points that undermine the dominant social reading of Wittgenstein on learning. I review them briefly (see Luntley 2015, 2016a, b).

(1) Training. The English word ‘training’ is elastic in meaning. It covers all sorts of learning schedules from simple stimulus-response (S-R) conditioning to initiation into complex activities that require sophisticated thoughtfulness, from learning nuanced craft skills to intellectual pursuits such as chess. Wittgenstein’s word for ‘training’ is *Abrichtung* and this has none of the elasticity of the English word. It applies only to crude S-R conditioning. It is a word suitable for conditioning ‘dumb brutes’—for whipping horses. It is not a word that is suitable in German for human training (Huemer 2006. See Luntley 2008, 2012 for further discussion). At the very least, this means that we must treat Wittgenstein’s talk of training with caution and would do well to assume that it means only simple conditioning. If learning involves training in Wittgenstein’s sense, it must include a good deal more too. Learning cannot consist simply in training; it must involve training plus something else.

(2) Wittgenstein nowhere endorses a social account of practices; he nowhere says that a practice is *constituted* by being a shared activity. In the one passage where his interlocutor directly raises the question, Wittgenstein ducks the issue, for he focuses on the need for repeatability over time, not across persons (Pears 1998, p. 377). Wittgenstein’s interlocutor says (PI §199):

> Is what we call “following a rule” something that it would be possible for only *one* person, only *once* in a lifetime to do?

to which Wittgenstein replies:

> It is not possible that there should have been only one occasion on which only one person followed a rule. It is not possible that there should have been only one occasion on which a report was made, an order given or understood, and so on.

(3) Wittgenstein’s speaks of practices, habits, customs as part of our ‘natural history’ (PI 25: 415), but he nowhere says of these things that they are normative, nor does he speak of norms. These terms are not part of Wittgenstein’s vocabulary. He speaks of rules—*Regln*—but this word is, of course, from the same root as *Regularitie*. What Wittgenstein is interested in are regularities (PI §208). The idea that the regularities or word use is normative or involves ‘grasp of norms’ is a fiction of the secondary literature that has dominated much writing on Wittgenstein (Kripke 1982 made it *de rigeur* to read Wittgenstein in this way). Furthermore, the idea that word use—linguistic meaning—is normative is false. To be interesting, the idea that word use is normative involves norms that are not reducible to mere causal regularities; that is, the ‘space or reasons/space of causes’ dichotomy that has become standard for many scholars (McDowell 1994; Bakhurst 2011; Huemer 2006). But that requires categorical norms, and not merely conditional norms, for the latter are easily handled in a teleological reduction. However, the idea that linguistic meaning imposes categorical norms on our word use is hard to sustain

(Hattiangadi 2006, 2007). Some writers on Wittgenstein have accepted the point (Boghossian 2003, 2005). Most commentators, however, continue to repeat the claim that meaning is normative without engaging with the substantive literature that has challenged the very coherence of Kripke's supposed insight (e.g. Williams 2010; McGinn 2013; Child 2010; Stern 2004; Baker and Hacker 1980/2005). That is not to deny that there is a perfectly intelligible sense in which word use has standards or norms in virtue of having correctness conditions, but that is no more than the idea of a semantic standard—conditions for correct use in the sense of use that is true. That notion of standard is not normative, for it entails no prescriptions for action, it places no binding on what we do (Hattiangadi 2007).

(4) The idea that learning involves a social model of initiation is incoherent. Assume that learning involves real cognitive development—the acquisition of new abilities, e.g. acquiring new concepts. This is a challenging assumption, one that invites us to consider how learning so conceived is so much as possible. The invitation is to provide an explanation of how there can be a process by which one acquires new concepts. Many Wittgensteinians think the invitation to explain how learning is possible should be avoided (Bakhurst 2011; Derry 2013). Some take the invitation seriously, and Williams' response is instructively clear and well argued (Williams 1994).

Williams endorses a social model of how concept acquisition is possible in which the key ingredient to the model is outsourced to the social. Williams accepts that Wittgenstein's concept of training is, on its own, insufficient resource to make learning possible—point (1) above. For Williams, learning = training plus X, and her extra ingredient is outsourced to the learner's teachers, elders, others. The learner acquires a new concept by being extended the 'courtesy' of being treated as having acquired the concept by her 'others'. That is the move that defines a social constructivism about mind and meaning. But that simply begs the question and cannot begin to be a coherent model of concept acquisition without an account of what it is about the individual that renders them apt to accept the courtesy extended by the others if they do not already have the concept in question. In short, such social outsourcing of the ingredient that makes learning possible is either incoherent or it collapses into a form of nativism in which the individual already possesses the concept in question.

The threat of nativism, if one takes the invitation to explain the possibility of learning, is often taken as good reason to avoid the attempt to provide an explanation and to rest content with a description of learning. But the descriptivist strategy fares no better than Williams' bold attempt at explanation.

To advocate description in favour of explanation is, in effect, to agree that all explanations of meaning are 'internal' or 'intra-linguistic' (Baker and Hacker 1980/2005, p. 35). But that is a form of nativism, for it means that one can only explain/teach the meaning of a word to someone who already has the conceptual space for understanding the meaning. If all teaching (compare all ostension) only works 'within language', then it can only work for those already equipped with the

resources for understanding the word. And that is a disguised nativism.[6] Here are two ways of seeing this point.

First, assume that learning is acquiring a new concept C by analysis; e.g. it is introduced as the word that attaches to things that are F, G and H. For this to work, the conceptual slot for C must already be there in the combination of those concepts that provide the analysis. So it is not really a new concept and it is simply a new label for a way of thinking that was already available by combining simpler concepts.

Second, a more subtle version of this would be to introduce ‘C’ by saying ‘it’s one of those’ or ‘it’s like this…’ or ‘it’s similar to these…’. These locutions are Wittgenstein’s favoured expressions when he is talking about learning; e.g. PI §69: “This *and similar things* are called ‘games’”. There are two ways of understanding what is on offer here. Either these open-ended expressions pick out concepts that analyse the target concept C, or they provide something less than a conceptual encounter from which the learner must then build the new concept C. The latter would be a model in which Wittgenstein has an answer to the invitation to explain how learning is possible. It is my preferred reading of Wittgenstein. The former is the descriptivist position, but this is still analysis and it is no better than the analysis of C in terms of a combination of simpler concepts, F, G and H. The descriptivist has analysis in terms of concepts that do not, until the learning encounter, have clear linguistic labels. But to understand these explanations—‘it’s like this…’—one must already have the conceptual space into which these words fit. This is a more sophisticated nativism, but fully compatible with Fodor’s (1975) version. The mind has a stock of innate concepts, and learning is simply the transaction by which one acquires labels for these concepts. No learning as such, in the sense of acquiring concepts, takes place.[7]

3 An Individualistic Account of the Path to Learning

If we take the descriptivist approach and eschew the invitation to explain how learning is possible, then we forego any answer to what seems to be a fundamental question:

> What differentiates the subject with a capacity to learn (acquire concepts) from those that do not?

[6]It is often assumed that Wittgenstein’s celebrated argument against ostensive definition as a fundamental method of assigning meaning to words makes a point something like this, but see Luntley (2015) for an alternative reading of what Wittgenstein says about ostension, including ostensive teaching, that is in line with what I argue here.

[7]Some descriptivists leave scope for explanation when they appeal to Vygotsky, e.g., Bakhurst, but that either hits a version of the problem that afflicts Williams’ social explanation, or it collapses back to descriptivism. In addition, this approach arguably misinterprets Vygotsky, for although he endorsed the key claim re the social constitution of the mind—interpsychological states are prior to intrapsychological states and he says that the latter come about by ‘internalisation’ of the former, he also states that we have no idea how this process works! And on that point, I have to insist, Vygotsky got it absolutely right! See Luntley (2016a).

This question needs an individual answer. It asks for an account of what makes the individual apt to be a learner, for no matter how much scaffolding from others might support learning and provide important platforms that speed up the process, without an account of the individual's resource by which they access social support, the social has nothing to support.

Let me be clear: the social is important. It is a powerful resource for learning, but it is not the key constitutive element to answering the invitation to explain how learning is possible. That has to be something about the individual. It has to be something about the individual that explains how by giving them less than a conceptual encounter with things—sometimes by saying things such as it is like this, go this way, these and similar things—we can provide them enough whereby they come to grasp a new concept. But this means that we need an explanation, an account of how encounters that are less than conceptually shaped encounters can provide the material from which conceptually shaped encounters can arise. This is the move from a form of generality that characterises the abilities of the pupil (where this is a generality less than the generality of concept exercising abilities), to a form of generality that characterises conceptual abilities. It is the move from the form of generality found in the limited first encounters with things—we learn the sequence 2, 4, 6, 8—to an understanding encounter in which we are entitled to say that our knowing how to go on with the sequence licenses our saying that in saying 2, 4, 6, 8… we mean it to go 2002, 2004, 2006… when that point is reached.

To have an account that makes sense of this transformation between different types of generality is to have a staging solution to the invitation to explain how learning is possible. Something of this form has to be available if we are to respond to the invitation to say how learning is possible. The basic form of a staging solution has to be like this: an individual who lacks the conceptual resources for encountering *F*s (lacks the resources for encountering *F*s in patterns answerable for truth and falsity) has the resources for encountering *F*s in patterns that are not answerable to truth and falsity. You might call these non-conceptual patterns, but the label tells us nothing about what sort of patterns they are, other than that they are not answerable to truth and falsity, they fail the generality constraint constitutive of the conceptual (see Evans 1982).

Any account of such a form will meet an obvious response from descriptivist readers of Wittgenstein: surely the dualism inherent in a staging solution inherits the problematic divide in the dichotomy between reasons and causes. The conceptual is the normative realm of reason-giving and the non-conceptual the causal realm of brute encounters. Set up the staging solution as outlined and we will never get the two to meet; the space of reasons is distinct to the space of causes. But that riposte simply repeats the fiction that Kripke got Wittgenstein right in saying that meaning is normative. As I have suggested above: (a) Wittgenstein nowhere speaks of rules as norms, (b) Good job too! For there is good reason to think that the idea that there are irreducible norms governing how we use words meaningfully is simply false.

Wittgenstein's own discussion of regularities in word use is much more relaxed than the somewhat fevered normativism found in many commentators.

We use words in patterns that are regular. Rules are like paths (BT: 240), paths in a garden (BT: 243). And we approach them using signposts (PI §198). Paths are natural, and they are part of our natural history. They are, in many respects, quite unremarkable things. They are traces of where others have been. Those traces have a pull upon us but of themselves impose no obligation that we should follow. The traces might be deliberate when a path is laid out in a garden, or they might simply be the marks left by those who went before and trampled the grass. They 'invite' our following, but even if we thought that expression appropriate, it makes sense only if we give some account of what it is about the individual that makes them apt to find the path inviting. Our fondness for paths is a natural aspect of our being that we share with many creatures; even sheep manifest a sense of belonging to paths in their heftedness to their pastures. Paths are a natural feature of how we are in the world. They are things we follow with a sense of allegiance that can provide a feeling that we are being led although we would be hard pressed to say exactly what leads us. It is certainly not a platonic ideal path that guides us and it is difficult to countenance the bare grass leading us. So, there is no spectral or mental talisman to guide us and it is not the object as such that leads us either. What then does guide us? The source of the feeling that we are following the path is not strictly external at all. Wittgenstein remarks

> When I follow the rule, I do not choose. I follow the rule blindly. (PI §219)

The same applies to the path. If we ask, 'Why blindly?' the right answer is, I think, the one Pears gives (2006, p. 29): We follow 'blindly'

> because the constraint comes from within—from our own natures—and not from any external force, and so there is nothing to be seen, and it is even questionable whether what we feel should be called 'constraint'.

Note, this is not the 'blindly' that comes from internalising a social norm (cp. Williams 2010). Pears' reading of 'blindly' is a use of 'blindly' that is part of the natural history of our being the kind of creature that has a sense of allegiance to ways of going that reflects something deep about our nature—the kit with which we confront things that, in themselves, give us no guidance whatsoever. In order to understand Wittgenstein on learning, we need to say a good deal more about this apparent 'constraint' from within, something that would help make palatable the outline staging solution sketched above.

One option would be to see this constraint as a subjective sense of 'ought' (see Ginsborg 2011 on 'primitive normativity and Luntley 2015). It is a sense of ought that gives a basic sense of fit or appropriateness where that requires a position within patterns that exhibit some generality, but not the type of generality associated with semantic correctness. So, something can fit because it completes a pattern (there is some generality) and this gives it a sense of belonging where it fits—it ought to be there, but we lack any sense of a rule governing this. The sense of fit is not answerable to a rule. I return to explore this idea further below.

We want an account of the individual's mindedness that has them engaged by patterns that are not conceptual and which give them the resources to acquire new concepts (see Luntley 2015, 2016b for more). A clue to how to begin lies in Wittgenstein's core metaphor for meaningful word use—language games. One of the hardest things to do justice to in reading Wittgenstein is the open-endedness of the regularities in our use of words. It provides a radical occasion-sensitivity to meaningful word use that is rarely fully acknowledged (Travis 2008, 2011 is the key exception here).

The fact that Wittgenstein's central metaphor for these patterns is 'game' can be hard to keep in focus. The concept of game serves many purposes. It says something about how the regularities in word use, however well-formed or flaccid, are in an important sense *our* regularities. They are not regularities sourced in Platonic abstractions, they are regularities in our uses of words, uses that are natural. The point is clear in the key metaphor for Wittgenstein—the path. Regularities are like paths, paths in a garden (BT: 240, 243). They are patterns we respect, to which we have some sense of allegiance, but which lay down no prescription about the way to go. The paths we walk with a clear sense of the way to go are also the paths we create as we go. How can this be? And how does this bear on what we add to training to get learning? Here is a speculative and tantalising answer.

The patterns found in games are oftentimes not conceptual patterns. Our initial games with new words (the games we play when we understand very little) are games that pick up on formal patterns of language, patterns of rhythm, rhyme and repetition.[8] These are the sorts of patterns appreciation of which figures large in our aesthetic experience. These are the patterns we naturally (it is how we are) amend and improvise with. We play with these patterns. Why? Perhaps because we are animals that make and enjoy patterns. We are, first and foremost, animals with imagination and the capacity to make and enjoy, indeed relish, patterns. These are not patterns answerable to truth, but they might become such. And although the sheep responds to patterns in their sense of heftedness to a place (a response we share with them), they do not engage in that distinctively natural human practice of playing with patterns. They lack the imagination to leave the path; their paths do not display the elasticity of ours. So what's distinctive about us qua learner? The answer, I suggest, is that our paths are natural, but bendy! And they bend because we have the imagination to bend them, they are the patterns we make and shape in the service of the aesthetics of experience. In other words, it is the capacity for play and imagination that characterises the patterns that provide our first encounter with

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[8]The 'very little' in this formulation qualifies our comprehension at the time relative to the specific learning at issue, and it does not qualify a period in ontogeny. In adult life, there are still learning encounters formed by game-like patterns that lack the generality of concept mastery. In other words, the role of aesthetic patterns in learning that I am promoting is not restricted to early development, for it never goes away. It is implicated in the craftiness of our use of words, in making sense of the art and craft of word use that is always available in our open-ended extensions of the conceptual. See Luntley (2016b) for more on this and the idea of the 'craft of inquiry' as a way of capturing Dewey's place for aesthetic experience within inquiry.

things where that encounter is not one answerable to truth and falsity. The shape of the non-conceptual is aesthetic. That is the extra to training that gives the start to learning.

It is instructive, if perhaps provocative, to think of this in term of Wittgenstein's Cartesian inheritance, an individualistic account of our mindedness based on an insight due to Descartes. In the *Discourse de la Methode* §V, Descartes says that what distinguishes an intelligent, or rational, animal from other beasts is the unboundedness of his capacity to place himself under the sway of reason. That, of course, sounds like the outcome of learning, a sophisticated end point to education. Understood in the context of Wittgenstein's naturalism about paths, I suspect it can be the starting point.

Generalise Descartes's thesis: what distinguishes the animal with a capacity to learn, rather than merely be trained, is the unboundedness of the animal's capacity when presented with a pattern to place it under another pattern. Animals that make patterns, that enjoy patterns and that have a sense of allegiance to patterns respond quite differently to training to the so-called dumb brutes. Animals that relish patterns are subjects with imagination. They are richly resourced individuals. They do not carry the nativist's burden of a mind full of concepts, but they do carry a basic drive to respond to patterns with play—they make a game of the patterns. They 'go on' when told 'do it like this…' etc. (see PI §208).

And what is this 'going-on'? It is the going-on that employs the 'and so on…' that is not an abbreviated notion. In PI §208, Wittgenstein distinguishes between the 'and so on' which is and that which is not an abbreviated notation. The latter is the going-on that is needed for know-how to be more than just a summary of what has been done, for it is the know-how involved in knowing how to use the word with meaning. The latter is the knowing-how implicated in a practice, the grasp of meaning exhibited in what we call following a rule. This 'know-how' is faithfully represented by saying, for example, that it is a case of

Knowing that 'm + n' means the addition of the numbers m and n.

but our entitlement to that lies not in the platitudinous output of a truth-conditional theory of meaning; it lies in our coming to realise that such know-how is available only to very special sorts of creatures with a peculiar natural history, a natural history revealed to us in the peregrinations of Wittgenstein's long meandering investigations across the landscape of our abilities with words. We appeal to know-how, not because it is the easy answer that degrades an otherwise complex ability into simple routines; we appeal to know-how in the revelatory investigation that shows what strange and complex creatures we are. We approach the environment with a relish for patterns and with the imagination to make and sustain patterns of fit, with the primitive normativity of the 'ought' without a rule. The type of generality applicable to fit falls short of the sort of generality applicable to sign use with standards of semantic correctness.

The 'fit' that falls short of semantic generality is the 'fit' of primitive normativity, the sense of ought that is not bound by a rule. We can know that '4' fits in the order '1, 2, 3,…' without grasping a rule in just the way that we can know that 'mo'

fits in the order, 'eeny, meeny, miny,…'. And if 'mo' does not follow, it is wrong, but not semantically wrong, for nothing has yet been said with our game.[9] How then do we move from the aesthetic 'fit' to semantic correctness? There is much to be said on this, but here is the obvious first move. Just as '4' fits after '1, 2, 3,…' so too can it 'fit' (primitive ought) in association with a set of four objects. We form an association between sign and object (in this case a simple set), but still there is no meaning, for the fit lacks the generality of semantic constraint. And perhaps, to begin with, we make do with no more than fit thus conceived between words and things. But that sense of fit gets disrupted by the intransigence of the world. We cannot negotiate the world to fit, and it demands change of us in our pattern-making to preserve fit. And that is the key to moving from purely imaginative patterns of fit to patterns of activity (calling out sounds in responses to things) that have something akin to correctness conditions, conditions that exhibit the generality due to expression of meaning.

And now we have something that goes beyond the gradualism endemic to many writers on Wittgenstein. The point about the limited generality of fit is not something that invites a gradualist response, as if the generalities of the pupil were akin to those of the teacher but just more limited in range. That is the thought that, for any given concept, there is no clear binary divide between a pattern of use that manifests grasp of the concept and one that does not. But the move from pupil to teacher for which we want an account is not a move from lesser to more extensive generality, it is the move from one kind of pattern that lacks the specific generality of concept mastery to the kind of pattern that does exhibit conceptual generality. It is the move from general patterns characteristic of our aesthetic sense of ought to the general patterns characteristic of use of words answerable to standards of semantic correctness.[10]

The phrases we employ in our open-ended use of words when we say to the pupil the pattern 'goes like this…' or 'do this, and this and now go on….' do not necessarily express fully conceptual encounters with things. They can be markers for patterns of aesthetic engagement that we can adapt free from the constraint of truth. When playful pattern-makers are subjected to S-R conditioning, the result is quite different to subjecting brutes to S-R conditioning. And when our pattern-making hits the distinctive recalcitrance of that which is non-negotiable (the material rather than the social environment) pattern-makers make first contact with

[9]I am indebted to Carey (2009) for the insight that numerals can figure in patterns with a sense of correctness weaker and distinct to the notion of correctness at play with words whose use is subject to semantic correctness. The former concept of pattern is central for her idea of placeholder structures that provide the learner with a first use of numerals prior to acquiring a conceptual understanding of numbers. The idea that such placeholder structures are akin to aesthetic patterns answerable to a primitive 'ought' of fit that is not rule-governed, is suggested by Ginsborg's work on rule-following and aesthetics, Ginsborg op cit.

[10]I ignore the issue whether standards of correctness introduce norms or 'oughts'. I suspect they do not, but even if they did, they are different norms to the primitive normativity to aesthetic patterns.

the idea of patterns that are not merely imaginative, but which represent. Then, the 'do it like this' is answerable to truth. Then, you start to move from an aesthetic unboundedness in patterns to the unboundedness of reasons that Descartes took as the hallmark of *res cogitans*. What I suggest we find in Wittgenstein's naturalism is the *res imaginatio*. It is part of our natural history (we might as well say, for us, it is the *res animus*). The point is simply this: the subject that responds to training with learning does so because they are creatures of the aesthetic, creatures with an innate capacity and drive to make and live in patterns. Training a *res imaginatio* means providing affordances that engage their sense of aesthetic patterns. It requires a pedagogy framed by playful encounters with the patterns of the aesthetic.

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Pedagogy and the Second Person

David Simpson

Abstract Over the past two decades, there has been gathering interest in the second-person perspective. It has been applied in ethics, philosophy of language, epistemology, and studies of social cognition. One source of this approach is Strawson, and another is Davidson, but I suggest that the seeds lie in Wittgenstein. A significant benefit of this approach is that it offers a way of avoiding the sceptical difficulties that arise when we limit our explication of human cognition and interaction to first- and third-person perspectives. There has been little discussion of the significance of the second-person perspective for educational theory, and I hope to address that in this paper. I will do so by reflecting on Wittgenstein's references to teaching, training, and learning in his later work, especially in his attack on mentalism and individualism. It can seem that Wittgenstein's way of introducing pedagogical moments treats those practices as cases of disciplining or forming an other—a first-to-third person interaction. But I argue that these cases are examples of shared, cooperative, and normative activities into which the child or novice is being welcomed. I thus seek to show that in his mentions of pedagogy, Wittgenstein ought to be seen as invoking and insisting on a second-person relation.

Keywords Second person · Interaction · Cognitivism · Davidson · Luntley

1 Introduction

> … How do I explain the meaning of "regular", "uniform", "same" to anyone?—I'll explain these words to someone who, say, speaks only French by means of the corresponding French words. But if a person has not yet got the *concept*s, I'll teach him to use the words

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M.A. Peters and J. Stickney (eds.), *A Companion to Wittgenstein on Education*,
DOI 10.1007/978-981-10-3136-6_30

> by means of *examples* and by *exercises*.—And when I do this, I do not communicate less to him than I know myself.
> In the course of this teaching, I'll show him the same colours, the same lengths, the same shapes; I'll make him find them and produce them; and so on. For example, I'll teach him to continue an ornamental pattern 'uniformly' when told to do so.—And also to continue progressions. That is, for example, when given:. .. … to go on: …. ….. …….
> I do it, he does it after me; and I influence him by expressions of agreement, rejection, expectation, encouragement. I let him go his way, or hold him back; and so on. (PI §208)[1]

I take this passage from the *Philosophical Investigations* as a starting point because it touches on some of the main themes that concern me here: the teaching of concepts, the development of normative judgment, and interaction in the pedagogical encounter.

In those later works in which Wittgenstein so regularly refers to and gives examples of teaching and training,[2] he uses the concepts of training in a practice and training in a technique. Many, myself included, think that these concepts show how normativity and the grasp of concepts can be explicated naturalistically, without recourse to mentalistic, nativist, or cognitivist hypotheses and without retreating to behaviourism. Although I have previously given an account of this claim (Simpson 2013), I want here to focus on some details that may have been passed over too quickly—or at least, which seem to demand emphasis. Whatever the apparent obviousness of the approach we find in Wittgenstein, the task of countering cognitivism in psychology, philosophy and education, and the liberal–analytic approach to pedagogy remains.

Here, I want to focus on the pedagogical encounter by drawing attention to the second-person perspective as it operates in that encounter. The second-person perspective—briefly, the perspective we adopt when we take another as an other subject—has been adopted as an analytic device in a number of areas. We find it being used in ethics (Darwall 2006), in philosophy of language and the theory of testimony (Moran 2013; Heal 2013, 2014), in discussions of social cognition (Gallagher 2001), in philosophy of mind (Dullstein 2012), and in neuroscience (Schilbach et al. 2013). The attractions of this approach to some extent depend on the specific area to which it is applied, but I think that three overarching and related features have been important: that it offers a way of avoiding the difficulties that arise when we limit our explication of human cognition and interaction to first- and third-person perspectives; that it allows a coherent account of social being; and that it offers a naturalistic but non-reductive explication of normativity. Consideration of the second-person perspective seems to offer relief from various forms of other

[1]Following convention, titles for Wittgenstein's works are abbreviated (OC = On Certainty, PI = Philosophical Investigations, RFM = Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, Z = Zettel), with section (§) or page number (p.), with full citation and initials (e.g., RFM) in the References.

[2]The works most relevant are *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics* (RFM), *Philosophical Investigations* (PI), and *On Certainty* (OC).

minds' scepticism and puzzles about objectivity, and it appears to offer a resolution (or sidestep) of the stand-off between Cartesian mentalism and behaviourism.

We see early use of the second-person perspective in Anscombe's (1963) analysis of intention, in Strawson's (1974) account of the reactive attitudes, and then in Davidson's (1992) critique of individualism. I claim that using the approach as a frame also helps make clear important aspects of the later work of Wittgenstein —crucially for this essay, those aspects of his discussions that have come to influence pedagogical theory.

While Wittgenstein's work has, certainly since Smeyers (1995), come to be viewed as important for the philosophy of education, there has been little or no discussion of the significance of the second-person perspective for educational theory. This is surprising, because the approach at least appears to focus on phenomena that are central to the pedagogical encounter. Steps towards such a discussion are initiated by Moran's (2013) work on testimony and also responses to that by Heal (2013) and Small (2014). In part building on this work, and in part by contrast, I aim here to show that by understanding pedagogical practice as constituted through a second-person engagement, some of the more puzzling aspects of that complex practice can be clarified. I will do so by way of first reflecting on Wittgenstein's references to teaching, training, and learning in his later work. One motivation of these references seems to be in illustration of the emptiness of the mentalist, nativist perspective that is arguably his main target in those works. Consequently, it can seem that Wittgenstein's way of introducing pedagogical events treats those practices as cases of disciplining or forming an other—a first-to-third person, behaviouristic interaction. But I argue that we have a richer palate available and that what is in fact going on in these cases are examples of shared, cooperative, and normative activities into which the child or novice is being welcomed, as we might say, and through which it is being shaped. That is to say, that in rejecting the first-person perspective adopted by cognitivists and nativists, Wittgenstein is invoking second-person relations.

We do not look to Wittgenstein for a theoretical account of learning, any more than we can sensibly look there for a theory of mind, or of meaning, but we can find help with clarifying our picture of the pedagogical encounter. As Williams (2007, p. 188) has pointed out, Wittgenstein uses discussions of occasions of instruction to introduce his critiques of referential theories of meaning, essentialist theories of understanding, and Cartesian models of consciousness. All of these targets have, explicitly or not, come to have a substantial influence on pedagogical theory just as they have on philosophy and psychology. Most importantly, the discussions of learning all focus attention on the question of normativity (Williams 2007: 188–9).

As noted, in the *Philosophical Investigations*, in *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics*, and especially in *On Certainty*, Wittgenstein regularly clarifies the point he is making by asking the reader to think about various examples of initiate training. So we must ask what the point of these invocations is. In anticipation of the claim I will develop throughout the paper: Wittgenstein's primary purpose in

introducing examples of initiate training is to demonstrate the naturalistic origins of concepts and normativity. In broad terms, the idea is that a child comes to possess concepts, reason, a shared objectivity, and the capacity to follow semantic and epistemic rules, by being initiated into a form of life. The challenge is to get clear about 'initiation' and 'form of life'. First, however, I want to look briefly at a motivation for clinging to a rationalist–cognitivist thesis.

2 Attention and Scaffolding

One attraction of or motivation for cognitivism seems to be that it closes a perceived gap between the sentient and the sapient, one that the notion of training in a practice is unable to bridge.

Michael Luntley interprets Wittgenstein as presenting a rationalist model of learning. It is an unusual position, partly because it is surprising to see Wittgenstein interpreted in such a way, but also because he says that he is not proposing a Fodorian language-of-thought account.[3] I won't engage with the interpretive issue (however, see Stickney (2008), and Luntley's (2008) reply to Stickney's critique). Instead, I want to focus on the actual position that is being proposed by Luntley, because it needs to be addressed, whether or not it is an adequate interpretation of Wittgenstein.

Luntley finds that the 'standard' interpretation of Wittgenstein on learning leaves an explanatory 'slack between what is said by the teacher and what the pupil learns' (Luntley 2007, p. 424). He claims that talk of 'practice' is a fudge.

> It is a fudge that offers to endorse the common sense point of view that learning occurs when knowledgeable people tell less knowledgeable people things and the latter 'catch on' and pick up a complex normatively configured practice. (Luntley 2007, p. 424)

According to Luntley, this 'catch on' is where all the real work is done, but the 'standard' view does not address it.

> The fudge is basically a descriptive strategy that says, 'We get by'. That is not good enough. Nothing has been added to the notion of training to substantiate the idea of intrinsic normative standards. Until that is provided, we should read 'training' as an activity aimed at conformity in action, something instilled by mimesis. (Luntley 2007, p. 424)

Luntley, as I read him, sees 'training' (and this for him embraces 'training in a practice') as nothing more than, and as capable of providing nothing more than, the disciplining of an unformed body. 'It is about acquiring habits of mind and behaviour that have been shaped by others' (Luntley 2007, 418). Thus, he regards a philosophy of education that takes training (in a practice) as its core as inadequate at an explanatory level and anathema to what real education is or ought to be about: the process of bringing about an autonomous, deliberative adult, able to take

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[3]In fact, it would be easier to see Luntley's position as a critique of Wittgenstein, *a la* Fodor and LePore (2007)—which is not to endorse their criticism of Brandom or Wittgenstein.

responsibility for their mental and social action, ‘a judge, not a mimic’ (Luntley 2007, p. 429, and see p. 419).

In order for this to happen, the child must already possess the capacity to learn.

> If language learning does not start with training, … the infant must already have rich cognitive capacities for making sense of the world and others prior to the acquisition of language. But that means that they must have the capacity to direct their behaviour prior to acquiring the language with which they label such organisation and direction. (Luntley 2007, p. 427)

Here, Luntley takes himself to be explicating the point of the first 38 sections of the *Investigations*.[4] He takes from there the idea that mere training cannot of itself bring about a grasp of concepts. In another paper, Luntley (2012) makes much of the term Wittgenstein uses, *abrichtung*. While ‘standard’ interpreters, he says, think of training in a practice as if it is a form of acculturation, that notion is captured by *bildung*, whereas *abrichtung* ‘is a concept of training applicable only to animals, never humans’.

> It is a concept for quite brutal training regimes; it is applicable for whipping horses, but is out of place describing regimes for human learning. (Luntley 2012, p. 89)

In response, note first that while *abrichtung* (*abrichten*) is used for ‘training’, it is also used for ‘drilling’ and ‘schooling’ and ‘educating’. Yes, it is applied to the training or drilling of animals (although not animals alone, and brutality and whipping are not really intrinsic to the concept!), and yes, Wittgenstein uses the term when he is challenging various versions of explicit and implicit nativism and Cartesianism. However, from the perspective of the ‘standard’ reading, one would say, that is just Wittgenstein’s point: the child is in the end something animal that, beginning with training, is opened into the normative space of concepts and reasons. On that reading, it is not something animal *plus concepts and rationality* that is recognized by participants in the language game.

Luntley thinks that the standard account here is not conceivable, that presented in this way ‘Wittgenstein’s position is at risk of becoming incoherent’ (Luntley 2012, p. 90). He thinks that the problem is to overcome Fodor’s paradox of learning, to explain how ‘we acquire a capacity for something [i.e. application of concepts in a normative space] that we cannot yet do’ (Luntley 2012, p. 93). He thinks that talk of training in a practice offers no help, because the ‘SR conditioning’ (2012, p. 91) that this amounts to cannot already contain the target skill.

However, he thinks that Wittgenstein is not incoherent. In Luntley’s earlier papers, the bridge from sentient to sapient is somewhat vague. He says that the explanatory/cognitive gap is closed because,

> The infant/pupil has sufficient mental equipment to generate, in response to training, the capacity to understand explanations, i.e. show a responsiveness to reasons. (Luntley 2008, p. 701)

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[4]Again, I set aside the question of whether this reflects an adequate reading of those passages and the point of those passages, or of the rule-following considerations.

It is very difficult to see this as more than an assertion that the gap is bridged. He rejects the full-blown nativism of Fodor, still claims that his thesis is rationalist, but does not really explain what this amounts to, beyond claiming that the child/pupil must have the necessary 'wherewithal' (Luntley 2008, p. 701). However, in his 2012 paper, Luntley provides something more substantial. He claims there that the bridging capacity is:

> … the capacity for conscious attention, where this is understood as a basic capacity of consciousness to focus on things made salient in the environment and where it is a form of awareness that is prior to a conceptually mediated awareness. (Luntley 2012, p. 98)

This is clearer, but notice first that this account can look remarkably like that told by the 'standard' interpretation of Wittgenstein. Williams, Stickney, and Medina will all happily agree, along with (they would say) Wittgenstein that in order to be 'trainable', the child/pupil must have, at the beginning, certain trainable ways of reacting (e.g. Stickney 2008, p. 681). So now that his point is clearer, it is not clear what Luntley has added. Yet, there *is* a crucial difference: Luntley's story is the story of an isolated individual arising in an environment, with the role of the community or the teacher seemingly contingent. The environment scaffolds the learning and in that way is necessary. But the story of learning is intrinsically individualist and asocial, and according to the standard view, to miss the importance of the social is to miss the most important dimension of Wittgenstein's later work.

3 Training in a Practice

In her important work on Wittgenstein's use of examples of learning and teaching, Meredith Williams identifies three roles that learning plays 'in the acquisition and determination of concepts and rules' (2007, p. 189)[5]: that ostensive teaching plays a causally grounding role in fixing meaning for the initiate learner; that when we observe learning, we see the source of normativity in the distinction between novice and master; and that initiate learning shows that how we learn bedrock concepts is constitutive of what we learn.

The first claim refers to the critique of denotational theories of meaning that occurs in the first 38 sections of *Philosophical Investigations*. Denotational theories assume that language learning is based on a teacher establishing for the initiate one-to-one connections between terms and what they denote. The familiar critique of this is that this sets off an explanatory regress, since it presupposes in the pupil already understands the notion of class membership, can take the baptismal objects as the paradigm by which other members of a class can be recognized, and realizes that the teacher is uttering a word that is being used as a name (Williams 2007, p. 191; and e.g. PI §31).

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[5]Chapter 7 of Williams' 2007 book was originally published in 1994.

However, as Williams notes, a cognitivist might accept the critique but insist that while competence cannot be taught through ostensive definition, this is no problem because it is already present for the initiate, as a language of thought or a universal grammar (Williams 2007, p. 192). She responds that for Wittgenstein, whatever competencies an initiate brings to the learning situation, they cannot be semantic and epistemic competencies. For him, these are taught by ostensive *training*, where the teacher, in the actual process of teaching, provides structured practice that embodies the semantic and epistemic normativity and inculcates it as pattern-governed behaviour in the initiate (Williams 2007, p. 192). Here, Sellars' (1954) term 'pattern-governed' indicates behaviour that conforms to a complex social pattern, but not from a conception of the set of rules according to which this pattern can be described (Williams 2007, p. 191). Yet even this move need not deter someone comfortable with a nativist position, who could still maintain the idea of an innate repertoire of unconscious rules and representation. Similarly, a behaviourist might insist that stage-setting is provided by the individual's environment and is sufficient to ground competence without recourse to a social account of the gestation of linguistic mastery.

Williams' second step is thus to assert the necessity of stage-setting that is both public and social. Here, she draws mainly on the private language and rule-following discussions at PI §139–242 which, she argues, show that understanding must be public—that is, understanding a norm requires actually behaving in appropriate ways—and social—the behaviour must be carried out as a cultural practice (Williams 2007, pp. 199–201). The first argument here is that an inner representation of, say, a formula cannot determine how it is to be interpreted or put into practice. Thus, a mere inner representation cannot guide judgment and behaviour. The second argument is that rule-following must occur in a practice, as a regularity over time; otherwise, a rule-following act cannot be distinguished from a move that is accidental, and this means that rule-following must be social. 'There must be a structured setting in the public domain' (Williams 2007, p. 200).

A further step needed for the picture Williams is drawing from Wittgenstein is the idea that the process of learning is constitutive of the content of what is learned. Here, the important aspect of public and social training and teaching is training in a technique—showing, testing, and correcting—such that the initiate comes to find the steps (of maths, or of speaking a language, or of reasoning) necessary. Thus is formed for the initiate a background that is not describable or able to be captured by rules (Williams 2007, p. 206) lying behind judgement and our concepts, but necessary and determinate of judgment and concept application.

On the sort of reading Williams offers, Wittgenstein's references to training, teaching, and practices involve a necessary introduction of a novice into a *community*. A community provides the space in which practices of judgement and meaning occur and thus the possibility of normativity.

For Wittgenstein (at least on this sort of reading), the notion of mastering a technique plays a central role in his exploration of the development of normativity

and a grasp of concepts. This is because we grasp a concept when we are able to apply it, which is to say, when we are able to deploy it in a certain way—namely, the way 'we' apply it. This is a point Williams is keen to make (2007, pp. 208–10), and it is explored at length by Medina (2002) in Chap. 6 of his valuable book.

As noted above, a rule or a concept in itself does not carry its interpretation. Even a concept that we understand quite well (cube, for example) can be applied in a range of ways, and its application is an interpretation. 'The picture of the cube did indeed *suggest* a certain use to us, but it was also possible for me to use it differently' (PI §139). In order to apply the concept, that is, we need the technique of application, and technique is a skill that we pick up by participating in a practice. This can be quite general:

> To understand a sentence means to understand a language. To understand a language means to have mastered a technique. (PI §199)

In *Zettel*, he comments that 'I cannot describe how (in general) to employ rules, except by *teaching* you, *training* you to employ rules' (Z §318). That is, there is not a general analytic method for applying rules; rules are applied and have to be learned to be applied, through techniques of application in context. This relates to an apt reminder by Stickney (2008, p. 680) that for Wittgenstein understanding, a concept or a practice (Stickney is referring to 'teaching' and 'learning') is always contextual and is not something subject to an analytic account. For Wittgenstein, analysis can never be adequate, because it assumes erroneously that a concept carries its interpretation somehow within it as its essence. In clarification of this point, Stickney quotes from §77 of the *Investigations*:

> How did we *learn* the meaning of this word ("good", for instance)? From what sort of examples? In what language-games? Then it will be easier for you to see that the word must have a family of meanings. (PI §77)

The point being that the context and the technique of application generate the actual conceptual meat.

The approach I've been expounding is nicely summed-up by Medina, in a section in which he is discussing the movement from novice to practitioner.

> The normative background that the teacher brings to bear upon the behaviour of the novice is progressively made available to the learner through the training, up to the point where the learner's behaviour becomes regulated by norms without the assistance of the teacher, thus becoming an autonomous practitioner. In other words, by interacting with masters who structure and regulate the learning environment, novices come to adopt structuring and regulatory activities of their own. (Medina 2002, pp. 164–5)

He goes on to characterize this as a move from 'other-regulation to self-regulation'.

> Initiate learning is thus conceived as a process of *enculturation* or *apprenticeship:* we learn norms by being acculturated into rule-following practices, by mastering their techniques. (Medina 2002, p. 165)

4 Interacting

I broadly endorse this picture. Yet, I suspect that a cognitivist would claim that 'enculturation' and 'apprenticeship' are too vague. Someone with cognitivist leanings might say that Medina, Williams, and Stickney have said *what* happens, but not *how* it is that a child or novice (something animal, non-normative) comes to engage with its world normatively. Let us avoid the temptation to turn the demand for explanation back onto the cognitivist. Instead, I want to draw out something that I think lies implicit in Stickney's and Medina's accounts, although perhaps not in Williams'.

From about the mid-1970s, Donald Davidson published a series of papers that, if not contradicting some of his earlier work, at least amounted to a significant change of emphasis.[6] Three approaches that Davidson adopted then are of particular interest: first, he asserted that language and thought are intrinsically social (that is, he explicitly rejected individualism); second, he came to deny that there is such a thing as a language in the sense of a set of shared linguistic conventions, or that such a language is necessary for communication; and third, he developed the notion of triangulation.

The first two of these positions seem to be contradictory. The second, the 'no language' thesis, seems to throw away that which we would see as essential for viewing humans as intrinsically social beings. However, seeing how this is *not* the case (and that the three positions are interconnected) is key to getting clear about the step from novice to participant that we find in Wittgenstein. For Davidson showed that if we find the *minimum* social step, then the move to a more maximal sociality occurs without a gap.

Williams, in her comparison of Wittgenstein and Davidson (Williams 2000), draws attention to many similarities (rejection of representational theories, focus on linguistic understanding rather than reference and meaning, treating linguistic knowledge as a skill, etc.). She also thinks that Wittgenstein would accept Davidson's triangulation argument (Williams 2000, p. 300). However, she finds a crucial difference: Wittgenstein's 'practice' or 'community' view sees the social nature of language as lying in shared conventions and conformity of behaviour among participants, whereas Davidson's 'interpretive' view sees it as lying in mutual interpretability between interlocutors (Williams 2000, p. 299). She says that Davidson appeals to the public character of language use as a condition on interpretation in the situation of radical interpretation. Thus, she says, Davidson thinks occasion sentences (sentences prompted by one's perception of objects in one's environment) must be causally related to public objects if interpretation is to be empirically constrained.

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[6]The five central papers are 'Radical Interpretation' (1973), 'Thought and Talk' (1975), 'Rational Animals' (1982), 'A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs' (1986), and 'The Second Person' (1992).

> Wittgenstein, on the other hand, urges that understanding must be manifested publicly as *constituting* the subject's understanding. This is the difference between taking the observer's perspective as a radical interpreter of a speaker and taking the subject's perspective as a participant in the game along with others. (Williams 2000, p. 300)

I disagree with Williams in two aspects of this characterization. First, the comparison between radical interpretation and initiate training is not the best way to measure one against the other. The radical interpreter is already a practitioner, with concepts of an objective world and normativity, and it would have been better to focus on Davidson's use of triangulation. Second, I think that the opposition between observer and subject perspectives mistakes both Davidson and Wittgenstein.

If we conceive of Wittgenstein as explaining how it is that an initiate finds itself a participant in a game, then the cognitivist and rationalist concern finds leverage. For when it is presented in these terms, it accords with a liberal, individualist view of education: taking a subject (already essentially a subject) and enabling it to participate in a game with other subjects. I doubt that this is Williams' view, but the dichotomy between first- and third-person perspectives, implicit in the passage above, leaves that interpretation open. Certainly, Luntley seems to see the situation like this, and this is why he thinks that the subject must bring with it rationality: the subject welcomed into the game must be recognized as already a rational being. If it is not, and not so recognized, then it is something merely animal, beyond reason.

Similarly, if we regard Davidson as explaining how, from a third-person perspective, we make sense of an alien, then radical interpretation does indeed seem mysterious. However, the radical interpreter's engagement with the stranger is not third person; it is a second-person engagement with another *as* a normatively constrained occupant of a shared objective world. Davidson's radical interpreter does not need to share a set of linguistic conventions with the stranger, because she, in the act of interpretation, sees herself as already like-minded (see Simpson 2003; Verheggen 2015).

In 'The Second Person', we find the following account of a child–parent/teacher relation: the parent, already with a sense of an objective world (and thus objective truth), engages with the child verbally, assuming (and thereby 'enforcing') a common experience of a common world. By common 'experience' of a common world, I mean a common 'slicing and dicing' of the world. The child will inevitably not slice and dice 'normally', but will be corrected, because it is correctable.

The child might lump all self-moving objects under the term they first learnt for one animal, or might lump all animals under one attempt to verbalize a class name. An example: a child might come to apply an expression such as 'borbie' to all small non-human animals (dogs, cats, chickens, etc.), originating in a parent's attempted ostensive teaching (I use this an example of a phonetic and a 'pointing' error). Such mistakes will be corrected over time through engagement; the emotional, repetitive engagement of parenting: stage-setting, testing, correcting, and repeating. The outcome of this process is to bring about a linguistic, communicative subject—that

is, a subject who has (that is, who applies, or acts in accordance with) the concept of objective truth, a subject who has beliefs, and who has and applies the concept of normativity.

This is also a subject who is able to provide and demand reasons. But again, learning this is a process. Wittgenstein's schoolboy (OC, §315) who interrupts with questions about the existence of things (say, a child in a maths class, who asks whether numbers exist) does not ask 'stupid' or unaskable questions, but questions that are not appropriate in that context. He has not learnt to ask questions in the practice in which he is engaged.

In the quote from Wittgenstein with which I began, he draws our attention to just these features of the teaching situation and especially focuses on the second-person interaction that this involves:

> I do it, he does it after me; and I influence him by expressions of agreement, rejection, expectation, encouragement. I let him go his way, or hold him back; and so on. (PI §208)

Much more could be said, but the central point here is that the triangulation of self-other-world makes possible and brings about the movement from an animal that reacts in certain recognizable ways, to a participant in the space of reasons.

I think, contra Verheggen (2006), that Wittgenstein does place an emphasis on the community that is absent in Davidson. This is clear from his discussion of ongoing practices and the reinforcing role they play. In fact, this aspect of the Wittgensteinian vision enriches our account of the second-person dimension of initiate learning. The child must come to be able to apply concepts and to have a sense of objectivity and normativity, and this arises through primary interaction, but in order to participate in a practice, the child must come to take responsibility for her contributions. That process takes time: being held accountable, learning what it is to be taken seriously, and to have one's testimonial contributions trusted (Moran 2013; Small 2014). It is the sort of social development that takes place in a community.

Verheggen is right, however, to claim that community alone cannot do the trick. It plays a role only because community begins with primary interaction/triangulation—the formation of second-person relations of mutual recognition. I cannot correct someone who does not recognize correction, and you cannot become self-correcting until you place yourself in a normative space.

5 Conclusion

I see the shape of my discussion in this way: as philosophers of education, we find Wittgenstein's notion of initiation into a form of life an attractive antidote to cognitivist, individualist, and rationalist thinking—the theoretical background of the liberal subject. It seems prima facie that the initiation here amounts to *inclusion into a community*, something which clearly almost always does occur for every child. However, it seems that this process is not sufficient to provide the fully

fledged subject we were after. It seems that there is a gap left by this way of thinking, between the animal and the social, into which the cognitivist can place a nativist solution.

In response, I have argued that there is more than one way to be an anti-individualist, such as Davidson's, which, I argue, is also Wittgenstein's. Furthermore, when we understand 'initiation' as triangulation, we find that inter-subjectivity is necessary for the arising of thought, but a community as such is not necessary at this primary stage. We find that the second-person relations of inter-subjectivity are sufficient to overcome any reasonable cognitivist concerns.

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Engagement, Expression, and Initiation

Casey Doyle

Abstract According to what has been called a "Transformational" account of education, a child comes to possess rational and conceptual capacities as a result of initiation into culture or a "form of life." I consider how we must understand the engagement with other minds involved in education if we are to make sense of the Transformational view. I argue that Wittgenstein's discussions of perceiving and mimicking other minds provide the resources to respond to worries one might have with the idea that a genuine meeting of minds can occur in education prior to the acquisition of sophisticated capacities for reasoning.

Keywords Wittgenstein · Education · Other minds · Expression · Mindreading

1 Initiation and the Meeting of Minds

Education involves a meeting and shaping of minds. On a view associated with the later Wittgenstein, which, following others (Bakhurst 2011), I will call a Transformational view, education is also responsible for the *creation* of minds. As John McDowell puts it, learning our first language is not merely a matter of coming to possess a means for expressing independently intelligible thoughts, but is, instead, "the same thing as acquiring a mind, the capacity to think and act intentionally" (McDowell 1994: 126). Interpreting Vygotsky, Meredith Williams writes that "[higher] mental functions are the product of social interaction in such a way that they cannot be characterized independently of that interaction" (Williams 1999: 262). David Bakhurst writes that "we owe our status as rational animals to our initiation into culture" (Bakhurst 2011: xiii). As the point is often put using

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© Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2017
M.A. Peters and J. Stickney (eds.), *A Companion to Wittgenstein on Education*,
DOI 10.1007/978-981-10-3136-6_31

Wittgenstein's imagery, we come to possess rational and conceptual capacities by being initiated into a form of life.[1]

Claiming that education is both a meeting of minds and the creation of minds has an air of paradox to it, since, of course, there cannot be a mind with which to meet prior to its own creation. Here are three ways one might respond to the seeming paradox. First, one might hold that there are really two kinds of education in play: that which involves a genuine meeting of minds, the kind of education with which we are most familiar, and that which does not, what Wittgenstein sometimes refers to with the word "abrichten," akin to the training of an animal. This is a familiar Empiricist model of learning. Otherwise, one might hold that two forms of mindedness are in play. On this view, education creates a species of mindedness, the kind at play in inquiry, in which sophisticated rational and conceptual capacities are exercised. This leaves in place the idea that prior to initiation into a form of life children possess another form of mindedness and that a meeting of minds does occur. The third option is, of course, to take the paradox at face value and to conclude that the Transformational view must be mistaken. This is a familiar Rationalist theory of learning on which we must always already credit the pupil with rational capacities in order to make sense of education.[2]

My goal in this paper is to explore the second option above and to consider how we must understand the engagement with other minds involved in education if we are to make sense of the Transformational view. The question I want to address here is the following: How is it possible that a child could enter into an educational encounter, engaging in a genuine meeting of minds, prior to her possession of sophisticated capacities for reasoning? I'll argue that there are really two difficulties here and that different strands in Wittgenstein's discussions of our engagement with other minds can help us to resolve them.

2 The Transformational View

The first thing to get clear on is exactly what the Transformational view holds, since it can be difficult to state without lapsing into absurdity or triviality. It would be absurd to deny that human beings have, as part of their natural endowments, the ability to come to reason and learn language. Likewise, it would be absurd to deny that creatures that have not been initiated into a linguistic community cannot reason

[1]Readers of Wittgenstein who attribute the Transformational view to him include McDowell (1994), Williams (1999, 2010), Huemer (2006), Stickney (2008a, b), Smeyers (2008), and Bakhurst (2011). This attribution is challenged by Luntley (2008, 2009). I won't address the interpretive question here.

[2]According to Luntley, a Rationalist, we must "acknowledge that the learner can only respond to training if they already possess sufficient mental equipment to generate the appropriate responses" (Luntley 2008: 695). Luntley (2009) uses the labels "Empiricist" and "Rationalist" in a similar way.

or process information about their environments, at least in some rudimentary sense. Thus, when its defenders claim that initiation endows the pupil with a mind, they must mean some species of mindedness. And it is trivial that caregivers and the broader linguistic community play a causal enabling role in a child's development of rational and conceptual capacities. Likewise, it is trivial that many concepts (for example, the concepts involved in games like chess) could not be possessed unless one was initiated into a particular form of life. So how does the view go beyond these trivialities while avoiding absurdity?

It is useful here to consider Sellars' famous remark:

> [I]n characterizing an episode or a state as that of *knowing*, we are not giving an empirical description of that episode or state; we are placing it in the logical space of reasons, of justifying and being able to justify what one says. (Sellars 1963, §36)

Sellars' focus here is knowledge, but the point generalizes to things done for reasons, including the use of words. When a subject occupies a position in the space of reasons, for example by referring to an object with a name, by making a claim about objects in her environment, by forming a belief, or by acting for a reason, she does so on the basis of her own assessment of the appropriateness of doing so. Such a move manifests reason in the demanding sense that it realizes her capacity to be moved by what she herself takes to be reasons, rather than the operations of some subpersonal part of her.[3]

This characterization is vague, of course, but it is sufficient for our purposes. The Transformational view holds that mindedness is achieved through initiation into a form of life. If the form of mindedness in question is that manifest in making moves in the space of reasons, then we need not deny outright that creatures without language or humans prior to initiation into a form of life lack minds, nor need we deny that humans are born capable of developing rational capacities by means of initiation. The Transformational view requires only that such initiation is constitutive of and necessary for that development. Such a view is clearly more robust than the platitudes about the causal enabling role of caregivers or the idea that some concepts are socially constructed.[4]

How the details get filled in will depend upon how one understands conceptual and rational capacities. But the basic thought is that through engagement with others the child becomes capable of entertaining abstract thoughts by decontextualizing representations from her concrete environment and engaging in sophisticated forms of reasoning.[5] By "sophisticated forms of reasoning" and abstract thought I mean such cognitive achievements as drawing causal inferences about

[3]Luntley (2009) and Bakhurst (2011) also frame the question facing the Transformative view in terms of the child's entrance into the space of reasons.

[4]The Transformational view should not be interpreted as holding that all concepts are socially constructed, though. See Bakhurst (2011), Chap. 3 for a helpful discussion.

[5]See Bakhurst (2011), Chap. 1 and Williams (1999) for further discussion of this process.

unobservable objects and operating with concepts defined in terms of other concepts. Children are bootstrapped into these sophisticated modes of thought because their caregivers put in place a structure and environment in which they (the children) are able to take advantage of what McDowell calls "a store of historically accumulated wisdom about what is a reason for what" (McDowell 1994: 126). On the Transformational view, then, rational and conceptual abilities are inheritances of culture. The question that we are considering is what abilities on the part of the pupil must be presupposed in order for this inheritance to occur.

3 Meeting of Minds

What do we mean by a meeting of minds? Often we mean a mutual or shared awareness of another's mind as directed at some joint venture or feature of the shared environment. To say that education involves a meeting of minds is just to say that it is a joint venture between pupil and teacher that arises as a result of mutual understanding of intentions and other mental states and that through this mutual understanding the pupil is able to come to see things as the teacher does. If initiation into a form of life is a meeting of minds, then it too must involve, on the part of the pupil, both an awareness of the other's mind and an act of taking on the perspective of the other, seeing things and responding to them as she does. These two aspects of a meeting of minds raise difficulties for the Transformational view.

Imagine a language game played with a small child involving the word "cat." Suppose the child is visiting relatives and encounters a cat for the first time. When the cat comes into view, the child is transfixed. Her parents point at it or bring it near and say "cat." Now two things are worth emphasizing here. First, the child does not have a grasp on what cats are prior to learning the game and, second, the child's grasp on what cats are will be shaped, at this early stage, by what her parents and she do with the cat. If the cat is rabid, the parents especially protective, or the child allergic, then calling out "cat!" will sound a note of warning. This game will involve calling attention to something the child should flee from or perhaps fear. Knowing what cats are, here, will require knowing them as things to be avoided. Competence in this basic game requires both that the child become aware of the parent's intentions concerning the cat and that she, in turn, attend to and respond to the cat in the same manner.

Education as a meeting of minds involves awareness of other minds and internalizing another's perspective. This raises difficulties for the Transformational view, since it is natural to suppose that both acts on the part of the pupil must involve sophisticated reasoning. There are, then, two objections to the Transformational view I want to consider, both straightforward. First, if education involves a meeting of minds, then the pupil or initiate must, in entering into an educational encounter, be aware of other minds. If the mental states of others are "hidden" behind behavior, then the pupil could only gain awareness of those states by means of inference. It would follow that education presupposes the capacity for

inference; hence, education cannot endow the pupil with such a capacity, as the Transformational view holds. Second, initiation into a form of life involves the child inheriting a point of view from her teachers by responding to and accepting an invitation from the teacher to do so, as described above. But it is difficult to see how taking up an invitation to see things a certain way could be anything other than an act of reason (Luntley 2008). I discuss awareness of minds first and then move to taking up another's point of view.

A meeting of minds presupposes awareness of the other's mind. On the dominant view mindreading is achieved by means of inference. Consider the following representative remark:

> Because the mental states of others (and indeed of ourselves) are completely hidden from the senses, they can only ever be inferred. Thinking about these unobservable states is a subtle business indeed, but in one way or another an essential part of our social life. (Leslie 1987: 139)

In a similar spirit, Sartre writes of the other that it is "only the outer shell which I possess" (Sartre 1943: 511). To gain knowledge of what lies beneath that shell requires reasoning about causes. There is disagreement in the literature about the form these inferences are supposed to take. According to Simulationism, one ascribes a mental state to another after simulating what mental state one would oneself experience were one to exhibit similar behavior or find oneself in similar circumstances (Goldman 2006). According to the "Theory Theory," mental state ascriptions derive from a folk theory about how invisible mental states, understood as theoretical entities, are causally related to behavior (Gopnik and Meltzoff 1997). But for our purposes what matters is what these approaches agree on: Awareness of another's mind is a result of observing behavior and drawing inferences about the unobservable mental states that cause it.

An inferential epistemology of other minds raises problems for the Transformational view because the following three claims are inconsistent:

Inferentialism: Knowledge of other minds is achieved by inference from observations of behavior.
Meeting: Education involves a meeting of minds and so presupposes the pupil's capacity for mindreading.
Transformational View: Education endows the pupil with capacities for reasoning and conceptual thought.

If education is a meeting of minds, then the pupil must already possess, to some degree, the capacity for mindreading. By Inferentialism, that capacity is the capacity for reasoning. But that means that education could not equip the pupil with that capacity, as the Transformational view has it.[6]

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[6]It won't help to insist that, according to its advocates, the analogical and theoretical reasoning involved are implicit. If education is a meeting of minds, then it involves personal level awareness on the part of the pupil. If minds are hidden, as Inferentialists hold, then this awareness must be mediated by inferences.

A natural response is to reject meeting on the ground that it overintellectualizes the achievements of the initiate and leaves no room for the Transformational view. Instead, we ought to distinguish education that involves reasoning from the training of the initiate. Earlier I referred to this as an Empiricist model of learning. Wittgenstein is often read as opting for this solution, and for good reason (Huemer 2006; Williams 2010). By the way of clarifying his use of the word "training," he writes:

> I am using the word 'trained' in a way strictly analogous to that in which we talk of an animal being trained to do certain things. It is done by means of example, reward, punishment, and suchlike. (BB, 77)[7]

Wittgenstein seems to draw a sharp contrast between training and teaching, where the latter consists in reasoning with the pupil and offering explanations and the former is more like conditioning (Huemer 2006). Conditioning is nonrational and presupposes little awareness on the part of the pupil. "[T]he child, I should like to say, learns to react in such and such a way; and in so reacting it doesn't so far know anything. Knowing only begins at a later level" (OC §538). If initiation into a form of life consists in training and this is understood as a form of conditioning, then it would be out of place to think that initiation into a form of life involves a meeting of minds.

However, regardless of whether we attribute it to Wittgenstein, we should reject this Empiricist view, which implausibly portrays the child as a passive recipient.[8] It is difficult if not impossible to understand how a process of conditioning can result in anything other than rigid dispositions to respond to what has been confronted before. But initiation into a form of life endows the child with the ability to creatively and intelligently apply concepts in novel circumstances while being guided by what she has been taught before. That is, unless the child is actively engaged from the beginning, it is very difficult to see how she could come to exhibit what Michael Luntley calls "responsible creativity" (Luntley 2009: 697). We want our account of education to portray the initiate as active and engaged with her teacher in a genuine meeting of minds. We should hold onto the thesis I called Meeting. It follows that defenders of the Transformational view must reject Inferentialism about other minds. I think Wittgenstein offers a way of doing this, to which I turn in the next sections.

One might reject the way I have framed the issues here for the following reason. On the Transformational view our reason responsiveness is an endowment of education. But reason responsiveness comes in inferential and non-inferential forms.

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[7]Following convention, titles for Wittgenstein's works are abbreviated (PI = Philosophical Investigations, BBB = The Blue and Brown Book, OC = On Certainty, RPP I = Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology I, RPP II = Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology II, Z = Zettel), with section (§) or page number (p.), with full citation and initials in the References.

[8]I do not read Wittgenstein's harsh use of the word "training" to commit him to a version of Empiricism, but, as mentioned, I won't take up the point here.

So the difficulty of combining the Transformational view with the thesis I called Meeting relies only on the idea that a meeting of minds involves knowledge, of whatever kind, and so presupposes an ability to respond to reasons. Inferentialism is a red herring.

But this would be too quick. As noted earlier, defenders of the Transformational view must make room for forms of mindedness lacking sophisticated rational capacities. The Transformational view holds that this form of mindedness is different in kind from genuine reason responsiveness and that the latter is an achievement resulting from initiation. This leaves room for the idea that the process of initiation exploits the child's awareness of her environment. The question is whether the minds of others can figure in that awareness. If awareness of other minds is only achieved by means of inference, then it could not figure in the initiate's awareness, understood along the lines of the Transformational view. So Inferentialism is a serious obstacle to the plausibility of that view.

4 Perceiving Minds

That Wittgenstein rejects Inferentialism about other minds is well known. Consider the following remarks.

> In general I do not surmise fear in him—I *see* it. I do not feel that I am deducing the probable existence of something inside from something outside… (RPP II, §170)

> Consciousness in another's face. Look into someone else's face, and see the consciousness in it, and a particular *shade* of consciousness. You see on it, in it, joy, indifference, interest, excitement, torpor, and so on. The light in other people's faces. Do you look into *yourself* in order to recognize the fury in *his* face? It is there as clearly as in your own breast. (And what does one want to say? That someone else's face stimulates me to imitate it, and so that I feel small movements and muscular tensions on my own part, and *mean* the sum of these? Nonsense! Nonsense! —for you are making suppositions instead of just describing. If your head is haunted by explanations here, you will neglect to bear in mind the facts which are most important.) (RPP I, §927)

Remarks like these run throughout the later works.[9] As I understand it, the view is as follows. Attention to plain facts and reflection on our actual interactions with others reveal that we often perceive the mental states of others directly by observing expressive behavior. When a person grits her teeth, gets red in the face, or shouts, her anger is thereby something that I can observe. We engage in neither inference nor simulation in order to arrive at mental state ascriptions since the pains, emotions, and other mental states of others are in plain view for us. To suppose otherwise is to be gripped by a view of what mental states *must* be like—hidden

[9]See also PI §244, PI §284, RPP1 §1070, Z §225, Z §472, for a start.

internal items—rather than attention to how we actually interact with others. I take this to mean that, for Wittgenstein, it would be wrong to think of his perceptual view as a bit of psychological theorizing. Instead, he asks us to consider an experience of confronting an angry face. When we do this, we should realize that it is extremely difficult and unnatural to describe what we are presented with other than mentalistically. Hence, what we are presented with in these remarks is a series of descriptions and reflections that remind us that we are not forced to accept the Inferential view.

Given that this is how Wittgenstein conceives of the dialectic, it would be misguided to expect him to offer anything like a theory of either expression or the perception of mental states. Whether that is the right way to see things is unclear. One might think that however natural it is to talk of "seeing anger in another's face" it is far from clear that such talk is not metaphorical or elliptical. Thus, one might think, against Wittgenstein, that we are owed an explanation before we accept the perceptual view, for example, an explanation of the relation between mental states and expressive behavior. I want to remain neutral about this. That is because our concern is not with defending the perceptual view in detail but rather determining whether that view can be put in the service of the Transformational account of education. I'll consider two reasons for thinking it cannot, one concerning the scope of the perceptual view and another concerning whether the idea of perceiving mental states is sufficient to account for a meeting of minds. I'll discuss the first in the rest of this section and consider the second in the next section.

The worry is as follows: In order to grasp meanings through initiation, the child must become aware of the intentions of her teachers. However, insofar as it is at all plausible that we perceive mental states, this is restricted to states like emotions or pains. Intentions cannot be perceived. Therefore, the perceptual view cannot be put in the service of the Transformational view.

Interestingly, this is a point on which Wittgenstein and Anscombe disagreed. Wittgenstein holds that intentions can be perceived by observing their natural expressions. He writes: "What is the natural expression of an intention?—Look at a cat when it stalks a bird; or a beast when it wants to escape" (PI §647). By contrast, in *Intention* Anscombe claims that "intention appears to be something that we can express, but which brutes (which e.g. do not give orders) can *have,* though lacking any distinct expression of intention" (Anscombe 2000: 5). We cannot perceive intentions because there cannot be natural expressions of intention in non-linguistic behavior. One thing that Anscombe might have been thinking is that an intention picks out an action under a particular description and nothing in one's non-linguistic behavior could do that. Suppose a cat stalks a bird before leaping up to a bird bath, splashing, and then grabbing it. Presumably the cat does not splash in the bath *intentionally* yet it is hard to see how anything in the stalking behavior could rule that out (or let it in if it was indeed a part of the cat's intention). In short, a limitation of expressive behavior is that it is too coarse-grained to show the intentional object of a mental state.

Here are three quick responses. First, in the case of intention, the object is just the action, which can often be observed. Now it seems clear that the intentional

object might not always be on display: You might observe a cat stalking and not see the bird it is heading toward; hence, you could not take the behavior as an expression of the intention to stalk *that* bird. But that seems to leave in place the idea that distinctive gestures or patterns of behavior might count as expressions of intentions to stalk, flee, and so on. Second, we started with the thought that if any mental states can be perceived, then emotions can. But emotions are often expressed in a way that also embodies one's intentions. My fear of the cat might be expressed by the way I cautiously step back from it, revealing also my intention to avoid it. It may, then, be wrong to drive a wedge between emotions and intentions here. Third prelinguistic children are able to detect and respond to playful behavior, which suggests they respond to expressions of intentions to play (Reddy 2008).

Nevertheless, it should be uncontroversial that there are not natural expressions of belief and that initiate learners cannot become aware of another's beliefs by observation. And there is sound empirical evidence—the "false belief test"—that indicates that children do not possess the concept of belief before they possess relatively sophisticated capacities for causal reasoning. If this is right, then the meeting of minds involved in initiation into a form of life must not require that the pupil grasp the beliefs of the teacher. That might sound surprising. It is certainly something the Transformational view must be able to explain. I will return to it at the end of the next section.

5 Mimicking and Sharing

As we have seen, the Transformational view can only be a plausible account of initiate learning if there is non-inferential awareness of other minds. Wittgenstein holds that there is such awareness and warns us that it is a result of forgetting plain facts to think otherwise. Granting this, we might still ask whether non-inferential awareness of other minds is enough to make possible the meeting of minds involved in initiation into a form of life.

We have already seen reason to suppose it is not. Earlier I claimed that for a meeting of minds to result in a child's competence in a language-game she must be able to take on the point of view of her caregivers, inheriting their outlook and concepts. Grasping that the other has a particular point of view is necessary for this achievement, but not sufficient. Obviously, one can recognize that another sees things a certain way but refrain from agreeing. In addition to awareness here, it would seem that a kind of decision is required. The pupil must recognize the teacher's invitation to see things a certain way and accept this invitation on the basis of her assessment of the invitation's merit. But this would seem to be a matter of reasoning on behalf of the pupil. So it looks like initiation into a form of life presupposes rational capacities even if other minds are observable features of our environments.

But we should not take the perceptual view of other minds as a complete model for engagement. Doing so invites us to think of education as a matter of a child internalizing what she recognizes as an external sign by means of rational acceptance. But perhaps the picture of internalization as rational acceptance is overly intellectualized. Clearly it must be if the Transformational view is correct. But what alternative is there?

In addition to his discussions on perceiving other minds, Wittgenstein emphasized the connection between our awareness of other minds and our propensity to mimic and share mental states.

> If someone sees a smile and does not know it for a smile, does not understand it as such, does he see it differently from someone else who understands it? – He mimics it differently, for instance.
>
> Hold the drawing of a face upside down and you can't recognize the expression of the face. Perhaps you can see that it is smiling, but not exactly what kind of smile it is. You cannot imitate the smile or describe it more exactly. (PI, Pt. II, p. 198)
>
> 'I see that the child wants to touch the dog, but doesn't dare'. How can I see that? – Is this description of what is seen on the same level as a description of moving shapes and colors? Is an interpretation in question? Well, remember that you may also mimic a human being who would like to touch something but doesn't dare. (RPP1 §1066)

According to Wittgenstein, when we are confronted with a smiling face the most natural description of what we are confronted with is mentalistic: We see happiness rather than a mouth turned up at a certain angle. But, of course, one could represent another's face in those terms. Wittgenstein's preoccupation throughout the discussion of mimicry is to understand what the difference is between representing faces mentalistically and not. If someone could not see a face as happy, then in mimicking it he would attempt to shape his mouth to mirror the angles and proportions of the other's face. (It would no doubt be quite an awkward enterprise.) But if I see your face as happy, then in mimicking it I will express happiness myself. As the first quoted passage suggests, Wittgenstein thinks that our ability to come up with apt descriptions of other minds is caught up in our ability to imitate them. How exactly might this work and how might it bear on the difficulties facing the Transformational view?

The quoted passages show that Wittgenstein does not think of our capacity for imitation as a means for drawing theoretical inferences ("interpretation"). We also know that he rejects the idea that we arrive at mental state ascriptions through analogical reasoning. It is natural to wonder how else imitation might aid in our awareness of other minds. Here is a suggestion. Our ability to imitate others aids our understanding of their minds because it exploits our natural ability to *identify with* and *share* mental states. A good imitation of a joyful smile is not achieved by some kind of contortion, but simply by expressing joy oneself. As he suggests throughout the discussion of smiling in particular, our awareness of another's joy is

achieved through our smiling. If this is not simulation, then it must draw on a propensity to genuinely share another's mental states.

This is relevant to the Transformational view because this capacity is also plausibly at play in initiate learning. Consider again the game with the cat. The child, mystified by the new creature, looks to her parents for guidance. The parents respond in fear, discomfort, and so on. These expressions are manifest for the child and also serve as a kind of commentary on the cat.[10] As we might put it, the parents' expressions of fear are a kind of proto-judgment to the effect that the cat is dangerous and to be avoided. If the child is naturally attuned to the emotions and intentions of her parents, then she will be disposed to share in these attitudes and thereby take on board the relevant commentary. So the transmission of outlook that constitutes initiation into a form of life is achieved, at this early stage, without complex reasoning or abstract thought. This capacity is exercised in mimicking another's face without analogical or inferential mediation.[11]

Imitation is neither a result nor a stage in reasoning. It is instead what Wittgenstein calls a "primitive reaction. "

> It is a help here to remember that it is a primitive reaction to tend, to treat, the part that hurts when someone else is in pain…
>
> But what is the word "primitive" meant to say here? Presumably that this sort of behaviour is pre-linguistic: that a language-game is based on it, that it is the prototype of a way of thinking and not the result of thought. (Z §540–41)

If internalization of a point of view was a form of rational acceptance, then it would be a move within a language game already in place. But these reactions and this attunement are "primitive" in Wittgenstein's terms because they are not the result of reasoning.[12] The child naturally desires to be like her caregivers and is disposed to share their reactions. Internalization of commentary, (e.g. that the cat is to be feared and avoided) is not a matter of rational acceptance of something grasped prior to internalization. The reverse is the case: The child grasps the commentary by internalizing the emotion that embodies it.

If we supplement a perceptual epistemology of other minds with an account of imitation and sharing mental states as primitive reactions, we have the resources for a full-blooded picture of a meeting of minds prior to the acquisition of rational capacities. This view has two other benefits worth mentioning. First, it can make sense of what remained puzzling from our discussion of the perceptual epistemology of other minds. There are not natural expressions of belief, hence, no way for prelinguistic children to grasp the beliefs of others. That made it look mysterious

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[10]The idea that expressions of emotion serve as a commentary on the shared environment is mentioned by Roessler (2006).

[11]If this is Wittgenstein's view, then he must think that the same capacity at play in initiate learning is exercised in our mature knowledge of other minds, which is an intriguing suggestion.

[12]The place of primitive, animal reactions in education is emphasized in Stickney (2008a).

how perception could aid in a child's acceptance of another person's outlook. On the present view the pupil need not become aware of her teacher's beliefs in order to enter into the language game. That is because the process of accepting another's point of view occurs without the question of divergences of perspective arising at all. In order for a shared perspective to arise there must be agreement, but this can occur without the child's grasping the possibility of disagreement. Second, the view may help us to understand what Wittgenstein had in mind when he wrote that, "[i]f language is to be a means of communication there must be agreement not only in definitions but also (queer as this may sound) in judgments" (PI §242).[13] The suggestion is that the agreement in judgments can be achieved by the kind of sharing of outlook described here, an agreement that draws only on primitive, natural reactions, and which forms the foundation of language games.

6 Conclusion

My goal in this paper has been to raise an objection against the Transformational account of education and to sketch an account of engagement with other minds that can meet it. At a minimum, I hope to have shown that those sympathetic to the Transformational view ought to take seriously the question of how we engage other minds. The crude idea of training so often invoked will not suffice, no matter how often one chants the mantra about the dawning of light on the whole (OC §141). It is also not enough here to appeal to a perceptual epistemology of other minds of the kind endorsed by Wittgenstein, intriguing and important as that is. The focus on education as *engagement* with other minds makes this clear. Instead, we must take seriously and try to understand the picture of engagement hinted at in Wittgenstein's suggestive remarks about imitation, mimicry, and primitive reactions to the minds of others. Our capacity to mimic exploits our natural tendency to share and identify with the minds of others. It is this natural, primitive attunement that allows for initiation into a form of life and the development of rational capacities.

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[13]Thanks to Jeff Stickney for drawing my attention to the relevance of this passage.

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Wittgenstein and Judging the Soundness of Curriculum Reforms: Investigating the Math Wars

Jeff Stickney

Abstract Wittgenstein's rule-following argument draws considerable attention: its policy significance for education, very little. Confronted with rule deviation, what justifies claims to 'sound'/'unsound' implementation of curricular reforms, or reasonable adaptation? Playing on John Mighton's *Possible Worlds* scenario, I probe these questions on different planes of inquiry through similar vignettes, focused on his ethically aimed math training program (JUMP). Surveying the topic space, I first touch on fervent debate between Rorty and his critics, Putnam and McDowell, over 'solidarity' grounding judgment. Must 'soundness' claims be 'answerable to the world,' and if so, how do we justify our educational practices? Is sharing a 'sense'/'sensibility' (a fact/value) of 'pedagogic soundness' sufficient to uphold its veracity? I then explore the controversy between contending paradigms of discovery learning and Mighton's guided training in math fundamentals, illustrating opposition between liberal-analytic definitions of teaching with training. In terms of student diversity, which possible worlds beckon account? Finally, drawing on Medina, we see the problem of encountering alien practices through the lens of 'logical insanity.' Faced with seemingly 'unsound' reforms, teacher resistance acts as healthy, conservative brakes; alternately, recalcitrance can normatively blind teachers to innovation, effectively stalling improvement in learning. Not an *either/or* in terms of grounding, balance is advocated between the need for (a) faithful immersion in demonstrative practices in order to understand (immanently) their sense within the flow of classroom life; and, (b) the professional need for reasons or warrants—liberal-analytic, rational justification motivating the exertion of energy needed to sustain change initiatives.

A portion of this paper was given at the PESGB *Gregynog* Conference, 'Orientations Towards Wittgenstein' (Wales 2015), hosted by Paul Standish and Naomi Hodgson.

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M.A. Peters and J. Stickney (eds.), *A Companion to Wittgenstein on Education*,
DOI 10.1007/978-981-10-3136-6_32

Keywords Wittgenstein · Mighton · Mathematics training · Discovery learning · Liberal-analytic philosophy · Rorty · Putnam · Mcdowell

> Nothing seems to me less likely than that a scientist or mathematician who reads me should be seriously influenced in the way he works…. I ought never to hope for more than indirect influence. (CV, pp. 61–62)[1]

1 Judging 'Soundness'

Educators working in the midst of 'madness' may share Wittgenstein's lament that 'philosophers have to cure themselves of many sicknesses before arriving at notions of sound human understanding' (RFM: IV.53). Frequently cast into bewildering change initiatives, teachers often wonder whether these are arbitrary, useless, perfunctory, or even counter-productive. What warrants judgment that some teaching practices or curricula are 'sound' and others relatively 'insane' or injurious? Inspecting varying reactions to new pedagogic rules governing math education, I build upon Wittgenstein's rule-following argument in the *Philosophical Investigations* (§§143–242; Stickney 2005, 2008a, b; McDowell 1998): exploring from different angles where rules and their criterion of success reside. Not just *another* rule-following paper, here we step aside from Wittgenstein's illuminating scenes of pupils extending numerical series (games of +2, PI §§185, 208)[2] to enter more politically charged, *parallel worlds* within educational reform. Linking epistemology with political philosophy, teachers' intransigence and improvisation with curricular rules reveal scenes of paradigm conflict: broader terrain where professional autonomy and accountability come into view. Playing off John Mighton's screenplay for the movie *Possible Worlds* (2000): Like George (Tom

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[1]Following convention, titles for Wittgenstein's works are abbreviated (RFM = Remarks on the Foundation of Mathematics, BB = The Blue and Brown Books, LC = Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief, Z = Zettel, PI = Philosophical Investigations, OC = On Certainty, LFM = Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics, WL = Wittgenstein's Lectures, CV = Culture and Value, LW1 = Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology, PO = Philosophical Occasions), with section (§) or page number (p.), with full citation and initials (e.g., RFM) in the References.

[2]When a teacher instructs a pupil to add 2 to 100, 200, 300, ….why is it 'wrong', he wonders, for a pupil to add 4 instead, when reaching 1000, 2000 …—frustrating teachers expecting 1000 + 2 (PI §185)?

> We say to him 'Look what you've done!'—He doesn't understand. We say: 'You were meant to add two: look how you began the series!' (PI §185)

> I do it, he does it after me; and I influence him by expression of agreement, rejection, expectation, encouragement. I let him go his way, or hold him back; and so on.
>
> Imagine witnessing such teaching. None of the words would be explained by means of itself; there would be no logical circle. (PI §208)

McManus) and Joyce (Tilda Swinton) reliving the same scenes in parallel worlds, I find myself probing this topic repeatedly on different planes of application.[3]

Pairing discussion of math curricula with scattered remarks about training and learning in Wittgenstein's corpus can be illustrative but also hazardous. Not advocating that we implement the pedagogical techniques found in Wittgenstein's later writings, I note that Mighton's math training initiative in Canada and the UK —Junior Undiscovered Math Prodigies (JUMP)—employs quasi-Wittgensteinian methods. Basically, JUMP uses a 'guided approach to discovery' (e.g., unraveling puzzles and discerning patterns/rules/algorithms/theorems); steps are broken down into simplified language, often using models to aid comprehension. 'Guided repetition and practice are essential,' with explicit instruction needed in developing facility with math notation (McIlroy 2010). Compare Wittgenstein's philosophical reflection on pedagogy:

> Of course, we teach children the multiplication tables in the form of little sentences, but is that essential? Why shouldn't they simply: learn to calculate? And when they can do so haven't they learnt arithmetic? (RFM, I.143)

In a contrasting thought experiment, Wittgenstein imagines an inspiration model of mathematics in which answers come to children intuitively[4]:

> It would also be possible to imagine such a training in a sort of arithmetic. Children could calculate, each in his own way – as long as they listened to their inner voice and obeyed it. Calculating in this way would be like a sort of composing. (PI §233)

It seems obvious to many parents and educators that it would be difficult to gain traction or progress in mathematics or language learning if one abandoned training in fundamentals, hoping for solutions and grammatical rules to simply appear in the heads of children. Struck by JUMP's similarity with Wittgenstein's builder's language (the three-word language: 'block'/'slab'/'hilarious,' appearing in Mighton's movie script for *Possible Worlds*), and finding his Masters Philosophy dissertation (Mighton 1982) on the *Philosophical Investigations*, I discovered that Wittgenstein's influence permeates Mighton's artistic, philosophical and educational thinking.[5] Asking John if similarity was more than coincidence, he replied (Toronto: October, 2014):

> I'm not sure exactly how Wittgenstein influenced my work for JUMP– it would be interesting to see if any of the methods used in JUMP derive from or are in keeping with Wittgenstein's ideas.

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[3]Addressing Hirst's (1971) deceptively simple question 'How, upon entering classrooms, do inspectors know 'teaching' is taking place and not crazy and fuzzy things in its name?' I wrote companion papers responding from Wittgenstein (Stickney 2009a) and Foucault (Stickney 2012).

[4]Wittgenstein was aware of the brilliant, inspired mathematician Srinvasa Ramanujan working with Cambridge Professor G.H. Hardy in 1914 (see PI §144 and Z §461 re: Indian mathematicians). Coincidentally, this book was produced in Ramanujan City, India.

[5]Mighton was a consultant on, and even made a guest appearance in, the movie 'Good Will Hunting' (1997) in which Matt Damon played a custodian at MIT who turns out to be a math prodigy (also starring Ben Affleck and Robin Williams).

> But I know that Wittgenstein had a profound effect on my work in theatre and in mathematics. I learned a way of thinking from him that I apply everywhere (in particular, asking if things have to be a certain way or if we are being misled by language). I also feel a deep attraction to his mystical perception of the world and love his prose style and the general style of his work.
>
> I refer to Wittgenstein several times in my book *The End of Ignorance*. Part of the central argument of that book is that in education we are constantly seduced by questionable arguments because they are framed in very appealing and progressive sounding language. Unfortunately the ideas behind those arguments do a great deal of damage to kids and condemn our society to deep inequalities. (They also fly in the face of rigorous research in cognitive science.) I also look at some of the ways educators are misled by language (through equivocation and so on). So in that respect, I would say that Wittgenstein had an influence on my work in education.
>
> JUMP has gathered a large body of evidence that suggests that it would be worthwhile for schools to test the program, but we are facing a lot of resistance from math consultants. The school system unfortunately is more faith based than evidence based. We are trying to change that.

Caught up in the current 'math wars' (Carlson 2014), JUMP has received both praise and visceral reaction among educators and school districts. As Mighton suggests, blind opposition to JUMP shows how dogmatic faith in the venerable discovery model undermines open inquiry and professional development into scaffolding methods for improving math competency. Conservancy of practice can act as necessary brakes on senseless initiatives but enthrallment in established models also has negative implications when preventing educators from experimenting with progressive methods. My goal in this chapter is not, however, to settle the dispute, but to use it to reveal the shallow ground on which educators decide for themselves the veracity of these practices.

Drawing on Josè Medina's reading of Wittgenstein (2002), I explore this contest through the lens of 'logical insanity': alienation experienced when confronting seemingly senseless practices. Understanding JUMP's regimen of math training comes gradually through initiation. Appreciation also hinges, however, on second-order recognition of the contrast between the *normativity* involved in guided inquiry into math competencies and higher ethical, liberal aims of autonomy and self-fulfillment entailed in JUMP's goals. Virulent reactions to math 'training' throw light on the contrast between liberal-analytic conceptions of teaching as 'the giving of reasons' (Hirst 1971) and Wittgenstein's description of training into normative practices: initially compared with animal training (BB, pp. 70–79) and ultimately depicted as giving 'certainties' grounded in a *form of life*—'beyond justification' as 'something animal' (not requiring ratiocination, OC §§358–9, 475).

