Masahide Ishihara · Eiichi Hoshino
Yoko Fujita *Editors*

Self-determinable Development of Small Islands

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Preface

This volume is a product of the collective research project "Toward New Island Studies As an Academic Node Between Japan and East Asia/Oceania," which the International Institute for Okinawan Studies at the University of the Ryukyus (IIOS) has worked on for 5 years since 2013 and which is funded by the Japanese Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology. For this project, researchers and practitioners from various fields extracted common issues found in small island countries/territories, including Okinawa, analyzed present conditions with a multidisciplinary approach, and explored possible solutions to problems. In small island countries/territories, which are particularly susceptible to external influences, strategies to tackle externally-related issues are especially necessary. In existing approaches in the field of Island Studies, terms like islandness, remoteness, smallness, and vulnerability are often used to characterize islands. Because of these characterizations, existing research drew the conclusion that small island countries and territories have disadvantages compared to other regions. Moreover, small island regions have been placed at the "periphery" or in "subordinate" positions. These views are the result of seeing islands as inferior entities in a comparison with a continent or a mainland.

Another viewpoint shows submerged subjectivities of island regions in a globalized society through theorizations by big, advanced countries since the colonial era. Degradation of the natural environment from unsustainable use, degeneration of traditional cultures with the westernization of values, and over-dependency on external economic assistance have blocked possibilities for spontaneous development. They have often resulted from the choices that have been made based on the island regions' interest in seeking short-term economic benefits. As advanced countries suffer a global recession, there is no guarantee that economic assistance will continue for island regions in the future. Island regions need to know that the development of their regions has been constrained within a framework of aid projects by advanced countries. Island regions must have the power to discipline themselves and to explore ways for sustainable development.

Meanwhile, it is also important for big countries and developed countries to secure maritime transportation and accessibility to marine resources. Under the

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, steady development of island regions, exclusive economic zones promises security for commodity distribution and human mobility at a global level. Moreover, significant international issues – such as climate change and the conservation of cultural and biological diversity – have a deep connection with the small island regions. To properly maintain and manage the natural environment of precious island regions and to cope with the effects of global warming to protect the existence of islands, it is necessary for island regions to become politically stable. Therefore, the development of island regions' societies and economies is an important global issue for big, advanced countries as well.

That is to say, it is time for small island regions in the world, including Okinawa, to break away from an economic assistance dependency and to construct new relationships with continents, big countries, and mainlands. Rather than being reconciled to a comparative disadvantage with continents and big countries, the time has come for us to enhance the superiority built on the diverse and unique environments, cultures, and history. It is time for all subjects to participate, collaborate, and aim at creating self-determining and sustainable societies.

This volume has been compiled to explore the contemporary issues of island regions from various disciplinary fields, such as political science, international relations, economics, sociology, human geography, linguistics, ocean policy, and history.

It consists of the following;

Part I: Okinawa Agenda aims to present problems from the Japanese island prefecture of Okinawa to the world's island regions that share similar challenges. It includes articles about international affairs and strategies of the Ryukyu Kingdom from the fourteenth to nineteenth centuries, human security in Okinawa under the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, Okinawan diasporic communities originateing from and centered on an island, and revitalization and succession of Ryukyuan languages that were designated as endangered by UNESCO.

Part II: International Context explores placements of island regions from the perspectives of international relations and international politics with three articles. Topics include the rise of China in Oceania, an analysis of diplomatic relations between Japan, Korea and China over islands in East Asia, and the strategies of Taiwan and the United States regarding the East and South China Sea.

Part III: Economic and Social Development consists of an article about the economic development of small island regions in globalization, an economic analysis of the vulnerabilities of island regions from international tourism, and an article that shows the proactive use of communication technology by Pacific Islanders for development as part of the history of telecommunications in the twentieth century.

Part IV: Ocean Policies includes three chapters that examine the ocean and island policies of big countries such as Australia, Japan, and the United States. The chapters reflect island regions from the perspective of continents and show new challenges over the vast oceans around islands.

Part V: Indigenous Languages explores the theme of languages, which comprise the base of islanders' identity. The current situations of and efforts regarding three endangered traditional languages – Ainu, Chamorro, and Welsh – reveal one of the contemporary challenges of island culture.

Because island regions are isolated from others by the ocean, they have diverse and unique natural environments, cultures, histories, and social backgrounds. In other words, island regions are like a museum of diversity and uniqueness in the world. Since they have diverse backgrounds, there are various ideas about the development of indevidual region. Among the many island regions, one independent country is the Republic of Palau in Micronesia. The key industry of this country is tourism, which depends on the mixed World Heritage of its nature's bounty and its traditional culture. Since 2014, with the rapid increase of tourist groups from China, the economy of Palau has rapidly been becoming structured to depend solely on China. Moreover, the influx of tourist groups, who do not know the proper ways of enjoying and appreciating nature, has damaged the natural environment that Palauan people cherish. Rapid change in 1 year is transforming the small country with a population of less than 20,000. Many Palauan people are concerned that this change will not lead to favorable development for Palau and that the natural environment will suffer damage. To overcome this situation immediately, the Palauan government has set up a bold strategy to reduce chartered flights from China and has tried to return to a sustainable economy without getting swayed by temporary benefits. In March 2015, the President of the Republic of Palau, Tommy Remengesau, conducted an interview with a reporter. After he had noted that he does not mean to deny visits from any particular country, he stated his resolution about this situation. As a statement that looked ahead to the future of small island regions with subjectivity and autonomy, we would like to conclude this preface with his statement:

> Do we want to control growth, or do we want growth to control us? It will be irresponsible for me as a leader if this trend continues. I am not only looking at the present, but as a leader, I am looking after tomorrow.
>
> By Tommy Remengesau, the President of the Republic of Palau

Okinawa, Japan

Masahide Ishihara
Eiichi Hoshino
Yoko Fujita

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First, the editors would like to express our appreciation to all the contributing authors to this book, all the speakers and participants in the symposiums, workshops and the IIOS Lecture Series conducted by the research project, "Toward New Island Studie As an Academic Node Between Japan and East Asia/Oceania." We have benefited for these 5 years from collaborating with those distinguished experts working for the development of small islands with enthusiasm. Also, we thank the Japanese Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology and University of the Ryukyus for their financial support.

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Part I
Okinawa Agenda

Chapter 1
US Military Bases and Human Security in Okinawa

Eiichi Hoshino

1.1 Introduction

> I shall feel secure when I know that I can walk the streets at night without being raped.[1]
>
> I resent continuing to live in fear of the U.S. soldiers, in fear of incidents, exposed to danger [. . .] Please, give us back a peaceful Okinawa. Please, give us back our peaceful island without military forces, and without tragedy.[2]
>
> We, people of Okinawa, particularly women, are outraged at another heinous crime committed by a U.S. serviceman on February 10th, 2008. We have been imposed the burden of hosting U.S. military and bases. For long 62 years, the lives of women and children in Okinawa have been made insecure by the presence of the U.S. military and bases.[3]

The first quote is the voice of a fourth year primary school pupil from Ghana, which was published in the United Nations Development Programme's *Human Development Report 1994*. This citation brings to mind the real-life experiences of people living with unease following the 1995 Okinawa Rape Case, the comparatively little-known yet numerous sexual offenses committed by US soldiers, and the issues and incidents caused by military bases.

The second quote is a statement of determination from a third year high school student at a convention for Okinawan citizens who condemned the rape of a schoolgirl by US soldiers and demanded SOFA revision; the convention was held

---

[1] UNDP (1994: 23).

[2] "Mo iya, heiwa na shima wo kaeshite [Enough already: give back our peaceful island]" (http://tamutamu2011.kuronowish.com/heiwanasimawokaesite.htm) (Accessed October 31, 2012).

[3] OWAAMV (2008).

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in 1995 in Ginowan Seaside Park and saw 85,000 participants. The third citation is the "written request for removal of military forces and objection to sexual violence toward young girls committed by marines" from Okinawa Women Act Against Military Violence (OWAAMV), in response to the rape of a schoolgirl in 2008.

"Human security" is an issue in two such distant places as Ghana and Okinawa. The concept of "human security" is generally used in the context of the economic and social development in developing nations; this chapter, however, applies it to a peripheral region of a developed nation. If, due to state policy, citizens are not able to benefit from political and economic rights enjoyed in other regions, it is the state that is the cause of this "insecurity" (circumstances in which security is not guaranteed).

Andrew Linklater indicates three cases in which a state becomes a threat to the security of the people, one of which being where immigrants, minorities, and original inhabitants may not receive protection according to the rule of law or where they are not granted the political, economic, or social rights enjoyed by regular members of the state or territory (Linklater 2005: p. 116).

This chapter takes the concept of "human security" as its lead and describes the "insecurity" brought to Okinawan society by the presence of US military bases. The chapter clarifies how Okinawan society, after the region's return to the mainland, has found escape from "insecurity" difficult through deepened dependence on "Promotion and Development" frameworks.[4]

1.2 Lack of Democracy, Inequality, or Discrimination?

The voices of Okinawa do not reach mainland Japan. "The voices of Okinawa" here are the opinions and demands shared by many Okinawan citizens concerning the US military bases located in Okinawa: "gradual reduction of US military bases," "revision of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA)," "returning the Futenma base

---

[4] This chapter is a revision of a report from the Peace Studies Association of Japan (PSAJ) Spring Conference, which was held at Okinawa University in June 2012. Hiroyuki Tosa, the planning chief of the Conference, described the "essence" of the event as follows. "As may be seen in matters such as the issue of relocating the Futenma military base in Okinawa and the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant incident in Fukushima, there is an intensification of the assignment of restraints from central bodies to regional areas and of accompanying issues such as biased allocation of risk; as a result, regional societies are being left in situations whereby their [very] peace and harmony are under threat. Meanwhile, regional societies have been divided following many years of skillful pork-barrel politics, and their powers of resistance have been weakened for a long time. This conference will reflect upon the structures and processes which threaten peace in regional areas, all the while considering the present situation whereby the state occasionally threatens regional peace and society becomes increasingly polarized. In addition, we will also examine, from multiple perspectives, possibilities for creating and constructing harmony from grassroots levels."

[to Okinawa]," "opposition to the construction of a new base in Henoko," and "relocating the Futenma base outside of Okinawa prefecture." [5]

In a 1996 poll of Okinawan citizens, "gradual reduction of US military bases" and "revision of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA)" received 89 % of votes from participants that is equivalent to 53 % of the electorate.

Regardless of the peculiar addition of a choice between "conditional" and "unconditional," in a 1997 poll of Nago City, residents who chose "opposition to the construction of a new base in Henoko" were the majority. It is reported in a joint *Ryukyu Shimpo–Mainichi Shimbun* public opinion poll (2012) that "opposition to the construction of a new base in Henoko" among Okinawan citizens reached 89 %.[6] Susumu Inamine, who was opposed to new base construction, was reelected in the 2014 Nago City mayoral election; the prefectural governor elections saw the appearance of Takeshi Onaga, who appealed for "all-Okinawa" (i.e., cooperation between conservatives and progressives) opposition to new base construction; in Lower House elections the following month, also, the LDP, which supported "reduction of burdens [for hosting US military forces stationed in Japan] through relocation within Okinawa," saw considerable losses in the prefecture's four single-seat constituencies.

Yet, an *Okinawa Times* journalist wrote that a national newspaper journalist had commented that "Okinawa is selfish for not accepting [the construction of] Henoko [base] whilst still receiving money." "In Tokyo," the *Okinawa Times* journalist writes, "the issue of military bases in Okinawa is discussed in terms of 'money' and Promotion schemes. Subsidies according to burdens; numerous Promotion schemes. The sense of it being considered natural that Okinawa would submit to current and future burdens because money is being pumped in was greater than can be imagined" (Hiyane 2012).

An editorial in the *Okinawa Times* also points this out: "In the past 40 years, is it not now that the psychological distance between Okinawa and mainland Japan is at its greatest? A '27th parallel of the heart' is rising on the military base issue" (*Okinawa Times*, May 15, 2012). In response to the question "Do you think mainlanders understand Okinawa?" in the previously mentioned joint *Ryukyu Shimpo–Mainichi Shimbun* public opinion poll, 22 % of respondents said "Yes, they understand," while 63 % chose "I don't think so."

---

[5] In 1995, base reduction and SOFA revision was shared hopes among Okinawan citizens. In 2004, early decommission and return of Futenma became widely acknowledged, followed by opposition to construction of a new base in Henoko and opposition to relocation within Okinawa in 2006. Around 2009, desire for the base's relocation outside of Okinawa and/or Japan exceeded 80 % in public opinion polls.

[6] The method used in the joint *Ryukyu Shimpo–Mainichi Shimbun* public opinion poll is as follows. Survey method: the survey was conducted over 2 days between May 5 and 6 and targeted men and women over 20 years old using RDD (random digit dialing), whereby telephone numbers are generated and dialed at random by computer. The number of households reached with a member of the electorate present totaled 1,408; responses were received from 828 of these households. A *Mainichi Shimbun* national survey was also conducted on the same day. Responses from 1035 people out of 1580 households were obtained.

Perhaps it is antipathy—“the anti-base movement is for the sake of reeling in money” or “there isn’t the time to entertain Okinawa’s emotional, unrealistic pacifism”—or simple disinterest that is preventing the voices of Okinawa being heard.

Therefore, what would make “the voices of Okinawa” be heard? Or what sort of language—what words? How about democracy, inequality, and discrimination?

At the 40th anniversary ceremony of the return of Okinawa, former Development Bureau Chief Kousuke Uehara appealed to “democracy.” “Lastly, I would like to say this to Prime Minister Noda, to Mr. Ambassador Roos, and to the Emperor and Empress. The foundation of a democratic society is respect for public opinion. Why does neither government not pay more respect to the earnest voices of Okinawan citizens?”[7] This statement, however, was not featured significantly outside of local media.

According to the joint public opinion poll above, in response to the question, “Do you think it is unfair that over 70 % of the US military bases in Japan are currently concentrated in Okinawa?,” 69 % of respondents in Okinawa answered “I think it is unfair”; meanwhile, only 33 % of respondents across Japan answered that they agreed (see Fig. 1.1).

A joint *Okinawa Times–Asahi Shimbun* public opinion poll (2012) posed the following question: “Is it discrimination against Okinawa by the mainland that US bases in Okinawa have not been reduced?” Responses to this question, too, differed greatly between Okinawa and the other part of Japan. As seen in Fig. 1.2, half of respondents in Okinawa, yet only 29 % of respondents across Japan, answered “That is discrimination.”[8]

Thus, there is no guarantee that “the voices of Okinawa” will be heard if the situation is described anew with the phrase “human security” and appeals made accordingly. There are, however, things that become clear by using this term.

---

[7] “(Okinawa fukki 40-nen shiten) Uehara moto-kaihatsu-cho chokan no shiji zenbun [40th anniversary of Okinawa’s return: complete version of former Development Bureau Chief Uehara’s address]” in *Asahi Digital* (http://digital.asahi.com/articles/SEB201205150103.html) (Accessed October 31, 2012).

[8] The method used in the joint *Okinawa Times–Asahi Shimbun* public opinion poll is as follows. Survey method: the survey was conducted over 2 days between April 21 and 22 and targeted members of the electorate within Okinawa Prefecture and across Japan using RDD (random digit dialing), whereby telephone numbers are generated and dialed at random by computer. Okinawa Prefecture survey: 1,331 cases of numbers used by households; 785 usable responses, 59 % response rate. Japan nationwide survey: 3,170 cases of numbers used by households; 1565 usable responses, 49 % response rate.



Fig. 1.1 "Do you think it is unfair that over 70 % of the US military bases in Japan are currently concentrated in Okinawa?" (Source: Joint *Ryukyu Shimpo–Mainichi Shimbun* public opinion poll)



Fig. 1.2 "Is it discrimination against Okinawa by the mainland that US bases in Okinawa have not been reduced?" (Source: Joint *Okinawa Times–Asahi Shimbun* public opinion poll)

1.3 "Human Security" Approach

1.3.1 Concept of "Human Security"

According to the "Human Development Report 1994" (UNDP 1994), the concept of security has long been interpreted narrowly—that is, "protecting territory from external aggression." This was a concept related more to nation-states, rather than to people. It came to be interpreted more broadly, however; it came to include protecting individuals and groups from threats such as famine, disease, and political instability and also threats that would suddenly disrupt daily life. The significance of this swelled with contexts such as the recognition, following the end of the Cold War, of the turning point facing state-centric perspectives on security and with the awareness, accompanying globalization, of the severe circumstances faced by the economic societies of the poorest nations in Africa and elsewhere.

When seeking to fundamentally change thinking on security from focusing on states to focusing on people, and when the key interest is in how to remove factors which threaten human security, rather than military threats from hostile states, it is necessary to look instead at various types of securities and threats, such as socio-economic conditions, political conditions, food supplies, health and hygiene, the environment, communities, and individuals. The "Human Development Report 1994" lists the factors which threaten human security through the following seven items: economy (unemployment, poor working conditions, poverty), food supply (unequal distribution), health (disease, hygiene), environment (damage), individuals (torture, war, opposition to minorities, crime, daily violence, rape, domestic violence, child abuse, drugs, suicide, deterioration in public order), community (societal splits, oppression of indigenous populations), and politics (violation of human rights, political oppression). Attention is also drawn to the following global issues as factors that threaten human security across the world: population increase, unequal economic opportunities, excessive international relocation of people (emigrants, refugees), environmental damage, manufacture and trade of drugs, and international terrorism.

"Is this not," questions Ryuhei Hatsuse (2011), "a rehash of old concepts?" Certainly, this concept does feature aspects both of the tradition of human rights theory (freedom from threat), which sees the state as the source of threat to the security of individuals, and the development argument (freedom from poverty), which sees the state as an agent that stimulates the security of individuals; these aspects could be seen in various UN policy documents. Makoto Katsumata displays the following, coolheaded view: "In discussions of international society—particularly the foreign policy, and aid policy of Europe, the U.S. and Japan—freedom from fear and poverty has come to be discussed once more, this time with the term 'human security'" (Katsumata 2001: p. 2).

There is also the critical view that the concept of "human security" is not only a "rehash" but also an "ideology of control" whereby the UN and developed nations help the misery of developing states brought about by economic globalization (Tosa 2001). Tetsuaki Shigemitsu, for instance, acknowledges that it is a concept convenient for existing order and control: "[...] an oppressive, restricting, negative ideology of control steeped in ill-intention, which denies the ability and possibility of target (other) societies to generate change inherently, and seeks to fix the people residing in these regions as being passive and low-ranked, assumed as deficient and lacking" (Shigemitsu 2001: p. 260).

Meanwhile, while recognizing the ideology of the "human security" concept, Hatsuse expresses sympathy with the "coolheaded affirmation" that it is "a helpful keyword which various positions seek to use as a banner" (Mushanokoji 2001: i). "It is [a keyword] which, based on the principle of focusing on the weak (women, indigenous peoples, subsistence agriculture, workers, people subject to discrimination), aims to remove insecurity (fear and deficiency) in real, everyday life, to establish security for multiple, state and non-state objectives, and seeks to form ‘common human security’ amongst different states, religions, cultures, and people with differing senses of safety” (Hatsuse 2011: p. 33).

Then, how could we compare and contrast this concept of “human security” with that of “national security”?

1.3.2 “Human Security” and “State Security”

In *Human Security Now*, a report by the UN Commission on Human Security joint-chaired by Amartya Sen and Sadako Ogata, “human security” is defined as “[protecting] the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and human fulfillment” (Commission on Human Security 2003: p. 4).

Further, the report sees “human security” as complementing “state security” and introduces the following four viewpoints: “its concern is the individual and the community rather than the state,” “menaces to people’s security include threats and conditions that have not always been classified as threats to state security,” “the range of actors is expanded beyond the state alone,” and “achieving human security includes not just protecting people but also empowering people to fend for themselves” (Commission on Human Security 2003: p. 4).

Hatsuse also introduces the position of addressing human security with state security as a pretext (Ueda 2000). “[This view] argues that, whilst relying on Japan–US security arrangements and the US nuclear deterrent, Japan ‘goes on to grapple with’ the ‘various threats that pose danger to human survival, livelihood and dignity’ for people of the world” (Hatsuse 2011: p. 34). Additionally, there is also the view that “the human security is neither an antithesis of nor a substitute for the state security which provides safety for the state and the majority of citizens” (Kurusu 1998: p. 99).

Naturally, there are also viewpoints that human security and state security are fundamentally opposed and contradictory. Barry Buzan (1983) says that individuals are in various ways confronted with threats from states and indicates that individuals may also be exposed to threat as a result of their state’s own external behavior and/or mutual interaction with other states in global systems.

If human security and state security contradict each other, taking a step further, we could say that the concept of “human security” harbors potential as an “principle of resistance” (Ohshiba 2004: p. 299). Hatsuse agrees with Mushanokoji’s viewpoint—“a state must guarantee safety of the state whilst guaranteeing the safety of the people” (Mushanokoji 1999: p. 11)—and considers his words a statement of the need to pursue “the safety of an infant being punished by economic sanctions, for instance, or safety which seeks to prevent citizens from being injured or dying following military intervention” (Hatsuse 2011: p. 35).

From such perspectives, it is by no means inappropriate to consider Okinawa using the concept of “human security.”

1.3.3 “Human Security” and Okinawa

The new approach toward human-centric, pluralistic security visible in the *Human Development Report 1994* and *Human Security Now* by Ogata and Sen has also come to occupy an important place in the Japanese government’s foreign policy. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, human security is “implementation of human-focused approaches which seek to protect people from wide-reaching and serious threats to human survival, livelihood, and dignity and to realize the rich potential of the people” (MOFA 2011).

As a concrete expression of this implementation, the Japanese government has established and contributes to the UN “Trust Fund for Human Security.” It is intended to “translate the concept of human security into concrete activities implemented by UN agencies through supporting projects that address diverse threats including poverty, environmental degradation, conflicts, landmines, refugee problems, illicit drugs and infectious diseases such as HIV/AIDS, thus to secure people’s lives, livelihoods and dignity in the real world,” and it seeks to “primarily [set] its focus on each individual, [and support] projects designed to protect the people from the abovementioned threats and empower those people to enhance their resilience” (MOFA 2011).

In 1999, the Japanese government contributed 500 million yen and established the Fund; from that time until 2013, a total of 42.8 billion yen has been contributed and 217 projects implemented. From these figures, the Japanese government appears earnest about realizing “freedom from fear” and “freedom from want” in developing nations. Yet is this “favorable view” toward the peoples of developing nations also being directed toward the people of Okinawa?

Applying the concept of “human security” to Okinawa is not a novel undertaking. Ryuhei Hatsuse (2011), Kinhide Mushanokoji (2002), Ryo Ohshiba (2004), and Motoki Higa (2007) have mentioned “Okinawa” in their work on human security. Hatsuse refers to the Okinawa military base issue as “an example of citizen security being domestically distributed unfairly by region” and places this in the context of human security: “the safety of people residing in areas surrounding the bases is unstable on a daily basis” (Hatsuse 2011: p. 36).

Mushanokoji addressed an “open letter regarding human security” (*Sekai*, May 2002) to Ogata and Sen, the joint chiefs of the UN Independent Commission on “Human Security.” In this letter, the “gender-related aspect of activity which confronts militarization and guards human security” is indicated as the third gender-related aspect of “human security”; the 1995 schoolgirl rape case and OWAAMV are raised, and connections to the concept of “human security” are discussed clearly.

Further, the following statement by Ohshiba (2004: p. 299) is thought-provoking in the context of these arguments:

> In reality, in fact, we often see attempts to guarantee state security through sacrificing the human security of certain groups. The Japan–US Security Treaty, for example, exposes the security of the Okinawa region to great crisis: whilst state security may be guaranteed, in

> Okinawa, where there are numerous U.S. Military bases, there are crimes committed by U.S. soldiers which damage human security for the people of Okinawa; furthermore, it is also highly possible that the U.S. Military bases may become the target of attacks in times of emergency. Is not the concept of human security a clear expression of a principle which is made possible by people who have come to be sacrificed following state security policy (minorities, in many cases) lodging objections against the state—that is, a principle of resistance?

Then, what sort of effects do the state security policy choices made by the Japanese government have on the conditions of "human security" in Okinawa?

1.4 The "Human Security" Approach to the US Military Base Issues

Needless to say, the Japanese government's state security choices cause the US military bases to be concentrated in Okinawa. Of the facilities for US military use in Japan, 74 % are concentrated within Okinawa Prefecture, which composes less than 1 % of the physical area of the entire country. These facilities occupy 10 % of the area of the prefecture and around 20 % of the area of the main island of Okinawa. Further, 60 % of US military personnel in Japan are stationed in Okinawa, 60 % of which belong to the Marines.

The purpose of this section is to clarify what sort of impact these circumstances are having on the conditions of human security in Okinawa. Faced with the reality of "human insecurity"—soldier and military crime typified by the 1995 schoolgirl rape case, incidents brought about by military exercises such as the helicopter crash at Okinawa International University, and damage to daily living environments indicated by lawsuits concerning noise pollution from Kadena Air Force Base and Futenma Marine Corps Airfield—the majority of Okinawa has come to demand "gradual reduction of the US military bases," "revision of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA)," and concrete measures for reducing burdens for accommodating military facilities.

1.4.1 The Issues of US Military Bases: Crime

In October 2012, amidst strong opposition to the deployment of Osprey aircraft, another schoolgirl gang rape incident occurred in Okinawa. A girl was sexually assaulted on her way home by two US navy soldiers, who were arrested on suspicion of group rape. Just that August, there had been a case of forced indecent assault by a member of the US Marines. An editorial in the *Okinawa Times* wrote, "The War ended 67 years ago—where, exactly, is there a region in which women's rights have been threatened for such a long period?" (*Okinawa Times*, October 18, 2012).



Fig. 1.3 Change in numbers of criminal arrests made due to US military personnel and cases of brutal crimes, including rape (Data: Okinawa Prefectural Governor's Office 2014)

According to Okinawa Prefectural Police statistics quoted in *Okinawa's US Military and JSDF Bases* (Okinawa Prefectural Governor's Office 2014), criminal arrests made due to US military personnel between 1972 and 2013 amount to 5,833 cases—570 of which being brutal crimes, including rape, and 1050 of which being violent crimes. These crimes have a considerable impact on the lives, livelihoods, and property of the prefecture's residents.

As can be seen in Fig. 1.3, while the number of crimes has fallen, severe crimes are still occurring.

Police statistics regarding conditions before the reversion of Okinawa in 1972 are inadequate, and the actual circumstances are unclear. Even post-reversion, the real extent of the problem is not fully understood, as it is only the number of cases actually reported to the police that is made public. The Okinawa Women Act Against Military Violence (OWAAMV 2010) carefully searched for records and collated lists in *sexual crimes against women committed by US soldiers in Okinawa* (*April 1945–August 2010*). According to OWAAMV's investigation, the number of rape cases (including attempts) by 2010 was 130, and the number of people involved was 147 (Miyagi 2010). It was reported in a 2010 investigation by the US Department of Defense that around 80 % of sexual assaults that occur within bases go undeclared (*Ryukyu Shimpo*, July 6, 2012); taking into consideration the existence of victims who do not undertake litigation, these figures for Okinawa should perhaps be nothing more than the tip of the iceberg.

According to documents made public in May 2008, the Japanese and US governments agreed in 1953 to overlook crimes by US military personnel if they were not serious. Indeed, according to the statistics for the following 5 years, 97 % of cases related to US soldiers ended without indictment. In a 2001 paper concerning the Japan–US Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), Dale Sonnenberg (International Law Department of the US Military in Japan) touches upon this issue and states that the consent was not public, but the Japanese side even today adheres to the agreement (*Ryukyu Shimpo*, October 22, 2008).

1.4.2 The Issues of US Military Bases: Accidents

In September 2012, a prefectural gathering was held in opposition to the deployment in Okinawa of new-model US military transport aircraft Osprey, and tens of thousands of participants from across Japan gathered in Ginowan Seaside Park. Acknowledging suspicions that the new-model transport aircraft to be deployed at Futenma Marine Corps Base is a "structurally flawed machine," the US Secretary of Defense referred to it as "the world's most dangerous base." One certainly recalls the children who died at Miyamori Elementary School in the past and, in recent years, the accident at Okinawa International University.

According to Okinawa Prefecture's *Okinawa's US Military and JSDF Bases* (Okinawa Prefectural Governor's Office 2014), there had been 497 accidents involving US military aircraft (43 of which being crashes) since Okinawa was returned to Japan until the present time of December 2009. Of these, as many as 135 incidents occurred outside of bases, causing great unrest among the citizens of Okinawa, not to mention those residing in surrounding areas. As can be seen in Fig. 1.4, even in the 2000s, between 10 and 60 cases of aircraft-related accidents occur each year, setting the scene for the rise of the movement opposing the Osprey deployment.

Figure 1.5 applies restrictions used for the areas surrounding bases in the United States to the Futenma base in Okinawa. Two areas at the end of runway indicate the Clear Zone (no-access area) in which no sort of building may be built. In Ginowan City, there is a considerable amount of housing, including schools and hospitals, built in these areas. It is perhaps unsurprising that Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, when he observed the area from above, commented that "it is a miracle that accidents don't occur."

In August 2004, there was an accident in which a US military CH-53D helicopter crashed into the Okinawa International University campus, causing great shock to the prefecture's citizens. An *Okinawa Times* editorial pointed out important issues that went beyond the damage from the accident: "Following the helicopter crash inside the Okinawa International University campus, the U.S. Military initially



Fig. 1.4 Change in accidents involving US military aircraft since Okinawa was returned to Japan (Data: Okinawa Prefectural Governor's Office 2014)

evicted local police and fire squads, and took control of the site. Regardless of the rules of SOFA, this is a clear infringement of sovereign rights" (*Okinawa Times*, May 3, 2012).

As seen in Fig. 1.4, the accidents were not only those involving aircraft. In December 2008, a M33 bullet was found in the number plate of a household vehicle parked at a private home near Camp Hansen in Igei Ward, Kin Town. The Okinawa Defense Bureau made appeals for refraining from exercises using real bullets, but they went unheard. Regardless of the fact that training at a distance of a few hundred meters from private homes results in such accidents occurring and that it is easy to imagine the risk of lives being taken, the Marine Corps claim that practice with actual ammunition is necessary for the protection of Japan. The *Ryukyu Shimpo* quotes the words of an Igei Ward Committee member: "The U.S. Military creates a shooting range which would not be possible in its own country, claiming it as 'safe' in Okinawa, and thus live ammunition is fired. Once more, bullets have come flying from the training ground, yet the truth is shrouded in mystery. Are the lives of Americans and of us Okinawans different in importance?" (*Ryukyu Shimpo*, December 2008).


Ginowan City
Child Center [ARAGUSUKU]
新城児童センター
普天間第2小学校
Futenma Daini Elementary School
住宅地域
普天間第二小学校
Housing Area [OJYANA]
住宅地域（大謝名区）
住宅地域（いすの木通り）
Housing Area [ARAGUSUKU]
住宅地域
上大謝名公民館
Community Center [UEOJYANA]
クリアゾーン内には
公共施設・保育所・病院が18箇所、
住宅　約800戸
約3,600人余の住民が居住している
Within the Clear Zone there are: 18 nursery schools, hospitals, and public facilities; approximately 800 households; a little over 3,600 residents.

Fig. 1.5 Futenma Airbase Clear Zone (no-access area) (Source: "Ginowa Homepage" http://www.city.ginowan.okinawa.jp/DAT/LIB/WEB/1/06_07_.pdf. Accessed March 2, 2015)

1.4.3 The Issues of US Military Bases: Noise Pollution, Living Environment

In the areas surrounding Kadena and Futenma Airports, there is, as ever, noise pollution from aircraft that exceeds the environmental standard levels determined by the Ministry of Environment (MOE). There are concerns about the effects on the daily lives and health of the areas' residents. Education is also being affected, with, for example, lessons frequently being interrupted at schools near the bases. Figure 1.6 contains data of noise pollution records for Kadena (top) and Futenma (bottom). Both exceed the permissible limit of 70 in WECPNL, and despite confirmation of these circumstances as illegal through a lawsuit for "roaring" noise pollution, corrective measures have not been taken.

In February 2009, the Fukuoka High Court (Naha) ordered the State to pay 560 million yen in compensation to the 5,500 plaintiffs in the Kadena "Roaring" Noise Pollution case. The judgment, however, omitted suspension of flights in the



Fig. 1.6 Change in noise pollution levels in Kadena and Futenma (Source: Okinawa Prefectural Governor's Office 2013)

early morning and late at night, stating that there was already judicial precedent in the Supreme Court of the Japanese government being unable to interfere with US military flight drills.[9]

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[9] According to SOFA Article 18, the United States pays 75 % of these fees, and the Japanese government pays the remainder. However, the US government declares that it is the responsibility of the Japanese government and will not pay; the Japanese side, therefore, currently pays the entire amount.



Fig. 1.7 "What do you think should be done about the US bases within Okinawa Prefecture in the future?" (Source: Joint *Okinawa Times–Asahi Shimbun* public opinion poll)

Above is an overview of the effects of the excessive US military presence in Okinawa on the situations of "human security," paying particular attention to crime, accidents, noise pollution, and living environment. In light of such circumstances, it is no surprise that, as seen in Fig. 1.7, negative opinions formed the majority of responses when residents of the prefecture were asked "What do you think should be done about the US bases within Okinawa Prefecture in the future?": 49 % answered with "reduction" and 37 % with "complete removal" (Joint Okinawa Times-Asahi Shimbun Public Opinion Poll 2012).

There would also be viewpoints reluctant to consider these circumstances as severe in the same sense and using the same words as the severe states of poverty and starvation faced by developing nations.[10]

In other words, can these situations in Okinawa be termed a "human security" issue?

1.4.4 *"Human Security" Issues?*

A case can easily be made for referring to the circumstances in Okinawa as a "human security" issue. Three points will be used to make this argument.

"Freedom from fear," or freedom from insecurity or fright, will first be examined. Certainly, the concept of "human security" according to those such as the

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[10] Tetsuo Umemura (2003) ranks Okinawa among other nations across the world using the UNDP Human Development Index (HDI). According to Umemura, the living standards ranking of Okinawa is approximately 20 out of 173 states, at the same level as Italy and Spain; Okinawa is classified as a UNDP state with a high level of human development. The income per capita for Okinawa residents was compared with the income per capita for citizens of the world in 2009, also; Okinawa ranked twentieth, between Spain and Greece, and is classified as a high-income state according to World Bank classification.

UNDP and the Japanese government emphasize "freedom from want," and in this sense, it is difficult to compare the situations in Okinawa with those in developing nations. However, among the "human security" issues that occur in the "periphery" of developed nations, greater numbers of those involving freedom from insecurity or fright occur than those involving freedom from want; both of these "fears" together form important constituent elements of "human security." In a similar manner to how reference is made to unemployment in Italy and Spain, and the severity of crime in the United States is reported in the *Human Development Report 1994*, the damage caused by the bases in Okinawa should also be discussed.

Second, there is the point of protecting human dignity. Okinawa was treated as a sacrifice for the defense of mainland Japan in the Battle of Okinawa in 1945 and was separated from this "mainland" for 27 years, left under the administrative control of the United States. Furthermore, while issues of crime, accidents, and noise pollution go unsolved, opinions that may be considered the consensus of the Okinawan people—"relocation of Futenma base outside of Okinawa" and "opposition to Osprey deployment"—have been ignored, and new transport aircraft have been deployed at Futenma airfield. Even though there are hospitals and schools near bases which would be at risk according to rules in the United States, in the case of Okinawa, they are instead considered not at risk. In Hawaii, efforts are in place to restrict noise pollution in schools to below 45 dB; yet, in Futenma, even a measurement of 81 dB is not considered a problem.

Those who speak of "discrimination against Okinawa" indicate that this reality is a "human security" issue concerning the protection of human dignity. If the Japanese government claims to address the "various threats which expose human survival, livelihood, and dignity to danger," it goes without saying that the issue of US military bases in Okinawa should also be included.

Third are memories of the War. In Okinawa, war memories are symbolized by the words "the military does not protect the people." Being denounced as spies, being thrown out of trenches, being forced to supply food, being provoked to commit "mass suicide"—these memories are a mirror which clearly reflects how their own safety was sacrificed for the sake of state security. In the twenty-first century, crimes committed by US soldiers (particularly sexual violence) and the crashes and noise pollution resulting from US military aircraft recall the sufferings during and after the War. Simply by picturing these cases, one realizes that freedom from this anxiety and fear is a severe issue of "human security."

When reaffirming that the current situation of "insecurity" in Okinawa is indeed an issue of "human security," it becomes apparent that there are deep ties to another "insecurity" in Okinawa: economic "insecurity."

1.5 Economic Disparity and Compensation Politics

Economic "insecurity" such as low income and unemployment is also an "issue" in developed nations. The *Human Development Report 1994* indicates that youth unemployment rates in the United States, the United Kingdom, Italy, and Spain are notably high, being between 14 and 34 %; the report also addresses that 44 million people—28 % of the EU working population—only earn less than half of the average wage (UNDP 1994: pp. 25–26).

1.5.1 Economic Disparity and "Closing the Gap"

After the reversion of Okinawa in 1972, three Okinawa Promotion and Development Plans and one Okinawa Promotion Plan, which lasted 10 years each, were drafted and implemented.

The three Okinawa Promotion and Development Plans (OPDPs) since 1972 promoted "closing the gap with the mainland" and "preparing the fundamental conditions for self-support development," actively furthering solidification of social capital and living environments. In the Okinawa Promotion Plan (OPP) from 2002, there was a change of course: "it is necessary to move from a promotion-development catch-up-style plan based on 'closing the gap' with the mainland, to a promotion plan of innovative creation which properly displays Okinawa's uniqueness" (Cabinet Office, "Okinawa Promotion Plan").

These were promotion–development plans that promoted "closing the gap with the mainland" and "preparing the fundamental conditions for autonomous development," but as may be seen in Figs. 1.8 and 1.9, the results were far from what Okinawa expected. Despite large amounts of public investment, the per-capita incomes of Okinawa residents remain at approximately 70 % of the national average, with the disparity not lessening; the unemployment rate also worsened from 4 to 8 % in the 1990s and remained at high levels of around 8 % since.

In terms of composition of industry, as may be seen in Fig. 1.10, while the service industry alone has grown considerably, the manufacturing industry is in poor shape, with primary and secondary industries in stagnation.

Financial dependence (ratio of general government expenditures and public gross fixed capital formation to the prefectural gross income) remains at the high levels of 30–40 %, showing an unchanging disparity with national levels (24 % in 2009). The need for economic independence is strongly called for, but one should not hope for its realization in current circumstances.

These current economic situations are reflected in the awareness of Okinawa residents. According to a prefectural public opinion poll by the *Okinawa Times* (2007), 85 % of participants responded with "that's correct" to the following viewpoint: "There are various disparities between Okinawa and the mainland." Further, when the participants were asked about what sort of disparities they were



Fig. 1.8 Change in income per resident (citizen) (Source: Okinawa Prefectural Governor's Office 2013)



Fig. 1.9 Change in absolute unemployment rate (Source: Okinawa Prefectural Governor's Office 2013)

aware of (Fig. 1.11), as many as 65 % indicated economic disparities, including low income (48 %), military base issues (24 %), and unemployment (17 %).

Even now, the "closing the gap" slogan from the 1970s may be seen here and there in newspaper pages. A "developmentalist" tendency (Suehiro 1998) remains strong among the people of Okinawa.



Fig. 1.10 Change in total production within Okinawa Prefecture (Source: Okinawa Prefecture, *Okinawa Prefecture Statistics Almanac* Annual Edition)



Fig. 1.11 Disparity with the mainland (Source: *Okinawa Times* Prefectural Public Opinion Poll 2007)

1.5.2 Compensation Politics and "Linkage" Theory

Kent E. Calder's (2007) "compensation politics" argument is the idea that the Japanese government used the realities of this economic disparity and awareness thereof as leverage to successfully impose military bases on Okinawa.

"Compensation politics" is "politics directed primarily toward advertising and satisfying demands for material satisfaction between grantors and supporters, as opposed to those politics oriented toward attaining nonmaterial goals" (Calder 2007: p. 132). He calls the network of people regularly involved in this distribution of wealth the "compensation ring" and indicates the local interest groups which provide various services to military bases—construction workers, military base labor unions, power companies, and land owners of military property—as the beneficiaries thereof.

Looking at the whole of Okinawa Prefecture, the amount of payments made to landlords for military land use has grown from 12.3 billion yen in 1972 to 79.3 billion yen in 2010. The income of military personnel has increased from 24 billion to 50.4 billion yen, while the "provision of finance and services to the US military" has increased from 41.4 billion to 64.9 billion yen. Base-related revenue as a whole was 77.7 billion yen in 1972, but this has almost tripled in size to 208.6 billion yen (Okinawa Prefectural Governor's Office 2014).

Schemes such as the following exist in municipalities providing base facility grounds: the Defense Facilities and Living Environment Fund, the Special Defense Facility Subsidy, the Adjustment Subsidy for Base Municipalities, and the Base Municipality Revitalization Projects (Shimada Panel Discussion Project), which was implemented from 1997 as consideration for compliance with the bases. In addition to the US Military Base Realignment Subsidy, these are typical representations of compensation politics that may be called "explicit linkage" between "accepting the bases" and "economic development policy."

Cases in which "compensation" nominally is not directly related to bases could be called "latent linkage." It is latent because the funds have originally been intended for other purposes or, as with the Promotion and Development Plans, only partially related to burdens for military bases. Examples include the budgets for Okinawa Promotion (and Development) Plans, the high rate of subsidies of these Plans, and the Northern Promotion Project, for which 100 billion was provided over approximately 10 years since 2000. The government indicated that for the Okinawa Promotion Plan from 2012, approximately half of the 300 billion yen budget related to Okinawa would be made into lump sum payment free of usage restrictions—ironically, this may also be considered to fall under the "latent linkage" category.

After the SACO agreement in 1996, local opinions in Nago City were severely split regarding whether or not to comply and accept a further military presence, which had surfaced as the destination for relocating the Futenma Airfield. Anti-compliance factions exceeded the majority in a 1997 Nago municipal referendum, but with the Northern Promotion Project, the Shimada Panel Discussion Project also having an influence, candidates from pro-relocation factions were elected in each of the three mayoral elections from 1998.

After the schoolgirl rape case in 1995, then Governor Masahide Ota revolted against the central government's base policy. Taking account of the rise of anti-base opinions among the people of Okinawa, Ota refused to act as agency and sign documents regarding land for use by stationed troops (this is an agency delegated function for the central government). Ota subsequently lost in a court battle and agreed to sign. The flow of public funds from the central government worsened, however; he received criticism for the "economic recession caused by prefectural administration" and was unable to achieve reelection. The governor for the subsequent three terms agreed conditionally to the government's Futenma relocation plans.

According to an *Okinawa Times–Asahi Shimbun* joint public opinion poll (2012), in answer to the question "To what extent do you think US military bases are useful to Okinawa's economy?," while 11 % responded with "they help greatly" and 51 % with "they help to some extent," 29 % responded with "they don't help much" and 7 % with "they don't help at all."

Even granted that there was pressure from the central government, the fact that both the governor of Okinawa and mayor of Nago City for a long period accepted, however conditionally, the establishment of a new base at Henoko is considered evidence of the success of compensation politics. The current post-return Okinawan society, with its slogans "closing the gap" as well as "nuclear free, equality with the mainland," has been "skillfully" taken advantage of.[11]

1.5.3 The Okinawa Promotion (and Development) Regime and the US Military Base Realignment Subsidy

The "Okinawa Promotion (and Development) Regime" has been the focus of compensation politics regarding Okinawa (Shimabukuro 2009).

Accompanying the return of the administrative rights for Okinawa to the Japanese government was the establishment of return-related legislation for the "promotion" of Okinawa. This consists of three development laws—the "Okinawa Development Special Measures Law," the "Okinawa Development Bureau Establishment Law," the "Okinawa Development Finance Corporation Law"—and the "Law for Special Measures Accompanying the Reversion of Okinawa." The aims of this legislation were to correct the disparity with the mainland in matters such as average income and social capital through measures such as the development of dams, airports, harbors, and roads and to provide basic requirements for Okinawa's autonomous development.

The main point of this legislation is said to be in its "spirit of compensation." Such special measures are applied to Okinawa because of particular circumstances such as the region having been through cruel events in the Battle of Okinawa, having been placed under the administrative control of the US military during the

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[11] Cooley and Marten (2006) argue that the "burden payments," while contrasting with the negative effects of the US military presence, do offer incentives to the people of Okinawa for agreeing, for economic reasons, to the continuance of the bases.

Table 1.1 Periods and budgets of Okinawa Promotion (and Development) Plans

	Period	Budget
First Promotion and Development Plan	1972–1981	1.2493 trillion yen
Second Promotion and Development Plan	1982–1991	2.1348 trillion yen
Third Promotion and Development Plan	1992–2001	3.3704 trillion yen
Okinawa Promotion Plan	2002–2008[a]	1.7915 trillion yen
Total		8.5460 trillion yen

Data: Miyata (2008)

[a] The table here reflects only first 7 years of the 10-year plan

27 years following the end of the War, and currently still having a high concentration of US military bases (Miyata 2009: pp. 115–116).

From 1972 onward, 10-year Okinawa Promotion (and Development) Plans were drafted and implemented four times. As may be seen in Table 1.1, a budget of 8.546 trillion yen has been poured into the schemes over the course of 36 years.[12]

However, as mentioned earlier, the results of these schemes were quite far from what Okinawa expected. Despite large amounts of public investment, the per capita income of Okinawa residents remain low with the disparity not lessening; the unemployment rate also remains at high levels. While the service industry alone has grown considerably, manufacturing is in poor shape and industry is in stagnation. The rate of financial dependence is high, and there is little hope for economic independence.

Why?

Tsuneo Ohshiro calls this the “natural consequence of Okinawa promotion schemes as policy for maintaining the Security Treaty.” If Okinawa were to become economically independent, return of the bases would be demanded for the sake of further development. This would shake Japan–US security relations. It follows that, from the perspective of state security, it is necessary that the Okinawan economy depends on the central government—that the regional economy remains reliant on US military bases (Maedomari 2009: p. 130).

Further, Jun Shimabukuro argues that the Okinawa Promotion (and Development) Regime takes on the role of “nullifying contention” in order to prevent the US military base issue from surfacing as a political matter and have brought about the collapse of local government’s “financial discipline” and an underdeveloped ability to develop policy at one’s own expense (Shimabukuro 2009: pp. 141–154). The argument is that the Okinawa Promotion and Development Regime is an effort for the purpose of preserving Okinawa’s dependence on central government and for placing regional government at a distance from the military base issue.

Jun Nishikawa indicates this as the general form of “promotion” policy below (Nishikawa 2011: p. 142).

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[12] During the 22 years between 1994 and 2015, a budget of 6.6543 trillion yen has been allocated (*Ryukyu Shimpo*, February 8, 2015).

> Until now, "underdeveloped" or unfortunate people have been shaped as objects of "promotion" [. . .] What are the costs of this [treatment]? None other than damage to nature, the supplementation of Japan's foreign relations and economy, public engineering works following investment of vast amounts of financial capital and, more than anything, the control of regional society by power-holders in collusion with "the center" (corrupt relations in politics and business), and the contrasting deprivation of residents' independence and right to self-determination. It is not that the indigenous Ainu population and the Okinawan people are "unable to be independent"; they have been "made unable to be independent."

The US Military Realignment Subsidy is a recent example in which "compensation" is nominally directly related to the bases. Starting in 2007 and until 2009, a total of 2.3 billion yen was paid to 39 municipalities across the country; 7.18 billion yen has been allocated for the budget until 2014. The Ministry of Defense hands over subsidies to local governments that cooperate with US military reorganization and seeks further cooperation.

Local governments that would have greater burdens for bases as a result of US military reorganization are made payments from the defense budget according to the extent of the reorganization plans, such as the enactment of construction works, and results of environmental impact evaluations (assessments). Meanwhile, there are also stipulations whereby subsidies may be reduced or withdrawn for uncooperative local governments if there has been hindrance to the progress of US military reorganization. This is a typical "carrot-and-stick" policy. It even resembles a direct transformation into policy of the following mainland views toward Okinawa: "since [we are] investing money, it's natural that Okinawa submit to responsibilities at present and in the future"; "the anti-base movement is for the sake of reeling in money."

In January 2010, Nago City saw the appearance of a mayor against the acceptance of "Futenma replacement facilities." Amidst the rise of the "outside the prefecture, outside the country" opinion among the Okinawan public following the change of government from LDP to DPJ in 2009, the residents of Nago City selected a candidate who appealed for "promotion policy without links to bases." In order to maintain consistency and the pledge against constructing new bases, Nago City decided on a policy whereby budget would be allocated to ongoing projects which used the US Military Base Realignment Subsidy, but new projects would not be incorporated into the general budget for 2010 (*Ryukyu Shimpo*, February 24, 2010). In December, the Ministry of Defense gave a "not granted" notification regarding the portion brought forward from 2009 and the amount requested for 2010. Nago City stopped making budget allocations with ties to the Realignment Subsidy in 2011. The municipal leaders declared, "From now on, we will further municipal government without relying on these sorts of carrot-and-stick subsidies" (*Ryukyu Shimpo*, December 29, 2010). Nago City was the first to have the subsidy actually withdrawn.

This is an example of how compensation politics is an attempt to impose troublesome facilities on economically weaker regions and silence them with subsidies. However, the use of subsidies and funds with political conditionality will not necessarily continue to be successful forever. This is because the government, which is suffering cumulative losses with public bonds, is in financial difficulty, and one now hears the voice that a region's independence is not necessarily tied to regional promotion schemes linked to acceptance of bases.

1.5.4 The End of Compensation Politics?

Local administration dependent on base revenue (including subsidies and funds from the government) expects results tied to regional independence, namely, that this money would stimulate the regional economy, reduce financial burdens, increase independent revenue sources, and lessen the unemployment rate. It has gradually become clear, however, that depending on the region, this approach is not only irrelevant to stable economic growth, but it actually increases financial dependency, thus making finances inflexible; the balance of public debt and unemployment rates also increases (Maedomari 2009: pp. 132–136). Those who expect a typical linkage between "base acceptance" and "economic promotion schemes" in compensation politics are actually becoming a minority.

As previously noted, base-related revenue itself has increased along with the growth of military property fees; the proportion of base-related revenue in the income of Okinawan residents, however, has fallen from 15.5 % in 1972 to 5.3 % in 2010. The proportion represented by amounts paid as military property fees has also fallen from 2.5 to 2.0 %. The number of personnel employed by the military was also 19,980 in 1972, but 8,942 in 2013 (55 % reduction) (Okinawa Prefectural Governor's Office 2014).

In terms of municipalities, the proportion of total annual income of the prefecture's municipalities represented by base-related revenue is 3.9 % on average, but strikingly high dependency rates are shown for some of local administration, such as 33.7 % in On'na Village, 30.0 % in Ginoza Village, and 27.2 % in Kin Town (all figures from 2012).

There was a watershed around 2010, after which the opinion that "the Okinawan economy surely couldn't stand up without the bases" began to be countered with the assertion that, "reduction of the bases will actually bring about economic growth." A *Ryukyu Shimpo* editorial made the following comment in response to the former opinion: "This is nothing but prejudice. One need only look at how the economic effect in the new center of Naha has increased more than tenfold between before and after return of the bases, or similarly how the growth of the Mihama and Hamby area in Chatan Town has exceeded 170 times previous figures. Okinawa is already escaping the base-dependent economy" (*Ryukyu Shimpo*, May 15, 2012).

In 1981, around 66 ha of base land were returned in Chatan Town, and redevelopment was carried out over 20 years. As a result, tax revenue and the economic ripple effect increased, and employment also rose. For the Hamby area (a former airbase), tax revenue has increased by 52 times the pre-return levels, while the economic ripple effect increased 81 times the previous effect and employment by

22 times the pre-return employment. For the Maymosscolor area (a former firing range) also, there are reports of tax revenue increasing by 38 times, economic ripple effect by 17 times, and employment by over 100 times (Maedomari 2009: p. 134).

Meanwhile, Nago City decided to accept construction of a new base in 1997. While base-related revenue was 200 million yen in 1995, it increased to 900 million yen in 2001. During this period, the proportion of base-related revenue in the Nago City budget jumped from 6 to 29 %.

This did not, however, bring about growth in Nago City. There was no great change in corporate tax revenue by inviting private enterprises, the absolute unemployment rate worsened from 8.7 to 12.5 % (2005), and municipal debt increased from 1.71 billion to 2.35 billion yen (2004) (Maedomari 2009: p. 135).

The Promotion (and Development) schemes and compensation politics have come to function as mechanisms for keeping US military bases in Okinawa. Perhaps the people of Okinawa have been trapped in a “developmentalist cage” with the slogan “closing the gap.” Compensation politics will not necessarily continue to function, however.

One sign of this is the fact that in the November 2011 prefectural governor elections, the opposing conservative and progressive candidates were both negative regarding the relocation of Futenma Airfield within the prefecture. The governor election was truly a fierce battle between then incumbent Hirokazu Nakaima seeking reelection and the former mayor of Ginowan City Yōichi Iha; both candidates announced their positions of being unable to accept the US and Japanese governments plan for relocation to Henoko in Nago City. Until this point, Iha had advocated relocation outside of the prefecture—by contrast, Nakaima for the first time made demands of the government to relocate outside of the prefecture in September’s Prefectural Assembly, and many people suggested that his assertions were made in consideration of the election. What is important in this context, however, is that on Nakaima’s side there was the judgment that victory was not possible with the assertion that promotion budgets are acquired in exchange for accepting the base.

Another more definite sign is the fact that Susumu Inamine, who opposed new base construction, was newly elected in the Nago City mayoral elections in January 2010; additionally, 16 out of 27 seats were filled by assembly members who supported Inamine in the municipal assembly election in September of the same year (*Ryukyu Shimpo*, September 13, 2010). As previously mentioned, at this point, the Ministry of Defense was withholding payment of the US Military Base Realignment Subsidy; it is important to bear in mind that Nago citizens have voted with their understanding of the possibility that the subsidy might not be paid. It is as though the residents of Nago City declared “We no longer need compensation politics.”

1.5.5 The 2014 Prefectural Governor Election and How to End Compensation Politics

The voices of Nago City residents—"We no longer need compensation politics"—were expressed even more definitely in the 2014 elections for Nago City mayor and the municipal assembly. In the January Nago City mayoral election, Susumu Inamine, who had been opposed to new base construction, was reelected, while in the September municipal assembly elections, 14 out of 27 seats were obtained by the incumbent party that supported Susumu Inamine, who strongly opposed relocation.

Further, the November 2014 prefectural gubernatorial election saw the appearance of Mayor Takeshi Onaga, who appealed for "all-Okinawa" opposition to new base construction, while in the following month's National Assembly Lower House election, the LDP, which proclaimed "burden reduction through relocation within the prefecture," lost all four seats in the four single-member constituencies in Okinawa. The *Ryukyu Shimpo* (November 17, 2014) reports that as many as 60 % of people placed importance on base relocation when voting, according to prefectural governor exit polls ("What did you place importance on when voting?"). While marine construction aimed toward construction of an "alternative" base for Futenma Airfield was beginning, surely there was awareness that the base issue was at an important juncture that would affect Okinawa's future. Seeing candidates who said "no" had overwhelming victories, it is clear that the public consensus of the Okinawan people is that "new bases should not be constructed in Henoko." It may even be said that the opinion that "We no longer need compensation politics" has taken hold across the prefecture as a whole.

In terms of compensation politics, following the 1995 schoolgirl rape case, a series of promotion schemes linked to the bases have been put in place, but there is now a common awareness among the Okinawan people that these schemes have not solved the problems. Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga's speech that the government would give full support if Okinawa wants the Universal Studios Japan to be opened on the island (*Nikkan Sports*, November 10, 2014), reminiscent of LDP Secretary-General Ishiba's announcement of a 5 billion yen regional promotion fund in a Nago City mayoral election support speech (*Asahi Digital*, January 16, 2014), failed to gather votes.

Among LDP and Komeito supporters, 30–40 % of people did not support Nakaima (*Jiji.com*, November 16, 2014). Governor Nakaima's comment in response to receiving from the government an annual promotion budget of 30 billion yen for 8 years—"We could have good New Year celebrations"—may have been reminiscent of Kevin Maher's comment that "Okinawans are masters of extortion" (*AFP Tokyo*, March 11, 2011). Perhaps memories of such insulting comments gave birth to antipathy—"if Nakaima wins, that means we sell Okinawa for money"—even in people with conservative inclinations.

As a result of this year's series of elections, the following message has been sent out from Okinawa: it will be impossible to "persuade" the people of the prefecture with compensation politics and construct a comprehensive Marin corps base in Henoko.

Following March 11, 2011, in Japan one frequently hears the proposition, not limited to Okinawa, that "regional society has been divided through many years of skillful pork-barrel politics, resistance to which has long been weakened" (Tosa, "Opening Comments" of the Spring Conference of the Peace Studies Association of Japan, June 2012). It is also often to discuss Fukushima and Okinawa together (Takahashi 2012; Maeda 2012). What thus becomes an issue for Okinawa is how to connect the "21st Century Okinawa Vision"—which seeks to escape from reliance on bases and financial dependence—and its related policies with the realization of "affluent living" not trapped by developmentalist scheme of promotion development plans. Success of this connection conditions how to end compensation politics.

When asked about the effects of base-related schemes such as the Northern Promotion Policy, Moritake Tomikawa (2014) responds, "if there is no clear vision for development, [the funds] end up being used for empty projects [. . .] Has it not been made clear through the experiences of the past decade with Okinawa that lasting development is not possible with promotion policies?" Nago City voters elected a mayor opposed to US military realignment and base construction in Henoko for two consecutive terms; I also agree with the suggestion of former Nago City municipal assembly member Yasuhiro Miyagi (2014) that these voters not only considered justice and common sense but also judged that, in terms of real-life experience as Tomikawa mentioned, the disadvantages of accepting new bases would be greater than the gains from the promotion policy that would accompany new bases.

The new mayor, however, has the troubling job of how to end compensation politics. This job is troubling because, while there is consensus on becoming "more affluent," consensus is not yet formed on "what kind of affluence." The CEO of a large hotel company in Okinawa states that, "Tourism is a peaceful industry. Would it still be a resort area if Osprey aircraft were flying around above? Relocation to Henoko would be deserting paradise" (*Asahi Digital*, November 9, 2014); there is also the view that "For Okinawa to escape from the economic structure of dependence, and to gain competitiveness in Asia as a basis for tourism and distribution, would be consistent with Japan's direction towards 'growth strategy'" (Yoshida and Uema 2014).

It is not easy to realize the "21st Century Vision for Okinawa"—the prefecture's fundamental idea which may even be termed a "proclamation of post-bases economy"—while trapped in the "cage of developmentalism" which has "closing the gap" as its slogan. Continuing to build only citified streets centered around large shopping malls, such as the new city center of Naha (Omoromachi) and the Mihama–Hamby area in Chatan Town (American Village, Hamby Town), is surely not desirable. In order to achieve land use of the base sites that may become "Okinawa's pride," we should balance interests among various stakeholders to allow for the gradual reduction of US military bases, put our heads together in considering a way of making use of base sites, and crystallize the particulars of "affluence."

1.6 Conclusion: "Building Our Peace"

This chapter has, taking the concept of "human security" as a lead, given an account of the "insecurity" brought upon Okinawan society by the US military base issue and described the details of how post-reversion Okinawan society deepens dependence on the frameworks of Promotion and Development and, therefore, how it has become difficult to escape these traps. It has also argued that increasing numbers of people are not proud of the linkage, typical of compensation politics, between "accepting military bases" and "economic promotion policy," regardless of how the "developmentalism"-tinged slogan "closing the gap" has permeated the Okinawan population.

Finally, in lieu of a conclusion, I would like to list findings concerning the concept of "human security".

First, Okinawa provides typical cases in which the state becomes a threat to the security of the people. The democracy enjoyed by people in other prefectures in Japan is not functioning in Okinawa; the people sense inequality and discrimination. Taking the concept of "human security" as a lead, here is the basis for the account of the "insecurity" brought upon Okinawan society by the US military bases.

Second, in Okinawa, "human security" and "state security" are fundamentally opposed. The Japanese government's security policy, which concentrates 74 % of US military bases in Japan within Okinawa, is bringing US military crime, accidents, and noise pollution, to Okinawa. Since many of the US military bases in Japan are concentrated in Okinawa, and 20 % of the living area of the main island is used for US military bases, Okinawa is a typical case of human security being sacrificed for state security.

Third, the central government has created difficulties for the regional government by using economic inequality or economic "insecurity." Seen from the Okinawan side, by accepting Promotion and Development budgets intended to "overcome" economic "insecurity," Okinawa has been forced to assume the "insecurity" brought about by US military bases.

Lastly, attention must be paid to Ohshiba's assertion that, in cases where human security and state security contradict each other, the concept of "human security" could be an "ideology of resistance." An *Okinawa Times* editorial on Constitution Memorial Day comments as follows: "In order to protect human rights and achieve self-governance, citizens without the strong backing of the Constitution have confronted political rulers barehanded, been rejected, got back up when they have fallen down, and carried on shaking their fists. One may say that this loop has formed the history of post-war Okinawa" (*Okinawa Times*, May 3, 2012).

Blaney and Pasha (1993) claim that changing the focus of the concept of security from military power toward something human centric signifies an important step for the protection of people's security by civil society. If rights are not granted to the people through governments or laws, but are things acquired by people through fights and victories, human security is also unavoidably so. Even if the attempt at describing the situations of Okinawa using the term "human security" has not delivered the "voices of Okinawa" far enough, the struggles of Okinawan people surely contribute to enrich the concept of "human security," that would be applied to other places across the world. In 2015, the Okinawan people's struggle is still being repeated and is further shaping the reality of "human security."

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Chapter 2
Formation and Development of an Okinawan Global Network Using an Island Hub

Hisamitsu Miyauchi

2.1 Introduction

An island has physical geographic features such as being surrounded by the hydrosphere and having a small total land mass.[1] Except for the islands around the Eurasian continent, which have been either populated or explored since ancient times, many islands farther out in the ocean were not discovered until the Age of Exploration and were incorporated into the capitalist world economy during the modern period. According to Wallerstein, who proposed the world systems theory in 1987, the capitalist world economy revolves around two dichotomies: class and "the spatial hierarchy of economic specialization, or core versus periphery" (p. 223). Except for the few "core" islands, such as Great Britain, Japan's Honshu Island, Denmark's Zealand, and Singapore, most of the islands in the world have been "marginalized."

Many researchers have compared islands with continents or the mainland and regarded them as "highly remote" areas, also classifying them as "isolated," "vulnerable," and "underdeveloped." Although each of these features varies in its degree, the insularity common among these features has been considered the defining characteristic of islands. This remains the same when considering islands versus continents in terms of share of global space and when considering small islands versus large ones, such as island countries (e.g., Japan, Great Britain). Generally, the smaller an island is and the greater its distance from the closest continent or mainland, the stronger the "insularity" becomes.

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[1] Yamashina (1952) defines that "an island is a landmass that is completely surrounded by a hydrosphere and is relatively small in area."

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In terms of the relationship between islands and continent/mainland, islands have been considered politically, economically, socially, and culturally dependent. Since the modern period, therefore, those who initially had lived on islands have tended to move to the continent or the mainland; for example, younger generations move in pursuit of higher education, people of productive age move in pursuit of higher wages and greater employment opportunities, and the elderly move in pursuit of enriched medical services. Those who reach the mainland and migrate to foreign countries, in particular, are called overseas emigrants.

An economist, Bertram, and a geographer, Watters, studied Polynesian migration with a focus on the Cook Islands (Niue, Tokelau, and Kiribati) and advocated the MIRAB model (Bertram and Watters 1985). MIRAB is an acronym coined from four keywords—migration, remittance, aid, and bureaucracy—and describes the characteristics of today's insular island economies and societies. In other words, by migrating from poor insular countries to rich continental (or developed) countries and sending back the wages earned there to families living on their home islands, it will allow that island culture, and the people who wish to remain there, to survive. The financial environments and general society of insular countries revolve around the financial aid, material support, and resident assistance provided by continental countries, which hinders the growth of private companies in these insular economies, leading to an imbalanced industrial structure where the public sector is bloated. One could thus argue that MIRAB is a model that accurately describes the dependency of islands on their continental counterparts.

In modern Japan after the Meiji Restoration, many people migrated to foreign countries.[2] One of the characteristics of this Japanese emigration is that many people were from small islands other than the four major islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, and Shikoku. More specifically, many emigrants were from the islands of Geiyo and Boyo in the Seto Inland Sea, Amakusa in Kyushu, Izu in the Pacific, and Ryukyu. All of these have a small total land mass and low levels of agricultural productivity and were characterized as insular areas with a surplus population during the modern period. A number of migrants were sent from these small islands to continental countries such as the USA, Canada, Brazil, and Peru.

As *dekasegi* (working and earning money away from home) was the primary intention of Japanese migrants, many of them eventually returned to Japan; however, some settled permanently in the countries or areas to which they had migrated (hereafter referred to as host society). In these host societies, unique Japanese communities of immigrants have formed. According to Sugiura (1991), ethnic groups generally engage in mutual assistance and internal joint activities as the foundational strategy for their survival and growth and have developed organizations and systems for this purpose. They are, essentially, communities with a self-defense mechanism for protecting their own interests within the host society or to maintain and pass on their unique culture and ensure smooth daily living (Yagasaki 2008).

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[2] In this chapter, the modern period of Japan refers to the period from the Meiji Restoration in 1868 to the end of the Asia-Pacific War in 1945.

Japanese immigrants also established a variety of global organizations with territorial connections as well as ones with professional connections in their host societies. *Nihonjinkai* (Japan club/Japanese association) is an example of the former, and *nihonjin shokokai* (business association/commerce and industry association) is an example of the latter. Many of the *nihonjinkai* constructed meeting halls in areas where many Japanese live, as these immigrants actively engage in mutual assistance as well as social and heritage activities, in these halls, which serve as the base of Japanese communities within the host societies. Similarly, prefectural associations called *kenjinkai* and city/village/town associations called *shichosonjinkai* were formed at prefectural and municipal levels according to the original hometown of the immigrants; some larger *kenjinkai* groups construct their own halls and engage in a variety of activities. There are diverse spatial scales between *nihonjinkai*, *kenjinkai*, *shichosonjinkai*, and the immigrants' hometowns; however, these hometown groups or associations traditionally operate spatially at the local level or the national level in their respective host societies or between the immigrants' hometowns and the host society.

However, entering the 1990s, the spatial scales of hometown associations began to change, as they began to engage in activities on their own. A global network of hometown groups began to form, for example, establishing a transborder global-scale hometown association or holding festivals where hometown groups scattered around the world could gather. This tendency is particularly evident with Chinese and Indian associations, as many migrants from these countries have settled permanently in various host societies across the globe.[3]

In Japan's insular areas, which, as mentioned, have sent out many migrants since the Meiji Restoration, there is a tendency to form global-scale hometown-based networks to protect their identity and culture and to co-prosper economically. This can be seen as a countermovement to one-directional economic and cultural invasions by the continent/mainland. This chapter discusses Okinawa as one example of such a movement.

Okinawa collectively refers to the prefecture comprised on Ryukyu Islands located southwest of Japan. Naha, the central city of Okinawa, is approximately 1500 km from Tokyo, the capital of Japan. During the modern period, Okinawa was characterized as being "small," "remote," "isolated," "vulnerable," and "underdeveloped" within Japan and was considered the area with the highest level of "insularity" in Japan. Among all the small islands of Japan, Okinawa has sent out the largest number of migrants to foreign countries. Okinawa Prefecture's Department of Culture, Tourism and Sports, Exchange Promotion Division (2012) indicates that 93,149 people migrated from Okinawa to foreign countries in the 95 years from 1899 to 1993.[4] The migrants sent from Okinawa established not only Okinawa *kenjinkai* but also *shichosonjinkai*, *azajinkai* (*aza* refers to an administrative subdivision of a Japanese city, town, or village), and trade associations in their host societies, forming unique Okinawan immigrant communities among the greater Japanese immigrant communities.

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[3] Regarding Chinese immigrants, Cai (1998) reported that there were 17 world festivals held in 1997 based on networks with territorial ties or blood ties. Of these, 13 festivals had begun in the 1990s. Regarding Indian immigrants, the First Global Convention of People of Indian Origin was held the same year that the Global Organization of People of Indian Origin (GOPIO) was formed, in 1989 (Koga 2000).

