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Global Change and Human Mobility

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Global Change and Human Mobility

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Preface

Global Change and Human Mobility is the title of this volume, published in the series of Springer essays dealing with all the aspects considered in the Advances in Geographical and Environmental Sciences. The title of the book appeals to scholars interested in the issue of change and mobility across the world, both empirically and theoretically, offering a selection of studies developed by members of the International Geographical Union Commission (see www.globility.org) on this subject, from both thematic and geographical perspectives.

Owing to its ability to link locations and societies, human mobility has received increasing academic attention over the last few years in the context of the globalization process. As a manifestation of some of the world's key political, economic, societal, and cultural issues, human mobility has acquired great importance in the social sciences and particularly in geography. The chapters of this book demonstrate the strength of this topic in looking at a changing world from the focus of a new disciplinary approach. From these contributions, it can be seen that human mobility transforms the perspective of migrations conceived as processes between points of origin and destination, analyzing the fluidity of the relations between spaces. Therefore, new tendencies of human mobility and new interpretations of old processes overlap in this book's chapters.

Chapter 1 is dedicated to a theoretical reflection about the state of the art in the subject of human mobility and is written by Professor Armando Montanari and Dr. Barbara Staniscia from the Sapienza University of Rome, Italy. Professor Montanari established the Commission on Global Change and Human Mobility within the International Geographical Union in the year 2000, while Dr. Staniscia is the current Scientific Secretary of the Commission.

Chapter 2 offers a perspective of the reaction of migration systems in the current context of global financial and economic crisis. Professors Daniel Göler from the University of Bamberg in Germany and Zaiga Krišjāne from the University of Latvia develop a broad reflection on the "regional element" of transnationalism, opening that concept with a new transregional perspective drawn from the

migratory systems of Albania and Latvia, which strengthens the spatial issue in migration studies.

Chapter 3 focuses on the fluidity of human mobility, challenging migration and border controls. Professor Dirk Godenau from the University of La Laguna in Spain and Ana López-Sala, Research Fellow from the Spanish Council for Scientific Research (CSIC) offer a reflection on the connectivity between migration and border studies, with the backdrop provided by the analysis of migration control initiatives undertaken along the southern border of Europe over the last decade.

Chapter 4 presents a critical assessment of the challenges faced by female refugees and of the effectiveness of policies and interventions from international agencies such as the UNHCR. The "women perspective" bursts into this book as a result of the study of refugees, highlighting the double discrimination against them by reasons of gender and political persecution. They have no or few legal rights and are powerless and marginalized, and their voices are rarely heard. As highlighted by Professor Brij Maharaj and Dr. Sinenhlanhla Memela from the University of KwaZulu-Natal in South Africa, the atrocities encountered in their home countries could sadly be repeated in the destination country.

Chapters 5, 6, 7, and 8 of the book are dedicated to the issues of migration, mobility, and integration from different geographical perspectives. Professor Victor Armony from the Université du Québec à Montréal in Canada is the author of Chap. 5, which deals with Canada's immigration policies and integration models, with a particular focus on the division between the predominantly French-speaking province of Québec and the rest of the country, mainly English-speaking. It also describes the tension between two competing models, multiculturalism and interculturalism, that coexist in the Canadian context and reflect two narratives and practical approaches to the integration of newcomers.

Researcher Fellow Susana Sassone from the National Council on Scientific and Technical Research in Argentina proposes, in Chap. 6, an analysis of the role of Latin American migrants as actors and agents of the spatial transformation of cities in the era of globalization, taking into account both theory and empirical evidence. The study of different immigrant communities in Argentinian cities proves that the building process of the neighborhood and social cohesion are related to transnationalism relationships, which imply a new profile of the postmodern migrant, prone to react in a flexible way to globalization and shaping a new city landscape.

Chapter 7 covers integration – a key issue in the literature about migration – through the study of the relationships between integration and the role of associations in France. Professor Yann Richard and Researcher Fellow Mathilde Maurel from the Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne in France, and Professor William Berthomière, Director of the National Centre on Scientific Research in France, dedicate special attention to the consequences of the associations increasing or decreasing the oppositional identities of migrants. Integration is analyzed with a geographical (links between regional distribution and density of associations) and economical perspective, e.g., the access to employment.

Chapter 8 studies the nature of the integration process, comparing the four models representing different types of migration and integration of the small

community of Thai nationals in the Euro-Atlantic area. Dr. Daniel Šnajdr and Pr. Dušan Drbohlav, Head of the Geographic Migration Centre, from Charles University of Prague in the Czech Republic, adopt a qualitative procedure to characterize this small community of migrants, highlighting the importance of a relatively unknown flow of migration from Thailand to Europe.

In Chap. 9, Professor Gábor Michalkó of the Research Centre for Astronomy and Earth Sciences and Associate Professor Anna Irimiás from the Kodolanyi Janos University of Applied Sciences, both in Hungary, develop a study on the role of emotions and expectations in human mobility. The qualitative research highlights the importance of expectations related to the host country in the different stages of migration; the adjustment capacities of migrants coping with acculturation stress; and emotions related to the overall migration experience. The case of Hungarians living in the United Kingdom highlights the influence of migrants' personal traits and their ability to establish network capital in the new forms of mobility.

Chapter 10, written by Assistant Professor Miguel Glatzer and Tara Carr-Lemke from La Salle University in the United States, analyzes the role of the social initiatives dealing with illegal immigration in the U.S. In a context of harshness, movements, and organizations that work to empower unauthorized immigrants, to change public opinion and to alter policy play a critical role. This chapter presents a case study of one such organization: the New Sanctuary Movement of Philadelphia (NSM Philadelphia).

In Chaps. 11, 12, 13, 14, and 15, researchers develop the issue of youth mobility, a flourishing topic in the current state of knowledge, owing to the facilities provided by new forms of relationships between regions and countries, especially for those who have grown up parallel to the IT revolution.

In Chap. 11, Professors Josefina Domínguez-Mujica, Ramón Díaz-Hernández from the University of Las Palmas de Gran Canaria in Spain, and Juan Parreño-Castellano, Director of the Department of Geography from the same university, connect the recent demographic changes of Spanish population with the decision of young skilled Spaniards to go live abroad during the financial crisis.

This perspective is complemented in Chap. 12 by Junior Professor Birgit Glorius from the University of Chemnitz in Germany, where she analyzes the same phenomenon from a complementary perspective, i.e., Germany as a recipient country of human capital flow from Spain. The labor necessity and the legal framework propelling these migrations are shaped by personal decisions on opportunities to career development and to pursue a transnational lifestyle.

Professor Cristóbal Mendoza from the Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana in Mexico and Dr. Anna Ortiz from the Universitat Autónoma de Barcelona in Spain focus in Chap. 13 on Ph.D. students' mobility and migration. The in-depth interviews carried out allow them to offer an interpretation of this process as conditioned by two different circumstances: the selection of a certain university by higher studies decisions and the attractiveness of certain places like Barcelona for Latin American students.

Chapter 14 studies the same phenomenon in a different geographical framework. Professor Maria Lucinda Fonseca and Dr. Juliana Chatti Iorio from the University

of Lisbon in Portugal and research fellow Sónia Pereira of the Human Rights Institute of the University of Deusto in Spain, analyze the mobility of Brazilian students to Portugal. In this case, the focus moves from personal decisions to the role of the Brazilian government and university strategies in Portugal in stimulating the international mobility of university students.

An interesting perspective of the consequences of globalization in rural areas is presented in Chap. 15. The authors are Associate Professor Birte Nieneber and Assistant Researcher Ursula Roos from the University of Luxembourg, who study the issue of migration in rural areas and its contribution to the globalization of these spaces through the creation and multiplication of networks. They use two case studies to develop their analysis, from the district town of Merzig in Saarland, Germany, and the German–Austrian borderlands (Bavaria), where cross-border migration prevails.

Chapter 16 analyzes the fall of totalitarian regimes in Central and Eastern Europe and the enlargement of the European Union as the framework of the persistent Romanian migratory drain. The analytical approach, developed by Professor Ioan Ianos from the University of Bucharest in Romania, reveals that the main factors propelling internal and external flows of migration in Romania are of an economic nature, and that there is a causal correlation between migration and economic development thanks to the flexible mobility within the European Union.

Finally, Chap. 17 offers a look into the linkages between human mobility and the volcanic environment of Ilha do Fogo in Cape Verde. Dr. Judite Medina do Nascimento, Dean of the University of Cape Verde, Lecturer Claudio Moreno Medina from the University of Las Palmas de Gran Canaria in Spain and the technicians at the natural park in Ilha do Fogo Alexandre N. Rodrigues and Herculano Dinis, show the social and cultural behavior of the island inhabitants facing volcanic risks. They document the resilience of human mobility in these hazardous episodes using the observations collected during the last eruptions (1995 and 2014–2015) and the interviews they carried out.

Las Palmas, Spain   Josefina Domínguez-Mujica

Contents

Chapter 1
Human Mobility: An Issue
of Multidisciplinary Research

Armando Montanari and Barbara Staniscia

Abstract The chapter retraces the stages which led to the theorisation and the affirmation of the concept of human mobility in social sciences. Moving from comparative analyses concerning urban development in the 1960s and 1970s of the twentieth century, the chapter comes to the latest theories on immaterial and virtual mobilities. Human mobility is the core of the discussion; in the background are the main events that have revolutionised the global world, in its political, economic, technological aspects.

1.1 Introduction

Human mobility is currently one of the central topics of interest to the social sciences around the world. It takes on different forms, which include migration and tourism, and is an element of scientific reflection due to the relationships and overlaps presupposed by these flows. Tourism is a form of mobility of variable duration, which in turn generates further forms of migration: (i) those activated by the demand for services from tourists, (ii) those linked to second homes, (iii) those dependent on seasonal cycles in the labour market, (iv) those linked to changes in lifestyles and (v) those linked to new habits of elderly people and pensioners. Starting at the beginning of the last decade (2000–2010), the problem of redefining the concepts of migration and tourism was considered, as well as the need to carry out new research on the synergistic relationship between migration and tourism (Hall and Williams 2002). Many forms of migration do in fact generate flows of tourists, as immigrant communities can become hubs for such flows, while simultaneously activating return tourism flows for visiting friends and relatives (VFR) and for maintaining relationships with the country and culture of origin. These transformations in the nature of human mobility developed between the end of the

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twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first in a context of advanced globalisation following significant changes in public policy due to technological innovations and economic changes. These new forms of mobility in turn influenced social and cultural development and were supported by increasingly globalised information. In contemporary culture, global phenomena and local development are strongly interrelated. Human mobility is one of the most significant expressions of this interrelationship.

1.2 Human Mobility in the 1960s and 1970s: The Prerequisites for Identifying the Phenomenon

Research into the phenomenon we now call "human mobility" intertwined from the very beginning with comparative research in the social sciences. The researchers initially focused their attention primarily on the mobility of the population within metropolitan areas. This was due to the fact that the variable of commuting had been chosen in defining the size of a metro area and its components, core and ring. In effect, the first forms of urbanisation saw places of production and places of residence concentrated in specific areas, and the phenomenon of commuting was easily identifiable and predictable. These reflections had taken their cue from the concepts expressed in one of the best known and most widely distributed sociology texts of the early twentieth century (Park and Burgess 1921). Park et al. (1925) then developed a model in which the urban structure is identified via concentric zones, including the central business district, the zone of transition containing the residential areas in a phase of degradation and finally the working class and residential zones and the commuter zone. The city was therefore identified as a living organism in continual transformation, in which the concentric circles could change their hierarchy on the basis of the different stages of development. Apart from this potential for change, the urban structure remained predominantly stable in the case in which the power of planning to orient and change was prevalent.

The concept of dynamism of the urban structure became a priority in research from the 1960s onwards. The Social Science Research Council's Committee on Urbanisation noted the need to identify a reference model for urban development capable of demonstrating its validity beyond the limits of geography and time. However, the attempt to identify a reference model was soon bogged down by the principles of ideological contrast that governed the world at the time. For the free market economies, the phenomenon of urbanisation was unstoppable and the resulting problems and conflicts inevitable. Public administrations could have taken measures to reduce the undesired social and economic effects. In planned economies, on the other hand, the problems were considered from completely the opposite point of view; the urban-rural contrast was seen as a tool to contribute to the destruction of the traditional lifestyle of inhabitants of rural areas. Jones (1975), in his "Essay on World Urbanisation" for the International Geographical Union

(IGU), held that the widespread phenomenon of urbanisation in countries around the world referred to such a large number of variables that it would be impossible, as well as irrational, to draw up a common summary of such a phenomenon.

Jensen (1976) attempted to perform comparative analysis of the urban environments in the USA and the Soviet Union. He concluded, however, that due to the different historical experiences and different stages of economic development, it was not particularly significant to perform comparative analyses and it was more appropriate to analyse the dominant themes of the two countries' urban development. Among these, the policy for reducing the growth of the largest urban areas is significant. From 1958 onwards in the Soviet Union, new industrial plants were built only in urban areas with a population of between 50,000 and 100,000 inhabitants, on condition that they did not then exceed a population of 250–300,000. Berry (1976a) found that a fundamental change had begun in the 1970s in the USA, when the American metropolises grew at a slower rate than in the past, and on the contrary even began losing population – around 1.8 million people between 1970 and 1974 – in favour of areas outside the metro regions.

In the same period, the Stockholm Conference (1972) confirmed worries about excessive atmospheric pollution, and the process of introducing new environmental policies began at the worldwide level. The deteriorating environmental situation led to numerous major international meetings between the end of the 1960s and the early part of the following decade, when a more concentrated and significant series of events highlighted the onset of environmental risk on a worldwide scale, among these, the formation of the Club of Rome (1968), the promotion of the Man and Biosphere (MAB) programme by UNESCO (1971) and the Stockholm Conference, the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, UNCHE (1972).

Berry (1976a) reported that there was no longer an indistinct movement of population, but that it was limited to particular social and economic groups who were more sensitive to innovative phenomena moving to new areas, leaving the less dynamic groups behind them. Berry (1976a) called this phenomenon "freedom to move", which he justified with the desire for a better quality of life in residential areas closer to nature and in regions where it is easier to grasp the opportunities offered by the new phases of economic development. This phenomenon is the result of a number of decisions taken individually within an individualist, yet extremely contagious, cultural position. Berry's work (1976a) therefore shows the first attempts to identify the phenomenon of human mobility. This must be understood as a complex phenomenon in which individual options and choices overlap with policies on national and international migration implemented by public players. Berry (1976b) also encouraged verification of the findings from the USA in other countries around the world.

Drewett et al. (1976) analysed the situation in the UK, noting that changes in the population distribution were due only to natural changes and migration. They hoped, however, that subsequent research would aim towards a better understanding of the social and economic implications of the changes in progress, above all in terms of the roles of the different social groups. Berry's research (1976b) had an immediate impact on European research as well; indeed, even as the first results

were arriving from the USA, a group of researchers coordinated by Roy Drewett (who had collaborated with Brian Berry) presented a research project proposal entitled The Costs of Urban Growth (CURB) to the European Coordination Centre for Research and Documentation in Social Sciences (Vienna Centre). The CURB project was approved and operated between 1975 and 1982, when the first volume was published (v.d. Berg et al. 1982). The Vienna Centre had been set up by the International Social Science Council (ISSC) to coordinate comparative research projects in the social sciences and to encourage cooperation between European countries with planned economies and those with free market economies. Previously, between 1963 and 1973, the Vienna Centre had coordinated a project titled "The economic and sociological problems of tourism in Europe", involving research groups from 12 countries.

The topic of urban change was a particularly delicate one to take on, considering the debate around it in the preceding years. A balance was found in recognition of the fact that urban growth was a burdensome phenomenon to deal with, regardless of the economic system of each country. All the European States, moreover, needed to further analyse a topic to which the social sciences had paid little attention, mainly for methodological reasons. Up to that point, research on urban areas had been performed mainly by geographers, including in the USA. Input from economists was missing, and as a result, the increase in costs related to urban growth had not been quantified. Sociologists had identified the problems related to social imbalances, but had not provided the costs. For this reason, the CURB project had proposed measuring the demographic and economic changes and the extent of the urbanised areas in order to identify the human, economic and environmental costs, aiming to involve all branches and skill sets of the social sciences.

As well as the internal costs of the urban area, it was also necessary to add costs relating to areas the city is able to influence, the size of which would represent a topic for study and analysis. For this reason, as the research proceeded, the concept of functional urban region (FUR) was gradually identified and developed. This definition was later enhanced by the introduction of the "core" and "ring" concepts in order to also take in the external areas of influence. The logical model adopted by CURB to identify the main relationships in the urban system provided three lines of evolution, the result of decisions concerning policies for (i) the location of industrial areas, (ii) the organisation of recreational activities and (iii) the services provided. Three levels of analysis corresponded to these lines. At the first level were the number, the quality and the location of jobs, together with the size, quality and location of the areas reserved for recreation, and the location and quality of social infrastructure. At the second level was analysis of the time to reach the workplace, size, quality and location of the residential areas and the difficulty in overcoming social imbalances. At the third level was analysis of the accessibility, in both hard and soft terms, of the workplaces, recreational areas and geography of the infrastructures.

The results of the CURB project showed that it is not the economic and political/administrative system which determines differences in urban development, contradicting the numerous theories which, up to that point, had highlighted

different relationships between urban growth and free market economies and between urban growth and centralised political/administrative systems. The problems of large urban areas, particularly those deriving from crises or insufficiencies in urban planning, existed in all regions of Europe, albeit with specific characteristics and peculiarities. CURB represented the basis and the occasion for intense scientific discussion, which lasted for several years and produced around 300 working papers. In this way, a scientific path was developed which led to verification of the development of areas from both a macro- and microeconomic point of view, at the international, national and regional levels. The most original aspect of the project – i.e. the theory of growth and decline of the urban areas in the European continent – was built on the processing of this research material. Although particular emphasis had been given in the early stages to specific aspects of the comparability of eastern and western countries, the greatest concern soon became to provide the research with a goal. The objective was to provide an answer to the need to understand urban development trends in advance in order to anticipate problems in this regard. For this reason, CURB was extended to the largest possible number of European countries. The results of CURB were presented at numerous international conferences to be compared with the results of other national and international research projects.

In the first phase of research and comparative analysis, no references were made to human mobility, as there was the danger of conflict with the planned economies, in which the circulation of goods, services and persons was controlled by the state. It could be argued that the free market economies tolerated and maybe even encouraged human mobility in its different forms of migration and tourism. The planned economies did not permit phenomena of human mobility. They highlighted the negative consequences of these phenomena experienced in the West. Despite this, in some Eastern countries, illegal forms of spontaneous urban migration were recorded, which had an impact on the quality of life of the citizens. With regard to the USA, Berry (1976b) points to phenomena of individualism that have always prevailed in American history, causing an administrative fragmentation also driven by interest groups using the principles of democratic pluralism to their advantage. Berry (1976b) found it appropriate to cite Warner (1968), who pointed out that US cities depended on the sum total of the success, or conversely on the lack of success, of that plethora of private enterprises operating independently of the actions of the public administration for their own economic success and prosperity. The form, the characteristics and the organisation of American cities therefore depended on the actions of large-scale companies, the goal of which was their own profits and, at times, their own speculative activities. In any case, private enterprise is able to move more rapidly than public bodies and therefore able to follow the demand from the population more quickly or even to anticipate it.

The political atmosphere in Europe began to change, and on 1 August 1975, the Helsinki Declaration, the first official document of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, was signed; this was an attempt to improve East-West relations. During his first decade as president of the Vienna Centre, Adam Schaff threw himself into activities supporting the preparation of the Helsinki Declaration,

and following this promoted a series of meetings dedicated to semiotic analysis of the declaration (Villaine-Gandossi 1991).

In the CURB project as well, as with other international gatherings, the researchers from countries with centralised economies held positions that were officially different from those expressed by the researchers from free market countries. The former denied the existence of an urban development model, since the countries of Eastern Europe had concentrated their efforts on developing production and settlements in the context of a rural type of "urban network". For this reason, the work of v. d. Berg et al. (1982, p. 5) stated that the form, purpose and path of development of an urban settlement are the consequence of socioeconomic development, geographical conditions, institutional characteristics and finally of citizens' choices. As these conditions were significantly different in the countries with centralised economies, the results should have been different. Enyedi (1992), who had participated in CURB in his quality of member of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, retraced the urban history of the cities of Eastern Europe after 1988. Significant differences emerged between what had been theorised and what had happened. He wrote that Eastern European researchers, in their official declarations, referred to the Soviet model, as they had no choice in the matter. In reality, however, those responsible for town planning in the Eastern European cities paid close attention to the Western models. Alongside the official positions, there was also an "informal" policy which had an impact on urban development which was much greater than might have been envisaged at the end of the 1980s.

1.3 Human Mobility in the 1980s: Recognition of the Phenomenon as a Research Subject

In the 1980s, significant transformations in the world production system and major changes in the economic, political and social structure in Europe occurred. In order to analyse the roots and the significance of those changes, the European Science Foundation (ESF) promoted a series of conferences and seminars between 1985 and 1988 with the goal of defining the characteristics of the new map of Europe, which was then being traced out. The discussion initially examined the prevailing tendencies of the world economy, its consequences at the national and local levels and at the same time the processes of change in the core and peripheral regions around the world. Problems pertaining to the core-periphery relationship were also considered, both at the global and European level. The problem faced by the participants at these meetings was that of justifying the weakening, and in some cases the reversing, of the clear trend towards counter-urbanisation, a phenomenon already identified in the preceding years and which many thought would continue for at least several decades. The meetings promoted by the ESF had in fact highlighted the onset of a powerful push towards new regional polarisation in a world increasingly dominated by the innovations brought by new IT and internationalisation of

the economy. In 1987 a conference was organised in Jerusalem to consider issues related to the globalisation of economic phenomena, while the impact of these changes on the geography of the European States and regions was considered in Bergen the following year (Shachar and Öberg 1990; Hebbert and Hansen 1990). The results obtained during the feasibility stage of the project and the topical nature of the research areas identified made it possible to prepare a research project proposal on "Regional and Urban Restructuring in Europe (RURE)"; this proposal was approved by the ESF towards the end of 1989. Indeed, there was significant interest in predicting the characteristics of the new European regional and urban structure that would result from the economic, organisational, technological, geo-political and sociocultural processes in progress in those years. The programme prioritised the study of regional changes set in action by the transformations to the production system, new operational strategies and methods of multinational companies, demographic changes and the population's ability to adapt to the new economic processes. To this end, RURE was structured into four working groups (WGs) responsible for studying the following topics: "Changes in the organisation and operation in the production system" (WG 1, chairperson E. Shamp), "Strategies and operations of transnational corporations" (WG 2, chairperson M. de Smidt), "Population processes in the urban and regional system" (WG 3, chairperson A. Montanari) and "Societal responses to changes in the production system" (WG 4, chairperson J. Gaspar).

At the time of the launch, the numerous changes involving the European economic and social structure due to the collapse of the Soviet Union were superimposed with the methodological clarity and consistency of that project. Some of the transformations that had only been vaguely hypothesised in the pre-feasibility phase of the project proposal quickly became highly topical, requiring revision of the research projects already underway. In some cases, this led to the study of new topics – via the introduction of *ad hoc* groups – and greater collaboration and integration between the different WGs. The *ad hoc* WGs which met during the Lisbon Conference (February 1991) were as follows: car manufacturing (chairperson W. Gaebe), advanced producers services (chairperson F. Moulaert), tourism (chairperson A. Montanari), housing (chairperson J. V. Weesep), industrial districts (chairperson A. Amin), rural and peripheral areas (chairperson J. Oksa), atlases and GIS (chairperson C. Vandermotten) and research proposal on Southern European integration (chairpersons J. Gaspar and A. Shachar). These eight groups approached and developed topics that had not been sufficiently considered when preparing the project proposal. The "tourism and economic development (RURETOUR)" group was transformed into a full WG with its own independent scientific activities and working meetings. To this end, it collaborated with the most active European researchers in the sector, including some external to the RURE Programme.

The results from RURE were published in around 20 books and special issues of journals (Malberg 1996). Around 70 scholars from 21 European countries took part in the programme, primarily geographers, but also economists and sociologists. The working groups met twice a year. Each year, moreover, a topic was chosen for a

conference (urban and regional restructuring in southern Europe, in central Europe, in northern Europe) during which the RURE programme compared its results with research performed by other academics, including those with different disciplinary approaches. The research was led by two codirectors – Arie Shachar (University of Jerusalem) and Sture Öberg (University of Uppsala and IIASA, Laxenburg, Austria) – who operated within a management committee in which the heads of the four research groups and the coordinators of the annual conferences participated.

RURE had to deal with numerous problems as soon as it got underway. One initial problem was the speed of the geopolitical transformations occurring in Europe in the late 1980s: never in the post-war period (in other words, since multinational comparative research programmes on urban and regional changes in Europe had begun) had such a multitude of profound economic, political and social transformations taken place. It was no longer possible, for example, to divide the European countries into free market and centrally planned economies. The economies that had been subject to central planning had begun a rapid transition towards new and different economic systems. The free market economies seemed to be keeping to their own line in terms of economic policy, but in reality had to adapt to a world which was no longer simply black and white. RURE, on the other hand, had been conceived in a period, later recognised as being one of great stability and continuity, in which urban and regional transformations were considered almost exclusively as the result of phenomena internal to the system, though within the context of internationalisation of the economy. RURE, therefore, which had already been defined but was no longer completely up-to-date in all its components, was presented to the participants – selected when the research programme had already been defined – to carry out, and it was received with some controversy.

It is fatal when, in times of crisis of a research project in which the initially chosen goal is no longer identifiable, rigidities owing to different mindsets, methodological habits and, above all, different schools of thought re-emerge. Schools of thought that in some cases were sharply cut down to size by the evidence of what was occurring, and had lost part of their identity, found it more difficult to regain a logical line of reasoning. This new situation was discussed in particular during the meetings of the working groups and the managing committee in the autumn of 1991, without managing to provide sufficient answers to the impending events. Reopening the discussion at the general level would have perhaps been fatal for the entire RURE programme, and for this reason, each working group was left to face and deal with the problems on the basis of its own individual choices and management abilities. This was done by dividing the working groups into subgroups to cover the different topics, allowing to express themselves to the best of their ability in their own cultural and methodological area. Although they were part of a common system of coordination, the subgroups were formed on the basis of free individual participation; they identified their own lines of research and put together their own publications. This occurred in working groups 1 and 2 after intense discussion and fiery methodological confrontations. In working group 3 (RUREPOP), the discussion was possibly even more heated. With all the exasperation of this conflict, the researchers still managed to find a strong spirit of scientific solidarity. This led to the

identification of three common topics to which all group members gave their contribution, without forming subgroups, following a conceptual plan based on the relationship between society, the economy and the territory. Three typologies were considered in relationship to development cycles, changes in the organisation of production and strongly rooted structural processes.

It was in this atmosphere of uncertainty and profound scientific conflict that the foundations were laid for the study of human mobility. RURE WG 3 concentrated its activities on the qualitative changes in migration flows. The reference was always to migration, but by that point the types of migration were becoming rather numerous. And also for this reason, the term "mass migration" was used: migration that was large in scale yet heterogeneous in its goals and motivation, between regions with different cultures and management abilities in their public administrations. It was pointed out that these flows, even when they did not concern large numbers in absolute terms, were nevertheless able to modify the population distribution both in their countries of origin and countries of arrival (King 1993). The research mooted the possibility of European states introducing policies to contain these flows and succeeding in managing them. The alternative was that these migration flows were uncontrollable and that over the course of a few years there was the possibility they would reach a level of between one and two million immigrants, legal and illegal, per year. These new flows were in addition to the previous ones that had seen populations, above all from southern Europe, find work and set up residence in northern European countries.

At the same time, it was noted that these historical emigrants were beginning to return to their countries of origin, while the flows of skilled international migration and qualified manpower were spreading out. The RURE WG 3 tried, with the RURETOUR WG, to tackle the problem of how the flows "traditionally" considered tourism overlapped with those traditionally considered migration. Specifically, King (1995) examined the changes in the tourism labour market in the post-Fordist period. He also noted that the tourism labour market represents a particular form of attraction for foreign workers, who are often not easily identifiable because it is an informal labour market that escapes official statistics. It was then also noted how the returning migration flows had a significant impact on the tourism sector. These may be temporary or permanent returns, but are nevertheless made after retiring and therefore in forms which are easily comparable to tourism. The returnees also use money they have saved to set up tourism businesses in their places of origin: often, these are pleasant seaside locations in southern Europe, little known to traditional flows of tourists.

1.4 The Theory of Human Mobility Between the Late Twentieth and Early Twenty-First Century

There were around ten bodies of scientific work significant for the acceptance of the concept of "human mobility" by the international academic community. Urry's work (2000) influenced research in the social sciences even before its publication, since he had hinted at its contents in advance at various conferences and some concepts had already been covered in previous publications. Although Urry is a professor of sociology and the stated goal of his work had been the development of categories relevant for the field of sociology, his sensitivity, attention and communication in regards to geography should not be forgotten. It is not surprising that his work was even informally discussed at the IGU conference, August 1996, The Hague (NL). In particular, a meeting between William A. Clark, Armando Montanari, Arie Shachar and Allan Williams is notable, in which the relevance of the subject for geography and the need to prepare the proposal to set up an IGU commission on "Global change and human mobility (GLOBILITY)" was considered.

Urry's volume (2000) represented a manifesto for sociology which examined the different "mobilities" regarding human beings, goods, images, information and refuse, their interdependencies and the relative social consequences. For this reason, the second part of the title of his work refers to "mobility" for the twenty-first century: mobility is considered a phenomenon that is both geographical and social. When Urry states that social mobility has so far failed to ignore the intersections of social classes, genders and ethnic groups with regions, cities and places, he indicates a new dimension in sociology, no longer anchored to the concept of human society, but by now in search of new paradigms, which can be precisely networks, mobility and horizontal fluidity. Sheller (2011) wrote a historical reflection on the way in which sociology, in the cultural dynamism expressed in the 1990s, provoked widespread discussion between sociologists as well as between academics in the fields of geography, anthropology, architecture, urban planning, media and communications theory and art (Sheller and Urry 2004).

On the basis of this new disciplinary approach, the parameters became those of the sociology of flows, where there are points of neither arrival nor departure, there are no specific reference scenarios, the direction and the speed are more important than the destinations and so characteristics such as viscosity and temporariness come into play; barriers to mobility exist but contain cracks that cannot be ignored. The intersections of the flows and the hierarchical rungs of these cracks are the centres around which power revolves, just as different flows intersect in the "non-places" of modernity. Of the notable authors in this preliminary stage of developing the base concepts, Favel, Sheller and Urry are sociologists; Axhausen and Smith are urban planners; and Cresswell, Hall, Kellerman and Williams are geographers; however, all refer to Urry in their work, regardless of their main academic discipline. All these geographers, with the exception of Kellerman, were involved by Urry in the editorial board of the journal *Mobilities*, published since 2006 by Routledge and edited by Urry alongside M. Sheller and K. Hannam. Larsen

et al. (2006) published the results of research commissioned by the British Ministry of Transport considering five independent types of mobility that form and re-form the geography of networks and of travel in the modern world. These are physical journeys undertaken by people, goods and things, imaginary ones based on memory, virtual ones made via the Internet and those requiring direct communication between people via post, telephone, fax, Skype and videoconferencing.

While the authors complain of the limitations in their mandate, the work is particularly interesting as it transfers and verifies primarily methodological approaches on an empirical level. Indeed, the concept of mobility, in the various ways in which it is considered, does not easily find statistical reference data that can be compared and contrasted in a straightforward way. The gathering of statistical data makes reference to long-acquired concepts and can therefore not offer a quantitative base consistent with theories that have only been very recently formulated and are predominantly methodological. This therefore represents one of the few studies in which combining a quantitative base with a qualitative survey of reference has been possible. Cresswell (2004) published his work in the *Short Introduction to Geography* series, which includes fairly accessible volumes to facilitate students' understanding of core geography concepts.

In this volume, the key concept is the "place", dealt concisely but without ignoring traditional topics and academic debate on human geography, covering the evolution of the concept from the 1950s onwards. The author also manages to discuss the end of the concept of place in relation to mobility, above all comparing Relph's (1976) approach full of negative moral connotations – for example, when he refers to the "place and placelessness" relationship – with the value of the transitory, temporary and ephemeral in Augé's (1995) definition of "place and non-place". According to Relph (1976), it was mobility, therefore the railways and motorways, which destroyed places. The destination is not important, but rather how one arrives there. Cresswell (2004), on the other hand, believed he had found in Augé (1995) the prerequisites for an evolution of the concept of place that presupposed mobility.

In examining the literature, Cresswell (2004) concluded by identifying three approaches to the concept of place: descriptive, social constructionist and finally phenomenological. In a later work, Cresswell (2006) centred on mobility as one of the key concepts of modern life, and to do so he examined social mobility over the last 150 years from many standpoints. He also claimed that the study of human mobility in geography has a history as long as the discipline itself, and therefore anyone trying to describe the positions expressed in this period, would get bogged down and should focus on certain salient points. In this volume, human mobility is thought of as a potentially observable empirical phenomenon, an ideological concept such as freedom, transgression, creativity and life itself, and finally as a fulfilled experience; mobility is practised as a way to exist in the world.

Cresswell (2006) also presupposes a further interpretation: human mobility implies the presence of complex beings, pedestrians and dancers, pilots and athletes, refugees and citizens, tourists and businessmen, men and women. He enters the discussion between the interfaces that form between physical bodies in

movement and mobility, represented in order to understand situations which could not otherwise be interpreted. The volume did not miss out on acclaim from Urry, who in a review defined it as a novella that is also a scientific volume thanks to its wealth of details and enlightening theoretical suggestions; in short, it is a must-read. Cresswell (2006), not Attali (2003), whose work is perhaps – to use Urry's concept again – simply a novella on the history of man, initially a nomad, then stably settled and now becoming a nomad once more, but of a new type.

Kellerman (2006) came to the concept of human mobility using a different approach; for many years, he mainly studied the geography of telecommunications and information. His volume deals with personal mobility, explaining his approach in the first part of his work, making reference to Lash and Urry (1994) and the concept of society in movement. This statement is contrasted by Kellerman, who cites the "*homo viator*", the individual who moves both in society and in space, and immediately thereafter reminds us that the greater dimension of mobility was made possible by the invention of the telephone, which permitted a spatial extension of interpersonal relationships and therefore a society based on the mobility of information. He thus focuses his attention primarily on innovation and thereby on the relationship between this and mobility: was it the need for mobility that accelerated innovation or the latter which facilitated mobility?

Another recurring theme is the interface, or rather the interference, between human mobility and personal mobility. He then opens a treatise on the reasons behind mobility, which despite being geographical in nature have not yet been studied in depth by geographers as much as it has been by sociologists. Smith and Favell (2006) collected together ten chapters written by sociologists, political scientists, demographers and ethnographers, which illustrate various aspects of what is defined, maybe too hastily, as a new development of global migration. Financial and commercial flows represent, together with free movement of specialised personnel, technicians and students, a key aspect of globalisation. This work aimed to provide a more in-depth analysis of the discussion about the characteristics of these migrants, on the costs and consequences of the phenomenon of "brain drain" which is the inevitable result of the migration of specialised personnel, the characteristics of national policies on highly skilled migrants and the presumed inevitability of professional migration.

Szelényi (2006) published the results of interviews with 26 university students who had moved to the USA, leaving open the question of whether this was brain "drain, gain or circulation?" Smith and Favell (2006) also gave a glimpse of the interesting implications of a form of invisible "slippage" from controlled migration to mobility without any kind of social friction. The new forms of migration are slowly moving through the classical migration categories, like goods and capital migration is in part turning into temporary mobility that is less visible to countries' monitoring and surveys. Many new ways of "frictionless mobility" are possible through the use of new forms of temporary movement. Cressell and Dixon (2002) published 14 contributions from around 20 authors, many of whom are geographers. The authors explain the reasons behind their work in the introduction: many geographers use films for their lectures and researches as metaphors, allegories or a

means to question the character of representation and a tool to record the day-to-day perception of the world. Three aspects are considered – mobility, identity and didactics – to explain the way the films are used.

The epistemological passage from an existentialist to an anti-existentialist behaviour had a significant effect on how mobility was studied and theorised. Mobility in and of itself does not have a specific meaning, inasmuch as it exists only in relation to the presence of a social and cultural context. This mobility must be structured in such a way as to reproduce or challenge social relationships. Mobility is therefore of lower status than the priorities represented by space, place and landscape. On the basis of the various social and cultural theories, the preoccupation for stability and permanence has been replaced by the fluid, both at the level of theoretical transfer, nomadism and theory of travel, and been the topic of research, fluid space. Mobility is able to capture a certain attitude with regard to the notion of society and space that is expressed in scepticism towards stability, towards that which is entrenched, without uncertainties, and observance of the rules. Concentrating on the mobility included in or around films has the effect of putting our notions of fixity and identity up for discussion.

In the section examining the acquisition of mobility, there is the contribution of Kirsch (2002), who writes about the spectacular violence, hyper-geography and alienation characterising Quentin Tarantino's 1994 film *Pulp Fiction*. Tarantino parodies the popular fiction of the 1930s and 1940s published in so-called pulp magazines, indicating publications printed on low-quality paper and thus implying similarly low-quality writing. *Pulp Fiction* is a film which is not only timeless but without landscape: the viewer is subject to an unstable vision of modern-day Los Angeles, a hyper-geography composed of a social network of roads and internal spaces, both public and private, all linked together in a relative space.

Hall and Williams (2002) highlighted three topics: migration linked to tourist production, migration due to tourist consumption and finally human mobility resulting from visits to friends and relatives. For some years, Williams and Hall (2000) had been working around the subject of human mobility, and as far back as 2000, an article had already appeared with their early reflections, involving numerous authors who had approached these topics.

Szivas and Riley (2002) examined the characteristics of the job-related mobility of an economy in transition towards the tourist sector through a sample survey (351 questionnaires collected) performed in four different regions in Hungary. Although tourism offers low levels of pay, it has attracted labour from other sectors in crisis, therefore leaving open the question of whether this phenomenon might be permanent or just temporary. Cooper (2002) considered the impact on the labour market of two regions in Australia and one in New Zealand from flows of Japanese, Korean and Taiwanese tourists. These tourists do not speak English, and therefore in the initial phase, they encourage a flow of labour and entrepreneurs from their own countries. The second phase is represented by Japanese, Korean and Chinese tourism companies using itinerant labour such as students or Australian and New Zealand nationals who speak the same language as the tourists. Once the labour market becomes more flexible, there is then a third phase characterised by

individual tourists from these same countries whose travel is primarily motivated by social relationships and visits to friends and relatives.

Mason (2002) analysed the phenomenon of a significant number of young New Zealanders aged between 18 and 30 who move for a period of time ranging from a few months to a year or two to gain experience abroad, above all in Great Britain. In qualitative terms, this flow is new and original in comparison to tourism and migration and represents a sort of pilgrimage, a rite of passage that does not exclude the typical motivations of *push and pull* theory which provides for visits to friends and relatives, or places of family origin, and also leaves space for subsequent travel experiences to visit the places of initiation and experience abroad. For Krakover and Karplus (2002), the concept of human mobility is highlighted by the relationships between tourism flows and migration flows in Israel, where the state practices a policy of attracting flows of migrants who could be defined as "ethnic tourists". In the initial phase, the flow which is activated can be likened to that of tourism for visiting friends and relatives; therefore, there is good information before travel, reduced cost of the stay abroad and finally a support network in the event of decision to remain abroad. The state itself intervenes in this phase, partially even replacing the network of friends and relatives by offering a generous contribution to integration. In a second phase of settlement and integration, the "tourist" is transformed into a migrant. In the third phase, the decision may be made to return to the country of origin, and therefore, it will be necessary to assess whether this return is performed as a tourist – in the case that the stay in Israel was brief or the settlement abroad was temporary – or else as a returning migrant.

The two authors describe the case with a wealth of data and demonstrate how it is possible to put in place policies aimed at attracting specific segments of population by using the similarities and continuity which exist between the phenomena of tourism and migration. Salvà Tomàs (2002a) references the Balearic Islands and the stages of development of tourism in relation to the different types of mobility according to three time periods: the 1950s in which the phenomenon began; the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, in which growth and consolidation occurred; and the 1990s, when it reached maturity. Tourism is certainly the product of situations and policies with a global reach, but its qualitative and quantitative dimensions are strongly influenced by the ability of numerous local players to attract and modify its flows.

Timothy (2002) considers ethnic tourism, which occurs in certain enclaves, on the basis of the results of empirical research performed in two ethnic islands in the USA. This type of tourism is the result of the overlapping in space and alternation in time of flows of both migrants and tourists. Fountain and Hall (2002) analysed the case of Akaroa – a small island in New Zealand, the attraction of which is the lifestyle – identifying characteristics, behaviour and the impact on the local community of four types of flows: pensioners, groups of artists, stressed-out professionals and telecommuters (those who move home while maintaining their work connections through teleworking). For Müller (2002), the phenomenon of the approximately 7000 Germans who purchased a second home in Sweden during the 1990s highlights one of the typical processes of human mobility. The research

focused on a phenomenon which, having property deeds as a reference, can easily be documented with precision and also makes reference to the topics of terrain use, which are particularly significant for geography, and finally presupposes a commitment to the area and the community of arrival similar to that of immigrants.

Flognfeldt (2002) also focused on the topic of second homes, in Norway, analysing a longer period to study the sense of place between primary and secondary residences and to what extent the purchase of a second home is the first step towards a subsequent decision to migrate. In the field of visits to friends and relatives (VFR), Lew and Wong (2002) reference how the development of tourism in China was able to draw advantages from the complex network of connections with Chinese emigrants who made their fortunes abroad and returned as entrepreneurs. Nguyen and King (2002) studied the Vietnamese communities in Australia, highlighting how they perceive Vietnam and the cultural and economic features of their visits to the communities of friends and relatives in their country of origin. Boyne et al. (2002) used the results of their research into the phenomenon of visits to friends and relatives in Scotland to highlight the increasing importance of this type of flow both in relation to the phenomena of globalisation and to the positive economic and cultural effects on the local communities.

Duval (2002) went into these concepts in depth, referencing the results of a study of the Caribbean community in Toronto, Canada, which allowed him to highlight the continuity between visits to friends and relatives – traditionally considered a form of tourism – and the migrant flow of departure and that (final) of return. Hall (2005) returns to the concepts expressed in an earlier work (Hall and Williams 2002) with reference to the mobility of production and consumption, broadening them by reminding us how tourism is increasingly considered a dimension of mobility and temporary circulation. Research into tourism must aim to formulate an approach consistent with the attempt to interpret the meaning of the range of different types of mobility that refer to individuals and not necessarily to tourists. Considering tourism on the basis of space/time relationships will not only allow the analysis of various forms of mobility but also the tools which limit or encourage mobility at both the individual and collective level. Although this work echoes Hall's previous research, it tries to maintain continuity in its attempt to answer questions that could contribute to rethinking – as indicated in the volume's subheading – the social sciences of mobility.

In 2000 the International Geographical Union (IGU) set up a research commission – "Global Change and Human Mobility (GLOBILITY)" – on the methodological prerequisites of a process of evolution of population flows. Researchers and lecturers from over 100 institutions participated in GLOBILITY, 50 % of whom are Europeans and others are distributed among the other continents. The research benefited from the experience and evolution of the social sciences in the preceding decades, and contributions thus came not only from the countries in the northern hemisphere but also Africa and the Pacific region. In order not to end up with a distorted view of human mobility, care was taken that the participants represented the point of view of both developed and developing countries. Although the

network was set up within the confines of the IGU, scientists from other disciplines in social sciences were invited to actively participate in GLOBILITY.

Attention was focused on the processes that occurred from the 1990s onwards, when the effects of the global changes due to the processes of the post-socialist (Baláz and Williams 2002; Kolossov and Galkina 2002; Galkina 2006) and post-apartheid (Maharaj 2003; Manik et al. 2006) societies were clear. The different aspects of human mobility were examined in relation to the processes of globalisation of production and consumption (Claval 2002; Montanari 2005, 2012; Williams et al. 2012).

Scientific contributions did not concern only domestic and international migration of unskilled workers, which have been given significant attention in the literature; rather, they examined the role of women (Domínguez-Mujica and Guerra Talavera 2005, 2006; Raghuram and Montiel 2003; Wickramasinghe 2002) and young people (Lash 2003; Chikanda 2003), a topic which has still not been focused on sufficiently. Staniscia (2012) and Montanari and Staniscia (2014) published work on the mobility of university students outside the framework of international agreements, occurring as spontaneous phenomena linked to the decisions of individual young persons.

Specifically, attention was paid not to one single type of human mobility but rather to the many and varied forms of mobility present in contemporary society. The study of new methodological approaches for examining processes totally different from the past also made it possible to consider and develop proposals for intervention policies to alleviate the significant imbalances that human mobility can generate for the environment and the quality of life of our societies. The difficulty of involving researchers from various parts of the world, for economic reasons as well as difficulties in obtaining visas, was dealt with by organising meetings in Africa (Chikanda 2003; Laroussi 2002), America (Clark 2002) and Asia (Janzen and Bazargur 2003; Kim and Yoon 2003; Montanari 2003), so that the Eurocentric thrust of the empirical and methodological approach could be reduced.

GLOBILITY studied the forms of international mobility and migration which can be linked to the processes of internationalisation and globalisation of the economy (Venier 2002), forms of local development and investments (Staniscia 2005), social and cultural habits which can mainly be ascribed to consumption rather than production phenomena (Salvà Tomàs 2003) and new forms of investment and social habits (Salvà Tomàs 2002b; Michalkó and Rátz 2006). The study of human mobility phenomena on islands produced significant results because the spaces are easier to delimit, and it is therefore easier to gather quantitative and qualitative data and compare the current situation with the past, as in the previously mentioned works of Salvà Tomàs and Domínguez-Mujica, who recently performed a study on a historical fishing community settled in Las Palmas (Domínguez-Mujica and Avila-Tàpies 2012).

The reference typologies can be ascribed to the new forms of recreation, free time and tourism that represent the economic prerequisites for the transformation of urban areas (Glorius and Friedrich 2006; Hatziprokopiou 2006; Montanari and Staniscia 2006). The economic restructuring due to the crisis in traditional

production sectors comprises niche forms of tourism that represent the driving sectors in urban and regional development and restructuring strategies. The internationalisation of economic activities leads to new forms of short-term occupational mobility, including temporary transfers between one office and another of the same multinational company and participation in training, promotional activities and conferences (Verquin 2002). This favours investment in the free time and hospitality sector as well as in services and the related infrastructure and therefore contributes to urban and regional restructuring. Changes in the time patterns, organisation and porosity of work, in the availability of retirement income and in the organisational and institutional structure of pensions favour processes of internationalisation of the use of free time from work and retirement (Illés 2006). Over the last 3 years, the effects of the international economic crisis on human mobility have also been considered (Brusa and Papotti 2011; Ishikawa 2011; Montanari 2010; Montanari and Staniscia 2011), with particular reference to the real-estate market (Tömöri and Süli-Zakar 2011), starting out with the experience of Japan which represented an early case of domestic economic crisis in a framework of international growth (Ishikawa 2003).

The empirical evidence of a relationship between phases of development and flows of human mobility was highlighted by the research of, among others, Salvá Tomás (2002b) on the Balearic Islands. He identified seven stages of economic development corresponding to the same number of phases of growth, crisis and consolidation of the tourist industry. To each of these phases – identifying distinct flows of human mobility, primarily of consumption – it is possible to combine an equal number of phases in which the mobility flows are directed at production. The flows from the European countries are primarily attracted by consumption activities such as tourism and free time, long-term tourism, ownership of second houses and spending long periods during retirement. In addition to these types of flows, there are also those connected with production activities linked to tourism, holidays and free time or professional support in the field of financial and real-estate consultancy, as well as healthcare. The population pyramid related to German citizens, for example, is characterised by a greater presence of individuals aged between 50 and 64 years, with a significant presence of those aged between 30 and 50 as well, and a general predominance of females.

The flows originating in developing countries, on the other hand, are attracted by production activities, even though they also contribute to generating other flows, which are initially minor, linked to consumption, therefore visits to friends and relatives, and family reunions in general. In the case of persons originating from Africa, the population pyramid indicates a predominance of individuals aged between 30 and 40; in terms of gender, there are three or four times more males than females. An equivalent study was performed in Italy's Sangro Valley, analysing the flows of international migration in relation to the phases of economic development (Staniscia 2005). In outlining the conclusions of her research, Staniscia (2005) refers to a model of migratory attraction based on two key characteristics: (i) the local economy and its ability to provide employment

opportunities for unskilled workers as well as managers and entrepreneurs and (ii) the local community characterised by a high degree of hospitality.

An attempt to create a model for the relationship between the stages of development and the different types of mobility was made by Montanari (2005). The mobility flows were catalogued according to four spatial levels, the local, national and European spaces, as well as the international extra-European one, and three levels of permanence, commuting, temporary and permanent mobility (Montanari 2012). The flows were divided into incoming and outgoing flows according to these characteristics.

Alongside the previously mentioned international activities, GLOBILITY also favoured the organisation of research teams that submitted to the European Commission research proposals which were then financed. These included the following projects: "Interregional migrations in Europe" (MIRE 2002), "Spatial deconcentration of economic land use and quality of life in European Metropolitan Areas" (SELMA 2002–2006), "The spatial effects of demographic trends and migration" (ESPON 1.1.4 2003–2006), "Female citizens and workers in Europe" (CELINE 2005–2008), "Preserving places. Managing urban tourism, urban conservation and quality of life in historic centres" (PLACE 2008–2010), "Solutions for environmental contrasts in coastal areas. Global change, human mobility and sustainable urban development" (SECOA 2009–2013), "Territorial Impact of Globalization for Europe and its Regions" (TIGER 2010–2012). More recently, the YMOBILITY Project has also seen some of the main players in the European debate on human mobility come together to study the phenomenon of youth mobility, the stimuli and the necessities sustaining it and finally the policies which should be put in place to enhance its advantages and reduce any negative aspects. In all the above-listed projects, the central element was the region, specifically the place where the spatial theories are applied and where the new social theories were born. This issue cannot, certainly, be limited to the discussion within the social sciences, but should be applied as an element of understanding for all phenomena concerning human beings.

1.5   Conclusions

Until recently, research projects have made reference to the positions of the European Commission, which makes a clear distinction between flows of migrants and flows of tourists, as if it were the responsibility of the European administration to focus its attention on something – the migration flows – considered to be serious by the public opinion: serious because it involved hard work, old-fashioned sweat and toil, and because it concerned industrial production and economic development, and flows of workers, often illegal, crossing borders. Migration is a serious ethical and cultural problem. EU is based on the breaking down of borders and on the exchange of goods and services between countries, as well as free movement of its inhabitants. But EU has also established a series of international agreements,

providing for a certain freedom in the movement of goods and financial flows. Information and communication flows travel freely between countries and continents, but this is extremely difficult to manage when it comes to people.

Tourism, on the other hand, does not seem to create problems: the more the flows increase, the greater the advantages, often only apparent, for the countries receiving them. Even the idea of admitting that the "blessings" of tourism might be strictly interwoven with migration creates both cultural and ideological problems. Recently, significant progress has begun to be seen in the cultural acquisition of the link between flows of tourists and migrants. A signal, although maybe a weak one, can be found in the first HORIZON 2020 calls published in late 2013, where, for the first time, a reference appears to mobility as a complex phenomenon concerning certain segments of the European population. Young persons, who seem prepared to experiment, or to look elsewhere for what they cannot find at home, are the first to fully experience mobility.

The question should be asked of what are the opportunities for the social sciences to keep a central role in producing results that can be of support to EU policies. The first problem is that of data. The concept of human mobility is too highly evolved with respect to the methods and variables used by statistics offices both in EU countries and at the coordinated EU level. The speed with which the extent and the characteristics of human mobility change is only comparable with that of financial flows. People – above all the most dynamic ones and, therefore, young people – are able to receive information on events, trends and culture exactly as they occur. The information used by researchers should, therefore, also be acquired in real time, making the best use of the available information.

Human mobility has already changed the demographic structure of European countries. We have to make the most of this situation in order to study in depth the changes produced, above all, because, now more than ever, the entire world is represented within Europe. It is no longer necessary to go to the places where human flows circulate to perform research. This would consist of studying this new demographic situation to the fullest possible extent in order to best understand who is arriving and who is leaving, who has never moved and maybe never will and those who are in perpetual movement. These analyses will allow us to learn more about situations of well-being and malaise in our societies, the consequences of eating habits, about diseases and the ability of our bodies to best come to terms with global changes. Researches on human mobility are placing themselves ever more at the centre of the multidisciplinary research that is required, now more than ever, to understand and solve the complexity of the issues at hand. This approach is required for collaboration with the natural sciences when it is necessary to understand environmental change as an active and passive relationship with human behaviour. If we place multinational research at the centre of attention, then we also have to put the clinical and psychological aspects of human health into play, along with the way we feed ourselves.

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Chapter 2
Elusive Migration Systems: Shifting from Transnationalism to Transregionalism

Daniel Göler and Zaiga Krišjāne

Abstract The global financial and economic crisis as well as post-socialist transition means a similar general framework for socioeconomic and spatial development in different countries. Their migration systems react in different ways on such externally caused incidents, even in slightly comparable contexts. Consequences are, among others, increasing migrations and mutual interactions between sending and receiving countries as well as strong linkages of international migrations and internal migratory movements – phenomena we usually refer to as transnationalism. Against this backdrop, the aim of the paper is to stress the "regional element" of transnationalism. Thus, we suggest to broadening the concept of transnationalism with a new transregional perspective in order to strengthen the spatial issue in migration studies.

Keywords Migration • Migration system • Transnational social space • Transnationalism • Transregionalism

2.1 Concept and Methods

Basis of analysis is empirical findings taken from two case studies that show a widespread variability and diversity regarding mobility and migration pattern: Latvia and Albania. Both show different preconditions in their status regarding EU membership along with various types of predominant forms of mobility. Latvia is characterized by stable permanent emigration that tends to increase recently. Albania in contrast experienced a long-term mass out-migration with a dramatic brain drain, but has higher potentials of return. New social practices and multilocal activities of migrants have been on the research agenda of several qualitative and

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quantitative studies (Göler and Doka 2015; Göler et al. 2014; Göler and Krišjāne 2013; Göler 2009a, b; Apsīte et al. 2012; Krišjāne et al. 2013). Analysis focuses on mutual interactions between sending and receiving countries with particular reference to social and spatial consequences and latest variations.

The structure of the paper is as follows: first, we refer to transnationalism as a key concept in migration studies. Second, thinking in transnational pattern will be reassessed from a geographical point of view. Third, we introduce concepts and main findings of our empirical field work. Fourth, we suggest "transregionalism" as a modified and more accurate concept for comparative geographical migration studies.

2.1.1 Transnationalism: A Key Concept in Migration Studies

One of the key tools in contemporary migration research is the well-known concept of transnationalism, understood as "increasing interconnections between nation-states across borders" with "political, economic, social and cultural dimensions" (Faist et al. 2013, viii). It goes back to Glick Schiller et al. (1992) and was further adopted in groundbreaking but also critical studies by – among others – Smith and Guarnizo (1997), Portes et al. (1999), Portes (2001, 2003), Kivisto (2001), Levitt (2001), Vertovec (2001), Levitt et al. (2003), Levitt and Jaworski (2007), Dunn (2010), and Collyer and King (2014). Main outcome of transnationalism from the geographical point of view is the manifold effects of international mobility and migration. Regarding geographical evidence it is very useful to pivot the lens on the "transnational social space" (Pries 2001). Figure 2.1 stresses the combination of traditional and new elements of migration research. Migration is interpreted as a

Fig. 2.1 The transnational social space (According to Glick Schiller et al. 1992; Pries 2001) (Source: the authors)

physical movement of human beings between territories. The consequences are seen as results of immaterial exchanges and social discourse.

Obviously, the perspective in migration research shifted: "classical" study turned attention to courses and consequences of the change of permanent residence. Contemporary migration studies analyze mainly the variability of social spaces defined by migrants. Consequently, interest began to focus on circular mobility, when a physical migratory movement is repeated episodically or periodically with the result that different "places" are connected. This interconnection can be sustained by further means of internet-based communication (like e-mail, Skype, WhatsApp, and others), which can contribute to the substitution of physical movements. All in all, these strong interrelations between two or even more places, probably located far away from each other, define the transnational social space as an "arena of social interactions" (Dahinden 2009, p. 16).

Perhaps the most noticeable outcome of international migration is the money sent home by migrants, so-called remittances. They are estimated to $581 billion in 2014 (The World Bank 2014) and tend to increase in spite of the global financial crisis – with regional variations. Remittances are three times the size of official development assistance and they provide an important lifeline for millions of poor and vulnerable households. And they are an important factor not only in the global south but also in (post-socialist) transition countries, especially in those with strong out-migration like Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, and others.

The overall economic effects of international migration for the sending and receiving countries and for the migrants themselves are substantial. They include the transfer of money in terms of remittances as well as "social remittances" (Levitt 1999) i.e. knowledge, innovation, behavior, skills and other cultural or lifestyle-related elements. In this view questions related to migration networks and integration become more and more relevant. They include aspects of individual action strategies and of hetero- or multilocality, and a consecutive return migration as a new form of social resilience (Goss and Lindquist 1995; Zelinsky and Lee 1998; Cassarino 2004).

2.1.2   Some Critical Remarks on Transnationalism

Main point of critics on the concept of transnationalism is the focus on nation-states as basis of analysis. Vice versa, the concept underestimates the manifold migration networks inside the countries of origin as well as possibly developing networks in the destination countries. For this reason it is worth to highlight these topics especially from the geographic point of view. Keeping space in mind, we are suggesting to complement the transnational perspective with a transregional one and will provide a proposal by the end of the paper.

To study these issues, different concepts and appropriate theoretical approaches exist already. One is given by King et al. (2008, p. 44): the study of migration pathways shows the potential variety of the migration process besides a way from place "A" to another place "B," including ("linking") internal and international

steps of migratory movements. Another more complex concept focuses on families or households as units for the analysis (Haas 2008, p. 31): household trajectories show the overall complexity of migration. They take family-based groups and individual mobility as well as different scales and occurrences of relocation and reunification into account. Both concepts bear groundbreaking theoretical evidence for empirical studies in transition contexts.

These considerations lead to a new agenda for empirical studies which is able to incorporate distinctiveness and uncertainty as well as the bias between mobility and sedentarism as possibly options. These phenomena exceed characteristics of fluidity, flexibility, plurality, and diversity of migrant groups and mobility. All in all, mobility and migration at least in times of global crisis has created an emerging field for migration studies beyond liquid migration (Engbersen et al. 2010). These configurations may be embraced in the line of "elusive migration systems" as adequate research agenda. This may serve as hypothesis for the following reflections on the basis of empirical field work.

2.2 Empirical Evidence: Albania and Latvia

2.2.1 Albania

Albania, one of the Southeast-European transition countries, faced a period of economic marginalization and destabilization of living conditions after the end of the rigid Stalinist socialist system. The opening of the country 1991 and the deregulation of migration control served as a stimulus for an increasing internal and international migration of a highly vulnerable population. The country explored a period of massive and long-lasting out-migration (Göler 2009a; Vullnetari 2012). Today, the stock of emigrants is 45.4 % of the total population. Remittances, which are estimated at $1.5 billion, an equivalent to 11.5 % of the national GDP in 2008 (INSTAT 2014, p. 43), still play an important role.

INSTAT (2014, p. 36) indicates that 90 % of emigrants live in Greece and Italy. Both countries are the main source of return migrants after 2008. Even if the migratory balance is still negative, there is a remarkable return migration flow to Albania. In some cases, when migrants have finished their individual migration cycle, this is a voluntary movement. In others it is a forced one. Returning from Greece, for example, is mostly triggered by the economic crisis there (Göler and Doka 2014). Especially less-qualified migrant workers get problems on the labor market, according to the motto "last hired, first fired." However, migration in both ways is part of the coping strategy; living in the diaspora is a basic element of resilience. And, additionally, keeping close relations to various regions in the home country (and sometimes to several places in the country of destination) is a new transregional element. Besides monetary effects such as remittances, nonmonetary

effects of out-migration like social remittances and intensive knowledge and innovation transfers can be observed.

This is true for returnee's business "in good times." The results of a study from 2006 (cf. Göler 2007) may serve as a typical example of the nexus between migration and entrepreneurship. In this regard, remittances are a promoting factor for the formation of private entrepreneurship in Southeast Europe. Qualitative studies based on entrepreneurs' biographies showed that the capital transfer from abroad plays a crucial part in the foundation of small- and medium-sized enterprises. The connection of entrepreneurship and migration is a rule in Albania. Only 1 out of 34 interviewees in our survey was not in emigration before his start-up. In fact, start-ups usually are prepared with a stay of several months or a couple of years abroad, mostly in Italy or Greece. Some of our interviewees looked back at several back-and-forth movements to different countries. Others spend a continuous 10-year period abroad.

In comparison to our second study on returnees, conducted in late 2012 in southern Albania, the general framework and conditions for return migrants had changed. While Albania was hardly affected by the global financial and economic crisis directly, high unemployment in Greece caused problems for many migrants. For years return was just an option for Albanian migrants. Recently returning became a necessity for lots of them. Biographical sketches from returnees in southern Albania indicate two facts: first, return migrants meet, in comparison to the time when they left the country, more or less the same problems in Albania itself. Second, potential windows of opportunities are, in comparison to the past decade, dying out, at least due to increasing competition in doing business and on the labor market. Additionally, there is a big problem of social exclusion of returning migrants, mainly among youngsters who grew up abroad and came back together with parents according to the family's decision (tied migrations). They try to finish secondary school, to get a third-level education or just make plans to leave the country again. The common issue among them is the combination of internal and international migration, because most of them choose new places of residence after return, outside the village their family came from.

2.2.2 Latvia

Out-migration from Latvia has not been consistently high. It has noticeably increased since 2008 as a result of the financial crisis. It induced also shifts in migration system taking place in the context of Latvia.

In 2004 Latvia became one of the EU member states. After accession the country has experienced important social, political, and economic changes. Latvia was also one of the countries that suffered negative economic recession effects. While being one of the EU member states, Latvia due to emigration has lost around 10 % of the population and GDP decreases for 17 % in 2009 (CSBL 2014). After the EU enlargement, the main destination countries were the UK and Ireland. The most

drastic flows of emigration from Latvia were found after year 2008 where due to the high unemployment rate which was a consequence to previous economic boom years and high number of people being unable to cover monthly payments and mortgage payments, they choose to live and work abroad (Apsīte et al. 2012). The economic downturn period highlighted the new destinations such as Germany and Norway. After the end of the transition period, Germany as a new destination was widely recognized from migrants from Latvia and wage differences has been an important attracting factor. Despite the fact that English-speaking countries show rather high number of immigrants from Latvia, Germany experiences stable increase in registered in-migrants from Latvia especially along with economic instability in the country of origin and deregulation to A8 countries. According to the Eurostat data in 2013, around 150,000 Latvian citizens resided outside Latvia and 76 % of those live in one of the top three countries (the UK, Germany, and Ireland; Eurostat 2014) (Fig. 2.2).

Previous research on migration patterns from Latvia showed that shortly after accession to the EU, labor migrants from Latvia were mostly driven by economic motives and necessity to earn more or to gain higher income compared to Latvia (Krišjāne et al. 2007).

The key tool in order to characterize Latvians residing abroad was to perform survey through social media. Online survey took place in the beginning of year 2012 and comprised migrants from Latvia residing in the main destination countries. The unique data set results allowed describing profiles of migrants from Latvia and to discover main emigration motives. The survey was administered through social media www.draugiem.lv (www.frype.com) and the questionnaires were individually posted to the registered users residing in one of the top countries of destination. Sample size in each country was calculated separately, for instance, the UK ($n = 1{,}117$; 41 % male; 58 % female), Ireland ($n = 618$; 36 % male; 64 % female), and Germany ($n = 426$; 36 % male; 64 % female). Respondents were in the age between 16 and 73 years, but the largest group comprised persons aged under

Fig. 2.2 Migrant flows from Latvia to top destination countries: the UK and Germany (Source: Statistisches Bundesamt 2014; Department for Work and Pensions 2014)

30 years of age. In the case of the UK, it was possible to compare with the official A8 migrants statistics where the sample correlated with the general age composition of A8/Latvian migrants in the UK (Gillingham 2010; Apsīte-Beriņa 2013; McCollum and Apsīte-Beriņa 2015).

The main motives for emigration in recent years corresponding to the difficulties of the economic crisis were mostly economic related. Both in the case of the UK and Germany unemployment have an important role in the out-migration decision-making. Necessity to find employment and gain desired salary has been recognized as an important aspect in order to move to Germany. This is mostly due to the economic instability and dismissal related to the general reaction of worsening of economic conditions in the country of origin. Previously well-off people who took bank loans for various expenditures along with the change of economic fortune in Latvia occurred in the position of out-migration in order to keep the properties and cover monthly payments which were formed in the period before the economic downturn (Apsīte-Beriņa 2013). Germany as an attractive destination slightly more than before attracts persons with private and family reasons and welcomes persons who desire to travel and receive international experience while living in Germany. Most out-migration arguments from Latvia to the main destination countries are economically grounded. Study-related motives or others constitute only around 5 % (Fig. 2.3).

Just after accession, geographical distribution of out-migration regions in Latvia was rather equal – all regions lost some proportion of residents; however new trends of migration patterns were noticed. Despite the fact that the capital Riga showed the lowest unemployment rate and available employment to some extent, a number of Riga residents were not satisfied with available remuneration and therefore emigrated. Furthermore employment opportunities in other cities and rural parts of the countries were insufficient and more precisely employment range and income level

Fig. 2.3 Motivation of Latvian emigrants by top destination countries: the UK and Germany (Source: Online Survey 2012)

were much lower than in the capital. Therefore, traditionally residents of small towns and rural parts of Latvia went working in larger regional cities or capital. Along with accessibility of work opportunities abroad, residents of peripheral regions could directly make international moves. This is largely due to the distribution and accessibility of low-cost airlines in this region connecting to the main destination countries. On the other hand, period of economic crisis along with migrants from peripheral regions of Latvia attracted also residents of Riga and Pieriga region (the suburbs of the capital Riga). Persons who emigrated from central parts of the country along with other secondary motives as the prime push factor mentioned need to cover high mortgage payments; however, migrants from lagging behind region in the eastern part of the country mentioned necessity to earn more in order to cover monthly consumption costs.

Mortgage payments as increasing motivation sustain the transregional argument, as people who took loans to improve their housing situation (under which they suffer today) were usually living in Riga's suburban area and were originally moved from socialist period housing estate neighborhoods of the capital city.

2.3 A Proposal: Transregionalism as a New Conceptional Framework

The case studies show the ability of migration systems and subsystems to cope with internal and external caused shocks, to reorganize in this process in a novel and creative manner, and, if necessary, to redefine themselves as a new social system. Main characteristics of these systems are widespread multilocal social networks led by migration, individual migration experiences, and migration culture. Migrants are in this sense interpreted as agents of societal change. They are able to adapt social practices from different economic, social, and cultural contexts. Such kind of permanent resilience as a performed social practice is based on creativity, knowledge, and other individual and personal skills and capacities of the participants of the network and may correspond with our considerations on elusive migration systems.

Return migration and, to some extent, also the flow of remittances are strengthening already existing regional disparities in the countries of origin. Both are usually directed to the main economic centers or, as reported already decades ago by Portes (1978), to large towns in the home country and less to the region of origin; this is true especially for the case of (possible) return. Even those migrants that stay abroad are showing elements of transregionalism, at least while shifting from one country to another. And paying mortgages transfers money mainly into centers, not in peripheries.

So our first result is the increasing complexity of migration pattern with strong interconnections between different kinds of mobility with overlapping elements of permanent, temporary, and circular migratory movements (Fig. 2.4). These specific

Fig. 2.4 From international to transnational to transregional migration (Source: draft based on Gans 2011, p. 118, modified)

Fig. 2.5 Elements of transregionalism (Source: the authors)

changes regarding spatial interconnections characterize the step from (classical) international to (modern) transnational to (postmodern) transregional forms of mobility.

Thinking in distinguished geographical scales leads to a model of the "transregional social space" (Fig. 2.5). This proposal combines manifold interconnections of internal and international migration, underlined by a rather complex

network with circular movements and various repercussions between sending and receiving spaces, places, and societies.

Transregional migrants use movements and communications on local, regional, and national scales as tools to overcome stages of risk, vulnerability, and uncertainty. Seeking the place of living in more favorable conditions in and outside the home country is an element of social resilience. In this model, return is an option among others, besides sedentarism or multilocality, respectively. The perspective is an increase of socioeconomic spatial differentiations, not only between nation-states but also on a subnational level.

2.4   Conclusions

Our considerations on elusive migration systems and the proposal of the model may serve as an additive tool for a more detailed interpretation of geographically differentiated outcomes of transnationalism. We aim to contribute to a new framework for geographical migration studies, taking into account the liquid and elusive character of individual migratory movements and mobility.

Permanent changes of general contexts on the global level and the accelerating variability of local socioeconomic circumstances make it necessary to overcome thinking in national dimensions and territories.