> I cannot describe how (in general) to employ rules, except by teaching you, training you to employ rules. (Z §318)
>
> Any explanation has its foundation in training. (Educators ought to remember this.) (Z §419)

Adherence to liberal-analytic pictures of learning makes suspect Wittgenstein's scenes of training, but the perplexing relationship between inculcation and autonomy within rules in Wittgenstein's later philosophy does not entail abandonment of

precious liberal values. Ostensibly, initiation into *forms of life*, both at rudimentary levels and within the 'space of reasons,' comes into perspective here as our common ground for judging teaching practices as sound or unsound.[6]

2 Indeterminacy of Curricular Rules and Shallow Grounds for Pedagogies: 'Solidarity' Versus 'Answering to the World'

Wittgenstein's summation of 'knowing how to go on' in a number series (§§179–200, cf. §151)—that pupils deviating from instructors' intended rules raises the paradox that 'no course of action could be determined by a rule, because every course of action can be made out to accord with the rule' (PI §201)—led Kripke (1982) into the much-debated interpretation that Wittgenstein reveals the 'indeterminacy' of rules and therefore of correct meaning/use of expressions (cf. OC §61; Wright 2001: 117). Wright (2001: 11) responds to Kripke's scepticism by noting that people do not coherently doubt *most* meaningful expressions in daily life; furthermore, *more* precise rules preclude notions that there are indefinitely many, equally good alternatives 'in accordance.' Curricular expectations, for instance, can be quite precise (e.g., at *this* age, 'all students *will/should* know the multiplication table up to 10,' which is clear but unachievable, drawing Daggett's retort: 'We don't buy children *age-specific* shoes'[7]).

Myriad interpretations of rules in situ present challenging real-life problems. Teaching practices differ within the same curricular and policy frameworks (in/among schools and departments), resulting in archipelagos of divergent evolution instead of uniform landscapes and 'aligned' school systems envisioned by educational administrators (Stickney 2015). Who decides which adaptation is right? Plurality demonstrates how shallow and fragile the desired 'consensus' can be within education, but does not commit us to an 'isles-of-language' type relativity where incommensurability prevents communication or correction across differences (see Rorty 1991: 211; Burbules 2000: 52–3; Scheman 1996). Isolationism is defeatist, precluding negotiation among the agents for reasonable improvisation and 'freedoms within the rules' (Tully 2003).

Avoiding Kripke's quagmire, Wittgenstein's paradox gives pause to wonder when educational rules are indeterminate; arguably, in the company of neo-pragmatists, I want to hold onto the possibility of distinguishing occasions where choices are arbitrary from curricula and teaching moves that are more tightly bound with experience and agreements shared in practices: demonstrating utility

[6]Taking up this theme, Michael Luntley, Paul Smeyers, Paul Standish, Nicholas Burbules, Richard Smith, and I addressed these topics in both a PES panel and PESGB symposium in 2016.

[7]Bill Daggett, International Center for Leadership in Education. See http://premierespeakers.com/bill_daggett.

and (though exceedingly difficult to isolate) building upon causal and normative relations in teaching like scaffolding techniques. Although Wittgenstein was interested in these kinds of questions around effective pedagogy (see Savickey 1999, 2017), he distinguished these empirical and psychological pursuits from the philosophical or grammatical problems that occupied his later thinking. In his 1930s Cambridge lectures, he concluded that training as the cause that secures rule adherence drops out of view, as being irrelevant to his philosophical concern with how meaning and judgment range within shared limits as to what as reasonable or appropriate (see Medina 2002, 2006; Stickney 2017).

Judging pedagogic soundness, however, involves broader and more accessible controversy than etiological problems. Multiplicity of interpretation demonstrates there are often many ways of effectively muddling through on vague or conflicted educational policies, especially when administrators recognize complexities and allow for renegotiation within specific contexts (see Greenhalgh 2015: 211). But educators diminish their capacity for growth when harboring in mutually reinforced enclaves of blind habit or folk tradition (Dewey 1944). Cavell (1979) reminds us that in 'entering claims we are answerable for our assertions,' meaning educators cannot hide behind Wittgenstein's 'digging' aphorisms:

> How can he know how he is to continue a pattern by himself – whatever instruction you give him? – Well, how do I know? – If that means "Have I reasons?" the answer is: my reasons will soon give out. And then I will act, without reasons. (PI §211)

> If I have exhausted the justifications I have reached bedrock, and my spade is turned. Then I am inclined to say: "This is simply what I do." (PI §217)

As Hargreaves quips,[8] we rationally expect more justification for teaching methods than Julie Andrews' reply in *The Sound of Music*: 'These are a few of my favourite things.' 'For justification-minded philosophers of education,' however, Wittgenstein's rule-following cases reveal vicious circularity: More sweeping education reforms rely upon prior training into concepts and practices: 'Now, we must ask, how is all of education to be justified as the philosopher insists if significant parts of that education must already be taken for granted?' (McCarthy's 1995, 199). If judgments of 'suitability' rest upon foundations (concepts/customs/institutions/seeing-as) previously established through training, how can we step outside the circle, or at least glimpse ourselves circling without then seeking (in Ludwig's terms) 'greater depth' or succumbing to the 'disease' of trying to explain what can only be described (PI §109; cf. RFM: VI.31)?

Cognizant of this circularity, Putnam and McDowell offer criticisms worth considering before tunneling into Wittgenstein's notion of 'agreement in judgment' (PI §242; see Medina and Wood 2005). Normatively 'thick' cases like 'sound teaching' offer escape from 'entanglement' in the fact/value dichotomy (Putnam 2002, 34, re: 'cruel teachers'), not regarding these judgments as simply empirical or measurable questions of efficacy. As Putnam notes (126), citing Wittgenstein (PI,

[8]Andy Hargreaves, *Quest* conference (York Region, 2005).

p. 227), some learn to make such judgments better than others without then having the ability to teach how to do it, other than demonstrating or giving tips. But Wittgenstein grounds judgment of emotion and intention in percipience: 'Corrector prognoses will generally issue from the judgments of those with better knowledge of mankind' (PI, p. 227).

> To be sure, there is this: acquiring a knowledge of human nature; it is also possible to help someone with this, to give lessons, as it were, but one only points to cases, refers to certain traits, gives no hard and fast rules. (RPP II §607; cf. PI, p. 227)

Adopting an informed ethnographic view like Wittgenstein's implies astute observation of human behavior and culture.

> If we look at things from an ethnological point of view, does that mean that we are saying that philosophy is ethnology? No, it only means that we are taking up a position right outside so as to be able to see things *more objectively*. (CV, p. 37e)

Here I am taking up a position on the margins of the debate between Rorty and his critics, in order to throw light on the problem of whether certain forms of math training can be said to be grounded empirically, or whether they are at best supported by means of communal solidarity in practice. Accepting that even science rests upon presuppositions and epistemic values, some facts must be in place before values come into question: e.g., realist intuitions such as presuming the existence of different cultures capable of holding disparate views of how an 'objective' world works (Putnam, 143, contra Rorty). Wittgenstein's philosopher, however, is not trying to resolve whether traditional medicine or math teaching works, but is rather describing the grammatical context (*language games*) in which efficacy claims become regarded *as* certain. Not 'backsliding' into explanation of things as they are in themselves (Rorty 1999), Wittgenstein shows instead how '*Essence* is expressed by grammar' (PI §371). Exegetically, these statements appear to leave Wittgenstein's philosophical concerns squarely on the analytic side of Hume's fork, but with Quine it is fairer to say that Wittgenstein's philosophy eschews this dichotomy inherited from classical empiricism.

> Philosophical problems…are not empirical problems: they are solved, rather, by looking into the workings of our language, and that in such a way as to make us recognise those workings: in spite of an urge to misunderstand them. The problems are solved, not by giving new information, but by arranging what we have always known. Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language. (PI §109)

Following Wittgenstein into analytic philosophy, it is quite another thing to suppose one can pull up the drawbridge and proclaim teaching beyond the purview of empirical science. Siegel and Phillips (2013) indicate (perhaps unfairly) that Carr hazards this move in proclaiming that 'the forms of human association characteristic of educational engagement are not really apt for scientific or empirical study at all' (Carr 2003: 54–5).

> His reasoning is that educational processes cannot be studied empirically because they are processes of "normative initiation"—a position that as it stands begs the question by not making clear *why* such processes cannot be studied empirically. (Siegel and Phillips 2013)

There has to be more backing, educators commonly think, warranting asserted pedagogies than Foucault's historically decanted 'games of truth' or Rorty's 'solidarity' with agreeable practitioners (see Putnam 2002: 100). Addressing Rorty, McDowell (2000: 137) argues that philosophers risk losing their 'sanity' when rejecting the possibility that 'inquiry can be normatively beholden not just to current practice but to its subject matter.' Parsing 'soundness' through McDowell (135), avoiding pitfalls of linguistic idealism and anti-realism: 'Open-eyed to contingency,' we cannot afford a 'dismissive attitude to the very idea of making ourselves answerable to the world.'

> We must indeed avoid the illusion of transcendence…but we do not put our capacity to do so at risk if we insist that in claim-making we make ourselves answerable not just to the verdicts of our fellows but to the facts themselves. (McDowell 2000: 140)

Though McDowell cites scientific cases such as cold fusion, here we wonder whether restoration of 'facts' means there are 'right ways' of teaching math, attuned to 'how things really are' (134) in terms of techniques, capacities, and causal learning conditions. How can we weigh claims to veracity behind contending educational practices, without slipping back into logical positivism's *verificationism*, and, given student diversity, which *possible worlds* beckon account?

Forster (2004: 174) notes that Wittgenstein moved away from earlier positivistic notions of finding meaning through verification, often inquiring instead, 'How is the word learned?'

> Asking whether and how a proposition can be verified is only a particular way of asking "How d'you mean?" The answer is a contribution to the grammar of the proposition. (PI §353)

In cases explored below, meaning pivots around questions like: 'Am I *sure* that JUMP improves math competency for many, as of sensations that rain is imminent?' (see PI §354). Seeing these as grammatical rather than empirical questions, we nonetheless face problems of access to intelligibility. Must one train 'blindly' or devoutly in these math practices in order to grasp the answer or master techniques (cf. PI §198)? [Religious appropriations of Wittgenstein shelter in the affirmative (Kerr 1998).[9]] Forster notes opposition in Wittgenstein's later philosophy between the suggestion in *Philosophical Investigations* that one must be committed to the rule or grammar in order to grasp meaning, and a diversity thesis—especially

[9]Wittgenstein notes that members of religious *forms of life* reason differently in response to assertions about the final judgment (LC, pp. 53–55).

> But what men consider reasonable or unreasonable alters. At certain periods men find reasonable what at other periods they found unreasonable. And vice versa.
> But is there no objective character here?
> *Very* intelligent and well-educated people believe in the story of creation in the Bible, while others hold it is proven false, and the grounds of the latter are well known to the former. (OC §336)

prominent in posthumously published works such as *On Certainty* and *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics* (intended connection to the *Investigations*, PI, p. 232)—allowing intelligibility of alternate grammars and concepts (167). Forster finds exegetical resolution and more philosophical plausibility in taking the less severe interpretation among: (a) barring understanding if one has not joined into a social tradition; or (b) 'making social tradition a causal and normative obstacle preventing easy access' to alternate grammars or concepts (164). He compares this limitation on understanding 'others' with Wittgenstein's anti-sceptical thinking in *On Certainty*, where, without precluding interpretation of others, Wittgenstein emphasises limitations to what we can readily doubt. Entrenchment in 'world-pictures' causes us to feel 'intellectually very distant' from those who think differently (OC §108).

> How does it come about that doubt is not subject to arbitrary choice? – And that being so – might not a child doubt everything because it was so remarkably talented? (Z §409)
> A person can doubt only if he has learned certain things…. (Z §410)

Philosophically implausible, however, is the notion that we cannot bridge these differences when in daily life and in teaching, certainly, we so often do.

> I want to say: an education quite different from ours might also be the foundation of quite different concepts. For here life would run on differently. (Z §387–88; cf. PI, p. 230)

Defending Rorty's 'contingency' without invalidating critical reactions to his spade-turning concept of 'solidarity,' danger comes in going down dead-end paths of essentialism (1999). Instead of lamenting the poverty of our epistemic situation, post-linguistic turn, Rorty invites escape from metaphysical pictures long holding us captive (PI §115). With Dewey, he sees education as neither inducing or educing truth: Most often at the primary and secondary levels, it establishes what elders regard as true and then promotes more critical inquiry later in post-secondary education ('Socialization and Individuation,' 1999, p. 118). Today we push those limits on critical thinking into lower grades (see Stickney 2014a, b).[10]

Mocking his critics, Rorty defies epistemology's quest: 'truth can safely be neglected' (1999, p. 118), noting that 'Dewey put a new twist on the idea that if you take care of freedom, truth will take care of itself.' Redescribing this neo-pragmatist stance in an interview (2006: 142), 'It suggests that there are lots of ways of describing things; and that we choose among languages on the basis of utility, not

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[10]Not that Rorty or Dewey first noticed this contradiction; Kant's *Pedagogy* turned apposition between methods and goals in child rearing into a philosophical antinomy.

> One of the greatest problems in education is, How can subjection to lawful constraint be combined with the ability to make use of one's freedom? For constraint is necessary. How shall I cultivate freedom under conditions of compulsion? I ought to accustom my pupil to tolerate a restraint upon his freedom, and at the same time lead him to make good use of his freedom. (Kant 1904, §29, p. 131)

on the basis of correspondence to the true nature of experience.' It is not just local agreement of familiars that makes something right; as Rorty argues (2006: 32, 41 & 145), we can expand the context of contingent application and communication within the widest aperture of free and open inquiry—not reading philosophy as a quasi-scientific endeavor while awaiting geniuses like Wittgenstein to come along and 'kick over the chessboard.'

Viewed from Wittgenstein's post-foundational epistemology, criteria for what counts as 'sane' pedagogy are both infused with social values (linguistically filtered under descriptions 'all the way down') and defeasible, resting upon shifting bedrock—open to ranges of interpretation or alternate reactions based on enculturation into ingrained educational pictures and practices (PI §218; OC §§94–98; cf. Cavell 1990). Likewise, our language has evolved throughout our natural history, but the meaning of our concepts is under-determined by our personal and collective experience (PI, p. 230). Avoiding dead-end avenues or the *aporia* of philosophy, Wittgenstein observes that in flagging some assertions as 'true,' we have not demonstrated correspondences promised by robust empiricism.

> Well, if everything speaks for an hypothesis and nothing against it – is it then certainly true? One may designate it as such. – But does it certainly agree with reality, with the facts? With this question you are already going around in a circle.
>
> To be sure there is justification; but justification comes to an end. (OC §191–92)

Equally, he defends against accusations of 'reductionist behaviorism.'

> But doesn't anything physical correspond to it? I do not deny that. (And suppose it were merely our habituation to these concepts, to these language-games? But I am not saying that it is so.) If we teach a human being such-and-such a technique by means of examples – that he then proceeds like this and not that in a particular new case, or that in this case he gets stuck, and thus that this and not that is the 'natural' continuation for him: this of itself is an extremely important fact of. (Z §355)

Without hope of settling grand controversies in epistemology, or looking upon 'sound pedagogy' as resolvable someday by educational 'science' (PI §308; PI, p. 232), Wittgenstein directs us to look at how practitioners operate fluently or become entangled with 'agreements in judgment' (PI §242).

Have we come any further in resolving the original problem of whether math pedagogy is grounded empirically (an observational science of education) or rests tenuously upon collective agreements of the math and parent community? Not anticipating resolution of this paradox, let us enter into the math wars to witness application of the problem space opened up by asking if 'agreement in judgment' can be 'answerable to world,' lending educational relevancy to familiar polemics. As Wittgenstein clarifies, the goal is to shift the pivotal interest of our investigation from disengaged theorizing to perspicuous description of particular cases: 'the axis of reference of our examination must be rotated, but about the fixed point of our real need' (PI §108).

3 JUMP and *Possible Worlds*

> The civil status of a contradiction, or its status in civil life: there is the philosophical problem. (PI §125)

Junior Undiscovered Math Prodigies (JUMP) is a social justice initiative aimed at improving math competency for all students (Mighton 2014; see Bornstein 2011). Seeing the 'ubiquitous bell curve' (Mighton 2010) as an indication of methodological problems instead of dim realities, JUMP strives to place most students into the 80–90th percentile by not underestimating their ability. Developed by mathematician and playwright John Mighton, the charity aims to fulfill children's intellectual potential by providing teacher training and curricula based on 'guided discovery' in "meticulous, well formulated steps" (Mighton 2003, p. 43; cf. JUMP). If you miss a step in math you cannot go on; losing confidence stifles progress (Mighton 2012). Math teaching promoting anxiety is circularly linked with perpetuation of 'the myth of ability' (Mighton 2003). 'What if this belief itself was the main cause of the problem,' Mighton asks? His goal is to break the negative feedback loop whereby missing one step leads to failure at math, ultimately diminishing possibilities in life.

JUMP found considerable success in Vancouver, Ontario, the US and in London's inner-city Lambeth Borough. Empirical claims for validity are supported by two randomized, controlled studies (Mighton 2013), with the US Department of Education funding the $2.7 million, two-year study at Sick Kids Hospital in Toronto comparing students working from Ontario's math curriculum with another group in JUMP training. Coupled with statistical evidence are encouraging qualitative reports from teacher testimonials and district implementation studies. Despite mounting evidence, however, JUMP has come under fervent attack. Wittgenstein frequently reminds us that arguments rarely break out over solutions to mathematical problems (PI, pp. 225–7; see Hunter 1985), however tempers flare over its teaching techniques. Here, on the 'mathematics battleground,' we observe the convergence of facts and values (Putnam 2002, 36) in an ethically 'thick' problem of what constitutes 'sound teaching.'

Opposition to JUMP is rooted in an alternate picture: Discovery learning (broadly conceived) belongs to a 'paradigm' (Kuhn 1996; see Stickney 2006) or 'social imaginary' (Taylor 2004) grounded in Rousseau (1979) and Dewey's (1938) progressive, applied-learning philosophies. Some versions include directed investigation: not simply dropping students into problem spaces to 'figure it out your-self.' Fearing 'drill-n-kill' methods, JUMP's detractors also draw tacitly on presuppositions and values inherited distally from the professoriate's immersion in the liberal-analytic school of philosophy of education (c. 1960s–90s; Hirst 1971; Spieker 1991): reasonable suspicions that rudimentary training is more akin to conditioning or indoctrinating into unshakable, irrational mindsets than teaching

pupils how to weigh evidence and demand justifications.[11] Education in this liberal-analytic mode of thinking has been quite successful in armouring teachers against administrative efforts to indoctrinate or proselytize them into new 'paradigms' of education, as representatives of the various liberal arts, autonomous professionals reasonably demand evidence or justification for changing practice (Stickney 2015). So it's not that educators are wrong to hold these fears, or like post-analytic philosopher Aaron Ridley (1998)—drawing on Collingwood—to 'inveigh' against education reforms that reduce teaching to the 'supine' act of transferring technique: purveying learning skills or mere craft instead of engaging in more noble, liberal arts of making finer distinctions. But most artistry requires technique, building upon laborious training in fundamentals. The liberal conditions of more autonomous learning we demand as adult professionals is not necessarily the best way to initiate children into the practices upon which the liberal arts are based (see Smeyers 2017, in this volume).

Here, we have a contradiction with considerable *civic status* (PI §125): adherence to liberal principles we wish to uphold may prejudice assessment of JUMP's training methods. Ironically, rational and empirical arguments for experimenting with JUMP are suppressed in the interests of promoting critical thinking, stemming from entrenchment in idolized views of open-discovery as the *only* avenue to autonomy and creativity. Mighton responds: 'In all the debates that are going on, we think it's a bad idea to throw [discovery learning] out, but the other side is right also…. The parents and those who want to go back to basic math are right in some sense: You need to combine the discovery with guidance' (Carlson 2014). Overreacting to terms such as 'fundamental' or 'basic training' in math can halt innovation in the classroom; in worst-case scenarios, forming ideological blocks on reasonable, evidence-informed discussion of effective pedagogy.

> The effect of making men think in accordance with dogmas,…. It is not a wall setting limits to what can be believed, but more like a brake which, however, practically serves the same purpose; it's almost as though someone were to attach a weight to your foot to restrict your freedom of movement. (CV, p. 28e)

Instead of being guided by faith Mighton requests educators consider the evidence and enter into the training before ruling JUMP techniques 'outlandish.' What appears at first as 'logical insanity' may become customary upon initiation. Wittgenstein created scenes of imaginary woodcutters using seemingly incomprehensible selling practices (by area instead of volume or weight, or even by effort or need, RFM: I.146–151), or people using worn coins with no apparent value (RFM: I.151–2), to demonstrate that meaningful usage hinges off training into a *consensus of action*.

> It is perfectly possible that we should be inclined to call people who behaved like this insane. And yet we don't call everyone insane who acts similarly within the forms of our culture, who uses words 'without purpose'. (Think of the coronation of a King.) (RFM: I.152)

[11]Referring to liberal-analytic distinctions between indoctrination and teaching as the giving or weighing of evidence, McClellan (1976: 53–4) refers to 'counterfeits of teaching.'

Paraphrasing Medina's reading of Wittgenstein's 'liberal-contextualism': confronted with estrangement from Others' techniques 'we can either train the aliens into our practices to fill normative and conceptual gaps, or we can enter into processes of negotiation and mutual clarification with the aliens.' He concludes: 'we are not forced to withdraw the presumption of intelligibility on a priori grounds even when no such understanding can be obtained. After all, the recognition of a gap that we have been so far unable to bridge does not warrant the conclusion that the gap is in principle unbridgeable' (Medina, pp. 153–4; cf. LFM: VIII, p. 84). Under benign conditions of professional autonomy (free-play), it may be incumbent on recalcitrant teachers to openly enter into new practices such as JUMP: training and trying in classrooms what at first appeared uncanny, improvising with novelties instead of rejecting them out of hand. Easily dismissed as trivial, such attempts to broker understanding are crucial to ethical regard of others and to negotiation of 'freedoms within the rules' that unnecessarily bind us (Tully 2003).

> The danger here, I believe, is one of giving a justification of our procedure where there is no such thing as a justification and we ought simply to have said: that's how we do it. (RFM: II.74; referring to how we check the accuracy of calculations by going over them again)

Regarding Forster's rejection of the notion that adepts need to embrace training wholeheartedly in order to internalize rules, this proviso would also require sampling innumerable techniques available in the 'marketplace' of educational discourses. On whose advice do superintendents or teachers buy into programs, expending limited resources? 'Consumer reports' help us see JUMP as a 'possible world' for viably improving math education for many pupils, altering the universe of possibilities for disadvantaged learners. Teaching academically challenged 'work-place' destined students, Tara Arnott (Darlington, ON) explains that JUMP plugged major gaps in fundamental skills (cf. Winch 2006). Experimenting with JUMP, she wonders whether rebranding in Dweck's (2012) popular terminology around 'growth mindsets' could open avenues for the program (Dweck, n.d.). Educators captured in discovery-learning 'pictures' (PI §115) of what works, however, do not create the 'logical space' (Owen 2003: 90) to entertain second-order beliefs about the truth or falsity of their first-order beliefs; consequently, alternate pictures cannot find their way in, creating conditions of model entrapment.

> The truth cannot force its way in when something else is occupying its place.
>
> To convince someone of the truth, it is not enough to state it, but rather one must find the path from error to truth. (RFGB, PO, p. 119)[12]

As Mighton concedes, and as I argue concerning liberal-analytic conceptions of learning in relation to Wittgenstein's emphasis on normative training, it is not an *either/or*. Educators need convincing by reasons and demonstration, otherwise feeling infantilized during education reforms; initiation into practices is part of

[12]Beginning: 'One must start out with error and convert it to truth. That is, one must reveal the source of error, otherwise hearing the truth won't do any good.'

training and deliberative processes, without presuming epiphanies, or simply that 'trying is believing.'

Witnessing combinations in practice (in the conservatory), and addressing McDowell's demand for 'answering to the world,' I asked my colleague Andrew Wilson at University of Toronto Schools what he made of the conflict. Not surprisingly, he saw this as a 'false dichotomy' fallacy.[13] Teaching more gifted math students, classes begin with a JUMP-start drill to 'rev up their minds' and to 'develop neuro-plasticity' by exercising basic operations; he then moves into an inquiry task, developing more elaborate lessons around central problems; and then they move into investigation, where higher cognitive tasks and critical thinking are required. Some lessons/assignments also involve composition, though at an introductory level. Arguing from analogy, he asks: 'Would we criticize music teachers for having students do their scales?'[14] Relying on discovery learning alone means students must perform many rich applications before arriving at eureka moments of recognizing underlying principles, which is something JUMP provides readily through well-chunked, coherent and logically sequenced lessons. But JUMP is not a self-sufficient panacea.

Wilson likens math teaching to musical composition (cf. PI §233): designing integrated, developmentally staged lessons and whole concertos/courses, comprising a coherent curriculum extending from Grades 7 to 12. All parts have to come together in ways students comprehend, building for successive years, with more complex mathematical inquiries as students mature. Challenging to conduct, given that his Grade 7 students come from 68 different elementary schools (with several teachers at each), where methods or emphases varied. Math curricula *must* build in accommodations for students who focused on technique to the exclusion of theory or inquiry, or remedy over-emphasis on 'authentic' learning contexts (word problems) by showing multiple but formulaic solutions to various problems—providing basic toolkits that allow for later exploration and creativity in math. Working with 68+ *possible worlds* of math teaching, Wilson is not developing a single training regimen or battery of problems (workbook) for all, but rather assemblages of exercises, strategies, prompts, inquiries, etc. that will assist diverse pupils pursue their *alternate worlds* in post-secondary programs and careers—relatively few becoming engineers or accountants. Unfortunately, Wilson notes, proponents of 'discovery math' easily fall into the problem Kuhn (1996) identified where adherents 'hire in their own image.'

Supportive testimonials of experienced math teachers provide significant but limited evidence for JUMP's efficacy; in this feedback loop, however, narrative accounts register positively only when cohering with everything else 'we' adhere to *as* true or agreeable (Cioffi 1998).

[13]Working together on a high school philosophy text (Stickney 2011), Andrew Wilson wrote the logic unit.

[14]Wilson notes: Musicians (savants, prodigies) not needing scales often practice and improvise so much they are immersed in the activity all the time; to some extent, scales are embedded in the repertoire constantly rehearsed.

> But I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its correctness; nor do I have it because I am satisfied of its correctness. No: it is the inherited background against which I distinguish between true and false. (OC §94)

Empirical studies cannot provide indubitable credibility either; given the messiness of learning-conditions, we rightly scrutinize adequacy of controls and immensurability of variables. Purported causes for learning may prove dubious, inviting caution before proclaiming success. Apparent success (e.g., in how we go on with a number series) is not the *cause* for our certainty, as though there were an inductive basis at work here establishing grounds.

> Whether the earlier experience is the cause of the certainty depends on the system of hypotheses, or natural laws, in which we are considering the phenomenon of certainty.
> Is our confidence justified? – What people accept as justification – is shown by how they think and live. (PI §325)

For Wittgenstein, philosophical interest revolves around problems regarding how we come to regard or react to these techniques and how we judge the appropriateness of their tests.

> The insidious thing about the causal point of view is that it leads us to say: "Of course, it had to happen like that." Whereas we ought to think: it may have happened like that – and also in many other ways. (CV, p. 37e)

'Am I less certain that this man is in pain than twice two is four?' Wittgenstein queries, taking us back to context-relativity for the veracity of assertions.

> I can be as *certain* of someone else's sensations as of any fact. But this does not make the propositions "He is depressed", and "25 X 25 = 625" and "I am sixty years old" into similar instruments. The explanation suggests itself that the certainty is of a different *kind*. – This seems to point to a psychological difference. But the difference is logical….'Mathematical certainty' is not a psychological concept.
> The kind of certainty is the kind of language-game. (PI, p. 224)

Wright (2001, 73) notes that *defeasibility* comes in several kinds, here applied to JUMP: (1) Perhaps stronger evidence will be produced for discovery learning or for equally strong alternatives; (2) Perhaps there are alternative, equally plausible explanations for why data appear to support JUMP; or (3) Perhaps someone can fault the evidence, showing reasons for disqualifying the data. The first two, Wright explains, admit the data but dispute their capacity to warrant conclusions favouring belief. The third undermines the data. Wright argues cases are *impeccable* if immune to defeat in this third way; furthermore, it constitutes a genuine warrant for belief 'if it is both impeccable and will not be defeated in either of the first two ways no matter what the additions to our knowledge.' Crouched in Toulmin's (1969) argument-form (warrants for data, and qualifications on conclusions), Wright's formula teases us with reward of 'impeccability' while at the same time reminding us of *fallibilist* suspicions that endurance is implausible. (Rousseau's *Emile* is not *our* authority on breastfeeding.) Caught in the circle we started with, we arrive back at Wittgenstein's realization that—even for techniques that apparently work—within our linguistically bounded gaze and eroding riverbed of certain knowledge

(OC §§94–98) we can only *hold* or *count* things *as* true. Regarding the role of experiments in informing our practice Wittgenstein steps away from thorough anti-realism, again referring to how we learn to carry on.

> I am taught that under *such* circumstances *this* happens. Not that that would prove anything to us, if it weren't that this experience was surrounded by others which combine with it to form a system….But in the end I rely on these experiences, or on the reports of them, I feel no scruples about ordering my own activities in accordance with them. – But hasn't this trust proved itself? So far as I can judge – yes. (OC §603)

> There are countless general empirical propositions that count as certain for us. (OC §273)

Is judging math teaching then *just* a matter of agreement with like-minded others, as Rorty's solidarity stance suggests (1989)? Wittgenstein repeatedly answers with ambivalence, leaning toward coherence over correspondence models of truth. Test scores may demonstrate improvement in math ability, yet not be conclusive as to the cause we attribute for the success. Wittgenstein remarked that his own students seemed to do better when under his supervision than later, on their own (a kind of Hawthorne effect; CV, p. 38, see Stickney 2017, Chap. 3 of this volume).

> All testing, all confirmation and disconfirmation of a hypothesis takes place already within a system. And this system is not a more or less arbitrary and doubtful point of departure for all our arguments: no, it belongs to the essence of what we call an argument. The system is not so much the point of departure, as the element in which arguments have their life. (OC §105)

Appraising pedagogic suitability or effectiveness rests upon similar, prior agreement in judgments (PI §242).

> We do not learn the practice of making empirical judgments by learning rules: we are taught *judgments* and their connexion with other judgments. A *totality* of judgments is made plausible to us. (OC §140)[15]

Cohesion also applies to the way we perform calculations or follow rules of logic, but it is not as if we check in with others to confirm our sensibility or vote on these agreements.

> They are determined by a consensus of action: a consensus of doing the same thing, of reacting in the same way. There is a consensus but it is not a consensus of opinion. We all act the same way, walk the same way, count the same way. (LFM, XIX, pp. 183–84)

[15]The propositions describing this world-picture might be part of a kind of mythology. And their rule is like that of rules of a game; and the game can be learned purely practically, without learning any explicit rules (OC §95).

4 Conclusion

> In philosophizing we may not *terminate* a disease of thought. It must run its natural course, and *slow* cure is all important. (That is why mathematicians are such bad philosophers.) (Z §382)

Suppression of JUMP training in favour of discovery learning models of math, informed by liberal-analytic conceptions of education and banished with the hope of fostering critical thinking, presents a contradiction of considerable ‘civil status.’ Investigating how agreement in judgment impacts on the way educators look at new practices, we can see both positive and negative effects. Sharing common ‘background‘ and ‘bedrock’ for judging curricula can have conservative effect on education reform: brakes effectively stopping teachers, sometimes, from driving onto faulty bridges. Not only averring plunges into absurdity, however, conservation of practice can also halt critical assessment of and hands-on experimentation with alternative methods. Regarding initiatives foreign to us, it may be premature to judge that seemingly insane practices 'make no sense' absolutely or objectively—in supposed correspondence to reality. Alternate practices may more simply clash with the cultural background constitutive of our way of life: novel theories causing reactionary response. ‘Answering to the world’ to the best of our ability (albeit fallibly), ideally we attend to educational subjects from our shared descriptions of ‘the facts’ concerning learning capacities and teaching techniques. When these descriptions disagree, as between discovery and JUMP math, we fall back upon ‘agreements in judgment’ in arbitrating which is the most constructive model of learning to accept: not upon some metaphysical flight into the world itself, but into the many *possible worlds* our diverse students represent and which teachers encounter as active, mutually engaged learning-subjects in classrooms.

Adopting Wittgenstein’s post-foundational perspective avoids both vicious circularity of assuming firm standpoints for judging and scepticism in rejecting any basis. Without releasing all realist footholds, agreement in *forms of life* and judgment (PI §§241–2) provides genealogical[16] realization that pedagogical truth claims are held *in relation* to temporally specific, culturally contingent and intricate weaves of interrelated practices, customs, institutions, argument forms and second-nature reactions (Z §§567–9; cf. OC §279–80, 603; see Mulhall 1990, 2001; Smeyers 2008; Taylor 1995; Stickney 2009b).[17] Without conferring others or actively interpreting (PI §201; cf. RFM: V.33), how we carry on and determine in

[16]One of the most important methods I use is to imagine a historical development for our ideas different from what actually occurred. If we do this, we see the problem from a completely new angle (CV, p.37e).

[17]Instead of the unanalysable, specific, indefinable: the fact that we act in such-and-such ways, e.g., punish certain actions, establish the state of affairs thus and so, give orders, render accounts, describe colors, take an interest in others’ feelings. What has to be accepted, the given—it might be said—are facts of living // forms of life (PI §630; cf. PI, p. 226).

accordance with curricular rules hinges upon shared *bedrock* knowledge and a consensus of practice, giving us limited *pictures* of pedagogic 'soundness.'

Basing judgment of teaching practices on *forms of life* does not warrant stronger assertions that we cannot ascertain or rely upon any connection between learning theories and realities, nor any identifiable causes of learning retention. Sceptical readings of Wittgenstein's 'agreement in judgments' (PI §242)—attributed (perhaps harshly) to Rory's concept of 'solidarity' by Putnam (2002, 100) and McDowell (2000)—risk detaching ordinary truth claims from the kinds of 'certainty' to which teachers like Wittgenstein (OC §290) and Mighton attest. Wittgenstein's suggestive remark, 'At the end of reasons comes persuasion,' illustrated by 'missionaries converting natives' (OC §612) does not imply for educators that we do not need convincing reasons, nor liberally educated teachers wrong to demand them when being inducted into education reforms or cast into paradigm shifts (see Stickney 2009b). Wittgenstein's *On Certainty* implies more prudently that if we undergo initiate training into another way of acting and seeing, then perhaps some alien practices would not seem so unreasonable in context.

> If someone asked us "but is that true?" we might say "yes" to him; and if he demanded grounds we might say "I can't give you any grounds, but if you learn more you too will think the same".
>
> If this didn't come about, that would mean that he couldn't for example learn history. (OC §206)

Although perspicuous description of enthralling traps is a crucial precondition to engagement, Wittgenstein doubted the messianic abilities of avatars to extricate people: "those who following all their instincts live within the herd" (Phil., PO: 185). Only a change in practice—'modes of thought and life'—can 'cure the sickness of a time': "not …medicine invented by an individual" (RFM: II.4).

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Language and Mathematical Formation

Sharon Rider

Abstract Inspired by a certain reading of Wittgenstein, especially his notion of rule-following, this paper sketches an outline of an idea of elementary mathematics (arithmetic and basic geometry) as an intrinsic part of intellectual formation, or *Bildung*. In particular, I argue that we need to distinguish between mathematics as an activity and mathematics as a body of knowledge, where it is the first mentioned that is primary for the character of thinking. My claim is threefold: (i) The development of the capacity to think mathematically, together with the ability to read, write and speak one's native tongue with clarity and precision, ought to be the primary aims of primary and secondary schooling; (ii) At this basic level, the capacity to think mathematically is inseparable from the capacity to reason in general and should be seen as an essential part of the latter; (iii) These two claims, if correct, have profound consequences for how we ought to think about the form and content of teaching.

Keywords Arithmetic · Benezet · Bildung · Literacy · Wittgenstein

1 Preliminary Remarks

Reflecting on the oft-quoted remark in Wittgenstein's *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics*, "It is essential to mathematics that its signs are (also) employed in *mufti*. It is the use outside mathematics, and so *the meaning* of the signs that makes

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M.A. Peters and J. Stickney (eds.), *A Companion to Wittgenstein on Education*,
DOI 10.1007/978-981-10-3136-6_33

the sign-games into mathematics" (RFM V, §2),[1] Severin Schroeder offers a qualification that is important for any consideration of what it means to learn elementary mathematics, that is, school arithmetic and geometry. He writes:

> It is certainly not true that every mathematical *proposition* or formula has an application outside mathematics. For one thing, the link with the applications may only be indirect. A line in the middle of a long mathematical proof is obviously not meant to be applied, but only a step on the way to something that may be applicable. And even the end result of a proof may be intended for further inner-mathematical work, rather than an application in engineering, say. For another thing, even an indirect outer-mathematical usefulness of a formula may only be a vague hope, rather than a clear intention. Even so, even if the link between a given piece of mathematics is only indirect, and often just a vague possibility […] if this practical application were removed entirely, it would be less clear that we are still concerned with mathematics […]. (Schroeder 2015, p. 123)

One of Schroeder's main aims in the paper is to shed light on Wittgenstein's concern with the question of what it means to say that an arithmetic equation, for instance, is correct or incorrect; for Wittgenstein, such correctness depends neither on some metaphysical eternal truth (rationalism) nor on some empirical fact about the world (empiricism), but rather on what it means to follow a rule (RFM I, §§116, 131, 133).[2] And two things about rule-following that are highly relevant for problems in education are that (i) for something to be a rule, it must *apply*, i.e., it says something about how we generally do things and (ii) it must be practically *applicable* in the case at hand, in some respect. Rules, in contrast to universal, metaphysical principles, apply to the doings of the people who are going to apply them. Our arithmetic has developed for use in a world where, if you give me two apples when I already have three, I have five apples. In a world in which apples regularly vanish into thin air, another way of counting might be in order. But that does not relativize the truth or correctness of 2 + 2 = 4 for us (RFM I, §157). On the other hand, as Schroeder points out, there are cases in which 2 + 2 = 4 is not applicable (one drop of water added to another makes just one bigger drop of water). But should the equation become *generally* useless, "that would be the end of all sums" (RFM I, §37). At the same time, it might still hold for a certain calculus, even if that calculus itself then had no application beyond itself. Naturally, deviant or perverse ways of adding are entirely possible even where and when a certain rule, say of addition, applies, but then, such ways of figuring are, at best, impractical. The best way of seeing what someone believes or understands, in mathematics as in life, is to see what they do, that is, in the former case, how they calculate. (cf. Wittgenstein (OC) on how to recognize the nature of calculation: §45 "We got to know the *nature* of calculating by learning to calculate," and §46 "*This* is how one

[1]The English phrase "in mufti" is here a colloquial translation for *im Zivil*, i.e., in civilian dress, especially for someone who normally wears formal attire such as military uniforms. The term derives from the dressing gowns favored by off-duty British officers in the early 19th century.

[2]Following convention, titles for Wittgenstein's works are abbreviated (PI = Philosophical Investigations, RFM = Remarks on the Foundation of Mathematics, OC = On Certainty), with section (§) or page number (p.), with full citation and initials (e.g., RFM) in the References.

calculates. Calculating is *this*."). If someone is using our arithmetic to calculate something of our world (say, adding a liter of milk to two liters of milk), then we can judge whether the mathematical rule is being properly applied (which is the same as to say that the calculation is correct). The important point to bear in mind when thinking about basic mathematics education is that mathematics is both a body of knowledge *and* an activity. Now the question for education is at what point *the body of knowledge* is to be introduced, and how it is related to the practices of adding, subtracting, etc.

In what follows, I try to show that there is no incongruence between rigorous mathematical training and a more "progressive" view of learning in which the life-world of the pupil is the focus of instruction (cf. Stickney 2015). But to be clear, the paper concerns basic arithmetic and elementary geometry. Paul Bernays once remarked, "Wittgenstein all too often writes as if mathematics existed solely for the purposes of housekeeping" (Grève 2014). It is precisely this kind of rudimentary mathematical knowledge that is the concern of this essay.

2 Language and Mathematics

There has been much discussion in recent years in response to a perceived general decline in interest and ability in mathematics among students. Given the demands of the so-called knowledge society, it is nothing short of a crisis if the coming generation is ill-equipped to deal with what will be required of them in daily life as much as in the workplace. At the same time, a debate rages concerning the causes and effects of other pedagogical obstacles, such as deteriorating verbal and analytical skills as well as an apparent disinclination among pupils to allow their assumptions and habits to be challenged. The dispute often takes the form of an epistemic struggle over what is most important for education, "culture" or "science," as if these were not only independent of one another, but even stood in some sort of opposition. In this paper, I will sketch out an idea of elementary mathematics as an intrinsic part of intellectual formation, or *Bildung*.[3] My claim is threefold: (i) The development of the capacity to think mathematically, together with the ability to read, write and speak one's native tongue with clarity and precision, ought to be the primary aims of primary and secondary schooling; (ii) At this basic level, the capacity to think mathematically is inseparable from the capacity to reason in general, and should be seen as an essential part of the latter; (iii) These two claims, if correct, have profound consequences for how we ought to think about the form and content of teaching.

[3]Later in the essay, I will discuss in more detail an idea of *Bildung*, intellectual formation through education, which is not primarily concerned with erudition, eloquence or style, but which rather has to do with refined *judgment*, what Kant called, respectively, the maxims of "unprejudiced," "enlarged" and "consecutive" thought in the *Critique of Judgment*. My reading of it is influenced by Hannah Arendt's interpretation in Arendt (1992). See also Arendt (1961).

A common assumption in educational policy, expressed, if only implicitly, in school curricula and steering documents of different kinds, is a conception of language as first and foremost a tool or instrument for communication, i.e., as a *means* to other ends. The emphasis is often on the importance of sufficient competence in reading and writing for achievement in other subjects. When the stress is not on basic communication skills as a vehicle for learning, it is on their value for gainful employment and active citizenship. To be sure, the ability to read and write is a basic requirement for the acquisition of a host of other kinds of knowledge and is therefore decisive for participation in social, political and economic life today. But the insight that linguistic competence is fundamental raises a further question: What is it about language and literacy, broadly construed, that is so essential to learning? It stands to reason that the answer to that question should tell us something about how we should go about fostering what is most essential. Otherwise, we risk reducing the cultivation of the most primary human potential into a mechanical and instrumental but essentially incoherent assemblage of interchangeable bits and pieces of semi-digested information and semi-skills in written and spoken communication, as if these were isolated special aptitudes, distinct and separate from, say, the capacity to reason or observe.

Policy documents are formulated and curricula are often devised in terms that indicate that a picture of language as a tool for communication has guided teaching principle and practice, with little concern for the relationship between the means of communication and what is to be communicated. In particular, only fairly recently has much attention been paid to the connection between literacy and numeracy (see Martin and Mullis 2013). A reductionist picture of language as a discrete set of communication skills has a parallel in the idea of basic mathematics as a set of necessary or desirable competencies and techniques, rather than as something intimately weaved into our everyday thinking and practices. This instrumentalist view is especially detrimental at a time when more training in mathematics is viewed as the key to academic and professional success for students as well as to political and economic flourishing for nations. Like skills in oral and written communication, competence in elementary mathematics is a prerequisite for both civic and private life, as well as for employability and prosperity. And again, there is no question that advanced techniques and capacities in mathematics presuppose basic numeracy. But we see here also the tendency to regard the ability to reason mathematically as a set of isolated skills and techniques, with little consideration of what is it that gives training in elementary mathematics this foundational character. The short answer, I will argue, is that basic arithmetic and elementary geometry are "formative" insofar as they belong to the development of the ability to describe and analyze. They characterize the entire intellectual apparatus in a way that the adding on of new pieces of information or drilling in techniques does not.

A central feature of the idea of *Bildung* is that thinking develops organically, as a whole: what is formed belongs properly and inextricably to the one so formed, as opposed to facts and "skills" that are added on with the aim of achieving some external goal or outcome. Viewed as formative disciplines, language and mathematics education together constitute training in conceptualization and idea formation upon which

other skills and capacities can be further developed through modification and self-correction; it is on the basis of the pupil's deepened and broadened ability to formulate and solve a certain kind of problem that more complex operations make sense, i.e., have an intrinsic use. One might say that *Bildung* describes an activity, a way of thinking, rather than a specific body of knowledge, or canon. The latter (say, trigonometry or the calculus) can become active or operational in new and unfamiliar contexts (for example, new problems), provided that the learner is already familiar with the practice of thinking mathematically in a more primary way. Thus one consequence of teaching mathematics as a formative discipline rather than as an instrumental one would be that, especially at the most basic levels of instruction, standard techniques and problems should be avoided. Pupils should instead confront new problems at every lesson and be made to deliberate about different alternatives for how to solve the problem, with the teacher as the authority in place to guide the pupils in weighing the benefits and drawbacks of alternative solutions.[4] Repetitive, mechanical training can never replace active problem solving for *conceptual* reasons: the aim of correct computation per se is not that of self-correction. In the first case, the pupil may compute correctly for the wrong reasons, that is, fail to see which method is appropriate for solving the problem at hand, while in the second, understanding what she is doing and why she is doing it, i.e., applying the right rule in the right way, is paramount. Getting the correct answer comes along with learning for oneself how to identify a problem as being "this kind of problem" in the first place. This distinction is fundamental. Knowing a certain fact ("this algorithm is the one we have been taught to use for problems of type x") is not the same as being able to judge a certain problem *as this kind of problem* ("this looks like the kind of problem that I have solved before in such and such a way"). A good test of how much mathematics one has genuinely learned is the extent to which, barring disease or trauma, it is possible to forget something. While most adults who do not use mathematics in their professions have probably forgotten everything they learned in high school calculus, is it even conceivable that one could forget *when* we need to add or subtract or how to do so?

3 Mathematics and Language

Progressive reform pedagogy arose as critique, out of dissatisfaction with a procedural picture of what instruction in mathematics or entails that had been dominant in schooling and which was seen to have a pacifying or even anesthetizing effect on pupils. In order to make the subject matter more relevant, pedagogical reformists focused on the practical, the everyday, and the emotional life-world of the learner. As we have noted, there *is* good reason to suspect that mechanized drilling, as a

[4]For a comparison of the two methods of instruction, see Stevenson and Stigler (1992). In the book, the authors attribute the superiority of Japanese and Chinese student skills in mathematics over American students to this difference in pedagogical culture.

general principle of education, is highly problematic. But formal and methodological training need not entail repetition and rote memorization. Similarly, a therapeutic constructivist approach to mathematics need not conflict with a scientistic, cognitivist one. Indeed they are often intermingled. While the progressive platform since Dewey has made a convincing case for rejecting the idea of knowledge production as a mechanical affair and learning as an instrument for achieving other goals than learning itself (i.e., the procedural picture), there have been concomitant developments in pedagogical theory that are more problematic. Most importantly, a mentalistic idea of what learning and knowledge are has held sway, indicated, among other things, by recurrent casual references to the student's "representations," "images" and "experiences" (cf. PI §115). Here I will offer one example of a way of thinking about early education in mathematics (and indirectly about language) in which the dichotomy described above dissolves.

By way of introduction, we should note a parallel between the difference between what I have called "mathematical formation," on the one hand, and rote repetition and memorization, on the other, and the difference between learning one's native tongue and a foreign or second language. Even the simplest mathematical equation presupposes some basic form of conceptual articulation (that is, a native tongue). With only a very rudimentary grasp of one's first language, it will be very difficult to formulate any kind of thought, mathematical or otherwise, accurately and distinctly. Even the most elementary addition would then be highly difficult, since already the most basic signs, such as + or = , assume the capacity to recognize and use exact symbolization. Here, on the issue of numeracy and scientific literacy, a number of the confusions regarding the relationship between ordinary language and technical language and formalization, as well as that between student-centered and more procedural educational models and methods, become acute. Let us imagine, for example, that the national scores among middle-school students in mathematics and science in a given country are declining in comparison with students from other countries in PISA tests.[5] One possible interpretation of the results could be something like this: the problem is not with the students' knowledge, but with the way in which that knowledge is tested. The use of technical or abstract terms, for instance "constant" or "factor," tests not what the students in point of fact know about the subject matter they are being examined in, but their knowledge of the language in which the questions are formulated. Below I cite an analysis of this kind from one recent study, regarding a test question in which the term "factor" is employed.

> One of the everyday terms used for SPFs (Sun Protection Factor) […] is literally "sun factor" or just simply "factor." Therefore, the language game (PI/1997) in which the […] students are reasoning may be connected to the actions and events of everyday life in which "factors" denote sunscreen products. In addition, the term "factor" (in Sun Protection Factor) originally had a mathematical connotation, representing the increase in the amount of time that protected skin could be in the sun without burning. However, in this test question, the term "factor" represents the different conditions to be scientifically tested, that is, the experimental variable. Thus we have identified at least three different possible

[5]The OECD's Programme for International Student Assessment.

> meanings of the word "factor." We argue that the problem for the students is not their understanding of the fictive experiment per se (or its design), which is the competency to be tested; rather, it is that the word "factor," which is used in the text as if it were a specific term, has different meanings in different language games. That is, the word "factor" may have a multiplicity of Wittgensteinian functions. (Serder and Jakobsson 2015)

The authors argue that because the term has different uses in different contexts, the students' trouble is not with comprehending the subject matter, but in seeing through the linguistic attire, as if language were something draped over the content. On this view, the worlds of the student and what he studies collide, as it were, in the PISA tests, since the students' familiarity with the use of the terms in certain everyday situations causes confusion for them when they're trying to "decipher" the test questions. The students have to learn a second or foreign language: the one spoken by those who construct the tests. From the point of view of certain progressive educators, this need to "translate" is especially salient for students from underprivileged backgrounds, since the "native speakers," those who come from educated homes, for instance, have an unfair advantage. This interpretation of the results, as we shall see, conflates the elementary language of thinking through simple mathematical or scientific problems taught to children with the body of knowledge used in advanced applications.

Is the decisive difference between the student's everyday language and experience and some stipulated foreign language (of mathematics and science)? Or is it between an activity and a body of knowledge? If it is the latter, then the "translation" metaphor is misleading when applied to the kind of mathematics and science that are taught at primary and secondary school because *that* sort of basic science and mathematics is *already* intimately tied to ordinary experience. On this understanding, basic scientific or mathematic literacy (as opposed to the more formal, technical and symbolic kinds of mathematics taught in, say, advanced high school courses) is exactly the ability to recognize a problem as being "this kind of problem," requiring a certain kind of solution. In the quotation above, it is suggested that there is some "content" that the students (potentially) understand, despite their inability to recognize the form; what I suggest here under the rubric of "Bildung" or "formation" is that to understand the form is to understand the content, and vice versa (cf. Ungaru 1975).[6] The capacity to make use of a terminology the precision of which depends on recognizing when and where it is appropriately used, and for which purpose, is something that can be fostered, but only if the supposed

[6]Sabetai Ungaru's forcefully criticizes what he considers the incoherent application of modern algebraic operations on the historical interpretation of Greek geometry, and the incommensurability of the two. In response to those who argue or assume that the Greeks dressed up algebraic formulas in cumbersome geometric outfits, he replies: "*Language* is the immediate reality of *Thought*. The differences between the two ways of thinking are real differences [...]. Different ways of thinking imply different ways of expression." Or, as he writes in a footnote later on in the paper, "To what extent does one possess the method if he lacks the means to put it to use?" Similarly, my claim here is that there is nothing more to "scientific literacy" than being able to recognize and knowing how to use certain terms in the "right way" in the appropriate context. The quotations are from Ungaru (1975), pp. 80 and 107, respectively.

opposition between thinking clearly and thinking clearly mathematically (at a basic level) is not assumed at the outset.

Someone who challenged the assumption was L.P. Benezet.[7] Reflecting on the complaint that the curriculum consisted in an amorphous heap of desired skills piled on top of each other, Benezet agreed that "we are constantly being asked to add new subjects to the curriculum (safety instruction, health instruction, thrift instruction, and the like), but no one ever suggests that we eliminate anything." Asked what must be included in the American public elementary school curriculum, and what can be left out, he writes:

> In the first place, it seems to me that we waste much time in the elementary schools, wrestling with stuff that ought to be omitted or postponed until the children are in need of studying it. If I had my way, I would omit arithmetic for the first six grades […]. I feel that it is all nonsense to take eight years to get children through the ordinary arithmetic assignment of the elementary schools. What possible need has a 10-year-old child for knowledge of long division? The whole subject of arithmetic could be postponed until the seventh year of school, and it could be mastered in two years' study by any normal child. (Benezet 1935a)

The situation in which Benezet found himself ought to resonate with many school officials today. Among the pupils in his district were numerous recent immigrants from homes without the benefit of education or English as the home language, there was increasing pressure from the authorities to provide the kind of civic and practical instruction that previously had been expected to be provided in the home, and there was a great deal of political discussion and debate about what to do about the perceived lowering of standards and poor results from schooling. (A fifth of the children had to be left back due to inadequacies in their knowledge of first-grade arithmetic.) At the same time, the pupils' command of English, even among the native speakers, was also weak: "I was distressed at the inability of the average child in our grades to use the English language. If the children had original ideas, they were very helpless about translating them into English which could be understood." (Benezet 1935a)

As an experiment, Benezet asked the children to explain, in their own words, that if you have two fractions with the same numerator, the one with the smaller denominator is the larger fraction. The children said things such as: "The smaller number in fractions is always the largest"; "The denominator that is smallest is the largest"; "If the numerators are both the same, and the denominator's one is smaller than the one, the one that is the smaller is the larger," and so forth. Benezet remarks: "The average layman will think that this must have been a group of half-wits, but I can assure you that it is typical of the attempts of 14-year-old children from any part of the country to put their ideas into English. The trouble was not with the children

[7]Benezet was Superintendent of Schools in Manchester, New Hampshire in the 1930's. In 1935, under the heading, "The Teaching of Arithmetic: The Story of an Experiment," he published a series of articles in the *Journal of the National Education Association* in which he offers a detailed and very enlightening account of his "experiment" and its results, from which I here borrow a few elements.

or with the teacher; it was with the curriculum" (Benezet 1935a). Benezet thought that training in fractions and long division in the fourth and fifth grades was meaningless, all the more so if it were at the expense of learning how to use language correctly and accurately. In 1929, Benezet began to test his hypothesis, which was that a thoughtful and rigorous pedagogy with respect to the use of English with precision would have positive effects on the children's ability to learn to think mathematically.

Benezet tested his idea on third-graders in a number of schools. The children received vigorous practice in oral composition and had to narrate things that had happened, or describe films they had seen or give an account of a book they had read. After a year, Benezet compared these children with other fourth graders in the same town. The children in the experimental classes were both more ready and more able to present their ideas orally. Benezet found this result interesting even for the teaching of mathematics, especially given his previous experience with early instruction in arithmetic, which was that its effect was to "dull and almost chloroform the child's reasoning faculties" (Benezet 1935a). A problem that he had presented to children in sixth, seventh and eighth grade hundreds of times was this: "If I can walk a hundred yards in a minute [...], how many miles can I walk in an hour, keeping up the same rate of speed?" (Benezet 1935a). The results were generally disheartening, so Benezet asked the teachers in his experimental classrooms to make the pupils practice estimating heights, lengths, areas, distances and such instead of drilling them in fractions and long division. An example of the kind of exercise he used as a model for the teachers was this: he told the children that in 1680, when the Europeans first set eyes on the Niagara Falls, they were 2500 feet lower down than they are at present. He then asked them at what rate the falls were retreating upstream. The discussion that ensued between Benezet and the children concerned how to reason about spatial distances and intervals of time.

To get started, Benezet wants to show the children a cross section of the Niagara Falls. He asks them if they understand what he means if he says that he's going to show them a cross section of an apple. The class is uncertain. Cutting an apple in front of the pupils, Benezet asks the class what he is showing them when he holds up a half. The children reply, "Half the apple," "The core of the apple," "The inside of an apple," etc.

Mr. B: Tell me. Is the word "section" a new word to the majority of you?

Enthusiastic chorus of "No."

Mr. B: Well, a cross section of an apple means a cut right thru an apple. Why have I said this to you?

Meantime he has drawn on the board a cross-section of Niagara Falls.

Child: Because it is a cross section of the falls.

In this exchange, the children have to think about what is meant by "section" in this instance, how it is being used, in order to consider a cross section of the Niagara Falls. Part of learning how to reason about distances geometrically is to know what a

section is. These children are apparently familiar with the word "section," but they do not know exactly what is meant here. It is not that the pupils have to learn a new technical word, "section," on top of learning how it is being used. But now they see how to apply it in a "proto-mathematical" way. The children have started *thinking* in terms of "cross sections." As the experiment progressed, they also began formulating other parts of the problem with conceptual precision, and all of this prior to arithmetic counting, adding and subtraction. Benezet asserts that the children who had learned to think about distances and dimensions accurately in language were also much better at reasoning through mathematical problems generally than students who had merely been trained in computation. Encouraged by the results of his small-scale experiment, Benezet scaled it up to include all in all 200 classes. One class had no formal training in arithmetic or geometry until sixth grade. This class displayed significantly better results in mathematical skills (including calculation) after one year of instruction than the pupils who had studied mathematics as a separate subject since third grade (Benezet 1935b, c).

It is worth repeating the point that we are talking about children in primary school. Benezet did not question the value and necessity of training, even drilling, in formal methods and techniques. To the contrary, his claim was that basic algebra and elementary geometry *could and should be mastered in 2 years* by any normal child. His point was rather that hammering in tables and equations in the minds of 10-year-olds is ineffectual. Children fostered to reason (estimate, approximate, analyze) with increased accuracy recognize what would otherwise appear to be the introduction of "new" or "foreign" applications such as techniques for exact measurement or computation as mere refinements of an already familiar way of thinking about certain kinds of problems. In Benezet's pedagogics, the disparity between training in languages, history, geography, music and such, on the one hand, and arithmetic and geometry, on the other, disappears. In every case of intellectual formation, there is a development from everyday practice and discourse to a more advanced, sometimes technical or procedural, level. It is all part of what we call education, the aim of which is to achieve greater exactness and clarity in the activity thinking, whatever the subject matter, upon which a solid body of knowledge can be built. Precision and self-correction in thinking needs to be attained in all conceptualization; it is not a given. Benezet's method aimed to teach the children to discipline and correct their own thinking: the guiding principle was for them to be able to recognize and figure out, i.e., to judge for themselves, what needs to be done to solve any given problem.

4 Mathematical Formation

The example of Benezet is not intended here as a proposal or model for teaching in mathematics (similar progressive methods have been attempted with greater or lesser success), but as a perspicuous representation of a way of thinking about the teaching and learning of the language of mathematics. Educational theorists such as

those cited earlier misunderstand the notion of a “language game” if they take it to mean that the human capacity to move from ordinary, individual experience to a more regulative reasoning is divided up into distinct units, either in the individual or in the culture of which it is a part. Having a “general idea” of figures and proportions is no less necessary for the study of history or French grammar than it is for learning arithmetic, and in each case rationality is achieved in the readiness and ability to formulate expressly and precisely for ourselves the premises of our prior thinking and to revise our reasoning if we should discover that the rule we are following does not apply just here. In light of such a widened view, mathematics is exemplary for reasoning as such, provided that it is taught with that idea in mind. But that principle, what I called, echoing Kant, “unprejudiced, enlarged and consecutive thought” has been forgotten, or at least overshadowed, by a utilitarian picture in which language and mathematics are imagined as packages of isolated units of competencies, with no internal relation between them. These skill packages, in turn, are not conceived on the basis of what makes for better thinking as such, but in terms of the immediate interests and demands of heteronomous authority.

On the other hand, there is no necessary opposition between learning useful skills and learning them well, on the one hand, and learning for its own sake, or what I have called intellectual formation, on the other. The problem of “how can mathematics instruction recognize the pupil’s experience?” is misconceived from the outset. The question should rather be “how can instruction make children recognize the mathematical in their experience?”[8] In the first formulation, which I think captures much of common practice in most school curricula whatever the wording of the policy documents, the assumption is that the child’s lifeworld is not mathematical to begin with, which is why they find it difficult to make the transition. The solutions hitherto presented for remediating declining skills in mathematics have largely been either to revert to rote memorization and technical training, or to introduce more *verbiage* into mathematical instruction, that is, to take mathematical problems and clothe them in everyday language, to decorate an arithmetic or geometrical problem with stories, situations and characters with which the child can identify, etc. Often the two are combined.

The pupils in Benezet’s experimental classes, in contrast, had no “mathematics instruction” at all in the first few years of school (Benezet 1935b). Rather, every reading assignment, from fictional narratives, to geography to history, was saturated with mathematical questions, not because he cleverly designed them so, but because they are *always, already there* (as the example of the Niagara Falls illustrates). To teach elementary mathematics as a subject entirely distinct from the teaching of history, for instance, involves a distortion of both. Notions of time and duration, ideas related to space and distances, proportions and percentages can hardly be avoided in historical subjects: to understand the victory of the vastly outnumbered

[8]Compare to Wittgenstein (OC §38): “Knowledge in mathematics. [One has to ask]: “Why should it be important? What does it matter to me?” What is interesting is how we *use* mathematical propositions.”

allied Greek victory (378 triremes) over the Persians' fleet of 1207 triremes at the Battle of Salamis; to explain that the greater rise in wages and economic flourishing for region B was due largely to the Black Death decimating the population of that region by 60%, while another region lost only a third of its people; to see that, in order to determine the location of the Norse settlements in Vinland, we need to relate navigation to the divisions of the Viking compass with its eight divisions divided into three hours, and so on. Rather than worrying about the exact number of hours pupils receive in formal training in arithmetic or geometry in the classroom, we ought to consider what kind of training they receive in relation to everything else that they are supposed to be learning.

This is not to advocate more mathematics at the expense of other subjects. Rather, the point is that history, geography and home economics are already suffused with mathematics. If the pupils are learning practical skills such as boiling potatoes, it should be the most natural thing in the world to discuss temperature and that could include, for instance, conversion from Fahrenheit into Celsius, or how the density of the tuber effects the time needed for it to be ready, etc. The important thing is that the children themselves notice, are ready and able, to see how much adding, subtracting, multiplying and dividing we need to be ready and able to do, if only approximately, in our ordinary lives: when we estimate commuting time to and from school; when we assess how much money we have left from our allowance after the movie; when we figure out how much time we need to study in order to pass the next geography test.

Let us now reconsider the quote from the article mentioned earlier in which the authors discuss three different "Wittgensteinian language games" in which the word "factor" is used:

> One of the everyday terms used for SPFs (Sun Protection Factor) […] is literally "sun factor" or just simply "factor." Therefore, the language game (PI/1997) in which the […] students are reasoning *may be* connected to the actions and events of everyday life in which "factors" denote sunscreen products. (Serder and Jakobsson 2015; My emphasis)

Benezet's experiment demonstrates that, for someone who has learned and understood the science in question, the other uses become irrelevant. The competence that the tests are designed to assess is exactly the ability to form a certain kind of judgment, that is, to recognize the tacit proper use in the given context, to know when, where and how to apply a certain rule by doing things a certain way. The relativizing interpretation of language games is confirmed in the rest of the quote:

> In addition, the term "factor" (in Sun Protection Factor) originally had a mathematical connotation, representing the increase in the amount of time that protected skin could be in the sun without burning. However, in this test question, the term "factor" represents the different conditions to be scientifically tested, that is, the experimental variable. Thus we have identified at least three *different possible meanings* of the word "factor" (my emphasis). We argue that the problem for the students is not their understanding of the fictive experiment per se (or its design), which is the competency to be tested; rather, it is that the word "factor," which is used in the text as if it were a specific term, has different

> meanings in different language games. That is, the word "factor" may have a multiplicity of Wittgensteinian functions. (Serder and Jakobsson 2015)

The implication here is that the students can somehow understand the content of the experiment described and yet apply a completely irrelevant notion of the term "factor." What we saw from Benezet's experiment was the reverse: the pupils who had developed precision in their use of language were inclined to look first and foremost for *the right way* to approach the problem presented rather than just use words, whether technical or ordinary, willy-nilly.

The earlier suggestion that education be understood as a movement from the personal, emotional and psychological to the rational or logical (by which I mean here simply shared rules of action and thought) might be put another way: intellectual development is, in part, the development of the capacity for abstract or symbolic thought on the basis of having learned to apply certain kinds of rules, that is, to perform certain kinds of activities. A 7-year-old will have difficulty understanding abstract reasoning such as constitutes formal mathematics not because his lifeworld is not yet mathematical, but because he hardly knows yet the various practices that make up our common world. The symbolism of pure mathematics, its techniques and the abstractions it entails, are possible because the activities of our common world lend themselves to more primary operations. By the time a high school student is studying trigonometry, she has moved from ordinary arithmetic experience and activity to abstraction and technical manipulation, and can now begin to operate with the symbols themselves. But it hardly seems advisable to introduce that kind of abstraction and technicality into the mind of a child who is not even sure what a "section" is. If the students in the sunscreen example do not recognize how the word "factor" is being used, it is not simply because there are different "idioms," but because they are, in fact, not scientifically literate yet. They have not received an education that would have made them think about how to use the relevant term in the relevant sense. If a student fails to apply a mathematical rule correctly, it is not because she somehow "knows" how to calculate but does not recognize when to divide and when to subtract due to some other (verbal or conceptual) failure: "If you demand a rule from which it follows that there cannot have been a miscalculation here, the answer is that we did not learn this through a rule, but by learning to calculate" (OC §44).

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What Does Calculating Have to Do with Mathematics? Wittgenstein, Dewey, and Mathematics Education in Sweden

Tove Österman

Abstract This paper concerns mathematics education in Sweden in relation to Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Dewey. Both Wittgenstein and Dewey were critical of an essentialistic, or dualistic, view of knowledge as a distinct (mental) phenomenon distinguishable from the (physical) result. This kind of view is commonly expressed in the research on mathematics education, where mathematical understanding is seen to take place in the mind or the brain, and the calculation that takes place on paper is a more or less contingent result of the mental process. I will exemplify how this view has influenced the classroom practice in Sweden and will argue that as well as being philosophically problematic in the framework of Wittgenstein and Dewey, it is counterproductive as regards the aims of mathematics education.

Keywords Education · Evaluation · Mathematics · Understanding · Skill

1 Wittgenstein and Dewey

I will begin by a rather sweeping characterization of Wittgenstein and Dewey in order to show how similar they are in the relevant respects and then proceed to the question of mathematics education in order to point out some problems that Wittgenstein and Dewey can help bring out. The key issue is what it means to say that someone understands a mathematical task, what it means to, for example, continue a mathematical series correctly.

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M.A. Peters and J. Stickney (eds.), *A Companion to Wittgenstein on Education*,
DOI 10.1007/978-981-10-3136-6_34

As Wittgenstein points out, it is common to think that "to have got the system (or again, to understand it) can't consist in continuing the series up to *this* or *that* number: *that* is only applying one's understanding. The understanding itself is a state which is the *source* of the correct use" (PI §146).[1] This common way of thinking is rejected by Wittgenstein. In the *Brown Book*, he writes: "It is no act of insight, intuition, which makes us use the rule as we do at the particular point of the series. It would be less confusing to call it an act of decision, though this too is misleading, for nothing like an act of decision must take place, but possibly just an act of writing or speaking" (BB: 143). Wittgenstein is here rejecting the view that understanding, or grasping a rule, or knowing, must be a specific (mental) process, something we can seek to identify in or behind the action/utterance. What Wittgenstein is saying here is that the use of the rule, or the fact that we can continue the series correctly, or perform a calculation, does not have to entail anything more than the writing down of numbers on paper. It can, but it does not have to—and this is how our normal mathematical practice proceeds. In the *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics*, Wittgenstein writes: "'I know how to go on' means: I am in no doubt how I have to go" (RFM: 341). That is, for Wittgenstein, "knowing" does not designate a mental phenomenon, but a way of doing things, of acting. In a similar vein, Dewey writes: "In one sense, knowledge is that which we take for granted. It is that which is settled, disposed of, established, under control. What we fully know, what we do not need to think about. In common phrase it is certain, assured. And this does not mean a mere feeling of certainty. It denotes not a sentiment, but a practical attitude, a readiness to act without reserve or quibble" (Dewey 1966: 295).

Both Dewey and Wittgenstein stress the act, what many would see as the result, rather than some mental source of understanding. And the certainty, the "readiness to act without reserve" is not in essence a mental phenomenon. For both Wittgenstein and Dewey, it has its root in practices outside mathematics, the role concepts such as explanation, justification, proof, and certainty play in other areas of our lives. "'Mathematical certainty' is not a psychological concept. The kind of certainty is the kind of language-game," Wittgenstein writes (PI: 224). Dewey puts it this way: "The things which we take for granted without inquiry or reflection are just the things which determine our conscious thinking and decide our conclusions. And these habitudes which lie below the level of reflection are just those that have been formed in the constant give and take of relationship with others" (Dewey 1966: 18). These relationships with others, our life with language and the concepts that are involved also in mathematical practice, give us the background for deciding whether we should say that someone understands the rule, when, for example, we should say that he or she continues the series correctly. We do not actually need to peek into their heads, or be able to reconstruct that understanding in a logically

[1]Following convention, titles for Wittgenstein's works are abbreviated (PI = Philosophical Investigations, BB = The Blue and Brown Books, RFM = Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics), with section (§) or page number (p.), with full citation and initials (e.g., RFM) in the References.

binding form. This also means that there can be no completely "neutral ground" from where to judge the correctness of a mathematical operation, there could always be some point of view from which doubts could be raised as to the completeness of the grounds given, for example.

Instead of indicating a kind of skepticism to rule following, for both Wittgenstein and Dewey, this lack of a general, or final, certainty does not mean that our conclusions are any the less certain. "Attainment of the relatively secure and settled takes place, however, only with respect to *specified* problematic situations; quest for certainty that is universal, applying to everything, is a compensatory perversion," Dewey writes (Dewey 1930: 218). And the perversion comes from thinking that the right solution to a problem is objectively the right one, for everyone, no matter what our concerns and aims are. This is the idea of an explanation that is not directed at anyone, or an answer without a question. In Wittgenstein's words: "One might say: an explanation serves to remove or to prevent a misunderstanding—one, that is, that would arise if not for the explanation, but not every misunderstanding that I can imagine" (PI §87). This is because the explanation generally has a practical purpose, as Dewey notes: "Now an idea or conception is a claim or injunction or plan to *act* in a certain way as the way to arrive at a certain clearing up of a specific situation" (Dewey 1972: 156). Goldfarb writes, with a nod to Cora Diamond, that the philosophical fantasy is to want an answer that nobody *depends* on (Goldfarb 2012: 86). That is, where nothing is at stake, where there is no problem, no cause for asking for clarification. For Dewey, this complete or final clearing up of obstacles for understanding is not just a fantasy, but a kind of nightmare that would mean the end of thought, and philosophy: "One question is disposed of; another offers itself and thought is kept alive" (Dewey 1930: 218). If we had complete and final answers, there would be no more need for thinking.

Wittgenstein and Dewey seem to agree that understanding (or thinking, for that matter) cannot be localized in the mind (or brain). It is rather tied to, and cannot be identified apart from, the activities in which it occurs, for example, solving a mathematical task. Furthermore, the explanations for why we proceed in one way rather than another do not exist in a vacuum, but are answers to specific problems or questions.

2 Mathematics Education in Theory and in Practice

Now I will turn to the research on mathematics education and how it has affected the teaching in Swedish schools. In the research, mathematical understanding is very much taken to be a specific something: a mental phenomenon, the effect of which is, for example, a correct way to continue a mathematical series or to solve a specific mathematical problem. The understanding itself is seen as disconnected from the practice (the effect), something that could, in principle, be discovered

through a brain scan. There are several educational studies that focus on brain activity. In one, students are given different types of mathematical tasks to solve, after which their brains are scanned in order see which kinds of tasks really made them think (Liljekvist 2014). When understanding is taken as mental, the act of calculating, or continuing a series, is seen as a somewhat unreliable criterion for understanding. Just like the skeptic, the educational researcher is unsure of what it means that the student continues the series correctly, or rather, calculates correctly—as if it might suddenly turn out that she has not understood after all. Therefore, it seems relevant to ask for further grounds, in this case, for the mental phenomena that comprise the "real understanding".

In the research on mathematics education, a distinction is made between imitative, procedural, or algorithmic reasoning on the one hand and creative reasoning on the other. The former is the kind of thinking needed when using algorithms and rules to solve a problem, whereas the latter is connected to reasoning ability, which is seen as a conceptual ability. Here is a quote from one of the leading Swedish researchers on mathematics education:

> The AR [algorithmic reasoning] focus will lead to short term gains like managing textbook exercises and passing examinations that are adapted to AR. It is shown how it is possible to get really far by superficial AR strategies in exercises and in tests. But this leads to long term losses: The search for algorithms *becomes* mathematics instead of being a part of it. The aspects that can make mathematics truly meaningful to the students, such as conceptual understanding, creative reasoning, and insights in the central roles of mathematics in our society are not enhanced by rote learning. (Lithner 2008: 273)

The worry expressed here is that teachers leave the kids to solve mathematical tasks mechanically without checking whether they actually understand what they are doing, and the kids learn empty rules that they do not understand the meaning of and therefore cannot apply to situations outside the classroom. This is no groundless fear—it is one of the things that the progressive school movement, with Dewey, tried to change in the beginning of the last century. Dewey argued against the idea that there is a "faculty" of abstract knowledge that can give a general intelligence which is then applied to different areas of life. This was an idea current time: the more abstract the information taught to students, the better, since abstraction helps them develop a general intelligence. Therefore, the more disinterested they are in a subject, the better. As a result, students were made to learn Latin words and grammar by rote. Instead, Dewey argued that the teaching should be made interesting to the students through relating the taught subject as much as possible to their lives. Today, this is something most people would agree with.

Thus, the idea that students should learn reasoning abilities rather than just mechanical applications of rules is understandable. The problem is that instead of emphasizing the importance of learning to calculate with understanding, the rules and algorithms that are a part of mathematics are seen as an impediment to mathematical understanding—since the rules and algorithms are taken to lack any mathematical content. Guy Brousseau, one of the founders of mathematics education as a discipline, is often quoted in this connection: "The reason why an algorithm is regarded as efficient in solving a task (but not for learning) is that it is

designed to avoid meaning" (Brousseau 1997). And the application of algorithms and rules is taken to be so trivial that when using them only a careless mistake can prevent the right answer from being reached (Lithner 2008: 259).

Let us go back to one of the quotes from Wittgenstein cited at the beginning: "It is no act of insight, intuition, which makes us use the rule as we do at the particular point of the series. It would be less confusing to call it an act of decision, though this too is misleading, for nothing like an act of decision must take place, but possibly just an act of writing or speaking" (BB, 143). It sounds almost like the educational researcher speaking of the so-called imitative reasoning—something that we do automatically, without understanding. But Wittgenstein is not referring to a lack of understanding here, but to normal mathematical practice. What he is trying to show is that mathematical understanding is not necessarily a mental phenomenon, separate from the writing or speaking. Mathematics can very well take place on paper, so to speak. But to the educational theorist, the real mathematical understanding *must* take place in the mind, and therefore, we should separate the kind of mathematics that only takes place on paper, mechanically, and the kind that takes place in the brain. This is why imitative reasoning and creative reasoning are characterized as *opposites*: "The aspect of creativity that is emphasized in this framework is not 'genius' or 'exceptional novelty,' but the creation of mathematical task solutions that can be modest but that are original to the individual who creates them. Thus, *creative is the opposite of imitative*" (Bergqvist and Lithner 2012: 254, my italics).

In other words, what the students should learn in school is to solve mathematical tasks creatively, not mechanically. They should learn to think, not just calculate. And because, as we have seen, algorithms are designed to avoid meaning, the use of algorithms stands in the way of real mathematical understanding. Moreover, this suspicion of rules and algorithms extends to all calculation, since calculating *could* be just an expression of mechanically applied rules. Just like the other minds' skeptic who thinks that because it is possible to suppress our feelings and lie about them, we can never trust other people's facial or bodily expressions, the educational researcher thinks that since it is possible to calculate mechanically, to learn a rule and apply it without understanding, calculations are in essence a kind of surface activity empty of meaning. So it is thought that we cannot trust the students' calculations if we want to know what they understand (i.e., the mental processes), even if these calculations seem to entail decisions that require understanding. What we need is something else. And in the absence of brain scanners in the schools, what we make do with is a verbal report of the process of understanding.

Thus, focus has shifted from showing mathematical skills toward expressing understanding of the mathematical tasks verbally. The children are encouraged to *talk about* mathematics. In many Swedish schools today, the pupils are given tests where they are required to solve a mathematical task in a traditional way (by calculating), just like we all presumably had to do at school, but they also have to do something in addition: they have to give a (verbal) explanation of their mathematical moves. So, in many cases, beside each calculation, there are a few lines where they should write why they chose the methods they chose. It is not uncommon that a mathematically gifted child who has no problems performing the

mathematical operation has trouble coming up with the verbal "explanation" for something that she has already shown, in detail, mathematically.

This demand of verbalization is a result of the fact that the national tests focus on conceptual and communicative skills. The national tests are given in grades 3, 6, 9, and at upper secondary school level, and since the reputation of the school and the funding is connected to the results of these tests, they tend to direct the teaching rather strongly. The following table is an example of an evaluation matrix for a task in a test for grade 9. It is an example given by PRIM-gruppen (2015) at Stockholm University, responsible for constructing the national tests, to be used for discussing evaluation (my translation of the matrix).

	A	C	E
Problem solving and method	Reads the graph or draws simple conclusions	Interprets the relationship between the variables and describes how the graph shows change over time	Draws correct conclusions from the graph
Concepts	Shows basic knowledge of the gradation of the axes in the diagram	Expresses knowledge of how the inclination of the graph shows the change of the water level *or* that the structure of the graph is connected to the geometric form of the tank	Reasons correctly about the form of the tank, the proportions between its parts or about the structure of the graph with respect to volume/time
Reasoning 1	Shows simple reasoning skills with respect to the graph or the gradation of the axes	Reasons about the structure of the graph and its connection to the form of the tank	Shows well developed reasoning skills with respect to the form of the tank, the proportions of its parts or about the structure of the graph in relation to volume/time
Reasoning 2	Contributes with a question or comment that to some extent advances the reasoning of other students	Contributes with ideas and explanations that advances the reasoning of other students	Takes part in the argumentation of other students and develops and expands their reasoning
Communication	Expresses her/himself simply and the train of thought is easy to follow	Expresses her/himself clearly with the suitable mathematical language	Expresses her/himself with confidence and consistently uses the relevant and correct mathematical language

The task is about water let out of a water tank and a graph showing the water level changing with time. This is an example of how that specific task is to be evaluated, but for each task, the model of evaluation is the same. For this task, the maximum is 15 points, given at three different levels (A, C, and E) for five competencies: "problem solving and method," "concepts," "reasoning," which comes up twice, and "communication". For a maximum of 15 points, you have to get 5 points on the lowest level (A), 5 on the middle level (C), and 5 on the highest level (E). The marks are given in the form 5/5/5. The complexity of the marking also means that the students (and parents) often do not know whether they did well on a test or not. (This particular task is an oral examination performed in groups of three students, and it is noteworthy that in order to get full points, the student has to express him/herself "with confidence". It seems that even shyness or social anxiety is a hindrance for mathematical competence.)

Because it is not easy to evaluate a test following this model, there is an extensive evaluation manual consisting of examples of different solutions and how they should be graded. All evaluation has to follow this model, so it is impossible for the teachers to ignore the manual and continue evaluating the tests as before—in order to give the three different points for all the five areas, they have to let go of their previous experience of evaluating tests and follow the manual rather slavishly. As a result, the teacher, who used to be able to tell what was a well-grounded answer and what was not, cannot do that anymore. Where she used to be able to rely on her own understanding of mathematics and experience as a teacher for judging the answers correct or incorrect, well-reasoned or insufficiently argued for, now she has to use a manual consisting of a total of a hundred pages for each national test in mathematics. This means that teachers have to be re-educated in the marking procedures, and that a greatly expanding part of teachers' education consists in how to mark papers.

It seems that the evaluation material is so complex and time-consuming in order to, as far as possible, eliminate human fallibility (and with that, human judgement), so that anyone, or almost anyone, could grade the paper correctly.[2] Partly, this is the result of a commendable attempt to avoid mechanical learning and, in the absence of a national examination with external examiners, to avoid a bias in the evaluation procedure. But it is telling that the bias is taken to be a problem precisely at the point where the teachers normally use their professional judgment: in the apparent gap between the student's mental understanding and the result on paper. Following the view of the educational researchers, the teacher is not so much using her competence to judge a chain of reasoning, but drawing unwarranted conclusions from the marks on paper to what is happening in the student's mind; as if the mathematics that takes place on paper is contingent to the understanding. Therefore,

[2]It has been suggested to me that one reason for the extensive manuals is that many mathematics teachers lack the necessary mathematical training to be able to evaluate tests in a more traditional way. This might, of course, be one explanation to the need for extensive manuals.

this step needs to be eliminated, and the students have to start verbalizing their understanding so that the teacher can judge their real mathematical competence. This is comparable to a French test where the students have to give explanations to their choices of verbs and conjugations in English—since, when writing in French, they *might* just be following the grammatical rules mechanically.

There is no denying that some calculations take place mechanically, and that it is important to avoid meaningless drilling, both in mathematics and language classes. Knowing a series of rules by heart is equally useless in both areas in the absence of an ability to use the rules in a meaningful way. And without a doubt, discussing mathematical solutions and teaching the students to see the abstract calculations in a bigger context is important for developing this kind of understanding. But this need not result in downplaying numerical skill. Rather than characterizing the numerical and the conceptual ability as opposites (where the latter is seen as creative, expressing a "deep" understanding of mathematics, and the former is merely "imitative"), they should be seen as equally important aspects of mathematical competence. What is "mechanical," and what requires thought, often depends on how much mathematics we master. Wittgenstein's example of continuing a series is a good example—what someone sees as self-evident (that 2, 4, 6 is followed by 8) might require much thought for someone else. Similarly, the multiplication table is followed more or less mechanically by those that master it, whereas beginners might have to spend a long time thinking about how it works. Often, only when we have mastered techniques well enough in order to perform them more or less mechanically, can we move on to more difficult tasks. A mathematician needs to take many things for granted in order to proceed with her work. This is not denied by the educational theorists, who would argue that I am stating their case: that the rules and algorithms are meaningless, designed to be so in order to save time and effort. But what they seem to overlook is that there is no clear cut distinction between the "blind" following of rules and the "creative" problem solving. What we have to struggle with understanding one day, we take for granted the next—and taking some procedure for granted often requires mastering a technique. In many cases, it is only when you have gained a certain numerical skill, though a laborious process of calculations, of learning rules, counting, and recounting in order to get the result right that you can take a step forward in your mathematical reasoning. Only at this point can you start communicating, reasoning, and evaluating different solutions in an adequate manner and understand the relation between mathematics and other disciplines. At this point, you might also be able to reflect on some of the more basic rules that you learned at the start. The two aspects of learning mathematics presuppose each other, there is no "short cut" to deep mathematical understanding without having the mathematical skill that goes with it. Theory and practice, understanding and skill, are intertwined.

