Creative Economy

Nobuko Kawashima · Hye-Kyung Lee
Editors

Asian Cultural Flows

Cultural Policies, Creative Industries, and Media Consumers

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As the global economy has developed, we have seen severe competition and polarisation in income distribution. With this drastic change in the economic system, creativity with a high market value has come to be considered the main source of competiveness. In addition to the improvement of competitiveness, however, we are required to work toward fairness in society.

This series covers research on creative economies that are based on humanity and spirituality to enhance the competitiveness, sustainability, peace, and fairness of international society. We define a creative economy as a socio-economic system that promotes those creative activities with a high market value and leads to the improvement of society's overall well-being.

Through this series, we intend to propose various policy recommendations that contribute to the prosperity of international society and improve the well-being of mankind by clarifying the concrete actions that are needed.

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Preface

The idea for editing this volume firstly came from a workshop, entitled ‘Cultural Industries and Cultural Flows in East Asia—The Emergence of Regional Culture’. The workshop was initiated by Nobuko Kawashima and was held at the Center for the Study of the Creative Economy of Doshisha University in Kyoto in July 2014. Many of the authors in this volume were participants of this event and discussed the papers for 2 days. The discussion, we felt, needed to be continued in a different place with more speakers who could easily come to Europe, resulting in the second workshop/conference ‘Asian Cultural Flows—Cultural Industries, Cultural Policies, and Media Consumers’ at the Birkbeck College, University of London, in London in September 2015. With students and researchers from Birkbeck, University of London, King’s College London, Liverpool University and Sheffield University, we could expand our discussion and see the contribution we could make in a broader context.

For the publication project, the two editors with the late Lorraine Lim started to formulate the structure of the volume and solicited contributions not only from those who participated in the abovementioned events but also from further afield. Diana Crane was especially helpful in giving us her opinions and searching authors and topics. She declines to be listed as an editor of the book, but in the early process, her contribution was enormous. We are indebted to her as an advisor to the project.

Despite the smooth starting and gradual development of the project, we encountered the sudden death of Lorraine Lim in September 2017. She was only in her late 30s and had a lot of interesting ideas and energy to proceed with various research projects we worked on together. This book in particular owes so much to her as her dedication to the editing process by reviewing and giving constructive comments to the authors improved the quality of the book. The shock the other two editors, Nobuko Kawashima and Hye-Kyung Lee, had with the sad news is beyond description, and it still brings tears to us to witness and re-appreciate her academic legacy. There is no need to mention that it is a huge loss for the research community on cultural policy, but we think Lorraine would have been pleased with the completion of the volume.

By September 2017, we luckily had the finished manuscript of Lorraine's chapter and only needed to work on the final process of editing. It must be noted that we were late to ask for the abstract of the chapter from Lorraine, so her chapter lacks one. Her bio comes from the one she prepared for other publication. Otherwise, the chapter is the original work of Lorraine Lim, and the proofs were read by Kawashima and Lee, who made no corrections.

Finally, our thanks go to Juno Kawakami, the editor of Springer in Japan, who has given helpful advice and support throughout the editorial process. The Center for Research of the Creative Economy of Doshisha University, the organiser of the workshops mentioned above, has received a 5 year grant since 2012/2013 to 2017/2018 for the strategic development of research centres at private universities in Japan from the Ministry of Education, Science and Sport. Research was also supported by JSPS KAKENHI Grant Number 15K12847 (Principal Investigator: Nobuko Kawashima). These grants made the workshops and related activities for this publication possible.

Kyoto, Japan — Nobuko Kawashima
London, UK — Hye-Kyung Lee
March 2018

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Introduction: Asian Cultural Flows from a Cultural Policy Perspective

The phenomenal spread of popular culture from Japan since the 1990s and from South Korea in recent decades in East and Southeast Asia (henceforth, Asia) is now well known and well documented (e.g. Chua and Iwabuchi [eds] 2008). Popular culture in these flows are consumed by the young generations in Asian cities such as Taipei, Shanghai, Bangkok and Singapore and include pop music, film, animation (or *anime* from Japan), television programmes, fashion magazines, comics and video games, as well as their derivative products such as toys, costumes, food and other merchandise. Although less prominent, the culture of other countries has also been transferred across national borders within the same region, making cultural flows a major topic within inter-Asia cultural studies, as cultural flows in Asia are found to be multidirectional and multicultural (Otmazgin and Ben-Ari [eds] 2012; Iwabuchi 2011).

An interesting survey was conducted of consumer preferences in major metropolitan cities in Asia by a research institute affiliated with the major Japanese advertising agency (see Tables 1, 2, 3 below). Respondents were 15–54 years, middle to upper-middle class by income. Although the results show that Japanese cultural industries lag behind those of South Korea, particularly in Southeast Asia, more interesting is that the respondents from highly developed, relatively affluent cities—Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore—show a keen interest in cultural products of all origins: from Japan, South Korea and the USA/Europe, as well as locally made cultural products.

Table 1 Music one often listens to (MA, %)

	HK	Taipei	Shanghai	S'pore	KL	Bangkok	Manila/Met	HCMC	Jakarta
Local	89.8	90.5	73.2	25.2	60.0	91.9	96.4	96.4	90.9
Japanese	34.0	40.3	16.5	9.4	3.0	2.0	5.4	2.3	2.3
Korean	33.0	29.3	26.4	15.8	5.4	7.8	20.8	6.0	6.0
Euro/USA	63.3	75.3	24.2	52.8	33.9	18.6	34.5	34.5	31.3

Source: Hakuhodo (2012)

Table 2 Favourite TV drama (MA, %)

	HK	Taipei	Shanghai	S'pore	KL	Bangkok	Manila/Met	HCMC	Jakarta
Local	74.1	52.3	63.3	47.2	66.4	82.8	84.8	64.6	69.5
Japanese	50.3	45.0	32.5	10.4	5.5	5.9	6.4	16.1	4.9
Korean	50.6	39.8	47.7	26.0	11.0	27.8	27.8	51.3	17.3
Euro/USA	50.4	50.4	28.3	41.0	37.5	11.5	11.5	44.1	14.3

Source: Hakuhodo (2012)

Table 3 Favourite anime and manga (MA, %)

	HK	Taipei	Shanghai	S'pore	KL	Bangkok	Manila/Met	HCMC	Jakarta
Local	36.0	22.5	18.3	6.0	32.8	25.1	38.9	17.9	21.1
Japanese	76.3	65.4	39.5	16.2	11.9	25.5	52.1	22.0	26.4
Korean	7.3	2.4	8.9	4.0	2.5	0.5	12.5	6.6	3.8
Euro/USA	19.1	11.6	9.8	15.4	16.6	6.3	16.1	26.8	11.0

Source: Hakuhodo (2012)

It is clear that the consumers in these cities have cosmopolitan tastes, enjoying a vast range of cultural products coming from many nations and regions. Different patterns of preferences are found among the consumers in less affluent cities such as Ho Chi Minh City and Metropolitan Manila, which can be interpreted as their having less access to a range of cultural products, rather than as the reflection of their cultural preferences. As their standard of living improves, it can be expected that they too will exhibit a similar pattern as their affluent neighbours. It can further be imagined that given the preferences of consumers in Southeast Asian cities for locally made pop culture, in addition to exports from South Korea and Japan, local cultural industries will also be able to export to other countries in the region as they develop their capacity of production and marketing.

Academic attention to this phenomenon of cultural flows in Asia has been plentiful, and by now, a large volume of literature in the English language has been accumulated, particularly on the Korean Wave in the last decade (e.g. Jin 2016; Kim [ed] 2013). Why add to this already large body of research? It is because we feel that this phenomenon has not yet been explored from a cultural policy perspective, which is a different approach from those undertaken in the existing literature. The majority of the existing papers and books come from a critical media, cultural studies or critical sociological perspective (with the exception of Otmazgin 2013; Otmazgin and Ben-Ari [eds] 2012, 2013). One strand of research has examined cultural products in circulation within the Asian region as text and analysed their impact on the receiving societies in relation to national identity and modernity formation. Another strand of the literature has been the rise of East Asian popular culture and the possibility of inter-Asian cultural dialogue and connections. In these studies, Asia is regarded as

a cultural zone where various cultural texts are enjoyed by consumers who have cultivated similar sensibilities and tastes (Chua 2012; Iwabuchi 2002). The location and roles of Asian cultural flows within the broader, global circulation of culture, too, are an important theme extensively discussed in the literature (e.g. Iwabuchi 2002; Kim [ed] 2012). In short, this vast body of literature has shed light on the issues relating to the national or transnational identities of urban consumers, the meanings of regionally shared cultural texts and the implications of Asian cultural flows for our understanding of cultural globalisation. Yet, it has paid insufficient attention to the actual processes through which culture has flowed among Asian countries.

It is usually customary to ascribe the rise of Asian cultural flows to the wealth accumulated in major cities in Asia and the increased number of middle-class consumers demanding larger volumes of entertainment and leisure. Other reasons for cultural flows that are often cited include the relaxation of media regulation, leading to increased demand for quality media products to fill in air time. Also, the development of information and communication technologies (ICT) has enabled faster transmission of cultural products across the national borders, and new, interesting products can be found more easily by media suppliers and consumers. While all of these usual explanations are generally helpful, there is still a need to go into more details of how cultural flows are encouraged (or discouraged), directed and conditioned by the cultural policies of sending and receiving countries.

In using the term 'cultural policies', we mean not only policies and concrete programmes and projects of states to support or regulate the expression, manifestation and value of culture and the arts but also their interaction with market forces. In this volume, we are interested in investigating the ways in which various actors—national governments and their agencies, local authorities, industries of culture and the arts, consumers and citizens—interact, negotiate and give rise to flows of culture in Asia. Cultural policies of individual nations, especially the policies aimed at improving production capacity of their cultural sectors, are important to examine because the creative quality of their products is central for their flow. However hard one tries to market a cultural product, circulation will not occur unless there is some sort of original, innovative and exciting element that attracts consumers. This is especially true in the case of transnational context as there is an inevitable 'cultural discount' occurring because of differences and distance between cultures (Hoskins et al. 1997). This is why cultural export policies, for example by the Japanese and South Korean governments, tend to focus on lowering language and cultural barriers by subsidising the translation, dubbing and subtitling of content and providing domestic producers with information on overseas markets and co-production opportunities. Furthermore, cultural products from abroad, no matter how high in quality they may be, would be difficult to export if the receiving country restricts the inflow, although in practice technologies and consumer demand may actually bypass such regulatory barriers.

In the following sections, we discuss three key areas of concern in cultural policy research that have direct implications on cultural flows in Asia but have not been adequately covered in the existing research: (1) the rise and spread of 'creative industry policy', (2) the use of culture and the arts in city strategies for redevelopment and revitalisation and the enhancement of economic competitiveness and (3) national and city branding and the cultural diplomacy associated with it.

Creative Industry Policy

The rise of creative industry policy around the world in policy practice and discourse and in the academic literature has been rapid since the turn of the last century, whose origin of these policies are usually associated with the early years of the Blair government in the UK. With the advent of the Labour government in British politics, the cultural policy of the country has seen a major transformation, including the renaming and rebranding of the policies in this area as the 'creative industry policy', which encompasses commercial cultural sectors as well as subsidised, not-for-profit sectors of the arts and cultural heritage. The new policy direction has had an increased emphasis on the economic (and social) effects of culture, although governmental attention to the economic effects of the arts and culture was not novel at all. The positive results observed in the measurement of the market size of the creative industries, including the high gross value and export potential of this market, encouraged the government to move forward with the policy concept of the creative industries (see, e.g. Flew 2012, Chap. 1). Soon the term was adopted by governments of many countries around the world (Prince 2010; see also Kong and O'Connor [eds] (2009) on the policy transfer to Asia and Volkering (2001) for the transfer to Canada and New Zealand).

What is new about creative industry policy? If cultural policy of previous eras can be summarised as that of protection of heritage and support for high art, then this newer cultural policy that includes the concept of creative industries can be expressed as policies that promote a wider variety of cultural forms including popular culture, designer fashion and media such as video games for the purposes not only for their cultural value but also for their economic and social value. Film, for example, is a typical area where culture and commerce meet (or collide); it has generally been conceived as a commercial business from its inception, but has become polarised into a money-making global industry on one hand and the non-profit, artistic independent segment on the other. Given these divergent paths within the industry, film policies attempt to protect and promote national cinema, but have traditionally intervened in this area via economic measures to make such film efforts viable (Hill and Kawashima 2016). In the last 10–20 years, however, a new strand of governmental policies related to film has emerged with strong elements of market orientation. No longer do film policies focus on trying to make locally made films commercially viable, rather, these policies now view the audiovisual production sector as an economic driver that should be promoted, particularly on-location film-

ing that comes to their territories from abroad (very often from Hollywood). Bi- or multinational agreements for film co-production may be signed not only for the benefit of international cultural exchange and collaboration opportunities but increasingly for attracting large-scale foreign productions to come and spend money in their national territories. For the same economic reasons, many national and regional governments in every region of the world now compete by offering tax incentives and building studios and other facilities to attract foreign film productions and post-production activities, as their economic effects are believed to outweigh the investment and foregone tax revenues. By the same rationale, many countries extend benefits and incentives to television programme makers, video game developers and commercial music developers.

Thus, renamed as the creative industries, culture is now seen as a thriving industry, a money-maker and a key player in the creative economy. Further support for creative industries is provided through the wider discourse on the knowledge economy, the intellectual property-based new economy and other pro-innovation policies that are common among the major policy goals of advanced countries, and it is as part of this broader trend that creative industry policy has gained currency. Asia is no exception to this trend, and it has followed the global trend at different points in time (Kong et al. 2006). The extent to which creative industry policy is implemented in practice varies, with substantive measures differing among countries. The governments of Singapore, China, Taiwan and South Korea have taken the lead and other Southeast Asian countries are following, with all of these countries acknowledging the economic potential of creative industry policy and expecting to see its benefits come to fruition. Japan is a little anomalous in this regard, having a reticent cultural policy, with policymakers initially expressing doubt about the creative economy thesis in particular. However, Japan, too, has finally realised the utility of its popular culture for economic policy and has started to formulate policies targeting the creative industries and their exports (Kawashima, Chap. 2 of this volume). All in all, the expanding scope of areas covered and the redefined goals of cultural policies pursued under creative industry policies in Asian nations can be understood as acting as a driver of the cultural flows in Asia.

Cultural policies of Asian countries, however, are not just active and positive measures for promoting the creative industries; some policies include highly restrictive measures, namely, censorship and import restrictions. China and Singapore have the mechanism of cultural censorship despite the overall openness of their market economies. While censorship in China and Singapore occur for different purposes, with the former focused on maintenance of political ideologies and the latter on the prevention of social unrest (deriving from, for example, ethnic conflict within the country), the institutions that deny the freedom of expression have a huge impact on what can be produced, distributed and consumed by the public in their respective countries and their trade partners in Asia.

Importantly, cultural flows are sometimes deterred or slowed by official bans influenced by foreign relations between the specific countries concerned. The Taiwanese and Korean bans of Japanese cultural products have long been lifted, but there are other contemporary bans between different nations because of political

strains. For example, the current tension between China and South Korea as part of the complicated geopolitics in East Asia, namely, the rising tension between North Korea and the USA, is preventing K-Pop from further penetrating the Chinese market despite the local consumer demand for Korean entertainment products. This aptly shows how soft power driven by popular culture can be curbed by the use of hard power in world politics.

Urban Development Through the Use of Culture

In recent decades, distinct cultural policies have been developed by cities. There has been more than three decades of manufacturing decline affecting former city centres in Europe and the USA, including cities such as Pittsburgh, Detroit, Glasgow, Manchester, Birmingham, Bilbao and many more (Bianchini and Parkinson [eds] 1993). These cities, suffering from shrinking tax revenues, high rates of unemployment and crime and decayed city centres, attempted to revitalise their economies with the help of cultural planning. These cities have had success in obtaining funds from various public bodies for regional/urban regeneration plans and have invested in flagship institutions and facilities for culture, installed public works of art, hosted arts events and redeveloped specific local areas for cultural tourism and consumption. These cities aim to attract tourists, business conventions, outside investment and the relocation of high-value-added industries.

In the case of Asia, where countries' economies have developed later than their Western counterparts, the need for such cultural planning at local level may be different, but they too have joined the international competition for global city status through the use of cultural investment (Kong et al. 2015). Japan, as a country that developed much earlier than the rest of Asia, now suffers from the same economic decline that previously occurred in former manufacturing-based cities and pays great attention to the concept of the 'creative city', namely, the goal of city revitalisation by the local polity in partnership with citizens who independently and autonomously apply creative ideas for problem-solving. Here, too, cultural planning plays a major role. Also, more arts-related projects for local redevelopment are seen in towns and villages in remote areas where depopulation and ageing are serious problems. In many cities around the world, phenomenal developments with major cultural facilities like museums, design centres and theatres have been built as part of their ambition to become world cities with greater capital investment, inflow of the so-called creative class (Florida 2002) and development of high-value-added industries.

Kong et al. (2015) note that cities in Asia competing to improve their world/global city ranking have developed 'new urban landscapes through the making of cultural infrastructure, often impressive for their size and scale and their architectural distinctiveness' (Kong et al. 2015, p. 7). Indeed, Singapore as a city-state has transformed its cultural landscape over the last 10 years or so with the development of theatres, museums and art galleries, which together with the property develop-

ment along the Marina Bay area, including the stunning architecture of the Marina Bay Sands Hotel and the Botanical Gardens, have become highlights of Singapore tourism. Seoul, Beijing, Shanghai and Taipei are also prime examples of this strategy. Southeast Asian metropolises such as Bangkok, Kuala Lumpur and Jakarta, which already have an increasing number of high-rise buildings for offices and international luxury hotels, have not yet started to make massive investments in cultural facilities as they still lack highly developed public transport systems, but it will not be long before we see flagship cultural facilities crop up in those places, too.

'Culturalisation' of city economies and landscapes obviously has had impacts on the capacity of cultural consumption as more venues are available and programming more varied and larger in number, which in turn have positively promoted cultural flows in Asia. The new cultural strategies of cities have also influenced the capacities of cultural production, as more creators and artists are drawn to those places where creative activities are encouraged and artistic inspirations and exchanges are more frequent than they would be in remote, isolated places in rural areas. Observing cultural policy at the city level is useful since it encourages us to consider not only the importance of urban dwellers in transnational cultural consumption, which was a key theme in many existing writings on Asian cultural flows, but also the flow of creative talents and ideas within and between cities as cultural clusters.

Nation Branding and Cultural Diplomacy

An extension of these urban strategies of cultural development to the national level is nation branding. Together with the purpose of improving foreign relations and elevating the country's status in international society, culture is seen as playing an important role in public diplomacy (as opposed to formal negotiations between diplomats and top-level politicians). This is a relatively new but popular topic in cultural policy research as the practice of nation branding has rapidly spread over the world. Nation branding is not only for the purpose of external relations and export improvement but also for the reconstruction and redefinition of internal, national identities. There is abundant literature on place branding with 'how-to' papers and books normatively written by branding consultants, but a different strand of literature is emerging that focuses on critical analysis of place branding and basically views this practice as the commercialisation of national identity (e.g. Aronczyk 2013; Jansen 2008). There is also a criticism that nation branding obscures domestic problems and issues that nations must tackle and instead simplifies and overemphasises the country's culture, history and other offerings that are marketable to tourists, investors and consumers. Just like urban cultural investment, strategies have been proposed by international consultants, with the same format being emulated and recycled. Nation branding is mostly outsourced to a handful of international consultants (many of whom are based in London) and repeat the same mechanical procedure for each client country.

It is beyond doubt that cultural flows in Asia in recent decades have greatly contributed to the brands of the nations where cultural production originates. As Kawashima and Gonzalez detail in their chapters in this book, even Japan, with basically has little interest in cultural policy per se, has started a Cool Japan strategy, in which a nation branding process was consciously undertaken (by a committee whose members were nominated by the Cabinet Office of the Japanese government, rather than outside consultants, which was probably due to budgetary constraints rather than out of genuine commitment to the exercise). For South Korea, too, branding went hand in hand with its creative industry policy to help K-Pop enjoy further success and at the same time contribute to the nation's economic success. In both cases, culture is expected to contribute to economic gains as foreign consumers interested in cultural products from abroad will also naturally feel familiar with industrial products from the same countries or would like to visit the countries. However, it is very difficult to firmly establish a causal relationship in this scenario and show quantitative evidence to support these economic claims.

The negative effects of nation branding identified by critical researchers are exactly the type of concerns raised by cultural policy researchers, too, as national identities can be distorted in the resultant brand image portrayed for marketing and diplomatic purposes. A major goal of cultural policy has always been national identity building. This purpose is explicit in countries like Singapore and Taiwan that have mixed ethnicities within their populations and in the former colonies of Japan in Asia where new national leaders had to assert their cultural distinctiveness. Implicitly, too, national identity is constantly redefined and reaffirmed through various nation branding initiatives and tourism campaigns where discourse on the distinctiveness of culture and way of life of the given society is expressed and articulated. In this process, it is not only popular culture such as TV, film and pop music but also folklore festivals, heritage and cultural properties, crafts and skills that support the continuation of tradition. Various aspects of traditional culture and lifestyle—costumes, housing, cuisine—are reimagined from a 'branding' perspective and valorised for tourism and development of the local economy, while those lacking commercial potential are left on the verge of extinction. Cultural policy research is largely critical of such commercialisation of culture and the over-representation of sellable or exportable culture.

Cultural exchange projects undertaken, for example, by the British Council and similar organisations funded by governments for the purpose of advancing mutual understanding, do not always have the goal of nation branding, but such activities may be within the purview of cultural diplomacy. This is a topic that is gaining more attention in cultural policy research in recent years, leading the International Journal of Cultural Policy, which publishes five issues per year, to add one special issue each year specifically focused on this topic. The literature is still emerging in this area, and existing research tends to focus on historical case studies, sometimes focused on the years prior to or during World War II. This is understandable because it is actually in the early and mid-twentieth century that international propaganda was most demanded and frequently implemented, whereas today cultural exchange and flows are driven by private actors and market forces and less explicit. The extent

to which intercultural understanding is advanced by cultural diplomacy is also very difficult to establish in today's globalised world where a vast amount of information flows through a myriad of routes. This is the interest that cultural policy research and the existing research on cultural flows in Asia from the critical media/communication study perspective seem to share, but it looks to us that both disciplinary traditions are still in their early stages of development on this topic. More attention needs to be paid to who benefits from constructing a national identity, which is malleable and flexible, and what effects a reconfirmed identity brings to relevant parties such as domestic audiences and local cultural producers in economic, social and communicative terms.

Organisation of the Book

Having outlined these major concerns of cultural policy research that have implications on cultural flows in Asia specifically, this volume is organised in three parts. Part 1 focuses on the main perspective we employ for this book: national and local governments' cultural policies. Chapter 1 by Jin on South Korea discusses new cultural policies that respond to social media, which is a new technology of communication widespread in global society. There have been differing views, misunderstandings and one-sided explanations on the spread of K-Pop in the existing literature: there is one camp that emphasises the Korean government's investment in the creative industries and the support for export in particular, whereas the other argues it has been more industry-led and that the government's role was minimal. It seems that a reconciliation or convergence of the two theories is most reasonable when different degrees of importance are placed on government policy when looking at the situation chronologically. Initially, for Hallyu 1.0, the industry was the major player, but later in Hallyu 2.0 when K-pop music and television drama spread to Southeast Asia and beyond Asia, in particular, the governmental role had become substantial.

Jin's chapter identifies the most contemporary and influential factor for cultural flows in Asia and beyond—social media, whose spread has been accelerated by the availability of smartphones and its uptake by younger generations worldwide. This situation actually contrasts with the decline of J-Pop music and Japanese television drama in Southeast Asia, as the Japanese entertainment and media industries still resist the forces of the social media and adhere to traditional distribution methods (Parc and Kawashima 2018). Japanese rights holders for television dramas and films for theatrical release have difficulty selling their products overseas, as the Japanese 'neighbouring rights' (i.e. the rights of performers as opposed to those of authors in copyright law) require that producers obtain consent for online distribution from each performer appearing in the work. In the meantime, buyers of cultural products turn to Korean ones for which they can more easily obtain rights to broadcast and distribute online in one deal.

Chapters 2 and 3 are on Japan, starting with Kawashima on national cultural policy, followed by Gonzalez on the cultural policies of the Tokyo Metropolitan Government. As has been mentioned in this introduction, Japanese cultural policy is traditionally minimalist, but the Cool Japan strategy, involving a large number of central ministries and governmental agencies, has been implemented in the recognition of the economic potential of the pop culture of Japan. Kawashima traces the development of this policy and examines its substance and effectiveness as an economic policy. Given the minimalist nature of cultural policy in Japan, Tokyo does not boast newly built iconic buildings and facilities for culture. Even with a financial size that approximates that of some small European countries, Tokyo has not laid out any ambitious plans and strategies for cultural policy so far. With the approach of the Tokyo Olympics and Paralympics Games to be held in 2020, however, the city is well aware that this mega event would provide an unprecedented opportunity for place branding aimed at global businesses and citizens. Despite the need for Tokyo's cultural policy leading to 2020 and beyond to advance mutual understanding in a global society, the chapter argues that the city branding policy seems unidirectional, particularly vis-à-vis its Asian neighbours.

Chapter 4 by Lim looks at the explicitly restrictive aspect of cultural policy, namely, censorship in Singapore and Hong Kong, with particular attention paid to mass media reporting. The development of ICT over the years has enabled citizens of these cities to access a variety of unmediated news and information, which is also the very reason for the enhanced control exercised over the media by the governments. Lim argues that the ways in which current affairs are reported and past events are archived and presented create the narratives of politics and culture and affect the formation of cultural identities and memories in Singapore and China. The degree to which governments can retain control is, however, unknown, and it is possible to predict how this control might be disrupted with recent and future technologies accelerating flows of information and culture in Asia.

Part I finishes with another chapter on South Korea by Lee. Although the existing literature on cultural flows in Asia discusses Korea as a sender of pop culture, this chapter examines Koreans as the recipient of other cultures in Asia. In this case, the transmission occurs in the real-world settings of transnational tourism that is sometimes linked to the Korean Wave and Asian immigration. Korean government policy on this seems divided between the transnational (commercially driven Korean Wave and tourism) and the multicultural (social integration of marriage immigrants and their families). The consequence is a lack of reflexive, cross-cultural dialogue 'inside' the country. This can also be viewed as an indicator of the disjunction in cultural regionalisation itself, between the flow of media content and the flow of people.

Part II turns to the strategies of the creative industries themselves, not only because they are key players in the cultural flows in Asia but also because they are key objects of the cultural policies developed in recent decades. Chapter 6 by Chu in fact acts as a bridge between Parts I and II, as her examination of museum exhibition export and import in Taiwan reveals the important roles played both by the private and public sectors. Her findings indicate that the inflow and outflow of exhi-

bitions relies on different actors. It is private companies such as newspaper publishers that act as the major sponsor and operator of projects that bring blockbuster exhibitions to Taiwan. For export of major exhibitions from Taiwan, it is the Taiwanese government that actively promotes the projects as part of its cultural diplomacy efforts so as to obtain a legitimate position in the international community.

Chapter 7 by Crane examines film export and import by taking an empirical approach that uses quantitative data, a feature that distinguishes this volume from most of the cultural studies literature. Using a comparative perspective, another feature this book proudly presents, she examines box office rankings and the countries of origin of hit films within the Asian region in comparison to that within the European region and argues that cultural flow is almost non-existent both within Europe and within Asia. One of the possible explanations noted by Crane is that unlike TV dramas, films cannot be adapted to local audiences (unless remade). The extent to which the conclusion of this chapter based on the examination of hit films is applicable to other sectors of culture may be debatable, inviting further research with a wider scope of examination.

Chapter 8 by Yecies and Keane takes up this issue by arguing that cultural flows happen through technological and skill transfer in international collaborations rather than through the finished content of film and TV co-production. They describe the recent developments in the collaboration between South Korea and China in co-production projects of audiovisual products, through which professionals exchange creative ideas while film craft and story-telling skills are transferred from Korea to China. The main argument of Chap. 8 is further elaborated in Chap. 9 by Lai, who provides a case study of a specific individual who has actively pursued the regionalisation of Taiwanese media products, exploring practical strategies to make media products denationalised and regionally appealing. The Taiwanese film director Tsai Yeuh-hsun, in adapting dramas that originated in Japan and South Korea, has been successful in creating regionally oriented productions, through which political elements have gradually been erased to appeal to the consumers and governments of different countries.

Finally, Part III focuses on the consumers' demand for, and engagement with, cultural products of various origins. Chapter 10 by Jirattikorn, like the last chapter of Part II, also focuses on TV drama adaptation. 'Full House', a popular Korean TV drama, was adapted in Thailand as 'Full House Thai', through which Thai-isation was undertaken not only by using local actors and actresses but also by aligning the content with Thai culture. The Thai version was then exported to Vietnam and other countries in Asia. Jirattikorn's analysis of the Vietnamese viewership of this drama reveals how audiences translate and interpret the text and how remaking the drama allows domestication, indigenisation and target-orientation. In this way, the chapter examines the same phenomenon—TV adaptation and remake across countries in Asia—through consumers' engagement with the product as opposed to the producers' strategy (as is seen in Chap. 9).

Chapter 11 by Turner furthers the examination of viewers and audiences but goes deeper to the area of 'fandom', which may well be a discrete area of research within

popular culture studies. The author undertakes a case study of an online fan site for *yaoi* (a specific genre of Japanese manga), where fans communicate and exchange information and opinions on Japanese culture, which defines the context of their beloved manga works. Through conversations and discussions online, Turner argues, fans develop their knowledge of Japan and Japanese way of life, both real and imagined, with this knowledge also functioning as a type of cultural capital sought after in this fandom.

Chapter 12 by Kist and Verboord, which is similar in nature to Chap. 7, uses an empirical and quantitative approach to examine music video circulation. Also, like Chap. 7, it takes a comparative perspective by looking at the Asian and European regions. Few would object to the authors' assumption that YouTube plays a major role in the globalisation of pop music today. Examining YouTube's music video charts, and particularly the transnational music flows in the Asian and European regions, the authors find that digital media has a modest, rather than dramatic, impact of music flows. However, the success of South Korea found in the Asian YouTube charts is apparent, whereas Japan, despite its large domestic market that is the second in the world, shows only a minimal presence overseas. The issues of 'cultural distance' and 'cultural proximity' have been discussed in the literature on cultural export and homogenisation, but this chapter's contribution is distinct as an examination of music popularity online, particularly in how music is boosted by social media and smartphones, which is resonant with the argument of Chap. 1.

The final chapter by Huang also takes an empirical approach to examine Taiwanese perceptions of Japan and South Korea from 1951 to 2015, as reflected in mass media reporting. The media discourse about the two countries in Taiwan, Huang argues, actually reflects Taiwan's position relative to them respectively. Political relations and economic competition with the two countries vis-à-vis Taiwan are much reflected, even though the inflows of their cultures to Taiwan are generally well received. Therefore, she indicates that transnational cultural flows should be discussed within the broader political, socioeconomic and diplomatic environments of the countries involved. What is clear is that cultural flows can enhance mutual understanding between countries but that resistance may occur, depending on the local context of the time.

Thus, although we divide the chapters into three parts, there are arguments and perspectives in common and in resonance throughout the whole volume. In addition to the distinctive perspective of cultural policy and research, we are pleased to present some discussions on relatively less well-known examples and facts of transnational cultural flows in Asia such as the adaptation of Full House Thai, *yaoi* fan communities and Asian migration into South Korea. However, Asia is a huge, diverse and fast-developing region; we admit that one volume cannot do justice to the vast range of recent developments occurring in cultural production, circulation and consumption in this region. We conclude this introduction by again stating our belief that further collaboration between scholars on and in Asian countries should be advanced.

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Part I
Governments and Cultural Flows: National Cultural Policies and Urban Strategies

Chapter 1
The Korean Government's New Cultural Policy in the Age of Social Media

Dal Yong Jin

Abstract The Korean wave has recently changed the way of cultural flows in conjunction with social media. While the Korean cultural industries have continued to export their cultural products, the rise of social media has fundamentally reshaped the nature of the *Hallyu* phenomenon among global fans. Many global fans consume Korean popular culture through social media such as YouTube, Facebook, and Instagram in the 2010s. While cultural policy has not solely focused on social media, the Korean government has advanced several key policy measures in advancing *Hallyu* in many parts of the world in the age of social media. It documents the recent development characterizing the Korean wave in tandem with the cultural industries in the age of social media. It discusses the increasing role of social media and changing media consumption habits in the Korean wave transition and the Korean cultural policy's active responses to it. In doing so, it investigates the roles the nation-state can play in this shifting new media-led cultural market environment.

Keywords Korean wave · Hallyu · Cultural policy · Korean cultural industries · Nation-state · Cultural flow

1 Introduction

In the early twenty-first century, social media has played a key role in disseminating the popular culture of both Western countries and non-Western countries. Local popular cultures produced by cultural producers and corporations in non-Western countries, including South Korea (hereafter Korea), are especially benefiting from the rise of social media, because global fans of popular culture have been enjoying locally-produced popular cultures, including music, television dramas, and films on

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various social media, such as YouTube, Facebook, and Viki., Consequently, the emergence of social media indicates one of the most significant breakthroughs in both dissemination and consumption in popular culture.

Previously, there were certainly significant networks, including broadcasting, for people to enjoy cultural products, and "the relationship between culture and networks" has been crucial in the dissemination of popular culture (Arora 2012, 601). However, in the 2010s, social media as a new form of network has played a major role in creating the nexus between culture and networks. As "culture has shifted in being viewed as national character, value and identity to that which is local practice, discourse and meaning, network has also evolved in its meaning from stable and static systems causing action to structures that are dynamic, negotiating and culturally embedded" (Arora 2012, 601). Therefore, investigations of social networks have been conducted in relation to the culture (Lopez 2003, cited in Arora 2012).

As Huat and Jung (2014, 417) point out, the new network, of course in this case social media, is rather unique because "newly arisen grassroots-led bottom-up distribution through social media networks has played a significant role in the rapid rise of transnational flows of information, images, sounds, symbols and ideas." People around the world easily and massively access social media, such as social network sites (SNSs) and user-generated content (UGC) sharing sites (e.g., YouTube) on PC or smartphones, to relish global popular culture. Although social media does not totally replace the traditional form of cultural flow on old networks, as a type of export and import of cultural materials, it has certainly supplemented the latter, and therefore, global audiences now enjoy quick and easy access to popular culture coming from other countries, both Western and non-Western. This new cultural distribution paradigm "enables once marginalized pop content like Asian popular cultures to easily cross national boundaries" (Huat and Jung 2014, 417–418).

Most of all, the Korean wave (*Hallyu* in Korean), symbolizing the sudden growth of the Korean cultural industries and the penetration of Korea's popular culture in terms of audio-visual and digital cultures in the Asian cultural markets, followed by Western cultural markets, has recently changed the way of cultural flows in conjunction with social media (Kim 2013; Jung and Shim 2014; Lee and Nornes 2015; Jin 2016). While the Korean cultural industries have continued to export their cultural products, such as television dramas, films, and digital games, the rise of social media has fundamentally reshaped the nature of the *Hallyu* phenomenon among global fans. Indeed, we have seen many global fans consuming Korean popular culture through social media such as YouTube, Facebook, and Instagram in the 2010s (Jung 2011; Jung and Shim 2014; Jin and Yoon 2016).

The above phenomenon helps us understand new possibilities and strategies of cultural policy of the nation-state. While cultural policy has not solely focused on social media, the Korean government has certainly advanced several key policy measures in advancing *Hallyu* in many parts of the world in the age of social media.

This chapter documents the recent development characterizing the Korean wave in tandem with the cultural industries in the age of social media. It especially discusses the increasing role of social media and changing media consumption habits in the Korean wave transition and the Korean cultural policy's active

responses to it. In doing so, the chapter investigates the roles the nation-state can play in this shifting new media-led cultural market environment. Through a case study of the newly emerging policy in this area, the chapter sheds light on the complex nature of neoliberal cultural policy, where neoliberal agendas such as economic discourse of culture are closely tied to the active intervention of the state in the affairs of culture.

2 Dynamics of the Nation-States and the Cultural Industries amid Neoliberal Reforms

Over the past several decades, state cultural policy on the cultural industries and global flows of cultural products have been mainly concerned with fostering and supporting the production of television dramas, documentaries, feature films, and other forms of audiovisual content like music by domestic producers. Two main thrusts to this type of policy making globally have existed. "The first has been support for production—either through direct government funding or through tax incentives aiding the production of individual television programs and films. Second, a complementary regulatory thrust has typically mandated levels and varieties of local content and encouraged production by companies independent of major broadcasters" (O'Regan and Goldsmith 2006, 68). Similarly, screen quota and program quota have been key policy tools in this area.

However, since the mid-1990s, the global trade in cultural goods and services has been influenced by neoliberal globalization and new media technologies, namely digital technologies. Many countries around the world have experienced neoliberal reforms, including liberalization of their cultural industries, and consequently cross-border consumption of cultural products has rapidly increased in the global cultural markets. This means that cultural policy partially, if not entirely, ceased to have the attention of governments in the way it once did over the latter part of the 1990s. As Bennett (1995) argued, cultural policy and subsidy was previously justified within the context of national cultural identity and social welfare. However, as neoliberal globalization has emerged, cultural policy has much shifted, changing the focus of attention away from cultural policies themselves toward the context within which they exist. In other words, cultural policy does not operate in isolation from broader pressures within our contemporary society, and we need to understand socio-economic and political environments surrounding the development of cultural policies within particular times (Gray 1996; 2007, 205). In this regard, O'Regan and Goldsmith (2006, 70) claim;

> long-established government commitments to the direct and indirect support of cultural production have come under pressure as governments seek to come to terms with changing market conditions and new priorities for the allocation of state revenues. Whereas governmental attention is focused on "reducing the size of government" (in reality, allocating the funds "saved" elsewhere to new initiatives), the funds available for cultural policy and

therefore film policy have become increasingly contingent on the capacity of recipients to attract finance from the private sector and to deliver commercially successful outcomes.

In the midst of neoliberal globalization, many nation-states have to reduce their roles as major players in the realm of cultural flows. As Friedman (1982, 2–3) clearly pointed out, "the foundation of neoliberalism is the creation of policies that maximize the role of markets and profit making while minimizing the role of non-market institutions, through deregulation and privatization, the government's power must be limited while the private companies operate their maximum freedom in a free market." This ideological trend of neoliberalism that has swept over most of the world in the last two decades has had a substantial impact on cultural policies (Jin 2016).

Many countries, including Korea, have no choice but to develop neoliberal cultural policies demanded by global forces, in particular, the U.S. and international governance systems, including the WTO (World Trade Organization) and the IMF (International Monetary Fund), focusing on limited government interventions in the cultural industries and global trade. Neoliberalism is a political ideology as well as an economic practice (Friedman 1982; McChesney 2008), where the role of the government in the realm of culture is expected to significantly decrease.

In addition, the increasing role of digital media and now social media has potentially reduced the fundamental function of the government as Ohmae (1995) already pointed out, because the well-informed citizens of a global marketplace would not wait passively until nation states deliver tangible movements in the lifestyle. In other words, citizens get enough information for their own life from digital media/social media, and therefore, they do act properly in several dimensions, resulting in the decreasing role of the government. For example, in domestic politics, citizens are increasingly organizing rallies and petitions after having enough information and knowledge through social media in order to influence government affairs. The increasing use of social media in the realm of popular culture also implies that cultural flow and consumption today can go easily beyond the existing framework of government policy and regulation.

In opposition to those common expectations, the Korean government has developed its distinguishable, expansionist cultural policies. Although it is not directly related to the enhancement of cultural diversity, the Korean government has advanced substantive supports to the country's cultural industries and their competition in the global cultural trade, primarily through both legal and financial arms. The Korean government since the mid-1990s has deregulated the cultural industries based on its neoliberal norms; however, it has, either directly or indirectly, supported the cultural sector, making *Hallyu* into a showcase window display that policy makers and media scholars need to carefully analyze when it comes to the changing role of the government (Jin 2016). Korea, "which was once a representative East Asian developmental state," has continued to pursue state-interventionism in the realm of popular culture (Heo 2015, 351).

In more recent years, the Korean government has especially developed new cultural policies in order to reflect the rapid growth of digital media and/or social

media, including policy measures related to copyright and online piracy issues, while establishing several financial supporting mechanisms to support the Korean wave. The shift in the nation state's cultural policy corresponding to the rise of social media has become one of the major influences to the growth of *Hallyu*.

3 Possibilities of Contra Flows in Popular Culture

Korea has rapidly increased its exports of cultural products since the late 1990s. It started to export television dramas to a few Asian countries, followed by films and popular music, which propelled the dramatic growth of the Korean wave tradition in Asia. Starting in the mid-2000s, the Korean cultural industries have penetrated several parts of the world, including Western Europe, North America, and Latin America, while expanding the range of their cultural forms, such as online games, mobile games, and animation. While several Asian countries, including China and Japan, are still the largest cultural markets for Korean products, fans around the world have recently received Korean popular culture through both traditional media and social media. Consequently, between 1998—the very early stage of the Korean wave—and 2014, the exports of Korean cultural products, including broadcasting, movies, animation, music, games, characters, and manga, increased by as much as 22.75 times, from $188.9 million in 1998 to $4,299 million in 2014 (Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism 2016). In particular, Korean popular music has exponentially increased its global penetration in recent years. Between 2000 and 2008, the exports of music increased only 107%, but between 2008 and 2014, it was by as much as 20 times, from $16.4 million in 2008 to $335 million in 2014, which was remarkable, partially because of global fans who love K-pop via social media (Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism 2016). For example, once global fans started enjoying K-pop, they become avid audiences of music events held in many parts of the world, which boosted the rise of the exports of Korean popular music. Korea has eventually made a global sensation with several cultural forms, as many fans throughout the world love Korean popular culture.

Interestingly enough, the nature of cultural flows has changed partially because social media has become the new outlet of popular culture. As was briefly explained, global fans of popular culture previously enjoyed films, television programs, Webtoons (web comics in the U.S.), and music by either purchasing DVDs and CDs or watching them on traditional media, including television and on screen, yet now enjoy popular culture from other countries on social media with no material possession.

More specifically, the nascent growth of *Hallyu* has been made possible primarily because of global fans' increasing access to K-pop and television dramas via social media. Korea's reality shows, including *Running Man* and *Super Star K*, have been shared among overseas fans, young people in particular, on social media in the form of short video clips (Yoon and Jin 2016). K-pop has been popular in Asia, but fans in Latin America, North America, and Europe also enjoy K-pop, as social media such as YouTube has become a major outlet in the 2010s. K-pop has become one of

the most dynamically distributed forms of pop culture in the global pop market, meaning K-pop has become widely circulated through new media platforms such as fan blogs, user-generated content platforms, peer-to-peer (P2P) file-sharing websites and social networking services (SNS) (Jung and Shim 2014). As the case of Psy's globally popularized K-pop song, *Gangnam Style*, exemplifies, what is important is that social media has become an integral element of global cultural flows.

Major entertainment powerhouses have also made great use of social media. SM Entertainment, Korea's largest entertainment agency, for example, opened its official YouTube page in 2009 to provide diverse music and visual content created by their own stars to their global fans. As of September 2013, about 3.6 million people subscribed to the page (Chung 2013). YG Entertainment, the second largest agency, also jumped on the social media bandwagon. Iconic K-pop star G-dragon opened an account on Weibo in 2013, a Chinese version of Twitter, with his followers exceeding 600,000 (Chung 2013). *Hallyu* had long conquered Asia, but before the proliferation of global social networks, attempts by K-pop stars to break into Western markets, including the U.S., had largely failed. However, social media has made it easier for K-pop idol groups to reach a wider audience in the West, and those fans are turning to the same social networking tools to proclaim their devotion. When several famous idol groups like 2NE1, Super Junior and Girls' Generation hold concerts in Europe and the U. S., fans use social media to organize flash mobs demanding more shows (Choe and Russell 2012).

Social network sites have also become some of the most significant outlets for both mobile games and social images, as game developers and publishers have shifted their focus from online to mobile and social games. As Facebook itself has announced, more than 250 million people play games on Facebook.com and Facebook-connected mobile games every month (Facebook for Developers 2016). As such social media have changed the form of digital games and the so-called 'social games' on SNSs became a new trend in the global games industry in the 2010s.

Of course, instead of supplanting the old top-down (industrial expert-base) model, this new form of bottom-up (grassroots-base) model supplements the former (Hartley 2009a). In short, today's cultural distribution is based on a mixture of bottom-up grassroots-led approaches and mainstream media-centered top-down approaches (Jenkins 2006, cited in Huat and Jung 2014). "Social networks are a valuable adaptive mechanism," (Hartley 2009b , 64) and it is composed largely of social networks that are "hybridized mechanisms of macro-scale of populations and systems and micro-scale individual choices" (Hartley 2009a; Huat and Jung 2014, 417), causing new challenges and opportunities for cultural industries and policy makers. As will be discussed later, this new form of distribution has been the result of new cultural policies emphasizing the role of the government utilizing social media in the midst of neoliberal globalization.

4 New Cultural Policies in the Age of Social Media

A paradigm shift in cultural policy has been detected in the styles and contents of popular culture in Korea since the 1990s. Until the early 1990s, Korean popular songs were heavily censored by the government in the name of upholding morals and preventing political agitation under the military regime (Yang 2007). However, the loosening censorship under the newly elected civilian government starting in 1993 influenced the change in styles and lyrics. Right after the 1997 financial crisis, K-pop again rapidly changed. K-pop musicians in the late 1990s showed a much different direction for the Korean music industry.

Although the Korean wave started in the late 1990s, the Korean government's role in supporting pop music was limited in the pre-social media era; however, as several forms of social media started to become available around 2004–2007, the Korean government began considering the increasing role of the social media, and thereafter, introducing relevant policy measures. Starting in the mid-2000s, as social media has acted as a new platform for global cultural dissemination, the governments and cultural industries corporations have been developing new policies and corporate strategies respectively to adjust to the changing media environment.

In particular, when the Lee Myung-bak government (2008–2013) developed cultural policy to support the cultural industries, it focused on the convergence of popular culture and digital technologies, and later social media. The Lee government applied neoliberal ideologies and practices in most areas, including its economic policy in general and the same approach was adopted for policies on the information and communication technology (ICT) sector and cultural industries. The government supported the cultural industries due to their significance to the national economy in the early twenty-first century, furthering the marketization of culture through its cultural policies (Jin 2016). As briefly explained in a previous section, the Lee government developed a clear policy measure to deal with rampant piracy in Asian countries.

Most of all, the Lee government supported the development of "smart contents" given the rapid growth of smartphones and social networking sites. It believed that timely investment was significant in order to help Korean cultural industries gain global competitiveness. As part of its plan, the government announced its project to select a few consortiums and to provide financial supports of up to $5 million when smart gadgets producers, service companies, and content producers work together to create smart content (Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism 2010). The government also secured $2 million to support application creators who develop mobile contents, and decided to support the game industry with $11.5 million in 2011 in order to nurture 100 game corporations (Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism 2010). The Contents Industry Promotion Committee (2011), which was established in 2011, decided to have contracts with a handful of global platforms to support the global service, localization, and marketing of Korean contents, as social media/digital technologies have continued to grow to be major outlets. The Lee government consistently supported and guided the Korean contents industries. In doing so, it

expanded its state-intervention in the cultural industries not for the traditional goals such as the promotion of national identity and national cultural expressions but for economic imperatives.

The Lee government especially intensified its own capacity to meet the rapidly changing digital and/or social media-driven media environment. In its 'Major Business Plan of 2012,' for example, it expanded its strategic investment in the realm of new content areas that social networking sites are driving (Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism 2011). The plan itself was not yet matured; however, it at least showed that the government started to plan to develop its cultural policy relevant to social media.

Meanwhile, the Park Geun-hye government has continued to develop its hands-on policy for the Korean wave in that it acknowledges and supports the cultural industries. At the world economic forum annual meeting 2014, for example, she emphasized the significance of social media for the Korean wave:

> Culture has the power to connect people of different languages and different backgrounds. The world is coming closer together as economic, social, cultural and other barriers are ebbing away. We see how the culture of one nation is no longer confined to that country alone. It is increasingly being shared and enjoyed beyond borders. We use the expression Korean Wave to describe the widespread enthusiasm for Korean culture. Today, that wave is spreading rapidly across the globe. When Korean music recently paired up with YouTube, it became a global sensation. K-POP, Korean dramas and films are being greeted here and there and creating new added value. When the cultural values of each country are brought together with IT technology, the possibilities for generating greater added value become truly limitless. (Park 2014)

What President Park understood was that Korea's cultural industries corporations are welcomed around the world because they have successfully combined various cultural contents with new technology (Park 2014). Under this circumstance, the Park Geun-hye government planned to develop K-Platform, Global Webtoon Platform, and Global Game Platform to advance the Korean wave boom in the global markets. The Park government also developed a plan to establish a Korean wave map by analyzing the cultural industries via a big data model in order to provide designed information to cultural corporations (Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism 2015b).

As mobile and social games are increasingly significant in the global game markets, the Korean government and relevant agencies alongside game corporations have developed new supporting measures and strategies. The Korea Creative Content Agency has expanded its support to the game industry. One of the major policies in the game sector has been the establishment of the game global service platform (GSP), which focuses on the global promotion of game content by small- and medium-sized companies. As several global social networking sites, including Facebook, have functioned as a social game platform, "small game publishers and designers cannot compete with them in the global markets; therefore, one of the major strategies for KOCCA has been the installment of servers in the geographic locations in Britain, Germany, Russia, Singapore, Japan, and the U.S. that allow gamers in these regions to access Korean games" (Chung 2015, 500). In 2016 alone,

KOCCA allocated $40 million dollars to support the game industry, including the expansion of the global service platforms (Lim 2016).

Overall, since 2008, Korea's cultural industries, including the broadcasting and game sectors, have significantly changed their business strategies in the midst of the growth of social media. For example, online game corporations have changed their global strategies. Instead of establishing foreign subsidiaries, they have begun to install global platforms as Facebook and Twitter select. They locate the global service platform in Korea and provide game services to difference countries after changing languages.

5 Social Media Drives Changes to Cultural Policy in the Korean Wave Tradition

While there are several major cultural policies that drive the growth of the Korean wave, copyright-related issues have become some of the most significant mechanisms. Korea has continued to increase its exports of local popular culture with an expectation of gaining more financial benefits. But this has not happened due to the rampant piracy in several Asian countries. The nascent penetration of Korean popular culture in the global markets relies on accessibility, which means that global fans of the Korean wave access all kinds of social media to enjoy Korea popular culture. Unfortunately for the cultural industries corporations, this new media environment provokes unexpected negativities (Jin 2015).

In this respect, the Korean government has developed two different approaches which conflict with each other, but work anyhow. Most of all, it has created some policy measures to reduce piracy, which it believes hurts not only economic benefits but also cultural creativity. The government acknowledges that there are less dependable legal systems in several Asian countries, including China and Taiwan (Korea Creative Content Agency 2011), meaning that the revenue from the exploitation of copyright is not increasing despite the exponential growth of Korean cultural content online. Although it cannot be denied that the convergence of social media and K-pop has greatly developed the current boom of Korean popular music in many countries, piracy in Asia could damage the Korean cultural industries.

In fact, as social media has rapidly become part of people's cultural activities, the circulation of unauthorized copies of cultural products has changed. For example, with the rapid growth of smartphone use, people have illegally circulated cultural products via smart phone apps in the 2010s (Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism 2015a).

> In the Philippines alone, local television companies regularly buy licenses from Korean broadcasters for them to be able to air dubbed versions of Korea novelas. Local online game publishers also source most of their games from Korean game publishers. However, not all Korean creative content that is available in the local market is legitimate. Pirated copies of Korean dramas, music and games are also easily accessible to the public both offline and online. In general, "there is a very low level of IP consciousness and very low level of IP appreciation among Filipinos," Mark Herrin of the IP Office of the Philippines told the

> forum. The Philippines is moving to amend its copyright law to address this nagging piracy problem. (Estavillo 2012)

As such, digital piracy in the age of social media is one of the most significant elements holding back further growth of the legitimate penetration of culture in the global cultural markets, in particular in the Asian region. As the Korea Creative Contents Agency (KOCCA)—the main government body overseeing the development of cultural industries—points out (2011, 3), one of the most significant policy measures to advance *Hallyu* further is the cooperation between the government and cultural corporations to protect intellectual property. The government, therefore, initiates intergovernmental collaboration among Asian countries to protect intellectual property (IP) rights, while the cultural industries develop new business models to overcome the IP issues (Jin 2015).

More specifically, the government has developed a very unusual approach to the copyright issue, assuming that for many other parts of Asia, illegal downloads and pirated CDs are so pervasive that only a small minority are willing to pay up for the legal versions (*Associated Pres*s 2012b). The government along with the music industry have decided to tolerate people creating music parodies instead of regulating them. For example, when *Gangnam Style* was globally popular in 2012, the Korea Music Copyright Association gave up pursuing legal battles with music parody creators but allowed them to make and post them online in the name of 'fair use' so that these music parody videos would help the popularity of *Gangnam Style*. Obviously, *Gangnam Style*'s success does not depend on strict enforcement of copyrights. Quite on the contrary, "to a large degree the success relies on effectively waiving copyright enforcement with regard to both the distribution of the original video and the production and dissemination of parodies and remixes" (Governance across Borders 2012).

As *Gangnam Style* runs toward one billion views on YouTube, the first Asian pop artist to capture a massive global audience has gotten richer click by click. With one song, PSY has become a millionaire from YouTube ads and iTunes downloads, underlining a shift in how money is being made in the music business. In fact, this one viral video has clicked more than 880 million YouTube views since its July of 2012 release. PSY's official channel on YouTube, which curates his songs and videos of his concerts, has nearly 1.3 billion views as of December 2012. TubeMogul, a video ad buying platform, estimated that PSY and his agent YG Entertainment had raked in about $870,000 as their share of the revenue from ads that appear with YouTube videos (*Associated Press* 2012a). PSY and YG Entertainment also earn money from views of videos that parody his songs. Google as the owner of YouTube detects videos that use copyrighted content. Artists can have the video removed or allow it to stay online and share ad revenue with YouTube. In the final week of September when *Gangnam Style* had around 300 million views, more than 33,000 videos were identified by the content identification system as using *Gangnam Style* (*Associated Press* 2012b). With the global success of *Gangnam Style*, the heyday of K-pop, along with the country's other creative content, is proving to be far from over. It provided a good reason for Korea to bolster its copyright protection strategy,

particularly in countries where its cultural products exports are most popular and where copyright infringement is rampant (Estavillo 2012).

The Korean government has continued to develop several policy measures to protect the intellectual property of Korean popular culture in the global markets, in particular in Asia. The government and the Korea Copyright Commission have built copyright centers in several Asian countries, including China in 2006, Thailand in 2007, Philippines in 2011, and Vietnam in 2012, because these countries are major recipients for the Korean wave. The copyright centers protect copyright of domestic popular culture, while supporting the extension of legal trade of popular culture and digital technologies in these countries. They monitor digital and social media to find piracy and legally deal with relevant issues (Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism 2015a, b, 320). The Lee Myung-bak government especially intensified global copyright protection measures in several ways. In 2010, in order to better control illegal piracy in Asia, the government developed the illegal content obstruction program (ICOP) in several cultural sectors, including books and games, and intensified its monitoring of illegal circulation.[1] The government also established an intellection property portal site (http://www.ip-desk.or.kr/join/main.hcom) to provide necessary information of other countries' IP related information to domestic cultural industries corporations (Ministry of Culture, Sports, and Tourism 2010). It has made tangible investments to protect domestic and foreign copyrights, which are very significant changes in cultural policy in the age of social media.

In sum, although the Korean government, in particular, recent conservative governments have been attempting to apply neoliberal cultural policies, emphasizing a small government in the realm of culture, they have developed an effective government body dealing with almost all cultural sectors as part of their economic and export strategies. Driven by a new systematic export strategy that incorporates private corporations in the cultural industries and the government, the cultural penetration of Korean culture, including K-pop and digital games, has increased in many parts of the world (Jin 2016). The deepening globalization of culture appears to impose several significant constraints on certain kinds of national level cultural policies. But the restricting of the nation-state is well characterized by a significant change in its functions and internal structures rather than some absolute reduction in its role or responsibility (Lee and Hewison 2010). The neoliberal reforms in the Korean context, in particular in tandem with the cultural industries, do not imply the end of government intervention. They do not mean that the Korean government has entirely followed the neoliberal path. As seen from its support for the cultural industries and their global strategies in the age of social media, Korea's tradition of state-interventionism, which conflicts with neoliberalism, has continued at least in the field of cultural policy. That is, the Korean government cannot entirely give up its

[1] ICOP was started in 2008 as a system to monitor illegal music download, and it now comprehensively monitors film, broadcasting, publication, manhwa, and game. By using an automatic monitoring technique, ICOP asks for content deletion of illegally downloaded programs (Copyright Protection Center 2013).

crucial role in boosting the cultural sector, which it believes is a new driving force for both the national economy and cultural diplomacy.

6 Conclusion and Discussion

This chapter has discussed the changing role of cultural policy at the nation-state level in line with the rise of social media as a significant means of global cultural trade and flow. In the early twenty-first century, several elements have become driving forces to advance the Korean wave boom in the global markets, and social media certainly plays a key role here. Unlike the early stage of *Hallyu*, which relied on TV broadcasting or sales of CD/DVD, the recent expansion of *Hallyu* has been driven by social media.

As social network sites and user-generated content sites have become new outlets for Korean popular culture, cultural policy for the Korean government has shifted in order to adjust to a newly changing media environment. The government has developed several policy measures to both facilitate the exports of several cultural forms, including films, K-pop, and Webtoons and protect copyright. It has also promoted the images of the nation-state through social media, which consequently help the Korean cultural industries increases their global penetration. In particular, the recent conservative administrations certainly understand the role of social media in the global markets and devised necessary supporting mechanisms, both financially and legally. While the Korean government has continued to support the growth of the Korean wave in several ways, cultural policy in terms of legal supports relevant to social media has become a crucial element in the 2010s.

Shifting cultural policy in the Korean context asks us to reconsider the role of state cultural policy in the age of social media. Some proponents of globalization argue that nation-states have lost their supremacy as a meaningful unit in the realm of culture as in other fields. However, the Korean case shows the nation-state is more than capable to continues to either initiate or support the cultural sector, both the cultural industries and cultural flows, and the necessity of strategic state-level cultural policy has been intensified with the growth of social media. As Wu and Chan (2007) point out, contemporary cultural flows are more complex than many globalists, who claim a decreasing role of the government, suggest.

Korean cultural policy makers have learned that the national cultural industries have substantially grown when the government actively supports the development of the cultural sector. While neoliberal norms call for a small government in the realm of culture, the Korean government has taken a fundamental role because the cultural industries need supportive governmental intervention to grow as commodities (Jin 2016).

Under the neoliberal cultural policies that several administrations have primarily taken on, the role of the Korean government has been decreased in several areas and/or occasions. What is unique in the Korean wave context is that the government has unexpectedly intensified its leading role in the growth of the cultural industries

and the exports of popular culture and digital technologies. Korea has developed its state-led developmentalism since the early 1960s, and therefore, the Korean government cannot easily give up its trait (Heo 2015). The Korean wave illustrates that the government has reinforced its authority to cultural life. The Korean wave has become a global sensation in the middle of a coexistence of state-interventionism and neoliberalism over the past decade.

In particular, the recent governments have developed newly emerging areas of policy measures such as IP protection abroad and provision of global platforms for overseas consumers. This new direction has been made possible because the Korean government has emphasized the notion of 'contents' and/or 'creative industries' and thereafter, the 'creative economy', in which intellectual property is taking a major role. Under this circumstance, many cultural corporations have also developed global platforms to disseminate their content abroad directly via these platforms. This means that instead of only selling their cultural products, they advance new forms of revenue resources as global fans are shifting their consumption habits.