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Chapter 3
Migration and Borders: Empirical Patterns and Theoretical Implications in the Case of Spain

Dirk Godenau and Ana López-Sala

Abstract In the last decade, the analysis of irregular migration and migration control has led to a fruitful debate among disciplines in the social sciences. At the heart of this discussion, which has also resulted in new dialogue between migration and border studies, lie the new functions and spatial dimensions of border action. The purpose of this paper is to reflect on the connection between migration and border studies by considering the role given to borders when analyzing international mobility, with the backdrop provided by the analysis of migration control initiatives undertaken along the southern border of Europe and in Spain over the last decade. An empirical analysis of the Spanish case puts forth a series of considerations concerning the scope that the study of border control can have on the expansion of migration theory.

3.1 Introduction

Over the course of the last decade, the analysis of irregular immigration and of migratory controls has led to a fruitful debate among disciplines in the social sciences. At the heart of this discussion, which has also resulted in new dialogue between migration and border studies, lies the analysis surrounding the new

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functions and the new spatial dimensions of border action, as well as the emergence of new ways of implementing migratory controls that go beyond state action and involve interstate cooperation.

The border has become increasingly visible as a setting where initiatives aimed at controlling irregular immigration are tested, conferring, as in the case of the European Union, an analytical centrality to some neighboring territories. The purpose of this paper is to reflect on the connection between migration and border studies by considering the role given to borders when analyzing international mobility from various disciplines, with the backdrop provided by the analysis of migration control initiatives undertaken along the southern border of Europe and in Spain over the last decade. The paper is structured into three parts. In the first, we present a brief description of how the border is viewed in different disciplines and its role in modulating migration theory. We also highlight the increasing reference to migration phenomena in border studies. Migrations and borders are the two elements that have shaped the analysis into the implementation and development of Spanish and European migration control policies in the last two decades, which are described in the second part of the paper. This action has been characterized by a series of guidelines that are best described by the attributes of externalization, communitization, and technologization. It has also been subject to political scrutiny by social organizations in the receiving societies and by the international community in response to actions that are seen as violating the fundamental rights of migrants. An empirical analysis of the Spanish case in the third part allows us to put forth a series of considerations concerning the scope that the study of border control can have on the expansion of migration theory. To do so, we focus on the factors that explain the restriction and containment of human mobility and on the spatial dimension that lies at the core of this type of public intervention.

3.2 Interrogating Migration Control and Borders

3.2.1 Borders and Social Sciences

The border has been a key category for the social sciences since the late nineteenth century, with the modern configuration of the nation and state building processes. After a certain decline in its analytical centrality in the 1970s and 1980s, resulting mainly from the emergence of studies on globalization, the new social and political meanings of borders have reemerged with vigor among the theoretical concerns of academia, associated with, among others, the analyses of migratory dynamics. In this section, we will briefly focus on the links that exist between migration and border studies before continuing on to consider the most significant areas of inquiry into borders and migration control in social sciences. Although this review is not

Fig. 3.1 Mutual determination of borders and migration

intended to be exhaustive, it shows how the study of borders is able to nourish dialogue between different disciplines.[1]

At the intersection of migration and border studies, and the bodies of theory that supply both areas, is the centrality of border action in modulating human mobility. Borders appear in migration theory through their role as one of the factors that explain the dynamics of mobility between areas of origin and destination and the distinction between international and internal migrations. In border studies, the analysis of borders has a broader approach that transcends the study of human mobility. A theory on borders must be able to encompass and explain various types of cross-border flows, since a border's functionality is not limited to just migratory management processes, though we should note that its various functions have a significant effect on its performance as a migratory filter (Fig. 3.1). Moreover, irregular or unauthorized migrations shape the exercise of border management, and it is where "migratory pressures" arise that innovative ways of implementing selective permeability mechanisms emerge. In addition, while different theories on migratory studies have had as their primary purpose that of explaining the directionality, volume, and composition of flows, border studies are focused on calibrating the specific effects that this type of filter has on mobility pathways and on the adaptive strategies of those involved in the movement, the migrants.

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[1] Various specialists have stated that despite the surge in border studies in the last decade and the expansion of the disciplinary boundaries involved in this type of research, this "disciplinary encounter" has not managed to yield a body of ideas of a shared common lexicon that is relevant to every specialist, whose analyses are firmly anchored in the theories of different disciplinary traditions (Newman 2006).

But how have borders been considered by the various social sciences? And what role is attributed to them in the realm of international migrations? As we will see in this brief review of the findings made by political science, sociology, geography, economy and anthropology, these disciplinary approaches may be viewed firstly as more complementary than exclusionary in their focus. Secondly, they exhibit different elements in the consideration of structure (macro) and agency (micro), as well in their emphasis in the selective and discriminating results of bordering.

A significant amount of recent theoretical output has come from political studies. In political sociology, political geography, and political economy, the main efforts have been directed at the goal of "bringing the state back in" to the analysis of migratory processes, concurrent with the entry into the academic agenda of ideas on cosmopolitanism, transnationalism, and the post-national and denationalization processes (Sassen 2007; Soysal 1994; Faist 2011; Hollifield and Wong 2014).

Political science and sociology have also focused their attention on analyzing the logic that defines and comprises the new migration control practices on an international scale (Lahav and Guiraudon 2006; Zolberg 2003; Cornelius et al. 2004) and their effects on territory and sovereignty (Balibar 2004; Mountz 2013). To these aspects, political geography also adds arguments regarding the emerging mobile character of borders both in terms of time and space (Anderson 1996; Pickering and Weber 2012; Bialasiewicz 2012). In political geography, borders are a socially constructed phenomenon and delimiters of social categories (Paasi 1996) which have been seen not only as signifiers of culture and identity but also as tools of exclusion and inclusion that create spatial compartmentalization and social difference (Newman 2006). These arguments are in agreement with those made by certain specialists in security studies, who maintain that borders have become complex and intricate technologies of control and government (Inda 2006; Pickering and Weber 2006; De Genova et al. 2015) responding to logics of securitization and criminalization of international irregular migration that legitimize extreme exclusion and destitution practices and create what has been defined as a permanent state of emergency and exception (Bigo 2006; Agamben 1998).

Borders have also been interpreted and rethought by economic sciences and regional studies. From an economic perspective, the border, as part of the international migration system, is an element that serves the interests of the state. Borders are seen as a type of barrier that, unlike natural barriers, constitute socially constructed norms (social institutions) that condition transaction costs, normally upward,[2] separate national economic systems, and allow for differences in each country's internal operations. In short, the permeability and selectivity of borders depend on the state's policies on the mobility of factors, be they goods (trade policy), capital (foreign investment policy), or people (migratory and mobility policy for travelers in general). Consequently, for economic theory, a retreat from

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[2] Let us not forget that social institutions, including borders, are not only containment mechanisms, but they may also become mechanisms that foster certain types of transactions and means of mobility.

a system of free exchange (free movement of factors on an international scale) means recognizing the importance of the political economy in determining the transaction costs between states and supranational entities.

Microeconomic theory and anthropology have distanced themselves from this state-centered interpretation of borders. In the former, they are one of the elements factored into the cost/benefit analysis of an individual's or group's decision to migrate (Stark 1991), as well as into the assessment of the risks associated with an unauthorized migration. In anthropology, borders are also negotiated spaces beyond the formal limits of the state (Donnan and Wilson 1998), defined by the collective narratives and experiences of the everyday practices of people living in borderland areas. In this sense, borders have been not only an important element in the study of human agency and human experience but also spaces of contact, exchange, and hybridism (Newman 2011). Hence, anthropology has focused part of its analysis on how migrants respond to and resist the migration controls exercised at a border and on their adaptive strategies for overcoming these restrictions by, for example, resorting to social networks and creating transnational social spaces.

All of these contributions, at once divergent and complementary, show how reflecting on borders and migration controls is able to produce an epistemological expansion of migration theory. In particular, based on the conception of a border as one of the "intermediate obstacles" (Lee 1966) that determines human mobility, borders are seen as a filtering mechanism where, via permeability and selection processes, many of the elements underscored by the various disciplines converge, primarily (a) the new spatial performativity of borders, (b) the tensions between agency and structure, and (c) the contradictions between the processes for facilitating and containing various immigrant profiles. Unlike the traditional approach of migration theory, which has attempted to explain the origin and continuity of migration flows, the analysis of migration control and border actions emphasizes the obstacles and restrictions to undesired mobility, opening a new field of inquiry that can benefit from a knowledge of migratory processes. In short, the intersection between border studies and migration theory offers an opportunity to observe the interaction between the macro (structure) and micro (agency) levels. It also underscores the need to resort to social theory to understand processes whose logic goes well beyond the geographic setting in which they occur.

3.2.2   Transformations of Migration Control Implementation: Borders as Permeability Control Devices

Borders, as mechanisms for managing the selective permeability between the interior and exterior of a social space, adapt in their implementation and management to changing geopolitical circumstances. In this sense, borders are dynamic,

and their main challenge in the current context of globalization is to reconcile the agile screening of increasingly legal flows with the effective detection of unauthorized crossing attempts. In the case of irregular migration into the European Union, a significant percentage takes place at locations that are not equipped to handle border crossings, in particular maritime corridors. This is the main option for migrants with few financial resources who are forced to accept greater risks on these journeys (FRA 2013; Brian and Laczlo 2014).

Against this backdrop of Mediterranean maritime routes connecting the north of Africa with southern Europe, border management has evolved toward a situation that can best be described by the following attributes: (a) externalization, with outsourcing, remote control, and policing at a distance; (b) international cooperation and, in the case of the European Union, communitarization; and (c) technologization of the control, with the partial privatization of the technical innovation of security, and the adaptive response of migration strategies through the capitalization and technological sophistication of smugglers.

These tendencies are not exclusive to Europe; rather, they are notable examples of how rich countries seal their borders against irregular crossing attempts by poor and unqualified migrants. The goal of these restrictions to mobility is to have a dissuasive effect on the plans of potential migrants while they are still in their country of origin, hoping that the high likelihood of failure will result in many not even trying. Thus, effective border management is not measured exclusively by its effectiveness in frustrating crossing attempts (defined by a high probability of interception), because another goal is to indirectly disincentivize the choice of irregular migration as an individual or family strategy (which would be manifested by a lower influx at the border). Considering the huge migration potential from Africa to Europe, and given the notable differences in the standard of living on either side of the border, it appears that the goal of dissuasion is being achieved, at least in part, since the number of maritime interceptions continues to be relatively low in comparison to this migratory potential.

The three tendencies mentioned – externalization, communitarization, and technologization – are closely intertwined and mutually determined. Externalization implies the partial transfer of migration management to countries of origin or transit by way of a broad range of measures, the most important being visa policies and cooperation in police, military and intelligence matters involving the monitoring of departures, and migration transits. A good example of this is offered by the actions implemented in the wide interstitial maritime areas of the Mediterranean (López-Sala y Esteban 2010; Baldacchino 2014), where cooperation with countries in the north of Africa has proven highly effective at certain times and in specific contexts. Political instability in some of these coastal countries, however, shows how vulnerable this externalization policy is, as it depends on the wills and capabilities of other governments. In this sense, outsourcing migration controls to other countries and efforts at achieving "policing at a distance" require stable and firm political relations. They are also subject to constant negotiations in which transit countries can "play the migration card" as an additional resource to further their economic and political interests. For example, temporarily relaxing internal

migration controls in these transit countries could be used to exert influence on stalled trade negotiations.

The second tendency, the communitarization of border controls (Godenau 2014), is an inevitable consequence of building the European Union as a single market with free movement that requires a common border in terms of permeability and selectivity conditions, both as regards trade and the mobility of people. As a result, it comes as no surprise that the European Union has endorsed initiatives that are gradually shifting the Union toward a shared border control, both through interstate cooperation and through the creation of organizations like FRONTEX. As concerns irregular maritime migrations in the Mediterranean, the EUROSUR[3] initiative (European Commission 2008a; Jeandesboz 2011) is particularly telling. EUROSUR reflects the path toward the goal of the European Union's Integrated Border Management[4] (IBM) by way of cooperation and joint control practices that rely on integrated information systems (Barbero 2012; Seiffarth 2012) and on coordinated surveillance through the network joint operations (NJO).

The third tendency, technologization, refers to the gradual incorporation of information and communications technologies – and of instruments based on these, such as satellites, drones, night-vision cameras, radars, and so on – into border control implementation. Technological innovation in this field is being driven by the European Union itself through its financing of applied research projects, typically led by companies with ties to the military and security industry (Godenau and López-Sala 2016). These technologies serve various functions in managing European borders, but they are particularly important to the migrant detection and interception phases. The subsequent identification and repatriation phases continue to rely to a greater extent on traditional technologies (passports, translators, means of transport, etc.). This increased reliance on technological means by expanding the land and maritime coverage of detection devices is triggering adaptive changes in the strategies employed by those organizing irregular border crossings. This technological race between border managers and irregular migration facilitators is fueling the growth of a migration industry that is becoming increasingly capitalized and technologized and that is encroaching on other areas of the military and security industry on the one hand and of illegal trade intermediaries (especially drug traffickers) on the other.

These three tendencies have resulted in the development of increasingly complex migration controls that, in an effort to contain flows, have had a notable effect

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[3] COM (2008) 68 final. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee, and the Committee of the Regions, *Examining the creation of a European Border Surveillance System* (EUROSUR), Brussels, 13.2. 2008

[4] "The concept of an integrated border management involves combining control mechanisms and the use of tools based on the flows of persons towards and into the EU. It involves measures taken at the consulates of Member States in third countries, measures in cooperation with neighboring third countries, measures at the border itself, and measures taken within the Schengen area" (European Commission 2008b).

not only on the likelihood that migrants will gain access to the territory of the destination country. They have also led to greater risks associated with irregular migration, risks that must be borne by the migrants. Hence, one of the most evident effects observed at some of the borders with the highest crossings is the drive, by both migrants and by national and international human rights groups, for new ways to respond to increasingly rigid controls. These new countermeasures have sparked a growing interest in the theoretical reflection on border control policies and on the configuration of restrictive migratory regimes (Nyers and Rygiel 2012) that violate the physical integrity of the migrants and cast doubt on the legitimacy of migration control.

This kind of public scrutiny of the praxis of migration control and the parallel construction of supervisory mechanisms around the forms that migration control has adopted is well covered by the concept of "humanitarian borders," coined by Walters (2011). In Walters's opinion, migration and border studies have extensively focused on analyzing the new rationales underlying the political measures and objectives of border control and on the securitization and technologization associated with them. However, an analysis that seeks to reflect the functional and symbolic transformation of the borders in the sphere of human mobility must also consider what Walters has referred to as the "birth of the humanitarian border" or the reinvention of borders as a space of humanitarian government and humanitarian engagement articulated through political struggles and the action of diverse agents which focus on a perspective of migrants as victims (de Genova et al. 2015).

3.3 Multilayered Deterrence of Irregular Maritime Migration in Spain

3.3.1 Context Embeddedness of Irregular Maritime Migration to Spain

Spain is part of the Mediterranean stage for irregular maritime migrations from Africa to Europe. Spain's geographical position at the EU's southwestern corner, and as a direct neighbor of Morocco, a 14.4-km journey across the Straits of Gibraltar, makes it one of the shortest potential and, in principle, least risky crossings.

The empirical pattern of irregular migrations from Africa to the European continent can be summarized in the following stylized facts: (a) pronounced variations in arrivals and interceptions, (b) dynamic changes in the pattern and dynamics of routes, (c) diversification in means of transport and in (d) migrant profiles, (e) expansion and capitalization of the smuggling "industry," and (f) technologization of detection, interception, and diversion. We should add that migration flows from Africa to the European Union are relatively low in comparison to regular and irregular migration flows as a whole; nevertheless, they are the

subject of attention from both the mass media and the public, hence the recurring idea of what has been called the "myth of invasion" (de Haas 2007). This volume is also low if compared to the migratory potential of a border with such a pronounced inequality as that separating the north and south Mediterranean coasts. The complex dynamic pattern of the Mediterranean setting is explained by the interaction between multiple factors that can in turn be assigned to several categories: (a) push-pull-type factors that generate a migration potential, (b) factors that condition the likelihood of opting for the irregular maritime option (depending on the relative appeal of other options), and (c) factors that affect the likelihood of being intercepted during the transit. Policies intended to seal borders have deterrent effects on all three categories, since deterrence affects migration plans (whether or not to migrate), the route selected and the mode of entry (the destination, the route, and the method), and the probability of success.

Statistical data provided by the European agency FRONTEX show a peak in maritime arrivals in 2013 and 2014, with particularly heavy traffic along the Mediterranean's central and eastern routes (see Fig. 3.2). The growing use of these routes stems from the increasing political instability in countries along the south Mediterranean starting in 2011 and from the worsening Syrian conflict, which has resulted in a massive outflow of migrants and refugees. In parallel with these peaks, we see a change in the ethnicity of the migrants, with a growing presence of Syrians, Eritreans, Afghans, and Albanians, to the detriment of sub-Saharan migrants. As the frequent sinkings demonstrate, migrants along these routes have

Source: European Commission, 2015

Fig. 3.2 Illegal border crossing by route (Source: European Commission 2015)

had to assume greater risks, due mostly to the longer maritime distances involved and to overloaded vessels.

As a consequence of these recent changes, Spain has lost importance in terms of its share in the number of irregular migrants arriving via maritime routes along the European Union's southern border over recent years. The current situation is the result of a change over time that has gone through several phases: the first, from the 1990s until 2000, in which the western Mediterranean route prevailed; the second, from 2001 to 2008, with the intense growth and subsequent collapse of the west African route via the Canary Islands (Domínguez-Mujica et al. 2014); and the third, starting in 2008, when the Mediterranean route regained its importance. It is possible that the current situation will undergo changes and, as FRONTEX notes, "several indicators point to a continued increase in migration along this route" (FRONTEX 2014, p. 6). The cities of Ceuta and Melilla comprise a particular case in the scenario of migration routes for irregular crossings into Spain. Their growing prominence in recent times as a land crossing is explained by the fact that "they do not require the costly involvement of a facilitation network" (FRONTEX 2014, p. 19), such as that associated with maritime crossings.

Despite the gradual construction of a common migration control policy in the European Union, the states receiving these migrants continue to retain a high degree of autonomy and intervention through national and bilateral initiatives involving the design and implementation of their migration policies. In this regard, the EU's policy complements national policies in the sense that states enjoy ample maneuvering room while providing the wealth of knowledge and experience that serves to underpin much of the common policy. Italy's recent experience along the Mediterranean's central corridor, as well as Spain's experience in the middle of the last decade, show the limitations and partiality of European initiatives to engage in effective control during times of intense migration flows. In the context of the migratory setting of the Mediterranean, Spain's strategy has evolved by following a progressive and comprehensive multilayered deterrence strategy along three main areas of action: (a) a gradual externalization and geographical extension of border control, (b) intensified bilateral and multilateral cooperation with the African countries involved, and (c) the gradual Europeanization or communitarization of actions aimed at integrated border management.

3.3.2   Tendencies in Border Management in Spain

The migration control exerted by Spain along its southern maritime and land border exhibits the three tendencies mentioned earlier. It also involves a multilayered deterrence strategy intended to control irregular immigration. The last decade saw the intensification of bilateral and multilateral initiatives with those African countries where these flows originate and transit through. These initiatives have been shaped and have served to reorient Spain's foreign actions, particularly those involving Morocco, Mauritania, and Senegal. This cooperation has included

surveillance and detection activities both on land and along the coasts of transit countries and collaboration in monitoring maritime routes for the purposes of early detection, identification, and return (López-Sala 2015). These types of deterrent measures, implemented through various policy instruments for external action, such as migration cooperation plans like the Africa Plan[5] or bilateral readmission and repatriation agreements (Asín 2008), have been combined with other security policy instruments relative to intelligence and risk detection. The best example of such a dual bilateral action combining external action and intelligence was the creation of what is known as the Atlantic Seahorse Programme and the Sea Horse Network.[6] This active bilateralism and its containment effects in Spain's case have had an important influence on Europe's still developing migration policy for its maritime borders and the partial communitarization of this policy. The high influx of irregular immigration in Spain in the years following the creation of this policy transformed Spain's border into a geographic testing ground for many of the initiatives developed later along the common maritime border. After the creation of the European border agency (FRONTEX), the Hera, Indalo, and Minerva joint operations became the first initiatives to supplement the joint surveillance being carried out by Spain and other countries along maritime routes to Europe.

The migration control strategy has not only relied on resorting to policy and intelligence instruments but on the use of new technological strategies and capabilities. The technologization of migration control has developed along two lines: on the one hand, the employment of detention and barrier technology in parallel with the use of long-distance and remote control technology and, on the other, the progressive search for collaboration in technological innovation both between countries and between the public and private sectors.

Lastly we should note that the application of these border control initiatives has had various effects on the dynamic of migration flows. Evident are the so-called deviation effects, in reference to the appearance of alternative routes or to the intensification of existing routes. Also noticeable are selective effects involving the strategies adopted by migrants as a function of their financial capabilities and their social and relational capital. This includes new access mechanisms, such as the growing use of new illicit crossing techniques (including the use of false

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[5] The Africa Plan is a political plan approved as part of Spain's cooperation policy, the goal of which was to enhance collaborative migration measures with African countries (see Alcalde 2007).

[6] A secure regional satellite communications network coordinated by Spain to exchange information on maritime irregular immigration in which police authorities from Mauritania, Morocco, Cape Verde, and Senegal participate. The Seahorse Mediterranean project, established in 2013, is an extension of the cooperation accord in place since 2006 between African countries on the Atlantic coast. Seahorse aims to support the direct exchange of information on "incidents" at sea and the presence of patrols in the area. This includes using satellite imagery to obtain near-real-time information. Seahorse is a subregional project of the surveillance network Eurosur (European Border Surveillance System).

documents) or, as in the case of Ceuta and Melilla, a transition from a trickle influx to a strategy involving waves of immigrants attempting to cross the land perimeter.

The gradual impermeabilization of Spain's external border in recent times has led to a heightened social debate on the effects of this policy and especially on the controls used in Ceuta and Melilla. There are three elements of social debate articulated by the opposition to the actions of the current Spanish government: first, the use of containment equipment at border perimeters, in particular the use of concertina wire; second, pushback deportations criticized as irregular return practices; and third, the lack of guarantees in the international protection processes for potential asylum applicants at these land borders. The two most important elements in response to these actions have been the breadth of the social agents involved, which include not only human rights organizations but also legal associations, police organizations, and Spain's own Ombudsman and, secondly, how this response and its associated advocacy practices have been deployed using multiple strategies, including visibility in the media, political influence, and appeals to courts and to European institutions.

3.4   Final Remarks on the Intersection of Migration and Borders: Feeding Back Empirical Patterns into Theoretical Considerations

Borders are state-driven permeability control devices; they are rules with enforcement costs and these depend on entry (or exit) pressures (Godenau 2012). As mechanisms of selective permeability, borders conform to the state's logic, which is based on understanding and characterizing certain migratory flows as desired or undesired. In today's receiving societies, this logic is characterized by facilitating the former and containing the latter.

Over the last decade, migration and border control measures have been implemented as part of a multilayered and multisited deterrence strategy that includes both physical containment actions and other, indirect means of dissuasion (Godenau and López-Sala 2016). Migration control through border management is possible and real. Although overgeneralized statements about the ineffectiveness of borders abound in the media and international reports (as evidenced by sentences such as "people vote with their feet," "nothing can detain the force of desperate humans," "higher walls bring longer ladders," "it's like squeezing a balloon"), we think EU and Spanish bordering demonstrates deterrence can be achieved, but normally at the expense of other destinations (deviation effects in migration routes and entry strategies) and of migrants themselves (higher risks and higher costs for trespassing). This is why the assessment of migration control measures is tied to the concepts of effectiveness and efficiency. It is worth nothing that effectiveness and efficiency are different concepts: the first involves achieving a goal, and the second includes cost (effort) optimization in achieving this goal.

Effective deterrence implies an increase in border transaction costs (not to be conflated with border implementation costs) and creates transborder opportunity structures for agents who specialize in permeability/impermeability maintenance. Migration "industries" are just one more example of how these opportunity structures manifest themselves in irregular border crossing (irregular trade, smuggling, is another example). Due to the spatial dimension of borders, these industries flourish in border regions (and both sides of the border) (Gammeltoft-Hansen and Sorensen 2013). As trespassers attempt to thwart or bypass border controls, this may provoke increasing costs for all participants: migration industries capitalize through innovation (including transport technology, communication devices, fake documents, etc.), and border implementation technology reacts to these new "threats and risks" (using the Frontex jargon). As a consequence, migration industries tend to diversify in both the horizontal (more functions) and vertical directions (e.g., integration into multinational drug trafficking organizations).

Though all technology is of an instrumental nature, the design and use of technology is not socially and politically neutral. A large amount of public and private resources is used to create and implement border technology. The EU's Integrated Border Management, progressively expanded in different levels and countries, is used to selectively screen mobility. Ideally desired legal mobility is to be promoted and unhindered by border controls, while illegal and undesired flows should be detected as early as possible and effectively avoided without interfering with regular mobility. As most immigration policies try to maximize the economic contribution of migrants to their countries, and poor and less qualified migrants are seen as a burden, these profiles of socially desired migrants are reflected in bordering through their counterpart: border technology tends to detect poor irregular migrants on their routes. This construction of migrant categories is therefore a logical consequence of the social filtering functions of borders.

In terms of migration theory, deterrence is related to intermediate obstacles (Lee 1966) and directly (and negatively) influences real immigration and immigration intentions through interception (related to theories on accumulative causation in international migration: bordering stops migration from taking place) and indirectly through its influence on migration projects (related to theories on why migration starts). As a result, the emphasis in migration control studies on analyzing the obstacles and restrictions to undesired mobility allows for the incorporation of a new approach that could enhance migration theory by offering alternative explanations of why migration is contained or stopped, thus explaining the phenomenon of immobility.

Agency and structures interact in bordering and migration control practices. Borders are social institutions, and as such they are designed and implemented with the aim of channeling individual and group behavior. Agency responds adaptively to these structural constraints, using, in the case of migrants, forms of relational capital and community support networks. Through their actions, they cause a certain degree of institutional change, with the larger part of these changes normally being due to preventive and adaptive state (and supranational) action. The state is not to be seen as only relevant as a macrostructural element, because the state also is

a stakeholder and appears through its action at the border as such. Although the observation of specific border sites can be labeled as microanalysis, we should be aware of the presence of both micro and macro dimensions in every social reality. The humanitarian border concept illustrates that the interaction at the border also includes civil observers and organizations. The social response to certain bordering practices shows how microscale evidence is channeled through the meso-level (organizations) up to the macroscale (immigration policy). What does this imply for migration theory? It means we need theories that can flexibly integrate both downscale (structural conditions channel action) and upscale (agency induces institutional change) processes.

Borders are useful "places" for bringing (back) space into social (migration) theory. The social construction of space is clearly visible at conflictive and contested borders. Research on these locations offers an opportunity to improve social theory in its spatial dimension. These locations are not only placed at the external geographical perimeter of states, but they are also to be found inside these countries, in other countries' territories, and even in international/trans-boundary waters and high seas. Migration theory is also bound to include spatial considerations, as migrants are physical objects moving in space, which is why borders have to be physical at some point in time and space. This physical trait of both migration and borders is relevant to social theory in several aspects: (a) borders as implementation sites (a laboratory for observing agency-structure interaction); (b) borders as social barriers and delimiters of social categories; (c) border areas under migratory pressures as places in a constant state of emergency and exception (social discourse), including the implementation of forms of spatial exceptionalism and spatial excision; and (d) the social construction of social fields bridging borders (migratory transnationalism in border regions).

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Chapter 4
Challenges Facing Refugee Women. A Critical Review

Sinehlanhla Memela and Brij Maharaj

Abstract The fear of being persecuted has led to thousands of refugee women fleeing from their homelands to seek safety in other countries. Concerns have been expressed about the security, safety and the rights of female refugees who have not been given the protection offered to male refugees in host countries. This chapter critically assesses the challenges facing women refugees and effectiveness of policies and intervention from international agencies like the UNHCR. Refugee women have less human agency, especially when newly arrived in the destination country. They have no or few legal rights and are powerless and marginalised, and their voices are rarely heard. Sadly, the atrocities encountered in their home countries could be repeated in the destination country. A key concern is that despite policies designed to protect refugees, women were still vulnerable, and they have been subjected to social exclusion, prejudice and discrimination. These experiences have only recently been recognised by the UNHCR. A holistic approach is required in order to solve the problems experienced by women. The needs of female refugees must be included in all phases of a refugee's life starting with the refugee determination process. In most countries, refugee laws have incorporated gender perspectives in the asylum application process. However, poor and inconsistent implementation of gender-sensitive refugee policies in host countries adds to the vulnerabilities of refugees.

Keywords Refugee • Women • Integration • Exclusion • Policies

4.1 Introduction

The twentieth century has been marked by an increase in refugee populations around the world as a result of socioeconomic and political instability. This can be attributed to the formation of new states after colonial rule, the end of the Cold War, the adoption of external policies and the legacy of military action (Martin

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2004). Prominent episodes of forced migration have been marked by Russian refugees during the 1920s, Jewish refugees in the 1930s, Vietnamese refugees in the 1970s, Rwandan refugees in the 1990s and Zimbabwean, Somalian, Sudanese, Congolese and Eritrean refugees in the twenty-first century (Bollaert 2008). Between January and June 2014, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimated that there were 46.3 million forcibly displaced people worldwide, and 13 million were refugees (UNHCR 2015, p. 3). The top 10 refugee-producing countries were Syrian Arab Republic (2,902,100), Afghanistan (2,700,000), Somalia (1,100,000), Sudan (670,300), Democratic Republic of the Congo (493,500), Myanmar (479,700), Iraq (426,100), Colombia (397,000) and Central African Republic (381,000) (UNHCR 2015, pp. 4–5). Four African countries, namely, Somalia, Sudan, Democratic Republic of the Congo and Central African Republic, were amongst the top 10 refugee-producing countries of the world (UNHCR 2015). Africa remains one of the continents which produce the most refugees due to conflict and wars created by political instability (Hamilton 1999). Forced migration in Africa was caused by 'conflict resulting from decolonization, both during liberation and subsequent to independence as a result of ethnic conflict and state formation or collapse' (Hamilton 1999, p. 5).

At the end of 2013, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimated that there were approximately 11.7 million refugees worldwide and that some 49 % constituted women and girls (UNHCR 2013, p. 7). Concerns have been expressed about the security, safety and the rights of refugees. Millions of women throughout the world are subjected to sexual torture, injury, starvation and murder because they are female. These crimes against women are recognised as a violation of their human rights. Women sometimes faced the same abuse as men. However, women victims were usually invisible because they were not politically active and vocal. Many violations of female's human rights were connected to gender (Bunch 1990).

Barring a few exceptions, the burgeoning literature on refugees has tended to be gender blind with an implicit male bias. Hajdukowski-Ahmed et al. (2008) argued that while both males and females are represented in the study of refugees, women's experiences were often muted. Current writings are characterised by generalisations about the vulnerabilities of African refugee women. The few studies on female refugees have focused on developed countries with little attention paid to the developing countries (Mahler and Pessar 2006; Kanjo 2010; Park 2010). This gap in the international research on the vulnerabilities of refugee women has resulted in a one-sided body of literature (Mahler and Pessar 2006). However, there are few notable exceptions (e.g. Indra 1999; Brun 2000; Turner 2000; Martin 2004; Hajdukowski-Ahmed et al. 2008; Hyndman and De Alwis 2008; Karraker 2013).

In the host countries, refugees experienced ethnic, racial and gender discrimination that prevented integration into the host society (Karraker 2013). However, the gender-based violence experienced by refugee women was not regarded as a form of persecution by the UNHCR 1951 and Organisation of African Unity's (OAU) 1969 definition of refugees (Boyd and Pikkov 2005). Female refugees also faced difficulties in accessing host governments' social services. In the past decade,

the UNHCR has worked to ensure that refugee women have equal access to protection, goods and services (Martin 2004). The UNHCR seeks to remove the barriers encountered by women when applying for refugee status; increase its efforts to provide health-care services, water and food; combat sexual violence; and increase training and skills development opportunities for women in all member states (Hajdukowski-Ahmed et al. 2008). This chapter critically assesses the challenges facing women refugees and effectiveness of policies and intervention from international agencies like the UNHCR. This chapter is divided into six sections. The first section focuses on gender and forced migration, followed by an analysis of social construction of gender in host countries. The fourth and fifth sections reflect on the experiences of women in refugee camps and those who are integrated in urban areas, respectively. The final section assesses the changing policies of the UNHCR towards refugee women over the past three decades.

4.2 Gender and Forced Migration

Forced migration and adaptation to new environments requires refugees to understand unfamiliar demands and circumstances. This is achieved by renegotiating expectations, relationships and behaviours and assuming new gender roles. Most new circumstances impact at the household level and are differentiated along gender lines. The relationship between gender and the household offers important understanding of how refugees adapt to new environments and situations (Hyndman and De Alwis 2008).

Female refugees are affected by the same political, historical and social forces as their male counterparts (Hyndman and De Alwis 2008). However, refugee women face specific risks (sexual violence) during conflict and the journey to destination countries. Forced migration causes women to engage in new gender roles in order to support their dependents (Hyndman and De Alwis 2008). Refugee women lose their social and negotiated roles and have to adjust to a new, changing life. Parrenas (2001, p. 73) argued that 'the process of migration for women involves escaping their gender roles'.

During conflict, refugee men may have joined the military, died or become separated from their families. This leaves women as breadwinners or as single parents (Martin 2004). Women have to seek employment in order to support their families. They take on different roles as protectors and providers. Forced migration also removes the household division of labour between a man and woman. Sometimes women and children may be the group most targeted by humanitarian aid (Brun 2000). Women may be more empowered, receive education, start their own business or find employment. Refugee men may spend most of their time at home and end up participating in domestic work (Martin 2004). Male refugees lose their role as heads of households. They may be unable to rebuild their position as self-respected decision makers. Men may want to gain back their authority and traditional culture, and this can lead to domestic violence (Brun 2000).

Structural factors such as gender-based violence and conflict result in the violation of human rights and forced migration. In their country of origin, women may have experienced gender-based violence such as forced pregnancy, rape, forced sterilisation, slavery, forced female genital mutilation (FGM), sexually transmitted diseases, and acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS) infection. Once they have been sexually attacked, they face social stigmatisation (Ganguly-Scrase et al. 2005). The decision to move is made in a state of panic and people have few options but to escape with life and limb. Forced migration disrupts ontological security and refugees lose stability in their known world. Ontological security is a process whereby people understand their place and feel comfortable. Forced migration disrupts the lives of refugees and fragments their families, and they lose their sense of belonging and stability in their known world (Hynes 2004).

Refugee women have less human agency, especially when newly arrived in the destination country. They have no or few legal rights and are powerless and marginalised, and their voices are rarely heard. Sadly, the atrocities encountered in their home countries could be repeated in the destination country. The experiences of female refugees in the destination country are limited by language, education, work experiences and childcare facilities (Koskela 1997; Healey 2006; Moritz 2012). Language barriers can impede refugee women from access to social services and learning in the destination country. Most refugee women do not know the language of the destination country and have little formal education and work experience (Wolfel 2013). Hence, they face difficulties in finding a job and communicating with the local people. They are also denied access to government social services by corrupt officials. Local people in the destination country often discriminate against refugee women and make them feel unwelcome. Some refugee women cannot work outside their household because they have to look after children.

The human rights violations that occur during conflict seriously impacted women (Hamilton 1999; Gururaja 2000; Sirleaf and Rehn 2002; Hynes 2004). Women were also at risk, like men, of being abducted and recruited as fighters. Adding to the human rights abuse suffered by individuals in general, additional coercion is directed to girls and women such as forced impregnation, rape, abortion, sexual slavery and trafficking by rebels and soldiers (Hamilton 1999; Hynes 2004). After conflict, women were likely to experience domestic violence and commit suicide, while others were killed by soldiers.

Even when there was no armed conflict, women were abused because of their age and gender. Girls and women from Africa and Asia were subjected to cultural practices such as FGM which left them traumatised, psychologically harmed and injured (Crista 2009; Horowitz and Jackson 2010). Some cultures compelled women to marry at an early age before they were emotionally, mentally and physically mature. Early marriages were usually followed by early pregnancies which affected their health. Forcing woman to get married at an early age is a human rights violation (Crista 2009; Horowitz and Jackson 2010). Other girls and women were subjected to domestic violence practised by family members or husbands. This led to physical handicap, trauma and death. When the state is

unwilling or unable to protect women, this can result in females taking a decision to flee to other countries.

Humanitarian organisations empower women and their agency (Turner 2000). They offer food assistance, education and health-care services and protect them from sexual violence. Humanitarian organisations are concerned with building refugees' human agency, reducing dependency and boosting their self-esteem. Humanitarian organisations establish economic projects that help female refugees to be self-reliant. For example, they have programmes to help refugee women to learn English. Once they have learnt the language of a destination country, they can get jobs, communicate with local people and access social services (Wolfel 2013).

4.3   Social Construction of Refugees in the Host Country

Much of the available literature highlights how refugee identities are constructed and how men are favoured over women in destination countries. Refugee women face specific risks during conflict and the journey to the destination countries. Rajaram (2002, p. 251) argued that 'refugees are consigned to their body... they are rendered speechless and without agency, a physical entity or rather a physical mass within which individuality is subsumed'. This generalised and depoliticised description of refugees is usually influenced by decision makers engaged in developing and implementing asylum policies, and refugees may be powerless during this process (Barsky 1994; Spijkerboer 2005; Rajaram 2002). The powerlessness starts during the asylum determination process because of the lack of economic resources, information, knowledge and institutional power. Gender-based persecution may be assessed in terms of cultural, gendered and racial notions of the asylum seeker (Barsky 1994; Spijkerboer 2000; Rajaram 2002). Spijkerboer (2000) argued that it was common for female refugees to be constructed as defenceless and subjugated to their male counterparts during the asylum determination process. This construction conforms to the notion of culture and gender. However, such social construction of female refugees may perpetrate myths that can work against them if they get a residence permit.

Macklin (1995) and Crawley (2000) demonstrated private and public distinctions during asylum determination. In most cases, gender-based violence has been assigned to the private rather than the public sphere. This distinction is maintained when gender-based violence is the reason for asylum, especially when the perpetrator is a family member. As Freedman (2007) argued, domestic violence is not regarded as seriously as other forms of violence that take place in the public sphere. When a woman uses domestic violence as reason for asylum, her application is usually dismissed. Women's experiences were often constructed as private acts, even when practised by state officials or family members.

Sexual violence has not been seen as a form of torture and has not been incorporated into the UNHCR's definition of refugee as it has been viewed as a private and personal matter associated with lust and desire (Spijkerboer 2000;

Freedman 2007). Sexual violence is considered normal and a universal relationship between men and women and asylum claims on such grounds are usually not taken seriously (Freedman 2007). The reason for this is that persecution is framed as political rather than private. Spijkerboer (2005) argued that sexual violence is often directed at women's bodies with a clear political motive. The recent debate on sexual violence during war has moved sexual violence from the private to public sphere, and hence, there is more focus on this form of violation (Canning 2010). Sexual violence may be used as a weapon or tactic to deconstruct a community and its culture (Canning 2010). If women asylum seekers are granted refugee status, they can either settle in urban areas or refugee camps, depending on the policies of host countries.

4.4   Refugee Women in Camps

Refugee camps are places to accommodate forcibly displaced people so they can get protection and assistance as part of the UNHCR's principles and host governments' strategy to keep them in one place. Refugee camps were theoretically designed to protect refugees but they have become unsafe places for women. Many scholars have analysed the experiences and challenges of refugee women in refugee camps (Hamilton 1999; Kagwaja 2000; Martin 2004; Hyndman and De Alwis 2008). A major problem was sexual exploitation of refugee women, not only by military and border officials but also by local people, humanitarians and government officials (Hamilton 1999). A study conducted in 2002 in Sierra Leone, Guinea and Liberia by Save the Children and the UNHCR revealed that sexual exploitation of refugee women was perpetrated by staff from the UNHCR and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) (Martin 2004). Refugee girls stated that if they reported such cases to the authorities, all staff of humanitarian organisations mistreated them and refused to assist them. Hence, keeping quiet was the only solution. The UNHCR (2002) noted that the physical environment of refugee camps often exacerbated women's safety and security problems. In the destination area, families from different sides of the conflict were forced to live in one area and shared social and communal space. Refugee camps were often overcrowded, lacked privacy and had poor lighting, which increased violence against refugee women.

   Martin (2004) found that in some refugee camps, food was distributed by male camp leaders, often without women's participation. This resulted in inappropriate distribution of food because male leaders did not understand the circumstances and needs of the people who fed and cooked for their families; they provided food which was not suitable; males were served first and when food was limited, children and women did not receive it. This exposed refugee women and children to malnutrition and diseases which also increased mortality rates (Martin 2004). Sometimes refugee women were pregnant and malnourished which resulted in

insufficient provision of nutrients to the foetus and the death of both mother and child.

Kagwaja (2000) argued that women were also responsible for collecting water and wood in Kenya. Refugee women spent a lot of time collecting water and carrying heavy containers. Some female refugees reported being physically and sexually attacked as they travelled to fetch wood and water. For example, in Kenya at the Dadaab camps, refugee women from Somalia were often attacked by bandits (Kagwaja 2000; Martin 2004). Some female refugees were also exposed to sexual harassment during their long journey to collect water and wood (Hamilton 1999).

Concerns about safety and security impede access to health-care services. According to Martin (2004), female refugees were less likely to visit clinics because they had to pass to insecure areas. The clinics were located far from refugee communities and they were scared of being attacked on their way to the clinic. In some refugee camps, like in Pakistan, there were more male health workers than females (Martin 2004). The absence of female health workers prevented women from accessing health-care services. Cultural values that prevent women from being attended to by men who are not related to them hindered refugee women's access to health-care services. Some camp leaders asked for bribes or sexual favours in exchange for health-care service in Hong Kong (Martin 2004).

Hajdukowski-Ahmed et al. (2008) noted that after forced migration families were forced to deal with new living arrangements. Fathers had joined the military forces or died during the war, leaving women as heads of families. Children and relatives died due to disease and hunger. First, women were responsible for domestic work, and after forced migration, females had to take over men's responsibilities (Hamilton 1999). Women found themselves as heads of households and were forced to depend on external help from humanitarian organisations. Some officials working at humanitarian agencies required sex in exchange for services. Other refugee women were forced to seek employment outside the home. This resulted in women not being able to fulfil their traditional domestic functions (Martin 2004). Forced migration destroyed the society's traditional values. Many traditional cultures required women to be separated from strange men. During humanitarian emergencies, women were located in camps with many unrelated men. This created insecurities amongst men as their wives were exposed to strange males and sometimes led to domestic violence.

Inaccessibility to health-care services hindered the well-being of refugee women. They were more exposed to health risks than males (Hamilton 1999). Complications from pregnancy due to a lack of midwives and poor lighting during birth resulted in health risks for women. According to Martin (2004), refugee women were also susceptible to waterborne diseases, as they were responsible for collecting water in refugee camps. Sometimes water was contaminated, causing illness such as infectious hepatitis, typhoid, dysentery and cholera (Martin 2004). Women were also at risk of contracting illness carried by small insects that bite or breed next to the river like malaria, sleeping sickness, red blindness and yellow fever and being infected by sexually transmitted diseases (STDs) after having being sexually attacked on their way to fetch water (Martin 2004).

Refugees had limited access to education in the camps because there were inadequate resources, classes and teachers (Martin 2004). There was a lack of sanitary supplies and girls were scared of being humiliated at school (Women's Commission for Refugee Women and Children (WCRWC) 2000). The cost of education was high and displaced people could not afford it. In Burundi refugee parents could not afford school fees, clothing and books (Martin 2004). Some had asked government for financial assistance which had been refused. In Sudan and Uganda, girls could not go to school because buildings were destroyed and pupils and teachers were killed and abducted (WCRWC 2001). Most Sudanese girls were not allowed to go to school because their families feared that that they would be sexually harassed on their way.

4.5   Refugee Women in Urban Areas

According to Koskela (1997), newly arrived women in the city fear urban violence. This is 'a result of the social production of fear: parental and other warnings, rumours, the media and crime prevention advice they all produce the picture of public space as dangerous and private space as safe' (Koskela 1997, p. 7). In urban areas, women experience violence, sexual attacks and harassment (Koskela 1997). This threatening situation and violence causes more fear that restricts women's mobility, undermines their confidence, restricts their activities and limits their access to public space (Koskela 1997). The structural forces in the destination countries include the rules that governs employment opportunities, cultural practices that prevent women from achieving certain educational levels, gender division and the cost of education and training (Hynes 2004).

Some refugees may settle in urban areas because there are no refugee camps in a particular country, for example, in South Africa and Zimbabwe. Other refugees settle in an 'urban area based on the assessment that they will make them relatively better off' (Kobia and Crabfield 2009, p. 4). There is a view that there is a natural connection between urban areas and refugee camps (Sommers 1999; Horst 2002; Jacobsen 2004; Crisp et al. 2009). Some refugees leave the camps so they can work to support their families. Refugees often argued that living conditions in camps are bad and money is scarce. In refugee camps, social services may be concentrated in one area, while in urban areas, assistance centres are spread out (Kobia and Crabfield 2009, p. 4). In urban areas, there are no movement restrictions as compared to camps. Education, health, accommodation and employment opportunities are better in urban areas than in camps and refugees can become independent and self-sufficient.

Urban employment in the informal economy is common amongst refugees, mostly in countries that are not part of the 1951 Convention (Sommers 1999; Horst 2002; Jacobsen 2004). Denied access to formal employment, refugees often seek jobs in the informal sector, hiding their legal status. Employers often exploit refugee workers, pay low wages and demand longer working hours in unconducive

working environments. Under such circumstances, refugees will struggle to support their families. Refugees usually do not report such cases due to fear of possible identification, detention and deportation (Sommers 1999; Campbell 2005; Kobia and Crabfield 2009). Refugees who pursue small businesses bring their expertise from their home countries. The authorities may turn a blind eye to refugees' informal business activities because of their contribution to the economy and the fact that they are not a burden on the state. For example, in Nairobi, Somalian-run businesses are integral to the informal economy (Sommers 1999).

There is a gendered dimension to the experiences of men and women in the cities (Gururaja 2000). Women may live in urban areas in unhealthy conditions with lack of access to services such as sanitation, health care and education. Refugee women may have no or limited access to employment while they are expected to feed their families (Gururaja 2000). Sometimes they may be exploited by their employers. Women may be at risk of being sexually exploited by landlords as they do not have the money to pay for rent and food. Women may be less equipped than their male counterparts. Males may have resources or survival strategies to overcome a crisis situation (Sommers 1999; Horst 2002; Jacobsen 2004). Refugee children usually engage in employment without being aware of the dangers of child labour. Child labour occurred in Pakistan amongst Afghan refugees. Some girls may be motivated by poverty to marry at a young age to curb the economic burden.

4.6 The UNHCR and Gender Dynamics

As known, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is the primary protector for asylum seekers and refugees. The 1951 UNHCR and the 1969 OAU definition of a refugee did not include gender-based persecution experienced by women. Furthermore, men were favoured over women when refugee applications were assessed (Crawley 2000; Martin 2004; Boyd and Pikkov 2005; Hyndman and De Alwis 2008). Refugee women faced the following difficulties in their countries of origin: domestic violence, prejudice due to traditional customs, forced marriage, forced abortion, forced to witness killings, tortured through sexual violence, forced pregnancy and human trafficking abductions (Boyd and Pikkov 2005). Female refugees also faced sexual harassment during and after their journey and experienced difficulties in accessing government social services and livelihood opportunities in host countries.

It was only in recent decades that the issues pertaining to women began to be included in the UNHCR's policies and programmes. In 1975 the General Assembly of the UNHCR in Mexico 'proclaimed 1976–1985 as the United Nation (UN) Decade for Women: Action for Equality, Development and Peace' (Martin 2004, p. 147). The World Plan of Action was adopted to overcome the challenges experienced by female refugees. At the following mid-decade conference, it was expected that some minimum goals would have been met, including: increased participation of women in decision making, equal access to education, increased

access and provision of health-care services, equal rights to vote and recognition of women's activities. The mid-decade conference was held in July 1980 in Copenhagen. The problems facing refugee women were discussed and resolutions were adopted (Hajdukowski-Ahmed et al. 2008). Several recommendations pertained to the reasons for migration and state's responsibility to assist and protect refugee women. They included the following:

– Governments should punish those who exploit children and women refugees and take measures to prevent further atrocities.
– The UNHCR, together with other UN agencies, must create the necessary programmes to deal with the needs of displaced and refugee women. Such programmes must specialise in education, employment and health-care opportunities.
– The UNHCR should create and implement programmes for family reunification and resettlement.
– The UNHCR must increase the number of female staff in senior positions to assist refugee women.
– Information regarding family planning and contraceptive methods must be freely available and distributed to refugee women and men (Martin 2004).

According to Martin (2004), during the second half of the decade, the World Plan of Action called for:

– Counselling and assistance for refugee women, with an emphasis on developing self-reliance.
– Special health-care measures and counselling by female health practitioners where needed.
– Special programmes to feed lactating and pregnant women.
– Educational and skills training opportunities including language acquisition and programmes to assist refugee women to generate an income.
– Refugee camps should have international personnel to discourage attacks and exploitation of refugee women.

These strategies were an attempt to better understand the challenges and needs of refugee women. However, the implementation of the above recommendations was difficult and little progress was made because of a lack of resources and funding.

In 1985, the UNHCR Executive Committee decided that all countries were 'free to adopt the interpretation that women asylum seekers who face harsh or inhuman treatment due to their having transgressed the social mores of the society in which they live may be considered as a particular social group' (National Consortium on Refugee Affairs (NCRA) 1999, p. 5). In 1985, at the end of Decade for Women, the UN established refugee women's groups and associated NGOs under the banner of the UNHCR, aimed at tackling the problems faced by female refugees identified at the Nairobi Conference (Hajdukowski-Ahmed et al. 2008).

The UNHCR formulated policy frameworks that insisted that females be placed in developmental programmes (El-Bushra 1995). One such framework was the Women in Forced Migration (WIFM) policy which received institutional

recognition in 1985 at the third Decade for Women Conference in Nairobi, Kenya (Indra 1999). The WIFM approach started to be integrated in charters, programmes and discourses of organisations responding to humanitarian emergencies. The approach was rooted in the belief that refugee women have special needs and are more vulnerable than men. It suggested that more resources and specific programmes should be allocated to women to address their vulnerabilities (Torres 2013). In addition, women refugees were entitled to civil human rights and especially the right to protection from violence, abuse, exploitation and harmful cultural, religious and traditional practices, access to social justice and to be involved in all decision making in matters relating to their lives and those of their children. The UNHCR implemented projects such as ceramic, handicraft and soup making to meet the needs of refugee women and some programmes were successful (Torres 2013). However, other projects suffered from a lack of funding (Indra 1999).

In 1990, the Executive Committee of the UNHCR ruled that severe discrimination against women as defined in the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) could be one of the bases for granting refugee status (NCRA 1999, p. 5). The discrimination against women means 'any differentiation, exclusion or restriction applied due to sex, which irrespective of marital status of women, lead to limited exercise, use and recognition of human rights and fundamental freedoms by women in political, economic, social, cultural, civil or other field' (UN 1979, p. 5).

4.6.1 Guidelines on the Protection of Refugee Women

In 1991, the UNHCR issued its 'Guidelines on the Protection of Refugee Women' to overcome the challenges faced by female refugees (Martin 2004, p. 152). The Guidelines included the suggestion that legal procedures be reformed to include gender-based persecution and also suggested interview techniques when dealing with claims of this nature (Martin 2004; Hajdukowski-Ahmed et al. 2008). Crawley (2000) viewed the UNHCR guidelines as a strategy that can be used to raise awareness of specific difficulties experienced by displaced women. The 1991 UNHCR guidelines defined female refugees as a vulnerable group whose physical security was at risk during and after their journey. Upon their arrival in the destination country, women needed to apply for refugee status which was important for the protection and assistance of females. Women often faced difficulties in acquiring refugee status if they cited gender-based persecution as a reason for their application for asylum. The 1991 UNHCR guidelines recognised gender-based persecution in assessing applications (UNHCR 1991). The 1991 guidelines further provided measures to protect women from physical violence, human trafficking abduction and sexual violence and to ensure that they had access to food, healthcare services and education and could participate in economic activities (UNHCR 1991).

Almost a decade late, an assessment by the WCRWC (2002) showed that there had been some progress in implementing the 1991 UNHCR guidelines. On the positive side, the guidelines had improved efforts to protect women including: the increased number of girls enrolling at schools, refugee women being included in camp management, women who were involved in food distribution, an increased number of women who were employed as health-care workers, and the availability of the reproductive health-care facilities and counselling services for women suffering from trauma (WCRWC 2002).

However, the problems of refugee women continued to increase. The 1991 UNHCR guidelines were poorly implemented due to the following reasons (WCRWC 2002):

– Lack of organisational commitments to address the needs of refugee women.
– The UNHCR's work settings were challenging. It worked in unsecured, dangerous and impoverished environments.
– Some states failed to fulfil their responsibilities under international law and made the protection of refugee women difficult.
– Refugee women and girls' unequal status in the society in which they were located.
– A lack of funds and resources made it difficult to implement the guidelines.

The 1991 guidelines were also criticised at the international refugee women's conference held in Toronto in 1993. The conference was entitled 'Gender Issues and Refugees: Development Implications' (Martin 2004). The 1991 guidelines emphasised the protection and participation of women only, excluding men as well as socioeconomic contexts. The conference emphasised the need to address the problems of refugee women through a gender-integrated approach. Furthermore, gender issues should be mainstreamed in all assistance and protection programmes. Humanitarian agencies were aware of the needs of refugee women; however, the implementation of the UNHCR guidelines was lacking. Hence, the situation of refugee women was still precarious (Hajdukowski-Ahmed et al. 2008). This was attributed to a lack of funding, inadequate staff and the environment in which women were located.

The French Commission for Appeals of Refugees recognised FGM as a form of persecution in terms of the 1951 UN Convention in 1991 (NCRA 1999). In 1993, the Executive Committee of the UNHCR issued guidelines on the evidentiary processes to be used by countries during refugee status determination. The UNHCR Executive Committee agreed that people who had experienced sexual violence should be treated with specific sensitivity (NCRA 1999). Furthermore, the UNHCR recommended that all countries establish training programmes for officials involved in asylum determination in order to ensure that they are sensitive to culture and gender (NCRA 1999).

Canada was the first state to produce guidelines in March 1993, including gender under membership of a social group, in terms of the 1951 UNHCR Convention (NCRA 1999). In 1996, the Canadian guidelines were revised and restructured. Today, these guidelines act as a guide for other states in addressing gender-based

claims. Canada was followed by other states, such as Australia, the United States of America and the United Kingdom (NCRA 1999). However, most countries have not amended their current law to include gender or sex under social groups. Rather they have set nonbinding procedures on how asylum determination officials may assess gender-based claims (NCRA 1999). South Africa is the only country to include gender under membership of a social group (NCRA 1999).

4.6.2 Sexual Violence Against Refugees

A second set of guidelines were issued in 1995 by the UNHCR, entitled 'Sexual Violence Against Refugees: Prevention and Response'. These were specifically intended to protect women refugees from sexual violence (UNHCR 1995). The 1995 guidelines provided ways to address sexual violence and emphasised the provision of training, education and awareness campaigns. According to the UNHCR (1995, p. 3), the 1995 guidelines 'seek to promote attitudinal changes in relation to sexual violence where there are obstacles, to improve or initiate services that address psycho-social as well as health needs, and, overall, to create an awareness and sensitivity to special needs and concerns of refugees who have been subjected to sexual violence'. The UNHCR, NGOs and state governments needed to ensure that the necessary steps were taken to prevent sexual violence (UNHCR 1995).

The 1991 and 1995 guidelines were based on the notion that refugee women have special needs and concerns (Martin 2004). The UNHCR implemented developmental projects for refugee women so they could access jobs and meet their basic needs. Some projects designed for women did address their needs. These included ceramic, handicraft and soup making as well as repairing tractors and bicycles (Hajdukowski-ahmed et al. 2008). However, other projects suffered from a lack of funding and did not generate a profit as expected. The developmental programmes were criticised because they focused on the needs of female refugees in isolation, as if they were living separately from males. Instead of empowering women, they increased inequality between men and women (Hajdukowski-Ahmed et al. 2008). Measures to protect refugee women from gender-based violence failed because most humanitarian agencies remained gender neutral. The 1991 and 1995 guidelines could only be effective during a crisis, yet refugee camps were becoming long term and almost permanent (Torres 2013).

There was a need for a paradigm shift in terms of the policy framework from looking at the needs of women only to focussing on both female and male refugees' issues. Gender mainstreaming was endorsed at the 'Beijing Platform for Action' during the UN Fourth World Conference on Women held in Beijing in 1995 (UN 1995; El-Bushra 1995). All countries agreed to recognise claims made by women on the basis of well-founded fear of persecution, comprising torture by sexual attack and other gender-based persecution (UN 1995). The adoption of gender perspectives during humanitarian emergencies was encouraged

(UN 1995). This focused on removing harmful cultural and traditional practices while promoting women's human rights (Torres 2013). NGOs and humanitarian agencies were encouraged to adopt gender perspectives in their projects and programmes. However, some NGOs resisted adopting a gender perspective (Indra 1999). Furthermore, this perspective improved refugee women's access to social services and promoted greater awareness of their needs but did not confront ideological discrimination against female refugees. Gender perspectives failed to consider the power relations in which refugee women were trapped (Indra 1999). If projects were designed for both males and females, they always favoured men. For example, in Sri Lanka, capacity-building training included programmes such as welding, carpentry and tractor and bicycle repair, while women were not allowed to work outside the household (Hyndman and De Alwis 2008).

At the Beijing Conference in 1995, countries agreed to give female refugees legal status if their claims were based on well-founded fear of persecution including sexual attacks and other gender-based persecution (UN 1995). The 1998 Report of the UN Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women urged states party to the 1951 UNHCR to adopt guidelines with respect to gender-based claims. The UNHCR issued a third set of guidelines in 2002 which focused on 'gender-related persecution'. The intention was to ensure that national policies consider gender-based violence a form of persecution. The traditional definition of refugee was based on the framework of men's experiences. This meant that the experiences of homosexuals and women were ignored (Gururaja 2000). Understanding of gender and sex in the refugee context has advanced in international law. The 2002 guidelines also emphasised gender awareness and sensitivity during the application process for refugee status (Martin 2004; Hajdukowski-Ahmed et al. 2008). Gender is referred to as the relationship between men and women, which is socioculturally constructed and identifies status, role and identity as well as the responsibilities allocated to each sex (NCRA 1999). Gender-related claims apply to both males and females, but are commonly raised by women. They are not limited to domestic violence and include FGM, sexual violence, forced family planning, discrimination against homosexuals and punishment for transgression of social mores (NCRA 1999).

4.6.3   Gender-Related Refugee Claims

Gender-related claims can be included for consideration for refugee status on the following basis:

– *Well-founded fear of persecution*: According to UNHCR (2002, p. 3), 'Female and male applicants may be subjected to the same forms of harm, they may also face forms of persecution specific to their sex'. International criminal and human rights laws recognise other acts as violation of the laws, including sexual violence. Sexual violence is classified as serious abuse and is a form of

persecution. Sexual attacks as well as other forms of gender-based violence including FGM, dowry-related violence, trafficking and domestic violence cause severe suffering and injury, whether perpetrated by state or non-state actors.

– *Discrimination amounting to persecution*: According to the UNHCR (2002, p. 4), a 'gender-related claim is also an analysis of forms of discrimination by the state in failing to extend protection to individuals against certain types of harm'. Domestic violence cases or abuse can also be analysed in this context.
– *Sexual orientation*: A person can be persecuted and discriminated against because of his or her sexuality. In most cases, an individual may have refused to perform the cultural or social roles attributed to his or her sex. For example, in many societies, homosexuality is illegal and people have been persecuted because of their sexual orientation (UNHCR 2002).

4.6.4   Convention Grounds

The well-founded fear of being persecuted must be linked to the Convention grounds in terms of 'race, religion, nationality, membership of particular grouping or political opinion' (UNHCR 2002, p. 6). The fear of persecution can be attributed to one or more of the following Convention categories:

– *Race*: Men and women can experience racial persecution in different ways (UNHCR 2002). For example, in a war, the persecutor may want to destroy certain racial or ethnic groups by injuring, imprisoning or killing men, while women may be sexually attacked.
– *Religion*: In many societies, religion ascribes certain behavioural codes and roles to different sexes. If a woman fails, refuses or does not fulfil her roles, she can be punished. Women may have a well-founded fear of persecution because of religion (UNHCR 2002).
– *Nationality*: Refers 'to membership of an ethnic or linguistic group and may occasionally overlap with the term race' (UNHCR 2002, p. 7).
– *Membership of particular social group*: Gender-related claims are often analysed under this category. A social group is defined as a group of people that have similar characteristics but face different forms of risk of persecution (UNHCR 2002). Their characteristics are unchangeable, innate, important for identity and an affirmation of human rights. Females are an example of a social group, defined as immutable and innate and are treated differently from males. Women are a group in the society that receives different standards and treatment in most countries. The category can also include transsexuals, homosexuals and transvestites (UNHCR 2002).
– *Political opinion*: This includes any opinion on matters where society, government, the state or policy is involved. The claimant is assumed to be holding an opinion which is not accepted or tolerated by society or the authorities: 'It is not always necessary to have expressed such opinion or to have already suffered any

form of discrimination or persecution; rather it is based on an assessment of the consequences that a claimant having certain dispositions would have to face if he or she returned' (UNHCR 2002, p. 8). Females generally do not get involved in high-profile political activities as males. Women may be persecuted because of their relatives' involvement in politics. Sometimes women may work as nurses in rebels' camps and not intentionally support them. The persecutor may see women as part of the rebel group and punish them (UNHCR 2002).

4.6.5   Guidelines for Women and Status Determination

A person that has faced gender-based persecution needs a supportive environment and should be reassured that all information presented is confidential. Due to trauma, some claimants are too scared to tell the truth about the causes of their persecution. Hence, they are afraid that the asylum determination officials may reject their application. The UNHCR (2002) guidelines provided procedures that need to be followed in such cases:

– Female asylum seekers need to be interviewed alone without family members or a male presence. This will ensure that women speak without fear.
– It is important that female asylum seekers are given information regarding the status determination process and legal advice in a language that they understand.
– Claimants should be told that they have the right to interviewers and interpreters of the same sex. Interviewers and interpreters need to be gender sensitive.
– Interviewers should build trust with the claimants so that they are able to talk about sensitive topics.
– The interviewers and interpreters need to introduce themselves and explain their role and the purpose of the interview. They must assure the claimant that all information presented would be treated confidentially.
– The interviewer must remain objective, compassionate and neutral. Claimants must be allowed to tell their stories without being interrupted. How women react during the interview must not affect their credibility. Interviewers and decision makers must understand that trauma can adversely affect people.
– Questions relating to gender need to be incorporated into the asylum interview process. Female asylum seekers that have been involved in political activities usually do not provide relevant information. Women asylum seekers often fail to relate information about torture and the type of persecution they fear such as FGM and rape.
– Medical staff such as counsellors and psychologists should be made available if necessary before and after the interview.

While some countries adapted these guidelines and procedures in their legislation, others developed their own guidelines and policies but on the same grounds. The UNHCR encouraged states to ensure that their asylum application laws and procedures were gender sensitive. South Africa was the first developing state to

include gender-based persecution as the reason for asylum and distinguished itself as a country committed to women's rights and gender equality.

4.7 Conclusion

In the past decade, a growing number of countries have introduced immigration policies that allow for the exclusion of refugees. People who flee from injustices into nation states for refuge are often met with a system that is marked by a process of filtering, of choosing, of accepting and of exclusion (Worth 2006). The fact that there are a 'chosen' number begs a question of justice and ethics. What is evident in the contemporary world is a failure of nations to deal adequately and humanely with refugees.

The UNHCR is the primary guardian for asylum seekers and refugees, but not the only protector. While there are no 'quick fixes' or immediate permanent solutions, there is a need for a global response from all nations to improve the lives of those seeking refuge – to go beyond statistics and focus on the human dimensions of the problem (Loescher 1993).

Conflict was the most common cause of refugee flows. Female refugees have not been given the protection offered to male refugees in host countries throughout the world. Female refugees are an extremely vulnerable group that needs special attention. This chapter analysed the challenges facing refugee women and the difficulties they encountered in specifically designated camps and in urban areas. This review revealed that female refugees continuously experienced difficulties in their home and host countries. Despite policies designed to protect refugees, women were still vulnerable, and they have been subjected to social exclusion, prejudice and discrimination. These experiences have only recently been recognised by the UNHCR.

A holistic approach is required in order to solve the problems experienced by women. The needs of female refugees must be included in all phases of a refugee's life starting with the refugee determination process. In most countries, refugee laws have incorporated gender perspectives in the asylum application process. However, poor and inconsistent implementation of gender-sensitive refugee policies in host countries adds to the vulnerabilities of refugees.

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Chapter 5
Immigration Policies and Integration Models in Canada: Conflicting Approaches and Converging Trends

Victor Armony

Abstract This chapter deals with Canada's immigration policies and integration models, with a particular focus on the divide between the predominantly French-language province of Québec and the mainly English-speaking rest of the country. After portraying the origins and evolution of the immigration legal framework in Canada, particularly in the light of nation-building and the path that led from a highly restrictive admission policy to an extremely open one through the adoption of the "points system", the chapter describes the tension between the two competing models, multiculturalism and interculturalism, that coexist in the Canadian context and that reflect two narratives and two practical approaches to the integration of newcomers. These differences stem from Québec's unique status within the national context and, in particular, from an agreement signed between that province and the federal government that recognized its "distinct identity" and gave Québec full authority to select its "economic" immigrants. The final section dwells on some of the recent and current changes in immigration policy that seem to signal, in both English Canada and Québec, a major shift in their view of diversity, as new criteria applied to the selection of immigrants appear to heed to economic pragmatism and might entail a more restrictive conception of what a "desirable immigrant" is.

Keywords Canada • Québec • Immigration • Integration • Policies

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5.1   Introduction

In this chapter, I focus on Canada's immigration policies and integration models. Contrary to the centralized character of such matters in most countries, any analysis of Canada's governance and public policy needs to take into account the reality of a highly decentralized federal system and, more fundamentally, the split between what amounts to two diverging identities: one based in the predominantly French-language province of Québec and the other established over the mainly English-speaking rest of the country (Armony 2014). Canada was created in 1867 as a "pact between two founding peoples", the French, mostly Catholic early colonists of New France, and the British, mostly Protestant settlers, who arrived after the Treaty of Paris was signed in 1763. Currently, more than one Canadian in five (22 %) is a native speaker of the French language (i.e. "francophone"), a decreasing proportion of the total population (they represented almost 30 % of all Canadians in the 1950s), but a very significant one nevertheless, all the more so because of its concentration in one single province. Canada's institutional framework reflects that original duality, which unsurprisingly has both generated tensions between the two groups and encouraged the construction of innovative mechanisms for mutual accommodation and political compromise. It goes without saying that history and mother tongue are not limited to reckoning facts and demography, but they embody—maybe even more importantly—a potent vector of cultural categorization and a vital aspect of majority-minority relations (Cardinal 2012).

Therefore, given the particular nature of the Canadian case, internal comparisons make more sense, at least in some respects, when they are based on the twofold—bilingual, bicultural, even binational to a certain extent—structure of the country. But this divide is to be considered in combination with Canada's unique constitutional design regarding federal-provincial relations. In most federations, the areas of governmental action that are usually associated with key national goals or principles stay in the realm of federal politics, even when decentralization occurs. Canada, on the other hand, instead of leaving to provinces "residual powers" (as is the case with the US model), constitutionally assigns specific powers to provinces and allows for devolution of federal authority to provinces in "shared jurisdiction", and immigration is one of them. Moreover, since the late 1950s, the tendency has been towards a "steady attrition of the power of the central government" (Watts 1987). In this context, the French-language province of Québec has gained extraordinary autonomy—extremely unusual compared to any subnational entity in the world—over immigration and integration policy. For similar reasons—the Québécois' own nation-affirming struggles—and regardless of their political leanings, all that province's "governments resist the centralizing and nation-building efforts of Ottawa" (Béland and Lecours 2007) in other critical areas as well, including education (an exclusively provincial power).

In the first section of this chapter, I describe the origins and evolution of the immigration legal framework in Canada, particularly in the light of nation-building, by examining the path that Canada followed from a highly restrictive admission

policy to an extremely open one. In the second section, I focus on the divergences regarding immigration and integration between the French-language province of Québec and the rest of the country ("English Canada"), a situation that stems from the country's past but also from rather different conceptions about national identity and the politics of majority-minority relations. In the third section, I dwell on the tension between two competing models—multiculturalism and interculturalism— that coexist in the Canadian context and that reflect two narratives and two practical approaches to the integration of newcomers. In the last section, I present some of the recent and current changes in immigration policy that seem to signal, in both English Canada and Québec, a major shift in their approach to diversity.