The aim of mathematics education is often described as giving the students tools to manage their lives: to keep track of their finances, medical doses etc. But in life as well as in the classroom, reasoning and numerical skills go hand in hand. Knowing how to adequately discuss a problem and how to reach a solution is not

enough, you need to be able to perform the calculation that gives the correct result. If you lack the numerical skills to take the correct dose of a medicine, all the meta-mathematical understanding you might possess will not help you.[3]

3 Conclusion

As a result of a dualistic view of knowledge, in the research on mathematics education there is a tendency to see the development of reasoning ability, characterized as a conceptual ability, as the desirable outcome of mathematics education, whereas numerical skill is seen as unimportant. The effect of this trend on the Swedish educational practice is an increased emphasis on verbal explanations and communication about mathematics, whereas numerical skills are deemed less important than ever before (Bråting and Österman 2017). There are many good reasons to stress a practical mathematical ability and to make mathematics meaningful to the students by, among other things, talking about and contextualizing the mathematical problems. But to treat mathematics as a combination of two independent abilities that can be taught and tested separately, one rational and one mechanical, seems to be both unwarranted and counterproductive.

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[3]This is not self-evident: In a Finnish study concerning the benefit of word problems in mathematics education, the students were given full points if they modeled the task correctly but reached the wrong result due to lack of numerical skill. The problem concerned "especially multiplication and division with decimal numbers" (Pongsakdi et al. 2016: 33).

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&c.: On Linguistic Regularity, Normativity and Language Acquisition

Niklas Forsberg

Abstract How do we know when learning has taken place? When is a teacher's job done? One answer that may be drawn from Wittgenstein's work is: *when the pupil is able to go on alone*. One temptation here is to say that a child has learned how to go on alone when she has grasped the regularity underlying the phenomena at hand—we know how to use a word in new contexts when we know what it means, or we know how to use the words we have learned when we know the rules that guide their correct use. This paper aims to show that we often misunderstand the point where the student is ready to part way with his or her teacher if we focus to strongly on rules. It is argued that it may be helpful here to think more about kinds of regularities in language use that are not so self-evidently "rule-like" in order to further make clear that regularity in language use, the normative force of language, does not depend on, or fall back upon, a kind of rule, or form of language, that precedes all articulations (correct and incorrect).

Keywords Wittgenstein · Rule following · Language acquisition · Normativity · Contextualism

1 Introduction: Not Just Any Old Bird

Our bird, a cockatiel named Hedwig (hatched, purchased, and named well before the invention of Harry Potter's owl), died last summer at the honorable age of 23. It was a loss to the whole family, but for our youngest daughter (aged 2) this was a really hard blow. We did not really notice her strong attachment to the bird in the beginning. We knew she loved animals—all animals—more than most kids do.

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M.A. Peters and J. Stickney (eds.), *A Companion to Wittgenstein on Education*,
DOI 10.1007/978-981-10-3136-6_35

She could stare at, and proclaim her love to, a calf, an ant, a dog, a toad, a cat, and, of course, to Hedwig. But she could also call *any* bird "Hedwig." So did she really know Hedwig? Or did she think that all birds were called "Hedwig" (and not "bird"). Would it be fair to say that she had confused type with token, generality with particularity? She had learned something, that's for sure. She did not, for example, call cars or trees, or the food on her plate "Hedwig." She did not call airplanes "Hedwig" (and I have seen kids call airplanes "birds" and parents not correcting them on the basis that it was "close enough").

But nearly half a year after the birds passing, our two-year old happened to watch some photographs in which Hedwig figured in the background. And tears started to roll down her cheeks. "Where's Hedwig now?" she asked. That Hedwig really was a unique individual to her became quite obvious. But this also means that some of the uncertainties that we have had regarding her use of Hedwig's name appeared in a new light. It was quite clear that her care for Hedwig was very real and that Hedwig was not just any old bird. Of course, we had corrected her earlier on when she had used Hedwig's name too inclusively: "No, that's not Hedwig. Hedwig is at home. That is another bird." And we had also—of course, all parents do, all parents *must* do—trained her using ostensive definitions in a very traditional sense, saying things like "*That's* Hedwig" while pointing at the bird.

In hindsight, these kinds of corrections now sound a bit odd. For they may make it appear precisely as if our daughter actually had *confused* token and type, particularity and generality. And clearly that was not the case. But we might say, I take it, that we did teach her that there is a kind of distinction to be drawn here, at the same time as we taught her what a name is. We never thought about it that way ("Hey, should we practice the type/token distinction today?") at the time. We know that now only when we have *stopped* talking about it. Teaching was done when she talked about these things in a way that did not spur correction, and one can clearly see, in hindsight, that we had "taught" her much more than we thought we did.

This, so it seems to me, suggests that it is quite hard to point out a particular moment when our daughter had learned such a straightforward case of language use as "learning the name of one's pet bird." And it also shows that one of the reasons why that may appear difficult to do is because it is surprisingly hard to say *what* a child has learned when she has learned to use a name properly—and so one may say that it is hard to pinpoint what is to be included in this "properly." (Perhaps one may also say that coming to know Hedwig—who she was, what that particular name meant, also included learning that birds are living creatures and that all living creatures eventually dies?)

So, how *do* we know when learning has taken place? When is a teacher's job done? One answer that may be drawn from Wittgenstein's work is: *when the*

student is able to go on alone (see, e.g., PI, §§143–151).[1] But then one may ask: "What does the pupil know, when he or she knows how to go on, on his or her own?" And now several responses seem natural to resort to. For example: The pupil knows how to go on when he or she knows what a word/concept really *represents*, because only then would he/she be able to use it without guidance, and sense would be externally secured. Another kind of answer that one may naturally reach for is to say that a child has learned how to go on alone when she has grasped the regularity underlying the phenomena at hand. We know how to use a word in new contexts when we know what it means, or we know how to use the words we have learned when we know the rules that guide their correct use. Something is not right in such responses. And I will show why I think so in what follows. Indeed, I even think it is fair to say that Wittgenstein's talk about "learning how to go on" and "knowing how to go on" is employed precisely to debunk the hollowness of philosophical attempts to explain "knowing the meaning" in terms of "knowing what name connects to which thing" or "knowing which rule to apply."

More specifically, I will suggest that a focus on rules of language runs the risk of misrepresenting the real nature of the linguistic regularities (which may also be called normative regularities) they are meant to explain or elucidate.

2 From Names, to Rules, to Life

It would be bizarre to suggest that normativity is not involved in language acquisition. And it would be nonsensical to say that there are no regularities to be found in language use. But are we then to conclude that the regularities we find in language use, and the kind of normativity we impose on each other as we continuously try to learn our languages, must fall back on some linguistic *rules* that guide and control our uses? Would such an account enable us to think clearly about scenes of instruction where we speak to a child, agree with her projections of words, and then, in hindsight, revise out judgments about what it was that the child knew (as was the case with Hedwig and our daughter)?

There is a ladder to be climbed here I think. The first rung of the ladder is the assumption that a child knows a word when she knows what the word stands for—words are names for things, the meaning of a word is what the word "stands for" or "refers to." This—clearly one of the most persistent and tempting philosophical thoughts—is a misguided way of thinking about language on a larger scale. Knowing how to use and understand the name "Hedwig" was, for our two-year-old, knowing much more than knowing what our bird was called. It included, for example, knowing that Hedwig was living but is now dead, what death *is*, that there

[1]Following convention, titles for Wittgenstein's works are abbreviated (PI = Philosophical Investigations), with section (§) or page number (p.), with full citation and initials in the References.

is a difference between a particular individual and a general kind, i.e., that not all birds are called "Hedwig," and that calling one's newly attained toy-bird with batteries inside "Hedwig" can upset one's older sister because that name "was taken" and because it is disrespectful to call a toy by the name of one's newly diseased animal. *Of course*, these remarks can by no means, nor are they intended to, challenge the idea that a words are often names for things. That would be downright stupid. Words refer too. But it is precisely because we often *can* tie a string between a word and a thing, and let a particular light shine on that string in philosophy books that tempts us to think that this is all there is to it, or at least think that this is *the* basic relation that we need to think about.

The second rung of the ladder would be to say that linguistic regularity cannot be explained as a name—thing relation only. It is also probably quite uncontroversial to say that a shift has occurred from words to sentences in philosophy of language. We also need a rule which tells us *when*, in what circumstances, a particular word-thing relation holds and is relevant. That is, linguistic sense and regularity, as well as the normative force one may have as a teacher, fall back on a specific linguistic, grammatical, rules which guide and control all our uses. The rule is what assures us that this projection of our words is OK, as well warrants us in correcting somebody who is using (or attempting to use?) language in an outlandish, or too eccentric, way.

This line of reasoning is very familiar today, and many philosophers who underline the importance of guiding, normative, rules are also philosophers who proclaim to be followers of, or at least inspired by, Wittgenstein. Some of the earliest and most influential and formative interpreters of Wittgenstein have also placed "rules of language" at the center of Wittgenstein's philosophy. Crispin Wright, for example, claims that "To know the meaning of an expression is to know, perhaps unreflectively, how to apprise use of it; it is to know a set of constraints to which such uses must conform" (Wright 1993, p. 24). Tim Thornton suggests that "The correct (and incorrect) applications [of a word] are determined by the rules that prescribe its correct usage" (Thornton 1998, p. 32). Hans-Johann Glock suggested that "linguistic understanding involves mastery of techniques concerning the *application of rules*" (Glock 1996, p. 223), and he has also suggested that the point with Wittgenstein's philosophy is that it "clarifies grammar, the set of rules by which we determine the correct use of words" (Glock 1991, p. 70). Peter Hacker claims that "Possessing a concept involves being able to use a word in accordance with a standard of correctness" (Hacker 1972, p. 219).

But then we should ask: What were the rules that we (supposedly) had taught our daughter? And what, more concretely, does it mean to teach a child a rule for the uses of our words *without*, or at least *before*, one teaches her the word? This is a bit bantering, I know. Nobody can think that we teach our children a rule *before* we teach them the word. But this kind of ragging remarks, the possibility of them, point to something too. For if the regularity itself, the standard of correctness, cannot be so much as gestured at without using the words they are meant to guide and control, then why should we say that the one *must* precede the other? And can one really say

that our uses of language *are* guided by an underlying rule *if* we cannot even discern that kind of regularity without looking at the word in use, *already* in use?

Wittgenstein can be said to climb these two rungs of the ladder in the *Philosophical Investigations*. The idea that words are names is indeed the very first thought that Wittgenstein opens his *Investigations* with. And it is fair to say that Wittgenstein's builders (however else one may understand them and the point of the example) seek to destabilize the certainty with which one claims that words are names for things. As soon as the builders are said to formulate sentences, combination of words, the idea that meaning can be reduced to reference crumbles. It is not that Wittgenstein wants to deny that words name things—as if one could deny the fact of names altogether—but it becomes evident that we will not get the regularity of language in view by means of explicating meaning in terms of reference. Reference alone cannot give us a way to understand the manifold ways on which just a few numbers of words can be used.

> But how many kinds of sentences are there? Say assertion, question, and command?—There are *countless* kinds: countless different kinds of us we call "symbols", "words", "sentences". And this multiplicity is not something fixed, given once for all; but new types of language, new language-games, as we may say, come into existence, and others become obsolete and forgotten. (We can get a *rough picture* of this from the changes in mathematics). (PI §23)

Just as one may be tempted to think about "learning to speak about Hedwig" as a question about learning to make a connection between an individual animal and a name, it may be tempting to think that "learning language consist in giving names to objects. Viz, to human beings, to shapes, to colours, to pains, to moods, to numbers, etc." (PI §26). But that, Wittgenstein quickly notes, merely appears to get at something that is "preparatory to the use of a word" (PI §26). The pointing, the ostensive definition—"*This* is Hedwig"—has its contexts too: "the ostensive definition explains the use—the meaning—of the word when the overall role of the word in language is clear" (PI §26). Names, ostensive definitions, talk about reference *are* parts of language, but "the *speaking* of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life" (PI §23).

Thereby, Wittgenstein leads us to think that if we want to understand what "coming to know the meaning of a word" means (where it happens, and how, and why), and what one has learned when one has mastered a concept, we need to look at some other level. And, it is not surprising that "rules" came to take a central position in such a quest—for Wittgenstein does talk a great deal about rules, and where else are we to look if we want an account of the normativity of language if not there? There has to be a way of determining *what* one has to know *when* one knows how to use a word correctly! Right? And *even if* one were to be unable to spell out exactly what the rule was, there still has to be a kind of "standard of correctness," as Hacker called it to fall back upon when a teacher says to a student "repeat after me" or "go on like this…."—right?

Wittgenstein now asks us to think about what it means to teach somebody how to "write down a series of signs according to a certain formation rule" (PI §143). The series Wittgenstein picks is perhaps the most simple we can think of: "the

natural numbers in decimal notation" (PI §143). Quite likely, the first thing that happens is that the teacher tries to teach our student how to copy the numbers. Importantly, Wittgenstein remarks that "the *possibility of getting him to understand* will depend on his going on to write it independently" (PI §143). Whether or not the teaching continues depends on the pupil's reaction. If he continues the series the correct way, like we do, teaching may come to an end; if not, not. But how many times does the pupil have to continue the series in the same way as we do, in order for us to say that the pupil actually got it? "Clearly," Wittgenstein remarks, "you cannot state a limit here" (PI §145). Clearly? Really? Is there no "it" we can assume that the pupil knows? This is the point at which it seems natural to claim that it is the rule itself, or the system, that the pupil must have mastered.

> Suppose I now ask: "Has he understood the system when he continues the series to the hundredth place?" Or—if I should not speak of 'understanding' in connection with our primitive language-game: Has he got the system if he continues the series correctly so far? —Perhaps you will say here: to have got the system (or, again, to understand it) can't consist in continuing the series up to *this* or *that* number: *that* is only applying one's understanding. The understanding itself is a state which is the *source* of the correct use. (PI §146)

There are two central lines of thought here that Wittgenstein criticizes, or challenges. The first is how natural it may seem to think of the application of a rule as something quite different from the rule itself. Indeed, it seems almost self-evident. Here is the rule. Here is me applying *it*. That the exemplary case here is "natural numbers in decimal form" further underlines the reasonableness of such a reaction. "For the series is infinite and the bit of it that I can have developed finite" (PI §147). The second thing worth emphasizing here is that *understanding* also (and expectedly?) is divorced from the "application," and said to be residing in some kind of relation to, or attitude toward, or insight in, the system, the regularity, itself.

But wait a minute! Is this not precisely the image that underlies the very idea that language use *must* be guided by means of a set of underlying rules? Let us look again at these classical formulations of Wittgenstein's so-called rule-conception of language:

> To know the meaning of an expression is to know (…) a set of constraints to which such uses must conform. (Wright 1993, p. 24)

> The correct (and incorrect) applications [of a word] are determined by the rules that prescribe its correct usage. (Thornton 1998, p. 32)

> [L]inguistic understanding involves mastery of techniques concerning the *application of rules*. (Glock 1996, p. 223)

> Possessing a concept involves being able to use a word in accordance with a standard of correctness. (Hacker 1972, p. 219)

Are not these formulations clear expressions of the idea that the application of a rule is something quite different from the rule itself, and the idea that *understanding* must be sought for in the system, the regularity, itself? And, are not these merely alternative formulations of the idea that "The understanding itself is a state which is

the *source* of the correct use"? It seems as if these followers of Wittgenstein are rehearsing the very image that Wittgenstein aims to challenge—for example, when he somewhat mockingly asks: "But what does this knowledge consist in? Let me ask: *When* do you know the application? Always? day and night? Or only when you are actually thinking of the rule? do you know it, that is, the same way as you know the alphabet and the multiplication table? Or is what you call 'knowledge' a state of consciousness or a process—say a thought of something, or the like?" (PI §148).

Wittgenstein aims to show that "knowing how to go on" was already, as it were, the *full* answer to the question what it is one must know in order to follow the lead of one's others. "The grammar of the word 'knows' is evidently closer to that of 'can', 'is able to'. But it is also related to that of 'understands'. (Mastery of a technique.)" (PI §150).

What has gone missing, one may say, is precisely the life of language—the fact that "the *speaking* of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life" (PI §23). I remarked above that a shift has occurred from words to sentences in philosophy of language. There are clear connections to make between the focus on words with an interest in reference and the representational character of language, and the focus on sentences and the interest in (grammatical, logical) rules. These together would mark the first two rungs of the ladder of this paper. The third rung of the ladder is the attempt to return to the rough ground, as it were, and look for linguistic regularity in practice, as lived.

3 The Life (of "&C.")

I want to suggest that one problem here, one reason why we may be tempted to cling on to the "rule-rung" of the ladder mentioned above a bit too long, is partly due to Wittgenstein himself. The way I see it, Wittgenstein chose simple mathematical series as exemplary for his discussions, precisely because these kinds of "linguistic" regularities are so *tempting* to think of in terms of guiding, externally existing, rules—almost Platonic (in the pejorative sense of the "term"…). But it appears as if many of Wittgenstein's interpreters think that his penchant for simple mathematics was due to Wittgenstein wanting us to think of the regularities of our language as just a variation of a simplistic mathematical rule (*as if* Wittgenstein had not gone to great length in trying to show that mathematics too was far from as simplistic as many philosophers are prone to think).

So it may be helpful here to think more about kinds of regularities in language use that are not so self-evidently "rule-like" in order to further make clear that regularity in language use, the normative force of language, does not depend on, or fall back upon, a kind of rule, or form of language, that precedes all articulations (correct and incorrect).

One clear, common, colloquial, everyday, image of "knowing how to go on" (that does not immediately make us think about underlying or guiding rules) can be found in the simple phrase "&c." "&c." is the old abbreviation of etcetera. The "&" refers to "et" which is the Latin for "and," and the "c" stands for "ceteri"—i.e., "others." Literally then, the Latin et cetera means something like "and the rest of such things," and we usually use the phrase "etcetera" when we want to suggest that a list that has just been started should go on, be made longer (but probably not ad infinitum). And we may also use "etc." to signal that there is no *need* to give the list in full—when the rest of the list is, as it were, too obvious, or too tedious to repeat. Et cetera thus means something like "go on in this manner" (where "in this manner" means something like "like this, but do not merely repeat the same over and over again") and "go on for some time, but not for ever—I won't bother specifying it, you'll get it." So there is an instruction and a following of the instruction involved, but both the instruction and the "carrying out" may appear rather vague. This is the kind of phrase we employ when we trust that the other will be able to go on alone (without my guidance and supervision).

&c. may also be used in statements that requires that we "fill in the blanks"—as in "They lost everything in the fire; house, boat, both cars, photo albums, etc." The "go on like this" then, the "rest of such things" implied by the "&c.," need not be "strict" instances of the same concept (as in "I like berries, like blueberry, cloudberry, lingonberry, etc."), but are quite often more loosely ordered: "… and by 'original' I mean the text which you read or copy; the dictation from which you write; the score from which you play; etc." (PI §162); or "The adverbs that can be inserted in 'How … do you know?' are few in number and even fewer in classes. There is practically no overlap with those that can be inserted in 'How … do you believe?' (firmly, sincerely, genuinely, etc.)" (Austin 1979, pp. 81 f.n. 2), or "Either I myself may be dreaming, or in delirium, or under the influence of mescal, &c.: or else the item may be stuffed, painted, dummy, artificial, trick, freak, toy, assumed, feigned, &c.: or else again there's an uncertainty (it's left open) whether *I* am to blame or *it* is—mirages, mirror images, odd lightening effects, &c." (Austin 1979, p. 87). What follows from the "etcetera" is, as it were, "left open," but it would be wrong to say that this signals an uncertainty. There is no *obvious* way, not *one* way only, to go on here, yet we know what it would mean to go on, and also what it would mean not to go on.

Etcetera is thus an expression we use in order to signal that there is a form of regularity about our shared life with words here, and we are counting on our others to see that. And we use it ("etc." that is) without hesitation. So, in a sense, it is an expression of trust. Only that "trust" often becomes relevant, something to relate to, in cases where the trust is questioned, or not easily discerned, in a similar way as "certainty" often comes together with doubt. (I do not *trust* you to not stab me with a knife; I am not *certain* that the ground on which I walk will carry my weight. But if you "inform me" that you are not going to stab me with a knife, or ask me if I think that the ground I am about to walk will carry my weight, doubt, and evaluations of my surrounding *may* be spurred, and *then* certainty and trust may be expressed.)

Focusing now on the kind of trust (the kind of unwittingly held expectations, or silently expressed acknowledgments of a shared horizon) that is involved in cases where we say "etc." or "and so on" should broaden our horizon and widen our image of what "understanding" and "knowing" may mean if, say, a pupil follows the lead of his or her teacher.

Compare these two scenarios: First, a teacher asks her first graders to "go on like me" after she has said "red, orange, yellow… and so on." One of the kids raises his or her hand and says, "black, blue, white, and pink." The teacher says "Good!" A few days later, the same teacher asks her students if they know how to "go on like me" after she has said "red, orange, yellow… and so on." And one of the kids raises his or her hand and says "black, blue, white, and pink." Some of the kids giggle. The teacher says "No. That is not right, I'm afraid. Anyone else?"

What can possibly have happened? What has gone wrong? The scenes appear to be identical, and the persons involved are the same. The collapse of sense here is due to a lack of understanding of context, or of the situation. *If* we imagine these two scenes as really being identical, it is true that something utterly strange is going on—so strange, indeed, that we are likely to disregard this as too unreal, nonsensical perhaps.

But suppose, instead, that in the first case, the children were practicing colors—how many there are, what they are called, what they look like, how they are spelled (*etc.*). If that is the case, it is quite clear that the child did "go on by herself" in exactly the right way. And suppose now that the second scenario—in which the (same) child raised his or her hand and responded with the same words to the same question *but got it wrong*—happened in a class where our poor child was fooled to believe that they were discussing "colors" (it all looked the same, and his or her teacher did say the same things as last week), *because* she just got back from a doctor's appointment and so arrived at class too late (just at the moment at which their teacher popped the question) and *did not know* that the topic under discussion was physical phenomena like rainbows (the color of them, for example, and the order of the colors in them). If this was the case, there is nothing strange with the teacher correcting the child. It just was the wrong answer!

Thus, this it is not merely a case of us, being external observers, failing to understand the context of these two scenarios. The student who got it wrong in the second scenario did not understand the setting either. And I am inclined to say that *that* is why she did not know how to go on in the right, expected way. That is, if a child fails to complete a series, or does not manage to "go on like the teacher," follow his or her lead, this is not necessarily because the child does not understand the rule, or some other underlying normative structure, of this particular language-game. It is more likely that the child lacks the relevant kind of preconception of the order of things, does not understand the horizon from which the example originates, and does not share the world with the teacher. This is one of the reasons why I think that Stanley Cavell points to something of great importance when he remarks that "In learning a language, you do not merely learn the pronunciation of sounds, and their grammatical orders, but the 'forms of life' which make those sounds the words they are, do what they do" (Cavell 1979, p. 177). But that also means that

Wittgenstein must be seen as steering our attention away from the idea of language as rule-governed, toward a more holistic way to bring linguistic regularity into view when it is called for, and *if* it is.

This last comment about *when* an attempt to bring linguistic regularities into view is called for, *if* it is, is prompted by a worry that philosophical questions that call for such responses tend to enter the world in which language us lived sideways on. A typically philosophical posture here would be to say that "Meaning does not depend on rules, but on the form of life in which speaking takes place. What is more: what cases such as the two series of colours show, meaning is not only context sensitive, but occasion sensitive" as Charles Travis may be said to suggest (Cf. Travis 2008). Now, I think Travisian reflections are true and *very* helpful on many occasions, but as a general theory of language, I am inclined to say that they *must* miss the target. If it is wrong to say that rules are what bring meaning to language, and it is problematic to say that contexts are what invest our signs with meaning, it is also confused to say that meaning always is invested in our words "occasionally"… That is, as a source of philosophical criticism, Travis' reflections on occasion sensitivity are extremely helpful, but if we think of these reflections as forming a general theory of language, then "occasion sensitivity" comes in too late, as it were. This would be a theoretician's response to a puzzle and that would be its only function. "Occasion sensitivity" may be said to describe features in conversational scenes, but it does not really play an *actual* or *guiding* role in conversational situations, as if one would have to consult one's own faculty of occasion sensitivity *before* one "decoded" an utterance. Also, in scenes of instruction, scenes in which language is learned, we do not teach our pupils an almost infinitely long list of occasions, and a complementary list of "suitable" ways of turning ordinary words in them (and I am quite certain that Travis in agreement with me here).

It may be right to say that the child who failed to go on listing the colors of the rainbow did not understand the context of the utterance and was thereby not occasion sensitive enough. It would be wrong, however, to say that she did not understand the words of the language, or the sentences. But it would also be strange to say that she understood the words of the language, the sentences, *rightly*. What she did not understand was the context. And it is true that words belong in contexts. But we should be very hesitant to introduce either "context" or "occasions" as "suitable alternative responses" to the philosopher that proclaims: "There *has* to be a way of determining *what* one has to know *when* one knows how to use a word correctly!"

Contexts and forms of life are not answers to questions about what invests words with meaning. But that is not to say that contexts are irrelevant, or disconnected from the sense of our words. Quite the contrary actually. So John Searle, for example, has a point when he remarks that "cut" means quite different things in "cut the grass" and "cut the cake" (Searle 1980, 1994). And therefore, it may appear to make perfect sense to say that the lawnmower is "implied" in the first, and a pair of scissors are "implied" in the second. But this does not mean that one *cannot* "cut the grass" with a pair of scissors. Not only in the sense that one *can* use a pair of scissors to cut grass, but because "cut the grass" may be used in a great many

varieties of ways too. This particular sentence is, for example slang for trimming one's pubic hair. So I want to say that even though it is true that one wouldn't be cutting the cake if one ran it over with lawnmower (Searle 1994, p. 640) and it is true that it would look odd, untoward, and unexpected to see somebody try to trim say, a soccer field, with a pair of scissors; just like one can feed peanuts to a monkey but not pennies, and pennies to a parking meter but not peanuts (Cavell 1979, p. 183); there is still something with Searle's view that does not seem right. Searle's view suggests that how one ought to do it (with a pair of scissors or with a lawnmower) follows from the semantic content of the sentence. I want to say that the idea of semantic content cannot be disconnected from sentences used in concrete situations, which means that the whole idea of "semantic content" (or "sentence meaning," for that matter) becomes deeply problematic. Contexts do not *bring* meaning to words and sentences; words and sentences mean in contexts. We simply do not know enough about the world in order to determine what "cut the grass" means (what semantic content it supposedly has) without knowing *what*, if anything, we are doing with our words. And, after all, to understand a context is not to understand the meaning of a word, or the root of all meaning, but to understand the context. This can be seen as variation of Cora Diamond's remark: "To give an account of meaning in terms of assertion conditions is to remain with our eyes fixed in the wrong direction" (Diamond 1990, p. 15).

4 Pedagogical Postscript on Hedwig and the Question of Parroting

When our two-year-old learned talk about Hedwig, she learned to employ the pet's name in a great number of contexts and to include talk about Hedwig in a great number of activities. To learn to understand, as it were, what "Hedwig" denoted in this case, included learning a great deal about life and death, sisterhood, the difference between a pet and toy, and, perhaps also, to come to see *where* the philosophical–theoretical description of language use captured in the type/token comes from, and so on and so forth. So there is a sense in which it is true to say that to merely repeat the birds name, pure parroting, is not to know the name.

Teaching and learning need to be brought home to our shared practices. And there can be something dubious about abstracting principles and summarized images of expected "learning outcomes" etc., not because we cannot say, or hope, or predict, that our pupils will learn this or that, but because such abstractions tend to misrepresent the objects. We do not, for example, cook together (in school or at home) in order to let our children see or learn about a practical *application* of the principles behind measuring (say, ounces and cups, or deciliters and centiliters, even though they will nevertheless learn what ounces, cups, or deciliters and centiliters *are*; and one thing that they will learn is that ounces and cups, or deciliters and centiliters are not abstract principles). Practical learning experiences

are not practical ways to learn about theoretical entities; they are, as it were, the thing itself. This is why I said that "knowing how to go on" is already, as it were, the *full* answer to the question what it is one must know in order to follow the lead of one's others.

"To learn to speak" may be described as learning to use language in a way that adheres to the regularities we find in language. But it would be wrong to say that this amounts to the same thing as "learning to apply a rule." Rush Rhees thus put his finger on something immensely important when he said: "Show how rules of grammar are rules of the lives in which there is language" (Rhees 1970, p. 1970; Cf. Diamond 1990). Learning is a matter of coming closer to one's others, to one's community. But, of course, given that learning means "learning how to go on, on one's own," it follows too that becoming a member of one's community is never a matter of parroting.[2]

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[2]My thanks to my daughters for inspiration and clarifying conversations, and to Nora Hämäläinen for valuable comments.

Can an Ape Become Your Co-author? Reflections on Becoming as a Presupposition of Teaching

Pär Segerdahl

Abstract Wittgenstein's remarks on teaching highlight how teaching is an interactive, bidirectional process: through her responses, the learner contributes to the teaching process. However, not every potential learner exhibits such responses. A one-year-old child is typically too young to respond in ways that sustain interactive processes of "learning how to multiply." But we have the attitude that she *will* become teachable, when she gets a little older. Teaching can be said to presuppose a dimension of becoming. Our familiarity with this dimension comes to expression in how we imagine the learner in Wittgenstein's examples. We do not assume that the pupil in the mathematical rule-following discussion is a one-year-old child, for example, or an ape. By discussing ape language research, this chapter investigates becoming as a presupposition of teaching. Ape language research is interesting because we generally do not expect that an ape can become someone whose spontaneous responses sustain language learning. Using as my point of departure an article by Sue Savage-Rumbaugh and three language-competent bonobos, I show how different our attitudes to ape and human learnability are. We patiently await learnability in human children, but assume that apes must be specifically trained, if they are to learn at all. By revealing our attitudes to apes as not living in a dimension of becoming (as being at most susceptible to disciplining), and by demonstrating the challenges these presumptions mean for ape language research, the chapter emphasizes the didactic significance of attitudes to learnability, and of becoming as a presupposition of teaching.

Keywords Ape language · Learnability · Becoming · Didactic attitudes · Wittgenstein

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M.A. Peters and J. Stickney (eds.), *A Companion to Wittgenstein on Education*,
DOI 10.1007/978-981-10-3136-6_36

1 Attitudes to Learnability

Wittgenstein often uses examples in which someone (a child, a builder, or a pupil) is taught how to do something, like reading or developing a mathematical series. But what if the learner is unteachable? In §§143–145 of *Philosophical Investigations*, Wittgenstein emphasizes the contingency of teaching:

> And here too our pupil's capacity to learn may come to an end. (PI §143)[1]
>
> What do I mean when I say "the pupil's capacity to learn *may* come to an end here"? (PI §144)
>
> I only wished to say: the effect of any further *explanation* depends on his *reaction*. (PI §145)

Without making any exegetical claims about the significance Wittgenstein attaches to this contingency, I will in this chapter investigate "teachability" when the learner is an ape.

A feature that I do think Wittgenstein's remarks highlight is that teaching is an interactive, bidirectional process. Through her reactions, the learner contributes to the teaching process. Can you even try to teach a one-year-old child multiplication? Such a child will not exhibit responses that make "this is how you multiply" take off the ground as a didactic process. You would feel ridiculous trying. A one-year-old child is not yet teachable when it comes to multiplication. Not because she is too young to understand multiplication, but because she is too young to *contribute* to learning processes which may lead to the judgement: "Now she understands."

There is a time for learning. We know, or have the attitude, that a one-year-old child changes and will be able to learn multiplication, when she is a little older. She will become teachable, of course she will! By default, we assume she will.

Becoming teachable is itself a form of learning. (A child is not teachable in soccer until she at least learned to walk, or to handle a wheelchair.) In Wittgenstein's examples, we assume a learner who already learned to be teachable. His examples presuppose a dimension of becoming. We adapt to them by imagining a particular kind of learner. We do not assume, for example, that the pupil in the mathematical rule-following discussion is a one-year-old child, or an ape. These adaptations reveal attitudes to learnability. They can be fatefully presumptuous, but we have them and most often they work sensitively.

This chapter highlights Wittgenstein's presupposed dimension of becoming by discussing ape language research. Ape language research is interesting because we do not generally expect that an ape can become someone who spontaneously responds in ways that contribute to language learning. My idea is that by facing our

[1]Following convention, titles for Wittgenstein's works are abbreviated (PI = Philosophical Investigations, Z = Zettel), with section (§) or page number (p.), with full citation and initials in the References.

own attitudes to apes as *not* living in the familiar dimension of becoming (as being at most susceptible to disciplining), and by seeing the challenges these presumptions mean for ape language research, we will also see the didactic significance of such attitudes, and of the dimension of becoming. But is it really possible to invoke ape language research to highlight aspects of Wittgenstein's thinking, given that he said, "If a lion could talk, we could not understand him" (PI, p. 223)? Well, let us begin by discussing ape language and then return to Wittgenstein's aphorism, for I believe they are in perfect harmony and shed much light on each other.

The chapter thus investigates the importance in ape language research of approaching apes as living in dimensions of becoming; simultaneously, it investigates the difficulties of doing so. We will scrutinize our attitudes to ape learnability.

2 An Unusual Attitude Toward Apes

In 2007, an article appeared in *Applied Animal Welfare Science* which featured a human first author and three ape co-authors (Savage-Rumbaugh et al. 2007). The first author was Sue Savage-Rumbaugh, famous ape language researcher, and the three co-authors were language-competent bonobos, more commonly known as Kanzi, Panbanisha, and Nyota.

Because of her practice of living together with her animal research subjects, Savage-Rumbaugh's claims about what they understand, do, and say (usually by pointing to word symbols) are sometimes seen as suspicious. Although she developed rigorous experimental designs to test especially Kanzi's comprehension of spoken English, she has been viewed as being emotionally too close to "her" apes to make scientifically valid assessments of what they actually learned. Ape language skeptics would presumably wave off the unexpected listing of co-authors as revealing more of Savage-Rumbaugh's attachment to her apes than of bonobos' actual capacities to function as co-authors. The suggestion I develop is that Sue's attachment can be seen not primarily in her act of listing three apes as her co-authors, but in the history of living together that preceded the listing, which enabled Kanzi, Panbanisha, and Nyota to *become* apes who could function as her co-authors, at least in the sense in which human informants are acknowledged as co-authors in participatory research. In contrast to listing your co-authors, which requires little effort, this decades-long sharing of life changed the trajectory of Sue's and the bonobos' lives. It allowed an ape–human culture to develop. The question is not whether apes can be co-authors. The question is whether these specific apes became such apes in the emergence of a bi-species culture.

I want to make the listing of co-authors as unsurprising as it is to those who know who these individual bonobos became, together with Sue, in the course of time. But we need to begin in our more common sense of astonishment.

I remember my first visit to the apes, and asking Savage-Rumbaugh's colleague, William M. Fields, about an issue that had troubled me before I travelled.[2] It was about the linguistic tests they performed to measure the bonobos' linguistic skills. I'm thinking of tests where, for example, one experimenter asks Kanzi, in spoken English, to give another experimenter pictures of various items—such as pictures of potatoes, of ice, of balloons, or pictures of people Kanzi knows—and he correctly picks up the right pictures and hands them over. I had seen the tests in TV documentaries, but they featured mainly the controlled test situation, without living context. I was curious about what happened before the tests, so I asked Fields: How do you bring the research subject into these test situations, where the ape sits on a chair, wears headphones, and takes the test? How does an ape end up on a chair wearing headphones?

I was astonished to hear him answer: "We ask them if they want to work." If they agree to working, they will follow the experimenter's instructions about where to sit and whether they should listen to a voice in the headphones or attend to an experimenter present in the room. But if they refuse to work, and if you cannot persuade them by polite negotiation, there will be no linguistic test performed that day.

Why was I astonished by the answer, "We ask them if they want to work"? Because, in its simplicity, it indicated that the bonobos were more than only animal research subjects, specially trained to react to certain words or signs in specific experimental conditions. Evidently, one spoke freely and casually with the apes, before, during, and after the tests.

Later during my visit, I could witness these ape–human conversations on a daily basis. They concerned any issue of importance to the bonobos, like: what to do in the afternoon; who is coming for a visit; where Kanzi's ball is; what upsets Matata (another bonobo); which direction to take in the forest; where Sue is; whether Kanzi would be so kind as to assist the caretaker by collecting the young apes' toothbrushes; and yes, Kanzi will get his surprise later, when Bill returns. (See Segerdahl 2015 for philosophical discussion of a disagreement between Kanzi and a caretaker about where his ball is, where Kanzi turns out to be right.)

The TV documentaries surprise viewers with what an ape can do in test situations. During my visit, the everyday context of the tests soon impressed me more. Before Kanzi ended up on that chair wearing those headphones, he was politely asked whether he wanted to work. And before he was asked to work, he spent years with humans who exposed him not only to language, but also to attitudes that are self-evident with human children, but unusual with apes.

I had gotten a glimpse of Sue's future-oriented attitude to ape learnability, which focused less on teaching them and more on their becoming teachable, in due time: "I decided to abandon all instruction and focus my attention instead on what was

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[2] My first visit was in August 2001, when the bonobos lived in Atlanta, at the Language Research Center, Georgia State University. In 2004, they moved to the Great Ape Trust in Des Moines, Iowa. Sadly, Panbanisha died in 2012.

said to Kanzi rather than on what we could teach him to say" (Savage-Rumbaugh et al. 1998: 26–7). Many of us would feel ridiculous if we were to approach young apes with such an attitude, speaking to them while expecting that they will eventually learn what we never teach them—as if they were like children in the familiar dimension of becoming.

3 Resistance to Viewing Apes as Living in Dimensions of Becoming

My response to experiencing the bonobos in daily conversation with caretakers and researchers, and with me, was to view them like furry humans, and myself like a human animal. I couldn't help it. It was how I perceived them, and myself. When I asked (at that time) 3-year-old Nyota which direction we should take in the forest, he pointed. And when I asked him about the name of a place we approached along the path he indicated (a place where apes and humans used to rest, cook, eat, and have fun), he pointed to its signpost (I hadn't seen it). I could either respond and participate in the ape–human culture or quickly return home and pretend that nothing really happened (see Segerdahl 2014).

Viewing animals like humans is commonly seen as an intellectual sin called anthropomorphism. Sue is sometimes accused of this sin. Presenting apes as your co-authors certainly invites the accusation. However, the accusation is issued not only by scientistic ape language skeptics. Many morally concerned animal ethicists and animal studies scholars are sworn enemies of such human-centered perspectives, because they are supposed to be insensitive to the animals.

I once showed one of the TV documentaries to an animal ethicist. She was not impressed by the bonobos' featured linguistic and cultural skills; at least I couldn't detect the amazement these documentaries usually produce in viewers. Her only comment after seeing the documentary concerned the fact that Kanzi, in one of the outdoor scenes, was wearing a yellow jacket. The jacket indicated that Kanzi was not allowed to be the animal he is: The documentary represented him as human. The yellow jacket was not animal sensitive.

I mention the accusation of anthropomorphism, not because I believe it is generally false, but because of the predicament that it means for ape language research and for apes as learners. Kanzi is not just "a bonobo" with his real home in the rainforest in the Congo. He became a North American bonobo with a human mother next to his wild-caught bonobo mother, and it can be cold in the USA. Offering him a jacket, especially if he asks for it himself, is being sensitive to who Kanzi *became* through an upbringing of daily ape–human interactions, exhibiting the attitude that he *will* become someone you cannot entirely anticipate, someone who tomorrow will be able to learn what he cannot learn today.

I am inclined to say that it was the animal ethicist's complaint about the yellow jacket that was insensitive to Kanzi, namely as an ape in becoming, who lives in an

ape–human culture also in becoming. I will return to Kanzi's yellow jacket a few times in this chapter, as an emblem for our difficulties of appreciating ape learnability.

4 What Exactly Is Noteworthy About Kanzi as a Learner?

One can view the linguistic tests with Kanzi in analogy to Wittgenstein's examples of a pupil developing a mathematical series under the guidance of a teacher. For the test situations are peculiar and Sue had to teach Kanzi to function in those conditions. He was taught to sit still for long periods of time, to focus on the voice of a person he cannot see, and to "continue the series" of handing over pictures, which the voice mentions, to another person, who stands behind his back (to avoid cuing him). He was taught to be testable in a laboratory. This required talking with Kanzi. The tests cannot even be initiated, or conducted, or ended, without talking:

> Do you want to work with Sue today?
> Kanzi, sit on this chairKanzi,
> put on the headphones, please
> You can play with Panbanisha later
> Kanzi, turn round, please; thank you (said by the experimenter behind Kanzi)
> Thank you, Kanzi, you've been good; now you can play with Panbanisha.

All this talking, just to make apes testable and capable of proving to science that they can talk! I didn't expect this comical clash between the apes' everyday talk and the experimental work to prove that they can talk.

When Sue taught Kanzi about laboratory work, he had already become someone who responded to questions, requests, and instructions, like those cited above. By initially abandoning instruction in Kanzi's life, he could later on be instructed about specific topics. His responses to the teaching efforts were not always correct, of course, but they were responses that contributed to a didactic process: a process that Kanzi entered and enabled (as the pupil does in the didactic interactions Wittgenstein portrayed). He had become teachable about laboratory work. Savage-Rumbaugh's tests thus presuppose a dimension of becoming, and it is connected with her abandonment of instruction.

One could be struck also by *how casually* Kanzi slips into his jacket (or by *how seriously* Panbanisha, before Halloween, looks through a catalogue, and indicates to caretakers which monster outfits she wants). What is striking, if I may say so, is how *unsurprising* a jacket is on Kanzi, once you know him as the bonobo he became. The yellow jacket is, in his case, not a human symbol placed upon an animal body to make it represent a human. Rather, the self-evidence of his wearing it indicates that a transformation we do not expect in an animal already occurred in him. The nuances of Kanzi's actions make you sense the presence of an entire

culture—"the whole hurly-burly" of daily actions—functioning as the background of his conduct (Z §567). The casualness of his slipping into the jacket or donning the backpack reflects his upbringing as a language-competent bonobo who *often* wore a jacket and helped Sue carry the pick nick equipment in the forest.

This does not fit our notion of animals as destined to "be what they are." When I began to see the bonobos like humans, it did not mean that I began to imagine them as wearing human clothes and sitting in cozy armchairs. What rather happened was that I was struck by the notion that animals are not only destinies but also beginnings. I saw them as learners, in some cases possible to imagine in at least some of Wittgenstein's examples of human learners.

What I thus think is noteworthy about Kanzi as a learner is how he, together with a human who abandoned instruction, lived in a dimension of becoming that made him teachable. But we need to look more closely into how it could happen *where* it happened: in a captive environment.

5 Being Animals Behind the Wire

The bonobos live in captivity, that is the crude fact. They spend most of their time behind wire, behind concrete walls, and locked steel doors. How can a dimension of becoming exist in such restrictive conditions? This question brings us to the article that Sue wrote with input from Kanzi, Panbanisha, and Nyota. Its topic is welfare of apes in captive environments. What do these captive bonobos consider important for their welfare?

Once again a surprise awaits us, related to ape becoming. The article rejects two related animal welfare ideals: enrichment and providing captive animals with environments that can be seen as natural for their species. Ideally, captive animals should be provided with stimulating environments that allow species-typical behavior. Savage-Rumbaugh, Wamba, Wamba, and Wamba do not find these attempts to be sensitive to animals sensitive to *them*. Why? What can possibly be wrong with enriching the environment of captive animals and making it more natural for their species?

These welfare ideals presuppose that captivity is merely an external feature of the captive animal. Essentially, the captive animal "*is*": a tiger, an elephant or a bonobo. Essentially, the chimpanzee "*is*": a juvenile or an adult; a male or a female. Here, I'm using zoological vocabulary that supposedly reflects what animals "*are*." The ideals of enrichment and naturalness do not address animals in the captivity that became their existence, but treats captivity as something that can be concealed for the animals by providing them with environments that (according to human perception) allow them to "do what they do" and to "be what they are"—almost as if they were not captive. "All these efforts render the visual aspect of the environment more entertaining and acceptable to the viewer," Savage-Rumbaugh et al. (2007: 8) remark. Ethically and ethologically informed sensitivity to animals reproduces the notion of animals as destinies rather than beginnings.

Future-oriented meetings with humans are downplayed on this physically enclosed scene of animality, because such relationships, and such openness to possible futures, disturb what the animals are destined to "be." No common vocabulary is to be used about us and the animals on the other side of the wire, because it would represent them as humans. A linguistic, cultural and temporal boundary is thought to be what animal sensitivity demands. How can adding the latter boundary to the already existing physical boundary be *more* sensitive to captive animals? That is the question Savage-Rumbaugh, Wamba, Wamba, and Wamba ask.

Perhaps the answer is that adding such a boundary *seems* sensitive to animals because language already contains such a picture of animals: "A *picture* held us captive. And we could not get outside it, for it lay in our language and language seemed to repeat it to us inexorably" (PI §115). Kanzi, Panbanisha, and Nyota do not want to be held captive by our *picture* of them as animals. It is sufficiently troubling to be held captive by the wire.

6 Negotiating the Wire

A phrase that Savage-Rumbaugh and Fields often use in conversation about their work is that of "negotiating the wire." Despite my previous references to the forest, the bonobos most often find themselves in an environment of wires, walls, keys, barriers, regulations, caretakers, and humans with terrifying powers to decide about their captive existence. How did Sue and her co-workers negotiate the bonobos' captivity to create an environment of becoming and learning?

I cannot identify all relevant features of Sue's negotiation of the wire, but I will give five examples that indirectly indicate how she saw captivity as the bonobos' form of existence, and how she negotiated it with them.

One feature is that Sue spent much of her adult life behind the wire herself, together with the bonobos. When she is behind the wire, she is a member of the captive group and has to rely on the services of caretakers on the outside, and she shares with the bonobos the fear of powerful and skeptical humans. At the same time, she makes the wire as transparent as possible, as little of a boundary as possible, for example, by ensuring that caretakers on the outside are meaningful to the apes; that they are part of an extended family.

A second feature of the negotiation of the wire is that the bonobos can plan and realize travel outside of the building, in the forest surrounding the laboratory. So not only does Sue "go in" with the apes to share their captive existence within the enclosures of the laboratory building. She also "goes out" with them into the excitingly greater freedom of a large, though still enclosed, forest. When they move through the forest, their joint decisions about where to go, what to eat, and what to do, can be realized immediately and spontaneously, as opposed to the slower pace of life in the laboratory building, where all decisions and plans require tedious negotiations across the wire with an outside world that often has another agenda (although it may concern the bonobos, as when caretakers need to prepare the

bonobos' dinner and must hurry off instead of participating in Panbanisha's monster performance). In the forest, the bonobos are not dependent on slow and often interrupted negotiations with busy caretakers on the other side of the wire. Together with Sue, acting freely as an ape–human group sharing the same world, they celebrate the joy of that forest autonomy. "It's in the forest it all happens," Sue often says in conversation about the formative experiences of the bonobos. It is where they are most independent and explorative, and Sue follows.

A third feature that I believe is significant is that Sue, when they still lived in Atlanta, built her private home in the forest, behind the same wire that circumscribes the entire property, including the laboratory building where the bonobos make their nests at night (when they do not sleep in the forest or in Sue's house). When the ape–human group moves through the forest, Sue's home is as accessible to them as the laboratory building, and it is as much behind the wire that encloses the forest as the bonobos' most common nesting place. One might see this as a geographic feature of Sue's way of negotiating the wire so that it does not divide the ape–human group.

A fourth feature of Sue's approach is that she did not isolate an exclusive group of apes from their families in order to subject them to purely human influences, as many ape language researchers did before her. The three bonobos who contributed to the article live in a larger group of bonobo relatives who did not learn language. The three bonobos' participation in ape language research does not isolate them from their captive parents, siblings, aunts, and uncles. Sue negotiates the captivity of the three co-writing apes by negotiating the captivity of their entire family. The language-competent bonobos regularly help Sue to take this responsibility by telling her what the nonspeaking apes fear, want, or expect. If humans fail to respond appropriately to the bonobos' demands, they will find it difficult to function as caretakers, researchers, or visitors, because the bonobos will not allow them to.

The fifth and final feature that I wish to mention is the type of language Sue uses with, and about, the bonobos. She does not use the professional zoological vocabulary of, for example, "males and females." She talks about the bonobos in what is described in the article as the vocabulary of personhood:

> We use the biological terms *males* and *females* with regard to apes, rather than such social terms as *boys*, *girls*, *men*, *women*, *husbands*, *wives*, *fathers*, *mothers*, *uncles*, *aunts*, *brothers*, *sisters*, *teenagers*, *adults*, *parents,* or *grandparents*. These social terms imply an understanding of self, other, and normative group behavior that results from symbolic constructions rather than from biologically given attributes.
>
> The use of a different vocabulary for humans, to encompass these basic roles of personhood, has established as a human, cultural imperative the erroneous belief that apes have no culturally constructed social roles that place expectancies of normativeness on them; we perceive apes only as individuals who might or might not "get along" with each other. (Savage-Rumbaugh et al. 2007: 10)

Panbanisha is spoken of as *Kanzi's sister*, and Kanzi is spoken of as her babies' *uncle Kanzi*. It is partly because Sue unashamedly uses such social and personal language with and about the apes that her statements about them sometimes are viewed as anthropomorphic; as saying more about her than about the apes

themselves. What I wish to emphasize in the next section is that it is through the kind of relationships that these forms of language sustain that Kanzi became teachable about, for example, laboratory work.

7 Normative Responsiveness in Personal Relationships

The necessity of letting apes acquire language spontaneously, without training them, has been discussed elsewhere, emphasizing the difficult to survey cultural dimensions of language (Segerdahl et al. 2005). Here, I wish to emphasize another aspect of the issue. It is that instruction, or animal training, reinforces the divide: *We* train *them*. This is not a sensitive way of negotiating the wire to create an environment of inter-species becoming. It is rather like disciplining prisoners.

Training obstructs the social relationships we talk about in the vocabulary of personhood; it inhibits the normative responsiveness of close personal relationships. The ape might learn to do what the trainer wants it to do, because it wants the associated food reward, but not because *you* are important for the ape, or because what you teach the ape has a point in your relationship, or shared life. This reminds me of a remark Wittgenstein made about the task of teaching someone the meaning of the word “thinking,” which appears intricate, requiring long-winded explanations and descriptions. It does not, says Wittgenstein: “I just teach him the word *under particular circumstances*” (Z §116). Circumstances are forms of life which the learner came to share with the teacher, but was not taught. They emerge in the dimension of becoming. And this is what I above all learn from Savage-Rumbaugh’s work: not merely that apes can be taught human language, but that the normative responsiveness to meaningful others which characterizes human becoming also characterizes ape becoming. Emerging circumstances *will* enable ape teachability, in due time, if you wait trustfully, as with a young child.

The normative responsiveness of shared life is more transformative than the few simple psychological buttons that are monotonously pressed, again and again, in animal training. Not until social relationships develop, and apes and humans transform in them, can teaching efforts be made about specific topics like laboratory work. Teaching is not what makes us beginnings, but what makes us beginnings (living together) will allow teaching. Teaching presupposes the responsiveness of social relationships, which drives the emergence of circumstances occasioning teaching. Early emphasis on *training them* would prevent such circumstances from appearing, and from using them as occasions for learning. It would not permit “the whole hurly-burly” of actions; the background which “determines our judgment, our concepts and reactions” (Z §567). (Consider how the five features of the negotiation of the wire that I mentioned permit such a dynamic background.)

That Sue negotiated the bonobos’ captivity with them is full of significance, I believe. If she had not, their relationships would have become dishonest, avoiding the most salient feature of their existence. Negotiating the wire can be viewed as an

everyday concern that comes with close relationships with captive bonobos. In their daily ape–human dealings with the basic condition of their existence, social relationships deepened and a whole "hurly-burly" of circumstances allowing learning emerged. Negotiating the wire is, in one way or another, what living and talking always revolves round for the bonobos, for they live in captivity. By negotiating it instead of hiding it, captivity became productive. It permitted *living* in captivity and not merely *being held* in captivity. It allowed a bi-species culture to emerge.

8 Presumptuous Amazement and Wittgenstein's Lion

There is a way of being amazed by language-competent apes that, despite appreciating what they learned, presupposes the attitude to "apes" that Sue overcame by abandoning instruction. In order to face our deepest presumptions, we need to scrutinize this superficial way of being amazed by her work.

Savage-Rumbaugh is famous for scientific results that tease the imagination; not least the result that Kanzi demonstrates comprehension of spoken English sentences comparable to that of a 2½-year-old human child (he was even a little better than the child he was compared with) (Savage-Rumbaugh et al. 1993). What teases the imagination, I believe, is that she managed to teach an *animal* human language. It is as if we believed that apes simply cannot wear jackets, and here is the researcher who managed to put the jacket on the ape. What teases the imagination is the unresolved conflict between our concept of language and our attitude to animals as destinies.

The ape who acquires language *changes*. The ape who is politely asked to work is not the "ape" we are amazed could be taught linguistic skills. This is why I believe a notion of becoming is needed to understand ape learnability. It demystifies what happened in Savage-Rumbaugh's work by helping us resolve the conflict between the "ape" and what the ape learned.

Presumptuous amazement arises when we do not follow the animal's trajectory through life, and thus operate with an outmoded notion of "it." Kanzi is not the ape genius that a documentary presents him as in the title: *Kanzi, an Ape of Genius* (Niio 1993). If you participate in the ape–human culture on a daily basis, even if it is only as a visitor, the bonobos' language soon stops to amaze you. It is the elementary stuff of their lives. You soon expect Kanzi to respond with comprehension to what Sue says, and you will be curious to know what he has to say, because your accumulated experience of him updated your understanding of who he became.

It is when you leave the culture and return home that you notice how amazing the stories about Kanzi and the bonobos seem, because what were everyday matters in the culture then turn into fascinating anecdotes about "animals" in the presumptuous sense. In the culture, Kanzi is not an "animal." He is uncle Kanzi, who gently persuades the young apes to hand him the toothbrushes when Clara, the

familiar caretaker, asks him to assist her. Staying in the culture, you are not amazed by his responses. You recognize uncle Kanzi in them.

This sheds light on Wittgenstein's aphorism: "If a lion could talk, we could not understand him" (PI, p. 223). For just before this famous aphorism, he remarks that we sometimes fail to understand *people*, even when we master their language, namely if their traditions are entirely strange to us. What makes the aphorism about the lion work for Wittgenstein's purposes, then, is not that lions are animals, but that the life of a lion obviously is totally foreign to us. In the pregnant aphorism, the lion elegantly signifies "strangeness" (not "an animal"). But uncle Kanzi's life is not strange to the humans with whom he lives. They changed together, giving birth to shared forms of life and a shared history. Since this bi-species culture is not entirely strange to us—it is, after all, an *ape–human* culture—even visitors and newly employed caretakers soon respond and learn to understand when uncle Kanzi talks.

9 Breaking a Vicious Circle by Living Together

Joint negotiation of the wire probably allowed the bonobos to become more like non-captive apes than most captive apes become, since it allowed them to live and develop in meaningful ways that the restrictions of captivity typically preclude. This brings us to another theme in the article, namely, a vicious circle in our perception, and treatment, of apes:

1. Our perception of ape mental abilities determines the handling of our captive apes.
2. The handling of our captive apes determines the level of their mental development.
3. The level of their mental development determines our perception of ape mental abilities.

> Until we break this cycle, and do so permanently, the relationship between ourselves—as human beings – and apes – as something strange, exotic, beastly, alluring, and yet repugnant – will continue unchanged. The real issue is not "What *are* they like, and how should we treat them?" The real issue is "What do we want to permit them to *become*?" (Savage-Rumbaugh et al. 2007: 19; my emphasis)

Experimental psychologists who work with apes often doubt that apes can understand and do what Kanzi, Panbanisha, and Nyota understand and do (like talking, pointing, imitating, teaching). Their skepticism is sincere, because it is based on their own experience of "their" ape subjects, whose captivity was not negotiated. These researchers can, with their own eyes, see chimpanzees that are strikingly different from what Sue permitted Kanzi, Panbanisha, and Nyota to become. No wonder they are skeptical. They are caught in the vicious circle and they judge "apes" from within it.

How did Sue break the circle? The quote above should not fool us into thinking that Sue discovered some clever handling of apes that makes them smarter. The notion of "handling" belongs to the conventional zoological vocabulary of "males and females" that "get along" with each other. Sue does not handle apes in ways that reveal unexpected potentials in them. She lives with apes, and living with apes cannot be understood as a brilliant form of handling them. You handle the creature on the other side of the wire. Handling apes is what Sue overcame by negotiating the wire: by abandoning not only instruction, but also the ethical standard question: "How should we treat them?"

There is thus profound beauty in William Fields' answer: "We ask them if they want to work." Researchers above all live with the apes. Their role as researchers is subordinated to their living together. Only occasionally do they work in the laboratory, politely negotiating the work on the basis of their social relationships.

That Sue lives with her ape family should not be held against her. *It is where it happens*. And it is where we, as readers of Wittgenstein, should expect it to happen. For if what "has to be accepted, the given, is—so one could say—*forms of life*" (PI, p. 226), then shared forms of ape–human life must be permitted to emerge in ape language research. In the typical animal psychology laboratory, however, nothing significant is permitted to happen on this personal level. Permitting a dimension of ape–human becoming would interfere with the supposedly objective assessment of what ape cognition "is."

10 How the Bonobos Contributed and What They Agreed Was Important

How did the bonobos contribute to the article? Sue first explained the endeavor to them and they agreed to participate in a dialogue about "what bonobos need." She had prepared a long list of things she believed were important to them. She explained the list in simper terms, to see whether they agreed. If she was in doubt about a reply to one of her questions, she rephrased it (Savage-Rumbaugh et al. 2007: 17). The bonobos did not agree with all suggestions, but here is what they agreed is important for them:

1. Having food that is fresh and of their choice
2. Traveling from place to place
3. Going to places they have never been before
4. Planning ways of maximizing travel and resource procurement
5. Being able to leave and rejoin the group, to explore, and to share information regarding distant locations
6. Being able to be apart from others for periods of time
7. Maintaining lifelong contact with individuals whom they love
8. Transmitting their cultural knowledge to their offspring
9. Developing and fulfilling a unique role in the social group

10. Experiencing the judgment of their peers regarding their capacity to fulfill their roles, for the good of the group
11. Living free from the fear of human beings attacking them
12. Receiving recognition, from the humans who keep them in captivity, of their level of linguistic competency and their ability to self-determine and self-express through language. (Savage-Rumbaugh et al. 2007: 18)

It may seem far-fetched that apes can express views on topics such as these. But these are their everyday concerns. They discuss with caretakers what to eat; they initiate discussions about where to go; they inform others about frightening dogs or monsters in the forest; they ask about absent friends; they display normative expectations on group members and respond to others' displays; they ask their humans to protect them from visitors they find disrespectful and uncomprehending. Their language developed while dealing with issues such as these, negotiating the wire with their humans… every day, year after year.—So why not ask them?

11 Concluding Remark

We plan and perform teaching, but we also patiently await learnability, at least when the potential learner is a human. This patient waiting is not passive. *It is where it happens.* It is where we reveal ourselves and respond to each other. It is where we set free the normative responsiveness of living together. I used the challenges of ape language research to highlight the significance of this intimate dimension of becoming, and its function as a presupposition of teaching. Our familiarity with this dimension in human life makes us adapt sensitively to Wittgenstein's examples by imagining a suitable human learner. But our presumptions about animals make us less adaptable to ape learnability, and the very idea of exhibiting such expectations with apes feels embarrassing. Savage-Rumbaugh, however, often remarks that the apes surpassed her expectations, and she regrets not having expected even more.

Acknowledgments This is a reworking of unpublished presentations at two conferences "Zoo-Ethnographies" (Uppsala University, 2011) and "Human and Non-Human Primates – Crossing the Boundaries" (University of Warsaw, 2014). The work was funded by the Swedish Research Council, project number 344-2011-5099, "Becoming 'human': gender theory and animals in a more-than-human world." I want to thank Jeff Stickney for pointing out some very relevant remarks by Wittgenstein to use and discuss in this chapter.

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Something Animal? Wittgenstein, Language, and Instinct

Paul Standish

Abstract Thinking about the world necessarily involves notions of causation. Norman Malcolm has argued that such notions are embedded in instinctive reactions and that it is from such natural behaviour that language emerges. This insight is a powerful and important antidote to mentalistic pictures of human life and action. Malcolm's account is, however, open to criticism in terms of its over-emphasis on such natural reactions as the basis for understanding human beings and the development of language. Attention to the profound differences between the signs that animals use and human language reveals the need to understand human being not from the bottom up but from the top down. The human relation to language emerges as more troubled than Malcolm seems to imply. Yet this disturbance in the human condition is shown to be the very basis for culture and education. The idea of the world itself, as ordinarily understood, depends upon this more complex picture. The paper concludes by taking these ideas forward in relation to recent work by Danièle Moyal-Sharrock and, more briefly, to jointly authored research by Cameron Boult and Duncan Pritchard.

Keywords Animal · Cause · Instinct · Language · Scepticism

A shorter version appears in the Wittgenstein section of the *Encyclopedia of Educational Philosophy and Theory* (Springer, 2016), co-edited by Nicholas Burbules & Jeff Stickney (Michael A. Peters, Chief Editor).

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M.A. Peters and J. Stickney (eds.), *A Companion to Wittgenstein on Education*,
DOI 10.1007/978-981-10-3136-6_37

> It is so difficult to find the *beginning*. Or, better: it is difficult to begin at the beginning. And not try to go further back. (OC §471)[1]

1 Introduction

In recent discussions of *On Certainty*, renewed attention has been drawn to Wittgenstein's various ways of questioning the impulse to provide a rational grounding for human ways of knowing and being. The point of departure for that text is G.E. Moore's "Proof of an External World". Moore's lecture begins with Kant and the "scandal" of scepticism—the scandal, as Kant puts it, that the existence of things outside of ourselves must be accepted merely on faith, that we are unable to provide proof that there is an external world. Against Kant, Moore claims that a proof can indeed be provided:

> How? By holding up my two hands, and saying, as I make a certain gesture with the right hand, "Here is one hand", and adding, as I make a certain gesture with the left, "and here is another". And if, by doing this, I have proved ipso facto the existence of external things, you will all see that I can also do it now in numbers of other ways: there is no need to multiply examples. (Moore 1939, p. 166)

Moore's mildly theatrical "proof" leads Wittgenstein to contest the idea that one can legitimately say "I know that this is my hand". Knowledge claims are meaningful where doubt is possible. We could indeed invent a scenario where the claim that I know that this is my hand might have some purchase—in the dark, after an explosion, as we struggle to gain consciousness and assess how badly we are injured, perhaps where the hand has gone numb, etc. But in ordinary circumstances, doubt has no way in.

Wittgenstein's remarks rove over a number of different matters, in the midst of which the question of what is fundamental to the human condition tends to be displaced by a preference for speaking of what is primitive. He is searching for an appropriate expression for that "*comfortable* certainty" (OC §356) that obtains not as the result of coming to a conviction but where a doubt cannot get a foothold. In the next paragraph, and again registering the inadequacy of the expression, he speaks of the inclination to think of this in terms of "a form of life". And then he writes, crucially for the present discussion: "But that means I want to conceive it as something that lies beyond being justified or unjustified; as it were, as something animal" (OC §359). At a later point, Wittgenstein refers again to the animal, and

[1]Following convention, titles for Wittgenstein's works are abbreviated (PI = Philosophical Investigations, Z = Zettel, OC = On Certainty), with section (§) or page number (p.), with full citation and initials in the References.

this is then connected with the idea of the primitive—specifically, with the thought that man[2] might be seen as a "primitive being":

> §475. I want to regard man here as an animal; as a primitive being to which one grants instinct but not ratiocination. As a creature in a primitive state. Any logic good enough for a primitive means of communication needs no apology from us. Language did not emerge from some kind of ratiocination.

There is much here, then, to invite further thought.

Wittgenstein's overt and seemingly necessary struggle with expression in respect of these matters has inevitably led to differences of interpretation, including vehement divergence of view amongst his most enthusiastic defenders. In what follows I shall begin by sketching a line of thought associated especially with Norman Malcolm, Wittgenstein's student, interpreter, and friend; indeed, it was while staying at Malcolm's house in Ithaca, in New York state, that Wittgenstein developed the responses to Moore's paper that provide the starting point and guiding thought in *On Certainty*. I shall focus in particular on a paper of Malcolm's entitled "Wittgenstein: the relation of language to instinctive behaviour", which was first published in 1982. Rush Rhees, who was also Wittgenstein's student, interpreter, and friend, responded appreciatively in a letter to Malcolm, and that letter is now collected with Rhees's further discussions of *On Certainty* in a volume edited by D.Z. Phillips. Rhees also figures in what follows, though my reference to his work is more indirect.

In Malcolm's thinking ideas of causation and instinct come powerfully to the fore. His position is open to criticism, however, in terms of what I shall claim is its over-emphasis on natural reactions as the basis for understanding human beings and the development of language. Attention to the profound differences between the signs that animals use and the signs humans use reveals the need to understand human being not from the bottom up but from the top down. The human relation to language emerges as more troubled than Malcolm seems to imply. Yet this disturbance in the human condition, I shall claim, is the very basis for culture and education. The idea of the world itself, as ordinarily understood, depends upon this more complex picture. Moreover, this is a matter that seems partly to escape more recent contributions to the discussion of this topic. To illustrate this, I shall turn to work by Danièle Moyal-Sharrock and Duncan Pritchard.

2 Causation and Thinking

One thing causes another. This simple thought is basic not only to science but also to our ordinary understanding of the world. But where does the concept of a cause come from? It has become mainstream to the philosophy of science that causation is

[2]While the translation refers to "man", Wittgenstein's word is the gender-neutral *Mensch*. As "human being" and other alternatives would be distracting in the discussion, I shall mostly adhere to the familiar translation.

not something discovered through experimentation but rather a principle according to which phenomena are interpreted. What, then, is its basis? Clap your hands in front of the face of the baby, and her eyes will shut. The same happens with the adult. This is not the application of the concept of a cause. It is an instinctive reaction, and causation is inherent in this. One can build up from such examples to the developing infant's being pushed off balance by someone and naturally pushing back or to her noticing that the piece of string that is wriggling on the floor in front of her is being pulled at the other end by the cat.

That this is the case is at the heart of Malcolm's "Wittgenstein: the relation of language to instinctive behaviour". The fallacy he identifies is that of thinking that there must be a universal rule, in conjunction with which, at each instance of its application, a potential doubt arises as to whether the rule is satisfied by the events in question, and that this rule must be present from the start in our use of causal expressions. The target is, more or less, the fantasy that in our thinking we are like super-scientists, meticulous in removing any doubt that might jeopardise the identification of a causal process in any particular instance. In fact, not even meticulous scientists operate like this—not because they are not meticulous enough, but because thinking in terms of causes could not operate in this way. And we could scarcely think *without* a notion of causation.

How, then, are we otherwise to account for what is happening? The crucial move for Malcolm is to put emphasis on instinctive or primitive reactions, and this achieves two things: first, it shows that, in seeing things in causal terms, there is "no uncertainty, guessing, conjecturing, conferring, concluding"; and, second, it drives home the point that such reactions are *actions*, with causal expressions such as "He knocked me down" grafted onto these immediate reactions. In other words, our ordinary perceptions of the world are not of pixelated instants seen cumulatively such that they add up to a picture or are grafted together after the event. They are instead holistic from the start, such that perception is thematised or given a certain narrative structure, minimal though this may well be: the cat is pulling the string. In fact, to see the cat is already to react in thematised or narrative terms: cats are playful; they are living creatures capable of pain; they are pets to be cherished and stroked, etc. Something similar could be said of the string. But one cannot give any coherent account of (human) action without this structure being, as it were, built in. (Of course—let me interject, anticipating a little of what comes later—to spell this out in language, and in these sets of propositions, risks anthropomorphism in some degree; I say "in some degree" because plainly it is the case that the child's coming into these ways of thinking occurs in a context that is linguistic, where she hears words used before she understands or can use them herself, where light dawns gradually over the whole.)

There are occasions, perhaps many, where we are uncertain how to act. But all this occurs on the basis of a vast range of reactions in which hesitation and doubt play no part. "The primitive form of the language-game is certainty, not uncertainty", Wittgenstein writes. "For uncertainty could never lead to action. The basic form of the game must be one in which we act" (OC §421). So it is also with names.

At the start of the *Philosophical Investigations* Wittgenstein quotes from St. Augustine's *Confessions* where the idea is expressed that initial language learning takes place through ostensive definition: someone points to the cat and says "cat", and the child picks up the expression; the child associates the name with the thing. Now this is indeed what partly happens. This is more obviously the case in second-language learning, but in first language learning, it can be at most part of the picture: so much else needs to take place, for without this how can the child begin to know what the point is of pointing and naming (how can they learn what pointing, etc., is?). Wittgenstein's answer, as is well known, is that the child must be initiated into a variety of language games, where "language game" is taken to refer not only to the language but to the actions into which it is woven (PI, §7): the basis of the language game lies in action. It is worth reflecting on the fact that the small child does not learn words such as "cup" and "spoon" first as names for objects but rather in a more imperative form—that is, as compressions of "bring me the cup", "use the spoon", and so on. The holistic nature of this, in the broader context of eating, for example, is such that it is far from being a frozen moment but is dynamic and structured already by assumptions of causation. The differentiation and refinement progressively achieved with language emerges from pre-linguistic reactions.

3 Language and Instinct

Malcolm's discussion of causation constitutes an important element in his broader account of language's emergence from instinctive behaviour. Let me summarise the argument. A recurrent theme in Wittgenstein's later writings is that language did not emerge from reasoning (OC §475) but rather from simple reactions—reactions, for example, to pain. First-person pain *expressions* ("ouch!", "it hurts") constitute new pain-behaviour (PI §244). They are not the result of reasoning or of thought but are to be understood rather as immediate. This thought is extended in relation to the pain of others, such that tending another's wound or saying "he's in pain" is also to be seen as the refinement of instinct: "it is a primitive reaction to tend, to treat, the part that hurts when someone else is in pain, and not merely when oneself is" (Z, §540). Such behaviour is the prototype and not the result of thinking. Reports of and responses to pain plainly become further refined as language advances, from the advent of temporal expressions ("it hurts less than yesterday") to the development of precision instruments such as thermometers, which themselves must be calibrated in some way to human natural reactions.

At the heart of Malcolm's account, as we have seen, is a discussion of causal expressions, which stresses the fact that a reaction to a cause can be immediate. It is not a matter of the "second-order" conjecturing, etc., referred to above: it is action. Moreover, it is misleading to say that the child will acquire "*the* concept" of

cause-and-effect: the idea of an "essence of causation" would obscure the variety of uses of causal expressions. Furthermore, instinctive reactions would be one source of the learning of causal expressions. The child does not learn that there are books and armchairs, but learns to fetch books and sit in armchairs (OC §476). *Belief* in these things' existence is to be construed in terms not of some kind of conceptual or primarily cognitive grasp but of *this* behaviour in *these* circumstances. The belief is not a "source" of the behaviour.

The account of language that emerges contrasts sharply, then, with such influential theories as those of Noam Chomsky and Jerry Fodor, and indeed with more recent ideas developed in neuroscience. While it is true that the nervous system of a human being is innate, it is a fallacy and ultimately vacuous to suppose that neural processes constitute a "language of thought" or a "representational system" (see also Williams and Standish 2015). No doubt it is true also that the position developed here is at odds with a vast range of thinking in psychology and linguistics that has contributed to ideas of language development.

But Malcolm's purpose goes beyond this. It is not just that the child's early language is grafted onto instinctive behaviour: in fact, the adult's complex employment of language embodies, strange though it may seem, something resembling instinct. A step forward can be made with this apparently extraordinary claim if we pause over the Pascalian thought that our nature is convention. If human beings are understood in purely biological terms, this will not begin to approach what it is that constitutes human life. We shall understand human beings on a par with the way that we understand other life forms in biology. To understand the human being beyond such terms involves attending to language and culture, and these are matters of convention: a biologically human being without some kind of initiation into these things is scarcely recognisable as human. This helps to show that the human being cannot be understood in purely naturalistic terms. It shows also, perhaps, that while so much of this will be learned, it later becomes embedded in a fabric of reactions and responses that have the spontaneity of instinct. Malcolm's way of moving the discussion forward here is to focus on such claims of G.E. Moore as that he knows he is wearing clothes or knows he is in a room presenting a paper. The fact that Moore is wearing clothes—given the culture he is in, etc.—might be understood as something of which he has instinctive awareness: it is not something that, under normal circumstances, he could reasonably be said to check. If he were to check, this would be interpreted as a sign not of conscientiousness but of mental disturbance. In this sense, then, as Malcolm argues, echoing Wittgenstein, it is not something that he can be said to "know" or to be "certain of" (that is, there is no role for the claim: "I know/am certain that I am wearing clothes".). It is not something he could ordinarily be mistaken about. And here distinctions between the empirical and the conceptual begin to break down. Does our use of words, even the logic of our thoughts, have an empirical basis? In a sense, yes, because we have learned them, and the particular language we learned was a contingent matter. But our relation to that background is not anything we

would need to check. Our words are there for us in a way that we cannot ordinarily doubt, as close as our skin, as it were. The words stand fast for us.[3]

In fact, as Malcolm goes on to say, such absence of doubt is there in any learning: there is necessarily this background of spontaneous reaction to a cause. Contra Fodor, for example, one does not need to form a hypothesis before one acts. You learn words ("Sit on the chair") before you can employ them. The absence of doubt can be called instinctive because, on Malcolm's account, it is not learned. It is hard to deny that standing on two feet was something that at one time one learned, but—and this is surely Malcolm's point—when one rises from a chair, one does not first check that one has two feet or that the floor is there. Such matters become embedded in the fabric of one's being and one's world. The particular form this takes will surely vary from culture to culture and generation to generation; but that there must be particular forms embedded in this way is essential to the human condition. Hence, there is an outgrowth from unthinking behaviour that permeates and surrounds all human acting.

4 Animal and Beyond

Wittgenstein conceives of the absence of doubt as "something that lies beyond being justified or unjustified; as it were, as something animal" (OC §§358–359). To speak of knowledge or conviction or acceptance, etc., is not really appropriate in these circumstances as these expressions have their roles within specific language games: they are not appropriate when it comes to explaining the basis of *all* language games. In fact, all such psychological terms lead us away from what is important here, from this "unthinking, instinctive behaviour" that, as Malcolm puts it, underlies all language games (p. 17). Wittgenstein makes the point in terms at once more stark and more graphic: "The fact that I use the word 'hand' and all the other words in my sentence without a second thought, indeed that I should stand before the abyss if I wanted so much as to try doubting their meanings—shows that the absence of doubt belongs to the essence of the language-game…" (OC §370). This instinctive behaviour is like the squirrel's gathering of nuts or the cat's

[3]Malcolm puts this in provocative terms. Absence of doubt appears, first, in advance of any learning, in the spontaneous reaction to a cause. Second, it is there in the young child's response to orders such as "Sit in the chair," before the child can employ the words. Third, it appears in the "behaviour, due to teaching, or employing names of objects" (Malcolm 1982, p. 15). Malcolm qualifies this by saying that, at the second and third levels, the confident way of acting and speaking could be called "instinctive" in a secondary sense. But the next paragraph begins: "The absence of doubt, at all three levels, can be called 'instinctive' because it isn't *learned*, and because it isn't the product of thinking" (ibid.). The apparent contradiction, regarding the third level especially, between the behaviour's being "due to teaching" and its not being learned needs to be explained, I take it, in terms of the embedding of these forms of behaviour in the mature human condition. By the same token, there would be no role for the statement "I see that Moore has learned to put on his clothes," in the way that one might reasonably say this of a two-year old.

watching a mouse hole. Can the child who is told to sit on a chair and responds appropriately be said to know what a chair is? What of the dog that is told to sit? Learned discriminative behaviour does not depend upon mental states that "explain" the response: mental states are not the basis of mastery of language, for all psychological concepts have their basis in ways of acting.

It is plain, then, that Malcolm's Wittgensteinianism militates against the Cartesian legacy—against mentalistic accounts of human being and against cognitivism as it has been found in psychology and education for most of the past century. There is every reason to support the broad direction of this critique, and certainly, the emphasis on reactions and on the animal is a powerful driving force in the account. But this position is open to question on grounds of a quite different kind.

It was suggested earlier that Malcolm's argument gains plausibility if it is acknowledged that, paradoxical though it initially sounds, the nature of the human being is convention. But the account naturalises convention. In its sustained attack on mentalistic thinking it frames language within the terms of the animal—that is, as a refinement of natural reactions, from the blinking of an eye and the adjustment of one's balance to primitive reactions of sympathy when others are in pain. There is some truth to this, perhaps especially in phylogenetic terms. It understands the rule-following of language and so much ordinary behaviour in terms of knowing how to go on in the same way, and there is truth to this too, especially in the light of the vast background of consistency in our linguistic and social behaviour. But there is no need to deny this in order to recognise something else—something that is of unique importance for education but also, in fact, for the understanding of human lives as a whole. This is that the signs human beings produce, with which and through which they live, are of a different order from those made by other animals. The signs of animals in general (and clearly we are speaking primarily about the higher animals) operate with a kind of push-pull regularity, sophisticated in varying ways but limited in the range of their possibility. Lions roar at one another in different ways, and their young learn this behaviour. It is passed on from generation to generation. The lions roar, reproduce, eat, and sleep, and over time things remain the same. Human beings communicate through signs also, but their signs are of a quite different order. Human signs—words and gestures—are such as to admit open possibilities of response: unending chains of association and connection, and infinite possibilities of interpretation. The human sign is not of the order of an animal here-and-now but depends upon a distancing from things that can refer precisely to what is not present here and now, which in turn conditions what "here" and "now" can mean. And it is crucial that signs refer: in language, it is possible to say things about the world. Indeed, it is through language that the world comes into view. World, in the sense that we ordinarily mean it, is language dependent; and so too, of course, is the human being. Being open to association and connection in the way indicated, words do not remain within a closed circle of exchange: on the contrary, they become the engine of culture, the very possibility of new departure, and in a sense the essence of education; and such can be seen in ordinary conversation, which can take directions that are not anticipated and produce effects as yet unknown.

The world the child comes into is not a world of similar beings, all making early moves in the refinement of natural reactions—along the lines, one might imagine, of the development of primitive human societies in evolutionary terms. It is a world where there are grown-ups with language full-blown. A consequence of this is that when the child is told to sit on a chair, their early understanding, which produces the correct behaviour, occurs against a background that is at present, so to speak, above them. It occurs against refined cultural practices of sitting on chairs and having dinner or watching television or attending to a lecture… Without this framing from the top down, as it were, how could such practices be rightly understood? On this account then, the child's developing reactions, behaviour, and language can be understood only in limited terms from below. This is not so much the case for the lion-cub for which the relevant signs are finite and circumscribed in their usage, as are the activities to which they relate—activities that constitute neither practices nor actions. Not to mark this distinction between the animal and the human is to submit to a naturalism that falls short of what it is to be a human being.

It is certainly the case that Wittgenstein said much in his last writings that would support such a naturalistic view—perhaps because of the vehemence of his condemnation of Cartesianism and of the mentalistic philosophy of mind that persisted so stubbornly during his lifetime. But it is a mistake to confine the interpretation of his work to these passages, and there is much elsewhere in what he says that gestures towards a less naturalistic view. "My attitude to him is an attitude towards a soul. I am not of the *opinion* that he has a soul" (PI II: iv, p. 152). "The human body is the best picture of the human soul" (ibid.). What is to be made of remarks such as these, or of the following from a few pages earlier in the same text?

> One can imagine an animal angry, frightened, unhappy, happy, startled. But hopeful? And why not?
>
> A dog believes his master is at the door. But can he also believe his master will come the day after to-morrow?—And *what* can he not do here?—How do I do it?—How am I supposed to answer this? (PI II: i, p. 148)

In the face of such questions, the emphasis on language as a refinement of natural reactions seems of limited use, to say the least—or, at best, to require a recasting of the idea of the natural, such that our nature is understood as convention. In fact, however cogent its rejection of mentalistic pictures of psychological states, the idea of language as a refinement of natural reactions here seems in danger of missing the point.

5 Saying Things

A further question can also be raised against Malcolm, and perhaps against Wittgenstein, about how far the overemphasis in the account teeters on the brink of being wrong. Our everyday relation to words is such, it is said, that they stand fast for us and we do not call them into question. Yet this is plainly not true for

everything we say—at least, not every day, all of the time. It is a common experience to find oneself at times unable to choose one's words well or simply at a loss as to what to say. Moreover, there is the eerie experience of repeating a word over and over again until it becomes difficult to connect it with its usual reference; or at least until that connection no longer seems as natural as it did. Not to acknowledge this is to fail to recognise a degree of violence that exists in our coming into language, which both distances us from our animal-like, pre-linguistic, seamless involvement in things present and opens for us a kind of alienation, the condition for entry into the world of human beings. Wittgenstein surely had some sense of this, with his remarks, for example, about the physiognomy of words (PI §568; p. 155, 179, and 186), strange and surreal as these to some extent are, and with his respect for the human tendency to run up against the limits of language. But the philosopher who has most extended this line of thought is surely Stanley Cavell, whose purpose is other than the sceptic's but whose concern is with the all too human tendency to call into doubt the human condition. Language seems as close as one's skin, but at times one can feel oneself to be in the wrong skin, or perhaps find that the clothes one is no doubt wearing are in fact not one's own.

There is, however, a further, more powerful reason to resist the above account, and here the criticism may be levelled not only at Malcolm but at Wittgenstein himself. Rush Rhees took issue with Malcolm over aspects of the paper that has been the main subject of this discussion but also criticised Wittgenstein more broadly in respect of his account of language (Rhees 2006). For all the brilliance of his understanding of language, Wittgenstein had failed to pay attention to the fact that, when the child learns to speak, she can *say things*. She discovers that she can say things about the world. In a sense, as was indicated earlier, it is only through this that the world comes into view. In learning that she can say things she learns also that this is something she can share with others. She participates, perhaps clumsily at first, in this possibility: she can make judgements and test them against others; through this she comes to see that we have a common world, contested though its nature will continually be. No amount of attention to "knowing how to go on" or to what it is to follow a rule will account for this aspect of language, which Rhees understands as something that conditions language as a whole and makes it a whole. The emphasis on language games rightly stresses the variety of things we do with words, but it risks hiding this unique importance of language for human beings.[4] Overemphasising the basis of language in the primitive reaction can only hide this some more.