Of course, it is not dicey to admit that the Korean government has supported the cultural industries primarily because of commercial imperatives. In the Korean wave context, both social media and the intellectual property rights in the cultural industries are some of the primary resources for capital accumulation; therefore, the Korean government should develop its supporting policy measures to gain further capital gains through global trade. In the early twenty-first century, neoliberal cultural policy still continues; however, it never eradicates the significance of the nation-state, and instead, it drives the increasing role of the nation-state in the realm of popular culture in the case of Korea.

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Chapter 2
'Cool Japan' and Creative Industries: An Evaluation of Economic Policies for Popular Culture Industries in Japan

Nobuko Kawashima

Abstract 'Cool Japan' has been a cross-departmental policy agenda for Japanese government that has gained prominence over the last 10 years or so. Although the government has been reticent about cultural policy in general and particularly to East and Southeast Asia in post-war decades, attention has recently been given to the international popularity of Japanese popular culture such as manga and anime with policies aiming to cash in on what is named 'Cool Japan' phenomenon. Policy has been, however, patchy and disjointed. This paper will examine the background and emergence of this policy with industrial and economic aims, its recent transformation and impact on cultural flows in Asia. It will argue that whilst the government's policy for popular culture industries may not have led to significant results, it has done what it could legitimately do without riding on the bandwagon of the creative industries discourse that has swept across the rest of the world. The chapter will also stress the importance of the industries to broaden their regional perspectives.

Keywords Cultural policy · Japan · Cool Japan · Creative industries · Pop culture

1 Introduction

Recent decades have seen Japanese popular culture spread across the Asian region. Although the peak of this Japan boom may have been in the middle of the 2000s (Otmazgin 2011, 309, 2014, 323–324), animation (anime), comic books (manga), television programmes, video games, characters and fashion are still keenly consumed in major metropolitan cities in Asia such as Hong Kong, Seoul, Taipei, Singapore and Bangkok. This phenomenon has been brought to the attention of the Japanese government, leading it to launch policies, called the Cool Japan initiative, to promote popular culture abroad for diplomatic and economic aims.

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Not much, however, has been written on the actual content of the government's policy related to the cultural flow from Japan to Asia, even in academic articles written specifically on Cool Japan. Existing research on the flow of Japanese popular culture to Asia and beyond has had two focuses instead. Firstly, researchers, mostly from cultural studies, have discussed the content, imagery and narratives of Japanese cultural products and examined local consumers' responses to them, considering the implications for the local cultural identity and possibilities of the formation of a pan-Asian culture and cultural consumer identity (e.g. Iwabuchi 2004). Secondly, papers on Cool Japan have critically examined it as a form of cultural diplomacy and nation branding in relation to Japanese nationalism. For example, ethno-centric implications in the whole project have been pointed out by Daliot-Bul (2009) and Nakano (2008), whilst Iwabuchi (2015) argues that the superficiality of Cool Japan, not seriously engaging in cultural diversity within Japan, would not contribute to advancing mutual understanding between the Japanese and other nations in Asia.

Whilst their arguments are interesting and valuable, they have paid less attention to Cool Japan as an *economic* policy of the Japanese government. As the above scholars understand it, the ultimate purposes of Cool Japan may have been to improve foreign relations as well as the general image of Japan and the Japanese people and to enhance the brand value of the country. It is important to note, however, that Cool Japan has also aimed to increase the actual sales of products of popular culture industries abroad. In fact, it was the popularity of Japanese pop culture that triggered the whole Cool Japan project. As I will discuss later, the scope has since expanded, and the economic function these industries are expected to play has changed, but it still forms one of the cores of the whole strategy. Interestingly, however, few studies have attempted to connect Cool Japan and the spread of Japanese popular culture abroad to investigate the economic and industrial effectiveness of this government policy.

This chapter aims to contribute to filling these gaps in our knowledge and evaluate the policy of the Japanese government on these terms. Firstly, it will describe the Japanese government's policy development since the early 2000s for popular culture industries such as film, television programmes, music, animation (anime), manga and video games. It will then discuss the later stage of this policy development in the late 2000s, when gradually the government became disappointed with the economic performance of this sector: there was a discrepancy between the apparent popularity of Japanese culture and its foreign income generation. The chapter will discuss some of the reasons why export in monetary value has been limited. With the results of this investigation in Sects. 2, 3, and 4 the chapter will proceed to examine the content and direction of the Cool Japan strategy as an industrial and economic policy for popular culture industries.

The chapter will show that the consumer demand for Japanese popular culture in Asia has not produced much revenue for Japan, nor have the media and entertainment industries made sustained efforts to cash in on their popularity abroad. In other words, the economic policy of the Japanese government specifically targeting these industries does not seem to have been impressive in its results. The last section of the chapter will argue that this is inevitable, as the government can only legitimately

support the creative industries through a changed scenario and in a small way in an administrative structure that clearly distinguishes not-for-profit arts and commercial culture. The future depends much on whether the industry wakes up to become more outward-looking and targets the Asian market strategically.

2 The Development of Policy for the Popular Culture Industries—From METI to IPHQ

The introduction of this chapter has referred to the popularity of Japanese pop culture in Asia. One element that supports this popularity is the strength and sheer size of Japan's domestic market for these industries and the abundance of creative products that was not easily available in the emerging markets in Asia. By the early 2000s, the market size of the 'content industries' in Japan, including publishing, broadcasting, music, film, animation and video games, had grown to about 10 trillion yen (100 billion USD), second in the world only to that of the US (METI 2014, 376).[1] As a mature economy with highly developed relevant technologies, Japan has had a lively popular culture sector. Since the late 1990s to the early 2000s in particular, the economy of culture has advanced and expanded even more, stimulating growth in related sectors of the economy, such as toys and other merchandising, 'cosplay', theme parks and other attractions deriving from the characters of manga and anime. 'Content tourism', which fans of specific anime work engage in to explore the places related to or featured in their favourite works, has grown, whilst live concerts of anime songs have blossomed. Fashion and other aspects of street culture, created by Japanese young people, are no longer insubstantial in monetary value either. In short, the economy of popular culture has visibly increased during the period when Japan as a whole experienced an economic downturn after the 'bubble' of the late 1980s burst, which has continued to today.

The Japanese government did take note of this phenomenon, but popular, commercial sections of culture usually operate outside the domain of the conventional cultural policy framework in Japan, which is defined mostly by the Agency for Cultural Affairs (ACA) and cultural affairs departments of local authorities. There is little space to discuss Japanese cultural policy in depth in this chapter; interested readers should consult Gonzalez in this volume, and Kawashima (2015, 2014). To summarize briefly: cultural policy is generally conceived as a measure to correct market failure, and support is given to non-commercial arts and culture organizations, albeit in a limited way compared to other advanced nations (except the US, where private funding is highly developed). The budget of ACA is 0.1% of the total public expenditure of the central government (2016),[2] much of which goes to

[1] Throughout the paper USD equivalents given are simplified, with the exchange rate 100 yen for one US Dollar (it in fact is about 113 yen for a dollar at the time of writing), for indicative purposes as the rate fluctuates.

[2] The comparable figures of France and South Korea are about 1% for 2016 (ACA 2016).

heritage preservation and supporting national institutions of culture, such as museums and performing arts centres.

Commercial, popular cultural industries may in theory qualify as objects of economic and industrial policies, but these policies used to be mainly concerned with manufacturing and energy industries until the end of the twentieth century. From the beginning of the twenty-first century, however, with the decline in manufacturing competitiveness superseded by emerging economies in the world, the Japanese government belatedly started to pay more attention to services and other high value industries for economic growth. Thus, in the major restructuring of the central ministries and agencies undertaken in 2001, there-named Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI, previously the Ministry for the International Trade and Industry, MITI) set up a department dedicated to the cultural industries, within a larger unit for industries that produce services and non-tangible products. In addition to the long, official name, the newly created department was given the nickname 'The Media Content Industries Department', which caught the attention of the media as it symbolized the new direction the economic and industrial policy of the government seemed to be heading towards.

In the first few years after it was set up, the Media Content Industries Department undertook research to identify policy issues so as to help industrial growth. The insufficiency of finance for production was one barrier identified, particularly for small-to-medium sized content production companies (as opposed to distributors, which tend to be large oligopolists) across the media and entertainment industries. Compared to major studios in Hollywood, their Japanese counterparts had long suffered from the lack of finance by investors outside the industry. Another issue identified was the unequal relationship between production companies and content distributors such as broadcasters. Other policy areas highlighted include human resources; a particular problem that was pointed out is that there were too few good producers able to manage diverse talents for creative production whilst sticking to the budget and schedule set out to complete a project.

The METI annual report for 2003 (METI 2003) states that the year 2002/2003 marked the very beginning of the policy for the content industries as a pillar within a larger strategy of economic growth in the Japanese government (METI 2003, 390). These industries were acknowledged as one of the seven sectors that are potentially innovative and at the forefront of economic growth in a METI policy paper entitled Strategy of Creating New Industries (METI 2004). The importance given to them was then reflected in the larger governmental policy and strategy document released by the Cabinet Office in June 2004 (Cabinet Office 2004). The same year saw the implementation of legislation on the creation, distribution and use of 'contents' (i.e., media and other cultural products in digital format), underlining the importance of these industries and outlining the responsibilities carried by the public sector.

In parallel, the policy for the content industries was included in a larger governmental framework that aims to strengthen Japan as an Intellectual Property-based economy, set up in the Cabinet Office of the Prime Minister. In this cross-ministerial framework, the Intellectual Property Headquarters (IPHQ) was created with a close

connection to METI, which since has promoted policies to support the creation, protection and exploitation of IP rights such as patent, trademark, design as well as copyright. Policies have ranged from supporting research and development, strengthening legal structures for IP and its enforcement internationally, to encouraging industries to innovate with new digital technologies. Its annual plan has since referred to the content industries as an important asset of Japanese IP and a strong engine for economic development, and has done so for more than a decade now. Also to be noted is the setting up of special committees on specific topics for the content industries under the IPHQ for limited periods of time, including, for example, export, which has fed into METI policy development and given it an additional layer of authority.

Subsequent years have seen policy development at METI for the media and content industries, in particular in relation to their expansion into international markets. In 2007 a major policy document was released by an advisory council set up by METI, whose members included major industry figures, to announce the importance of the global strategy for these industries, which laid out detailed plans. According to this document, the Japanese media and content industries derive only 1.9% of their total income from abroad, whereas the US figure was 17.8% (METI 2007, 20). The US media and entertainment industries are of course no comparison, as they are the global giant producer of popular culture, but still, it was argued that the Japanese content was not fulfilling its potential to earn globally and that there was concern that its existing competitiveness might soon decline. Given the three threats and dangers identified for the Japanese content industry—firstly the prospective shrinkage of the domestic market because of an ageing population, secondly the exodus of talented creatives and producers from Japan but no movement vice versa, and thirdly the globally re-structured value chain caused partly by Hollywood's sourcing and outsourcing at different stages of content production and distribution—the paper proposed policy measures for globalization with a strong sense of urgency (METI 2007).

Thus, the Japanese government has in recent decades overall been active in promoting the popular culture industries in an unprecedented way. Cultural policy per se is not involved in this, but economic and industrial policies of the government led by METI have highlighted structural problems perceived to have been hindering industrial development. Such policies were incorporated in the broader, cross-ministerial policy framework of the central government, and embedded in the policies released by the Intellectual Property Headquarters of the Cabinet Office and the Economic and Fiscal Management Reform Committee of the Cabinet Office.

3 Export Expanded?

However, the expectations put upon these content industries turned out to be less promising in reality. To start with, the size of the industries in the domestic market had not grown as much as was expected. The credit crunch of 2008 which knocked

the global economy, combined with the mega earthquake that hit Eastern Japan in 2011, harmed the media and entertainment industries. Even excluding these macro-level factors beyond the control of the sector, the rapid development of the information and communication technologies, digitization of content and changes in media consumption have, like elsewhere, had profound implications for the sector as a whole and the publishing and music industries in particular.

More importantly, the export potential of Japanese pop culture has not materialized either. Apparently, popularity of content is one thing but earning from it is another, and the aforementioned report did already acknowledge the low level of export, except for the video games industry (METI 2007, 20), and the sales figures have not improved since then. It is difficult to pin down precisely how much the Japanese content industries are earning from export, as definitions and methodologies of data collection undertaken by different industry bodies vary, and the figures may well duplicate what is included or leave gaps. However, the available data strongly suggest the lack of income from abroad. The export value of television programmes from Japan, for instance, is estimated to have been merely 6.3–9.3 billion yen (63–93 million USD) per year between 2004 and 2011 (MIC 2013, 384). This includes all kinds of programmes for broadcasting, including anime, and both the licensing fees for broadcasting of the programme as well as format sales.[3] Even for Japanese animation, which once was anecdotally said to take up about 60% of air time in the world (METI 2003, 390), the economic performance from export has not been impressive (on average 20 billion yen, or 200 million USD per year since 2002, Association of Japanese Animations 2015). As will be explained later, the prevalence of unlawful copies in Asia may have negatively affected sales. In the US, too, there was a time when Japanese anime was very popular, but the number of anime titles broadcast in the US (excluding repeats) was estimated to be around 30 per year between 2003 and 2006, but was only 6 in 2013 (Kaifu 2014, 174; see Daliot-Bul 2014 for an insightful examination of the demise).

There were joint or mixed productions between Japanese and American media that appeared to have a Japanese-like coolness (Brienza 2014; Allison 2008, 109, citing the Hollywood films *Kill Bill* and *The Matrix*), but they did not contribute to Japanese earnings. The anime works of Hayao Miyazaki (of Studio Ghibli) are highly valued in the US for their meticulous touch and imaginative stories, and have been distributed by Pixar in North America, but even his Academy Award-winning film *Spirited Away* was released to only 26 screens in its 1st week (and expanded to only 129 in a month in the US). Unlike in Japan, it looks as if the work was received as art rather than as popular culture. As far as the US market is concerned, the success of the Pokémon anime series was exceptional, but others remain in the realm of

[3] The comparable figures for other countries are as follows: 2.3 billion USD (UK), 238 million USD (France), and 309 million USD (South Korea). For the US, it is more than 18 billion USD for both television programmes and feature films. By including values of other rights related to programme selling such as online distribution and merchandising, the total export value of Japan was recorded as 14.1 billion yen in 2013 (MIC 2015, 56).

the '*otaku*'[4] community (Mihara 2014; Kaifu 2010). The Association of Japanese Animations (AJA) expressed its concern in its annual report of 2015 on the industry (AJA 2015, np), noting that since 2002, when the industry started to collect the export data, the peak was in 2005 with 31 billion yen (310 million USD) earned from export, whereas it stands at less than 20 billion yen (200 million USD) now. There was a sudden surge for 2016, with the export jumping to 31 billion yen again, due largely to the strong demand from China, which, however, cannot be relied upon for the future as it tends to fluctuate (AJA 2016, np).[5]

A variety of factors that prevent export growth are at play (Cabinet Office 2015). One is the industry's reluctance to export because of its concern with the lack of effective copyright law enforcement in Asian countries, particularly in Southeast Asia such as Vietnam and Indonesia. Given the growth rates of these countries and their lack of locally made quality content to satisfy consumers, they present a great opportunity for Japan. Companies in the media and entertainment industries are, however, very fearful of the possibility of piracy when their products are officially exported (which does not make sense, because their products are pirated anyway). The popularity of anime in the US, for a start, was made possible by acts of infringement, and was initiated and sustained by the efforts of enthusiastic fans who transported video tapes from Japan to the US, dubbing them themselves and spreading copies among aficionados (Leonard 2005; see also Lee 2009, for fan 'scanlation' activities). In a country like the US, such activities could have been turned into legitimate revenues by setting up official distribution channels and satisfying the demands of fans. However, Japanese anime producers were slow in taking action and are said to have been complacent with the inflow of requests for licensing for US broadcasting. In the meantime, a large number of works of inferior quality that were exported damaged the market and turned fans away (Mihara 2014).

Secondly, very little marketing expertise for the sale of Japanese products of media and entertainment globally has been developed thus far. In selling abroad, it is important for producers to be aware of different demands of non-Japanese consumers and different standards of objectionable expressions applied in culturally diverse markets. It is possible to adjust or delete details at the point of export, but it would be ideal to create content that can be accepted globally (in the way Hollywood does), while retaining the Japanese distinctiveness that appeals to fans abroad. Such a global perspective rarely exists among Japanese popular culture industries, and producers tend to lack business skills and experience in dealing with international media companies and their intermediaries.

Thirdly, for larger-scale productions of animation and film, the prevalent financing scheme can be a problem for export. In Japan, over the last 15–20 years, major films of live action and anime have been produced by what are called 'production

[4] Otaku refers to those people, usually young males, who are obsessed with subculture and enthusiastically follow their chosen hobbies or franchises. In Japan it is believed that they are typically introverted and lack social skills.

[5] The figures are collected by AJA's questionnaire to its members (anime production studios). Export values include the sale of DVDs and licensing royalties.

consortia' or 'production committees' (*seisaku iinkai*).[6] I have discussed this financing scheme extensively elsewhere (Kawashima 2016, forthcoming); in brief, it is a partnership of companies investing in a film production project, in which neither major studios nor production companies exclusively control all rights. A typical production consortium includes a major trading company, an advertising agency, a television network, a video company, a publishing house, a merchandiser, a music label and a film major. Each of these entities has a particular stake in the film project, in addition to the purely financial return obtained if the movie is successful. All the players in any partnership are established firms in their respective business sectors. They are only loosely bound by contract and trust, not forming a formal corporation, such as a Limited Liability Company, and together they hire a production company to actually make the movie that receives a lump-sum payment for the service. The benefits of this financing system has included, firstly, increased budgets for movie projects as they induce non-film studios as investors and stakeholders, and secondly cross-fertilisation of different interests, such as film releases tied in with merchandising campaigns at fast food chains, followed by novelization and so on.

For the purpose of export, however, this system has not functioned well. It is a globally established practice that a local distributor (with which a Japanese consortium might have a deal) would demand all local rights (i.e. to theatre release, broadcasting, online distribution, etc.), but each member of the production consortium has different business interests in the export market to agree on such a comprehensive deal. The absence of a central power within the consortium obstructs quick decision-making. Whilst in Japan members would collaborate for profit maximisation, they do so less keenly in the international market as from their perspective it would involve excessive resources with which little can be achieved.

Finally, although the Asian market is apparently developing fast and generally promising for Japan, it is still difficult to generate profit from it, as the content industries need to price their products low according to the purchasing power of the local consumers. Korean TV drama is increasingly dominant in countries like Vietnam and Thailand, as the producers nearly give their products away to local broadcasters, but sponsorship from companies such as LG would compensate for this, in return for product placement in the drama. According to Lee (2010), it is the Korean government's strategic thinking, in alliance with the industry, that products should initially be made easily available and that prices may rise later. In the meantime, Korean TV drama actually earns mainly from more affluent markets: Taiwan, China, Japan and Hong Kong (Lee 2005) so that it can forego income from Southeast Asia.

It must be noted that there have been several METI schemes to encourage content export. One is the creation of the Cool Japan Fund Inc. in 2013, set up with contributions from government and the private sector and amounting to 52.3 billion

[6] One tends to find 'production committee' in the English translation of the Japanese in relation to film production more often than 'production consortium', but the latter better expresses this type of partnership and is used in the remainder of this paper text.

yen (523 million USD, as of 2016), to finance risky projects that fit the aim of promoting Japanese culture internationally. It invests in commercial projects that have elements of Cool Japan culture, such as media, food, fashion and design. The Fund, together with two Japanese media companies, has for instance acquired SDI Media Group Inc., a world-leading specialist in subtitling and dubbing services based in Los Angeles, in the expectation that SDI's international network will help distribute Japanese media content (Cool Japan Fund 2015).

For dubbing and subtitling in particular, there also was a scheme called J-LOP, which ran from 2013 to 2015, and that had a year's extension in J-LOP+ from April 2015. These two temporary funds amounted to 21 billion yen (210 million USD), from the budgets of METI and Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communication (MIC), to subsidize localization and promotion of Japanese audio-visual content in overseas markets. METI has also established All Nippon Entertainment Works Inc. (ANEW) with contributions from business corporations, with the aim of promoting the licensing of Japanese content. Unlike anime, live action Japanese films do not travel well abroad, but there are many ideas in Japanese content that Hollywood studios may want to adapt. *Edge of Tomorrow* (2014), starring Tom Cruise and Emily Blunt, for example, was based on a Japanese novel. ANEW, headed by one of the leading figures of Hollywood, aims to accelerate the process of selling rights for adaption and remakes particularly to Hollywood producers.

Nevertheless, because the Japanese domestic market is large, with a relatively homogeneous range of consumers, the popular culture industries can be satisfied and not yet feel a strong pressure to go overseas for expansion; the industries have largely remained domestically orientated. In contrast, other countries have implemented more active policies with ample funding in a recognition that the media and entertainment industries are economically significant and worth public support for further growth. South Korea, as explained in detail by Kwon and Kim (2014), is a remarkable example. Taiwan, China and Singapore, too, are enhancing their media and entertainment strategies with investment and collaboration with other countries. For example, Singapore has invited the studio Lucasfilm from California to enhance the local production capabilities of computer graphics and related technologies. Collaboration between China and South Korea, as explained by Keane and Yecies in this volume, has also been advancing, whilst Japan still lags behind in terms of cross-national collaboration.

4 Cool Japan

In the meantime, the government as a whole, aware that Japanese contemporary culture represented by anime, manga and fashion is very popular abroad, has embarked on a new initiative that is commonly called 'Cool Japan'. Emulating the Cool Britannia slogan of the UK's Blair government in the late 1990s, Japan has started to engage in nation branding, involving many of the central government's departments and ministries, the private sector, the national media, academics and

commentators. It is in this new policy direction that the popular cultural industries may now be situated.

Nation branding is by now a big business undertaken in many countries (Aronczyk 2013), to which the political scientist Joseph Nye gave an influential theoretical basis with his concept of 'soft power'. In Japan, too, his argument that culture, as opposed to military and economic powers, can be a means by which a country exercises influence in the international arena has ignited the interest of the government (Nye 2004). More influential and meaningful for Japan was the writing of Douglas McGray, an American journalist, who applauded Japanese popular culture as cool and argued that Japan should capitalize on this asset to rescue the economy from the decline experienced since the 1990s (McGray 2002). These two arguments and the terms 'soft power' and 'Gross National Cool' (jokingly proposed by McGray to measure the cultural strength of a country) soon became well-known amongst Japanese intellectuals and bureaucrats, whilst the popularity of Japanese anime, manga, computer games, fashion and food in the rest of the world has increasingly seen greater media coverage.

When exactly the Cool Japan policy started is difficult to determine. In one sense, as Daliot-Bul (2009) seems to understand it, it was in 2002 when a new Intellectual Property Strategy Headquarters (IPHQ) was established in the Cabinet Office, as this is the structure that later incorporated the Cool Japan strategy under its umbrella. The principal function of IPHQ has been to strengthen intellectual property related businesses such as ICT, pharmaceutical and other high technologies. Cool Japan was not explicitly mentioned in their documents until 2005 when the term 'Japan brand strategy' appeared for the first time in the annual plan published by the IPHQ. However, as the IP Strategy places emphasis on the creation, protection and exploitation of IP rights, such as patent, trademark, design as well as copyright, the media and entertainment industries have been accommodated under the banner of Cool Japan.

What was more important in the 2000s, however, was the initiative taken by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA). The Japan Foundation, MOFA's quasi-governmental agency for international cultural relations, received recommendation on its new directions from its advisory board to the Chairman. The report of the board (Kokusai Koryu Kenkyukai 2003), which focused mostly on public diplomacy, notes the rise of Japanese Cool in the international arena and acknowledges it as an important asset in foreign relations (p 10), exactly following the arguments made by Nye and McGray. Taro Aso, Minister for MOFA from 2005 to 2007, helped create a 'pop culture diplomacy'; unusually for a senior politician Aso is known to be a keen fan of manga and pop culture. During his tenure, the International Manga Award and the World Cosplay Summit were created in 2007, under MOFA's initiative or with its involvement.

So far I have argued that the Cool Japan strategy was initiated in the 2000s, with the popular cultural industries at the core of the initiatives by IPHQ and MOFA, whereas the next decade saw a number of major changes in direction. Firstly, going beyond IPHQ's policy for IP development and MOFA's pop culture diplomacy, nation branding has become more fully-fledged. A number of advisory councils and

research groups were formed to engage in the projects of nation branding (e.g., Cool Japan Advisory Council 2011). The Cool Japan Movement Promotion Council (2014) in particular undertook a thorough exercise in identifying the country's strengths and weaknesses, and defined the ways in which the country should be seen in the global community. Whilst this project is interesting in its own right, replacing the self-proclaimed coolness of Japan with the more noble sounding slogan 'Japan, trying to offer creative solutions to global issues' (p. 5), it seems in our view to have less relevance for the media and entertainment industries and their exports.

Secondly, the industrial and economic policy aspects of Cool Japan has advanced with a broader scope, wherein the initial focus on the media content industries became blurred. The next focus was on the 'creative industries', in which a variety of artisan crafts, hand-made in traditional ways in various regions of the country, were highlighted. This shift was in line with the development of nation branding using culture in a broader sense. Thus, not only the narrowly defined content industries were mobilized, but also the wider creative industries that seem to express the way of life and values of the Japanese have come into play. Reflecting this awareness for nation branding, a new department was established within METI in 2011, dedicated to these industries including fashion, cuisine, regional crafts, tourism, advertising and art and design. Whilst the list here may look similar to that of the UK creative industries, fine arts and popular culture industries are excluded as they are in the domain of ACA and the Media Content Department of METI respectively. METI at this time has started to discuss Cool Japan strategy in its annual report in the following way:

> Cool Japan strategy is about nation branding, making the most of the power of Japanese culture and small businesses, identifying the potential of each of these, presenting them as the Japan brand to the world and attracting visitors from Asia and beyond to Japan. Through these measures, we can develop new industries and create employment. (METI 2011, 360, author's translation)

These 'creative' products and services, it is believed, have special qualities and refined designs that allow them to command high prices from savvy, wealthy consumers across the world. Thus, the shift to traditional crafts in the second phase may have helped highlight one important aspect of Japanese culture, but as a result the content industry has been overshadowed. The focus has since shifted from artisan crafts to services in Japan, with their reputation for allegedly good customer care, including traditional inns and courier services. Clearly, while Cool Japan seems to have started with the popular culture industries, it has subsequently transformed into something else.

Expanding the scope of Cool Japan even further, thirdly, food and drink now receive attention. The cross-ministerial structure of the policy has allowed different ministries to argue for more resources in areas of their own concern. The Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF) deals with industries that are of strategic importance for the nation, but that are small in economic output in contemporary Japan. Japanese food, represented primarily by sushi but including haute cuisine as well as street food like noodle soup, is becoming popular overseas. Many

of these restaurants and eateries, however, serve food prepared by chefs who have no background in Japanese cuisine using non-Japanese ingredients, leading the government to believe that Japan is missing out on the economic benefits of this boom (see Sakamoto and Allen 2011 for an interesting discussion on Japanese nationalism and the globalization of food). MAFF aims to increase the export of Japanese agricultural and marine products from 450 billion yen (4.5 billion USD) in 2012 to 1 trillion yen (10 billion USD) by 2020 (MAFF, memorandum on budgets for 2014).[7] Japanese food and cuisine are now firmly embedded in the framework of Cool Japan targeting overseas well-to-do, quality conscious consumers and visitors to Japan.

Finally—and this is the fourth stage—the remarkable growth of inbound tourism in the last few years has led to a new conception of Cool Japan strategy and the place occupied by the popular culture industries. Until 2012, Japan annually received only 6–8 million foreign visitors, but the number had doubled by 2014. The total number of 'international tourist arrivals' (i.e. visitors from overseas) has become over 24 million in 2016. This number is the 16th in the world, lagging far behind those of France, the US, Spain and many others, but this is one of the few sectors of the economy whose rapid expansion can realistically be seen right now and in the next several years. It can also be expected to help Japan's regional economies. Some time ago, media products were expected to earn abroad on their own, but as I have explained, this vision did not really materialize. Instead, it is assumed that they can work as a good *vehicle* to earnings in other industries. It is hoped that overseas consumers will expand their preference of Japanese electrical goods and other consumer goods and services. The popularity of Japanese culture overseas, the scenario goes, will attract foreign consumers to actually visit Japan. Towards 2020, when the Olympic Games are to be held in Tokyo, promotion of inbound tourism is high on the agenda of the government's economic policy. In this vastly transformed picture, Japanese pop culture industries are given only a small role to play as an ambassador of Japanese 'culture' in a broader sense.

5 The Japanese Response to the Creative Industries Turn

This chapter has outlined the development of industrial/economic policies of METI regarding the popular culture industries since the early 2000s and their merger with the Cool Japan policy promoted government-wide. Japan has been, in short, one of the few countries in which the creative industries discourse has not put down new roots. The Cool Japan initiative and the various policy programmes of METI and IPQH may suggest that Japan has joined the league of nations that embrace such notions as creative economy, creative cities, creative class and creative industries,

[7] Bestor (2000) gives an interesting report of the global tuna trade, describing how tuna, the mainstay of sushi, is caught off the coast in New England of North America, shipped whole to Tsukiji, Tokyo, the global capital of fish trade, and then exported to sushi restaurants in New York or Los Angeles.

but this chapter has shown that the Japanese interest in these has been rather superficial (see Kong et al. 2006 for an interesting comparison of Asian nations on the creative economy policy). Such an attitude can, however, be evaluated as a realistic approach to industrial policy. There have been a number of critical commentaries in the literature on the over-expansive scope and narrative of policy at the expense of 'creativity' in culture in many countries (see, e.g., Special Issue on the Cultural Industries and Cultural Policy, *International Journal of Cultural Policy* 11, 1, 2005; Lee 2014). Criticisms about creative industries policies have included the lack of good definition and statistical data on the industries (e.g., Galloway and Dunlop 2007) and the simplistic assumption of policy transfer from one country to another (e.g., Pratt 2009). Another major problem has been the political nature of the rhetoric regarding intuitively appealing yet amorphous terms such as creativity and innovation (see Wijngaarden et al. 2016). The lack of 'causality' between creativity in the arts and culture and their spillover effect of inducing innovation and economic development has also been a deficiency (see Potts 2009).

I would argue that the executive officers of the relevant departments of METI and IPHQ are fully aware of the repeated rhetoric, but not quite convinced of its credibility and applicability to Japan.[8] Whether they personally believe in the theories or not does not always determine the fate of policies, as policy is developed through a number of committees and councils involving a large number of industry professionals and experts before it reaches politicians. However, whether and how bureaucrats perceive an issue for policy to tackle is decisive for setting the agenda in process for development.

The department of METI for content industries is well informed of the creative industries policies of many countries including the US, the UK, France, South Korea, China and others, with details such as the general aims of policies, concrete programmes and the scale of public expenditure for policy implementation. With a wealth of knowledge and 'success stories' heard about Korea in particular, however, METI is still in search of rationale for a fully-fledged creative industries policy in Japan. So far it has been its job to encourage the growth of the industries, but after 10–15 years of policy intervention they feel the need to revisit the basis for the intervention itself. Knowing well that entertainment is a risky business, vulnerable to the changes in fads and fashion, and being aware that any potential indication of Japan's cultural imperialism would antagonize the nations in the Asian region (see Otmazgin 2012), they feel their policy needs to be strongly justified in economic terms. Unless some economic externalities can be proven—the core industries may well be under-productive but can contribute to enhancing economic outputs in related, other industries—it is difficult for METI to explain why public money should be spent to help them. As such, METI would find support if the creative industries trigger technological developments in areas such as Virtual Reality (VR),

[8] The following discussion in this section is informed by discussions I had with METI and IPHQ officials (December 2016 and February 2017), my observations at research committee meetings held by METI (from September 2015 to March 2016), of which I was a member, and other occasional contact with them.

Augmented Reality (AR), robots and Artificial Intelligence (AI) by providing content that tends to make use of these technologies, perhaps more keenly and earlier than many other industries would (see Potts 2009). Connection between content and innovation/growth in other industries, however, remains ad hoc and is yet to be soundly demonstrated.

In contrast, METI has understood that for European countries creative industries policy is often a form of protectionist cultural policy rather than economic policy. This recognition is a relief to METI, because that would mean the policy area becomes irrelevant to it. Ironically, however, this demarcation is also a problem for the Ministry: unlike conventional cultural policy, which can be explained through the economic theory of market failure and 'merit goods', support for commercial culture is harder to sustain except for measures that aim at export expansion.

The limitation of conventional cultural policy in Japan comes from the lack of convincing arguments in this respect. Both difficulties are of a different nature, and are not particularly specific to Japan but are seen elsewhere too, which may explain why the term 'creative industries' has globally been welcomed. It amalgamates the subsidized and commercial cultures, or more precisely, 'smuggles' the arts into commercial culture industries and the policy terrain (Cunningham 2009). The Japanese government, traditionally little involved with cultural policy anyway, has tried a little, but beyond this limited commitment it is difficult for public policy to fully engage in popular culture.

It could be said that the Department for the Media and Content Industries of METI has done what it could legitimately do, and ongoing projects are still running.[9] Beyond helping to improve the infrastructure for industrial development and providing platforms and opportunities for motivated professionals in the industries to take advantage of, the only policy option that remains is to directly support content production. This, however, is the least favoured option for METI as it involves the selection of projects for support, meaning the advancement into the area of cultural policy irrespective of the aim. In other countries, creative industries policy has been discussed as a shift from cultural to economic (Banks and O'Connor 2009, 367), which has caused concern amongst cultural policy researchers. In the case of Japan, if METI starts to support content production, it would certainly make Japanese policy-makers themselves nervous.

6 Conclusion

This chapter has aimed at starting to fill a gap in our knowledge on the concrete content of the Japanese government's policy towards the popular culture industries. The popularity of Japanese pop culture overseas was an initial trigger for the

[9] E.g., J-LOP+, which was mentioned earlier, measures to combat piracy abroad, support organizing fairs and markets for international buyers of Japanese content, and investing in future media producers who can work globally as well as introducing the most advanced digital technologies to the media industries

development of the economic/industrial policy for these industries, which soon merged with the Cool Japan initiative for nation branding. In the process of such policy development, the government's commitment to the popular culture industries has waned, led to a downgrading of their position within the policy framework. The last section of the chapter has discussed such a retreat within the global context of the creative industries turn.

To conclude, whilst the government's policy for popular culture industries may not have led to significant results, it has done what it could do without riding on the bandwagon of the creative industries discourse that has swept across the rest of the world (Cunningham 2009). This is not a matter of ignorance of policy-makers or failure to mobilize policy resources, but a sign of prudent choices in the Japanese policy context. If no remarkable profit has been made out of Cool Japan, this failure in economic terms owes more to the reluctance and protectionist attitude of the industries themselves. Japan could not blindly follow the creative industries 'turn' because there has been little need to smuggle the subsidized sector into the broader framework: the little, under-subsidized arts and culture sectors continue to stay in the compartmentalized structure of cultural policy defined by ACA. The creative industries policy of Japan, if there is one, has no grand narrative, but what is there may well remain for the time being, whilst the waiting is on a more convincing rationale for policy intervention with strong evidence before we can see further development.

In the meantime, there have been changes in digital technologies related to content production, distribution and consumption globally and as a consequence in business models in some industries. Inevitably some companies experience difficulty, but changing environments in business need to be faced squarely. For example, online games have overtaken the conventional console games in many parts of the world, and the names of the top firms in this sector have therefore changed. Japanese anime producers struggled with distribution for broadcast in North America, but with the expansion of online distributors of video such as Hulu, Netflix and Amazon, it can now be said that they should have better opportunities of global marketing.

There may well be small gaps here and there in policy measures, but what is now more important is that the media and entertainment industries themselves wake up and take a strategic approach to expansion into a globalized market in a sustained manner. So far there have been few signs of that proactive approach on the part of the industries as they can still be satisfied with the size of the domestic market with little regard for the future of younger generations. It is hoped that the retreat of the position of popular culture in the economic policy of the Japanese government and nation branding has given the industries a sufficient wake-up call on the danger of remaining inward-looking.

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Chapter 3
Asian and Global? Japan and Tokyo's Cultural Branding Beyond the 2020 Olympic and Paralympic Games

Grace Gonzalez Basurto

Abstract The chapter examines the rationale and imbrication of Japan and Tokyo's cultural branding for—and beyond—the Tokyo 2020 Olympic and Paralympic Games. In doing so, it analyses Tokyo's cultural branding through the lens of the "Tokyo Vision for Arts and Culture" (2015–2025), the most recent agenda unveiled by the Tokyo Metropolitan Government. Notwithstanding Tokyo Metropolitan Government's cultural and urban branding is an ongoing endeavor, the analysis of its rationale, dynamics, and scope in early phases aims to contribute to the empirical debate in both academic and policy circles. The chapter uses the mobility/assemblage approach in policy knowledge to assess the urban and cultural branding of Tokyo from a regional (East Asia) and global perspective. Rather than solely focusing on the transfer of 'best practices', the chapter seeks to balance the specificity and generality aspects of contemporary policy knowledge by paying attention to 'embedded institutional legacies and imperatives' and in-situ politically feasible policy assemblage (McCann. Ann Assoc Am Geogr 2011:109; Flyvbjerg. Rationality and power. The Chicago University Press, Chicago, 1998). Lastly, the primary data for this study overwhelmingly suggest Japan/Tokyo's cultural policy and cultural diplomacy to be unidirectional, particularly *vis-à-vis* their Asian neighbors.

Keywords Tokyo · Policy mobility and assemblage · Cultural/urban branding · Tokyo 2020 Olympic and Paralympic Games

1 Introduction

As the ultimate marketing strategy, mega-events coupled with cultural programming (e.g., The Olympics) galvanize symbols, images, and discourses that enhance, reconstruct or change the perceptions of countries/cities while invigorating

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patriotism (Wilson 2014). To this end, both high and mass cultures get instrumentalized for economic gain as the definite benchmark of uniqueness. Portraits of bold, cheerful, and extraordinary qualities of a country and/or city are carefully selected and positive images of cultural accessibility and urban vibrancy are thus projected (Hewison 2014: 193). In this vein, the reorganization of urban and cultural spaces through mega-events becomes a sought-after policy strategy (Johansson and Kociatkiewicz 2011). A city/country thus acquires a dualistic nature. On the one hand, a city/country's cultural uniqueness is used for highly touristic/entertainment value. On the other, cities in particular, must showcase global attributes (Marcuse 2007).

These 'desired' attributes engender policy mobilities on a global scale, as ambulatory and all-encompassing narratives of 'success stories' become a blueprint for urban governance, especially in capital cities. Furthermore, seeking or adhering to a global urban 'appeal' intrinsically shapes policy mobilities through an assemblage of knowledge, whereby the "circulation of parts of elsewhere" (McCann 2011b: 144) is touted or implicitly taken as universally applicable (Ong and Collier 2005).

The chapter examines the rationale and imbrication of Japan and Tokyo's cultural branding for –and beyond– the Tokyo 2020 Olympic and Paralympic Games. In doing so, it examines Tokyo's cultural branding through the lens of the "Tokyo Vision for Arts and Culture" (2015–2025), the most recent agenda unveiled by the Tokyo Metropolitan Government (2015a). The chapter argues that while the branding of Japan and Tokyo aims at curating a narrative of cultural openness and innovation to be consumed by international audiences and recognized by global/cultural (Western and Asian) cities alike, this narrative reinforces the demarcation of a national culture immutable and untainted by transnational cultural dialogue or regional/global multi-directional cultural flows (Iwabuchi 2002, 2014; Avenell 2014). The challenge for Japanese policy makers and cultural stakeholders is therefore to strike a balance between using the country's cultural resources and directly intervening or heavily curating the country's image.

Notwithstanding Tokyo Metropolitan Government's cultural and urban branding is an ongoing endeavor, the analysis of its rationale, dynamics, and scope in early phases aims to contribute to the empirical debate in both academic and policy circles. The primary data for this study overwhelmingly suggest Japan/Tokyo's cultural policy and cultural diplomacy to be unidirectional, particularly *vis-à-vis* their Asian neighbors. In this sense, issues related to cultural identity and increasingly diverse local cultural landscapes seem to be tangentially dealt with.

The chapter uses the mobility/assemblage approach in policy knowledge (McCann 2011a, b; Ong and Collier 2005; Prince 2014; Dolowitz and Marsh 2000) to assess the urban and cultural branding of Tokyo from a regional (East Asia) and global perspective. Rather than solely focusing on the transfer of 'best practices', the chapter seeks to balance the specificity and generality aspects of contemporary policy knowledge by paying attention to "embedded institutional legacies and imperatives" and in-situ politically feasible policy assemblage (McCann 2011a: 109; Flyvbjerg 1998). In other words, the complexity embedded in policy drawing and implementation according to local socio-economic, socio-political and

socio-cultural contexts calls for an approach that facilitates the analysis of hybrid forms (a combination of vernacular and assemblage) of public policy. Even though Japan has a long tradition of partial or complete emulation of foreign (largely Western) institutions, technologies, cultural traditions, and policy knowledge (Kawashima 2012: 1), it is worth noting that Japan/Tokyo are likely to also act as policy lenders as the result of being Olympic hosts. By the same token, there is potential for policy and institutional innovation derived from this very same policy approach.

The second section of this chapter explores the dimensions and links between cultural branding and soft power. The third section provides a bird eye's perspective on the path trodden by Japan in the realm of soft power and nation branding. Likewise, it assesses the current state of Japan's brand vis-à-vis fellow East Asian countries by way of several national and international rankings/surveys. The fourth section examines the policy pillars and implementation of Tokyo's urban and cultural branding, particularly in relation to the 2020 cultural Olympiad, cultural tourism (Tokyo's positioning with respect to 'global' cities of culture), and the Tokyo Metropolitan Government's long-term cultural policy. Here, the experiences of London (i.e., 2012 Olympic Games) and Seoul (i.e., 2018 Winter Olympics and cultural tourism) are also drawn for comparison purposes. On the one hand, the London 2012 Olympics and its nation rebranding have served as a blueprint for the Tokyo 2020 Games and Tokyo's cultural branding. On the other, Seoul's experience as an early adopter (and policy assembler) of a cultural branding and tourism policy in Asia showcases the elasticity and viability of this model in the long term. Although Tokyo is likely to emulate Seoul in matters of policy implementation, given its target audience (e.g., China), this emulation is to be fundamentally unacknowledged by Japanese policy makers and stakeholders. Lastly, the chapter identifies the prospects of Japan and Tokyo's branding for and beyond the 2020 Olympics.

The chapter findings draw on primary data and secondary data both collected by the author. Primary data are mainly comprised of semi-structured in-depth interviews conducted (in English and Japanese) between October 2013 and February 2016 in Tokyo, London, and Seoul. Informants include stakeholders in academia, government, private sector, and non-profit organizations that lead or are directly involved in the planning, enactment, and management of cultural policies and nation/city branding. Other primary data include first-hand accounts collected at public and academic forums in Tokyo, Kyoto, and Seoul. Secondary data are comprised of official documents and reports. All translations of interviews and literature in Japanese are by the author.

2 Cultural Branding and Soft Power

City and Nation branding is increasingly becoming the tool of choice for socio-economic revitalization under a model of *urban entrepreneurialism* (Harvey 1989; OECD 2007; Kavaratzis 2007). In this vein, the public (urban) policy is framed

within the context of cities' potentialities and possibilities whereby creating an economic and social 'buzz', rather than a set of initiatives aimed at tackling urban problems related to welfare such as poverty, crime, housing, and health. These 'new urban politics' tend to be aligned with the cultural and creative industries[1] (henceforth, CCI) in an effort to carve a distinctive urban *milieu*, and in turn, attracting mobile global resources (e.g., residents, visitors, and investors alike) (Cox 1993; Waitt 2008). It is particularly in the context of economic downturn that city and nation branding are aimed at propelling economic competitiveness through elements such as cultural heritage, 'flagship' arts projects and mega-events. Contemporary urban politics of entrepreneurialism or *urban neoliberalism* are therefore the "conjunction of business, play, and fantasy" (Waitt 2008: 513).

Urban branding attempts to influence people's perceptions and imagery towards cities. It manages cities in the same manner that businesses manage their products and services (Kavaratzis 2007: 703). The city's built environment and functionality are therefore essentially catered towards a desired brand (Kavaratzis 2007: 704). Even though the specialized literature shows the results of city branding generate little public benefits (e.g., Evans 2003; Evans 2009; Grodach 2013), the promotion of the European Capitals of Culture, for instance, continues to be used as a policy tool to attract inward investment and consumption. Moreover, policy mobilities in this field have generated the 'analogous cities phenomenon', hindering the very same vernacular distinctiveness that it is supposed to be at the center of this practice, while simultaneously creating significant financial burden on local taxpayers.

As a corollary, urban branding is coupled with soft power[2] strategies. Currently, CCI, major sporting institutions, respected business brands, and even a strong civil society are bestowed as critical components of a country's soft power (McClory 2015). Whereas re-branding is helpful in counteracting low overall awareness, negative/outdated stereotypes, or indifference (McClory 2015; Kavaratzis 2007), local and national governments increasingly attribute the lack of an established brand to the loss of international markets and partnerships in areas such as inward investment and exports. However, the intrinsic challenge of this formula entails the ability to harness the power of influence through culture, which in turn, renders a country's investment in its own cultural infrastructure a crucial long-term factor. Here, the institutional rationale is to access different demographics and expanding audiences, in addition to engineering national cooperation among stakeholders. Moreover,

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[1] The cultural and creative industries are defined, for the purpose of the chapter, as those industries that are based on highly aesthetic and symbolic attributes in the form of goods and services, content, amenities, and experiences linked to urban milieux. Otherwise known as content or copyright industries, the CCI entail both for-profit and non-profit sectors. They include advertising, crafts, design, film, multimedia, publishing, video and computer games, and visual and performing arts, among others.

[2] Soft power is a concept developed by Joseph Nye, Jr. in 1989 in the field of international relations to describe the ability to attract, co-opt, and entice in order to attain favorable outcomes. The soft power of a country rests on its culture, its political values, and its foreign policies (Nye 2008). Soft power is "often hard to use, easy to lose, and costly to re-establish" as it rests on credibility (rather than propaganda) (Nye 2015: 6–7).

branding serves as a political instrumentalization of public culture in order to shape and/or update the external perceptions while galvanizing a cohesive national identity.

It is worth noting that social injustices and inequalities are seemingly forgotten in the euphoria of entertainment provided by the core elements of urban branding (e.g. festivals or mega-events) (Waitt 2008: 514). Thus, it is of critical importance that policy makers –as mediators and/or facilitators between the spatial, the economic, and the cultural (Hutton 2004) –carry out these projects with strict political accountability and socio-economic sustainability.

3 Japan in East Asia: Retrofitting the Nation's Brand?

Japan's current soft power policy focuses on the economic potential of cultural consumption in the global marketplace by jostling with other nation brands across the board. Since the second half of the twentieth century and early twenty-first century, Japan's approach to cultural policy and cultural diplomacy has followed two logics. On the one hand, to avoid connotations of cultural imperialism in Asia following the Second World War and, on the other, to focus on culture and cultural exports only when considered economically profitable or politically strategic (Otmazgin 2012: 37, 47).

Nonetheless, economic prowess dependent upon the "manipulation of signs and symbols, images and ideas" (Hewison 2014: 34) requires the update of political agendas, regionally and globally, through the rebranding of national identities. An example of these government efforts has materialized in Cool Japan,[3] an initiative launched by the Ministry of Economy Trade and Industry (METI, henceforth) in 2010. The *Japan Brand*, more specifically, focuses on showcasing and promoting Japanese culture and lifestyle globally through cuisine (*washoku*), fashion, crafts, cosmetics, services (education, leisure, bridal), cultural tourism, and media content. To this end, the content industries –as often referenced in Japan– and their embedded soft power have been touted as a pillar of cultural and economic value (Intellectual Property Strategic Headquarters 2005, 2007). Even though METI has deemed the CCI as the new engine for Japan's postindustrial economic growth, the

[3] Here, it is worth clarifying the use of "Cool Japan" in journalistic and policy circles –and the imbrication of the two. Cool Japan was initially coined by journalist Douglas McGray in 2002, to describe the cultural influence of Japanese popular culture (e.g., anime, manga, video games, and film) on a global scale and therefore, a source of soft superpower appeal for economic reinvention. This along with other various articles published in the early 2000s in foreign media, such as the *Le Monde* (Pons 2003) and the Washington Post (Fiola 2003), resonated with Japanese policy makers, whom years later would rework the 'cool' concept to inject further economic and soft power potential to cultural goods (JETRO 2005; Intellectual Property Policy Headquarters 2004; MOFA 2006). Another reference of 'Cool Japan' includes the NHK talk show broadcasted since 2006 in which a panel of foreign nationals discusses the most extraordinary, appealing, or unusual elements of Japanese culture and lifestyle.

overall logic is rooted in attaching the Japanese origin "tag" to mass-produced icons and ditties sold to an increasingly depressed global market (Leheny 2006: 229). Whereas it could be argued that all tangible and intangible products within the CCI must inevitably be viewed through the economic system (i.e., use, exchange, and symbolic values), these also embed cultural and cognitive processes (Kopytoff 1986: 64). As such, excessive commoditization is intrinsically anti-cultural (Kopytoff 1986: 73).

Japan's image, creative industry exports, lifestyle, and cultural specificity have been mostly based upon Japan's self-portrayal as ethnically and linguistically homogeneous and culturally unique (Fisher 2014: 4; Iwabuchi 2014). But, what are the most appealing cultural features of Japan, as deemed by international consumers? According to Dentsu's "Japan Brand" survey of consumers in 20 countries/regions worldwide (2015), the current top 2 favorite things about Japan are traditional culture and gastronomy. Likewise, the top 2 most interesting things about Japan are cuisine and sightseeing. However, Japanese animation/manga, fashion, films, games, and *cosplay* seem to have either dropped within or disappeared from the top 10 positions, in respect to the 2014 rankings, signaling perhaps an overexposure or saturation in the global market. On a closer look, the results of Dentsu's survey could be further refined by including sub-genres in each category, disentangling 'subculture' or 'youth' culture aspects from the broader Japanese popular culture, as it is consumed overseas.

In terms of branding and soft power, Japan excels in global/international indices when ranked against technology, infrastructure, R&D, and consumer brands (i.e., electronics and automobile industries). This is also reflected in the Country Brand Index 2014–2015 (Future Brand 2014) in which Japan's country brand strength is ranked number 1 (out of 20 countries, most of which are European),[4] with a particular emphasis on technological innovation and the high quality/expertise of the 'Made in Japan' products (i.e., consumer electronics and automobiles). Also, within this Index, Japan enjoys a top 5 ranking in terms of culture and heritage and tourism dimensions. As for the Soft Power 30 (McClory 2015) and the Anholt-GfK Roper Nation Brands Index (Anholt-GfK Roper 2015),[5] Japan ranks 8th and 6th, respectively. It is worth pointing out, however, that in international cross-regional rankings Japan shows significant weaknesses when emphasis is placed on culture-related categories/metrics[6] (McClory 2015; Anholt-GfK Roper 2014). In this sense, even

[4] The other East Asian countries in the index, Singapore and South Korea, are ranked 14th and 20th respectively.

[5] The Soft Power 30 is a global index of 30 countries that measures soft power according to categories such as enterprise, culture, digital, government, engagement, and education). The Anholt-GfK Roper Nation Brands Index combines the dimensions of exports, governance, culture, people, tourism and immigration/investment to assess nation branding on a global scale.

[6] Here, budgetary constraints could be cited as a critical factor vis-à-vis cultural ripple/spillover effects at national and international levels. Figures from the Mori Memorial Foundation (2016) show that total (publicly-funded) budgets for arts and culture in Japan (US$1.2 billion) lag behind those of countries like France (US$ 7.9 billion), U.K. (US$3.3 billion), South Korea (US$2.0 billion), and Germany (US$1.3. billion).

though Asian neighbor countries like South Korea and Singapore usually lag behind Japan in the above-referenced rankings, South Korea is acknowledged as an "early adopter of soft power" in Asia and growing "creative powerhouse", channeling much investment into its CCI (McClory 2015; Mayor of London & BOP Consulting 2014). On the other hand, Singapore is recognized for its investment in human capital and digital infrastructure (McClory 2015). This suggests that, in relation to soft power, Japan currently holds a narrow or reduced competitive advantage as the innovator and cultural leader in East Asia, making the country's branding a key aspect to stay slightly ahead of East Asian counterparts in the foreseeable future.

In sum, the current approach to cultural policy and branding in Japan is led by soft power, engulfing a myriad of realms such as CCI, international trade, tourism, and cultural diplomacy. Here, the challenge for Japanese policy makers is whether a plausible and coherent rationale to tackle the above can be achieved through policy assemblage; largely as assemblage is a marker for the global and soft power/cultural branding rather than a marker for the national.

To further explore this challenge, the following section addresses the state of imbrication among cultural policy, urban branding, and soft power through the conduits of mega-events (i.e., Olympics) and cultural tourism. These dimensions impinging on policy enactment ought to be understood as simultaneous, if not circular.

4 Beyond the Tokyo 2020 Olympics: Long-Term Cultural Strategies

The Tokyo Metropolitan Government's cultural policy: From "hard" to "soft" infrastructure

In the Japanese context, cultural public policy has been developed through a "patchwork of projects conventionally supported and sporadic programs undertaken without strategic frameworks and visions" (Kawashima 2012: 8).

Against this background, since the year 2000 the cultural policy of the Tokyo Metropolitan Government (TMG, henceforth) has shifted from a focus on the establishment of public art/cultural facilities to the dissemination of Tokyo's popular and traditional arts in Japan and overseas (Arts Council Tokyo 2015).[7] In 2001, the TMG revisited its policy from cultural promotion for citizens' enjoyment to a policy of support for the creation and dissemination of traditional and contemporary arts

[7] According to data provided by the Agency for Cultural Affairs (in Tokyo Culture Creation Project Office & Tokyo Metropolitan Foundation for History and Culture 2012), Tokyo's artist population (writers, visual artists, craftspeople, designers, photographers, musicians, actors, and dancers) is almost 133,000; that is, approximately one-third of Japan's artists. Tokyo has more than 3000 theater and production companies that hold over 24,000 yearly live performances. Tokyo also holds 4,5000 classical music concerts each year. The city possesses around 80 museums and 400 commercial galleries.

and culture by young/up-and-coming Japanese creators (Tokyo Wonder Site 2011). This policy serves a dual purpose to incubate the next wave of creators as well as showcasing the breadth of Japanese arts and culture overseas. The policy shift was inducted with the drafting of the "Tokyo Metropolitan Government Guidelines for Culture Development" (2006) and the enactment of Tokyo Council for the Arts and the foundation of Arts Council Tokyo (ACT, henceforth) in 2012 (ACT 2014; Tokyo Wonder Site 2011). The creation of a 'new' culture in Tokyo centers on the collaboration with arts and cultural organizations and arts-focused non-profit organizations (NPOs, henceforth) by providing artistic and cultural activities for children, youth, and communities (Tokyo Culture Creation Project 2014; TMG 2014b). Additionally, international festivals and conferences disseminate the city's cultural traits to international audiences. A seasonal events calendar gets disseminated through the *Tokyo Paper for Culture*, provided in Japanese and English. As of April 2015, ACT has spearheaded several of these activities in order to enhance its long-term think-tank functions. This policy development can be regarded as the first-time ever attempt to generate a consorted cultural policy in the city (see "Tokyo Vision for Arts and Culture" below).

4.1 The Tokyo 2020 Olympic and Paralympic Games: The (Re-)Makings of Japan and Tokyo's Cultural Branding?

The Tokyo 2020 Olympic and Paralympic Games are portrayed as the ultimate opportunity to showcase Japan/Tokyo to a global audience. By tying together society, economy and culture, the TMG aims, in particular, at presenting Tokyo (towards and in the aftermath of the 2020 Olympics) as a global welcoming city for visitors and business people alike. Rebuilding amicable diplomatic relations with East Asian neighbors such as China and South Korea is likewise a crucial target, particularly in the current context of intense city/nation branding competition.

Aspects of urban entrepreneurialism and cultural branding in the *Long-term Vision for Tokyo* (2014–2024) are particularly curated towards the Olympic city 'model' and 'legacy', widely utilized by the London 2012 Olympics[8] (Masuzoe

[8] In matters of urban policy mobilites/assemblage, institutional arrangements or local practices can result in risky implementation, as exemplified in the debacles regarding the planning of the new 2020 Olympic stadium and the unveiling of the Tokyo 2020 Olympic Logo. The troublesome planning of the Olympics by a given host city tends to be zealously covered in the national and international press, ultimately casting negative perceptions onto the nation/city branding (e.g., inefficiency, political opacity, unoriginality, and so forth). Costly 'do-overs' stemming from a lack of transparency and institutional inadequacy/incompatibility are compounded with issues rooted in the role of 'globally mobile' consultants who draft candidate files or bid books. These consultants offer grand urban visions to the International Olympic Committee (IOC) by obliterating local socio-economic contexts (Müller 2014: 4). Thus, host cities must adhere to not only the benchmarks established by former Olympic cities, but also by the expectations created in said bid books.

2014; TMG 2014a). This policy mobility/assemblage aims at not only branding Tokyo as the "number one city in the world" by delivering the "best" Olympic and Paralympic Games in history (Masuzoe 2014), but also establishing Tokyo as "one of the world's most popular tourist destinations" (TMG 2014a: 24). Emulating London too, the TMG intends on capitalizing on the Cultural Olympiad to brand Tokyo as the unquestionable Asian metropolis of culture.

It is worth emphasizing that other local East Asian governments like the Seoul Metropolitan Government (SMG, henceforth) have actively engaged in policy assemblage in tourism marketing, creative cities, and 'culturenomics' through mayoral 'study visits' to Western European (London, Paris, Milan, Barcelona) and East Asian cities since mid-2000s (Lee and Hwang 2012). More recently with the plan to host the 2018 Winter Olympics in Pyeongchang, South Korean stakeholders have sought policy-drawing lessons from Western European and North American renowned academics/policy makers in the field of cultural economics, as well as cognate fields, such as cultural policy in order to maximize the Olympic legacies and local economic revitalization (author's fieldwork, Seoul 2015). In addition, interviews in Tokyo and Seoul amply suggest that policy mobilities/assemblage in the above-referenced areas stem from the political motivations of 'charismatic' Mayors.

In the case of Tokyo, potential knowledge exchange, learning, and partnership achieved by stakeholders at the TMG through the preparation and staging of the 2020 Olympics are taken as long-term major competitive advantages and legacies. Most informants agreed that the highly political nature of the Olympics positioned the decision-making process on the implementation and the overall funding of the Cultural Olympiad –rather than the quality of programming– as the most important issue. For example, informants amply commented on the challenge of creating partnerships and networking between national and regional cultural organizations in order to deliver a successful Cultural Olympiad. In this sense, it is worth pointing out that the redeployment of resources to cope with this mega-event will unavoidably distort the funding channels for local cultural organizations in the lead-up of the Tokyo 2020 Olympics. On the one hand, the Olympics are an invaluable opportunity for the arts and culture sectors to fund and realize large-scale (and far too expensive) projects otherwise. On the other, there is an intrinsic risk behind the "once in a life time" events in that, the scale of the investment and focus on the cultural and creative industries are scarce in the aftermath of such mega-events, as interviews with stakeholders involved in the London 2012 Cultural Olympiad suggested.[9]

One of the main challenges for Japan centers on whether the nation branding allows for some permeability and influence from the rest of the world, in order to

[9] Overall, one of the disadvantages brought about by the Olympics/Cultural Olympiad as expressed by LOGOC stakeholders was the redeployment of resources in terms of staffing to "cope" with the mega-event, "sucking up money and interest" from audiences, and great difficulties for cultural organizations that are not part of the "Olympic bandwagon" to access funding, including the National Lottery funding and other promotional efforts.

achieve cultural innovation in the lead-up and beyond the year 2020. In this respect, an informant from the TMG referred to one of the main programs of the 2020 Cultural Olympiad, "Tokyo Caravan[10]", as follows:

> The creative directors involved with the "Tokyo Caravan" are interested with merging with local cultures. So, wherever they go, they'll let the cultural exchange happen. Popping up here and there. For instance, if they're in Rio it'd be a Rio theme+Japan. There could be multiple caravans happening in different locations simultaneously. I think they're still fiddling between options.
>
> The first Tokyo Caravan will happen in Rio so we'll be working with local people, local cultures and they don't work like the Japanese do, of course. So, we have to learn when to let it go and just have fun with it.