5.2 Immigration Policy and Nation-Building in Canada

In spite of its reputation as a very open country, Canada has a dark side to its history with respect to immigration and minorities. Some events have become symbols of past injustices and are commonly addressed in history school textbooks: the shameful "Chinese head tax" established in 1885 with the aim of discouraging immigration from China, the "None is too many" infamous comment by an immigration agent at the end of Second World War referring to the government's systematic rejection of Jewish refugees between 1933 and 1948 and the forced relocation of all people of Japanese descent living in Canada to internment camps "as enemy aliens" between 1941 and 1948. While these (and other) well-known examples reveal deep streaks of intolerance among Canadian political leaders at least up to the mid-twentieth century, prejudiced attitudes towards certain minorities pervaded as well the general population, both of British and French origin. Many Canadians still remember the "Jewish quotas" at Montreal's English-language McGill University from the 1920s to the 1960s (similar to those at Harvard and other Ivy League schools in the United States during that period). While this reflected a more elitist practice of discrimination in British Canadian society (not only against Jews but to most other groups too, including the Irish and the French Canadians), some forms of populist, street-level prejudice took grasp in Québec: for example, in 1938, an astounding 128,000 citizens in that province signed a petition demanding a stop to "all immigration and specially Jewish immigration". Religious and language tensions obviously played a role in shaping people's attitudes and government's policy measures (i.e. French Canadians perceived foreigners and non-Catholics as a threat to their cultural survival), as well as the fact that Canada was still a "dominion" in the British Empire (i.e. subject to London's geopolitical goals and needs and dominated by a defensive mindset vis-à-vis the United States). These are all rather well-known historical facts. What is less known (even by many Canadians), however, is that the legislative framework itself was, for many years, clearly and effectively discriminatory, even explicitly racist. In other words, Canada's intolerant approach to diversity for almost the entire first century of its existence was not limited to the behaviour of an anxious populace, certain high-class

institutions and some narrow-minded officials but was rather a sanctioned and deliberate state policy, implemented and upheld by the judiciary and the public service.

Canada's first immigration law, adopted only 2 years after the Confederation (the birth of the country in 1867), established—at least formally—a very accessible immigration policy, something that was a usual practice among other settler or "frontier" societies (such as Argentina and Australia) eager to have their vast territories occupied and developed. But this initial unrestrictive approach to immigration was indeed deceptive, in that not all groups were equally welcome. Argentina, very akin to Canada at that time, is a quite telling case (and typically duplicitous) in this respect: its very liberal nineteenth-century constitution invited "all men in the world who wish to reside on Argentinean soil" in its lofty Preamble, but then specified in the first part that "the federal government will foment European immigration". Canada's similar preference for certain ethnic groups would be rendered explicit when, in 1919, the Immigration Act was amended. Until then, the capacity to pronounce an "absolute prohibition of any class of immigrants" whenever the government "considers it necessary or expedient" (Article 30 1906) granted the executive branch discretionary powers for precluding specific groups—though not named in the law—from coming to Canada (due notice was to be given to the transportation companies, a proviso that implies a practice of profiling and rejecting banned categories at the port of embarkation). No judiciary overview could interfere with the Ministry of Immigration's decision, and in 1910, a further restriction was included in the law, stating that immigrants deemed to be "unsuited to the climate requirements" (which can be interpreted as a coded reference to non-Nordic peoples) could be denied entry or be deported. In 1919, the racialized approach to immigration became entirely evident through an amendment that gave the government the authority to "prohibit or limit the number . . . of immigrants belonging to any nationality or race . . . or because such immigrants are deemed undesirable owing to their peculiar customs, habits, modes of life, and methods of holding property". Under this provision, ethnic origin and cultural traits (e.g. religion) could be invoked as reasons for "undesirability". But the same article (13, paragraph c) went even further: immigrants could be banned from Canada "because of their probable inability to become readily assimilated". In other words, any group could be pre-emptively declared "inassimilable". In 1952, the Immigration Act was overhauled, and all mentions of race and ethnicity were removed (while political restrictions were added, particularly concerning "subversive activities"). However, the new law conferred even more discretionary and procedural powers to the Ministry, while doing nothing to remove the restrictions already embedded in the immigration system and its administrative practices. For another decade, race and ethnicity would remain a cornerstone for immigrant selection in Canada.

Finally, new regulations adopted in 1962 eliminated all forms of racial discrimination in the selection process (in line with a Bill of Rights adopted by the federal government in 1960), and the entire policy approach to immigration was now to be geared towards meeting the needs of Canada's economic development. In 1967, the

notorious "points system" (still in use) was established: any person in the world, regardless of race, ethnicity or nationality, can apply. A score is calculated by adding points gained on the basis of education, training, employment opportunities, language skills etc., and if the total tally is high enough, admission as a permanent resident is granted. It goes without saying that this was a momentous shift, and immigration rates soared, with a marked reversal in the origins of newcomers, now mostly coming from Asia, Africa and Latin America. Since then, the Canadian immigration system has been lauded as one of the most generous and fair-minded in the world, and many have proposed that it should be adopted in other countries.[1] But, even if Australia and New Zealand have followed a similar path (albeit not identical, as important differences remain), Canada still stands out as a particular case. Why is that? It may be argued that some structural factors—many of them the result of chance rather than will—play a major role in Canada's exceptional approach to immigration: notably, geography, demography and political history.

Of course, each country is unique in its institutional and sociological makeup, evolution and public culture. Although similar in many respects, Canada is very different from the United States on several crucial aspects. Let's consider geography: Canada is a vast territory with relatively scarce population, most of it concentrated in the south, stretched from ocean to ocean within a hundred kilometres from its only international border. The United States, while attracting millions of Latin American immigrants, shields Canada from any mass population movement, a reality that allows Canada to exert maximum control on who enters the country. This location advantage translates into the ability to develop a rational, highly selective, planned immigration policy, particularly for a country where the legacy of slavery (or colonial rule) has not left insurmountable racial injustices, as is the case in the United States (and, to a certain extent, in former European imperial powers). Ironically, the dark past of restrictive—and often racially motivated—immigration laws that prevailed in Canada until the 1960s contributed to weaken racial tensions within the country (ensuring that the European-descent population kept an unchallenged demographic majority), a context that allowed Canadians to react favourably to a ground-breaking immigration policy that was framed as a vital lever of economic development. Almost 50 years later, Canada remains an outlier, as a country "where one in five persons is an immigrant, and several of the largest cities can claim that half of the population was born abroad, [and] public opinion about immigration is largely positive" (Gustin and Ziebarth 2010).

Not surprisingly, one of the key features of Canadian society is the colossal challenge that it faces in order to simply hold together such an "improbable

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[1] The Canadian-style point system was seriously considered by the US Congress in 2007, even if the whole immigration law reform was eventually rejected. The point system was mainly criticized here (including then Senator Obama) because it would seemingly favour higher-skilled, better-educated applicants, shifting the focus away from reuniting families, the main thrust of legal immigration in that country. This criticism is understandable, given the reality of millions of undocumented immigrants and the fact that many Latinos from underprivileged background would not attain the score required in order to be admitted into the Unites States.

country", as the cliché goes[2]. Canada is a highly decentralized federation with constitutionally enshrined bilingualism and multiculturalism. The link that bonds together the ten provinces is much more tenuous than the one that connects the American states.[3] For some years now, Canada displays the highest per capita immigration rate in the developed world. In 2011, Ottawa delivered 280,000 immigration visas and has received a quarter of a million newcomers each year for the past two decades (proportionally, twice the number of legal immigrants admitted in the United States). Today, more than 20 % of the Canadian population is foreign-born, and it will reach 25 % by 2030, compared to 12.5 % currently in the United States. Despite this reality and given Canada's notoriously weak national identity, it is actually surprising that internal diversity has not generated any serious social or political rifts. Furthermore, the province of Québec, with almost one quarter of Canada's population, has acquired a quasi-state status over the past four decades, becoming a sort of "nation within the nation", formally recognized as such by the federal parliament. As we will see in the next section, the government of that province, supported by a majority of the French Québécois people, imposes restrictions on the choice of language of business and education, openly rejects Canadian-style multiculturalism and enforces different selection and integration criteria for immigrants, based on Québec's particular interests rather than Canada's. This raises the question: how such a disjointed, fragmented country can even exist, never mind be an example of tolerance and peaceful cohabitation where "compared to other countries there appears to be a relatively smooth integration of immigrants into the mainstream", who themselves "have become an integral part of the Canadian community, and their social and cultural contributions are frequently celebrated" (Reitz 2014)?

A historical fact, seemingly removed from current affairs, might nevertheless prove extremely relevant to today's issues of immigration and integration: Canada did not fight an independence war or a civil war. Among all the major countries in the Americas, Canada is alone in not having a collective memory of founding armed acts of emancipation, revolution, nation-building or territorial conquest. There is no "Canadian Revolution" to speak of, as there is an "American Revolution" or a "Mexican Revolution". It can be argued that it is one of the reasons why Canadians lack a powerful narrative on the basis of which strong expressions of patriotism could have been built or even a sense of national destiny (as opposed to the overwhelming sense of "manifest destiny" in the United States). As I mentioned, the birth of the Canadian Confederation is, to a large extent, the result of a "pact between two nationalities"—the British and the French. This has a clearly beneficial effect: politics as a game of compromise is built-in throughout Canada's

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[2] For example, Thomas Walkom, a *Toronto Star* columnist, recently wrote: "It's been 141 years since this improbable country was created from a collection of disparate British colonies, with little linking them other than the fact they were not the United States. And yet we persist" (May 24th, 2014).

[3] For example, Canada does not have a federal Department of Education, because education from kindergarten to university is under exclusive provincial jurisdiction.

institutional design and civic culture. While some view this as a phenomenal achievement (i.e. a centrist politics of moderation as civic religion), others blame this soft, somewhat relativistic approach for Canada's less assertive, less aspiring national character. This has a direct bearing on the issue of diversity: "culture wars" and social polarization on values are much less prevalent in Canada (than, say, in the United States), because of its weaker national core, thus opening up space for diversity itself. But it can be argued that it also congeals the widely held idea of Canada as a work in progress, as something to be assembled in the future rather than an essence to be searched in its past. In brief: a collective mindset that naturally encourages the rise of "multiculturalism" and may epitomize what some call "Canadian exceptionalism" (Kazemipur 2014).

5.3 Diverging Policy Approaches: Québec vs. English Canada

Multiculturalism in Canada refers to a vast variety of social, political and legal aspects of collective life. Countless books and studies have been devoted to its history, significance and effects. The term lends itself to numerous interpretations and debates, both theoretical and ideological. Multiculturalism has variously been described as a "national myth", a "doctrine", a "state of mind", a "Canadian value" etc., but it has also been either promoted or analyzed as a specific policy orientation, a constitutional rights issue and a dimension of interpersonal trust. Is Canada's multiculturalism first and foremost an "idea"—may be a shared ideal or, conversely, a collective self-delusion—a substantial institutional framework (made of state agency, bureaucracies etc.), a mode of governance (i.e. how things are actually done, a "style" of management) or all of the above? Is multiculturalism a constant in Canada's past half-century, or has it fundamentally changed, perhaps weakened and deviated from its sources? Is multiculturalism good for Canada? If so, can it be exported to other countries? This chapter is not the place to expand on such complex and diverse questions (even if all of them are relevant). The focus here is rather set on the contrast between a widely supported model of diversity management at Canada's federal level and in the nine English-language provinces, on the one side, and Québec, on the other. A foreign observer would be struck by both the impressive strength of multiculturalism across most of the country and at virtually all levels (from local communities to the central governments) and Québec's vigorous and very widely held opposition to Canada's brand of multiculturalism. The same types of questions as before arise: are most Québécois against multiculturalism as a reality (they would feel uneasy with a growing ethnic diversity), as a government approach (they would rather favour a more integrationist model) or as a symbol of Canadian identity (they would reject it as a vehicle of "Anglo" national dominance).

Of course, multiculturalism has its detractors in English Canada as well, and it can be even argued that the Conservative government led by Stephen Harper between 2006 and 2015 has made Ottawa a much less friendly place for multicultural ideas (more on that later). But a fundamental divide remains nonetheless between a decisively pro-multicultural English Canada and a markedly anti-multicultural French Québec. This is reflected in political discourse and in public opinion: "Canada is far more open to, and optimistic about, immigration than its counterparts in Europe and the United States", its "federal government [is] bullish about migration—and has been for quite a while", and "this national ethos is supported by government policies of multiculturalism, anti-discrimination laws, and settlement programs that promote integration through public-private partnerships" (Bloemraad 2012).[4] This is in marked contrast with most OECD countries, where "people tend to take a negative view of the economic and cultural impact of migrations and of policies designed to increase migratory flows".[5] A report by the Migration Policy Institute published in 2010 noted that "according to the German Marshall Fund's Survey of Transatlantic Trends, the share of people who considered immigration more of a problem than an opportunity increased between 4 and 9 percentage points between 2008 and 2009 in France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, the United States, and United Kingdom". Against that general trend in the wake of the global financial crisis, survey data by Angus Reid showed that "since September 2010, the proportion of Canadians who think immigration is having a positive effect in the country has increased by five points".

As Reitz (2012) points out, Canada's immigration and integration policy is based on three pillars: multiculturalism as the guiding, but mostly symbolic and ideal, the point system of selection for skilled workers and significant provincial autonomy with respect to settlement programmes, "partly because many activities are proposed and operated by local community agencies". This description is, of course, accurate, but only as long as this is applied to the country in general or, more precisely, to Canada at the federal level and to the nine English-language provinces and three territories. It does apply to Québec in some ways, but the reality of each pillar is significantly different from the national norm: as we will see in the next section, the guiding ideal is called "interculturalism" instead of multiculturalism; the selection of immigrants is effected in a different manner and produces a different outcome; and the funding, principles and delivery of settlement programmes are different as well. These differences stem from Québec's unique status within the national context and, in particular, from a historic agreement signed between that province and the federal government in 1978: the Cullen-Couture Accord. As a recognition of "the distinct identity of Québec" and taking into account "the federal and bilingual character of Canada", the Accord gives Québec full authority to select its independent immigrants (and the federal

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[4] Ontario boasts itself as "the most multicultural province in Canada where half of all new immigrants make their home" (http://www.ontarioimmigration.ca).

[5] OECD International Migration Outlook 2010

governments admits them unless they are inadmissible by virtue of health or security concerns). Moreover, the federal government withdraws from settlement programmes and compensates Québec through a fixed financial transfer (not dependent on immigration levels) so the province can provide all reception and integration services to newcomers. Both Canada's and Québec's governments "undertake to pursue a policy that will allow Québec to receive a percentage of the total equal to the percentage of Québec's population compared with the population of Canada", with the aim of maintaining that province demographic weight within the federation.

Thanks to the Cullen-Couture Accord, Québec handles the selection of its own "skilled workers" (70 % of all immigrants in that province) with a similar system than the one the federal government uses, but with different weighing assigned to language skills (giving preference to the French language) and other priorities (such as the provincial labour market needs). Overall in Canada, the top country sources of immigration in 2012 include China, the Philippines, India, Pakistan and South Korea; in Québec, among the ten top sources, four are in North Africa (Algeria, Morocco, Egypt, Tunisia) and two in Latin America (Colombia, Haiti). Naturally, given these national origins, the largest minorities in English Canada are South Asian and Chinese, whereas in Québec the largest are Black, Arab and Latin American. The most spoken non-official languages in English Canada are Cantonese, Punjabi and Mandarin, while in Québec the most spoken non-official languages are Arabic and Spanish. Integration patterns are also different, usually revealing a harsher reality in Québec. Settlement services are highly centralized: in that province, it is estimated that no more than 10 % of public spending on integration programmes is done by the NGO sector, while that proportion reaches 70 % in the rest of Canada (Meinhard et al. 2012); Québec's government delivers 93 % of language training (7 % by NGOs), and most support to immigrants is channelled through the ministries of immigration, education, employment and health (Reichhold 2011). However, in spite of the considerable resources available (received from the federal government as compensation), Québec's ample autonomy in setting the integration policy and the high degree of coordination between agencies and civil society actors, the outcome is generally seen as rather underwhelming. For example, the unemployment rate among immigrants with foreign postsecondary credentials was, in 2010, 13 % in Québec, compared to 9.7 % in Ontario and 7.6 % in British Columbia (Boudarbat 2011). According to Statistics Canada's 2011 census, the prevalence of low income among members of "visible minorities" (non-White) was 21.5 % overall in Canada, compared to 30.3 % in Québec. What is the explanation for such gaps? Some point to Québec's defensive ethnic-based nationalism (which would foster xenophobic attitudes in the job market), while others to Québec's less dynamic economy and (comparatively to English Canada and the United States) overbearing state interventionism, or to the fact that, particularly in Montreal, bilingualism is de facto required, penalizing French-speaking immigrants with insufficient knowledge of English (which is the case of many Arab skilled workers selected by Québec). Either as an underlying cause or as a reflection of social relations and attitudes, the interculturalist

approach, envisioned as an alternative to multiculturalism, is undeniably a factor in the disparity between Québec and the rest of Canada. Majority-minority relations are key to grasp such a complex reality.

Section 23 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms—which is part of the Constitution Act of 1982—deals with "Minority Language Educational Rights" and stipulates that Canadian citizens "whose first language learned and still understood is that of the English or French linguistic minority population of the province in which they reside, or who have received their primary school instruction in Canada in English or French … have the right to have their children receive primary and secondary school instruction in that language in that province". Put simply, if you are a francophone—because French is your mother tongue and/or you went to a French-language elementary school anywhere in Canada—you have the right to send your children to a publicly funded French-language school anywhere in Canada. However, this is not an absolute right, as its application is conditional on the "number of children of citizens who have such a right" and which would justify (or not) the use of public funds to that end.

The term used in Section 23 is "where numbers warrant", and its precise interpretation has resulted in political controversy and judicial disputes. The burden of proving the existence of a substantial linguistic minority that would warrant the use of public funds for minority-language education tends to rest with the minority itself and particularly with the parents wishing to educate their children in that language. Also, given the dwindling number of francophones living outside Québec, and the decline of (English/French) bilingualism across English Canada, it becomes politically harder to commit public funds to minority education in communities already suffering from limited resources (all the more in contexts of economic crisis and budget cuts). Of course, there are different situations and diverging approaches among provinces, often linked to their particular history and demographic patterns.

The largest Canadian province, Ontario, has a substantial French-speaking minority: over half a million individuals have French as their mother tongue or about 4.5 % of that province's population. Its dominant place within the Confederation has led Ontario to go well beyond the constitutional requirements regarding minority language rights. The province has legislated on the government's mandate to provide services in French and generally recognizes the rights of Franco-Ontarians (e.g. making both English and French the official languages of the provincial courts of justice). The province provides services in French in designated areas in which francophones amount to 10 % of the population or represent 5,000 people or more. Such thresholds can be said to be relatively low, particularly regarding what they imply in terms of cost and management.

Indeed, Ontario does not apply the Charter's criteria about "where numbers warrant", in that it guarantees publicly funded education in French regardless of how many children are eligible to receive minority-language education in a given area. According to a report by the Fraser Institute published in 2012, "the total costs of French-language minority services under the FLSA [French Language Services Act] in Ontario are $52 per provincial resident or $1,275 per minority member or

$621 million in total". These amounts are considerable, but no number of measures can supersede the reality of demographic trends: 70.5 % of Ontarians have English as their mother tongue, and immigrants massively gravitate towards English. Indeed, English is undoubtedly Ontario's de facto official language, and French's (legal, even symbolic) special status hardly translates into social or political relevance, all the more in front of the growing weight of immigrant languages (e.g. Mandarin, Cantonese, Punjabi, Tagalog, Spanish, Arabic etc.).

Québec, of course, has a very different approach to language. French is its only official language, by law, and the Charter of the French Language, which regulates the use of language in many areas of social life, has constitutional status in that province. The English-language population is granted constitutionally protected rights, but they are limited to the extent that Section 23 does not fully apply in Québec. Services may be provided in English in municipalities where more than half of the population—thus, an absolute majority—has English as their mother tongue (and not as the usual or only official language understood—an important distinction that frames the application of such collective rights). English may be used in the legislative assembly, in the courts, in the health system and, of course, in education, but always within very strict and generally highly regulated (as well as closely monitored and enforced) parameters.

The use of French is mandatory in the private sector, under certain conditions (e.g. depending on the number of employees in a business or regarding the relative prominence of the French lettering compared to another languages on billboards and commercial signs), and, at a time, Québec's government even invoked the "notwithstanding" clause in Canada's constitution in order to override some individual rights (i.e. freedom of expression) explicitly protected under the federal charter. Unsurprisingly, language policy and laws—particularly when they infringe on individual rights and coerce people's behaviour and hamper their personal choices—are extremely controversial and politically explosive. Those who support such measures (actually, the majority of Québec's public opinion, although favourable views are naturally less prevalent among non-francophones) argue that in the absence of proactive, state-driven protection of French, a majority language in Québec but a minority one in Canada, and for that matter in the North American continent, demographic and economic trends will eventually impose English. The decline of French in the rest of Canada, even with the existence of protective measures as found in Ontario, is seen as proof of the fundamentally fragile nature of this minority language and the need to safeguard it even at the cost of divisive and identity-based politics.

5.4   Competing Models of Integration: Multiculturalism vs. Interculturalism

Canada's multiculturalism and Québec's interculturalism are what are usually called models of integration, that is, normative and policy frameworks that seek to define and facilitate immigrants' transition towards full national membership. A model of integration is a vastly complex creature, as it interweaves political, legislative and administrative processes at many levels and with different methods and resources, but it also boils down to a relatively simple and coherent conceptual core. In other words, a model of integration is supposed to reflect a society's particular idea of what membership means (or, put more precisely, what the social contract that binds members together mean), which in turn relies on that society's existential bearings: its national identity, beliefs of shared origin and destiny, common values etc.

This does not necessarily mean that the "facts on the ground" are correlated with those basic cultural understandings—actually countless contradictions are commonly observed—but the model of integration nevertheless provides a master narrative with which the government and public opinion make sense of the collective challenges they face. For instance, in spite of the highly dissenting political and ideological viewpoints that make up the current immigration discussion in the United States, most participants still hold the notion that theirs is a "country of immigration" and they tend to describe their current conundrum with the trope of "the system is broken". The cliché of the "melting pot", while discredited since the civil rights movement (that brought awareness of the clear limits of "racial fusion" in US history), still stands in the back of many Americans' mind as an unspoken reference when assessing the integration—or lack thereof—of Latinos into society's fabric. While no one would argue that such images and ideas represent some sort of "essence" from which public policy orientations and social behaviour and attitudes would naturally derive, it can be argued that a country's historical path and reified cultural norms (including memories, symbols, rhetorical shortcuts) underlie institutional structures, government priorities, expert counsel (including scholarly production) and public debates on integration.

Canada's multicultural model occupies a particular place in this country's self-definition. Of course, all bounded national entities establish membership rules and develop their own conception of "nationalness"—who belongs and who does not, what does belonging entail, how one comes to belong (or ceases to do so). This refers not only to civic rights and duties and rules of nationality and naturalization (and loss of citizenship or residency privileges) but also to the ways in which a given country may specifically articulate those parameters. A society that consistently pursues collective self-introspection (i.e. putting the question of "who are we?" at the centre of the public conversation) will write down charters of rights, declarations of common values, guides for newcomers, policy guidelines, "white papers" etc.; it will create consulting bodies, launch educational campaigns, fund citizenship-building initiatives etc.

Much of that body of work generated by elected representatives, government agencies, the media, civil society organizations and academia will consist of discourse. Or put in other terms, the ratio of words to deeds will be very high. It could be argued that this is exactly the case of Canada's multiculturalism. What is done—any factual or tangible measure (actual funds distributed or spent, policies and regulations enforced, actions or processes initiated etc.)—will pale, in numbers, compared to what is said. But should this be the measure with which one assesses the true importance of multiculturalism in Canada? Let's point out that the advocates of multiculturalism (for whom it promotes openness, ensures equality, enriches us all) and its critics (who see it bringing about ethnic ghettos, hurting social cohesion, threatening universal values) mostly clash against each other's abstract idea of what societal membership means and what society should become (and is, and was), rather than about a comprehensive and empirically based set of analyses and programmes.

But if that is the case with Canada and its own model of integration—a web of norms, policies and practices that are quite standard fare internationally (at least among Western democracies) but which is framed by a "multicultural" self-definition—what makes Canada different from other countries in this regard? Is it only a matter of discourse, that is, Canada "would talk the multicultural talk" more than others, or is there a fundamental difference when compared to, say, Australia Spain or Sweden? If we consider the types and scales of government action (laws promulgated, budgets appropriated) or policy outcomes (e.g. which country shows a better record on the integration of immigrants), we would find some interesting variations, but certainly not a sharp divide between self-defined multicultural Canada and the rest of the developed world. In this regard, let's mention that Queen's University's Multiculturalism Policy Index shows that, other than Canada, Australia, Belgium, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain and Sweden had explicitly affirmed multiculturalism or had created a relevant public entity to implement multicultural policies in 2000 and/or 2010. That is, 11 countries out of 21 examined were deemed multicultural, while, curiously enough, the United States did not make the cut.

Canada may get consistently high scores on the multiculturalism indicators (although not always the highest), and it certainly leads the way on several issues, but it is not entirely atypical within the group. In fact, the gap that separates Canada from other countries that adopted multicultural approaches to diversity (with or without using the label itself) stems, in part, from Canada's—to use Kymlicka's words (2006)—"thinner" or "tamed" model of nationhood. Moreover, if, as Benhabib (2006) puts it, the politics of peoplehood consists of a negotiation between the ethnos ("a shared community of fate") and the demos ("a democratically enfranchised totality of all citizens"), Canada stands out as a particular case among liberal nation-states: not only is its ethnos distinctly weak, for historical reasons (i.e. not by choice), but its leadership and population have largely embraced the idea of civic integration. Of course, other multiculturally inclined countries have done the same, at least to a certain extent, but the notion of an overriding national identity that commands loyalty and, eventually, full assimilation is still

very much present in those places (all the more so in the wake of the current anti-multiculturalism backlash in Europe).

What about Québec? A quite common, albeit flawed, approach to Québec's model of integration has been to oppose it to Canada's model by referring to the tension of ethnos and demos. Québec's separatist thrust would naturally put the emphasis on the ethnic definition of peoplehood, instead of following (English) Canada's path towards civic integration. While certain aspects of this contrast may be founded (historically speaking, much less so politically in today's context), it is important to challenge the simplistic notion that (English) Canada and Québec have contradictory models of integration, as well as the idea that one model is right and the other is wrong. Regarding the latter, it goes without saying that the ethnos needs to be "tamed" for the demos to flourish. However, the "shared community of fate" is also necessary for social cohesion and solidarity to exist. This is a complex debate about a fragile balance that any liberal nation-state in the globalization era is bound to address.

But here I focus instead on the alleged disparity between (English) Canada and Québec: this French-language province has officially adopted an "intercultural" model, which posits interaction and exchange between cultural groups rather than maintaining ancestral identities. Interculturalism also entails that, in spite of their particular cultures, all communities must adopt a common public culture, defined by the use of the French language and by certain fundamental values (such as secularism and gender equality). But doesn't Canadian multiculturalism also promote interaction rather than isolation and seek a convergence in the public sphere around a common language and universal values? Actually, it would seem that there is no significant rift between Canada's multiculturalism and Québec's interculturalism (Winter and Simkhovych 2012), either in principle or in practice, other than in a matter of degree (more or less general tolerance to the manifestation of cultural differences in the public realm), societal context and ideological sensibilities (the use of specific words or historical references). Or, if Québec's interculturalism is indeed significantly different from Canada's multiculturalism, as Bouchard claims, the latter "would appear [as] slowly evolving in direction of the former" (2012, p. 106). In any event, Québec and English Canada do seem to behave like two separate countries regarding the management of diversity, and their respective realities are rather divergent on some levels. Table 5.1 provides a simplified but eloquent overview of such contrast.

Ironically, in spite of Québec's strong nationalist streak, both (English) Canada and Québec share a weak ethnos. This does not necessarily mean that French Québécois national identity is frail—a majority of them feel quite strongly about their "community of fate"—but rather that their group's claim to peoplehood is effectively contested. Put it simply, no one credibly challenges the fact that "France belongs to the French people". But the question "Does Québec belong to the French Québécois people?" is seen by many as a fair one to debate, and not all answers are unconditionally affirmative (as they would be in France's case). It can be argued that Canada's multiculturalism and Québec's interculturalism are not opposed, but rather two variations of the same model of integration, one that favours civic

Table 5.1 Some key differences between Québec and the rest of Canada

	English Canada (provinces and territories outside Québec/English speakers)	Québec (French speakers)
Official model/ideal of immigrant integration	Multiculturalism	Interculturalism ("multiculturalism... is not a Québec value"[e])
"Canada is a country of three nations: the Québec nation, the English-Canadian nation and the First Nations (aboriginals)"[a]	12 %	40 %
Authority over selection of independent immigrants	Federal government	Québec provincial government
Top ten countries of origin of immigrants (2012)	China, Philippines, India, Pakistan, United States, France, Iran, United Kingdom, Haiti, South Korea	China, France, Haiti, Algeria, Morocco, Colombia, Cameroun, Egypt, Tunisia, Moldova
Federal funding to provinces for settlement programs[b]	Ontario: 40 % of federal funds with 50 % national share of immigration	34 % of federal funds (transferred to Québec government) with 18 % national share of immigration
Main provider of settlement services[c]	NGO sector (Approximately 70 %)	Provincial government (Over 90 %)
Hold a very favorable opinion of Jews, Muslims and Sikhs[d]	39 %/20 %/19 %	11 %/9 %/6 %

Source: The author

[a]Source: Association for Canadian Studies (2013)

[b]Source: Meinhard et al. (2012)

[c]Source: Reichhold (2011)

[d]Source: Association for Canadian Studies (2007)

[e]Louise Beaudoin, Parti Québécois MNA, February 9th 2011

inclusion rather than assimilation, plays down public displays of patriotism, values diversity in itself and judges immigrants' contribution to society as mostly positive.

This depiction is supported by abundant research data on Canada and Québec's political and social realities as well as by many media content analyses and opinion polls. This supports the hypothesis that a weak ethnos encourages people to collectively discuss membership rules (the social contract) and, when that happens in a highly democratic setting, making multiculturalism (or interculturalism) the privileged optics through which to tackle diversity. But, ironically, the open debate about society's membership may lead to making choices about who is wanted as a fellow citizen—and who is not.

5.5   Conclusions: Current Transformations – Towards a Selectivist/Restrictionist Turn?

This last section of the chapter deals with recent changes in immigration, integration and naturalization policy in Canada. I focus on the underlying rationale for policy reform in various areas of federal jurisdiction and on the possible causes of what amounts to a major legislative and administrative shift, perhaps the largest in decades. Even though it is extremely difficult to pinpoint the precise causes of policy changes (in any given context), it is nevertheless reasonable to posit a convergence of several contributing factors, direct and indirect, internal and external. These include, of course, the government's preferences (based on the ruling political party's programme and membership) and capabilities (depending on parliamentary strength), the influence of lobbies and social activism, the media and public opinion. But other factors, broader and sometimes more diffuse in their impact, also need to be taken into account: on the one hand, the international context—particularly in terms of global economic forces, migration fluxes and geopolitical trends—and, on the other, the core elements of national identity and models of integration.

The previous Conservative government's approach to naturalization (justified by the "need to reinforce the value of Canadian citizenship"), the new rules regarding the points system (so as to advantage younger workers who have stronger language skills) and the steep increase in the number of temporary foreign workers are changes that can be framed in different narratives that give heed, in some cases, to economic arguments (Canada would need a faster, more flexible and responsive immigration system, particularly in the wake of the global crisis) and, in other cases, to ideological views (e.g. immigrants have a "duty to integrate into Canadian society" by respecting Canada's values). The stunning upsurge in the number of "non-permanent resident workers"—foreign nationals that are admitted on a temporary basis to hold a job in a given occupation or location, usually restricted to a particular employer—permitted to work in Canada in order to address specific labour shortages has changed the country's immigration landscape: it more than tripled between 2002 and 2013, reaching 338,000. In 2008, for the first time in Canada's modern history, temporary foreign workers exceeded the number of landed immigrants admitted that year.[6] Yet, as a C.D. Howe Institute report revealed, the federal government implemented these policy changes even as "the unemployment rate remained the same at 7.2 %" and "there was little empirical evidence of shortages in many occupations" (Gross 2014). That is not the only paradox: we see "poor labor market outcomes for many immigrants while simultaneously there are calls for immigration to meet 'shortage' situations" (Ferrer et al. 2012).

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[6] "[In 2012] data from Citizenship and Immigration show 491,547 temporary foreign workers either entered Canada or were still present in Canada that year" (The Globe and Mail, April 22nd 2014).

In their detailed analysis of immigration policy changes in Canada since 2008, Alboim and Cohl (2012) point out some other trends that could be potentially problematic, in the sense of altering the long-standing Canadian approach to immigration, either by themselves or through their cumulative impact or unintended results. They mention, in particular, the federal government's excessive focus on short-term labour market gains by giving priority to "provincial nominees" (economic immigrants designated by provincial governments on the basis of immediate local market needs). Regarding the steep increase in the number of temporary foreign workers, they see the government bent on taking that path "despite evidence showing that federal skilled workers selected for their human capital have better long-term outcomes".

Overall, according to Alboim and Cohl (2012), Canada's "desire for a faster, more flexible and responsive immigration system" puts "just-in-time" economic strategies ahead of any long-term nation-building effort. They also observe that Canada's new immigration policy measures lack coherence and predictability and that many current policy changes are not based on evidence or research data. And even if the economic rationale appears to be paramount, other dynamics must also be considered, all the more so in the light of the current debates on immigrant and minority cultural integration in Canada. For example, new rules in the point system grid will give priority to workers aged 46 and younger and to those who have strong language skills (in either English or French, but knowledge of both will not entail a significant premium). Also, a new "Canadian experience" category will offer a path towards permanent residency to graduates from Canadian universities.

Obviously, these measures can be seen as driven by economic pragmatism, but they may also imply specific constraints to immigrant selection that need to be taken into account. Those who hold a favourable opinion on the current changes will argue that attracting younger English- or French-speaking candidates, ideally with a Canadian education background, will experience an easier and less costly integration process. However, in a more critical perspective, it is possible to understand that approach as a move towards targeting specific countries, cultures or groups as desirable (and less "desirable") sources of immigration. While it is difficult to assert that, as some commentators have suggested, there is a hidden agenda aiming to promote immigration from Western (particularly European) countries and curb immigration from non-Western regions, it is clear that the portrait of the ideal applicant tends to favour certain geographic locations and cultural and social origins. That was the case since the creation of "meritocratic" point system and the progressive strengthening of "a 'human capital' model of immigration that rewarded skills such as education, experience and language ability" (Ferrer et al. 2012), but the current changes may vastly intensify that approach and even create two different routes towards Canada: one for temporary workers in unskilled, low-wage occupations (seasonal agricultural work, live-in care of children and the elderly, minimum-wage jobs in the fast food industry), often with origins in impoverished countries, and the other for "future citizens", that is, temporary skilled workers that are offered access to permanent residency

(an opportunity specifically denied to low-skilled workers) and, of course, to successful applicants admitted through the points system.

In Canada, there are no relevant political or public pressure groups that advocate any drastic reduction in immigration numbers, and those who may publicly discuss or question the makeup of the immigrant population will generally advance economic arguments rather than cultural (or ethno-racial) ones. And we have seen that polls consistently show that Canadians are, in comparative terms, essentially very open to immigration and diversity. However, beneath the strong multiculturalist discourse that permeates Canadian national identity, it is possible to observe a growing malaise in some segments of Canadian society concerning the integration of certain ethnic and religious minorities, Muslims in particular but not exclusively. Canada's Conservative Party, in power until 2015 under Prime Minister Stephen Harper, was born in the 1990s from a populist movement based in the Prairies and the oil-rich provinces (Boily 2007) and has consistently shown some reluctance about multiculturalism, at least in its more liberal forms (seen by some conservatives as a leftist "ideology"), while staying very friendly with certain ethnic constituencies (particularly around socially conservative values and freedom of religion or issues of foreign policy).

The Harper administration placed a strong emphasis on Canadian citizenship and shared values as the cornerstones of social cohesion, while stressing the British Commonwealth heritage and a closer alignment with the United States. These clearly conservative inclinations (also displayed in issues such as abortion, same-sex marriage, gun control etc.) were combined with a libertarian streak and a pro-business stance. In this regard, it could be argued that the ongoing global financial crisis gives the federal government the opportunity to frame in pragmatic terms—with a rhetoric built around the need to shield Canada's economy during difficult times—what amounts to a paradigm shift in immigration and integration policies based not only on economic grounds but, at least in part, also on an underlying ideological purpose: to favour "good immigrants", implicitly referring to notions of cultural and ethnic proximity (or acceptance) vis-à-vis certain groups.

In recent years, Canada's government has also toughened the rules regarding naturalization (from stricter residence requirements to a higher pass grade in the citizenship exam); has included controversial wording in the citizenship guide (referring to "barbaric practices" brought by some immigrants); has revoked, for the first time in history, the citizenship of thousands of Canadians for "residence" fraud (i.e. they did not stay the required length of time in the country in order to be eligible for naturalization); and has considered withdrawing citizenship rights to dual citizens who "act against Canada" (i.e. trough terrorism). During the same period, several changes and projects put forward in Québec under quite different conditions (and with apparently conflicting ideological motivations and goals) suggest the possibility of a rather puzzling convergence with English Canada's increasingly restrictionist outlook. In 2008, Québec's (Liberal, that is, centre-to-right, federalist) government instructed that all newcomers to the province would be required to sign a "Declaration on the Common Values of Québec Society" (notably

gender equality and separation of state and church) as a condition for obtaining their immigration visa.

Ostensibly, the government wanted to "send a strong message" in the wake of an acrimonious debate on "reasonable accommodations" (the public perception that demands made by some religious minorities could undermine gender equality and secularism in public institutions), so as to signal that settling in Québec "is not a right, but a privilege" (according to the provincial Premier's words) and that immigrants are welcome as long as they integrate into mainstream Québec society. In 2011, mandatory standardized testing of language skills were introduced and an "advanced intermediate" level of French became the standard for "language points" in the selection process of immigrants, significantly raising the bar (thus creating a much stronger preference for French native speakers or those educated in French-language schools). Even if more than three quarters of all immigrants who settle in Québec (about 50,000 each year) already have at least a basic knowledge of French on their arrival, the government declared that an even higher proportion was needed to offset the linguistic imbalance, particularly in the city of Montreal.

In 2013, a Parti Québécois ("sovereignist") government unveiled the project of a Charter of Secularism that would have barred civil servants from wearing overt religious symbols, among other measures. The long-standing aversion towards multiculturalism held by prominent intellectuals (and other members of the French-language intelligentsia: artists, actors, journalists etc.) close to the pro-sovereignty movement (Belkhodja 2008) could be more legitimately articulated—as in justified by concerns about gender equality and the fight against radicalization among the youth—in the wake of the anti-multiculturalist tide sweeping across much of Europe (Ryan 2010). The Parti Québécois government was defeated in 2014 (because it lacked an absolute majority in the provincial legislative assembly), and the controversial (but widely supported by the French-speaking public opinion) proposal was abandoned. However, the new Premier, from the Liberal Party, promised to legislate in order to clarify the limits of accommodation and the importance of secularism in Québec. So, interestingly, it is possible to observe some common trends with the rest of Canada, despite the highly divergent political contexts (a Conservative government in Ottawa between 2006 and 2015 and a separatist, centre-to-left government in Québec City between 2012 and early 2014) as well as significant gaps between the stated goals and the effective or potential consequences of certain policy measures.

Policy shifts regarding immigrants and minorities may follow simple, relatively "conventional" patterns (e.g. an economic crisis creates unemployment, which generates social unrest, giving raise to intolerant attitudes, pushing governments to adopt anti-immigrant rhetoric and legislation, etc.). However, in Canada, with a strong pro-immigrant and multicultural stance, which is deeply rooted in public culture, and a highly decentralized political system, change patterns are extremely complex. Opportunistic strategies and sheer pragmatism, along with principled objectives and ideologies shape the policymaking process. Canada's often noted "exceptionalism" in terms of immigration and integration issues is, in this regard, a fascinating place, where things are not always what they appear to be. On the one

hand, both Canada's and Québec's governments have increased the absolute and relative number of permanent residents selected as "economic immigrants" in recent years; both governments have recently modified the point system selection in order to give more weight to younger applicants (under 46 in Canada, under 35 in Québec), stronger language skills (either official language in Canada, French in Québec) and a better fit with the labour market.

In brief, a more selectivist approach which, ironically, can be justified on economic grounds by both progressive and conservative, federalist and separatist governments. On the other hand, both Ottawa and Québec City have "sent strong messages" about society's "fundamental values" and the "obligation to integrate", clearly deviating from a more pluralistic understanding of immigration accultura-tion. This restrictionist turn may be seen, as I suggested, under the light of a wider anti-multiculturalist backlash in the Western world, but the Canadian context pro-vides a unique setting: instead of Québec following English Canada's multicultur-alist shining example (a scenario expected by many observers), it is in fact the reverse scenario that seems to unfold. But this does not translate into an anti-immigrant view, as is the case in most European countries (and in the United States, to a certain extent): immigration is still viewed as a positive contribution to Canada's development, albeit in terms of the idea that newcomers have to be more "carefully chosen", implicitly referring to "undesirable" immigrants. It is under such type of argument that a darker side to Canada's approach to diversity may transpire.

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Chapter 6
Latin American Migration, Residential Patterns, and Social Cohesion in Argentina Cities

Susana María Sassone

Abstract The aim of this chapter is to analyze the role of Latin American migrants as actors and agents of the territorial transformation of cities in the era of globalization, taking into account both theory and empiric evidence, following studies done in Argentine cities. International migrants contribute to the formation of neighborhoods, define models in the ethnic economies, and adopt cultural and identity strategies for visualization at public spaces. Particularly, in this chapter the conformation and dynamics of residential areas of Bolivian and Chilean migrants are analyzed, in particular, at the metropolis of Buenos Aires and at two intermediate cities in the Argentine Patagonia: Puerto Madryn (Province of Chubut) and San Carlos de Bariloche (Province of Rio Negro). In each of the cases, we propose to go deep into the conditioning factors of these urban transformations: the formation of neighborhoods, all as ex novo settlements, characterized by their own mechanisms for the appropriation of space, generally in the impoverished suburbs of popular habitat. There are evidences of the same process of gestation, as migrants' residential choices are accompanied by logics for the access to housing, the relationships with employment, and the conditions of daily travel and

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accessibility, both toward and out of their residences. Particularly, it is relevant how they contribute to the building process of the neighborhood because they have a strong sense of solidarity intracommunitary. That social cohesion is related to the transnationalism relationships, which imply the new profile of the postmodern migrant that reacts to the dynamic of globalization with high flexibility and shape the landscape of the city.

Keywords Migration • Neighborhood • Building practices • Social cohesion • Argentina

6.1 Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to analyze the role of Latin American migrants as actors and agents of the territorial transformation of cities in the era of globalization, taking into account both theory and empiric evidence, following studies done in Argentine cities. The social framework of migrant groups reveals the mechanisms for the appropriation of space in urban areas, creating a spatial capital, that is, in turn, of high selectivity. Among contemporary international migrants arriving at large cities, looking for employments, the geographical logic of spatial concentration, defined as ethnical, cultural, religious, migration, and/or class affinity, prevails. This implies a strategic gregarious sense of those arriving and residing at cities, in dialectic social and spatial relationships, with a shelter seek sense, because immigrants feel that they are among peers.

For a long time, we have been looking for spatial models of international migrations within the Argentine territory, at a local scale, whether at large cities, in the metropolitan suburbs, rural spaces with intensive agriculture, intermediate cities, or surrounding an international border, where the different forms of appropriation of space by a foreigner, that is, international migrant, are recognized. The context of globalization at a global scale, the cyclical crises in Argentina as well as the global crisis of 2008 have offered "paradigm spaces," going far beyond our expectations when we can relate and explain spatial behavior of migrants. We are looking for evidence when interpreting those processes from a geographical view, but in that way we open us to interdisciplinary interpretation.

When we say that migrants are agents and actors in the transformation of cities, we mean that they contribute to the formation of neighborhoods, define models in the so-called ethnic economies, and adopt cultural and identity strategies for visualization at public spaces, for example, when they celebrate festivities and religious devotions. It is necessary to consider that, when expressing mechanisms for the appropriation of space, based on their cultural identities, each migrant group does so as a community, considered in a wide sense. Therefore, as a community, the migrants grow in number; they form neighborhoods, mainly as a result of chains and networks; they form their own commercial districts or stand above the rest, due to the kind of products sold (Serra Pozo 2006; Escobar Basavilbaso 2011; Hughes and Weise Hurtado 2013). These are types of ethnic economies since they achieve

to generate self-employment and establish as entrepreneurship or when they have several and active participation in the public space. Undoubtedly, although we can go deep into these three pillars, in this chapter it is analyzed the conformation and dynamics of residential areas of international migrants in the cities of Argentina.

In order to understand these geographical processes, the qualitative methodologies have been applied; in particular, the migration trajectory has been studied, caught by the biographical method and with the use of the compared life narratives techniques, and of the in-depth interviews to migrants. These primary sources admit the double longitudinal and transversal analysis of the socio-spatial experiences of migrants. The backgrounds of these types of investigations were the researches of Douglas Massey (1987) for the Mexican Migration to the USA, in which the ethnosurvey combines surveys with the biographical method. Other important references were Françoise Dureau contribution (2004) and Dureau and et al. (2002) and her works at Groupe de Réflexion sur l'Approche Biographique (1999), which applied a survey and an in-depth interview to residents of neighborhoods in large Colombian, Venezuelan, and Brazilian cities. This type of access helps the comprehension canals of uses, values, senses, representations and imaginary which direct and redirect the behavior of migrants and suppose the ways of the appropriation of space in the new global order. We would also like to focus on other methodological sources used like the in situ recognition, through visits and rounds in the neighborhoods, with the identification of cultural marks in the landscape, the functioning of stores and services for the migrants, and the recognition of everyday life rhythms. The result of all this activity is the creation of photographical and phonic banks, as primary sources. The combination of these methodological strategies has allowed us to go deep into the key components so as to explain the formation of migrant neighborhoods from the triple view of spatiality, sociability, and temporality of this trialectic of space, proposed by Edward Soja (1990, 1997, 1999). Today, these studies comprise the body of knowledge of the moving etnographies or as Amelina et al. (2014) call methodologies at movement to understand the international migrations from a transnationalism perspective. It is a complete methodological and interpretative effort to understand how international migrants look for residential fixation from their movement experiences at the space they move around.

Recent migrations are becoming diverse, taking composition into account, though Paraguayan, Bolivian, and Peruvian prevail, as well as arrival rhythm, Chinese (Sassone and Matossian 2014). However, there are other origins of interest such as sub-Saharan Africans. Even with the risk of generalizing, although such is not our intention, these groups mentioned grow in visibility, because they outstand in certain activities, joined to others with a little exoticism, all of which is making us far away from the idea of a "white and European" Argentina. In this chapter, some elements for theorization are provided, and, in the same way, empiric evidence is presented regarding residential patterns of Bolivian and Chilean migrants, in particular, at the metropolis of Buenos Aires and at two intermediate cities in the Argentine Patagonia: Puerto Madryn (Province of Chubut) and San Carlos de Bariloche (Province of Río Negro). In each of the cases, we propose to go deep into the conditioning factors of these urban transformations: the formation of

neighborhoods, characterized by their own mechanisms for the appropriation of space of these international migrants, generally in the impoverished suburbs of popular habitat.

Migrants form neighborhoods. This assentation may be difficult to justify in a first reading. Follow the reasoning: migrants characterize social practices and practiced places that justify talking about concentration in sectors of the city where marks carved at landscapes and everyday practices translate a sense of belonging, expressed in particular and specific vicinity relationships. Sometimes those areas are not strictly neighborhoods but a part of urban districts institutionalized in the laws of the respective local governments. There are evidences of the same process of gestation, as migrants' residential choices are accompanied by logics for the access to housing, the relationships with employment, and the conditions of daily travel and accessibility, both toward and out of their residences, which are generally poor. The appearance of businesses and ethnic services are detected; social and economic strategies within the same group and toward the receptor society are seen. There is a management of the public space where the migrant identity is shown. But, at the same time, the transnationalism relationships, which imply the new profile of the postmodern migrant that reacts to the dynamic of globalization with high flexibility, are shaped, particularly at a local scale, as this chapter aims to show.

6.2 Toward the Construction of Migrants' Neighborhoods

6.2.1 Concepts and Typology

In Argentina, Samuel Baily wrote a pioneer study, focused on the differentiation of residential areas after the arrival of Italian immigrants in New York and Buenos Aires. Baily (1985) compared the settlement patterns in both cities and distinguished, on the one hand, structural variables like localization, job availability, housing market, accessibility and transport and, on the other hand, cultural variables, such as the desire and need to keep parental or fellow bonds alive, among others, as conditioning factors. Redondo (1988) analyzed the neighborhood La Boca, also in the city of Buenos Aires, as an ethnic neighborhood, characterized by the presence of Italian immigrants who arrived in the first half of the XX century. From a geographical perspective, Sassone (2000, 2002, 2010) analyzed the conceptualization of migrants' neighborhoods, as communities, as a concentration of people, in particular, coming from the same country, linked to the idea of "place" and the sense of belonging, related to the humanistic geography. Otero and Pellegrino (2003) compared the residential concentrations of Europeans in the cities of Buenos Aires and Montevideo at the beginning of the nineteenth century. The first dominant aspect is always the concentration of people of a same origin, arriving from the same country. Therefore, the researcher must comprehend the

reasons for those spatial patterns as well as the several consequences for those willing to live together and are situated at the "inside" in the same way as for those at the "outside." Social scientists, especially geographers, are interested in the increasing and renovated tendency of these types of settlements in Latin American countries, with migrants from the same country or region of the world.

Although the School of Chicago defined the concept of neighborhood at the beginning of the XX century, this conformation to the interior of the cities was recognized with the origin of the urbanization. The different definitions of neighborhood show that it is an area, sector, or district of a city with historic and cultural characteristics, that is, it is a space of social identity (Gravano 2005). It is part of the urban patchwork, an area with spatial, social, and functional attributes. Estebánez (1988) affirmed: "In each neighborhood, there is a process of evolution as it grows as community and it is possible to identify four stages, from the physical neighborhood to the community neighbourhood."[1] The latter is defined as such neighborhood in which people develop a sense of belonging and tend to associate with their neighbors more than with the people living out of it. When the people inhabits in the neighborhoods are international immigrants, the residential concentration is the base of a community conscience; such is a main characteristic. These presences require a consolidated permanence, generally a long-lasting one. In a specific sense, among the migrants' neighborhoods, the ethnic neighborhood outstands as a distinctive mode, which is a clear expression of the community ones. Here, the contributions of Wilson and Portes (1980) about the ethnic enclave must be highlighted, in addition to the hard criticism of R. Waldinger (1993) in relation to the types of ethnic economies linked to neighborhoods of migrants. Furthermore, the closest and most well- known type of neighborhood where an ethnic minority lives, the ghetto, needs to be mention, notion that recovered part of its sense when it was addressed by Loïc Wacquant (2001) in his book *Parias urbanos*: *marginalidad en la ciudad a comienzos del milenio.*

An ethnic neighborhood is made up of an accused concentration of migrants, and it is ruled by the strength of personal, familiar, or social relationships, at the same time, consolidated by the intracommunity chains and networks. Migrants located at the urban space and create an impact in it, going beyond the exclusive area of the members of the chain (Sassone 2000, 2002, 2010). In this way, the social hierarchies established within the chain spread over the localized microcommunities. Gandolfo (1988) indicates that: "the degree of ethnicity, [for the conformation of the ethnic neighborhood]... is a function of social control that the migrant elite exercises over a portion of the urban territory."[2] According to this author, an ethnic neighborhood "... is not a mere physical place where immigrants with a certain regional or national origin prevail but also a social space where the relationships made by the migratory chains keep on reproducing (and modifying)."[3] This is not about a static means; migrants are localized in a new place; they live with others,

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and in this way they see themselves obliged to redefine their social space of belonging as well as to rebuild their territoriality. Like gated communities, migrants' neighborhoods are expressions from the geographic segregation (also called spatial, residential, or urban). It requires the spatial separation of the different social groups in a city or in a geographical area in accordance with ethnical, religious, income differences, etc. Marcuse and van Kempen (2000) uphold that the segregation phenomena is inherent the history of cities, and they show that what is new is their intensity, visibility, and deployment.

6.2.2   Spatiality, Sociability, and Temporality: The Three Dimensions in the Neighborhood Construction

Three dimensions characterize a migrant's neighborhood: the spatiality, the sociability, and the temporality. Such modeling of this process of construction of migrants' neighborhood has certain precedents. Sassone and Mera (2007) studied the two first categories. After the migrants' settlement patterns in the cities, the concentration in neighborhoods in both dimensions, material and symbolic, is noted. The initial explanation responds to the mechanisms of ethnic cohesion that build from daily life. Although for the eyes of any of the inhabitant of the city the concentration in migrants' neighborhoods results evident and even obvious, the systematic analysis of these spatial patterns shows that the concentration sense varies according to appropriation and use of the urban space that migrants make.

Some explanations about the analytical proposal resulted from the comparison of three neighborhoods localized at the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires: Baek-ku neighborhood or Korean neighborhood (Flores neighborhood), the Chinese neighborhood (Belgrano neighborhood), and the Charrua neighborhood, a Bolivian neighborhood (Nueva Pompeya neighborhood).[4] The appropriation of space by migrants is founded in two strategies: one is the replacement of deprived or peripheral neighborhoods and the other is an ex novo settlement. In the analyzed cases, the authors showed that the Koreans and Chinese' pattern of settlement respond to the first strategy, while the Bolivians' one to the second. These two strategies show the kind of dialogue that the communities have with the local society; Chinese and Koreans resort to individual strategies for the access to housing through the intermediary of real estate agents, while Bolivians, resorting to collective decisions, with a strong community commitment, achieve this through public lands, whose access to housing overcome conflicts. These types of appropriation has promoted different ways of vicinity relationships; in one case, it must be negotiated with the already settled, usually Argentinean (Korean and Chinese neighborhoods) in the place, while in the other it is monopolized by the community (Bolivian neighborhood) (Table 6.1).

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[4] The Autonomous City of Buenos Aires' Districts is between parentheses.

Table 6.1 Territoriality and sociability in migrants' neighborhoods

	Territoriality		Sociability	
Neighborhood	**Appropriation of the urban space**	**Urban function**	**Ethnic institutions** (intracommunity relationships)	**Open institutions** (extracommunity relationships)
Charrua	Ex novo community construction	Residential/cultural	Church/media/association	School/health center
Baek-ku	Replacement pattern in peripheric area	Residential/cultural/commercial	Church/associations/school/means of communication	Cultural workshop
Chinese	Replacement pattern in deprived central area	Commercial/cultural	Temples/associations/schools	Restaurants/supermarkets/bazaars/oriental medicine

Source: Sassone and Mera (2007)

Regarding settlement patterns, in all the three cases, the creation of migrants' neighborhoods, identified as such by the same migrants and the local society, is observed. Each neighborhood may be featured according to the function, whether residential, commercial, cultural, or the combination of the three. It has been proved that although ethnicity emerges as a distinctive characteristic of the territoriality migrants build, there are certain variants in which a function outstands the others. In the Korean case, the neighborhood unifies the residential, commercial, and cultural ethnic functions; in the Bolivian neighborhood (Charrua) case, the residential and cultural ethnic functions unify. As for the Chinese neighborhood, it is mainly about cultural and commercial ethnical functions, as well as stores open to Argentines and tourists. This last feature comes from the Chinese neighborhood (Chinatown), a profile of large metropolis in the world like San Francisco, Paris, Sydney, and Toronto, among others. In other words, unlike Charrua or Baek-ku neighborhoods, the Chinese neighborhood uses the cultural difference as a particular consumption brand inside the city.

It has also been observed that while Korean and Bolivian neighborhoods have their own denomination, Charrúa and Baek-ku show the ethnic landscape (by hiding their origin or by demonstration of their identity); the Chinese neighborhood is called "Chinese Neighborhood of Belgrano" by the population of the Chinese community as well as the rest of the city neighbors. The way they call themselves also makes reference to an affective charge that has its origins in a historical process of decades: in the Bolivian case, it is related to the pattern of neighborhood construction and in the Korean case to the way in which it was baptized as Baek-ku (the 107 number bus, which upon arriving, this line took them from shanty towns of Retiro – their first settlement – to that part of Flores neighborhood). Such considerations come from narratives from everyday experiences and are charged with emotions, always transmitted by adults. The Chinese neighborhood seems to be different.

The institutions that comply with the reproduction of the commercial and cultural ethnic functions are the ones that strengthen the mechanisms of social

cohesion of the respective groups. In the Korean case, it is about use and consumption activities from and for Koreans (associations, churches, bars, and restaurants) and, in the Bolivian case, about sociability activities (associations, first-aid facilities, kindergartens, and churches) from and for Bolivians. On the contrary, in the Chinese case, it is possible to see that the cultural functions (Buddhist temples, associations) are from and for Chinese, while in the case of commercial activities, a double orientation can be seen: one inside the community and the other one outside. Such depends on the opening strategy of these communities to the local society from the constructed neighborhoods, notwithstanding the administrative divisions imposed by the local policies.

The neighborhood spatial concentration – in all the three cases – organizes and structures the community life and conditions the ways that the ethnocultural identity adhesion adopt. In Table 6.1, the two dimensions of the construction of an ethnical neighborhood, by means of which it is possible to evidence the ethnic-cultural urban segregation shaped in socio-territorial cohesion mechanisms, have been summarized. Out of the three, the Bolivian and Korean neighborhoods are closer, and the Chinese neighborhood of Belgrano shows channels open to the external society. In the landscape of these neighborhoods, it is possible to explain that socio-territorial cohesion because it is combined the appropriation and use of space with the ways of access to housing and land property, as well as sociability relationships which show visible traits, strengthen by everyday practices that speak of the reproduction of the ethnic identity.

However, there is a third dimension in our own studies: the appropriation of space by migrants in cities and, within this category, the residential patterns, as conformations closely related to temporality. The rhythms of migrant actions are seen at several scales: global, intermediate, and local. It is possible to observe that there are short- term processes, the everyday ones, which combine with long-term processes, the annual ones, as the generational and intergenerational time periods. This issue has also been pointed out, for instance, by García Almirall and Frizzera (2008), who proposed four stages for the process of locating the immigrant in the city: (a) landing, (b) arrival, (c) settlement, and (d) stabilization. A preliminary issue has also been dealt with by us (Sassone 2009a) precisely related with the formation of a neighborhood of migrants. It is possible to identify five stages. As a first stage, we identify the arrival, featured as residential instability, a sense of uncertainty and dependence to networks. The second stage implies spatial strategies of intragroup social cohesion which come into action; there is a fixation in the access to housing (e.g., inhabiting with family, friends, renting alone, or sharing with other migrants) with the appearance of commercial and cultural functions, together with that residential use. This is a key stage as it creates new social relationships in each spatial gathering. In a third stage, the members of the neighborhoods interconnect several ethnic enclave concentrations in the metropolis. A fourth stage refers to the appropriation of public space and institutional practices. For the fifth stage, we identify processes such as migration interchange, with a feedback process with the arrival of newcomers of the same origin, or not, which reveal succession mechanisms. The consequences are new social compositions and newer demographic profiles. All these socio-spatial

behaviors are justified through migration paths, considering residence, which become collective thus, once again, redefining chains and networks. Therefore, the reasons for residential choices are related to the creation and reproduction of urban migration clusters, already started by pioneer migrants.

6.3 Neighborhood of Migrants: Residential Strategies and Ethnocultural Identity

It frequently speaks in the literature about the presence of migrants in the urban re-composition, both in residential or commercial areas or public spaces. Amsterdam, Madrid, Toronto, San Pablo, New York, San Francisco, Los Angeles, Rome, Milan, and London, among others, have neighborhoods of migrants and ethnic commercial centers. There are even public spaces where certain days migrants meet, for example, the Peruvian migrants used to gather every Sunday at the beginning of the year 2000 in one of the streets in Duomo square in Milan (Tagmano 2002), or the sub-saharan men, sellers of different souvenirs arrived at sunset at one of the esplanade at Geneva Port in order to go to their community lodging at the outskirts of the city together, as checked in June 2012.

Although neighborhoods of migrants do not pass unnoticed, they may be made invisible at local political and national levels and do not appear at media, despite having complex and even marginal stories to tell. Only as examples, we mention Paris when in 2005, as well as in approximately 300 cities in France (like in other European ones), there were complaints at public space in some of their neighborhoods, due to lack of employment and access to services, like health and education. Due to the great number of reactions, such demonstrations reached the media, television, and social networks in the web. As we have said, migrants tend to concentrate in neighborhoods where cultural ties of ethnic cohesion are observed and where there are daily rhythms that make them different. The socio-spatial relationships are loaded with other senses, values, and representations. Three cases (all are ex novo settlements) among the great number already found in metropolis and middle-sized cities of Argentina will be dealt with. The first of them is located at the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires: the Charrua neighborhood of Bolivian migrants (already mentioned in the previous point). The second is the El Porvenir neighborhood in the city of Puerto Madryn (Province of Chubut), a Bolivian neighborhood, and the third is the Arrayanes neighborhood in San Carlos de Bariloche, a Chilean neighborhood.[5]

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[5] The Arrayanes neighborhood (San Carlos de Bariloche) was studied by Dr. Brenda Matossian, PhD, in Geography, in her doctorate thesis entitled *Chilean Migration and Urban segregation*: *the case of San Carlos de Bariloche* (Universidad Nacional de Cuyo), which I directed, following my own theoretical-methodological matrix of the first two projects quoted.

6.3.1 "Charrua" Neighborhood: The Bolivian Neighborhood

General San Martín neighborhood or Charrua neighborhood is a neighborhood of Bolivian migrants (the different concentrations of these migrants within the Metropolitan Area of Buenos Aires are called this way), characterized by cultural and residential functions as well as services functions for their members. This, in particular, is recognized as the first Bolivian neighborhoods. Szulik and Valiente (1999) said: "it is the first Bolivian neighborhood or, in other words, the first ghetto in which Bolivian can easily be recognized as a community."[6] It was a slum at first (a shanty town o villa de emergencia as they are known in Argentina), and it was first called Villa Piolín and then Villa 12. As time went by, it was a neighborhood of migrants but above all an ethnic neighborhood (Sassone 2002, 2007a). Their few squares make it possible to observe the creation of a landscape where inhabitants' interaction with the physical space modeled a physiognomy of their own ethnocultural identity. It was and still is the meeting point for all the Bolivian community in Buenos Aires and even Argentina. At mid-2000, 3000 Bolivians and their families with Argentine children resided, according to unpublished official sources.

Charrua neighborhood is situated at the administrative district of Nueva Pompeya, near Villa Soldati district and surrounded by Erezcano Street, Fernández de la Cruz Avenue, Bonorino Street, and the Ferrocarril Metropolitano (former Belgrano) railway crossing. A particular building evolution may be studied in very few squares. The area is about 2.6 ha or 26,000 m^2. The Charrua planning shape is special; although its inhabitants speak of three squares (Bertone de Daguerre 2003, 2005), these are not complete but rather a part together with the surface occupied by the chapel, the school, and the Asociación Vecinal de Fomento General San Martín. All are public spaces.

Going back to history, Villa Piolín was the first name given to this neighborhood in the 1950s. The newcomers settled during the night, hidden and carrying only the few belongings they have, and traced the limits using threads as a territorial appropriation method. After a number of fires and toward long-lasting solutions, much was done among neighbors in order to achieve housing through self-construction under the coordination of Municipal Committee for Housing (Comisión Municipal de la Vivienda), the local government institution of the 1960s. Bolivians built their housing units on Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays, all together, brick by brick. The construction was finished approximately in 1968, and so they went on with the distribution of housing units by draw. The housing planning was based on single-family units, distributed in 18 interior corridors. The assignment required several years, and the allotment was finished in 1992 when all the housings were allotted. Laumonier et al. (1983, p. 24) pointed out that buildings were planned in two floors, but in the first years most only had one. Later, the housing units started to increase in size "upward" in order to overcome lack of

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space, therefore making the narrow corridors darker. For 20 years, there have been apartments with up to four floors. Although the external appearances have improved, the neighborhood has kept the look of a construction site for a number of years (Sassone 2002, 2007a).

In 1981 School n° 13 Presbítero Alberti was inaugurated, which used to be a parcel called by inhabitants "the canchita" (neighbors used to meet every Saturday so as to play football). As to the neighborhood committee (Asociación Vecinal de Fomento General San Martín), it was funded in 1989, and it is one of the first ethnic associations of Argentina, created by Bolivians from the neighborhood. The daily activity in the streets is very intense. A fair situated at Charrua Street in front of the chapel, the school, and the association is opened every Saturday; for a number of years, the fair's administrator was one of the first inhabitants of Charrua, who was also president of the committee mentioned. It starts very early, and in the middle of the morning, a lot of people, mainly from the neighborhood, move around; hardly nobody can walk among stands. It is a fair from Bolivians to Bolivians. Meal smells remind them those of traditional foods from the Andean countries, and they are sold to passersby.

The neighborhood strong sense of belonging was celebrated at the Copacabana Virgin Festivity in October 1975 (other sources speak of 1972) when the statue of that Marian devotion, venerated in Bolivia, was brought to Argentina and to the neighborhood and the festivity, like the ones in Bolivia, was given (Laumonier 1990; Sassone 2002, 2007b, 2009b). As Vargas (2002), a Bolivian leader, points out, "this place in the city of Buenos Aires is the reference for the Bolivian community... due to the inevitable relationship with the festivity, which is a part of their community identity. The celebration of the Lady of Copacabana is the most important and significant event for the Bolivian residents in the county."[7] It calls thousands of people of the Bolivian community in Argentina and in particular in Buenos Aires city. Today it is included in the official calendar of festivities in the city government, at the official program called "Buenos Aires Celebra."[8]

6.3.2 "El Porvenir" Neighborhood in Puerto Madryn City: A Bolivian Neighborhood

Puerto Madryn is a middle-sized city in the Province of Chubut, in the region of Patagonia. Its importance lies in: (a) being the closest entry to Península Valdés, an international tourist attraction center and (b) its industrial activity, linked to heavy industry with the production of aluminum and to the fishing industry, both projected to the international market (Sassone et al. 2013). Such activities hold a migratory issue, which does not often spread when defining the city profile. As to

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[7] Special translation for this chapter

[8] See: http://www.buenosaires.gob.ar/derechoshumanos/colectividades/buenosairescelebra

demographic growth, Puerto Madryn is one of the most dynamic cities in Argentina and the third out of the five most important in the Province of Chubut (after Comodoro Rivadavia, Trelew and followed by Rawson and Esquel). Its population was nearly 90,000 people (2010) with a population growth rate of 4 % (2001–2010). Nearly 50 % of its population was not born in the province, and this city is one example of migration diversity (Sassone et al. 2011). The 7 % of its *population is foreigners and comprises* the 3 % of Bolivians, the 2 % of Chileans, and another 2 % of other origins. Concerning Bolivian migration, Puerto Madryn is the city with the greatest participation of population of that origin: 38 %, exceeding the Chilean (34 %). These migrants were attracted by the demand for labor in construction industry, economic niche dominated, at a national level, particularly by them as well as the Paraguayans. In the case of the Bolivians, their arrival was linked to the installation of aluminum company Aluar Aluminio Argentino S.A.I.C. in the 1970s and then with the enlargement in the middle of 2000 (Sassone et al. 2012).

Puerto Madryn's urban structure reveals the existence of three different sectors considering socio-spatial division: (a) the industrial port city, (b) the "window to the world" city, and (c) the popular city, all of them living together. One of the oldest Bolivian neighborhoods in the Argentine cities, without considering Buenos Aires and San Salvador de Jujuy (where Mariano Moreno neighborhood has been the proper of the Bolivian migration, pursuant Sassone 1984, p. 22) is situated there. Such neighborhood is El Porvenir. The "popular city" – the other Madryn, the city of the suburbs – is characterized by unpaved streets, with no trees and no sewer and flooded, with a difficult topography. The sector is situated toward the West where there is a strong urban growth; neighborhoods formed from the interaction of national housing policies, provincial policies, and the local urban planning predominate. At first, they were illegal settlements, and, then, thanks to the municipal social parceling, inhabitants, including migrants, were encouraged to build their houses by means of self-building practices. This pattern is expanded, and, thus, migrants achieve to have their own houses. In this way, the fact is that migration influences in the cultural diversity of the city, and spatial fragmentation is verified. Such part of the city kept growing uncontrollably and to a great extent due to the strong demand for workforce in the construction sector like in other services, all of which encouraged the arrival of more internal and international migrants, particularly of Bolivian and even Paraguayan origins. Such population increase was not accompanied by governmental housing planning (whether municipal, provincial, or national); thus, access to the urban land market turned a serious problem to be solved.