[4]For further discussion, see Standish (2015, 2016).

6 There—Like Our Life

Rhees's interpretation of *On Certainty* has been made widely available thanks to the efforts of D.Z. Phillips. *Wittgenstein's* On Certainty*: there—like our life* (Rhees 2003) was constructed by Phillips primarily from handouts Rhees prepared for his lectures on the text at the University College of Swansea in 1970, along with the notes Phillips himself took on those occasions. The title for the book was chosen by Phillips. The subtitle, which repays attention, is drawn from a paragraph late in *On Certainty*:

> §559. You must bear in mind that the language-game is so to say something unpredictable. I mean: it is not based on grounds. It is not reasonable (or unreasonable).
>
> It is there—like our life.

The remark follows further reflections on the blurring of the boundary between the empirical and the logical that has been Wittgenstein's concern through much of this text. That the language-game is not based on grounds or reasons might be thought common ground amongst readers of Wittgenstein. And yet the aphorism of the last line lays the way for divergent readings.

Consider then Danièle Moyal-Sharrock's "The Animal in Epistemology: Wittgenstein's Enactivist Solution to the Problem of Regress" (Moyal-Sharrock 2016). The exploration in this text of Wittgenstein's "hinge certainties"[5] builds on her earlier impassioned identification in *On Certainty* of a "third Wittgenstein" (Moyal-Sharrock 2004, 2007). She attempts to show that hinge certainties are non-epistemic, grammatical, non-propositional, and enacted—features that together bring justification to a logical stop and so solve the regress problem of basic beliefs. She has no difficulty in finding plentiful quotations that support her argument, many of which are iterations of the following thought: "I cannot doubt this proposition without giving up all judgment" (OC §494). The upshot is emphasis on cases where doubt is either unreasonable or logically impossible. The range of propositions to which Wittgenstein appears willing to apply this remark is, however, strikingly wide, and possibly Moyal-Sharrock does not give as much attention to the implications of this breadth as it deserves, especially when she is pressing her main case. For her sense of what it is that is "there – like our life" is that this is to be understood in animal terms—a view apparently well supported by the quotation mentioned at the start of this paper: "But that means I want to conceive it as

[5]"That is to say, the *questions* that we raise and our *doubts* depend on the fact that some propositions are exempt from doubt, are as it were like hinges on which those turn" (OC 341). And two paragraphs later: "But it isn't that the situation is like this: We just *can't* investigate everything, and for that reason we are forced to rest content with assumption. If I want the door to turn, the hinges must stay put" (OC 343).

something that lies beyond being justified or unjustified; as it were, as something animal" (OC §359).

Part of the point of stressing the animal for Moyal-Sharrock is to resist the inclination to explain this background in terms of a kind of contextualism, the view she associates with Michael Williams (2001), where basic certainties must stand in logical relationship to whatever judgements rest on them and be susceptible themselves to processes of justification, whether or not such processes actually occur. The assumption that basic knowledge must be secured in this way seems to entail the thought that it must therefore be propositional, and it is resistance to this especially that provokes Moyal-Sharrock's emphasis on the animal. She further invokes Wittgenstein's telling remark: "Giving grounds, however, justifying the evidence, comes to an end; – but the end is not certain propositions striking us immediately as true, i.e. it is not a kind of seeing on our part; it is our acting, which lies at the bottom of the language-game" (OC §204). The non-propositional nature of basic certainties is evident precisely in their being ways of acting and their being animal in character. Such certainties may seem instinctive or natural (e.g. our certainty of having a body), and they may be second-nature, where, for example, they are the result of conditioning, as in our correct use of words (the child correctly uses the word "table"). The notion of the reflex action is invoked the better to describe this. Moyal-Sharrock writes (p. 7):

> With such repeated references to hinges as reflex-like ways of acting and not propositions striking us immediately as true, Wittgenstein puts paid to the picture of basic beliefs as propositional beliefs that lie dormant in some belief box tacitly informing our more sophisticated thoughts. On his view, the hinge certainty verbalised as: "I have a body" is a disposition of a living creature which manifests itself in her acting in the certainty of having a body. Certainty is a way of acting, not a tacit belief.

As the phrasing shows, it is difficult to avoid the ambiguities attaching to the articulation of (apparently) psychological expressions—as here with "basic beliefs", "propositional beliefs", and "belief box". Moyal-Sharrock acknowledges that Wittgenstein and Moore do indeed articulate some of our certainties; but they do this, she explains, in the manner of "mentioning" them, not "using" them, and this is done heuristically in order to become clearer about the nature of thinking. Helpful though this is, there is a tidiness to the explanation that is not wholly convincing in that it is not clear that it would apply to all cases or that the distinction is clear-cut. It would be a nice exercise to extend the examination to cases of "identifying", "referring", "citing", and "quoting", though perhaps even this would not yield such clear distinctions as we might like. Certainly it is right to be wary of overly legislative approaches, which can slide into an attempt to police the limits of language.

A similar concern attaches to her uncompromising affirmation of the security that basic certainty provides. The logic that basic certainty adheres to is not that of the epistemologist but a grammatical certainty, manifested in action. So far this seems right, but the claims become amplified. The groundlessness does not, it is said, imply any kind of precariousness. On the contrary, it characterises the "the

rock solidity that makes our spades turn and allows us to 'stand fast' (OC §152) (not reel over); the certainty on which all our knowledge is *logically* hinged" (Moyal-Sharrock 2016, p. 10). The non-propositionality of basic certainties is at one with their being "animal". Recalling a remark with which she begins her discussion,[6] she writes: "If for Crispin Wright: 'There is no animal in epistemology!', for Wittgenstein: 'It is there, like our life'" (p. 15).

At the close of the penultimate paragraph of her paper, Moyal-Sharrock writes (p. 16):

> But what *On Certainty* shows us is that our distrust of the arational (the animal) and our reliance on propositions are excessive: "I want to regard man here as an animal; as a primitive being to which one grants instinct but not ratiocination. As a creature in a primitive state" (OC §475). It is only by realising that putting ways of acting into sentences is only a heuristic tool designed to better understand the animal, that we can take, as Wittgenstein did, the uncompromisingly revolutionary step to stop the regress of justification.

She is surely right that our distrust of the animal and our reliance on propositions are excessive. But how does this lead to the reductivism of "putting ways of acting into sentences is only a heuristic tool designed to better understand the animal"? There is of course some irony in the fact that the apparently intuitive or obvious appeal of the phrase "there—like our life" seems to be to something very different to her than to Rhees, who in considering the ungroundedness of the language-game evokes the examples of the practices of the Azande, the style of Michelangelo, and the stanza form adopted by Spenser in *The Faerie Queen* (Rhees 2003, p. 83).

It is worth paying attention, furthermore, to the problematic lines with which §475 continues: "Any logic good enough for a primitive means of communication needs no apology from us. Language did not emerge from some kind of ratiocination." The undoubted truth that language did not emerge either phylogenetically or developmentally from ratiocination gives obvious support to Moyal-Sharrock's case, but this provides scant evidence for the claim that our basic certainties must be understood in animal terms. While she acknowledges that our basic certainties will extend from the natural and instinctive to what is acquired through second nature, the significance of this is woefully underplayed. The things that stand fast for me are of a complexity and sophistication that comes to permeate the whole. Language illustrates this *par excellence*. What the words "cat" and "string" (or "table", to take Moyal-Sharrock's example) mean to the young child will extend in fluid and unpredictable ways over part of the range of connotations they will have for the adult, but the communication *and thought* they enable will be "primitive" in only a limited sense: this is what you would expect a three-year old to say, and that is what might be expected of a thirteen-year old. Communication and thought of these kinds are emphatically not primitive if this is taken to imply that they belong to a

[6]At the start of her paper, Moyal-Sharrock recalls a question she put to Crispin Wright, following his keynote address at Kirchberg in 2003: "What have you done with the animal in *On Certainty*?" —to which he gave this dismissive response.

language other than ours or in some way complete in itself. The words belong to language full-blown, open-ended and dynamic as any natural language is, and this in virtue of the nature of the signs human beings use.[7] But what then would be the "apology" that is not needed? What is it that contrasts with the primitive here? Here, as elsewhere, Wittgenstein seems to be intent on stilling the impulse to explanation, whether epistemological or behaviouristic.

The grammatical certainty of animal action is said to provide "the rock solidity that makes our spades turn and allows us to 'stand fast'", but the passage in the *Philosophical Investigations* to which this alludes yields a reading of a different kind. That passage runs: "If I have exhausted the justifications I have reached bedrock, and my spade is turned. Then I am inclined to say: 'This is what I do.'" (PI §217). The interpretation of this as the securing of bedrock is at best part of the story, for it fails to attend to the tone of the passage, which is tinged with a note not of triumph but of sadness or regret. It fails also to attend sufficiently to the experience to which Wittgenstein refers (and with which, having worked as a gardener, he was surely familiar): in the turning of the spade there is a characteristic, unexpected twisting of the hand, where the smooth movement of digging is frustrated. This should at least qualify the confidence that Moyal-Sharrock evinces, just as, in the face of appeals to the animal, recognition of the complexity of human language must sound a cautionary note.

There is reason, furthermore, to question the conjoining of the animal and action. It is plainly the case that, in the elaboration of Wittgenstein's views, ideas of instinct and the animal cannot be rehabilitated if they are understood reductively. The only credible way to avoid this, in my view, is to see instinct as sophisticated in the ways described above (in relation to Malcolm). Perhaps this would entail seeing human beings as an animal species characterised by language and reason (cf. Aristotle's *zoon echon logon*). This would admit the idea of the animal whose nature is convention. It is also the case, as indicated in passing above, that connections between the activities of animals and those of humans can be made too quickly. Distinctions between behaviour, activity, and action need to be drawn, a standard consequence of which is that action, related to intention and the will, and to language itself, will not be attributed to animals. Wittgenstein's expression is not wholly consistent here, but his phrasing in §359, "as it were, as something animal", has a subjunctive form that should perhaps guide interpretation, reinforcing the blurry line between the human and the animal.

Taking cognizance of these facts and of the more complex picture that they yield helps to show why "it is difficult to begin at the beginning. And not try to go further back" (OC §471). To go further back might lead us to a phylogenetic account or to something too simply animal. By contrast, and rehabilitating some of the terms in

[7]A further factor here, brilliantly illustrated in the section entitled "Projecting a word" in Stanley Cavell's *The Claim of Reason*, is that the child's take-up of a word will make connections that exceed "correct" usage of the term. Thus, the term "kitty" (for a baby cat) will be applied to a fur stole, a furry rug, and perhaps other things that are similarly soft to the touch. The routes of association are never closed.

question, we might see as natural, even instinctive, Moore's (knowing that he is) wearing clothes and giving a lecture. Such a way of thinking would substantiate Malcolm's position.

7 Before the Abyss

One response to the "the rock solidity" that Moyal-Sharrock's reading offers might be to say: "Thanks, but no thanks. The security you provide with the emphasis on the animal and action is indeed some security, but it does not address our questions. It does not answer our doubts. We want reasons, not a causal account." Something along these lines is indeed found in the work of Duncan Pritchard, with whom Moyal-Sharrock's paper critically engages. Pritchard's position regarding such interpretations of *On Certainty* is one of some unease. The regress of reasons comes to an end, but not with reasons of a special foundational sort, as we were expecting. There is instead only a rationally groundless "animal" commitment (OC §359), a kind of "primitive" trust (OC §475). "For Wittgenstein", Pritchard continues, "understanding that this is so is meant to be the antidote to radical scepticism, and yet it must surely be admitted that, superficially at least, it looks very much like a version of radical scepticism" (Pritchard 2016, p. 5).

Elsewhere, in co-authorship with Cameron Boult, Pritchard has suggested that the "solution" offered may fail to allay a kind of epistemic *Angst* or vertigo. Philosophical enquiry in effect "ascends" to a level "unfettered by practical concerns", where it becomes apparent, if Wittgenstein is right, that our ways of knowing are essentially local and our believing ultimately groundless. Thus,

> just as someone atop a high tower can fully recognise that he is not in danger, and yet fear the height nonetheless, so someone who undertakes the kind of philosophical investigation that we are conceiving of can intellectually recognise that there is no actual epistemic danger (in the sense that the kind of improvement in their epistemic situation that was initially sought after is simply unavailable), while nonetheless feeling the epistemic vertigo. (Boult and Pritchard 2013, p. 34)

This passage in their text is preceded almost immediately by their quoting Wittgenstein's remark that "the difficulty is to realise the [ultimate] groundlessness of our believing" (OC §166, parenthesis added by the authors). And this is followed almost immediately by a footnote acknowledging an earlier similar insight in Stanley Cavell's *The Claim of Reason* (1979). Indeed their paper begins with the following epigraph:

> An admission of some question as to the mystery of existence, or the being, of the world is a serious bond between the teaching of Wittgenstein and that of Heidegger. The bond is one, in particular, which implies a shared view of what I have called the truth of skepticism, or what I might call the moral of skepticism, namely, that the human creature's basis in the world as a whole, its relation to the world as such, is not that of knowing, anyway not what we think of as knowing. (Cavell 1979, p. 241)

Certainly Boult and Pritchard's sense of epistemic vertigo is compelling. The substance of these remarks from Cavell, however, clearly points in directions beyond the scope of their paper or the present discussion. It sharpens the difference between their position and that of Moyal-Sharrock, and it suggests that their emphasis on propositions may open to possibilities beyond epistemology, as conventionally construed. Fear of heights may require therapy of some kind, therapy that would quell the symptom and perhaps remove the disease. So it is not clear how far they would go with this. For Cavell, the truth of scepticism, existential rather than epistemological, touches on the mystery of existence and of the world, and its moral requires acknowledgement. "Knowledge is in the end based on acknowledgement" (OC §378). The prominence of scepticism in epistemology is a manifestation in philosophy of a more general aspect of the human condition, its tendency to call its own condition into question, which Cavell famously explores through examples drawn from literature and film. The human creature's basis in the world is then seen not as animal and not as rock solid but precarious in some degree. After all the language-game is "so to say something unpredictable" (OC §559). So *how* are we to read the following lines?

> The fact that I use the word "hand" and all the other words in my sentence without a second thought, indeed that I should stand before the abyss if I wanted so much as to try doubting their meanings—shows that the absence of doubt belongs to the essence of the language-game…. (OC §370)

Does this mean that I never stand before the abyss?[8] Is Wittgenstein simply ruling out the possibility that I might doubt the words I am using? "[If] I wanted so much as to try doubting…"—does this mean that I shall not?… There is a comparatively simple logical point here in that you cannot play a game without accepting its presuppositions unconditionally. Move the bishop sideways and you are not playing chess. That much is rock solid. But then we might again say: "Thanks, but no thanks. That rule just looks like something arbitrary, when we were looking for a reason why the bishop must move diagonally". And to the child who persists with these questions, we might eventually say, "Then play another game", or perhaps, losing patience, "Just go away!" But in the language-game the parallel holds out only so far.[9] A game such as chess functions through a kind of suspension of disbelief. Language-games depend upon maintaining the faith. But faith can falter, and then, it will not do simply to tell the sceptic to go away. So cannot our language-games break down or stall? The question "How do I know…", Wittgenstein continues, "drags out the language-game, or else does away with it"

[8]Levinas speaks of the vertiginous aspect of the relation to the other human being, a relation that occurs through language. In this, there is a clear proximity to the ideas of language as abyssal, as explored by Gershom Scholem and Jacques Derrida, for example. For a discussion, see Standish (2011). On Cavell's relation to Levinas, in which the common theme of scepticism is central, see Standish (2008). This paper relates particularly to Cavell's essay on Levinas, which is entitled "The Scandal of Scepticism" (Cavell 2006).

[9]One can opt not to play chess and indeed opt not to play any games at all, but one cannot altogether opt out of language-games. In a sense, there is no outside.

(OC §370); and when it does, then perhaps I do indeed find the ground giving away beneath my feet.

The evocation of the abyss brings connotations of faith and judgement, and the possibility that these might fail, that behaviouristic readings excise. Excise or exorcise. Once again, the attempt to tidy up what we say and do in these matters—rather like the legislative tendencies that beset extreme versions of resolute reading—may hide aspects of the human condition that it is philosophy's purpose to illuminate. The struggle with words that Wittgenstein's writings manifest bears witness to this.

Acknowledgments The writing of this paper was aided by participation in a discussion of Malcolm's paper and Rhees's response at the *Welsh Philosophy Society* meeting held at Gregynog in April 2016. On that occasion these papers were introduced by Danièle Moyal-Sharrock and Hugh Knott. Moyal-Sharrock's comments were based in part on the paper discussed here, and Knott's on his "Before Language and After" (Knott 1998). I am grateful to both for the introduction they provided and to other participants in the discussion. Suzy Harris and Jeff Stickney are also thanked for their comments on drafts.

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Universal Grammar: Wittgenstein Versus Chomsky

Danièle Moyal-Sharrock

In memoriam Laurence Goldstein (1947–2014).

Abstract The motivations for the claim that language is innate are, for many, quite straightforward. The innateness of language is seen as the only way to solve the so-called logical problem of language acquisition: the mismatch between linguistic input and linguistic output. In this paper, I begin by unravelling several strands of the nativist argument, offering replies as I go along. I then give an outline of Wittgenstein's view of language acquisition, showing how it renders otiose problems posed by nativists like Chomsky—not least by means of Wittgenstein's own brand of grammar which, unlike Chomsky's, does not reside in the brain, but in our practices.

Keywords Wittgenstein · Chomsky · Universal grammar · Nativism · Language acquisition · Training

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Professor of philosophy at the University of Kent, Laurence Goldstein's work on Wittgenstein includes a book, *Clear and Queer Thinking: Wittgenstein's Development and His Relevance to Modern Thought* (1999), and articles such as 'What does "experiencing meaning" mean?' (in *The Third Wittgenstein* 2004), and 'Wittgenstein and Situation Comedy' (*Philosophia* 2009). See his edited collection *Brevity* (Oxford University Press, 2013). Laurence was advisory editor for the 2005 *Monist* issue on the Philosophy of Humor. He was keenly interested in language acquisition, designed apparatus for teaching syllogistic to blind students and wrote a series of texts for teaching English to Chinese children.

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M.A. Peters and J. Stickney (eds.), *A Companion to Wittgenstein on Education*,
DOI 10.1007/978-981-10-3136-6_38

1 Introduction

A few years ago, I sent Laurence Goldstein a draft entitled 'Coming to Language: Wittgenstein's Theory of Language Acquisition'. Laurence being a Wittgenstein-inspired philosopher, I was astonished when his comments revealed a leaning towards Chomsky's universal grammar:

> There is one problem that you mention but don't much discuss, about which I still feel some unease, and that's the 'poverty of stimulus' argument. You deny that there is any such poverty – you talk about the child's 'multifarious practice and repeated exposure', but child developmentalists say that infants are typically exposed to very little language and close to zero correction of grammar by parents. I am also disinclined to ignore Derek Bickerton's evidence for the 'language bioprogram hypothesis'. Bickerton gathered a large amount of data on pidgins and creoles. A pidgin has rudimentary grammar; a creole is grammatically complex, but the transition from one to the other is made within the space of one generation, suggesting that grammar is biologically hard-wired.

However, a week later, Laurence wrote me the following:

> For the last week, I've been hanging around with my first grandchild, now six months old, and so have had the opportunity to assess the poverty of stimulus hypotheses. Of course, that environment, replete with articulate adults bent on amusing the child was unrepresentative. But what struck me, and this would be true too of the linguistically less rich environments, was the variety of 'language-games' to which the child is exposed. Almost all the words it hears are interwoven with action – objects are pointed to, animal sounds are made in the context of stories about country life, the child is lifted and lowered to the accompaniment of 'up we go…..down we go' etc.

In saying this, Laurence had replaced the poverty of *grammatically complex* instruction and correction with the richness of exposure to a huge variety of *language games* where words, behaviour, context and repetition interact with each other to inculcate in a child her native language. In Peter Hacker's words: 'We must not think of understanding a language as mastery of a calculus, but rather as mastery of complex interlocking language-games' (2015: 11).

In this paper, I begin by unravelling some strands of the nativist argument, offering replies as I go along. I then give an outline of Wittgenstein's view of language acquisition to see if it does not render otiose problems posed by nativists like Chomsky, not least by means of Wittgenstein's own brand of grammar which, unlike Chomsky's, does not reside in the brain, but in our practices.

2 Chomsky's Universal Grammar: The Nativist Argument

> … we humans have explicit and highly articulate linguistic knowledge that simply has no basis in linguistic experience. Chomsky (1983)

The motivations for the claim that language is innate are, for many, quite straightforward. The innateness of language is seen as the only way to solve the so-called logical problem of language acquisition (LPLA): the mismatch between linguistic input and linguistic output. How is it that children come to know and use —at an incredible speed—linguistic principles they have never been taught (and indeed, that exceed the knowledge of a PhD in linguistics), and how is it they can produce an unlimited number of sentences from the limited data they are exposed to? This is also known as 'poverty of the stimulus' or the underdetermination of the output. The nativist solution to this problem is that linguistic principles do not have to be input or learned at all; we are born with them—they come in the form of an innate universal grammar. For Chomsky, then, knowledge of language is based on a core set of principles embodied in all languages[1] and innately stored somewhere in the mind/brain of every human being. Let us flesh out the nativist argument.
The syntax or structure of any language is so abstruse that it seems impossible that children should learn it—particularly as quickly as they do. As Green and Vervaecke write:

> Constituent hierarchical structure, an almost definitional feature of language, is just not something, by and large, that we come up against in the everyday world; and even when we do, it is darn hard, even for the best and brightest among us, to figure it out. Witness, for instance, the struggles of linguists themselves to adequately characterize language. … linguists have been unable to discover exactly what the rules are, even after dozens (one might argue hundreds or even thousands) of years of research. By contrast, virtually every child does it within a few years (with far less in the way of specialized cognitive machinery, and control over the quality of the incoming data, it is worth pointing out, than a Ph.D. in linguistics). (1997)

The difficulty is compounded by the fact that the child's environment is, allegedly, of hardly any help. As Anderson and Lightfoot note: 'The child masters a rich system of knowledge without significant instruction and despite an impoverished stimulus; the process involves only a narrow range of 'errors' and takes place rapidly, even explosively between two and three years of age. The main question is how children acquire so much more than they experience' (2000: 13–14).

The *poverty of the stimulus* argument strikes at empirical or social theories of language acquisition by claiming that the utterances encountered by the child in

[1]In fact, nativists recognize that not all principles occur in every language, but claim that this does not prevent that principle from being universal as long as the principle is not broken. Indeed a principle can be claimed universal on the basis of its occurrence in a single language: 'In what sense can a universal that does not occur in every language still be universal? Japanese does not break any of the requirements of syntactic movement; it does not need locality for question movement because question movement itself does not occur. Its absence from some aspect of a given language does not prove it is not universal. Provided that the universal is found in some human language, it does not have to be present in all languages'; '… it is not necessary for a universal principle to occur in dozens of languages…. it can be claimed to be universal on evidence from one language alone; 'I have not hesitated to propose a general principle of linguistic structure on the basis of observations of a single language' (Chomsky 1980b: 48)' (Cook and Newson 2007: 21; 23).

experience are too limited[2] for it to be possible to learn the language by generalizing from them, and so we are forced to suppose that the brain contains innate means of creating an unlimited number of grammatical sentences from a limited vocabulary. Hence, Chomsky's stipulation that the child is born with a 'language acquisition device' (LAD) which, when the child starts being exposed to language, recognizes which language it is and sets the correct parameters for that particular language. Thanks to the LAD, the child knows *intuitively* that there are some words that behave like verbs, and others like nouns, and that there is a limited set of possibilities as to their ordering in a sentence. The LAD can enable this because it is equipped with a universal grammar (UG) which consists of invariant principles,[3] as well as parameters[4] whose settings vary between languages, and recursive rules to enable productivity or creativity. Thus equipped, the child is able to apply her built-in unconscious knowledge of how language works to the limited number of sentences she hears, and at an otherwise (allegedly) unexplainable speed[5]:

[2]Chomsky is no longer concerned by the degeneracy of the data, but only its poverty or meagreness. The poverty of stimulus argument now focuses on the poverty of language addressed to children (the fact that it does not contain the right kind of syntactic evidence) rather than on the degeneracy of the data (the fact that it is not always completely well-formed). This change is due to research on speech addressed to children which showed that it was highly regular, and so the data are arguably not as degenerate as was earlier thought. Newport et al. (1977) found that only 1 out of 1500 utterances addressed to children was ungrammatical (Cook and Newson 2007: 192–3).

[3]UG is 'the sum total of all the immutable principles that heredity builds into the language organ. These principles cover grammar, speech sounds, and meaning' (Chomsky 1983); they are the finite, invariant, genetically innate set of principles common to all languages 'by which the child can infer, on the basis of the limited data available in the environment, the full grammatical capacity which we think of as a mature speaker's knowledge of a language' (Anderson and Lightfoot 2000: 6). UG is part of the LAD, an innate biologically endowed language faculty. The LAD is also known as the 'initial state' of the language faculty—the state we are born with; we have learned English (i.e. the language faculty reaches its 'mature state') when, by being exposed to it, we have learned the lexicon and set the parameters for English.

[4]This is the Principles and Parameters (P&P) Theory, according to which 'UG provides a fixed system of principles and a finite array of finitely valued parameters' (1995: 170). Parameters are language-specific, binary parameters that can be set in various ways. An example of a parameter is 'the head parameter', whereby a particular language consistently has the heads on the same side of the complements in all its phrases, whether head-first or head-last. So, for instance, English is head-first: *in the house*: preposition heads first before the complement; *killed the man*: verb heads first before the complement. Japanese is head-last. 'It may be that the values of parameters are set to defaults at birth, but that these can be changed across a small range of values by certain linguistic experiences' (Green and Vervaecke 1997).

[5]Bishop (2014) objects: 'The problem is then to explain how children get from this abstract knowledge to the specific language they are learning. The field became encumbered by creative but highly implausible theories, most notably the parameter-setting account [see note 4 above], which conceptualized language acquisition as a process of "setting a switch" for a number of innately determined parameters'. I would, however, begin by objecting to the 'abstract knowledge'.

'Learning a particular language thus becomes the comparatively simple matter of elaborating upon this antecedently possessed knowledge, and hence appears a much more tractable task for young children to attempt' (Cowie 2008).

Minimal exposure to 'language evidence' is necessary to trigger the various parameters of universal grammar[6] (Cook and Newson 2007: 186). As for vocabulary, writes Chomsky:

> You just have to learn your language's vocabulary. The universal grammar doesn't tell you that "tree" means "tree" in English. But once you've learned the vocabulary items and fixed the grammatical parameters for English, the whole system is in place. And the general principles genetically programmed into the language organ just churn away to yield all the particular facts about English grammar.[7] (1983)

It is, then, through the *interaction* between our genetically inherited principles and the linguistic environment to which we happen to be exposed that a specific language emerges:

> … English-speaking children learn from their environment that the verb *is* may be pronounced [iz] or [z], and native principles prevent the reduced form from occurring in the wrong places. (Anderson and Lightfoot 2000: 6)

Let us see how this prevention works in practice. Anderson and Lightfoot:

> The verb *is* may be used in its full form or its reduced form: English speakers can say either *Kim is happy* or *Kim's happy*. However, certain instances of *is* never reduce: for example, the [*is*] underlined items in *Kim is happier than Tim* <u>*is*</u> or *I wonder where the concert* <u>*is*</u> *on Wednesday*. Most speakers are not aware of this, but we all know subconsciously not to use the reduced form in such cases. How did we come to know this? As children, we were not instructed to avoid the reduced form in certain places. Yet, all children typically attain the ability to use the forms in the adult fashion, and this ability is quite independent of intelligence level or educational background. Children attain it early in their linguistic development. More significantly, children do not try out the non-occurring forms as if testing a hypothesis, in the way that they "experiment" by using forms like *goed* and *taked*. The ability emerges perfectly and as if by magic. (2000: 3)

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[6]Anderson and Lightfoot: 'the trigger experience, which varies from person to person … consists of an unorganized and fairly haphazard set of utterances, of the kind that any child hears' (2000: 14).

[7]Chomsky affirms having once said that 'the child has a repertoire of concepts as part of its biological endowment and simply has to learn that a particular concept is realized in a particular way in the language' and adds that '[w]hen you read the huge Oxford English Dictionary …, you may think that you are getting the definition of a word but you're not. All you are getting is a few hints and then your innate knowledge is filling in all the details and you end up knowing what the word means' (Chomsky 2000). Cook and Newson (2007) speak of a 'computational system' in the human mind which bridges meanings to sequences of sounds in one direction and sequences of sounds to meanings in the other. The lexicon is allegedly represented in the mind and the computational system relies on this mental lexicon.

On the nativist view, then, the child is faced with a chaotic linguistic environment and scans it—in this case, she is looking for *clitics*: unstressed words that cannot stand on their own (e.g. The contraction of ***is*** in 'What's going on?' or the possessive marker *'s* in 'The man's book'). Since clitics and their behaviour are predefined at the genetic level, the child is able to arrive at a 'plausible analysis' on exposure to a few simple expressions: she concludes that no reduction obtains for the second '*is*' in *Kim is happier than Tim is* or in *I wonder where the concert is on Wednesday*, and countless other cases. The child needs no correction in *arriving* at this system: the very fact that'*s* is a clitic, a notion defined in advance of any experience, dictates that it may not occur in certain contexts. She now has a *reason* for the generalization that *is* may be pronounced as'*s* does not hold across the board.[8]

How this in fact goes on in the brain is of course far from clear. It is merely *assumed* that the brain is able to produce, store and evoke symbolic representations that inform or instruct the child when, in fact, symbolic representations can only be determined by conventions, not by neurons.[9] It seems also assumed that the child is able to understand a notion like *clitic*, for she is said to come to a conclusion about it. To reply that all the analysis, scanning, inferring and concluding she is said to do is subconscious or subdoxastic or intuitive falls short (at the very least) of explaining how the child 'understands'. And what would be the sense of saying that the child arrives at a 'plausible analysis' of something she does not understand? Moreover, this is all supposed to add to her antecedent knowledge of the language. But what knowledge of clitics can an average child 'already' have at 3? Again, adding 'tacit' to 'knowledge' or replacing 'knowledge' with '*cognizance*', as Chomsky was—precisely for such reasons—compelled to do, hardly allows him to retain all the epistemic activity—scanning, analysis, comparing, inferring, concluding, understanding—that allegedly goes on in the child.

I suggest, then, that we replace this fantastical child-grammarian scenario with an explanation along the lines of: reducing the 's' in cases such as *Kim is happier than Tim is* makes the sentence incomprehensible; it gives: **Kim is happier than Tim's*—where the contraction misleadingly suggests possession, unlike such correct constructions as 'Sue's liking this'. Failure to communicate meaning may well be what discourages the child from reducing in such cases, besides the fact that she never hears it done in such contexts.

[8]This paragraph is a faithful rendering of Anderson and Lightfoot (2000: 11).

[9]For fleshed-out arguments on this, see Hutto and Myin (2013), Glock (2013) and Hacker (2007). Hacker: 'It is common among psychologists and cognitive neuroscientists to speak of internal representations in the brain. In so far as 'representation' signifies no more than a causal correlate in the brain of an external stimulus, this is innocuous. But it is evident that all too frequently it is meant to signify a *symbolic* representation. And it makes no sense to speak of semantic (symbolic) representations in the brain … [f]or such representations are determined by conventions' (2007: 20–1).

3 Principles not Required

It is sometimes difficult to pick out what Chomsky is faulting, not only because his views have changed considerably over the years, but also because of his lack of clarity. In speaking of language acquisition, Chomsky sometimes speaks of *language* not being acquired but at other times of *principles* not being acquired. So that when he claims children are seldom corrected by parents, one can easily disagree, but it is more difficult to disagree with the view that parents do not teach children linguistic *principles*, which leads Chomsky to conclude that these must be innate. For, on Chomsky's view—shared by nativists generally—to acquire a language, one must know the *principles* of language. Call this Chomsky's 'Principle Requirement'. The poverty of the stimulus argument crucially rests on this misleading requirement; that is, on the false assumption that the only way to *acquire and use* language in all its grammatical diversity is to know it in all its grammatical *complexity*. And as no child, or indeed adult, is ever taught all the grammatical complexity of language, we are forced to stipulate an innate universal grammar which endows the child with this complex knowledge—these principles—for how could she otherwise understand and speak her language?

But surely the fact that children know *language* by age three need not imply that children know *linguistic principles* by age three; what it does—more plausibly—imply is that knowledge of linguistic principles is not needed at all to know or use a language. The idea that children learn languages by discerning grammatical principles—or indeed, that this is the only possible way of acquiring a language—is an unnecessary and unsubstantiated stipulation which goes against all we experience and witness about how native languages are learned, namely by directed and undirected repeated exposure to use, in a multiplicity of contexts. This basic observation is fleshed out in diverse ways by empirical studies.

Research shows that children systematize the language they hear based on the probability and frequency of forms, not on the basis of principles; they learn probabilistic patterns of word distributions, not syntactic rules; they generalize from cues, not from rules.[10] A series of experiments conducted by Hudson-Kam and Newport (2009) show that children ignore minor variations in linguistic input and

[10]Studies in language development find that children use a wide variety of cues, including syntactic, semantic and prosodic information, to learn language structure (Bates and MacWhinney 1989). Bishop (2014): 'Current statistical learning accounts allow us to … study the process of language learning. Instead of assuming that children start with knowledge of linguistic categories, categories are abstracted from statistical regularities in the input (see Special Issue 3, *Journal of Child Language* 2010, vol. 37). The units of analysis thus change as the child develops expertise. And, consistent with the earlier writings of Bates and MacWhinney (1989), children's language is facilitated by the presence of correlated cues in the input, e.g. prosodic and phonological cues in combination with semantic context. In sharp contrast to the idea that syntax is learned by a separate modular system divorced from other information, recent research emphasizes that the young language learner uses different sources of information together. Modularity emerges as development proceeds'.

reproduce only the most frequent forms—thereby regularizing and systematizing the inconsistent input and standardizing the language they hear around them. As Melodie Dye has also found:

> Young children … act like finely-tuned antennas, picking up the dominant frequency in their surroundings and ignoring the static. Because of this – because toddlers tend to pick up on what is common and consistent, while ignoring what is variable and unreliable – they end up homing in on and reproducing only the most frequent patterns in what they hear. In doing so they fail to learn many of the subtleties and idiosyncrasies present in adult speech (they will come to learn or invent those later). (2010)

It is precisely this picking up of the dominant frequency that explains characteristic errors such as children adding the suffix '-ed' to irregular verbs to mark the past, as in: 'He hitted me'.[11] Such findings fit within a relatively new approach to language acquisition known as 'statistical learning'; as also 'similarity-based generalization' to explain how children are able to figure out how to use new words by generalizing about their use from similar words they already know how to use (Yarlett and Ramscar 2008). And of course, children also learn from repeated failure.[12] So that word learning is a probabilistic, success and error-driven process, rather than a process of implicit rule application.

Also, the nativist emphasis on the poverty of grammatical instruction and correction seems to rely on a restricted view of these. That children do not learn language with much in the way of *overt instruction*, as Cowie (2008) contends, is right if by this she means they are not taught linguistic principles or rules of syntax; but that they are often taught *language* is readily observable, as well as argued for by interactionist theorists of language acquisition, such as Lev Vygotsky's (with his notion of *collaborative learning*) and Jerome Bruner (with his *Language*

[11]Whereas the Chomskyan explanation here is that the regularity of such errors, and the fact that they are not based upon what the child hears, demonstrate that they are derived from the universal grammar. The child allegedly works through from the simplest possibilities offered by the UG to the more complex, until his own grammar is the same as the grammar of the mother tongue. But even if we were to grant Chomsky the occurrence of such cerebral gymnastics, how does he explain that many children go on making mistakes of this kind into adulthood? I heard a man laughing at his companion who had just used the word 'sped' rather than 'speeded' (both are right), affirming that there is no such word. And how many of us are ever sure about when to use 'hung' or 'hanged'? It is bodies like the *Académie Française*, not UG, that legislate as to what is grammatically legitimate, and what changes are accepted, though it has a reactive rather than generative role—the evolution of language being mostly the spontaneous upshot of language users. As Ramscar, Dye & McCauley have found: 'children's overregularization errors both arise and resolve themselves as a consequence of the distribution of error in the linguistic environment, and … far from presenting a logical puzzle for learning, they are inevitable consequences of it' (2013: 760).

[12]Ramscar and Yarlett (2007) and Ramscar et al. (2013) show the importance of expectation and error-driven learning processes in language acquisition. For example, when children erroneously expect an ungrammatical form that then never occurs, the repeated absence of fulfilment serves as a kind of implicit negative feedback which encourages them to correct their errors over time.

Acquisition Support System).[13] In fact, as Schoneberger (2010) has shown, the crucial nativist claims that children find little linguistic reinforcement or corrective feedback is a myth. There is plenty of empirical evidence that children do encounter corrective data.[14] However, when presented with such evidence, Chomskians reject it on the grounds that whereas only *some* children are exposed to correct data, *all* children learn the correct rule. Indeed, a key justification for a universal grammar is that it explains why *all* children pick up the language correctly. As Green and Vervaecke write:

> … the single most important datum to capture when modelling language learning is that children *virtually never* fail to learn language correctly, regardless of what kind of linguistic data they are exposed to early in life. (1997)

I don't really know what to make of this; it sounds preposterous in that it is obvious that many children *do* fail to learn language correctly and that, in fact, many of them do not improve with age: a ride on the bus, a stroll in a shopping mall or even a university corridor or an hour of TV viewing will easily attest to the fact that many, if not most, people—children and grown children—do not speak grammatically correct English. For instance, we seem to be wiping out adverbs and are now doing 'amazing'. There is hardly a day when I don't hear some of the errors made in the following sentence: 'I'm feeling *more better* than I *done* yesterday though I'm not my *bestest*; but still, I should *of went* to the gym'. And other such common errors could be heard on the lips of many campaigning MPs, including Harriet Harman boasting about something 'we have *showed* [the country]' (2015 TV campaign appearance). Such errors are much too frequent and consistent to be dismissed as slips of the tongue. The point is whether or not we ought to deplore this state of things—linguistic norms change,[15] like it or not—but that what we call

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[13]MacWhinney (1993) shows that language acquisition includes a 'rich armoury of learning mechanisms'—including expressive and receptive monitoring, alongside competition, conservatism, complex, indirect and overt negative evidence, and cue construction—indicating that 'the logical problem of language learning is easily solved, and that there is really no logical problem of language acquisition at all'.

[14]Moerk (1994) conducted a meta-analysis of 40 studies and found substantial evidence that corrections do indeed play a role, and that they are not only abundant but contingent on the mistakes of the child. Schoneberger (2010) cites findings that evidence (both positive and negative) available in the linguistic environment provides adequate constraints when learning a language. For example, children are provided positive evidence (a) when their grammatically correct utterances are directly reinforced by adults; (b) when their grammatically correct utterances are indirectly reinforced by adults by means of automatic reinforcement; and (c) when adults provide grammatically correct exemplars. Further, they are provided direct negative evidence when their grammatically incorrect utterances result in corrective feedback as well as indirect negative evidence by usually not being exposed to grammatically incorrect utterances. They also cite evidence to support the claim that reinforcement promotes language acquisition during naturally occurring parent–child verbal interactions.

[15]There are of course many well-documented examples of this, such as changes in the grammar of Old English to that of Chaucer's Middle English.

'grammatical' is not hard-wired. Grammar is a mapping of language norms in use, not a map established in the brain in advance of all use, which linguists try to fathom.

Neither we, nor our brain, rely on or need to know any *principles* to form a correct sentence. If universal grammar (innate principles) were there to guarantee that the correct parameter is set, why do children (and adults) not eventually systematically produce the correct version of what they hear? Why, when she lives in an adult community which regularly produces expressions such as 'Me and her went to the gym' or 'They hurt theirself', does the child use these mistaken expressions into adulthood? Or, alternatively correct herself if and when guided or exposed to correct usage. The number of adults who speak ungrammatically, and the fact that, as Dabrowska (2010) shows, agreement on well-formedness of complex sentences is far from universal in adults, easily belie the claim that, unless our language organs are severely impaired, we are universally either actual or potential perfect grammatical users of our native languages. What we speak is what we learn.

The poverty of stimulus argument took added impetus from findings by Derek Bickerton's examination of pidgins and creoles (1984). A pidgin has rudimentary grammar[16]; a creole is grammatically complex, but Bickerton found that the transition from one to the other is made within the space of one generation, and without the creole deriving its grammatical principles from the target language (that of the 'masters'), or from any of the substratum languages (one spoken by some subgroup of the labourers), suggesting that grammar is biologically hard-wired. Fortis (2008) has shown Bickerton's evidence to be faulty. The complexification of Hawaiian pidgin seems to have been accomplished by speakers who were more or less passively bilingual, and therefore previously exposed to complex linguistic data; and new evidence shows that the complexification of pidgin to creole is not made within the space of one generation, but two.[17]

[16]Pidgins are basic or proto-languages developed as a means of communication by adults who do not share a common language. They are syntactically impoverished languages, characterized by reduced syntax and vocabulary, no fixed order of words, with considerable variation from one speaker to another. However, a pidgin can evolve into a creole, which is a full-blown language. The argument here is that inasmuch as a full-blown language can be developed from an impoverished linguistic environment (with only vocabulary, but not grammatical principles drawn from a pidgin inasmuch as pidgins do not possess such principles in the first place), principles must be innate.

[17]The transition occurs progressively. It is only in the second generation that pidgin is established, by speakers who have retained some of their native language. It is this stable and developed form of pidgin, constructed by the second generation, which gives birth to creole. The Hudson-Kam and Newport (2009) experiments mentioned earlier also suggest that creole languages do not support a universal grammar. In a pidgin situation (as also in the real-life situation of a deaf child whose parents were disfluent signers), children systematize the language they hear based on the probability and frequency of forms, and not on the basis of a universal grammar.

Another argument in support of nativism is the alleged 'domain specificity' of the language faculty: its independence from other aspects of cognition. This dissociation of language from the rest of our cognitive abilities is said to be evidenced by children who are linguistically prolific and yet present impaired intelligence; and, inversely, by cases where language ability is impaired in the presence of otherwise normal cognitive ability. The latter is known as 'specific language impairment'. It is conceded, by Anderson and Lightfoot, that the homogeneity of cases that have been grouped under the SLI diagnosis is quite controversial, but this does not prevent them from using the argument. The controversy, I believe, is mostly to do with cases of feral children as the main evidence in support of SLI. The claim being that feral children fail to develop language despite normal cognitive abilities and exposure to language. But the objection that flares up here must be that *normal cognitive abilities* are attributed to feral children in the first place. If not retarded from infancy and abandoned because of this, the psychological and physical abuse feral children suffered is alone sufficient to preclude normal language development.[18] The child can hardly be seen as growing up in a nurturing environment; the lack of language acquisition in later life may be due to the results of a generally abusive environment before—but also after—it was found, as the teaching methods used are often limited, if not repressive: the child is kept in (often harsh) experimental conditions, taught a native language by mere ostensive teaching of words rather than normal exposure and habituation in a form of life. It seems to me, then, that what such cases demonstrate is that language acquisition is *not* separable from cognitive development generally.

There is no space here to go into other kinds of case used to justify 'domain specificity', but as a general response, I would say two things: (1) there may be neural structures in the brain that are crucial to linguistic development, and the impairment of these may result in linguistic disabilities, but this neither justifies nor demands making those structures into a language acquisition device capable of storing and activating grammatical principles; (2) language acquisition is not separate from intelligence; it is one of our abilities that require intelligence, but whose structural impairment does not necessarily impair our other intelligent abilities.

[18]I cannot expand on this here but the literature is abundant—the cases of Victor and Genie being the most notable. In Genie's case, psychological and physical trauma was caused by her father who physically punished her if she made any sounds (Curtiss et al. 1974: 84). As for Victor, he presented insensitivity to any feelings except joy and anger (e.g. he never cried; his eyes were without expression); he was virtually insensitive to noise and his sensitivity to temperature was different from the norm (e.g. he did not react to boiling water); he was unable to distinguish between a painting and an object in relief, and could not undertake mundane tasks like opening a door. See Singleton and Ryan (2004) against the validity of feral cases in support of the SLI hypothesis.

4 Chomsky's Universal Grammar: A Hopeless Monster[19]

The idea of a Chomskyan-style universal grammar has been contested on linguistic, neurobiological and anthropological fronts. Studies in descriptive linguistics have shown that there is no universal set of principles determining language; it is diversity, rather than universals, that is found at almost every level of linguistic organization. In their target article, which summarizes decades of cross-linguistic work, Evans and Levinson (2009) show just how few and unprofound the universal characteristics of language are,[20] and how languages vary radically in sound, meaning and syntactic organization. Where there are significant recurrent patterns in organization, these are better explained as stable engineering solutions satisfying multiple design constraints, reflecting both cultural–historical factors and the constraints of human cognition. So that '… the great variability in how languages organize their word-classes dilutes the plausibility of the innatist UG position' (2009: 429; 435). Research on syntax has brought Dunn et al. to conclude that there is no universal set of rules determining the evolution of language; rather, it is cultural evolution that is the primary determinant of linguistic structure, at least with respect to word order (2011: 79).

The notion of an innate structure of mind imposing 'universals' has also been rejected from a biological perspective. As Wolfram Hinzen affirms, there is no clue, empirically, about the type of rule that would be able to organize neuronal connections that enable language competence; there is no biology specific to language; no universal grammar rooted in the human genome (2012a: 636). This segues with Christiansen and Chater's findings: 'a biologically determined UG is not evolutionarily viable' in that the processes of language change are much faster than processes of genetic change, so that language constitutes a 'moving target' both over time and across different human populations and cannot therefore provide a stable environment to which language genes could have adapted (2008: 489). And Terence Deacon abundantly demonstrates that Chomsky's scenario is unsupported by evolutionary anthropology which evidences a *gradual* adaptation of the human brain and vocal chords to the use of language rather than the sudden appearance of a

[19]A wink at what biologists call a 'hopeful monster' theory, described by Deacon as 'the evolutionary theorist's counterpart to divine intervention, in which a freak mutation just happens to produce a radically different and serendipitously better-equipped organism. The single most influential 'hopeful monster' theory of human language evolution was offered by the linguist Noam Chomsky' (1997: 35).

[20]Views that espouse some universality do not need to appeal to nativism: Christiansen and Chater (2008) hold a non-formal conception of universals in which these emerge.

language organ containing a complete set of parameters enabling all grammars[21]—Chomsky's 'Big Bang' theory.[22]

'Don't think, but look!' (PI §66)[23], writes Wittgenstein (PI). By this, he means that we should draw our accounts of human life from *life*, from what we *do* rather than from presuppositions often generated by false analogies that lead to false requirements. And what we do shows that language acquisition is not due to the activation of principles but to the acquisition of a technique, a know-how, an ability. Children are not mini-grammarians. They do not need to 'cognize' and apply the location principle or any grammatical principle to acquire language. They use words in the same way we play tennis, without knowing what the mechanics are. Stipulating a principle requirement creates a problem where none was there, and appealing to innateness fabricates a solution where none is needed. Rather than 'language growing in us'—as Chomsky would have it—it is we who physiologically, psychologically and socially *grow* into language.[24]

We can now move on to Wittgenstein, whose view of language development—in contrast to Chomsky's 'Big Bang' theory—seems to me ontogenetically and phylogenetically consistent and coherent.

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[21]This is echoed by Christiansen and Chater (2008) whose research finds that it is non-linguistic constraints that have shaped language to the brain, and given rise to statistical tendencies in language structure and use. The question is not 'Why is the brain so well suited to learning language?', but 'Why is language so well suited to being learned by the brain?' Following Darwin, they argue that 'it is useful metaphorically to view languages as 'organisms'—that is, highly complex systems of interconnected constraints—that have evolved in a symbiotic relationship with humans' (2008: 490).

[22]This view of the sudden appearance of language as a kind of evolutionary accident where humans, to the exclusion of all other animals, were somehow accidentally blessed with a fully functioning prefabricated language organ (see Chomsky 1988) has been found, Green and Vervaecke (1997) concede, hardly plausible. However, they retort: 'ironically, … the *real* Big Bang theory is, as far as we now know, true! A substantial critique of the implausibility of 'catastrophic' or 'big bang' theories of brain evolution to account for humans' unique linguistic capacity can be found in Deacon (1997).

[23]Following convention, titles for Wittgenstein's works are abbreviated (TLP = Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, BB = The Blue and Brown Books, Z = Zettel, OC = On Certainty, RFM = Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, N = Notebooks, RPP I = Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology I, RPP II = Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology II, LPP = Lectures on Philosophical Psychology, PO I = Philosophical Occasions I, PO II = Philosophical Occasions II, PI = Philosophical Investigations, WL = Wittgenstein's Lectures, BT = The Big Typescript), with section (§) or page number (p.), with full citation and initials (e.g., RFM) in the References.

[24]Chomsky is averse to saying that language acquisition is a learning at all; it is, to him, more akin to *growing* than to learning: 'In certain fundamental respects we do not really learn language; rather grammar grows in the mind' (Chomsky 1980a: 134); 'language development really ought to be called language growth because the language organ grows like any other body organ' (1983). Cook and Newson: 'Acquisition of language is, to Chomsky, learning in a peculiar sense: … it is not like learning to ride a bicycle, where practice develops and adapts existing skills. Instead it is internal development in response to vital, but comparatively trivial, experience from outside' (2007: 185).

5 Wittgenstein's Social Account of Language Acquisition

5.1 The Primitivity of Action: The Deed, not the Word

> In the beginning was the deed.
>
> Wittgenstein, quoting Goethe (OC §402)

One of the important things Wittgenstein said about language is that it has its root in gesture—or, as he also put it, in 'action', and more precisely: 'reaction' or 'instinct': 'What we call meaning must be connected with the primitive language of gestures' (BT, p. 24). By this, he means instinctive gestures and reactions which—first through evolution, then through enculturation—get replaced by words. This—Wittgenstein's 'primitivism' (Canfield 1997: 258)—prompted Michael Tomasello to realize that '[i]f we want to understand human communication, … we cannot begin with language'; contrary to primatologist dogma, apes' *gestures*, not their vocalizations, are the precursors of human language (2008: 59; 53–5).[25]
When Wittgenstein writes that '[t]he study of language games is the study of primitive forms of language or languages' (BB: 17), he does not, by this, mean words or symbols, but reactions:

> The origin and the primitive form of the language game is a reaction; only from this can more complicated forms develop.
>
> Language – I want to say – is a refinement. 'In the beginning was the deed.' (PO I, p. 395)

Language, then, is a refinement, or 'an extension', of our primitive behaviour[26]; it emerges from the *development* of some of our animal or natural reactions. Not just *any* natural reaction—not singular or idiosyncratic ones, like tics—but our *shared* natural reactions; what Wittgenstein calls 'the common behaviour of mankind' (PI §206): reactions such as crying when in pain or sad; smiling when glad; jumping when startled; gasping or screaming when afraid; but also reacting to someone's suffering. He writes (1993a):

> In its most primitive form [the language-game] is a reaction to somebody's cries and gestures, a reaction of sympathy or something of the sort. (PO I, p. 414)

[25]For an *aperçu* of Wittgenstein's impact in the field of language acquisition, see Nelson (2009).

[26]'Being sure that someone is in pain, doubting whether he is, and so on, are so many natural, instinctive kinds of behaviour towards other human beings, and our language is merely an auxiliary to, and further extension of, this relation. Our language-game is an extension of primitive behaviour.' (Z §545). 'What, however, is the word "primitive" meant to say here? Presumably, that the mode of behaviour is *pre-linguistic*: that a language game is based *on it*: that it is the prototype of a mode of thought and not the result of thought.' (RPP I, §916). Wittgenstein (RPP II) speaks of *primitive* or *animal* behaviour in the phylogenetic as well as the ontogenetic sense. Here is an illustration of the phylogenetic primitivity of our concepts: '(An ape who tears apart a cigarette, for example. We don't see an intelligent dog do such things. The mere act of turning an object all around and looking it over is a primitive root of doubt' (RPP II, §345).

These instinctive common reactions or action patterns are, Wittgenstein (RPP I) says, the *prototypes* of our modes of thought (RPP I, §916) and of our concepts. And so, the basis for the development of language is constituted by a number of such distinct instinctive, behavioural patterns which John Canfield calls ‘proto-language games’ (1996: 128). Without these behavioural patterns, there would be no language.[27] This is the case phylogenetically as well as ontogenetically; for these natural configurations of behaviour—such as: ‘“[t]he natural, untutored behaviour of one pre-linguistic hominid helping another it sees is hurt”—are part of the species’ inheritance’ (ibid.). So that ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny.

5.2 Training

In the *Investigations*, Wittgenstein writes that the primitive forms of language are those used by the child when it is learning to talk and that, here, ‘the teaching of language is not explanation, but training‘ (PI §5). Why? For an obvious reason: in the learning of a first language, the initiate has only instinct and reactions but no language at her disposal, and so the learning of a native language will *have* to do with action or behaviour—language at first playing only a background music role. This is why language cannot take its impetus from explanation: ‘Language did not emerge from some kind of ratiocination’ (OC §475).

Language, then, is an extension of our patterned non-linguistic behaviour through training. On Wittgenstein’s view, this should include at least one competent trainer—that is, a reasonably adept user of the language, endowed with enough pedagogic ability to mould or shape the child’s responses to the training so that they end up in harmony with the norm.[28] Of course, by ‘training’ here is not meant anything formal but the kind of repeated direct and indirect guidance that is effected through intersubjective interaction in various contexts. More formal teaching may —it does not always—come later.[29] But it is clear that for Wittgenstein, language acquisition is not a one-track affair: he rejects the Augustinian view of it as resulting from a mere nominalization process, and describes it in terms of habituation and enculturation.

[27]Wittgenstein: ‘it is characteristic of our language that the foundation on which it grows consists in *steady ways of living, regular ways of acting*’ (PO I, p. 397; my emphasis). Our acquiring concepts, such as pain, requires that we have appropriate (i.e. normal) human reactions: ‘If a child looked radiant when it was hurt, and shrieked for no apparent reason, one could not teach him to use the word “pain”’ (LPP, p. 37).

[28]On Philippe Narboux’ view, training is a necessary but insufficient condition for the learning of a *native* language whereas *second language* acquisition does not require it, and can rely on nothing other than ostensive definition because it relies on previous training (2004: 136).

[29]Once the child has some language, there will be more explanatory teaching, and perhaps the odd transmission of some linguistic principles (though not usually of the ‘clitic’ sort). Wittgenstein talks about teaching as well as training: (e.g. Z §§318 & 186).

So how is the child trained to go from proto-language games to language, from her instinctive reactions to language? '… how, asks Wittgenstein, is the connexion between the name and the thing set up?'—and he replies:

> This question is the same as: how does a human being learn the meaning of the names of sensations? – of the word 'pain' for example. Here is one possibility: words are connected with the primitive, the natural, expressions of the sensation and used in their place. A child has hurt himself and he cries; and then adults talk to him and teach him exclamations and, later, sentences. They teach the child new pain-behaviour. (PI §244)

So the *connection* between the name and the thing is not made by an act of ostension, not by merely hooking gestures on to their public referents, but by processes of drill or habituation that are similar to stimulus-response conditioning, but that must be supplemented by training *into the practice* in which those words are used.[30] Note: what the child is taught in learning to replace his primitive reactions with words is new *behaviour*; that is, in first picking up the linguistic expression, the child is not *describing* with it or *referring* with it, but still *reacting* with it.

Ostensive teaching, as opposed to mere ostensive *definition*, involves behavioural conditioning: the child is taught, through repetition and exercises, to utter certain words in certain contexts or situations. These drills are used to tap and channel the child's natural reactions. What we witness in these initial stages is not yet language, but 'processes resembling language' (PI §7); for a language is not the mere repetition of certain sounds in certain contexts and after certain prompts. Wittgenstein is not a behaviourist. Drill is not enough; beyond mere conditioning (cf. PI §6), a normative *attitude* towards utterances, towards how things are to be done, must be inculcated in the child, so that it can learn to regulate itself.[31] And acquiring a normative attitude demands nothing less than being enculturated. It is thanks to her acquiring this normative attitude that the child is eventually able to go on, on her own; to proceed *from other-regulation to self-regulation* (Medina 2002. 165). Successful enculturation means the child can then judge for herself that in a particular instance a word or phrase makes sense, not by comparing it to a benchmark, context-free, use but on the basis of her experience of multiple language games in which the word or phrase is employed. For Wittgenstein, the acquisition of language is the acquisition of a technique, skill or capacity, and capacities are flexible to individual and occasion; they allow for—and indeed, are basic to—productivity and creativity.

[30]Cf. Medina (2002: 173). As psychologist Derek Montgomery also observes, if the carer repeatedly uses the verb 'want' while interpreting the infant's behaviour in certain contexts, it is 'reasonable to suspect that when the verb emerges in the child's lexicon it will be in familiar contexts such as [those] where the child has repeatedly heard it being used. The meaning of the term, like the meaning of the prelinguistic gesturing, is bound up in the role it plays within such contexts' (2002: 372).

[31]'Our children are not only given practice in calculation but are also trained to adopt a particular attitude towards a mistake in calculating [variant: '… towards a departure from the norm'] (RFM: VII 61, p. 425)—that is, children are habituated into standards of correctness of the practice in question, and thereby formed to act and react in particular ways; they are thus trained to master a technique.

6 Technique: Wittgenstein's Answer to the Productivity Problem

To understand a language means to be master of a technique.

Wittgenstein (PI §199)

So that 'technique', I suggest, is Wittgenstein's answer to the nativist problem of productivity, which is how to account for our capacity to produce an unlimited number of novel utterances from the limited set of grammatical rules and the finite set of terms we acquire from experience. On Wittgenstein's view, we are able to extend our limited acquired knowledge of language to new situations and contexts precisely because the teaching of language is not a teaching of principles but the transmission of a technique, which does not aim for total regulation, but for self-regulation.

It is criteria that determine whether a speaker is following a rule or using a word in accordance with the norm that is being inculcated. These criteria are public, not private; they can be transmitted to the child and invoked to guide and correct him in his attempts to use the words he is being taught. The child's various attempts are guided (encouraged/discouraged) until enough training allows her to grasp what *sorts of contexts* are propitious for the use of the word: semantic development involves precisely 'becoming increasingly sensitive to how characteristics of different contexts constrain the words one can use' (Montgomery 2002: 373).[32] However, though constraint is necessary, there is no exhaustive determination of use but an indication of proper use (the use is *constrained, not shackled*), which allows for and explains creativity/productivity.

We might make an analogy here with a dog that is trained not to bite: the dog will not only not bite the people present at the training, but also not bite in all similar contexts (e.g. unthreatening contexts). Or again, when the child is taught to open a door, she does not just learn to open *that* white, single panelled door which her mother is using to teach her, but all doors that she will come across in experience—whether they be white, black, double-panelled, glass and so on. This is

[32]For Chomsky, in contrast, our words are informed by the brain; they get their meaning from internal meanings (which are abstract mental representations), and it is the brain that communicates meaning: the human mind bridges the gap between external sounds and internal meanings (which are abstract mental representations) via a 'computational system' that relates meanings to sequences of sounds in one direction and sequences of sounds to meanings in the mind in the other. The mind changes the representation of language used by the computational system into the general concepts used by the mind, called 'the conceptual–intentional system', i.e. *moon* is connected to the concept of 'earth's satellite'. Going in the opposite direction, while speaking the mind has to convert the concepts into linguistic representation for the computational system, i.e. 'earth's satellite' is converted into *moon* (Cook and Newson 2007: 6). In contrast to this mentalist view, for Wittgenstein (echoed here by Montgomery), it is in social practices that the meaning of words and the standards for their use are established. Meaning, as Wittgenstein says, is 'in use'—out there—not in the head, not in some mental repository.

where the teaching of a technique surpasses, say, ostensive definition. As Wittgenstein writes:

> Teaching which is not meant to apply to anything but the examples given is different from that which '*points beyond*' them.[33] (PI §208)

To suggest that we need a language acquisition device to explain how we can produce an unlimited number of new and correct sentences from limited input is like suggesting we need a manoeuvre acquisition device to explain the potentially unlimited variety of manoeuvres that a cyclist is able to execute from the basic or limited training he has received (cf. Rorty 2004: 225). Wittgenstein's answer to the productivity problem is encapsulated in this passage: 'Yes, there is the great thing about language—that we can do what we haven't learnt' (LPP, p. 28).

So that, *contra* Chomsky, first-language acquisition is *essentially* social; it requires that at least one member of the linguistic community mould the child's primitive reactions and proto-language games into language games, bringing the child, through a process of enculturation, to assimilate, conform to and apply the standards of correctness of its linguistic community. Acquiring language is like learning to walk: the child is stepped into language by an initiator and, after much hesitation and repeated faltering, with time, multifarious practice and repeated exposure, it disengages itself from its teacher's hold and is able, as it were, to run with the language.

7 Training Is not Enough

This may be a good time to bring up Chomsky's argument that while human babies and animals can both be trained, if they are exposed to exactly the same linguistic data, the human child will acquire language, but the kitten will not. For Chomsky, to suggest that language is ***not*** innate is to imply that no crucial and relevant internal nature differentiates a child from a rock or a rabbit; so that if we put a rock, a rabbit and a child in an English-speaking community, they should all be able to learn English (Chomsky 2000). It is in order to avoid coming to this conclusion, he says that we must accept that the relevant capacity the child has which the stone and rabbit lack is the 'language acquisition device' (LAD). But this, I suggest, is like using a hammer to crack an egg. We hardly need resort to a language acquisition device to mark a difference here—internal or otherwise—between humans and animals (to say nothing of rocks). Before resorting to something as ad hoc as a

[33]Wittgenstein's rule-following argument shows precisely that generating new sentences is nothing but an instance of knowing how to go on, 'how to extend the speech that [we] have into new contexts' (Bruner 1983: 39). As H.-J. Glock notes, the early Wittgenstein's was also concerned with what is now known as the problem of 'the creativity of language': the number of propositions being indefinite although the number of words is finite (N, p. 98; TLP §§4.02, 4.027 etc.) (1996: 298).

language organ to account for the difference, we might, for a start, evoke obvious, traceable physiological requirements such as the anatomical structures necessary for the vocalization of human speech that are lacking in rabbits and rocks. Or indeed, as Elizabeth Bates does, to differences between human brains and, say, those of chimpanzees, but differences—she insists—that do not require us to postulate a language organ (1993: 8). However, the difference is not only physiological.[34]

Rebecca Saxe, a cognitive scientist at MIT, argues that the key difference between apes and humans seems to be that we have *explicit teaching* while animals have only imitation. Chimps may use sticks as rudimentary tools, but they learn such skills through observation and mimicry as well as trial and error, rather than direct instruction. Humans learn through all of these, but teaching may be the signature skill of our species. Also, a part of teaching is 'triadic attention': being able to work out the coordination of my attention and the other person's attention on this third thing: the task I'm trying to teach. I have to pay attention to all three elements continuously. Finally, it seems like 'it's not just a cognitive capacity that's necessary for teaching; there's this other thing, which is *wanting to teach*. That may be even more critical. We need to understand that somebody else is unable to do what we're doing, and also have some reason, motivation, desire to help that person learn it. As Saxe says: 'That desire to teach seems to be really pervasive in humans and may be mysteriously missing in apes' (2008). Humans have both the passion and the mental skills to teach each other.

So that the inability for rabbits and stones to speak and teach goes some way in explaining why they do not acquire language and we do. But also the fact that children *expect* (and like) to be taught makes a vital difference, and this is visible in their capacity for attention. Though the learner's *triadic* attention is a development, attention for teaching appears before language kicks in. Apes cannot get into that; although they do things together and coordinate their actions together, they have no *shared goals based on shared commitment*. Kids, on the other hand, have these naturally, almost immediately.

Another distinguishing feature of humans is what John Haugeland calls 'norm-hungriness' (2002: 22)—an expectation of norms that parents try to teach us. Haugeland claims the fundamental divide between humans and animals lies in our essential use of norms. Humans display a norm-susceptibility, and a deep 'norm-hungriness'; deep, both in that the desire is almost insatiable, and in that the norms are unique in their richness and complexity (ibid: 31).

[34]Actually, the deeper confusion here is that unless we assume that language is innate, exposure to English would have to result in the child, the rabbit and the rock learning **English**. As Wittgenstein said: 'If a lion could talk, we wouldn't be able to understand it' (PI, p. 223), for he wouldn't—couldn't—speak 'human'. Learning humans speak (e.g., English) takes enculturation in a human form of life, and that presupposes shared behavioural reactions and responses. I won't even bother about the rock …

8 Wittgenstein's Universal Grammar

I'd like to conclude this paper by suggesting that we replace Chomsky's universal grammar with Wittgensteinian grammar. Inasmuch as the latter is all the grammar we require to possess a language, and inasmuch as its acquisition can only be achieved through enculturation, it makes an otiose monster out of Chomsky's hopeful monster.

As linguist Everett (2012) says: 'universal grammar doesn't seem to work, there doesn't seem to be much evidence for that'; but what, he asks, can we put in its place? His answer is a Wittgensteinian one: 'A complex interplay of factors, of which culture, the values human beings share, plays a major role in structuring the way that we talk and the things that we talk about'. In view of the implausibility of Chomsky's UG,[35] Wolfram Hinzen seeks to rehabilitate universal grammar as internally linked to human nature, without that centrally involving notions of innateness, essence or modularity (2012b: 55). Gone is the idea of grammar as an autonomous module described by arbitrary formal rules; grammatical theory is a theory of the mode of thought that we find expressed in human language and that is manifest in human culture (2012a: 643). Hinzen's view of grammar seems apt to resonate with Wittgenstein's in that Wittgensteinian grammar is a description of the rules or bounds of sense that determine, and are embedded in, our use of language as a result of the evolution of languages in the various cultures of human life.

For Wittgenstein, there is no question that language depends on grammar; but Wittgensteinian grammar is a different animal from Chomsky's. Whereas Chomsky construes grammar as a set of arbitrary *principles* existing in advance of use or practice, for Wittgenstein, it is not principles, but rules or norms that are necessary to the existence of a language, and these do not pre-exist language but are inextricably bound up with its practice. As John Canfield puts it: 'The practice underlies the rule rather than vice-versa' (1975: 114), which is to say that grammatical rules merely express or *bring out* our *normative* use of words and expressions. In fact, rules of grammar, as Wittgenstein conceives them, are nothing like linguistic principles; they are garden-variety or ordinary expressions (reminders) of the norms that have been regulating our meaningful use of words (e.g. 'A bachelor is an unmarried man'; 'This is what we call a table'; 'Red is darker than pink'; 'A rod has a length'). The child assimilates these norms as it assimilates the language—through guidance in (which may, but need not, involve explicit reminders of the norms), and exposure to, correct usage. As Peter Hacker puts it: 'Rules for the use of words are exhibited in human discourse, in explanations of meaning, in corrections of errors, in what counts as accepted usage' (2010: 29). Nothing more complicated than that.

[35]Hinzen: '… controversies about UG abound and the enterprise is widely rejected as ill-conceived and unfounded' (2012a: 335n).

Learning the meaning of a word is nothing but learning how it is used; that is, assimilating the *norms that govern its use*—what Wittgenstein calls its *grammar*. We could not speak of the number of people in a room if we did not have a norm- or rule-governed use of the words ‘people’, ‘number’ and ‘room’. So that if I were to say that I have counted 30 people in the room, of whom two dogs and a cat, I would not be using the words ‘people’, ‘dog’ and ‘cat’ correctly. I would not be speaking grammatically. Grammatical norms determine what it makes sense for us to say also by excluding certain combinations of words from meaningful use.[36]

The grammatical rules I have been describing are what we might call ‘thin’ and ‘local’: they are norms for the use of words, expressions and numbers[37] (‘2 + 2=4’ is for Wittgenstein as much a rule of grammar as ‘A rod has a length’). But Wittgenstein came to realize that many of our grammatical rules are ‘thick’ or ‘reality-soaked’[38]: they are *conditioned* by empirical reality. So, for example: ‘The earth has existed for a long time’; ‘Human beings have bodies’; ‘If someone’s head is cut off, he is dead and will never live again’; ‘Babies cannot look after themselves’; ‘Human beings are born, grow old and die; they need air, water and sleep; they usually smile or laugh when they’re happy; cry when they’re sad or in pain’.

Now of course Wittgenstein is well aware that these look like run-of-the mill empirical propositions, not expressions of rules of grammar. Yet he notices that these are propositions about which ‘no doubt can exist if making judgments is to be possible at all’, and so they do not, in fact, *function* as empirical propositions[39] but as *logical* propositions: they ‘form the foundation of all operating with thoughts (with language)’ (OC §401). Failing, in our language games, to ‘assume’ the indubitability of such propositions would result in a failure to make sense: for an English speaker to ask, in a non-sci-fi context, whether ‘human beings have bodies’ would be as nonsensical as asking whether a ‘rod has a length’. Either question would make us suspect, first, the speaker’s proficiency in English and if that were

[36]Wittgenstein (PO II) does not think his conception of grammar contrasts with the grammarian’s; he insists that ‘any explanation of the use of language’ is ‘grammar’ (PO II, p. 69). On his view, ‘A rod has no length’ is as ungrammatical as ‘A rod length has’; but as he concedes (to Moore), the former violation of grammar is of interest only to the philosopher (ibid.), whereas syntax—albeit also part of grammar—is not the part philosophers are interested in. Wittgenstein leaves it to grammarians to bring out the syntactic aspect of use. Grammarians and philosophers may find it of interest to map grammatical rules, but this does not make the apprehension of rules as such relevant to language acquisition. In picking up the correct syntactico-semantic use of language—its grammar—the child is not picking up rules as such, but simply, to repeat: correct use.

[37]I am generalizing for simplicity’s sake. For a more nuanced view of Wittgenstein’s conception of grammatical rules, see Glock (1996: 150–55), and Moyal-Sharrock (2004).

[38]I owe this expression to Bernard Harrison (1991: 58).

[39]‘That is, we are interested in the fact that about certain empirical propositions no doubt can exist if making judgments is to be possible at all. Or again: I am inclined to believe that not everything that has the form of an empirical proposition *is* one.’ (OC §308).

ascertained, her sanity. Inasmuch, then, as our language games are *logically* hinged on such putative 'propositions', Wittgenstein takes them to have a *grammatical* role ('logical' and 'grammatical' are synonymous for the later Wittgenstein). Such 'propositions' are in fact expressions of rules of grammar.

Their seemingly empirical nature is due to these rules of grammar being *conditioned* by 'very general facts of nature' appertaining to 'the natural history of human beings'[40] (PI §§230: 415): 'it is characteristic of our language that the foundation on which it grows consists in steady ways of living, regular ways of acting' (PO I, p. 397). Their being conditioned by facts that unassailably pertain to the human form of life makes them *universal* rules of grammar—that is, laws of thought belonging to the 'scaffolding of thought' of any normal human being. They are the bounds of sense from which *any* human being must begin to make sense.[41] Such rules, I suggest, constitute alongside our more local grammars, a universal grammar.[42]

[40]Note: *conditioned*, not *justified* by facts or *inferred* from them. This is what precludes their being empirical propositions. Rules are not empirically or epistemically grounded in reality, though they may be 'caused' by reality (OC §§131, 429, 474). This is why Wittgenstein writes: 'The rule we lay down is the one most strongly *suggested* by the facts of experience' (WL: 84). For clarification regarding the nonempirical nature of 'thick' rules of grammar, see Moyal-Sharrock (2013).

[41]Some people may hold beliefs that seem to violate—and so could not condition—universal rules of grammar. For example, in the Trobriand Islands, some women, called *Yoyova* or flying witches, are believed to have the capacity to fly. It is, however, also (accommodatingly) believed that they either leave their bodies behind when they do this, or have doubles in the form of fireflies, etc. fly for them (1979, Young: 207). The universal rule of grammar: 'Human beings cannot fly unaided' is therefore not actually transgressed. Any attempt to ignore or transgress it *in action*—such as a *yoyova* attempting to *actually* fly off a cliff (without 'leaving her body behind')—must be seen as pathological. For any local belief that seems to violate universal rules of grammar, such accommodating measures will always be found. There is no *normal* transgression of a universal rule. To genuinely think or act on the basis of such rules of thought as—'I can fly unaided' or 'Only I exist' is a pathological problem, not a doxastic option. See Moyal-Sharrock (2007) for a discussion of *local* and *universal* rules of grammar drawn from *On Certainty*.

[42]They are conditioned by 'extremely general facts of nature—such facts as are hardly ever mentioned because of their great generality' (PI, p. 56)—including the 'common behaviour of mankind'—behaviours such as breathing, eating, walking, hoping, dying, speaking, thinking, giving orders, asking questions, telling stories, having a chat. It is this common behaviour that constitutes the universal 'system of reference' which conditions what might be called, though in obvious contrast to Chomsky, the 'universal grammar' of mankind—that grammar by means of which any human being can understand a foreign language (PI §206).

9 Conclusion

We have seen that Chomsky's UG faces multiple objections from multiple fronts—objections it cannot answer. This, however, has not managed to take the wind out of UG's sails.[43] Myths are difficult to debunk. For, if anything transpires from even a glance at Chomsky's position, it is that it does have the trappings of myth. On the other hand, Wittgenstein's conception of language acquisition—resulting as it does from observations so basic as to be incontestable—is of the order of 'perspicuous presentation'; it merely makes obvious the *familiar unseen*: 'We want to understand something that is already in plain view. For this is what we seem in some sense not to understand' (PI §89).

There is nothing mysterious, speculative or ad hoc about Wittgenstein's view of language acquisition: no positing of hidden principles lodged in the brain and requiring 'cognisance'; all that is needed is the (plain to see) ability to be initiated in and master the technique of language through enculturation. Any more detail than this must be left to empirical research, but of the non-mythopeic kind[44]—the kind, instead, that Ramscar and Yarlett are gesturing at here:

> Language is ultimately a cultural capacity (Tomasello 1999; PI); arguably, it is the capacity for culture that sets Homo sapiens apart from our closest neighbors. Understanding how the processes of imitation that appear to be key to the acquisition and establishment of cultural common ground interact with the processes that allow humans to exert more cognitive control over their responses, and thus achieve agency across the course of cognitive development, may ultimately result in a much deeper understanding of our capacity for, and the nature of, both language and culture. (2007: 952)

Constancy of meaning, linguistic communication and expression are made possible by a grammar, but this grammar is not a set of innate linguistic principles biologically programmed in our brains in advance of all use, and enabling the inner growth of language. In contrast to Chomsky's grammar, there is nothing inexplicable about Wittgenstein's grammar. On his view, human grammar is internally related to human life and action—this is what his concept of the language *game* conveys, as well as his often-reiterated conviction that 'at the beginning is the

[43]As Vyvyen Evans testifies, Chomsky's views are 'established fact in many of the linguistics textbooks currently in use in many of the stellar universities throughout the English-speaking world. I was trained using these textbooks, and they are still compulsory reading for today's undergraduate and graduate students—tomorrow's researchers, educators and language professionals—even at the university where I teach and work. University students are regularly told that there is a universal grammar, that language is innate, that language is incommensurable with non-human communication systems, and that all languages are essentially English-like' (2014: 19–20).

[44]That it is necessary to have a well-functioning brain to achieve language acquisition does not make the brain the locus of language acquisition—or part of it, a 'language organ'. The brain is a mere mechanical enabler: its proper functioning is necessary to our acquiring and using language in the same way it is necessary to our ability to walk or digest—without it implying the existence of walking and digestion organs in the brain.

deed'. If universality is the motivating force behind nativism, there is in our shared natural history and in our shared instinctive reactions, universality enough. Our grammars are embedded in our use of language and conditioned by our forms of life; it is therefore in the 'stream of life'—and not in the human brain—that Wittgenstein rightly locates these grammars.

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Learning Without Storing: Wittgenstein's Cognitive Science of Learning and Memory

Ian O'Loughlin

Abstract Education has recently been shaped by the cognitive science of memory. In turn, the science of memory has been infused by revolutionary ideas found in Wittgenstein's works. However, the memory science presently applied to education draws mainly on traditional models that are quickly becoming outmoded; Wittgenstein's insights have yet to be fruitfully applied, though they have helped to develop the science of memory. In this chapter, I examine three Wittgensteinian reforms in memory science as they pertain to education. First, Wittgenstein has inspired a particular strain of enactive models of memory and cognition, with important implications for theories of situated learning in education. Second, researchers have begun modeling memory as *public practice*, which deeply informs, *inter alia*, fraught theoretical discussions of assessment. Third, a number of memory researchers have rejected models based on a stored trace, a fundamental, Wittgensteinian revision with broad implications for characterizations of learning.

Keywords Memory science · Situated learning · Situated cognition · Assessment · Computationalism

An early version of this chapter was presented at the Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain's annual conference in at Oxford, April 1–3, 2016. I am also indebted to a series of helpful and fruitful discussions I had, as the paper was developed, with two philosophically inclined education scholars: Aila O'Loughlin and Kailea Saplan.

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M.A. Peters and J. Stickney (eds.), *A Companion to Wittgenstein on Education*,
DOI 10.1007/978-981-10-3136-6_39

1 Wittgenstein and the Developing Science of Memory

Probably to the disadvantage of both, respective research traditions surrounding *learning* and *memory* have sometimes followed notably separated tracks (Anderson 2000; Karpicke and Roediger 2008). It is not even clear that these phenomena are conceptually distinct (Hoffmann 2010). The cognitive science of learning has been routinely applied to education and education theory in a number of popular and influential works (Blakemore and Frith 2005; Rohrer and Pashler 2010; Siegler 2003), but the cognitive science of memory has traditionally been relegated to a lesser role (Cowan 2014; Karpicke and Roediger 2008; Phye and Pickering 2006). Consequently, treatments of memory and topics from the science of memory in education research run the risk of myopic focus on outdated models (Fenesi et al. 2014); revisions to theories and models in the science of memory are slow to reach educational contexts, despite the conceptual intimacy between learning and memory. Memory science encompasses a dynamic, variegated collection of research endeavors; memory scientists admit that making sense of recent revisions to foundational concepts is no easy task (Roediger et al. 2007). One recent family of particularly philosophical and conceptual revisions to the basic framework within which cognitive scientists understand human remembering follows Wittgenstein's lead (Moyal-Sharrock 2009; Smit 2010; Stern 1991; Sutton 2014), and these Wittgensteinian reforms have a number of important implications for learning and education.

Wittgenstein was a philosopher, not a psychologist; furthermore, he was a philosopher who famously separated the respective methods of philosophy and science. It may at first seem misguided to discuss "Wittgensteinian reforms in memory science" or "Wittgenstein's cognitive science of memory." There are three responses. First, although there is by no means consensus regarding the relationship between philosophy and science according to Wittgenstein, a significant thread through extant Wittgenstein research defends and deploys the positive application of Wittgenstein's ideas to empirical work in psychology and cognitive science (Boncompagni 2013; Harré and Tissaw 2005; Hutto 2009; Susswein and Racine 2009). Second, "cognitive science" is an inherently multidisciplinary enterprise that is taken to include philosophy as one of its constituent parts. If philosophical work, like Wittgenstein's, that takes as its focus the concepts and assumptions we bring to bear on investigations of minds, brains, and behaviors does *not* count as this philosophy component of cognitive science, *what would so count*? If work in cognitive science includes work in philosophy, it is difficult to imagine a clearer candidate for this than the work of Wittgenstein.

Third, Wittgenstein's remarks on memory in particular are among those which, of all that he wrote, bear most straightforwardly on work that we would today call cognitive science. In addition to discussions of the phenomenological aspects of various remembering phenomena, these also include inquiries concerning the characteristic cognitive behaviors of remembering, points demonstrating the implications of particular models of memory, and investigations into what memory

correlates we can, or should expect to, find in the brain (Z, secs. 136, 610, 612; BB, p. 85, PI, secs. 265, 305, 602).[1] These insights into theories and models of memory have already contributed to the developing science of memory—even if it can be difficult to trace the lines of influence—regardless of how well this squares with Wittgenstein's metaphilosophy (Moyal-Sharrock 2009). Like other areas of psychology and cognitive science, the science of memory has recently undergone a number of significant revisions, many of which bear conspicuously Wittgensteinian marks.

This family of revisions coheres, in part, through the rejection of computationalism. Classical computationalism, in its simplistic and outmoded form, is the view that human minds operate much as do computers, by means of storing input as coded representations which are then transformed by inner processes. If the human mind is computational in this sense, then what we are as cognitive systems is information processors and transmitters, translating input into output by means of stored, inert representations. In many areas of philosophy and cognitive science, this crude analogy between computers and human cognitive systems has long been criticized and overturned; whatever computationalist paradigm may have once dominated has been undermined by both empirical and conceptual considerations. Post-computationalist approaches, from situated emphases on the embodied, embedded, or active nature of cognition to modeling cognitive systems in the holistic, interdependent terms of dynamic systems and neural networks, have thrived in the recent decades of cognitive science. Education research has already absorbed some of these revisions through contact with other areas of cognitive science, but memory research has been a latecomer to the post-computationalist festivities.

Assumptions about memory and the operations of memory dwell near the core of the classically computationalist picture. Computationalism depends on the view that cognitive systems operate on stored representations of input. These stored representations are taken to be the main elements of memory. Computation-based models of other areas of cognition have undergone dramatic rejections and revisions, but even after two decades of post-computationalist fervor, memory science has only recently produced tenuous attempts at models that are thoroughly situated, embedded, embodied, and dynamic. It can be difficult to imagine what a thoroughly situated, dynamic, non-computational model of memory might look like. This may be one reason for the recurrence of memory in Wittgenstein's work: superficially, the language and phenomena of memory seem well-suited to just the "inner mental processes" about which he seeks to warn us (Z, secs. 211, 565, 605). Nonetheless, memory researchers have lately been concerned to offer revised models. Lynn Nadel wrote in 2007 that "few memory researchers, in private, defend the fixed

[1]Following convention, titles for Wittgenstein's works are abbreviated (Z = Zettel, PG = Philosophical Grammar, LWPP = Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology, LPP = Lectures on Philosophical Psychology, BB = The Blue and Brown Books, PI = Philosophical Investigations), with section (§) or page number (p.), with full citation and initials in the References.

memory trace paradigm. They know that memory is far more dynamic than our models have typically allowed" (Nadel 2007, p. 181). In the years since, a number of psychologists, cognitive scientists, and philosophers have begun to offer real alternatives to storage and retrieval (Brockmeier 2010; D'Esposito 2007; Kryukov 2008). This conceptual revision must be taken into account if we are to bring the insights of the cognitive science of memory to bear on learning and education.