Beginning in the 1990s, regional Okinawan organizations began to form a global immigrant network. This chapter introduces the formation and development of such a global hometown-based network and examines how these immigrants' homeland of Okinawa and overseas host societies are connected. It also considers what kind of cultural influences the host societies have on Okinawa.

2.2 Out-Migration from Okinawa and *Kenjinkai* Activities

2.2.1 Out-Migration from Okinawa

It was the end of 1899 when the first group of indentured migrants was sent out from Okinawa. Twenty-six migrants arrived in Hawaii in January 1990 (Kinjo 2011). Kyuzo Toyama (1868–1910), who was from Kin Village, played a major role in this emigration, and during the second wave of Okinawan emigration to Hawaii in 1903, Toyama himself accompanied the people from Kin Village to their new host society. After returning to Okinawa, Toyama helped local people emigrate as an agent of a migration company. As such, Toyama is considered the "father of Okinawan emigration."

Figure 2.1 shows the numbers of migrants sent from Okinawa overseas during the 95 years between 1899 and 1993 and reveals that emigrations from Okinawa continued until immediately prior to the outbreak of war between Japan and the USA, which peaked in 1906, 1917, 1929, and 1936. According to statistics by Okinawa Prefecture's Department of Culture, Tourism and Sports, Exchange Promotion Division (2012), a total of 75,423 people were sent out from Okinawa to overseas as migrants in the 42 years from 1899 to 1940. Of the 15 countries that received the most Okinawan immigrants, the USA received the largest percentage, at 21,391 persons.[5] This is followed by the Philippines (17,026), Brazil (15,714), Peru (11,461), Argentina (3154), and Singapore (2801). Most of these areas are halfway around the globe from Okinawa. As shown in Fig. 2.1, the USA was the

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[4] Among the 47 prefectures in Japan, the one with the largest number of emigrants is Hiroshima. According to Ishikawa (1997), there were 96,181 emigrants between 1899 and 1937; however, the homeland of many emigrants from Hiroshima is Honshu Island. Regarding emigrants from small islands, Okinawa sent out the largest number of migrants in Japan.

[5] Within the USA, the number of migrants to Hawaii was 20,518 or 96 % of all the Okinawa migrants that went to the USA.



Fig. 2.1 The number of Okinawans who migrated overseas (Source: Prepared based on the information prepared by Okinawa Prefecture's Department of Culture, Tourism and Sports, Exchange Promotion Division 2012)

major recipient of immigrants between 1899 and 1916, while the countries in South America, such as Brazil and Peru, were the major recipients around 1917 and the Philippines from the late 1920s onward.

In 1928, geographer Yoshiji Takemi first academically addressed Okinawan overseas emigration in his paper entitled "Okinawa-to shusshin imin no keizai chirigaku-teki kosatsu [Economic and geographic consideration of emigrants from Okinawa Island]." In this paper, he explains the cause of emigration as an ever-present "economic reason behind out-migration" (Takemi 1928). The economic reason for Okinawa was the economic poverty of agricultural communities on the island, due to a lack of land. Okinawan people moved overseas hoping to engage in farming in areas incomparably vaster than their homeland. In other words, the smallness in area, which is a physical geographic feature of islands, caused a stagnation within the insular economy and became the primary reason for overseas emigration. Okinawans in foreign host societies sent the money they earned back to their homeland; as such, in one aspect, the economy and society in Okinawa relied on money sent from overseas during the modern period.[6] Bertram and Watters (1985), mentioned above, described the characteristics of an insular economy as MIRAB; however, it is considered that aid and bureaucracy were absent in modern Okinawa, and thus, the economy was more of an MIR economy.

During the Asia-Pacific War, Okinawa was the only location of a ground battle in Japan and was burned to the ground. According to an estimate by Arashiro (1994), approximately 150,000 people, or one-quarter of Okinawa's residents, were victimized. And after the war, Okinawa was administratively separated from the rest of the country and placed under US military rule for 27 years. The poverty of the people in Okinawa during this period was no different from the prewar period.

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[6] Ishikawa (2013, 2014) and Hanaki (2015) discuss in greater detail the remittances that the Okinawan migrants sent from overseas to their homeland.

Some people were even expelled from their lands due to the construction of US military bases. Thus, after 33 people migrated to Argentina in 1948, more people began to migrate from Okinawa primarily to countries in South America through the early 1960s (see Fig. 2.1). According to Okinawa Prefecture's Department of Culture, Tourism and Sports, Exchange Promotion Division (2012), a total of 17,726 people migrated from Okinawa to foreign countries in the 46 years from 1948 to 1993. Of these countries, the country that accepted the most immigrants was Brazil, at 9494; in addition, 3897 people migrated to Argentina, 3448 to Bolivia, and 733 to Peru. They were called "new immigrants," and many of them still live in these countries.

Okinawan overseas emigration now has a history that spans more than 100 years. These immigrants have now passed through first and the second generations, and the third and fourth generations are now active members of their host societies. In November 2014, David Ige,[7] a third-generation Okinawan-American, was elected the governor of Hawaii. Many Okinawans overseas are highly educated and work as specialists, playing active and vital roles in their host societies.

2.2.2 Okinawan Immigrant Communities Overseas and Hometown Associations

Thus, entering the twentieth century, migration from Okinawa to the Asia-Pacific region and countries in South America gained momentum, with many immigrants deciding to permanently settle in their recipient countries. Okinawans overseas have formed hometown associations, such as Okinawa *kenjinkai*, *shichosonkai*, and farming associations called *kochikai* in their host societies, separately from the more Japan-focused *nihonjinkai*. The establishment of these groups was necessary not only for mutual assistance but also to ensure protection of the rights of Okinawan people.

Table 2.1 lists Okinawan *kenjinkais* established in major host societies and their history of development, such as name changes. Of these, the oldest *kenjinkai* is the Okinawan Mutual Aid Organization, established in San Francisco in 1902.[8] The *kenjinkai* with the next oldest history is the Association of People from the Prefecture of Okinawa, established in 1906 in Hawaii. Following, Okinawa Kenjinkai was established in 1912 in Peru, Davao Okinawa Kenjinkai in 1916 in

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[7] The grandfather of Governor Ige is from Nishihara town in Okinawa Prefecture. There was strong support from the Okinawan communities during the election (*Okinawa Times*, November 6, 2014).

[8] About 50 people from Okinawa had already been living in San Francisco. Many of them were immigrants who came to study or find greater employment opportunities and had arrived in the USA earlier than the indentured immigrants who came in 1900. Okinawa Club of America (1981) reports that the office of the kenjinkai was more like a hostel for people from Okinawa. It also argues that, for early settlers, the establishment of the kenjinkai was a manifestation of the compelling instinct for mutual assistance.

Table 2.1 Development of Okinawan kenjinkais overseas

Year	Country/ region	Formation of kenjinkais
1902	USA	Okinawan Mutual Aid Organization was founded in San Francisco
1906	Hawaii	Association of People from the Prefecture of Okinawa was founded
1908	USA	Southern California Okinawa Kenjinkai was founded
1912	Peru	Okinawa Kenjinkai was founded
1916	Philippines	Davao Okinawa Kenjinkai was founded
1925	USA	Southern California Okinawa Kenjinkai was renamed Southern California Branch of the Okinawa Overseas Association
1926	Brazil	Kyuyokyokai was founded
1934	USA	Okinawa Prefectural Association of America was founded
	Peru	Okinawa Kenjinkai was renamed Peru Central Branch of the Okinawa Overseas Association
1940	Hawaii	Association of People from Okinawa Prefecture in Hawaii was founded
1941	USA	Okinawa Association of North America was founded
		The Asia-Pacific War broke out, which put a stop to activities of kenjinkais in various countries and regions
1945		Battle in Okinawa, end of war
	Hawaii	Okinawan Relief Clothing Collection was founded
1946	USA	Okinawa War Damage Relief League was founded
1947	Brazil	Brazil Okinawa-Kyu-Sai-Kai was founded
	Peru	Peru Okinawa-Kyu-Sai-Kai was founded
	Hawaii	Hawaii Federation of Okinawan Relief was founded
1950	Peru	Okinawa Jinkai was founded
1951	Hawaii	Hawaii United Association of Okinawan People was founded
	Argentina	Centro Okinawa en la Argentina was founded
1952	Peru	Peru Okinawa Jinkai was renamed Asociacion Okinawense del Peru
1953	Brazil	Associacao dos Okinawanos Residentes no Exterior was founded
1954	USA	Okinawa Club of America was founded
1978	Argentina	Centro Okinawa en la Argentina was renamed Centro Okinawense en la Argentina
1982	Philippines	Philippine Okinawa Society was founded
1995	Hawaii	Hawaii United Association of Okinawan People was renamed Hawaii United Okinawa Association
1996	USA	Okinawa Club of America was renamed the Okinawa Association of America, Inc
1998	Brazil	Associacao dos Okinawanos Residentes no Exterior was renamed Associacao Okinawa Kenjin do Brasil

Source: Prepared based on the anniversary books of Okinawa kenjinkais in various areas and countries

the Philippines, and Kyuyokyokai in 1926 in Brazil. No integrated *kenjinkai* associations were formed in Argentina until the defeat of Japan in 1945, which signaled the end of World War II in Asia. Thus, compared to the USA (particularly Hawaii), some countries have either no *kenjinkai* or experienced delayed establishment of *kenjinkai*, such as in South America. This is likely due to various Okinawan hometown associations being formed within the host societies, causing a delay in the establishment of larger *kenjinkai*, the groups that are supposed to supervise those smaller associations. Even in Hawaii or mainland America, where *kenjinkais* were formed in the early twentieth century, they have since rapidly changed their forms, with some splitting up or getting reintegrated.

Due to the outbreak of war between Japan and the USA in 1941, Japanese immigrants living in Hawaii, mainland America, and even those in South America (which supported the USA) faced various restrictions as enemy aliens. As a result, Okinawan hometown associations, including the Okinawa *kenjinkais*, were forced to suspend their activities or dissolve. Many Okinawans who lived in mainland America or in Peru were placed in internment camps, which led to the collapse of not only the original Okinawan immigrant communities but also larger Japanese immigrant communities.

After the war ended in 1945, Okinawan hometown associations were immediately rebuilt around the world. Because these immigrants' homeland of Okinawa was burned to the ground in Japan's only ground battle, resulting in the victimization of survivors and severe local poverty, the associations were rebuilt to support war-victim relief activities by those living abroad who wanted to offer material and emotional support to their homeland of Okinawa. An overseas group engaged in war reconstruction activities was established in Hawaii in 1945 and another in mainland America in 1946. They sent relief money, clothing, food, medicine, daily necessities, school supplies, and even farm animals such as goats to Okinawa. Similar Okinawa relief groups were also established in Brazil and Peru in 1947.[9]

In the 1950s, *kenjinkais* were reformed around the world, sprouting from the Okinawa war-relief groups. Okinawa Jinkai was established in Peru in 1950. The next year, the Hawaii United Association of Okinawan People was established, along with Centro Okinawa en la Argentina in Argentina, which was followed by Associacao dos Okinawanos Residentes no Exterior in 1953 and Okinawa Club of America in 1954. The *kenjinkais* owned their own halls and engaged in various activities, serving as the base of the Okinawan communities just as they did before the war.

While Okinawa *kenjinkais* were formed in countries other than these, the aforementioned groups that were established in the 1950s are considered the representative *kenjinkais* in major recipient countries. According to the list of overseas Okinawa *kenjinkais* prepared by Okinawa Prefecture, Okinawa *kenjinkais* have been formed in 31 countries and regions in North America, South America, Asia, Europe, and Africa as of December 1, 2014. What the "father of Okinawan emigration," Kyuzo Toyama, said more than a century ago was finally true: "Let us set out and let the five continents be our home."

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[9] For example, 10,000 USD was sent from a relief group in Brazil to the one in the USA, and 5,000 USD was sent from a relief group in Peru, to be eventually funneled to Okinawa. Three hundred goats sent from Hawaii to Okinawa in 1949 were purchased in the USA and transported from San Francisco.

2.3 Global Network Development of the Worldwide Uchinanchu Festival

2.3.1 Conception of Worldwide Uchinanchu Festival

Okinawa was returned to Japanese rule in 1972. Junji Nishime (1921–2001), who was elected the governor of Okinawa in 1978, took a great interest in overseas Okinawan communities and visited various Okinawa *kenjinkais* until his resignation in 1990.[10] Governor Nishime's administration promoted international exchange[11] and adopted policies to support Okinawan hometown associations around the world, more specifically, to provide aid for these overseas Okinawa *kenjinkais*' operating costs and aid for the construction of *kenjinkai* halls, sending groups from Okinawa to participate in ceremonies to commemorate overseas migration, and to implement subsidized projects. This facilitated deeper, more invigorated connections between the Okinawa *kenjinkais* and the Okinawa Prefectural Government. Furthermore, new halls, which they still use today, opened one after another on the basis of the aid these *kenjinkais* received from Okinawa Prefecture.[12]

In June 1985, Governor Nishime, who was visiting Washington, D.C., to make a direct plea to the US Secretary of Defense[13] regarding the military base in Okinawa, stopped by Atlanta, Georgia, on his way back home. Having heard about the governor's visit, a number of Okinawans living in the city gathered and welcomed him. The governor gave the following words to the Okinawans who came to see him depart from the Atlanta airport: "Let's have drinks next time in Okinawa" (Chinen 2012). According to *Ryukyu Shimpo* (1998), around this time, Governor Nishime said the following to prefectural government executives: "We need an information network from now on. I want to have a gathering here in Okinawa for people with Okinawan heritage living overseas." In 1986, the year after he returned to Okinawa, Governor Nishime suggested the Worldwide Uchinanchu Festival as one of the policies of the prefecture. *Uchinanchu* is a word that Okinawans use to refer to themselves.

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[10] The number of visits was counted based on Junji Nishime's biography posed in *Ryukyu Shimpo* (1998).

[11] He organized an international exchange division within the prefectural government in 1979. He also contributed to the founding of the Okinawa International Exchange Foundation in 1981 and the Okinawa Human Resources Development Foundation in 1982.

[12] New halls opened in Brazil and Bolivia in 1978, in Peru in 1981, in Hawaii in 1990, and in Argentina in 1991.

[13] Governor Nishime asked the chairman of the Association of People from Okinawa Prefecture in Hawaii, who had personal connections with the Department of Defense, so that he could meet with Weinberger, who was the current Secretary of Defense (Ryukyu Shimpo 1998).

According to the project proposal by the Worldwide Uchinanchu Festival Committee in 1989, the goal of the festival is "to develop a global network of Uchinanchu"; more specifically, it was to position the Okinawans living abroad and playing active roles in host societies around the world as valuable assets of Okinawa. In addition, it would establish a network that connects them in such fields as economics, culture, and technology and allow them to function organically, while Okinawa serves as its core. According to the proposal, Okinawa was aiming to gather at least 500 people from overseas as the first participants in the Worldwide Uchinanchu Festival.

2.3.2 Worldwide Uchinanchu Festival and Its Achievements

The Worldwide Uchinanchu Festival was held on August 23–26, 1990, using the Okinawa Convention Center in Ginowan City as its main venue. It attracted a total of 2397 people from 17 countries and 41 regions, greatly exceeding the initial goal of 500. This reveals how eager Okinawans living abroad were for this type of gathering. During the festival, many events were held, such as exchange events like karate, traditional Okinawan entertainment, commemorative gateball championships, and various symposiums and forums. Okinawans who gathered from all over the world deepened their exchanges with one another, and various events were also held at the municipal level to welcome hometown immigrants from the same area.

Approximately 100 people were assigned as civil ambassadors of Uchinanchu during the festival. This was Governor Nishime's idea, as he did not want the festival to be only a onetime event; his intention was to allocate these civil ambassadors around the globe toward the "development of a global Uchinanchu network," which was the goal of the festival, and to have them serve as a "human base" for network building (Worldwide Uchinanchu Festival Committee 1990).

The second festival was held in 1995, the third in 2001, the fourth in 2006, and the fifth in 2011. The number of participants from overseas increased each time, 3409 in 1995, 4025 in 2001, 4393 in 2006, and 5317 in 2011. This festival has taken root as a popular, recurring event for Okinawans living abroad. Considering that travel expenses from their host societies and accommodations once in Okinawa need to be self-assumed, the passion of Okinawans living abroad to participate in the festival is truly amazing. Okinawans living abroad must feel that there are benefits to participating in the festival even if it requires a significant financial commitment.

Various efforts have been made at each festival toward the "development of a global Uchinanchu network." Worldwide Uchinanchu Business association (WUB) was established during the second festival, the Junior Study Tour started during the third festival, and the Host Family Bank was set up during the fourth festival. During the fifth festival, World Youth Uchinanchu Association (WYUA) was formed, and it was also suggested that a large-scale foundation be set up for human resources development. It appears that after each festival, the goal of developing the network is evolving toward developing and fostering the next generations of Okinawans living abroad.

In the following sections, I would like to introduce the establishment of WUB and WYUA, which were the achievements of the Worldwide Uchinanchu Festival, and their activities.

2.4 Business Network: Establishment of WUB and Its Development

2.4.1 Establishment of WUB: From HUB to WUB

Members of the WUB are Okinawan businesspeople living in Japan and overseas. The association's philosophy is to contribute to regional development and prosperity through worldwide economic, cultural, and social activities and to cooperate and connect with one another. A nonprofit organization, WUB Network, located in Hawaii, serves as the association's headquarters. As of March 2015, there are 22 WUB chapters throughout the world (see Fig. 2.2).

The predecessor of WUB is Hawaii Uchinanchu Business Group (HUB), formed by 13 businesspeople with Okinawan heritage living in Hawaii who participated in the inaugural Worldwide Uchinanchu Festival in 1990. These people organized the Okinawa Business Study Tour and visited Okinawa again as the Okinawa Business Inspection Group. There, they visited 25 companies in the prefecture, including



Fig. 2.2 The number of Okinawans and Okinawan Hometown Associations by Country (Source: Prepared based on the information provided by the 5th Worldwide Uchinanchu Festival Committee (2011) and hearing investigation)

tourist facilities and factories. After returning to Hawaii, the members of the inspection group formed HUB and began their own activities.

The idea of WUB was outlined at the second Worldwide Uchinanchu Festival held in 1995. After more than a year of preparation, the Worldwide Uchinanchu Business Conference (WUB Conference) was held in Honolulu, Hawaii, on September 1–2, 1997, and it was then confirmed that HUB would be dissolved to form WUB. Approximately 80 businesspeople with Okinawan heritage attended this conference from areas other than Hawaii, such as Okinawa, the USA, Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Canada, and the Philippines (documents from the 1st Worldwide Uchinanchu Conference 2003).

2.4.2 WUB's Development as Viewed from WUB Conference

Table 2.2 shows matters related to WUB, WUB Conferences, and other related festivals along with their locations, characteristics, and establishment of WUB chapters between 1990 and 2014. Here, the 17-year period from WUB's establishment in 1997 through 2014 is divided into three periods according to the characteristics of WUB Conferences: (1) the early period of WUB (1997–1999), (2) the developing period (1999–2007), and (3) the transition period (from 2008 onward). I would like to look into the history of WUB organizations by examining the contents and activities of WUB Conferences held during each period.

During the early period, four conferences were held, including the 1st Worldwide Uchinanchu Business (WUB) Conference held in 1997. During this conference, the name of the WUB organization, its board members, and its organizational structure were agreed upon, and various topics such as a master business plan were discussed and determined, which ultimately shaped the nature of the organization. It was also confirmed at each conference that WUB would not only promote business exchange but also invest in cultural exchange and human resources development of Okinawans living abroad.[14] Business exchanges and nonbusiness exchanges are defined as the essential wheels of this organization. In parallel with these conferences, efforts were made toward the establishment and organization of chapters.

The 3rd WUB International Conference was held in Los Angeles and Las Vegas from August 9–12, 1999, and included lectures, business idea presentations, and discussions held at five committees. It was also agreed that the WUB organization would support the measures and policies of Okinawa Prefecture. The following year, in 2000, the 4th WUB International Conference was held in Okinawa. During the International Exchange and Promotion Business Fair that was part of the WUB

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[14] To "support Okinawan culture and education" and to "broaden the horizon for our children and future generations by helping them become better global citizens" are listed in WUB's mission, indicating that the organization's aim includes activities in nonbusiness areas.

Table 2.2 WUB conferences and festivals and establishment of chapters

Year	Month	Conference/festival (location)	Characteristics of conference/ festival	Establishment of chapter
1990	8	Worldwide Uchinanchu Festival		
1993		Hawaii Uchinanchu Business Group (HUB) was formed		
1995	11	2nd Worldwide Uchinanchu Festival		
1997	9	1st Worldwide Uchinanchu Business (WUB) Conference (Hawaii)	Worldwide Uchinanchu Business Association (WUB) was established	Hawaii, Okinawa, Brazil, Argentina
1998	2	WUB Executive Conference (Hawaii)	WUB's official name was decided	Peru, North America
	6	2nd WUB Conference (Brazil)	Names of the world headquarters and chapters were decided	
1999	6	WUB Executive Conference (Los Angeles)	Various business schemes were discussed	Tokyo, Guam
	8	3rd WUB International Conference (Los Angeles, Las Vegas)	First international conference was held	
2000	6	4th WUB International Conference (Okinawa)	First International Exchange and Promotion Business Fair was held	Kansai, Europe, Bolivia
2001	10	5th WUB International Conference (Tokyo)		Canada, China, Singapore
	11	3rd Worldwide Uchinanchu Festival		Malaysia, Thailand, Hong Kong
2002	10	6th WUB International Conference (Bolivia)	The largest number of participants	Mexico, Maui, Taiwan
2003	9	7th WUB International Conference (Hawaii)		Philippines
	9	1st Worldwide Uchinanchu Conference (Hawaii)		
2004	8	8th WUB International Conference (Argentina)		
2005	4	9th WUB International Conference (Kansai)	MOU was signed for mutual support and cooperation with Inter-American Investment Corporation	
2006	1	10th WUB International Conference (Peru)		
	10	4th Worldwide Uchinanchu Festival		

(continued)

Table 2.2 (continued)

Year	Month	Conference/festival (location)	Characteristics of conference/ festival	Establishment of chapter
2007	9	11th WUB International Conference (Shanghai)	Conference celebrating the 10th anniversary of the founding of WUB	
2008	8	12th WUB International Conference (Brazil)	The HQ organization was renamed WUB Network	
	8	2nd Worldwide Uchinanchu Conference (Brazil)		
2009	8	13th WUB Executive Conference (Los Angeles)		
2010	10	14th WUB Conference (Hawaii)	Discussion on Uchinanchu spirit	
2011	10	5th Worldwide Uchinanchu Festival		Miyako
	10	15th WUB International Conference (Okinawa)	Discussion on how to pass onto the next generation	
2012	11	16th WUB Conference (Hong Kong)		
2013	9	17th WUB Conference (Tokyo)		
2014	8	18th WUB International Conference (Peru)	Peace Economy Declaration was adopted	
	8	3rd Worldwide Uchinanchu Conference (Peru)		

Source: Prepared based on the documents distributed at the 1st Worldwide Uchinanchu Conference, information provided by WUB Okinawa office (2007) and the articles from Ryukyu Shimpo

Conference held in Naha City, the WUB members set up their companies' booths and actively engaged in business talks.[15] While the conference in Okinawa focused on international business exchange, the subsequent WUB international conferences also included the focus areas of cultural exchange and human resources development. WUB international conferences have been held in Tokyo, Bolivia, Hawaii, Argentina, Kansai, Peru, and Shanghai on a rotating annual basis among the chapters to promote business exchange among members in a variety of fashions. During this development period, WUB grew into an organization with 21 chapters, and the global network connecting businesspeople with Okinawan heritage scattered around the world was almost complete, establishing a solid organization.

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[15] Fifty-seven companies set up 59 booths at the International Exchange and Promotion Business Fair, and the number of participants amounted to about 1,350 in 2 days. Sixty-three concrete business negotiations were made overall and 58 of them were considered to "have potential." Seven deals were closed, including the "export of agaricus products," "agent agreement for distributing Okinawan entertainment and culture such as DVDs and full CG movies" (article posted in *Ryukyu Shimpo*, September 16, 2000).

During the 12th WUB International Conference, held in São Paulo, Brazil, in 2008, the goal of WUB was redefined and specified as network building. It was also confirmed at this time that the organization would not only put effort into business exchange but also facilitate communications among the Okinawans both culturally and academically and focus on the cultivation of international human resources. Furthermore, in consideration of the financial burden of the members, it was agreed that the WUB International Conference, which had been held annually up until this point, and the executive conference, at which the representatives of the chapters gather, would be held alternately every other year. This is considered the inflection point of WUB activities, as after this 12th conference, WUB has focused more on human resources development of Okinawans living abroad and cultural activities than business exchange.[16] Therefore, the characteristics of the transition period from 2008 onward can be described as follows: In addition to the WUB international conferences primarily promoting business exchange (as seen in the developing period), WUB began to play a leading role in human resources development and cultural activities and invest more in network building with various people and organizations, including young Okinawans living overseas and other Okinawa-related organizations. Additionally, at the 18th WUB International Conference, held in Peru in 2014, a “Peace Economy Declaration” was adopted. This declaration appeals for the realization of a peace-based economy using the established network. This can be viewed as an effort characteristic of businesspeople with Okinawan heritage.

2.5 Network of Young Generations: Development of WYUA

During the 5th Worldwide Uchinanchu Festival, an international youth conference was held for young people living in Okinawa Prefecture and the children of Okinawans overseas. Participants came from seven countries,[17] engaged in active discussions, and formed the World Youth Uchinanchu Association (WYUA). WYUA proposed seven new projects for the 6th Worldwide Uchinanchu Festival and submitted a proposal for the “Global Next-Generation Projects by Youth International Conference” to the governor of Okinawa. The proposed projects included an Uchinaguchi worldwide festival, Okinawan Olympics, fashion show, film festival, and information dissemination using manga. Uchinaguchi is an Okinawan language. It was also decided that Worldwide Youth Uchinanchu Festival would be held annually from the following year on a rotating basis among the continents (5th Worldwide Uchinanchu Festival Committee 2012).

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[16] For example, in addition to the members of the WUB Network and members of Okinawa-related organizations in Hawaii, about 150 people attended the 14th WUB Conference held in Hawaii in 2010. There, group discussions were held on “what Uchinanchu spirit (Okinawan spirit) is, how it is contributing to each organization, and what it will be like in the future.”

[17] The next-generation representatives from the US mainland, Hawaii, Brazil, Peru, Argentina, and the UK attended the conference (according to the document distributed by WYUA).

In addition to the Okinawa headquarters, as of March 2015, WYUA has chapters in eight areas in seven countries: the USA (one mainland and one Hawaii location), Brazil, Peru, Bolivia, Argentina, the UK, and Japan (North Okinawa location) as of March 2015 (see Fig. 2.2).[18]

Table 2.3 shows the achievements of the WYUA at its Okinawa headquarters between 2011 and 2014. Its activities are diverse; in addition to the Worldwide Youth Uchinanchu Festival held every year and the next-generation conferences, it is involved in the planning, operation, and coordinating participation of various events, such as Uchinanpick. It also accepts international exchange-related programs entrusted by the country, prefecture, and Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and arranges visiting lectures at schools in Okinawa Prefecture on international exchange and cross-cultural understanding. The Worldwide Youth Uchinanchu Festival has been held annually on a rotating basis among the continents, first in São Paulo, Brazil, in 2012; in Los Angeles, USA, in 2013; and Dusseldorf, Germany, in 2014, to facilitate communications among young people with Okinawan heritage, primarily university students, who gather from all over the world.

During the Worldwide Youth Uchinanchu Festival, various workshops are offered in addition to events, in an effort to promote friendship and idea sharing among next-generation Okinawans. For example, at the 2012 festival held in Brazil, an international meeting was held where 150 participants held small-group discussions on the themes of “sustainable use of networks,” “activities to spread awareness of Uchinaguchi,” and “creation of new cultures.” From these workshops and events, the WYUA adopted the “Youth Declaration.” At the international conferences held during the festivals in the USA and Germany, discussions were held on themes such as “Uchinanchu networks,” “human resources development,” “cultural inheritance,” “peace education,” and “natural environment.” At every conference, the next-generation Okinawans agree that it is necessary to maintain a peaceful world, spread the *shimakutuba* (Ryukyu languages), and cherish the bonds among Okinawans around the world in order to ensure cultural inheritance and maintain the identity of the Okinawan people.

In the 4 years since WYUA was formed, it has developed various plans full of youthful vigor; for example, Ryukyu Stomp is a creative performance that incorporates Okinawan qualities into stomp (body percussion). By participating in the performance, young Okinawans from around the world, who often speak different

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[18] Since a list of members is not available, the total number of WYUA members is unknown. There are about 60 members working at the WYUA Okinawa headquarters, both students and adults combined (according to the hearing investigation).

Table 2.3 WYUA activity log

Year	Month	WYUA's activities
2011	10	An international youth conference was held at the 5th Worldwide Uchinanchu Festival, and WYUA was established. A proposal was submitted to the governor of Okinawa
	10	Performed at the main stage of the Okinawa Cellular Stadium at the 5th Worldwide Uchinanchu Festival (Ryukyu Stomp by a total of 80 members)
	11	Exhibited at the International Cooperation and Exchange Festival 2011 organized by JICA Okinawa International Center
	12	Held an opinion exchange meeting at Training Programme for Young Leaders for China organized by JICA Okinawa International Center
	–	Ryukyu Stomp performance at events in Okinawa (3 times)
	–	Regular meeting every Thursday
2012	4	Implemented Kincho fieldwork (theme: experiencing the foreign cultures)
	5	Held a meeting for studying the history of Okinawan emigration (cooperation by Okinawa NGO Center)
	7	Introduction of activities at 2012 Utina-Junior-Study program organized by Okinawa Prefecture
	7	Planned and organized the 1st Worldwide Youth Uchinanchu Festival in Brazil 2012. Sao Paulo Declaration from the International Youth Conference to the governor of Okinawa
	8–9	Case introduction at the 2nd Hawaii Next-Generation Conference
	9	Held a photo session at the "Passing down the hope of peace to our descendants project" organized by Okinawa Prefecture
	10	Dispatched interpreters for "Miss International 2012 in Okinawa" held by the Miss International Committee
	10	Held a debrief of the 1st Worldwide Youth Uchinanchu Festival in Brazil 2012
	11	Exhibited at the International Cooperation and Exchange Festival 2012 organized by JICA Okinawa International Center
	–	Ryukyu Stomp performance at events in Okinawa (2 times)
	–	Visiting lecture at schools in Okinawa (2 times)
	–	Regular meeting every Thursday
2013	2	Implemented part of The Ship for World Youth Leaders 2012 program, held by the Cabinet Office (cross-cultural understanding course)
	4	Held MIXED NATURE—Okinawan immigration exhibition and live Okinawan ethnic music, organized by volunteers from the University of the Ryukyus and Okinawa International University, Worldwide Youth Uchinanchu Association, and Naha City Central Shopping Street Union
	5	Held Kincho fieldwork: what in Okinawa reminds you of foreign countries?
	6	Held a fieldwork session in the south of Okinawa's main island
	6	Held a fieldwork session for getting to know and think about the Futenma base problems
	7	Planned and organized the 2nd Worldwide Youth Uchinanchu Festival in America 2013
	8	Held Fiesta Okinawa x Bolivia, organized by Icharivamos, NPO Lequio Wings, and WYUA
	8	Accepted 2013 Utina-Junior-Study program organized by Okinawa Prefecture (Comprehensive Study I)

(continued)

Table 2.3 (continued)

Year	Month	WYUA's activities
	8	Cohosted a fundraising lecture celebrating 105th anniversary of Okinawan immigrants in Brazil
	9–10	Organized an accomplishment report exhibition of "Passing down the hope of peace to our descendants project" organized by Okinawa Prefecture
	10–11	One trainee (from Peru) for the 2013 Nakagusuku Training Program for Children of Okinawan Emigrants accepted for corporate training
	11	Exhibited at the International Cooperation and Exchange Festival 2013, organized by JICA Okinawa International Center
	12	Held a debrief of the 2nd Worldwide Youth Uchinanchu Festival in America 2013
	12	Cooperated in the operation of "Come on out! Supporters of Utina Network 'Big Reunion'" sponsored by Okinawa International Exchange & Human Resources Development Foundation
	–	Regular meeting every Thursday
2014	3	Produced a short film on emigrants from Nishihara town for Iine! Nishihara Film Festival, organized by Nishihara town
	5	Organized an Okinawan ethnic music festival "WAHAHA"
	6	Held a fundraiser for the 3rd Worldwide Youth Uchinanchu Festival in Germany 2014
	7–8	Planned and organized the 3rd Worldwide Youth Uchinanchu Festival in Germany 2014
	8	Accepted 2014 Utina-Junior-Study program organized by Okinawa Prefecture (Migration Study II)
	8	Planned and organized Colonia Okinawa Youth Future Conference (Bolivia), announced Colonia Okinawa Youth Future Declaration
	10	Held an activity report party celebrating the 3rd anniversary of the founding of WYUA
	10	Held a debrief of the 3rd Worldwide Youth Uchinanchu Festival in Germany 2014
	11	Exhibited at the International Cooperation and Exchange Festival 2014, organized by JICA Okinawa International Center
	–	Visiting lecture at schools in Okinawa (4 times)
	–	Regular meeting every Thursday

Source: Prepared based on the materials distributed by WYUA and hearing investigation

languages and dialects, can overcome language barriers and share a sense of unity as Okinawans. In addition to this, various music, film, and animation events are often planned to promote international exchange through youthful creativity.

2.6 In Conclusion: Development of Soft Power and a Global Network Using an Island Hub

This chapter introduced how Okinawa, a small insular prefecture that sent many migrants overseas during the modern period, has been serving as a hub for connecting Okinawans around the world through Okinawan hometown associations



Fig. 2.3 Structural change of Okinawan network (**a**) before 1980’s (**b**) after the holding of the Worldwide Uchinanchu Festival in 1990 (**c**) after the establishment of WUB in 1997

that are part of a global network. Since the inaugural Worldwide Uchinanchu Festival in 1990, this has led to the establishment of an economic exchange network (WUB) and a next-generation youth network (WYUA). Figure 2.3 is a schematic overview of how Okinawan hometown associations scattered around the world and Okinawa Prefecture, the homeland to immigrants, are connected.

From the beginning of the twentieth century, when the land allocation system was abolished and people gained freedom to travel, the small insular prefecture of Okinawa began to send many migrants to other areas in the Asia-Pacific region and countries in South America due to demographic and economic pressure. Some of these migrants settled permanently in their host societies and formed Okinawan hometown associations, such as Okinawa *kenjinkai* and *shichosonkai* as a strategy to adapt within these host societies. These various associations engaged in activities to support mutual assistance among the Okinawans overseas in their host societies, which led to the exchange of human resources, materials, money, and information between them and their homeland, Okinawa. In addition, these overseas Okinawan hometown associations provided significant financial and material assistance toward postwar reconstruction of their homeland Okinawa, which was destroyed in battle in 1945. At this stage, the Okinawan hometown associations and their common homeland were linked individually (see Fig. 2.3a).

The Worldwide Uchinanchu Festival, held in 1990, changed this to a “one-to-many” relationship (see Fig. 2.3b), where the homeland Okinawa served as a hub to connect the Okinawan hometown associations, primarily *kenjinkais*. This is what Shiramizu (2006) described as a hub-type network; however, as *kenjinkais* in South America were already communicating with each other, an area network was locally developed. At this stage, the outline of a transborder global network of Okinawans overseas emerged.

Due to the establishment of WUB in 1997, this was reorganized as a distributed network on a many-to-many basis, where WUB chapters often connect with each other without going through the homeland Okinawa (see Fig. 2.3c). Examples of this chain of interaction include business exchange among the WUB chapters, a study abroad program from South America to Hawaii, and the Worldwide Uchinanchu Conference and Worldwide Uchinanchu Festival. One could say that the worldwide network of Okinawans overseas has been enriched and deepened, and due to the establishment of WYUA for next-generation Okinawans, the network is becoming multilayered.

In modern history, Okinawans overseas became stronger amid conflicts with host societies, discrimination, and feelings of inferiority. Regardless, Okinawans overseas were able to maintain their identity as people of Japanese descent and, more specifically, as Okinawans. In the second half of the twentieth century, however, they incorporated the image of "internationality" as they became conscious of a new global identity that accompanies a sense of pride. Now, Okinawans living in multicultural countries around the world have voluntarily crossed borders and are connected as an ethnic group, forming a global network and exploring a new social space.

The history and culture of Okinawa are believed to be what is connecting this network. Kinjo (2010) argues that the cultural core of the Okinawan network is *chimugukuru* (compassion) and that the Okinawan culture is represented by a combination of the spiritual climate summarized in *chimugukuru* and traditional entertainment as artistic expressive means, such as *shamisen*, *minyo*, *butou*, and *eisa*, which indivisibly united with *Uchinaguchi* (*shimakutuba*) or the Okinawan language. The reason the spreading of *shimakutuba* is discussed every year at WYUA's international conference is that Okinawans living in the homeland and those living in multicultural countries around the world have realized that the language culture *Uchinaguchi* is important as a result of pursuing a common ethnic identity.

There is an increased awareness of Okinawan history (including language) among Okinawans both overseas and living in the homeland. For example, in March 2006, the Okinawa Prefectural Assembly established September 18 as the "Day of Shimakutuba." According to Kinjo (2010), this is a result of Okinawa Prefectural Assembly members' visit to South America to take part in a ceremony commemorating the 100th anniversary of the Okinawan migration to Peru. They were deeply impressed with how these Okinawans treasured *shimakutuba* and were told by the Okinawans there to "cherish *uchinaguchi* if you are an *uchinanchu*." Kinjo (2010) points out that the presence of Okinawan communities overseas, where *shimakutuba* is preserved better than in present-day Okinawa, has invigorated the people of Okinawa today.

Takeshi Onaga, whose catchphrase was "identity over ideology," won the Okinawa gubernatorial election at the end of 2014. To confirm and ensure Okinawa's identity, communicating with Okinawan communities overseas is essential. It is expected in the future that Okinawa Prefecture and the Okinawan communities overseas will be connected in various fields multilaterally and that their network will be reinforced. It is likely that the Okinawan network pursuing peace and connected through culture will also become a source of "soft power" for Okinawa.

Since the modern period, Okinawa, a small insular prefecture and the most remote from Japan's mainland, has been considered underdeveloped in every aspect—politics, economy, society, and culture—and dependent upon its relationship with Japan's mainland. In terms of the cultural aspect, however, the current

Okinawa already has independence and uniqueness, incorporating "internationality" through links with the Okinawan communities overseas. It is believed that the cultural independence will lead to mental (and perhaps even some economic) independence.

The Okinawan global network discussed in this chapter is a case example of a small island off the coast of a developed country; therefore, careful consideration is necessary when determining whether these strategies and initiatives could be applied to small islands in developing countries. However, Okinawa has demonstrated that even a highly dependent insular region can form an independent and transborder network and social space under the right circumstances and with the support of its people, and I believe that this can be a model useful to further studies of insular societies and insular cultures.

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Chapter 3
Ryukyu Kingdom Diplomacy with Japan and the Ming and Qing Dynasties

Kazuyuki Tomiyama

3.1 Introduction

This chapter investigates primarily the characteristics of diplomatic relations of the Ryukyu Kingdom, existing from the mid-fourteenth century until 1879, as well as the ways in which the kingdom responded to the international context surrounding it.

Before turning to that topic, however, an overview of Ryukyu history will be helpful.

As an island chain comprising over 160 islands and islets, the Ryukyu archipelago has distinguishing island and marine characteristics. In terms of historical periodization, the period from several tens of thousands of years ago to about the tenth-century C.E. is the prehistoric period of Ryukyu history. During this long period, which consisted of a hunter-gatherer economy centered on activities such as fishing, there was no formation of a state. With the advent of agriculture (e.g. dry crop farming) around the tenth century under the influence of the Kyushu region at the southern end of the Japanese archipelago (including the migration of peoples to the Ryukyus), small states began to form in the Ryukyu archipelago.

Competition between local rulers in the Ryukyu archipelago led eventually to the creation of three small states (Hokuzan, Chuzan, and Nanzan) in the fourteenth century. In the early fifteenth century, the king of Chuzan successfully conquered the other two states, thus establishing the unified Ryukyu Kingdom (called the "First Sho Dynasty"). In 1470, this dynasty was overthrown and replaced by the "Second Sho Dynasty." This Second Sho Dynasty was invaded by the armies of the Shimazu family rulers of Japan's Satsuma Domain (Kagoshima) in 1609, putting the kingdom under Shimazu rule until the kingdom's dissolution in 1879.

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From the fourteenth century until the Ryukyu invasion by the Shimazu in 1609, the Ryukyu Kingdom maintained an investiture/tributary relationship with the Chinese Ming Dynasty. This meant that the Ming emperor had granted the title of kingdom to the Ryukyu state, making the latter its "vassal," while the Ryukyu Kingdom, as vassal, paid regular "tribute" (for instance, Ryukyuan products such as sulfur and horses) to the Ming Dynasty. In return, the Ming Dynasty granted rewards (royal crown, Ming clothing, etc.) to the Ryukyu Kingdom, as well as preferential treatment in official trade (tribute trade). The same system was applied to other tributary states. Taking advantage of the Ming Dynasty's investiture/tributary system, the Ryukyu Kingdom actively engaged in intermediary trade between Korean, Japanese, Chinese, and Southeast Asian countries. Indeed, under the preferential policies of the Ming Dynasty, the Ryukyu Kingdom distinguished itself during this period as a trade state that flourished within the far-reaching trade network extending from Southeast Asia to East Asia.

From 1609 to 1879, however, the kingdom came under the rule of the Shimazu family in Japan, while it maintained its investiture/tributary relationship with the Ming and Qing dynasties in China. While the Ryukyu Kingdom preserved its political system (i.e., monarchy), the kingdom's territory was reduced as the Amami Islands, north of the Okinawa Island, came under direct Shimazu control. In other words, it was a period in which the Chinese empire and Japanese state simultaneously extended their control to the Ryukyus.

The Tokugawa shogunate, which governed the Japanese state at the time, had adopted policies to suppress Christianity, such as banning Portuguese ships from coming to Japan. Its prohibitions on Christianity reached the Ryukyu Kingdom through the Shimazu. Thus, like other domains, from 1636 onward an annual survey, called *Kirishitan shumon aratame* (Christian religious affiliation census), was conducted in the Ryukyu Kingdom to reveal the presence of Christians. In other words, the Japanese state's system for exposing Christians had a significant impact, via the Shimazu, on the Ryukyu Kingdom as well.

Japan's system of tax collection also had an impact on the Ryukyu Kingdom. During the Edo period, Japan's tax system was centered around a yearly rice tax based on assessments, or *kenchi* (land surveys), of the entire nation's arable land. Everywhere the status of daimyo families and the ranking and even stipends of samurai households were based on assessed rice production, or *kokudaka* (rice yields). This *kokudaka* system was imposed, via the Shimazu, on the Ryukyu Kingdom as well, making it the kingdom's official form of tax collection, while older methods of tax collection under the Ryukyu regime predating *kokudaka* continued to be applied in villages.

As discussed above the Ryukyu Kingdom was influenced both politically and economically by the Japanese state. Meanwhile, the Ryukyu monarchy (Shuri court) actively adopted Qing Dynasty methods of rule beginning in the late seventeenth century. For instance, it promoted the restructuring of Ryukyuan society, from ruling elites to farming peasants, along Confucian ideological lines based on its understanding and adoption of Qing Dynasty Confucianism. The kingdom remained under the political rule of the Shimazu while gradually strengthening its Ryukyuan identity.

In 1879, the Ryukyu Kingdom, which until then had been a smaller state wedged between the larger states of the Chinese Ming and Qing dynasties and Japan, had its monarchy dissolved by the Japanese Meiji government. Renamed Okinawa Prefecture, the Ryukyu Kingdom was incorporated in the Japanese state, forcing the Ryukyuan people (now Okinawans) to live as a newly established minority group within Japanese society. As a result, Ryukyuan (Okinawan) customs, language, and culture were deemed inferior and looked down upon, and modernity became a process in which Japanization and civilization were intertwined. In 1945, Okinawa's modern period came to an end with the Battle of Okinawa. For 27 years between 1945 and 1972, Okinawa was under military rule by the USA, creating a unique postwar Okinawa that was neither Japanese nor American. As movements to return Okinawa to Japan grew strong among Okinawa residents, the USA ended its military rule in 1972, and Okinawa was again made a Japanese prefecture (Okinawa Prefecture). Nevertheless, issues surrounding US military bases remained unresolved, creating ongoing tension between the Japanese government and Okinawa residents.

3.2 The Ryukyu Kingdom's Status in International Relations

Between 1609 and 1879, the Ryukyu Kingdom maintained close ties in the following ways with the Japanese state and Chinese Ming and Qing dynasties.

In terms of relations with the Japanese state, the major impetus was the 1609 military invasion of the Ryukyu Kingdom by the Shimazu of Satsuma Domain, after which the Ryukyu Kingdom was considered a sub-territory or vassal state (client state) of Satsuma Domain. While the Tokugawa shogunate recognized Satsuma's dominion, or *shioki* (rule), over the Ryukyus, the Ryukyus were never recognized as part of the state proper but rather integrated as a foreign country inside the territorial boundaries of the Japanese state (i.e., the *bakuhan* state system). Hence, via Satsuma Domain, key principles of Japanese state rule, i.e., the ban on Christianity and the *kokudaka* system, had an impact on the Ryukyu Kingdom as well. Following the invasion, Satsuma Domain conducted land surveys for the entire Ryukyu Kingdom, assessing its yield at more than 89,000 *koku*. While the *kokudaka* system would gradually spread to Ryukyu society as well, its concomitant military service requirements, or *gun'yaku* (military duty), were never imposed. Although territorial maps of the country produced by the Tokugawa shogunate included the Ryukyu Kingdom, they did so in way that distinguished it from other daimyo domains.

The Ryukyu Kingdom had become a vassal state (client state) of Satsuma Domain and, with the Amami Islands now under Satsuma's direct control, the territory the kingdom ruled had been reduced as well. Nonetheless, the kingdom preserved the authority of the Ryukyu king to rule generally within its boundaries, albeit with certain restrictions. One method of control used by Satsuma Domain was the permanent stationing of a supervisory official, or *zaiban bugyo* (stationed magistrate), dispatched to the Ryukyus (Maehira 1985; Tokunaga 2005). The *zaiban bugyo*'s responsibilities included surveilling the Ryukyu Kingdom, exposing Christians, and managing the trade with Ming China. In the latter half of the eighteenth century, once Satsuma Domain had started to pursue trade with the Qing Dynasty more actively, the domain began dispatching to the Ryukyus an additional official, called the *toubutsuhow* (Chinese products officer). Unlike the *zaiban bugyo*, who continued to supervise the Ryukyus, the new *toubutsuhow* was stationed in the Ryukyus expressly to manage the Qing trade.

At the same time, the Ryukyu Kingdom's investiture/tributary relationship with the Chinese Ming and Qing dynasties was maintained even after the Shimazu's 1609 Ryukyu invasion up until the dissolution of the Ryukyus as part of their integration into the Japanese state in 1879. Neither the Ming nor the Qing sought to interfere with the internal politics of the Ryukyu Kingdom. Indeed, the Ryukyuans' effort to maintain the investiture/tributary relationship with China is a defining feature of the relationship between the two countries. The investiture ceremony that recognized the Ryukyu king internationally was performed in the Ryukyus by investiture envoys sent in the name of the Chinese emperor. In the Ryukyus, the king's recognition ceremony was regarded as a major event that occurred just once in the life of the king.

The Ryukyu Kingdom's investiture/tributary relationship with the Ming and Qing dynasties in China was a loose one. Moreover, the tribute trade was advantageous for the Ryukyus because it provided tax exemptions on both imports and exports. This is why the Ryukyus actively sought to maintain the tribute trade. The tributary relationship and granting of kingship through investiture were two sides of a single coin that made the investiture/tributary relationship with the Ming and Qing dynasties in China an essential element of royal authority in the Ryukyus.

The Ryukyu Kingdom's foreign relations with the Ming and Qing dynasties and with Japan are summarized in Table 3.1.

To expand on the table, the main points are as follows. Politically speaking, the first characteristic is the requirement that the Ryukyu king and top officials (e.g., Sanshikan) submit an oath pledging their allegiance to Satsuma Domain (the Shimazu daimyo family). In relations with the Chinese Ming and Qing dynasties, there was no such system demanding allegiance. Second, whereas Satsuma Domain dispatched and stationed an official to supervise the Ryukyu Kingdom (i.e., *zaiban bugyo*), there was no such supervisory official sent by the Ming or Qing.

In economic terms, tribute paid to the Ming and Qing consisted of horses, sulfur, handicrafts, and other distinctive Ryukyu products, with some copper obtained from Satsuma Domain. By contrast, tribute paid to Satsuma Domain consisted generally of economic goods, such as grains and cloth, though there was a shift from silver to rice tax (and some brown sugar as a substitute, cloth, etc.). Moreover, in addition to the fixed annual rice tax (*shinobose-mai*) that was submitted to

Table 3.1 The Ryukyu Kingdom's relations with the Ming/Qing Dynasties and Japan

	China	Satsuma	Tokugawa shogunate
Royal title	Chuzan King of the Ryukyus (title granted through investiture)	Governor of the Ryukyus (imposed) > title later restored to Chuzan King	Chuzan King of the Ryukyus
Allegiance	Tribute missions sent once every 2 years	Visit by the crown prince (journey to Kagoshima)	Journey to Edo (travel to Edo by Ryukyuans)
Mission title	*Chokoshi* (mission to pay tribute), *Shinkoshi* (mission to offer incense)	*Nentoshi* (new year mission), *Taishu shukushi* (mission to congratulate the lord)	*Keigashi* (mission of felicitations; sent when new Shogun is installed),
	(Investiture mission sent to Ryukyus)	e.g. *Keichoshi* (mission of congratulations or condolences)	*Shaonshi* (mission of gratitude; sent when new Ryukyu king is installed)
Tribute items	*Shinkohin* (tribute): horses, sulfur, copper, tin, great green turban, etc.	*Shinobose* (tribute): annual rice tax, a portion of which is substituted with brown sugar)	*Shinmotsu* (tribute): incense, ramie cloth, awamori, ambergris, and Ryukyuan lacquerware
Forms of reciprocity	*Hanshihin* (gifts): investiture crown and robes, dragon-patterned cloth (*motan*), calligraphy, etc.	*Hairyobutsu* (gifts): dried bonito, Uji tea, Kokubu tobacco, copper, etc.	*Henreimotsu* (gifts): silver (5000 ryo), cotton (500 bundles), etc.
Calendar system (era names)	Chinese era names	Japanese era names	Japanese era names
Direct supervision	None	Stationed officials, e.g., *zaiban bugyo*	None
Pledges of allegiance	None	Oath (sworn by leaders, from the king to the Sanshikan)	None
Laws	Prohibited from purchasing banned books, ironware, etc. in China	Ban on Christianity and other	Ban on Christianity
Forms of trade	Tribute trade (raw silk, medicinal ingredients, etc.)	Brown sugar, turmeric	None
Mourning	Ming/Qing emperor (7 days)	Satsuma Domain lord (50 days)	Tokugawa shogun (7 days)
Support during emergencies	None (demand for support not made)	Rice, silver (loan)	Rice, silver (contribution)
Intervention in Ryukyu Kingdom judicial decisions	No	Yes	No
Exile lands	No	Yes (Amami Islands)	Yes (Ryukyu Kingdom, including Amami Islands)

Satsuma Domain as tribute, the domain also collected supplemental and provisional taxes as well.

In social terms, the first point is that the Ryukyu Kingdom was used by the Tokugawa shogunate as destination for criminals sentenced to exile (Tomiyama 1987; Minowa 2015). By contrast, exiles were never sent to the Ryukyu Kingdom from Ming or Qing China after 1609.

A second point is that mourning took the following forms. When a Ming or Qing emperor died, there was a 7-day prohibition on architectural and construction projects; song, music, and dance; and hunting and fishing. On the other hand, when the Tokugawa shogun died, there was a 7-day prohibition on performances (song, music, and dance), while the death of the Satsuma Domain lord brought a 50-day prohibition on fishing and hunting and a 30-day suspension of construction projects (Tomiyama 2010). This shows that the greatest mourning-related restrictions on the Ryukyu Kingdom were imposed upon the death of the Satsuma Domain lord, followed next by the death of the Chinese emperor and Tokugawa shogun. It is worth noting that the death of the Ryukyu king was followed by a 50-day prohibition on killing animals, the same as for the Satsuma Domain lord.

The information above suggests that diplomatic relations with the Ming and Qing dynasties were loose, whereas those with the Satsuma Domain reflected relatively strong client ties to Satsuma, including annual taxes (and provisional taxes), a ban on Christianity, and the stationing of a *zaiban bugyo*.

The character of the Ryukyu Kingdom, in which the latter was influenced politically and economically by both China and Japan, has been defined by the author (Tomiyama 2003) as a "dual tributary state" that maintained loose allegiance to the Ming and Qing dynasties in China and a strong client relationship with Satsuma Domain (and Tokugawa shogunate).

3.3 The Ryukyu Kingdom's Perception of Diplomacy

3.3.1 Diplomatic Relations with the Ming and Qing Dynasties

Subsequent to Satsuma control in the Ryukyu Kingdom, the expression *tow yamato no o-toriai* (dealings with China and Japan) was used frequently. This expression can be a reference about Ryukyu diplomacy. Higashionna Kanjun, who was the first person to take note of it, has this to say about the expression:

> In the Okinawan language, diplomacy is referred to as *toriai* (dealings). This word refers to all interactions, official or private. In times past, when used in the sense of international dealings, i.e. diplomacy, politicians would speak of "*o-toriai* with China and Japan." When speaking in slightly more precise terms, they would refer to "*o-toriai* with China and *go-hoko* [service] to Japan." (Higashionna 1978)

As this shows, Higashionna understood *o-toriai* to mean “all interactions, official or private.” To be more precise, the term *toriai* (without the honorific prefix o-; Okinawan: *tuiee*) refers to a range of private interactions, from relationships between men and women to those between relatives, whereas the term *o-toriai* (with the honorific prefix o-; Okinawan: *utuiee*) refers to official interactions between states, i.e., diplomacy. As such, a difference needs to be made between the two terms.

How, then, did the Ryukyu court perceive its *o-toriai* (dealings) in this sense of diplomacy? I will look at the term’s use in a work titled *Kotogoto nukigaki*.[1] *Kotogoto nukigaki* was compiled by the Ryukyu court toward the end of the Ryukyu Kingdom in the 1870s. The opening section, on the reigns of Ryukyu kings, lists the dates of birth and death of each Ryukyu king, as well as their reign dates, from the time of the Tenson lineage through King Sho Iku. With a total 17 sections, the work preserves select documents that offer, as it were, a survey of state governance in the Ryukyus. The second and third sections summarize *Tow o-toriai no koto* (dealings with China) and *Yamato o-toriai no koto* (dealings with Japan), respectively.

The section on “dealings with China” is distinguished by its broad handling of basic, important issues in relations with the Chinese Ming and Qing dynasties. For instance, it records that the tributary relationship at the center of Ming/Qing diplomacy began in 1372 with King Satto and notes the investiture relationship by listing the names of the investiture envoys from the time of King Bunei (1404) through King Sho Tai (1866), the last of the Ryukyu kings.

Its various entries pertain to the tributary/investiture relationship, including brief histories of *kansho* (“official students,” i.e., students sent to study in Ming and Qing Chin) and villagers of Kume, silver (*totowgin*) for use in trading, the types (sulfur, copper, tin) and quantities of tribute, a repatriation ship (convoy ship) sent to Fuzhou to return Chinese castaways who washed ashore in the Ryukyus, a listing of the 36 Ryukyu islands (including the Amami Islands) and their corresponding Chinese names (which used Chinese characters to represent an island’s name, such as Kudaka, phonetically), and the size of investiture missions (more than 400–600 people).

In particular, entries regarding tribute ships (*shinkosen*, i.e., large and small Chinese ships), envoy ships (*sekkosen*), convoy ships (*gososen*), and the like merit special attention. First, an entry titled *Totosen no koto* (Regarding China-bound ships) reveals the size and tonnage of tribute ships (approximately 40 m long by 11 m wide, at 162 t per ship). Second, detailed information is given on ship personnel for each kind of ship. For instance, in the case of tribute ships, the large China ships (also referred to as *togosen*, i.e., lead ship) carried approximately 120 members on board, including 26 crewmen, as well as the senior envoy’s entourage of ten people (nine junior staff per single senior staff member) and junior envoy’s entourage of 11 senior and junior staff. In the case of the *hosen*-style lead ship used to pilot the mission, the ship carried ten senior and junior welcome staff, a senior and junior captain (one each), three aides, and three crewmen. In other words, the work is a comprehensive record of the types of ships that supported the functioning of diplomatic relations through tribute/investiture, as well as the forms of small group organization of senior and junior staff that corresponded to each.

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[1] *Kotogoto nukigaki*. Okinawa Prefectural Library.

The above generally describes *tow no o-toriai* with China as summarized by the Ryukyu court. At the same time, there were many specific diplomatic concerns that arose outside them. One example would be the issue of gifts made to the retired Qianlong emperor following his abdication of the throne in favor of his son, the Jiaqing emperor, in 1796. Another would be the issue of congratulations to the same retired emperor 4 years later as he approached his 90th birthday.

In the former case, the Qing court informed the Ryukyus that their tribute should be presented to the reigning Jiaqing emperor. Despite that, the Ryukyus sought advice from within the court and the Kakou tsuzi "translators in Fuzhou," ultimately deciding to present gifts to the retired emperor as well. The Ryukyus were *not* reproached for having done so. The issue of congratulations upon the 90th birthday of the retired emperor was slightly complicated. In 1798, as the retired emperor turned 88, the Ryukyu court argued that the retired emperor should naturally be presented congratulatory gifts. By contrast, Kume village, which specialized in diplomatic relations with China, argued the opposite view that presents should not be sent, pointing out that no congratulations had been sent on the occasion of the emperor's 70th or 80th birthday and no precedent for doing so existed going as far back as the Ming Dynasty. Kume village's reasoning stressed the importance of "strict adherence to precedent in dealings with China," while the court, fearing a "breach of etiquette" if it overlooked congratulations for the retired emperor's 90th birthday, remained intent on sending congratulations given the "great benevolence" the Qianlong Emperor had bestowed upon the court during his reign and the fact that other countries had been requested to offer congratulations to the retired emperor.[2] In the end, the retired emperor died before his 90th birthday at the age of 89, making the issue of congratulations, which were not sent, a moot one.

As this shows, what appear on the surface to be vexing matters of etiquette are in fact issues that reveal a facet of "dealings with China" (i.e., diplomatic relations with the Qing). Specifically, the Ryukyu Kingdom did not act solely on the basis of precedent. It not only paid attention to developments in other tributary states but also deliberated and determined what particular steps it should take.

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[2] *Atome sengi kankei shiryo* (facsimile, provisional title). Urasoe City Library.

3.3.2 Diplomatic Relations with Japan

Next I will consider “dealings with Japan” (i.e., Satsuma Domain). The section on “dealings with Japan” in *Kotogoto nukigaki* has a mere five entries. Their general content is as follows:

The first entry records that the Ryukyus were “conquered” by the armies of Kabayama Gonzaemon Hisataka and others of Satsuma Domain during the reign of King Sho Nei in 1609 (Keicho 14) and that the Ryukyus were subsequently placed “under Satsuma control.”

The second entry records that the first land survey of the entire Ryukyus was conducted in 1610 and that the *kokudaka* value of the Ryukyu Kingdom’s lands was set at just over 88,000 *koku* in 1611. However, as a result of registered values that were in error and missing official values (*shuindaka*), there were variances that ultimately resulted in an increased *kokudaka* valuation of just over 94,230 *koku* for the Ryukyus in 1727.

The third entry is about the annual rice tax paid to Satsuma Domain. It records that tax payments in kind immediately after the land survey were changed to payments in silver and then to rice from around 1620. The basic annual tax by the end of the kingdom (1870) was just over 7632 *koku*.

The fourth entry is also about Satsuma’s collection of rice tax (supplemental tax). The amount of tax fluctuated until about 1660, after which it more or less stabilized until the end of the kingdom at just over 1036 *koku*.

The fifth entry records that Satsuma Domain became Kagoshima Prefecture following its dissolution in 1871 as part of the Meiji government’s abolition of the han system and creation of prefectures. Payments of the Ryukyu Kingdom’s annual rice tax were transferred to Kagoshima Prefecture. The basic annual tax, including transportation, was just over 11,777 *koku* (with 970,000 *kin* of brown sugar substituted for 3680 *koku* of rice).

In other words, with the exception of the Shimazu invasion of the Ryukyus, all the entries relate to taxation. Needless to say, there was more to relations between the Ryukyu Kingdom and Satsuma Domain than this. Important issues would include the strict restrictions on Christianity that extended to the Ryukyus via Satsuma Domain. Every year the Ryukyu court produced a *Kirishitan shumon aratamecho* (Christian religious affiliation census register) which it submitted in accordance with Satsuma Domain requirements.

Additionally, as noted above, the kingdom’s crown prince (heir apparent) was obligated to visit Satsuma Domain to demonstrate his allegiance.

A “journey to Edo” from the Ryukyus was also customary, with a “mission of felicitations” (*keiga shisetsu*) sent on the occasion of a new shogun’s installation and a “mission of gratitude” (*shaon shisetsu*) sent on the occasion of a new Ryukyu king’s installation. For the Ryukyu Kingdom, this “journey to Edo” was a major diplomatic ceremony comparable to its reception of investiture missions, i.e., *kansen* (investiture ships), from China. Each of these was an important issue in diplomatic relations with Satsuma Domain and the Tokugawa shogunate, yet neither is mentioned in *Kotogoto nukigaki*.

3.3.3 The Issue of Distribution Channels for **Toubutsu** *(Chinese Goods)*

I will look at the concrete issue of distribution channels for Chinese goods into Japanese markets that arose in the early nineteenth century. The investiture ships that carried the investiture mission were also heavily loaded with goods that the Ryukyus purchased in exchange for the mission's purchases of Japanese marine products (e.g., kombu).

This form of commerce is referred to as *kansen boeki* (investiture ship trade; also *hangaa boeki*, or assessment trade) (Tomiyama 2000). Chinese goods, such as herbal medicine, that were obtained through the investiture ship trade were sold in Japanese markets via Satsuma Domain, giving the Ryukyu court the means of repaying its debt of silver to Satsuma. In 1800, however, when the goods purchased from the investiture mission as part of this investiture ship trade were sent as always to Satsuma Domain, the Tokugawa shogunate's tightened market restrictions on Chinese goods resulted in a severe directive from the shogunate to Satsuma Domain: either return the goods to the Ryukyus or burn them. In this instance, Satsuma Domain took steps to purchase all the goods, enabling the Ryukyus to repay its silver debt.

In 1808, however, the investiture ship trade faced an even more dire situation because Satsuma Domain had instructed the Ryukyus in advance to stop any transportation into the Ryukyus of Chinese goods (herbal medicine) carried by the investiture mission on its ships. Despite this, the investiture mission did transport its goods into the Ryukyus, obligating the Ryukyus to purchase the entire lot, as was customary practice.

Satsuma Domain, however, refused shipment of the goods to Kagoshima, thereby closing off all distribution channels for the trade goods purchased by the Ryukyus. Seeking to resolve the situation, the Sessei and Sanshikan submitted a petition to Satsuma Domain in the August of the same year.

Their main points of the petition were the following. The Ryukyus managed its regime through its "friendship" (*tsuyu*) with both Satsuma Domain and China. The purchase of trade goods from China as part of the king's once-in-a-generation investiture ceremony was "long-standing etiquette" (*korai kara no reigi*). Hence, if distribution channels for Chinese goods into Japan were closed, it would impede "friendship" with China in the future. Not only a matter of "vital importance to the Ryukyu Kingdom," the preservation of distribution channels was also a necessary one to sustain service to Satsuma Domain. Such were the arguments made in the petition.[3]

It is unknown whether or not this petition contributed directly to resolving the situation. Given that Satsuma continued to accept Chinese goods obtained through the investiture ship trade for sale in Japanese markets, it seems to have had at least some effect.

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[3] *Ryukyukan monjo*, vol. 4, entries for Jiaqing [Jp. Kakei] 13 (1808). University of the Ryukyus Library.

3.4 In Lieu of a Conclusion

As discussed above, relations with Ming and Qing China and Japan (Satsuma Domain) were closely intertwined. From 1609 to 1879, the Ryukyu Kingdom developed such diplomatic relationship with China and Japan and was more than just a passive and heteronomous entity in its balancing of China (Ming and Qing dynasties) and Japan. Its diplomatic relations with these two countries were rife with contradiction, yet the Ryukyus maintained its regime through its compromises with both. This was the meaning expressed by "dealings with China and Japan."

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Chapter 4
Language Revitalization Efforts in the Ryukyus

Masahide Ishihara

4.1 Introduction[1]

In February of 2009, *Atlas of the World's Languages in Danger* (3rd edition) listed six languages in Japan as endangered. Six of them – Amami, Kunigami, Okinawan, Miyako, Yaeyama, and Yonaguni – are spoken in the Ryukyuan Islands (see also Moseley 2009).[2] These languages are in danger of extinction since younger generations have not acquired them as their first languages (Ishihara 2014a). The decline of the languages began in the second half of the nineteenth century, when Japan's central government enacted an assimilation policy that encouraged people of the islands to speak Japanese and discouraged them from speaking their local languages (see Heinrich 2012; Kondo 2014; Oguma 1998; Yoshimura 2014 among others). None of the languages were taught as a subject at school. After Japan was defeated in the Pacific War, the US Military governed the Ryukyuan Islands for 27 years from April 1945 to May 1972.[3] During the US occupation of the Ryukyus, the language policy of encouraging people to speak Japanese was not an official policy of the Government of the Ryukyus.[4] However, teachers continued to encourage students to speak Japanese and discouraged them from speaking their local languages (Ishihara 2010; Masiko 2014; Oguma 1998): Japanese was the language of instruction and all the textbooks were imported from Japan. Beside this

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[1] This chapter is a translated and revised version of Ishihara (2015).

[2] http://www.unesco.org/culture/en/endangeredlanguages/atlas

[3] The Amami Islands returned to Japan in December of 1953.

[4] There were two governments in the Ryukyus during the US occupation: the United States Civil Administrations of the Ryukyu Islands and the Government of the Ryukyu Islands. The former was above the latter.

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encouragement of speaking Japanese, the development of mass communication and urbanization led people to use more and more Japanese and less and less local languages. Under these conditions, majority of children did not have opportunities to listen and speak the languages of the islands. As a result, the number of speakers declined. After the reversion of the Ryukyus Islands to Japan in 1972, the decline in the use of the language did not stop since Japanese had already become the everyday language for the majority of people.

In around 2000, people who were concerned with the possibility of extinction of their local languages started to revitalize the languages. They started to teach the languages not only to children but also to adults. The Prefectural Government of Okinawa has established their policy on the Ryukyuan languages. They state in their official documents that the languages of the Ryukyus are at the core of the Ryukyuan culture (Okinawa Prefecture 2005, 2012). Furthermore, they designated September 18th as *Shimakutuba-no Hi*, or Community Language Day, in 2006, according to a prefectural ordinance anonymously passed by the Prefectural Assembly.[5] Following the move of Okinawa Prefecture, the town of Yoron in Kagoshima Prefecture enacted a similar ordinance that designates February 18 as *Yunnuhutuba-no Hi*, or Yoron Language Day.[6]

Since 2000, there have been a lot of activities toward the revitalization of Ryukyuan languages by private organizations including NPOs and governmental organizations. This chapter describes revitalization efforts toward endangered languages called Shimakutuba (community/local language) in the Ryukyu Islands in the past few years. This chapter is based on my research of press reporting, Internet updates, and interviews (including telephone and e-mail interviews) conducted in 2013 and 2014.