The first inhabitants of neighborhood "El Porvenir" came from the first informal settlement in Puerto Madryn, called "Loma Blanca" and formed in 1973, near the current city bus station. At the micro-local scale, square dispositions resemble the ones in Charrua neighborhood; they are rectangular squares with narrow passages as streets. The neighborhood is organized on two axes: the street Roberto Gómez and Juan XXXIII Avenue. That avenue truly separates more than joins although neighbors walk within the area. This neighborhood is the main focus of attention to Bolivians. It is a residential sector with a different physiognomy, compared with the

adjacent neighborhoods, and only nearby shops, mostly in charge of Bolivian owners, can be found. They are Bolivian shops for Bolivians, and this is seen especially when Bolivian names and place names predominate in notices (kantuta, the Bolivian national flower; or Copacabana, in relation to the devotion of Lady Copacabana, Bolivia's patron saint, whose temple is in the city of equal name, near La Paz in Bolivia; or Urkupiña, to the devotion of Lady Urkupiña, patron saint of the Department of Copacabana, in Bolivia, etc.). It is striking that the buildings have extended "upward" due to lack of lot surface, like the Charrua neighborhood case in Buenos Aires (Sassone 2002; Bertone de Daguerre 2003, 2005; Sassone et al. 2012). The increase in Bolivian migration has encouraged other ethnic concentrations of that origin in other nearby periphery neighborhoods like Pujol II, V.E.P.A.M., CO.DE.PRO., and "21 de enero" (ex Pujol I) at the same city.

"El Porvenir" has become the place of reference for the local Bolivian community in particular due to the festivities for the Lady of Copacabana and the Lady of Urkupiña, which sequentially take place during the month of August every year since the mid-1980s. Both celebrations go beyond the neighborhood space since rehearsals include community members living in others (Sassone and Hughes 2009). During the weeks, before the festivities, members of the fraternities rehearse diverse Bolivian dances in the street or in neighborhood assemblies or in houses in other neighborhoods (e.g., Puyol II). Furthermore, celebrations gather Bolivians settled in the nearby cities of Trelew and Gaiman and the horticultural producers from the Lower Valley of Chubut River. Dancing and musical groups from Comodoro Rivadavia, Caleta Olivia (Province of Santa Cruz), and Sierra Grande (Province of Río Negro) also participate. This neighborhood is recognized as a Bolivian "place," not only due to the greatest presence of that origin since its own creation but also due to the visibility the community obtains when that public space is used every year as of the popular religious expressions. We would be in the presence of a socio-religious structure, whose study "allows the understanding of organization, characterization and differentiation of the places, taken as experience-based spaces full of sense and significance" (Campos and Santarelli 2007, p. 134).[9]

6.3.3 Arrayanes Neighborhood in San Carlos de Bariloche: A Chilean Neighborhood

San Carlos de Bariloche is one of the main centers of population attraction, among the intermediate cities of the Patagonia. It is located at the edge of the Nahuel Huapi Lake, in the Province of Río Negro, very near to the boundary with Chile. The year 1902 is considered by the official history the city's foundation year, when the agricultural-shepherding Colony Nahuel Huapi was organized. Since the middle of the XIX century, during several decades, economic and social activities in the

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region were linked to Puerto Montt and city's businessmen of Germany, Italy as well as of other origins. Since 1947, Argentinien population has increased: from a little more than 6,000 people in that year to 50,000 in 1980 and to 77,600 in 1991, with population growth rate ranging between 44 and 58 per 1000. According to 2010 census, there are more than 110,000 inhabitants (Matossian 2011).

The city's development has been accompanied by the Chilean presence, even when it was only an incipient village. There are 9 % of Chileans' residents there, considering the total population; that percentage represents 80 % of the international migrants in the city. Argentineans born in other provinces, both of rural and urban origin, are added. All together they contribute to the target of heterogeneous demographic, social, and cultural structure of San Carlos de Bariloche. Like in other Patagonian cities, the presence of Argentineans is manifested at the debate among the identities VYQ (from Spanish "venidos y quedados": arrived and stayed) or NYC (from Spanish "nacidos y criados": born and raised). Particularly, this city is distinguished by both its national and international tourism, thanks to location at the Patagonic Andes and the forest and the lakes, specially the Nahuel Huapi Lake. The surrounding is dominated by natural beautiful landscapes, in addition to topography and seasonal changes, which encourage both winter mountain sports as well as adventure ones.

However, it must be recognized the existence of a complex urban variety giving room to several "cities" living together. The first frequent division coincides with the installed idea of the "Bariloche's double faces": one overlooking the lake and enjoying the best environmental and socio-economic conditions, strictly related to tourism and the other one back toward the lake, with a population living in unfavorable conditions and even in some cases of extreme marginality. This idea has contributed to harmonize differences in a city that has grown fast (Matossian 2010). Chilean migrants' concentration in certain neighborhoods within periphery sectors of the city, linked to a process of greater urban segregation, also constitutes one of those marks (Matossian 2007), one of which being Arrayanes neighborhood. The origin of these neighborhoods has been defined by the interaction of the different elements in the complex urban expansion, influenced by urban land market, housing practices, and planning public policies and demographic growth, among others.

Arrayanes neighborhood is one of the popular ones in "El Alto," comprising the Southern and Southeastern neighborhoods situated at the moraines 800 m above sea level. "El Alto" is known as the city of marginality, and its name is loaded with a certain degree of discrimination. The municipal government recognized this neighborhood, through Resolution 138-C-86, despite the fact that at those years the neighborhood already had its history (Matossian 2011). Toward the end of the year 1979, the municipal government decided to relocate population of the so-called Ceferino and Nahuel neighborhoods, the latter being close to the lake (Duran unpublished, c. 1982) by force. The replacement was made, and in the first years the sector was called "New Neighborhood." Some authors explain this process and affirm that forced eradication was made "using aesthetic political reasons" (Nuñez 2007, p. 14). Then months after relocation, other Chilean migrants

settled irregularly surrounding the first core. Afterward, such lands were transferred to the local government by the province, and the subdivision was declared of social interest. The neighbors did a great deal to get the regular possession of the lots: in 1986 the application was submitted at the provincial government, and 2 years later precarious allotment was achieved. With it, neighbors, mainly Chilean or their Argentinean sons, started paying for their lots as contemplated in a contract, establishing 125 quotes in total (Matossian 2011).

In its origins, Arrayanes lacked public services; the accessibility conditions were difficult, and the fact of being far away from commercial, educational, and health centers increased isolation even more. Sanitary conditions were deploring; nearly there were rubbish dumps, and then the same inhabitants, the Chileans, readapted them. Also, there were physical barriers such as the high edge of Ñireco stream and a quarry toward the Southwest. In addition, the cemetery has always been a barrier, with a negative impact as shown in the migrants' narratives (Matossian 2011). The habitat has been conditioned by all these situations, especially as to accessibility and intra-urban mobility. In the face of all these difficulties, the neighbors gathered in an attempt to solve their main problems. With the return of democracy, the "Juntas Vecinales" (neighborhood committees) were consolidated. Chileans comprised the first boards of the Arrayanes neighborhood. Thanks to their performance, the neighbors achieve the installation of a sports campus, the construction of a committee house, the local health service center, the incorporation of a bus line, as well as the public lightning, the improvement of pavement and the water services. All these have been positive collective actions for the community in a context of several hardships. Their own local committee fostered the fact that Chilean migrants could keep their original culture, through the celebration of their patriotic holidays, like the Ramada on September 18. The neighborhood is the "place" to which they belong and with which they identify.

6.4 Final Reflections

International immigration has expanded disproportionately, in both traditional and emerging receiving nations and their cities. We know the most impoverished migrations tend to become visible due to their residential patterns in depressed central areas or in the suburbs of the urban peripheries, and, in turn, they have access to the labor market formal and informally. At the residential spaces, international migrants are actors and agents of territorial transformations (in the sense that they make them and cause them, respectively). Understanding those processes requires immersing in both micro-spatial and micro-social dimensions and in this chapter the mechanisms of the appropriation of space of the migrants in order to form neighborhoods are shown.

They arrive, look for strategies to acquire housing, help themselves, and seek residential stability. Every neighborhood has been and still is the privileged geographical frame for the social analysis of the city due to its identity and social

integration, as place of growth, interaction, and belonging. The birth and organization of certain neighborhoods have Bolivian and Chilean migrants as outstanding actors in several Argentine cities and towns; their informal networks of nationals and relatives are functional tools to the spatial concentrations. The strength of the cultural identity guides and models the ways of living. The migrants form neighborhoods where ordered and/or planed urbanization had not taken place. In migrants' neighborhoods, practices and uses are identified, and neighborhood representations are formed through everyday life. In such dimension, political, cultural, historical, economic, and personal circumstances are mixed, which place migrants as subjects with their own behaviors of the identity reproduction.

Inside the neighborhood, migrants feel comforted, in a place, in their place, in which they move with trust, familiarity, and safety, showing relationships of vicinity, within their ethnocultural identity. These same neighborhoods determine the process of identity construction of the group in a particular way. For example, stores, churches, ethnic associations, sports sites, and the public spaces, which are under their own control day by day. All these elements become ways of appropriation of space, which reinforces the consolidation of their cultural identities as immigrants.

There are evidences of the same process of gestation, as migrants' residential choices are accompanied by logics for the access to housing, the relationships with employment, and the conditions of daily travel and accessibility, both toward and out of their residences. They contribute with the building process of the neighborhood because there is a strong sense of solidarity intracommunitary. Otherwise, it is possible to recognize that the same group shows social, economic, and associative strategies between them and claim to the local governments for their building needs. That social and territorial cohesion are related to the transnationalism relationships, which imply the new profile of the postmodern migrant that reacts to the dynamic of globalization with high flexibility and shape the landscape of the city.

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Chapter 7
The Integration of Immigrants in France: Economic and Geographical Approach

Yann Richard, Mathilde Maurel, and William Berthomière

Abstract Integration is a key issue in the literature about migration. It refers to a set of public policies aiming at integrating foreign populations in a given society. This paper aims at investigating the relationships between the integration of four communities installed in France (Algerian, Portuguese, Turkish and Vietnamese) and the presence of associations. The methodology is rooted on two approaches, quantitative economics and geography. It uses a new database, extracted from the *Official Journal* and several surveys, noticeably TeO. In a first step, we ask whether the regional distribution and the density of associations explain the degree of integration of the migrants stemming from the four communities. In a second step, we test whether memberships into an association increase or decrease the adoption of oppositional identities and if the latter influences the integration via the access to employment.

Keywords France • Immigration • Integration • Applied economics • Geographical approach

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7.1 Introduction

The subject of integration is a major thrust of the research literature on immigration. The term was used for the first time in France by public authorities in 1974, when labour immigration was halted and family reunification (spouses and minor children) was introduced. It refers to a set of policies that governments implement to correctly insert populations, be they immigrant or not, into a given society. The goal is assimilation into mainstream society. According to the Chicago School and Emile Durkheim, integration also refers to the process by which an individual or group of individuals slowly find a place in society. It begins at the economic level, with access to employment, and continues with learning of the norms that govern the society. This learning principally takes place within the family or at school.

Sociological studies on integration involve a number of debates. For some authors the process is not linear: in many cases integration through norm and value learning does not translate into upward social mobility; occasionally, upward mobility (a sign of economic integration) is achieved without cultural integration (Safi 2006). Furthermore, integration takes different forms depending on the country: integration contracts (France, Switzerland and Austria), mandatory language classes for newcomers (Germany and France) and tests upon arrival (Netherlands, Great Britain, Estonia, Denmark, Germany, etc.). In some countries integration is combined with openness to cultural particularities: for example, for a time the United Kingdom practised multiculturalism by promoting ethnic minority representation in public sector employment and by funding associations promoting interethnic relations; the Netherlands is home to faith-based community institutions funded, inter alia, by the state.[1]

Mohand Khellil (Sociologie de l'intégration – the sociology of integration) defines integration as follows: "a fairly long process whereby one or several individuals living in a by definition foreign society express willingness to participate in the construction of the national identity of this society, which take a series of economic and social measures targeting them to help attain this objective". When the notion is applied to a country's entire population, and not just immigrants, it is referred to as "socialisation". The process involves the action of two actors: the host country (e.g. through public policies) and the person or the group who integrate by travelling a certain distance. Integration must be distinguished from assimilation, which is predicated on the physical and cultural severing of relations with the home country.

This article focuses on France, which has long served as a model of assimilation into the so-called French melting pot (Noiriel 1988). This idea of a melting pot has been thoroughly debated (Brubaker 2001; Amiraux and Simon 2006), and many public policies show that governments have adopted a much broader vision of migration issues since the 2000s, taking into account the Muslim population,

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[1] The June 2009 issue of the journal *Sciences Humaines* includes a chart of European pathways to integration.

for example, to fight against ethnic discrimination. However, it is the Jacobin approach that continues to prevail (Beauchemin et al. 2011), against the backdrop of the idea that integration involves severing ties with the country of origin and ties with the immigrant population from the same community.

Our objective is to study potential relationships between the integration of people from four communities and the existence of associations by crosscutting a geographical approach and an economic approach. We would like to know whether or not there is a contradiction between integration and the membership in associations. Does maintaining ties with the country of origin and its community through community organisations prevent integration? To contribute to the discussion on this issue and provide answers, we propose to compare the integration of members of four communities (Algerian, Portuguese, Turkish and Vietnamese) residing in France against the density of association networks. We deliberately chose this sample of communities because they have very different characteristics in terms of size, length of presence, rate of entry, etc.

First, we will present the methodology applied and the sources used (mainly the *Official Journal* and TeO survey), after reviewing existing research on the link between integration and association networks. Next, we will show the geography of the community associations linked to the four selected population groups (Algerian, Portuguese, Turkish and Vietnamese associations). We will seek to determine whether there is a relationship between the geography of association availability and the geography of these populations' performance with regard to integration, by comparing different regions of metropolitan France. In the second part, we will observe what we call the density of association availability (the number of associations for the four considered groups in each region), and we will only consider community associations, that is, ones that are exclusively tied to first-generation Algerian, Portuguese, Turkish and Vietnamese immigrants. In the third part, the observed variable will be different: the focus will be the four community members' tendency to be members of associations, be they community associations or not. By using several models, we will seek to determine whether being a member of one or several associations strengthens immigrants' adherence to values that conflict with the cultural model of the host country (in this case, France) and whether this at least indirectly impacts their integration through access to employment.

7.2   Immigration, Integration and Association Networks: The State of the Art and the Sources

Wanting to explore the link between the integration of foreign populations and of their descendants and association dynamism may seem self-evident. However, the available data are scarce, and, more generally, it remains very difficult to access the information. At the same time, and in the spirit of the relationship that France has developed with foreign immigration, a refusal to include the integration problematic within the framework of community rhetoric – unlike Anglo-American approaches –

has shifted this issue to the fields of urban policy or specific educational policy (such as ZEP) studies, where the issue of social integration became more pressing due to the concentration of immigrant populations (Schnapper 2007, p. 204).

The dialectic linking association practices and integration was thus further complicated, not least because of state action. Successive French governments since the 1980s have continually created, reconfigured or redefined the public framework for the political priority that integration has become. The multiplicity of initiatives undertaken and the variety of responses to them have contributed to defining the notion of integration. At the beginning of the 1990s, this dynamic led Dominique Schnapper to capture its spirit by describing integration as "the process by which individuals participate in community life through professional activity, learning of consumption norms, adoption of family and social behaviour, and building relationships with others" (1992, p. 18). More recently, Serge Paugam noted that this notion cannot be reduced to the issue of immigration and that "the explanation to integration problems is no longer only sought in immigrant populations' inherent difficulties with prevailing norms in the host country, but also in the functioning – or, rather, malfunctioning – of the institutions expected to enable integration" (2014, p. 5).[2]

This article builds on knowledge of integration processes by making association structure the focus of the discussion and observing it from both a spatial and thematic perspective. Building on data provided by the *Official Journal*, this involves embracing – as Marie Poinsot (2000, p. 49) suggested – a functional approach in which the associations' areas of activity are used to provide insight into the shared dynamics of the four groups being studied, as well as the specificity of their action and involvement, especially at the regional level. In addition to this spatial reading, this research casts new light on association dynamics through the lens of the values and identity choices that drive them based on findings from the TeO survey (Trajectories and Origins), the first proper major study in France on the impact of origins on living conditions and social trajectories. In this respect, the conclusions provided on the decisive nature of adherence to oppositional values and identity choices echo the reflections made at the end of the 1990s by D. Baillet, who distinguished between societies' associations and associations with a community dimension called communalist (2000, p. 56). Thus, the research challenge is considerable, even if we know that any attempt to categorise immigration situations is inherently flawed due to the fact, as Jocelyne Streiff-Fénart put it, that "assessment of the values of immigrants depends on the perspective from which they are considered; and this perspective is in large part shaped by national conceptions of immigration and of the relationship to foreigners, as well as by institutional arrangements drawing on these conceptions, and the public policies that implement them" (Streiff-Fénart 2000, p. 854).

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[2] It should be noted that D. Schnapper offered this perspective in the context of writing "public policies can only aim to integrate all populations through citizenship and participation in economic activity, complemented by the protection of the welfare state. No democratic government would contemplate an exclusionary policy. It is therefore the terms of these policies that should be analysed" (2007, p. 203).

7.2.1 The Association Movement and Immigration: A Slow Process Towards Equal Rights

In an article published on the occasion of the centennial of the Waldeck-Rousseau law of 1 July 1901 on the freedom of association, François Boitard noted that France and associations "have always had fraught relationships, veering between freedom and control, especially when foreigners are involved" (2001, p. 5). The law of 1901, which enacted the freedom of association in France, was indeed the result of a slow process (comparison to Great Britain, which authorised it beginning in the seventeenth century) in which the events of 1789 compounded the feeling of distrust towards potentially conspiring collective dynamics. Nevertheless, its culmination – the law of 1901 – did not place any restrictions on the association activities of foreigners. It was not until the decree-law of 12 April 1939 that this freedom was removed from foreigners, and it would be over 40 years before François Mitterand's government repealed the law, on 9 October 1981 (Belorgey 2000; Boitard 2001). While prohibited by law, political events in some of the countries of origin of foreigners residing in France have always resulted in forms of mobilisation and groupings by nationality. In his work, Antoine Dumont (2010, p. 128) mentions the example of Italians who were active in antifascist movements during the interwar period and that of the Etoile Nord-Africaine (North African Star), an Algerian association involved in Algerian independence movements that was founded in Paris in 1926.

It is not until the 1980s and the shift from temporary emigration to a phase of immigrant settlement that the problematic of the associational life of migrants and their descendants became a research subject. The dysfunction of the institutions that were supposed to enable their integration (to use Serge Paugram's terms) had to become part of public debate (e.g. the "Marche des beurs – walk of the French Arabs" in 1983) for research to obtain state funding. While there is no space here to delve into the gradual interweaving of integration and urban policy issues or the emergence of the identity issue and the trans-nationalisation of mobilizations and feelings of belonging[3], it should be noted that this development was not unique to France.

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[3] These notions echo the problematic of nationality defined by Benedict Anderson. As Antoine Dumont notes, "rather than abandon the idea of associational ethnicity, it should be rebuilt on what is the foundation of many migrant associations, that is, their attachment to their national origin and their feeling of national belonging. This is the feeling that Benedict Anderson calls "nationness", in contrast to nationality: the latter grants access to political rights, while the former describes the feeling of belonging to a "national community" defined by a history, a culture, a religion and a language" (Anderson 1991). "This distinction makes it easier to understand that possession of the nationality of a state is not always accompanied by a feeling of belonging to the nation represented by this state" (2010, p. 128). Still according to Antoine Dumont, to be grasped, associational nationness requires "not only combining theories of nationality and of ethnicity, but also taking into account the fact that this nationness is expressed from a distance, from a state other than that to which this nationness is tied" (2010, p. 128).

Whether or not public policies embraced a community-based approach, most states converged towards the same questioning of association ambivalence (Cattacin 2007).

The political, economic and identity effects stemming from the multidimensional nature of the association problematic have been explored in France. But it is especially at the local level that research has been able to explore variation in the association dynamic. In 1997, the journal *Migrations Etudes* focused one of its syntheses on this level of analysis and emphasised that "despite the many dysfunctions analysed, what shaped the study was identification of the significant integrating role played by associations as active components of local sociability. By drawing on the lived world of neighbourhood residents and on community organization of everyday life, the associations help maintain a social link and create a civil link that could be seen as a means for these under-integrated populations to "strike" upon a local and participatory citizenship. These associations may fall short of civic involvement in public affairs, and of a vision of social proximity as a civic matter or anti-establishment matter, but the idea is to see how they reconstruct, in a somewhat humble and invisible way, a "civil community" where ordinary reciprocal rights between individuals are reconstituted in daily human interactions" (Eme and Neyrand 1997, p. 2).

The associative process is thus driven by a dynamic of "working together" that is also expressed in community choices characterised by a wish for social segregation. To use the expression of M.-A. Hily and M. Poinard in relation to the Portuguese association movement, the objective is to explore the "dynamic density" of the association movement to help outline the moral relations developed by individuals in Durkheim's meaning of the term, according to these authors: "that is, individuals who not only trade services or compete with each other but also live in common" (1985, p. 25).

With over 1.3 million associations in France (over half of which are devoted to sports and culture), it is very difficult to have a sufficiently detailed reading to grasp the range of conditions for association processes in the context of migration. However, various elements allow for the development of a sufficiently stable methodological basis to understand the phenomenon spatially.

Due to the lack of reliable data on the number of associations involved in migration, we are not able to measure the density of the association phenomenon, but one of the last reports produced by the Haut Conseil à l'Intégration (High Council for Integration) called "investing in associations to succeed with integration" estimated that at the beginning of the 2000s, only 1,300 associations remained partners of the state in the area of integration, in addition to "9,000 associations funded by the agence nationale pour la cohésion sociale et l'égalité des chances (ACSE – National Agency for Social Cohesion and Equal Opportunity) and the secrétariat général du comité interministériel des villes (SG-CIV – General Secretariat of the Inter-ministerial Committee on Cities) in the context of urban policy".[4]

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[4] Quote extracted from the High Council on Integration's opinion (p. 13) called "investing in associations to succeed with integration" (2012, p. 82).

7.2.2 From Referencing to the Survey or the TeO "Evolution"

Listing the associations was one of the first steps in this article's methodology. France offers direct access to the *Official Journal*, where associations recognised under the law of 1901 are referenced (see Fig. 7.1).

We were therefore able to explore this database and extract data on associations linked to the four countries of origin studied here. The information provided includes the head office location, the date of creation and the objective (see Fig. 7.1). One of the drawbacks is that associations do not always inform the administrative services when they cease to exist. Besides this *Official Journal* list, which allowed us to

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Rappel de vos critères de recherche :

Annonce(s) contenant le ou les mots : marocains

Activité de l'association : DÉFENSE DE DROITS FONDAMENTAUS, ACTIVITÉS CIVIQUES

> Modifier ma recherche

Page 1 / 4   1 2 3 4   Suivant

Association : **ASSOCIATION SOCIO-CULTURELLE DES MAROCAINS DE RENNES (A.S.C.M.R.)**   No d'annonce : **799**
                                                          Paru le : **14/06/2014**

Identification R.N.A. : **W353012997**

No de parution : **20140024**
Département (Région) : **Ille-et-Vilaine (Bretagne)**

Lieu parution : **Déclaration à la préfecture d'Ille-et-Vilaine**
Type d'annonce : **ASSOCIATION/MODIFICATION**

Déclaration à la préfecture d'Ille-et-Vilaine. **ASSOCIATION SOCIO-CULTURELLE DES MAROCAINS DE RENNES (A.S.C.N.R.).** *Nouvel objet* : promouvoir des activités culturelles et sportives au service de ses adhérents ; soutenir la dynamique sociale de proximité ; lutter contre l'échec scolaire en mettant en place des activités à cet effet ; promouvoir les actions de solidarité avec le Maroc en mettant en place des actions humanitaires et d'entraide ; organiser des sorties ou voyages en France ou à l'étranger pour ses adhérents ; mettre en place des ateliers de santé et sportives. Siège social : Appt 35, 2, square des Hautes Ourmes, 35200 Rennes. *Date de la déclaration* : 3 juin 2014.

Fig. 7.1 An example of data sheet in the *Journal Officiel (Journal Officiel de la République française)*

gather over 4,350 associations, we used a survey called "Trajectoires et Origines. Enquête sur la diversité des populations en France" (TeO survey – Trajectories and Origins. Survey on population diversity in France). This is the first major survey to be conducted with the goal of enlightening the French political class on population diversity as well as discrimination and inequality issues. The combination of these two sources forms the body of work that allowed us to pursue a double interpretation of the association process: an original geographical interpretation for the four groups studied and an effort to highlight the specificities of the integration process in light of association availability.

The TeO survey aims to identify the impact of origin on living conditions and social trajectories, while considering other socio-demographic characteristics, including the social environment, neighbourhood, age, generation, gender, and level of education.

Integration and discrimination issues play an important role in public debates. Yet France still lacks national statistics that would allow for study of these phenomena. The TeO survey was created to close these gaps. TeO covers all the populations living in metropolitan France, their current living conditions and their journeys. However, the survey is particularly interested in populations who might encounter obstacles in their trajectories due to their origin or physical appearance (immigrants, people from the DOMs and their descendants). The TeO survey was jointly conducted by INED and INSEE. It was rigorously monitored by organizations in charge of public statistics (CNIS; CNIL). It strictly respects the rights of respondents: people were interviewed voluntarily and anonymously. The gathering (from 22,000 respondents in metropolitan France) took place between September 2008 and February 2009 (http://teo.site.ined.fr/)

7.3 The Geography of Association Availability in France for Four Communities

7.3.1 Different Association Geographies Depending on the Group

The association geographies of the four considered population groups share several characteristics. Paris and the Ile-de-France region are by and large the locations with the largest concentration of associations (Fig. 7.2), with high primacy indexes (share of the region with the highest concentration in the national total) for associations related to Algeria and Vietnam (Table 7.1). By contrast, the associational network is relatively weaker in the swath stretching from the northeast of France to the Massif Central, to Brittany, to the north-eastern part of the great Paris basin (Normandy, Picardy, Champagne-Ardenne) and to Corsica, that is, in the areas where population densities are on average lower. However, there are differences among the population groups:

Fig. 7.2 Spatial associations of immigrants in France (Source: Official Journal of the French Republic, 2013)

Table 7.1 The associations associated with the four communities

Group	Algerians	Portuguese	Turkish	Vietnamese
Associations in Ile-de-France	497	273	143	318
Associations in France	1205	712	482	763
Ile-de-France (share)	41 %	22 %	29 %	41 %

Source: Official Journal of the French Republic, 2013; authors' calculations

– The associational network related to the Algerian community is mainly concentrated along the Paris-Lyon-Marseille axis (Rhône-Alpes and Provence-Alps-Côte-d'Azur, hereafter PACA), followed by other regions in the south of France (especially Languedoc-Roussillon), Nord-Pas-de-Calais and the Val de Loire (Pays de la Loire region).
– Besides the Ile-de-France region (with 22 % of associations identified in France), the Portuguese associational network is concentrated in the South, especially in Aquitaine and Rhône-Alpes, followed by PACA, Midi-Pyrénées and the Centre region.
– The Turkish associational network has the most mixed geography, with two major areas of concentration (Ile-de-France and Rhône-Alpes). Furthermore, the primacy of the Ile-de-France region is also relatively weak (29 %).
– The geography of Vietnamese associations is different: the major concentrations are in the peripheral regions, from Bretagne to PACA, in contrast to the great Paris basin (regions abutting the Ile-de-France region), the east and the centre of France.

7.4   How Can the Geography of Associations Be Explained?

It is no surprise that the main explanatory variable for the geography of the associational network is the geographical distribution of the Algerian, Portuguese, Turkish and Vietnamese populations. We note a very strong correlation between two variables: on the one hand, the relative weight (in percentage) of each French region in the total population of the four population groups considered and, on the other, the number of associations (all fields combined) registered in each region over the total number for all of France. The Algerian, Portuguese, Turkish and Vietnamese population stocks were collected in the Lili survey (see above): in all cases these stocks by region include foreign or French people residing in France but born in the country of origin. The French-born descendants of these people were not taken into account. Only true immigrants were therefore counted in this survey.

Given the small number of territorial units considered in this study (around twenty French regions), it is not possible to calculate a strong coefficient of determination between the geography of the communities studied (the weight of each region in the total number of people belonging to each community) and the geography of association availability. However, a link probably exists. It is worth noting the remarkable weight of the Ile-de-France region in the distribution of the populations and of the associations concerned.

Even if this region is removed, the geographical correlation remains. We also note that the geographical distribution of Vietnamese associations outside of the region of Ile-de-France does not align with this group's population geography. This can be explained by its extreme concentration in the Ile-de-France region, which brings together 44 % of the community and 41 % of associations. For Turkish associations, the geographical correlation is a lot less clear when the Ile-de-France

and Rhône-Alpes regions are excluded. This means that variables other than the geographical distribution of these two groups' populations play a significant role in the geography of the associational network. However, these variables could not be identified.

The association ratio can greatly vary from one region to the next within a same community. Simply calculating the number of inhabitants per association in the different regions makes this apparent. The lower the number, the higher the association ratio, meaning that the number of associations relative to the number of considered inhabitants is high: for the Algerian community, the number varies from 403 inhabitants per association (Pays de la Loire) to 2,665 (Lorraine); for the Portuguese community, from 317 (Nord-Pas-de-Calais) to 2,152 (Basse-Normandie); for the Turkish community, from 87 to 1,225 and for the Vietnamese, from 15 to 824. Thus, there are major differences across the communities in France (on a national average). The Vietnamese community has the greatest tendency to create associations, with 128 people per association, followed by the Turks (477), the Portuguese (784) and the Algerians (1,029). Moreover, the density of the associational network varies considerably from one region to the next and from one immigrant population to the next. Generally speaking, the regions with the highest number of associations in absolute terms tend not to be those with a high network density (Fig. 7.3), because the targeted populations in these regions tend to be among the largest.

7.4.1 Different Thematic Distributions

The *Official Journal's* database classifies associations into over 20 major areas of activity, which are in turn divided into several dozen subareas. This makes it possible to give a pretty accurate picture of the thematic range of associational networks in all the regions and to note the nuances between the regions. For example, map 3 of Fig. 7.4 represents the number of associations in two areas for the four populations involved: "cultural and artistic" associations and "social intervention" associations (Fig. 7.4). It shows that the ratio between social intervention and cultural activity is not the same from one group to the next: social action clearly dominates for the Algerian group, while the opposite is true for the three other groups.

By classifying associations by area, nuances appear from one group to the next, but several major features can be highlighted:

– Some areas often appear at the top of the ranking: the "culture, artistic activities and cultural practices" area dominates in the Vietnamese (23 %), Portuguese (58 %) and Turkish (30 %) groups; the "social interventions" area dominates in the Algerian group (45 %) but is highly ranked in the other groups too. These two areas also rank among the top two areas for three population groups: Vietnamese, Turkish and Algerian. Associations in the "clubs, affinity groups and mutual

Fig. 7.3 Number of persons per associations in the four communities in France (Source: Official Journal of the French Republic, 2013)

aid groups" or "education, training" areas often rank highly, as do sports associations (10 % of the total for the Portuguese population).

– Conversely, some areas are underrepresented: tourism, the defence of economic interests, employment assistance, religious, philosophical and spiritual associations, justice, etc.

Fig. 7.4 Examples of thematic distribution of associations in France for the four communities (Source: Official Journal of the French Republic, 2013)

– Some associational areas that could theoretically promote the integration of immigrant populations are underrepresented ("defence of economic interests", "employment assistance"). On the other hand, some well-represented associational areas do not, at least in theory, promote integration into the French population and instead foster "self-segregated community" practices

("clubs, affinity groups, mutual aid groups"; "culture, artistic activities, cultural practices").

Finally, the thematic range presents noticeable differences between regions that are not always easy to explain. Observing the data nonetheless enables the identification of several important facts:

– In broad terms, the thematic range is only complete in the Ile-de-France region. This is not surprising given that it is the region with the largest populations from the four groups and with a higher number of associations. Next are Rhône-Alpes and PACA and then the Nord-Pas-de-Calais in some cases (Algerians and Vietnamese).
– The ranking of associations in number can vary significantly by region within a group. For example, the thematic breakdown for associations in the Algerian group shows that the "social intervention" area clearly dominates in all the regions, except in the Limousin (dominated by the "defence of fundamental rights and civic rights" area) and in Corsica (tied with the area of "charitable and humanitarian associations, development aid, development of volunteer work"). For Portuguese associations, the "culture, artistic activities, cultural practices" area clearly dominates in 17 regions (at least 47 % of listed associations),but not in Lorraine, France-Comté and Midi-Pyrénées, where the thematic breakdowns are more balanced.

7.5 Association Availability: An Impact on Economic and Social Integration?

It is widely known that immigrants are worse hit than nationals by unemployment, especially immigrants from non-EU member countries.[5] According to INSEE, the unemployment rate for working immigrants[6] 15 years and older was 16 % (20 % for non-EU immigrants and 8 % for EU immigrants), while it was only 9 % for nonimmigrants. The differences appeared at all skill levels and across all age groups. There were also large variations depending on the country of origin: for immigrants aged 25–64, the unemployment rate was only 7 % for EU nationals, 25 % for Turks, 22 % for North Africans and 19 % for other Africans. Only the acquisition of French nationality was correlated with a considerably lower unemployment rate, which can be explained in several ways: they have resided in France longer; they are better acquainted with the host society; they have had time build a network that can help them find employment.

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[5] "L'insertion professionnelle des immigrés et de leurs descendants en 2010", Inf. Migrations n° 31, DSED, Jan. 2012.

[6] In this part, the considered populations are composed of people born abroad.

In light of INSEE's analyses, we might assume that community association availability is not conducive to contact with the host society but rather strengthens relations within the community and therefore does not have a positive impact on access to employment. This is not exactly what we found from looking at the figures. The completion of simple linear regressions between the absolute number of community associations in the various French regions and the unemployment rate for members of the four communities considered shows that there is actually no correlation, be it positive or negative, between the density of association availability and access or lack of access to employment. For three of the groups taken into account in the INSEE statistics (the Algerians, the Portuguese and the Vietnamese), we compared (i) the unemployment rate and the number of associations and (ii) the unemployment rate and associational density (number of people per association in the regions). The conclusion would be that community associations play neither a positive nor a negative role in the economic integration of communities. However, this method does not yield robust results because the sample size is too small. Comparing the geography of indicators can nonetheless help determine whether their geographical variation across France is superimposable. We reused this methodology for other indicators providing information on the economic and social integration of immigrants: length of job search, level of education and the proportion of owners. The result was the same. No correlation appeared, be it positive or negative.

The absence of results might be attributable to the nature of the highly aggregated data, from which it is impossible to establish a more subtle causality considering the association membership of a particular individual in relation to the probability of having a job, etc. Certain data are inaccessible, which limits the possibility to cross-reference them. For instance, there is not much information on the commitment of the studied groups of population in associations, on the residence time of members of the associations, etc. It would also be very useful to learn more about the political, economic and social context more or less favourable in various regions for the creation of associations, in particular community associations. Going further in this direction requires in-depth field research. Nevertheless, the TeO database provides some means to analyse this causality.

7.6 Association Membership, Adherence to Oppositional Values and Integration Through Employment

Establishing a subtle causality requires the formulation of hypotheses under which obtained results can be interpreted. This third section is devoted to analysing the link between membership in an association, whether or not the association is tied to an immigrant population, and the probability of finding a job. We will use the conceptual framework from the model of adherence to oppositional values developed by Battu and Zenou (2010), to which we have added a hypothesis on the role of associations in individuals' choice of identity. In this part the variable is no longer associational availability, that is, the number of community associations for the four groups considered in each region; rather, it is the tendency of members of

these four communities to belong to associations in general, be they community associations or not.

In theory, associations can play a socially integrating role or, on the contrary, a segregating one. They can reduce the transaction costs between an individual belonging to a minority group and the rest of society and in this case integrate. Or they can tend to draw individuals from the same minority group towards community values, thereby increase the costs of integration, and as a result segregate. In the latter case, individuals reject the dominant group's positions and bear the cost that this rejection involves. Indeed, adherence to oppositional values reduces the likelihood of finding a job. In his analysis of North African organisations in France, Baillet (2001) distinguished between organisations that, by promoting community grouping, widened the gap with the dominant culture and organisations that facilitated their members' integration into this group.

The literature shows that adherence to oppositional values is linked to key economic challenges, such as labour market participation and integration. For example, Berthoud (2000) has shown that the employment of individuals from ethnic minorities in Great Britain depends on identity variables, which are causes of exclusion from employment. Blackaby et al. (1997) suggest that some minority groups prefer to withdraw into their own community, thereby limiting economic opportunities and increasing unemployment. These works assume that integration into the labour market depends on the cultural distance between the job seeker and the country's dominant culture or of identification with the host country's values. Variables such as the level of proficiency in the host country's language, (past) exposure to racist behaviour, harassment, etc. change the choice of identity, which in turn affects the probability of integration into the labour market. The focus here is on a new variable – membership in an association – as a determinant of adherence to oppositional values or choice of identity, in addition to the aforementioned variables.

7.6.1   Econometric Model and Approach

Following the example of Battu and Zenou (2010), who tested the model on British data, we are verifying whether adherence to oppositional values influences the probability of finding employment.

While membership in an association does not directly affect the probability of finding employment,[7] it affects adherence to oppositional values and therefore indirectly (via adherence to oppositional values) affects the probability of finding employment. In the selected communities – Portuguese, Turkish, Algerian and Vietnamese – membership in an association influences variables such as the feeling of being French and of being perceived as French and distrust of French institutions. These variables (Table 7.2) were selected as markers of adherence to oppositional

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[7] The results are not published here due to space constraints but are available.

Table 7.2 List of variables

Employment
Employment counts as one if the individual is in the labour market and has a job
Adherence to oppositional values
Justice = 1 if the individual states having "no" or "little" trust in French justice
Policy = 1 if the individual states having "no" or "little" trust in French policy
Public Services= 1 if the individual states having "no" or "little" trust in French public employment services
School = 1 if the individual states having "no" or "little" trust in French schools
Feeling French = 1 if the individual responds "mostly disagree" or "completely disagree" with the statement: "I feel French"
At home = 1 if the individual responds "mostly disagree" or "completely disagree" with the statement: "I feel at home in France"
Seen as French = 1 if the individual responds "mostly disagree" or "completely disagree" with the statement: "I am seen as French"
Freq. Controls= 1 if the individual responds "often" or "sometimes" (as opposed to "rarely" or "never") to the question: "how often are you asked about your origins"
Association membership
Sports = 0 if the individual is in a sports association
Parent of Student = 0 if the individual is a member of a parent-student association
Solidarity = 0 if the individual is a member of a solidarity and mutual aid association
Defence of Rights = 0 if the individual is a member of an association defending human rights and fighting against racism
Culture = 0 if the individual is a member of a cultural association
Religion = 0 if the individual is a member of a religious association
"Control" variables
Nonmar = 1 if the individual is single
% Neighbourhood = 1 if the individual answers "almost all" or "over half" to the question: "what is the percentage of immigrants living in your neighbourhood"
Immi1 = 1 if the individual's migration status is "immigrant"
Immi2 = 1 if the individual's migration status is "descendant of one or two emigrants" or "descendants of one or two DOM natives"
Immi1c if the status of the individual's current spouse is "immigrant"
Immi2c if the status of the individual's current spouse is "descendant of one or two emigrants" or "descendant of one or two DOM natives"
Controls = 0 if the individual answers "never" to the question: "how often does the police or gendarmerie check your identity"
Racism = 0 if the individual answers "no" to the question: "have you been the target of racist comments or attitudes over your lifetime in France"
Marriageforce = 1 if the individual states not having wanted to get married and being forced to by family pressure
Religious Education= 1 if the individual answers "great importance" to the question: "what was the importance of religion in the education you received"
Fem = 1 if the individual is a woman
Age corresponds to the individual's age
Age of arrival in France corresponds to the age of arrival in France

Table 7.2 (continued)

French proficiency = 1 if proficiency in French is high
Nodipl = 1 if the individual has no degree
Cep = 1 if the individual has a CEP (certificate of primary education) or its foreign equivalent
Brevet = 1 if the individual has a *brevet des collèges* (general certificate of secondary education), the BEPS, *brevet élémentaire* or its foreign equivalent
Capbep = 1 if the individual has a CAP (vocational training certificate), BEP (vocational diploma) or its foreign equivalent
Bac = 1 if the individual has a vocational or technological baccalaureate or an equivalent degree, a general baccalaureate (A, B, C, D, E, ES, L, S series), an advanced certificate, a basic legal qualification, a DAEU (diploma granting access to university studies) or its foreign equivalent
Higheredu = 1 if the individual has a degree that is at least equivalent to BAC + 2

values and therefore of identity choice. By affecting the distance from the dominant cultural group, they alter the probability of finding employment. In an econometric approach, by functioning as instruments, they make it possible to identify the impact of adherence to oppositional values on the probability of finding employment. The influence of associations is therefore indirect: it is not because individuals belong to an association but rather because they see themselves as more French or place greater trust in French institutions and that they have greater chances of finding employment.

The model identifies two steps, formulated as follows:

In the first step (the results are presented in Table 7.3), association membership, which is the explanatory variable of interest, prompts or maintains adherence to oppositional values, depending on the nature and functioning of the associations that the TeO database allows us to consider (see the box below). *Adherence to oppositional values = a2 association membership + b2 controls.*

In the second step (Table 7.4), adherence to oppositional values alters the probability of being employed. *Employment = a1 adherence to oppositional values + b1 controls.*

This two-stage strategy has the advantage of addressing the endogeneity between the choice of an oppositional identity and whether or not the individual is employed. Indeed, being unemployed or not having a job certainly has an impact on the feeling of being French, of being perceived as such, of feeling at home in France and even the trust an individual places in French institutions. Therefore, while adherence to values rejecting French identity might explain integration into the labour market, the reverse is just as true. An individual has a higher chance of feeling well integrated or considering that she/he is perceived as such and of trusting institutions, if she/he is employed. Instead of identifying a causal relationship with potential implications for economic policy advice, we found a simple correlation between two variables expressing or measuring the same thing. The hypothesis on which our methodology is based is that membership in associations reduces oppositional behaviour; in the same way that, conversely, frequent police controls, exposure to racist reactions and cultural practices that are far removed

Table 7.3 Association membership and adherence to oppositional values

Variables	1 Feel French	2 At home	3 Seen as French	4 Freq. Controls	5 Justice	6 Policy	7 Public Services	8 School
Parent of Student[a]	0.252	0.285	0.0124	−0.127	0.441**	−0.174	0.0783	**0.869****
	(0.189)	(0.181)	(0.197)	(0.175)	(0.213)	(0.182)	(0.171)	**(0.416)**
Sports[a]	**0.219***	0.0467	0.102	−0.122	−0.0359	0.210*	−0.0569	**0.474****
	(0.126)	(0.117)	(0.125)	(0.113)	(0.123)	(0.125)	(0.112)	**(0.209)**
Solidarity[a]	−0.0386	0.0372	**−0.377***	0.274	−0.0773	0.0288	0.216	0.169
	(0.178)	(0.175)	**(0.221)**	(0.168)	(0.182)	(0.181)	(0.172)	(0.259)
Defence Rights[a]	−0.0118	−0.439	−0.526	−0.411	0.348	−0.409	−0.0888	−0.340
	(0.351)	(0.367)	(0.479)	(0.357)	(0.395)	(0.354)	(0.341)	(0.399)
Religion[a]	−0.175	−0.107	−0.122	−0.0349	−0.0928	−0.112	0.216	0.351
	(0.162)	(0.173)	(0.202)	(0.158)	(0.172)	(0.171)	(0.164)	(0.266)
Policy[a]	0.173	−0.113	−0.325	−0.305	0.105	0.122	0.189	**−0.826*****
	(0.296)	(0.273)	(0.326)	(0.267)	(0.302)	(0.292)	(0.264)	**(0.293)**
Culture[a]	0.187	0.108	0.175	**0.198***	**0.246***	**0.310****	**0.279****	0.0696
	(0.126)	(0.123)	(0.133)	**(0.117)**	**(0.131)**	**(0.132)**	**(0.118)**	(0.168)
Controls	0.285**	0.141	0.230	0.354***	0.443***	0.914***	0.292**	0.195
	(0.117)	(0.124)	(0.151)	(0.120)	(0.118)	(0.119)	(0.115)	(0.149)
Racism	0.273***	0.156**	0.432***	0.371***	0.390***	0.371***	0.267***	0.412***
	(0.0646)	(0.0659)	(0.0754)	(0.0628)	(0.0651)	(0.0651)	(0.0619)	(0.0817)
Marriageforce	−0.146	−0.0735	0.143	−0.349	0.336	0.175	0.0223	0.132
	(0.286)	(0.296)	(0.346)	(0.272)	(0.280)	(0.287)	(0.275)	(0.356)
Religious Education	−0.0459	0.0309	0.0817	0.0848	0.0409	0.00478	0.0789	−0.0124
	(0.0588)	(0.0604)	(0.0661)	(0.0566)	(0.0608)	(0.0611)	(0.0566)	(0.0781)
Immi1c	0.158**	0.449***	0.320***	0.135*	−0.0202	−0.161**	−0.144**	−0.264***
	(0.0766)	(0.0747)	(0.0807)	(0.0724)	(0.0772)	(0.0772)	(0.0718)	(0.0988)
Immi2c	0.0631	0.394***	0.204*	0.0710	−0.0638	−0.233**	−0.119	−0.369**
	(0.111)	(0.112)	(0.123)	(0.106)	(0.116)	(0.115)	(0.106)	(0.155)
French proficiency	−0.345***	−0.633***	−0.305***	−0.0433	0.0125	−0.0660	−0.0308	−0.145
	(0.0694)	(0.0698)	(0.0776)	(0.0669)	(0.0722)	(0.0729)	(0.0673)	(0.0941)

(continued)

Table 7.3 (continued)

Variables	1 Feel French	2 At home	3 Seen as French	4 Freq. Controls	5 Justice	6 Policy	7 Public Services	8 School
% Neighbourhood	0.171***	0.0579	0.0911	0.0786	0.0402	0.148**	0.0322	0.0757
	(0.0592)	(0.0610)	(0.0670)	(0.0573)	(0.0617)	(0.0618)	(0.0574)	(0.0785)
Fem	−0.0529	0.0958	−0.104	0.0270	0.142**	0.00828	0.170***	0.142*
	(0.0582)	(0.0591)	(0.0637)	(0.0557)	(0.0598)	(0.0600)	(0.0557)	(0.0771)
Age	−0.0188***	−0.0292***	−0.0233***	−0.0180***	0.0111***	0.00650**	0.00387	−0.00389
	(0.00314)	(0.00328)	(0.00358)	(0.00302)	(0.00326)	(0.00326)	(0.00303)	(0.00409)
Nonmar	0.207**	0.241***	0.210**	0.220***	0.147*	0.107	−0.102	−0.0331
	(0.0877)	(0.0868)	(0.0935)	(0.0833)	(0.0880)	(0.0874)	(0.0826)	(0.111)
Age arrival France	0.0209***	0.0229***	0.0218***	0.0222***	−0.00695**	−0.00977***	−0.00551*	0.00753*
	(0.00319)	(0.00325)	(0.00360)	(0.00311)	(0.00337)	(0.00338)	(0.00309)	(0.00420)
Immi1	0.0578	0.243	0.466***	−0.161	0.184	−0.0499	0.00147	−0.368*
	(0.178)	(0.171)	(0.165)	(0.161)	(0.175)	(0.166)	(0.157)	(0.196)
Nodipl	0.0865	0.258**	0.341***	0.168*	0.0123	0.162	−0.0623	0.0688
	(0.102)	(0.105)	(0.111)	(0.0975)	(0.104)	(0.107)	(0.0971)	(0.133)
Capbep	0.218*	0.202*	0.00371	−0.00694	−0.0412	0.160	0.0143	0.0419
	(0.115)	(0.116)	(0.120)	(0.110)	(0.115)	(0.118)	(0.108)	(0.151)
Bac	0.295**	0.157	0.207	−0.0317	−0.180	−0.0434	−0.0327	0.159
	(0.120)	(0.123)	(0.132)	(0.115)	(0.125)	(0.129)	(0.115)	(0.154)
Higheredu	0.359***	0.304***	0.468***	0.197*	−0.221*	0.0826	0.116	−0.00200
	(0.113)	(0.115)	(0.125)	(0.108)	(0.117)	(0.119)	(0.107)	(0.149)
Constant	−1.021*	0.285	1.187*	0.197	−1.988***	−1.331**	−0.664	−1.438*
	(0.592)	(0.181)	(0.693)	(0.566)	(0.627)	(0.591)	(0.549)	(0.787)
Observations	2,36	2,36	2,36	2,36	2,36	2,36	2,36	2,296
LR Chi2	280	493	348	208	138	202	121	107
Prob>Chi2	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Pseudo R2	0.091	0.1558	0.1369	0.0637	0.0510	0.0732	0.0378	0.0689
Unrestricted log likelihood	−1,393	−1,337	−1,099	−1,531	−1,287	−1,281	−1,538	−726

Standard deviation in parentheses

***$p < 0.01$; **$p < 0.05$; *$p < 0.1$

[a] A positive and significant figure (one or several stars, in bold in the table) means that non-participation in associations (the variable takes the value 1) increases mistrust in institutions and diminishes the perception, by one's self or by others, of being French and of feeling at home in France

Table 7.4 Probability of accessing employment

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
At home[a]	−1.100*							
	(0.571)							
Feel French[a]		−1.282						
		(0.834)						
Seen as French[a]			−1.057**					
			(0.512)					
Freq. Controls[a]				−0.457				
				(0.435)				
Justice[a]					−0.806*			
					(0.445)			
Public Services[a]						−1.011*		
						(0.536)		
Policy[a]							−0.794**	
							(0.312)	
School[a]								−0.186
Immi1c	0.103	0.251	0.143	0.0718	0.0468	−0.00322	0.0109	0.0756
	(0.0961)	(0.159)	(0.102)	(0.0941)	(0.0924)	(0.0969)	(0.0938)	(0.100)
Immi2c	0.0378	0.196	0.0843	0.0347	0.0111	−0.0181	−0.0326	0.0483
	(0.129)	(0.170)	(0.132)	(0.129)	(0.129)	(0.130)	(0.131)	(0.141)
% Neighbourhood	−0.247***	−0.287***	−0.283***	−0.299***	−0.301***	−0.300***	−0.272***	−0.322***
	(0.0789)	(0.0728)	(0.0723)	(0.0721)	(0.0712)	(0.0712)	(0.0727)	(0.0723)
French proficiency	−0.228**	−0.367*	−0.172*	−0.101	−0.0902	−0.104	−0.108	−0.0946
	(0.107)	(0.195)	(0.0896)	(0.0820)	(0.0819)	(0.0820)	(0.0820)	(0.0848)
Fem	−0.392***	−0.327***	−0.397***	−0.360***	−0.340***	−0.307***	−0.381***	−0.344***
	(0.0709)	(0.0701)	(0.0711)	(0.0681)	(0.0683)	(0.0722)	(0.0689)	(0.0694)
Age	0.0164***	0.0116	0.0174***	0.0205***	0.0263***	0.0247***	0.0245***	0.0211***
	(0.00533)	(0.00879)	(0.00479)	(0.00486)	(0.00390)	(0.00369)	(0.00368)	(0.00375)

(continued)

Table 7.4 (continued)

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Nonmar	−0.215**	−0.177	−0.228**	−0.255**	−0.249**	−0.324***	−0.257**	−0.269***
	(0.107)	(0.125)	(0.104)	(0.106)	(0.102)	(0.101)	(0.100)	(0.101)
Age of arrival Fr.	−0.0135***	−0.0111	−0.0150***	−0.0172***	−0.0230***	−0.0232***	−0.0236***	−0.0198***
	(0.00519)	(0.00719)	(0.00455)	(0.00487)	(0.00392)	(0.00393)	(0.00388)	(0.00378)
Immi1	0.0669	0.168	0.225	0.0245	0.101	0.0506	0.0295	−0.00848
	(0.203)	(0.217)	(0.220)	(0.204)	(0.204)	(0.203)	(0.204)	(0.211)
Nodipl	0.0729	0.147	0.139	0.0719	0.0483	0.0184	0.0822	0.0643
	(0.113)	(0.130)	(0.121)	(0.115)	(0.112)	(0.114)	(0.113)	(0.113)
Capbep	0.282**	0.280**	0.192	0.198	0.193	0.203	0.241*	0.213
	(0.137)	(0.140)	(0.131)	(0.131)	(0.131)	(0.131)	(0.132)	(0.132)
Bac	0.356**	0.308**	0.304**	0.236*	0.200	0.221	0.231*	0.242*
	(0.148)	(0.143)	(0.140)	(0.137)	(0.139)	(0.137)	(0.137)	(0.139)
Higher education	0.389***	0.386***	0.398***	0.294***	0.208	0.297**	0.276**	0.272**
	(0.142)	(0.150)	(0.142)	(0.130)	(0.131)	(0.128)	(0.127)	(0.128)
								(0.670)
Constant	0.731*	1.142*	0.891*	0.493	0.451	0.915*	0.439	0.417
	(0.432)	(0.673)	(0.470)	(0.418)	(0.373)	(0.497)	(0.366)	(0.401)
Observations	2,36	2,36	2,36	2,36	2,36	2,36	2,36	2,296
LR Chi2	206	205	207	204	206	206	209	185
Prob>Chi2	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Pseudo R2	0.1020	0.1013	0.1022	0.1007	0.1017	0.1019	0.1033	0.0950
Unrest. log likelihood	−909	−910	−909	−911	−909	−909	−908	−884

Standard deviation in parentheses

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$

[a] A negative and significant figure in the employment equation means that adherence to oppositional values diminishes the probability of access to employment

from the dominant practices in France foster this behaviour. Associations promote integration and assimilation, just as other variables (racism, different cultural practices) discourage them. All of these variables appearing in the equation of adherence to oppositional values are instrumental, because they only explain employment through their impact on the construction of an identity rejecting or accepting French society. This hypothesis is bold and certainly debatable. Membership in an association might have a direct impact on the probability of finding employment, because an association might act as a network (Zenou and Battu 2009). We therefore tested the validity of our instruments, and the test results confirm the assumption that the impact of membership in an association on employment is only indirect.

However, these tests are not definitive and our results are only valid within the boundaries of our modelling. The two explained variables – rejection of the dominant culture and probability of finding employment – are dichotomous variables (taking two values: 0 and 1). We therefore estimate two probit models. The equation mobilising the determinants of rejection of the dominant culture, allows for the construction of the rejection of the dominant culture as predicted (or theorised) by the instruments. This prediction is used in the employment equation instead of the different variables we selected to measure adherence to oppositional values: the feeling of being French, the feeling of being perceived as French (feel French, at home, seen as French) and distrust of French institutions (Justice, Policy, Public Services, School).

The results are presented in Tables 7.3 and 7.4. Table 7.3 explains adherence to oppositional values and includes eight columns corresponding to the eight proxies for adherence to these oppositional values (see the box describing the variables used): I feel French; I feel at home in France; I am seen as French; assessment of the justified or excessive nature of controls; level of trust in French justice; level of trust in French policy; level of trust in public services for employment in France; and level of trust in French schools.

Other variables:

– Untimely police or gendarmerie controls (Controls) and acts that respondents characterise as racist towards them (Racism) were significant in almost all cases and deepened the sample of foreigners' distrust towards their host country.
– Cultural practices that are clearly foreign to France, such as forced marriage (Marriageforce), oddly had no impact on variables measuring integration. An education centred on religion (Religious Education) also played no role.
– In contrast, high proficiency in French (French proficiency) promoted integration by reducing adherence to oppositional values. This result is common in the literature (see, e.g., Constant and Zimmerman 2008).
– Living in a neighbourhood where over half of the inhabitants are foreigners (% Neighbourhood) promoted adherence to oppositional values.

– Women (fem), people who came to France young (Age of arrival in France) and single people (Nonmar) were better integrated.
– Finally, the level of education (Nodipl, Cep, Brevet, Capbep, Bac, Higheredu) played a role.

Table 7.4 shows the impact of different proxies for adherence to oppositional values on the probability of finding employment. Irrespective of the marker of adherence to oppositional values (not feeling French, not feeling at home in France, not being perceived as French, not trusting French institutions), the probability of access to employment was significantly reduced.

The other variables had expected effects on the probability of finding employment. Thus:

– The nationality of the spouse or of the latter's parents played no role.
– The proportion of foreigners living in the neighbourhood and proficiency in French had the expected impact (respectively, negative and positive) on the probability of being employed.
– Women, young people and people who are unmarried or who came to France later in life were less employed.
– Finally, education is positively correlated with access to employment.

7.7 Conclusions

Do associations help strengthen the integration of those who suffer from discrimination and who, in some geographic zones, are mostly of foreign origin? Building on the TeO survey, which is extensively used in this article, the High Council for Integration had noted that foreign nationals born abroad and the descendants of immigrants represented over half of the people between the ages of 18 and 50 living in ZUS (*zones urbaines sensibles* – sensitive urban zones). Is it advisable to invest in associations to achieve successful integration? Does France still know how to integrate immigrants? Surveys confirm that an overwhelming majority of French people are open to immigration, on the express condition that immigrants and their children adapt to French values and mores, that is, that they integrate.

There are significant difficulties to working on the integration of immigrants. First, adequate databases are lacking. So we had to do with what existed to try to assess the performance of associations regarding the integration of four immigrant communities that were selected on the basis of representativeness criteria. Thus, the national index of associations that we used in the second part did not include a specific "integration" section. The associations were therefore classified by subject area, such as "defence of fundamental rights, civic activities", "cultural action", "education-training", "social intervention" and still others that might or might not support integration. It is therefore not necessarily alarming to not find a correlation between the density of associations or association's presence on the one hand and indicators of integration into the labour market on the other, given that the objective

of these associations is not to integrate. The TeO database on which the analysis draws in the third part has the same problem, in addition to lacking information on the ethnic or community belonging of the association (its members are part of a foreign community and the association defines itself as such).

A brief overview of the history of immigrant associations in France furthermore shows that the integration of foreign populations, particularly economic integration, has not been a stated objective but rather improved housing for North African families who settle in France, the fight for equality between French people and foreigners or the fight against racism (SOS racism), for example. Our emphasis was integration in terms of access to employment, via the choice of identity, which was assessed in terms of adherence to oppositional values. Our resolutely quantitative approach shows that membership in a noncommunity association influences the choice of identity (by playing a role in the level of adherence to oppositional values) and that the latter affects the probability of finding employment. Individuals have lower chances of finding employment if they do not feel French, do not feel at home in France, are not perceived as French and do not trust French institutions. The choice of identity is also influenced by membership in associations that can serve as social integrators.

These results should obviously be taken with a grain of salt. First, they cannot exactly pinpoint what associations should be funded – associations claiming to be involved in integration or the more professional ones that have a partnership with the state or local communities. They also give no further insight into whether it is preferable to subsidise associations or to pursue the type of policy that has been in place for several years now and has translated into integration policies and urban policy at the national and local levels. However, they do provide context for the past decade's declining number of state-funded associations specifically working to integrate immigrants and their immediate descendants, as grants to these associations fell from 200 million euros in 2000 to 100 million euros in 2010 (High Council for Integration 2012).

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Chapter 8
"Young and Small" Thai Immigration into Czechia: Wives of Czechs Versus Migrant Workers

Daniel Šnajdr and Dušan Drbohlav

Abstract This article tries to thoroughly map Thai immigration into Czechia with an emphasis on the nature of the integration process. It analyzes what has not been studied yet, it uses an important comparative perspective, and, in practical terms, it sheds light on whether there is a spatial and social isolation/exclusion which Czechia should tackle. Four models representing different types of migration and integration of Thais in the Euro-Atlantic area are used as a frame of reference for specifying the main outcomes of the authors' own questionnaire survey (159 Thai respondents, snowball sampling, conducted mainly in Prague, in 2012).

Keywords Czechia • Integration • Questionnaire survey • Thai migrants • Migrants' wives

8.1 Introduction and Goals

The migration of Thai people abroad is a relatively new topic in migration studies. Thais are not a nation of wanderers, and thus it is no surprise that emigration from Thailand was almost unknown some 60 years ago. It began to form only after the WWII. Until then, only a few Thais outside of the diplomatic corps left the country, and when they did, it was for academic reasons or family reasons (Chantavanich 2003). More extensive migration began in the 1960s, but the number of emigrants from Thailand is not significant in comparison to the number of all migrants living outside their countries. New waves of migration, particularly in the 1990s, stirred up the interest of researchers in this topic (Goldstein and Goldstein 1986; Richter et al. 1997). In the European context, many studies of accompanying phenomena of

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the Thai migration have been carried out – prostitution, cross-cultural marriages that are often linked to the "mail-order brides" phenomenon, and remittances (see Piper and Roces 2003; Ratana 2006; Plambech 2007; Suksomboon 2007; Lapanun 2010; Pataya 2011).

Since the Velvet Revolution in 1989, when communism collapsed and a new democracy based on a free market system was established, Czechia has been changing and opening to the world in the last two decades (Drbohlav et al. 2010; 2011). It has quickly become a transit and more and more an immigration rather than an emigration country. The current number of 441,536 legally registered immigrants[1] (4.2 % of the total population) is unrivaled in any other post-communist countries in the region of Central and Eastern Europe (Drbohlav et al. 2010; Okólski 2012).

This article tries to thoroughly map Thai immigration into Czechia with an emphasis on the nature of their integration process. It has the following basic goals:

– Regarding the basic research, the article describes and explains migration and integration processes of a small immigrant group, which has not been analyzed yet. As of December 31, 2013, there were only 790 Thai people with long-term or permanent residence in Czechia (the largest immigrant groups included 105,232 Ukrainians, 90,948 Slovaks, and 57,406 Vietnamese – Ministry 2013). We tried to analyze the issue in an integral way by taking into account both the modalities of movements and the modalities of establishment (Martiniello 2013) in a new Czech society and the ties that the Thai migrants may keep to their mother country.
– More specifically, we chose the way of analysis through which it is also possible to ascertain whether or not there are commonalities or parallels between the case of Thai migrants in Czechia and Thai migrants in other important selected destination countries. Thus, the comparative approach, which is often called for, is applied (see Martiniello 2013 or Vargas-Silva 2012). We also adhere to a "firm belief that comparative work will promote the theoretical development of migration research" (Saharso and Scholten 2013, p. 1). Thus, the article is also partly relevant to the issue of making typologies of migratory movements. As for countries of Central/Eastern Europe (CEE), typologies have so far concerned their own migrants in other destination countries (see, e.g., Engbersen et al. 2014) rather than new immigrants in CEE destination countries.
– What is also worth pointing out is that we analyze the Thai migration and integration to/in Czechia, which is still in a relatively immature stage of development. Hence, our paper makes it possible to follow up in the future with other research activities mapping in detail the character of the integration of Thais in Czechia over time. This is an opportunity that was missed when mapping some other immigrant groups in Czechia.
– As far as the applied research is concerned, the analysis aims to broaden the knowledge while possibly assisting practical tasks of the Czech state as to how to

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[1] Ministry of the Interior of Czechia – data as of December 31, 2013.

prevent the creation of closed immigrant communities, social isolation, and social exclusion of foreigners, how to design integration measures in order to reflect actual needs of foreigners, and also mutual coexistence of immigrants with majority population, as is, indeed, stipulated in the official concept of foreigners' integration of the Czech Republic (see, e.g., Ministry 2011).

The characterization of the main terms, definitions, and concepts used follows the introduction and main goals, together with an account of the present state of Thai migration to the chosen countries. Four models representing different types of migration and integration of Thai people are used as a frame of reference for specifying the main outcomes of a survey. This section is preceded by an introduction to the methods used during the research, and the outcomes themselves are divided into logical blocks providing information about the state of Thai migration to Czechia – the total number of migrants and their distribution by age, gender, education and family status, language knowledge, interaction with the majority population, remittances, inclusion in key institutions of the society, acculturation, and, above all, the destinations and source areas of Thai migration to Czechia. The conclusion summarizes the main outcomes of the research.

8.2   Terms, Definitions, and Concepts Used

We define international migration as the movement of individuals and groups of people between different countries, in our case the movement of people from the Kingdom of Thailand to Czechia. When defining residence status, we use internal statistics of the Alien Police of the Czech Republic, which differentiate between temporary and long-term residence. We consider the residence to be temporary if the visa is for more than 90 days, i.e., the foreigner intends to stay for 90–180 days and long term if the foreigner intends to stay for more than 6 months. The period of stay is considered to be permanent if a person holds a permanent residence permit, which is granted when all the legal conditions are met and the foreigner has been living in Czechia continuously (migrants can usually get this after 5 years of temporary residence).

In the paper, we use the term irregular migrants in harmony with principles recognized by the Council of Europe. As irregular migrants, we consider people who fulfill at least one of the following conditions: (1) migrants who cross borders illegally, (2) migrants who overstay the allowed period of entry or resident permit in the area, (3) migrants who work even though they do not hold a permit or they work in a manner that is inconsistent with their immigration status (see more in Bogusz et al. 2004).

The integration of migrants into the new societies of the target countries is an ambiguous term that is hard to grasp (Bauböck 1994; Heckmann 2006). Various levels of the integration of migrants into the new, target society are conceptualized differently (see, e.g., Bauböck (1994), Barša (1999), Heckmann (2006), and Bolaffi

et al. (2003)). In this article, we use integration as a synonym for a term of social integration. It means a conscious interaction and cooperation of actors (migrants and members of a majority society) (see, e.g., more in Zincone et al. 2006). More specifically, we make use of Heckmann and Schnapper's (2003) concept (which is based on Lockwood's and Esser's concepts – see in Heckmann 2006). Within this social integration framework, integration of migrants into a receiving society should be understood through the aspects of placement, culturation, interaction, and identification.[2] Heckmann and Schnapper (2003) suggested conceptualizing these as structural integration, cultural integration (or acculturation), interactive integration, and identificational integration. They are basic dimensions of integration and have proven to be well apt for operationalization in empirical research and for the development of indicators (Heckmann 2006, p. 10).

- "Structural integration means the acquisition of rights and the access to positions and membership statuses in the core institutions of the immigration society: economy and labor market, education and qualification systems, housing system, welfare state institutions including the health system, and citizenship as membership in the political community" (Heckmann 2006, p. 15).
- Cultural identification has to do with cognitive, behavioral, and attitudinal change of individuals. "Acculturation primarily concerns the immigrants and their descendants, but is an interactive, mutual process that changes the receiving society as well..." (Heckmann 2006, p. 16).
- Acceptance and inclusion of immigrants in the sphere of primary relations and networks of the receiving society – interactive integration – is indicated by peoples' private relations and primary group memberships. Indicators which represent the integrative integration are: social intercourse, friendships, partnerships, marriages, and membership in voluntary organizations (Heckmann 2006).
- Finally, there is inclusion in a new society based on the subjective level, and we can call this identificational integration. It "shows in feelings of belonging to and identification with groups, particularly in forms of ethnic, regional, local and/or national identification, or in sophisticated combinations of these" (Heckmann 2006, p. 17, see also Bosswick and Heckmann 2006). All in all, integration is a process requiring reciprocal effort and having impact upon both migrants and the host society (Heckmann and Schnapper 2003). The integration concept is symptomatic chiefly of migratory experience occurring in Europe (Favell 2010); therefore, it makes sense to apply it in this article.

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[2] For example, Bolaffi et al. (2003) mention four "kinds of integration" – economic, political, cultural, and associative.

8.3 The Background and the Present of Thai Migration in the World

In the long history of Thailand, dating back to the first Thai independent state of Sukhothai, we can observe a new feature in the field of population mobility from the mid-twentieth century – international migration of Thais. This relatively new phenomena was not common before. Only few people traveled outside Thailand, and the main reasons for migration were education, diplomatic, and family matters (Chantavanich 2003). Until the mid-twentieth century, we could see the dominant flow as rural-rural migration (Pejaranonda et al. 1984, in Chantavanich 2003). After that, it was the rural-urban and urban-rural migration that started to evolve (National Statistics Office 1993, in Chantavanich 2003). The international migration of large numbers of people started only in the mid-1960s (see Table 8.1).

When we look at emigration from Thailand, we can recognize four main migration streams during the last 60 years (see more in Auerbach 1994, cited in Yahirun 2011; Bao 2010; Ratner 2000; Sciortino and Punpuing 2009; Velázquez 2000; Chantavanich 2003; Piper and Roces 2003; Pataya 2011). Not having a room for deeper specification, we concentrate on the latest era.

The last, fourth emigration flow is focused on the movement of Thais to Europe. This migration stream evolved simultaneously with the migration of the workers to the Middle East in the 1970s. The migration involves a large number of women moving to Europe, especially to Germany, Denmark, Switzerland, and the Netherlands (Suksomboon 2007). However, this migration stream of Thai women does not follow usual patterns of international migration. Usually, it is the men who move

Table 8.1 The number of Thai emigrants abroad in 2010

Country	Number of people
USA	282,000
Germany	140,581
Taiwan	67,600
Japan	49,609
Singapore	45,000
South Korea	43,865
Great Britain	40,000
Sweden	32,000
Australia	30,000
Malaysia	28,286
Israel	26,000
Libya	23,000
New Zealand	22,353
Switzerland	22,000
Other countries	153,757
Total	**1,006,051**

Source: Numbers were published by the Thai Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Huguet JW, Chamratrithirong A (2011) Thailand Migration Report 2011

first within economically driven migration, and only then are they gradually followed by women and other family members. The reverse approach represented by the large number of Thai women in Europe is probably due also to the historical fact that Thailand has never been under colonial rule (Suksomboon 2007), which would probably make "classical labor migration" easier.