2 Remembering Without Storing

Encoding, storage, and retrieval have together comprised the foundation for modeling memory for most of the last century. The ubiquity of the computer metaphor in twentieth-century cognitive science strengthened this tendency, but the notion that memory is, or is supported by, a stored trace that is encoded and retrieved antedates the computationalist era. Nevertheless, this idea has come under critical scrutiny of late: Yadin Dudai calls "storage" a "misguided metaphor, of the type quite abundant in the science of memory" (Dudai 2007, p. 191). William Randall urges memory scientists to jettison storage entirely; he suggests that we replace the metaphorical computer with a metaphorical compost heap (Randall 2007). Kourken Michaelian recommends a *generative* model of memory, which makes construction and dynamicism the rule rather than the exception (Michaelian 2011). Daniel Schacter writes that "Cognitive psychologists have long abandoned the idea of a 'memory store'" (Schacter 2007, p. 25). Although the retrieval of traces is still commonly invoked in work in other disciplines, among those who study memory this conceptual foundation has already given way under its own weight.

The reasons for this are twofold: empirical and conceptual. Empirically, the more data we have gathered regarding how humans remember, the less it appears that this process involves the retrieval of inert memory traces. Retrieval of a given memory is intimately tied to future and past "retrievals" of that memory; memory retrieval interferes with future retrieval, both positively and negatively (Brown 1968; Gardiner et al. 1973). Retrieval cues are regularly incorporated into future iterations of remembering (McDaniel and Masson 1985). Indeed, this intimate relationship between storage and retrieval is what motivated Endel Tulving—arguably one of the most prominent living memory scientists—to compare the storage and retrieval of memory to the Heisenberg uncertainty of particles (Tulving 2007, p. 67). This is borne out by studies of amnesia, forgetting, and other instances of memory failure. Remembering or failing to remember is anything but the binary effect we would expect from the retrieval process operating on stored traces: Amnesics demonstrate a rich variety of partial-rememberings (Toth 2000), as do normal rememberers under a broad array of conditions (Roediger and McDermott 2000). If our model of memory commits us to a stored trace, but this trace cannot be accessed without affecting it, is often absent or distorted when we do try to access it, and manifests very differently depending on how access proceeds, our model

becomes suspect. Consequently, over the last three decades models of memory have, gradually but surely, started to give up the assumption that memory must operate by means of the encoding and retrieval of a stored trace.

This transition away from models of memory that deal in inner, computational processes operating over mental tokens encoded in the brain is familiarly Wittgensteinian, as Wittgenstein scholars have been noting since the transition began (Hark 1995; Moyal-Sharrock 2009; Stern 1991). Wittgenstein repeatedly warns against the assumption that psychological phenomena must be explained by reference to inner mental processes or tokens in the brain (Z, secs. 211, 565, 605; LWPP, sec. 504, PI, secs. 305–308). Several of Wittgenstein's remarks aim to examine and exorcise this assumption, particularly within the study of memory:

> I saw this man years ago: now I have seen him again, I recognize him, I remember his name. And why does there have to be a cause of this remembering in my nervous system? Why must something or other, whatever it may be, be stored up there *in any form*? Why *must* a trace have been left behind? Why should there not be a psychological regularity to which *no* physiological regularity corresponds? If this upsets our concept of causality then it is high time it was upset. (Z, sec. 610)

Wittgenstein has not here denied that certain physiological processes or functions are *necessary* for recognition or remembering; he has simply discounted the claim that some physiological regularity must correspond to the memory. "Must I assume that if someone draws or describes or imitates something from memory," he writes elsewhere in *Zettel*, "he reads off his representation from something or other?!—What supports this?" (Z, sec. 34) That is, the mere necessity of physiological structures or processes for psychological phenomena does not guarantee that the latter can be "read" off from the former. In another supposition, he spells out this possibility of correlation without correspondence:

> Even if we knew that a particular brain area is changed by hearing *God Save the King* and that destroying this part of the brain prevents one's remembering the occasion, there is no reason to think that the structure produced in the brain represents *God Save the King* better than *Rule Brittannia*. (LPP, sec. 90)

Memory scientists have begun to agree; Tulving writes that there is no memory trace that is a physical object in the brain (Tulving 2007, p. 66). According to Tulving—as well as other memory scientists—there is no mapping between brain changes and any potential, later act of remembering, nor can either of these be reduced, in any way, to the other; any relationship between them is fundamentally indeterminate (Moscovitch 2007; Tulving 2007, p. 67). Furthermore, Tulving's remarks concerning this supposed reducibility express an attitude reminiscent of Wittgenstein's:

> Talking about mental experiences as separable from neuronal processes may be questioned by those who think that because mental experience depends on neuronal processes it must also be in some sense *reducible* to neuronal processes. Aside from the problem created by many meanings of the concept of reduction, the logic of this type of argument has always escaped me. (Tulving 2007, p. 66)

Tulving is engaged in empirical work, but he is also sensitive to conceptual difficulties in the science of memory (Tulving 2000). Wittgenstein's arguments against inner mental processes are of course not empirical; they are conceptual and philosophical. He seeks to show that if we want to understand what it is to learn something, and to remember it later, we do not need to assume that the basis of this is an inner process involving received and retrieved information:

> Think of putting your hand up in school. Need you have rehearsed the answer silently to yourself, in order to have the right to put your hand up? And *what* must have gone on inside you?–Nothing need have. But it is important that you usually know an answer when you put your hand up; and that is the criterion for one's *understanding* of putting one's hand up. Nothing need have gone on in you; and yet you would be remarkable if on such occasions you never had anything to report about what went on in you. (Z, p. 136)

But Wittgenstein does not just seek to obviate the *need* for this kind of inner process of retrieval, he also wants to demonstrate why the reception and retrieval of an inner item cannot explain learning and memory *anyway*. In *The Brown Book*, Wittgenstein tells iterations of a story involving remembering a color for the sake of comparing it to another color on a bolt of material.[2] In the first iteration, the remembering subject holds an image of the color in his mind, compares this image with various colors in the real world, and chooses the appropriate real-world color. In the second iteration, he has no memory image before his mind, but rather only feels "a sort of mental tension" when looking at the various colors on offer, which relaxes when he reaches the desired color. In the third iteration, the subject "goes to the shelf without a memory image, looks at five bolts one after the other, takes the fifth bolt from the shelf" (BB, p. 85). In this last case, we might be tempted to respond with Wittgenstein's interlocutor: "*But this can't be all comparing consists in*,"—However, argues Wittgenstein, if a person can be trained to produce an image in response to a cue or an order, automatically, why can we not be trained to simply choose the right fabric? If remembering can just be raising one's hand, or choosing the right fabric, then the addition of an inner process is unhelpful—if these stand in need of another process, then so also will any process we propose. We are inclined to think that the essential features of the remembering process have yet to be revealed, but any process we imagine will be grounded in trained, automatic responses at some level. When we follow a rule, this process is not composed of interpretation and executive choice: rather, we "follow the rule *blindly*" (PI, sec. 219).

Remembering, for Wittgenstein, happens in the world, manifesting in complex (but not *hidden*) ways. There is no internal object or process that "is" the memory, in any sense. If we want to observe the processes of memory, we need look no further than the processes that are already before us (PI, secs. 305–308). Morris Moscovitch, a contemporary memory scientist, agrees: "Memory does not exist independently of its being retrieved," he writes, urging us *not* to think of memory

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[2]This version is in the *Blue and Brown Books* (BB, p. 85), but there are similar stories told in the *Investigations*, as well as the *Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology*.

as "an entity awaiting discovery" (Moscovitch 2007, p. 21). Although Wittgenstein was painting this post-computationalist picture of human memory before the computer metaphor had fully taken root in the studies of mind and cognition, his arguments against explanations of memory in terms of inner processes and items have been taken up by modern researchers. New models of memory are in terms of dynamic cognitive systems, distributed environmental cognition, persistent attractor states, and network dynamics rather than anything being encoded, stored, or retrieved (Brockmeier 2010; Kryukov 2008; Li et al. 2015; Michaelian and Sutton 2013). In this developing framework for modeling human memory, learning and remembering *consist in* complex practices, changes that cannot be decomposed into modules of stored information and inner processes; learning is better characterized by the ever-developing, interdependent relationship between learner and environment.

If human rememberers are not, in fact, storing "memory traces"—if we neither encode nor retrieve when we learn and remember—then any understanding of learning that is predicated on the transmission, encoding, and retention of stored information must be revised. If learning is dynamic, embodied, and situated by nature, then remembering takes place in the world, not in the head. Strategies for education which duly take up the lessons of this Wittgensteinian cognitive science of memory must treat humans accordingly: attempting to educate as though humans are primarily in the business of processing, storing, and transmitting information will only be an impediment to real human learning.

3 Learning as Human Rememberers

The post-computationalist models of human memory are still developing, but it is none too soon to glean lessons for education. In education research, even among research that is philosophically sensitive and empirically oriented, learning is often treated in terms of encoding and storing information that is to later be retrieved (e.g., Blumenfeld et al. 1991, p. 386; Fenesi et al. 2014, pp. 2, 8, 13, 14; Friedlander et al. 2011, p. 415; Rohrer and Pashler 2010, p. 406). The tasks of transposing all of the invocations of memory research in education theory into a Wittgensteinian, post-computationalist framework extend far beyond the scope of this essay. However, if explanations of memory are founded in training rather than information processing, then as Wittgenstein wrote, "Educators ought to remember this" (Z, sec. 419). To begin this process of duly attending to the Wittgensteinian insights being absorbed by the developing science of memory, I will briefly discuss three implications for education theory.

First, an understanding of the remembering human as a fundamentally situated agent for whom learning is neither more nor less than changing the shape of one's approach to the ever-changing world lends new gravity and credence to old ideas about situated learning. "One of the most dangerous of ideas for a philosopher," Wittgenstein writes in *Zettel*, "is, oddly enough, that we think with our heads or in

our heads" (Z, sec. 605). With the situated learning theorists, we might now say that this is one of the most dangerous of ideas for an educator as well. In their influential monograph on situated learning, Jean Lave and Etienne Wenger write, "persons, actions, and the world are implicated in all thought, speech, knowing, and learning" (Lave and Wenger 1991, p. 52). The parallels between the theoretical underpinnings of situated learning and Wittgenstein's emphasis on the external, situated nature of cognition run deeper than this injunction against this picture of thought as "in the head." When we learn to recognize something, Wittgenstein insists that this is not explained by some mental item that we have gained. According to Wittgenstein, "no 'act of recognition' takes place" (Z, sec. 202, cf., PI, sec. 602). Rather, by training we have changed; we react differently to our situations than we would have done had we not learned. Learning is not the addition of mental items, or the "processing of information"; learning is not an inner process that is *responsible* for the way we change in our interactions, learning *just is* the way that we change in our interactions. Lave and Wenger agree, writing that, "one way to think of learning is as the historical production, transformation, and change of persons" (Lave and Wenger 1991, p. 51). This characterization is already reminiscent of Wittgenstein's work on memory—Wittgenstein insists that what has happened when we have taught a pupil is that we have "changed [the pupil's] *way of looking at things*" (PI, sec. 144), but, as stated, Lave and Wenger's version is too weak: "change of persons" is not just *one way* to think of learning, it is exactly what learning *is* according to the Wittgensteinian, dynamic models at the forefront of post-computationalist research on learning and memory—especially those models in the dynamic systems tradition that replace the distinctions between data and algorithm, or between process and product, with a unified, interdependent complex system analyzable along selected dimensions or in terms of selected features (Li et al. 2015; Spencer et al. 2009). This is closer to Lave and Wenger's later statement: "learning thus implies becoming a different person with respect to the possibilities enabled by [community and environment] systems of relations" (Lave and Wenger 1991, p. 53). Just so. If being able to remember something is just having been changed by the past such that the rememberer now expresses the past in various ways, then learning *just is* becoming a different person with respect to our community and environment.

This perspective on memory changes the force of arguments about situatedness in learning. Lave and Wenger write that general knowledge "can be gained only in specific circumstances" (Lave and Wenger 1991, p. 34). But this characterization makes the "specific circumstances" in question contingent, merely instrumental to a process of "gaining general knowledge." Herbert Simon is among the critics of situated learning—this is perhaps unsurprising given that he remains today one of the last defenders of classical computationalism. Simon and his colleagues write, "what is important is what cognitive processes a problem evokes and not what real-world trappings it might have" (Anderson et al. 1996, p. 9). If we characterize the importance of situatedness in learning by emphasizing that our specific circumstances *enable* us to effectively internalize items of generalize knowledge, we have already granted the importance of the abstract, situation-free mental tokens that critics like Simon and colleagues seek to prioritize. Classical computationalism

is perfectly consistent with situatedness being a *contingent* condition for the essentially abstract transmission or retention of information. What the fundamental, Wittgensteinian rejection of computationalism in theories of memory adds to our understanding is the *essentially* situated nature of learning. We do not happen to need our environments in order to *evoke* the right inner processes and products. Rather, when we successfully remember something, we have transformed our agent-environment system to a new state; this is just what remembering *is*.

Second, remembering as agent-environment state transformation has implications for the much-discussed topic of *assessment*. Assessing learning is already known to be a complex and context-dependent affair (Astin 2012; Black and Wiliam 2009). The notion, however, that there either is or is not a learned item that can be detected or inferred, *even in principle*, depends on just the assumptions about memory Wittgenstein's remarks urge us to renounce.

> Memory: "I see us still, sitting at that table".—But have I really the same visual image—or one of those that I had then? Do I also certainly see the table and my friend from the same point of view as then, and so not see myself?——My memory-image is not evidence for that past situation, like a photograph which was taken then and convinces me now that this was how things were then. The memory-image and the memory-words stand on the *same* level. (Z, sec. 650)

That is, there is no one process or manifestation that is "the memory"; we can remember with an image or we can remember with words, among other ways of remembering. We can express our learning in myriad ways, and no one of these is especially privileged.

> Remembering, then, isn't at all the mental process that one imagines at first sight. If I say, rightly, "I remember it" the most *varied* things may happen; perhaps even just that I say it. (PG, p. 84)

Recalling something we have learned does not mean producing any one thing in particular. Remembering is a family of practices that transpire in the public world. Indeed, as Tulving writes, there is no object or entity "that can be said to *be* a particular memory trace…it is in principle not possible to observe it as such, to identify it as such or to determine its properties as such" (Tulving 2007, p. 67). If we seek to know whether someone remembers, or whether someone has learned, the answer is probably going to be qualified and context-dependent, since there is simply not one unitary thing we can investigate.[3]

This is not to altogether undermine assessment in the context of post-computationalist memory, rather it is to reframe assessment *targets*. The systemic changes that constitute successful remembering in new models of memory can be assessed, but we must remember that these changes are the targets—in assessing learning, we are trying to characterize the changes that the remembering agent has undergone. State change as a target of assessment automatically changes our

[3]Another authority on memory science, Henry Roediger, writes: "The assumption that underlies such single measure experiments—that all memory measures correlate and measure some quantity such as 'strength of memory'—is surely wrong" (Roediger 2007, p. 282).

expectations; such agent-environment states are highly multidimensional, and so we cannot expect to measure the *whole* of such learning.[4] This limitation is built in, as it were, to the very notion of learning and the highly complex, multidimensional change of persons. On the view that learning just is this kind and degree of transformation, any learning assessment will *necessarily* be partial.

Additionally, the multiply manifest phenomena of partial remembering cast further doubt on the legitimacy of *reporting* as assessment. Whether we can report something that we have learned is one, but only one, of the many criteria by which we identify remembering. Remembering, according to Wittgenstein, is *very various*; it may consist in an image, an action, a verbal claim, a sensation. Each of these manifestations stands on the same level; the verbal claim is not a report of some inner state or token that is the "real" memory. The expression *is* the real memory—even in cases where the expression demonstrates tension with the report. Memory research on the gradations and idiosyncrasies of partial and nonstandard remembering date back to famous studies of the "anomalies" among amnesic patients, but it is now acknowledged that partial or non-conscious forms of memory are the rule rather than the exception, even among normal, healthy, remembering subjects (Toth 2000). As John Sutton writes in an article on Wittgenstein's contributions to recent models of memory, "There is no two-step process, first an inner experience of remembering and then its expression. Rather, remembering is just something we do, across a range of activities or practices" (Sutton 2014, p. 9). This means that what we report having learned is but one of many ways our learning may manifest and that methods of assessment which are based on reporting should enjoy no privileged role.

Lastly and most fundamentally among these lessons for education research, the very idea of a stored item in our memory has been questioned. When education theory researchers characterize learning as "linking ideas with information stored in long-term memory" (Fenesi et al. 2014, p. 2), or when they encourage testing that "requires a learner to retrieve some piece of information" so that we can "directly strengthen the memory representation of this information" (Rohrer and Pashler 2010, p. 406), these researchers are straightforwardly deploying models of memory that have been undermined both by Wittgenstein's insights and by modern memory science. Focusing instead on the person-in-the-world, as Lave and Wenger write, "in turn promotes a view of knowing as activity by specific people in specific circumstances" (Lave and Wenger 1991, p. 52). Thinking of "learning" as an intrinsically *transitive* concept is already missing the point. Asking "what is it that was learned?" may or may not be answerable in a meaningful way. That is, learning and remembering always involve multidimensional change of state, but there is no *object* that is the thing that was learned. There is no one way to characterize all of the changes undergone by someone who has remembered something learned, even in relatively trivial cases of learning and change. This is not just about assessment,

[4]Even those who are proponents of situated learning techniques, such as project-based learning, tend to express the difficulties in applying traditional methods of assessment in these contexts as shortcomings, providing alternative assessment methods in a tone of concession (Blumenfeld et al. 1991, p. 383).

about how we can *know* what was learned, it changes the very notion of "what was learned" itself. We do not learn items, we gain complex and essentially non-determinate abilities. We do not transmit or receive knowledge, we change who we and who others are with respect to the distributed, dynamic systems that comprise our and their cognition.

This shift privileges accounts of learning that emphasize development, complexity, and situated, real-world performance. This renews the case for apprenticeship models, since learning outcomes cannot be captured in simple propositional terms if post-computationalist models of human memory have rejected discrete learned items. Rather, the outcome teaching and learning must aim for is to develop the learner into something complex and inarticulable: the master practitioner in the world. The only outcome at which we can aim is one that is guaranteed to be as complex as we—other human learners who have been changed for the better by the learning in question. We cannot say what *the* object of an instance of learning is (though we may be able to articulate *some* objects of this learning) and what cannot be said must be shown. Apprenticeship models of learning emphasize the complex, situated practitioner as an exemplar of successful learning, and these models de-emphasize discrete elements of propositional knowledge that must be transmitted in order for learning to have been successful.

Less directly, the shift from remembering as the transmission of coded, propositional knowledge to remembering as the complex practice of shaping agent-world cognitive systems provides novel vectors of support for concrete pedagogical strategies like project-based learning or other anti-computationalist movements that de-emphasize the transmission and retention of data-like knowledge, such as critical pedagogy. If project-based learning urges the importance of embedding learners in real-world projects that consist in interconnected, multimodal, multidisciplinary elements, and if remembering just is a situated process constituted by the complex changes in the interconnected elements that make up the agent-world cognitive system, due to past experience, then project-based learning does not just *enable* or *facilitate* learning: The transformation that is diachronically manifest in a complex project situated in the world simply *is* learning. If critical pedagogy strategies worry about the implications and effects of viewing teaching and learning and the transmission of knowledge from a teacher who "has" this knowledge to a student who "lacks" the knowledge in question, and if modern theories of memory belie not just the efficacy or the cultural value in this but the very conceptual foundation that underlies this picture, then those theorists suspicious of transmission models and their effects have a new and deeper reason for their suspicion.[5] These by no means exhaust the implications for models of education and learning borne by the rejection of computationalism in memory science.

[5]It should not escape our notice that Freire himself, the founder of the critical pedagogy movement, casts his critique of mainstream education models in terms of *humanizing* and *dehumanizing* influences (Freire 2000). Although the aims of critical pedagogy are mostly orthogonal to the interests in this present paper, this point of contact is no accident: treating human learners as computers—something other than humans—is a de-humanizing process in a very literal way.

4 Conclusions

Memory science is in the midst of foundational restructuring. Those conceptual elements which heretofore had been taken as fundamental to the study of memory—encoding, storage, and retrieval—are being either dramatically revised or rejected through a rich array of empirical results and philosophical argumentation that stems from, or follows in the footsteps of, the work of Wittgenstein. As one contemporary memory scientist writes, "the way forward involves facing up to the complexity of memory and the processes involving the acquisition and constant transformation of knowledge as a function of experience" (Nadel 2007, p. 181). Claims about learning and education are intimately wrapped up in assumptions about how we remember, whether or not these assumptions are made explicit. If human memory does not operate like a computer, if we do not store coded input that is later retrieved, but instead we change our deeply embedded states in highly complex ways, then memory science has a number of important if preliminary lessons for education and learning. First, this gives a new and more deeply theoretical underpinning to approaches based on situated learning; it also strengthens the claims made concerning situated learning, since situatedness and systemic change are constituents, not conditions, of the learning and remembering process. Second, these new characterizations of memory cast assessment in a new light: given the non-localized, transformative nature of learning and memory, any assessment will and should necessarily be partial or incomplete. A Wittgensteinian picture of memory de-emphasizes the role of first-person reports in memory, and places traditional, report-based assessment methods alongside other methods. Wittgenstein also insists in the *varied* nature of expressions of remembering and learning, and any assessment strategy which neglects this variety neglects learning itself. Last, a picture of memory that rejects encoding, storage, and retrieval of a memory trace has broad implications for the way we think about learning and learners in general. If being able to remember something is not a binary product, but instead an infinitely complex set of abilities and new relations with the world and its possible situations, then accounts of, and approaches to, learning that focus on development, complexity, and real-world situations, and which de-emphasize transmission of abstract knowledge, all gain new theoretical traction. Given the Wittgensteinian rejection of computationalism in the science of memory, the aim of education is not the transmission of knowledge, it is the transformation of persons, the development of master practitioners in the world. Only by treating learners as human rememberers can we expect teaching and learning to result in the complex cognitive systems that are educated human beings.

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How Scientific Frameworks 'Frame Parents': Wittgenstein on the Import of Changing Language-Games

Luc Van den Berge

Abstract Wittgenstein has been used to develop ideas of initiation and education in the field of philosophy of education, especially drawing on his account of how children, as infants, become full-blown members of their language community. In order to further refine this Wittgensteinian concept of 'initiation' I look into the *liminality* of certain propositions in a parenting manual that I believe to be exemplary of recent trends in parenting support. These propositions are on the threshold of becoming framework or methodological propositions. The idea of liminality draws on certain sections of Wittgenstein's *On Certainty* and *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics*. It will prove to be helpful to get a deeper understanding of what might be the import of the propagation of new language games in the field of parenting support.

Keywords Wittgenstein · Framework propositions · Scientific parenting · Parenting support · Infantilization

1 Introduction

In this chapter I take the way certain propositions function in a particular parenting handbook as a starting point of an investigation into the ways language-games actually change and what this implies for parents and parenting. The choice of *The Whole-brain Child. 12 Revolutionary Strategies to Nurture Your Child's Developing Mind* (Siegel and Bryson 2011)[1] is not coincidental. It represents an important strand in parenting support—a default position—that holds first that there

[1] I will further refer to this book as WBC.

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M.A. Peters and J. Stickney (eds.), *A Companion to Wittgenstein on Education*,
DOI 10.1007/978-981-10-3136-6_40

is a lack of parental confidence which can be restored by providing scientific knowledge, and second that the providing of this knowledge is somehow morally neutral: these resources allegedly only provide information. The sciences drawn from until recently were developmental and behavioral psychology, but the latest evolution is that parenting expertise draws from findings in the fields of 'hard' sciences such as neurology, epigenetics and endocrinology. Engaging with Wittgenstein and Wittgenstein scholarship, especially on *On Certainty*, I will critically question both of the above assumptions.

WBC is a bestseller and has been translated into 21 languages, at the time of writing.[2] In the introductory pages of WBC parents read that they will acquire knowledge that will allow them to 'parent' better and it is suggested that what they will learn is firmly grounded in epistemic certainties, which are in a way foundational:

> So we want to introduce you to the whole-brain perspective. We'd like to explain some fundamental concepts about the brain and help you apply your new knowledge in ways that will make parenting easier and more meaningful. (WBC, 3)

> What you do as a parent matters, and we'll provide you with straightforward, *scientifically based ideas* that will help you build a strong relationship with your child that can help shape his brain well and give him the best foundation for a healthy and happy life. (WBC, 4; *emphasis mine*)

Parents learn that through their relationship with their child, they can help *shape his/her brain*, and that a brain that is well shaped, is *a foundation for a happy, healthy and prosperous life*. Some basic ideas that I believe to be very significant are:

> "Parents can shape their child's brain, through their relationship with him/her."

> "Brains can be well shaped."

> "Well shaped brains are a foundation for a happy, healthy and prosperous life."

WBC contains what I believe is another rather central and fundamental idea, that we could rephrase as: *'parenting ultimately boils down to integration, this is the wiring and rewiring of our child's brain'*.[3] This proposition is not articulated, let alone claimed, as such. But it seems to be central in the book, as the next small selection of parts of the book (hopefully) will make clear.

> The first chapter presents the concept of *parenting with the brain in mind* and introduces the simple and powerful concept at the heart of the whole-brain approach, integration. (WBC: x)

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[2]See Siegel's website: http://www.drdansiegel.com/books/the_whole_brain_child/ accessed on 16 November 2015.

[3]Compare this with Wittgenstein (1966: 24): "The attraction of certain kinds of explanation is overwhelming. At a given time, the attraction of a certain kind of explanation is greater than you can conceive. In particular, explanations of the kind 'This is really only this'."

> A clear understanding of these different aspects of the whole-brain approach will allow you *to view parenting in a whole new way*. (WBC: xi)

> [T]he brain physically changes throughout the course of our lives, not just in childhood, as we had previously assumed. What molds our brain? Experience. (…) [O]n top of our basic brain architecture and our inborn temperament, parents have much they can do to provide the kinds of experiences that will help develop a resilient well-integrated brain. This book will show how to use your everyday experiences to help your child's brain become more and more integrated. (…) This wire-and-rewire process is what integration is all about: giving your children experiences to create connections between different parts of the brain. (WBC: 7–8)

> The rate of brain maturation is largely influenced by the genes we inherit. But the degree of integration may be exactly what we can influence in our day-to-day parenting. *The good news is that by using everyday moments, you can influence how well your child's brain grows toward integration.* (WBC, 10; *emphasis in original*)[4]

Some ideas are emphatically presented as very central and foundational.

> Sibling rivalry is like so many other issues that make parenting difficult –tantrums, disobedience, homework battles, discipline matters, and so on. As we'll explain in the coming chapters, *these everyday parenting challenges result from a lack of integration within your child's brain*. (WBC 9–10; *emphasis mine*)

Others are mentioned '*en passant*' and thus demand some interpretative effort.

> "The upstairs brain weighs different options."

> "A parent connects with his/her child's brain."[5]

> "Brains are shaped by parents."

The most basic or fundamental ideas of the book (for instance, 'Humans have brains') are not explicitly mentioned, and it would furthermore be strange to mention them, although they are very fundamental.

> "What happens between a child and a parent are interactions"

> "We have brains."

> "*Parenting* exists."

[4]It may seem that I am overstating their claim here: is 'integration' really intended to replace the broader scope of the parenting role? The least one can say is that it is *the* central and very pervasive idea within their account of parenting. And we can imagine many readers would interpret it in this way.

[5]'Once she had connected with him right brain to right brain, it was much easier to connect left to left and deal with the issues in a rational manner. By first *connecting* with his right brain, she could then *redirect* with the left brain through logical explanation and planning, which required that his left hemisphere join the conversation. This approach allowed him to use both sides of his brain in an integrated, coordinated way.' (WBC: 25)

These propositions are exemplary for many parenting manuals and websites. They allegedly inform[6] parents of epistemic certainties, that result from scientific enquiries. What they have in common is that they seem to say: Consider these propositions as beyond any doubt. Still, some of them are rather new and maybe even unsettling, for instance to believe that it is not the child, but his/her brain that weighs different options.

2 Non-epistemic Foundations in Wittgenstein's *On Certainty*

In *On Certainty* Wittgenstein showed a particular interest in propositions[7] that were beyond doubt, but he was not the first to *articulate them*. In his famous attempt to overcome scepticism the common sense philosopher G.E. Moore claimed that he *knew* that e.g. "Here is one hand and here is another," or that "The earth existed for a long time before my birth." Moore believed that the propositions that he had discovered were universal and established knowledge. They were truly foundational in an epistemological sense to him and allegedly countered the threats of idealism and scepticism (cf. Hamilton 2014: 168–177). Wittgenstein did not accept that these statements expressed knowledge, but was on the other hand convinced that they articulated certainties, leaving open the possibility of non-epistemic foundations. For Wittgenstein, Moore's *epistemic* certainties are no more and no less than the unmoving foundations of our language-games *in disguise*, which means they cannot truly be established as knowledge:

> To say of man, in Moore's sense, that he *knows* something, that what he says is therefore unconditionally the truth, seems wrong to me. —It is the truth only inasmuch as it is an unmoving foundation of his language-games. (OC §403)[8]

This 'unmoving foundation' is no more and no less than 'logic' in Wittgenstein's view. For instance, Rhees takes 'the questions raised in *On Certainty*' to be 'questions in logic, not questions in epistemology' (Philips in Rhees 2003: 135) and

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[6]'But even the most caring, best-educated parents often lack basic information about their child's brain.' (WBC: 3); 'This is really important *information* for parents to understand.' (WBC: 41)

[7]I will, in the following discussion, use the word 'proposition' as is commonly done in the Wittgenstein scholarship. When I use 'proposition' I follow Hamilton (2014: 112) who believes that Wittgenstein, at least in his later philosophy, conceived of 'propositions' non-technically as 'statements' or 'what is said' in an everyday sense. However, I do not agree with Hamilton when he claims that 'a proposition, unlike a sentence, does not belong to a particular language, but must always be expressible in one' (ibid.), because it seems to allow for meaning outside of a context of use.

[8]Following convention, titles for Wittgenstein's works are abbreviated (PI = Philosophical Investigations, OC = On Certainty, RFM = Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, PO = Philosophical Occasions), with section (§) or page number (p.), with full citation and initials in the References.

thus (Rhees 2003: 48–51) claims that for Wittgenstein the whole set of remarks that compose *On Certainty* is a discussion of logic, not in the sense that it describes logical principles, but in the sense that it describes language-games, or what belongs to a language-game. For language and communication to be possible, there is a logical requirement of agreement in judgments.[9]

> For Wittgenstein, agreement in the judgment "This is a hand"—speakers agree that this is a hand—underlies the determination of the meaning of "hand" in English. It follows that if, in normal circumstances, someone were to express doubt that this is a hand, then either their understanding of English, or their cognitive or sensory functioning, would be in question. (…) The proposition that in normal circumstances no two-handed person doubts whether they have two hands is, for Wittgenstein, part of logic—and not, as most philosophers would say, an empirical claim. It is part of the characterization of a language-game—the language-game of knowledge-ascription which relies on agreement in such judgments. (Hamilton 2014, 32–33)

On many occasions in his later philosophy Wittgenstein refers to situations of learning, to emphasize that we are not born with this agreement in judgments. Instead we have to become, to borrow a phrase of Cavell, initiated into language, and hence into logic. Cavell claims that for Wittgenstein language-learning implies being initiated into *forms of life*:

> Instead, then, of saying either that we *tell* beginners what words mean, or that we *teach* them what objects are, I will say: We initiate them, into the relevant forms of life held in language and gathered around the objects and persons of our world. (…) In 'learning language' you learn not merely what the names of things are, but what a name is; not merely what the form of expression is for expressing a wish, but what expressing a wish is; not merely what the word for 'father' is, but what a father is; not merely what the word for 'love' is, but what love is. In learning language, you do not merely learn the pronunciation of sounds, and their grammatical orders, but the forms of life which make those sounds the words they are, do what they do—e.g. name, call, point, express a wish or affection, indicate a choice or an aversion. (Cavell 1999: 177–178)

While we usually conceive of the verb 'learning' as a *transitive verb* in the sense that we always learn 'something', Cavell seems to be indicating here that for Wittgenstein the verb 'learning' is strangely enough not only transitive, but also constitutive: the processes of learning 'produce' 'names', 'wishes', 'fathers'. So the learning itself is constitutive of what has been learned, and constitutes our ontologies.[10] What exists in my world can only do so thanks to my having acquired *forms of life*.

[9]Cf., PI §242: 'If language is to be a means of communication there must be agreement not only in definitions but also (queer as this may sound) in judgments.'

[10]Cavell's analysis helps us to see that *every* form of initiation into new language-games involves the constitution of (partly) new ontologies. Children are initiated into existing forms of life, nothing new happens there. Adults can be initiated into existing forms of life too, but as we will see later on, in the case of WBC something more is happening: *new* (supposedly universal) ontologies are propagated through the process of initiation and thus ontologies are changing.

> I have wanted to say: Kittens—what we call "kittens"—do not exist in her [Cavell's three-year-old daughter, at the time] world yet, she has not acquired the forms of life that contain them. They do not exist in something like the way cities and mayors will not exist in her world until long after pumpkins and kittens do (…). (Cavell 1999: 172)

So we could say that *initiation into forms of life* is also conceivable as an initiation into certain 'grammars' or 'logics'. The logics we have been initiated into reside mostly in the background. They form systems of what one does not doubt, what is self-evident, the 'obvious'. Once these 'foundations of our language-games' have been articulated and uttered, they do not contain nor convey any knowledge; they tell us nothing new. These propositions in fact look awkward, almost too obvious. But if we can imagine a use for them in daily life, the awkwardness disappears. Many have a use in situations of teaching and learning, and thus as instructions (cf., OC §36). Often these propositions *look like* empirical propositions that describe states-of-affairs in the world, though Wittgenstein discovered that the role they play in our language games is a very different one. Propositions such as "The earth existed for a long time before my birth" are in fact, as Wittgenstein believes, not empirical propositions that describe a state of affairs in the outside world, but are articulations of the foundations of our world-picture or of *that which stands fast for us*. It does not make sense to announce that one *knows* these facts, as Moore did, since they are not facts, but articulate what we have to consider beyond doubt in order to make it possible for facts to be known.

3 A Dynamic Account of 'What Is Beyond Doubt'

Wittgenstein talks about the '*unmoving foundations* of our language-games', or uses the simile of propositions being like 'hinges' on which a door turns (OC §341, §343, §655), and so stresses the need for a certain semantic stability. In addition, *On Certainty* is a work on logic. So aren't things rather static in a Wittgensteinian account? I don't believe they are. First, no proposition can be called an empirical proposition or a 'methodological' proposition as he calls them sometimes (for instance, §318–321) outside a context of use. Furthermore, for Wittgenstein the domain of what is beyond doubt seems to be ever shifting, and not the same for everyone, or in any timeframe. Propositions that were once empirical, have become 'propositions that are beyond doubt', others were once 'methodological', and have become empirical again.

Wittgenstein's vision of these particular propositions is a very dynamic one, as is pointed out by Hamilton (2014: 104–109). As the riverbed simile clarifies,[11] some

[11]It is good to remind oneself of the remark Wittgenstein made concerning his use of similes in the Chapter "Philosophy" of the Big Typescript which he constructed in 1933.

> (A simile is part of our edifice; but we cannot draw any conclusions from it either; it doesn't lead us beyond itself, but must remain standing as a simile. We can draw no inferences from

of our propositions are very solid, and can hardly change—on another occasion (§492 and §512) he suggests that they are un-revisable—still hard rock can become sand and vice versa.

> §96. It might be imagined that some propositions, of the form of empirical propositions, were hardened and functioned as channels for the empirical propositions that were not hardened but fluid; and that this relation altered with time, in that fluid propositions hardened, and hard ones became fluid. [Translation altered.]
> §97. The mythology may change back into a state of flux, the river-bed of thoughts may shift. But I distinguish between the movement of the waters on the river-bed and the shift of the bed itself; though there is not a sharp division of the one from the other.

Wittgenstein believes many discoveries have become part of what he calls *the scaffolding of our thoughts* (OC §211). In the words of Philips (Rhees 2003: 155):

> (…) in some cases, what is now accepted without question, was arrived at as a result of an investigation, for example, that every skull contains a brain. What is true is that once discovered, it becomes part of what Wittgenstein calls the scaffolding of our thought, such that no one would doubt that every skull contains a brain.

Wittgenstein would accept 'scaffolding' (at least in English) to be something that is *happening* and that is reversible in time as the 'riverbank simile' shows.

In *On Certainty* Wittgenstein does not elaborate the idea of *how something becomes a part of the scaffolding of our thoughts*. He returns to mathematics (see OC §211–212). Moyal-Sharrock (2007: 229) quotes Crispin Wright (see also Williams 1999: 297, note 12): 'What is novel in *On Certainty* is the extension of [the suggestion that such propositions are best viewed as rules] to propositions outside logic and mathematics, propositions which we should not normally deem to be capable of being known a priori but which have instead, as Wittgenstein says, the appearance of empirical propositions'. I believe there are good reasons to accept this extension also where it concerns the 'fossilization of empirical propositions into rules' outside the domain of mathematics, and that the same similes might be used here too. He offers a more elaborated account of these 'processes' in his *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics*, where he uses the image of 'going in a circle'. A child learns to count and discovers that 2 + 3 gives 5. And then:

> He tells us: "I saw that it must be like that." "I realised that it must be like that"—that is his report. (…) This "must" shews what kind of lesson he has drawn from the scene. This "must" shews that he has gone in a circle. I decide to see things like *this*. And so, to act in such-and-such a way. I imagine that whoever sees the process also draws a moral from it. (RFM, 308)

(Footnote 11 continued)

it. (…) Philosophy simply puts everything before us, and neither explains nor deduces anything.) (PO: 177).

The word edifice was underlined, meaning that Wittgenstein was not sure of it (PO: 158).

> It is as if we had hardened the empirical proposition into a rule. And now we have, not an hypothesis that gets tested by experience, but a paradigm with which experience is compared and judged. And so a new kind of judgment. (RFM: 324)

4 The 'Liminality' of Propositions: The Changing of Language-Games 'Caught in the Act'

Looking into parenting manuals such as WBC, we can say that parents are initiated into new language-games or logics. The ideas (propositions) that are presented to parents *seem* to be empirical propositions, but in fact they function as methodological or rule-like propositions. Empirical propositions can be true or false, they can be verified empirically: one can convince oneself of their correctness. But parents are not supposed to verify these insights. They are invited rather to treat them as methodological or rule-like propositions. In other words, to use them as a way of looking at the world, or as frameworks.[12]

For instance, the (implicit) proposition 'The level of integration of the child's brain is decisive for parenting outcomes' is intended to function as something one does not (or should not?) doubt in the new logic/language-game parents are initiated into. To use some of Wittgenstein's well-known images, we could state that this proposition functions as *an axis*: 'This axis is not fixed in the sense that anything holds it fast, but the movement around it determines its immobility.' (OC §152) or as a *foundation wall that is supported by the whole house* (OC §248). And this is precisely what is demanded from parents in WBC: that they organize their parental behavior around this proposition. It should support everything they do and everything they do as parents should support it.

Some readers of the book may of course take a proposition as *parenting is the wiring and rewiring of a child's brain*, as an empirical statement, and thus as a proposition that has a truth value. But the authors of WBC—as educators would[13]— seem to want *parents* to accept this and other propositions as being obviously true, to stand fast for them and so they use them rather as instructions.

At this point I should notice that this account might be too static. Although the content of the book is presented as reporting recent discoveries of what has always been the case, what is happening is very dynamic. With WBC, we seem to be in the middle of *the riverbed analogy*, as it presents itself as a case of transition or 'liminality'. The propositions at hand seem to have rather a 'liminal' or

[12]Cf. Hamilton (2014: 4): (-) 'Moorean propositions function more like a kind of *framework* within which genuinely empirical propositions operate.' (*emphasis mine*).

[13]This point raises a whole other set of issues about education that lie beyond the scope of this chapter; for instance, about the significance of the pedagogical intent and relationship; or about whether there is some necessary (developmental?) stage in any educational process which involves this intentional initiation into foundational logics.

candidate-status, in the sense that they *might* become propositions that play a 'methodological' or 'rule-like' role too, or they *might not*; they *might* become part of the scaffolding of our thoughts, or they *might not*. This means that parents (or other adults) *can* 'go in a circle' and learn—to use another example—that it *must* be so that 'the integration of a child's brain is decisive for parenting outcomes'.[14] This 'going in a circle' is a description of a crucial aspect of what happens in the process of initiation, whether it concerns an infant (a novice) learning its mother tongue, or the learning by adults of other languages and language-games. This means, that we, in a Cavellian sense, can say that their ontologies change. This also means that we are looking into propositions of which at least some are somewhere in between, because they do not function as empirical propositions do, neither do they function as rule-like propositions yet, at least not for many people. When language-games are changing, some of the propositions haven't yet hardened into rules or methodological propositions. That explains why many are still *mentioned*. They are in the middle of the process of hardening, or not. They might become generally accepted, or not.

Framework propositions usually do not seem to be worth mentioning, because they are so obvious that they 'go without saying', and if they are mentioned it often happens 'en passant',[15] but here we have many propositions that apparently *do seem* worth mentioning. Since the context at hand is one of teaching and thus learning, this is another reason why the obvious has to be mentioned. Now, in contexts of learning very often what is obvious for an educator is typically not (yet) for the pupil. It would be hard for us to remember the time when $2 \times 2 = 4$ wasn't obvious to us yet, but was something we still could 'discover'. In the approach exemplified by WBC, parents are initiated into what is obvious, and as in other learning situations, it is hoped for that certain propositions will eventually be beyond doubt.

First, some individuals might 'have gone in a circle', and begin to take them for granted, but eventually a whole community or society might 'have gone in a circle' concerning certain certainties, or they might not. Here we see how parents are initiated into new frameworks, but unlike the initiation of children into their mother's tongue, here at the same time new frameworks are propagated. Their

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[14]For Wittgenstein, unlike for Moore, a proposition can stand fast for me and many others, not necessarily for everyone: Instead of "I know …", couldn't Moore have said: "It stands fast for me that …"? And further: "It stands fast for me and many others…" (OC §116).

[15]Compare Camarata (2015: 42):

> *Because your goal as a parent is to wire your child's brain* for real-life-thinking, the latest findings from neuroscience, based on the narrow bits of behaviour scientists use to isolate minute brain circuits in the lab, may not be very useful to you. *(italics mine)*

The italicized part of this quotation from *The Intuitive Parent* illustrates how the idea that parenting boils down to the wiring of the brain is already treated as if it belongs to the scaffolding of our thinking about parenting.

discoverers want them to become universalized, because for them these certainties are universal. The authors of *WBC* seem to want parents to accept certain propositions as being so obvious, that they don't seem to be worth mentioning anymore.

5 A Science-Based Conversion?

Instead of being provided with morally neutral scientific knowledge or information, I believe, in the exemplary case of WBC, parents are initiated into new logics, new language-games. This may have far-reaching consequences. The next remark by Wittgenstein can provide some insight:

> If we imagine the facts otherwise than they are, certain language-games lose some of their importance, while others become important. And in this way there is an alternation—a gradual one—in the use of the vocabulary of a language. (OC §63)

WBC offers an example of this changing of language-games: parents are invited at least to *imagine the facts*[16] *otherwise*.

> "The upstairs brain weighs different options."

Parents, on this account, should acknowledge the fact that it is not their child, but her upstairs brain that weighs options. This is a subjectivisation of the upstairs brain: it becomes the (grammatical) subject in a sentence.

> "A parent connects with his/her child's brain."

Parents shouldn't connect with their child directly, but through connecting their brains. A parent is quoted:

> "Recently, I learned about trying to connect emotionally first – right brain to right brain, which was totally foreign to me". (WBC: 36)

In 'the entire system of our language-games' (OC §411) a shift seems to be 'proposed' from understanding and interpreting to explanation,[17] from engaging with

[16]Parents are given exact instructions about for instance how they should conceive of memory: 'That's how memory works. One experience (the end of ballet class) causes certain neurons to fire, and those neurons can get wired to neurons from another experience (getting bubble gum). Then each time we undergo the first experience, our brain connects it with the second one. Thus, when ballet ends, our brain triggers an expectation of getting gum.' (WBC: 69) What seems to be implied is that it is the brain, and not the child, that is the cause of wanting bubble gum. Regardless of whether the account is true or not, parents are asked to imagine things differently.

[17]The Belgian child psychiatrist Adriaenssens (2010: 18–19) explains the aggressive behaviour of a schoolboy in terms of neurology and endocrinology. What gets lost is being interested in the story of the boy: What made him so upset? Not in terms of the functioning of parts of his brain, but in terms of how he understands himself, or of what he deems important and so on. Ramaekers and Suissa (2011: 21) made a similar point, using the same example: they pointed out that such explanations do not provide real answers to educators.

one's child as a person to engaging with the brain of one's child, from having a relationship with one's child, to conceiving of this relationship as the interaction between brains, and even as the manufacturing of the child's brain, and so on.

Now for Wittgenstein, imagining the facts to be otherwise entails that some of our language-games become important, while others lose some of their importance. Language-games are not superficial. Changing one's language-games means changing one's way of going about in the world, changes one's ways of acting, thinking, of what one is convinced of, of what one can give reports about, of what one values.

In *On Certainty* there is also another famous remark:

> (…) why should not a king have been brought up in the belief that the world began with him? And if Moore and this king were to meet and discuss, could Moore really prove his belief to be the right one? I do not say that Moore could not convert the king to his view, but it would be a conversion of a special kind; the king would be brought to look at the world in a different way. (…) (§92)

When parents are not taught to look differently at certain facts, within their own familiar frameworks, but *when their frameworks are changed*, they are converted (or not) to a new logic, in the Wittgensteinian sense of the word. WBC is a book that is particularly reminiscent of religious ideas of conversion. Promises are made. If parents accept this new 'belief', it will be possible to almost create a heaven on earth. Children who have been parented this way will be able to enjoy meaningful relationships, they will be caring and compassionate, they will do well at school, they will work hard and be responsible, and they will feel good about who they are (WBC: vii). Another promise is that parents will be able to knead or mould their children's brain and hence personality by manipulating their experiences, in the sense that bad parenting experiences (from the viewpoint of the parents) will become unique occasions to help their children thrive (WBC: viii)! The turnabout that is demanded from parents can be conceived of as a conversion, in the sense that one leaves behind an allegedly irrational belief system to exchange it for another one, not on the basis of rational arguments, but rather on the basis of persuasion.

6 The Indispensability of Trust

At least some of the propositions parents are implicitly provided with are (candidate) framework or methodological propositions, that are supposed to be beyond doubt, and though they appear to be very central and important, they don't provide any information or knowledge, anyway not in the admittedly somewhat narrow sense of knowledge Wittgenstein uses.[18] If we indeed accept that many of the

[18]Cf. Hamilton (2014: 39): 'Wittgenstein's view is that unless it is logically possible to doubt the claim—that is, unless doubting makes sense—then it cannot be an object of knowledge.' Hamilton believes for Wittgenstein 'KILPOD' holds: 'knowledge implies the logical possibility of doubt'.

seemingly empirical propositions provided by experts (in this case the authors of *The Whole-brain Child*) are non-empirical, which means parents are not supposed to convince themselves of their truth by verifying them, and parents are invited to include them in their belief systems (OC §141, §144) *about parenting*, then this means that parents are required to put their trust in these experts.

If we look at trust amongst adults, then we notice that it implies as a necessary condition that not everything is known beforehand, as Han notices:

> Trust means establishing a positive relationship with the other, even in ignorance. It makes actions possible despite one's lack of knowledge. If I know everything in advance, there is no need for trust. (Han 2012: 47, corrected translation)

I believe Han's observation helps to understand the strange runaway situation parenting support seems to have ended up in: in an effort to strengthen parents' self-confidence, they are supplied with scientific 'information'. But since knowing more does not necessarily lead to trusting more or being more confident, but again demands trust as a condition, more information is still given, while parents do not become more sure of themselves.[19] Anyway, as we saw, although the alleged lack of parental confidence is answered with more 'information and knowledge', at the heart of science-based parenting support it is still *trust* (at least in the sense of 'relying on') that is at work, or at least that has to do the work.

But, the trust that is demanded from parents resembles an infantile form of trust. Children, while being initiated in their parents' language-games and forms of life, acquire mastery over 'bedrock practices', for instance counting or reading, and cannot but be blindly obedient (Williams 1999: 183). To believe that they could resist or doubt what their parents say is a bit (but not wholly) like making the mistake of the sceptic in *On Certainty* who believes that it is possible to doubt *everything*. Wittgenstein argues that doubting everything is not logically conceivable. To be able to doubt, at least some things have to be certain,[20] or have to have been acquired. To learn to speak/count/read and so on, also requires a form of relying on community practices and those who mastered these practices, the adults. This is not the same kind of trust or confidence that adults have in each other. When

(Footnote 18 continued)

Wittgenstein seems not to allow the use of the verb 'to know' at bedrock level (cf., OC §495 and 498). If we loosen the constraints Wittgenstein puts onto the use of the word 'knowledge', we could indeed say that 'we know that everyone has parents'. But we do not know this because we have verified it, but because we relied on our parents and other adults, and because we continue to rely on our language-games and thus our communal practices.

[19]Symptomatic of this tendency is Camarata (2015) who in his book *The intuitive parent* tries to reassure parents who became less confident after reading brain-based parenting advice, that they are *naturally* provided with the skills which enable them to do all the necessary wiring- and rewiring of their children's brains. He then supports this claim with further scientific findings stemming from the same brain-science.

[20]Wittgenstein (OC §115): "If you tried to doubt everything you would not go as far as doubting anything. The game of doubting itself presupposes certainty." Cf. also Hamilton (2014) from page 227 on.

adults trust each other, for instance when someone makes a promise, the other one can decide whether or not to place their confidence in the other and to trust them. In the latter case an element of choice is involved, and thus an element of responsibility. Adults can always review this decision to trust someone and go back on it.

We could say that what happens in science-based parenting support is the confusion of these two states. Parents, though they are adults, are regarded as novices (infants): they should unquestioningly trust the experts, and this trust or confidence is modelled along the lines of the learning of bedrock practices. Blind obedience and blind trust is demanded.[21] The drawing on scientific evidence and alleged scientific certainties indeed seems to suspend the normal situation between adults, where one has to decide to trust another adult. It is as if the experts are saying: ‘You can trust what I say is *scientifically* founded. So I couldn’t possibly be lying to you. You can trust me as if we were in a parent-child relation.’

7 Concluding Remarks

In Wittgenstein’s *On Certainty*, we can experience a shift from knowing to trusting, in the sense that our basic certainties are not derived from knowledge, but from a relying on our language-games and world pictures we could not possibly escape from.

In this chapter I have suggested that we can draw on this picture in thinking about recent trends in parenting support of which WBC is paradigmatic. Parents are (as with a conversion) asked to rely blindly on new language-games. They are demanded to trust those who propagate this new way of seeing the world, this is, also to see themselves and their children in new and *promising* ways. It is not so much that they receive new scientific evidence; rather, they are provided with new frameworks; they are asked to comply with them, and to accept their logics.

We do not know yet whether these candidate-methodological propositions will become part of the scaffolding of our thoughts, and will actually come to stand fast for us. What we can conclude is that if parents accept these frameworks, this will probably change the ways they normally think about parenting and behave as parents, and that this may even change their *moral* horizons. Because all this happens as it were behind their backs, parents are put in a position of infants, who do not have the resources to take a critical stance towards these forms of ‘science-based’ parenting support and their propagated conceptualizations of parenting.

Wittgenstein’s holist and non-epistemic ‘foundationalism’ implies that we have to rely on others and our community. Maybe that is Wittgenstein’s lesson: certainty

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[21]One could make the (obvious) point that parents are not dependent on the parenting experts in quite the same way as children are dependent on adults; they can choose not to buy the parenting books, not to read the magazines; not to watch the TV programs. And this is my point: once they accept to read the book, readers are no longer supposed to be critical of it, they are supposed to behave in a way as infants.

implies trusting, relying on [*sich verlassen*], rather than knowing. The emphasis on knowledge does not do away with the fact that trust is needed; this only *seems* to be the case: it is still *trust* that has to do the work. The emphasis on scientific (epistemic) certainty might obscure what parents really need: not so much more knowledge, for instance more 'facts' about the way brains work or develop, but rather more recognition for their desire to be addressed as adults, who will and should always be doubting; and that their doubting is accepted as something for which no cure is available, or even desirable.

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Professional Learning and Wittgenstein: A Learning Paradox Emerges

Sam Gardner

> This knowledge will not come from teaching but from questioning. (Plato, *Meno* 85d)
>
> I should not like my writing to spare other people the trouble of thinking. But, if possible, to stimulate someone to thoughts of his own. (From the Preface, *Philosophical Investigations* p. viii)

Abstract On the basis of a survey of the classical learning paradox (as first described by Plato and given its modern formulation by Fodor), I argue that a kind of *professional* learning paradox holds, in particular for professionals and professional peer groups attempting to learn new content. Given Wittgenstein's notions of training and "logical grammar" (following Shanker (1986) in this latter formulation) and the situation of professionals who are essentially on their own in learning new things, it is difficult to see how professionals could bootstrap their own understanding. I suggest that the set of practices or language games constitutive of *inquiry* may serve to help to some degree in this matter. However, this is not a (dis)solution to the learning paradox—especially given that the professional learning paradox is not a *philosophical* problem. Finally I point out that this proposal connects to political issues concerning the relationship between institutions and professionals, with regard to the kind of environment entailed by the needs of professional learning.

Keywords Professional learning · Wittgenstein · Schön · Inquiry

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M.A. Peters and J. Stickney (eds.), *A Companion to Wittgenstein on Education*,
DOI 10.1007/978-981-10-3136-6_41

1 Introduction: The Basic Learning Paradox

In this paper, I explore a variation of the "learning paradox" as it applies to professional learning. I argue that a "professional learning paradox" can be seen to emerge from considerations concerning learning put forth by Wittgenstein, as well as by educational theorists such as Schön (1983, 1987) and situative theorists such as Lave and Wenger (1991). I do not believe that there is any particular (dis)solution of this learning problem, though I will describe it in the terms offered up by Wittgenstein. I hold that it simply is an unavoidable situation, though there are better and worse approaches to working through it. By "professional learning", I refer to the learning done by professionals (such as educators, managerial bureaucrats, artists, nurses, doctors, lawyers and social workers) in the course of their professional working lives, through formal and informal means and focused on the content areas specific to professionals' *expertise*.

The basic "learning paradox" arises given a particular rendering of learning within certain sets of assumptions about rationality and knowledge. Note that I am not interested in this paper in the issues of properly formulating or resolving the learning paradox itself, which strikes me as a deeply contested problem.[1] Rather I wish to use it to help frame a more specific problem of practice pertinent to my own work in the professional development field, which concerns how professionals can make significant strides in their learning on their own or in peer groups.

The classical version of the paradox of learning is set out by Plato (1961) in the dialogue *Meno* (see 80 d–e for a concise statement of the argument). Moravcsik (1978) provides a clear formulation of the problem:

> It is not possible for a man to inquire either into what he knows or into what he does not know. He cannot inquire into that which he knows, since if he knows it there is no room for inquiry. On the other hand, he cannot inquire into that which he does not know, since in that case he does not know what it is that he should be seeking. (p. 54)

This is the *Meno* version of the learning paradox, viz. that one cannot even start inquiry. Plato's later dialogue, the *Theaetetus* (1973), sets out a different version of the paradox. There the focus of the argument is on the nature or definition of "knowledge", which in the relevant part of the dialogue for us is taken to be true judgment/opinion (see *Theaetetus*, 187e–201c). What is of interest here is the dialogue's concern for the problem of *how* we can tell true from false judgment. The point that I am interested in (at 199e–200c) is that, on the models of knowledge constructed in the dialogue, one cannot tell that one has knowledge or not-knowledge (i.e., true judgment or false judgment). The attempt to determine the one from the other leads either to an infinite or a circular regress (see 200b–c). So the two main issues of the learning paradox are, without *already* knowing what you

[1]See, for example, the innovative debate carried out in the *American Educational Research Journal* in 1999–2000 with regard to Prawat's (1999) article on the learning paradox. [See AERJ 36(1) and AERJ 37(1).]

set out to learn, (1) how one can even get started in inquiry (*Meno* version) and (2) how one can know when one's inquiry has succeeded (*Theaetetus* version). These two aspects will be important for our later discussion.

Wittgenstein himself did not explicitly consider the learning paradox, for reasons which I will indicate below. However, a number of thinkers over the last 50 years have been interested in it. For example, Polanyi (1967) framed the problem in the context of the "experience of seeing a problem … for to see a problem is to see that something is hidden", i.e., a possible comprehension of a (new) coherence of particulars (see p. 21). Polanyi sees the paradox emerging only insofar as it concerns what he calls *explicit* knowledge; the resolution of the paradox is through an intimation of the relevant *tacit* knowledge (or, otherwise, in the intimations that are afforded by tacit knowledge). For Polanyi,

> Tacit knowing is shown to account (1) for a valid knowledge of a problem, (2) for the scientist's capacity to pursue it, guided by his sense of approaching its solution, and (3) for a valid anticipation of the yet indeterminate implications of the discovery arrived at in the end. (p. 24)

So we have "tacit foreknowledge of yet undiscovered things" (p. 23), which answers for the *Meno* version of the paradox, and before the "fruitfulness" of the truth of discoveries reveals itself we are "aware also of the hidden implications of a scientific discovery" (p. 23), which answers for the *Theateatus* version.[2]

Fodor (1980) provided the seminal modern version of the paradox, setting it out in terms of the Chomskyian perspective in contrast to the Piagetian approach. The paradox emerges from the assumption that learning is a matter of hypothesis formation and confirmation by individuals, which Fodor claims is the only theory of learning that we have. Such theories have no way of accounting for the origin or manner of acquiring concepts/hypotheses, and in fact must assume them as "given" in the learning schema (1980, p. 146). Assuming the developing child to be a sequence or "series of logics" (p. 147), getting from one stage to the next in development by learning (i.e., hypothesis formation and confirmation) is problematic inasmuch as "such a hypothesis can't be formulated with the conceptual apparatus available at [the earlier] stage 1" (p. 148). In other words, "it is *never* possible to learn a richer logic on the basis of a weaker logic" (p. 148). All that learning theories can do is indicate how beliefs get fixed by studying statistical associations between hypotheses/beliefs and experience, circumstances, etc., but cannot account for how we get from one conceptual system to a "higher" one. Such movement can *only* be explained within a nativist framework in which sets of innate

[2]Burbules (2008) provides an interesting perspective on tacit knowledge and teaching, discussing these notions in terms of Wittgenstein's comments on teaching and learning, on "showing", and in terms of Wittgenstein's own example as a teacher. This is not the place here to dispute Burbules' argument, but as with a lot of thinking about the issue of tacit knowledge it rests on an unwarranted asymmetry, viz. if I *say* p, a proposition, it is assumed that p somehow exists in me, and if I *do* x, an action, it is assumed that the "know-how" or capacity to x somehow exists in me. However, why not similarly assume that the *capacity* to say p instead exists in me, rather than that p somehow exists in me and that the saying of it is straightforwardly non-problematic?

concepts emerge as the individual matures. As Fodor (1980) states in this much-quoted passage:

> … there literally isn't such a thing as the notion of learning a conceptual system richer than the one that one already has; we simply have no idea of what it would be like to get from a conceptually impoverished to a conceptually richer system by anything like a process of learning. … The only intelligible theory of enrichment of conceptual resources is that it is a function of maturation, and there simply isn't any theory of how *learning can affect concepts*. (p. 149)

Like Fodor, Bereiter (1985) situates the learning paradox as properly located within constructivist and cognitivist perspectives:

> …learners must grasp concepts or procedures more complex than those they already have available for application. Thus the learning paradox descends with full force on those kinds of learning of central concern for educators, learning that extends the range and complexity of relationships that people are able to take account of in their thought and action – the kinds of learning that lead to understanding core concepts of a discipline, mastering more powerful intellectual tools, and being able to use knowledge critically and creatively. (p. 202)

Bereiter identifies the roots of this paradox in the general systems problem, viz., "how can a structure generate another structure more complex than itself?" (p. 204), with the more theoretical question specific to human development being, "how can the development of complex mental structures be accounted for by mechanisms that are not themselves highly intelligent or richly endowed with knowledge?" (p. 205). The learning paradox arises for Bereiter, as it does for most others, largely from the cognitivist stance he adopts: thus the paradox issues from the general question of "the extent to which experience can modify cognitive structures" (p. 202). Importantly, Bereiter situates the paradox in the context of the issue of "self-generated cognitive growth" (p. 205).

Bereiter's (1985) resolution of the paradox concerns combining various less-problematic mental resources for constructivity such as "adapting already-existing systems to new uses" (p. 209), imitation (p. 211), various learning support systems (pp. 211–212) and so on. This solution, which Bereiter himself recognizes as insufficient, is not without its problems. Bereiter concludes this paper by clarifying that the source of the learning paradox is to be found in the constructivist perspective, i.e., that it "spring[s] from one central problem—the problem of explaining how complex knowledge is constructed by the learner"[3] (p. 222).

Finally, Luntley (2008) attempts to resolve a variation of Fodor's formulation of the learning paradox, viz., concerning the genesis of new concepts. Taking up a

[3]Bereiter's (1991) later contribution argues that a connectionist approach holds the most promise for a resolution of the paradox, being neither a nativist argument nor a learning theory premised on hypothesis formation and confirmation, the latter of which, if taken "too literally" (p. 297), leads to such problems. He formulates the paradox in terms of learning, i.e., "what is to be learned must already be known in order for learning to take place" (p. 294). The resolution of the paradox here is given through connectionist models, which "provide demonstrations of systems that can acquire apparently rule-guided behavior without its involving any internal representation of rules" (p. 295). Connectionism, then, would be the third way that Fodorv could not see.

cognitivist stance and developing further the main thrust of his general philosophical approach (e.g., see Luntley 1999, 2007), Luntley resolves this issue by working out an affective process that, through a mechanism of sub-conceptual discrimination, is able to generate a certain range of new concepts. This avoids the paradoxical aspect as Luntley describes it, i.e., hypotheses formed out of discriminations which assume the operation of the concept yet to be confirmed (e.g., see p. 2). However, all that Luntley has (purportedly) shown is that we can discriminate certain aspects of social behaviour at a sub-conceptual level—assuming that affective response is indeed sub-conceptual and minimally rational. Luntley's evidence base for his argument "draws on developmental studies of infant cognition" (p. 12), though it is in fact based on a few unsourced, constructed (for this purpose) anecdotes.[4]

While it is not to the point of this paper, it is reasonable to hold that the learning paradox is not a problem in the terms set out by Wittgenstein. In brief, for Wittgenstein concepts are not self-identical mental cognitive structures that one either has or does not have, but rather signs that can be employed in different ways to do different things in various circumstances. The paradox depends on discontinuities between the contents and structures of understanding, whereas for Wittgenstein understanding is a matter of the continuous, positive interaction within a community and its form of life. The problem of the paradox is how structures can generate new, different structures, whereas for Wittgenstein, as members of communities, we are invited to move actively into more and more sophisticated uses of signs within living economies of signs. This brief survey is sufficient to set up my own problematic, and I turn now to what I call the "*professional* learning paradox".

2 The Professional Learning Paradox

In terms of the learning of professionals in situ, that is in the context of their work environments, there is clearly little problem with regard to a good deal of the learning that does in fact take place. In many situations, there is a place or "post" ready (see, for example, PI §§29–31: 257)[5] for new information that is encountered in the course of daily work or in professional learning situations. The learning

[4]Various others have treated the learning paradox, taking up different approaches. For example, Prawat (1999), Glasersfeld (2001), Hoffman (2003) and others have explored solutions based on pragmatist perspectives employing Peirce's notion of "abduction". Note finally that the term "learning paradox" is used in far looser ways as well in the contemporary literature. See, for example, Armitage et al. (2008) where the paradox is identified as the practical problem that learning about resource and environment management is generally recognized as important though little is actually done in the relevant sectors to encourage it.

[5]Following convention, titles for Wittgenstein's works are abbreviated (RFM = Remarks on the Foundation of Mathematics, BB = The Blue and Brown Books, Z = Zettel, PI = Philosophica Investigations, OC = On certainty), with section (§) or page number (p.), with full citation and initials in the References.

paradox for working professionals arises more in terms of a deepening of understanding, or in learning new ways of seeing and going on in professional practice.

The professional learning paradox begins to emerge from a reading of Wittgenstein that emphasizes (a) the notion of learning as "training" and (b) that learning is gaining mastery of the "logical grammar" of signs. I take Shanker's (1986) notion of "logical grammar" as the most useful for my purposes here (see in particular pp. 12–16). Wittgenstein does not use the phrase "logical grammar", but it gets at the fundamental aspect of the interconnections of signs that I find appealing (and connects as well in an appropriate way to the importance of the notions of "logical form" and "logical space" of the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*). Cavell's use of "grammar" as well captures—and possibly even pushes beyond—what Shanker intimates with his use of "logical grammar". Contrasting the "logical grammar" of an ordinary noun like "chair" with its basic syntactic grammatical characteristics, Cavell (2012) says that:

> … Wittgenstein attributes to this particular noun (and proposes that there will be a similar exercise for each other noun in the language) a structurally essential, or essentially structural, articulation of its own, bound up with the human life form, something he also characterizes as the natural history of the human. The articulation recalls that the family of things we call chairs, hence the family of postures we describe as sitting on a chair, plays a distinct family of roles in human existence, essentially related to (what we call) sitting on a canvas camp stool or on a fence or a swing or on a bottom step and hence related to getting up and standing still and waking and resting and chatting and dining and presiding and squatting and kneeling and cushioning and leaning and stretching out and writing alone for hours at a table. Every step we take across the web of speech makes the entire web tremble, as if to remind us that it requires the entirety to sustain us. (p. 24)[6]

To return to training and logical grammar, there is a kind of unity here between (a) and (b), which is a consequence of Wittgenstein's rejection of his own onto-logic approach of the *Tractatus*. One cannot reason one's way into a particular existing logical grammar (say of the word "chair")[7]—see OC §475 and Z §545 for different kinds of perspective on this point—and thus one must be brought into it by other means, i.e., by training, encouragement, dissuasion, etc. (e.g., see PI §§143, 145; RFM: VI 18). The logical grammar of a particular sign, in turn, is contingent,

[6]In keeping with Cavell's depiction of the deep interconnections possessed by a simple noun, it is thus at the same time important to keep in mind that this notion of "logical grammar" is all the same bounded by ambiguity and indeterminateness. For example, Wittgenstein indicates that the language of the adult is a complicated affair—a "labyrinth of paths" (PI §203)—and that the logical grammar of any word is likely to be tangled—"But the part the word ['reading'] plays in our life, and therewith the language-games in which we employ it, would be difficult to describe even in rough outline" (PI §156).

[7]Though one might make "reasonable" guesses at uses of "chair", and find through experience that such uses are indeed employed by others.

the result of the history of a culture, of the actual uses made of that sign. Creative endeavours—scientific or artistic—are bounded on many sides by existing logical grammars, by language games and practices, and the new uses of (new) signs that may result may be taken up by others and enter the culture to become new aspects of logical grammars, or may remain local and quickly fade away. One way of looking at professionals and their expertise is that they are adepts, or masters, in the logical grammar of certain signs and associated non-linguistic activities, that they know how to go on in using these particular sets of signs.

There is, obviously enough, much more to be said in this vein, but the point I need here to bring out the particular paradoxical aspect of professional learning is that we can learn certain things only be being shepherded along by others, that those who have mastered the relevant "logical grammars" must perforce guide novices into using signs in the prescribed ways. The problem in professional learning is thus that either one receives the relevant training into the new logical grammar from someone who has the necessary mastery, or one is left unguided to find a way into the new logical grammar. The problem begins to seem *paradoxical* insofar as, practically, it is for the most part impossible for relative novices in professions to be trained by masters—bluntly put, there are far more professionals than there are relevant masters. This is especially so when the desired learning crosses disciplines; for example, in cases where educators or government bureaucrats desire training in developmental science.

Note that I am moving somewhat freely between philosophical remarks and (empirical) remarks about pedagogy. While I am working to frame and organize the latter around the former, they are still not for that philosophical themselves. Thus, the problem of professional learning is not going to be dissolved by the kind of grammatical investigation encouraged by Wittgenstein to deal with the conceptual confusions of metaphysics and epistemology. Indeed, the problem of professional learning in fact *emerges* from proceeding in line with some of Wittgenstein's thinking about language. In the language of the situative theorists, the problem would be of how one might get drawn in from the periphery to the core of a community of practice without interacting with members of that community, i.e., with those closer to the core.[8]

The crux of this *professional* learning paradox can be seen clearly in the work of the educational theorist Schön (1983, 1987), in which both the *Meno* and *Theaetetus* versions are relevant. Schön affirms the basic learning paradox problematic in the context of professional learning, i.e., in "teaching and learning of any really new competence or understanding … the student seeks to learn things whose meaning and importance she cannot grasp ahead of time" (1987, p. 83). The *professional* learning paradox arises, in turn, in the context of practical constraints on

[8]If indeed this is not tautologically impossible—i.e., since it is the community that defines and gives form and substance to the relevant practices, even to engage in the practice *qua* practice one must interact with the community in specific ways. If on the other hand it is somehow possible, then would one gain new practice, i.e., learn, only in grudgingly slow, haphazard and accidental ways.

professionals inasmuch as Schön argues that a "coaching" relationship is necessary for a range of professional learning.

For Schön, an active, positive coach–student relationship in professional learning and development is necessary. He says in this regard, for example, that "students must be engaged in learning by doing and in dialogue with someone in the role of coach" (1987, p. 162). Thus, the basic *Meno* version learning paradox (i.e., in order to learn x we already need to know x in some manner) is practically resolved in terms of situating learning in the context of a dyadic relationship in which the relevant knowledge does already exist. The coach—who does "know"—finds a means to motivate the student to initiate relevant dialogue *in any way*; this allows the skilled coach to use various (training) techniques to draw the student into a productive "learning circle", and "so the stage is set for a continuing dialogue of actions and words, of reciprocal reflection in and on action" (1987, p. 166). These coached learning situations are such that the coach "knows that the student … can get good reasons for acting only by beginning to act. However much the master may dislike asking the student to give up his autonomy, he must invite him to enter into a temporary relationship of trust and dependency" (1987, p. 95). Indeed, Schön says that students "do not as yet have the idea of a learning process in which imperfect actions are continually modified through reflection-in-action" (1987, p. 291), but it is this process all that same that must happen. The student's learning is dependent "on the career of his dialogue with the coach" (1987, p. 169), and such dialogue in turn is dependent on the positive nature of the relationship between coach and student.

There are interesting commonalities here between this characterization of the coach–student activity and Wittgenstein's notion of "stage-setting", inasmuch as this notion can be applied to non-initiate learners. For example, Williams (1994) argues that "naïve learner's utterances" get provisionally taken in teaching/learning sequences as proper linguistic behaviours, and that this status is "extended to those utterances by masters of that practice … the initiate learner speaks, makes judgements, requests, and the like only by virtue of a courtesy extended to the learner by those who have already mastered the practice", as the way to draw learners into normative behaviour (p. 180; also see p. 185). Though note the context here: Williams connects this "stage setting" account of novice learning to Wittgenstein's critique of ostensive definition—I am not entirely certain that Williams would approve of my use of stage setting in the case of adults who are only *relative* initiates.[9]

To continue with Schön, students on the basis of their own kinds of understanding can be blocked in their development (e.g., "a picture can hold them

[9]Similarly, with regard to Schön's notion of the "learning circle", see Medina (2002): "… the "circle" created by the process of training into a technique consists in the following: that what the learner is trained to do, blindly, becomes the criterion of identity for what he is doing. Thus the end of the process becomes the beginning: what is obtained by the learned procedure becomes criterial for having followed that procedure. The actual applications of the rule thus fix the normative standards of similarity that define what counts as following a rule" (p. 161).

captive"; see PI §115) in that they can "see" neither the detrimental aspect of their current picture of things nor any positive aspects of different pictures or approaches that might promote understanding. The coach operates in such a way as to liberate the student past such blocks in understanding. This *Theaetetus* side to the professional learning paradox thus is seen in the importance of the coach helping students begin to recognize a good solution or thread to follow. For Schön, one ideal for professional learning is the *reflective practicum*, in which students at all career levels are guided in a variety of ways by coaches/teachers/mentors.

To present matters in this way has the implication that autodidacticism is, with regard to certain learning, impossible. This is the crux of the *professional* learning paradox: that without the necessary coaching relationship, in Schön's terms, professional learning of the kinds we're interested in is not possible given the constraints of professional work life. The practices that would enable individuals to be able to go on are absent, and the normative pressures—i.e., from environments/communities of practice and from the active presence of masters of the relevant techniques—that could be brought to bear to influence new learners in the relevant ways do not exist. Thus, despite its seeming impossibility, the only *feasible* resolution of the learning paradox specific to professionals concerns the exigent necessity for the *autodidacticism* of professional learning, i.e., that it is principally through communities of *peers* and interaction mostly with others at similar levels of expertise that professionals will have opportunities to somehow bootstrap their own learning. If the situation is as I describe it, the question then is how professionals *on their own* can draw *themselves* into new practices or train *themselves* to take on new logical grammars and to see new aspects of things.

3 A Wittgenstein-Inspired Response to the Professional Learning Paradox

My position in this paper is that framing professional learning in terms of Wittgenstein's perspective on language, meaning, and understanding provides at least a way to describe such learning situations, and through such reframing obtain more perspicuous pictures of them. The issue that emerges is how individual professionals or professional peer groups *on their own* obtain the training necessary to allow them to move into new language games and practices and become adept at new logical grammars.

Two important points need to be made here. First, a goal of training is to help in the development of *autonomous* participants who can interact in community with others. There are at least three basic senses of autonomy potentially operative here. (i) One is autonomous in the sense that one regulates one's own behaviour with regard to a particular language game or logical grammar, i.e., one can go on in the right ways without the continuing encouragement, correction and guidance of another who is adept in the relevant ways. But autonomy surely must be stronger

than this important though limited form, especially given the background of the contingency and changeability of language games—"… but new types of language, new language games, as we may say, come into existence, and others become obsolete and get forgotten" (PI §23). Thus, stronger forms of autonomy should be considered, such as the following. (ii) One is able to take on new logical grammars on one's own initiative, and by virtue of the characteristics of practices and grammars one has already mastered, e.g., knowing how to ask for a name, and being able to talk about what things are for, might lead to knowing how to ask for a function of some named thing.[10] (iii) Creatively going beyond existing logical grammars and practices.

Second, I want to say that these aspects of the growing autonomy of learners still play themselves out (ultimately?) in the arena of training, of master–novice relations and the normative pressures of communities. In other words, I think it makes sense to speak of adult professional learning as still a matter of being trained in various ways into new logical grammars and language games.[11] I interpret statements like, "but how can I explain it [a specific language game/rule] to anyone? I can give him this training" (RFM VII: 40), as applying generally, i.e., to adults as they encounter and learn new logical grammars/language games.

In a significant sense everyone can be a novice in some regard, i.e., in attempting to learn new approaches or subject matter (that is to say, learning how to go on with the logical grammar of new signs, or new logical grammar of old signs). I urge that it makes sense to say that it is "training" that occurs in less than explicit ways in diffuse social settings, for example in cases in which no one else picks up on the particular way we attempt to do or articulate something, with the result that we drop that way of seeing and putting things. Thus, a professional might try out different articulations of a particular point, and the silence and non-reactivity of her colleagues to certain of her offerings is the kind of reaction that dissuades the use of those particular articulations and encourages one to gravitate instead towards those articulations that garner more positive reaction and uptake. Such cases I take to be a kind of training. Likewise training can occur in situations where one acquiesces to ways of putting things the group applauds, and where subsequent repetitive practice within the group using this formulation reinforces its increasingly extended use. In this manner and in the dynamic aggregate, new ways of talking and acting amongst a peer group form and begin to take hold. There is considerable affinity here with the sort of position on learning as set out by "community of practice" theorists (e.g., see Lave and Wenger 1991) and by some of the socio-cultural theorists (e.g., see Rogoff 1995; Rogoff et al. 1996).

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[10]There are a lot of possibilities here. Developing the structure of a new logical grammar, by analogy or metaphor, strikes me as an important possibility, though one that perhaps straddles the second and third senses of autonomy.

[11]That we are still talking about adults taking on new language games is made clear by Wittgenstein (BB, p. 81): "… when the boy or grownup learns what one might call special technical languages, e.g., the use of charts and diagrams, descriptive geometry, chemical symbolism, etc., he learns more language games".

In terms of the stronger forms of autonomy, though still within the context of the training of adults who are taking on new logical grammars, there is at least one way to approach the professional learning paradox impasse that may be productive, i.e., through the practice of inquiry. Wittgenstein makes two important points about inquiry and question-asking. First, he explicitly identifies inquiry as a language game (see PI §23), and thus, there must be logical grammars of inquiry, ways of going on with asking questions. A rudimentary, schematic formulation of that grammar might include such general practices as asking questions (versus asserting, describing, reporting); responding to questions (e.g., when to respond to a question with a question, with a tentative response, with a firm answer); sustaining/maintaining a thread of inquiry (versus drifting away from it); and inferring/drawing something from a line of inquiry (versus settling for vague inconclusivity). Further, I would hazard that there are various aspects of the logical grammars of inquiry that would be more or less fruitful in the context of professionals attempting to bootstrap their own understanding on new and difficult matters. For example, it would seem worthwhile to examine the logical grammar that constitutes *rhetorical* question-asking, particularly in the context of professionals' learning dialogues with each other.

Second, insofar as inquiry is a language game constituted by a logical grammar, it is something that we *learn*, i.e., it is a practice in which we can be trained by adepts or masters. In this regard, Wittgenstein develops an analogy indicating that we learn how to ask questions:

> That is to say, the teacher will feel that this is not really a legitimate question at all. … The teacher would feel that this was only holding them up that this way the pupil would only get stuck and make no progress—And he would be right. It would be as if someone were looking for some object in a room; he opens a drawer and doesn't see it there; and he closes it again, waits, and opens it once more to see whether perhaps it isn't there now, and keeps on like that. He has not learned to look for things. And in the same way this pupil has not learned to ask questions. He has not learned *the* game that we are trying to teach him. (OC §315—italics Wittgenstein's)

Learning sessions set up such that explicit questions can be asked and considered by the participants themselves, that push after the connections between new material and what participants can talk about now, would be to take seriously this insight and would help serve the goal of professional development. For example, for professionals approaching new content purportedly pertinent to their practice to ask why it is important to engage with this material and in what ways their existing way of seeing things needs modification or replacement would be one natural place to begin inquiry—though in fact questions such as these are rarely asked or deliberated upon in actual professional learning events. Proceeding further into the learning session, by asking questions about the material and, most importantly, about how they themselves have begun to talk about that material, learners begin to sort out and practice new logical grammars by doing and repetition and practice ("We talk, we utter words, and only *later* get a picture of their life." PI II, p. 209).

In terms of learning logical grammars of inquiry, I suggest the emphasis be on *doing*; and when these kinds of learning sessions happen, they need consist of

something other than transparently didactic lessons in question-asking. Rather they need to focus in other ways on *showing* how to ask and work with questions that are productive of advancement in knowing how to go on in relevant ways. It is of a piece of the growing autonomy of the professionals in question—and respect for that autonomy—that professional learning and growth happen in the terms of the *emergent* questions of practice asked by the learning professionals themselves. An organizational culture that values and supports the ability of its professional members to ask and handle questions stands in line with these ideas from Wittgenstein about language and learning. However, the main point I am making is that there will be *no* emergent questions of practice, or at best ill-considered ones, if the practice of inquiry is not encouraged, supported and intentionally developed. In part, this speaks to an institution's attitude towards its professional staff, whether it is in terms of respect for experts with appropriate ranges of autonomy or as functionaries fulfilling tightly constrained and designated programs of intervention and monitoring.[12]

4 Conclusion

The overall idea here is that one kind of training can make possible or open us to other kinds of training, i.e., knowing how to go on in the language game(s) of inquiry makes possible more productive attempts to take on substantive content (e.g., the logical grammar of a developmental construct in the case of educators). Indeed, the very nature of the professional learning paradox as I have described it makes inevitable the search for these kinds of directions, focusing on the self-directedness and capacities of the professional individuals and peer groups themselves.

Let me end here on a caveat by pointing out one of the important (and obvious) problems that remains with this approach. Just as professionals on their own, viz., without the guidance and normative pressure of masters and environments of practice, will struggle to gain the ability to take on new logical grammars in substantive content areas (take again the example of educators attempting to learn a developmental construct new to them), so will they struggle in taking on the logical grammar of inquiry. It is important to note as well, however, that this is *one* kind of

[12]Certainly the importance and role of inquiry are a significant topic in the education literature—see, for example, Bereiter and Scardamalia (1993), Argyris (1976, 1982, 1986, 1989), Smith (1982); and see the concept map (Fig. 1.1) of learning in Novak and Gowin's (1984/2002) book on learning how to learn. See as well the literature on more inquiry-focused pedagogical theory: for example, Hmelo-Siver and Barrows (2008), Blanchard et al. (2009), Oliveira (2010) and the work of van Zee, Minstrell, and Schoenfeld, who provide multiple analyses of discourse in learning sessions, with an emphasis on the kinds of questions with which session participants work (e.g., van Zee and Minstrell 1997a, b; Minstrell 1999; Schoenfeld et al. 1999; van Zee 2000, van Zee et al. 2001). Finally, the tradition of problem-based learning certainly falls within the notion of the logical grammar of inquiry: see, for example, Barrows (1996).

language game in which to be trained, the benefits of which can be transferred to the autonomous work of the trained professionals to take on other, multiple logical grammars. Training in inquiry, I would contend, is training in a particular set of logical grammars that would strengthen and extend professionals' autonomy.

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Wittgenstein on Teaching and Learning the Rules: Taking Him at His Word

Tracy Bowell

Abstract In this paper, I reflect upon Wittgenstein's descriptions of how rules are learned and taught. As background I begin with a discussion of the conceptual connection Wittgenstein makes between words' meaning and their use or application. I extend this discussion to an account of rules as practices, habits, customs and of the way in which becoming ac-custom-ed to following those rules amounts to nothing more, and nothing less, than learning how to act correctly. Here I provide an account of what, by Wittgenstein's lights, we are learning and being taught as we (be)come into our ways of being in the world and with others. I then move to an examination of what Wittgenstein says about teaching, learning and educating, paying particular attention to the German terms he uses to express his observations and to any nuances of difference between those terms. In this exercise of taking Wittgenstein at his word(s), I attempt to see the role that each of these types of learning and teaching might play in the process of our *Bildung*, the process of self-formation that constitutes our (be)coming into the ways of being in the world and with others that become second nature to us.

