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Practice Theory Perspectives on Pedagogy and Education

Praxis, Diversity and Contestation

Springer

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This book is dedicated to our dear colleagues Barbara Garrick and Roslyn Brennan-Kemmis who sadly passed away far too soon. Both were integral to the development of this volume, but passed away between the symposium and the publication of this book. Their work in and for education was an inspiration to all who worked with them and their dedication to a just and fair society is will be their legacy.

Preface

Although there is a long history of understanding and theorising work, education, and other facets of social life through practice perspectives, recently there has been renewed interest. More specifically, in theorising pedagogy and education that Schatzki, Knorr Cetina, and von Savigny (2001) called for a *practice turn* to contexualise educational practices in grounded and highly transformative ways. This turn has not only launched new developments in practice theory itself, but has been adopted across a range of educational sectors and contexts as an approach to not only understand the practices that constitute their conduct but as an approach to liberate neoliberal tendencies that pervade the work and practices of those sovereign beings within their bounds. For the contemporary educator and researcher what is interesting is that this call to practice has taken place against a background of debate attempting to instrumentalise practices within regimes of accountability and measurement. Furthermore, 'practice' (as an enduring concept) has been addressed through a range of academic traditions including philosophy and sociology, and these traditions are reflected in the chapters of this book.

This book was developed alongside an invited symposium where the authors and other interested academics and practitioners from across the globe gathered to discuss practice theory perspectives on pedagogy and education. The premise was that the symposium was to be driven by ideas; ideas that generated rich, genuine dialogues among those present. The symposium was held in June 2015 when the authors, and a few invited discussants, met for two days in Brisbane, Australia. The authors prepared an initial full draft of their chapter prior to the symposium, and these were distributed to the delegates about one month prior to the event. The participants read the draft chapters prior to the symposium and came prepared to discuss the ideas within the draft chapter. At the chapter presentation sessions at the symposium, the authors gave a short presentation (20 minutes) and then there was an extended period for discussion (40 minutes). This structure was designed to provide extended time for dialogue and discussion about the ideas presented in each chapter, and to offer the authors informed and thoughtful feedback. In the light of this feedback, and further feedback from the editors, the authors then revised their chapters. The chapters then underwent an anonymous peer-review process.

The title of the book, *Practice Theory Perspectives on Pedagogy and Education*, captures the central overarching focus that underpins all the chapters in the book. All of the authors have addressed at least one of the key themes outlined below:

- *Practice Theory:* It is acknowledged that there is a plurality of "practice theories", and in each chapter the author(s) include a theoretical perspective on practice. Through these various perspectives of 'practice theory' a richer understanding emerges and the theories are developed and enhanced. These, in turn, provide useful tools for advancing and developing *practice*.
- *Pedagogy:* Pedagogy is a term commonly used in educational contexts, but it can mean different things in different cultural contexts. In this book, the related dual perspectives of pedagogy as a *teaching practice* (as understood in Anglo-Saxon countries) and pedagogy as a *practice of up-bringing* (as understood in continental Europe) are both included and discussed.
- *Education:* The third key theme is *education*; however, this is not seen as synonymous with schooling. Here, we include education in a range of contexts and sectors including VET, tertiary and non-formal settings. Furthermore, education is seen as serving a dual purpose—the development of individuals and the betterment of societies and community—and it is this conceptualisation of education that underpins the chapters in the book.
- *Diversity and Contestation:* As is evident in the previous themes, in this book it is acknowledge that there is a diversity of understandings and perspectives of practice theory, pedagogy and education. This also means that each of these understandings and perspectives are contestable and ripe for further development.

The chapters in this book represent some innovative, and at this time provocative, perspectives on educational and pedagogical practice. We hope that they challenge current understandings and promote further theory and practice development. But more importantly, we hope that the perspectives presented herewith open up possibilities for readers to enter into generative conversations about the practices of pedagogy and education with others around them, thereby initiate changes to enhance practice and praxis.

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Reference

Schatzki, T. R., Knorr-Cetina, K., & von Savigny, E. (2001). *The practice turn in contemporary social theory*. New York: Routledge.

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Chapter 1
Practice Theory and Education: Diversity and Contestation

Peter Grootenboer, Christine Edwards-Groves and Sarojni Choy

Abstract There has emerged, since the turn of the century or so, a cohesive body of work centred on theorising education as practice. These practice theories come from a range of theoretical and philosophical traditions, but collectively they draw attention to the sociality of practices, and the ontological nature of practice. A 'practice turn' also emphasises the 'happingness' of education and the need to consider teaching and learning as they unfold in particular sites within local conditions. In this chapter we provide an overview of practice theory in relation to education, and outline how these theories can provide a critical perspective of education across a range of settings and systems. We also provide an argument and illustration of how developing a communicative space is foundational to developing educational practices under diverse and contested practice arrangements.

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Practices are formed by being in and participating in the social world. Understanding thereby practices requires a theory, or suite of theories, that illuminate the socialness and sociality of practical being, action and interaction. So, understanding education practices where learning and socialisation co-occur presumes what is necessary is a social theory that makes visible the intricacies of what it means to participate in the enactment of the complex world of education practices[1]. Theories that examine and are sensitive to practices, the enactment of practices, the composition and the development of practices and the practitioners of practices can collectively be described as practice theories. Noting that because of the complexities, nuances and diversity of the scope of practice there is not a singular unified theory of practice, but rather 'a family of theoretical approaches connected by a web of historical and conceptual similarities' (Nicolini 2012, p. 1). This plurality of practice theories come from a range of scholarly traditions, fields and theoretical positions (Nicolini 2012) that, although diverse, make for richer understandings of everyday practices.

At the beginning of the twenty-first century it was suggested that the theorising of pedagogy and education required a 'practice turn' (Schatzki et al. 2001). The 'practice turn' has been a far-reaching movement taken up in a range of contexts and across a variety of educational systems, workplaces, organisations and forms. But this turn towards practice-based perspectives is not simply a trend or fashionable bandwagon (Nicolini 2012); rather it is a turn towards the recognition of the need for social theories that offer close attention to the intricate details of practical enactment in the social world. Such practice-based perspectives deepen, broaden and heighten the meanings, descriptions and reasonings offered in empirical studies focused on practice. Now, some 15 years later, it is timely to renew discussions about the developments and insights that practice theories offer education. The practice turn taken across this chapter, and indeed each of the chapters in this book, discuss the nature and relevance of practice theory, before specifically looking at it in terms of education. Primarily, in this chapter we provide a broad theoretical and philosophical foundation to ground and contextualise practice theories as interpreted in the chapters within this book.

Why Practice Theory?

Practice is a ubiquitous—and perhaps even a taken-for-granted, idiom found in descriptions of everyday social life. Its presence threads through theoretical, methodological and practice-based literature to point to both broader *and* particular

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[1]Kemmis, Wilkinson, Edwards-Groves, Hardy, Grootenboer and Bristol in their 2014 book 'Changing Practices, Changing Education' describe the interconnected and multidimensional practices of education. They identify these education practices as being student learning, teaching, leading, professional learning and researching, pronouncing them as the 'complex of education practices' (p. 50).

acts, actors, actions and activities encountered in the practical social world. Although the heightened interest in practice theory in education is relatively recent, it is not new; and it is possible to trace theories and ideas about educational and organisational practices throughout history. Practice theorist Davide Nicolini (2012), for example, mapped out an introduction to *practice theories*[2] beginning with ancients Plato and Aristotle before traversing a range of theorists and philosophers including Marx, Heidegger, Wittgenstein, Giddens, Bourdieu, Wenger and Schatzki (just to name a few). However, the 'practice turn' noted by Schatzki et al. (2001) has been quite a contemporary phenomenon, and indeed, the seminal works of Schatzki (2001) has given impetus to and sustained this renewed emphasis on the primacy of practice as an integral dimension of understanding the everyday workings of social life (inclusive of education and work because both are habituated in the lifeworlds of individuals). The allure of a practice-based approach to understanding work, education and organisations is grounded in the range of affordances it offers including the way it embraces the ordinariness and routine nature of *lifeworlds* and *systems* (as put by theorist Jürgen Habermas, 1987):

> The great promise of the practice lens is that of explaining social phenomena in a processual way without losing touch with the mundane nature of everyday life and the concrete and material nature of the activities with which we are all involved. (Nicolini 2012, p. 9)

As suggested here by Nicolini, the feature of drawing on practice theories is that they ultimately include and, in most cases emphasise, the recursive relationship between social, structural and material conditions, and the actualities of 'living out' practices as they exist or are experienced in Habermas' terms, 'system' and 'lifeworld'. In general, practice theories argue that viewing social life as a simply quantifiable and measurable machine is deeply inadequate; rather these theories respond to, leverage out and account for the layers, levels and intricacies and situatedness of enactment. Just as practices (in their doing) are not static, practice theories do not succumb to the rigidity of measurement regimes, rather liberated from the confines of functionalist perspectives governed by tradition. In their portrayal, a practice approach is inclusive of the complex multidimensionality and dynamism of being in and participating in the social world. Schatzki (2001) extols this virtue by pointing out that as a social theory, practice theories embrace aspects 'such as knowledge, meaning, human activity, science power, language, social institutions and human transformation' (p. 2).

Another feature of practice theories is that these generally appear to work around the common tendency to see the world in terms of such as theory and action, and individual and social. As such, practice theories avoid the oppositional conceptualisation of aspects of life and work that have been seen as unresolvable, particularly in epistemological frameworks. The ontological dimension of a practice-perspective adds substance to this since foundation of practice theories

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[2]Here we use the plural "theories" to denote the multiplicity of theories of practice described as a practice theory, that although distinct and distinctively different from one another have a primacy of practice.

provides a somewhat radical perspective that is more reflective of life and work as it unfolds in time-space. Specifically, rather than seeing aspects or machinations of the social world in dualistic ways, practice theories allow them to be seen as mutually constituting and sustaining, and relationally connected in complex and irreducible terms. For example, a teacher will engage in teaching practices that are idiosyncratic and specific for her particular classroom, but at the same time she is part of the particular community of teachers at her school; these practices are nuanced and unique on the one hand, yet are also nested within a broad profession of educators. In this, her individual teaching practices are simultaneously shaped by the 'traditions' of the broader practice, but at the same time the traditions of the broader practice are also made and remade by the practices of individuals – that is, these dimensions of practice action and participation are mutually constitutive. This was noted by Marx in the Third Theses on Feuerbach (1845/2002) when he said:

> The materialist doctrine that [people] are products of circumstances and upbringing, and that, therefore, changed [people] will be the product of changed circumstances and changed upbringing, forgets that it is [people] who make circumstances, and that the educator must [themselves] be educated.

In the everyday conceptualisation of practices, when people think of practices they often think of the activities and the doing of things, not only of who is involved. This directs us to another characteristic of a practice-based approach to understanding and developing education is the shift of sole focus from the *practitioners* to the *practices* (Nicolini 2012). For example, in educational inquiry, rather than discussing school leaders, the focus would shift to be about school leading; or rather than investigating teachers, the research and theory about the work of teachers would centralise the practices of teaching. Thus, in this view practices have pre-eminence over practitioners, noting that the place of practitioners is one that is not overlooked nor undermined but viewed as part of the practising of practices. This shift is necessary because to understand the education that happens in a site, it is necessary to have an appreciation (both theoretically and analytically) for the *range* of interconnected practices that unfold in the day-to-day realities of particular practitioners of practices within a particular practice landscape. We argue, therefore, that the role of the individual in undertaking practices can only be understood within the arrangements and conditions that enable and constrain the practice as it is experienced among the other practices that are ecologically arranged with it in the site. As an example, Wilkinson and Kemmis (2014) explain what this means in relation to educational leading:

> …we frequently employ the verb 'leading', rather than its noun form 'leadership'. We do so as part of a site ontological approach, that is as a means of shifting attention from the notion of leadership as a taken-for-granted and fixed state or role (implied in an entity view of organisations), to the activities and practices that constitute leading and that may include encouraging and supporting others to engage in practices of leading. (p. 5)

This shift is not merely a play on words (from nouns to verbs or more specifically gerunds), but a profound change in the philosophical foundations for understanding, appreciating and developing practices. And in terms of research into

educational 'practices' it places the emphasis on the actual conduct of practices or *happenings* in the enactment of practices in sites (like leading or teaching or learning) rather than the personal qualities of the central figures in the practice. Hence, as researchers we tend to adapt, improvise, experience, but within the rules of the practice of research to justify our adaptive features and argue its validity. Nonetheless, practice theory does acknowledge that researchers as participants make praxis happen and in this way contribute to the history making.

Not only are practices ecologically arranged in the realities of their existence however; they are historically prefigured although not predetermined (Kemmis et al. 2014a, b). As Warde (2005) explains, practices 'contain the seeds of constant change… as people in myriad situations adapt, improvise and experiment' (p. 141). In this way, practices can be said to have 'trajectories' which are made up of minor modifications in past performances and the particular combination of elements at any one point in time (Warde 2005).

Finally, practice theories offer a more rounded comprehensive understanding of social phenomenon by encompassing more than is available through analyses that are solely based on one dimension alone, for instance, on discourses and language. This is not to say that discursive practices are not fundamental to a social understanding of organisations and education, but rather to highlight that alone they are inadequate.

> Practice approaches suggest that we need theories that take into account the heterogeneous nature of the world we live in, which includes an appreciation that objects and materials often bite back at us and resist our attempts to envelope them with our discourses. (Nicolini 2012, p. 8)

Thus, we argue, practice theory can be seen as a way of remediating the over simplification of education to just texts, discourses and signs by including social and material dimensions. It therefore offers a unitary understanding of education as practice.

Beyond the Practice Bandwagon: Diversity and Scope in Practice-Based Perspectives

Practice theories are fundamentally social theories bound by a core interest in the conduct and shape of practices in all dimensions of everyday social life: what they are composed of, how they are enacted, what is accomplished by them, the individuals and materials involved, what enables and constrains the doing of them, the structures and/or processes, the discourses, how they are produced and reproduced. Contemporary practice theories are anchored in philosophical traditions strongly influenced by the thinking of Marx, Heidegger and Wittgenstein (for example). Their importance to sociology recognises the sociality and situatedness of practices by availing themselves of close scrutiny of both the shape of and the shaping conditions of practice and practical action; they are built on and give rise to different

theoretical positions that form the increasingly diverse range of practice-based perspectives. These differing positions have been distinguished by Schatzki (2001), who described four main types of practice theorists:

> *philosophers* (such as Wittgenstein, Dreyfus, or Taylor), *social theorists* (Bourdieu, Giddens), *cultural theorists* (Foucault, Lyotard) and *theorists of science and technology* (Latour, Rouse, Pickering). It is also possible to distinguish two 'waves' or generations of practice theorists. Whilst the first generation, led by some of the foremost theorists of the twentieth century (e.g., Bourdieu 1977; de Certeau 1984; Foucault 1979; Giddens 1979, 1984) laid the foundations of what we now regard as practice theory, the second generation is currently testing those foundations and building new extensions to the theoretical edifice." (cited in Postill 2010, p. 4; emphasis added).

The diversity of theories illuminates different theoretical, empirical and methodological orientations of practice offering sometimes overlapping, entangled, tangential, interconnected or even discrete accounts of practice. And as Nicolini (2012) cautions, harboured in the strength of each one of these theories are comparable weaknesses which needs to be acknowledged in the adoption or argument for one theory or another. That is to say, it must be acknowledged that any theory on practice positions both the researcher and the representation of research in particular ways; positions not without limitations.

What follows in this brief section (utilising Schatzki's (2001) four broad categories as organising structures) is a modest attempt to draw out some of these various perspectives[3] which places the social *in* practices but differ in their localisation of the social and in their conceptualisation of the body, mind, things, knowledge, discourse, structure/process and the agent (Reckwitz 2002) in their accounts of the production and reproduction of practices.

Philosophers

Sensemaking, intelligibility and comprehensibility made perceptible in language in the *doing* of things form the centrepiece for philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein's (1958) characterisation of social practice. A Wittgensteinian view asserts that practices 'are social (they help people combine as a group), are set in motion by processes of intelligibility and are given some coherence and identity by their inherent teleological nature' (Nicolini, 2012, p. 171). For Wittgenstein, intelligibility, coherence and identity are symbiotically shaped in practices constituted in, through and by language. For him, social practices are not, and cannot be reduced to discursive practices alone however. 'Actions (not thought) underlies language' (Schatzki 1996, p. 135); and so language-as-social action is given, and gives off, varying shades of meaning in practices. Thereby it is through language (as more

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[3]We draw on Nicolini's comprehensive and historical account of a range of practice theories; for more detail, see Nicolini (2012).

than speech acts) that meaning enters and leaves the spatiotemporal moments of activity, as people as interlocutors in interactions come together to do things of varying kinds. This means that language is not considered simply 'as a lexicon but as an interlocutory activity of meaning making' (Kemmis et al. 2014a, b, p. 28). Coherence in practices reciprocally influences and is influenced by language. Wittgenstein places the idea of *language games* as central to understanding practices and the sociality of practices. Practices as 'a shared, collective, *intersubjective* achievement' (Kemmis et al. 2014a, b, p. 28) are made recognisable and comprehensible in, through and by language and the *games* (routines, rules, patterns and social forms) that influence or even govern its evolution and utility. As Schatzki (1996) writes 'Practices thus 'constitute worlds' in the sense of articulating the intelligibility of entities (objects, people and events), specifying their normativized interrelated meanings' (p. 115).

Social Theorists

An early proponent of a social theory of practice is Garfinkel (1967) whose work in ethnomethodology, for instance, forms an important way to 'treat practical activities, practical circumstances and practical sociological reasoning as topics of empirical study' (Garfinkel 1967, p.1). Although ethnomethodologists would not typically describe themselves as practice theorists, Garfinkel's early movement towards a focus on inquiry into everyday social phenomenon led to understanding practices as locally accomplished. This ontological position opened up other social theories of practice that give primacy to the discourses that both *flow* discursively through practices at the same time *shape* talk-in-interaction practices (or the in-the-moment accomplishment of practices). For example, although located in discipline of sociology, the work of Sacks et al. (1974) in conversation analysis, Fairclough's theoretical work (1992) on critical discourse analysis and Gee's (1992) work on 'D'/discourse analysis are not strictly theories of practice (according to Nicolini 2012), they do (although differentially) position the centrality of discourse in practices as discursively produced social action. For them the unfolding of discourse as activity in space-time—discursivity—is the core matter in the conduct and accomplishment of practice.

Conceptualisations of 'social practice' have also been offered by social theorists such as Giddens and Bourdieu to understand the nature of the dynamics between agency, structure, dispositions and context. For instance, sociologist Giddens (1984) situates practices within social structures both constituted by human agency, and yet at the same time are the very medium of its constitution. In his view, practices are not governed by a prefigured world of objects but requires human agency, solidarity and identity produced and reproduced in social interaction and transactions. Bourdieu (1977, 1990) goes further to purport a logic of practice that emphasises the importance of the body of persons in the enactment of practices which are influenced by varying degrees of individual agency (or capitals) and

dispositions formed in and because of ones' habitus. Central to Bourdieu's thinking is the treatment of language and discourses as mechanisms of power embedded in different fields and habitus is pivotal in how participants in practices of one kind or another develop particular habitus. Habitus, according to Bourdieu (1990), is a set of unique dispositions developed by participants (as sovereign beings) enacting a particular practice in cultural, material and social fields (for example); these dispositions are what give the participant the 'feel for the game' that makes it possible for them to act accordingly in the field.

Science and Technology Theorists

According to prominent practice theorist Reckwitz (2002), materials, objects, technologies and even infrastructures are elevated in status as essential active elements that co-constitute practices with their own agentic influences that ultimately determine the enactment of practices. Latour's Actor Network Theory (ANT) (2005) proposes that *all* parts of the practices in social life—natural, technological, or human—are actants (parts of the natural, technological, or human network that have some role to play) to be treated equally as influential, interconnecting and active dimensions of the whole system. In this theory, every situation or practice may be referred to as a network (a group of interconnected reciprocally affectual elements), composed of actants and interconnections (ways that the parts of the networks interact).

Recent Developments in Practice Theory

In more recent developments in practice theory, work by Kemmis and Grootenboer (2008) and Kemmis et al. (2014b) argue that theoretically and empirically, practices are influenced (enabled and constrained) and ecologically connected by particular cultural–discursive, material-economic and social-political arrangements that form historically constituted site-based conditions for the enactment of practices. Kemmis et al.'s (2014a, b) theories of practice architectures and ecologies of practices, located in the field of social theory, give rise to a new integrated view of practice that accounts for the physical space-time *and* the semantic and social spaces that mutually and simultaneously shape the conduct of practices. In these spaces, this theory gives primacy to sociality and to both subjective and intersubjective meaning making as practitioners of practices come together as interlocutors in interactions and actions in diverse sites of practices. The theory of practice architectures develops Schatzki's (2002) formulation of practice as a 'organised array or nexus of *doings* and *sayings* existing in practice arrangement bundles', to give equal attention to a third dimension *relatings*. This theory makes explicit how in practice power, solidarity and agency shape the social–political arrangements and

hang together with material-economic and social-political arrangements in a site to help hold a practice in place. According to Kemmis et al. (2014a, b):

> This quality of 'hanging together' in a project is crucial for identifying what makes particular kinds of practices distinctive. Sayings, doings and relatings, and cultural-discursive, material-economic and social-political arrangements can and do exist independently of practices. All are galvanised into action in more or less coherent ways in relation to one another, however, when they hang together in the conduct of distinctive practices (even if they sometimes include contradictory ideas or contrary impulses or relationships of conflict or contestation between participants). (p.31)

That galvanising often relies on the linguistic abilities as tools to harmonise the cultural–discursive, material-economic and social–political arrangements. Kemmis et al. (2014a, b) explain further that practices of one kind or another (like teaching, hairdressing or nursing) are always ecologically arranged with other practices. Their claim is that a practice can never be completely understood as its own bounded entity. This aligns with the view offered by Røpke (2009) who asserted that practices are always interconnected with other practices (e.g., practices of hairdressing and practices of hair design and purchasing hair products) and are in a mutually constitutive relationship within wider political, economic, legal and cultural structures of varying formality. So in reality practices are never unitary, isolated or discrete, but rather are almost always found to exist within an assemblage of other practices. This means practices are always *enmeshed* with other practices. And so in education, practices are fully integrated with, interwoven into, and constituted as part of a broader contexture of practices involving leading, teaching, professional learning, student learning and researching or as they assert within the broader education complex of practices (that include policy and research). The theory of practice architectures is also differentiated from other theories of practice because of its explicit moral dimension connected to educational praxis (described in more detail in a later section).

Site Ontologies

Practices always occur somewhere in physical space-time. Practices, therefore are temporally situated, locally influenced, locally produced, locally enacted, locally accomplished and locally comprehended. As was highlighted in previous sections, one of the characteristics of a 'practice turn' in theorising pedagogy and education is an emphasis on and interest in the *sites* of practices, forming a fundamentally site ontological approach. In his theory, Schatzki (2002) brings practice, sociality and ontology together in the moment of practising in his proposal that practices are 'the site of the social' (pp. 146–147). Thus attention to the site, and the nuances of sites, is an approach different from the more idealised and generalised views of education and pedagogy that emphasise the epistemological through terms like 'best practice'. In a site-based understanding of education, the *realities*, *actualities* and *happeningness* of practices is emphasised. Furthermore, this position views practices as

only comprehensible within the sites *and* within the moments in which they actually occur. This conception has a number of implications for theorising and understanding the conduct of practices.

First, if practices unfold in particular space-time, then it is only sensible to consider practices and the arrangements that enable and constrain them simultaneously. To this end, Schatzki (2012) stated:

> Because the relationship between practices and material entities is so intimate, I believe that the notion of a bundle of practices and material arrangements is fundamental to analyzing human life. …. To say that practices and arrangements bundle is to say (1) that practices effect, use, give meaning to, and are inseparable from arrangements while (2) arrangements channel, prefigure, facilitate, and are essential to practices. (p. 16)

This notion of practice-arrangement bundles means that to understand educational practices, attention must be paid simultaneously to the practices and the practice architectures; and as we contend, to discuss educational practices outside their particular site is at best partial, and at worst, meaningless.

Second, the forms of certain practices that emerge in a particular site are shaped—enabled and constrained, by conditions that exist in that particular site at that time. This means that while we can label a certain practice as, for example teaching, it is not realised or practiced in the same way as in the next classroom, the school down the road, or the educational institution in another country. Furthermore, this view also challenges the veracity of a term like 'best practice' in anything other than a very general sense, as 'best practice' implies that there is a generalised abstracted version of teaching (or leading or any other educational practice) that is the way to practice teaching. Politically and publically these terms cause confusion and ignore site ontological perspectives, hence considerations for site by site basis is rarely if ever deliberated.

Third, in conceiving of development or reform, explicit attention needs to be given to the particularities and nuances of the sites that the 'reformed' practices are intended. A site ontological perspective sees practices and site-based arrangements as being symbiotically and intimately inter-related, with each to a large degree constituting the other. Thus, to roll out some systemic reform in any sector, requires a development in the new practices, and, the site-based conditions and arrangements that enable and constrain the desirable new forms of practice. Furthermore, this needs to be considered on a site-by-site basis, otherwise, as history will attest, the uptake of new practices will be patchy at best, and certainly limited in its scope. So while the allure of widespread systemic educational reform is often attractive (particularly when one considers economies of scale), it is unlikely to be successful without significant resourcing and attention to local sites. This makes practice theory an important vehicle for change management for policy and practice, given that the theory unveils detailed understandings of the arrangements that need attention.

Practice Theory for Education

Practice theories in education capture the diversity within and across sites and practices. The title of the book—*Practice Theory Perspectives on Pedagogy and Education*, captures the central overarching focus that underpins the chapters in this book, and so here we move from a more general discussion of practice to focus more tightly on education. Although education is a key theme across the chapters of the book, it is important to note that education is not understood as being synonymous with the concept of schooling. The authors of the various chapters traverse education in a range of contexts and sectors including Vocational Education and Training (VET), tertiary and non-formal settings. Furthermore, and more crucially, education is viewed as serving a dual purpose—the development of individuals and the betterment of societies and community. It is this conceptualisation of education is foundational to all that follows in this book. Also, the term *pedagogy* is commonly used in educational contexts, but its meaning is not universally consistent. *Pedagogy* can mean different things in different cultural contexts, and so here the related dual perspectives of pedagogy as a *teaching practice* (as understood in Anglo-Saxon countries) and pedagogy as a *practice of upbringing* (as understood in continental Europe) are both included and discussed by different authors.

Without reiterating the points made previously, here we want to highlight some features of conceiving, interrogating and understanding education using practice theories. The first is the capacity to ameliorate or sidestep unhelpful dualisms. The second is the attention it provides to the *everydayness* and situated nature of education, and finally and relatedly, the capacity it provides to consider practices in ecological ways.

While it is widely known and accepted that education is both an individual and social practice, in general the theoretical tools available to researchers have tended to favour one perspective or the other, and so understandings of education have been unbalanced. This is not to suggest that these theories are irrelevant but to say that now, with the 'practice turn', there is the possibility to consider and theorise educational practice in a more uniform yet comprehensive way. The individual learner (student or teacher) and the community of learners are considered in a symbiotic and mutually constituting manner in the classroom context. In this way, the individual is practising education within the discursive, material and social conditions of their site, but also the practice arrangements are being developed and changing as individuals collective engage in the learning and teaching practices. In the same way, the term *practice theory* unites the often dualistically considered aspects of 'theory' and 'practice'—this is not just theory informed practice or practice informed theory, but rather an indivisible theory–practice nexus.

The second feature to highlight here is the ontological perspective of education—the routineness of education as realised in classrooms and other learning environments. As was hinted at in general terms above, this means that education is considered as it happens and unfolds in the 'everydayness' of learning and teaching.

It also sees educational practice as situated in physical time-space. The implications of this are profound for education, because it means that regardless of whatever is mandated from the likes of central agencies or even school management, education actually happens in classrooms (real and virtual) and other learning sites such as workplaces, with real learners and teachers engaging in a specific curriculum or learning material. Thus, to research or develop education it must be considered in its site, and so generalised notions of 'best practice' are of limited value or relevance. Education practice is only understandable within the arrangements and conditions that enable and constrain it in its particular site. Of course, it is important to note here that the 'site' might not be just a 'bricks and mortar' building, as it could, for example, be a virtual classroom or work site.

Finally, in education it is pointless to consider particular practices in isolation from other practices. At the most obvious level, it is clear that teaching practices (inclusive of training as in VET) are intimately and ecologically related to student learning practices in classrooms or work sites. Kemmis et al. (2014a, b) identified five integrated AND interrelated educational practices that have been evident since the inception of compulsory mass schooling:

1. student learning;
2. teaching;
3. teacher professional learning;
4. educational leadership and administration; and,
5. educational research and evaluation.

Kemmis et al. (2014a, b) described these as the 'education complex' (as mentioned previously); and while these can be identified and noted at a broad level:

> On a smaller scale and in a simpler form, the way one practice shapes another and is shaped by other practices can be seen at a local level. Teachers may engage in a professional development program in response to some pedagogical need that arose in their classrooms, and they then change their pedagogy in response to their learning. In this case, the broad practices of teaching and professional development are symbiotically related, with each practice shaping and being shaped by the other; in this case, we might thus describe professional development as 'nested' within the Education Complex – the complex formed by the interdependence of these five educational practices. (Kemmis et al. 2014a, b, p. 51)

While this has a number of implications for education, perhaps the most significant is the need to consider education and educational development in more complex ways. It is an approach that does not diminish aspects of the conduct of education to unitary understandings, but renders it intricately complex, multidimensional, multifaceted and multilayered. Taking this into the realm of educational reform therefore, there is always a need for all five practices in the educational complex to be highlighted, critiqued and problematised if the development is to be effective and sustained. Often in recent educational initiatives (e.g., new curricula) emphasis is given to changing one aspect (e.g., teaching) but little attention is paid

to other related practices (e.g., teacher professional learning), and the resultant development is patchy and slow to be taken up. In this way, practice theories provide tools for the critical analysis of education, and point to considerations for change management as well as innovation arising from site specific variations to allow for local functionalities.

Educational Praxis and Practice

In contemporary understandings of educational practice, the notion of *praxis* and its connections to practice in educational institutions such as schools or Technical and Further Education (TAFE) has re-emerged as fundamental premise for theorising the formation, enactment and sustainability of quality educational practices (Edwards-Groves and Grootenboer 2015). Its origins have been traced back to Ancients such as Aristotle and have been influential in the thinking of philosophers like Hegel and Marx. A neo-Aristotelian perspective, for example, locates educational praxis within a practice-based perspective formed and differentiated by knowledges and dispositions. This perspective differentiates different classes of knowledges and dispositions (epistēmē, technē, phronésis, critical) (outlined in Table 1.1) that give rise to different kinds of actions (theoria, poiēsis, praxis, emancipatory) and ethics that have value and legitimacy in all human practices.

These differentiated knowledges and dispositions give rise to different kinds of educational actions shaped by ethics forming the theoretical, technical and practical dimensions and shape the conduct of practices as they happen in education sites like schools, TAFE and universities. Praxis grounded in an Aristotelian tradition thus understands praxis as 'conscious action that is morally committed, and oriented and informed by traditions in a field' (Kemmis and Smith 2008, p. 4); that is, practical and prudent action that– at the particular moment of enactment—aims for the good of those involved (the individual) and for the good for humankind (the collective) (Edwards-Groves and Grootenboer 2015).

It is a view also consistent with post-Hegelian/post-Marxian understandings of praxis as 'history-making action'; that is, as action with moral, social and political consequences—good or bad—for those involved in and affected by it. In *The German Ideology* (1845) Marx and Engels articulated their historical materialism, arguing that social formations, ideas, theories and consciousness emerge from human and collective social praxis, and that social action (praxis) makes history. *Educational praxis* therefore, may be understood in two ways:

> First, as educational action that is morally committed and informed by traditions in a field (right conduct), and second, as history-making educational action. (Kemmis et al. 2014a, b, p. 26)

Both are determined by the sociology at the time and are subject to change.

Table 1.1 Disposition–action couplings (adapted from Kemmis 2012, p. 4)

	Theoretical perspective	Technical perspective	Practical perspective	Critical–emancipatory perspective
Telos (Aim)	The attainment of knowledge or truth	The production or reproduction of something	Wise and prudent judgement activity	Overcoming irrationality, injustice, suffering, felt dissatisfactions
Disposition	*Epistēmē*: to seek the truth for its own sake	*Technē*: To act in a reasoned way according to the rules of a craft	*Phronēsis*: To act wisely, morally and justly	*Critical*: To act towards emancipation from irrationality, injustice, suffering, felt dissatisfactions
Action	*Theoria*: 'Contemplation', theoretical reasoning about the nature of things (justification)	*Poiētike*: 'Making' (or remaking) action, involving means-ends or instrumental reasoning to achieve a known objective or outcome	*Praxis*: 'Doing' action, morally informed action, involving practical reasoning about what it is wise, right and proper to do in a given situation	*Emancipatory*: Collective critical reflection and action to overcome irrationality, injustice, suffering, harm, unproductiveness or unsustainability

Critical Perspectives of Education and Pedagogy

Practices are never *just* practices. Practices are not neatly constructed activities, and participating in practices is never seamless or without some degree of contestation, struggle or tension. This is because those entering a practice of one kind or another (in education, in work, in organisations or in everyday social life) come to it as individuals with unique and diverse biographies. Added to this, as we suggested earlier, practices in their enactment are intricately complex, multidimensional, multifaceted and multilayered. Given these circumstances, a critical approach is needed to open up what may remain hidden, taken-for-granted or unchallenged about practices. In education and pedagogy, critical perspectives provide ways of interpreting and perhaps even untangling the everyday practical actions, discourses and relationships that otherwise might be left undiscovered. Therefore, practice theories as approaches for critical analysis of practices, recognise and account for

the diversity and contestation brought to bear in the actual realities and 'happen-ingness' of the enactment of practices.

The notion of criticality in education, raised by Kemmis (2012) as a key dis-position for practical action in Table 1.1, concerns the centrality of exposing the uncertainty, tenuousness and 'unforeseeability' in the enactment of practices. Thus, another crucial factor in understanding practice is the uncertainty of situations, and the unknowability of outcomes before they unfold. This is not to say that indi-viduals and groups cannot have wisdom about the possible consequences of par-ticular practices, but rather to appreciate that the outcomes are always influenced or impinged upon by a range of factors – many of which are outside the (immediate) 'control' of the practitioners, and so the uncertainty of outcomes requires forms of practice that can only be judged in the light of history. As will be clear throughout this chapter and book, this means that notions like *best practice* are at best a misnomer, and at worst a dangerous unrealisable shaper of teaching practice. Here is one important place where practice theories serve to provide critical perspectives of education—not to just serve as a descriptive tool but to provide philosophical and practical ways to interpret and critique pedagogical practice and to understand why certain prevailing and hegemonic discourses, like *best practice*, are not rational, sustainable or just. This is a key matter for education.

Practice theorists understand education to be shaped by many different and perhaps even conflicting ideologies, intellectual traditions and taken-for-granted practices. Therefore, education practices do not simply desire critical approaches to understanding the production, reproduction and transformation of practices, it demands it. It demands it because what is at stake is education practices that promote individual *and* social formation; that is, to act towards both acceptance and emancipation from irrationality, injustice, suffering and felt dissatisfactions. Hence, such an emancipatory disposition calls for solidarity, agency and empowerment through collective critical reflection and action to overcome irrationality, injustice, suffering, harm, unproductiveness or unsustainability. In this book, the utility of practice theories acknowledges the diversity of understandings and perspectives of practices, pedagogy and education. Also, they serve as tools to critique prevailing notions about education and pedagogy, and to bring about change towards more defensible practices. This also means that each of these understandings and per-spectives are not set in stone, but are contestable and ripe for further development and fine-grained critique; an enduring theme across the book.

Developing a Communicative Space Through a Symposium

This section will briefly outline the organisational details of the invited symposium that was the foundation for the development of this book. While we will provide a description of the event, the main purpose here is to outline how the symposium was established as a 'communicative space' (Habermas 1996) and understood as a form of academic practice.

The Symposium

The symposium was held in June 2015 in Brisbane, Australia over two days. It was organised and sponsored by Griffith University's *Griffith Institute of Education Research* (GIER) and supported by Charles Sturt University's *Research Institute of Professional Practice Learning and Education* (RIPPLE). It was made very clear that it was an *invited symposium*, not a conference, and so the programme required intense involvement from all the delegates in the whole programme. The 35 delegates came from across the world (from Australia, Sweden, Norway, Finland, the United Stated, New Zealand) and were invited because of their expertise and interest in practice theory and education, and the symposium deliberately and singularly focused on this topic. All of the delegates were involved in at least one of the roles of discussant, keynote paper presenter or paper presenter. The keynote papers and most paper presentations were subsequently developed as chapters for this volume.

Before the symposium all the presenters were required to provide a draft of their paper and these were distributed to all the delegates. It is important to note that this was not a small request of the writers/presenters, as they were asked to share papers that were underdeveloped and in draft form. This required a strong sense of trust and respect for the other delegates, but was also foundational to the practice of the symposium enabling genuine engagement with author's ideas. This was a key to establishing a true public sphere and open communicative space. Specifically, in each session more than 50% of the time was devoted to discussion, debate and deliberative conversations, and delegates were expected to read the draft papers before attending the presentations. In this way, the time allocated for each paper could be spent talking about the ideas and exploring the implications of practice theory in education. During each paper session, a volunteer would take notes and these were then provided to the author(s) so they could refine their writing, particularly for those becoming chapters in this book. Thus, the event was established (as a symposium, not a conference per se), and was designed as a dialogue with open unstructured space, but with faith and trust in the delegates to engage in academic practices of active listening, thoughtful reflection, and respectful discussion. Moreover, those spaces extended beyond the common venue for the symposium into social gatherings in small groups.

The symposium formed a space for communication. Although not all participants focused on education practices from the same intellectual traditions, international contexts, sites and disciplines, the symposium created spaces for dialogue, civility and action established around a common interest in *practice*. Given that from the outset members were not an established community of scholars where all shared common views, intellectual and historical traditions, beliefs or theories of practice, the symposium was designed to counter a narrow monologic professing of one's own perspective, warned against here by Murray (1960):

> Barbarism… threatens when [people] cease to talk together according to reasonable laws. There are laws of argument, the observance of which is imperative if discourse is to be civilized. Argument ceases to be civil when it is dominated by passion and prejudice; when its vocabulary becomes solipsist, premised on the theory that my insight is mine alone and cannot be shared; when dialogue gives way to a series of monologues; when the parties to the conversation cease to listen to one another, or hear only what they want to hear, or see the other's argument only through the screen of their own categories…. When things like this happen, [people] cannot be locked together in argument. Conversation becomes merely quarrelsome or querulous. Civility dies with the death of dialogue. (Murray 1960, p. 14)

Murray's caution was fundamental to the way the communicative space was framed around civility, openness, reflective and critical dialogical conversations. It was a fundamentally held belief of the organisers that from dialogue comes 'communicative action'. This happened through the 'enabling' practice arrangements that shaped the programme—that the symposium as a communicative space was non-hierarchical and an opportunity to inform our own and each other's practices. Therefore, contrary to Murray's closed representation of a monologic state, the symposium became a professional practice that invited possibility through conversation and argument, discussion and debate. So alongside practice theory, we turn to Kemmis et al. (2014a) rendering of the Jürgen Habermas's terms 'communicative action', 'communicative space' and the 'public sphere':

> *Communicative action* is what happens when people stop to consider what is happening in their situation, and strive for intersubjective agreement about the language and ideas they use, mutual understanding of one another's perspectives, and unforced consensus about what to do.Communicative action happens when a group collectively creates a *communicative space* in which all are free to express their points of view. The group also agrees to be disciplined about being inclusive in order to open up a *public sphere*.Public spheres are actual networks of communication amongst participants who volunteer to participate in changing practices that create a sense of unease – a legitimation deficit or crisis. Participants construct public spheres to create conditions to open up communicative space in order to engage in communicative action. (adapted from Kemmis et al. 2014a, pp. 34–35)

Some of the invited participants had a pre-existing sphere—the Pedagogy Education and Praxis network (PEP) which is an existing communicative space and this was extended to the symposium.

As noted previously, the intention was to create the symposium as a *communicative space* (Habermas 1996), and the structure and processes outlined above were all in line with this objective. To this end, the participants were taking leave of their normal academic work to stop for two days to focus on understanding educational practice and theory. Thus 'communicative action' was directed towards obtaining some sort of *intersubjective agreement* about our views, theories and ideas, and the language we employ. In striving for *intersubjective agreement,* four validity claims were used:

(a) Is it *comprehensible*?
(b) Is it *true* (in the sense of being accurate)?
(c) Is it *sincerely stated* (i.e., non-deceptive)? and,
(d) Is it *morally right and appropriate*?

There was also a sincere desire for *mutual understanding* about each other's perspectives and thoughts as an underpinning quality of a 'communicative space'. It is important to note that, in line with Habermas (1996), '*communicative action*' is guided by *communicative reason*—not the sort of 'argument' noted by Murray (1960) above, and this is distinct from '*strategic action*' which is guided by *functionalist reason*. Thus, the social space was created for genuine dialogue, and the end point was not predetermined or known - there was trust in the process once the practice architectures of the academic practice were established.

> Unlike success-oriented actors who mutually observe each other as one observes something in the objective world, persons acting communicatively encounter each other in a *situation* they at the same time constitute with their cooperatively negotiated interpretations. The intersubjectively shared space of a speech situation is disclosed when the participants enter interpersonal relationships by taking positions on mutual speech-act offers and assuming illocutionary obligations. Every encounter in which actors do not just observe each other but take a second-person attitude, reciprocally attributing communicative freedom to each other, unfolds in a linguistically constituted public space. This space stands open, in principle, for dialogue partners who are present as bystanders or who could come on the scene and join those present. (Habermas 1996, pp. 360–361)

Finally, because participants for the symposium were *invited* because of their interest and background in practice theory in education, the communicative space was not open to everyone and anyone (like a typical conference). Nevertheless, participation did presuppose communicative freedom to speak, to listen, to observe, and to moderate their participation vis-à-vis others in their group. This was not done by rules, but rather an expectation that their academic dialogical practices were undertaken as a form of academic praxis. That praxis was enabled by translanguaging using English as the medium of communication by native and non-English speakers to explain contextual interpretations illustrating different ways in which 'constitutional worlds' (Schatzki 1995) of the authors and normatised interrelated meanings. Translanguaging is described by Garcia (2009) as being 'multiple discursive practices in which bilinguals engage in order to make sense of their bilingual worlds' (p. 45) to construct and co-construct meanings. The dialogic interactions also furnished sociological reasonings (Garfinkel 1967).

Book Overview

After the symposium, several of the participants went on to develop and refine their ideas and the results are the chapters in this book. Here we will not give a brief summary of each chapter—they all have their own abstracts, but rather we provide an overview of the foci and themes of the book in a somewhat sequential manner.

In the first part of the book, Chaps. 2–5 provide a more general discussion of educational practice and these are not as empirically based as the later chapters. These four chapters are written by authors from a range of disciplines and fields including philosophy (Schatzki), education (Kemmis, Edwards-Groves, Lloyd,

Grootenboer, Hardy and Wilkinson), and occupational and professional practice (Hopwood and Billett). Chapters by Schatzki (Chap. 2) and Kemmis et al. (Chap. 3) both differently challenge cognitive views on learning in provocative, and perhaps controversial, social accounts of learning practices, knowledge and education. Billett (Chap. 4) examines the interplay between historical, cultural and personal forces that influence occupational or workplace learning practices. Hopwood (Chap. 5) takes up the socio-material approach of 'attuning' to examine the connectivities between practice, the body, and pedagogy within the field of nursing. With this in mind, each of the chapters stands alone as a coherent and interesting exploration of educational practice, but when read together their diversity provides different but intriguing insights into the broader understanding of practice—not a recipe or unified definition, but innovative ideas about the conduct of practice that challenge the reader to more critically reconsider what it means to participate in education practices. In these chapters the authors provide some ideas that may be seen as contestable and even controversial as they challenge some of the commonly accepted views of learning and practice.

In the second part of the book, Chaps. 6–13 focus more specifically on a particular case and/or educational practice. Specifically, Kemmis and Mahon (Chap. 6) and Hardy and Garrick (Chap. 7) problematise educational practice and/or praxis in universities, and in particular the practice architectures or conditions that enable and constrain teaching and research practices. Also focussing on tertiary education, Choy and Hodge in Chap. 8 examine Vocational Education and Training (VET) teaching practices in the ever changing political arrangements of this sector. Teaching practices are also the focus of the chapters by Edwards-Groves (Chap. 9) and Blue and Grootenboer (Chap. 10). Edwards-Groves examines the situatedness and local accomplishment of teaching and learning in a school classroom by provocatively bringing together two distinct approaches to investigating the sociality of classroom interaction practices. In their chapter Blue and Grootenboer draw on the theory of practice architectures to outline and discuss financial literacy education practices in a Canadian Aboriginal community. In the next chapter (Chap. 11), Mockler and Groundwater-Smith present the case for teacher research as a practice that underpins teaching as a 'knowledge-producing profession'. Finally, Wilkinson (Chap. 12) and Grootenboer, Edwards-Groves and Rönnerman (Chap. 13) write about the educational practice of leading, and in the process they provide a solid argument for a renewed emphasis on education, as opposed to just schooling. Together, these eight chapters (along with others in the book) highlight the diversity and contestations to present an underlying social justice perspective to education and pedagogy, thus promoting and arguing for educational *praxis*.

Conclusion

To many, the terms *theory* and *practice* have been regarded in polarity with one another. Indeed, each of these concepts bring with them their own vocabularies, empirical rationales and methods. Practice theories offer insight into production, reproduction, change and transformation in education in ways that lay bare critical and site ontological dimensions of the conduct of practices.

For the authors in this book, theorising how social beings (with their diverse motives and intentions within diverse contexts shaped by diverse conditions) practically and in situ make and transform the world in which they live requires theorising the nexus between theory and practice. These fundamental educational concepts therefore cannot be reduced to singular strands of thought that sit in parallel with one another. Rather the complexity of the cultural–discursive, material-economic and social-political dimensions of practices and practical action in the social world, demands that the theories set down to explain them offers insight that attends to the dialectic betweensocial structures and human agency in education as they are intricately interconnected or entangled with one another within dynamic interrelationships. As the chapters will show, practice theories bring delicately into concert the nuances, diversity and contestation that shape education as the authors untangle and extend traditional, long held views to collectively contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of pedagogy, practice and education.

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Chapter 2
Practices and Learning

Theodore Schatzki

Abstract This essay considers the contribution that practice theory makes to understand learning. It argues that practice theory does not foster a new conception of learning but instead holds insights into learning traditionally conceptualized as the acquisition of knowledge. Part one considers Lave and Wenger's idea that learning is coming to participate in practices. I argue that coming to participate in a practice amounts to acquiring the knowledges of different sorts needed to participate in it. As a result, learning qua coming to participate in practices is a version of the traditional conception that highlights practical knowledge and ties contents and processes of knowledge to the organization of social life as practices. Part two explores implications of the ontological centrality of practices for learning and illustrates how practice theory ties the contents and processes of knowledge to practices. After an interlude on the nature of knowledge, the conclusion argues that training à la Wittgenstein underlies the acquisition of knowledge, thus participation in practices, and is itself a form of learning.

Ideas on the nature of learning and education often reflect conceptions of human mind, life, or nature. The current essay explores learning less on the basis of such a conception than through a particular contemporary social ontology. It does so on the assumption that the basic features of social existence have implications for the nature of learning. The particular ontology concerned, moreover, is the general one identified with so-called practice theory. This ontology avers that human lives proceed through practices and that practices form fields, complexes, textures, or a plenum where social affairs transpire. The thought behind this essay, consequently, is that thinking of human life and social phenomena as taking place in practice fields or textures holds implications for understanding learning. And the particular question that I will consider is, What contribution does or can practice theory makes to this topic? My view is that practice theory does not foster a new con-

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ception of learning but instead holds insights regarding learning as standardly conceived.

This essay focuses on knowledge. I do not believe that the acquisition of knowledge alone constitutes learning. Learning also embraces the acquisition of such items as normative convictions, aesthetic judgment, feelings, and the power of reflection, as well as self-understandings, ways things matter, and character traits such as judiciousness, politeness, and obedience. Indeed, Lave and Packer (2008, p. 43) have something right when they tie learning to the "ontological transformation" of people—though not all transformations qualify as instances of learning (see Section "Knowledge and Learning"). Focusing on knowledge, however, does not deform my account. For the bearing of practice ontology on theorizing learning when learning is treated as embracing the acquisition of this fuller set of features parallels its bearing on theorizing learning qua the acquisition of knowledge. In addition, knowledge—in its full breadth—is central to these other acquisitions.

On Learning

Learning has been frequently conceptualized as the acquisition of knowledge, and the type of knowledge involved as propositional knowledge. Propositional knowledge is the knowledge that the sky is blue, that Helena loves Lilly, that my elbow hurts, that $e = mc^2$, and so on. This traditional view is sometimes called "cognitivism." A further feature of cognitivism is the idea that individual people are what learn: learning is the acquisition by individual people of propositional knowledge. It does not matter, moreover, whether propositional knowledge is discovered through personal investigation, transmitted via books or Internet, or handed along through interaction. All three processes instantiate the acquisition of knowledge and, thus, learning. This focus on the individual person has also historically been accompanied by the idea that mind—or, more recently, brain—is the locus of learning, the place where knowledge is accumulated. On this narrower view, learning can be seen as the internalization of propositions (or their encoding in the brain).

The long middle stretch of the twentieth-century witnessed a steep rise in interest in the practical side of human life; a development associated with such thinkers as Dewey, Heidegger, Wittgenstein, and Ryle. These thinkers believed that practice and practical understanding have priority over theory and propositional knowledge. In the eyes of they and their followers, learning is the acquisition, not just of propositional knowledge, but of skills, capacities, competences, and abilities, too. Someone who thinks that knowledge is (only) propositional knowledge will treat this development as expanding the scope of learning beyond knowledge. Others will view it as an internal development of the traditional conception since skills, capacities, competences, and abilities can be identified as a type of knowledge,

namely, practical knowledge or know-how.[1] Both interpretations presume that it is individual people who learn.

Before continuing, I should explain that in writing of the "acquisition" of knowledge I do not mean—regardless of what some conceptions and theories of learning as acquisition might have implied—that acquiring knowledge is a discrete, one-off event that does not admit of degrees, in which some "unit" of knowledge is fully acquired. This characterization might be true of the acquisition of some propositional knowledge, but it is decidedly not true of the acquisition of much know-how. Much know-how (e.g., knowing how to drive a car or knowing how to size up an interpersonal situation) is acquired over time and to different degrees by different individuals: some people are better than others at carrying off the accomplishment in question. In writing of acquisition, I also do not imply that learning is a thing, has a location (see Section "Knowledge and Learning"), or is independent of context.[2] Nor, as I also explain in this Section, is what is learned a thing or object (cf. Sfard 1998). What the concept of acquisition implies partly depends on the disciplinary background of the person using or encountering it. Anyone for whom the concept has unwanted implications is invited to substitute the notion of coming to know for it: In my view, to acquire knowledge is to come to know. A virtue of the expression "coming to know" is that it overtly allows for temporal passage, different degrees, and the bearing of context on what is learned. It also accommodates the role of learners' agency in learning (cf. Billet 2006).

With the advent of practice theory, a challenge arose to the traditional view that learning is the acquisition of knowledge. In their book, *Situated Learning: Legitimate Peripheral Participation*, Lave and Wenger (1991), on the basis of observations of apprenticeships the world over, reject both cognitivism and some forms of situated learning theory as adequate accounts of learning. These rejected outlooks concur that learning is a distinct and intermittent process, viz., the acquisition of knowledge by individuals. They differ in that situated learning theory alone emphasizes that this process occurs in situations, amid social arrangements, which affect it. According to Lave and Wenger (1991), by contrast, "…learning is not merely situated in practice—as if it were some independently reifiable process that just happened to be located somewhere; learning is an integral part of generative practice in the lived-in world." (Lave and Wenger 1991, p. 35) What they partly mean is that learning is a diffuse event (embracing the whole person) that

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[1]The idea that know-how is abilities has been regularly challenged ever since Ryle distinguished know-that from know-how. An influential recent large-scale assault is that of Stanley and Williamson (2001; see Stanley 2011), who claim that knowing how to X is a type of knowing-that, namely and roughly, knowing that a particular way to X is a way for the knower herself to X. Although addressing their analysis would lead my discussion away from its main focus, I should indicate that I affirm a counterargument that many philosophers have offered, viz., that, although Stanley and Williamson have grammatically identified a perfectly sensible (though in my opinion formulaically unusual) type of know-how, this type differs from another, pervasive type that equates know-how with ability and the like (see, e.g., Nöe 2005, Winch 2009).

[2]All these (alleged) features of acquisition have been put to me by Paul Hager, either in personal communication or in his written work (e.g., 2010).

continuously occurs in all practices: it is the transformation of people that accompanies their participation in practices. What one becomes by participating in practices, however, is, most generally stated, a participant in them (a member of a community of practice). So, learning is integral to practice ultimately because (1) learning is the process of coming to participate in practices (together with the subsequent evolution of participation) and (2) practices do not exist unless people participate in them. Stated in overt social theoretical terms, their claim is that the reproduction or perpetuation of (communities of) practice takes place through learning (cf. Lave and Wenger 1991, p. 55): for it is by virtue of people learning to participate that (communities of) practice acquire the participants—recruit the members (cf. Shove and Mika 2005)—through whose activities they remain in existence. Learning, as a result, does not just happen to take place in social practices: it is integral to them. It follows that the progression of any person's learning over time is the history of his or her participation in different practices (cf. Gherardi 2006, p. xxi; on the notion of personal/learning trajectories, see Lave 1997; Dreier 2003). In the apprenticeship practices studied by Lave and Wenger, the progression of learning takes the form of an advancement from peripheral to increasingly central participation. Finally, since for Lave and Wenger (and even more for Wenger 1998) a practice is the practice of a community, in participating in practices one becomes a member of communities. It follows that a key feature of the learning process is the acquisition of identities.[3] This idea makes clear that Lave and Wenger concur that it is individuals who learn: not only do individuals alone join communities, but learning implicates becoming a different person (e.g., 1991, p. 53).

Ideas parallel to those of Lave and Wenger abound in subsequent work. Wenger (1998), Gherardi (2006), and Kemmis et al. (2014) offer prominent examples. Kemmis et al. write that "learning is a process of initiation into practices" (p. 59; cf. Smeyers and Burbules 2006), or more colorfully, a process of being stirred into them. Learning is the process by which people become (and evolve as) practitioners of practices. Drawing on Wittgenstein, moreover, the authors analyze (pp. 62–63) having been initiated or stirred into practices as knowing how to go on in them (cf. Bourdieu's 1990 notion of practical sense). Appropriating Wittgenstein's notion of knowing how to go on makes something explicit that is present but not highlighted in Lave and Wenger's account, namely, that learning, understood as coming to participate in practices, bears a close connection to the acquisition of know-how.

According to Kemmis et al. (2014) moreover, a practice embraces activities (doings), language-games (sayings), and relations to people and entities in the world (relatings), all within the scope of a distinctive project. As a result, what a person learns in coming to know-how to go on in a practice is "participation in a language game, an activity, a way of relating, or a practice" (2014, p. 58). Although

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[3]The authors occasionally suggest that the acquisition and evolution of identities is the central feature of learning. Lave and Packer, for instance, write that "[k]nowledgeability, the narrow focus of epistemologically based theories of learning, is subsumed within the production and reproduction of identities…" (2008, p. 44, footnote 4). In my opinion, claims such as this conflate who one is (identity) with what one is (one's properties or features).

Kemmis et al. do not explicitly put the matter in the following way, what she learns is (1) how to perform or take up activities, language-games, and relatings, (2) when to do so, and (3) how these hang together within the ken of the organizing project. The authors claim that learning of this sort differs from the acquisition of knowledge, skills, and values. This claim is acceptable when knowledge, skills, and values are construed, respectively, as cognitive content (or concepts), psychomotor content, and affective content (2014, p. 93). The claim is not acceptable, however, if know-how either qualifies as a type of knowledge or implies possessing skills regarding what one is able to do. For knowing how to go on is itself know-how and, as suggested, umbrellas know-hows (and know-thats) regarding activity, language games, relatings, and their connections. These know-hows, moreover, can be described as skills—coming to know how to go on in a practice is becoming skilled at these things (cf. Dreyfus 1991).

Kemmis et al. (2014) acknowledge a connection between practical knowledge and learning qua coming to participate in practices. Both Gherardi and Wenger embrace the connection even more overtly (see also Elkjaer 2003). According to Gherardi (2008, p. 517), knowledge is the capacity to competently participate in practices. Knowledge and practice, moreover, are mutually constitutive: the capacity to competently participate is indispensable for practice and itself exists only within practice (2006, p. 230). Wenger (1998), meanwhile, analyzes communities of practice as collections of people who, through mutual engagement and the development of a shared repertoire of routines, tools, stories, gestures, actions, concepts, and the like, pursue a joint enterprise. His example is a group of insurance claims adjusters working in a San Francisco office who, through interaction and the development and perpetuation of shared routines, concepts, and ways of doing things, etc., pursue the enterprise of adjusting claims and do so in such a way as to make this enterprise "inhabitable." According to Wenger, communities such as this embrace regimes of competence: abilities to perform actions, to engage with others, to establish relationships, to use a shared repertoire, and to understand and take responsibility for the community's enterprise. Such regimes also include the possession of certain information and the mastery of certain skills in the abstract (Wenger 1998, pp. 136–137). Someone who has appropriated such a regime has higher order abilities to participate, to belong, and to negotiate meaning (1998, p. 226). Because, for Wenger, learning is mastering practices, learning requires taking on such regimes, becoming part of the communities involved, and, among other things, thenceforth reconciling these regimes of competence with experiences of ambiguity, challenge, novelty, discord, surprise, conflict, and the like (see also Wenger 2010). Learning thus involves both the acquisition and subsequent development of a regime of competence. Incidentally, because Wenger conceptualizes the social world as constellations of practice communities, his account is meant to be a general account of learning: *all* learning involves entering a community of practice, assuming its evolving regime of competence, and thereafter carrying on its practice while maintaining identities and negotiating meaning within it. Scientists, elementary school students and teachers, salespersons, hotel staff, sports team members, and lawyers—to mention just a few examples—all do this as much as insurance claims adjusters do.

Gherardi, Wenger, and Kemmis et al. overtly embrace something that is not fully fleshed out in Lave and Wenger, to wit, that the acquisition of know-how is integral to learning construed as coming to participate in practices. This latter realization, however, in turn suggests that it is mistaken to distinguish coming to participate from the gradual acquisition of abilities. It is true that through learning people come both to carry on additional practices and to carry on already mastered ones better or in new ways. But this fact does not imply that learning is coming to participate in practices *as opposed to* gradually acquiring the wherewithal that underwrites this. Indeed, the former *consists in* the latter: coming to participate in a practice amounts to acquiring the know-hows and other knowledges (the evolving regime of competence) required for participation. As Elkjaer (2003, p. 49) writes about the contribution pragmatism makes to understanding organizational learning, "social learning theory…inspired by pragmatism does not make a separation between coming to know about practice and coming to be a practitioner."

It is important to emphasize in this context that the range of know-hows required to participate in practices is usually quite broad. It includes abilities to perform simple actions, but also abilities to accomplish more sophisticated things such as size up a situation or maneuver in complex interpersonal situations. These abilities also encompass innovative responses and transformations, small and large, in practices. What's more, most know-hows of the sort I have in mind are not abilities to X simpliciter. Formulaically expanded, knowing how to X is knowing, within one or more particular practices, (1) how to X in a manner appropriate to current situations and, as the know-how becomes more developed, (2) when it is situationally appropriate to do so. Note that the ability to X in particular practices does not imply the ability to X in others. The know-hows that must be acquired also include those pertinent to whatever ways of being, or ways of practicing (Dall'Alba and Sandberg 2010), someone takes over in learning a practice; these modalities help individuate participants. Of course, taking over a way of being—like learning a practice—involves the acquisition of more than knowledge alone. It also encompasses the acquisition of habits, feelings, normative convictions, and self-understandings. All this complexity, however, does not imply that learning to participate in the practice is something beyond gradually acquiring those know-hows (and other items). Learning is the acquisition of the know-how and other knowledges and items that underwrite participation in practices. Learning to participate is a simultaneous higher order achievement. These claims also yield an alternative explanation of Lave and Wenger's thesis that learning is integral to practices: the acquisition of these know-hows by individuals is necessary for the practice to exist and continue existing (as well as internally evolve).

All the above theorists hold that learning is coming to participate in practices. It turns out, however, that this conception of learning is a version of the traditional conception that (1) highlights practical knowledge and (2) thinks of the knowledge, the acquisition of which is learning, as knowledge that is either needed for participation in practices or relevant to or available in particular practices. (As will be discussed in Section "Knowledge and Learning", the knowledge involved embraces know-how, propositional knowledge, and familiarity.) A key difference with the

traditional conception thus lies in the idea that the composition of the social world as practices delimits and also defines types of knowledge people acquire. Bourdieu offers a clear version of this idea. He claims that the social world is organized into fields of practice with whose objective structures the habitus of those acting in the fields is homologous. Learning, as a result, takes the form of acquiring this habitus, which is needed to operate in particular fields (cf. Hodkinson et al. 2008, p. 39). The more the habitus is acquired, the better someone can proceed in these fields, and in a greater range of situations.

Before proceeding, we need to take a step back and sideways. What does the notion of learning get at? A clue is found in the application of the concept to human evolution. Ever since Darwin, thinkers have debated the relative contributions that heredity and environment make to human behavior. In these debates, the notion of learning has been appropriated to characterize those behaviors and dimensions thereof whose existence can be attributed to environment (the concept of "learned behaviors"). In this context, the learning process over time involves the continual acquisition of new behaviors, which in turn implicates a continual enlargement of an organism's capacities, a multiplication of options and possibilities. Even though the idea of distinct gene and environment responsibility has been recently challenged,[4] it indicates something important about learning, namely, that learning is intimately tied to the augmentation of operability. Indeed, the acquisition of knowledge would not qualify as learning if it did not augment a person's range of maneuver.

Learning so characterized resembles Dewey's description of it as the "development and change of human beings" (Elkjaer 2000). Reference to change in this context can be misleading since not all change enlarges capacity (injury, for instance, can diminish it). Nonetheless, new capacities are continually acquired even as others atrophy or are lost. "Learning" designates the accumulation side of the change of capacities over time. Practice theories affirm this understanding of learning. Lave (1993, p. 17), for example, writes that for learning to be situated is for knowledgeability—meaning the flexible process of engagement with the world (1993, p. 13)—to be "routinely in a state of change rather than stasis, in the medium of socially, culturally, and historically ongoing systems of activity, involving people who are related in multiple and heterogeneous ways…" She thereby equates learning with the development of flexible engagement. More directly, Hager (2012, p. 30) writes that "…learning should be regarded as a growing capacity to act in flexible, constructive, and innovative ways suited to the demands of ever-changing circumstances." Augmentation of this capacity, or of Lave's knowledgeability, is learning.

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[4]This hoary debate has evolved with the emergence of a systems perspective that, challenging the idea that specific behaviors can be assigned this much to genes and that much to environment, argues that behavior is the holistic output of an initially largely genetically determined living system that develops throughout its lifetime according to system principles under the continuing input of DNA codes and, especially, environmental events. It is possible to advocate this systems perspective and still uphold the association of learned behavior and environment, labeling as "learned" all behaviors that the system produces once the initial large genetic contribution is supplanted by massive environmental input.

Learning Within Practices

Practice theory does not promulgate an alternative conception of learning. What difference, then, does recognizing the ontological significance of practices makes to the theory of learning?

One clear difference is that all learning is understood to occur within practices and in the fields, textures, complexes, or constellations of practices in which human lives and social affairs transpire (cf. Dreier 2009; Hodkinson et al. 2008, pp. 34, 37). The significance of this embeddedment is that the character of practices (and the nature of textures or complexes etc.) bears on the content and processes of learning. I just observed, for instance, that practice theories uphold a version of the traditional conception of learning according to which the knowledge people acquire is knowledge required for, relevant to, or available in particular practices. More generally, the idea that learning is beholden to practices implies that practice theory advocates some version of situated learning theory: the accumulation of capacities occurs *somewhere*, subject to features of where it takes place. What is learned and how it is learned are not independent of where and amid what the learning takes place.

Due to its situatedness, moreover, the learning that anyone undergoes takes a path (assuming that learning is a temporal event or process). The idea of a path or course of learning has both metaphorical and literal meanings. Learning takes a course in the metaphorical sense of forming a progression, different acquisition episodes overlapping or occurring successively and building on prior ones. (The sense in which learning builds on prior learning is a vexed one and cannot be considered here.) Learning also takes a course in the literal sense that its occurrences form a broken space-time path through bundles of practices and arrangements (cf. Dreier's notion of personal trajectories). The shape taken by any such path typically reflects opportunities to learn that are afforded at particular space-time locations in bundles: at or in particular workstations, stoves, classrooms, training fields, meeting rooms, and the like. Which learning opportunities are afforded at these locations depends on the practices that are carried on at them, for example, leather good production practices (apprenticeship), cooking practices, teaching practices, training practices, review practices, and the like. It also depends on the material arrangements involved—the laid out production facilities, kitchens, classrooms, training fields, etc.—as well as what, at any moment, happens to be going on at these locations. In principle, an opportunity to learn can be afforded anywhere depending on the bundles there and what is going on at a given moment.

The ideas that situations and bundles afford opportunities to learn and that a person's learning follows a course whose content and space-time shape are tied to these opportunities give rise to the propitious notion of a learning curriculum. In Lave and Wenger's words:

> …[t]he practice of the community creates the potential "curriculum" in the broadest sense —that which may be learned by newcomers with legitimate peripheral access. …A learning curriculum unfolds in opportunities for engagement…[and]…consists of situated opportunities…for the improvisational development of new practice. (1991, 92-3, 97)

Gherardi (2006) nicely focuses the idea in writing:

> the learning curriculum includes all the learning opportunities offered to individuals pursuing the same occupational work careers. These opportunities include the teaching curriculum during the schooling phase, the situated curriculum of the community…to which they belong during their occupational careers, and all the other formal and informal occasions of learning offered in the day-to-day lives of organizations. (p. 112)

I add only that this curriculum devolves from the bundles in which people proceed and depends on what the individuals involved have already learned: learning courses of the two sorts are mutually dependent.

The temporal character of learning exhibits a certain indefiniteness. Suppose that over the summer John learned to hit a mean forehand even though no particular moment can be identified as the moment when he acquired this know-how. Even though, moreover, the learning took place "over the summer," the process is composed of episodes that presumably coincide with all or some of the occasions when he played tennis. Precisely dating these episodes presents similar problems: was it throughout all or some of the sessions or only at some or all of the times he specifically hit forehands that he acquired the ability to hit a mean one? This example shows that although learning is always an achievement, the existence of which might be apparent ex post facto, the temporal coordinates of learning as a process or event are less well-defined. This indefiniteness extends to the learning curricula that are embedded in nexuses of practices and arrangements: they cannot be assigned definite spatial-temporal coordinates.

I suggested that practice theory ties the general contents and processes of learning to its conceptions of practice and of how practices link in wider textures, complexes, etc. Permit me to illustrate this claim in more detail through my own conception of practices. A practice is an open manifold of doings and sayings organized by rules, practical and general understandings, and prescribed or acceptable ends, projects, tasks, and emotions. This is as true of the practices in a leather workshop where a master and apprentices work, and those in a classroom where teachers and students interact, as of the practices carried out at a sports training facility where coaches and athletes toil and the cooking practices that are underway when learning occurs in the kitchen. Learning, and thus augmented operability, consists, first, in attaining greater facility and possible excellence in the performance of the sayings, doings, tasks, and projects that compose a practice. In the leather workshop, for example, the master has learned when he more adroitly articulates tips for the apprentices, when he voices encouragement to which his charges more energetically respond, when he divides labor among the apprentices more efficiently, and when the new apprentices he chooses pick up things more quickly. Correlatively, the apprentices have learned when they more effectively and quickly produce leather goods, when they ask fewer questions and fewer obvious ones, when they take initiative and become inventive, and when they begin to take pleasure in their work. In all the above mentioned sites of learning, moreover, greater operability in the form of more excellent performance can also encompass the more flexible and adroit use of the material entities and arrangements thereof with which the practices involved are bundled.