Furthermore, whereas all interviewees expressed the likelihood of cooperation between metropolitan and national agencies to fulfill this task, the goals of promoting the quality and sustainability of the arts and cultural sectors may tilt considerably towards Tokyo-based organizations. In this vein, a representative for the Tokyo Organising Committee of the Olympic and Paralympic Games (TOCOG) expressed that there are two discerning branding goals regarding the 2020 Olympics. At a national level, the Olympics are intended to "inform" the perception of Japan by overseas audiences, in other words, to revamp the nation branding. And at a local level, the TMG aims to brand Tokyo as the "best" city in the world. To this interviewee, the Cultural Olympiad is one of the most important "engagement tools" for audiences that are not interested in sports, for which sufficiently "promotion and awareness" needed to be developed. Likewise, this interviewee pointed out that the cultural programming is what carves a particular "atmosphere" as well as "unforgettable memories" for host cities and their audiences. Consequently, one of the sought-after goals for stakeholders is to raise the profile of arts councils in Japan (mainly that of the ACT) by leveraging cultural funding and emulating the 'arm's-length' model[11] of Arts Council England (ACE, henceforth) with respect to the overall funding of the arts and culture. Here, the inclusion and diversity of both traditional and contemporary Japanese art and cultural forms in the Cultural Olympiad will set the tone and pace for potential institutional partnerships beyond the year 2020.

A couple of interviewees who serve in various capacities within the TMG pointed out that the enactment of several cultural/creative initiatives since early 2000s (e.g., TCCP) responded to the lack of a solid cultural policy to "win potential Olympic Games bids". As such, arts and culture were seen to play a strategic role in the "next

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[10] Tokyo Caravan will promote Japanese culture and international cultural exchanges as part of the Tokyo 2020 Cultural Olympiad. The Caravan or "Grand Cultural Circus" will start its journey in Rio de Janeiro for the 2016 Olympics as well as in various stops across Japan and overseas. The first glance at the Caravan and its concept was presented as part of a workshop and showcase at the Komazawa Olympic Park in October 2015, during which the Japanese public was able to watch the rehearsals (inclusive of behind-the-scenes preparation) and attend the final performance (Author's site visit, 2015).

[11] This arm's-length refers to a principle ruling the ACE by which the funding decisions for the arts and culture (e.g., arts organizations) should be made without direct government and/or political interference.

chapter of Japan's history" by interviewees, particularly to further international networks with fellow East Asian countries. Another interviewee at ACT further stated:

> The TMG is keen to compete with other global cities in terms of arts and cultural promotion through infrastructure and programming. Of course we want Tokyo to become the number one city by 2020 with the Olympics. That's the target. The Governor [Masuzoe] made this point during his election campaign.

To partly fulfill the above goal, the "Tokyo 2020 Festival of Arts and Culture" is set to broaden opportunities of cultural discovery to the Games' visitors, local communities, and emerging international artists. For instance, admission-free theatres and museums, parks, streets, and public facilities will be available to experience both the traditional and contemporary cultural scenes, engulfing the city into a grand spectacle, in what has been termed "the festivalization of the city" (Preuss 2004; Harvey 1989). Following in the London 2012's footsteps, Tokyo's cultural programming focuses on street revitalization, taking the arts outdoors, and commissioning disabled artists for mainstream art pieces and/or engaging disabled people through arts and culture, *à la* London 2012 "Unlimited". As such, "TURN", one of the pillars of the Tokyo 2020 cultural programming, held an exhibition and conferences in early March 2016 to showcase the concept of "creative inclusiveness" in which disabled youth "encounter" art by collaborating with visual and performance arts professionals and arts NPOs (author's visit to TURN Fes site). While this creative inclusiveness focuses on disabled Japanese citizens, other platforms such as the Tokyo Diversion Research (TDR, henceforth) project, implemented by both the TMG and ACT, tackle the relation between art (artists) and groups who are considered to be on the "fringes of society by way of disability, gender, labor, sexuality, and nationality" (ACT 2015). Both, TURN and TDR seek to build social bonds and engagement through the concept of co-existence. However, aspects of diversity, permeability, and hybridity between Japanese/Tokyoite and foreign cultures remain unchartered.

Overall, in matters related to the implementation of the 2020 Cultural Olympiad the critical issue is to harness local enthusiasm for and engagement in arts and cultural activities whereby schools, universities, and neighborhood associations are considered as main stakeholders. Genuine representation of the socio-cultural diversity in Tokyo is of utmost importance, as it will display the uniqueness so urgently sought, as well as separating Tokyo's cultural Olympiad from previous Olympic hosts.

4.2 Cultural Tourism: The Prospects for and Beyond the 2020 Olympics

According to interviewees in the arts and cultural sectors in Tokyo, it is crucial to create a scheme in which funding from the private sector and, even tax-deductible donations from the general public, can be leveraged for the 2020 Cultural



Fig. 3.1 Number of international tourists as % of city population. (Elaborated with data from Mayor of London & BOP Consulting 2014)

Olympiad.[12] For instance, former Governor Masuzoe noted the importance of boosting tax revenue through tourism ahead of 2020 to finance and make the Olympics "successful" (Masuzoe 2014). This, however, was not as straightforward as Mr. Masuzoe's remarks appeared to be. In order to encourage foreign tourists spending, tax-free or duty-free shopping (between 5% and 8% tax exemption on combined purchases over ¥5000 –in consumables such as foodstuffs, beverages, medicines, and cosmetics–at major department, electronics, and souvenir stores) has been widely advertised by governmental agencies in an effort to patch up and compensate for the lack of consumer confidence after the national tax hike of April 2014.

From a comparative perspective, Tokyo is not particularly well-positioned vis-à-vis other fellow World Cities of Culture (WCCF) (Mayor of London & BOP 2014) in the number of international tourists expressed as percentage of city population (except for Shanghai, see Fig. 3.1). Although Tokyo fares better against fellow East Asian cities in terms of the number of culture and heritage sites (see Fig. 3.2), and also vis-à-vis cities like Hong Kong, Shanghai and Singapore in the combined number of annual music, dance, and theatre performances (see Fig. 3.3), it shows a significant disadvantage in the above-referenced categories when compared to cities such as London, New York, and Paris. Nevertheless, Tokyo's main competitive advantage stems from amenities such as bars and restaurants, surpassing all other cities at the number of Michelin-starred restaurants (see Fig. 3.4). Taking into consideration this data, the inscription of *Washoku* (traditional Japanese gastronomy) as an intangible cultural heritage of humanity by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in 2013, and the findings of the Dentsu survey (Sect. 2 of this chapter), it could be argued that cuisine renders as an

[12] For example, the LOCOG leveraged 116 million pounds from an initial budget of 10 million pounds by partnering with various organizations and funders around the UK in order to "safeguard" the role of arts and culture in the Olympic program" (Author's interview with stakeholder, London 2012 Cultural Olympiad).



Fig. 3.2 Number of culture and heritage sites (National museums, other museums, art galleries, and UNESCO World Heritage Sites) per 100,000 people (excluding other heritage/historical sites). (Elaborated with data from Mayor of London & BOP Consulting 2014)
On July 17, 2016 the building of the National Museum of Western Art in Tokyo was added to the UNESCO's World Heritage list to recognize the pioneering contribution of Swiss-French architect, Le Corbusier, to the modern architectural movement. This is Tokyo's first UNESCO World-Heritage Site within its core 23 wards



Fig. 3.3 Number of theatre performances, music performances, and dance performances. (Elaborated with data from Mayor of London & BOP Consulting 2014)

unparalleled cultural attribute and therefore vital for the long-term management of both, nation and city branding.

In Japan, foreign tourism is touted by the Abe administration as one of the pillars for economic growth towards (and beyond) the year 2020. Therefore, discursively, the potential economic benefits of international tourism and the 2020 Olympics are used in a circular logic. For instance, the Bank of Japan (BOJ, henceforth) has projected positive effects for the Japanese economy as the result of hosting the 2020 Olympics through two demand channels: inbound tourism and construction investment (BOJ 2016). With regard to foreign tourism, the goal is to reach 20 million



Fig. 3.4 Restaurants, bars, and Michelin restaurants per 100,000 people. (Elaborated with data from Mayor of London & BOP Consulting 2014)

(and possibly 33 million) visitors by the year 2020 and capitalize on regional excursions nationwide (BOJ 2016). However, these numbers have heavily depended and will continually to do so on the depreciation of the yen –a considerable depreciation in nominal and real terms since 2012,[13] as part of the Abe administration monetary policy. Furthermore, even though Japan welcomed more than 13 million foreign visitors in 2014, tourists' spending represented less than 0.5% of Japan's nominal gross domestic product (GDP, henceforth) in the same year (Japan National Tourism Organization 2014; Kim and Shimizu 2014; Tomisawa 2014). Likewise, the recent increment of per visitor expenditure greatly stems from the aforementioned duty-free system and currency depreciation, being the 'bakugai' or 'explosive buying' by Chinese tourists a prime example. In terms of leisure-related consumption, the current trends show that cultural experiences (e.g., traditional arts and crafts, museums, heritage sites, etc.) constitute less than 2%[14] of per visitor expenditures (BOJ 2016). Similar account was given by one of the interviewees from the TMG:

> Tourists from other Asian countries come to Tokyo to shop, mainly. European tourists, come for the cuisine or Japanese gardens. Our emphasis on Tokyo's urban culture and cultural programming and the amount of resources we dedicate to this, gets overlooked. They don't come for the museums or cultural events… That's what we uncover from our survey taken last year [2014]. We want tourists to visit Tokyo for its culture and through that, to boost Tokyo's economy.

[13] The depreciation of the Japanese Yen in terms of real effective exchange rates (REER) and nominal effective exchange rates (NEER) between 2012 and 2015 –against a broad basket of currencies– is 18.74% and 19.1%, respectively (elaborated with data from the Bank for International Settlements 2016). The yen, however, has depreciated in real terms against the US Dollar 35% since late 2011 (IMF 2016). The value of the yen has surged in the first semester of 2016 approximately 15% (compared to the 2015 average) vis-à-vis fluctuations in the global financial market following the US dollar weakening in April 2016 and the UK referendum to leave the European Union (Brexit) in late June 2016 (IMF 2016).

[14] Calculated with data from the BOJ (2016).

In this sense, the tourism policy in the lead up to the 2020 Olympics will be oriented to develop the international awareness of the quality and safety of Japanese cultural products and services (BOJ 2016). However, according to the World Travel and Tourism Council (2014), the long-term growth of travel and tourism's direct contribution to Japan's GDP between 2014 and 2024 is projected at 1.4% (compared to 5.4% for Asia-Pacific, and 4.2% world-wide); travel and tourism's direct contribution to employment in the same period at 0.6% (compared to 2.0% for Asia Pacific and 2.0% world-wide); and travel and tourism's investment contribution to capital investment in the same period at 0.9% (compared to 6.4% for Asia Pacific and 5.1% world-wide).

To draw a comparison with an East Asian neighbor, it is helpful to look into the case of South Korea, where the national government has proactively developed a tourism policy based on culture and sports throughout the 2000s (OECD 2002, 2014). An interviewee from the Seoul Institute, the think tank of the Seoul Metropolitan Government, stated that tourism has the "Mida's touch" for a city's economic revenue in tangible (exports) and intangible (positive imagery) forms. Although the direct causality between inbound tourism/business travel and exports (among trading partners) has been incipiently explored in the literature (Kulendran and Wilson 2000; Shan and Wilson 2001; Keum 2011), there is increasing empirical evidence to support this policy direction.

According to the above-referenced interviewee, Seoul is the tourist magnet in South Korea as 80% of the inbound international tourism visits Seoul. As a corollary, the Seoul Tourism Marketing Organization Co. Ltd., (STM) founded in 2008 provides various tourism products and services in South Korea, such as city walking tours in Korean, English, Chinese, and Japanese; MICE (meeting, incentive, convention, exhibition) bidding and hosting; the operation of tourism information centers, and the management of tourism-related complaints, among others. Likewise, this informant emphasized that hospitality in the tourism industry is a top priority to the Seoul Metropolitan Government, although the relevance of attaching a quintessential Korean-ness attribute to this hospitality was not necessarily paramount to the city's brand. Rather pragmatically, the Seoul Institute has focused on conducting surveys since 2007, paying "hundreds" of surveyors to "go around Seoul" detecting, reporting, and interviewing foreign tourists on "trouble areas" (e.g., the transport system, street signs, and overall availability of tourist information in several foreign languages, etc.). According to this interviewee, 50% of these surveyors are foreigners living in Seoul. These surveys also include metrics of satisfaction among foreign tourists on categories such as accomodation, shopping, eating, and drinking.

By giving different aspects of the Korean Wave (*Hallyu*) a spatial/urban turn in Seoul City (K-Roads in Gangnam-Gu), the local tourism industry has greatly benefited from youth –and young creative/entrepreneurial– urban cultures. That is, the synergy among locations of film and television dramas,[15] Hallyu stars' sightseeing

[15] The majority of the Korean drama production houses and broadcasters are agglomerated in the Seoul Metropolitan area. Furthermore, the ownership rights of a drama set belong to municipalities (Oh 2014: 2144, 2147).

spots (i.e., cafes, restaurants, bars, parks, clothing and beauty/cosmetic stores/clinics), and gentrified areas (e.g., Garosu-gil street, the Ttuk-seom-Seongsu-Konkuk University axis, Passion Island, Itaewon). In tandem, this "destination placement" strategy has sparked conspicuous consumption of lifestyle goods (Oh 2014). However, as the appeal and consumption of cultural and/or lifestyle commodities are highly unpredictable, entrepreneurial local governments need to continually dedicate vast resources to riskier ventures. In this vein, the interviewee from the Seoul Institute pointed out that as the tourism strategy for Seoul was "almost exhausted", the next phase in the city's cultural branding would be the fashion industry, potentially turning Seoul into a world city of fashion, mainly *vis-à-vis* its East Asian neighbors. Interviews in Tokyo and Seoul strongly suggest that dialogue and collaboration between TMG and the SMG in matters of cultural branding and tourism is limited to campaigns such as "Visit Japan (Tokyo), Visit Korea (Seoul)", with little interest in developing further ties or engaging in explicit bilateral policy learning.

4.3 A Glance at the Future: The Tokyo Vision for Arts and Culture 2015–2025

The *Tokyo Vision for Arts and Culture* was launched in May 2015. It represents the long-term cultural strategy by the TMG in order to find a viable economic model for the mishmash of everyday life consumer and popular cultures in Tokyo. Furthermore, it intents to map out the course of Tokyo's urban and cultural branding for-and-beyond the Tokyo 2020 Olympics. In other words, this "vision" establishes an all-encompassing framework to commodify and commercialize popular culture, leveraging traditional arts and cultural forms for mass experiential purposes. A few concrete practices of the Vision revolve around CCI, tourism, and gastronomy in the form of introductory cultural programming for tourists (in English) to experience traditional culture and performing arts (e.g., workshops in vaudeville theatre, paper crafts, umbrella rotating, classical dance in *yukata*, *kabuki* makeup, flower arrangement (*ikebana*), and tea ceremony, among others) (ACT 2015). Additionally, ACT is set to develop international arts and cultural exchanges (artist-in-residence programs, disabled artist programs, and city diplomacy programs), as well as educational and on-the-job training programs on arts management and cultural policy.

But, what is the narrative that sets Tokyo apart from other branded urban milieux? In essence, it relies on a carefully crafted iteration of the *mélange* between contemporary and traditional vernacular cultures built for an increasingly international audience, in the form of inbound tourism. The emphasis is placed on the heritage of the Edo period popular culture and everyday life aesthetic qualities (1603–1868) as the source of cultural synergy and sophistication. The innovative cultural bonds of the ordinary citizen *vis-à-vis omotenashi* (the Japanese tradition of selfless hospitality) and its socio-economic ramifications (tourism and patronage towards CCI) are

therefore the cornerstones of Tokyo's branding. The recent launch of the official Tokyo Brand website (&Tokyo) describes the capital as "a city that promises all kinds of fun by constantly generating new styles while bringing tradition and innovation together" (TMG 2015b). The merits of Tokyo in the "& Tokyo" website are rooted in fashion, cuisine, art, hospitality, festivals, and eco-friendliness, among others. Thus, the official narrative consists in portraying the culture of Tokyo as global and tolerant; a cultural brand that intersects and bridges the East and West by promoting Tokyo as a breeding ground for both Japanese and international creative professionals. An interviewee from the TMG emphasized the most competitive features of Japan and Tokyo in the following manner:

> Efficiency. Everything works in Tokyo. And also, hospitality. That'd be a great advantage. However, we can only be hospitable in one way [alluding to the socio-cultural hierarchy in Japan]. We tend not to be flexible. That may not accommodate everyone. I think opening-up is the key. We need a lot more mixing-up with other cultures. And when we do, we have no other choice but to open-up ourselves.

Whereas urban efficiency is critical for the logistics of a mega-event such as the Olympics, it is not generally equated with cultural vibrancy. As such, much effort is expected not only to build this vibrancy form the ground-up (e.g., night culture), but also to adapt the Japanese *omotenashi* to the tourists' expectations from all over the world, especially in the aftermath of the Tokyo 2020 Olympics. Another interviewee from the TMG expanded on the long-term goals of Tokyo's branding against the backdrop of Japan's super-aging society:

> The idea is how to solve this problem through arts and culture. We could be the pioneers from which the rest of the world can learn from, especially [for] other mature economies. We could be the test bed for that sort of social experiment. Also, like in the case of London and Paris, arts and culture can contribute to economic growth. That's something that we're keen to try. And to let people in Tokyo know that arts and culture are so powerful that they can transform and make the future better. (the author's translation)

Japanese policy makers think that a core element of Tokyo's branding as a 'pioneer' resides in the improvement of urban governance for global (and Asian) metropolises through partnership and cooperation (with 30 cities by 2020). Yet, building a tangible and easily recognizable cultural brand is crucial for Tokyo. Insufficient overseas PR (in multimedia platforms), lack of tourism infrastructure (inclusive of multi-language services, and copyright and brand management) and lack of policy frameworks to transform Tokyo into a key tourist destination (Mori Memorial Foundation 2012) have been cited as major obstacles. In this sense, one of the (aforementioned) TMG interviewees commented the following:

> We're known for being weak at disseminating PR, especially overseas...Tokyo is being putting a lot of effort into cultural programming nowadays but not too many people abroad seem to know about it. Things do not reach outside Japan. We usually have little things here and there in English but, it's not very well done (grammar, content, etc.). That's one of the challenges. We're aware we have to do something about it and we're trying. Our Twitter account has already reached more than 100,000 followers in English. That's a start. It's a useful platform!

The TMG interviewees pointed out that a top priority for the TMG is being able to "control" the ways in which "people" (especially overseas) perceive the city of Tokyo. In this sense, TMG's involvement in the World Cities of Culture (WCCF) is of strategic relevance as it allows the status quo to curate and control the narrative of Tokyo's cultural branding evolvement on an international level. Whether Tokyo successfully develops a solid cultural branding (hand-in-hand with urban imagery residents can recognize as their own) remains to be seen.

5 Conclusions

The scope and scale of a nation/city branding are intrinsically linked to inward- and outward- looking dimensions of hegemonic culture practices and lifestyles. Inward-looking strategies in Tokyo's cultural branding focus on unearthing creativity and spurring innovation among all Japanese people, and in so doing, propelling a renewed sense of everyday life culture. By the same token, the 'remastering' of Japanese culture is hoped to advance the nation and urban (Tokyo) branding overseas for tourism purposes. Cultural tourism, as previously pointed out, is fostered as a key pillar for the stagnant Japanese economy. Reacquainting the Japanese public (and Tokyoites in particular) with their vernacular cultural forms, while implementing short and long-term growth strategies related to the 2020 cultural Olympiad and inbound tourism is indeed a Herculean task. Part of policy agenda in Olympic host cities is to keep the momentum going by coupling sporting events with cultural tourism, in particular audience development around the arts and culture sectors. One element to consider in the long run is the difficulty to position culture alongside sporting events, other than the Olympics. Institutionally speaking, even in a context of culture-for-economic gain, structural aspects such as funding schemes, audience development, marketing, and policymaking regarding short and long-term cultural branding must undergo through a major overhaul. Yet, what is expected is rather incremental policy and institutional innovation in the aftermath of the Tokyo 2020 Olympics. Whether Japan and Tokyo can turn the policy knowledge for the 2020 Olympics into a profitable business model in the form of expertise 'sold' to future Olympic hosts is contingent upon the ability to project 'originality', particularly in the cultural sector.

City imagery is both multifaceted and unstable. The recognition of the distinctiveness of Tokyo depends on the policy coherence regarding the meaning, impetus, scope, and direction of cultural branding. In the case of Japan, the promotion of an essentialist rhetoric of the national culture runs the risk of perpetuating anachronistic and self-Orientalizing imagery. In a global context of accelerated comparison and evaluation of cultural branding, the discourse of cultural uniqueness and distinctiveness must be carefully balanced with aspects of 'glocal' cultural hybridity and common ground. Whereas the experiential leisure and entertainment seems to permeate policy interest at national and local levels, issues related to the dialogue and multi-layered identity between residents and the city/nation are yet to be

addressed. Likewise, it can be argued that the positioning of Japan in East Asia, as envisioned through soft power and cultural branding, signals the continuation of a unidirectional insular policy approach. Furthermore, cultural pathways of reciprocity and exchange at policy level between Japan and neighboring countries like South Korea are marginal, if not effectively discouraged.

Overall, the primary data for the chapter confirm little change in the scope and direction of Japanese cultural policy praxis extensively observed in the specialized literature: (a) the instrumentalization of culture in the context of regional (Asia) and global political influence and economic value; (b) multidirectional cultural flows solely represented by the official rhetoric of 'cultural cooperation' and 'cultural exchange', and therefore ad hoc exercised (e.g., Cultural Olympiad or the Asian Performing Arts Festival); (c) policy borrowing/learning in the realms of cultural branding and soft power still largely drawn from developed Western countries. Once assembled in Japan/Tokyo, policy is enacted based on a unidirectional cultural flow primarily towards Asia.

Lastly, it is worth emphasizing that a reductionist economic approach to culture is ought to represent a transient policy direction. Galvanizing grass-roots urban imagery and cultural innovation is undoubtedly the main challenge for Tokyo and Japan; a challenge only feasibly overcome by detaching in-situ cultural dynamics from the pressure to produce and 'perform' culture in tune with mega-events.

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Chapter 4
Between Control and Disruption: News Media and Cultural Flows in Singapore and Hong Kong, China

Lorraine Lim

1 News Media in Singapore and Hong Kong, China

News media is strictly regulated in both Singapore and China. Strong state intervention has ensured that news media in both countries play more of an information and dissemination role than that of the 'fourth estate' which news media in American and European countries often aspire to. In Singapore, mainstream news 'remains regulated by the ruling political party' (Cenite et al. 2008). The Singaporean government therefore is able to exert 'considerable influence on how traditional media reports news about local politics' (George in Hao et al. 2014: 1225). Two major companies dominate the media scene in Singapore. Singapore Press Holdings which 'has close links to the ruling party' and a 'virtual monopoly of the newspaper industry' and 'MediaCorp' which operates TV and radio stations and is owned by a 'state investment agency' ('Singapore Profile- Media' in BBC News 22 January 2013).[1] In China, news media is subjected to the 'control and influence of the Chinese Communist Party' (CCP) through various measures, for example, all media outlets have to be 'sponsored by and under the authority of a government entity' (Lorentzen 2014: 410). Furthermore, journalists 'must possess a government-issued press card' which can be cancelled or not renewed by the CCP (Lorentzen 2014: 410). The largest media company in China is Chinese Central TV which is state-run. In addition, 'all of China's 2600- plus radio stations are state-owned' (BBC News: 2016). The opening-up of the media industry in China has 'extended to distribution and advertising' but 'not to editorial content' ('China Profile- Media' in BBC News, 26 April 2016).[2]

[1] http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-15966553. Accessed July 27 2016.

[2] http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-13017881. Accessed July 27 2016.

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However, the control of and the type of information that is circulated internally and externally of these two countries has come under strain in recent years. Recent studies on online media with reference to Singapore and Hong Kong, China (see Goh 2015; Kwong 2015; Lee 2015) have shown that there are three main reasons for this. Firstly, the growth of technology exemplified through the Internet and its associated social media programmes such as Facebook, YouTube and the microblogging services of Twitter and Weibo have made it easier for people to bypass 'traditional' sources of news media such as television, radio and newspapers. Within Singapore and Hong Kong, high internet penetration and usage has also meant low barriers of entry in terms of cost and equipment. As of November 2015, Hong Kong had a mobile phone penetration rate of 227.2% with almost 84% of households possessing broadband internet (Office of the Communications Authority 2016). Singapore also possesses a high mobile phone and broadband internet penetration rate of around 148% and 103% respectively (Information Development Authority 2016). Besides being an information platform, the Internet is also a useful tool allowing for a 'new form of mobilisation'; where 'highly personalized digital networks' allow for users to not only connect with one another but coordinate resources (Lee et al. 2015: 357). For the Umbrella Movement[3] that took place in Hong Kong in 2014, online media was widely acknowledged to have 'played important roles in the communication, organisation, and coordination that took place among the occupiers' (Lee 2015: 335).

Secondly, researchers have pointed out that the largest and fastest growing demographic of users creating and accessing alternative online news media sources are young people within these two countries (see Lee 2015; Hao et al. 2014; Goh 2015; Tsui 2015). These youths, which are usually categorized as being under 35, are labelled as 'digital natives' (see Prensky 2001) as opposed to 'digital immigrants'. Digital natives are described as being 'born' into the digital age as opposed to their older counterparts who had to emigrate from an analogue world to a digital one. They thus possess an ease and familiarity with navigating various technologies and are continually pushing the boundaries through developing new uses and tools. What this particular demographic also share in common is a growing political consciousness that can be traced back to the political and social upheavals (or lack thereof, in the case of Singapore) they experienced growing up.

For young Hongkongers growing up post-1997,[4] there is a sense that being a part of China has only resulted in increasing overt political control and a lack of

[3] The Umbrella Movement was a pro-democracy political movement that took place in 2014. The movement was first known as 'Occupy Central' but became known as the umbrella movement with reference to how umbrellas were used for defence against tear gas. The protest came about due to the decision made by the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress on proposed reforms to the Hong Kong Electoral System. The decision was seen to be too restrictive and seem to indicate that candidates for the Hong Kong Chief Executive Election in 2017 would be prescreened by the Chinese Communist Party before being presented to the Hong Kong Electorate.

[4] 1997 was the year that Hong Kong was formally returned to China. It was agreed that a 'One Country, Two Systems' principle would be practised whereby Hong Kong would be treated as a Special Administrative Region where the socialist system of China would not be implemented and that its way of life would remain unchanged for 50 years.

political autonomy that has impacted upon their social and economic prospects. This perception is supported when one looks at issues such as freedom of the press and political rights. Hong Kong has seen its ranking in the World Press Freedom Index fall from 18th in the world in 2002 to 70th in 2015 (Reporters without Borders: 2015). A survey of the general public conducted in 2014 showed that'49.1% of citizens believed that Hong Kong media practiced self-censorship' and '56.7% believed that the media had reservations about criticizing the Chinese government' (Kwong 2015: 273–274). The issue of universal suffrage which was discussed as part of the 1997 handover, also seems to be have been postponed to 2017. What has also occurred since 1997 has been changes in Hong Kong society itself which has seen a large influx of immigrants from China putting pressure on housing and public services and a growing economic inequality. While the older generation in Hong Kong 'embraced a self-reliant spirit', the younger generation feel that the 'government has a significant role in helping them meet their challenges' and their concerns do not seem to have been addressed by the current government (Cheng 2014: 208–209).

For young Singaporeans who have grown up in a country that has transformed itself into an economic powerhouse in just under 50 years, the lack of political upheaval has resulted in a demographic that is now more interested in '(social and moral) values rather than by the obsession with (monetary) value' (Tan 2012: 280). This was evident in the Singapore General Elections in 2011 where it became clear that while younger Singaporeans were interested in bread and butter issues of job security and wages, they were also aware of the uneven political playing field in Singapore. For them, issues such as 'electoral fair play, civil liberties, and quality of life' were also becoming important (Tan 2012: 267). Many young Singaporeans have identified that a main reason for this lack of 'fair play' stem from government regulation of mainstream media which often sees positive coverage of government and party policies and positions (see Cenite et al. 2008). They have thus turned to alternative online media sources to not only seek news of other political parties but to also challenge and rebut assertions made by the ruling party on members of the opposition in an attempt to ensure that accurate information is being disseminated. The growing political consciousness of both young people in Hong Kong and Singapore coupled with their ease with digital technology has resulted in a demographic that is able to share their dissenting views widely across multiple platforms through the Internet in a way that their parents could not.

The final reason for why both Singapore and China is struggling to maintain complete control over news media is the international nature of technology which stymies efforts of national governments to control and manage the flow of information not only within a nation but transnationally as well. At the heart of this issue is how to manage 'new virtual landscapes' and how to 'expand territorial law into the previously non-territorial network' (Hintz 2012: 129). Where it used to be possible to arrest journalists or shut down offices, how can governments respond today to information that does not 'belong' to a physical space?

This chapter thus seeks to show the impacts of various attempts at regulation from both governments and the disruption from citizens of these 'flows' in the news.

It also aims to highlight that these attempts at regulation at 'news' goes beyond just the reporting of current news events but also to the re-presentations, re-interpretations or the organisation of a physical event of past historical events such as film documentaries and vigils. It will show that controlling not only current news events but interpretations of past events has an implication goes beyond presenting an official version but also highlights a desire from both the Singapore and Chinese citizens to re-think and re-construct their national and cultural identities.

2 To Re-port the News

The link between factual news reporting and a cultural product such as a film documentary can be best understood through how both these texts have an influence on a person who consumes these texts. In his book, *The Cultural Industries*, David Hesmondhalgh writes that 'newspapers, broadcast news programmes, documentaries,…films, TV series' provide people with 'recurring representations of the world…constitute our inner private lives and our public selves…and identities' and 'contribute strongly to our sense of who we are' (Hesmondhalgh 2007: 3). Therefore, while an event might have occurred in the past, the re-portrayal of the event in a different text has the potential to contribute to changing ideas or assumptions of what has gone on before. For the Singapore and Chinese governments, it was possible, before the advent of online media, to control and limit not only what news was made available but also the way in which the news was reported and how this information was disseminated as the 'political system is a paramount structural apparatus for building its media narrative' (Pan et al. 1999: 100). An official version of what occurred could be circulated and this version would thus form a part of the accepted version of the history of the nation and influence the development of policies that impacted upon the creation of national and cultural identity, for example.

The idea of 'narratives' here is helpful in allowing us to understand the responses from the Singaporean and Chinese governments on online media. In his article, *Narrative Analysis- or Why (and How) Sociologists Should be Interested in Narrative,* Franzosi states that the stories (or narratives, as he terms them) we read in the news when analysed reveal an 'understanding of social relations as embedded in linguistic practices' (1998: 550). In other words, 'the role of the reader is far from passive', where readers bring in their own attitudes based on their own knowledge and experiences (Franzosi 1998: 546). At the same time, the construction of these stories also present perhaps the ideologies of the writer whereby 'some events are ignored, some adapted to the narrative, and other cause the narrative to change path' (Budarick 2011: 40). Beside the story itself, what is also key is that 'characters within a story are attributed various moral, motivational and function qualities' and the way these qualities are presented are meant to influence a reader's perception of the story whereby the 'often binary codes make them common to the various public spheres of society' and allows readers to decide if these characters are

'heroes or antiheros' (Budarick 2011: 40). As demonstrated above, due to the strong state control of local media in both Singapore and China, it is possible for the governments to present 'narrative' that provide opportunities to perhaps push ahead with certain policies based on how the news was presented. In their study on the influence of media policy narratives, Shanahan et al. have highlighted that 'policy narratives do contain frames that develop problem definitions based on the inclusion of some evidences and not other information to bolster a particular policy outcome (2011: 374).

However, a younger demographic in both these countries are aware of the censorship of past news events and are now, coupled with the use of technologies, attempting to re-port and include information that had been left out of these past news events. I use the word 're-port' deliberately as opposed to 'report' to highlight that what these young group of people are doing are not just providing a 'spoken or written account of something that one has observed' as the term is commonly understood (Oxford Dictionary 2016), but rather examining and questioning the reporting of past news events so as to be able to 're-port' these past events with information that they feel might have been omitted when these events were first reported. This section will provide examples from both Singapore and Hong Kong to show how narratives of past events as well as future narratives have been and can be constructed and how they are being re-examined through the work of filmmakers and writers. It will highlight how technology has allowed for these new 'versions' to flow between countries despite attempts by the government to stymie these 'flows'.

The next section will show how responses from both the Singapore and Chinese governments highlight an awareness of the implications of alternate interpretations of what has occurred in the past. I will highlight how through this re-porting, what is also happening is that the narratives of past stories are being challenged where not only the sequence of events are being questioned but also where the roles of people within these stories who perhaps were initially portrayed as 'villains (those who cause a problem), victims (those harmed by a problem), and heroes (those who can solve a problem)' are re-examined and redefined in these re-ports (Shanahan et al. 2011: 374). I will argue that non-governmental sanctioned accounts of news events have the potential of creating a space that allows citizens to interrogate issues surrounding how history has been presented and the ways in which this particular vision of history has been used to justify political, social and cultural decisions and policies impacting upon the formation of what it means to be Singaporean or Chinese.

3 Challenging Narratives

It would be possible, via two examples from Singapore, to see how this re-porting of the news is an issue that they would consider problematic. In 2014, the film *To Singapore, with Love*, a documentary made by local filmmaker TAN Pin Pin was

issued with a Not Allowed All Ratings (NAR) classification by the Media Development Authority (MDA) which meant that it could not be in screened in public although private screenings are allowed and screenings at tertiary institutions are possible if certain conditions are met. *To Singapore, with Love* contained interviews with Singaporean political exiles who had fled Singapore between the 1960s and 1980s due to their fear of detention without trial. Tan, has sought to explain that she made the film to 'understand how we became who we are by addressing what was banished and unspoken for' so as to be able to 'understand ourselves better as a nation' (To Singapore, with Love website: 2014).[5] For her, the film was an attempt to 'give Singaporeans a sense of the different movements that have shaped the country, or not shaped the country' (Chen: *New York Times:* 2014). MDA would however have a different view on the purpose of this film, writing that their decision on the classification of the film was based on the grounds that the film's content 'undermined national security' and presented 'distorted' information by not providing a balanced view of the issues being presented in the documentary (MDA: 2014). A subsequent appeal by the director was rejected with the Films Appeal Committee (FAC) stating that it found the film to be a 'one-sided account' that if presented to viewers 'without sufficient knowledge and understanding of the historical context would take the views presented as the truth' (FAC: 2014).

An attempt to control what kind of 'news' was being presented would also occur with the work of graphic artist Sonny LIEW with his graphic novel, *The Art of Charlie Chan Hock Chye*. The novel portrays the life of a fictional artist known as Charlie CHAN and includes depictions of LEE Kuan Yew, Singapore's first prime minister as well as opposition politician turned exile LEE Chin Siong and key political and historical events in Singapore such as Operation Spectrum[6] and the Hock Lee Bus Riots.[7] A day before the launch of the book, Liew and his publisher, Epigram Books, would be informed by the National Arts Council Singapore (NAC) that a SGD$8000 (USD$5300) publishing grant for the book would be withdrawn. As the book had already been printed, this meant that the publisher would have to bear all costs of the publications. This can be construed as a form of financial censorship. The reasons behind this withdrawal were similar to those offered to Tan for her film, where the 'retelling of Singapore's history in the work potentially

[5] http://www.tosingaporewithlove.com/. Accessed 30 March 2016.

[6] Also known as the 'Marxist Conspiracy', Operation Spectrum was a security operation that arrested and detained without trial (under Singapore's Internal Security Act) a total of 22 people in 1987. The government stated that people arrested posed a threat to national security as they sought to seize power and subvert the government through communism. Nine of the detainees upon being released alleged that they were tortured while detained in a press statement. Eight of these nine people were subsequently re-arrested and were only released after signing statutory declarations denying the press statement. There have since been questions about the allegations made by the state about the intentions of the arrested. See Turnbull, M. 2009. *A History of Modern Singapore, 1819–2005* (3rd ed.). Singapore: Singapore University Press.

[7] The Hock Lee Bus Riots are a series of events that began when the Hock Lee bus workers went on strike in 1955. The strikes escalated into a clash between various unions and law enforcement on 12 May 1955 which resulted in 4 deaths.

undermines the authority or legitimacy of the Government and its public institutions' which were in breach of the NAC's funding guidelines (Channel NewsAsia: 2015). In his interviews conducted about the book, it would seem that one of Liew's aims of focusing on subject material that was deemed political sensitive was again about being able to 'suggest the need for a critical and sceptical approach to whatever narratives we encounter' (*Comic Book Resources*: 2016). What has occurred here with both Tan's film and Liew's book is that through interviews with exiles that had never had their positions presented before in Singapore as well as the re-interpretation of key historical events in Singapore through the eyes of a fictional character, different 'versions' of what happened in Singapore's past political development are being presented; questioning if there is indeed a 'true' version about the political development of Singapore.

I would argue that that if the film or the book had been released before the advent of digital technologies, both these cultural products would have faced limited ways in which they could reach out to a wider audience both within Singapore and internationally. However, it is possible to see how technology has enabled both Tan's and Liew's work to reach a wider than expected audience. Tan, would use the internet as a platform to not only disseminate information about the film but also organised private screenings of the film taking place outside of Singapore. The website contains not only information about the film such as its trailer but also a list of future screenings and information of how to obtain a copy of the film on DVD or watch it online albeit with restrictions. A film banned in Singapore for public screening also entails a distribution ban. However, these restrictions can be bypassed through certain means. For example, as long the film has been posted from an overseas address, it can be sold to anyone overseas. If one wishes to watch the film online, as long as the IP address of the computer is not located in Singapore, the film can be viewed on the Vimeo website for a fee of USD$2.99 per view. The latter form of accessing the film can be bypassed with the use of Virtual Private Networks (VPN) which are widely used and easily accessible as highlighted in an editorial in the Singapore broadsheet in 2013 (see Tan 2013).

For Liew, the publicity of the withdrawal of the grant would make *Charlie Chan Hock Chye* a bestseller within Singapore. As of March 2016, it has sold around 9000 copies where a similar locally-published graphic novel sells about 500 copies a year. However, Liew's book is also experiencing international recognition and a growth in sales because it is possible to buy it on global websites such as Amazon. In addition, it is also possible to read online reviews by the book conducted by international media agencies such as the BBC in the UK and National Public Radio in America allowing for the content of this book to be discussed on a wider platform. Technology has enabled there to be a cultural flow of the ideas being presented in both these cultural products even though there have been attempts to stymie this flow by the Singaporean government.

It is not only the re-porting of past new items that might make governments wary but also how current news events re-interpreted could also potentially pose a challenge to government sanctioned news and information. The reaction the Chinese government has had to the release of the recent film *Ten Years* would be a case in

point. An omnibus of five short films, *Ten Years* imagines a Hong Kong in the future which has been completely taken over by China to the extent that 'neither the language, Cantonese, nor local agricultural products can be freely used' (Sala: *The Guardian*: 2016). Despite playing to full houses in Hong Kong when it was first on general release till January 2016, with the film drawing more movie goers than Hollywood blockbuster *Star Wars: The Force Awakens*, its run was not extended by cinema operators in Hong Kong. Political commentators would feel that this was in response to criticism from Chinese news media on the content of the film. In a similar strategy adopted by Tan, private screenings of the film are now being organised via Facebook (https://www.facebook.com/hktenyears/). The various stories in the film point to a Hong Kong in the future where its local cultural identity has been systematically erased and subsumed into a larger Chinese national whole.

According to Andrew CHOI, the executive producer of the film, the film project started around 2012 and the original intent was to make a film about Hong Kong, however, 'Hong Kong became very political in every way' and therefore the film had to 'involve the current situation' (Chan: *Washington Times*: 2016). The attempt by the Chinese government to introduce a national education curriculum which was abandoned in 2012 amid accusations and protests that the content was tantamount to brainwashing students with propaganda from China, would have served as inspiration for aspects of the film along with the Umbrella Protests that took place in 2014. There is a fear here that current continual attempts by the Chinese government to influence various aspects of a Hongkonger's cultural identity would eventually result in the dystopian future set out in the film.

What is key about this example is not only how current news events are being re-interpreted and re-imagined but what the potential consequences are if what is happening is not being challenged. As NG Ka-leung, one of the directors in the film highlights, the film is 'not a prediction' but rather about the 'need to face the future together (Sala: *The Guardian*: 2016). What the filmmakers are trying to do, through this film, is to ask Hongkongers to question and think about the qualities that make them different from China, be it language or local produce, so as to find a way to preserve these qualities that represent their cultural identity. This, in a way, is a challenge to attempts by the Chinese government via its national education curriculum or its proposed national security law to try and bring Hong Kong more in line with the way mainland China is being governed. It's clear that the Chinese government is not happy with the film and is not only trying to control the dissemination of this film by limiting ways for the film to be screened but are also preventing the broadcasting of the Hong Kong Film Award ceremony where *Ten Years* has been nominated for the Best Film Award.[8] The awards ceremony have been broadcasted in China since 1991. What seems to be occurring here is an attempt by the Chinese government to not only control the dissemination of past news events, which they have been able to before, but also how to ensure that current re-ports or re-interpretations of these past events would have minimal influence or impact upon mainlanders in China today. There is a real fear here that despite measures to contain

[8] The film would eventually win the Best Film Award.

information about the film that there are cultural flows occurring between the borders of Hong Kong and China. This section has also demonstrated that total control is no longer possible with the advent of technologies, the next section will examine the implications of this re-porting and the responses from both governments to tighten these flows.

4 Between Control and Disruption: Changing Narratives and Technological Boundaries

What the above examples seek to highlight is how it is possible to view the control of 'news' as more than the reporting of current events. The examples seek to extend the idea of 'news', by re-porting past events so as to counter government-sanctioned and controlled narratives about a particular news event. When news events form the basis for political and social policies that can impact upon the formation of a person's national and cultural identity, the questioning of past narratives can potentially lead to the challenging of authority that might offer a de-stabilising effect for both the Singaporean and Chinese governments.

Singapore's 'was created when it became independent in 1965 following its expulsion from the Federation of Malaya in 1965 (Lim et al. 2014: 15). This narrative was used to justify policies and laws such as the Internal Security Act (ISA) whereby under the law', 'the state has the right to detain an individual for an indefinite period without trial on grounds that the individual is a threat to national security' (Lim et al. 2014: 17). This was used to detain political activists such as the fore-mentioned LEE and Singaporeans (such as the detainees from Operation Spectrum). What Tan and Liew have done is ask through their respective works if these people were actually the 'villains' they were made out to be or if the ISA was used as a form of political intimidation so as to allow the government to pursue policies that they feel were necessary to fulfil this narrative. What is happening here is that a younger generation of Singaporeans are becoming more aware of the competing narratives that are present in the history of Singapore, and technology as allowed for the creation of 'new pockets of space for the proliferation of ideas previously suppressed…(by) the state' where Singaporeans can 'engage with each other, challenge the establishment and shape the national narrative and public discourse' (Lim et al. 2014: 19).

For China, there is an attempt by the Chinese government to impose a narrative of a one 'nation-family' onto Hong Kong and the failed attempt to introduce the fore-mentioned compulsory classes titled 'Moral and National Education' in primary and secondary 2012 is one example. Media coverage of the 1997 handover ceremony of Hong Kong to China, highlighted how China viewed the handover as a 'family reunion' whereby CCTV and the *People's Daily* (a Chinese newspaper) 'profusely praised' the fact that the handover signified that 'children of the Yellow Emperor' will not be united in the 'big motherland family' (Pan et al. 1999: 104).

The attempt to introduce classes which sought to promote the CCP as 'progressive, selfless and united' against multi-party systems which are seen as disastrous led to criticisms that the classes were aimed at influencing an 'impressionable younger generation in order to ensure…future loyalty at the polls' ('National Education raises furor in Hong Kong' in CNN News 30 July 2012[9]; 'Hong Kong debates 'national education' classes' in BBC News 1 September 2012[10]). The film *Ten Years* thus challenge this narrative of a harmonious nation-family by highlighting other potential outcomes of this narrative.

The challenging of these narratives which are now possible due to new technology has thus led to authorities in both Singapore and China using a mix of territorial and non-territorial methods to control the flow of information within and outside of a nation. For China, in an attempt to control the flow of information between Hong Kong and mainland China during the Umbrella protests, 'information about the Umbrella Movement was largely blocked in China'; however a survey conducted on movement participants showed that up to 40% of those surveyed were able to explain to their friends in mainland China the 'background, aims and development of the movement' via social media platforms such as Weibo (Lee and Chan 2015: 12). In addition, during the period of the movement (which lasted 79 days), China would also stopped approving group tour travel to Hong Kong because of the 'spread of pro-democracy demonstrations' (Pham: Bloomberg: October 3 2014). This move was largely seen to prevent mainlanders from having the opportunity to visit the site where the protests were taking place or to obtain information about the demonstrations. The results of these methods of control have produced mixed results. While information about topics sensitive to China are not available widely in China, it does not mean that information is not leaking through, or in other words, there are cultural flows between borders. The annual Tiananmen vigil held in Hong Kong has since an increase in attendees where organisers speculate are due to increasing number of mainlanders travelling into Hong Kong to attend the event (Hung and Ip 2012).

In Singapore, the government already uses libel laws and defamation suits to counter what they perceive to be inaccurate news reporting and have seen sought to exert some form of control over the non-territorial network through the implementation of the Media Convergence Act enacted in 2013. The act, sought to make online media such as websites, play by the rules of traditional media through a series of measures where websites that met certain conditions were required to register their website with the MDA. Registration of a website would entail putting up a SGD$50,000 bond (USD$36,500) as well as abiding by rules such as not being able to accept foreign funds for the provision, management and/ or provision of the website. The latter regulation clearly highlights how there is a desire here to maintain some form of territorial control of how the news is reported in Singapore where there is an assumption that funding from foreign interests would be potentially

[9] http://edition.cnn.com/2012/07/30/world/asia/hong-kong-national-education-controversy/. Accessed 21 November 2016.

[10] http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-19407425. Accessed 21 November 2016.

damaging. Since the implementation of this act, at least one socio-political website, *The Breakfast Network* has had to close because it did not register its website. The Media Convergence Act can thus be seen as a way in which the Singapore government is attempting to expand territorial law into a non-territorial space by placing limitations on the operations and management of websites that produce what is essentially intangible content. The Chinese government is also recognising the potential reach and influence of websites through two recent announcements. Firstly, a draft law that would require websites to register their domain names with the authorities is the latest way in which the government seeks to expand control to non-territorial spaces. This proposed registry could potentially 'create a system of censorship' where websites that are only 'specifically registered with the Chinese government would be reachable from within the country' (Mozur: *New York Times*: 2016). Secondly, the ban imposed by the country's internet regulator, The Cyberspace Administration of China, on original news reporting. In this ban, operators of mobile and online news services are 'only carry reports provided by government controlled print or online media' (Bloomberg News 'China Bans Internet News Reporting as Media Crackdown Widens' in Bloomberg News 25 July 2016).[11]

It would also be naïve to think that governments are not engaged in other forms of control such as surveillance or data collection. It has been documented that the Chinese government has adopted a 'sophisticated combination of technology, human censors, and traditional propaganda to prevent citizens from organising and coordinating' mass public demonstrations, for example. (Tsui 2015: 2). This is particular problematic when the laws surrounding online communication such as e-mails are not as clear cut as communication over the telephone or post, and it might be that someone's e-mails that have been hacked and leaked to the press might not have the same recourse in court. Critics of Singapore's government introduction of laws on online media have highlighted that the measures adopted meant that website operators would err on the side of caution and self-censor rather than lose their bond or registration.

5 Conclusion

What is clear from these measures is that the reporting of news in Singapore and China is not a free-for-all, and what remains to be seen is how successful these measures will be in the near future in controlling the reporting and dissemination of news events. A pessimistic point of view highlights that while barriers of entry are low, governments can 'bring overwhelming resources to bear to respond and counter' an online movement they do not approve of (Tsui 2015: 5). In addition, as can be seen in the case of Singapore, governments can also 'simply raise the cost of maintaining (a) website' which can be significant for 'marginal and under-resourced

[11] http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-07-25/china-slaps-ban-on-internet-news-reporting-as-crackdown-tightens. Accessed July 27 2016.

civil society organisations' and individual citizens (Tsui 2015: 5). An optimistic point of view points out that the Internet, compared to traditional forms of media, is still largely unregulated and has the potential to become a civil society that exists without borders. In China, the use of social media such as Weibo has provided 'vast new platforms for Chinese citizens to exchange views and information' where the 'scope and speed of information flow' makes censorship more difficult (Hung and Ip 2012: 515). Therefore there is a scope for multiple views to be heard and debated rather than simply adopting an official position. Research on news consumption in Singapore has found that news consumption through the Internet 'was found to be significantly associated with both offline and online political/ civic engagement as well as political knowledge' (Hao et al. 2014: 1230). The Internet thus not only becomes an information and communication tool but also possesses the potential to increase political and civic engagement in the citizenry through being an available source for news.[12]

While it is possible to point to the potential emancipatory potential of technology to challenge the state through examples such as the Arab Spring, what has to acknowledged too is that 'the usage of these new media for political participation is still very much restricted by the local political structure and culture' (Hao et al. 2014: 1233). Therefore while journalists in China are able to use *Weibo* to connect with like-minded people and are able to 'post, read, re-post, and comment on current events, protests, and disasters that are often not reported in the traditional media but which lead to public debate', it is highly unlikely that this alone would result in a freer media (Svensson 2012: 26). In his article, *China's Strategic Censorship',* Lorentzen argues that the Chinese government has developed a strategy that allows for 'journalists to report aggressively on low-level malfeasance' to demonstrate a willingness to improve governance and yet at the same time also 'constantly adjusting the amount of reporting in order to avoid giving discontented citizens enough information' (2014: 413). The state thus places unspoken limits on what is permissible and how much is permissible. This is similar with regards to how the media is controlled in Singapore where the Internet Code of Practice states that there is a need to ensure that 'nothing in included in any broadcasting services which is against public interest or order, national harmony or which offends against good taste or decency' but what kinds of material that would run afoul of these parameters is never made explicit (MDA: 2016). Technology alone 'cannot be the cause of democratic shifts' as the state still possesses the power to assert control (Hyun and Kim 2014: 10).

Yet, it is undeniable that that technology has definitely had an impact on the control and disruption of news media within Singapore and China. The examples highlighted in the chapter point to ways in which news and information can be disseminated that would not have been possible before the arrival of the Internet. It is

[12] This positive view of the Internet however should also take into account that people who tend to use the Internet are pre-disposed to civic and political engagement. A study in Singapore showed that Singaporeans who went online for alternative information during the election tended to be 'younger, have higher income and are more educated' (Tan et al. 2011 in Goh: 2015: 16).

possible to see how the Internet and its associated media can and have already provided alternatives to state control media and how technology through the hands of its users are challenging and disrupting these controls. What remains to be seen is the extent of how these controls can be challenged and what this would mean for the flow of information across borders in the future.

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Chapter 5
The Korean Wave, Encountering Asia and Cultural Policy

Hye-Kyung Lee

Abstract The existing literature on the Korean Wave and Asian cultural flows highlights regional audiences' inter-cultural encountering and dialogue via transnational media consumption. However, Korea's experience tells a different story. Contemporary Korea as a pop-culture-sending country has not yet experienced an enthusiastic reception of Asian pop cultures and their virtual encountering with other Asians is relatively limited. Rather, the encounter tends to occur in the real-world settings of transnational tourism that is sometimes linked to the Korean Wave and the Asianised (im)migration. As such, it is divided between the transnational and the multicultural, and the division is affirmed by government cultural policy facilitating commercially-driven inbound tourism and population policy concerned with social integration of marriage immigrants and their families. The consequence is the lack of reflexive, cross-cultural dialogues 'inside' the country. This might be an indicator of the disjuncture in cultural regionalisation itself: the flow of media content and the flow of people, who bring their own language and way of life with them, may take their own routes, providing members of a society with different sorts of experiences of encountering others and making (or not making) connections with them.

Keywords Korean Wave · Cultural policy · South Korea · Encountering Asia · Korean pop culture · Multiculturalism · Multicultural family

1 The Korean Wave and Encountering Asia

The rise of South Korean pop culture in Asia and beyond is well documented and frequently discussed. The common narrative is that it started with the popularity of Korean drama in Vietnam and China in the second half of the 1990s and was affirmed as a region-wide phenomenon with the explosive female fandom around

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Winter Sonata, a Korean TV drama series broadcasted in Japan in early 2000s, which was followed by the huge success of another Korean drama series, *Dae Jang Geum*, in Taiwan and many other Asian countries. Other forms of pop culture such as pop music, film and games have also ridden the Korean Wave for the last 10 years, solidly positioning Korea as a key centre of East and Southeast Asian pop culture. Many scholars have tried to make sense of the Korean Wave within regional contexts or define it as a regional cultural phenomenon whilst its successful reach to global audiences is increasingly noted more recently.

One of the shared views is that the Korean Wave assists the ongoing process of the formation of pan-Asian pop culture, which is created, re-created, circulated and consumed widely in the region. Instead of taking the Korean Wave as a historically unique phenomenon, scholars tend to regard it as a reiteration of the regional sharing of Asia-originated pop culture in the past, for example, that of Hong Kong gangster film in the 1980s and Japanese pop culture in the 1990s (Cho 2011; Iwabuchi 2013). In this sense, the Korean Wave might indicate one of many critical moments in the continuous making and remaking of Asian pop culture with further moments hopefully coming with other Asian Waves, for example, the Taiwanese Wave or Vietnamese Wave (Cho 2005). Such a view has double implications: it firmly ties the Korean Wave to the Asian (East and Southeast Asian to be precise) region as a both cultural and spatial entity, thus deterring it from being seen as a potentially global and transregional phenomenon; at the same time, the Wave is endowed some degree of generality as it (re-)captures something that has already happened and perhaps will happen again in the regional pop cultural sphere.

Like popular culture of other origins, Korean pop cultural products provide their audiences with a source of pleasure, dream, fantasy and escape from the mundane life (Chan and Wang 2011) and a space for forging and expressing individual or collective identities. Yet, many scholars agree that the Korean Wave's implications for Asian audiences go beyond this. For example, Youna Kim (2013) points out that, by being exposed to and experiencing Korean pop culture such as a TV drama, Asian audiences can develop a better awareness of socio-cultural and economic conditions under which they are living, critically reflecting on the legitimacy of their own social systems and imagining new possibilities. The key agency in this process of everyday reflexivity might primarily be middle-class youth and women who live in the contemporary social conditions which are mostly urban, mobile and transnational while constantly negotiating with existing social hierarchies and constraints in their society. Koichi Iwabuchi (2013) links such individual reflexivity to the possibility of cross-border dialogue and cultural connections among Asian audiences. He indicates that Korean pop culture products generate not only wider repertories for Asian audiences to re-view their own lives, but also moments for encountering with other Asian modernities (as an alternative to Western modernities) and forging mutual understanding with Asian neighbours in a transnational scope. From this perspective, the Korean Wave exemplifies an imagined, cultural consumption space in which Asian audiences feel a sense of cultural proximity, coevality and connectedness to other Asian societies, which are both familiar to and different from their own. In spite of the existence of various forces of disconnections and non-sharing

(Chua 2012; Iwabuchi 2013), it is expected that the intra-Asian cultural dialogue via the Korean Wave functions as a catalyst for Asians to newly discover an interest in other Asians and their societies and develop a feeling of living in the same contemporary world that might be characterised with the rising consumerism underpinned by the rapid economic expansion, modern lifestyle shaped by both global and local forces, and increasing individuality amidst heavy operation of traditional values and norms.

While acknowledging the potentiality of the Korean Wave's contribution to the formation of cultural dialogue as well as shared feelings and identities in the region, this chapter points out that perhaps Koreans themselves have been rather detached from such an experience due to the country's distinct position in the regional media and cultural flows, where it has not had a big moment of passionate reception of pop culture from the region. Rather, Koreans' encounter with Asia tends to occur in the real-world situation of transnational tourism, which is sometimes related to the Korean Wave, and the Asianised (im)migration. Looking at Korean cultural policy's approach to these two areas, the chapter argues that the encounter with Asia is divided between 'the transnational' and 'the multicultural'. While the former highlights economic values of the Asian markets for Korea's cultural exports and tourism, the latter is preoccupied with the agenda of social integration of marriage immigrants and their families. What is problematic is that these bipolar streams of cultural policy leave very little scope for deliberating on Koreans' reflexive engagement in intercultural dialogue with Asian neighbours, not to mention their exploring and feeling Asian identities.

2 Korea's (Lack of) Experience of Asian Pop Culture

Amidst the expanding cultural flow and media sharing in Asia, Korea holds an unusual position. This is because, ordinary Koreans seldom take part in the process of making pan-Asian identity formation via pop culture consumption or 'pop Asianism' in the following two senses. Firstly, although Hong Kong film was popular in Korea in the 1980s and the 1990s and there are young people who are attracted to Japanese popular culture, the impacts of these Asian cultures have not been felt widely. Hong Kong's martial art and gangster films were received mainly as nostalgic and extremely masculine fantasies and, therefore, Koreans' feeling of contemporariety with Hong Kong society or sharing of the latter's modernity was quite limited. Whereas there is avid consumption of Japanese pop culture by youth and J pop philes, the Japanese Wave has never been a society wide, explosive phenomenon. For example, Korea was excluded from the Asia- and world-wide *Oshin* phenomenon where *Oshin*, a Japanese TV drama series, was broadcast in 51 countries including Singapore, China, Thailand, Taiwan, Vietnam, Mongolia and countries in the Middle East, Africa, Europe, North and South America, between 1984 and 1996, gaining phenomenal popularity (Takahashi 1998). Before the Korean government's ban on Japanese popular culture began to lose its hold in the late 1990s, the

consumption of Japanese cultural products was taking place underground. Today, there still are restrictions on Japanese TV programmes and pop music on TV and radio channels while the Korean reception of Japanese films has been unexpectedly lukewarm.

Perhaps the ‘Japanese Wave’ in Korea is most strongly felt in the book market, especially novels. For example, the sales of Japanese novels in Korea increased by 40% between 2005 and 2015, and the number of Japanese novels published in Korea soared from 437 to 1132 (The Herald Business 2015a), with the popularity of female-oriented genres and the crime genre being noted. While the high demand for Japanese novels is often compared with the decline of Korean literature (Weekly Kyunghyang 2007), the Japan fever is felt among the book reading public only. Meanwhile, Japanese animations on cable channels are consumed mainly by teenagers and the viewership of Japanese drama on cable channels, which quickly gained popularity in the 2000s, appears to be limited to young audiences in their late teens, twenties and early thirties (Chosun Ilbo 2007). In other words, the Japanese Wave is not (yet) felt by Koreans as a ‘boom’ or ‘explosion’ of Japanese pop culture. A key reason for this might be the limited access of Japanese TV shows and music to Korean terrestrial TV and radio, which are a very popular and omnipresent media serving a wide range of audiences, including the middle-aged and elderly. Of course, Korean TV had a reputation for copying Japanese TV programmes without acknowledgement for decades, and its current TV dramas and films are sometimes based on Japanese manga, novel and drama (this can be called ‘*quiet* wave from Japan’). Nevertheless, the original products are seldom experienced in Korea in the endemic and passionate manner in which Korean pop culture is received in the country’s Asian neighbours.