Keywords Wittgenstein · Language · Rules · Teaching · Learning

1 Introduction

Familiarly, Wittgenstein begins his *Philosophical Investigations* not with claims about the meanings of words, but with Augustine's reflections on being initiated into language. On first reading, the significance of Wittgenstein's selection of this passage from this voice might seem to lie in the fact that it provides a foil for his subsequent comments on naming, on ostensive definition and on theories of

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M.A. Peters and J. Stickney (eds.), *A Companion to Wittgenstein on Education*,
DOI 10.1007/978-981-10-3136-6_42

reference more generally. But equally, if not more, significant is the fact that he chooses to begin with an image of a child, of the learner and of her counterpart, the teacher. Further, the passage from which Wittgenstein quotes evokes his own observations about the ways in which linguistic practice amounts to more than words, involving facial expression and the play of eyes, of the movements of the limbs and the tone of voice (PI/PPF §1).[1] Throughout his later work, Wittgenstein's preoccupation with our understanding of norms of practices, including, but not limited to, linguistic practices, is played out through reflection on and observation of how those norms are taught and learned. For Wittgenstein, the pedagogical and the normative are conceptually embedded in one another; learning how to go on within a practice just is learning the rules, how to behave normally within our community.

If we want to see what correctly following a rule consists in, writes Wittgenstein, we need do nothing more than describe the '*learning* of "proceeding according to the rule"' (RFM, VII: 26). This in turn will show us the way to resolve our epistemic anxiety about how it is that we manage to follow the rule. In this paper, then, I consider and reflect upon Wittgenstein's descriptions of how rules are learned and taught. As background to those reflections I begin with a discussion of the conceptual connection Wittgenstein makes between words' meanings and their use or application. I extend this discussion to an account both of rules as practices, habits, customs and of the way in which becoming ac-custom-ed to following those rules amounts to nothing more, and nothing less, than learning how to act correctly. This part of the paper serves to provide an account of what, by Wittgenstein's lights, we are learning and being taught as we (be)come into our ways of being in the world and with others. With this background in place, I move to an examination of what Wittgenstein says about teaching, learning and educating, paying particular attention to the German terms he uses to express his observations and to any nuances of difference between those terms. In undertaking this exercise of taking Wittgenstein at his word(s), I attempt to see the role that each of these types of learning and teaching might play in the process of our *Bildung*, the process of self-formation that constitutes our (be)coming into the ways of being in the world and with others that become second nature to us.

2 Meaning, Use, Rules and Practices

Perhaps the most well-known of Wittgenstein's remarks on the conceptual interconnectedness of linguistic meaning and linguistic use appears at PI §43:

[1]Following convention, titles for Wittgenstein's works are abbreviated (PI = Philosophical Investigations, where PI/PPF = Part Two of the Philosophical Investigations, or "Philosophy of Psychology—A Fragment", RFM = Remarks on the Foundation of Mathematics, CV = Culture and Value, Z = Zettel, LFM = Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics, OC = On Certainty, WL = Wittgenstein's Nachlass), with section (§) or page number (p.), with full citation and initials in the References.

> For a *large* class of cases of the employment of the word 'meaning'—though not for *all*—this word can be explained in this way: the meaning of a word is its use in the language.

Like much of what eventually appears in his *Philosophical Investigations* Wittgenstein had been developing this idea for quite some time before it appeared there and we see it clearly expressed in his *Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics*. For instance, in the course of Lecture XIX Wittgenstein comments, 'One can say that we can judge what a person means by a word from the way he uses it'. (LFM: 182)[2] And, similarly, 'there is no question of giving a meaning [of a sign] apart from an application' (LFM: 223). In the same vein, he notes the way in which even contradictions can take on a meaning through the (continued) use to which we put them, such as when we say, for instance '"Well it is fine and it's not fine" meaning that the weather is mediocre' (LFM: 176).[3] The interconnection of the meaning of a word or phrase and the use to which we put it is further articulated in the context of remarks about understanding or knowing the meaning of a word, which, Wittgenstein observes, consists in our knowing how to use it. Thus, in LFM I he notes, 'To understand a phrase, we might say, is to understand its use' (LFM: 19). Expanding on this theme later in LFM XIX in the context of discussing the meaning of a fictional name for a colour ('Boo'), he remarks.

> It sounds as if your learning how to use it were different from your knowing its meaning. *But the point is that we all make the SAME use of it.* To know its meaning is to use it *in the same way* as other people do. 'In the right way' means nothing. (LFM: 182)

This shared communal use becomes the natural way for us to act (LFM: 186–7). Moreover, learning the meaning of a word—learning how it is used by us—takes place contextually within a language game and within a rich and complex network of interconnected and overlapping language games (PI §77). More broadly, the techniques that constitute correct use of language can only be acquired against the background of the form of life into which we are becoming initiated yet within which we are always already embraced. Wittgenstein's position can be understood as a response to alternative approaches to the question of the source of standards of linguistic correctness that make the source either internal to the minds of individuals, such as Fodorian and Chomskyan accounts, or external to us altogether such as the objectified meanings offered by Platonic or Fregean objects (Williams 1999: 227).

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[2] I note that Wittgenstein, in characteristically self-critical vein, frames this remark as follows '…to put the matter badly and in a way which must be corrected later…' but clearly this fundamental understanding of the connection between meaning and use that he was teasing out in his lectures in the late 1930s remained central to his views on linguistic meaning.

[3] The New Zealand habit of responding to a question with the apparent contradiction 'yeah, nah' is a similar case. Despite appearing to contravene the law of excluded middle, it is used to say no, but with vagueness or uncertainty.

For Wittgenstein, linguistic rules, indeed rules for how to proceed correctly in any of the vast array of practices that constitute our ways of being in the world and with others, just are techniques of correct use. Many of the observations he makes in the context of considering the issues that constitute what are often referred to as the 'rule-following considerations' are essentially a series of reminders about what rules and rule-following amount to *in practice* as opposed to in theory (PI §§197–202; RFM: VI.31–34). Traditional considerations of what constitutes 'going on in the same way' lead to the apparent sceptical impasse that Wittgenstein articulates for us at PI §201. First we are induced to a concern about whether the moves we make in a practice really amount to going on in the same way. This can be understood as an appeal for the right to confidence with respect to our rule-governed actions. Secondly, assuming that confidence is available, we want to know what makes it the case that we are going on in the same way—what is the ground of that confidence? Traditionally, epistemology has encouraged the expectation that justification will be found (or found to be lacking) outside of the practices for which we seek vindication. Anything else—any kind of justificatory force within the practices themselves—will feel like an epistemic cop-out; it will fall short of our expectations. This is the response that Wittgenstein says we should come to see can be relinquished. These misplaced expectations are undermined by means of returning our understanding back to the conceptual (what Wittgenstein often refers to as 'internal') connections between rules, practices and communities (PI §202, §§241–2, §258) and between meaning and use.

Wittgenstein's remarks amount to a dissolution of what he sees as the illusion of a paradox that is diagnosed to be the result of wrong-headed thinking about rules as rail-like guides to linguistic practices, the consequence of which is that whichever way of making the next move in a practice seems right can be right (PI §201). This is the paradox taken literally and, arguably, resolved by way of a sceptical solution by Kripke (1982). It has become standard to read Wittgenstein as first describing the conditions that lead to the apparent paradox and then rejecting the rule-following 'problem' *qua* problem and providing us with reminders of how rule-governed behaviours work in (ordinary, everyday) practice in order to lead us out of the ways of thinking about practices that led to the appearance of that paradox.[4] Cavell appeals to the notion of form of life as a source of relief for what he terms the 'vertigo' induced by coming to accept, as Wittgenstein is said to advocate, that there is no metaphysically deeper ground for correct moves in a practice—nothing more that makes them correct—than our forms of life. *Lebensformen*, then, are the bedrock beyond which no further justification is possible and they should be accepted as the given (PI §217; PPF §345). Where we agree in our judgements, it is not merely as a consequence of our sharing the same

[4]See for example, Baker and Hacker (1985) and Pears (1988), for accounts that could be considered to develop the 'standard view'.

opinion (PI §241). Rather, our arriving at the same place ensues from our being in the world within the same form(s) of life.[5]

3 McDowell on Learning and *Bildung*

Following Cavell, McDowell notes the epistemic difficulty we may confront in accepting that our forms of life are the only available source of normativity within our rule-governed practices. Accepting this philosophically counter-intuitive insight requires us to overcome a type of epistemic vertigo, an unease at the lack of a solid, practice-independent underpinning for our ways of being in the world. According to McDowell, the remedy for this unease is to acknowledge that the understanding of rule-following and justification that had previously provided a sense of security is a 'consoling myth' that offers only 'illusory security' (1994: 207). Closure, then, is achieved only through accepting that it is the gravitational pull exerted on our actions and judgements by our form of life that keeps our practices on track. Accepting this also involves accepting an apparent circularity in the relationship between practices and norms in those practices. If the criteria of correctness for a practice are generated by nothing more than what we do within that practice against the backdrop not of anything independent of the practice (such as naturalistic norms or platonic forms) but the very forms of life constituted by the web of our practices, then we need to overcome any anxiety we feel in the face of the insight that criteria of correctness are, and can only be, generated internally to those practices. Philosophical solace is available if we accept that this circularity is not vicious and that coming to recognise it through the reminders that Wittgenstein assembles for us offers powerful insights into the way in which it is only within the web of practices and forms of our lives that a gap can be maintained between a move's seeming right to us and its being right.[6]

It is often commented that although scholars have set quite significant store by the notion of forms of life, Wittgenstein himself uses it sparingly and with little amplification. Thus some argue that we should not overplay the work that the idea does in his later work. On the other hand, it is generally agreed that Wittgenstein was expanding upon a notion borrowed from Spengler and that he did not view it as a technical term requiring explanation (Haller 2014: 82–85; Glock 1996: 124). Indeed to have meant it as a technical term or theoretical term of art would have gone against the grain of the philosophical approach that he advocated and strived

[5]I implicitly allow the possibility of sharing forms of life here in order to allow space for the possibility of forms of life that are sufficiently similar to share certain practices, yet also significantly different in certain respects (see Bowell 2009).

[6]An alternative way of articulating this thought would be that the concepts involved in such practices are *response-dependent* where that label is understood in a *modest* sense; i.e. as meaning that responses are invoked in the determination of concepts' extensions as opposed to meaning that the features identified by the concept are themselves response-dependent.

to practise. In a passage often cited by McDowell (1994: 207), Cavell insightfully fleshes out Wittgenstein's notion of form of life thus:

> We learn and teach words in certain contexts, and then, we are expected, and expect others, to be able to project them into further contexts. Nothing insures that this projection will take place (in particular, not the grasping of universals nor the grasping of books of rules), just as nothing insures that we will make, and understand, the same projections. That on the whole we do is a matter of our sharing routes of interest and feeling, modes of response, senses of humour and of significance and of fulfilment, of what is outrageous, of what is similar to what else, what a rebuke is, what forgiveness, of when an utterance is an assertion, when an appeal, when an explanation—all the whirl of organism Wittgenstein calls 'forms of life'. Human speech and activity, sanity and community, rest upon nothing more, but nothing less than this. It is a vision as simple as it is difficult, and as difficult as it is (and because it is) terrifying. (OC: 161)

What then of learning and teaching rules thus conceived? We have seen that, by Wittgenstein's lights, the meaning of a word or phrase is the regular, shared use to which we put it, or the way in which it is employed within our practices. Understanding language, then, consists in nothing more than knowing how to *use* its words, phrases, tones, and so on, in context. The consequence of this is that learning the rules is nothing more than learning how to use the language, to play the language games. Teaching in this context is basically conveying how to use language; initiation into linguistic practices. It is teaching someone how to *do* something. Moreover, for Wittgenstein, getting to grips with how we teach and learn rules is key to understanding what it is to follow the rules. For, as he emphasises, once we describe how teaching and learning take place, we have said all that can be said about acting correctly according to a rule. (RFM: VII.26)

> To repeat, what the correct following of a rule consists in cannot be described more closely than by describing the learning of 'proceeding according to the rule'. And this description is an everyday one, like that of cooking and sewing, for example. It presupposes as much as these. It distinguishes one thing from another, and so it informs a human being who is ignorant of something particular. (RFM: VII.26)[7]

As Taylor points out (1995: 177), acting in accordance with a rule can involve a judgement call; it is not always automatic and unreflective in the sense captured by Wittgenstein's analogy with obeying an order (PI §206). Insight and understanding are required in order to determine how one should act in a given situation, and this is not the same as knowing how to formulate the rule. That is to say, what is needed is practical wisdom. The realisation that the acquisition and application of *practical* wisdom are necessary to our becoming, and remaining, competent users of language throws into sharp relief the way in which linguistic practices, though frequently the immediate focus of Wittgenstein's interest, are just one region in the terrain of the customs, habits and practices of acts, of doing things, of which our living in the world is comprised (PI §23). Indeed, in the final texts that contribute to

[7]As well as drawing our attention to the mundane, diurnal nature of language use, this observation also reminds us that using language—talking, writing, speaking, singing, and so on—are activities, thus prefiguring the more explicit practical turn we witness in *On Certainty*.

Wittgenstein's later work, especially in *On Certainty*, we see a more explicit reorientation towards deeds rather than words (OC §204, §402). By way of example, here in New Zealand/Aotearoa, many of us non-Māori find ourselves as visitors on the Marae (spiritual place, meeting house, home of ceremonies and celebrations). Learning how one should act in this setting, learning how one should *be* there involves not only learning how certain phrases, such as greetings, are used and being able to make the judgement call as to which is appropriate with a particular person(s) in a particular circumstance, but also learning where to sit (women never sit in the front row, for instance), when to stand, when to approach, with whom it is appropriate to exchange a *hongi* (forehead to forehead greeting), and so on. These deeds are intertwined with and suffused with language; they too have to be learned and taught. For Māori, they are part of an upbringing; others, like me, learn and are taught them as if learning a new language, a new way of being in the world. Practical wisdom extends too to the need continually to interpret and reinterpret how one should act or use a word. As Wittgenstein acknowledges in *On Certainty* (§97), our practices are in flux, are renewed and altered and their boundaries change as we bend and sway with the environmental, social and economic shifts that shape our habitus. Thus, we are always learning, always being taught, and becoming newly ac-*custom*-ed to alterations in our ways of being.

Given Wittgenstein's insightful recognition of the ways in which language is bound up with the diversity of our activities, our form of life (PI §23), it is not unnatural to incline, as McDowell does, for example, towards a picture of learning how to act within these practices that places the notion of *Bildung* at its centre. However, in investigating the ways in which Wittgenstein talks about learning and teaching. I seek to show that, although self-formation must, of necessity, occur if we are to become properly initiated into and immersed in the ways of being that constitute the form of our lives, Wittgenstein himself saw the process as more didactic and teacher-led than the notion of *Bildung* as McDowell adopts it, would imply. McDowell's Wittgensteinian narrative constitutes a building block of the project he undertakes in *Mind and World*, a project whereby he seeks to demonstrate the reconciliation of reason and nature, of the normative and the natural; a reconciliation achieved through the recognition that they are in continuity rather than opposed.[8] An in-depth discussion of the project of *Mind and World* would take us too far off track here. Instead I draw on the account developed there of how we are able to become properly immersed in our form of life and consider to what extent that account finds resonance in Wittgenstein's own thinking about teaching and learning language and other ways of being in and coping with the world and with each other. Taking Aristotle as a starting point, McDowell develops a

[8]In an early articulation of this theme in his work McDowell couches it in terms of the "interpenetration" of the inner (mind) and outer (world) realms (McDowell 1986: 150–1).

humanised naturalistic account of our being in the world according to which we come fully to be in the world and to access it by dint of developing our *second* nature.[9] According to this narrative, it is because of the process of *Bildung* that the nature that we develop is humanised, that it is largely *second* nature. As Charles Taylor puts it, according to McDowell, the process of *Bildung* ensures our journey from mere mechanism to full (Kantian) spontaneity (2002: 111). This cognitive, cultural and intellectual upbringing and cultivation opens us up to the possibility of understanding the world, enabling us to be in the world effectively. It takes place within the linguistic and conceptual practices into which we are in the process of becoming immersed. For we already inhabit those practices in a very basic way. As we come into being in the world, we become more at home in those practices, so that eventually we can fully live in the world. A large part of this educative process involves our coming to recognise similarities between objects, between cases, between the requirements imposed by situations. As Wittgenstein notes (PPF §221), this ability to recognise relevant sameness and difference is central to our coming to participate fully in rule-governed behaviours.[10] The fact that we come into the world linguistically primed and (with the exception of unusual, but well-documented, cases) immediately embraced by ways of living that are situated in and performed within language means that we come into the world equipped with the potential (if properly nurtured) for coming to be fully in the world. We develop the capacity for understanding and judgement, our conceptual capacities, through a socialised process of initiation into existing practices.[11] This capacity for appropriate recognition emerges as a result of our becoming at home within the practices into which we are initiated.

Although Wittgenstein does not articulate his thoughts in these terms, McDowell's thought that our being initiated into practices that constitute our ways of coping with and being in the world is, in some sense, a natural process is resonant of some of Wittgenstein's observations (McDowell 1994: 95). Wittgenstein often refers to his philosophical approach as that of supplying remarks on the 'natural history of mankind' which are, by his lights, uncontroversial facts that escape our notice because they are always in front of us (PI §415). Included among these facts of our lives are activities such as 'giving orders, asking questions,

[9]McDowell's notion of second nature goes beyond a strictly Aristotelian notion, which lacks the cultural and social dimensions of the process of becoming oneself that play a significant role for McDowell. In (one of) his Précis of *Mind and World* (1998: 367), McDowell explains that he offers the idea of second nature as therapeutic reminder, thereby placing his approach in broad alignment with a key tenet of the *resolute reading* of Wittgenstein favoured by, among others, James Conant, Cora Diamond and Rupert Read (Crary 2000).

[10]In his response-dependence based straight solution to the rule-following problem, Pettit (1990) also identifies this ability as key to rule-following. For McDowell it is a significant part of coming fully into personhood.

[11]These practices may also incorporate criticism and interrogation of current ways of going on and the subsequent development of new ways of going on.

having a chat…walking, eating, drinking, playing' (PI §25). So we see that Wittgenstein's use of 'natural' invokes a kind of 'naturalism, humanly-speaking'; in which are included not only those activities in which we might still engage were we not human animals—walking, eating, drinking, being playful, for instance—but also activities that are essentially human—taking a stroll for pleasure, giving a dinner party, ordering a drink at a bar, playing games—and beyond the natural in the sense of first nature.[12] It is activities such as these that constitute our forms of life through which we live out our second nature.

4 Learning and Educating

Since, as Wittgenstein had long recognised, meaning is socialised, initiate training —showing the learner how our practices are enacted, how we go on in the same way—provides the means by which the learner comes to conform. Training, then, is indispensable in enabling the learner to become fully embedded in her community. Through the process of training, a change occurs in the learner whereby she begins by conforming to the behaviour of her teachers and comes eventually to obey the rule. She develops from unskilled participant to skilled actor (Williams 1999: 205). Training, then, provides scaffolding towards eventual autonomy and to becoming someone who could themselves teach others. Thus the learner moves gradually, but (almost) inevitably towards equality with her teacher. When we are fully trained in a technique, have fully learned how to go on, are completely immersed in a practice, that practice becomes natural to us in the sense that the way to go on becomes obvious to us, unavoidable, we continue in the practice inexorably. Thus our confidence in our practices, our certainty that we are, indeed, doing the right thing, making the right moves, becomes, as Wittgenstein observes, something '*animal*' (OC §258–9). It is a confidence that is achieved through acting and interacting successfully. It becomes something we embody.

While it is clear that one of Wittgenstein's major preoccupations is with how we reach the point at which certain ways of going on become natural and non-negotiable for us, the German terms in which he discusses the process of learning and teaching throughout his later work indicate that he saw that process as one in which the teacher *leads* the learner to the point where she is able independently to participate fully in a practice. He demonstrated far less interest in the process of *self*-formation associated with the tradition of *Bildung*. Indeed, Wittgenstein himself does not use the term '*Bildung'* when discussing the educative process whereby we are initiated into the practices the weave of which constitutes our form of life. It is not unreasonable to suggest that this absence reflects Wittgenstein's ideas about learning and educating which are expressed using a variety of terms associated with educating: *Erziehung*,

[12]The phrase 'Naturalism Humanly Speaking' originates from Hilary Putnam. See his Many Faces of Realism (1985: 54).

Abrichtung, *Unterricht*, *Lehren*, *Anleiten* and *Beibringen*, all of which connote a sense of an activity that is dialogical, that involves both teacher and learner and a more prescriptive process of initiation than the culturally and socially embedded lifelong process of self-formation that is articulated by the use of '*Bildung*'. I want to show, then, that Wittgenstein's depiction of our cultivation as humans being in the world, our opening up to the world and becoming fully enmeshed in our form of life, is a depiction of scenarios in which learning and teaching are somewhat more directed and formal than could be solely derived from the resources offered by the tradition of *Bildung*. Wittgenstein presents the learner's relationship with her mentors as one in which the latter leads the former, through the example of her own practice, towards an understanding of the correct way to go on.[13] The way in which Socrates demonstrates the process of enquiry through the practice of *elenchus* would stand as an example of the process of learning by doing and by being shown through others' deeds that is at play in the scenarios that are the foci of Wittgenstein's attention here.

While on the one hand he employs Augustine's conception of language as an instance of an over-simplified understanding of language, on the other Wittgenstein does not demur from Augustine's description of the way children are first initiated into simple language games—children learn, not only from replicating the words of their elders, but also from noticing and then imitating their facial expressions, tone and gestures (PI §1). Indeed he uses Augustine's model in the remarks that follow, in which he constructs a picture of children learning a primitive language game through receiving instruction (*Unterricht*) and conditioning-oriented training (*Abrichtung*) in how to go on in the language game in question. In these early passages in the *Investigations*, Wittgenstein is specifically addressing how children learn language and, more specifically still, how the most primitive of our language games are learned. It seems to me, admittedly somewhat speculatively, that Wittgenstein's observations about teaching and learning are influenced by a mental model of a school teacher and a school pupil—Wittgenstein frequently refers to the learner as a '*Schüler*', a pupil—and of how children learn in such situations. This model was likely influenced by his own experiences with his tutors as a child and his, much documented, time as a school teacher in a rural Austrian school (e.g. Monk 1991: 192–233). Thus the cases he describes and draws upon are captured to a large extent as situations in which the teacher and learner are rarely on equal terms and in which learning takes the form of following the teacher's lead and being drilled until such time that one can follow the rule for oneself. There is much pedagogy, but little heutagogy (learner-determined learning). That said, the learner is still learning by doing. Even in the most primitive cases such as those sketched in the opening sections of the *Philosophical Investigations*, she learns the words 'block', 'pillar' and 'slab' as she does things with the blocks, pillars and slabs to

[13]As Cavell notes, however, Wittgenstein can be understood as seeing the mentor as allowing for an element of choice and creativity on the part of the learner such it is possible that the mentor could learn from her mentee (2006: 19).

which these terms refer.[14] Here in PI §5 Wittgenstein is unequivocal about the nature of teaching that takes place in the case of these basic practices—it is not an explanation, but training—*ein Abrichten*. In such cases, one might indeed expect an account of learning and teaching as a simpler training process than that suggested by *Bildung*. However, at later points in the *Investigations* where Wittgenstein deals more broadly with the acquisition of abilities to follow rules more generally, he continues to express his thoughts in terms of the notions of instruction, teaching and training (PI §189, §206, §211, §§223–5; Z, §318; WL 1981). Elsewhere, when considering initiation into more complex practices, Wittgenstein continues to use the notion of education, or upbringing, employing the term *Erziehung*. In *Culture and Value*, Wittgenstein discusses the possibility of educating someone to believe in God (CV, 85–86). He observes that experiences in life (not sense experiences per se), experiences of suffering, for instance, 'force the concept on us'. One might come to believe in God's existence, he writes, by means of a certain kind of 'upbringing', a shaping of his life in some way. Once again we see Wittgenstein writing in terms of the learner being *shaped* and shaping herself by means of the upbringing she receives from being shown or led by another person.[15] His analogies with military training intended to remind us of the inculcated, habitual, non-reflective feel of rule-following practices (once one is immersed in them) also reinforce this picture of the learner. This contrasts, I suggest, with the notion of *self*-formation inherent in the notion of '*Bildung*' favoured by McDowell.

Michael Luntley has drawn attention to Wittgenstein's use of the terms '*Abrichtung*'—usually rendered as 'training' by Wittgenstein's translators—when discussing language learning (2012). As Luntley acknowledges, '*Abrichtung*' connotes training through conditioning—the kind of repetitive stimulus and response approach that is used to train animals. Luntley observes that scholars have tended to overlook the role Wittgenstein affords this kind of training in his picture of the development of second nature. However, when Wittgenstein does employ this term, somewhat surprisingly given its negative connotations in German, he tends to use it specifically when talking about a stimulus–response-type process associated with becoming initiated into the most primitive language games, and when drawing analogies between learning how to participate in certain language games and learning how to respond to an order in a military context (PI §§5–6, §86, §§157–8, §189, §198, §206, §223, §441, §630; PPF §70). When discussing the more complex ways of talking about, thinking about and being in the world, Wittgenstein tends to opt for the more general and less authoritarian '*Erziehung*'

[14]There is a long history of philosophical recognition of the educational value of construction play. In their article on Minecraft, arguably the digital version of block play, Fanning and Mir (2014) note that philosophers as diverse as Locke, Walter Benjamin and Maria Montessori discuss the role of block play in children's learning.

[15]In his review of *Mind and World* ("Exorcism and Enchantment" 1996: 104) Michael Williams draws our attention to the Latin etymology of 'education', from *e-ducere* a leading out. Leading out suggests that there is someone to do the leading, someone to provide guidance and direct our attention to the communal environment in which this kind of learning takes place.

with its connotations of being educated by others. Certainly Wittgenstein saw a stimulus–response-type training, as *a* means by which we are initiated into some of the practices by which we are able to be in the world, but the contexts in which he employs the idea captured by '*Abrichtung*' tend to be restricted to specific language games that are relatively primitive and to those contexts where he is discussing examples of techniques that are learned and taught by drilling such as the case of learning the meaning of 'all' discussed at RFM 1, 10. While Wittgenstein's understanding of the teaching and learning interaction in such cases may seem to privilege an authoritarian seeming approach, these interactions do represent an early step towards eventual equality between learner and (former) teacher. So while Luntley usefully reminds us of the important role this particular concept of training plays in Wittgenstein's picture of learning and teaching, *Abrichtung* is only part of that picture.

In passages in *Culture and Value* dated a couple of years earlier than the *Investigations* (CV: 69–70), Wittgenstein discusses how someone might be taught to understand music. This might be called 'explaining music', he observes, but what is being acquired is the ability to appreciate music (to 'get' music as we might say). The cues and examples that enable such acquisition are significantly similar to those invoked in Augustine's discussion of learning even the primitive language games discussed above. Someone who already understands music will listen with a different expression on his face, will use certain expressive movements when listening, will talk differently about it from someone who lacks that understanding. And he will be able to go on beyond this particular instance, responding in similar ways in similar cases. In this discussion, Wittgenstein uses the term '*beibringen*', which his translators render as 'learn'. *Beibringen* has the sense of reflective learning, or learning the skill of appreciating something. Thus the teacher guiding or helping someone to the point where they understand, or in the music case, appreciate the interplay of melody, harmony, tone and expression more fully. It also has the sense of conveying a meaning to someone, which is what Wittgenstein captures when he notes that we might draw attention to the movements and gestures of the teacher and also when he observes that we might teach someone to understand poetry and painting as a route to helping them understand music.

So along with the similarity to the Augustinian case of the child learning simple, elementary linguistic moves, the music case also typifies a more advanced type of learning, a type of learning in which the learner is already sufficiently educated such that she is able to learn more autonomously. The person playing the role of the teacher s*hows* how a piece of music can be best understood and appreciated, but the learner herself must do more than copy the teacher's behaviour and look for affirmation that she has done the correct thing. Further support for the idea that Wittgenstein is noticing a difference between certain kinds of teaching–learning scenarios is that he also uses the term '*beibringen*' at PI §143 where he discusses the case of trying to 'wean' someone off a systematic mistake they make when copying a number series. This is another case in which the learner already

understands sufficient to be in a position potentially to be brought to see (understand, appreciate) the nature of their mistake and to grasp the normal way of going on.[16]

All of Wittgenstein's various ways of articulating the teaching–learning experience capture the way in which they are dialogical. As well as reminding us that the learner is a social being, not an isolated individual mind, and that teaching–learning interactions are social interactions, he shows us that even though there is an uneven power differential between the learner and the teacher, the process they are enacting is a partnership in which neither partner can play their proper part without the other doing so. In this way, the teacher and learner are partnered like dance partners, musicians playing a duet or doubles partners at tennis, one partner's moves are attuned to and dependent on those of their other; together the actions that they both take form a whole. This is similar to Wittgenstein's frequent example of giving an order and its being obeyed. The action only takes place if both parties play their part properly—one gives the order, the other follows it. The case of the builders illustrates the dialogical nature of our interactions more broadly. Even this 'primitive' scenario is dialogical. It would make no sense for a lone builder to say to himself 'block', 'slab', 'pillar' and then to fetch them. The scenario only makes sense when there is someone to whom the order or request is being given and it is only enacted properly when that person responds correctly. Many of the gestures that play a part in our linguistically suffused ways of being also function in this way. The much cited gesture of brushing under the chin with the fingertips made by Italian economist Sraffa in response to Wittgenstein's insistence that a proposition and the state of affairs it describes must share the same logical form has no meaning if there is no one to whom it is directed (Monk 1991: 260–1). Carried out in the absence of others, it is merely touching one's chin; carried out in the presence of others, it connotes 'no' or 'go away'.[17]

5 Conclusion

In this paper, I have presented an account of Wittgenstein's depictions of teachers and learners in the processes of initiation into the practices, habits, customs that constitute rules by his lights. I began by providing an overview of the way in which Wittgenstein points us to the internal, conceptual connections between meaning and

[16]We are able to learn because we are already embraced by our form of life in the most basic cultural sense. The culture into which we are being acculturated forms the background to our being from the moment we arrive in the world. We are always already in culture to some extent.

[17]Exactly what is connoted seems to vary according to cultural location. In Belgium, France and Tunisia it is used to tell someone to go away, in Italy to say 'no'. In Derek Jarman's 1994 film about Wittgenstein (PI/PPF) the anecdote is dramatised by means of a scene in which schoolgirls give two fingers to a startled Wittgenstein. Again, the gesture is meaningless unless directed at another.

use and between rules and practices. In what followed I examined the extent to which Wittgenstein conceives of the process of teaching and learning the rules as a process of self-formation that could be captured by the idea of *Bildung*. In all of his depictions of teaching and learning scenarios, some kind of training or instruction occurs with the learner manifesting varying degrees of independence from the teacher. So while it is clear that in a broad sense learning to follow the rules, learning how to act within practices, including linguistic practices, takes place within the process of *Bildung*, an examination of Wittgenstein's observations on teaching and learning scenarios, of the terms he uses to express those observations and of his depictions of the teacher–learner relationship shows that his view of teaching and learning the rules was of processes that are more deeply dialogical and traditionally pedagogical than that of self-formation.

I have highlighted Wittgenstein's reminders that learning how to use language is learning how to *do* something, for the language game just is behaviour (Z §545). Thus by his lights, learning and teaching, and the learner's subsequently being able independently to continue on in the same way, are embodied practices. Often the teacher is depicted as demonstrating—showing—how the rule is followed through his own embodied practice (PI §433; OC: 78–80) and training is described as a shaping of reactions, many of which involve actions in addition to speaking or writing something down. The attention that Wittgenstein gives to gestures, facial expressions, expressive movements, to the physiognomy of following a rule in everyday life (PI §235) can be seen as a reminder of this embodiment, as a reminder that our entire network of practices, of ways of being in the world and with each other are embodied and thus are learned and taught in embodied ways.

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And if L. Wittgenstein Helped Us to Think Differently About Teacher Education?

Sébastien Chaliès and Stefano Bertone

Abstract This article outlines a broad research program (Lakatos 1987) in cultural anthropology that has been conducted over the past fifteen years in the field of teacher education. The core hypotheses of the program and their theoretical foundations, which are based on analytical philosophy (Wittgenstein in Philosophical investigations (PI). Blackwell, Oxford, 1968), are first reviewed: the immanence of the subject through and in the experience of language, the assumption of individuation and subsequent subjectivization, and subjectivization as the process of following rules and/or carrying out the actions governed by the rules. The theoretical advances in the study of subjectivization are then presented, along with the empirical research findings that show how the subjectivized individual in teacher education is constructed from and through learning rules. The article concludes with an explanation of why it is important to expand this research stream on subjectivization, which is defined as a process occurring in and through actions governed by rules.

Keywords Cultural anthropology · Subjectivization · Rules · Subject · Teacher education

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M.A. Peters and J. Stickney (eds.), *A Companion to Wittgenstein on Education*,
DOI 10.1007/978-981-10-3136-6_43

1 Introduction

This article outlines a "research program" (Lakatos 1994) that has been inspired essentially by the analytical philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein and developed over the past fifteen years in the field of teacher education. As part of a broad enterprise in "culturalist anthropology" (e.g., Bertone et al. 2009a; Chaliès et al. 2012, 2013) to study the construction of the subject in the context of professional education, the program grew out of a "core theory" (Lakatos 1994) and its main theoretical hypotheses: (i) The immanence of the subject is revealed by and through language experiences (Chauviré 2009; Proudfoot 2009; Taylor 1997), (ii) individuation leads to subjectivization (Laugier 2010; Macherey 2009), and (iii) subjectivization occurs by following rules and/or performing the actions governed by them (Butler 1997). As in any research program, the studies as a whole seek to stabilize these "hard core" assumptions and extend them through new "auxiliary" hypotheses (Lakatos 1994).

With respect to the theme of this collection of works, we present two of the theoretical hypotheses currently being explored in our research program, and they constitute the conceptual framework for this article. The original methodologies used in the empirical studies to (in)validate these hypotheses are then detailed. Last, these theoretical and methodological proposals are illustrated by a number of empirical results taken from studies in the field of teacher education.

2 Theoretical Framework

The two theoretical hypotheses were chosen because the empirical results thus far suggest that they are appropriate heuristics for addressing many of the problems in teacher education today. A notable issue that deserves attention is how to effectively implement the principle of alternation between the sequences of education at the university and in the schools with the sequences of classroom work.

2.1 *First Theoretical Hypothesis*

In this theoretical presentation, teaching someone (or being taught) how to teach means that the person will (learn to) carry out actions governed by "rules" (PI §§145–242)[1] and/or (learn to) identify those actions that the community of teachers considers as exemplifying the rules of their profession. These rules have nothing to do with the "situated normative experiences" (Lähteenmäki 2003) that are accepted by the community as rendering each teacher's actions intelligible, anticipatable, and

[1]Following convention, titles for Wittgenstein's works are abbreviated (PI = Philosophical Investigations), with section (§) or page number (p.), with full citation and initials in the References.

evaluable (Livet 1993). They instead carry the weight of authority as standards of correct practice within the community. Yet applying the rules can in no way be dictated, as every teacher who follows them is free at any moment to deviate from them, transgress them, or even refuse to follow them (Descombes 2004). For preservice teachers (PTs), these rules are a kind of experiential "grammar," not yet fully mastered but useful in helping them to recognize and/or judge how well their actions (Berducci 2004) conform to professional prescriptions (Clot 2008). Nevertheless, this experiential grammar is certainly not the be-all and end-all, to be learned and interiorized as a precondition to being able to teach day after day. It is instead an "arbitrary reality" (Searle 1998) composed of a complex system of endlessly shifting rules, constantly overwhelmed by the singularity of the situations and unexpected circumstances of teaching. What makes teacher education activities difficult from this theoretical perspective are the two registers of meaning and the heterogeneous, relatively autonomous actions.

(i) The first register of meaning is related to the emergence of normative capacities, which reveal "in some respects" the professional skills that make it possible to reduce dissimilarities between singular situations and see the "family resemblance" (PI §§46–49, §§67–73). Situational regularities can be identified, and the teacher is able to consider the circumstances as meaningful with regard to a system of rules that is being "played out" at a given instant and a given context (Le Du 2004). At this level, the normative capacities that have been developed let the teacher sample the lived experience, identify it as being more or less emblematic of the teaching profession, and make judgments on the pertinence, correctness, or meaning of the actions being observed or carried out (Descombes 2004).

(ii) The second register of meaning is related to carrying out the actions that "significant others" (the other members of the teaching community) consider satisfactory and meaningful in an established context. In this register, reflexivity is a kind of self-presence (Legrand 2005) that mobilizes neither symbolic representations nor clear awareness of what the actors are in the midst of doing. The meaning of an event becomes "transparent" only at the moment where it is apprehended in the course of action. Action is thus "governed by rules" (PI §219).

In this conception, alternation can be characterized by the activities in which each PT deploys a dual register of reflexivity (Ogien 2007).

(i) In classroom teaching situations, PTs are engaged in situated interactions with students and make decisions based on prereflexive consciousness. They carry out actions governed by rules, with these rules being "inherent" to action (Ogien 2007). Preconscious rules can nevertheless be the object of reflexive activity in post-lesson training. These rules are indeed potentially sayable either because they were learned in earlier reflexive training or because learning them has occurred implicitly within a community of practice (Lave and Wenger 1991) through nonverbal interactions and/or informal alignments with the observed practices of other teachers (Rogoff et al. 1996).

(ii) In other situations, PTs are engaged in dialogic activities or interactions whose object is classroom teaching as part of teacher education. The activities have characteristics that approach the idea of “consciousness as liaison” (Vygotski 2003) wherein the PTs use a register of reflexivity on the order of “apprehending the inherent” (Ogien 2007). In the course of these interactions, both verbal and non-verbal, they carry out actions of “following” the work rules, which enable them to identify, describe, comment on, and analyze lived experience. They thus act in accordance with the rules that are, at a given instant, both conscious and sayable because they have been learned in earlier reflexive training and through dialogic re-elaborations. Teacher education at the university and/or in the schools (e.g., during post-lesson interviews with the cooperating teacher (CT)) mainly calls on this register of reflexivity. In order to understand the outcomes and limitations of this register, certain characteristics should be detailed.

2.2 Second Theoretical Hypothesis

In order for PTs to engage in reflexive thinking about their classroom work, they first need to learn the rules so that they can correctly assign meaning to their experiences—that is, meaning in line with the expectations of the teaching community. Theoretically, learning these rules requires that the university supervisors (USs) or CTs engage in “ostensive teaching” (PI §6) by which they teach the meaning of those experiences considered as exemplary of the work rules. A US or CT will indeed judge a PT’s action as inadequate by referring to the rules that structure the meaning of the teaching profession and that thus serve as yardsticks for measurement. For each of these experiences, judged and/or taught, the US or CT creates “meaningful links” (Bertone et al. 2009a, b) that associate (i) a language experience that names a fact or action, (ii) examples that are described, shown, and/or demonstrated, and used as samples or emblematic examples, and (iii) the results that are usually associated or expected in the teaching community. The meaningful links taught by the US or CT can then become real “benchmark” experiences (Williams 2002) as PTs interact in the training situation and/or act in the classroom. They are able to build on these samples of exemplary experience to give meaning to and judge observed events.

This step is nevertheless not sufficient (Bertone et al. 2009b), and theoretically, the US or CT must next engage in a new activity of supporting the PTs as they begin to follow the rules (Chaliès et al. 2013). Through this support, the US or CT not only makes it possible for the PTs to carry out the expected actions (e.g., by arranging the work situation), but they also and above all ensure that these first steps in following the rules lead to the usually associated and expected results. Only by observing these results will the PTs be able to relate a practical work intention to a rule that was taught (Cash 2009), and this connection is far from obvious: The intention to obtain the result cannot logically precede the expected action, prescribed by the US or CT but hitherto unknown to the PT, both in its execution and in its positive or negative

outcome. It is thus by correctly following the rules that were taught and observing the expected results in the classroom that the PTs complete their learning and can develop professionally and subjectively within the rules (Nelson 2008). During these first efforts at rule following, the US or CT "monitors" compliance and intervenes, if necessary, with "ostensive explanation" (Davis 2009). This is accomplished by multiplying the examples described, shown, and/or demonstrated so as to remove any possible misinterpretation (Chaliès et al. 2012). It is only at this point, when the rules have been learned, that the PTs can free themselves from the control of the community members. They are now able to build a system for interpreting the rules (Winch 2009) that authorizes an "extended" use of the meaningful links outside of the original situations in which they were learned. This extended use is based on the identification of a "family resemblance" between the circumstances of the current situation and those of the original training situation. From these meaningful links, the PTs are finally able to organize a complex network of similarities, "understand" the new situation as it unfolds, and ultimately succeed in producing activities consistent with community expectations—all while gradually freeing themselves from the control of the teaching community. In these situations, the US or CT helps the PTs to engage in highly personal instances of following the rules and to experiment with their original meaning (Butler 1997) so as to be optimally equipped to adapt them to the ever-shifting circumstances of teaching.

3 Method

Essentially the same methods are used for all the studies in the research program (Bertone and Chaliès 2015). In all cases, four successive steps are respected.

3.1 Step 1: Establishing the Research Conditions

In this step, the researchers (Rs) (i) define a new hypothesis derived from the core hypotheses of the research program and (ii) select a field of potential study. They thus formalize a new hypothesis from the results of previous work. They then identify a professional education program as a potential field of study, and they proceed to an inventory and review of the international literature in the field of study.

3.2 Step 2: Establishing the Research-Working Conditions

In this step, the Rs meet with the actors (US, CT, and/or PT) in the selected program to present the hypothesis and the field of study. At this time, they are attentive to the actors' concerns or "requests for assistance." The Rs and the actors then agree to engage in (in)validating the hypothesis and finding solutions to some of the concerns.

3.3 Step 3: Data Collection and Processing

For each study, two types of data are collected and transcribed verbatim.

(i) "Extrinsic" data, usually audio–video recordings, are collected at each stage of the study using a video camera and a wireless microphone worn by each actor.
(ii) "Intrinsic" data are collected from the audio–video recordings of self-confrontation interviews (SCIs) conducted by an R with each actor at the end of each step in the program. These interviews are conducted to reconstruct a posteriori the rules learned and/or followed during situations of training and/or teaching. All interviews follow the same protocol. The interviews are semi-structured, and the R encourages the actors to talk about the meanings they attributed to the observed actions and any judgments that were made. By asking for clarification or provoking controversy, the R further invites them to substantiate these judgments. Last, the R invites them to talk about the results they had expected from the actions being viewed.

The data are processed so that each actor's activity, its evolution over time, and the articulation of all actors' activities (US, CT, and/or PT) can be analyzed at each stage of the study. To achieve this, a four-step procedure was built (Chaliès et al. 2010).

(i) The extrinsic and intrinsic data are transcribed verbatim and then decomposed into units of interaction. These units are delimited by the meanings that the self-confronted actor attributes to the events being viewed. A new unit of interaction is created every time the subject of the meaning attributed by the actor changes.
(ii) For each unit of interaction, the elements supporting the meaning attributed by the actor are then identified. By convention, these supporting elements correspond to all the circumstances mentioned by the actor to explain to R how to arrive at the same meaning—that is, by following the same rule for the events of the viewed training situation.
(iii) For each unit of interaction, the rule followed by the actor to understand and judge his or her experience is then formalized. By convention, every rule is labeled from (a) the subject of the meaning attributed by the actor, (b) all the circumstances mentioned by the actor to support this meaning, and (c) the results observed and/or expected. To minimize R's interpretations, each rule is labeled using vocabulary close to that of the actors.
(iv) A double synchronic and diachronic grammatical inquiry is then conducted. The synchronic investigation compares the rules followed and/or learned by the actors during the same step, and the diachronic inquiry traces the historicity of the rules followed and/or learned by every actor over the entire training program. By convention, two actors are assumed to be following the same rule if the object of judgment, some of the supporting elements, and the associated results are identical.

3.4 Step 4: Progress of the Research Program

The progress of the research program is assessed by the empirical results. The overall results are organized in line with the initially defined auxiliary hypothesis. If the hypothesis is validated, it is incorporated into the program and it will serve much as the earlier hypotheses did: as the starting point for defining a new hypothesis. Otherwise, it is rejected.

4 Empirical Illustration

4.1 Elements of Contextualization

The two theoretical hypotheses and the methodological choices detailed above are illustrated by empirical results from a study whose principal characteristics can be summarized as follows. In this study, the hypothesis was the following: *The PT has to follow rules that need to be learned. This compels the educators to engage not only in ostensive teaching of the rules but also in supporting the first efforts at following them*. To (in)validate this hypothesis, the educational component under study was the traditional situation of a CT and PT in the public school system (for a review see Chaliès et al. 2009). This situation was modeled on the notion of educative mentoring (Feiman-Nemser 2001), which theoretically mitigates the separation between training (meetings of the CT and PT before and after lessons) and teaching. The collaborative mentoring in each PT/CT dyad comprised four successive steps over two consecutive weeks. Each mentoring sequence occurred once per trimester of the school year:

- Step A: The CT observed the PT's lesson;
- Step B: After the lesson, the CT and PT assessed the lesson and planned the next lesson (co-preparation);
- Step C: This planned lesson was carried out by the CT and the PT with the PT's students the following week (co-intervention);
- Step D: After this lesson, the CT and the PT assessed it (co-assessment).

4.2 Empirical Results

Two results are presented, chosen because they illustrate and validate the hypothesis of the study. They also suggest the need to reconsider the usual principle of alternating between training situations and suggest a new hypothesis related to rethinking the time of classroom work as a genuine time of training.

4.2.1 Making the Classroom a Training Situation on and of Work: Arranging the Work so that the PT Can Simulate Professional Practice

At the time of the co-intervention lesson (Step C), the PT and CT of Dyad 1 (subject: physical education) were standing in a corner of the gym to observe the students. They did not think that the students were doing what they had been asked to do during this badminton lesson ("*Score a point by hitting the shuttlecock with a downward movement [of the racket]*"). They were thus talking about the reasons for this difficulty and the possible solutions (Excerpt 1).

Excerpt 1

PT: So we need to review it (he mimes the action of hitting the shuttlecock toward the ground) because they (the students) are all like this (he mimes the action of hitting the shuttlecock upward).
CT: Yes.

PT: They're hitting it from underneath, like this (he mimes the student' action of hitting toward the ceiling)…
CT: So we need to show them!
PT: By holding the shuttlecock in front and we break the wrist to get under it from the bottom (he mimes the movement while speaking).

During the SCI, the PT justified his action with the CT. The excerpt that follows identifies the rule he followed during the lesson to engage with the CT (Excerpt 2).

Excerpt 2

PT: Here I'm practicing… with him (the CT) the points to review… I try almost to put myself in the situation.
R: You're practicing with him, you mean?
PT: I'm listing (the actions to do) so I don't forget anything… Break the wrist… somewhere in there, I sense that I'm going to have to say it (to the students)…
R: So you're trying to prepare?
PT: Sort of!
R: You say, I'm practicing… can you explain that?
PT: Almost like I'm explaining (to the CT)… I'm trying to verbalize, to clarify what I want to say…So that afterwards I can say it to the students…And it's something (verbalizing the instructions before giving them to the students) that he (the CT) does when we prepare together. When we were preparing (co-preparation of the lesson) he said it (what he would do) as if he were speaking to the students…

In this excerpt from the SCI, the PT gave the R the supporting elements that indicated his use of a rule: "*Prepare to tell the students what they have to do*" which meant placing himself "*in the situation*" as if he were already speaking to the students. He did this in front of the CT by "*trying to verbalize*" and "*practicing with him*" and "*listing*" what had to be delivered, "*as if he were explaining it.*" By following this rule, the PT expected to "*clarify*" and "*not forget*" the information he wanted to give the students during the demonstration.

Excerpt 2 provides access to the history of usages of this rule. The CT had initially taught the rule to the PT during the co-preparation of the lesson. The CT in fact revealed his own way of "*preparing to explain what the students needed to do*" by placing himself "*in the situation*" by simulation. The excerpt of the SCI that follows about the co-preparation meeting with the CT strengthens the idea that the PT started learning this rule during the co-preparation meeting (Excerpt 3).

Excerpt 3

PT: I listen to him (the CT). He builds the lesson directly here… I'm thinking that he's… When he's preparing the situation, he's already planning the instructions he's going to give the students…
R: Can you be more specific?
PT: He's letting the situation unfold there. He's preparing… In the way he prepares, he saves time and more than anything… He doesn't miss anything, he forgets nothing… Once on the field. Because while preparing, he's going to say… We're going to do… We're going to put them two on a court and then make them work on the wrist break… And he goes further than that… He says 'I serve, the other returns it'. Here, he's already… As if he were talking to the students.
R: And you?
PT: There I get it… how to prepare and be clear on the field… In fact, he practices… He already has a text prepared and he practices it. He worked out the instructions before giving them to the students…

Excerpt 3 informs on the quality of the articulation between the co-preparation and the classroom work in the collaborative mentoring situation. It shows that the PT "*understood how to prepare (the lesson) in advance to be clear while in class*" during the co-preparation. By observing the CT's actions and taking them as an example of what to do, he began the process of learning a rule that he then tried to follow in the lesson. The PT thus constructed a meaningful link between an experience that labels a professional practice ("*I'm thinking that he's... he's preparing the situation*") and an experience that lets him sample a work action. The CT thus demonstrated a rule, or it was demonstrated without him quite being aware as he neither stated it nor deliberately addressed it to the PT. Yet the PT followed this rule in the co-intervention lesson, both to elaborate his work and to interpret his classroom experience ("*I'm practicing the different points to make with him here... I'm trying to almost put myself into situation... As if I were explaining it to him... I try to verbalize, to clarify what I want to say... So that afterwards, I can give the instructions to the students,*" Excerpt 2). The co-intervention situation was therefore not merely a work situation for the PT. Because the CT was alongside him, the situation was in fact an occasion to follow the rule for the first time. Similar to and in continuity with the situation of co-preparation, it can be considered a real training situation for supporting the PT as he tracked the outcome of a rule learned in training. Ultimately, learning this rule exceeded the co-preparation and resulted in a self-prescription that organized his classroom actions while co-teaching.

4.3 Making the Classroom a Training Situation on and of Work: Arranging the Work so that the PT Can Follow the Rules

During his SCI about the co-intervention situation (Step C), the PT of Dyad 3 (subject: mathematics) said that for the first time he had noticed that following a rule taught by the CT had had the expected results (Excerpt 4).

Excerpt 4

PT: Here, it's working. They (the students) are listening.
R: It's working?
PT: Well, here I'm lowering my voice in fact, and it's pretty quick, they realize it… and they stop (talking).
R: And so?
PT: There it's kind of relief. In my head, I say 'finally! Oof, that's it, it's OK now, it's done.
R: And you feel better?
PT: Totally… It took a while but I'm finally there.
R: But you were looking for what?
PT: Well, there, it's a thing I'd been working on (with the CT) for a while now. To gain control, we work with silence.
R: Meaning?
PT: To make them (the students) listen to me I can raise (my voice) louder and louder, and they do the same. So the idea was to do this less. He (the CT) suggested that I speak more quietly to make them listen… They actually listen better when I keep my voice low… And that's what happened there. They listened better… so there I had better control of them.

This excerpt documents the PT's satisfaction with both his correct following of a rule taught by the CT ("*Manage the students*" stands for "*play with silence*" meaning "*speaking more quietly to the students*") and the result (they were "*more attentive*" and "*listening*"). The excerpt also indicates that "*it took time*" and required the PT's repeated attempts to follow the rule in order to finally see the expected results and end this part of his learning. The question now is whether or not the mentoring situation contributed to his learning.

The following excerpt is taken from the co-preparation of the lesson. It illustrates the CT's engagement in ostensive teaching of the rule (Excerpt 5).

Excerpt 5

CT: You don't always want to talk like that, louder and louder. I don't know if you realize it but you end up yelling… So in this case, to better manage the class… I would suggest you do the exact opposite. Get silence by silence. The idea is to play on your voice. You speak more quietly… And they are forced to stop, to listen up.
PT: Yes, but…
CT: It's not easy. For sure… But it still works really well. You keep lowering your voice until they start listening. You make them become attentive…

At that moment, the CT was engaged in ostensive teaching of the rule (he deliberately addressed it to the PT). By doing so, he created a meaningful link between the statement ("*Manage the class*") and the practices ("*play with silence,*" "*lower*

your voice") of the experiential circumstances that were clearly identified ("*you end up yelling*"). He also pointed out the results expected from following this rule ("*you make them become attentive*"). From this perspective, the CT helped the PT to become engaged in following the rule.

Two distinct steps in training emerged in the analysis of this case. The first is the CT's verbalization of examples of the rule. Quite removed from the actual circumstances of the PT's classroom work, this description alone can only guarantee the "tracking" of the outcome of rule following. The second step is the support to the PT in his classroom attempts to follow the rule. The excerpt of the PT's SCI about this moment in the co-preparation sequence documents the developmental impact of Step 1 of training and indicates that the PT has constructed an "expectation" (Excerpt 6).

Excerpt 6

PT: Here it's clearer. I know what I have to do.
R: Which is what?
PT: He (the CT) told me to stop trying to speak louder and louder… I have to try to lower my voice so that they listen more.
R: So there you have a solution. And before that there were no solutions?
PT: Yes. But I had to wait to see what would happen in class.

The excerpt from the CT's SCI about the co-intervention sequence documents the efficient training activity that allowed the PT to correctly follow the rule and observe the classroom effects (Excerpt 7).

Excerpt 7

CT: It's like before. I don't know if you saw but, well, for the instructions, every time he gives them to his group I try to be there. Just before, I actually left my group of students to be there (…)
R: Did you plan to help him that way?
CT: Yes, I tried to simplify those moments when he had to give the instructions… So there, I took a seat next to a couple of agitated students.

This excerpt illustrates not only the importance of supporting the PT in class, but also and above all the need to arrange the circumstances in which he would try to follow a rule he had just learned. The CT's engagement in managing the PT's students (by trying to be "*more present*" and by leaving his own group) "*simplified*" the task of "*giving instructions.*" By showing himself and/or by positioning himself differently in the classroom ("*I took a seat next to a couple of agitated students*"), the CT calmed the class and thereby allowed the PT to follow the rule and, most importantly, to see the result of doing so.

5 Discussion

The empirical results presented above validate the prediction of new developments linked to the hypothesis of the study. These results indicate that CTs should not stop at ostensively teaching the rules and therefore that the hypothesis is good. CTs in

fact need to complete ostensive teaching by "supporting the first steps of rule following" as soon as the PT is next in the classroom. Although certain aspects of the complexity of professional development (especially with regard to its temporality) will no doubt be overlooked, we nevertheless have chosen to focus the discussion on two points.

The PTs were able to self-address a rule learned in the co-preparation session or reflexive training, while they were in the classroom because an "expectation" had emerged, but this resulted in a "resolved action" only because of the CTs' attentive classroom support. Two distinct training activities were notably identified: ostensible teaching (not deliberate) and ostensive teaching (deliberate) of a rule. The observation that these activities were complementary and relatively autonomous suggests the specificity and limited contributions of training related to a reflexive system of meaning and the analysis of PT classroom experience. Although identifying a problem and prescribing a rule to resolve it favored the emergence of new capacities to "perceive" notable classroom events and to even "expect" them, ostensive training was not enough to transform the PTs' power to act in the classroom. This result was previously reported (Bertone et al. 2009a, b), but this time our in-depth analysis revealed something unexpected: New teaching activities emerged in ordinary circumstances and under real classroom constraints when an expert (the CT) was there to facilitate this emergence by arranging the circumstances. Satisfactory rule-following required more than the CTs' mere presence in the classroom. Instead, the CTs played a very active role in ensuring the PTs' success in following a rule and finding personal confirmation that the rule had indeed produced the effects usually expected by the teaching community. These results provide greater detail on the findings in the international literature that indicate that real changes in PTs' classroom actions are only observed when their mentors' work is intense and systematic (Miller-Rigelman and Ruben 2012) and constructed within a reassuring and supportive community of practice (Roehrig et al. 2008).

This "discovery" of results late in the training process about what a newly learned action can produce echoes the findings in a recent study (Rozelle and Wilson 2012). These authors documented the effectiveness of PTs' genuine imitations of their CTs after systematically observing them. They notably reported that these PTs reproduced the lessons to the point of giving the exact same explanations, examples, and anecdotes, although their actions were (i) too rapid and (ii) too rigid to allow for any improvization that would take into account their personal interaction with students. These actions, which Rozelle and Wilson called "carbon copies," were considered satisfactory by the CTs. Moreover, when the PTs were no longer able to observe their CTs' actions due to an increasing number of teaching placements, they managed to gradually free themselves from these expert models through a growing capacity to adjust their actions in the classroom.

Conceptually, these findings raise questions about CTs and the precise circumstances when switching from ostensive rule teaching to actively supporting PTs in the classroom is effective and relevant. Regarding the PTs, they raise questions about the shift from an initial capacity to unambiguously "apply" rules to the

capacity to handle multiple interpretations adapted to the particularities of each classroom situation.

In this regard, this study suggests that learning a rule can be considered as completed only when both registers of meaning (the inherent and understanding the inherent) have been constructed and "following the rules" is consubstantially associated with actions that are "governed by the rules." This model of alternation in teacher education provides a detailed look at the nature of the interactions in training situations needed for the effective development of professional activity. It strengthens and clarifies earlier results on PT satisfaction with their teaching activity in the classroom and in training (Chaliès et al. 2013). Two phases appeared in the development of the PTs' professional activity. First, the PTs acted in compliance with the rules, hesitant and shaky though this may have been. They were less driven by the desire to be efficient and clear, not having fully grasped the importance of this, and were more focused on "pleasing" their CTs. Sometimes, the PTs even thought that the advice they were trying to apply was irrelevant to their situation.

In this phase of learning the rules, the CTs' arrangement of the PTs' classroom situation and their help were crucial. Support in the classroom was not limited to simple note-taking and silent observation, but was an active co-intervention to bring about the expected results and thereby demonstrate the value of following the rules. Second, the PTs not only performed satisfactory actions ("resolved") but they were able to shape and adapt them to the unexpected circumstances of new classroom situations. In this phase, the PTs felt free from the control of their CTs and training was done.

The results of this study do not support the conception of alternation in teacher education as a sequence of classroom visits and post-lesson interviews. Instead, they point to the need to carry advisory and teaching activities into PTs' field work to ensure that they can "track" the outcomes of rule following in the classroom. In other words, this study suggests that PT education should be supported by specific activities that are arranged and implemented in the unique situations of training. This is undoubtedly at the heart of the complexity of supporting preservice teachers. The support must be considered as embodying the principle of "alternation" between learning the rules and interpreting them, and this within a framework of training programs broadly conceived along the principle of "continuity" between teacher education in the university and/or in the school system and work situations that are more or less arranged.

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More Insight into the Understanding of a Movement: Using Wittgenstein for Dance Education

Carla Carmona

Abstract The aim of this paper is to gain more insight into the understanding of a dance movement by making use of Ludwig Wittgenstein's philosophy. I will look at how a movement is taught and rehearsed until it is accomplished in order to shed light on what understanding a movement involves and will reflect on what takes place in the execution of a movement with expression and with understanding. In order to do so, I will examine how language is used in dance instruction. In addition, I will explain how Wittgenstein's concept of aspect seeing can be used in the dance studio for the development of the quality of a movement, since how a movement is performed is intimately connected to the aspects dancers perceive in it. Finally, I will place the execution of a movement against the background of the form of life of a culture, in order to develop the idea that a movement has the possibilities to reflect a whole culture. In the process, other concepts of Wittgenstein will arise in the discussion, such as those of aesthetic satisfaction or depth and surface grammar. At the same time, this article proposes dance practice as an ideal field of examples for the issues discussed by the later Wittgenstein.

Keywords Dance education · Understanding · Aspect seeing · Form of life · Wittgenstein

1 Introduction

Ludwig Wittgenstein's philosophy has imbued the imaginary of thinkers from the most varied disciplines, from logic to art, from gender to religious studies. To a great extent, this vast influence is due to the richness and forcefulness of the core

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M.A. Peters and J. Stickney (eds.), *A Companion to Wittgenstein on Education*,
DOI 10.1007/978-981-10-3136-6_44

concepts of his philosophy, even though those concepts were often not clearly outlined by Wittgenstein himself.[1]

Let us focus on art and the understanding of aesthetic experiences. For instance, there are aesthetes and art critics who think of the arts and their diverse manifestations as intricate language games that respond to the demands of the forms of life that circumscribe them. Take another example: the anti-essentialism of the later Wittgenstein was long ago incorporated into the discussion about the definition of art and helped to erect one of its indispensable dimensions. Not less worthy of attention is the application of the early Wittgenstein's distinction between saying and showing to the controversial debate about the Holocaust being impossible to represent.

Moreover, it is remarkable how many artists have acknowledged the influence of Wittgenstein's philosophy on their work. Many of them have used their art as a medium in which to engage in a dialogue with his thought.[2] Furthermore, it is significant that Wittgenstein's philosophy has penetrated art forms of every kind, like music, cinema, painting, sculpture, poetry, literature, video or performance. One ought not to forget either the important role that art and aesthetics played in Wittgenstein's approach to philosophy, or the many examples he took from those fields in order to address a good number of the fundamental questions he explored. Not to mention the well-known presence of the arts in his biography.

Taking all this into consideration, thinking that Wittgenstein's concepts might be useful in a pedagogical set-up in the context of the arts seems to be quite reasonable. In the following pages, I shall give examples of how to use such concepts in the educational context of the dance studio.[3] Addressing the academic educational context would be too close to the analysis and application of such concepts to the arts, and this has already been done successfully by a good number of scholars.[4]

In addition, Wittgenstein's dialogical approach to persistent philosophical tangles would also be very useful in the studio, especially in relation to deep-rooted dualistic misconceptions. In particular, I am thinking of Wittgenstein's method of clarification through the examination of our use of language in specific contexts of understanding or rule following.

Wittgenstein's linguistic analysis could be portrayed as moving in two directions. At times, it shows that philosophical problems "arise when language goes on

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[1]This particular feature of Ludwig Wittgenstein's philosophy is addressed by Johannessen (2004) in relation to his concept of "aesthetic enquiry".

[2]Think, for instance, of Julião Sarmento's pictorial and video works related to Wittgenstein's *Remarks on Color* (ROC). Sarmento not only examines our sensory perception of color engaged in a constant conversation with Wittgenstein's paragraphs but also reflects on the sharpness and the austerity of his writing style.

[3]Nevertheless, the examples that will appear in these pages could be used in an academic context in order to foster the understanding of some of the basic aspects of fundamental artistic and aesthetical questions.

[4]Take Hagberg's (1994, pp. 9–44) examination and insightful applications of the concept of language game.

holiday" (PI I, §38).[5] The metaphysical use of the word *know* generates a picture of *knowing* as an obscure inner process, and this picture is subsequently identified as a reality. But our use of language can also shed light on the nature of such complex processes, and as a result destroy such idols and avoid reductionism. If we notice that the grammar of the word *know* bears a family resemblance to the grammar of other words such as *is able to* or *understand*, we gain more insight into what *knowing* involves (PI I, §150). Similarly, Wittgenstein invites us to reflect on the occasions we say "now I can go on!" (PI I, §151).

It is in those two veins that in the coming section I shall be looking closely at the meaning of executing a dance movement with understanding and examine a series of dance instructions. The idea is that looking at how language is used in dance education can clarify things about the nature of the practice and help us accept the complexity of such an enriching activity without the clouds of traditional philosophical ghosts, such as dualism.

The case of dance deserves special attention not only because it is likely to be one of the arts that has been least discussed by Wittgenstein scholars and Wittgensteinian thinkers, but also because it has a number of features that make of it a particularly suitable domain of examples for some of the issues discussed by the later Wittgenstein, such as the nature of understanding.[6] Gaining insight into the understanding of a movement by making use of Wittgenstein's philosophy is precisely the aim of this paper. In order to do that, I shall be looking at how a movement is explained in the first section and applying the concepts of aspect seeing and form of life to the context of the execution of a movement in the following two sections.

2 The Depth Grammar of a Movement

Let us start with the parallelism that Wittgenstein (BB) noted between the understanding of a sentence in our language and the understanding of a musical phrase:

> What we call "understanding a sentence" has, in many cases, a much greater similarity to understanding a musical theme than we might be inclined to think. But I don't mean that understanding a musical theme is more like the picture which one tends to make oneself of understanding a sentence; but rather that this picture is wrong, and that understanding a sentence is much more like what really happens when we understand a tune than at first

[5]Following convention, titles for Wittgenstein's works are abbreviated (LC = Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief, BB = The Blue and Brown Book, ROC = Remarks on Color, RPP = Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, LW1 = Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology, CV = Culture and Value, PI = Philosophical Investigations), with section (§) or page number (p.), with full citation and initials (e.g., RFM) in the References.

[6]In dance the connection between the inside and the outside is particularly palpable. Dance could be understood as a paradigm of the mind–body problem, and this has to do both with its performative character and also with the fact that it has movement at its core.

> sight appears. For understanding a sentence, we say, points to a reality outside the sentence. Whereas one might say "Understanding a sentence means getting hold of its content; and the content of the sentence is in the sentence." (p. 167)

Wittgenstein used understanding music as a model to clarify linguistic understanding, and this parallelism can be particularly illuminating in dance education, for the understanding of a movement also involves "getting hold of its content".

However, I would also like to propose that dance might be a better model than music for the clarification of that kind of understanding. Taking for granted the non-referential character of instrumental music, Wittgenstein advanced the idea that the content of a sentence is in the sentence just as the content of a musical phrase lies in the musical phrase in itself. Nevertheless, as Yael Kaduri (2006) pointed out, music, which is supposed to serve as the model, is enigmatic enough. By contrast, dance, thanks to the physicality of movement, might be able to clarify issues that in other arts are less obvious. It is in that light that I want you to take the following examples.

Think of the widely extended dualistic approach to the understanding of playing a musical phrase with understanding. The context of dance might shed more light on what lies behind the idea that playing a specific musical phrase with understanding is not something that the musician merely introduces with his head, but something in the musical phrase in itself; that no matter what the musician had on his mind while playing the piece, if it does not show in the playing, it is simply not there (PI I, §341). In order to understand how executing a movement with understanding takes place, let us look first at executing a movement with expression, and as a result be free for the time being of such a tongue-twister.

There is a tendency towards affectation in the practice of dance, and this tendency is stronger among immature dance practitioners. It is often related to the attempt to communicate something in particular with the dance. Let us begin by looking at how language is used in dance instruction. Exaggerated movements can be a response to the instruction "dance with expression" or even "dance with delicacy".[7] It is hardly surprising that such an inclination actually exists, given that there is something in the grammar of our language that easily takes us in that direction. The fact that the imperative "dance" is accompanied by a noun by means of the preposition "with" seems to indicate that the dance and the quality one is aiming at are two separate things and share the same weight. Probably giving the instruction by means of an adverb would be less confusing. "Dance expressively" or "dance gently" do not separate to such an extent the activity from the quality one is after. Generally, in the dance context, "dance with expression" is usually a synonym for "dance expressively" and is used as "dance expressively".

[7]One could propose the Graham technique as a counter example of this idea. However, even the affectation characteristic of the Graham school cannot be separated from the dance, and is at the core of Graham's concept of contraction and the subsequent concept of release. In this regard, one could say that the exaggerated movements typical of the Graham approach are an internal consequence of the dance.

Wittgenstein's (PI I, §664) distinction between depth and surface grammar might be useful in order to realize this. It seems that if we take "dance with expression" as an instruction to add something to the dance we are staying at the surface of the grammar of our language. However, if we realize that "dance with expression" is being used as "dance expressively", we are looking deeper into the workings of our language. And one is also looking deeper into the workings of dance, for dance also has its depth grammar. Delicacy is not something that one adds from the outside to the movement, but something in the movement itself, and it shows itself in the movement. The movement, or the dance, the sequence of movements, is delicate and displays its quality, delicacy. The same is true of "dancing with expression", where the expression is a component of the movement, and not something that merely accompanies it. The choreographer might be also able to reduce the student's or the dancer's tendency towards affectation by working at the formulation of the dance instruction with this insight in mind.

Following Wittgenstein's (CV, p. 79) advice to investigate musical understanding by examining how music is explained, I will tackle the understanding of dance by dealing with how dance is generally taught. Dance instruction rarely happens only at a verbal level; even if it might include verbal comments, suggestions and corrections, it usually consists of a dance step or a sequence of them. In fact, words generally play a secondary role and are there to direct the receiver's attention to a particular aspect of the movement. Think of statements like "do it this way" or "no, not like that, like this". It is interesting to observe that even when the explanation is more descriptive, there is still a need to exemplify how the movement should be. This could also be read as an indication of the fact that the qualities addressed by the instruction are a component of the movement and not something in any way independent of it. In addition, it also shows that in dance, and in art in general, explanation and what is explained go together.

How language is used also tells us a great deal about the nature of the quality of a movement and about what understanding a movement involves. We shall see that there is an intrinsic connection between understanding a movement and performing it. Wittgenstein (RPP) talks of it in relation to music: "Would it make sense to ask a composer whether one should hear a figure like *this* or like *this*; if that didn't also mean: whether one should play it this way or that?" (PI I, §1130).

Think of instructions like "break the movement", "break yourself" or "lose gravity". Imagine a dancer doing a particular dance step and the choreographer giving her one of those instructions. What do they mean? Are they obvious for the dancer herself initially? Is there an evident interpretation? It is clear that those verbal instructions do not have the same meaning as in a non-dance context. And in fact the meaning of the instruction will be quite determined by the movement they are referring to. And the result of the instruction will depend on the dancer and her interpretation. And it won't come straight away.

The dancer will have to play with the instruction, and around it, and find its meaning in her dance practice. It is a process of search that takes place in the movement itself, and the quality of the movement will be the result of an

experience.[8] It is as if one ought to look for the loss of gravity and learn to move in that way, but it is not about thinking in abstract terms about the loss of gravity and acting in consequence. The feeling for the loss of gravity ought to be in the movement itself, and its meaning can only be discovered there, and each time that particular feeling has to be searched for as if for the first time. The search is done with intention, but the intention is not something independent of the movement.

The choreographer or dance instructor should direct the dancer's attention to the experimental quality of the process, to the fact that there is nothing written in a mysterious invisible book that one ought to find inside oneself, and she might do it by pointing out that the use of language is figurative. This could be done by means of rhetorical questions like "Why do you think I do not give you an exact description of what the movement should be like?" It is important to insist on the metaphorical use of language because in order to understand the instruction one ought to be able to recognize its code, in other words, how language is being used. "Break yourself", "break the movement" or "lose gravity" are figurative ways of expressing an image. "Lose gravity" means "dance as if you were losing gravity". It is not about dancing according to a particular idea, but about experimenting until accomplishing a specific movement. What one ought to do is not fixed. It has to be searched for; it is a learning process. It involves self-examination. And that self-examination happens towards the outside, given that the dancer is continuously reacting to her surroundings. In this respect, there is no such a thing as an independent inner process, since the dancer is continuously dealing with the space, the ground, other dancers, sound and music, etc.

At a certain point, the dancer will feel that the movement is appropriate, congruent, and this singular certainty will be a proof of having reached the place where one wanted to be. Here, we can make use of another Wittgensteinian concept (LC III: 1–5), his idea of aesthetic satisfaction as something that 'clicks'. Dance instruction ought to help the practitioner develop an ear for that kind of clicking. And that ear, in the case of dance, will prove to be a very good eye.

Much of the search will consist of the repetition of the movement in question, with some variations. The repetition of the movement often takes place before a mirror, and in most occasions the movement is acknowledged as true from the outside, according to the analysis of the image one gets from the mirror. It is interesting that even when one feels that one has got it right, one still checks with the mirror whether that perception is accurate. When the mirror is not there, one might also need to check with a fellow dancer. And the viewer is usually questioned as follows: "Does it look alright?" Pointing out these aspects about the dance practice to the dancer will stop her from picturing the activity of dance as a

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[8]One has to be careful not to confuse this idea with what Wittgenstein (CV: MS 137 20b:15.2.1948, pp. 79–80) criticizes: the dualistic picture of understanding a musical phrase as experimenting something *while* we listen to it and the subsequent generation of a specific experiential content. In fact, as McFee (2001, p. 96) has pointed out, one ought to avoid giving too much weight to the term experience because it might be misleading to those not "at home" in a particular conceptual world, in this case, dance.

mysterious inner process that cannot be shared easily with her fellow dancers or the audience unless one makes extra effort and spells everything out (and this misperception is behind the tendency to overdo a movement).

The fact that the dancer has to check with the mirror whether she is getting it right says a lot about what executing a movement with expression involves. If it were an internal process, the dancer would not need to check with the mirror that everything is going well from the outside. This could be understood as an indication of the fact that the expression does not accompany the movement, but it is in the movement, it impregnates it and cannot be separated from it. And this connects with Wittgenstein's (LW1 §32–51) point that "the outer is the inner".

Furthermore, there is another kind of mirror the dancer keeps checking in order to get her movement right: the rest of the piece. To a great extent, the coherence of a movement will depend on how it relates to the rest of the piece. The whole composition could be understood as a looking-glass where the particular movement one is after ought to find a meaningful reflection. The totality of the piece takes part in the process of the generation of a movement. In order to know whether she has got right a particular movement, the dancer will have to examine how the movement relates to everything else, for instance, to other movements. She will also check that everything fits together, that there is a general coherence, for example, a flow from one movement to the next.

We can turn now to the analysis of executing a movement with understanding. Just like executing a dance movement with expression shows in the movement, carrying it out with understanding will also show in the movement, and a competent viewer will recognize the manifestation of understanding in the performance. In his remarks on music, Wittgenstein (CV) did not differentiate between what takes place in hearing and playing regarding the manifestation of understanding:

> Appreciation of music is expressed in a certain way, both in the course of hearing & playing and at other times too. (…) Someone who understands music will listen differently (with a different facial expression, e.g.), play differently, hum differently, talk differently about the piece than someone who does not understand. (MS: 137 20b:15.2.1948, p. 80)

How can one know that a member of the audience understands what he is watching? One can observe his gestures and notice that, for example, his body movements resonate with the dance and respond sympathetically to it. Or that he smiles when the dancers stop at a particular point of the piece as if understanding the need for a choreographic pause. Similarly, one will be able to notice certain things in the dancing, such as how a dancer controls her breathing when there is a general pause in the choreography. It is like saying "I love you" with love or without love. The love or the lack of love will show in how one says it, and in one's actions. It is the same in the case of dance. It is not about the state of mind of the dancer while she is executing the choreography, it is about what her movements convey, the impression she leaves on the choreographic language, and this language won't be influenced only by the dancer, but also by what came earlier and what is coming afterwards, and by the rest of the choreographic material. The question should never be whether the dancer communicates her interior, or whether the

movement coincides with her interior. Given that we cannot get into that interior, there is no point in asking that kind of question. We should stay where we know our whereabouts, at the analysis of the movement, and that is description.

3 The Quality of a Movement and *Aspect Seeing*

In Section xi of what was usually identified as the second part of the *Philosophical Investigations*, along his famous analysis of what takes place before the duck-rabbit picture, Wittgenstein (PI II, §138–140, 144) explains that there is a way of seeing that is also a way of thinking, of understanding: *seeing-as*, that is to say, seeing aspects, and that is seeing relations (PI II, §247). This kind of seeing is highly valued by Wittgenstein, since he wanted to foster the art of "seeing connections" (PI I, §122). *Seeing-as* exceeds mere perception, "and therefore it is like seeing, and again not like seeing" (PI II, §137). But Wittgenstein not only distinguishes that complex way of seeing from the way we see a mere physical object, but also from the traditional pictures we have of *thinking* or *understanding*. The fact that Wittgenstein still refers to aspect perception as "seeing" has to do with what we were saying towards the end of the previous section. As Schroeder (2010, p. 362) points out, it is a strategy to move away from the idea of an inner picture and should be understood as a dispositional stance.[9]

What changes in us when we see as a rabbit something that we had previously seen as a duck? Wittgenstein never answers this kind of question explicitly because he thinks that the question itself arises confusion. But he indicated that seeing something in a way and not in another way is a question of organization, that seeing aspects is a way of seeing that is also a way of organizing what we see; in fact, we organize everything we see, even though we are generally unaware of it. It is a capacity that we enjoy much during childhood. A child can easily see a cardboard box as a house or as a truck. But it can also make a child very unhappy. Think of the child that can only see the cardboard box as a home while his friend is using it as a truck.

Against this background, Wittgenstein (PI II, §257) speaks of a very special kind of blindness, that of seeing aspects. Just like the child who does not see the cardboard box as a truck, there might be someone who does not see in the rabbit-duck picture either the rabbit or the duck; and it might be the case that someone does not see anything at all in the drawing, someone who is not able to

[9]Wittgenstein insisted that explaining *seeing-as* as an inner picture is a dangerous business. If what one sees in the duck-rabbit picture goes beyond the drawing, it does not mean it is a private object in the interior of our consciousness (PI II, §132). Wittgenstein made real efforts to reject the idea that what takes place within us is obscure for everyone else. For a comprehensive account of Wittgenstein's concept of aspect perception, cf. Schroeder (2010).

interpret it, to organize those lines either as giving shape to a duck or to a rabbit. Wittgenstein compared aspect-blindness to the lack of a musical ear (PI II, §260). It is also related to the lack of a nose for identifying the authenticity of an expression of feelings and bears resemblance to the limping that Wittgenstein (CV: MS 118 45rc:1.9.1937, p. 32) attributed to the general practice of philosophy: seeing things always from the same position and being blind to other perspectives.

Expressions like *seeing-as* and the like are quite extended in art education and appreciation (PI II, §178, p. 213). We often say about a painting "you have to see it this way". In the dance context, we can also find many examples: "look at the movement in this way", "if you take it as a pause, the movement will come easily", "think of it as a release", "there is room for tenderness in that movement and I do not see it when you execute it", or "do not focus on that movement, do not stop too much in it, see it as a transition". However, those expressions are most commonly used without awareness and received without full understanding of what they involve. Gaining more insight into the concept of *seeing-as* might deepen the capacity of the dancer to understand a movement, and it might be useful that the dance instructor carefully explains that there are many aspects to a movement. Dance education ought to make sure that dancers develop a very good eye for aspects of movements, for the more aspects they are able to address in a movement, the richer the movement will be and the more understanding it will show.

Let us look at some examples of aspect perception in the context of the dance studio. Aspect perception can explain things that happen continuously in that set-up. For instance, think of the variations that arise when a movement is executed by different dancers. It is interesting that one still speaks of all those cases as the same movement. In fact, in the studio those dissimilarities are not considered as variations of the movement, since a variation of a movement would involve a more substantial change, like the alteration of a part of the movement or the introduction of a new element in it (imagine we include the raising of the right elbow in a movement in which initially the arms played no role and lay relaxed along the torso).

How can those small differences be noticed then? Even if the movement is meant to be executed by all dancers at the same time, the pace at which they do it may vary. Some dancers might start at a faster pace and relax once they are advanced into the movement, and others might do it the other way around: initially recreating themselves and finishing it fast. What might appear as a random decision could be a result of aspect perception, for the performance of a movement is intrinsically connected to how we understand it, to what we see in it. Regarding the example, each group of dancers might be paying attention to a feature of the movement that has passed unnoticed to the other group. For instance, the first group might be focusing on the decisiveness they perceive in the first part of the movement and consequently execute that part at a faster pace. Consequently, they might relax in the second part of the movement in order to stress that initial rapidness. By contrast, the members of the second group might decide to recreate themselves at the start because they read the beginning as a longer note.

The quality of a movement will be related to the dancer's capacity for aspect perception. In fact, the role of a good choreographer often consists of calling the dancer's attention to particular features of a movement or of a sequence that do not seem to be acknowledged in her performance, that is to say, that do not show in her execution of the movement. Imagine that a dancer simply repeats a movement, without noticing any of its aspects. The choreographer might say "look at it this way" while emphasizing the curvature of one of the arms. Once the dancer incorporates that aspect into her movement, the choreographer might draw her attention to a new aspect, and so on, until the choreographer is happy with the quality of the movement.

Aspect perception is fundamental since the combination of opposing features is what often makes a movement interesting. It is of no coincidence that opposition of forces is at the basis of dance. One could imagine a choreographer drawing the dancer's attention to the fragility of a movement if the dancer has only focused on its decisiveness. If fragility and decisiveness are conveyed in the movement, let us say, together with delicacy and certainty, it might move the choreographer, and the audience, to tears.

And it might also be the case that the choreographer sees in the execution of the movement, an aspect that she was unaware of, that is to say, that she had not noticed while creating the movement. For instance, the dancer might connect that movement to the next by stretching it, even though the choreographer had not anticipated such flexibility in the movement. This is one of the ways in which a choreographer might get a lot of choreographic material from a seminar she has taught herself, and it explains the choreographic strategy of letting dancers explore a movement before incorporating it into a choreography without much initial guidance.

Aspect perception in a dance movement depends much on the insight that both the dancers and the audience have into the practice of dance and the form of life in which it is rooted.

4 The Roots of a Movement

The dancer grasps a choreographic concept immersed in language. How can a dancer give shape to the instructions of a choreographer? The more acquainted the dancer is with the way dance instruction develops, the more familiar she is with the way one ought to follow an instruction, the easier it will be for her to interpret it. Getting used to how discussions about dance take place, assimilating the argot and learning from those who are competent in the field, will also contribute to her understanding. It is similar to learning how to judge the genuineness of expressions of feeling in human beings. It is a kind of knowledge one develops "«by picking up tips» and learning through experience how to *weigh imponderable evidence*" (Stickney 2015, p. 35; citing PI II, §355). It is not something one learns by memory or in a classroom, but observing our fellow human beings in given situations; and

the more variety, the better. It has more to do with the field of feeling than with calculus, and thus it is rooted in language games that differ from those of calculus. Those who already master the art of making correct judgments about other people's feelings can direct our learning process by making the appropriate remark at the right moment, like "see how his voice is trembling". But even the expert might be unable to put his knowledge into words.

The dancer also has the choreographer's language as a background. The movement she ought to accomplish by means of those instructions is learnt within that choreographic language and bears a resemblance to other movements she might already be familiar with. It could be the case that, due to its characteristics, it would not make sense to refer to the choreographic oeuvre in question as a language. Surely, it will still be a universe of meanings with its own rules and affinities where an observant dancer will be able to find her whereabouts by means of seeing relations. In addition, the better she knows the history of the practice, the more acquainted she is with as many dance schools as possible, the more understanding is her execution of a particular movement likely to show.