The apprentices and even the master have learned, second, when they become able to perform more of the actions that make up their practices. Although this is especially true of the apprentices, likewise of students, team members, and children, it also holds true of teachers, coaches, or parents as when, for example, they utilize a wider variety of teaching techniques. Similarly, learning can take the form of coming to be able to use and relate to more of the artifacts, organisms, and things in the settings where practices are carried out, and with arrangements of which practices are bundled.

Learning has occurred, third, when people better choose what to do in a practice. This can involve reasoning better or making choices that are better informed by the state of the world. Here, learning embraces enhanced clairvoyance and carries greater likelihood of success or satisfaction. The master's comments evince learning, for instance, when they rest on greater awareness of her apprentices' experiences and weaknesses. Similar comments hold when the coach organizes the summer training camp regimen out of an understanding of his player's vacation habits, when a teacher chooses or changes class exercises in concert with the mood and preparation of the students, and when a parent holds back from stating the moral in a teaching moment and allows the child to draw conclusions for itself.

Yet again, learning, and thus augmented operability, has occurred when a person becomes capable of performing a greater range of bodily doings and sayings in carrying out intentional actions (the actions that make sense to her to do; see Schatzki 2010, Chap. 3). Sometimes this development is a matter of mastering additional techniques, for instance, additional ways of dying leather or stitching soles or the use of new presentation media. At other times, it is simply a matter of realizing that there are further, usually already mastered bodily doings through which particular actions can be carried out, for instance, laying out fabric patterns, lifting heavy objects, turning screwdrivers, or rolling out pie crusts. Learning has likewise occurred when a person is capable of flexibly coping with rules—obeying them, interpreting them, ignoring them, and taking them into account. And yet another form of learning is a person becoming better able to articulate general understandings that imbue practices she carries on, thereby enabling these practices to proceed more clairvoyantly, focusedly, and confidently (cf. Taylor 1985). Examples of such understandings are of the teaching profession as calling; of a sports team as unified and pulling together; of the role of coach as mentor, teacher, and parent; of a parents' duty to help make their children better able to cope with the world; and of the authority of masters and coordinated deference of apprentices.

A final prominent form of learning concerns normativity. The normative structure of a practice is never set in stone. Not only must rules (formulated prescriptions and admonishments) be interpreted, but which ends, projects, and tasks are acceptable or prescribed is subject to disputation and to evolution in the face of disputation and changing circumstances. Disputation of this sort inhabits almost all practices, including those carried out in schools, in apprentice workshops, at sports facilities, and at home when teaching moments occur. The better a person becomes at stating and defending what rules call for and what is acceptable or prescribed, the larger becomes the contribution she can make to the determination of the

normativity that governs the practices she carries on. Since humans are so constructed as to be sensitive and responsive to normativity (which is not to say they always or even regularly act in accordance with it), the better she can do this the more she can contribute to the evolution of these practices.

All the above forms of learning are defined by reference to the composition of bundles. Their enumeration illustrates the point that practice theory offers accounts of how the structure of the social world as practices delimits and defines the knowledges (and other items), the acquisition of which constitute learning. Of course, knowledge that is pertinent to a given practice need not be acquired in that practice. A teacher, for example, might learn of a useful teaching technique at a workshop. The acquisition of propositional knowledge is also involved in learning of the above sorts, and propositional knowledge is often picked up in bundles different from those in which it subserves action. Beyond this, many learned ways of being or acting are both picked up through and pertinent to participation in multiple practices. For example, one can learn, among a thousand other things, to lead, to love, to calm down, and to listen, as well as to organize, to govern, and to design. These ways of being and acting are picked up in and play out across multiple practices and bundles: one acquires them in living through different situations and bundles, and carrying them out requires performing different actions in different situations. Learning to love, for instance, requires doing what it takes to come to perform certain actions in particular ways at the right times in the various practices in which one interacts with the other or through which one bears on his or her life. Picking up this ability requires considerable experience of different situations in different bundles. Incidentally, I do not mean to imply that learning to love, lead, calm down, or organize is nothing more than acquiring an ability to perform certain actions appropriately. Powers of reasoning and particular thoughts and feelings are also involved.

Sophisticated abilities such as these can be called "higher order." For their exercise rests on the exercise of other abilities, which can be dubbed "lower order." The ability to love, for instance, rests on abilities to appreciate, empathize, listen, and please, etc. What's more, most lower level abilities (a few mental abilities are the exception) rely on baseline bodily abilities to perform the doings and sayings through which—in this example—acts of empathy, listening, pleasing, and compromise are carried out (see Schatzki 2010, Chap. 3 on this hierarchy). Incidentally, this terminology reflects Christopher Winch's (2013) distinction between first and second order know-how. For Winch, first order abilities are "skills": abilities to perform "relatively restricted types of task typically, but not exclusively, requiring hand-eye co-ordination and/or manual dexterity. Examples would be: planing a piece of wood, drawing a bow, baking a cake, writing a letter." (2013, p. 283) Note that the first two of these abilities are of the baseline bodily sort. This is not true of baking a cake or writing a letter, which rest on such baseline abilities. By contrast, a second order ability for Winch is any ability, the exercise of which consists in performing different actions in different situations. Because Winch draws his distinction in the context of a discussion of professional and vocational education, the examples he gives of second order abilities mostly involve linking and connecting

nexuses of bundles (e.g., the abilities to plan, control, coordinate, and communicate). In his hands, as a result, first order abilities concern particular manual actions, whereas second-order ones concern organization, governance, and design and require the performance of different actions in different situations.

As discussed, Lave and Wenger argue that because (1) learning is coming to participate in practices and (2) practices exist only if learned, learning is integral to practices.[5] I affirm that learning is integral to practices in the sense that practices must be learned by participants, though what they learn is not the practices as such but how to go on in them. I also affirm that learning occurs in all practices. Coming to more excellently carry out a practice's actions, to perform a greater variety of such actions, to more adroitly and flexibly use the material entities and arrangements thereof bundled with the practice, to more skillfully articulate and contribute to the determination of normativity and to have more ways of carrying out particular actions or coping with rules—these processes and results can transpire in all practices and bundles and also over the course of people participating in multiple ones. Learning can also arise unplanned and undesigned in any practice or bundle, as what Dreier (2009, p. 89), following Holzkamp, calls "concomitant" learning: learning that is not aimed at in what people do but that happens along the way.

At the same time, there exist repeated activities, which can be called "learning activities," that more directly—intuitively and intentionally—contribute to people being able to perform other activities or to carry out particular practices. Learning arithmetic, for example, involves performing specific exercises and following particular techniques. What students learn in carrying out these exercises and techniques subsequently helps them participate in the many practices that employ arithmetic (practices of accounting, grant-getting, illegal commerce, playground sports etc.). Learning arithmetic is also an early stage in a trajectory leading to participation in the practices of higher mathematics.

Some learning activities, furthermore, are such that in performing them one carries on the practice one is learning. When someone apprentices or learns sports, for example, learning activities such as cutting and dying leather, trying your hand making the sauce, taking lessons, and playing in a youth match can be components of the practices learned. This is not true of other learning activities. Kemmis et al. (2014, p. 62) define learning practices as practices whose "project or purpose is *to come to know* how to go on in" substantive practices. Learning practices are designed to bring substantive practices into being (2014, p. 100). Examples include attentively listening, dividing into groups, working collaboratively, reporting back to a class, reflecting on learning, using a whiteboard, reading books, and referring to wall charts with vocabulary written on them. All these practices are learning activities in the above sense. (Some of them might also be what I (1996, pp. 91–96)

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[5]The practice theories that Lave and Wenger affirm (those of Bourdieu and Giddens) treat practices as a, or the, central component of the social. As a result—paraphrasing Wenger (1998, p. 15)—the thesis that learning is integral to practices makes a practice-based theory of learning close to a "learning-based theory of the social order." I believe that practice theories generally can endorse this idea.

call "dispersed practices.") They are not, however, part of the substantive practices that are learned by carrying them out. The flip side of this independence is that a learning practice of Kemmis et al.'s (2014) sort, unlike a learning activity that is part of the practice learned, hardly ever subserves participation in a particular substantive practice. Rather, it underwrites participation in diverse practices and only in particular situations underwrite the learning of a particular one. Attentive listening, for instance, occurs in varied organized, concomitant, and impromptu learning situations in diverse bundles and contributes to people participating in many practices. This is equally true of such learning activities as reading books, reporting back, working collaboratively, and learning arithmetic: the contributions they make to the forms of learning mentioned in this section depend on circumstances and are indefinitely varied.

In short, learning is at once integral to practices, a feature of practices generally, and by design the business of particular activities or practices.

Knowledge and Learning

Learning is closely tied to augmented operability. Things of very different sorts, however, augment operability. For instance, changes in the world, including in the material arrangements with which practices are bundled, can have this effect. The acquisition of a new tool augments the operability of those who have access to and know how to use it. But neither the acquisition of the tool nor the resulting augmentation of operability implies that learning has occurred. The weather, moreover, can augment operability. A sunny day, for instance, facilitates a trip to the beach. More generally, changes in the weather, like changes in material arrangements and the physical world at large, augment operability in some ways and diminish it in others. None of these changes, however, qualify as learning.

Operability is likewise augmented through the invention, innovation, or design of new tools, new material setups, new techniques, new ways of achieving ends, even new actions and practices. People, moreover, certainly learn through the invention, innovation, and design of such things. Learning and invention/creation, however, are analytically distinct processes or results. When, for example, someone invents a new food dish, he or she might learn something about combining spices or preparing sauces in the process. He or she will also presumably learn how to make the dish. In this case learning occurs through invention/creation, but the learning and the invention/creation are different things. After all, if the chef subsequently forgets how to make the dish, this does not negate the creation. Learning involves *acquiring* or *appropriating* something; even if the acquisition transpires via creation, the learning and creating are distinct.

Learning has occurred when augmented operability arises from changes in people as opposed to changes in the world or innovation and invention as such. Again, not just any change in people counts. The physical development of a human being during childhood and adolescence augments that individual's operability. But

physical development is not learning. The traditional conception of learning had something right in holding that the relevant changes are acquisitions of knowledge (or of normative conviction, aesthetic judgment, habits, etc.). As we will see in the next section, however, this is not the whole story.

What I just wrote implies that changes in knowledge are changes in people. Changes in knowledge are not in people as changes in their brains and nervous or skeletal-muscular systems are. Knowledge is not a "collection of real entities, located in heads." (Lave 1993, p. 12) Nor does knowledge or changes therein reside in a peculiar sort of nonphysical internal space or stage (the space of mind or consciousness), a kind of inner depository for propositional contents (or for acts of entertaining them). Indeed, knowledge is not a state of mind in the way states of consciousness are (see Schatzki 1996, Chap. 2). Rather, changes in knowledge are changes in people in the sense that knowledge and changes therein are *attributed* to people, for example, "After watching the news he knew that the weather would be bad," "Over time she accumulated great knowledge." Knowledge is a property or possession of *people*, not of minds or brains (cf. Strawson 1959). Of course, knowledge is also attributed to entities other than people, including higher mammals, pets, groups, and organizations (as well as computers and functionally defined elements or units of the brain). Attributions to mammals and pets are probably best viewed on analogy with attributions to people. Attributions to groups and organizations, by contrast, derive from attributions to persons, though the exact nature of this relationship is disputed and will not be examined presently. The current topic is human, not group or organizational, learning.

A number of authors of a practice persuasion deny that knowledge is a property of people. They do this partly in the belief that the denial undercuts the acquisition conception of knowledge (cf. Sfard 1998). In place of the idea that knowledge is a property of people, Lave and Wenger write (1991, p. 122) that knowledge is "located in relations among practitioners, their practice, the artifacts of their practice, and the social organization and political economy of communities of practice." Lave later (1993, p. 9) writes that knowing (and learning) is "distributed throughout the complex structure of persons-acting-in settings…in the relations among…" individuals, tasks, tools, and environment. Similarly, Gherardi (2009, p. 354) writes that knowledge is an activity "distributed between humans and nonhumans. Objects, tools, and artifacts embody knowledge." Statements such as these conflate two things: a misguided attempt to identify an alternative location for knowledge and the correct observation that knowledge is mediated. These authors essay to avoid a Cartesian conception of knowledge as something residing in an interior space. As a result, they seek an *alternative* location for it, and in this search their post Cartesian intuitions direct them to the situatedness of human activity in the world (and a preference for the word "knowing" over "knowledge"). However, the better lesson to learn from the illusions of Cartesian interiority is that knowledge does not have a location at all, at least none in any usual sense of location. Hence, skirting the Cartesian conception of interior space does not require abandoning the idea that knowledge is a feature or possession of people. Meanwhile, it is true, as Gherardi especially has emphasized that knowledge is meditated—by the body, by

social interactions, by language, by physical context, and by relations between people and things (2006, pp. 228–229; 2008, p. 521). Mediatedness, however, does not imply that knowledge is located in, a property of, the nexus formed by bodies, interactions, language, and physical world. Rather, it indicates that both the acquisition and attribution of knowledge depend on facts about bodies, interactions, language, and the physical world.

There are three sorts of knowledge, the acquisition or change of which qualifies as learning.[6] The first two of these have already featured in my discussion. Practices and practice-arrangement bundles differ in the mixes of knowledges of these three types that typically characterize learning in them.

The first sort of knowledge is know-how. When one acquires know-how one learns to X. As discussed, know-how can pertain to the actions, tasks, and projects that compose a practice, to using the artifacts, things, and arrangements thereof with which the practice is bundled, to circumscribing and effectively determining the normativity that delimits the practice, to interacting with people and organisms, to switching among practices and bundles, to carrying out actions in multiple bundles, to organizing, linking, or governing bundles, and so on. Notice that the identity of know-hows tracks concepts of action, since know-how is knowing how to X, the range of distinguishable know-hows is delimited by the available range of action concepts. For reasons I will not explore presently, the relevant range is those available to participants in the practices and bundles involved (cf. Winch 2013, p. 284).

The second type of knowledge is knowing that (propositional knowledge). When one acquires knowledge that X one learns that X. The acquisition of propositional knowledge bears on action because what makes sense to people to do partly rests on what they know (or believe) about the world, that is, on the states of affairs given which now doing X (in this situation) makes sense (see Schatzki 2010, Chap. 3). Grasping others' knowledge and beliefs is thus an important ingredient in understanding their actions. Indeed, all understanding of others, as well as all participation in and interaction within particular bundles, rests on shared propositional knowledge. Although I do not want to pursue the topic presently, it is worth opining that, far from know-how reducing to know-that, the reduction, or more cautiously stated, the priority, if anything, favors know-how. For just as what it is to know how to X is to have the ability—the skills and competences—to X, what it is to know that Y is to be able to say or to think that Y and to be able to act on the basis of that Y. As Lave (1993, p. 8) writes, "Acquisition of knowledge is not a simple matter of taking in knowledge." Knowing that Y instead requires being able to do things. Kemmis et al. (2014, p. 58) say something similar in writing that "all of what is conventionally called knowledge arises from, recalls, anticipates, and returns to its

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[6]Wittgenstein strongly suggests (1958, §78) the existence of three kinds of knowledge when he writes: "Compare knowing and saying: how many metres high Mont Blanc is—how the word "game" is used—how a clarinet sounds. Someone who is surprised that one can know something and not be able to say it is perhaps thinking of a case like the first. Certainly not of one like the third.

use in practices." I acknowledge, however, that defending this thesis requires addressing prominent arguments to the contrary.

The third sort of knowledge, acquisition of which constitutes learning, is acquaintance. John Dewey writes (1964):

> Again we cannot overlook the importance for educational purposes of the close and intimate acquaintance got with nature at first hand, with real things and materials, with the actual processes of their manipulation, and the knowledge of their social necessities and uses….The educative forces of the domestic spinning and weaving, of the sawmill, the gristmill, the cooper shop, and blacksmith forge, were continuously operative.No number of object-lessons, got up as object-lessons for the sake of giving information, can afford even the shadow of a substitute for acquaintance with the plants and animals of the farm and garden acquired through actual living among them and caring for them. (p. 298)

Acquaintance is familiarity with things perceived or dealt with in experience. Examples of its objects are the sound of an instrument, the smell of frying garlic, the feel of an icy ski slope, the recalcitrance of material, and animal behavior. Further examples are—following Wittgenstein's analysis of the topic—other people's actions, emotions, and even states of consciousness (such as being in pain). This type of knowledge can be dubbed "knowing X." When one acquires acquaintance with X one learns X.

Familiarity can be compared with the idea of direct experiential knowledge that was a favorite of empiricists from Hume to Russell. For acquaintance with something presumes access to it and consists of gaining knowledge of it through encounters with it. The empiricists, however, ignored that such encounters rest on considerable stage setting. The encounters that a person can and does have depend on multifarious facts—about the experiencer, about the practices he or she carries on, and about the world. It is only on the background of cooking practices, olfactory physiology, and the chemical properties of garlic, for instance, that the smell of frying garlic can be accessed and apprehended. In this way, people, nexuses/constellations of practice, and the physical world form the background on which people enjoy access to and commerce with things of the world.

The empiricists also overlooked that encountering entities does not take place in perception alone. Acquaintance also results from intervention in the world and interaction with the things in it. Indeed, a person acquires acquaintance through the entirety of her being-in-the-world. It is through perception, feeling, and interaction in tandem that a person becomes acquainted with such things as emotions, the materiality of things, skiing technique, and animal behavior. Thus, acquaintance is not like the direct perceptual knowledge favored by empiricists, though it does result from perceiving and dealing with entities themselves. Anyone worried about the cogency of the idea of perceiving and dealing with things themselves should keep in mind the straightforward contrast between things encountered in action and perception and matters figured out, inferred, investigated, and so on, on the basis, among other things, of things encountered.

Knowledge of differs from knowledge that because knowledge that cannot be reliably substituted for it. (This claim presumes that all propositional knowledge can be formulated.) It is true that a person who has knowledge of something usually

knows that he has knowledge of it. A person, for instance, who knows the sound of a bassoon, the demeanor of depression, the recalcitrance of marble, or how animals act usually knows that he has knowledge of the sound, the demeanor, the recalcitrance, or the behavior. He might also know that that is a bassoon, that Hilda is depressed, that the direction of his chisel needs to be changed, and that the animals are worried. In this way, acquaintance always implicates propositional knowledge. Even when someone can not identify the sound, the mood, the resistance, or what's up with the animals, he knows that he is experiencing a sound, a mood, some material, or unusual behavior. These sorts of things, however, might be most or even all he can put into words about the matter. He might not be able to say much or anything about how a bassoon sounds, how depressed people carry themselves, the recalcitrance of the material, or the worried behavior. So whatever he can say, whatever propositional knowledge he does possess, likely fails to be equivalent to his acquaintance. German and French mark the difference between knowing that X and knowing Y with the words *Wissen* and *Kenntnis* and *savoir* and *connaissance*, respectively. Note that among the entities with which a person can be familiar are the sayings, doings, actions, people, material entities, and arrangements thereof that help compose bundles.

I suspect, just like propositional knowledge, knowledge of boils down to know-how. Familiarity with, say, the behavior of farm animals consists partly in knowing that X and Y about them, that is, in being able to say and think that X and Y and being able to act toward them on this basis. It also consists in being able to anticipate their behavior, to placate them, to deal with emergencies, and so on. Familiarity, in other words, cashes out as a battery of abilities.

Learning is coming to know how to X, that Y, and Z. It is obvious but bears repeating that knowledges of these sorts that are acquired in one bundle can be pertinent to acting in other bundles. An example I gave in the previous section is knowing how to do arithmetic, which finds application in many bundles. Similarly, a wide variety of knowledge that and of is transferable. The knowledge that credit cards can be used like money is pertinent to many practices, just as acquaintance with fear, joy, depression, and other emotions and moods can bear on proceeding in diverse bundles.

Training

Learning always happens under some condition or other. It sometimes happens under conditions of no notable general sort but simply as a concomitant of activity and perception. Among the significant sorts of conditions under which it occurs is teaching. Teaching is significant because the organized or informal activities that compose it aim specifically to effect learning. Indeed, learning is often paired conceptually and rhetorically with teaching on the presumption that especially important learning takes place under the aegis of teaching. The learning that supposedly results from teaching is so valued that teachers and teaching organizations endlessly revise teaching bundles.

Another condition under which people are intended to learn is training. Training is usually distinguished from teaching and education, but there is no unanimity about what it is. Some thinkers see training as something done to animals and to humans by way of analogy to this. The juxtaposition of circus animal training and human toilet training reveals both similarities and differences in training so conceived. Other thinkers treat training as little as possible as a matter of conditioning. The present section does not analyze training comprehensively. It simply describes a type of training that underlies learning and that jibes well with a practice theory approach to the latter.

This notion is found in Wittgenstein's use of the German word *Abrichten*, which is standardly translated as "training" and finds particular application to animals. Wittgenstein (1958, §6) writes, regarding children who are just learning to talk, that "[h]ere the teaching of language is not explaining, but training." "Here" refers to a situation in which the child (1) learns simple referential connections between language and the world such as the word "slab" referring to slabs and the word "five" referring to five items of some countable sort such as slabs or pillars and (2) learns to respond to such commands as "Five slabs" by gathering and handing over five slabs (to a builder). Grasping that "slab" refers to slabs and "five" to five objects of whatever sort is at issue is a matter of training: there is no explanation of, no reasons that can be given for, these referential connections. The child must simply fall in line with using the words these ways. Once, moreover, the child has achieved this, it simply goes on using the words thus, without justificatory explanations or reasons.

In other contexts, Wittgenstein uses the word "reaction" to denote going on in a certain way without reasons ("spontaneously"). Reactions appertain to more than the use of particular words. They also occur, for example, when solving simple mathematical formula such as $y = x^2$ (Wittgenstein 1958, §189), following simple rules (§198), and obeying orders. "Following a rule is analogous to obeying an order. One is trained to do so, and one reacts to an order in a particular way." (§206) That people can be trained to react to certain things in the same ways is a fact about human beings, part of their natural history. "[I]if we teach a human being such-and-such a technique by means of examples, – that he then proceeds like *this* and not like *that* in a particular case…and thus that this and not that is the "natural" continuation for him: that of itself is an extremely important fact of nature. (Wittgenstein 1967, §355; emphasis in original). Wittgenstein was particularly interested in how reactions—inborn or acquired—enable language use. Reactions, however, secure nonlinguistic behavior as well. For example, two of Wittgenstein's more memorable examples of reaction are (1) using a chart that associates items of one sort, listed in a column, with items of another sort, listed in a parallel column, by looking horizontally to see what is associated in the right column with a given item in the left column (1958, §86) and (2) going in the direction in which a signpost points (§85). Reactions such as these pervade human life and form anchors around which motivated and complex behaviors can develop, including practices and the bundles practices form with arrangements. Notice that training of this sort yields a spontaneity that can be pertinent to indefinitely many practices or bundles;

this contrasts with much that is called "training" (e.g., vocational training, sports training, musical training) which prepares people for participating in specific practices or bundles. I should add that reactions are not just an inborn or trained spontaneity that enables children to learn more complex activities and is subsequently shed or disappears into the more complex activities. Reactions, once acquired, continue to occur. Adults, for instance, still go in the direction of signposts, add two in response to "+2," and cry "Ouch" when in pain.

Reactions and, thus, training are central to learning. They make possible the acquisition of knowledge (of all three sorts) as well as participation in practices. A human being who was unable to acquire reactions could not gain knowledge or participate in practices. The acquisition of reactions through training is also itself a form of learning (Wittgenstein even describes training as a form of education; 1958, §441). This is clear when learning is closely tied to augmented operability.

A person who undergoes training comes to carry out particular bodily doings and sayings as reactions to particular events. Training thus involves a regimentation of the body. In some sense, moreover, the bodily regimentation achieved in training is the very aim of the training. In this, it compares to the types of training that Foucault (1979) made prominent under the label "discipline," which seek to shape the form, appearance, and movement of human bodies. Another profound form of bodily regimentation is what William McNeill (1995) calls muscular bonding. McNeill argues that what underlies human society and the development of language is shared rhythmic movement of the sorts found in community dance and military drill among other activities. For, training in these movements so alters human emotion and feeling as to found—both historically and contemporaneously—social solidarity. Muscular bonding is a bodily resultant of particular practice-arrangement bundles. I mention it to complement Wittgenstein's equally profound notion of training as the calibration of reactivity. Together, shared rhythmical bodily movement and calibrated bodily reactivity underlie social life as we know it.

Conclusion

Upholding practice theory does not require jettisoning the traditional conception of learning and adopting a new conception that defines learning as coming to participate in practices. Practices are composed of actions, for which the traditional conception—duly expanded to include, indeed, highlight practical knowledge—is well suited. Learning, as a result, can be understood as the acquisition of the epistemic (and other) wherewithal that makes participation in practices possible. What the ontology of practice theory provides to students of learning is what it provides to students of any aspect of social life, namely, a conception of the site where their topics of concern play out: learning, like life itself, transpires in the plenum of practices. The import of this conception for theorizing learning is that the composition of the social world as practices organizes the analysis of the knowledge whose acquisition is learning. In addition, I suggested that, because reactions

underwrite the acquisition of knowledge, the traditional conception of learning must expand to include their acquisition. I also indulged myself a little at the end of the essay, turning away from practice theory and speculating that, combined, Wittgenstein and McNeill provide a profound picture of the bodily understory of practices and social organization. As Bourdieu's views about the role of educating the body in support of and as a means of executing the homologous organization of habitus and field suggest, this picture jibes smoothly with practice approaches.[7]

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Chapter 3
Learning as Being 'Stirred In' to Practices

**Stephen Kemmis, Christine Edwards-Groves, Annemaree Lloyd,
Peter Grootenboer, Ian Hardy and Jane Wilkinson**

Abstract This chapter provides a 'societist' (Schatzki in Philos Soc Sci 33(2):174–202, 2003) account of 'learning' using the theory of 'practice architectures' (Kemmis and Grootenboer in Situating praxis in practice: Practice architectures and the cultural, social and material conditions for practice. *Enabling praxis: Challenges for education*. Sense, Rotterdam, pp. 37–62, 2008; Kemmis et al. in *Changing education, changing practices*. Springer Education, Singapore, 2014). Drawing on observations of classrooms, schools and a school district, the authors argue, first, that people 'learn' practices, not only 'knowledge', 'concepts' or 'values', for example. They suggest that learning a practice entails entering—joining in—the projects and the kinds of sayings, doings and relatings characteristic of different practices. The metaphor that learning involves being 'stirred in' to practices conveys the motion and dynamism of *becoming* a practitioner of a practice of one kind of another, like learning or teaching. Being stirred into practices sug-

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gests an account of 'learning' that elucidates the process, activity and sociality of learning as a practice.

In their book *Changing Practices, Changing Education*, Kemmis et al. (2014) controversially proposed that:

> learning is *always* and *only* a process of being stirred into practices, even when a learner is learning alone or from participation with others in shared activities. We learn not only knowledge, embodied in our minds, bodies and feelings, but also how to interact with others and the world; our learning is not only epistemologically secured (as cognitive knowledge) but also *interactionally secured* in sayings, doings and relatings that take place amid the cultural-discursive, material-economic and social-political arrangements that pertain in the settings we inhabit. Our learning is bigger than us; it always positions and orients us in a shared, three-dimensional—semantic, material and social—world. (p. 59; emphases original)

This view is provocative in departing from a psychological view of learning as a process by which learners acquire knowledge, for example by the transmission of knowledge from a person or text to another person. It aims to complement a psychological view, first, with a 'societist' (Schatzki 2002) view of learning as secured in interactions between a learner and other people and things in the world; and, second, with an ontological perspective that focuses less on the *epistemological* concern about the *knowledge* people acquire than on the changes that can be observed in their activities and practices.

In *Changing Practices, Changing Education*, Kemmis et al. (2014) report on their multi-year study in several Australian primary schools, in which they observed learners (students and teachers) participating in classroom or professional development projects and activities in ways that revealed that nothing was being 'transmitted' in the learning they observed. In fact, what was observed, rather, was people coming to participate in language games, activities and practices shaped by the arrangements the learners encountered in the semantic, material and social dimensions of the world they inhabited in lessons or in professional development activities. Whilst in many ways, these observations broadly align with well-described socio-cultural perspectives on learning like that of Vygotsky (Wertsch 1985), Kemmis et al. (2014) concluded that learning is interactionally secured in the process

> … through which people, perhaps tentatively or as novices, enter the sayings, doings and relatings that hang together in the project of a practice and, by practising, explore the enablements of and constraints on interaction characteristic of that practice, and become more adept in interacting with others and with objects in the world through it. (p. 59)

In this sense, then, this is a view that throws into doubt some conventional views about 'learning' and 'knowledge'. By taking a particular kind of practice perspective, it offers a view of learning as a social practice, not solely as a psychological process.

From observations of students participating in their lessons and teachers participating in their professional development, the metaphor of being '*stirred in*' (as described by Kemmis et al. 2014, pp. 56–61) seems aptly to convey the motion and dynamism of becoming a practitioner of a practice of one kind or another. Being stirred into practices suggests an account of 'learning' that elucidates the process,

activity and sociality associated with coming to do something new. As Kemmis et al. suggested, people encountering and engaging a new topic or field of practice (sometimes tentatively and with difficulty) can be observed being drawn in or stirred into the practice not only by a teacher or leader but on their own volition and by others with whom they participate. In this sense, learning in many social, educational and organisational settings can be thought of as a process of co-production that occurs through co-participation with others and the world in the unfolding of the practice as it happens in physical space-time. Kemmis et al. (2014) thus bring the ideas of 'learning' and 'practising' together. On this account, it seems to us that the reason 'learning' and 'practising' *appear* to be distinct is that for many decades learning has been discussed as if (a) learning were *a process separate from* the practice of doing something (including 'knowing' something and thus being able to participate in language games about that topic), and as if (b) the '*product*' of learning (usually regarded as 'knowledge' or 'concepts' or 'values') could be regarded as having a relatively enduring (in short or long term memory) existence *separate from* the lived and embodied capacity to go on in an activity, language game, or practice. As the empirical evidence we will offer shows, this common view now seems to us to be a mistaken way of viewing things.

This chapter aims to give empirical substance to this more sociological account of 'learning' using the resources of the theory of practice architectures (Kemmis and Grootenboer 2008; Kemmis et al. 2014). This theory holds that practices are prefigured by practice architectures composed of the cultural-discursive, material-economic and social-political arrangements found in particular sites. As they are encountered, these architectures enable and constrain how practices unfold, moment by moment.

To illustrate how learning is understood from the perspective of the theory of practice architectures, the chapter draws on empirical material collected in primary schools in two Australian school districts: principally interviews and observations in classroom lessons. The larger study from which this evidence is drawn explored ecological relationships between particular practices of learning, teaching, professional learning, leading and researching, as seen through the lens of practice theory and philosophy.[1]

Here, we explore the ways that learning happens in practices, through individuals' agency and actions, and amidst the cultural-discursive, material-economic and social-political preconditions that make their practices possible. This view of practices enables learning to be described and interpreted in new ways, offering surprising insights into learning and coming to know. While it might be regarded as extending Richard Peters' (1964) view of education as 'initiation' into forms of knowledge, we think our view is conceptually compatible with the view of Smeyers and Burbules (2006) that education is an initiation into practices, or the view of Lave and Wenger (1991) that learning in organisations occurs through 'legitimate peripheral participation' (p. 27) in work in a site. We aim to extend these views

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[1]For a fuller account, see Chap. 4 (pp. 55–91), 'Student Learning: Learning practices', in Kemmis et al. (2014).

about knowing and learning by considering the historical prefiguration of practices and the ontological conditions that hold 'learning' in place: the ways in which a practice is made possible and held in place by practice architectures. Following Kemmis et al. (2014, especially pp. 56–61), we aim to illustrate how initiation into practices occurred in some cases we observed. Following Wittgenstein (1958), we show how learning occurs as a process of 'coming to know how to go on' in practices, or, as we observed it in student learning in classrooms, and teacher learning in professional learning settings, as a process of being 'stirred in' to practices.

Learning as Being '*Stirred In*' to Practices

According to Kemmis and Grootenboer (2008) learning a practice entails entering —or joining in—the *projects* and the kinds of *sayings*, *doings* and *relatings* characteristic of different practices. When people 'learn' practices that are new *for them*, it might be said that they are initiated into these practices (Smeyers and Burbules 2006), or that they initiate themselves into the practices, with the co-participation of others—for example through 'legitimate peripheral participation' in the practice (Lave and Wenger 1991, p. 27). However, in our observations of teachers and students in the moments of 'learning', we saw them as participants more or less tentatively *entering* new (for them) practices that already existed (for example, as a practice already known by a teacher or fellow-learner). The notion of 'initiation' seems to imply a more or less deliberate ritual knowingly entered into by the one being initiated and the one doing the initiating. Being 'stirred in', by contrast, seems to us to imply much more happenstance in the process, in which the learner is somewhat adrift but also being caught up in the vortex of an activity that already has some shape, and that is held in place by the arrangements (practice architectures) that channel it. The metaphor of being *'stirred in'* is intended to convey the motion and activity associated with accomplishing practices in physical space-time, along with the idea that some things are already present to make the doing of the practice possible.[2]

The following example of being stirred in is based on a focus group interview with six Year 6 students. The students are discussing how they have learned to use Keynote digital presentation and GarageBand musical composition software on the Mac computers at their school. They think the new software has helped them in their learning.[3]

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[2]We concede that the metaphor of 'stirring in' suggests that someone, a teacher, say, does the 'stirring' while someone else, a student, say, is 'stirred in' to a practice. Despite this limitation of the metaphor, we want to assert that people can also 'stir themselves in' to practices that are new for them simply by imitating others, or by 'legitimate peripheral participation' (Lave and Wenger 1991, p. 27), or by reading a book, for example.

[3]B is a Boy, G is a Girl, Q is one of the interviewers.

G: I think most things have changed for the better and we now have Macs with new programs like 'Keynote' and things that make it easier and more beneficial programs for our learning.

Q2: How does Keynote work?

G: Keynote is PowerPoint pretty much and you have—make a slideshow except it has more things on it, like it has different/

G: /Transitions and animations.

G: And there's a program that's called 'GarageBand' and you can create pod-casts and music and –

… ((All talking))

G: And the teacher just lets us … at the end of the term the teacher lets us choose a way that we want to present our HSIE [Human Society in Its Environment] topic, on computer or on a poster or whatever.

Q: So do you like having to choose your own way?

G: It's better to have free rein because you might really not want to do something but you have a really good idea that you want to do but you're not allowed to -

… ((conversations continues))

G: I personally like the old computers better than the new ones because I'm not very good at adapting to the changes in computers and things.

B: Like you've had these sorts of technology for so long and you get this new sort and you're like, 'Oh, what do we do here?'

Q: How do you learn it? Because that's/

G:/Well, we have a teacher, Miss G//

B://We've got like Miss G that comes from the … [regional teacher consultancy support office] and teaches us about them.

G: She puts her computer on the smart boards and she shows us how to do it.

G: She gives us examples while we're at our desks and we can copy what she does.

These students are telling us how they get *stirred in*to new (for them) practices of using software programs like Keynote or GarageBand to make presentations. As they talk about learning to use the new software (to include animations and pod-casts in their digital texts for example), they are being oriented to the ways they come to 'know'. Specifically, their comments stating how they are 'shown', 'adapt to the changes', 'copy what she does', that the 'teacher just lets us', that they have 'free rein' indicate their view that learning is a process of being drawn into the practice of presenting their work using new technology. In the doing of the practices associated with 'learning' these applications, these students are joining in through doing and participating—although tentatively at first. This evidence reveals interpretive categories used by participants to describe their learning that we think justify our use of the metaphor 'being stirred in'.

Miss G, it turns out, also talks about how this group of Year 6 students learns by trying things out in periods of free practice and experimentation that she calls 'sandpit time'. In describing how she works with students to draw them into new practices, she also uses interpretive categories (like 'sandpit time' and 'practising themselves') that further justify our use of the metaphor 'being stirred in':

> I work with … [the students] on Keynote or GarageBand … and then the kids go off and have 'sandpit time' (because we're not allowed to have 'fun at school', we have 'sandpit time') [and the] kids like that, so they say "Oh, sandpit time!", and the way it's set up … is that they're off doing what they're practising themselves. Then they have to be prepared to come back and share one thing that they feel confident enough to share with someone else.

Here, Miss G is suggesting the interconnectivity between participating in practices (as the students do in 'sandpit time') and learning (as practising something until they are more confident in it—something the students' teacher also allows them to do, as we saw in the student excerpt above). It appears that, for Miss G, practising, learning, participating, doing and sharing are entwined with one another. She continues in her observations of these students as becoming highly effective in new practices through practising, commenting: 'What I do know is that they're, within the classroom, the kids are highly functioning and literate with what they're doing now…'

Students, too, are remarkably articulate about how they see themselves developing, in terms of learning from one another. Asked about whether, in the second term of a four-term year, they were becoming more confident in their skills of presenting to the whole class, one student in a Year 5 focus group responded this way:

> I reckon it's sort of like a second chance to improve your presentation skills. Like first term we sort of … like I felt like I really didn't sort of know what I was doing. Like I just get in there and do it. And like with our inquiry, each term we usually have to do a presentation at the end and first term it was sort of the same thing. [In second term] It was like a chance to show them what you've learned with your other presentation skills and watching like your other friends when they're presenting and learn things off [= from] them.

We interpret such cases in terms of students (and teachers) being 'stirred in' to new practices not only by the teacher but also by fellow-students. For the students, learning happens by 'just get[ting] in there and do[ing] it' and 'watching … your … friends' in the sequential moment-by-moment enactment of a lesson as the past encounters the present and envisages a future, in the particular site of their learning; for them, these are overlapping. We see them engaging with a new topic or field of practice and being 'stirred in' to the practice through participation. They are 'stirred in' to what makes the practice coherent as an overall activity or project of a particular kind, and into the different and varying kinds of activities that together constitute the practice under varying kinds of conditions and circumstances.

But it is not only through their own agency and activity that students are stirred into practices; the practices they are learning are made possible and held in place by practice architectures—the cultural-discursive, material-economic and social-political arrangements that prefigure the practice in (respectively) semantic space, physical space-time and social space. As they encounter them, the students are channelled by these enablers and constraints as they try out the practice, and find how to 'go on' in the practice amidst them. In Wittgensteinian (1958) terms, they learn how to go on in the practice—in the language of the practice, the activities of the practice, and in relating to others and the world in the practice.

As they learn, (to use Ryle's 1946, 1949, distinction between 'knowing how' and 'knowing that'), people are finding out *how* to do a practice; as an after-effect, they also come to understand *that* they can do it (inasmuch as they can avow something about it; Winch 2009) and *that* certain knowledge, concepts or values may be associated with it, or 'in play' when this practice is being practised.

When someone asserts that a learner has learned some 'fact' or 'concept' or item of 'knowledge'—*what* that person learned—we now find ourselves compelled to ask *how* they learned it. Our central claim is that *what people learn is how to go on in practices*; we thus observe learners learning to discover how they learn go on in the sayings, doings and relatings that constitute these practices. In our observations, we try to see beyond the 'fact' or 'concept' or 'knowledge' particular learners learn, to discover the language games, the forms of life and the practice architectures in which these 'facts' or 'concepts' or items of 'knowledge' are grounded. Several centuries of 'the philosophy of the subject' (Habermas 1987a, b) have led us to think of knowledge as inscribed in our minds or memories—as the trace left behind by our having learned X or Y or Z, and then to think of this knowledge as an object we perceive as cognitive subjects who do this 'knowing'. By asking *how* a person learned X or Y or Z, however, we can discover how this knowledge is *grounded* in practice. We can discover what practice or practices it arises from, and recalls, and what future practices it anticipates and returns to its use in.

We came to the notion of being stirred into practices by interpreting the particular words our informants used—whether teachers, students or consultants to schools. As we saw, Miss G says 'they're off doing what they're practising themselves'; the Year 5 student says it involves processes like 'watching … your other friends when they're presenting and learn things off them'. Another teacher says 'it was a real conscious effort to develop that skill of being able to collaborate…'. They do not use the words 'stirred in', but they nevertheless point us towards what we interpret as being 'stirred in'. In short, being 'stirred in' is what happens when people, perhaps tentatively or as novices, enter the sayings, doings and relatings that hang together in the project of a practice. In their tentative practising, they experience and explore the practice architectures that enable and constrain their interactions in the world as they practise, with the result that, ordinarily, they become more adept in interacting with others and with objects in the world through the practice. And what they learn, we claim, is *how to go on in language games, activities, and practices*.

Learning as *Coming to Know How to Go on* Amidst the Practice Architectures of the Practice

In another class, we observed Year 5 students in a lesson about forces and processes changing the Earth (including, for instance, deforestation and drought). We saw students participating in particular practices, and while some (including their

teacher) might interpret the students to be learning particular *concepts* like 'climate change', we (by contrast) interpreted what was happening in terms of students being stirred into the particular sayings, doings and relatings (of their practice) so that they could 'go on' in the language games, activities and practices of the lesson. They were coming to know how to speak a particular kind of language—to enter a particular kind of discourse—about forces changing the earth, including discussing topics like deforestation, and using notions like 'climate change' in their talk and texts. This lexicon of words formed a prominent part of the cultural-discursive arrangements that enabled and constrained the practice of talking about forces changing the Earth in this classroom. In Wittgensteinian terms, they were entering, and orienting themselves in, a *language game* about 'forces changing the Earth', and a language game about how to use the words 'climate change' in ways recognisable to other people using these words. And so, as the students entered the project of making a digital presentation about forces changing the Earth, they demonstrated the extent to which they had begun to master the language game of speaking about forces changing the Earth—a language game in which it is reasonable to say particular things in particular ways, in which meaning and sense come from shared orientations among interlocutors towards particular themes and topics, using this specialist discourse.[4] Through their talk in the lesson, we observed students being drawn into new sayings (ways of saying things) about ecology and the environment.

We thus concluded that the students were entering the practice by *coming to know how to go on* (Wittgenstein 1958, §151, §179) in a particular language game which involves discussions and descriptions and explanations and arguments about matters like 'climate change', 'deforestation', 'environmental sustainability' and 'forces changing the earth'. In particular, we observed the work of these Year 5 students as distributed through and across their interpretation of several different types of texts and activities in order to produce texts of their own, including visual texts, digital texts, written texts and oral texts. The appropriation, use and production of such texts is an instance of a classroom and school language game and form of life by now familiar to many if not all of the students, although, when they began, the particulars of the task of reading and reporting had been in some ways new to them.

In addition to coming to know how to go on in this new language game about forces changing the Earth, the Year 5 students we observed were simultaneously coming to know how to go on in other *activities* like making digital presentations, constructing particular kinds of texts, and working together in groups. They came to know how to go on in a wide range of *sayings*, *doings*, and *relatings* that together composed the practice of this particular inquiry lesson at the time. They also came to know how to go on amidst the *practice architectures* (Kemmis and Grootenboer 2008; Kemmis et al. 2014) that formed the enabling preconditions that made their

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[4]Kemmis et al. (2014, p. 70, Fig. 4.1), show a photograph of a long vocabulary list from this classroom, including words like 'carbon', 'energy', and 'greenhouse effect'.

particular practices possible, and enabled and constrained the unfolding of the practice in its course, namely:

(a) *cultural-discursive arrangements* that enabled and constrained the practice (in the medium of language and in the dimension of semantic space), that is, the characteristic language and discourses used in talking about forces changing the Earth;

(b) *material-economic arrangements* that enabled and constrained the practice (in the medium of activity and work, in the dimension of physical space-time), that is, the characteristic kinds of activities undertaken in the course of (for example) constructing a digital presentation about forces changing the Earth; and

(c) *social-political arrangements* that enabled and constrained the practice (in the medium of power and solidarity, and in the dimension of social space), that is, the characteristic patterns of relationships between students and between the students and their teacher, and between them and the non-human objects present.

In our view, coming to know how to go on in a practice means not only coming to know how to go on *in* the sayings, doings and relatings, of the practice, it also means coming to know how to go on *amidst* the practice architectures that enable and constrain. What the learners learn to say and to do, and they ways they learn to relate to others and the world in such cases, is not only formed by the intentions of the learners; the practice architectures in the setting also channel or canalise the learners' practices into the forms in which we observe them. Schatzki (2002) describes the relationships between practices and arrangements in terms of 'practice-arrangement bundles'; like Schatzki (2002), we think that '[b]ecause the relationship between practices and material entities is so intimate, … the notion of a bundle of practices and material arrangements is fundamental to analysing human life' (p. 16).

On the basis of our observations of students learning in lessons like this one, then, we have come to the view that *learning* is no more than coming to know how to go on in practices, and that it occurs by being 'stirred in' to practices (including by stirring oneself into them by joining in). This view disrupts some views of learning that see it as a *psychological* process, that occurs '*in the mind*', and that see learning principally from an *epistemological* viewpoint. In contrast to the psychological view, the view we have described here offers a '*societist*' (Schatzki 2003) account of learning that sees it as something that occurs in the *intersubjective space* between people, in terms of initiation into, or being stirred into, practices, and that sees learning principally from an *ontological* perspective. The intersubjective space in which learning occurs is three-dimensional: it exists in the media of language, work and power/solidarity, in which we encounter one another in the world, in (respectively) semantic space, physical space-time, and social space. This is not to say that the intersubjective view eschews the psychological view. It does not. Rather, it aims to locate the psychological within the social, in the same way

that the subjective is located in the intersubjective. In our view, then, we come to know anything, including ourselves as cognitive subjects, in the shared medium of language, in a shared material world, and in shared social spaces. The subjective and intersubjective are dialectically related. By offering a societist account of learning, we aim to locate the subjective in the intersubjective, and the epistemological, at least as it pertains to people's own knowledge, in the realm of the ontological—the historical and material world of practice architectures (arrangements) to be found in the real sites in which we act, in which we encounter one another, and in which we develop—by learning, for example.

We next make a brief excursus to distinguish two types of practices we ordinarily encounter in social settings like schools and other organisations where learning is a prominent part of what happens in the site: 'learning practices'[5] and 'substantive practices'.

Being Stirred into 'Learning Practices' and 'Substantive Practices'

In a Kindergarten lesson, we observed two teachers (team teaching) preparing kindergarten children to build outdoor ornaments that the next day would be subjected to 'rain' (in fact, water from a sprinkler) in order to discover different 'properties of materials'. This involved preparing them to participate in a complex of reciprocal interactions involving two main school-type 'social projects' that were both necessary for the successful accomplishment of the lesson. First, the teachers were stirring the children into 'how to participate' more generally in school lessons; this is evident in the lesson excerpt below where the teachers are orienting the students to 'put your hands up' to indicate they have an answer, to interact with others by 'sharing and using nice words' and to 'managing impulsivity' by sitting differently [note: all names are pseudonyms]:

Teacher 1: Put your hand up if you can tell me what this one is, and what it means? [Teacher points to a behaviour prompt card; points to a student to respond.]
Charity: Working Interdependently (children talking over each other) …
Teacher 1: … That's right, what does that mean?
Charity: …. [Helping]

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[5]Kemmis et al. (2014, p. 55) make the distinction between 'learning practices' and 'substantive practices'. A *learning practice* is a practice whose project is to help people learn (like interacting with others, taking turns in conversations, listening, or web-searching).A *substantive practice*, by contrast, is the practice to be learned—a practice whose project is to be able to do something in the world (for example, practices like reading a factual text about rainforests, reciting poetry, making a speech, building a Lego tower, or the practice of critiquing practices of schooling). In formal learning settings, learning practices and substantive practices frequently overlap and intertwine.

Teacher 1: Helping other people. What else does it mean? Finn? He's got his hand up.
Finn: It also means share and don't … –
Teacher 1: That's right, sharing and using that, nice words to each other, could I please have that when you're finished. [Teacher wanting to remove object from child who is fiddling.] Let's move on to this one//
Teacher 2://Oh let's, who's doing that right now, let's see who is doing it…
Teacher 1: Nate is.
Teacher 2: Well done.
Teacher 1: So it's called managing/
Teacher 2:/Show us what your body looks like, when you're Managing Impulsivity. Wow, show us what your lips look like, even when you're listening and managing [your impulsivity], … [Students moving to sit differently.] Fantastic.

As the students complied, they co-constructed the reciprocal and interactive practices deemed appropriate for completing this lesson; that is, they were being stirred into participating in particular practices of learning or *learning practices* (Kemmis et al. 2014, p. 68). They demonstrated comprehensibility *in knowing how to participate* in the practice of interacting in class, by doing it as requested.

In the next part of the lesson introduction (below), the teacher stirred students into the *substantive practice* of identifying properties of objects and designing and building a garden ornament (Kemmis et al. 2014, p. 65) which is inevitably intertwined with the *learning practice* of listening to others in a class discussion. The teacher 'tuned the students in' (or stirred them in) to the 'doings' (the activity), the 'sayings' and language required to participate in the task (including in this case, using ideas like 'waterproof', 'properties', 'metal' and 'rusty'), and the appropriate 'relatings' (when to respond individually and when to respond collectively when asked a question):

Teacher: It is waterproof, and does it need to be waterproof to be an outdoor ornament? [Teacher is holding up a metal duck garden ornament.]
ALL: Yes.
Teacher: Why?
Charity: So it doesn't break.
Eli: So it doesn't break anymore—the properties won't change. [Children talking over each other.]
Teacher: Alright, what do you mean by that Eli, the properties won't change, what do you mean?
Eli: If water gets on it, if it was made of paper and the water gets on it, it would rip.
Teacher: Will this rip?
ALL: No.
Teacher: Because it's made from?
ALL: Metal.
Teacher: Will this rip? [Holds up the metal duck.]
ALL: No. [Chorus.]

Teacher: Because it's made from?
ALL: Metal. [Chorus.]
Teacher: And the only property that may change Rhett, is that it could become … ?
Rhett: Rusty.
Teacher: Rusty outside… [Several turns later.]
Teacher: Your task today is to make an outdoor ornament

As this group of Kindergarten children was stirred into building outdoor orna-
ments, through this and the following lesson the next day, they came to know 'how
to go on' in the activities of planning and constructing, relating with others
appropriately, and using technical language as necessary.[6] As they did so, their
substantive practices began to 'hang together' in an authentic project to which the
students developed a commitment through the introduction to the lesson. For
instance, in the realm of language, through particular sayings, students were drawn
into discourses associated with properties and building; in the realm of activity,
through particular doings, they were brought into identifying properties of mate-
rials, and into constructing and building by doing the construction task; and in the
realm of sociality, through particular relatings, they related in particular ways to
each other, the teacher and various material objects, as they went about their work.
These students were stirred into these substantive practices through particular kinds
of learning practices—and vice versa—as they unfolded in time through the par-
ticular language, activity and interactions required to make it the lesson it was.

These students were drawn into noticing, naming and reframing (Smith 2008,
pp.77–78) four different aspects of the task (the broader project of the lesson).
Through participating in the particular orchestrated teacher–student interactions
(like the one presented above), students were also oriented to:

- the idea of 'materials' and their 'properties' (where the kindergarten children
  already used this technical language, as they had been previously 'stirred in' to a
  language game that requires these terms),
- the idea of 'outdoor ornaments' (through material objects brought from home by
  one of the teachers),
- the task of 'making a plan' (through activities of designing, drawing and
  labelling in the form of a labelled diagram), and
- the task of 'building the ornament'.

What emerged was an example of reciprocity in practices: the teacher stirring the
children in to the task by leading them to understand the task of making a garden
ornament and the stages in planning and making the ornament, and the children
gradually being stirred in, responding individually and collectively to the teacher's
directions and questions, until they had—however temporarily—a grasp of what the

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[6]Of course it is not necessarily the case that that all students come to know (or come to know
equally) how to go on in language games, activities and practices going on around them in their
classrooms. It is frequently the case that learners resist or refuse or are too confused to enter the
language games, activities and practices on offer in their classrooms.

task ahead involved and how they would complete it. It is not only a reciprocity between participants—teachers and students—but also a reciprocity between practices: the teachers' practice of 'stirring the students in' to the multilayered project of building and testing an outdoor ornament, and the students' practice of 'being stirred in' to the project. The students came to know not only how to go on in the *substantive practices* of planning, constructing and testing their garden ornaments, but also how to go on in particular kinds of *learning practices* involving mutually constructed interactions of 'working in groups', 'collaborating' and 'sharing', for example.

Knowledge and Practice

We have asserted that to take the view that learning means *coming to know how to go on* in a practice is to be at odds with some conventional views about *what* people learn as well as about *how* learning happens. Knowing is often attributed to cognition and epistemology, and people are usually said to learn things like knowledge, concepts and values embodied in our minds, bodies and feelings. In our view, however, and from the perspective of the learner as a *cognitive subject*, these things, whose existence we do not deny, are no more than 'after-images' or traces in memory of the practices to which they refer. They are the after-effects of what we see learners learning *directly*—namely, how to participate in a practice (whether they do so well or badly, roughly or smoothly, or highly idiosyncratically).

It seems to us, then, that knowledge, concepts and values exist as the after-effects of participating in practices, as traces in individual minds, that is, in human cognition. But they are not only traces in individual minds: they also crystallise into the traces and tokens that are the words and ideas that exist 'independently' of particular language users in the intersubjective space of the languages and discourses we share in our various language communities, and that endure in objectified form in written texts as well as in oral and sometimes visual form in such diverse kinds of knowledge as the stories of ancestors passed down in oral traditions, times tables, theories in physics, histories, the rules of chess and the painting style of Vincent van Gogh. 'Knowledge' is not only *in* heads, it also exists *between* them, in the intersubjectively grounded meaning of words, in the intersubjectively encountered materiality of utterances and texts, and in the intersubjectively constructed relationships between speakers and hearers, and authors and readers.

In the *Philosophical Investigations*, Ludwig Wittgenstein (1958) located *knowing* and *meaning* not in words or ideas or in the alleged correspondences of words with objects, states of affairs or events in the world, but, rather, in *language games* in which people use language in ways that orient them to the world in the

same way. In turn, he located these language games in shared *forms of life*[7] which make the language games interpretable to those participating in them—like the shared lives of people in a farming community, say, where an overlapping matrix of shared practices makes the lives of members of the community more or less comprehensible to one another.

Just as Wittgenstein located meaning in language games and forms of life, we have come to the conclusion that *all 'knowledge', 'concepts' and 'values' arise from, recall, anticipate, and return to, their use in the forms of life characteristic of different practices*. We thus do not regard meaning and knowledge as somehow 'internal' to a word or the language in which the word is used, nor are they 'external', in the sense that they correspond with, or point to, something in the world.[8] Rather, they are to be found in the 'saying' and 'doing' and 'relating' of the historically and materially located 'happening' of practices in which particular words are used, and to which particular knowledge refers. They are interactionally secured in the doing of something.

Taking the view that knowledge arises from, recalls, anticipates and returns to its use in practices, then, the consummate professional teacher teaching 'consonant blends', for example, is likely to be alive to the wider, richer framework of reading and literacy practices that makes this particular corner of literacy important for her students to master. For the student, however, learning the consonant blends may just be finding out how to go on in the game of completing the tasks the teacher has set today, each of them a variation on other games in the teacher's repertoire that the student has previously encountered. The game of literacy and the game of the classroom are not necessarily at odds with one another in the practices of classroom literacy learning. Rather, the project the teacher ascribes to a particular day's lesson —like having the students learn to label diagrams for their garden ornaments—may be different from the projects all or some of the students ascribe to the activities of the classroom—perhaps something like 'getting by'. It is the game—the practice— that engages or does not engage the students in learning or finding how to go on in either or both of these games. This is the primacy of practice. It makes the ascriptions of the actors secondary to the language game and form of life that is the practice—it unfolds in what happens, not in what was intended or described or justified, although those sayings may be caught up and bundled into the doings and relatings that also make up this or that particular practice.

If people do not learn anything other than practices, then we need to consider how 'learners' are drawn into new practices, whether, for example, by observation in the form of 'legitimate peripheral participation' (Lave and Wenger 1991), or by simply allowing them to try out (practise) a new practice. It has long been known

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[7]Wittgenstein (1958, p. 88^e, §241): '"So you are saying that human agreement decides what is true and what is false?"—It is what human beings *say* that is true and false; and they agree in the *language* they use. That is not agreement in opinions but in forms of life'.

[8]Wittgenstein (1958, p. 107^e, §329): 'When I think in language, there aren't "meanings" going through my mind in addition to the verbal expressions: the language is itself the vehicle of thought'.

that *active engagement* promotes learning. This does not necessarily mean active *physical* activity though it does mean active cognitive and emotional engagement in practising thinking or talking in a new field of practice and practice-knowledge (as happens when students encounter a new and interesting topic like 'rainforest ecologies', or in the practice of critical reading of websites relevant to 'rainforest ecologies'). If we want learners to learn knowledge, concepts or values—which we suggest are 'after-images' of practices—then we need to consider how to engage them, in what practices, to induce them to form those after-images. For example, one such practice is the practice of rote memorisation (like chanting times tables or memorising a song for an anticipated performance) that is an exercise aimed at preparing a learner to (re-) produce information on demand, which is to say, to participate in a practice in which such demands are made and fulfilled. Other practices that induce the formation of knowledge as after-images of doing them include reading, drawing, problem solving and conversation.

In the light of our view that knowledge arises from, recalls, anticipates and returns to its use in practices, we would encourage teachers to think about curricula as *curricula of practices*, and to ask, 'What substantive life practices do students need to learn?' and 'What learning practices will stir students into those practices?'

Learning or Practising?

We learn by engaging in practices. Frequently (but not always) this occurs when people co-produce new practices together, as they encounter one another in action and interaction. Through their encounters, people develop ways of interacting that are arranged in increasingly well-ordered or even routinised ways characteristic of the kinds of practices in which they are encountering each other (as when a teacher and students speak with one another about how to use Keynote software), or in which they encounter others and particular kinds of objects in the world (as in a practice like using computers and particular software packages to insert animations into PowerPoint presentations or building garden ornaments). What was initially surprising to us during our empirical observations is something that now seems very obvious: the particular part of 'learning a practice' that is the 'learning' is difficult to distinguish from the part that is the 'practising' of the practice—more difficult than has previously been noticed.

Our observations have led us to the view that the practices we usually call 'learning' are typically to do with particular kinds of situations (like understanding a word or idea, or how to perform a particular skill) and settings (like classrooms or conference rooms) where people are said to 'learn'. Conventionally, we *say* that people 'learn' in these situations and settings, but our observations have caused us to doubt the existence of a process or practice of 'learning' that is distinct from practising the practice (though perhaps practising it inexpertly or in a clumsy way). Indeed, like Lave and Wenger (1991) and even Dewey (1933), we think that what we call 'learning' is not a distinct process or practice in itself, but just a description

of a state that a person is in when they are not yet practising at the level of skill or virtuosity they or someone else hope/s or expect/s them to reach.

Rote memorisation (like practices of chanting and reciting poetry) might be an example of a practice of learning; learning by doing (like the examples of trial and error Year 5 students report in coming to grips with the possibilities of new computer software like Keynote) might be another; and learning by 'legitimate peripheral participation' (Lave and Wenger 1991; as, for example, when some students watch others who are more skilled and gradually enter a practice 'from the sidelines') might be yet another. In each case, however, what counts as distinctively 'the practice of learning' remains mysterious. What is 'the practice of learning' *as distinct from* practising the other 'target' practice at some stage of accomplishment? In our view, when someone says that a person is learning, they use the word 'learning' simply to refer to the person being at a stage or state in which their practice is not yet as accomplished as they, or someone else, want it to be.

To put it another way, our observations suggest that, apart from common usage, there is nothing about 'learning' that is distinct from learning-something-or-other at some level from novice to virtuoso.[9] Moreover, our observations suggest that practising always includes responding to varying conditions that apply at any particular moment at any particular place, and that the cumulative effect of this variation is to contribute to adaptation of the practice to a range of different conditions. Seen from the perspective of someone who has accomplished the adaptation, adaptation looks like learning—having reached a new stage of accomplishment in the practice.

If this is so, then it seems to us that learning and practising amount to much the same thing: that what one learns is always a practice, and that what counts as 'learning' a practice is always part of or a stage in practising the practice, especially when one is new to the practice or when one is practising in new circumstances. On this view, one is always simply at an earlier or later stage of efficacy and virtuosity in the conduct of the practice, always at a more superficial or profound level of being stirred in to the practice.

One thing that encourages us to take this view is that in ordinary life—not in the specialised settings and specialised discourses used by educational psychologists and teachers, for example—people do not ordinarily need an elaborate specialist language to describe learning, or to orient them in their learning or to support them as they learn things. They may say things like 'pay attention to this' or 'notice

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[9]One is tempted to use a sequence like the five-stage sequence 'novice', 'advanced beginner', 'competent', 'proficient' and 'expert' employed by Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1986) to describe the progress towards 'virtuosity'. But the apparent logic of this sequence only holds when the sequence is viewed from the perspective of the 'expert', who is expert in this or that particular way, in this or that particular practice. It is not always clear from the perspective of the 'novice' what virtuosity will develop from practising a practice. One learner develops virtuosity in *pretending to read*, for example, while another develops virtuosity in *reading*; and one learner develops virtuosity in physics from practising mathematics, while another's practising of mathematics develops his virtuosity in playing poker.

that…', but they do not need an elaborate language to describe the process. They assume that learners will be able to pick things up with a little guidance and some practice. This suggests to us that, ordinarily, people do not treat the process of learning as separate from the process of entering and engaging in the practice to be learned: ordinarily, people come to know how to go on in the language game so they can use (practise) the language of the topic of an exercise in a textbook, or conversational French, for example. It seems to us that if a specialist language were needed to describe learning as a distinct process or practice, everyone would be using it all the time, since we are learning more or less constantly in the everyday world. But we do not have an elaborate everyday language of learning. This seems to us to be a kind of proof that ordinary people do not need an elaborate specialist language or discourse for describing learning in the ordinary learning situations they meet from day to day. A compelling example is the everyday, yet extraordinary, process of children learning to speak a language, in which children begin to use words and approximations of them at the prompting of parents, siblings and others, usually without anyone formally designated as a teacher in sight; in such situations, children are 'just' stirred in to the practice of using the language. Perhaps people know intuitively that learning is like that: that it is not a specialised and particular practice distinct from other practices. Perhaps people know intuitively that, rather, 'learning' is the word we use to describe the particular state a learner is in when they are in the process of coming to know how to go on in practising a practice, when they have not yet reached the level of virtuosity in the practice that they or someone else wants them to reach. Or perhaps it is a word to use when we know that a person is in a particular setting—like a school classroom, or a workplace learning setting—where people gather expressly in order to 'learn' to do things.

Nevertheless, we have little doubt that we will all continue to use notions like 'learning' and 'knowledge' and 'concepts' and 'values', as if they were separable from coming to know how to go on in activities, language games and practices. But our observations lead us to think that these notions are comprehensible only in terms of the practices that ground them. It seems to be the case that what we call 'learning', like what we call 'knowledge', 'concepts' and 'values', always arises from, recalls, anticipates and returns to its use *in practices*.

Learning and the Reproduction and Variation of Practices

Simply by virtue of *being practised* (of coming into being in people's practising), social practices *reproduce* themselves. By being practised, they create conditions of human social possibility that can be repeated. By being practised under different conditions, in differing times and places, however, practices are not just repeated as a kind of mimicry; they are always repeated or (re-) produced with adaptive *variations*, like improvisation in jazz or dance. Variation occurs both in response to pressures of circumstance and as participants explore opportunities for refinement

or extension of practices. By varying the way particular practices are practised in response to changed historical or material conditions in different times and places, practitioners create conditions for the *transformation* and *evolution*[10] of both the practices and themselves as practitioners, whether for better or for worse. The history of this evolution is the evolution of a *practice tradition*, always varying in relation to local conditions and the historical moments in which they are embedded. From the perspective of the practitioner practising the practice, however, the history of this evolution in its successive enactments is also the history of the practitioner's 'learning', which is to say their *self-formation* and transformation.

This is another reason for thinking that learning is no more than (a stage in) practising: practising always varies, however slightly, to adapt to new circumstances. In the light of all we have said earlier in this chapter, our observations lead us to conclude that what people ordinarily describe as 'learning' is no more than this kind of adaptation. While it is usual to say that a learner learns by adapting to new circumstances, we might equally say that a practitioner develops a practice, and her or his practising of the practice, by adaptation of existing modes of practising. And this, we think, is true of students practising a new language game in a classroom like the language game of 'climate change', or teachers practising a new approach to teaching like 'the inquiry approach'. We all learn new practices by variation: by adapting existing practices to new situations and settings, sometimes to the point where we conclude that past practices have been 'transformed'. 'Learning', on this view, is the variation, adaptation and transformation of practices.

Conclusion

Some readers may baulk at our view that learning is nothing more than a process of being 'stirred into' particular ways of living, particular practices, and that this process is inherently social, not just psychological. Our view challenges some taken-for-granted conceptions of learning and understanding. Other challenges we invite the reader to take up include the notion that knowledge is an after-image or after-effect of becoming a practitioner of one kind or another. And perhaps most controversially, we ask the reader to consider whether 'learning' 'exists' (at least as commonly understood).

Hesitations about these propositions are understandable given the immeasurable extent to which we have all previously been 'stirred into' a particular set of practices in which we are always and everywhere implicated. In this case, what has dominated our thinking is a view of the practices of a society that overtly and

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[10]The idea of the evolution of practices relates closely to the notion of the evolution of knowledge described by Stephen Toulmin in his (1972) *Human Understanding, Volume I: The collective use and evolution of concepts*. In an epigram at the beginning of the book, he quotes the philosopher Søren Kierkegaard (from Kierkegaard's *The Concept of Irony*): 'Concepts, like individuals, have their histories, and are just as incapable of withstanding the ravages of time as are individuals'.

covertly frames learning and understanding primarily as a psychological process, undertaken by individual learners, even if they often do so in various sorts of social settings like schools, workplaces, clubs, leisure venues and so on. Such scepticism may also have roots in the increased individualism of contemporary culture, together with the technocratic rationality evident in contemporary neoliberal times that appear, for example, in the form of various audit technologies used to keep under surveillance the individual and collective work and lives of students and teachers.

Against that neoliberal view, we offer a 'societist' (Schatzki 2003) alternative: to see learning from the perspective of practice. In the introduction to this chapter, we posed a challenge to some ways of viewing learning and knowledge that are generally taken for granted when we discuss what goes on in classrooms, schools, universities, in workplaces or in other places where we normally say that people 'learn' things. We argue that it might be possible to talk about the development of practices—what people ordinarily call 'learning a practice'—without using the discourse of 'learning' at all, and perhaps without other familiar terms like 'knowledge' and 'concepts'. For us, the challenge is to show how such an heretical and apparently unthinkable notion might be made orthodox and thinkable—or at least to show that it is possible to look at 'learning' and 'knowledge' in a different way, and to see them from the perspective of the practices in which, we believe, both are co-located and constructed.

With this view of practices as a guide, we conclude that people learn only language games, activities, and practices, and the things they are said to learn—notions like 'knowledge', 'concepts', 'values' and 'skills', for example—are the after-images or after-effects of their having found how to go on in practices. 'Knowledge', 'concepts', 'values', and 'skills', we argued, arise from, recall, anticipate and return to their use in practices. We also came to the view that learning is not a distinctive process but rather the name for a state someone is in when they are in the process of coming to know how to go on in practising a particular practice. These conclusions provoke us to look rather differently at a large range of situations we observe as educators and educational researchers. They provoke us to ask what practices people are engaged in when we encounter them in different kinds of situations, especially ones where 'learning' is said to be occurring. We now ask what it is that people are being invited to—or are inviting others to—'go on' in.

Throughout this chapter, we have sought to question the 'common sense' usage of the terms 'learning', 'knowledge', 'concepts', 'values' and 'skills' in ways that may variously challenge, provoke or engage readers. We have aimed to stir readers in to a series of language games about these venerable terms in order to understand learning from a practice perspective—to see learning as practising learning practices and practising substantive practices to be learned.