4.2 Administrative Efforts

At the beginning, I would like to introduce four examples of administrative agencies' efforts to preserve indigenous Okinawan languages. First, Department of Culture, Tourism and Sports of the Okinawa Prefecture Government (OPG) implemented the "*Shimakutuba* prefectural campaign" and held the first *Shimakutuba* Citizen's Rally on September 18, 2013. At the rally, then Vice governor Kurayoshi Takara read the speech of then Governor Hirokazu Nakaima "The languages that Okinawan people have been passing down in each community are the basis of Okinawan culture. They identify Okinawa. We want to pass on our culture to future generations" (*Ryukyu Shimpo*, September 19, 2013). Masaharu Kina, the Okinawa Prefectural Assembly Chairman of the time, gave a speech in *Shimakutuba*. He talked about when the assembly set up Shimakutuba Day in 2006, saying, "It is important that momentum has grown mildly to reach what we have today. I hope that people start using *Shimakutuba* at home." The Okinawa Prefectural Assembly enacted a regulation drafted by local government to promote *Shimakutuba* and set up *Shimakutuba* Day, to be held September 18 every year. A memorial symposium and *Uchinaa Shibai* (Okinawan theater) were held in September of 2006 as part of the ordinance. Yet although various efforts have taken to deal with *Shimakutuba*, no campaign has been hosted by the OPG afterward. Assembly Chairman Kina rightly said "mildly grown," since it required 7 years for the prefectural government to hold the *Shimakutuba* Citizen's Rally. The OPG conducted an extensive survey about people's awareness of Shimakutuba in 2013. It was a prefectural-wide survey of residents from Kunigami to Yonaguni village (the *Shimakutuba*-specific survey was the first attempt for the OPG). The OPG released its findings and developed an implementation plan to promote dissemination of *Shimakutuba* (Okinawa-ken 2013). It does not give details of the plan yet delineates a picture of the future one decade from now.

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[5] *Shima* means "island" in Okinawan language. It also mean community or locality. *Kutuba* means language. Therefore, *Shimakutuba* means an "island's language" and/or "community/local language."

[6] *Yunnu* means "yoron" in the local language of the Yoron Island. *Hutuba* means language. Therefore, *yunnuhutuba* means a "yoron language."

As a first approach, the Department of Culture, Tourism and Sports published the "Shimakutuba Calendar (a collection of proverbs called *kuganikutuba*)" (see Fig. 4.1) and a guidebook "*Katati nndana Shimakutuba* (Let's speak Shimakutuba)"



Fig. 4.1 Shimakutuba calendar

(see Fig. 4.2) in 2014. The guidebook can be downloaded from the web page of Department of Culture, Tourism and Sports (http://shimakutuba.okinawa.jp/).

The "Shimakutuba Calendar" is a daily pad-type calendar with *kuganiktuba* (proverbs) in it. It covers the languages and proverbs of northern Okinawa, central southern Okinawa, Miyako, Yaeyama, and Yonaguni. Not like as Shimakutuba textbooks sold in bookstores, the handbook not only includes Naha or Shuri dialect but also includes three other dialects (Mawashi, Naha; Hirara, Miyako; and Ishigaki, Ishigaki), and it features everyday conversation such as "self-introduction," "greeting," "show someone the way," and "take calls." This indicates the OPG recognizes and respects the diversity.

A second approach that aimed to preserve Okinawan indigenous languages was made by the Naha City Board of Education. In 2013, it published the supplementary reading material *Chikati Ashibana Shimakutuba* (Let's use and play in



Fig. 4.2 Shimakutuba handbook

Shimakutuba) for lower and upper grades and has distributed it to all the 1–9 graders enrolled in the city (see Fig. 4.3).

As far as I know, no other school board had developed *Shimakutuba* material. It was revolutionary approach since it provided children with the opportunity to make conversation with their parents and grandparents in Shimakutuba. Shigehisa Karimata, the editorial supervisor, mentioned the purpose of this reading material in the final chapter (p. 70).

> We communicate though language, it helps us tell someone what we see, hear, think and feel. It is also needed to develop our thinking and gain knowledge. It helps us to express and convey the distant past and the future. Language is what truly matters to human beings. . . .
>
> Within the Okinawa prefecture, the languages of Okinawa, Miyako and Yaeyama are distinct from each other. Moreover dialects vary from island to island, and region to region. The language of the southern part and the northern part of Okinawa differ, and within Naha city, the dialects of Shuri, Naha, Oroku, and Mawashi are slightly different.
>
> The word "*shima*" means "hometown", therefore *Shimakutuba* is the languages of hometowns. *Shimakutuba* is not just one language rather each hometown has its own *Shimakutuba*. . .
>
> In the past, dialects were banned from use since they were considered inferior to standard language. That led to a decline in the number of *Shimakutuba* speakers from each community. However today's generation has a renewed sense of the importance and urgency to speak *Shimakutuba*.
>
> Learning *Shimakutuba* can enrich our understanding of local culture and language. It also promotes better understanding about the nature around us. *Shimakutuba* helps build a


ちかてぃ あしばな しまくとぅば
つかって あそぼう
しまくとぅば
低学年用
那覇市
ちかてぃ あしばな しまくとぅば
使って 遊ぼう しまくとぅば
高学年用
那覇市

Fig. 4.3 Supplementary Shimakutuba reading material

> foundation of multicultural and multilingual education for our future generations' learning. Please make use of this book and Shimakutuba learning to help give children a global view and cultivate an attitude of respect for people who have different sets of values.

The central character in the *Shimakutuba* book for lower graders is the third-grade-boy Taakee. His sister Miikii, their parents, grandparents on the father's side, and their pet cat and dog appear as well. On the other hand, in the book for upper graders, the central character is Miikii. The chapter divisions of both books are "family," "express feelings," "everyday life," "play," "events," and "words of interest."

For the third approach fostering Okinawan indigenous languages, I would like to introduce the activities at Nishihara Central Community Center. The center provided four lectures concerned with Shimakutuba in 2014. I consolidated information from the Nishihara Town website into Table 4.1, which summarizes the scope of each of the lectures.

The lectures were only two hours a week, so the total number of hours was not sufficient. Yet, the approach deserves recognition since the center provided Shimakutuba lectures for specific purposes and skill levels for ordinary citizens, educators, and children. The center also sets up an opportunity for students to demonstrate the results of their studies as a performance. The Shimakutuba promotional program *Abiti Chikatindana Shimakutuba* (Let's try and use Shimakutuba) was held in February 1, 2015 (see Fig. 4.4). As mentioned above,

Table 4.1 Nishihara Town Shimakutuba lectures 2014

	Name of the lecture	Number of classes	Enrollment limit	Target	Purpose
1	Shimakutuba teacher training course	10	15	All town people who are interested in Shimakutuba	To train local Shimakutuba teachers, to promote, and to succeed at this
2	Shimakutuba lecture for teachers	3	15	School teachers and other school personnel, Shimakutuba teachers	To teach about Shimakutuba through history using greetings, children's songs, and action songs of Nishihara
3	Narati Chikati Shimakutuba (Let's learn and use Shimakutuba)	5	20	Students from 5 to 12 years old	To teach basic Shimakutuba such as greeting, self-introduction, children's songs, action songs, and folk songs
4	Lectureon Okinawa theater	10	30	Elementary school students to adults who live, work, or study in the town	To practice and perform Okinawan theater in a group to promote and advance Shimakutuba



しまくとぅば継承・推進事業
あびてぃ ちかてぃんーだな しまくとぅば
入場無料

第1部 子どもしまくとぅば講座・うちなー芝居講座 成果発表会

うたあそび・お話
意見発表など

歌 劇
仲直り三良小

喜 劇
奉る(年の夜)

第２部 劇団花道 原作：津波盛廣

あむとぅぬしちゃ
〜輝け老人パワー〜

●日時：平成27年2月1日(日) ●開場：13時30分 開演：14時〜

●場所：さわふじ未来ホール ●入場無料※入場整理券が必要です。

入場整理券配布日:H27/1/19(月) 9時〜なくなり次第終了。西原町中央公民館大ホール ※お一人様2枚まで。

主催：西原町教育委員会 問合せ先：西原町中央公民館(098-945-3657)

この事業は沖縄振興特別推進交付金を用いています。

Fig. 4.4 A flier for Shimakutuba promotion project

Shimakutuba varies from one region to another; therefore, language maintenance and inheritance require regional efforts. The approach of Nishihara town will be the foremost example of this.

For the last example of administrative approaches supporting indigenous Ryukyuan languages, I would like to introduce the project carried by Tokyo University of Foreign Studies, the International Center for Japanese Studies, Setouchi Town Library, and Setouchi Municipal Museum of Kagoshima Prefecture with financial assistance from Hakuho Foundation Research Grant for Children's Education. *Setouchi no Shimaguchi* editorial committee published *Setouchi no Shimaguchi* (Community Languages in Setouchi) in March 2013. Tatsuro Maeda, a member of the editorial committee, said as follows:

> History background of Amami and Shimaguchi
>
> The dialect was banned as the school education has started in Amami. "Correcting dialect" had begun in school, sometime with punishment and expanded in the society of the island.
>
> Amami was under a colonial industrial structure in the Satsuma era. Therefore to seek a job, people had to immigrate to Hanshin (Osaka to Kobe) or Tokyo areas. People who spoke *Shimaguchi* were ridiculed. Such experiences caused the people on Amami to avoid using *Shimaguchi* on the island too. The local people now think that this is one of the reasons the number of *Shimaguchi* speakers declined. I believe *Setouchi no Shimaguchi* could help people's attitudes to become more positive toward *Shimaguchi*.
>
> *Shimaguchi* in Setouchi Town
>
> Setouchi Town is made up of the southern part of Amami Island and three inhabited islands. Three villages and one town were incorporated as a town in 1955. Each region has its own tradition and history, but, from the 1980s, people were aware of a crisis because their children hadn't inherited *Shimaguchi*. Thus, they started some activity to promote it. First, *Kodomo Shimaguchi Taikai* (Shimaguchi speech contest for children) was held in 1996, and, with this contest as a start, *Shimaguchi* has been taught to the children through activities at the community center. Elders of the region needed to devote much effort to teaching and making teaching materials. The *Setouchi no Shimaguchi* project was designed to ensure that *Shimaguchi* is handed down to younger generations on a local basis.

Setouchi no Shimaguchi is a booklet with two DVDs (see Fig. 4.5). It allows students to learn Shimaguchi not only by reading a text but also listening to people's



Fig. 4.5 Setouchi no *Shimaguchi*

voices and watching images of actual conversation. The casts of the video clips are local people.

As Maeda said, the *Shimaguchi* spoken in Amami Islands are as rich in diversity as the Shimakutuba spoken in Okinawa Prefecture. To maintain this diversity, active involvement of local administrations is required.

4.3 Private Sector and NPO Efforts

Various approaches toward language revitalization have been taken by NPOs and private sector entities in Okinawa Prefecture. In this section, I would like to describe some recent approaches. One notable example is the establishment of a Shimakutuba liaison council called *Shimakutuba Renraku Kyōgikai*. The groups address to Shimakutuba revitalization such as *Okinawago Fukyu Kyōgikai*, *Uchināguchi kai*, and the Topia project gathered for the establishment. It will become the core network for individual activities. The group administered a questionnaire survey about language attitude toward Shimakutuba to elementary school students (third to sixth grade), junior high school students (seventh to tenth grade), teachers, and parents in October 2014, and it is currently under analysis. As far as I know, this is the first survey toward such a purpose and publication of its results is anxiously awaited.

Attempts to foster *Shimakutuba* that use the Internet are a recent trend that also deserve mention. First, there is an official website for the *Okinawa Times* newspaper. It publishes *Shimakutuba Shinbun Uchinā Taimusu* (Shimakutuba newspaper *Uchinaa Times*) every Sunday, and some of the articles are available as podcasts on the Internet. Jun Senshu, a young comedian who is becoming increasingly popular in Okinawa, writes a weekly column *Jun Senshu no Shimakutuba nikki* (Jun Senshu's Shimakutuba diary) in the paper. Figure 4.6 shows the fourth installment in a series titled *Warabātā-ya Shima no Takara* (Children are treasure of the island). The *Okinawa Times* has also recorded his voice and uploaded it to their website.

Uchinā Times also runs articles about *Shimakutuba*. For example, it recently featured an article about a workshop for card writing at the Lunar New Year, which is celebrated in Okinawa, in the paper No. 84 (February 15, 2015).

Another example of Shimakutuba use on the Internet is the blog *Hōgen Nikki, Makabi munii* (Diary in the Makabi dialect) (http://yugurihaikara.ti-da.net). The blogger is a woman from Makabi, Itoman City who lives in the United States. She keeps an Internet diary in both *Shimakutuba* and English. There is also a blog titled *Imensēbiri Uchināguchi Sanka* (Welcome to celebration of Okinawan language) (http://haisai.co.jp/). It encourages people to learn *Shimakutuba* by writing and provides guidance about writing. Also the site administrator, Kiyoshi Higa, wrote a novel and put audio book on the site. Since this is a frequently maintained blog, I visit there frequently.



はいさい！

じゅん選手のしまくとぅば日記 4

子どもに感想を聞くじゅん選手＝読谷村文化センター

2月8日 わらばーたーや島の宝

読谷まなびフェスタうてぃ、わらびぬちゃーめーうてぃ、うちなーぐちカルタ読まーなかい、カルタ勝負し遊びたん。お笑いネタんさびたしが、わーネタや、むるしまくとぅばやいびたくとぅ、わらばーたーや、ちゆくちん笑ららん。

わーネタやうむこーねーやびらんはじやいびーさ。ただ前歯が出じとーる兄さんがあびあびーそーんでぃち、うむわっとーたるはじやいびーさ（笑）。

3歳ぬわらばーんかい「ぬーが前歯まぎさる？」でぃち、とぅーらったくとぅ、笑いかんてぃ「悪っさるぐとぅし、罰かんちゃん」でぃち、しかまさーに、てーふぁーあびたんよー（笑）。

わらばーたーやくりからぬ沖縄ぬ宝、しまくとぅばや、ちばてぃうびーりよー。

しまぽっど

＜ヤマトグチ大意＞

読谷まなびフェスタで、子どもたちとうちなーぐちカルタで遊びました。お笑いネタもしましたが、僕のネタはしまくとぅばなので、子どもたちは少しも笑いません。僕のネタは面白くないみたい。ただ前歯が出ているお兄さんと思われたかもしれない。3歳の子に「どうして前歯が大きいの」と聞かれたので、「悪いことをして罰を受けたんだよ」とジョークで返しました。子どもは島の宝、しまくとぅば頑張って覚えてね。

Fig. 4.6 Jun Senshu's Shimakutuba diary

A fourth example of revitalization of *Shimakutuba* via the Internet is groups dedicated to it on Facebook. I have joined several such groups as a learner. A leading group is Facebook *Uchināguchi Kōza* (Okinawan course on Facebook); the number of member reached 7300 as of February 28, 2015. Participants are people from Okinawa (including Okinawans on mainland Japan), mainland Japanese (including Japanese living in Okinawa), and a few overseas Okinawans.

The Shimakutuba proficiency of the participants varies. There are beginners from mainland Japan who want to learn more about Okinawa and some Okinawan beginners who joined because they realized their ignorance of Okinawan language. Most of them are young and enthusiastic. There are also Okinawan participants who left their hometown and live in mainland Japan. They aim to relearn the language that they have forgotten. There are also some fluent speakers, they are in their 50s and 60s, from Okinawa and also from mainland Japan, and they answer beginners' question politely. They have extended communication and it seems an effective and enduring manner rather than a temporary measure. Other than *Facebook Uchināguchi Kōza*, *Hajimete no Uchināguchi* (Introduction to Okinawa language), *Shimakutubasshi katayabira*! – *Uchināguchi ya eien ni* (Let's talk in Shimakutuba – Okinawan languages are forever!) offers similar learning opportunities on Facebook.

A final example of private sector and NPO efforts to foster *Shimakutuba* is community radio. FM Nirai, FM Yambaru, and FM Koza all broadcast Shimakutuba-speaking programs. These are distributed on Ustream (Ustream 2015); therefore people can watch them online anytime. Moreover a company named Crest opened the Internet radio station *Okinawa Shimakutuba Hōsōkyoku* (Okinawa Shimakutuba radio station) in September 2014, so people can hear Shimakutuba programs anywhere. The station has announced that they intend to provide Shimakutuba programs 24 h a day, 365 days a year. (For the detail, please see their homepage http://crest-ryukyu.co.jp/uchina/).

4.4 Educational Approaches

Next, I would like to discuss Shimakutuba education in Okinawa Prefecture. At present, teachers cannot teach Shimakutuba as a subject, given the current curriculum guidelines. Yet, in some schools, instructors who are dispatched from NPOs such as *Okinawago Fukyū Kyōgikai*, *Uchināguchi kai*, *Ginowan Uchināguchi kai* teach *Shimakutuba* in the periods designated for integrated learning or extracurricular activities. Sometimes *Shimakutuba* plays are performed at elementary and junior high schools.

The Yonabaru Cultural Association has a Shimakutuba theater group called *Obaa Kyu*; it consists of female members in their 60s to 80s. They established the theater group because they wanted the children of the town to be familiar with *Shimakutuba*, and they have performed in nursery schools, kindergartens, and elementary schools (*Ryukyu Shimpo*, January 24, 2014). On January 17th 2014, they showed their handmade picture story show and skit about Oni Muuchii (an Okinawa story) to the children in Yonabaru Kindergarten.

Okinawan plays are also performed at elementary schools. According to the newsletter of Itoman City (http://www.city.itoman.lg.jp/docs/2014071100017), an operetta *Nakanaori Sanrāgwā* was performed in Makabi Elementary School by Okinawa *Haiyū Kyōkai* (Okinawa Stage Player's Association) in July 2014. At first, a picture story show was shown to students and then the players performed the operetta. The story is about Sanrā, a boy who is racking his brain about how to get his *Sū* (father) and *Anmā* (mother) back again. Since this operetta has up-tempo rhythm and a story with a lot of humor, it will be well received by children who see it. According to the newsletter, *Okinawa Haiyū Kyōkai* also performs operettas and other plays in other cities and towns in Okinawa for the purpose of promoting *Shimakutuba*, as a part of a project aimed at activating and procreating Okinawan culture.

As for how Shimakutuba is promoted at junior high schools, I would like to mention the activities in Miyakojima City. They hold a *Hōgen Ohanashi Pafōmansu Taikai* (Shimakutuba Speech Contest) as part of the junior high school Arts Festival in Miyako District. According to the local paper *Miyako Mainichi Shinbun* (January 25, 2015) the contest is held to foster students' motivation to use their dialects across the island with great pride. It is in its fourth year and students of Tarama Junior High School, located in a small remote island, participated for the first time. To join the event, the students come into contact with the elders of their hometown including their grandparents. This encourages them to value their local culture. It is desirable that such activities be widespread across the prefecture, and a prefectural tournament would be a good idea. There are performing arts peculiar to each locality in Okinawa Cultural Festival for Upper Secondary School. If this kind of approach is added to such festivals, more students will become interested in their local culture and language.

As the promotion of *Shimakutuba* at the high school level, the development of mobile applications should be encouraged. According to the local paper *Ryukyu Shimpo* (January 30, 2015), five students from Miyako Industrial High School developed an app for learning Shimakutuba as part of a study subject. They interviewed their parents and covered 120 frequent Myākufutu – Miyako language – words and phrases such as family, body parts, foods, and feelings. Four frame cartoons are used to attract the interest of younger viewers. The students learnt Myaakufutu that they didn't know in the process of making the app. This app development shows the interesting phenomena of wedding a "high-tech" information-communication technology (ICT) and a "low-tech" cultural activity of making a Myaakufutu dictionary.

Another educational initiative to foster S*himakutuba* is the NPO Okinawa Hands-on's initiative, which is attracting rising attention. In coordination with the board of education of Chatan town, *Shimakutuba* teachers of the NPO teach elementary school children. The teachers provide guidance about a *Shimakutuba* operetta performance. Also, the Hands-on youth club with members of late elementary grades to high school students has performed an operetta in their hometown. This "people development system" through the teaching of Okinawan history, culture, and language by the NPO was highly appreciated and awarded the grand prize of "Child raising project to empower the future" sponsored Sumitomo Life in 2013. By participating in the activity, children and their parents came to have interests in their local culture and roots. Further expansion is expected. This is a good example of how the community can act as a unit for Shimakutuba education.

4.5 Survey and Analysis of Attitudes Toward Shimakutuba

Several surveys report on attitudes toward Shimakutuba. *Ryukyu Shimpo* (2002, 2007, 2012) surveys Okinawan citizens' attitudes (*Okinawa Kenmin Ishiki Chōsa*) at 5-year intervals, the University of the Ryukyus faculty of Law and Literature conducted research with participants from the university's student population and performers of traditional Ryukyuan performing arts in 2010 and 2011, and the Okinawa Prefectural Government Department of Culture, Tourism and Sports conducted *Shimakutuba Kenmin Undō Suishin Jigyō Kenmin Ishiki Chōsa* (Shimakutuba prefectural campaign promotion survey Okinawa attitudes). The survey by *Ryukyu Shimpo* included adults over 20 years old prefectural wide (around 1000 respondents). It was not only concerned with the Shimakutuba issue, yet it asked respondents "Are you familiar with dialects from Okinawa?," "Can you speak a dialect?," and "Do you want your children to become able to speak a dialect?" I was in charge of the survey at the University of the Ryukyus. Language attitude and language activity were questioned. Generally speaking, the singers, sanshin (Okinawan musical instrument) players, and dancers had positive feelings toward Shimakutuba, and they seem likely to use Shimakutuba daily basis. To research their attitudes and language activities, we surveyed performers of Okinawan music (about 600 respondents). Also we surveyed local performing arts students at Haebaru High School and students at the University of the Ryukyus and Okinawa International University (about 470 respondents) to see the language attitudes and activities of these young people. The results are published as Ishihara (2014). The survey of OPG covers citizens in their 20–70s and there were about 1500 respondents. OPG also conducted a survey to which about 1000 students (5th-grader, 8th-grader, and 11th-grader students) responded.

These surveys show that the majority of the people in Okinawa Prefecture have positive feelings toward Shimakutuba, and they want their children and grandchildren to become able to speak the language. Also, people recognize the needs of Shimakutuba as a heritage language and agree to language maintenance initiatives. However, attitude toward the language and language competence or activities to foster such do not necessarily correspond. In other words, attitudes differ from actual verbal activity. All the results indicate that Shimakutuba speakers are mainly elderly people, and as far as the younger the generation goes, the younger they are the less they speak: less than 10 % of respondents in their teens and 20s can speak the language. The number of the people who can understand Shimakutuba but cannot speak increases for people in their 40s and 50s. Speaking ability differs between 40s and 50s. Some of the people in their 40s are still raising children, yet not many parents could speak to their children in Shimakutuba. On the other hand, Shimakutuba speakers in their 60s and 70s seldom have opportunities to speak in Shimakutuba with their children and grandchildren. People wish for their youngsters to be able to speak Shimakutuba but fail to provide an opportunity for them to do so at home. Finally, the survey by the OPG indicates that many people think it is important to teach Shimakutuba in schools (Okinawa-ken 2013).

4.6 Impact and Challenge of Language Maintenance

As I mentioned in Sect. 4.5, the OPG survey suggests that people consider Shimakutuba education at school important for its maintenance (Okinawa-ken 2013). However, there are a lot of challenges putting this into practice. In 2012, Okinawa Prefecture Cultural Association conducted a survey to find out what revitalization activities were being done in schools. They sent a questionnaire to 274 elementary schools and 154 junior high schools. According to the survey, 80 elementary schools and 32 junior high schools are teaching *Shimakutuba* in classes or as extracurricular activities (*Ryukyu Shimpo*, October 15, 2013). Many of the schools did not respond; there is a possibility that they are not teaching Shimakutuba. The International Institute for Okinawan Studies at the University of the Ryukyus administered an analogous survey to students from elementary school to high school in Amami and Okinawa on consignment from the Agency for Cultural Affairs. Results indicated that there were also only a few schools teaching *Shimakutuba* or *Shimaguchi*. The reason why they do not or cannot teach it is common to most of the schools: Teachers cannot speak; therefore, they cannot teach, there is no textbook, and there is no time to teach. In 2014, I interviewed the principal of Oku Elementary School in Kunigami Village, which is located in a remote area. The principal gave me similar reasons. First, teachers cannot teach Oku language since they are not from the community. Second, they have to teach according to the school course guidelines and the required number of hours, so that it is difficult to find time to teach Shimakutuba. The principal also mentioned that since the decision whether to teach Shimakutuba or not depends on individual teachers, it is not sustainable because teachers transfer at regular intervals.

As can be seen from above, if we wish to include teaching *Shimakutuba* in schools, we are facing challenges regarding teacher training programs and a lack of teaching materials. There is no official teaching certificate, like Japanese or English. Most Shimakutuba teachers have no background in language teaching, making teaching plans, or developing teaching materials at a college of language education. They have learned how and what to teach in teacher training programs which are provided occasionally by NPOs. I have become increasingly convinced of the need for cooperation with professors (or similarly qualified educators) of language teaching such as those who teach English or Japanese language pedagogy and applied linguists. As far as I know though, this has yet to be attempted. Adding to this difficulty is the fact that most of the current *Shimakutuba* teachers are senior citizens. Except in special cases, seniors and people in the community work as volunteer teachers. People under 60 years old who are still working may not want to teach *Shimakutuba* as his/her occupation since it is an unstable source income because their teaching hours will possibly be short.

Finally, the issue has been raised in the course of dialog about Shimakutuba revitalization in 2014 as to whether there should be a standard Shimakutuba or not. Maseru Sato, a writer, discussed the need for a “standard Ryukyuan language” to sustain its viability and independence and to undertake decolonization (*Ryukyu Shimpo*, June 14, 2014). Likewise, Tatsuhiro Oshiro, a novelist, argued a necessity of standardization (*Okinawa Times*, August 10, 2014). I understand there are people who support the establishment of a “standard” language and their claims that it would avoid the possibility of Shimakutuba being wiped out. The Shuri dialect, Naha dialect, or *Okinawa Shibai Kutuba* (the language of Okinawa theater) has been proposed to be such a standard language. Karimata (2015) implies that standardization will kill minority languages of small villages and that standardization may lead to destruction of the language diversity of Okinawa Prefecture. Considering the history that leads to the decline of *Shimakutuba* and the growth of Japanese, there remain serious questions regarding the viability and, indeed, desirability of standardization and its necessary promotion.

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Part II
International Context

Chapter 5
Geopolitics, Self-Determination, and China's Rise in Oceania

Terence Wesley-Smith

The debate about China's rise in the Pacific Islands region, or Oceania, tends to focus on implications for the strategic dominance of the United States and its regional partners, particularly Australia. Although this aspect is important, it serves to obscure the possibility that rapidly expanding bilateral relations with China are influenced as much by island leaders and national self-interest as by Beijing and that those leaders are helping shape the changing regional order in new and significant ways.

This chapter explores the implications of China's rise for the strategic, political, and economic interests of the small number of external powers, including the United States, which have exercised considerable influence in the Pacific Islands since the colonial era and, more importantly, for the goals and aspirations of the developing states of the region. It argues that China's rising profile has caused concern among more established external actors but left them with little option but to accommodate the new situation. The chapter notes that China's rise has been generally welcomed by island leaders, offering them economic and political opportunities not readily available heretofore. The emergence of the China alternative has disrupted long-standing networks of power and influence in the region and given island states a degree of control over their own futures perhaps unprecedented in the postcolonial era.

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5.1 China's Rise in Oceania

Although China has a long history of interaction with Oceania, its involvement in the region has increased significantly in recent decades. In 2006, with the value of trade fast approaching USD 1 billion, Beijing announced plans to raise substantially the level of its engagement with the region. At the first China-Pacific Island Countries Economic Development and Cooperation Forum in Fiji in April of that year, then Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao pledged to make available preferential loans worth USD 376 million over 3 years, establish a fund to encourage Chinese companies to invest in the region, cancel or extend debts maturing in 2005, and remove tariffs on imports from the least developed island nations (Wen Jiabao 2010). At a follow-up meeting in Guangzhou in November 2013, Vice Premier Wang Yang announced, among other things, an additional USD 1 billion in concessional finance over 4 years and a further USD 1 billion in non-concessional loans to be made available through China Development Bank (Hayward-Jones and Brant 2013). Even if President Xi Jinping had "very little new to announce" to Pacific leaders during his visit to Fiji in November 2014, the occasion was of considerable symbolic importance (Hayward-Jones and Brant 2015).

Beijing now has formal relations with 8 of the 14 independent or self-governing Pacific Island states and is increasingly active in key regional organizations, including the Pacific Islands Forum. According to China's Vice Premier Wang Yang, bilateral trade has grown at an annual rate of 27 % since 2006 and is now valued at USD 4.5 billion (Yang 2013). Led by China Metallurgical Corporation's USD 1.4 billion Ramu nickel mining venture in Papua New Guinea, Chinese commercial investment in the region has also increased rapidly and construction contracts to Chinese firms now total in excess of USD 5 billion. Aid flows are more difficult to calculate, largely because of disagreement about which transfers to count. Although in 2013 Vice Premier Yang cited a cumulative USD 9.4 billion for "all kinds of assistance," Australian researcher Philippa Brant estimates that China has distributed a much more modest total of USD 1.5 billion in development assistance to the island states since 2006 (Yang 2013; Brant 2015). In any case, the growth of Beijing's support to the Pacific Islands is impressive, and China now provides about as much as development assistance as New Zealand and is set to overtake Japan and the United States if present trends continue. According to Brant, "China is now the largest bilateral donor in Fiji and the second largest in the Cook Islands, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, and Tonga" (Brant 2015: p. 2).

Scholar Yongjin Zhang argues convincingly that China's new approach to Oceania is best understood as "an integral part of its new diplomacy toward the global South" (Zhang 2010). Certainly its pattern of behavior in the Pacific shares many of the hallmarks of recent engagement with other parts of the developing world. First, it includes multifaceted bilateral relations with a number of key regional states, including Fiji, Samoa, and Tonga. Relations with Papua New Guinea have proved more volatile, but its vast array of natural resources makes it an obvious trading partner for China (Nelson 2010). Second, China's bilateral agreements in the Pacific Islands typically include trade concessions, investments, and concessionary loans, as well as aid and technical assistance. Third, there is an emphasis on multilateral relations. The April 2006 summit in Fiji was a first for the region. But it reflects the form and substance of similar events elsewhere, including the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) series launched in 2000 and the China-Caribbean Economic and Trade Cooperation Forum held for the first time in Jamaica in February 2005. Finally, as Hong Kong-based scholar Simon Shen points out, China's activities overseas, including in Oceania, are increasingly characterized by an apparent desire to be perceived as a responsible stakeholder in the international system (Shen 2015).

Beijing's engagement with the Pacific Islands also has its distinctive elements. It is worth noting, for example, that although China's political and economic profile in Oceania has increased dramatically in recent times, it remains modest relative to its investment in other regions of the world—and to Australia's level of engagement in the Pacific. Two other factors—the search for natural resources and efforts to expand its political influence—help to define the specific characteristics of China's relations with the island nations of the Pacific.

Oceania is important to China as a source of key natural resource inputs for its burgeoning economy. China already imports significant quantities of timber and fish from Pacific Island countries, including Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea. It has a particular interest in Papua New Guinea's vast energy and mineral resources. In March 2005, a major government-owned construction and operating company, Chinese Metallurgical Construction (Group) Corporation, purchased a majority interest in the giant Ramu nickel and cobalt mining project in Madang. When it reaches full production, the mine is expected to yield 32,800 tons of nickel annually, much of which will be exported to support China's booming stainless steel industry (Ramu nickel). In 2009, the China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation (Sinopec) agreed to purchase two million tons of liquefied natural gas (LNG) annually from Papua New Guinea's massive LNG project, making it the single largest customer for this ExxonMobil-led initiative (Seattle Times 2009).

Although China's quest for reliable access to natural resources helps drive its relations with particular island states—most notably Papua New Guinea (which, with Solomon Islands, became the largest supplier of tropical timber to China in 2011)—efforts to build political influence are region-wide. Indeed, political motives probably best explain the relatively large number of Chinese diplomats posted to the region, the "visit diplomacy" that brings many island leaders on goodwill trips to Beijing every year, as well as some of the high-profile aid projects producing sports complexes and other public facilities in island countries. Along with similar efforts in the Caribbean and smaller countries in Africa, China hopes to mute international criticism of its record on human rights, advance its economic goals in institutions like the World Trade Organization (WTO), and block Japan's aspirations to play a more active international role. Until recently China's efforts to isolate Taiwan were of key importance in structuring its activities in the region.

5.2 The Taiwan Factor

In recent years China's growing political and economic influence has taken its toll on Taiwan's quest for international recognition, which dates back to its loss of UN membership in the 1970s. Since 2003, Taiwan has lost 8 of its 30 diplomatic allies, although it retains informal trade and other ties with many others. Taiwan remains relatively successful in Oceania where nearly one fourth of its remaining allies are located. Today, six Pacific Island states (Kiribati, Solomon Islands, Palau, the Marshall Islands, Tuvalu, and Nauru) recognize Taiwan, while a further eight (Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Tonga, the Cook Islands, Fiji, Vanuatu, the Federated States of Micronesia, and Niue) have formal relations with China (Atkinson 2010).

The rivalry with Taiwan for recognition has been among the most controversial aspects of China's growing relationship with Oceania and was considered by some a key factor influencing China's early activities in the region (see, e.g., Dobelle 2007). Fergus Hanson, for example, once described the diplomatic rivalry with Taiwan as "the central organizing principle of [China's] engagement" in the Pacific and used this to explain some perceived shortcomings in Beijing's aid program in the region (Hanson 2010/2011). Without this element, some commentators have suggested, China's involvement in the region could well turn out to be short-lived (see, e.g., Medcalf 2010).

The "diplomatic truce" between Beijing and Taipei in recent years provides an opportunity to evaluate these claims. The 2008 elections in Taiwan saw the Kuomintang (KMT) party return to power after 8 years in opposition. Incoming President Ma Ying-jeou brought with him a much more conciliatory approach to cross-strait issues than his predecessor and immediately set about repairing the strained relationship with China. The Chinese government responded positively to Ma's overtures, and, in September 2010, China's Premier Wen commented that political relations between the two sides had reached "the most promising point in decades" (United Kingdom Press Association 2010). In the general elections of January 2012, President Ma was reelected by a comfortable margin, and relations with Beijing have continued to improve. These developments support Chinese foreign policy expert Robert Sutter's claim that the balance of power in cross-strait relations has tilted significantly toward China (Sutter 2011).

In the Pacific, changes on the Taiwan side of the equation have been readily apparent. Taipei's 2009 White Paper on Foreign Aid Policy signaled a move away from "check book diplomacy," and toward "appropriate motives, due diligence, and effective practices" in the delivery of aid (Republic of China 2009). During a visit to Solomon Islands in March 2010, President Ma declared that Taiwan and China had "stopped trying to win over each other's diplomatic allies" (Garrett 2010). Although the "diplomatic truce" has frozen attempts to reduce the number of states that recognize Taiwan, it has not precipitated other significant changes in Beijing's policy toward Oceania. Indeed, the November 2013 meeting with regional leaders in Guangzhou and a year later in Fiji suggests that China's interest in the region continues on an upward trajectory.

It is too soon to properly assess the impact of improved China-Taiwan relations on Beijing's attitude toward the Pacific. For one thing, the truce itself could well be compromised by any number of developments, including a resurgence of support for independence among the Taiwanese electorate or a hardening stance in the US Congress toward arm sales to Taipei. Furthermore, as Simon Shen argues, the whole focus on the "diplomatic truce" may itself be misguided. Instead, Shen suggests that Beijing's tolerance of the status quo reflects a new foreign policy emphasis designed to demonstrate that China is a responsible power in the international system. Shen argues that the larger strategic design is no longer to win over the remaining states that recognize Taipei, but to "pave the way for future Chinese reunification and the 'Chinese dream' by engaging all kinds of possible state and non-state actors." He suggests further that this approach may well persist even if President Ma and the KMT fall from power in the next elections (Shen forthcoming). In any event, it is clear that, although competition with Taiwan has been an important component of Beijing's foreign policy in Oceania, it is not the only or even the most important factor driving Beijing's activities in the region.

5.3 Changing Geopolitics

Some Western commentators have expressed concern that the rise of China in Oceania will alter the strategic balance in a part of the world long dominated by the United States and its regional allies, particularly Australia (Henderson and Reilly 2003; Windybank 2005). However, Beijing's activities in the Pacific Islands provide little evidence of a grand strategy driven by hegemonic aspirations. Certainly, the notion of "hard balancing" with military power seems farfetched, at least as it might implicate the Pacific Islands region.

Like their global counterparts, regional threat scenarios usually reference China's growing military expenditure and expanding naval capacity. However, the impact of an impressive increase in military spending may not be quite as significant as some Western commentators suggest, and, in any case, it is clear that China will not have the military capacity to challenge the global dominance of the United States any time soon (see, e.g., Erickson and Liff 2013; Lanteigne 2012). It is also important to note that creating such global capabilities has not been a priority for Beijing. Instead, military planners have focused consistently on a narrowly defined set of strategic objectives in the East and South China Seas.

The dramatic increase in the capabilities of the People's Liberation Army Navy to operate in the Near Seas (i.e., inside the "first island chain") has significant implications for the interests of the United States and its allies in the Asia-Pacific region, especially coupled with Beijing's new assertiveness in pursuing its objectives there. Indeed, the recent declaration of an air defense identification zone (ADIZ) in the East China Sea moves to regulate foreign fishing in the South China Sea, and the ongoing dispute with Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands leads scholar Denny Roy to conclude that there is intent on the part of China "to establish a maritime sphere of influence, with exclusive rights to resources" (Roy 2014). Whether that is the case or not, it is clear that the long-standing ability of the US Navy to operate "whenever and wherever it wants" in the Western Pacific is now compromised and that this represents a potentially serious axis of friction between the two powers, as well as between China and regional neighbors like Japan, Vietnam, South Korea, and the Philippines (Kaplan 2010: p. 34).

The implications of all of this for the island countries of Oceania are less clear. Most of the Pacific Island states do not lie close to the strategic sea lanes that service China's burgeoning trade in raw materials and energy or to marine chokepoints, such as the Straits of Malacca. Few would appear to offer strategic assets in the event of conflict with Taiwan, and those that might, like Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas, are already firmly under US strategic control and, in the case of Guam, heavily militarized. And none are directly implicated in the ongoing disputes associated with China's contested Near Seas periphery. Some commentators have suggested that China is actively seeking port facilities in the region for its naval vessels, citing Chinese-funded wharf and port development projects in Tonga, Papua New Guinea, and elsewhere (see, e.g., Yanada 2012). However, there is no evidence that these projects have been instigated for anything other than commercial purposes—and no apparent reason why China's military planners would prioritize such initiatives under present circumstances.

The evidence for some forms of "soft balancing" in Oceania is more solid. Tokyo's unease with recent developments is clear, and Japanese scholar Kobayashi Isumi states bluntly that the substantial increase in aid to the Pacific Islands announced in May 2006 was intended to counter Beijing's growing sway in the region (Isumi 2010). Furthermore, the United States, which has maintained a relatively low profile in the region since the end of the Cold War, is now attempting to "renew its focus and commitment" to the island nations through enhanced diplomatic efforts and increased financial assistance (Campbell 2010). Although perhaps not the only factor driving this change in posture, the rise of China in Oceania is clearly an important part of Washington's new strategic equation.

However, it is notable that neither of these balancing initiatives have lived up to initial expectations, at least as they impact the Pacific Islands region. There have been no more dramatic increases in Japanese aid in recent years, and the most significant development at Japan's most recent Pacific Island Leaders Meeting in Okinawa in 2012 was the inclusion of the United States in the talks and a renewed commitment to cooperation in aid delivery (Brien 2012). The reopening of a USAID office in the islands region in October 2011, this time in Port Moresby, demonstrated a symbolic return to an earlier profile for the United States, as has a steep rise in the number of visits by American officials to island capitals and regional meetings. However, at least to date, this new commitment appears to lack both coherence and substance. US Secretary of State Hilary Clinton arrived at the 2012 meeting of the Pacific Islands Forum in the Cook Islands to great fanfare, but her pledge of an additional USD 32 million in US aid was modest by any standards. The Obama administration's pivot to Asia-Pacific, it seems, is much more about Asia and much less about the insular Pacific.

When it comes to increased interest in the region, the main actor is clearly Australia. Researcher Jonathan Pryke identifies a boom in aid to the Pacific Islands region from OECD sources (i.e., excluding China) in recent decades, with Australia accounting for the lion's share (65 %) of the total increase since 2002 (Pryke 2013). However, the trigger for this surge in aid is not directly related to the rise of China. Rather it is fueled by the emergence of a new conventional wisdom that makes connections between security threats and "failed" and "failing" states (Wesley-Smith 2008). Consistent with what expert Shahar Hameiri calls the "securitization" of regional aid programs, a large portion of Australia's aid has gone to support an interventionist state building effort in Solomon Islands, which experienced significant domestic conflict in the early years of the century, and to regional programs also heavily focused on good governance and state capacity-building initiatives (Hameiri 2008). China does not subscribe to this reform agenda and is therefore seen by decision-makers in Canberra as placing such initiatives in jeopardy.

5.4 Competition and Cooperation

In the present century, the ultimate objective of Australian aid and diplomacy in the region remains the strengthening of the neoliberal state in island places. The urgency of the task has increased with a heightened awareness of "nontraditional" transnational security threats such as pandemics, drug and people smuggling, and terrorism – the latter especially after the events of 9/11, as well as the 2002 Bali terrorist bombing that killed a large number of Australian citizens. The main focus is on preventing state failure or, as in the case of the Solomon Islands, rebuilding dysfunctional state institutions. The means to achieve these ends have become more aggressive, with Australia prepared to intervene more directly in the domestic affairs of island states (Fry and Kabutaulaka 2008). Multilateral efforts are also an essential part of this threat-reduction strategy. In particular, the Secretariat of the Pacific Islands Forum, the premier regional organization, has been seen as a key conduit for promoting reform efforts, guided until recently by the Pacific Plan, a "master strategy" for regional integration heavily influenced by neoliberal ideas (Hameiri 2009).

The major concern for Australia and other established powers active in the region is that the rise of China will disrupt the extensive structures of regional influence carefully constructed over many years to preempt nontraditional security risks. At issue is, first of all, Beijing's long-standing practice of providing support to its aid partners without political conditions, except adherence to the "one China" policy. This provides Pacific leaders with the opportunity of avoiding some of the unwanted pressure associated with the aid-leveraged, Western-led reform agenda.

However, it is worth noting that Beijing's bilateral agreements do not require island states to modify or relinquish their ties with Western powers, and recent multilateral initiatives appear specifically designed not to replace the existing architecture of regional cooperation. Indeed, Beijing has been careful to work within established Pacific regional organizations and to avoid any direct challenges to existing patterns of leadership. Perhaps in part to assuage Australian fears that a rising China would derail ongoing attempts to enhance regional cooperation and encourage good governance, Beijing pledged support for the Pacific Plan, then a major blueprint for such efforts. In February 2008, it also signed the Kavieng Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, a local version of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, which provides guidelines for donor countries involved in Papua New Guinea (Kavieng Declaration 2008). However, in September 2011 China indicated that there were limits to its willingness to conform when it made it clear that it would not be bound by the Cairns Compact, a 2009 agreement of the Pacific Islands Forum, which identifies strict criteria for regulating regional development efforts.

Critics also cite a range of other China-related actions that they regard as disruptive to regional order. These include the unpredictability of aid flows from year to year, the lack of provision for the long-term maintenance of infrastructure projects, a lack of transparency in dealings with Chinese government officials, and the lack of local flow-on benefits from construction projects where everything, including labor, is imported from China (Hanson 2009). These are familiar complaints from other parts of the global South, where some observers have argued that these shortcomings reflect the inadequacies of China's aid bureaucracy, or the ineptitude or inexperience of Chinese companies, and raise the possibility that at least some of these points of friction will improve over time (see, e.g., Brautigam 2009). Scholar Graeme Smith researched labor practices during the construction phase of the massive Chinese-operated Ramu nickel mine in Papua New Guinea and discovered a disturbing array of health, safety, and pay issues. Smith attributes these issues to a number of factors, including the inexperience of the Chinese company involved, working conditions back home, and efforts to keep costs down. But he also found evidence of a learning curve, as new investors learn from their mistakes and find better ways of "getting things done" as a matter of corporate self-interest (Smith 2013a, b).

A key factor often overlooked in the critical analysis of China's rise in Oceania is that not every activity undertaken by Chinese actors overseas is coordinated and controlled by state officials in Beijing. Especially since Beijing's "going out" strategy was implemented in the mid-1990s, Chinese companies have significant incentives to invest abroad and seem to be exercising an increasing degree of independence from state control. Chinese companies are increasingly involved in a whole range of projects in the region including large-scale resource extraction, industrial initiatives such as tuna processing, infrastructure development, as well as smaller-scale retail and wholesale activities. Although the "going out" policy was predicated on close collaboration between the state and Chinese corporations, and many of these companies are state-owned, often it is the corporations rather than the state that take the lead in overseas commercial ventures. Work by Philippa Brant analyzing Chinese-led resource development projects in Fiji and Papua New Guinea sees little evidence that these initiatives are driven by aid and diplomacy. Rather, it finds that it is more common for the companies to negotiate access with local actors before "bringing the state with them" to provide grants and interest-free or concessionary loans and move the project forward (Brant 2013b). Increasingly the logic associated with the expanding Chinese presence in the region has more to do with commercial factors than foreign policy directives emanating from Beijing. It also suggests that the ability of state officials to control disruptive commercial activity may be limited—even when that activity runs counter to China's own diplomatic goals (Brant 2013b).

An emerging focus of concern for critics of China's activities in the region is the amount of debt assumed by island governments in Chinese-funded infrastructure projects. They point out that Samoa, the Cook Islands, and Tonga have already taken on levels of debt from China's Exim Bank that are unsustainable in these small economies, even at concessional rates of interest. And they worry that the assistance package announced at the 2013 Guangzhou forum provides for a further USD 2 billion in concessional and non-concessional loans over the next 4 years (see, e.g., Pacific Institute of Public Policy 2013). These are legitimate concerns because, if past patterns are any guide, the most important actors facilitating access to these loans will be Chinese corporations with little interest in the longer-term ramifications for government debt loads or default.

5.5 Self-Determination

Some analysts have argued that China has exploited particular regional vulnerabilities to establish itself in Oceania and, in the process, encouraged corruption and instability in island states. Not only do these allegations remain unsubstantiated, but they serve to obscure the possibility that bilateral relations with China are influenced as much by island leaders and national self-interest as by some grand strategy devised in Beijing (see, e.g., Henderson and Reilly 2003; Windybank 2005). A 2010 collection of country-level studies of relations between Pacific Island states and China and Taiwan belies any sense of external domination or manipulation (Wesley-Smith and Porter 2010). What we see instead are Pacific Island leaders making rational decisions about what they see as their best interests in the face of changing opportunities in the external environment. Although there may be concern about large and relatively unfamiliar powers acquiring significant stakes in Pacific futures, there is also clear appreciation of what those powers can bring to the table. Officials acknowledge the fact that China pledges not to interfere in domestic policy, comment on governance or other development issues, or attach conditions to transfers of aid and other resources. Pacific leaders also respond positively to the egalitarian qualities of contemporary Chinese diplomacy, noting that they are treated with respect regardless of their nation's size, resource endowment, or system of government.

Perhaps the most important element associated with China's heightened presence is the opening up of new options. For the first time in generations, Pacific leaders can make new choices regarding aid, trade, and investment opportunities, as well as contemplate alternatives to dominant development paradigms often presented as necessary, universal, and nonnegotiable. In 2012 President Anote Tong of Kiribati noted the new level of engagement in the region by outside powers and indicated that he found "these initiatives most welcome indeed.... It is nice to be relevant" (Tong 2012).

It is clear, for example, that the nature of China's evolving relationship with Fiji has been determined as much by decision-makers in Suva as by their counterparts in Beijing. Fiji's "Look North" policy emerged in the aftermath of the so-called civilian coup of 2000 as an effort to diversify diplomatic and economic relations away from traditional partners pressuring Fiji to restore democratic institutions. This coincided with China's interest in raising its regional profile, and the relationship between the two countries has grown significantly, especially since the 2006 military coup further deepened the divide with Western countries (Tarte 2010). However, it is important to note that, while former military commander and current Prime Minister Frank Bainimarama has repeatedly emphasized the significance of these ties, China has not always reciprocated with pointed statements of its own. Indeed, Beijing has been at pains not to over-exploit this opportunity for regional influence so as to avoid any direct confrontation with Fiji's traditional partners, particularly Australia. Before Fiji's return to elected government in 2014, Hanson and Hayward-Jones accused China of "bankrolling a pariah military dictatorship" (Hanson and Hayward-Jones 2009). But Beijing's decision to continue its relationship with Fiji when others decided to impose sanctions is entirely consistent with its pledge not to interfere in the domestic affairs of partner states.

Furthermore, it seems that much of the increase in Chinese economic activity in Fiji in recent years has nothing to do with any special favors from Beijing. Rather, in typical fashion, most of these resource and infrastructure development projects have been initiated by Chinese companies, with funding either from the pool of concessional financing made available to the region and announced by Premier Wen Jiabao in 2010 or on commercial terms from the China Development Bank (Brant 2013a, b).

5.6 A New Regional Order

In an influential assessment of the potential for geostrategic competition in Oceania resulting from the rise of China, Australia's Lowy Institute analyst Jenny Hayward-Jones concludes that the region is "big enough for all of us" (Hayward-Jones 2013). This echoes comments made by US Secretary of State Clinton at the 2012 meeting of the Pacific Islands Forum and is based on two main arguments. The first is that, to date, China has not demonstrated an explicit desire to compete for leadership in the region. The second is that, even if that did become a priority sometime in the future, China's ability to "challenge a well-established order dominated by a number of key external powers with whom the countries of the region have long-standing and deep ties" remains in doubt (Hayward-Jones 2013: p. 7).

Hayward-Jones' reassuring analysis reflects an emerging consensus in the Western countries most active in the region, particularly Australia and New Zealand. Despite ongoing concerns about the longer-term implications of China's rise in Oceania, and keenly aware of their own growing economic entanglements with China, decision-makers in Canberra and Wellington have responded pragmatically to the new situation. In 2012, then Australian Parliamentary Secretary for Pacific Island Affairs Richard Marles indicated that China's increased presence in the region was "fundamentally welcomed" by Australia, and, in April 2013, Australia signed the Australia-China Development Cooperation Memorandum of Understanding, which allows for cooperation on aid initiatives involving health issues and water resource management (Marles 2012; Byfield 2013). Former New Zealand diplomat Chris Elders and scholar Robert Ayson note that New Zealand was already benefitting from China's rise and needs "to adjust to the reality of China's growing South Pacific influence" (Elders and Ayson 2012). In 2012, New Zealand and China agreed to collaborate on a project to improve water quality in Rarotonga, Cook Islands (New Zealand Aid Programme 2012).

The Hayward-Jones analysis begs some questions about the effectiveness of the Western-dominated order, however large and well-established, especially if that means an ability to ensure conformity and progress toward identified goals. It is not clear if the Canberra-based reform agenda has actually helped strengthen state institutions across the region, enhance "good governance," or foster rapid economic growth. Indeed, the most recent survey of progress toward the Millennium Development Goals shows decidedly mixed results in Pacific Island countries, even in those island states, like Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea, where Australian involvement is most intense (Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat 2013). Perhaps the most telling test of effectiveness is in the Solomon Islands, where in 2013 the Australian-led Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI) intervention celebrated its tenth anniversary and is in the process of transferring its functions to more conventional aid mechanisms. Most commentators agree that the RAMSI initiative has made progress on all three pillars of its stated mission, i.e., restoration of law and order, improving the machinery of government, and promoting economic growth. However, most also express concern about the sustainability of these pillars after the well-resourced expatriate officials who have occupied key positions in the bureaucracy depart for home (see, e.g., Allen and Dinnen 2013).

Perhaps most important, the Hayward-Jones paper underestimates the significance of Pacific Islander agency in influencing the nature and direction of change in the region. She goes so far as to claim that "most of the Island states... (with the possible exception of Fiji) are not seeking to change the regional order, even if they could...." (Hayward-Jones 2013: p. 13). This ignores growing evidence of dissatisfaction with the status quo. In October 2012, for example, President of Kiribati Anote Tong expressed his disappointment at the lack of international action on important global issues, particularly climate change, and went on to call for "a new paradigm shift where the Pacific needs to chart its own course and lead global thinking in crucial areas such as climate change, ocean governance and sustainable development" (Tong 2012). Other indications of this desire to chart a more independent course include mounting regional resistance to PACER Plus and other free trade initiatives actively promoted by external powers, the demise of the Pacific Plan in the face of the blistering critique of island leaders, and the successful 2013 effort to get French Polynesia reinscribed on the UN list of nonself-governing territories to be decolonized, despite strong opposition from France and without the endorsement of traditional partners like the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand. In a recent article, Sandra Tarte argues that some significant changes in Pacific Islands regionalism, including declining support for the Pacific Islands Forum (which includes Australia and New Zealand as members), the increasing prominence of the Melanesian Spearhead Group, and the 2013 establishment of the Pacific Islands Development Forum, are "driven by the discontent of a growing number of island states with the established regional order and by a desire to assert greater control over their own future" (Tarte 2014). Despite the full restoration of relations with Australia after the 2014 elections, Fiji, which Hayward-Jones identified as the "possible exception" to her rule about satisfaction with the status quo, continues to assert that it will not return to the Pacific Islands Forum unless Australia and New Zealand withdraw their membership.

China's increased presence in Oceania, which will likely continue to expand, has not created the new assertiveness of island leaders, but it has facilitated a number of significant changes in long-established patterns of power and influence in this vast sea of islands. It has opened up alternatives to long-standing political and economic relationships and, in the process, exposed some weaknesses in a regional order largely designed and managed by the Western powers active in the region. It has provided Pacific Island leaders the opportunity to push back against an unpopular aid-leveraged regional reform agenda and put them in a strong position to influence the shape of a changing regional order.

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Chapter 6
The Similarities and Differences Between Tensions Over the Senkaku Islands and Dokdo Island

Myong-Chan Lee

6.1 Introduction

The international situation in East Asia is currently extremely unstable. Japan and China are in a potentially explosive dispute over both the Senkaku Islands (Chinese name: Diaoyu Island),[1] which has been declared by the Chinese as an Air Defense Identification Zone, and Dokdo Island, where Japan and South Korea have become embroiled in serious diplomatic hostilities. Moreover, since Prime Minister Abe's visit to the Yasukuni Shrine in December 2013, Japan has been in serious conflict with China and South Korea over various historical problems.

The fierce diplomatic dispute between Japan and China was triggered by an incident involving a collision between a Japanese coast guard vessel and a Chinese fishing vessel in the waters around the Senkaku Islands in September 2010. Then, in September 2012, the Japanese government "nationalized" Uotsuri Island (known in China as Diaoyu Island), resulting in the already hostile diplomatic relations between Japan and China escalating into a potentially explosive situation. Commenting on the territorial dispute that has spread across East Asia in the wake of the Senkaku Islands conflict between China and Japan, the US current affairs magazine *Foreign Policy*[2] noted that it was similar to the situation in the

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[1] In this chapter, the terms "the Senkaku Islands" and the "Kuril Islands" are used in preference to other variants as these are the names used by the countries that have effective control over them.

[2] Reported on January 30, 2013.

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Balkans, which instigated a world war as a result of the rise of nationalism and the intensification of territorial disputes.

In this chapter, in gaining an understanding of the reality of the intensified dispute between China and Japan over the sovereignty of the Senkaku Islands, its similarities and differences with the continuing dispute between Japan and South Korea over Dokdo Island (Takeshima Island in Japanese) will be considered. First, the points in dispute regarding the claims of sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands by both Japan and China will be arranged. Through this, by comparing the tensions over the Senkaku Islands and Dokdo Island, the contradictions in Japan's territorial policy and the inefficiency of its diplomacy that emerges from these contradictions will be considered.

6.2 The Points of Dispute in the Senkaku Islands Problem: The Historical Point of View Versus the International Law Point of View

The difficulty we face when trying to understand the Senkaku Islands problem is the asymmetrical conflict between China's claim of historical evidence and Japan's claim of the judicial doctrine of occupation. In other words, the Chinese and Taiwanese sides have an awareness that emphasizes the historical fact that before 1895, the islands were their territory. In contrast, the Japanese side claims that its territorial claim to the islands acquired legitimacy in accordance with international law in the incorporation process that has occurred since 1895. Based on these differences in their competing claims, the various sides have clashed in their diplomatic policies. We will investigate this dispute by considering the following six questions:

1. Does the Senkaku Islands territory belong inherently to Japan or to China?
2. Was Japan's territorial acquisition of the Senkaku Islands in 1895 a legitimate act based on international law?
3. Were the Senkaku Islands returned to China in the Cairo Declaration or the Potsdam Declaration?
4. Were the Senkaku Islands placed under the administration of the United States by the signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty?
5. Were the Senkaku Islands returned to Japan by the Okinawa Reversion Agreement?
6. Did China raise any objection (to Japanese sovereignty over the islands) prior to 1971?[3]

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[3] Regarding these six points of dispute, please refer to Yabuki (2013: pp. 125–131).

6.2.1 Does the Senkaku Islands Territory Belong Inherently to Japan or to China?

The first question to be answered about the dispute between China and Japan is, as a result of an investigation of historical documents related to the Qing Dynasty, whether its dominion extended to the Senkaku Islands. There is no difference in the recognition of Japan, China, and Taiwan of the fact that since ancient times, the Senkaku Islands were not included in the territory of the Ryukyu Kingdom. The problem is rather that neither Taiwan nor China recognizes that these uninhabited islands were terra nullius and have instead continued to claim that they are part of their territory.

Japan claims that, “After carefully confirming that the Senkaku Islands were uninhabited and that there were no traces of dominion over them by the Qing Dynasty, they were incorporated into Japanese territory based on international law and therefore they are territory belonging to Japan.” In response to this, China asserted that “The Diaoyu Islands and its attached islands are part of China’s indivisible territory and they were not *terra nullius* and were under the administration of China for a long time” (Hosaka and Togo 2012: pp. 125–131).

China claims that historical documents indicate the Qing Dynasty held dominion over the Senkaku Islands before 1895 and that Japan’s first step to invading China in the Sino-Japanese War (1895) was its incorporation of the Senkaku Islands. In other words, it claims that Japan changed the name of the islands in 1895 during the course of the Sino-Japanese War, and, therefore, they should have been returned to China at the end of the Second World War. Hence, China considers Japan’s incorporation of the Senkaku Islands to be a historical problem. On the other hand, Japan claims that its incorporation of the islands was legitimate and separate to colonial rule as it was a territorial incorporation based on the doctrine of terra nullius in international law after 1895.[4]

6.2.2 Was Japan’s Territorial Acquisition of the Senkaku Islands in 1895 a Legitimate Act Based on International Law?

The second question regarding this dispute relates to the interpretation of the judicial doctrine of occupation in international law. Japan claims that its incorporation of the islands was a legitimate act in accordance with the doctrine of terra nullius in international law and also that in the Treaty of Shimonoseki of April

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[4] This awareness of the “historical problem” is similar to the awareness of South Koreans of the incorporation of Dokdo Island as Takeshima Island by Japan in 1905. In other words, the perception of South Koreans is that the colonization of the Korean Peninsula by Japan began with its incorporation of Takeshima Island.

1895, the Qing Dynasty conceded to Japan that the Senkaku Islands were not part of Taiwan or the Penghu Islands and, therefore, that it was not possible for Japan to have seized them in the Sino-Japan War.

In response to this, China asserts that Japan's official documents clearly describe that Japan was secretly pressing ahead with its plan to steal the Diaoyu Islands and, as they were not terra nullius, their incorporation does not have efficacy as stipulated by international law. China provides the counterargument that as a result of the Sino-Japan War, China was forced by Japan to conclude the unfair Treaty of Shimonoseki and was compelled to cede to Japan all Taiwan and all of its attached islands and that the Diaoyu Islands were ceded to Japan as part of Taiwan's attached islands.

The rationale of the Japanese side is, for example, that even if it to a certain extent recognizes the islands to have a historical connection with China, in order for possession of a territory to be recognized by international law, there must be facts showing effective dominion over that territory and that in the absence of such facts, as terra nullius, a territory can be claimed by a third-party country as its own.

Within the Senkaku Islands problem, this "uninhabited island" question is the most vexatious one. Although it is possible to consider China's historical documents as having shown an awareness of the islands as its territory, it never actually dispatched anyone to these uninhabited islands. In other words, the problem is that it did not exercise effective dominion over them. Following a Cabinet resolution, Japan incorporated the Senkaku Islands into its own territory in 1895. The position of the Japanese government is that, ultimately, this was the official incorporation of the islands into a national territory based on the international law of that time, and it has developed its diplomatic policy with this as its understanding.

So what exactly is terra nullius? It is Latin for "nobody's land," but in international law, it is not limited to "uninhabited land." Even if somebody is living on that land, it remains "ownerless land" if it is not included in the territory of a certain nation. We might consider as an example Africa prior to the doctrine of terra nullius being applied by the European powers. Although this land was inhabited by "primitive natives," as they had not formed states in accordance with international law, the land was interpreted as being ownerless land. By the nineteenth century, this doctrine was fully developed when it began to be claimed that the land must be practically occupied and dominion over it demonstrated, which became the practice of empires. In the second half of the nineteenth century, it was established in international law that the doctrine was an effective one. When viewed in the context of the details provided above, we can clearly see that the doctrine of terra nullius in international law is controversial. In other words, it is contested as the logic of the dominion exercised by the great powers.

6.2.3 *Were the Senkaku Islands Returned to China in the Cairo Declaration or the Potsdam Declaration?*

China asserts that the Cairo Declaration clearly states that "All the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China," and that, in addition, "Japan will also be expelled from all other territories which she has taken by violence and greed." Article 8 of the Potsdam Declaration stipulates that "The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out." So China claims that as Japan accepted the terms of the Potsdam Declaration and as the Diaoyu Islands were islands attached to Taiwan, they were returned to China together with Taiwan.

Japan has responded that China has shown no factual evidence showing that the "islands attached to Taiwan" in the Cairo Declaration included the Senkaku Islands or that the Allies recognized them to be part of the Republic of China. Therefore, Japan asserts that the islands were not returned to China.

6.2.4 *Were the Senkaku Islands Placed Under the Administration of the United States by the Signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty?*

Japan claims that on signing the San Francisco Peace Treaty, it abandoned its sovereignty over Taiwan and the Penghu Islands that China had ceded to it, but the Senkaku Islands were not included within Taiwan and the Penghu Islands. It asserts that based on Article 3 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, the Senkaku Islands were considered part of the Nansei Islands and the United States exercised actual administrative rights over them under a new governance system in which it was the sole administering authority.

In response to this, China argues that the San Francisco Peace Treaty was concluded in a situation in which it was excluded and that it was in this context that islands such as the Nansei Islands were placed under the delegated administration of the United Nations, which then settled on the United States to be the islands' sole administrator. However, it claims that the Diaoyu Islands were not included in the Nansei Islands, the administration of which was delegated to the United States, and that subsequently the United States Government of the Ryukyu Islands arbitrarily expanded the scope of its delegated administration by simultaneously issuing Executive Order 27 and Executive Order 68, thereby incorporating the Diaoyu Islands, which were Chinese territory, into the scope of its administration.

6.2.5 Were the Senkaku Islands Returned to Japan by the Okinawa Reversion Agreement?

Japan claims that the Senkaku Islands were included in the area whose administrative rights were returned to Japan in the Okinawa Reversion Agreement, which was signed in 1971. It argues that the administrative rights were returned to Japan when this agreement came into effect, which means that its sovereignty over them was also returned. China's response is that the Okinawa Reversion Agreement's incorporation of islands such as China's Diaoyu Islands into the "territory to be returned to Japan" was illegal, and as a result, it could not have changed the territorial sovereignty of these islands. Taiwan has also expressed its strong opposition to this argument by Japan.

In response to this, the United States has stated its position to be that "The return of the administrative rights over these islands does not in any way damage claims to sovereignty" and that "Any conflicting claims over these islands are to be mutually resolved by the relevant parties." Also, the United States Department of State issued a statement saying that while "The United States had returned the 'administrative rights' of these islands to Japan, it takes a neutral position with regards to the conflicting claims of sovereignty by both Japan and China over these islands and it takes no sides in any aspect of the dispute."

6.2.6 China Did Not Raise Any Objection (to Japanese Sovereignty Over the Islands) Prior to 1971

Japan emphasizes that it held sovereignty over the islands up to 1971 and that prior to that time, China did not raise any objection to this. According to Japan's claim, the critically vulnerable part of China's argument is that Japan obtained sovereignty over the islands in 1895 and that not only up to Japan's defeat in the Second World War, but also after that, despite the fact that the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China were in the position of being the victors in the war, China did not on any occasion claim the islands as its own territory at the time of the adoption of the San Francisco Peace Treaty or at any time up until 1968. It emphasizes that it was not until the results of a survey by the Coordinating Committee for Geoscience Programmes in East and Southeast Asia (CCOP) announced that there were an enormous amount of subsea resources in the vicinity of the Senkaku Islands that China claimed sovereignty over them. From Japan's perspective, the Senkaku Islands were dealt with in the Peace Treaty in the same way as Okinawa, and China and Taiwan were free to claim territorial rights over them even during the Cold War period but chose not to do so. Japan asserts that according to current international law, this means that China has basically forfeited any grounds to a claim of sovereignty.

In response to this argument, Eric Huang, Deputy Director of the Taipei Representative Office in Singapore, has provided the following counterargument (Huang 2013).[5] As the Diaoyu Islands were ceded to Japan, together with Taiwan, in 1895 in the Treaty of Shimonoseki, based on the Cairo Declaration (1943), the Potsdam Declaration (1945), Japan's declaration of surrender (1945), and its peace treaty with China (1952), they should have been returned to China together with Taiwan. He argues that Japan's claim that the Republic of China did not raise any objections when the Diaoyu Islands were entrusted to the administration of the United States is also without merit. Specifically, he asserts that in 1900, Japan changed the name of the Diaoyu Islands to the Senkaku Islands and incorporated them into Okinawa, but in 1945, when Taiwan was returned to the Republic of China, the Republic of China was not able to have the Senkaku Islands recognized as the Diaoyu Islands. Furthermore, he notes that as there was a military alliance between Taiwan and the United States, there was no reason for the Taiwan to object to the United States utilizing the waters in the vicinity of the Diaoyu Islands as a firing and bombing range, and the United States also did not exercise sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands. Therefore, he concludes that the transfer of administrative authority back to Japan in 1972 (including the Diaoyu Islands) did not also signify the transfer of sovereignty.

6.3 The Similarities and Differences with Dokdo Island

While analyzing the development of the dispute between Japan and China over the Senkaku Islands, we will compare it with the Dokdo Island problem in terms of the following three points. First is the point of the positioning of the Senkaku Islands and the Dokdo (Takeshima) Island problems as historical problems. Second is that the lesson learnt from the further intensification of the dispute between Japan and China following Japan's nationalization of the Senkaku Islands is that it is necessary for the country with effective control to show restraint in strengthening its effective control. The third is that in connection with the arbitration of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) for both problems, the judicial doctrine of the occupation of terra nullius does not have much efficacy as logic within the current international law.

6.3.1 The Historical Problem

Up to the present time, China has frequently announced its distrust of Japan over matters such as Japanese textbooks, Yasukuni Shrine, and historical problems. At the root of this distrust are its feelings of dissatisfaction that Japan has not reflected on its war of aggression. Today, the Senkaku Islands problem has changed into becoming the focal point for these feelings. Why has this happened? The process can be traced to the fact that the treaty ceding Taiwan to Japan as a result of Japan's victory in the Sino-Japan War was signed and came into effect in May 1895, but Japan's declaration of the occupation of terra nullius of the Senkaku Islands was made in January of the same year, just 3 or 4 months earlier. This judicial doctrine of the occupation of terra nullius is a logic from the age of imperialism, and from the Chinese side, it is viewed as nothing more than "the ceding of one part of Taiwan." In this way, the Senkaku problem has been transformed into the starting point and symbol of Japan's invasion of China (Yabuki 2013: p. 18).

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[5] Eric Huang, Deputy Director of the Taipei Representative Office in Singapore.