However, that is not the whole story. If one wants to make the best of a movement, one will have to go deeper into the grammar of dance. In that respect, Wittgenstein's concept of form of life might be useful. As Kjell S. Johannessen (1990) explains:

> To establish the identity of a particular practice cannot be done solely on the basis of the semantic rules assumed to be immanent in it. Its relations to the surrounding practices have to be included in any reliable procedure for establishing the identity of practices. (…) Mastery of a particular practice can therefore be regarded as a fragmentary expression of an overarching and comprehensive understanding of reality, which is common to the participants of the language community. (p. 168)

In order to fully understand the practice of dance, one has to examine it in the context of the other practices of a culture, against the background of the form of life it belongs to. And the same is true of an action. Wittgenstein (RPP II, §§624–26, 629) explains that an action is judged according to its background within human life. The depth grammar of a movement also rests in such a web of practices. Where does depth grammar lie? In use, it is the grammar that has its roots in the form of life, which makes itself manifest as clearly as impenetrably. We are wrapped in a complex web of language games that are themselves a component of human practices, and these practices constitute forms of life, that, in turn, provide support for the earlier. That web ought to be walked across in all directions: otherwise we will go against its nature. Life itself, regulated by arbitrary rules, is the ultimate basis. Dance rests on the web of life.

As Wittgenstein (LC I: 25–26, 35) stated about music, a whole culture ought to be described in order to shed light on the practice of dance and on our expressions of aesthetic judgment in that context. That is also the case for particular dance movements. For instance, the better we have studied the movements of a culture, the more insight we have into how we walk, which movements seem to be rude or which friendly, the deeper the understanding of a particular movement in a context

will be and the more aspects it will have (and therefore the richer it will be). Dance education ought to provide insight into the idea that a single movement has the possibility of reflecting a whole culture.

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‘Not to Explain, but to Accept’: Wittgenstein and the Pedagogic Potential of Film

Alexis Gibbs

> Not *to explain, but to* accept *the psychological phenomenon—that is what is difficult.* (RPP §509)

Abstract The current use of film in education is limited to either its illustrative function in the service of other ideas, or as the object of empirical and theoretical study. Wittgenstein sees both illustration and explanation as extensions of the Cartesian legacy of *psychologism* and thereby disengaged from the actual experience of the world. Film, Wittgenstein’s followers argue, provides a unique opportunity to reconnect with that immediate experience: firstly, by exposing the neuroses of psychologism; and secondly, by inviting the viewer to relinquish the tendency to explain film’s hidden meanings prior to accepting what it has to say on its own terms. Finally, where film is currently being taken very seriously by some philosophers as a mode of philosophising in itself, or a medium that philosophises in front of our eyes, I will argue that the same attention has not yet been given to the ways in which film can act as an educator (how it can teach).

Keywords Wittgenstein · Cavell · Film · Pedagogy

1 Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to explore and examine the ways in which film can open up meaningful discussions about the nature and character of education, beyond explanations of film according to their technical composition or theoretical interpretation. This is not to suggest that film can necessarily reveal to its viewer

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M.A. Peters and J. Stickney (eds.), *A Companion to Wittgenstein on Education*,
DOI 10.1007/978-981-10-3136-6_45

precisely what education *is*, in its essence, but rather that it can start new conversations about what education *can* or *might* be, depending on how we as viewers understand and experience it. Where film is currently being taken very seriously by some philosophers as a mode of philosophising in itself, or a medium that *philosophises* in front of our eyes, the same attention has not yet been given to the ways in which film can act as an educator (how it can teach).

Film's current use in education is largely limited to it being used either as an illustrative tool, or as an art form that requires theoretical explanation. I will suggest that these functions—whilst useful—constitute distractions from a more meaningful direct experience of film, because illustration and explanation are extensions of a *psychologistic* impulse in education. Psychologism seeks to *explain* experience prior to the actual experiencing of it. Wittgenstein's critique of psychologism, which harks back to Descartes' famous epiphany concerning the sovereignty of the mind over sensory experience, is an invitation to his readers to relinquish some of the Cartesian suspicion we adopt towards the world and to see meaning anew as it presents itself to our immediate experience. Film, I will argue here, is well placed to challenge our explicatory instincts and thereby to teach us something about the nature of education itself.

2 Film in Education: The Illustrative Function

My discussion proceeds from an intuition that film can be educational in a broader sense than its current use in classrooms or lecture theatres either for illustrative purposes, or as an objective medium that requires critical explanation. This is not to deny any evidence that using film illustratively in class can further engage student interest across disciplines. In recent years, books such as *Math Goes to the Movies* (Polster and Ross 2012) and *Teaching with the Screen* (Leopard 2013) have provided innovative examples of the ways in which moments in films can illuminate not just particular problems within certain disciplines, but also the practice of dealing with them. I myself use film in this way, but have noticed that this illuminating/elucidating function does not necessarily differ from other illustrative pedagogical media. For example, when I use Michael Sandel's Harvard lectures on YouTube to explain Socratic dialogue in pedagogy, or I show the 'two boats' scene from Christopher Nolan's Batman film *The Dark Knight* (2008) to discuss Kantian or Benthamite approaches to moral dilemmas, there is (hopefully) a comparable effect in the communication of particular ideas. This is because I invite the video clip to become a representation of an already formed idea, and it is therefore secondary to the pedagogic principle under discussion. Its effectiveness in illustrating the principle is more dependent on an intervention on the part of a teacher, i.e. *my* explanation of what makes Michael Sandel and the 'two boats' scenario representative of a style of teaching and a moral dilemma, respectively.

Using film as an illustrative tool helps to communicate an idea, because it renders that idea visible becomes a representation of it. But it remains the case that

the idea comes first (e.g. the idea of Socratic pedagogy) and the visual illustration comes second (e.g. Michael Sandel in a Harvard lecture theatre). Much of Wittgenstein's *Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology* is devoted to trying to unpick the fallacy at the heart of this representation, which is that the illustration really only amounts to *my* interpretation of the visual, and how it can be deployed to good effect, as opposed to an expression of how the thing itself is experienced. Wittgenstein's objection to illustrations, or examples, is not so much that they do not communicate meaning, but that that meaning is limited to the expression of an individual psychology and how it chooses to interpret the visual (and other sensory) data available to it. My interpretation of Michael Sandel as an example of Socratic pedagogy appears valid in the context of my Education Studies classroom; it would make less sense to try and persuade a class of moral philosophy students that Sandel's only purpose in his lectures was to illustrate Socratic pedagogy. Interpretation allows us to carry something between experiences, but we should not cling to one interpretation as if it were a rule, if we are to allow situation and circumstance to refine and re-evaluate current attitudes, opinions and dispositions.

An emergent group of film philosophers, who take some of their cues from the thought of Wittgenstein and Stanley Cavell, have also identified a tendency towards using film in an illustrative fashion for philosophical ends. This is Nancy Bauer on the limitations imposed on film by illustration:

> Everywhere and always, Cavell puts pressure on the view that, at best, a given film might do a good job of *illustrating* a philosophical problem or position…This mainstream view concedes that it is sometimes useful to show a film in a philosophy class, since films can rouse the passions or interest of students and thereby get them more invested in the issues. Of course Cavell would never disagree. But a pressing issue for him is not *whether* films rouse passions but exactly why and how they succeed in doing so. (Bauer 2005, p. 39, italics in original)

Like Wittgenstein, neither Cavell nor Bauer are rejecting the value of illustration, nor embracing the power of film solely on the grounds of its ability to rouse passions; what they point towards is a considered appreciation of the film as it presents itself to the viewer, rather than just the philosophical ideas to which it is in service. The illustration of an isolated idea simply does not account for the whole experience of film viewing, because it abstracts the film from the contextual and emotional factors of a viewer's response and concentrates exclusively on how well those films perform as a representation of something else.

The point about illustration being both contingent upon context and an expression of individual psychology may seem obvious and harmless enough, but Wittgenstein's concern is that the illustrative function in philosophy can translate examples into wore widely generalisable propositions. They can come to exemplify entire theoretical standpoints. He even criticises his own tendency towards using examples in this way in his earlier work, the *Tractatus*: 'The basic evil…of mine in the *Tractatus*, is that what a proposition is is illustrated by a few commonplace

examples, and then pre-supposed as understood in full generality' (RPP I, §38).[1] To equate an example with a generalisable theory prevents the actual conditions in which an example appears from challenging theory, as opposed to simply supporting it.

3 Education in Film: The Impulse Towards Explanation

The illustrative function of film is related to, but not the same as, the explanatory mode. Where the illustrative function takes film to be at the service of other (philosophical, educational) ideas, the explanatory mode is one that takes film as the object of analysis. Film does not serve as an *example* of other ideas, so much as it conceals within it particular machinations of meaning which require the application of a critical mind for their exposition. Film theorising is a way of explaining how film works: not so much in the dissection of its techniques, but how those techniques operate upon the viewer to particular effect. This mode of explanation is most commonly practiced in the discipline of film studies' theorising. Laura Mulvey's seminal essay on 'Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema' (1975) continues to be influential enough in film studies to warrant its use as an example here.[2]

Mulvey's feminist-psychoanalytic critique of Hollywood cinema rests on the charge that its camera and its characters are complicit in the enactment of a 'controlling male gaze', which reduces all women in its films to passive objects. The idea is easy enough to illustrate by means of a scene from the James Bond film, *Dr No*. I, the viewer, observe Bond asleep, only to hear the sound of someone singing. Because I don't know the identity of the singer, I immediately identify with (the psychology of) the character who is also deprived of that information, James Bond, who awakes to the siren call and looks around to discover its origin. I follow his searching gaze, and the thought process it implies, until it lights on the figure emerging from the sea. The change of expression on Bond's face registers his delight and his fulfilled desire, thereby doing the same for the viewer. The fact that the woman remains unaware of Bond's presence evidences her lack of consciousness, an inability to exercise her own gaze as the object of one—the gaze of the male lead, which directs my own. In this scene, Bond enacts his own cruder version of the Cartesian awakening, opening his eyes to discover that his inner knowledge that women exist for him is confirmed in the reality of a woman appearing to do just that. Mulvey's point is that, irrespective of gender, the viewer will come to align their own gaze with that of the male in narratives of this kind, and therefore, both men and women will reproduce these attitudes in their own lives.

[1]Following convention, titles for Wittgenstein's works are abbreviated (PI = Philosophical Investigations, RPP = Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology), with section (§) or page number (p.), with full citation and initials (e.g., RFM) in the References.

[2]Oxford film philosopher Andrew Klevan describes Mulvey's essay as 'perhaps the most studied and cited in the history of film scholarship' (2014, p. 147); Rodowick (2014) calls it 'the most influential and intensely debated essay in contemporary film theory' (p. 253).

By means of the psychoanalytic theory, Mulvey is able to reveal evidence of the male gaze in any number of films. The thesis demonstrates the ways in which the male gaze not only subjugates women within films, but invites a female audience to submit to the patriarchal order which the visual pleasure of cinema imparts. Female subjectivity is suppressed through objectification, whether for the male or female spectator. But what is not acknowledged in this analysis of social control is the way that the analysis exercises its own form of control over film interpretation and the visual. The theorist may view Bond as the avatar of a particular gaze, but is unable to reflect on the way that she herself imposes a different kind of gaze upon him: the explanatory gaze, one which governs and determines how he will behave as that avatar throughout the film. This is by no means a defence of Bond’s dubious feminist credentials, but a means of drawing attention to the problem of what it means to see in the first place, and how often we mistake an ability to explain with an ability to see. This misattribution can be traced backed to Descartes and a psychologistic turn in thought that took place in his articulation of the *cogito*.

4 Wittgenstein’s Critique of Psychologism

Descartes’ ‘Third Meditation’ begins with him shutting his eyes and blocking his ears, declaring that the sensory world is one of the illusions that will distract him from accessing the true nature of thought and his self:

> I am a thing that thinks, that is to say that doubts, affirms, denies, that knows a few things, that is ignorant of many, that wills, that desires, that also imagines and perceives; for, as I remarked before, although things which I perceive and imagine are perhaps nothing at all apart from me and in themselves, I am nevertheless assured that these modes of thought that I call perceptions and imaginations, inasmuch as they are modes of thought, certainly reside [and are met with] in me. (Descartes 1968, p. 179)

The most commonly accepted truth arising from this observation that of the *cogito* and its primacy is one that has come to characterise a shift towards an ingrained introspection in Western philosophy, pitching reasoned thought before immediate experience, the former serving to explain and organise the latter. The act of seeing, along Cartesian lines, becomes less of a sensory response to the world and more the ordered imposition of a rational mind upon an irrational world. Wittgenstein’s later work not only challenges this universalising perspective on the grounds of logical fallacy (Why shut out the world in order to understand it, to divide it up into ideas that are not reflected in the actual experiencing of it?), but contends also that such introspective statements say more about the sayer than saying something about the world (RPP I, §212). Malcolm Budd’s study of the *RPP* is unequivocal on this point:

> My use of introspectionism can show me only what is true for me, and only what is true for me on the occasion I introspect. For no matter how careful I may be, *whatever* I am aware of happening when I introspect, the question must arise whether it is essential that this happening should occur in someone when the psychological predicate I am proposing to define applies to him. (Budd 2013, p. 8, italics in original)

In the instance of the *cogito*, this means one of two things: either Descartes takes what is the case for him to be true of everyone, in which case we only learn how it is that Descartes views the world, not how everyone does. It is a statement of one's own psychology. Or, if Descartes had accepted that what was true for his own experience was not necessarily the case, then the *cogito* itself would have been undermined.

Needless to say, the first option is the more convincing, and the consequence of Descartes' exclamation has been its generalising infiltration into modern thought: to convince oneself of the surety of one's own thought is to see all experience as subjugated and secondary to the mind, i.e. to the psychology of the individual. The meaning of the visual domain can only make sense when one's rational thinking is imposed upon it. There are few stronger images of the extreme scepticism instituted by Descartes than his vision of the men passing by his window potentially being artificial machines dressed in hats and cloaks. The philosopher initiates a psychology so suspicious towards human behaviour that it refuses to admit of its ordinariness, preferring to isolate itself until it becomes equipped with the means to explain that behaviour first.

The paranoid behaviour arising from suppression of ordinary and immediate experience is eloquently explored by Hutchinson and Read in *Film as Philosophy: Essays on Cinema after Wittgenstein and Cavell* (2005). The authors describe how the film *Memento* plays out the experience of an individual determined to explain the mystery of his own existence through the collection of recorded data serving as his memory that he has to repeatedly make sense of, whilst exposing the notion throughout that human existence is never explicable through abstract and fragmented data, but is cumulative and contingent. Hutchinson and Read describe the lead character, Leonard, as suffering from suppressed trauma and 'a continually maintained bad faith' (2005, p. 89). The neurosis at the centre of this narrative is one which could equally be witnessed in films like Ron Howard's *A Beautiful Mind*, in which the isolation of genius is seen to prompt schizophrenic delusions of an alternative reality. In the course of this exposition, the film's philosophical import lies not so much in the effective illustration of a particular mathematical problem (e.g. the Riemann hypothesis, explored in *Math Goes to the Movies*), but in the way that the character of John Nash plays out the collapse of Cartesian introspection under the weight of its own restrictions. Both *Memento* and *A Beautiful Mind* perform an unravelling of the tendency towards explanation (which amounts to metaphysics) beneath the burden of actual existence.

Both *Memento*'s Leonard and *A Beautiful Mind's* John Nash are striving for some explanation of their existence that transcends their immediate experience of it. But for Wittgenstein, any attempt to capture the essence of a thing as abstracted from its 'surroundings' constitutes a disavowal of its actual meaning in use; in Rupert Read's words, metaphysics is that operation 'which strives to establish an essence where it is non-obvious that an essence can be established' (Read 2014, p. 64). Attempts to override the contingency of meaning in its 'everyday use' result in a metaphysics that is more the product of an hypostasising instinct, critiqued by Wittgenstein in the *RPP* as the legacy of classical psychology, than it is a true

reflection of the correspondence between word and meaning, or word and reality. To begin to think about film's educational potential on its own terms, rather than a medium simply at the service of illustration, firstly requires addressing the impetus behind wanting to control the relationship between image and meaning in the first place—what Wittgenstein calls 'the tendency to explain' (RPP I, §256).

Wittgenstein's *Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology* criticises the 'tendency to explain' on the grounds that it defers to pre-existing models for understanding the world, rather than giving accurate descriptions of it as it appears to our immediate perception. Explanation relies on growth 'from a certain germ', the source of knowing that precedes the experience of things:

> Mere description is so difficult because one believes that one needs to fill out the facts in order to understand them. It is as if one saw a screen with scattered colour-patches, and said: the way they are here, they are unintelligible; they only make sense when one completes them into a shape – Whereas I want to say: here is the whole. (If you complete it, you falsify it.) (RPP I, §257)

The implication, of course, is that to complete the scattered patches of colour, you would have to know the shape you wanted to form them into in advance, such that that the screen and its patches of colour are secondary to the shape—their meaning is predetermined by it. Wittgenstein here points to the troubled inheritance of Cartesian introspectionism: the possibility of a complete or final understanding in which thing and idea coincide in their perfect meaning, thus allowing for the example to become the rule.

The drive for completion indirectly alludes to both the intention of Descartes' psychologism and the difficulty presented by not submitting to it. The former lies in the desire for making complete sense of things, with one of the most stabilising means to that end being the positioning of one's own mind as the source of the logic and security of meaning; the latter, on the other hand, portends the indefinite destabilisation of meaning and therefore a lack of control over it. ter Hark (2011) describes the rational impulse that emerges as 'the psychological predicament of the philosopher (or scientist) determined to explain the nature of conscious experience', noting that a 'particular motive for hypostasising experiences arises when thinking about the exceptional, the unfamiliar' (p. 505). In the face of the exceptional, and experiences that simply cannot be reduced to causal explanation, proposes this challenge for his reader: '*Not* to explain, but to *accept* the psychological phenomenon – that is what is difficult' (RPP I, §509). Just as Descartes is wrong to take his experience of *his* self as the source of understanding *the* self in relation to the world, so 'it would be just as wrong to use an experience of meaning to explain the concept of understanding meaning' (RPP I, §155). Why say that we have to understand vision before describing what it is we see? Are we deceived in our experiences of things if we don't fully know what those things are in advance?

5 Psychologism and Theory's Control Over the Visual

The allure of controlling one's own view of the world in this way has meant that Cartesian philosophy has contributed to an enduring psychologism within theorising itself (Standish 2012), in that theory has grown according to an explanatory mode, somewhat close to a science. In using the term theorising, I have in mind that mode described by Nancy Bauer as the 'attempt to describe and explain phenomena systematically in an internally consistent way that mandates or predicts what should or will happen in relevant future cases' (Bauer 2015, p. 106). In language that echoes Wittgenstein's 'screen with scattered colour patch' image, Allen and Turvey have identified two key characteristics of theories:

> First, they unify a range of apparently disparate, unconnected phenomena by postulating an underlying principle that these phenomena putatively have in common and that can explain their nature or behaviour. Second, the common, underlying principle postulated by the theory – whether it takes the form of an entity, process, force, concept or something else – is at least initially hidden from view. (Allen and Turvey 2001, p. 2)

Theory thus all too easily manipulates sensory data by gathering them under one formula and explains them according to a principle to which only the theorist has privileged insight and access. In this, theory shares something in common with Descartes' self-deception about the nature of sight, i.e. the idea that seeing must be explained before we can make sense of what is seen. D.N. Rodowick's history of theory, *Elegy for Theory*, cites from Raymond Williams four key uses of the word that emerged from the seventeenth century: spectacle; a contemplated sight; a scheme of ideas; and an explanatory scheme (Rodowick 2014, p. 18). There is something semantically irresistible about the association here between seeing and explaining: as Rodowick goes on to explore, contemporary theorising, whether in the fields of film studies or education or elsewhere, frequently allows for a conflation of the visual and the explanatory and in turn generates a science of the kind Wittgenstein specifically sought to debunk.[3]

Wittgenstein argued that an appeal to theory relieves us of our ability to describe things as they actually appear in particular circumstances, deferring to causal explanation over immediate experience. The allure of explanation is not surprising, given the speed at which the visual domain (and by implication, the world) moves—there is frequently so much to take in that it helps to contain experience within frameworks of understanding. Theory may provide some comfort in its universal applicability, but by virtue of that universalism, it also creates the potential for bad faith in the face of what is actually seen: *explaining* what we see can be a lot more tempting than accepting the visual as something that might challenge that explanation.

From Wittgenstein's point of view, the desire for explanation extends from, and leads back into, the same psychological cul-de-sac, the mind turning in on itself in

[3]Allen and Turvey have described Wittgenstein's rejection of theory as the signature feature of his later work.

reassurance of its own primacy of understanding (RPP I, §212). On the surface of things, then, new theories can be developed in line with cultural shifts and different phenomena, but the underlying tautology remains unchanged if theory isolates objects from (our experience of) their meaning in use or action. And this is precisely where it becomes important to distinguish a particular theory as an interpretation on the part of one person, from a theory that takes on some metaphysical credibility.

6 Film’s Challenge to Theory

With regard to film specifically, Stephen Mulhall has observed that film theorists ‘exhibit a strong tendency to treat the films they discuss as objects to which specific theoretical edifices…could be applied’ (Mulhall 2002, p. 6), whereby the object facilitates the coherence of the theory, rather than revealing something new about the object. Film theory can only achieve this by isolating those elements within film that achieve this squaring of circles (or ‘scattered colour patches’), rather than addressing an overall complexity that escapes complete reduction to any theoretical perspective.[4] If we are too quick to seek causal explanations of phenomena instead of accepting the irreducibility of the whole as it appears to our immediate experience, we are likely to ignore the ways that some of the contingent factors (including time and place) surrounding that appearance may even alter our reception and understanding of those phenomena. When we explain things, it is only the mode of explanation that is reaffirmed. I can apply the theory of the male gaze to any new cinema release and claim to have offered a new reading of it, but in doing so, I have only really confirmed the ‘truth’ of the male gaze theory.

Where Wittgenstein sees theorising as an explicit and outwardly rationalised manifestation of Cartesian psychologism, his more recent interpreters have come to see that psychology evidenced (or philosophised) in films as a condition altogether more contained, claustrophobic, neurotic and hysterical. By looking at films such as *Fight Club* (Bauer 2005), *Memento* (Hutchinson and Read 2005) and the *Alien* series (Mulhall 2002, 2005), film philosophers have demonstrated how narratives and characters in these films play out the sorts of conditions that arise from the mind’s split from the body: in *Fight Club*, a character that has to invent an idealised avatar of himself to cope with the crisis of his masculinity; in *Memento*, a character who sees himself only as set of composite memories that he has to collect as data to recall who he is; and in *Alien*, a spaceship boarded by creatures that repel and attack its human inhabitants by confronting them with the grotesquery of their own bodies. In each of these films, we witness a collapse or perversion of the Cartesian psychology under the burden of its inability to order the world according to its reason

[4]This is not to denigrate theory entirely. Rodowick (2014) makes the observation that theory should not be confused with law, because it simply offers a provisional account of the way things are, making it a description in the sense that Wittgensstein and Cavell both endorse.

or desire. The lesson: if we reject sensory experience in favour of a priori explanations, we do not dispatch the disorder the world presents with; rather, it is suppressed and will return to haunt us.

A good question to ask at this point would be: but are these films then not themselves illustrations, or even explanations, of the existential suppression contained within Cartesian psychologism? On the one hand, the answer is yes, because they are all interpreted as containing traces of that notion; on the other hand, I have grouped those traces under one prevailing trait for the purposes of this argument, when the essays about them in *Film as Philosophy* do indeed carry their ideas in other directions also, as do the films themselves. This is to say that these analyses cannot reduce the whole of the film to a single idea, nor can they be elevated to the status of a science, or the law, as film theory has done with Mulvey's Male Gaze. But the point is also, as Mulhall observes, that the film itself is thinking these issues through, rather than allowing the theorist to proclaim upon them from an entirely disinterested perspective (Mulhall 2005). In our ordinary lives, it is difficult to effect the transition from explaining to accepting what we see, because we take this mode of viewing so much for granted. Where films provide an interesting intervention is that they present with an alternative reality. The contrast provided by this alternative is where the challenge of acceptance begins: we have to accept the plausibility of the world we are watching before we can explain it.

For the later Wittgenstein, philosophy is therapy: our only way to deal with the issues of the world is to talk them through, with ourselves and with others, and to try and give our very best descriptions of those issues and our experience of them. For film philosophers inspired by this view, film acts as an interlocutor in the same way: it is in such descriptions that Cavell discovers a way out of simply critiquing Cartesian psychologism in cinema (which itself would risk being illustrative or explanatory) and turns towards readings of films that show how they can teach us something new about philosophy, to 'rediscover' it. In this, Descartes is no longer the object of criticism; indeed, Stanley Cavell has discussed at great the length the ways in which the spirit of Descartes is very much one with the spirit of philosophy, at least in terms of how philosophy can be 'rediscovered' in film. This rediscovery is a project of moving away from the scepticism at the heart of a Cartesian psychology and towards the affirmation of values shared in common.

7 Film as Philosophy

Cavell frequently returns to the films of Frank Capra for philosophical inspiration and one in particular. In Capra's *Mr Deeds Goes to Town,* a seemingly naïve young man from small-town America suddenly inherits an enormous fortune. In order to settle the finances, Longfellow Deeds has to go to New York, where he discovers a world full of superficiality, cutthroats and capitalist zealots, all of whom seem to abide by the same logic of disenchantment that supports an unhappy and unhealthy society (Deeds notes on arrival that 'They work so hard at living they forget how to

live’). At every turn, people seek to take advantage of a man they assume to be simple, including the woman he falls in love with, Babe. But Deeds counters their opportunism with questions that derail his interlocutors in their simple reasoning. In the figure of Deeds, Cavell discerns not Descartes himself (which would be illustration), but the spirit of Cartesianism, or the ‘rediscovery of philosophy’:

> …I do not invoke Descartes in my discussion of *Mr Deeds Goes to Town* as something the film illustrates. It is rather that the film rediscovers what it is that Descartes changed philosophy by discovering. It’s a rediscovery of philosophy. (Cavell 2005, p. 190)

Being careful not to celebrate the Cartesian turn inwards itself (witnessed instead in the more hostile and self-interested motivations of the film’s New York inhabitants), Cavell instead commends Descartes’ exuberant expression of self-awareness. Cavell’s defence of the traces of Descartes to be discovered in Deeds is made less on the grounds that the film itself proposes a solipsistic view of the world and more on the grounds that philosophy begins with making a statement of responsibility for one’s own existence in the world. When Longfellow Deeds is put on trial accused of an insanity that would deprive him of the ability to redistribute his wealth as he chooses, Deeds initially refuses to speak in the face of the law, normative morality and science that is stacked against him in the courtroom. In the face of so many *explanations* of his behaviour, Deeds is silent, unable to ‘keep heart in the point of talking at all’ (Cavell 2004, p. 196). In fact, it is Deeds’ silence that gives the explanations greater force, because they function almost as if he were not in the room at all (just as a theory of film might settle its meaning in advance of, or even in the absence of, the film being viewed). But it is a gesture of love on the part of Babe which finally awakens him, and he begins to point out the ways in which everyone in the courtroom manifests the same behaviours by which they seek to condemn him: ‘…when Deeds begins to speak, defending his sanity, he is performing, as the climax to be expected in a melodramatic structure, a version of Descartes’s *cogito*, taking on the proof of his own existence, against its denial by the world’ (Cavell 2004, p. 199). To declare one’s self in this fashion, free from deference to the worldview of others, is to defy the explanatory mode (i.e. the explanations of Deeds’ behaviour by others) and attest to the importance of acceptance (accepting that his actual behaviour belies those explanations) first. Acceptance of a person’s psychology requires not isolating incidents of their behaviour as illustrations of the whole, nor on abstract theorising, but of giving an account of it within the context of that person’s *actual* appearance. Difficult as Wittgenstein professes this acceptance to be, it is a wholly different starting point for *learning* from others and the world.

Just as Wittgenstein was ‘interested in language only in so far as it is the source of philosophical difficulties’ (Budd 2013, p. 7), so Cavell’s take on films is seen as troubling the way we allow generalisations about the visual domain to inform our experience of it. What we witness in Cavell’s reading of *Mr Deeds Goes to Town* is less the confirmation or rejection of the assumptions we bring to bear upon the film (Is it accurate representation of the way I see the world? Is it attempting to control my worldview?) and more the playing out of investigative philosophical questioning in the face of assumptions made by those on the screen: How do we discern

nonsense when we encounter it? How do we respond to the irrationality of others, especially when it masquerades as accepted reason? Where the literal representation of philosophers on screen invites the viewer to invest in their privileged psychology, to follow Longfellow Deeds' journey is to see him change in relation to others, some of whom assume this privileged psychology and others with whom we are invited to sympathise as being flawed in the same way that we know ourselves to be.

The case for film as philosophy is instead made on the basis that film can *think* philosophy (or philosophically) on screen, a form of thinking out loud that can be as ordinarily meaningful as speech or conversation itself. The film reveals significantly more once we have let go of the assumption that what we are to be told resides in the mind of its director, or of a central character. Equally, the suspicion that film is trying to do something to us loses the totality of its control if we acknowledge that we too have designs on it, but that the reciprocity and simultaneity that are all part of the film-viewing process can illuminate and disturb those assumptions that we take for granted: 'film awakens as much as it enfolds you' (Cavell 1979, p. 17). Cavell finds that the value of film lies not in its ability to represent the meaning of things, but *to present* a meaningful world (Cavell 1979, p. 25), one whose irreducibility to its component objects demands a revaluation of meaning according to the whole.

8 Conclusion: The Film as Educator

Cavell's writing, and that of those who take inspiration from it, frequently elides the roles of philosopher, film and educator. His study of the intersection between moral philosophy and the Hollywood comedies of remarriage, *Cities of Words*, is significantly subtitled 'Pedagogical letters on a Register of the Moral Life' and self-identifies with a tradition of perfectionism whose 'journey is described as education' (2004, p. 26). For Cavell, then, film *is* at once philosophical and educational: it philosophises and thinks on screen and in doing so educates its viewer in conversations about morality. But this pedagogic potential of film has to begin with acceptance: for the teacher, this means accepting the film itself as educator, rather than something that illustrates the point under instruction; for both teacher and viewer, it also means resisting the explanation of films according to a rule. Films can invite the rediscovery of philosophy, and education, in this spirit of acceptance.

Cavell describes the best films as ones which 'let the world happen' (1979, p. 25), a notion that also pays homage to the influence of Heidegger in his work. If the viewer accepts that she cannot fully control how they do that, then her response will always depend somewhat on the circumstances of viewing also. The response to what she sees, within its given circumstances, is demands of the viewer what Cavell calls 'film criticism', the meaningful and serious conversations about film (its description) that must take place before we try and apply theories to them. If we hold that pedagogy is concerned with more than just curriculum or method of delivery, then we can start to see how film might act as pedagogue also: it too has

the potential to present worlds to students that do not directly coincide with the education of their experience, that do not condescend to theory to explain that experience, and can ask valuable questions of that experience and the meaning of education in the process. Allowing film to act as teacher is a reminder to relinquish control over teaching—letting education happen—which can only take place if those teaching relinquish some control over the visual, what it means *to see*.

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Part V
Religious and Moral Education

The Learner as Teacher

Patrick Quinn

Abstract This paper examines Wittgenstein's pedagogy as a learner–teacher. Having taught elementary school in Austria from 1919 until the mid-1920s, he later lectured at Trinity College, Cambridge, where Norman Malcolm, G.H. von Wright and others described his method as thinking out loud in front of his students and inviting them to co-research with him various topics of philosophical interest. He taught them how to think by personifying thinking and learning which always aimed at greater clarity and insight and he valued writing his thoughts as material for further reflection and communication. Wittgenstein emphasised the importance of seeing things in the right way and identified as a major obstacle to learning the wilful human tendency to want to see things otherwise than as they are. The importance of language, culture and belief as central aspects of learning defined his pedagogical vision which was continually sharpened by teaching others but most of all himself.

Keywords Ethics · God · Learner · Wittgenstein · Writing

1 Studying Himself

Rather like Descartes, one of Wittgenstein's aims was to study himself, which took the form of a rigorous and continuing self-examination of conscience about how he was living his life and whether or not he was reaching the high standards to which he subscribed, personally, ethically and professionally. His students and friends like Alice Ambrose, Fania Pascal, Norman Malcolm, Con Drury and others agreed that his presence exuded a strong moral character though Wittgenstein himself would have vehemently insisted that he often failed to live up to the moral standards to

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M.A. Peters and J. Stickney (eds.), *A Companion to Wittgenstein on Education*,
DOI 10.1007/978-981-10-3136-6_46

which he aspired. He once declared to Fania Pascal that he wanted to be perfect (Rhees 1984: 37) though she concluded in her memoir written some years after his death that his moral character was very evident in his relationships with others[1] and particularly in his work and teaching as a philosopher (Rhees 1984: 49). Alice Ambrose, who had collaborated with him in the early 1930s on the *Brown Book*, agreed and stated that "doing philosophy for Wittgenstein was a moral matter" (Ambrose and Lazerowitz 1972: 25). His strong sense of right and wrong remained with him to the end of his life and his worries and scruples in 1949 about how the punishments of hell might be explained in the light of God's goodness give some indication of his state of mind (*Culture and Value*: 92e). In 1950, a year before his death, he was particularly concerned about God's judgement and predestination:

> How God judges people is something we cannot imagine at all. If he really takes the strength of temptation & the frailty of nature into account, who can he condemn? But if not, these two forces simply yield as a result the end for which this person was predestined. In that case he was created so as either to conquer or succumb as a result of the interplay of forces. And that is not a religious idea at all so much as a scientific hypothesis. So if you want to stay within the religious sphere you must struggle. (CV: 98e)

In the passage that follows, he writes of the poisonous relationships that human beings can have with one another and in the month before his death (in April 1951) he adds this very personal note on how he might be judged:

> God may say to me: "I am judging you out of your own mouth.
> You have shuddered with disgust at your own actions when you have seen them in other people". (CV: 99e)

To some extent, these thoughts echo his post-World War I sense of dismay often expressed in his letters to his friend Paul Engelmann and notably in one where he describes his inability to take the "direct road" in life because he lacks the strength to do so (Engelmann 1967: 21). This led him to thoughts of suicide, he admits:

> Just how far I have gone downhill you can see from the fact that I have on several occasions contemplated taking my own life. Not from my despair about my own badness but for purely external reasons. Whether a talk from you would help me to some extent is doubtful, but not impossible. (Engelmann 1967: 21)

Wittgenstein does not say what these "external reasons" are though they seem to have been linked to his difficulties with some of the people whom he met, parents included, while teaching elementary school in rural Austria in the 1920s. His respite from such troubles occurred, he says, by reading fairy tales to the children whom he taught (Engelmann 1967: 29). Fortunately, he did manage to overcome his thoughts of suicide as far as one can tell, not just by not giving into them but more

[1]Although she also deplored his treatment of Francis Skinner, whom Wittgenstein persuaded to give up his mathematical research at Cambridge and embark on a mechanical apprenticeship (see Rhees 1984: 23). Pascal was convinced that Wittgenstein could exert an unduly negative influence on others at times in their decision-making options.

importantly by coming to see life afresh in the new possibilities that he perceived opening up for him in philosophy if he investigated his “new ideas” about language in what came to be known as the language-game. This was based on the thesis that the meaning of a word can be known from the sentences or contexts in which it appears. He was also encouraged by some of his friends at Cambridge in the late 1920s to return to philosophy about which he had formerly decided no more could be written following the publication of his *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. The most influential encouragement came from Bertrand Russell, his former tutor and mentor, who persuaded him to return to Trinity College and get his doctorate by submitting the *Tractatus* as a research thesis for a Ph.D. This, in turn, enabled Wittgenstein to be given a contract to lecture in philosophy at Trinity in 1930 where he was able to develop his “new ideas” on language from then onwards.

2 Writing as Pedagogical and Confessional

Self-teaching by reflective writing was very important to Wittgenstein in this project and indeed earlier as is clear from his *Notebooks 1914–1916* written during World War I when he was a soldier at the front in the Austro-Hungarian army. Some of these notes on logic and propositions later reappear in the *Tractatus*. However, in the later section of his *Notebooks* (N)[2] from June 1916 (N: 72e) to January 1917 (N: 91e), he abruptly begins to explore the theological, ethical and personal significance of God as the meaning of life, conscience as the voice of God, viewing the world *sub specie aeternitatis* and what living the good life involves, (N: 83e) and once again, some of these reflections re-appear in significant parts of the *Tractatus*. They also came to be regarded by Wittgenstein as immensely more significant for his private life and its direction so it is not surprising that a number of these theological concerns also resurface later in *Culture and Value*.

His writings were thus important to him in thinking things through and may be seen to represent a deliberately chosen form of self-learning by Wittgenstein who wrote in 1931:

> I really do think with my pen, for my head knows nothing of what my hand is writing. (CV: 24e)

However, despite his commitment to writing, especially for clarifying his thinking, he admits that it is often difficult to know where to start when writing a book (CV: 11e). Writing freed him up, as it were, to think more effectively and he often re-read

[2]Following convention, titles for Wittgenstein’s works are abbreviated (BB = The Blue and Brown Books, TLP = Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, CV = Culture and Value, N = Notebooks, PR = Philosophical Remarks), with section (§) or page number (p.), with full citation and initials (e.g., CV) in the References.

what he had written, discarding in part and retaining or reshaping the material as he saw fit. He accepted that he was often repetitive but this too could be useful:

> Each sentence that I write is trying to say the same thing over and over again & it is as though they were views of one object seen from different angles. (CV: 9e)

He also tells us how he struggled to find the right kind of language “never more than half [succeeding] in expressing what I want to express” and often doing “nothing but ‘stammering’” (CV: 16e). The latter was actually an earlier feature of his speech at times, at least when he was conversing with Engelmann who often acted as an effective “forceps” according to Wittgenstein, by being able to conjure up the right word or phrase that represented what the philosopher was trying to express. Such “stammering” then and later was undoubtedly due to Wittgenstein’s efforts to find what he described as the “liberating word” which would free up his thoughts by helping him to convey more clearly what he wanted to say. In 1949, he returns to this difficulty:

> There really are cases in which one has the sense of what one wants to say much more clearly in mind than he can express in words. (This happens to me very often.) It is as though one remembered a dream very clearly, but could not give a good account of it. (CV: 90e)

His conversations with himself “*tete-a-tete*” as he describes them (CV: 88e) which when recorded in writing provided Wittgenstein with further material for reflection that was also pedagogically useful for others as well as himself in helping to develop the activity of thinking:

> I must be nothing more than the mirror in which my reader sees his own thinking, with all its deformities & with this assistance can set it in order. (CV: 25e)

Such a pedagogical task implied that “what I should do is erect signposts at all the junctions where there are wrong turnings, to help people pass the danger points” (ibid.). However, we also know how difficult it was for Wittgenstein to write or complete a book for publication which would satisfy him because of the high standards he set himself with the result that it was only the *Tractatus* that was published in his lifetime.[3] Even finding titles for his books proved difficult for him. Perhaps this was due to his way of thinking which he describes when *not* writing a book as

> “jumping” about all over the topic; that is the only way of thinking that is natural to me. Forcing my thoughts into an ordered sequence is a torment for me…. I squander untold effort making an arrangement of my thoughts that may have no value whatever. (CV: 33e)[4]

[3]He did however dictate *The Blue and Brown Books* to a selected group of students in the 1930s.

[4]This is helpful however for those who read his writings where one might approach them, for example, by using the index to his publications where this exists and select topics of interest which can then be explored in the body of the text.

3 Truthful Writing

Writing truthfully is also necessary, he insists, particularly when writing about oneself, though that can be difficult:

> When one is frightened of the truth (as I am now) then it is never the whole truth that one has an inking of. (N: 13e)

This statement from his *Notebooks* in 1914 also gives us some glimpse of Wittgenstein's state of mind at the time. Later in 1937, he wrote:

> You cannot write more truly about yourself than you *are*. That is the difference between writing about yourself and writing about external things. You write about yourself from your own height. Here you don't stand on stilts or a ladder but on your bare feet. (CV: 38e)

However, the difficulty here is that "truth can be spoken only by someone who is already *at home* in it; not by someone who still lives in untruthfulness and does no more than reach out towards it from within untruthfulness" (CV: 41e). He continued to write about and for himself as reflective material for possible action. It seems clear, for example, from his hints and wishes to those close to him like von Wright, that he wanted even some of his very private thoughts published posthumously as indeed they were in *Culture and Value*. This volume also contains his thoughts on pedagogy, ethics, religion, culture, architecture, psychoanalysis and many other topics.[5] Indeed, Wittgenstein reminds himself and his readers how he wishes to be read:

> Sometimes a sentence can be understood only if it is read at the *right tempo*. My sentences are all to be read *slowly*. (CV: 65e)

He repeated this instruction in a further reminder to himself and others in the following year (1948):

> Really I want to slow down the speed of reading with continual
> punctuation marks. For I should like to be read slowly.
> (As I myself read.) (CV: 77e)

O.K. Bouwsma, with whom he came to be friends during his visit to the USA in 1949, suggests that Wittgenstein's relationship with the reader through the written text was as follows:

> When Wittgenstein wrote, he wrote thinking. He not only thought of the subject but wrote as though while writing he kept his eye on the reader, making sure that the reader was keeping up with him. He wrote, engaged in a dialogue with the reader, asking questions, making suggestions… He never spoon-fed a reader and no reader was left with a pocketful of Wittgenstein which he could repeat as his own… Wittgenstein's interest is in the reader and his interest in the reader is not to tell him something he does not know, but to intensify the discomfort (the reader) already has and then to help him to think himself out of trouble. (Bouwsma 1982: 28)

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[5] *Culture and Value*, to my mind, represents the best introduction to Wittgenstein's thinking in his own words.

Bouwsma's astute account is compelling, not least because before he had met Wittgenstein in 1949, he himself had studied the *Blue Book* in detail during the 1940s and came to perceive his role as a student of Wittgenstein the master thinker. As a result Bouwsma's own approach to learning and teaching philosophy long after Wittgenstein was dead continued to display the latter's influence on his thoughts and writings. This form of learning by reading slowly and thinking critically as one proceeded through a text suggests the kind of pedagogical relationship that is still possible between the Austrian philosopher's published work and the contemporary reader. It also depicts how Wittgenstein perceived his relationship with himself as writer and reader in the tete-a-tete conversations which he conducted with himself through his texts. In this connection, Bouwsma interestingly claims to detect in *Philosophical Investigations* more than one voice in the discursive approaches that marks Wittgenstein's approach there.

4 Learning and Teaching Ethics

It is true to say that religious faith and the Christian model of living as depicted in the life of Christ were in a sense rediscovered by Wittgenstein in his mid-twenties during his time as a soldier in World War I (and certainly by May 1916).[6] In addition, his family life would initially have shaped his strong ethical sense of right and wrong which demanded honesty of thought and a strong moral sense of duty and obligation to live up to the highest standards. He never lost this sense of ethics which he regarded as a precondition for living a good life and this awareness continued up until his death. That being said, he was nevertheless dismayed by his failure to adhere to the high moral standards which he held. His understanding of ethics also suggested to him that it was something that could not be taught, a position that he continued to hold over the years. Yet he was not averse to *discussing* ethics as evidenced by his famous 1929 Cambridge Lecture on the subject as we know. His paper on ethics is particularly interesting for its somewhat tentative approach which suggests that Wittgenstein was then exploring the nature of ethical language as to how ethical discourse should be understood as distinct from the ethical activity that marks human life. His *Tractatus* was also particularly important in subsequently disclosing to the poet Fricker that:

> The book's point is an ethical one. I once meant to include in the preface a sentence which is not in fact there now but which I will write out for you here, because it will perhaps be a key to the work for you. What I meant to write, then, was this: My work consists of two parts: the one presented here plus all that I have *not* written. And it is precisely this second part that is the important one. My book draws limits to the sphere of the ethical from the

[6]An important factor in Wittgenstein's renewed interest in Christianity was stimulated by his discovery and constant re-reading of Tolstoy's *The Gospels in Brief* which Wittgenstein came across as a soldier in World War I.

> inside as it were, and I am convinced that this is the ONLY *rigorous* way of drawing those limits […]. For now, I would recommend you to read the *preface* and the *conclusion*. Because they contain the most direct point of the book. (Engelmann 1967: 143–4)

This silent underlying core of ethics in the *Tractatus* as that which cannot be said but which only shows itself derives, according to Wittgenstein, from its mystical or supernatural source which exhorts us to see the world *sub specie aeterni* as a limited whole, taking the God's eye perspective, as it were. Yet it is paradoxically the apparent impossibility of doing so that limits our thoughts and discourse, in spite of what is demanded, that signifies the very presence of the mystical in the first place. Ethics as the *Tractatus* states "cannot be put into words (because) Ethics is transcendental" (Proposition 6.421). The question is how the "unsayable" nature of ethics fits with our attempts to talk about it since such discourse occurs anyway and indeed seems inevitable. Wittgenstein himself took part in part in such discussions and notably at length in his 1929 Cambridge Lecture on Ethics. In addition, if ethics shows itself, as Wittgenstein claims, this must occur in some form or other, including in its human manifestation by being personified in the attitudes and actions of those who try to live according to ethical principles. Indeed, *feeling* the world as a limited whole (TLP: 6.45) in wonder and awe at being (as mentioned in Wittgenstein's Cambridge Lecture) implies situating ourselves in the realm of the ethical. So how does ethical discourse fit with the mystical-supernatural nature of ethics itself? Perhaps a contemporary example of what this involves is contained in the recent biography of Sir Nicholas Winton written by his daughter who describes his involvement in rescuing some 669 children in 1938–39 in Prague from the Holocaust. Her father tried to arouse readers there to an awareness of the need to help such children by writing a newspaper article in 1939 about the deadening of moral standards out of fear, indifference, or even news-overload which needed to be fought against by what he called "active goodness". Here is what he said:

> There is a difference between passive goodness and active goodness which is, in my opinion, the giving of one's time and energy in the alleviation of pain and suffering. It entails going out, finding and helping those in suffering and danger and not merely leading an exemplary life, in the purely passive way of doing nothing wrong. (Winton 2014: 33)

This explains what needs to be done, according to Winton, who hoped his words would stimulate others into the relevant ethical activity and in doing so, demonstrate by "going out, finding and helping those in suffering" what ethics as ethical action means in practice. Wittgenstein would undoubtedly have applauded such "active goodness" and in a discussion between himself and his friend Con Drury as to what it meant to be a Christian, he told Drury:

> It is my belief that only if you try to be helpful to other people will you in the end find your way to God. (Rhees 1984: 114)

Elsewhere, he advised Fania Pascal, who taught him Russian in the 1930s, not to pursue political work but instead:

> What you should do is to be kind to others. Nothing else. Just be kind to others. (Rhees 1984: 22)

He also advised Con Drury on graduation that he should do something useful with his life by becoming a teacher or a doctor, which Drury did, first by teaching and then by studying medicine and qualifying as a psychiatrist who worked at St. Patrick's Hospital, Kilmainham in Dublin in the 1940s.

So, given that Wittgenstein's ethical attitude seems clear enough, how then did he see himself, from an ethical point of view? The answer would seem to be that though his intentions were praiseworthy, he appeared to himself as someone deeply flawed and even unworthy. As a young man, we know that in addition to, and perhaps because of, his early thoughts of suicide which he had confided to Paul Engelmann, he thought of himself as being poorly astride life. Although scrupulous and remorseful and increasingly concerned in later years about God's judgement, Wittgenstein would appear towards the end of his life to have become resigned to the impossibility of changing his life for the better although earlier he had seemed convinced that religious faith in the form of Christianity, was the way of doing so, as indicated especially by his lengthy devotional remarks in 1937 on the Resurrection (CV: 38e–39e).

One might therefore assess his ethical statements then in the light of his own self-assessment as exploratory, certainly, at least in part, but more importantly perhaps, as containing imperatives for action of the life-changing kind and despite his negative views about himself, the tributes of many of his friends and students testified, as we have seen, to his ethical sensitivity, one example of which Alice Ambrose mentions:

> Wittgenstein not only gave affection to his students; he exercised himself in a practical way on their behalf. (Ambrose and Lazerowitz 1972: 24–25)[7]

She too perceived the moral aspect of his philosophising where he aimed at seeking true solutions to problems that arose and she was also convinced that "few philosophers have followed (him) in this direction" (Ambrose and Lazerowitz 1972: 25).

His ethical learning was particularly applied to his work on himself as a person whose aim was to help others in so far as he could with the gifts that he had, especially by providing them with a template of his own thinking and learning.

5 The Religious and the Ethical

The crossover between the ethical and the religious in Wittgenstein is also suggested by his references to his work as an attempt to glorify God and in another separate statement where he argues that he cannot avoid viewing the world except

[7]The example Ambrose gives is of his financial and personal assistance to a promising student who lacked the funds to stay on at Cambridge.

from a religious point of view.[8] With regard to glorifying God, there is the following dedication in his Preface to *Philosophical Remarks*:

> I would like to say "This book is written to the glory of God", but nowadays that would be chicanery, that is, it would not be rightly understood. It means the book is written in goodwill, and in so far as it is not written, but out of vanity, etc., the author would wish to see it condemned. He cannot free it of these impurities further than he himself is free of them.

Years later towards the end of the 1940s, he is more explicit on this point to Drury on receiving a letter from an old priest friend of his from Austria.[9] This priest had expressed the hope that Wittgenstein's work would go well if it were God's will and Wittgenstein replied to Drury: "Now that is all I want: if it should be God's will" following which he quoted Bach's remark: "To the glory of the most high God, and that my neighbour may be benefitted thereby". Wittgenstein then added "That is what I would have liked to say about my work" (Rhees 1984: 168). Such dedications suggest a thinker whose views were deeply shaped by a form of Christian faith whose main principles he tried to apply to his own life in so far as this was possible for him, especially ethically. His acceptance of suffering as a necessary part of the human condition was part of such faith representing the price he perceived that one had to pay for one's state of imperfection. In this connection, he had once remarked that he was certain that we were not here simply to have a good time.

6 Learning and Teaching

Wittgenstein's writings and conversations often revealed his frustration at being misunderstood or not being understood at all and this was no doubt the result of his constant search for perfection. In his insightful study, *Wittgenstein in Exile*, Legge points out that this made for Wittgenstein's difficulties both in communicating his thoughts to others and in ensuring that his thinking could be understood. Indeed Wittgenstein *expected* to be misunderstood and often tried to counteract this by explaining what he had written to those who were interested in what he had to say. This occurred when he wrote the *Tractatus* (e.g. with Russell and Frege) and *Philosophical Investigations* (with Norman Malcolm). His lack of publications during his lifetime was to some extent made up for by his discursive form of teaching which he believed, like Plato, was essential to philosophical learning. Hence, his insistence on the dialectical approach in his lectures especially from the 1930s onwards despite his verbal and conceptual stumbling and inarticulacy in his

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[8]"I am not a religious man but I cannot help seeing every problem from a religious point of view" (Rhees 1984: 79).

[9]Most likely, the priest in one of the villages where Wittgenstein taught elementary school, whose company the philosopher sought as a means of finding some stimulating conversation.

attempts to convey his thoughts to others.[10] This very personal and dramatic form of making such difficulties so publicly explicit in the academic theatres of learning which he inhabited may come to represent his greatest legacy to self-teaching and learning and his model of self-analysis as pedagogy for himself and those others whom he taught certainly challenges all of us as lifelong learner–teachers today.

7 Conclusion

Finally, it should be said that though Wittgenstein was sceptical about his pedagogical legacy (perhaps like most teachers), arguing that his type of thinking "is not wanted in this present age" where he had to "swim so strongly against the tide", he was nonetheless hopeful that "Perhaps in a hundred years people will really want what I am writing." He was also realistic about what the philosopher can achieve:

> The philosopher says: 'Look at things *like this*! – but first that is not to say that people will look at things like this. Second he may be all too late with his admonition & and it's possible too that such an admonition can achieve absolutely nothing & that the impulse towards such a change in the way things are perceived must come from another direction.' (CV: 70e)

This is reminiscent of what he had earlier said about seeing things in such a way that the problem that we have been struggling with disappears. In his own life, this may well have been demonstrated during his early post-World War I years when in the late 1920s, his thoughts about suicide seem to have vanished to be replaced with his new exciting ideas about the language-game theory that he worked on from 1929/1930 onwards. This gave him, as it were, a new lease of intellectual and personal life that marked his vitality up until his death in 1951.

Lastly, his personal and professional demeanour while in Ireland in the late 1940s is worth noting during his stay in Rosroe, a remote area near the sea in County Galway.[11] Rory Brennan's poem "The Setting" depicts the philosopher in this way.[12] It will be remembered how much Wittgenstein himself had valued poetry as the best linguistic form for expressing philosophy and indeed had wished that his *Tractatus* could have been written as a poem:

Addendum: "The Setting"

The philosopher folded himself into a deckchair
(word games skipped like sand gusts in the air)

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[10]See the example of the maths student who attended his lectures and described one of these as consisting of the philosopher's inability to finish even one sentence as in Klagge, *Wittgenstein in Exile*, p. 165.

[11]During this last period of his life, he had stayed at Redcross, County Wicklow, at Rosroe, Galway and finally in Dublin.

[12]Rory Brennan, a Dublin poet of long-standing and a friend of mine sent me this poem some weeks ago.

But his contraption graced no sunlit beach
(it was the *cathedra* he used to teach)

Instead was planted firm on planks of deal
(such pitiless severity negates appeal)

Inside a room as artless as a cell
(in the mauve dusk there chimed a mordant bell)

Where no engraving, photograph or sketch
(the unencumbered mind begins to stretch)

Intrudes upon exactitudes of space
(the house back in Vienna states the case)

Landscape and architecture stripped and stark
(even his body coiled into a question mark)

And so he sat, a gaunt ascetic on a shaky throne
(all his propositions too were skin and bone)

Each student pinioned on a bentwood chair
("an explanation must conclude somewhere")

Astounded by the thinker's shell-hole eyes
(empires and cosmogonies cut down to size)

Who in his choice of setting made it known
If truth cannot be proved it may be shown.

(Rory Brennan © 2016)

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Imagining Philosophy of Religion Differently: Interdisciplinary Wittgensteinian Approaches

Mikel Burley

Abstract Despite a growing interest in philosophy of religion in secondary level education, especially in the United Kingdom, courses at undergraduate level frequently fail to build upon the preliminary understanding that students have gained. A fixation on the evaluation of religious "truth-claims" tends to detract from an appreciation of the variegated nature of religious forms of life and practice, while a limited palette of examples constrains the cross-cultural reach of the subject. After outlining weaknesses in the approach often taken to teaching philosophy of religion, this chapter considers both how increased interdisciplinary engagement can deepen and expand the cultural range of philosophy of religion and how Wittgenstein-inspired modes of investigation can facilitate such interdisciplinarity. The influence of Wittgenstein's ideas in the study of religion outside philosophy is concisely surveyed, and examples are given from my own teaching of how to integrate Wittgensteinian and interdisciplinary dimensions into an undergraduate course.

Keywords Philosophy of religion · Ludwig Wittgenstein · Interdisciplinary approaches · Cross-cultural · Anthropology

1 Introduction

The popularity over recent years of philosophy of religion units in religious studies courses at pre-university level in the United Kingdom has contributed to a growing interest in this area of study at university level. Although what is taught in secondary education under the title of philosophy of religion, or sometimes "philosophy and

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M.A. Peters and J. Stickney (eds.), *A Companion to Wittgenstein on Education*,
DOI 10.1007/978-981-10-3136-6_47

ethics", suffers from problems of narrowness, it has tended to provide students with a competent grounding in the subject. When it comes to university, however, undergraduate courses in philosophy of religion often fail to significantly deepen or expand the students' philosophical inquiry into religious matters. Frequently duplicating portions of secondary level syllabuses (most of which were, in the first instance, modelled on what gets taught in introductory university courses), the university courses commonly add further technical detail while missing opportunities to enhance students' appreciation of the variety of phenomena that exist within the category of religion.

A particular problem is the extent to which philosophy of religion has fostered an exaggerated conception of the role that propositional beliefs, or "truth-claims", play within religious forms of life. Strhan (2010, p. 31) summarizes the problem as follows:

> The centrality of philosophy of religion within RE [religious education] leads students to view being religious as believing that certain statements of knowledge are true. Thus, exam specifications, determining to a large extent the content of the curriculum, tend to present religion in too simplistic terms as assent to certain religious propositions.

Although the problem that Strhan highlights is a genuine one, it could be misleading to suggest that it is caused by the "centrality of philosophy of religion within RE", for the real problem is more specific than this: it is that a *particular conception* of what philosophy of religion is has become dominant both in pre-university religious education (or religious studies) courses and, paradigmatically, at university level. By presenting philosophy of religion per se as the enemy, we risk bolstering a false opposition between philosophy on the one side and other approaches to the study of religions—including social scientific and philological approaches—on the other, when what really needs to be recognized is the possibility of doing philosophy of religion differently, broadening its horizons in ways that afford a richer understanding of the multiple forms that being religious (or rejecting religion) can take.

This chapter has a critical and a constructive aspect. On the critical side I elaborate my allegation that philosophy of religion, primarily as it is taught in universities, needs to be imagined differently. Then, on the constructive side, I discuss some ways in which a philosophy of religion syllabus might be enhanced, both with regard to its cross-cultural and multi-religious scope and, relatedly, in terms of its engagement with other relevant disciplines. My contention is that methods of investigation inspired by Ludwig Wittgenstein harbour the potential to facilitate such interdisciplinarity, especially given the wide-ranging influence that his work has had across several disciplines involved in the study of religions, including anthropology and theology along with the methodologically diverse area known as religious studies.

2 Philosophy of Religion at Pre-University Level

Pre-university students in the United Kingdom have been most likely over recent years to study philosophy of religion as part of an AS (Advanced Subsidiary) or A (Advanced) Level religious studies course, which they would normally take in the context of their secondary education from the ages of sixteen to eighteen. Although things are set to change in the near future, the 2013 OCR (Oxford, Cambridge and RSA [Royal Society of Arts]) specification document for religious studies includes both an AS and an A2 philosophy of religion unit, which are designed to be progressive (see OCR 2013, pp. 12–15, 39–40). Thus, although students who proceed to A2 Level after completing the AS Level have been entitled to choose units from areas of study different from those which they took at AS Level, they are encouraged to remain within the same unit area.

Between them, the AS and A2 philosophy of religion units have provided a coherent introduction not only to philosophy of religion, but to western philosophy more generally, making reference to key figures such as Plato, Aristotle, Boethius, Aquinas, Descartes, Hume, Kant, and indeed Wittgenstein (Mayled et al. 2015). Among the strengths of the syllabus are its long historical range, its sustained comparative emphasis, and its bringing of philosophy into dialogue with scriptural sources (most notably the Bible). Thus, for example, the AS unit has typically begun with “Ancient Greek influences on philosophy of religion” (OCR 2013, p. 12), with Plato’s analogy of the cave and theory of Forms being examined along with Aristotle’s conceptions of causation and of a Prime Mover. This has been followed by a section entitled “Judaeo-Christian influences on philosophy of religion”, which features comparisons between biblical representations of God and Aristotle’s more austere conception, and a version of Plato’s *Euthyphro* question is adduced in discussing the “goodness of God”. Then come the traditional arguments for God’s existence, usually covering the ontological, cosmological and teleological arguments plus a Kantian moral argument and some psychoanalytic challenges from Freud. The AS syllabus has then tended to conclude with discussion of the problem of evil and issues arising from the relation between religion and science. Following this, topics dealt with by the A2 unit have included: religious language (in which context Wittgenstein receives a mention), religious experience (with William James’s *Varieties of Religious Experience* providing a point of departure), miracles, the nature and attributes of God, and life after death (OCR 2013, pp. 39–40).

Weaknesses of these A Level philosophy of religion syllabuses include the fact that, by remaining closely tied to the European or Euro-American philosophical tradition, the religious and cultural purview is rather limited, with Christianity—or, at most, the so-called Judaeo-Christian tradition—being implicitly treated as normative for what constitutes the religion about which philosophical questions are to be raised and addressed. Occasional gestures are made in the direction of non-Abrahamic traditions, such as when reincarnation is mentioned among the “views of life after death” (OCR 2013, p. 40; Mayled et al. 2015, pp. 269–271), but

these gestures do not extend very far. Moreover, the textual focus of the units contributes to the problem that I mentioned above, namely that the conceptualization of religion is limited to one that prioritizes doctrines over practices, presenting those doctrines as propositions or "truth-claims" largely in abstraction from the practices that, as Wittgenstein would put it, give the words their sense (cf. CV, p. 97e).[1]

The weaknesses to which I have just drawn attention would not be so much of a problem, at least for students who go on to study philosophy of religion further at university, were it the case that university courses actively sought to deepen and expand the philosophical discussion of religion beyond what is offered at secondary level. Regrettably, however, this is not generally what happens. Indeed, university courses often restrict the syllabus even more in certain respects while presuming that they are providing greater "clarity and rigor to traditional pursuits" (to quote the contemporary American philosopher of religion William Wainwright) by applying such "tools" as those of "modal logic [and] probability theory" (Wainwright 2005, p. 6). I shall say more about philosophy of religion as it is commonly taught at university undergraduate level below.

3 Philosophy of Religion at University Level

What many undergraduate courses, or modules, in philosophy of religion do—in the United Kingdom but also in the USA and elsewhere in the Anglophone world—is to structure the material in terms of a series of arguments between so-called "theists" on the one side and "atheists" on the other while assuming these arguments to be paradigmatic of what is at issue, not only in the philosophy of religion, but in religious life outside the academy as well. As a consequence, questions of justification and truth are privileged over more nuanced inquiries into the variety of ways in which religious beliefs and practices enter into the lives of people and their communities. In this connection, Anna Strhan's critical remarks are well taken when she points out that the understandable "desire to protect students against religious indoctrination" by cultivating their analytic and evaluative skills runs the risk of "a more subtle indoctrination" into the assumption that religious life is exclusively a matter of weighing up arguments for and against religious doctrines (Strhan 2010, p. 32).

An illustrative example of unadventurous thinking in course design is provided by a recent syllabus for an undergraduate module in philosophy of religion taught within the Department of Philosophy at King's College London. It begins in week 1

[1]Following convention, titles for Wittgenstein's works are abbreviated (BB = The Blue and Brown Books, TLP = Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, WL = Wittgenstein's Lectures, PO = Philosophical Occasions CV = Culture and Value), with section (§) or page number (p.), with full citation and initials (e.g., PO) in the References.

with "Existence Arguments and Non-Existence Arguments"; week 2 is entitled "Arguments for (Broad) Atheism I"; week 3 is "Arguments for (Broad) Atheism II"; week 4 is "Arguments for (Narrow) Atheism"; week 5 is "Arguments for (Narrow) Atheism II"; and the remainder of the module deals with life after death and the rationality of religious belief, all with Christianity—or some tenuously Christian form of "theism"—as an assumed background (see King's College London 2014–2015).

Tim Mawson of the University of Oxford epitomizes the attitude of many lecturers in philosophy of religion when, at the outset of his book *Belief in God*, the subtitle of which proclaims it to be "An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion", he announces that the book is "going to be focusing on the central claim of the Western religions of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, those religions that say that the answer to the question [of 'the physical world'] is a personal agent, namely God" (2005, p. 2). Mawson proceeds to ask his readers to view his neglect of "the traditions of the Eastern religions"—not to mention the many smaller religions that are well described neither as western nor as eastern—"as methodological humility rather than methodological narrow-mindedness". In his defence, he adds:

> If I am to make significant progress in the space allowed by a relatively short book, I must concentrate on an area that I can reasonably hope to traverse in the amount of time such a format allows. So for this reason, which I admit is not a philosophical reason, I'm going to focus exclusively on the main philosophical arguments pertaining to the monotheistic religions of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, and to the main claim of these religions, that there is a God. (2005, p. 2)

Mawson is undoubtedly right that one cannot hope to cover everything about the philosophy of religion in a single book of fewer than three hundred pages. Still less can one expect to do so in a single module of ten, eleven or twelve weeks. But opting for the narrowness of Mawson's approach—considerably more attenuated than even the A Level syllabus—seems peculiarly remiss when one is claiming to provide a genuine introduction to the philosophy of religion rather than to merely a tiny portion of it.

4 Broadening Developments in Philosophy of Religion

Despite the persistent insularity of philosophy of religion syllabuses in many universities, pressure for greater depth and inclusiveness is coming from a variety of directions. There have, of course, long been philosophers of religion who have themselves sought to broaden the subject's remit, prominent among these being John Hick (1922–2012), who affirms in a work first published in 2001 that to him "it seems clear … that the philosophy of religion is not properly just the philosophy of the Christian (or Judaeo-Christian) tradition, but in principle of religion throughout history and throughout the world" (2010, pp. 12–13). More recently Kevin Schilbrack has gone further than Hick in pushing not only for a more historically and

geographically encompassing approach, but for stronger mutual engagement between philosophy and other disciplines involved in the study of religions as well, notably the sociology and anthropology of religion and the various subdisciplines that get lumped into the category of religious studies (Schilbrack 2014, esp. ch. 7).

At least as important as these forces coming from within philosophy of religion is the pressure generated by campaigning groups such as Minorities and Philosophy (MAP 2015) and the Society for Women in Philosophy (SWIP UK 2015), which are concerned not exclusively with philosophy of religion but with philosophy across the board. The activities of these two groups in particular is not only raising awareness about the imbalances within most philosophy departments in English-speaking countries—in which women and members of non-white ethnic groups are severely underrepresented among the academic staff—but also devising strategies for rectifying these imbalances. Their campaigns include promoting the diversification of invited seminar speakers and course reading lists to ensure that relevant and important work by women and non-white philosophers is not unfairly neglected (see, e.g. BPA/SWIP UK 2014, p. 6; Diversity Reading List 2015). The trend that these campaigns are generating is thus towards increased cultural inclusiveness and a questioning of conservative agendas both in teaching and in research.

In the philosophy of religion this diversification agenda encourages the expansion of syllabuses to take account of non-Christian and non-Abrahamic religious traditions and also the incorporation into course reading lists of material produced by female and non-white authors, thereby opening up fresh perspectives on religious issues. The agenda is assisted by the sorts of multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary ways of working that people such as Schilbrack and myself have been advocating (see Burley 2015), and these ways of working can themselves be furthered through the adoption of Wittgensteinian methods, which are remarkably conducive to bringing philosophy into productive dialogue with other disciplines, including those that I have mentioned already such as anthropology, religious studies and theology. An important reason for this is that some of the investigative approaches in these other disciplines have much in common with Wittgenstein's later methods. Moreover, Wittgenstein's work has had a direct impact on those disciplines that is comparable to its impact on philosophy; indeed, in some respects the impact in those other disciplines has been more pervasive and enduring.

In the next section I underscore some instances of where Wittgenstein's influence has been significant in the study of religions outside mainstream philosophy before focusing, in Sect. 6, on some specific examples of how philosophy of religion can be deepened and expanded.

5 Wittgenstein and the Study of Religions

Among the ideas associated with Wittgenstein that have been influential in the study of religions are those of "family resemblance concepts" and "forms of life", but also some of the themes discernible in his "Remarks on Frazer's *Golden*

Bough" (PO), most notably the criticisms of Frazer's intellectualist tendencies and the emphasis that Wittgenstein places on seeking analogies between forms of behaviour in other cultures and things that go on in one's own culture.

With regard to the notion of family resemblances, this has had at least as strong an effect on thinking about the concept of religion as it has in any other area of inquiry. Though often mediated through, or conflated with, the notions of polythetic classification popularized by the anthropologist Needham (1975) or so-called prototype theory devised by Lakoff (1987, esp. pp. 16–17), talk of family resemblance is commonplace in the study of religions. Probably the first to take up the idea in print was Ninian Smart, who, in an article first published in 1959, urges us to "abandon the old-fashioned notion of definition and throw off the fascination of essences", instead recognizing that the term "religion", like other general terms such as "game", applies "to a wide variety of things in virtue, not of some common property, but of 'family resemblance'" (1959, pp. 222–223).

Subsequent to Smart, many others have adopted the view of "religion" as a family resemblance concept and have also applied this idea to various specific religions, with the concept of Hinduism having become signally prone to being characterized in these terms. The Indologist Wendy Doniger, for example, advocates a "polythetic approach" to thinking about Hinduism, which she says "owes much to the concept of family resemblance laid out by … Wittgenstein". She recommends depicting the concept in the form of a Venn diagram, "grouped into sectors of different colors, one for beliefs or practices that some Hindus shared with Buddhists and Jainas, another largely confined to Hindu texts in Sanskrit, a third more characteristic of popular worship and practice, and so forth" (2010, pp. 28–29).

In my own experience of teaching undergraduate courses on Hindu traditions and South Asian religions more generally, many students find the sort of approach outlined by Doniger intuitively appealing. It constitutes a sober intervention in the often heated debates between those scholars who insist that there is no such thing as Hinduism—there is, at most, merely a disparate collection of Hindu*isms* or Hindu *religions* (von Stietencron 1997)—and those who maintain that, on the contrary, there are certain things that all Hindus have in common, such as a belief in a cosmic principle called *dharma*, which bind them together into a relatively cohesive religious community (Halbfass 1988, ch. 17). The family resemblance idea provides a means, not of simplistically disposing of these disagreements, but of inviting us to look and see whether they hinge upon certain questionable assumptions. One such assumption might be that "religion" must have an essence and that what we, as students of religion, have to do is discover whether any given phenomenon or tradition (such as Hinduism) fulfils the requirements—the necessary and jointly sufficient conditions—for having the term "religion" applied to it. Deploying the idea of family resemblance allows us to attend more closely to the particular ways in which religious traditions both diverge from and intersect with one another, without forcing us to expect them all to conform to a predetermined blueprint. Such an approach, which can serve to relieve both scholars and students of what Wittgenstein (BB, p. 1; WL, p. 90) would call "a mental cramp", have usefully been embraced in connection not only with Hinduism but also with New Age religions

(Kemp 2004, p. 7), Buddhism (Jackson 1988, p. 129), Tantra (Urban 2003, pp. 43, 272), and no doubt with other religious phenomena as well.

Aside from the notion of family resemblances, Wittgenstein's influence on the study of religions has also been felt in discussions of the relation between belief and practice. Again, Rodney Needham—who in one place suggestively describes social anthropology as "empirical philosophy" (1972, p. xiv)—foregrounds this issue in his book *Belief, Language and Experience* (1972), which is dedicated jointly to the anthropologist Lucien Lévy-Bruhl and to Wittgenstein. The book could be characterized as a sustained cross-cultural grammatical investigation into the concept of belief, at the end of which Needham concludes that the ways in which his fellow ethnographers have attributed "beliefs"—especially religious "beliefs"—to the communities they study has frequently been unduly loose and misleading. More generally, Wittgenstein's influence is discernible in the reluctance among many contemporary anthropologists to try to *explain* religious practices by reference to underlying beliefs or theories supposedly held by the practitioners. The suggestion that practices, such as rituals, might not be based on specific beliefs—such as the belief that performing the ritual will bring about a certain practical effect—was hardly original to Wittgenstein, but Wittgenstein gave the suggestion a form of expression that has caught the imagination of several anthropologists of religion.

In one of his remarks on Frazer, for instance, Wittgenstein writes that "One could almost say that man is a ceremonial animal" (PO, p. 129)—a phrase that is picked up in the title of Wendy James's book *The Ceremonial Animal: A New Portrait of Anthropology*, in which James invokes not only the notion of ceremoniousness, but also Wittgenstein's term "form of life", in order to accentuate the sociality of human cultural and linguistic activities (2003, esp. p. 6). Much could also be said about the creative uses to which Wittgenstein's ideas have been put by other anthropologists such as Clifford Geertz, Stanley Tambiah and Veena Das, not to mention the repercussions of his work in other relevant disciplines such as theology and even biblical hermeneutics (MacDonald 2005); but enough has been said for our present purposes to indicate that Wittgenstein's voice remains eminently audible in the study of religions beyond philosophy.

6 Interdisciplinary Wittgensteinian Experiments in Teaching

My task in this penultimate section is to outline some examples of how I have endeavoured in my own teaching to deepen and expand the scope of philosophy of religion, both by using explicitly Wittgensteinian material and by employing an implicitly Wittgensteinian sensibility to promote interdisciplinary inquiry. Of particular pertinence is a third-year undergraduate course entitled *Religion, Belief and Ethics*, which I designed with the intention of exposing students to a wider range of subject matter, and of ways of going about philosophy of religion, than they are

likely to have met earlier in their undergraduate studies or during their secondary education. Here I shall give a few examples of what is covered in the syllabus with a view to illustrating three of the course's main objectives. One objective is to show students how standard topics in philosophy of religion can be explored in deeper and more morally serious ways than is normally the case. A second objective is to raise questions regarding the nature of religious belief and hence about what we understand, or think we understand, religion to be. And the third, closely related, objective is to extend the syllabus in cross-cultural directions.

One of the standard topics included in the syllabus is that of life after death or eternal life. This is commonly broached in philosophy of religion courses in terms of whether there are good reasons for believing that life after death is possible, but the logically prior question of what it means to speak of an afterlife—or of eternal life, resurrection, reincarnation, and similar matters—is routinely neglected. I aim to encourage students both to see that it is a mistake to overlook this logically prior question (or nexus of questions) and to be open to the possibility that there are *many* things that speaking of, and believing in, an afterlife might amount to.

I find that adducing the subject of reincarnation, or rebirth, at the outset of the course immediately prompts students to think about the connections between what we might call, as a starting point, metaphysics and ethics—between, in this particular case, the belief in a kind of life beyond death on the one hand and the sorts of ethical values that inform a person's life on the other. The article that I get students to read and to discuss during the first seminar is by the psychiatrist and perseverant reincarnation researcher Stevenson (1977), which serves several purposes. First, since the piece was published in a medical journal it effectively disrupts the unhelpful expectation that sources relevant to philosophy of religion are to be found only in explicitly philosophical publications. Second, it immediately plunges students into a form of cross-cultural and interdisciplinary inquiry that exceeds the often constricted parameters of mainstream philosophy of religion.

Third, although Stevenson's own interest in the article is the question of whether the idea, or "theory", of reincarnation has explanatory power with regard to various human phenomena—such as why some children are exceptionally gifted, why others exhibit phobias or unusual habits, and so on—his approach enables me to shift the focus slightly: away from questions of explanation and towards questions of how a belief in reincarnation facilitates alternative perspectives on these aspects of human life. For example, we might say that *in the light of* a belief in reincarnation a child's fear of water is able to be spoken of in terms of the child's having perhaps drowned in a former life; similarly, a precocious musician's talent could be described in terms of her having carried this ability over from one life to the next. None of this is intended—by me, at any rate—to constitute a reason why someone who does not already believe in reincarnation should start believing in it; rather, it is a first step towards our seeing how religious beliefs shape the possible ways in which phenomena can be perceived and understood.

A fourth purpose served by the Stevenson article is that of providing a convenient entry point for discussing conceptual issues concerning what it means to attribute a religious belief to someone. Fortuitously, Stevenson's article is cited by

David Cockburn in a thoughtful essay entitled "The Evidence for Reincarnation" (1991), in which Cockburn contemplates the ethical significance of regarding someone, especially a child, as in some sense the "same person" as someone who previously died. I use Cockburn's piece as a follow-on reading, exhibiting for students a very different style of philosophizing from that which is typical of philosophy of religion, a style that owes much to the ethical thought of Peter Winch, who was himself of course greatly inspired by the work of Wittgenstein.

Inevitably perhaps, given the kind of training they have previously undergone, students are apt to initially miss Cockburn's point, which is that in order to see what talk of reincarnation means, an important place to look is the ethical attitudes of those who speak in these terms. Many students hear this as a call to leave aside metaphysical questions about whether reincarnation "really happens" and to instead concentrate exclusively on questions of how we ought to treat one another: whether it is "fair" to look upon a child as the reincarnation of someone else, and so on. It can require effort to bring students to see that in a case such as belief in reincarnation there may be no clear sense that can be given to the idea of "leaving aside" the metaphysical questions in order to concentrate on the ethical ones, for "metaphysics" and "ethics" are intimately interfused. But some students do get the point; and even those who continue to struggle with it are enabled to see that attention needs to be given to how religious beliefs and ethical values relate to each other.

Another noteworthy feature of Cockburn's article is its inclusion of reflections on how a dialogue between two parents of a child might go if one of them were to believe the child to be a reincarnation of another child of theirs who had died and the other parent were to reject this contention. Though, again, some students misunderstand the point of this dialogical form of exposition—falsely assuming that the author, Cockburn, must be endorsing one parent's view and opposing the other—the form nevertheless begins to ease them into other ways of viewing philosophical inquiry: into the possibility that there is value in exploring alternative perspectives, regardless of whether one ends up agreeing or disagreeing with any of the perspectives considered.

From reincarnation, the course moves to the notion of immortality or eternal life as expounded principally in Christian thought, which provides an opportunity for bringing philosophical sources into engagement with theological ones. As primary readings I generally use articles by Jantzen (1984) and Lash (1978), respectively, each of whom seeks to place in question the assumption that terms such as "immortality" and "eternal life" obviously refer to a state of existence subsequent to death. These perspectives help to reemphasize questions of meaning over questions of truth or justification, obliging us—and students—to forego lazy assumptions that we know perfectly well what "immortality" or "eternal life" means and that believing in it must necessarily be incompatible with believing our lives to be finite in duration.

Relevant to these discussions of eternal life are contributions by Phillips (e.g. 1970), who provocatively exhorts his readers to consider the practical moral and religious significance of belief in eternal life, and himself invokes Wittgenstein's rhetorical questioning in the *Tractatus* of whether the idea of "eternal survival after

death" offers any clearer answer to the problem of life's meaning than does our present finite life (TLP: 6.4312; Phillips 1970, p. 49). By citing these remarks from Phillips and Wittgenstein in the context of more thoroughgoing theological investigations of talk about eternal life, it becomes possible to show students how, despite the prejudices of many mainstream analytic philosophers of religion, construing Wittgensteinian approaches as "anti-realist" or "non-cognitivist" are simplistic. Rather, what Phillips and other Wittgensteinians are doing is, for the most part, identifying possibilities of sense in religious discourse that are frequently neglected by those philosophers who are in a hurry to determine whether some given proposition is true. Of course, the alternative is not to uncritically accept what theologians say—not least because much of what they say can be frustratingly enigmatic—but to look carefully at the roles that religious forms of language have in believers' lives, and this can again require the cultivation of a more anthropologically or ethnographically inflected sensibility than is commonly found in philosophy of religion.

In addition to Wittgenstein's own suggestive allusions (Rhees 1965, p. 25; CV, p. 45e), one conspicuous point of contact between philosophy and anthropology is in the debate sparked in large part by Peter Winch's critical response to the ethnographic work of Edward Evans-Pritchard (Winch 1964). Whatever one thinks of Winch's particular arguments, the debate that they instigated—concerning how, or whether, religious and magical practices in small-scale societies are to be understood—can be highly engaging for students. Although Winch himself, along with other Wittgenstein-influenced philosophers, is customarily dismissed in the literature as advocating an implausibly deflationary "expressivist" or "emotivist" theory of ritual practices (cf. Cook 1983), if one is able to see beyond those superficial characterizations then rich interpretive possibilities can come into view. Especially notable is the procedure, exemplified by Wittgenstein himself in his remarks on Frazer, of seeking in one's own culture analogies or "connecting links" with practices performed in cultures that are ostensibly different. Following Wittgenstein, Winch (1964, pp. 320–321) recommends, for instance, not assuming that divinatory practices are a kind of misguided proto-science and instead suggests looking to forms of Christian prayer as a more profitable analogue. Even if this specific example of Winch's proves to be too limited, the principle of seeking analogies for the purpose of disclosing possibilities of meaning is extremely fruitful, notably as a step towards fuller engagement with ethnographic sources, which in turn brings an array of small-scale indigenous societies into the purview of philosophy of religion.

7 Concluding Remarks

Let me, then, sum up the principal points I have been highlighting. First I drew attention to some weaknesses in the way that philosophy of religion is commonly taught. The fixation on critical analysis and evaluation of beliefs—construed in

terms of “propositional attitudes”, “assent to propositions” or “truth-claims”—gets underway prior to university but really comes to the fore in undergraduate courses, where opportunities for expanding conceptions of human religious life are frequently missed and students are fed desiccated arguments disconnected from the cultural contexts in which religious beliefs and practices have the sense that they do.

Second, I indicated some sources of pressure, both internal and external to philosophy of religion, which have the capacity to unsettle the complacency that continues to surround much of the teaching in this area. Third, by furnishing reminders of how influential Wittgenstein’s ideas have been in the study of religion outside philosophy, I proposed that Wittgensteinian approaches can be especially conducive to interdisciplinary working.

Finally, I selected examples from the syllabus of my own course, *Religion, Belief and Ethics*, to illustrate some directions in which to look if philosophy of religion is to be imagined differently. Prominent among these directions is increasing cross-cultural inquiry, which is itself enabled by interdisciplinary exchange between philosophy and anthropology. There remains enormous potential in that direction, both for teaching and for ongoing research, and it is in work inspired by Wittgenstein—by philosophically inclined anthropologists as well as anthropologically inclined philosophers—that we find many of the methods best suited for furthering these developments.

Acknowledgments An earlier version of this chapter was presented at the 50th anniversary conference of the Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain, 29 July 2015. I am grateful to Paul Standish and Naomi Hodgson for the invitation to participate in that conference and to members of the audience for their lively questions and discussion. Special thanks go to David Cockburn and Ieuan Lloyd, both of whom engaged me in correspondence subsequent to the conference.

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To Think for Oneself—Philosophy as the Unravelling of Moral Responsibility

Niklas Toivakainen

Abstract The main aim of the paper is to try to show how I see Wittgenstein's ("later") philosophy and its focus on clarity of thought to be essentially pointing towards the notion of personal responsibility. Two interconnected features in will be discussed. First I will draw attention to the so-called "destructive" nature of Wittgenstein's philosophy, trying to show that its central contribution to clarity of thought lies in its ability to expose our temptation to misunderstand and hence our personal involvement and responsibility for it. From here I turn to a discussion on the famous notion of "bringing words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use". Here also, the issue of personal responsibility becomes essential. The main claim will be that while "bringing words back to the everyday" is closely related to conventions, it is only via an elucidation of the interpersonal moral dynamics underpinning those very conventions that clarity can be reached. After this I attempt to characterise, as an example, how the notion of philosophy as the unravelling of moral responsibility is both present and absent in Raimond Gaita's reflections on goodness and evil, and how the absence is characterised by an externalisation of personal responsibility to a *picture* of reality. In the end, I will come with some concluding remarks on how I see the sense of the paper qualifying the notion of "teaching to philosophise".