On this view of learning as being stirred in to practices, we can ask what kinds of sayings, doings and relatings we want learners to come to know how to go on in, within what projects of the practices we want them to learn. And we can ask what kinds of practice architectures are needed to support the practices we want them to learn, both the practice architectures of learning practices we may want learners to

enter, and the substantive practices we want them to learn. Moreover, to learn these practices, we may want to think carefully about *learning design*, in terms of the practice architectures we want learners to encounter, in the form of arrangements that will enable and constrain their practice in the intersubjective space in which they and others encounter one another in the world. On this view, we may begin to think about curricula as curricula of practices, composed in practice architectures that will enable and constrain learners as they enter the practices to be learned. Furthermore, it opens up possibilities to think about how learners can learn by processes of variation that foster the formation and transformation of their practices, and thus their self-formation and transformation as persons (and not only in terms of their 'store' of knowledge, concepts, values and skills).

In the 'ordinary' classrooms we observed, we encountered educators who see their central role and purpose as extending, challenging and enriching learners both socially and academically, that is, in terms of the students' formation and coming into being as future citizens of our world. We have attempted to examine the kinds of conditions and practices that occur in the moment-to-moment transactions of classroom engagement that offer paths towards achieving this critical moral purpose of education. What we have come to see, however, is that the formation of these students as persons and as future citizens occurs through *the formation of practices*: the formation of students' and teachers' and leaders' capacities to go on in particular kinds of practices, to be the bearers of these practices, and to participate actively in formation and transformation of the practices themselves—as paths and as ways of being for those who practise them. In the seeming 'ordinariness' of the day-to-day, reciprocal, classroom practices of 'learning' and 'teaching' we thus catch glimpses of something extraordinary in the making: the formation of people capable of individual and collective self-expression, self-development and self-determination, who have it within their power bring into being a culture based on reason, a productive and sustainable economy and environment, and a just and democratic society.

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Chapter 4
Theorising the Co-occurrence of Remaking Occupational Practices and Their Learning

Stephen Billett

Abstract Occupational practice arises through, is transformed by and co-occurs with human learning and development. As such, these practices offer a useful platform to consider and appraise perspectives of practice theories and their applicability to learning. Proposed here is that occupational practice arises through history, culture and is manifested in particular circumstances (e.g. workplaces). Yet, its existence, enactment and advancement are shaped by how individuals engage with, remake and transform history and culture. Hence, accounts of the geneses, manifestations and advancement of these practices needs to include contributions of institutional (i.e. those of the social world) and personal factors (i.e. those pertaining to individuals' development), and, also brute facts (i.e. those of the natural world, e.g. ageing) that shape the needs for occupations and how humans engage with, enact and learn through them. The implications for learning, development and societal change here are powerful and enduring. Sites and circumstances of practice, and individuals' engagement in them, have been the key source of that learning across human history. The case made here emphasises the importance of the personal within these relationships and contributions. It does so by drawing upon empirical work and conceptual precepts that have arisen through a focused programme of inquiry informed by contributions from philosophy, social cultural theory, cognitive science, anthropology, sociology and historical studies, but framed broadly within what might be termed cultural psychology, and attempts to understand further the relations between cognition and culture.

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Personal, Institutional and Brute Contributions to Learn Through and for Occupational Practice

Given that occupational practice arises through, is transformed by and co-occurs with human learning and development (Donald 1991; Lave 1993), these practices offer a useful platform to consider and appraise perspectives of practice theories that seek to elaborate them. Proposed here is that occupational practices arise through history and culture, and are manifested in particular circumstances (e.g. workplaces) (Billett 2001a). However, the existence, advancement and enactment of occupational practices are shaped by how individuals engage with, remake and transform them. Hence, explanations of the geneses, manifestations and advancement of these practices need to account for the contributions of institutional (i.e. those of the social world) and personal factors (i.e. those pertaining to individuals' development) and the relations between them. Yet, sitting within all of this are also brute facts (i.e. those of the natural world) that shape the needs for many occupations, and also mediate how humans come to engage, enact and learn through them. Together these three types of factors inform how individuals engage with the world as they experience it. So, more than accounting for the suggestion of the social world (e.g. norms forms and practices), consideration of what constitutes occupational practice, how it is engaged and advanced necessarily includes considerations of personal and brute factors (i.e. those of the natural world, for instance ageing) and relations amongst all three. The educational implications here are powerful and enduring. Sites and circumstances of practice, and individuals' engagement in them have been the key source of occupational learning across human history (Billett 2011a). Indeed, the advancement of the occupations upon which the human species depends has, in some ways, been largely been premised upon how individuals learn through their occupational practice. This learning has been supported by practice curriculum and pedagogies, and directed by their personal epistemologies, as individuals have learnt, practiced and innovated across human history.

So, occupational practice needs to be understood through a consideration of how individuals come to mediate the suggestions of the social and brute worlds, which as Searle (1995) reminds us, cannot simply be wished away. Two legacies arise from that mediation: (i) individuals' learning and development; and, (ii) the remaking and transformation of occupational practices. Emphasised here is the role of the personal (i.e. what we know, can do and value) and conceptions of occupational practice, the contributions and premises for that learning and remaking of that practice.

The case made here draws upon empirical work and conceptual precepts that have informed and been informed by a focused programme of inquiry framed within what might be termed cultural psychology. The case commences by outlining the misalignment between the contributions the personal makes to the learning and remaking of occupational practice and how it has been captured in the public and scientific discourse. An account of learning of occupations through practice is used to illuminates the importance of individuals' mediation of that

learning. The point made here is that across most of human history, occupational capacities were learnt rather than taught. The implications here extend to a consideration of how human learning and development progresses, and their alignment with the remaking of culture.

Some Beginnings

My doctoral work completed in 1995 aimed to provide evidence of and strengthen conceptualisations of what was referred to as 'situated cognition'. In the years prior to the commencement of this study, there much discussion about the kinds of knowledge required for effective or expert performance, and how that knowledge might best be learnt. One view was that such capacities were based upon cleverness: individuals' ability to secure, manipulate and adapt what they knew. This kind of view was broadly supported by cognitive psychology and two decades of inquiries into what constitutes expert performance and how it might be developed. However, there were critiques suggesting that this research agenda was driven by commercial and military imperatives, largely from America, and were directed towards identifying artificial intelligence and technologies able to replicate human performance and to reorganise classrooms might best be organised to achieve high performance outcomes (Noble 1991). However, alternative accounts suggested that human cognition was more than individual cleverness, and was shaped by contributions from the social world. In particular, perspectives from anthropology and anthropological studies were used to suggest that the social circumstances in which individuals engage and the kind of socially derived activities they participated in had a profound impact on human cognition, and as such learning, adaptability and performance (Brown et al. 1989; Lave and Wenger 1991).

However, there is little in the way of empirical work or evidence to support these contentions. This was in contrast to the strongly evidence-based and positivist approaches being used within cognitive science and its programs of research. Consequently, my doctoral work sought to ascertain if there were situational effects on cognition and, if so, what were those effects. It involved understanding practice and learning of the same occupation in four different circumstances: hairdressing, and its conduct in four hairdressing salons, one each in three Australian communities and one in Britain (Billett 1995).

Through this empirical work and drawing upon Vygotsky's conceptions of historical formation of knowledge (Scribner 1985) four levels of contributions: (i) phylogenetic (i.e. the evolving practices of the human species); (ii) the social cultural (i.e. the particular culturally derived practices); (iii) situational (i.e., the situationally manifested instance of that practice); and, (iv) the ontogenetic (i.e., the contributions which arrived from individuals' personal history) (Billett 1996, 2003) were identified. Phylogenetic development refers to the need for humans, for example, to have their hair cut and dressed; the particular culturally derived approach to hairdressing (i.e., sociocultural); how hairdressing was enacted in

particular situated circumstances of practice (i.e., situational); and, what individual hairdressers brought to their learning of and conduct of that occupational practice (i.e., personal histories). It was found that relations between the situation and the person were both salient and relational (Billett 2003). Whereas the phylogenetic and sociocultural levels were in many ways dis-embedded or abstracted from actual practice, the particular workplaces (e.g., hairdressing salons) where the occupational practice was enacted, the need for it to be undertaken, the problems solved and, the requirements for performance, which were made manifest and were judged (Billett 1998) were situationally embedded. Yet, how individual came to engage in and learn through those situated practices were mediated by personal factors.

This four-level framework has proven helpful in delineating different domains of knowledge (i.e. canonical, situational, personal), and to elaborate conceptions such as the situated nature of expertise, what constitutes transfer or adaptability, and also understanding both learning and development through its emphasis on the relations between individuals practising and the circumstances of practice (Billett 2005, 2006). This line of inquiry was enacted over the next years through a series of detailed studies of how people learn in workplaces, some of which were up to two years in length (Billett 2001b). Throughout, the relationship between the person and the situation emerged as being an important explanatory principle, regardless of whether the learning occurred through everyday practice or through training or educational interventions.

Consideration of relations between persons and the workplace setting was highlighted in a proposition advanced by Scribner (1997/1990) that having overturned Cartesian dualism, the task now is to understand the relations between social factors and human behaviour. She asserted that these relations are irreducible: suggesting that to separate the two was like attempting to separate sodium and chloride, and still expect saltiness. In many ways, what Scribner proposed has framed much of the focus for my enquiries in the subsequent two decades. That is, to understand the relations between the person acting and the social circumstances in which they are acting, and how this explains human cognition, learning and adaptability and also the enactment and remaking of occupational practice.

Yet, despite what is often proposed as Cartesian dualism, de Carte (Cottingham et al. 1988) had realised the importance of these relations. As early as 1644, in Principles (part one S48, 1, 208–209) he noted that the mind and body are separable in principle, but are in fact in a 'close and intimate union'. Later, in his final major publication—The Passions of the Soul in 1649, he outlined the strong association between human passion and desire and human thinking and acting. However, he is not alone in reaching conclusions towards the end of a career about the importance of human passion and desire in shaping the nature and the kind of human activity and learning. In his final work—The History of Sexuality (volume 3), Foucault (1986) claimed that no amount of surveillance and control can suppress desire. Here the importance of understanding the relation between the social world and personal practices is paramount. Also, far from being irreconcilable, these relations are inevitable for understanding human action and learning. So, beyond being guided by Scribner's challenge, Miller and Goodnow (1995) advised that, when

considering these phenomena, it is important to negotiate a pathway between the twin hazards of individual constructivism and social determinism. Indeed, it is that challenge and these outcomes that led to a strong focus on trying to understand the dualities that comprise the relation between the worker and the occupations they practice and the workplaces in which that practice occurs.

My Project and Dualities

Much of the explanatory concepts that have emerged through program in inquiry have focused on dualities of the kind referred to above. Given some misunderstandings about this word, it is worthwhile reiterating what dualities comprise. That is, unlike dualisms—two entities which are separate and not reconcilable, dualities referred to the opposite—two entities which are richly interlinked and linked to each other. Dualities are helpful in seeking to explain how individuals learn through working life. For instance, both co-participation at work and participatory practices are founded on the duality between workplace affordances and individual engagement. Affordances comprise the invitational qualities extended or suggested by work settings (Billett 2001c): i.e. how individuals are invited to participate. That invitation can variously be welcoming and supportive, or minimal or even rejecting or actively inhibiting individuals' participation in work and learning. However, beyond affordances, are the bases from which, and means by which individuals elect to engage with what is afforded them. That is, how they take up the invitations being afforded. These practices were referred to as being co-participatory (Billett et al. 2004). Later, the concept of relational interdependence was advanced to refer to both the interdependence between the person and social setting, but also its relational and person-dependent qualities (Billett 2006). These relations were not evenly shared, uniformly enacted or perceived. So, the relational qualities of individuals' interactions came to the forefront of these explanations. Within subsequent analyses the centrality of interdependence has been sustained, as has individuals' personal epistemologies as the means by which individuals came to engage with what was afforded or suggested to them in and through their work. Going beyond epistemological beliefs, personal epistemologies comprise the capacities of and ways in which individuals come to construe and construct from what they experience. That is, they mediate the process of experiencing, and therefore, learning.

Dualities are well acknowledged and represented in accounts of learning and education. In terms of the project of human learning, rich learning of the knowledge required for occupational practice is understood to be dependent on the kinds of activities and interactions available to those who are learning, and, on the other hand, how learners engage with them. In terms of the educational project, experiences provided in educational institutions and practice settings are nothing more or less than invitations to change. Ultimately, how individuals take up that invitation is salient to what they learn. The distinctions that Wertsch (1998) makes between

appropriation and mastery are worth noting. Mastery is a superficial form of learning which arises for individuals who comply with what is being socially suggested. However, although apparent compliance does not mean individuals are committed to have learnt that knowledge or are convinced by it. They have simply mastered the requirements to meet external demands. When acting independently however, means they are unlikely to utilise that knowledge. Conversely, for Wertsch (1998) appropriation comprises individuals' enthusiastic engagement and taking up of what they have experienced and making it part of themselves. So, these two forms of engagement are premised upon how individuals elect to respond to that particular experience and, how and what they learn from those experiences.

Together, these precepts have guided much of my considerations of occupational practice and its learning, and anchored the centrality of interdependencies in my theorising of how individuals have come to mediate what they experience and learning across working life. Yet, an enduring concern that affects that mediation is how occupations are societally privileged as this shapes how they come to be viewed as worthwhile and worthy of personal and societal investment.

Societal Privileging of Occupational Practice

The standing and worth of occupational practice is deeply rooted in societal values and relations. Indeed, across human history it has been 'privileged others' who have decided the worth of occupational practice: aristocrats, theocrats, bureaucrats and academics (Billett 2011b). Moreover, decisions about conceptions of occupational practice are most often advanced in the absence of those who practice voices. This has led to distorted understandings and an uninformed basis of what constitutes these occupation, the knowledge required to practice them, and how that knowledge can be learnt. Taking some examples, for Plato, artisans and artists' work belonged to that side of life which the average freeborn Greek (male) citizen regarded as banausic and unworthy of his serious attention (Lodge 1947). Similarly, Aristotle claimed that 'citizens must not lead the life of mechanics or tradesmen, which is ignoble and far from conducive of virtue' (1964, p. 40 as cited in Elias 1995). Aristophanes referred to potters as 'stupid buffoons' because of the work they do. Plato also suggests that the nurse and the tutor were of no worth for anything else. Moreover, Plato claimed that artisans were incapable of generating new ideas themselves. Instead, "they have to wait for God to invent a solution" to their problems (Farrington 1966, p. 105). He conclude, not surprisingly, that the "lowest form of education was to be for those who work with their hands and not their minds" which was referred to as technical from the Greek *techne* (Elias 1995). So, these aristocrats claimed that not only was the work undertaken by these practitioners of low worth, but also they themselves were of low worth and incapable of complex thought. Whilst it has been suggested that in Homeric Greece there was a more benign approach to the standing of occupations, the above kinds of sentiments were not restricted to Greece. In Imperial Rome, Cicero stated that "… now in

regard to trades and employments, which are to be considered illiberal… all craftsmen are engaged in mean trades, for no workshop can have any quality appropriate to a free man" [De officiis (On Duties)].

Similarly, elsewhere and later in human history, theocrats as powerful social elites also expressed sentiments about the worth of work based on their own precepts. The word vocation has its Latin root as 'vocare', which is to call—a summons, a bidding, an invitation to a particular way of life. However, that invitation was based upon a particular set of views and beliefs about what constituted worthwhile work. For instance, "some economic activities were seen as being distinctively more 'perilous to the soul' than others and the more commercial the motive the more dangerous activity became" (Rehm 1990, p. 130). Hence, the valuing of occupations was again premised on the sentiments of privileged others: theocrats. Even within Calvinism, where work was set to reshape the world in the fashion of the divine 'kingdom-come' through dedicated labours of particular kinds and in ways that reflected theological rather than personal purposes (Dawson 2005). Within such traditions, daily work became the design and location for what became characterised as the so-called Protestant or puritan work ethic. That is, for individuals to labour unquestioningly and without disrupting the status quo, which included particular religious beliefs and values. Marx critiqued this sentiment as being instances of workers being duped into false consciousness. What he proposed was that this societal sentiment was reducing workers to being mere ciphers and subject to the demands of societal elites and directly contributing to their own servitude and enslavement to such elites. While such criticism has validity and has been rehearsed more recently in accounts of democrat work and workplaces, it again emphasises again the sentiment of another kind of societal elite (academics and commentators) much of what is written is advanced in the absence of the voices of those who practice). That is, an elite view is that if individuals found satisfaction, interest and fulfilment in their work, then they were being duped. If, however, workers were dissatisfied and critical of their work, they were being socially emancipated. Again, what this rehearses is a continuation of socially privileged views that have failed to account for the perspectives of those who work.

More contemporaneously, bureaucratic and sectoral accounts have made distinctions and allocate worth amongst occupations. The formation of modern nation states led to the rise of bureaucratic control, much of that was associated with securing and maintaining those states. Initially, when they were being formed there was the need for a strong emphasis on switching allegiance from individuals' estates to the state. That is, rather than having an allegiance to the local lord upon whose land individuals lived, the guild that workers were associated with or the professional association, those allegiances had to be first and foremost directed to the state. This then led to interventions of different kinds, most noticeably the destruction of the guilds in republican France, because their associations with the Ancient Regime, and their dismantling and re-establishment under bureaucratic control in Germany, for instance. Hence, occupations were classified and sorted bureaucratically.

So, although a key outcome of modernity was the rise of individualisation, that rise needed to be broadly aligned with the state's interests (Quicke 1999), part of which is to delineate occupations into hierarchies. For example, the development of what is now referred to as the professions also arose from a concern to delineate and create hierarchies in work that were a product of societal changes arising from various industrial revolutions. In essence, parts of the changes that comprised modernity were to generate a new set of occupations associated with science and technology reflecting changes in the kinds of work to be undertaken. In particular, those occupations that were held to offer clean and decent work were those privileged by societal elites and growing middle class. Part of this delineation was to emphasise occupations that were deemed worthy of a level education that was higher than schooling. Although the virtues of the liberal higher education are often made, its key intent was occupational (Roodhouse 2007). That is clean non-manual work, employment as befits the kind of education that provided pathways for the children of the upper middle classes to gain employment in the public service and in diplomacy. Hence, these mechanisms were used to generate and extend societal sentiment that allocates different kinds of worth on different occupations and emphasises those that are seen to be 'clean', despite some obvious contradictions (i.e. the work that surgeons do).

It is noteworthy that in the Table 4.1, sentiments identifiable at the time of Plato are still being rehearsed in terms of what is seen as being desirable occupations in the twenty-first century. In this table, a scale of the social desirability of occupations is presented. It is noteworthy that the hierarchy of desirability is characterised by the so-called mental-manual divide, and that the knowledge required to manufacture things (i.e. techne) features most strongly in the lower levels of desirability. For instance, Class III work involves routine non-manual activities (e.g. clerical work) is seen to be more socially desirable than the work of the self-employed, technicians and skills manual workers. Within all of this delineation and hierarchies of work, also come different demands and requirements for the recognition of work and the discretion afforded to workers.

So, just as earlier, Plato had suggested that tutors were no use for anything else, with the development of modern nation states often came the formation of mass education systems to align individuals with the goals and values of these states, and avoid threats to those states. Over time, this alignment between states interests and

Table 4.1 Occupational social desirability (Hope-Goldthorpe Scale 1974)

Class	Occupations
Class I	High-grade professionals, managers, administrators and large proprietors
Class II	Lower grade professionals and managers, and higher grade technicians
Class III	Routine non-manual workers
Class IV	Small proprietors and the self-employed
Class V	Lower grade technicians and supervisors of manual workers
Class VI	Skilled manual workers
Class VII	Semi-skilled and unskilled manual workers

education has led to a growing regulation of teachers' work and often clear imperatives arising from the bureaucratic provision of education directed towards controlling what teachers do, what they teach, how that teaching occurs and how students' learning is assessed. All too often, these very measures are undertaken without reference to or consultation with those who teach, as Plato would have suggested.

So, the point made here is that across human history, it has been privileged others who have issued the call, made judgements about occupations, and have advanced views of their worth, and organised educational provisions accordingly. It might be easy to view this as being an issue of the past, but as the examples above indicate, the regulation of teachers' work in contemporary times is but one of a number of instances of this sentiment continuing. Indeed, the kinds of values that were laid down in Hellenic Greece by the likes of Aristotle and Plato still seemingly frame much of the views of what constitutes worthwhile work, the delineations between what is erroneously taken as mental and manual work and placing low values on the capacities to produce goods.

Academics

However, it is not only aristocrats, theocrats and bureaucrats that contribute to distorting societal sentiment about work and delineating in unhelpful ways the requirements for work and occupational standing. Academics have also contributed to this exercise. Again, it seems that much of the views expressed without bothering to engage with those who work. For instance, Bauman (1998) states that "…the majority of people [are] locked into meaningless and degrading work that offer little opportunity for notoriety or fulfilment" (p. 36). He goes on to suggest that such activities are not worthy of individuals key life projects. Yet, it is not at all clear whether these views were formed through engaging in discussions with the individuals to whom he refers. Similarly, Wright Mills (1973) who did interview some workers came up with the conclusion that "For most employees, work has generally unpleasant quality. If there is little Calvinistic compulsion to work among propertyless factory workers or clerks, there is also little bit Renaissance exuberance in the work of the insurance clerk freight handler, or department store sales lady" (p. 3). Yet, it is clear that he did not interview sufficient numbers to make conclusions about entire classes of workers and those who work. Dewey (1916) was far more circumspect. He proposed that the worth of occupational practice is essentially what it means to those who enact it and also their associates. "A vocation means nothing but such direction in life activities as renders them perceptibly significant to a person, because of the consequences they accomplish, and are also useful to his (sic) associates" (p. 307). Pusey (2003), whose research projects interviewed and surveyed large numbers of Australian workers, also reached similar conclusions claiming that work was a social protein that buttressed individuals' sense of self. Similarly, Noon and Blyton (1997) referred to the diversity of work in

the ways in which workers' experiences emphasise both satisfaction with work and alienation from it and how this is expressed through patterns of cooperation and resistance to work.

Much of this second set of sentiments seems to be more closely aligned with the findings of research projects I have conducted about individuals' engagement with work and working life. Even those who are employed in forms of work that others might view to be low status and demeaning (e.g. production process workers, employees in a wholesale fruit and vegetable market) report satisfaction in their work and finding meaning within it. Moreover, these workers reported taking pride in what they do and being seen as being effective in that work. Furthermore, surprisingly across a series of studies was the extent of discretion that workers had, but their emphasis on needing to perform that work effectively. Hence, necessarily, even low status forms of work and seemingly precarious forms of employment afforded levels of discretion which were engaged with by the informants that were interviewed. This is not to suggest that all individuals' work is rewarding and that all individuals find worth within it. However, it does contest the delineation of work on the basis of societal sentiment about its worth. Ultimately, the valuing of work, what constitutes occupational practice and how it is enacted will be mediated by the individuals who practice. Hence, it is important to understand the role of the personal plays in accounting for what constitutes occupational practice, how is it enacted, and in what ways is individuals' learning about it and the development of occupational practice.

Positioning the Personal

It follows that the positioning of the person in the enactment and remaking of the social practice and learning in and through it becomes clear. Although the individual or the personal is often seen as being oppositional to or antithesis of the social, quite the opposite is the case. That is, the personal is the epitome of the social. It arises through individuals' ontogenetic development that comprises the ongoing negotiations amongst the contributions of the individual, the social world and brute facts across individuals' life histories. What individuals have suggested to them every day by the social world shapes what they know, can do and value. But it is also the brute factors of nature such a maturity that also influences how we experience and our responses to it. As we age, hearing may be less acute, sight less clear and our expectations about what we can and are able to do is transformed. These comprise bases upon which individuals construe what they experience and construct knowledge from what that process of experiencing that arises through socially derived processes engaged in everyday across individuals' life histories. So, individuals' processes of experiencing are themselves a product of earlier or premediate experiences that are often socially derived (Valsiner and van der Veer 2000). As Harre (1995) suggests "personality becomes socially guided and individually constructed in the course of human life. People are born as potential

persons, in the process of becoming actual persons takes place through the individual transformation of social experience" (p. 373). Hence, these processes are person dependent by degree. The cultural psychologist Valsiner (2000) refers to socially derived everyday experience being unique to individuals in some way. This is salient because it is human's intentionality and agency that shapes their meaning making.

Individuals and the Social Suggestion

The product of social efforts and suggestions is not and cannot be some uniform construction, as implied in the concept of socialisation. Socio-geneses is not uniformity of experiences and experiencing. Instead, the social suggestion is constructed personally in many ways. Here, for instance, it is worth distinguishing between occupations and vocations. Occupations are those that arise from the social world and social need. Humans need doctors, nurses, hairdressers, carpenters, etc. to address their needs. Those occupations transform over time as social requirements and expectations change and practices of these occupations are transformed by new discoveries, technologies and ways of being practised. Yet, these are institutional facts (Searle 1995). They arise from the social world. However, in contrast, vocations are personal facts. That is, individuals elect what constitutes their vocations and the degree by which they will exercise their effort and interests to engage with them. As noted, the word is derived from 'vocare', what calls the individual to engage with it. Individuals have to assent to an occupation being their vocation. No amount of social press can make an individual want to engage wholeheartedly and effortfully with an occupational practice that they do not take to be their own. But, more than that, not only is it assenting to accepting an occupation as a vocation, but it is how it is enacted—practised. What individuals brings to the enactment of the occupation—the knowledge about it, capacities to enact and values associated with it, comprise the occupation in practice. Without the person, there is nothing being practised. What that person brings, not only gives life to the practice but also shapes it in particular ways. Dewey uses the example of a small room with nothing in it apart from a window and telescope, to meet this point. He suggests that to a brute realist the room seems relatively barren and constricted. However, to the astronomer who lives there it opens up on to the entire universe (Higgins 2005). Indeed, it is this personal mediation of experience—the process of experiencing, through which humans learn and come to practice. Factors associated with human capacities, intentionality and agency are those that shape what people do. Valsiner (1998) proposes that "most of human development takes place through the active ignoring, the neutralisation, of most of social suggestions to which the person is subject in everyday life" (p. 393). He goes on to suggest that this process of mediating what is experienced is essential to buffer individuals' personalities against the constant demands of social suggestions. He continues, "hence, what is usually viewed as socialisation efforts (by social institutions or parents) is

necessarily counteracted by the active recipients of such efforts and can neutralise or ignore a large number of such episodes, aside from single particularly dramatic ones" (p. 393). Moreover, Valsiner (2000) invites a reconsideration of some precepts which have long been established within theorising about the social world and human development. He suggests that the popular portrayal of Vygotsky's concept of the zone of proximal development is quite counter to what was originally intended, which was to give licence to the agency and intentionality of individuals.

> In play, the child is always higher than his (sic) average age, higher than his usual everyday behaviour; he is in play as if a head above himself. The play contains, in a condensed way, as if in the focus of a magnifying glass, all tendencies of development; it is as if the child in play tries to accomplish a jump above the level of his ordinary behaviour….Play is the resource of development and it creates the zone of near miss development. Action in the imaginary field, in the imagine situation, construction of voluntary intention, the formulation of life plan, will motivate, this all emerges in play. (Vygotsky 1966, pp. 74–75 as cited in Valsiner 2000)

His contemporary, Leontyev (1981) referred to appropriation as individuals making their own from what they experience in the social world.

Similarly, as was foreshadowed previously, Wertsch (1998) distinguishes between processes he refers to as mastery and appropriation. Appropriation is the effortful and full-blooded taking in of what is being suggested by the social world. Conversely, mastery is the superficial acceptance of what is being suggested that arises through social press, because individuals resist or are uninterested in appropriating that suggestion. A qualification here is that, appropriation and mastery are not to be seen as being inherently positive in the first case, and negative in the second. Individuals can enthusiastically engage in and appropriate bad practices and inappropriate values or misunderstandings. Equally, individuals might well engage in a process of mastery because they simply do not believe, agree, or value, what is being suggested to them. For instance, in one of the first critiques of the concept of 'communities of practice', Hodges (1998) pointed out that rather than participating in a community of practice and then inevitably leading to identifying with it, that quite the opposite could arise. Experiences of an early childhood education program led her to dis-identify with that particular community of practice.

Central here is the concept of individuals' ontogenies. That is, the development that has risen across personal histories, from the accumulation of individual processes of experiencing. Through having had experiences in particular social circumstances, individuals learn moment-by-moment from what they experience. This ongoing process of learning shapes what individuals know, can do, and value, and in ways that are quite person dependent, because the particular set of experiences individuals have had and how they have reconciled those experiences across their life histories. These occur, moment-by-moment, every day and in different ways across individuals' life histories. Consequently, there is an inevitability that individuals' mediation and construction of knowledge, and their role in remaking occupational practices, are person dependent by degree.

All of these propositions have consequences for the learning and practising of occupations?

Learning for and Transforming Practice: Personal Mediation

As individuals engage in their occupational practice, two kinds of legacies arise: learning and the remaking of occupational practice.

Learning Through Practice

As has been noted above, the process of engaging in thinking and acting is generative of change in individuals (i.e. learning). That change can comprise the construction of new knowledge (i.e. fresh concepts, novel perspectives, new means of achieving goals) that quantitatively and qualitatively can change what individuals know, can do, and value. So, when individuals have experiences that are novel for them in some way or ways, these kinds of legacies can arise. Of course, sometimes new experiences can be overwhelming and, as a consequence, the kind of changes that arises may be confusing or unhelpful. Nevertheless, novel experiences can lead to changes in individuals. Yet, here it is important to be reminded that what is a novel experience for one individual is a routine experience for another. Being confronted by a foreign language might be overwhelming for one individual, but for the individual for whom that language is native it is quite ordinary and routine. More likely, perhaps most frequently, throughout our everyday lived experience as adults, we hone and refine what we know, develop links and associations, and reinforce our sense of self and that about the world in which we engage. Hence, experiences which are routine and commonly encountered also have a legacy in terms of qualitatively and incrementally changing what we know, can do, and value, even through reinforcement and refinement. Again, what is familiar to individuals is person dependent, as is how they experience, construe and construct from those these experiences (i.e. the process of experiencing), and therefore, what they learn from them. Hence, in this and person-dependent ways, as individuals engage in thinking and acting within and across their working lives they are learning. Certainly, engaging in work activities and interactions are no exception. Indeed, the very goal-directed nature of work activities and interactions are those that require conscious engagement and are likely to be variously generative of new knowledge or the further development of what individuals already know. Yet, in all of this, it individuals' personal mediation of those experiences that shape what changes in what individuals, know, can do and value (i.e. learning arises).

Remaking and Transforming Occupational Practice

Beyond individuals' learning arising through every day experiencing, the activities that are engaged in are remade or transformed through their enactment. Just like other social norms, forms and practices, individuals' occupations are shaped by history, culture and situation. Yet, as occupational practice are enacted in particular circumstances of practice in responding to specific goals and through activities and interactions shaped by those situations, occupations are remade (Donald 1991). This consideration emphasises the importance of how cultural practices are maintained, refined and sustained through its enactment. Importantly, for a consideration of occupational practice there is a co-occurrence between individuals' learning and the remaking of the occupational practice (Billett et al. 2005). As individuals engage in their occupational practices incrementally, individually, and collectively, they are contributing to a process through which occupations are remade as requirements for occupational practice either stay the same or slowly change. In this way, rather than changes in occupational practices being characterised as some kind of tsunami of change sweeping all before it, it is more like thousands of small waves of different kinds and intensity which bring about that change. For instance, an occupation like nursing is increasingly confronted by not only an ageing population of patients but increased frequency of demented patients. It is predicted, that soon as many as a third of all patients in hospitals in Western countries will have issues of delirium and dementia beyond the particular health-related issues for which they are being treated. It will be doctors, nurses and other healthcare staff who will be responding to these challenges in their wards and remaking their occupational practices in response to these changes in patients.

Moreover, engagement in practice can also lead to the transformation of that practice as new circumstances arise and requirements change. Awareness of environmental damage has led to changes in practice associated with disposal of refrigerants, oil waste, and then understanding the dangers arising from construction workers encountering asbestos has led to transformations in renovation work. Some of these transformations to occupational practice can arise quite rapidly. For instance, the recent outbreak of Ebola led to new quarantining protocols as existing practices were found to be insufficient to contain the disease. Solutions had to be generated and implemented locally and quickly by healthcare staff. In this way, the practices of disease control work transformed. So, as Lave (1993) reminds us "knowledge always goes through reconstruction and transformation in use" (p. 8). What anthropology also provides are insights into the kinds of practice oriented curriculum and pedagogies that arise as part of the enactment of occupational practices and these support the remaking of occupational practices.

So, beyond individuals needing to access and engage with the occupational knowledge that arises through history, culture and situation, the very development of that occupational knowledge is dependent upon individuals acting on and with it

in responding to requirements for the occupation in particular circumstances. Hence, cultural practices such as occupations co-occur with individuals' learning, with both processes being mediated by personal factors.

Learning Through Practice

The learning of occupational practice provides an example of this kind of co-occurrence. Across human history the most common and sustained mode of initially learning occupations has been through the practice of those occupations. Family and local workplaces were common sites for that learning in Europe (Hanf 2002), Hellenic Greece (Lodge 1947), India (Menon and Varma 2010), Japan (Singleton 1989), Mesopotamia (Bennett 1938) and China (Ebrey 1996) to mention a few examples. In Europe, as perhaps in other places, family-based occupational preparation was largely displaced by industrialisation that destroyed family businesses which were perhaps the mainstay of local communities and economies (Gowlland 2012; Greinert 2002). However, that mode of learning has been central to humanity and human progress because not only was it about developing occupational capacities, but also their transformation. As foreshadowed, it seems that in these countries, and over time, the key process of learning occupations was through individuals' mediation of what they experienced in occupational practice. That is, through processes of observation, imitation, practice and action (Downey 2010). Collectively, these processes are referred to as mimetic learning. Importantly, this is a process of learning, rather than being taught. Indeed, the practice that is commonly refer to as teaching (i.e. the transmission of knowledge from a more informed to less informed social interlocutor) is a recent phenomenon and one linked to the formation of modern nation states and compulsory and universal education and the ubiquitous processes of 'schooling' and the need for this kind of didactic approach (Billett 2014b).

The important point here is that mimetic learning is largely personally mediated and arises through active engagement and construction of meaning and development of procedural capacities (Billett 2014a). Indeed, analogously, the word apprenticeship is derived from the word 'apprehend', inferring it is the learner's job to engage with and grasp the knowledge required for the occupation. Similarly, contemporary processes of apprenticeship learning in the Middle East have been described as apprentices having to steal the knowledge required for their occupation, rather than being given easy access to or taught it (Marchand 2008). The Japanese word for apprenticeship—'minarai', means one who learns by observation (Singleton 1989), and there is even a term 'minarai kyooiku', which refers to learning by in unobtrusive observation. Further "it is expected that serious learning will proceed unmediated by didactic instruction" (p. 26).

From a series of studies into how learning occurs in workplaces and across a range of industries and kinds of employment, three of the four key contributions to that learning were premised on individuals' participation (i.e., engaging in

goal-directed activities, observing and listening, engaging in practise) and only one (direct guidance of more experienced partner) was largely mediated by others (Billett 2001b). Hence, whilst not diminishing the importance of expert guidance, particularly when learning through discovery alone is insufficient, it is wrong to deny, minimise the importance of the personal mediation of experiences and learning. This is probably never more salient than in an era of schooling that privileges teaching and the organisation of educational experiences, often based around institutional imperatives, than students' learning.

The importance of what is proposed here is that the personal mediation of learning is an innate and foundational basis of human cognition and therefore, learning is central to how human society has evolved (Byrne and Russon 1998; Downey 2010; Plotkin 1994). Therefore, rather than the teaching of occupations being the starting point for considerations about developing occupational capacities, but rather their learning. As the anthropologist Jordan (1989) notes, "learning through observation and imitation … is important in all higher social animals, but it is humans who have developed this propensity into the primary modality for the acquisition of skills" (p. 931). So, although within 'schooled societies' there is propensity to view mimesis as mimicry (i.e. mere copying), but it is an important and foundational process through which humans make sense of what they experience and learn from those experiences. To utilise what is experienced requires an evaluation of it, and prediction of its applicability, and the reproduction of what has been experienced demands a level of engagement requiring higher forms of cognitive functions (Byrne and Russon 1998). Indeed, relatively simple imitative acts (i.e. copying another person's thumb movements) utilises a number of cognitive functions and sensory processes (Barsalou 2008), all of which are coordinated by higher forms of cognition. In all, mimetic processes do much to shape how we act, particularly when seeking to achieve particular kinds of goals such as in and through work (Meltzoff and Decety 2003).

However, given this complexity it is important that we move from a consideration of mimesis as observation, imitation, and rehearsal, through to a broader conception of mimetic learning. There are three key reasons for proposing this shift to a broader conception of personally mediated learning. First, the kind of sensory inputs that humans engage are not restricted to observation. There is also auditory, haptic, taste and olfactory contributions, and even peripetital sensations. Second, it is account for the contributions for the intra-psychological processes (i.e. those within the person) which include how the cognitive, sensory and nervous systems mediate what is experienced and are generative of responses. Indeed, it is timely to revisit the contributions of intra-psychological processes given the advances in our understandings that are being informed by developments within neuro and cognitive science. Given new findings about how the sensory (Barsalou 2003, 2009) and neural (Heyes 2005) systems engage with and has legacy associated with what is experienced socially, these contributions are informing in ways that have never been possible before. Third, there is a need to understand how mimesis can be augmented through other kinds of experiences that can support its efficacy. For instance, in studies from anthropology and history, it is possible to identify practice

curricula and pedagogies that can augment learning in ways that extends the potential of personally mediated experiences (Billett 2014b). It is important to account comprehensively for how the moment-by-moment learning (i.e. microgenetic development) arises in individuals and contributes to their ontogenetic development (i.e. that arising through the legacy of personal experiences), and how this development is shaped by the range of sensory contributions, need to be understood through both inter-personal and intra-personal processes, and there are means exercised in practice settings that support the remaking of practice that can be described as practice curriculum and pedagogies.

The Conceptual Promise

In sum and conclusion, proposed here is an account of understanding occupational practice and its learning which posits conceptual promise. First, it offers some reconciliation between nativist and empiricist perspectives of human development, some of which are premised upon recent findings from cognitive science. While nativists emphasise innate capacities within humans and empiricists hold that human capacities arises through experience, what is proposed here is that both of these contributions are important, with perhaps the innate capacities and foundational qualities of human cognition being a part of our phylogenetic development (i.e. across the history of the human species), the experiences individuals encounter are mediated but also mediate those innate capacities. Hence, it is the interaction between both the innate and the experienced that is essential to understand human learning and development.

Second, whilst learning and development are two separate concepts best captured in the distinction between microgenetic and ontogenetic forms of development, both are founded on interdependence between the person and the physical and social world they encounter. That is, the basis of learning and development is bidirectional and mediated by social sources and those from the brute world, and individuals' personal epistemologies and their mediation of what they experience. Interdependence refers to the need by individuals to engage with some of these sources to learn on the one hand, and, on the other, how institutional facts (i.e. those arising from the social world) require to be engaged with, remade and transformed for them to exist.

Importantly, and thirdly, this theorising contributes to our understanding of the socio-genesis of knowledge. It extends a consideration of the social origins and contributions of knowledge and knowing to individuals' personal histories and ontogenies. There is nothing more social than the personal. It also questions the Vygotskian premise of knowledge arising first on the social plane and then becoming an intra-psychological attribute. How can anything be experienced if there is no basis for that experiencing? To deny the innate contributions of individuals' cognitive, neural and sensory systems, let alone what they have learnt across their lives, and the capacities and understandings that they have developed,

suggests a very poor theorisation as Wertsch and Tulviste (1992) suggested long ago. Indeed, all of this suggests that inter-psychological processes cannot be understood without a consideration of the intra-psychological. Finally and importantly, for a consideration of learning occupational practice, all of this elaborates human occupational practices as being mediated relationally across culture, situation and personal facts including brute facts which are part of our own personal experiencing.

In all, here the co-ocurrence of human learning and development, and the remaking and transformation of cultural practices has been posited and elaborated, with an emphasis on the personal mediation as being central to this concurrence.

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Chapter 5
Practice, the Body and Pedagogy: Attuning as a Basis for Pedagogies of the Unknown

Nick Hopwood

Abstract   This chapter articulates a distinctive connection between practice, the body and pedagogy. Linking these is the idea of attuning, conceived as relational, corporeal and enacted. In this way, binaries between mind and body, knowing and doing, self and other, teacher and learner are disrupted. The account of embodied pedagogy also explores how such work is done when it is not clear at the outset what is to be learned, and where knowledge informing what to do is unstable, incomplete and fragile. This is framed in terms of 'pedagogy of the unknown', conceptualised here as emergent, consistent with practice theoretical and sociomaterial approaches. The analysis draws on an ethnographic study of professional practices in a parent education service supporting families with young children deemed to be at risk. The pedagogic role in these practices has been intensified through changing relations between professionals and clients, referred to here as partnership. Theorising pedagogic work in practices not traditionally regarded as educational in nature casts new light on the demands placed on professionals through contemporary shifts in the relational basis of professional work, referred to more broadly in terms of coproduction.

Introduction

This chapter articulates a distinctive connection between practice, the body and pedagogy. Linking these is the idea of attuning, conceived as relational, corporeal and enacted. In this way, binaries between mind and body, knowing and doing, self and other, teacher and learner are disrupted. I discuss 'pedagogies of the unknown', referring to situations where it is not clear at the outset what is to be learned, and

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where knowledge informing what to do is unstable, incomplete and fragile. Pedagogy is seen here as emergent, consistent with practice theoretical and sociomaterial approaches (see Reich and Hager 2014; Hager 2011; Hopwood 2016b). My analysis draws on an ethnographic study of professional practices in a parent education service supporting families with young children deemed to be at risk (see Clerke and Hopwood 2014; Hopwood 2013, 2014a–e, 2015a–c, 2016a, b; Hopwood and Clerke 2012; Hopwood and Clerke 2016). The pedagogic role in these practices has been intensified through changing relations between professionals and clients, referred to here as partnership, but connecting with broader spread of coproduction as a focus in practice reform. This underpins the case for exploring growing demands on professionals to act pedagogically in work not traditionally conceived in this way.

I describe an approach to pedagogy that relies on professionals attuning to the bodies and objects around them. Two further steps of explaining to learners (clients) why what has been noticed is significant, and then attributing agency to them as the locus for change, complete a sequence that transforms mundane, often overlooked features into pedagogically valuable resources. This is a highly embodied and responsive pedagogy, much more than simply a 'teachable moment'. I link practice theory with Vygotskian ideas, arguing that the second and third steps in the sequence bring learners into a 'space of reasons' (Derry 2008), making links between the concrete and conceptual that have inferential rather than just representational meaning.

The argument of the paper unfolds through a series of philosophical, conceptual, and empirical moves. The notion of attuning developed here is a strongly embodied one, so I begin by briefly setting this against historically problematic treatment of bodies in scholarship. Contemporary practice theory provides one way to attend to the body in more productive ways, and thus constitutes a broader philosophical and theoretical basis for the chapter. Specifically, this enables us to consider body and mind in more entangled and performative (or enacted) ways—a move that is crucial in unpicking attuning and its relation to pedagogies of the unknown. It is to the 'unknown' features that I then turn. I arrive again at the relevance of practice theory, but this time through consideration of changing relations between professions and clients. I argue that these place professionals in a somewhat ambiguous pedagogic role, where what the client is to learn cannot be specified in advance. This strike at the heart of contemporary theories framed around metaphors of emergence, and places a further conceptual foundation for the account of attuning that follows. I use the idea of 'epistemic dilemmas' to convey the knowledge challenges that professionals face in this kind of relational work, prefiguring a close grip on questions of knowledge as the body that is maintained throughout the chapter.

Before going further, I will rehearse the main advance of the chapter by outlining the distinctive notion of attuning that is developed and empirically illustrated below. My conceptualisation of 'attuning' is heavily infused by practice theory. It invokes the body, but not (just) as physical entity, rather as entangled with mind, knowing and other bodies. Cartesian dualism and clear-cut individual subjectivity are rejected. Attuning as discussed here points to bodily effort of professionals as they attune to their surrounds—noticing, attending to, interpreting, and making

meaning. I make no clear distinction between perception and conception, but work instead with a Schatzkian notion of practical intelligibility in which meaning cannot be separated from unfolding practices. I suggest attuning is central to ways in which professionals resolve the epistemic dilemmas associated with pedagogies of the unknown. Thus, I bring questions of the body into direct dialogue with questions of knowledge, expertise and learning.

The Body, Mind and Practice

Jackson (1983) argued that the subjugation of the bodily to the mental or verbal is epistemologically fallacious and contradicts our experience of the body as a lived reality. However, the tendency to marginalise the body in accounts of educational practices has persisted. Cartesian metaphors continue to underpin separation of mind from body and the location of (rational) thought in the mind and (irrational) affect in the body (Barnacle 2009). 'Scientific' knowledge writes the body out, supposedly, to protect rationality and objectivity (Dale 2001, cited in Haynes 2008). Professionals appear as mindful and bodyless (Ellingson 2006, 2015) or 'empty workers' (Acker 1990). Much scholarship remains haunted by the idea of the body as biological, devoid of expertise (Boyer 2005).

Breaking away from Cartesianism is not easy (Hodkinson 2005). Fortunately, the resources for doing so are multiplying, and the reward of pursuing alternatives becoming increasingly apparent. Feminist approaches have unsettled mind/body separations (Butler 1993; Grosz 1994), questioning conventional ways of conceiving the boundaries of the body (Weiss 1999a, b). This disrupts conventional distinctions between bodies and things (Haraway 1991), the knower and known (Barad 2007, 2013). Contemporary practice theory offers novel tools for rethinking the body in pedagogy, drawing in valuable ideas from such work and social philosophy more broadly (see Green and Hopwood 2015b). I draw on a number of practice theoretical ideas in building distinctive, embodied concepts of attuning and pedagogy. These are performative notions of corporeality that help to foreground the 'knowingness' of the body in practice.[1]

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[1]I wish to acknowledge, explicitly, the partial approach to 'the body' that I take in this chapter. I anticipate that many readers will notice the absence of reference to bodies as gendered, raced, aged, (dis)abled, and so on. I do not dispute the importance of these aspects, nor do I suggest they are irrelevant to the argument presented here. There are already a number of new ideas and connections to grapple with, and so for reasons of conceptual economy and parsimony, I feel the present focus is warranted. I expect that the practice theoretical concept of attuning and the understanding of its links to questions of pedagogy and the body would be advanced and enriched by analyses that pay deliberate attention to gender, race, age, ability and other issues that remain lacunae in the present discussion.

Epistemic Dilemmas and Pedagogies of the Unknown

Changes in the relational basis of professional services raise important questions about practice, expertise and the nature of learning and pedagogy. Shifting relationships between professionals and service users are variously referred to as coproduction (Boyle and Harris 2009; Fenwick 2012; Needham 2006), co-configuration (Edwards 2012; Engeström 2007), or partnership (Davis and Day 2010; Gallant et al. 2002; Hopwood 2014d). These move away from a notion of clients as passive consumers or recipients of services in which problems are solved on their behalf. The public have been imagined as 'doers, not the done-for' (Boyle and Harris 2009), associated with alluring notions of empowerment and equality. Seductive as these ideas are, they do not come without challenges. Professional practices reconstituted on new relational terms can give rise to epistemic dilemmas, in which the nature, status and content of knowledge are brought into question, and in which the professional has to act pedagogically amid uncertainty as to what should be learned (see Hopwood 2016a, b).

This can be linked to what Edwards (2010) describes as a 'relational' turn in expertise. Rather than seeing expertise in terms of knowledge held by individuals, expertise has come to be viewed as relational in its focus, constitution and accomplishment. Relating with others is seen as part of what professionals are expert at, what their expertise is *focused on*. This accompanies rather than replaces specialist expertise in particular professional domains. The relational *constitution* of expertise refers to the idea that expertise is not wholly contained within an individual mind/body, but is socially and materially distributed. The relational *accomplishment* of expertise means that expertise is not simply owned, a possession that, but is rather something that is done, emerging through relationships in practice (see Gherardi 2006; Hager 2011). The concept of attuning that I present in this chapter builds on these assumptions.

Practices are emergent (see Reich and Hager 2014; Schatzki 2010). This means that the knowledge required to perform as a professional cannot be fully specified in advance (see Hager 2011; Hopwood 2016b). Whether working with clients, patients, students or pupils, pedagogic practices cannot be reduced to routines repeated without difference, or with differences so minor that they present no knowledge challenge to professionals. There is always a degree of the unknown and unknowable in professional work. This can be considered as a gap between stable, shared bodies of specialist expertise and the knowledge required to go on successfully in particular moments. The quest for the knowledge needed to practice is never finished. There is a recurring imperative for the professional to learn in the course of work.

The need to learn as one goes about work is not a particularly novel idea, and may often be resolved unproblematically. However, the uncertainty described above presents particular difficulties when it converges with 'what is to be learned' in practices where professionals take on pedagogic responsibility. By this I mean

situations, where there is a clear intention that one or more people should learn, and that the professional is expected to guide, facilitate and support that learning. School teaching, university lecturing, and workplace training are all familiar examples. Other professional practices are increasingly constituted around pedagogic responsibility, albeit perhaps less obviously. This includes the work of child and family health practitioners who build resilience in families with young children. Relationships based on partnership or coproduction involve different roles and responsibilities for the professional and client. One key focus of this difference concerns the pedagogic imperative—that the professional should help the service user(s) learn. This is not to say that the professionals do not learn from clients, patients, students. Indeed, the concept of attuning explicitly points to professionals learning from, about and with such others.

Many practices now involve pedagogic responsibilities. Why, then do emergence and associated properties of uncertainty and unknowability create a problem? If we are to help another person learn, it helpful to know what she should learn. In formal education a large degree of uncertainty (but by no means all of it) is removed by prior specification of content and learning outcomes. But what if there is no curriculum? What if we do not, and cannot, know what the person we are trying to help should learn? What if we do not, and cannot, know what aspects of our specialist knowledge will have a useful bearing on the work we are going to do together? What if large parts of what we do know about the people we are working with cannot be treated as stable, complete or robust? Then we must lead others down an unknown learning path where much of the knowledge informing this is changing, partial and fragile. This confronts professionals with what I term *epistemic dilemmas*. They are thrown into a position in which straightforward relationships between what they know and what they should do break down. Thus, they must enact *pedagogies of the unknown.*[2]

I am not suggesting that everything is unknown. Wide bodies of specialist knowledge remain relevant and active. The client is also assumed to bring relevant knowledge to bear in discussing what direction joint work should take, and how to get there. Neither epistemic dilemmas nor pedagogies of the unknown implies a knowledge vacuum. Prior knowledge influences what happens and contributes to what is learned, but new knowledge also emerges, and the nature of such influence and contribution cannot be specified in advance. I would speculate that such dilemmas and unknown characteristics are not absent from pedagogic relations even where features such as a detailed curriculum might suggest otherwise.

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[2]The phrase 'pedagogies of the unknown' is used by Benadusi (2014) to describe pedagogies of resilience in disaster risk education. My use of the phrase carries some meanings forward (particularly around flexibility and dynamism) but inflects the idea with particular and new meaning through its folding into a wider practice theoretical framework.

Professional Setting: Supporting Parents in Families at Risk

Having outlined the skeleton of the key concepts and relevant aspects of their theoretical underpinnings, I will now introduce the professional practice setting that provides the empirical reference throughout the remainder of this chapter. Services for families with young children are often delivered by professionals from a range of fields including child and family health nursing, social work, speech and language pathology, psychology, psychiatry and paediatrics. The focus of such services may include providing assistance with issues relating to infant sleep and settling, breastfeeding, managing challenging toddler behaviour, coping with chronic conditions and mental health. Such challenges may pose threats to child and family wellbeing, with lasting consequences if left unaddressed. The philosophy of early intervention is supported by extremely strong evidence that suggests multiple benefits of providing professional support for parents (see Hopwood 2016b).

It clearly makes sense to support parents who experience challenges in giving their children the best possible start in life. However, doing so effectively requires sensitive approaches. Parents who are already vulnerable can feel judged and disempowered when confronted with a professional who knows the answers and points (implicitly or otherwise) to flaws in their practices. We know that parenting is one of the strongest influences on child development and well-being, yet there are no universal recipes for effective parenting that apply across family, community, historical and cultural contexts. Parents are less likely to follow through on advice from professionals if they do not feel listened to and actively involved in decision-making (Davis and Fallowfield 1991).

It is crucial to better understand the kind of practices and expertise that such approaches demand. With this in mind, a number of scholars have turned to concepts of learning and pedagogy. The role of the professional is not to solve problems for families, but to help them learn. To do so, the professional must learn about, from and with these families. Thus such work has been described as 'reciprocal learning' (Fowler et al. 2012). Fowler and Lee (2007) question the notion of knowledge transfer between professional and service users. They suggest learning and emergent forms of knowing are more helpful concepts. I have described this kind of work on Vygotskian terms (Hopwood 2015c), highlighting its pedagogic aspects (Hopwood 2014c, 2015c, 2016a, b). I will return to Vygotsky later in this chapter, in connection with the space of reasons.

While a nurse might be familiar with a wide range of approaches for settling young children, she cannot know which of these will be appropriate in terms of being acceptable to parents, matching their family practices, and producing desirable effects. Even though components of professional expertise provide a recurring basis for content to be learned (such as attaching meaning to children's cries), they are always reshaped as they are brought to bear with particular parents. There are nearly always new knowledge issues at hand, too. For example, if a parent is encouraged to give her child practice falling asleep in a cot rather than in arms, then the pedagogy concerns how conditions favouring such practice can be put in place.

This requires detailed knowledge of family life, domestic arrangements and so on, and is never merely a question of selecting from a range of pre-existing solutions.

Professionals' generic specialist knowledge is relatively stable and robust. However, what they come to know about each family is unstable, incomplete and fragile. Even 'facts' like how many children a parent has might change (one mother gave different answers, depending on whether she included a child who had died). Elsewhere I have described how parents' goals change from day to day, while new knowledge emerges, bearing on what and how parents might learn in order to meet those goals. For example, midway through one week, staff learned that a father could not read and write, and had difficulty controlling aggressive behaviour (see Hopwood 2016a). Such ambiguities around what is (not) known, and the status of knowledge contribute to the epistemic difficulties encountered in this kind of work. I theorise the response to this dilemma in practice theoretical terms as a process of attuning, through a knowing body and embodied knowledge. Before turning to theory in more detail, I will give brief details of the research underpinning this chapter.

Empirical Context

The study was based at the Residential Unit of Karitane in Carramar, Sydney. The Unit accepts around ten families each week for a five-day stay, and is staffed by a team representing many of the professions mentioned above (see Hopwood and Clerke 2012; Hopwood 2014a–d, 2015a–c, 2016a, b). Data were generated through asymmetrical team ethnographic methods, with Teena Clerke (see Clerke and Hopwood 2014; Hopwood 2013, 2014e, 2015b). Most observations involved shadowing members of staff, and were enriched through sketching, photography and document collection. Families are referred to the Unit for help with parenting children under the age of four, and the Unit specialises in taking on complex cases where multiple risk factors or forms of vulnerability may be present.

Karitane has adopted the Family Partnership Model (FPM; Davis and Day 2010; Day et al. 2015) as a particular approach to working with families. The FPM constitutes a specific articulation of coproduction. It frames the work of supporting families as a helping process, emphasising a negotiated, joint approach. In the FPM expertise of both professionals and parents comes together. A professional might challenge an unhelpful idea (especially by identifying strengths in parents when they may feel they are lacking) and suggest strategies to a parent, but the process of trying out particular ideas and assessing their worth and effectiveness is done jointly, and with constant reference to parents' goals and values. Professionals on the Unit do not solve problems for families. Rather, they use their expertise to support parents' learning. Attuning enables professionals to lead this pedagogy while coping with the uncertainties and ambiguities that characterise the knowledge involved. My analysis of these practices foregrounds the body in particular ways, and so it is worth pausing here to dwell further in how practice theory might enable a distinctive way of handling questions of the body in practice.

The Body in Practice Theory

A now oft-cited passage from Schatzki (2001) provides a useful starting point, establishes the centrality of the body in practice theory:

> A central core, moreover, of practice theorists conceives of practices as embodied, materially mediated arrays of human activity centrally organized around shared practical understanding. (p. 2)

To take practices as a unit of analysis brings us immediately and inescapably to questions of the body. Importantly, this is a material body. The material and social bundle intimately because social practices are performed through bodily activities. These activities include not only doings and sayings, but 'fine shades' of behaviour, including the manner in which doings are carried out, and the tone of voice with which utterances are spoken (Schatzki 1996). What kind of body or corporeality is implied here? Schatzki (1996) writes:

> To be a body… is to be able to both perform bodily doings and sayings and to experience bodily sensations and feelings…. Being a body is but one component of embodiment, one that emphasizes the lack of experiential and conceptual disunity a person has with her body in normal circumstances of acting and experiencing. (p. 43)

There are parallels here with Green and Hopwood's (2015a) notion of the body as background.[3] This body is the one that does not require or engage our conscious attention as we perform particular activities. We do not try to hear, we simply hear. Barnacle (2009) argues that developing and sustaining a sense of self in relation to others is not merely or even primarily cerebral. Instead, she refers to a relational notion of self, an idea I take up through the notion of attuning. This body, the body we *are*, is entangled with mind, knowing and other bodies.

Schatzki (1996) refers also to 'having a body'. That we have a body becomes evident in breakdown, malfunction, discomfort and incompetence—when our bodies manifest themselves explicitly and demand our attention. This might be when in moments of struggle, for example when trying to see in the dark. The unity of self and body is undermined. For the professional expending bodily effort in attuning to her surrounds, although the body is hers, she is not identical with it, she has it.

Finally, Schatzki (1996) writes of the instrumental body. Through the performance of bodily actions, other actions are effected. There are parallels here with the body as resource (Green and Hopwood 2015a). By raising her arm, cupping her hand, placing it on a mother's shoulder, and speaking through a calm, quite voice, a nurse may reassure a parent that she is doing well in trying out a new settling

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[3]In connection with the first endnote: the argument is not that bodies can ever be completely backgrounded. There are many occasions when one's embodiment is far from something that can be ignored, for example when the body performing a practice deviates from norms of gender, age, race, ability (etc.) that are associated with that practice. However the point remains that there are aspects of the body that are backgrounded—however conspicuous the body is.

technique. Schatzki (1996) is clear: "In saying this, I do not mean that the body is an instrument that some disembodied will or intelligibility takes hold of, as it were, and exploits to achieve its ends" (p. 45).

Here we confront what Green and Hopwood (2015a) refer to as the body as metaphor. This challenges mind/body dualism, and the relegation of action to performance at the will of the mind. Schatzki (1996) conceives people as in-the-world via behaving and feeling bodies. By way of the body, mind is present in experience. I take this to mean that a distinction between perception and conception falls down—a point that informs my theorisation of attuning.

Schatzki's (2002) concepts of practical and general understanding are relevant. The former refers to know-how that enables people to carry out the actions it makes sense to perform. We understand with our bodies, and our performances are forms of understanding. The concept of general understandings points towards shared, relatively stable forms of expertise (at least in my appropriation of it, see Hopwood 2016b). These guide and are expressed in doings and sayings, but refer to concepts, norms, aesthetic judgements, expectations of conduct, and attributions of meaning that enable us to participate in practices. A practice theoretical approach displaces mind as the central phenomenon in human life (Schatzki 2001). It brings with it a transformed conception of knowledge, in which practices are the source and carrier of meaning and norms, and yet are where novelty and transformation take off and take hold.

A Practice Theoretical Concept of Attuning

Having established a particular set of assumptions about practice and the body, I can now locate the concept of attuning can be located at the interface between practice, body and pedagogy. Not only does this address the need for post-Cartesian accounts of pedagogy, but it can explain how professionals cope with epistemic dilemmas associated with leading learning down an unknown path, when much of what is known is unstable, incomplete and fragile. Attuning helps to explain pedagogy in situations where neither existing theories of formal education or workplace learning quite cover what is going on.

My work on attuning was prompted by analysis of ethnographic data showing how professionals paid careful attention to what was happening around them in order to inform judgements as to what to do next (Hopwood 2016b). Framing the idea within a practical theoretical tradition imbues attuning with conceptual power not otherwise present. It emphasises the body, while speaking directly to questions of knowledge, expertise, learning and pedagogy. Attuning is a relational, embodied, and knowing process of noticing, attending to, interpreting and meaning-making. It invokes a body that is in-the-world, but this body does not just receive the world or even occupy it. It also bodies forth, actively creating it. Patterns of our experience of the world become embodied in our emerging understandings and actions on that world.

This has important implications for how we think of professional expertise. My notion of attuning does not view expertise as located solely within the head or even body of the professional. Instead it views expertise as relational in the three ways described above: concerning relations between self and the world, distributed between self and world, and accomplished through inter-actions between self and world. This expertise cannot be taken out of an unfolding moment where the professional is entangled in changing, relationships with the world around her. Markauskaite and Goodyear (2014) write of professional expertise as dependent on conceptual perception and sensory intelligence—capturing important features of attuning. Distinctions between body and mind collapse, as 'conceptual perception' suggests the senses do not perform separately from how we interpret and make meaning, while 'sensory intelligence' suggests that meaning making resides in the senses as much as in any cognitive realm.

The conceptual specification of 'attuning' as I am presenting it here can be taken further by linking it to Schatzki's (2002) concept of practical intelligibility. Practical intelligibility shapes which features of the material world (including other human bodies) are pertinent to practices, when and how (Schatzki 1996, 2002). Materiality exerts force in social affairs largely through ways it becomes intelligible *in relation to particular practices*. Objects, including bodies of parents and children, do not have or carry meaning outside of particular practices. On the Residential Unit professionals may place one or more chairs in the corridor during the night, in anticipation that settling may take a long time. The chair is intelligible as something to sit on, but also as something that normalises what parents feel is pathological, reassures and gives permission (see Hopwood 2016b).

Attuning relies on practical intelligibility. As the professional attunes to the bodies and objects around her, they become meaningful through the practices that are unfolding. The resources for such making sense do not come from inside the professional's head, but from the social practices that constitute professional work. Attuning also shapes the unfolding activity, informing what happens next.

Linking attuning to practical intelligibility yields two important results. One is to imbue attuning with a sense of movement, entangling with human activity that is purposeful and oriented to particular ends. Attuning is teleological. The second is to reaffirm and extend the decentring of the individual. While attuning might rely on physical performances by particular human bodies in relation to other bodies and things, involves sense-making that is social in origin. Practical intelligibility frames this sociality in terms of the practices into which particular performances of attuning are folded.

Attuning in Practice

Having set out key aspects of the concept in abstract form, I will now show how the concept of attuning can be put to work, and the benefits of doing so for our understanding of pedagogy. I my approach physical environments and the bodies of

others emerge as practically intelligible, informing what and how the professional learns and guides others' learning.

When families arrive on the Residential Unit each Monday, the professionals working with them know relatively little about them. Notes from referral documentation are expanded through intake phone calls prior to arrival. Staff learn about, from and with these families over the course of the week. Edwards and Apostolov (2007) describe 'relational forms of co-configuration with parents and carers', in which 'practitioners learnt from listening to and working with families' (p. 81). As I have explained elsewhere (Hopwood 2016a) such professional learning can be considered in terms of three foci that mediate each other: learning about particular clients and what matters to them, learning about the changing relationship between professionals and clients, and learning about the practices that lead to lasting positive change. In the present chapter, I advance this argument, claiming that none of these can proceed in the absence of skilful performances of attuning on the part of the professional. To convey what is involved in performances of attuning, I disentangle particular senses and features. Such separations are analytical (i.e. devices that serve a conceptual purpose) rather than ontological (i.e. being performed separately in reality).

Dixon (2011) asks how we might know when someone is a good listener. In my analysis of performances of attuning, I focused on bodily performances, an approach that proved highly instructive. Below is an excerpt from my fieldnotes[4]:

> Wednesday, 2.05 pm. Nurses Jayne, Julia and Mary are sat at the nurses' station, writing up progress notes. A cry is heard down one of the corridors. Jayne stands up and asks "Who is that?". Julia replies "I think it's Jayden from [room] 11".

Here, we can see the body as background, the nurses *as* their bodies. They were writing without having to focus on how to move their fingers, while their bodies were listening for them, alert to the sounds that might come from the corridor. We can also see Jayne listening *with* her body. She stands up. At this point the *instrumental* body comes alive. The act of listening is folded into practices with other ends, associating sounds with a particular (child) body, to inform judgements about what to do next—where to go, who should go, when to go and so on.

These acts of listening are not mindless. They are instances of knowing, and through them, knowledge emerges. The constant alertness to children's cries draws on shared forms of professional expertise (general understandings) about children's sleep routines, the nature and meaning of cries. It is also connected to tentative ways of knowing particular children, what their cries sound like, and what their cries mean (emerging practical understandings). This is shaped by shared intentionality—supporting families with young children through partnership. The fact that Julia correctly identifies the source of the cry shows how the sounds are entangled with multiple forms of expertise—the habitually developed ability to locate sounds, and the recently developed association between specific sounds and Jayden.

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[4]All names used are pseudonyms.

Fig. 5.1 Listening as a whole-of-body act of learning

The excerpt below and Fig. 5.1 convey how attuning through listening is a whole-of-body and mindful act.

> Thursday, 8.30 am. Nurse Bridget walks up to stand outside the nursery door for room 13. There are sounds of gentle cries and it is dark inside. She takes down the chart, which is hanging by the door, writes on it, and puts it back. She stands with her feet close together, hands clasped in front of her. She lifts the flap covering the small window in the door to peer in occasionally, using her left hand to shield her vision from the bright corridor lights outside. She either gazes at a gentle angle down towards the floor, or along the corridor into the distance, towards the nurses' station. She is almost statuesque, moving only slightly and occasionally, shifting weight from one leg to another.

After pausing and listening by the nursery door, Bridget returned to the nurses' station and called the child's mother on the telephone. She explained that the child was 'just talking, winding down a bit'. She cues the mother to listen out for cries like those from the night before, and to go in and comfort her daughter when she is ready. The quotation and the image convey the way in which listening is not performed just with the ears, but through posture, stillness, gaze. Where there is movement, it is gentle and synchronised with changes in sounds being listened to. Thus, the sense of listening as performed by the whole body.

Performances of listening are not separate from expertise in the form of practical and general understandings. Such knowledge resources listening, but it also emerges through it. I hold that this emergence of knowledge constitutes learning when it affects connectedness in action—what Gherardi (2006) calls texture—(see Hopwood 2016b for a more detailed explanation of this position). The meaning that Bridget constructed informed what she said to the mother. The act of attuning was born out of relationships between these three bodies (nurse, child, mother), not just in the moment, but stretching back at least as far as the night before. The act also reshaped those relationships, leading to intervention by Bridget in which she encouraged and invited the mother to continue listening, applying professional vocabulary and categories (chatting, winding down) to help the mother associate sounds of cries with meaning.

In this example, I have focused on listening, revealing it as a whole-of-body act that cannot be separated from mind. But attuning, of course, is rarely focused solely on the aural domain. Understanding children's behaviour and communicative intent involves attuning to sounds, facial expression, postures, movements and touch. Much work on the Unit responds to children's bodies, and imbuing them with meanings such as boredom, hunger, fatigue, frustration, attachment, separation anxiety, calmness, protest, distress and so on. This professional practice also relies on similar attuning to parents, including listening of the kind implied by Edwards and Apostolov (2007). Giving open-minded and non-judgemental attention to what parents have to say requires 'fine shades' (Schatzki 1996) of bodily performance including tone of voice, pauses, hesitations, silences, sighs. It also depends on attuning to bodily cues in parents, such as changes in posture, trembling lips, furrowed eyebrows, fidgeting.

Such attuning is accomplished through an entangled array of whole-of-body and mindful acts. Perceiving and conceiving happen together, shaping how sense is made of what is happening and what to do next. Several times, I observed professionals deviating from planned activity because of the ways parents' bodies became practically intelligible. For example, some parents confirmed verbally that they wanted to pursue with an approach to settling their child in the cot. However, when the time came, nurses detected signs of anxiety, interpreted these through understandings of partnership, and so discussed whether or not to continue. Just as with the example of listening, such attuning constitutes professional learning when new ways of knowing emerge, and these have implications for relations between professionals and clients.

Attuning and Pedagogies of the Unknown

My task now is to close the loop, and connect attuning with the features of professional practices mentioned at the outset of the chapter. I thus now address the question of how attuning can enable professionals to go on amid epistemic uncertainty and fold this emerging knowledge into acts that facilitate families'

learning. Attuning underpins the first of three linked practices that together constitute a pedagogic approach that functions under conditions of uncertainty.[5] Through attuning, explaining significance and attributing agency to parents, professionals can support and guide parents' learning in a responsive way. In such sequences, the epistemic dilemmas described above become less problematic, as the pedagogy is tolerant of tentative knowledge. More stable forms of knowledge are required, too, but the immediacy of these attuning-based practices means issues of durability and fragility are less pressing. Indeed, at their most powerful, these practices can help to stabilise knowledge, clarify its degree of completeness, fill out gaps and strengthen what was previously fragile.