The Japanese side's awareness of this problem is premised on the international situation after the Sino-Japan War, while the awareness of Beijing was inherited from the Qing Dynasty and starts from before the Sino-Japan War. As Taiwan discusses the zones of activities for fishermen, its historical awareness goes back even much further than this. Therefore, an awareness of how the three countries of China, Japan, and Taiwan differ from each other in terms of their "origins of memory" is required. On the eve of the Sino-Japan War, the famous General Grant, who appears on the €50 bill in the United States, responded to a request by Li Hung-Chang and proposed to Japan a draft "to divide Okinawa into three equal parts." Specifically, he proposed dividing the territory into three so that Japan's territory would end at Amami Oshima Island, Qing territory would start south of Miyako Islands, and in the middle, the main island of Okinawa would be a "neutral and independent country." At that time, the Qing Dynasty was recognized as "a sleeping giant." In 1880, the year after Grant's proposal was received, Marquis Inoue Kaoru, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, ordered Ambassador Tamaki Shishido to proceed with "border negotiations" with Zongli Yamen (the Qing government office). As a result, the negotiations were concluded to the extent of initialing the treaty, with "the territory of Japan being up to the Okinawa main island." However, as Li Hung-Chang refused to conclude the treaty at its final stage, the "proposal to divide the Ryukyus in two" fell through, and the problem of the treatment of the Ryukyus was left unresolved. This problem was then solved in one fell swoop by the Sino-Japan War (Yabuki 2013: p. 11).

Taiwan was ceded to Japan, the victor of this war, and as a result, it goes without saying that from that point onward, any dispute over the Senkaku Islands, which chronologically began with Diaoyu Island and another two islands attached to Taiwan, also ceased to be an issue between the Qing Dynasty and Japan. This was because Japanese territory had already been extended from Gaoxiong to the Penghu Islands. On the eve of the Sino-Japan War, Japan had considered issuing a warning about the area "between the Okinawa main island and Miyako Island," but as a result of its victory, Japan extended its borders as far as the Penghu Islands. This was nothing less than territorial expansion during an era of imperialism.

The view that the Chinese authorities began staking a territorial claim to the Senkaku Islands, based on the statement by its Foreign Ministry on December 30, 1971, relating to the Okinawa Reversion Agreement, is one that ignores the undercurrent that has existed since the negotiations by General Grant on the eve of the Sino-Japan War.

In the case of Dokdo Island, the circumstances are that during the course of the Russo-Japanese War, Korea was in practical terms robbed of its diplomatic rights, and this territory was incorporated immediately prior to Japan's annexation of Korea. Similarly, the Senkaku Islands were incorporated a few months prior to the Treaty of Shimonoseki. Therefore, although there are differences between Dokdo Island and the Senkaku Islands in terms of which country has effective control, they have points in common in the context of Japan's rule over the Korean peninsula following the ceding of Taiwan to Japan.

Kazuhiko Togo, on viewing the problems from this viewpoint, warned of the possibility that a terrible situation could arise in Japan (Hosaka and Togo 2012: p. 141) because "As the territorial developments of Dokdo Island and the Senkaku Islands are very similar, these two problems could be turned into historical problems." For example, even if legally the Senkaku Islands are determined to be Japanese territory in terms of the international law that was created by the great powers of Europe and the United States, when viewed from the perspective of the Chinese people, their incorporation occurred during one of the periods in history that China most wants to forget, namely, its defeat in the Sino-Japan War and the annexation of Taiwan by imperial Japan. Even if just limited to the extent of the Qing Dynasty's area of interest, if a fire is lit among the Chinese people about Japan's taking of a territory by force from a collapsed country, it could lead to an explosion of nationalism.

The most fundamental factor in the dispute between Japan and China over the Senkaku Islands is the wiping away of the history of 100 years of shame that the Chinese people have carried inside them, and the realization of a "power shift" that could become a new point of departure for "the restoration of China." The problem of the Senkaku Islands for Japan and China is no longer just about facts and mutual interests; it is a problem relating to the honor of these countries. For South Korea also, the Dokdo Island problem that has arisen between it and Japan is related to the issue of finally being liberated from its colonial past. Until the Dokdo Island problem is resolved, South Koreans will not feel that they have been fully liberated from Japan. Therefore, for South Korea also, the Dokdo Island problem is not simply a territorial one.

6.3.2 *Effective Control*

Exercising effective control is an advantage greater than any other within a territorial dispute. However, if this effective control is further "strengthened," then strong opposition from the other party is unavoidable. If the purchase of the Senkaku Islands is viewed from the perspective of the other countries in the dispute, what it invokes is not maintenance of effective control, but rather the strengthening of it. The party that has the stronger position in a territorial dispute is the one that exercises effective control over that territory. If the impression is given that action is being taken to strengthen this effective control, it will result in a backlash from the other parties and serve only to further enflame the dispute. So, measures to strengthen effective control must be avoided (Okada 2012: p. 40).

Russia and South Korea have effective control over the Kuril Islands and Dokdo Island, respectively, but the situation in the Senkaku Islands is different. Up to the present time, Japan has exercised effective control over the islands, and there are also circumstances where this was recognized by both Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping. As was mentioned, exercising effective control is an advantage greater than any other in a territorial dispute. Therefore, Japan is the diplomatic winner over China in this dispute. Alternatively, to be more precise, we should say it was the winner up until recently. The reason the situation has changed is that Japan has refused to agree that the "decision has been put on hold" in its dispute with China. Naturally, China has responded to this. In other words, we might say that Japan has itself thrown away its dominant position in the Senkaku Islands dispute by provoking the other party and causing the problem to escalate. Moreover, Japan nationalized the Senkaku Islands into its territory, which from China's position can be considered to be Japan's unilateral destruction of the agreement to "put the decision on hold." Practically no Japanese are aware of this, but the starting point for this incident was when the Japanese side changed the rules.

In comparison, South Korea is an advantageous position in the Dokdo Island problem in terms of the historical viewpoint of sovereignty, and, furthermore, it exercises effective control of the island. Therefore, in view of the intensification of the territorial dispute between China and Japan after Japan nationalized the Senkaku Islands, it seems South Korea should refrain from any actions that would give the impression of it strengthening its effective control. The visit of South Korean President Lee Myung-Bak to Dokdo Island might be thought of as a natural course of action from the perspective of South Koreans, but, as can be seen from the recent deterioration of relations between Japan and South Korea, experts believe that it corresponded to an act of strengthening that caused more damage than any benefit gained.

6.3.3 Filing of Appeals with the International Court of Justice (ICJ)

On August 17, 2012, the Japanese government announced its plan to file an appeal with the International Court of Justice to request adjudication over the Dokdo Island problem. However, as long as South Korea does not "declare acceptance of its jurisdiction" (declaration of forced acceptance of jurisdiction) or implement a counter appeal to the legal appeal by the Japanese side, the ICJ's rule is that the adjudication will not start. South Korea has clearly announced that it rejects (this adjudication) in the case of the Dokdo Island problem.

What about the Senkaku problem? Even if Japan filed an appeal, China, similar to South Korea, would probably not consent to it and would not file a counter appeal. For this dispute, Japan strongly emphasizes the judicial doctrine of the occupation of terra nullius as a principle of international law and that this should be the inviolable rule when determining territorial problems. However, there have been practically no legal cases in recent years where a judgment has been made based on the doctrine of terra nullius.

These days, the rulings of the International Court of Justice are overwhelming judgments focused on what sort of treaty exists between the parties to the dispute and its interpretation of these treaties. For the Senkaku Islands, what is important is the method that is used to connect the Potsdam Declaration, the Cairo Declaration, and the San Francisco Peace Treaty. There is no possibility that the doctrine of terra nullius will be given more importance than the Potsdam Declaration and the Cairo Declaration. This judicial doctrine of terra nullius is a product of the colonial era, and its logic has little validity in modern international law (Magosaki 2012: pp. 35–36).

Based on this understanding, we need to know that, with regard to Japan's threat to take legal action in the International Court of Justice over the Dokdo Island problem, there is no need to feel that one should back off.

6.4 Factors in the Northeast Asia Territorial Disputes

In the last 10 years, there has been a major power shift between Japan and China, and, fundamentally, the recent Senkaku Islands dispute is taking place within the ramifications of this power shift. In 2010, China, which had been in second place as the economic power in the region, overtook Japan to become the economic superpower in Asia. China's economic overtaking of Japan has a special significance, as it is the first time it has achieved this status in over a century since Japan established its position of hegemony in Asia by defeating China in the Sino-Japan War. In other words, it can be said to be significant that China has wiped away the shame of history that had been internalized within its people for 100 years and that it has reached a new point of departure in realizing the "restoration of China."

An article in the Korean *Chosun Ilbo* newspaper on October 1, 2014 placed the blame for the current conflict between South Korea, China, and Japan on territorial and historical problems. However, it also described the fundamental factor driving it as the changes taking place on chessboards, from the simultaneous conflict between the major powers of the United States and China on a "global chessboard" and the struggle for hegemony between China and Japan on a "regional chessboard."

The Korean Peninsula is in the middle of the vortex of the power struggle between the United States and China (the global chessboard) and the struggle for hegemony between China and Japan (the regional chessboard). The United States hopes that South Korea and Japan will improve their relations and cooperate with its Asia strategy. On the other hand, China views South Korea-Japan relations as the weakest link in Northeast Asia and is trying to drive a wedge between South Korea and Japan and the United States. South Korea is not explicitly an ally of Japan. However, through its alliance with the United States, South Korea is joined to Japan in an alliance similar to the US-Japan one. However, in recent years, conflicts have occurred between South Korea and Japan over historical issues that have greatly shaken the basis of the triangular alliance between South Korea, the United States, and Japan.

Order in Northeast Asia has been supported up to the present time by the "three pillars" of the 1965 South Korea-Japan Agreement, the 1972 China-Japan Treaty of Peace and Friendship, and the China-US Shanghai Communiqué (joint statement) of the same year. However, the "1965 system" between South Korea and Japan and the "1972 system" between the United States and China are already being shaken. The conflict in Northeast Asia has intensified, and it has been noted that in practical terms, the effectiveness of the 1964 South Korea-Japan Agreement, the 1972 China-Japan Treaty of Peace and Friendship, and the Shanghai Communiqué of the same year that supported the order in Northeast Asia for the past half century have dissipated.

South Korea and Japan have expressed different opinions on the Agreement between Japan and the Republic of Korea Concerning the Settlement of Problems in Regard to Property and Claims and Economic Cooperation, and they are seeking new bilateral relations. The situation is that the tacit agreement between Japan and China to reserve judgment on the sovereignty of the Senkaku Islands, which was an agreement arrived at via the 1972 Treaty of Peace and Friendship and the 1978 Treaty of Peace and Friendship, has been broken in practical terms. In addition, the agreement between the United States and China, achieved via the 1972 Shanghai Communiqué to "not pursue hegemony in the Asia and Pacific regions," has also broken down.

We are approaching an era of simultaneous major powers of China and Japan in the Northeast Asia region that is unprecedented in history, and this has brought them into sharp conflict. There has been no period in history like today, with two simultaneous major powers in the region like China and Japan. Prior to the modern era, China ruled Northeast Asia through its overwhelming power. Then at the end of the nineteenth century, Japan was victorious in the Sino-Japan War (1894–1895) and acquired the position of hegemony in Northeast Asia. In 2010, China overtook Japan in terms of GDP size and once again emerged as Asia's strongest country.

Since 2010, China and Japan have been ranked second and third in terms of global GDP after the United States. With 2012 as the standard, the combined GDP of China (approximately $8.3583 trillion) and Japan (approximately $5.9597 trillion) is around $14.3180 trillion. This is an amount practically double the combined GDP of the three major powers in Europe of Germany, France, and the United Kingdom. China and Japan occupy a major axis of the world economy ahead of that of Europe. Today in East Asia, in the context of the struggle for hegemony between Japan and China that is fiercely shaking their "regional chess board," changes are also taking place at the global level, as the powers of the United States and China simultaneously clash on a "global chessboard."

6.5 Conclusion

Regardless of the fact that the Kuril Islands, Dokdo Island, and the Senkaku Islands are distinct problems, a tendency is growing within Japan to view them as a single one. The *Mainichi Shimbun* newspaper commented that “If Japan unilaterally concedes [on the Kuril Islands negotiations], it could also have an impact on the disputes with China and South Korea over sovereignty of the Senkaku Islands and Takeshima Island” (May 1, 2013), while the *Sankei Shimbun* stated that, “There is not a single reason for Japan to concede. If we are misled in the conflict surrounding the Senkaku Islands and Takeshima Islands, we could be caught by the ankles by the people of China and South Korea” (May 5, 2013). As we can see by these claims, there is an understanding in Japan that links the Kuril Islands problem with the Takeshima Island and the Senkaku Islands ones. In other words, Japan is concerned about the occurrence of a chain reaction between these three sites of territorial dispute, and so it has basically been placed in a situation where, in principle, it refuses to negotiate on any of them. This is a factor that makes it difficult for it to respond strategically to circumstantial changes and is resulting in the solidification of the existing situation. It goes without saying that Japan’s strong protests against South Korea, which has effective control over Dokdo Island, is causing Japan-South Korea relations to deteriorate. In addition, in the Senkaku Islands dispute, Japan faces the problem that it has become difficult for it to leverage its advantage of having effective control and, hence, being in a superior position. Looking ahead, the possibility that Japan will exercise effective control over Dokdo Island is practically zero (according to one influential Japanese politician). However, it remains unclear what will be the conclusion to the Senkaku Islands problem. Rather than inefficiently expanding the goals of its territorial diplomacy, Japan should increase their efficiency by focusing on clear and achievable goals.

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Chapter 7
Taiwan's East and South China Sea Policies and the US Factor

Cheng-Yi Lin

7.1 Introduction

From 1949 to 1972, President Chiang Kai-shek was mostly preoccupied with the mission of returning to Mainland China through his military counterattacks and harassment of Communist China. Chiang's grand plans came to a halt after the Chinese nuclear weapons testing in Xinjiang in October 1964 and then a devastating loss of two Taiwanese naval ships in the Taiwan Strait in August 1965, which resulted in the deaths of the 200 soldiers aboard. Chiang was right to garrison the remote islands of *Taiping* (Itu Aba, Spratly Islands) and *Tungsha* (Pratas Islands) in the South China Sea in the 1950s, but they were not his priority in terms of sovereignty or national security because the greatest threat came from the Taiwan Strait. Before 1970, Chiang hardly ever raised the sovereignty issue regarding the *Diaoyutai*/*Senkaku* Islands in the East China Sea with the USA, which had a security alliance treaty with the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan from 1954 to 1979. The nonpresence of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in the South and East China Seas hardly constituted an insurmountable challenge for Chiang when dealing with sovereignty issues either with the USA/Japan or other Southeast Asian claimant states. From 1949 until he passed away in April 1975, the main issues that concerned Chiang when he was forced to move to Taiwan were Mao Zedong and the Communist regime in Mainland China. Even with the opening up of relations across the Taiwan Strait starting in the 1990s, ROC presidents after Chiang Kai-shek still adopted a pro-US stance in their national strategy and shunned calls for coordination by the Chinese in handling the South and East China Sea issues.

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7.2 Chiang Kai-shek, Taiwan, and the South China Sea

After World War Two, President Chiang Kai-shek consolidated Chinese sovereign claims in the South China Sea by dispatching troops in November–December 1946 to occupy *Yongxing* (Woody) Island of the Paracel Islands and *Taiping* Island of the *Nansha* (Spratly) Islands. Japan occupied these two islands from 1939 to 1945 until they fell under the Allied occupation led by Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers. Chiang's military deployment did not elicit protest from other claimants such as Vietnam and the Philippines, which were still struggling with the consolidation of national independence and paying very little attention to Nationalist Chinese moves, let alone Malaysia and Brunei, which were still protectorates of the UK.

Although the French government dispatched reconnaissance planes and anchored an F-23 military ship near *Yongxing* Island, they failed in vain to force the ROC to evacuate from the island. The French, however, proceeded to occupy *Shanhu* (Pattle) Island in January 1947 (Yu and Chen 1995: 1, p. 425). The Chinese Communists captured Hainan Island in April 1950, thereby forcing Chiang to withdraw the Chinese Nationalist troops from these two island groups in the South China Sea back to Taiwan in May 1950. Communist China decided to fill in Nationalist China's place by occupying islands in the eastern part of the Paracel Islands. Before leaving *Taiping* Island, the ROC Minister of Foreign Affairs George Yeh and Minister of Interior Ching-tang Yu suggested that, with a shared anti-Communist China policy, the Philippines could lend assistance by guarding the island before the ROC returned to the Spratly Islands. However, their proposal was turned down by President Chiang Kai-shek (Yu and Chen 1995: 2, p. 807).

In 1954–1955, Victor L. Anderson, an American businessman in the Philippines and self-appointed foreign minister of the Kingdom of Humanity in the South China Sea, asked for recognition from the ROC, but he and his associate Morton F. Meeds were later arrested and charged by the Philippines for business extortion. At the time, President Chiang was tied up with the management of the first Quemoy offshore islands crisis (1954–1955), and he regarded those remote locations in the Spratly Islands as having little strategic value for the defense of Taiwan and the Pescadores. President Dwight Eisenhower agreed to sign the US–ROC Mutual Defense Treaty in December 1954 and then requested congressional authorization of the Formosa Resolution to deploy US forces to safeguard those "related positions and territories of that area now in friendly hands" implicitly including Quemoy and Matsu under ROC control. Chiang did not change his lukewarm position on the South China Sea until Tomas Cloma, the founder of the Philippine Maritime Institute, landed on *Taiping* Island and claimed the founding of the Kalayaan Group of Islands (Freedom Land) with tacit approval from the Philippine government in 1956.

A multilateral collective defense treaty linking ROC, the Philippines, and the Republic of Korea with the USA playing the pivotal and leading role was always lingering in Chiang Kai-shek's strategic thinking about the anti-Communist campaign. To forestall the fall of *Taiping* Island into the hands of Tomas Cloma, President Chiang at first only sent naval ships to patrol the islands, but he later instructed the Navy in June 1956 to station troops permanently because no Filipinos were spotted on *Taiping* Island. As long as the Philippines formally recognized those islands as belonging to the ROC, Chiang deliberated the negotiation of an ROC–Philippine or ROC–US–Philippines defense cooperation plan in the Spratly Islands to deter a possible Chinese Communist invasion from the north and to relieve the ROC from the responsibility of single-handedly conducting the resistance vis-à-vis the PRC (*Chiang Kai-shek Diaries*, 30 May 1956, Box/Folder: 65:6, 8 June 1956, Box/Folder: 65:7).

Chiang was regarded as a champion of Chinese nationalism but his top priority was to sabotage the Chinese Communists' moves in the South China Sea. Persuading the USA to deter Mao Zedong's possible military actions in the South China Sea became a political necessity for Chiang. The most pressing concern for Chiang was Mao's actions in the South China Sea and their implications for the ROC's diplomatic relations with South Vietnam and the Philippines. After the South Vietnam government under Ngo Dinh Diem dispatched troops to land on *Nanwei* Dao (Spratly Islands) in August 1956, President Chiang decided to lodge a diplomatic protest instead of conducting military actions to avoid the possibility of Communist China taking advantage of the intrusion (*Chiang Kai-shek Diaries*, 28 August 1956, Box/Folder: 65:9). In a sense, Chiang's archenemy was Mao Zedong and Communist China, rather than South Vietnam or the Philippines, in its defense in the South China Sea.

When South Vietnam and the PRC became involved in military skirmishes in the Paracel Islands in January 1974, Chiang did not lend any support to the People's Liberation Army (PLA) naval ships when they passed through the Taiwan Strait with the aim of strengthening PLA capabilities in the South China Sea. The ROC issued a statement of not siding with either side and reiterated the ROC's indisputable legal claims over the Paracel and Spratly Islands, although Chiang had not instructed armed forces to return to *Yongxing* Island after its retreat in 1950. The ROC ambassador to Vietnam, Shaw-chang Hsu, even cautioned Taipei not to issue protest against the Vietnamese government, instead suggesting that it condemn the PRC's use of force in occupying new territories in the Paracel Islands.[1]

President Chiang was more concerned about the use of *Tungsha* Island in the South China Sea when launching military actions against Communist China. In particular, *Tungsha* was critical for Taiwan's strategic defense and Chiang's strategy for returning to the Mainland. As early as December 1963, Chiang instructed the ROC Ministry of Defense to evaluate the potential fortification of *Tungsha* Island with aerial and naval bases able to facilitate the landing and taking off of fighter jets and docking of military ships as intermediary base port facilities. The assessment report suggested Chiang abandon the building of a fighter jet airstrip but to consider a shorter airstrip for air transport purposes, and Chiang approved the recommendation in January 1964.[2]

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[1] "Telegram from the ROC Embassy in Vietnam, January 22, 1974," (*Diplomatic Archives*, *the Republic of China Ministry of Foreign Affairs*, 1928-, Number 019.3/ 89007).

In December 1969, President Chiang continued to push for the construction of a wharf in *Tungsha* Island (*Chiang Kai-shek Diaries*, 7 December 1969, Box/Folder: 75:10). In February 1970, Chiang's military tactics included ROC Navy presence in the waters surrounding *Tungsha* Island while waiting for the ROC Air Force to control the air space, followed by launching an amphibious landing on Mainland China. Chiang also instructed the military to increase oil reserves on *Tungsha* Island and to extend the length of the airstrip on that island (*Chiang Kai-shek Diaries*, 14 February 1970, Box/Folder: 75:13). As far as *Taiping* Island was concerned, it was too far (about 880 nautical miles) away from Taiwan and simply beyond Chiang's strategic calculations for any military actions against Mainland China. For example, Chiang ordered the ROC military to prepare combat maps covering the Taiwan Strait, Okinawa, and *Tungsha* but left out Taiping Island (*Chiang Kai-shek Dairies*, 13 May 1970, Box/Folder: 75:16).

After the PRC's military clashes with Vietnam in *Yongshu* Island (Fiery Cross Reef) and *Chigua Jiao* (Johnson South Reef) in January–March 1988, President Lee Teng-hui, who had just succeeded President Chiang Ching-kuo in January, reiterated ROC sovereignty claims over the Spratly Islands but carefully avoided taking sides or getting involved in the confrontation between the two socialist states. Taiwan did heighten its defense preparedness on *Taiping* Island to monitor the developments of the military clashes.[3]

During the 1990s, President Lee Teng-hui utilized legal mechanisms to strengthen Taiwan's South China Sea claims. In 1993, President Lee approved the Policy Guidelines on the South China Sea to achieve the goals of safeguarding ROC sovereignty and strengthening the development and management of the islands in the South China Sea. With the beginning of cross-Strait secret envoy meetings and public negotiations between the Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) on the Taiwanese side and the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS) on the Chinese side, oil corporations from Taiwan and China initiated joint exploration projects in the waters near *Tungsha* Island. Cross-Strait relations rapidly deteriorated after Lee's visit to the USA in June 1995, which was followed by the launching of Chinese missile testing exercises in the waters surrounding Taiwan.

In January 1998, Taiwan promulgated the Law of the Republic of China on Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone as well as the Law of the Republic of China on the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf. In February 1999, the ROC government published the first batch of territorial sea baselines for Taiwan and its affiliated islets *Tungsha* (*Dongsha*, Pratas) Island and *Huangyan*

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[2] "File on Military," (*President Chiang Ching-kuo Archive*, December 1963, Number 005-010202-00074-003); *Chiang Kai-shek Diaries* (10 January 1964, Box/Folder: 70:13), Hoover Institution, Stanford University.

[3] Yu and Chen (1995: 2, p. 1302); See also http://lis.ly.gov.tw/lghtml/memo/memo_d.txt

Dao (Scarborough Shoal) in *Zhongsha* (Macclesfield Bank). In 1999, President Lee took a significant step by replacing marines stationed on *Taiping* and *Tungsha* Islands with coast guard personnel in order to reduce the total number of ROC armed forces. According to the ROC Ministry of National Defense (MND), the coast guard personnel "would be less controversial in performing missions like cracking down on maritime smuggling and stowaways, as well as environmental protection." (*Chingnian Ribao* 1999; Lu 2000; Luo and Chen 1999; Siong 1999) Needless to say, Taipei was concerned about the difficulty of effectively defending *Taiping* or *Tungsha* Island and understood that its switch of personnel might elicit greater international criticism of the PRC and Vietnam were they to attack nonmilitary coast guard forces stationed on the two islands. Beijing feared that Taipei would adopt a separate and different South China Sea policy from that of the PRC and thus paint Beijing as more militant (Gao 2000). Beijing argued that Taipei's maneuver had weakened the defense capabilities of the Chinese people and complicated collaboration of forces against rival claimants in the South China Sea.

On 14 March 2005, the same day Beijing adopted the anti-secession law threatening the possibility of using force against Taiwan, three national oil companies' representatives from China National Offshore Oil Corporation, together with the Philippine National Oil Company, and Vietnam Oil and Gas Corporation, signed a tripartite Agreement for Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking in the Agreement Area in the South China Sea. The tripartite agreement covered *Taiping* Island, but Taiwan was excluded from negotiating or signing the agreement.

President Chen Shui-bian took a series of actions to strengthen Taiwan's claim in the South China Sea. Taiwan's decision-making body for the South China Sea was shifted from the Ministry of Interior to the National Security Council in 2006. The Chen government established *Tungsha* Island as Taiwan's sixth national park in 2007. President Chen visited *Tungsha* Island in December 2000, July 2005, and February 2008. The airstrip on *Taiping* Island was constructed and completed in 2008 to highlight not only Taiwan's sovereignty but also its consideration of humanitarian assistance and maritime security. Chen also announced the *Nansha* (Spratly) Initiative suggesting all claimant countries recognize the region as an ecological preservation area and proposing a plan to have international ecologists and environmentalists conducting research around the area of *Tungsha* and *Taiping* Islands on a regular basis (Ko 2008; "President Visits Disputed Spratly" 2008; Shih et al. 2008). What made Chen's Spratly Initiative too difficult to implement was that Taiwan had no diplomatic ties with the other claimants, and they did not want to elicit negative reactions from Beijing by expressing support for Taiwan's proposal. For Beijing, the airstrip on *Taiping* Island could bolster the Chinese presence in the region vis-à-vis other ASEAN claimants if Taipei agreed to jointly defend Chinese sovereign rights in the South China Sea.

While cross-Strait relations have become warmer with 21 agreements inked under President Ma Ying-jeou as of January 2015, regional tensions in the South China Sea have continued to rise with Chinese land reclamation activities on and around occupied islands and reefs. Numerous calls for a shared responsibility to safeguard or jointly defend Chinese sovereignty and jurisdiction in the South China Sea have begun to emerge on both sides of the Taiwan Strait ("Veterans, Scholars from Chinese Mainland, Taiwan Discuss Safeguarding Sovereignty" 2012). The official position of Ma's government appears to be more cautious about any joint defense projects with the PRC (Ausgaben 2010). Shortly after the public showdown between the Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jie-chi and the US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton on the South China Sea in July 2010 at the ASEAN Regional Forum in Hanoi, the Ma government took a neutral stance and urged all claimants "to respect the principles and spirit of the Charter of the United Nations and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, and to refrain from adopting unilateral measures that might upset the peace and stability of the region and the South China Sea." (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China [MOFA, ROC] 2011)

As previous administrations had also done, the Ma government has issued numerous statements objecting to other claimants' attempts to assert sovereignty in the South China Sea. In February 2009, Taiwan protested against the Philippines for its proposed incorporation of *Huangyan Dao* into the Macclesfield Bank and part of the Spratly Islands into Philippine territory (MOFA, ROC 2009a). In May 2009, the ROC Ministry of Foreign Affairs published statements opposing the submission by Vietnam as well as that submitted by Vietnam and Malaysia jointly to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, extending the outer limits of their respective continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles of their baselines (MOFA, ROC 2009b). In addition to taking diplomatic measures, President Ma Ying-jeou visited *Tungsha* Island in September 2008, and he decided in April 2011 that the coast guard personnel stationed on *Taiping* Island should be trained by the country's elite Marine Corps to carry out sea combat operations (Sui 2011). Since the summer of 2011, the Ma government has sponsored and facilitated university-level study tours to the South China Sea islands (Soong 2011). In December 2011, Taiwan announced the opening of a new solar power system on *Taiping* Island, which is expected to generate an estimated 175,920 kW h of electricity per year, saving fuel costs and helping eliminate carbon emissions ("Solar Power Station Opens on Taiping" 2011). The construction of a new wharf on *Taiping* Island is also under way and will be able to host frigates and corvettes when completed in 2015 ("Executive Yuan Earmarks Funds" 2013).

At the cross-Strait level, Taiwan and China have made important breakthroughs in functional cooperation relating to the South China Sea. For example, the two sides have revived their cooperation in the exploration and development of offshore hydrocarbon resources, which was suspended since 2004 as a result of the cross Strait political stalemate. In December 2008, the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) and Taiwan's China Petroleum Corporation (CPC Taiwan) signed four agreements, whereby the two companies would conduct joint exploration in the Taiwan Strait and off the southern Guangdong coast of China in the northern South China Sea. In November 2009, the two sides successfully initiated a joint project entitled "Southeast Asia Network for Education and Training" at the 19th Indonesian South China Sea Workshop. This was the first cross-Strait joint initiative since the inception of the workshop in 1990 (Song 2010).

Generally speaking, the PRC has inherited the territorial claims of the ROC based on its U-shaped line South China Sea map released in 1948.[4] Even though the USA has maintained a neutral position on the legal merits of the various territorial claims, the identical legal claims of Taiwan and China run counter to the US position that not all islands and reefs belong to either China or Taiwan. Under US pressure to clarify the legal basis of U-shaped line, Taiwan has stopped insisting the arguments of deeming those waters within the U-shaped line as Chinese "historic waters" and is concentrating on land features of *Taiping* and *Tungsha* Islands as their legal basis under the 1982 United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The PRC has claimed that all islands and relevant waters within the nine-dash line are under Chinese sovereignty, giving it the sovereign right to exercise law enforcement activities in the South China Sea. For example, since 2007, the PRC has stopped the USA and foreign oil and gas firms from working with Vietnam and the Philippines in the South China Sea.

The USA has become more actively involved in the disputes since 2010 and has been at loggerheads with China over issues of freedom of navigation, the appropriate legal basis for territorial, and maritime claims, as well as approaches for resolving the disputes (Buszynski 2012). The USA has supported the Philippines in its appeal for international arbitration over the Chinese nine-dash line to judge its legality under the UNCLOS and has long asserted its rights to conduct military reconnaissance activities in the Chinese Exclusive Economic Zones in the South China Sea. The Obama administration has clearly disagreed with China's legal claims, particularly the nine-dash line. There is concern that a potential conflict between the USA and PRC in the South China Sea region could place the Ma government in an awkward position. If Taiwan allies itself closely with the PRC in the South China Sea territorial disputes, the USA might face more domestic calls for reconsidering its role in defending Taiwan against PRC's use of force.[5] However, if Taiwan openly supports an increased US presence in the South China Sea, this could rekindle Beijing's suspicion toward Taiwan's intentions and possibly lead to a setback in its development of cross Strait economic and functional cooperation with the Ma government.

7.3 Chiang Kai-shek, Taiwan, and East China Sea[6]

If President Chiang Kai-shek had taken President Franklin Roosevelt's advice to take over Okinawa after World War II, there might be no lingering territorial dispute over the *Diaoyutai*/*Senkaku* Islands. At the Cairo Conference in November

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[4] For a comprehensive review of ROC's (Taiwan's) claims in the South China Sea, including the U-shaped line, see Wang (2010); Cf. Zou (2012).

[5] A summary of various arguments for why the USA should not abandon its defense commitment for Taiwan can be viewed in Rigger (2011).

[6] This section is revised and updated from Lin (2012).

1943, President Roosevelt asked Chiang the possibility of Chinese administration of the Okinawa Islands. In response, Chiang suggested to Roosevelt the idea of a joint administration by the USA and ROC commissioned by international institutions. Chiang believes his proposal could calm US concerns, conform to history (Okinawa belonged to Japan before 1894), and a joint administration of Okinawa could be better than one managed single-handedly by the ROC (*Chiang Kai-shek Diaries*, November 25, 1943, Box/Folder: 43:10).

Soon after the conclusion of WWII, Generalissimo Chiang was occupied with the Chinese civil war, which led to his retreat to the island of Taiwan in 1949, and the ROC government was not invited as a participant to the 1951 San Francisco Peace Conference. In April 1952, the USA was designated as "the sole administering authority" under the Peace Treaty, in which the USA would "have the right to exercise all and any powers of administration, legislation, and jurisdiction over the territory and inhabitants of these islands, including their territorial waters." President Chiang was upset for not being consulted when in March 1962 President John F. Kennedy issued a statement recognizing "the Ryukyus [as] a part of the Japanese homeland" and pledging "eventual restoration of the Ryukyu Islands to Japanese administration."[7]

In 1968, United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) geographic survey team, comprised of scientists from Taiwan, Japan, the USA, and South Korea, concluded in the Emery Report, "A high probability exists that the continental shelf between Taiwan and Japan may be one of the most prolific oil reservoirs in the world." (Emery et al. 1969) After the 1969 Emery Report, the ROC government, a signatory to the 1958 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), was prompt to ratify the 1958 Continental Shelf Convention in August 1970. Chinese Petroleum Corporation (Taiwan) was able to secure four contracts with US oil corporations such as Gulf (1970/1977), Oceanic (1970/1978), Clinton (1970/1979), and Texfel (1972/1976) in joint exploration and exploitation surveys north of Taiwan. Starting from 1969, the Nixon administration was debating the wisdom of a seabed moratorium, and State Department declared in April 1971 an oil exploration moratorium policy leading to a suspension of the abovementioned joint contracts under its *force majeure* clause.

When Prime Minister Sato met with President Nixon in 1969, the USA agreed to return sovereignty over Okinawa to Japan. President Chiang's position was that the status of Okinawa should be settled among the Allied powers of WWII, including the ROC, according to the Cairo Declaration (1943) and the Potsdam Declaration (1945). Former US National Security Council staff member John H. Holdridge once stated in a memorandum that the ROC "has long maintained that it should have some say on the basis of the Japanese Peace Treaty regarding the disposition of Okinawa," and the ROC "wants to stall by calling for a plebiscite to be held to confirm the wishes of the Okinawan people."[8] The ROC government, realizing that it could not prevent Okinawan reversion, neither agreed to nor opposed the return of Okinawa to Japan.

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[7] "National Security Action Memorandum," March 5, 1962 (U.S. Department of State [USDOS] 1861a–, p. 724n). *Chiang Kai-shek Diaries* (March 20, 1962, Box/Folder: 69:9), Hoover Institution, Stanford University.

Regarding the *Diaoyutai* Islands, the ROC government treated them differently. On September 16, 1970, ROC Ambassador Chow presented a four-page aide-mémoire to Marshall Green, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs, and again sent a note verbale to the State Department on March 15, 1971, detailing the ROC's position on the *Diaoyutai* issue, including the following arguments:

1. As early as the fifteenth century, Chinese historical records considered the Senkakus as the boundary separating Taiwan from the independent kingdom of the Ryukyus.
2. The geological structure of the Senkaku Islets is similar to that of other islets associated with Taiwan. The Senkakus are closer to Taiwan than to the Ryukyus and are separated from the Ryukyus by the Okinawa Trough at the end of the Continental Shelf, which is 2,000 m in depth.
3. Taiwanese fishermen have traditionally fished in the area of the Senkakus and called at these islets.
4. The Japanese Government did not include the Senkakus in Okinawa Prefecture until after China's cession of Taiwan and the Pescadores to Japan after the first Sino-Japanese war in 1895.
5. For regional security considerations, the GRC [Government of the Republic of China] has hitherto not challenged the US military occupation of the Senkakus under Article 3 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty. However, according to international law, temporary military occupation of an area does not affect the ultimate determination of its sovereignty.
6. In view of the expected termination of the US occupation of the Ryukyu Islands in 1972, the USA is requested to respect the GRC's sovereign rights over the Senkaku Islets and restore them to the GRC when this termination takes place.[9]

On April 12, 1971, ROC Ambassador Chow was instructed by President Chiang to meet President Nixon before returning to Taiwan and taking the new post of foreign minister, and Chow pinpointed the repercussions of the "return" of *Diaoyutai* to Japan for the ROC position vis-à-vis Communist China. A series of protests by intellectuals in Taiwan and the USA challenged the ROC stance in handling the *Diaoyutai* issue. Ambassador Chow pressed his argument that "[i]f Taiwan can [not] do that, then intellectuals and overseas Chinese will feel they must go to the other side [the Chinese Communists]," and President Nixon accepted

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[8] "Memorandum from John H. Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)," November 14, 1969 (USDOS 1861b–, pp. 123–124).

[9] "Memorandum from John H. Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)," April 13, 1971 (USDOS, 1861b–, pp. 296–297).

Chow's statement on "the need to consider the political views of overseas Chinese."[10]

Ten days before the signature of the Okinawa Reversion Agreement, on June 7, 1971, David M. Kennedy, Ambassador-at-Large on textile negotiation with Taiwan and Japan, recommended President Nixon "preserve[e] the status quo rather than [allow] Japan to assume administrative control with the great loss of face this entails for Taiwan."[11] Bypassing the State Department, President Nixon immediately responded to Ambassador Kennedy that "the President's decision on the Islands is that the deal has gone too far and too many commitments made to back off now."[12] Through ROC Vice Premier Chiang Ching-kuo's efforts to persuade Ambassador David Kennedy and other US visitors, the State Department promised to declare that "the final status of the islands was underdetermined" and urged the Japanese to negotiate the issue with the ROC. The State Department affirmed on June 17, 1971, the day of signing the Okinawa Reversion Agreement, that a return of "administrative rights" to Japan of the *Senkaku* Islands "can in no way prejudice the underlying claims of the Republic of China."[13]

Instead of accepting the "reversion" of the *Diaoyutai* Islands to Japan, ROC Ambassador to the USA James C.H. Shen suggested to State Department officials the idea of using the *Diaoyutai* Islands as a US firing range in May 1971.[14] The ROC government tempted the USA with the possibility of "neutralization" of the island group, and, again in March 1972, Chow Shu-kai, Minister of Foreign Affairs, told Walter McConaughy, US Ambassador to the ROC, that it was better to use *Diaoyutai* as a US firing range.[15] It was crystal clear that, for the Chinese Nationalists, keeping the *Diaoyutai* Islands in the hands of the USA was better than in the hands of Japan. For Taiwan, "once Japan had administrative control there [was] absolutely no possibility of their ever relinquishing that control."[16]

What concerned the Chiang government most was the deteriorating support from the Nixon administration and the *détente* policy pursued by Henry Kissinger and President Nixon. When Kissinger went to Beijing for his second trip, the ROC was expelled from the United Nations in October 1971, which was, in turn, followed by about 30 countries shifting their diplomatic recognition from the ROC to the PRC.

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[10] "Memorandum of Conversation," April 12, 1971 (USDOS 1861b–, p. 293).

[11] "Memorandum from the President's Assistant for International Economic Affairs (Peterson) to President Nixon," June 7, 1971 (USDOS 1861b-, p. 343).

[12] Backchannel Message from the President's Assistant for International Economic Affairs (Peterson) to Ambassador Kennedy, in Taipei," June 8, 1971 (USDOS 1861b-, p. 343).

[13] "Backchannel Message from the President's Assistant for International Economic Affairs (Peterson) to Ambassador Kennedy, in Taipei," June 8, 1971 (USDOS 1861b–, p. 345n).

[14] "File on Diaoyutai," (*President Chiang Ching-kuo Archive*, May 13, 1971, Number 005-010205-00159-015).

[15] "File on Diaoyutai," (*President Chiang Ching-kuo Archive*, March 26, 1972, Number 005-010205-00013-002).

[16] "Memorandum from the President's Assistant for International Economic Affairs (Peterson) to President Nixon," June 7, 1971 (USDOS 1861b–, p. 343).

President Chiang did not want to lose one of its most important diplomatic ties with Japan after the fiasco in the United Nations. In March 1972, Minister Chow Shu-kai told Japan's last ambassador to the ROC, Atsushi Uyama, that if the ROC and Japan were trapped in a serious rift over the *Diaoyutai* Islands, the PRC would be the only winner. Chow complained that the PRC had used the episode to tarnish the ROC government's reputation overseas and spoil the friendship between Taiwan and Japan.[17] Since the Okinawa Reversion Agreement took effect in May 1972, Taiwanese fishermen have been prohibited from operate within 12 nautical miles of the *Diaoyutai* Islands. On September 29, 1972, Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka finalized the process of normalization in Beijing and severed diplomatic ties with the ROC through a personal letter of appreciation to President Chiang for his longtime support of Japan and Tokyo's willingness to maintain close people-to-people relationships between the two countries.

In 1990 and 1996, the right-wing Japan Youth Federation (*Nihon Seinensha*) erected a lighthouse on the disputed islands leading to protests from Taiwan, Hong Kong, and China. Groups protecting the *Diaoyutai* Islands in Taiwan and Hong Kong dispatched volunteers to land on *Diaoyutai* from time to time. For example, in October 1990, Wu Deng-yih, then the KMT mayor of Kaohsiung and now ROC Vice President, organized two fishing boats carrying an Olympic torch to the *Diaoyutai* to demonstrate the ROC's claim to the *Diaoyutai*. With the deterioration of cross Strait relations, coupled with occasional bickering from the *Diaoyutai* issue, Taiwan's President Lee Teng-hui decided to form an interagency task force on Diaoyutai. In September 1996, Taipei declared that there was no room for collaboration with China in settling the *Diaoyutai* dispute as long as Taiwan was under Chinese military threat and that Taiwanese fishermen's rights were the top priority for settling the dispute with Japan. From August 1996 to May 2008, Taiwan and Japan conducted 15 rounds of fisheries talks, 5 during Lee's presidency and 10 during Chen's presidency. Both President Lee and Chen were more preoccupied with the security threat from the PRC, and the Japan government felt no pressing need for a fishery agreement. In November 2003, President Chen delineated the Provisional Law Enforcement Line of the Exclusive Economic Zone which was aimed at stopping Japan's assertive action to detain Taiwanese fishing boats in overlapping EEZ between the two countries, in particular, in waters surrounding the *Diaoyutai* Islands.

In June 2008, less than 1 month after President Ma took office, a Taiwanese leisure fishing boat, the *Lienho*, collided with the Japanese Coast Guard ship *Koshiki* and then sank into waters 5–6 nautical miles from *Diaoyutai*. Immediately after the incident, President Ma recalled Taiwan's representative Kho Se-khai back to Taiwan, and the Japanese Coast Guard later compensated the loss of the boat to the owner. The Ma government has often been caught in the middle as Japan and the

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[17] "File on Diaoyutai," (*President Chiang Ching-kuo Archive*, March 26, 1972, Number 005-010205-00013-002). Similar expression of intent could be traced back to September 1970, see *President Chiang Ching-kuo Archive* (September 5, 1970, Number 005-010205-00013-007.

PRC confront each other over the *Diaoyutai* dispute. For example, in the case of the Chinese Fujian trawler's collision with Japanese Coast Guard ships in September 2010 near *Diaoyutai*, the incident prompted a major diplomatic dispute between Beijing and Tokyo. The Ma government did not side with Japan on Chinese fishing disputes with Japan, but Taipei also kept quiet in not offering support for China.

President Ma has constantly tried to assure the Japanese that Taiwan will not seek cooperation with the PRC in settling the *Diaoyutai* dispute. Rather, fishing rights are a top priority for Taiwan, and it is imperative to have separate bilateral negotiations between Taiwan and Japan. For Ma Ying-jeou, it is not the right time now to settle the *Diaoyutai* sovereignty dispute (Office of the President, Republic of China [Taiwan] 2010a, b). President Ma has a high regard for the Japan–China Principled Consensus on the East China Sea Issue of June 2008 designating a block of 2,600 km^2 of joint development. To convince Japanese Diet members or experts of the necessity of joint cooperation, Ma has often cited the deliberations of the International Court of Justice on North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, involving Denmark, the Netherlands, and the Federal Republic of Germany, leading to joint development and coproduction of Brent Crude (Office of the President, Republic of China [Taiwan] 2008; Cf. Gong 2011).

For Beijing, Taiwan should cooperate or coordinate with China to jointly safeguard Chinese territories, rather than leaving the Chinese mainland to fight the sovereignty issue in the East China Sea alone (Hsiao and Wang 2012; Minamoto and Oki 2012; Zhang 2012). In responding to the nationalization of the *Diaoyutai/Senkaku* Islands by the DPJ government, President Ma, in August 2012, proposed the East China Sea Peace Initiative urging joint exploration of resources in the East China Sea among Taiwan, Japan, and China and seeking consensus through dialogue on a code of conduct in the region. Whether this initiative could move Taiwan closer to China on the *Diaoyutai* issue is worth watching closely. In addition, President Ma has been repeating the ROC position on "safeguarding sovereignty, shelving disputes, pursuing peace and reciprocity, and promoting joint exploration and development" in the East China Sea (Office of the President, Republic of China [Taiwan] 2012a).

On September 7, 2012, President Ma traveled to the offshore *Pengjia* Islet to the north of Taiwan and announced the implementation guidelines for his East China Sea Peace Initiative. Ma reiterated that two stages for his proposal to work starting from peaceful dialogue and mutually reciprocal negotiation and then followed by sharing resources and cooperative development among Taiwan, Japan, and China. In particular, five areas of potential cooperation should be considered, including fishing industry, mining industry, marine science research and maritime environmental protection, maritime security and nontraditional security, and an East China Sea Code of Conduct (Office of the President, Republic of China [Taiwan] 2012b).

Although Ma has explored the possibility of trilateral negotiations among Taiwan, Japan, and China over the *Diaoyutai* dispute, the center of his focus is on neither Taiwan–Japan fisheries talks nor Japan–China East China Sea joint development talks. Both of these have taken place on and off in the past. What has been a subtle and modest adjustment is President Ma calling for an arrangement of three sets of bilateral negotiations. In addition to Japan–China and Taiwan–Japan, Ma, for the first time, revealed that Taiwan and China should also conduct negotiations over the settlement of the *Diaoyutai* dispute ("Ma's Peace Initiative 'Sensible': Ex-AIT Director" 2012; "Nationalism over the Senkakus" 2012; Yeh 2012).

After the tensions raised by the nationalization of the *Diaoyutai* Islands, Taiwan asked its representative Shen Ssu-tsun to return to Taipei as a gesture of protest, but both Taipei and Tokyo issued statements indicating intentions for early resumption of a new round of fishery talks (Murakami 2012). The purchase of the *Diaoyutai* Islands may not be planned by the DPJ government, but the government ownership is perceived by China and Taiwan as a big step in changing the status quo in the *Diaoyutai* dispute.

Along with Chinese retaliation measures against Japan's nationalization of the *Diaoyutai/Senkaku* Islands, on 25 September 2012, several dozens of Taiwan's fishing boats, with financial support from the *China Times*, a China friendly newspaper in Taiwan, and escort from Coast Guard Administration patrol vessels entered waters surrounding the *Diaoyutai* Islands. Although Taiwanese fishermen were conducting separate protest actions, Japan and the USA might have had the impression that Taiwan and China were working in tandem.

Taiwan–Japan fishery negotiations were resumed, and then in April 2013, Taipei and Tokyo signed a fishery agreement after 17 years of negotiations (1996–2013). Prime Minister Shinzo Abe apparently wanted to use the fisher agreement to prevent Taiwan and China from forming a joint front against Japan in the disputed East China Sea. The agreement provided Taiwan with the addition of three operating blocks, covering a total of 4,530 km^2 in waters surrounding *Diaoyutai*, raising protests from Okinawan fishermen. Although Taiwan may be the only winner in the East China Sea tensions, it has also found itself marginalized as the power equation has changed.

As were the other countries concerned, Taiwan was taken by surprise by Beijing's unilateral announcement of creating an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the East China Sea in November 2013, but President Ma toned down its criticism of Beijing. The USA has regarded Beijing's measures as a "provocative act and a serious step in the wrong direction" and "an attempt to change the status quo in the East China Sea." In comparison, President Ma mildly urged those "parties with the overlapping ADIZs [to] initiate bilateral talks for solutions at the earliest possibility" ("President Ma Calls for the Establishment of East China Sea Code of Conduct" 2014).

7.4 Conclusion

During President Chiang Kai-shek's years in Taiwan, he was always thinking of returning to the Mainland by various means, but he was not able to fulfill his dreams without US support. If Chiang had only paid attention to Taiwan and the

Pescadores, he might have had different visions in the South and East China Seas. However, it was not too late for Chiang to deploy his troops on *Taiping* and *Tungsha* Islands and to successfully finalize oil contracts with US corporations before the Okinawa Reversion Treaty was signed. The ROC even persuaded the Nixon administration to maintain its ambiguous position regarding the legal status of the *Diaoyutai/Senkaku* Islands.

Before 2008, Taiwan had been tied down in the front of the Taiwan Strait, and ROC presidents did not perceive the disputed islands in the East and South China Seas as the top priority for guaranteeing national security. President Chiang's focus was on *Tungsha* instead of *Taiping* Island, and the *Diaoyutai* Islands issue came to his attention only after 1970. The USA played an important role for Chiang Kai-shek in his position when securing sovereignty in both the South and East China Seas. Chiang tried to have the USA play a leading role in containing Communist China in the South China Sea while keeping Japan in check in the *Diaoyutai/Senkaku* Islands. The USA has always been reluctant to side with any one country in dealing with the maritime territorial disputes.

For Presidents Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian, the strategic location of the Okinawa Islands could serve a shield for Taiwan. As did his predecessors, President Ma has constantly tried to reassure the Japanese that Taiwan will not seek cooperation with the PRC in settling the *Diaoyutai* dispute. A crisis in the Taiwan Strait could trigger tension in the South China Sea but not necessarily in the East China Sea. The US Pentagon has even considered the possibility of the PRC launching a long-distance blockade of the sea lines of communication (SLOC) southwest of Taiwan to deter actors pushing for Taiwan independence. In the South China Sea, Beijing might even adopt hit-and-run tactics against the *Tungsha* or *Taiping* Islands to embarrass Taiwanese and American leaders (U.S. Office of the Secretary of Defense 2012). Such an incident is much less likely in the East China Sea. Taiwan's perception of its security threat is hardly from the north because US troops stationed on Okinawa have prevented the area from being dominated by the PRC. Increasing Chinese naval or fishing activities in waters surrounding the *Diaoyutai* Islands might create a new destabilizing factor for Taiwan.

The "China factor" invariably plays a role in Taiwan's policy consideration toward the South and East China Seas. When cross Strait relations are improving, Taiwan and the PRC tend to develop a shared objective to promote territorial claims on behalf of China. When relations deteriorate, the chance of bilateral cooperation lessens. For Taiwan to avoid waging a two-front battle, one in the Taiwan Strait and the other in the East China Sea or in the South China Sea, leaders in Taipei have had little choice but to side with the USA and welcome the rebalancing strategy and the strengthening of US–Japan defense cooperation related to Taiwan's national defense.

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Part III
Economic and Social Development

Chapter 8
Small Island Developing States and Globalization: Development Potential

Tetsuo Umemura

8.1 Characteristics of Small Island Developing States (SIDS)

Theories of economics are typically constructed according to the example set by the advanced countries of Europe and the United States. In recent years, a new discipline known as development economics has emerged, an applied economics for the economies of developing countries that invokes the theories of international economics, macroeconomics, microeconomics, econometrics, and so on. While development economics contributes to policymaking in low- and middle-income countries (LMY) whose economic structures and historical and cultural contexts differ from those of advanced countries, the characteristics of developing countries reveal an immense diversity, and it is not appropriate to generalize about them. Furthermore, the recent expansion and deepening of the globalization of the world economy has strengthened the links between single countries and the global economy, a factor that also requires consideration. In the current era, no nation exists in isolation from the global economy.[1]

In light of such diversity, in 2001, the United Nations (UN) established the UN Office of the High Representative for the Least Developed Countries, Landlocked Developing Countries and Small Island Developing States (UN-OHRLLS[2]). The Office defines three categories of developing countries that are particularly

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[1] While the Japanese government does not maintain diplomatic relations with the Republic of China (Taiwan) or the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea), economic relations via trade are deepening. In 2013, Japan was Taiwan's fifth largest export partner and largest import partner (Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Taiwan Basic Data).

[2] See http://unohrlls.org/

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economically and socially weak and are vulnerable to external environmental changes and that must be closely monitored and provided with ongoing development aid: least developed countries (LDCs), landlocked developing countries (LLDCs), and SIDS.

As of March 2015, 48 countries were designated LDCs,[3] accounting for 880 million people or 12 % of the world's population. The standards used to define these countries are the GNI per capita, the human asset index,[4] and the economic vulnerability index.[5] For the 32 designated LLDCs, according to the UN-OHRLLS, the "lack of territorial access to the sea, remoteness and isolation from world markets, and high transit costs continue to impose serious constraints on the overall socio-economic development."

In addition, according to the UN-OHRLLS, SIDS

> tend to confront similar constraints in their sustainable development efforts, such as a narrow resource base depriving them of the benefits of economies of scale; small domestic markets and heavy dependence on a few external and remote markets; high costs for energy, infrastructure, transportation, communication and servicing; long distances from export markets and import resources; low and irregular international traffic volumes; little resilience to natural disasters; growing populations; high volatility of economic growth; limited opportunities for the private sector and a proportionately large reliance of their economies on their public sector, and fragile natural environments.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (2014) defines an SIDS as a

> developing country whose territory is made up of small islands. They are exposed to sea level rises caused by global warming and are vulnerable to problems unique to island nations (small populations, remoteness and natural disasters, etc.) and as such their sustainable development is considered problematic. While there are no clear definitions of SIDS, 38 countries from the Pacific, the Caribbean and African regions, as well as a number of non-member countries/zones are included in the list published by the Secretariat of the UN. Many of these countries/zones are party to the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS).

The relatively early and comprehensive study of SIDS by Kakazu (1986) considers all the island nations specified by the UN at that time in the Atlantic, Pacific, and Indian Oceans. The study characterizes the economies of these island states based on the following nine factors.

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[3] Designations made as of December 4, 2013, remain valid.

[4] Established by the UN Committee for Development Policy (CDP) as a measure of the level of human development, the index shows the relative values for simple averages of four indicators, namely, the ratio of the malnourished population, the rate of infant mortality under five, the rate of secondary education completion, and the adult literacy rate.

[5] This index is a measure of economic vulnerability to external shocks established by the CDP that includes population, geographic remoteness, the concentrations of export goods, the share of primary industries, the ratio of population living less than 10 m above sea level, volatility of goods and service exports, and the percentage of people affected by natural disasters.

1. Lack of resources: Natural and human resources are limited.
2. Constricted markets: Domestic markets are small because of their small populations and domestic economies.
3. Monoculture-based export structures: Many island states are former colonies specialized in the production and export of a limited variety of goods, with the majority of exports going to the former colonizing country.
4. Chronic trade deficits: Island states are limited in terms of the types and quantities of export goods, while at the same time reliant on imports for a multitude of different goods including food and capital goods. Trade deficits are made up for through tourism revenues and overseas development assistance (ODA).
5. Diseconomies of scale: Owing to the small scale of production, not only do economies of scale not function but also diseconomies of scale exist within a range of areas such as investment, consumption, traffic and transportation, education, research and development, and government services.
6. Expensive transportation costs: Island states suffer from high transportation costs associated with foreign imports and exports as well as domestic transportation due to the scattered locations of small, populated islands domestically.
7. Large population flows: In addition to natural population increases, island states experience large social movements due to workers migrating to neighboring states or advanced countries.
8. High reliance on public finances: The variety and activities of private companies are limited, and government spending accounts for a large proportion of GDP.
9. Colonial inheritance: This includes the production of monoculture agricultural products, the economic reliance on the former colonizer, and the dominance of domestic markets by firms of the former colonizing nation.

Studies conducted on Oceania SIDS by international organizations include that of the IMF (1989), which states that the development of the tourism sector is emphasized in Fiji and Vanuatu. A report from the international conference held by the UNCRD, the International Conference on Multilevel Development and Planning in Pacific Island Countries in 1990, held in Nuku'alofa, Tonga, includes a report by Toda (1993) entitled "Tourism: Key Issues and Variables for Policy and Strategy Development." The report highlights that growth in international tourism associated with the advance of globalization is an opportunity to develop the tourism industries in the relevant countries and that how this opportunity is utilized and profited from will affect the growth of island nation economies. According to the World Bank (1991), living standards in South Pacific island nations have been higher than those in other developing countries since the 1980s. However, despite large injections of development assistance, their fluctuating average annual growth rate has been just 0.6 %, well below the rate of 5 % seen among Caribbean nations or 7 % for island nations in the Indian Ocean. While the natural environments of South Pacific island nations provide an advantage for tourism, this sector has proven unable to become a leading industry, and it only accounts for as little as 2–20 % of GDP compared with other developing countries where tourism provides between 30 % and 60 %. Some of the reasons for this discrepancy are the (1) low numbers of flights, (2) lack of investment in hotels and other tourist facilities, (3) high cost structures caused by the reliance on imported goods, (4) lack of effective tourism promotions to attract visitors, (5) distances from the principal markets, and (6) inadequate supplies of potable water. It has been argued that economic growth rates are restrained as a result of these factors. A later World Bank report (1996) deals explicitly with tourism, along with the fisheries and forestry industries, as key sectors for island nations and states that while awareness of the importance of tourism increased among these countries during the 1990s, they still only achieved a 5 % growth in visitor numbers compared with the 8.7 % increase among Asian nations. Again, the reasons given are related to their geographical isolation, dispersed location, and limited resources. The report highlights the need to utilize cultural heritage, manage natural environments, and provide government support for tourist development led by private enterprises.

The UNWTO (2004) has also argued that while tourism is a principal economic activity for SIDS from the perspective of raising income, creating jobs, and providing a source of foreign currency, their extremely small size may negatively affect their natural and social environments. Thus, it argues that monitoring tourism planning, management, and development is critical, taking into account the issues of sustainable development and support from international bodies. Studies of the importance of international tourism and associated revenues under globalization, such as Umemura (2006), underline that the growth in international tourism often increases the importation of goods to the detriment of domestically produced products to meet tourist preferences. As a result, tourism revenues leak out from local economies and have a correspondingly small economic impact. With limited management abilities and hospitality experience, injections of foreign capital through foreign direct investment (FDI) are crucial to develop tourist industries. Systems to receive tourists can be established only by building tourism infrastructure and creating the necessary human resources in the tourism sector. Promotions aimed at target markets are also critical, along with the construction of transportation systems, to link tourism with economic growth.

Nonetheless, reliance on foreign investment increases the problem of profit leakage. Although the sector may generate employment opportunities, local people are commonly hired as employees, while management positions are occupied by foreigners, and a part of their salaries thus sent abroad. Furthermore, the provision of high-quality tourism services requires high-quality furnishings and foodstuffs, which when sourced from imports, again creates capital leakage. The development of tourism in island nations must therefore tackle the problems of reducing such economic leakage, promoting local production for local consumption, retaining tourist revenues in local island economies, and consolidating the significant economic ripple effects of tourism. Indeed, the third international conference on SIDS was held in Samoa from September 1st to 4th, 2014, with the topic of “the sustainable development of SIDS through genuine and durable partnerships.”[6]

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[6] See http://www.sids2014.org/index.php?menu=14, accessed June 25, 2015.

The conference adopted a partnerships platform, a partnership framework, a UN implementation matrix, and the SIDS accelerated modalities of action (SAMOA) pathway as its outcome.

8.2 Changes in the International Economic Environment Due to the Expansion and Deepening of Globalization

In this section, World Bank data are used to show the degree to which the international economic environment has changed in response to the expansion and deepening of globalization. Figure 8.1 shows the changes in trade dependency for high-income countries (HICs) and LMYs between 1970 and 2012. Three points emerging from this chart are noted here.

Firstly, both groups saw increases in trade dependency, indicating that the economies of each group have become more dependent on international trade. While trade dependency of HICs (39 %) and LMYs (20 %) in 1970, the ratios have increased to HICs (61 %) and LMYs (60 %) in 2012.

Secondly, the trends for both HICs and LMYs have been more or less in accord; however, LMYs overtook HICs in terms of trade dependence in 1992. This change occurred in the context of rapid economic growth in the emerging countries of Southeast Asia and Central and South America, the stimulation of international trade expanded and intensified of globalization. Unlike HICs, which are able to produce a huge variety of manufacturing goods domestically from light industry to heavy and chemical industry, LMYs promote industrialize, especially an export-oriented industrialization aimed at economic growth while simultaneously relying on imports for capital goods. From the early 1990s onward, LMYs continually showed a higher degree of trade dependence than HICs.



Fig. 8.1 Trend of the trade dependency ratio (Source: World Bank 2014a)

Thirdly, the impact of the global financial crisis, stemming from the 2007 subprime crisis in the United States and September 2008 collapse of Lehman Brothers, can be clearly seen. A number of HICs, which suffered the most serious impacts, recorded negative growth rates during this period, while LMYs were also affected due to the recessions among HICs' trading partners. However, the effects on LMYs were not as significant as those of the "1997 Asian Financial Crisis." During the global financial crisis, the dependence of LMYs on HICs for trade in fact lessened, highlighting their increased resilience in comparison with their earlier reliance on HICs.

Figure 8.2 shows the changes in net FDI inflows, percent of GDP. FDI refers to the overseas expansion of firms, of which there has been an increasing trend despite large fluctuations after the late 1990s. The increases in FDI to LMYs from around 1990 were mainly due to the expansion of firms in high-income countries entering to emerging economies. FDI can occur between developed countries, between developed and developing countries, and between developing countries. Of these, FDI between HICs accounts for the largest amount of money transferred. An example of this is Japan in the 1980s, which in the past conducted voluntary export restrictions when automobile exports to the United States increased and whose automobile industry later established production bases in the United States to begin local production. The second largest investment flows are those from high-income countries to developing countries with investment toward China and Asian emerging countries, because of the coincidence of interests between multinational corporations, which seek to utilize lower labor costs and increase export competitiveness, and governments of developing countries seeking increased exports through FDI, job creation, and technology transfers. Indeed, recent trends highlight the growth of FDI toward ASEAN nations more than China, where wages have been rising. This includes FDI not only from developed countries but also from emerging economies.

The marked spike shown in the chart for 2000 among developed countries indicates a bubble in direct investment, which is seen returning to appropriate



Fig. 8.2 Trend of the net FDI inflows, % of GDP (Source: World Bank 2014a)

levels after its subsequent collapse. The growth at the end of 2007 was due to the robust activity of multinational corporations, which diminished following the effects of the global financial crisis (UNCTAD 2008). The chart also shows that developing countries' net FDI inflows (as a percentage of GDP) have overtaken those of HICs, a result of LMYs policies of actively utilizing foreign investment for economic growth. The reduced margin of fluctuation in comparison with HICs also indicates that LMYs are more integrated into the world economy.

Figure 8.3 indicates the trends in the amounts received from the remittances sent by overseas migrant workers. Regression lines have been added to show the differences in the trends for HICs and LMYs. As shown, from 2000, remittances to LMYs increased rapidly, reaching 350 billion USD in 2012, accounting for 1.62 % of GDP. Migrant workers from developing countries typically leave their countries to work in developed countries, where wage levels are higher. The working populations of developed countries are either too small or not matched to the work available because of aging demographics or domestic unwillingness for unskilled or dangerous work, and these countries have shifted toward receiving foreign workers. By contrast, remittances to HICs were 128 billion USD in 2012 or 0.27 % of GDP, mainly from those working in other HICs.

The expansion and deepening of globalization in recent years can thus be confirmed from the perspectives of international trade, FDI, and migrant worker remittances (Umemura 2011; World Bank 2014b). It is important to note that these are also mutually related. Higher levels of trade dependency have occurred in the context of the trade liberalization led by the World Trade Organization (WTO), with more countries participating, fewer barriers to trade, FDI, and investment in offshore securities. All of these factors have served as positive reinforcement in the expansion of international trade. Additionally, the movement of workers from LMYs to HICs also means a re-income distribution globally, yet another factor contributing to the economic growth of LMYs.



Fig. 8.3 Trend of the personal remittances (Source: World Bank 2014a)

In summary, the relationships between developed and developing countries changed drastically between the postwar era and the 2000s, by which time globalization had become pronounced. During the 1970s, the relationship was overwhelmingly dominated by HICs, while presently, the deepening of economic ties has reinforced their mutual dependence. This fact implies that economic mismanagement among one group of countries affects the other much more than previously. The deepening of mutual dependence between HICs and LMYs and the economic growth that this has created are also responsible for increases in per capita incomes, particularly among emerging countries. As discussed later, this is linked to impacts on global supply and demand relations, particularly concerning food.

8.3 Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), the Human Development Index (HDI), and SIDS

The MDGs adopted by the UN General Assembly in September 2009 are a set of eight specific goals for developing countries to be achieved by 2015, as follows:

1. Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger,
2. Achieve universal primary education,
3. Promote gender equality and empower women,
4. Reduce child mortality,
5. Improve maternal health,
6. Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases,
7. Ensure environmental sustainability, and (8) Develop a global partnership for development (United Nations 2014a).

These goals comprise 21 quantifiable targets and 60 associated indicators. While some emerging countries have achieved these goals, many countries have not. Discussions concerning post-MDGs have already begun, and sustainable development goals (SDGs) are set to commence from 2016.

Below, the predictions for MDGs' achievement by developing regions and Oceania SIDS are compared. The indicators used to measure their achievement are based on 1990 benchmark figures. The achievement figures for 2015 are established by the relative evaluation of each country and region. Accordingly, the evaluation of each item is divided into four: (1) goal achieved or expected to be achieved by 2015, (2) not achievable by 2015 under current conditions, (3) no progress or worsening, and (4) insufficient data.

To make these achievement levels comparable, scores were given by quantifying each of the objectives, whereby (1) = 5, (2) = 0, (3) = −5, and (4) = N/A. The maximum value possible for each of the eight goals is 5. No information from Oceania SIDS was available in relation to Goal 8. The total possible achievement level was thus set at 35 (5 points × 7 goals = 35 points), excluding Goal 8, to make

Table 8.1 Quantification results of MDGs' progress by region in 2015

Region	Subregion	G1	G2	G3	G4	G5	G6	G7	G8	Score (sum of G1 to G7)	Achievement (%)
		Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger	Achieve universal primary education	Promote gender equality and empower women	Reduce child mortality	Improve maternal health	Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases	Ensure environmental sustainability	Develop a global partnership for development		
Africa	Northern	0	5	0	5	0	0	5	5	15	42.9 %
	Sub-Saharan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.0 %
Asia	Eastern	5	0	0	5	5	0	5	5	20	57.1 %
	Southeastern	5	0	0	5	0	0	5	5	15	42.9 %
	Southern	0	5	0	0	0	5	0	0	10	28.6 %
	Western	0	0	0	5	0	0	0	5	5	14.3 %
Oceania	–	0	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	14.3 %
Latin America	–	0	0	0	5	0	5	0	5	10	28.6 %
Caucasus and Central Asia	–	5	0	0	5	0	0	0	5	10	28.6 %
		15	15	0	30	5	10	15	30		
		33 %	33 %	0 %	67 %	11 %	22 %	33 %	67 %		

Remarks: The figures above are not averages. Values are set from 5 to −5
Oceania includes 20 countries and states: American Samoa, Micronesia (Federated States of), Samoa, Cook Islands, Nauru, Solomon Islands, Fiji, Niue, Tokelau, French Polynesia, New Caledonia, Tonga, Guam, Northern Mariana Islands, Tuvalu, Kiribati, Palau, Vanuatu, Marshall Islands, and Papua New Guinea (PNG). For more details, refer to: http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/Default.aspx
Sources: United Nations (2014a, b)

a comparison possible. Each region's total was then divided by 35 to arrive at the achievement values. For reference, the achievement level of each goal worldwide was also calculated. While this method has caused debate because it weighs each goal equally, it is based on the calculation methods utilized by the UNDP's HDI and used to make simple calculations between regions and countries.

Table 8.1 lists the MDG achievement levels according to each goal and region. Sub-Saharan Africa shows the slowest progress with a predicted achievement level of 0 %. Oceania is the next slowest region with 14.3 %. East Asia shows the most progress with 57.1 %; however, 100 % achievement is not predicted for any region.

In terms of individual goals, Goal 3 (promote gender equality and empower women) shows the lowest level of progress with just 0 % achievement. Only Goal 4 (reduce child mortality) and Goal 8 (develop a global partnership for development) show comparatively good progress with 67 % each. In any case, when considering the data from a regional perspective, the possibility of the MDGs being fully achieved by the end of 2015 is effectively zero.

By using the same methods as for Tables 8.1 and 8.2 shows the same information for the 15 countries classified as Pacific Ocean SIDS. PNG (−100 %), the Solomon Islands (−28.6 %), and Kiribati (−57.1 %) all show negative scores and have thus gone backward over the past 15 years. Especially, PNG shows negative value for all goals. Vanuatu, the Federal States of Micronesia, the Marshall Islands, and Nauru have shown no progress (0 %). Meanwhile, Palau (85.7 %), the Cook Islands (100 %), Niue (100 %), and Tonga (71.4 %) have all recorded positive scores, while full achievement by 2015 by the Cook Islands and Niue looks certain.