The second reason for Korea’s distinct position in the Asian pop culture geography is that Koreans have had few chances to experience Korean drama or pop music as Asian pop culture. In short, Koreans have been ‘observers’ rather than participants in this process of Asian pop culture formation via the consumption of Korean Wave products. Their feeling of ‘being connected to Asia’ or ‘being part of the scene’ has not been generated by their own everyday mundane consumption of Asian media products but mainly by observing the enthusiastic responses from Asian neighbours to Korean pop culture via journalistic media. Of course, there are increasing cultural dialogues, mixing and mutual borrowing via pop culture between Korea and some neighbouring countries, but this may be the case mainly with those who are involved in the production and distribution of Korean drama, film or pop music, or those who are pan-Asian fan communities of Korean idols. Koreans are aware of the increasing Asian elements in Korean pop culture today such as Chinese, Japanese, Taiwanese or Thai members in K-pop bands and a growing number of non-Korean celebrities being shown on Korean TV. More recently, they are getting news reports that feature Korean media companies, such as CJ group, trying to secure regional markets via investing in film co-production, distribution and exhibition in some Asian countries such as Vietnam (The Korea Economic Daily 2014).

Similarly, there are reports on Chinese companies, for example, Tencent, acquiring stakes in Korean games companies (Yonhap News 2016a). It is also well known that Chinese media corporations are investing in Korean entertainment companies and their productions (The Herald Business 2015b); however, their focus tends to be on bringing and localising successful formats and elements 'from' Korea so these can be marketed in China, rather than creating cultural content that appeals to both markets. The overall failure of Korea-China coproduced films in the Korean domestic market is quite telling (ETnews 2016) and this experience is driving the coproduction between two countries to be oriented more towards the localisation and adaptation of Korean content to cater for market tastes in China (The Herald Business 2015b). Although these new developments imply a rapid increase in co-creation among Asian media industries and thus expanding opportunities for cultural mixing across national boundaries, they are deemed as part of media businesses in the region, not part of Koreans' everyday cultural life. Hence, those familiar descriptors of the Korean Wave, such as 'virtual travel', 'encountering with other Asians' way of life', 'cross-cultural dialogue', 'Asian identity' and 'feeling Asian', are limitedly applied to mundane experiences of the Korean Wave by Korean people themselves.

3 Encountering Asia in the Real World

Apparently Koreans are more likely to encounter Asia in real-world situations that are often interpreted and represented in the 'journalistic media' rather than' pop culture media'. Asia as a real world is perceived as being conditioned by complex historical, geopolitical and economic forces, with which Korea as a nation should successfully manage with vision and strategy. At an individual level, Koreans may come across Asians as tourists, migrants and immigrants, and the location of such encounters is geographically and societally specific. Asian tourists are easily spotted at airports, busy shopping centres, duty-frees or tourist destinations. They might be affluent, consumerist and mobile individuals coming mainly from China, Japan and some Southeast Asian countries. In recent years, Koreans have witnessed the rapid increase in the number of Chinese tourists and their impressive consumption power (Forbes Korea 2014). The presence of Chinese tourists has dominated the country's tourism scene, meaning that they are now the most important clients for the country's tourism industry and the main target of government policy in this area (MCST 2016). The encountering of Chinese and Asian tourists could generate various moments for everyday reflexivity for Koreans, where they can experience both cultural connections and differences, and re-view their own way of life and sociocultural environments. Disappointingly, however, the policy and media discourse of inbound Asian tourists is preoccupied with economic rationality and there is a stark dearth of cultural perspectives. Even academic literature in this area show little interest in the inter-cultural aspects of inbound tourism as researchers are obviously

concerned with practical business and policy strategies to boost the tourism industry, better satisfy the tourists' desires and capitalise further on the Korean Wave.[1]

Meanwhile, it is the real-world and often journalistically mediated encounters with Asians as migrant workers and marriage immigrants that urge Koreans to engage themselves in an unprecedented 'deep reflection' on their culture, identity and society, and their relation to other Asians – from the perspective of the 'multicultural'. Since the 1990s, Korea has become multicultural with an increasing influx of migrants from Asia and beyond. Before that decade, it was a labour-sending country; for example, it sent miners and nurses to West Germany in the 1960s and 1970s (Yun 2013)[2] and construction workers to the Middle East in the 1970s and 1980s, as part of the country's construction industry export.[3] However, the country was transformed to a labour-receiving country during the 1990s by attracting migrant workers, mainly unskilled labourers willing to work in the so-called 3D (difficult, dirty and dangerous) industries that were shunned by Koreans (Kim 2009).[4] These migrant workers were mainly from Asia; that is, China (ethnic Koreans in particular), Vietnam, Indonesia, Bangladesh and the Philippines. More recently, the country attracts workers from Russia, Pakistan, India, Uzbekistan, Brazil and Nigeria too (Kim 2009: 75). Encounters with these workers tend to be geographically specific as they are concentrated on the industrial areas in and near Seoul and other industrial locations.

Another driving force behind Korea's multiculturalisation is the so-called 'foreign brides', from China (ethnically Korean as well as non-Korean Chinese), Vietnam, Philippines, Japan, Cambodia, Mongolia, Thailand and so on. The proportion of international marriages among all marriages in Korea increased rapidly and reached a peak in 2005: it expanded by more than ten times from 1.2% in 1990 to 13.6% in 2005. As of 2005, such marriages accounted for 35% of marriages in rural areas (Lee 2008: 111). While the international marriages until the early 1990s were between Korean women and foreign men, those of today are primarily between Korean men and foreign (Asian) women. According to Bèlanger, D. et al. (2010), there are a number of reasons for this change. Firstly, the greater gender equality and mobility of females in the country have caused a marriage squeeze for males with

[1] I found 319 research articles on 'Chinese tourists' on DBpia, one of research portals in Korea, on 27 July 2016. Their titles indicate that a majority of writings are concern with practical strategies to motive, increase and sustain tourists from China.

[2] According to Yun (2013) a total 10,723 Korean nurses migrated to West Germany between1959 and1976, and approximately 8000 Korean between 1963 and 1977. The migration was arranged between two governments and the Korean government required those migrants not to come back to Korea during the 3-year contract period and remit a certain proportion of their salary to Korea. Also see http://www.germanvillage.co.kr/neu/story/story02.html Accessed 25 July 2016.

[3] http://www.archives.go.kr/next/search/listSubjectDescription.do?id=000274 Accessed 25 July 2016.

[4] They are employed in construction, textile, furniture manufacturing, SME manufacturing and dyeing industries (A.-E. Kim 2009, p. 75). Female immigrants from China (ethnic Koreans) also find jobs in service industries such as catering and domestic service.

lower socio-economic backgrounds, leading them to find potential wives elsewhere.[5] The second is the Korean society's patriarchal culture, where females are tied to the roles of wives, mothers and daughter-in-law. However, young Korean women of today are becoming more independent, refusing to remain in those traditional role, whereas Asian women are seen as more submissive. Another factor to consider is that international marriages between Korean men and Asian women were encouraged by local governments which were concerned with the declining local population. For those Asian brides from less developed Asian nations such as China (ethnic Koreans and non-Korean Chinese), Vietnam and the Philippines, such a cross-border marriage could be seen as 'marrying up' or 'hypergamy' (Kim 2009: 83).

Amidst the regionalisation or 'Asianisation' of international marriage, Korean women's international marriages still follow the pattern of marrying up with men from developed countries such as the USA or Canada (Kim 2009: 87). The proportion of international marriages among all marriages has declined from 13.6% in 2005 to 7.6% in 2014 but is still dominated by the marriage between Korean men and foreign women. More recent statistics show that the number of marriage immigrants and naturalised Koreans has been on a upward trajectory from 142,015 in 2007 to 305,446 in 2015 (MGEF 2015a).[6] As of 2015, it is estimated that there are approximately 820,000 members of so-called 'multicultural families', families having a marriage immigrant or a naturalised Korean.[7] There are nearly 1.3 million foreigners over the age of fifteen (including marriage immigrants and migrant workers and excluding foreign students) in Korea[8] and the number is likely to increase given the country's economic, social and demographic changes, urging Koreans to reconsider their identity and culture from multicultural perspectives. This has made 'multiculture' or 'the multicultural' into a keyword for a range of areas of public policy including cultural policy (Yuk 2016).

[5] As of 2015, the monthly average income of Korean household was 4,373,000 Korean won http://kostat.go.kr/portal/korea/kor_nw/2/6/1/index.board?bmode=read&aSeq=352215 Accessed 25 July 2016. In the same year, 83.5% of multicultural households (households that have a marriage immigrant or a naturalised Korean via marriage) earned monthly income under 4,000,000 Korean won (MGEF 2015b).

[6] The figures include the number of naturalised Koreans via both marriage and other routes. Both are considered as 'multicultural' by the Korean government and the *Multicultural Family Support Act* (2017).

[7] This includes the families of naturalised Koreans via recognition (that is, those who are recognised as a son or a daughter by Korean parent). http://oneclick.law.go.kr/CSP/CnpClsMain.laf?csmSeq=548&ccfNo=4&cciNo=2&cnpClsNo=1 Accessed on 25 July 2016.

[8] Statistics Korea (2015) Press release: Result of 2015 survey on employment of foreigners. Seoul: Statistics Korea.

4 Cultural Policy and Imagining Asia: Between Transnational and Multinational

4.1 Asia in the Korean Wave Policy: transnational Consumers Empowered

Imagining Asia within the Korean cultural policy discourse could be seen as somewhat schizophrenic, between transnational and multicultural, and between affluent Asian consumers and Asian-originated ethnic minorities who are in need for support and inclusion. If the transnational consumerism informs various Korean Wave projects across the country, multiculturalism is the base of cultural policy measures for 'multicultural families', especially families that include a marriage immigrant or a naturalised Korean via marriage. The rise of the Korean Wave has brought about some substantial changes in the country's cultural policy and one of such changes was the policy's transnational orientation. At the central level, the government promotes both essentialist and market-centred interpretations of the Korean Wave, seeing the Korean Wave to be a result of the rational responses of overseas markets to the unique creativity and innovation found in Korean culture. In particular, in the cultural ministry's target-driven approach to the Korean Wave, Asia is seen as a 'mature market' for the Wave, where not only Korean cultural commodities but also the country's other goods and services – ranging from cosmetics to medical services – could easily find potential consumers (Korean Wave Committee 2015).

Whether it is original, hybrid or remade from another culture, Korean pop culture is regarded as possessing the power to appeal to Asian audiences as well as global audiences. The notion of 'power' hints not only at the country's so-called soft power or cultural attraction, but also its hard power in the form of the growing export of Korean-made goods and services. It is interesting to see the sense of power being transferred to consumers themselves in tandem with cultural policy's active embrace of the discourse of participatory consumers and 'collective intellect' (MCST and KOCIS 2012: 13–17). Korean cultural policy empowers the overseas consumers of Korean pop culture to the point where they become an important source of the legitimacy of Korean pop culture itself and its aesthetics (Lee 2013). Those consumers are regarded as informed, rational decision makers and competent cultural arbiters; their convenient access to Korean cultural products has become an important agenda not only for cultural businesses but also cultural policy makers in the country. Even their unauthorised access to Korean cultural content online has been tolerated and dealt with carefully not to upset fan communities although there are growing concerns with copyright protection abroad (see Jin, Chap. 1 in this book).

After all, overseas fans, as empowered and active consumers, are viewed as less-bounded by and liberated from the conventional model of cultural distribution such

as the centralised cultural dissemination by the existing business of cultural industries. They are also seen less affected by state control of the import of foreign cultural commodities, which used to be a key concern of national cultural policy and international cultural trade negotiation in the past. Monitoring overseas fans' enthusiastic engagement with K-pop and TV drama has become an everyday routine for government agencies, and referring to overseas fandom of Korean pop culture is now an essential feature of cultural policy advocacy today. Cultural policy makers' increasing attention to overseas fans of the Korean Wave is aptly reflected in the fact that one of two goals of the Korean Wave Committee, a public-private committee led by the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism, for year 2016 is to increase the membership of Korean Wave fandom abroad from 21 million (as of 2014) to 40 million by developing policy strategies targeted at different markets (Korean Wave Committee 2015).

The delocalising and transnationalising trend of cultural policy is frequently witnessed at the local level of cultural policy and tourism strategy. The Korean Wave functions as a frame of thought where various local policy makers and businesses re-imagine local cultural traditions and resources as something that can be associated with the Korean Wave and work as an instrument to attract tourists and revitalise local economy. As pointed out elsewhere (H.-K. Lee 2013), there are many Korean Wave projects at the local level; for instance, the Korean Wave Star Street (Gangnam, Seoul), the delayed Hallyu World (Goyang City, previously Hallyuwood), the proposed Korean Wave Focal Point (North Cholla Province), the planned Han Style World Audiovisual, Tourism and Leisure Town (Gosung, Gangwon Province), the planned Korean Wave Drama Zone (Chucheon), the cancelled Korean Wave Audiovisual Theme Park (Jeju Island) and the canceled Korean Wave Star Street (Chungmuro, Seoul). These projects are tightly linked to local tourism business and broadly involve building cultural facilities, tourist attractions, shops and accommodations. They are likely to rely on a risky speculative assumption that the motif of the Korean Wave will attract enough private investors and tourists and boost the local tourist industry.

For example, Hallyu World, a large-scale Korean Wave project consisting of a K-pop arena, shopping malls, several hotels, residential apartments and broadcasting facilities, was proposed by Gyonggi Province in 2005 but its progress has been very slow because of economic recession and the difficulty in finding a capable project company. Recently, the cultural ministry of the Park Guen-Hye government entered into a deal with CJ E&M, one of the biggest media corporations in the country, which has a large stake in K-pop business, to revive the Hallyu World project. As Park's wrongdoings are unfolding and being investigated at the time of writing, however, it is very likely that the above deal will be revisited in due time, further delaying the project's progress. Meanwhile, Taebaek City (Gangwon Province), an ex-mining town, has decided to develop local tourism in connection with the popular military romance drama *The Descendants of the Sun* (2016), some parts of which

were shot in a set located in the city. As the drama gained a huge following in China and some other Asian countries, the city is aspiring to capitalise on its attachment to the drama to lure Asian tourists (Yonhap News 2016b). As such, the prevailing tendency is that local governments tend to jump into the bandwagon labelled Korean Wave, whenever opportunities arise, in order to reshape local cultural provisions and fuel the local tourism industry that mainly targets affluent visitors from Asia. Their projects are likely to delocalise local culture by reinventing the city or town in question as a potential mecca of Korean drama or pop music which has transnational and even global appeal. In those endeavours, there is little thought of transcultural exchanges or inter-Asian connections.

4.2 Asia in Multicultural Policy: Wives, Mothers and Carers in a 'Multicultural Family'

In the meantime, multicultural policy in Korea is carried out as part of family and population policies rather than cultural policy. It is based on the *Multicultural Family Support Act* (2008) that understands 'multicultural' from a 'family' perspective and defines a multicultural family as a family having an immigrant or naturalised Korean as a family member. According to Hye-Kyung Lee (2008: 120), an expert in multicultural policy, emphasising the aspects of family was a strategic move to elicit sympathy from and appeal to the strongly patriarchal Korean society. Yet, 'Asian' held negative connotations in Korea ('Asia' in this context normally refers to Southeast Asian societies whose economies are lagged behind Korea) and this explains why the term *Kosian*, which was introduced to refer to the mixed children between Korean (father) and Asian (mother), has been removed from the public discourse. In addition, the immigrant wives (and naturalised Koreans via marriage) from Asia have been subject to negative and problematic images from victims (victims of human trafficking, female commodification, poverty, domestic violence, discrimination and cultural deficiency) to opportunists (fake marriages and runaway brides) (Lee 2008: 114, Yuk 2016: 522–523).

The above law stipulates that the government and local authorities should develop and implement policies intended to support the country's multicultural families. At the central level, the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family is responsible for setting a basic plan for multicultural family policy every 5 years. As the ministry's website indicates, its multicultural policy focuses on teaching the Korean language, counselling and training.[9] However, the policy can be criticised for being limited in two senses. First, its key concern is to support foreign-born spouses and their family, help victims of domestic violence, provide social welfare and offer multicultural education at school (see its website). The scope of the policy is narrowly oriented

[9] http://www.mogef.go.kr/korea/view/policyGuide/policyGuide06_04_01.jsp Accessed 25 July 2016. Also view the ministry's The Second Basic Plan on Policy for Multicultural Family 2013–2017.

towards social integration and cultural assimilation of multicultural families to Korean society, far from recognising, respecting and promoting foreign-born spouses and parents' own cultures and their contributions to the multicultural Korea. Moreover, the government policy's overall view of foreign-born wives from Asia has taken a gendered perspective: seeing them as dependent, vulnerable and incapable and their roles primarily as wives, bearer of future generations and carers of the elderly. As Yuk (2016) points out, such a gendered perspective of multiculturalism seems to be an inevitable consequence of this notion's coupling with 'family'. Secondly, grounded on the *Multicultural Family Support Act* (2007), the policy focuses on marriage immigrants and naturalised Koreans whilst excluding migrant workers in the framework of multicultural family. Hence, 'others' such as migrant workers, asylum seekers or defectors from North Korea tend not to be considered 'multicultural' or part of multicultural society. There is a separate law on the status of foreign residents in Korea where the definition of foreigner includes only foreigners who are staying in the country with the purpose of permanent residence, and, thus, excludes the large number of migrant workers who are regarded as temporary guest workers and illegal migrant workers (Park and Park 2014).

The multiculturalisation of Korean society is reflected on in its pop culture, for example TV drama. For instance, during recent years, there has been an increasing number of drama series featuring various non-Koreans and their interactions with Korean society. Yet, the general stereotypes tend to be repeated and affirmed here: Western and mixed-blooded (between Korean and Westerner) tend to be individualised, free and successful characters; Asian (Chinse) businessmen are presented as young, ambitious and entrepreneurial; Asian women are seen as being subject to love relations and being young, dependent and struggling to integrate into Korean society often with their culture and language rejected; and Asian migrant workers are unseen and almost non-existent (Kim et al. 2009; Lee 2010).

Within the overall framework set by the *Multicultural Family Support Act* (2007), the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism has developed a set of policies. The core of the policies has been the creation of Korean language textbooks, the regional touring of the multicultural musical *Love in Asia*, the training of educators on multicultural society and the development of 'multicultural content', the establishment of multicultural resources for public libraries and organising multicultural programmes at the libraries, and supporting cultural activities where multicultural families, migrants and ordinary citizens can participate (MCST 2013; Park and Park 2014). For most projects, however, the main actors and, thus, government funding recipients tend to be local cultural organisations who hold events or create content 'for' multicultural families (Park and Park 2014: 50), implying that the ministry's multicultural policy is yet to move beyond the reductive framework that sees families of marriage immigrants and migrant workers as economically deprived and socially marginalised groups who are in need of assistance. These people's connection to their own culture and society requires more active acknowledgement, and their potential cultural contribution to Korean society is yet to be explored. So far, the cultural ministry's approach to the multicultural has focused on integrating immigrants into Korean society rather than the society's reflection on its existing

culture, identity and way of life in relation to its increasing multicultural experiences. The visible weakness in cultural policy in this area is that it has been devised, justified and implemented as a subset of 'family' policy led by the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family, rather than being developed as 'cultural' policy which is led by debates on cultural consequences of the increased transnational movement of people in the region and globally.

One key moment was when the *Cultural Diversity Protection and Promotion Act* was enacted in 2014 as the Korean government's response to the *UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity in Cultural Expressions* (2005). Indicating the possibility of discursive shift from 'multicultural' to 'diversity' in Korean society, the law stipulates that the government and local authorities should make policies to protect and promote cultural diversity, nurture culture and the arts based on cultural diversity, and raise necessary financial resources. It states that cultural and arts expressions or activities should not be discriminated against on the grounding of the cultural differences caused by nationality, ethnicity, race, religion, language, place, gender and generation. Calling for public support for cultural and arts activities that promote cultural diversity, it regards the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism, as the key actor in this emerging field of public policy. The ministry's first *Cultural Diversity Report* for UNESCO (MCST 2014) gives some indication of how policy makers understand cultural diversity and where the issue of multicultural Korea is located. The overall impression is that 'the multicultural' is one of several categories that capture the Korean understanding of diversity: the multicultural (now both multicultural families and migrant workers), the independent/indie, the disabled, the marginalised youth, the poor, the digital poor, partnership with developing countries, international cultural exchange, and international cultural aid. Whilst the concept of cultural diversity is broad, neutral and positively acknowledging varied identities, it is yet to see how this new concept can interrupt and overcome the one-way multiculturalism by intercultural dialogue and cultural connections within Korean society (Yuk 2016).

The enactment of the above law provides a legal grounding for the cultural ministry to take steps to bring forward the agenda of multiculturalism, which can affect the country's existing cultural policy. Yet, this is a new territory for cultural policy makers and perhaps it would take time for them, as well as the wider society, to have meaningful discussions on the scope and substance of multicultural policy as cultural policy. Currently, an obvious gap exists in Korea's cultural policy between the economically-driven Korean Wave and inbound tourism strategies, and the strategies that support family policy targeted at 'multicultural families'. What is missing here is cultural policy's due attention to and concerns with (inter)cultural exchange, understanding and dialogue that can be facilitated via Koreans' transnational and multicultural experiences and can be an important route on which the country can make contributions to cultural diversity regionally while also enriching its own culture.

5 Conclusion

Koreans' encounters with other Asians are a multi-faceted and historically contingent phenomenon that happens not merely through the consumption of Asia-originated pop culture. It occurs mainly via their observations of the government's geopolitical strategies and news reports featuring Asia and Asians, as well as their interactions with (im)migrants and tourists from the region. Unlike the existing literature on the Korean Wave, which tends to highlight such experiences being primarily virtual, mobile and pop-culture centric, this chapter has shed light on the cultural and social significance of the encounters taking place in real-world settings. Korea is an interesting case as it is a pop-culture-sending country that has not yet experienced an endemic and enthusiastic reception of pop culture from Asian neighbours, meaning that Koreans might have relatively few chances to pleasingly practise 'everyday reflexivity' via consuming Asian popular cultural products, which is a key theme in the existing literature on the Korean Wave. It is rather the Asianisation of the (im)migration and the international marriages in the real world that requires Koreans to seriously reflect on their life and identity in relation to Asian neighbours and ethnic minorities in Korea.

Currently, Koreans' encounters with Asia (or feeling Asia) correspond with two separate tracks of cultural policy: consumerist transnationalism in the externally oriented Korean Wave and inbound tourism policy; and the limited multiculturalism in the domestic policy dedicated to multicultural families. To a certain degree, a similar orientation is observed in Japan where transnationalism and internationalism in Cool Japan policy is not coupled with an adequate level of concerns with cultural diversity inside the country where there exists a substantial number of ethnic minorities (for instance, approximately 900,000 Japanese residents who are Korean descendants) and an influx of migrants (Iwabuchi 2015; MOFA 2013). While the above cases in Korea and Japan might reveal their cultural policy's lack of reflectivity and absence of a more active initiative to build cross-cultural dialogues inside the country, it can also be seen as an indicator of disjuncture in cultural regionalisation itself (Appadurai 1990): that is, the flow of media content and the flow of people, who bring their own language and way of life with them, may take their own routes, providing members of a society with different types of experiences of encountering others and making (or not making) connections with them. This chapter argues that our understanding of Asian cultural flows can be deepened when we acknowledge and pay adequate attention to the disjuncture between the region's mediascape, where pop culture is sent and received, and its ethnoscape, which is historically and politically embedded and increasingly driven by forces of economic globalisation. Here, one important task of Korean cultural policy is exploring parameters of multicultural society by opening up discussion and more actively reflecting on varied cultural consequences of the increased transnational mobility and flow of people in the region and beyond.

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Part II
Creating Cultural Flows: Asian Creative Industries

Chapter 6
How Exhibitions *Flow*: Governments, Museums, and Special Exhibitions in Taiwan

June Chi-Jung Chu

Abstract This chapter is a macro-oriented study on how and why the "flow-in" and "flow-out" of large-scale exhibitions in Taiwan have developed over the past two decades since the first blockbuster exhibition was held in 1993. Based on Appadurai's framework of global cultural flows, I firstly provide an overview on how large-scale exhibitions were brought to Taiwan through Public-Private-Partnership. These exhibitions have developed to become smaller in scale and the themes of exhibitions have expanded considerably. I propose that the highly fluid feature of the small enterprises, and the government's promotion of creative industries are the main factors explaining the multi-faceted presentation and the variety of exhibitions brought from abroad. Second, I discuss how the government has played a key role in sponsoring large-scale exhibitions to be sent abroad to promote Chinese, Taiwanese art and culture over different periods of time. Meanwhile, I disclose how the hidden agenda of promoting Taiwan as a political sovereignty was presented alongside the various exhibitions, mainly Venice Biennials and the exhibitions organized by National Palace Museum.

This chapter concludes that the private sector's involvement explains the changes of large-scale exhibitions that have brought to Taiwan. Meanwhile, by authorizing museums as "agencies", the government plays a crucial role in initiating and facilitating the "flow-out" of exhibitions from Taiwan. Last, both the government and the private sector have enhanced their interaction with Asian countries in recent years as the economic, cultural, and geopolitical factors all have made the regional dynamism much more active than before.

Keywords Special exhibitions · Blockbuster exhibitions · Public-Private-Partnership · Cultural diplomacy · National Palace Museum

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1 Introduction

Since the 1990s, large-scale exhibitions from abroad have been displayed in Taiwan; some of them have resulted in great success for their organisers. Additionally, the Taiwanese government has facilitated large-scale exhibitions to be displayed abroad to fulfil various objectives. Although some studies have discussed particular cases of international exhibitions, the flows of large-scale exhibitions into and out of Taiwan has not been explored over a period of time on a macro level. As a type of cultural activity, large-scale exhibitions that traverse national boundaries are a result of globalisation. Discussion of these exhibitions should not be limited to their 'cultural' content but should also include their non-cultural aspects.

On the theoretical level, since the 1990s, globalisation has been the focus of considerable debate regarding the homogenisation and heterogenisation of culture. One of the key strands of academic discussion on 'glocalisation' has focused on how local cultural contexts develop in response to the influence of globalisation. During the 1990s, when globalisation started to gain popularity, Appadurai (1990) proposed five '-scapes', namely ethnoscape, mediascape, technoscape, financescape, and ideoscape, as a framework for exploring cultural flow under globalisation. Appadurai pointed out the fragmentation and deterritorialisation in the shifting world and simultaneously stressed the interconnectedness among the five '-scapes'. This analytical framework has significantly influenced the anthropological study of culture and has been widely applied to the study of global culture. Twelve years later, Crane included four models for analysing cultural globalisation (2002: 1–19): first, the centre-periphery model, which can be represented by Tomlinson's discussion of cultural imperialism (Tomlinson 1991, 1997); second, Appadurai's aforementioned cultural flows; third, reception theory, demonstrating cultural transmission as being both central-peripheral and multidirectional; fourth, the cultural policy strategies that frame national cultures in response to global culture. Crane (2011) further reviewed the theories on the effects of cultural globalisation on national cultures, the process of cultural globalisation, and theories concerning world culture and the cultural bases for a global civil society. On the basis of Crane's review and critiques of theories, one can see that each model and theory focuses on specific aspects of cultural globalisation, and that no single model or theory sufficiently encompasses cultural globalisation, which is highly dynamic and even conflicting. In addition to the agents and networks involved in the discussion of cultural globalisation, the dichotomies of macro and micro, unitary and disjuncture, static and volatile, and whole and fragmentary, and anywhere in between are among the conditions that scholars have sought to analyse.

Informed by Appadurai's framework and Crane's discussion, I explore the flows of large-scale exhibitions in Taiwan—how and why they 'flow in' and 'flow out' of Taiwan—from multiple perspectives, including sociocultural, economic, and political. The time frame is set from the 1990s to the present. I also provide an overview of background information relating to earlier periods. First, I explore how large-scale exhibitions were brought to Taiwan through public-private-partnerships. In

addition to exploring changes in exhibitions' subject matter, presentations, and exhibitions venues over time, I discuss the government's promotion of the creative industries and highly fluid and mobile small enterprises in Taiwan—which have entered the exhibition market and organised events through collaboration with partners from home and abroad.

In the second part of the chapter, I explore how the Taiwanese government has played a vital role in supporting various large-scale exhibitions to be displayed abroad to promote its art and culture over different periods. I identify how a hidden agenda—promoting Taiwanese sovereignty—was advocated through various exhibitions. The Venice Art Biennale, Venice Architecture Biennale, and several exhibitions that were co-organised by the National Palace Museum in Taipei serve as my main case studies.

The large-scale exhibitions discussed in the first part of the chapter are often referred to as blockbuster-type exhibitions. Since the first blockbuster exhibition, 'Treasures of Tutankhamen', was held at the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York in the late 1970s,[1] blockbuster exhibitions have defied predictions of their demise and continued to occur—and even expand. Not only American and British museums but also museums in other European and Asian countries, as well as Australia, have included blockbuster exhibitions in their schedules. A blockbuster exhibition can be defined as a special exhibition that draws numerous visitors and employs large-scale marketing activities to attract visitors,[2] in conjunction with selling souvenirs at museum shops. On this basis, the 1993–1994 Monet exhibition, loaned from the Musée Marmottan and co-hosted by the China Times Group and the National Palace Museum, should be considered the first blockbuster exhibition held in Taiwan.[3] Following the Japanese practice—in which blockbuster exhibitions are co-hosted by newspaper groups and museums (Tanaka 2003)—the initial blockbuster exhibitions in Taiwan were typically jointly hosted by newspaper groups (who acted as agents by introducing exhibitions from abroad) and public museums (who acted as venue providers by leasing exhibition spaces). Occasionally, art foundations and other third parties would participate in the collaboration. Newspaper

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[1] Prior to its exhibition at the Metropolitan Museum of Art, the Tutankhamen exhibitions had already been exhibited in several other museums, such as the British Museum in 1972, and attracted many visitors. However, substantial marketing and commercial activities were not then employed. For a chronology of exhibitions related to the exhibition, see http://www.kingtutart.com/ (accessed 03/29/2017).

[2] Apparently, disagreements concerning the definition of 'blockbuster exhibitions' exist, and some authors only take visitor numbers into account when defining them. For example, Pergam claims that 'Manchester Art Treasures Exhibition' in 1857 was the first blockbuster exhibition. In addition, the 'Berlin Treasures' exhibition held at the National Gallery in Washington, D.C. in 1948, and the Mona Lisa exhibition held from 1962 to 1963, both drew record numbers of visitors. Both have been considered the first blockbuster exhibition by various authors (see Conforti 1986; Davis 2008; Pergam 2011).

[3] Prior to the Monet exhibition, the Miro exhibition held at the Taipei Fine Arts Museum in 1991 also drew large crowds, with the organiser likewise producing souvenirs for the exhibition. However, intensive promotional activities and advertisements accompanying the exhibition had yet to be implemented.

groups generally have broader networks and more competitive access, which enable identifying overseas source exhibitions and promoting exhibitions at a comparatively low cost. Crucially, newspaper groups share the financial costs of hosting exhibitions with public museums, which otherwise cannot afford hosting these exhibitions alone. Additionally, to newspaper groups, participating in blockbuster exhibitions is considered sponsorship and a vital method of enhancing their corporate image (Tanaka 2003). In the case of Taiwan, newspapers' participation in blockbuster exhibitions also results in profits, although they often deny that their goal is profiteering.[4] Nevertheless, because of a decline in readership, newspaper groups have changed their role from sponsors to profit-making entities in their partnerships with public museums since the late 1990s.[5]

In the early years of the development of blockbuster exhibitions in Taiwan, one to two exhibitions were organised annually, and most were held at museum venues. However, when cultural and creative districts were established by the government in the late 2000s and early 2010s, they were also used as venues for hosting blockbuster exhibitions. Museums and non-museum venues now hold such exhibitions all year round. In addition to the two newspaper groups, namely the China Times Group and the United Daily News,[6] which were the initial major players in the private sector bringing in exhibitions, newcomers from the private sector have entered the market to co-host blockbuster exhibitions with public museums and other venue providers. When blockbuster exhibitions were a new phenomenon in Taiwan, visitors queuing up outside of exhibition entrances were a common sight. However, recently this has not been the case for most blockbuster exhibitions, except at weekends and holidays or when the exhibitions are approaching the end.

Most literature in English on blockbuster exhibitions is based on Anglo-American practices, and has primarily focused on criticising, debating, and finding the balance between cultural commodification and the traditional elitist approach to culture (Wu 2002; Alexander 1996). This strand of literature has not discussed how blockbuster exhibitions travelled to other countries and how these exhibitions were received by local audiences abroad. Meanwhile, a number of studies on blockbuster exhibitions in Taiwan have been published in Chinese (e.g., Chen 2011; Chiang 2009; Hsu 2003; Lai 1995; Wang 2000, 2002). Most authors have conducted single case studies to criticise blockbuster exhibitions as being heavily commercialised and commodi-

[4] A senior source at the United Daily News group in Taiwan stated that the purpose of the newspaper group's decision to co-host the early blockbuster exhibitions was to contribute to society and to promote Western art that was inaccessible to the general public (Peter Lee, personal communication, 5 June 2017).

[5] Newspaper groups have not disclosed how much profit they have made from co-hosting blockbuster exhibitions. The distinction between their roles as sponsors and profit-making entities is unclear. When the China Times Group established its profit-making division, Media Sphere Communication Ltd., in 1998, all the business relating to blockbuster exhibitions was moved to the new division.

[6] Media Sphere Communications Ltd. is the subsidiary of the China Times Group that manages blockbuster exhibitions. The subsidiary of the United Daily News group was initially called Gold Media group; it changed its name to udnFunLife Co., Ltd. (lianhe shuwei wenchuang gufen youxian gongsi) in 2017.

fied, using the perspective of cultural consumption and the culture industry concept developed by the Frankfurt School. They consider the involvement of newspaper groups in co-organising blockbuster exhibitions to be highly problematic and interpret their method of promoting exhibitions to entail the exercise of power (for example, Kuo 2000; Wang 2002). Some scholars (e.g., Lien 2010: 264–319) have argued that blockbuster exhibitions involve an unequal exchange of resources between Taiwanese and overseas museums because museums in Taiwan must often pay premium fees to receive exhibits that are occasionally of low quality. However, such scholars have failed to account for the ongoing changes in the exhibition market and the newly evolving dynamics between key actors.

2 Expanded Themes and Exhibition Venues

Dinosaurs, ancient civilisations, and prominent artists such as Da Vinci, Michelangelo, Van Gogh, Monet, and other Impressionists are exhibition subjects that have remained popular in Taiwan, with many having been exhibited more than once since the 1990s. The recurrence of these themes indicates that certain subjects and artists do have a universal appeal, as evinced by exhibitions in European and North American museums. In particular, exhibitions on Chinese civilisation have a local appeal. In addition to the popularity of certain themes, a recent development is that exhibitions touching on popular culture have been positively received. Of the exhibitions held since 2010, those involving animation and famous cartoon figures have been notably popular, particularly those imported from Japan such as Doraemon, Hello Kitty, and Crayon Shin-chan. Other popular themes include those that already possess a large fan base such as Titanic, The Art of The Brick (a Lego exhibition), and pop musicians.

In the early years, blockbuster exhibitions were held mainly at the National Palace Museum and National Museum of History. Other venues, such as the Taipei Fine Arts Museum, hold some irregularly. Currently, at least nine venues in Taipei City hold blockbuster exhibitions.[7] Major museums, such as the National Palace Museum and National Museum of History, hold an average of three blockbuster exhibitions each year. Non-museum venues, such as the Huashan Creative Park (or Huashan 1914) and Songshan Creative Park, which became exhibition venues in approximately 2009 and 2011 respectively, can each accommodate at least three blockbuster-style exhibitions at any one time. Non-museum venues now host blockbuster exhibitions not only because many exhibitions do not need to be held in environment-controlled spaces, such as museums, but also because the content is entertainment-oriented and is more successfully presented in cultural and creative districts than in museums.

[7] In addition to the National Palace Museum and National Museum of History, these are the Chiang Kai-Shek Memorial Hall, National Science Education Center, Sun Yat-Sen Memorial Hall, Sung-Shan Creative Park, Huashan Creative Park, Taipei Fine Arts Museum, and the former venue for the International Flower Expo.

3 New Presentations

Due to technological advances, blockbuster exhibitions in recent years have increasingly involved reproductions and replicas that cannot be easily identified as such by the general public. The Michelangelo exhibition held at the National Museum of History in 2013 and the Vermeer exhibition held at the Chiang Kai-Shek Memorial Hall in 2014 are cases in point. For the Michelangelo exhibition, only 14 original works – drawings loaned from Casa Buonarroti– were exhibited. Other features of the exhibition included (1) high-quality computer-generated prints of Michelangelo's works that were mounted on fine frames, (2) a life-sized three-dimensional reconstruction of Michelangelo's studio with reproductions of famous works such as The Creation of Adam on the ceiling of the Sistine Chapel, and (3) replicas of Michelangelo's sculptures. Despite most of the works not being originals, their interpretation was handled professionally.

The Vermeer exhibition, which was presented as an 'art educational exhibition', consisted entirely of computer-generated prints of the original works. As the main sponsor that produced all the reproductions, Hewlett-Packard had its logo affixed to the wall label of each reproduction. The reproductions method was explained and advertised at the end of the exhibition to promote Hewlett-Packard's high-end printing technology. Despite the fact that no single authentic work was present, this art educational exhibition drew a considerable number of visitors, who were attracted to the high-quality images, films, texts, maps, and other materials, which introduced and explained the Vermeer's work, the society he lived in, and the social values of his time.[8] That is, the exhibition differed substantially from a traditional art exhibition but involved social and urban contexts, as well as an art education dimension.

A new type of exhibition is the 'photo-taking exhibition', in which visitors can take 'selfies' and photographs with friends. The exhibits often include fibre-reinforced plastic or resin 3D models and figures, life-sized 3D reconstructions of famous scenes, or large-scale colour printouts. These exhibitions are mostly developed using widely known pop culture figures. The LINE FRIENDS exhibition,[9] held at the National Science Education Center over 3 months in 2014, serves as a representative case. To the surprise of museum staff, the exhibition received a record number of visitors. Another example is the solo exhibition of Japanese photographer Mika Ninagawa that was organised by and held at the Museum of Contemporary Art, Taipei, in 2016. Many of Ninagawa's flower images were presented like wallpaper, essentially transforming the exhibition space into a photo studio in which youngsters could take selfies and photos with friends for an admission charge of only NT$50 (less than US$2).[10] In particular, young women dressed up and took

[8] For critiques of this type of exhibition, see, Liao (2014).

[9] LINE FRIENDS was about the cartoon characters appeared on the LINE app. LINE is a messaging app on smartphones; it is widely used in Taiwan, Japan, and Korea.

[10] http://www.mocataipei.org.tw/index.php/2012-01-12-03-36-46/current-exhibitions/1841-mika-ninagawa (accessed 04/04/2017).

photos with Ninagawa's blown-up images in the background. During the one and a half months of the exhibition, visitors had to line up for up to 2.5 h to enter.[11] It is the most visited exhibition since the museum opened its doors in 2001, drawing over 120,000 visitors (Cheng 08/05/2016).

4 Culture, Leisure, and Creative Industries

Although the China Times Group and the United Daily News have dominated blockbuster art exhibitions, various newcomers have entered the market and organised smaller-scale exhibitions and entertainment-oriented exhibitions that require less specialist knowledge of art and culture. The roles played by these news media groups changed when they began to regard the exhibitions as profit-making opportunities. Thus, whether to host an art exhibition from overseas is currently ultimately a commercial decision. Also, because promotional activities, ticket sales networks, and methods of collaborating with museums have become standardised, barriers to entering the market are low provided newcomers find a source museum or overseas organisation to lend their works. Nevertheless, the increasing competition means that the profit pattern has changed. The profit margin for each exhibition has decreased significantly, thereby necessitating that these companies expand their business vertically or horizontally. For example, in 2016, China Times Group held 13 cultural activities in total: two art and culture exhibitions (Keith Haring and the Terracotta Warrior exhibition), eight entertainment-oriented exhibitions, and three concerts and performance events. The group also manages several shops for public museums, thereby extending its business arm.

In addition, under the flag of promoting creative industries, the government has provided opportunities for newcomers joining the market to bring in exhibitions. For example, the Ministry of Culture, together with the Ministry of Economic Affairs, has offered various tax incentives, financial assistance, and training programs to encourage individuals to set up start-ups; organizing blockbuster exhibitions are among the businesses for some start-ups in the creative industries.[12] Meanwhile, private investors may invest in particular exhibitions if they see potential profitability. For example, a start-up company that recently produced the 'Aesthetics of Horror: Junji Ito Solo Exhibition' in Taipei, Hong Kong, and Shanghai had succeeded in raising funds from private investors before the exhibition was launched in Taipei (Vannesa Wen, personal communication, 4 June 2017). This

[11] See MoCA's Facebook page (25/03/2016) https://www.facebook.com/MOCATaipei.39/posts/10154101793558408 (accessed 04/04/2017).

[12] As a consequence of the 2010 Law for the Development of the Cultural and Creative Industries, the Taiwanese government offers various tax rebates, discounts, and subsidies to start-ups and existing companies participating in the creative industries; one such law is the 'Directions for Preferential Loan of Cultural and Creative Industry' (Wenhua chuangyi chanye youhui daikuan yaodian).

low-cost exhibition was successful in the cities it travelled to and attracted many young visitors.

Because of the revenue from admissions and souvenir sales, entertainment-oriented exhibitions have proven to be substantially more profitable than art exhibitions, and thus the number of entertainment-oriented exhibition has greatly increased. The shop space for these exhibitions has been expanded, particularly for the exhibitions featuring animation and cartoon figures.

These exhibitions have become a popular leisure activity, particularly among youngsters in urban areas. The ticket price of a blockbuster-style exhibition is similar to that of going to the cinema. For many youngsters, going to an exhibition has become primarily a social activity to enjoy with friends and family rather than a pure learning activity.[13] As mentioned, photo-taking areas with props, reconstructions of scenes related to exhibits, and seal-stamping and collecting areas are near essential at any exhibition (including art exhibitions). With ever-smarter cell phones, visitors frequently upload photos taken at exhibition venues to social media sites – Facebook particularly – to share with friends. This not only is a collective activity for connecting with others but also a method for constructing and enhancing self-image, through which cultural and social capital can be accumulated.

5 Public Museums: New Dynamics Beyond Venue Provision

Compared with the private sector, which has co-hosted a wide variety of blockbuster exhibitions, over the years, public museums have undergone minimal change in their primary role as venue providers. However, these museums are not completely stagnant given that they have designed educational programmes when blockbuster exhibitions are hosted. For example, when the Kaohsiung Museum of Fine Arts co-hosted the Michelangelo exhibition in 2013 and 2014 with the United Daily News, the museum displayed different types of marble to demonstrate the various stages of the sculpting process. Despite the heavy marketing activities that made the exhibition ‘over-commercialised’, the museum was conscious of its educational role and strove to fulfil it. However, the effort that different public museums exert to develop educational programmes varies substantially, and museum employees are not consistently willing to contribute their time and effort to programmes. The other development is that private-sector companies have joined these exhibitions hosted at public museums as active partners by supporting economically disadvantaged groups’ attendance. Along with an increase in philanthropic activities in Taiwanese society, this recent dynamic is the result of increasing inequality between urban and rural areas; people living in rural areas, particularly students, are able to access substantially fewer resources than people living in cities.

[13] Although large-scale empirical data or research papers have yet to be published to support that going to exhibitions has become a social activity for many youngsters, various marketing activities have been employed to encourage youngsters to go to exhibitions with friends and family.

6 Exhibitions That Flow Out of Taiwan

Compared with the blockbuster exhibitions held in Taiwan that are driven mostly by profit-seeking motives, large-scale exhibitions that are organised by museums in Taiwan and tour abroad are often policy-driven and are sometimes heavily embedded with political messages. The second half of the paper focuses on large-scale exhibitions that tour abroad, namely the exhibitions co-organised by the National Palace Museum, Venice Art Biennale and Venice Architecture Biennale, and exhibitions held in the Czech Republic during the early 2000s. I comment on the government's recent introduction of the New Southbound Policy as the broader political and diplomatic context in which these exhibitions are embedded.

Since Taiwan (officially the Republic of China (R.O.C.)) was expelled from the United Nations in 1971, its diplomatic relations with most countries have officially been terminated. Before leaving the United Nations, Taiwan was a key ally of the United States, and the US government was the main driver in assisting the Nationalist Party of China (the Kuomintang or KMT) government to re-establish itself after it retreated to Taiwan from China in 1949. Since leaving the United Nations, Taiwan has had minimal scope for representing itself as a country on the international stage. Under the 'One China' policy of the People's Republic of China, Taiwan's existence as a sovereign state is denied and its names (either R.O.C. or Taiwan) cannot be used in areas of the international political arena dominated by Beijing. These circumstances force Taiwan to utilise non-political platforms for international relations. Consequently, organising cultural activities—including museum exhibitions—is a primary method through which the government can promote Taiwan abroad.

In addition, Taiwanese society is divided into two principal political camps based on the issue of the country's political future, namely the pro-Chinese unification (the so-called pan-blue camp, led by the KMT) and the pro-independence (the so-called pan-green camp, led by the Democratic Progressive Party [DPP]) blocs.

Isolation on the world stage forced Taiwan to adjust its foreign policy strategy when former president and KMT leader Lee Teng-hui was in power from 1988 to 2000. Because building diplomatic relations with other countries appeared unachievable under the One China policy, Lee adopted 'pragmatic diplomacy', calling for

> The advancement and reinforcement of formal diplomatic ties, the development of substantive relations with countries that do not maintain formal relations with Taiwan, and admission or readmission to international organisations and activities vital to the country's national interest. (Hickey 2007: 14)

After Lee's presidency, both the DPP (in power between 2000 and 2008) and the KMT (in power between 2008 and 2016) followed the pragmatic approach, yet with different degrees of emphasis on asserting Taiwan as a sovereign state and distinct attitudes towards China. Compared with the DPP's 'scorched earth diplomacy' strategy—that is, claiming Taiwan's status as a sovereign state at every possible occasion—the KMT adopted the 'viable diplomacy' strategy by emphasising economic and cultural activities abroad as a form of 'soft power'. Outbound exhibitions organised by Taiwanese museums are seen as one of the means to promote Taiwan's soft power.

7 Special Exhibitions Co-organised by the National Palace Museum

Since the late 1990s, the National Palace Museum have selected works from its collection to exhibit five times abroad, namely in the United States, France, Germany, Austria, and Japan. Wherever the exhibitions went, they received great media attention, surpassing any other exhibition held abroad. The National Palace Museum's collection mainly consists of the imperial collection of the Qing Dynasty (1644–1911), which was succeeded by the KMT when the party unified China in 1926. The KMT assembled a special task force to transport the majority of the collection to Taiwan when the party was defeated by the Communist Party in 1949. The National Palace Museum's collection is considered the most exquisite collection of Chinese art and artefacts; it also symbolises the political authority of the state (Chu 2011).

Prior to the 1990s, the collection was loaned on at least three occasions. Wu's research (2003) on the National Palace Museum collection that travelled to five U.S. cities from 1961 to 1962 analysed how art exhibitions and the museum played a unique role in Taiwan's cultural diplomacy during the Cold War era, when Taiwan was an ally of the United States. This was a cultural as well as diplomatic endeavour because the exhibitions involved government-to-government negotiations concerning shipping, the exhibits' immunity from seizure by China, and professional exchanges between museums. The exhibition's diplomatic message was paramount for the KMT government because it represented 'Free China' through cultural treasures that were taken directly from the Qing Dynasty court, a symbol of legitimate political power.

In 1970, the National Palace Museum selected 49 works from its collection to be exhibited in the China Pavilion at the Osaka World Expo (National Palace Museum 2000: 307). Participating in the Expo was a cultural, economic, and political task that involved collaboration between the Education, Economic Affairs, and Foreign Affairs ministries. It was held just before Taiwan was expelled from the United Nations, when Taiwan was still recognised as the legitimate China.

In 1992, the Museum loaned several works to the National Gallery of Art in Washington, D.C. for the 'Circa 1492: Art in the Age of Exploration' exhibition, which subsequently led to discussions, led by Wen Fong (方聞) and James Watt of the Metropolitan Museum of Art, on whether an exhibition could be held at the Met. Wen Fong and James Watt had requested a smaller exhibition. However, the then-director Chin Hsiao-yi (秦孝儀) of the National Palace Museum suggested a considerably more ambitious event, leading to a substantially larger-scale exhibition, 'Splendors of Imperial China: Treasures from the National Palace Museum, Taipei' in 1996 (Fong & Watt 1996: vii). In addition to the National Palace Museum's efforts, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Taiwan donated US$3 million to the Met for 'International Cultural Exchange' to realise the exhibition (Chang 1996).

Among the 475 pieces of works that were sent to the Met for the exhibition, 27 pieces were highly fragile works, which provoked an unprecedented storm of protests from not only the cultural sections of society but also the general public.

Sending these fragile works was viewed as Taiwan 'selling out' to the United States. Museum Director Chin Hsiao-yi defended his position and the exhibition by arguing that this was a rare opportunity for Taiwan to be visible:

> This is an unprecedented diplomatic breakthrough since our country withdrew from the United Nations. (cited from Wu 2003: 202–203)

The exhibition finally travelled to the United States as scheduled, but 23 fragile works were withdrawn from the list of works in response to the public pressure. In addition to the demonstrations by the local community, China protested to the Met and asked the museum to remove 'National' from the National Palace Museum's official name. However, the National Palace Museum's policy is to retain its full name in all circumstances, which prevented the name change occurring if the Met hosted the exhibition (Hu 02/04/1996).

The successful presentation of the National Palace Museum's collection at the Met led to further exhibitions abroad. In 1998, the National Palace Museum organised the 'Memory of the Empire: Treasures of the National Palace Museum, Taipei' exhibition, which was held at the Grand Palais in Paris. In accordance with the 'pragmatic diplomacy' policy, First Lady Tseng Wen-hui (曾文惠) visited the exhibition on a personal trip to Europe. Together with other First Ladies' personal visits abroad, it was coined by the press 'First Lady Diplomacy.'[14]

During the period of DPP government between 2000 and 2008, sending exhibits abroad from various museums was among the instruments employed for cultural diplomacy, and the National Palace Museum organised exhibitions to Germany and Austria in 2003 and 2008, respectively.

In 2003, the National Palace Museum selected exhibits from its collection and co-organised the 'Treasures of the Sons of Heaven: The Imperial Collection from the National Palace Museum, Taipei' exhibition at the Altes Museum in Berlin and subsequently at the Bundeskunsthalle in Bonn. Hoping to meet with German political figures and viewing the meetings as an opportunity for direct contact between the Taiwanese government and Germany, First Lady Wu Shu-chen (吳淑珍), who was wheelchair-bound, flew to Berlin and attended the exhibition opening. However, the First Lady was not allowed to deliver any message publicly at the opening at the request of the German authorities (Chen 17/07/2003). Furthermore, no German political figures were present at the opening. The Taiwanese government deduced that this was the result of China applying pressure (Chung 20/07/2003). On the same trip, the First Lady visited the Holy See and met with the Pope.[15]

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[14] Because Taiwanese presidents are often not allowed to visit countries that do not have diplomatic relations with Taiwan, First Ladies are often the figures who represent Taiwan's presidents abroad on high-profile political occasions.

[15] See Embassy of the Republic of China (Taiwan) to the Holy See webpage http://www.roc-taiwan.org/va/post/11.html (accessed 01/04/2017). When exhibits from the National Palace Museum travelled to the Kunsthistorisches Museum Vienna in 2008, no political figures attended the opening ceremony apart from the museum director and curators. 2008 was the last year of President Chen Shui-bian's second and final term in office. Although the trip was acclaimed as a success of cultural diplomacy, it received markedly less media attention than the previous exhibitions held in Germany in 2003.

In 2014, the National Palace Museum produced the ‘Treasured Masterpieces from the National Palace Museum, Taipei’ exhibition held at the Tokyo National Museum and then at the Kyushu National Museum. Because the word ‘national’ was omitted from ‘National Palace Museum’ on the exhibition’s posters printed by some of the exhibition’s sponsors, including the NHK and Asahi newspaper group, the Taiwanese government sent an official protest letter from the President’s Office demanding the correction of the name lest the exhibition be cancelled (Staff writer 21/06/2014). Tokyo National Museum replaced all the incorrect posters, and the exhibition opened on time and was favourably received. The incident was regarded as a victory of Taiwanese cultural diplomacy by the local press in Taiwan. Museums again came under the spotlight for Taiwan’s diplomatic relations abroad. Similar to the First Lady’s visit to the National Palace Museum exhibition in Berlin in 2003, the then-First Lady Chow Mei-ching (周美青) also attended the exhibition to promote Taiwan. However, the political messages delivered alongside the exhibition were much milder than those during the previous exhibitions held abroad. No mention was made of Taiwan’s political sovereignty; instead, ties in trade activities and the friendship between Taiwan and Japan were emphasised.

8 Venice Art Biennale and Venice Architecture Biennale: What’s in a Name?

The Venice Art Biennale and Venice Architecture Biennale are two high profile events that the Taiwanese government sponsors to promote its presence abroad through art and architecture.[16] Taiwan has participated in the Venice Art Biennale since 1995 and Venice Architecture Biennale since 2000. Taipei Fine Arts Museum and National Fine Arts Museum are the main bodies responsible for organising Taiwan’s delegation at these biennales, respectively. In the early years of Taiwan’s participation in the Venice Art Biennale, when China was not yet a participant, Taiwan’s participation was accepted under the designation ‘Taiwan Pavilion’, although not as a member state. In 2000, Taiwan’s first participation in the Venice Architecture Biennale was protested by China and, subsequently, Taiwan was forced to change its name to ‘Taiwan Museum of Art’ as an institutional participant (Chu 30/05/2000). That is, Taiwan participated not as a country but as a museum.

[16] Taiwan participated in the São Paulo Art Biennial between 1957 and 1974 as ‘Free China’ as opposed to ‘Communist China’. This participation ended with Brazil’s recognition of the People’s Republic of China as the only China. In 2002, Taipei Fine Arts Museum presented the Taiwanese photographer Chang Chien-chi’s work at the São Paulo Biennial. However, the museum’s participation under the name of ‘Taipei Fine Arts Museum, Taiwan’ as a ‘national presentation’ was protested by China, resulting in the removal of ‘Taiwan’ from the exhibition venue and the press material. For details, see, Chen (2017).

In 2001, China protested Taiwan's use of 'Taiwan, R.O.C.' at the Venice Art Biennale, yet Taiwan's participation as 'Taiwan, R.O.C.' remained unchanged despite the dispute. In 2003, China's continual protests forced Taiwan to change its designation from 'Republic of China, Taiwan' to 'Taipei Fine Arts Museum of Taiwan', the same pattern used in the Venice Architecture Biennale. That year, the Biennale committee established its 'Extra 50' section for non-member states, including the Taipei Fine Arts Museum. Since 2003, Taiwan has participated in these events in the form of various institutions rather than as a member state.

The aforementioned examples are widely known in the art and cultural circles in Taiwan, and numerous additional examples can demonstrate Taiwan's political position abroad and its pragmatic response. Because both the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Culture are the main sponsors of the Venice Biennales,[17] the museums work closely with these ministries to respond to any diplomatic concerns that may occur. That is, when Taiwan is not allowed to be present as a state, museums are the implicit representatives of the government for delivering messages that most effectively serve Taiwan's interests abroad.

9 Exhibiting Taiwan in Prague

Although sending exhibits from the National Palace Museum's collection abroad is guaranteed to attract visitors, the museum's collection itself does not represent the art and culture of Taiwan and its land and people. Promoting Taiwan through its own local culture and art abroad was a key task for the DPP when it was in power between 2000 and 2008. Museum exhibitions and performance activities were deployed as tools to promote cultural diplomacy under the DPP's foreign policies in Eastern Europe, in particular in the Czech Republic. Tubilewicz (2007) provided detailed accounts of how Taiwan attempted to establish diplomatic relations with several post-Communist Eastern European countries. However, these attempts eventually failed because of these countries' own national interests, and their adopting policies in accordance with the European Union policy. Václav Havel, who led the Velvet Revolution and became the first president of the post-Communist Czech Republic, was a prominent supporter of Taiwan. A strong opponent of Communism, Havel once acknowledged Taiwan as 'China' in a press conference at the United Nations (Tubilewicz 2007: 58).

When Havel left office in 2003, the Czech government became pro-China. Although its diplomatic goal was not achieved, the DPP continued its cultural

[17] The Taipei City Government and Ministry of Culture are the governing authorities of the Taipei Fine Arts Museum and National Museum of Fine Arts, respectively. That is, both governing authorities allocate budgets to the two museums to organise the Venice Biennales. For the Venice Art Biennales, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Culture have regularly appropriated budgets for the Taipei Fine Arts Museum because the budgets the museum receives from the Taipei City Government has always been insufficient.

exchange programmes with the Czech Republic. For example, in 2005, 'A Thousand Faces of Formosa – The Nature and Tradition of Taiwan' exhibition was held at the National Museum in Prague. The then-director of the Council for Cultural Affairs (CCA, the former Ministry of Culture) Chen Chi-nan (陳其南) flew to Prague to attend the opening ceremony and delivered greetings from President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁). This was the first time that a national museum in the Czech Republic had received an exhibition from Taiwan, and the CCA stated that this was the largest exhibition to have been sent abroad to promote the culture and natural history of Taiwan. Since 2008, cultural exchanges between Taiwan and the Czech Republic have continued but become less frequent.

10 Recent Developments: The New Southbound Policy

A recent development that may lead to museum exhibitions travelling to Southeast Asian countries is the 'New Southbound Policy', which was launched in August 2016, shortly after President Tsai Ing-wen was sworn into office in May 2016.[18] Under the policy, various initiatives and partnership activities have been implemented across ministries, local governments, governmental agencies, and various nongovernmental organisations. The government provided a total budget of NT$2.1 billion (approximately US$69 million) during the first year of the New Southbound Policy[19]; and the budget has been allocated to four policy areas including 'Economic and trade cooperation', 'Talent exchanges', 'Resource sharing', and 'Regional connectivity'. The Ministry of Culture has also established new programmes and funding opportunities for people and organisations that are interested in promoting cultural exchanges between Taiwan and the 16 countries covered by the New Southbound Policy.[20]

A government official from the Ministry of Culture, Chou Yen-ju, stated that, to promote the New Southbound Policy, the ministry encourages museums to work with cultural institutions in the aforementioned 16 countries to co-host exhibitions on the themes of Taiwanese art and culture by allocating additional budgets to the exhibitions (personal communication, 3 June 2017). One museum source, who has participated in curating an exhibition to support the New Southbound Policy but

[18] Before Tsai's New Southbound Policy, a Southbound Policy was originally introduced during former President Lee Teng-hui's presidency to reduce Taiwan's trade dependency on mainland China. However, the Southbound Policy failed, partly because of the financial crisis that affected Southeast Asian countries in the late 1990s. Although President Chen Shui-bian continued the policy, it was regarded as unsuccessful at the end of his term in 2008.

[19] See the Central Government's Budget Proposal for the Fiscal Year of 2016, published by the Directorate General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics (DGBAS) of the Executive Yuan http://www.dgbas.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=40176&ctNode=6306&mp=1 (accessed 02/042017).