The first step in the sequence involves the professional attuning to the bodies and objects around her. This implies all the bodily mindful characteristics discussed above—fine shades of bodily performance, and practical intelligibility. With attuning as the catalyst, these pedagogies arise out of what happens in practice. The pedagogy emerges and does not need to be planned or follow a curriculum, nor does it emerge from or into a vacuum. As explained previously, attuning links both to what unfolds in-the-moment, and to more stable, shared forms of expertise. The latter guide professionals' attention, informing what they attune to, anticipate and deem important. Pedagogic responsibility is upheld because the purpose of attuning is to make explicit something that would otherwise have been overlooked (or perhaps considered irrelevant) by the client alone. And, the epistemic conditions are somewhat ameliorated as the new knowledge introduced comes from something that has just been witnessed. It cannot be undone, is robust, and endures for as long as is needed.

When the professional attunes to the parents and children she is supporting, the act is a relational one (linking her body with other bodies and objects). However, there the sense-making is, so far, private. The second step in the pedagogic sequence changes this in two important ways. Parents' attention is drawn to what has been noticed, and then the professional explains why this is significant. Significance here is not a property of the action that was attuned to in the first place, but a form of practical intelligibility that links the action to the pedagogic purpose of supporting the client. A particular gesture or utterance from a child may be significant if the goal is to help the child fall asleep in a cot, but be less important if the focus is on other changes. Often in this step, the professional might apply labels to describe what has been noticed, using categories from their specialist expertise. Establishing significance involves bringing parents into what Derry (2008) calls a 'space of reasons'. The space of reasons is linked to Vygotskian (1978, 1986) ideas of spontaneous and scientific concepts. Entry into the space of reasons moves away from the realm of the concrete (that particular cry, gesture etc.) and into a more abstract space where concepts form part of a system of relations. This pedagogy is based not only on establishing *referential* value between a professional way of

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[5]In Hopwood (2016b) I refer to these as 'nanopedagogies'. However, for the purposes of the present chapter I have chosen not to work with the 'nano' metaphor. To do so would require further explanation, when the crucial arguments are better made directly with reference to the concepts of practice, body and attuning that are already elaborated in this chapter.

understanding and what has just happened, but *inferential* value. The latter promotes much more powerful learning as it changes the forms of reasoning that parents can participate in, including conceptual work of classifying and considering causes (because of…) and consequences (if… then…). The move into this space of reasons follows a path from the concrete bodies and actions of a particular family to more abstract forms of understanding. Parents then return to the concrete, now through new forms of reasoning.

Important pedagogic work has already taken place, however, the Karitane study revealed a third step that extended and expanded the transformational impact of seemingly minor and mundane occurrences. The final step draws on the first two and attributes the locus of agency to the parent. This can include retrospective analysis, in which a positive, observed change is linked to actions that the parent has performed herself. It can also look forwards, suggesting that future changes can be promoted by the parent, challenging unhelpful notions that the situation is beyond the parent's capacity to influence. This final step brings parents further into a space of reasons. Here, the reasoning expands from interpreting child behaviours to connections between this and parents as agents of change. It is through this final step that the aims of partnership—to build resilience rather than to problem-solve— are more fully realised. I will now illustrate the sequence with an example.

> Kaveri has come to the Unit for help settling her son Usaf. She wants to be able to put him down to sleep in his cot, rather than having to breastfeed him to sleep, so that her husband could be more involved, and also so that he might be easier to resettle when he wakes during the night. On Tuesday evening, Cat works with Kaveri to settle Usaf in his cot. At this stage neither Cat nor her colleagues know what settling techniques Usaf will respond to. Based on experience from the day before and earlier that day, the nurse suggests an approach that involves going in and out of the nursery, giving Usaf chance to self settle, but going in when his cries indicate physical comforting is warranted. Previously, Kaveri had found it hard to distinguish between different cries and their meaning. On entering the nursery, Kaveri is encouraged to pat the mattress and offer strong shushes, and to avoid picking Usaf up or touching his body.

> At one point, the two adults are stood in almost statuesque posture, outside the nursery, listening to the child. Cat's attuning also encompasses the mother. Cat's gaze switches between a soft focus (listening to Usaf) and occasional open glances to Kaveri. Cat's changing gaze, synchronized with Usaf's cries, helps guide Kaveri's attuning. Kaveri takes eye contact from Cat as a cue to question what she is hearing for potentially different meaning.

> After a while, Cat and Kaveri's gazes meet, and through raised eyebrows and a gentle nod, Cat suggests they go into the nursery. Kaveri sushes and pats in the dark, and Usaf settles. They come back to the corridor. Cat says "I noticed he didn't lift his arms up this time". "Oh!", responds Kaveri, expressing surprise. Cat continues, "That is showing us that he doesn't want to be picked up any more. He lifts his hands when he wants and expects you to pick him up. He's showing us he's happy in his cot now". Cat's tone remains measured, firm and authoritative, maintaining the low volume required of conversations outside a nursery. "He's happier staying in his cot because you're going in as soon as he gets distressed. You're telling him you're not far away, that you're there if he needs you. He needs that reassurance. By shushing and patting the mattress, you're showing him you're right there, and helping him go off to sleep. You've been consistent, doing the same thing each time, so he is learning that you're not going to pick him up immediately, you'll see if he settles with some patting and shushing first. He cries because he loves you, but he's learning."

Notice the attuning work going on outside the nursery. This is informed by and informs emerging knowledge about Kaveri and her family and is performed whole-of-body. Forms of professional expertise are made pedagogically available, by differentiating cries and associating meaning with them in order to inform what to do next: this is a protest cry, we can remain outside; this indicates more distress, we should go in. Both stable understandings of cries as communicative, and particular understandings of Usaf's cries are active here.

When they go into the nursery, Cat notices Usaf's arms remaining down. Her expertise tells her to look out for his, and she notices it as a change because of what she knows about Usaf's recent behaviour. On returning to the corridor, Cat proceeds through the three steps outlined above. She draws Kaveri's attention to what she noticed in the nursery, then she helps Kaveri understand why the lack of arm movement is significant, bringing her into a space of reasons. Finally, she makes links between this positive change and Kaveri's own actions, locating the mother as the driving force for change. Through new modes of reasoning, Kaveri is learning about her agency as a mother, what to look for as signs of positive change, and about the potential efficacy of this particular settling approach. While such settling routines are familiar to nurses like Cat, the pedagogy is infused with particulars. Cat could not have known that this is where the settling episode would end up. Previously tentative knowledge of Kaveri's tolerance of her child's cries was, at the outset, provisional, became more robust and stable as they proceeded. The pedagogy emerged through relational, embodied and expert work, building on a foundation of attuning from which a path into the unknown became available.

Conclusions

I began this chapter by posing problems associated with the absented body in accounts of pedagogy, indeed of professional practices more broadly. I handled ideas of a knowing body, and embodied knowledge within a performative framework that imbues the concept of attuning with meaning and significance far beyond its everyday currency.

My distinctive concept of attuning involves more than noticing with one or more senses. Attuning, in this practice theoretical guise, is a mindful whole-of-body performance. Perception and conception, doing and knowing, are entangled. Attuning involves: (i) knowing how to listen, look, touch, sense; (ii) knowing what to listen and look for; and (iii) making meaning. These are separate only in analytical, not ontological terms, as performance, knowing and meaning occur together. Meaning and motive support each other. Meaning in the form of practical intelligibility arises through motive, as what is attuned to is significant only in the context of a particular practical ends. Meaning supports motive, as it is through the creation of new meaning, linking the particular and the abstract, and entry into a space of reasons, that powerful pedagogies take effect.

The shifting relational basis of professional practices can confront professionals with epistemic dilemmas. The pedagogic nature of professional work is intensified when professionals take up roles of helping others bring about change. Thus, professionals working in partnership or other relational modes have to both learn in practice from, about and with their clients. But they must also act as pedagogues, guiding, leading and facilitating others' learning. Epistemic dilemmas arise when what is to be learned cannot be specified at the outset, and the knowledge at hand is unstable, partial and fragile.

I showed how attuning can enable professionals to go on amid precisely such difficulties. The pedagogies I described are based on attuning. When sense-making through attuning becomes shared, it can support changes in reasoning that in turn act as a driving force for change. I have developed these ideas through exploration of a context where unknown qualities and epistemic ambiguities are quite stark. It remains to explore whether my characterisation of the pedagogic imperative and challenges associated with it hold up in other forms of partnership-based and coproductive work.

Recalling my prior assertion that the unknown is not completely removed in formal education, the idea of 'teachable moments' (see, e.g., Hyun and Marshall 2003) seems potentially relevant to the attuning-based pedagogies I have discussed here. A long-standing notion, the teachable moment includes both a sense of learner-readiness (resonating with partnership) and responsiveness (resonating with the notion of emergence). My sense is that the theorisations in offered in the present chapter could be useful in enriching what teachable moments are, how they arise, and in specifying more fully how they can be exploited for greater pedagogic benefit. My framework would tear at some of the (perhaps implicit) assumptions regarding knowledge and the body that underpin existing ideas of the teachable moment. But in this tearing lies significant disruptive value.

It also remains to ascertain whether these ideas bear similar fruit in contexts where, on the surface, pedagogy appears to proceed amid more 'known' than 'unknown' conditions, as in formal education. Rather than assuming that the presence of a curriculum or pre-specified learning outcomes does away with the epistemic dilemmas, my inclination would be to entertain the possibility that such challenges are indeed present. To do so would potentially be revealing of features of pedagogic expertise that have previously been more shadowy presences in our accounts of teaching and learning, not least: the body.

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Chapter 6
Practice Architectures of University Education

Stephen Kemmis and Kathleen Mahon

Abstract This chapter aims to challenge the narrative of the university in decline in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, by showing how earlier forms of university life and practice persist within emerging forms. It uses the resources of practice theory—more precisely, the theory of practice architectures—to illuminate the analysis. The chapter proceeds in five main steps. First, the theory of practice architectures is outlined. Second, three vignettes of Australian university life in different eras (1964, 1987, 2015) are presented. These give a sense of the changes underway in Australian university life and practice; each is briefly contextualised by reference to a specific university at the time, and in relation to wider Australian culture, economy, and society and politics. Third, the notion of 'practice landscapes' is used to interpret and characterise the 'look and feel' of Australian university life and practice across the three periods being explored. We describe the university of 1964 as the *juridical* university, the university of 1987 as the *negotiated* university, and the university of 2015 as the *entrepreneurial* university. Fourth, we return to the notion of practice architectures to show how multiple forms of university life and practice have coexisted over time, with earlier forms persisting within later ones. Finally, we draw the argument to its conclusion, namely, that change in the life and practice of (some) Australian universities 1964–2015 is not a linear progress (or regress) in which earlier forms of the university are destroyed and replaced, but, rather, a complex process in which earlier forms are sedimented and displaced within contemporary university life and practice as a contested terrain. We think this alternative perspective offers scope and hope for transformative action for recovery and renewal in the Australian university.

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The Decline and Fall of the Australian University?

In a very literal way, Peter Brown's (1971) remarkable *The World of Late Antiquity* rewrote history. The particular history he rewrote was Edward Gibbon's (1776–1789) *The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, which created, for much of the English speaking world, the dominant conception of the centuries after about 200 AD, as the time of the dissolution of the Roman Empire in Europe, groaning under the complacency of its imperial power, and shattered by invading barbarians. Brown saw the history another way. In his fresh view, late antiquity was not the end of a civilisation: the culture and ideas of antiquity did not turn to dust and disappear into the soil of Europe; they were preserved. Brown shows how the culture and ideas of antiquity migrated eastward to Constantinople, in some ways to survive and thrive in the new cultural context of eastern Christendom, but also to develop in different directions as they encountered the scholarship of the Persians and Arabs. It was from this trove of scholarship that texts of Aristotle, 'lost' to Europe for half a millennium, returned to Europe, carried by Moorish Islamic scholars through Morocco to what is now Spain. Thus, the commentaries of Averroes (from the Arabic 'Ibn Rushd'; 1126–1198) on the lost texts of Aristotle came into the hands of Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274), making possible a new intellectual revolution as largely Platonic Christian thought engaged with Aristotelian ideas.

In this chapter, we resist the tendency to tell the story of the Australian university in the second half of the twentieth century and into the twenty-first as a decline from the former glory of the university, invaded by barbarians, reduced to rubble, and replaced by a mass economic institution principally sensitive to market forces. Many contemporary writers on higher education do see the story as one of decline; however, insofar as universities are seen by many contemporary commentators as being in a state of crisis. Mahon (2014, p. 1) provides this snapshot:

> Much has been written in recent times about contemporary universities being in, or approaching, a 'state of crisis' (e.g. Altbach et al. 2009; Giroux 2010; Tomlinson and Lipsitz 2013; Zipin and Brennan 2003), or at the very least, facing profound challenges associated not only with the 'massification' of university education (Altbach et al. 2009) that began last century, but also with the penetration of a 'market logic' and 'manageri-alism' into higher education (Ball 2012; Blackmore et al. 2010; Calhoun 2006; Connell 2012; Davies and Petersen 2005; Nixon 2011; Olssen and Peters 2005; Walker, 2002; Zipin and Brennan 2003). Particular attention has been drawn to the influences of neoliberalism, a 'market-centred policy logic' (Connell 2013, p. 1); the knowledge economy that construes knowledge as 'a form of capital' important for economic growth (Olssen and Peters 2005, p. 330); globalisation, the increasing 'interconnectivity' of the world's markets, businesses, culture and people (McCarthy et al. 2009, p. 41); and new public management, a neoliberal managerial system (Olssen and Peters 2005). These closely linked phenomena are said (e.g. Olssen and Peters 2005) to have been permeating universities all over the world for the last three to four decades, variously reshaping relationships between universities and societies, and transforming university functions, governance, culture, and programmes.

We think there are alternative narratives to a narrative of decline in the period we are considering. These alternative narratives undermine a linear view. As Brown saw late antiquity, we see the story of the alleged decline and fall of the Australian

university 1964–2015 as one of sedimentation and displacement, not ruin and replacement. Accordingly, we also see the story as one of contestation and possibility. Examining university landscapes over time through the lens of practice architectures allows us to see how this can be so.

The Practice Architectures Lens

The theory of practice architectures gives a site ontological account of what practices are composed of, and how practices are shaped by, and shape, the cultural-discursive, material-economic, and social-political arrangements (practice architectures) with which they are enmeshed in sites (Schatzki 2002, 2012) of practice. Examining life and practices within educational institutions from a practice architecture perspective illuminates what enables particular practices, or kinds of practice, to emerge, persist and/or dominate relative to other practices. For the purposes of our discussion in this chapter, we briefly explain here how practice, praxis, practice architectures and practice landscapes are conceptualised in the theory of practice architectures. See Kemmis et al. (2014b) for a more fully elaborated account of the theory.

Practices and Praxis

Building on Schatzki's idea of practices as nexuses of sayings and doings,[1] the theory of practice architectures asserts that practices are comprised of characteristic *sayings* (forms of understanding, utterances), *doings* (modes of action) and *relatings* (ways of relating to people and the world). Sayings (which include thinking) characteristic of university teaching practice, include such things as the content of conversations that teachers have with their students, and the content of conversations among university teachers about what good teaching practice consists in; doings include such things as asking questions of students, assigning grades to student assessment items, compiling reading lists, engaging in scholarship related to the discipline, and delivering lectures; and relatings include things like building trust and rapport with students, positioning selves as co-learners in workshops, negotiating faculty hierarchies, working collaboratively with 'educational designers', and asking provocative questions. Just as sayings and doings overlap—because sayings are a 'subclass of doings' (Schatzki 2012, p. 15)—so, too, do sayings, doings, and relatings overlap.

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[1]Schatzki (2012, p. 14) described practices as "open-ended, spatially temporally dispersed nexus [es] of doings and sayings".

It is not the sayings, doings and relatings on their own that make a practice a practice of a particular kind, however. Rather, it is that the sayings, doings and relatings happen together in the *project* of the practice (Kemmis et al. 2014a). This project gives the sayings, doings and relatings coherence and meaning. Thus, in the theory of practice architectures, practices are described as sayings, doings, and relatings that 'hang together' in a distinctive project. As Kemmis et al. (2014a, p. 155) put it,

> The project of a practice encompasses (a) the intention (aim) that motivates the practice, (b) the actions (sayings, doings and relatings) undertaken in the conduct of the practice, and (c) the ends the actor aims to achieve through the practice (although it might turn out that these ends are not attained).

A core project of university teaching practice, from our perspective, is twofold: (1) to contribute to the well-being of the individual students who are studying at university (for example, by helping them to prepare for their chosen professions; and to further develop particular attributes); and (2) to contribute to society more generally, including (but not only) through the formation and transformation of various professions and disciplines, and the formation and transformation of persons both as professionals and as citizens. This reflects the dual purpose of education described by Kemmis (2014): to help people to 'live well' (in an Aristotelian sense) and to help create a world worth living in (although what this means will always be contested).

We view praxis as a 'special form of practice' (Mahon et al. 2016): a kind of practice that is morally committed and informed both by relevant traditions (for example, in a professional field), and by the consequences of the action as they emerge. Practitioners who enact practice as praxis are practitioners who, recognising that their actions make history (Kemmis 2010)—that is, that their actions have consequences that may not be undone—act in the interests of those affected by the actions and in light of the circumstances. This can also be said of practitioners acting collectively—like university teachers within a faculty or university, for instance. In such cases, individuals and groups deliberate about how most appropriately to respond in situations that require taking into account the ethical/moral/social justice implications of acting in one way or another. This is different from the kind of rule-following practice that we associate with instrumental or technical reasoning. In praxis, ethical judgement and contextual sensitivities, rather than prescribed procedures and rules, are the primary bases for proceeding in action. In this paper and in the theory of practice architectures, practice *as praxis* is taken into account because of its importance in/to education where the need for action based on ethical judgement and contextual sensitivities is paramount.

Practice Architectures

The theory of practice architectures moves beyond what practices are composed of, to an account of how practices are shaped or made possible by arrangements and conditions, as well as the roles practices play in constituting such arrangements and conditions. While practices are viewed as being shaped to some extent by practitioners' dispositions, experience, intentions, actions and capacities, the theory points to the significant role played by *intersubjectivity* in shaping the enactment of practices in the social sites where they occur. Following Schatzki's (2002) ontological account of practices, the theory of practice architectures emphasises that practices always occur within particular local sites, and that practices and the sites within which they occur are mutually constitutive.[2] The *arrangements* that comprise the site of any given practice constrain and enable—or *prefigure* (Schatzki 2002)—a practice, making it possible, and channelling 'the flow of activity by qualifying the possible paths it can take' (Schatzki 2002, p. 44), for example, by rendering a particular activity more or less expensive, difficult, and time-consuming (Schatzki 2012), or more risky, legitimate, educational, and just (Mahon 2014). As Schatzki (2012, p. 16) says, 'practices effect, use, give meaning to, and are inseparable from arrangements' within the sites in which they occur.

The arrangements that comprise sites of practice, according to the theory of practice architectures, are of three overlapping kinds. These are *cultural-discursive arrangements*, *material-economic arrangements*, and *social-political arrangements* (Kemmis and Grootenboer 2008). Cultural-discursive arrangements within a site of a practice include languages and discourses that make possible, and constrain and enable *sayings* in and about that practice. Material-economic arrangements within a site of a practice are arrangements in physical space-time that constrain and enable the *doings* of that practice, such as aspects of the surrounding environment, material and financial resources, schedules and division of labour arrangements. Social-political arrangements within a site of a practice are arrangements that constrain and enable the *relatings* of that practice, such as organisational rules, social solidarities, and hierarchies.

In a university setting, cultural-discursive arrangements that constrain and enable pedagogical practice, include such things as a shared language (e.g. English) or specialist discourses related to particular disciplines (e.g. history, sociology) or professions (e.g. nursing, teaching). Salient material-economic arrangements include lecture theatre layouts, office spaces, staffrooms, staffing arrangements, timetables, employment contracts, and learning platforms for on-line learning. Relevant social-political arrangements include teacher-student relations, team-teaching arrangements, research collaborations, line-management structures, surveillance technologies and face-to-face teaching-learning modes.

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[2]The theory also takes up Schatzki's (2002) point that practices can occur in multiple sites at a time, and that practices can be the sites of other practices, for example teaching practice can be the site of assessment practices.

These three kinds of arrangements correspond with three intertwined dimensions of the social world that Kemmis et al. (2014a, p. 156) describe as 'three dimensions of intersubjectivity, that is, the space in which human beings encounter one another'. These are *semantic space*, where people encounter each other 'in the medium of language' (Kemmis et al. 2014b, p. 32); *physical space-time,* where people encounter each other, as bodies, 'in the medium of activity and work'(p. 32); and *social space*, where people encounter each other 'in the medium of power and solidarity' (p. 32).

Together, the three kinds of arrangements that make possible, constrain and enable the sayings, doings and relatings of a practice form the *practice architectures* of that practice (Kemmis and Grootenboer 2008, p. 57). They are the mediating conditions of practices. Practices can also be, or produce, practice architectures for other practices. For example, in a university setting, the leading practices of a faculty executive team can produce policies that enable and constrain, and thus prefigure, the teaching practice of university academics. Such relationships of enablement and constraint between practices become more complicated and more indeterminate in highly complex practice landscapes (Schatzki 2010) like universities.

Practice Landscapes

Schatzki (2010) describes practice landscapes as practice settings where multiple practices occur, and in which there may be multiple and overlapping sites of practice. According to the theory of practice architectures, practice landscapes encompass the people in the setting, their practices, the practice architectures that make those practices possible, and any practice traditions that have been established over time through the accumulated practices of others who have inhabited the setting. Some practices in practice landscapes can be ecologically related to each other in the sense that different practices may be interdependent with one another (as learning and teaching are sometimes, but not always, interdependent), and in the sense, just discussed, that one practice may be (more or less powerfully) a practice architecture for another. At the same time, however, other practices simply coexist with one another in a landscape, without clear evidence of interdependence with, or enablement or constraint of, other practices. When practices are interdependent, Kemmis et al. (2014b, Chap. 3) speak of them as forming *ecologies of practices*.

The university setting is an example of a practice landscape. The practice landscape of a university is comprised of a vast number of practitioners of varying types (e.g. administrators, IT technicians, teachers, tutors, programme managers, students, electricians, cleaners) engaged in an array of intersecting practices (policy making, curriculum design, learning, marking, researching, installing electrical cables, cleaning classrooms) that happen in multiple and overlapping sites. Each of these practices has a set of practice architectures (and possibly practice traditions, such as the use of tutorials, or the professionalism of electrical tradespersons)

shaping its unfolding. Like other educational settings, the university is a highly complex practice landscape. The empirical task of unpacking the relationships between practices and practice architectures within such a landscape can yield insights with the potential to inform endeavours to transform university education.

Three Snapshots of Australian University Education

To illustrate the theoretical ideas we have been discussing, and to proffer thoughts regarding possibilities for educational practice in the contemporary university, we now present three vignettes giving snapshots of university education in Australia at moments in a 50-year span. The vignettes are fictions based on vivid memories from our experiences as students and/or educators in Australian universities. The first vignette takes us to 1964 and Stephen's first year of a Bachelor of Arts degree at the University of Sydney; the second leaps forward to 1987 and Kathleen's final year of a Bachelor of Education degree at James Cook University; and the third, set in 2015, is a composite, based on Australian universities we have worked in, and is written from the perspective of a fictional student. Each vignette is contextualised by a brief commentary on life and practices particular to the relevant university and Australian society at the time in which it is set.

1964: Stephen in the First Year of a Bachelor of Arts at the University of Sydney

I am seated in a row two-thirds of the way up the steeply tiered lecture theatre. Associate Professor C is our lecturer today, dressed in his black graduate gown, as much a protection from chalk dust, we are told, as a mark of status. As the lecture progresses, he sets out the main points in an outline on the blackboard, in neat, careful handwriting, legible from everywhere in the room. His writing is always eerily horizontal, not like others' blackboard scrawls that curve down at the full stretch of their arms. As the lecture progresses, he rolls each board up on its pulleys, filling one after another with key points to record and remember. So I will have a precise copy of the lecture outline in my notebook, even if my attention wanders.

Associate Professor C is renowned among Psychology students for his lecture outlines. They are a script from which he barely deviates except to elaborate an argument or illustrate with an example. I wonder if he re-works them every year, or whether he annually reproduces his notes from former years, copying himself, as he is copied by the hands of hundreds of first year Psychology students, some earnest and eager, some languid, and some struggling to maintain attention to the relentlessly unfolding outline on the board.

Associate Professor C is a neo-behaviourist. Like many other academics in 1964, he doesn't hold a doctoral degree, but he did his Master of Arts degree in Iowa, under the supervision of famed behaviourist Kenneth Spence, who was, in turn, the student of Clark Hull at Yale, who was influenced by Ivan Pavlov, Edward Thorndike and John B. Watson, the so-called father of behaviourism. Some pedigree! Yet behaviourism, we are discovering, is regarded as simplistic from the perspective of some other schools of Psychology.

Perhaps Associate Professor C's neo-behaviourism accounts for his rigidly 'value-neutral' approach to the empirical world. But there seems to be some copy theory of truth—a world of propositions that claims to correspond exactly to the world that meets our senses—at work both in what he professes and how he professes it, both in his stance in Psychology and in his pedagogy. I am copying into my notebook from the blackboard what he is copying onto the blackboard from his notebook. In lectures in the University of Sydney, 1964, there is not much dialogue. That is saved for tutorials.

My tutor, Miss L, is a PhD student in the Psychology Department. She earnestly wants to help us grasp the complexities of each week's topic, and gratefully welcomes questions and comments. We students, on the other hand, are reluctant to appear too eager or too forward. Our shared Australian culture urges us to reticence, to modesty, to speak when spoken to. In tutorials, we answer questions, often articulately and intelligently, but we are slow to initiate dialogue. Here, teachers reign, and we have been their subjects for many years before this, at school. It will be a couple of years before we are coaxed to voluntary intellectual parry and thrust in the communicative space of the seminar. We may then have begun to rid ourselves of the habits of compliance, and to see ourselves as the peers of at least some of those who teach us. In the meantime, we continue to address our teachers as 'Miss X', 'Mr Y', 'Dr A', 'Professor B', and they, in turn, address us as 'Mr This' and 'Miss That'. In this hierarchy, we all know our places.

In all our subjects in the Faculty of Arts, our teachers remind us that the real subject is to be found in the reading lists, not the lectures or the discussion and problem solving activities in tutorials. The subject—the discipline—is engraved in its accumulated (research) literature, growing constantly at the edges and occasionally revolutionised at the core by some great scholar or school. Only by reading can we find our way into the vast rivers of knowledge whose headwaters seem always to be receding up some new valley. We must do all the required reading for lectures and tutorials, and as much of the recommended and 'other' reading as we can manage. Across three or four subjects, it is not unusual to read the equivalent of several books a week. Is it any wonder that photocopying journal articles in the new, state-of-the-art Fisher Library (completed 1963) sometimes becomes a substitute for reading them? Once I possess a copy, hold it in my hand, it seems 'mine', even though its content is not yet in my mind. I can read it later if I need to for the assignments, or to prepare for the exam. Sometimes I do.

Oh, yes: exams. Assignments during Lent, Trinity and Michaelmas Terms are usually compulsory but they don't count towards our final grades, although apparently our teachers can use them to query our final grades on the annual

examination for a subject. Our marks on the exams at the end of the year are the only crucial assessments. They assay all the content of the course for the whole year. We have 'freedom to fail' on assignments through the year, and to try out ideas as part of our learning. The end of year exam will not be so forgiving. It will fix the harvest of our learning in a single grade: in First Year, either Fail, Pass or Credit (or Discontinued, which I sometimes did); in later years, Distinction grades are also possible. In my first Philosophy I lecture, Professor A said: 'Look at the person to the left of you; look at the person to the right of you. At the end of the year, one of you will fail'. Despite this threat, the old University of Sydney adage had it that 'First term, freshers [freshmen] work; second term, no one works; third term, everyone works'. I thought it would be true for me, until suddenly I was so captured by what I was studying that I was completely immersed in it, from the beginning of Lent Term until the end of Michaelmas.

The University Context

1964 was an interesting year. It was nearly at the end of a period from the Second World War lasting through the 1950s into the early 1960s: a period innocent of the substantial changes that were to occur in the late 1960s and into the 1970s.

The University of Sydney was a more hierarchical institution in 1964 than in later years. The University Senate, chaired by the Chancellor, ensured that the University operated according to the legislation governing it: *The University and University Colleges Act 1900*, and according to the University statutes approved by the Governor in Council of the State of New South Wales, and the regulations under those statues approved by the University Senate. The most senior Officer within the University was (and is) the Vice Chancellor. The most senior academic body was the Professorial Board, not supplanted until 1975 by an Academic Board (in which academics of non-professorial rank, and, later, students, were represented). In 1964, the Professors were frequently Heads of Department, with substantial powers over the curriculum, pedagogy and assessment, as well as over hiring and management of staff. Firing was a rather theoretical possibility in those days of University tenure, since to get rid of a staff member for misconduct might require a hearing chaired by the University Visitor, normally the Governor of New South Wales.

In 1964, university students, the majority of whom were male,[3] were sharply conscious of themselves as preparing for the professions, even if some in the Faculty of Arts were still unsure where their education would take them, whether into the public service, journalism, teaching, or business. The university of 1964 was also a rather elite institution: open to that small minority of entrants who had performed well in matriculation examinations at the end of high school, and had

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[3]This was also the case for academic staff.

won scholarships to support them while they studied, but also to those with adequate matriculation grades who were able to pay university fees (largely middle class students). In university vacations, most students worked to earn money to see them through term time; a few had permanent part-time jobs or shift work at night; and some worked full time during the day, and took evening classes at the University. In 1964, most male students at the University of Sydney wore a sports coat, casual trousers, shirt and tie. Women also wore neat casual attire, often twin sets with skirts, though some wore slacks. The student uniform of blue jeans did not become ubiquitous until the late 1960s.

Democratising pressures were beginning to emerge in the University in 1964. Australia's involvement in the Vietnam War (1963–1973) ignited political activism among students with consequences inside and outside the University. In November 1965, University students participated in the first large demonstrations against the war in Vietnam, and their activism began to flow over into demonstrations about University matters. Organising for activism also provoked calls for better student representation within the University. In 1967, demonstrations against excessive Library fines led to changes over subsequent years in student representation on a range of University bodies.

In 1965, Charles Perkins, an Aboriginal student at the University of Sydney and its first Aboriginal graduate in 1966, led the 'Freedom Ride', a bus ride through New South Wales in which a group of students visited towns around New South Wales protesting the conditions faced by Aboriginal people in health, welfare and education, and the state of relations between non-Aboriginal and Aboriginal people.

The Wider Australian Context

The conservatism of the University was mirrored at this time by the conservatism characterising Australian society at large. In 1964, Donald Horne published *The Lucky Country*, a stinging critique of Australian cultural complacency in the face of a changing world. Politically, 1964 was at the fulcrum between the conservative post-War Australia of the 1950s, and the more progressive Australia of the Whitlam years (1972–1975). In 1964, Robert Gordon Menzies, leader of the Liberal Party, was Prime Minister (1939–1941 and 1949–1966). The Labor Party was mostly a strong opposition, but was held out of power for 23 years by Liberal and Liberal-Country Party Coalition Governments. In 1964, the small Communist Party of Australia (founded 1920, dissolved 1991) continued to attract adherents, despite an attempted ban by Menzies in 1951; it had an influence far beyond its numbers, through strategic alliances and activism. It was vehemently opposed on the Right by the Democratic Labor Party (DLP), which famously split off from the Labor Party in 1957, described thereafter as 'The Split'. The DLP was largely Catholic in origin, guided by one of Australia's most forthright public intellectuals, Bob Santamaria, who had been inspired by the Catholic Archbishop of Melbourne, later Cardinal,

Daniel Mannix, who died in 1963. The Split helped to keep conservative governments in office for 15 years.

In 1964, Australia was also culturally conservative. Most Australians still saw themselves proudly as part of the British Empire, although the proportion of non-British migrants to Australia was increasing, and Australia was becoming more multicultural, even though many believed that Australia could 'assimilate' non-British migrants into a monocultural Australian way of life, just as it could 'assimilate' Indigenous Australians into the Anglo-Australian cultural 'mainstream'. Since the 1920s, progressive people throughout Australian society had been more sensitive to difference, and more disposed towards recognising and respecting different cultures, but, in 1964, a very large proportion of Australians saw their own skin colour, language and general backgrounds reflected in most of the other people they encountered each day. The most socially potent differences in the Australia of 1964 were differences of class (marked by what English lecturers in those days described as the 'educated Australian' accents of the middle class, and the 'broad Australian' accents of the working class), religion (a Protestant versus Catholic tension inherited from Ireland, sometimes blossoming into open antipathy, and occasionally violence), race (as 'White Australia' was slowly eroded in policy and practice, from the 1960s through the 1970s to the 1980s), and gender (Australian society was patriarchal; women were still commonly viewed as nurturers whose destiny was to marry and raise children; and there were marked differences between men and women in terms of pay, opportunity and social standing[4]).

Some important discourses of today's global society were the preoccupations of only small cultural minorities in Australia of 1964. Feminism was finding a discourse and champions in the 1960s, but it was not until 1970 that *The Female Eunuch* appeared, written by Germaine Greer, who was an English lecturer at the University of Sydney in the 1960s. Discourses of multiculturalism were similarly under construction as Anglo Australians began to recognise and respect the non-British migrants settling in the suburbs. The 1957 book, *They're a Weird Mob*, by John O'Grady (writing under the pseudonym Nino Culotta), was one light-hearted attempt to 'naturalise' the differences brought to Australia by Italian immigrants, and to neutralise the antipathy that migrants often encountered, including being labelled as 'wogs' and 'reffos', for example. Homophobia was widespread, and violence against gay men was common, despite general disapproval of anti-gay violence.

Economically, the Australia of 1964 was highly dependent on agriculture. Wool, in particular, was a crucial industry: since the Second World War, Australia 'rode on the sheep's back'. The resource sector was also important: mining was crucial to the economy, but so was steel production. There was a relatively strong manufacturing industry, from the manufacture of cars to appliances to clothing (despite much of Australia's wool being sold to Britain and elsewhere for clothing

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[4]The Commonwealth *Sex Discrimination Act* was passed two decades later (1984).

manufacture). Since the Second World War and post-War Reconstruction, Australia also had very strong public sector employment, across a wide variety of government services including post and telecommunications, education, health, water, electricity, and welfare of various kinds, as well as the military and a number of associated military equipment and supplies industries. In 1964, many middle class men believed that their wives should not work; in 1964, but not a decade later, many of their wives agreed with them.

1987: Kathleen in the Fourth Year of a Bachelor of Education at James Cook University

I am standing before a group of my peers and our lecturer, Faye. I have the TV unit beside me—a tall trolley with TV on the top shelf, and video player on the bottom shelf—and remote control clutched tightly in my hand. A recording of me teaching a Year Nine lesson is paused ready for my presentation to start. Behind me is a large whiteboard, the smudges of red, green, blue and black telling tales of earlier lessons. It is bordered on one side by a new overhead projector atop a purpose-built trolley, and on the other side by a dejected, lesser model, strangled by its cord and balanced precariously on an equally dejected 'one-armed bandit' (a free standing chair with a fold-down writing table on the side).

My peers have arranged themselves in groupings around the variously config-ured trapezoidal tables. Our bags, hiding overdue library books, the projects due today, subject readings and various personal items, are scattered about people's feet. Most of my classmates (there are about 15 of us in the room) have pens and notebooks of some description in front of them. Those not presenting today are dressed casually in shorts and singlets. Some have bare feet. I have replaced my usual singlet-shorts-volleys ensemble with my best jumpsuit. The room, hardly bigger than my lounge-room, seems full, full of our things, but also our anticipa-tion, our ideas, and our growing confidence as young, developing teachers. Soon we will graduate and ...

Our lecturer, Faye, has joined one of the groups, but sits off to the side, pen and notepad poised. She is smiling in the friendly way to which we are now accustomed, but there is a hint of seriousness in her demeanour. This is assessment after all.

If I am smiling, it is through nervousness, not joy, and not because the pre-sentation is being assessed. That matters, but not as much as having to expose my teaching practice to the scrutiny of others. The presentation I am about to give includes showing and critiquing a lesson that I, like my classmates, arranged to be filmed during our final 5-week school experience practicum at a local high school. I am expected to critically reflect on an aspect of my teaching in relation to our subject readings. After I have finished my critique, my peers and Faye will share their observations of the lesson and their reactions to my reflection. And then we will discuss the ideas and issues that emerge.

This kind of critical self-reflection on practice, or reflection with others, is not new to our cohort. We have been encouraged to engage in reflective practice, and draw on our experiences, in many of our Education subjects in the last 2 years of our four-year Bachelor of Education degree. The first two years were mostly foundational as far as Education subjects were concerned: we studied psychology, semantics, sociology, philosophy, statistics. Our studies in those 2 years were less about practical aspects of teaching, and more about what education is, and what it is for, as well as educational issues. (This year, all our subjects are Education subjects, whereas in First Year one of four subjects per semester was an Education subject, in Second Year it was two of four, and then in Third Year it was three of four.) We are also very accustomed to presentations and group work, many of our assessment tasks being collaborative projects. In my bag at the moment is a unit of work for Year Ten English that I developed with two others in my class. (I'll drop it into the assignment box after this workshop.) Sitting beside that is the journal I kept during my practicum.

The mood is jovial and I am amongst friends. The critique will be constructive and supportive. Our discussion later may become lively, depending on how firmly people hold to their views, or how topical the emergent issues turn out to be, and whose ideas are challenged by the discussion, but we will be respectful, and appreciate each other's honesty afterwards. We have become a kind of critical learning community, thanks, in part, to Faye, our facilitator, our prodder, our Devil's advocate.

I look at Faye, now our assessor, for a sign that she is ready. She nods encouragingly and I begin.

The University Context

The University of 1987 was arguably less conservative and exclusive than the University of 1964, and in some ways, more responsive to a plurality of community interests. James Cook University (JCU) in 1987 is a good example. 1987 was a year of expansion for the Townsville-based university with an additional JCU campus being established in Cairns. (The establishment of campuses in Brisbane, Singapore, Mackay, Thursday Island and Mount Isa was yet to come). Based in the tropics, JCU was developing a strong 'tropical agenda' (JCU website 1), for instance, through research and education in marine science, especially coral reef science; tropical ecology; cyclone research; and rural, Indigenous, and tropical health (but not yet Medicine). The University specialised in areas relevant to North Queensland, but with national and global implications. The establishment in 1987 of the Tropical Health Surveillance Unit, later to become the Centre for Tropical Health and Medicine (JCU website 1), was the latest in a string of initiatives reflecting the University's responsiveness to societal needs and attention to regionally relevant issues. By 1987, a nationally significant Aboriginal and Islander Teacher Education Program (AITEP) was in place at JCU, having been established

10 years earlier. This programme was developed to address Australian Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander education needs (JCU Website, 'News and media').

In 1987, 26 years had passed since the first courses were offered by the University (then called the 'University College of Townsville') in Townsville as an annex of the University of Queensland, and 17 years had passed since the James Cook University of North Queensland[5] became a university in its own right on April 20th, 1970 (JCU web site, 1). It was also 5 years after James Cook University's amalgamation with the Townsville College of Advanced Education (formerly Townsville Teachers College, established in 1969) located on an adjacent site in the suburb of Douglas. This was recent enough for the Faculty of Education to still be located in the buildings once belonging to the College of Advanced Education (CAE).[6] The amalgamation of JCU with the CAE was one of many such amalgamations in the 1980s and early 1990s. Indeed, in 1987, Australian higher education was on the cusp of fundamental changes to university governance and university culture. In 1988, the Federal Government would release its new higher education policy (the Dawkins reform[7]), introducing the 'Unified National System' of higher education, a cost saving measure that would see the amalgamation of several Colleges of Advanced Education with Universities and/or other Colleges to form universities. It would also usher in a series of reforms associated, by some, with the 'marketization of higher education' (e.g. Marginson 2004, p. 2), and an era of mass higher education. As in other Australian Universities, tuition was still 'free' for students at JCU in 1987, and some students were appreciating the benefits of the Tertiary Education Allowance Scheme (TEAS), a form of means-tested student income support.[8] This would not be the case for much longer. The Whitlam Labor Government had abolished fees in 1974 with the intention of making higher education more accessible to working and middle class Australians. (By 1974, the Australian Government had assumed greater financial responsibility for universities than the states). The Whitlam Government introduced TEAS for similar reasons in 1973. However, in 1989, facing financial pressures brought on by increasing university participation rates, the Hawke–Keating Labor Government (1983–1996), with the support of the conservative Liberal party then in opposition, reintroduced university tuition fees and created the Higher Education Contribution Scheme (HECS). HECS was an interest-free, loan-based scheme through which students could defer payment of fees until their future income reached a prescribed

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[5]The University officially changed its name to James Cook University in 1998.

[6]The Faculty of Education no longer exists as such. Education is located within the College of Arts, Society and Education.

[7]The reforms were named after the Federal minister responsible for the reform, John Dawkins (see Australian Government 1988). Note that James Cook University was known in the late 1980s and 1990s as a 'pre-Dawkins' university. The university's amalgamation with the Townsville College of Advanced Education in 1982 pre-dated the Dawkins reforms.

[8]A precursor to AUSTUDY and Youth Allowance.

threshold (Chapman 2001).[9] The introduction of HECS marked the end of 'free' tertiary education in Australia.

In the Faculty of Education in 1987, pedagogical practice was frequently student-centred, experiential and project-based. A focus on curriculum content was balanced by a pedagogical emphasis on critical engagement, processes and skills and gaining experience in the professions. The place of 'the practicum' and 'microteaching' in Teacher Education courses, and a strengthening relationship between the University and local schools were products of such emphases. Student assessment still included examinations and essays, although the end-of-semester examination was no longer the weightiest assessment instrument in the Faculty of Education, as it remained in some other faculties. In Education, collaborative projects, negotiated tasks and peer and self-assessment were common assessment instruments. Reading lists were important, but not ends in themselves. Rather, they were resources for evoking critical discussion about contemporary education issues.

The Wider Australian Context

That the University of 1987 was less conservative and less exclusive than the University of 1964, is a reflection of a general societal shift. Australian society was more politically, culturally and economically liberal in 1987, having been shaped by, among other things, the kinds of social-political movements in the 1960s and 1970s referred to earlier. However, new forces were also now beginning to redefine various aspects of Australian life, creating some interesting ironies. The Dawkins reforms, which were in the draft phase in 1987, were, for example, a part of broader political change initiated by the Hawke Government. Driven by economic rationalism (Pusey 1991), the Government focussed attention on finding efficiencies in public expenditure and deregulating the market. Tighter government control of public institutions became a means of creating mechanisms to support a free market and free trade. Federal politics at the time ironically included a significant equity agenda—an agenda which has been viewed as an attempt to counter-balance the effects of market reform for lower income earners (Kelly 2000). This equity agenda was evidenced by the introduction of welfare measures such as Medicare (1984), the Family Income Supplement (1983–1987), the Family Allowance Supplement (1987–1992) (Parliament of Australia website 1), and a series of superannuation reforms (see Nielson 2010).

In the background, a campaign was being waged for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander land rights, led by Torres Strait Islander Eddie Mabo with connections to James Cook University, and a team of lawyers. This campaign lasted a decade, ending with the landmark decision by the Australian High Court in 1992 that

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[9]HECS was modified in 1996 and then replaced in 2005 by HECS-HELP, a similar user-pays, loan-based scheme.

rejected the doctrine of *terra nullius* (according to which the Indigenous inhabitants did not have a legal system of land tenure, and thus did not 'own' the land they occupied). Striking down *terra nullius*, the Mabo decision recognised, in law, the special relationship that Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples have with the land, and paved the way for the Australia's *Native Title Act 1993*.

Adding to the political contradictions were the economic extremes of 1987. Australia had recovered from a recession in the early 1980s (a period of high unemployment and inflation), and although the Federal Government was still dealing with a 'balance of payments' issue and the declining value of the Australian dollar (Stokes n.d.), the country was enjoying a period of growth. The dream of owning a home was being realised by many 'ordinary' Australians, while some of Australia's wealthiest entrepreneurs, like Alan Bond, Kerry Packer, Rupert Murdoch, and Christopher Skase, were expanding their corporate empires, and jostling for ownership of television networks. The national economy was becoming increasingly market-oriented and globalised (Kelly 2000), enhanced by its free trade agreements. This meant that when the United States experienced a stock market crash on 19th October 1987 ('Black Monday'), Australia, like other countries around the world, experienced similar falls the next day.

The effects of globalisation in Australia were being felt beyond the economic realm in 1987, with substantial advances in communication technology and transport, expanding mass media, and increasing levels of immigration. Australia had long-since officially dispensed with the Assimilation and White Australia policies, and was more embracing of multiculturalism.

Consumerist and neoliberal discourses had found their way into the Australian vernacular, becoming a potent force in social relations generally, not just at the level of government affairs. Material wealth (signalled, for example, by home ownership for the many, and television network ownership for the wealthy few) had become a widely shared measure of 'success'. Just as discourses of economic rationalism and equity jostled in national policy, so too, they jarred increasingly in people's everyday working lives in public institutions, particularly in education. In the late 1980s, for example, university teachers began to speak about 'EFTSUs' (Equivalent Full Time Student Units) and 'WEFTSUs' (Weighted Equivalent Full Time Student Units) when discussing the financial viability of subjects and courses within Faculties. This neoliberal language contrasted sharply with long established discourses concerning students and learning—discourses like those of liberal education (or 'Stoic education'; Nussbaum 1997) and those that acknowledged students as autonomous adult learners, and as participants in a process of being initiated into a discipline.

2015: ID11412015 (Sharon) in Her Final Year of a Master of Teaching Course at Virtual State University

Here we are again: me, my computer and a cup of coffee. And myLMS.[10]

This is a nightly ritual. I have a date with myLMS, usually in my pyjamas, between 9 and 11 every night, or later when assignments are due). This time suits me because, by nine the kids have gone to bed and my husband is happily comatose in front of the television, numbed by the latest reality television show, so I can concentrate just on my studies. Wednesdays and Sundays (my two days off from my job at the fitness centre) can be slightly different if I am engrossed in my course readings or bogged down in assessment, and I keep going with that rather than jump on-line.

It's funny how myLMS has come to mediate everything I do as a university student. I tell it my name and password. It checks that I am who I say I am. And then I can enter and navigate my way around the site, clicking in and out of modules, moving backwards and forwards between weeks, and meandering through discussion forums. My LMS tells me when my assignments are due, or when someone has sent me a message. It collects my assignments. It limits my contact to my tutorial group of 30 (out of 755 people studying this subject in total, some on-line and some on-campus students!). MyLMS is my interface with these 30 people, my tutor, Wayne, and the Subject Coordinator. It is our so-called 'learning platform'.

⎡Login⎤ ↵ *Click. I'm in. That's a relief. Yesterday I couldn't access the system. 'You have encountered a system error. The University apologises for any inconvenience', the message said, followed by some techno-jargon that I just ignored as usual. I must remember to raise this at the next Faculty Board meeting since I am not the only student consistently having problems with technology. I am the Undergraduate Student Representative and our next meeting is this coming Wednesday…*

Right, so where do I start tonight? I might just see if Wayne responded to my query last night about the recorded lecture. The Subject Coordinator recorded and uploaded the lecture she presented to the on-campus students in our year level and we on-line students get to see it too. I could have been an on-campus student myself, as I live 20 min away from the university. But it just made more sense, given my family and work commitments, to enrol as a distance student and have the flexibility to study when and how I needed to. And having the Residential (Res) School at the start of the course gave me a chance to meet some of my classmates.

Yep there's a response. Good on him. Ooh, he was up late. His post was just after midnight. I'd better reply. 'Dear Wayne……' No, that's a bit formal.

⎡Delete⎤ ↵ *Click*

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[10]Stands for 'my Learning Management System'.

'Thanks for the advice, Wayne. Appreciate you responding so quickly.'
Send ↵ *Click*

Wayne's a contract lecturer—who lives on a boat somewhere in Queensland (when he is not attending Residential Schools in our course). I met Wayne at the Res School. He was friendly and encouraging, and very good in tutorials. He facilitated discussion so even the students who were there just to satisfy the course requirements began to join in, cautiously admittedly. I definitely preferred his style to Associate Professor K's long, monological, magisterial lectures about his research. He went on and on in his sessions. He could have just given us readings about his research. And all that stuff he said about what is expected in assessments[11]: just an unnecessary repetition of the Unit Outline. I liked Professor G's style. She was very dialogical in her lectures, getting us to talk to the people beside us in the lectures about questions she raised, and having a kind of rolling dialogue with us about the ideas. I can now appreciate Wayne's comments back then about discussion in seminars. According to him it was an ancient form of learning in the university that started with Socrates or before. In mediaeval disputations, apparently, students had to discuss topics with their superiors while avoiding heresy! 'Disciplining students into the discipline', he said. Wayne doesn't seem to be too much of a disciplinarian, but he does want us to learn to be 'critical', questioning how things come to be as they are, I think, and working out if they could be better or more just by being some other way.

Now, what's happening on the forum?
Discussion Forum – Week Six ↵ *Click*

Oh Sally had her baby. Well done, Sally. I'll just add my 'Congratulations' to the fifteen other congratulatory messages that have been added today. Even Wayne's.

☺ ↵ *Click.*

Right, so where have you discussed the forum topics, people? Come on! This isn't about Sally's baby, however exiting that news might be.

Oh, thank goodness. Mark has written something worth reading. And so has Trish. They both post pretty regularly, and I often find myself going straight to their posts and their responses to each other. They've usually thought about the topics, and they have such interesting ways of thinking about things. They give me something to bounce off, at least. Both of them sound switched on, lovely, based on their posts. They weren't at the Res School, so their posts are all I have to go on. I'll respond to Mark and Trish later, and add my five cents worth on this week's topic: the Australian Professional Standards for Teachers. I see Wayne hasn't written much on the discussion forum, other than the message to Sally. That's usual. He sometimes suggests a link to click on, a 'you tube' clip to watch, or an article to

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[11]At such moments, 'Professor K' speaks the kind of discourse Bernstein (1996, p. 46) calls *regulative discourse*.

download, and he occasionally challenges our comments with incisive questions. But other than that, we discuss issues (virtually) among ourselves. I suspect he lurks often, silently checking who's engaging, and perhaps being amused by our naïve, but well-meant, comments????

Ping. A message from Wayne (speak of the devil): 'My pleasure.' Short and sweet.

The work of a university academic must have really changed since my dad was at university. I cannot imagine there being so many casual staff like Wayne, and the idea of Dad having a conversation with his lecturers late in the evenings is impossible. No doubt the challenges are different. Being a student representative on the Faculty Board has given me a very small window into some of the Faculty- and University-wide issues, especially pressures created by budget cuts and regulatory bodies. (Listen to me—don't I sound like the consummate model 'corporate citizen'?!) At our last meeting, it was announced that there would be no new continuing appointments within the Faculty for the time being, meaning that more casual staff would be used to fill the gaps in the teaching timetable. I guess if the casual staff are lecturers like Wayne, that's not a bad thing. But I wonder what pressure it puts on the full time staff, like it does at my work, or what it will be like when my kids are at university (!).

Anyway, I'd better have a look at the next assignment. Haven't even started thinking about it. Now where do I find the Assessment Two information? Come on, myLMS. Help me. Help me. It's something about an ePortfolio…. There.

Assessment Two ↵ *Click*

Yep. ePortfolio↵ *Click. 'You are to compile an ePortfolio based on …….' Here's a link to an ePortfolio PowerPoint. Oh that's for Week 8. Good, I'm ahead of myself. I'll look at that on Sunday. Take me back to the discussion forum, myLMS.*

Discussion Forum – Week Six ↵ *Click.*

University Context

The Virtual State University (VSU) of 2015 is a multi-campus, regional university with an expanding student population. It prides itself on its capacity to meet the needs of the domestic and international market. 2015 has been a successful year in one respect as the University has attracted extensive and prestigious research grants and has learnt of its rise in the university world rankings. On the other hand, financial strains brought on by reduced government funding are starting to show. The formal *structures* of governance have changed little in decades, although the *practices* of governance have changed. Departmental mergers aimed at rationalising resources and processes have almost become a default response to changing conditions. The emergence of more muscular practices of executive management, for

instance, tend to challenge the collegial practices of earlier times (manifested, for example, in the meetings and deliberative practices of School Boards, Faculty Boards, Academic Boards and departmental staff meetings).

Other notable changes from previous years are the academic calendar and the teaching day, and technology. There are three teaching sessions a year instead of two, and on-campus classes are timetabled from 8am to 8 pm rather than 9am to 5 pm on weekdays. Technology has revolutionised daily operations to such an extent that the institution has become 'paperless' in some of its procedures. For instance, timetabling, student evaluation of subjects, workload allocations for staff, are all now computerised and centralised. Despite this, records from the VSU Green office show that paper consumption increases annually in all of the University's Schools, though some of this paper returns to the soil after being shredded and used as mulch in the University gardens.

University staff represent a diversity of cultural backgrounds, and a few have been employed by the University since it was first established through an amalgamation of Colleges of Advanced Education (CAEs) in the late 1980s. The percentage of Indigenous staff, although still small, has increased, especially with the introduction of Indigenous Studies in the last decade. All staff in continuing positions (now an endangered species in the University) have undergone training about workplace health and safety, discrimination in the workplace, and bullying and harassment. Many staff members are employed on a casual or part-time basis, including teaching staff. Some, like the students who study via a 'distance' mode, live interstate, and only visit campuses during Residential Schools.

While some Australian universities offer 'teaching only' positions, at Virtual State University teaching staff are expected to be actively engaged in research and service to the community in addition to their teaching responsibilities. 'Research only' positions for academic staff exist in the form of research fellowships and research professorships. The number and reach of publications a teaching academic produces (as indicated by publication lists, journal impact factors, citations, and H-indexes), along with student evaluation scores, awards, grant funding secured, and PhD completion rates, are key measures of academic success. These measures inform the performance review process which all academic staff members are required to enjoy or endure twice annually. Teaching staff are expected to keep abreast of the latest technological advances relevant to their disciplines (including the latest versions of the Learning Management System), and regular in-service programmes are offered to support any required upskilling. It is common for aspects of a university teachers' work, such as the marking of student assessment, to be 'outsourced' to casual staff.

The student population is also diverse. There is a high number of international students, many of whom study part-time, and via 'distance' mode. The great majority of students, however, are 'domestic' (Australian) students. Large proportion are engaged in part-time employment to support their studies and choose to study on-line, regardless of proximity to campuses, so that they have greater flexibility regarding working hours.

Teaching and learning at the University is a bricolage of old and new practices. Traditional lectures and tutorials still dominate on-campus teacher-student

interactions, although courses for on-campus students are becoming increasingly digitalised and offered in 'blended' or 'flexible' mode, that is, with both on-campus and on-line components. Teaching and learning spaces support all manner of teaching styles, including the transmissive style that dominated the lectures of bygone eras. Rooms are fitted with sophisticated audio–visual and information technology and communications equipment, some containing multiple interactive whiteboards, for instance. e-learning has been embraced wholeheartedly: a rapidly increasing proportion of courses are now available fully on-line. Subjects are modularised to accommodate the on-line and blended modes of teaching and learning (and increasing class sizes). From the student's point of view, the digitalisation of the curriculum means both faster feedback and easier communication with staff and other students, but it also means much more surveillance, including, for instance, the use of software designed to identify plagiarism. 'Educational designers' have become important members of the teaching teams, playing a significant role in the support of teachers' development and management of subjects using relevant technologies.

The Wider Australian Context

Global mobility, social media and social networking, consumerist discourses, sustainable living, cultural diversity, individualistic branding (e.g. mySchool website, myBank, myUniversity, myGov, 'My Kitchen Rules'), anti-terrorism laws, 24/7 services (e.g. 24 hours-a-day news coverage and shopping), are some of the many (contradictory) hallmarks of Australian society in 2015. Technology has influenced every aspect of Australian life from YouTube to smartphones to reality television programmes. Globalisation and the 'technology revolution' have arguably contributed to a heightened awareness of social and environmental issues and global and national affairs.

Australia in 2015 once again has a conservative government: the Abbott–Turnbull Coalition Government (2013 to the time of writing). Government policies have sparked much public debate on issues such as migration (especially regarding refugees travelling to Australia), health (e.g. about patients paying more to see doctors), welfare (e.g. about access to benefits for unemployed under-30-year-olds; and the workload pressures in child protection services), defence (e.g. about Australian troops serving overseas in 'the War on Terror'; and about decisions to buy submarines from Australian or non-Australian suppliers), and higher education (e.g. proposed changes to university funding arrangements, and the HECS-HELP student loan schemes).

The Australian economy is highly integrated with the global economy, its economic positioning in the Asia Pacific region being of particular importance. Exports of coal and iron ore dominate the news as prices for commodities have plummeted with oversupply and cooling demand in China and India. An emphasis on a free market and free trade agreements with key trading partners persists. Political rhetoric is marked by a preoccupation with budget deficit reduction.

International education has become one of Australia's largest export industries (second to mineral resources such as coal and iron ore), earning over 17 billion dollars in 2014 (Australian Government 2015). And Australian politics continues to be beset with indecision about how to respond to the incontrovertible facts of global warming.

University Landscapes Past and Present

The three vignettes present three university practice landscapes that are distinctive in many respects. This is perhaps not surprising given their different locations, geographically and chronologically speaking. There is a danger that the construction of a historical narrative makes progress or regress seems inevitable. What we have hoped to show is that, over these 50 years, two things are happening simultaneously: first, older, distinctive forms of university education practice have persisted despite changing times and circumstances; and, second, new forms of university education practice have emerged in response to changed opportunities, challenges, times and circumstances. To a greater or lesser extent, these different forms of education, that coexist in the contemporary university, are in tension with each other.

Some might read this narrative as one of decline, a gradual dissolution of the mid-twentieth century ideals of liberal higher education in universities (see, for example, the 1963 Martin Report into university education in Australia). Others might read it as the gradual overwhelming of the liberal university under pressures of globalisation, massification, marketisation and commodification, and the emergence of a new form of university at ease with neoliberal times and policies. We prefer, however, to see the story as one of differentiation within and between universities: a story of the persistence of old forms amongst the new; of a continuation of ancient battles about the extent to which universities are to be funded from the public versus the private purse; and a continuation of battles about dominant ideologies that sometimes overreach and explode, making space for subaltern (and sometimes new) ideologies to contest for light and air.

Yet there are also significant parallels that can be usefully understood as the result of years of layering of these different forms of education. The notion of 'layering' in discussions about university education is not new (c.f., Barnett 2011). However, we offer a particular practice theory view of layering brought about by the different forms of education being carried in the persistent and emergent practices, practice traditions and practice architectures that can be observed in universities over time, for example through the period 1964–2015. If we consider these landscapes from the point of view of the theory of practice architectures, we can see some of the distinctions, parallels, and tensions more sharply. For the purposes of this chapter, and drawing on examples from the vignettes, we have chosen to focus on some of the distinctive sayings, doings and relatings of teaching staff in the practice of teaching and the practice architectures that have made such sayings, doings and relatings possible.

The University of 1964

The *sayings* of the 1964 lecturer at Sydney University—typified in the vignette by Associate Professor C's notes, lecture content, and formal ways of addressing students, and Professor A's rhetoric around failure rates—were made possible by a number of key practice architectures. For instance, the content of the lectures and notes were shaped by specific, historically formed cultural-discursive arrangements in the semantic space the participants occupied, a space including the discourses that were particular to the lecturers' fields, disciplines, or even schools of thought (e.g. neo-behaviourist psychology) in which the lecturers were 'schooled' and in which they continued to engage as participants in communities of inquirers. In 1964, discourses of progressives were also becoming more widely noticed, but often these were paternalistic. Rhetoric of failure rates was made possible by a grading system (a social-political arrangement) designed to differentiate academically weaker from stronger students to shape pathways of study within the university and pathways of employment after graduation.

The *doings* of the 1964 lecturer—for example, following a 'script', professing, copying and reproducing, transmitting information—were similarly made possible and shaped by material-economic arrangements in the physical space-time in which participants encountered one another, including the teacher-centric, tiered design of the lecture theatre. The use of the lecture theatre as a monologic space for the lecturer and his or her (usually his) lectern was a longstanding tradition, a variant on the priest's pulpit. The intent to transmit and reproduce ideas and practices reflected in such doings, was very likely shaped by the conservative values shared widely in society, and a dominant view of knowledge as knowable, canonical truths that could be possessed and passed on to the next generation of (worthy) students. Other significant doings, such as assessing, grading and failing/passing students, were inherited practices by this time entrenched in the landscape in such practice architectures as academic calendars, and the scheduling of end of year, later end of semester, examinations.

The hierarchical *relatings* of the 1964 lecturer were taken for granted across Australian society, to a degree that seems archaic today. Hierarchical relationships are evident in such things as the magisterial authority of the professors in the ranks of university staff, and their role in authorising the academic affairs of the university; in the academic authority of all academic staff as they assessed students; and in the everyday reproduction and entrenchment of hierarchy through the use of formal titles (Professor, Miss, etc.). That taken for granted ness of hierarchy in university at the time was made possible by the existence of particular kinds of social-political arrangements in the social space in which participants encountered one another in the university and beyond, including a wider faith in institutions in Australian society: for example, the Church, the University, the school, and the public service. That faith now seems naïve from the perspective of an era disenchanted by a litany of revelations of the abuse of power within them. Matriculating so one could enter university and graduating from university were major steps in the

lives of those who entered these practice traditions, and both matriculation (in a small way) and graduation (in a larger way that persists to the present) were marked by academic processions in which the normally hidden symbols of office were revealed: among them, the academic regalia of the staff, and the University Mace carried by the Esquire Bedell recalling ancient maces carried to protect the Chancellor, not to mention the elaborate rituals required of academic staff, including doffing one's mortar board (trencher) or bonnet to the Chancellor before one rose to speak and before resuming one's seat after speaking. At the University of Sydney in 1964, most lecturers wore graduate gowns when teaching, marking their distinction from students who, by 1964, no longer wore undergraduate gowns, except in University Colleges where undergraduate gowns were worn at dinner and on other formal occasions.

Taken together, such sayings, doings and relatings, enmeshed with the cultural-discursive, material-economic and social-political arrangements that made them possible, that is, their practice architectures, gave academic life and work distinctive forms that seem, from today's perspective, closer to the ritual life of the mediaeval universities of Europe, or the philosophical schools of ancient Greece and Rome. They cohere, we think, in practice architectures that gave a sense of order to the acquisition of professional knowledge, skills and resources, and status, marked by explicit and formally-recognised transitions. For the student, there were transitions into and out of the university, and from the freshman year to final undergraduate year. For those who stayed on to become academics, the transitions included undertaking graduate degrees, passing through the stages and statuses of Bachelor, Master and Doctor. Among staff, there were transitions through the academic ranks of tutor, lecturer, senior lecturer, reader (the title of Associate Professor was just beginning to emerge in the University of Sydney in the 1960s and 1970s, mostly as an academic-administrative rank), and professor.

What was more palpable, in those more formal, conservative days, was the sense of the *juridical university*, for example the University of Sydney created by leg-islation of the state of New South Wales, that governed itself by its own regulations within the powers granted to it by the state (including, for example, the right of lecturers, as well as academic bodies of various kinds, to fine students up to pre-scribed limits for different categories of misconduct). Within those powers, all the academic affairs of the University were formally regulated through a hierarchy of collegial councils like the University Senate, the Professorial Board, and Faculty Boards. The University could do only that which it had an explicit power to do, created and conferred through legislation and regulations, particularly with respect to the academic curriculum, pedagogy, and assessment, and academic misconduct by staff or students. On all these matters, the University Senate was obliged to receive the advice of the Professorial Board, later the Academic Board, which in turn were advised by Faculty Boards and other specialist standing committees of the Board (for example, the University Research Committee), sometimes in turn advised by various committees at departmental level. On these grounds, we con-clude that that participants in this juridical university comported themselves with a greater formality than is common today.

Members of the University—to a greater extent, the staff, but also students passing through, and, to a lesser extent, the convocation of graduates of the University—were more acutely conscious of the *status* they occupied in each of these roles, and of their status in relation to other offices and occupations in Australian society as a whole. They were conscious that their status depended upon their being 'learned' and their scholarship, won and accumulated through continuing study, and capable of being recognised and rewarded in one way via academic degrees, and in another via academic ranks. A similar hierarchy applied among students, from year to year, and especially between undergraduate and postgraduate students.

The University of 1987

Many of the practices and practice architectures of the 1964 university persisted into the 1980's and remained evident in the 1987 university. However, they were now competing with new practices, new practice architectures, and new practice traditions (or new variations on old traditions) emerging with the shifting cultural-discursive, material economic, and social-political tide of society at large. This was evident in the practices of the university lecturers at the time, and the practice architectures that came to prefigure their teaching practice.

Take, for example, the practices of the 1987 Education lecturer of James Cook University. The emergence within universities and the broader society of social-critical, feminist, and multicultural discourses and literature, as well as conceptualisations of knowledge as socially constructed, are some of the many cultural-discursive resources that made it possible for particular kinds of lecturer *sayings*—such as those represented by Kaye's practice in the second vignette—to displace and/or sit along side some of the more formal, conservative, and/or traditional sayings indicative of the 1964 university. Informal ways of addressing students and colleagues, critical questions and reflective self-talk, politically aware language, and the emphasis on 'we' (signifying doing together) are some of the kinds of sayings that stemmed from and perpetuated more socially-critical discourses of the time. At the same time, rubbing up against these critical ideals, were intimations of the neoliberal discourses that had begun to shape Australian politics and filter into the Australian vernacular (reflected, for example, in the language of EFTSUs and WEFTSUs referred to earlier), although not yet to the level of embeddedness characteristic of the 2015 university.

The *doings* of some 1987 lecturers, or most lecturers some of the time, may have resembled the teacher-centric, ritualistic doings of the 1964 lecturer on some levels, for example, through delivery of the traditional lectures and generation of reading lists. However, given the opportunities afforded by material-economic arrangements such as audio-visual technologies, collaborative learning spaces (i.e. more workshop and tutorial spaces furnished with group-friendly desks), the 'workshop', and work-placement arrangements (i.e. the practicum), 1987 lecturer doings

extended to creating opportunities for experiential, collaborative, and reflective learning; or facilitating and participating in critical discussion. Certainly lecturers were responding to a greater diversity of students than in the 1960s and early 1970s due partly to the Labor Government's introduction of free tuition and student income support, measures which challenged the elitism preserved by the 1964 university by allowing greater access to students from lower income families. Assessing was still an important doing of teaching practice, although forms of assessment were changing to accommodate collaborative and project-based activities. Assessment also continued—and continues—to be a crucial part of the economic and administrative role of the university in qualifying a student for the profession, complemented by the role of professional bodies beyond the university in accrediting university courses as acceptable forms of professional preparation.

Assessment and grading systems that survived into 1987 meant that hierarchical *relatings* were still evident between teachers (assessors) and students (assessees), but these hierarchical relationships were tempered (and sometimes challenged or even contradicted) by the informal teacher-student interactions promoted or permitted perhaps by practice architectures such as informal dress codes, more relaxed social mores relative to the Christian conservatism that was so pervasive in the early 1960s, and an increasingly diverse and liberal-minded society. In regional universities like James Cook University, the size and location of the university may also have been a factor. Collegial and democratic pedagogic exchanges between students and teaching staff were more common as dialogical classroom relatings between lecturers and students displaced the monologic lecturer-student body relatings as the dominant form of interaction. The curriculum was treated as something to be negotiated (especially with colleagues) and needing to be responsive to a changing society and to local and global circumstances (exemplified by the emergence of a 'tropical agenda' at James Cook University), rather than something to be transmitted and reproduced. We suggest that the degree of autonomy that academics enjoyed, the staff solidarities, and the collegial and democratic forms of university governance in the 1987 university are likely to have influenced lecturers' relatings with colleagues, students and the curriculum.