Another reason, besides that related to migration policy aspects (see below), is the type and kind of work that Thais often specialize in when staying and working abroad. Women vis-à-vis men might profit from this situation too (see especially massage parlors). Emigration to Europe is linked with the end of the Vietnam War and the development of tourism. Thai women who had previously been providing sexual services primarily to US soldiers and European tourists started to move to cities such as Amsterdam, Frankfurt, and Zurich (ILO 2012). So, the first wave of this migration was associated with prostitution. However, later, a new model of "cross-cultural marriages" was developed. Marriage with a man from the "West" is the main and also the easiest way to get to Europe while avoiding the strict immigration rules today (Chantavanich 2003; Suksomboon 2007; Lapanun 2010). For example, in 2007, 15 % of all the marriages in the northeast part of Thailand were mixed. "Thai women's marriages to European men are not a response to crisis but a strategy to solve the problem" (Plambech 2007, p. 23).

Thai migrants are usually older than 25, most of them being 30–39 years old. The majority of immigrants are from the northeast part of Thailand, with most of the migrants coming from the Udon Thani, Nakhon Ratchasima, Khon Kaen, Chaiyaphum, and Buriram provinces (ILO 2012). A significant proportion of the migrants also come from the center, which can suggest that Bangkok does not offer adequate labor opportunities for its citizens, who opt for migration within their country to improve their living conditions. Most of the migrants are males, but their number has been decreasing lately while the number of women is increasing. Migration to Europe and Australia is an exception as it has been led by women from the beginning.

The publication *Internal Migration in Thailand* (2009) points out that the educational structure of Thais who migrate abroad because of work is low – "half of them having only partial primary school education (below Grade 4), more than 70 per cent having less than lower high school (Grade 9 and below), and only roughly 11 per cent having a diploma or a bachelor degree" (Sciortino and Punpuing 2009, p. 27). In accordance with the low level of education, Thais are usually employed in fields with low qualification requirements. In 2007, only 8 % of them had a qualified job. Even though the majority of them are migrating to Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries, the ratio of more highly educated migrants is still very low in comparison to other countries in the region.[3] Education influences both migration strategies and the

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[3] The percentage of university-educated migrants out of all university-educated Thais was only 1.5 % in 2008. By comparison, there were 13.2 % in Singapore, 11.6 % in Malaysia, or 7.3 % in the Philippines (Sciortino and Punpuing 2009).

behavior of migrants from Thailand. Opportunities for people with low qualifications are very limited. Usually, they stay in the country only for a short time and then return to Thailand. Highly qualified people, on the other hand, have easier access to a new country and more possibilities, which leads to better integration in the target country (Sciortino and Punpuing 2009). "Limited proficiency in English and local languages is a major barrier to performing their jobs and adapting to the new country and, while wanted by employers, they often feel discriminated against and looked down on by the surrounding society" (Sciortino and Punpuing 2009, p. 28). Today, most Thai workers are employed in agriculture, manufacturing, or as construction workers. Women are involved in the service sector or as domestic helpers, cleaners, or carers (Kang 2012; Sciortino and Punpuing 2009). Kang (2012) also admits that a similar work orientation is characteristic of the entire region. Moreover, a new type of female migration has begun to form with women moving abroad to work in factories. Female migration is however also connected with organized criminal groups, who are using the women for prostitution, especially in Japan (Chantavanich 2003; Huguet and Punpuing 2005; Pataya 2009).

The predominant reason for migration is the need to support a family, caused by poverty or family debt. But poverty is a relative term. It does not necessarily mean absolute poverty with a lack of basic needs, but can often mean relative poverty or a sense of poverty (Lisborg and Plambech 2009).

Remittances play a key role in Thai migration and the success of migration is also measured by their level. "Sending money back home in a common practice for more than 90 percent of Thai migrant workers" (Chantavanich 2003, p. 28). The amount of money depends on the country of employment. For example, Suksomboon (2007) has found that the amounts of money sent from Europe do not differ that much. This is due to the fact that Thais are comparing the remittances they receive with each other, and they try to ask for similar sums from their family members abroad. Usually, the remittances are sent to parents or partners (husbands or wives), but many point out that the remittances are not always used effectively. They are used to buy property, a new house, and household equipment (refrigerators, TVs, etc.). Part is used for children's education and other domestic expenses. One study states that less than 5 % is used for direct investment (see more in Chantavanich 2003; Huguet and Punpuing 2005; Suksomboon 2007).

8.4 Four Models of Thai Migration and Integration

We summarized the behavioral strategies of Thai migrants into four basic models for the purposes of this article. Below, you will find our own interpretation of studies carried out by other researchers in the given destination countries.[4] Of

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[4] We chose models based on Thai migration to Europe and North America – the regions where Czechia is located while ignoring, for example, Thai migration to the Mideast or East Asia.

course, they need not work directly with the four types of integration as defined by Heckmann (see above). Moreover, studies were carried out separately, often with different sets of conceptual frameworks, research methods, and objectives. Hence, our four given models are logically burdened with some deduction and simplification. Despite this fact, we believe that for the given purpose, the models capture reality in a more or less satisfactory way. The simplified models will serve us as a framework for evaluating the types of migration and integration of Thais in Czechia.

– The American model is distinct from that of other countries, thanks to the high number of Thais in the country (see Table 8.1). There is a high ratio of highly educated people and an almost equal gender composition of the population (Pataporn 2010). The factors behind the migration are economic reasons, family reunions, starting a family, and study. Generally, Thais have no problem integrating structurally, as well as culturally and socioeconomically.[5] Identificational integration is also characteristic for the second generation, which is why many people gain permanent residence in the country, settle there, and become naturalized (Yahirun 2011). The representative country for this model of behavior of Thai migrants is the USA.

– The German model is, in comparison with other models, based on more people being found in irregular situations (see ILO 2012). However, migration to the country is based mainly on "Thai brides," who get visas as wives or partners. The main reason for migration is economic deprivation in the mother country, which leads to emigration for the sake of supporting the family (in the form of remittances sent) and also to improve the living conditions of the migrating individuals (Piper and Roces 2003; Pataya 2009). The composition of the migrants is characteristic as more than 80 % of them are women. Migrants are moving to the country mainly from the northeast part of Thailand, and they have a low level of education (Duangkumnerd 2009). Individuals with residence permits are included in the structural part of integration. Cultural and socioeconomic integration can be partially recognized for the wives, who entered the country to be reunited with their family. On the other hand, it is very limited for the people who are living there based on a work permit. Identification with the "culture and society of the host country" (identificational integration) is almost nonexistent, because the main goal is to return to the country of origin. The countries that represent this model of behavior of Thai migrants are Germany and Japan.

– The British model is similar to the American model with a high percentage of well-educated people. The difference in the gender representation in the population is recognizable as women represent 70 % of all the Thai immigrants in the country. Migrants are coming to the country from all Thai regions, especially

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[5] It concerns migrants who came to the USA in the 1960s and 1970s and their descendants. In contrast, those who migrated to the USA in the 1990s have integrated very little in this respect (see more in Yahirun 2011).

from the northeast part of Thailand, but that is the case for the whole of Europe. The migrants usually get into the country for reasons of study, family reunion, and, last but not least, employment (Sims 2008). Structural and socioeconomic integration is usually attained. For the students and wives, cultural integration is also recognizable. The identification aspect of integration is not usually present, because the goal is to return to the country of origin (Kitcharoen 2007). The countries that represent this model are Great Britain and Australia.

– The Scandinavian model is not, in comparison to other models, characterized by a large number of migrants, which corresponds to the fact that migration of Thais to Scandinavia is more recent. The migration is based mainly on marriages and is mainly due to economic deprivation in the country of origin (Ohtsuki 2010). More than 60 % of Thais are married to a person born in the target country.[6] That corresponds with a high ratio of women, above 70 % (Bissat 2008; Byberg 2002). Most migrants come from the northeast part of Thailand (De Jong et al. 2002, cited in Bissat 2008). Thais usually integrate well structurally and socioeconomically. Cultural adaptation is recognizable for employees and wives (Bissat 2008). Identificational integration is almost nonexistent for the migrant workers, because the main goal is to return to the country of origin. The countries that represent this model are Iceland, Denmark, and Norway.

8.5   Empirical Research: Methods and Methodology

This article uses both quantitative and qualitative data. The statistics obtained from the central information system of the Alien Police (CIS), which is maintained by the Alien Police of the Czech Republic, and the data from the Czech Statistical Office and National Statistical Office of Thailand, form part of the quantitative data. The main qualitative part of this article is based on selected data collected during a survey and additional interviews.

Based on the statistical data, an initial analysis of the concentration of Thais in Czechia was made. It identified Prague (the capital of Czechia) as the place with the highest concentration of Thais, and this group therefore became the primary target population for the research. The survey itself was conducted between April 2012 and July 2012. The sample of respondents was carried out based on a non-probability sampling, using the "snowball" method. For this purpose, some basic conditions were set that the participants had to meet in order to be included among the respondents.

The respondents had to meet the following two conditions: Thai citizenship and living in Czechia on a long-term visa, i.e., over 90 days, long-term residence, or permanent residence.

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[6] For example, in Sweden, Thai wives are now more numerous than Finns (Haandrikman 2012).

Four different methods were used for the distribution of the questionnaires: personal contact, Internet, mail, and contact thanks to an intermediary. The method that was used most often was personal contact. All the surveys in Prague and Central Bohemia were distributed in this way (about 85 % of respondents). The respondents were sought particularly in Thai massage parlors and restaurants, because, based on our experience and other findings, these were the places with the largest numbers of Thais. The distribution process for the migrant workers involved contacting the manager or the owner of a company where the migrants work. The employer was informed of the purpose of the survey, and in some cases it was necessary to send the questionnaire to the owner for approval. After this "operation" was finished, it was decided whether the survey could be conducted in the company or not. The respondents had a chance to fill in the survey directly at work or at home. The questionnaires were collected by arrangement, usually 3–7 days after they were distributed. An intermediary or a provider of postal services was used to deliver the questionnaires to those Thais who are in Czechia for a different reason than work and those Thais that do not reside in Prague or the Central Bohemian Region (only 15 % of respondents).

In total, 214 questionnaires were distributed in Czechia and 74 % were collected, i.e., 159 questionnaires were successfully returned (but not all of the participants had answered all the questions). This number represents some 24 % of Thais living in Czechia for a longer period of time. The final version of the questionnaire was prepared in Thai using a translation from the English version done in Thailand.

The questionnaire itself contained 55 research questions and was divided into two main parts. The first part was made up of 40 questions divided thematically into six groups focusing on the following topics: migration, integration, social connections, language skills, socioeconomic background, and cultural adjustment. The second part consisted of 15 questions about identification.

During the final phase of the survey, semi-structured interviews with some of the respondents were also conducted.[7]

8.6 The Main Results: Is the Czech Model of Thai Migration and Integration Distinct?

The first citizens of the Kingdom of Thailand were registered as residing in Czechia by the end of the twentieth century. Before 1993, the Thai presence in Czechia (or Czechoslovakia) was almost exclusively a matter of state visits. We can see that since 1993, the relationship between the countries has strengthened, Thailand has

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[7] When using semi-structured interviews, a researcher designs main topics and their general structure in advance, so that it is clear what main questions will be asked. "The detailed structure is left to be worked out during the interview, and the person being interviewed has a fair degree of freedom in what to talk about, how much to say, and how to express it" (Drever 1995).

Table 8.2 Changes in the number of Thais in Czechia between 1994 and 2013

Year	Temporary residence	Permanent residence	Total
1994	16	1	17
1995	18	1	19
1996	9	5	14
1997	12	6	18
1998	19	8	27
1999	30	6	36
2000	26	9	35
2001	43	12	55
2002	54	16	70
2003	72	22	94
2004	116	33	149
2005	173	42	215
2006	223	59	282
2007	328	79	407
2008	403	91	494
2009	452	99	551
2010	570	106	676
2011	611	114	725
2012	617	114	731
2013	661	129	790

Source: Based on data from ČSU (2012) and IS CIS (2013)
The data are always as at 31 December. As for the definitions – see the part Terms, Definitions and Concepts Used

developed economically, and bilateral migration policies have also became more open. This is also reflected in the first labor migration of Thais to Czechia. In 1994, there were only 17 citizens from this Southeast Asian kingdom living here. Table 8.2 shows the development in the following years.

It is clear that the "Czech model" will be different from the models identified above to some degree and it will not follow all the characteristics of any given model. Just by looking at the development of migration in Czechia, we can see a clear difference in the number of Thai immigrants. By contrast to other destination countries, Thais in Czechia represent really a small fragment of the population (0.008 %). This is because the migration history of Thais is much longer in the other countries. The Czech model is closest to the Scandinavian one.

Table 8.2 clearly shows that the number of Thais in Czechia has grown. It was in parallel with the number of other foreigners (see, e.g., Drbohlav et al. 2010). It is also clear that the group of Thai migrants was in some way immune to the effects of the current global financial crisis as their population is still growing, unlike that of some other groups (e.g., Horáková 2012). However, it is important to realize that just as in the other countries, there are many migrants with irregular status in Czechia (Drbohlav 2008; Černík 2005), and this phenomenon also touches the Thai community. The Alien Police has discovered 59 Thai migrants who were in

Czechia irregularly during the last 60 years (IS CIS 2012), which does not say, however, anything about the actual number of immigrants in an irregular position in Czechia, only that they were and are there. More specifically, in 2012, according to police data, there were fewer than 0.3 % of Thai migrants with irregular status out of all irregularly residing foreigners who were detained. However, that the number of irregular migrants from Thailand is higher than the official data states was also demonstrated during our own research, as we found it to be at least twice as high.

As we can see, the growth of the Thai population in Czechia in the years 1994–2013 was relatively dynamic. For the most numerous immigrant groups in Czechia, the population during this period increased four times (Slovaks) or eight times at the most (Ukrainians). For Thais, the population multiplied 46 times, which ranks Thailand as the sixth country in terms of the highest increase of residents in Czechia, placed right behind Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Moldova, and Côte d'Ivoire. The increased growth of Thai migrants reflects new opportunities on the labor market. Since 1998, the first Thai massage parlors in Prague have opened, and this has contributed to the increase in the number of these immigrants.

Generally, the main reason for leaving Thailand is predominantly economic deprivation caused by relative poverty. By leaving the country, the migrants are trying to ensure better living conditions for them and their family. The better economic situation in the target country is what attracts the migrants the most, as it naturally leads to higher earnings. The same applies to the Thais in Czechia. The survey shows that the main reason for migration is to get money to support the family (67.5 %). This answer is related to the second most common reason for emigration which is the better financial conditions in the target country than in Thailand (65.5 %).

The connection between these two answers was also reflected in the final evaluation of the emigration. Eighty-four percent of respondents mentioned at least one of these factors as the main reason for leaving Thailand. The ways they are getting to their "dream" destinations differ though. The predominant method in Czechia is an approach by a contact person (usually an owner of a massage parlor or relatives who are already working there), and they are offered a job (the migrants are contacted directly in Thailand). Migration networks are also often used to move, as are connections with Thais in the target countries, including Czechia. The relatively simpler conditions for obtaining a residence permit under Czech migration policy lead Thais to migrate here solely for job opportunities. This is also one of the main reasons why they choose Czechia as their target destination and why the majority of Thais live here legally, having obtained a long-term residence permit in order to work (the actual number is 70 % of temporary permits and 61 % of all permits in 2013). Moreover, Thais are often getting to the countries based on marriages (see more in Lisborg 2002; Butratan and Trupp 2011; Yahirun 2011). In Czechia, only 15 % of Thais have long-term visas based on marriage. The number of the marriages is, however, increasing by 2–4 % every year. This is related to the length of time Thai women are living in Czechia, as the number of marriages increases with the time they have spent here. We can see the opposite tendency here than in the other countries. The first visa is given to the immigrant on an employment basis, which changes over time to family reasons. This can be

Fig. 8.1 Thais based in Czechia according to age categories in 2013 (Source: Based on IS CIS (2013), $N = 737$)

observed especially for Thais with permanent residence, where the family factor applies in 80 % of cases, but if both temporary and permanent residence are included, the number falls to 26 % (the actual situation as of 2013). This makes the Czech model distinct and different to any of the other models mentioned.

The age structure of Thai migrants in 2013, according to data from the Visa Information System, is shown in Fig. 8.1.

In comparison to the age structure of other foreigners in Czechia, where the average age is 36.7 years, we can conclude that the Thai citizens who come to the country are older (the average age of Thais in Czechia is 39.2[8]) (Srb et al. 2013).[9] 96.2 % of Thais in Czechia are of working age, with the largest group being 36–45 years old. On the contrary, relatively few Thais are beyond working age, i.e., 66 years old or older, in the 56–65 age group or under 18 (see Fig. 8.1). The number of these is also low for other foreigners in Czechia (Drbohlav et al. 2010). Although the demographic statistics are similar and they correspond with the "regularities of international migration," even here, we can find one exception. The percentage of women in this immigrant group is quite distinct, standing at 92.7 %, which is the highest ratio among all the nationalities represented by more than 100 people in Czechia. This one-sided representation is due the fact that the majority of Thais are employed in massage parlors, which are usually staffed by women (Prachakitbamrung 2011).

[8] Based on a weighted average method.
[9] Data valid as of December 31, 2012.

The results of the survey imply that the people have usually a lower level of education. 40.1 % of the respondents answered that they have elementary education, 24.6 % lower secondary education, 28.2 % upper secondary education, and 7 % are graduates or postgraduates (usually having a bachelor's degree). However, it is important to understand the differences in the educational system. Higher education in Thailand[10] is fee-paying, and secondary schools are not easily accessible for people from remote rural areas. We believe that the improving quality of education in Thailand is also reflected in the structure of migrants in Czechia – whereas in 2008, most of the people moving into the country had an elementary education – the number of people with a higher level of education is now rising (e.g., 70 % of high-school graduates arrived after 2008).

The marital status of the respondents ($N = 152$) shows that the largest group of respondents are immigrants who are single (44.1 %), followed by married people (21.7 %), divorced (19.1 %), widowed (9.9 %), and people living with a partner (5.3 %). Thais who are married or who are living with a partner ($N = 41$) are usually in a relationship with Thais (61 %) or Czechs (29 %); the rest are living with other foreigners. 68.6 % of the 137 respondents analyzed have children, while 30 % of people married to Czechs are without children. All the children of these couples are living in Czechia. In contrast, 96 % of children of Thais without a Czech partner live in Thailand.

Generally, the key factor leading to better integration of foreigners into the majority society is the knowledge of the language of the target country (e.g., Esser 2006). The language is not only important for maintaining contact between a migrant and the new society but also for improving socioeconomic status. The language knowledge of Thais is usually very low, which is a logical result of their low level of education. The exception is the situation in the USA. The very low knowledge of Czech or English as a lingua franca is also visible in Czechia. Due also to the fact that learning Czech is a relatively exacting task, immigrants achieve only an average knowledge of Czech even after several years of living here – usually it is the wives of the Czechs who do so. Almost half of the respondents (47 %) answered that they are not learning Czech and that they do not intend to. Another 15 % are not learning now, but expect to do so in the future. The rest of the Thais are attending language courses irregularly or they are learning by themselves, but only 5 % learn regularly.

Due to the heavy workloads and lack of knowledge of the language, there is a separation between Czechs and Thais. Again, there are two different "types" of Thais. The results of our survey show that wives of Czechs are usually willing to learn the language and – usually thanks to their husbands – they try to integrate into social networks and social life. In contrast, the majority of the migrant workers (those who have not created or reunified a family) agree that outside of work, they

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[10] Thailand underwent an extensive reform of the educational system in the 1990s. A very significant change was in the free compulsory education, which changed from 6 years to 9 and then to 12 years (see more in Hallinger and Bryant 2013).

do not have time to make contact with the majority society and that they have no way to communicate. So they usually spend their free time with other Thais and have no contact with Czechs, with only a few exceptions. Thus, it is clear that, except for the wives of the Czechs, there is almost no inclusion of Thais in "interactive integration." As a community, Thais maintain strong relationships between each other – 83 % of them responded that they meet with other people from Thailand multiple times a week. That is of course due to the fact they work together, but also because of their culture, religion, and because they live close to each other. Accommodation is usually provided by the owner of the massage parlor, who rents a house or flat for his/her employees and deducts the costs for the apartment from their wages. Again, there are distinct differences between those Thai women with a Czech husband and the others. The wives of the Czechs live with their new families in apartments that are owned by their husbands or in rented apartments they pay for together. The rest of the women live in flats they share with other Thais. Only 5.9 % of the respondents answered that they live alone. But Thais do not maintain contacts only with other people from Thailand in Czechia. They also try to stay in contact with their family and friends in Thailand, be it over the Internet, by phone, or by regular visits to their home country.

Just the fact of the emigration inherently implies that remittances, which usually range from 2,500 CZK (some 125 US$) to 15,000 CZK (some 750 US$) in Europe, will be sent back to Thailand. A similar amount (an average of 10,000 CZK) (some 500 US$) was confirmed in Czechia during our research. The remittances are usually sent every month (43.7 %) or irregularly (31.8 %) when they save a certain amount of money. The amounts sent vary based on the frequency with which they are sent. The most common amount is 10,000 CZK per month (some 500 US$) for a whole year. The second variant is to send one larger amount of money, normally around 60,000 CZK (some 3,000 US$), once a year. The preferred way of sending remittances is through Western Union, but some choose instead to send the money via other Thais who are planning to go to Thailand. In this way, they are trying to avoid the high charges for official transactions. The money from the remittances is used mainly to improve the living conditions of the family. It is also used to ensure a better education for children who stayed in Thailand or to purchase appliances. People from Isaan (one of the poorest region) also support the development in the villages during their visits, especially by giving financial support to the temples. Ultimately, after subtracting the cost of living, they sometimes end up sending almost all of the money they earn to Thailand. Also, in harmony with *bun khun* principles (Plambech 2007), by being a "good daughter," they are improving their social status and the social status of their family in Thailand. And the strategy for the majority of Thais is not to stay in the host country permanently, just to earn enough money to improve their own living standards and those of their family. Replies to our survey and interviews revealed that after they earn enough, their goal is to return to their home country. This situation logically does not allow for identificational integration, which is present only in the American model.

The last important part of integration is its cultural dimension, which is about acquiring the cultural values and competencies of the target country, as well as the

same common knowledge. The main premise for convergence is, however, a common language. From this standpoint, only the American model fulfilled this type of integration. For the other models, the signs of cultural integration can be recognized only in the cases of Thai wives. In Czechia, the situation is similar. It is obvious that Thais are maintaining their own culture and meeting with each other. Cultural habits and customs associated with Buddhism are an integral part of Thai lives, not only in their home country but also in Czechia. Thais meeting each other maintain their habits and rituals – 86.5 % answered that they keep the Thai traditions and customs and 98 % of them celebrate them with others (it concerns the main Thai festivals such as Songkhran, Loi Krathong, and the King's Birthday on 5th December). For example, Wat Thai Prague (the Thai temple in Prague) founded in 2010 is very important for the cultivation of faith. It is essentially an apartment with relics placed inside, which are cared for by Buddhist monks from Thailand. The question as to whether they celebrate Czech public holidays as well was answered negatively by 35.5 % of Thais. The majority (62.6 %) answered that they participate in some traditions, especially Christmas and Easter. This is also because it is another chance to meet. Due mainly to their heavy workloads and the difficulty of gaining information or coming into closer contact with the majority society, Thais do not know about Czech culture, and they are usually not interested in learning about Czechia or its culture.

Larger cities like Prague, Brno, and Ostrava are the most attractive destinations for foreigners. In Bohemia, Prague is the dominant destination, as almost one third of all registered foreigners live there (Čermák and Janská 2011). Prague's attractiveness is even more pronounced in the case of migrants from Thailand, more than 50 % of whom live in the capital city. The reason for choosing the larger cities is that they are better adjusted to accepting groups of migrants than the smaller towns. However, the distribution of foreigners is uneven and it does not depend only on size. Attractive destinations also include spa towns, border regions, or cities that are well-supported with investment from foreign countries (Čermáková 2010; Uherek 2003). This fact is also supported by the distribution of Thais who are also represented in greater numbers particularly in Brno, Pilsen, Cheb, and Karlovy Vary as well as Prague. This fact is reflected in Fig. 8.2.

The very uneven spatial distribution (by Czech districts) is confirmed by calculating the Gini coefficient, which is almost twice as high for migrants from Thailand (reaching a value of 0.784 – see Table 8.3) than the distribution of the whole Czech population.

It is noticeable that Thais with permanent residence are more evenly distributed than those with long-term residence. This is mainly due to the fact that, in contrast to "family-oriented migration," residence for work (long term) is primarily focused on economic activities in the larger cities. A similar situation applies also for other groups of foreigners (see Čermák and Janská 2011; Janská et al. 2013; Novotný et al. 2007).

The survey showed that as in other European countries, the Thai migrants come predominantly from the northeast part of Thailand (43 % of respondents). At the

Fig. 8.2 Spatial distribution of Thais in Czechia in 2013 (Source: Based on data in IS CIS 2013. Note: The ratios represent the number of Thais in the districts compared to the total number of Thais in the whole Czechia)

Table 8.3 Geographic concentration of the Czech population and foreigners (Gini index)

Total population	**0.40**
Total foreigners	0.67
Thai population	**0.78**
Vietnamese	0.65
Ukrainians	0.74

Source: The Thailand value was calculated based on data from IS CIS (2012). Other indexes were taken from Janská et al. (2013). Note: The value was calculated from the data from the 76 districts and Prague. For Thais, the data reflects the situation in 2011, and the rest reflects the situation in 2010. The values are in interval (0; 1). A concentration of the population in one district would equal 1 and a uniformly distributed population would equal 0

provincial level, the largest number of Thais came from Bangkok, Sakon Nakhon, Chiang Mai, Nakhon Ratchasima, and Udon Thani (Fig. 8.3).

In this respect, Czechia is closest to the Scandinavian model, which shows a very similar distribution. The high concentration of Thais in Prague resembles the situation in Vienna or London in contrast to the examples from Germany or the USA, where the Thai population is distributed more evenly through the country. It should be noted that, as in other countries, Thai wives in Czechia do not always follow the trend of choosing the most attractive destinations mentioned above and

rate representation in %

0.0000 - 0,5
0.51 - 2
2.01 - 3
3.01 - 5
5.01 - 9
9.01 - 15

Fig. 8.3 Map of the provinces with the places of origin of Thai migrants in Czechia (Source: The survey. Note: The map shows places of origin of Thai migrants in Czechia by their representation in percentages ($N = 144$))

they move to the places where their husbands live even if these do not have a higher concentration of Thais.

8.7 Conclusion

We tried to analyze the migration of Thai people into Czechia while focusing on the nature of their integration process. Our work is based on the results of a questionnaire survey of 159 Thais (snowball sampling, conducted between April and July 2012), who represent some 24 % of Thais living in the whole Czechia for a longer time period. Such "basic research" – which has so far never been done – enriches knowledge in the given field of migration and integration especially when applying comparative perspective. For this purpose, we defined and used four models representing different types of migration and integration of Thais in the Euro-Atlantic area (the American, British, German, and Scandinavian models). These models served as a frame of reference for specifying the main outcomes of our own survey.

Integration was conceptualized in harmony with the social integration framework as defined by Heckmann (2006) via the following main dimensions: structural integration, cultural integration, interactive integration, and identificational integration.

Overall, we can state that in terms of the characterization of immigrants, the situation in Czechia is similar to other countries/models. To be more precise, we have a high percentage of women in the population of migrants and a high percentage of migrants from the northeast part of Thailand. There is also a similar structure of the level of education as the migrants consist mostly of people with a lower level of education.

On the other hand, the main difference between Czechia and all the other selected developed countries/models in the Euro-Atlantic area with Thai immigrants lies in the fact that the migration to Czechia is still "young." It does not have a sufficiently long tradition and thus is still small, immature, and not greatly differentiated. Hence, our analysis and results can also effectively assist those who will study Thais in Czechia after some time and will be interested in revealing character of the development of their migration and integration processes over time. Such possibilities – concerning various immigrant groups – have so far been rather rare.

Moreover, Czechia does not fit into any of the integration models outlined, mainly because of the atypically narrow focus on just one segment of the market, the different process for getting a residence permit (the focus on long-term residence for the purpose of work), and the low number of intercultural marriages. Closer identification of Thais with Czechia is usually completely absent. We can distinguish two main groups of Thais in Czechia: wives of Czechs and migrant workers. In comparison with other countries which enter models we are working with, the number of Thai wives is lower in Czechia. This is caused by the nature of

migration of Thai women itself. They are often contacted in their home country where they are offered a job in Czechia, which is also related to getting necessary permits for stay and work there. Thus, in this case, there is a small incentive to use family reunion as a channel for migration. The second reason is the fact that in Czechia, the gaining of a long-term visa and consequently a long-term residence permit for the purpose of work is easier than gaining a long-term visa/residence permit for family reasons. Hence, from what has been mentioned, it is clear that Thai wives may appear in our case as a less important group. On the other hand, we have to acknowledge and also take into consideration the "overlapping roles" played by Thai women who can be both wives and workers at the same time (see more in Piper and Roces 2003). Anyhow, wives are important and constantly growing group. It is the wives who integrate better into the majority society institutionally and culturally and in terms of the language, social ties, and relations. In contrast, Thais who came mainly because of job opportunities typically do not have many contacts with Czech society outside of work and maintain strong relationships within their own community.

In terms of the gained knowledge that might be useful for "applied research," we found out that even though the Thai women (migrant workers) have very limited ties to Czech majority society, they socialize very intensively within their immigrant group. They do not create spatially and socially separated, segregated, or even marginalized groups where correction/remedy intervention of anybody like the state or cities/towns would be needed or appreciated.

We can see that from a global point of view, the migration to Czechia is most similar to the Scandinavian model and it differs most from the American model. The situation in Czechia might represent a new model that is focused primarily on legal migration for work without any attempt to integrate into other social structures. A similar situation might be beginning to come to the surface perhaps in Slovakia (see Štatistický 2011). There is a question of how the situation in the field of migration and integration of Thais is developing in the other post-communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe and whether Czechia is preceding the development in the whole region or not.

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Chapter 9
Labor Mobility to the Promised Land: Hungarian Migrants' Experiences in the United Kingdom

Anna Irimiás and Gábor Michalkó

Abstract The aim of this paper is to highlight the role of emotions and expectations in mobility. The empirical research focused on sojourners' expectations related to the host country in the different stages of migration, their adjustment capacities and coping with acculturation stress, and emotions related to the overall migration experience. In 2011, 78 semistructured interviews were conducted with Hungarian migrants who had post-accession working experience in the United Kingdom. Results suggest that the new migrant employees' expectations about the UK and about the overall migration experience were affected by emotions. Furthermore, coping and adjustment capacities were significantly influenced by migrants' personal traits and the ability to establish network capital.

Keywords Hungarian migrants • Employment • Expectations • Coping

9.1 Introduction

The myth of the successful self-made emigrant is a newly emerged figure in Hungary where the song of the Western sirens promising the hope of a better life abroad has recently become stronger and stronger. Since the European Union enlargement, a significant number of young and skilled Hungarians have opted for mobility and to become a modern nomad in search for its fortune and happiness (Baumann 2000). The Hungarian population is traditionally "sedentarist," "a-mobile" using the terms

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by Hannam et al. (2006), and compared to other Central Eastern European peoples (e.g., Polish, Slovaks, or Romanians), Hungarians had hardly ever chose mobility to find better job opportunities or better living conditions (Illés and Kincses 2012). This attitude can be in part explained by the strong historical and traditional roots embedded in the myth of one's own terrain and property considered to be a "kingdom."

Spatial mobility is concerned with different emotional and affective states which have several individual and social aspects (Benson 2011; Blunt 2007; Conradson and McKay 2007; Svašek 2010; Urry 2007). Certain emotional processes such as the multiple emotional attachments to the homeland and to the host country are generated by migration-specific issues (Svašek 2010).

The importance of the concept of motility referring to migrants originated from Central Eastern European countries is twofold. Firstly, individual freedom and traveling were state controlled until 1989 when the Communist rule over the social and political systems in Central and Eastern Europe collapsed (Irimiás 2006; Kale and Little 2007). Following the fall of the Berlin Wall, a relatively long transitional period has been started which generated significant social, economical as well as psychological changes for individuals and families. Secondly, during the transitional period, the accession to the European Union in 2004 and the possibility of free circulation of labor work toward the United Kingdom, Ireland, and Sweden represented another milestone in the Central Eastern European mobility patterns (Williams and Baláž 2008).

It is worth noting that the EU enlargement witnessed the proliferation of low-cost airline carriers (e.g., Ryanair, Wizzair, easyJet, Jet2, among others) operating routes between the major Central and Eastern European cities and the UK (Burrell 2011; Graham and Shaw 2008). Much of the rise of passenger numbers and of the brand-new routes can be attributed to the new flows of migration (Burrell 2008). Furthermore, the low-cost travel routes alleviated the transnational activities, and frequent travels between the home and the host country were made possible. This transnational aspect of the new nomads' migration patterns facilitates the contacts with family members and friends across borders (Bauman 2000; Hannam et al. 2006). Homesickness, loneliness, and anxiety are frequently experienced emotions by migrants, and the wish to be in a familiar surrounding can be in part satisfied by contacts with the loved ones. Not only physical but virtual mobility have been evidenced as new forms of mobility (Fortier 2006).

Focusing as it has on the emotional experiences and expectations of migrants, this research has not included in-depth statistical analysis of immigration, but it is nevertheless important to consider the wider context of immigration to the United Kingdom. According to the statistics published by the British Home Office (Accession Monitoring Report May 2004–March 2009), labor migrants originated from one of the A8 ("Accession 8" countries joined the European Union in 2004: Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia) countries to feel the gaps in the labor market in hospitality and catering which is the second most popular sector in which workers are employed (the other sectors are: administration, business and management, agriculture, manufacturing, food/fish/

meat processing). According to data, the top year for hospitality and catering with the highest number of registered workers coming from the A8 countries was 2006 with the total of 38,675 migrants. These figures suggest that hospitality and catering, especially in Anglia and in London, constitute one of the most important sectors for migrants to be employed.

Mobility and circulation are conceived as a multistage life experience, and emotions, expectations, beliefs, and fears influence motility, the migrants' well-being as well as their social integration (Ek et al. 2008; Flamm and Kaufmann 2006; Fortier and Lewis 2006; Illés and Kincses 2012; Stillman et al. 2009; Weishaar 2010). According to our understanding of the transnational mobility, the migration continuum can be divided into three main stages. In the pre-migration stage, imagination of a desired improved life might be shadowed by the fear of the unknown and unexpected situations (Yijälä and Jasinskaja-Lahti 2010). Issues of met expectations are relevant in the context of employment and constitute a key factor in mobility (Brow et al. 2008). During the initial stage of the migration, emotions vary from excitement and bravery to homesickness, stress, and anxiety generated by the barriers faced in the host country (Heilbrunn et al. 2010). In the consolidation stage when the sojourner has already settled, emotions might be rather different and may vary from disappointment and sadness to satisfaction and self-fulfillment (Weishaar 2010).

In the pre-migration stage, perceptions of places and destinations can be influenced by several sources and factors such as previous tourism experiences at the destination (Aitken and Hall 2000; Bowen and Schouten 2008; Williams and Hall 2000). As Williams and Hall (2000) argued, several overlaps can be traced between tourism and migration, especially in the case of circulation which is a newly emerging phenomenon in which recurring moves are evidenced among multiple residences. The geographical extension of family ties and friendships enhances the VFR (visiting friends and relatives) tourism which might have an influence on new migration paradigms. The authors demonstrated that tourism may also generate migration flows (Williams and Hall 2000). Furthermore, the image of geographical places entwined with the narratives of family members, friends, and acquaintances might influence potential migrants' perceptions and imagination about their future host country (Christou 2011; Hui 2008; Lawson 2000). The narratives are intermingled with the narrators' subjectivity about past experiences and are also influenced by their emotional state lived in that situations (Ahmed 2013; Smith 2006).

During the initial stage of migration, the social network established with fellow co-nationals in the host country (Janta et al. 2011b) and frequent contacts with family and friends in the home country alleviate homesickness. Mobility is a "liquid," nonstationary life experience which requires flexibility, quick adaptation to new circumstances, and the ability to decode cultural signs. Individuals have their mental representations of places, people, and culture which are challenged, formed, and evolved continuously. Adjustment capacities and coping with acculturation stress are key features during the adaptation process in the host country.

Personal traits, emotional and mental health, and the trust in one's skills to overcome difficulties determine the success of migration.

In the consolidation stage, social networks are already established, the first difficulties related to the workplace and living conditions are overcome, and migrants are experiencing their new "gray" everyday life abroad. The emotional background of this stage results to be more balanced because migrants took the decision to settle in the host country which means that they accepted, at least in part, their social status as migrant (Larsen et al. 2007). The focus during this stage is to establish a normal everyday life where social contacts are relevant and the clear understanding of the cultural and social environment is a key factor for integration.

This paper examines how migrants' emotions and expectations are influenced by their previous knowledge about the host country. Moreover, in this paper it is also outlined how migrants elaborate contacts and networks in the physical and virtual environment and the way these contacts influence their emotional state. Data are used to demonstrate how Hungarian migrants employed in tourism and hospitality cope with unexpected situations in order to delineate their adjustment capacities and how the peculiarities of "being Hungarian" influences their work achievement and attitude.

The research on which this article draws arises from a broader project investigating Hungarian post-accession migrants' experiences in Europe, the nexus between tourism and migration with particular interest in VFR tourism, and migrants' niche experiences.

9.2 Literature Review

Several aspects of the nexus between tourism and migration such as employees' foreign skills, foreigners' real estate purchases and second homes, travel-stimulated entrepreneur migration, lifestyle mobility and circulation, and visits of migrants' friends and relatives have been widely studied by academics (Aitken and Hall 2000; Benson 2011; Benson and O'Reilly 2009; Bowen and Schouten 2008; Duval 2003; Hall 2005; Illés and Michalkó 2012; Irimiás 2013; Oigenblick and Kirschenbaum 2002; O'Reilly 2003, 2007; Snepenger et al. 1995; Williams and Hall 2000).

The access to resources and opportunities and the competence in mobility referring to skills and abilities were highlighted to constitute the key factors of potential mobility. As Kellerman (2012) outlined, active and passive potential mobilities are influenced by individuals' mobility needs, access, and competences. According to previous studies, the term motility refers to spatial mobility and individual freedom, and it is considered as a factor of social integration (Cass et al. 2005; Flamm and Kaufmann 2006; Kaufmann 2002; Kellerman 2012).

The meaning and experience of integration for British and German migrants in Spain were studied by O'Reilly (2007). According to her findings, lifestyle British migrants experienced social exclusion in Spain because of poor language skills and inadequate knowledge about local legal and insurance issues among others. In her

paper, the author highlighted the contradictions inherent in mobility-enclosure dialectic evidencing the incongruity between free circulation within the European Union and social exclusion in nation states. The ambiguous status of British migrants living in Spain, although they made some efforts to be socially integrated investing time, money, and emotions in the place, in some cases, led to frustration (O'Reilly 2007).

Undeniably, the development and cost-efficiency of transport and communication facilities have significantly influenced transnational interconnections and have alleviated communication between geographically dispersed people (Larsen et al. 2006). Larsen et al. (2006) analyzed the concept of network capital focusing on the geographies of social networks. The authors argued that mobility is driven by personal choice and will, although it is significantly influenced by emotions like caring, pleasure, sense of obligation, and even guilt. Through an exploratory study, the authors tried to map the participants' social network geographies and the associated networking practices. Their findings demonstrated that "network capital" is crucial in modern societies, and distant and nearby ties and contacts are reinforced by communication and transport technologies. Relations between wider social networks develop through transnational opportunities, and global cities provide a platform for networks of mobility.

As Williams (2009) defined analyzing the concept of employability of labor migrants, mobility is an option to extend labor market and career opportunities. Labor mobility, employability, and migrants' employment in tourism and hospitality have already attracted wide academic attention (Duncan et al. 2013; Janta et al. 2011a, b; Szivas et al. 2003; Williams 2009); however, the emotional background of mobility during the migration stages, the key focus of the present paper, has not been deepened yet by researchers.

Using mobilities as an exploratory framework, Duncan et al. (2013) highlighted in their concept paper that the conventional management thinking of tourism and hospitality employment (unskilled, low-paid labor process) can be challenged by an interdisciplinary approach. The authors emphasized that the internationally and culturally mobile tourism and hospitality workforce are required to have "soft" skills along with emotional and aesthetical features. Moreover, experience-seeking and lifestyle tourism and hospitality employees have the control over their migratory strategies which respond to specific aims and goals (e.g., to develop international experience, to improve language skills, to widen social networks, and to experience everyday life in a global city). However, it is worth to note that these concepts are mainly valid for the tourism and hospitality sector in the Western world.

In fact, as Szivas et al. (2003) argued referring to the transitional era of the 1990s in Central and Eastern Europe, during the periods with significant economic change, tourism employment fulfilled particular roles. Further, their empirical research conducted in the United Kingdom within areas facing economic downturn revealed that mobility into tourism offered job opportunities for people with different labor backgrounds. Results showed that moving to tourism as a career

opportunity was based on several motivations, and positive outlook on tourism jobs was evidenced as a common trait.

Janta et al. (2011a, b) deeply analyzed the migrant workers' adaptation strategies in their comprehensive study on the experiences of Polish migrant workers employed in the UK tourism sector. As the authors outlined, tourism employment provides both for high- and low-skilled migrants access to various social networks especially in the early stage of migration. Since hospitality employment facilitates the contacts with the host community and with other migrants from different countries, it has been considered a useful tool for social integration and a key issue to improving linguistic and cultural competence. Their empirical research based on three different methods (netnography, interviews and an online questionnaire) and the importance of host, international, and conational relations were analyzed. Results revealed that the use of the Internet is not simply a source of information, but it has become a key channel of communication and social support for migrants (Janta et al. 2011a). The majority of migrant tourism workers participating in their research were young, well-educated, with limited family obligations, flexible, and open to new experiences. Migrants considered their employment in the tourism sector as stepping-stones and not as a career opportunity (Williams 2009).

According to previous studies, barriers such as lack of language proficiency, inadequate human capital, unfamiliarity with the culture, and lack of network might render difficult immigrants' social and economical integration in the host country (O'Reilly 2007). As Ladkin (2011) observed, poor language skills constrain migrants to accept low-paid and the lowest-grade jobs. Linguistic competence is needed for a better adjustment and for integration in the host society. From their research conducted to analyze Polish migrants' networks and strategies to improve their language skills emerged that employment in tourism and hospitality provided better social integration possibilities through everyday contacts with British costumers and through virtual contacts with co-nationals already settled in the host country (Ladkin 2011).

9.3   Methodology

The empirical research focused on migrants' expectations in the pre-migration stage about the host country and their adjustment capacities and coping with acculturation stress and emotions related to the migrant experience while in the host country. The qualitative method of interview was selected because it is considered to be a culturally sensitive method of investigation, suitable to trace inner thoughts and emotions related to personal decisions and experiences (D'Andrea et al. 2011; Flamm and Kaufmann 2006).

The research was conducted on a group of Hungarian migrants who had some working experience in the United Kingdom following Hungary's accession to the European Union in 2004. The interviews were conducted between February and

May, 2011. Combining convenient and snowball samples, a total of 78 participants from all over Hungary were surveyed. The research started with a convenient sample asking the authors' friends and relatives living in the UK to participate in the research and proceeded with snowball sample by asking students at Kodolanyi University of Applied Sciences for their contacts and acquaintances who could be sampled. Snowball sampling has been proven successful in research on migrants, and a convenience sample was recruited among Hungarians who were employed in the UK or had been living there for at least 3 months with the primary motivation of work.

The interviews were conducted in Budapest with those migrants who had returned to Hungary (n. 54) and on Skype with those who were still living in the UK during the period of the research (n. 24). The interviews were prearranged, lasting between 40 and 60 min, and were conducted in Hungarian. The use of Skype for research was considered to be the easiest and most cost-efficient way since all the participants affirmed to have good Internet connection and the interview could be conducted "face to face."

The interviews were semistructured containing 21 questions and the demographical data on respondents. The interviews were organized in three sections, in the first section questions were related to the pre-migration stage and aimed to explore the prior knowledge on the host country and the expectations related to the new life stage experience. In the second section, the interview focused on the employment stage in the host country highlighting migrants' adjustment capacities, coping, and adaptation based on their positive and negative feelings and experience. The third part of the interview mainly focused on the overall migration experience whether it had concluded, and the participant returned to the home country or the migrant entered in the consolidation stage of migration and settled in the host country. All interviews were digitally recorded and transcribed for content analysis (Stepchenkova 2012). The data was subsequently coded, categorized, and analyzed thematically in order to identify key issues (Malloy and Fennell 1998; Nickerson 1995).

Despite the fact that our sample is not representative, it is important to highlight the demographical characteristics of the Hungarian labor force in the UK. According to the Home Office Statistics (Accession Monitoring Report May 2004–March 2009) between May 2004 and March 2009, the cumulative total of migrant workers originated from Hungary was 35,925, and 12,805 Hungarians were employed in hospitality and catering. The analysis of this sector is highly relevant since the research sample in this paper is in correlation with the statistical data on registered Hungarian workers. Between May 2004 and March 2009, the proportion of workers from Hungary working in hospitality and catering was greater than in any other nationality. Of those who applied between May 2004 and March 2009, 81 % of registered workers were aged 18–34. It is important to note that analyzing spatial mobility, the most popular destination for migrant workers was London which had 15 % of the total registered workers, and during the statistically monitored period, the cumulative total of 47,335 migrants were employed in hospitality and catering. From Budapest to London, most of the respondents traveled by

low-cost airline carriers. The convenience sample (n. 78) showed that 45 participants in the research were living and working in London. Individuals in the sample were young, 29 respondents belonged to the age group 18–24, while 40 participants were among 24–44 years old.

9.4 Findings

In this paper, the research is focused on the emotional aspects of Hungarian labor mobility. In particular, the empirical study evidenced the emotions and expectations of migrants employed in the tourism and hospitality sector.

9.4.1 Pre-migration Stage and Perceptions About the Host Country

Getting information on job possibilities and social environment Hungarian migrants used online forums to extend their social network. The majority of the respondents claimed that after taking the decision to travel to the UK with working motivations, they invested a great amount of time on online forums to gather as much information on the host country as possible. Information available on the Internet, virtual communities, and online social contacts were considered to be crucial for migrants:

> After taking the decision to go to work to the UK I spent a lot of time on the internet, reading forums and searching for information on jobs and other. Fortunately I have found many things. [male, 25–44, London]

Beside the Internet, the primary sources of information about the UK and about the job opportunities, legal restrictions, health insurance, and general living conditions were offered by family members and friends already employed in the UK:

> I had never been to the UK before, so I had no idea about it. I had information through my friends who were working in the UK for three months already. Also many of mine acquaintances had been there so I had some information also from them. The internet was extremely useful. [. . .] I knew that I would have a completely different life in the UK. [female, 25–44, London]

During the interviews, participants were asked about their perceptions about the UK and the image they had about the place where they planned to live for a period of time. Confirming the results of other previous research, respondents mentioned several sources of information to influence their perception about the place. The answers were content analyzed and categorized as follows: (1) the country attracted me since childhood; (2) I have studied/read a lot about British culture and history; (3) I have visited the country as a tourist; (4) I have seen it in several films and television programs; (5) my family members/friends who are settled in the UK have spoken a lot about it.

Respondents who have had previous knowledge about the British culture and history stated that they imagined the UK as an aristocratic country where people are well-mannered and kind but in the same time strict and distant. Migrants' expectations about their receiving country were based on their studies and information gathered from history and literature school books. Most respondents affirmed that novels and films set in the UK influenced the image they had about the host country. The minor part of the participants in the empirical research had already visited the UK as a tourist. Perceptions elaborated during these tourist journeys show a wide range of first impressions about the country and its inhabitants. During the interviews, several first impressions were recalled which reflect a general perception about the place. These impressions were considered to be strange or different compared to what the respondents considered to be "normal" in their home country. Food was a frequently mentioned factor embedded among tourist memories. British food in general was considered by respondents to be strange and fatty, only the "full English breakfast" was recorded with positive adjectives.

The multiculturality of the British cities and especially the great variety of people and cultures living in London impressed tourists and migrants as well. During the interviews, almost all the respondents recalled that they were surprised to see so many different people and to experience life in such a vibrant city. It is worth to highlight that several participants in the research were originated from small Hungarian cities or rural villages and to imagine themselves to live in such a different environment elicited different emotions. Essentially, the culturally rich environment and the fact that so many nationalities were living in London were conceived positive for migrants. It enhanced the feeling that it would be easier for foreigners to get integrated in a multiethnic society:

I knew that many different people were living in London, so I thought that people were direct and open minded and it would be easy to get integrated. [male, 25–44, London]

Most respondents claimed that although they had no previous experiences about a multicultural society, their expectations were positive about it. These expectations in many cases however were not confirmed since establishing contacts with British citizens, a pivotal sign of integration, resulted to be difficult. Respondents cited that they were able to accomplish social contacts with fellow foreign migrants who were in their similar conditions.

Expectations enhancing migration were fuelled by the wish to earn much more than in the home country and possibly with less working hours. Indeed, most respondents affirmed that their greatest expectation was to get a high salary:

The first time when I decided to go to work abroad I could think only about the great amount of money that I would earn. If I have to be honest I did not even consider whether the working conditions were better or worse compared to my job in Hungary. I thought that the money would compensate me for the poor working conditions. [male, 25–44, Minehead]

Migrant workers usually earn less than nationals and they tend to accept the lowest-grade jobs. The main reasons are: lack of sufficient language skills, knowledge about the working culture and lack of social networks. Respondents in our research confirmed these results claiming that they had quickly realized that to

work in the UK is not a "triumphal march" and they had to cope with several unexpected situations in their host country. Unrealistic high expectations can result in low satisfaction; reality can be a sort of shock for newcomers (Brown et al. 2008).

9.4.2 Initial Stage of Migration and Elicited Emotions

The interviews (n. 78) were content analyzed, and answers were categorized according to the elicited emotions related to the different stages of migration. Expectations related to the future host country and its inhabitants are analyzed in the previous paragraph. The initial stage of migration was defined in this research to indicate the first months (3–4 months) of living abroad. In particular, this stage of mobility is highly sensitive because of the living conditions; the first working experiences; the contact with flatmates, neighbors, and colleagues; and the immersion into a completely different life situation mean changes and challenges in all the aspects of everyday life. In the in-depth interviews, respondents were explicitly asked about their disappointments and their satisfaction generated by mobility. Thus, the content analysis of the texts provided the opportunity to establish the following categories constructing the emotional background of mobility: (1) disappointments; (2) difficulties and features of living abroad; (3) satisfaction and happiness; and (4) "I would have never thought."

Disappointment is one of the negative emotional experiences related to the perception of reality (Smith et al. 2003). More fundamentally, disappointment is reflecting the frustration of expectations. The extent of the reaction arising from disappointment depends on the so-called frustration tolerance. Respondents addressed several aspects of mobility that caused disappointment for them. The sources of disappointment caused by external factors were identified to be related to the lodging conditions, general living conditions, and working conditions:

> *My room was small and smelly. I was crying while entering there. It was awful.* [female, 18–24, London]
> *My flat was very much under the basic Hungarian living standards.* [male, 18–24, London]
> *At my workplace reality was completely different from what we had agreed upon.* [male, 18–24, London]

Most of the Hungarian migrants participating in our research (more than 31 % of the respondents) claimed that they had no prior expectations related to their future working and living conditions. One of the interviewees stated that she was prepared for the worst. In the initial stage of migration, they would have accepted any kind of legal job. Hence, it is worth to note that 17 % of the respondents affirmed the wish to be employed in the tourism and hospitality sector. During the interviews, it emerged that there is a secondary source of disappointment that could be defined as internal source of frustration. These internal sources of disappointment were related

to language skills, working skills, and to the contrast between the "old" and the "new" self of the migrant:

> *I thought that I was fluent in English. I was studying English for twelve years, but I had communication problems.* [female, 18–24, Brighton]
>
> *It was so frustrating to think that I would become a housekeeper.* [female, 25–44, London]
>
> *I am doing a job that I had never ever accepted to do at home.* [female, 25–44, London]
>
> *My biggest disappointment was with people. They disdain us.* [female, 25–44, London]

Difficulties emerge in every life situation, and starting a new life in a foreign country, even if it is planned for a short period of time, generates several emotional challenges. In fact, following the content analysis of the interviews under the category of "difficulties" related to the mobility, those experiences and feelings are gathered that had to be overcome with flexibility and acceptance from the part of the migrant. Fear, homesickness, sadness, and loneliness were mentioned by respondents as the major difficulties during the initial stage of migration. One of the respondents who has been working in a pub in London since 2004 claimed that the difficulties were related to the living conditions. She would have preferred to rent a flat by her own, but it was expensive, and she had to share even her room. She said that in the flat, it was extremely cold, but they "*managed to survive.*"

Respondents recalled numerous episodes which generated positive feelings for them and elicited satisfaction and happiness. It must be mentioned here that the perception and interpretation of reality depend on personal traits and internal sources which differ from one person to another. Many interviewees underlined that they were open minded and optimist who liked working with people and are able to adapt quickly to new situations:

> *I hoped to get a job in London, but I am happy that things went in a different way. I thought that the capital city was itself a miracle but I was disappointed about it. I had no idea about the villages or small cities, I have never wanted to go there. Now I am really happy to work here, I would not change this peaceful environment for London.* [male, 25–44, Warwick]

Happy moments were linked to leisure time or to apparently insignificant moments when migrants felt "at home" in the host country. One of the respondents recalled that her happiest moment in the UK was when she went fishing with her colleagues and she was as annoyed as she used to be with her grandfather at home. Most respondents affirmed that they just accepted the way things happened around them, and they tried to get used to it. In fact, adjustment capacities are evidenced through the interviews when respondents outlined how they reacted with flexibility to challenges at their workplace.

The "I would have never thought" category, in our understanding, reflects in the best way migrants' adjustment capacities. During the interviews and the elaboration of the content analysis, this was a frequently repeated phrase to indicate the unexpected situations but also the unexpected reactions from the migrants themselves. Respondents claimed that they discovered new features of their character which could emerge only in the particular situations of initial stage of migration. In fact, respondents commented that coping with acculturation stress was alleviated

through flexibility, less critical attitude, and acceptance of the fact that usually challenges can be faced in a multitude of manners. One of the respondents reminded that she could trust only in her efforts and that she "*had to solve everything with the awareness that she could succeed or fail*." Furthermore, the willingness to succeed and the wish to make the best out of the mobility experience gave energy to face difficulties. As one of the respondents highlighted, she wanted to find a job very hard; it was her primary goal and nothing else mattered. Most respondents mentioned that they would have never thought to establish contacts with so many different nationalities and to feel at home in the company of other fellow Central Eastern European migrants. Mobility is entwined with the wish to escape from the well-known everyday life in the home country. In this respect, many respondents who planned to stay in the UK for a short period of time, more or less 1 year, claimed that it was surprising to them to feel homesickness. To sum up, it emerged from the results that adjustments capacities and coping with acculturation stress were handled by migrants using those efforts and personal traits they had never thought to possess.

9.4.3   The Consolidation Stage of Mobility

In this migration stage, social networks are already established, the initial shock of being catapulted into a brand-new situation is disappeared, and the first difficulties are overcome. The retrospective accounts of our respondents were focused on the reasons why they chose to settle in the UK. Thus, in this paragraph those in-depth interviews are reported that were conducted with the 24 Hungarians who have been still living and working in the UK during the research and have planned to settle in the host country for a longer period of time (3 or more years). The respondents belonged to the 25–44 age group and were all employed in the tourism and hospitality sector. During the interviews, participants were asked about their overall opinion of their mobility, well-being, and emotions:

> *At the beginning I had bad jobs*; *I suffered homesickness which was unbearable. This influenced my mood and everything in my life. I had to return home for a couple of months. I improved my English because I thought that was the problem. When I came back to Norwich*, *I could handle better my homesickness and the humiliations and other. Since we are living here with my boyfriend*, *I consider this place my home. But my HOME is always Hungary*. [female, 25–44, Norwich]

Most of the respondents claimed that establishing social contacts with colleagues and neighbors and enhancing their network capital as much in the physical as in the virtual environment eased their decision to settle in the UK. Much importance was given to virtual contacts with the loved ones living in Hungary, and migrants reported that to buy a good laptop and to establish a fast Internet connection at home were among the first needs to be solved in order to nurse at-a-distance relationships. Moreover, respondents affirmed that the virtual communities

established by Hungarian migrants living in the UK were useful to share information, to chat, or to meet each other.

Respondents recalled that their primary reason of labor mobility was to earn as much as possible in order to return to the home country and to afford a higher standard of living and a balanced well-being. It must be added that in Hungary which has been going through significant economic and social transformations and was whisked away by the financial and economic crisis migration offered a possible alternative for individuals to escape. Furthermore, several years of working experience abroad and good language skills are added values to migrants' human capital whether they consider to return to Hungary or not.

Network capital established in the host country is conceived as one of the most relevant features of migrants' well-being. Adjustment capacities are reinforced by everyday contacts with co-nationals, with colleagues from different nationalities, and in more contacts with local people. Even though most of the respondents affirmed to have less contact with British people that were considered to be strange by them in the initial stage of migration, they got used to it after a while. Establishing relationships with so many different nationalities and to meet such diverse culture in everyday life elicited the feeling of being a cosmopolitan citizen proud of its origin and of its diversity.

Considering the emotional background of settlement in the host country, respondents stated to live a less stressful life in the UK. The interviews revealed that the working environment, despite the initial difficulties, was considered more balanced and less stressing in the UK than in Hungary. Moreover, coping with acculturation stress was overcome in the initial stage of migration, and after having established a routine for everyday life, migrants felt comfortable in the host country. Accordingly, to get a high salary has not constituted a priority anymore because it has been substituted by better working conditions, better career opportunities, and experience-seeking along with living in a restful environment.

9.5   Conclusions

The empirical research focused on the Hungarian migrants' experiences in the UK and the emotional background related to mobility. The peculiarity of Hungarian nationality in mobilities can be traced in the culturally specific attitude and work ethics. During the interviews, most respondents affirmed to have become embittered because in the UK, anyone coming from Central Eastern Europe is thought to belong to one nationality. Following the EU accession in 2004, labor mobility from Poland was intensive, and the campaigns around the issues of the "Polish plumber" were embedded in social discourses on mobility. Polish communities are visible because they attend Christian religious ceremonies and do their shopping in national shops and the overall perception is that Polish are everywhere (Janta et al. 2011a, b).

Hungarians are proud of their culture, of their non-Indo-European language, and of their work ethics. In Hungary following the collapse of the Communist rule over the social and political system, employees and society in general, for the first time, had to face unemployment. Mobility related to labor appeared to be a brand-new phenomenon. During the 40 years of Communism, not only traveling was state controlled but mobility in general was nonexistent. Novels and films set in the United States of America transmitted the image of labor mobility, but from the European periphery stuck in stationary life and immobility, it was almost an unbelievable phenomenon. Expectations related to political freedom, to the opening of the Western countries toward Hungary and the faithful trust to be accepted and to reenter the European community, all slogans of the EU enlargement, were in part embittered by reality.

The stereotype of the Hungarian employee as in the Socialist era as today has been the image of a hard worker and precise and trustful workforce. Being accepted, understood, and valued by the employer and by society constitutes the key features of the Hungarian spirit and is overwhelming in the emotional background of mobility. According to this understanding, consciousness of one's own value is conceived to have a key role in the emotional reactions while living abroad. Hungarian employees usually have a healthy self-image and consciousness of their own skills, diligence, and reliability. Being immigrants from Central Eastern Europe forces on them the stereotype of "the Eastern migrant" who is some how disdained. This change of perspective to position oneself in society is not free of emotional turmoil. The lack of emotional well-being might affect migrants' working capacity and efficiency and might decrease their work achievement. Negative emotions linked to mobility have a key role in the word of mouth among family members, friends, acquaintances, and even in the virtual communities of Hungarian migrants. Sharing negative experiences or the unhappy moments experienced as an immigrant might have a discouraging effect on co-nationals to migrate to the UK.

Current thinking on international migration suggests that the phenomenon should be observed and analyzed from a multitude of aspects. The categories of highly skilled and low-skilled migrants have become superfluous distinctions because in the initial stage of migration highly skilled migrants, in some cases, would accept any kind of legal job.

Furthermore, the three different stages of mobility delineated in this paper are based on the categories emerging from the interviews. The limits of this research are the lack of empirical evidence whether these stages can be separated, or overlaps among the stages can be demonstrated. Most of the respondents claimed that they had some information and a perceived image about their host country; however, in the initial stage of migration, they realized that their expectations could not be met immediately. It is worth to note that migrants who had family members or friends already employed in the UK and had a relatively good level of English had higher expectations than those who just jumped into the mobility experience and would have accepted any kind of job in the initial stage of migration.

The wider interconnections of tourism and hospitality employment, mobility, and emotions are only just starting to be fully explored. This research aimed to

contribute to the advancement of knowledge in the emotional background of mobility by analyzing the perceptions, feelings, and opinion of the overall migration experience of Hungarian migrants in the UK. The understanding of contemporary migration flows reveals that several factors and motivations influence mobility in which network capital, experience-seeking, and the wish to improve language and professional skills are as relevant as economical benefits (Williams and Baláž 2008).

The changing paradigm related to labor mobility, the recognition of the own efforts, and willingness related to career opportunities are enhanced by the peculiar situation of international migration. Most respondents affirmed that it was a surprise for them to realize that they could solve difficult and unexpected situations with flexibility and open mindedness. These personal traits, attitude, and the prompt reaction to unexpected situations are added values to human capital which are given a high relevance in the international labor market.

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Chapter 10
Accompanying the Stranger in a Context of Political Impasse and Constraints: New Sanctuary Movement Philadelphia

Miguel Glatzer and Tara Carr-Lemke

Abstract This chapter presents a case study of New Sanctuary Movement Philadelphia, an interfaith organization that works to promote the rights and dignity of undocumented immigrants in the city. Designed to give ample decision-making on priorities and strategy to immigrant members, NSM Philadelphia engages allied congregations from a wide variety of faith communities in a number of supportive roles. The chapter begins by providing some brief context on attitudes towards immigrants in Philadelphia, the political impasse on immigration reform at the federal level and background information on the sanctuary movement of the 1980s, as well as the reasons for its reemergence as the New Sanctuary Movement in the 2000s. Using interviews with members of the leadership team who were born in the USA but come from different faiths, the paper explores the religious understanding that underpins their deep involvement with undocumented immigrants and the organization. The chapter then analyses the functioning of the organization, both in terms of its campaigns and its longer-standing programmes.

Keywords Undocumented immigration • New Sanctuary Movement • United States immigration policies • Solidarity • Accompaniment

10.1 Introduction

Across the rich democracies, politics and policy towards unauthorized immigrants have turned harsh. Past experiences of amnesties and routes to regularization or legal status have been largely abandoned. Instead, many European countries have seen the continued rise of explicitly anti-immigrant parties or the co-optation of

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many of these positions by mainstream parties. Australia has prevented boats from landing on its shores or processed unauthorized immigrants on remote islands. Although roughly equal numbers of people (or slight majorities) express sympathy for unauthorized immigrants and support a path to regularization of status, the USA has not escaped the trend. Instead, it has fortified its Southern border with Mexico, reduced the discretion of immigration judges, engaged in an unprecedented dragnet of deportation and opened new detention centres for unauthorized immigrants.

In a context of harshness, movements and organizations that work to empower unauthorized immigrants, change public opinion and alter policy play a critical role. This chapter presents a case study of one such organization: the New Sanctuary Movement of Philadelphia (also known as NSM Philadelphia). It presents an analysis of the organization and its strategy and focuses in particular not on members who are unauthorized immigrants but on the motivations and strategies of members of its leadership team who are US citizens. Religious tradition is central to the New Sanctuary Movement in general and to NSM Philadelphia in particular. To understand general strategy as well as the distinct theological understandings that underpin the calling to engage on the issue of unauthorized immigration, interviews with leadership members of different faiths were conducted. The interviews are complemented by newspaper coverage of the organization as well as information produced by the organization itself and presented on its website.

The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 10.2 provides information on Philadelphia, as well as the larger political context of failure in Washington to pass comprehensive immigration reform. Section 10.3 provides a brief history of the original sanctuary movement, formed in opposition to the US role in the conflicts in Central America in the 1980s and the immigrant flows those conflicts produced. Section 10.4 focuses on the religious understandings of a Catholic, Jewish and Baptist member of the leadership team of NSM Philadelphia. Section 10.5 describes the organization's strategy, accomplishments and some of its challenges. Section 10.6 concludes.

10.2 Philadelphia and the Federal Immigration Impasse

The fifth largest city in the USA, Philadelphia has a long history of immigration. As the largest town in the USA during the revolution and the first capital of the new country, Philadelphia had a vital role in the eighteenth-century immigration. It continued this role as a mass gateway in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. On the banks of the Delaware River just south of Philadelphia and now near derelict stands Lazarus Station. Built in 1799 in reaction to a yellow fever epidemic and in operation until 1895, Lazarus Station, where immigrants landed and where some were quarantined, predates Ellis Island by almost a century. By some estimates, one in three Americans today has an ancestor who entered through Lazarus Station (Independence Hall Association n.d.). Between 1815 and 1985, an estimated 1.3 million people arrived in the USA via Philadelphia (Miller n.d.). In the second half

of the twentieth century, however, the city suffered a number of significant challenges. Middle class flight to the suburbs, deindustrialization, the ensuing loss of manufacturing jobs and a poorly performing public school system led to decades of population decline (Singer et al. 2008; Takenaka and Osirim 2010). Recent upticks in population are partially the result of young professionals and retirees moving to the city, but are also the result of immigrants settling there. Seeing the benefits to the city and its tax base that a higher population brings, city leaders have welcomed the recent increase in immigration.

Perhaps reflective of the city's long history of immigration, as well as recent pro-immigrant statements by local leaders, public opinion towards immigrants is somewhat more positive than in the nation as a whole. In a 2012 poll conducted by the Pew Philadelphia Research Initiative, 51 % of Philadelphians agreed that immigrants had strengthened the city, while 34 % thought they represented a burden on school resources, housing and social services (Matza 2012). By contrast, a 2010 Pew poll that asked the same question nationally found that 44 % of Americans agreed that immigrants "strengthened" their community, while 42 % thought of them as "a burden". More recently, in 2013, 62 % of Philadelphians expressed sympathy for immigrants who are in the country illegally, while 33 % said they were unsympathetic. Fifty-one percent said unauthorized immigrants took jobs that Americans did not want, while 37 % said they took jobs from US citizens (Pew Charitable Trust, cited in Gallagher 2014). A series of interviews with long-term residents of the city found that most praised the immigrant work ethic. A majority also felt that immigrants help stabilize declining neighbourhoods by buying and fixing property and by opening new businesses (Gallagher 2014). However, a substantial minority worried about immigrants using government services, lowering wages and the lack of assimilation.

If Philadelphia is generally supportive of immigration, the country as a whole is relatively divided. This division is both a cause and reflection of the long-standing political impasse on comprehensive immigration reform at the federal level. However, the impasse on comprehensive reform should not be taken to mean that federal policy on immigration has been stable. Far from it. Over the last 15 years, immigration policy at the federal level has shifted decidedly towards militarization of the border, enforcement of immigration law and mass deportations.

Although President George W. Bush argued that outreach to Hispanic voters needed to be an important priority for the Republican Party, and despite his strong advocacy on its behalf, comprehensive immigration reform failed to pass the Congress during his administration. The numerous attempts at immigration reform (such as the Comprehensive Enforcement and Immigration Reform Act of 2005, the Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2006 and the Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2007) shared some basic principles. They tried to balance greater border security with a path to regularization and citizenship for undocumented immigrants in the country and, in some cases, to changes in the visa system to allow the entry of greater numbers of highly skilled immigrants.

The failure to pass comprehensive immigration reform was in part an indirect effect of the 9/11 attacks and the reaction to them. Led by the White House, the

USA adopted an extraordinary security posture. Fears that terrorists might cross the unsecured borders fed the fortification and militarization of the border. US Border Patrol saw substantial increases in both staffing and technology. Not only was the border fortified with walls and fences in many sections, but the barriers were complemented with cameras and high-technology motion sensors, many of which were installed through contracts with defence establishment firms (New York Times 2009b). Fences and barriers were primarily placed in areas where numbers of illegal crossings were high, typically urban areas of the border or areas where roads were nearby. Predictably, the result was not simply deterrence of illegal crossings; migrants started to take riskier routes through the desert. As a consequence, deaths on the US side of the border, from dehydration, injury or disorientation, shot up (New York Times 2009a).