[20] The 16 countries include 10 ASEAN member states, 6 countries in South Asia, Australia and New Zealand. See New Southbound Policy Portal, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, http://nspp.mofa.gov.tw/nsppe/ (accessed 02/04/2017).

wants to remain anonymous, told me that although the exhibition proposal was agreed upon by the museum of the host country, the exhibition must still be evaluated by the foreign ministry of the host country. Apparently, this policy-driven collaborative exhibition project initiated by the Taiwanese government is being closely scrutinised by the host country to ensure that the project does not offend China.

11 Conclusion

This chapter has discussed how the 'flow-in' and 'flow-out' of exhibitions in Taiwan have been developed by the private sector and the government, respectively. Large-scale exhibitions that flow in to Taiwan, or blockbuster exhibitions, are the result of the profit-seeking nature of the private sector, with the public sector mainly serving as a venue provider. Initially, venue providers were public museums but have since expanded to include cultural and creative districts that were developed for creative industries. The content of the exhibitions was originally cultural but subsequently blended in various entertainment elements, with some exhibitions expanding to become entertainment-based. Public museums may still safeguard the quality of exhibitions organised by the private sector, whereas other exhibitions have become increasingly commercialised.

In reference to Appadurai's proposition of cultural flows, in the first part of the chapter, I exemplified that the fluidity in resources, technology, manpower, and government policies has enabled the changes in and expansion of these exhibitions over time. Additionally, the profit-seeking nature of the private sector propelled the changes in the first place. Furthermore, the limited market size of Taiwan has precluded the organisation of very costly exhibitions. From the perspective of 'financescape', the first part of this chapter shows the centre-periphery discourse is still relevant because exhibition themes related to Western culture and art still hold a universal appeal to local audiences. Nevertheless, subjects and themes of regional or local popularity have emerged and proved to be successful in recent years. That is, global, regional, and local contexts are all relevant, and their relative importance varies over time. Apart from the recent development of market expansion to several cities in China, the dynamic of these exhibitions remains highly 'nation-bound' and 'Taiwan specific'.

With the exception of the recent development that a few profit-making enterprises have started to export exhibitions to other cities in Greater China, the large-scale exhibitions that flow out are often policy-driven and bear political messages. Even when these exhibitions themselves started with no clear political intention, such as the Venice Art Biennale, Venice Architecture Biennale, and the National Palace Museum's collection exhibited at the Metropolitan Museum of Art in 1996, various political messages were still channelled through them. This is because of Taiwan's problematic status on the international stage, which leads to museum exhibitions and other cultural activities becoming a means through which the government can promote its presence and deliver certain messages abroad. In particular,

the exhibitions co-organised by the National Palace Museum have been used by governments of all political parties to channel various diplomatic ideas, whether to assert Taiwan as a sovereign state or simply to demonstrate Taiwan's 'soft power'. Even the DPP, which often forcefully claims that the National Palace Museum collection has little connection with Taiwanese local art and culture, uses this collection to promote Taiwan's presence abroad. Under the recent development of the New Southbound Policy, whether the government is going to embed diplomatic messages in forthcoming exhibitions remains to be seen.

This chapter clarifies that without government support, these exhibitions could not have been presented abroad. As government-funded institutions, public museums speak on behalf of the government, act as its arm, and deliver its messages in cases where direct government involvement is restricted by pressure from China. On the basis of Appadurai's proposition, the second part of this chapter describes how structuring the discussion along the 'ideoscape' perspective is helpful to explain how the majority of large-scale exhibitions flow out of Taiwan. To promote Taiwan's interests, whether diplomatic or cultural, the international arena is the main destination of the outbound 'flows'. However, a more nuanced contextualisation of Taiwan's foreign policy and the content of the exhibitions themselves must be considered to more completely understand how the dual cultural and political objectives of the Taiwanese government may be achieved.

On the basis of the 'flow-in' and 'flow-out' of exhibitions in Taiwan, this chapter concludes that, first, the government still has a strong presence on the local, regional, and global levels through policy intervention, particularly when the profit-seeking motive of the private sector is absent. Second, certain policies do lead to changes, but some of these changes may have been unintended – for example, the increasing commercialisation of the exhibitions that have flowed in – and caused by other factors. As stated at the beginning of the chapter, no single model can fully explain cultural globalisation because the process is complex and not static. Furthermore, when a longer time is investigated, the addition of variables complicates the analysis. However, the units of analysis offered by various models are useful because they serve as toolkits when tracing the development of exhibitions.

Lastly, one type of exhibition that was not discussed in this chapter is the large-scale cross-Taiwan Strait exhibitions; in other words, cultural exchange between China and Taiwan. Since 1987, when the Taiwanese government first lifted the travel ban that forbade its citizens from visiting relatives in China, various cultural exchange activities, including exhibitions, have been hosted in Taiwan and China. These exhibitions have been hosted by both public and private organisations and at both individual and institutional levels. The most notable example is the Terracotta Warrior exhibition held at the National Museum of History in Taipei in 2000; the exhibits were loaned from several museums in China. Drawing 1.05 million visitors, it remains the most visited blockbuster exhibition to date. In the visual art field, world-famous artists from China, such as Ai Weiwei, Xu Bing, and Cai Guo-qiang, have had large-scale solo exhibitions at the Taipei Fine Arts Museum. Notably, however, most of the cultural artefacts that were transported from China to Taiwan by the KMT in 1949 have not been exhibited in China because the Chinese government

has not passed the legislation to protect the artefacts from seizure once they are in China. Similarly to how cross-Taiwan Strait cultural activities are often discussed separately from foreign affairs in Taiwan, cross-Taiwan Strait exhibitions must be handled separately because the unique relationship between the two political entities predetermines the context of discussion.

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Chapter 7
Cultural Flows and the Global Film Industry: A Comparison of Asia and Europe as Regional Cultures

Diana Crane

Abstract Using lists of top 20 box office films in countries located in East Asia and Western Europe, I use the national origins of the most popular films in each country as an indication of the extent to which cultural flows of films are circulating among these countries. In contrast to other types of cultural flows, such as TV drama and music videos, cultural flows of films among countries in these regions are almost non-existent. American blockbuster films, national films and co-productions predominated on these lists. Two explanations for these findings are: (1) the world-wide domination of American films and the relatively un-competitive nature of regional film industries; (2) the fact that, unlike TV dramas, films cannot be adapted to specific audiences. Consequently, escapist American blockbusters, usually a form of science fiction, can be appreciated by regional audiences without adaptation while films from neighboring countries, dealing with personal, social and economic issues, cannot. One French film that imitated the typical American blockbuster was popular in both regions.

Keywords Regional culture · Global culture · Popular culture · Film industry · Transnational flows

The global film industry is a strategic site for examining the existence and nature of regional cultures. Transnational flows of various forms of popular culture, such as music, television series, literature, and film have been steadily increasing but little is known about their effects on the emergence of regional cultures. The film industry is an interesting case because it is dominated by American films (Crane 2014) although there are signs that this domination has recently begun to diminish in East Asia (Napolitano 2014). The world-wide domination of American films, which can be interpreted as a form of media imperialism, threatens to create a homogenous

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global culture which would impinge on the distinctiveness of national cultures. Alternatively, transnational flows of films within regions could support regional cultures that would be based on regional values and beliefs.

Cultural regionalization is a more useful concept than globalization since it refers to a smaller geographical unit which is in turn broader than purely local units. It is a complex phenomenon, which refers to people's consciousness of being associated with countries other than their own. It results from a variety of factors, such as the organization of cultural industries, cultural policies of nation states, and attitudes and preferences of audiences (Otmazgin and Ben-Ari 2013). Countries with sizable and profitable cultural industries are more likely to export cultural products to other countries with similar languages and histories. Governments perform important roles, encouraging the export of cultural goods and banning imports that are perceived as inappropriate for national audiences.

The film industry is the target of national cultural policies in many countries. The fact that many governments spend large sums to maintain a presence in the film industry suggests that films are perceived as having considerable symbolic and cultural value. Film production and consumption are seen as performing an important role in "negotiating cultural identity and articulating social consciousness" (Gao 2009, p. 423). Cultural policies that support national film industries may be interpreted as a form of cultural resistance to the homogenizing effects of globalization (Gao 2009, p. 423). In spite of the enormous increase in the social media on the Internet, the global film industry continues to expand (European Audiovisual Observatory 2010). In many countries, the number of films being produced is steadily increasing as well as the number of tickets being sold.

Regardless of the organization of media industries in a particular country, audiences need to develop preferences for cultural products circulating in other countries in order to make it profitable to disseminate those products in their country. Certain types of institutions facilitate audience awareness of cultural products in other countries. For example, YouTube makes music videos available to audiences in countries other than the one in which they originated. Kist (2014; see also Kist and Verboord, Chap. 12 in this volume) shows that, in Southeast Asia, videos from South Korea are more popular throughout the region than videos from other countries, including the US.

The phenomenon of co-production (e.g. a film made jointly by companies located in different countries) is another way in which audiences become aware of cultural products from other countries. Otmazgin (2013a) argues that Asian creative industries have become a network, as a result of activities by Japan's cultural industries, which have engaged in extensive collaborations with companies in other countries. Cultural industries in other Asian countries have been enormously influenced by the ways in which Japanese cultural industries operate and by their formats for popular culture products. In other words, he claims that Japan has performed an important role in the regionalization of popular culture in East Asia.

At the same time, due to cultural proximity and geographical proximity, some countries in a region have closer ties with one another than with other countries. These ties facilitate the dissemination of cultural products between these countries.

Studies show that cross-national exchange between countries is influenced by cultural proximity that includes historical, ethnic, religious, linguistic, geographical and other similarities (La Pastina and Straubhaar 2005). Iwabuchi (2001) argues that young Asian consumers are likely to search for media products in other countries that express their perceptions of the relationship between the West and non-Western experiences. These issues cannot be adequately dealt with in American popular culture.

Geographical proximity, which is likely to be correlated with cultural proximity, should also facilitate diffusion of cultural products across national boundaries. This affects the consumption of popular music (Verboord and Brandellero 2013, cited in Kist 2014). Similarities and differences in languages that might be expected to affect audiences' choices of films are less salient with the widespread use of dubbing and subtitles.

Cultural regionalization is difficult to assess and takes different forms in different geographical spaces. In this paper, I will examine cultural flows of films between countries in two major regions, East Asia and Western Europe. To what extent do these flows occur? Do certain countries dominate these flows? Can the domination of certain countries be explained in terms of the relative size and importance of national film industries? Can flows between two or more countries be explained in terms of cultural or geographical proximity? What are the implications of these flows for the existence of regional cultures in these two regions?

1 Data and Method

Statistics published annually by the European Audiovisual Observatory and by Box Office Mojo (www.boxofficemojo.com) provide extensive databases for documenting cultural flows between countries in East Asia and Western Europe as well as levels of film production in different countries. In a previous article (Crane 2014), I showed that the global film industry is highly stratified. Thirty-four countries produced over 25 films in 2009; 32 countries produced less than 26 films. Among the 34 countries that produced a substantial number of films, I identified four categories: (a) Super Producers (4 countries that produced over 400 films in 2009); (b) Major Producers (7 countries that produced between 101 and 400 films); (c) Medium Producers (11 countries that produced between 51 and 100 films); and (d) Minor Producers (12 countries that produced between 26 and 50 films).

Table 7.1 shows the distribution of Asian countries among these four categories. Two Asian countries are Super Producers, China and Japan. South Korea is a Major Producer. The remaining Asian countries are Medium Producers or Minor Producers.

The two Asian Super Producers, along with South Korea, have the most successful film industries in the region. A list of films in the region that obtained the highest box office receipts in 2013 ("The Asian films driving global box office", 2014) is dominated by Japan, Korea and China which together account for 72% of the films on the list.

Table 7.1 East Asian film market: Number of films produced by country, national market shares, and types of films on country's top 20 lists, 2014*

Super producers	No. of films (over 400)	Perc. natl market share	Types of films in country's top 20: Natl	US	Co-P. Asian	Co-P: Other
China	618	54.5	7	5	5	3
Japan	615	58.3	13	2	2	3

Major producers	No. of films (101–400)	Perc. natl market share	Types of films in country's top 20: Natl	US	Co-P. Asian	Co-P. Other
South Korea	248	50.1	10	8	1	1

Medium producers	No. of films (51–100)	Perc. natl market share	Types of films in country's top 20: Natl	As.	Eur.	US	Co-P. Asian	Co-P. Other
Other								
Malaysia	84	10.2	0	0	1	13	4	2
Philippines	78 (2011)	25.7 (2011)	5	0	0	11	2	2
Thailand	53 (2011)	37.5 (2009)	3	0	1	11	3	2
Hong-Kong	51	21.7 (2013)	2	1	0	8	7	3

Minor producers	No. of films (15–50)	Perc. natl market share	Types of films in country's top 20: Natl	Eur.	US	Co-P. Asian	Co-P. Other
Taiwan (2011)	33 (2014)	17.5 (2013)	4	0	14	1	1
Singapore	18	4.0 (2013)	0	1	11	3	5

*Based on statistics contained in European Audiovisual Observatory (2015) and Box Office Mojo, International Yearly Box Office by country

Until 1994, China's film industry was effectively closed to external cinematic influences as a result of both government protectionism and censorship. In the past decade, it has engaged in co-productions with Hong Kong, representing a type of cultural and geographical proximity. Strong protectionist barriers remain in place but in 2014, it signed co-production agreements with India, the UK and South Korea (European Audiovisual Observatory 2015: 51). The Korean film industry is expanding rapidly; local demand is exceptionally high.

Although all of the East Asian countries have had film industries throughout most of the twentieth century, the film industries of countries in the categories of medium and minor producers encountered increasing difficulties in the past two and a half decades from a variety of factors including American competition, piracy of film DVDs, and censorship. For example, the Hong Kong film industry was the third largest motion picture industry in the world for several decades and the second largest exporter ("Cinema of Hong Kong," Wikipedia: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cinema_of_Hong_Kong; see also Fu and Dresser 2000). During the 1980's and

early 1990's, the country produced highly professional and sophisticated films that were exhibited throughout the region, including Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia and South Korea, and were exported as cult films to the West. At that time, cultural flows consisting of Asian films created a regional culture. Later in the decade, the industry was overwhelmed by American blockbusters and the Asian financial crisis and has never recovered its former eminence.

The film industry in the Philippines also thrived from the 1960s through the 1990s, producing about 140 films per year. It too declined in the early twenty-first century due in part to rampant piracy but also to excessive taxation of film revenues. Taxes were lowered in 2009 but the industry has not yet recovered (Whaley 2012).

Film industries in the other Asian countries, such as Malaysia, are smaller and less profitable, as seen by their low national market shares (see Table 7.1). The Indonesian film industry has only recently begun to produce a substantial number of films. Most of them are unsuccessful, low-budget horror films, although the quality of Indonesian films has increased since 2012 ("Cinema of Indonesia" 2014; see also Sen 1995). Censorship has hampered the Thai film industry but its martial arts films have been successful internationally ("Cinema of Indonesia" 2014).

The Taiwanese film industry was devastated in the early 1990s by competition from Hong Kong ("Cinema of Hong Kong," Wikipedia: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/

Cinema_of_Hong_Kong), Hollywood blockbusters and high levels of piracy ("Cinema of Taiwan," Wikipedia) but produced some successful films (e.g. *Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon)* that were shown in the West (Klein 2004: 18). The latter exemplifies the ways in which Asian film producers collaborate across national boundaries. Production of *Crouching Tiger* involved five different companies in five countries (Klein 2004: 19). Klein argues that the film is "diasporic" rather than regional on the basis of the producer's ties with Chinese film producers working outside China.

Recent statistics show that there is a resurgence of interest in Asian films ("The Asian films driving global box office," 2014). Ticket sales in the Asia-Pacific region have been increasing twice as fast as elsewhere. Audiences are choosing local films rather than foreign imports.

Table 7.2 shows the distribution of European countries among the four categories in Table 7.1. No European country is a Super Producer, but seven European countries are Major Producers. Two European countries are Medium Producers and two are Minor Producers.

European film industries have long histories but, with the exception of France, have suffered from American competition in recent decades.

In this study, based on lists of films that were among the top twenty films in terms of box office receipts in 2014, I use the national origins of the most popular films in each country as an indication of the extent to which cultural flows of films among these countries constitute a cultural region.

Table 7.2 West European film market: Number of fiction films produced by country, national market shares, and types of films on country's top 20 lists, 2014

Major producers	No. of films (101–400)	Perc. natl market share	Types of films in country's top 20				
			Natl	US	Eur.	Co-P. Eur.	Co-O.: Other
France	221	44.4	7	8	0	3	2
Italy	201	27.8	6	8	2	2	2
United Kingdom[a]	186	16.5	0	11	0	2	7
Germany	149	26.7	4	8	2	2	3
Spain	126	25.5	3	11	1	3	2
Switzerland (top 10)	107	6.2	0	5	2	2	1
Medium producers	**No. of films (51–100)**	**Perc. natl market share**	**Natl**	**US**	**Eur.**	**Co-P. Eur.**	**Co-O.: Other**
Netherlands	62	20.8	5	11	0	3	1
Belgium[b]	65	14.0	1	9	3	6	1
Minor producers	**No. of films (15–50)**	**Perc. natl market share**	**Natl**	**US**	**Eur.**	**Co-P. Eur.**	**Co-O.: Other**
Austria	20	4.6	0	12	4	2	2

Based on statistics contained in European Audiovisual Observatory (2015) and Box Mojo, International Yearly Box Office by country

[a] Includes Ireland

[b] Includes Luxembourg

2 The Asian Film Market as a Cultural Region

During the second half of the twentieth century, cultural flows between neighbors in East Asia were scarce (Shim 2013: 53). Regional popular culture was dominated by American popular culture. Until the mid-90s, some countries, such as South Korea, restricted the inflow of foreign media content. Korean film importers ignored most Asian productions and focused on big moneymakers like Hollywood films (Shim 2013: 53). In 1989, Waterman and Rogers (1994: 107) concluded regarding television programming that

> countries of the Asian region as a whole have a relatively low dependence on imported programming, and a relatively low dependence on intra-regional program trade.

This situation changed in the 1990s when governments in East Asia encouraged Asian co-productions on the grounds that these films would be culturally proximate and share a common value system (Shim 2013: 65). However, these East Asian co-produced films were not successful at the box-office. On the other hand, they did lead to cultural hybridization in films and television dramas produced in Korea and elsewhere.

At the present time, the nine East Asian countries in the study do not share an Asianist ideology (Hau and Shiraishi 2013: 92–93). Nationalism remains important although several countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand) have formed an economic alliance known as ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations). The citizens of these countries do not share an Asian identity and do not identify themselves as Asians. Hua and Shiraishi (2013: 93) state that:

> the "community of consumers" of East Asian popular culture products is a provisionally- and context-bound "occasioned" and "occasional community" (Chua 2008: 88) rather than one whose sense of community derives its impetus from fixed, stable notions of "Asianness" and "Asian" identity.

Otmazgin (2013b: 48) argues that regionalization of popular culture in East Asia has not led to cultural homogeneity or to "a unified and prevailing transnational identification". He states:

> East Asia is…becoming a region that contains overlapping circles of cultural preferences and allegiances, which exist simultaneously and in varying intensity.

From the perspective of this study, the most important finding in Table 7.1 is that, in only one of the nine countries in the region for which information was available, was a film from another country in the region on the list of the most popular films, other than co-productions: a Taiwanese film on the list for Hong-Kong. The only foreign country whose films appeared frequently on these lists was the United States. Countries that were Medium Producers and Minor Producers had higher proportions of American films on these lists than the Super Producers and the Major Producers. Exceptionally, one French film, *Lucy,* appeared on top-20 lists for Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand and among the top-25 for the Philippines and Hong Kong. *Lucy's* "global" popularity can be explained in part by the fact that the film was shot in several locations (New York, Paris and Taipei) and featured a multinational cast.

National films constituted significant proportions of films on these lists for countries that were Super Producers and Major Producers. Japan had the highest proportion of national films on its list (13 out of 20), the smallest number of US films (2) and only two links to other countries in the region through co-productions. Korea had more American films on its list but only one tie to another country in the region through a co-production. China had more links with its neighbors through co-productions. National films were less frequent on lists for countries that were Medium Producers and Minor Producers, presumably because their film industries were smaller and less successful.

With the exception of *Lucy,* films associated with countries other than the US appeared on these lists only if they were co-productions. Three types of co-productions were identified: five co-productions in which an Asian country was associated with a Western country (the US), six co-productions in which an Asian country was associated with another Asian country and six co-productions in which two Western or English-speaking countries were associated. Co-productions between Asian countries involved China and Hong-Kong exclusively. Most of the

co-productions (10 out of 17) involved an American company. Surprisingly, Japan was involved in only three of these co-productions.

Ten co-productions in which an Asian country (China, Japan, or Hong Kong) was involved represented the only type of Asian cultural flow in these data. Two US/Asian co-productions, *Transformers* (US/China) and *Godzilla* (US/Japan), appeared on top 20 lists of eight and seven Asian countries in the study, respectively. The remaining Asian co-productions appeared four times or less.

In other words, based on data for popular films, Asian cultural flows were relatively insignificant. Contrary to predictions derived from the work of Otmazgin (2013a, b), Japan did not perform a significant role in cultural flows in these data. Unlike the case of music videos (Kist and Verboord, Chap. 12 in this volume), Korean films were not important in these data. There were no Korean co-productions.

However, the effects of cultural and geographical proximity were significant. Top-20 lists for China and Hong Kong, which share a border, had ten films in common.

3 The European Film Market as a Cultural Region

Europe has a long history, consisting of countries with different languages and cultures that were often at war with one another in previous centuries. These countries are now members of the European Union, but citizens of these various nations still identify primarily with their own countries rather than with the notion of being "European". The EU tends to be perceived negatively in opinion polls.

American films were also very important in the European film market (see Table 7.2). Unlike the Asian countries, lists for six of the nine European countries included films from other European countries. These films were primarily French. The French film, *Lucy,* appeared on top-20 lists for six European countries (other than France). A second French film, *Qu'est-ce qu'on a fait au Bon Dieu,* appeared on four lists (other than France). A third French film, *Belle et Sébastien,* appeared on the list for Italy. Two German films appeared on the list for Austria, a case of cultural and geographical proximity.

The importance of French films is also seen in the fact that, among the top 20 European films by admissions in the European Union in 2014, twelve were French or French co-productions (European Audiovisual Observatory 2015: 20).

Co-productions with other European countries represented a potential cultural flow within the region. Again, France performed an important role. France was involved in five out of seven co-productions between European countries. The US also performed an important role. Twelve out of eighteen co-productions involved the US.

Thirteen co-productions involved European countries. Among the European countries, Great Britain (8) and France (5) were most frequently involved in co-productions. Five involved Asian countries, including China, Japan and New Zealand.

On the basis of these data, the United States performed the major role in European cultural flows, followed by France, presumably because the French film industry is more productive and more profitable than film industries in other European countries, most of which have succumbed to American competition. French cultural policy provides subsidies and other forms of support for French cinema. The national market share of French films in the French film industry is substantially higher than the national market shares of other European film industries (see Table 7.2).

The effect of cultural proximity on film attendance in France and Belgium which share a language and a border was high. Lists of top-twenty films included twelve of the same films. The effect of cultural proximity for Germany and Austria which also share a language and a border was higher. The two countries shared six films in the top 10. By contrast, top-20 lists for France and Germany included four of the same films.

4 Film Attendance as a Cultural Experience

The limited role of films in cultural flows can be partially explained in terms of the ways in which films are experienced in comparison with other cultural activities. Television and music are omnipresent in daily life while attending a film is now a relatively exceptional experience for most people. Statistics on film attendance show that the average person in most European countries sees a film less than twice a year (*Screen Digest*, 2014). In 2003, film attendance per capita was highest in Spain and Ireland: over three times per year (see Table 7.3). In France, the UK, and Switzerland, film attendance was almost as high: 2.5, 2.3 and 2.1. In the other European countries on the list, film attendance was lower: less than twice a year (see Table 7.3).

Some of the figures for East Asia were higher. New Zealand had the highest attendance rate: 4.16 times per year. Singapore and India were next with 4.13 and 2.61. Japan and South Korea had rates of 1.14. China, Russia and Malaysia had attendance rates below one film per year.

At least three factors affect these rates: (1) the number of film screens in these countries, several of which are "under-screened", according to the European Audiovisual Observatory (2015); (2) the level of piracy, which is high in East Asia; and (3) the quality of the films produced by the local film industry.

Many of the countries in East Asia are under-screened, including China, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand (European Audiovisual Observatory 2015: 51, 59).

Table 7.3 Film attendance by country in Asia and Europe: admissions per capita, 2003[a]

Asia:

No. of admissions per capita:



Europe:

No. of admissions per capita:

[a]http://nationmaster.com/country-info/stats/Media/Cinema-attendance-per-capita

Films are also viewed on the Internet and on television but statistics concerning these types of flows were not examined in this study.

5 Explaining the Success of Foreign Films in Cultural Regions

The popularity of American films and the virtual non-existence of foreign films from the same region on the top-20 lists requires an explanation. The spectacular success of American films in both Asian and European countries can be explained in part by the enormous expenditures that American film companies allocate to marketing and advertising their films. Typically, about one-third of a film's budget is spent on promoting a film. Fu and Govindaraju (2010: 223) show that countries all over the world have increasingly been importing and watching U.S. films.

The popularity of TV dramas from other countries in the region contrasts with the lack of success of films from the same countries. Undoubtedly, these films are not promoted to the same extent as American films but other factors lead to their failure to attract audiences.

A possible explanation lies in the fact that, while foreign TV dramas are heavily adapted for local audiences to fit their cultural norms and values (Jirattikorn, Chap. 10 in this volume), films cannot be adapted in this manner; they can only be dubbed or subtitled. This suggests that foreign films are most likely to be popular when their implications for local cultures are minimal and therefore no adaptation to the local culture is necessary. This is the case for most of the American films that are on the top-20 lists. Fu and Govindaraju (2010: 232) argue that, because Hollywood films have been shown extensively all over the world, "world cinematic audiences have acquired increasingly indistinguishable preferences in choosing Hollywood features to watch." The distinctive style of American films coupled with their ubiquity means that audiences have no difficulty in understanding them.

A half-dozen American blockbuster films appeared on virtually all the Asian lists (see Table 7.4). All of these films were science fiction or took place in environments that presumably have nothing to do with the world inhabited by the Asian audiences (for example, *How to Train Your Dragon)*. They also transmitted no information about contemporary American life.

By contrast, two films that appeared on the top-20 lists for European countries and that dealt with contemporary issues (*The Wolf of Wall Street* and *Gone Girl)* were virtually non-existent on the Asian lists. It seems likely that, in order to be meaningful to Asian audiences, these films would have to be adapted to reflect Asian conditions.

The top-20 Asian lists contained two types of films: American escapist films discussed above and national films or local co-productions which dealt with issues that the Asian audiences face in their daily lives or with their cultural heritage (e.g. *The Tale of the Princess Kaguya* (Japanese). The French film, *Lucy,* which was the

Table 7.4 Successful American films by region and country

East Asia	Country							
Title	China	JP	Korea	Malay.	Philip	Thai.	HK	Sing.
The amazing Spider-man 2	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Captain America: Winter Soldier	x	–	x	x	x	x	x	x
Dawn of the planet of the apes	x	–	x	x	x	x	x	x
X-men: Days of Future Past	x	–	x	x	x	x	x	x
Guardians of the Galaxy	x	–	–	x	x	x	x	x
How to train your dragon	–	–	x	x	x	–	–	x
The Wolf of Wall Street	–	–	–	–	–	–	x	–
Gone Girl	–	–	–	–	–	–	x	–
12 Years a Slave	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–

Europe	Country							
Title:	France	It.	UK-Ire	Germ	Spain	Neth,	Belg.	Austr.
The amazing Spider-man 2	x	x	x	–	–	–	–	–
Captain America: Winter Soldier	–	x	–	–	x	–	–	–
Dawn of the planet of the apes	x	–	x	x	x	x	x	x
X-men: Days of Future Past	x	–	x	–	x	–	x	x
Guardians of the Galaxy	x	–	x	x	x	–	x	x
How to train your dragon	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
The Wolf of Wall Street	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Gone Girl	–	–	x	–	–	–	–	–
12 Years a Slave	–	–	x	–	–	x	x	–

only European film on the top-20 Asian lists, was an imitation of an American blockbuster.

The top-20 European lists were similar to the Asian lists (see Table 7.4). They contained the same American escapist films plus the French blockbuster, *Lucy*, combined with local films (e.g. *Les vacances du petit Nicolas* (French). However, they also included a few American films that explored contemporary issues that were salient to European audiences (e.g. *The Wolf of Wall Street).*

In other words, cultural content, in order to be successful and worthy of the label, cultural flow, must either be completely divorced from the everyday lives of target audiences (but entertaining for other reasons) or adapted to the realities of their everyday existence. Otherwise, such content is likely to be consumed only by small elite or niche audiences.

6 Conclusion

In both these regions, cultural flows of films from one country to another were relatively sparse. In both regions, American films provided the majority of the cultural flows. Regional films were virtually non-existent in East Asia. Co-productions were successful in other countries primarily when the US was one of the partners.

Cultural flows between countries in the same region, such as China and Hong-Kong, were more significant. The top-20 lists had ten films in common. On the other hand, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan were relatively isolated from Asian regional film culture. Few Asian co-productions were popular in these countries and these countries did not participate in Asian co-productions.

By contrast, France, which has the most successful film industry in the European region, performed an important role in the circulation of cultural flows. The majority of European cultural flows emanated from France. However, in Europe as well as in Asia, the US was the major source of cultural flows.

It is unlikely that cultural flows of films are contributing significantly to the emergence of cultural regionalization in either East Asia or Western Europe. However, the relative absence of this type of cultural flow in both regions is an important indicator of the extent of cultural regionalization that already exists.

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Chapter 8
Cultural Exports, Creative Strategies and Collaborations in the Mainland Chinese Market

Brian Yecies and Michael Keane

Abstract The authors examine how Chinese film and television companies have collaborated with their counterparts in South Korea during the past decade. The first part of the chapter challenges the concept of cultural and media 'flows', arguing that processes and technologies have probably been more instrumental in transforming the Chinese media industries. Whereas the generic term 'flows' applies to finished content, an increase in film co-production and formatting activity in the television industry between the two nations leads us to examine other factors including professional relationships and the exchange of creative ideas and technology. The next section looks at the Chinese government's 'going out' strategy through the 2014 film co-production agreement with South Korea, and the post-production collaboration that followed it. We then examine some examples of television collaboration and how this is helping to raise China's profile in East Asia, where it is inevitably tarred with the negative image of the Chinese Communist Party. The question that arises is: will such East Asian collaboration efforts enable or impede China's media dream of reaching out to the world stage?

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Keywords China · South Korea · Korean wave · Cultural policy · Co-production · Cultural exports · Soft power · Transnational media collaboration · TV formats

1 Introduction

Over the past decade, the government of the People's Republic of China (hereafter China) has announced lofty ambitions to extend the nation's culture beyond its national boundaries. Many state-sponsored initiatives are now encouraging Chinese cultural producers and products to 'go out', that is, to internationalize. The roots of what is now called the 'strong cultural power' (*wenhua qiang guo*) strategy extend back to 1988, when the prominent policy advisor Zheng Bijian first proposed the term 'cultural power'; in the early 1990s this concept was subsumed into a multi-layered national strategy known as 'comprehensive national power' (Huang 1992, 7, cited in Zhang 2010). In the late 1990s, as China moved closer to joining the World Trade Organization (WTO), previously separate regional media units were consolidated into clusters (*jituan*), later to be reclassified as 'cultural industries' (*wenhua chanye*). These efforts at consolidation and reclassification were aimed at resisting foreign competition, which at that time was seen as coming from the West.

It was not until the mid-2000s that cultural officials in Beijing acknowledged China's failure to export its cultural products relative to its East Asian neighbours – Japan, South Korea, SAR Hong Kong and Taiwan. The term 'cultural soft power' first appeared on the policy agenda in 2007 (see Vlassis 2015; Keane 2015). Adding the term 'cultural' (*wenhua*) to the existing concept of 'soft power' (*ruanshili*), an expression derived from the work of Joseph Nye (Nye 1990), was intended to promote the cultural distinctiveness of China with respect to South Korea (hereafter Korea) and Japan, which were deemed to be heavily influenced by Western pop styles.

The film, television and music industries in Hong Kong and Taiwan have already been well documented (Curtin 2007; Fung 2013). Thanks to the rapid escalation in internet users on the mainland, by the early 2000s trendy, youth-oriented creative content from Korea was finding new audiences and creating fan communities in China (Cho and Zhu 2017; Pease 2009; Leung 2008); in many of these accounts, 'wave' offers an apt metaphor for what many commentators have seen as a one-way tide of media content. In this chapter we draw attention to the transfer of 'know how' into China from Korea, not only in terms of technical skills, but also in storytelling and media management expertise. In making the case for such transfers, we challenge the dominant metaphor of 'flows' to characterize the relationships between the East Asian media and their Chinese counterparts. Although 'flows' and 'waves' are useful concepts for describing the reception of content or personnel, and while the flow metaphor has gained a new dimension with the advent of online streaming services, such terms do little to help us to understand the ways in which personnel and production practices are moving across national boundaries. In

discussing the adoption of new technologies, we consider why China is reverting to earlier terminology, such as 'cultural power', to replace 'soft power'. We suggest that this choice of language reflects the growing agglomeration and influence of the Mainland media content market on China's less robust East Asian neighbours.

In the following section, we describe the connections developed between Korean and Chinese filmmakers throughout the 2010s, prior to the 2016 THAAD missile crisis, an incident which demonstrates how politics can effectively trump policy. We briefly explore the discreet bilateral relationships behind the making of the VFX-heavy Chinese hits *Journey to the West: Conquering the Demons* (2013) and *The Monkey King* (2014), as well as *The Mermaid* (2016) and *Operation Mekong* (2016), which were all post-produced with input from Macrograph, one of Korea's most active digital effects studios. Through our case study of Macrograph, which originated in 2003 as the research and development arm of the government-funded Electronics and Telecommunications Research Institute (ETRI), we demonstrate how Korean directors, actors and special effects practitioners have offered their skills to the rapidly expanding Chinese film industry in return for massively increased exposure and investment opportunities. Against the background of pan-Asian collaborations of this type, which have arisen in response to pressures from within China to produce better-quality content, we look at the ways in which the 2014 co-production treaty between China and Korea and its outcomes are unexpectedly benefitting the expanding media industries in China.

In the next section, we turn to the television industry and the role that Korean-originated TV formats are playing in the Chinese market. Formats are a highly significant contributor to ratings in television schedules at both the national and international levels. They constitute an alternative mode of media globalization, one that confirms the importance of exploiting specialist knowledge from abroad. While the ideas behind many programs may be global, they incorporate local elements; in effect, this global–local dynamic underwrites the commercial viability of Chinese television, especially as it reaches out to the world on online platforms. An example of Korean influence on Chinese television is the talent show *I am a Singer* (*wo shi geshou*), which through its successful adaptation in China has paradoxically allowed it to stake a claim as a major new locus of East Asian pop culture – a trend that may well be disconcerting for the Korean media industry. Moreover, as Zeng and Sparks (2017) have noted, because Koreans have maintained a close cultural understanding of Chinese ways of producing media content, Korean-licensed television formats are more akin to co-productions than simple localizations.

In conclusion, we ask to what extent media collaborations with Korea will aid China in 'strengthening' its cultural power base. One scenario is that as the Korean Wave dissipates, it will merge with a much larger Chinese media production complex that will reach out into East Asia. Another possibility is that political developments may render such collaboration increasingly problematic.

2 Rethinking the Metaphor of Cultural Flows

Media scholars have conventionally used the 'flow' metaphor to describe the cross-border movements of audio-visual media. The concept had an early incarnation in the political economy of the media; for instance, the term 'cultural imperialism' implied an unrelenting flow of Western media products that were perceived by scholars, and the political class in the receiving nations, as largely detrimental to their people (see Tomlinson 1999; Flew 2016). The McBride Report, produced for UNESCO in 1980, fomented debate about the negative standardizing effects of Western media – although these concerns were more focused on news information channels than content (Harvey and Tongue 2006). In the late 1990s, UNESCO followed up with a *World Culture Report*, which suggested that media diversity was in fact multiplying in the age of globalization.

The term 'flow' subsequently appeared in many articles and reports, in reference to the asymmetrical relationships between dominant and emergent media economies. Daya Thussu has proposed a useful typology, dividing media flows into three broad categories: 'global, transnational and geo-cultural', with a secondary triad of 'dominant, contra and subaltern' flows. As Thussu (2007) puts it: 'The global media landscape in the first decade of the twenty-first century represents a complex terrain of multi-vocal, multimedia and multi-directional flows' (12). Considering the 'geo-cultural' category, much has been written about audio-visual consumption in East Asia. In 1993, Thomas Gold (1993) cited the heady influence of 'gangtai' (Hong Kong and Taiwanese) pop music and television serials on the Chinese mainland. In 2004, Iwabuchi and his colleagues edited a collection of essays on media consumption in East and Southeast Asia entitled *Rogue Flows: Trans-Asian Cultural Traffic*, with an emphasis on 'goods, ideas, cultural products and finance' (p. 1). Berry et al. (2009) noted 'transborder cultural flows' in the North-east Asian region (Berry et al. 2009), while other commentators (Black et al. 2010) have spoken of 'complicated currents', embodying 'waves of influence' (p. vi). The metaphor gained further traction as a result of the 'Korean Wave' (Shim 2006; Chua and Iwabuchi 2008; Lee and Lim 2014), referring to the rising 'soft power' tide that was attracting foreign audiences, albeit without the negative associations of cultural imperialism.

Despite the prevalence of the metaphor, we believe that 'flow' is an inadequate descriptor for the majority of cross-border or 'transnational' media. Firstly, flows generally refer to finished products (e.g. films, TV series, animations) conceived and produced in one nation, which are then circulated and traded across boundaries. Most of the literature on the Korean Wave charts the rise of South Korean-branded content both in the domestic market and through its reception in neighbouring countries, typically Japan, China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Southeast Asia. Most existing studies have concerned content made in Korea for consumption by Korean audiences, rather than product pitched directly at overseas markets. Second, applying the concept of flows is problematic in China where barriers – including quotas, censorship, protectionism and market distortions – impede the normal 'flow' of media seen in neighbouring territories. An emphasis on policies, people and industry

relationships that allow producers, writers, actors, investors and technicians to engage in collaborative efforts calls for an explanation more akin to technology transfer, albeit one that takes account of political realities. In the case of South Korea, this contingency was demonstrated by the 2016 missile crisis, a subject to which we return in the conclusion.

Film co-productions are an excellent example of 'cultural technology transfer' among producers, investors and distributors, often drawing on existing reserves of goodwill and shared resources. Negotiations might include subjects such as distribution rights, the sharing of production costs, and leveraging off local production tax offsets and subsidies. The trading of television formats, on the other hand, are strategic ventures, a bundle of resources that are supplied on demand between television production houses and broadcasters. The format 'bible' contains explicit instructions detailing the production sequence. In many cases television formats are simply copied, leading to claims and counterclaims of intellectual property violation. In China over the past decade many TV stations have opted to take advantage of the transfer of 'know-how' associated with the format industry. Both co-productions (film) and format licensing (television) in China are subject to the securing of production permits – another reason why the term 'flows' does not adequately capture the negotiated complexity of the production process.

Thus, cross-border productions might be better characterized as 'assemblages': as Chris Berry writes of film production, 'the cast and crew might hold passports of different countries; and elements of the final product such as the music, the editing, special effects and so forth may be outsourced across national borders.' (Berry 2014, 454) Writing about television formats Cho and Zhu (2017, 2337) say, 'cultural assemblages, therefore, enables us to expand the scope of television format studies beyond its industrial and technical dimensions: rather, it underscores diverse, recurring, and reciprocal flows and ensuing social discourses.'

In the examples discussed in this chapter we illustrate the various factors that come into play when media practitioners come together to co-produce, co-finance, co-develop, adapt or format a production in China. In some cases, a film project might be launched from scratch, with both partners contributing to the treatment or screenplay. In other cases, the bulk of the creative work will be done in one country (e.g. Korea); shooting logistics may be handled by a media company in China, subject to clearance by the China Film Co-production Corporation (CFCC) and script approval from the State Administration of Print, Publicity, Radio, Film and Television (SAPPRFT). Post-production might take place at a third location. The success of the production process, in both the film and television sectors, will often be determined by cultural proximity. In the case of Korea and China, a shared Confucian cultural heritage, combined with a history of professional dialogue among industry practitioners, offers a relatively straightforward process compared with a Sino-US co-production or format. On the other hand, political sensitivities need to be acknowledged.

Political sensitivities have become a feature of all co-productions and format licenses. However, an increase in co-productions, TV formats, and associated forms of technical exchange over the past few decades has meant that the Chinese state is

now willing to co-operate with 'foreign' nations rather than seeing them solely as competitors. In 2004, the Chinese government promulgated two documents, *The Provisions on the Administration of Sino-Foreign Cooperation in the Production of Films*, followed by the *Interim Provisions on the Administration of Chinese-foreign Joint Ventures and Cooperative Enterprises Producing and Distributing Radio and Television*. These documents indicated that the government's strategy was now all about attracting foreign investment and expertise to China's audio-visual industries, specifically film, TV, and animation. Thus, processes, technology and specialist know-how, rather than 'flows,' are gradually changing the balance of cultural power in East Asia and beyond.

3 The Forging of Chinese–Korean Connections

Central to the current frenzy of transnational activity in the Chinese film industry are contributions by Korean practitioners – often assisted by the Korean Film Council (KOFIC), which has made a significant impact on the Asian superpower's film industry ecosystem. Chinese practitioners, firms and policymakers have increasingly sought to boost the international appeal of Chinese media and cultural contents by recruiting established Korean directors; Park Yu-hwan, Jo Jin-kyu, Kwak Jae-yong, Ahn Byeong-ki, and Hur Jin-ho are the best known.[1] Producers such as Edward Yi Chi Yun, who developed personal networks in China in the early 1990s while attending the Beijing Film Academy (BFA), have consulted on a number of major films.[2] The personal networks that producer Yi and numerous other Koreans (including KOFIC-Beijing's long-time manager, Kim Pil-jung) cultivated while studying in China, and the contacts they have made since, have paved the way for much of this collaboration. Through these relationships and connections, Chinese industry players have begun integrating lessons learned from their foreign competitors.[3]

Among the long list of Korean firms working in and/or with China, Macrograph stands out for its increasing contributions to the Asian film industry. At the peak of its activity as the research and development arm of the non-profit government research center ETRI, a team of technicians led by Lee In-ho, who later formed

[1] The results of these collaborations include the thriller *The Mysterious Family* (2016); melodrama *Passion Heaven* (2016); rom-com *Meet Miss Anxiety* (2014); Korean horror remake *Bunshinsaba* (2012, aka Bi Xian); and the romantic drama *A Good Rain Knows* (2009), respectively.

[2] These include Feng Xiaogang's *Assembly* (2007) and *Aftershock* (2010); John Woo's *Red Cliff I* (2008); Tsui Hark's *Flying Swords of Dragon Gate* (2011); the action–crime–comedy *Bad Guys Always Die* (2015), co-produced by leading Chinese and Korean filmmakers Feng Xiaogang and Kang Je-gyu; and the fantasy-adventure-comedy *Journey to the West: The Demons Strike Back* (2017, dir. Tsui Hark).

[3] For further detail on Korean–Chinese film collaborations, see Yecies and Shim (2016).

According to the authors, the range of production and post-production collaboration between the Korean and Chinese film industries had reached a peak, with no end yet in sight.

Macrograph, worked with the Digital Tetra (DTI) consortium of CG companies to create the special effects for *The Restless* (2006), a Korean historical swordplay fantasy film in which evil demons are pursued by a band of heroic hunters across the underworld. In 2007, *The Restless* was nominated for the Best Visual Effects award at the 1st Asian Film Awards hosted by the Hong Kong International Film Festival, bringing Korea's burgeoning special and visual effects industry to the attention of filmmakers and audiences across Asia and beyond. The momentum generated by this domestic film led to Macrograph's working on the martial arts action–adventure–fantasy *The Forbidden Kingdom* (2008, dir. Rob Minkoff), a medium-budget (US $55 million) US–China co-production starring Jackie Chan and Jet Li, emphatically demonstrating the firm's commercial potential. As its first major project, *The Forbidden Kingdom* opened doors in China for Macrograph and other Korean post-production companies and practitioners looking for opportunities outside of Korea's dynamic but limited domestic industry.

One of the biggest box office sensations resulting from Chinese–Korean collaboration is Stephen Chow's fantasy–drama–romance *The Mermaid*, which as of April 2016 had returned a gross profit of nearly $526 million US in China alone.[4] For this VFX-heavy production, Macrograph (joined by Hong Kong's Different Digital Design) completed the spectacular computer-generated imagery (hereafter CGI). Previously, Macrograph and VFX firm Moneff had completed part of the CGI for director Stephen Chow and Derek Kwok's action-packed 3D film *Journey to the West: Conquering the Demons*, while at least 11 Korean visual and special effects companies, including Macrograph, Dexter Digital, Digital Studio 2 L, and Digital Idea, worked on the collaborative hit by director Cheang Pou-soi, *The Monkey King* (2014). Around this time, Macrograph opened branch offices in Beijing and Shanghai in order to work closer with their Chinese partners. In their respective credits, *The Mermaid*, *Journey to the West* and *The Monkey King* boast the longest list of Korean companies and practitioners of any films produced in China, demonstrating the increasing internationalization of post-production in both Chinese and Korean cinema.

In mid-2013, the strengthening of industry relations between China and Korea led to the signing of a MOU, which underlined the benefits of cultural exchange and introduced standard procedures for collective financing, as well as joint production and distribution guidelines. The provisions of the MOU, in tandem with some assistance from KOFIC's Beijing office, eased the opening of Macrograph's branch offices in China. As a result, workflow and cultural differences were minimized, and the bilateral relationship was enhanced.

In light of these expanding joint ventures, it came as no surprise that in July 2014 a formal co-production agreement was signed between Korea's Ministry of Culture, Sports, and Tourism and China's State Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, Film and Television (hereafter SAPPRFT, formerly known as SARFT). The announcement of the deal followed a high-profile trade summit in Seoul between Korean president Park Geun-hye and Chinese president Xi Jinping. At the time, *The*

[4] http://www.boxofficemojo.com/movies/?page=intl&id=mermaid2016.htm

Hollywood Reporter, a leading film trade publication, hailed the treaty as a 'landmark agreement' (Coonan 2014). The deal is much more than a thinly veiled device to enable Korean films to be classified as 'domestic' in China, thereby circumventing China's protectionist import quotas.[5] Like other international policy instruments that seek to increase training opportunities – as well as to provide location incentives, producer offsets and tax exemptions, and post-production rebates – the 2014 agreement is stimulating an increasing number of official film collaborations and industry networking initiatives between both nations, and also maximizing distribution opportunities for co-produced films in the global market.

Under the agreement, a film qualifies as an official co-production after meeting specific requirements from each partner. Official co-productions are considered to be 'domestic' films in both countries, thus enabling them to circumvent existing film quotas that restrict the number of annual screenings of imported, foreign films. The treaty requires both domestic and international partners such as KOFIC to liaise with SAPPRFT via the China Film Co-production Corporation (hereafter CFCC), the chief quasi-governmental body responsible for the selection and administration of co-produced films. According to most of these agreements, all international (i.e. non-Chinese) partners are required to fund between 20% and 80% of the total production budget. Regardless of the agreed funding ratios, producers are encouraged to match their financial commitment with creative contributions by a film's cast and crew; the sharing of computer graphics, virtual reality and/or digital cinema skills and technologies; production budgets and in-kind costs; and other contributions made by (minor) third parties.

On paper, the 2014 co-production agreement seeks to promote the development of the Korean and Chinese film industries and to increase the competitiveness of joint productions by facilitating technical cooperation across all sectors of the filmmaking process, including visual and special effects, virtual reality, and digital cinema infrastructure. In reality, however, as Korea already has an established record of technical innovation and a mature film industry ecosystem (see Yecies 2010), the agreement effectively favors Chinese firms in their bid to catch up with international industry standards and adopt the genre-bending story lines for which Korean cinema is so well known.

Nevertheless, in between 2014 and 2018 only a few producers on both sides have pursued this formal avenue for collaboration – primarily because co-productions are subject to a lengthy three-stage approval and completion process involving extensive paperwork, online submissions, and other administrative processes. According to the KOFIC website, only 29 official China–Korea co-productions were made between 2000 and 2010, and a further 21 are known to have been produced since then.[6] However, since mid-2014, *unofficial* collaborations have well exceeded these

[5] At the time of writing, China's quota of foreign films included 34 revenue-sharing films per year, while Korea's screen quota regime required all cinemas to show domestic films for a minimum of 73 days per annum.

[6] See: www.koreanfilm.or.kr/jsp/coProduction/productionCaseList.jsp. Accessed 22 November 2017.

numbers. Two recent unofficial co-productions are the box office hits *The Mermaid* (2016, dir. Stephen Chow) and *Operation Mekong* (2016, dir. Dante Lam), with reported gross takings of $3.5 billion RMB and $1.145 billion RMB, respectively.[7] These examples are among a host of Chinese films made with creative and technological input from Korean post-production practitioners that have enabled Chinese cinema to reach new heights in terms of the number and quality of features released.

Among an increasing number of bilateral productions, *Journey to the West: Conquering the Demons* and *The Monkey King*, and as well as *The Mermaid* and *Operation Mekong*, stand out for the lessons that they offer for collaborative media production. They are all outstanding examples of the joint projects that are attracting the attention of Mainland Chinese, diasporic and non-Chinese audiences – all of which are on the rise. For each of these films, Macrograph completed between 150 and 500 VFX shots, many of which proved very challenging. Between 7 and 10 Chinese assistants were employed by Macrograph on each production, and Macrograph's CEO (Lee In-ho), as well as numerous Korean crew members, including VFX producers, supervisors, coordinators and translators, worked closely with the Chinese directors and their local crews. In ways similar to Hollywood-style VFX filmmaking, Chinese and Korean crewmembers were able to exchange ideas and to learn from each other – even when simply looking on. Today, many of the local crews from these and former China-Korea joint ventures have contributed to other Chinese films and have begun to rise in the ranks of their respective arenas. Beyond the guidelines offered by any policy agreement, the development and production strategies adopted by Macrograph and its fellow post-production studios have minimized the cross-cultural, communication, and practical clashes that occur when mixing crews of different nationalities and making films for simultaneous appeal to audiences in multiple countries. As collaborative opportunities between the two countries continue to expand, so too does the complexity and creativity of the VFX and special effects featured in Chinese cinema.

These four collaborative film projects have not only struck a chord with Chinese audiences (by successfully customizing stories that appeal specifically to Chinese audiences and the sentiments that underpin their culture), but their production strategies have pushed the bilateral relationship beyond the conventional approach of importing stars and/or locations as 'exotic' accessories into an otherwise wholly domestic film. In these ways, *Journey to the West: Conquering the Demons* and *The Monkey King*, as well as *The Mermaid* and *Operation Mekong*, have done much to strengthen future opportunities for collaborative ventures. They are going a long way to justify the 2014 film policy agreement, offering strong models for future collaborations as well as Chinese co-productions with other countries such as Thailand, India and the USA.

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[7] For *The Mermaid*, see: www.boxofficemojo.com/movies/?page=intl&id=mermaid2016.htm; for *Operation Mekong,* see: www.boxofficemojo.com/movies/?page=intl&country=CH&id=operationmekong.htm. Accessed 15 November 2017.

4 Television: The Korean Format Strategy Takes Off

The television formatting model represents a process similar to that of film co-production, albeit one that avoids much of the bureaucracy associated with the former, while still needing to reconcile political and cultural differences. Moreover, television reaches a broader audience, generating a range of ancillary benefits. Television formats have provided an alternative way of making audio-visual content in China: they are essentially remakes or versions. As noted above (Zeng and Sparks 2017), Sino-Korean format agreements are more akin to co-productions than format deals with other territories. In their study of the localization of Korean variety show *Running Man*, Zeng and Sparks describe how Korean consultants 'teach' their Chinese colleagues, rather than simply provide advice.

Many formats 'value-add' in ways that serials find difficult: for instance, through product placement, celebrity branding, tie-ins, merchandising and social media. All this has come about thanks to media commercialization, which began to accelerate with the rapid development of satellite channels in China in the 1990s. A trickle of formats in the 1990s, initially from Taiwan, had become a tide by the end of the first decade of the new millennium. As Keane (2015) has detailed, satellite channels initially sought formatted shows, hoping to cash in on the breakout national audience captured by Hunan Satellite TV's *Supergirls* (*chaoji nvsheng* 2004), an opportunistic clone of *Pop Idol* (Meng 2009; Yang 2009; Huang 2014; Wu 2014). Formats provided such channels with an alternative to buying canned (finished) foreign shows, which inevitably had to run the censorship gauntlet. Along with the transfer of entertainment shows to the Mainland came creative personnel, consultants, writers, producers and technicians.

The alignment of the Chinese and Korean television industries, their programmes and creative personnel, began to happen as the Korean Wave started to break in the late 1990s. South Korean programmes made inroads into the living rooms of Chinese audiences, firstly through television serial dramas including *What is Love* (1997) and *The Jewel in the Palace* (2005), and more recently on online platforms and satellite channels via the adaptation of Korean television formats such as *Running Man, Where Are We Going Dad?* and *I am a Singer*. Korean formats – both the originals and localized-in-China versions – have connected with mainstream audiences and in so doing have hastened a migration of production and celebrity talent to China. Korean producers, in particular Shin Jung-soo (*I am a Singer*) and Kang Gung (*Where Are We Going Dad?*), have made no secret of their intentions to relocate to China (Park 2016). At the same time, however, it is evident that they are 'collaborating', in the sense that they are taking secrets about Korea's success to China.

Korea's success in selling formats into China was made easier as a result of the widespread popularity of its television drama, film, and pop culture in Asia (Chua and Iwabuchi 2008; Chua 2013; Fung 2013; Berry et al. 2009). But there is another important factor. In October 2013, SAPPRFT introduced a 'one format policy' (Keane and Zhang 2017), a move intended to restrict the burgeoning numbers of

formatted talent shows. The SAPPRFT rules restricted each satellite channel to importing just one format each year, with the additional constraint that it could not be broadcast during prime time (7.30–10 pm). The only exceptions were music talent shows approved by SAPPRFT: a limit of four per year was prescribed. The regulator believed that a surfeit of foreign content was restricting local creativity – a somewhat ironic claim considering SAPPRFT's, and its predecessor SARFT's, restrictive practices.

The regulations were intended to contain the entry of foreign businesses into the Chinese media market through the formatting model. In effect, media businesses were using formats as a calling card, pitching ideas that were new and fresh, at least to Chinese producers. The remade versions, authorized and managed by the Chinese entity, took due cognizance of cultural and political factors. The Chinese media networks, primarily satellite channels, were essentially 'outsourcing risk' (Chalaby 2016) by buying proven concepts, while the foreign format traders were avoiding the problem of directly navigating the censorial labyrinth of SAPPRFT. As a result of the 2013 crackdown, formats from Korea gained a competitive advantage. If a network or channel only had one chance to buy an entertainment show each season, it made sense to look for something that was culturally appropriate. It also signalled the entry of Korea into the format exporting business, extending the Korean Wave to the export of programme ideas, consultancy and technical support.

Interestingly, Korea had began its move into the format business by copying Japanese programs. Dong-Hoo Lee (2004) notes how Japanese programs were seen as a way of adapting elements of American production 'know-how', already assimilated into the Japanese television industry, into local contexts (Iwabuchi 2004). At the time, it was expedient for Korean producers to simply copy Japanese shows because of a ban on Japanese entertainment programs in the 1990s – the legacy of historical antagonism between two countries. After the ban was lifted in 1998, Korean producers were more circumspect, but by this time the Korean Wave was in full swing.

While copying is rife in the creative industries, the television industry adopts a pragmatic approach. There is an exchange of ideas – in many cases a considerable amount of consultancy, together with license agreements that cover the sharing of ancillary rights among the partners. In talent shows, these might include performing rights (such as concerts and CDs), brand relationships and merchandising. Television formats provide an opportunity for Korea to leverage its entertainment industry complex into China. Moreover, the development of these programmes involves economic and political awareness. First, there is a supply and demand relationship at stake – television networks want shows that will win over audiences and generate greater advertising revenue. Second, in China the road to success is littered with the corpses of failed programmes, a testament to the vigilance of SAPPRFT.

These formats are essentially adaptations – more than merely adding Chinese elements and cultural nuances, they bring about changes in the way that programmes are made, that is, in the production culture (Caldwell 2008). New ideas often encounter resistance, particularly in the delicate area of linguistic, cultural and intertextual codes. A good example of these codes is provided by Seiko Yasumoto's

comparative study of the television adaptation of the Japanese manga *Hani yori dango*, which became a serial called *Meteor Garden* in Taiwan and *Boys Over Flowers* in Korea. While some of the original cultural expressions in the Japanese version were not included in the remakes, others were retained, emphasized or modified. In the Chinese (i.e. Taiwanese) adaptation, *Meteor Garden*, the producers replaced Japanese idioms with references to traditional Chinese culture through the insertion of well-known expressions (Yasumoto 2015).

To a greater extent than those originating in Taiwan and Hong Kong, Korean formats embody a variety of lifestyle elements including fashion, food culture and tourism. Their aesthetics draw heavily on Japanese Kawaii ('cute') culture, with its modern take on fashion and youth lifestyle. In game shows like *Running Man*, contestants are fashionably attired and likeable, appealing to younger audiences. Echoing Japanese production styles, reality shows frequently add cartoon-style captions and text messages. Compared to their Korean counterparts, Chinese television program-makers have paid far less attention to visual aesthetics, leading one of China's politburo members, Wang Qishan, head of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, to suggest that Korean TV programs make family values more appealing by wrapping them in designer clothing and cool gadgets (Wee 2014).

In 2013, Korea introduced two significant licensed programs into the Chinese market. The first, *I am a Singer* (*wo shi geshou*), was a talent elimination contest with live audience voting; the second was reality show *Where are we Going*, *Dad?* (*baba qu na'er?*) (see Keane and Zhang 2017). Both were developed and distributed by the Munhwa Broadcasting Corporation (MBC) to Hunan Satellite TV (HSTV); interestingly, both shows formed elements of South Korea MBC's long-running variety show *Sunday Night*, which was already attracting a large Chinese online audience. A third Korean show with an avid following, *Running Man* (*benpaoba xiongdi*), was localized by Zhejiang Satellite Television (ZJSTV) the following year.

I am a Singer is made by Hunan Satellite TV. It was the first Korean format purchased by Hunan Satellite from the Korean broadcaster MBC. The program differs from *The Voice* in that the seven singers chosen are already established performers. As in most formats there is an elimination process, here determined by a selected audience. The level of live performance and 'music quality' is usually high. *I am a Singer* has achieved remarkable success and, along with *The Voice of China*, replicates the Eurovision Song Contest in arousing nationalist sentiments. Both the jury and contestants hail from different countries in East Asia. In the recent past, China has looked to its 'cool' neighbors, Japan and Korea, for pop culture. It now has a powerful attraction of its own, even though the format comes via Korea. (For this new pan-Asian phenomenon, see especially Wang and de Kloet (2016)).

Being on *I am a Singer* provides artists with the opportunity to launch (or relaunch) their careers in the Mainland. In the third season (2015), the winner was Han Hong, already a well-known singer with a Tibetan background; she performed a duet with Hong Kong pop idol Eason Chan. Whereas talent shows like *The Voice* function as a possible stepping stone towards a music career, determined by a panel

of judges, the audience in *I am a Singer* judges if the singer is worthy of stardom. Wang and de Kloet (2016) argue that the show illustrates the new regionalization of pop culture – it takes a Hong Kong pop star, a Tibetan singer, a Korean format and a provincial satellite TV channel to produce a national winner. Like *The Voice of China*, this second-generation format is drawing audiences in Asia to watch Chinese programming, now available on a myriad of online platforms including YouTube.