By contrast with the juridical university of 1964, then, the university of 1987 was a *negotiated* university. While the juridical machinery of the 1964 university remained more or less intact, the university as an organisation was less formal and less hierarchical in everyday practice. Furthermore, student voices (reflecting more of a gender balance) and community, professional and industry voices from outside the university, played important roles in shaping university decision making regarding courses, teaching, assessment and research programmes.

By comparison with the privileged status of knowledge and learning in the university of 1964, inhabitants of the 1987 university were much more aware of the social construction of knowledge in the disciplines (e.g. following Kuhn's highly influential 1970 *The structure of scientific revolutions*) as well as the social construction of knowledge in individual minds, for example through reading, writing and discussing ideas. Thus, university pedagogies encouraged discussion and debate, and teaching practices offered opportunities for students to experiment with

ideas actively, and frequently collectively in group work. Reflection was also emphasised, both as an individual process of learning from experience, and as a collective process by which communities of inquiry could make progress, in the disciplines, in the professions, and in civil society within and beyond the university.

The University of 2015

Remnants of the *juridical* and *negotiated* universities of 1964 and 1987 are to be found in the sayings, doings, and relatings bundled together in the teaching practice of the 2015 university lecturer, and in the practice architectures with which those sayings, doings and relatings are enmeshed. The *sayings* of the 2015 lecturer at Virtual State University on the one hand reflect discipline- and profession-specific language, and carry traces of the social-critical, multicultural, and progressivist discourses, and formalities and informalities of earlier times. On the other hand, as well as being penetrated by (or producing) an emerging vocabulary associated with innovations of the twenty-first century, lecturer sayings have been penetrated by (and are producing/legitimising) discordant and contradictory discourses of quality assurance, accountability, consumer choice, inclusivity, equity, and sustainability—discourses that are indicative of our more neoliberal, yet socially and environmentally aware society. Descriptions of students as consumers, customers, and future entrepreneurs, are common in this new landscape (c.f., Star and Hammer 2008) where knowledge and education are sometimes treated as commodities to be bought and sold (Ball 2012; Nixon 2011). Lecturers' language has also been variously influenced by the 'posts' (e.g. post-modernism, post-structuralism, post-colonialism), those intellectual traditions that have been turning modern thinking on its head for the last four decades. Lecturers' language is also heavily mediated by on-line technology and asynchronous modes of communication.

The multiple (and sometimes frenetic) *doings*—the activities—of the 2015 Virtual State University lecturer—for example, maintaining surveillance (or lurking) on on-line forums, answering emails '24/7', uploading youtube clips, recommending readings, keeping abreast of the latest information technology, preparing unit outlines, facilitating residential workshops, attending to administrative tasks, managing casual markers, accounting for the whole of one's work activities (across teaching, course development, research and publication, community engagement and 'corporate citizenship') in annual performance reviews, and accounting for research outputs for the triennial national Excellence in Research in Australia (ERA) accountability exercise—are shaped by a range of practice architectures both inside and outside universities. Inside universities, a variety of arrangements are having a significant bearing on the everyday doings of teaching staff, such as learning management systems and other technological resources, on-line and blended modes of learning, workload policies and allocations, enterprise bargaining agreements, employing and staffing practices (e.g. high rates of casual employment), student demographics, university strategic plans and programmes, administrative

procedures, and infrastructure, and timetables and academic calendars. Activities are also directly influenced by arrangements outside universities to an extent, arguably, not experienced before the rise of neoliberalism and managerialism and concomitant market pressures, high rates of change, and preoccupations with accountability, competition, and performance in Australian society. These arrangements include accrediting bodies, professional associations, funding arrangements, the standing of Australian universities among universities internationally, a range of government policies affecting the higher education sector, and mass media.

As for the *relatings* of the 2015 lecturer, the informal, dialogical, democratic (e.g. Wayne), and formal and monological (e.g. Professor K) ways of relating with students are still embodied as they were in the 1987 university. So too are the hierarchical relatings induced by that persistent practice architecture: the grading system. However, these ways of relating have also been overlaid by other ways of relating. These include, first, *virtual relatings* engendered by the switch to blended and on-line modes of interacting and operating, and the geographically dispersed student populations. Second, *competitive relatings,* especially between staff, have been encouraged by performance review arrangements, staff promotion policies, award and grant systems, a diminished number of tenured or continuing positions, strains on universities' financial resources, competitive relations between universities for students and status, and university ranking systems, to name a few key internal and external architectures. Third, *customer service relatings* between staff and students have become more prominent (c.f., Shore and Wright 2004, p. 111). We wonder whether the widely mandated student evaluations in Australian universities are contributing to this. Fourth, *bureaucratic relatings* have become widely evident (c.f., Barnett's (2011) notion of the 'bureaucratic university', p. 67) as tasks formerly handled by administrative staff are automated in software systems (e.g. Gradebook for handling student assessment results) and managed directly by academic staff as part of their academic-administrative work.

It is more hazardous to pin a label on the present than on the past, but it seems to us that the university of 2015 might be described as the *entrepreneurial university* (Barnett 2011) (a step up from the 'enterprise' university described by Marginson and Considine 2000). The university of 2015 retains elements of the legal corporation inherited from the mediaeval university, as well as the legal structures of the juridical university of 1964, but it has also responded to the discursive regime of a globalised, neoliberal era. It is cost-conscious in everything it does, framed by neoliberal discourses, ruled by budgets, and managed by command-and-control executive structures that make the university seem, to many who inhabit it, less an example of the rule of law than an example of the rule of executives.[12]

Many things are fragile in the entrepreneurial university. Change occurs at a frenetic pace (c.f., Tight's (2013) discussion of 'institutional churn') to meet

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[12]We draw here on the old distinction between 'the rule of law' and the 'rule of men' [sic], in which the latter is prone to arbitrariness and whim of rulers, whether tyrants, monarchs or elected officials.

ever-changing societal demands and technological advances. Tenure has been replaced by continuing employment which is available only to a diminishing number of academic staff; more and more teaching is done by casual and part-time staff, many of whom have 'recent and relevant' experience in the professions, but do not necessarily share the career aspirations of academics of the 1964 and 1987 universities who chose work in universities to live the life of their disciplines, and to initiate rising generations into the professions. This fragility is said, by many in the upper echelons of universities and the higher education sector, to be more than matched by the virtues of 'flexibility': flexible staffing arrangements, modularised courses, flexible timetabling, flexible study patterns, flexible curriculum, to mention a few.

But the entrepreneurial university also retains elements of the negotiated university of 1987. These include such things as some more-than-merely-remnant collegial practices among officers of the university, the representation of students in university decision making bodies, and the practices of partnership with the professions and industry, in course accreditation and in research. Negotiation also remains evident in some prized practices of teaching and learning—individual and collaborative student research projects; the collective, relentlessly examined life of Millennials in on-line forums and social media; and the rise of more focussed and directed activity-based workshops, and online forums, that have aimed to displace the social forms of the more stilted 1964 tutorial and the more fluid, conversational, collectivist and constructivist 1987 seminar.

Moreover, most students are pressed to work to pay their fees and their bills, and many undergraduates fit university work into a life that involves 20–30 hours of paid outside employment. In consequence, their dispositions are sometimes more utilitarian than in former eras, and their study practices more focussed and strategic. They have more fully absorbed the roles of client and customer from their lives beyond the university, and the expectations these roles encourage flavour their interactions, especially with their teachers, within the university. The sense of hierarchy, enchantment and, sometimes, awe, of 1964 students for their teachers has not disappeared without trace, but student-staff relations are far less enchanted, much more businesslike and transactional. The sense of polite collegiality and congeniality in relations with respected teachers in the 1987 university has not disappeared, either, but the pressures of daily life in the entrepreneurial society of 2015 sometimes make students' practices of interaction with university staff more sparse in frequency and sometimes more terse in tone. Most obviously, of course, the life of teachers, students and administrators in the university has been changed to a degree unimaginable in 1964 or even in 1987 by ubiquitous digital technologies, the internet, and mobile technologies. Everyone is aware of being connected, wirelessly tied to others (positively) in group solidarities and (negatively) in relations of constant surveillance (in 2014, the U.S. Pew Research Center described Millennials as 'detached from institutions and networked with friends'). In the face of these technologies, boundaries between the personal and the social, the private and the official, bend and blur, not only outside the university, but also within its—virtual—walls.

Examining the Past to Find New Beginnings

In this chapter we have explored different forms of university education that reflect different eras in Australian history. Each of the three vignettes represents a somewhat distinct landscape, with distinct practices and practice architectures, and somewhat distinct practice traditions. That said, by allowing us to look archeologically at the arrangements characteristic of these different eras, the theory of practice architectures has made it possible for us to highlight how the older university is still to be found within the new, buried, in some respects, beneath more recent layers of practice, but by no means dead: arrangements that characterised earlier layers of university practice, life and history persist and protrude into the life and practice of the contemporary university, and its teachers and students, making the contemporary landscape complex and contested. Arrangements from the distant and more recent past form complex practice architectures that prefigure contemporary practice in contradictory ways.

University laws and collegial relations are good examples of how such arrangements persist from the past into the present. The university is an ancient corporation constituted by laws that, though amended, continue to define its powers. It seems to us, however, that such powers were more explicit in 1964, and more fully present in the everyday consciousness of the university's inhabitants. Collegiality of the 1987 university continues as a highly valued ethos in the contemporary university: still the kind of value that attracts people to work and study in universities. Collegial values, likewise, are arrangements that contest with the more hierarchical executive practices and the more muscular managerialism of the 2015 entrepreneurial university. This entrepreneurial university that survives or thrives by its strategic responsiveness to changing policies from governments, the vagaries of increasingly diverse sponsors of teaching and research activities, and the perceptions of potential students, the particular 'market segments' to which different universities appeal in their efforts to thrive.

In the light of our thesis that universities contain within them contested and contesting forms of practice, and practice architectures that have endured from former eras, one challenge for university educators, leaders and policy makers, as well as to university teachers and researchers, is to grasp more fully that the life and practice of the university, as an institution and as a lifeworld, is not unitary and logically consistent, but internally contested and contradictory. It is not merely what its leaders and managers assert it to be, even if it is equally not only what university lecturers' nostalgia or ideologies might proclaim it to be. Despite the shortcomings of our quasi-historical narrative, composed of fictional vignettes, we think we can draw some rather firm conclusions. One is that the juridical university continues to exist, defined by Acts of Parliament and university legislation that has flowed from the powers residing in the Acts. That legislation defines the powers of the university of 2015, and imagined powers that exist in addition to or beyond those powers are illegitimate and should be challenged and banished from the university of 2015. Some of the more authoritarian and even tyrannical tendencies of some

contemporary university managers might be challenged on these grounds: that they are without foundation in university legislation.

Another conclusion is that some of the forms of university life and practice of the negotiated university persist, and continue to animate the life of the university itself, as well as the disciplines, professions, industries and communities the contemporary university serves. The constructivist perspective is one of the reasons people choose to join university life, if not as students, then as graduates who come to see the powerful attractions of 'a life of the mind' and 'a community based on reason', even though this form of life seems fragile and perhaps elusive in 2015. These commitments to the life and the community of a discipline and a profession continue to be crucial elements of what it means to be an academic, if not an administrator, in the contemporary university. The philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre (1981) argued that, by the middle of the twentieth century, the tradition of the moral virtues had been overwhelmed by the Weberian view that bureaucratic organisation and administration are the most 'rational' forms of organisation. He concluded (p. 245) that 'the barbarians are not waiting beyond the frontiers; they have already been governing us for quite some time'. Yet the negotiated, civil life of the university is still a life people choose, as MacIntyre urged people in our time to do, as he believed people had done before, at the end of the Roman Empire in Europe:

> … when men and women of good will turned aside from the task of shoring up the Roman *imperium* and ceased to identify the continuation of morality and civility with the maintenance of that *imperium*. What they set themselves to achieve instead – often not recognising fully what they were doing – was the construction of new forms of community within which the moral life could be sustained so that both morality and civility might survive the coming ages of barbarism and darkness (p. 244).

The monastery was one of the institutions that came into existence, MacIntyre suggests, to survive the barbarism of the Dark Ages in Europe; the university was one of the institutions that emerged at the end of that age of darkness. MacIntyre (especially, 1990) has been relentlessly critical of the contemporary university, but the university nevertheless retains forms of civil life, grounded in disciplinary research and teaching, that cannot proceed other than through the examination of ideas and arguments in communities based on reason, always remembering, as Pascal (1966) said, that 'The heart has its reasons of which reason knows nothing' (§423)—meaning that reason and reasoning encompass not just 'facts' and logic, but also perceptions, interpretations, points of view, and, yes, feelings, emotions and embodiment (things sometimes discounted as 'irrational'). That is to say, in disciplinary research and teaching in the university, the claims of reason cannot ever yield to custom, convenience, compliance or coercion.

This tradition of reason, as old as philosophy itself, is what has enabled us to displace some of the more elitist, paternalistic, and racist practices of past eras. It flowered for yet another season in the university of 1987, and it continues to bud and to bloom in the university of 2015, even in the face of the typically instrumental claims of strategic plans and university 'visions' and 'missions'. Despite the demands on the entrepreneurial university to be agile in response to the needs of

sponsors, partners and students, it cannot, without denaturing itself, undermine or destroy the civility needed to sustain communities based on reason, for it is these communities, in research programmes and in classrooms, that sustain the work of the university. Wise managers of universities, as distinct from other kinds of enterprises, must therefore take great care to ensure that the modes of management and administration they employ, including the modes associated with neoliberal, market-driven forms of organisation, sustain rather than supplant the life of the mind and the communities of reason on which the work, the life and the practice of the university depend.

These two conclusions might be summarised in the notion—or hope—that the university of 2015 might and ought to continue to act as universities were first established to act, to be what was in mediaeval times known as 'corporations of masters[13] and students' (Le Goff 2011), bound to act within their own laws, and to preserve the morality and civility necessary for the life of the mind and for the flourishing of communities based on reason, within the disciplines and the professions, through no power other than the power of reason, as well as in the relations of the university with the wider communities it also aims to serve.

To arrive at this conclusion is perhaps to moderate Alasdair MacIntyre's cataclysmic view that 'the barbarians … have been governing us for quite some time'. While not a refusal of the refrain that the university is in crisis, despite its repetition in recent higher education literature, our argument in this chapter is intended as a refusal of the claim that the university is in decline. Even if the university of 2015 is, in some sense, on its sickbed, it nevertheless contains within itself the means and the mechanisms to restore it to health. These means and mechanisms include both its own laws and its own established modes of scholarly and academic practice, including the practice of reflexive self-interrogation in the interests of social justice, and the collective imagining of how things can be otherwise. We do not see the university of 2015 as the result of the ruin and replacement of modes of university life and practice from former times; instead, as we have intimated, we see the story as one of sedimentation (Barnett 2011) and displacement. Indeed, we see some of the extravagances of contemporary university policy and administration as a kind of ridiculous cocked hat perched on the head of the university: a stylistic adornment, rather than the wellspring from which the work of the university flows. The marketers and administrators may write the mission and vision statements for the university, but they no longer live its life in their own everyday research and teaching. Professionalised as managers, they have become progressively separated, even isolated, from the academic life of research and teaching that formerly informed collegial decision making in the university. Increasingly assimilated to the world of budgets, management, and widening gyres of accountability, they have become preoccupied, not with what MacIntyre (1981) described as the 'intrinsic

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[13]'Masters' in the sense that they were holders of the degree of Master. Le Goff (2011, p. 84) writes that 'The [medieval] universities were … *universitates magistrorum et scolarium*, or corporations of masters and students, though they varied to a greater or lesser extent from each other, from Bologna where the students were in control, to Paris which was ruled by the masters.'

goods' of the university (those things that can only be had by doing academic work), but with 'extrinsic goods'—money, power and status. And we think that MacIntyre is right to conclude that the greater their preoccupation with extrinsic goods, the greater the threat to the intrinsic goods of the university—the values and virtues of forming rising professionals and the professions, contributing to knowledge in the disciplines, and informing the wider community about how advances in knowledge might contribute to changed policy and practice in the community at large. The greater their preoccupation with money, power and status, the less their preoccupation with nurturing the life of the mind in communities based on reason within and beyond the university.

To notice, as Alasdair MacIntyre did in 1981, this bifurcation of the work of the university as an organisation, with, on one side, the increasingly professionalised management of the university, and, on the other, the continuing work of the university in research, teaching and community service, is to notice that the university of tradition and possibility continues to exist beneath its neoliberal garb or carapace. Indeed, we prefer to conclude that the capacities of the 'judicial' university of 1964, and the 'negotiated' university of 1987, persist in the university of 2015, neither dormantly nor latently, but as living practices that continue to constitute the academic life of universities. The challenge for the self-understanding of the university of 2015, then, is to grasp that these capacities persist, and to contest the ground with other versions of university management and administration. It follows that one challenge for the inhabitants of the university of 2015 is to continue to enact the practices of collegial self-governance, as they apply in the civic engagement and the life and work of the disciplines, and to continue to press for recognition that these are the primary values of the life and the work and the academic praxis of the university. These are the values that make universities still possible in 2015, and will continue to make universities possible for the foreseeable future.

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Chapter 7
Educational Practice as Praxis: Understanding and Challenging Neoliberal Conditions in University Settings

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Abstract This chapter explores the nature of current higher education practices in the context of broader neoliberal conditions, and how these conditions can be challenged. Specifically, the chapter draws upon neo-Aristotelian theorizing to help make sense of these practices, and as an alternative to neoliberalism to guide educators' work and learning. The project explores the value of these concepts through research into tertiary teaching practices in an Australian university. The chapter argues for a praxis-oriented approach to educational practice as a challenge to more neoliberal influences, and seeks to reveal how more neoliberal and praxis-oriented positions coexist in both policy and practice. The research reveals how the conditions for practice in the university, as evident in key policies for university teaching, act as 'practice architectures' for the practices which subsequently develop, and also provides insights into how these conditions might be better managed for more educative purposes.

Neoliberalism, Universities and Online Learning

The Pervasiveness and Persuasiveness of Neoliberalism

Educational provision is significantly influenced by broader political debates and conjecture which inform modern conceptions of the 'good life', and subsequent policy-making. At present, the dominant political ideology is one which endorses 'small' government, a form of 'new' liberalism or 'neoliberalism' which enables the freeing up of entrepreneurial endeavour:

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Neoliberalism is in the first instance a theory of political economic practices that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade. (Harvey 2005, p. 2)

However, this 'new' liberalism differs from its original instantiation during the interwar period, and which arose in response to concerns about fascism, Nazism and communist totalitarianism, arising out of the aftermath of the Great War, and the Depression (Jones 2012). Neoliberalism also differs markedly from earlier laissez faire approaches in that it is not simply about minimizing the influence of governments over individual initiative, but is an interventionist agenda, actively oriented towards creating markets, and encouraging individual responsibility in arena beyond the economic, and where this was never previously the case: '[I]f markets do not exist (in areas such as land, water, education, health care, social security, or environmental pollution) then they must be created, by state action if necessary' (Harvey 2005, p. 2). As Connell (2010) argues: 'Neoliberalism is a missionary faith: it seeks to make existing markets wider and to create new markets where they did not exit before' (p. 23). This missionary zeal is evident in the ways in which neoliberalism not only encourages the modification of economic arrangements, but deeply embedded institutional practices

'Neoliberalism' broadly means the agenda of economic and social transformation under the sign of the free market that has come to dominate global politics in the last quarter-century. It also means the institutional arrangements to implement this project that have been installed, step by step, in every society under neoliberal control. (Connell 2010, p. 22, 23)

This pervasiveness has meant that neoliberalism has become an embodied way of life, a taken-for-granted approach to how we interact: 'Neoliberalism… has pervasive effects on ways of thought to the point where it has become incorporated into the common sense way many of us interpret, live in, and understand the world' (Harvey 2005, p. 3).

Neoliberalism, Education and Universities

In education, this pervasiveness of broad, neoliberal principles is evident in the push to develop educational markets, in all arena—child care, schools, universities and other vocational education and training sites. This pervasiveness is rendered through various processes which steadily wear away any forms of life not amenable to commodification or profit

Attention to the mundane also serves to highlight neoliberalism as a process, not something that is realised as a set of grand strategies and ruptural changes but rather made up of numerous moves, incremental reforms, displacements and reinscriptions, complicated and stuttering trajectories of small changes and tactics which work together on systems, organisations and individuals – to make these isomorphic. They are made into enterprises. These ensembles of changes work together to produce new practices, subjectivities and opportunities. This constitutes a process of attrition which gradually renders the social into the commodity form and amenable to profit (Ball 2012, p. 30).

In education, neoliberal principles have been adopted to rearticulate the nature of what is construed as beneficial learning. This takes the form of compliance with various audit technologies as mechanisms to check and test the competitiveness of nation-states' educational systems and processes (Groundwater-Smith and Mockler 2009).

In the university sector, managerial technologies are deployed to monitor inter- and intra-institutional performance. This includes the use of various forms of audit processes to measure and monitor research output and teaching performance, commercialization of intellectual property developed in universities, and various markers of engagement with the wider community. Most obviously, this involves competitive international rankings in which universities are compared against one another on the basis of classification systems biased towards what Ordorika and Lloyd (2015) describe as 'the elite, Anglo-Saxon research university' in developed countries, and which encourage what these authors describe as an 'academic arms race' at the expense of more pressing development priorities' (p. 385).

Neoliberalism and Online Learning

These processes of neoliberalism are evident in current teaching practices in universities. For example, the advent of Massive Open Online Courses (MOOCs) has led to universities seeking to redefine how they deliver their courses, and maximizing their competitive advantage by making these available to a much wider audience than was traditionally the case. In this sense, MOOCs represent a significant marketing tool for the courses on offer at participating universities. This is the case in spite of the fact that even though MOOCs are characterized by large numbers of initial registrants, they also have very low rates of completion (Perna et al. 2014). Nevertheless, the very rapid growth in universities participating in MOOCs platforms reveals the sense of urgency around MOOCs.[1]

Also in relation to teaching, intra-institutional monitoring and reform have also occurred to ensure the more efficient deployment of resources. This includes the introduction of 'efficiencies' through forms of online and 'blended' learning. Blended learning involves students engaging in various combinations of online and face-to-face teaching (Porter et al. 2014). Such approaches are undertaken for a variety of purposes, including to improve pedagogical provision (Graham 2013), and to enhance flexibility and access to learning opportunities (Graham et al. 2005), but also to enhance use of resources and to improve cost-effectiveness (Graham 2013; Vaughan 2007). Natalier and Clarke (2015) explicitly flag how this push for online education is expressed in ways that articulate closely with practices of

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[1]Perna et al. (2014) refer to how major MOOCs established in 2012, such as Stanford's Udacity and Coursera, had partnerships with 16 universities/other organisations, and 107 partners respectively, and MIT/Harvard's EdX had 30 partners by January 2014.

increased efficiency within the 'neo-liberal university', such as increasing student load without additional staffing.

Drawing upon research into 11 universities in the United States, Porter et al. (2014) reveal that the institutional location of staff influence understandings for the adoption of blended learning, with administrators responsible for financial imperatives focusing more strongly on increasing enrolments and student retention, while faculty were more focused on pedagogical issues. Torrisi-Steele and Drew (2013) argue for better understandings of blended practice on the part of academics more generally, including in relation to the contexts in which they work. Blended learning has also been revealed as increasing academic workload, including in Australian university settings (Ryan et al. 2014). This includes Australian research undertaken by Garrick (2013) and Garrick et al. (2015) which revealed that blended learning is now a significant practice, often associated with the teaching of large cohorts of students, staff angst, increased workloads, senses of confusion about what constitutes online and blended learning, and increased focus upon such provision to satisfy audit processes and demands for increased efficiencies of expenditure. That is, there is a strong focus upon various sorts of 'outputs' for their own sake, including student numbers and student-generated scores of teaching satisfaction, and that these provide a numeric calculus that 'measures' only part of what actually occurs in university classrooms, and very little in relation to pedagogy.

An Alternative: Educational Practice as Praxis

Importantly, neoliberal principles and practices do not exist in isolation, and are not the only influences upon educational sites and practices, including university teaching. We draw upon neo-Aristotelian insights to understand how practices can be understood, and engaged differently. We argue education involves particular actions, talk and relationships that are always grounded in the ordinariness of particular sites, and that are both product and productive of particular conditions for further practice (Kemmis et al. 2014). Education should also involve what Aristotle described as 'doing' good, which is in turn central to the development of right-living. Such 'moral virtue' is a product of specific acts and actions over time. It is through the 'doing' of these virtues that someone comes to be 'good' or otherwise

> …of all those faculties with which nature endows us we first acquire the potentialities, and only later effect their actualization… But the virtues we do acquire by first exercising them, just as happens in the arts. Anything that we have to learn to do we learn by the actual doing of it: people become builders by building and instrumentalists by playing instruments. Similarly we become just by performing just acts, temperate by performing temperate ones, brave by performing brave ones. …

> Again, the causes of means that bring about any form of excellence are the same as those that destroy it, and similarly with art; for it is as a result of playing the harp that people become good and bad harpists. … Men [sic] will become good builders as a result of

building well, and bad ones as a result of building badly. … Now this holds good also of the virtues. It is the way that we behave in our dealings with other people that makes us just or unjust, and the way that we behave in the face of danger, accustoming ourselves to be timid or confident, that makes us brave or cowardly. … In a word, then, like activities produce like dispositions. Hence we must give our activities a certain quality, because it is their characteristics that determine the resulting disposition. So it is a matter of no little importance what sort of habits we form from the earliest age – it makes a vast difference, or rather all the difference in the world (Aristotle 1976, pp. 91–92).

As Aristotle argued in the *Ethics*, the conception of phronesis which informs our actions is a disposition/mode of reasoning oriented towards doing something well, as opposed to simply undertaking some sort of task with technical skill—thereby exhibiting a more 'practical' rather than 'technical' disposition.

This notion of moral virtue was described by Aristotle as a form of praxis. Working out ways of 'enabling praxis' (Kemmis and Smith 2008) is central to improving the conditions for enhanced practice. Importantly, practice as praxis is also an active process involving social actors making sense of—researching—their own practice. Praxis is a form of action designed to effect improvements in people's lives in keeping with the particular aims of a particular enterprise:

> Praxis is a particular kind of action. It is action that is action that is *morally-committed, and oriented and informed by traditions in a field*. It is the kind of action people are engaged in when they think about what their action will mean *in the world*. *Praxis* is what people do when they take into account all the circumstances and exigencies that confront them at a particular moment and then, taking the broadest view they can of what it is *best* to do, they *act*. (Kemmis and Smith 2008, p. 4; emphasis original)

Or, as Kemmis et al. (2014) put it even more pithily, praxis is 'action that aims for the good of those involved and for the good of humankind' (p. 26). Such action, as a social practice, exhibits 'an open, organised array of sayings and doings' which are spatially and temporally arranged, although never somehow 'predetermined' but always 'indetermined' (Schatzki 2010, p. 51). Kemmis et al. (2014) argue that even as these sayings and doings imply particular forms of relationships between those involved within these time-spaces, making more explicit reference to these 'relatings' is also helpful for providing additional insights into the specificity of practice. Notions of 'relating' foreground the conditions which influence these practices. That is

> [m]aking 'relatings' explicit brings the social-political dimension of practice into the light, draws attention to the medium of power and solidarity which always attends practice, and invites us to consider what social-political arrangements in a site help to hold a practice in place. (Kemmis et al. 2014, p. 30)

In this way, praxis does not exist in isolation, but is also the product of the particular conditions and circumstances in which people find themselves. Praxis is influenced or prefigured by particular material arrangements (Schatzki 2002) which exist in the social world. It is also influenced by various cultural-discursive, material-economic and sociopolitical influences/arrangements:

> We thus include sayings, doings and relatings in our conceptualization of practices, and understand practices as enabled and constrained by three kinds of arrangements that occur at sites, namely, cultural-discursive, material-economic, and social-political arrangements (respectively). (Kemmis et al. 2014, p. 30)

Such practices and conditions always exist at particular times and in particular places, and are influenced by the history of these spatial and temporal circumstances —or as Schatzki (2010) puts it, particular spatio-temporal arrangements. Such a stance resonates with a conception of practice as virtue or practical wisdom.

Praxis in Practice: 'Acacia' University

To reveal how alternative, educational practices and processes unfold, we draw upon research into practices in a university setting in South East Queensland, Australia. While we focus upon specific university practices here, we would argue that these practices exist as potentialities within many different educational contexts. This section provides a summary of key policies informing teaching practice, particularly online and blended learning, at 'Acacia' University. This includes the 'Strategic Plan', 'Academic Plan', and 'Blended Learning Strategy'. The centrality of these foci, and of blended learning in relation to the key plans/strategies for the university, is evident in their prominence on the landing/initial page of the University website, where blended learning was the first subheading/theme underneath the principal headings.

Strategic Plan 2013–2017

As part of the Strategic Plan, there was an explicit focus upon making the university amongst the most influential universities in Australian and the local region. This was to be achieved through the attainment of several goals. One of the University-wide goals—the second goal after a global goal about 'scale' (relating to the need to ensure sufficient size to maintain a comprehensive suite of programs across its different campuses)—was to ensure 'Flexibility of Study'. The target for this goal was to gradually increase the number of programs online. It is this focus on 'flexibility' through online delivery which constitutes our primary focus of the latter part of this chapter.

Alongside these goals were specific, direct, often technically detailed 'targets' through which the attainment of these goals was to be determined. Strikingly, a numerical calculus, a form of 'enumeration of education' (see Hardy (2014) for an analysis of how schooling is also increasingly enumerated), was evident. Specific percentages were foregrounded as evidence or otherwise of success. In relation to

'Student satisfaction', the target of achieving in the upper bands for CEQ[2] Good Teaching by 2017 reveals an overtly national ranking and comparative technology at play. This focus on developing 'measures' of learning was also clearly evident in the use of University Student Evaluation of Courses (SEC), and pressure to ensure most courses attained above 3.5 out of 5 for all academic groups by 2017.

Academic Plan 2013–2017

The Academic Plan 2013–2017 sought to 'transform' students' learning experiences. The very first paragraph of the Plan (after the Foreword by the Deputy Vice Chancellor) contained an explicit acknowledgment of the broader neoliberal conditions (competitive; cost-centric; increasingly privatized environment) within which the university was located. Even as the University was actively creating the environment in which it was operating, it was being significantly influenced by broader neoliberal architectures of practice/practice architectures.

Reference to the 'way students study' was particularly salient in relation to the focus on what the University described as 'blended learning strategy'.

Blended Learning Strategy

The blended learning strategy was expressed explicitly within the Academic Plan. Specifically, there was an acknowledgment that students wished to be able to study anywhere and at any time. Technology was construed as an important vehicle for supporting students' learning. However, at the same time, this supportive stance— perhaps a form of praxis—was also evident alongside a more competitive logic, including the need to compete within a MOOCs environment, and in which course provision was construed as increasingly flexible (including the ability to 'sample' courses before committing ('try before you buy')).

This focus upon a competitive environment sat alongside and in tension with the University's expressed concerns about also ensuring students from more disadvantaged backgrounds were also able to participate in such learning initiatives. This was, after all, a key focus of the original establishment of the University.

Online/Blended Learning in Practice

To understand how these policy conditions played out in practice, the remainder of the chapter outlines how this focus upon blended learning at Acacia played out in

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[2]Australian Graduate Survey—Course Experience Questionnaire (CEQ).

one particular School in the University. Within the School,[3] the School Executive member responsible for 'Teaching and Learning'[4] was charged with implementing a much stronger online presence under conditions of increasing budget stringency within the University. That is, decisions, 'doings', were expected of, and taken by, more senior members of staff within the School, and under direction of the Dean of Teaching and Learning within the Faculty of which the School was one subunit. As part of this process, 'sayings' in the form of several staff meetings were held, in conjunction with additional dedicated 'think thank' meetings (open to all staff), to develop ways to try to 'get the budget back in the black' within the School; such meeting also helped cultivate improved 'relatings' amongst staff members, as they became more aware of the budgetary situation. These budgetary concerns occurred in conjunction with federal government cuts to Higher Education (described as an 'efficiency dividend') which were being implemented at this time. There was also clear evidence of cuts to the number of full-time, permanent academic and professional staff, and cuts to the sessional (part-time staff) budget which placed pressures upon other forms of relationships/relatings between full-time and part-time staff. This latter meant that there were even fewer casual staff employed to fulfil teaching responsibilities in the School than had previously been the case.

During a relatively early staff meeting in the life of this change process, the School Executive member responsible for Teaching and Learning informed staff that they had to reduce the amount of face-to-face contact with students—lecture and tutorial contact—as part of the School response to this situation. The 'solution' to this fiscal dilemma was to make more extensive use of the University's online capability. At the same time, and at the level of the Faculty within which the School was located, staff were told during staff meetings that the Dean of Learning and Teaching was concerned about another local university's use of MOOCs, and how this constituted a threat to the market share of the Faculty, and Acacia University more generally.

The Head of School in conjunction with the Senior Executive responsible for Teaching and Learning (who was answerable to both the Head of School, and the Head Learning and Teaching at the Faculty level), made a decision to create economies of scale across three primary campuses at Acacia. This involved the 'doing' of creating omnibus courses, with up to 900 students across the three campuses, which also serviced multiple programs (including the two largest courses). This meant the only way the individual lecturers responsible for these courses could cope with these changes was to undertake online lectures. Administratively, at the same time, it was increasingly difficult to book lecture theatres to conduct face-to-face lectures. There was also a level of learning-on-the-job about how to manage these new arrangements. While there was some mention of the need for more blended learning approaches, there was a tacit assumption that lecturers would simply change from teaching face-to-face lectures and tutorials with smaller numbers of students to 'going online' to lecture large

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[3]Names of organisational units have been anonymised.

[4]Names of positions of personnel have been anonymised.

numbers of students across multiple courses. This was expressed in School meetings (and individual and collective phone conversations) as necessary to manage the School budget, including to 'prevent academic retrenchments'. Tutorials were also increased in size as part of these changes.

The School Executive was learning about this process at the same time as staff were grappling with its implementation. During the 18 month period within which this change occurred, the talk, 'sayings', of the Senior Executive responsible for Teaching and Learning, for example, changed from a focus solely on 'on-line' delivery to one of considering a much more 'blended' approach. In large measure, this can be understood as a response to academics' concerns about engaging in much more online teaching as part of their work, and their desire to ensure that the learning their students experienced was genuinely of a more blended nature, rather than simply delivered en-mass through online fora. Such an emphasis also reflects the explicit policy position within the university which advocated blended learning as a separate policy.

At the same time, the School Senior Executive believed that the approach taken was also important and beneficial for students and staff, as well as to help address budgetary concerns. Educational issues sat alongside managerial prerogatives as significant foci. There was a sense in which the University needed to enhance its ability to teach larger numbers of students—an important federal government policy initiative aimed at 'widening participation' amongst under-represented groups. There were also formal meetings and informal discussions, 'sayings', about how the shift to more online learning would enable increased flexibility of academics' time, student access (where and when they were able to study). Given the relatively large number of Acacia's students who work full- or part-time, or who have significant family responsibilities (particularly as parents), these were important issues.

At the same time, staff were sympathetic to the demands upon the Senior Executive team, but also concerned about the direction of teaching and learning within the University. These concerns also affected staff health and well-being, evident in increases in sick leave, stress-leave and anxiety about workloads. Staff expressed concerns during staff meetings about the rate of change and how this affected both their capacity to teach, and students' learning opportunities. An outcome of these discussions was the subsequent employment of more staff as it became clear that more staff were required to address increases in student loads. The work conditions have subsequently improved, as more academics have been employed to help address workload concerns, and as existing academics have developed their understandings of online and blended teaching, and how these might be enacted to enhance the student learning experience.

Discussion: Practice, Praxis and Challenging Neoliberalism in University Settings

In relation to Acacia University's push for increased online and blended learning, there is clear evidence of how the neoliberal conditions outlined at the beginning of

this chapter have permeated both the policy-making processes at Acacia University, and subsequent practice, even as there is evidence of a simultaneous push to genuinely consider ways of enhancing students' learning opportunities via online and blended learning. The specific policy artefacts (website; strategic plan; academic plan; blended learning strategy) reveal how these tensions create a policy-practice architecture characterized by both technical (*techne*) and practical logics (*phronesis*). These policies at each level also act as broader practice architectures for the more specific policies nested beneath them. Such policies represent a suturing together of multiple discourses and influences, including both broader more neoliberal, globalized policy discourses, and more genuinely educational foci (Rizvi and Lingard 2010); the latter are evident in more praxis-oriented discourses embedded within the plans/policies themselves. These policies constitute particular textual 'sayings'/discourses which emphasize varied and conflicting foci, including the need to be more influential in the region, more flexible in provision of learning options, to increase the number of programs offered, and to increase student participation as part of a process of fostering more inclusive practices.

In turn, these policies have played out in specific ways in practice. This includes a strong economistic focus in relation to the provision of education/courses for students at the university within a broader competitive academic milieu. It also plays out in demands upon academics to alter their teaching practices in fundamental ways to achieve economistic goals under tighter budgetary conditions. The result, potentially, is a student learning experience radically different from that of previous generations.

However, and at the same time, there is also evidence of how more praxis-oriented disposition—phronesis—is also evident in the specific 'sayings', 'doings' and 'relatings' of those involved.

The university was founded during the expansionary period of the university sector in Australia, when overt concerns about the environment, Indigenous peoples, multiculturalism and diversity were in the ascendancy. Founded on a praxis-oriented tradition—very much focused upon the good not simply for the individual, but society more broadly (Kemmis et al. 2014)—the University's charter was grounded in ways of achieving emancipation from deprivation for many of its students/potential students. In many ways, the emphasis upon/promotion of enhancing students' learning experiences, and particularly increasing participation of students, is a reflection of the University's historical mission.

However, how this broader vision statement is expressed in various goal statements, and how these are to be attained through specified 'targets', reflects broader tensions arising from the University's conditions of existence. It is this notion of 'targets' which is most significant in terms of how the vision for the university is to *actually* be enacted. This work exists in a regulatory and competitive environment. And these 'forces' contrast (and are in tension) with the goal of providing a high quality learning experience, regardless of students' backgrounds (Acacia University Strategic Plan 2013–2017, p. 2). Some of the goals themselves are broadly defined in what appear to be a more praxis-oriented stance, but many are framed in more nebulous ways, referring generally to notions of 'scale', 'flexibility of study',

'participation', 'retention', 'teaching quality', 'student satisfaction', 'work-ready graduates', 'graduate success' and 'student contributions' (Acacia University Strategic Plan). Such goals *could* be laudable, depending upon the values which inform them, but, equally, they could also be problematic if enacted in more overtly economistic or managerial ways. The focus on being an influential university in Australia and the region (Acacia University Strategic Plan) reflects potentially praxis-oriented approaches/foci, but in a broader competitive milieu, perhaps reveals, even more so, the influence of neoliberal practices and principles.

At the level of practice, the experiences of online and blended learning at Acacia University reflect a set of talk/'sayings', actions/'doings' and relationships/'relatings'/that seemed to compound as well as challenge more neoliberal pressures. Particular material-economic 'arrangements' (Kemmis et al. 2014; Schatzki 2002) were in place—such as lecture theatres—which could enable face-to-face lectures alongside online learning opportunities (a different material-economic arrangement), but these seemed to be marginalized, at least initially, in the push for online learning. This was also a case of how personnel positioned differently in relation to one another also reflect different concerns and foci, with senior administrators in the university focusing on budget bottom lines and academic staff in Schools/Faculties focusing on issues of teaching and learning (cf. Porter et al. 2014).

The 'think tank' meetings and regular staff meetings were sites of particular sayings about the nature of the budgetary position, and how online learning was a 'doing' which could ameliorate the current budget concerns; in many ways, the sayings around budgetary concerns reflects the pervasiveness of neoliberal approaches, the 'common sense way many of us interpret, live in, and understand the world' (Harvey 2005, p. 3). It also relates to purposes of blended learning for enhancing use of resources and cost-effectiveness (Graham 2013; Vaughan 2007). These sayings were linked to the very material doings of cutting back sessional staff —a process which also increased workloads for permanent members of staff. The relatings under these circumstances seemed to be dominated by more managerial and economistic concerns. These relatings also involved relationships between the university and neighbouring universities with which it saw itself in competition, particularly in relation to the rapid expansion of MOOCs at one of these institutions. The particular material-economic, sociopolitical and cultural-discursive arrangements within which these academics worked led to significant changes in practice—doings—which altered their relationships—relatings—with their students and one another, and involved a different discourse—sayings—from that which had previously characterized their work. Such meetings, building out of initial policies, were part of the 'institutional arrangements to implement [the neoliberal] project that have been installed, step by step' (Connell 2010, p. 23).

In many ways, the decision-making surrounding the move towards a much more online environment was guided by a disposition of technē, focused on achieving a known end through a series of generally understood steps (see Kemmis and Smith 2008). However, a disposition of phronēsis—practical wisdom—'a moral disposition to act wisely and prudently (with practical common sense), with goals and means both always open to review' (Kemmis and Smith 2008, p. 15) was also

evident in efforts to engage with staff about how to work within an increasingly stringent budgetary position, whilst seeking to simultaneously be true to the founding aims of the university (particularly in relation to increasing participation of students from nondominant groups). Senior staff's doings of trying to articulate this founding mission, and efforts to engage/relate with staff, even as they felt pressure to tell/say during individual and group meetings/staff meetings that cuts had to be made to the budget, also reveal how more neoliberal practices can be challenged, at least in part.

The emphasis upon praxis as not simply a *form* of morally committed action, but as also *informed* by the particular traditions within a field is also important in relation to the case presented. On the one hand, making decisions for largely economic reasons reflects how these traditions—in this, those associated with university teaching and learning—can be sidelined. However, on the other, the contestation, which this caused, reveals the continued influence of these broader traditions within the field itself. The academics in question did not simply 'give up', but argued for their perspectives to be heard. That this occurred, at least in the latter stages of the process as it became apparent that cuts had been too dramatic and affected teaching quality, reveals the significance of the logics intrinsic to the field (of university teaching and learning). The focus upon what the action of dramatic cuts would mean *in the world* (Kemmis and Smith 2008, p. 4) is significant, and also challenging, given the attempts of staff to manage such large numbers of students, including across quite diverse cohorts. However, again, this was not simply a situation of these academics' making, but reflected broader policy prerogatives which construed cuts to tertiary funding at the federal level as acceptable, indeed necessary.

Methodologically, seeking to critique more neoliberal approaches to educational policy and practice, the chapter also serves as an example of research praxis in practice—or what Blackmore (2014) describes as critical educational research in the context of global edu-capitalism. It is also an example of how more critical research can be undertaken in the context of global reconfiguration of higher education, even as this is challenging work.

Conclusion: Beyond Neoliberalism

In many ways, the push for a much stronger online presence at Acacia University was achieved through a number of policy moves which helped to normalize this as a mode of learning for students. This was complemented by a series of meetings within the School to ensure the academics involved were similarly aware of the changed practices to be adopted. As Ball (2012) argues, such 'ensembles of changes work together to produce new practices, subjectivities and opportunities' (p. 30). Such subjectivities were both productive and problematic—providing opportunities for a reappraisal of existing teaching practices in light of new technologies, but also reflecting more neoliberal prerogatives and trajectories within the university sector more generally.

Neo-Aristotelian conceptions of practice as praxis help shed important light upon the broader conditions—practice architectures—for practice, as well as the specific dialogue/'sayings', and actions/'doings' relationships/'relatings' which both constitute and challenge more neoliberal practices and processes. This challenging of neoliberalism in universities is an important part of the process of reinscribing more inclusive practices so necessary for achieving more inclusive and socially productive goals of widening participation, sustaining quality teaching and learning experiences for students, and providing sustainable workplaces for academics to enable them to achieve these goals. Importantly, these 'alternative' practices are ever-present, even if they may seem somewhat dormant and precarious under current conditions. Just as neoliberalism was itself a precarious project during its formative years (Friedman 1951), and one which is even now constantly in need of 'construction' (Peck 2010), so too do more productive approaches to university teaching and learning need to be exercised—in both policy and practice—to bring them into being.

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Chapter 8
Teaching Practice in Australian Vocational Education and Training: A Practice Theory Analysis

Sarojni Choy and Steven Hodge

Abstract In recent times practice theory has been used to analyse occupations and the dynamics of occupational reproduction. This kind of analysis throws a distinctive light on learning and teaching, which emerge as integral to the reproduction of practices. In contemporary society, however, the process of developing learners' capacities for occupations has become an occupation in its own right within systems of vocational education and training (VET). A tension is indicated between teaching practice in VET as a process internal to the reproduction of occupational practices, and as a practice external to the occupational practices being taught. In this chapter, the theory of practice architectures is used to analyse teaching in the Australian VET system, highlighting contextual influences that shape this complex practice. Evidence is presented, that suggests the theoretical tension identified by practice theory between VET teaching as internal as well as external to occupational practices, illuminates the experience of contemporary VET teachers whose role has for some time been understood as expressing a 'dual identity'. Practice theory helps to clarify this feature of contemporary VET teaching and identify factors underlying the tensions inherent in the system.

Introduction: Occupations as Practices

Since the 1980s (Ortner 1984), the concept of 'practice' has gained ground as a way of describing and analysing complex social phenomena. There are now many versions of 'practice theory' (Rouse 2006) reflecting disagreements about the fundamental nature of practices and what they encompass. However, these theories share the view that at some level, human discourse, activity and relationships can be

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effectively examined in terms of a loosely bounded complex of a shared social project. In this chapter, we use the generic term 'practice theory' to capture the core idea that practices (the bounded complex of a shared social project) serve as a useful unit of analysis, specifically when examining occupations and the work of educators with respect to occupations. Practice theory is recognised for its nuanced approach to studying complex phenomena in which social structures, knowledge, power relationships and individual identity coalesce. It seeks to reconcile subjective and objective dimensions of social life, and structure and agency as determinants of individual experience. The classic example of a practice phenomenon is the occupation. Occupations happen to be one of the earliest examples of social undertakings to be analysed as practices. In anthropological research in the 1980s, a number of traditional occupations were studied using the practice lens (Ortner 1984). Pelissier (1991) noted how some of these studies showed that learning emerged as a key component of the reproduction of practices. Vocational learning by newcomers was something that came about during participation in the everyday activities of the occupation rather than through formal educational endeavours. For example, in Lancy's (1980) study of becoming a blacksmith among the Gbarngasuakwelle, apprentices learned through immersion in the activities of the trade. It was Lave (1982), in her research on apprenticeships among Liberian tailors, who made clear the value of the practice lens for understanding the nature of occupations. Her later work with Wenger used the concept of practice to analyse the occupations of Yacatec midwives, U.S. Navy quartermasters and meatcutters, in addition to Vai and Gola tailors from Western Africa (Lave and Wenger 1991). In these studies, individual learning was a function of the reproduction of occupational practices.

In anthropological research, understandings about occupations of traditional societies clustered around stability and change, learning and identity, knowledge and power, and patterns of social relations (Pelissier 1991). Contemporary social theory and research on a wide range of occupations in industrialised nations contributed to the construction of practice theory (Fuller 2007), extending the concept of practice beyond occupations (Rouse 2006). Current literature on applications of practice theory includes educational occupations, such as school teaching (Kemmis 2010) and teaching in higher education (Hardy 2010). An educational sector that has received relatively little attention from practice theorists is education for occupations through 'vocational education and training' (VET). What is clear from the seminal practice theory-based studies of occupations is that learning and teaching have been regarded as central to an understanding of practices and their reproduction. Lave and Wenger (1991), for instance, derived a distinctive and influential learning theory (of situated learning) from investigations on reproduction of practices such as tailoring where teaching plays a more implicit albeit complex role in facilitating and supporting the learning process. But in modern societies, VET teaching—like other forms of teaching—has become an occupation and practice in its own right.

In this chapter, we examine the occupation of VET teaching using a practice theory lens, in particular the theory of practice architectures (Kemmis and

Grootenboer 2008; Kemmis et al. 2014). We commence by analysing VET teaching as a practice, then trace the recent history of VET teaching to explore the complexities of this kind of work. The chapter goes on to suggest that a practice theory analysis of VET teaching offers a fresh perspective on the long-standing debate about the 'dual identity' of these teachers.

VET Teaching as a Practice

In this chapter, we use practice theory to explore a tension in VET teaching work. On the one hand, educators are occupational insiders who facilitate the process of occupational practice reproduction by helping newcomers to gain the knowledge and skills for full participation in the occupation. On the other hand, contemporary VET teaching work has become institutionalised as a practice that operates externally, through formal means, upon occupational practices to reproduce them. We conceptualise these as two modes of teaching: as an 'internal function' (a process or role within an occupational practice) and an 'external practice' (a separate practice that acts on an occupational practice external to the 'internal function'). These two modes are represented in Fig. 8.1. We suggest that these two modes make conflicting demands on VET teachers and account for the tensions noted in analyses of teacher work that conceptualises it in terms of 'dual identity' (e.g. Dickie et al. 2004).

Research into the reproduction of occupational practices such as that by Lave and Wenger (1991) imply two basic modalities for the work of VET teaching. On the one hand, there is VET teaching as a process that can be understood in terms of the self-regulated reproduction of an occupational practice. On the account of

Fig. 8.1 Contrasting modes of VET teacher work using the practice theory lens

occupations generated by practice theory, they are practices that need to be reproduced and will recruit newcomers who encounter learning that is a mix of spontaneous learning opportunities (the 'learning curriculum' of the practice proposed by Lave and Wenger) and more contrived activities (the 'teaching curriculum'), both of which tending to equip the newcomer with a practitioner identity and associated abilities that eventually allow full, skilled participation. In light of this account, VET teaching is a process internal to the dynamics of the self-reproduction of an occupational practice. This role can only be fulfilled by an experienced, highly capable member of the occupational practice, who can model practitioner identity and demonstrate the expertise necessary for the ongoing success of the occupation in relation to its overarching goals. The experienced VET teacher as occupant of this role knows the activities that underpin legitimate peripheral participation and allocates them understandingly to the newcomer, helping the latter to build appropriate expertise and an individual's occupational identity in the process. In contrast, in modern VET, teachers undergo formal training for the role that is non-occupation specific. Their expertise is represented in capability frameworks and professional standards designed especially for them as an occupational group. They may belong to professional associations, and are subject to regulation. The analysis of VET teaching as an internal, practice reproducing role breaks down under these conditions. Two different accounts can be offered for this quandary.

The analytic framework of Lave and Wenger may be too limited to explain what is going on in contemporary occupations. Their case studies were predominantly of traditional occupations that were localised, stable and relatively small. Hodkinson and Hodkinson (2004) and Fuller (2007) highlighted the limits of Lave and Wenger's (1991) framework in the face of the complexities and breadth of contemporary occupations. In their study of school teaching, Hodkinson and Hodkinson (2004) used practice theory to throw light on subtle dimensions of teachers' work. Fuller (2007) reported on a wide range of studies that have used the practice concept to understand contemporary Western occupations that include sales and manufacturing. Lave (2008) conceded this point in a reflection on her earlier work with Wenger. One problem she identified with the original formulation of their practice theory of occupations and learning was:

> …leaving out the political economic and institutional structuring that partially determines communities of practice and their changing participants. It is difficult to imagine the differences it makes in talking about 'learning' to examine the interconnected political, economic and cultural forces at work beyond the immediate. (2008, pp. 287–288)

Importantly, analysing occupations to understand occupations as practices extends beyond an individualistic focus that views an occupation as the aggregated result of workers applying bodies of knowledge to the tasks typical of the occupation. That is, practice theory rejects the methodological or procedural priority characteristic of certain approaches to the analysis of social life (Schatzki 1996). Related to this position is the rejection of the assumption that occupations may be analysed in terms of knowledge which can be extracted, coded, manipulated, and then applied back to the work. Schön (1983), for instance, contended that

application or transfer of knowledge in the professional work context could not account for the actual behaviour of professionals when tackling ill-defined problems. Consistent with critiques like this, practice theory rejects the duality of theory and practice as an approach to understanding occupations. To view occupations as practices is also to avoid regarding them as the sum of observed tasks. The discipline of task analysis, derived from the founding work of Taylor (1906), reduces occupations to a series of tasks for the purpose of analysing, rationalising and controlling work. Task analysis remains an influential paradigm for understanding occupations (Kirwan and Ainsworth 1992; Clark et al. 2008) and incidentally underpins the competency-based curriculum which contemporary Australian VET teachers are obliged to implement. Nonetheless, practice theory rejects the reductivism inherent in the task-based perspective on occupations.

In contrast with these other perspectives on occupations, practice theory offers a distinctive account. The individual practitioner is seen as an agent constructed during the process of participation in the occupation, as someone whose identity is achieved and embedded in the practice of the occupation (Schatzki 2001). Practitioner identity formation of newcomers is influenced by the practice and contributes to an identity that cannot be understood, sustained or developed separate from the practice. At the same time, practitioner expertise is not something acquired first and then applied, but is integral to the practice. From the practice theory perspective, knowledge cannot be separated out from knowers in knowledgeable practices without losing its coherence. Rather, it is embodied, diffused, and comes to consciousness in the context of practice. It is impossible to fully extract knowledge from practice. Any attempt to do so produces an abstract representation of practice of limited, if any, value. Connected with this rejection of theory-practice dualism is the view that observable tasks belong to a practice whole. Particular tasks can only be meaningfully understood in the practice context. An occupational practice is thus more than the sum of observable tasks and certainly cannot be reduced to the latter no matter how extensive and well-researched an inventory of discrete tasks is.

Contemporary VET Teaching Through a Practice Theory Lens

We take Australian VET teaching as typical of contemporary practice in advanced economies. Australian VET teachers are charged with developing a productive workforce that serves workplaces, occupations and industries as well as contributes to a global skills base. Like VET teaching in other nations, in Australia it is a practice directly shaped by government policy and employer groups, often responding to developments such as the 'global knowledge economy' and reduced public expenditure on education and training. Some forms of practice theory recognise the impact of broader influences on practices, using terms such as 'fields' (Bourdieu 1977; Schatzki 1996; Hodkinson and Hodkinson 2004), 'regimes'

(Foucault 2007), 'architectures' (Kemmis and Grootenboer 2008), 'landscapes' (Wenger-Trayner and Wenger-Trayner 2014) and 'social imaginaries' (Taylor 2004) to highlight the idea that particular practices can be understood within a broader structuring context or background.

We use the theory of practice architectures (Kemmis and Grootenboer 2008; Kemmis et al. 2014) to analyse the history, context and characteristics of contemporary VET teaching practice. According to this conceptualisation, practices are always influenced or shaped by 'architectures' comprising a set of 'arrangements' that extend beyond and are enmeshed in particular practices. Kemmis et al. (2014) postulate three such arrangements: 'cultural-discursive', 'material-economic' and 'social-political'. Cultural-discursive arrangements concern thought and speech, informing the 'semantic space' of what is possible to think and say within a given practice. The cultural context and discourses extend across society and inform multiple related and unrelated practices. Material-economic arrangements impact on practices in terms of the 'physical space-time' or the layout of buildings and teaching spaces, temporal patterns of activity, resources deployed in the practice and the funding arrangements underpinning them. Practices are localised in sites and among things specific to the project of the practice. Finally, there are social-political arrangements that concern power structures, hierarchies and relationships that characterise the 'social space' of the practice. Together, these three arrangements prefigure the 'sayings', 'doings' and 'relatings' respectively that can be described as typical within a practice. These arrangements have their source outside a practice although they are 'enmeshed' within a particular practice in unique ways. Together these arrangements constitute the 'architectures' of a practice (Kemmis and Grootenboer 2008).

Bringing these elements into a framework to bear on VET teaching practice, it is noted that this practice shares a history of institutionalisation with similar educational practices across the Western world (Billett 2011). That is, the move to extract teaching for occupations from a position internal to the occupational practice to create a professional practice in its own right that is external to the occupations taught has been a long-term development ingrained in the institutionalisation of learning to establish 'education' as a feature of society as such. Contemporary practice of VET teaching has its source in the historical development of arrangements that have produced the 'institutional fact' of education (Billett 2011). Within a comparatively short history of Australian VET teaching the practice has achieved a coherent profile during what is called the 'Kangan Era' of reform in the 1970s when the then 'technical and further education' (TAFE) sector coalesced, receiving high-level recognition and support from commonwealth and state governments (Goozee 2000). The cultural-discursive arrangements obtained during this period were dominated by an egalitarian and broadly humanist vision of education that shaped practices across all educational sectors. In this context, VET teaching was informed by principles that promoted a practice whose 'project' was that of developing individuals, communities through skills and knowledge for particular occupations. Materially and economically, there was an unprecedented influx of funding and rich capital works to establish the new sector. Social-political

arrangements positioned VET teachers, like educators in other sectors, as autonomous professionals entrusted with control over curriculum and pedagogy (Hodge 2015). These arrangements served to crystallise the occupation of VET teaching as a practice in its own right, with a project that only indirectly focused on reproducing other occupational practices. Set within humanistic cultural-discursive context, individual and community development were taken as valid concerns for curriculum and pedagogical endeavours as much as occupations, while social-political arrangements strongly promoted professionalisation of VET teaching, firmly setting it apart from the specific occupations that graduates of the VET sector might enter. Material-economic arrangements provided distinctive physical spaces that gave VET a spatial locus outside occupations, underlining the separation between VET teaching practice and occupational practices. The contributions of industry to VET practice architectures narrowed the divide between VET teaching practice and occupational practices being taught.

New arrangements affecting VET teaching practice were introduced during a period known as 'training reform' (Smith and Keating 2003). These arrangements in the 1990s were coached around emerging economic and social conditions similar to those in developed, industrialised nations throughout the world. Among the triggers of these changes was internationalisation of trade that offered less expensive labour by globalising businesses leading to loss of 'low skill' work in advanced economies such as the U.S., Britain and Australia (Harvey 2007). With the closure of industries that had employed low-skilled labour in these countries, unemployment rates rose and fiscal crises engulfed financial systems that had been geared to a highly regulated, tariff-protected economy. Economists and policy makers theorised the situation in terms of 'skills equilibrium', and identified a range of changes across their societies that would need to be implemented to prompt a shift to 'high skills equilibrium'. For instance, Finegold and Soskice (1988) itemised a set of institutions that would require fundamental reform to break advanced countries out of low skills equilibrium, including industrial relations, company management and financial systems. VET systems were seen as a vehicle for economic well-being so became a high-priority target for reform. Hence, VET teaching in particular was singled out for reconceptualisation as part of a raft of changes to various dimensions of practice architectures such as funding, governance, curriculum, pedagogy and assessment across the sector (Hodge 2015).

The cultural-discursive shift that occurred with the Training Reform also introduced a discourse for talking about VET and its relationship with the economy. Part of this discourse, directly influenced by skills equilibrium theory, concerned the role of 'industry' in leading the VET system. Analysis of the dangers of becoming 'trapped' in low skills equilibrium by economists and policy makers (Finegold and Soskice 1988) suggested that the 'failure' of training was due in part to too much professional autonomy on the part of VET teachers. The conclusion was that high-level employer involvement would be necessary to better attune VET curriculum to the needs of the economy. Such a discourse might suggest that the 'Kangan Era' (c. mid-1970s) vision of VET as serving individuals, communities and occupations would be transformed into a more homogenous goal of preparing

learners for work in various occupations. Greater importance was accorded to VET for transition into multiple, related occupations to ensure opportunities for workers as old occupations shut and new ones emerged. That is, portability of skills became a focus. In the post-Training Reform era, VET teachers are compelled to work with curriculum that is developed by employer representatives and committed to 'competency standards' for occupations. An assumption of these new cultural-discursive arrangements is that employers knew best what skills and knowledge are required for occupations for viable business. In other words, an 'industry-led' system signalled a VET system in which teachers no longer operated as autonomous professionals but instead as implementers of pre-specified curriculum authored by employer representatives.

Training reform also ushered in new material-economic and social-political arrangements bearing on VET teaching practice. The discourse of industry leadership of VET was matched by expectations that VET teachers would undertake more delivery within workplaces, a shift signalled by the title of the new mandatory qualification for VET teachers, the competency-based 'Certificate IV in Assessment and Workplace Training'. The spaces in which VET teaching was practiced changed, with much teaching moving from classrooms in the old publically and privately funded educational institutions and into enterprises. Some VET teaching roles became entirely workplace-based. Other change in the arrangements for VET teaching included adoption of new technologies to create alternative modes of delivery. The term 'flexible delivery' was used to indicate a commitment to a wide range of times and spaces of delivery that contrasts strongly with the relatively rigid forms of the traditional timetabled, on-campus, face-to-face teaching approach. The rhetoric of marketisation was matched by new funding arrangements that progressively allowed 'private' providers of VET to access public funding, establishing a quasi-market in which the older TAFE institutions were forced to compete for business with non-traditional providers.

Along with these new material-economic arrangements were shifts in social-political arrangements which included forms of governance with new government and industry bodies set up to oversee the new system. Part of this move was the introduction of strong auditing requirements. Auditing mechanisms saw VET teachers and the new managerial and business oriented staff recruited to the system increasingly aware of and beholden to frameworks such as the 'Australian Quality Training Framework' that described principles of practice regularly policed by auditors external to providers now called 'Registered Training Organisations' (RTOs). Apart from a sense of surveillance from authorities outside RTOs, the VET teacher workforce was subject to increasing 'casualisation', gradually replacing the expectation of permanent positions in VET institutions. VET teachers have since become more vulnerable to market flux and been forced to become more 'entrepreneurial' in their practice, marketing themselves and acting as enterprise consultants. Such employment conditions have steadily undermined the professional solidarity of VET teachers, leaving them in often precarious employment within a fragmented field. They too had to become multi-skilled.

The shift in the practice architectures bearing on VET teaching did not, however, result in a move to a mode of teaching internal to the occupational practices being taught. The shift was rather from one external reproductive practice to another. The new arrangements affecting VET teachers positions them as part of a complex system that sits outside particular occupations and connects with occupational practices in highly formalised ways. Training organisations are expected to recruit teachers from occupations relating to training programs that they offer, and these teachers must maintain their 'industry currency'. Two formal links between the training organisation and the occupational practice are thus indicated: recruitment from the practice and ongoing engagement with the practice to maintain currency. VET teachers individually embody these connections. In addition to these links with practice, the curriculum enacted by teachers is based on units of competency that comprise national training packages. These competencies are notionally based on an analysis of the tasks that make up the occupation—the process mentioned above which conceptualises work as a set of tasks reflected in specifications of behaviours, skills and knowledge common to particular occupations. Thus a codified and reductive representation of the occupation mirrors the connection between a training organisation and the occupational practice. This forms the basis for tensions in VET teaching practice.

The day-to-day work of contemporary VET teachers comprises an intricate connection with occupational practices. There is particular curriculum alignment of taught occupations and practices to implement the intentions of the training reform. Teaching within occupational spaces is strongly promoted to mirror authentic practices and replicate contemporary work practices. However, their work also encourages learning for emerging practices, innovation etc. The concept of 'practice ecologies' (Kemmis et al. 2012) is a useful tool for analysing this lived aspect of VET teaching practice, and at the same time highlighting the contrast between this practice and that of school and higher education teaching. Contemporary VET teacher work takes place among occupational practices in multiple sites and contexts that comprise the 'ecologies'. That is, VET teaching practice is distributed across macro, meso and micro interrelated and interdependent systems and practices with potentially distinct and discrete ecologies of practice within each.

At a macro level VET teaching practice resides in the overarching education sector and is administered by the different levels of governments and industries, each with specific economic and policy arrangements. At the meso level their practice exists within the VET sector and its distinct operations. At the micro level, VET teachers' practices function in the context of their vocational areas of focus and those of the work sites where their learners gain learning experiences. Fundamentally, VET teaching involves constant movement of varying scales within ecologies of practices in ways that distinguish their practices from teachers in other educational sectors. Each of these three levels or ecologies of practice present a combination of common and distinctive characteristics and practice architectures that shape particular sayings, doings and relatings (Kemmis et al. 2014), and that enable or constrain their efforts to operationalise VET practice. In the following section, the practice ecologies of contemporary VET teaching are described. The description is scaffolded by the

distinctions between 'sayings', 'doings' and 'relatings' that reflect the underlying architecture of VET teaching practice. We acknowledge these three dimensions are interconnected or enmeshed, which makes them 'hang together' (Schatzki 2001).

Sayings in VET

Conventional sayings in educational institution settings are characterised by the language of competencies and training packages, workforce development, national training agenda, and in the day–to-day conversations about students and the nature of their work. These are framed around the intended, enacted and experienced curriculum for the teaching areas. The sayings are shaped by particular cultural-discursive arrangements; these are featured within specific practice architectures covering the culture and discourses of pedagogy, assessment and reporting to meet different client needs and purposes (learners, governments, community and regulatory bodies). Teachers' sayings also incorporate discourses of their own workplace, the way that their work is talked about and regarded socially, vocationally and academically. Typically, VET sayings in workplace settings are founded fairly expansively on the technical language of workforce capacity building; human capital; skilling workers; and using skills as a competitive advantage. It is true that some of these sayings prefigure the practices at the same time do not determine what actually happens in VET teaching and learning. The particular vernaculars reveal an instrumental perspective of VET, one that is dominated by economic imperatives. Hence, a mass 'production' of skilled workers who can quickly reproduce a practice with quick returns is highly regarded and expected. The sayings suggest input (material, space and time) and outputs (skilled workers who will make economic and social contributions), not the VET that was characterised by traditional trade training nor of the 'Kangan Era', not focused simply on skill acquisition but having a strong praxis orientation to being for example a good carpenter or a good cook and contributions to the wider society through endeavours to achieve excellence. The contemporary instrumental focus often supposes a lower status and lowly utilitarian significance to VET qualifications compared to university degrees. There is also the discourse of the administrative and legislative regulatory frameworks such as workplace health and safety that frame VET. A pervasive auditing and compliance culture characterising contemporary VET also directs distinctive ways of speaking and thinking. Because VET teachers are required to articulate the nexus between the commercial and economic language with colleagues, peers, managers and outside partners, their language to describe VET pedagogy becomes the foundation of their practice as teachers. In summary, the practice architectures for these sayings are continuously shaping mechanisms that indicate and enable and constrain the measures of success, benefits and outcomes; learning at and through work; and meeting auditing requirements.

Doings in VET

The material-economic arrangements of contemporary VET that shape the 'doings', characteristic of teaching practice bear on work in both institutional classroom settings and in the workplace. The doings that take place in the classroom are reflected in the pedagogies of the staff, their attitudes towards the provision of training, and the compliance or otherwise subjected by codes of practice and legislation. The material-economic arrangements in the form of the curriculum, resources, teaching staff, the equipment and technology that is available all form the material conditions of practice at the institutional sites.

The doings in workplaces are founded on taking advantage of the workplace pedagogical opportunities and affordances, employer supported training; in-house guided learning provision; and externally supported learning provisions. A consequence of VET teaching practice activity in workplaces is that the teaching is undertaken in close proximity to the work and business imperatives of productivity and competition. These doings transpire through interaction with peers, co-workers, managers and other agents who facilitate and support learning (e.g. workplace trainers, supervisors, suppliers, clients who may assist students). All of this happens in the course of completing work tasks and tend to be unstructured and not necessarily aimed as a learning outcome. The apprenticeship model however, allows a more structured approach to the doings to complete the agreed training plan. Variations in provisions at each learning site are also accommodated. Industries with intentional work arrangements (e.g. in aged care where learners and inexperienced workers operate with a more experienced 'buddy') that facilitate learning can enable or constrain the doings for VET teachers. Most models of VET provision tend to rely on the good will of employers, and other workers. At the operative level, material-economic arrangements manifest in the layout of work sites, deployment of resources and co-workers, and the kinds of equipment, technology and the environment of each workplace. Regardless of the different provisions and practice architectures, VET teachers' doings are also enabled or constrained by their learners' motivation, readiness to learn, and agency in accessing the affordances and opportunities available in the workplace.

VET teachers' understandings and knowledge of the sayings and doings in the two settings make them valuable connective agents to assist their students with integration of what is learnt in VET institutions and workplaces. It also forms the basis for relatings.

Relatings in VET

VET teachers' relatings reflect the social-political arrangements impacting on VET and the distinctive social spaces it creates. VET teacher practice involves constantly relating with internal and external partners, clients and networks to achieve different

outcomes and interests. Such interplay occurs on many levels with varying degrees of intensity and complexity, in the social and community spaces within and outside the education institute site. These are mediated with the social and political world of the VET system, policies, procedures and the politics of industry. This interplay happens through negotiation and mediation of relationships with a wide variety of people—students, workplaces/employers as clients, and reporting bodies.