The Bush administration also undertook significant increases in deportations. Some of these, such as workplace raids where agents targeted locations like meat-processing plants or garment factories that employed many unauthorized immigrants, gained national media attention and provoked considerable controversy, as they frequently resulted in chaos (Bernstein 2009). Particularly when both parents, working in the same plant, were detained at the same time, children returned home to no parent. Frequent movement of parents from one detention centre to another, often hundreds of miles away, made it difficult for children and parents to contact each other; as a result, some of the children were placed in the custody of children's protective services. Deaths on the border and the agony of the workplace raids would both play a role in the emergence of the New Sanctuary Movement.

Despite pro-immigrant promises and support for initiatives like the Dream Act, President Obama is viewed by advocates for immigrants as having a decidedly mixed and in some ways deeply troubling record. The label "Deportation President" is an accurate description as over two million people have been deported during his administration. With over 400,000 people deported in some years, the rate far exceeds any previous administration, including that of President George W. Bush. The administration has argued that although it can use discretion in deciding whom to deport, it is required to carry out the law. It also argues that the increase in deportations is in part the result of tighter enforcement at the border and that investing in greater security at the border was crucial to its strategy of encouraging a divided Congress to pass comprehensive immigration legislation. As it became clear that comprehensive immigration reform would be blocked in the Congress, President Obama promised to take executive action. However, repeated delays in carrying out these promises, most recently in the summer and fall of 2014, led advocates of immigration reform to feel betrayed. The administration acknowledged that the delays were primarily the result of electoral concerns and argued that maintaining democratic control of the Senate in the 2014 midterm elections was properly a higher priority than fulfilling a promise on the timing of executive action on immigration. As it turned out, delaying this action was not sufficient to save the Senate, which turned to Republican control.

10.3 The Sanctuary Movement in the USA and Its Reemergence as the New Sanctuary Movement

The modern sanctuary movement is centrally connected to the Central American conflicts of the early 1980s, principally in El Salvador and Guatemala and to a substantially lesser effect in Nicaragua, and to the refugee flows these conflicts engendered. Religiously grounded, the sanctuary movement arose in opposition both to US foreign policy in Central America and in particular to US policy towards the migrants fleeing government repression and violence (Crittenden 1988). Appalled by the inability of these migrants to secure refugee status and by the terrible fates that were likely to befall them if they returned to El Salvador or Guatemala, churches and synagogues started to offer refuge on their property to migrants in defiance of federal law. Doing so subjected supporters to prosecution. In 1985 and 1986, in what would become high-profile cases, charges of conspiracy and encouraging and aiding illegal aliens to enter the USA were brought against members of the sanctuary movement (Cunningham 1995). The movement fought back in the courts, arguing that the US government was violating refugee law, as well as in the court of public opinion through protests at offices of the Immigration and Naturalization Service and, eventually, through the lobbying of the Congress. In 1990 the Congress passed a bill granting temporary protected status to Central Americans and 7 years later permitted Central American refugees to apply for permanent residence. By then, the sanctuary movement had largely ebbed.

The New Sanctuary Movement represents a resurgence of religiously motivated action on behalf of unauthorized immigrants (Salvatierra 2007). It rose in the mid-2000s, also in response to US government policy. As mentioned above, following September 11, 2001, the USA devoted ever greater sums to border security as well as to enforcement of immigration law through detention and deportation of increasing numbers of undocumented immigrants. The political climate towards immigration turned ugly, with increases in fear mongering and nativist sentiment, particularly in the Republican Party, fuelled in part by important members of the party (Malkin 2002; Buchanan 2006; Ramos and Chamberlain 2008). Indeed, in the 2007–2008 Republican primary, candidates assailed one another for being soft on illegal immigrants and lobbed charges that rivals were presiding over "sanctuary cities" where local government was prohibited from informing the federal government when an undocumented immigrant used city services (Luo 2007).

Border deaths, workplace raids and a bitter political rhetoric were the seed for the New Sanctuary Movement. In this context, a religiously understood ethic of compassion would compel some to join not only in charity but in an effort to move beyond it to grapple with the roots of the problem, challenge policy and at times engage in civil disobedience. This was particularly the case at the border but also extended to the interior of the country and to lobbying in Washington (Campese and Groody 2008; Doty 2006; Hagan 2008; Hondagneu-Sotelo 2008; Hoover 1998; Rose 2012). Groups like the Samaritans, Humane Borders and No More Border Deaths emerged to offer succour to migrants crossing dangerous territory and to

document hardship and death. The conviction of Walt Staton, who placed water jugs on a federal wildlife reserve in the Arizona Desert, on the charge of littering drew wide attention both to the issue of migrant deaths and to the civil disobedience of those trying to help migrants. Refusing to pay the fine, Staton was sentenced to probation, 300 hours of community service and prohibited from returning to the reserve for a year (New York Times 2009a; Greer 2009).

10.4   The Role of Religion Among Members of the Leadership Team of NSM Philadelphia

For NSM Philadelphia, like the Sanctuary and New Sanctuary Movements more generally, faith plays a crucial role. Many activities involve prayer and religious songs, and joint action frequently employs religious imagery and tradition. A deep sense of belief and a religious understanding of justice undergirds the mission and work of the organization. While faith based and non-denominational, NSM also welcomes non-believers. Interviews with members of the leadership team (the Executive Director and members of the Board) quickly revealed a common theme. Regardless of their particular faith, all shared the notion, expressed by Executive Director Peter Pedemonti, of having a "responsibility to the people who are now here to help them lead a more dignified life" (Pedemonti, interview).

For Pedemonti, Catholic moral and social teaching and the Catholic perspective are central to his stance. For him, the exhortations to love one's neighbour and to welcome the stranger are ideas to take seriously and practice literally. Furthermore, the concept of neighbour is much broader than mere physical proximity. The parable of the Good Samaritan, the idea that all are created in the image of God and the itinerant nature of Jesus's life, from the very beginning onwards, are important anchors of the idea that we must care about migrants and strangers. God shows up in and moves through the poor and the oppressed: Jesus was not a king but a member of a marginalized class. He was poor and a stranger and with Joseph and Mary was in flight from danger.

For Peter Pedemonti and many others involved in the New Sanctuary Movement, immigration law does not serve God's law. Rather fears of terrorism, drugs and scarcity drive the politics of immigration in ways that run counter to crucial elements of Catholic teaching, which is rooted in love. The reaction of the country to the crisis of unaccompanied children in the summer of 2014, which involved panic and strong steps to stem the tide, is evidence, if proof was needed, of how fear rather than love guide our immigration policies. For Pedemonti, instances where immigrants won their legal cases against large odds (e.g. in a case where four undocumented women found the courage to testify and where their testimony trumped that of three police officers) are evidence that God is present and working for justice. Although God's work is hard, faith, prayer and spiritual sacrifice such as fasts are powerful. Not only do faith and these activities help bond the community,

motivate the congregations and offer spiritual succour to immigrants facing highly stressful situations, they are also effective. How else to explain cases of success against such difficult odds?

This religious calling to be concerned about marginalized communities leads to a commitment to engage in civil disobedience when necessary and after careful deliberation. "When politics and laws run counter to faith, we are called to change and to work for justice in an attempt to bring this world as close to the reign of God as possible" (Pedemonti, interview). While Martin Luther King, Jr., and the civil rights movement is an inspiration, the roots of civil disobedience go much farther back in time. Jesus frequently challenged the laws publicly, in front of the authorities, and thus took risks in doing so.

Having written letters, visited legislators and marched and gotten arrested in front of the White House, in 2015 NSM decided that it was time to take the next step. This was to offer sanctuary and to do so highly publicly, inviting a great deal of media coverage and placing the government in a difficult situation from the point of view of public relations. Sanctuary involves harbouring in a church, synagogue or other place of worship an immigrant who has exhausted all appeals and has received a final order of deportation. It differs from most forms of civil disobedience, such as when a group blocks a street or trespasses, because the law that is the subject of the protest is the very one that is being broken (in this way, it offers parallels to Gandhi's strategy of protesting British bans on Indian salt-making and textile-making by directly violating those laws). The logic and goals of sanctuary are rich and complex. They include "breaking a law that is unjust; taking a risk to follow God's law; calling attention to an unjust law; making the conflict and trauma involved in the law visible; and having people who are unaffected take risks in solidarity" (Pedemonti, interview).

Of course, not all Catholics support NSM's vision or strategy. Many rank immigration issues considerably lower on their list of priorities or agree with the government's policies of greater border controls and enforcement of deportation orders. They might side with the institutional church that has pushed judgement and exclusion to a much greater extent than compassion and grace and focused on personal sin (abortion, contraception and gay marriage) much more than its social teaching. Many of these Catholics see the issue of unauthorized immigration in moral terms as well, but for them it is wrong to break the law. A frequent position is to ask why unauthorized immigrants can't come legally. They might refer to the precept to render unto Caesar what is Caesar's and to God what is God's. Interestingly, at times the concept of American exceptionalism can get infused with religion: God has special plans for the USA. God has made the borders or approves of them.

Rabbi Ramberg is a Jewish member of the board who once worked for a farmworker union in Oregon. Visiting a poorly maintained labour hostel was a transformative moment, one that resonated with the Passover story of people enslaved in another society. For him, the liberation that Jews celebrate with Passover "needs to happen here and now for immigrants" (Ramberg, interview).

Judaism's commandment to be kind to the stranger, to not oppress the stranger, is another central theme that informs his work on behalf of immigrants. Appearing at multiple points in the Torah, this can be found in Exodus, Leviticus and Deuteronomy, among other places. The story of Abraham and Sarah, for example, notes that their tent was open on all sides. In Midrash interpretation, this detail indicates their hospitality. They would welcome strangers no matter their origins or their destination. Similarly, Jacob has to flee because his life is in danger. Most well known, of course, is the Passover story of Moses and the flight from slavery to the Promised Land. "You know the heart of a stranger because you were once a stranger in the land of Egypt" is a powerful interpretation of the biblical meaning of these stories. Jews' own history of having to move, of the search for a dignified life, echoes and reinforces these biblical stories. Together, they constitute a powerful case for showing kindness to immigrants.

In Philadelphia this school of thought resulted in a synagogue called Mishkan Shalom. Founded in the 1980s as part of the original sanctuary movement concerned with US role in Central America's conflicts and the people thereby displaced, the congregation chose the name Mishkan, which means sanctuary or dwelling place in Hebrew, intentionally. Today the congregation continues to be involved with social justice issues, but most of its energy is directed towards POWER Philadelphia, an advocacy group whose focus is jobs, education and health in the city.

Like Catholics who feel differently about supporting unauthorized immigrants, Jews who feel the same way are likely to emphasize the need to balance compassion with the requirement to follow the law. When asked about their own family history, they are likely to emphasize the legal means through which their family arrived in the USA. Distinct from Catholics, however, is an interpretive debate on the meaning of the word "stranger" in the Torah. For some, the word refers more narrowly to converts to Judaism. There is thus a theological debate within Judaism regarding how broadly to interpret the biblical obligation to strangers.

For Jewish congregations, the process of accompaniment (described in greater detail in the next section) may in some ways be more difficult than with Christian congregations, as the congregation and the immigrant typically lack common rituals and holidays that can be easily shared together. Accompaniment tends to work well when there are repeated interactions between the immigrant and the congregation. In the most recent accompaniment case of the synagogue, Pedro visited perhaps three times over the course of a year and half, at the start of the process, in the middle and in the conclusion. While this was by no means solely due to religious differences, they played a part and the experience raised an important issue. How to spend time together and what to do together if we are Jewish and celebrating a Jewish service and the immigrant is Christian became a somewhat awkward question for both parties.

For Caroline Cargo, an ordained Baptist minister who is a member of the Board, the Bible reminds us to be concerned about the poor and about the strangers among us. For her, several passages are central to her religiously grounded commitment to undocumented immigrants. Among these are Jesus's words harking back to Isaiah

61:1: "The Spirit of the Lord is on me, because he has anointed me to proclaim good news to the poor. He has sent me to proclaim freedom for the prisoners and recovery of sight for the blind, to set the oppressed free". She also cites "Love your neighbour as yourself", and Matthew 25:45: "Then they themselves also will answer, 'Lord, when did we see You hungry, or thirsty, or a stranger, or naked, or sick, or in prison, and did not take care of You?' Then He will answer them, 'Truly I say to you, to the extent that you did not do it to one of the least of these, you did not do it to Me'".

She argues that as a Baptist it is important to remember those who have gone before. One example is Martin Luther King, Jr., and his call for people to witness to the Bible and thereby transform reality. Another is Walter Rauschenbusch who worked in Hell's Kitchen in New York City and was a pioneering figure in the Social Gospel Movement. He did "core thinking on the sin of institutions and within social structures that oppress, arguing that salvation is not solely personal, but also found in the transformation of sinful structures around us. He preached that we are not only searching for salvation in the beyond/heaven, we are also called to create a world where the Kingdom of God breaks in" (Cargo, interview).

For Cargo, the term Baptist "means a whole lot of things, including social analysis and reform". Cargo feels connected to Central Baptist Church, the American Baptist Church that is a part of NSM Philadelphia, because she sees it as seeking and thinking deeply about social transformation and justice.

Of course not all Baptists read the Bible in the same way and nor do all share her commitment to social transformation. In her view, it can be "easy for Christians to think in terms of charity, with hearts full of compassion to meet present needs, but to avoid moving beyond [this] to ask questions of the reasons for poverty and injustice. It can be easy to set up a food pantry and feel as though you are doing God's work and following God's word, yet this is not the full measure of extending biblical justice".

While these members of the leadership team all see their understandings of Catholicism, Judaism and the Baptist Church as central to their work with undocumented immigrants, it is important to note the routes they took to these religious interpretations and in particular to the role played by family and experiences of the world.

Peter Pedemonti's parents are both immigrants from Europe. His father migrated as a child after World War Two with his parents. They had been poor farmers in Northern Italy who had faced hunger and malnutrition during the war. In the USA, Peter's paternal grandparents encountered lingering anti-Italian sentiment. As immigrants and non-English speakers, they were also occasionally taken advantage of and cheated. Peter's mother, by contrast, is English and from an upper class family. Growing up with stories his family told and seeing the different treatment his mother received, Peter was particularly attuned to immigration and the experience of immigrants.

As an adult, he was shocked, angered and saddened by the wave of anti-immigrant sentiment, anti-immigrant legislation and the "terrible" policies. He also saw the difference that race played in his family's immigration experience as

compared to immigrants of colour. Being white opened up "so many more opportunities" that immigrants of colour never have. "This family experience and history is not the same as the current experience of immigrants of colour today, but it does allow me to reflect and process and then become a stronger ally" (Pedemonti, interview).

Shortly before moving to Philadelphia to join the House of Grace Catholic Worker, a faith-based intentional community that operates a free medical clinic, works for social justice and has a house of hospitality for immigrants and refugees, he saw a programme on Elvira, who was in sanctuary in 2006/2007 in a Chicago Church. "I was so inspired by her act of civil disobedience and by this faith community that was putting its foot down, and refusing to obey a law that violated God's law". A few months later at the Catholic Worker, he met a United Church of Christ pastor and they started organizing NSM of Philadelphia. "It really feels like those two pieces came together – my family and my faith" (Pedemonti, interview).

Rabbi Ramberg mentioned the influence of his parents who worked on civil rights and women's rights in Jackson, Mississippi. After college, he lived in Peru as a Fulbright scholar and studied democracy and civil society. While there he volunteered with an organization focused on liberation theology. That society showed him a great deal of hospitality. Many had a family in the USA and were trying to get there. While these experiences helped shape his sense of social justice, his commitment to undocumented immigrants in the USA came later, when he worked as an organizer for a farmworker union in Oregon. It was this experience of the lives of immigrant farmworkers where connections between Jewish stories and immigration issues crystallized. This was deepened when, as a rabbinical student, he interned with NSM Philadelphia.

For Cargo, it is crucial that social justice work be grounded in faith and in an interfaith movement. This desire taps into her long-term, personal history with the church. Her roots are in Alabama where she grew up in the 1960s and 1970s. One of her earliest memories of the church is being in the downtown Southern Baptist church in Tuscaloosa when a group of African Americans approached the church and asked to be let in for service. All of the male white deacons linked arms to bar the group's entrance. She connects this action to a song she and children were learning around the same time, "Jesus loves the little children, all the children of the world. Red and yellow, black and white – they are precious in His sight. Jesus loves the little children of the world". For Cargo, it was "so ironic and shocking" to have those words recently incorporated into an understanding of the faith community collide with the action of the deacons of the church. "The juxtaposition of the loving words and the unjust actions really made such an impression on me at that early age" (Cargo, interview). Since that time, she has been very conscious of the church as a force for transformation for good or as a part of a system of oppression. In her own family, this event was pivotal, causing her father to leave the church, while her mother stayed. These choices also led her to consider whether it is best to walk away from an oppressive system of which you are a part or to stay to struggle for change from within. Much later, her time in seminary exposed her to liberation theology, which has informed her faith life and choices ever since.

Her particular involvement in the issue of undocumented immigration is an extension and outgrowth of relationships formed with a sister community in El Salvador by Central Baptist Church, her church in Philadelphia. Central Baptist Church had been part of the original sanctuary movement in the 1980s. That history and those connections with Central America remained a critical part of the life of the congregation. Arriving at Central Baptist Church 15 years ago, she was exposed to the church's ongoing relationships with El Salvadoran communities.

On a trip to El Salvador with her husband and three daughters, she recalls participating in a workshop facilitated by the popular education group, Equipo Maiz. Her group of North Americans were joined by Salvadoran youth from their sister community. The workshop facilitator took the participants through a socio-economic analysis of El Salvador's reality which included a very gloomy outlook. A question grew: "What is the future for the Salvadoran youth?" The response was made in a somewhat flippant way: "Migration to the US". She was left wondering why her own children have opportunities when the Salvadoran young people do not. There seemed to be no sense to this reality.

Cargo identifies this experience as a core impetus for relating to issues of migration in USA. Subsequently, she engaged with migrants in the USA who work to send remittances back home. These experiences provided a personal face to migration and compelled her to become part of the New Sanctuary Movement in Philadelphia when it started to form.

10.5 NSM Philadelphia: Strategy, Accomplishments and Challenges

In its mission statement, NSM Philadelphia presents itself as committed to building "community across faith, ethnicity, and class in its work to end injustices against immigrants regardless of immigration status, express radical welcome for all, and ensure that values of dignity, justice, and hospitality are lived out in practice and upheld in policy" (NSM website). Borrowing a phrase from Martin Luther King, Jr., NSM Philadelphia works "together to bend the arc of the moral universe towards justice and transform our communities into a place where immigrants, families, friends, and neighbours are safe, respected, and welcomed (respetados con dignidad); where economic, spiritual, and emotional wholeness are realized; and where borders and divisions disappear as we build a community welcoming to everyone". Describing itself as a "faith-based immigrant rights organization", it defines its central values in the following list:

"Dignity: As brothers and sisters, we treat everyone with deep honour and respect. We affirm the creative, active power of every individual to make our community and the world better".

"Community: In an inclusive community, we find shared strength, power and
  wisdom that allow us to realize our full potential. For this reason, we intention-
  ally nurture relationships and invite all people to participate".
"Mutuality: We believe that we all have something to give and something to gain.
  When all are invited to the table, everyone benefits. In the spirit of mutual trust,
  we share as equals, learning from each other and growing as individuals".
"Spiritual non-violence: Inspired by the legacy of people of faith who have joined
  together in creative, peaceful movements for social change, we confront violent
  structures and actions with bold compassion and courageous love. We draw on
  our collective courage and strength to stand up for the rights of all people,
  regardless of immigration status".

Member congregations are at the centre of NSM Philadelphia. Composed of
immigrant and allied faith communities alike, "member congregations participate
in trainings, workshops, campaigns, events, accompaniment with families facing
deportation and shared worship services" to "build relationships across faith,
ethnicity and class". The 17 different congregations that currently participate in
NSM Philadelphia span a wide variety of faiths. These include Catholic as well as
mainline Protestant (Methodist), Evangelical, Baptist, Lutheran and Unitarian
Universalist churches and a Jewish synagogue.

The core of NSM's strategy is "empowering affected immigrants to organize for
change and inviting allied members to stand in solidarity with them in order to
create policies that reflect our shared faith values of justice, dignity, and hospitality
for all". Within congregations, the process involves "grassroots organizing (...)
small groups to share stories, support healing as a community, analyze issues, build
skills and strategize for policy change". Crucially, the strategy "builds the individ-
ual and collective capacity of the immigrant community to work for their rights and
structural change". Forming "a caring and supportive community where we can
confront historical barriers of ethnicity, race, class and status", NSM seeks to build
spaces where members can form relationships and where allied congregations can
support the strategies and priorities set by immigrant members. "Together, mem-
bers engage in direct action and reflection. Grounded in traditions of spiritual
nonviolence, we come together to pressure elected officials to create a more just
and welcome city, state and country".

To accomplish this strategy, NSM Philadelphia runs a number of programmes.
Particularly salient is the Accompaniment Program which "pairs immigrants facing
deportation with congregations". Congregations accompany families that are facing
the highly stressful deportation process in multiple ways. These include: "building
relationships through emotional and spiritual support; support in accessing legal
counsel; visiting deportation centres; going to deportation hearings; connecting
families with health care services (including psychological support); attending
rallies" and "connecting immigrants with employment opportunities". At the
same time, immigrant families have "become leaders in the movement for immi-
grant justice in Philadelphia and have spoken at religious services, organized city-
wide rallies, and volunteered with NSM and with their partner congregations". As a

result of their involvement with the Accompaniment Programs, "some immigrant participants have secured legal status in the United States", while "others have had successful legal delays in their deportation".

The New Leadership School, a 5-month course run in collaboration with Training for Change that "educates emerging immigrant leaders to organize for change and immigration justice in Philadelphia" constitutes another programme run by NSM Philadelphia. Themes include grassroots "organizing skills, planning campaigns and meeting facilitation skills".

To provide information about the lives of immigrants in Philadelphia and across the country, NSM staff also lead Immigration 101 Workshops with student groups and allied congregations. Reaching hundreds of people per year, these workshops focus on "the root causes of migration, current immigration policy and immigration as a faith issue" and invite the audience to engage in the immigrant justice movement.

Storytelling Circles were started in the spring of 2009 as a response to the increased deportations that resulted from collaboration between the Philadelphia Police Department (PPD) and the federal Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). In partnership with the Philadelphia Storytelling Project, the first Storytelling Circles involved Mexican and Indonesian faith communities in North and South Philadelphia. Creating opportunities for "healing, reflection, analysis and empowerment", the storytelling process uses "personal testimony as a tool for grassroots mobilization and leadership development". "Immigrants share their stories with each other, with people from allied congregations, and ultimately with officials who have the power to change policies". These testimonies become a means of highlighting "violations of civil and human rights and enable demands for policy changes, such as ending PPD/ICE collaboration".

In addition to the programmes described above, NSM Philadelphia runs campaigns on issues selected by immigrant community members. The process typically starts with a "listening campaign" that lasts two or more months in which undocumented NSM members speak in depth with the immigrant communities. Very importantly, "NSM staff do not choose the campaigns". Rather, undocumented immigrant members of NSM compile and analyse the results to determine the next local campaign in a democratic process.

In 2008, NSM started a campaign to end collaboration between the Philadelphia Police Department (PPD) and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) whereby Philadelphia honoured "ICE holds". These are one page detainers that ask local police and jails to continue to hold people already in their custody for an additional 48 hours until they can be transferred to federal custody (ACLU 2015). ICE holds have played an important role in the federal government's ability to identify and deport unauthorized immigrants because they in effect transform local police departments into an extension of federal immigration enforcement. The system grew rapidly. Over 111,000 people were issued ICE holds through the Secure Communities programme in fiscal year 2010, a more than 500 % increase from FY 2009 (Meissner et al. 2013). While they create considerable fear in immigrant communities that contact with the police and minor brushes with the law can result in deportation, a

number of local police departments have also expressed resistance, arguing that the fear in immigrant communities hampers the ability to solve and reduce local crime. In addition, ICE holds raise serious constitutional questions and can violate the Fourth Amendment (ACLU 2012). Finally, despite claims by ICE that Secure Communities targets "dangerous criminal aliens", an analysis revealed that 82 % of ICE holds in FY 2012 and 2013 were issued to "individuals who either had no convictions or had been at most convicted of a misdemeanour or petty offense" (Matza 2014; TRAC Immigration 2014). The most common offences were driving violations, illegal entry, marijuana possession and other drug violations.

Frustrated with the slow pace of change both at the city as well as federal level, in the summer of 2013, NSM Philadelphia announced a campaign called Forty Days of Action, Fasting and Prayer for Immigrant Justice. Members and supporters went without food to call attention to "the millions of immigrants [who] are separated from their families for indefinite periods of time because of unjust immigration policy" (NSM Philadelphia). In addition to the fasting, the 40 days in June and July included a number of related events, namely, public demonstrations, rallies and vigils, prayer-filled events in Philadelphia-area faith communities, meetings with public officials, workshops on spiritual non-violence and immigrant justice and public testimonies by immigrant families facing deportation.

In coalition with a number of other immigrant rights organizations including Juntos, 1Love Movement, HIAS (Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society-Pennsylvania), PFUN (Philadelphia Family Unity Network), Victim/Witness Services of South Philadelphia and PICC (Pennsylvania Immigration and Citizenship Coalition), NSM was instrumental in successfully pressing the city to substantially change policy in April 2014. Philadelphia was thus part of a trend that by October 2014 comprised 225 counties and cities that refused to cooperate with ICE holds (Carcamo 2014). The list of large cities includes Baltimore, Chicago, Denver, Miami, Milwaukee, New York City, Newark, San Diego and Washington, D.C. (Badger 2014). However, in large measure because of NSM's campaign and strategy, Philadelphia enacted one of the strictest bars on cooperation with ICE. Like many mayors, Mayor Nutter had wanted to bar the cooperation with ICE for minor offences but had wanted to continue the cooperation when the charged offence was major and involved violence. Indeed, slogans like "immigrants not criminals" or "families not felons" stood both for the idea that hardworking immigrants should not be deported nor families split up for minor offences but also for the idea that such a policy should not apply to immigrants who had been charged with a serious offence. NSM was able to persuade other immigrant justice organizations to maintain a common stance demanding a full Philadelphia ban on cooperation with ICE, arguing in part that charges do not mean convictions (Hunter 2014; Pedemonti, interview). In addition, the coalition used protests and hearings with the city council to place pressure on stalled movement from the mayor's office. Finding himself unable to find an advocacy group that would support his incremental policy, Mayor Nutter shifted course and adopted what is acknowledged to be one of the most progressive policies in the country. Philadelphia only informs ICE of a pending prisoner's release where the conviction was for a violent felony

and where ICE's request is supported by a judge's warrant. As the latter condition is rare, Sunita Patel of the Center for Constitutional Rights describes Philadelphia's policy as "unique and cutting edge" (Matza 2014).

In coordination with other organizations, NSM Philadelphia has taken its protests against deportation to Washington, D.C. Its position is absolute in that it condemns any deportation. Indeed, its goal is "to end deportations for all, regardless of country of origin, legal status, criminal conviction, sexual/gender identity, socioeconomic status, marital status, or previous deportation order" (NSM Philadelphia). On July 31, 2014, nine members of NSM Philadelphia, along with 112 immigrants and clergy from around the country, engaged in non-violent civil disobedience and were arrested at the White House. All were released.

Their statements during the protest reveal their motives. For Peter Pedemonti, "there is no reason we cannot welcome 50,000 children into our country. There is no reason we cannot address the economic and political roots of migration, and there is no reason we cannot create a compassionate and welcoming immigration policy. But we have given into fear and turned our backs on our common humanity. I am getting arrested as an act of outrage, but also as an act of faith that the power of nonviolent love is greater than the White House, Congress and a militarized border; and as a a act of hope in a better world where not only have we stopped deportations, but have broken open the borders of our hearts" (NSM Philadelphia).

Caroline Cargo stated that she was "angry and ashamed that our elected officials continue to punish people who come to the US longing for the same safety and stability that I and my own family desire. As a follower of Jesus, I try to act with compassion and love, and to stand beside those who are suffering. We want humane policies that relieve suffering – not further deportations and militarization of our borders" (NSM Philadelphia).

Older members talked about their sense of solidarity with the people of Central America from earlier service in a Sanctuary Church in the 1990s or the power of civil disobedience to demand civil rights and an end to the Vietnam War. An immigrant mother stated that she was risking arrest because "before the eyes of God we are all brothers and sisters and have the right to work, dream, grow, and breathe freely in whatever part of the world that God created, without feeling like unjust laws, politicians, and certain individuals are drowning us with words and feelings of hate" (NSM Philadelphia, translated from Spanish).

In addition to calling for an end to all deportations, NSM Philadelphia's statement on immigration reform supports a clear pathway to citizenship for the 11 million undocumented immigrants in the USA "without insurmountable barriers such as language requirements, background checks and fines". It also rejects the concept of an enforcement trigger, a proposal in some versions of comprehensive immigration reform which requires additional border security measures to be implemented before a pathway to legal status for undocumented immigrants can be opened. The statement criticizes the dramatic increases in spending on border security, enforcement and incarceration of migrants of recent years and argues that rather than increasing security, militarization of the border "only increased deaths at the border". Prioritizing spending on education, health, dignified work and

housing over unjust enforcement that terrorizes immigrant communities, the statement calls for an end to the Secure Communities programme as well as the immigrant detention system. The statement calls for an end to E-Verify, a federal programme that requires employers to check for the employability status of job applicants, arguing that it is riddled with errors that can deny authorized immigrants the right to work. To reduce the exploitation of immigrant workers, it also calls for enhanced enforcement of labour laws. Finally, it calls for the greater availability of visas to speed up the process of family reunification, as wait times for immediate family members can sometimes exceed 20 years (NSM Philadelphia). However, it is important to note that several members of the leadership team hold the more radical view that no border restrictions on entry should be in place.

The event that has undoubtedly received the most media attention, and that revives memories of the original sanctuary movement of the 1980s, is Angela Navarro's sanctuary in a Philadelphia church. Over 40 news articles on "Angela's story" were written. They appeared in a broad array of media outlets comprising Philadelphia's principal news sources such as the Philadelphia Inquirer and CBS Philly; Spanish language newspapers such as Al Dia; national sources such as the Associated Press, the Huffington Post and USA Today; and international media such as Al Jazeera America, RT America and Diario La Prensa Honduras. As a Honduran mother of two and married to an American citizen, Angela faced a final order of deportation. She entered into sanctuary and was harboured at West Kensington Ministry for 58 days, emerging only after the Obama administration reversed her order of deportation.

Supported by NSM Philadelphia her act of civil disobedience gained support from 11 members of Philadelphia's city council, a state representative, Congressman Bob Brady, who represents Philadelphia in the US House of Representatives, 200 clergy and 6100 signatures on a public petition (Kelley 2015) Unless there is a threat to public safety or national security, federal guidelines bar arrests in sensitive areas. Entering a church to arrest someone who offered sanctuary would generate bad press, which is why this tactic can be effective. As a result, ICE, using its prosecutorial discretion, granted Ms. Navarro a 2-year reprieve in the form of a stay of removal. Angela Navarro was one of nine undocumented immigrants facing a final order of deportation who entered sanctuary in 2014. She was the only one on the East Coast. Congregations in Illinois, Arizona and Colorado, among others, opened their churches to sanctuary. By one count in 2014, 24 churches and synagogues were willing to harbour people to avoid deportation, and 52 additional congregations supported the effort (Foley 2014).

Advocates readily admit that sanctuary can help only a tiny minority of the 11 million undocumented immigrants in the country, but the news stories it generates can produce sympathy and place pressure on an administration (Stanton 2014). Reverend Adan Mairena, Pastor of the West Kensington Ministry that harboured Angela Navarro, expressed the sentiment motivating sanctuary in a statement addressed to the White House. "President Obama: like millions of others, Angela lives in fear of her family being torn apart. As a father, I know you can relate. As a practicing Christian, you are asked to 'welcome the stranger.' As the

leader of our great country, I ask you to live out your faith, use the authority you have been given and stop all deportations" (NSM Philadelphia). In a similar vein, the NSM website declares that "as people of faith, we cannot obey immoral and devastating laws that have deported over two million people during Obama's presidency" and asks members to continue organizing "until all individuals can permanently remain with their chosen families in their chosen communities" (NSM Philadelphia).

As of this writing, NSM Philadelphia has embarked on a new campaign, also selected by immigrant members after a 2-month listening campaign. The current goal is to change Pennsylvania law to allow undocumented immigrants to obtain driver's licences. This is seen as "critical to getting to work and school without fear of deportation or having a car taken away" (NSM Philadelphia). Again, NSM Philadelphia has entered into a coalition, this time with Lucha Pro-Licencias PA, to fight for the cause. While NSM Philadelphia has accomplished a great deal, like many organizations where an alliance between those with relatively few resources and institutional power (in this case unauthorized immigrants) and their allies is central, one of the challenges it faces is the issue of diversity on its board of directors. There is a natural tendency for the board to be composed of people with a combination of a relatively high degree of formal education and experience who have the skills to provide financial oversight, apply for non-profit status and set pay and benefits policy. An important additional role for board members is to help with fund-raising and to donate to the organization, when feasible. While there have been immigrant members on the board in the past, currently that is not the case. Instead, the board is composed principally of white professionals.

Given the philosophy of the organization, with empowerment of unauthorized immigrants and the building of their leadership capacities at its core, this issue is a troubling one for the board. Recognizing that issues of race, class, ethnicity and legal status play out even in well-meaning alliances, NSM Philadelphia has made a decision "to face this head on" (Pedemonti interview). In April, the organization commenced this process by holding a white privilege workshop for its white ally members. In addition, the board will meet every other month to talk about how these systems of structural power play out in the board and determine concrete steps it can take. It has also collected feedback from former immigrant board members. Executive Director Peter Pedemonti is "really proud of NSM of doing this deeper and long-term work around race and class – [it] feels like if we are really going to be build a multi-racial movement, we need to be doing this internal work" (Pedemonti, interview).

10.6 Conclusions

This chapter has provided a case study of a remarkable civil society organization in Philadelphia. NSM Philadelphia is a faith-based organization devoted to improving the conditions under which undocumented immigrants live. By employing listening

campaigns, it supports priorities and strategies set by immigrants. Through accompaniment and sanctuary, it offers hope to undocumented immigrants facing deportation. Through educational efforts, letter-writing campaigns, lobbying, protest and civil disobedience, it aims to change policy. Notable for creating a community that crosses class, ethnicity and legal status lines, it also deftly forms coalitions with other advocacy organizations. While a majority of Philadelphians is supportive of immigrants, a significant group of the leadership team holds a position that is shared by only a few: open borders. Despite this radical position, through linkages with other immigrant advocacy groups, the organization has had a significant impact on Philadelphia policy, ending the city's cooperation with Immigration and Customs Enforcement holds. In an era of increased anti-immigrant sentiment across the rich countries, NSM Philadelphia offers a tangible example of another politics, motivated by a deep sense of the equality of all human beings.

Interviews

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Chapter 11
Migrating Abroad to Get Ahead: The Emigration of Young Spanish Adults During the Financial Crisis (2008–2013)

Josefina Domínguez-Mujica, Ramón Díaz-Hernández, and Juan Parreño-Castellano

Abstract Recent demographic trends in the population of Spain, as in other Mediterranean countries, show a period of high net immigration in the transition from the twentieth to the twenty-first century. In 2008, with the onset of the recession and the weakening of the Spanish job market, a new period of net emigration began. This phase has little in common with past trends, as two new types of primary actors have entered the scene: on the one hand, former immigrants who return to their home countries or develop different adaptation strategies, shifting back and forth between them as necessary, using their transnational connections and making migration processes more flexible; and on the other hand, Spanish youth and young adults who have been unable to find jobs in Spain, at least not ones commensurate with their skills and education. The emigration process of the second group—young skilled Spanish workers—is analyzed in this chapter. This work is based on a qualitative survey conducted in 2013 with a group of 170 informants obtained by snowball sampling, although we have also used other quantitative and qualitative sources to explore this topic in greater depth.

Keywords Emigration • Spain • Young adults • Skilled youth • Globalization

11.1 Introduction

The trajectory of Spain's demographic evolution is a peculiar case within the European Union. In terms of natural dynamics, after a long period of high fertility and natural increase rates (until the 1980s), these plummeted to levels far below those of other western European countries, leading some authors to speak of a second demographic transition in southern Europe (Van de Kaa 2002; Sobotka 2008). These Mediterranean nations have also exhibited a different pattern of

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migration. The net emigration scenario of the 1960s and early 1970s gave way to a phase of high net immigration that began in the 1990s and peaked in the early years of the twenty-first century, giving a boost to the country's development, as different authors have pointed out (Cavounidis 2002; Ribas-Mateos 2004; Arango et al. 2009; De Haas 2010; Willekens 2014, etc.). However, in 2008 a new net emigration phase began that bore little resemblance to the previous one; the modernization of society and the economy, in correspondence with the demographic transition itself, the verticalization of family structures and the "familistic" system prevalent in Mediterranean countries converged to create a new migratory reality (Moreno 2012; i Valls et al. 2014).

Among other reactions, Spanish society has responded to the financial crisis by encouraging the emigration of its skilled youth and young adults (Arango et al. 2014). These are usually the descendants of small middle-class families who have pinned their hopes on their children's schooling, shouldering the cost of higher education with the expectation of social advancement and ultimately producing, in recent years, the most highly educated generation in the history of Spain (Gentile 2006). These young people have also benefited from a process of social democratization and the proliferation and improvement of university centres, which began in the 1980s. Another major cause of this emigration trend is the internationalization of the Spanish economy: many Spanish companies have established branches in other countries, seeking business opportunities abroad and creating job openings for skilled workers at their different foreign offices (Guillén Rodríguez 2004), which has also contributed to outbound migration.

These structural factors must also be considered in conjunction with other circumstances, such as those derived from European integration on matters of education, foreign language studies, mobility programmes for studying abroad (Erasmus) and corporate internships (Leonardo), pre- and postdoctoral grants, collaboration agreements between institutions in different countries, etc. Not only are the younger generations better educated, but they are also better equipped to operate in a global context. Yet these circumstances have not translated into more job opportunities for young people in Spain. In most European nations, a higher education level among young people leads to a decline in youth unemployment rates, but in Spain, Greece, Italy and Portugal, the exact opposite occurs (Hernández Peinado and Montero González 2013, p. 677).

In light of all this, in the context of the economic recession, when the expectations of young people and their families have not been met and Spanish society as a whole is deeply dissatisfied with the political strategies adopted during the crisis, it is easy to understand why social and geographical mobility is viewed as the alternative to unemployment, precarious work or underemployment. "We're not leaving, we're being forced out", the slogan adopted by a social network of young emigrants called *Marea Granate*, sums up many aspects of this new phenomenon of emigration among skilled young workers and its social connotations, a phenomenon also observed in Europe's other Mediterranean countries (Triandafyllidou and Gropas 2014).

11.2 Research Objectives and Methodology

Our general objective in this study has been to characterize the emigration of young Spaniards during the crisis. Our specific objectives were to further define the socio-demographic profile of these young adults, analyze the pattern of outbound migration flows in terms of timescale and destination, characterize the education level of those young people and their degree of socio-labour specialization and examine three major elements of this process: the decision to go abroad, arrival and integration in the host country and their relationship with Spain. The study also analyzes their discourses, opinions and comments about what made them emigrate and their prospects for the near future.

To achieve these objectives, we used quantitative and qualitative analytical methods. For our primary sources, we used the data supplied by the European and Spanish statistical offices (EUROSTAT and INE), as well as the quantitative information gleaned from certain surveys conducted by research organizations or institutions. We also made use of the results of in-depth interviews carried out by other researchers. With regard to secondary sources, we consulted a number of studies of this migration phenomenon, primarily via the Internet—the swiftest means of disseminating research results, as the average time it takes to review and publish scholarly articles means that many recent studies are not yet available in scientific journals.

Finally, the fundamental research source was the survey designed by us, the authors of this study, the details of which are described below (see Table 11.1). The survey was conducted over a 10-month period, from March to December 2013, when the outbound migration of Spanish young adults was at its peak according to Change of Residence Statistics, which record new municipal census registrations of Spaniards in locations other than their regular place of residence—in this case, in foreign countries. We used the snowball sampling technique, starting with a pool of multiple initial informants and making a simple random selection. The geographical area included 37 countries. The sample group consisted of Spaniards between the ages of 25 and 40 who were born in Spain but were living abroad at the time of the survey. Using non-probability sampling, we collected a total of 170 surveys. The questionnaires were distributed by email, using our own network of acquaintances, relatives and social media contacts to obtain email addresses. The main advantage of the e-survey was the fact that it could be carried out at a low cost without jeopardizing the confidence level. A comparison of our results with the data obtained from other types of surveys and research sources revealed a high rate of coincidence.

The survey included both closed and open-ended questions. This method was deemed efficient for two reasons. The first is that the size of the sample group was unknown due to the inaccuracy of available statistical data; many of the respondents were "hidden". The second is that a high level of trust was required in order for respondents to be willing to participate in the study. The personal referrals gave them confidence and information about the aims and results of the research.

Table 11.1 Survey specifications

Type of study	Survey of Spanish young adults born in the reporting country and living abroad
Timeline	1 March–31 December 2013
Geographical area	37 countries
Sample group	Spaniards between the ages of 25 and 40 living abroad
Sample size	170 respondents
Sampling technique	Non-probability
Type of survey	Questionnaire distributed by email
Type of questions	Closed and open ended
Response rate	100 % (closed-ended questions) and 42.3 % (open-ended questions)
Method	Snowball sampling; simple random selection based on referrals originating with multiple initial subjects
Advantages	Low cost
Confidence level	High
Method efficiency—justification	(a) The size of the sample group is unknown due to inaccurate statistical data, and many respondents are "hidden"; (b) a high level of trust is required in order for respondents to willingly participate in the study (personal referrals giving them confidence and information about the aims and results of the research)
Method bias	The individuals in the sample were more likely to be selected due to their connection with the initial informants, and emigrants who did not have a successful experience abroad may have refused to answer the survey

Source: study authors

However, we acknowledge the bias inherent to this method, as the individuals comprising the sample had a greater probability of being selected because of their direct or indirect connection to the initial informants. Besides, it is possible that emigrants who did not have a successful experience abroad chose not to answer the survey.

We analyzed the survey results in two different ways. The first step was a quantitative analysis with the aim of identifying the migration patterns of the young adults surveyed. In this process, we conducted a relational analysis of univariate relationships based on frequency distributions and of bivariate relationships using cross-tabs and Pearson chi-square correlations. To conclude our quantitative analysis, we created a statistical tree diagram.

With the open-ended questions, we analyzed the content and interpreted the discourses detected in the informants' responses. The study is therefore organized into the following sections: socio-demographic profile of emigrants; timeline and geographical profile of their migration; the decision to go abroad; reception and integration abroad; their relationship with Spain; the emigrants' thoughts on the migration process, the crisis and how it is being managed; and, finally, their proposals.

11.3   Socio-demographic Profile of Emigrants and Characteristics of Outbound Migration

11.3.1   The Generations of Spain's Demographic Transition

European countries are demographically stagnant, aged and, as a general rule, currently undergoing a "second demographic transition" (Van de Kaa 1987) or a "second demographic revolution" (Dumont 1995). In the case of Mediterranean countries, this demographic transition began much later, and many characteristics of the current population can be explained by recent demographic changes, as these countries maintained high fertility and birth rates until the 1970s. In subsequent years, the rate of natural increase dropped to a level well below that of other western European countries where the transition had happened earlier, and this decrease was accompanied by a change in migration patterns. Until 1973, Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece had a negative migration rate, but following a series of changes in the post-Cold War era, they became countries with net immigration to a greater or lesser degree. In the first decade of the twenty-first century, the Mediterranean countries became powerful magnets for immigration (Reyneri 2001), making a strong debut in the group of European states with positive migration rates.

In Spain's case, after the 1960s, the country rapidly reached a level of efficiency in human reproduction, as evidenced by the sharp drop in general adult and child mortality rates (Pérez Díaz 2005), the consequent increase in life expectancy for all age groups and the steep decline of the fertility rate after the 1980s (Bernardi and Requena 2003; Devolder and Merino 2004). The plummeting fertility rate resulted in fewer children and young people, causing the proportion of elderly people to skyrocket (Abellán and Puga 2005 p. 57). This, combined with a significant increase in the mother's average age at first birth (Kohler et al. 2006), which became more pronounced during the years of the financial crisis, has situated Spain's birth rate at an all-time low (1.27 children per woman in 2013).

These demographic processes have had direct effects on family structure and indirect effects on the social composition of different age groups. With regard to the former, these processes have led to a verticalization of family structures, in which more generations are alive in each family but with fewer members in each generation. This verticalization of the family has resulted in what some authors call the emergence of the fourth generation (Cabré et al. 2002)—in other words, the increasing likelihood of belonging to a lineage with four living generations. Concerning the social composition of different age groups, we are now witnessing a de-standardization of emancipation patterns among young people. In Spain, as in other southern European countries, the period of young peoples' residential and economic dependence on their families has lengthened. This particular trend has a number of causes: high unemployment among youth, the cost of housing (given the widespread preference for home ownership), higher levels of education and the high cost of starting a family (Domínguez-Mujica and Guerra-Talavera 2009). However, while this pattern of dependence was sustainable during the years of

economic prosperity, the crisis has reversed the trend, undermining young people's hopes of success and of improving their social status. Despite their best efforts, the families' emotional and financial investment in their well-being has also failed in this new scenario. This is the general background of many skilled young Spaniards who have chosen to emigrate during the crisis, as the results of the survey explained in this chapter confirm.

11.3.2 Characteristics of Recent Spanish Outbound Migration

The data on outbound migration since 2008 shows that the emigration of Spanish citizens born in Spain was most intense in the year 2014, with a total of 51,267 emigrants and a higher proportion of the 25–39 age groups (Fig. 11.1).

If we group the emigrants' host countries into large geographical areas, we find that EU member states are the most common destinations, and if we include Norway and Switzerland, this group accounts for more than 50 % of migrant destinations for all years under consideration. The cluster analysis performed by De Miguel Luken and Recaño Valverde (2013) confirms that the youngest Spaniards living abroad are found in EU member states, as our own survey also confirms. This group is followed by Latin America and the Caribbean, which account for approximately 20 % of all migrant destinations. The United States and Canada attracted around 10 % of emigrants, and at the bottom of the ranking are the countries of Asia, Africa and Oceania, in descending order. This preference for countries in the European Union is probably due to geographical proximity, a greater perceived likelihood of success and/or job opportunities and the free movement guaranteed by the Schengen Treaty. Interestingly, Spanish emigrants

Fig. 11.1 Emigration of Spain-born citizens in selected age groups (Source: Migrations Statistic. INE)

are widely scattered among individual host countries. The Change of Residence Statistics for 2013 report that Spanish emigrants between the ages of 20 and 39 relocated to a total of 126 foreign countries: 40 in Europe, 23 in the Americas, 33 in Africa, 27 in Asia and 2 in Oceania.

However, the data supplied by the specific host countries is even more revealing. In 2013, for example, continuing the trend of previous years, the top destination was the United Kingdom, where 3,557 Spaniards registered as residents. The preference for this country was discussed at the IMISCOE conference held in Madrid in 2014 (Pumares et al. 2014) and tallies with observations made earlier by King et al. (2014). The UK is followed by Germany with 2,722 registrations, France with 2,253 and the United States with 1,667. Another point of interest is the fact that movement in the abovementioned age range (20–39 years old) is most evident in outbound migrations to Denmark, Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands, Poland, the UK, Germany, Sweden, Norway, Switzerland, Chile, China and Australia. The map in Fig. 11.2 illustrates the volume of young adult migration flows by destination. Migration attractiveness is rising for practically every country in the European Union, except Bulgaria, Italy, Portugal, Romania and Lithuania. Canada and the USA are also viewed as increasingly attractive destinations, and the same is true of many Latin American nations, such as Brazil, Chile and Peru, the Middle East, China and Australia.


Fig. 11.2 Outflows of Spanish young adults during 2013 by country of destination (Source: Change of Residence Statistics. INE)

11.4 Socio-demographic Profile of Surveyed Emigrants and Characteristics of Their Outbound Migration

11.4.1 Socio-demographic Profile of the Young Adults Surveyed

In Spain's biodemographic structure, according to the 2011 census, the generation of young adults between the ages of 20 and 39 represents 29.02 % of the population, with men slightly outnumbering women (sex ratio of 105 males for every 100 females). More men than women responded to the survey, which may suggest that men are more likely to emigrate within this age group. The INE's records of outbound migrations also point to this possibility. Specifically, in 2013 a total of 36,376 Spanish citizens between the ages of 20 and 39 left Spain to go abroad, and 50.3 % of them were men. In this respect, the research conducted by Navarrete Moreno (2014) indicates that the employment crisis in Spain seems to have triggered a slight increase in male emigration, a pattern confirmed by the data records of important host countries like the UK and Germany and the results of our own survey.

At the subset level, the largest number of subjects was in the 30–34-year-old age group, which tallies with the INE's statistics on outbound migrations for 2013. Survey informants between the ages of 30 and 34 represented half of the sample, where the mean age was 30.12 and the mode 30. This is undoubtedly the most suitable age for deploying the personal abilities one has acquired (skills, attitudes, knowledge and experience) and pursuing a life project in a proactive, responsible manner. The combination of gender and age data reveals that, despite the slightly higher proportion of men within this 20–39-year-old group, women are more numerous among the youngest subsets, while men outnumber women at the other end of the age spectrum. This can probably be explained by the fact that women's migration patterns are often conditional on childbearing, among other factors. The behaviour of these age subsets is quite relevant because, as we will show, there is a correlation between the emigrants' conduct and their residential preferences, job profiles, their decision to go abroad and the means available for taking that step.

With regard to level of education, in virtually all cases, informants stated that they had completed Level 5 and Level 6 studies, with only 3.6 % reporting that they had not completed Level 5. Therefore, the majority of survey participants had a higher education degree and moved or had moved in the advanced tertiary sector (professionals, executives, experts/technicians, researchers, etc.) in both Spain and abroad. Within this sector, most of the emigrants who participated in our survey saw no problem with taking advantage of their time abroad to improve and advance their professional careers, as other surveys have also shown (González Enríquez and Martínez Romera 2014).

The professions declared by participants were quite varied and scattered across the board, although engineers and architects accounted for the largest number. Finally, in terms of occupation groups, nearly three out of four individuals surveyed

(71.2 %) stated that they were working as scientific professionals or experts/
technicians—in other words, highly qualified personnel employed by a com-
pany—followed, at a considerable distance, by directors and managers (8.8 %),
other mid-level experts/technicians (6.5 %), etc.

11.4.2   Timeline and Geographical Profile of the Migration of the Young Adults Surveyed

In the surveys conducted, we found that young adults had primarily gone abroad
during the years of the crisis. Some respondents said that they had left Spain at the
turn of the millennium, but most of them left after 2007; specifically, 142 of the
170 subjects emigrated in 2008 or later. As noted earlier, the most popular host
countries by far are EU member states, especially the United Kingdom and Ger-
many. In Latin America and the Caribbean, the countries named most frequently
were Brazil, Ecuador, Mexico and Chile and in North America the United States. In
the group of non-EU European countries, Switzerland was the country with the
largest number of respondents. Finally, when considering the survey's geographical
profile, it is important to bear in mind that the majority of the young adults chose to
live in large cities, usually the capitals of their host countries (London, Berlin, Paris,
New York, Dublin, Rio de Janeiro, Santiago de Chile, etc.).

With regard to the regional provenance of the young Spaniards living abroad
who responded to our survey, the highest percentage of emigrants came from
Madrid, Catalonia, Andalusia, Valencia and the Canary Islands. The composition
of our sample therefore corresponds to the geographical distribution of the Spanish
population between the ages of 18 and 39, according to the 2011 census, with the
exception of the Canary Islands, which is overrepresented in our group. However,
this is only logical considering that our initial contacts for the snowball sampling
process were made in that region. Finally, virtually all respondents named a major
city in those regions as their place of birth, indicating that their movements are
cases of interurban migration.

When we combine the data on destination and age, we find a very clear statistical
correlation between the youngest age groups and the destinations of the United
Kingdom, Ireland, Germany, Austria, France, Belgium and the Netherlands; and a
similar correlation exists between those over age 35 and the countries of East Asia,
the United States and Canada, as if these destinations required a more experienced
type of emigrant. In the case of Latin American and Caribbean nations, the
predominant profile was that of individuals over the age of 30. This data is quite
telling, because it proves that the possibility of free movement within the European
Union is an advantage primarily seized by younger adults, who have fewer oppor-
tunities and means of opting for other destinations.

The positive statistical correlation between the host countries and the respon-
dents' answers to the question about whether or not they settled abroad with the

benefit of social or family assistance indicates that those who chose European destinations had received social or family assistance, while those who settled in Latin American, Caribbean or East Asian countries or in Canada or the United States had not. Similarly, those who answered the survey from the United States and Canada saw their host countries as permanent rather than provisional migrant destinations; in contrast, those who were living in France, Latin America and the Caribbean, Africa and the Arabian Peninsula viewed their own emigration as a temporary experience. The correlation between language difficulties and host countries is also statistically significant. Survey respondents living in Austria and Germany stated that they had experienced language difficulties, while residents in Latin America and the Caribbean said they had not experienced such difficulties (logically, as Spanish is spoken in that region). Interestingly, those residing in Canada and the United States also claimed not to have had problems with the language.

11.4.3 The Decision to Go Abroad

We used a statistical tree distribution to come up with a profile of the typical emigrant; in other words, we defined statistical probability by creating a graphic rendering of the survey's potential results in which we established a series of steps, each of which could be carried out in a finite number of ways. The results of this model yielded two different profiles. The first is that of the emigrant who had no thought of going abroad before the crisis began, did not work prior to emigrating, did not have an offer of employment before going abroad, and received a job offer within 3 months of arriving in the host country. The second profile is that of the emigrant who had considered going abroad before the crisis began, had worked prior to emigrating and received a job offer before leaving Spain. The fact that there are two predominant profiles clearly shows that we cannot simplify the phenomenon of young-adult emigration by narrowing our focus to unemployed young adults for whom going abroad is the only viable option; we have to consider another profile, found in many other countries round the world, where the emigration of skilled workers operating on a global stage is a sign of the new times (Matthewman 2011).

At the time of their relocation, the majority (65.7 %) stated that they did not receive any kind of assistance, while 34.1 % did settle into their new home with the help of friends or relatives. Within the latter category, there are respondents whose settlement abroad was handled entirely by their employer or who benefited from the backing of official networks (embassies, consulates, EURES, etc.). They generally travelled alone, although there are some who went with a relative, friend or partner, and very few have children. Children accompanied their parents in cases where both partners went abroad.

For 46.1 %, precarious work or the lack of job opportunities was the main reason for leaving Spain, but 51.5 % of these young people cited other motivations,

primarily a rational choice cost-benefit analysis, considering the negative "push" factors driving them out of Spain and the positive "pull" factors of the international job market. We must also remember that these individuals went abroad after successfully completing their higher education. Many university graduates took the next step in their careers by going abroad and competing on the basis of their training and level of education. In the survey, 46 % of respondents stated that they were still students when they went abroad, working to complete their course of studies, although the majority waited until they had graduated to leave.

Concerning the expectations that influenced their decision to go abroad, for most these were related to their professional and working lives. For 67.57 % of the young adults, employment expectations were the primary motivation for emigrating. Another 36.76 % said that they left to gain professional experience; this group went in search of opportunities abroad to give them a greater competitive edge in the labour market. The third most selected response option was income or salary, marked by 34.05 % of survey participants.

11.4.4 Reception and Integration Abroad

As in the previous section, the statistical tree distribution allowed us to identify a migrant profile. In this case, there was only one profile, that of the emigrant who has settled abroad without the benefit of social or family assistance, does not live with relatives abroad, associates with fellow expatriates and new acquaintances (neighbours, co-workers, etc.) and found housing without difficulty. This type of emigrant generally believes that labour conditions are better abroad, viewing his/her current residency abroad as a positive experience, and states that he/she has adjusted to the new situation easily and has not had difficulty with the language.

Frequency analysis revealed that three out of every four emigrants described their experience of living abroad as good, and they are probably inclined to do so because they believe that working conditions are better abroad (70.6 % of them); in fact, 73.5 % consider themselves emigrants. Moreover, when asked if their migration experience has been positive, they almost unanimously replied in the affirmative (96.5 %). The most evenly divided responses (approximately 50 %) are those to questions about living with friends abroad, receiving social assistance with settlement abroad, changing jobs abroad and having difficulty with the language.

Another interesting discovery was the intense social life we can infer from their answers. The majority said that they associate with fellow emigrants and expatriates (87.1 %) and that they also interact with new acquaintances: co-workers, neighbours, friends, etc. (98.8 %). Judging from their responses, the degree of associationism among migrants/expatriates is very high, especially considering that this phenomenon is less intense among immigrants in Spain, as noted by Aparicio Gómez (2014). This probably explains why they believe they have integrated and easily adjusted to the new living situation abroad (stated by 78.2 %). As this process is still quite recent, there are as yet no indications of new partnerships formed

between them and other expatriates from Spain or elsewhere, or between them and citizens of their host countries, but we can infer from some of their responses to the open-ended questions that this will be a fairly common occurrence as the years roll by.

It is therefore obvious that the ease with which they change jobs abroad, their intense social life and their doubts about whether to define their experience abroad as temporary or permanent all characterize a distinctive migration pattern more typical of the well-educated generations, who overcome the limitations and difficulties of domestic job markets by moving in a global context.

11.4.5 Relationship with Spain

The statistical tree distribution indicates that the typical emigrant does not send remittances to Spain, does not keep looking for work in Spain, continues to follow the news in Spain, recommends that friends leave Spain and does not know how long he/she will stay abroad. The fact that they do not send remittances to Spain is one of the most significant differences between them and the Spanish emigrants of past decades, as other surveys have also revealed (Aparicio Gómez 2014), and another is the fact that they do not continue to look for work in Spain while abroad (80 % in both cases). Despite the sociable profile of these young people, the survey shows that their decisions are individualistic: they do not plan to bring relatives to live with them abroad (77.7 %) and they do not job hunt for friends still living in Spain (69.4 %), although they do recommend that those friends leave Spain (82.9 %). The respondents generally maintained very close ties to relatives and friends in their home country. They miss those they have left behind and regularly communicate with home and friends using information technology; indeed, they might aptly be termed "Skype emigrants". The new digital media also allow them to stay abreast of what is going on in Spain, in both public and private life (IT-powered social networks), and they travel back and forth between their place of residence and their home country with relative ease, although those living in non-European countries do so less frequently.

Finally, the survey revealed another detail which, though a mere sideline in our survey, is actually quite significant: the tendency of these new emigrants to forge transnational bonds. Initiatives launched by some of these migrants to support other potential emigrants or to connect with people living in the same country who share their place of origin and situation; their attempts to push for a change in the crisis management and labour policies implemented in Spain, even from a distance; the companies they have founded to cater for the tastes and preferences of Spanish expats; and similar actions clearly point to a new scenario of Spanish migration, in which emigrants are proud of their roots, strive to prove their worth by shattering old stereotypes about Spanish emigration in the past and defend their role as valuable assets to their host countries.

11.5   Emigrants' Thoughts on the Migration Process, the Crisis and How It Is Being Managed

In order to ascertain the young survey participants' perception (both objective and subjective) of the socio-economic and historical context in which their migration experience took place, we asked them to share their thoughts and perspectives by answering two open-ended questions on the survey: (a) If you could send a message to the employers, political leaders and government institutions in Spain, what would it be? and (b) if there is anything else you'd like to add, please do so. Using their answers, we proceeded to assemble a narrative, organized by topics and subtopics, about the context in which they went abroad, what they thought and think about the causes and consequences of the crisis and, finally, their prospects and plans for the future. We also analyzed their frame of mind and their reactions, their views on governance, their alternatives and the degree to which the migration experience has affected their own identities.

11.5.1   The Financial Crisis and Emigration

For most of the survey participants, the decision to go abroad was related to the financial crisis which has forced many highly educated young people to seek employment outside of Spain. They express their opinions differently in the survey, but their words convey a strong sense of social engagement and deep concern about the economic situation. Respondents coincide in their perception of the bad situation of the Spanish economy, describing it as very serious, and they regard it as one of the primary triggers of their decision to go abroad.

When asked what they would say to Spanish employers and leaders about how the recession has been managed, our young respondents gave a wide variety of responses, heavily nuanced and in some cases very strongly worded, expressing their indignation. They believe that the advent of the crisis brought an end to the days of wasteful spending and that public institutions should have shown more foresight in that context, starting to set an example by being more frugal and prioritizing expenditure. They blame them for not adopting countercyclical policies to support small businesses, not facilitating the creation of new companies and failing to use available funds effectively by making productive investments. In addition, they believe that the authorities have not analyzed the inefficiency of the Spanish labour system as closely as they should and that, instead of finding solutions and implementing corrective measures, they have resigned themselves to living with precarious work, high unemployment rates, low salaries, evictions and social exclusion. Respondents also feel that the measures adopted have only benefited those responsible for the crisis and have actually been prejudicial for workers, limiting their rights and freedom. They acknowledge that more resources

should have been dedicated to stimulating economic activity and creating jobs for young people.

For many of the individuals surveyed, Spain is a country where it is impossible for young people to work and find career opportunities. In their view, no one seems to be interested in or capable of stemming the exodus of qualified Spaniards or of increasing the youth employment rate. They cannot understand how, after investing so heavily in the education of its young people, the Spanish government is willing to sit back and let other countries reap the benefits. The fact that so many highly trained people are forced to leave Spain in order to find work is defined by them as a political and economic failure. Some suggest that graduates could be hired for low wages, which would yield high profits for business owners. Others consider that if there is no work, taxation cannot be increased to maintain the basic social services of the welfare state. A considerable number of respondents do not understand why Spain has hardly any labour mobility agreements with other friendly nations, aside from the basic general visa programmes, and believe that Spanish authorities should have made an active effort to improve relations with foreign governments on labour issues, promoting mobility by signing work and travel agreements with neighbouring nations and countries with which Spain maintains cordial relations. Some also compare Spain's high unemployment rate with the situation in neighbouring countries whose economies are less solid, and yet unemployment rates are much lower.

These ideas are expressed in the following opinions, selected from among many others:

More resources for creating jobs and less for other nonsense. And I'd tell employers not to use the difficult economic situation as a pretext for doing away with labour rights [Silvia C., Santiago de Chile, Chile]

They need to make it easier for young people to have their first job experience. In other countries they offer conditions for starter jobs that are nothing like those in Spain. The abysmal working conditions aren't a product of the crisis but of poor practices [Laura G. Braunschweig, Germany]

After working in several countries, I decided to look for a job in Spain. After several interviews, I was surprised that they asked me personal questions and talked about doing unpaid overtime on a daily basis [...] Those conditions and the lack of professionalism motivate me to stay abroad. Why would I go back to Spain if I can live earning much more by working for companies that respect my contract terms and my rights as a worker? [Olmo, Edinburgh, Scotland]

11.5.2 Demands for a New Mentality and Modernized Power Structures

Our respondents criticize the actions of the different government administrations that have managed Spain's public institutions from 2007 to 2015. The same is true of employers who, in the young emigrants' view, did not rise to the occasion as they should have. An analysis of their responses regarding the lack of good governance

and the management practices of Spanish authorities reveals that they think it would be advisable for Spain to institute stricter requirements for those who go into politics, correct the flaws in the electoral system, do away with party discipline and establish a decision-making process guided by the nation's best interests rather than partisan concerns.

They demand that leaders and employers (and, exercising self-criticism, citizens as well) stop being so self-absorbed, perform their duties responsibly and honestly and avoid corruption and nepotism. They call for action to transform the system and ask for new administrations, separation of powers among the three branches of government and greater rigour and exemplary conduct from the Justice Department and the Spanish Tax Authority. Respondents cannot conceal their annoyance with political leaders and the business community, and they take Spanish society to task for its passivity in the current situation, but their harshest criticism is reserved for the topic of corruption. They regard this practice as unacceptable and blame it for the majority of Spain's problems. They propose forced resignations and exemplary punishment for corrupt officials. Furthermore, they reiterate the suggestion that Spain learn from its Scandinavian neighbours; they demand greater respect for the rules of public interest and that the personnel selection process for government officials and public agencies be based on merit rather than "who you know".

They call for a new mentality, a broader worldview and keener vision to see beyond the short term. They want to improve the existing electoral systems and put an end to bipartisanship and separatist schisms. They want leaders not to waste their time on issues which, in their view, are irrelevant. Additionally, they feel that, in order to cut public expenditure, a large number of public offices in government institutions should be dispensed with; they propose a reduction of the civil service corps and higher standards of intellectual capacity or competence for those who serve the public. They even propose that public officials should be sent abroad for a time to learn how countries with fewer resources solve their citizens' problems and imitate the best practices of certain neighbouring nations.

The following statements, and many others not quoted here, express these feelings without mincing words:

It's obvious that our leaders are managing the crisis in a short-sighted, totally ineffective way, that they constantly deceive us and that they're working as fast as they can to whittle down the welfare system it took us so long to achieve [Gemma M., Brussels, Belgium]

[. . .] they need to stop dragging democracy through the mud [. . .] They're all a bunch of thieves, liars and hypocrites, and at this point we don't believe a word they say or expect anything good from them. They don't govern for the benefit of Spain and Spaniards, but so they and a few of their mates, whose greed knows no bounds, can suck the entire country dry and rob us of everything, even our joy. At best, they're incompetent hacks [. . .] If the Spanish justice system was any good, they'd (almost) all be in prison and they'd have been forced to give back the money they stole from the Spanish coffers [. . .] And if you crunch the numbers, that alone would have put an end to the supposed crisis [Elba, Vienna, Austria]

I'd like them to realize that, in order for Spain to be a competitive country, the personnel selection process in public companies should be based on merit, not on the system of personal contacts and string-pulling that characterizes this country today. In Spain there are people who are highly educated and very competent. The problem is that they aren't occupying the positions they should be, because in all likelihood that position was given to

someone less competent but with better connections. That way, the only thing being encouraged is mediocrity [Marta, San José de Costa Rica, Costa Rica]

11.5.3 Reasons for Emigrating, the Experience of Living and Working Abroad and Plans to Return

The responses received from participants indicate that the financial crisis was the primary catalyst of their departure from Spain and clearly continues to influence their thoughts of returning. These young people do not know how long they will stay abroad, largely because, for the majority, the end of their migration experience is conditional on the evolution of the Spanish economy. Some intend to return sooner or later, while others believe that they will never go back, or at least they will not make a decision until things improve substantially in Spain. Their perception of the situation is very negative, because many of them believe that, even if the country's economy improves, there must also be a change in the attitude of political leaders and employers regarding fair labour conditions, treatment and payment, a factor that also influences their decision to return. A particularly relevant detail is the fact that, for many of them, the emigration experience represented the beginning or consolidation of their own emancipation process, and their independence and personal autonomy is therefore linked to their work abroad and the ability to support themselves financially instead of relying on their families.

With regard to their assessment of the migration experience, as we have already commented, the respondents always described their own as positive. According to them, going abroad has allowed them to acquire additional training; plus, they claim to be better paid than in Spain and treated well by the companies that employ them. They also add that, thanks to their mastery of the language, they have had it easier and been able to integrate. Some respondents said that they were able to go abroad because they were helped by their family members and that the host countries do not offer handouts: everything must be earned through hard work and merit. In some of the answers, participants mourn the fact that they had to accept jobs for which they are overqualified or low salaries and (in an ironic tone) pretend to "be grateful" for them. A few remarked that, even abroad, string-pulling is often required to get job interviews, and candidates must be "connected" in order to be hired by certain companies. We can say that all of their accounts coincide in emphasizing the high personal cost of being forced to leave; the difficulties they had with integration, at first; and the emotional strain they have suffered in the host countries, far from family and friends.

On another level, we found that respondents complain about the indifference towards this phenomenon in Spain, the lack of support and incentives to facilitate the return of emigrants and the partisan use of emigration by political rivals. In their messages, we can sense that they are outraged to a certain extent about the reprehensible statements made by several high-profile members of the political class, but they are also pained by how their emigration has been mythicized in

Spanish public opinion. We therefore find critical opinions of the media's treatment of this phenomenon, misrepresenting emigrants as adventure-seekers or victims. Meanwhile, other respondents are grateful to the crisis for having forced them to leave, and there are several who state that they would have left in any case, even if the crisis had not made it imperative.

Some participants believe that we are witnessing a pattern of labour mobility typical of the age of globalization, something to which we must become accustomed and even embrace as an opportunity. Others, however, see this phenomenon as simply another sign of decline and the unflattering image of Spain being projected in the world today. Virtually all of them hope that the situation in Spain will be definitively remedied in the not-too-distant future and that the political parties in the minority will devise an alternate plan for economic recovery based on grassroots social groups.