5 Conclusion

In this chapter we have argued that processes, skills, technology and know-how, rather than media 'flows', are redefining the landscape of film and television production in East Asia. The term 'cultural assemblage' (Cho and Zhu 2017; Berry 2014) appears to offer a more useful way of understanding the diverse, recurring and co-dependent nature of media production in East Asia today, along with its capacity to effect 'cultural technology transfers' (Keane et al. 2007). Moreover, the prevailing metaphor of flows fails to adequately capture what Wang and Kloet (2016), writing about China, refer to as the 'state-global-regional media complex.' In a nutshell, the PRC is building its networks into East Asia, perhaps as a stepping stone for a global campaign which is already underpinned by its investment in overseas film companies and distribution chains. The Mainland, long regarded as backward, politically restrictive, unimaginative and bureaucratic, is becoming more welcoming to outsiders. At the same time, creative personnel, from producers to sound technicians, are collaborating with Chinese partners. Prior to the early 2000s, such collaborations were rare, often one-off ventures, and subject to a high degree of scrutiny from SAPPRFT.

In the light of this evolving story, we ask: Are Sino-Korean collaborations enabling or restraining the Chinese dream of cultural ascendency on the world stage? Is China's 'cultural power' index on the rise? And what is at stake for South Korea? Certainly the evidence suggests that China is benefiting from the skills and creativity of its South Korean neighbours, while the latter are vigorously pursuing ongoing opportunities in the world's largest media market. The pan-Asian media market, previously dominated by commercial, trendy 'pop culture' from South Korea, Hong Kong, Japan and Taiwan, is now increasingly 'sinocized.' Creative personnel are moving to the Mainland in increasing numbers.

However, during times of political conflict, allegiances built up over time are likely to come under pressure. This applies as much to Korea, a close neighbour of China, as probably to Hollywood. In mid-2016, South Korea was the victim of an economic and cultural backlash by the Chinese government, a reaction to the deployment of the US-sponsored Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile system on the Korean Peninsula. This response has impacted heavily on the Korean Wave by pressuring Chinese investors, promoters and distributors to severely limit the exposure of Korean bands and musical acts, television and film stars, and television programs, as well as Korean films and Korean directors on local films in China.

Behind the camera, some Chinese studios have been asking their Korean employees to use their Chinese names, or to remove their names altogether from a film's credits. At the time of writing, Korean VFX firms such as Macrograph appear to have skirted the crisis, and it appears that the so-called missile crisis has begun to end.

The Sino-Korean film and television collaborations discussed in this chapter have unfolded on multiple levels, bringing together creative talent involving producers, directors, and actors as well as action, visual effects, and post-production specialists and cinematographers on an unprecedented scale. These bilateral film encounters began largely without any intervention or guidance from official co-production policy agreements. Prior to the 2014 co-production agreement, filmmakers 'made do' by forging company-to-company deals via informal personal networks, allowing the parties involved to benefit from their existing access to different types of market channels. However, in 2018 such ventures largely lie within or alongside the aims and objectives of the formal 2014 co-production treaty, which was established atop a robust foundation formed by a wealth of previous joint filmmaking activity.

The opportunities for Korean film practitioners to work on a long and ever-growing list of Chinese films have grown from tiny seedlings – the contacts and friendships that a handful of aspiring Korean filmmakers made while studying at the Beijing Film Academy during the early-to-mid-1990s. The professional inroads made by these now major players have enabled themselves and others throughout the Korean film industry to become some of the most active practitioners and companies in China today. In this way, Chinese cinema is continuing to 'go out by staying home' – that is, leverage off talent and expertise from some of its Asian neighbors while also benefitting from policy agreements that allow it to gain privileged insights into a partnering country's market and the sharing of advanced creative ideas and technical expertise. The stronger bonds forged between the two industries have also helped them resist the US dominance of the film and cultural industries across many parts of the globe. The success of films like *Journey to the West: Conquering the Demons* and *The Monkey King*, as well as *The Mermaid* and *Operation Mekong*, is evidence of this. Yet, ironically, this experience is now enabling the Chinese film industry to form new and stronger bonds with firms and practitioners across the US industry.

While Korean practitioners have been contributing to the expansion of Chinese cinema and television in terms of the refinement of genres, themes and storylines, as well as technical skills, Chinese media companies are enabling the Korean film and television industries to increasingly internationalize their approaches to overseas markets. In this new cultural and commercial arena, Korea's global experience and success with its own brand of soft power and technical prowess has been instrumental in developing its collaborative relationship with China. However, the remainder of the 2010s no longer looks like delivering a win–win scenario for both countries. The Chinese film and television industries are now opening up a new transnational chapter in both the economic and cultural spheres. In following the path it has chosen for itself, it seems that Korea is inadvertently repositioning China as the major locus of pop culture in Asia.

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Chapter 9
Regionalization of Taiwanese Post-Confucian TV Dramas: A Case Study of Tsai Yueh-hsun's *White Tower* and *Black & White*

Jocelyn Yi-hsuan Lai

Abstract This essay explores the mediation of ideas and values of Taiwanese film and TV producer-director Tsai Yueh-hsun's regionally oriented productions, in particular, *White Tower* and *Black & White*. Tsai's career has been conditioned by the globalization and regionalization of film and TV consumption and production in Taiwan. His films and TV productions are not related to Taiwan's national politics. They are set in non-discernible, hence, denationalized urban societies. They appeal to audiences in both the Taiwanese and East Asian markets, with their post-Confucian presentation of personal and social issues of urban subjects. These productions stage the problems of Confucian patriarchal authority and highlight the significance of democracy in modern capitalistic East Asia. They make use of star power and take advantage of specific national markets at different times (in particular, Taiwan, Japan and China).

Tsai's earlier works were not approved by Chinese censors smoothly and relied financially on Japanese appreciation of the works. As he started making more adult-oriented dramas that engaged serious political issues, his markets multiplied. Yet these markets lacked consensual (geo-)political viewpoints; thus, Tsai altered the settings of his works to be more conceptual and abstract, so as to appeal to more diverse audiences. He removed the political viewpoint commonly perceived in Taiwan, but not to the agreement of Chinese officialdom in the works.

Keywords *Black & White* · Chinese-language film and TV · Confucianism · Co-production · East Asian pop culture · ECFA · Idol drama · *Meteor Garden* · Post-Confucian TV drama · Taiwanese film and TV · Tsai Yueh-hsun · *White Tower*

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1 Introduction

> The exploration of these three television drama versions of *White Tower* reveals several socio-cultural trends within the flow of transnational East Asian popular culture and the appropriation of televisual texts.
>
> In addition, by dramatizing the vicious politicking and corruption behind the otherwise exalted medical profession, *White Tower* also frames a broader critique of East Asia's paternalistic political culture—a political culture often credited with the region's post-war economic development. Kai Khiun Liew (2011, p. 252)

In the article above, Singaporean researcher Kai Khiun Liew categorizes the three TV dramas from Japan, South Korea and Taiwan (that shared the same title *White Tower*) as "post-Confucian East Asian TV dramas" that stage the problems of Confucian patriarchal authority and highlight the significance of democracy in capitalistic modern East Asia (Liew 2011, pp. 260–262). They all presented the power struggles of contemporary medical practitioners in a Confucian, patriarchal and paternalistic hierarchical relationship; yet, each drama was created in its unique production environment. Made by Taiwanese producer-director Tsai Yueh-hsun, the Taiwanese *White Tower* (2006) was the product of a less-established TV industry that paradoxically targeted international audiences in East Asia—Taiwan, China, Hong Kong, Singapore, Japan and Indonesia—whilst the Japanese *White Tower* (2003) was produced by one of the more established media industries in East Asia and was mainly designed for Japanese domestic viewing.[1]

After the deregulation of the Taiwanese film and TV market that led to the proliferation of foreign content and the emergence of East Asian TV drama marketing and cooperation, Taiwanese TV producers embraced the regional markets for urban TV productions that targeted female audiences (Chen 2008). Following a successful TV drama, *Meteor Garden* (2001), their overseas market not only included Chinese-speaking audiences, but also non-Chinese within East Asian countries including Japan, Indonesia and the Philippines (Deppman 2009; Lin 2002). The *Meteor Garden* director Tsai Yueh-hsun became one of the pioneers in the East Asian expansion of this industry. The five TV dramas he directed since 2001, in particular, *Meteor Garden* (2001), *White Tower* (2006) and *Black & White* (2009), reshaped Taiwanese TV dramas and created international success in East Asia. With this success, he entered filmmaking, producing the prequels to *Black & White* in 2012 and 2014. Tsai believes that the Taiwanese film and TV industry requires East Asian audiences to remain viable and competitive in the twenty-first century. Thus, he produces commercial genres with themes and backgrounds that, at different degrees, are detached from Taiwanese-specific social historical contexts. These genres

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[1] The Japanese TV drama *White Tower* (2003) was adapted from the novel of the same name written by Yamasaki Toyoko. The novel was serialized in Japan in 1964 and adapted into movies and TV dramas five times in Japan between 1964 and 2003. The 2003 adaptation was highly popular in the Chinese-speaking countries of East Asia during 2003 and 2004 (Wu 2004). The Korean TV drama *White Tower* (2007) was based on the same novel (Liew 2011, p. 252). The Taiwanese TV drama *White Tower* was adapted from Taiwanese novelist Hou Wen-yong's novel of the same name, published in 1999 (Lin 2006, p. 19).

cannot be exclusively associated with Taiwan and, therefore, are better positioned to attract multinational audiences. In Tsai's own words, he is determined to create a borderless breed of Chinese-language movie and TV dramas that are not constrained by national borders (Kuo 2012, p. 48; Wu 2012), regardless of public doubt.[2] In 2012, Tsai announced the launch of his project "Ya Zhou Hua Yu Xin Ji Hua", a new (East) Asian project of Chinese-language film and TV dramas (Wang 2012).[3] For this project, he has received the support of Chinese and Japanese companies in financing and distributing, casted multinational East Asian actors and employed a multinational production staff from Taiwan, mainland China, Hong Kong, Japan, Thailand, France and America (Hollywood) (BlacknWhitetw 2013; Kuo 2012; Qiu 2012; "Tsai Yueh-hsun promoting *Black & White Episode One* in Japan" 2012; Wang 2012).

Seeking both Taiwanese and overseas success, Tsai must consider the differences within different East Asian markets during the production, and monitor public opinion in the marketing. As one of the most successful Taiwanese TV drama creators in East Asia, Tsai's regionalization strategy has raised several questions:

1. What are the characteristics shared by his works?
2. How has he made TV dramas and films that appeal to regional markets from his base in Taiwan while addressing Taiwanese demands?
3. How has he adjusted to the regional market and cultural conditions, such as (1) the Japanese consumption of Taiwanese TV dramas; (2) the rise of Chinese economic power and its vagarious censorship; and (3) Taiwan's post-war difference with China, its binary national politics, its scepticism and concern about the economic integration with China, and, recently, its government's support and funding for local TV drama and films?

To answer these questions, this essay probes the mediation of ideas and values of Tsai Yueh-hsun's TV dramas and movies (in particular, the *White Tower* and *Black & White* franchise). It firstly reviews the deregulation of Taiwanese film and TV markets and the regionalization of film and TV cooperation and marketing. It then discusses how Tsai learned to produce commercial products that succeeded in appealing to both Taiwanese and non-Taiwanese audiences with their post-Confucian staging of social and interpersonal relationships, and how he adapted to

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[2] In the forum of the 2012 National Taiwan University film festival on 21 Dec 2012, Tsai defended his strategy of targeting multinational East Asian markets, despite doubts from the audience about its feasibility, particularly concerning co-producing with the Chinese film industry for its investment. He claimed that his strategy, derived from his TV experience, was just one of various trajectories of the Taiwanese filmmakers in the twenty-first century. Further, he stated that he respected the value of the Taiwan New Cinema and auteur filmmaking movement, but he is the type of filmmaker who "earns money to sustain a family". He believed that the two film strategies supplement and need each other. Finally, he wanted to accumulate capital and technology in Taiwan, while the Chinese film market is burgeoning, by making films that can integrate into the East Asian mainstream markets. He encouraged people to identify with his ideal.

[3] The project is composed of the second prequel to *Black & White*, a TV adaptation of the Japanese manga *Midnight Restaurant*, and two TV dramas: *In Love with Aisin Gioro,* and *Super Power* (Wang 2012).

the domestic and regional market conditions mentioned above. It is argued that his success relies on his taking advantage of specific national markets at different times (Taiwan, Japan and China), his use of star power and his production of genres that are set in non-discernible, hence, denationalized urban societies. These works, presenting the darker side of modern East Asian societies, were not approved by Chinese censors smoothly and relied financially on Japanese appreciation. Subsequently, Tsai avoided representing Taiwanese ideological viewpoints concerning the region in his latest productions—the movie prequels of the *Black & White* (that were filmed in Taiwan and co-produced by China and Taiwan)—since the differences between Taiwan and China remained irreconcilable. His regional endeavour reminds us of the political differences between globalized East Asian societies, with which all Taiwanese TV and filmmakers have been confronted.

2 Globalized/Regionalized Taiwanese Film and TV Production and Consumption Before and During the 2000s

Tsai Yueh-hsun's career has been conditioned by the deregulation of Taiwanese film and TV markets. The 1990s is argued, by Taiwanese film and TV scholar Chien-san Feng (1995), to be the beginning of the deregulation of the Taiwanese media markets, which resulted from: the expansion of Western and non-Taiwanese East Asian media in Taiwan; the intensifying internal competition in the domestic media market between numerous Taiwanese ethnic groups and the pan-Chinese media economic integration between Taiwan, Hong Kong and China.

In the film market, Taiwan witnessed the gradual disappearance of its commercial films in the 1990s (Yeh 2006); for example, established Taiwanese commercial filmmakers, such as Chu Yen-ping, who often co-produced films with Hong Kong, mainly produced repeats (Yichuangqingshu 2016). Additionally, Taiwanese art filmmakers created self-reflective and thought-provoking films, ignoring market considerations (Yeh 2006). Hollywood films and Chinese-language films from Hong Kong provided entertainment to Taiwanese film audiences at the time (Lii 1998). Forced to accept the American doctrine of a free-flow of cultural products, the Taiwanese government gradually lifted the import quotas on Hollywood films and the latter's number of release prints provided to theaters for screening between the mid-1980s and 2002 (Liu 2007). By the time the Hong Kong films deteriorated in production quality and prioritized cable TV channels rather than theater releases, Taiwanese movie-goers were accustomed to consuming Hollywood entertainment culture (Curtin 2007, pp. 68–108). Eventually, Hollywood movies overwhelmed the Chinese-language cinemas of Taiwan and Hong Kong film industries and have dominated the Taiwanese film market since the mid-1990s. In the early 2000s, both Taiwanese art and commercial films relied on state subsidy and international co-productions (Tsai and Shin 2013, p.8).

When the Taiwanese commercial film industry was at its lowest ebb, Taiwanese TV still maintained a regular commercial drama industry; however, the TV drama

industry was also becoming international in production and marketing. The Taiwanese government opened its TV market in 1993 (Chang 1994) and, since then, the market has not been oligopolized by the domestic TV stations controlled by the KMT (Kuomintang, the Chinese Nationalist Party that ruled Taiwan from 1945 to 2000 and from 2008 to 2016) and mainlander ethnicity. The politicians and businessmen of Hoklo ethnicity who were close to the DPP (the Democratic Progressive Party that ruled Taiwan from 2000 to 2008 and since May 2016) established new local TV channels. Hollywood and other foreign media companies entered the market (Feng 1995; Curtin 2007, pp. 151–175, 211–228). Japanese youth-centered urban TV dramas became popular among teenagers and young women in their twenties (Iwabuchi 2002, pp. 121–157).

The deregulation of the TV market was part of a bigger East Asian media circulation and consumption. In the 1990s, there emerged an East Asian trade network of TV dramas, formed by satellite, terrestrial and cable TV channels operating in Hong Kong, Taiwan, China and South-East Asia (Iwabuchi 2002, pp. 121–157). In addition to the American and Japanese TV dramas, many TV dramas produced in Chinese-speaking countries also circulated in the trade network (Chen 2008, pp. 176–177; Chua 2004, p. 208; Curtin 2007, pp. 133–150). This trade network became an important funding source for many Taiwanese TV production companies, as Taiwanese TV channels began to reduce their programming budget due to failures in market competition. At the same time, the Taiwanese production companies produced martial arts stories and historical costume dramas set in ancient China, with financial backing from the Chinese-language TV channels in the network (Chen 2008; Curtin 2007, pp. 133–150).

3 Initial Post-Confucian Staging of Urban Subjects in *Meteor Garden* and *White Tower*

Having previously participated in Taiwanese film and TV as an actor and filmmaker, Tsai Yueh-hsun became a TV director when a new young-idol-centered genre of TV drama—locally coined *ouxiangju* (idol drama)—was about to emerge (Dong 2007; Kuo 2012, p. 44). The creation of the idol drama was mainly influenced by Taiwanese consumption of Japanese youth-centered urban TV dramas. The Japanese dramas, which packaged youth fashion, stylistic idol talents and complex plots were called "trendy drama" in Japan, but "idol drama" in non-Japanese East Asian markets (Iwabuchi 2004). Identifying the shortage of domestic idols and TV dramas targeting Taiwanese young audience, emerging Taiwanese TV producers emulated the Japanese TV dramas, hoping to win back the audience (Lin 2002). As a director, Tsai Yueh-hsun participated in the production of the TV drama *Meteor Garden*—a live-action TV adaptation of the Japanese manga *Boys over Flowers* (Dong 2007). The TV drama witnessed huge regional success, even reaching Japan and many non-Chinese-speaking countries, where Taiwanese TV dramas were rare. This success suggested a regionalization approach to Tsai. Since then, he has produced and directed idol dramas that target both domestic and regional markets.

3.1 Iterating Stories Proved Commercially Successful by Japan

Meteor Garden's regional success was attributed by Hsiu-Chuang Deppman (2009, pp. 90–91) to three factors: its adaptation of successful Japanese manga, a fresh presentation of masculinity embodied by Taiwanese young actors-turned-stars, and a denationalized East Asian urban image. This theorization paves the way for a systematic understanding of all Taiwanese TV dramas that imitate the experience of *Meteor Garden*. It is argued that Tsai relied on Taiwanese actors' transnational stardom for his televisual staging of urban subjects that had previously been explored successfully by Japanese media industries, as his production and marketing strategy between 2001 and 2006.

Tsai believed that Taiwanese TV dramas were not in high demand in the mainstream markets of East Asia, thus, he told stories centering on regionally accepted themes/genres and presented them with Taiwanese modern landscapes and new talents. In a TV interview, Tsai (Fang and Tsai 2009) stated that:

> The most important thing for a TV drama that targets international markets is its inclusivity. The TV drama should not have too many elements that can only be understood locally. There are many barriers between national cultures, so you cannot communicate to the markets with what they are not interested in … Of course, once our country's charisma is extremely strong, we may be able to talk to them about the local culture in Taiwan. Before that, we must communicate to them with elements which they can understand immediately.

Tsai has manifested an interest in the complicated and sensitive dramatization of urban individuals coping with troubles in social settings. He initially attempted to tell stories in a way that was more akin to Taiwanese ethnic reality, such as with his first project, *Friends* (2003), which was an original work, and its following of Japanese trendy drama was limited to its subject-matter and aesthetics. It revolved around seven countryside youngsters, two of whom were indigenous people, struggling in urban Taipei. Tsai (Dong 2007; Gao 2004, p. 198) labeled it a genuine "trendy drama" that reflected the lives of contemporary Taiwanese youngsters, which most "idol dramas" that tried to copy *Meteor Garden*'s Cinderella fantasy, had not achieved. Nevertheless, *Friends* gained poor TV ratings due to many factors including the lack of star casting, which made it less marketable. Nor was it particularly well received in the overseas market, despite receiving encouraging feedback from local viewers who yearned for reflexive domestic TV dramas (Tsai, as cited in Zhang 2006, p. 55). After this commercial setback, Tsai returned to adapting existing work that either originated from Japan or alluded to their Japanese models, such as his directing and producing of *Mars* (2004) adapted from the Japanese manga of the same name. This romantic thriller set the record for the highest budget in Taiwanese idol drama history in 2004 (Nian 2004) and received positive feedback from online TV critics, TV ratings, and overseas sales (Chen 2005; Liu 2005; Ye 2004). When the Japanese medical TV drama *White Tower* (2003) became a huge success in Japan and Taiwan in 2003 and 2004, Tsai successfully caught the regional

interest in medical workers' power politics by adapting the Taiwanese best-selling fiction *White Tower*, penned by Taiwanese novelist Hou Wen-yong and published in 1999, into a TV drama, *White Tower* (2006). This high-budget medical drama received both commercial and critical acclaim in 2006 and 2007. Its topicality, in terms of the politics of the medical profession, prompted Japanese public broadcaster NHK to air it in 2007 (Dong 2007; Ye 2007).

3.2 Post-Confucian TV Dramas

To ensure successful overseas marketing of the two dramas, expensive by Taiwanese standards, Tsai relied heavily on the star power of Taiwanese actors Vic Chou and Jerry Yan, members of the idol group F4 featured in the *Meteor Garden*, whose personas Tsai refashioned in regard to the display of their male qualities. Indifferent to national politics in Taiwan, these works addressed the personal concerns of urban subjects.

One common motif among his TV dramas, was the yearnings of young protagonists, whose relationships with their parents or authorities were constantly split or in jeopardy, with a backdrop of capitalistic modern or, as argued, post-Confucian East Asian society. The concept of "the post-Confucian East Asia" refers to the lingering of Confucianism while society progresses toward capitalistic modernization in East Asia (de Bary 1984). Whether East Asian societies may import Western ideas or not, they are confronted with the incorporation of any attempts to modernize itself within the Confucian tradition. "Post-Confucian TV dramas" are works that not only stage social problems, issues and controversies of post-Confucian East Asia, (in particular, the problematic aspects of Confucian patriarchy and paternalism), but also identify the problems of the triumphant narratives of East Asian postwar modernity (Liew 2011, p. 260). They contrast with other dramatic stagings of East Asian modernity that have been seen in many regionally successful South Korean TV dramas. It has been argued that the South Korean TV dramas powerfully articulate Confucian moral and ethical codes; i.e., the established patriarchal authority dominates within scenes of South Korean TV dramas, where family members of multiple generations coexist harmoniously (Zhu 2008, p. 91).

Tsai was drawn to this post-Confucian staging of urban lives, as shown in his works. *Meteor Garden* presented a complex pattern of class and gender relationships (Deppman 2009, p. 103). The complex form of dramatization was inherited and transcended in Tsai's later works, *Mars* and *White Tower*. *Mars* revolved around two psychologically traumatized teenage protagonists suffering in their families: one was raped by her step-father; the other grew up without paternal care and witnessed the suicide of his younger brother. The post-Confucian staging of social and interpersonal relationships was much more obvious in *White Tower*, which engaged public attention in a broader social space. It was an attempt to critique the authoritarian and paternalistic medical cultures of East Asia by depicting hospital politics in a Confucian hierarchical structure, in which senior male doctors were fatherly

mentors to their juniors, and by encouraging audiences to react to serious social issues, such as power abuse, the corruption of the medical professions and deteriorating healthcare in Taiwanese medical institutions (Liew 2011, pp. 261–262). It also indirectly suggested the unstoppable trend of democratization via a scene in which a prestigious hospital director must resign because of his error (Liew 2011, p. 261).

3.3 Responding to Chinese Censorship Passively

Nonetheless, these post-Confucian TV dramas did not pass Chinese censorship smoothly. The first decade of the twenty-first century, in which Chinese TV actively imported Taiwanese idol drama, is considered by Chinese scholars to be an age of the "Confucian Revivalism" in China (Zhu 2008, p. 95). The Confucian Revivalism refers to the cultural policy during the administration of Hu Jintao (2002–2013)—a period of rapid transformation of Chinese socio-economic structure. The government attempted to cultivate its nationals with morally and ethically upright behavior as well as more conservative cultural and gender codes. In TV culture, it launched "Clean up the Screen", a series of reactive regulations to curb and remove "inappropriate" content from TV screens. It banned certain subject-matters that were considered harmful to social and moral order, including the portrayal of crime, sex, corruption, and other dark sides of modern society (Bai 2015).

After being aired in China for several episodes in 2002, *Meteor Garden* was inevitably banned by the Chinese government, who judged its depictions of teenagers' school life as having a negative influence on the youth (Chen 2008, p. 178). Despite this, the drama was hugely popular in China through piracy. *Mars* presented the suicide of a protagonist and murder scenes; the adult-oriented *White Tower* contained scenes involving sex, adultery, bribes and corruption. Tsai responded to the Chinese censors mainly by providing Chinese editions of the two dramas ("China Entertainment Satellite TV to broadcast *Mars*" 2005; Feng 2006; Hong 2007; Yang 2004).

White Tower was censored in China because of its political subtext. The drama drew on the doctor-turned-novelist Hou's actual work experience in the National Taiwan University Hospital—one of the oldest and most prestigious hospitals in Taiwan (Lin 2006, p. 24). Hou set the fiction in a non-existent Taiwanese university hospital and invented a fictional (yet presumably) Taiwanese President (Huang 2006). As the Taiwanese government was not recognized as legitimate by the Chinese government, the scenes that insinuated the existence of the former could not pass Chinese censorship. To overcome this difficulty, Tsai produced a Chinese version of the TV adaptation, where the title of the president changed in accordance with Chinese official discourse of the Taiwanese political system (Feng 2006; Hong 2007).

4 More Post-Confucian Staging in the *Black & White* Franchise

After the success of *White Tower*, Tsai ventured into the genre of police action drama that has been produced by many TV industries throughout the world. In the 2000s, the action genre reached a peak in the East Asian TV market, exemplified by *24* and *CSI* from the US, the *Bayside Shakedown* franchise from Japan, the *Academy* franchise from Hong Kong, the *Iris* franchise from South Korea and Tsai's *Black & White* (2009) from Taiwan. The TV drama *Black & White* revolves around two police officers fighting against the political economic control of a mysterious transnational arm-selling conglomerate—the Heaven. The Heaven forms a secret agreement on arms purchases with several government magistrates in a city of an unnamed country, led by the Chair to the Parliament and the Minister of Defense. It sends a group of Middle Eastern mercenaries, the Zarkozi, to the city to clear any barriers to the Chair winning the presidential election. The two police officers must fight together against the Ministry of Defense, its secret killers, the Zarkozi, and other corrupt accomplices on the police force.

4.1 Fictionalizing Temporal-Spatial Setting to Avoid Political Problems

Black & White presents a fictional temporal-spatial setting where the story takes place in "Harbor City", a fictional metropolitan city in a non-discernible Mandarin-speaking country. It may be argued that Tsai created the fictional city within a specific Taiwanese context. The Taiwanese press and elected politicians tended to analyze popular texts, looking for material to ignite binary debates and attract public attention (Chan 2004, pp. 12–13; Lo 2008, pp. 217–218). The story of *Black & White* drew on Taiwan's political history for its inspiration (personal communication with an anonymous scriptwriter of *Black & White*, Jan 25, 2013) and, thus, the main subject-matter would strike a chord with many Taiwanese people who were concerned about Taiwan's arms purchases, the manipulation of its presidential elections and its governmental corruption. The production and marketing of *White Tower* also influenced how *Black & White* covered political subtext in a nationally non-specific setting. Tsai claimed that he was troubled by the Taiwanese press, who diverted public attention away from the key theme of the *White Tower* (Chu 2009). As *Black & White* alluded to Taiwanese politics even more than did the *White Tower*, the essentially fictional setting of *Black & White* could prevent it from suffering unwanted media, social or governmental attention. It fictionalized the spatial-temporal setting to avoid any possible undesirable problems (personal communication with an anonymous scriptwriter of *Black & White*, Jan 25, 2013; personal communication with Tsai Yueh-hsun, Feb 20, 2013). Kaohsiung City, which

gentrified its urban space and provided support for film and TV shooting, was later chosen as the drama's major filming location.

When promoting *Black & White*, Tsai never purposefully oriented his audiences to attend to the political scene. Instead, he emphasized its core themes on the complex and non-dichotomous reality of the contemporary world and the significance of pursuing justice with bravery, which were delivered to audiences as entertainment, although he welcomes diverse interpretations from audiences (personal communication with Tsai Yueh-hsun, Feb 20, 2013). *Black & White* realized phenomenal success in Taiwan, including high ratings, young actors' overnight fame and film critics' acclaim (Lan 2009). For citizens who were concerned about Taiwan's arms purchase history and governmental corruption in the 1990s and 2000s, this aspect of the TV drama may have aroused their collective memory; additionally, for people seeking entertainment, the TV drama contained many popular elements. It also changed people's perception of Kaohsiung, which became famous for being the drama's major filming location. The tourism-focused Kaohsiung municipal government claimed that the TV drama successfully refashioned the city's image and therefore made a phenomenal contribution to tourism (Yang and Xie 2009). This success gave birth to two movie prequels, *Black & White Episode One: The Dawn of Assault* (2012) and *Black & White: The Dawn of Justice* (2014).

4.2 New Production Condition: Incorporating the "China Factor" in the Movie Prequels

The two prequels stated above faced a different situation than that of their TV origin. Since the late 2000s, the Taiwanese idol drama industry has been in crisis. Its regional markets disappeared due to competition with South Korean TV dramas, Chinese protection of its growing domestic industry and the decrease in funding from the Taiwanese domestic market (Lai 2016). Yet Taiwanese commercial films have witnessed a resurgence. The success of *Cape No.7* (2008) at the box office announced the renaissance of Taiwan's commercial films (Yeh 2014). Since then, the market share of domestic films has risen and an increasing number of distributors and venture capitals in Taiwan have invested.

At the same time, the Chinese film market has been growing rapidly and its government has encouraged film co-operation between the Taiwanese and Chinese film industries. After the Taiwanese and Chinese governments signed the Economic Co-operation Framework Agreement (ECFA) in 2010, the Chinese government further ratified the Current Regulations about Improving Film Co-operation across the Taiwan Strait in January 2013 (Lin 2012). It promised that the Taiwanese film industry would have preferential access to the huge Chinese film market under the ECFA and that Taiwan-China co-produced films would be treated as Chinese productions. Since then, the Taiwanese film industry has had the advantage of garnering the rapidly expanding Chinese film audience (Xi 2012).

Since segregation in 1949, Taiwan and China have had different political systems, although China claims Taiwan as its province. Taiwan has been allied with the US under the rule of the KMT and has internalized the American worldview, including being fearful of communism (Chen 2010). This ideology has been maintained, even though the pro-independence DPP replaced the KMT to rule Taiwan. The Taiwanese mainstream viewpoint of the world opposes the stance of Chinese officialdom that continues official friendship with communist countries such as North Korea (Kim 2008). Paradoxically, since the 1990s, the two societies have been closer in economic terms but distinct in their political systems. Taiwan has accepted Western political values and has been democratized, whilst China is likely to remain authoritarian. Since the 2000s, China has influenced Taiwanese economy in the hope of eventual political union. The Chinese influence on Taiwanese politics and economy has been coined "China Factors" (Wu 2009, 2015). Taiwanese business has been driven by capitalist principles to take advantage of the Chinese market, given the size of the latter; yet, anti-China sentiment has been rising within Taiwan due to Taiwanese collective anxiety concerning the loss of its own political economic and cultural autonomy (Wu 2009, 2015).

The Taiwanese film and TV industries are also affected by the "China Factor". Many Taiwanese filmmakers are at a crossroads, either making films that primarily appeal to Taiwanese audiences or catering to the needs of the Chinese state and society (Cremin 2013). Chinese censorship has been arbitrarily dependent on its censors' subjective decisions (Samuels 2012); as such, many Taiwanese film directors developing a strong independent consciousness would rather run small-budget projects with locally specific themes so they can refuse Chinese money backers' requests (Maple 2015b; Zichuan 2015).

Similar to his previous TV dramas, *Black & White* did not pass the Chinese censorship and was only broadcast by China Entertainment Satellite TV ("*Black & White* to broadcast on China Entertainment Satellite TV" 2009; personal communication with Tsai Yueh-hsun, Feb 20, 2013), a satellite service available mainly in Guangdong, Hong Kong and Macau. In other words, its Chinese broadcast was limited. The "China Factor" was significant in the two *Black & White* prequels. They were co-funded by Tsai, who raised funds from the Taiwanese government, brands, and venture capital (Kuo 2012, pp. 42–44), and the Beijing Hualubaina Film & TV Company Ltd. from China. They cast Chinese-speaking actors from China, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore. The Japan-based Amuse also participated in the first prequel, as a Japanese market distributor, enlisting its actor Dean Fujioka, who was active in the Taiwanese media and speaks Mandarin fluently, to perform as an ethnic Chinese character (personal communication with Tsai Yueh-hsun, Feb 20, 2013).

4.3 Becoming More Neutral in Political Subtexts in the Prequels

Although the *Black & White* franchise is set in the fictional Harbor city, this TV drama was thematically embedded in Taiwanese political history. As mentioned previously, the ultimate evils in the TV drama are: The Heaven, which comes from nowhere and is not discernibly connected to any country; a colluding Chair to Parliament in a clever disguise; and his accomplices in the Ministry of Defense and the police. The evil, according to Tsai (Yu and Tsai 2009), is the transnational political control of the munitions industry that links to the colluding government magistrates. The TV drama offers a message that has emerged in modern society: evil comes from inside society and from those in power. Although *Black & White* is comedic in the beginning, not as serious as the *White Tower*, it similarly delivers a message that challenges the Confucian authoritarian idea that state authority is morally upright and safeguards its people. The drama also advocates the importance of real, non-superficial democracy.

Yet the worldview of *Black & White* was from the Taiwanese viewpoint and, therefore, was not ideologically neutral. In this TV drama, the agent of the Heaven for arms sales is North-Korean Russian; the Heaven assigns a Middle Eastern mercenary to Harbor City; a drug dealer originates from North Korea; and the US is promoted as the centre of world elites since two of the main characters received American education and professional training. The subjects from North Korea and Russia, mysterious and unfamiliar to the Taiwanese, are not "ultimate baddies" but they still help reinforce Taiwan's mainstream perception of the two countries. In other words, the TV drama still stayed within the Americanized mainstream Taiwanese ideology.

Tsai adapted to the new production conditions when making the prequels of *Black & White*. He became more considerate towards the Chinese market in the making of the prequels than when he made the original TV drama. He also accommodated different cultures, accents, backgrounds and political perceptions with generic Chinese-speaking scenes that were shot in Kaohsiung City. Tsai (personal communication with Tsai Yueh-hsun, Feb 20, 2013) stated:

> I fictionalized it [the story] so that it did not refer to any place. I took out borders appearing in the story. That means I took out state, ideology, politics and everything. The trouble no longer exists.

Being cognizant of the discrepancy in cultural perception towards North Korea and Russia between China and Taiwan, Tsai decided to avoid this issue. He eradicated the remaining ideological representations that would be identified as conflicting to the mainstream viewpoints in the Chinese market. In the prequels, there are no North Korean or Russian characters; instead, only the Heaven, the Ministry of Defense and the latter's secret killers remain, which connotes the post-Confucian idea concerning state authority.

Even though the prequels attempted to be ideologically neutral in terms of political subtexts, they were still involved in the political entanglements between Taiwan

and China, and failed to produce positive political discussion in Taiwanese society. When the first prequel encountered problems in its application for shooting and screening approvals from China, the Taiwanese press was concerned about the likelihood of the movie's passing Chinese censorship and Tsai's compromise on the Chinese viewpoint involving North Korea (Chu 2010; Huang 2011; Jiang 2011; Wang 2011). Although this act may not have been intended to arouse opposition, it would indirectly stimulate the anti-China sentiment in Taiwan. Kwai-cheung Lo (2005, p. 154) once commented that the historical antagonism between Chinese and Japanese nationalists is likely to be an irresolvable opposition in heterogeneous East Asia. The ideological difference between China and Taiwan is another discrepancy that Tsai cannot transcend. He may have learned to consider the opinions of multiple countries, yet this consideration has been at the expense of the last two installments of the *Black & White* franchise, which became increasingly neutral and superficial by removing the political pulse of Taiwan and leaving only post-Confucian narratives and regionally-marketable urban settings and character types. As a result, the prequels of *Black & White* achieved lukewarm success in the Taiwanese film market and became part of the ongoing debate on the Taiwan-China film and TV relationship of the future.[4]

5 Conclusion

The globalized/regionalized consumption of foreign products in Taiwan, emerging co-operation between East Asian media industries and Taiwanese governmental support for local productions have shaped the TV dramas and films of Tsai Yueh-hsun. His regional operations have been confronted with entangled geo-politics that include conflicting nationalistic viewpoints and values embedded both in China's state censorship and Taiwanese polemic political and media climates. These factors jointly brought about Tsai's emulation of commercial media content from Japan and Hollywood, his production of generic Chinese-speaking urban TV dramas set in a non-discernible East Asian metropolitan space albeit shot in Taiwan, and his co-operation with East Asian media industries.

Operating at a regional scale, Tsai's productions are marked by post-Confucian staging of the personal and social issues of urban subjects (performed by Taiwanese talent-turned-stars) and modern East Asian cities, a dramatic form of presentation that has been explored by the Japanese media. Since the beginning of his TV directing career, Tsai has been creating fictional stories that are detached from the geo-political and historical realities of his actual filming location—Taiwan. In his works, a place-specific locale is downplayed in favour of a generic subjectivity to which regional audiences can relate. Initially, he adapted Japanese manga into TV dramas;

[4] The first prequel earned NT$0.12 billion in Taiwan in contrast to a gross of nearly CNY0.1 billion in China; the second prequel only garnered NT$50 million in Taiwan in contrast to CNY0.2 billion in China (Maple 2015a; Yang 2012; Zhang 2012).

later, he produced original works that followed successful Japanese or American commercial TV dramas and films, and presented characters living in a modern Chinese-speaking city, presumably in Taiwan. The image of his work is modern and urban, driven by his aspiration to interest both Taiwanese and other East Asian markets, with a modern look of Taiwan. His works retain the Chinese language (Mandarin) at present. The works are ambiguously detached from Taiwanese political and social realities to a certain degree, for the consideration of international marketability. His characters usually live in modern urban settings where the rule of established authorities (patriarchs or governments) is the source of social and personal problems. These post-Confucian messages have been communicated to viewers in East Asia by the Japanese media. Based in the lesser-developed Taiwanese film and TV industry and confronted with the highly competitive regional markets, he relied on Taiwanese stardom for the marketing of the works.

Tsai has not demonstrated any intentions of fore-grounding the cross-cultural or inter-Asian subject-matter; instead, he is creating fictional stories without directly touching the conflicting (geo-)political issues in East Asia. At the same time, he is changing the public perception of Taiwan's (Kaohsiung) urban image in favor of Taiwan's economy. This detachment and shedding of the Taiwanese political reality and viewpoint, is adapted according to the conditions of his different film and TV projects. As he started to produce more adult-oriented dramas that engaged serious political issues, his target markets multiplied, yet the markets lacked consensual (geo-)political viewpoints; thus, Tsai altered the setting of his works to be more conceptual and abstract so as to appeal to more diverse audiences. He removed the political viewpoint that is commonly perceived in Taiwan, but is not agreed upon by Chinese officialdom. Confronted with many conflicts and dilemmas, his post-Confucian staging of East Asian modernity and his future strategy are worthy of academic attention when we contemplate the regional storytelling by the Taiwanese TV and film industries in the context of globalization.

Appendix

Tsai Yueh-hsun's Directing Filmography

Meteor Garden 流星花園 (2001)
Friends 名揚四海 (2003)
Mars 戰神 (2004)
White Tower 白色巨塔 (2006)
Black & White 痞子英雄 (2009)
Black & White Episode One: The Dawn of Assault 痞子英雄首部曲:全面開戰 (2012)
Black & White: The Dawn of Justice 痞子英雄:黎明再起 (2014)
Midnight Restaurant 深夜食堂 (2017)

Glossary

Beijing Hualubaina Film & TV Company Ltd. 北京華錄百納影視股份有限公司
Black & White 痞子英雄
Black & White Episode One: The Dawn of Assault 痞子英雄首部曲:全面開戰
Black & White: The Dawn of Justice 痞子英雄:黎明再起
Cape No.7 海角七號
Chu Yen-ping 朱延平
Current Regulations about Improving Film Co-operation across the Taiwan Strait 關於加強海峽兩岸電影合作管理的現行辦法
Economic Co-operation Framework Agreement (ECFA) 海峽兩岸經濟合作架構協議
Friends 名揚四海
Hou Wen-yong 侯文詠
In Love with Aisin Gioro 愛上愛新覺羅
Jerry Yan 言承旭
Mars 戰神
Meteor Garden 流星花園
Midnight Restaurant 深夜食堂
Super Power 超能
Tsai Yueh-hsun 蔡岳勳
Vic Chou 周渝民
White Tower 白色巨塔
Yamasaki Toyoko 山崎豊子
Ya Zhou Hua Yu Xin Ji Hua 亞洲華語新計劃

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Part III
Demand, Reception and Engagement—Cultural Flows and Media Consumers in Asia

Chapter 10
Thai Television Dramas, a New Player in Asian Media Circulation: A Case Study of Full House Thai

Amporn Jirattikorn

Abstract This paper examines the success of *Full House Thai*, a Thai remake of popular Korean drama "Full House". First, it explores the indigenization of Korean elements in the Thai remake *Full House*, arguing that the success of *Full House Thai* lies not only on the attractiveness of Thai actor and actress but also on the Thai-ization of Korean elements. The second part looks at the reception of Asian audience towards *Full House Thai*. Taking the case of Vietnamese audience, the paper explores how Vietnamese audience interpret Thai remake version in relation to the original Korean version as well as with respect to Thai culture portrayed in the series. The aspects of Thai culture the paper asks Vietnamese audience to reflect upon include views on gender, roles of men and women, the portrayal of social class as well as romantic love. Data presented in this paper come from textual analysis as well as in-depth interviews with 15 Vietnamese audiences.

Keywords Thai television dramas · Remake · Audience reception · Transnational media flows

1 Introduction

Woon Nak Rak Tem Baan is a Thai remake of popular Korean drama "Full House," which aired in 2004. It features the story of how a famous actor and a young woman who wants to become a writer accidentally come to live together in the same house, where they fall in love with each other. After its first release in Korea in 2004, it has been exported to many countries in Asia, and has been remade four times in four different languages—Filipino, Vietnamese, Indonesian, and Thai. Of these, none has gained as high audience ratings as *Full House Thai*. Aired in 2013–2014, this

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Thai version has gained immense popularity both in Thailand and in many Asian countries. It has been broadcast on television in 9 countries and has been subtitled in 17 languages on website channels.

Prior to the success of *Full House Thai*, Thai television dramas had gradually gained popularity in Asia. Beginning around 2003, Thai dramas entered Chinese television channels,[1] followed by the success of many drama series in the following years. For example, *Battle of Angels*, broadcast on Anhui Satellite TV in 2009, achieved the tenth highest audience rating of all programs in the first week it was released. It was re-run four times between 2009 and 2010 (Phongpatcharathornthep 2012). *Roy Adeet Hang Rak* (Track of Love), aired in 2010, achieved the second highest ratings on China Central Television's TV drama channel (CCTV 8) (Chan 2011). Following this success in China's television market, Thai dramas have expanded to Vietnam, Taiwan, Singapore, Malaysia, and the Philippines. Besides being exported for telecast, the phenomenon of subtitles created by fans in many countries has also made Thai dramas more widely accessible. Between 2013 and 2014, *Full House Thai* subtitled in the Chinese language was seen by over 100 million viewers (Daradaily 2014).

The unprecedented success of *Full House Thai* in comparison with the same remakes from other countries, along with a growing interest in Thai popular cultural content in the past decade, begs the question of whether *Full House Thai* should be viewed as Thai or Korean. What attracts audience to this remade version? While the definition of "remake" connotes "adaptation", "new versions of existing films", or "films based on an earlier screenplay", this paper looks at the *Full House Thai* remake as a "translation," rather than simply a "copy". While the juxtaposition of the terms "original" and "remake" often suggests an unbalanced distribution of creative agency (Gil 2014: 21), I argue for the need to consider *Full House Thai* as a translation which allows us to see creativity and interpretation of the text by those who "translate" it and those who "read" it.

The paper investigates two important aspects regarding the success of *Full House Thai* in Asia. First, I explore the indigenization of Korean elements in the Thai remake of *Full House*, arguing that the success of *Full House Thai* lies not only in the attractiveness of Thai actors and actresses but also in the Thai-ization of Korean elements. The second part looks at the reception of *Full House Thai* by a pan-Asian audience. Drawing on the case of a Vietnamese audience, the paper explores how Vietnamese viewers interpret the Thai remake version in relation to the original Korean version, as well as with respect to Thai culture portrayed in the series. The aspects of Thai culture I ask Vietnamese audience members to reflect upon include views on gender, roles of men and women, the portrayal of social class, as well as elements of Thai national culture and values. Vietnamese audiences provide an interesting case to examine how cultural proximity plays a role in receiving and interpreting transnational cultural texts. Unlike Korea, which shares a Confucian

[1] The first Thai drama series that entered into Chinese television channel was *Sao Chai Hao Jai Chicago* (Chicago Hearted Maid), produced by Exact Scenario. It was imported and broadcasted on CCTV 8 in 2003.

belief with Vietnam, Thailand is considered to share few cultural and religious elements with Vietnam. Geographically, however, Thailand is more proximate to Vietnam than Korea. In addition, Thailand and Vietnam are members of ASEAN (the Association of Southeast Asian Nations), which at the beginning of 2016 launched the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), aiming to promote economic, political, and cultural integration. Economically, Thailand and Vietnam are considered to share the same pace of urban development. These socio-cultural and economic contexts form a background on which to examine audience interpretation of Thai television drama.

Methodologically, data presented in this paper come from my textual analysis, as well as my interviews with 15 Vietnamese audience members; most of whom are 18–36 year-old females, living in the two metropolitan cities of Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh. While the small number of Vietnamese audience members I interviewed cannot be representative of the entire Vietnamese audience, my aim is to use this sample to examine cross-cultural readings of transnational text, as well as to gain a better understanding of the complexity of consuming a remake by transnational audiences. In addition, between 2013 and 2015, I conducted research on cross-cultural reception of Thai television dramas in three Southeast Asian countries: Vietnam, Cambodia and Myanmar. Information on the rising popularity of Thai television dramas in the region presented here comes from my long-term research project involving aspects of production and consumption of Thai dramas in these three countries.

2 Thai Popular Culture: A New Player in Asia Media Circulation

Scholars argue that the rapid flows of Asian cultural products over the past two decades have created a fissure in Western-centered globalization (Kim 2009: 736–7). Although media products still flow largely from the developed North to the developing South, recent decades have seen Asian media emerged as new players for transnational consumption, changing the dynamics of the media landscape in the region (Kim 2008: 19). The rise of non-Western regional media circulation over the past three decades signifies the decentralizing multiplicity of global media flows.

As the first of several popular cultural “waves”, Japanese popular culture (J-pop), which includes pop songs, films, cartoons as well as television dramas, took the lead in the 1990s. Particularly in the case of television dramas, the 1990s saw Japanese urban trendy dramas attract young audience all over Asia (Iwabuchi 2002). Set on the themes of love, hope, and a better life for young Japanese living in the metropolitan center of Tokyo and other cities, these dramas captured the imagination of young viewers domestically and regionally (Siriyuvasak 2010: 158). Lee (2004) points out that the success of Korean dramas in recent decades can be argued to have copied Japanese trendy dramas in a slightly modified format.

After the wane of J-pop, beginning in 1997, a phenomenal rise of Korean popular cultural content, which comprised TV dramas, movies, pop songs and their associated celebrities, took Asia by storm (Shim 2006). Over the past two decades, analyses of the factors contributing to the success of K-pop in the region have received greater attention. So far, literature about the sudden boom of Korean popular culture has tended to concentrate on two approaches: political economy, and a cultural approach. From the political economic point of view, the rise of K-pop is seen as a result of recent capitalist development and a policy developed by the Korean government in response to the 1997 economic crisis. In regional terms, Lim (2008) argues that the popularity of Korean popular culture is part of changing regional dynamics. With rising affluence and the growing marketplace of Asia's television, as a result of increasing urbanization and youthful demographics of the East Asian region, media companies are driven to produce better quality TV productions and broadcasting services. On the other hand, with the development of global technology, East Asian media industries attempted to expand their reach across multiple territories. Along with this, the growth of Asian-based networks of production offer great regional opportunities for trade in made-in-Asia media commodities.

While some critical observers view the success of Korean popular culture contributing to the structural changes in Asian media networks and the growth of youthful demographics in East Asia, others look into cultural aspects to explore a clue to their success (Yang 2012). Scholars researching this trend have paid attention to program content. They argue that Confucian elements or traditional values in Korean TV series help attract a large portion of the population in the receiving countries. This cultural reception approach also agrees that cultural proximity explains the positive reception of Korean popular culture content. As Kim (2007: 48) has indicated, cultural commonality, which lies in a sense of Asianness, i.e. shared norms of beauty, mannerism, styles in clothing, is the key to flows of cultural content in Asia.

Since broadcasting is a market driven industry, Lim (2008) argues that broadcasters in Asia now operate under the assumption of greater market fragmentation and the need to cater to niche audiences, as they exhibit less consumption loyalty. The success of Korean popular culture has paved the way for other N-pop (any national popular culture) to enter into Asian marketplace. It has made countries in Asia easily receptive to try other national pop culture. Technology has also enabled a growth in circulation. As a result, recent decades have seen a growing amount of Thai popular cultural content circulated around the region. Of the countries in Asia, the audience can be divided into two types. The geo-linguistic-cultural audience, that is Cambodia, Laos, and some ethnic minorities living along the Thailand-Myanmar border, have consumed Thai popular culture such as pop music, movies and TV dramas for more than a decade. Particularly in the case of Thai television dramas, these audiences have watched Thai dramas through several unofficial channels such as spillover signals, illegally dubbed VCDs and DVDs as well as watching them directly on Thai television channels through satellite signals. In new marketplaces such as in Vietnam, Indonesia, the Philippines and China, audiences have been familiar with Thai popular culture for only the past few years. With regard to

Thai television dramas, the new viewers watch them through two main channels, local companies or satellite TV channels which import shows telecast in their countries, and fan-subtitled Thai series in various languages, which are then uploaded to the internet.

In considering the growing attraction of Thai television dramas, attention needs to be paid to the different socio-cultural, economic and political contexts of each receiving country. Unlike the flows of Korean popular culture to East Asia, the success of which many scholars argue lies in cultural commonalities shared within the region, Southeast Asia does not possess such commonalities needed to create a sense of cultural proximity. Economically, unlike East Asia which, as Iwabuchi (2002) has argued, shares a sense of "co-evalness", that is, a feeling of having the same pace of development, each country in Southeast Asia possesses a different level of economic and urban development. Culturally, Southeast Asia share few religious and cultural elements with each other. Hence, in order to better understand the reasons why these countries are attracted to Thai television dramas, the particular socio-economic conditions of each country need to be taken into account.

As for the countries which share geo-linguistic-cultural aspects with Thailand, i.e. Cambodia, Laos, and ethnic minorities inhabited along Thailand-Myanmar border, I would argue that their long-time loyalty to Thai television dramas is due to three related reasons. Firstly, there is the notion of cultural and linguistic proximity. These countries are considered to share cultural and religious elements with Thailand, i.e. the belief in Theravada Buddhism, and the practice of wet-rice cultivation. Linguistically, the Lao in Laos and the Shan in Myanmar can understand the content in Thai television dramas easily, as they and the Thais are ethnic cousins and share a similar language and culture. Thai and Cambodian languages also share a large amount of vocabulary. Secondly, because the television markets in these countries are small, they do not receive enough advertising revenues to cover the production costs of drama series. They, therefore, rely on foreign imported products. The audiences in these countries having watched Thai television dramas for more than two decades, I would argue, have developed a taste and consumption loyalty for Thai cultural products. The third reason, as I have argued elsewhere, is a taste for modernity on the part of audiences in Thailand's neighboring countries. Thai television dramas depict modernity in terms of material wealth, display of new technologies, western commodities and a more "advanced" economy that some of these viewers aspire to experience (Jirattikorn 2008). All of the reasons mentioned above, linguistic and cultural proximity, high production cost with too small a market, and the depiction of modernity have made Thai television dramas a major form of entertainment media in these countries.

As for the countries which are considered new audiences for Thai television dramas such as China, Vietnam, the Philippines, or Malaysia, the reasons for the growing popularity of Thai dramas differ in each different country. However, while the reasons vary, it can be argued that this new outward flow of Thai television dramas in the region has been triggered by the success in mainland China. Although China is not the first country to which Thailand exported its television dramas for broadcasting, its extremely large market is enticing for the Thai media industry. The

reasons for the success of Thai dramas in China can be summed up as follow. First, egged on by the huge market capitalization of Korean television dramas, local Thai-Chinese distribution agencies predicted the future market of Thai *lakorn* (the term for Thai television dramas) in China and have hence pushed forward with an attempt to sell the copyright of Thai television dramas to Chinese satellite channels. Han Media Culture Co., Ltd., a company owned by a Chinese businessman in Thailand whose network remains largely in mainland China, was the first company to introduce Thai television series to China (interview with Wanida, Distribution Manager of Hun Media Culture, 2 March 2015). In 2002, the company sold the copyright of Thai drama *Leud Honk* (Phoenix Blood) to CCTV (China Central Television Station). It was broadcast on CCTV-8. Thai drama series only gained a good reception in China in 2009, when *Battle of Angels*, a series about female flight attendants fighting over male pilots, was broadcast on Anhui Satellite TV. Since then, Thai dramas have flourished on China's Satellite televisions. The wave of Thai dramas' popularity in China is thus said to have begun with *Battle of Angels*.

The second reason for the growing interest in Thai television dramas is related to the socio-political context in China. Nationalistic fear over dominant Korean popular culture has led the Chinese censorship board to limit Korean television imports. This in turn gave way to more Thai imports (Phongpatcharathornthep 2012). The third reason is related to the better quality of Thai *lakorn* over the past decade, and the low price of Thai *lakorn* exports, which enable it to compete with the more expensive Korean television dramas. Phongpatcharathornthep (2012) points out that between 2009 and 2011, some satellite televisions in China broadcasted about 8–10 Thai television dramas series a year.

The past decade, however, saw the ebbs and flows of Thai television dramas in China. Chan points out that tightening state controls on broadcasting foreign media, including limiting the number of foreign imports, tight censorship, and viewers being able to identify clichéd elements of Thai dramas, have led to the declining popularity of Thai dramas in China (Chan 2012). While the first wave which began with *Battle of Angels* waned around 2011, Chan argues that with the release of *Full House Thai* in 2014, Chinese interest in Thai *lakorn* was renewed. Interestingly, this second wave emerged over China's streaming sites. This recent decade has seen the phenomenon of enthusiastic fans who obtain foreign cultural products, translate the text, then release subtitles for viewing, without asking for permission from the copyright holders. Chan points out that recently there are 16 main subtitling groups of Thai dramas on Chinese video sharing websites, each with its own official channels. As for *Full House Thai*, exclusive streaming rights were bought by Tencent Video, a Chinese video streaming site (Chan 2012). However, while the success of *Full House Thai* caused interest in Thai *lakorn* among Chinese fans to resume, there has not been a Thai drama after *Full House Thai* to significantly sustain the momentum of a Thai cultural wave.

The success in China's large market between 2009 and 2011 in which Thailand has exported more than 25 drama series to China (Phongpatcharathornthep 2012) has led Thailand to believe that Thai lakorns can make new inroads in the region. A major Thai distribution agency, Han Media Culture, whose exports more than 80%

of Thai *lakorns* to China between 2002 and 2011 (Jirattikorn 2016), began to see the opportunities to trade another "made-in-Asia" media commodity to audience across multiple territories. The expansion to the new marketplace in Asia is also related to the company's attempt to reduce its distribution cost. As the company's distribution manager told me, in order to sell the copyright of Thai dramas to mainland China the company has invested in separating dialogue line from music and sound effects so that the dubbing can be done in other languages. Since the investment is on the shoulder of the distribution agency, the company, therefore, foresaw that it could expand its market capitalization to other countries with little investment (interview with Wanida, Distribution Manager of Han Media Culture, 2 March 2015). Following the success of Han Media Culture, other companies which emerged as part of Thai government's promotion of digital TV also began to explore new markets in the neighboring countries.

While the rise of Thai television dramas in Southeast Asia can be understood from the production side, growing economies on the receiving end also contributes greatly to the increasing outward flows of Thai dramas. In Vietnam, the growing cable television market has fostered a high demand for television content. Having relied on imports from China, Korea, and Western countries for decades, Vietnamese cable television stations turned to look for a new source. They began to import Thai and Filipino dramas to broadcast on cable television. Coinciding with a nationalist sentiment against China over the conflicts in the South China Sea, and declining enthusiasm for Korean dramas, Thai television dramas finally made an entrance into the Vietnam broadcasting scene (Interview with Thai Program Manager of Lattasa Cable Company, Vietnam, 7 July 2014). Similarly, in Cambodia and Myanmar, the government's privatization of television channels (in Myanmar), the growth of cable television networks (in Cambodia), the advance of mobile technology, combining with the ebbing of Korean dramas, have contributed to the increasing growth of Thai television dramas in these countries' broadcasting scene.

Chan (2011) notes that Thai popular culture, particularly its TV dramas, could possibly become the next wave in the largest television market in Asia. Chan points that even though the Thai cultural industry still faces problems and shortcomings, it may yet transform into a model for other Southeast Asian countries wishing to export their cultural products. While it remains to be seen whether the outward flow of Thai television dramas is a growing trend or a short-lived fad, its current rising flow demands our attention.

3 Full House Thai and the Craze for K-Pop in Thailand

The above discussion provides a background for the popularity of *Full House Thai* in Asia. Now I wish to turn to the series *Full House*, which is the focus of this paper. A Korean drama series titled *Full House* aired in Thailand in 2004. It gained huge popularity in Thailand and throughout Asia. A decade after the original South Korean version was released *Full House Thai*, starring "Mike" Pirath Nitipaisalkul

and "Aom" Sushar Manaying, has surprisingly claimed to triumph the success of the *Full House* "original". Not only was it popular in Thailand, the Thai remake of *Full House* has gained international attention. As mentioned, it has been broadcasted on television in 9 countries and has been translated into 17 languages, and is also available on YouTube and other websites. The two actors have established a large fan base, not just in Thailand but in China, Vietnam and Taiwan. In China, Mike Pirath has recently begun to act in Chinese soap operas such as *Wu Xin: The Monster Killer*.[2]

Before going into a discussion of the reasons behind the success of *Full House Thai*, let us explore how Korean dramas find their place in Thailand, where countless local drama series air every day. The first reason, as many scholars have argued, is cultural proximity. Cultural proximity plays an important role in audience preference of entertainment media consumption (Siriyuvasak 2010; Iwabuchi 2002). As Siriyuvasak (2010) has argued, a key feature of Korean popular culture for regional export lies in cultural proximity, which has been designed to give regional consumers a sense of familiarity and pleasure. The proximity of social values between Korean and Thai culture makes these series more relatable to Thai viewers.

The second reason, I would argue, come from the fact that Thai TV dramas, which have been dominating prime time on Thai television for over three decades, tend to be what Thai people call "*lakorn nam nao*" (polluted soaps). They are *nam nao* or polluted for their portrayal of "unreal" life, presenting characters who are more attractive, glamorous, and wealthier than everyday reality. The plot usually involves romance between a poor girl and a rich boy, whose family spurns her. The evil ex-girlfriend or a hero's admirer (usually accompanied by the rich guy's elder sister) stands in their way to happiness. Thai TV dramas have been criticized for being "*nam nao*" (polluted) or *talad* (market-oriented), i.e., full of "cat fighting" scenes, presenting a visual grammar of lavish and luxurious settings, over-exaggerated acting, and melodramatic plots. The presence of "evil" female characters whose actions are overly theatrical, including numerous screams and shrieks, is essential (Jirattikorn 2008).