Keywords Responsibility · Moral dynamics · Evil · Communality · Externalisation

1 Introduction

To "think for oneself", not just to absorb a body of established knowledge is, arguably, a cornerstone of our "modern civilisation" and its sense of education. And in particular, when it comes to philosophy, "to think for oneself" is perhaps not simply a cornerstone but an essential feature of the concept itself. Yet at the same

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M.A. Peters and J. Stickney (eds.), *A Companion to Wittgenstein on Education*,
DOI 10.1007/978-981-10-3136-6_48

time it is not hard to imagine the words "be yourself, think independently" as a slogan for a sports gear or smart phone advertisement: to "think for oneself" is also a perfect notion for an utterly collective consumerist ideology. One way of drawing a distinction between an ideological usage of "to think for oneself" and, as it were, a philosophical one, would be to say that the philosophical sense is internally connected with a search for and elucidation of the meaning of those very concepts "think" and "self", while the former is an appeal to immerse in a *given picture* of them and reason according to the "logic" of that picture.

The issues involved here are connected with the question what it would mean to say that one can be *taught* to "think for oneself". I gather that most will be inclined to say that there is much one can be taught about thinking, but that there is "obviously" *always* a limit to it. And here I am not talking about intellectual limits, although there are of course instances when this is also at issue. Rather, the "pedagogical limit" that is *always* present is the limit of one's power/influence over the other: there is a point where the other has to answer for herself and take the necessary steps herself. But there is of course something confused about this way of putting it, since talk of "limits" and "power/influence over the other" are exactly concepts relevant for the purpose of ideological aims. Nobody *can make* another "think for oneself", but this is not a "limit" to anything.

I think that philosophy—and hence philosophical problems—is essentially about what is not teachable. Or perhaps better put, I think philosophy—hence "to think for oneself"—is essentially about responsibility. Kant seems to have thought something like this when he wrote his "*What is Enlightenment*" (Kant 1949). In the beginning of this short text, we find the following formulation: "*Dare to know!* (*Sapere aude.*) 'Have the courage to use your own understanding', is therefore the motto of the enlightenment" (ibid.). I am not quite sure how far Kant would agree with me here, but as far as I can see "Dare to know" is both connected to things like not fearing the expectations and demands of social normativity as well as, and perhaps more importantly, to be ready to take responsibility for all that *understanding* addresses us with.

There are many reasons for not including Wittgenstein as part of the enlightenment tradition, perhaps most obviously because of his distrust and even distaste for a culture that idealises (or has as its ideological basis) scientific and technological "progress". Nevertheless, Wittgenstein's philosophy seems to be, perhaps more than anyone else's, a manifestation of the Kantian enlightenment motto.[1] In the preface to the *Philosophical Investigations* (*Investigations*), we find a modification of this motto: "I should not like my writing to spare other people the trouble of thinking. But, if possible, to stimulate someone to thoughts of his own" (PI, viii).

Arguably, in both Kant's and Wittgenstein's case the focus on "thinking for oneself" is internally connected to their respected conceptions of philosophy. Kant connected his enlightenment motto with his notion that philosophy does not consist

[1]I want to note that by saying this I do not mean to say that Wittgenstein understood himself as part of the enlightenment.

of a body of knowledge, at least not of any metaphysical knowledge that transcends experience (MacDonald Ross 2005: 72–73). In other words, Kant is quite explicit in saying that there is no such thing as teaching philosophy (over and above the tradition of philosophy and, as Kant in his mature stage held, some facts about our experience); one can only be taught to *philosophise* (ibid.: 75–76). Wittgenstein seems to sympathise with Kant here. In fact, he seems to be even more radical than Kant, since, as I will suggest, he did not seem to think that philosophy can contribute to any body of knowledge (cf. PI §109, §128),[2] nor that philosophy is a discipline of any kind, something Kant in certain respects thought (MacDonald Ross 2005). Nevertheless for both, the task of philosophy/philosophising was centrally to clarify what conditions and forms our thinking as such. As Wittgenstein wrote (perhaps with Kant's blessing): "One might also give the name 'philosophy' to what is possible *before* all new discoveries and inventions" (PI §126).

In what follows I will try to show how I see Wittgenstein's ("later") philosophy addressing the issue of responsibility and its connection to clarity of thought —"thinking for oneself". First by drawing attention to the so-called "destructive" nature of his philosophy and then by way of a discussion on his famous notion of "bringing words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use". After this I attempt to characterise, as an example, how the notion of philosophy as the unravelling of moral responsibility is both present and absent in Raimond Gaita's reflections on goodness and evil, ending with some concluding remarks on "teaching to philosophise".

2 Conceptual Confusion and Houses of Cards

> Where does our investigation get its importance from, since it seems only to destroy everything interesting, that is, all that is great and important? (As it were all the buildings, leaving behind only bits of stone and rubble.) What we are destroying is nothing but houses of cards and we are clearing up the ground of language on which they stand. (PI §118)

Unlike Descartes, who was keen on pulling down the houses of knowledge to their foundations in order to rebuild them anew on secure ground (Descartes 1975), Wittgenstein does not promise any rebuilding (cf. PI §109 & §128). The houses were, after all, only made of cards; they were "grammatical illusions" (PI §111) or "grammatical fictions" (PI §307).

Wittgenstein speaks of our conceptual confusion as generated by "pictures" or grammatical "fictions" and "illusions" that hold us "captive" (PI §115). Although he speaks of these as "forcing" themselves on us (cf. PI §304) or as bestowed with a

[2]Following convention, titles for Wittgenstein's works are abbreviated (Culture and Value = CV, Philosophical Investigations = PI), with section (§) or page number (p.), with full citation and initials in the References.

bewitching character (cf. PI §109), he in other places suggests, as for instance Cavell (1989: 34–35) has noted, that we are ourselves intrinsically part of the very grammar that is so bewitching; that we are ourselves responsible for our confusion. Our personal responsibility for our confusion is, I think, quite clearly indicated when Wittgenstein speaks of these pictures or grammatical fictions/illusions as generated by our—or his—own "urge" and "temptation" to misunderstand (PI §109, §345), by our tendency to be "seduced" into misunderstandings (PI §192). Saying that we have an "urge", are "tempted" and "seduced", implies that misunderstanding is *appealing* to us. Our misunderstandings are, in other words, not simply innocent intellectual mistakes.

Cavell (1989) has also, I think correctly, noted that Wittgenstein does not show us *why* misunderstanding is appealing but rather reveals instances *where* it becomes apparent that we—whomever is tempted by it—are somehow personally involved in the misunderstanding; that our confusion is, as Socrates would have said, a dissonance of the soul.

The so-called "private language argument"[3] is a notable example of this method at work. Take for instance remark §293, the famous "beetle in the box". In the beginning of the remark, we find a formulation of the idea of a language based on necessarily private sensations: "Now someone tells me that he knows what pain is only from his own case!" This claim is then straight away articulated in the form of a thought experiment that suggests itself as an analogous description of what a private "language game" might actually look like (cf. PI §261). "—Suppose everyone had a box with something in it: we call it a 'beetle'. No one can look into anyone else's box, and everyone says he knows what a beetle is only by looking at his beetle". On the one hand, the picture forcing itself on us, or on Wittgenstein, is expressive of our, or his, temptation to think of sensations, our "inner life", as being outside the reach of others, *whether we like it or not*; they *cannot* really know what "I" feel, think, experience, nor can "I" *really* know how it is with them. At the same time "we" are (unreflectively, as if self-evidently) driven by a desire to be with others, to speak to them, a desire that our words would have significance for others and their words for us—everyone is saying "beetle" *to each other*, this is part of the picture/fantasy. This interpersonal bond that we *already* find ourselves in is affirmed as the remark continues. "—But suppose the word 'beetle' had a use in these people's language?" Notably, there is no protest by any of the "voices" in the text against the suggestion that the word would have a use. Rather it seems to capture the *form* of the fantasy of a private language (cf. PI §294–308).

[3]Wittgenstein interpreters are used to speak of the private language argument, usually referring to remarks §243–308. The basic notion that is "argued" against, introduced in remark §243, is that of the possibility that one can name sensations that are necessarily only accessible to the individual. That is to say, the words of such a language "are to refer to what can only be known to the person speaking; to his immediate private sensations. So another person cannot understand the language" (PI §243).

What is then, as it were, internally exposed in the pursuit of an articulation of the fantasy of a private language is a picture endowed with the dissonant desire that one's utterances have significance for others (and their words for us) while at the same time, as it were, securing a realm of the *real meaning* outside the reach (and critique) of others. As Richard Eldridge has put it, although with a different emphasis, the fantasy of a private language suggests, or at least results in, a fantasy of absolute authority (Eldridge 1997: 245).

And so the fantasy starts to crumble from within (cf. PI §308); it starts to crumble exactly because of the split urge to both share significance with others and at the same time necessitate the "real" meaning as each and everyone's own private possession. The remark continues:

> "—If so it would not be used as the name of a thing. The thing in the box has no place in the language-game at all; not even as a something: for the box might even be empty.—No, one can 'divide through' by the thing in the box; it cancels out, whatever it is. That is to say: if we construe the grammar of the expression of sensation on the model of 'object and designation' the object drops out of consideration as irrelevant". (PI §293)

A house of cards—the *form/grammar* of the fantasy—has come crumbling down. But Wittgenstein does not offer us any rebuilding. At this point, one might recollect the, as it were, pedagogical characterisation in the preface to the *Investigations*: "I should not like my writing to spare other people the trouble of thinking. But, if possible, to stimulate someone to thoughts of his own". One way of understanding this is to exactly relate it to the "destructive" nature of Wittgenstein's philosophy. An important thing to acknowledge is that the pulling down of a grammatical illusion does not by the force of "argument" do away with our temptation and urge to misunderstand—our misunderstanding is not about "intellectual mistakes". We are simply exposed to ourselves in that from the rubble of card-stone rises our urge to misunderstand, naked, unarmed with grammatical fictions, anxiously looking for a new house to take refuge in (cf. PI §304–307).

I think that it is right to say that it is only in instances when the "ground of language has been cleared up", or "freed",[4] that thinking (for oneself) can begin. In other words, the fall of a grammatical illusion *can* become a moment of insight: we *can* come to recognise that we are ourselves responsible for our misunderstanding and start to unravel what it is in us that urges to misunderstand. But most likely our reaction to such exposure is to some extent that of unthinking (this responsibility), desperately eager to build new houses of cards to take refuge in. So the work goes on indefinitely, as does the *Investigations* (the *Investigations* (Part 1) does not, I would suggest, have an endpoint, a conclusion; it simply ends in a remark no different from the others, suggesting its own indefinite continuity; the task of teaching and learning to philosophise is indefinite: the *Investigations* is a struggle with our relentless will to misunderstand and avoid responsibility).

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[4]In the original German version Wittgenstein uses the phrase "legen den Grund der Sprache frei", which is translated as "clearing up the ground of language" (PI §118). The English translation loses the more direct sense of and connection to freedom.

This "*can*" alluded to here connects to what I meant by saying in the beginning that philosophy, even philosophising, is essentially about what is not teachable; that the problems of philosophy are essentially problems with our personal responsibility. Philosophy or philosophising is "more like a working on oneself" (CV: 16), as Wittgenstein wrote, although I think it would be better to say that philosophising is "working on oneself *with others*" or "*in one's life with others*".[5] There is, I would suggest, always togetherness—an other—involved in our being and thinking.

3 Bringing Words Back to Their Everyday Use

> When philosophers use a word—"knowledge", "being", "object", "I", "proposition", "name"—and try to grasp the essence of the thing, one must always ask oneself: is the word ever actually used in this way in the language-game which is its original home?— What we do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use. (PI §116)

Remark §116, and many others as well, obviously invites a variety of different understandings (or misunderstandings). That is to say, it invites a variety of different ways of understanding what work in philosophy is and its relationship to the tradition of philosophy. One interpretation the remark strongly tempts with is to think that somewhere in our everyday lives concepts hit, as it were, rock bottom, their unfounded foundation, a point where their meanings are clear exactly because that is where they are perfectly in tune with their use; they fully follow the rules of a linguistic convention of a particular language community. As Peter Hacker would say, there is nothing "inadequate" with our everyday uses of words "relative to the purpose they serve" (Bennett and Hacker 2003: 6).

And there are of course many instances in the *Investigations* that would support such a reading. Yet I think that there are important qualifications and meanings that will remain unnoticed if one, as it were, stops at this point. What I am centrally thinking of here is that while Wittgenstein does say things like our words are "founded on convention" (PI §355), and that we should always think of the "context" or "occurrence" of particular speech acts, to look at how the word is used (cf. PI §117, §296, §514), he pushes these notions further by every now and then indicating that thinking of "context" involves essentially to think of our own personal engagement with language and thought. Think here of the following remarks: "Just try—in a real case—to doubt *someone else's* fear or pain" (PI §303, emphasis added), "But can't I imagine that the people around me are automata […] But just try to keep hold of this idea in the midst of your ordinary intercourse *with others,* in the street, say!" (PI §420, emphasis added). Such reminders, I think, are essential to

[5]For an interesting development of the connection between the notions of "working on oneself" with that of caring for community see Wallgren (2006), especially Chap. 7.

the notion of "bringing words back". In other words, there is no "everyday" as such, for it essentially refers to reflection on one's personal engagement.

What these reminders, so it seems to me, are advising us to do is not only to acknowledge that our life with language is a life with other people, other living beings. More than so, they are advising us to acknowledge that what we say, think and *wish* to mean has its bearing on others; they are essential features of how I treat and relate to others. And they are of course also features of how I do *not* relate to and care for others, features of how I distance myself from them. "Words are", as Wittgenstein notes, "also deeds" (PI §546).

All of this is of course not an argument against the importance of turning to our norms and conventions and the notion that our words are "founded on convention" (PI §355). Rather, it is to say that our (linguistic) conventions are part of our moral practices in which we personally engage and thus answer for. To understand a convention *is* to understand its part in the moral dynamics of our lives with others.

Think for instance of children playing together. It is quite usual that children come up with games of their own, start playing together without *yet* knowing *what* they are playing. Rules are then often made up as the game goes along until at some point, if it is a "good" game, it might become something they will come back to. A convention is now set. The rules that define the bounds of the game are not "justifications" for the game, rather they show "simply what [they] do" (PI §217). But what is it that the children actually do? Here of course there is no general answer to be given. What we must do is of course to somehow get an understanding of the convention and its rules. But such an understanding would be just shallow or formal, if we were not to elucidate the underpinning moral dynamics that motivate the game and its rules. Say for instance that essential parts of the rules are made up in order to give some special privileges to certain kids, say to the more dominating ones. Or, perhaps a group of boys make up rules that ban girls from taking part. None of this *must* happen, but we know that the interpersonal dynamics—the clarification of which is essential for the suggested notion of philosophy—that would motivate such conventions are quite often close at hand.

And it is of course not only children who are driven by such moral dynamics. Think for instance of "money" (the current institution of money). There are certain institutions that have the right to issue money. The use of money follows certain standards and criteria, which obviously are not, just as the rules of any game, bound by any universal law but rather set and upheld by political/power dynamics. Money has a purpose which it, some think, quite effectively serves. But the rules of money and the fact that humans trade and money serves a certain kind of trade, does not bring to light the moral and interpersonal dynamics that are always present in the use of money (or more commonly in trade). And to think of the meaning of money is simultaneously to think about the moral dynamics underpinning for instance concepts such as "personal possession", "authority", "distribution", "wealth", "inequality" and "scarcity".

My point here is, hopefully clear enough, that the *grammar* or *meaning* of a convention is not revealed to us by simply an outlay of the rules since the rules

themselves do not bring to light what is, if it is, sublimated, suppressed or repressed in them. The question is: how do we come to understand the potential sinister, evil and confused dimension engraved at the very core of our "communality" and our lives. And how do we come to understand how these features always relate to the unavoidable significance others have for us and the force that underpins it (cf. Backström 2015; Backström and Nykänen 2015; Nykänen 2014).

I think that Wittgenstein wants us to be aware of the confusion involved in trying to separate moral acknowledgement, scrutiny and engagement from conceptual questions when he notes that in laying down a linguistic convention, when drawing the bounds of language, we are always (morally) obliged to ask ourselves "what [we are] drawing it for" (PI §499). And what I am also claiming is that I think the *Investigations* indicates that an essential part of finding one's way to clarity is connected to a clarification of one's *personal*, or rather *interpersonal* responsibility for one's own and others' sayings and doings—how we respond to others. This also makes the appeal of misunderstanding comprehensible. For if bringing words back to their everyday use is centrally to acknowledge ones moral responsibility, then metaphysical uses (philosophical confusion) is essentially connected with an attempt to suppress or repress that responsibility: misunderstanding serves as a haven from the responsibility that understanding addresses us with.

4 Better One Than Ten? An Exercise in Wittgensteinian Philosophy

> How does the philosophical problem about mental processes and states and about behaviourism arise?——The *first step* is the one that altogether escapes notice. (PI §308, emphasis added)

What I have been trying to suggest is that the *Investigations* is trying to "stimulate" us to acknowledge that, and have us think about how, we are ourselves part of and responsible for philosophical problems/confusion and that this confusion is underpinned by a moral dynamics. In other words, philosophical problems are rooted in the very way in which we ourselves are prone to characterise a certain given event, notion, relationship, etc.

Raimond Gaita has localised the failure of consequentialism at exactly such a point. In discussing a paradigmatic consequentialist dilemma—ought one kill one person in order to save ten others—he notes that: "the most important philosophical question concerning such examples is not, 'What ought to be done?' The most important question is how to characterise the situation and to capture the evil in it. Consequentialists take the evil out of it. It is often remarked that they have no sense of the evil *done*. I have tried to bring out that they have no sense of evil *suffered*, beyond the varieties of natural harm suffered" (Gaita 2004: 72). As far as I understand Gaita, what he means here by the consequentialist being insensitive to

"evil *suffered*" is that the "engineering" mentality of the consequentialist systematically fails to acknowledge that in characterising goodness and evil relative to a calculation of consequences, one loses sight of—or rather does away with—one's personal relationship to and responsibility for each of those individuals that become victims of the evil involved in the calculation (Gaita 1982: 99–101). And because there are *individuals* that suffer—even though the consequences might be "better" than if they did not—and because we are always responsible for taking part in (either actively or passively) the consequentialist action and thought that lead to this suffering, we, who do not suffer any natural harm, nevertheless suffer the evil we are drawn into. In other words, the consequentialist systematically does away with —suppresses, represses—our personal responsibility for the fact that when we do or part take in evil, *we do or part take in evil*.

Nevertheless, Gaita is not in the business of advocating, what he would call a Socratic ethics (ibid.). In fact, he thinks that there is an important truth involved in the consequentialist approach, although that truth is not *in* consequentialism as a theory but rather in the "serious fact", as he says, about human life that the world, on many occasions, will be a better place if one follows what formally is a consequentialist principle rather than a deontological one (Gaita 1982: 90).

Gaita is inclined to think, as perhaps we all are tempted to do, that life in accordance with an Socratic/Christian ethics—*never* do evil—unavoidably leads to greater evil and suffering than if we are ready to use "reasonable amounts" of violence and evil. Persons and communities (governments), so it is suggested, that would categorically refrain from any evil "surrender its people as a hostage to the improbable good fortune that they will have no enemy sufficiently wicked or cunning to attack them in ways which leave them with only evil means of defence" (Gaita 2004: 257). This is why, Gaita claims, Socratic/Christian ethics refrains from defending "the conditions of political community itself" (Gaita 1982: 96) and that "the acknowledgement, *in advance*, that we will do evil is a condition of political communality as such": it is the "sober acknowledgement of one's political *persona*" (Gaita 2004: 261). Nonetheless, Gaita does not mean to say that the conditions for a political community are a "justification" for the evil done. Rather, he seems to think of it as a kind of Wittgensteinian reference to conventions that "we" all share: "we always have done this and always will, but that is no justification" (ibid. 2004: 262. cf. PI §217). Those who categorically refrain from doing evil "are not", Gaita claims, "truly amongst us" (ibid. 2004: 259); they do not, as it were, share common practices and conventions, and to a certain degree, a common *grammar*. One might even say that Gaita is trying to bring—according to a certain reading of Wittgenstein—words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use, to the convention of evil that "political communality as such" builds upon. The suggestion is then that this description has clarified or done away with the moral (philosophical) dilemma (ibid. 2004: 261); it has describe—not justified or explained—the grammar of good and evil and its relationship to communality and politics.

Yet, as I wish to indicate, although it is not hard to see that Gaita's claim that an "in advance" acknowledgement that "we" are "ready to do evil in order to prevent an even greater evil" is a widely shared convention/practice, it does not, I would

claim, free us from philosophical/moral (no distinction intended here) confusion. Nor do I think Wittgenstein would say so for reasons I alluded to earlier. While it is true that many political communities have “saved” themselves “as a people” (although often at the cost of another “community”) by taking to violent and even evil means, it is a completely different thing to claim that the world has by *that* “changed for the better” (ibid. 2004: 71). In what sense do we know that this is so? Has the world actually changed for the better *because of* the evil done? Another critical observation that is called for is that the historical fact that evil has been used to prevent “greater evils” is certainly no proof of Gaita’s claim that a community of people that refrain from doing evil—at any cost—is sure to be erased from the face of the earth. This is not an empirical fact. To think this is surely *tempting*. Nevertheless, perhaps its “sober realism” is in fact cynicism in disguise.

Gandhi could have called it cynicism. His notion of non-violent resistance was not a passive pacifism but an active force that became to be called *Satyagraha*, translated variably as soul- or truth force, and something Gandhi usually connects with the notion of the force of love (Gandhi 1997: 88–99; Gandhi 2008: 53–58). He noted that history is a bad reference point since the belief in and practice of non-violent resistance has been more or less absent—basically because people tend to exactly think along the lines of evil as the greater “worldly” force. The historical fact that communities that have been ready to use violence and evil have survived is, at its best, simply evidence of the weakness of human love and its ingenuity, not of the necessity of violence and evil as the only “realistic” defence against “great” evil (Gandhi 1997, 2008). While it is clearly true that one who tries to resist evil non-violently risks being injured or killed (even whole communities), Gandhi noted that the same “risk” is involved just as much in violent resistance, which seems to indicate that our proneness to violence is motivated by more than just the rational notion that one has a better chance of surviving when fighting fire with fire (Gandhi 1997). His point was, I think correctly, that we have no empirical/factual reasons, nor any a priori reasons for believing in what Gaita characterises as the condition of (political) communities. He would also have claimed that all instance where persons or even communities relentlessly kept to truth, goodness and love have inspired humanity to “change the world for the better” with far greater force than any acts of violence. One might even propose that nothing else than love and goodness changes the world for the better; grammatically speaking, evil *cannot* do this. And finally, he believed, not in a naive way, in the goodness of humans, that evil, *when faced with Satyagraha*, could go only so far before breaking down from within, before truth/love exposes itself in humans (ibid.)—do we have any factual or a priori evidence that shows Gandhi to be wrong? Obviously, as Gandhi continuously stressed, *Satyagraha*—keeping to and understanding truth and love—is the most difficult thing to do. But not because our own and our community’s existence is threatened and we rationally reason that violence is the only “realistic” way to defend it, but because keeping to and understanding love and truth demands a relentless self-critical search for the violence and evil in oneself (Gandhi 1997, 2008).

I called upon Gandhi simply to suggest or indicate that what Gaita wants to understand as more or less purely descriptive features of our lives with goodness and evil and politics are perhaps not free from their own "temptations to misunderstand". That is to say, I do not mean to use Gandhi here in order to claim that he has "a better picture of the world". What is important here is that Gandhi's example can help us, for instance when we teach or discuss philosophy with others, to pull down the grammatical illusion Gaita and perhaps we all are "bewitched" by. For in Gandhi we encounter someone who *dares to think* in the face of evil, and in this encounter, we can come to see that Gaita's notion of evil and its relationship to the survival of political communities—the "first step", as it were—is not based on any evident empirical or a priori "fact" about the world or human life, *although it is given exactly that "function"*. So Gandhi's thoughts—and actions—can free us from the captivating hold our difficulties with evil has on us, yet it can do so only to the extent we ourselves dare to think about our personal difficulties with evil and goodness.

There are questions anyone tempted by the *picture* articulated by Gaita needs to ask, questions that one should also challenge others with, say in a class room, at family dinners, in the company of friends, at one's workplace, etc.—As I have been trying to indicate, I understand philosophy to be a relentless challenge to overcome our temptation to externalise our responsibility to *seductive pictures*; *to relentlessly draw ourselves and others personally into the centre of philosophical work*. What we, or Gaita, should ask is: What does the *picture* Gaita provides us with serve? Well it at least serves, or gives the opportunity for, a convenient strategy for externalising personal responsibility for one's part taking in and suffering of evil to a "serious *fact* about human life" (Gaita 1982: 90, emphasis added). What we then should ask is: why cannot *I* be one who does not do evil? Why is it that *I* cannot see any other options than either to more or less passively stand by and watch when evil is done or resort to evil and violent means to protect? What is it in me that tempts me into thinking that the world will be a better place if *I* am permitted to take part in evil?

Our willingness to do evil—in the face of "a greater evil"—is perhaps part of a convention. But that does not mean that the convention itself is not an attempt, in disguise, to justify our part taking in evil. Our, Gaita's, temptation to use (consciously or unconsciously) the notion of the necessity of evil for the survival of political communities as a "fact" indicates exactly this.

5 To *Teach* Philosophising or to *Stimulate* Someone to Thoughts of Their Own: Concluding Remarks

Somehow it seems appropriate to me to say that *to* philosophise is always also *to learn* to understand what it means to philosophise. What I mean by this is that I do not think philosophising to be so much a skill or art, or a discipline (without a doctrine) for that matter, as I believe it to be a moral-existential challenge. Cavell is,

I think, right in suggesting that philosophy is “education for grownups” (Cavell 1999; Saito and Standish 2012), an education that continues indefinitely, as I earlier suggested.

There is of course no denying that there is a tradition to be taught and learned, and that one can be shown and come to see how far someone has been able to think about certain problems or difficulties and what kind of confusion is still left. But *if* our clarity of thought—“thinking for oneself”—cannot be separated from how far we dare to take on the responsibility we are always already endowed with, and *if* philosophy is essentially about clarity of thought, then the sense of “learning” and being “taught” to philosophise seems to mean something quite different than what we “ordinary” take them to mean. My suggestion is that Wittgenstein’s use, in the preface to the *Investigations,* of the notion “to *stimulate* [and to be stimulated] someone to thoughts of his own” is perhaps one that suits this moral-existential dimension better than “teaching” or “learning”.

I also think that the concept of *love* has its place here. To come to *clarity*—not just intellectual reasoning—about one’s moral responsibility for oneself in one’s life with others is, I would hold, to grow in love—although not necessarily in “happiness”. That is to say, grow in one’s love for the other and one’s love for truth —no clear distinction can be made here. The same goes for the “teacher”. It seems to me to be somewhat queer to say that one can “teach” someone to love, even to say that one can “learn” to love. Words such as to “stimulate” or “inspire” are perhaps more appropriate. Yet I think that love must be understood through love, that “love is”, in a sense, “only first called forth by love” (Beehler 1978: 171). By this I mean to say that I believe one can be “taught”, “stimulated” or “inspired”—whatever we want to call it—to philosophise by encountering *someone* (perhaps *in* a text) that cares for one’s soul by caring for truth; cares for truth by caring for one’s soul and that of others.

Acknowledgments I would like to thank Ella and Georg Ehrnrooth Foundation and Emil Aaltonen Foundation for financial support enabling the research for this paper.

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Wittgenstein and Therapeutic Education

Christopher Hoyt

Abstract Wittgenstein's method of doing philosophy with a therapeutic purpose has a direct bearing on current debates about the propriety of therapeutic education. Many detractors of therapeutic education worry that the practice contributes to a secular understanding of the self and of personal responsibility that is morally bankrupt and damaging to both individuals and society. They worry that therapeutic education teaches students to think of themselves as damaged and to think of their actions as rooted in their wounds rather than in autonomous choices. In that spirit, such critics of therapeutic education call for a return to a "traditional" academic curriculum, and to a view of individuals as morally capable and culpable. While such complaints might be valid for some particular therapeutic educational programs, Wittgenstein's manner of examining and healing himself through the process of philosophical reflection demonstrates the soundness of therapeutic education, at least in principle. Wittgenstein's example shows that the sort of open-ended examinations of self, morality, and one's conception of the world associated with therapeutic education is essential to the development of moral depth and spiritual well-being rather than being antithetical to them. Critics of therapeutic education may be hostile to Wittgenstein's example of moral and spiritual seeking because they are wedded to the ideas of moral and religious truth rooted in what Charles Taylor identifies as having evolved during the Reformation, whereas Wittgenstein's own method is more in keeping with a progressive religious outlook that emerged in the cultural revolution of the 1960s.

Keywords Wittgenstein · Therapy · Therapeutic education · Religion · Secularism

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M.A. Peters and J. Stickney (eds.), *A Companion to Wittgenstein on Education*,
DOI 10.1007/978-981-10-3136-6_49

1 Introduction

In the past decade or two, there has been a sharp rise in interest in therapeutic education, that is, the inclusion of therapeutic activities and exercises in schools, as well as an increasingly close alliance of educational and therapeutic services (Smeyers et al. 2007; Ecclestone and Hayes 2009; Wright 2014). The roots of the movement are considerably older (and arguably go all the way back to Ancient Greece), but recent years have seen a decided acceleration. Advocates point to the need to help children and young adults achieve happiness and well-being in the face of empirical evidence that "shockingly high" numbers of young people suffer depression and anxiety (Seligman et al. 2009, p. 294), and in response to the growing perception that the modern world is "toxic" for children (Palmer 2010). In Australia, for example, the state curriculum mandates that education should foster competent and confident students with "a sense of self-worth, self-awareness and personal identity that enables them to manage their emotional, mental, spiritual and physical wellbeing" (Australian Curriculum, Assessment and Reporting Authority 2010, p. 7). In Britain, a Parliamentary committee has concluded that personal, social and health education (PSHE) should be included in the compulsory curriculum of state education (House of Commons Education Committee 2015), though no such mandate has yet been legislated. And in Sweden, many schools already include courses in *Livsknskap*, life competence education, and the Swedish Parliament has considered mandating such courses in the national curriculum (Aldenmyr 2012, p. 24). In America, the movement is perhaps more fragmented, but it is widespread and active.

Coincidentally, during the same period, an increasing number of scholars have emphasized the therapeutic nature of Wittgenstein's philosophy. Advocates for therapeutic readings disagree in just what they take to be the therapeutic nature and purpose of Wittgenstein's philosophy, but the orientation appears to be gaining ground (Crary 2000a; Hagberg 2003; Hutchinson 2007; Harré 2008; Fischer 2011). In this essay, I want to develop a specific interpretation of Wittgenstein's therapeutic aims in philosophy—though not one that I claim to be exclusive—and to bring that interpretation to bear on the matter of therapeutic education. Most writers who consider Wittgenstein's philosophy therapeutic emphasize that his approach is intended to heal "intellectual pathologies," as Harré (2008, p. 484) has put the point. I don't disagree, but I believe that it also makes sense to regard Wittgenstein's philosophy as therapeutic in a different sense. Wittgenstein did philosophy in the hopes of improving himself morally and spiritually, and for him philosophy was always an endeavor verging on the religious. His own thoughts move freely and quickly between the matters of objective understanding, self-discovery, and spiritual well-being, thus providing a model of education that integrates those aims.

2 Therapeutic Education and the Its Critics

In order to bring Wittgenstein into contact with our subject, we will focus on the criticism that therapeutic education presumes a secular worldview that is antithetical to the "traditional" ideals that supposedly undergird a proper, or ideal, education. I will argue that Wittgenstein's own manner of doing philosophy implies that this worry is misplaced. However, it is important to acknowledge that I will be concerned only with what therapeutic education could be in principle, not with its particular implementations. There are countless instances of therapeutic education, and each must be considered on its own merits. For example, whether or not "circle time" (an activity in which children practice expressing and respecting emotions) is good or bad for children will depend largely on how it is carried out.

In their provocative and widely discussed book, *The Dangerous Rise of Therapeutic Education*, Ecclestone and Hayes develop a complex argument that therapeutic education reinforces the concept of a "diminished self" (xi). This is initially surprising, since they define therapeutic education as "any activity that focuses on perceived emotional problems and which aims to make educational content and learning processes more 'emotionally engaging'" (2012: x). The problem, in their eyes, is that the practitioners of therapeutic education see emotional problems all too often, and that they teach their students to see themselves as damaged and troubled also. "Diminished images of students and pupils are rife throughout the education system," they argue, "reflected in the routine use of labels such as 'vulnerable learners', 'at risk learners', students with 'fragile identities'," and so forth (2012: xi). Children are internalizing these ideas, they say, and so are coming to see themselves both as troubled and as relatively powerless against the social forces that supposedly hurt them.

Debates about therapeutic education tend to be politically charged, though the lines of division are particularly crooked. Advocates tend to be progressive, and many see themselves as campaigning not only for personal well-being, but for social justice and inclusivity also. Therapy often involves explicit training in empathy, anger management, and other practices that point in the direction of pluralism and collective good. Many critics, on the other hand, are conservatives who regard therapeutic education as fostering a mentality of victimhood rather than one of personal responsibility. Ecclestone and Hayes are adamant that their position is above political partisanship (xiv–xv), and it is true that their ideas might serve both progressive and conservative agendas. The progressive thinker Amsler (2011) echoes the worry that therapeutic education encourages students to see their suffering as a personal fault, to see suffering as the result of one's failure, and to adjust to one's context. Thus, therapeutic education too readily accepts the status quo rather than encouraging students to identify, critique, and work to change the institutions and norms that are the real source of suffering (p. 55).

Nonetheless, Ecclestone and Hayes do far more to develop a conservative-friendly critique than a progressive one, and their account of the historical origins of therapeutic culture and education speak directly to the concerns of religious

conservatives. Ecclestone and Hayes trace the historical emergence of this diminished self to the displacement of religion by psychoanalysis and subsequent psychotherapeutic movements (pp. 123–135). They argue that the first phase of the "epochal shift" in the Western concept of the self was generated by Frued and first identified by Phillip Rieff in his 1966 book, *The Triumph of the Therapeutic: Uses of Faith after Freud*. In that initial phase, Freud and other psychoanalysts persuaded moderns to give up belief in God and absolute morality in exchange for a system of values in which self-interest is paramount. "Rieff argued that Freud used analysis to free people from their enslavement to the demands of an external, self-denying morality," Ecclestone and Hayes write, "and to reconcile themselves to a tension between that and their self interest" (p. 124). This new, post-Freudian system of values thus involves "little renunciation in the old religious and moral sense," and so moderns have turned their attention away from the external world and their fellows and onto themselves (p. 124). This inward-facing self lacks "commitment to any form of morality," Ecclestone and Hayes write, "and this lack of commitment to ends defined the epochal nature of the shift to a therapeutic…" (p. 125).

Ecclestone and Hayes credit Christopher Lasch with naming the second historical phase in the therapeutic movement, namely the narcissistic culture that emerged in the 1970s, and they approvingly quote Lasch from his 1979 book, *The Culture of Narcissism*:

> The contemporary climate today is therapeutic, not religious. People today hunger not for personal salvation, let alone for the restoration of an earlier golden age, but for the feeling, the momentary illusion, of personal well-being, health, and psychic security. (Lasch [1979] 1991, p. 7; quoted in Ecclestone and Hayes 2009, p. 126)

As Mintz (2009) notes, the worry that therapeutic education is in direct conflict with a religious worldview was articulated as long ago as 1987 by Phyllis Schlafly, the arch Christian conservative and head of the Eagle Forum (p. 634). In a speech to the New York Board of Education, Schlafly (2007) bemoans the fact that "instead of teaching children knowledge and basic skills, the purpose of education has become group therapy" (p. 98). A bit further on, Schlafly continues, "In public school classrooms, children are required to discuss feelings and emotions and attitudes. They are confronted with all sorts of moral dilemmas, instead of being given the facts and knowledge they need" (p. 99). Rather than telling children what God deems right and wrong, children are encouraged to contemplate open-ended problems. Just a little further on, Schlafly continues:

> These moral dilemmas never tell the child that anything is wrong. The child is taken through all the areas of sex, with obscene descriptions, and discussions and role-playing, and other psychological manipulations in the classroom. You can call this secular humanism, you can call it situation ethics, you can call it group therapy, you can call it psychological manipulations, you can call it counseling. … There is nothing neutral about the way these values are taught. The option that we should abide by God's law is never offered. (p. 100)

Thus, we see that much of the worry about therapeutic education lies in the idea that it embodies a post-Christian value system. This is not an idle worry, for any

therapeutic program does necessarily presume certain values about what makes life meaningful, about human nature, society, and more. If therapy is about finding a sense of meaning and well-being, it necessarily assumes values that we might call into question.

3 Wittgenstein's Therapeutic Philosophy, Part I

While Wittgenstein's philosophy notoriously defies progressive and conservative political readings (Crary 2000b), his philosophical method and example lend support to a progressive attitude toward therapeutic education. His own thought ranges freely between efforts to understand the world and efforts to understand and heal himself, and his ideas imply that this integration of projects is natural, and even necessary, in certain domains. For most of his life, Wittgenstein was a deeply unhappy person, and he did philosophy in an effort to heal himself. That orientation was clear from the outset of his career, when he began holding long, intense conversations with Russell that freely ranged between philosophy and his personal worries. Late one night, when Wittgenstein fell into a long silence, Russell asked him, "Are you thinking about logic, or about your sins?" To which Wittgenstein gave the curious, now well-known response, "Both" (Monk 1990, p. 51). Wittgenstein's diary entries from a few years later, kept while fighting near the front lines during World War I, similarly record his incessant feelings of self-loathing literally alongside thoughts about logic and language that were later published in the *Tractatus.* For the remainder of his life, Wittgenstein never fully embraced academic life, and he continued to do philosophy for personal, not professional, reasons.

Both the grounds and the original causes of Wittgenstein's suffering are uncertain, but biographers have consistently laid much of the blame on his father, Karl, who was overbearing in the extreme. Karl was an enormously successful industrialist who put intense pressure on all five of his sons to follow him into business, despite that at least four clearly had other interests and talents. Three of Wittgenstein's brothers went on to commit suicide, and it is generally thought that at least two were driven to it by their father's demands (Monk 1990, p. 11).

But how is one to isolate the sources of shame, guilt, and suicidal thoughts in a life as complex as Wittgenstein's? There were obviously other significant factors. For example, Wittgenstein's ancestry was Jewish at a time when anti-Semitism was a growing and terrible force in Europe, and many of Wittgenstein's journal entries show that he struggled to identify and accept his "Jewish" qualities and the limits he thought that they imposed. Janik and Toulmin (1973) emphasize that Wittgenstein was a *fin de siècle* Viennese born just in time to watch the empire unravel, and the world descend into war (pp. 33–66). And of course, Wittgenstein was predominantly homosexual in culture that was intensely homophobic. These and other factors contributed to Wittgenstein's lifelong sense of being a man out of his time, a person alienated from the dominant culture of "European and American

civilization" (CV, p. 8).[1] The young man who came to study with Russell had a lot on his mind, and philosophy was, in large part, a way of working out his thoughts and feelings, and he seemed to regard such personal aims as the proper goal of philosophy:

> Work on philosophy–like work in architecture in many respects–is really more work on oneself. On one's own conception. On how one sees things. (And what one expects of them.) (CV, p. 23)

As a philosopher and as a man, Wittgenstein was especially driven toward integrity, which for him meant being completely open and honest with himself and about himself. He is known to have made a series of confessions to friends and family starting at a young age (Monk 1990, p. 18). Later in life, he came to feel deeply ashamed of having hid the extent of his Jewish background from friends at Cambridge and so called them together to "confess" yet again (Monk 1990, p. 280). More importantly, Wittgenstein did philosophy with the same aim of achieving deep and demanding honesty with himself. This can be seen in a well-known remark from 1939 included in *Culture and* Value, in which Wittgenstein comments on the fact that a philosopher must face himself honestly in order to grasp the truth:

> One cannot speak the truth;–if one has not yet conquered oneself. One cannot speak it–but not, because one is still not clever enough. The truth can be spoken only by someone who is already at home in it; not by someone who still lives in untruthfulness, & does no more than reach out toward it from within untruthfulness. (CV, p. 41)

Like many of the fragments included in *Culture and Value*, this one might initially sound disconnected from Wittgenstein's philosophical project, especially to readers who insist on relatively strict readings of his texts. After all, Wittgenstein wrote about logic, language, meaning, and other relatively technical problems. If he had a view of what sort of person might produce good philosophy, the skeptic might protest, it was a personal view and not a philosophical point.

However, Wittgenstein's manuscripts suggest that he regarded the relationship between integrity and philosophy as intimate, even essential. The forgoing remark regarding the demands of truthfulness is not an off-hand comment made to a friend, say, but one situated within a continuous philosophical discussion recorded on a single day, January 12, 1939. Seven paragraphs earlier in his notebook, Wittgenstein muses about familiar concerns regarding the grammar of "pain": "To the language game of pain, some want to say that not only pain behavior belongs," he writes, "but also a picture of pain."[2] As he rehearses now familiar arguments against the picture of an inner object of pain and the idea that such an inner object is

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[1]Following convention, titles for Wittgenstein's works are abbreviated (Culture and Value = CV, The Blue and Brown Book = BB, Philosophical Investigations = PI, On Certainty = OC, Wittgenstein's Nachlass = WN, Zettel = Z), with section (§) or page number (p.), with full citation and initials in the References.

[2]"Zu dem Sprachspiel mit 'er hat Schmerzen' gehört—möchte etwa man sagen—nicht nur das Bild des Benehmens, sondern auch das Bild der Schmerzen" (WN 2000, 162b: 33v). My translation with assistance from Dr. William Lehman.

the meaning, or the understanding, of the word, Wittgenstein transitions to contemplation of what it means to learn a law of logic. Here, too, he seems to target the simplistic idea that one grasps a formula internally, i.e., that the understanding is an inner phenomenon. Then, Wittgenstein comments:

> The philosopher needs patience to suffer uncertainty. If mathematicians approach philosophical problems, they are too impatient in their handling of unclarity; [mathematicians proceed as if] we want to be freed from it [the uncertainty] in the quickest way possible, and therefore we cannot solve the problem, but rather can only cover it up.[3]

It is only a few lines later, after having briefly contemplated what it means to see a stroke ("|") under a particular aspect, that Wittgenstein interjects his comment about the essential value of self-understanding and truthfulness for the philosopher.

If we are impatient with these philosophical problems, we are all too likely to plow forward into spurious theoretical solutions. In an impatient mood, we might say that the understanding that allows the child to apply a mathematical rule must be a private mental model, for example, or that pain is a particular experience playing in the theater of the mind. Such hypothetical solutions imply countless more philosophical conundrums, and as we pursue them, we will inevitably find ourselves lost in a seemingly endless chain of puzzles. While most philosophers of mind are thrilled by those puzzles—they are the lifeblood of the field, after all—Wittgenstein sees them as the product of some more fundamental mistakes in how the original problems were posed. From *The Blue Book* forward, at least, Wittgenstein charges that such confusions arise when we mistake problematical grammatical features of the expressions we use to describe the world for problems in the world itself. Thus, for example, we ask impossible questions about the nature of time:

> And in fact it is the grammar of the word "time" which puzzles us. We are only expressing this puzzlement by asking a slightly misleading question, the question: "What is…?" This question is an utterance of unclarity, of mental discomfort, and it is comparable with the question "Why?" as children so often ask it. (BB, p. 26)

If we obstinately drive forward without investigating our own confusion, we will fail to see that the original problem we set ourselves was itself spurious, whereas if we investigate our own confusion, those puzzlements will simply disappear. Thus, we arrive at Wittgenstein's idea that philosophical problems require a therapeutic response rather than hypotheses and theories:

> For the clarity that we are aiming at is indeed complete clarity. But this simply means that the philosophical problems should completely disappear. …
>
> There is not a philosophical method, though there are indeed methods, like different therapies. (PI §133)

[3]"Wenn Mathematiker sich an philosophische Probleme [heranmachen|machen], sind sie zu ungeduldig im Ertragen der Unklarheit; wollen auf dem schnellsten Weg (von ihr) befreit werden, und können daher das Problem nicht lösen, sondern nur oberflächlich zudecken" (WN 2000, 162b: 35v). My translation with assistance from Dr. William Lehman.

4 Wittgenstein's Therapeutic Philosophy, Part 2

Were we to take the impatient path—were we to think that our confusion about pain, time, mathematical understanding, and so forth concerned the world rather than the concepts through which we frame the world—we would inevitably "take language on holiday" (PI §38), to use Wittgenstein's own turn of phrase. That is, we would find ourselves lost in theories about the supposed referents of those words that would distract us from their actual employment in our lives. Wittgenstein says that the purpose of his own therapeutic philosophy is to "bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use" (PI §116). Thus does Wittgenstein's grammatical method allow us use language to understand our world and ourselves rather than to distance us from them. This has a therapeutic effect in a more literal sense, for it allows us to understand our world and ourselves in ways that serve a life of integrity and meaning. To see this, consider the effect of Wittgenstein's grammatical method on one trying to understand his own grief. When his interlocutor is tempted by theories that would reduce grief to an inner object, Wittgenstein coaxes him back to the difficult task of facing the confusing, complicated nature of the experience. Wittgenstein aims not simply to dismantle the false theory, but rather to put the interlocutor back in touch with what it is really like to grieve:

> "For a second he felt violent pain."–Why does it sound queer to say: "For a second he felt deep grief"? Only because it so seldom happens?
>
> "But don't you feel grief *now?*" The answer may be affirmative, but that does not make the concept of grief any more like the concept of a sensation. — The question was really, of course, a temporal and personal one, not the logical question which we wanted to raise. (PI II, p. 174)

Wittgenstein's ambition to stop the philosopher from taking language on holiday is, in its positive aspect, an attempt to put her back in touch with the "temporal and personal," to put her back in touch with the experiences of life when she might be tempted by spurious, distracting theories.

When our lives and our language fall out of sync with each other, we are emotionally and intellectually crippled, denied any chance to genuinely understand our experiences. Wittgenstein's philosophical therapy is intended to heal those wounds, to put us back in direct contact with our lives, so to speak. To illustrate this point, let us concentrate on some remarks focused on the concept of shame and what they might have meant to Wittgenstein as he pursued moral and spiritual well-being. As noted above, Wittgenstein felt shame and the need to confess his failings much more acutely than most people do. We begin with two remarks from the *Philosophical Investigations*:

> 642. "At that moment I hated him."–What happened here? Didn't it consist in thoughts, feelings, and actions? And if I were to rehearse that moment to myself I should assume a particular expression, think of certain happenings, breathe in a particular way, arouse certain feelings in myself. I might think up a conversation, a whole scene in which that hatred flared up. And I might play this scene through with feelings approximating those of a

real occasion. That I have actually experienced something of the sort will naturally help me to do so.

643. If I now become ashamed of this incident, I am ashamed of the whole thing: of the words, of the poisonous tone, etc.

To understand one's own feelings of shame, it is essential to acknowledge what we may call the "totalizing" nature of the experience. Unlike a sensation, shame is something that consumes our whole way of seeing the world and our manner of interacting with it.

The connection between Wittgenstein's grammatical study of shame and his own efforts to deal with the shame he felt in his own life is apparent if we turn, once again, to the *Nachlass*. The following is the first part of an entry in Wittgenstein's journals from 1947 that we will analyze piece by piece. In this first section, Wittgenstein again comments on totalizing nature of shame, here adding a new emphasis on the curious fact that humans have reactions of shame at all. Shame is something basic to human life, quite possibly a bedrock phenomenon beyond the reach of explanation:

The natural expressions of shame, if one has lied, are the equivalent of the words "I lied." It is a curious reaction. Don't see it as simply a matter of course that man has motives, (or) says things because of motives. These phenomena constitute the mental (spiritual) life of man.[4]

The language and gestures of shame erupt from us spontaneously, so to speak, they emerge naturally from our whole orientation to life. Shame motivates confessions and tears, and it shows up in one's manner of crying, not only in the fact that one cries. Shame may be expressed in one's selection of words, intonation of speech, pallor, gaze, and even in one's choice of career or spouse.

The entry in the *Nachlass* next takes two curious turns. In the first, Wittgenstein puckishly tempts his reader to try to make sense of shame given a standard theory of mind—one that is roughly Cartesian in its outlines. If thinking really is just articulating sentences in the privacy of one's mind, Wittgenstein asks, What would it mean to have a shameful thought?

To be ashamed of a thought. Is one ashamed of the fact that one has said this or that sentence to himself in his imagination?[5]

Given the Cartesian picture of mind, to "think a shameful thought" must be to speak an unsavory sentence to oneself. If we try to put this picture to use, its categorical inadequacy becomes apparent. It is incoherent to think that the shame that

[4]"Die natürlichen Äußerungen der Scham, wenn man gelogen hat, sind das Äquivalent der Worte "Ich habe gelogen." Es ist hier eben eine eigentümliche Reaktion. Sieh's nicht als selbstverständlich an, daß der Mensch Motive hat, etwas aus einem Motiv sagt. Diese Phänomene machen das geistige «seelische» Leben des Menschen" (WN 2000, 134: 79. February 1947–June 1947). My translation with assistance from Dr. William Lehman.

[5]"Sich eines Gedankens schämen. Schämte man sich dessen, daß man den & den Satz zu sich selbst in der Vorstellung gesprochen hat?" (WN 2000, 134: 80. February 1947–June 1947). My translation with assistance from Dr. William Lehman.

Wittgenstein felt for hating someone unjustly was nothing more than him speaking unkind sentences in his mind. That would contradict the totalizing nature of the experience, the strange way that shame pervades our entire bearing toward the world.

The final movement of the Nachlass passage takes sharp turn to a religious theme. Wittgenstein writes:

> The folds of my heart always want to stick together, and to open it, I would have to tear them apart again and again.[6]

This effusive, surprising line is a play on language used in old Catholic prayers in which the supplicant asks God to penetrate the folds of her heart and expose any hidden sins (Rak 1868, p. 201). These are prayers of confession, promises to lay oneself bare in an act of complete submission. Wittgenstein's own statement is also a confession, but a confession that he is too weak to achieve the ideal of humility and total exposure expressed in the original prayers. "Understanding oneself properly is difficult," Wittgenstein says elsewhere, "because an action to which one *might* be prompted by good, generous motives is something one may also be doing out of cowardice or indifference" (CV, p. 48). Wittgenstein was tormented by his inability to consistently know himself and to quash his own ego, and his confession was a serious matter for him. In a remark he made a few years earlier, Wittgenstein says that Christianity offers solace to anyone "in infinite distress" who can open his heart to God and man in his moment of need.

> He thereby loses his dignity as someone special & so becomes like a child. That means without office, dignity & aloofness from others. You can open yourself to others only out of a particular kind of love. Which acknowledges as it were that we are all wicked children.
>
> It might also be said: hate between human beings comes from our cutting ourselves off from each other. Because we don't want anyone else to see inside us, since it's not a pretty sight in there. (CV, p. 53)

Kant (1959) struggles with the complexity of human motivation and comes to the conclusion that a moral act must be chiefly motivated by the will to do one's duty. He claims that the only meaningful interpretation of Christ's command to love one's neighbor is that we should perform our dutiful obligations to him out of respect for duty itself (p. 67). Wittgenstein faces the same problem, but suggests that religion has the power to purify our love, to free us of vain self-interest, and so to carry out Christ's command from feeling, not ratiocination. "Wisdom is passionless," Wittgenstein writes, "But faith by contrast is what Kierkegaard calls a *passion*" (CV, p. 53). Thus, at the end of a series of remarks exploring the grammar of shame, Wittgenstein comes to reflect on the sources of pain and isolation in his own life, and the path to spiritual salvation. The two types of therapy—the philosophical and the spiritual—were often continuous for him.

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[6]"Die Falten meines Herzens wollen immer zusammenkleben, & um es zu öffnen müßte ich sie immer wieder auseinanderreißen" (WN 2000, 134: 80. February 1947–June 1947). My translation with assistance from Dr. William Lehman.

5 Varieties of Religious Seeking

The fact that Wittgenstein's manner of entwining philosophy, religion, and therapeutic self-examination is not more familiar speaks to complicated historical trends and shifting cultural divisions. In his compelling historical study, *A Secular Age* (2007), Charles Taylor helps makes sense of the current divisions between religious conservatives and progressives by looking at centuries of change within the Church itself, and how those changes led to our own fractured, secular epoch. To greatly simplify Taylor's richly detailed study, starting in the Late Middle Ages, the Church embraced a new social order heavily focused on discipline, a discipline originally inspired by the emergence of new political and economic realities. As cities and states grew and complex economic systems came into being, communal success came to depend increasingly on civility and the hard work of cooperating individuals. Society thus evolved new ideals of courtesy and civility, and the state began to extend its authority in the form of poor laws (p. 108) bans on unruly cultural practices such as carnival and charivaris (109), strict economic laws (p. 111), and rigid state institutions (p. 111). The Church, seeing its own opportunity to both extend its authority and to stamp out Pagan religious forms it had long tolerated, evolved in concert with the state. Soon enough, it came to equate piety with discipline (p. 105). The Church eliminated all traces of an older vision of a cosmos enchanted by unruly spirits in exchange for a vision of a mechanical universe, a universe so organized as to benefit man if only he acts in concert with its God-given laws. In this new vision, "God's design is one of interlocking causes, not of harmonized meanings. // Otherwise put, humans are engaged in an exchange of services. The fundamental model seems to be what we have come to call an economy" (p. 177).

Over the centuries, Taylor argues, people have come to feel unsatisfied with a religious duty reduced to hard work and salvation reduced to the economic well-being of society. We have come to suffer, says Taylor, "the malaises of modernity" (p. 299). In the Romantic Age, some turned to art and beauty for alternative visions of meaning and spiritual satisfaction (p. 313), while others adopted a tragic sense of the meaninglessness of life. These cultural strains reached a breaking point in the 1960s, when people in the North Atlantic countries began leaving the Church in droves, and instead seeking spiritual satisfaction in cults, yoga, self-actualization, and countless other practices and outlooks (pp. 505–535). The Beatles' treks to India and The Church of Saint John Coltraine are just two expressions of this yearning for meaning and spiritual satisfaction. If there is a common theme to these varied movements, says Taylor, is that people today are driven toward authenticity. That is, spiritual seekers of our day are in search of some mode of being in which they feel self-actualized, inspired, personally fulfilled. In the present age, people hunt for a path that presents itself as their particular path, "the one which moves and inspires you" (p. 489). Thus Taylor deems ours "The Age of Authenticity."

It is not much of a stretch to see Wittgenstein's unique form of philosophizing in pursuit of integrity and spiritual well-being as one version of this modern quest for authenticity, one which also harkens back to the passionate religious forms of pre-Reform ages. Wittgenstein took religious matters seriously his whole adult life, especially after World War I, yet he never committed to a Church, presumably because he did not believe he would find there what he was looking for in philosophy. Wittgenstein once said to his friend Drury that the "religion of the future will have to be extremely ascetic," and that it may "be without any priests or ministers" (Drury 1981, p. 129). Wittgenstein was a man hunting for a kind of authenticity and religious fulfillment outside the confines of the Church, and without concern for the disciplinary boundaries that separate education from moral training, or religion from philosophy. In his sedulous hunt for truth and integrity, Wittgenstein expresses a moral outlook and vision of education sharply at odds with the likes of Phyllis Schlafly, whose focus on discipline and authority clearly harkens back to the Reform ideal. If therapeutic education is understood as an attempt to find meaning, integrity, and spiritual satisfaction in our modern age, Wittgenstein's example strikes me as a good one to follow.

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Clarifying Conversations: Understanding Cultural Difference in Philosophical Education

Thomas D. Carroll

Abstract The goal of this essay is to explain how Wittgenstein's philosophy may be helpful for understanding and addressing challenges to cross-cultural communication in educational contexts. In particular, the notions of "hinge," "intellectual distance," and "grounds" from On Certainty will be helpful for identifying cultural differences. Wittgenstein's dialogical conception of philosophy in Philosophical Investigations will be helpful for addressing that cultural difference in conversation. While here can be no panacea to address all potential sources of confusion, Wittgenstein's philosophy has strong resources that are helpful for curbing some of our human tendencies to misunderstand another person.

Keywords Wittgenstein · Certainty · Communication · Cultural differences · Education

1 Introduction

Detecting cultural differences would seem to be a first requirement for successful cross-cultural communication, but cultural differences can be detected without being well understood. There are many good reasons to approach Wittgenstein's philosophy in thinking about education. One such reason is the need to acquire a set of conceptual tools and a model of philosophy that are both useful for addressing obstacles to cross-cultural communication. Given the diversities present in so many

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This essay draws on an earlier paper I presented at the International Forum on Chinese Culture and Cross-Cultural Communication, Beijing Foreign Studies University in July, 2013. I am grateful to audience members for questions and comments on that paper.

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M.A. Peters and J. Stickney (eds.), *A Companion to Wittgenstein on Education*,
DOI 10.1007/978-981-10-3136-6_50

educational contexts today, this apparent utility of Wittgenstein's philosophy would be all the more practically important for faculty.

Differences in cultural background might be less important in courses in academic disciplines that are more empirical or formal in nature, where mastery of empirical methods or formal systems is easily measured; however, because many areas in philosophy make use of interpretation, analysis, qualitative research, and intuition in their investigations, these areas are particularly susceptible to undetected encroachments of cultural bias.

My aim in this essay is to explore some resources from Wittgenstein's philosophy that are relevant for identifying and addressing challenges to cross-cultural communication in educational contexts. Human beings possess commitments to values, beliefs, and/or traditions that are not so easily or readily called into question. In the following three sections, I will unpack what this means and what role these sorts of commitments might play in educational settings. First, I explore the notions of "hinge," "intellectual distance," and "grounds" as the expressions are used in Wittgenstein's late text *On Certainty*. Next, I explore the self-reflective aspects of Wittgenstein's model of philosophy. Last, I draw together these two strands to address their implications for cross-cultural education.

2 Epistemology and Cultural Differences in *On Certainty*

Before proceeding, some clarification of the role the term "culture" plays in this essay would help in avoiding confusion. By "culture," I understand complexes of values, beliefs, traditions, practices, and/or languages that are inherited from one's social context, frequently including family and neighboring community. This is not meant as a definition of "culture"; rather it is a list of some features commonly associated with "culture," as ordinary language users (not necessarily theorists) use the term.[1] What I have in mind by the expression "cross-cultural communication" is an event where interlocutors identify with different cultural backgrounds and where these differences (acknowledged or not) are relevant to the communication ventured. In some cases, interlocutors may self-consciously identify with particular cultural traditions, and in other cases, they will not. One's culture may appear as just common sense, where one might refer to "what we all know." Appraisals of cross-cultural communication may be one-sided. Even when all parties identify a communication event as being cross-cultural, differences within cultures can easily be overlooked, with a tendency to view all members of a particular culture as sharing a set of values or beliefs. All of this suggests that scholars have good reason to proceed very carefully when trying to understand cross-cultural communication. The

[1]Consider the following definition of "culture" from the *Oxford English Dictionary*: "The distinctive ideas, customs, social behaviour, products, or way of life of a particular nation, society, people, or period. Hence: a society or group characterized by such customs, etc." (OED 2015).

words themselves might seem to invite an understanding of "culture" that is static and unitary, where cross-cultural communication would involve the transmission of information from one cultural–linguistic group to another (or vice versa). This is a deficient model in which the particular interlocutors would be incidental to the communication event. In introducing the notion of a language-game, Wittgenstein was not presenting a *theory* of meaning; a *theory* of culture rooted in Wittgenstein's ideas would be likely to stray far from Wittgenstein's philosophical purposes.

a. Hinge Propositions

In *On Certainty*, Wittgenstein uses a variety of metaphors to grasp the epistemic dynamics relating to expressions of certainty. While these discussions relate primarily to problems in epistemology (and particularly, G.E. Moore's critique of idealism), Wittgenstein's remarks are helpful for appraising cultural differences especially where these differences involve alternate certainties or commitments.

Regarding "hinges," it is notable that there are just three references to the notion in *On Certainty* (remarks §341, 343, and 655); however, a growing body of secondary literature has been accruing lately on the concept and its role in epistemology.[2] While there is disagreement over how to interpret the expression "hinge proposition" as well as over how to apply the notion in contemporary epistemology, I will focus my attention on how Wittgenstein's remarks on "hinges" can help with appraisals of epistemic differences.

The first two passages from *On Certainty* that concern "hinges" appear in the 340s; yet it is clear from the context that they are part of a series of remarks that ought to be read together as developing a line of thought. Arguably, the relevant line of thought begins at remark §336, where Wittgenstein writes:

> But what men consider reasonable or unreasonable alters. At certain periods men find reasonable what at other periods they found unreasonable. And vice versa.
> But is there no objective character here?
> *Very* intelligent and well-educated people believe in the story of creation in the Bible, while others hold it as proven false, and the grounds of the latter are well known to the former. (OC: 43e)[3]

Here, Wittgenstein considers the differences between people in perception of reasonableness of a given claim. What appears to be plausible "alters". The remark may mean at least three things: (1) what *a person* considers plausible varies throughout their life, (2) what *a people* considers as plausible changes throughout history, and (3) what *different contemporaries* find to be plausible may differ.

[2]Scholarship by Annalisa Coliva, Danièle Moyal-Sharrock, and Duncan Pritchard has figured prominently in this area. See, for example, Coliva (2013, 2015), Moyal-Sharrock (2007), and Pritchard (2000, 2001). See also the forthcoming special issue of *International Journal for the Study of Skepticism* edited by Coliva and Moyal-Sharrock on Hinge Epistemology.

[3]Following convention, titles for Wittgenstein's works are abbreviated (OC = On certainty, PI = Philosophical Investigations, PO = Philosophical occasions), with section (§) or page number (p.), with full citation and initials (e.g., RFM) in the References.

Wittgenstein continues to explore these themes of differential epistemic plausibility alongside long-term themes from *On Certainty* concerning doubt. In §341, he returns to the overarching point about the limited scope of doubt. Wittgenstein writes:

> 341. That is to say, the *questions* that we raise and our *doubts* depend on the fact that some propositions are exempt from doubt, are as it were like hinges on which those turn.
> 342. That is to say, it belongs to the logic of our scientific investigations that certain things are *in deed* not doubted.
> 343. But it isn't that the situation is like this: We just *can't* investigate everything, and for that reason we are forced to rest content with assumption. If I want the door to turn, the hinges must stay put.
> 344. My *life* consists in my being content to accept many things. (OC: 44e)

During an inquiry, some propositions remain "exempt from doubt…like hinges on which those turn." The exempting of these propositions from doubt, furthermore, is a "deed", an action. Despite the fact that for the door to turn "the hinges must stay put," these hinges may and do change over time, and different hinge commitments are perceptible (as indicated in 336).

Wittgenstein returns to the notion of "hinges" in the 650s when discussing reasoning in mathematics and comparing mathematical reasoning with everyday reasoning. He compares the exemption from doubt of certain mathematical propositions with the incontrovertibility of his acceptance of the proposition "I am called L.W." While both kinds of proposition are incontrovertible, they are so for different reasons; the mathematical proposition, "The multiplication '12 × 12', when carried out by people who know how to calculate, will in the great majority of cases give the result '144'," (OC, 86e) is exempt from doubt on the basis of what it is to comprehend the relevant mathematical definitions, while the proposition about self-naming is secure because it has a mass of evidence in its favor, and thus would not enter into doubt (doubt for it has no ground). On the basis of these remarks, one has a sense of different kinds of plausibility and of hinges that support senses of plausibility. What we consider to be plausible (propositions that may be the focus of inquiry) depends upon a smaller set of propositions that are exempt from doubt. The example of those who believe the creation story of the Bible is instructive in that it sets the stage for the exploration of "hinge propositions," but it is different from both the mathematical and self-naming examples; after all, there is not unanimous support for it (unlike the other two examples). It may just be that the Bible example concerns a different sort of incontrovertibility of belief. An axiom must be accepted to perform a mathematical operation, and a grammatical rule must be accepted for one to articulate a well-formed semantic unit in a language, but belief in a narrative from the Bible would be secured by more than mere pragmatic grounds (e.g., in order to speak Chinese, one must pronounce the appropriate tones). The ground of belief in the merit of a sacred text may lie in reasoned grounds, but more likely, it will lie in the context of a life, its relationships, and the commitments that trusted

others happen to hold.[4] What I take from the above is that not only are there different hinge commitments, but also there are different kinds of hinge commitments, and there are different ways in which hinge commitments may come to hold fast for one. To help elaborate on these differences, it will be helpful to consider related notions such as "intellectual distance" and "ground".

b. Intellectual Distance

In the set of remarks that consider the statement "I know that I have never been on the moon," Wittgenstein contemplates speaking with others who might think they have indeed been to the moon. Wittgenstein writes,

> 108. "But is there then no objective truth? Isn't it true, or false, that someone has been on the moon?" If we are thinking within our system, then it is certain that no one has ever been on the moon. Not merely is nothing of the sort ever seriously reported to us by reasonable people, but our whole system of physics forbids us to believe it. For this demands answers to the questions "How did he overcome the force of gravity?" "How could he live without an atmosphere?" and a thousand others which could not be answered. But suppose that instead of all these answers we met the reply: "We don't know how one gets to the moon, but those who get there know at once that they are there; and even you can't explain everything." We should feel ourselves **intellectually very distant** from someone who said this. (OC: 17e, emphasis added)

It is not just that one person believes the statement that people have been on the moon and the other one does not; the difference between the two concerns, perhaps more importantly, the relevance of physics. Someone who answers when challenged, "We don't know how one gets to the moon, but those who get there know at once that they are there; and even you can't explain everything," is someone who does not secure their beliefs by means of the "whole system of physics"; it is because of this that Wittgenstein writes that "we should feel ourselves intellectually very distant from someone who said this." The feeling of intellectual distance arises out of the perception that another person does not merely adopt contradictory propositions to oneself but that the methods that the person employs are different than or even incompatible with the methods one uses oneself. There may be greater or lesser distances between people in this way. Perception of intellectual difference is the perception of an alternate epistemological orientation (what might be called "epistemic imaginaries"[5]) from the conclusions reached to the methods used and right down to the very goals that guide inquiry.

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[4]Compare with remarks §159 and 160 (OC: 23e).

[5]Here I am drawing on Charles Taylor's notion of "social imaginaries." Taylor uses the term to refer to the way "ordinary people 'imagine' their social surroundings"; it is "that common understanding which makes possible common practices." (Taylor 2007: 171f). An "epistemic imaginary" would be a shared understanding between people about hinges and grounds (i.e., about the practices involved in securing beliefs).

c. “Ground”

References to “ground” vastly outnumber references to “hinges” and “intellectual distance”. While the latter notions appear, respectively, just three times and once, the notion of “ground” appears at least sixty times. Wittgenstein’s references to “grounds” have to do largely with reasons that have the effect of securing propositions, sometimes from all doubt, but some uses of the notion refer to grounds that can be overridden by still more compelling grounds. The ultimate epistemic grounds, then, would be those that secure propositions from all doubt, but importantly, one might wish to possess objectively certain grounds rather than subjectively certain grounds (Moyal-Sharrock 2007: 76).[6] Here are a few references to “grounds” that show the variety of epistemic circumstances Wittgenstein entertains (emphasis added):

> But what about such a proposition as “I know I have a brain”? Can I doubt it? **Grounds** for doubt are lacking! Everything speaks in its favour, nothing against it. (OC: 2e)
>
> “I know” often means: I have the proper **grounds** for my statement. (4e)
>
> Isn’t this altogether like the way one can instruct a child to believe in a God, or that none exists, and it will accordingly be able to produce apparently telling **grounds** for the one or the other? (16e)
>
> You must bear in mind that the language-game is so to say something unpredictable. I mean: it is not based on **grounds**. It is not reasonable (or unreasonable).
>
> It is there - like our life. (73e)
>
> Is it wrong for me to be guided in my actions by the propositions of physics? Am I to say I have no good **ground** for doing so? Isn’t precisely this what we call a ‘good **ground**’? (80e)

In these passages, we see a variety of roles being played by “grounds”. On the one hand, the word “grounds” is used much the same as the word “reasons” might be used. To have grounds for a proposition is just to have reasons to believe it to be true (or more frequently, Wittgenstein refers to “grounds for doubt” being lacking). This use of “grounds” is justificatory; it is by means of grounds that one is justified in propositional attitudes such as certainty, knowledge, or doubt. Yet, another use of “grounds” appears here as well. This is the idea of the “background” against which propositions can be understood and subsequently judged true or false.[7] Many of the uses of “grounds” in *On Certainty* are like this; the word is used to refer to the systematic nature of a person’s epistemic life; “grounds” represent the measures a person may use in maintaining or updating a particular belief. In both of these cases, grounds are subjective in character; that is to say, grounds concern subjective certainty. Whether subjectively certain grounds are enough to ensure the knowledge status of a proposition is another matter.

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[6]See also Brice (2014) for an analysis of a similar distinction between “bottom-up” (i.e., biologically grounded) and “top-down” (i.e., culturally grounded) approaches to achieving certainty.

[7]On this use of “background,” see Rhees PI, §38–39.

The metaphors of hinges, distance, and grounds can be used to help clarify some of the difficulties in cross-cultural communication. For all human beings, something will hold fast in their picture of the world. Obvious examples of these hinge propositions would include some that are similar to those Wittgenstein mentions: mathematics, self-certainty, and beliefs of a religious or traditional nature. The perception of intellectual distance indicates a detected divergence not only in terms of hinge commitments, but also in terms of grounds. Cultural differences may also pertain to the grounds people employ in securing belief. For example, belief in the authority of a tradition would likely be grounded in the relationships by means of which a person is raised into a way of life. What qualifies as a "good ground" depends on the object of inquiry. Some topics (arithmetic calculation, name identification) have very clear grounds, while others (the authority of an ancient text) do not. Taken together, these notions raise a set of concerns an interlocutor can bring to cross-cultural encounters: awareness of the types of hinge commitments, the conditions of their detection, and their connection to what will count in a context as a "good" ground for believing or doubting something.

3 Wittgenstein and Dialogical Conceptions of Philosophy

As indicated above, I do not think it is in the spirit of Wittgenstein's philosophy to develop a theory of cross-cultural communication. Numerous scholars have identified so-called dialogical or therapeutic aspects of Wittgenstein's approach to philosophy. Key among such readers of Wittgenstein is Stanley Cavell, who wrote half a century ago: "The first thing to be said in accounting for his style is that he *writes*: he does not report, he does not write up results" (Cavell 1976: 70). While the notions of "hinges," "distance," and "grounds" could be used to develop a theory of communication, it would be more in line with Wittgenstein's overall philosophical output to use these notions to question what it is we think we know about a communicative or educational encounter. Cavell continues in exploring Wittgenstein's approach to philosophical writing:

> In its defense of truth against sophistry, philosophy has employed the same literary genres as theology in its defense of the faith: against intellectual competition, Dogmatics; against Dogmatics, the Confession; in both, the Dialogue. Inaccessible to the dogmatics of philosophical criticism, Wittgenstein chose confessions and recast his dialogue. (70f)

If Wittgenstein practiced philosophy in a dialogical way, he did not do so through the writing of actual dialogues. The dialogues that Wittgenstein would have engaged in would have been dialogues with himself. Philosophical dialogues aim at showing the contradictions (or other logical problems) in an interlocutor's way of thinking. If Wittgenstein writes in the dialogue format, then he explores and challenges the aspects of his own tendencies of mind that would enter into various logical problems. Through philosophical investigation, he lays bare these problems, thus showing as problematic a line of thought.

More recently, scholars have identified therapeutic concerns that run throughout Wittgenstein's philosophical corpus (especially in the work of those associated with the "New Wittgenstein"). Cora Diamond writes in the introduction to her collection of essays, *The Realistic Spirit*:

> The papers are, then, all attempts to think about ethics in a realistic spirit, i.e., not in the thrall of metaphysical requirements. They make two sorts of claims about the effects of such thralldom. The requirements which we lay down stop us seeing what moral thought is like; further, they lead us to construct stupid or insensitive or crazy moral arguments, arguments which are capable of hiding our own genuine ethical insights from ourselves and of giving others good grounds for identifying philosophical argument in ethics with sophistry. (Diamond 1995: 23)

In Diamond's development of it, Wittgenstein's philosophy aims at drawing attention to the human tendency to reach for a "God's-Eye View"[8] of the relationship between language and the world. In drawing attention to this tendency, Wittgenstein's philosophy does not advise skepticism about humanity's ability to know its world; instead, his philosophy seeks to show that the aim of wanting to see the world from a God's-Eye View is a kind of illness, an attempt to rise above the standpoint of humanity.

Indeed, we can see that it is because of Wittgenstein's rejection of a God's-Eye View that his philosophy eschews a systematic structure and instead proceeds "crisscross" from localized instances of confusion (PI: viii). This drive in Wittgenstein's philosophy to unravel the sources of our confusion about language (not least in the practice in philosophy) is something I have called an "ethic of perspicuity" (Carroll 2014: 38). The idea is that Wittgenstein saw philosophy as something that is pursued for the goal of a searching clarity, that to engage in the clarifying of practices was to respond to an ethical duty. Whether these practices of clarification are thought of via the genre of confession, a therapist's analysis or a detective's inquiry does not necessarily matter; each of these metaphors may be useful at one time or another when considering the aims of philosophy. The important thing to recognize is the recurring tendency human beings have toward conceptual confusion, equivocation, and over-generalization. The task of philosophy as Wittgenstein conceives it is to remind us, when we have become forgetful, about these tendencies and to help identify and unravel confused instances of language. In cross-cultural encounters, it is all too easy for these tendencies to exacerbate communicative problems. Thus, there is all the more reason to engage in critical practices that expose in oneself or one's interlocutors conceptual confusion, equivocation, and overgeneralization.

[8] I am here drawing on Hilary Putnam's use of the expression. See Putnam or (1990: 17).

4 Wittgenstein and Cross-Cultural Education

As was seen with Wittgenstein's practice of philosophy in the previous section, the work of clarification always begins somewhere, and typically, in the classroom, it begins with the particular confusions or uncertainties individual students may have. In the context in which I teach,[9] an English language small liberal arts college in Shanghai, I seek to help students identify claims and reasons from philosophical texts originating from a wide variety of places and times, all this in a way that is intelligible to students familiar with elements of Confucianism, Daoism, and Chinese Marxism. The intellectual bridges the students and I seek to build are not very different from those constructed in cross-cultural contexts elsewhere although the background knowledge, assumptions, and recognized methods of inquiry (i.e., hinges and grounds) may vary. Despite our best intentions, three potential sources of confusion recur, but I have found Wittgenstein's philosophy to useful for understanding and addressing them.

The first and most significant source of confusion has to do with instructors themselves. This is where the dialogical model of philosophy is so helpful. Professors do well to monitor their assumptions so as not to encounter their own prejudices or culturally specific certainties in their object of study. This dynamic is at play both in cases where faculty study philosophical traditions with which they do not identify as well as those with which they do. For example, as one who studies the philosophy of Wittgenstein, I have my own favored interpretations of his works, but if I do not suspend my favored readings from time to time, then I may miss evidence against my view or, for that matter, other new insights to be gained from his writings. I may also miss or downplay the questions or uncertainties my students have with his writings and be unable to explain his texts in ways appropriate to the students' levels of understanding. Assumptions that faculty may employ can take the form of projections of likely background knowledge that one's students may share as well as certainties that may be uncontested in one's own culture but contestable in cross-cultural contexts.

The second source of confusion arises from the increasing diversity present in many classrooms around the world. Diverse classrooms may have students for whom English is a second language as well as students of various ethnicities, gender identities, religions, and economic backgrounds. While the focus of the present chapter is on cultural diversity within classrooms, some of the approaches taken here for improving the chances of communication might be helpful for diverse classrooms based on other sources of identification. The second source of confusion is one that I face on a daily basis in my role as a philosophy faculty member at Xing Wei College. There are intra-Chinese differences of ethnicity, religious or non-religious identification, region, and economic background.

[9]From 2012–2016 (including the time of writing), I was Founding Faculty in Philosophy at Xing Wei College in Shanghai, China.

Furthermore, the cultural differences between students and faculty can make communication difficult.

A third source of confusion has to do with the disciplinary lenses used in cross-cultural philosophical education itself. Some texts claimed by philosophy may be claimed also by other disciplines, disciplines with which students may or may not be familiar. The two disciplines in which I teach are philosophy and religious studies, but faculty in comparative literature, history, political science, and sociology (among others) may also study philosophical texts in their courses. Furthermore, ancient texts such as those attributed to Plato, Aristotle, Confucius, and Mencius are each claimed by a variety of disciplines. When should one draw on academic resources across disciplinary boundaries?

In addressing these potential sources of confusion in the classroom, Wittgenstein's remarks on hinges, intellectual distance, and grounds as well as his model of philosophy will be helpful. Recall the remark quoted above, where Wittgenstein writes of "very intelligent and well-educated people" who "believe in the story of creation of the Bible." Just because there are grounds to believe that story to have been proven false does not mean that a believer in the creation narrative would be persuaded. They would have to be the right sort of grounds to be persuasive (given the hinges to which one may be committed). Here, one finds resonance between Wittgenstein and John Clayton's "counsels of prudence" (Clayton 2006: 2). For example, Clayton's "presumption of competence"—the assumption that most of the beliefs of a community or culture are true, and that the people in question are rationally competent[10]—is a sensible principle of interpretation to apply because it puts the interpreter on par epistemically with those who she or he is interpreting.

Part of recognizing the rational competence of an interlocutor is seeking to understand their mode of reasoning. Clayton also suggests the "practice of empathy," the imaginative participation in the way of thinking of another person. It is not easy, and it may be impossible to do fully, but even a small amount of progress on this will enable the student or scholar to appreciate the interconnections between ideas, values, commitments, etc., in another person. This mode of understanding another's epistemic imaginary would be helpful insofar as it recognizes the deep reach of hinge commitments and the salience of different sorts of grounds.

Wittgenstein also advised a reluctance to leap to conclusions that might be drawn too easily. Scholars ought to be very careful when evaluating the beliefs, values, or institutions of another. One can see this value in Wittgenstein when, e.g., he criticizes Frazer for treating the magical practices of ancient peoples as if they were the proposing of theory about the natural world (PO: 119). In a similar vein, Clayton advises reticence about evaluation. As a hermeneutical principle, its

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[10]Clayton likens this presumption to Donald Davidson's principle of charity. There are, of course, disanalogies between the two: Davidson's principle concerned radical interpretation, i.e., interpretive contexts where there had been no previous contact between the interpreters and the people interpreted. Davidson holds that this principle is essential to the process of interpretation for without it, interpretation would be impossible.

usefulness is fairly clear: it is pointless to evaluate a claim or a practice that is not understood clearly and deeply. To understand a claim is to understand not only just the meanings of the words, but also the grounds on which it is taken to rest and the hinges on which it relies; to evaluate the claim is to evaluate it with an understanding of the hinges and grounds of that claim.

Returning to the potential sources of confusion noted earlier in this section, the first source concerned the faculty member monitoring her or his assumptions about the topic in question. As we will see, the sources quickly compound one another. For example, the claim “Confucianism is a religion” is hotly denied in China and elsewhere in East Asia, while the claim retains some level of plausibility within the USA.[11] Which point of view is correct? Any answer to this question depends, of course, on the relevant hinges and grounds. Part of approaching this question empathetically in the classroom is imagining this question from the point of view of one’s students, that is, with sensitivity to their hinge commitments and what qualify as grounds they would accept (i.e., their epistemic imaginaries). Most of my students in Shanghai have been taught that Confucianism is not a religion, that religion has to do with gods and superstition, that religion is incompatible with modernization and national development, and that certain elements of Confucianism contain good moral teachings. Because, for my students, “religions” are not cultural complexes inspiring pride, to call something “religious” is to label it pejoratively. While I hold a different view on the evaluative connotations of ascribing religion status to something, I am not going to tell my students they are wrong. What I do wish to teach them is how to assess their own commitments to particular definitions of important terms. Furthermore, when I detect instances of intellectual distance, there is an opportunity to learn about my interlocutors to better understand their hinges and grounds. Some of the hinge commitments may be changeable (especially, if they rest on grounds that may be publicly contested), but not all will be.

As concerns the third potential source of confusion, no one academic discipline has special access to knowledge. Careful interdisciplinary work can contribute to better insights into philosophies or religions (i.e., through better understanding of the background to a claim, authoritative sources for justifying a claim and possible identification of hinge commitments); yet, performing interdisciplinary work responsibly is no straightforward task. Even for scholars trained in more than one field, it may be difficult to articulate the methods and aims of a field in a way that is intelligible to both fields. It also may be that the aims of different fields are incompatible. For example, religious studies is largely a descriptive field; the goal is to thoroughly describe and interpret religious practices, identification, texts, institutions, and the theories used in describing and interpreting religious phenomena. When it comes to studying theologically committed philosophical texts, the descriptive aim of religious studies can clash with the evaluative aim of philosophy; this clash may parallel that between intellectual history and the history of

[11]Plausibility can be assessed in part by the presence of chapters on Confucianism in textbooks on world religions published in the U.S. On this, consider Brodd et al. (2015).

philosophy. If historical study in philosophy does not evaluate that which is studied but only discerns who wrote what and to whom, then it may lead some philosophers to claim that it is not philosophy.

Interdisciplinary work is particularly useful when it supports the aims of one particular discipline. For example, history can help frame the background contexts of philosophical works. That is, history can help philosophy be more responsible *as philosophy*. Consider trying to understand Augustine's *Confessions* without understanding the ends of Christianity or al-Ghazali's *The Deliverance from Error* without appreciating the ends of Islam. Once the historical, cultural, or religious contexts of philosophical works have been uncovered, it will be possible to engage in close reading and interpretation of those philosophical works. Philosophical texts contain reasons, reasons offered in support of certain ideas, principles, courses of action, ways of thinking or being, or interpretations of yet other texts.

In responding to these potential sources of confusion using these strategies, Wittgenstein's philosophical model is that of an attentive, self-scrutinizing interlocutor looking to draw fellow interlocutors' attention to points of conceptual confusion. His texts provoke readers, both teachers and students, to consider if they know what they think they know. While Socrates provides a memorable model of the philosopher as a stinging insect on the body politic (a model not too distant from Wittgenstein's perspicuous philosopher); in the Confucian tradition, there is a different model in the *junzi* ("exemplary person" in Ames and Rosemont's translation (Ames and Rosemont 1998)), a figure who draws others to harmonious living through moral, ritual, and pedagogical virtuosity. Philosophers are sometimes radical critics and sometimes learned servants of their societies. Which ends students will find plausible for philosophy—or for education, generally—depends on the grounds and hinges they possess and the rational felicity of cross-cultural philosophical conversation. So long as they can provide their teachers and their peers in a cross-cultural classroom with good reasons, then their claims will be candidates for knowledge status. If other students, and their teacher, have sought to understand the intellectual differences present in the classroom community, then they will be in a position to see, and evaluate, differential intellectual achievements. In this way, cross-cultural educational contexts provide an arena in which Wittgenstein's philosophy may be applied, one well beyond the contexts he may have envisioned for it but for which his philosophy appears to be particularly well suited.

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M.A. Peters and J. Stickney (eds.), *A Companion to Wittgenstein on Education*,
DOI 10.1007/978-981-10-3136-6

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