In summary, at a regional level, the developing countries of Oceania have the lowest level of MDGs' achievement after sub-Saharan Africa, with PNG, the Solomon Islands, and Kiribati falling behind, while Palau, the Cook Islands, Niue, and Tonga show demonstrably high achievement levels. Data concerning Goal 8 (develop a global partnership for development) were not available and therefore not included in the calculations. However, from the fact that many Oceania SIDS receive foreign aid and there were no conflicts other than in Fiji, PNG, and the Solomon Islands, there may be some positive trends here. Although the MDGs are designed to measure the level of goal achievement, such that a positive value indicates improvement, it is important to note that values show the relative speed of improvement and that these are absolute evaluations using 1990 as a base year. The HDI is discussed below to appraise economic and social development from a different perspective.[7]

Figure 8.4 shows the HDI trends over time for nine of the Oceania SIDS. Because the HDI's calculation methods were revised in 2011, it might not be appropriate to assess trends for individual countries over a longer period. Nevertheless, the general trends and rankings since 2011 are the focus here.

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[7] The HDI was developed by UNDP to compare levels of development (not only economic aspect but also social aspects). The concept of the HDI includes health, education, and income.

Table 8.2 Quantification results of MDG progress for Oceania SIDS in 2015

		G1	G2	G3	G4	G5	G6	G7	G8		
	Countries/ regions	Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger	Achieve universal primary education	Promote gender equality and empower women	Reduce child mortality	Improve maternal health	Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases	Ensure environmental sustainability	Develop a global partnership for development	Score	Achievement (%)
Melanesia	Fiji	0	5	0	5	5	0	5	N.A	20	57.1 %
	PNG	−5	−5	−5	−5	−5	−5	−5	N.A	−35	−100 %
	Solomon Islands	0	0	−5	0	0	0	−5	N.A	−10	−28.6 %
	Vanuatu	0	0	0	5	0	−5	0	N.A	0	0 %
Micronesia	FSM	−5	0	0	5	−5	0	5	N.A	0	0 %
	Kiribati	−5	−5	0	0	0	−5	−5	N.A	−20	−57.1 %
	Marshall Islands	−5	0	0	5	5	−5	0	N.A	0	0 %
	Nauru	−5	5	0	0	0	5	−5	N.A	0	0 %
	Palau	0	5	5	5	5	5	5	N.A	30	85.7 %
Polynesia	Cook Islands	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	N.A	35	100 %
	Niue	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	N.A	35	100 %
	Samoa	0	5	0	5	0	0	5	N.A	15	42.9 %
	Tokelau*	N.A.	5	N.A.	5	5	N.A.	0	N.A	15	42.9 %
	Tonga	0	5	0	5	5	5	5	N.A	25	71.4 %
	Tuvalu	−5	5	0	5	5	0	0	N.A.	10	28.6 %
		−20	35	5	50	30	5	15	–		
		−27 %	47 %	7 %	67 %	40 %	7 %	20 %	–		

Remarks: *The data for Tokelau in 2015 are from the UNDP Samoa Multi-Country Office (UNDP Samoa MCO)
There are no data for Goal 8
Source: Pacific Island Forum Secreate (2015)
PNG Papua New Guinea, *FSM* Federal States of Micronesia



Fig. 8.4 Trend of the HDI for Oceania SIDS (Source: UNDP, Human Development Report, various reports)

Countries are listed in the key in order of highest to lowest HDI, as of 2013. Only Palau (0.775), Fiji (0.724), and Tonga (0.705) exceeded the world average HDI of 0.702, while all the other countries fell below the global average. Some Oceania SIDS fell below the average for all SIDS globally (0.667). Observing the changes between 2012 and 2013, only Fiji and PNG showed improvement, while HDI for the others declined. Between their independence in the 1980s and 2000, Oceania SIDS developed both economically and socially and their HDI rose continually; however, this trend has since leveled off. This looks like middle-income trap.

The global ranking of Samoa, Vanuatu, and PNG has also declined. For Samoa, the massive impact of the September 2009 earthquake and tsunami disaster may explain this. Meanwhile, the motion of no confidence passed against Vanuatu's cabinet in December 2010 and its associated political disarray may be one cause for its decline. In any case, it is clear that both internal and external factors strongly affect Oceania SIDS.

8.4 Conventional Perspectives and Potential for Development in Oceania SIDS

In this section, the issues facing SIDS highlighted by the UN-OHRLLS are summarized. The eight points listed below are also discussed in terms of how they might be perceived in the context of globalization:

1. Resources of all kinds are limited.

2. Domestic markets are small and economies of scale via mass production in manufacturing industries are unachievable.
3. Distances from trading partner countries as well as irregular and small-scale transportation create high transportation costs.
4. Economies have high cost structures because of their reliance on imports for energy and capital goods.
5. Natural disasters such as earthquakes, tsunamis, typhoons, and floods are common, while the ability to recover from damage is limited.
6. Vulnerable to the external (world) economic environment, economic growth rates are unstable.
7. The role of private enterprise is limited and economic activity is dependent on the government/public sector.
8. Island environments are vulnerable to negative impacts from natural disasters and development projects.

Firstly, let us consider resource limitations. In relation to mining resources, most SIDS have a small territorial area that, as noted earlier, is not limited to island nations alone.[8] Only a few countries worldwide possess underground resources, and many countries including Japan are unable to produce these domestically, making them dependent on imports. Island nations, in possession of vast ocean areas, should focus on their immense marine resources and territorial waters. This should include not only fishery resources, which have been utilized in the past, but also renewable energy sources (such as wind, solar, tidal currents, waves, ocean thermal energy, and biomass), seabed mineral resources, and deep ocean water as potable water. Some of these resources may entail high costs or technologies that have yet to be established; however, their utilization in the near future may be a possibility for some island nations.

Secondly, island nations are unable to benefit from economies of scale because of their small populations and the limited size of their domestic markets. If goods are produced for the domestic market alone, not only will unit costs remain high but also the transportation costs of imported input material will increase. Additionally, as is made clear by their designation as SIDS, these countries do not possess advanced productive technologies. Indeed, island economies retain economies of self-sufficiency. Tropical agricultural products and coastal fisheries provide food, while natural materials such as palm trees are used for food, clothing, and shelter. These also function as a natural safety net when the distribution of goods is delayed by natural disasters such as typhoons. Their natural environments have allowed Oceania SIDS to avoid any serious famine until now. Moreover, the use of natural materials can also be considered to be part of an eco-friendly lifestyle.[9] Instead of seeking the necessary foreign currency to import manufacturing products and capital goods through exports, island nations might utilize their comparative advantages in service exports, inbound tourism,[10] and the sale of fishing rights. In particular, increasing demand for international tourism in emerging countries represents an important opportunity for SIDS. However, as it may not necessarily create positive effects, the appropriateness and impacts of tourism are discussed further below.

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[8] Crude oil, gold, and bauxite have been discovered and extracted in Fiji; crude oil, gold, and copper in PNG; crude oil in Samoa; and gold in the Solomon Islands.

[9] The Marshall Islands provide an example of how the westernization of lifestyles increases the importation of plastic and other petrochemical products as well as the environmental damage caused by nonbiodegradable rubbish.

Geographical constraints have largely been alleviated in comparison with the past. Each country now has an international airport and the construction of seaports continues,[11] dramatically improving access. Nonetheless, international airports have been constructed only in capital cities or close to tourist destinations. Meanwhile, the domestic movement of people and distribution of goods between islands has not improved and still involves considerable time and cost.

The vulnerability of SIDS to natural disasters is a significant issue. Economic fluctuations in SIDS are frequently occasioned by natural disasters such as typhoons (Umemura 2006). Trade deficits in the years following disasters can be caused by the rapid increase in the imported materials required to repair basic infrastructure such as roads and bridges. While also resulting in reliance on advanced countries for financial support, this is the largest cause of economic destabilization among SIDS. For example, following recent climatic changes such as the powerful typhoon that struck Fiji and Vanuatu in 2012, Japanese government conducted multiple rounds of emergency assistance.[12] Sea level rises due to global warming also create flooding in low-lying countries such as Tuvalu and force migration to other countries. In September 2009, a tsunami created by an offshore earthquake left Samoa heavily damaged.[13] The impacts of such events are indicated in Fig. 8.5, which divides Oceania SIDS into three regions of Melanesia (Fiji, PNG, the Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu), Micronesia (Kiribati, Micronesia, the Marshall Islands, and Palau), and Polynesia (the Cook Islands, Samoa, Tonga, and Tuvalu). This figure shows the relationship between the GDP growth rates of each group and

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[10] In 2009, Fiji's national airline, "Air Pacific," ceased all direct flights between Fiji and Japan and commenced direct flights between Fiji and Hong Kong. This is seen as part of a strategy in anticipation of increased demand from an emerging country. The company name was changed to Fiji Airways on June 17, 2013. The most common option to go to Fiji from Japan is to fly from Japan with Korean Air via Incheon International Airport.

[11] However, these were not set up by using their own expenditure; most were established, thanks to foreign aid.

[12] In January and April 2012, the Japanese government provided two allotments of emergency assistance in light of the flooding in Fiji (material supplies) (Source: JICA, Humanitarian Aid News Release, http://www.jica.go.jp/english/news/field/2011/20120127_01.html and http://www.jica.go.jp/english/news/field/2012/20120406_01.html, accessed June 25, 2015).

[13] On September 29, 2009, an earthquake to the southeast of Samoa caused a tsunami affecting 30,000 people. The Japanese government provided humanitarian assistance (material supplies) (Source: JICA, Humanitarian Aid News Release, http://www.jica.go.jp/english/news/field/2009/20091008_01.html, accessed June 25, 2015).



Fig. 8.5 Economic growth, natural disasters, and other external shocks in Oceania SIDS (Source: Created by author based on World Bank 2014a, and Asian Development Bank 2014b)

negative impacts of natural disasters and main causes of global economic fluctuations.

The regions are within comparatively close proximity to each other, with the impact of typhoons being felt across multiple countries. In addition, the global financial crisis clearly affected all countries alike. While each country is affected by their unique causes of political and economic fluctuations, these economic instabilities are typically sizeable. Such economic instability tends to inhibit long-term investment and hampers economic development.

The nature of private sector activity in these nations was insubstantial because of the impact of their former colonization. Prior to the Second World War, Oceania SIDS were entirely managed by their colonizing nations. While one by one they gained political independence after the war, government-led economic and social development was carried out, and it took time to develop their private sectors.[14] A cursory observation of their agricultural products shows the continued predominance of primary goods such as sugar cane, coconut, and coffee.

A further complicating factor is the coexistence of two decision-making systems, namely, the traditional system of chiefs and modern parliamentary democracy, which is also considered to have hindered development. Fiji, meanwhile, has been strategic in its introduction of foreign investment.[15] Indeed, it has unified all government bodies relevant to foreign investment and linked investment to industrial policy by providing preferential taxation arrangements for investment in targeted specific sectors (agriculture, manufacturing, and tourism). Foreign investment, particularly in the tourism sector, is therefore increasing in many Oceania SIDS including Fiji, promoting their status as tourist destinations (Umemura 2013).

While the natural environments of SIDS are fragile, recently they are widely used as tourist attractions via eco-tourism. Eco-tourism has expanded in some Oceania SIDS that make efforts toward environmental protection. In Palau, the entrance fee to the famous Jellyfish Lake rose from $35 per adult to $100 (valid for 10 days) in June 2012, while a green tax (environmental tax) of $30 has also been added to the previous $15 departure tax.[16] These measures have allowed Palau to regulate the number and quality of international tourists and to support the protection and conservation of the natural environment to encourage sustainable development. With increased global demand for tourism, each country has become more dependent on tourists. In Palau, tourism revenues account for 72 % of GDP in 2012.

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[14] The years in which these countries became independent are as follows: PNG (1975), Fiji (1970), the Solomon Islands (1978), Vanuatu (1980), Samoa (1962), Tonga (1970), Tuvalu (1978), Micronesia (1986), Kiribati (1979), the Marshall Islands (1986), Palau (1994), and Nauru (1968).

[15] Formerly, to advance foreign investment, authorization was required from the Fiji Trade and Investment Board (FTIB) and several ministries. Currently, an organization called Investment Fuji has unified control over the management and acceptance of foreign investment.

[16] Until September 30, 2012, a $15 tax was paid on departure. This was raised to $30 on October 1, 2012. Accordingly, a $20 departure tax (for those aged three and above) and a $30 green fee, a total of $50, are collected on departure.

Other Oceania SIDS such as Vanuatu (37 %), Fiji (25 %), and Samoa (26 %) are also strongly dependent on revenue from tourists.

From the perspective of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and Human Development Index (HDI), economic and social development among SIDS appears to be sluggish. However, this is not to say that living standards have deteriorated. As shown in Appendix 8.2, per capita incomes in each country have been rising steadily. The problem is the speed of these increases. In this context, natural disasters, external shocks, aid from developed countries, remittances from migrant workers, and the development of tourism are all relevant factors.

In the future, it will be necessary to consider the potential of fishery resources found in the vast ocean waters of Oceania SIDS. Figure 8.6 shows the data on global fishing hauls and the unit price of fish over time. Fishing production data include both fresh and saltwater species and exclude hatchery fish. While growth in catch size has been falling, unit price has undergone sharp increases because of the increased consumption of seafood by emerging countries, which has led to tight conditions in the global fish market. Such conditions should help raise the value of the fishing rights of Oceania SIDS. Technological advances have also increased the possibility of extracting seabed resources that, if they can be used to develop island nations, may represent further development potential. Despite this fact, if developed countries are able to interfere in their economic activities, such as was the case under colonization or in Africa presently, there is a risk that island nations may lose this opportunity.

The trends in international tourism within Oceania SIDS are examined. Figure 8.7 shows the trends in international inbound tourist numbers for nine Oceania SIDS. The number of inbound tourists visiting Fiji is widely different from those of other countries; hence, the right-hand axis serves as a point of reference.

Each country has experienced an increase in inbound tourist numbers to different degrees. The legend lists the countries in order of inbound tourist numbers as of 2012



Fig. 8.6 Trend of fish production and fish price (Source: FAO 2015, and World Bank Commodity Price Data (The Pink Sheet) 2015)



Fig. 8.7 Inbound tourists in Oceania SIDS (Source: World Bank 2014a)

except Fiji. Fiji's 661,000 tourists are overwhelmingly the largest, followed by PNG (186,000) and Samoa (126,000). Differences in the rates of increase can also be seen, with inbound tourists to PNG and Palau undergoing rapid increases, while other countries showing constant or even declining trends. The number of inbound tourists was declining noticeably in 2009, which is attributed to the impact of the global financial crisis. Tourist numbers in the Solomon Islands are low yet steadily increasing, while Kiribati continues to receive around 5,000 visitors annually. The increase in inbound tourist numbers is caused by a product of tourism development through foreign investment and active external promotion campaigns. Domestic infrastructure construction and airline development have also played a supporting role. Tourists to Fiji come primarily from Australia and New Zealand with many others from countries other than European nations or the United States. However, most visitors to Micronesia are typically Japanese tourists, although Taiwanese and mainland Chinese tourists have increased dramatically in recent years. The expansion of airlines has also been a causal factor, as has the increased demand created by the rising incomes in emerging countries.

Despite the large numbers of tourists entering the region, whether this has helped economic growth is another question, as larger countries undoubtedly record higher numbers of inbound tourists. Looking at international tourism revenues as a percentage of GDP, an increase in tourist numbers will logically not directly create positive economic effects. Firstly, the consumption propensity of foreign tourists within the destination country is critical. Each government therefore seeks to attract high-end tourists over than those with a lower consumption propensity. From a macroeconomic perspective, the leakage of tourism revenues outside of the country is a significant problem. Even when consumption by tourists permeates local economies, the leakage of tourism revenues to overseas countries means their multiplier effects are reduced. The introduction of foreign investment has served



Fig. 8.8 International tourism receipts, % of GDP (Source: Calculated by the author based on World Bank 2014a)

to reduce the contribution of tourism toward domestic economies due to profit outflows. Reducing such leakages will require tourist facilities such as hotels to be financed with local capital as well as the improved sales of domestically produced goods. In other words, local production for local consumption is the keyword.

Figure 8.8 shows the revenues from international tourism as a percentage of GDP for the Oceania SIDS. Clearly noticeable is the extreme reliance of Palau on these revenues (71.8 %), followed by Vanuatu (36.6 %) and Fiji (25.3 %). While PNG receives many tourists, tourism revenues account for just 0.03 % of its GDP because of the recent growth in crude oil exports.

In spite of increasing in number of inbound tourist, Fiji's constant level of tourism revenue against GDP (25.3 % in 2012) may be due to the growth in mineral water exports called "Fiji Water." These points clearly reflect the peculiar characteristics of island nations with few exports. Until 2014, PNG obtained foreign currency through the exploitation and export of gold, crude oil, and copper; tourism revenues as a proportion of exports were exceedingly small, and with the further mining of liquid natural gas (LNG), these exports will for the time being support its economy (Asian Development Bank 2014a). Additionally, discoveries of crude oil, gold, and bauxite (aluminum) in Fiji, gold in Palau and Samoa, and crude oil in the Solomon Islands can be expected to produce further economic development if utilized effectively.

Finally, remittances from overseas migrant workers as a proportion of GDP are discussed. The deepening of globalization in recent years has given rise to large increases in migrant workers from developing countries to developed countries. In the Philippines, a government Bureau of Immigration assists workers to migrate overseas.[17] The quantity of money sent home from these workers surpasses even that of ODA and FDI and constitutes a stable flow of capital (World Bank 2014b).

In regard to remittances as a proportion of GDP among Oceania SIDS (see Table 8.3), in 2012 Samoa was the largest recipient (23.2 %), followed by Tonga (12.6 %) and Kiribati (12.3 % in 2011). Other countries recorded lower figures, Fiji (4.1 %), PNG (0.1 % in 2011), the Solomon Islands (1.7 %), and Vanuatu (2.9 %); however, these were all higher than the developing country average (1.6 %) except PNG. Fiji and the Solomon Islands were the countries to record an increased percentage of remittances against GDP, while that of other countries has tended to decline. This fact may be explained by the relatively small growth in remittances compared with domestic economic growth, more specifically due to the growth rates of domestic industries including tourism and increased revenues from mining and marine resources. It should not only focus on remittance inflows from overseas but also entail the leakage of tourism revenue outside of the country. As most tourism developments within island nations are led by foreign-owned enterprises, these leakages of tourism revenues require further examination as I mentioned earlier.

8.5 The Possibility of New Development in SIDS Under the Globalization Process

This study examined whether the oft-cited disadvantages that hinder the economic growth of SIDS remain pertinent today owing to the expansion of globalization since the 1990s. The growth of emerging nations has been remarkable in recent

Table 8.3 Personal remittances, % GDP

	1990	1995	2000	2005	2010	2011	2012	1990–2012 change
Fiji	1.6	1.7	2.6	6.8	5.5	4.1	4.9	3.3
Kiribati	18.1	12.3	12.3	12.3	12.3	12.3	–	−5.8*
PNG	0.2	0.3	0.2	0.1	0.0	0.1	–	−0.1*
Samoa	38.4	20.5	18.3	19.8	19.7	21.7	23.2	−15.2
Solomon Islands	–	–	1.0	1.7	0.2	0.2	1.7	0.7*
Tonga	21.1	15.4	16.2	25.9	19.4	16.5	12.6	−8.5
Vanuatu	5.2	5.8	12.7	1.3	1.7	2.9	2.8	−2.4
Low- and middle-income countries	1.1	1.2	1.4	1.9	1.6	1.6	1.6	0.5
World	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.6	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.3

Remarks: *Changes of Kiribati and PNG are calculated from 1990 to 2011. The changes of the Solomon Islands are calculated from 2000 to 2012
Source: World Bank (2014a)

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[17] See http://www.immigration.gov.ph/

years, and the structure of demand and supply within the world economy has changed in many senses.

In relation to GDP, for instance, Japan's number two position in the world was overtaken by a rapidly growing China in 2010. The possibility of an economic collapse among PIIGS nations (Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece, and Spain) is rumored in Europe and the United States, while the eurozone continues to be destabilized. The 2007 global financial crisis that originated in the United States primarily affected the economies of developed countries. Additionally, global demographics indicate that population growth rates in the developing countries are falling, although they remain higher than those of developed countries do. The result of this population expansion has been a global tightening of demand for and supply of food and price increases for foods. Technological advances have also made the cross-border movement of people easier, such that overseas migrant workers and international tourists have been steadily increasing. These developments in their entirety can be viewed as the effects of globalization.

If we follow Walt Whitman Rostow's stage theory of economic growth, the progress of emerging countries can be seen as the stage in which a mass consumption society emerges. While there remain significant income disparities both between and within countries, the interests of people with rising incomes will shift from material goods to services. Historically, the world could be divided clearly into developing and developed countries. Nevertheless, the relative gap between the two has been diminishing, and mutual dependence between them has increased as they develop together.

This transformation also affects SIDS. The disadvantage of their geographical isolation has been reduced, infrastructure has improved due to economic assistance, tourism facilities have been put in place to receive international visitors, and the introduction of foreign capital has accelerated the development of tourism sectors. The scarcity value of fisheries resources has increased, which will also work to the advantage of SIDS. These are potentially positive developments for island nations, yet they also imply new types of risks.

Particularly serious are the potential effects of climate change. Small islands dispersed across a huge area of ocean are vulnerable to coastal erosion, and sea level rises attributed to climate change have been accelerating. In countries such as Tuvalu, low-lying areas are inundated with seawater, reducing the area of habitable land and forcing entire families to migrate overseas. Meanwhile, typhoons have historically been a disruptive factor in relation to economic growth among SIDS, and stronger typhoons caused by climate change are now responsible for immense natural catastrophes.

Damage from earthquakes and tsunamis must also be taken into account. Owing to their historical formation, island nations are often found in earthquake-prone locations. The extremely low elevation of some islands also makes them vulnerable to the impact of tsunamis created by earthquakes both in Asian and Central and South America. While island nations possess the 3Ss (sand, sea, and sky) and enjoy the benefits to tourism that beaches provide, these locations are at risk from tsunamis. Some countries such as Saipan have installed signs to guide people to evacuation routes in the case of a tsunami, although depending on a tsunami's scale evacuation of beaches may not be sufficient to save lives. The 2009 tsunami in Samoa, in which many people lost their lives, is a recent example.

Further, globalization has changed the structure of the global economy and the demand and supply conditions of material goods, while advances in transportation and information technologies have lowered the barrier of distance, all of which have benefited SIDS. However, climate change and the resulting natural disasters constitute detrimental factors. How each government manages these developments will strongly affect their future development. If policies work to enhance assets and minimize risks, these countries will be able to forge a path away from their oft-remarked economic disadvantages. On the contrary, they risk being left behind in the global economy if political measures are found to be inadequate. The transformations of the global economy occasioned by globalization should thus be seen as opportunities for SIDS.

Appendix 8.1: Classification of Small Island Developing States

SIDS – 57 nations (10 LDCs)

UN members 38 (9 LDCs)			
East Asia and Pacific 14 (5 LDCs)		LDCs, per capita gross national income (2012)	
Fiji	Papua New Guinea	Kiribati[a]	$1,736
Marshall Islands	Samoa	Solomon Islands[a]	$1,810
Federated States of Micronesia	Singapore	Timor-Leste[a]	$1,105
Nauru	Tonga	Tuvalu[a]	$4,044
Palau		Vanuatu[a]	$3,161
Latin America and the Caribbean 16 (1 LDC)			
Antigua and Barbuda	Guyana	Haiti[a]	$776
Bahamas	Jamaica		
Barbados	St. Kitts and Nevis		
Belize	St. Lucia		
Cuba	St. Vincent and the Grenadines		
Dominica	Suriname		
Dominican Republic	Trinidad and Tobago		
Grenada			
Middle East and North Africa 1			
Bahrain			
South Asia 1			
Maldives			

(continued)

UN members 38 (9 LDCs)			
Sub-Saharan Africa 6 (3 LDCs)			
Cape Verde		Comoros[a]	$767
Mauritius		Guinea-Bissau[a]	$576
Seychelles		São Tomé and Príncipe[a]	$1,400

Remarks: [a]Least-developing countries

Non-UN members/associate members of the regional commissions (19)					
1	American Samoa	7	Commonwealth of Northern Marianas (CNMI)	13	Martinique
2	Anguilla	8	Cook Islands	14	Montserrat
3	Aruba	9	Curacao	15	New Caledonia
4	Bermuda	10	French Polynesia	16	Niue
5	British Virgin Islands	11	Guadeloupe	17	Puerto Rico
6	Cayman Islands	12	Guam	18	Turks and Caicos Islands
				19	US Virgin Islands

Source: UN-OHRLLS (http://unohrlls.org/about-sids/country-profiles/ (as of June 21, 2015)), World Bank (2014a)

Remarks: [a]Least-developing countries

Appendix 8.2: GDP Growth and GDP Per Capita in Oceania SIDS

Micronesian region











Melanesian region









Polynesian region











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Chapter 9
Small Island Destinations and International Tourism: Market Concentration and Distance Vulnerabilities

Jorge R. Ridderstaat and Peter Nijkamp

9.1 Introduction

This study investigates the vulnerability of small island destinations (with a population of less than 1.5 million) to international tourism, considering that small island destinations operate almost exclusively in international markets (Reid and Reid 1997). Vulnerability is defined by Nelson et al. (2007) as the susceptibility of a system to perturbations and their ability to adapt to these distresses. There are many types of vulnerabilities that can affect a country or region. The International Monetary Fund, for example, looks at several indicators of external and domestic origin to assess the soundness of the public sector of countries (http://imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/vul.htm). They also look at indicators to assess a country's ability to avert liquidity crises or their sensitivity to market risk (including changes to interest rates and exchange rates). Besides economic vulnerability, countries may also be exposed to risks related to climate change, natural hazards (e.g., hurricanes and earthquakes), wars, terrorism, and health disasters (e.g., cholera), to name a few. These vulnerabilities can cause shockwaves that could threaten the development of nations or regions.

Each country, in principle, inhibits its own set of vulnerabilities, and certain groups of territories could have similar susceptibility issues, small island destinations being such a collectivity. Small island destinations are conventionally experiencing several challenges, including problems of remoteness, geographical dispersion, susceptibility to natural and man-made disasters, fragility of

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ecosystems, constraints on transport and communication, and lack of natural resources, for instance (Brigulio 1995; Nijkamp and Verdonkschot 1995; Encontre 1999; Hampton and Christensen 2007; Nunkoo and Ramkissoon 2010; Croes 2011; Seetanah 2011; Ridderstaat 2015). These face-offs make small islands vulnerable to forces outside their control, which could threaten the economies of these nations or regions (Brigulio 1995). Export concentration is typically pronounced in the case of small states (Brigulio et al. 2009), with tourism as a prominent export activity for many small island destinations (De Albuquerque and McElroy 1992). Islands often attract tourist numbers far exceeding their population (Hall 2010); in many instances tourism is one, if not the most, important contributor to the economy and labor of these islands (Sharpley 2003; Hampton and Christensen 2007).

Several small island destinations use tourism as a growth strategy to achieve a higher economic performance and development (Croes 2006). However, tourism is an open system, with an exposure to both human (inter)actions and acts of nature (Ridderstaat 2015), that can threaten the stability of small island destinations. For example, the global economic and financial crisis of 2007–2010 has shown to have spillover effects on tourism (Ridderstaat et al. 2013), and the environment in which tourist destinations operate has become increasingly uncertain (Lyon and Worton 2007; Tiernan et al. 2007). Vulnerability becomes an issue for small island destinations when their growth blueprint is highly concentrated around a single or a few large tourism markets. And while their typically large geographical distance from their tourist markets could often signal a degree of attractiveness, exotism, enticement, or exclusivity, it could also become a vulnerability in times of crisis, conflicts, or epidemics, as international tourists could change their mindset from long-haul travel to short-distance ones (Müller 1998; European Travel Commission 2009; Smeral 2009). The travel behavior of tourists could also suffer from possible corrective environmental measures to reduce emission from air travel (Gössling et al. 2010).

The previous observations suggest two specific dimensions that contribute to tourism vulnerability of small island destinations, i.e., market concentration and distance dependency. Tourism vulnerability in this regard depends on the level of heterogeneity of markets that comprise the tourism demand for each destination and the travel range of tourists.

The current study aims to make three contributions to the tourism literature. Firstly, this study contributes to further understanding of the nature of tourism export vulnerability of small island destinations by considering the tourism market structure, the travel distance, and the overall contribution of tourism to the economy. The literature on tourism vulnerability has up to now been quite vague on the features of tourism market vulnerability. Secondly, the study provides an analytical framework for tourism market vulnerability, which could serve as a benchmark tool in future studies on tourism market exposure. Thirdly, the study contributes to the literature by presenting a unidimensional assessment of the degree of tourism market vulnerability of small island destinations. Having a one-dimensional view could speed up the interpretation process and is particularly relevant when simultaneously considering multiple indicators of tourism market vulnerability.

The remaining part of the study is organized as follows. Section 9.2 discusses the literature on tourism vulnerability, with particular attention to tourism market dependency and travel distances. Section 9.3 reviews the data and describes the applied methodology, while Sect. 9.4 presents the empirical results. Section 9.5 concludes and provides policy implications and directions for future research.

9.2 Literature Review

Tourism is not an isolated phenomenon, but it is an open system that interacts with elements both inside and outside its boundaries (Hall and Lew 2009; McDonald 2009; Ridderstaat et al. 2013; Tita 2014). As an open system, it is exposed to human (inter)actions and/or acts of nature (Ridderstaat 2015) that could put its sustainability at stake, making destinations vulnerable to multiple types of shocks (Calgaro et al. 2014). This is particularly relevant for small island destinations, given that tourism is the economic lifeline for many of these nations, supporting income, jobs, foreign exchange, and the like (Mosdale 2006; Ridderstaat 2015).

The literature has covered to some extent the issue of vulnerability of small island destinations (Bull and Weed 1999; Encontre 1999; Armstrong and Read 2002; Jayaraman 2004; Croes 2006; Mosdale 2006; Scheyvens and Momsen 2008; Brigulio et al. 2009; Guillaumont 2010; Seetanah 2011), but has remained mostly superficial when it comes to the exact nature of these vulnerabilities. For example, according to Brigulio (1995), small islands are dependent on a very narrow range of goods and services, with the disadvantage of having too many eggs in one basket. However, the author does not elaborate further on the anatomy of these goods and services, at least in terms of their typical features. Alternatively, Mosdale (2006) alludes to a power relationship between developed (tourist origins) and developing countries (tourist destinations), thereby placing destinations in dependency to tourist-generating regions. However, the nature of this power relationship remains vague. Understanding the essence of the vulnerabilities of small island destinations could assist these nations or regions in building resilience against possible shocks originating from the core of vulnerabilities of these tourist places.

Small islands' economies have often been reliant on mass tourism for their development, with many destinations regularly concentrating on limited markets (Bull and Weed 1999; Sharpley 2003). For example, according to Bull and Weed (1999), the island of Malta was heavily dependent on one single market (British visitors), which has led to rapid growth in Malta's tourism, but has also proven to make this island's tourism particularly vulnerable at various times in its tourism development history. Similarly, the tourism market from the United Kingdom (UK) has been the dominant market in Cyprus, which has already proven vulnerable to developments in the previous country. For instance, in 2002, major British tour operators have cut capacity to Cyprus between 10 and 20 % (Sharpley 2003), which impacted tourism on the island. Further information provided by the latter author indicate that both Scandinavia and Germany each accounted for about 10 % of all visitors, signaling further vulnerability of Cyprus to only a few major markets. Tita (2014) mentions the case of the Seychelles, which are vulnerable to business cycle developments in European countries, given that they are strongly dependent on tourism from these states. Tourism vulnerability in the above-provided examples originates from the dependency of small island destinations on one or only a few markets of origin. The risk of being affected by shocks from these markets of origin could, thus, be real and substantial.

Shocks due to high market dependency do not necessarily have to come from the market(s) of origin themselves, but can be triggered by intensified competition from rivaling destinations. A study by Romeu (2008) on the effects of the opening of Cuba for tourists from the United States (USA) showed that Cuba would gain market share, whereby some of the non-US visitors to Cuba would be redirected to other destinations in the Caribbean. However, the latter would not be the case for all Caribbean destinations, as many are ultimately at risk of losing a significant number of visitors. And while being just a hypothetical question at the time of the study, the announcement on December 17, 2014, of the intention of both the United States and Cuba to normalize relations has shown that many Caribbean islands are currently more vulnerable for Cuba as a destination than ever before. The examples above show the perils of small island destinations having little diversified tourism markets, whereby the concentration is on one or a few large countries of origin.

Even in the case of perfect diversification of markets of origin of tourists, small island destinations could still remain vulnerable to the distance that tourists need to travel to get to these places. Island destinations can often provide a degree of attractiveness, exotism, enticement, or exclusivity, to a trip, together with unique cultures and natural habitats (Scheyvens and Momsen 2008; Hall 2010). While transportation costs are vital, the inconvenience of tourists to travel to farther destinations may be mitigated by quality aspects of an island destination and the tourist motivations (e.g., desire to broaden cultural knowledge and discovering new places or recurring family visits) (Encontre 1999; Nicolau and Más 2006; Nicolau 2008). However, travel distance could become a vulnerability issue for destinations when considering that in times of crises, conflicts, or epidemics, international tourists tend to forego, reduce, or delay long-distance travel and trips that involve a flight (Müller 1998; European Travel Commission 2009; Smeral 2009). Moreover, the future of air transportation could suffer from environmental measures, such as fair pricing and regulatory or emission trading systems, aimed at reducing emissions from air travel (Gössling et al. 2010), which could also make long-distance travel less attractive. The reasonably isolated position of islands may make them highly susceptible to any regulatory structures put in place to manage these emissions (Hall 2010), adding further risks to the future of their tourism development.

The previous remarks show that developments in markets of origin at competing destinations as well as changes in the travel behavior of tourists could be at the originating end of export vulnerabilities of small island destinations. Identifying the causal factors of this vulnerability is a first step, given that measurement of these factors is a necessary ensuing phase, to better understand the position of small islands with respect to these factors of vulnerability. This is the theme of the next two sections.

9.3 Data and Methods

The basis for the analysis in this study is a list of 22 small island destinations, located in five different geographical regions (respectively, Caribbean, Europe, Oceania, South Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa) (see Table 9.1). There is no consensus in the literature on what exactly constitutes a small island destination (Ridderstaat 2015). According to McElroy (2006), a small island is one that is smaller than 5000 km^2 in surface. Another definition applied by Croes (2011) and the World Bank (2000) considers small islands as territories that have a population of less than 1.5 million inhabitants. Generally speaking, population is used as a measure of country size (Brigulio et al. 2009), so the population definition of small islands will be followed in this study. The selection of the small island destinations was based on available data on international number of visitors over the period 2010–2014, whereby the information was segmented by (main) markets. These data were derived mostly from the tourist bureaus of the selected destinations and, in some instances, from the central banks of the islands. The authors strived to get a minimum of 70 % of the total number of stay-over tourists explained by their markets of origin.

The collected data were first processed to determine the proportion of each of the individual markets of origin in the total number of visitors per destination, whereby the authors worked with average data over the period under review. This is because of lack of data for certain islands during specific years in the assessed period. Next, the authors determined the joint ratio of these markets in the total number of stay-over visitors per destination. The latter is a first indicator of market vulnerability of each of the destinations. In order to further analyze the market susceptibility of the destinations, the authors calculated a market vulnerability ratio (MVR) indicator, which is determined in a number of phases. First, the difference is calculated between the actual market share of each main market of a destination and the average contribution of all main markets to the total number of visitors to the destination. The latter is equal to the ratio between the total contributions of the destination's main markets in the overall number of visitors divided by the number of countries of origin, considered as main markets. For example, if the total contribution of the main markets of the destination equals to 80 %, with four main markets, the average contribution per main market would be 20 % (=80 % divided by 4). In case a market actually has a share of 40 % in the total number of visitors, the difference between the actual market share and the average market share of all markets of the destinations would then amount to 20 % (40 % minus 20 %). This difference is subsequently squared and summed up with the other differences. Next, the outcome is divided by a similar calculation, but now for all destinations together. In formula, the MVR is calculated as follows:

$$\mathrm{MVR}_i = \frac{\frac{1}{n} \times \sqrt{\sum_{j=1}^{n} \left(X_{i,j} - \left(\frac{\mathrm{TCM}_i}{n}\right)\right)^2}}{\frac{1}{N} \times \sqrt{\sum_{i=1}^{N} \left[\sum_{j=1}^{n} \left(X_{i,j} - \left(\frac{\mathrm{TCM}_i}{n}\right)\right)^2\right]_i}} \tag{9.1}$$

Table 9.1 Selected small island destinations and their characteristics

	Region	Population (end 2014)	Area (in squared kilometers)	Direct and indirect contribution of tourism (2014) economy	Labor
Anguilla	Caribbean	16,449	90.0	59.6	61.7
Antigua and Barbuda	Caribbean	92,561	440.0	64.0	58.2
Aruba	Caribbean	106,858	180.0	86.8	89.1
Bahamas	Caribbean	382,343	5507.0	48.0	56.8
Barbados	Caribbean	286,342	431.0	36.5	36.0
Cayman Islands	Caribbean	61,609	196.0	26.1	28.0
Curacao	Caribbean	153,500[a]	444.0	28.0	n.a.
Cyprus	Europe	1,184,652	9251.0	24.0	25.4
Dominica	Caribbean	72,143	750.0	31.9	29.0
Fiji	Oceania	895,824	18,274.0	38.7	27.2
Grenada	Caribbean	107,236	310.0	20.8	19.3
Kiribati	Oceania	104,607	811.0	24.4	20.9
Maldives	South Asia	336,921	298.0	93.2	86.2
Malta	Europe	424,204	316.0	26.3	27.2
Mauritius	Sub-Saharan Africa	1,319,906	2040.0	25.6	24.3
Montserrat	Caribbean	5121	102.0	15.0	n.a.
Seychelles	Sub-Saharan Africa	90,829	459.0	54.4	54.7
Saint Kitts and Nevis	Caribbean	54,916	261.0	23.4	22.3
Saint Lucia	Caribbean	182,973	616.0	39.6	43.0
Saint Maarten (Dutch)	Caribbean	39,000[b]	87.0	n.a.	n.a.
Saint Vincent and Grenadines	Caribbean	108,300	389.8	21.3	19.5
Vanuatu	Oceania	257,359	12,190.0	67.4	20.9

Source: World Travel & Tourism Council; wikipedia; http://countrymeter.info; Worldbank
[a] 2013
[b] 2012

where

MVR = market vulnerability ratio
TCM = total contribution of main markets
i = specific small island destination
j = specific country of origin
n = number of markets at a specific destination
N = total number of markets at all destinations

The higher the MVR, the higher the vulnerability of a destination to tourism demand developments in the most important markets.

A second calculation of market vulnerability is made by estimating the main market vulnerability ratio (MMVR), which is equal to the individual destination's main market ratio (MMR) divided by an average of the main market ratio of all destinations. In formula:

$$\mathrm{MMVR}_i = \frac{\mathrm{MMR}_i}{\frac{\sum \mathrm{MMR}_i}{N}} = \frac{1}{N} \times \frac{\mathrm{MMR}_i}{\sum \mathrm{MMR}_i} \tag{9.2}$$

where

MMVR = main market vulnerability ratio
MMR = main market ratio

The higher the MMVR, the higher the vulnerability of a destination to tourism demand developments in the most important market.

A third dimension investigated in this study has to do with the distance of each tourist market to the destination and vice versa. One indicator of remoteness is the weighted average distance (WAD) between a destination and its main contributing markets. In other words, the WAD provides an indication of the distance (going to and coming back) in kilometers that one visitor has to travel to reach the destination and return back home afterwards. Such an indicator has been applied by Romeu (2008), where it was used as a proxy for travel costs. The WAD is calculated by determining the total number of kilometers traveled by all visitors to a destination, considering the weight of each market in the total number of stay-over visitors to a destination. The formula for calculating the WAD is as follows:

$$\mathrm{WAD}_i = \sum\nolimits_{j=1}^{n} w_{i,j} \times D_{i,j} \,\mathrm{for}\, w_{j,i} = \frac{T_{i,j}}{\sum T_{i,j}} \tag{9.3}$$

where

WAD = weighted average distance between a destination and its main tourist markets
D = distance
T = number of stay-over visitors

The higher the WAD, the larger the travel distance per tourist between the destination and its main tourist markets of origin, the more vulnerable a destination could be for the effects of crises, conflicts, epidemics, or for punitive measures to reduce air travel emissions.

The previous calculation methods provide a multidimensional portrait of tourism market vulnerabilities of the selected small island destinations. The weaknesses of a multidimensional system of indicators are that each indicator could differentiate from the others in terms of its development, requiring an individual analysis of each variable, which could be a cumbersome process. For this purpose, this study calculated an overall index of tourism market vulnerability using the three previously calculated indicators, i.e., the MVR, the MMVR, and the WAD. For comparative purposes, these variables were first transformed into a unitless index using the following formula:

$$I_i = \frac{X_i - \mathrm{Min}(X_{\mathrm{AC}})}{\mathrm{Max}(X_{\mathrm{AC}}) - \mathrm{Min}(X_{\mathrm{AC}})} \tag{9.4}$$

where

I = index
X = variable representing either MVR, MMVR, or WAD
AC = all countries (i.e., all i's)
Min = minimum value
Max = maximum value

This produces a series of outcomes that vary between zero and one. In other words, one of the outcomes (more specifically the one where $X_i = \mathrm{Min}(X_{\mathrm{AC}})$) would equal zero. Because of this, and for further calculation purposes, the authors added the value 1 to all outcomes, so that the minimum and maximum values of all three indices would now lie between one and two. To determine the one-dimensional index, the authors considered as well the relevance of tourism in the GDP of the selected destinations, i.e., the index form of this indicator. Ultimately, the index of tourism market volatility (ITMV) was essentially based on the method of calculation (geometric mean of three variables) that was also applied in the Human Development Index of the United Nations Development Program (2010). The difference here is that four variables are used instead of three:

$$\begin{aligned}\mathrm{ITMV}_i &= \left[\sqrt[4]{\mathrm{ITMV} \times \mathrm{IMMVR} \times \mathrm{IWAD} \times \mathrm{ITCE}}\right] - 1 \leftrightarrow \mathrm{ITMV}_i \\ &= \left([\mathrm{ITMV}]^{\frac{1}{4}} \times [\mathrm{IMMVR}]^{\frac{1}{4}} \times [\mathrm{IWAD}]^{\frac{1}{4}} \times\ [\mathrm{ITCE}]^{\frac{1}{4}}\right) - 1\end{aligned} \tag{9.5}$$

where

ITMV = index of tourism market vulnerability
IMMVR = index of main market vulnerability
IWAD = index of weighted average distance
ITCE = index of tourism contribution to the economy

The value one is deducted again from the outcome of the calculated ITMV to ensure anew that the value of the index falls between zero and one.

The next section will review the findings of the indicators presented in Sect. 9.3.

9.4 Empirical Findings

Some socioeconomic and geographical characteristics of small islands are provided in Table 9.1. The majority of the selected small island destinations were located in the Caribbean (14 out of 22), followed by Oceania (3 out of 22) and, respectively, Europe and Sub-Saharan Africa (both two countries). Seven of the selected islands (31.8 %) had a population of less than 100,000 inhabitants. Eleven destinations (50 %) had a population between 100,000 and 500,000, whereas one destination had a population between 500,000 and 1 million. Two of the selected destinations had a population of more than 1 million, but less than the 1.5 million maximum defined at the beginning of the study. Fourteen of the selected destinations had a surface area of less than 500 km^2, whereas three destinations had an area between 500 and 1000 km^2. The remaining set (five destinations) had a surface area larger than 1000 km^2, with Fiji being the largest. The latter implies that the smallest island (Saint Maarten) was more than 200 times smaller than the largest island (Fiji). Tourism was in the majority of cases both directly and indirectly responsible for at least 25 % of economic activity or employment on the islands, with the Maldives being the most tourism-dependent island.

Figure 9.1 shows a word cloud of the representative influence of origin markets of the stay-over visitors. The figure shows Australia, the United States, and Russia being the three largest markets of origin of the stay-over visitors, followed by 27 other home countries and regions of the tourists visiting these small island destinations.

The relationship between the small island destinations and the countries of origin of the tourists is further explained in Table 9.2. On average, 5.8 markets accounted for 84.0 % of the total number of stay-over visitors to the selected small island destinations, with the lowest quantity being found in the case of the Cayman Islands (2 markets explaining 84.8 % of the total number of stay-over visitors) and the



Fig. 9.1 Word cloud of most important countries of international tourism to small island destinations

Table 9.2 Contribution of main market (average 2010–2014)

	Region	Markets that together contribute to more than 70 % of all stay-over visitors	Contribution (in %) of main markets to overall stay-over tourism	Contribution of largest tourism market	Data over period
Anguilla	Caribbean	United States (64.6 %), United Kingdom (4.4 %), Canada (4.6 %), Caribbean (16.6 %)	90.2 %	United States (64.6 %)	2010–2013
Antigua and Barbuda	Caribbean	United States (36.2 %), United Kingdom (28.4 %), Canada (9.8 %), Caribbean (14.3 %)	88.8 %	United States (36.2 %)	2010–2013
Aruba	Caribbean	United States (60.3 %), Venezuela (15.1 %), Canada (4.7 %), Colombia (1.9 %), Netherlands (4.4 %), United Kingdom (1.4 %)	87.9 %	United States (60.3 %)	2010–2014
Bahamas	Caribbean	United States (78.9 %), United Kingdom (1.7 %), Canada (9.1 %)	89.7 %	United States (78.9 %)	2010–2013
Barbados	Caribbean	United Kingdom (33.2 %), United States (24.7 %), Canada (13.2 %), CARICOM (17.3 %)	88.4 %	United Kingdom (33.2 %)	2010–2013
Cayman Islands	Caribbean	United States (78.3 %), Canada (7.3 %)	84.8 %	United States (78.3 %)	2010–2014
Curacao	Caribbean	Netherlands (34.7 %), United States (14.8 %), Venezuela (17.7 %), Aruba (5.1 %), Suriname (2.7 %)	75.0 %	Netherlands (34.7 %)	2010–2013
Cyprus	Europe	United Kingdom (41.0 %), Russia (17.4 %), Sweden (4.8 %), Greece (5.3 %), Germany (5.7 %), Switzerland (1.9 %)	76.1 %	United Kingdom (41.0 %)	2010–2014
Dominica	Caribbean	Caribbean (56.5 %), United States (19.6 %), United Kingdom (6.3 %), Canada (3.4 %)	85.8 %	Caribbean (56.5 %)	2010–2013

(continued)

Table 9.2 (continued)

	Region	Markets that together contribute to more than 70 % of all stay-over visitors	Contribution (in %) of main markets to overall stay-over tourism	Contribution of largest tourism market	Data over period
Fiji	Oceania	Australia (50.8 %), United States (8.4 %), United Kingdom (3.3 %), New Zealand (15.6 %), Canada (2.1 %), China (3.5 %), Japan (1.5 %), Korea (1.8 %)	85.9 %	Australia (50.8 %)	2010–2012
Grenada	Caribbean	United States (26.3 %), United Kingdom (22.1 %), Canada (7.1 %), Caribbean (22.3 %)	77.8 %	United States (26.3 %)	2010–2013
Kiribati	Oceania	Australia (22.2 %), United States (6.3 %), United Kingdom (3.5 %), New Zealand (8.7 %), Fiji (14.1 %), Nauru (4.6 %), Japan (4.8 %), Germany (7.0 %)	71.1 %	Australia (22.2 %)	2010–2011
Maldives	Oceania	China (23.1 %), United States (1.6 %), United Kingdom (10.4 %), Italy (7.7 %), Russia (6.8 %), Japan (4.0 %), Korea (2.7 %), India (3.3 %), France (5.9 %), Germany (9.4 %), Switzerland (3.4 %)	77.8 %	China (23.1 %)	2010–2014
Malta	Europe	United Kingdom (30.3 %), United States (1.2 %), Ireland (1.9 %), Italy (14.8 %), Spain (4.2 %), Belgium (1.9 %), Russia (2.1 %), France (7.2 %), Germany	79.0 %	United Kingdom (30.3 %)	2010–2013

(continued)

Table 9.2 (continued)

	Region	Markets that together contribute to more than 70 % of all stay-over visitors	Contribution (in %) of main markets to overall stay-over tourism	Contribution of largest tourism market	Data over period
		(9.4 %), Austria (1.5 %), Switzerland (1.7 %), Netherlands (2.7 %)			
Mauritius	Sub-Saharan Africa	France (28.2 %), United Kingdom (9.6 %), Reunion (13.9 %), South Africa (9.1 %), Italy (4.7 %), India (5.6 %), Germany (5.8 %), Switzerland (2.5 %)	78.5 %	France (28.2 %)	2010–2014
Montserrat	Caribbean	Caribbean (35.2 %), United States (26.7 %), United Kingdom (25.8 %), Canada (6.7 %)	94.5 %	Caribbean (35.2 %)	2010–2013
Seychelles	Sub-Saharan Africa	France (17.1 %), United States (1.7 %), United Kingdom (6.1 %), Reunion (2.0 %), South Africa (5.8 %), Italy (12.0 %), Spain (1.3 %), Belgium (1.2 %), Russia (5.7 %), China (1.9 %), India (1.2 %), United Arab Emirates (5.1 %), Germany (13.2 %), Switzerland (4.0 %), Mauritius (1.7 %)	82.5 %	France (17.7 %)	2010–2014
Saint Kitts and Nevis	Caribbean	United States (62.8 %), United Kingdom (8.0 %), Canada (6.4 %), Caribbean (18.3 %)	95.5 %	United States (62.8 %)	2010–2013
Saint Lucia	Caribbean	United States (39.8 %), United Kingdom (23.1 %), Canada (11.4 %), Caribbean (18.4 %)	92.7 %	United States (39.8 %)	2010–2013

(continued)

Table 9.2 (continued)

	Region	Markets that together contribute to more than 70 % of all stay-over visitors	Contribution (in %) of main markets to overall stay-over tourism	Contribution of largest tourism market	Data over period
Saint Maarten (Dutch)	Caribbean	United States (52.5 %), Canada (8.6 %), Venezuela (0.7 %), Netherlands (3.7 %)	71.2 %	United States (52.5 %)	2010–2013
Saint Vincent and Grenadines	Caribbean	Caribbean (31.4 %), United States (28.8 %), United Kingdom (19.6 %), Canada (9.7 %)	89.5 %	Caribbean (31.4 %)	2010–2013
Vanuatu	Oceania	Australia (60.5 %), New Zealand (12.9 %), New Caledonia (11.8 %)	85.3 %	Australia (60.5 %)	2010–2013

Source: tourism statistics from destinations and authors' calculations

highest number at the Seychelles (16 markets explaining 82.5 % of the total number of stay-over tourists). This is a first indication of vulnerability of the islands to only a few markets. In the case of nine small island destinations (40.9 %), there was one particular market that explained more than 50 % of all stay-over visitors coming to the island (Anguilla, Aruba, Bahamas, Cayman Islands, Dominica, Fiji, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Maarten, and Vanuatu). For example, the US market accounts for slightly more than 78 % of all stay-over visitors to both the Bahamas and the Cayman Islands. The average contribution of the most important market of each of the selected destinations was 43.8 %, which can be considered high. Furthermore, it indicates that these small island destinations are susceptible to developments in one single main market.

Further evidence of vulnerability can be derived from the vulnerability ratios provided in Table 9.3. The MVR is the highest for the Cayman Island and the Bahamas and the lowest for the Seychelles and the Maldives. The MMVR shows an almost similar picture (the Bahamas and the Cayman Islands ranked, respectively, on the 1st and 2nd place, and Kiribati and the Seychelles on, respectively, the 21st and 22nd place). These two ratios show that the Bahamas and the Cayman Islands are the most vulnerable destinations when it comes to tourist market dependency.

The calculated WAD as an indicator of market remoteness is also provided in Table 9.3. The minimum travel distance (going to and coming back) for a tourist was on average 4111 km in the case of Malta, and the highest travel range was 14,664 km for a tourist visiting Kiribati. Most of the travel distances (72.7 %) were in the range between 5000 and 10,000 km. With a typical cruising airplane speed between 878 and 926 km per hour (source: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/cruise_%

Table 9.3 Market vulnerabilities and remoteness

	Market vulnerability ratio	Rank	Main market vulnerability ratio	Rank	Weighted average distance (in km) 1]	Rank
Anguilla	9.7837	4	1.4735	3	7070	16
Antigua and Barbuda	4.1923	11	0.8257	12	8981	7
Aruba	6.7352	8	1.3754	6	7062	17
Bahamas	15.8605	2	1.7997	1	5362	20
Barbados	3.0063	16	0.7573	15	9914	5
Cayman Islands	19.8286	1	1.7860	2	5771	19
Curacao	4.0062	14	0.7915	14	9290	6
Cyprus	4.3720	10	0.9352	10	7457	13
Dominica	8.3474	7	1.2888	7	4317	21
Fiji	4.4192	9	1.1587	9	11,483	4
Grenada	2.8822	17	0.5999	19	8620	9
Kiribati	1.6462	20	0.5064	21	14,664	1
Maldives	1.3630	21	0.5269	20	14,064	2
Malta	1.8621	19	0.6911	17	4111	22
Mauritius	2.1322	18	0.6432	18	7874	11
Montserrat	4.1122	13	0.8029	13	7206	15
Seychelles	0.9497	22	0.4037	22	13,878	3
Saint Kitts and Nevis	9.0574	5	1.4325	4	7382	14
Saint Lucia	4.1303	12	0.9078	11	8945	8
Saint Maarten (Dutch)	8.6845	6	1.1975	8	8000	10
Saint Vincent and Grenadines	3.3605	15	0.7162	16	7780	12
Vanuatu	10.3488	3	1.3800	5	6207	18

Source: authors' calculations

28aeronautics%29, visited March 28, 2015), this implies that visitors in this distance range would have to spend between 5 and 11 h to get to their destination (not counting waiting time at airports). In the case of Fiji, Kiribati, the Maldives, and the Seychelles, the travel distance for a tourist ranged between 10,000 and 15,000 km, implying a travel time between 11 and 17 h, making them the remotest islands in the investigated list of small island destinations.

The results from the previous analysis show that the indicators of tourism market vulnerability are not homogeneous in nature and could show different outcomes for each island. For example, while the Bahamas has the highest MMVR and the second highest MVR, it is ranked on the 20th place when it comes to the WAD (obviously because of its high dependence and close proximity to the United States). This calls for a unidimensional analysis of these indicators. Table 9.4 provides the index forms of these indicators together with an index of tourism contribution to the GDP and an

Table 9.4 Index of tourism market volatility

	Index market vulnerability ratio	Index main market vulnerability ratio	Index weighted average distance	Index contribution of tourism to GDP	Index tourism market vulnerability
Anguilla	0.4679	0.7663	0.2804	0.5021	0.4944
Antigua and Barbuda	0.1718	0.3023	0.4615	0.6215	0.3790
Aruba	0.3065	0.6961	0.2796	0.8253	0.5083
Bahamas	0.7898	1.0000	0.1186	0.3880	0.5354
Barbados	0.1089	0.2533	0.5499	0.2848	0.2898
Cayman Islands	1.0000	0.9902	0.1573	0.1271	0.5095
Curacao	0.1619	0.2778	0.4908	0.1620	0.2664
Cyprus	0.1813	0.3807	0.3171	0.0541	0.2267
Dominica	0.3919	0.6340	0.0195	0.2203	0.2970
Fiji	0.1838	0.5408	0.6986	0.2923	0.4146
Grenada	0.1024	0.1405	0.4273	0.0690	0.1769
Kiribati	0.0369	0.0735	1.0000	0.0939	0.2492
Maldives	0.0219	0.0882	0.9431	1.0000	0.4418
Malta	0.0483	0.2059	0.0000	0.1353	0.0945
Mauritius	0.0626	0.1716	0.3566	0.1505	0.1807
Montserrat	0.1675	0.2859	0.2933	0.0000	0.1805
Seychelles	0.0000	0.0000	0.9255	0.5589	0.3163
Saint Kitts and Nevis	0.4295	0.7369	0.3100	0.0860	0.3709
Saint Lucia	0.1685	0.3611	0.4581	0.2801	0.3126
Saint Maarten (Dutch)	0.4097	0.5686	0.3685	n.a.	n.a.
Saint Vincent and Grenadines	0.1277	0.2239	0.3476	0.0780	0.1900
Vanuatu	0.4979	0.6993	0.1987	0.5766	0.4810

Source: authors' calculations

overall index of tourism market vulnerability. The overall index can be explained in the same way as the individual indices, i.e., values should lie between zero and one, with the latter indicating the highest level of vulnerability. The results show that the Bahamas and the Cayman Islands have the highest degree of vulnerability according to this index, closely followed by Aruba, Anguilla, and Vanuatu. Alternatively, Malta, Grenada, Mauritius, Montserrat and Saint Vincent, and the Grenadines have the lowest degree of tourism market vulnerability.

The relationship between the individual indicator and the overall index can be further investigated by plotting them as bar charts (see Fig. 9.2) or as a scatter charts



Fig. 9.2 Comparison of individual indices and the index of tourism market vulnerability



Fig. 9.3 Scatter plot of individual indices and the index of market vulnerability

(see Fig. 9.3). The four charts in Fig. 9.2 show from a visual inspection that there is some relationship between each individual index and the aggregate index of tourism vulnerability. A scatter plot of the data shows that the first, second, and fourth index could, to some extent, be modeled by a linear equation, but the scatter between the index of the weighted average distance and the aggregated index of tourism vulnerability could not be modeled by a simple linear regression, but by a polynomial trend line, possibly indicating that the link between the index of weighted average distance and the index of tourism market vulnerability is likely more complicated than the other three cases.

The previous analysis provides a framework for further investigation into the vulnerability of destinations with respect to tourism markets. The evaluation also shows the diversity that could exist in each individual indicator, suggesting a possible usefulness of a unidimensional approach when assessing the vulnerability of nations with respect to their tourist markets.

9.5 Conclusion

This study investigated the vulnerability of small island destinations for the markets of origin of their tourists. The results show that tourism to many small islands is often determined by a few number of markets, generally with one large dominant market. Moreover, the results indicate that the distance between the destination and its markets could be considerable. Furthermore, the results also show that, although small island destinations show similar symptoms of vulnerability toward tourist markets of origin, the degree of vulnerability varies from country to country, depending on how they score on each individual indicator of vulnerability and the importance of tourism to their economies.

These findings are important, because they shed light on the vulnerability conditions of small island destinations with respect to the structure of their tourist markets of origin, the travel distance, and the overall contribution of tourism to their economy. The results also provide a framework for analysis of tourism market vulnerability, while providing a methodology to determine a one-dimensional indicator of this vulnerability.

The results could assist managers and policy makers in delineating strategies to limit their destination’s vulnerability and to build resilience to cope with crises, conflicts, epidemics, and the like that could influence their international tourism development. For example, destinations could try to build loyalty relationships with their visitors by stimulating them to come back frequently (e.g., each year). This entails that destinations should have an adequate view on what induces tourists to become loyalists frequently returning to the same tourist place. For instance, a recent study by Frangos et al. (2015) showed that repeat visitors to Athens (Greece) care more about the price of the trip and the sunny natural environment of Athens and Greece generally.

Some limitations may apply to the data in this study. Firstly, data on international visitors were in some cases not fully available for certain destinations, inducing the authors to work with average data. In other cases, no data was available at all for certain small island destinations, causing their full omission from the study. This complete elimination could have an effect on the overall picture on tourism market volatility in small island destinations. Secondly, and considering the first limitation, the study does not provide an overview of how tourism market vulnerability has developed over time in the destinations, but was limited to just comparison with other small island destinations. Benchmarking a small island destination against itself over time could provide additional information on the direction of tourism market vulnerability, for example, whether the destination's authorities are successful in mitigating the tourism market vulnerability. Thirdly, calculating the WAD in some instances was a challenge, particularly in the case of a large country of origin like the United States, with multiple international airports and lack of data on the port of departure of tourists to the destination. Working with data on the top 15 airports only could be a limitation to the study.

Future research should firstly consider expanding the scope of the investigation by including larger islands or mainland countries as tourist destinations. Also, future studies should consider benchmarking countries against themselves, by comparing tourism market vulnerability over a longer time horizon than the one applied here. These study intentions could provide a better understanding of the tourism market vulnerability concept and could allow countries to eventually become more resilient to this type of vulnerability.

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Chapter 10

Self-Determination for the Communication Policy in the Pacific Islands

Rieko Hayakawa

10.1 Introduction

Thousands of islands are spread across the vast ocean which covers a third of the Earth's surface. Telecommunication development has always presented challenges for their economical, political, and cultural development in this region.

This chapter will discuss, firstly, how telecommunication was developed in the Pacific Islands with the launching of undersea cables in the early twentieth century and how satellite communication and decolonization developed after WWII. Secondly, the chapter will discuss how Pacific Island people utilize communication networks for their independent movements, even during the colonial time in Vanuatu. Thirdly, the chapter will discuss how Pacific regional organizations utilized the free satellite as a windfall of the US space development.

From these discussions, we will see that the Pacific Island people and developing countries were not merely passive recipients of telecommunication technologies and its development but were people who chose and fully utilized them for their political will for their own purposes.

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10.2 Historical Background of Telecommunication Development in the Pacific

The Pacific Ocean covers a third of the Earth's surface and has about 25,000 islands, currently 1,500 of which are inhabited. First human colonization is confirmed around 50,000 years ago from Papua New Guinea. The second major colonization event was by seafaring peoples who colonized the Pacific Islands. They originated from Southeast Asia, possibly even Taiwan, before arriving in Papua New Guinea and spreading out into Remote Oceania some 3,000 years ago. People were using traditional outrigger vessels, using wind and the movement of tides, and reading star charts, to aid in their crossing of thousands of kilometers. They commuted between the islands traveling over hundreds and even thousands of kilometers, back and forth, exchanging materials such as plants, food, people, and information (Summerhayes 2000). One example is that of the sweet potato which has a South American origin and which was discovered in an archaeological deposit some 1,000 years old at Mangaia, Cook Islands. Archaeological studies proved that this potato was taken by Pacific Island people who visited South America by sailing vessel and then brought it back to their islands (Hather and Kirch 2000).

Information and communication have been actively undertaken across the vast Pacific oceans for many centuries with traditional technologies such as drums, smokes, songs, stories, and other forms of expression except written languages.

The arrival of Europeans in the fifteenth century to the Pacific led to various economic development and social change. The invention of telecommunications in Europe and the USA subsequently came to the Pacific in the twentieth century.

10.2.1 Western Powers in Pacific and Communication Marine Cables

The first telegraph cable was launched across the Pacific Ocean in 1902. It began from Vancouver Island to Fanning Island to Fiji to Norfolk Island and then separated into two cables, one for Australia and another for New Zealand (Headrick 1991). This ensured that all Commonwealth countries of the British Empire were connected – "All Red Line" (see Fig. 10.1). Of course this communication infrastructure was not developed for Pacific Island people but the colonial administration for economic and military purposes. Furthermore the British Empire wanted their communication network to be excluded and not bridging with other countries' networks.

In 1905, the German territory of Yap was bridging the US mainland and Asia Pacific region. First, Yap-Menado and then the Yap-Guam line were launched. In the same year, the Yap-Shanghai line was launched. The Yap-Guam line was connected to Midway-Honolulu-San Francisco; then it reached to New York.


CANADA
VANCOUVER
LONDON
BERMUDAS
BARBADOES
FANNING
PACIFIC
OCEAN
ATLANTIC
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ASCENSION
ST HELENA
CAPETOWN
DURBAN
MAURITIUS
COCOS
AUSTRALIA
PERTH
BRISBANE
FIJI
NORFOLK
NEW ZEALAND
AUSTRALIA
PERTH
BRISBANE
NORFOLK
THE ALL-RED LINE AROUND THE WORLD

Fig. 10.1 "The All Red Line"

From New York, via Azores Islands in the North Atlantic, the cable was finally connected to Emden, north of Germany.

Again, the German telegraph cable was launched for the German Empire's administration and for economic and military purposes, not for the people of Yap Island (Takaoka 1954).

Headrick described this cable development in his book, *The Invisible Weapon, from 1851 to 1945*. Britain always enjoyed her monopoly and occupied more than half of the world's cable, even though this ratio slightly declined over time. In 1892 it was 66.28 % of the world's total, in 1908 it was 56.22 %, and in 1923 it declined to 50.54 %. America drastically expanded their cable. In 1892 their length of cable was 38,986 km, and after 30 years, the American cable expanded more than three times to 142,621 km making up 24.20 % of the world's cable. The French, who also had territory in the Pacific, owned around 10 % of the world's cable, increasing almost three times over 30 years (in 1892 21,859 km, in 1923 64,933 km). After the three powers, i.e., Britain, America, and France, both Germany and Japan became major cable players having had an opportunity to have territory in the Pacific. Germany, who became united in 1870, had changes in her colonial policy under Wilhelm II and expanded their territories and power, which also caused tension among Western countries. In 1908 Germany possessed 33,984 km of cables which is 7.18 % of the world's total. After WWI Japan also expanded her cables to 14,463 km after obtaining the Micronesian islands as compensation for protecting her allies such as Britain, Australia, and New Zealand from Germany (see Table 10.1 and Fig. 10.2).

During the negotiations for cables across the Pacific, small Pacific islands were annexed by Britain and the USA. In 1888 Fanning Island was formally annexed by Britain. This island is located in the middle of Pacific and is currently within the

Table 10.1 Distribution of cables in the world in 1892, 1908, and 1923

	1892			1908		1923		
	Number of cables	Length (km)	% of World total	Lengthe (km)	% of World total	Number of cables	Lengthe (km)	% of World total
British cables	508	163,619	66.28 %	265,971	56.22 %	795	297,802	50.54 %
American cables	27	38,986	15.79 %	92,434	19.54 %	147	142,621	24.20 %
French cables	74	21,859	8.85 %	44,543	9.41 %	108	64,933	11.02 %
Danish cables	82	13,201	5.35 %	17,768	3.76 %	26	15,590	2.65 %
Germany and Netherland				33,984	7.18 %			
Japan						214	14,463	2.45 %
Others	535	9,206	3.73 %	18,408	3.89 %	2,276	53,819	9.13 %
Total World Cables	1226	246,871	100.00 %	473,108	100.00 %	3,566	589,228	100.00 %

Data from Headrick (1991)



Fig. 10.2 Distribution of cables in the world in 1892, 1908, and 1923 (Data from Headrick 1991)

territory of the Republic of Kiribati. The annexation arose as a result of a British Dominion government-held conference in 1877 which decided that their cable had to land only on British territory. The other island was Necker Island which is located to the northwest of Hawaii. In 1894 the colonial conference at Ottawa endorsed the cable project from Vancouver Island to Necker Island and then to the British Fanning Island. There was an attempt to raise the British flag on Necker, but the provisional government of Hawaii quickly sent a ship and formally annexed it (Headrick 1991) (see Fig. 10.3).

Thus British communication cable policy was the dominant, both physically and politically, in the world. As a result, small islands were annexed for their communication policy, and this communication policy of monopoly remained until recently after more than 100 years in the Pacific Island countries.

Fig. 10.3 Ceremony to annex Mokumanamana (Necker Island) for the provisional government of Hawaii (Source: Ben H. Norton – Bernice P. Bishop Museum, taken from Wikipedia)

10.2.2 Decolonization and Satellite Development After WWII

It is reasonable to start with the “The Missing Link” as officially titled and also known as the “Maitland Report” to describe the historical background to Information Communication and Technology for Development – ICT4D. The “Missing Link” was released in 1985 from ITU as the first comprehensive study on ICT4D. However, I would like to summarize events from a few decades before which led to this report.

The events begin in the mid- to late 1950s with the Bandung Conference (1955) and the Sputnik Crisis (1957) – in other words, decolonization and space development under the Cold War. These two events and movement showed us that space development and decolonization (post-colonization) were synchronized for ICT4D. One of these movements was a demand from newly independent countries for their equal right for new space territory which at that time was a new territory for nation-states. The other movements were a demand from two hegemonies – the USA and Soviet Union, who both wanted to develop space technologies for their power struggle as well as obtaining newly independent countries for their political allies.