Sick of "*nam nao*" plots, a new generation of Thai viewers found an alternative form of entertainment in Korean series, which they see as more realistic, and which feature more natural acting. Even though the portrayal of love in Korean dramas is often "too good" and too romantic to be true, the relationships between male and female leads are believable.[3] Ultimately, the depth of character is what distinguishes Korean dramas from Thai dramas, where the antagonists are always presented one-

[2] Mike Pirath has been invited to perform in this fantasy-drama which contains 20 episodes. The drama is produced by Chinese web streaming company Sohu TV. It began on 6 July 2015 on the Sohu web streaming site. The series will also be broadcast in Taiwan on GTV and Hong Kong TVB Jade channel. See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wu_Xin:_The_Monster_Killer#cite_note-3

[3] Watchara Nuamteam (2008) studies factors which influence Thai audiences' preference towards Korean drama series. Through a survey with 400 university students, Nuamteam found that the majority of his sample likes Korean dramas because the storylines are realistic (not *nam nao*). Other reasons include natural acting, believable storylines, and the lack of evil female characters (the presence of evil female characters characterizes Thai *lakorn*).

dimensionally. This could be an important reason that draws a new generation of Thai audience members to Korean dramas.

4 Remake vs. Original: Thai Indigenizing Korean

The success of *Full House Thai* (which from now on will be called FHT), I would argue, comes from the same reasons mentioned above. In terms of plot, it portrays a fantasy, a heartwarming, modern-day fairy tale, wherein a famous actor and a young woman come to live together in the same house and thus fall in love with each other. Love, in the series, is depicted in the form of emotional affection rather than physical contact. The relationship between the male and female leads is a result of time spent together, the kind of romance usually not found in Thai soap operas. Unlike Thai dramas, where the male lead tends to have an origin in the royal or noble classes, or from influential business families, the male lead character in *Full House* (both Korean and Thai versions) is a famous singer, whose success depends on his skills in singing and dancing, hard work, and a good image. And unlike Thai dramas where female characters tend to possess grandiose houses, luxurious automobiles, and often dress as if they are always on their way to a fancy ball, the female lead character in FHT dresses in simple clothes, and struggles to make her career goals come true. This depth of characters makes FHT different from Thai soap operas in general.

As for its international success, I would argue, evolving media trends also play a huge role. The phenomenon of subtitles created by fans has made foreign TV series much more widely accessible. Fans fluent in various languages add subtitles to these series before uploading them to YouTube and other websites. These subtitles are created by those who simply love the series, and do not do it for profit. The fansubs are usually made available as quickly as within two days of the aired premiere, depending on the level of reception of the series (Thungkasemvathana 2014). The past few years has seen the phenomenon of Thai soap operas subtitled in Vietnamese, Cambodian, Chinese, and Malay, as well as English, on an unprecedented scale.

However, with the success of the "remake," the question remains: is this series Thai or Korean? When audiences watch the series, do they feel that they are watching a Thai or a Korean drama? My argument is that it is at once both Thai and Korean. FHT does not adhere to the concept of fidelity, which would dictate that a remake should be faithful to the original. Instead, it re-creates the original text into something new by adding local elements, the point I shall illustrate in detail in the following. While in general, all remakes are seen as parasitical and not worthy of any critical considerations, FHT received critical acclaim from magazine reviews and internet sites that it was a good remake that was even better than the original. The commercial success of FTH as many viewers have commented online, is fully credited to the performance of the leading actor and actress and their on-air chemistry. Below, I provide some online comments from some Filipino fans after watching this series.

> I marathoned this *lakorn* in 3 days. Having finished it, I dare to say that this is the best version of Full House…better than the original Korean version.
>
> This *lakorn* while following closely the original storyline, also included so much more chemistry and memorable scenes between the two leads. While watching this, you will come to the conclusion that it makes sense for both of them to end up together but with the original Korean version Full House – you do question to a certain degree, Bi's sudden turn around from his decades' long crush with his childhood sweetheart towards a woman who nags and whine for a living. In this *lakorn*, the main actress was given a much lovable character (Aryeal, 24 March 2014, http://www.avirtualvoyage.net/2014/03/full-house-gone-lakorn.html)
>
> I really liked the finale epilogue which offered better closure for all the characters versus the Korean version. I am glad for that.
>
> I tried to start on Full House Pinoy version, but I couldn't hurdle past the first episode. It seems to follow the textbook of its Korean version, introducing the first meeting between the leads, other than that, it didn't impress me any further (Keane, 28 March 2014, http://www.avirtualvoyage.net/2014/03/full-house-gone-lakorn.html)

The viewers' comments above reveal two important things. First, they feel that FHT is not like the original version. Second, they confirm that much of the success lies in the on-air chemistry between the two leads. But what are then the elements in FHT that have been indigenized to fit with a Thai cultural context? Using textual analysis, I present three aspects where FHT has indigenized Korean elements, i.e. gender relations, the portrayal of social class, and the representation of Thai traditional customs.

Regarding gender relations, it can be argued that FHT follows the tradition of Korean dramas, in being attentive to gender roles in society, and depicting what women want. Aom-am, the female lead, tries very hard to make her dream of becoming a writer come true. Mintra, a childhood sweetheart of Mike, the male lead, is portrayed as a woman who speaks her mind. Mintra also has a successful career.

While FHT follows Korean drama tradition in portraying the changing role of women, the series also makes the female lead character adhere to traditional gender roles in Thai society. Aom-am showed that she can perform household chores, i.e. cooking, cleaning, and doing the laundry for her (fake) husband. It also depicts what the older generation (the grandmother) expects from young women today. There are scenes when Aom-am is called in to the grandmother's house to learn how to be a "good" woman, i.e. learning how to cook Thai dishes, learning how to make traditional flower garlands, and how to carve fruits and vegetable for decoration. The mixture of new (changing roles of Thai women) and old (norms and expectations of the older generation) elements infuses a certain charm into the series, and as a result makes it distinctively Thai.

With respect to the portrayal of social class in Thai society, the series portrays the male lead's family and his related circle of friends as richer, while Aom-am and her sister are depicted as coming from a lower class background. Social class provides twists and turns for the series when Aom-am, a sweet ordinary girl, comes to be part of high society circles through her fake marriage. The depiction of social class also appears in several food scenes. For example, Mike's elite family denies eating chicken feet, for the feet are seen as food for lower class people. However, when

Mike is with Aom-am, he is relieved from this social pressure, and is seen enjoying eating chicken feet. While the portrayal of social class in Thai dramas through the better-off male lead is arguably to fulfill the desire of female viewers, who long for a modern-day fairy tale, the use of social class in this series is to make the story comical and the characters lovable. For example, there are scenes where Aom-am is called in to the grandmother's house to learn how to be a "good woman" who is able to do the fore-mentioned traditional things. She claims that she can dance very well. But instead of traditional dance as the grandmother expects, she shows a funny dance with includes the movement of her bottom, which girls from the old days were not supposed to do.

As for the representation of Thai culture, in FHT, viewers could see the depiction of Thai customs replacing Korean elements in many scenes: the wedding scene, and the cooking lessons between Aom-am and the grandmother, for example. It is as the director of the series said, "our aim is to transform the story so that it fits with a Thai context" (Thungkasemvathana 2014). Not only are traditional Thai cultural aspects represented, but contemporary Thai culture, which has become more globalized, is also present. The use of the "Line" application for mobile phones, Thai people's craze for K-pop, and "selfie" culture, for example, can all be seen. These are elements which effectively make FHT more Thai than Korean. At the same time, however, the series remains relatable to an international audience through the storyline, which is already familiar.

I have argued that FHT has altered specific Korean elements to avoid difficulties in understanding Korean culture, and to make it fit the local Thai audience. This indicates that, in this case, a remake should be seen as a strategy that allows for a more easily transferred product into a target system. As the director of FHT states, "we've changed a lot of things in the story though we have kept the key characters and certain situations. Our aim is to transform the story so that it fits with the Thai context" (Thungkasemvathana 2014). What the director revealed illustrates is that for the remake to be successful in a new national context, the production side needs to take into consideration the new audience they are addressing. In this process of translating Korean's *Full House* into the new national context, television texts thus need to be re-written, redefined and re-created. Here the method of "targeted-translation" goes hand-in-hand with the process of "indigenization" of a foreign text for domestic audience.

5 Cross-Cultural Interpretation of the "Remake"

I wish now to turn to my last point, audience reception. As stated, I choose to explore how a Vietnamese audience interprets the Thai remake version in relation to the original Korean version, as well as with respect to Thai culture portrayed in the series. The data presented below comes from my interviews with 15 Vietnamese audience members with the help of my research assistants. I could not ensure

diversity amongst my respondents in terms of gender and age, as most of my informants are female viewers (only 3 of them are male), and are between 18 and 33 years old.

With regard to the question of whether the Vietnamese audience sees FHT as Korean or Thai, most of the answers I received reveal that Vietnamese audience members are aware that they are watching the remake version, for the reason that they have already watched the original. Moreover, they have also watched the Vietnamese remake of *Full House*, which was produced in 2009. This awareness among the Vietnamese audience that they are watching the remake is, however, different from the case of the Thai audience, for the Thai remake was made 10 years after the Korean original aired in Thailand. As a female Thai audience member commented in a newspaper report about the success of FHT:

> I don't think many people would really compare the two versions. There is also a generational gap. People who were obsessed with Rain (the original Korean lead actor) 10 years ago are likely of a different generation than people who are now obsessed with Mike, (Thungkasemvathana 2014).

Although recognizing that they are watching the remake version of the Korean original, most Vietnamese viewers say that they like that they can see several aspects of Thai culture in the series. All of them have seen the *Full House* Korean version, as well as a Vietnamese version; yet they still want to watch FHT for the fact that they love the Korean original. Some said they started off with curiosity to see how good or bad the Thai version would be, then got hooked on watching it to the end. Many of them said that FHT was successful in making them understand aspects of Thai culture portrayed in the series. Phoung, 31, married, working as a civil servant, said:

> I think FHT is successful in transforming the Korean version into the Thai version, in both characters and film details. In FHT, I also understand more about Thai culture, such as wedding traditions, or family relationships. Another thing that makes it Thai is the presence of a gay character, which I have often seen it in Thai *lakorn.* I do not mean to criticize it, but I take this as the openness of Thai society toward gays and lesbians.

With regard to the Vietnamese remake of Full House, *Ngoi Nha Hanh Phuc,* many viewers said that it copied the original almost scene for scene. For example, there is a scene when the male lead teaches the female lead to learn how to ride a bicycle. One viewer commented that this scene is unrealistic, for the fact that almost every girl in Vietnam would have already known how to ride a bicycle since young. While there were slight changes, such as a certain scene that took place on a yacht in the original series, which now takes place on a beach, many viewers commented that the rest of the Vietnamese version followed the original too closely. Here is another comment I found on a Vietnamese blog:

> I wish the writers and director had felt free to make the series better by changing things around to reflect Vietnamese life better and to be more logical (http://jamieguo48.livejournal.com/25884.html).

It should be noted that I am not trying to reduce my analysis to the dichotomy of good original/bad remake, assuming that if the remake is unfaithful, it is considered bad because of its infidelity, and that if the remake follows too closely, it is only

imitative and not as good as the original (Mandiberg 2008). Instead, I am suggesting that we look at the remake as allowing domestication, indigenization, and target-orientation. The active changing of points of cultural difference in the Thai version has effectively erased the (Korean) foreign other, and as a result causes an international audience to recognize the series as distinctively Thai.

When asked if the Vietnamese audience sees Thai cultural aspects portrayed in the series as different or similar to Vietnamese culture, the answers I received were mixed. Some say that they think the Thai culture they see in FHT is very different from Vietnam. When I asked them to give examples, they pointed to a generation gap and social class not found in Vietnamese culture, such as when the female lead character meets with the grandmother, or the fact that when talking with older people, the younger people have to sit on the floor. Moreover, all of the viewers I interviewed point to the way Thais organize weddings as remarkably different from Vietnamese culture.

With respect to gender relations portrayed in FHT, most of the audience members I interviewed said the Thai series makes the female lead character strong and independent, yet lovable. For example, a 19 year old man, studying at Hanoi University said:

> I see that women in this series are more equal to men than their Vietnamese counterparts. In the series, I can see that Thai women can have both a career life and a family life whereas for Vietnamese women, they need to prioritize housework more than a career.

Another female audience member, 21, a third year student in the university in Hanoi, said:

> I think Thai women in the movie have stronger characteristics because they fight strongly for love and career.

Ngoc, 33, married, commented on my question about gender roles portrayed in the series:

> As for me, the position of men and women in FHT is not very different from that of Vietnamese men and women. As for the women, they have their jobs, and they do the best for their career. They also take care of their family. I see a lot in common between Thai and Vietnamese women. As for men, I take the example of Pao: before he got married, he spent a lot of money for himself; he made people angry for his careless spending behavior. But when he realized that he is going to be a father, he becomes more responsible. This is not different from the Vietnamese family, where men are considered the breadwinner of the family.

The interview material mentioned above highlights the recognition of FHT by Vietnamese audience not as a direct copying but as distinctively Thai. The audience comments above also illustrate that they consider "national" cultural elements when it comes to consuming popular culture. Thus, rather than looking at the Thai remake as recycling the Korean original, I suggest we regard such a remake as the domestication of the foreign other, which will eventually give way to yet more new popular cultural content. As Appadurai has argued, in today's world, once an image has been produced, it is involved in many complicated inflections, depending on their mode (documentary or entertainment), their hardware (electronic or pre-electronic), their audiences (local, national, or transnational), and the interests of those who own and

control them (Appadurai 1996: 35). *Full House Thai* exemplifies the new world we live in, the world full of floating signs, which permits recycling, re-creation, and the simultaneous presence of different national cultures. The Korean Wave as a product of national culture contributes to the overall diversity of national signs, and when more such "waves" (T-wave, for instance) are recognized, people in Asia will have more contact zones and content by which they can recognize the similarities and differences of their diverse national cultures (Cho 2011).

6 Conclusion

I have argued that the reasons behind the success of the Thai remake of popular Korean drama "Full House" lies not only in the attractiveness of Thai actors and actresses but also in the indigenization of Korean elements. I have also suggested that for a remake to fit with a new national context, it should allow domestication, indigenization and/or target-orientation. Hence the remake should not be viewed as a direct copying but a translation through which specific local elements can be added. The translation of foreign Korean other into something distinctively Thai, on the one hand, create the condition for Vietnamese audience to perceive *Full House Thai* as more Thai than Korean. On the other hand, it complicates the notion of cultural proximity, particularly because Vietnamese audience also consume Korean television dramas out off the notion of cultural commonality as both countries share a belief in Confucianism. More specifically, since this is a remake of a popular Korean drama and the audience has watched both the Korean "original" and the Thai remake, what is proximate and for whom they feel proximate with, therefore, remain unclear. Further, while the notion of cultural proximity believes that people will more readily accept those imported cultural products that have something common with their own values, feelings, and experiences, Vietnamese audience reveal that both commonalities and differences play an equal role in enticing them to this remake version.

The recent appearance of Thai television dramas in Vietnam is evidence for the rise of the flows of Thai media products in the region. The question remains whether the media flows from Thailand to Vietnam as well as to other countries in Asia can promote inter-cultural exchange between the countries and provide an opportunity for citizens in these countries to participate in the process of regional cultural integration. Many argue that the huge popularity of Korean popular culture which has swept over Asia on the one hand signifies the growth of regional network of cultural production. On the other hand, such regional media has come to serve as a basic for fostering a larger and shared East Asian identity. While it remains to be seen whether the rise of Thai television dramas can eventually translate into such a "regional" cultural product, recent cultural flows of Thai media products at least suggests the increasing diversify of national signs in Asia.

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Chapter 11
"Have You Realized This Forum Has a Lot To Do with Japan?": Transnational *yaoi* Manga Online

Simon David Turner

Abstract This chapter highlights the transnational appeal of Japanese manga by examining an international *yaoi* manga fan community. *Yaoi*, which originated in Japan in the late twentieth century, focuses on the narratives of romantic relationships between men. It is popularly known as a genre written by and for mainly heterosexual women. The instance of heterosexual women writing and reading about homosexual men has generated a great deal of fascination from gender studies scholars, including myself. Many of *yaoi* fans are also general manga manga fans with interests in genres of manga other than *yaoi*. This chapter offers an exploration of non-gender issues to show that whilst gender and sexuality are the obvious aspects to study with *yaoi,* they need not be the sole ones and may help us to understand general trends of Japanese popular culture fandom. This chapter will consider the reception and interpretation of Japan and Japanese culture through an online *yaoi* fan site, *AarinFantasy*. It will highlight how an international online fan community is able to facilitate consumer demands by providing easy access to a transnational text. This allows for the creation and maintenance of mediated reception that allow fans to contribute their own interpretations of Japan in a digitally mediated fan community.

Keywords *Yaoi* · Manga · Popular Culture · Online Community

1 Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to investigate how an online manga fan community facilitates knowledge of Japan and Japanese culture through its members' activities and interactions with one another. The reason for using a *yaoi* fan site for this study is based on my previous and ongoing research into *yaoi* manga fandom. As part of my prior studies into gender and sexuality in *yaoi* fandom, I discovered that fans had investments in the genre other than solely gender and sexuality and so I resolved to

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explore how one such fan community, *AarinFantasy,*[1] engaged with topics related to Japan and Japanese culture. The site was founded in 2004 in Malaysia and, at the time of writing, is the largest English language fan site dedicate to *yaoi* manga online. Whilst this chapter utilises a case study of manga fandom, the issue of fans learning about Japan and Japanese culture within their fandom, via mediated interaction, is hoped to be applicable to wider mediated fandom for Japanese popular culture, as opposed to manga fandom alone.

Nonetheless, it is important to contextualise the medium of choice for this chapter. In Japan, the market for manga is highly compartmentalised with several genres segregated by age and sex. A key genre is known as *shōjo* [girls'] with a focus on romance of which *yaoi* is considered a part due to its target audience of young women. *Yaoi* focuses on narratives featuring romantic relationships between men. The use of the term '*yaoi'* refers to the Japanese acronym for *Yama Nashi Ochi Nashi Imi Nashi* [No Climax, No Point, No Meaning] referring to derivative fan works and which emphasises the lack of detailed storylines in favour of sexually explicit art. It is difficult to give a comprehensive description of *yaoi* manga in terms of common storylines, however the focus of the relationship is exclusively on that between two male youths, often referred to as *bishounen* [beautiful men], depicted via the *seme* and *uke* relationship. The *seme*, or 'attacker', is the dominant insertive partner in the relationship whilst the *uke*, or 'receiver' is, as the title would suggest, the passive receptive partner.

The data for this chapter comes from thread analysis and interviews with members of *AarinFantasy* as part of ongoing participation on the site that began in September 2011 as part of my earlier PhD research. This chapter focusses on threads and discussions that take place within a sub-board of the site's extensive message boards titled 'Asian Culture'[2] in which fans take the opportunity to discuss topics related to Japan. I propose that fans do not simply consume *yaoi* with little to no interest in Japan; rather they contextualise their fandom and supplement it with an engagement with Japanese culture. This engagement is often maintained through strong social bonds between the fans. It should further be kept in mind that whilst this chapter examines a single online *yaoi* fan community the overall examination sheds critical light on key issues of wider manga fandom that are pertinent for considerations of Japanese manga's international fandom that transcends any one particular genre of the medium.

2 Transcultural Manga

Members of *AarinFantasy* come from a range of countries throughout the world but whilst *AarinFantasy* is accessible to Japanese fans and the site has its origins in South East Asia, the majority of those with whom I have communicated are not

[1] http://www.aarinfantasy.com

[2] https://aarinfantasy.com/forum/f305/

East/South East Asian. Based on an ongoing and popular poll on the site asking ‘which region are you in’, the majority of members are in fact located in Europe and America.[3]

June Madeley (2015) suggests that within anime and manga communities, fans tend to prefer the retaining of original aspects of Japanese culture. This can include names of characters, items, and features of Japanese grammar including name suffixes including *–san* (used at the end of Japanese names to infer respect) and *–chan* (a diminutive suffix placed at the end of names that implies familiarity and or ‘cuteness’). This may also involve retaining Japanese onomatopoeia that is often seen in written form laid over images to add sound effects to the narrative (Pasfield-Neofitou and Sell 2016).

In spite of this, Iwabuchi Koichi has famously theorised that that Japanese media are popular abroad because they are culturally ‘odourless’, what he refers to as *mukokseki* [without nationality] (2002), to such an extent that there are few characteristics one would immediately connect with Japan or Japanese culture. On the other hand, in her article ‘Imagining Transcultural Fandom: Animation and Global Media Communities’, Sandra Annett (2011) analyses the Japanese series *Cowboy Bepop* (1998–1999) and warns us to not be overly celebratory with the concept of *mukokuseki*. She utilises the series as a challenge to Iwabuchi’s odourless texts arguing that:

> Far from avoiding the cultural context of its production, the show hints ironically at its Japanese origins when it depicts the spaceship’s owner…engaging in markedly ‘Japanese’ cultural practices such as tending bonsai or bringing back [souvenirs] of a cute local food called piyoko (even in the English dub) (2011, np)

Annett argues that in terms of erasing ethnicity, rather than being stateless, Japanese popular culture is more akin to Arjun Appadurai’s post national diaspora as “while nation-states have ceased to exist, ethnic, cultural, and linguistic diversity has flourished and flows through the new channels of ethnoscapes and mediascapes” (2011, np). In *Modernity at Large* (1996), it is indicated that financescapes (financial), ethnoscapes (people), mediascapes (media), technoscapes (technology), and ideoscapes (ideology) engender, trigger, orient, direct and/or regulate global cultural flows. Annett’s reference to ‘scapes’ in relation to Japanese popular culture is interesting as whilst mediascapes allow globally diverse people to connect with their origins, they also provide a means for diverse audiences to form “communities of sentiment based around a common interest or goal” (Annett 2011, np). Annett’s incorporation of Appardurai’s work considers globalised texts, in this case a mediascape i.e., global flows of Japanese manga online, and its audience in terms of an affective relationship between the individual and their chosen texts. Within the complicated and multi-faceted process of cultural globalisation and media flows,

> …a ‘transcultural…fandom community’ can be defined as a group in which people from many…backgrounds find a sense of connection across difference, engaging with each other through a shared interest (Annett 2011, np)

[3] https://aarinfantasy.com/forum/f24/t3195-which-region-are-you.html

I will show that in some instances, fans of Japanese popular culture are often quite interested in the national origin of their chosen media text and wish to discuss this with others in their community. However, following Andrea Wood (2006), I am keen to emphasise that it is not the aim of the chapter to assess a sense of Japanese 'validity'. I do not aim to comment on the fans' discussions and understanding of Japan and Japanese as true or untrue (if such a thing were even possible). Instead, I will exemplify that whilst Japan and Japanese culture as a point of orientation will be of great importance to the members of *AarinFantasy,* it is not necessarily the only aspect of the online manga fan community that maintains ongoing membership and activity. I do not go so far as to say that Japan or Japanese culture lacks importance for the members. However, whilst there may be preference for Japanese culture as presented in manga as "a shared [community] interest" (Annett 2011, np), its presence may serve highlighting a secondary community focus regarding how fans use and interact with this culture within their fan site.

Consequently, the chapter demonstrates how in a context of 'global flows' (Appadurai 1996), culture may flow through channels of mediated consumption and how this flow materialises and is utilised in the community.

3 *AarinFantasy*

The name *AarinFantasy* is an amalgamation of the first name of its creator and the role-playing game series *Final Fantasy,* a beloved game of the site's creator. Aarin states that the purpose of the site is:

> […to] provide yaoi fans a database in which they can find fellow yaoi fans…I was determined to find every single yaoi anime and manga out there and that formed my "yaoi collection". Satisfied with my collection which took me many months to download them, I share them to others because I know how hard for anyone to get it. (Aarin)

Bertha Chin and Lori Morimoto have "call[ed] for the greater contextualisation of studies of transnationally circulating media" calling for attention to "fan behaviours, motivations, and processes of meaning-making as driven by affective pleasures and investments" (2013, p.98.) I wish to do just this and "embrace" the fans' knowledge, focusing on the "transnational circulation and consumption of media" (p.98). To do so, I have examined the basic structure of the *AarinFantasy* forum, paying particular attention to the sub-thread 'Asian Culture' where the majority of fan discussion regarding Japan and Japanese culture takes place.

AarinFantasy, is not, by any means, the only website dedicated to *yaoi* manga. Indeed there are innumerable sites online for wider Japanese manga and anime fandom. A simple search for "*yaoi* manga community" via Google returns a possible 18,400 results in English alone.[4] Some prominent *yaoi* sites featured in the lists

[4] Search made on 10 Feb 2016.

focus on commercial sales of licensed manga such as *JuneManga*.[5] There is a link to view the forums indicating it has community features, however when clicking on this link the user is taken to an external site which explains in a popup that the page is not found and community sections have all been removed (here, by community features, I am referring to facilities of a site that allow visitors to interact with one another in a forum). *JuneManga* does have a blog section but appears to only relay updates and information regarding releases and offers no support for members to interact with one another. Overall, this website is dedicated to selling and promoting *yaoi* manga via its parent company Digital Manga, Inc. (DMI) which focusses on the "importation and preparation of anime, manga, and related merchandise".[6]

The *AarinFantasy* forum, which is the largest section of the site hosting the majority of member communication, is split into eight different areas: (i) 'Important Updates and News', (ii) 'AF files and Forum Support Center', (iii) 'General', (iv) 'AF Miscellaneous', (v) 'Yaoi Mania', (vi) 'Exhibition Hall', (vii) 'Download Central' (Yaoi/BL), and (viii) 'General Download Central' (Non Yaoi/BL). The existence of these different boards, particularly the 'General', 'AF Miscellaneous', 'Exhibition Hall', and 'General Download Central' suggest that *AarinFantasy* is a place where any types of discussions or activities may take place and that these discussions do not necessarily need to be related to *yaoi* manga.

According to Aarin, the site:

> Originally…didn't have all the different places, …it was just a place to download subs for anime, then…when more people came it got to the point where…we began to sort out the initial mass of posts into sections just to sort out the mess. (Aarin)

The number and variety of discussions that have been posted made Aarin aware that there was a need for topic specific areas of the site rather than having all in one place. The 'café' in 'Community Café' is an appropriate analogy suggesting that you go to a café drink coffee, but when you are there with friends you do not necessarily just drink the coffee, you also might engage in conversation.

As this chapter examines mediated transcultural flows as opposed to a content analysis of *yaoi* manga, I focus on the 'General' section of *AarinFantasy* within which there is a variety of sub-threads. One of these is the 'Fans' Non-Yaoi/BL Interest' that is further divided into: 'General Anime', 'Manga', 'Music Chat', 'General Drama and Movie', 'General Games', and, the focus of this chapter, 'Asian Culture' which highlight the site's much broader focus on Japanese popular culture. For example, upon software development company Niantic's release of *Pokémon GO* on the 6th July 2016, which has since found huge global appeal, a number of new threads within the 'General Games' sub board discussing this game have been started by fans, one such thread simply titled 'Pokemon Go'.[7] Whilst it is not the aim of this paper to examine the popularity of this augmented reality game on

[5] http://www.junemanga.com/ [last accessed July 1st 2016].

[6] http://www.digitalmanga.com/about/ [last accessed July 1st 2016].

[7] http://aarinfantasy.com/forum/f203/t191942-pokemon-go.html / [last accessed June 23rd 2016].

AarinFantasy, it is being mentioned here to exemplify how the site is not a space strictly dedicated to the discussion of *yaoi* manga.

4 Japan on *AarinFantasy*

Learning about Japan from reading manga is a recurrent theme that emerged during my time spent on *AarinFantasy*. The fans engage with Japan and Japanese culture in a variety of ways (information regarding research methodology can be found at the end of the chapter). As a result, *AarinFantasy* has evolved over time and established itself as more than a simple means for fans to find, and discuss *yaoi* manga. Exactly how fans learn more about Japan appears to be a straight forward process of fans asking a question or opening a topic of discussion in a new thread in the sub-board 'Asian Culture' and then proceeding to communicate with other members of the site.

In an introductory post to the sub-thread titled 'About Asian Culture section',[8] Aarin writes:

> The section is meant to be educational, for us to share info and learn about different cultures… Please do not ask me about "why no other region culture?", because we are focusing more towards the things found mostly in this forum (which is mostly from Asia like whatever that's available for download etc)… that's all~ No other reasons. (Aarin)

The most popular Asian culture to discuss in this sub-board is Japanese with 22 (51%) out of 43 threads dedicated to discussions about Japan or an aspect of Japanese culture. Other Asian cultures are also discussed in this sub-board and as illustrated in Fig. 11.1. However, there are instances where fans also discuss topics related Chinese (6 threads [14%]) and Korean (5 threads [12%]) cultures. Almost



Fig. 11.1 Topics discussed in 'About Asian Culture' sub-board

[8] https://aarinfantasy.com/forum/f305/t138178-about-asian-culture-section.html

one fifth of the discussion in this thread are what I have grouped as 'non-specific' (8 threads [19%]). 'non-specific' refers to discussions not explicitly related to any one named Asian culture such as the thread titled 'Help With Asian Art'[9] in which a fan asks others to help identify the origins of a piece of art. It is difficult to ascertain precisely what may and may not be discussed in this section of the site, however Aarin gives some general guidelines in an introduction to thread:

> Suggestion (for those who dunno where to put): If it talks about J-pop like the songs/lyrics/singer/stage performances, I think it should be in the Music section. But if it talks about how J-pop is influencing dressing cultures, makeup trend and such… I think it should be in the Asian Culture. (Aarin)

Admittedly, this is a slightly vague piece of advice for what may be included. Nonetheless, it appears, for example, that anything specifically concerned with music would be in the site's 'Music' section, whereas music's influence on other things would be appropriate here. We can, at least, attempt to delineate what shouldn't be discussed in this sub-board based on the other sub-boards within the 'Fans' Non-*Yaoi*/BL Interest' which include 'General Anime', 'General Drama and Movies', 'General Manga', 'General Games', and 'Music Chat'. Therefore, it appears that anything to do with Asian culture that is not related to any of the aforementioned topics would be acceptable.

In *AarinFantasy,* fans often wish to discuss that which they have either read or seen. Indeed a common use of the sub-board is for the fans to ask one another about aspects of daily life, especially school life, in Japan. Whilst not essential to understanding the narrative, the Japanese way of life in its broad sense have been picked up by fans as something that piques their interest and which they wish to learn more about:

> The main thing I'm curious about is that I see SO many teenagers that are high school students living on their own in so many series…what's all that about? (Fan 1)

As fans ask about whether or not something seen in *yaoi* holds true in Japan, many fans ask why *yaoi* manga employs certain techniques or common tropes:

> Why is there so many yaoi manga with high school settings? Also in high-school yaoi, I often see stuff going on at the roof-top, is this just the mangaka's [manga artist's] attempt to advance the characters' interaction? (Fan 2)

Sometimes that about which fans want to know more about is somewhat generalised, such as the backgrounds, phrasing and tropes:

> When reading yaoi, I often stumbled upon things I don't really understand. Whether it's Japanese cultural things, in-story backgrounds, inability to understand the phrasing, tropes I don't really get it so I decided to ask here and hopefully getting an answer. (Fan 2)

When a fan asks a question, they invariably get an answer from another or they are directed to another source of information. Sometimes both. Many of the members of *AarinFantasy* have in fact visited Japan themselves as tourists, foreign

[9] http://aarinfantasy.com/forum/f305/t162765-help-with-asian-art.html [last accessed July 29th 2016].

exchange students, or because their family moved there. Often fans would cite this experience of time spent in Japan to support their answers. For example, in the aforementioned discussion of Japanese high schools, the topic of what schools in Japan look like emerged. Some fans wonder if all schools in Japan look similar because this seemed to be the case via their representations in Japanese popular culture. Another fan replied explaining what they thought based on their own experiences:

> About the school design: I noticed several "template A1 school buildings" just on the way from home to Tokyo…On the other hand, schools that don't fit the template won't be identified as such by me, so I'm fairly sure your average fan will only notice the school architecture of manga fame, thus reinforcing the "all schools look the same" idea (Fan 3)

What is particularly interesting about this fan's explanation is that they mention not being very knowledgeable about Japanese schools. As such, the buildings they will identify as schools will be those that look similar those they have seen in anime and manga. For this particular fan, their understanding of the school buildings will have to do, perhaps until they have learnt more. The fans are discussing Japan and Japanese culture with one another, however in a great deal of cases the information that fans are using to facilitate their understanding comes from a medium of Japanese popular culture. Many may make the initial assumption that *yaoi* should not be considered a reliable source for understanding Japanese culture. However, it is not the aim of this paper to comment on manga as a valid source. Rather, I follow Lawrence Grossberg's assertion that we must explore the contexts within which fan "practices are deployed" in order to understand of fandom (1992, p.132)

5 *AarinFantasy* as a Source of Knoweldge

It may be inferred that fans want to know whether something they have seen in manga holds true in 'reality. However, they also want to know more about why a manga regularly shows certain scenes such as high school settings. The fans on *AarinFantasy* will help one another through discussions based on what they know from either familial relations or their own personal experiences to disseminate knowledge about Japan and Japanese culture. Nonetheless, can what is being discussed and given as factual by information be considered credible? Is it possible to describe *AarinFantasy* as a legitimate source of learning about Japan? These are difficult questions to answer, indeed, they may in fact be impossible. To assess whether *AarinFantasy* offers a valid and credible view of Japan through its fan communication would require an ontological understanding of Japan. Nonetheless, the matter of credibility in *AarinFantasy* is important for what it tells us about fan communication and how an online community facilitates knowledge about Japan and Japanese culture. In other words, exploring and taking note of what fans view as 'accurate' and how they come to see it as 'accurate' tells us a great deal about fan values in *AarinFantasy*.

It is at this point that I would like to consider information verification, specifically how fans assess the validity of the information they are receiving from others in the community. Do fans question what others tell them in the community or do they trust their fellow members of the fan community? Not all fans have been to Japan, they haven't all had contact with Japanese people, nor do they all have experiences of learning about Japan in universities or schools. For these reasons, some fans' information about Japan is often based largely on that provided by others. When receiving information from other fans in the discussions boards and posts fans often have to make a judgement on how they are going to trust that other fan who, in this instance, is contributing to an understanding of Japan and Japanese culture.

Some fans express a sense of caution regarding how much Japanese culture they could understand from manga that may be thought of as objective learning. For example, Fan 4 explained to me the benefits and limitations of *yaoi* manga in terms of learning about Japanese politeness:

> While yaoi doesn't exactly explain all, it does offer the most important thing of all about Japanese culture, which is the way in which people act every day. All *manga* features some things about which make it wackier than real life. If you can take the craziest stuff with a grain of salt you can learn a lot. (Fan 4)

During my interview with Fan 4, we discussed whether or not the information or citations of Japaneseness found online in the sub-board could be considered credible, in other words, did the fan believe them?:

> I think everybody decides it though his/her own "filters". I mean, for example, let's take our little *yaoi* manga community. We accept authentic what we judge that belongs to our vision…it'd be "my Japanese culture" (Fan 4)

Fan 4 touches upon two important areas. Firstly, they mention that information about Japan are part of the community's activities. Secondly, the fan mentions "[their] Japanese culture". It is not necessarily to be compared to any sense of a 'real' Japan. It is something that they have interpreted for the community's benefit. This is also picked up by Fan 5:

> I usually go into suspended disbelief mode because it's probably not all true but that shouldn't be bad because [its] fun for us, you know? (Fan 5)

Therefore, I suggest that it is better to think of their experiences and understanding as not necessarily authentic, but not to let that bear down on their *yaoi* fan community experience. This is expressed clearly in Fan 6's comment below:

> I am aware of all the inaccuracies and idealizations that *yaoi manga* has, but it is perhaps the idealizations that allow me to like *yaoi* and the community to begin with (Fan 6)

It appears that the fans remain engaged with manga and their community despite any inaccuracies. Trusting other fans and maintaining objectivity relates to a relationship with both manga and one another. There are potentially limitless fan interpretations but part of the process of being a member of *AarinFantasy* is negotiating these interpretations. Indeed, on *AarinFantasy* there is a system called the *Aarin*

Friending Thread.[10] In this system, fans are paired together with an inexperienced member introduced to a more experienced member of the site. The more experienced member is referred to as the *senpai* whilst the inexperienced member is called the *kohai*. This is based on the Japanese words for senior/superior/elder (*senpai*) and junior, subordinate (*kohai)*. Two fans involved in my study are in one such *senpai-kohai* relationship, they are Fan 7 and Fan 8.

Fan 8 is the *kohai* and Fan 7 is the senior *senpai*. Speaking of their relationship Fan 7 mentions:

> [I] have no trouble taking care of new members and questions they have about thing. I'm just one of the members that…others turn to when they have questions (Fan 7)

Fan 8 mentions:

> I can ask [Fan 7] about anything I don't understand….I really learnt a lot from her and I trust her completely (Fan 8)

The existence of this system supports the possibility that fans trust other fans regardless of potential inaccuracies in information. This does not, consequently, mean that fans are flippant regarding Japanese culture, rather that "the nation…is but one of a constellation of possible points of affinity upon which transcultural fandom may be predicted" (Chin and Morimoto 2013, p.99). Thus, whilst an orientation towards Japanese culture or a Japanese way of life will most likely be an important part of the fans' activities and investments on the site, whether or not what the fans consider 'real' is, perhaps, not as important as the activities and relationships, the basis of which such an orientation forms.

Anne Allison (2006), researching the popularity of Japanese media in the West, refers to "J-cool" suggesting that what makes Japanese culture popular abroad is that it "projects attractive images of Japan based more on [Japan's] particular brand of virtual playmaking than on its policies, culture, or lifestyle" (2006, p.96). Allison notices two words that are important for a consideration of the reception of Japanese popular culture, 'virtual' and 'cool'. Cool' is used in reference to international fandom for Japanese popular culture. Astrid Fellner et al. (2014) suggests that research into 'cool' has been "recognized as one of the most pervading and…elusive qualities of contemporary consumer society" and is perhaps the "cultural dominant of our time" (p.10). In this sense, an attachment or interest in Japan and Japanese culture could see these acting as a source for communal bonds as opposed to 'objective' knowledge accumulation. In other words, the deployment of knowledge, and subsequent discussions, regarding Japanese culture operates as social, as opposed to strictly cultural, capital within the community.

This leads back to the work of Azuma Hiroki (2009) on Japanese popular culture for whom there is no 'Japaneseness', in any ontological sense, to be removed in the first place. Together with this, by alluding to "virtual playmaking" (2006) Allison hints at something not quite real, particularly so when she suggests this is not connected to a 'real' Japan. This similarly works well with Azuma's work which

[10] https://aarinfantasy.com/forum/f13/t159851-friending-thread-%7Bcome-join.html

suggests that global Japanese popular culture is a mix of both Japanese and non-Japanese influences. Azuma argues that references to a real Japan, are "produced as a simulacrum from the start, and in turn the simulacrum of that simulacrum is propagated by fan activities" (2009 p.26). Thus, when fans consume Japanese media texts, what they are really fans of are derivatives without an original. This is important because defining a 'real' Japan or Japanese culture is, perhaps, beyond objective possibility and will always be partial. Rather, *AarinFantasy* acts as a mediator between Japan and the rest of world whilst regarding reception and interpretation of Japan and Japanese culture as part of its members' activities.

6 Conclusion

This chapter provides a cursory exploration looking at an alternative avenue for future *yaoi* research. Gender and sexuality have, for very compelling reasons, comprised the majority of *yaoi* research. However, I am acutely aware that this is not the only aspect of *yaoi* fandom that can be examined. I have presented a preliminary examination into the transcultural consumption of *yaoi* manga abroad because the issue of Japan and Japanese culture is, in many instances, a part of the fans' attraction to the genre and it is important that we not lose focus of this within wider manga studies.

There is a process on *AarinFantasy* through which fans learn about Japan. Community sites for *yaoi* fandom can, and do in this instance, act as mediators for fans to not only further their interest in *yaoi* manga but also offer a means for fans to explore 'a' Japan and 'a' Japanese culture. I am keen in this instance to emphasis the indefinite article 'a' here as what the fans discuss and learn through their communication with other fans is not necessarily an attempt to gain 'accurate' information about Japan. Rather, the process of learning about Japan, whilst acting a mediator for the flow of information, also provides fans with opportunities to forge connections and strengthen the overall community. Potential inaccuracy does not deter the fans because the community presents itself as more important than accuracy.

Overall, by investigating aspects of *yaoi* fandom we are implicated to explore the wider issue of what fans do when they are online in terms of interaction amongst fans, their relationships, and corresponding interpretations of these relations.

Appendix

Research Methodology

Following the work of Mary Gray in *Out in the Country* (2009), I wanted to fill a gap in literature concerning the lives of individuals who are often missed out. In Gray's case, her project concerned the life experiences of LGBT youth in rural America that are overshadowed by youth in metropolitan areas and as a result "we

have largely drawn our conclusions and developed our theoretical frameworks… from a very…limited data pool" (p.10). *Yaoi* fans are also relatively difficult to find offline in the United Kingdom. National conventions for *yaoi* do not exist and physical interest clubs are equally difficult to encounter. It is possible to go to events that are dedicated to Japanese popular culture which manga and anime often make a large part. However, *yaoi* is a sub-genre of manga and as such forms a much smaller part of conventions also. Similarly, the content of *yaoi,* male homosexuality, means that many fans are often shy when talking about their interest with a researcher when face-to-face.

Gray examines LGBT youth in rural United States who are not easily found and writes that "unless our research calls for staying online….I think there is a greater impetus to explore offline experiences of phenomena" (2009, p.106). In the case of this chapter, I do the opposite but for what I believe is the same reason as Gray. She writes that LGBT youth experiences in the United States that are readily found in cities limits the pool of participants to those who readily have access to online groups that tend to serve metropolitan communities. Therefore, she advocates going offline as a contextually based decision to include rural LGBT youth. I take the opposite approach by going online for the same context based decision. Being online presents a greater chance to include *yaoi* fans whom one cannot easily meet offline. What Gray is examining could be referred to as what Fabiola Baltar and Ignasi Brunet call a "hard to involve populations" (2011). Maryse Marpsat and Nicholas Razafindratsima (2010) define a 'hard-to-reach' population as having relatively low numbers making an investigation "throughout the general population very expensive". Being hard to identify, they often have something in common that is not easy to detect because it is "illicit [or] socially stigmatised…which leads to a poor choice of places in which to approach them" (p.4). If we think in terms of the wider manga community then *yaoi* fans are certainly in the minority, at a manga convention or in the public. There is no way to know who is a *yaoi* fan unless one were to stay by a *yaoi* booth but even then, many individuals who spend time at the booths may only have a passing interest in the genre. Actual fans may be too shy or nervous to walk up to the booth knowing in advance that it is related to male homosexuality.

I completed 15 online semi-structured in depth interviews from January 2015 with member checks, as triangulation, taking place periodically until November 2015. Interviews took place in real-time synchronous textual chat sessions via Skype. Although conducting interviews online means that it is possible to conduct them concurrently, I felt that if I did so, analytic focus would be detracted from the participant responses.

In the beginning of each interview, I would spend some time chatting informally with the participant explaining that I was a member of the site and had been for the past couple of years. This was an important conversation to have as it allowed for the formation of some basic intimacy between us. I did not want to appear in the research setting as an unknown researcher as this could have had adverse effects on trust or the quality of responses.

On average, each interview lasted 1 week. There were sometimes gaps between interview sessions as participants would often have prior engagements or found

themselves busy with other tasks such as work, study, or family meaning that there would sometimes be a day between interview sessions. Initially these gaps may seem like a disadvantage to online research, however without the availability of the internet and the flexibility it allows, much research that involves dispersed participants such as these *yaoi* fans would be impossible and it means that I am able to keep in touch with individuals that may otherwise not be able to take part.

Conducting interviews in real time has many benefits over asynchronous communication. By being present with the participant, I was able to intensify online interaction and create an atmosphere where the conversations were able to grow naturally. For example I did not begin each conversation by immediately starting the interview but would rather chat for a while to 'break the ice' before moving into more focussed interview questions. After I had asked my questions or I felt that the participant was becoming fatigued, I would wind down the session with a casual chat once more before agreeing on a time to continue the interview and logging off. These off-topic conversations mean that I developed friendships with my participants and was able to learn about their daily lives. By knowing my participants more personally, I was able to improve my interviews and collect richer data. Furthermore, due to the nature of my online research, the lengthy task of transcription is quickly resolved as copies of communication can be easily saved in text format. This also means a way of avoiding the issue of 'transgression' in transcripts of interviews. Steinar Kvale writes that "transgression [is] a transformation of one narrative mode –oral discourse- to another narrative mode – written discourse -[and] attempts at verbatim interview transcripts produce hybrids, artificial constructs that are adequate to neither the lived oral conversation nor the formal style of written texts" (1996, p.166).

I have also conducted thread analysis of discussions taking place in the 'Asian Culture' sub thread of the community site. In both interview transcripts and threads, I have coded themes referring to Johnny Saldaña's *The Coding Manual for Qualitative Researchers* (2012). Starting with a heuristic frame of mind, I coded my data both during and after collection as an analytic 'tactic' and as an 'exploratory problem-solving technique' without any specific pre-existing formula to follow (2012, p.8). To facilitate the coding and analytic procedures I used the qualitative data analysis software Nvivo10.

The participants' usernames, bar the site creator, have been anonymised. Whilst there are no prescribed ethical measures for online ethnography, many researchers elect to change the usernames of participants as well as the name of the site that they are investigating in order to maintain privacy.

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Chapter 12 The Diffusion of Music Via YouTube: Comparing Asian and European Music Video Charts

Just Kist and Marc Verboord

Abstract This research aims to study what role YouTube – arguably the largest and most popular video sharing website in the world – plays in the globalization of pop music. As a transnational medium, the internet has the potential to diminish the impact of cultural centrality and cultural proximity in explaining cultural flows. We conducted an empirical analysis of YouTube's music video charts. In particular, we focused on the transnational music flows between Europe and Asia, with special attention paid to the positions of Japan and South Korea. The former is the second largest music market in the world, while the latter is increasingly associated with successfully exporting its local pop music (K-pop) in the digital era. The results show that the internet has closed the gap between cultures from different parts of the world to only a limited extent. At the same time, we found that artists from South Korea had the strongest presence in the South-East Asian charts, with greater cultural centrality than the US and Japan. The implications of these findings are discussed below.

Keywords YouTube · Cultural globalization · Cultural flows · Pop music · K-pop

1 Introduction

In the summer of 2012, the music video *Gangnam Style* by PSY (Park Jae-Sang) went viral on the internet, becoming the most viewed video of all-time on YouTube (at the time of writing, 2.5 billion views; see also Xu et al. 2014). Gangnam Style's success signifies that cultural products like popular music can nowadays come from anywhere in the world, and points to the role that new media, in particular YouTube, play in disseminating music across the globe (Oh and Park 2012). Although the notion that the exchange of music and other forms of culture between countries has

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been accelerated due to the digital revolution is not new, very little empirical research has been conducted into this. Many scholars believe that this digital revolution has also changed the global music industry (e.g. Wikström 2013). In particular, the rise of social media and video sharing sites such as YouTube has had an impact: individuals increasingly access music via websites or friends to whom they are connected via the internet. The efforts and costs required to promote popular music have dropped dramatically due to this connectedness, and audiences can now find music from all across the globe (Jang and Paik 2012; Baek 2015).

This research aimed to study what role YouTube – arguably the largest and most popular video sharing website in the world[1] – actually plays in the globalization of pop music. This was done by analyzing YouTube's music video charts. The first aim was to examine the trends in the degree, direction and diversity of international music videos within YouTube's national music video charts of Western European and South-East Asian countries. These charts contain the most popular and most trending music videos at a particular time on YouTube within a specific country. The second goal was to understand how national differences between countries' musical exchanges can be explained. There is a large amount of literature available on the flow of media, which emphasizes the importance of market size, cultural centrality and cultural proximity when it comes to increasing a product's chances of entering foreign markets (Straubhaar 1991; Fu 2006; Verboord and Brandellero 2016). Yet many of these studies concentrate on trade data, with hardly any focusing on the internet as a source of diffusion. Interestingly, recent work that studied the impact of the internet focused on K-pop (Korean pop music), as the increased global popularity of this form of mediatized entertainment has been associated with the rise of YouTube and other forms of social media (Baek 2015; Oh and Park 2012; Xu et al. 2014). One of the main findings of these studies resonates with the cultural proximity thesis: countries culturally similar to South Korea are more likely to express favourable attitudes towards K-pop. Our study contributes to this body of work by adopting a slightly more overarching perspective. Unlike what, for instance, Baek (2015) and Yang (2012) did for South Korea, we do not focus on how music from one country is received in other nations; instead, we map the popularity of selected European and Asian countries in each others' charts. Our primary interest, therefore, lay in the analysis of the transnational flows between Europe and Asia. We examined cultural distance and geographical distance, but also the importance of market size and the reliance on domestic content. Finally, we explored the role of the content partnerships that YouTube has with media companies that provide it with videos in terms of how the music video charts are produced.

Our article is structured as follows. We start by discussing the theoretical background of this study, with specific attention paid to trends in the global music market and the role that the internet, and particularly YouTube, is increasingly playing. We then describe our data and methodology. Section 4 presents both descriptive and explanatory analyses of which songs have charted in Asian and European YouTube

[1]YouTube ranks second among all websites according to the authoritative web traffic analytics website Alexa.com (retrieved December 5, 2016).

lists. We end with a discussion of the implications of our findings for the study of music flows and the cultural proximity thesis.

2 Theoretical Background

Cultural globalization is generally conceived of as the transmission or diffusion of various forms of media and the arts across national borders (Crane 2002; Janssen et al. 2008). The intensified, yet uneven, spread of cultural products across the world in past decades is often interpreted theoretically as being the result of inequalities between nation states in terms of economic and political power, cultural prominence, population size, and other factors at the country level. Among the earliest models of cultural globalization (see Crane 2002 for an overview) was *cultural imperialism theory*, which stated that the production and dissemination of cultural products is best understood as a one way flow from 'central' countries to more 'peripheral countries'. This theory has been criticized over time for its ethnocentric undertones: it disregards the plurality of cultural centres across the world (particularly outside American and European territories), the reciprocal nature of flows, and the rise of transnational media corporations (see Crane 2002). Consequently, scholars of globalization have started to emphasize the two-way flow of culture in recent decades. Arguably, this led to slightly different empirical and theoretical approaches to cultural globalization. Quantitative analyses of media flows started to: explicitly distinguish origin and destination countries and country ties (see Fu 2006; Verboord and Brandellero 2016); or conduct network analyses (see Moon et al. 2010) in order to model determinants of such flows more accurately. Influenced by the theoretical writings of Appadurai (1996), Nederveen Pieterse (2004) and others, more qualitative studies have increasingly emphasized the notion of hybridization with regard to both cultural content and audiences. That is, because of the multidirectional way culture travels across countries, it is inevitable that products become mixtures of local and global influences—whether by natural evolution or intentionally because of marketing. Yet individuals also create their own hybrid cultural identities from global, regional and local cultural spheres, as they incorporate influences of global communication forms into their own geo-culturally and cultural-linguistically shaped backgrounds (Straubhaar 2014). This accords with the ideas from *reception theory*, which looks at individuals' responses to specific cultural products and provides more insight into why individuals are open (or not) to cultural content that originates in different national cultures than their own (e.g. Liebes and Katz 1990; Straubhaar 1991; Gao 2016).

Most of these approaches are—to certain extent—compatible: they show the multilayered complexity of cultural globalization; articulate the trade-off between production and consumption practices; and acknowledge mediating factors such as cultural institutions, media channels, and policy actors. Of course, this does not mean that there is complete consensus. Indeed, debates have already started on terminologies (e.g. 'global' versus 'transnational'; 'flow' versus 'hop'). Moreover,

an important issue is probably the tension between, on the one hand, zooming in closely at content or audience receptions to achieve a fuller understanding of these complexities (avoiding superficiality) and, on the other, the extent to which such scrutiny still renders generalizable outcomes through reliable interpretations (avoiding idiosyncrasy). A final issue concerns the difficulty of extending one's research perspective beyond one's cultural and linguistic background. Despite the—perhaps somewhat gratuitous—criticisms in empirical studies of theoretical scholars on ethnocentrism, practical limitations to the kind of cross-national comparisons that are feasible are serious obstacles for expanding empirical research to a wider part of the globe. Our study is an, admittedly modest, attempt to make progress on this issue.

2.1 Trends in the Global Music Market

Pop music has often been found to be one of the most globalizing forms of culture (Janssen et al. 2008; Regev 2013). At a basic level, various arguments can be made as to why pop music travels relatively well. First, musical formats can more easily overcome linguistic barriers than products that need translation, such as books, films and television series (Kuipers 2015). Second, recorded forms of culture tend to travel better than strictly performance-based genres, as they can be disseminated more easily (Janssen et al. 2008). Third, the production of pop music is largely concentrated in an industry that has become increasingly transnational over time (Wikström 2013). Nevertheless, it is important to note that the globalization of pop music is often also associated with relatively few countries of origin. In an analysis of the pop charts of nine countries between 1960 and 2010, music from the US and the UK accounted for the lion's share of 'foreign content' (Verboord and Brandellero 2016). Regev (2013) points to processes of convergence towards Anglo-American sound models as also influencing local content: in his words, 'pop-rockization'. Indeed, despite criticisms of the cultural imperialism thesis, most studies on the production of pop music continue to highlight the dominance of Anglo-American pop culture (Campbell-Robinson et al. 1991; Negus 1993; Wikström 2013; Regev 2013).

Obviously, our previous remark on the strong Western focus of existing research applies here. As Marshall (2013) signals in his edited volume on the international recording industries, there are major local differences in how the music industry operates. Japan is an important example. The Japanese market has been one of the largest in the world for years. Moreover, similar to the American market, most of its music consumption involves domestic content (81% in 2010; IFPI 2010). Nevertheless, while US music pairs having a large domestic market with arousing major interest abroad as being a sign of its 'cultural centrality' in music (see Janssen et al. 2008: 722), Japanese music (J-pop) is less visible in the global arena. J-pop was popular in some East Asian countries in the 1980s and 1990s, but seems to have lost its top regional position to K-pop in recent years (Iwabuchi 2002; Yang 2012). It is claimed that K-pop, more than J-pop, has managed to find the right mix of

Asian and Western pop music elements (hybridization) that appeal to a larger Asian audience, and even to European and American listeners (Shim 2006; Ryoo 2009; Jang and Paik 2012). Some scholars draw on the cultural proximity thesis to explain K-pop's success in the region, but others are more skeptical about this argument and emphasize the efficiency of the Korean music industry and the growing use of social media to promote content (Oh and Park 2012). Moon et al. (2010) in their study of the structure of international music flows—using network analyses—mark Japan and Singapore as the most central countries in the Asian region, but it must be borne in mind that they only used data of the tangible recorded music market. While empirical research on these debates is thus limited, they do indicate that adopting more global perspectives (cf. beyond Europe and the US) may force us to re-assess our assumptions on the impact of 'centrality', 'proximity', and other concepts.

If there is one point of common ground in discussing changes in the industry across the globe, it is probably the rise of the internet (see also Marshall 2013). The basic argument is that the internet—and all related technological developments such as file-sharing, online social networks, user-generated content creation, and streaming—have enabled actors in the industry to increasingly bypass institutionalized mediators (Wikström 2013). This implies not only that audiences can download music for free (bypassing record stores) (e.g. Oberholzer and Strumpf 2007) and new artists (like Justin Bieber in 2007) can put their videos on YouTube (bypassing A&R managers at record labels); it also means that—theoretically—the music industry has less control over how music is distributed and promoted (Wikström 2013: 5–6). The global music market has become, in many ways, a digital music market in which CD sales are increasingly being replaced by sales of digital files (downloads),[2] while distribution and promotion is increasingly shifting from national media channels to global online platforms.

In this digital age, YouTube has become one of the most important online platforms for distributing videos in general, and music videos more specifically, since its establishment in 2005. While the focus was originally on peer production (lay persons disseminating home-made content), very soon a large share of the content consisted of industry-made, copyrighted material (Burgess and Green 2009). Threatened by copyright violation claims and limited profits, YouTube made arrangements with the music (media entertainment) industry that, in turn, managed to regain some its lost control (Elberse 2013). Media conglomerates have created content agreements with YouTube and other video platforms, with YouTube paying a share of its revenue to record companies in exchange for the use of clips and music. Revenue is also generated from paid downloads via third-party online stores like iTunes, or by selling advertising around the music video content (Edmond 2014). Furthermore, media conglomerates have created 'syndication hubs' for their partnerships with video platforms. One of these hubs is a company called Vevo, which was launched as a joint venture between two major businesses (Sony Music Entertainment and Universal Music Group) and the Abu Dhabi Media company

[2] Of course, a considerable element of downloaded music is that this is done without consumers paying for them.

in partnership with Google/YouTube.[3] Vevo is the exclusive distributor of music produced by these two majors on YouTube and other video sharing sites, and claims to deliver some 3.3 billion views monthly (Edmond 2014: 307).

Accordingly, music industry actors have also started to develop response strategies, which leads Rogers (2013) to conclude that the internet has not substantially altered the pre-existing power relations in the music industry (see also Elberse 2013 on the viability of the 'blockbuster'). Nevertheless, there is little doubt that the internet has downplayed geographical distances and, as such, has been instrumental in the cross-national diffusion of music. Baek (2015) probably offers the most elaborate analysis to date of how music reaches other countries via YouTube. He analyzed the extent to which the amount of YouTube comments on K-pop per country can be explained by the cultural distance of that country from South Korea. While there was some evidence that cultural distance remains relevant, we argue that it is important to also study other origin countries to assess how much exchange there is via YouTube, and what explains this.

2.2 Explanatory Factors of Cross-National Success on YouTube

We distinguished three types of effect in our empirical study: destination effects, origin effects and country tie effects. Destination and origin effects signal the impact of particular features of the importing and exporting countries, respectively, which limit or enable music flows. In our analysis, we concentrated on cultural centrality, market size, the focus on domestic repertoire, and internet usage.

Cultural centrality refers to the idea that some countries set the standards when it comes to cultural exchange (Heilbron 1999). Within the 'cultural world-system' (De Swaan 1999), certain countries have more symbolic power than others in attracting audiences from other nations. Often, countries with dominant positions in global cultural production fit this profile, such as the United States in film or the US and the UK in pop music (Janssen et al. 2008). Measuring cultural centrality is, however, challenging, particularly if we acknowledge the existence of regional differences. In a way, mapping which countries are represented in the various YouTube charts provides us with a snapshot of cultural centrality. Information is available on the global market size that countries represent and on the extent to which countries focus on a domestic repertoire. If we follow the argument that the internet is the great equalizer, the expectation is that the importance of global market size will not be very strong (in contrast to traditional media flows; see Fu and Sim 2010 and Moon et al. 2010).

It is widely believed in studies of cultural globalization that the relationship between the importing and exporting countries also affects the flow of cultural

[3] The other major record company, Warner Music Group, has signed a deal with Hulu, another syndication hub incorporating NBC, FOX and Disney/ABC.

products between them. More specifically, countries that share cultural histories, traits, or preferences tend to be more open to each other's products, since audiences will find it easier to relate to their content (Straubhaar 2014). This is the cultural proximity—or when reversed, cultural distance—argument: geo-cultural and cultural-linguistic ties facilitate exchange. Additionally, geographical distance can also play a role (Verboord and Brandellero 2016). When studying YouTube, the comparison between cultural and geographical distance becomes more interesting than before, because – in theory – the latter should no longer have an effect. In the pre-internet age, being located in different parts of the world could hinder the spread of media such as music magazines or television broadcasts. YouTube, however, is available wherever there is the internet. As a result, we expected that geographical distance and, to a lesser extent, cultural distance would not be particularly important when it comes to explaining cross-national successes on YouTube (when compared to, for instance, Verboord and Brandellero 2016 or Fu and Sim 2010).