Let us see what some of the respondents have to say in this respect:

> [...] *in my case I didn't decide to look for work outside Spain because of the crisis. Before the crisis began I was already thinking of studying and working abroad in an international environment, at least for a few years. The truth is that the job situation in Spain doesn't motivate me to return, at least for now* [Elena, Berlin, Germany]
>
> *I'm in touch with other Spaniards who are working abroad, and I can say that everyone who has family intends to stay for good* [...], *thinking of a better future for their children, they want to work here until they retire. That fact should make us think long and hard about the Spanish situation* [...] *Out of all of us who are under 40, without families, living abroad, we'll have to wait and see how many will actually return to our country, because little by little you make a life for yourself and the working conditions here are better; and, unless you have something really serious or important that makes you go back, practically no one will [...]* [María T., London, England]
>
> *Living outside your country, far from your family and friends, is very hard. When you go abroad, nothing gets handed to you, and having a degree doesn't make you better. Yet the conditions, despite the cultural and language barriers that may exist, are better, and that means there's a risk that many young people won't return to their home country* [Jonay, Cheltenham, England]

11.5.4 Education, Self-Esteem and Dashed Expectations

These young Spaniards state that employment is their foremost concern and that this has made them put off their personal life projects and remain dependent on their families for a longer period of time. Spain's successive government administrations have only managed to paper over the cracks and implement largely ineffective measures, which is why the respondents feel that sweeping changes are needed in the system's strategy and in social, economic and political policy. They point out the need to increase employment incentives, subsidize employment contracts, pass laws to improve working conditions for young people, offer more government aid to entrepreneurs or more study grants; they speak of subsidies for education and training, for emancipation, for access to housing, etc.

They even call for radically transformational sociopolitical action. Nearly half of the respondents mention the need to support movements that will change the system and political parties or institutions that aim to cleanse and purify it. Yet the survey results clearly indicate a pessimistic outlook, primarily because the young adults themselves know that they will not have the same opportunities in the future. This tallies with observations made by other authors, according to whom Spanish university graduates have more difficulty entering the workforce than other European young people with the same level of education (Serrano Martínez and Soler Guillén 2014). In this context some of the responses are understandably irate ("we're treated unfairly"), because "we are the most highly educated generation in the history of Spain" and "we don't deserve to be treated like this". They repeatedly voice complaints such as "The best of us are leaving", "Spain will pay dearly for the loss of such competent people" or "The exodus of the most qualified people will come back to bite the country in time".

The young emigrants are aware of the fact that further studies, more degrees and better qualification do them no good in Spain. They also believe that the lack of advancement opportunities for young people is deliberate, because as a group they are critical and discomfiting, proposing alternatives and unwilling to be manipulated. However, they are unanimous in their belief that Spain's future is at risk if it does not invest more in education and the arts, because a country without a stable educational system can never consolidate its socio-economic system. For this reason, they demand that the high levels of funding for research which existed prior to the beginning of the crisis be reinstated.

They also think that the educational system should be changed, from primary school all the way to the university level. According to them, the entire orientation of Spanish education needs to change: instead of rote memorization, pupils should be taught to analyze, to think critically and to speak and write correctly, and teachers should be encouraged to use English in schools even more than they do now. They have a particularly high opinion of the German system of professional training, because it combines paid internships with learning. They argue their case by pointing out the need to invest in R&D+i in order to remain competitive in a globalized world. Survey participants coincide in their assessment of the Spanish authorities' contradictory actions: after investing millions in the education of university students, when they graduate the government does nothing to facilitate their integration in the Spanish job market and lets them leave to render their services in foreign countries, which reap the benefits of that human capital without having invested a penny in their education. They believe that, if the country that invests in the education of its youth fails to capitalize on that investment, this will have disastrous economic and social repercussions.

> The financial crisis can't just be used as an excuse to dismantle the public R&D system; it should be an incentive to reinforce it, because investment in R&D is directly related to an increase in GDP. Science and technology are widely acknowledged as crucial factors in a country's economic and social transformation [...] but, based on what we see, know and feel [...] S-Pain is different [Tibiábin, Paris, France]

It's a sign of failure that, after the government invests so much in educating young people, they have to go abroad in order to work [Teo, London, England]

For once I'd like them to realize that if we (Educated expatriates) are going abroad because we can't find job opportunities in Spain, it means that the return on the investment Spain has made in our education is going to end up profiting other countries, which in the long term is a tremendous loss and a disaster for Spain, not only in financial terms, but also in social and cultural terms [Marta M. Praia, Cape Verde]

For years I juggled a job with university studies, but in Spain that doesn't do you any good. The measures taken by the government, employers and institutions don't let us grow and flourish as professionals [Sara, Pau, France]

11.6   Conclusions

The young Spanish emigrants we surveyed can, in general, be described as individuals following a career plan which fall into one of three basic categories. The first group is made up of those who went abroad to study and found a way to stay on or return to their host country using the networks established by their universities and research centres. The second consists of those who left Spain under the aegis of a multinational company's internal mobility programme. And the third comprises those who went abroad, with or without a job offer, to seek employment or find a better job than the one they had.

The majority of the young people we surveyed, in addition to reproaching Spain's leaders, institutions and employers for their poor management of the crisis, express a pessimistic view of Spain's potential for change in the short term. Their return to Spain is conditional on the improvement of the economic situation, and some think that, even if the crisis ends, they will not return as long as the salaries, contract terms and treatment of workers in the Spanish job market remain so unappealing. Once again, as in other periods of Spain's history, Spanish emigrants not only choose host countries with high income levels but also, in general, those that offer geographical proximity or cultural similarities, such as Europe and the Spanish-speaking Americas—a choice which also increases the likelihood of putting down roots in their host countries.

Considering the reasons given by these young people to explain their emigration, we can also confirm that, for the majority, the experience has met the expectations of employment and professional advancement they had before leaving Spain, confirming that emigration has become an important formative step in their personal emancipation and that their project is sustained by a degree of stability. Nonetheless, as the survey shows, these young people strongly identify with and maintain close ties to the region from which they come. They are concerned about everything that goes on in Spain and stay abreast of the latest news from home; and although they frequently keep in touch with family and friends via social media and, above all, by telephone and Skype, they find it easy to integrate in their host countries, which serves to reinforce their connections.

Finally, the migration of skilled young workers, viewed as a transfer of human capital from a country with economic difficulties like ours to other European nations with better and steadier growth (Germany and the United Kingdom) or other regions with developing economies (China, Chile, United Arab Emirates, etc.), is evidence of the fact that we are witnessing a transformation of different job markets, industries and productive regions at a macroeconomic level. Consequently, migrant worker flows have adapted to this new scenario. On one side, we have the European countries whose economic situation is critical, having been hit hard by the crisis, which are expelling skilled workers (like Spain and other European nations in the Mediterranean region), and on the other, the nations that have reacted best to the crisis and used the structural instability to increase their political leadership and economic competitiveness. In the latter group, we find the countries of northern and central Europe, which are magnets for skilled labour (Rodríguez Sanjulián and Ballesteros Guerra 2014), and other booming economies with a need for more management-level professionals, which increasing attract more investments, economic activity and skilled human resources.

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Chapter 12
New "Guest Workers" from Spain? Exploring Migration to Germany in the Context of Economic and Societal Change

Birgit Glorius

Abstract The article examines the recent migration processes from Spain to Germany in the context of the economic and financial crisis. Even though the German and Spanish media often stress the history of guest worker migration, past and recent migration processes have hardly anything in common. I argue that the profound political and economic reforms after the end of Franco regime laid the ground for today's migration. The demographic transformation, societal liberalization and the expansion of educational involvement are important frame elements for the emigration of young and mostly well-educated Spaniards. From the German perspective, the recent migration processes are more than welcome, given that demographic ageing already created shortages in certain segments of the labour market. Only since the recent decade, the state administration shifted its policies from hindering and controlling immigration towards the aim of shaping migration. In this context, initiatives and programs were created to support mobility of labour force from those southern European countries that were severely hit by the financial and economic crisis.

An analysis of Eurobarometer data and own survey data from a survey among Spanish language students showed increasing mobility intentions, especially among those respondents who are facing economic hardship and unemployment. But also generally, mobility intentions are high, as a stay abroad is meanwhile perceived as important step in the personal and career development. Germany as destination country has a very positive image from the perspective of respondents, especially concerning transparency and fairness in the labour market. For both countries, Germany and Spain, the long-term orientation of (prospective) migrants will be crucial, that is, whether they will settle permanently in the destination country, return to their country of origin or pursue a transnational lifestyle.

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12.1 Introduction and Conceptual Outline

After the termination of the German guest worker recruitment program in 1973, Germany was not a preferred destination for migrants from the European south for a long time. But as a result of the Spanish economic crisis, we can observe a growing influx of Spanish migrants to Germany, which hardly has similarities with the historic guest worker migration. This can be illustrated by key categories such as migration dynamics, mechanisms of labour market integration or socio-demographic characteristics of the migrants. But how important was the historical experience of guest worker migration in enabling today's mobility both in Spain and in Germany? How important is the impact of societal modernization and the European integration process for recent migratory flows from Spain to Germany? And what consequences can be drawn for the future development of the European internal mobility?

This chapter will explore those questions by redrawing the historical development of migration flows and their framing features. First, it gives an overview over the recent changes of migration dynamics and reviews conceptual approaches from migration theory and demographic and social theory that might help to understand and explain the recent development. The second chapter looks back on the development of Spanish migration in the context of political changes and economic and social transformation processes. Chapter 3 analyzes Germany as migration destination, exploring migration policy development after German reunification and latest changes in the context of demographic ageing and labour force shortages. It also discusses the role of the media and of supportive institutions for the recent migratory flows. The fourth chapter offers empirical results on the mobility intentions of Spaniards in times of crisis in general and on motives and mobility intentions of Spanish language students. Data for this chapter derive from secondary sources and from a survey that I carried out among language students of German language classes in Spain in fall 2013. Chapter 5 summarizes the findings and discusses possible future developments of Spanish migration.

12.1.1 Migration Flows from Spain to Germany

In 2012, Germany recorded immigration numbers of more than one million and a positive net immigration of approximately 370,000 persons. Especially the migration from those EU countries that were most affected by the economic and financial crisis increased strongly. In comparison to the previous year, in 2012 immigration from Spain increased by 45 %, from Greece and Portugal by 43 % and Italy 40 %.

Fig. 12.1 Migration of non-German nationals between Spain and Germany, 1996–2013 (Data source: StBA 2014)

Similar tendencies can be observed regarding the new EU member states, like Slovenia with a 62 % increase; Hungary, 32 %; Romania, 23 %; Bulgaria, 14 %; and Poland, 8 % (StBA 2014).

Those exceptional increases were preceded by a period of stagnation, which can be clearly observed taking the example of Spain (Fig. 12.1). Until 2008, there were rather moderate immigration and emigration numbers of around 9000 yearly, mostly with a slightly negative migration balance. In 2009, there were already signs of a turnaround, which came to full effect in 2010. Immigration increased from 7778 in 2008 to over 10,000 in 2010, climbing over 36,000 in 2013. At the same time, Spanish departures from Germany dropped from 9000 in 2008 to 8200 in 2010. By 2013, departures increased to around 14,000, which is expectable in the light of increasing migration dynamics. As a result of this development, we can note a vast increase in the positive net migration with Spain from 2421 in 2010 to 22,360 in 2013.

The general migration development is also mirrored by data showing labour market or educational integration of Spaniards in Germany. Whereas before 2010, the number of regularly employed Spaniards was continuingly decreasing, occupation numbers climbed from 34,202 in June 2010 to 48,546 in June 2013. Especially the year 2013 recorded a strong gain of 19 % in comparison with 2012 (BA 2014). Also the inflow of Spanish students to Germany increased significantly. While before 2008, the number of Spanish first degree students used to be around 2600, numbers escalated after 2008 until 4289 in 2013 (DAAD, DZHW 2015). Summing up it can be said that the immigration of Spaniards to Germany has increased significantly since the onset of the economic crisis and that a large part of this immigration was targeted on the German labour market and the higher education system. Nevertheless, compared to the times of guest worker immigration, the numbers are rather moderate. Also in comparison with migration flows from CEE

countries to Germany, the Spanish immigration appears to take place on a much smaller scale.

12.1.2   Conceptual Approaches to the Causes and Motives of Recent Migration

There are a number of conceptual approaches from migration theory that seem suitable to explain the altered patterns of migration of Spaniards to Germany before the background of financial and economic crisis. Especially neoclassical approaches seem to be appropriate, which conceptualize migration as a rational response to employment opportunities and wage differences (Sjastaad 1962; Todaro 1969). However, considering the present situation in Spain, we must ask the question why emigration does not develop much stronger.

The migration system theory considers migration decisions as comprehensively connected to the economic, political and social context of the countries involved (Mabogunje 1970). According to the migration system theory, migration is most likely to appear between countries that are connected through a shared history, geographical proximity or political and economic cooperation. The probability that significant migration processes take place between two countries that are connected within such a system is greater as between states which belong to different systems. Here, we can find a number of analytical starting points, be it the economic and political interdependencies of Spain and Germany and be it the lived experiences and transnational networks of their peoples resulting from earlier migrations and tourist mobility.

Network theories stress the impact of social networks for migratory decisions and successful integration. Migration networks are defined as sets of interpersonal connections of former, potential and actual migrants, groups and organizations in source and destination countries, which are bound together by kinship, friendship or weaker forms of social ties (Faist 1997, p. 69f). Differences in the structure and density of a network can serve as explanation for the selectivity of migration.

Also the development or the absence of a "culture of migration" can be of importance. In many countries and cultures, mobility is regarded as necessary element in the process of personality development (Monsutti 2007). The "gap year" or "year abroad" can enhance the individual cultural capital and can serve as a stage of testing oneself outside of the conventional social norms and networks (Baláž and Williams 2004; King and Ruiz-Gelices 2003). In case of the Central and Eastern European transformation countries, temporary labour migration became a natural means to secure livelihood at home (Engbersen et al. 2010).

However, the Spanish society is rather characterized by low mobility, both within the country and across its borders. Reasons for this lack of a culture of migration are seen in the strong attachment to family and place of origin (De Miguel and De Miguel 2002; Meil et al. 2008). However, the increasing

presence of young Spaniards in global locations such as London or Berlin (Faraco-Blanco 2014) may indicate that mobility gains acceptance in Spain as a "rite de passage", combined with the necessity to avoid economic hardship.

Compared to the era of guest worker migration, it becomes clear that the recent migration processes are framed by different political, economic and social conditions, within which migrants make their mobility decisions. These conditions should be fully taken into account in the analysis of migration processes. This includes not only changes on the regional and national level but also global transformation processes with respect to economies and labour markets (Castles 2010).

As mobility decisions are frequently embedded into a broader set of biographical decisions, such as career or family formation, there is the need to integrate elements of demographic and social theory into explanatory approaches focusing on recent Spanish migration.

Throughout the last decades, we observed a sharp decline in birth rates all over Europe. At the same time there was a change of family formation processes, as evidenced by declining marriage rates, rising divorce rates and an increasing number of extramarital cohabitation. The second demographic transition theory (SDT) (Lesthaeghe 1992; Van de Kaa 1987, 2001) explains the observed changes with a profound change of values, which leads to a changing partnership and reproduction behaviour. This development is usually framed by increasing prosperity and educational expansion of a society. Thus, young adults are confronted with a multitude of options regarding education, mobility and self-realization, which they have to match with family formation decisions. Also due to the ubiquitous availability of modern contraceptives, the birth of a child today is a conscious decision, which is taken later in life than in former times.

Another approach concerning the effects of social and economic change on the individual level is individualization theories. They describe the transition from an industrial to a post-industrial society as an important base component for the observed behavioural adaptations. "Individualization" refers to various levels: at the societal level, it points to the disintegration of formerly dominant social categories such as gender, social class or family. At the institutional level, individualization is understood as a transformation of formerly stable institutions such as the social welfare state, the labour market, the educational system or family law (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 2002). Both processes lead to a dissolution of previously given biographical role models and drive the individual to personally deal with a large number of decisions. This new multioptionality opens up new possibilities on the one hand, but generates new risks and constraints on the other hand. As a result, individuals make only provisional decisions and develop a constant willingness to adapt their life project to changing external conditions (ibd.).

In the following chapter, I will analyze if and how the conceptual approaches elaborated above are applicable for the explanation of recent migration processes from Spain to Germany.

12.2   Development of Spanish Emigration and Its Socioeconomic Context

12.2.1   Historical Migration Development Until the End of Franco's Regime

Within Europe, Spain is known as a country of late industrialization. Until the 1920s and 1930s, agricultural production prevailed, characterized by extensive farming and unfavourable ownership structures (Bernecker 2006, p. 317). Especially the smallholders and subsistence farmers could not secure the livelihood of their families, and emigration to South America was the only instrument to flee rural poverty. Between 1882 and 1914, around one million emigrants were documented, which represents one-third of the natural population growth of the same period (Bernecker 2006, p. 309). After the First World War, the international migration shifted to European countries, paralleled by a strong rural-urban migration (Bernecker 2006, p. 311). France was the preferred destination for immigrants from Spain because of its geographical proximity, favourable settlement rules and emerging industrial centres. Later it received a large number of refugees of the Spanish Civil War. After 1946, the overseas emigration was resumed, and until 1970, there were approximately 900,000 emigrants to the Americas, of which approximately 40,000 returned (Bernecker 2006, p. 312). Considering both internal and external migration, there were about 3.7 million Spaniards who left their place of origin between 1960 and 1970 (Bernecker 2006, p. 315).

The years of the Franco dictatorship (1939–1975) shaped the Spanish economy and society profoundly. In the 1950s, Francoist politics were focusing on the nationalization of industries and the attempt to make Spain economically independent. First, these reforms led to rising poverty and unemployment, and various development strategies were implemented aiming for an increase of productivity and a reduction of regional disparities. Driving forces of economic stabilization of those years were public investment in infrastructure and mass tourism, which began in the 1950s. This in turn led to a change in the economic structure, accompanied by rural outmigration (Bernecker 2006, p. 249f).

After the Second World War, the original main target countries of Spanish emigration had tightened their immigration policy by enforcing the qualification requirements for immigrants. Thus, the usually poorly educated rural emigrants increasingly turned to the European destinations, by means of both formal and informal migration. In 1956, Spain completed a first recruitment agreement with Belgium, followed by France (1959), Germany (1960), Switzerland (1961) and the Netherlands (1964) (Akgündüz 2012). Until the oil crisis of 1973 and the subsequent recruitment ban, a total of about 1.1 million labour migrants were officially registered. Germany was the second largest destination country behind France with around 400,000 Spanish labour migrants (Thränhardt 2014, p. 289f). The recruitment was organized by the German Commission. No specific qualifications were required, as the companies looked for unskilled workers for industrial mass

production. Important criteria therefore were the (young) age and the health status of applicants.

Historical reports describe the motivating effects of word-of-mouth propaganda. Returning guest workers stressed the easy employment opportunities and good wages in Germany, which made it possible to gain enough for financing own property back in Spain within 2 years of migrant labour (MIFKJF Rheinland-Pfalz 2010). Such narrations deployed a huge impact, especially in poor, rural areas. The number of Spanish labour migrants in Germany quickly rose, starting from approximately 16,500 until 286,000 in 1973, the year the recruitment stopped. Altogether, there might have been 600,000 labour migrants from Spain between 1960 and 1973. Due to return migration, the number of Spaniards decreased since those times down to 129,000 in the year 2000 (Thränhardt 2014, p. 291f).

12.2.2 Economic and Social Transformation of Spain After Franco

The economic transformations following the Franco regime caused a fast sectoral change with a shift from the producing to the service sector, combined with a profound privatization process and labour market reforms focusing on the flexibilization of labour contracts. Measured in terms of core indicators such as GDP, the economic development during this transformation period was largely positive. Until 2007, the yearly growth of GDP in Spain augmented the EU average and was largely driven by the boom of tourism industry, making Spain to the second largest tourism destination worldwide (Eurofound 2010, p. 2).

Besides tourism, the construction business had an important impact on the economic growth, and a large share of the seven million new jobs that were created in the years 1995–2006 fell into those branches. However, many of those new jobs were created under new, more flexible labour market conditions, which were introduced to reduce the high unemployment numbers. Thus, Spain experienced an increasing polarization of well-endowed and stable positions on the one hand and poorly paid, temporary and insecure positions on the other (Eurofound 2010, p. 14ff). Until today, Spain is the country with the highest share of temporary contracts throughout Europe (Eurofound 2010, p. 17).

Neither the flourishing economy nor the repeated labour market reforms could successfully reduce unemployment, which remained on a high level especially among the younger age groups. Reasons must be sought in the rapid change of labour market structures, lacking connectivity between education, job training and the requirements of the labour market as well as changes in the composition of the labour force, which is mainly driven by a large increase in female employment and rising numbers of working immigrants. All those groups mentioned – young adults, women and immigrants – are disproportionately affected by unemployment (Bernecker 2006, p. 276). Regarding the age-specific unemployment rates, we

Fig. 12.2 Unemployment per age group, Spain 1992–2010, in per cent (Data source: National Statistical Institute (Spain) 2011, own design)

can see that during the mid-1990s, youth unemployment was similarly high as today; however, this did not result in increasing emigration (Fig. 12.2).

Since the 1970s, Spain entered into a demographic transition process, which is characterized by decreasing marriages, rising numbers of divorces and extramarital cohabitations and postponement of fertility, resulting in a drop of fertility rates. Since the 1990s, Spain is among the lowest low-fertility countries in Europe, with fertility rates dropping from 2.79 (1975) until the lowest level of 1.2 in 1992. Since the end of the Franco era, the marital age at first childbirth moved from 25.3 years in 1975 to 26.8 years in 1990 and 29.8 years in 2010. The postponement of motherhood is dependent on the educational level, and it is most pronounced among women with tertiary degrees. While among academically trained women of the birth cohorts 1949–1953, 72.1 % had given birth to a child by the age of 30, the corresponding share among the female academics of the birth cohorts 1964–1968 is only 37.7 % (Delgado et al. 2008, p. 1071).

The increasing educational participation of women results in a transformation of education and occupational biographies. However, higher education attainment and female career development clash with still traditional role models of family life and a lack of institutional support for raising children. Thus, postponement of motherhood is a consequence of those transformations which move at different paces (Bernecker 2006, p. 339f, Delgado et al. 2008, p. 1096).

Another important reason for delayed family formation is the housing market with an absolute lack of affordable apartments for rent. This fact, together with the high youth unemployment and precarious labour conditions, results in a prolongation of adolescence. In 2009, 57 % of men aged 25–29 and 40 % of women of the same age were still living together with their parents, and even among 30–34-year-old Spaniards, those shares were rather high, with 26 % for men and 16 % for

women. Survey results indicate that economic difficulties are the main reason for the prolonged stay at the parents' house (European Commission 2011, p. 73f).

As already mentioned, also the educational behaviour changed significantly. During the last decades, the share of working age population with higher secondary or tertiary degrees increased strongly. While in 1992, only 40.9 % of persons aged 25–34 and 24.6 % of those between 35 and 44 years had at least a higher secondary degree, those shares increased until 2010 towards nearly two-thirds of the age group 25–34 and almost 60 % in the age group 35–55. At the same time, the share of population with tertiary degree more than doubled from 8 to 17 % (INE 2011).

Even though educational expansion and economic transformation took place in the same period, there were and still are matching problems between the acquired degree and labour market needs. Thus, especially in the transition period from education to occupational life, stages of unemployment are very likely. And even though young adults with tertiary degree have the lowest risk of unemployment, they also experience difficulties in the transition from university to work life. Thus, in 2010, 28 % of the young academics aged 20–24 were unemployed (INE 2011).

While youth unemployment did not result in rising emigration numbers during the 1990s, today the younger age cohorts consider (temporary) migration as a possible option, fuelled by the ongoing internationalization process of Spain during the last decades. Thus, the Spanish population shows increasing international mobility which is supported by transnational social networks. This is clearly displayed in 2009 survey data where 10 % of the Spanish respondents reported own migration experiences and 41 % stated that close friends or family members had experience living abroad (European Commission 2010).

Summing up, it can be said that profound political and economic transformations took place after the end of Franco regime, which brought about a societal transformation process which we conceptualize as second demographic transition and individualization process. Growing educational attainment and the internationalization process of the last decades enable today's young generations to opt for migration, while during earlier periods of crisis, the frame conditions were not as supportive towards such a step. In the following chapter, I will explore the framing conditions of Germany as possible migration destination, before I turn to my empirical results on migration motivation of Spanish language students.

12.3 The Development of Germany as Migratory Destination

Even though Germany has a significant share of foreign population, it identified itself as a nonimmigrant country for the longest time being. Since the recruitment stop of 1973, opportunities for labour immigration were scarce, and the largest share of effective immigration consisted of resettlement migration of ethnic Germans (*Spätaussiedler*), refugees and migration for the purpose of family

reunification (Glorius 2008, p. 83). European free movers only represented small shares of the migration volume and of the active labour force in Germany. Facing significant signs of demographic ageing, the state administration shifted its policies from hindering and controlling immigration towards the aim of shaping migration and especially attracting skilled migrants.

12.3.1   Migration Flows and Political Response After the End of Cold War

With the end of cold war and German reunification, population movements changed significantly. There was a large inflow of ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe who moved to Germany due to liberated travel regulations. Between 1990 and 1995, approximately 1.5 million so-called *Spätaussiedler* arrived in Germany and needed profound political and public efforts for social and economic integration (BMI 2014, p. 96ff). Also, the wars in former Yugoslavia caused an increase of refugee numbers during the early 1990s.

At the same time, the reunifying state was struggling with political and economic challenges. The breakdown of the socialist economic system strongly affected the East German economy and caused a rapid increase of unemployment numbers from officially near zero in the old system to one million in 1991 and 1.6 million in 2004. Following an absolute peak in 2005, with 4.8 million unemployed people in the whole of Germany, the numbers decreased steadily down to 2.9 million in 2013, which meant a drop of unemployment rate from 13.0 % in 2005 to 7.7 % in 2013 (Fig. 12.3).


Fig. 12.3 Unemployment rate in Germany with its eastern and western parts, in per cent of all dependent employed civilian persons 1991–2014 (Data source: BA 2015)

Facing those economic difficulties and the necessity to intensify the nation building process in reunified Germany, several reforms were implemented in order to reduce the inflow of refugees and "nonproductive" population. Those reforms included reforms of the constitutional right of asylum in 1992 and the implementation of the Federal Law for Displaced Persons of 1993, which hampered the application process and the conditions of approval (Glorius 2008, p. 88f). On the other hand, new entry channels for labour migrants from Central and Eastern European countries were opened since the beginning of the 1990s. Those recruitment schemes were based on bilateral agreements, and they pursued the declared objective to support economic transformation in the Central and Eastern European Countries. A further, more unofficial objective was to avoid irregular migration from those countries to Germany which was predicted on the basis of the large income and wealth gaps between Eastern and Western Europe. Agreements concerned contracted work (mainly in the construction business), agriculture-based seasonal work and vocational work as well as regulations for cross-border workers on the basis of daily commuting. All those treaties had clear time restrictions and did not provide for family reunification. Seasonal workers have been the largest group, with numbers between 200,000 and over 300,000 per year. Contract workers, as second largest group, amounted to around 40,000 treaties per year (BMI 2010).

A significant constitutional change in the field of migration legislation was the implementation of the new Immigration Act 2004 on January 1 2005. The Immigration Act restructured the legislative activities towards immigration and its regulation, summarizing and renewing several laws and subsequent regulations concerning immigration, residence and work. Even though it constructed new entry gates for high qualified third-country citizens, its main focus remained on the control and structuration of immigration (Glorius 2008).

As a result, resettlement immigration of ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe dropped down from over 100,000 yearly during the 1990s to less than 5000 per year, and also the inflow of refugees dropped significantly from over 100,000 per year during the 1990s to around 20,000 in the first decade of the 2000s. While seasonal labour and contract work remained on a very high level around 300,000 per year, labour migration from third countries developed rather moderately, from approximately 18,000 in 2004 to approximately 39,000 in 2012 (BMI 2014, p. 40).

12.3.2 Effects of Demographic Ageing on Labour Market Development and Political Response

Even though the German labour market exhibited high unemployment numbers and unemployment rates due to post-industrial transformation and the restructuring of East German economy, there were rising concerns regarding labour-force shortages due to demographic ageing. The demographic ageing process in Germany is already

observable since the 1970s, with total fertility rates below reproduction level and a continuing increase of life expectancy. Negative or only slightly positive migration balances – combined with the natural development – already caused a population decrease from 82.5 million in 2002 to 81.7 million in 2010[1] (StBA 2015). The ageing process is clearly observable regarding the age structure of the labour force. Between 1994 and 2013, the share of employees aged 15–24 years decreased from 14.1 to 10.4 %, those aged 25–49 years shrank from 65.1 to 59.4 %, while the group of employees aged 50 or more increased from 20.6 to 29.5 % (BA 2014). Even though Germany is facing unexpectedly high immigration numbers since 2011, a further decrease of population at working age and a continuing ageing process of the population and labour force are predicted for the decades to come (StBA 2015).

Demographic decline can also be observed in the number of high school graduates, which already dropped 15 % from more than 900,000 in the beginning of the 2000s to approximately 837,000 in 2015. Due to a restructuration of the educational system and increasing interest in higher education, the numbers of high school graduates eligible for higher education continued to increase until 2011, while the number of graduates who are ready to enter into vocational education dropped more than 20 % between 2004 and 2014 (BfB 2015, p. 13f). Thus, the demand for vocational training is shrinking, which initially caused some relief in certain segments of the labour market and in those regions where the demand for vocational education had not been met before. But at the same time, there were increasing complaints from the employer side, who were facing reduced options to choose the brightest trainees from a large field of applicants. Especially in smaller companies, in less attractive fields of occupation and in the peripheral regions of Germany, the demographic reduction of high school graduates already resulted in a shortage of apprentices (ABB 2014, p. 101).

The development of the higher educational system also caused significant changes for the labour potential. The Bologna reforms brought about a heterogenization of study programs, with a 45 % increase of possible fields of study between 2005 and 2014. The ongoing trend towards higher education caused increasing demand for academic training, even though the total numbers of high school graduates declined. The number of first degree enrollments climbed from 277,868 in 1990 to 314,536 in 2000 until a peak in 2011 with 518,748 first-year students (ABB 2014, p. 119). Accordingly, the number of university graduates increased between 2002 and 2012 as of 44 % to more than 300,000.

However, there seems to be a mismatch between the most popular fields of study and the demands of the labour market, especially concerning the so-called MINT sector (mathematics, information science, natural sciences and technology). Especially during the IT-boom in the beginning of the 2000s, there were around 130,000 open positions in the field of data processing. But even after the end of the IT-boom, the occupational potential in the MINT sector further increased. Estimates report

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[1] Due to the population census in 2011, the total population number was revised, which resulted in an even lower total population number of 80.3 million in 2011.

the number of open positions in the MINT sector around 315,000 in 2013 (IdWK 2013, p. 47). Furthermore, there are increasing labour force shortages in health-related jobs. Especially in the field of geriatric care, demands are rising due to demographic ageing and the decreasing potential for family care (VBW 2012). Occupation numbers in the care business already increased by 50 % between 1999 and 2011 to a total of 952,000 employees. Until the year 2020, a further increase of around 280,000 new positions is predicted (ibd.).

Regarding the general labour market situation, labour force shortages are less pronounced than in specific segments as elaborated above. Shortages on the labour market are indicated with the labour demand index of the federal labour agency. Taken the situation of 2004 as initial value (2004 = 100), the indicator ascended to a maximum of 180 points in December 2012 (BA 2015). The number of job vacancies increased from 207,000 open positions in 2004 to the maximum of 477,000 vacancies in 2014, with over one-third of open positions being vacant for more than 3 months (BA 2014).

As a consequence, the German state administration implemented several measures aiming on the recruitment of skilled labour migrations from third countries. Already in the year 2000, the Green Card for IT-specialists was introduced. Following the implementation of the New Immigration Act 2004, labour market access for highly skilled third-country national was facilitated by a number of measures, such as the reduction of necessary income levels, improved regulations for certificate recognition and more transparency concerning job openings in Germany (BMI 2014, p. 41). However, labour migration in the context of those measures remained on a moderate level, with numbers increasing from 18,415 in 2005 to 38,745 in 2012 (BMI 2014, 40). On the other hand, free mobility of EU citizens – however not promoted by the German administration but rather restricted concerning the new EU member states of 2004 and 2007 – increased steadily. While in the year 2000, arrivals and departures of EU citizens ranged around 165,000 each and caused a marginal positive migration balance, the situation changed within the decade thereafter. In 2005, more than 300,000 EU citizens moved to Germany and approximately 460,000 in 2010, amounting to positive migration balances of approximately 43,000 and approximately 93,000 in the same years. As arrivals are increasing more strongly than departures, the EU-migration balance amounted to a gain of 273,533 persons in 2012 (ibd.)

Even though until very recently there were no special initiatives from the state administration for attracting and integrating EU citizens, there are growing numbers of employer organizations or headhunters which develop strategies for recruiting European citizens for specific segments of the German labour market. Quite often, those initiatives are concentrating on one specific country of origin, as, for example, on Spain.

12.3.3   Structuration of Spanish Migration to Germany: The Role of Media Representation and Institutional Support

Regional and sectoral labour force shortages induced the development of coordinative structures that are aiming to recruit labour migrants in Spain. Those efforts are specifically directed to the employment of medical staff and engineers. Important actors are the German central labour office (Zentralstelle für Arbeitsvermittlung, ZAV), the consulates, the foreign chambers of commerce and various private actors such as headhunting agencies or hospital companies. There are also local initiatives that use existing contacts to twin cities or German schools abroad.

A recently completed study analyzed the recruitment structure for skilled workers in Spain. Media analyses found 400 different institutions which recruited workers and trainees from Spain. Among them were craft chambers, employer associations and educational and non-profit organizations. The largest group of actors, however, was small- and medium-sized companies (Kraußlach and Stapf 2014, p. 129). The main reason why they focused on Spain as source country was their already existing business relations with the country as well as the certitude that, given the high unemployment in Spain, there will be high interest for working in Germany and therefore good chances to attract skilled workers. Many of the interviewed companies reported that the media coverage of successful recruitments in Spain was a trigger for their own activities in this field (Kraußlach and Stapf 2014, p. 146f). The survey respondents aimed on filling a total of 4500 open positions for qualified workers, as well as 1800 positions for trainees. Main labour market segments were medical and health sector, mechanical engineering and the hotel and restaurant industry. The efforts were only partially effective, as out of a total of 53,000 job applications, only 3800 labour contracts were realized until the end of the survey (Kraußlach and Stapf 2014, p. 136, p. 146f). Starting in 2013, those efforts were supported by the Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs. A special program was started that is meant to support mobility of job applicants and young labour migrants from those southern European countries that are most affected by the financial and economic crisis. The "Program for supporting labour migration of trainees and unemployed workers from Europe" (MobiPro-EU) was put into practice at 02.01.2013. It provides financial support for language training and for travel costs for migratory moves, internships or job interviews in Germany, thus aiming to reduce mobility obstacles that usually hinder the intra-European mobility of young adults. The program has a financial frame of 140 million Euro and is designed to run until 2016 (BMAS 2013).

Concerning the willingness of Spaniards to choose Germany as migratory destination, the media representation of Germany in the context of labour force needs and accessibility of its labour market seems to play an important role. When in February 2011 – at the peak of the crisis – chancellor Merkel visited Spain, her statements concerning labour force needs in Germany received high media attention. Apparently those statements resulted in increased attention towards Germany

as possible destination for Spanish unemployed, and also German companies were increasingly drawn towards the Spanish labour market in order to look for employees (cp. Kraußlach and Stapf 2014). There are some tangible effects of media coverage on the migration motivation and locational choice of (potential) migrants. For example, in 2012, a Portuguese journalist published a magazine article on the city of Schwäbisch Hall in southwest Germany. Reporting on the tourist attractions of the city and region, there was also a comment on open labour market positions and a quote from an administration official that Portuguese workers would be welcome. Shortly afterwards, the local job agency received more than 2500 online applications from Portugal (Becker et al. 2013, p. 38).

Also the presence of German institutions in Spain is important for the development of destination choices, as they offer opportunities for direct contact and first-hand information. Most notably, the German Goethe institutions play an important role, which are located in four Spanish cities and offer language classes, cultural education and partly also business contacts. During the last years, the demand for German language training increased more than 50 %, and quite frequently language students are also looking for information and advice concerning labour market access in Germany. As a consequence, the Goethe institutions developed a lecture series on labour market issues and intensified contacts and cooperations with German and Spanish employment agencies (Seifert 2013, p. 53).

12.4 Mobility Intentions of Spaniards in Times of Crisis

12.4.1 General Mobility Intentions

The results of a Eurobarometer survey from 2009 gives the opportunity to analyze general mobility intentions of Spaniards compared to the total of EU citizens on the peak of the crisis. While only 12 % of Spanish respondents express the general intention to live and work in another country within the European Union (EU-27: 17 %), their mobility intentions would increase considerably in case of unemployment, be it for internal or international moves (Table 12.1). More in-depth analyses on EU-27 level show that a positive attitude towards international mobility is connected to one's own mobility experiences and to the existence of a social network abroad.

Another set of Eurobarometer questions examined the most relevant push and pull factors for migratory decisions. The answers give an idea of the difficult labour market situation and unfavourable working conditions in Spain. Compared to all EU-27 respondents, Spanish respondents indicated better working conditions and career opportunities significantly more often than the EU-27 respondents (Table 12.2).

However, considering possible factors that would hold respondents back from migration, the survey revealed the above-average significance of homeboundness in

Table 12.1 QC20: If you were unemployed and had difficulties finding a job, would you be willing to move to another region or country to find one? (in per cent of respondents)

	Spain	EU-27
Yes...	54	48
...to another region within this country only	15	18
...to another country only	4	7
...to another country or another region	35	23
No, I would not be ready to move	41	45
Don't know/no comment	5	7

Source: European Commission 2010

Table 12.2 QC 26: What reasons might encourage you to work in another country? (max. three answers, the table shows the five most important reasons for Spanish respondents, in per cent of respondents)

	Spain	EU-27
Better working conditions	48	27
Better chances of finding employment	36	21
Better career or business opportunities	27	23
Better quality of life abroad	23	29
To discover something new and meet new people	17	20

Source: European Commission 2010

Spain (57 % against 39 % EU-27) and concerns that migration would bear negative consequences for family members (44 % against 27 % EU-27).

The overall picture however shows the positive assessment of intra-European mobility, for individuals as well as for national economies and for the European integration process (Table 12.3).

Language skills seem to be a major obstacle for Spaniards considering labour migration. While on EU-27 level, 52 % of respondents consider missing language skills as main challenge in case of labour migration, among Spanish respondents concerns are even higher (63 %). And those concerns seem to have an even ground: according to recent studies on this issue, employers as well as Spanish labour migrants consider language barriers as biggest obstacle, while improvements are not achievable in a fast pace (Kraußlach u. Stapf 2014, p. 171ff).

12.4.2 Potentials and Motives for Germany as Migration Destination

The Eurobarometer survey showed that the migration motivation is strongly determined by socio-demographic factors, prior migration experiences and transnational networks. In order to assess the likelihood of mobility in connection with the necessary language skills and language acquisition in more detail, the author

Table 12.3 Generally speaking, do you think that when people move across countries or regions within the European Union it is a good thing, a bad thing or neither a good or a bad thing for. . . (in per cent of respondents)

	Spain	EU-27
. . . European integration	78	69
. . .the labour market	67	50
. . . the economy	67	47
. . . the individuals	60	48
. . . families	43	36

Source: European Commission 2010

launched a survey among Spanish language students at Goethe-Institutes and other German language schools in Spain. The survey was designed as online survey. It ran between September 18 and December 18 2013 and delivered 564 completed questionnaires, mainly deriving from the Goethe-Institute students. The sample is not representative for the Spanish population; however, it represents the typical clientele of Goethe-Institutes with a strong selectivity regarding age and education: the survey participants (57 % female) were mostly young adults and the largest group (40.5 %) were those aged between 25 and 34. About 28 % were younger than 25 years, and approximately 20 % between 35 and 44 years. Only a small share was older than 45 years.

The majority of respondents were single (66 %) and without children (88 %). They were mostly very well educated, about 70 % held a tertiary degree. About half of the respondents were employed at the time of the survey, 29 % were students and 13 % were unemployed. There were some respondents who were still attending secondary school (3 %), retired (2 %) or at maternity leave (1 %). Most of the respondents already had some experiences in Germany. Approximately 61 % already visited Germany as tourists, 13 % for business reasons and 15 % for education. Approximately 22 % travelled to Germany to visit relatives or friends, a social network structure that might be relevant for later migration projects. The survey participants showed a high level of internationalization, meaning social networks abroad, foreign friends or relatives in Spain, own experience abroad and varied language knowledge (Table 12.4). The degree of internationalization of the Goethe respondents is much higher than in the Eurobarometer surveys.

As main reasons for studying German, job and career-related motives were mentioned (Fig. 12.4). More than three quarters of respondents study German for job-related reasons. Almost every second respondent prepares for a possible labour migration to one of the German-speaking countries – Germany, Switzerland or Austria – and 21 % can imagine studying in one of those countries. But besides those utilitarian reasons of language acquisition, two-thirds also mentioned a general interest in German language and culture as a reason for studying German, one-third of respondents prepared for touristic travel and 18 % wanted to improve their German communication skills because they had German friends or relatives.

Table 12.4 Internationality of respondents, in per cent

|	
Friends/relatives abroad	88.6
Foreign friends/relatives in Spain	72.8
Experience abroad of more than 3 months	54.6
Very good/perfect proficiency of a foreign language	24.3

Data source: own survey, $n = 535$

Fig. 12.4 Reasons for studying German, in percent of cases (Data source: own survey, $n = 560$, multiple answer set with 1511 answers)

An in-depth inquiry showed that those migration plans have to be taken seriously in case of those respondents who study German for job-related reasons. Almost three quarters of them have already collected information on the labour markets in Germany, Switzerland or Austria, and over one-third has received labour migration consultation. 13 % had sent job applications, and nearly 5 % already signed labour contracts or are looking for housing in a German-speaking country.

More than half of the respondents already have experience living abroad, and there is a high willingness for further migrations, either for reasons of career advancement or because of a general openness towards new experiences (Fig. 12.5). For 80 %, professional development would be a migration motive; 76 % would move to push their career or to make new experiences in general. The willingness to move because of monetary reasons (44 %) or unemployment (45 %) is significantly lower, which can be due to the rather sound economic and occupational situation of the respondents who may have few reasons to consider those situations to come true. Practically none of the respondents would completely refuse a migratory stay.

Considering the possible length of a migratory stay, it is interesting to note that permanent emigration is not seen as an attractive option, nor are short-term stays. Almost one-quarter of respondents would prefer a sojourn time between 1 and 3 years; 14 % would consider a time span of 3–5 years. Every second respondent is not able to make a definite commitment at the moment of the survey. This stresses the fact that respondents have more general ideas of possible migration rather than a tangible plan and timescale. But the vagueness of respondents can also result from

Fig. 12.5 Reasons for living in another country, in per cent of cases (Data source: own survey, $n = 535$)

their awareness that the length of a migratory stay is foremost dependent on the possibilities of labour market and social integration in the destination country, a factor that cannot be planned in advance.

A further set of questions explored the job-related expectations and plans in the years to come. Among others, we asked how respondents judge the probability for a job search abroad. The results show a high pressure to find a job (either at home or abroad) among those respondents who were unemployed at the time of the survey. But also among university students, we observed a high determination to not solely rely on the home labour market for future occupational and career development (Fig. 12.6).

Even though those results are not representative for the Spanish population as a whole, and considering the gap between intention and action, we can state an increased readiness among German language students to leave Spain at least for a restricted period of time. The probability of realizing mobility intentions increases when respondents have prior mobility experiences or transnational social networks and if they have a high level of German language proficiency and a high educational level. Furthermore, the data show that migration cannot be solely interpreted as escape from the crisis at home, but that it is also an option for professional and personal advancement.

12.5 Summary and Outlook

This chapter examined the question how the new migratory dynamics from Spain to Germany can be explained considering factors on the macro-, meso- and microlevel. The analysis of framing elements in the Spanish labour market has revealed that due to economic transformation, there was a rather high

Fig. 12.6 Probability of job search abroad within the following 2 years (Data source: own survey, *n* = 497)

unemployment rate already since a number of decades. This mainly hits the Spanish youth who enters the labour market for the first time. While in former times, youth unemployment was differentiated by education, today the unemployment rates of the higher educated are "catching up", as they have difficulty to find a decent position that matches their qualification. The economic and financial crisis reinforced unfavourable working conditions and intensified the pressure for individual reaction.

More and more Spanish migrants choose Germany as destination, a fact that receives high media attention, even though those flows are far below the increasing inflow from other Mediterranean countries and from Central and Eastern Europe. Quite often, the young Spanish immigrants are compared with the former "guest worker" immigrants, though practically no similarities can be found. Those more recent migrants are mostly young, mostly well educated and mostly have international experiences and are transnationally connected. Their migration decision is only partly due to the economic crisis in their home country, as it also offers an opportunity for new experiences and self-realization. Their migration strategies are supported by their individual cultural capital and changed values concerning education and family formation.

So far there is no evidence that those social networks which developed in the context of guest worker migration have contributed to the recent development of migratory flows. However, it is evident that the economic and demographic transformation and internationalization of Spain has enhanced individual capacities to react to the crisis, so that international mobility within the European Union became more feasible for many Spaniards.

The processes we observe in Spain have many parallels to the transformation processes in Central and Eastern Europe after 1989. Economic transformation, combined with a reform of the educational system, demographic change and societal modernization processes, brought about a generation of young, well-educated migrants, who actively explore the new options that are provided by the

European integration process and the acquisition of full freedom of residence and labour market access. Analyses of remigration processes to Central and Eastern European countries reveal strong tendencies of transnationalization, as returning migrants develop further life and career strategies in the context of a broader geographical scope that extends the national boundaries of their own nation state. Their future might take place in the home country, but it can also be transferred into another European country, if the framing conditions seem more favourable there (Anacka et al. 2013). A similar development can be considered for today's migrants from Mediterranean Europe, and their further mobility development needs scientific attention. Apart from the question of future transnationalization processes and the development of circulary migration patterns, there is more research needed considering less privileged groups of migrants, which are less well covered by science and media so far. Finally, also the institutional development in the context of European labour migration and their regional and sectoral particularities should receive further scientific attention.

The European mobility space has an increasing significance in balancing asymmetries of single countries' labour markets. Even though institutional networks can shape and support migration processes, migratory decisions are still individual decision, and migratory success is still dependent on the social and cultural capital internalized by the individual migrant.

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Chapter 13
Student on the Move: Academic Career and Life Transitions of Foreign PhD Students in Barcelona (Spain)

Cristóbal Mendoza and Anna Ortiz

Abstract This chapter focuses on PhD students' mobility and migration, a relatively unexplored topic in literature. Specifically it revolves around the motivations and expectations of 27 young PhD students at Catalan universities, their reasons for migration, their personal and labour transitions, their evaluation of the migration process and the role of the city of Barcelona as an attractive place for living and studying. Perhaps unexpectedly, migration motivations are not always associated with a clear decision to do a doctorate, but they relate to other reasons, such as the attractiveness of the city of Barcelona. Arrival in Barcelona is a point of rupture which, in some cases, coincides with leaving the family home. Thus, there are complex multiple processes associated with migration: emancipation from family, entry into a doctorate and adaptation to a new country. From that perspective, the city is perceived as a vital kaleidoscope with multiple edges that allows for a wide variety of experiences and exchanges. The chapter so analyses the use and appropriation of everyday spaces of students, in the framework of a temporary migration. Since migration occurs in a crucial time in their lives corresponding to a learning period in a city with different potentialities and constraints from their place of origin, immigrants' everyday practices and experiences may be "released" in a new territory. This positive scenario becomes gloomy and dark for the future due to the lack of opportunities in Catalan universities (yet it is accepted that geographical mobility is a feature of the current university job market).

Keywords PhD students • Young people • Migration • Life transition • Barcelona

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13.1   Introduction

The literature has long shown that contemporary societies are characterized by a period of hypermobility that was already foreseen in the early 1970s by Zelinsky (1971). Most studies on migration associate the increase in mobility with globalization and greater integration in the world economy (e.g. Castells 1996; Castles and Davidson 2000; Smith 2001). It is evident, however, that many of the movements that take place in this increasingly integrated world respond to reasons that cannot be described as "economic", for example, tourism, family reunion or migration for study. Furthermore, the ease and speed with which people can communicate with different parts of the world have led scholars to rethink migration critically as not being a one-way process leading necessarily to integration into host societies.

Taking this into account, British sociologists have recently proposed the "new mobility paradigm" (Hannam et al. 2006; Urry 2007). This is an interesting conceptual and theoretical development that casts some doubt on the previous time-space assumptions of migration studies. This paradigm tries to overcome the concept of migration based on spatially fixed Euclidean identities and territories, since places are linked to many others through complex interwoven networks that exceed strict geographical limits (Sheller and Urry 2006). Conceptually, under this paradigm, "new" types of mobility and migration can be visualized and understood. In fact, it considers that people's movements are of such intensity that they even affect the structure of contemporary society, which can no longer be defined as immovable or static.

Despite the recognition of new forms of mobility in the contemporary world, there is a scarcity of empirical research dealing with specific highly mobile groups and their problems and patterns of social inclusion (Favell 2001). In this respect, this chapter proposes the study of a group of people who constitute a good example of the growing diversity of contemporary international migration patterns: a group of young people carrying out doctoral studies in Catalan universities. Despite a significant increase in the number of international students in the world, this collective is one of the least-studied categories of migrants (King and Ruiz-Gelices 2003; King and Raghuram 2013). At first, students are temporary migrants, although some of them eventually decide to stay permanently (Hazen and Alberts 2006). Their main reason for migration is the improvement of their human capital (Baláz and Williams 2004). PhD students are considered desirable migrants because they bring skills and knowledge into the countries of destination (Raghuram 2013) and help establish sociocultural networks between countries (Waters and Brooks 2011), apart from the influx of money received by host universities. In short, the reasons for students to migrate are complex, ranging from improved qualifications and future labour prospects to the opportunity of an international experience away from the family home (Haverig 2011; Raghuram 2013).

Students' migration has dramatically grown in the last 40 years. It has been calculated that it has increased fourfold from 1975 to 2008 (and in just the period

2000–2008, the number of international students rose by 40 %; Beine et al. 2013). In fact, UNESCO (2014) has estimated that there were at least four million foreign students developing their careers partially or totally in a country different from theirs in 2012, almost twice the number estimated for 2010. The preferred destination countries are the USA, Great Britain, France, Australia and Germany, which accounted for almost 50 % of the total numbers in 2012 (UNESCO 2014).

This growth in numbers goes hand in hand with the globalization of university studies. Iredale (2001) believes that curricula are increasingly similar worldwide as a response to a more global integrated labour market. The globalization of the university may therefore be considered a consequence of broader economic processes. More specifically, Findlay (2011) details several factors that push forward a university's globalization process: the increasing use of the English language both inside and outside universities, similarity in curricula across the globe, exchange university networks, international expansion of certain universities and greater worldwide recognition of diplomas.

The literature on migration has established different types of student migration according to the purpose and the time spent in the destination country. For instance, King and Raghuram (2013) distinguish between "credit mobility", which is an exchange programme for studies of up to 1 year in a foreign university (e.g. Erasmus), and "degree mobility", which implies that the new destination university gives a diploma. In their typology, these two authors also consider study trips that are not specifically geared towards obtaining an official certificate.

In our case, we suppose that the profile of students' migration is complex, since PhD students have stayed in Catalonia for more than 1 year, during which they are expected to carry out studies that are crucial to their future professional development. The completion of a PhD is associated with advance in their university career, to the extent that their future may depend on obtaining the PhD. Since their migration is, at least initially, restricted to a limited period, it is expected that their relationships, links and contacts with the country of origin are fluid and frequent.

Moreover, one aspect that is systematically ignored in the migration literature is the affective daily life aspects of the construction of migrant communities, which can be traced to more than one nation-state (Conradson and Latham 2005; Smith 2006). In this respect, this article revolves around the motivations and expectations of these young people, their reasons for migration, their personal and labour transitions, their evaluation of the migration process and the role of the city of Barcelona as an attractive place for living and studying. Regarding the latter point, we analyse the use and appropriation of everyday spaces, in the framework of a temporary migration. Since migration occurs in a crucial time in their lives corresponding to a learning period in a city with different potentialities and constraints from their place of origin, immigrants' everyday practices and experiences may be "released" in a new territory. This territory can enable new social relationships and "alternative" uses of time and space, but it may also imply some restrictions occasioned by its novelty.

13.2 Methods

The methodology for this research was qualitative. We carried out semi-structured interviews, to capture the complexity of the subjectivities of a group of young PhD students as regards their migration experiences and their daily life in Barcelona. In total, we interviewed 27 people (15 women and 12 men) in October 2012–October 2014. Interviewees were contacted following a snowball technique. The basic variables used to select the PhD studies were their sex, age, time of residence in Barcelona and nationality, in order to cover a great diversity of profiles, views and experiences of PhD students with contrasting personal backgrounds.

The interviews, which lasted an average of 1 h, were structured according to three broad themes (academia/work, social attachment and geography). Rather than obtaining specific data on each subject area, questions were left open to reveal individual opinions and concerns. This allowed us to obtain insights on questions as diverse as reasons for studying and living in Barcelona, the PhD syllabus, personal and labour transitions, everyday experiences in Barcelona as well as future plans. Finally, we asked the respondents both to draw a mental map of Barcelona and to send some photographs of Barcelona and their place of origin, in order to analyse their lived experience, personal appropriations of space and individual memory.

The interviewed group is very homogeneous, logically, in terms of educational levels, and the age range goes from 25 to 35 years. The residence time is also very similar, since the interviewed students had to have resided in the city for at least 1 year. They were also doing PhD studies at the time of the interview, although their arrival in the city may have been due to other factors (e.g. joining a partner). The interviewees were informed of the research objectives and they were assured that data would be treated confidentially. For this reason, this article always uses pseudonyms and there are no specific references to the university they are studying in.

As for their demographic profile, we interviewed 15 women (8 Latin Americans and 7 Europeans) and 12 men (9 Latin Americans and 3 Europeans). Of the total, 17 were single at the time of the interview, and 10 were married (8 women and 2 men). Interestingly, 11 of them have partners of a different nationality to their own. And another homogeneous pattern is as follows: no one lived alone; all of them lived either with a partner or with friends or acquaintances/friends. They had been living in Barcelona for 3 years and a half year on average. For many of these young people, this was not their first migration experience outside the country of origin: 13 people had lived in another country previously (for 1 month to 6 years), mainly due to studies. As regards their expectations for the future, many Latin Americans would like to return to their country of origin (and their scholarship often obliges them to do so). They also know that in Latin America, it will be much easier nowadays to find a job in their field of study. In contrast, most of the Europeans expressed their desire to continue living abroad and seek postdoctoral scholarships for further studies somewhere else.

The sample used for this project was not probabilistic. As the sample is relatively homogeneous, we believe that, with this number of interviewees, a level of saturation is reached; that is, answers were repeated and no new issues emerged from the questions addressed (Creswell 1998; Crouch and Mckenzie 2006). The non-representative sample used for this project tried to cover a similar number of both men and women and of Europeans and Latin Americans. Given the number of interviews, the objective of this article is not to make large-scale generalizations but to identify concerns, issues and trends regarding the migration processes and personal experiences of the studied group. Data were analysed by the content analysis method with the Atlas.ti software. This process included open coding, creating categories and abstracting (see Weber 1990).

Once the methodology is defined, the article focuses on the presentation of the main results of the research. The analysis is organized following a longitudinal approach. First of all, it addresses the reasons why this group decided to move to Barcelona. Subsequently, it focuses on the present and explores the group's experiences, perceptions and attitudes regarding their everyday life in the city of Barcelona. Finally, the article focuses on their projects for the future.

13.3 Arriving in Barcelona

The interviewed group of PhD students expresses very different reasons for migration to Barcelona. Perhaps unexpectedly, only a minority, and particularly those of European origin, sees their doctorate at a Catalan university within a well-defined academic project. Furthermore, most of the Latin American students consider PhD studies to be an option that had come up in their lives (e.g. after having abandoned studying for a while) and respond more to a desire for a life change, rather than academic reasons (see also Raghuram 2013). Yet, after the decision is taken, the PhD channels the majority of respondents into an academic career, although few interviewees state other future employment possibilities.

Lulú, a young Mexican woman, is a clear example of this. Before coming to Barcelona, she worked in an NGO that she set up with a close friend. Because of problems at work, she decided to leave behind the NGO, make a career change and pursue postgraduate studies. In her own words:

> I set up a NGO in Xalapa (Mexico) with a friend. The NGO worked, but my friend and I had different views on how to manage it. It was frustrating. We used to say that this project was like our baby; we did everything. I looked for options to get out of this, and a PhD came out as the best choice. To be honest, I found the PhD at (a Catalan university) by chance... and in a month I had already bought the plane ticket. I came in here as a tourist. (Lulú, 32, México)

This interviewee felt frustrated in her job and sees the doctorate as an interesting option to break with the past. Lulú's case may be extreme, given that she left her job and bought a plane ticket in just 1 month. She entered Spain as a tourist, without a scholarship, and, at Barcelona airport, she phoned an old acquaintance she had had

a short romance with. These types of migration decisions, which may seem to be irrational and unplanned, are personal advancement strategies.

Similarly, Paola explains her arrival to Barcelona from Argentina as the result of many coincidences. She also sees her migration as a point of no return to her past (a permanent job in a lawyer's office and a 2-year relationship). In her own words:

> When I think about it, I don't believe it. I had never crossed the Atlantic and I knew nobody in Barcelona. The master's programme began on Monday and I arrived in Barcelona the Friday before. I thought it was the right moment. My life in Mendoza [Argentina] was very stressful, my job, my political activism and also my boyfriend. I just wanted to leave everything behind. My colleagues at the lawyer's office [I used to work with] couldn't believe it. I quit a promising career. But I felt overwhelmed. (Paola, 34 years, Argentina)

Most of the Latin Americans did not have a clearly defined academic career when they decided to migrate to Barcelona. Furthermore, some of them had to postpone the decision to pursue a PhD for economic reasons. Indeed, they had already entered the labour market of their countries of origin and "found" the opportunity to pursue postgraduate studies at a special moment in their life. This is the case of two Colombians who worked while waiting for a grant: the first was employed in a call centre (after finishing a master's degree in Sweden) and the second on a construction site.

This pattern of postponing an academic career can be also observed in some of the Europeans' labour trajectories. This is the case of Elena, who arrived in Barcelona, following her Catalan boyfriend (they had already met – and lived together – in Italy). She had to adapt her studies to her chosen university and changed her academic profile completely. However, for most interviewed Europeans, there is a clear pattern: many of them had already been in Barcelona to study their degrees in Catalan universities through European Union scholarships and afterwards they decided, for various reasons, to stay and undertake doctorate studies.

Indeed, in the European students, we find a few "pure" academic trajectories, without previous employment or with limited professional experience (e.g. training placements). But, even in this case, Marie (a French/Canadian student with an MA in international relations and currently doing a PhD) chose a Catalan university not only for its quality but also because of the city of Barcelona which is seen as both cosmopolitan and retaining a certain local neighbourhood flavour.

Reasons for moving to Barcelona are therefore complex. The academic and professional motivations are certainly relevant, specifically, the interest in continuing studies and a specialization in a specific field of knowledge. This choice meets professional expectations, since they consider that a PhD programme entails greater academic recognition and better opportunity for employment promotion. The other reason would be of personal nature: the challenge of living in another country and of developing a transition to adult life in a motivating city. This last aspect is addressed in the following section.

13.4   Growing Up: Times and Spaces of PhD Students' Life Transition

Leaving home is a key moment in the process of transition of young people towards independence and adulthood. It is a complex process that can be definitive or not, depending on factors such as the greater or lesser length and stability of paid work or the time spent in a "transition home" shared with friends or colleagues from school or work (Hopkins 2010). An adult person assumes, in principle, responsibility for their actions, for autonomous decisions and economic independence. In today's world, emancipation from family and paid work are key stages in the attainment of autonomy and personal self-esteem, although precarious labour conditions can make the transition to a new home somewhat difficult.

For immigrants, this process involves adapting to a new country and a new social reality, and probably also a new sense of belonging. According to Ley-Cervantes (2012), feelings of belonging – including those related to the construction of a new home in a foreign country – are not only experienced through the fixed and the stable, but they can also be achieved through mobility and temporality. Skilled migrants' sense of belonging may be developed through multiple everyday experiences, routines and habits undertaken in a new place (Ortiz and Mendoza 2008).

Significantly, a substantial number of those interviewed left their family home when migrating to Barcelona. In general, this emancipation process is seen in a positive light, as it is considered to be a crucial period for personal growth in the way to reach adulthood (Holdsworth and Morgan 2005; Holdsworth 2009). Economic independence undoubtedly emerges as an important factor in the process of emancipation, but other aspects (e.g. managing their own resources, sharing a flat with other people and doing housework chores) are also quoted as decisive when explaining this process. Women are more likely than men to openly express their emotions regarding this transition. As in Kennedy (2010) in her research on Manchester's young postgraduate women, our female interviewees declared that they had "rediscovered" themselves, "grown as a person", "developed their own identity" and "were feeling happy" in the transition to a new period in their lives.

> I feel more independent here, because I was still living with my parents in Serbia, at the age of 27. I finished my degree in 2005, and I worked for a research institute, but the payroll was not enough for a rent. This was one of the reasons why I decided to study abroad: get a job and leave home. I know it's a bit sad (. . .). I learned how to do practical things, put on the washing machine, pay the bills. I like this feeling. (Ivana, 32, Serbia)
>
> Since I've been in Barcelona, I'm totally autonomous from my family (. . .). I'm alone and I love it. I work, I do the PhD, and I have my own time (. . .). No, I don't see myself in Brazil in the short term. I'm growing up as a person. . . I am developing my own identity. You walk away from the family. It's another language; you break with yours. (Maribel, 31 years old, Brazil)

Certainly a sense of freedom accompanies the process of leaving home, but, in some cases, they also feel homesick. Those who have grown up and lived in a small town, which is generally perceived as closed and traditional, value their experiences

of living in a culturally diverse city and find Barcelona "more relaxed" and "more informal" than their home towns.

> Yes, I feel freer here, because my city, my society, is far more closed. There they know each other, what you do, what you think. They always have control of your life and here I feel that nobody cares. I can do what I want and nobody judges me. Now I realize that I accept more differences. Before I would think that everything I said was right and it was the way it should be, but now I see that there are other things, other opinions, that may be also good, interesting. Barcelona opened up my mind to other perspectives that previously did not even consider. In my city all the people are of the same nationality, from the same culture. There is not much diversity in my city. By contrast, here there is such a great diversity, many cultures. (Nina, 29 years, Slovenia)
>
> My town is small and there everybody knows each other. You refrain from doing many things. Here no one knows you. I've changed the way I look at things. It is my life and nobody has the right to make any comment on it. And the fact of not being with my parents in some way makes you freer and more responsible. I've become much more responsible here. (Daniela, 34 years, Colombia)

Again, in the narratives of the interviewed women, the emotional ties that bind them to their parents are expressed more bluntly than in the case of their male counterparts. Rather than economic help (only two interviewed women declared they had economic help from their family), parents play an active role in encouraging and supporting their daughters' decisions. This is why some female PhD students expressed the difficulties they encountered in the emancipation process. In Daniela's words:

> Here in Barcelona I have gone through a tough adaptation process, because I used to live with my parents in Colombia at the age of 30. I have to admit that it was comfortable. We are a big family and we, the young ones, were like chicks. Now, at 12,000 Km away from home, things are more complicated. I'm very attached to my family. (Daniela, 34 years, Colombia)

For European respondents, the process of leaving home and creating a new one is less traumatic, due to facilities of air transport on the continent. The possibility of visiting family at a low cost (or at least an affordable cost) is a key aspect of feeling at home in Barcelona, especially in the first months of their stay.

> In the beginning [I would return] every month and a half, for a weekend or from Thursday to Sunday. But since last year I go every three months, three or four times a year (. . .). It is well connected and so I go there often. (Nina, 29 years, Slovenia)

Traditionally, for women, family emancipation was associated with marriage. Currently this emancipation comes in many ways, as in the case of our female interviewees. Interestingly, out of the 23 respondents, only three males (and no females) were married, two before their migration to Barcelona and the third in the Catalan city. For them, marriage is a crucial moment in their lives, and it is felt as a new life stage in which greater stability and personal maturity have been obtained. As an example of this, Paolo, an Ecuadorian student, who also has Italian nationality, decided to marry his girlfriend before migrating to Barcelona, so that they can both have legal status and the same labour opportunities in Barcelona. This bureaucratic step is experienced, however, in terms of personal and professional

commitment and as a moment of rupture with his life as a single person. José Luis views his marriage experience similarly. Married to a Catalan man, he considers his marriage to be a decisive step:

> [A new cycle] began when I got married. I feel more mature (. . .). I don't know if this is going to be the same for the next 15 years. But I feel that right now I'm in a new process, enjoying greater stability. I feel more peaceful, more stable, more adult, happier. (José Luis, 30 years, Colombia)

In short, the interviewees undergo processes of growth and personal improvement that they feel in everyday experiences and personal relationships forged during their experience abroad as PhD scholars. Students are complex subjects with varied interests beyond their postdoctoral studies. They are simultaneously members of a family, citizens of a given country and/or workers. In the intersections of these multiple areas and perspectives, they develop their lives (King and Raghuram 2013).

13.5 Barcelona: Beyond Tourism

All the interviewees highlighted the attractiveness of Barcelona and valued it as a dynamic city with good living standards and a significant cultural and architectural heritage. Under the critical gaze, Barcelona appears as a cosmopolitan, multicultural, comfortable, vibrant and safe city.

> I really like Barcelona. It is a city that seduces you. I love it. Whenever I go out walking, I see different streets, different people, I like it very much. (Daniela, 34 years, Colombia)
>
> [It is] a beautiful city with many choices for everyone, a very well-organized clean city, which has been carefully designed and planned. The city catches you from the first moment, and it captures the heart of visitors, with its mountains, beaches and unique landscapes.... A cosmopolitan city. (Carolina, 30 years, Colombia)

These young people live the city through the neighbourhoods they reside in. Amongst the neighbourhood qualities mentioned, we found the quantity and proximity of services and shops, the good transport network and the relatively safe streets. All this makes the city a comfortable one in which a varied offer can be reached within walking distance. The city of Barcelona is thus seen as a multicultural kaleidoscope which, however, retains a strong identity in its neighbourhoods and a relatively high social cohesion. An Italian, Elena, highlights its multiculturalism and the possibilities to interact with people of different ethnic groups, cultures and languages. According to her, multiculturalism does not contradict a certain neighbourhood life and the anonymity of living in a big city. Barcelona would thus have the size that is perfect to allow both feelings.

> I like to go to local markets. I always buy bread at the local bakery. I know the people behind the counter. There is a Pakistani shop in my neighbourhood. As they know that I speak Urdu, they talk to me in the language. But if I want to be completely anonymous, or I want to go to a part of the city that I've never been before and feel like a tourist, I also can do it. It's not a suffocating small town. (Elena, 28 years, Italy)

Comparisons with the cities of origin are numerous and constant. The majority feel that standards of living are more satisfactory in Barcelona than in their cities of origin. But while the Europeans stress the welcoming side of Barcelona, a certain lifestyle, the tranquillity of a "livable" city and issues like service quality (with the exception of a young Polish man who finds it a bit overwhelming, full of traffic and with few green spaces), the Latin Americans describe the convenience and ease of public transportation, cycling or walking in the city (compared with difficulties and time devoted to moving around in large cities like Bogotá, Mexico City and Santiago) and the perceived safety in the city (as opposed to their home towns).

> [In Colombia] I felt stress everywhere. You need to be aware of dangers: If you're going to withdraw money from an ATM, you must be very careful. It is sad but it becomes standard practice. You live with this feeling, you get used to it. And when I came here [in Barcelona], I just felt relieved. (Edmundo, 30 years, Colombia)

Specifically, in the narratives of Latin American women, safety comes out consistently. They stress that the city is a safe one which allows them to freely develop their daily lives. Some of them also say that they could dress more freely in Barcelona than in their home towns. Similarly, but in the opposite direction, research that was carried out with Spaniards in Mexico City points out that women changed their lifestyle and the way they dress in Mexico City according to perceptions of safety and perceived local cultural values (Mendoza and Ortiz 2006). In Barcelona, by contrast, "everyone is free to do whatever they want" (Daniela, 34 years, Colombia). To sum up this feeling, Paola explains her experience with these words:

> In Mendoza [Argentina] I used to take a taxi for five blocks at midnight. I was afraid (. . .) I could be robbed or sexually harassed. I remember when I came to Barcelona. I was with friends, and I told them "there is no metro. I'm going to take a taxi", and their reply "but your place is ten minutes' walk". "But look at the time", "Just relax, everything is fine". And then I realized that I could walk down the street at any time at night, and people don't harass me. This was a big change for me. (Paola, 34 years, Argentina)

Even if not directly asked in the semi-structured interviews, Catalan language and culture arise repeatedly in the narratives. At the time of arriving in the city, some interviewees were surprised that the Catalan language was normally used everywhere in society. After their initial surprise, this fact does not seem to be an obstacle to social incorporation. In fact, a few occasionally use Catalan in everyday life, and one interview (out of 27), with a young Colombian, was carried out in Catalan. Most declared that they were able to understand the language after a few months in the city, or attending courses. A minority, however, considered the Catalan language a barrier that hinders social integration. The following narratives express these two opposing views:

> In Barcelona, I experienced something very strange. I was completely ignorant about the Catalan situation, to the point that I only knew that there was a Catalan language three months before arriving here. I became amazed at discovering every single thing about the Catalan culture. (José Luis, 30 years, Colombia)

In the master, there were two Latin Americans, and at first I did not mingle much with them, because I did not want to make a sort of "ghetto". But finally, and even if they were not my friends, I ended up talking to them, because they spoke to me. With the others, there was a language barrier. When I talked to them, they answered me in Catalan, or they talked to each other in Catalan. They did not even make an effort. I don't know how to call it, maybe a little bit of courtesy to use Spanish with you, because when you arrive, you don't understand, you can get a few things, but you miss others. And they only spoke Catalan (...). I felt it as a barrier. It is a form of social exclusion. If they do not want to mingle, they keep talking in Catalan. I don't speak it, but I understand it. I have a basic vocabulary (Alvaro, 27 years, Mexico).