10.2.2.1 Decolonization and Space Development: Bandung Conference and Sputnik Crisis

After WWII, decolonization accelerated. In 1946 there were 55 member states in the United Nations; by 1970 membership became 127.

A major symbolic event for the decolonization movement was held in 1955 at Bandung, Indonesia. Twenty-nine decolonized countries from both Asia and Africa gathered and agreed to a ten-point "declaration on promotion of world peace and cooperation," which included human right, sovereignty, and equality of all races.

Following this first conference of non-allied countries, the Soviet Union in 1957 was successful in launching the space rocket Sputnik. This action raised tensions of the Cold War. Non-allied newly independent countries who gathered at the Bandung Conference were dragged into the respective camps of the two hegemony powers.

After the competition between the USA and Soviet Union began in 1957, 1 year later in 1958, the United Nations Committee on the "Peaceful Uses of Outer Space" was provisionally launched and then was formally established as a UN resolution in 1959.

The ITU – International Telecommunication Union – which was established in 1865, is the oldest international organization in existence. In 1952 the ITU became an official participating organization in the UN Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance. The aim was to recruit and send experts to developing countries to help in various technological fields, as well as to support the training of local personnel. In 1959 the ITU took over the management of its technical assistance schemes for telecommunications, with the creation of a department for that purpose the following year. This could be the origin of ICT4D.

In 1961, John F. Kennedy, US president, made a historical speech before the UN General Assembly which included the proposal for the peaceful space development and global system of communications satellites linking the whole world by telegraph and telephone and radio and television:

> . . .As we extend the rule of law on earth, so must we also extend it to man's new domain – outer space.
>
> All of us salute the brave cosmonauts of the Soviet Union. The new horizons of outer space must not be driven by the old bitter concepts of imperialism and sovereign claims. The cold reaches of the universe must not become the new arena of an even colder war.
>
> To this end, we shall urge proposals extending the United Nations Charter to the limits of man's exploration of the universe, reserving outer space for peaceful use, prohibiting weapons of mass destruction in space or on celestial bodies, and opening the mysteries and benefits of space to every nation. We shall propose further cooperative efforts between all nations in weather prediction and eventually in weather control. We shall propose, finally, a global system of communications satellites linking the whole world in telegraph and telephone and radio and television. The day need not be far away when such a system will televise the proceedings of this body to every corner of the world for the benefit of peace.... (John F Kennedy, Address Before the General Assembly of the United Nations, September 25, 1961)

Kennedy and the USA's intention may have been to make allies with those newly developed countries as part of global strategic information control under the Cold War time. Kennedy's speech led to the establishment in 1964 of INTELSAT – International Telecommunications Satellite – service organization. In the same year, the Soviet Union also established INTERSPUTNIK, another satellite service organization. Opportunities existed for the newly developed third world countries to access these satellite information systems, yet again they were divided into the US and Soviet Union hegemonies.

In 1965 the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) was established, and development for these newly independent nations was strengthened. Space development was also reinforced. As a result, in 1969 humanity made its first steps on the Moon – just as President Kennedy had promised in his 1962 speech.

10.2.2.2 Neglected Voices: "Many Voices One World" and "Bogota Declaration"

Was space development successful for "peaceful space development and global system of communications satellites linking the whole world" as Kennedy urged in his speech? The answer was NO.

The divide of wealth between developed and developing countries was further widened in the 1960s and 1970s. ICT was no exception. Studies in both media and communication showed that the flow of mass media information between developed and developing countries was obvious and that this situation worsened the divide and put up obstacles for development.

In 1969, UNESCO spoke about the "New World Information and Communication Order" and in 1977 launched the International Commission for the Study of Communication Problems asking the Nobel Peace Prize activist Seán MacBride to take the lead. In 1980 this committee released a report titled "Many Voices One World," or as it was well known as the "MacBride Report." The report was condemned by both the USA and UK as it was thought to have been against freedom of expression.

In 1976 there was another voice from developing countries on space satellite development which was ignored by the hegemony again. Eight countries from the world's equatorial zone, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Indonesia, Congo, Kenya, Uganda, and Zaire, joined together at a conference and signed the Bogota Declaration. This declaration made clear that the geostationary orbit arc above each country is the sovereign territory of that country. The declaration also stated that such sovereign rights are in the best interest of all countries and all mankind, not just the most developed countries. Following on from this, it was also thought that the geostationary arc above the oceans was part of the common heritage of all mankind and should be exploited to the benefit of all mankind. Those countries that were developed in space exploration such as the USA did not reply to these demands from developing countries and continued to enjoy their monopolized space technology and powers not for the betterment of developed countries but strengthening their own military-industrial complex.

It should be noted that the Kingdom of Tonga, located in the Pacific, started Tongasat in 1988 and that this influenced the monopoly satellite service of INTELSAT which led to the liberalization of satellite business in 1990s.

10.2.3 Summary

In the early twentieth century, undersea communication cables were launched across the Pacific Ocean. Some islands were annexed by the USA and Great Britain for this explicit purpose. But these ICT developments were not for the Pacific Island people but for colonial countries such as Britain, the USA, Germany, and Australia. Furthermore, competition between these colonial powers had an impact on ICT development policy, especially Great Britain, until recently who left telecommunication policy regime as legacy to the Pacific Island countries.

After the Sputnik Crisis, space development was the result of fierce competition between the two power hegemonies under the increasing tension of the Cold War. The ICT environment was divided between developed and developing countries. There were two significant voices from the developing countries – “Many Voices One World” and “Bogota Declaration” which were ignored. In 1982 ITU reacted to this discontent on the information and communication divide. During the ITU Plenipotentiary Conference held in Nairobi in 1982, the Independent Commission for Worldwide Telecommunications Development was set up. In 1983 the international study committee was launched under the chairmanship of Donald Maitland, and its report was submitted in 1985. Officially titled “The Missing Link,” this report revealed the huge telecommunication divide between developed and developing countries. The report obtained wide attention from the world.

However, the ITU and developed countries had not been so active until they launched in 2003 WSIS (World Summit on the Information Society) which has special attention on the Pacific Islands. Behind this ITU and UN initiative, there was strong concern about the US hegemony on Internet governance. Interestingly, the Pacific Islands had a strong position on this political issue with more than ten voting rights at the international arena.

This story tells us the complex historical background of communication which was developed as a result of the interaction between the demand for rights of space territory, technology, and information and communication equality from decolonized countries and the demand of military-industrial complex of the world’s hegemonies led by the USA and the Soviet Union who used lip service toward the peaceful use of space and global benefit.

10.3 Communication Development During the Colonial Time: Vanuatu Case

During the colonial era, were the Pacific Island people hopeless in developing communication and its policy? Vanuatu who obtained independence in 1980 showed us their unique position regarding communication policy and which led their independence movement.

10.3.1 Background of Vanuatu

Vanuatu is located in Melanesia, Oceania, and lies between latitude 16° 0′ S and longitude 167° 00′ E, which is northeast of New Caledonia and southeast of the Solomon Islands (see Fig. 10.4). The first human colonization in Vanuatu is confirmed around 3,000 years ago. These first inhabitants were part of the Austronesian expansion of Lapita cultures who originally came from Southeast Asia. There is a diversity in the languages of Vanuatu having some 113 in number. These are all Austronesian languages and no doubt reflect the complexity of interaction over a 1,000-year period since initial colonization with people further west. However archaeologists and linguists are still arguing this question.

In 1606 the Spanish arrived and set up a settlement on Espiritu Santo under the leadership of the Portuguese explorer de Quiros. The next European to arrive was in 1768 when the French explorer Louis Antoine de Bougainville rediscovered the



Fig. 10.4 Location of Vanuatu (Source: TUBS, taken from Wikipedia)

islands, and then in 1774 the English explorer James Cook arrived and named the island chain as the New Hebrides. In 1825 European traders found sandalwood, and afterward European immigration started. Blackbirding followed which involved the abduction and forced labor for almost half a century of some 60,000 Melanesian people from New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu, to work on sugarcane and cotton plantations located in Queensland and Fiji. Christian missionaries also arrived in the early nineteenth century using Polynesian evangelists to make the initial contact. The British and French both had interests in the New Hebrides leading in 1906 to both governments agreeing to a condominium regime, i.e., there were two schools, two hospitals, etc., one British and one French. This was quite a unique type of colonial governance in the world, and it was also the root for the complex social and political framework of Vanuatu until now. Many lands were sold to the French and British for very low prices. During WWII, Santo Island was the main US military base for Pacific theater of war.

The movement for independence started in the 1970s with local leaders such as Father Walter Lini, who became the first prime minister of Vanuatu. However, the French tried to stop independence, while the British supported it. Finally in 1980, Vanuatu, which has 113 languages spread over 82 islands, obtained independence.

In 1957 the French and British administration established an Advisory Council to discuss each year common political matters such as infrastructures, education, and health. Hereafter I would like to see how language in communication was discussed in this Advisory Council.

10.3.2 "Use of Pidgin in News Media"

The Advisory Council met almost every year during the time of the English and French condominium (Jackson 1972). In 1971 the 22nd New Hebrides Advisory Council Session discussed in the agenda the "use of pidgin in news media." This record tells us how language in the media was discussed under the colonial administration and how "Bislama," which is now one of the official languages in Republic of Vanuatu, survived in the media.

According to the proceedings, Archdeacon Rawcliffe, a member of the Advisory Council, suggested the use of "Bichelamar" (Mr. Rawcliffe's use of "Bichelamar" is hereafter called by its common expression "Bislama") as one of the languages to be used in the news media. He explained his reasoning as thus:

- Bislama is a language in its own right.
- It is a mistake to think of it as a form of English, a debased form of English.
- It is in fact a cultural achievement of New Hebrideans in the past.
- It is not something which has been evolved by Europeans.
- This is shown clearly by the fact that although the roots of the words are mainly English, the grammar is entirely "Melanesian."
- This is why he prefers some other names and not that of pidgin English.

Then Archdeacon Rawcliffe concluded:

> It is easy for English-speaking people to view this language as a form of English and therefore to think of it as being "quaint" or "funny" but once you look at it as a language in its own right and not as a form of English you view as something that should continue to exist as a lingua franca (Proceedings of the New Hebrides Advisory Council, 22nd Session, 14–17th December 1971).

He also suggested that Bislama needed an orthography rather than to use English spelling, as Papua New Guinea had done. I assume that the reason Archdeacon Rawcliffe made a motion on this issue was because of negative actions or opinions on the use of Bislama on radio programs around 1970.

M. Delacroix, an ex-soldier and French businessman, disagreed with Mr. Rawcliffe's argument and argued that Bislama should not be the third official language. He also suggested that speaking Bislama will be a disadvantage in the future:

> These who in this country will speak Bislama in future times rather than another language will see themselves cut off from several outlets and will find themselves limited in modern society (Proceedings of the New Hebrides Advisory Council, 22nd Session, 14–17th December 1971).

Mr. Seagoe, a British district officer, supports Archdeacon Rawcliffe such that:

> . . .if we limited the language to English and French, 75 % of the population and more will not understand what is going on in radio Vila. . . .broadcasting service is of more importance to the New Hebrideans than Europeans. . . (Proceedings of the New Hebrides Advisory Council, 22nd Session, 14–17th December 1971)

Mr. Abbil, who in 1971 held a position at the New Hebrides Cooperative Department, suggested the use of pidgin English on the radio for some 15–20 years until the Ni-Vanuatu could speak a major language (I assume English or French). He did not support Bislama as a full language in its own right.

Mr. Kalkoa supported the use of Bislama on radio and also made an indirect political comment for the future:

> . . .I tend to think that the pidgin which is at present use in the Radio Vila is not up to the standard and I am afraid the Melanesian on Radio Vila need better training in this language.
>
> . . .I should like to see pidgin English maintained, as far as this group or territory is concerned as we never know what may happen in the future (Proceedings of the New Hebrides Advisory Council, 22nd Session, 14–17th December 1971).

He may have been referring to future independence and what may happen. Both Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands obtained their independence in 1975 and 1978, respectively. I assume that the possibility of independence was discussed in Vanuatu in 1971 when this council was held.

Father Leymang, a Ni-Vanuatu Catholic priest, agreed with Archdeacon Rawcliffe's argument for the use of Bislama in the media, but "it should be second language between the islands to awaken people as to their belonging to a greater sphere from a political point of view. . ." and ". . .but (not) make pidgin into a written language and to an official language...."

At the end of this discussion, the council did not make a decision on the use of Bislama on radio or not, and they also did not make a decision on an official language or not. The president of the council, Mr. Allan, noted that a vote would not be taken and that the matter should be left to information services in preparing a recommendation to the Resident Commissions based on the debate.

The majority of the council members held a negative impression on the use of Bislama as a lingua franca, while a few agreed to use Bislama only for their convenience. The exception was Archdeacon Rawcliffe who defended the right of Bislama's use as a lingua franca.

10.3.3 Independence Movement and Role of Radio and Bislama

Discussion on the use of Bislama in the Advisory Council was actually a very critical element for the unity and movement of independence by the indigenous people of Vanuatu. For example, Bolton discusses the influence of radio communication to creating the unity of Vanuatu.

Bolton discussed interconnections between kastom, government, and radio in her paper "Radio and the Redefinition of 'Kastom' in Vanuatu" (Bolton 1999). Bolton discussed the definition of "kastom" (custom in Bislama) as:

> . . .I suggest that the term originally derives from missionary endeavors to make a distinction between unacceptably heathen practice, and acceptably Christian behavior. The antithesis of kastom in this opposition is the Bislama term skul, which until the late 1960s the tern kastom carried a negative connotation.... (Bolton 1999)

With 113 separate languages and cultural groups who live on separated islands, they did not have any common consensus on kastom or even a common uniform Bislama language. However, radio which communicated throughout the archipelago redefined kastom and helped standardize Bislama. The program of radio did not have any official policy to broadcast local contents and language, but as the fact they did. This was a major contribution to the identity of unity which also led to independence:

> The importance of the radio in the redefinition of kastom is a function of the way in which radio created nationally received forum for the communication of ideas. (Bolton 1999)

In the late 1970s, there was no standard Bislama. There was plantation Bislama, French Bislama, English Bislama, and versions of Bislama in specific certain islands. Again radio had a major role to standardize Bislama:

> The contribution of radio to the standardization of Bislama. . ., is very important to kastom. In order for local knowledge and practice to be presented to an archipelago-wide audience it has to be made at some level comprehensible in a language common at all, that is, in Bislama. . . .it is the radio, in this sense, that made kastom a nationally recognized phenomenon. (Bolton 1999)

Bolton also discussed the distinction of attitude between "listen" and "hear":

> The ear is passive, open to all stimuli. Listening is an active function by which a person tunes in to a particular sound. . .

So the radio had a role for "listening" and not merely "hearing" by Ni-Vanuatu. Kastom and a Bislama formed a common identity and unity which led to the independence of the whole archipelago – Vanuatu. Radio was critical in this.

10.3.4 Summary

Interestingly although the indigenous Ni-Vanuatu even did not have citizenship nor much of a voice on the colonial council during this period of time, as Rawlings (2012) discussed, they expressed a strong support to using Bislama as a language and also for local contents on the radio. This led to and also supported the movement of unity for the diversity of Vanuatu people and also the independence of Vanuatu. I would like to argue that people of Vanuatu were fully aware of the power of communication and chose the language and contents for their own reasons. This did not arise from any specific policy framework; however, we can see from the hindsight of the present that Ni-Vanuatu made communication policy as their political will.

10.4 Satellite Development and Regional Organizations: PEACESAT and USPNet

Pacific Islands had a unique opportunity of using the "free" satellite of the USA for four decades – 1971–2012. This satellite made possible a unique distance higher education network which connected twelve island nations for the regional university – the University of the South Pacific. The other regional organization Forum Fisheries Agency also utilized this satellite and obtained Internet service in the early 1990s.

10.4.1 PEACESAT: Windfall of US Space Development

After the Sputnik crisis in 1957, the USA accelerated space development. In 1958 the USA established the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) under the Department of Commerce and developed a series of communication satellites. The Applications Technology Satellite (ATS) series was one of them. ATS-1 was launched in 1966, but ATS development needed to face resistance from some members of the Congress who feared that NASA was developing technology for the benefit of a private company, i.e., Comsat. So NASA needs to work with the Department of Defense (DoD) to avoid this criticism, and DoD started to influence the ATS series.

Originally, ATS series were not developed for the Pacific Island people but for the US national interests such as space development during under Cold War era. There was pressure not only from the US Congress to the Department of Commerce who obtained huge budget for space development but also international criticism on the US monopolization of outer space.

When the "weather" experiments were completed in 1969, NASA offered free access to the satellite to any nonprofit group (Lewis and Mukaida 1991). The University of Hawaii developed a proposal for NASA's offer and started PEACESAT (Pan-Pacific Education and Communication Experiments by Satellite) in 1971. After 42 years, this experiment ceased on 12 April 2012.

I would suggest that PEACESAT had two stages in her 42 years of history. Stage one was using ATS-1 from 1971 to 1985 (16 years), with their main user in Pacific Islands being USP. Stage two was using satellite GOES series from 1987 to 2012 (25 years). This started with the Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA) as the major user in the Pacific Islands. In this chapter, I would only discuss about USPNet due to limits of space. FFA was established in 1979 with 17 member countries. One of their roles was to provide information to all member countries. PEACESAT installed the Internet in their operations in Hawaii, and this made it possible for FFA members to use the Internet. FFA was one of the first organizations to introduce the Internet into the Pacific Islands (Lassner n.d.). However, FFA withdrew from PEACESAT in the late 1990s as a result of advances in technology and the privatization of satellites, which allowed them to have their own or use another network that was more efficient and stable.

10.4.2 USPNet

10.4.2.1 Birth of Regional University for Pacific Islands: USP

How was the concept of the University of the South Pacific formed? The British and New Zealand governments agreed to study the possibility of higher education in the Pacific and published their results in the so-called Morris Report in 1966. There was an idea to utilize the New Zealand Royal Air Force complex located at Laucala Bay in Suva for the new higher education institute. This New Zealand Royal Air Force complex was built in 1942.

Why Britain and New Zealand studied this issue? In 1966 the British still had colonies such as Fiji, Kiribati, Tuvalu, and Solomon Islands in the Pacific. New Zealand also had their trust territory of Western Samoa and the protectorates of Cook Islands and Niue. While Australia had Papua New Guinea as a trust territory, there was another idea to establish a higher education institute in Papua New Guinea.

The Morris Report made an important and clear statement that "we have unanimously come to the firm opinion that what is needed is a fully autonomous university." "Accordingly we recommend that steps be taken as soon as possible to establish such a university, to be called the University of the South Pacific," in Suva, Fiji (Morris Report 1966). The Morris Report also proposed that USP should be regional in character as well as in its mission (Renwick et al. 1991). The Morris Report also emphasized "extramural studies" as "The University should have an Extra-mural Department to enable it to carry university studies to towns and villages through the region."

By 1968 the university's extension activities had been identified in a very broad outline (Renwick et al. 1991). The first Diploma of Education courses were taught to off-campus students in 1971. On 5 March 1970, the University of the South Pacific was established with a royal charter, i.e., Queen Elizabeth as head of state of Fiji. In the same year, on 10 October, Fiji gained their independence from the UK, but still Queen Elizabeth was the head of state.

USP's regional structure has always received attention from international experts because of its uniqueness. Actually there are only two "real" regional universities in the world. One of them is USP and the other is the University of the West Indies. One of the reasons for USP's success as a regional feature is that each of the member countries has had university centers from the beginning. Dr. Aikman, the first vice-chancellor, was successful in obtaining a grant from the Carnegie Corporation to build the regional centers. These centers support students enrolled in the USP's external courses but also connect with local people and transmit USP's information to them as well as their needs to university.

Before satellite technology was introduced to the university, they utilized the postal service for their extension courses. Even after the satellite network was installed into each of the centers, the postal service was still used to send textbooks and so on. Thus the current USP feature of regionalism and the functions of distance education were firmly conceptualized and architected before the satellite network was introduced.

10.4.2.2 Birth of Distance Education Network: USPNet

The Renwick Report pointed out that the vice-chancellor and senior members of USP were already aware of the possibility of using a satellite system for their extension service from an early stage. The president of the University of Hawaii was a member of USP's council, and he opened the door for USP to utilize the PEACESAT project (which was started in 1970 at UH) which was using a used satellite: ATS-1 of NASA. Although NASA offered the satellite for free use, USP needed to establish earth stations in each of their centers. Again the Carnegie Corporation provided a grant that made it possible for USP to make contact with NASA and the US Agency for International Development (USAID) in preparing the USPNet project.

In 1972 USPNet's first terminal opened at the Laucala Campus, followed by Nuku'alofa in Tonga. By 1976 USP extension centers in Rarotonga, Port Vila, Honiara, Tarawa, Apia, and Niue were linked, followed by Tuvalu in the following year (McMechan 2000) (see Fig. 10.5).


USPNet VSAT Network
Hawaii
INTELSAT
Marshall Islands
Papua New Guinea
Nauru
Kiribati
Solomon Islands
Tuvalu
Tokelau
French Polynesia
Vanuatu
Samoa
Niue
Fiji Islands
Tonga
Cook Islands
New Caledonia
Australia
New Zealand
USP Campuses
USP Centres

Fig. 10.5 USPNet (From USP website 2005)

The number of extension courses and students drastically increased. Although the ATS-1 satellite was lost in 1985, within 8 years, the number of students increased threefold. From 1980 to 1989, extension courses were increased fivefold (Renwick et al. 1991).

10.4.2.3 Friction: PEACESAT and USPNet

Because USPNet was using the same satellite as PEACESAT and PEACESAT UH was managing the network, USP had been having some stress to work with PEACESAT. "USP Centers found the maintenance of general PEACESAT program difficult" (McMechan 2000).

Some reports (Lewis and Mukaida 1991) described USPNet and other networks, such as Kangaroo Net, using ATS-1 as "part" or "under" the PEACESAT project. However, USP made it clear that USPNet was operating independently from PEACESAT (McMechan 2000). Yet, as pointed out by McMechan, because of USPNet and its location in the Pacific, PEACESAT could truly be said to be "pan-Pacific" in its coverage. However, this was the direct result of USP being the main user of ATS-1 in the South Pacific.

It could be argued that the PEACESAT operation based in the University of Hawaii did not make as much of a contribution to the Pacific Islands as has been argued, but rather the USP did by using ATS-1. Furthermore, McMechan criticized the PEACESAT operations in UH arguing that they imposed a burden on the other terminal centers in the Pacific Islands, such as the USP centers. This was based on the voluntary nature of USP's cooperation with PEACESAT, while the reverse was not true. PEACESAT staff were paid for their projects, while Pacific Island people working for USP had to sacrifice their work time for PEACESAT.

This history of PEACESAT and USPNet highlights the difficulties that existed and perhaps why USP did not want to participate with any project using a satellite that was shared with PEACESAT anymore. However, there was another reason why USP wanted to have its own satellite network. One of the directors of the Extension Center, Dr. Claire Matthewson, stated that "Some particular 'satellite events' deserve recounting" (Matthewson 2000) with USPNet, that is, disaster, contagious disease, and coups. The small scales of economy in island nations do not allow them to have multiple networks. Big economic countries, such as Japan, have a few marine communication cables and a few satellite networks. If one of them is not working, then the telecommunication carriers switch to an alternative network. There is always a backup for telecommunication services in developed countries, but not in small island nations.

During the occasions when the national telecommunication service was out of action or its use prohibited by their national authority, the USPNet was robust enough to connect people, students, and their families of all member countries. USP is not a national body but a regional organization, and it is this reason why they can legally escape from the influences of national government. Such occasions were:

1972 Cyclone Bebe
1976 Cholera Tarawa
1977 Earthquake Guadalcanal
1987 Coup in Fiji

This backup function of USPNet was also the most important reason for USP's proposal for an independent satellite network after the ATS-1. USP was convinced to keep separate communication networks from the national telecommunication carrier.

10.4.2.4 USPNet: From Free Satellite to Commercial Satellite

On August 1985, ATS-1 was finally disconnected, with USP and other users losing their satellite network. However, as we already noted, the "extension service" was the original mission of USP as the system of extension service was developed as the heart of USP. It was not long before connections were made. In the following year from September 1986, with the support from Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara, USPNet was reestablished using a "Project Share" agreement with INTELSAT in which the use of their satellite was provided for free.

This "Project Share" arrangement was the start of a period from September 1986 to September 1990. However, some centers only connected using HF radio: Niue, Western Samoa, and Kiribati. In Kiribati, unfortunately the satellite service was disconnected in 1988 as their privatized telecommunication carrier decided to charge full commercial rates – rates that USP could not pay (Renwick et al. 1991).

Prior to the satellite connections being reestablished, problems existed between USP and their national telecommunication carriers. The main problem was the lack of service from the telecommunication carrier with the "landlines" that connected USP. For example, in the USPNet upgrade proposal, it is seen that the list of "a typical fault register from June 1990 to December 1993" shows the length of time USP centers were disconnected from their national telecommunication station. In some cases, USP was disconnected for more than 1 month.

Thus we can see that around the end of the 1980s, USP was convinced to have their own satellite network because of the:

(i) Negative experience with PEACESAT
(ii) Negative experience with national carrier
(iii) Confirmed need for USP regional mission – extension service and higher education
(iv) Confirmed need for backup network – disaster coups

10.4.2.5 Japanese ODA for USPNet

In August 1988, the Japanese NGO, the Sasakawa Peace Foundation (SPF), hosted the Pacific Island Nations Conference in Tokyo, Japan, and invited leaders from Pacific Island nations including Rt. Hon. Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara of the Republic of Fiji.

In January 1989, Mr. Sasakawa met with Ratu Mara. At the meeting, Ratu Mara sounded out the possibility of support for launching a satellite for the whole Pacific Island nations. Ratu Mara pointed out three needs for a telecommunication service to the Pacific Islands:

(i) Communication service between the main islands and remote islands.
(ii) Hot line system which is connected to all Pacific Island leaders simultaneously. This is what happened with ATS-1 in the past.
(iii) Reestablish USPNet.

Ratu Mara confirmed that point 3, USPNet, was the highest priority.

In 1993 the SPF launched the Distance Education Development Study Committee for the Pacific region, inviting Japanese experts on telecommunication and education to study distance education, with a main focus on USPNet.

The first draft of the upgrade USPNet proposal was submitted to the SPF in 1992. Subsequently foundation kept discussion with USP on their proposal. One of the critical decisions of USP board – Ministers of Education – was that they agreed to have a separate network from an incumbent monopoly telecommunication carrier. Most of Pacific Island nations had exclusive monopoly license to the national telecommunication company, so this national and regional decision made a huge repercussion, as well as taking high risk at that time when the satellite industry was still uncertain for the competition and sustainability.

In 1995 the SPF made the decision to take the USPNet upgrade proposal to the Japanese ODA and started work with the forum and USP to approach the Japanese government. In October 1996, Hon. Amata Kabua was invited to Japan as the chair of the South Pacific Forum (currently Pacific Islands Forum), along with Forum Secretary General Hon. Ieremia Tabai, who is the first president of Kiribati, by the Japanese government as part of an annual event. They brought with them the USPNet proposal and handed it directly to the Japanese government without any preliminary discussions nor discussions with the Japanese Embassy in Suva. As background, it should be noted that the Hon. Amata Kabua made the decision to have the Marshall Islands join USP in 1991, despite Marshall's education system following US and the USP following UK. He believed that the USP education was much suitable and feasible for his country's youth rather than the US education system. It means that he is a strong supporter of the USP as well as its distance education system – USPNet. There was another coincidence. When he visited Japan in 1996, he was also the chancellor of the USP. It meant that he was invited as the chair of the forum, yet as he also wore the hat of the chancellor of the USP, he submitted the USPNet proposal.

This unexpected submission of the proposal directly to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan had an initial very negative reaction.

In 30 April 1997, both the Japanese and New Zealand prime ministers announced their support of USPNet at a joint press conference by Prime Minister Hashimoto and Prime Minister Bolger at the Japan-New Zealand Summit Meeting. After 6 months, in October 1997, the first Pacific Islands Leaders Summit was held in Tokyo, Japan.

What had happen between October 1996 and April 1997 – a period of only 5 months? There was an urgent need for the Japanese government to make a commitment to Pacific Island countries, especially toward the South Pacific Forum. What was happening between the forum and Japanese government? The answer lies in "plutonium shipping."

From 1992, instead of nuclear waste dumping, Japan started to ship plutonium between Japan and France/England where the nuclear reprocessing facilities were located. In the same year, the South Pacific Forum made a statement on this plutonium shipping in the forum communiqué. This same statement was passed in every forum general assembly over a 15-year period till 2006.

If Hon. Amata Kabua and Hon. Ieremia Tabai did not bring the proposal of USPNet's upgrade to the Japanese government in 1996, USP would not have the opportunity to obtain a grant from the Japanese government who hosted the first Pacific Islands Leaders Meeting in 1997. I would like to stress that this was a result of the regional political will of both the USP and the South Pacific Forum.

USP has now become a leader of ICT development not only in the region but also in all developing countries. The World Bank, Asian Development Bank, ITU, and other donor agencies and countries provide support measures to USP to enhance their capacity for distance education and the whole ICT development. In 2010 the Japan-Pacific ICT Centre was opened with aid from the Japanese ODA (see Fig. 10.6).

Fig. 10.6 Japan-Pacific ICT Centre in USP, Suva

10.4.3 Summary

Why had PEACESAT ceased, while USPNet still continued to grow? Of course PEACESAT was only an experiment, while USP is an institutional mission with many activities, not just an experiment. But we could also notice that PEACESAT's four-decade experiment was heavily reliant on the user needs of USP and FFA, especially from the Pacific Islands, not the PEACESAT operations in the University of Hawaii. In other words, the Pacific Island people and their organizations chose communication technologies for their own mission. The mission of PEACESAT in Hawaii looked lost. Free but unreliable and unsustainable satellite services were not accepted by the Pacific Island people.

However, PEACESAT is still a legacy of the Pacific. This is quoted and highly evaluated in both the "Maitland Report" in 1985 and "the Global Information Infrastructure: Agenda for Cooperation" in 1995. PEACESAT gave the Pacific an idea and opportunity of what ICT could do for education and other public uses in the Pacific Island. This may have led to the Pacific Islands' expressed robust demands of ICT to the development world.

10.5 Conclusion

Because of limits of space in this chapter, I cannot discuss the detailed current development of telecommunication in the Pacific Islands. In the last decade, deregulation and competition were introduced to the Pacific Islands. This is more than 100 years after Britain launched the exclusive undersea cable among her colonies which crossed the Pacific Ocean. Pacific Island governments made the decision to change their telecommunication policy and law which offered exclusive monopoly licenses to telecommunication companies and was for many decades a major obstacle for the ICT revolution. Another element which allowed small and remote islands to enjoy ICT was technological progress, i.e., wireless and compressed technologies. These technologies have drastically changed the picture and it solved “the last one-mile” problem. “The last one-mile” problem is a common phrase for telecommunication network services. Basically, it relates to making network infrastructure with the last one mile, usually into a rural area, very costly due to low population, long distance, costly maintenance, etc. However, mobile phone companies, such as Digicel, are using wireless networks that allow them to easily connect this “last one mile,” i.e., outer and remote islands and villages are now connected (see Fig. 10.7).

Thus, the Pacific Island countries who obtained their independence with self-determination from the 1960s to 1990s finally obtained the opportunity to provide telecommunication service to their people at an affordable price. It was their choice


Digicel
vanuatu
🟥 Excellent Coverage
🟩 Good Coverage
TVL Coverage Map
Torres
Mota Lava
Gaua
Santo
Ambae
Maewo
Pentecost
Malekula
Ambrym
Paama
Epi
Tongoa
Emae
Efate
Erromango
Tanna
Aneityum
tvl
Making Life easy.

Fig. 10.7 Mobile phone coverage map in Vanuatu Digicel (*left*) and TVL (*right*)

and their decision. However, we should not forget that Pacific Island people were fully aware of the importance of ICT and kept fighting to obtain its opportunity, even during the colonial times and even when the telecommunication companies enjoyed a monopoly.

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Part IV
Ocean Policies

Chapter 11
Management of Islands and Their Surrounding Ocean Areas and Japan's Ocean Policy Under the New Ocean Regime

Hiroshi Terashima

11.1 Introduction

Seventy percent of the surface of the planet on which we live is covered by ocean. Due to the enormous amount of heat capacity the ocean contains, it maintains a livable climate for humans and has made a great contribution to the development of human society. Although the main base for mankind is the remaining thirty percent of the earth's surface, the land areas, mankind largely depends on the ocean for provision of the natural resources necessary for its survival and lifestyles and for the transportation of people and materials.

Furthermore, in the twentieth century, particularly its latter half, the world's population saw a dramatic increase, which is expected to continue in the present century. As the limits to the land-based resources and environment have been made clearer in recent years, the ocean is expected to play an increasingly larger role in providing the water, food, natural resources, and energy necessary for the world's population, as well as facilitating transport and maintaining a stable and healthy global environment.

While it is said that our human ancestors left Africa tens of thousands of years ago to spread across the earth, they did not confine themselves to the continents but settled widely on the islands dotting the ocean and developed societies in harmony with it. In the twenty-first century, as the ocean and its resources have become ever more important to mankind's survival, the importance of islands has increased, especially regarding their role as bases for the development and use of the ocean and for the conservation of the marine environment and biodiversity. At the same time, in recent years, islands and island societies have been facing changes in their

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natural and social environments, such as in their living environments, in an increase of development and use, as well being affected by the problems of environmental degradation.

Also, changes in international society's initiatives on the ocean have had a large effect on island States, especially the new legal frameworks aimed at comprehensive ocean management introduced, and the action plans for sustainable development adopted, under the UN initiatives at the end of the twentieth century. This chapter will focus on the Pacific region southeast of Japan and the islands therein, the changes they are facing, and the responses by island States, international society, and Japan.

11.2 Natural and Social Changes Affecting Pacific Island Regions

The Pacific Ocean is the world's largest ocean, covering one-third of the earth's surface and accounting for 46 % of all ocean area, and is composed of the Micronesia, Melanesia, and Polynesia regions. These ocean regions contain many small islands spread across vast areas, and while they were colonized by the great powers beginning in the eighteenth century, many of them declared their independence after World War Two, from the 1960s to the 1990s. The period beginning from Samoa's independence in 1962 until 1994 also saw the birth, one after the other, of the Republic of Nauru, the Kingdom of Tonga, the Republic of Fiji, the Independent State of Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, Tuvalu, the Republic of Kiribati, the Republic of Vanuatu, the Federated States of Micronesia, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, and the Republic of Palau. These island States, with the exception of Papua New Guinea, are small countries with populations ranging from the tens of thousands to several hundreds of thousands and are now strengthening their coordinated activities as Pacific island States. In recent years, they have faced a variety of changes, including increases in use and development and environmental degradation, and have also been greatly affected by the recent introduction of the new ocean regime and thus occupied in reacting to it and making adaptations in response.

In concrete terms, the wave of economic and social globalization starting from the second half of the twentieth century has also reached the shores of these islands, and it is in the midst of these changes that island societies are facing a variety of challenges concerning their conservation and management. Namely, globalization has brought changes to island societies' economies and lifestyles, one result of which has been a threat to their living environments by an increase in waste matter. Another problem is the large effects on the environments and ecosystems of both land and ocean areas by inadequate sewage treatment facilities, as wastewater release has caused degradation of the coastal environment, including deterioration of coral reefs and mangrove forests, which play such important roles for society and in disaster prevention. Also, the new economies and lifestyles have led to the concentration of population on particular islands and increased housing in low areas and wetlands, thus creating conditions in which the threats from disasters such as typhoons, high tides, earthquakes, and tsunamis are magnified, as well as are those from floods, inundation, and land erosion.

Furthermore, in recent years, the large problem has arisen of the negative effects on the global environment of mankind's mass consumption of fossil fuels in the development of its economy. Mass emission of CO_2 has triggered climate change and variability, leading to global warming, accompanied by sea level rise and acidification. The threats to small island States from the effects of climate change and variability are particularly severe, as coral reefs and other marine ecosystems are vulnerable to changes in the natural environment such as ocean temperature rise and acidification, and it has also been pointed out that atolls and other areas might be partially or completely submerged by a rise in the sea level.

11.3 Changes in International Society's Ocean and Islands Initiatives

Other significant changes for island States were brought about by the coming into effect of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in 1994. After World War Two, countries around the world, supported by advances in science and technology, turned their attention toward the resources and environment of the vast oceans and, "Conscious that the problems of ocean space are closely interrelated and need to be considered as a whole," carried out discussions on a legal framework for the ocean, resulting in the adoption of UNCLOS, a comprehensive Convention covering almost all aspects of ocean law. UNCLOS expanded territorial waters to 12 nautical miles and established the EEZ and continental shelf system that largely entrusted to coastal States the management of resources and the environment in waters up to 200 nautical miles from their shorelines. These development and use rights over natural resources and responsibility for protecting and conserving the marine environment were also recognized to extend to islands, excluding "Rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life...," bringing large changes to island States' rights and responsibilities as well as to their role in international society and markedly increasing their importance.

Under the new ocean regime, it is said that approximately 40 % of ocean space came to be within areas over which States have jurisdictional rights. As Fig. 11.1 shows, an even greater percentage of the southern and western areas of the Pacific fall within the EEZs of Pacific Island States. In particular, the area between Japan and Australia is almost completely within the EEZs of small island States. This figure illustrates the importance of the role of island States in management of ocean


JAPAN
USA
MEXICO
Minami Tori Shima
NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS
Wake
HAWAII
Johnston
GUAM
MARSHALL ISLANDS
North Pacific Ocean
Clipperton
PALAU
FEDERATED STATES OF MICRONESIA
INDONESIA
NAURU
KIRIBATI
Howland
Baker
KIRIBATI
Jarvis
KIRIBATI
PAPUA NEW GUINEA
SOLOMON ISLANDS
TUVALU
TOKELAU
WALLIS & FUTUNA
SAMOA
VANUATU
FIJI
AMERICAN SAMOA
COOK ISLANDS
Coral Sea
NIUE
FRENCH POLYNESIA
NEW CALEDONIA
Matthew Hunter
TONGA
PITCAIRN ISLANDS
AUSTRALIA
Norfolk
Rapanui (Easter Island)
Lord Howe
Kermadec Islands
Tasman Sea
South Pacific Ocean
NEW ZEALAND
Tasmania
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) boundary
150°E
180°
150°W
120°W
30°N
0°
30°S
© Australian National University CartoGIS CAP 00-092

Fig. 11.1 Exclusive economic zones for countries in the Pacific area (CartoGIS, College of Asia and the Pacific, The Australian National University)

areas, not only for the individual States but for management of the Pacific as a whole.

However, in actuality, for small island States to develop and use the natural resources in the vast surrounding 200 nautical miles of ocean areas, and at the same time to discharge their duties to protect and conserve the marine environment of those areas, including the conservation of biological resources and otherwise to appropriately manage these areas, requires the provision of material capability and manpower to a degree beyond that of which most small island developing States are capable.

These new circumstances facing small island developing States were recognized by international society through its initiatives aimed at sustainable development, especially in 1992 at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, or the "Earth Summit," where they adopted Chapter 17 of the Agenda 21 Programme of Action. This chapter was titled "Protection of the Oceans, All Kinds of Seas, Including Enclosed and Semi-Enclosed Seas, and Coastal Areas and the Protection, Rational Use and Development of Their Living Resources" and raised the issue of sustainable development of small islands. Based on this, the 1st UN Conference on Small Island Developing States was held in 1994, where the Barbados Programme of Action was adopted. Furthermore, based on the Plan of Implementation from the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD), held 10 years after the Earth Summit, the 2nd SIDS Conference was held in 2005, at which the Mauritius Strategy was adopted. Also, in 2012, 10 years after WSSD, at the UN Conference on Sustainable Development (Rio + 20), strengthening of the United Nations System for continued and enhanced assistance to small island developing States was called for in the outcome document "the Future We Want," as concern grew that sustainable development initiatives had made less progress than expected due to their unique vulnerabilities and in response to the grave threats posed by sea level rise and other effects due to climate variation. Based on this, 21 heads of state and 3,500 participants attended the 3rd SIDS Conference (SIDS 2014) held in the Pacific region, on Samoa, where the SIDS Accelerated Modalities of Action (SAMOA) Pathways, a sustainable development action plan, was adopted.

International society has continued through initiatives such as these to support small island developing States (SIDS), though they are still far from producing the desired results.

11.4 The Ocean and Japan

Our country is surrounded by the ocean, from which it has benefitted in many ways; it has also been protected by the ocean and built and developed its society, economy, and culture while maintaining its ties deeply with the ocean.

Japan is an archipelagic island State consisting of 6,852 islands located off the northeast end of the Asian continent as well as dotting the vast surrounding waters in the northwest of the Pacific. An overview of these islands shows that many of them are located on a northeast-southwest axis whose main islands include the Kuril Islands, Hokkaido, Honshu, Shikoku, Kyushu, and the Ryukyu Islands, while others follow a north-south axis beginning from the Izu peninsula in central Honshu and extending to the Izu Islands and the Ogasawara Islands. Both the easternmost island of Japan, Minamitorishima, and the southernmost, Okinotorishima, are located in the northwest Pacific, while the westernmost island is Yonaguni, on the border between the Pacific and the South China Sea, and the northernmost is Etorofu, on the border between the Pacific and the Sea of Okhotsk. Out of all the islands comprising Japan, only Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku, and the main island of Okinawa are classified as the mainland, while the remaining 6,847 are classified as "remote islands."

The ocean areas Japan manages under UNCLOS spread into the three coastal seas located between the Japanese archipelago and the Asian continent, the Sea of Okhotsk, the Sea of Japan, and the East China Sea, and also into the northwest Pacific (see Fig. 11.2). The Sea of Okhotsk is a northern sea covered with drift ice in winter; the Sea of Japan is a deep sea with a maximum depth of 3,800 m but is regarded as largely semi-enclosed due to the shallowness of its four straits leading to open ocean, which include the Tsushima Straits and the Tsugaru Straits; the East China Sea is 20 % larger than the Sea of Japan but is shallow, averaging a depth of around 200 m.


Russia
Contiguous Zone
Territorial Sea
(including internal waters)
Etorofu Island
Japan Sea
Takeshima
Korea
High Seas
Japan
China
Pacific Ocean
Hachijojima Island
East
China
Sea
The Senkaku
Islands
Ogasawara
Islands
Taiwan
Ioto Island
Yonagunijima
Island
Okidaitojima Island
Minamitorishima
Island
Okinotorishima
Island
Exclusive Economic Zone

Fig. 11.2 Japan's territorial sea and exclusive economic zone (Based on Japan Coast Guard materials)

Moreover, Japanese waters at the south of the archipelago extend far into the northwest Pacific, covering vast ocean areas surrounding Japan's only tropical land areas, Okinotorishima, Japan's southernmost island, and Minamitorishima, its easternmost.

In Japan's Pacific Ocean waters, an ocean floor of several thousand meters depth unfolds, and it has been calculated that while the area of its EEZ is the world's sixth largest, in terms of volume it ranks fourth. In addition to this, as the Eurasian, North American, Pacific, and Philippine Sea tectonic plates that comprise a large portion of the earth's crust converge near Japan, it was plate subduction that formed the Japan Trench, the Izu-Ogasawara Trench, the Nankai Trough, and the Ryukyu Trench, some of the world's deepest gorges. On the other hand, this area is marked by extreme unevenness, as it is also crossed by underwater mountain chains, such as the Shichito-Iwojima Ridge, the Ogasawara Plateau, and the Kyushu-Palao Ridge, with many mountains rising from the seafloor thousands of meters deep almost to the ocean surface.

The Kuroshio and Oyashio Currents also flow into this ocean area, making it a source for marine product resources, as it is one of the world's richest fisheries. Also, at depths below 1000 m, mineral resources exist in abundance, including cobalt-rich crust, manganese nodules, minor metals found in hydrothermal deposits, copper (recently in short supply), as well as methane hydrates, which have received attention due to the scarcity of oil resources. Also, the richly varied seafloor, as well as the ocean space above it, holds large potential for use perhaps in deep sea CO_2 storage, as a global warming countermeasure, or in offshore mari-farming, as coastal zone aquaculture is said to create pollution pressures on the environment. Furthermore, the massive amount of seawater itself is a precious resource, in that it also contains large amounts of metals and minerals, can be desalinated, and is also used in generating processes for recyclable energy such as ocean thermal energy conversion and wave and wind power. Also, as interest has recently increased in marine biological resources, from the perspective of medicines and genetic resources, the great diversity of Japan's ocean areas suggests significant potential here as well.

From ancient times, the ocean has been exploited for fishing, transportation, and transport of materials, but on entering the second half of the twentieth century, mankind's capacities for action in the water-filled dimension of ocean space have increased dramatically. Along with increasing capacity and productivity in maritime transport and the fishing industry, advances and development of science and technology have also promoted the use and development of the coastal zone as well as making possible the development of undersea oil resources. We have now come to the point where the use and development of the ocean, the earth's final frontier, has become a reality, and as limits to the resources and environment on land are gradually becoming clear, interest in the oceans is increasing in countries around the world. For a resource-poor country such as Japan, the time has come to further refine our science and technologies and earnestly engage in ocean research, use and development, and conservation and management of the ocean. If we do so, the many islands across the ocean will no doubt play important roles as bases for activities in those vast ocean areas.

11.5 Japan's Response to Comprehensive Ocean Management and Establishment of the Basic Act on Ocean Policy

With the coming into effect of UNCLOS in 1994 and Agenda 21 in 1992, many countries since the 1990s have aimed at comprehensive ocean governance by addressing ocean problems under these internationally agreed legal and policy frameworks. Japan, by comparison, was slow to respond to the new international framework and the realignment of ocean space based on it. Finally, in 2005, prompted by the Ocean Policy Research Foundation's *Proposal for a 21st Century Ocean Policy*, a Basic Ocean Law Study Group was launched with MPs from the Liberal Democratic Party, Democratic Party, and New Komeito Party as well as experts in various ocean fields.[1] Based on the *Guideline for Ocean Policy* and *Basic Ocean Law* (*tentative*) *Proposal Outline* drafted by the Study Group, the *Basic Bill on Ocean Policy* was submitted to the Diet in April 2007 as multi-partisan MP sponsored legislation, where it passed by majority vote, was enacted, and came into effect on 20 July of that year.

Contents of the Basic Act on Ocean Policy are as follows:

Chapter 1 General Provisions
Chapter 2 Basic Plan on Ocean Policy
Chapter 3 Basic Measures
Chapter 4 Headquarters for Ocean Policy

In Chapter 1, General Provisions, necessary measures are laid out concerning the objectives and basic principles of the Basic Ocean Law; the obligations of the State, local governments, industry, and citizens; and the legal, economic, and financial issues.[2]

Article 1 states its objectives as follows:

> This law, based on the international cooperation and coordination agreed to in UNCLOS, Agenda 21, and elsewhere, recognizes the importance of this country fulfilling its role as an ocean state in pursuit of harmonization between the peaceful development and use of the oceans and their conservation, and seeks, through the application of a comprehensive ocean policy, the healthy development of the nation's economy and the improvement of the people's standard of living and the peaceful coexistence between mankind and the ocean.

Articles 2–7 stipulate the basic principles of the Basic Act on Ocean Policy as follows:

(a) Harmonization of the development and use of the oceans with the conservation of marine environment
(b) Securing the safety and security on the oceans
(c) Improvement of scientific knowledge on the oceans
(d) Sound development of ocean industries
(e) Comprehensive governance of the oceans
(f) International coordination and cooperation on the ocean issues

The basic principles are important as they coordinate a variety of measures on the ocean and function as a guideline and standard for assigning priority, thus enabling a comprehensive national plan. National and regional public bodies are obligated to abide by the points of the basic philosophy in formulating and implementing comprehensive and systematic measures concerning the ocean.

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[1] Organizer, Keizo Takemi, MP; Chair, Shigeru Ishiba, MP; Secretariat, Ocean Policy Research Foundation

[2] Basic Act on Ocean Policy, Articles 1–15

Articles 8–11 set out the obligations of the central government, local governments, industry, and citizens, while Article 12 requires mutual coordination and cooperation among these. Article 14 states that the government must take the necessary legal, economic, and financial measures necessary to implement policies related to the ocean. This is an important stipulation, made in recognition of the need for multilayered and cross-disciplinary management of the ocean and coastal zone. Also, Article 14 states that the government must take the necessary legal, economic, and financial measures necessary to implement policies related to the ocean, guaranteeing their implementation.

In Chapter 2, Article 16, it states that in order to promote ocean-related measures comprehensively and systematically, the government must formulate a Basic Ocean Plan. Decisions regarding the Plan must be made by the Cabinet, and government must take measures to secure the funds necessary to implement the Plan.[3]

The role of this provision is very important. By confirming the Basic Ocean Plan, Japan's ocean policy, under the basic principles expressed in the Basic Ocean Law, will be comprehensively adjusted and systematized. In the process, the main national measures concerning the ocean will be clarified, adjustments to priorities made possible, and mutual relations between measures made clearer. For example, while policy on remote islands had formerly focused on reducing disparities with other regions and encouraging residential growth, necessary due to the harsh natural and social conditions accompanying island life, their importance under the new ocean regime was now made explicit, recognizing their role in maintaining Japan's territorial waters and EEZ, securing maritime transport, developing and using ocean resources, and protecting the marine environment. The Basic Ocean Plan's role in reflecting the multifaceted roles of remote islands in national policy was decisive.

Chapter 3 stipulates 12 important Basic Measures beyond the scope of individual ministries that need to be addressed comprehensively.[4] The fact that "Conservation of the remote islands, etc." is included in the Basic Measures reflects the importance of the roles played by remote islands in the new ocean regime. Many of the rest of the Basic Measures are also closely related to remote islands and are as follows:

- Promotion of the development and use of ocean resources
- Conservation of the marine environment
- Promotion of development, use, conservation, etc., in the EEZ and on the continental shelves
- Securing maritime transport
- Securing the safety and security of the oceans
- Promotion of ocean surveys
- Promotion of research and development of ocean science and technology

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[3] Basic Act on Ocean Policy, Article 16.

[4] Basic Act on Ocean Policy, Articles 17–28.

- Promotion of ocean industries and strengthening international competitiveness
- Integrated management of the coastal zone
- Securing international coordination and promotion of international cooperation
- Enhancement of citizens' understanding of the oceans and the development of human resources

Chapter 4 stipulates the establishment in the Cabinet of a Headquarters for Ocean Policy to promote measures with regard to the ocean.[5] It stipulates that the Headquarters be headed by the Prime Minister, that the Deputy Heads of the Headquarters be the Chief Cabinet Secretary and the Minister for Ocean Policy, and that the Headquarters Members shall be composed of all other Ministers of State. It also stipulates that a Minister for Ocean Policy shall be established, who shall be appointed by the Prime Minister and whose duty will be to assist the Prime Minister in promoting intensively and comprehensively measures regarding the ocean. Also, responding to the decision of a Diet Committee, an advisory council on ocean matters was established to advise the Headquarters, composed of experts from a wide range of fields.

11.6 Japan's First Basic Plan on Ocean Policy

The Cabinet decided Japan's first Basic Plan on Ocean Policy on March 18th, 2008, 8 months after the enactment of the Basic Act on Ocean Policy. As the time allowed for preparation of measures was somewhat insufficient, only a few of the measures concretely state their aims, flesh out a schedule for achieving specific objectives, or present something like a roadmap. However, regarding Preservation of Remote Islands, including those that are uninhabited, the Basic Plan's contents do represent a step forward in the conservation and management of remote islands and promotion of ocean policy, as it clarifies their significance as a basis for establishment of jurisdictional waters, for securing safety at sea, for support in the use and development of ocean resources, and in the conservation of the natural environment in surrounding waters. The Basic Plan also stipulated the formation of the Basic Policy concerning the Preservation and Management of Islands for Ocean Management (tentative), which states an appropriate management system and schedule for measures and initiatives.

Based on the Basic Ocean Plan, of the measures promoted through the comprehensive coordination of the Headquarters for Ocean Policy, the following are directly or indirectly related to remote islands:

2008: Application to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf for the extension of Japan's continental shelf.

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[5] Basic Act on Ocean Policy, Articles 29–38.

2009: Approval of the Plan for the Development of Marine Energy and Mineral Resources/establishment of a Basic Policy for Preservation and Management of Islands for Ocean Management.

2010: Inception of Marine Information Clearing House operations/enactment of the Act for Preservation of Low Tide Lines and Construction of Facilities/establishment of Basic Plan for Preservation of Low Tide Lines.

2011: Adoption of the Policy of Future Responses Concerning Scientific Surveys and Exploration of Mineral Resources Within the Exclusive Economic Zone and Other Areas/approval of Instructions for the Designation of Japan's Marine Protected Areas/adoption of the Strategy for Conservation of Marine Biodiversity/185 areas designated by government ordinance as low-water line preservation areas/among remote islands serving as grounds for territorial seas, the decision was made to update names of ten remote islands not currently used in maps and charts/enactment of the Act on Partial Revision, etc., of the Mining Act (Act No. 84 of 2011).

2012: Among remote islands justifying the outer limits of EEZs, the decision was made to update the names of 39 remote islands not currently used in maps and charts/the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) agreed to some extensions of the continental shelf which Japan had requested/adoption of the Policy on Initiatives to Promote the Use of Marine Renewable Energy.

11.7 Revision of the Basic Plan on Ocean Policy

As the government is to review the Basic Plan on Ocean Policy approximately every 5 years and make necessary changes,[6] upon entering 2012, lively debates took place in many quarters aimed at revising the Basic Plan for Ocean Policy, after which a new Basic Plan for Ocean Policy was adopted by Cabinet decision in April of 2013.

Taking into account the progress made in initiatives for protection and management of remote islands, the changes in circumstances regarding maritime security and marine interests in Japan's surrounding waters, and initiatives regarding marine resource development and use, the new Basic Plan on Ocean Policy goes into considerable detail concerning the protection, management, and promotion of remote islands. To give a brief survey, first, in Chapter 1, Basic Policy of Measures with Regard to the Oceans, Section 2, Measures To Be Intensively Promoted Under the Plan, Subsection 2, Securing the Safety and Security on the Oceans, it states that "Measures should also be promoted for protecting, managing and promoting islands near national borders"; in Section 3, Direction of the Measures Under the Plan, Subsection 1, Harmonization of the Use and Development of the Oceans with the Conservation of the Marine Environment, it states that for the development of marine energy and mineral resources, "Concerning action bases for the development and other purposes, construction will also be promoted in areas including remote islands, specifically Minamitorishima Island and Okinotorishima Island," and in Subsection 2, Securing the Safety and Security of the Oceans, it states that "To secure safety of sea zones surrounding Japan, sea lanes and remote islands, the government should strengthen cooperative relationships with related countries and coordination among related ministries." Furthermore, in Subsection 5, Comprehensive Management of the Sea, along with the territorial sea and the EEZ, comprehensive management of coastal zones, it takes up remote islands and their preservation, management, and promotion in detail, especially the stable preservation and management of remote islands, stating that "the government should intensively promote remote islands that justify the outer limits of Japan's territorial seas and EEZ." It also states that "the government should strive to preserve the low-water line and surrounding areas," "develop activity bases with transport and supply functions" for long distance remote islands, "facilitate self-sustaining development of remote islands, stabilize residents' lives and improve welfare [and]... prevent...significant decrease of population on remote islands." Finally, it states that "the government should also comprehensively and successively promote the remote islands by, for example, developing industries, infrastructure, etc., and by implementing intangible policies concerning health care, transportation and communications, ...the living environment, education and culture, tourism exchanges and other aspects."

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[6] Basic Plan on Ocean Policy, Article 16.5.

Building on these, measures for the preservation, management, and promotion of remote islands are made explicit in Chapter 2 (Measures that the Government Should Take Comprehensively and Systematically with Regard to the Sea), Section 3 (Promotion of Development of EEZ and Continental Shelves), Subsection 3 (Establishment of infrastructure and the environment to promote development and other activities in EEZ and continental shelves); Section 5 (Securing Safety and Security of the Sea), Subsection 1 (Securing security and public order of the sea); Section 6 (Promotion of Marine Surveys), Subsection 1 (Promotion of comprehensive marine surveys); Section 8 (Promotion of Marine Industries and Increase in International Competitiveness), Subsection 2 (Creating new marine industries); Section 10 (Preservation of Remote Islands); and Section 11 (Securing International Coordination and Promoting International Cooperation), Subsection 3 (International cooperation with regard to the sea). In addition to these, while in Chapter 2, Section 1, Subsection 2, (Promotion of the use of marine renewable energy), and in Section 8, Subsection 1 (5), (Developing the fisheries industry) and exerting multiple functions of the fisheries industry and (fishing villages), remote islands aren't referred to specifically, measures relevant to remote islands can be seen throughout. This is evidence of the significance of the Basic Plan on Ocean Policy, revised by Cabinet decision for the comprehensive and systematic promotion of ocean policy, in fully promoting policies for remote islands.

Japan's initiatives on remote islands continue to progress, as under the revised Basic Plan on Ocean Policy, the Experts Discussion Group on Practices for the Preservation, Management, and Promotion of Remote Islands on the National

Border, meeting since 2013, presented its final recommendations in June 2014. Also, in August of the same year, among remote islands serving as grounds for the outer limits of territorial seas, the decision was made to update names of 158 remote islands not currently used in maps and charts.

11.8 Initiatives Linking Pacific Island States and Japan

The Revised Basic Ocean Plan urges measures that deal with the ocean from a global perspective in Chapter 2, Section 11, Subsection 3, stating, "Japan should promote coordination and cooperation with Pacific island countries and other countries toward solution of issues common to those states and islands of Japan, such as preservation and management of islands, management of the surrounding sea areas, management of fishery resources, and response to climate change." As seen in Section 3 of this chapter, Changes in International Society's Ocean and Islands Initiatives, ocean problems call for comprehensive and integrated initiatives with a global perspective, an observation that reflects Japan's own progress in broadening the scope of its ocean initiatives.

OPRF,[7] being located in the island country of Japan, has long had an interest in island problems and initiatives. From 2009 OPRF began collaborating on research with the Australian National Centre for Ocean Resources and Security (ANCORS) at Wollongong University and the Secretariat of the Pacific Community Geoscience Division (SPC-SOPAC), to be joined by the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat (PIFS) from 2013. We have focused on how island States in the South Pacific can carry out sustainable development and use of their islands and surrounding ocean areas, as well as their conservation and management. Based on the fruits of this research, we have compiled recommendations for what measures island States and international society should respectively take to address these problems and submitted these in the form of a joint policy recommendation by OPRF and ANCORS entitled "For the Better Conservation and Management of Islands and Their Surrounding Ocean Areas" to the United Nations and other relevant bodies to support the development of appropriate policy frameworks.

Our policy recommendation focuses on three areas, namely, (i) Conservation and Management of Islands, (ii) Management of the Surrounding Ocean Areas, and (iii) Response to Climate Change and Variability, and proposes necessary measures to address these. Under Conservation and Management of Islands, we have taken up the Development of Island Management Strategies and Land Use Plans, Increased Safety and Resilience of Island Communities, Implementation of Waste

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[7] As of 1 April 2015, the Ocean Policy Research Foundation (OPRF) merged with the Sasakawa Peace Foundation. As a result, it now operates under the name of the Ocean Policy Research Institute, the Sasakawa Peace Foundation (OPRI-SPF).

Management, Development of Renewable Energy, and Conservation of Coral Reefs and Mangrove Forests.

Under the Management of the Surrounding Ocean Areas, we have taken up Establishment of Baselines and Maritime Limits, Implementation of Practical Fisheries Management Policies, Maintenance and Securing of Shipping Services and Securing Safety on the Ocean, Exploitation of Marine Mineral Resources and Preservation of Marine Environment, Development of Marine Energy and Mineral Resources and Conservation of the Marine Environment, and Conservation and Sustainable Use of the Marine Environment and Marine Biodiversity. Under the Response to Climate Change and Variability, we addressed Adaptation to Climate Change and Variability and Response to International Law Issues Related to Climate Change. Also, based on the assessment and analysis of the current situations in each area and considering the issues identified, we have made recommendations on capacity building and institutional strengthening to effectively facilitate necessary measures in each of the three areas.

As noted in Section 3, above, the 3rd SIDS Conference (SIDS 2014) was held in September in the Pacific, in Samoa, where the SIDS Accelerated Modalities Of Action (SAMOA) Pathways was adopted, an action plan including much the same contents as our own joint policy recommendation.

OPRF attended SIDS 2014 as a member of the UN Major Groups and organized jointly with ANCORS a side event entitled “For the better conservation and management of islands and their surrounding ocean areas.” We had the honor of His Excellency Tommy Remengesau, Jr., President of the Republic of Palau, attending our side event, as he has great interest in these issues. In total, about 80 people from various countries, organizations, and groups joined us to discuss concrete measures to implement our recommendations. In order to facilitate implementation of our joint policy recommendations, OPRF proposed to establish the Islands and Oceans Net (IO NET) as an international collaborative partnership network, with the voluntary participation of international and regional organizations, governments, academia, businesses, and civil society. All the participants of the side event unanimously supported our proposal.

The establishment of a network of cooperation and coordination for promoting implementation of island and ocean policy, agreed upon by a variety of stakeholders and going beyond official positions, national boundaries, and fields of specialization, is a major step forward for future initiatives. Many governments, organizations, and groups from Pacific island States and around the Pacific region, as well as from Japanese organizations, groups, and businesses in agreement with the aims of the IO Net, have expressed strong interest in its establishment. At present, in cooperation and coordination with the coauthors of our joint policy recommendation, ANCORS, SPC-SOPAC, PIFS, and others, we are working on how we can construct and facilitate our collaborative activities to materialize our policy measure proposals. Regarding measures and initiatives, the IO Net intends to proceed in the direction expressed in the Basic Plan on Ocean Policy quoted at the beginning of this section, “Japan should promote coordination and cooperation with Pacific island countries and other countries toward solution of issues common to those States and to the islands of Japan." To achieve this, we look forward to the active collaboration of all those involved.

11.9 Searching for a Way Forward for Island Life in the New Environment of the Twenty-First Century: The Call for a New Island Studies Discipline

As discussed above, the last half-century has seen dramatic changes and progress in the natural and social environments in the Pacific region, in the international community's initiatives on the oceans and islands, and in Japan's initiatives toward comprehensive management of the oceans. The communities and States based on islands surrounded by the ocean and in conditions of isolation, limited land area, and small populations have long successfully coexisted with the ocean, depended on it for their livelihoods, and developed necessary trading networks. However, islands and island States are facing new natural and social environments, as in recent years, along with the waves of globalization of the economy, society, and lifestyles reaching their shores, discussions by the international community on world governance resulted in UNCLOS, whose coming into effect in the late twentieth century brought about a new order on the oceans. Faced with environmental changes such as these, island societies and island States, while searching for solutions to their immediate problems, are also being called upon to examine their ways of life from a new perspective.

Basically, Japan is also an island State, sharing many geographic and natural conditions with ocean islands, especially in the Ryukyu and Ogasawara island regions, which are in close proximity to Micronesia in the Pacific. Along with actively participating in the search for solutions to the environmental changes facing Pacific Ocean communities and States, the examination of our own problems against this background must also have great significance for the international community, for the Pacific region, and for ourselves. This, I believe, calls for the creation of a new Island Studies Discipline, which takes for its focus the new changes in the environment and wide array of island problems.

(Translated from the Japanese by John A. Dolan)

Chapter 12
The US National Ocean Policy: Priorities, Benefits, and Limitations in the Insular Pacific

Chris E. Ostrander

12.1 Introduction

In the summer of 2009, President Obama created an Interagency Ocean Policy Task Force and charged it with developing a national ocean policy and proposing a "comprehensive, ecosystem-based framework for the long-term conservation and use of our resources" (Obama 2009). That task force collected input from a wide array of stakeholder groups and individuals, deliberated over that input, and submitted its policy recommendations to the president late in 2009. President Obama introduced the US National Ocean Policy through an executive order in July of 2010. That policy, which was refined further through the release of a National Ocean Policy Implementation Plan, is designed to dramatically change the way the USA manages and interacts with its ocean and coastal environments (Obama 2010).

The adoption of a US National Ocean Policy has taken many decades, has been championed by many different presidents, and has always been a politically sensitive topic (Commission on Ocean Policy 2004; Pew 2003; Stratton 1969). For decades, the US ocean has been an overexploited commons—one that is used by numerous parties with minimal regulatory oversight, under ill-fitting sector-specific management practices, and oftentimes with the economic encouragement of the government (subsidies for fuel, vessel construction, insurance, etc.) (Rosenberg 2009).

Some critics of the policy feel that the Administration is overreaching, by adding extra regulation and potential restrictions to ocean commerce, recreation, and resource use at a time when the US economy can ill afford additional stress.

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Additionally, conservative policy makers within the US government, many of whom staunchly support the supremacy of state's rights over that of the federal government, take issue with the use of executive powers from the White House to change US policy without congressional consultation or approval.

Supporters of the Policy, however, point to overwhelming scientific evidence indicating that coastal and oceanic ecosystems are being adversely impacted by human activity. Unchecked and improper coastal development, destructive fishing practices, nutrient and sediment loading, overfishing, industrial and urban pollution, and the destruction of sensitive habitats all play a major role in the decline and loss of coastal ecosystems (Lubchenco and Sutley 2010; Lotze et al. 2006). With the knowledge that human well-being, safety, and prosperity are tightly linked to the health of the global ocean (Frumkin 2001; McMichael et al. 2006; Vieira et al. 2011), they argue that streamlined management and stewardship of our ocean resources is essential to economic, physical, and social well-being for future generations.

12.2 Ecosystem-Based Management

The National Ocean Policy (the Policy) encompasses a diversity of federal activities designed to benefit commercial activities (fishing, energy, navigation, shipping), ecosystem conservation and management, human health and security, national defense, and recreation (CEQ 2010). Connecting these diverse interests is a focus on the preservation, restoration, and protection of coastal ecosystem integrity with a particular emphasis on coastal productivity, biodiversity, and resilience. The principle tool the Policy promotes to effectively manage marine and coastal ecosystems for the benefit of a large and diverse stakeholder community is ecosystem-based management. Ecosystem-based management diverges from the historical sector- and issue-based management regime that many Western nations presently employ and moves toward a holistic and geographically based management regime—one that was historically common among the indigenous populations of the Pacific Islands. Ecosystem-based management relies heavily on scientific knowledge about the interconnectedness among habitats, species, and ecosystems, and between humans and healthy marine ecosystems, in order to ensure good stewardship across the plethora of ocean uses and users (Lubchenco and Sutley 2010). Within a pure execution of ecosystem-based management, one species is not singled out and removed from the system for individual management and assessment; instead, the interconnectivity of the system is accepted, broad ecosystem services are evaluated in tandem with individual species considerations, and holistic management is practiced across all trophic, spatial, and temporal scales.

To ensure appropriate and focused implementation of the Policy within each large marine ecosystem in the country, nine regional planning bodies (RPBs), consisting of federal, state, and tribal agencies, have been developed and charged with the implementation of ecosystem-based management through comprehensive


U.S. Mainland
Japan
Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands
Wake Island
Hawaii
Johnston Atoll
Guam
Howland and Baker
Palmyra Island and Kingman Reef
Jarvis Island
Equator
American Samoa
Australia

Fig. 12.1 The US Pacific Island region. *Light-shaded* areas surrounding islands indicate ocean area within the 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone, as agreed to by the international community

marine spatial plans within their existing statutory and regulatory authorities (Lubchenco and Sutley 2010). In the insular Pacific, the state of Hawaii, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, Guam, American Samoa, and the US Pacific Remote Island Areas are considered a distinct region (see Fig. 12.1).

12.3 US Pacific Island Region

The distinctive beauty of the Pacific Islands reflects the unique setting of the land, ocean, tropical climate, and biological diversity of the region. The Pacific Island region covers a vast area of the globe—spanning six time zones across the Pacific Ocean; the region is bisected by the International Date Line, straddles all four hemispheres, is distributed over a surface area of nearly 35 million km^2, and includes 2500 km of coastlines and over 2300 individual islands. The Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of the US Pacific Island jurisdictions covers an area larger than the other ten regions of US IOOS combined, and Hawaii alone constitutes nearly one-fifth of the total US EEZ. The Pacific Islands are uniquely an ocean region; over 99 % of the surface area is ocean. The vast majority of the land lies within 10 km of the shoreline and all the land in the region is within the coastal zone.