Finally, we examined how YouTube gets its content (though not in the multivariate analysis). As described earlier, record companies provide their music videos to YouTube and in return get a share of the revenue that is indirectly generated through that video. These practices could lead to artists being signed by media conglomerates that have agreements or partnerships with YouTube, and these musicians are given more visibility on the platform compared to those who are not affiliated with a media conglomerate that has such a partnership. Given its prominence, we focused here on Vevo. In particular, we analyzed how many videos in the music video charts were uploaded by syndication hubs such as Vevo. As Vevo only provides the music videos of two major companies, and because such firms have a smaller share of the music market in Asia than in North America and Europe (IFPI 2004), it was expected that more Vevo music videos would be present in Western European music video charts than in South-East Asian music video charts. Moreover, when keeping in mind that the majors favour UK and US artists above those from other countries (Negus 1993), it was expected that most videos uploaded by Vevo would be American or British.

3 Method

We determined the popularity of videos by examining YouTube's music video charts per country between 15 October and 19 November, 2013. We focused on two regions: Western Europe and South-East Asia. The charts from the following countries were coded: Norway, the United Kingdom, Germany, the Netherlands, Austria and Italy in Europe; and Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia in Asia. These are the 'destination countries'. This selection was made partly for reasons of availability (not all countries have a localized version of YouTube), and—for the European sample—partly to be able to compare our results with existing research (Verboord and Brandellero 2016). More importantly, as can be seen in Table 12.1, there are also major differences in the

Table 12.1 Background information on the countries under study

	Music markets		Videos in sample	
	Digital sales volume: 2009	% domestic repertoire	Mean # YouTube views (SD) in millions	Number of videos in sample
Japan	971.8	78%	11.6 (39.9)	22
South Korea	80.4	61%	3.1 (3.2)	21
Taiwan	7.8	39%	2.3 (2.7)	24
Hong Kong	8.2	25%	2.4 (3.3)	22
Philippines	3.1	30%	57.8 (99.4)	19
Malaysia	8.5	15%	35.5 (83.3)	18
Singapore	3.1	1%	46.0 (78.7)	21
Indonesia	27.7	69%	46.6 (85.1)	22
Norway	16.0	44%	53.2 (83.3)	20
United Kingdom	295.0	39%	48.7 (82.5)	24
Germany	155.5	13%	10.9 (40.9)	22
Netherlands	16.8	22%	46.7 (76.3)	21
France	131.6	35%	45.1 (82.6)	21
Austria	15.2	9%	68.8 (94.3)	19
Italy	33.7	43%	49.4 (80.9)	22
Total	–	–	34.4 (71.8)	318

Source: digital sales and domestic repertoire: IFPI Recording Industry in Numbers 2010; views: own data, collected in 2013

sizes of the music markets in the countries under study, which enables us to examine centrality and market size.

For our data collection, we recorded all the titles of videos and performing artists in: (i) the ‘Top Track’ top 10 YouTube music videos (which are the most popular videos at that moment); and (ii) the ‘Trending’ top 10 YouTube music videos (which are the videos that are trending the most at that point in time).[4] These two charts were combined to increase the number of videos under study, as we noticed that the charts have a low turnover. In total, 397 music videos were coded. However, some charted multiple times in the same country, albeit in slightly different versions. After cleaning the data to keep only the unique hit videos per country, we found 318 examples in our 15 destination countries (of course, some of these will chart in multiple countries).

[4]To make sure these lists did not differ across users (e.g. because of search histories), we cross-checked them by accessing them through various different computers. The lists were always the same.

3.1 Measurements

We looked up the nationality of the performing artist (as an indicator of the origin country of the video) and the language in which the video was sung for every video examined. By comparing this nationality with the destination country, we were able to classify artists as 'domestic' (e.g. Korean artists charting in Korea) or 'foreign' (e.g. Korean artist charting in the UK), depending on the country where they charted. Of course, we are aware that taking the nationality of the artist as an indicator has limitations, as some musicians live and record their music outside their original home nation (e.g. Rihanna). Nevertheless, as we do not have information on all the current locations of recording artists, nationality seems to be the best measure of a musician's origin. We also noted the details of the uploader of the video, which could be an individual, but in many cases was another organization such as Vevo or Bigbang. Moreover, we recorded how many views the videos had had.

We collected information on the origin and destination countries in the data set to be able to answer the second research question. In particular, we measured the global trade value (in US dollars) of the digital music sales of that country in 2009. We also recorded the share of the domestic repertoire in a country. This information was found in the report 'Recording Industry in Numbers 2010' (IFPI 2010), which was the latest version available to us.[5] The same report also provided us with information on the number of internet users in a country.

As a last step, we collected data on the connection between (every possible) origin and destination country. In line with previous studies (Fu 2006; Baek 2015; Verboord and Brandellero 2016), we operationalized cultural distance using Hofstede's (2013) cultural dimensions. Based on empirical observations, Hofstede developed a scheme of how cultural values differ across countries on the dimensions of power distance, masculinity, individualism, and uncertainty avoidance. While it is true that this scheme is not uncontested, it does offer a measurement of how countries differ in a cultural sense that is otherwise difficult to obtain. We calculated the difference between the origin and destination country for every dimension, after which we calculated the mean difference.

The variable of geographical distance was measured by calculating the distance between the capitals of the destination and origin countries using the website Timeanddate.org. Finally, we used the CIA's 'World Fact Book' to examine whether there was a language tie between countries in terms of sharing official languages.

[5] Note that, for some countries, the share of the domestic repertoire was not available in the IFPI report. For Germany and France, we therefore used information from a report on music circulation in Europe. We found online references for certain origin countries in our sample (Canada). Meanwhile, we estimated the share based upon the charts in 2010 for Lithuania, Russia and Romania.

3.2 Methodological Strategy

The first descriptive analyses concerned the data on the unique video titles found in the charts. The explanatory analyses were conducted by creating a country-by-country data file. That is, for every destination country (N = 15), we counted the number of videos from every origin country (N = 31). Our research units thus concerned the dyads between destination and origin countries, and the dependent variable was the number of videos from every origin country within the charts of a destination country. For instance, the number of videos from Taiwan in the Japanese charts represented one case, while the combination videos from Taiwan to the Netherlands yielded zero cases. This strategy enabled us to estimate the impact of country characteristics and country ties. The total N rose to 15*31 = 465, but since identical origin and destination countries were not of interest here, 15 cases were omitted, leaving us with 450 units to analyze.

As multiple observations per destination country were used, our data had a nested structure, implying that a multilevel analysis was warranted in order to correctly estimate standard errors (Hox 2010). Destination and origin countries cannot, however, be hierarchically ordered, as the latter do not exclusively situate themselves under the former. We conducted a cross-classified multilevel analysis to correct our standard errors for this cluster, using the Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) option in MLwin (see Hox 2010) to do so. Destination countries were modelled as Level 1, since our dependent variable was the number of videos in a destination country, while the origin countries were Level 2.

Table 12.2 Domestic and foreign hits in Asian and European YouTube charts (N = 318)

		Region destination				
	Region origin ↓	S-E Asia		W-S Europe		N
Domestic hits	S-E Asia	100%	78	0%	0	78
	W-S Europe	0%	0	100%	38	38
subtotal			78		38	
Foreign hits	S-E Asia	55%	50	1%	1	51
	W-S Europe	9%	8	28%	31	39
	N America/Aus/NZ	29%	26	55%	61	87
	Else	8%	7	16%	18	25
subtotal			91		111	
Total N			169		149	318

Note: South-East Asia refers to the eight Asian countries under study, plus the origin country of China; Western-Southern Europe refers to the seven European countries under study, plus the origin countries of Sweden and Belgium

4 Results

4.1 Cross-National Exchange of Music Videos

Table 12.2 shows the share of domestic and foreign video hits in South-East Asia and Europe, and also breaks the foreign hits down according to the regions of origin. The results show that the YouTube video music charts are, in general, quite international. A total of 202 of 318 videos (64%) were foreign. This percentage was slightly lower in Asian (53%) than in European countries (74%). Itemizing the foreign hits enabled us to observe that the majority of them in South-East Asia came from countries in the same region (55%), followed by North America (with Australia/New Zealand) (29%).[6] Only 9% of the foreign hits came from Western-Southern Europe. European destination countries, however, displayed a different picture; here, the majority of foreign hits originated in North America/Australia/New Zealand (55%) and other Western-Southern European countries (28%). The 'else' category was quite large in Europe, but it should be remembered that this consisted of several videos from Rihanna, who is from Barbados, but is currently based in the US.[7] Importantly, we only found one video from South-East Asia – 2NE1, a female pop group from South Korea, which charted in the UK.

There were 29 different artist nationalities in the video charts. The most common were from the US (79 times), South Korea (57 times), Taiwan (27 times) and the UK (25 times). It was hypothesized that artists in the South-East Asian region would be predominantly from the US, Japan and South Korea, and Korean and American artists did indeed have a convincing presence in the charts. Unexpectedly, artists from Japan were not found in charts abroad. Looking at both regions separately, it can be seen that South Korea is the dominant provider of videos in South-East Asia (33%). Meanwhile, in the sampled European nations, the United States is the most dominant origin country (36%). These results suggest that centrality of production is not always equal to a large market size. While for the United States this linkage seems to also hold true in the digital age, South Korea appears to have much greater centrality than Japan, despite it having a smaller market size (see Table 12.1). It should be noted that 17.3% of all music videos were collaborations between two artists. Of these, 12.8% were collaborations with artists from the same country, while 4.5% were international collaborations (not in the table).

[6] Note that most of these hits are American (79). We found one Canadian, six New Zealand (all by singer Lorde) and one Australian hit video.

[7] Accordingly, our categorization in all likelihood slightly underestimates the importance of the US, as many artists go there to record their records.

Table 12.3 Multilevel analysis of the number of videos from the origin country (logged) in selected destination countries (N = 450)

	Empty model	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Destination effects				
Internet usage		−.068 (.038)	−.054 (.038)	−.018 (.027)
Market size (0–10)		.020 (.039)	−.001 (.039)	
% domestic repertoire (0–1)				−.083 (.034)*
Origin effects				
Internet usage (0–10)		−.073 (.131)	−.077 (.138)	.145 (.114)
Market size (0–10)		.340 (.139)*	.321 (.145)*	
% domestic repertoire (0–1)				−.000 (.111)
Country tie effects				
Cultural distance (0–10)			−.082 (.038)*	−.089 (.038)*
Geographical distance (0–10)			−.192 (.037)***	−.193 (.037)***
Language tie (0/1)			.138 (.237)	.019 (.240)
Constant	.787 (.259)**	.126 (.415)	2.216 (.564)***	2.981 (.761)***
Variance level 1 (destination countries)	1.741 (.532)	1.302 (.416)	1.470 (.471)	1.759 (.556)
Variance level 2 (origin countries)	2.149 (.149)	2.138 (.153)	1.922 (.136)	1.894 (.134)
Deviance MCMC	1620.580	1617.784	1569.070	1562.635

Note: Units of analysis are country dyads: combination of destination country (level 1) and origin country (level 2). Significance (two-tailed): * = $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$ *** $p < .001$

4.1.1 Explanatory Analyses of Foreign Success

Table 12.3 presents the results of our multilevel analyses of the number of videos that charted in a particular destination country. We drew on three sets of explanatory variables: the characteristics of destination countries, origin countries, and country ties.

The empty model, containing only the random intercept, revealed that about 44.6% (=1.741/(1.741 + 2.149)) of the variance was located at the destination level, and 55.4% at the origin level. Destination effects and origin effects were added to Model 1. In line with the findings of Verboord and Brandellero (2016), we found very few destination effects. The number of internet users in a destination country appeared to have a negative impact, but this effect was not significant. The best predictor according to Model 1 was the centrality of production of the country of origin: the most central countries have 34% more videos in the charts abroad than the least central countries. This implies that artists coming from countries that have a dominant position in the global market (indicated by the number of digital sales)

have a clear advantage in achieving foreign success. Model 2 shows that these effects were largely unchanged when we included country tie effects. Two of the three new explanatory variables added to the explanation of foreign success. We found a clearly negative influence of cultural distance: the extent to which countries differ in the values they hold reduced the chances of a successful exchange. The coefficient can be interpreted as a difference of 8.2% between the most similar and the most dissimilar countries. However, the strongest country tie effects arose from the geographical distance. Here, the difference was more than 19% between the closest countries and those that were furthest apart. These findings corresponded to the descriptive results presented in Table 12.2, which showed that hit foreign videos in South-East Asia are often from other countries in the region, while videos in Western-Southern Europe often originate from the United States or other European countries. We did not find any significant effects for language ties.

Finally, in Model 4, we changed the market size variable for the variable indicating the reliance on a domestic repertoire in a country. As expected, the larger the domestic repertoire in a destination, the more difficult it is to enter the YouTube chart in that country. At the same time, there was no effect for the reliance on a domestic repertoire in the origin country. Note that additional analyses in which we controlled for GDP per capita did not produce very different results.

4.1.2 Video Uploaders

Finally, we addressed the question of the role of video distribution. We expected many videos to have been uploaded by the distribution company Vevo, and Table 12.4 shows that this was indeed the case for almost one third of them. The other uploaders were represented by far fewer videos: BIGBANG had 23, SMTOWN

Table 12.4 The degree of foreign videos uploaded by video distributors (N = 318)

	Artist in chart		
Uploader video ↓	Domestic	Foreign	N
Vevo	10%	90%	102
Other	49%	51%	216
N	116	202	318

Chi-square = 46.110, p = .000, Cramer's V = .381

Table 12.5 Regions of origin of charted artists by uploader video (N = 318)

	Region of origin of artist			
Uploader video ↓	S-E Asia	W-S Europe	N America/Aus/NZ	Else
Vevo	0%	29%	58%	13%
Other	60%	22%	13%	6%
N	129	77	87	25

Chi-square = 118.156, p = .000, Cramer's V = .610

Table 12.6 Uploader video by region of destination (N = 318)

Region of destination ↓	Uploader video	
	Vevo	Other
S-E Asia	14%	86%
W-S Europe	52%	48%
N	216	102

Chi-square = 52.891, p = .000, Cramer's V = .408

11, binmusictaipei seven, and the others six or fewer. It was not feasible to identify all the uploaders, but among these smaller uploaders were record labels (e.g. Spinnin' Records, UniversalRecPH), artists (e.g. Lily Allen, Jason Derulo, Bruno Mars), and other media outlets (e.g. BBC Radio 1), including specific YouTube channels (e.g. Trouble Maker). Comparing Vevo to the other – admittedly quite diverse group of – uploaders, we saw that Vevo is very internationally oriented: 90% of its videos involve a 'foreign' artist (from the perspective of the chart in question), but the distribution is quite balanced for the other uploaders. Table 12.5 provides more details on the origins of the uploaded artists. Most of the videos uploaded by Vevo were by American or English-language artists: 58% came from the US, Canada, Australia or New Zealand. Of the European videos (29%), half were by British artists. Remarkably, none of the Vevo videos were by Asian artists, even though Sony is a Japanese company and Universal has a large presence in the Asian music market. Our expectation that music videos by Vevo would be more present in the Western-Southern European music video charts (52%) than the South-East Asian music video charts (14%) was corroborated (see Table 12.6). These results suggest that the European music market is more concentrated in terms of video distribution than the Asian market, but more research is obviously necessary.

5 Conclusion

This article investigated to what extent and how the YouTube video music charts of South-East Asian and Western-Southern European countries differ in terms of their foreign content. Our study was inspired by the notion that the internet, as a transnational medium, has the potential for cultural audiences across the world to pick up new trends and make their repertoire more diversified. We took a special interest in comparing two parts of the world that are geographically and culturally far removed from one another. One of the preliminary expectations was that such distance measures—which were often shown to be important predictors of cultural flows in the pre-internet age (e.g. Straubhaar 1991; Fu 2006; Verboord and Brandellero 2016)—would be less important now.

Our findings suggest that YouTube, to a certain extent, stimulates the flow of international music and makes national music markets more internationally orientated. This is a finding that is in line with other studies which claim that the digital age has created a larger supply of international artists (Leyshon 2009; Jang and Paik

2012). In the South-East Asian charts, artists from South Korea and, second, the US have the strongest presence. It is an important and striking finding that South Korea is currently more central than the US, but also more than Japan, in the South-East Asian charts. In a previous worldwide study by Moon et al. (2010), South Korea did not belong to the most central countries of the international music trade in this region. At the same time, Iwabuchi (2001) has argued that the new emergence of a regional identity in Asia has led young Asian consumers to prefer products from neighbouring Asian countries to those of their Western counterparts. A possible explanation for why South Korea is dominant in the Asian YouTube charts, and not for instance Japan with its much larger global market share, has been provided by Oh and Park (2012). They argue that the Korean entertainment industry has been a pioneer in changing its conventional business model from the audience based business-to-consumer (B2C) strategy to a new social media-dependent business-to-business (B2B) model: 'In this new model, Google, through its subsidiary company YouTube, acts as a key provider of the new social media market to the K-pop music industry that is now targeting royalty income as its main source of revenue.' (Oh and Park 2012: p. 366). The Korean dominance in the South-East Asian charts shows the ongoing presence of K-Pop in the region, and also demonstrates YouTube's important role in disseminating K-Pop to audiences there.

While there are indications of a 'YouTube-effect', it is important to emphasize that we still found major influences of cultural distance variables in our multivariate analyses. Compared to Verboord and Brandellero's (2016) study of mostly Western countries, the impact of cultural distance is now smaller than that of geographical distance. Of course, it is possible that our indicators of cultural distance (using Hofstede's cultural value scheme) do not fully capture how countries differ in a cultural sense. While it provides a measure of how societies differ in terms of what issues are important to their inhabitants, this does not necessarily need to be related to aesthetic evaluative work. Nevertheless, putting aside the distinction between geographical and cultural distance, our findings imply that the internet has only closed the gap between cultures from different parts of the world to a limited extent. This seems to accord with the results of Baek (2015) who—analyzing more destination countries, but only one origin country (Korea)—still finds significant effects of cultural distance dimensions for online video consumption.

Studying cultural exchanges on the internet also raises the question of how cultural production and distribution works in an online context. Although the claim is often made that the internet enhances the agency of audiences by facilitating bottom-up production and distribution practices, our analysis showed – particularly in Europe—the dominance of one video distribution company (Vevo). This company is related to some of the major entertainment organizations (Sony, Universal), which implies that the democratizing impact of YouTube should not be overestimated.[8] Vevo's major presence at the very least suggests that the majors have succeeded in maintaining a great deal of control over the digital music market, at least in Western

[8] Note that Burgess and Green (2009) have also already signalled that a substantial amount of the video material on YouTube comes from the dominant global media corporations.

Europe (see also Wikström 2013; Rogers 2013). Again, the discrepancy with the Asian charts is remarkable and calls for further investigation. After all, Sony Music – one of the companies involved in creating Vevo—is based in Japan, yet we did not find any Japanese or other Asian videos that were uploaded by it.

This research, of course, has its limitations. We only studied the videos that appear in the YouTube charts, and this was over a relatively narrow time frame. It transpired that the turnover of videos in these charts is relatively low. Whether this is a sign that the same videos stay popular for a long time or these charts suffer somewhat in terms of validity is difficult to assess. We argue that they are interesting to analyze, even if they are not perfect reflections of popularity, since they are *perceived* to be indicators of popularity by YouTube visitors. An additional complication was that, in some charts, videos appeared that were unrelated to popular music. As we excluded these from our sample, the number of videos from each destination country differed slightly. Including more videos – via observing longer periods – would provide us with more robust measurements. We also admit that taking the nationality of the artist as an indicator of the origin country may not always accurately reflect where the musical product actually comes from, as musicians increasingly travel the world to produce their recordings.

Future research could also include more determinants (e.g. at the artist level), enabling a more comprehensive picture to be obtained of which factors play a role when it comes to global musical exchanges in the digital age. For instance, the significance of Vevo in our results shows that new constellations have emerged which have not received the empirical attention they deserve. How the recording industry has incorporated the internet could thus be analyzed in much more detail (e.g. Rogers 2013; Elberse 2013). Special attention should be paid to global inequalities. Although such inequalities could theoretically be challenged using the democratic potential of the web, research so far suggests that existing power relations are often reproduced online (Verboord and Van Noord 2016).

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Chapter 13
Japanese and Korean Popular Culture and Identity Politics in Taiwan

Shuling Huang

Abstract Japanese and Korean popular culture has brought the consumer culture of the two countries to neighboring nations and greatly boosted inbound tourism. Nevertheless, the degree to which popular culture is effective as a soft power strategy remains a point of debate. This chapter empirically explores whether the Japanmania and the Korean Wave that swept Taiwan in the 1990s and 2000s respectively have changed Taiwanese perceptions of Japan and South Korea. Focusing on the media as the dominant representation of culture, I examine Taiwanese media discourses on Japan and South Korea from 1951 to 2015 in order to look at discursive continuities and changes. The findings show that, first, Japan and South Korea have been represented with very different themes. Japan has been portrayed either as the main political adversary or as a frontrunner of modernization. These two narratives are greatly influenced by Taiwan's domestic politics, which has been polarized by two opposing nationalisms. In contrast, South Korea has been framed as Taiwan's major economic competitor on the road to modernization. Therefore, media discourses on Japan and South Korea actually reflect Taiwan's struggle over identity. Second, with the onset of inflows of Japanese and Korean popular culture, extreme discourses in Taiwan regarding the two countries have also increased. In addition to positive portrayals of their popular culture and consumer culture, politically polarized discourses on Japan and discussion of economic competition against South Korea have also become dramatized. This indicates that transnational cultural flows enhance mutual understanding in some ways, but can also spur resistance. The forms of resistance may vary, depending on the local context.

Keywords Popular culture · Transnational flow · Identity politics · Japan · Korea · Taiwan

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1 Introduction

The prevalence of Japanese and Korean popular culture in East and Southeast Asian countries since the 1990s has spurred academic interest in reconstructing the concept of Asianness. The inquiries center on the process of cultural regionalization, manifested by such regular media practices as content trade, format imitation, crossover of talents, technology transfer and co-production (Jin and Lee 2007; Keane 2006). An abundant literature on such transborder cultural flows and regional cooperation finds that a common media sphere is in formation in East Asia, with distinct and identifiable patterns of cultural production, narrative, circulation, consumption and reproduction (Choi 2010; Iwabuchi 2002; Jin and Lee 2007; Keane et al. 2007). Some scholars further speculate that an East Asian identity is emerging from this new mediascape, as people in this region increasingly share a convergent media culture (Chua 2004, 2012; Katsumata 2012; Otmazgin 2011). Contrary to the rosy picture of regional integration, there has been evidence that transnational expansion of popular culture has sometimes aroused nationalistic reactions and therefore become a source of intraregional division. Well-known examples included *Kenkanryu* (anti-Korean Wave) movements in Japan and boycotts of Japanese products in China (Chua 2012). The simultaneous yet contradictory trends towards regional integration and divergence reveal the complexity of the relationships between popular cultural flows and cultural identity. A valuable and convincing analysis should take into account the context that produces, facilitates and receives those flows.

On the supply side, it should be noted that the state in East Asia, invigorated by nationalism, has played a key role in promoting inter-Asian media culture (Iwabuchi 2014). Certain countries—Japan, South Korea and China in particular—actively use popular culture as soft power to renew their national images and advance their economic, political and cultural competitiveness in the region and beyond (Daliot-bul 2009; Jin 2014; Nye and Kim 2013; Otmazgin 2008; Sun 2010). Therefore, the transborder expansion of popular culture in East Asia has never been a neutral process. Rather, this phenomenon has been promoted not only by neoliberal globalization but also by cultural or so-called "pop" nationalism (Ching 2000b; Cho 2011; Joo 2011).

On the receiving side, it has been well documented that Japanese and Korean cultural products, such as TV dramas, pop music and anime, have attracted a growing number of fans abroad and thus greatly increased the two countries' cultural exports. Moreover, the sale of a variety of commodities associated with Japan and Korea, ranging from cosmetics, electronics, and food to fashion and tourism has also grown dramatically in several East Asian markets (Ching 1994; Chua 2012; Hu 2005; Huang 2011; Ko 2004). The commercial success of Japanese and Korean products owes a lot to popular culture shaping the images of Japan and Korea as countries that are modern, urban and in vogue (Kim 2005). Beyond fan culture (see Chua 2012) and consumer culture, how popular culture influences the general public of the receiving country is under-investigated. In particular, whether the inflow

of popular culture enhances or diminishes people's perceptions of the export country is less empirically studied.

Therefore, this chapter aims to bridge the gap and explore the relationships between media flow and cultural identity. I will examine the cultural politics associated with Japanese and Korean popular culture in Taiwan—a country that has been deeply involved in Japan-mania (*hari*) since the 1990s and the Korean Wave (*hallyu*) since the 2000s. Despite the relative popularity of Japanese and Korean popular culture in Taiwan, the Taiwanese have very different perceptions about Japan and South Korea. According to a survey conducted in 2012, of the Taiwanese interviewed, 61% said that they dislike South Korea, but almost 60% of them remained interested in buying Korean products (ETToday November 17 2012). A longitudinal survey targeting high school and university students—the key consumers of the Korean Wave—showed a similar tendency. In 2005, 18.8% of the interviewed young people said that they had a strong aversion to South Korea; that number rose to 47.4% in 2011 (Hsu 22 November 2011). In contrast, the Taiwanese in general have held a more positive view of Japan, as evidenced by their generous donations to relief efforts following the March 11 earthquake there in 2011.[1] A survey conducted in 2008 by the Japan-Taiwan Exchange Association, the official diplomatic agency of Japan in Taiwan, showed that Japan was the country most liked by Taiwanese. In addition, 69% of interviewed Taiwanese felt a close affinity with Japan (The Southnews 23 April 2009). Why are there such differences? How have these perceptions been formed?

Certainly, social and historical contexts matter. The survey data reveal a kind of public opinion, but they miss many nuances behind the numbers. This chapter provides a historical review of Taiwanese media representation of Japan and Korea. By looking at continuities and changes in media discourse regarding these two countries, we may better understand how people respond differently to the inflows of various foreign popular cultures and form different perceptions of the exporting countries. Media representation does not always reflect the thoughts of a society, but, as Tomlinson (1991) argues, the media is the dominant representational aspect of modern culture. This study investigates Taiwanese media portrayal of Japan and Korea in the post-war era, paying particular attention to Japan-mania in the 1990s and the Korean Wave in the 2000s. The materials for this chapter draw mainly from Taiwanese mainstream newspaper databases from 1951 to 2015, including UDNData (from 1951) of the United Daily News Group, publisher of the *United Daily News*, KMW (from 1994) of the China Times Group, publisher of the *China Times*, as well as websites for the *Apply Daily* (from 2003) and the *Liberty Times* (from 2004).[2] In

[1] According to a report by Japan's *Shukan Shincho*, Taiwan donated more money to Japan than any other country in the world right after the March 11 earthquake of 2011 (The Taipei Times 17 April 2011).

[2] UDNData is the electronic database of *the United Daily News* Group, and KMW is the electronic database of the China Times Group. Both databases contain the contents of several newspapers affiliated with the two groups. Until the 1990s, the *United Daily New*s and the *China Times*, under the protection of the press ban, had been the most popular newspapers in terms of readership in Taiwan. The content of the *United Daily News* was in concert with government ideologies and

addition, prominent magazines in Taiwan such as *CommonWealth* and *Wealth Magazine*[3] are also included.[4]

The next section briefly summarizes Taiwan's relations with Japan and South Korea, and the popular cultural inflows from the two countries to Taiwan. Then I review media discourses regarding Japan and South Korea, individually. The final section compares the discursive differences of the two countries and provides a theoretical reflection.

2 The March of Japanese and Korean Popular Culture to Taiwan

Taiwan was ceded to Japan in 1895 under the Treaty of Shimonoseki and was a colony of the Japanese Empire for 50 years. After World War II, the Nationalists (*Kuomintang*, or KMT) took over Taiwan in 1945 and then retreated to the island in 1949 upon their defeat in the civil war against the Communists in mainland China. Under the banner of the Republic of China (ROC), the KMT regime claimed itself to be the sole representative of China, as opposed to the People's Republic of China (PRC) across the Taiwan Strait. Due to divergent histories, Japan symbolized very different things to the newly-arrived Mainlanders and the local Taiwanese present before 1945. To the former, Japan had been a cruel invader that committed many appalling atrocities during the second Sino-Japan War between 1937 and 1945 in China. To the latter, Japan was not only a former colonizer but also a country that initiated Taiwan's modernization (Ching 2000a). Both historical contexts made the KMT government cautious of Japanese influence. The regime needed to suppress the Mainlanders' anger towards Japan in order to maintain bilateral relations. More importantly, it had to eradicate the Japanese legacy in order to legitimize its Sinicization project on the island. Therefore, the import of Japanese audiovisual products was restricted in the 1950s, and in 1974, they were completely banned in retaliation for Japan's breaking of diplomatic relations with the ROC in 1972 (Lee 2004).

Since the early 1980s, however, Japanese popular culture began to make inroads into Taiwan through various illegal avenues. For example, Japanese TV variety shows, dramas, cartoons and wrestling matches became popular through the circulation of videotapes and cable TV (Lee 2004). The consumption of Japanese

public opinions. Currently the *Liberty Times* and the *Apply Daily* lead those two newspapers in circulation. While the *United Daily News* and the *China Times* are considered friendly to China after Taiwan's democratization in the late 1980s, the *Liberty Times* and the *Apply Daily* have held an anti-China stand since they were launched.

[3] *CommonWealth* has been the most sustainable and prominent financial magazine in Taiwan, with a complete digital database from 1981. In addition to *CommonWealt*h, other magazine articles analyzed in this chapter were downloaded from the Hyread ebook database, which includes more than 100 magazines in Taiwan.

[4] The publications originally written in Chinese are indicated in the references, and the contents were translated into English by the author.

comics, cartoons, videogames, stationary, electronics and so on also became a daily practice of Taiwanese. In 1992, the satellite channel Star TV started to broadcast trendy Japanese dramas during prime time to the Taiwanese audience, making the shows a sensation. Other networks and cable channels followed suit. Under pressure from TV stations, the Taiwan government soon lifted the ban on the import of Japanese programs (Su and Chen 2000). Although Taiwan had already been deeply influenced by Japanese popular culture, trendy dramas created a space for Japanized cultural consumption that was unprecedented. This trend was dubbed "Japan-mania" in Taiwan, referring to a desire for Japanese popular culture, commodities, lifestyle and even identity (Ko 2004; Lee 2004). This Japanese fever only gradually waned in the early 2000s, when Korean popular culture swept Taiwan. However, it should be noted that the Japanized consumer space has not subsided.

Compared to their familiarity with Japanese culture, the Taiwanese were ignorant of Korean culture before the rise of the Korean Wave in the early 2000s. Taiwan and South Korea shared some similarities in modern history: Both were colonized by Japan during the first half of the twentieth century and then controlled by authoritarian regimes for decades. In the Cold War era, the two countries stood side by side against the Communists in China and North Korea, and maintained frequent political, economic and cultural exchanges. In addition, rapid economic growth and modernization from the 1970s made these two nations, along with Hong Kong and Singapore, members of the "Four Asian Tigers." Starting from the late 1980s, both countries went through political democratization that also impressed the world. However, in 1992, South Korea severed its diplomatic ties with Taiwan and built relations with mainland China. Afterwards, a wide range of bilateral exchanges were interrupted.

Around 1998, Korean popular culture started to appeal to the Taiwanese after some Korean pop singers and groups were introduced to the island. Nevertheless, it was TV drama that initiated the first Korean Wave in Taiwan, approximately between 2000 and 2004. During this period, Taiwan was the biggest importer of Korean TV dramas (Sung 2010). The fever peaked in 2005, when the historical drama *DaeJanggeum* hit a record-high in the TV ratings. Afterwards, Korean TV dramas remained popular in Taiwan. In 2010, Korean dramas occupied 37.9% of the broadcasting time of TV dramas on Taiwanese TV (Ministry of Culture, Taiwan 2014) and on average, 27 such programs were being broadcasted daily (Kuo 2011). Still, the Korean Wave subsided in several Asian countries. As a response, the Korean government and cultural industries invested heavily in pop music to sustain cultural influence, eyeing global markets. Taiwanese passion for Korean popular culture was also reignited by this so-called second Korean Wave or *Hallyu* 2.0 starting around 2008 and 2009 (Jin 2016; Lee 2015).

Like Japanese popular culture, the Korean Wave successfully introduced Korean products to Taiwan, such as food, cosmetics, attire, cellular phones and electronics. It also had a positive effect on film tourism. Taiwanese visitors to South Korea dropped significantly from 302,184 in 1992 to 131,392 in 1993 right after the two countries severed diplomatic relations. The number has gradually rebounded since 2000 and reached 626,694 in 2014 (Tourism Bureau, Taiwan 2017). In addition to the consumption of Korean commodities, the Taiwanese also became interested in

understanding Korean culture. In the past, Korean language classes were mainly offered by two universities with related departments. In 2003, a total of 31 universities had such classes. Outside formal training at universities, Korean classes for the general public increased from 46 in 2000 to 321 in 2009 (Kuo 2011). The Taiwanese interest in learning Korean was also demonstrated by the growth in the number of people who took the Test of Proficiency in Korean (TOFIK), from 555 in 2005 to 1537 in 2009 (Kuo 2011). Such a trend also reflects the increase in academic research on the Korean Wave. *Mass Communication Research*, a leading peer-reviewed journal on communication in Taiwan, devoted a special issue to the Korean Wave in 2015. It found that between 2001 and 2014, a total of 75 journal articles and theses on the Korean Wave had been included in a major Taiwanese academic database (Piong et al. 2015).

This historical sketch shows that Japan and South Korea meant very different things to the people of Taiwan when their popular culture greatly influenced Taiwan in the 1990s and in the 2000s, respectively. Japan was either a former colonizer or a former war adversary—both framed in political terms. South Korea, instead, was a sibling nation that resembled Taiwan in many ways. Despite South Korea's similarity with Taiwan, the Taiwanese were not so familiar with its culture as compared to Japanese culture. If Japan-mania was rooted in Japan's continuous presence in Taiwan, the Korea Wave was a sudden success, which looked more invasive.

3 Japan: A Reflection of Taiwan's Opposing Nationalisms

Various scholars have explained Taiwan's Japan-mania from the perspectives of post-colonial theory and modernity theory. Iwabuchi (2002) argues that the historical legacy of Japanese colonization overdetermined the influx of Japanese cultural products in Taiwan in the 1990s. This phenomenon happened as the temporal gaps between the two countries diminished, creating a sense of coevalness and feelings of cultural proximity. Similarly, Ko (2004) argues that the formation of Japanese consumer culture in Taiwan reveals a Taiwanese desire for a modernity that is both represented by Japanese popular culture and reminiscent of colonial history. The haunting trauma from the colonial past and the desire for present mimicry trigger a colonial complex, making Japanese cultural invasion look dangerous. Focusing also on the two desires for Japan in post-colonial Taiwan—Japanese mass cultural representations and colonialism—Ching (2000a) offers a more sophisticated explanation by adding the factor of identity politics in Taiwan. In his view, the desire for Japanese colonialism is part of the fantasy needed to construct a unique Taiwanese subjectivity against Chinese nationalism instilled by the KMT regime. This consciousness that "the Taiwanese are not Chinese" emerged from the Japanese colonial practices of assimilation and imperialization. Therefore, he argues, the Taiwanese desire for Japan should not be reduced to the psychology of colonial dependency or nostalgia. Rather, it manifests a fantasy not only to participate in the globalization of consumerist culture but also to create an independent Taiwanese

nation. Ching's explanation helps us understand the complexity of media discourses on Japan in Taiwan, a country that is divided by divergent histories, collective memories and national identities. In this regard, Japan has served as the mirror of two opposing nationalisms nurtured in Taiwan under specific historical contingencies.

After the KMT regime retreated to Taiwan in 1949, it monopolized political power by implementing martial law and setting boundaries on what could be expressed in the media. Eventual reunification of the Chinese Mainland was its core ideology (Rawnsley 2000). Therefore, discourses of mainstream media in the early period were mostly in concert with the government's ideological doctrine. My study finds that, from the 1950s to the 1960s, the news media represented Japan with ambivalent and even contradictory attitudes. Politically, Taiwan needed to secure its international recognition and legitimate its claim of "recovering China." Japan's support and military cooperation with Taiwan against the Communists were crucial to achieving this end. Therefore, the media called on Japan to resume and maintain diplomatic relations with the ROC—especially through signing the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1951 and the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty in 1952. Still, from early on, the media worried that Japan would abandon Taiwan and build relations with the PRC. There were frequent reminders of how the ROC repaid Japan's war atrocities with kindness. Such discourse appeared more and more frequently as Japanese businesspeople and politicians became eager to trade with the PRC. Putting the trade issue aside, the media admired Japan as a model for modernization that Taiwan should follow. Contrary to promoting political and economic attachments to Japan, the media advocated de-Japanization on the cultural aspects Japan's colonial legacy in Taiwan was seen as a hindrance to the KMT's Sinicization project to consolidate Chinese nationalism. Speaking the Japanese language, singing Japanese songs and adopting Japanese names were seriously criticized as a symptom of servility and fawning over Japan. Despite this concern, the media refrained from criticizing Japan, especially regarding its war crimes.

Such self-restraint ended around 1972, when Japan severed its diplomatic ties with Taiwan. The media released heavy coverage of the anti-Japan protests and boycotts on the island and abroad, and reiterated the history of Japan's "invasion" of mainland China. Japan was accused of ingratitude in contrast with the ROC's benevolence. The nationalistic tones were replete in news coverage and editorials for years. In particular, discourse on the "Eight-Year War of Resistance"—referring to the second Sino-Japan War—repeatedly appeared on certain national holidays, especially October 25 when Taiwanese celebrated the liberation of Taiwan from Japanese rule. For example, a senior editor of *the United Daily News,* pen-named Yangtzu, frequently fomented the anti-Japan sentiment in his column. His article, titled "How can we not be hostile to Japan", emphasized:

> I don't have any Japanese friends. I am adamantly hostile to Japan. I analyzed myself and found that I am actually ambivalent towards Japan. I admire Japan's democratization and economic development; at the same time, I dislike Japan because of the hatred embedded in contemporary Sino-Japan history. I think such a hatred would not disappear for generations. But history can't explain it all. The Japanese people's sense of superiority and racism also anger me. (Yang 4 April 1983)

This paragraph reveals the complex feelings that Chinese nationalists in Taiwan had about Japan: resenting Japan's invasion of China (which caused the civil war that divided China) and envying its modernity. Historical conflicts between China and Japan were recurrently represented in the media, especially after a series of diplomatic frustrations of the ROC in the 1970s. Meanwhile, trade deficits with Japan, emerging from the 1950s, became a national "humiliation" that was intolerable. In other words, the economic problem was packaged into political animosity. With the public anger, the Taiwan government banned the import of more than 1500 commodities from Japan in 1980. This move, as recognized by the Taiwanese media, was futile in balancing bilateral trade but was admirable as a symbolic triumph. Despite the boycott, Japanese commodities started to flood the Taiwanese market through various legal or illegal channels. The Taiwanese addiction to Japanese goods was likened to smoking opium. The media concern centered on youth culture, worrying that the next generation would be Japanized. As early as 1984, a magazine article described young people's "Japan fever" as "appalling" (Lee 1 August 1984).

In the early 1990s, Japanese TV dramas spurred a new Japan-mania. On the one hand, the Taiwanese media were eager to cover all things Japanese and extol Japanese culture (Huang 2011). On the other hand, concerns about young people fawning over Japan continued. Media and academic attentions concentrated on the issue of cultural imperialism. The concept of post-colonialism was introduced to the discussions (Chen 2005). Taiwan's post-colonial mentality, instead of Sino-Japan history, was emphasized. In addition, political factors played a role in polarizing discourses on Japan. After the lifting of martial law in 1987, Taiwan went through dramatic changes in many regards, including political democratization, cultural localization (or Taiwanization) and media liberation. Curiously, Japan became a focus of dispute between the competing ideologies of Taiwanese nationalism and Chinese nationalism, which found their vocal representatives in different media institutions. Such polar opposites were intensified by some political controversies from the 1990s to the 2000s, such as sovereignty over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, fishery conflicts, compensation for comfort women, Japan's revision of history textbooks as well as Taiwanese and Japanese politicians' visits to the Yasukuni Shrine.

It should be noted that while young people's Japan-mania could be overlooked, as they were considered ignorant of history, the fawning by the older generation was perceived as an act of betrayal by some pro-unification media. For example, in 1995, 100 years after the signing of the Shimonoseki Treaty, a parade called "Saying Goodbye to China" was held in Taipei. This event was denounced by the *United Daily News* as shameful Japanization and de-Sinicization. Its editorial harshly criticized the event, writing:

> It is like the father of a family [i.e. the ROC] who was too timid and too feeble to protect his children from the bullying of an intrusive bandit [i.e. Japan]. Of course these children have the right to complain about their father. But it goes too far to treat the thief as their own father. This is a betrayal of one's own roots. (The United Daily News 18 April 1995)

Contrary to the discourse of accusing Japan as an "intrusive bandit," some media representations praised Japan's contribution to Taiwan, especially its economic engineering during the colonial period. Japan's positive image was compared to the KMT's control of Taiwan and the Communist "tyrannies" in China. An editorial in the *Apply Daily* argued that the voice of hostility toward Japan was marginal because:

> Taiwan became modernized during Japanese governance. The Governors assigned by the Japanese empire in Taiwan put Taiwanese people in their heart and kept peaceful relations with the Taiwanese. Besides, Taiwan was shielded from the bitter history of China because of Japanese rule … All these reasons explain why Taiwanese people do not hate Japanese. (The Apple Daily 26 September 2012)

These sentences over-glorify Japan's colonialism as a way to legitimize Taiwanese nationalism in its opposition to Chinese nationalism. Therefore, Japan, a country that has been most deeply involved in Taiwan's modern history, serves as an ambivalent signifier of domestic contentions about identity politics. The theme of modernity has been chiefly adopted by those espousing Taiwanese nationalism, but also utilized by those promoting Chinese nationalism to amplify Japan's "arrogance" towards its Asian neighbors. Japanese popular culture as a representative of Japan's modernity (Iwabuchi 2002) may strengthen polarized impressions of Japan and radicalize extreme discourses.

4 South Korea: Continuous Race for Economic Competition

Compared to Japan's symbolic role in Taiwan's identity politics, South Korea's involvement in the construction of Taiwan's national identity is less evident, yet equally influential. According to Kim (2005), the Korean Wave has transformed the image of South Korea, from an "impoverished country" to a country of "material brilliance" that matches the progress of Taiwan. Analyzed from the political perspective, Sung (2010) argues that the Korean Wave has improved the two countries' relations and helped construct a new image of South Korea in Taiwan that is confident, admirable and worth emulating. The assumption is that in the past, South Korean was considered less developed in the process of modernization than Taiwan. Both scholars affirm that the Korean Wave has had positive effects on reversing this perception of South Korea and enhancing mutual understanding. Nevertheless, some scholars emphasize nationalistic reactions to the Korean Wave. For example, Yang (2008) argues that, in addition to fan discourse that focuses on fan culture, public discourse on the Korean Wave in Taiwan centers on economic nationalism and cultural nationalism against South Korea. Similarly, Liu (2015) finds an increase in anti-Korea discourses about sports events in Taiwanese newspapers in the 2000s. He further argues that such a nationalistic discourse has resulted from the competition between the two countries in terms of the national economies in general and the entertainment industry in particular.

Does the Korean Wave enhance or diminish the Taiwanese perception of South Korea? Currently, two polarized discourses on South Korea coexist in Taiwan: fan culture and hate speech. These two kinds of discourses frequently ignite vicious debates between Koreaphiles and Korea detractors. Aside from the two extreme discourses, the tone of media discourse on South Korea has been attuned to themes relating to economic competition over a long time span. Stories concerning Taiwan's economic rivalry with South Korea started to appear in Taiwanese mainstream newspapers in the 1970s and became more notable after the 2000s, the heyday of the Korean Wave.

Nevertheless, in the 1950s and 1960s, news reportage concerning South Korea focused on political issues. During that period, South Korea was in alliance with Taiwan against the Communists. The country was presented in the Taiwanese media as a "faithful friend" and a "sibling nation" who shared the same destiny as Taiwan. The comradeship of the two was said to be as strong as "iron and steel" for their commitments in fighting the common enemy. Frequent visits by top Korean officials to Taiwan were covered heavily and characterized as a sign of close bonds. Among these, South Korean President Park Chung Hee's visit in 1966 was a huge media event. An article titled "When 'Brother Nations' meet together" by the *Free China Review* emphasizes:

> China [the ROC, i.e. Taiwan] and Korea are called "brother countries" by their own people. The Chinese and the Koreans are considered "brothers" because they are ethnologically akin to each other and have much in common (Liu 1 March 1966).

This article then went on to point out "many similarities" between Taiwan and South Korea, including ideographic writing, names, respect for the Confucian doctrine of filial piety, use of seals, traditional holidays and medicine. It should be noted that these similarities, according to the author, resulted from Chinese cultural influences on South Korea. In other words, South Korea was implied to be inferior to the ROC in the sibling relations.

The kind of positive reportage came to an abrupt end in 1970, when the Korean government issued a white paper that stated its ambition to become the most advanced economy among developing countries by the end of the decade. At that time, South Korea had experienced rapid economic growth, but still lagged behind Taiwan in most economic indices. An editorial in the *Economic Daily News* thus ridiculed South Korea's "unrealistic goal", while at the same time cautioning that Taiwan should speed up economic reform to secure its advantage over South Korea (The Economic Daily News 30 March 1970). Afterwards, the theme of economic competition between Taiwan and South Korea began to appear in the Taiwanese media, covering such broad issues as GDP, export, trade, industrial productivity and innovation.

As the race for the export market between the two countries intensified in the 1980s, South Korea had already been conceived of as the main economic contender to Taiwan. The media discourse followed the logic of state-led developmentalism, regarding economic development as the key policy imperative. Even the chaos caused by student movements and workers' strikes in South Korea were described

as a threat to economic prosperity and a lesson that Taiwan should learn from. Economically, South Korea was not only constructed as an imaginary enemy, but also a key point of reference. For example, in 1988, a short editorial in the *United Daily News* called on the government to "take South Korea as a model" and adopt the protectionist stand against the import of American poultry. The articles went on to ask: "If South Korea can, why can't Taiwan?" (The United Daily News 21 March 1988). Afterwards, this interrogative sentence was frequently used in the media to such an extent that it became an idiomatic expression in common usage among Taiwanese. It should be noted that, despite the economic contest, the Taiwanese media was constrained from bashing South Korea directly, mainly for the sake of maintaining bilateral relations. In 1992, South Korea formally severed its diplomatic ties with Taiwan in order to build relations with the PRC. Having been abandoned by other allies earlier, the behavior of South Korea was seen as predictable but intolerable. The feelings of political betrayal and continuing economic competition occupied newspaper pages. In particular, South Korea's economic progress in the 1990s was portrayed as a great threat to Taiwan. Even when South Korea was heavily struck by the financial crisis in 1997, how the country sustained these difficulties was framed as an example to learn from.

Fougner (2006) argues that in the international arena, the concept of competitiveness "only makes sense in the context of rivalry among two or more actors in supplying a product or service." In that sense, competitiveness is always relational. Being labeled as newly industrializing countries (NICs), both South Korea and Taiwan adopted an export-orientated policy for economic growth and national development as early as the 1960s. Since then, the two countries have competed fiercely with each other for the export market, from light industrial products in the early stages to electronic products in the present. The model of NICs, characterized by developmental state, is the original prototype of what Cerny (1997) called "competition state." With the advent of globalization, the ethos of competition state prevails, forcing different states to identity and strengthen their comparative advantages in the search for international competitiveness. Theories of competition state can inform our understanding of Taiwanese media reactions to the inflow of Korean popular culture.

At the turn of the last century, Korean popular culture began to make inroads in Taiwan. Meanwhile, economic competition between Taiwan and South Korea also entered a new stage as South Korea became a growing economic power internationally. Several "milestone" events that evidenced South Korea's moving ahead of Taiwan hit the Taiwanese newspaper headlines. In 2000, Taiwan started to suffer a trade deficit with South Korea. In 2003, Korea's GDP per capita exceeded that of Taiwan (see Table 13.1). In 2012, Korea advanced to being designated as a developed country, leaving Taiwan behind. In the arena of sports, South Korea has also shown great ambition. In addition to hosting the Olympic Games in 1988, Korea also hosted the Asian Games and the football World Cup Games in 2002. Therefore, the term "Korean Wave" in Taiwan refers not only to popular culture; rather, it signifies the all-inclusive power of South Korea on the global stage. In contrast, Taiwan has seemed to be losing its edge in every regard.

Table 13.1 Nominal GDP per capita of Taiwan, Japan and South Korea (selective years from 1953 to 2014)

Year	Taiwan (US$)	Japan (US$)	S. Korea (US$)
1953	178	226	133
1960	163	481	158
1965	229	938	110
1970	397	1965	286
1975	985	4510	625
1980	2389	9240	1735
1985	3315	11,369	2476
1990	8216	25,015	6501
1995	13,129	42,849	12,454
2000	14,941	37,635	12,215
2003	**14,120**	34,009	**14,606**
2005	16,532	36,005	19,096
2010	19,278	43,151	22,589
2014	22,648	36,390	28,505

Source: Searching results from *AREMOS Taiwan Economic Statistics Database*. Taiwan Economic Data Center. http://net.aremos.org.tw/

Table 13.2 Comparisons between Taiwan and South Korea in the Taiwanese media after 2000

Issue	Index of comparison
Economic	Economic growth rate, GNP or GDP, trade performance, economic plans, economic rankings, number of FTAs signed, average wage, competitiveness of high-tech industries
Political	Government efficiency, corruption, foreign policy
Cultural	Media industries (film, TV, games, creative industries), educational expenditure, academic publication, literacy rate
Others	Sports (baseball, taekwondo), life expectancy, birthrates

As a result, worries about South Korea's increasing competitiveness have become a dominant theme in the Taiwanese media in the new century, as seen by these headlines: "Will South Korea lead Taiwan soon?", "The Koreans are here", "Taiwan is defeated by South Korea", "Taiwan should not lose to South Korea." Among various arenas of competition, economic issues are the most visible, such as the comparisons of GNP and growth rate, as well as the performance of individual industries, exports and intellectual properties. When South Korea signed a free trade agreement (FTA) with another country, the prediction that Taiwan would be marginalized took up a lot of newspaper coverage. Nevertheless, aside from economic indices, coverage of all kinds of competition between the two countries has also emerged in the media, ranging from government efficiency, expenditure on education, English test scores, numbers of research papers published in international journals and even life expectancy (see Table 13.2). With the success of Korean popular culture, Korean media industries and government policy are also seriously investigated. By using the metaphor of

the sweet potato (referring to Taiwan) and *kimchi* (referring to South Korea), the tortoise and the hare, spiked shoes and slippers, and so on, the media has aroused anxiety that Taiwan could become the loser among the four Asian Tigers, not only in the economic race, but also on various fronts. In other words, competition against South Korea has become a total war that includes a variety of battlegrounds.

For example, in 2012, one cover story in *CommonWealth*, a financial magazine, cautioned its readers with the title that South Korea's economy is: "Leaving Taiwan in the Dust, at a Price." This article begins by asking readers: "Once a poor junior cousin to Taiwan, South Korea now exports twice as much as Taiwan. Why has Taiwan fallen behind?" Then the reporters compare Taiwan's ten economic indices with those of Korea, showing that Taiwan has become an underdog (Wu and Huang 18 October 2012). Such comparisons indicate that South Korea is Taiwan's economic foe. This was frankly expressed by another magazine cover story titled, "South's Korea's global soft power: Learning from your enemy." In the beginning of this story, the reporter emphasizes that "maybe you think that Korea is the most disliked player in the global competition, but no matter whether you adore her or hate her, you can feel the omnipresence of the Korean Wave. This is a war without bloodshed … Taiwan needs to learn from Korea" (Chen 6 January 2011). As such, the media framed South Korea as an enemy and "losing to Korea" as a national crisis (see also Yang 2008).

All of these comparisons show that Korea is the main object of emulation for Taiwan, especially after the "invasion" of the Korean Wave. The logic behind "If Korea can, why can't Taiwan?", frequently asked by the media, politicians and others, is as follows: "Taiwan's future depends on the race against Korea. It is a total war in which nothing should be left behind. It is a national humiliation to lose to Korea. The way to win is to learn from the enemy." In this way, discourse on Korea interpellates the Taiwanese to fight for their future by exceeding Korea in every aspect. The following sentences excerpted from a newspaper article, titled "Five things to learn from South Korea," are representative. It states:

> Most Taiwanese have complicated emotions toward Korea. They dislike the behavior of Korean athletes and referees, but they have to admit the progress Korea has achieved. Korea's advance only shows Taiwan's backwardness. Now Korea begins to rival Japan rather than the other East Asian Tigers. Taiwan can only catch up by learning from Korea. (Chen 29 March 2010)

These sentences epitomize the collective anxiety of Taiwanese that South Korea, once an underdog, will sooner or later leave Taiwan behind. Such anxiety is not only shown in media representation but also affects reality. In 2007, then-president of Taiwan, Chen Shui-bian, had to contend in his National Day Address that Taiwan still led Korea in many economic indices. He argued, "Taiwan is no less impressive, economically speaking, than South Korea, both nations qualifying as an 'Asian tiger' in terms of overall economic performance, government finance, domestic real purchasing power, and various competitiveness rankings" (Chen 10 October 2007).

Therefore, competition, especially in the economic arena, has been the dominant discourse of Taiwanese media regarding South Korea for the past few decades. In

the beginning, it positioned South Korea as a sibling nation that was inferior to Taiwan but was comparable in many aspects. Later on, as Taiwan gradually lost its competitive edge over South Korea, the media tended to frame South Korea as both an object of imitation and an enemy to be defeated simultaneously. This kind of discourse was amplified upon the rise of the Korean Wave in the 2000s, when the Taiwanese sense of superiority over South Korea was replaced by a collective anxiety about losing the game. It seems that, at least in terms of media representation, Taiwan can only recover from such a trauma by leading South Korea again.

Why is South Korea's competitiveness over Taiwan so traumatic to the Taiwanese? And why is it so important for Taiwan to lead South Korea again? What is the symbolic meaning of South Korea to the Taiwanese? The reasonable argument is that Taiwan's political and economic similarities with South Korea make the two countries comparable in many regards. South Korea's rising power in the global stage is a sharp contrast to Taiwan's political isolation, as the country has been excluded from participating in many international affairs. The myth of the economic miracle, once the major source of national pride, is also losing its charm because of economic downturn. South Korea's outperformance has been presented as a threat to Taiwan's survival and therefore, a target of nationalism. The prevalence of Korean popular culture in Taiwan, from TV dramas to pop music, is such a reminder that Taiwan will be further marginalized in the world community.

5 Conclusion: Transnational Cultural Flow and Identity Politics

This chapter has historically reviewed Taiwanese media discourses on Japan and South Korea. It finds that (1) Japan and South Korea have been represented with very different themes—polarized political discourses regarding Japan and discourses of economic competition against South Korea, and (2) the themes have been sustained for decades, but became significant following popular cultural inflows from the two countries. Japan has always reflected Taiwan's political nationalism, albeit with different meanings. Discourses of Chinese nationalism reiterated the war atrocities of Japan in China, framing the country as the No.1 political enemy of the ROC. Discourses of Taiwanese nationalism, in contrast, cozied up to Japan in the battle against Chinese nationalists, emphasizing Japan's contributions to Taiwan's modernization. In contrast, South Korea has been evaluated via economic terms for a long time, with a focus on its economic progress and competitiveness. Japan-mania in the 1990s and the Korean Wave in the 2000s increased media curiosity about the two countries, with explosive coverage of their fan culture and consumer culture. At the same time, polarized portrayals of Japan and discourse on the economic race against South Korea also occupy press coverage. The change in media discourse cannot be attributed to popular cultural inflows alone, since other domestic and international factors also matter. However, it reminds us that the

consequences of transnational cultural flows are complicated, as far as cultural identity is concerned.

First, as Otmazgin (2007) argues, popular cultural resources are not automatically converted to diplomatic power, and "soft power can sometimes be counterproductive" (p. 75). Popular culture may rebrand a country's image, it can also bring about some resistance. Living in the same media sphere is different from shaping a common identity. Meanwhile, we should not overstate the intensity of the resistance as a burning animosity or anti-foreign bias; rather, at least in the case of Taiwan, we can relate the resistance to domestic identity politics. Hall (1997) contends that "identity is always … a structured representation which only achieves its positive through the narrow eye of the negative. It has to go through the eye of the needle of the other before it can construct itself." Both Japan and South Korea, Taiwan's closest neighbors, symbolize the Other of Taiwan. The representations of the two countries reflect Taiwan's identity crisis: domestic identity conflicts and the anxiety for international recognition. Japan, as an ambivalent signifier, is utilized to legitimize Taiwanese or Chinese nationalism. South Korea's growing competitiveness in the race of globalization arouses Taiwanese collective anxiety that Taiwan will be further marginalized. Therefore, the so-called anti-Japanese or anti-Korean complex in Taiwan are not always nationalistic reactions. For example, Liu (2015) considers Taiwanese anti-Korean emotions that erupted over sports events as "festival nationalism," which is expressed as entertaining performances. Meanwhile, anti-Japanese sentiments are usually associated only with extreme Chinese nationalists rather than the general public in Taiwan.

Second, different media discourses on Japan and South Korea illustrate that local context matters in the face of foreign cultural influences. The particularity of Taiwan, as mentioned earlier, lies in its identity crisis. As a result, popular cultural flows from Japan and South Korea become sources of critical reflection within Taiwan. In addition, the historical context of East Asia also matters. Embracing the logic of competition state and linear modernization for national development, East Asian countries compete with each other for the progress of modernity. Japan has long been positioned by the Taiwanese as the frontrunner in terms of modernity in East Asia. Taiwanese nationalist discourse tends to venerate Japan's modernity, while Chinese nationalist discourse regards Japan's progress in modernization as a humiliation. Modernity represented in Japanese popular culture (Iwabuchi 2002; Ko 2004) is a reminder that Japan's leading role in East Asian modernization is uncontestable. In contrast, South Korea has been framed as the chief competitor to Taiwan as it marches toward modernization, owing to the similarity between the two nations. Therefore, the race against South Korea has been set as the key tone in media discourse. As South Korea caught up or even outpaced Taiwan in competition, the media has overemphasized South Korea's threat to Taiwan, including the rise of its popular culture. Discourse of modernization focuses on national competitiveness and disregards other important aspects of people's lives. Popular culture, utilized as a soft power strategy and facilitated by cultural nationalism (Ching 2000a; Cho 2011; Iwabuchi 2014; Joo 2011), also follows this logic of national competitiveness. This may also be a hindrance to mutual understanding in the context of East Asia.

Undoubtedly, transnational popular cultural flow is strengthening and clarifying the concept of East Asianness, as people in this region increasingly enjoy a convergent yet distinct media culture. Nevertheless, we should not exaggerate the cultural influences of this East Asian media sphere, as audience studies may rush to relate popular cultural flows to regional identity. Nor should we rush to conclude that non-audiences are immune from such regional media flows. This chapter is an endeavor to find a middle ground between the two perspectives by examining public opinions as represented in Taiwanese media. The findings show that Taiwanese respond to Japanese and Korean popular cultural inflows differently due to the identity politics of Taiwan and the country's historical relations with Japan and South Korea. This result indicates that the relationships between transnational cultural flows and cultural identity are not that straightforward. Exchanges of popular culture do not always bring about mutual understanding, neither do they necessarily lead to resistance. The heterogeneous consequences heavily depend on the historical and social context. A deeper understanding of the complexity of this issue is called for, as well as more empirical case studies on other Asian countries being conducted in the future.

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