Relatings in workplaces become apparent through person-to-person interplay that occur on many levels and are contextualised and mediated within the business and social spaces. Social-political arrangements that shape the world of business and social relations and obligations, the life world relationships, and the respective power relationships that occur in the workplace both enable and constrain relatings typical of VET teaching practice. This facet of VET teaching is by no means effortless. It tests the experience and expertise of the teachers.

As mentioned earlier, it is the enmeshment of the sayings, doings and relatings that hang together and sustain VET teachers' practice and at the same time as an amalgamation that illustrates the integrated nature of their work across boundaries.

Thus far we have analysed VET teaching in Australia from a practice theory perspective, briefly describing the ecologies of practice and practice architectures that shape the work of teachers. Ecologies of VET practice transcend the complex socially located contributions in different practice sites that are subject to constant evolution of their own kind. This suggests that VET teachers' work is complex and multifaceted. Their roles demand collaborative decision making, regular problem solving, impromptu measures as well as mandatory activities such as formal assessment. These can be achieved through social interactions in appropriate ecologies of practice supported with the right kinds of practice architectures for specific instances, contexts and sites. It is the relational interdependence between their multifaceted practices that enable or constrain their practice. Fundamentally, VET teachers operate interdependently, but collaboratively in partnership with others such as learners, educational institutions and their staff, workplaces/ enterprises that afford work related learning, governments, professional bodies and unions, and the local communities. They mediate and reconcile practice architectures comprising the social political world, the world of business and social relations and obligations, the life world relationships, and the respective power relationships that occur in the workplace either enable or constrain the relatings.

A Practice Theory Perspective on VET Teacher 'Dual Identity'

In this chapter, we presented an analysis of VET teaching using the theory of practice architectures to represent VET teaching work as internal to the reproduction of occupational practices (Lave and Wenger 1991). Yet since the industrial revolution, teaching work has been institutionalised, constituting the practice as an occupation in its own right (Billett 2011). This development has reconfigured VET

teaching practice, reconstructing it as an occupation that is separate to the occupations taught by VET teachers. In Australia, VET teaching practice was shaped by architectures configured by the Kangan Era reforms in the 1970s and then by the more recent neoliberal training reform agenda of the 1990s. In this final section of the chapter the potential for tension between the two modes of VET teaching highlighted by analysis through a practice theory lens—internal function and external practice—is explored.

Tensions in VET teaching practice illuminated by practice theory are consistent with a long-standing acceptance of the idea that VET teachers have a 'dual identity'. Chappell and Johnston (2003) drew attention to competing claims on the allegiance of VET teachers to occupations they teach and the world of VET itself. Their research investigated the changing nature of VET teaching work in the wake of the training reform. Dickie et al. (2004) used the term 'dual identity' to capture the new practice which they said combined the identities of an 'industry professional' with that of an 'educational professional'. For example, an experienced plumber who becomes a VET teacher mediates between dualities of identity as a tradesperson (plumber) and a teacher. Identity confusion was elaborated by Palmieri (2004), who distinguished the two occupational platforms of VET teachers that propagated tensions between identities. Robertson (2008) identified different aspects of VET teacher dual identities, including the fact that in the world of VET, education is competency-based while other traditional models of learning form the basis of VET teaching. Similarly, Wheelahan and Curtin (2010) articulated VET teaching work in terms of dual identity [which emphasised the complexity of their work as a result of this duality (see also Orr 2008)].

Apart from the acknowledgement of VET teacher dual identity, there is criticism of the legitimacy of ways in which the external reproductive practices of contemporary VET may be operationalised. Lave and Wenger (1991) challenged the assumption that occupational practices can be reproduced using formal, institutional mechanisms. They argued that learning and teaching for the reproduction of occupational practices was driven by a 'learning curriculum' implicit in the structure of the practice and realised in the activities of legitimate peripheral participation. A common belief, central to formal education systems, that this learning curriculum could be abstracted from practice and applied formally and externally to the practice (eg. in RTOs) is undermined by an account of practice reproduction. In subsequent research that employed alternative theoretical perspectives a similar point has been made. For instance, within workplace learning research there is an emphasis on the inappropriateness of a total institutional basis to teach occupations (e.g. Billett 2011). The obligation on teachers in contemporary Australian VET to use competency standards as a basis for curriculum design, teaching and assessment is therefore challenged by practice theory and workplace learning theory, each questioning the assumption that formalised curriculum imposed by the practice architectures of VET teaching is an effective vehicle for reproducing an occupation.

There is evidence that VET teachers exercise agency with respect to the identity-constructing demands of the different modes of their practice. A string of research projects beginning with Robinson (1993), and including Lowrie et al. (1999),

Harris et al. (2005), Harris and Hodge (2009), through to Hodge (2014) suggest that VET teachers construe the demands associated with the practice architectures of training reform as problematic. That is, teachers make decisions about their practice that embody a stance on their part in relation to occupational reproduction. In part, these decisions are consciously informed by imperatives surrounding competency-based training. Hodge (2014) suggested that some VET teachers intentionally augment the official curriculum and supplement with insights directly garnered from occupational practice. Earlier, research by Chappell and Johnston (2003) indicated that VET teachers took a principled stand on their allegiance to a more traditional practice that can be interpreted as internal to occupations. Chappell and Johnston (2003) found that teachers, in what was at the time the still-new environment of practice in the Training Reform era, maintained their focus on quality teaching for the occupation in the face of competing demands of compliance with the new arrangements. More recently, Martin (2012) reported that VET teachers maintained an 'unofficial code' of professional conduct that could set them at odds with institutional objectives aligned to the practice architectures of contemporary VET.

What research and theory relating to contemporary VET teaching practice in Australia hints at is a tension that can be illuminated by practice theory. Analysis using the theory suggests two modes of practice: a process within the dynamics of occupational practice reproduction, and as participation in an external reproductive practice. The former positions the VET teacher as an occupational expert whose identity is aligned to the occupation and primarily concerned with the occupational practice: its quality, its traditions and culture, and its sustainability including processes of reproduction with which they are directly concerned. The latter positions the VET teacher as a VET specialist with a background in the occupation, who is highly responsive to the practice architectures of the VET system and has an identity bound up with roles connected with registered training organisation-based provisions that include facility in competency-based design, delivery and assessment, and who maintains 'industry currency' through formalised processes of engagement with an occupation. This teaching practice has been conceptualised in terms of a 'dual identity', straddling internal and external roles with respect to the reproduction of occupational practices. Evidence has been cited that suggests this dual identity, reflecting the two modes of practice causes tensions in the work of VET teachers, creates tensions associated with competing demands and courses of action that can be interpreted in terms of resistance, subversion of official curriculum, and maintenance of unofficial codes of conduct.

Conclusion

Use of a practice theory lens implies that the tension postulated in VET teacher work between internal and external modes of occupational practice reproduction is more than a subjective experience. Rather it may be a sign of complexities around

VET practices in Australia and other countries with advanced economies. The analysis of these complexities using practice theory illuminates the actuality of practices, the importance of the processes of reproduction, and the position of the practice expert as facilitator of reproduction. If practice architectures that are not specifically aligned to particular occupational practices shape the work of these experts—VET teachers—then practices may be formed that are characterised by reproductive work separate from or external to the occupation. But this transposition of the mode of VET teacher work could only be effective if curricular mechanisms and the cultural-discursive, material-economic, and social-political arrangements are available to support VET practice separately from the occupational practice. However, theory and empirical evidence indicates that such mechanisms are not adequate. Tensions in VET teaching practice thus suggest deeper issues with the way occupations are represented in the curriculum of contemporary VET. VET teachers are thrust into a position where they must negotiate complex demands, some of which stem from practice architectures that fall short of supporting VET practice.

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Chapter 9
Learning Practices: Financial Literacy in an Aboriginal Community

Levon Ellen Blue and Peter Grootenboer

Abstract In this chapter, we focus on the financial literacy education (FLE) practices in an Aboriginal community in Canada. We discuss the role of FLE in this Community and describe how a form of *site-based education development* occurred. The importance of *praxis*, the moral and ethical aspect of teaching by FLE practitioners is also explored. Next, we identify the ecological arrangements of FLE practices and Community members' financial practices. The enabling and constraining practice architectures encountered in the site are identified and explained. It is important to point out that the first named author of this paper is a member of this Aboriginal community and so in conjunction with fellow Community members, the approaches to learning and their felt needs were explored. Last, we will outline the implications for FLE practitioners/educators we identified working in this site.

Introduction

Occasionally when we are presenting our research about FLE in an Aboriginal[1] community, someone from the audience says something about FLE not being appropriate for Aboriginal people. This statement is usually made by someone who is not Aboriginal, or does not identify as Aboriginal when speaking with us further.

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[1]Aboriginal is the term used in Canada to described First Nations (status and non status), Métis and Inuit Aboriginal groups.

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We are informed by these individuals that Aboriginal people share all their resources (not true), are not interested in the future (not true) and that Aboriginal people just are not interested in learning about personal finances (apparently too much of a neoliberal agenda that does not align with *true* Aboriginal values). Based on our research[2] conducted in this Aboriginal Community about their felt need for FLE, we disagree with all three statements. Indeed, FLE was sought by Community members in this site thus demonstrating a genuine interest in acquiring financial skills and knowledge. For example, a Community member (Female, CM1) stated "You know everyone wants to learn about money and everyone wants to, I guess, it's like everything revolves around it right? It brings out either positive behaviours or negative behaviours that everyone sees especially in a small community".

Community members interested in increasing financial literacy in the Community invited an established charitable organisation (funded by a big bank and a nonprofit organisation) to deliver their multiple day financial literacy 'train-the-trainer' workshop to Community members working for Departments located on the reservation. Our research began approximately one year after this FLE *train-the-trainer* workshop failed to gain traction in the Community. By focusing our research on a topic important to the Community, we began to explore with Community members how FLE is important and relevant in this site. Here we will share with you some findings based on the FLE practices occurring in this site, starting with how site-based education development occurred.

Site-Based Education Development

This Community (or site) is located on a Aboriginal reservation in Canada. It is a small community with members living both on and off the reservation. Travel to the reservation, which is located on an island, requires a trip by vehicle and ferry. There are high levels of unemployment and limited opportunities for employment in the Community, but there are a few Departments operating in the Community, such as an employment office, housing office, etc., and there is one community store and a primary school located on the reservation.

Collaboratively developing education specific to the needs of individuals in the site is at the heart of site-based education development. Kemmis et al. (2014) define site-based education development as; "when educators[3] think together about how best to do this, in a particular school, for particular students and a particular community, they are engaging in site based education development" (p. 212).

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[2]This chapter is based some findings from Blue's PhD research in her Community (a First Nation Community in Canada). Interviews were used as the main research method during this research project as Blue returned to her Community twice during her PhD.

[3]In this case, the term educators refers to both researchers and community members who are collaboratively working towards education developments that are best for their site.

The need for a site-based education development approach to FLE was apparent after Community members shared with us their felt concerns and specific needs of the site. These site-specific needs included how to integrate financial awareness into a Departments' processes and also included discussions around FLE for students leaving the Community to attend post-secondary education. The need to also educate more members about how to complete grant applications and how to engage with and understand the Community's financial statements were identified.

Understanding these site-specific needs of the Community was what we regarded as the first step in moving towards more sustainable approaches for education development within the site. The next step in moving towards more sustainable education development involved having practitioners/educators along with Community members discussing and determining what the 'real' outcomes of FLE were (Blue and Brimble 2014) and what the 'real' outcomes of FLE were within this site. Importantly, we argue that recognising that FLE will not solve the issues of poverty Aboriginal communities face or easily remedy financial problems for Community members, was the first 'realisation' for FLE practitioners/educators to understand. This understanding of what FLE can and cannot do within a site is integral to the praxis of FLE.

The Importance of FLE Praxis

The dual purpose of education is that, it should be for the benefit of both the individual and society (Grootenboer 2013). To achieve this, it requires a *praxis* approach to FLE that highlights practitioner's/educator's role in developing their students' critical dispositions associated with their financial identities (Blue et al. 2014). This is consistent with the literature about mathematical identities (Grootenboer 2013), but it also incorporates a critical disposition require that ensures that students are not mislead into thinking that FLE will solve all their financial troubles. And indeed, relevant here is that poverty is prevalent on a larger scale in this Community than in the rest of the Canada (excluding other reservations). With this in mind, it is essential that the practitioner/educator teaching FLE abandon deficit thinking (Dudley-Marling 2007; Gorski 2006; Pinto 2013) when exploring the reasons for poverty. By deficit thinking we are referring to "…the myth that underachievement is caused by deficiencies in students, their families, their culture, or their communities" (Pinto and Cresnik 2014, p. 47) "… rather than the deficiency in the system" (p. 50). We also argue the importance of the moral and ethical decision-making associated with FLE. That is an understanding that having a praxis perspective involves understanding what FLE can and cannot offer students, and it is the moral and ethical aspect that makes us think beyond ourselves to our Communities and what would benefit it as a whole.

Ecological Arrangements of FLE Practices

The ecological arrangement of the FLE practices is multidimensional. That is, FLE practices are ecologically arranged with many other practices in the site, and therefore, other related practices need to also be considered alongside the FLE practices. This includes identifying the ecological arrangements by understanding the five practices of the *Education Complex* (teaching, student learning, leading, staff development, evaluation) (Kemmis et al. 2014). For example, FLE teaching practices are ecologically arranged with students' learning practices; FLE staff development practices are ecologically arranged with educators' teaching practices; and, FLE leading practices are ecologically arranged to teaching practices and staff development practices; etc. However, FLE practices are ecologically arranged with other practices beyond the Education Complex. These include political agendas that influence the teaching, learning, leading, development and evaluation of FLE. Importantly here, FLE practices are ecologically arranged with the financial practices of Community members and groups.

The financial practices of personal budgeting appeared to be the take away 'skills' that Community members who attended FLE workshop were expected to 'learn'. This resulted in one Department adding a budget sheet into their internal systems to assist with funding requests from clients:

> This is another personal budget sheet for them [name of the Community member] has incorporated in the system, we all have it, if a person comes in requesting assistance … this is part of the application and it is already in our system and we just enter the numbers in. (Female, CM2)

Another Department in the Community explained how they work with individuals facing financial trouble through home budgeting. This seems to illustrate that the message of from the workshop is that 'budgets' will solve financial problems.

> So if they start going into arrears one of our options before being evicted is to set up and do home budgeting with them to try and correct any problems that might come up. (Female, CM3)

These two brief examples of how FLE practices can shape Community members' financial practices and thus illustrate the ecological arrangement and influences in education practices. Identified and described below are the practice architectures with in the site that enable and constrain practice.

The Practice Architectures of FLE in the Community

As previously mentioned, this small Aboriginal reservation is located on an Island and has members living both on and off reserve. Some of the practice architectures; that is, the arrangements that enabled and constrained FLE practices in the

community, included: disadvantage, poverty, unemployment, health and well-being, education and identity. First, we describe and briefly discuss these broad conditions in turn, before outlining how they functioned as practice architectures to enable and constrain FLE in this Community.

Disadvantage

> Two thirds of that last generation to attend residential schools has not survived. It is no coincidence that so many fell victim to violence, accidents, addictions and suicide. Today the children and grandchildren of those who went to residential schools also live with the same legacy of broken families, broken culture and broken spirit. (Chief Councillor Charlie Cootes, cited in Royal Commission on Aboriginal People [RCAP] 1996, p. 22)

Much could be said about how many First Nation Communities continue to struggle under the *Indian Act* (Holmes 1987) but that could be the focus of a whole other book. 'An endless circle of disadvantage' resulting in forms of family violence, educational failure, poverty, ill health and other violence (Gray 1997) is how Aboriginal communities have been described. What causes such disparity and tremendous underdevelopment? "The casual factors associated with Aboriginal (Native) underdevelopment are numerous and complex, including loss of land and sovereignty, cultural genocide, lack of education, and job market discrimination" (Kendall 2001, p. 45). Much of this injustice, disadvantage and underdevelopment can be traced back to the treatment of Aboriginal people at residential schools. Children who were taken from their families were often abused emotionally, physically and sexually (Chrisjohn et al. 1997; Fournier and Crey 1997; Grant 1996) and left with a broken spirit (Royal Commission on Aboriginal People 1996). Children growing up in these setting learned abusive behaviours and inappropriate ways of being which continues to have its affects in Communities today. Mental health problems are another obvious side effect of cultural oppression and marginalisation (Kirmayer et al. 2003). Indeed, the aftermath of residential schools as described by Grant (1996) involved an inability express feelings, confusion about both values and culture, negative views about religion, feeling inferior and difficulties with employment. All issues that were not problems in Aboriginal communities prior to colonisation and residential schools and the 'intergenerational impact of residential schools' is acknowledged "…as a root cause of poor health and social conditions such as poverty, addictions and violence…" (Smith et al. 2005, p. 41).

An endless cycle of disadvantage continues to have an impact on individuals ways of being and financial practice. These disparities can lock an individual and/or Community into certain ways of being that make it difficult to escape the conditions that foster living for the moment and prevent independent ways of being including planning for the future. Disadvantage resulting in dependency is very much linked to poverty, which is the next practice architecture to be discussed.

Poverty

Individuals living in Aboriginal communities in Canada face many financial challenges that affect their financial practices which are often magnified for Aboriginal people living on reservations.[4] In North America, reservations were established as a place for assimilation and survival only, not success and well-being. With substantially lower income levels than the general population of Canadians. "In 2006, the median income for Aboriginal peoples was $18,962—30% lower than the $27,097 median income for the rest of Canadians" (Wilson and Macdonald 2006, p. 3) and Aboriginal people living on reserve receive the lowest of all wages at $14,616 annually (Mendelson 2006). A lack of collateral in property on reservations further widens the income gap between individuals who inherit and distribute wealth through ownership of property and those that do not.

Both dependency and poverty mean that financial practices are focused on (i.e. enabling) living for the moment and constrain planning for the future. Of course, this is further compounded by a lack of employment, and this is the next aspect of the practice architectures and is discussed below.

Unemployment

Even with the lowest incomes on offer for Aboriginal people living on reserves, employment opportunities do continue to exist and are offered in the Community. We were informed about the lack of jobs within the Community during interviews and it is apparent when you spend time in the Community and hear about Community members looking for work. We are told that opportunities for long-term employment are rare, especially jobs that offer a wage higher than the monthly social assistance payment. An issue with short-term jobs as described to us was whether the position is a 'real' job with 'real' duties or just a 'made up' job. It was reported that often jobs are created with limited responsibility and that all this teaches is 'bad habits':

> So that's our big push we are trying to give these kids their first jobs. And then working with the youth [initiative for summer jobs] is my biggest push there was don't hire anybody unless you have a real job for them if you are hiring them and all they are doing is sitting around. You are teaching them nothing but bad habits. (Male, CM4)

This issue of employment and creating 'real opportunities' is particularly relevant for the youth in the Community.

Another concern raised by some Community members was that some jobs in the Community were awarded to non-Community members which has resulted in some

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[4]A reservation, or reserve, is land that has been allocated for the exclusive use for registered, or status, Indians (First Nation individuals registered under the Indian Act).

Community members having even less hope for the future. This lack of hope is connected to not seeing themselves or fellow Community members in positions to aspire towards. Sense of hopelessness due to unemployment can also manifest into other issues. This can affect an individual's health and well-being as they look to escape the reality they are confronted with including a lack of opportunities.

Health and Well-Being

Aboriginal people in Canada continue to face "… poorer health, higher rates of unemployment, incarceration, and youth suicide than non-Aboriginal people" (Cappon and Laughlin 2009, p. 1). Living in poverty can mean a choice between paying the rent or feeding the family (Miko and Thompson 2004). Financial stress and lack of access to affordable, adequate and safe housing (without molds and potentially hazardous construction defects) means social and academic development will continue to suffer (Miko and Thompson 2004). With lower life expectancy than the non-Aboriginal population, poverty results in poorer health and living for today instead of living and planning for tomorrow:

> And when the youth see that the leadership is working for the youth then those youth are going to actually start moving forward and start to climb that ladder… Because right now the way I look at it, the youth here don't have anything. Nothing. (Male, CM5)

Another consequence of the "… powerlessness and hopelessness that has arisen due to the devastation of traditional cultural values" (McCormick 2000, p. 27) is addiction. Duran and Duran (1995) argues that, "alcohol use and even suicide may be functional behavioral adaptations within a hostile and hopeless social environment" (p. 193). This Community is not immune to these issues and where addictions are present there are a myriad of consequences and challenges, including financial ones, which are faced by the individual, their families and the community. Alcohol- and drug-related addiction adversely affect family life as money is used for these addiction which often place pressure on the household budget. Furthermore, and often relatedly, gambling can become an innocent past time that soon becomes an addiction as the individual attempts to win back the money spent on their other addiction. The embodiment of inequities especially the health inequities faced by Aboriginal Canadians compared to non-Aboriginal Canadians continues to be "… the underlying causes of disparities" (Adelson 2005, p. S45). These health inequities are directly related "… to Third World health status; those socio-economic determinants including infrastructure, housing, employment, income, environment, and education" (Adelson 2005, p. S45). With a health and education gap facing Aboriginal communities in Canada increasing retention rates in both compulsory and post-secondary education is viewed as part of the solution of enabling independency and self-determination.

Education

"While higher education is the way out of socioeconomic status, low socioeconomic status makes it less likely that higher education will be obtained" (Mendelson 2006, p. 9). Within this Community, it was reported that if an application for funding[5] is not submitted on time an eligible Community member can miss out on the opportunity to leave the Community and attend post-secondary education.

> And if they miss that deadline then they are out of luck and these people well they wander over to the welfare office and they notice that oh the money is free. Oh, okay then never mind my education. (Male, CM5).

We were told that too often individuals miss out, and for many individuals with future plans and aspirations, these go on hold because going on social assistance occurs instead of going off to post-secondary education.

Identity

As mentioned above, Aboriginal people in Canada who appear on the Indian Register are classified as Status Indians and are listed on Canada's official record under the *Indian Act* (www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca). Being a 'Status Indian' comes with certain rights and benefits according to Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada (AANDC), the Department who is responsible for maintaining the register. These rights and benefits may include access to on-reserve housing, education and exemption from taxes when you are employed on a reservation and exemption from provincial taxes off-reserve for Aboriginals with 'status'. This government identifying system is not without its faults including discriminatory practices resulting in some family members being granted 'status' rights and others not despite sharing the same family tree. This failure to be granted 'status' rights can also have a negative effect on the individual's sense of belonging and identity. Moreover, Aboriginal people have been awarded financial compensation for successful legal battles involving land claims and treatment at residential schools, as examples. Financial compensation awarded to Aboriginal people remains a controversial issue in the Canada between some Aboriginal and Non-Aboriginal citizens. This controversy usually comes down to not understanding historically what happened to Aboriginal people and the associated treaty rights and obligations the Canadian Government is required to pay. However, this felt resentment adversely affects individuals receiving this compensation or exemption from paying provincial taxes by showing a 'status' card when finalising

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[5]Treaty rights relating to education exist in Canada for First Nation people who are deemed to be 'Status Indians' by the Canadian Government.

a transaction. This undercurrent of resentment and feelings of not deserving can manifest an uncomfortableness about having money.

> So maybe there is a belief that it's not ours so if we get rid of it really quick then it means less. (Male, CM6).

Within the Community fellow Community members often help each other when in need. This generosity is demonstrated through extra meals cooked for those in need privately and during Community held events focusing around offered a hot meal, the 'Loonie'[6] fundraising Auction, offering someone a ride into town, hiring someone in need and/or generously sharing resources are all examples experienced or observed during time in the Community. Having such a strong network of Community members to rely on can really have advantages when living in and around the Community and can prove to be very difficult when an individual leaves the Community and is accustomed to such a large base of people to call upon.

Enabling and Constraining Practice Architectures in the Community

The conditions noted above formed (part of) the practice architectures for FLE in the community, and as such they both enabled and constrained FLE practices. Of course, these can be experienced differently by different people (i.e. what enables practice for one could constrain practice for another and vice versa), but in this section we outline the identified practice architectures that both enabled and constrain FLE practices and financial practices in the Community as they emerged from the data. These enabling and constraining practice architectures of FLE and financial practice in the Community are discussed below.

FLE Practices

Previously FLE training was delivered in the Community by an invited charitable organisation that provides FLE train-the-trainer workshops around Canada. These generic FLE programs are aimed at individuals with low financial literacy levels, including Aboriginal people. Being the target of FLE programs often implies that you are lacking a certain set of financial skills and knowledge deemed to be effective for managing your personal finances (Humpage 2016). This deficit is thought to be remedied by learning how to budget effectively, through FLE programs focusing on budget management.

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[6]A loonie is a gold coloured $1.00 Canadian coin that often has a loon (Canadian bird) depicted on it.

> In University there was some sort of quick, learn how to budget during orientation week… I think most of those budget things that I had attended, it was mostly just common sense stuff … I didn't necessarily learn anything at them. (Male, CM7)

Thus, FLE was enabled in the Community, by Community members interested in financial literacy asking a well-established FLE training organisation to deliver a train-the-trainer workshop in the Community. In addition to this workshop, Community members communicated with the first named author of this paper (a fellow Community member) to be a part of the FLE initiatives in the Community. This connection enabled us to have a better understanding of the Communities interest and needs around FLE after exploring with Community members why this train-the-trainer workshop failed to gain traction despite interest in acquiring personal finance skills and knowledge.

The FLE practice, in this case, a generic[7] one-size fits-all existing FLE workshop, was a constraining factor as the content did not suit the context. The content included a budget approach to FLE where teaching how to develop a budget is promoted as the key to overcome financial trouble, and this is a common approach in many generic one-size fits-all FLE programs around the world. This means, in the Communities were poverty, high levels of unemployment, and lower education levels are prevalent, the financial practices are taught with a deficit assumption. That is, an assumption that you are lacking these financial skills instead of determining what financial skills is required in the Community. Furthermore, these FLE programs aim to influence individuals' financial practices thus enabling effective money management behaviours such as spending less than you earn and saving a portion of your income. The focus is very much on the individual and how the individual can solve their financial troubles through discipline and careful attention to their spending.

> I think the thought out there because they have an already restricted budget and can't go any further then what they have already been using it for [and] that they don't think there is any use [for FLE training]. If you only have a like a fixed budget then it gone, its already dedicated to either bills or food. They just don't seem to worry about it. (Male, CM8)

This individualistic wealth accumulation focus of FLE is often at odd with Aboriginal communities who may have reciprocal kinship obligations, where sharing financial resources is expected (Humpage 2016).

> I think that it is important (financial literacy), but you have to keep in mind and consideration of a long history of tradition of wanting to share and look out for each other and not having this mentality of getting ahead of their neighbour. (Male, CM6)

In this small example of a FLE initiative in the Community we see that enabling factors include an interest in FLE in the Community, Community members working with an organisation and researcher on FLE initiatives, a Department in the Community commitment to provide financial awareness to their clients and,

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[7]The charitable organisation that delivered the FLE 'train-the-trainer' workshop did consult with Community members about their modules and made some modifications to their content.

constraining factors include a generic program, and Community members not comfortable being 'quasi' financial experts after receiving this FLE workshop. Indeed, it was reported that no one who participated in the training was willing to become a FLE trainer; thus this training practice was not sustainable.

> No, the majority that were there thought it was a pretty good course and gave them some awareness into financial literacy and what to look at and what to expect around budgeting and all that but they all agreed that or the majority agreed that they wouldn't be willing to go out and teach people. (Male, CM6)

The relevance and appropriate of the 'one-size-fits-all' program for the practice architectures and conditions in this site are of concern and may be overcome with a praxis approach to FLE—an approach to consider the moral and ethical aspects of teaching in each context. In the next section, we will explore the enabling and constraining practice architectures affecting financial practices in the Community and how these relate to the conditions and arrangements[8] identified in the site.

Financial Practices

In this section, we discuss some of the financial practices in the Community including budgeting, collateral, alternative sources of income, spending, lack of safety net outside the Community and access to financial institutions. Interwoven in this section is how these practices impact financial decision-making with in the Community.

> I'm just looking at the word financial and the word literacy and am thinking about the ones who can't read and write. Can they count money? How do they value money? (Female, CM9)

Financial practices are both enabled and constrained by an individual's source of income. Practices such as sharing the cost of a ride into town to purchase groceries and other items may be more prevalent at the beginning of the month. This is when some Community members receive the monthly social assistance payment and go into town. It was reported that offering Community meals towards the middle and end of the month were scheduled at this time for those Community members who might be out of funds and in need of a meal.

It is common practice for individuals with little money to be blamed for their poor choices and individuals with surplus funds highly regarded for this discipline and financial choices. This labelling of individuals for their poor financial choices or their effective financial choices is the focus of conventional FLE (Lucey et al. 2015). Indeed, in FLE workshops the importance of stretching funds over the month is emphasised and solutions such as either reducing expenses and/or

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[8]The condition in the site include: disadvantage, poverty, unemployment, health and well-being, education and identity.

increasing income are offered as the solutions to financial difficulties. The financial practices promoted are effective and responsible use of funds, saving a portion of your income, reducing your debt, monitoring your spending and reducing your expenses on non-essential items. The covert assumption behind this budget approach (or conventional approach) to FLE is that there is something wrong with you and your financial practices. However, one component missing from these FLE programs is how to secure well-paying year round job that is located within the Community.

It may be true that many of us do not budget our money however, only the poor are thought to be lacking budgeting skills. Indeed it is assumed that the well-off are expert budgeters since they can shift their financial resources around to cover any over expenditure and seek additional funds such as loans to cover other shortfalls with ease. This ability to acquire additional capital is another financial practice that is difficult for Community members living on the reservation. Indeed, not being able to own your land on the Reservation means Community members are very much dependent on only their wage to earn money and are often faced with limited opportunities to build wealth and obtain collateral. With restrictions in place around land ownership on the Island, there is limited scope for Community members to earn equity in the land allocated to them. This can lead to situations where progress is difficult, where an individual remains at a standstill and where homes are not cared for as there is no sense of ownership. However, it also acts as a safety net to ensure that individuals remain with a roof over their head despite being unemployed as their homes cannot be sold off to non-Community members. Off the Island, Community members are afforded the same opportunities to build equity in a property they purchase, if they are able to save enough for a deposit, but this is something that may not be easily achieved since receiving inheritance from parents and relatives is unlikely. Therefore, receiving additional income through gambling such as lottery tickets, scratch tickets and BINGO affects financial practices in this Community. Gaining additional income through luck or gambling means that the dream of winning it big starts as an innocent past time but soon it can turn into a habit that is hard to break and can become expensive the more addicted or desperate the individual is for additional funds.

It was reported that there can be a sense of urgency to get rid of a financial gain received. Based on interviews conducted, this could stem from many things such as a sense of guilt that it is not really your money; feeling like you need to spend it before others come knocking to borrow from you; the great feeling you get when you are finally able to purchase something; historically being labelled as 'bad with money' and living up to the stereotype; not wanting to appear better off than others; and, never having enough money so when you finally have some money it is gone before you know it. Whatever the reason is this behaviour constrains financial practices such as saving and planning for the future.

Obtaining post-secondary education is a part of planning for the future. It was reported that when Community members attend post-secondary schooling (outside of the Community), it can be very difficult for the student to remain at school if they have run out of money. Without a financial safety net (wealthy parents) and

Community members nearby the individual often finds themselves dropping out of college or university back in the Community.

> But they need to learn about managing the little money that they've got to make sure they are able to eat for the whole month. Instead of getting the money and going out and partying for the weekend and then they've got no money for food, they end up quitting school and stuff because they are not able to function because the money is gone and their haven't got any Community members to help them out with food. (Male, CM10)

Last, financial practices are also enabled by convenient access to financial institutions such as banks and constrained by only having access to one automatic telling machine (ATM) on the Island that dispenses money and does not accept deposits, Community members have to either travel off the Island to deposit cheques received or have their cheque cashed in the community store after spending the minimum required amount set by the store owner.

Summary of Practice Architectures

To summarise, the practice architectures that enable and constrain FLE practices and financial practice in the Community have been discussed. Overall enabling factors identified holding both FLE practices and financial practices together are: interest in acquiring financial literacy skills; having a Community member (also a member of this research team) working collaboratively with this Community; and, having a Department that wishes to provide financial education to their clients. The constraining factors present appear to be very broad with disadvantage, poverty and unemployment affecting all practices in the Community. In the last section of this chapter, we outline implication for FLE practitioners/educators.

Implications for Practitioners/Educators

Financial literacy is considered an essential skill for twenty-first century learners (Lusardi 2015). Therefore, increasing financial literacy levels of Community members is viewed as an important initiative, particularly to prepare the youth for a successful future. We argue that a praxis approach to FLE may reduce the risk of marginalised and/or vulnerable individuals potentially blaming themselves for not being able to easily change their financial circumstances after receiving FLE training. We believe that FLE practitioners/educators who comprehend the issues with disadvantage that exist including poverty and hopelessness in Aboriginal communities will instead acknowledge the social structures that exist to reinforce these conditions and with this knowledge transform their teaching practice by adopting a praxis approach to FLE. This praxis approach would include understanding: how an individual's financial decision-making impacts others; that not all

important life decisions are financially rewarding; that many individual's living on low incomes are unable to regularly save and/or maintain long-term savings; that an individual may be able to improve their financial management but this does not mean that they can increase their source of income; that your cultural and/or values such as being generous or being kind to others is an important aspect to evaluate when making a financial decisions. Furthermore, promoting site-based education development in the Community, with Community members, will help move FLE from an unsustainable 'imported' practice to a sustainable 'localised' practice. Last, it is the practice architectures in the site and the ecologies of practices that influence FLE provide insight into FLE as a practice and how FLE operates in sites of poverty and disadvantage. It was clear that the members of this Community were concerned about their finances and wanted FLE—both for themselves and their children. We have argued that a praxis approach to FLE that is developed in response to the needs of the local Community (as a form of site-based educational development) would lead to more appropriate and sustainable financial literacy and financial practices.

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Chapter 10
Teaching and Learning as Social Interaction: Salience and Relevance in Classroom Lesson Practices

Christine Edwards-Groves

Abstract Teaching and learning is intrinsically a social practice. By drawing on social theory, specifically the theory of practice architectures as a conceptual framework, the chapter inquires into the enduring question about the social happeningness of what goes on in classrooms (Heap 1985); and in particular, what happens in the moment-by-moment unfolding of lessons as teachers and learners encounter one another as interlocutors in the particular intersubjective spaces they co-create in lessons. The chapter utilises two distinct but intersecting approaches to this question, one from the study of the practice architectures that shape classroom practice and the other from the sociological analysis of naturally occurring interactions as they occur in lessons. These two approaches for understanding practices in situ are brought together to reveal the resources used in the moments of teaching and makes visible the trace the detailed linguistic, activity, and relational formulations (or cultural-discursive, material-economic and social-political arrangements) leave through the threads displayed in the participants' orientations (after Wetherall 1998). It is argued that what shapes naturally occurring talk-in-interaction (Sacks et al. 1974) in classrooms are practice architectures evident in the practices found at the site. It considers that, in the end, however, what counts as relevant in classroom practice as it is experienced in-the-moment by teachers and students can only be revealed through fine-grained analysis of their interactions.

Introduction

Teaching and learning are intrinsically social practices. They involve intersubjectivities, interrelationships, interactions and interconnectivities within actions which, in the social happeningness of classroom practice, form the sayings, doings and relatings which constitute them. By drawing on the theory of practice architectures as a conceptual framework, the chapter inquires into the enduring question about

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what goes on in classrooms (Heap 1985); and in particular, what happens in the moment-by-moment unfolding of lessons as teachers and learners encounter one another as interlocutors in intersubjective spaces. In this chapter two distinct but intersecting approaches to this question about social practice are utilised; one from the study of the practice architectures that influence teaching and learning, and the other from the sociological analysis of naturally occurring talk-in-interaction as it occurs in lessons.

Bringing together these two modes of inquiry into lesson practices aims to strike a balance between the analytical attention given to the local accomplishment of practices in-the-moment (offered by methods such as Conversation Analysis), and the connections that link the enactment of practices to others in space and through historical time (Scollon 2001). This approach aims to reveal the resources produced, and made relevant in the moments of teaching and learning, by making visible the detailed linguistic, activity and relational formulations (or cultural-discursive, material-economic and social-political arrangements) used to 'get things done'. It also enables us to examine saliences left as traces in the participants' orientations in lesson practices in-the-moment; these linguistic, activity and relational formulations are displayed, and therefore made accountable, in participant interactions. The approach connects the happenings in classrooms with its history (formation) and its sociality (happeningness) (Edwards-Groves and Grootenboer 2016); points that form the guiding propositions for the chapter.

Striking an Analytical Balance

To exemplify key points across the chapter, selected transcript excerpts from a one hour video-recorded Year One reading lesson will be used. The class, of 24 six- or seven-year-old children, was in a medium-sized school in a rural community in New South Wales, Australia. The empirical material will show that how practices are experienced by teachers and students in-the-moment can only be revealed through fine-grained analysis of participant interactions as they happen in the site of inquiry. It will show that what counts in learning to read is what is locally accomplished (said and done) at the time, and simultaneously, what is made relevant in locally produced interactions and interrelationships.

Transcripts provide the analyst with records of the turn-taking machinery (Sacks et al. 1974) that forms the sequential moment-by-moment discursive actions of the interactive participants involved; in this instance, the teacher Mrs Mott and her class of Year One students as they participated in the 'reading lesson'. These transcripts form representations of actual 'reading practices' in classrooms by showing who does what interactionally (Davidson 2012), revealing how interactive participants orient to one another in the moments of interaction. By using analytic methods such as Conversation Analysis (CA) (derived from the Garfinkel's 1967 work in the field of ethnomethodology) the procedural (turn-by-turn) examination of practices is enabled. Therefore, what constitutes practices can emerge in ways not clouded by

the theoretical, methodological and pedagogical filtres about the reading theories and the teaching of reading that have come to interpose themselves on understanding and enacting the teaching of reading (Freebody and Freiberg 2001). According to Heap (1991):

> …unless we attend to procedural definitions, and how teaching and learning activities are organized to produce them, we can never know whether our uses of reading theories are appropriate to the interactional contexts of their application. Those theories, in their flawed ways, tell us what reading is, and how it is done, supposedly in context-free terms. But students' knowledge of the *what* and *how* of reading is culturally and socially mediated through interactions with other persons. We do not know what we are teaching, procedurally, about the value of reading, and how it ought to be done. We do not know how students are acculturated to reading. (p. 133)

Conversation analysis (CA) is a method that attempts to get at the details of the *what* and *how* of practices (such as practices encountered in reading lessons). Its premise suggests that the discursive and nondiscursive practices are local accomplishments to be studied in terms of their moment-by-moment productions and the conversational resources that form the practice in its place of happening, at the time of happening. On the one hand, this approach is necessary because *zooming in* (Nicolini 2012, p. 16) to closely analyse the fine details of interactions in classrooms illuminates the means by which students actually encounter the language, the activities and other people in actions, interactions and interrelationships in their lessons. It shows the actual influence of talk on locally produced courses of action, revealing the language, the activities and the interrelationships that come to bear on the project (of learning to read) at the time. However, a CA position places strict requirements on researchers in the attribution of particular patterns of interaction to structural features of society (Schlegloff 1991, pp. 65–66). "The researcher needs to show from the data that the aspects of participant actions or the context that we as researchers find relevant to the interaction, are in fact aspects that are relevant to the participants we are observing, and that they show that in their talk" (Freiberg and Freebody 1995, p. 190).

On the other hand, and as a counter argument often said to be a tension with conversation analysis (see, e.g. Scollon 2001; Wetherall 1998), such a narrow focus on only the interactive moments runs the risk of neglecting the point that the positions, dispositions, histories and orientations of participants in the moments of practice make different possibilities *available* at the time. Wetherall (1998) believes that an adequate analysis must not only look at the conversational details of talk-in-sequence, but also at the 'trace' these detailed linguistic formulations leave through the larger threads displayed in the participant's orientations. From this position, the chapter attempts to move these related perspectives forward (or to *zoom out*, as put by Nicolini 2012) to an applied Ethnomethodology/CA position (ten Have 2007) that enables the examination of the nexus of language, activity and interpersonal interactions when in fact these influence the production of classroom interaction practices. Applied Ethnomethodology/CA directs us to a sustained critique of conventional and established concepts of the organisation of social life as it is experienced in classroom reading and the practical application of knowledge

based on such conceptions (ten Have 2007, p. 195). This then captures a broader view of the practice landscape (Kemmis et al. 2014) that encompasses the onto-logical and historical contours of particular practice traditions, like the teaching of reading. Practice traditions "encapsulate the history of the happenings of the practice, allow it to be reproduced, and act as a kind of collective 'memory' of the practice" (Kemmis et al. 2014, p. 27).

The chapter argues that what shapes naturally occurring talk-in-interaction (Sacks et al. 1974) in classrooms are practice architectures; these are evident in the particular cultural-discursive, material-economic and social-political arrangements found at the site (for instance in a particular lesson at a particular time), and in one sense these hold the lesson together. These arrangements become *relevant* to the practice when it is made visible in the practice as it happens (Edwards-Groves and Grootenboer 2016). It also becomes relevant when these arrangements visibly influence the talk.

The position in the chapter is not to mount a case for either approach per se, but to argue that what counts as classroom practice, and specifically learning to read as represented in the empirical case presented in this chapter, are the saliences and relevances brought into practices through talk-in-interaction (Sacks et al. 1974). Therefore, what is experienced in the happeningness of classroom teaching and learning practices as they unfold in the sequential moment-by-moment talk-in-interaction is the primary concern. In one way this is a challenging theo-retical and methodological task since these two research traditions are generally treated as different spheres of the same phenomenon. Although both are interested in the intricacies of practical action in social life, as methodologies they are treated as fundamentally distinct and separate. But, taking the lead from Nicolini (2012), the chapter seeks to map out the details of a lesson-in-action by examining the forms of discursivity that cycle though specific enacted sequences of talk to uncover what counts as classroom practice in the moments of happening. It positions the theory of practice architectures as a highly relevant conceptual and linguistic resource that enables a rich articulation of the both the intricacies of teaching as a social practice (prefigured but not predetermined by historical conditions and experiences) as they matter in interactive moments and teaching, and that are informed by particular practice traditions.

Getting at a View of Teaching Practice

This chapter is interested in getting at a view of teaching practices that accounts for the multidimensional nature and situated realities of the enactment of practices as they happen in classroom lessons. However, from this broad interest there are fundamental questions concerning the word 'practice' that as Bill Green (2009) explains

…is a term that circulates incessantly, and seems constantly and sometimes even compulsively in use, without always meaning much at all. Rather, it seems to float across the surface of our conversations and our debates, never really thematised and indeed basically unproblematised, a "stop-word" par excellence. So it is important to be clear at the outset that practice is not simply the Other of terms and concepts such as "theory" or "policy", as conventional usage would have it, though it might be linked in interesting ways to them. (p. 2)

In education, Green's concern has emerged as an unfortunate truism as catch-all phrases such as 'best practice', 'core practice', 'student-centred practice', 'quality practice', 'effective practice', 'evidence-based practice' (to mention a few) have entered the lexicon to describe teaching. And as a consequence, the incessant over use of the word gloss what practice means in education, rendering it rhetorical. These terms have also glossed its usefulness in understanding the multidimensionality and complexities of teaching. It is even argued that glossing, generalising, idealising, or 'averaging' the specifics of educational practice allows at best only a vague relationship between educational generalisations and specific, sited and site-specific educational practices (Edwards-Groves and Grootenboer 2015; Freiberg and Freebody 1995). To respond to Green's (2009) unease regarding the superficial and perhaps shallow usage, 'practice' itself, and so what 'counts as practice', is positioned as a focal point of examination. On this the characterisation of practice derived by Kemmis et al. (2014) is foregrounded; they define practice as

…a form of socially established cooperative human activity in which characteristic arrangements of actions and activities (doings) are comprehensible in terms of arrangements of relevant ideas in characteristic discourses (sayings), and when the people and objects involved are distributed in characteristic arrangements of relationships (relatings), and when this complex of actions – or interconnected sayings, doings and relatings - 'hangs together' in a distinctive project. (p. 31)

The work of Kemmis et al. (2014) seeks to understand practices from an integrated philosophical and empirical positioning as a way towards a theory and practice nexus that both theorises and illuminates descriptions of practices. Like many practice theorists their research examines the empirical connections between theory and practice in many fields of inquiry; for example Theodore Schatzki (2002) in the field of community practices, or Brian Street's work (1984) in the field of literacy teaching practices. A main aim of practice theory in education is to show how in classrooms (for example), teaching and learning practices are sites themselves, whereby teachers and students orient to each other through shared, characteristic and socially established actions. Such a movement enables us to form ways to 'trace' out and elucidate the socialness of classroom practices as they happen in reality in varying kinds of teaching and learning projects in different discipline areas. These, in turn, foreground the particularity and situatedness of the teaching and learning practices enacted in lessons.

Lessons as Sequentially Accomplished Turns of Talk: What Constitutes 'A Lesson'

The following transcript excerpt of a Year One reading lesson is presented to show empirically how classroom lesson practices unfold through sequential turn-by-turn interactions between teachers and students. It is presented in four segments that represent four distinctive phases of the lesson.

Excerpt 1

In this *first phase* of the lesson with the whole class (24, 6 year old students), the students as a cohort are seated on the floor facing a *big book* entitled "Mrs Washy-Washy" placed on a large stand beside the teacher, Mrs Mott. (Note: The Jefferson notation system is used in the transcripts; see Appendix for details)

1.	Mrs Mott:	For our familiar book today, Jonah, everyone, we're going to practise reading the big book Mrs Wishy-Washy again and so because we know it, we can make it sound so:o smo::oth↑ °and° remember
2.	Will:	°don't shout°=
3.	Mrs Mott:	=remember to use your eyes (~) and [search at the words]
4.	Jimmy:	[°don't shou:t°]
5.	Mrs Mott:	°okay? can you all do that?° together? c'mon the whole class
6.	Ss:	((nodding)) [yeah]
7.	Nate:	[yeah]=
8.	Joel:	=yep
9.	Mrs Mott:	okay↓ (.) so off we go=
10.	Will:	=MRS=
11.	Mrs Mott:	together Will, wait for us
12.	T &Ss:	=[MRS WISHY-WASHY
13.	Mrs Mott:	=[((turns page to introduction page)) [((points to the text))]
14.	Nick:	MRS [WISHY-WASHY]
15.	Will:	[WISHY-WASHY]
16.	Mrs Mott:	good on you Nick↑ (.) you're reading it↑ (.) >you all need to read it< too (.) >so focus↑< focus on each sentence ((begins to turn page))
17.	Joel:	MRS WISHY-WASHY
18.	Mrs Mott:	[((Stops turning page mid-way))] okay ((turns page)) right (.) eyes down here to these words Joel↑ (.) off we go:o=
19.	T&Ss:	=[O:H LOVELY MUD SAID THE COW] ((Reading continues))…
36.	T&Ss:	=O::H LOVELY MUD (.) [THEY SA]ID
37.	Joel:	[SAID THE]
38.	Mrs Mott:	°okay° (0.5) well done (.)
39.	Joel:	°they said°
40.	Mrs Mott:	they said, so you need to check down here ((points to 'they said')) Joel you can do better than that (.) you're not keeping up
41.	Will:	THEY SAID] ((shouting))
42.	Mrs Mott:	Will (.) you know we don't shout when we read (1.0) ↑that was lovely reading, sounded like real reading, what good readers you are… ((Reading continues))…

Any reading of the lesson transcript prompts questions such as, *what* are lessons? *what* are reading lessons? *what* do teachers teach in reading lessons? *what* do students learn about reading? To answer these questions requires a detailed analysis of the practices encountered in lessons. A close CA reading enables detailed attention to be drawn to the specific recognisable interactional resources used by the Mrs Mott and the Year One students to 'do' reading in this particular classroom.

First, each turn in the sequence of interaction is a response to a previous turn and influences the next turn. For example, Mrs Mott's initiating turn, "we're going to practise reading the big book", sets in chain what then 'happens', what is made salient and what becomes accomplished in the reading lesson. In another instance, Will's shouting out in turn 41 has consequences for the next turn, it prompts Mrs Mott's reprimand in turn 42. Second, accomplishing reading in a whole class arrangement, such as the shared reading of the text 'Mrs Washy-Washy', is a dynamic rapid-fire multiparty occurrence. As it is experienced by the teacher and the students in reality, many turns overlap (marked by the [ ]), turns are offered simultaneously (marked by the [[ ]]), turns are sometimes latched to a previous turn (marked by =), or quieter (marked by ° °) or louder (marked by CAPITALS); and because of this some turns are possibly not heard or acknowledged (see turns 2 and 4). Third, in turn 1 Mrs Mott explicitly names the project of the practice, "to practise reading Mrs Wishy-Washy again", which is followed by providing a rationale for doing this task, "because we know it, we can make it (the reading) sound so smooth". Fourth, it is evident that to accomplish this part of the reading lesson, the teacher mediates the courses of action by *doing* particular things such as, for example, turning the page (turns 13, 16, 17, 18); pointing to the text (turn 13, 40); directing students to use their eyes (turns 3 and 18), to search at the words (turn 3), to read it (turn 16) and to focus (turn 16); and directing where students they should put their eyes (turn 18, 40). Fifth, the interactional turns or student's courses of action are also mediated by the teacher's requests such as calling for cohort agreement (turn 5), to begin reading (turn 9), to read in unison (turns 5 and 11), to keep up (turn 40) and reminders not to shout (turn 42).

For their part, students contribute to the doing of the whole class reading by orienting to the shared, characteristic and socially established actions of reading as a whole class cohort. They do this in ways that show comprehensibility; that is, they show understanding of what it takes to participate in the reading lesson by complying with the teacher's mediated patterns of discourse. We know it is patterned and characteristic in this class through the language the teacher uses; for instance, Mrs Mott's opening statement begins with a call to practise reading by rereading the familiar book 'Mrs Washy-Washy'; that is practising means rereading. Through such utterances as 'we know it', 'remembering', 'doing it again', reading a 'familiar book' and by cohorting in phrases such as 'doing it together' and the use of the word 'we' the teacher brings into the lesson practices or characteristic ways of

doing reading in this class. Additionally, she uses characteristic discourses in the practice, such as using distinctive language associated with 'real' reading (turn 42), for instance 'searching at the words', 'reading smoothly', 'sounding like real reading', 'checking' and 'focusing on each sentence'. From this, students learn to read and about reading by hearing and producing (or searching, smooth sounding reading, checking and focusing on sentences). This discursive action orchestrated by the teacher influences what the students display in their actions and what they take reading to be about.

Lessons as Recognisably Locally Produced Courses of Action

To further the understanding of the nature of teaching and learning as it is experienced in lessons requires understanding the practices as well as the practice architectures that simultaneously constitute (and mediate) and are constituted (and mediated) by *situated* and *locally produced* courses of action in classrooms. These courses of action, comprised of interconnected sayings, doings and relatings, are manifest in language, activities and relationships, made visible and relevant (to the practice at the time) through the discursive sequentially enacted interactions in lessons (Edwards-Groves and Grootenboer 2016; Kemmis et al. 2014). What is brought to bear in classroom interactions is revealed through the substance of utterances and exchanges in the moment-by-moment discursiveness of the discourse. Understanding and participating in these courses of action in lessons depends upon students and teachers simultaneously

> …orienting themselves and one another to a shared culture (within their classroom, within their school, within their community) through shared language and symbols,orienting themselves and one another to the same salient features of the material resources and physical space-time inhabited at the time, andorienting themselves and one another socially and politically amid interrelationships and arrangements that contain and control conflict, secure social solidarities, and give them agency, selfhood and identities as members of classrooms, families, communities and organisations.

> It is an achievement secured by human *social practi*ces.

> (Adapted from Kemmis et al. 2014 p. 2)

Excerpt 2
In this next excerpt from the *second phase* (whole class comprehension) of Mrs Mott's reading lesson, as a whole class group the students engage in segments of teacher-led talk directed towards comprehending the meaning of the text.

43. Mrs Mott:	so they do- (.) look at the mud↓ they ma:de↓ (.) what a mess (.) so sitting still, now turn to your elbow partner (.) talk about what Mrs Wishy-washy would do (.) and if she saw them ↑ the mess what would she do↓? ((students shuffling to turn to the person beside them, talking in pairs)) (65.0) so back to the front, eyes to me, Mrs Wishy-Washy, she doesn't look very happy, looking at the picture, what would she do? What would you do it you were that mad? Trent you go first=
44. Trent:	=she would scream [at them]
45. Mrs Mott:	[↑she would] scr- probably scream at ((nodding)) them again (.) [wouldn't she?] Jimmy?
46. Jimmy:	[a:::nd] kick em↑
47. Mrs Mott:	kick them? ((looks at Jimmy acting surprised))
48. Nadine:	heh heh heh
49. Mrs Mott:	((looks at Nadine acting surprised)) hh:h what do you think she (.) mi:ght do to them? ((points to Willow))
50. Willow:	um: (1.0) they would >°get cranky at them↑°<
51. Mrs Mott:	good yes↑ (.) Think carefully, she would also↑ (5) come on, look at the picture (2) starts with w::w (.) she would ↑
52. Terry:	wash em'?
53. Mrs Mott:	Yes right Terry, I think that's what I'd do, wash them ((looks at Nadine, nods her head)) what do you think?=
54. Nadine:	=I think she'll (1.0) she'll make 'em into salami
55. Mrs Mott:	oh::ho ho!↑that'd get rid of the pig then wouldn't it? .hhh=
56. Jimmy:	=w[hat?]
57. James:	[what did you sa:y(~)? Nadine (2) Nadine?]
58. Will:	sal:a:mi .hhh ((leans towards James))
59. Mrs Mott:	to salami (1.0) >turn the pig< into salami
60. James:	a::w .hhh=
61. Mrs Mott:	=that means James (.) that's the end of the pig [well] done Nadine (0.1) that's so::o funny

At first reading, this excerpt from a distinct phase of the lesson (whole class comprehension) can be regarded as a highly familiar segment of classroom talk; found similarly in all the excerpts in this chapter. Considering it first as talk in terms of the speech exchange system (Schegloff 2007) in which students take part, we see features that are unlike ordinary conversation (Freiberg and Freebody 1995). In classroom talk one party (usually the teacher) takes every second turn at talk and generally asks all the questions. At play, is a typical and recognisable turn-taking structure, whereby

1. the teacher, Mrs Mott, makes a place for students' responses in what is described as 'transition-relevant places' (TRPs), usually by asking a question (e.g. turns 43, 49, 51; also seen in turns 81, 83, 85, 88 in Excerpt 3 below) or by leaving a sentence unfinished with an upward inflection (turn 51)
2. a student provides a response of some kind (from either being nominated as in turn 43 or self-initiating like in turns 82 or 86 Excerpt 3 below), and
3. the teacher provides some feedback on that response (e.g. turns 45, 53); the teacher's feedback can include repeats of the student answer (45, 53), or in

Excerpt 3 below new questions (turn 81), reminders (88), or new information (81); and if a TRP is not accepted within a certain time, the teacher will offer a hint as Mrs Mott did in turn 51 or provide a new invitation (51).

Many of these features have been long documented as the three-part teaching exchange, Initiation-Response-Feedback (IRF) (Mehan 1978; Sinclair and Coulthard 1975). To establish the meaning of the texts, the teacher produces this typical IRF classroom exchange system whereby the teacher initiates a question (I) ("What would you do it you were that mad?"), the students provide a response (R) ("she would scream at them") which is followed by feedback evaluation (F) ("she would probably scream at them again wouldn't she?").

Excerpt 3

In the *third phase* of the lesson (group work), some students move to smaller learning centre groups based at smaller tables or designated work stations; the remaining four students, the Emus group, stay on the floor facing in a semi-circle toward the teacher. They remain with the teacher for guided reading instruction aimed to address student's instructional levels; this teacher-led group talk is presented next.

61. Mrs Mott:	..so [let's get ourselves ready for our learning centre groups (.) off to sit at your tables (.) so time, off you go to your group Nadine, Jimmy (.) o:kay↑Check, everyone, the task board to see what your group will be doing. ((Students moving off to assigned groups)). Now, Emus, sitting down for our guided reading group let's have a practice of another book ((hands out new books)) .hhh °okay° (~) ((puts books in front of students on the floor)) here's my little cat. So it's only the four of us you know this book my li[ttle]=
62. Nate:	=[MY] [LITTLE]
63. Will:	[MY LIT]TLE CAT
64. Trent:	MY::↑ [LITTLE CAT]
65. Nate:	[LITTLE CAT]
66. Mrs Mott:	okay (1.0) so begin again, let's read it together (.) so pick it u:p Will ((picks up book for W)), look at the front cover, now carefully turn over the page to the begin (.) point to the first word to start ((Reading continues)) ```
81. Mrs Mott:	what sorts of things did this little cat sit in↓? let's do a summary(~) that means we talk about the main ideas (.) think about what hap[pened]
82. Joel:	[tree]
83. Mrs Mott:	((nods)) where else? ((looks at Will and Nate))
84. Nate:	a box::[:]
85. Mrs Mott:	[w]here else was the cat?
86. Will:	a dog's mouth (.) hhh
87. Nate:	ha:a
88. Mrs Mott:	no, don't be silly, Will, don't make things up, we don't do that (.) [w]here else was the cat?

In this excerpt, a CA reading reveals that Mrs Mott directs ("sit at your tables"), mediates ("don't be silly, don't make things up") and evaluates ("no") the student's actions and contributions. She mediates what students should and should not do, what they should and should not talk about, and what they should and should not think in relation to the text. To do this, she simultaneously establishes certain routines and procedures for 'reading', here and now, in this classroom. This is evident in her utterances "carefully turn over the page", "let's read it together", "point to the first word to start", "let's have a practice of another book", "read it with me now", "looking at the picture" and "let's do a summary". She also provides an interpretation of the text, orienting students toward a particular reading of it; for example "she doesn't look very happy", "what would she do?" and "What would you do it you were that mad?" These talk practices create regulatory classroom discourses that influence what the students orient to in their lessons.

Across these segments or phases, Mrs Mott's talk orients to particular sayings, doings and relatings, creating practice architectures that influence the unfolding of the lesson at the time. For instance in turns 43, 45 and 49 Mrs Mott nominates the next speaker by naming (Trent), pointing to (Willow), nodding at (Nadine) or looking at (Will and Nate) the selected student. Each of their responses were evaluated with an acknowledgement token (reference) such as a nod (turn 45 or 83), her repeating a response (turns 45, 47, 57 and 59), a feedback acknowledgement (e.g. "good, yes" in turn 51, "that's so funny" in turn 59, "no" in turn 88), or an extended response (e.g. in turn 53 "that'd get rid of the pig", turn 59, "that's the end of the pig", later in turn 88 "don't be silly, Will, don't make things up, we don't do that").

Examining these courses of action throughout the comprehension phase of the lesson reveals that, for their part, with the teacher students co-produce or 'conspire with each other to produce the order of things' (Latour 2010, p. 148). Through particular socially organised and/or mediated interactional methods and actions (Button and Lee 1987; ten Have and Psathas 1995), the teachers and students orient, discursively, to a shared social culture and social order about how to be a student and a teacher in *this* classroom. From the outset, teachers and students orient to the same salient features of the material resources (the books) and physical space-time inhabited at the time (in turn 43 sitting still, turning to their elbow partner, facing the front, looking at the picture or in turn 61 moving to the learning centre groups). Through language they orient to, and demonstrate comprehension of, the substance of the text and their participation rights as they engage with one another as interlocutors in interaction in this lesson (Freiberg and Freebody 1995; Kemmis et al. 2014).

Teachers and students also orient to a shared understanding of their locally produced social culture and moral order (Freebody and Freiberg 2006). This is displayed clearly in their contributions; for example, that it is funny and acceptable to say Mrs Wishy-Washy will make the pig into salami in turn 52, knowing that salami-making would be a common activity in their Italian farming community, or in turn 47 acting surprised at Jimmy's inappropriate contribution about kicking, or that it is silly and unacceptable to say the kitten would be in the dog's mouth in turn 86. By following instructions, looking at and responding to the teacher when directed, the students are orienting socially and politically to their identity and agency as students. Students also demonstrate their sense of solidarity (as a group

of students in this classroom) for instance, when they laugh at each other's jokes about kicking (in turns 48), turning pigs into salami (in turns 56 and 58), and kittens in the dog's mouth (in turns 87).

Spaces and Media of Participating in Lessons

What constitutes a reading lesson, in this instance, therefore is participating in site-specific locally produced social transactions about text (Mrs Wishy-Washy) in ways that are co-produced in the intersubjective space of their particular classroom interactions. The teacher and the students in this space orient to one another:

- *semantically*, as they shared meanings (about text, talk and tasks) through the medium of language; for example Mrs Mott when explained "that a summary means we talk about the main ideas";
- *in physical space-time*, as they engaged in interactions through the medium of activities using particular resources or material objects; for example Mrs Moss reconfigured the interactive arrangements so that the students worked as a whole class sitting on the floor facing the front, in a paired configuration when they turned to their elbow partner for a discussion, small learning centre groups sitting at tables or sitting down on the floor in a guided reading group of four students; and,
- *socially*, as they encountered each other in different kinds of interactions that enabled different kinds of roles through the medium of relationships which attribute different positions of power, solidarity and agency.

These students became practitioners of literacy practices (or specifically reading practices in the case of the excerpts presented) by co-inhabiting these particular intersubjective spaces with their teacher and peers in their classroom reading lesson (in-the-moment in physical space-time and over historical time). They employed particular sayings, doings and relatings appropriate and distinctive to the discipline of learning to read. It is in the specificity of interactive moments that students not only encounter other students and the teacher as interlocutors in interactions in the intersubjective spaces they co-create by their very presence, but these interactive moments are the sites where students encounter and make relevant the curriculum (or traces of it).

In one sense, what could be taken from the empirical material presented so far is that lessons need to be considered to be "participation in an evolving interactive event" (Edwards-Groves 2003). Reflecting a sociological viewpoint, and as we can see in the transcripts, in fact this view of a lesson occasions the consideration that teaching is about bringing practices of learning into being through participating in discourses in the discursive flow of talk-in-interaction. Discourse "is first and foremost, a form of action, a way of making things happen in the world, and not a mere way of representing it" (Nicolini 2012, p. 198). In this respect discourse is viewed as discursive social action that forms a nexus of practices (Nicolini 2012) mediated by practice architectures. Through discourse, these interactions (always

enacted in sequence) make evident what counts as lessons, what reading lessons are taken to be, what lessons teachers teach in reading lessons and what students learn about reading, participating and behaving.

This shifts the typical textbook view of a lesson that suggests it is a specified or organised period of time for teaching and learning, bounded by specific content in different disciplines; that is, an arbitrary technical construct. In education texts, for instance, it has been defined as "a planned focus for learning developed from the teacher's program" (Hinde McLeod and Reynolds 2007, p. 100) or as a "subdivision of a unit, usually taught in a single class period or, on occasion, for two or three successive periods" (Carjuzaa and Kellough 2013, p. 96). These perspectives provide characteristic parameters for understanding the concept of a lesson but neglect what counts as a lesson as it is constituted in-the-moment; that is, how it is experienced by students as it unfolds in the happening*ness* of real time actions and interactions. Respecifying 'lessons' to be about participation in interactions in practices, as suggested in this section, may be useful in addressing a superficial glossing of the term 'lessons' that may result in limiting understandings of its complexity and multidimensionality.

The Contours of Lessons: Understanding the Shifting Practice Architectures Across Phases

Examination of the fine-grained details of the daily, often taken-for-granted, practices encountered in classroom lessons illustrates the ways in which students access (or have access to) literacy and curricular knowledge through classroom participation. Conversation analysis, for example, enables the exemplification of how the literacy–curriculum relationship gets done in practice with a highly intricate level of detail, rather than speculating on how it could or should be done (Freebody 2003). In a practical sense looking at classroom practice at this level of talk-in-interaction, described by Anstey (1996) as the *micro* level of practice, has enabled a picture of what constitutes teaching and learning in 'lessons' and what is made available about literacy and curricular knowledge in classroom actions. And as shown, these actions are visible, and made salient, in the interconnected mutually formative, informative, and transformative nature of the sayings, doings and relatings encountered by teachers and students. However, these change shape across the phases of a lesson.

An examination of the lesson presented in this chapter (as sequential excerpts from a complete transcript) makes apparent the changing contours of lessons. Interactively, we have seen different phases shaped by different practice architectures in dynamic ways. For instance, in Excerpts 1 and 2, the *first* and *second phases* of the lesson, the material-economic arrangements make the particular whole class reading activity and teacher mediated interactions 'that came into being' possible. That is to say, the physical positioning of the students (seated on the floor as a cohort 'facing the front'), the teacher (sitting on a chair facing the students) and the material resources (the book on the stand beside the teacher) directly orients interactions to be teacher mediated and for the teacher to take every second turn (in the IRF speech

exchange system). This arrangement meant the teacher took up more of the talk time and fewer students had opportunities for participating. In *phase two*, when students worked in a paired configuration, when they turned to their elbow partner for a two-party discussion, different social-political conditions were created since all students had the opportunity to talk to one another. Similarly, the shift in the use of physical space in the *third phase* (see Excerpt 3), that had students move to smaller learning centre groups based on smaller tables or designated work stations, created the possibility for students to work independently from the teacher thus reforming and rearranging other dimensions of the practice.

As the material-economic rearrangements unfold across the period of time (signalled in the talk), so do the interactive possibilities and opportunities; these *re*shape the cultural-discursive and social-political arrangements. Consequently, changing practice architectures across the lesson make different sayings between teachers and students, different doings and activities and different ways of relating with one another in the space possible. A final example of this occurs in the final excerpt.

Excerpt 4

In this *fourth phase* of the lesson, the students in the small guided reading group move to face outwards with backs facing each other (with the teacher crouched behind them) to read independently. Mrs Mott then positions herself behind the students to 'listen' to the reading.

191.	Mrs Mott:	=you know all about the photo book (.) °so I would like you to turn °face ou:t↑ .hhh and [have a go at reading to yourself and I'll listen to you↓ ((positions herself behind Joel)) here (.) Joel, Joel turn this way
192.	Joel:	the photo book
193.	Mrs Mott:	lovely
194.	Joel:	Mum is in the photo book
195.	Mrs Mott:	no (.) let's turn back to this page ((turns the page back for J)) °okay° (.) read this for me
196.	Joel:	Da:d is in the=
197.	Mrs Mott:	=could you check?
198.	Joel:	[Mum]=
199.	Mrs Mott:	=no here↑
200.	Joel:	here is the photo book [((turns page))]
201.	Mrs Mott:	[°okay::°] (.)
202.	Joel:	Mum=
203.	Mrs Mott:	=I want you to follow with your finger this time↑ (.) follow with your finger this time↑ (.) read it with your finger↓
204.	Joel:	((points to each word as he says them)) mum is (.) in The photo (2) book (.) book
205.	Mrs Mott:	does ↑that match?
206.	Joel:	((looks at the page and shakes head))
207.	Mrs Mott:	↑could you read that again and fix it? Look at the first letter to help
208.	Joel:	m:m (.) m:mum is in the:↑ book ((points to each word))
209.	Mrs Mott:	fabulous keep going, turn the page (.) look at the picture now (.) in the next page (1.0) goo:d now off you=

210.	Joel:	=°teddy is in the photo book° ((starts to turn page))
211.	Mrs Mott:	((stops page turning)) could you make that correct
		(1.0) could you read that ag[ain(~)]
212.	Joel:	[°ted]dy°=
213.	Mrs Mott:	=look
214.	Joel:	°is°=
215.	Mrs Mott:	=stop ((places hand under J's chin)) look at me >so
		you know what I am saying<=
216.	Joel:	=here↑ ((points to 'here'))=
217.	Mrs Mott:	=no I want you to look at me ((raises J's chin with
		hand)) .hhh I want you to use your fingers to point (.) check
		each word .hhh and make it °ma:tch with what you're
		reading° (.) can you do that? ((takes hand away))
218.	Joel:	yep ((nods))
219.	Mrs Mott:	okay try that (1.0) now really look [through] the word
220.	Joel:	[here↑] is teddy
221.	Mrs Mott:	↑well done↑! (.) good boy↓ and now remember to
		check the [pictur:e↑]
222.	Joel:	[teddy:] is in the book (.) too ((points to each word))
223.	Mrs Mott:	↑fabulous checking with your fingers↓

In this exchange a different portrayal of learning to read emerges; this happened because the practice architectures changed. The change was signalled by the teacher's turn 191 "I would like you to turn face out, have a go at reading to yourself and I'll listen to you". Specifically, as the students faced outwards away from each other and away from the teacher, the book and the attention to their book emerged as a focal point for their concentration; they were enabled to read it to themselves (turn 191). As the teacher physically repositioned herself behind the students, other practices like students reading independently or the teacher listening to individual students reading aloud were made possible. Such a shift in the practice architectures (or the physical arrangements at the time in this instance) prompted a shift in other practices of learning and teaching.