Each of the island constituents of the Pacific Island region is distinct in terms of their respective governments, languages, legal systems, geography, cultural norms, societal structure, economies, and infrastructural development needs. The extreme geographic extent and remoteness of most island locations, coupled with a variety of local and federal governance and economic realities, present both significant opportunities and challenges for the growth of regional programs. Human activity in the islands is tightly coupled to the marine ecosystem—we are the top predators, introduce nutrients and pollutants, redistribute sediments, alter environmental links between land and sea, impinge upon the natural biological order of the ecosystem, and, in the process, increasingly expose ourselves, our visitors, and our endemic biota to natural and anthropogenic hazards, ecological depletion, and environmental stress.

The US federal government has played a significant role in the Pacific over the past two centuries, though it has been most influential and involved since the end of World War II. Because the islands and their economies are each considerably more isolated than continental cities of comparable size and population, federal resources have been needed to create and sustain infrastructure that in other regions might be supported by state, county, or city governments. Investments by USAID and the Departments of Defense, Interior, and Commerce have served to provide economic, social, and territorial security to many islands in the region (both inside and outside the USA) while securing and preserving marine and natural resources, as well as strategic land positions, for American benefit.

As America executes its defense pivot to the Asia-Pacific region, primarily through the rebalancing of naval and air force assets to the region from the Atlantic, and as China continues its rapid growth and emergence as a global superpower, the American possessions in the insular Pacific, and their associated ocean EEZ, will become even more critical to US domestic and foreign policy. Movement of marine forces away from Okinawa, the expansion of military facilities on the island of Guam and in the Northern Mariana Islands, deployment of new submarine and surface warfare assets by the US Navy, and the investment in new National Security Agency (NSA) intelligence and cryptology assets in Hawaii all underscore the strategic importance the unique island geographies of the Pacific play in global balance of military and political power.

The importance of the region, though, is not just associated with only defense posture and security. The Pacific is rich in marine resources. The vast majority of the world's tuna is caught in the equatorial Pacific, and the largest and most productive coral reef ecosystems on the planet reside in the region. The seafloor is littered with rare earth minerals, primarily in the form of manganese nodules. Extraction of these mineral deposits could radically change the economic equation for the use of these elements—which are critical for microchips, computer processors, cellular technology, and medical equipment. At present, China controls 95 % of the global production of these elements and artificially restricts supply to ensure demand-side growth sets a high commodity price for the resource. New sources of production will be needed to ensure sustained global technological advancement—mining the abyssal plains of the Pacific is an option being considered by many nations, including the USA.

As resource competition, driven by a growing global population, increases in the future and access to critical elements and protein supplies constricts globally, the insular Pacific will be a central point of resource supply and potential instability. That resource pressure, coupled with the impacts of global climate change and sea level rise, underlines the importance of a cohesive, conservative, and balanced policy for ocean resource management. With respect to the US Ocean Policy, and to marine resource conservation globally, the insular Pacific is incredibly important to the USA, both at present and in the future.

12.4 Priorities of the National Ocean Policy

The National Ocean Policy aims to ensure a healthy, productive, and resilient ocean and coastal zone through the achievement of nine national priority objectives (CEQ 2010):

1. *Ecosystem-based management*: Adopt ecosystem-based management as a foundational principle for the comprehensive management of the ocean, our coasts, and the Great Lakes.
2. *Coastal and marine spatial planning*: Implement comprehensive, integrated, ecosystem- based coastal and marine spatial planning and management in the USA.
3. *Inform decisions and improve understanding*: Increase knowledge to continually inform and improve management and policy decisions and the capacity to respond to change and challenges. Better educate the public through formal and informal programs about the ocean, our coasts, and the Great Lakes.
4. *Coordinate and support*: Better coordinate and support federal, state, tribal, local, and regional management of the ocean, our coasts, and the Great Lakes. Improve coordination and integration across the federal government, and as appropriate, engage with the international community.
5. *Resiliency and adaptation to climate change and ocean acidification*: Strengthen resiliency of coastal communities and marine and Great Lakes environments and their abilities to adapt to climate change impacts and ocean acidification.
6. *Regional ecosystem protection and restoration*: Establish and implement an integrated ecosystem protection and restoration strategy that is science based and aligns conservation and restoration goals at the federal, state, tribal, local, and regional levels.

(continued)

7. *Water quality and sustainable practices on land*: Enhance water quality in the ocean, along our coasts, and in the Great Lakes by promoting and implementing sustainable practices on land.
8. *Changing conditions in the Arctic*: Address environmental stewardship needs in the Arctic Ocean and adjacent coastal areas in the face of climate-induced and other environmental changes.
9. *Ocean, coastal, and Great Lakes observations, mapping, and infrastructure*: Strengthen and integrate federal and nonfederal ocean observing systems, sensors, data collection platforms, data management, and mapping capabilities into a national system, and integrate that system into international observation efforts.

The priority objectives of the Policy are, in some senses, a consolidation of various existing agency and program priorities across the federal government. Climate change, water quality monitoring, ecosystem protection and restoration, and Arctic issues have all been institutionalized by various federal agencies. However, cooperation among agencies on these issues is insufficient—the Policy aims to fix some of that through new joint initiatives and organizations. In addition, new ideas are presented in the Policy, and there are many gaps throughout the US EEZ that must be filled, both scientifically and technically, in order to achieve the vision of the Policy.

In particular, the science requirements that underpin the impacts of climate change on marine systems, as well as those that inform ecosystem-based management, are not fully explored. The connections between many species within the ocean ecosystem, especially those that are critical to fisheries, and protected species are not fully understood. Those connections, as well as accurate maps of existing human use and impact patterns, are necessary to construct the operational ecosystem models that will be needed to execute climate mitigation efforts and to employ ecosystem-based management nationwide.

Additionally, the technology to actively monitor biological and geophysical processes in marine systems (especially in the Arctic) is not fully mature. Further technological development is called for to meet the needs of the scientific community. That development alone isn't sufficient—vast observing networks are needed throughout the US EEZ, along with robust data infrastructure to move, analyze, and display real-time ocean data for informed, active decision-making. Initial observing assets are in place in many regions of the country, but a major capital investment is needed to expand that capability, both spatially and across scientific disciplines.

12.5 Benefits of the National Ocean Policy for the Pacific Island Region

Should America fully fund, implement, and institutionalize the Policy, the benefits for domestic stakeholders would be immense. Coastal ecosystem health and productivity would improve; commercial operations in the open and coastal environments would be safer, more efficient, and cheaper; scientific knowledge of the ocean would grow, with science and academic organizations benefiting from increases in both research funding and demand for ocean information; fisheries production could reach sustainable levels, with potential for increased yields, and decreases in catch-per-unit-effort driven by total ecosystem management, and commercial activities such as energy production, mining, aquaculture, and coastal engineering would see dramatically streamlined permit, regulatory, and authorization processes implemented nationwide.

The Policy has been developed primarily for these domestic benefits—with the growth and preservation of the US economy, security, and public health as the prime objective. However, the global interconnectedness of our modern civilizations, coupled with the role of America as the only global superpower and fact that our oceans and ecosystems transcend man-made geopolitical boundaries, means that adoption and execution of the Policy domestically can have far-reaching impacts on the ecosystems, and thus domestic services and policies, of many allied and neighboring nations. In some senses, that which is good for the growth and preservation of ecosystem services within US waters could be expected to generate spillover benefits for neighboring nations.

Within the Pacific, the US EEZ is by far the largest sovereign territory in the region. American leaders have clearly indicated in recent years the centrality of the Asia-Pacific region to their national security, defense, and diplomatic strategy. The close, strong, and cherished ties between the USA and her allies in the region, especially with Japan, but also with South Korea, Taiwan, Australia, and the former trust territories of the USA in Micronesia, mean that US domestic policy with respect to the oceans has the potential to become the de facto domestic policy of many other nations in the region—bringing with it the implied benefits I mentioned earlier. However, even if the individual nation-states in the region continue to manage their ocean policies in the ways they've done for decades, the adoption of an EBM-based ocean policy by the USA can have direct and indirect benefits for many parties in the region.

In the direct sense, all parties in the region can expect to see the American government, primarily through the US Agency for International Development, increase private funding for projects and programs that dovetail with the Policy. The vast majority of private funding in the region comes from US domestic and global environmental nongovernmental organizations, whose giving and strategic planning are very closely synced with the tenets that underpin the Policy. As the Policy is implemented, partners who execute programs in line with it will potentially see increased opportunities for funding and collaboration.

Central to the success of the Policy is the generation and use of massive quantities of ocean data. The observing, modeling, and data management infrastructure to facilitate that data resource is by design an open system—one that anyone in the world can access and utilize. New seafloor mapping data, real-time ocean measurements and forecasts, and the increased scientific understanding of species connections, ecosystem dynamics, and ocean response to a changing climate are relevant to, are applicable to, and will be widely available to anyone in the region, above and beyond their primary purpose of informing US domestic activities. American researchers are the dominant producer of global climate, ocean, weather, and geophysical data, with members of global community depending on US operational systems for some of their own domestic activities. The breadth and depth of data available to the global community will only increase, should the Policy be fully implemented.

Indirectly, the Policy has the potential to help those who share interest in the insular Pacific or whose territory borders the rim of the Pacific Ocean. As domestic and international populations within coastal zones grow (NOAA 2013), as both a share of total population and by total numbers, demand for coastal engineers, mariners, commercial providers, and ocean-literate workers will increase. The Policy seeks to grow and train a domestic workforce, with global reach, that is ocean literate and proficient at maritime skills and that can focus on emerging ocean careers.

In addition to a new workforce, the Policy calls for the development of new ocean technologies, for research, exploration, and commercial activities. These developments have the potential to drastically change and drive GDP, through new investment opportunities, growth in domestic manufacturing, and the creation of new technology sectors. Within the USA alone, the ocean economy employs roughly three million people and generates nearly $300 billion worth of goods and services (NOEP 2014). Just as most ocean users around the globe rely on and benefit from US, Canadian, and Scandinavian investment in oceanographic and meteorological equipment development for safe and efficient marine operations, all will benefit from resurgence in industry growth, design, and deployment of new technologies.

Ecosystem-based management, if done correctly, will serve to restore some coral and deep ocean habitats, improve fisheries yield and sustainability, and provide spillover benefits throughout the basin as spawning grounds, foraging grounds, and critical habitat for prized commercial species are preserved and restored. Many global fisheries stocks spawn and grow within the US EEZ—their protection and science-based management can also improve the yields and decrease catch-per-unit-effort of some stocks throughout the basin.

12.6 Potential Problems

Until the policy starts to be implemented by various agencies, there is no way to know if the design, as envisioned, will be fully successful. The Policy, while quite different from publicly stated priorities from the executive office in the past, is actually a fairly conservative and balanced approach to ocean resource management. It does not radically change the status quo, despite the rancor it has caused among some sectors of the US maritime community. Full implementation of the Policy as written will require careful, consistent, and open cooperation among many federal agencies, the executive office, and the Congress. Numerous potential problems must be resolved for the goals of the Policy to be achieved.

The largest potential hurdle the Administration needs to overcome on its path to implement the Policy has to do with the ability of the USA to approve a budget to fully execute the priorities of the Policy. Existing agency budgets are insufficient to reach the high goals of the Policy, and the inability of the US Congress to pass a budget for most of the current Administration's tenure is a troubling precedent for successful implementation. With a budget being passed, and without increased funds for implementation, the likelihood of the Policy truly providing ocean and coastal communities the benefit implied in its creation is minimal.

Additionally, the concept of ecosystem-based management would be exceedingly difficult, if not impossible and impractical, to employ across the entire US EEZ. Early successes in ecosystem-based approaches to management have been done at relatively small scales and in areas not heavily used by ocean commerce and recreation. The US EEZ (including territorial seas) is a massive construct. It is the largest EEZ in the world at 12.3 M km^2, covering more than 7 % of the global EEZ surface area. The EEZ is spread over three oceans and ranges from equatorial tropics to Arctic ecosystems. Even when considered in nine distinct management zones, some of the large marine ecosystems that are encompassed by the regional planning bodies are among the largest and most complex (e.g., California large marine ecosystem) on the planet.

Implementation of the Policy, especially as it relates to ecosystem-based management, will challenge a wide suite of federal agencies, commissions, and councils to better coordinate their activities, to streamline their budgetary requests and plans to maximize public utility, and to better coordinate in planning, execution, and evaluation of their priorities with partner and stakeholder groups (Lubchenco and Sutley 2010). The USA invests billion of dollars annually in ocean-related management, science, and data collection efforts, divided up to support the distinct missions of nearly two-dozen federal agencies and bureaus. Breaking down the historic mission and directive barriers between agencies and investing in coordinated management and policy will require a near-herculean feat of executive management and congressional cooperation but could generate significant synergy within the federal government toward the full implementation of the Policy.

Finally, with every coastal nation being connected by the fluid ocean, it is important to remember that the positive changes one nation makes on their natural resources can provide benefit to nations that share that resource (especially fish stocks) and more importantly that the full benefit of EBM within the USA cannot be achieved unless other nations in the region adopt a similar policy of shared resource conservation and adaptive management. Unchecked resource consumption and degradation of ocean habitats outside of the USA, while potentially mitigated by careful conservation of ecosystem services within the US EEZ, would, in the long run, undo many of the domestic gains brought about through the full implementation of the Policy. While the National Ocean Policy is written as a purely domestic set of goals and objectives, long-term domestic success will require careful, consistent, and coincident international engagement and encouragement (financial, political, security) to neighboring and allied nations to adopt the key tenets of the policy.

12.7 Closing Thoughts

We all share the ocean as a commons—the actions of any nation in the region directly impact the productivity and resource potential of every other nation. This is true with fisheries, with other marine natural resources, and even with security and maritime sovereignty. While the notion of ecosystem-based management within America is a noble goal, we must not forget the principal species of interest in the region, for commercial, recreational, and subsistence fisheries are highly migratory. Truly changing the paradigm with respect to fisheries, and ocean resource management as a whole, requires a collective effort of all parties. One nation can make a difference in how they interact with the environment, but the full Pacific community must work together to tackle our shared problems if we all expect to continue extracting benefit from the ocean for generations to come.

The new National Ocean Policy is a big step forward for the USA in how it manages and preserves its resources. Achieving that benefits proposed in the Policy will require careful consideration and collaboration between federal agencies, engagement of all maritime stakeholder communities on the adopting of new marine spatial plans, and sustained and suitable funding from the US Congress to advance critical initiatives, actions, and regulatory changes. If successfully implemented, the Policy has the potential to radically change the interactions of many nations with our collective ocean commons, something that provides direct domestic benefit to all coastal states and indirect benefit to the world as a whole.

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Chapter 13
Challenges and Opportunities in Managing Remote Islands: The Australian Practice

Mary Ann Palma-Robles

13.1 Introduction

The management of small islands is a special case for sustainable development because of the significant ecosystem assets and environment of such islands, their unique cultural identity, broad responsibilities and multifarious challenges confronted by governing states. Small islands are known for their rich natural resources and biodiversity encompassed within wide expanse of waters often larger than their land area. They are vulnerable to both natural and human-induced disaster to which they have limited capacity to respond and recover. While small island developing states contribute least to global climate change and sea level rise, they are amongst those that would suffer the most from the adverse effects of such phenomena (Barbados Programme of Action, Part III). Hence the protection and effective management of marine and coastal areas is paramount to the sustainability of these islands.

Principle 6 of the Rio Declaration on the Environment and Development in 1992 provides that the special situation and needs of developing countries, particularly the least developed and those most environmentally vulnerable, shall be given priority. This principle provides the basic tenet for managing small island states. In Chapter 17 of Agenda 21 which followed the Rio Declaration, one of the programme areas identified as requiring national, subregional, regional and global action in relation to marine and coastal area management and development is the 'Sustainable Development of Small Islands'. According to Agenda 21, the purpose of developing plans and activities for the sustainable development and management of small island marine and coastal resources is to meet essential human needs,

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maintain biodiversity and improve the quality life for island people (para. 17.127). In addition, the measures to be adopted to this end should enable small island developing states to cope effectively, creatively and sustainably with environmental change and to mitigate impacts and reduce threats to marine and coastal resources. Similar commitments were made to further implement the Agenda 21 measures for small islands, particularly through the Johannesburg Declaration and Plan of Implementation of the World Summit on Sustainable Development, the Barbados Programme of Action for the Sustainable Development of Small Island Developing States and the Mauritius Strategy for Further Implementation of the Programme of Action for the Sustainable Development of Small Island Developing States. Rio+20 also reaffirmed the international commitment to pursue the programme of action for small island developing states.

Although a global policy and various regional programmes have been established to address the challenges faced by small island developing states, little attention is paid on small remote offshore islands under the administration of either developed or developing coastal states. Although most of these remote islands share the characteristics of small island developing states in terms of the need to preserve ecological diversity and cultural identity, and deliver services comparable to those provided in the mainland and coastal cities, their unique challenges are often overlooked within a gamut of issues addressed by a single government or administration. This chapter examines some of the similarities between small island developing states and coastal state offshore territories and how the current global framework for the former may be used by both developed and developing states to address the marine-related challenges of the latter. The management practice of Australia for its offshore territories is presented as an example of how states can draw on the distinctive strengths of such remote islands and develop opportunities using limited resources for effective management.

13.2 Status of Islands Under International Law

According to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC), an island is ‘a naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high time’ (art 121(1)). An island is to be differentiated from a low-tide elevation which is a naturally formed area of land surrounded by and above water at low tide but submerged at high tide (art 13), such as shoals, reefs and drying rocks. The LOSC further provides that artificial islands, installations and structures do not possess the status of islands (art 160(8)). Defining and classifying island features ensures that states are able to measure the baselines and maritime zones of islands, and consequently the legal status of the waters enclosed. For example, individual islands, islands treated as part of the mainland, fringing islands and island clusters and dependent islands have different effects on how straight baselines can be drawn from which the maritime zones can be measured (Jayewardene 1990). States have drawn straight baselines around island groups which are dependent territories of continental or insular states enclosing them as a whole, i.e. Madagascar, Cuba and Iceland. For Japan, straight baselines have been drawn along the coasts of groups of islands (United States Department of State 1998). Archipelagic states also have a separate regime for measuring archipelagic straight baselines and their maritime zones, i.e. Indonesia, Fiji and the Philippines.

Islands may have different legal status depending on their geographic situation, geologic features and other economic factors. These include islands as independent territories, islands under colonial dependence, islands as forming part of or adjacent to another island, group of islands or archipelagos, and archipelagic states. While islands may have different legal standing before international law, they are confronted with similar resource and environmental challenges requiring effective management.

13.3 Sustainable Development of Small Islands

The sustainable development of small islands, particularly small island developing states, is one of the key agenda at the United Nations, as well as a number of regional organisations for small island states in the Pacific, the Caribbean and Latin America. Chapter 17 of Agenda 21 adopted a number of activities to support the sustainable development of small island developing states. These activities or management actions include:

- Studying the special environmental and developmental characteristics of small islands, producing an environmental profile and inventory of natural resources, critical marine habitats and biodiversity
- Developing techniques for determining and monitoring the carrying capacity of small islands under different development assumptions and resource constraints
- Preparing medium- and long-term plans that emphasise multiple use of resources, integrating environmental considerations with economic and sectoral planning and policies, defining measures for maintaining cultural and biological diversity and conserving endangered species and critical marine habitats
- Adapting coastal area management techniques using geographic information systems (GIS), suitable to the special characteristics of small islands, taking into account the traditional and cultural values of indigenous people of island countries
- Reviewing the existing institutional arrangements and identifying and undertaking appropriate institutional reforms, including intersectoral coordination and community participation in the planning process
- Designing and implementing strategies and contingency plans that address environmental, social and economic impacts of climate change and sea level rise based on precautionary and anticipatory approaches

- Promoting environmentally sound technology for sustainable development within small island developing states and identifying technologies that should be excluded because of their threats to essential island ecosystems (para 17.128)

In order to promote self-reliance and enhance the quality of life of the people in small islands, the international community supports national capacity building, including education training and skills development. Under the Barbados Declaration, the programme of action for small island developing states promotes the principle of the right to development and international cooperation through partnerships. The right to development includes the formulation of policies, strategies and programmes to strengthen institutions and achieve development, health and environmental goals while mobilising all available resources. The technical support of international organisations and special role of non-governmental organisations in promoting partnership with small island developing states to achieve this end is also recognised and encouraged. The international community is also seen as having a responsibility to facilitate the efforts of small island developing states in minimising stress on their ecosystem.

The Mauritius Strategy for Further Implementation of the Programme of Action for Sustainable Development provides a wide range of actions to address specific issues confronting small island developing states. These issues include: climate change and sea level rise, natural and environmental disasters, waste management, coastal and marine resources, freshwater resources, land resources, energy, tourism and biodiversity. Management actions for other issues are also provided such as in the realm of transport and communication, science and technology, capacity development, sustainable production and consumption, health, knowledge management and culture.

Apart from global programmes on small island developing states, there are also other initiatives under the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), Global Islands Network, International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) and the UN Commission on Sustainable Development. In fisheries, the developing aspirations of small island developing states are also recognised, particularly under the United Nations Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks and regional tuna fisheries agreements in the Western and Central Pacific. Small island country blocs have also been created in international meetings and negotiations, particularly in climate change issues.

Even though these international policy documents pertain to the sustainable development of small island developing states, a close look at the governing principles, objectives and management actions would also bring to light similar application in small islands under the administration of individual coastal states. This is because all islands, whether independent or not, share the same vulnerability to natural and environmental changes and human activities. While the manner in which islands are governed may differ from one country to another, the management actions and approaches as embodied in the programme of action for small island developing states are nevertheless appropriate and may be adapted by a governing state to the needs and challenges of islands under their jurisdiction.

One of the key differences in the management of small island developing states as a whole and that of small islands under the administration of a coastal state is that the priority given to the latter may not be the same for the former. The global programme of action for small island developing states emphasises the responsibility of the international community in promoting the development of small island developing states and the external network and cooperation required to achieve that objective. On the other hand, small islands administered by a coastal state, especially those under the governance of more developed countries, do not share the same status and priority. It would be up to the governing state as to how it would implement required management actions, often in relation to the needs of the mainland and the country as a whole. The level of external technical and financial support would also be limited to the capacity of the governing state, rather than drawing support from the global community.

The other gap in the application of the programme of action on small island developing states to small dependent island territories is the lack of specific measures that may apply to very remote offshore islands. By remote offshore islands, we mean those islands which, although part of a country's territory, are located thousands of kilometres from the mainland and may or may not be inhabited. The geographic dispersion or isolation of such islands presents challenges relating to transportation and communication, limited land resources and fresh water, access to energy and other affordable services, exposure to extreme weather conditions, natural disasters, environmental changes, waste management and lack of regular presence by enforcement authorities. Some of these remote offshore islands are also subject to weapons exercises for defence purposes, which may have an impact on the fragile ecosystems of small islands.

13.4 Australia's Remote Offshore Islands

The continent of Australia is referred to as an island because it is surrounded by ocean. Australia has the smallest landmass compared to other continents but is the world's largest island. It is also made up of more than 8,000 islands, including the continental island state of Tasmania. The total area of the mainland and state and territories is 7.69 million km^2 with a total area of the exclusive economic zone at 10 million km^2 (Symonds et al. 2009).

One of the most unique features of the country's maritime identity is its remote offshore territories which are located thousands of kilometres in the Pacific, Indian and Southern Oceans. There are seven remote territories from the mainland: the Ashmore and Cartier Islands, Australian Antarctic Territory, Christmas Island, Cocos (Keeling) Islands, Coral Sea Islands, Heard Island and McDonald Islands and Norfolk Islands (see Fig. 13.1). The most isolated of these territories are the Australian Antarctic Territory and the Heard Island and McDonald Islands located


Christmas Island
Ashmore and Cartier Islands
Cocos (Keeling) Islands
Coral Sea Islands
Australia
Norfolk Island
Heard Island and McDonald Islands
Australian Antarctic Territory

Fig. 13.1 Map of Australia showing remote offshore territories (Source: Geoscience Australia)

4,100 km southwest of Perth, Western Australia. The Australian EEZ comprises about 8 million km^2 of waters around the mainland and remote offshore territories while 2 million km^2 of EEZ surrounds the Australian Antarctic Territory (Geoscience Australia 2014).

Depending on the geographic and environmental features and challenges in each of the remote offshore territories, a wide range of measures have been implemented by Australia to ensure that such territories are afforded the same level of protection and service as the mainland and areas with significant population. These measures include enacting supporting legislation, adopting strategic management plans, declaration of marine or nature reserves, establishing a specialist unit to conduct continued scientific studies, organising administration with the nearest state or local government, entering into service delivery arrangements between relevant government departments to support economic activities in the area and entering into environmental agreements with other countries. Management plans established on remote offshore territories recognise the history of acquisition of the territory, culture of the people living on the islands and their socio-economic needs, surrounding environment, resource biodiversity and importance in national security.

The Australia's Oceans Policy (1998) recognises the external territories of the country as important and integral part of its maritime jurisdiction. The external territories are of considerable economic, social, scientific and cultural importance, but their isolation and the harsh conditions pose particular challenges for resource development, conservation and management. The Australia's Oceans Policy provides that '(t)he Government aims to provide residents of the inhabited islands with the same rights, opportunities and responsibilities as all Australians. This include promoting residents' economic development and the protection of their natural and cultural heritage'.

13.5 History of Australian Acquisition of External Territories

Shortly after the Federation of Australian colonies in 1901, the control of Papua or British New Guinea was transferred to Australia. Similarly, Australia acquired the Norfolk Island, Nauru, former German New Guinea, Ashmore and Cartier Islands, Antarctica, Heard Island and McDonald Islands, Cocos (Keeling) Islands, Christmas Island and the Coral Sea Islands (Kerr 2009). These external territories have a long history of association with Australia with the latter's efforts to administer the islands' affairs, including the determination of boundaries. At that time, apart from the Coral Sea Islands, none of the territories were acquired with the realisation that their sea and seabed resources would become important to Australia (Kerr 2009). Three of the territories have become two independent nations: Papua New Guinea and Nauru. Amongst the remaining external territories within Australia, the Ashmore and Cartier Islands, Coral Sea Islands, Australian Antarctic Territory and Heard Island and McDonald Islands are uninhabited.

Most of the remote offshore or external territories are integrated into the Australian legislative and political framework. The Norfolk Island has become a self-governing territory, while the Antarctica became subject to an international treaty. The existence of external territories is based on an Act of the Federal Parliament. In addition, section 122 of the Australian Constitution has the authority to make laws for all territories, including all external territories. This power is wide enough to allow the Federal Parliament to make laws providing the direct administration of an external territory or endow it with separate political and administrative institutions. Section 15B(2) of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) provides that any reference in a Commonwealth Act to a 'territory' includes the coastal sea of such territory which is the territorial sea of 12 nautical miles. The Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) also provides that except for the Christmas Islands and the Cocos (Keeling) Islands, legislation of the Federal Parliament only applies to external territories if expressly stated. Similar provisions have also been emphasised in the relevant Acts governing the existence of the external territories, with the exception of the two territories.

There are two other sources of law governing the external territories of Australia. The first is the ordinances made by the Governor General for the peace, order and good government of a particular territory. The second is the statute that provides the link between the external territory and one of the internal territories, in that if there is no federal law or special ordinances that apply to the former, the laws of the latter are deemed to be in force. The ordinance may not be made to affect the application of an Act of the Federal Parliament; however, it can amend or repeal an Act that is in force in the external territory by virtue of the adoption of laws of the relevant internal territory.

The characteristics and governance of the remote offshore islands or external territories of Australia are examined below.

13.6 Ashmore and Cartier Islands

The Ashmore and Cartier Islands is made up of the West, Middle and East Islands of Ashmore Reef as well as Cartier Island. The Ashmore and Cartier Islands is located on the outer edge of the continental shelf in the Indian Ocean and Timor Sea approximately 320 km off Australia's northwest coast and 170 km south of the Indonesian island of Roti (DIRD 2014). The islands have a 12 nautical mile territorial sea. The islands are uninhabited, small and low-lying and composed of coral and sand, with some grass cover.

The Ashmore Reef is rich in marine biodiversity, with 14 varieties of sea snakes, 433 species of molluscs, 70 fish species and 255 varieties of coral. The islands also have significant marine turtle nesting areas and migratory bird populations, as well as sightings of dugong, various cetaceans and whale sharks around the reef. Access to the East and Middle Islands of the Ashmore Reef is by permit only. The Cartier Island and surrounding reefs also have diverse ecosystems with 547 species of which, comprising about 16 % of Australia's fish species (Geoscience Australia 2014). To protect the vulnerable ecosystems the Ashmore Reef was declared as a national nature reserve in 1983 and the Cartier Island a marine reserve in 2000.

Indonesian fishermen have been known to fish traditionally in the area since the early eighteenth century. Hence, in 1974, Australia and Indonesia entered into a memorandum of understanding (MOU) to recognise the traditional fishing by Indonesian fishermen in certain areas and permit them to land on the West Island to replenish their supplies, visit graves of past fishers and take shelter. Over the years, illegal fishing of protected wildlife by both traditional Indonesian fishermen and non-traditional Indonesian vessels has been a problem around the reef and in the Northern Territory, which required increasing cooperation between Australia and Indonesia. The Royal Australian Navy and the Australian Customs and Border Protection Service also conduct patrols in the reserves to combat illegal foreign fishing.

13.7 Australian Antarctic Territory

Antarctica is the fifth largest continent in the world, comprising a rocky landmass of 7 million km^2 with a coastline of 7500 km. Australia is amongst the seven nations that have claimed territory in Antarctica. Its claim is based on discovery and historic connection. The Australian Antarctic Territory is the largest territorial claim over the continent and covers most of the eastern part, which is approximately 5.8 million km^2 in total area. The Heard Island and McDonald Islands are located 4100 km southwest of Perth, Western Australia, and about 1500 km north of Antarctica. The territory of Heard Island and McDonald Islands is designated as World Heritage site and marine reserve. These islands are home to the only active volcanoes in Australia (Australian Antarctic Division 2014).

The Australian Antarctic Territory is characterised by having pristine ecosystems and extreme weather conditions. The thick ice covering in the area, which is up to 4 km thick, assists marine life in providing insulation to the water allowing microalgae to grow. The algae are consumed by krill and other small animals which is essential for the ecosystem in the Southern Ocean. Apart from krill, there are a few wildlife in the Antarctic that have adapted well to the cold, such as mackerel icefish, toothfish, cods, flying birds, penguins, seals and sea lions, squids, whales, sponges and others (Australian Antarctic Division 2015).

The Antarctic as a whole is subject to a treaty signed in 1959 to which Australia is a party. The Antarctic Treaty provides for the use of Antarctica exclusively for peaceful purposes, continued freedom of scientific research and international scientific cooperation. Article IV of the treaty provides that '(n)o acts or activities taking place while the present Treaty is in force shall constitute a basis for asserting, supporting, or denying a claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica or create any rights of sovereignty in Antarctica. No new claim, or enlargement of an existing claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica shall be asserted while the present Treaty is in force'. Hence, all areas of Antarctica, including all stations, installations and equipment, are open to inspection (Art VII).

In order to protect the Antarctic environment, the Madrid Protocol was created under the Antarctic Treaty System in 1991. The Madrid Protocol has six annexes: environmental impact assessment, conservation of fauna and flora, waste disposal and management, marine pollution prevention, area protection and management and liability for environmental damage. Other international agreements also apply, such as the Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals 1972, the Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources 1982 and the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL 73/78).

The Australian Antarctic Division of the Department of Environment is responsible for advancing the strategic, scientific, environmental and economic interests of Australia in the Antarctica and the Southern Ocean, including the subantarctic regions of the territory of Heard Island and McDonald Islands, Macquarie Island and their adjacent waters. The subantarctic territories in the Southern Ocean are considered biological hot spots characterised by a very high number of breeding and nonbreeding seabirds and marine mammals (Australian Antarctic Division 2015). The national interests in this region are pursued by maintaining a strong presence in the area, mainly through its science programme and collaborative research, as well as support to effective environmental management.

13.8 Christmas Island

The Christmas Island is located in the Indian Ocean, 380 km south of Java and 2,650 km northwest of Perth. The coastline is 80 km in length which forms shallow bays and small sand and coral beaches. The island plateau, narrow tropic reef, steep drop-off to the ocean floor and undersea formation make the Christmas Island a popular diving destination. In addition, it has a diverse range of aquatic wildlife, particularly crabs and sea birds (DIRD 2014). More than 20 species of terrestrial and intertidal crabs exist on the island, which is unique and considered one of the wonders of the natural world. Eight species of sea birds nest on the island (DIRD 2014).

The shallow reef of the Christmas Island is home to 575 species of fish that live amongst the sand and corals. These include butterfly fish, lionfish, angelfish and parrotfish, as well as a small number of green and hawksbill turtles. The open ocean of the Christmas Island hosts species such as tunas, wahoo, barracuda, rainbow runners, mackerel scad, sailfishes, marlin, swordfishes and trevallies. Some of the larger species include the manta ray, spinner dolphins and whale sharks (Parks Australia 2015).

About 60 % of the Christmas Island has been declared as national parks, which is managed by Parks Australia. Phosphate mining, derived from bird droppings, is one of the largest industries in the island. Tourism is also increasingly contributing to the island's economy (Planning for People 2008).

The Territories Law Reform Act 1992 is the governing legislation for the Christmas Island, which applies Commonwealth laws and those of the state of Western Australia. The Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development has the overall responsibility for this offshore territory, including the provision of all service delivery arrangements. However, other functions such as quarantine and customs are the responsibility of the Commonwealth government. There are about 2,000 residents in the island.

13.9 Cocos (Keeling) Islands

The Cocos (Keeling) Islands is also located in the Indian Ocean, 2950 km northwest of Perth and 3700 km west of Darwin. This group of islands is a series of 27 seven coral islands with a total land area of approximately 14 km^2. Only two of these islands, the Home Island and the West Island, are inhabited.

This offshore territory of Australia is one of the most pristine tropic island groups in the Indian Ocean region with abundant wildlife, particularly seabirds, land crabs, turtles and a wide variety of corals, fish, molluscs and crustaceans. The northern atoll is the North Keeling Island which was declared as a national park in 1995 and administered by Parks Australia. It is considered as the one of the smallest and most remote Commonwealth National Park and is an important habitat for seabird breeding (Parks Australia 2015).

The Cocos (Keeling) Islands have rich colonial history and served as a communications and transport link during the world wars. Through an act of self-determination supervised by the United Nations, the Cocos community voted to be integrated with Australia. It is administered by the Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development and has the same arrangement for service delivery as the Christmas Island. In order to achieve comparable standards of living with those on the mainland, the government has established measures to provide services to Cocos (Keeling) Islands (DIRD 2014).

13.10 Coral Sea Islands

The Coral Sea Islands Territory is made up of many small islands spread over an area of 780,000 km^2 extending east and south from the outer edge of the Great Barrier Reef and including the Heralds Beacon Island, Osprey Reef, Willis Group and 15 other reef and island groups. However, the coral and sand islands are quite small and the total area of all the islands making up Australia's Coral Sea Islands Territory is only 7 km^2.

A number of marine national nature reserves have been declared in the Coral Sea Islands. Two species of sea turtles nest in the islands, as well as at least 24 bird species. Because of the historical fishing activities of Japan and other countries around the area, bilateral agreements have been entered into by Australia on endangered and migratory birds, which are implemented through a Migratory Birds Ordinance for the islands. Tropical cyclones also occur in the islands; hence, unmanned weather stations, beacons and a lighthouse are located on several islands and reefs and monitored by some staff of the Bureau of Meteorology located on Willis Island.

The laws of the Australian Capital Territory generally apply in the Coral Sea Islands Territory, and the Supreme Court of Norfolk Island exercises criminal jurisdiction in the Territory. Commonwealth laws only apply to the territory as expressly provided. Any Commonwealth or the Australian Capital Territory law that applies to the islands also applies to the 12 nautical mile territorial sea around each island. The Governor General may make ordinances for the peace, order and good government of the territory. A number of Commonwealth government departments administer certain activities in the Coral Sea Islands, including those responsible for the environment, agriculture, fisheries and national parks. The Royal Australian Navy and the Australian Customs and Border Protection Service conduct sea and aerial surveillance in the area.

13.11 Norfolk Island

The Norfolk Island is situated in the Pacific Ocean about 1600 km northeast of Sydney, 890 km northeast of Lord Howe Island and 1100 km northwest of Auckland. The island is a volcanic outcrop about 8 km long and 5 km wide with an area of 3455 ha. It has 1,800 inhabitants with tourism as the primary economic activity (DIRD 2014).

The Norfolk Island is Australia's oldest territory and one of the most geographically isolated communities comprising the Norfolk, Phillip and Nepean Islands.

Due to harsh conditions, early settlements deemed the island unsuitable for living. The third settlement brought about 200 men, women and children who made the 5-week journey from the Pitcairn Islands. The island's vegetation has been affected by people settlement, as well as the introduction of rabbits that infested the area. Today, only 5 % of the native forest remains undisturbed. Only after the last rabbit was trapped in 1986 did the vegetation start to regenerate (Geoscience Australia 2014).

The Norfolk Island is a self-governing external territory which means that it has powers similar to those of a national government and has established a representative legislative assembly and other separate political and administrative institutions provided under the Norfolk Island Act of 1979. Under this legislation, the Norfolk Island Legislative Assembly has wide-ranging powers to make laws with a few exceptions such as the establishment of defence forces, acquisition of property on other than just terms, coining of money and euthanasia. Norfolk Island is outside of Australia's immigration, social security and taxation systems. The Australian government controls the exclusive economic zone around the Norfolk Island which is the only source of its natural resources. The Norfolk Island does not directly control its marine areas but has an agreement with the Commonwealth through the Australian Fisheries Management Authority on fishing recreationally in a small portion of the EEZ (Joint Standing Committee 2003).

13.12 Challenges in the Management of Remote Island Territories in Australia

Similar to other islands in the world, the remote offshore territories of Australia address a number of wide-ranging issues. While the remoteness of these islands from the mainland is the key connection between these external territories, uninhabited islands would have a different set of challenges than inhabited remote islands in the country. The protection of fragile ecosystems of uninhabited islands may be a concern as a result of a lack of adequate studies on the state of environment in the area. Inhabited islands face more complex issues such as the need to balance economic development with the conservation of resources, addressing impacts of human activities, effective delivery of services to the people through adequate transport and communication links and waste management. In Australia, these offshore territories do not have a significant number of population compared to coastal cities. However, they may still share similar socio-economic concerns, although of a different scale, such as those islands in Indonesia and Japan, which are considered the most populous in the world, such as Java, Kyushu, Hokkaido and Okinawa.

Amongst the offshore areas, the Australian Antarctic Territory is one of the most vulnerable to environmental changes and increased human activities. The State of the Environment Report of Australia assesses that the Antarctic Peninsula is warming faster than anywhere else on earth, resulting in increasing loss of ice in coastal fringes. There is evidence to suggest that changes to ice seasonality have affected multiple levels of the marine food web. Warmer waters also enable alien species to extend their range which will likely compete and may replace native species. This could also have an impact on the benthic communities and functioning of the ecosystem (State of the Environment Committee 2011). The increasing activities in the Antarctic, including tourism and commercial fishing, also have an impact on the environment and would need further monitoring.

The Indian Ocean Territories of the Christmas Island and the Cocos (Keeling) Islands are also known to be vulnerable to the effects of climate change. Both external territories have experienced changes in the climate, such as air temperature and rainfall over the past decades. Studies have projected that these islands will be subject to a number of flooding which will affect settlements on Home and West Islands. It is also projected that while the number of cyclones and storm events may decrease in the future, the intensity of cyclones will increase (AECOM 2010a). Hence, any change in the mean sea level, combined with the effects of storm surges, will have dramatic consequences on these external territories.

Apart from known and potential environmental threats to the remote offshore territories in Australia, there are also issues relating to the security of people in the islands. An example of such challenges relates to the establishment of immigration centres in the Christmas Island. This was a response of the Commonwealth government to address an increase in asylum seekers in the country. While there have been a number of benefits to the establishment of detention centres in the Christmas

Island, including significant employment opportunities and economic contribution, there are also a number of negative impacts from the perspective of the residents in the area. These negative impacts include altered sense of security and safety, heightened stress and mental health issues, lifestyle changes, downturn in tourism and economic and political uncertainty (AECOM 2012b). The facility conditions at the immigration centres, including the length of detention, have been subject to scrutiny by asylum seekers, non-governmental organisations and the general public and have led to protests and class action that contribute to the security issues in the Christmas Island.

Because of the challenges posed by having detention facilities in the Christmas Island, a number of policy recommendations have been made in order to promote a more holistic type of development in the area (Change Sustainable Solutions 2010). Such recommendations include finding employment opportunities other than the detention centre, the government or the mines, to establish a thriving tourism industry and recognise the diversity of the community, and to have a more effective planning and development programme.

Similar to small island developing states, external island territories in Australia face a number of socio-economic development issues, particularly in comparison to a mainland or city area. The Norfolk Island, being a self-governing territory, has experienced a number of challenges in the delivery of economic and social services to the community, capacity to fund infrastructure development and investment, fiscal stabilisation and capacity building in terms of education and skill development. As a result, the Commonwealth government has provided regular injections of funding to the Norfolk Island. In order to address some of the socio-economic issues, a number of recommendations have been developed for the Norfolk Island in relation to legislative reform, tax reform, improvement in revenue-raising capacity, asset sales, increasing adult education services and capacity building and support to younger generation to access education and training in the mainland (ACIL Tasman 2012).

13.13 Developing Management Plans for Islands

The Australian government, whether at the local, state or national level, develops management plans for the sustainability of its islands and their resources. These management plans contain the various elements proposed in Chapter 17 of Agenda 21 for small island developing states, further demonstrating the applicability of similar sustainability approaches for islands of different legal status. These elements for a management plan include an environmental profile and inventory of natural resources and critical habitats, assessment of the carrying capacity of the island, medium- and long-term plans for multiple use of resources and sectoral planning, use of geographic information system and other mapping techniques and decision-making tools, intersectoral coordination, community participation, use of environmentally sound technology and contingency planning. Even though the many islands of Australia are under its administration, including the external territories, their right to development is respected and very well entrenched in strategic and environmental management plans.

Addressing the various needs and challenges of islands is achieved not only in terms of the legal and political framework, but most importantly through strategic or management plans. A management plan generally lays out the characteristics of the island, the diversity of the resources, various economic activities, as well as the applicable legal framework, policies or guidelines to be followed, the management authority involved, and objectives and actions to be undertaken. Any management plan would need to draw from the biological and cultural uniqueness of the islands as strengths and turn their protection, conservation and use as opportunities to sustain life and offer quality living for its residents. If a remote island is uninhabited, its protection may primarily be through the designation of a marine or nature reserve. There may be scheduled scientific expeditions to monitor the state of the environment of the island which is decided by the state or Commonwealth government. If an island is habitable, environmental and socio-economic elements are considered.

A management plan provides principles that guide all policies, decision-making and operations in an island. Examples of these guiding principles are the conservation of the terrestrial and marine environment; protection of cultural heritage; undertaking recreation, tourism and other activities as appropriate to the environment; preservation of the social environment; as well as the delivery of services and maintenance of facilities that address the needs of the people of the island comparable to the mainland. Some of the more specific elements of a management plan include:

- Determination of priority issues
- Environmental indicators and response to environmental impacts
- Specific management actions or management direction
- Development activity approval and planning
- Value of ecosystems and benefits of sustainable management actions
- Indigenous culture integration and heritage conservation
- Climate change factors, trends, risks and mitigation plan
- Provision of services, infrastructure and asset management
- Financial sustainability, including revenue, funding and cost savings
- Research and monitoring programme
- Role and responsibilities of government and ad hoc committees
- Stakeholder involvement and community participation
- Dissemination of information
- Timeframe for implementation
- Implementation strategies, including enforcement of management measures
- Performance assessment and reporting

Each island, big or small, would benefit from a comprehensive management plan that adopts the above elements, as appropriate to their requirement.

13.14 Conclusion

Islands of different legal status share the same wealth of cultural heritage, unique biodiversity and environmental vulnerabilities. Similar to small island developing states, island territories of more developed economies such as Australia have similar ecological characteristics and are confronted with comparable socio-economic challenges only at a different scale. Governments, whether at the local or national level, have the responsibility to promote self-reliance and enhance the quality of life of the people in small islands. While global and regional programmes have been developed to address challenges faced by small island developing states, little attention has been given to small remote offshore islands administered by individual coastal states. Although remote offshore islands are considered integral to the maritime jurisdiction of coastal states and may create an 'extension' of maritime waters, their geographic isolation and dispersion not only make them susceptible to environmental pressures; they are also subject to difficulties in human service delivery and security issues.

The Australian government promotes the sustainability of its islands, including the remote offshore islands or external territories by integrating them in the country's legal and political framework and developing specific management plans. These management plans contain the various elements promoted in global policies on small island developing states, which demonstrate the universal application of sustainability approaches for all islands, both as independent or dependent territories. In Australia, management plans draw on the biological and cultural characteristics of the islands within their limited human resource and financial capacity and turn the conservation and use of natural resources as opportunities for providing quality of life for its people and generations to come. This is an evolving process that requires continuous monitoring, community participation and effective implementation.

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Part V
Indigenous Languages

Chapter 14
Gefpå'go na Dinagi: Decolonization and the Chamorro Language of Guam

Michael Lujan Bevacqua and Kenneth Gofigan Kuper

14.1 Hacha: Tinituhon

As everyday advocates for the revitalization of Chamorro, the language of the indigenous people of the Marianas, we, the authors of this article, have committed to speaking to our children in the Chamorro language, regardless of the situation. On an island where less than 20 % of the people can currently speak Chamorro, very few of whom are demographically youth, this is often times treated as an oddity. We are regularly approached by Chamorros older than us to congratulate us because our speaking to our children in Chamorro is helping to preserve the beautiful language and heritage of the Chamorro people. When we press these elders as to whether or not they speak Chamorro to their own children or grandchildren, we are rarely given an affirmative response. They commonly invoke the difficulty in people learning the language today and also express the fear that it will interfere with their learning English, the dominant language in Guam today. Finally, many articulate exasperation that the younger generation doesn't want to learn Chamorro. All three of these answers, but the final answer in particular, are connected to what we refer to as *i Gefpå'go na Dinagi* or "the beautiful lie," a sharp and disastrous disconnect between prevailing positive language attitudes in Guam toward Chamorro and a continued disturbing lack of transmission to younger generations by existing speakers. Chamorros today unequivocally report that their language is an essential part of their heritage and a beautiful part of their peoplehood that must be preserved, yet do not take concrete steps in their own lives and within their own familial contexts to ensure the language is perpetuated (Pa'a Taotao Tåno' 2010).

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This phenomenon will be referred to as *i Gefpå'go na Dinagi* because of the way the perceived beauty of Chamorro, after centuries of colonial pressures for Chamorros to give it up, seems to have little effect on whether or not Chamorros who can speak the language will pass it on to those younger than them. The positive perceptions of the Chamorro language do not appear to positively affect sustainable intergenerational language transmission.

A community attempting to revitalize their language must move beyond easy praise for their language and rather engage in social projects that serve as a blueprint for language revitalization. In this article, Chamorro language revitalization is seen not only as a linguistic and cultural endeavor but also as a site for political, ideological contestation. In order to unpack this idea of *i Gefpå'go na Dinagi*, this article will be divided into five sections with the first outlining the history of linguistic colonialism and the remaining sections correlating to what we call the "4 stages of language colonization/decolonization." The first stage "Cultural Self-Destruction," aims to illustrate the effects of linguistic colonialism as seen through aspects of "internalized racism." The second stage "Recognition of Loss," will trace a short history of the beginnings of Chamorro language revitalization projects as well as analyze their effectiveness.

The third stage, "The Beautiful Lie," will attempt to ultimately frame this concept as not only a consequence of this colonial history, but as a continuation of the trappings of colonial logics. Most germane to this portion will be answering the question, "What are the ideological factors that stop Chamorros from moving beyond a 'Beautiful Lie' stage?" The article will conclude with the last stage "Return to Sovereignty," which will weave the narrative together to discuss the possibilities of moving beyond "The Beautiful Lie" and pushing Chamorros as a community to not settle for cultural or linguistic valorization in English, but rather seek to rebuild themselves as a sovereign Chamorro-speaking community again.

14.2 Hugua: History of Linguistic Colonialism

The Chamorro language is an Austronesian language spoken in the Mariana Islands, in the western Pacific region of Micronesia. The Marianas form a 15-island archipelago politically divided into the US "unincorporated territory" of Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands. The language is linguistically classified within the Malayo-Polynesian family.[1] According to the 2010 census, only 18 % of the population in Guam speaks Chamorro, and 44 % of people live in English-only households. An overwhelming number of fluent speakers are currently over the age of 60 (US Census Bureau 2014). Thus, the next 20 years are critical to the health of the Chamorro language, as the number of fluent speakers outside of the elder generation is minimal.

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[1] While most of the languages in Micronesia lie under the classification of Micronesian languages under the group "Oceanic," Chamorro, along with Palauan, is said to possibly be a totally independent branch of an Austronesian language. Linguists have also said that because of prominent grammatical features and vocabulary similarities, *Fino' Chamoru* is closely related to certain languages in the Philippines, although the exact language that Chamorro is derived from is unknown at this time.

To understand why the Chamorro language is endangered, it is essential to discuss the colonial history of Guam and its effect on the language. Guam has undergone four waves of colonization, the first in 1668 under the Spanish, whose primary mission was to convert the Chamorro people to Catholicism. The Spanish missionaries used the Chamorro language as a means of conversion. The current archbishop of Guam, Anthony Apuron, wrote:

> The fathers, who brought the faith to the Marianas, had to grapple with the natives and had to find ways in which to enter their mindset and culture. That they did by learning and speaking the native language in order to win the people over and in order that they may impart the faith that is Catholic. (Apuron 1996)

Diego Luis de San Vitores, the main architect of the Spanish mission, conducted his first masses entirely in Chamorro and also wrote the first Chamorro grammar books. While Chamorros were initially excited to hear Europeans speak their language, they rejected the cultural change that the priests required, such as the crushing of ancestral skulls Chamorros had venerated for millennia. This led to 27 years of sporadic conflicts known as the Chamorro-Spanish Wars (Benavente 2007). Combining introduced diseases, natural disasters, and killings and executions, Spanish military conquest killed an estimated 90 % of Chamorros by 1740. As part of their colonization of Guam, the Spanish sought to dismantle aspects of the matrilineal Chamorro society that gave greater influence to local women. Chamorro men were generally more accepting of the new patriarchal regime, with women more resistant. As a result Chamorro women became the bearers of the Chamorro culture and language (Souder 1987).

For the next two centuries, Spanish was used as the language of the Catholic Church, the colonial government, and trade. As Chamorro culture changed during this period and began to absorb Hispanic influences, this was also reflected in the language. Chamorros adopted more and more Spanish terms, particularly those associated with newly established institutions such as schools, the church, and the government. Chamorros continued to use their language as the primary means of communication and the language of their homes, families, and community. According to historian Pedro Sanchez, "By the end of the Spanish era in the 1890s, 75 % of the adult population was fluent in Chamorro and some 50 % were literate in Spanish" (Carano and Sanchez 1964).

After the Spanish-American War, Guam was "given" to the United States of America as a "spoil of war" in 1898, along with Puerto Rico, Cuba, and the Philippines.[2] Martial law ensued: from 1898 to 1950, the highest-ranking naval office on the island was designated as the governor of civil affairs. Idiosyncratic, heavy-handed executive ordinances resulted. One naval governor banned whistling in the capitol city of Hagåtña: "Whistling is an entirely unnecessary and irritating noise that must be discontinued" (Forbes 2014). This period was also characterized by forceful attempts to "Americanize" and ultimately "Anglicize" the people.

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[2] It is important to point out that this was the period when the Mariana Islands were officially separated politically, with Guam going to the Americans and the northern islands going to Germany.

Unlike the Spanish, the US officials viewed the Chamorro language as an impediment to colonialism. For the first time in Guam's history, there was an official government program to eradicate the Chamorro language. The US navy considered English foundational to civilization and Chamorro a remnant of primitivism. Naval governors formalized assaults on Chamorro. General Order #12 passed by the first naval governor, Richard Leary, required instruction in English for the youth of Guam. General Order #243, in 1917, banned the speaking of Chamorro except for official interpreting and designated English as the only official language of Guam (Clement 2009).

Chamorros suffered fees and corporal punishment for speaking their language in certain public places, even accidentally. In some schools a ticket system was implemented to discourage the use of Chamorro. Any student caught speaking Chamorro would be given a ticket, and this ticket would then be passed on to the next student caught. By the end of the day, whoever held the ticket would receive corporal punishment (Underwood 1987). Chamorro elders from the period commonly tell of fees in school for speaking their language. During this era, many a young Chamorro child went hungry at school because the Americans had taken her lunch money as fees (Gofigan Kuper 2014).

Although government and school policies were a significant part of the eradication effort, the introduction of media outlets also played a large role. The *Guam Recorder*, directed toward and eventually owned by the US Navy, published constant editorials on "English as Success Ideology." Chamorro scholar Robert Underwood describes this colonial ideology:

> Most of the value attached to English was phrased in terms of school success; but of equal importance, English was also cast as part of the agenda of progressive social development. The learning of English was supposed to uplift in social terms the Chamorro people. (Underwood 1984)

An anonymous editorial from September 1925 promoted the Americanization of culture through language:

> Through English will come a knowledge of fair play and a keen sense of honor such as the progenitors of Americans had at the time of the origin of the language and such as is practiced by the American nation at the present time. With a knowledge of English under American tutorship will come a natural love of labor and industry by those who even come to think themselves educated.

The US navy created an environment in which Chamorros were constantly pressured into giving up their language. However, while Chamorros used English when forced to in schools and government buildings, they continued to use Chamorro with family and friends. As late as 1939, US naval officials expressed racist frustration at indigenous language survival and the population's lack of fluency in

English (Rogers 2011). The Chamorro language was central to the people's identity, despite 35 years of oppressive colonialist ideologies.

On December 8, 1941, just a few hours after Pearl Harbor was bombed by Japanese imperial forces, Guam was attacked as well. The miniscule American military presence was quickly overrun, leading to 32 months of Japanese occupation. This period was marked by extreme hardship, such as forced labor, loss of property, and sexual violence aimed at Chamorro women for much of the occupation and a period of torture and massacres during its closing months (Palomo 2004). In July 1944, the USA took the island again with devastating bombing as part of their Pacific campaign.

The Japanese administration did not address the indigenous Chamorro language much, but sought to impose Japanese, eradicate English, and generally rid the Micronesian region of Western influence: "Language training was regarded as the key to foster consciousness among the natives as 'peoples of Asia' shaking themselves free from European and American colonial exploitation and having them acquire the Japanese spirit and culture" (Higuchi 2013). Japanese language and writing characters were taught, the Chamorro language was sometimes prohibited in schools, while the English language, including English reading material, was prohibited throughout the island (Higuchi 2013).

Since the Japanese did not ban the Chamorro language or understand it, many Chamorro people used their indigenous language as a bubble of sovereignty invisible to their Asian colonizers. Chamorros made simple songs that sounded upbeat, and might seem happy about the Japanese era, but in truth were highly critical (Bevacqua 2004). This linguistic agency hidden in plain sight provided a smokescreen of resistance to the colonial efforts at "Japanization."

14.3 Tulu: Cultural/Linguistic Self-Destruction

The 3-year period of World War II occupation in Guam had little Japanese linguistic consequence, but it changed the Chamorro relation to their US colonizers. Prior to the war, Chamorros did not want to become US citizens, viewing the colonial government as racist and paternalistic (Underwood 2001). From the ashes of war, however, Chamorros emerged fundamentally different, with a profound gratitude to the USA for expelling the Japanese. There was now a strong desire to Americanize and become closer to the USA, which finally pushed the Chamorro language to its current state of endangerment.

Postwar Americanization catalyzed this language shift, ending most Chamorro resistance to linguistic colonialism. The USA did not impose martial law on the island postwar, but allowed a façade of self-government to exist while keeping the island broadly under US political control (San Agustin 1996). Most Chamorros accepted the ideological arguments for Americanization and Anglicization and against Chamorro language and culture. Language resistance evaporated.

This postwar period inaugurated the first stage of language colonization in Guam: cultural self-destruction, the result of colonial processes of internalized oppression, and inferiority complexes. Frantz Fanon explains, “All colonized people—in other words, people in whom an inferiority complex has taken root, whose local cultural originality has been committed to the grave—position themselves in relation to the civilizing language” (1962). These sentiments are echoed by postcolonial author Ngugi Wa Thiong’o, who writes that colonization “annihilates a people’s beliefs in their names, in their languages, in their environment, in their heritage of struggle, in their unity, in their capacity and ultimately in themselves” (1986). Indigenous people veer away from anything resembling their own culture, gravitating instead toward materials, attitudes, and beliefs that resemble or symbolize the colonial power.

For Chamorros and their language, this cultural self-destruction manifested itself in various forms, subtle and overt, including teasing, education, and legislation. Anything overtly Chamorro or un-American was targeted. Schools set up language zones marked off by fences with giant signs saying “English Only,” and young students would be penalized for speaking Chamorro there. One school principal, Joaquin Torres, expressed his support of this “English-Only” crusade by writing that those who would refuse to continue developing their English skills “are really committing criminal deeds to the public and especially to the future generations who will have to face greater obstacles in meeting life’s necessities” (1925). Like Torres, many Chamorros now accepted the “English as Progress” ideology that they had resisted just decades before.

Contributing to this language shift was the drastic social restructuring of Guam after the war. Robert Underwood states, “The message of English and its impact of occupational success was given prior to the war but had little chance for application in the subsistence economy. The post-war occupational picture seemed to validate in dollars and cents this component of the ideology” (1987). The 1950s and 1960s saw Guam shift to a wage economy, with a mass exodus of Chamorros joining the US military (Untalan 2008), the introduction of television, and the arrival of waves of foreign immigrants to build new infrastructure. English became the lingua franca of the island.

While Chamorro remained vital among the older generation, Chamorro children now learned English as their first language. Racist ideologies of English language supremacy became commonly accepted. Parents did not speak Chamorro to their children for fear it might divide their brain functions, weaken their intelligence, and erase their prospects for higher education and well-paying jobs. These internalized ideologies of self-loathing were reinforced by memories of the fines and other forms of punishment in the prewar US educational system. Parents were worried their children might be shamed by these same punishments if they spoke Chamorro publicly (Gofigan Kuper 2014). Chamorro remained the primary language used by people of the war generation, but it was not passed down to most of the postwar generation.

14.4 Fatfat: The Recognition of Potential Loss

While the 1960s were a pivotal time of the counterculture and resistance against authoritative regimes, Guam experienced the beginning of a new sense of sovereignty and resistance in the 1970s when Carlos Camacho became the first democratically elected governor of what was still ultimately a US colony (Rogers 2011). Prior to this, all governors were either the highest-ranking naval official on the island or were appointed by the US president. Chamorros also received one symbolic, nonvoting delegate to the US Congress. Feeling more empowered by these political shifts, Chamorros also came to see their indigenous language and culture as worth valuing and preserving. This led to the second stage of language decolonization: the recognition of potential loss.

Chamorros began to recognize the problem with the generation that had lost their language, as a linguistic divide was created among family members. Studies in Guam estimated that the language would be dead in two generations, since it was no longer being transmitted to children (Topping 1973). Such findings sparked social and political programs to reverse language decline. The Chamorro language was no longer something to be ashamed of but a positive marker of cultural identity, which was widely described as in need of preservation.

In a watershed moment, the Guam public school system introduced a bilingual and bicultural education program, where Chamorro would be officially spoken in schools for the first time. Senator Frank G. Lujan had introduced Public Law 12-31, which authorized the Board of Education to develop this program. After the bill was passed, educators and community activists obtained US federal funds to create a pilot bilingual project. Historically, public schools had been a main site of indigenous language death, the official, exclusive domain of English. Chamorro was also formally elevated to the status of an official language in Guam through Public Law 12-132, introduced by Senator Paul Bordallo (Lujan 1996). Now, Chamorro could be used in official government business, while naval governors had once issued general orders against its use therein.

Another event of the 1970s that served as a catalyst for the revival of the Chamorro language was a major protest against the *Pacific Daily News'* (PDN) English-only policy. When the spouse of a bilingual/bicultural educator wanted to place an advertisement in Chamorro in the newspaper, the PDN refused, citing its policy prohibiting use of the indigenous Chamorro language. In response, on March 26, 1978, around 400 people gathered to protest, symbolically burning newspaper subscriptions, giving speeches over megaphones, and threatening to cancel their subscriptions unless the PDN rescinded its policy. The PDN backed down and agreed to print advertisements in Chamorro as well.

The legacy of the 1970s endures today. The bilingual/bicultural education program eventually became the Chamorro Language Program, and, by 1991, all public school students in Guam were required to take at least 6 years of Chamorro language in order to graduate (Guam Public Law, GC § 11682). In 2011, a bill was introduced by Senator Mana Silva Taijeron, which would increase the number of years Chamorro would be taught from 6 to 11 years total by 2014 (Guam Public Law, P.L. 26-150:1; P.L. 31-045:2). Outside of the public education system, children's books have been published in Chamorro, as well as comic strips that now run daily in the PDN. The most prominent of these is the comic "Juan Malimanga" based on a character from Chamorro-Spanish tales, created by language advocate Clotilde Gould (Tolentino and Varias 2012). There are also radio stations, such as 102.9 FM, that are dedicated to Chamorro music, linguistic studies published on Chamorro, and an immersion program for children, Hurao Academy, named for a Chamorro warrior and leader who resisted Spanish colonization.

14.5 Lima: Celebration of Beauty/"The Beautiful Lie"

The most recent study on language attitudes indicates that 90 % of Chamorros state that the Chamorro language is important and should be preserved and promoted (Pa'a Taotao Tåno' 2010). This marks the third and present stage of language decolonization: the celebration of beauty. Colonialist ideologies appear to be challenged and even usurped. Postwar attitudes saw Chamorro as useless or primitive, something to be discarded. Now, Chamorros celebrate their indigenous language and speak highly of all who learn it or can use it.

Those who speak the language are now seen as having special and exceptional knowledge. Even for those who may critique the idea of Chamorro language classes being mandatory in public schools, very few contest that the language is something that should be learned. To speak out against the use of Chamorro in Guam today would be to face social consequences, including explicit accusations of racism.

In terms of language revitalization or the bringing of a native language back to a healthy state, celebration of beauty is superficial and misleading. The harsh colonialist programs of the past have ended and there is no overt pressure to stop speaking the language. On the surface, it would seem that the language should now flourish again.

However, Chamorro language decline has continued since the 1970s expanding of consciousness, and it has not slowed down at all. Whereas 90 % of Chamorro above the age of 60 speak the language, less than 5 % of Chamorros under the age of 21 now speak the language (Pa'a Taotao Tåno' 2010). The Chamorro language classes that are mandatory for all public school students from elementary to high school have failed to create fluency. Teachers do not use a standard curriculum and the weekly contact hours are far too few to have any real impact. In addition, there has been no serious effort to create a more effective program of immersion in the curriculum. English is still the predominant language in Guam, and almost all children are still learning it as their first language, with Chamorro rarely spoken to young people in the home. The celebration of beauty does not serve fluency, but subverts it. The celebration of beauty only popularizes *I Gefpå'go na Dinagi* in which a narrative of celebration is promoted by everyone from politicians to average community members, but little concrete action is taken privately or publicly to promote its revitalization.

A core explanation for this requires looking at decolonization theory and processes around the world. The impacts of colonization can be so long-lasting and invasive that some theorists argue that even if you decolonize politically, you may never be able to leave the postcolonial moment (Bhabha 2004). The authors would argue, based on the theories of Frantz Fanon, that one cannot simply "get over" or "move past" colonization (Fanon 1963). In order to move beyond colonization, more overt efforts are required. Decolonization in the political sense does not mean that the infrastructure, processes, and ideology of colonialism are also eradicated. Colonization tends to leave vestiges of itself that can be damaging to a postcolonial society if not removed.

Jeff Corntassel in his essay, "Toward Sustainable Self-Determination: Rethinking the Contemporary Indigenous-Rights Discourse," discusses the problems of simply "getting past" colonization (2008). He argues that colonized, indigenous societies can re-empower themselves looking to their own culture and epistemology for the creation of a world rid of colonialism, rather than simply mimicking colonial infrastructure and processes in their "post"-colonial society. His concept of "Sustainable Self-Determination" is relevant here. Corntassel writes, "What is needed is a more holistic and dynamic approach to regenerating indigenous nations." He then goes on to explain what this holistic approach can look like. "Sustainable self-determination as a process is premised on the notion that evolving indigenous livelihoods, food security, community governance, relationships to homelands and the natural world, and ceremonial life can be practiced today locally and regionally, thus enabling the transmission of these traditions and practices to future generations" (2008).

Self-determination and decolonization do not simply mean leaving the colonial governmental structure in place and having indigenous leadership of these structures. Corntassel calls indigenous peoples to realize that a substantial amount of work, community, and imagination is needed for beneficial, effective change.

In regard to the Chamorro language, being stuck in the third stage is similar to never reinventing new ways of life, but rather feeding on the vestiges of colonialism's passing. The third stage makes one feel as if everything is already fine and that no more work needs to be done. For many, the language is being cherished and celebrated, what else needs to be accomplished? These questions reveal the true face of colonialism. The truth of the legacies of colonialism is that it strips the sovereignty from the language so that one can feel as if respect is being paid to that language through the fetishization of its surface rather than the reigniting of its core. Taiaiake Alfred describes this as moving from being trapped in a cage to having a chain around one's neck. While there is more room to move, and one thinks one is free, one is ultimately still in captivity. He writes:

> I believe it is because they are bound up in and unable to break free from the limiting logic of the colonial myths that they claim to oppose. The myths' symbols and embedded beliefs force aboriginal thinking to remain in colonial mental, political, and legal frameworks. (Alfred 2009)

With this legacy, the colonized do not necessarily improve the quality of their lives with the eradication of colonialism. While the language is celebrated in a superficial and abstract sense, it remains something detached and out of place in contemporary Guam.

A case in point is the fact that the language continues to decline despite the discourse on beauty that creates the impression that there is a community agreement on the importance of the language. If we accept this discourse at face value, individual parents and grandparents should be taking the initiative to use the language with their children and grandchildren. This has not happened, which means there must be something further happening at this stage to keep a colonial interpretation of the language intact, preventing the language from becoming healthy once again.

For those who have been stripped of sovereignty and had their language and culture attacked, it is commonsensical that they may need to reassert the importance and centrality of their language or culture. They might need to make a statement or take a stand in order to revive their language (Bevacqua 2013). This might be something that will offend some or make them feel as if they were being blamed for the sins of others. What can make this difficult in Guam and in other contexts is the discourse on multiculturalism. Guam is a multicultural space in the sense that many diverse cultures live there. The presence of diverse cultures is not what presents a threat to Chamorro language revitalization. The true threat to Chamorro language revitalization is a particular multicultural discourse that mitigates the way different cultures relate to each other and perceive themselves. This discourse is dangerous especially to native peoples (Bevacqua 2010).

Multiculturalism, while progressive compared to the way societies have been organized in the past, is ultimately a conservative discourse that creates an understanding of all cultures being fundamentally equal and beautiful in their own right. In this discourse, multiculturalism is an assimilationist model of cultural diversity in which white is the invisible norm by which others are judged. This form of multiculturalism present in Guam marginalizes the different experiences of minority groups/indigenous peoples and avoids analyzing the institutional factors involved in this marginalization (Nylund 2006).

Everyone is entitled to speak their own language and practice aspects of their own culture, but only to the extent that this does not interfere with anyone else’s beliefs or rights. Despite this emphasis on equality or diversity, in truth all cultures are supposed to respect and adhere to the dominance of a single, oftentimes invisible culture that will act as the mediator, telling each culture what it is allowed to practice and how much of its language should be spoken. This culture is dominant in the way it does not provide particularity to the multicultural matrix, but instead its particularity acts as the universal structure (Gordon and Newfield 1996). Avery Gordon, a sociologist, critiques multiculturalism as being an erasure of race: “Multiculturalism often avoided race. It didn’t seem very antiracist and often left the impression that any discussion of cultural diversity would render racism insignificant. It was ambiguous about the inheritance and the ongoing presence of histories of oppression” (Gordon and Newfield 1996).