On this occasion, the language about doing reading shifted to higher degree of specificity when students were expected to read 'by themselves'. In excerpt 4, focused mainly on the teacher interacting with Joel, the discourse of how Joel was to do reading turned specifically to him "having a go, checking, matching, rereading, correcting mistakes, following, reading it with your finger, remembering, looking at the pictures, pointing and trying". For Joel, it is the growing specificity of the talk encountered here that is central to the literacy learning-curriculum relationship.

Changing Practice Architectures in Lessons About Learning to Read

Zooming out (Nicolini 2012, p. 16) a little further enables us to 'trace' out and elucidate the particular practice architectures that influence what happens, and what is enabled and constrained, in the courses of action, like those experienced when

reading a big book as a class or reading in smaller groups. For instance, having the students sitting on the floor as a cluster facing towards the big book at the front (as evident in Phase 1) creates a physical space or setup that enables the students to orient to material resources required to do the shared reading activity. Such physical setups form particular material-economic arrangements that enable shared reading to be done in this class, in this way. These material-economic arrangements also simultaneously makes different ways of relating with one another possible in this lesson; for instance, because of her positioning (on the chair at the front with all students facing her) the teacher has the authority and power to control the turns at talk, the setups, and to decide on the right ways to behave (not to call out, to face the front, to read smoothly).

Noticeably, as the practice architectures changed shape across the lesson phases, so did what counted *as* reading; this was explicitly oriented to in the interactional exchanges between the teachers and the students. These exchanges became deeply consequential for learning *about* reading and learning *how* to read. The practice arrangements and *re*arrangements occurred across the "lesson" as intertwined or entangled (Hodder 2012) dimensions of practice, enabling particular kinds of sayings, doings and relatings to be made relevant as they "hang together" in the practice of reading and learning to read. In other words, practice architectures are arrangements that enable and constrain what happens, and so what counts, in practices of learning (to read). For instance the teacher builds through language, activities and ways of relating what it means to read for and in different phases of the lesson (see Table 10.1).

Across the four phases of the lessons presented in the transcript excerpts in this chapter Mrs Mott produced 55 instructions about how to do reading, revealing the complexity and multidimensionality of learning to read in Year One. A closer examination of the table makes available two distinct understandings of learning in classroom reading lessons. These 24 students in the Year One class were required to engage in reading activities involving both learning the *substantive practices of reading* (e.g. making reading sound smooth, searching, rereading, checking or practising) at the same time as being initiated into *practices of learning* (e.g. sitting still, turning to your elbow partner, facing the front or checking the task board) (Kemmis et al. 2014). In this reading lesson, Mrs Mott brought her Year One children into the *language* of reading and participating that allowed them to understand such concepts as 'searching', 're-reading', 'characters' or 'turning to talk to your elbow partner'. She created conditions in which the students could speak the language of reading and participating in answers to questions or directions, or in conversations with one another about the texts in which the ideas were relevant. At the same time, she invited the students to join into the *activities* of the class, for example, the activity of looking at the pictures to secure a shared meaning or sharing their ideas with their elbow partner. She also invited the students to enter *ways of relating* to others and to things (to her and the other students; and to texts and other materials found in the classroom).

As Heap (1985) suggested, the lesson excerpts exemplify the ways in which students' knowledge of the *what* and *how* of reading are culturally and socially mediated through interactive moments with the teacher and their peers. Heap's

Table 10.1 What counts in learning to read across lesson phases

Lesson phase	What counts? (as made explicit in the teacher–student exchanges)	Number of instances
Phase 1 Reading aloud as a whole class	Practising, rereading, knowing it, making the reading sound so smooth, remembering to use your eyes, searching at the words, not shouting, checking the words, looking to where the teacher is pointing, doing better, keeping up, not shouting, sounding like real reading	13
Phase 2 Comprehending and talking about text meanings as a whole class	Looking at pictures, sitting still, turning to your elbow partner, talking about what the characters would do, looking back to the front, facing eyes to me, answering questions, responding when nominated, responding when pointed to, responding when nodded at, thinking carefully, understanding the teacher clues	12
Phase 3 Reading and doing reading activities as a small group	Getting ready for learning centre groups, sitting at your tables, going to your group, checking the task board, moving off to assigned groups, sitting down in group, practising another book, reading together, looking at the front cover, carefully turning over the page to the begin, pointing to the first word to start, reading, doing a summary that means we talk about the main ideas, think about what happened	14
Phase 4 Reading as individuals	Having a go, reading to yourself, checking with your fingers, checking, matching the word to the letter, reading that again, fixing mistakes, following with your finger, reading it with your finger, look at the picture, make reading correct, using fingers to point, checking each word, making the words match with what is read aloud, remembering, really looking through the word, pointing to each word and trying	16

point reminds us of the significance of the moments both in terms of the pedagogical relevance of the exchanges and how the participants 'do' reading as they orient to each other relationally; but also how they relate to, and make relevant, the artefacts and the activity of the reading lesson and the particularity of the language which together make this interaction distinctively a reading lesson. Examining the excerpts shows the saliences brought to bear on the accomplishment of lessons of one kind or another; notably, these may or may not always be about the substantive practice of reading in a lesson designated 'a reading lesson'. Although, primarily, the excerpts show how students encountered lessons about how to do reading through specific language signalling that this is a reading lesson; at the same time, in the same intersubjective space, the excerpts also show how the Year One students encountered lessons about behaving in school in particular socially acceptable ways, lessons about how to participate, lessons about complying and orienting to the teachers questions, and lessons about meeting requests and following directions.

For the Year One students, therefore, learning to read was about being both initiated into substantive practices of reading by being *stirred into* particular

learning practices. For them, "learning [to read] is an initiation into other practices in which the 'learning' may be more or less inseparable from the practising of the practice being learned" (Kemmis et al. 2014, p. 56). In this case, the activity of reading and participating in interactions round reading were inseparable. Kemmis and colleagues (2014) suggest these inseparable dimensions of participating form the social*ness* of practices. They suggest that "learning a practice [like reading] entails entering—joining in—the *projects* and the kinds of *sayings, doings and relatings* characteristic of that particular practice" (Kemmis et al. 2014, p. 58).

Historicising Practices in Lessons: Tracing Prefigurement

Practices in lessons are embodied and enacted in-the-moment. But practices are not simply this. Lesson practices are also shaped by traditions, and professional and individual histories that are traceable in the cultural-discursive, material-economic and social-political arrangements made salient and relevant in the moment of enactment. Teachers and students use their knowledge and past experiences of those contexts to generate appropriate behaviours (or actions comprised of inter-connected sayings, doings and relatings), and the appropriateness of those behaviours, in turn, serve to define the context in which they interact (Edwards and Furlong 1979). This historical positioning for viewing practice sits alongside a long history of inquiry into teaching practice as being both social and situated, and locally produced in interactions (see e.g. Alexander 2008; Barnes 1976; Britton 1970; Cazden 1972; Edwards and Furlong 1979; Freiberg and Freebody 1995; Heap 1985; Sinclair and Coulthard 1975).

As the transcripts show, particular practices are made relevant and meaningful through participant displays in their talk-in-interaction; it is also true that these actions are prefigured by history, coming to exist in practice over time forming historical traces that leave remnants from the past on moments in the present:

> These historical traces are not 'just history', 'the past', 'what's done and dusted' - somehow divorced from present conditions and circumstance. Rather, these historical traces are key elements, key parts of the architecture of practice, the 'practice architectures' which we recognise as influencing current practices… Acknowledging and valuing how current day practices, and their associated doings, sayings and relatings, are not just site-based but deeply historically embedded, enables us to better understand the conditions for practice, and how more productive conditions might be brought about in practice, and supported in policy. (Hardy and Edwards-Groves 2016, n.p)

From a conversation analysis position, historical past moments may be considered as *just past* in a previous turn in a conversation, or as *past like*-interactions in that or a similar context or situation, where, as the transcript shows, interactive experiences influence and are influenced by other past interactions. That is to say that each turn in the classroom exchange act has a catalytic effect on the next turn; this happens turn-by-turn and in sequence as each turn of talk lays down a mark in the history of the occasion. And as was shown in the previous section, these

interactive experiences are similarly, and simultaneously, influenced by practice architectures.

The broader practice landscape of the classroom reading lesson is not serendipitous or happenstance, it has been prefigured by history. For instance, Vygotsky's (1978) seminal work on scaffolding learners and constructivist teaching, Brian Cambourne's (1988) work on the establishing conditions for effective literacy learning in classrooms through immersion in whole text reading, feedback, engagement, demonstration, and the 1970s push to learn to read by reading from Kenneth Goodman's research (1967) into a more wholistic language approach to teaching have influenced the approach to teach using whole texts and big books (as seen in phase 1). In another example, tracing out the substance of the orchestration of the types of classroom interchanges presented in the transcript excerpts above enables developing a sense of how the interactions about comprehending text entered the classroom discourse. For instance developing reading comprehension through talking about text as shown by Mrs Mott's orienting talk about developing a summary of what was read stemmed from very early work by Henderson (1903), Thorndike (1917), Bartlett (1932) (cited in Pearson, 1984). Retelling or summarising texts in extended conversations was brought to the fore in educational thinking and practice by theorists such as James Britton (1970) and Douglas Barnes (1976).

The theory of practice architectures even further illuminates practices in the time-space of human activity (Schatzki 2010) by getting at the particularity of site-based circumstances found in and brought to the practice (and the profession) at the time, in time and over time. It emphasises that practices occur and are entangled with particular kinds of nuanced arrangements found at specific sites, like particular classrooms in particular schools in particular communities in particular moments in history. "Retrieving a sense of our intellectual history is not an antiquarian pursuit" (Doecke et al. 2003, p. 100), but is one that reconnects empirical practices with the theoretical ideas that shape them; these, in turn are prefigured by practice traditions. Detailed interaction analysis using methods such as CA (as an ontological approach concerned with the here and now of talk-in-interaction) works in a complimentary way to enable us to get at the specificity of these practices traditions (formed in history) as they happen (formed in the present).

Conclusion: What Counts?

An underlying position of this chapter has been that what shapes naturally occurring talk-in-interaction (Sacks et al. 1974) in classroom lessons are practice architectures. Empirical material from a transcribed classroom Year One reading lesson was used to show how the moment-by-moment interactions display particular cultural-discursive, material-economic and social-political arrangements found at the particular site and how these 'hang together' in the practices of the reading lesson. As was shown in the talk that occurred in the reading lesson, these arrangements—displayed in the discursive flow of interaction—enable and constrain situated

action. At the outset, the chapter proposed that to understand what counts in classroom practices means to understand how together, the semantic, physical and social spaces of practice (as it happens in situ) form the intersubjective, interactional, interrelational, and interconnective nature of the activities associated with the learning and teaching that happens in classrooms. Furthermore, the use of the theory of practice architectures with the conversation analytic approach strengthens the portrayal of teaching and learning reading in classroom lessons.

To give "accurate portrayals of the realities of social situations in their own terms, in their natural or conventional settings" (Cohen et al. 2000, p. 110), the chapter has argued that an ontological approach is required to understand the *what* and *how* of classroom practice as it occurs in socially and locally produced situated occasions of interactivity. Examining practices in situations as they occur and unfold in actions and interactions enables us to take account of more nuanced representations of what counts *as* practices like teaching and learning are enacted (Heap, 1991). But added to this, is the view that to understand the nuances of practices also entails historicising practices as a way to trace *why this now*; why particular actions (or sayings, doings and relatings) come to be relevant, and so salient, in particular practices in particular places as displays in classroom talk. As presented, bringing these two ideas together entails capturing the practice architectures that shape or even prefigure classroom interaction practices, at the same time provide scope for a more detailed micro analysis of naturally occurring interactions as they occur in lessons. This 'both ways look' allows us to study teaching and learning at a small grain-size and reconsider broader questions concerning what counts in classroom practice—what counts as a lesson? what counts as reading lessons? what counts in teaching reading lessons? what counts as learning? what is made relevant in the embodied and enacted practices of teaching and learning reading?

Appendix A: Key to Jefferson Notation Symbols

The following transcription symbols used in the transcript have been adapted from Jefferson's notation system.

Atkinson, J. M., & Heritage, J. (1984). Jefferson's transcript notation. In J. M. Atkinson & J. Heritage (Eds.), *Structures of social action: Studies in conversation analysis* (pp. ix–xvi). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

[[	Indicates where participants begin speaking simultaneously
[	Indicates where participants' speech overlaps
]	Indicates where participants' overlapping speech finishes
=	Indicates where participants' speech follows on from each other without a break, latched
(.)	Indicates a micro interval during participants' speech
0.1	Indicates the length of a participant's pause (in approximate seconds)
::	Indicates a prolonged sound in a word (i.e.) scho::ol

-	Indicates where a word is cut off (i.e.) sch-
> <	Indicates that speech inside the symbols is said by a participant at a faster rate than the surrounding speech
?	Indicates where a participant asks a question
!	Indicates excitement in a participant's speech
" "	Indicates where a participant has repeated a previous conversation
↑	Indicates where the intonation in a participant's speech rises
↓	Indicates where the intonation in a participant's speech falls
SCH	Uppercase words indicate that the participant's speech is loud (often represents reading)
<u>Sch</u>	Underlining indicates emphasis on a syllable or word
…	Indicates that speech inside the symbols is spoken softly (i.e.) °school°
.hhh	Indicates a participant's audible inhalation
hhh	Indicates a participant's audible exhalation
(h)	Indicates breathiness in participants' responses, that could be laughter
(( ))	Provides a description of the verbal and non-verbal actions of participants
( )	Indicates where a participant's speech could not be heard
(∼)	Indicates the rise and fall of intonation in melodious speech (like singing)

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Chapter 11
Teacher Research:
A Knowledge-Producing Profession?

Nicole Mockler and Susan Groundwater-Smith

Abstract Teacher research has a long and proud history, stretching back to at least the 1970s, of supporting and valuing teachers as creators as well as consumers of knowledge about educational practice. In this chapter, we explore the shape and rationale of these historical ideals and the 'architectures of practice' that frame them, juxtaposed with the more instrumentalist notions of teacher research expressed in recent years by, among others, proponents of 'evidence-based practice'. We argue for an opening of the discussion around evidence in education and what constitutes good evidence of practice, and a reclaiming of the notion of 'evidence-based practice' as a generative rather than reductive interpretation of educational practice, consistent with rather than antagonistic to the notion of *praxis* as morally informed action.

Introduction

This paper explores the notion of teacher research as a knowledge-producing practice, asking the question "what is it for teachers to engage in 'knowledge creation' in an age of compliance?". We hold that teacher research, particularly in the form of participatory action research, holds the capacity to be a 'practice changing practice' (Kemmis 2009), and in this chapter we consider some of the enabling and constraining factors to this. We also explore some of the practice architectures that might frame teacher research as a practice-changing practice and contrast these with those that frame contemporary notions of 'evidence-based practice'. Finally, through contrasting these, particularly the cultural–discursive preconditions of each, we mount a challenge to the very notion of 'evidence-based

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practice' itself, arguing that current iterations cede a somewhat fanciful idea of 'evidence' to those who would render it in very narrow and limited ways.

The paper is presented in three parts. After a brief introduction to the concept of teacher research as a practice-changing practice, we explore some of the contextual and epistemological foundations of the approaches to teacher research in which our work is grounded, considering four-key concepts that we regard as central to the work of teacher research as knowledge production. In the second section, we explore contemporary iterations of evidence-based practice, providing a brief account of discourses of evidence-based practice in education, and posing the question, which we see as central to any discussion of evidence-based practice, of how evidence can and should be understood. Here we explore the cultural and discursive arrangements that we see as surrounding the use of the notion of 'evidence' both within and beyond discourses of evidence-based practice. In the final section, we draw on this discussion to argue for a broadening of understanding around what constitutes good evidence and the reclaiming of the notion of 'evidence-based practice' as a central dimension of teacher research as knowledge production.

Teacher Research as a Practice-Changing Practice

Stephen Kemmis first coined the notion of action research as a practice-changing practice in the 2000s, writing in 2009:

> Action research aims to be, and for better or for worse it always is, a practice-changing practice. Better because it sometimes helps make better practices of education, social work, nursing or medicine; worse because it may have consequences that are unsustainable for practitioners of these practices or for the other people involved in them. (p. 464)

In this work, Kemmis (2009) builds on the work of Schatzki (2010) to argue for the power of participatory action research to shape the 'practice architectures' that frame practice within particular sites. These 'mediating preconditions' are expressed thus:

(1) cultural–discursive preconditions, which shape and give content to the 'thinking' and 'saying' that orient and justify practices;
(2) material–economic preconditions, which shape and give content to the 'doing' of the practice; and
(3) social–political preconditions, which shape and give content to the 'relatings' involved in the practice   (Kemmis 2009, p. 466).

Further, he argues that critical action research, with its attendant focus on the sustainability of practices, transforms the social formations within which practice occurs, such that

> People involved in critical action research aim to change their social worlds collectively, by thinking about it differently, acting differently, and relating to one another differently – by constructing other architectures to enable and constrain their practice in ways that are more sustainable, less unsustainable. (Kemmis 2009, p. 471)

In this chapter we are largely concerned with the architectures of the 'meta-practice'[1] of teacher research, and while we understand that these practice architectures are thickly interwoven and interdependent, we pay particular attention to the cultural–discursive arrangements that frame particular iterations of teacher research. For it is in the framing of this 'thinking' and 'saying' that orients and justifies practice that we see not only the roots of the practice itself but the roots of what constitutes 'acceptable practice' in this place and time. We argue that it is in the cultural–discursive sphere that practitioners often have the greatest agency. While clearly material–economic preconditions manifest themselves in today's world, dominated as they are by neoliberal discourses and those socio-political preconditions that are the building blocks of education systems, these are spheres where practitioners are less able to exercise either professional judgment or professional control. Further, as we shall argue in the discussion that follows it is in the understanding of the local and contextual that education professionals can best apprehend their practice.

We begin with an exploration of four-key and interlinked concepts that underpin the particular understanding of teacher research within which our work is located, suggesting that these give rise to the valuing of particular sayings, doings and relatings that hold the capacity to lead to teacher research as rich, generative knowledge production.

Teacher Research: Four-Key Concepts

Our aim in this section is to explore some of the key concepts and approaches that have historically informed the conduct of action research in schools. Of course, we lay no claim to this selection of key concepts being definitive; they are rather the framing constructs within which over the years, we have chosen to locate and defend our work.

Using Research Means Doing Research: Stenhouse as a Starting Point

Throughout his work, Lawrence Stenhouse argued strenuously for the importance of teachers engaging in research. Key to Stenhouse's argument was the notion that teachers had a crucial role to play in the research endeavour through the testing of the results of research in their local context:

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[1]After Kemmis (2009), we argue that teacher research is a 'meta practice' in which it is a practice that shapes other practices (Kemmis and Grootenboer 2008).

> Using research means doing research. The teacher has grounds for motivation to research. We researchers have reason to excite that motivation: without a research response from teachers our research cannot be utilised. (Stenhouse 1981, p. 110)

Further, Stenhouse argued consistently against the adoption of the 'psycho-statistical' model in educational research (Stenhouse 1978, 1979, 1980, 1985) in favour of what he referred to as 'the illuminative tradition' (Stenhouse 1979) and the study of cases (Stenhouse 1980), both of which he regarded as capable of utilising and building teacher professional judgement rather than attempting to undermine it:

> Teaching is largely a response to the observation and monitoring of learning in cases. If this is so, then a crucial problem of the psycho-statistical paradigm as the design for a discriminant experiment is not simply that it deals in general prescriptions, but that it offers to guide teachers by overriding, rather than by strengthening, their judgement. (Stenhouse 1978, p. 8)

Drawing the analogy of the teacher being "like a gardener who treats different plants differently and not like a large-scale farmer who administers standardised treatments to as-near-as-possible standardised plants" (Stenhouse 1985, p. 22), Stenhouse posed that "The teacher must diagnose before he (sic.) prescribes and then vary the prescription…he is not able to fulfil his professional role on the basis of probabilistic generalisations but on the contrary is expected to exercise his judgement in situational analysis" (Stenhouse 1985, pp. 22–23).

Stenhouse's position constituted a thoughtful and comprehensive understanding of 'evidence' as locally and contextually constructed: for him, the evidence that counted was that which is concerned with the creation and verification of research results at the local level, not that which is generated outside the local context with a view to generalising 'what works'. Furthermore, in his defence and privileging of well-honed teacher professional judgement, and his invocation of Cronbach's (1975, p. 125) claim that "when we give proper weight to local conditions, any generalisation is a working hypothesis, not a conclusion", Stenhouse argued for the importance of the local and contextual in what constitutes evidence for use in educational decision making.

Teacher Research as 'Practical Philosophy'

Carr (2006) equates action research with a form of 'practical philosophy' derived from historical self-consciousness and aiming to understand and value the nature of context in all of its complexity. He argues, drawing upon Gadamer, that to

> … achieve a purely rational understanding is illusory, that human understanding is never simply 'given' in any perception of observation but is always 'prejudiced' by an interpretive element that determines how perceptions and observations are understood. Moreover, just as the act of understanding is always an act of interpretation, so it also has an inescapably historical character. (p. 429)

Drawing, in particular, upon an argument that action research should be willing to expand its "historical horizons" (p. 433), Carr argues for a form of inquiry that recognises the kind of practical knowledge, that is socially situated and historically formed, that requires practitioners to understand the historical antecedents of practice and to engage in an ongoing and rigorous interrogation of that practice through engagement in dialogue.

Also, in line with our purpose to trouble the notion of what constitutes quality, Carr asks that we consider educational research in general and action research in particular by understanding first and foremost what *education is* rather than what *research is* with the former underpinned by the kind of knowledge that can best contribute to its development by enabling practitioners to explore and critique their practice on the basis of their systematic inquiries:

> Thus, it would be a form of research that no longer produces social scientific knowledge 'on' or 'about' education but instead develops the kind of self-knowledge that enables practitioners to identify the unquestioned assumptions and irrational beliefs sustaining their practice and, by so doing, enables them to evaluate their practice on the basis of a coherent and clearly articulated educational point of view. (2007, p. 282)

Context, then, including the particular interpretations brought to bear on evidence by action researchers by virtue of their own standpoint and beliefs, is a critical element of this notion of action research as practical philosophy. Furthermore, Carr's conceptualisation of action research in this way links to Cochran-Smith and Lytle's (1992) conceptualisation of action research as related to teachers' epistemologies.

Knowing Our Own Knowledge

Over 20 years ago, Susan Lytle and Marilyn Cochran-Smith argued for teacher research to be understood as a means for teachers to 'know their own knowledge':

> … research by teachers is a significant way of knowing about teaching. We argue that teacher research is a way of generating both local knowledge and public knowledge about teaching; that is, knowledge developed and used by teachers for themselves and their immediate communities as well as knowledge useful to the larger school and university communities. (Lytle and Cochran-Smith 1992, p. 450)

Embedded within this conceptualisation of teacher research is an assumption of reflexivity between teacher research and teaching practice, wherein teachers, through the act of engaging in research, become producers and generators of knowledge rather than merely consumers of knowledge generated elsewhere. They posit, for instance, that "teacher research is a powerful way for teachers to understand how they and their students construct and reconstruct the curriculum… inquiry stimulates, intensifies and illuminates changes in practice" (Lytle and Cochran-Smith 1992, p. 458). In later work, Cochran-Smith and Lytle have extended this notion, drawing on the work of Carr and Kemmis (1986) to suggest

that their concept of 'inquiry as stance' "can be thought of as a theory of action grounded in the dialectic of inquiry and practice" (Cochran-Smith and Lytle 2009, p. 122).

This conceptualisation of the relationship between teacher research and knowledge production pushes far beyond previous conceptions of the knowledge-creating school (Hargreaves 1999a), rendered as these are with far more narrow ideas about data and evidence. Indeed, Cochran-Smith and Lytle encourage us to think beyond popular conceptualisations of knowledge itself, such as those advanced by Gibbons et al. (1994) to a more embracing and inclusive vision of knowledge as produced collaboratively and discursively within the field of practice (Groundwater-Smith and Mockler 2009).

As Groundwater-Smith and Irwin (2011) argue action research can make a powerful contribution to professional knowledge building:

> …while formal knowledge (episteme) may be seen at one end of the continuum where the intention is to seek knowledge for its own sake; action research is concerned with practical knowledge informing the moral disposition to act wisely, truly and justly (phronesis) and lies at the other end. (p. 157)

Whereas episteme concerns itself with theoretical knowledge and techne relates to 'know how'. Understood today as technical knowledge, phronesis refers to practical wisdom that we believe is essential in informing professional practice in terms of principled action. Evidence generated with an eye to teachers 'knowing their own knowledge' as praxis is necessarily local, contextual and open to rigorous debate and negotiation between practitioners in the local setting.

Teacher Research as Professional Learning and Development

While not concentrating on material–economic and social–political preconditions, as indicated earlier, we believe that we do require the frame of reference that they provide. As Altrichter and Posch (2009) remind us, the impact of globalisation on education has seen an increased embrace of market-based approaches to education, including teacher professional development. While action research has long been regarded as a powerful catalyst for teacher professional learning (Cochran-Smith and Lytle 1999; Groundwater-Smith and Mockler 2009; Grundy 1995), many pressures on contemporary schooling brought about by regimes of audit and accountability, with their attendant instrumentalism and standardisation, tend to privilege 'drive by' (Senge et al. 2000) or 'spray on' (Mockler 2005) professional learning over that which is more sustained and requires greater commitment. Added to this is the tendency to tie processes of teacher evaluation or appraisal to the collection of evidence and teacher professional development (Australian Institute for Teaching and School Leadership 2012), processes that on the one hand might be built generatively as opportunities for teacher research, but that on the other might

be constructed as tools of surveillance and accountability to narrow purposes (Mockler 2015).

Grundy (1994) wrote of teacher research as a collaborative professional development and school improvement enterprise: while practitioner inquiry holds the potential for the improvement of individual pedagogical practice, she argued that it can and should be a powerful tool for local, school-based educational reform through the opportunities it offers for deep collaboration. Kemmis, in his work over the past three decades, both individually and with colleagues, has similarly emphasised the critical collaborative nature of participatory action research, grounded in the opening and habitation of communicative space for teachers (see for example, Kemmis and McTaggart 2005; Kemmis et al. 2014), space within which professional learning and development thrives.

None of these framing concepts are 'pre-given'; rather they have been emergent over time and within a range of policy and practice pronouncements. Neither are their meanings fixed, as the various texts that govern them are themselves in a state of flux; these are the fluctuating moments informed by the cultural–discursive, material–economic and social–political conditions of the day.

Evidence and Evidence-Based Practice

We live in an age where 'data' rules. Schools are awash with data (Thompson and Cook 2014, 2015, in press) and teachers are increasingly encouraged to become 'data-driven' in their practice (see, for example, Australian Council for Educational Research 2008; Fenton and Murphy 2015; McLeod 2015). The 'data' in question almost always is confined to quantitative representations of educational achievement generated elsewhere.

In our desire to trouble the notion of 'evidence-based practice' in education, we are reminded, of Cameron's (1963) words:

> It would be nice if all of the data which sociologists require could be enumerated because then we could run them through IBM machines and draw charts as the economists do. However, not everything that can be counted counts, and not everything that counts can be counted. (p. 13)

We are also mindful of the corollary warning that over time, what often comes to be valued, or comes to 'count', is that which indeed *can* be counted. The rise of audit cultures in education, with their attention to measuring, ranking and subsequently laying claim to success and/or failure (Taubman 2009), provides ample demonstration of this phenomenon.

Discussions of evidence-based practice in education began almost two decades ago with David Hargreaves' 1996 Teacher Training Agency Lecture, (subsequently published as Hargreaves 2007). The central thrust of Hargreaves' (2007) argument was that educational research at the time did not represent 'value for money', primarily because it tended not to be 'cumulative': "few researchers seek to create a

body of knowledge which is then tested, extended or replaced in some systematic way" (p. 5). Small-scale studies which "inevitably produce inconclusive and contestable findings" (p. 5) are positioned to be 'of little practical relevance'. Instead, Hargreaves argues that what is required is research that "demonstrates conclusively that if teachers change their practice from x to y there will be a significant and enduring improvement in teaching and learning" (p. 9).

Rejoinders to Hargreaves' lecture, largely characterised by him as 'defensive responses' from 'postmodern hermits' (Hargreaves 1999b, p. 242), questioned the basis upon which his claim that educational research is not 'evidence-based' was made (Hammersley 1997), employed the notion of 'research-based teaching' to argue for the complex relationship between educational aims and processes (Elliott 2001), and argued against instrumentalism and for the role of theory in framing teachers' practices, as opposed to 'evidence' alone (Atkinson 2000).

A more mainstream resurgence of the discourse of evidence-based practice surfaced during Michael Gove's tenure as Secretary of State for Education in the UK, amid a push for greater 'evidence' to be used in social and human service areas generally (see, for example, Haynes et al. 2012). In 2013, epidemiologist Ben Goldacre was commissioned to produce *Building evidence into education* in which he argues for the adoption of 'evidence-based approaches' by teachers:

> I think there is a huge prize waiting to be claimed by teachers. By collecting better evidence about what works best, and establishing a culture where this evidence is used as a matter of routine, we can improve outcomes for children, and increase professional independence. (Goldacre 2013, p. 13)

The argument that 'evidence' is a good thing on which to base decisions related to professional practice is, like 'quality', difficult to argue against, and in the various iterations of evidence-based practice in education, we see a dismissal of those who may wish to mount a dissenting argument as defending the status quo, defending their own 'patch of turf', or just old fashioned and retrograde. The problem lies, however, not so much in the concept of evidence-based education itself as in the narrow conceptualisation of 'evidence' employed by those who peddle it. For many years now in our thinking and writing about teachers as researchers, we have sidestepped the concept of evidence-based practice, preferring to cede the term to those who have employed it for their own narrow purposes, lest our work might be misunderstood as standing in the same space. With this recent resurgence, however, we are interested in exploring the notion of evidence, how it is used by proponents of evidence-based practice and what it means for teacher research as knowledge production.

To say that educational decisions and teacher professional judgement should be based on 'evidence' appeals to common sense. But evidence is never a value-neutral construct: how one understands what constitutes good evidence in education is informed by ontological and epistemological factors and theories-in-action that frame one's view of the world (for further discussion of this notion, see Guba and Lincoln 2008). So how exactly do proponents of evidence-based practice understand the notion of 'evidence'? We shall briefly

explore 'evidence' as employed by Hargreaves and later by Goldacre (2013) as a means of answering this question.

At the centre of both Hargreaves' and Goldacre's discussions lies the comparison between educational research and medical research: writing almost 20 years apart, both bemoan the unwillingness of educational researchers to adopt the approaches to research adopted in medicine and argue strongly for practitioners to be more involved in the conduct of research instead of "university-based academics involved in teacher education who do not teach in schools" (Hargreaves 2007, p. 6). Hargreaves argues that just as *basic* research in medicine is primarily conducted within the academy while *applied* research is conducted by practitioners, so too should this distinction be pursued in education. Leaving aside the simplistic nature of the various dichotomies Hargreaves employs, the 'evidence' that he privileges is "evidence on the effects and effectiveness of what teachers do in classrooms", which should "provide an evidence-based corpus of knowledge" (p. 7). While Hargreaves does not expand on the specifics of what might make good evidence in this arena, however, his assertion that good evidence should be 'scientifically sound' (p. 5) and provide evidence of 'what works' (p. 5) suggests a particular, adversarial approach (Groundwater-Smith and Mockler 2002, 2009) to evidence in educational research.

Both accounts, however, leave aside a range of concerns and debates around medical practice and the role of evidence-based practice in doctors' work, choosing instead to simplistically represent the depiction of evidence-based practice used as the consensus-based standard. Groopman (2007), for example, has assembled a range of cases that highlight the mental traps into which medical practitioners sometimes fall as they seek to develop diagnoses under often pressing circumstances. Among these are the rush to judgement, reaching premature conclusions; being misled by social stereotypes; and following established pathways. They are trapped by what he regards as 'present algorithms and practice guidelines in the form of decision trees' (p. 5). He argues that the medical practitioner is too readily seduced by 'cognitive cherry picking', that is selection what is most readily available, and his solution is to liberate medical practitioners from their linear and unimaginative thinking by requiring them to be more ready and willing to listen and reflect than to engage in 'confirmation bias'. In a similar vein, Sales and Schlaff (2010) argue that

> Physicians would benefit from training in a broader and more nuanced approach to the epistemological challenges inherent to how they consider evidence. (Goldenberg 2009) In an era shaped by pressures to rapidly adopt new technology (Rothman 1997) and by direct-to-consumer marketing, (Wolfe 2002) such training may prove instrumental in efforts to curb overtreatment and contain healthcare costs.

While Hargreaves stops short of suggesting research approaches and methods that practitioners/researchers might employ in generating and documenting good evidence, Goldacre (2013) makes an instant and conceptual leap from the argument for evidence-based practice in education to the employment of randomised controlled trials, so often and spuriously defended as the 'gold standard' for medical

research. For Goldacre, there is clearly one way of 'building evidence into edu-cation': "it's only by conducting "randomised trials"—fair tests, comparing one treatment against each other—that we've been able to find out what works best" (p. 7). He urges teachers to implement randomised controlled trials in their class-rooms, seemingly ignoring the issues, both methodological and ethical, of the adoption of such practices might involve. Absent from Goldacre's argument is any recognition that what constitutes good evidence in education may be substantively different to the case of medicine, that the undertaking of randomised controlled trials by teachers in their classrooms may not in and of itself lead to good evidence, and indeed any recognition that collecting good evidence in education (and, one might hazard, Medicine, for that matter) might be anything other than a simple and simplistic endeavour.

Both Hargreaves and Goldacre's perspectives are plagued with unhelpful dichotomies that position practitioners and researchers in opposition to each other when it comes to evidence and research, a position not held exclusively by them. Recently, John Hattie, the Chair of the Australian Institute for Teaching and School Leadership, advised teachers to 'leave research to the academics', arguing that 'we have got no evidence that action researchers make any difference to the quality of teaching' (quoted by Stewart 2015). Hattie creates a distinction between teachers and researchers, claiming that "I want to put the emphasis on teachers as evaluators of their impact. Be skilled at that. Whereas the whole research side, leave that to the academics".

Furthermore, the Hargreaves/Goldacre approach positions evidence that makes a claim to be 'scientific' and thus generalisable as superior to that which claims authority over its local and contextual nature, thus the emphasis on the 'gold standard' of randomised controlled trials undertaken by teachers operating as researchers. As Wiliam (2014) has noted, however, Goldacre in his discussion of RCTs ignores a number of factors that make such studies difficult to undertake in education. Wiliam suggests that other forms of research might be both worthy and worthwhile, subverting Slavin's (1987) question of whether 'we really know nothing until we know everything?' (p. 347).

Given this summary, it is perhaps not unusual that so many commentators discuss evidence-based practice in cautious, even negative terms. Elliott (2004) sees the thrust in the UK towards teaching as an evidence-based profession as being highly problematic in that two different trajectories have emerged with one building upon the teachers-as-researchers tradition, the other perceiving teachers as passive utilisers of the kind of research that falls into carefully determined categories of being 'useful and relevant' evidence, collected through a narrow, instrumental research paradigm. These two trajectories can be seen to relate to a confusion in thinking about 'evidence for what purpose?' How then do we best understand the notion of evidence-based practice and the ways in which it might contribute to the knowledge building school and practitioner inquiry?

Davies (1999) suggests that evidence-based practice in education operates at two levels. The first is to *utilise evidence* from world-wide research and literature on education; the second is to *establish* sound evidence, by systematically collecting

information about particular phenomena. Engaging in evidence-based practice, we believe, requires both, although the types and approaches to *evidence* in use at these two levels are likely to be different.

As well as making the point that evidence can be collected differently for the enactment of practice and policy we also believe that we can think about purpose from the evidentiary positions themselves. It is possible to consider the gathering of evidence in adversarial settings where it is utilised to *prove* a case. Those seeking for that elusive, indeed we would argue generally impossible goal 'best practice' would wish to prove that one method is unarguably better than another. Discourses of 'what works' in education similarly make use of these adversarial approaches to evidence as providing the requisite 'proof'; a position that is strongly contested by education scholars such as Atkinson (2000) and Biesta (2007) who make the case constructs such as 'best practice' and 'what works' as simplistic and even injurious.

The second purpose for gathering evidence is to conceive of it forensically, where the investigator is seeking above all else to *understand* a particular phenomenon. Knowledge-building schools clearly wish to achieve a deep understanding of that which happens within them: pedagogy, curriculum decision making, managing human and material resources; communication and participation; and so on. Of course, this does not mean that practitioner inquiry should not concern itself with the *quality* of evidence, but rather the purposes to which that evidence is to be put. Robinson and Norris (2001) quite properly point out that a distinction should be made between weak and strong evidence.

The particular cultural–discursive preconditions to practice embodied in these two approaches give rise to different understandings and 'sayings' about evidence that inform both the practice of action research itself in schools, and, given the potential scope of influence of 'evidence-based practice', a broad variety of educational practices. Assumptions about generalisation of practice, transferability of 'what works', 'best practice' and so on work with the idea that particular educational practices in and of themselves are inherently 'right' or 'wrong', as opposed to contestable, open to debate and negotiation, and necessarily context-dependent. This works to shut down particular avenues of professional discourse, such as the 'communicative space' opened in authentic collaborative action research, where such debate and critical analysis of practice has traditionally flourished. Similarly, as the material–economic preconditions to education increasingly favour the kinds of evidence that can most easily be seen to render a level of (arguably, false) certainty, we see a privileging of accountability mechanisms that frame teachers' practice, pose a narrowing rendering of evidence of practice, and constrain the 'doings' that are possible. Finally, narrow approaches to evidence shape and give rise to particular 'relatings' more likely privilege competition in education than the kind of collaborative enterprise embedded in the practice of teacher research or participatory action research.

We believe, however, that there remains scope to reclaim generative approaches to 'evidence' in education and to promulgate the kinds of practice architectures toward which they naturally lead, and it is to this notion of reclaiming evidence-based practice that we now turn.

Reclaiming 'Evidence-Based Practice'

Evidence-based practice has long been regarded as representing a reductive and narrow approach to education, but this interpretation assumes a narrow interpretation of 'evidence'. Here we argue for a broadening of understanding around what constitutes good evidence in relation to educational practice and in a context where evidence is governed by conservative forces in relation to academic productivity. We believe that the evidence-based practice movement suffers from an impoverished view of evidence and a very limited understanding of what research, both that conducted by teachers and that conducted by others, is and could be. Ultimately, evidence is far more complex and multidimensional than proponents of evidence-based practice appear to understand. Evidence does not conform to universal good/bad, adequate/inadequate or reliable/unreliable dichotomies: how far evidence is any of these things is dictated by the purpose for which it was collected, the context within which is was collected, and the scope of the ensuing knowledge claims made in reference to it.

Some years ago, one of us wrote at length about the issue of authenticity in research: authenticity of design (congruence between the researcher's own way of seeing and being in the world and the enactment of research); authenticity of process (linked to ethical concerns and considerations); and authenticity of analysis and reporting (transparency and trustworthiness in the use of evidence) (Mockler 2011). While each of these 'authenticities' holds implications for teacher research, implications which have been explored elsewhere (Groundwater-Smith and Mockler 2007), authenticity of design holds particular implications for thinking about the nature of evidence and what constitutes 'good' evidence. Figure 11.1 highlights these implications.

The research enterprise is always framed by researchers' beliefs about reality and the nature of knowledge, regardless of whether or not researchers choose to make this explicit to themselves and their own community of critical discourse. For authenticity of research design to be achieved, an alignment between the critical questions related to ontology and epistemology that sit at the centre of the diagram and those more practical and pragmatic questions of 'How will I approach my research?', 'Where and how will I look?' and 'What strategies will I use?' needs to be achieved. What constitutes good evidence in research that aims to problematise practice at the local level, seek development of practice or bring teachers into dialogue about their practice will be substantially different to that which seeks to provide answers to educational questions that might be generalised across entire populations. It is not the case that the latter requires 'real evidence' while the former deals in the realm of the 'anecdotal evidence'. Likewise, when it comes to evidence about education and teachers' practice, it is not the case that the former deals with reliable 'objective' evidence while the latter with 'subjective' evidence that is in its very nature less trustworthy. Good evidence comes in many shapes, sizes and guises, and the critical issue is that any piece of evidence fits the scope and purpose of the questions to which it seeks to provide an answer.

Fig. 11.1 Research parameters and critical questions (Adapted from Mockler 2011, with permission from Sense Publishers)

Studies that seek to generalise across a population and use quantitative methods such as randomised controlled trials do not have the exclusive right to claim that practice that emanates from them is 'evidence-based'. Evidence-based practice is that which is based on evidence that might be reasonably put to use within the realm within which it is employed. It might equally involve the utilisation of locally gathered qualitative data that seeks to shed light on the appropriateness of particular practices in the local context.

So what is it for teachers to engage in 'knowledge creation' in an age of compliance? While we have argued in this chapter that engaging in 'evidence-based practice' as it is commonly construed is highly consistent with the mechanisms of accountability and instrumentality that are hallmarks of the age of compliance, we also believe that authentic knowledge creation, informed by a nuanced understanding of what constitutes 'evidence', is very much a subversive act. Enabling factors for this kind of subversion generally includes a critical orientation (on the part of both individuals—including formal leaders—and school communities) toward externally imposed 'solutions', a determination on the part of those who hold the purse strings to focus material–economic resources of the school on the collaborative creation of authentic knowledge, and a manifest desire on the part of teachers and school leaders to incorporate ongoing collaborative knowledge creation into the cultural fabric of the school.

We see many examples of schools and teachers challenging the simple solutions posed by flat conceptualisations of 'best practice' and 'what works', but increasingly we are conscious of the impact of policy frameworks that privilege these

'simple solutions' to teachers' work. We have argued in this chapter for a re-thinking and reclaiming of 'evidence-based practice', which takes into account the need to problematise as well as problem-solve, and advocated for breaking open discussions of what constitutes 'good evidence' in educational terms. In this stance we resonate with the most recent work of Biesta (2014) in his deservedly applauded book *The Beautiful Risk of Education* wherein he "gives teaching back to education" (p. 44) and with this gift returns teaching to a moral and virtuous activity. It is our contention that 'evidence-based practice' holds the potential to become generative and indeed transformative if such nuanced understandings of 'evidence' can be placed front and centre of the enterprise and, indeed, give teaching back to education.

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Chapter 12
Reclaiming Education in Educational Leadership

Jane Wilkinson

Abstract In this chapter, I employ a critical scholarship lens to foreground education as a key but often marginalised concept in educational leadership scholarship. In so doing, I draw on and extend theorising and empirical work conducted with Australian and international colleagues, which examined the ecological links between leading, professional learning, teaching, students' learning, and researching practices. I argue that part of the process of reclaiming education in educational leadership requires a need for new and different kinds of thinking tools drawn from a range of disciplines with which to apprehend the lifeworld of educational leadership practice.

Introduction

In the novel, *The Farewell Party*, by Czech author, Milan Kundera, the character Jakub describes the tension between the world of machines and that of humans as 'the longing for order'. Jakub describes this longing as

> … a desire to turn the human world into an inorganic one, where everything would function perfectly and work on schedule, subordinated to a suprapersonal system. The longing for order is at the same time a longing for death because life is an incessant disruption of order. Or to put it the other way around: the desire for order is a virtuous pretext, an excuse for virulent misanthropy. (1984, p. 75, as cited in Kemmis et al. 2014, p. 10)

The tension between the two worlds which Jakub attests to captures the tensions we have witnessed in Anglophone educational systems which increasingly seek to impose order on the world of educational practice, as part of an adoption of new

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public management ideologies. By drilling into the capillaries of pedagogical and leading practices, through a variety of technologies such as standards, frameworks, quality assurance measures, audits, and more recently, national testing in Australia, there is an attempt to fix, stabilise, and regiment educational practice.

On the other hand, from the *lifeworld* or human and humanistic perspective of educational practitioners, be it as teachers or executive staff, attests to the inevitable 'messiness' of daily practice, located as we are in classrooms, schools, universities, and childcare centres, where every day we are reminded through our encounters with students that living and working *educationally* is necessarily disruptive, messy but potentially life-nurturing.

This quotation captures some of the key thinkings that has been a central focus of my scholarly life as an academic and scholar in educational leadership practice. In particular, I draw on research that I have been conducting with colleagues at Charles Sturt and Griffith Universities as part of the international Pedagogy, Education and Praxis (PEP) research network. This research in turn builds on my longstanding interest and scholarship as a feminist scholar using Bourdieuian 'thinking tools' in the field of women, ethnicity, class, and leadership (e.g. Wilkinson and Eacott 2013) and practical philosophy (e.g. Wilkinson and Kemmis 2015; Wilkinson et al. 2010, 2013). Recently, it has involved examining what socially just leadership practices may look like when working with students of refugee background (e.g. Wilkinson, forthcoming).

The PEP network was formed in 2005 prompted by concerns that intellectual traditions, other than Anglo-American, were being ploughed under and colonised in the international educational field, particularly in international conferences where the dominant language has become English. The aim of the PEP network was and is to surface and revitalise a range of other intellectual traditions that may assist educators in 'speaking back' to the Global Education Reform Movement (or GERM[1] as Pasi Sahlberg, Finland's former Director of Education labelled it) (Sahlberg 2012). In particular, the network is committed to exploring what are the necessary conditions in different countries that support the growth of good professional practice or praxis for educators across the life course of their careers (Kemmis et al. 2008).

As a researcher in educational leadership, I have found the experience of discovering and interrogating intellectual traditions other than my own, an

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[1]GERM is the acronym Sahlberg gives to the educational reform orthodoxy that has taken hold in countries such as Australia, New Zealand, the UK, the US and increasingly which has spread into countries previously immune to GERMs such as Sweden and Norway. GERMs refer to the desire by nations to improve the quality of education and 'fix' the alleged problems of the public system. Its key features are:

- Standardisation of education through outcomes-based education reform
- Focus on core subjects
- Search for low-risk ways to reach learning goals
- Use of corporate management models
- Test-based accountability policies (Sahlberg 2012).

enlightening and invigorating experience. In particular, I have found that these explorations have provided my Australian colleagues and I with new sets of conceptual tools with which to not only interrogate and critique the gaps and silences in our respective educational fields, but also to begin to posit alternative ways of thinking and working in/through and with practice and practitioners. This latter point is particularly important for educational leadership theory, for I am mindful of criticism that critique of managerialist orthodoxy is not sufficient on its own. To critique without offering alternatives is to run the risk that we "become … knowing observers of sociological phenomena, comparing clever notes within our exclusive circle, while practices and policies that exacerbate inequalities continue oblivious and unabated" (Francis and Mills 2012, p. 578).

In this chapter, I employ a critical scholarship lens to foreground education as a key but largely taken-for-granted concept in educational leadership. In so doing, I draw on and extend theorising and empirical work conducted with Australian colleagues and partners in Sweden and Norway. The work was conducted as part of an Australian Research Council (ARC) Discovery Grant which examined the ecological links between leading, professional learning, teaching, students' learning, and researching practices in schools that were deemed 'exemplary' in relation to their innovative leading and learning practices.[2]

Confusing Terms

I begin this chapter by examining some confusions in key educational terms, and discuss how these confusions point to underlying major differences between Anglo-American and European traditions and practices of education. These differences, I argue, need to be understood for they impact on how educational leadership practice is talked and thought about (sayings) in Anglo-American and Continental and Northern European spheres; how it is practiced (doings) and how these differing understandings and traditions of leadership subsequently shape relationships between human actors in the education field (relatings).

Table 12.1 This table is derived from key concepts examined in Kemmis and Smith (2008a, b)

Term	Source of term	
	'Low' Anglo-American usage[a]	Continental and Northern European and 'high' Anglo-American usage[b]
Education	The processes and institutions of schooling	The philosophical field and different historical traditions in which initiation into forms of life can be understood in different ways
Pedagogy	The art of teaching; teaching methods	The philosophical field and different historical traditions in which a child's 'upbringing' into forms of life can be understood in different ways; 'Education-as-upbringing'
Praxis	A form of individual conduct: 'right conduct'	A form of social practice: social action with moral and political consequences, 'history-making action'

[a]Northern European usage: I am suggesting that the broader definition of education, pedagogy and praxis which is more commonly employed in Continental and Northern Europe and is sometimes utilised in Anglo-American usage. S. Kemmis (personal communication, 21 December 2015)
[b]S. Kemmis (personal communication, 21 December 2015)

Some Confusing Terms

See Table 12.1.

What Educational Leadership Theory Does not Say

In educational leadership scholarship, as well as within the field of practice, there is frequently a slippage between the term 'education' and the term 'schooling'. Yet, as noted in the preceding table, the two are not synonymous and their interchangeability has deleterious consequences for leadership practice and scholarship. In English, the two words have similar but not identical meanings. Education in English is frequently used in its narrowest sense to refer to schooling or training within formal educational institutions. But it also has a wider meaning, that is capturing education's broader social function and purpose, as both the incidental as well as deliberate institutional and designed practices of 'bringing up', 'rearing', 'raising' and forming the child or young person, intellectually, morally, spiritually, and physically (Dewey 1968). When we talk about something as having an "educative" function, this also hints at the deeper and wider purpose of education.

Moreover, the word 'education' draws attention to the reality that educative practices occur not solely as an individual function, confined to parents/guardians or in the private realm, but are the responsibility of the extended family, the community and society at large. In this larger sense, we potentially are all educators. In relation to educational leadership practice, for instance, the reality is that to be an effective educational administrator requires a 'stereoscopic' vision (Kemmis et al. 2014, p. 165) which recognises administrators' actions are prefigured both by

the system (i.e. the roles, functions, and requirements of schooling) and the life-world. Administrators' actions are necessarily nested in the lifeworld of 'person-to-person relationships between professionals' (e.g. teachers, leaders) and students, that is, as members of a lifeworld shaped by shared meanings, in which 'people organise reality through their own actions, based on their own preferences, in dialogue with others who share the same life world' (Ax and Ponte 2008, p. 14).

The Australian Institute of Teaching and School Leadership [AITSL] standard for principals (http://www.aitsl.edu.au/australian-professional-standard-for-principals) hints at this broader educative and social role of individual and social formation when they refer to principals as necessarily having a 'belief in the power of education to make a difference to the lives of individuals and to society now and in the future'(Australian Professional Standard for Principals, July 2011, p. 2). The statement implies that education is not solely the province of institutions but has a critical function in forming and reforming the broader *polis* of society. Yet, debate and discussion, be it informed by alternative intellectual traditions or other forms of knowledge (such as Indigenous Australians' lifeworld viewpoints of education) are missing in the dominant paradigms which dominate much educational leadership theory and debate.

The broader Anglo-American notions of education noted above along with Continental and Northern European definitions of education in the preceding table alert us to an alternative set of intellectual traditions which inform understandings of education. These traditions derive from thinkers such as Plato, Aristotle, Socrates, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, as well as Steiner, Montessori, Dewey, Piaget, and Nell Noddings. The definition in the right-hand column of the table attempts to emphasise the social function of education at its broadest. It stresses the different schools of thought which have informed our understandings of education, particularly in terms of fundamental questions about 'what education should be, what dispositions it should cultivate, why it ought to cultivate them, how and in whom it should do so, and what forms it should take' (Dewey 1968, p. 18).

Thinking 'Educationally'

So what does the term 'education' mean? For John Dewey—an advocate of educational progressivism, philosopher, psychologist, and education reformer—education is how:

> … a community or social group sustains itself through continuous self-renewal … this renewal takes place by means of the educational growth of the immature members of the group. By various agencies, unintentional and designed, a society transforms uninitiated and seemingly alien beings into robust trustees of its own resources and ideals. Education is thus a fostering, and nurturing, cultivating, process. All of these words mean that it implies attention to the conditions of growth. We also speak of rearing, raising, bringing up – words which express the difference of level which education aims to cover. Etymologically, the word education means just a process of leading or bringing up. When we have the outcome of the process in mind, we speak of education as shaping, forming, moulding activity-that is, as shaping into the standard form of social activity…the way in which a social group brings up its immature members into its own social form…(Dewey 1968, p. 10).

Dewey distinguishes between the broader social function of education which occurs indirectly and often incidentally in the life world of the infant and young child, and the formalised institutional processes by which increasingly complex societies inculcate their young. He describes schools as:

> … [coming] …into existence when social traditions are so complex that a considerable part of the social store is committed to writing and transmitted through written symbols… as soon as a community depends to any considerable extent upon what lies beyond its own territory and its own immediate generation, it must rely upon the set agency of schools to insure adequate transmission of all its resources. (Dewey 1968, p. 19)

Dewey argues that schools have three functions:

1. to support learners to 'assimilate piecemeal, in a gradual and graded way… the knowledge of complex civilisations';
2. 'to eliminate… the unworthy features of the existing environment from influence upon mental habitudes… weeding out what is undesirable';
3. 'to balance the various elements in the social environment, and to see to it that each individual gets an opportunity to escape from the limitations of the social group in which he was born, and to come into living contact with the broader environment… the intermingling in the school of… different races, differing religions, and unlike customs creates for all a new and broader environment … Dewey 1968, pp. 20–21).[3]

So what does this excavation of the terms education and schooling suggest in relation to educational leadership theory and practice? The first implication is that there is a key distinction between the practices of *education* and the practices of *schooling*. To make this distinction is not to set up a self-defeating binary (for the co-presence of lifeworld and system rests in both terms) but rather to foreground the *extrinsic* value and purposes of education. This value is critical to bring to the fore given the over-emphasis on 'technical action, guided by rules' (Kemmis et al. 2014, p. 5), which is an increasing feature of contemporary schooling practice in a number of Anglophone educational systems. The emphasis on technical action has meant that the life world of teachers and leaders as pedagogues is increasingly out of balance with the perspective of schooling as a system:

> … increasingly uncoupled from its anchoring in the life world… in which pupils … [both] … learn to understand … [their] … own capacities, preferences and perspectives on future life… as part of a meaningful learning environment … [in which] … they can act as authentic responsible persons." (Kemmis, personal communication, December 21, 2015)

In making a distinction between schooling and education, I draw on Aristotle's distinction between *praxis* and *instrumental action*, with educational praxis defined as 'educational action that is morally committed and informed by traditions in the field', whereas instrumental action is about 'meeting goals, following rules, and satisfying expectations of … roles' (Kemmis et al., unpub., p. 5). The difference between these actions is that the actions which inform praxis cannot be pinned

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[3]I deliberately draw on Dewey's work here to remind us that there has been an alternative tradition of education in the Anglo-American sphere, as opposed to the positivist view of education that has dominated educational research and development.

down, categorised, regimented, and delineated in capabilities or standards, nor can they be tested for through pen and paper, portfolios, or inspections. It involves educators who are committed not only to doing their best in a technical sense, but 'doing the best they can, under the circumstances in which they find themselves, for students and the communities they serve' (Kemmis et al., unpub., p. 5). Their actions 'cannot be predetermined, but can only be evaluated in the light of their consequences—in terms of how things actually turn out' (Kemmis et al. 2014, p. 26). It is this constant dance between the systematisation of schooling and the lifeworld of those working in educational sites, between stability and change, which is part of the 'incessant disruption of order' (Kundera 1976, p. 75, as cited in Kemmis et al. 2014, p. 10) that gives educational sites their ontological "happen-ingness" (Schatzki 2006).

Rethinking and Reimagining 'Education' in Educational Leadership Theory

Building on Dewey's notion of education as having a critical forming and nurturing function and arguing that education must occupy a central role in schooling, I draw on the following definition of education, that is, as:

> … the process by which children, young people and adults are initiated into forms of understanding, modes of action, and ways of relating to one another and the world, that foster (respectively) individual and collective self-expression, individual and collective self-development and individual and collective self-determination,, and that are, in these senses, oriented towards the good for each person and the good for humankind. (Kemmis et al. 2014, p. 26) (authors' italics)

The question of what is 'the good' for 'each person' and for 'human kind', however, needs to be an ongoing, critical topic for discussion amongst educational leaders. It is 'permanently contested' "and must always be determined anew for changing times and circumstances… what it is good for any person or group to do at any particular historical moment is always a matter for practical deliberation" (Kemmis et al. 2014, p. 27).

Broader definitions of education drawing on a range of intellectual traditions such as Continental and Northern Europe and Dewey's progressivism suggest critical questions for educational leadership scholarship to engage with in order to reimagine the core purpose of education. For instance, an understanding of education as an initiation into forms of life invites us to view the day-to-day practices of principals as not only a constant negotiation between lifeworld and system, but as central to informing broader debates about the forms of life into which young people should be initiated. Key questions suggested from this perspective include: what are the differing forms of life into which educational and schooling practices can and should be initiating our young people? What/Who are the ultimate targets of leading practices? The fully administered/managed world or the fully learning

world? What of the *lifeworld* of the school, particularly in terms of whole child formation, building trusting relationships, an inclusive society and enhancing social and academic outcomes beyond instrumentalist measures? If schools are invested in transforming practices—to what end and for whose purposes and interests do such transformations serve?

Furthermore, what role can educational leadership theories play in generating debate around these questions and bringing them to the foreground? This is where drawing on these different intellectual educational traditions can be enormously helpful in starting to *rethink* and *reimagine* the work of schooling, of education writ large and of the role that can be played by educational leadership as both a form of scholarship and knowledge production.

To argue these points is not to overlook the work of academics in the field that have drawn our attention to the importance of considerations of morality and ethical responsibility in educational leadership scholarship (e.g. Furman and Starratt 2002; Sergiovanni 1992; Starratt 2012). Rather, it is to point out that there are important intellectual traditions both within but also outside the Anglo-American sphere with which we can and should engage. It also to highlight the irony that on the one hand, Anglo-American theorists are rediscovering the importance of informed debates about the value and purpose of educational leadership as a set of ethically and morally informed practices. On the other hand, those intellectual traditions which can helpfully inform such debates are being increasingly ploughed under by the pragmatic educational traditions that are the default position of educational leadership as predominantly a field of Anglo-American scholarship.

Crucially, it is also to draw attention to the reality that engaging in debate and dialogue about education (and educational leadership) practice as a form of praxis in the post-Marxist sense, that is, social action with 'moral and political consequences—good or bad' (Kemmis et al. 2014, p. 26)—is to signify that such practices are necessarily *social* and *political* actions. Yet in educational leadership scholarship, the 'p' words of 'politics' and 'political' are too often silenced or left uninterrogated (Wilkinson 2008).

Discussion and Conclusion: Reclaiming *Education* in Educational Leadership

Two key implications for educational leadership theory and practice flow from this interrogation of 'education'. First, an analysis of the differing traditions that informs these key terms provides a different insight into the purposes of educational leadership and the broader educational context in which such leadership is located. It does so by situating leadership in an 'overall project of *educational development* (a social and critical view)', rather than a technical and managerialist view, that is, a practice 'dictated by rule-following, or producing an outcome of a kind that is known in advance' (Kemmis et al. 2014, pp. 158, 177). The latter view is

characteristic of technical actions' such as school improvement which adopt a highly functionalist approach to school change (Kemmis et al. 2014, p.177).

Second, a social and critical view of education suggests a need for new and different kinds of thinking tools drawn from a range of disciplines with which to apprehend the lifeworld of educational leadership practice. This is where theoretical lenses such as that which are derived from the philosopher, Theodore Schatzki's practice philosophy (Schatzki 2002), can be enormously helpful. Schatzki's site ontological view of practice, conceives of sites of practice, such as schools, as part of 'an *existential and ontological given* in education … where people meet and engage with one another in practice …' (Kemmis et al. 2014, pp. 214–215). A site ontological view of the world emphasises that practices such as education and educational leadership are prefigured by the particular kinds of *arrangements* to be found there. These arrangements or practice architectures (c.f., Kemmis and Grootenboer 2008), encompass the cultural-discursive, material-economic and social–political arrangements which enable and constrain practices. These arrangements do not predetermine the practices of educational leaders but they do prefigure their practices (Wilkinson and Kemmis 2015).

For instance, in one of the ARC case study schools, the principal had instigated a long term program to embed an inquiry approach to leading, professional learning, teaching, and student learning. The practice arrangements which enabled shifts in practice to support teachers and leaders adopting an inquiry approach to their work included changes to the cultural-discursive arrangements that enabled and constrained how a practice such as an inquiry approach to teaching was enacted in classrooms. For example, different kinds of discourses began to circulate in teacher and leaders' pedagogical discussions, arising from literature which staff immersed themselves in as they discussed how such an approach might apply in their school and classrooms. Changes to specific material and economic arrangements supported a shift towards teachers adopting the practice of inquiry learning, including the principal timetabling staff's planning meetings so that teachers from the same grades could regularly meet to plan and evaluate their programming. These arrangements also included provision of casual relief so that staff could visit other schools that had adopted an inquiry approach. There were particular kinds of social and political arrangements that supported these shifts in practice, e.g. changes to relationships between stakeholders as a result of more collaborative classroom setups, including changed relatings between students; between students and teachers; and between teachers and leaders in staff meetings.

Moreover, the case studies of exemplary schools' practices in ethnically and socio-economically diverse sites strongly suggested what made a difference in changing teaching and learning practices in these schools was:

1. a shift from viewing formal leadership roles such as the principalship as primarily a hierarchical and technical practice whose chief purpose was to disperse leading and learning amongst followers in order to improve learning as

measured by predetermined, externally audited forms of accountability such as national testing; and

2. a move towards a more collaborative approach to leadership practice leading to a thickened sense of shared responsibility for leading, professional learning, and teaching amongst executive, teachers, and students underpinned by high levels of professional and personal trust (Kemmis et al. 2014).

In this sense, the study concurs with work conducted by other researchers which contends that school leadership is primarily about nurturing a *collective ethic* of responsibility for the leadership of quality learning and teaching, embedded within a clear commitment to leading as a morally purposeful practice (Duignan 2012). Critically, this core ethic and commitment cannot be externally mandated by National Standards for Teachers or Principals, nor dictated to staff and learners by principals. Rather it is facilitated through shifts in the arrangements to practices at the individual site that occur as part of more holistic educational approach that recognises the collective, social, and political nature of educational practice as a particular species of the practical science of education, with its specific traditions, histories, and moral purpose or *telos*. An alternative way to state this point, grounded in Continental and Northern European traditions of education, pedagogy and praxis is that it foregrounds an approach to leading development as a 'praxis-oriented practice', that is, as morally informed practice in dialectical interplay with the social and critical traditions of the education field (Kemmis 2012). In so doing, it directs the gaze of educational practitioners and scholars to rethink and reimagine the *educational* implications of leadership practice, as forms of social action with profound moral and political consequences.

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Chapter 13
Leading from the Middle:
A Praxis-Oriented Practice

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Abstract Educational leadership has long been a focus of research and scholarship that focuses on effective education and school improvement. This has usually centred on the important practices of principals; but here we focus on the leading of those who are closer to the classroom—*middle leaders*. Middle leaders are those who have an acknowledged leadership position, but are also involved in teaching in the classroom. In this landscape, a prime role of middle leading is site-based staff and curriculum development. In this chapter, we discuss the features, characteristics and issues associated with leading from the middle, and we show how this is a mediated practice that is critical to educational development in school sites. It is mediated since the work of the middle leader is enabled and constrained by the cultural-discursive, material-economic and social-political arrangements exuding from policy and school personnel that are brought to bear on their practices. To navigate these arrangements, we will argue that the complex relational nature of this role demands practical wisdom, and the enactment of praxis.

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Introduction

When consideration is given to effective education and school[1] development, issues of leadership are inevitably part of the discussion. Indeed, it is hard to argue that 'good' educational leadership is not important for quality education in schools and other educational institutions. However, the vast majority of the literature and research in educational leadership focuses on the role and work of the 'positional head' or principal. We do not under-estimate the importance of these leaders,[2] but we think there is a lack of understanding and perhaps even uncertainty about forms of leadership at other levels of a school. Specifically, in this chapter we depart from more typical notions of leadership to focus on a group of educators described as middle leaders.

> It is middle leaders who have some positional (and/or acknowledged) responsibility to bring about change in their schools, yet maintain close connections to the classroom as sites where student learning occurs. In one sense, middle leaders bridge the educational work of 'classrooms' and the management practices of the administrators/leaders (Grootenboer et al. 2014).

Middle leaders would have various titles and positions depending on the size, scale and context of the school, but could include senior teachers, heads of department, deans, level coordinators and process leaders. In the chapter, although we recognise that there are tensions between wider demands for 'effectiveness' and 'quality education' and for 'good' leadership, we focus more specifically on the practices and practice architectures of leading professional learning among peers. The purpose is not to negate these real tensions but rather to argue that calls for 'effective education' and 'quality' are not necessarily seen as calls for a managerial line. In this then, we aim to recognise the underlying demands for 'effective education' that can enable and constrain 'good middle leadership'. In trying to conceptualise this middle leading role Grootenboer et al. (2014) from their empirical work identified three characterising dimensions of middle leading

1. *Positional*—middle leaders are structurally and relationally situated 'between' the school senior management and the teaching staff. They are not in a peculiar space of their own, but rather than are practicing members of both groups.
2. *Philosophical*—middle leaders practice their leading from the centre or alongside their peers. In this sense they are not the 'heroic crusader' leading from the front, but rather alongside and in collaboration with their colleagues.
3. *Practical*—middle leading is a practice and is understood and developed as a practice. To this end, the focus is on the sayings, doings, and relatings of leading rather than the characteristics and qualities of middle leadership (p. 17)

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[1]Although we will usually use the term 'school', we are referring to all sorts of educational institutions including early childhood centres.

[2]See Wilkinson chapter in this volume.

In this chapter, however, we want to add to these three dimensions—a *praxeo-logical* dimension; that is, that the work of middle leaders rises from a praxis orientation whereby their actions radiate from a morally committed educational stance, practical wisdom and a genuine responsiveness to the site (individuals, needs and circumstances). In practice—and practical action—these actions have social and ethical implications. This philosophical reasoning can be illuminated through empirical analysis by "situating praxis in practice" (Kemmis and Grootenboer 2008, p. 37) by examining the practices (manifested as sayings, doings and relatings) *as* they are experienced and accounted for by those practitioners in the practice at the time. This fourth dimension has been addressed in the analysis through utilising the theoretical tools provided by the theory of practice architectures that attends to the details and influences of the cultural-discursive, material-economic and social political arrangements on practices in sites. This added dimension will be reflected through the empirical examples presented throughout the chapter.

Stemming from the foundation formed by these four dimensions of middle leading is the critical importance of understanding the role of the classroom teacher. Fundamentally, it is the classroom teacher who has the critical educational role of interpreting and enacting the educational policies and curriculum to facilitate student learning. This means that the classroom—where teachers, the curriculum and learners intersect—is the most important site in the educational endeavour (Edwards-Groves 2003; Grootenboer and Edwards-Groves 2014). So, while principals and positional heads are somewhat distanced from the classroom (Lingard et al. 2003), middle leaders are positioned 'closer' to this most critical educational site. They are both embedded and embodied in the day-to-day life of teaching. Therefore, middle leaders are crucial in the development of 'good' learning outcomes among students because they exercise their leading both within and beside classrooms.

In this chapter, we first outline our understanding of middle leading *as a practice*. We will not reiterate the theoretical foundations of practice theory as outlined in the earlier chapters of this book, but instead we will use these theoretical tools to understanding of leading as practiced 'in the middle'. This will give rise to particular issues and affordances as middle leaders critically lead teaching and learning, and we have devoted the middle part of this chapter to discuss the middle leading practice as site-based educational development. Finally, and drawing on the previous discussion, we will further conceptualise middle leading as the enactment of praxis. Throughout the chapter we will illustrate with examples from some of our empirical and developmental work carried out in one region in Australia.[3]

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[3]Space will not allow us to outline the specific details of the broader empirical studies that have also been conducted in Canada, Sweden and another region in Northern Australia, but we will provide reference to other published work where further details can be found.