In a multicultural framework, although one now sees one's language and culture as being beautiful, one does not necessarily view the language as being essential to one's life. In Guam, although Chamorro is seen as beautiful and wonderful, it is not seen as something to be taken seriously as people interact with their children or with each other. Whereas English is intimately tied to commerce, to education, and to so many things marked as being modern, Chamorro seems to lack those associations. As a result, Chamorros do not use it in the homes and the government lacks any substantive effort to revitalize it. What holds people back are fears of marring the multicultural harmony of the space. For those who seek to decolonize, in an aggressive attempt to deal with colonial legacies, they are perceived to be ruining the multicultural present. They are asserting the language and culture too forcibly and pushing it onto others.

Thus, one of the largest hurdles of decolonization and language revitalization is challenging the hegemony of the invisible colonial culture that tends to linger. In the case of Guam, this is American multiculturalism and English. To seek to revitalize the language is to challenge the dominance of American ideas in terms of telling Chamorros and other cultures in Guam what the limits of their culture should be. Language revitalization tends to be the battleground for ideological contestations like these. David Leedom Shaul writes that "language revitalization projects tend to operate within the economics and strictures of a dominant society and therefore in step with the linguistic ideology of the matrix culture" (Leedom Shaul 2014). To emphasize this point, linguistic anthropologist Paul Kroskrity writes:

> A community's conceptions of its language are critically influenced by its position in political economic and other relevant systems… Those whose languages do not enjoy the hegemonic support of nation-states must either resist by locating authority in alternative, local sources or submit to dominant views. (Kroskrity 2009)

In the Chamorro situation, the language is caught up in and heavily influenced by the discourse of colonial multiculturalism and its emphasis on obedience to the invisible culture.

The third stage of "The Beautiful Lie" is seductive precisely because it does not challenge anything. It does not require anything in terms of challenging systems of power, nor does it actually require that people act to effect any substantive change. According to the "discourse on beauty," acknowledging the beauty of the language is what matters, not actually speaking it. Multiculturalism is a framework where value is gleaned from cultures recognizing and tolerating each other in largely superficial ways. What matters is not actually knowing one's language, but being able to represent it, either through tattoos, slang/curse words, or other forms of ethnic expression. "Saving the language" in this context is saving its superficial aspects. So long as one can articulate the beauty of the language in English, all that is needed is that superficial referent, the mere ability to refer to these ethnic attributes.

14.6 Gunum: Return to Sovereignty

In order to truly revitalize the Chamorro language, one needs to move to the fourth stage of language decolonization. Although we could refer to this stage as "the infusion of value," it is in truth an infusion of sovereignty. One cannot revitalize a language unless one challenges the ideological systems that led to its endangerment. The forces that give rise to language marginalization are also what give rise to the political, economic, and social marginalization of a people. Since language revitalization is trapped in the strictures of the dominant society, it is necessary to address these larger issues in order to effectively revive the language (Henderson et al. 2014). Without challenging those systems and strictures, one remains stuck in the third stage, celebrating the beauty of a language while letting it continue to decline in use. Centuries of colonization stripped the Chamorro people of the feeling that they can exist on their own or that they have an essence that is independent. This lack of sovereignty hinders so much in terms of revitalizing the language.

Sovereignty has many definitions, but it is a force that sustains people (Barker 2005). A language is a core part of this force. A strong and vibrant language can help keep people determined and vigilant as they confront life's challenges. In order for the language to become sovereign again, one must find ways to challenge the colonial ideologies that compel people to see the language of the colonized in narrow and limited ways. Even as they say the language is beautiful, they in truth believe in a colonial caricature of it, where it really does not have any purpose in the world except to be exotic, interesting, or beautiful.

What will it take for the language to become sovereign again? First, an examination of the prevailing language ideologies is essential. This process enables the community to recognize where it is and thus set more appropriate goals for language revitalization. Furthermore, this process would allow for a greater understanding of the political and colonial landscape still in Guam. The second step would be to develop language revitalization infrastructure aimed at countering the causes of language shift, rather than a pure concentration of language development. These projects would include the perpetuation of the Chamorro language in ways that delink it from being an obstacle to "multiculturalism."

Some scholars have critiqued mainstream language revitalization models as being too focused on language development while not focused enough on the actual causes of language endangerment: "The model contrasts strongly with existing models in that it focuses on collaborative work in which explicitly language-focused activities are undertaken only as intentional support for institutional development projects" (Henderson et al. 2014). Henderson, Rohloff, and Henderson give various examples of a new model of language revitalization revolving around social development as opposed to language development. One example was the development of programs that trained translators for healthcare services. Although this is not a typical language revitalization program, it helps to raise the status of the language by allowing the language to be used in the all-important domain of healthcare, whereas before it served as an obstacle to obtaining quality healthcare.

Projects like these can help broaden people's view of what the Chamorro language can be used for and how it can survive in the modern world.

14.7 Fiti: Finakpo'

Further illustrating possible routes to language sovereignty is best left to another paper, but what can be addressed now are some of the lingering limiting ideologies that have led to the severe endangerment of the Chamorro language. These limiting ideologies manifest in small, commonsensical ways, appearing at the edges of everyday conversations, but nonetheless create powerfully narrow impressions of Chamorro language possibility.

These are some points to consider in challenging the core of the colonial ideologies that have lead to Chamorro language endangerment:

First, Chamorro is not only worth celebrating, but it is worth using. Language survives by intergenerational transmission, and it must be seen as something natural to use and pass on to those younger than oneself. Unless this simple shift of consciousness takes place, the decline of Chamorro will most likely continue.

Second, celebrating the Chamorro language is not a substitute for knowing and speaking it. Multiculturalism can give the feeling that superficial aspects of one's ethnic existence bear deep and profound meanings, but this is part of the beautiful lie. Not all Chamorros needs to speak Chamorro, but it is something that is an important part of their identity, their history, and their culture.

Third, the meaning of the language itself should be expanded so that people do not associate it solely with the elderly or with times past. The language must feel like it can exist in the world today. It must be able to adapt and cannot be mired in debates over purity or authenticity.

Fourth, sovereignty does not mean exclusivity, and so the Chamorro is not "stuck" in solely a Chamorro world. Chamorros can speak other languages, and other languages can be in Guam.

With all of this discussion, the ultimate hope of the authors is for our children to grow up in a Guam where the Chamorro language is the norm. The hope is for our children to be raised knowing that to really pay tribute to the language, one needs to speak the language. The hope is for our children to be raised in a version of Guam relatively free of colonial logic and trappings and a version of Guam that allows the Chamorro to be present and sovereign. Our history shows that Chamorros are strong people who regularly shunned colonial ideologies; it is about time this next generation returned to that norm.

In the past year, the authors have coordinated a number of activities related to Chamorro language revitalization that attempt to focus on these root causes for Chamorro language endangerment. These events include campaign days focused on speaking only the Chamorro language and no English to the establishment of a master-apprentice language-learning pilot program. In all these activities, we recognize that the key to saving the Chamorro language is not to celebrate it, but to use it and, in doing so, to teach it to others or learn it for oneself. Our motto throughout all these activities has been “Yanggen un lå’la’ gi Fino’ Chamoru, un na’lå’la’ i Fino’ Chamoru”! (If you live in the Chamorro language, you give life to the Chamorro language!)

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Chapter 15
Ainu Languages: Correct, Good, and Less So

Katsunobu Izutsu

15.1 Introduction

Is Ainu language revitalization welcomed in Hokkaido? After living on the northernmost island of Japan for more than 20 years, my answer to this question is, unfortunately, in the negative. I could easily come up with ample evidence for this answer: the resistance to Ainu language activities in my workplace, a local assembly member's inconsiderate utterances, hate speech messages on electronic bulletin boards found on the Internet, and so forth. Nevertheless, the most overlooked fact may be that Ainu language revitalization can be defied not only by those who hate, despise, or deny the language but also by those who love, respect, or patronize it. Most people on both sides, apparently taking opposing stands, have in common "the 'species' metaphor of 'language survival'" (Patrick 2007: p. 125), which has presumably been more or less responsible for the revitalization of the language being unwelcomed. I am ashamed that I have also, though unintentionally, afforded partial assistance to such a misconception of the language.

However, I am proud that I have worked together with students and colleagues on Ainu language revitalization in my workplace for about a decade. After completing my first edited Ainu dictionary, I was engaged in grant-in-aid research for Ainu language revitalization based on the Welsh model for the following 3 years. In cooperation with some of my students and colleagues, I managed to realize some Ainu language materials, including a dictionary of present-day Ainu, a textbook and glossary for a radio language course, an Ainu language textbook for advanced learners, and a teacher's manual for Ainu language learning and studies.

The present-day Ainu dictionary made a number of attempts to present practical usages of frequently used words, semantic networks of polysemous words,

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explanations of dialectal and stylistic variations, and cross-references for near synonyms and antonyms. The advanced-level textbook endeavored to locate the language in a wide range of traditional and modern contexts and to demonstrate how a large vocabulary, old and new, can be put in use for present-day purposes. Some advocates of language preservation seemed to be critical about such editorial policy, but many more proponents of language revitalization were supportive of it. Although there have not been any comparable dictionaries and textbooks so far, Greenbaum's contention in the following passage still encourages us in our endeavors.

> Grammarians expose themselves to strictures from various directions: from scholars who object that they are oversimplifying and relying on insufficient evidence; from conservatives who accuse them of advocating that 'anything goes'; and from radicals who condemn the social discrimination in making any value judgments on language. But they should be courageous, prescribing without ridiculing. (Greenbaum 1988: p. 36)

The present study explores the notions of correct and good Ainu language compatible with both language preservation and revitalization. Different goals naturally invite different views of these notions. Ainu language preservation and revitalization are often in conflict; the former is sometimes destructively rather than constructively critical of the latter. The first key to a solution is to share the spirit of "division of labor." Language preservation intends primarily to conserve knowledge of the language by recording and documenting, while language revitalization aims to promote use of the language in present-day society. Linguists should serve a bridging function by preparing a platform for correct/good Ainu and helping to reconcile the preservation and revitalization of the language.

Following Greenbaum's (1988) discussion of "correct English" and "good English," the present study argues that correct Ainu is definable with respect to grammatical, lexical, and phonological conformity to the norms of one dialect or another, while good Ainu can be characterized first and foremost in terms of dialectal and stylistic consistency. Correctness and goodness thus defined are compatible with both the revitalization and preservation of the language. This study claims that linguists and grammarians have a responsibility to provide guidelines for correct and good Ainu through the publication of dictionaries and reference grammars with sufficient instructions on dialectal and stylistic variations.

15.2 An Indigenous Language in Northern Japan

15.2.1 A Unique Language "Critically Endangered"

Ainu is an indigenous language in Japan that has been said to be genealogically unrelated to any other languages of the world. The *UNESCO Atlas of the World's Languages in Danger* classifies it as "critically endangered."[1] With the disappearance of such an indigenous language, as it points out, “humanity would lose not only a cultural wealth but also important ancestral knowledge” embedded in that language.[2] For this reason, it is indisputably important to preserve and revitalize the Ainu language. Furthermore, this language bears a great importance for linguistic studies as well in that it exhibits interesting similarities and dissimilarities to its neighboring languages. It has a limited number of words that are phonetically comparable to words of geographically adjacent languages like Japanese and Korean, as exemplified in (1) and (2). As is often the case with many East-Asian languages, however, it is extremely difficult to find phonological correspondences between the vocabulary of one such language and that of another.

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[1] http://www.unesco.org/culture/languages-atlas/index.php

(1)	Ainu: *kur* ‘shadow,’ *niskur* ‘cloud’ (*nis* ‘sky’ + *kur* ‘black’), *kunne* ‘black’ (*kur* ‘shadow’ + *ne* ‘be’), *ekurok* ‘dark’
	Japanese: *kurasi* ‘dark,’ *kuru* ‘get dark,’ *kuro* ‘black,’ *kumo* ‘cloud’
	Korean: *kurum* ‘cloud,’ *kurimca* ‘shadow,’ *kəm* ‘black’ (Hattori 1964: pp. 27–28)
(2)	Ainu *tura*, Japanese *ture(ru)*, and Korean *teri(ta)* ‘go with’ or ‘come with’

Ainu is syntactically similar to neighboring languages as shown in (3); nevertheless, it manifests a number of morphological differences: grammatical marking of verbs in person and number as illustrated in (4) and readiness of incorporation as instantiated in (5), among others. In Korean and Japanese, *ganda* and *iku* can express any of “I go,” “you go,” “he/she goes,” “we go,” and “they go,” as shown in (4b–c). In Ainu, by contrast, *oman* only expresses “he/she goes,” as shown in (4a); to express “I go,” “you go,” “we go,” and “they go” requires an appropriate verbal form with an appropriate pronominal affix if needed, as illustrated in Table 15.1.

Table 15.1 Person and number marking of the verb “go”

ku=oman “I go” (N)	*paye=an* “we go”
k=arpa “I go” (S)	
e=oman “you (sing.) go” (N)	*es=paye* “you (pl.) go” (N)
e=arpa “you (sing.) go” (S)	*eci=paye* “you (pl.) go” (S)
oman “he/she goes” (N)	*paye* “they go”
arpa “he/she goes” (S)	

N and *S* indicate variants of the northeastern and southwestern dialects

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[2] http://www.unesco.org/new/en/culture/themes/endangered-languages/

(3)	a.	*ruyanpe*	*as*	*yak*	*somo*	*ku=oman.* (Ainu) (Hattori 1964: p. 322)	
		rain	stand	if	not	I=go	
	b.	*bi-ga*		*o-myeon*	*na-neun*	*an*	*ganda.* (Korean)
		rain-NOM		come-if	I-TOP	not	go
	c.	*ame-ga*		*hut-tara*	*watasi-wa*	*ik-anai.* (Japanese)	
		rain-NOM		fall-if	I-TOP	go-not	
		‘I won’t go if it rains.’					

(4)	a.	*ruyanpe*	*as*	*yakka*	*oman.* (Ainu)
		rain	stand	even.if	go
		‘He/She/*They/*I/*You/*We will go even if it rains.’			
	b.	*bi-ga*	*wa-do*	*ganda.* (Korean)	
		rain-NOM	come-even.if	go	
		‘I/You/He/She/We/They will go even if it rains.’			
	c.	*ame-ga*	*hut-temo*	*iku.* (Japanese)	
		rain-NOM	fall-even.if	go	
		‘I/You/He/She/We/They will go even if it rains.’			

(5)	a.	*tekekar* (*tek* ‘hand’ + *e-* ‘by/with’ + *kar* ‘make’)
	b.	*yayeisoitak* (*yay-* ‘oneself’ + *e-* ‘about’ + *iso* ‘hunting’ + *itak* ‘talk’)
	c.	*sihumnuyar* (*si* ‘self’ + *hum* ‘sound’ + *nu* ‘hear’ + *yar* ‘cause (to)’)

Ainu abounds with verbs formed by incorporating nouns with applicative affixes as exemplified in (5). While *tekekar*, *yayeisoitak*, and *sihumnuyar*, respectively, mean “make by hand,” “talk about one’s experience,” and “make others hear one’s sound to let them know of one’s visit,” Korean and Japanese have no single verbs that express those notions. As with English, those languages need to express the notions using several words.

15.2.2 Ainu Language Preservation and Revitalization

The governmental assimilation policy since the end of nineteenth century gradually forced the Ainu language into an endangered state. Meanwhile, a small number of Ainu linguists worked for the preservation of the language through documentation and translation. A number of native speakers have devoted their time to writing and recounting stories. On account of these efforts, Ainu may now be counted as a fairly well documented language among the world’s indigenous languages.

In sharp contrast with such endeavors for preservation, it was not until near the end of the last century that grassroots efforts started to be made to increase “the development of teaching materials, language classes in community centers and some universities" (Maher 2001: p. 340). No specific measures had ever been planned or employed for the revival or revitalization of the Ainu language. In November 1997, however, the government of Japan promulgated a law dubbed *Ainu Shinpo*, "Law for the Promotion of the Ainu Culture and for the Dissemination and Advocacy for the Traditions of the Ainu and the Ainu Culture." Subsequently, the Foundation for Research and Promotion of Ainu Culture (FRPAC) was established under regulations of the law.

The foundation has the following five chief goals: "promotion of comprehensive and practical research on the Ainu," "promotion of the Ainu language," "promotion of the Ainu culture," "dissemination of knowledge on Ainu traditions," and "revival of Ainu traditional lifestyle."[3] The second goal is further divided into two parts: "Ainu language education" and "dissemination of Ainu language."[4]

Maher (2001: p. 339) finds seven new measures for the promotion of the Ainu language in "the report of the Experts Meeting on Ainu Affairs (1996) to Chief Cabinet Secretary": establishment of regular Ainu language classes for systematic studies, establishment of teacher training programs, development of teaching materials, support for existing programs at institutes of higher education, support for existing language classes at local level, Ainu language programs (courses) on TV and radio, and Ainu language speech contest. In this connection, Maher (2001: p. 324) remarks: "In spite of the usual sociolinguistic disarray about who is doing what, what needs to be done, in the case of Ainu revitalization it is obvious, to even the casual observer, that the Ainu language is on the move and has made substantial gains both in grass-root consciousness and at national policy level."

In addition to the new legislation for the promotion of Ainu culture in 1997, the government's recognition of the Ainu as an indigenous people in 2008 offered a ripe opportunity for the revival or revitalization of the language in present-day Japanese society. Since its establishment, FRPAC has organized a variety of revitalizing activities, in which more and more people joined and more and more teaching and learning materials are accordingly created and produced in response to the needs of those people joining the activities.

Ainu language preservation and revitalization would at first sight seem fully compatible with each other because they are both supposed to strive to maintain the language. Regrettably, however, they are apt to come in conflict for at least two reasons. For one thing, they are likely to be based on conflicting metaphors and to shape competing ideologies, as discussed in Sect. 15.3. Moreover, they often differ in their conceptions of correct and/or good Ainu language, argued in Sects. 15.4 and 15.5. In order to maintain Ainu as a "living language," it is vital to reconcile language preservation and revitalization.

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[3] http://www.frpac.or.jp/english/project.html

[4] http://www.frpac.or.jp/english/details/promotion-of-the-ainu-language.html

15.3 Conflicting Metaphors and Competing Ideologies[5]

15.3.1 Different Conceptions of "Endangered Language"

When people talk of "endangered languages," "languages in danger (of dying out)," or "languages on the verge of extinction," they are likely to make an analogy to endangered species of animals or plants. In such a metaphorical conception, the relevant language is envisaged, consciously or unconsciously, as dying, withering, or disappearing from reality. However, languages are not living organisms; they are not supposed to die, wither, or disappear in the literal sense of the words. As Patrick (2007: p. 124) indicates, "it is the speakers of a language who live and die, rather than the languages that they speak."

When people talk about endangered animals and plants, they can have different conceptions of them. Some may imagine one or a few members of the relevant endangered species (e.g., of a bird group) as disappearing one by one from existence, while others may envision the mass of the group that is gradually disappearing. Likewise, an endangered language might metaphorically be conceived of as an individual speaker's knowledge of the language or as a collective mass of such knowledge socially shared by speakers. The first conception of language approximates Chomsky's (1986: p. 22) "I-language," whereas the second resembles de Saussure's (1989: Chap. 3) "langue."

In such conceptions, the endangerment of a language is likely equated with the fact that knowledge of the language disappears as speakers of the language pass away. However, such a fact cannot account for the endangerment at all. Although speakers with knowledge of a language like English and Japanese pass away year after year, the language is still far from being endangered. What happens to an endangered language is simply that the number of speakers decreases. In a "safe" language, more and more speakers of the language "disappear," but at least a comparable number of new speakers "appear" in the speech community.[6] In an endangered language, in contrast, the number of "appearing" speakers of the language in the speech community is extremely smaller than the number of "disappearing" speakers.

It should also be noticed that the appearance and disappearance of speakers cannot necessarily be simply equated with the birth and death of speakers. As much literature on language shift shows, people can choose to use a different language for political, economic, social, and other practical reasons. In fact, it is very common that the number of descendants of the people who use or used a language does not decrease but rather that fewer and fewer of them are using the language. No matter which conception of language discussed so far is realistic, we have to acknowledge that people can have different, sometimes conflicting, metaphorical understandings of an endangered language. As it follows, different language conceptions give rise to different conceptions of language maintenance, as argued in the next section.

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[5] The present section is partially based on a paper presented at the symposium titled "*Toosho Chiiki ni okeru Gengo Fukkoo* [Language Revitalization in Island Areas]," held at the University of the Ryukyus, 9 March 2013.

[6] *UNESCO Atlas of the World's Languages in Danger* classifies degree of endangerment into six categories: safe, vulnerable, definitely endangered, severely endangered, critically endangered, and extinct (http://www.unesco.org/new/en/culture/themes/endangered-languages/atlas-of-languages-in-danger/).

15.3.2 Different Conceptions of Language Maintenance

As Patrick (2007: p. 124) succinctly points out, “there are basic problems with metaphors that liken ‘language’ to ‘species’ and ‘linguistic diversity’ to ‘biological diversity,’ creating a distorted view of languages and language endangerment.” At the same time, it is also a fact that “the biological and ecological associations that this discourse invokes have had considerable rhetorical appeal for Indigenous language movements” (Patrick 2007: p. 122). Endangered animals and plants are commonly viewed as what is in “danger” or “crisis” of extinction and thus should be “saved,” “protected,” “conserved,” or “preserved.” Similar conceptions of a language seemingly underlie the understanding that centers on the usage of “language preservation,” “language conservation,” or “language protection” to refer to the effort to maintain an endangered language.[7]

On the other hand, “language revitalization,” “language revival,” or “reversing language shift” seem to be intended to put more focus on the aspect of language use as a human activity. In this respect, they may be somewhat contradictory to notions like “endangered language” that “rely crucially on the metaphor of languages as living things or ‘species,’ which is consistent with metaphorical talk of languages ‘living,’ ‘surviving,’ and ‘dying’” (Patrick 2007: p. 122). As a matter of fact, it is unrealistic to revive animals and plants, except in science fiction, like *Jurassic Park* (Steven Spielberg 1993). It is also much less natural to talk about revitalization of endangered animals and plants than revitalization of languages.

Language preservation and language revitalization may appear similar in that both are meant to be endeavors to maintain an endangered or lesser-used language. Nevertheless, they are very likely grounded on different metaphors and conceptions of language and therefore can often shape conflicting and competing ideologies. Motivated by such metaphors and conceptions, people can entertain different opinions on what should be done to maintain an endangered language. Advocates of language preservation aspire to conserve knowledge of the language by recording and documenting. They tend to be negligent or critical of new forms of the language "that include the language of younger speakers and mixed language forms, which are often considered illegitimate, as well as revived forms of language, which might be considered to lack authenticity" (Patrick 2007: p. 125). In contrast, the proponents of language revitalization aim to encourage as many people as possible to use the language. They are more interested in creating and producing learning and teaching materials for promoting use of the language in present-day society, which inevitably necessitates the modernization of vocabulary.

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[7] The use of one label to refer to an entity or phenomenon usually engenders a conception of that entity. As Ishihara (2010) points out, a reference to the Ryukyuan language(s) as Ryukyu dialects is political and ideological, concealing the vulnerable status, and diluting the cultural value, of the language(s). Likewise, the use of terms like endangered language, language preservation, and language protection as well as language revitalization can be political and ideological. Here lie the chief causes and reasons for the difficulty with language revitalization discussed below.

Few people oppose the preservation of endangered species. Similarly, almost no proponents of language revitalization object to the preservation of an endangered language. In contrast, advocates of language preservation often tend to criticize aspects of language revitalization. The most likely target of criticism is newly constructed expressions or traditional expressions with new senses that are integral parts of textbooks, newspapers, and other writings in the endangered language. However, the criticism can reflect "an overly romantic or sentimental view of 'pristine' past culture" (Patrick 2007: p. 126), which "not only glorifies folklore as somehow 'superior' in moral character, but also essentializes language, culture and 'peoplehood,' located in a timeless past" (Patrick 2007: p. 127). There can be diversity in the form of the language to maintain, use, teach, and learn. If one is to maintain an endangered or lesser-used language from now onwards, the preservation and the revitalization of the language need to be reconciled. One step toward such reconciliation is to address the question of correct Ainu language and good Ainu language.

15.4 What Is Correct Ainu Language?[8]

15.4.1 Conflict Over "Correct" Ainu Language

The increasing use of the Ainu language as part of either its preservation or revitalization, all the more with the aim of maintaining the language, naturally produces a new linguistic problem in this highly modernized and industrialized era. Publishing Ainu textbooks, newspapers, and other writings somehow requires new as well as traditional expressions for modern, historical, industrial, scientific, and foreign concepts. Some writers adopt Japanese expressions adjusted to Ainu phonology, while others use traditional Ainu words or phrases with new meanings. Other people will come up with coinages formed on Ainu lexicon and morphology. There can be conflicts among those who advocate different expressions for new concepts.

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[8] Sections 15.4 and 15.5 are based on a paper presented in a panel titled "Language Contact, Language Change, and Ideological Beliefs in Indigenous Languages in the Pan-Pacific" held at the 11th International Pragmatics Conference, Melbourne, Australia, 12–17 July 2009.

A dialogue in a textbook of present-day Ainu conversation, for example, may include sentences with the meaning, "Send me an email message when you arrive at the airport. I will go to pick you up." In a northeastern dialect of Ainu, for instance, that can readily be translated into the sentences in (6a), the words for "airport," "email message," and to "pick up" will be more or less controversial among other dialects.

(6)	a.	*sintatomari*	*e=kosirepa*	*yakun*	*imeru*	*kampi*	*ekte*	*wa*	*en=kore.*
		airport	you=reach	when	electricity	letter	send	and	me=give
		e=ekari	*ku=oman*	*kusune*	*na.*				
		you=to.meet	I=go	will	FP				
	b.	*kuko*	*e=kosirepa*	*yakun*	*meyru*	*ekte*	*wa*	*en=kore.*	
		airport	you=reach	when	email	send	and	me=give	
		eci=ekanok	*kusu*	*k=arpa*	*kusune*	*na.*			
		I.you=meet	to	I=go	will	FP			

In a southwestern dialect, the expression *e=ekari ku=oman* may be replaced by the dialect's more natural form *eci=ekanok kusu k=arpa*. Advocates of the corresponding Japanese expressions would replace the words *sintatomari* and *imeru kampi* in (6a) with *kuko* and *meyru*, Japanese words for the concepts that are adjusted to Ainu phonology. Proponents of the expressions in (6a) are likely to disapprove of those in (6b) in that they overuse Japanese expressions. Advocates of the expressions in (6b) may criticize those in (6a) as incorrect Ainu expressions.

Furthermore, some people working on rituals and academism in the tradition of the Ainu language and culture are extremely critical of the language and contents of present-day Ainu writings, in which they are often eager to find incorrectness and inappropriateness. Today, however, almost no native speakers are available to guarantee the appropriateness and authenticity of the words that are used for modern concepts or that are newly created for new meanings in the modernization of the vocabulary. Unless one or another word is chosen to refer to a new concept, it will be hard to put the Ainu language into present-day use, let alone revitalization. "Correctness" needs to be newly defined so that it will be compatible with both the revitalization and preservation of the language.

15.4.2 Multiplicity of Correctness

When we consider correct Ainu language, Greenbaum (1988) is very helpful in that he provides many arguments that revolve around the concepts of good and correct English. The point that lies behind his arguments is the multiplicity of correctness: from a descriptive point of view, there are some facets of correctness that are generalized as conformity to a certain norm of language use. He notes that there are at least three kinds of situations in which a person's language is judged to be incorrect. These situations are exemplified by the sentences in (7). Greenbaum argues that situations like (7a) are the only case in which, if someone uses the sentence, “we are confident that he has made a mistake, that he does not speak good English” (Greenbaum 1988: p. 9). Situations like (7b-c) are not a matter of correctness but of “variation and change” (Greenbaum 1988: p. 12).

(7) a. I am knowing them a long time.
b. I don’t know nothing about it.
c. . . .if you don’t mind me saying so. (Greenbaum 1988: p. 9)

In (7b), “we should more properly say” that the speaker “is using a feature characteristic of nonstandard dialects of English” (Greenbaum 1988: p. 9). The construction exemplified in (7c) was once objected to and called “ignorant vulgarisms,” but it has been gaining ground and “is common among speakers of even the standard language” (Greenbaum 1988: pp. 9–10). Sentences like (7b–c) can be safely judged to be correct in that they manifest some conformity to the dialectal or idiolectal norms.

As Greenbaum (1988: p. 19) notes, “[c]orrect English, as it is usually understood, is usage that conforms to the norms of the standard language (In a broader sense, nonstandard usage is also correct if it conforms to the norms of its own dialect).” By the same token, any Ainu expression observable in one dialect or another is definitely correct. Moreover, as long as no specific dialect is selected as the standard language, all dialects are assumed to achieve equivalent correctness. The second sentence in (6a) is as correct as the one in (6b) because both show general conformity to the conventions of the northeastern and southwestern dialects, respectively.

The correctness of the expressions illustrated in (6) can thus be based on different norms. More broadly, we need to recognize the multiplicity of correctness in present-day forms of the Ainu language in general. Different purposes and positions have different standards or norms of correctness. Language preservation is apt to be associated with storing Ainu language materials in museums and libraries and encouraging activities like recording and documentation. For that purpose, conformity to traditional forms and meanings of expressions evinces correctness. Conversely, language revitalization is inclined toward bringing back the Ainu language into active use, which will naturally require a large, modernized vocabulary. For that purpose, it is inevitable to devise Ainu expressions for modern concepts in one way or another: conformity to Ainu phonology, morphology, or syntax endorses correctness.

15.4.3 Linguistic Variation and Change

Citing George Campbell’s (1801: p. 290) complaint, “. . .is it not manifest that the generality of people speak and write very badly?” Greenbaum (1988: p. 8) points out the following “three main grounds for complaint about the ways that people use the language." The first ground concerns what is discussed with respect to the sentences in (7). The other two pertain mostly to some language critics' and writers' concerns about the deterioration of the language. All the complaints are subsumable under the rubric of resistance against linguistic variation and change.

1. The language is incorrect.
2. The style is faulty.
3. The formulation is unethical. (Greenbaum 1988: pp. 8–9)

As noted above with reference to the sentences in (6), if people are used to the southwestern dialectal form *k=arpa* as an Ainu expression with the meaning of "I go," the northeastern dialectal form *ku=oman* may sound odd and vice versa. If they do not know one form at all, they will be all the more inclined to object to it. As Greenbaum says:

> People resist innovations most when the changes displace existing words. We do not easily abandon lifetime practices. Our language is personal to each of us, imprinted in our brains—the medium for our private thoughts as well as the channel for communicating with others. (Greenbaum 1988: p. 13)

The person who knows *k=arpa* but does not *ku=oman* may see the use of the latter as if it were an innovation that displaces his familiar form *k=arpa*, which he could not help resisting. But if he knows both and recognizes that *ku=oman* is a form used in another dialect, he will not necessarily object to it. The clue to solving the problem of resistance to variation is not necessarily to determine which expression should be judged to be correct. It will be more advisable to inform people about the presence of more than one expression for the same meaning and how each one is used: in which dialect, in which style of discourse, with what nuance, and so on.

As Greenbaum (1988: p. 12) puts it, "[b]oth variation and change are normal in living languages." The Ainu language is not an exception; it will naturally have dialectal and stylistic variants and undergo lexical, morphological, and syntactic changes. The difference is that the number of people who use the language is small and that the number of people who will resist other people's usage of the language is disproportionate to it. Since there is ample room for controversy over correct and good English, it is natural that there will be a deeper conflict over correct and good Ainu. Section 15.5 will discuss good Ainu language derivable from the multiplicity of forms of correctness and the lessening of resistance to variation and change, and it will specify what grammarians can and should do to make it viable.

15.5 Good Ainu and the Grammarian

15.5.1 Good Language

Following Greenbaum's (1988) argument, we have so far discussed correct Ainu language. Correctness is defined in terms of conformity to the norms derived from language use and speakers' judgment. If correct Ainu is fixed in terms of conformity, what, then, is good Ainu like? One of the most plausible answers will be captured with respect to consistency.

Right after defining "correct English" in terms of conformity to the norms of the language, standard or dialectal, Greenbaum remarks as follows:

> Correct English is not necessarily good English. We can be correct and at the same time unclear and illogical; we can embarrass and offend by using language that is inappropriate to the occasion; we can conceal, mislead, and lie. The resources of the language are available to all who wish to speak or write good English. (Greenbaum 1988: p. 19)

Putting more weight on ethical rather than aesthetical aspects of the language, he implies here that good English has much to do with appropriate uses of the language. Ethical aspects aside, many aspects of appropriate linguistic use can be captured with respect to consistency. The following section will address two kinds of consistency, dialectal and stylistic.

As is also implied in the above quotation, whether the language one speaks or writes is good or not will often be a matter of his or her own choice. Basically, the same applies to any language. As far as a language like Ainu is concerned, however, the resources of the language are *not* available to all who wish to speak or write good Ainu. It is grammarians' responsibility to provide an overview of good as well as correct Ainu usages in the form of dictionaries and reference grammars, as argued in Sect. 15.5.3.

15.5.2 Dialectal and Stylistic Consistency

Dialectal consistency is observed in sentences like (8a–c). Each sentence can be judged to be correct English in that it conforms to the norms of British English in (8a), to that of American English in (8b), and to that of Australian English in (8c). However, the three sentences sound odd if one and the same person says them as one string of utterances. They will be judged to be inappropriate, which is attributable to dialectal inconsistency.

(8)	a.	I've got a maths class today.
	b.	I wanna cut it.
	c.	I can't but.

Similar dialectal inconsistency is detectible in Japanese and Korean utterances like (9a–b). In (9a), the first sentence conforms to the norms of the Hiroshima dialect, the second sentence the Yokohama dialect, and the third one the Osaka dialect. In (9b), the three sentences conform to the norms of the Chungcheongdo dialect, the Jeollado dialect, and the Gyeongsangdo dialect, respectively. If one says or writes (9a) or (9b) as one sequence, however, it will sound odd to any native speaker of each language.

(9)	a.	*kyoo*	*suugaku-no*	*tesuto-ga*	*aru-nja.*	*yasumi-tee-na.*	*mutukasii-nen.* (Japanese)	
		today	math-GEN	test-NOM	be-AP	skip-want-AP	difficult-AP	
		‘I’ll have a math test today. I wanna cut it. It’s hard.’						
	b.	*oneul*	*suhag*	*siheom-i*	*isseo-yu.*	*swi-go*	*sipda-ing.*	*eoryeobeo-yo.* (Korean)
		today	math	test-NOM	be-AP	skip-CP	want-AP	difficult-AP
		‘I’ll have a math test today. I wanna cut it. It’s hard.’						

The appropriate language use, illustrated in good English, Japanese, and Korean, thus presupposes dialectal consistency as well as dialectal conformity. It also needs stylistic consistency, as shown by the contrast between (10) and (11). Since the sentences in (10a–c) all sound more or less formal, the substitution of more colloquial or informal expressions like the underscored parts in (11) will make the overall utterances more or less inappropriate. *Cut* in (11a), *yo* in (11b), and *eoryeoweo* in (11c) exhibit stylistic inconsistency with each sequence of sentences.

(10)	a.	I have a math class today. Although I don’t want to attend it, I have to.						
	b.	*kyoo*	*suugaku-no*	*tesuto-ga*	*aru-ndesu-ga*	*yasumi-tai-desu.*	*muzukasii-desu.*	
		today	math-GEN	test-NOM	be-AP-though	skip-want-AP	difficult-AP	
		‘I’ll have a math test today. I want to stay away from it. It is difficult.’						
	c.	*oneul*	*suhag*	*siheom-i*	*iss-neunde*	*swi-go*	*sip-seumnida.*	*eoryeob-seumnida.*
		today	math	test-NOM	be-though	skip-CP	want-AP	difficult-AP
		‘I’ll have a math test today. I want to stay away from it. It is difficult.’						

(11)	a.	?	I have a math class today. Although I want to cut it, I have to attend it.						
	b.	?	*kyoo*	*suugaku-no*	*tesuto-ga*	*aru-ndesu-ga*	*yasumi-tai-desu.*	*muzukasii-yo.*	
			today	math-GEN	test-NOM	be-AP-though	skip-want-AP	difficult-AP	
			‘I’ll have a math test today. I want to stay away from it. It is difficult.’						
	c.	?	*oneul*	*suhag*	*siheom-i*	*iss-neunde*	*swi-go*	*sip-seumnida.*	*eoryeoweo.*
			today	math	test-NOM	be-though	skip-CP	want-AP	difficult
			‘I’ll have a math test today. I want to stay away from it. It is difficult.’						

In the same line of explanation as good English, Japanese, and Korean, good Ainu can also be defined with respect to dialectal and stylistic consistency. Thus, the sentences in (12) will not be judged to be good Ainu with no regard to the putative correctness of the words *sintatomari*, *imeru kampi*, *kuko*, and *meyru*. Just as *e=ekari* and *k=arpa* in (12a) belong to different dialects, so do *eci=ekanok* and *ku=oman* in (12b). Both sentences thus show dialectal inconsistency.

(12)	a.	*sintatomari*	*e=kosirepa*	*yakun*	*imeru*	*kampi*	*ekte*	*wa*	*en=kore.*
		airport	you=reach	when	electricity	letter	send	and	me=give
		e=ekari	*k=arpa*	*kusune*	*na.*				
		you=to.meet	I=go	will	FP				
	b.	*kuko*	*e=kosirepa*	*yakun*	*meyru*	*ekte*	*wa*	*en=kore.*	
		airport	you=reach	when	email	send	and	me=give	
		eci=ekanok	*kusu*	*ku=oman*	*kusune*	*na.*			
		I.you=meet	to	I=go	will	FP			

Stylistic consistency may be more difficult to assess than dialectal consistency. As for the difference in formality between variants, Greenbaum (1988) points out:

"[t]here may be a clear difference in formality between the variants" as in *The person I was talking to* vs. *The person to whom I was talking*. At the same time, he acknowledges that "the difference is not always conspicuous" as in *I don't know whether I can see them today/I don't know if I can see them today* and many other examples (p. 12).

In Ainu as well, there are a number of cases in which the difference in formality between variants is more or less clear. In some dialects where *k=arpa* is used as in (6b), *ku=arpa* can be seen as a more formal counterpart. Phonological contraction is a representative characteristic of informal or colloquial expressions. Besides, plural forms like *paye=an* for the same sense may sound more formal in some dialects of the language. However, there are still far more cases in which the difference is not conspicuous. As Greenbaum (p. 12) remarks on English, "[o]ften the variants co-exist peacefully, and even the same individual may vary."

It will also be difficult to judge the difference in formality between coinages like *sintatomari* "airport" or *imeru kampi* "email" and morphologically adjusted Japanese words like *kuko* "airport" or *meyru* "email." In Japanese and Korean, at least, coinages formed on their own lexical items and morphology tend to sound more formal than phonologically adjusted foreign words as exemplified in (13). For the time being, however, one can hardly tell whether *sintatomari* and *imeru kampi* sound more formal than *kuko* and *meyru*, respectively, in modern discourse.

(13)	*kamera* vs. *syasinki* 'camera'; *terebi* vs. *juzooki* 'television' (Japanese)
	kamera vs. *sajingi* 'camera'; *tellebi* vs. *susanggi* 'television' (Korean)

In traditional genres of Ainu narratives, on the other hand, one could find some differences between the literary and the colloquial language, which can be related to the distinction between the formal and the informal language. No matter how the formality and other style differences in Ainu are assessed and determined, their consistency is a key to the notion of good Ainu.

15.5.3 Linguists and Grammarians' Responsibility

As far as correct and good Ainu can be characterized along the lines discussed so far, what should be done in Ainu linguistics is obvious. It will be to provide an overview of correct and good Ainu usages in the form of dictionaries and reference grammars. Most scholars of Ainu linguistics have their respective territories in research field and dialect, hardly crossing others' borders. Although more and more Ainu dictionaries have been published in the last two decades, they are unexceptionally dictionaries of one dialect or another. Furthermore, such dictionaries are available in a small number of dialects but not in many others. One could hardly know what variants are present in which dialect for a certain concept.

Hattori (1964) and Chiri (1975, 1976), who have collected as many variants as possible from a wide range of dialects, are the only exceptions. Nevertheless, it is often very hard to use their works as ordinary dictionaries: the lexical items selected as headwords are sporadic, a number of dialects are sometimes not referred to, and stylistic information is missing in most cases. Present-day writers and speakers of Ainu will be at a loss over which one of the variants they should use. Regrettably, therefore, it does not seem practical to distinguish all attested dialects for language revitalization purposes.

Hattori and Chiri (1960) and Asai (1974) have provided detailed research on some 20 dialects in Hokkaido and Sakhalin. Following these studies, Yamada (2006) proposed that Ainu be divided into three major dialectal variants on the basis of grammatical rather than lexical elements: the southwestern and northeastern Hokkaido and the Sakhalin. Such a provisional dialectal division for practical purposes could open a convenient pathway to possible revitalizations. Based on the currently available dictionaries and linguistic texts, linguists can somehow manage to compile a larger or more detailed dictionary that gives a major dialectal overview of Ainu lexicon, tagging each lexical item in terms of the triadic dialectal distinction. Likewise, they may also be in a position to write a reference book that describes dialectal and stylistics characteristics of grammatical elements.

Descriptive studies as have been done in Ainu linguistics are enormously helpful for compiling a practical dictionary and reference grammar with dialectal and stylistic instructions. Linguistics should go one step further and calibrate the triadic dialectal distinction and stylistic variations. Admittedly, dialects form a continuum with neighbors, and different styles overlap. Any dialectal variation and stylistic distinction might be ultimately arbitrary. For language revitalization, however, a demarcation has to be expediently made between a reasonable number of major dialects and between different styles like formal/informal and literary/colloquial. Such work is by nature prescriptive rather than descriptive. As Greenbaum remarks, "'Prescriptivism' is often used pejoratively, especially among linguists and scholarly grammarians. 'Language planning' is a more respectable term, and suggests wider concerns. Let us then say that grammarians have a responsibility to be language planners" (1988: p. 38).

It is linguists' and grammarians' responsibility to plan the Ainu language in the present and future. Such language planning may lead to a further prescriptivism in the long run: creation of the standard variety. For the time being, it seems extremely difficult to standardize Ainu language usage in modern writings because many people esteem their familiar dialects so highly that they may even be very critical of other dialects. Once major dialectal variants are expediently limited to a reasonable number, say three, however, they could be readily merged into one standard in the very long run.

As for a standard variety of English, Greenbaum claims:

> It is possible to plan for the future of English, to introduce changes, to influence the direction that the language will take. The efforts to direct the development of a standard written language may achieve only partial success in countries where English is a second language, but it is worth striving to preserve as far as possible the essential unity of an International Standard English. (Greenbaum 1988: p. 38)

Likewise, it will not be impossible to plan for the future of the Ainu language, to introduce changes, and to influence the direction that the language will take. As long as its use is nearly limited to Japan, where Japanese is invariably dominant, Ainu will have to remain as a less used or a second language at least for some time. A brave resolution to make a triadic dialectal distinction serves to preserve the essential unity of modern Ainu language(s), which may lead to a present-day standard Ainu.

15.6 Conclusion

The present study explores correct Ainu and good Ainu on the basis of Greenbaum's (1988) discussion of "correct English" and "good English," which are compatible with both the revitalization and preservation of the language. "Correctness" is defined anew as grammatical, lexical, and phonological conformity to the norms of one dialect or another, while "goodness" is captured with respect to dialectal and stylistic consistency. It can be argued that "endangered" languages should be treated differently from languages like English or Japanese, but the languages should not be likened to endangered animals or plants and unconsciously discriminated against.

A modernized vocabulary is necessary to maintain the Ainu language in present-day society. Contemporary users of the language may individually devise new expressions for new meanings. Some may propose to replace some of the expressions with traditional words or expressions with new meanings. Others may suggest new words formed based on Ainu lexicon and morphology. Still others may advocate using Japanese or foreign words adjusted to Ainu phonology. In any case, anyone should be eligible to come up with alternatives if they disagree with those new expressions. Such discussions will pave the way to the modernization of Ainu vocabulary. To this end, it is important to revitalize not only discourse in the Ainu language but also discourse on the language.

In this discourse and context, linguists and grammarians have a responsibility to provide guidelines for correct and good Ainu language. They are urgently required to do so through publications such as dictionaries and reference grammars with sufficient suggestions on dialectal and stylistic variations. An expedient distinction between three main dialects and between major different styles like formal/informal and literary/colloquial would be of great help for the fulfillment of this responsibility. The author believes that further development and discussion of such provisional suggestions will lead to a better form of Ainu language revitalization and preservation.

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Chapter 16

Welsh Language Policy: A Long Twentieth Century

Patrick Carlin

It may seem somewhat self-evident to assert that language policy should be vitally indexed to the democratic, political and administrative fabric of institutional relations of any given polity. As we know, this nexus of relations is becoming ever more complex as governance continues to yield multilevel and discrete locations of power (Rhodes 1996). In the case of the Welsh language, however, for the vast majority of the twentieth century, language policy developed away from a 'Wales-facing' democratic mandate, being provided for politically, legislatively and institutionally at the UK level of government (Williams 2007). It is with the onset and deepening of asymmetrical devolution within the UK in the past 15 years that language policy has been more fully appropriated and 'brought in from the cold' by an emerging substate political, legislative and administrative system in Wales. This has resulted in the role of the Welsh language within a bilingual civil society being more deeply legitimated by the National Assembly for Wales (NAfW) as a public good worthy of policy and legislative scrutiny by the Welsh Executive and Legislature. Assessing the degree to which democratic and political values have underpinned language policy in Wales through the incremental growth of 'Welsh-facing' institutions lies at the heart of this chapter.

Political communities may or may not coincide with the boundaries of a state, but self-ascribing nations may exert influence on *some* level of government, and the increasingly plurinational UK is no different in this aspect. Interpreted as a union state, the UK has over the centuries sanctioned, and to some degree subsequently given free rein to, the growth of cultural and administrative flexibility within its constituent nations (Wyn Jones 2005). In the case of Wales, in the absence of political institutions at the substate national level until 1999, local government represented to a large degree elected government in Wales, taking on significant

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substate symbolism (Morgan 1981). In the case of the Welsh language, the ‘flawed consociationalism’ of policy-making which is attributed to the pre-devolution system became terrain to be negotiated by a multifaceted movement which comprised of policy communities seeking to extract concessions from the UK government (Thomas 1997), with bilingual statutory education at the vanguard of broad civil society lobbying during the second half of the twentieth century (Jones 2000; Thomas and Williams 2013).

The aims of this chapter are twofold. The first is to problematise the incremental growth of Wales-facing institutions during the course of the twentieth century and to provide a summary of how such an institutional ‘creep’ has provided the political and social fabric within which language policy has and continues to operate in Wales. In sketching out such an outline, a link is made between substate language policy and a wider demo-driven surge for political accountability to a given territory. A second aim focuses on the uneven development from locally mandated forms of language policy to both negotiated and mandated policy and planning regimes which have been legitimated and conceptually driven by UK legislation in the first instance and later on by the substate legislature, the NAfW. It is argued that the development of language policy in Wales reflects the incremental growth of Wales as a converging political, legal and institutional system over and above a nation predicated on solely cultural and linguistic traits. Such a development would mirror the path of a ‘*complex* normative language policy’[1] which is premised upon ‘the acknowledgement that the interface between power and language does not operate in a linear or predictable fashion’ (Peled 2014: p. 313).

16.1 Building the Blocks: From Nation to Administration

Despite the fact that the UK *qua* legal and political system intermittently sanctioned cultural and linguistic heterogeneity[2] within its territory, until the turn of the millennium, the UK (or at least England and Wales) was essentially a centralised political system with power residing formally within a strong sovereign parliament (Jeffrey and Wincott 2006: p. 3). The 450 years between the Acts of Union (1536 and 1543) and the present period can be seen as two general ‘tendencies’ explaining broad-stroke historical change (Carter 1970: p. 30). The first tendency was the creation of formal English administration in Wales and the suppression of the various jurisdictions which at that time existed in Wales. It was during this period that legal structures and administrative areas which would treat England and Wales as one unit began to develop. The second tendency is in some respects a countertendency with the individuality of Wales being increasingly recognised from the end of the nineteenth century due to social, religious and political pressures. The effect of this counter-tendency would be the gradual growth of Welsh-facing institutions and Wales-related legislation at Westminster. This institutional and legislative incrementalism acted as the building blocks for administrative devolution midway through the twentieth century, with political and legislative devolution occurring respectively in 1997 and 2011.

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[1] Italics in original.

[2] For the demolinguistic vitality of the Welsh language, see Jones (2012).

During this second 'tendency' characterised by an increased awareness of Wales as a national entity, a number of periods can be discerned. Until the arrival of administrative devolution with the creation of the Welsh Office in 1964, the first period between 1886 and 1959 oversaw a period of division within the UK Conservative, Labour and Liberal parties, with sections in favour of administrative and a degree of political devolution at loggerheads with those unwilling to countenance these developments occurring. By the end of the nineteenth century, the Liberal Party and its erstwhile Wales-facing *Cymru Fydd* movement were calling for a response to the increase in Welsh national consciousness, linked to pressure for political, administrative and cultural change following the Representation of the People Act 1884 at Westminster which increased suffrage in Wales to approximately 60 % of the male adult population, an increase of slightly under 300 %. This piece of legislation is regarded, unwittingly perhaps, as a constituent element in the birth of Welsh political democracy (Morgan 1981: p. 27). The Sunday Closing (Wales) Act of 1881, the Welsh Intermediate Act of 1889, the creation of the Central Welsh Board in 1897 in the field of education, the establishment of a Welsh department in the central government Board of Education in 1906 and the Welsh Church Act 1914 are all crucial building blocks in an appreciation of the degree to which the central UK state was beginning to publicly accept the distinctiveness of Wales as a separate nation and that this would need to be consistently managed in an increasing number of areas of public life (Griffiths 1996: pp. 46–47).

Under the stewardship of the Welsh UK Prime Minister David Lloyd George, during the second decade of the century, Wales-serving administrative capacity was added to, this time in the area of social services with the creation in 1914 of a Health Insurance Commission for Wales and a Welsh Board of Health in 1919. This was the first time that central UK departments assigned substantial powers to Welsh public affairs (Gowan 1970: p. 51). Indeed, during the 12 years after the Liberal Party regained power in 1906, Welsh-serving departments were created in four existing ministries (Deacon 2002: p. 15), bringing into relief the degree of incremental institutional growth. Although greater power was assigned to such institutions during the 1920s and 1930s as part and parcel of a regional devolution to offices throughout the UK, during the Second World War, significant linkages were made between government departments in Wales, industry and trade unions. By 1945, 15 Whitehall departments had offices in Wales (Gowan 1970: p. 52), and existing bodies such as the Welsh Board of Health had been given greater responsibilities (Rawlings 2003: p. 26). Additionally, the distinctiveness of Wales was recognised more than the English regions through the 'Conference of the Heads of Government Departments' which produced a yearly report on activity in Wales. By the time of the creation in 1964 of the UK ministerial cabinet post of Secretary of State for Wales and the Welsh Office, the governmental all-Wales devolved administrative and policy co-ordination body, a somewhat patchwork yet significant Wales-serving institutional framework was by now in existence (1970: p. 53).

Party political debate responded in tune to incremental institutional growth. Throughout the 1950s, the Labour Party, which dominated the Welsh political landscape for the vast majority of the twentieth century, had to balance the presence of both devolutionists and anti-devolutionists within its ranks. Although a 'Parliament for Wales' campaign by a number of staunch devolutionists, including from within the Labour Party (Morgan 1981: p. 380), resulted in failure, the advisory Council for Wales, set up in 1949, called on the Conservative government of the day to create a Welsh Office which would co-ordinate government activity in Wales (Prys Davies 2008: p. 43). The growth in support for the nationalist Plaid Cymru (Party of Wales) provides an added reason for the inclusion of a Secretary of State for Wales and administrative devolution in the Labour Party's manifesto of 1959 (Davies 1990: p. 643).

By the 1960s, however, there were enough devolutionists within the governing Labour Party to facilitate the creation of the Welsh Office in 1964 (Deacon 2002: p. 21). The Welsh Office would, over a period of 35 years, oversee the development of an incipient institutional and policy community system which was subsequently inherited by the NAfW in 1999 when political devolution ushered in the beginnings of democratically mandated government accountable to the people of Wales (Rawlings 2003: p. 1). Welsh Office activity oversaw an increase to, and stabilisation of, statutory and policy responsibilities facilitated by both rational planning and 'ad hoc opportunism', with the embryonic regional system developing into a 'multi-functional ministry carrying out the majority of non benefit-related, revenue raising and social security government functions in Wales' (Deacon 2002: p. 39). Wales-specific policy communities, which brought forward differentiated policies to the rest of the UK, especially in the field of education, branched out and developed, with progressive divergence impacting upon language policy at both a Wales and local level.

Although all Secretaries of State were 'expansionists, bringing fresh powers and functions to the Welsh Office' (Deacon 2002: p. 40), there was not a corresponding increase in the number of civil servants implementing the new functions, thus creating a distinct problem for capacity within the Welsh Office. Other factors led to further calls for an elected all-Wales Assembly: the image of five consecutive 'colonial' Secretaries of State representing electorates in England, and Secretaries of State after 1987 who were deemed to be using their post in order to raise their profile inordinately at the UK level (Deacon 2002: pp. 226–227); the tension between the dominance of the Labour Party within local government on the one hand and the lack of all-Wales power on the other; the shattering of industrial infrastructure in Wales; and the growth of new concepts around what a 'civic' Wales could look like (Prys Davies 2008: pp. 118–119; Rawlings 2003: p. 29). In its turn, a multiparty and multi-sectorial momentum was created with the aim of establishing political devolution with a layer of elected government, despite the rather lacklustre stance taken by some sectors within the Labour Party and local government (Morgan and Mungham 2000).

Following a successful referendum vote of 1997 and the Government of Wales Act of 1998, the NAfW came into existence in 1999 with roughly the same powers as those assigned to the preceding Welsh Office, including subordinate legislation within a framework of primary legislation (Royles 2007: pp. 39–40). Although some commentators were of the opinion that significant constitutional change was unlikely to occur for a considerable amount of time (e.g. Patchett 2000: p. 255), the 15 years following political devolution have witnessed sustained institutional and constitutional incrementalism, creativity and invention (Keating et al, 2012). The main examples of such incrementalism are, following a second Government of Wales Act in 2006, a formal split between the legislature and the executive (Wyn Jones and Scully 2008) and, following a referendum in 2011, the acquisition of primary legislative powers in 20 policy areas. These recent developments in the institutional and constitutional governance of Wales mirror the incrementalism occurring in the Welsh polity over a period of more than a century. Due to the advances in administrative, political and legislative devolution and the growth of policy areas now under the aegis of the Welsh Assembly and Government, an increasingly extensive regional institutional, legal and political system may now be said to exist in Wales. The concurrent, yet uneven, development of language policy within the emerging Welsh system will now be examined, in the first instance that of locally mandated political agreement around the creation, maintenance and adaptation of such policies.

16.2 Uneven Development in Language Policy: The Subnational Mandate

This section deals with language policy adopted by Gwynedd County Council (previously Gwynedd Council) in northwest Wales since its inception in 1974 (see Fig. 16.1). The Council is the stand-out case of local government[3] in Wales whereby a raft of locally mandated language policies were introduced irrespective of, and before, Westminster and all-Wales language legislation.[4] Such locally mandated policies were pre-emptive of national developments and facilitated the Council's graduated objective of becoming a bilingual tier of government, both internally and public facing. In doing so, the Council distinguished itself manifestly from other county councils in Wales.[5]

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[3] Understood here as referring to the tier of local government directly below both central and all-Wales elected government

[4] Although the Welsh Language Act 1967 acknowledged the use of the Welsh language in public life (Roddick 2007: p. 273), with formal provision being for the Welsh language in certain legal proceedings and in statutory forms and signage in Wales, the legislation made no provision for other aspects of language policy.

[5] For a wider comparative view of local government engagement with language policy both in Wales and further afield, see Carlin (2013).



Fig. 16.1 Welsh County Councils between 1974 and 1996 showing (in *bold*) Gwynedd County Council

Although the Council's language policy was to receive a greater degree of legislative legitimation in the form of the Welsh Language Act (WLA) enacted at Westminster almost 20 years later, the changeover period of local government reorganisation in 1973–1974 was, however, a political opportunity not to be missed during a period in which Plaid Cymru began to flex its muscles, aspiring to become a significant political actor at the national level (Morgan 1981). A shadow council created a tier of senior officers who could work in both languages (Shadow Gwynedd County Council 1973), and, in 1975, deputy senior officers were requested to be able to comply with the same requirement. A Bilingual Subcommittee was created which was to wield substantial influence over public bodies not only across North Wales but nationally as well. In its early years, it focused on ensuring bilingual services for the public and developing language courses for officers. As regards the use of the language by elected members, the Subcommittee's aim was to establish the principle that Welsh should be made the language of the plenary sessions and subcommittees, and, in this vein, a translation unit was set up to facilitate and extend the use of simultaneous translation. However, Gwynedd harboured substantial doubts about its ability to push the policy forward due to indirect lines of communication with the Welsh Office in Cardiff and a legal regime unable to support its activity (Thomas 1997: p. 334). This uncertainty would lead to a number of restrictions on the internal language policy, for example, the unwillingness to usher in a requirement of Welsh for all officers and the lack of budgetary details concerning the rolling out and maintenance of the policy. Indeed, in 1985, the Council was involved in a legal dispute with labour unions and the Commission for Racial Equality on this requirement. Internal Council language policy was adversely affected by the publicity generated around this case (interview with senior officer 2006), and it was not until enactment of the Welsh Language Act (WLA) in 1993 and further local government reorganisation in 1996 that Gwynedd Council designated Welsh as the administrative internal written and oral language, thus becoming the first county council tier of government within the UK to designate a non-statewide language the working language of internal administration. With the enactment and subsequent implementation of the WLA, the Council was able to continue with its singular language policies, yet the tenor of the local mandate was now to include and build upon concepts and practices of a different – and national – magnitude. This would enable the Council to move from adopting a 'pre-emptive' stance regarding their language policies to one whereby it could simply categorise itself as being adherent to, and complying with, state legislation. Conceptually, the Council was able to incorporate its normative decisions within a national framework whereby the newly created government quango, the Welsh Language Board (WLB), would reach agreement with public bodies on how they would provide citizens with public services in Welsh within particular geographical areas or sectors of activity. These consensuated agreements are entitled language schemes. On a practical level, the Council was able to repackage its policy on bilingualism within the framing of language schemes, availing itself of legislation enacted at Westminster in order to legitimise a raft of activities which had been consistently mandated at the local level.

16.3 Local, National, Uniform? A Thorny Triangle

This final section deals with the development, implementation and conceptual premises of the most recent Welsh language-specific legislation, the Welsh Language Act 1993 and the Welsh Language (Wales) Measure 2011. The WLA, as we have seen, was passed by the central UK Parliament at Westminster, and its statutory requirements currently remain on the statute book. It is a rather peculiar piece of pre-devolution legislation in that it was driven forward by Conservative party elites in Wales, pressured due to its inability to gauge the strength of lobbying groups calling for new language legislation, and which was accepted meekly by a weakened central UK Conservative Party (Edwards et al. 2011).

The passage of the WLA gave a statutory basis for Welsh-medium public service provisions. However, from a symbolic and cultural perspective, the WLA is also significant because it repealed several of the historically significant pieces of legislation which had shaped the contours of Welsh public life for centuries, going back to 1535 and 1542, the so-called Acts of Union, which determined English as the only language of official public administration and office in Wales.

Following the WLA, the Welsh Language Board was established as the Wales-wide principal agency for the promotion of Welsh in public life. As the policy process which developed from the WLA matured, there remained significant structural weaknesses in terms of the implementation of public body language schemes, partly due to an inability to successfully resolve public and lobbyist expectation regarding uniform access to Welsh language services at the point of delivery but also to the perception that the language scheme mechanism was open to claims of fragmentation because of the elevated number of schemes operating throughout the territory.[6] Additionally, the WLB did not have any independent powers of enforcement, but rather it was the Secretary of State for Wales *before* the establishment of the NAfW, and the Welsh Ministers *after* devolution, who were authorised to take enforcement actions, but were not obliged to do so.

At the time of writing, it is not yet clear how the institutional, conceptual and implementation elements contained within the Welsh Language Measure (WLM) of 2011 will interact,[7] not least due to the lag in implementing a number of the statutory components of the legislation. Such a systemic delay in itself would suggest at the very least uncertainty on the part of political and institutional actors regarding the interpretation of, inter alia, the new language standard regime and the degree to which this new mechanism will be able to bridge the perceived gulf between the supply side of the implementation of government policy, the demand side of public and lobbyist expectation and the demolinguistics of a minority language, albeit one which represents a significant cleavage in Welsh society (Jones 2008).

It is not perhaps unexpected that language legislation emanating from the Welsh legislature contains a degree of conceptual novelty regarding the official status of the Welsh language. The first part of the legislation section states that 'The Welsh language has official status in Wales', the legislative articulation and breadth of which formed the basis of significant evidence giving and plenary discussion during the measure's passing through the legislature. As previous language legislation encapsulated a legal customary interpretation that the official status of the Welsh language was de facto official and therefore did not require a declaration to that end in legislation (HC Deb 1993), a declaration regarding the status of Welsh in substate legislation is significant for language policy per se but quite possibly as regards the wider implications as to the relationship between bilingualism and the increasingly asymmetric UK.

A traditional view is that the customary and partly written UK constitution, of which the WLM now forms a part, is based upon pragmatism and adaptation, with practices being created through precedent rather than sweeping value-laden statements. It is often described as being a 'political' constitution in that it is through political processes and institutions that those who wield power are made accountable to citizens. UK sovereignty, thus, resides in Parliament (Gee and Webber 2010). Such a constitution develops as a result of a reasonable degree of conflict in politics whereby 'the democratic process *is* the constitution' (Bellamy 2007: p. 5). Recently, however, it has been argued that the UK is gradually moving away from a 'political' to a more 'legal' and Europeanised constitution (Claes 2007). Examples of this include the Human Rights Act 1988, the creation of institutions such as the Supreme Court and the impact of devolution in the UK in general, despite there not being any 'settled procedures for dealing with constitutional reform in the UK' (Oliver 2011: p. 340).

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[6] By 2011–2011, there were 557 operational language schemes (Welsh Language Board 2011).

[7] This subject forms the basis of a current major 3-year study by the School of Welsh at Cardiff University and financed by the UK Economic and Social Research Council entitled 'The Office of Language Commissioner in Wales, Ireland and Canada' (ES/J003093/1).

With this in mind, the language scheme mechanism of the WLA is understood in the context of a 'political' constitution, being a somewhat creative modern day revival of the commutation schemes which form part of the Welsh Church Act of 1914 (Williams 2013) constitution as such an exceedingly ad hoc example of Welsh – and British – language planning. Since the referendum result of 2011, however, full lawmaking powers in devolved areas reside in the NAfW. With a Welsh legal jurisdiction being mooted (Welsh Government 2012), it is reasonable to reflect on what might be the position of the Welsh language in such a jurisdiction and under what legal mechanisms its use would function. Reference once more to the customary British constitution might shed some light on this if one considers that the UK constitution is not perhaps as flexibly customary as portrayed:

> It has [the constitution] over the centuries embodied substantial formal and written elements, and these have grown more extensive and prominent in recent times. Indeed, it could be maintained that it is precisely some of these formal provisions – Magna Carta, the exclusion of papal jurisdiction, the various acts passed between 1533 and 1560 establishing the Church of England, the Petition of Right, the act abolishing the Court of Star Chamber, the Habeas Corpus legislation, the Bill of Rights of 1689, the Act of Union of 1707, the Reform Act of 1832 and many others – that constitute the milestones marking out the growth and nature of the British constitution . . . the constitution is largely defined by those institutions and practices which emerged from and were confirmed as acceptable conclusions facilitating a renewal of constructive political activity after phases of acute conflict and division. (Johnson 2004: pp. 14–15)

On such a view, the recent constitutional changes in the UK referred to earlier could be seen to funnel into such 'a renewal of constructive political activity'. Similarly it might be asked to what degree the *declaration* of the official status of the Welsh language in WLM, and in a subsequent declaration in future 'consolidated' legislation in Wales, such as a third Government of Wales Act, or in legislation regarding the establishment of a Welsh legal jurisdiction, might resemble such constructive political activity.

On an initial view, the legislative drafting tradition in the UK does not support this possibility. According to lawyers at the Office of the Parliamentary Counsel, declarations do not form part of UK primary legislation (Williams 2013). In other words, primary legislation must be substantive, noting what is permissible in legislation and what is not, rather than having recourse to declaratory statements. However, to what degree might this interpretation of UK law be comprehensive? Although declaratory statements do not often appear in legislation, it is not completely unknown either. An example of this, with undoubted constitutional ramifications, can be seen in the first part of the Northern Ireland Act 1998, whereby:

> It is hereby declared that Northern Ireland in its entirety remains part of the United Kingdom and shall not cease to be so without the consent of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland voting in a poll held for the purposes of this section in accordance with Sch. 1. (Northern Ireland Act 1998)

This piece of legislation makes a *declaration* regarding the continuance of a specific territory within the UK until such time as citizens living there choose otherwise. It seems appropriate on occasion, therefore, to design declaratory legislation in the British context. One possible reason for a declaration might be for reasons of absolute clarity:

> The argument that it is not legitimate [declaratory statements] rests on the assertion that the sole purpose of legislation is to change the law. But if there is a real doubt as to the state of the law in respect of a particular matter, *removing the doubt by express provision does effect a change in the law*, even if it does no more than to restore as the sole construction what would probably have been the better construction in the face of doubt. (Greenberg 2008: p. 68)[8]

One might wonder, however, whether certain criteria under which a 'real doubt' is removed might be linked to a value-laden cultural sphere whereby declaratory claims in legislation offer signposts for clarity whilst couching subtle normative – and political – values? In the realm of language, might not the statement regarding the official status of Welsh begin to link political values with statutory language mechanisms and specific territories within Wales?[9] It is thus conceivable that precedents exist within the British legal tradition which might facilitate the development of a language regime in Wales, open to democratic scrutiny yet diverging significantly from earlier versions. Seen thus, the flexible British constitution might make the development of the WLM declaratory statement in future Welsh constitutional texts more legally acceptable where political consensus in the NAfW obtained. The acceptance of such a mechanism could form the legitimising basis for Welsh Government strategic plans and strategies in the form of soft law for general promotional and sector-specific policy areas[10] as well as providing the required statutory framework for those local governments in Wales already engaged in working towards offering Welsh as a default priority language within a wider bilingual service framework.

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[8] Italics inserted by author.

[9] Sections 44 and 150 of WLM 2011 hint at the territorialisation and sectorialisation of language regimes within Wales.

[10] See, for example, Welsh Assembly Government (2003, 2010).

16.4 Conclusion

The former First Minister of Wales, Rhodri Morgan, stated in 2007 that the depoliticising of the language question during the 1980s and 1990s was the most appropriate strategy in the search for consensus (Morgan 2007). Such a path was tactically purposeful and, indeed, in line with government language policy throughout the twentieth century. However, with the arrival of the NAfW and the further development of the Welsh political and legal system, the possibility of a normatively informed language policy is within reach, indexing thus policy with polity in a much more defined manner. Such a policy need not necessarily be predicated on the moral grammar of language rights but rather on a contingent, context-driven process. The argument is forwarded here that it is specifically within the context of a flexible British constitutional setting that such a development might occur, representing an applied interpretation of language policy rather than the static prism of third-generational language rights. The appeal to politics within a broad institutional setting is clear:

> One cannot simply expect polities, languages and their interplay to remain unchanged through time, at least not outside a highly ideological perception … [d]enying future generations the opportunity and responsibility for a meaningful participation in the shaping of their own political and linguistic circumstances effectively neutralises the dynamic prioritisation process of politics as a human activity. (Peled 2014: p. 313)

A practical and adaptable policy of this description could only be viable were it to achieve party political consensus within the Welsh political system in order to support its design, implementation and maintenance. An extended and inclusive 'national discussion' would invariably be needed for this purpose. At a time when the British constitution is rapidly adapting to the continuing relocation of power relations within the UK, a flexible approach to language policy forming part of future Welsh constitutional documents would legitimise variations for territories where the capacity for community-based Welsh language transmission is deemed to exist whilst promoting other aspects of language transmission in the rest of Wales. Might a more creative and flexible approach to language policy in Wales represent a partial recognition of, and response to, the language practices of citizens living in Wales?

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