Middle Leading as Practice: Some Theoretical Underpinnings

In the first section of this book, an understanding of a theoretical and empirical positioning of practice was outlined and discussed in several chapters. After Kemmis et al. (2014), we recognise practice to be a form of socially established, cooperative human activity, involving distinctive

- forms of language, discourse and understanding (evident in *sayings* and *thought*),
- modes of action in particular physical locales using particular materials (evident in *doings* and *activities*), and
- ways in which people interact with, and relate to, one another and the world (evident in *relatings* and *relationships*).

These dimensions are enmeshed or 'bundled together' (or simultaneously produced) in a distinctive *project*.

The project of a practice concerns its "teleoaffective structures" (Schatzki 2002). These are the broad purposes or even intentions of any given task at any given time in any given place; for instance learning to read, or having a coaching conversation, or conducting a staff meeting. Each project is distinctively formed by practices and it is in the particularity of the human activity that transpires in practices by which particular sayings, doings and relatings accomplish projects.

Practices, and as in the case of educational practices, can be recognized and understood at various levels and on different scales; but here we are focusing on the educational practice of leading and specifically middle leading. It is important to note that we are not interesting in simply characterising middle leaders, but rather we want to focus equally on their *practices*. Added to this, we argue that these practices are site based, locally enacted, understood and co-produced in interrelationships with others. This view lays down an ontological ground that locates its significance in the particularity of the happenings in places and the particular conditions or practice architectures that enable and constrain or mediate what occurs in these places. In other words, we are not suggesting that there is a universal or standard practice of middle leading, but rather middle leading practices are developed and undertaken within the practice architectures of any given site. Indeed, this will be significantly shaped by the contexts and circumstances in which practices exist; this might be the size, scale, type and location of the school (i.e. in a large secondary school there would be several middle leaders including the Deans and Faculty Heads, whereas in an early childhood centre there might be one middle leader who could be the senior teacher. Whether the practices are conducted in Sweden, Australia or Canada, different curriculums and educational policies exert influence on the work of teachers for instance).

With the previous caveats about practice in mind, the *sayings* of middle leading might relate to curriculum and developing classroom teaching and learning; for example, terms related to specific disciplines or pedagogical practices enter the

language of individuals in ways that enable mutual comprehensibility so that a shared language enters or shapes the practices. The *doings* will then often relate to organising and facilitating professional and curriculum development; for example, a reorganised timetable that allows teachers to work together with the middle leader at particular times or that particular physical set-ups enable a 'roundtable' conversation. In turn, *relatings* will be 'among' and 'across' with teaching colleagues and 'up' to the principal or positional Head. Of course, these sayings, doings and relatings do not occur outside enabling and constraining arrangements—the practice architectures (Kemmis and Grootenboer 2008).

These sayings, doings and relatings occur as interconnected dimensions, or even actions, in the practice. The *sayings* are enabled and constrained by, for example, the mandated curriculum requirements, an individual teacher's experiences and contexts, professional standards for teachers, and the learning needs of the students. Similarly, the *doings* of middle leading are enabled and constrained by school budgets and resources, and the physical attributes of the school site. In addition, aspects like the past professional experiences and strengths of the teachers, and the school culture, will enable and constrain the *relatings* of the middle leaders. Furthermore, although we have briefly outlined these here as somewhat separate dimensions of middle leading practice, in action as it happens in sites they occur as inextricably inter-connected and inter-related, and so while we can identify *sayings*, *doings* and *relatings*, they only really make sense when considered in the wholeness of middle leading *practice* (Grootenboer et al. 2014); that is, that sayings, doings and relatings act on and with each other in practice.

Of course, practices do not exist in isolation—they are ecologically arranged with other practices (Kemmis et al. 2014). In a most rudimentary sense, middle leading practices are inextricably related to the leading practices of the systemic administrators, government agencies, school principals and positional heads, and other middle leaders. They also exist within dynamic interdependent ecological arrangements with other educational practices including teaching, student learning, professional development and assessment, evaluation and research. Kemmis et al. (2014) described these as the "education complex of practices". As an example, the leading practices of a middle leader will be enabled and constrained by a school principal's leading practices as they relate to collaborating, distributing and delegating. These, at the same time, will be enabled and constrained by the experiences, dispositions, attitudes and capacities of each teacher on the staff; or the experiences, needs, circumstances, dispositions, attitudes and capacities of individual students. And so, a fundamental aspect of a middle leader's practice will be to act ethically and with the practical wisdom that genuinely responds to the site, to the individuals and to the circumstances that will most likely promote student learning. So to understand middle leading, we extend the suggestion made in the previous paragraph that the sayings, doings and relatings of practices 'hang together' and make sense in unison, we also suggest that practices need to be considered within an ecologies of practices.

When considering the implications of middle leading, we recognise that middle leading is both a mediated practice and a mediating practice (in terms of educational

outcomes). By this, we mean that middle leaders are in a position to enable and constrain the practices of others, but at the same time their practices are enabled and constrained by other practices (leadership, policy, resources, state testing and so on). Middle leaders are in the position to create conditions or arrangements that can assist in promoting student learning, although they cannot directly influence it (except in their own classrooms through their own teaching practice and development). In essence, middle leading is a *practice changing practice*, yet this is accomplished through the practice architectures of their colleagues' teaching practices. Middle leaders promote student learning by developing and sustaining arrangements that enable (and constrain) quality teaching practices across classrooms, and they do this primarily through curriculum and staff development. Their success, or otherwise, is doubly mediated by the teaching and learning practices of the teachers and students involved, or by the school's policies and resources. Taken together, therefore the practices of middle leaders are mediated by both shaping and being shaped, by both acting on and being acted on, and by both enabling and being constrained by the practices and practice architectures that exist at the site.

In reflecting on these points, and after considering the empirical work we have been involved in over the last few years, we have tentatively concluded the following:

> **The practice of middle leading** involves engaging in (simultaneous) *leading-teaching* by *managing and facilitating* educational development through *collaborating and communicating* to create communicative spaces for sustainable future action.

We will expand, discuss and illustrate this view throughout the rest of this chapter, and while some of the rationale behind this view is yet to be explored, we provide a little detail in Table 13.1.

To exemplify the key points raised in the next sections of this chapter, we will draw on empirical material from a single case as a way to illustrate the intricate details of middle leading in practice. Excerpts from transcripts gathered in this empirical case will be presented across the chapter as a running example.

The Case of Hilltop Primary School—A Running Example

Hilltop Primary School[4] Action Research Project – *Improving classroom pedagogies: incorporating a dialogic approach to instruction*

Hilltop Primary School is a large school in a regional city in inland NSW, Australia. Its 550+ students are drawn from the surrounding suburb. The school-designed professional learning project, *Improving classroom pedagogies: a dialogic approach to instruction,* was led by middle leader Jana who worked with the 23 full time staff (including the principal Martin and the deputy principal Marcia) and

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[4]All the names used in this article for schools and individuals are pseudonyms.

Table 13.1 The practice of middle leading

Practices		Practice architectures
The sayings, doings and relatings of *simultaneously leading and teaching*	Leading and teaching	Structures and arrangements that enable and constrain *simultaneous leading and teaching*
The sayings, doings and relatings of organising and facilitating *professional and curriculum development*	Managing and facilitating	Structures and arrangements that enable and constrain *professional development*
The sayings, doings and relatings of creating and sustaining *communicative spaces*	Collaborating and communicating	Structures and arrangements that enable and constrain *communicative spaces*

a number of part-time staff. The project emerged as a response to a collective staff concern about the growing issue of student engagement in learning and fluency with oral language among the diverse student population in the school. As a consequence, teachers recognised their more limited teacher knowledge about appropriate pedagogical approaches that could address the concern. The project therefore broadly aimed to address the development of oral language and critical thinking among the culturally diverse student cohort. It was designed as a whole-school action research project, where teaching teams from across the year levels developed a specific pedagogical focus that was particular to their age group.[5]

Jana, who in her role as curriculum co-ordinator with one day a week release from face-to-face teaching her Year 5 class, was responsible for taking the lead in facilitating the development of the team projects. This involved supporting each of the year level teaching teams to change their teaching practices, to reflect on changes and to re-develop and evaluate their projects (in terms of pedagogical change and student learning). Jana also provided support for teachers to develop a plan for gathering and sharing evidence (for instance they began video and audio recording lessons, writing in reflective learning journals, writing field notes from collegial visits) and to respond directly to issues and concerns arising from the project. For Jana, who had been working mainly as a teacher but also the curriculum co-ordinator for 6 years, this also meant making adjustments to her own teaching practices and working with her teaching team to design and implement the Year 5 project; that is, her investment in her own professional learning about teaching was instrumental in the development of her leading practices (Edwards Groves and Rönnerman 2012). At the same time it meant that she also needed to

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[5]Empirical data for this chapter is drawn from a range of qualitative approaches, including field observations of three whole school professional learning days, three after school workshops and two planning meetings; surveys from the three middle leaders Sean, Jana and Lena (responsible for different curriculum areas); two interviews with middle leader Jana; teaching observation in Jana's Year 5 classroom followed by a de-brief interview; observation and de-brief interview with Year 5 teacher Phillipa; Focus Group interview with the Year 5 teaching team (Phillipa, Tegan and Stephanie); interviews with deputy principal Marcia and the principal Martin.

consult with the school leadership team (including other curriculum leaders, the principal and the deputy principal) to design ways that she could make changes to the practice architectures of the school that would enable her to support individual teachers and the teaching teams to implement and develop their projects.

Excerpt 1

According to Jana

> … after organising the initial professional development days that provided teachers with some basic input from [outside experts], I had find ways to support the teaching teams, that meant even my own, to collaborate with each other, and for some that was a first, they had always planned and taught in silos …some resisted… I then helped them in planning meetings to develop team theories of action that would keep them focused; this was a way that the focus came from them, not me or Martin… So, for example, if we engage in more dialogic instruction approaches we believe our students will improve their ability to communicate their thinking, or if the focus might be on developing our feedback or getting student feedback, meaningful feedback, it might be if we focus on developing learning focused feedback in our responses to students we believe students will improve their ability to communicate their thinking to others. Those teachers they would then bring examples or anecdotes of feedback and what they noticed in the student talk, was it descriptive or focused on the learning agenda.

> Our school goal became a common conversation all teachers were having. Even if it was hard for some who were quiet, or too shy to have class visits, or some wanted to do their own thing, I had to keep trying to keep it going; I knew it was important. But what that developed in the end was, I guess, focused professional talk around feedback or extending student thinking or whatever, so you'd see teachers talking about it in the hallways, they would be sharing examples, they would be looking again at the student work and re-evaluating their teaching.

In her description of the project in Excerpt 1, above, Jana oriented to the changes to the practice architectures that shaped her work as a middle leader. Finding ways to support teachers required changing the sayings (e.g. bringing in new language such dialogic instruction or theories of action into their common conversations), the doings (e.g. making collegial visits, bringing examples or anecdotes of feedback, developing theories of actions in planning meetings) and relatings (e.g. collaborating as teaching teams, communicating as peers). These changes to the practice architectures were also acknowledged and described by members of the Year 5 teaching team, Phillipa, Tegan and Steph (who worked with Jana). Below they outlined the practices Jana enacted as they discussed their project in a focus group interview.

Excerpt 2

> Phillipa: We started the project from a staff discussion because it was seen that there was a need with the children here right through from Kindergarten to Year 6 that they didn't have the skills to express their thoughts deeply and in a more detailed manner. So I think that's where it originated and we wanted then to extend on their answers from just one word. So once we asked the kids a question we would just maybe jump all around to someone else to get something else. …not giving the kids a chance to give fuller responses…but I've sort of been a bit sporadic.

Steph: We had to change our individual release to be co-ordinated with each other in the team so we could be released and plan together. This time became our sharing time where we really began to critique our work.

Phillipa: Like after our first couple meetings, yeah I was really good, gung-ho and then I'd forget about it. And then I'd feel guilty, then I'd get back into it. So I've got to work out a way to be a little bit more systematic to make sure it's happening consistently rather than up and down.

Tegan: That's where Jana is really good, she's focused, and she keeps us focused, keeps the momentum going for the project and all the teams. I feel like I have more control though because we can steer it in our own way, you know have a say. The way we have now made our release time a time for our project development is important for keeping it ticking along. ….

Phillipa: Well she'll come to you and she doesn't keep everything to herself. She shares what she learns, doesn't she? She gives you things, time and she just shares whatever she does to see how you go about doing it or how it works for you and then she can get feedback to see whether you're doing it better than her and it gives her ideas. But just I think with the actual sharing of what she finds out, she doesn't keep it all to herself.

Tegan: And even in sharing I find too, she doesn't share with the thought that-she wants something in return.

Phillipa: At first I panicked a bit, I was worried about the NAPLAN test and our kids results, but Jane reminded us about this type of classroom dialogue will really help in the longer term it is more important, the big picture of it.

Steph: She is generous in her feedback too when she observes our teaching, she is thoughtful and helpful as a critical friend and never makes you feel awkward because she always talks about how she is also working on this, or struggling with that, not judging you, but also challenging you at the same time; it helps to see things differently.

Phillipa: What she has is the way that you have to do it either, as if it's the perfect way to teach. She seems to – the way she shares I think is the way that you get – I get the impression that she's trying to make what she's doing better as well. Probably then, hopefully someone might share back and then you can build and grow together.

Steph: Well she's very educated too. She reads.

Tegan: You need knowledge to build knowledge in others.

Phillipa: She does obviously a lot of work and she knows her stuff so she's – and if it's new then she's interested to see how other people go with it as well but she doesn't force it on you. It's there as an option or something to try.

Tegan: Part of it is that we are now talking differently with each other about student language learning, as they are learning a new way of interacting lessons, so are we.

This excerpt provides some evidence of the particular practices and practice architectures that comprised the project this group of teachers participated in. For instance, Steph's comment that they "had to change individual release time to be co-ordinated with each other" to enable the team to be 'released' to 'plan together' indicates how Jana facilitated changes to the ways that teachers engaged in professional development. Jana assisted the staff to change from more individual practices that were, at the time, more typical in the school to team-based professional learning through action research processes. From a practice theory

perspective, the changed physical set-ups (or material-economic arrangements), enabled the teachers in the teams to have the time to work together thus changing what these teachers did. As she continued, Steph recognised the impact that this change had on their professional learning, "this time became our sharing time where we really began to critique our work". Tegan added that they began "talking differently"; that is, the changed material-economic arrangements changed their sayings and doings and relatings. Phillipa commented on the way Jana 'shares' as a way to 'build and grow together', not 'forcing change' and 'offering choices and flexibility' orienting to ways of relating that reflect agency, solidarity and equality. These social-political arrangements influenced the shift in power experienced by the teachers who felt like they had more control, could 'steer it in their own way' and have a 'say in what they were doing'. As the conversation progressed, Phillipa, Steph and Tegan, in turn, acknowledged the specific practices (the sayings, doings and relatings) facilitated by Jana that formed the foundation for their particular project "to develop more dialogic approaches to pedagogy".

In the next excerpt taken from an interview with Martin, the principal, descriptions of the project and the role of Jana, as a middle leader, are outlined.

Excerpt 3

> I had organise for her to release teachers at the same time to be part of the team project development so they could lead their own learning; that was her idea, and I trusted her with this, she really drives it and the teachers respond to her…I was restricted a bit by the availability of the relief teachers, but we did our best.
>
> For me, through the project myself, I began asking better questions about teaching that focused on the change agenda of the school, I really listened to what the teachers wanted and were noticing and tried to accommodate them the best I could. I could sense teachers were making better observations about what was happening with students when they were visiting each other's classrooms, they were engaging students more in around the feedback over a piece of work.
>
> So these conversations I believe, in terms of the collective professionalism at the school, were much richer and focused…it was both ways learning for the staff, for me as the principal and for the teachers who were trialling the approaches…we were all focused on improving our own learning as teachers as well as the learning of our students… It was a real shift in the traditional ways I did things.

According to the principal Martin, changing practices required recognising and responding to the material-economic arrangements that enabled and constrained Jana's middle leading practices. That he had the authority to organise the release time to enable team meetings but at the time was constrained by the "availability of relief teachers"; a point that orients to the significance of the practice architectures of middle leading. Aligned with this, Martin's own sayings, doings and relatings were shaped by particular cultural-discursive arrangements (that enabled him to ask better questions focused on the change agenda, have richer and focused professional conversations), material-economic arrangements (by releasing teachers for planning meetings, by accommodating inter-class visits), and social-political

arrangements (by trusting Jana, by listening, by accommodating requests, by shifting the power to Jana) to facilitate 'both-ways learning'. These were facilitated by the practices of Jana.

Middle Leading Practice as Site Based Educational Development

As proposed in the preceding section, we see a most fundamental feature of middle leading practice is site based educational development. Even when innovations and curriculum reforms are externally mandated, to make them come 'alive' in the day-to-day work of teachers, they need to be realised, actioned and outworked in the particularity of the school sites. From this then, curriculum and professional development must be fundamentally responsive to the learning needs of the students in the particular school site; that is, in sites middle leading is 'practiced' by *managing and facilitating* educational development through *collaborating and communicating* to create communicative spaces (for teachers). In Table 13.2 we have outlined some of the aspects that may make up this practice.

In outlining these aspects of the practice of middle leading, we are not implying that is some form of essential list, or indeed a representation of 'best practice', as this would fundamentally contradict our site-based view of the nature of practice. However, they do represent some of the key dimensions that emerged from our studies across different educational sectors in Australia (and Canada and Sweden in the broader study). To illustrate we draw on the running examples from Hilltop Primary School introduced previously.

Leading and Teaching

Site-based education development involves middle leaders in simultaneously leading and teaching. In other words, middle leaders have to both lead professional and curriculum development and engage in the professional and curriculum development in their own teaching; these aspects are connected and integrated. This could involve things like being an exemplary teacher, and sharing their teaching practice with their peers through having colleagues visit their classroom and visiting others' classrooms themselves. To illustrate this relationship we return to our empirical material from the running example.

Excerpt 4: Jana

So I guess in terms of curriculum my role is to support teachers in their development in professional learning and classroom learning and teaching. So it could be as basic as supporting them in the purchasing of resources that are going to help them teach or it could be seeking out professional learning opportunities for them to improve what they need to

Table 13.2 Aspects of middle leading practice

Practices		Practice architectures
· Leading by being an exemplary teacher (including personal professional development) · Sharing their teaching practice (e.g., inviting colleagues into their classroom, sharing resources and ideas) · Engaging in the teaching practices of others (e.g., visiting the classroom of colleagues) · Balance between tangible expectations and freedom to try things · Mediating between the staff and the senior leader(s) (e.g., advocating for staff with the principal)	*Leading & Teaching* *Mutually informed and reciprocally arranged*	· School professional climate · School physical structures and organisational structures (e.g., timetables) · Relationships with teaching peers and senior manager/leaders
· Organising pd meetings and events · Administrative tasks (e.g., compliance issues, school management) · Facilitating strategic professional development opportunities for others (e.g., through action research) · Focusing development on educational issues, particularly improving student learning · Maintaining the momentum	*Managing & Facilitating* *Mutually informed and reciprocally arranged*	· Expectations/requirements of management · Time · National, local and school-based initiatives · Sense of collegiality v autonomy · The educational philosophies/views/beliefs of the community, managers and teachers
· Developing a shared 'sense of purpose' · Creating 'space' for others to learn · Communicative action, communicative space and public spheres · Professional dialogue—shared language/ understandings · Developing and sustaining relationships 'up' and 'across' · Supporting teacher development through sustained support and descriptive feedback · Creating and sustaining 'relational trust'	*Collaborating & Communicating* *Mutually informed and reciprocally arranged*	· Trust—between principal and ML, and ML and teachers · Collegiality · The professional engagement (or otherwise) of colleagues (e.g., resistors)

know. And it's also I suppose being a member of the executive is whatever else needs to be done in the school. So sometimes that's being a mentor and sometimes it's providing emotional support for staff that are just going through a bit a personal crisis and at other times it could be something completely different, really random – the fine print.

I am the in-between person in the school, the Year 5 teacher, the facilitator of the curriculum and teaching development and a part of the exec; lots of balls to juggle, but I try not to see them as separate, for me they sort of work together, each one feeds the other.

Comments made by Jana (who described herself as the 'in-between person') explicitly direct us to considering her role in the school as one that sits between teaching in the classroom, and being a member of the staff *and* of the executive team; she both leads and teaches. In this, Jana discusses how leading and teaching 'work together', that these dimensions of her work are mutually informed and reciprocally arranged as she facilitates curriculum and teaching development (her own as well as that of her colleagues). Her role in the school is one that is both mediating and mediated by practice architectures. In Excerpt 5, below, these considerations are also raised throughout the teacher focus group interview.

Excerpt 5: Year 5 Teacher Focus Group

Phillipa: I think what we touched on just before put it in a nutshell, that our principal doesn't teach in the classroom and Jana does. Here she is leading us and leading them too in a way.

Steph: Yeah I think that just having somebody that's dealing with the everyday issues in the classroom is so important. …Because when you're not in the classroom you forget what it's like. …

Tegan: But there just seems to be so much extra added pressure and more work for the teachers to do in all different areas of being a teacher and school life that you don't realize it unless you're actually in there doing it. And Jana is more involved in the teaching -

Phillipa: Just what they're bringing that teachers have to deal with everyday, different things happening at home. That's not teaching, it's the caring side of it, and Jana has that understanding. She brings that to her role in mentoring us through the PD.

Tegan: So, when you think of her or someone in that position, I think of her as a teacher first.

Tegan: And then in a whole – I look at it in a whole school as Jana and the assistant principal, whoever that might be. Only simply because they generally run staff meetings and that's often when the professional development's happening or the messages are being delivered to the whole school. So I see those two as the driving force in their curriculum change side of things. And I see Michael as more of a-

Steph://administrator or overseer

Phillipa: Yeah and he's more of a people person, more so heavily involved in that with the parents. Jana is more involved in the teaching -

Tegan: Curriculum and development side of things. But that's just my perception. I don't exactly know how it works, who does – I don't actually know which leader has what particular role in the school, in this school. So they've been very mixed in together as a team. I do know that each role is necessary to keep the school moving forward and keeping

up with new ideas; but Jana is so important for that part of it keeping us in touch with the big plan, but at a practical level too.

Phillipa, Steph and Tegan bring forth ideas about the reciprocity between leading and teaching. For them they think of Jana 'as a teacher first'; but aligned with this is that, as suggested, Jana is "leading us and leading them", that she "Jana is more involved in the teaching", that "Jana gets our issues" because her role is one of leading and teaching.

Managing and Facilitating

While there has been a considerable debate in the educational leadership literature to conceptualise leading as more than administration and management, it nevertheless always has a managerial dimension. However, in the studies we have undertaken, managing and facilitating have been fundamentally different from the administrative practices undertaken by senior leaders/managers such as deputy principals or principals. In general, we argue, that this is because the work of the middle leader is more directly related to classroom teaching and learning practices, and it was constituted in more *collegial-like* relatings.

Excerpt 6: Jana

> But basically, although I am responsible for managing the whole thing, I like to think that I'm – I'm like them; I'm struggling with a lot of things about my classroom teaching too and I don't try and put myself up on a pedestal and model myself as the perfect teacher. And I'll seek help from people too when I don't know a lot about something. And I'm very open about the fact that that's the way that I am that I'm happy to learn from anyone who can give me advice. And quite often if I see someone doing something great I'll go and say "I love what you're doing there can I borrow that?" Or "Could you show me how to do it?" And I think that fosters that two way understanding as well, they know I understand teaching – this has implications for my ability to facilitate their development too, so then they're quite comfortable thinking well, she asked me about that, she said she liked that so maybe I can go to her and say "Well I – I just need some ideas about this." I'd like to think that's part of it.

> The classroom too I'm like them. I'm teaching, and managing all that comes with that, and I'm struggling and I'm trying to find a balance and I'm not someone who's sitting in an office saying "This is what you have to do" with no understanding of all of those day-to-day things that happen that encroach on that.

Jana clearly raises the tensions and struggles between her role managing as a teacher and managing as a facilitator, as she tries to 'find a balance'. Her response to this tension is revealed in her point suggesting that she is "happy to learn from them", that "she is not the perfect teacher", and that by her going to others in the team for ideas and advice she open up her facilitation relationally in ways that "fosters that two way understanding". This orients to the mutuality and reciprocity between these two dimensions of her work. She positions herself as a manager and

a facilitator in the practices she enacts, and her comments direct us to particular social-political arrangements that shift the power and agency of her practices to situate herself 'among' the staff she is leading. These ideas are illustrated in the comments made by teachers in Excerpt 7 below.

Excerpt 7: Teacher Focus Group

Phillipa: It's hard to keep it going sometimes when you are in the classroom though

Tegan: Yes, it is. But you need to have something in place… Just to keep the ball rolling.

Phillipa: I think that because she's enthusiastic, she's keen, she's all for it and doing it too. So if someone's keen and enthusiastic, well you're going to try something hard or new and we get a bit motivated off her.

Steph: She is good at picking up on what is realistic and manageable for us, and goes from there, her way of working with the staff by including us in it as experts too really keeps the momentum going, I think because it is important to her classroom too.

Tegan: Sometimes it helps to, like Phillipa was saying before, she is open too, sometimes if you have someone like her to speak to, discuss and have conversations with about any.. topic, it makes you think this is worthwhile or I'm almost doing that if I just tweak a little bit I could cover that as well, refreshing and refining what you do in that crowded classroom.

Steph: And like you say you do it at first and then it sort of peters off a little bit and then you realize, keep it going, refreshing your teaching. So I think if you do more of it and keep at it, and coming back to it-

Tegan: Keep it at our forefront, but realistic at the same time.

Phillipa: For me it's also about when we hit the brick wall – she is the go-to person. Until it becomes something that's an everyday thing, more so than a one off thing, by the way she organises things she helps us see that…and to strike the right balance for our own classroom.

Across the transcript, Tegan, Steph and Phillipa highlight the connections between managing and facilitating and the enabling conditions created by Jana that shaped their teaching change. Jana's managing and facilitating practices reveal a kind of praxis that shows her way of recognising and responding to the particularity of circumstances of the teachers in her school. They acknowledged this. For example, her practices of finding ways to "keep the ball rolling", "keeping it realistic and manageable", "including the staff as experts" and by being 'open' orients to a particular way of managing and facilitating that create conditions that enable the teachers to "strike the right balance for [their] own classroom". This is a critical point when considering the ways that particular sayings, doings and relatings that are facilitated by the practices of middle leaders such as Jana for educational development and change.

Collaborating and Communicating

As with *managing and facilitating*, middle leaders' practices substantially involves collaboration and communication among and across with teaching peers. However, their leading practices also involve collaborating and communicating 'upwards' with the senior managers/leaders of the school (as illustrated in Fig. 13.1).

This positioning for Jana is "is not either-or; it is both-and". For her, "having been in the assistant principal's role once" she realised "there is a different perception of leadership" when you are in that position. According to Jane, "there's almost a separation between just the classroom teacher and the principal but I am like the middle man". In this sense, the relatings associated with middle leading are complex in that they have to negotiate relatings 'across' and 'up'—in a kind of relational sandwich. This positioning as being crucial for dealing with the day-to-day issues of classroom teaching is discussed by the teachers in the next excerpt.

Excerpt 8: Teacher Focus Group

Tegan: Well, [she is a] co-coordinator, because there's also the positioning of this sort of person as a go-between, is sort of in the middle because they're also the same as you because they're a classroom teacher going through the mess of all of the issues that you're dealing with on that day-to-day basis.

Steph: But they also have a responsibility for driving staff development, but they're also not necessarily the principal. So in one sense they're sort of the one that sort of is feeding both.

Tegan: Probably in the exec meetings [on Wednesdays], I would assume that they would discuss a lot of whole school development in there.

Phillipa: They have a good working relationship with each other…well I know that she feels that she can go between us and them and be an avenue of communication between the both of us if we don't have the time. Because often we try and catch up with the principal or the deputy and we can't. But if you talk to Jana you know that eventually, if you can't get to them, she will pass on what you're feeling or what you're thinking and I think that's really good. She's a great go-between between the exec and the staff.

Tegan: Yeah, that's exactly right; she's that, she's so reliable. So you can go to her for advice or – and she can take it back to them and can come back to you; and I trust her with that.

Phillipa: They're all willing to listen to each other. And Martin doesn't really know what it's like, even though he is the boss, he doesn't – he makes the final decisions but he's someone that will listen to everyone's input so he's not just going to make the final decision. If Jana has something different idea that he hasn't thought about, he would go with that, he trusts her.

Tegan: I was going to say and that's what – and you know who you go to about certain things.

Their views are important for conceptualising the practices of middle leading, since her 'go-between' practices that enable collaboration and communication from this middle position require different practice architectures. Phillipa clearly orients

Fig. 13.1 Positioning of the middle leader

to the notion of Jana being a trustworthy messenger in that part of her practice takes on the responsibility for going between the principal (Martin) and the teachers where otherwise a more direct contact is not possible (or desirable in some instances). In one way her work creates a communicative channel where ideas, issues and decisions flow between the people on the staff. Notions of trust, willingness, responsibility, discernment and good working relationships are mentioned as conditions that shape these avenues of communication that make collaboration possible. This is important for the practices of middle leading. For Jana and the teachers with whom she works, there is a tight connection between collaborating and communicating dimensions of middle leading. Jana explains

Excerpt 9: Jana

> So because I'm a classroom teacher as well as an executive member often I'll have people coming to me to talk about a problem that they've had or a question that they have and they feel probably more comfortable because I'm not going to be judging them or I'm not their employer as such. It's the day to day things, so I'm – I'm the person on the ground so to speak and Martin [principal] and Marcia [assistant principal] are very supportive of that and I can take the information that staff are giving to me and present it to them if I think that they need to follow anything up. As well as sometimes just keep it to myself and work through it with the staff member.
>
> There's just little things like dealing with parents, or an emotional child, or doing the actual assessments and reports, I think that there is an artificial barrier – that no matter how the executive tries to set themselves up as being open and approachable, there is an attitude there is always going to be that feeling of they 'just don't understand what we're going through at a classroom level'; it is a common anthem among teachers… I am the connection between them.

Being the person "on the ground" is in itself a practice architecture that opens up spaces for collaboration and communication among peers and between the staff and the school leadership team. This positioning creates opportunities for people to approach her with high levels of comfort about issues of concern, affording their

voice to be heard "without judgement". As such, she is a broker (Bennett et al. 2007) of relational trust that leverages communication over the 'artificial barrier' often felt by teachers in schools. As she states, she is often the 'connection' between the staff and the executive that addresses, through her practices, commonplace anthems of a workplace divide that can exist as obstacles for curriculum and pedagogical development in large schools like the one Jana works in. These kinds of practice-based tensions experienced by teachers often require a delicacy in both her collaborative and communicative practices (not afforded by the pressures of whole scale accountability and standard-based reforms, for instance). Her responsiveness to both individual and collective needs and concerns makes visible an orientation towards praxis, a point reflected in the excerpt below.

Excerpt 10: Teacher Focus Group

Tegan: And I think too she also understands how good a teaching tool dialogic pedagogies are, and so is going to do anything that she can to make sure that other people have a chance to see how good it can be, trying to get people out of their comfort zone and change their teaching style but she does it in a way as well that is supportive. And she's someone who would be willing to give up time to get someone to go talk with individual people, and watch someone in their class as a critical friend, like she would do that in her role as well.

Steph: The way she talks to you, like she sort of models the kinds of dialogic pedagogies are trying in our classrooms. When she is facilitating the PD days and our team planning meetings she really tries ways to get us talking openly, to say reasoning why we doing things in particular ways, providing evidence from our own classrooms to support our practice.

Phillipa: Well she'll come to you and she doesn't keep everything to herself. She shares what she learns too, doesn't she? She gives you things, time, ideas and readings and she just shares whatever she does to see how you go about doing it or how it works for you and then she can get feedback to see whether you're doing it better than her and it gives her ideas, sort of learn from each other as we share. But just I think with the actual sharing of what she finds out, she doesn't keep it all to herself.

Tegan: And even in sharing I find too she helps us understand what she means by things; she doesn't share with the thought that-she wants something in return.

Phillipa: What she has isn't a way that you have to do it either, as if it's the perfect way to teach. She seems to – the way she shares I think is the way that you get change – I get the impression that she's trying to make what she's doing better as well… and that is sort of what makes it real for everyone. Probably then we share and then you can build and grow together.

Steph: And, she makes us feel she is on the journey with us.

Phillipa's final comment suggests that communication and collaboration need to reflect the kind of open sharing that enables them to "build and grow together"; it is a comment that directs us to the role middle leading practices have for generating an open space for professional learning, collaborating and communicating. For these teachers, this is about the practice architectures that enable this to happen; for instance practices that shape distinctive kinds of sayings (sharing ideas and giving feedback, making sure they understand meanings), doings (modelling, participating

in PD days and team planning meetings, giving time and readings), and relatings (sharing, not keeping things to herself, being supportive) that are experienced as a genuine sense of equality as they all walk 'on the journey' with one another as colleagues. Their words capture the genuineness of Jana's practices'; in that, her practices both form and open up communicative spaces (Rönnerman et al. 2015) built on dependable and trusting interrelationships.

Middle Leading as Praxis

Finally, we want to discuss in more detail the conception of middle leading as a form of *praxis*; that is we want to draw out the *praxeological* dimension we introduced earlier in the chapter. In a broader sense, education is an ethical and morally dense practice that is enabled and constrained by practice architectures that are experienced in local sites. But as was clear from the excerpts in the preceding sections, middle leading is a practice that involves a range of sayings, doings and relatings that responds to the persons and circumstances at any given moment in any given site. These responses draw on particular kinds of practice wisdom that are shaped in time and with experience of conducting oneself in morally and ethically rights given the particularity of the circumstances at the time. Actions, and so practices, in particular sites and circumstance—such as those demonstrated by the middle leader we described in this chapter—form an empirical example of a particular kind of professional; one who acts with the best intentions and with practical wisdom and ethical judgement, given the circumstances at the time. From this, a praxeological stance means middle leading, therefore it requires people who work with others in site-based education development- education to account for, respond to and display particular kinds of knowledge of curriculum and learning theory, pedagogical skills and practical wisdom for effective teaching (Edwards-Groves and Grootenboer 2015). Therefore, what is required is a stronger conception of middle leading as praxis.

Praxis is a term that has been used in a range of ways, but simply it has dual roots

1. an Aristotelian sense sees it as morally committed action that is aimed at good for individuals and society; and,
2. a post-Hegelian/post-Marxist sense, it can be understood as history-making action with social and ethical implications (Kemmis et al. 2014).

For us, both views can be understood as complementary and significant. Educational middle leading is a practice, like education more generally, that is moral and ethical in nature, and the practices of middle leaders have historical consequences for all involved. Thus, middle leading needs to be understood and nurtured as a form of praxis. With these points in mind, we view praxis as, "what people do when they take into account all the circumstances and exigencies that

confront them at a particular moment and then, taking the broadest view they can of what is best to do, they act" (Kemmis and Smith 2008, p. 4; emphasis original). Therefore, middle leaders can be said to be engaged in *middle leading praxis* if in their everyday practice, they are thoughtful of the ethical and historical implications of their work for the students and the community.

Conclusions

In this chapter, we have focussed on a particular dimension of educational leading practice—middle leading. We have marked out this educational leading practice as unique and distinct in that it primarily focuses on professional and curriculum development. It is a kind of leading practice that is often neglected in the literature, since it is a position that is predominantly a teaching one but at the same time it sits between the formal leadership and classroom teaching. We argue that middle leading is a leading practice that is essential for real (and realistic) change in classrooms and so in schools; we say this because of the middle leaders ongoing everyday connection to the day-to-day issues of being a teacher in a classroom, of dealing with the 'real-life' issues of students, parents and communities as they are played out in classrooms, and of keeping abreast of curriculum mandates and policies. So, our empirical work provided illustrations of middle leading from a critical perspective, to show the relational context of being a middle leader and highlight the ethical and moral dimensions of middle leading.

Across the chapter, we have endeavoured to characterise the work—the practices—of the middle leader as one that is *both* an everyday teacher and an everyday leader. In other words, it is our view that is a role that has a closer ecological arrangement with the classroom practices of teaching and learning than the leading of principals and systemic managers/administrators. We have endeavoured to draw out, through the words of the teachers involved in a particular case, the practices of middle leading. These are practices that encompass leading *and* teaching, managing *and* facilitating, and collaborating *and* communicating. In describing and discussing these middle leading practices we have also tried to highlight their importance for educational development in the prime educational site—classrooms and schools. For us, recognising their role as pivotal in the continuing development of any school site is crucial for understanding individual and collective development, and for understanding the real drivers of educational change, learning and development. However, this recognition itself gives rise to enduring questions about school leadership, "does the recognition of middle leaders and their practices in the development of schools imply a new hierarchy or new division of labour—even if they are "practicing members of both groups?". This problem is one that should be considered more explicitly in future research in this field.

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Chapter 14
Provoking a (Re)newed Frontier in Theorising Educational Practice

Sarojni Choy, Christine Edwards-Groves and Peter Grootenboer

Abstract To understand the accounts of practice and the theories that draw attention to the sociality and situatedness of practices presented in this volume, we take up the challenge of reflecting critically and concisely on the present state and the relevance of practice theory in education research. We do this by writing the chapter in the form of a *Rundbriefe* ("round letters"). The Rundbriefe process enables us, as the authors, to respond as both individuals and as a collective authorial team to these key questions: (1) How does a practice turn enhance our understandings of practices in education? (2) How does the various practice theories talk to one another? (3) What does a practice perspective make visible or leave invisible? (4) In what ways does practice theory help us to understand praxis, diversity and contestation? Our writings circulate around the editorial team members of this book each inviting the other to respond and to deliberate further, coming together in the final section to make concluding comments.

The use of the Rundbriefe as a kind of underground communication among 'political Freudians' is discussed at length in Jacoby's (1983) *The Repression of Psychoanalysis*; and its use in the Palgrave Handbook of Action Research (2016) is used as a model for the development of this chapter.

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The First Round of Writing

Christine Edwards-Groves' Comment

To speak about education, is to speak about sociality and practices. Each of the chapters in this volume capitalise on the recent turn, in education, towards a practice perspective for theorising education as a complex of interrelated social practices. As suggested by Nicolini (2012), to do this 'offers a remedy for a number of problems left unsolved by other traditions, especially the tendency of describing the world in terms of irreducible dualisms between actor/system, social/material, body/mind, and theory/action' (p. 2). Stemming from this, the practice approach has 'the capacity to dissolve (rather that resolve) such enduring dualisms' (Nicolini 2012, p. 3) yielding new understandings about education, learning and knowledge from the ground up. The chapters in this book take this stance, sensitising us to the nuances and particularities of what happens as people (like students and their teachers) come together in particular local sites in local circumstances enhancing our understandings of the complex social machinations of education and its constituent practices. The practice turn seeks out ways to understand how social life is constituted, in particular how it is organised, reproduced and transformed in the doing of practices. This move leaves behind a view education and schooling practices as simply being a matter of quantification, psychology or cognition devoid of its connection to human sociality and the circumstances in which people come together in action and interactions.

The idea of the 'practice turn' rose to prominence by Schatzki et al. in their (2001) edited book "The Practice Turn in Contemporary Theory", where authors steer us towards the rationality and the dynamism of a practice mindeness. This direction makes central the sociality and situatedness of practices, rather than more prominent modes of thought such as individualism, intellectualism, structuralism, systems theory and many strains of humanism and post-structuralism (Schatzki et al. 2001, p. 2). The attention to the specificities of the site and situatedness of the enactment of practices (in particular classrooms, in particular schools, in particular roles, in particular universities, in particular vocations, in particular districts) are reflective of a practice mindset that values how practices unfold in the realities of time and space. Therefore, practice theories offer a site ontological view that other theories may leave invisible or perhaps even neglect (Schatzki 2002). Kemmis et al. (2014a, b) develop this notion of situatedness further in their research that unveils the concept of site-based education development, a notion illustrated with empirical material in some of the chapters in this book. For these authors, site matters. Garfinkel and Sachs (1970) suggest that "the stability of sense, relevance and meaning does not arise from the form of propositions but from the circumstances of their use" (cited in Nicolini 2012, p. 138). Taking this one step further, Kemmis et al. (2012) developed the theory of ecologies of practices that makes visible the interconnections and interdependence between practices. This view shows how practices are ecologically

arranged with one another, and how practices influence and are influenced by one another.

The major theoretical shift that characterises the 'practice turn' is a move away from the view in cognitive psychology that language, work and power represents and communicates thoughts that an individual has developed through interaction with her environment and her social group. Rather than meaning being made available to learners as an *outcome* of social interaction and activity, practice theories suggest that meaning is actually *created in and through* social exchange and activity; that is, in the practice itself. For me, the notion of intersubjectivity sits at the heart of the matter; practice theories, in particular the theory of practice architectures make explicit and coherent what happens in practices and the ways in which people as interactive participants make themselves intelligible to one another. For educational psychology, this is seen as a turn away from ideas about meaning understood as schema within an individual's head, and learning as expanding and connecting these schema, to ideas about meaning being generated in the interaction between people as they talk about the things they are doing with each other—i.e. the 'sayings', 'doings' and 'relatings' that practice theorists explicate in their work. This produces a radical shift from top-down views of education towards attending to the particularities and distinctiveness of how people do practices.

The appeal of the practice turn in education stands in what has been variably described as practice idiom, practice standpoint, practice lens, or a practice-based approach lies in its capacity to describe important features of the work and circumstances people inhabit as something that is routinely made and remade in the doing of practice (Nicolini 2012). Although practice theories could be viewed as related through particular historical, conceptual or philosophical similarities and perhaps even talk to one another in particular circumstances, practice theories themselves are diverse and contested. Both Schatzki (2001) and Nicolini (2012) speak not of a unified theory of practice, but rather an assemblage or confederation of theories that can be better described as broad 'family' of theoretical resources connected by a shared and broad interest in understanding human action and the historical conditions that shape what happens in social situations. However, practice theorists themselves (e.g. Bourdieu 1990; Kemmis et al. 2014a, b; Latour 2007; Ingold 2011; MacIntyre 1981; Schatzki 2002, among others), draw attention to different aspects of practices and the ways people, objects, discourses, relationships, activities and circumstances that maybe brought to bear in the doing of a practice.

Peter Grootenboer's Comment

The practice perspectives presented in the chapters in this book, and commented on above by Christine Edwards-Groves, have provided a refreshing way of understanding education and considering its development. In particular, the way practice theories seem, in many cases, to avoid or work without the common issues of dualisms like theory-practice and individual-social, has been a valuable

contribution. In my mind, this has enabled thinking about education (and other professional fields) to embrace some of the complexity of educational sites and the unavoidable ontological 'reality' of learners, teachers, and educational leaders encountering one another around curricula in classrooms, schools and other educational settings. Indeed, it is the 'everydayness' of practices—the 'taken-for-grantedness', which is foregrounded by practice theory, and in terms of education it brings attention to the mundane and routine experiences of learning and teaching. This is the 'bread and butter' of education—not the spectacular, one-off special lesson or experience, but the normal ordinary unfolding of learning and teaching, and it is this dimension of education that demands attention simply because of its pervasiveness and commonality. Similarly, the term 'practice' has assumed an unquestioned and assumed meaning as part of everyday professional vernacular, and so perhaps it has lost some of its rich meaning and descriptive potential. The value of practice theory is that it questions and problematizes this taken for granted meaning, and in the process turns a critical lens to terms like 'professional practice' and 'best practice'. Of course, what is evident in the chapters in this book is that the concept of practice is complex and not uniformly understood or conceptualised—hence we have always referred to practice *theories* or 'practice theory' in a plural sense.

Here I do not want to simply reiterate the points made by Edwards-Groves previously, but to rather pick up on a feature that, I believe, is in need of further debate and consideration. It concerns the situatedness of practices. Many of the chapters in this book are replete with examples and discussion of site-based development, and indeed, the deliberate and overt "site ontologies" of practice theories is their strength and defining quality. However, *theory*, by definition, is a generalisation or an abstraction from contexts or sites. So, practice theory (at least the theories featured in this book) can be seen as general understandings of a phenomenon (practices) that are unique and site-specific, and this can be seen as problematic and incongruous. If practices are site-specific, then does it make sense to talk of the essential and de-contextualised features of practices? Also, it is common to talk of practices, both in general usage and specifically here in this book), as having some meaning and common understanding beyond specific sites. For example, teaching is a practice (or meta-practice), that is recognisable and comprehensible in ways that is not site-specific. Similarly, we talk of *professional practice*, and while part of the ongoing work of the authors represented in this book is to continue to problematize and reflect about what this means, it is still something that is generally comprehended, albeit at a perhaps superficial level. This leads us to seriously consider questions related to practice theory and the ways these reveal practices as being understood, recognised and conceptualised in site-specific ways.

Of course, any theory, by its very nature, is incomplete and open to revision, and so questions like those listed above will always remain (unless the theory becomes a 'law'). Within the spirit of ongoing discussion and debate, here I offer some initial thoughts about the issues related to the situatedness of practices. An understanding of the ecological nature and arrangement of practices helps here—specifically the *nestedness* of practices (Kemmis et al. 2012; Kemmis et al. 2014a, b). According to

Capra (2005), ecologies have a range of characteristics including being "nested systems", where various levels of practices are nested within one another. This means that one can conceive of a practice at different levels, and therefore, in different levels of 'sites' or, more specifically, within different level of *practice architectures* (Kemmis and Grootenboer 2008). For example, one can conceive of reading learning practices at the level of an individual child in a classroom, or at a school-level where reading learning practices are conceived more broadly, or even at a systemic-level where the practices of learning to read is considered in a very general way and they may talk of *best practice*. In the classroom site, the practice architectures will include specific conditions related to the learner and the teacher, whereas when the school is the site, the practice architectures will include the nature and needs of the school community, and at the systemic level the learning practices will be enabled and constrained by factors like government policy and national agendas vis-à-vis reading. Thus, the site of the practice, and the associated practice architectures, are visible and understandable, at different levels in an ecological nested arrangement.

Sarojni Choy's Comment

My response focuses on addressing the question: How does a practice turn enhance our understandings of practices in education?

   Much has been written about practice theory applications in the schools and universities and only in recent times the commentary on practice theory extends to the vocational education and training (VET) sector. Compared to schools and universities, the VET sector deals with and is largely dependent on a range of industries that contest their roles and contributions to education, yet demand skilled workers. Therefore, it can be argued that VET practices are subject to a wider set of influences and challenges as the sector continues to expand into new territories, while schools and universities already have long established practice traditions. The concept of practice is understood in different ways. In common public perception it is associated with professional practice (e.g. medicine, law), and the interpretation of practice is associated with expectations of standard types of services and outcomes. However, more recently the perceptions of practice have been extended to include other professions where practice is conceived as professional activity in occupational settings (e.g. teaching, nursing). It is timely to review VET through a practice theory lens (as done by Choy and Hodge in Chap. 8 of this book) and add to the growing body of research and literature on practice theory.

   The value of practice theory here, and as evidenced in the chapters in this book, is that it goes beyond just a panoramic view of the traditions of teaching in schools or other educational settings. Practice theory allows one to delve in the day to day happenings to understand the functionalities and how and what makes those functionalities to materialise or not. Practice theory provides (organic or otherwise) a more illuminative lens for informing the dynamisms of the operatives in particular

occupational settings, be it a school, university, restaurant, nursing home or VET sites. Although it has long historical roots, it is a complementary theory, not promising to provide an all-encompassing explanation about everything, but rather it allows for deeper insights into the happenings that shape and make the living aspect of the practice. An understanding of the conditions, actors and their interactions and inter-subjectivities in shaping, re-shaping, and growing what takes place, as magnified through the practice lens, unveils practice as organic and ever changing. In essence, the ecology of practice sees them as an ecosystem of living, tangible, intangible and inert features, some being more dominant than others. Thus, as can be seen in the preceding chapters, research using practice theory attempts to understand the dynamics of practice with intentions to improve and innovate in education. Given that some features of practice are more stable and others subject to change, it implies that there is potential for change and development, as can be illuminated through a practice lens, and this has thus popularised interest in practice theories.

Interconnections and interdependence between practices that Kemmis et al. (2012) speak of suggests symbiotic and reciprocal relations aimed at a common set of goals or outcomes. For instance, partnerships between VET institutes and industries for site-based education (Choy and Green 2016) highlights the relations for successful VET practice. The theory unpacks the 'messiness' of the threads in those interactions. The cultural-discursive arrangements for instance explain how the actors talk about the work they do in the practice, what they say and what they do not say and how these enable or constrain outcomes. Similarly, a clear sense of other arrangements such as material-economic and social-political help to understand the features that sculpt and influence the conditions for practice can provide insights in the happenings and consequent outcomes. Not just what is available and afforded, but also how the various internal and external actors, systems and artefacts interact, negotiate and reconcile with each other to needs to be understood. The strength of practice theory is that it brings to the forefront the contributions and influences of the practice architectures (Kemmis et al. 2012), the human factors and synchronisation of all the features to achieve particular outcomes at different levels, in given time and space.

The term 'arrangements' ('cultural-discursive', 'material-economic' and 'social-political'), as used by Kemmis et al., may imply that their assemblies are deliberate. Essentially, only parts are predetermined, others are created and recreated on an ongoing basis. A critical and reflective view of these conditions or arrangements can enlighten what is being enabled, what is being constrained, and what is damaging thus demanding change as a priority. These understandings then allow participants to appraise their practices within the prevailing practice architectures (i.e., arrangements). Without unpacking and reviewing these individually and then collectively, it is difficult to know what can remain as is in the interim and what needs to be changed immediately. Decisions here are determined by what is acceptable and what takes priority. So how practices in schools are shaped depends on the traditions, some are difficult to change because that is what the local community or particular societies want and accept. Others (e.g. the curriculum) are

largely governed by political directives therefore less flexible to change in short timelines.

Practice theory is inclusive in that it engages other practitioners in collectively shaping the operations within a practice through informed details about the processes, practices and contributions relevant and appropriate within particular time and space. In this way practice theory lens brings out the aspects and mechanisms within the lifeworld of practice where individuals gain and engage in educational experiences. In other words, it avoids 'othering', and is inclusive of all features and actors. However, the lifeworld of any practice is contested by diversity, sometimes colonised by particular actors, or driven by purposive rationality coming from policy routines and bureaucratic systems and powers. In this way the systems can encroach on the lifeworld of any practice and constrain the space time dimensions of practice. The inclusive feature of practice theory espouses social constructionist views, in that the shaping of practice is underpinned by the social-cultural and related discursive practices and values. It genuinely considers socialisation of individuals within the practice environment that through the combined efforts of all actors, are kept functioning and alive. Thus, practice theory is ontologically inclusive. Garland (2012) contends that ontological inclusivity requires considerations of the 'objective world; subjective world; intersubjective world; individual rights; social solidarity; and the common good' (p. 13). All these are considered by practice theory.

Given that education is a social activity, those engaged in the lifeworld of educational practices need to have consensual understandings of various aspects of practice to sustain and respond to its organic lifeworld. As highlighted by Edwards-Groves in this chapter, the assemblage or confederation of theories draws attention to the contributions of 'people, objects, discourses, relationships, activities and circumstances' that shape practice. All actors engage in mutual composition of knowledge and meaning.

Most other educational theories tend to focus on aspects of learning or teaching without consideration of extended features and dynamics. This does not give other theories any lesser importance because the developers set out to understand a narrowly defined aspect of practice. Practice theory, on the other hand, aims at a wider perspective and sets out to investigate a whole ecology and existence of all features as a constellation and its impact on society as a whole. Therefore, it acknowledges other theories and extends understandings beyond the contributions of other theories, making it eclectic. The sociocultural theory by Vygotsky for instance acknowledges the value of human interactions, but falls short of mentioning much about their interactions with the architectural arrangements. Similarly, Habermas' (1990) theory of communicative actions suggests that knowledge construction is a cumulative process that results from communicative actions. This is widely accepted. Habermas' communicative theory implies pluralistic commitment of actors in the practice setting to achieve 'conceptual pluralism' (Putnam 2004, p. 48) through the use of different 'optional languages' that permits multiple ontologies. The rational discourses (Habermas 1990) permit refinement and appraisal to maintain continuity of practice. Practice theory goes a step further and

acknowledges the openness of communicating in and about practice. Therein the cultural-discursive arrangement explained by practice theory enriches Habermas' theory.

Practice theory is eclectic and allows us to integrate many different philosophical and social-theoretical perspectives. In a sense it leans towards phenomenological sociology to understand the intersubjective lifeworld. This makes practice theory ontologically inclusive in many ways. It helps us understand practical reasoning and not just what is the capitalist view of education—to educate learners, rather also the development of liberal and emancipatory aspects of education. Practice theory extends ways of construing educational practice. The point is that socially constructed and discursive aspects of knowledge, and the subjective and social constructions are contextual so inseparable from the site and meaningful in particular times and spaces.

Finally, practice theory recognises that practice encompasses multiplicity of factors and crosses 'paradigms'. This implies there are multiple ontological relations that shape the social world of practice. Moreover, situational horizons are likely to shift, expand, or contract and individuals need to make adjustments as they go. For instance, aspects of practice may present as problematic (i.e. when things do not work or when outcomes are not achieved due to disparities between what was intended, expected and achieved) or unproblematic. This is where actors need to reconsider positions that are intersubjectively shared for a more objective approach. The theory allows thematising what is otherwise seen as unproblematic and normal or routine set of actions and events. It is open to all actors to engage in this thematising through communicative actions to come to a common rationality. In this way practice theory offers a performative view on the realities of the practice site and the happenings in them.

The Second Round of Writing

The second round of writing follows on from the first whereby the three editors write a reply to the collective position—as a form of intersubjective agreement— that emerged over the three items. It also reveals the gaps and silences, and points of departure. Writing in this way creates a communicative space for the authors— through their written words—to generate free and equal responses to each other in the writing roundtable process. Here are those replies.

Christine Edwards-Groves' Comment

As a general response to the preceding discussion, it first strikes me that according to the positions presented above, practice theories usefully problematize education —the sociological, the ontological, the empirical, the epistemological and the

philosophical. So "on this larger canvas, each of us, as educators [and researchers], participate in education because we share a common fate: to be bound up with one another in a world we share" (Kemmis et al. 2014a, b, p. 217).

As educators and researchers, like each of the authors in this book, whose daily work entails being *in practices* oriented towards educating others (in schools, in workplaces, in universities, in other educational institutions like TAFE, or as researchers in the scholarly community), theorising, researching and representing practice matters. So, for us, in our own practical realities, practice theories matter to our daily work equally as much as it does for the perspectives we bring to, and take from, the sites of our own research.

This brings me to my second point. It occurs to me that although each of the texts collectively extols the virtue of practice theories as enabling the dynamic portrayal of practices and their influential and shaping dimensions, what remains less overt is the notion of *praxis* in educational research. '*Educational* praxis,' may be understood in two ways: first, as *educational* action that is morally committed and informed by traditions in a field ('right conduct'), and second, as 'history-making *educational* action' (Kemmis et al. 2014a, b, p. 26). It is here—in the realm on praxis in educational researching practice—that I explicitly focus my response. To do this I loop back to the idea of praxis in practice theory (introduced in Chap. 1) as it relates to researching and portraying education practices; a matter raised in question four above: In what ways does practice theory help us to understand *praxis*, diversity and contestation?

In one way my response harnesses the integrity of practice theory, in particular the theory of practice architectures (Kemmis et al. 2014a, b) which is distinguishable by its interest in praxis, to comment on praxis in educational research.

As researchers of practices, questions about the conduct of research that linger for each of us are not only practical ones, theoretical ones or methodological ones, above all else they are ethical ones. Simply, for me, research is not only about what *they* do (as objects of research)—but what *we* do (as researchers in researching practices). So, the question becomes how do we as researchers and scholars reflect a praxis-orientation (Edwards-Groves 2008) or a praxis stance (Smith 2008) in the conduct of our own researching and scholarly practices? As praxis-oriented professionals (Edwards-Groves 2008), we need to consider questions related to how our researching practices show us to be committed professionals who consciously and continuously act and interact with moral integrity in an educationally right and sound way (Kemmis 2009; Kemmis et al. 2014a, b). As Kemmis (2012) suggests praxis can be understood as 'socially consequential history-making action (p. 149). Therefore, what is required is consideration be given to the particularity of the ways praxis underlies researching and scholarly practices. This means considering praxis in research in two realms—as right conduct, and as social action with moral and political consequences. We also need, as practice theorists, clarity about how practice theory illuminates this.

The practical question about what these propositions mean for us as educators who draw on particular educational theories to frame our work, relies on understanding what educational praxis—or educationally 'right' practice—looks like in

our researching practices. It also relies on understanding how our research and researching practices form and inform history-making action. This also relates to the ways in which the particular cultural-discursive, material-economic and social-political arrangements that enable and constrain our work shapes and reflect a praxis-oriented stance within the scholarly communities to which we belong. This challenge is a provocative one that requires us to cast a critical, and even retrospective, eye over the details of our work through a critical praxis lens (see Dr. Kathleen Mahon's dissertation, 2014, as an example). This exercise serves to inform a deeper understanding of praxis in research and the necessity for us to draw on practice theories that attend to the moral and ethical dimension of educational work; the theory of practice architectures enables this possibility. It challenges us, as researchers, to examine and reframe our own practices and the practice architectures that enable and constrain our work as we seek to think and act educationally in the right and proper way. That means viewing our research as ethical practice rather than technical processes concerned with the production of things— for example, the production of people of a certain kind, or the production of certain kind of deliverables or particular 'outputs'. Following the argument by Kemmis and colleagues:

> on this technical view, some may understand researchers as technicians who are responsible for only producing such research outcomes to be laid over or applied to the knowledge, skills and values of those *to be educated* – as if these others (teachers, workers, students, community members) are pliant or resistant 'raw materials'…Such a view overlooks the agency of the others (adapted from Kemmis et al. 2014a, b, pp. 25–28).

As researchers we act in history and so praxis in research is also history-making action (in the Marxist sense of the term), whereby as researchers we "inherit a world partly made by [our] history of action in the world" (Kemmis 2012, p. 150). So praxis-oriented researchers do not and cannot close their minds to prudence and wisdom in their daily practical action, they are aware of these actions *as* history-making action as it relates to the "unceasing flow of history made by human, social action" (Kemmis 2012, p. 151). Therefore, praxis-oriented researchers can be viewed as those who do not simply do 'researching practice' (engaged in the 'technē' or the technical aspects of researching), they have a philosophy about researching that inspires, guides and even provokes ongoing improvement, redirection and transformation of researching practices. Praxis operates within and from a disposition or a deeper consciousness about the enactment of practices involving phronésis; i.e. the moral disposition to act wisely, truly and justly; with goals and means both always open to review (Kemmis 2012).

Praxis in research, therefore, is not static, but rather it is about doing action involving practical reasoning about what it is wise, right and proper to do in a given situation in an ongoing dynamic and transformative process that is ever-evolving and historically developing. It is always about transformation connected to living well in a world worth living in. Its development hinges not only on researchers having opportunities to engage with others as interlocutors to create for themselves intersubjective spaces to reflect on their researching practices as part of a

self-extending system of professional growth (Edwards-Groves 2008), it involves an understanding that decisions we make form us as researchers just as it shapes the courses-of-action that transpire in research (as we make analytic moves and present or represent our findings). Praxis-oriented researchers address issues relating to their own practices which consequently provides the self-extending, professional, substantive ownership over and commitment to, improving conducting ethical research and so education. The symposium that generated this book is reflective of this. It is my belief that once a researcher develops such a self-extending philosophy as a researcher, the praxis pathway becomes a moral imperative in their work.

Peter Grootenboer's Comment

The chapters in this book, and the preceding discussion in this chapter, have given rise and emphasis to the ethical and moral dimensions of practice—what Edwards-Groves foregrounds above in the concept of *praxis*. The ontological and site-based nature of educational practice has also highlighted the need for a critical perspective that considers and responds to education as it unfolds in particular sites. This also means that these ethical considerations of practice/praxis cannot just be theoretical or abstract musings, but rather they need to be grounded in the actual practices and practice arrangements in the site.

From my experiences as a teacher, leader and researcher in a range of educational sites, it seems to me that overt discussion about a critical perspective of education as realised in their school or institution is rare. Indeed, to talk of a critical perspective of teaching and learning is seen as abstract and esoteric. This seems problematic given the grounded and ontological nature of practice/praxis, and somewhat incommensurate with the claims that practice theory goes some way to ameliorating the apparent practice-theory divide. This issue was addressed some 30 years ago by Carr and Kemmis (1986) when they wrote the seminal book *Becoming Critical* that laid the foundation for action research.

Action research, and the underpinning critical theory as discussed by Carr and Kemmis (1986), offer meaningful avenues to critically consider educational practices. There is not scope here to discuss these in detail, but rather I will just quickly outline two salient features. The first relates to the social nature of practice and the collaborative characteristic of action research, and the second critical questions to facilitate praxis development in educational sites.

In Chap. 1 we outlined how the symposium that led to the development of this book, and in particular how and why it was conceptualised as a "public sphere" (Habermas 1987). I will not reiterate the details and discussion here, but point out that action research starts with a "communicative space", and such spaces can allow educators to engage in critical dialogue about how they engage in their practices under the prevailing conditions. It is the social-cultural arrangements that can enable or constrain how effective those communicative spaces for engagement and critical dialogue are. So, given the social nature of practices (Schatzki 2002), and

the need for educational practices to be developed and understood in critical ways, specifically related to the practice architectures of the site, participatory forms of action research offers a practical, theoretical, ethical and philosophical approach for practitioners:

> The practical nature of action research … offers a first step to overcoming aspects of the existing social order which frustrate rational change: it organizes practitioners into collaborative groups for the purposes of their own enlightenment, and in doing so, it creates a collaborative model for a rational and democratic social order. … Moreover, it focuses the attention of participants on their own educational action with the intention of reforming it so that educational practices, understandings and situations are no longer marred by contradictions or distorted by ideology. (Carr and Kemmis 1986, p. 200)

Of course, fundamental to this social, dialogical and collaborative understanding of critical practice development is that those collaborating and participating are the practitioners themselves. Again, Carr and Kemmis (1986) noted (30 years ago) that "[a]ction research is research into practice by practitioners for education and those involved in the practices which constitute education" (p. 199).

While the need for practitioners to be the key participants in critical research and development in educational practice is clear, the desire and willingness of these people is not always immediately evident (Carr and Kemmis 1986). It seems that participation and engagement in critical inquiry needs to be grounded in the educators and students' everyday experiences, and I have found that three key questions posed initially by Kemmis et al. (2014) have been insightful and useful; these involve considering whether the prevailing educational practices, and the arrangements that enable them are

- rational, reasonable, comprehensible and coherent;
- sustainable, effective and productive; and,
- just, positively affecting relationships, serving the interests of all, and not causing unreasonable conflict or suffering? (adapted from Kemmis et al. 2014a)

These questions are not abstract or merely theoretical—rather they are reflective prompts that are targeted directly to the educational practices as they unfold in a particular site with specific conditions and arrangements. They are grounded in the everyday experiences of teachers and learners and allow those involved to critically reflect on educational practices as they are experienced. For example, a physical education department could ask whether their current practices are irrational vis-à-vis developing positive attitudes towards healthy lifestyles. Is the current competitive sports-based program just if the same students 'lose' all the time and learn to hate sport and avoid physical activity? Is this sustainable? What sort of experiences in physical education would promote healthy lifestyles for all?

To take a critical perspective to educational practice—to conceptualise educational practice as praxis, requires collaboration, collegiality and participation by practitioners. These cannot just be theoretical or esoteric consideration; they are fundamentally practical and critical focus on change. In this way practice theory can be a critical form of theory that can highlight irrationality, unsustainability and injustices.

Sarojni Choy's Comment

The conversations here have drawn attention to education as a compendium of interrelated social practices, enlightened through the practice theory lens. I acknowledge the interconnections between the various site-specific arrangements, with educators being the nexus or the key agents of praxis. I contend that they create social and communicative spaces for learners and other participants to make meaning in particular practices, within consideration of practice as an evolving system. In doing so, educators and researchers are charged with a moral obligation and commitment to improve practice. The moral obligations that Christine is talking about implies reciprocity, that is, the educators/practice theory researchers having genuine interest and commitment to making a difference to enhance practice. This comes with passion and navigation skills that educators/researchers need to build over time. Their skills in not just looking, but observing closely, making judgements, understanding the challenges, objectively noting the constraining features of the practice architectures, bringing in fresh set of eyes and making insiders aware of the arrangements that may need to be rearranged or re-assembled in consultation with the community of practice, to work out a plan and travel together for change. This may be less problematic for educators who reside within a practice, but more constraining for researchers from outside the practice site. This kind of responsibility may not be the forte of the novice researchers. It takes time and levels of maturity in researchers to do this, to develop the critical eye, and the skills to communicate this in a sensitive manner. If it is meant to be reciprocal, than seeing things from the perspective of the researched and the researcher is critical. Research is after all a snap shot if you are an outsider. We miss the day to day dynamics that happen over time which gradually form the history and influence praxis. Kemmis (2012) contends that history-making takes time hence researchers are not able to fully participate in history-making because they often leave the research site after the project so no longer have the opportunity to contribute to the ongoing efforts of change and history-making. This is typical of researchers who work on defined projects under consultancies for instance. The point is that "practices are formed by being in and participating in the social world" of practice, but from a praxis perspective this is not always possible. Academic researchers on the other hand can do this in their own spaces, albeit within competing demands of work, and ever changing priorities. This is not so easy for other researchers who do not reside within the site and have defined tasks and duration for research in any given site.

Praxis in research is sometimes predetermined by the agreed or expected outcomes, e.g. through consultancies, but the moral aspect lies within the researcher's ethical considerations. It is a combination of passion, commitment and expertise that makes it happen. It is not only about promoting and disseminating research which are measures of performance in universities. It needs time investment that most researchers are short of. Yet such moral and long term objectives of personal commitment to praxis form the basis of what will improve things researchers believe in.

Christine's point about praxis in research being an unstable and ever-evolving setting where researchers need to create intersubjective (Edwards-Groves 2008) and communicative spaces allows them to quickly navigate between sites. The requirement to develop skills to be able to navigate between sites challenges programs designed to develop novice researchers preparing for global practices. Higher degree research programs for instance have defined durations and may not allow exposure to experience a wide spectrum of praxis opportunities.

Peter's points about collaboration, collegiality and participation for educational practice as praxis as well as good leadership and recognition of knowledge bearers and creators for effectual praxis are prudent. In any case, participation needs to be invitational and opportunities afforded for all to contribute. All things considered, success in improving practice and praxis insists on examining a range of assumptions about the interpretations, arrangements and strategies suggested in literature. While the practice architectures and the arrangements within form a useful theoretical tool to understand the dynamics of the practice, the spiritual facet is not mentioned. Yet when speaking of the intersubjectivities the cognitive, physical and emotional interactions between the various elements can't be denied. I believe that it is the spiritual connections that bind people who then operationalise the happenings. We assume the presence of spiritual connections, but cannot ascertain that because it is difficult to measure.

Peter stresses the significance of critical research and development in educational practice, but this too is laden with assumptions about what is critical, who has the voice to be critical and how will the critical aspects of research be generated, received and valued to influence change in practice and praxis. Besides, criticality is culturally embedded and needs to be processed through the social-cultural arrangements in specific sites. Critical perspectives need to be facilitated and not left to assumptions that participants will engage in such processes.

The Final Word

The conversations in this chapter aim to provoke a (re)*new*ed frontier in theorising educational practice. Collectively, they highlight some essentialities and theoretical contestations of practice and praxis; in a way centralising the call for practice mindedness in Pedagogy and Education. Similarly, the accounts in other chapters illustrate a range of perspectives and contestations on how educators understand and operate in various practices, in various circumstances, under various conditions. The authors in this volume turn towards the centrality of a practice perspective as a critical approach for rethinking education practices—not just for the here and now, but for a more sustainable future of education. In this last chapter we also highlight our obligations and responsibilities as educators to actively contribute to the history making action through praxis. We believe the next step is to examine the assumptions and then use practice theory as the basis for change management to improve practice; change that operates from a site-based ontological concern. For

us, to change practices requires changes in the practice architectures constituted by the cultural-discursive, material-economic and social-political arrangements that prefigure yet do not predetermine practices that exist or come to exist in Education.

This is an evolving, critical and renewed conversation.

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