13.6 The Future

Future projects are strongly influenced by the Spanish economic situation. In the context of economic crisis, high rates of youth unemployment and budget cuts in education, there are not many job options at the university where they are pursuing their graduate studies. So many Latin American students see universities in their countries of origin as attractive labour destinations.

My friends told me that now is the right time to get a job in Latin American universities; particularly in Brazil. (Carlos, 29 years old, Brazil)

Furthermore, a group of Latin American PhD students must return to their place of origin (e.g. Chile, Ecuador, Mexico), when finishing their doctoral studies, since they had been granted fellowships in their countries. Otherwise, they would have to pay back their funding.

My immediate future after completing the Phd is going back to Chile. My scholarship requires my return and a stay in the country twice the time I've been out, unless I continue with postdoctoral studies. In the latter case, the return is "frozen." (Lucas, 30 years, Chile)

I've got a problem. My Ecuador scholarship asks me to return to my country after three years [the time to finish the PhD]. So I have to go back to Ecuador, unless I get a super good job that allows me to stay and pay back the grant. And this is not going to happen. That's why we don't even consider staying in Barcelona as an option. Before the scholarship, we discussed the possibility of not returning, because, despite family and friends, Ecuador is a violent insecure country (. . .). Now we don't think about this anymore. We are forced to go back for six years. (Pedro, 35 years, Ecuador)

From a totally different perspective, another smaller group decides to live in Barcelona, despite the current economic situation, since they believe that work opportunities may be better in the future. To take this decision, aspects related to partners and the city's everyday life are crucial. Elena, an Italian national, epitomizes this feeling. She declares her love for Barcelona and her Catalan boyfriend, and she is pondering a 2-year postdoctoral fellowship in India, with the aim of having greater job opportunities in her current university afterwards. This interviewee wants to stay in Barcelona and is happy not only with her academic life but also with her personal and everyday life. Uncertainties about the future are seen as characteristic of the present times. In a similar vein, José Luis

expresses his ideas about personal and everyday life but, in this case, he opts for a new migration, perhaps to Canada. The reason for this lies in the bad economic situation.

> I'm staying in Barcelona for three more years at least. The crisis situation in Spain makes it difficult to consider staying here. I've already talked about this with my partner, the possibility of going elsewhere, and he's happy with the idea of living abroad. (José Luis, 30 years, Colombia)

In fact, the opinion of José Luis is shared by the majority. They do not want to leave Barcelona; they are generally happy in the city and with their PhD studies. However, the scarce employment prospects in Catalan universities push their work options towards universities in other countries, if they want to stay in academia. In this sense, the good economic situation, at least comparatively, of some Latin American countries makes the return to their countries of origin attractive:

> At the moment, it's far easier to get a well-paid job in Ecuador than here, because there is no competition for jobs. They just changed the higher education law. All the professors need a doctorate, and there aren't many people with doctorates in Ecuador. If I go back with a PhD, I'm going to have at least three or four job offers. Obviously this is not the case here. I've got a colleague in my department, with a brilliant thesis, and an excellent CV, and he cannot find work at Spanish universities. He's thinking about migration to England, United States and Chile. Here it's certainly complicated. (Pedro, 35 years, Ecuador)
>
> I want to finish my PhD. That is clear. I would like to go back to Mexico, but I don't know when or where. Right now I would like to stay in Barcelona, because it's one of my favourite cities, but the future is dark and gloomy here (. . .). Sometimes I feel tired of not having a real life. Sometimes I've got the feeling of living in a bubble. All my friends are already married and with children. This is not the life I would like to have, but you keep thinking that something is wrong with you (..) I guess that I'll be living here for two more years, and then we'll see. I know, though, that I have more professional choices in Mexico. (Lulú, 34, Mexico)

Lulú also introduces an interesting nuance, as she has the feeling of not having a "real life" and staying "in a bubble", as compared to the lifestyle of her friends back in Mexico who are married and with children. This is a boring model of life, however, for the interviewee, but, at the same time, it remains a key reference for her. Having a partner is very relevant for the interviewees. People who are in a relationship, irrespective of being married, give much importance to it, to the extent that any decision on a future migration (or otherwise) goes necessarily through an agreement with the partner. Finally, beyond migration, we find a minority of interviewees who describe their lives as transnational. As Ivana (32 years, Serbia) said, "once you leave home, it is easier to stay abroad". They believe that their professional future is not linked to a permanent residence anymore, but it may be developed in different countries at least in the short term. This is the case of Daniel who imagines himself and her wife in the future as follows:

> Upon completion of the PhD thesis, we will see if there are job offers outside Barcelona. I'd like to go, at least for two or three years, to the United States, Australia or Canada to practice my English a little more, because you lose a lot, if you don't practice. If I get a postdoc position, my wife could come with me as a visiting researcher. She [also doing a PhD at the same University] could have her viva afterwards. She does not need to be here to work [on the thesis]. (Daniel, 29 years old, Poland)

Or the example of Nina:

> When I finish, I would like to do a postdoc. I'd like to go to the United States to do a postdoc and then return here. I love my country, but I do not believe I could do the things I am interested in there. (Nina, 29 years, Slovenia)

These two interviewees have a temporary position in Spain but a permanent transnational life. They see themselves moving around the global university system until the right position eventually comes up. Their situation certainly fits what Williams and Hall (2002) defined as "transnational temporary mobility". Students' mobility is thus composed of different decisions made within people's life course and academic career without any clear idea of settling down (see also Frändberg 2014). Adding a further twist to this argument, King and Ruiz-Gelices (2003) refer to "mobility links", in the sense that decisions made in a specific point of people's lives and careers determine future migrations. In any case, it seems clear that students' mobility puts into question strict definitions of mobility and migration, as understood in conventional binary terms of movement/settlement.

13.7 Conclusions

From the interviewees' narrations, and following a longitudinal perspective, this article has studied motivations to migrate, personal transitions at a crucial life stage and future prospects of a collective of migrant young people who are pursuing a PhD at a Catalan university and live in the city of Barcelona. This group is part of what has recently been called "migrants on the middle", referring to those migrants with middle or high levels of formal education who, because of their age and (lack of) experience, are located in intermediate positions in the labour market. Empirical studies of these groups have been scarce (e.g. see Conradson and Latham 2005; Wiles 2008; and for the specific case of university students, King and Ranghuram 2013).

The first conclusion of our research revolves around the reasons for living in Barcelona. Perhaps unexpectedly, motivations are not always associated with a clear decision to do a doctorate. Specially in the Latin Americans, we found very few "pure" academic careers, rather than people who, at some point in their lives, have joined the labour market in their countries of origin and have decided to return to the academia (e.g. after leaving a job or a sentimental break-up). In contrast, a few interviewees experience the reverse process: they made a key decision in their personal life (e.g. marriage) before their migration to Spain to carry out doctoral studies. This is in line with previous research that also has pointed out great diversity in students' reasons for migrating (Haverig 2011; Raghuram 2013).

In any case, arrival in Barcelona is a point of rupture (or even a point of no return) which, in some cases, coincides with leaving the family home. This pattern is observed more amongst the Europeans, because, in general, they do a PhD at a younger age than Latin Americans. Thus, there is a complex multiple process

associated with migration: emancipation from family, entry into a doctorate and adaptation to a new country. Particularly amongst the interviewed women, this threefold process is experienced with great intensity in positive narrations (see also Holdsworth and Morgan 2005; Holdsworth 2009). From that perspective, the city is perceived as a vital kaleidoscope with multiple edges that allows for a wide variety of experiences and exchanges. Amongst these exchanges, the formation of a new household emerges as a key factor, since most of the interviewees decided to start living with her/his partner in the city (also Hopkins 2010).

This positive scenario becomes gloomy and dark for the future. However, broadly speaking, it is accepted that labour and geographical mobilities are features of the current university job market. Moreover, because of changing labour conditions, some believe that they are not going to reside permanently in a single country, thus internalizing migration as a part of their lives (also King and Ruiz-Gelices 2003; Frändberg 2014). Furthermore, for some Latin Americans with financial support from their countries of origin, the return to their country is inevitable, since this is stipulated in their scholarships. For others, though, this would be an undesirable return, given the reduced quality of life in many Latin American cities. Finally, almost all the interviewees consider that decisions about the future should be discussed and agreed with her/his partner. With few exceptions, the interviewees' partners are happy to accompany their partner in a new migration, if the right labour opportunities arise. The life stage is seen by both the interviewees and their partners as a transition to adulthood that triggers new decisions.

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Chapter 14
International Mobility of Brazilian Students to Portugal: The Role of the Brazilian Government and University Strategies in Portugal

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Abstract Student mobility associated with processes of internationalisation in higher education has been consistently on the rise since the 1970s. However, so far, most research has focused on the periphery-core moves mostly targeting Anglophone countries. More recently, within the European Union, increasing attention is being paid to processes of intra-European student mobility (Erasmus Programmes and similar). Little is known about other systems of international student mobility, particularly involving the Lusophone world. Brazilian students have long sought Portugal for the pursuit of higher education. However, only in recent years did this flow experience an intense growth (of 109.1 % between 2008 and 2012). It is particularly striking that this growth is taking place within an overall framework of declining migration from Brazil to Portugal following the economic crisis and declining labour demand. Both the policies adopted by the Brazilian government to stimulate the international mobility of its students and strategies developed in Portuguese universities to attract Brazilian students have been fundamental in the constitution of this flow. This paper draws on data from multiple sources to examine the institutional framework that facilitates mobility, on the one hand, and the experiences of the students themselves, on the other (viz. in terms of academic reception, accommodation and life experience): (i) secondary statistical data, (ii) policy documents, (iii) interviews with representatives of Portuguese Universities (in Lisboa, Coimbra and Porto) and (iv) interviews with students.

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14.1   Introduction: Internationalisation of Higher Education and the Role of Student Mobility

The internationalisation of higher education is undoubtedly an important and growing phenomenon (Beine et al. 2012; Altbach and Knight 2007; Rosenzweig 2006). This process includes several dimensions: academic mobility of professors and research staff, development of joint research projects or academic programmes, international student mobility, training in foreign languages, long-distance learning programmes, etc. (see, e.g. Altbach and Knight 2007 or Findlay 2011, p. 165). One fundamental and crucial actor in this process is 'the student', who constitutes the most numerous embodiment of the process of internationalisation. For some, students' engagement in international mobility is primarily related to individual attributes such as social class status, socio-economic background, gender, language competencies or personality traits (for a revision, see Findlay et al. 2012, p. 119). However, as Findlay (2011, p. 164) rightly argues, to understand student mobility, one must look beyond individual factors and take into account the contexts within which those students decide to study abroad. The abilities of institutions to attract foreign students or to foster their mobility are crucial drivers of internationalisation.

This paper gives special attention to the processes that enable the recruitment of international students and also highlights the challenges that they face, upon arrival, in the hosting country. Importantly, we examine how students' expectations, generated by programmes put in place to stimulate international higher education, are met in the process of international mobility and study abroad. One example mentioned in the literature is the difficulties involved in the recognition of foreign diplomas, despite the widespread promotion of international higher education. Another example is the tension between returning to the country of origin (often a prerequisite of origin country funding schemes) and remaining in the reception country, often eager to retain talent (Findlay 2011, p. 164).

The process of recruiting international students reflects important South-North divides. The majority of recruiting institutions are in the developed 'Global North', particularly in rich Anglophone countries (the USA, Canada, Australia and the UK), while most international students originate in the less developed 'Global South' (Altbach and Knight 2007 p. 294). In other words, mobility tends to take place from low- to mid- to high-income countries. Findlay et al. (2012, p. 125) highlight how students allude to a global hierarchy of universities and how they rationalise their choice in terms of being at a 'world-class' university. At the same time, foreign students are often asked to pay higher fees than native students. Interestingly, a number of funding schemes are put in place to fund such mobility and training abroad, sometimes originating in Northern countries themselves (e.g. the British Chevening or American Fulbright scholarships).

In practice, international student mobility largely involves students from the 'Global South' moving to higher education institutions in the 'Global North', often paying higher fees and contributing to fund 'Northern' higher education systems, enriching the academic environment of their host institutions and fostering cross-cultural understanding (Findlay 2011, p. 164, Altbach and Knight 2007) while also being trained in 'Northern' epistemologies and knowledge-building paradigms. This takes place largely on the premise that the students will return to their countries of origin, to contribute to the 'knowledge society' and economic growth with the training acquired abroad. However, this process needs to be further examined on three grounds, which take into account the tensions that may exist between structural forces in sending as well as host countries, and individual motivations, decisions and experiences: (1) How are host universities attracting foreign students? Through which schemes? Is what they 'advertise' actually being delivered, in the students' views? (2) How are origin countries' governments and institutions dealing with student mobility? Are students' expectations and needs taken into account? And if so, are they being met? (3) What is happening in processes of mobility to peripheral European countries, outside the dominant more 'elitist' Anglophone world? Are processes similar to those observed in other contexts?

This chapter looks at the case of Brazilian students going to Portugal to study to examine these questions. In the next sections, we look at (i) the context of the evolution of migration flows and student mobility between Brazil and Portugal, (ii) the policy framework put in place by Portuguese universities to attract Brazilian students and by Brazilian institutions to promote higher education mobility and (iii) students' views on the processes of mobility experienced, particularly seeking to unpack the tensions and conflicts between expectations and lived experiences generated by the institutional framework; (iv) we conclude by teasing out the implications of the analysis to a more in-depth understanding of international student mobility.

Data for this analysis is drawn from secondary data available from the Ministry of Education and Science in Portugal (through the Direção Geral de Estatísticas da Educação e Ciência – DGEEC), regarding the number of Brazilian students enrolled in higher education institutions in Portugal, and from the Brazilian higher education agencies, CAPES (Coordination of Higher Education for Personnel Improvement) and CNPq (National Council for Scientific and Technological Development), regarding funding granted to Brazilian students to study abroad. In addition, we look at data obtained from interviews conducted in 2014 and 2015 with nine faculty directors of universities in Lisbon, Porto and Coimbra and with two chancellors of universities in Lisbon, 53 interviews with Brazilian higher education students in Portugal (23 in Lisbon, 10 in Coimbra, 10 in Porto and 10 returned to Brazil), including both short-term exchanges and full degrees, from bachelor to PhD. These interviews are complemented by data obtained from 90 interviews and a survey with 306 Brazilians living in Lisbon Metropolitan Area between 2010 and 2012, which included Brazilian students living in Lisbon at the

time, and interviews with 11 students returned to Brazil (interviewed in Campinas and Rio de Janeiro).[1]

14.2 Understanding the Broad Context of Migration Flows Between Brazil and Portugal

Brazilian migration to Portugal has been a long-standing reality rooted in the colonial links that connected the two countries in the past.[2] Crucially, the two countries share the same language, which is an important facilitator of migration, not least in the education field. However, before the 1980s, immigration from Brazil was not particularly significant and was constituted mainly of political expats, some women and executives (interview with José in 2010, arrived in Portugal in 1974) and also some students who sought out Portuguese higher education institutions, namely, within the framework of bilateral agreements between the two countries (interview with Artur in 2011, went to Portugal to study medicine in 1967). During the 1980s the flow grew, but was less intense in comparison with the growth experienced during the 2000s, and was constituted mainly of skilled and highly skilled professionals (dentists, marketing and IT experts, engineers, etc.) who arrived in Portugal to work in their respective professions. In addition we find that many migrants arriving at that time were also descendants of previous Portuguese emigrants in Brazil (Malheiros 2007b). These migrants were from diverse regions in Brazil, including Rio de Janeiro, Rio Grande do Sul and Pernambuco.

At the end of the 1990s, a different kind of flow emerged, known as the 'second wave of Brazilian immigration' (Casa do Brasil/Acime 2004), which was much more intense than the previous wave. This 'second wave' included mainly low skilled who took jobs in the hotel and catering sector, construction and domestic work. These immigrants were predominantly from the southwest of Brazil and nearby regions: mostly Minas Gerais and Paraná but also Espírito Santo, São Paulo and Goiás (Casa do Brasil/Acime 2004, p. 8).[3] Contrary to the case with pioneers from the 'first wave', the 'second wave' of Brazilian immigration included a large proportion of undocumented migrants (Casa do Brasil/Acime 2004; Fonseca et al. 2005).

Differently to migration flows, between other countries, dominated by male pioneers, both waves from Brazil to Portugal have always included a high percentage of independent women who do not migrate within family reunification schemes (Padilla 2007).

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[1] Data from the Research Project THEMIS – Theorising the Evolution of European Migration Systems (funded by NORFACE research programme on Migration in Europe)

[2] The first Portuguese arrived in Brazil in 1500 and the country gained independence in 1822.

[3] There is some empirical evidence pointing to internal migration in Brazil prior to international migration, usually rural-urban or small city-large city.

Since 2008 the deteriorating economic climate in Portugal has resulted in decreasing opportunities in the labour market for Brazilian migrant workers. This negative macroeconomic evolution has contributed to a reduction in labour migration from Brazil (the number of residence permits issued between 2008 and 2010 was substantially reduced from 32,751 to less than half – 16,165). At the same time, the inflow from Brazil has always included a number of students that have sought Portugal to pursue their higher education, and in recent years, we find evidence that this group is increasing within the flow (Table 14.1). Simultaneously, we observe (i) policy measures to promote the internationalisation of Portuguese universities and an active engagement in the recruitment of international students, particularly from Brazil, and (ii) Brazilian investment in promoting the international mobility of its students (both undergraduate and postgraduate). These developments indicate that migration flows are not static over time; indeed, neither is the macroeconomic and political frameworks shaping them. This case is illustrative of how changing policy and economic frameworks also contribute to the transformation of the dynamics within the migration flows themselves. Once have been dictated predominantly by labour market opportunities, education migration has found increasing relevance in the migration relationship between Brazil and Portugal today. These changing dynamics show that multiple factors affect migration behaviours, and while labour migration may be negatively affected by the economic crisis, other flows respond differently to other policy and economic factors.

Data from Table 14.1 in particular show how student migration flows have been strongly influenced by the mobility programme 'Science without Borders' sponsored by the Brazilian government (and further explained in the next section). We observe in 2013 a strong decline in the number of new permits issued to students which coincides with the withdrawal of Portugal from the programme. It is also worth noting that students are not necessarily disconnected from other migrants, with other migration motivations, trajectories or the timing of migration. In fact, students seeking Portugal also contact with previous migrants to get support, as illustrated in the quotes below.

> . . .a cousin of mine ended up coming, but not for herself. Her husband came to do a masters and they came. I [helped her] with some knowledge, information, she even stayed at my

Table 14.1 Comparison of the total of Brazilian citizens with a residence permit and Brazilian students

Year	Brazilian citizens with residence permit (total stock)	Brazilian students enrolled in higher education in Portugal	New residence permits issued to Brazilians (total)	Residence permits for study issued to Brazilians
2009	116,220	3,813	23,138	1,617
2010	119,363	4,421	16,165	2,418
2011	111,445	5,335	12,896	3,010
2012	105,622	6,989	11,715	4,838
2013	92,120	6,680	6,680	1,242

Source: SEF and DGEES

house during the first month or something. (Danilo, professional migrant interviewed in Lisbon in 2011)

A couple, friends of mine from the university, they were living there [in Portugal] and she found me a flat to rent. . . they were there for work. . . because her husband is an engineer and had got work there. . . (Sandra, student in Lisbon, interviewed in Campinas, SP, Brazil in 2011)

I have a cousin, on my father's side, who emigrated to Portugal thirteen years ago and he lives there. When I travelled there, during the first months, I stayed in his house because I had some difficulties in finding a flat near the university at a reasonable price. . . and before I went [to Portugal] he was the person that gave me a bit more information. (Rômulo, student in Porto, interviewed in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil in 2011)

A friend of my mother from the school years, she already lived there [in Portugal]. . . she lives like an hour by train from Porto. Through Orkut[4] they met again and talking [my mother said] 'my daughter is going to Portugal. What could you do?' And she was the person, my guardian angel, there. She looked for a flat for me, called people. . . she even offered "you can come and live here [in her flat]. . ." (Lia, student in Porto, interviewed in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil in 2011)

Previous migrants have been important sources of support and information for students in mobility schemes moving from Brazil to Portugal. This illustrates the relevance of taking into account the broader migration contexts within which student mobility takes place and considers it in the analysis of international student migration. The existence of a migration history between Brazil and Portugal is an important supporting factor for students in mobility even though it has not been, at least explicitly in this case, an influential and determining factor.

14.3 Brazilian Students in Portuguese Higher Education: An Overview

The year of the international financial crisis (2008), which led to subsequent declining migration from Brazil (as shown above), coincides precisely with the take-off in the number of Brazilian students in higher education in Portugal. That year (2008/2009), the number of Brazilian students overtakes for the first time the contingents from Angola and Cape Verde (Fig. 14.1).

Between 2008 and 2012, the number of foreign residents with residence permits for higher education studies increased 109 %, mostly due to the increase in the number of Brazilian students. The dynamism of student mobility has indeed been recognised in the national strategic plan for migration 2015–2020 approved by the Portuguese government in March 2015.

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[4] Orkut is a social networking website.

Source: Survey to students enrolled and higher education graduates, DGEEC/MEC

Fig. 14.1 Evolution of the number of students from Brazil, Cape Verde and Angola in higher education institutions in Portugal (Source: Survey to students enrolled and higher education graduates, DGEEC/MEC)

The majority of these students target public higher education institutions: around 80 % between 2008 and 2012 (data from DGEEC). Between 2000/2001 and 2006/2007, the University of Porto (the largest in the country at that time, by enrolment) was the first recipient of Brazilian students. This was largely the result of an active strategy of a Vice-Chancellor who during the 1990s laid the basis for cooperation with Brazil (mentioned in different interviews with faculty directors). In this university, back in 2003, Brazilian students established an association (Brasup[5]) to provide support for newcomers, including information available online with practical tips about life in Porto (Rômulo, Brazilian student who went to the University of Porto in 2010). In 2007/2008, the University of Lisbon ranked first, but in the following year, it was supplanted by the University of Coimbra. Since that year, the University of Coimbra has gained relevance in terms of its capacity to attract Brazilian students (Fonseca et al. 2015). In the academic year 2011/2012, it clearly stands out in terms of the number of newly enrolled Brazilian students as well as in terms of their weight in the university (Table 14.2).

The programmes sought by Brazilian students are diverse, but the most important are Law, Management and Administration, Education, Sports, Psychology and Electronics and Automation, with little variation over the years, in terms of their relative importance (Fonseca et al. 2015).

Current and former students interviewed in Portugal and Brazil indicate that the main motivations for seeking higher education studies abroad include:

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[5] http://brasup.up.pt

Table 14.2 Brazilian students enrolled for the first time in 2011/2012

Higher education institutions	Total enrolled in the academic year 2011/2012	Brazilian citizens enrolled in the academic year 2011/2012	Weight of Brazilian students in total (%)
University of Coimbra	23,408	1,576	6.73
University of Lisboa + Technical University of Lisboa[a]	48,398	975	2.01
University of Porto	30,772	751	2.44
Total (National)	397,337	7,082	1.78

Source: DGEEC

[a]In July 2013, the University of Lisbon and the Technical University of Lisbon were merged into one, keeping the name University of Lisbon (ULisboa)

– Access to funding: training abroad becomes less dependent on the students' own resources, contrasting with the global tendency (self-funded students constitute the largest share of international students) (Altbach and Knight 2007, p. 294); the favourable economic and political context in Brazil, which has boosted funding for international student mobility through a high number of scholarships, has amplified access to study abroad programmes to students who would otherwise lack the means to engage in such mobility; for example, Mirtes (went to Lisbon in 2010, interviewed in Rio de Janeiro 2011) mentions: '... with our economy booming ... it became a lot easier to travel abroad...', and Maria (went to Aveiro in 2006, interviewed in Campinas in 2011), 'the Brazilian Government gives incentives to undergraduate students in Brazil to gain experience abroad'. This way, the mobility of Brazilian students to Portugal is less rooted in privileged class belonging as has been found in other research (see Findlay et. al 2012).

– Building human capital and increasing returns to education upon return: students interviewed mention the need to enhance knowledge in certain scientific areas and better the *curriculum vitae* (*CV*); for example, Paula who went to the University of Coimbra (interviewed in Rio de Janeiro 2011) says: '... I am going to see if I can find something good there, to better my CV'. Rômulo, who went to Porto in 2010 (interviewed in Rio de Janeiro in 2011), mentions '... nowadays there is another flow, another boom in the emigration flow. But it is another situation, in general people go academically, to gain a specialization, do a course or study or even to develop within their profession...'. Engaging in training abroad has been considered – and promoted – and has a way of gaining further competences and bettering one's CV, in other words, of advancing one's human capital and increasing the returns on education upon return to the origin country, from an economic perspective. Our interviewees mention not only the 'training' itself but also the 'international experience' (also found in Findlay et al. 2012, p. 126) or the importance of building social networks abroad as a way of boosting their CVs. At the postgraduate level, the recognition of the university

is important as a differentiating factor but not necessarily distinct from a prestigious university in Brazil. As Alina, a PhD student in an exchange in Lisbon, mentions: 'I do not need a Portuguese University because no Portuguese university is better than USP (university of S. Paulo). So, I am doing a split PhD here but my diploma is from USP'. There is the idea that education induces social differentiation and that the university chosen will influence both the acquisition of knowledge and the CV (King et al. 2010: 33). However, the context analysed here subverts an often prevailing idea that higher education in the 'Global North' is necessarily better than in the 'Global South'.

– Intercultural life experiences: to experience new cultures and lifestyles is also widely mentioned by students. 'I wished to have the opportunity to visit other places, to learn from other cultures and to leave home for a while, to be away from the family' (Júnior, Évora, 2014).

– The decision to move to Portugal specifically is, first, much influenced by the shared language: '. . . to move to any other country you need to prove proficiency in the language and I don't have it, except for Portuguese, my English is very bad. . .' (Helena, student in Évora in 2008, interviewed in Rio de Janeiro in 2011).

For Brazilian students the shared language with Portugal is a very influential factor, which goes against other realities of international student mobility that have favoured English as lingua franca in education; the agreements between higher education institutions in the two countries are also important facilitators of migration: '. . . I went to Coimbra to study at the University of Coimbra within the mobility project of the University UNIRIO' (Nilma, went to Coimbra in 2009, interviewed in Rio de Janeiro in 2011).

In the next section, we look in more detail at how both the policy framework and strategies for higher education in both countries have fostered and influenced these changing dynamics in the Brazilian flow through the increased participation of students, in an otherwise unfavourable context to labour migration.

14.4 Policy Framework: Promotion of International Student Mobility from Brazil to Portugal

Students' motivations for international mobility and the growth of the flow to Portugal have been largely shaped – as some of the students consciously mention – by the institutional framework that in both countries has favoured and supported such mobility.

14.4.1 In Brazil

In order to respond to the new challenges brought about by globalisation and the transition to a service economy, based on knowledge and innovation, the Brazilian Government has made, from the late 1980s, a huge investment in education and the development of the national system of scientific research (Schwartzman et al. 1993; Castro de Almeida 2001; Mazza 2008). In 1985, the Ministry for Scientific Research and Technology was set up, and from then on, several new universities and federal institutes have been created and spread throughout the country (Laus and Morosini 2005). In 2003, higher education received a new boost with the Programme REUNI, focused on restructuring and expanding Federal Universities and promoting both access and permanence in higher education. In 2004, the Brazilian Government launched the Programme *University for All* and in 2006 the *Open University of Brazil* (Góes Brennand and Góes Brennand 2012).

Alongside the qualification of human resources internally, the Brazilian Government has also taken measures to stimulate the internationalisation of its universities. For this purpose, the Forum of Consultants of Brazilian Universities for International Affairs – FAUBAI – was created in 1988, and new policy actions were implemented to promote the international cooperation and the mobility of students, namely, by creating funding schemes for undergraduate and doctoral students to study abroad, as well as by funding international projects and the mobility of postdoctoral researchers (Laus and Morosini 2005; Leite 2010). During the 1990s, after the establishment of MERCOSUL in 1991, and more specifically of SEM (its educational arm), efforts were made to establish a shared academic space between member-states with the intention of fostering human resources training and as way of stimulating the integration process already underway in the region (Siebiger 2011). At the regional level, other programmes have been implemented to further enhance international student mobility between Latin American countries.

In Brazil, at the federal level, the promotion of student international mobility has been mostly supported by the Ministry of Education (MEC) and Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation (MCTI) through their respective agencies, CAPES (Coordination of Higher Education for Personnel Improvement, since 1951) and CNPq (National Council for Scientific and Technological Development, since 1950), together with the Secretaries of Higher Education and Technological Education.

CAPES is an agency of the Ministry of Education whose main aim is to foster the development and consolidation of postgraduate studies (master's and PhD) in all Brazilian states and since 2007 also to act in the training of teachers in basic education.[6] Its activities include funding exchanges at undergraduate level and master's and PhD programmes abroad through scholarships and other support.

In 2001, Brazil and Portugal signed the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Consultation, which established cooperation in the domains of education and

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[6] In http://www.capes.gov.br/historia-e-missao

research, including the mutual recognition of academic titles and degrees obtained in higher education institutions of the two countries. This was an important diplomatic achievement for both countries to overcome one important constraint in international student mobility, mentioned above. Between 1998 and 2011, the number of scholarships attributed for higher education studies in Portugal increased from 49 to 881. This evolution resulted mostly from strong increase in combined PhD Programmes (conducted both in Brazil and abroad) after 2004 and combined undergraduate programmes (conducted both in Brazil and abroad) after 2009.[7] Since 2011 the mobility of Brazilian students has been strongly influenced by the implementation of the Programme Ciência sem Fronteiras (Science without Borders) created in July 2011 by the Brazilian Federal Government and officially launched in December of that same year. This programme includes the attribution of funding to pursue higher education abroad from undergraduate to postgraduate levels in a number of selected scientific fields.[8] Until March 2015, 78,173 scholarships had been granted (of which 3,599 to study in Portugal). The vast majority of such scholarships have been granted in mixed undergraduate programmes (61,542). This programme has had a very strong impact in terms of amplifying access to tertiary education programmes abroad. In the words of a representative of this programme, Jurandir Fermon Ribeiro Júnior, in 2014, in the XXIV national postgraduate congress in Brazil: '. . . before it [Science without Borders] no undergraduate student would have the ambition of going abroad, except to do an English course for 3 months. . .'.[9] By 2015, a total of 101,000 scholarships are expected to have been granted within this programme. However, in 2013 Portugal was excluded from this programme on the claim (by the Brazilian government) that such high numbers of students were seeking Portugal because of the common language, and one of the objectives of the programme is precisely to stimulate learning in other languages, such as English.[10] Despite this change, Brazilian students still constitute, by far, the largest community of foreign students in higher education in Portugal (5,218 in full mobility[11] and 1,996 in exchange programmes[12] in the academic year 2013/2014).

Portugal has also been influenced by the implementation, since 2010, of the Programme of International Undergraduate Studies (PLI – Programa de Licenciaturas Internacionais), which aimed at improving teaching in Brazil and

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[7] Information available online: http://www.capes.gov.br/sobre-a-capes/historia-e-missao, accessed on 4 June 2014, and GEOCAPES (http://geocapes.capes.gov.br)

[8] Information available online http://www.cienciasemfronteiras.gov.br, accessed on 3 June 2014

[9] http://www.anpg.org.br/?p=5303, accessed on 17 July 2014

[10] Announcement made by the Minister of Education, Aloizio Mercadante, on 24 April 2013. News online: http://g1.globo.com/educacao/noticia/2013/04/portugal-sera-excluido-do-ciencia-sem-fronteiras-diz-mercadante.html, accessed on 8 August 2014

[11] Enrolled in a Portuguese higher education institution, having completed high school in a foreign country, with the objective of obtaining a diploma in Portugal

[12] Enrolled in an exchange programme (education or traineeship) for a limited period of time to obtain credits that will be recognised by students' home institutions

the quality of early training for teachers in basic education (in the fields of Chemistry, Physics, Biology, Math, Portuguese, Arts and Sports). This programme stimulated combined undergraduate studies (conducted partly in Brazil and partly in Portugal and granting dual diplomas – in both countries) for undergraduate students in Brazil that were in undergraduate courses to become teachers in one of the aforementioned fields. Initially, this programme was put in place with the University of Coimbra, and since the academic year 2012/2013, it has been extended to other universities throughout the country: the New University of Lisbon, University of Beira Interior, University of Algarve, University of Aveiro, University of Évora, University of Lisbon, University of Minho, University of Porto, Technical University of Lisbon and University of Trás-os-Montes.[13] Nevertheless, the University of Coimbra is still the higher education institution that receives most students, and some faculties within the other universities (such as the Faculty of Humanities of the University of Lisbon) have not been as successful (interview with a Faculty of Humanities representative).

Furthermore, in 2010, CAPES and the Portuguese Foundation for Science and Technology (FCT) signed an agreement with the aim of stimulating the constitution of joint research projects involving institutions in both countries, in order to promote scientific exchange between the two countries and advanced training for human resources.[14] Between 2011 and 2013, a total of 99 research projects have been approved under this scheme. These projects have the duration of 2 years with the possible extension of 1 year and also include the mobility of researchers and students.

CNPq is the National Council for Scientific and Technological Development, an Agency of the Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation (MCTI), which has also supported the internationalisation of higher education in Brazil. This body also provides funding to students and researchers wishing to conduct further training abroad. The number of scholarships granted also registered a strong increase in 2012 (1,721), most of them for mixed undergraduate courses (1,541). This is also related to the implementation of the programme Science without Borders, implemented jointly by CAPES and CNPq. There was a sharp decrease in 2014, due to restrictions introduced in the programme for studies to be conducted in Portugal as mentioned above.

In addition to these two federal level agencies, at the state level, there are also foundations, which, in each state, have their own funding schemes to support research, including the mobility of students and researchers. These are the so-called Fundações de Amparo à Pesquisa no Brasil (FAPs) – Foundations for the Support of Research. These institutions are included in the Brazilian scientific system and are connected to the state governments. Among their tasks they may

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[13] In http://portal.mec.gov.br/index.php?option=com_jfilter&task=search&Itemid=%C2%A0164&params[search_relevance]=Programa+de+Licenciaturas+Internacionais&params[search_method]=exact

[14] In http://www.capes.gov.br/cooperacao-internacional/portugal/fct

also fund studies abroad. Enquiries made to get data from different foundations resulted in only one positive answer – from FAPESP, in the state of São Paulo. Between 2000 and 2014, this foundation supported 247 Brazilian students to pursue higher education studies in Portugal.

According to the National Strategy for Science, Technology and Innovation of the Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation for the period 2012–2015, between 2000 and 2010, the total number of graduates in the country increased 155 %, from 324,732 to 826,928. However, the same plan considers that training in engineering is not meeting the needs of the country, which became particularly evident at a time of accelerating growth of the Brazilian economy. Until recently, Brazil had not developed an active policy framework or strategy aimed at taking a systematic advantage of scientific and technological training obtained abroad. As a result, there was a limited number of scholarships to study abroad granted by CAPES and CNPq. This changed with the implementation of the programme Science without Borders, mentioned above, which constitutes an active promotion and investment in the acquisition of competences abroad through advanced training particularly in the fields of engineering and technology.[15]

14.4.2   In Portugal

The promotion of internationalisation in higher education in Portugal and the implementation of strategies aiming to recruit international students are still very recent. Fonseca and Hortas (2011) and Fonseca et al. (2015) refer to a number of incentives and programmes that have fostered faculty and student mobility: Erasmus, Erasmus Mundus and Socrates (all of them sponsored by the European Commission), the participation of Portuguese institutions in international research projects and cooperation in both higher education and research with the community of Lusophone countries (CPLP) in general and with Brazil in particular.

The current relevance given by the Portuguese Government to the recruitment of international students is clearly demonstrated by the recent publication of the *Status of the International Student – Estatuto do Estudante Internacional* (Decree-Law No. 36/10 March 2014), which regulates the issues pertaining to international students. This regulation creates new opportunities for the recruitment of international students, particularly from Lusophone countries and Brazil, more specifically (interview of the rector of the University of Lisbon with the Association of Foreign Press in Portugal on 11 April 2014).

The demographic transition, with declining fertility and birth rates (in 2013, Portugal's fertility rate fell to 1.21 children per woman), combined with financial difficulties that stimulate an earlier entry into the labour market, is likely to have a negative impact on the number of students pursuing tertiary education in the

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[15] http://www.mct.gov.br/upd_blob/0218/218981.pdf

country. This is already evident in the fact that the number of students enrolled, for the first time, at undergraduate level (both in public and private institutions), has declined since 2010/2011 (from 77,301 new students in 2010/2011 to 68,076 in 2012/2013). This reduction has affected mainly the private universities, although public schools have also followed a downward trajectory (58,327 new students in 2010/2011 and 55,307 in 2012/2013).[16] This trend is also reflected in the decrease in the number of vacancies available in Portuguese universities. According to official data published by the General Directorate of Higher Education (DGES), in 2014, for the third consecutive year, the number of places for new undergraduate students in public universities has dropped, in response to decreasing demand and Government guidelines to eliminate courses with few students.[17]

To offset the negative effect of the declining number of Portuguese students applying for tertiary education, the Government has recommended that Portuguese universities increase the recruitment of foreign students. This political guideline is clearly expressed in the prologue of the Decree-Law mentioned above:

> The attraction of foreign students allows institutions to enhance the use of their resources and to increase their own revenues, which can then be applied in strengthening and diversifying the education system.[18]

This explicit reference to the positive impact of increasing numbers of international students on universities' own revenues cannot be taken without reference to the broader context of cutting down on public funding in place after 2008. According to the Public Funding Observatory of the European University Association, during the period 2008–2013, the total public funding in EUR provided to higher education institutions by the national government registered a decrease of nearly 11 %. After the intervention of the Troika (IMF, EC and European Central Bank) in 2011, the budget constraints imposed upon higher education institutions have been further aggravated. Between 2011 and 2013, the decrease in direct funding from the general state budget decreased 16.4 %.

Portuguese universities themselves have also been active promoters of the mobility of international students to Portugal, particularly within their respective strategies of affirming their position among Lusophone countries, mainly in Brazil. The celebration of agreements between Portuguese and Brazilian universities and the internationalisation of Portuguese researchers and teachers in Brazil have generated the constitution of networks, which have also informally stimulated the flow to Portugal. For example, an interviewee in Rio de Janeiro recalls how her sister (and other colleagues) had been stimulated by a teacher who visited Portugal

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[16] Data from DGEEC: http://www.dgeec.mec.pt/np4/235/ on 18 August 2014

[17] The number of places for new students in public universities and polytechnic institutes dropped from 53410 in 2011/2012 to 50820 in 2014/2015.

[18] Translated by the authors from the Portuguese original: 'A captação de estudantes estrangeiros permite aumentar a utilização da capacidade instalada nas instituições e potenciar novas receitas próprias, que poderão ser aplicadas no reforço da qualidade e na diversificação do ensino'

regularly (as a visiting professor) to pursue further studies there, and she ended up going to the University of Aveiro for her master's.

The main universities – of Lisbon, Porto and Coimbra – stand out in terms of the number of international students enrolled. Of these, the Universities of Coimbra and Porto have been more proactive in attracting Brazilian students to their courses. In their strategic plans for the period 2011–2015, both the Universities of Porto and Coimbra indicate the importance given to 'internationalisation', including the attraction of foreign students, with a particular reference to the Lusophone countries. The University of Lisbon's activity plan for 2014 also indicates the importance of internationalisation, namely, within the Portuguese-speaking countries. As mentioned above, the rector of the University of Lisbon highlights the role of the adoption of the *Status of the International Student* to facilitate the attraction of Lusophone students, particularly from Brazil.

The Luso-Brazilian scholarship programme sponsored by the Santander Bank has also contributed to bring Brazilian undergraduate students to these universities for one term. In place since 2007, this programme will fund in the current academic year 170 Brazilian students from federal universities and 23 from state universities accepted in one of the universities in the programme (both Porto and Coimbra are part, while Lisbon has stopped receiving students within this scheme).

In the specific case of the University of Coimbra, which as we have seen clearly stands out in its capacity to attract Brazilian students, its historical importance and the prestige associated to it in Brazil have always contributed to attract Brazilian students, as the quotes below illustrate:

> I decided to focus on the two universities in Portugal and from the two I thought that the University of Coimbra, because of its history... all the research in my field in Biology, the research more... more focused on what I do and I ended up opting for Coimbra. (Nilma, 2009, Coimbra, interviewed in Rio de Janeiro in 2011).
>
> I already knew of the University of Coimbra, by name. Within the field of Law I had always heard about the University of Coimbra... (Isabella, Coimbra, 2001, interviewed in Lisbon)

In addition, in recent years, Coimbra has adopted a number of strategies that have largely contributed to increase the number of Brazilian students. The University has pursued an active policy of signing agreements with Brazilian Universities. In 2010, it introduced the PLI (Programme of International Undergraduate Studies) mentioned above. It has also had a starring role in the implementation of the programme 'Science Without Borders' in Portugal (Fonseca et al. 2015) – the university received 850 students funded by the programme, corresponding to around 27 % of the total (3,166) granted in Portugal.[19] The University of Lisbon (former University of Lisbon and Technical University of Lisbon) and the University of Porto received, respectively, 586 and 592 students. Furthermore, the University has advertised that for the academic year 2014/2015, Brazilian students can apply directly to its undergraduate courses with the grades obtained in a Brazilian

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[19] In http://www.cienciasemfronteiras.gov.br/web/csf/painel-de-controle, on 17 August 2014,

Exam – ENEM (Exame Nacional do Ensino Médio).[20] This is likely to further increase the number of Brazilian students enrolled at this institution. Two other universities, Aveiro and Beira Interior, have also announced the same strategy, which reveals the interest of other universities in attracting Brazilian students as well.[21] The University of Coimbra's website also has the particularity of being the only of the three showing a specific link for Brazilian applicants. It also hosts an association of Brazilian Students and Researchers in Coimbra (ABEP), and in 2013 the Casa da Lusofonia (House of Lusophony) was created as joint project of seven Lusophone countries.

14.5   Students' Perspectives: What Are the Shortcomings of These Strategies?

While the different actors involved in the process of international student mobility – origin state, host institutions and the students – seem to converge around the positive dimensions of such mobility, in what appears to be a win-win situation, it is crucial to look at the lived experiences of the students who do the actual moving. How do they handle it? What challenges and obstacles do they encounter? How are expectations met?

The testimonies of the students interviewed illustrate a clear paradox. On the one hand, there is (i) clearly a strong investment made by the Brazilian Government to provide academic experiences abroad to Brazilian university students, within an overall strategy of improving national human capital to foster economic growth and (ii) active recruitment strategies employed by Portuguese institutions of higher education to attract Brazilian students. On the other, upon return to Brazil, students often fail to find a matching entrance into the labour market. At the same time, Portugal has not been able to benefit from 'student migration as a form of global talent recruitment embedded within the globalization of higher education' (Findlay 2011, p. 165). This is because students are often 'required' by their funding schemes to return to Brazil, the low labour market demand in Portugal, as a result of the 2008 economic crisis, combined with a lack of coherent government strategies to retain talent in the country.

Additionally, experiences in Portugal reveal that student mobility is not restricted to the academic sphere but very importantly also involves other domains of the students' life. Indeed, focusing on international student mobility in its

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[20] Information available here: http://www.uc.pt/brasil, accessed on 16 August 2014

[21] Announced here:
http://www.fundaplub.org.br/site/noticia/duas-universidades-de-portugal-aceitam-brasileiros-pelo-enem/
and here
http://g1.globo.com/educacao/noticia/2014/07/reitores-questionam-exclusao-de-portugal-do-ciencia-sem-fronteiras.html

academic dimension alone fails to recognise that it offers a much more encompassing life experience, as Juliana (a student in Coimbra) illustrates:

> It was a lot more incredible than I had thought. . . I highly recommend it because it is a jump that you take, a life experience. The academic part was important but not the most important.

In fact, several students refer to how the academic experience failed to fulfil the expectations of studying at a 'European university' but that the mobility became rather a life enhancing experience. For some, the merit of the international mobility became more social and cultural rather than strictly academic. Thus, the advantages associated with international study stretch beyond the pursuit of academic credentials in recognised top universities to include the cultivation of a more cosmopolitan identity (Beck 2004) or the acquisition of transnational social networks, as the following quotes illustrate:

> Regarding the studies, we reduced our expectations because we expected more in terms of learning. But I think that our experience was amazing, because I think the exchange is not only to take your subjects in another place, we met people from all over the world and that gives you a whole new vision of the world. (Joana, student in Évora)

> I would recommend it but with caution. . . It did not correspond to my expectations in terms of the dynamism of the course. I expected it would be better. . . Based on my experience, I grew more as a person. (Lisa, studied in Coimbra)

> [The experience was positive] more because of other factors, such as personal and cultural development, things that don't show up in your CV. (Cristina, Lisboa, 2010)

> It was a great experience. I was charmed by the city of Évora every day. I would highly recommend it. It was worth the experience of meeting the people from there, even to change a bit the vision I had of Europe, Portugal. . . because it was an European university I expected that the academic standards would be a bit higher. (Bethania, Évora, 2013)

In April 2015, the Centre of Social Studies of the University of Coimbra organised the seminar: 'Brazilian Students in Coimbra: Intercultural Policy or Market Strategy?' The title itself suggests a potential tension/conflict between two of the most relevant dimensions or gains resulting from international student mobility: the economic benefits, especially for the host country's institutions and the development of intercultural understanding, favouring both the student engaging in mobility and his/her academic community, most immediately in the host country but also in the long run, upon return to the origin country. In this event students and researchers intended to make their claims visible in a context of expanding international education. In particular, the organisers highlight that international students are incorporated not only into an academic institution and community but also into the city where that institution is located. This important dimension is very relevant in Coimbra, a mid-sized 'university-city', where the presence of students is very visible and an important motor for the city itself. At this seminar students voiced their view that because of the financial difficulties that the University of Coimbra was experiencing, the market-driven and microeconomic

administration, focused on ever increasing the number of students enrolled, has impacted academic quality, with consequences for most students.

On the one hand, active recruitment strategies are attracting increasing numbers of Brazilian students, and on the other, faculty complain that they are not prepared to receive these students. In the students' view, Portuguese professors are not aware of what the 'Brazilian student' is like. The shared language has overshadowed other differentiating factors in terms of student behaviour and academic attitude, which only become evident when these students join the classes in Portugal. Therefore, recognising the differences in 'academic cultures' would have positive effects in facilitating the inclusion of Brazilian students into the host institutions' academic environments. In addition, this would include acknowledgement of the cultural, social and symbolic capital students bring with them from their countries of origin and previous academic training. Nevertheless, several students interviewed highlight a very positive experience upon arrival resulting from the welcome programmes, especially developed in the international relations departments of host universities. This includes 'welcome kits', mentoring by Portuguese students and social events involving Portuguese and foreign students.

In addition to academic integration, students encounter difficulties in the city of Coimbra itself, as they feel discriminated, for example, in the housing market. Some of the students interviewed had opted to live in Lisbon while studying in Coimbra. The choice of the city and the life it offers is very important, particularly within the framework of student mobility, both as an academic and a lifestyle experience.

14.6   Concluding Remarks

The data presented here reveals that at a time of economic crisis in Portugal resulting in strong decrease in labour migration from Brazil, other contextual and policy factors have produced an increase in the number of students from the same country. The framework influencing this increase combines both the interest and investment of the Brazilian Government and institutions of higher education in stimulating the international mobility of Brazilian students as well as the interest and strategies developed in Portugal to attract them. The common language combined with the historical cooperation developed between Portuguese and Brazilian higher education institutions largely explains why the main Portuguese universities have been developing strategies to attract Brazilian students. Discourses emanating from Portuguese universities largely reflect the intention of establishing 'quality' academic circulation between Brazil and Portugal, looking mostly at consolidating partnerships with well-established, mostly public, universities in Brazil. However, students' testimonies reveal that attracting 'numbers' has gained prevalence over providing quality education for Brazilian students. From the perspective of Portugal, in the context of shrinking state funding to the university system and the declining number of Portuguese students applying for tertiary education – due

both the population ageing and to the effects of the economic crisis – the recruitment of international students appears to be an important alternative source of revenue. Immediate economic objectives seem to be the main motivation pushing universities towards the recruitment of Brazilian students.

In order to consolidate its recent economic growth, Brazil has been confronted with the need to improve the qualifications of its working force. Given the lack of capacity within Brazilian universities to respond to such needs, both in terms of places available and intellectual capital, the Brazilian state (at the federal and state levels) has actively promoted the international mobility of its students and researchers.

However, students' experiences reveal that to 'study abroad' is much more than simply academic and is embedded in an increasingly powerful 'mobility culture' that attaches symbolic capital to the very performance of international living (Findlay et al. 2012, p. 128), as Neusa (student in Coimbra in 2009) clearly states: '. . . if during your training you spent some time abroad that is well regarded'.

For Brazilian students in international mobility schemes in Portugal, the academic dimension seems to be the weak point, in contrast to what has been thought to be the role of joining a 'high-quality' academic institution as a driver of international student mobility in other contexts. However, students are initially motivated by the prospect of studying at a European university and only after arrival become confronted with falling expectations and the valorisation of other 'personal development' factors. Significant international student mobility between Brazil and Portugal is a recent phenomenon that is only beginning to take shape in both countries, with ongoing developments taking place on both sides. With time, it is likely that continuing feedback on the experiences in Portugal will have an impact on future student flows. This is certainly a matter worthy of continuing research.

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Chapter 15
Globalising Rural Areas: International Migrants in Rural Germany

Birte Nienaber and Ursula Roos

Abstract International migrants sometimes decide to live in rural instead of in urban areas. These migrants can be clustered into different groups, e.g. amenity migrants, cross-border migrants, asylum seekers, training migrants and working migrants (seasonal and permanent). In rural areas in Germany, for example, in 2010 11.1 % of the population had a migratory background. In the German census for 2011, people with a migratory background include "all immigrant and nonimmigrant foreigners, all German citizens who immigrated after 1955 into the current territory of the Federal Republic of Germany and those Germans with at least one parent who immigrated into the current territory of the Federal Republic of Germany after 1955" (translated from the text from the Statistisches Bundesamt, Zensus 2011: Ausgewählte Ergebnisse. Wiesbaden, 2013b, p. 26) (Statistisches Bundesamt, Bevölkerung und Erwerbstätigkeit. Bevökerung mit Migrationshintergrund – Ergebnisse des Mikrozensus 2010. Fachserie 1 Reihe 2.2. Wiesbaden, 2011). Even though this phenomenon of international migrants moving into rural instead of urban areas exists, it has long been neglected by researchers.

The aim of this chapter is to investigate how international migrants support the development of a "globalized countryside" (Woods, Prog Hum Geogr 31 (4):485–507, 2007). Afterwards we focus on two different German case studies. First, we analyse international migration into the district town of Merzig (Saarland). Second, we investigate cross-border migration into rural areas in the German-Austrian borderlands (Bavaria). Based on the results, in our conclusion we discuss the statement that international migrants globalise rural areas.

Keywords Rural regions • Globalisation • International migration • Saarland • Bavaria

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15.1 Introduction

When people think of rural areas, they often think of the so-called rural idyll with the traditional localised community. However, things have changed. Rural areas in Europe and in many other parts of the world are now integrated into globalisation processes. "'Globalization' surfaced as the buzzword of the 'Roaring Nineties' because it best captured the increasingly interdependent nature of social life on our planet" (Steger 2009, p. 1). However, it was not only a challenge for the 1990s, but is still a key challenge facing the regions in the early twenty-first century. Significant challenges can be of social, economic, cultural, ecological or political procedural or normative dimensions. Furthermore, globalisation is seen as a discourse (e.g. Kelly 1999). Steger (2009) explains different aspects of globalisation: the creation and multiplication of networks, the expansion and stretching of social relations, activities and interdependencies, the intensification and acceleration of social exchanges and activities as well as the subjective level of globalisation.

Cid Aguayo (2008) argues that globalisation processes take place in all aspects of life, even in small settlements which she calls "global villages". As these globalisation processes also appear in rural areas, Woods (2007) calls these regions "globalized countryside" and names ten characteristics. For our paper, the three most important of these characteristics are that a globalised rural region "is both the supplier and the employer of migrant labour" (Woods 2007, p. 492), "attracts high levels of non-national property investment, for both commercial and residential purposes" (Woods 2007, p. 493) and "is characterized by increasing social polarization" (Woods 2007, p. 493).

Keeping these three characteristics in mind, in this paper we wish to investigate the impact of international migration into rural areas and how these migration processes globalise rural regions. Firstly, we want to give a general overview of international migration into rural areas. We thus investigate the question of which migrant groups discover rural rather than the very intensively analysed metropolitan/urban regions. Afterwards we focus on two different German case studies. Firstly, we analyse international migration into the district town of Merzig (Saarland). Secondly, we investigate cross-border migration into rural areas in the German-Austrian borderlands (Bavaria). Based on the results, in our conclusion we discuss the statement that international migrants globalise rural areas.

15.2 International Migrants in Rural Areas

The variation of international migration into rural areas is very broad. However, the research done on international migration into and not from rural areas is quite a new research topic.

A considerable amount of research has been done on seasonal workers, especially those employed in agriculture: for example, the Polish asparagus harvesters

in Germany (e.g. Becker 2010) or the Moroccan strawberry pickers in Spain (e.g. Mannon et al. 2011). Besides the migrant agricultural workers, there are also some international migrant workers who arrived in rural areas as part of the influx of guest workers in the 1960s and 1970s and settled there, instead of moving and staying in the industrialised urban parts of Germany (e.g. Geiger 1975; Nienaber and Frys 2012; Nienaber and Roos 2012a, b). Besides these specific types of working migrants, research has also been done on international working migrants to rural areas in general (e.g. Jentsch et al. 2007; Danson and Jentsch 2009).

Another type of international migration that has been further analysed by researchers is "amenity migration", a type of lifestyle migration. "Amenity migrants" do not want to live in urban areas or in their former rural surroundings, but search for a "nice" and more attractive place to live. This amenity migration can be associated with retirement (e.g. British people retiring to Tuscany (King and Patterson 1998), as in the general anthology edited by Brown and Glasgow (2008)), with recreational aspects (e.g. Gallent et al. 2005; Glorioso 2009; McIntyre 2009), with the desire for "subjective well-being" (e.g. Cai et al. 2014) or with the search for the rural idyll (e.g. British moving to Pomurska, Slovenia (Lampič and Mrak 2012)). This type of migration can be also seen as a rural gentrification process, although rural gentrification processes are multifaceted (Stockdale 2010) and this is only one aspect of it.

Another example of international migrants coming to rural areas is that of asylum seekers who cannot freely choose their place of residence in the country where they applied for asylum. Setting up new homes for them in the rural countryside sometimes leads to problems between different local actors (e.g. Hubbard 2005; Findlay et al. 2007). It also "raises serious questions about the ability of the [e.g.] English countryside to accommodate Otherness" (Hubbard 2005).

A non-forced international type of migration is cross-border residential migration. This type plays an increasingly important role regarding the internationalisation of rural border regions in many parts of Europe (e.g. from the Netherlands to Belgium or to Germany (e.g. van Houtum and Gielis 2006; Gielis and van Houtum 2012), from Poland to Germany (Balogh 2013; Nienaber and Kriszan 2013) and from Italy to Slovenia (Jagodic 2012)).

All these international movements are often connected with transnational social networks. For example, Brazilians came to the rural municipality of Gort in the Irish county Galway to work in the meat processing industry as they had just lost their jobs in this field in Brazil. Then gradually more Brazilian workers were attracted and in 2006 one-third of the population of this town had a Brazilian migratory background (Maher 2010). Such networks can become established in very different rural settings.

Furthermore, there is also research regarding special marketing activities for attracting foreigners to rural, sparsely populated or depopulated regions (Eimermann 2013; see also Hedberg and do Carmo 2012).

In Hedberg's and Haandrikman's (2014) analysis focusing on international migrants moving to the Swedish countryside, they document how heterogeneous

international migrants are regarding to age, sex, nationality, household structure, labour market status, duration of stay and residential location.

Considering these various types of international migration in rural areas, Oliva (2010) calls the Spanish rural areas "rural melting pots". He therefore wants "to refer to at least three things. Firstly, we suggest there is a process of constant social diversification as a result of the mobilities that have arisen in recent decades (like returning pensioners, retirement migrants, neo-liberal inhabitants, ex-urban professional classes, holidaymakers and amenity migrants). [. . .] Secondly, this concept indicates uncertainty over processes of change and social diversification. [. . .] Finally, the concept refers to the idea of a structure or container that is both physical and social – the rural areas where these processes can be seen and the sociological environments in which those involved draw up different social strategies" (Oliva 2010, p. 279). Therefore it is not only the process of international migration to rural areas that is discussed but also the consequences for the regions, specifically the integration of migrants (e.g. Jentsch 2007).

15.3   International Migrants in Rural Germany

In German rural areas, all the types of migrants mentioned above can be found. As one consequence, international migrants are very diverse, e.g. sex, age, nationality and duration of stay. However, nowadays there are four major groups of international migrants in rural Germany. These are working migrants, ethnic Germans ("Spätaussiedler") as well as Jewish contingent refugees from the former Soviet Union and asylum seekers. These migration groups are not equally distributed across rural regions, so some areas are particularly preferred by specific migrants or migrant groups compared with others. While working migrants mainly live in economically viable regions, the other groups stay in areas of allocation – often close to their first reception centre or temporary accommodation. However, from 1 January 2010, the law was changed so that Spätaussiedler are now allowed to freely choose their place of residence and are not being allocated a specific destination for the first 3 years (Schader-Stiftung 2011).

In the 2010 census, 10,336,000 people lived in rural areas in Germany. 11.1 % of them had a migratory background. 3.6 % were foreign citizens with migratory experience themselves, 0.7 % had no migratory experience, 4.3 % had already gained German citizenship but had migratory experience themselves, and 2.4 % had German citizenship without migratory experience of their own but with a migratory background. Compared with 2009, the amount of people with a migratory background living in German rural areas was reduced by 4.2 %. In comparison with conurbations or urbanised areas, the percentage of citizens with a migratory background in rural regions is low. For example, only 6.5 % of all foreign citizens with personal migratory experience reside in rural areas compared with 67.9 % in conurbations and 25.7 % in urbanised areas (Statistisches Bundesamt 2011). Beyond that, there are differences, for example, regarding age structure between

the indigenous residents of rural regions and those originating from elsewhere. While 68.8 % of foreign nationals are between 25 and 65 years old (i.e. working age), only 43.3 % of the Germans with a migratory background and 54.5 % of the Germans without one are aged between 25 and 65. Moreover, the Germans with a migratory background are the youngest of the three groups, while the Germans without a migratory background are the oldest (Statistisches Bundesamt 2013a; own calculation).

In rural Germany, 83.15 % of all foreign citizens have completed a school-leaving certificate in 2011, but nearly half of them (46.1 %) have a lower secondary school certificate and only 24.2 % of them a high school certificate (Abitur). 11.7 % of the foreign citizens have no school certificate and 4.4 % are still in school. Compared with conurbations, in rural areas there are fewer people with Abitur, but more having a school certificate in general (Statistisches Bundesamt 2013a; own calculation).

For foreign nationals, in 2011 the average household size in rural Germany was 2.31 persons per household (compared with 2.36 in conurbations and 2.41 in urbanised areas), whereas for German citizens with a migratory background it was 2.37 (compared with 2.39 in conurbations and 2.48 in urbanised areas), and for German citizens without a migratory background it was 2.04 (compared with 1.89 in conurbations and 2.02 in urbanised areas) (Statistisches Bundesamt 2013a). In addition, there are also differences regarding the income of people with and without a migratory background. Accordingly, the income of foreign citizens and German citizens with a migratory background living in rural areas was lower than the income of German citizens without a migratory background (see Table 15.1).

At the same time the percentage of people depending on financial assistance (welfare) was higher (see Table 15.2).

A study of rural international migrants to the federal state of Saarland and to the eastern part of the federal state of Saxony showed that migrants are also very diverse in terms of their reasons for migration as well as their experiences in Germany. In general, the interviewees with a migratory background in Saarland were very satisfied with their move to a rural area. Nevertheless, they also mentioned negative aspects they were confronted with. That is why they demanded, for example, "equality of migrants on the labour market, more language assistants and courses in rural areas, less bureaucracy and more integration into local activities" (Nienaber and Frys 2012, p. 86). The comparative evaluation of the results of both

Table 15.1 Net income per household in rural areas 2011 (percentage of each group)

	<1300 €	1300–2000 €	2000–3200 €	>3200 €	n.a.	Total
German citizens without a migratory background	27.7	24.3	25.5	18.6	3.9	100
German citizens with a migratory background	31.0	23.0	27.4	15.5	3.1	100
Foreign citizens	36.1	22.9	26.8	14.1	0.0	100

Source: Statistisches Bundesamt (2013a; own calculation)

Table 15.2 Income source per person in rural areas 2011 (percentage of each group)

	Employment	Family members	Pension	Welfare	Total
German citizens without a migratory background	45	22	27	6	100
German citizens with a migratory background	36	40	14	10	100
Foreign citizens	47	26	13	14	100

Source: Statistisches Bundesamt (2013a; own calculation)

case studies (Saarland, eastern Saxony) explains how dominant values in rural areas could on the one hand complicate the integration processes and on the other hand could sometimes cause xenophobia. However, migrants who decided to move to a rural area often prefer rural lifestyles (due to their own childhood or due to positive attitudes towards rural life) (Nadler et al. 2012). However, this is on the condition that they are allowed to freely choose their place of residence and not be allocated one according to an allocation formula.

In addition to these types of international migrants residing in rural Germany, there are also seasonal workers, especially those working in agriculture, but also in gastronomy, hotels and the construction business. These migrants stay only for a couple of weeks or up to 4 months each year working in Germany and then migrate back to their country of origin (Becker 2010). Statistics focusing on the numbers of such people working and staying in rural as well as in urban areas do not – to our knowledge – exist.

15.4   Case Studies

With the aim of tracing the migration and integration paths of international migrants living in rural areas, 12 problem-centred interviews were conducted in 2013 in the district town of Merzig (Saarland). The selection of the interview partners was based on socio-demographic aspects (e.g. age, sex, educational background and current labour situation) as well as the migratory background (e.g. nationality, duration of stay and reason for migration). For the interviews, an interview guide was developed, focusing on the four dimensions of integration (structural, cultural, social and identificational integration) and consisting of questions regarding individual migration as well as integration processes. After the interviews had been transcribed, they were analysed in the form of migration and integration biographies, tracing these processes and helping to identify factors that were useful for integration and those that were a hindrance to it. Two out of these 12 interviews will be explored in the Sect. 15.4.1.

In Markt Scheidegg, in Bavaria, we conducted ten qualitative in-depth interviews with Austrian citizens in 2011 about their reasons for living in Markt Scheidegg and their integration into their home communities as well as into their

arrival communities. These interviews were then transcribed and analysed. More-over, a network analysis has been made for some of these interviewees. In an additional step, all houses where Austrian citizens were registered were mapped with details of the type of housing, the age of the houses, etc., to find out if any special spatial residential structures exist. As the municipality has changed the house numbers and names of streets several times, the houses of fifteen Austrian residences could not be identified.

15.4.1 Migration and Integration Paths of International Migrants in the District Town of Merzig (Saarland)

The district town of Merzig is located in the federal state of Saarland, near the French and Luxembourgish borders. Due to the below-average housing density, the sparse population and the high percentage of open spaces, for example, the regional development plan, "settlement" section, includes the town as well as the whole district in the spatial category of "rural areas" (Chef der Staatskanzlei 2006). In 2012, Merzig had a population of 30,267, with approximately 1980 people with foreign citizenship from over 75 different countries (Kreisstadt Merzig 2012a, b). The municipality was awarded the honour of "Ort der Vielfalt" ("Place of Diver-sity") by the federal German government in 2010 with regard to the multitude of social strata, lifestyles, social backgrounds and cultures as well as innovative social approaches, which were developed above all by local international migrants. Specific encounter structures have already been developed thanks in part to the multicultural character of Merzig, e.g. the "Interkulturelle Woche" (Intercultural Week) or the "Nacht der Kulturen" (Night of Cultures). In the same manner, the mosque in Merzig organises interreligious and intercultural festivals in order to promote dialogue between the religions and cultures. Also with regard to culture and sports, there are several opportunities which have been organised by people with a migratory background. These include the Italian theatre group Compagnia Teatro Popolare "Citta Di Merzig" and the club "Associazione Sportive Italia", as well as a Kurdish and Turkish soccer club which has Arabic, German, Polish and Turkish players. Some of the existing self-organised immigrant associations include the Spätaussiedler integration association "Miteinander Leben e.V." and "DITIB Merzig", which is a Turkish cultural centre with a cultural association as well as a mosque congregation (Internationaler Bund 2009).

The variety of inhabitants, in terms of nationalities, cultures, religions, migration purposes and ways of life, amongst other things, makes up the multicultural character of Merzig. This diversity is also reflected in the interviews. Two short-ened migration and integration biographies are therefore presented below. Amongst other types of migration purposes (e.g. migration for employment purposes, migra-tion for other purposes, German resettlers) that can be found in the municipality,

these are examples of migration for training purposes and migration for humanitarian and political purposes.

15.4.1.1 Migration for Training Purposes

Sebastián O.[1]: "It's An Absolutely New World When You Are Here. You Have to Explore What It Is and See What the New World Offers."

Sebastián was born in the mid-1970s in Mexico. After completing his high school-leaving certificate, he started a course of study in the field of electrical engineering. During his studies he decided to do a PhD in Germany, so he applied to the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) for a PhD scholarship. After being accepted, Sebastián left Mexico with the intention to return after completing his PhD. He arrived in Germany in autumn 2002. Regarding his German-language skills, the DAAD organised a 6-month language course in Hesse. Furthermore, they took care of the flat-hunting as well as the administrative matters, e.g. visa extension. The scholarship as well as the support he received from the DAAD created good conditions for his stay in Germany. However, the lack of language skills caused problems at the beginning, so Sebastián was motivated and willing to learn German quickly and well. Besides the official language class, he participated in a Tandem Language Programme and learnt on his own initiative by reading the daily newspaper. In addition to improving his language skills, the course and the Tandem Programme gave him the opportunity to make contact with other people. He thus built up initial contacts with other people from Latin America, but also from Germany, with whom he spent his free time.

After finishing the language course, Sebastián transferred to a university in Rhineland-Palatinate to start his PhD thesis. There, he met open-minded colleagues who had sympathy for his situation as an immigrant. They therefore organised an apartment for him and offered to use English as their common working language. Through his contacts amongst colleagues as well as fellow students, Sebastián built up a new social network. Beyond that, events organised by the general student committee gave him an opportunity for socialising. At one of these events, he met his future wife, who studied at Saarland University at that time. Some years later, and shortly before the completion of his PhD thesis, Sebastián moved to Saarland to be with her, because of the birth of their son. During his studies, he came to the decision not to return to Mexico, and this was strengthened by the birth of his son. Instead, he preferred to stay in Germany to gain some work experience. After gaining his PhD in 2008, he therefore started job hunting in the Greater Region (bordering parts of Germany, Luxembourg, Belgium, France) as well as in Baden-Wurttemberg. Sebastián's former colleagues from the university as well as friends assisted him with the written applications. On the one hand, they supplied him with insider information regarding the field of electrical engineering and on the other

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[1] To preserve the anonymity of the interviewees, their original names have been changed.

hand they did the proofreading of the documents in support of the application. After some weeks, he received a job offer in the field of electrical engineering and automotive technology at a company in Baden-Wurttemberg. However, a so-called "Vorrangprüfung" (priority review[2]) had to be carried out before Sebastián definitively got the job. The new workmates were interested in his country of origin, which provided a common basis for discussions. Personal contacts with German colleagues in particular also enabled him to improve his German-language skills. In addition to the personal acceptance, he was also appreciated for what he could deliver. After 2 years of service, Sebastián got a different job in this federal state. While his wife and son still lived in Saarland, he stayed in a flat in Baden-Wurttemberg during the week and commuted back at weekends.

This separation between family and workplace as well as the wish to have a common centre of life in the future prompted him to search for a new job in the Greater Region. In 2012, he found a vacancy in an international company in Luxembourg. Due to the new job, his wife's position as well as the existing social and technical infrastructure, Sebastián and his family moved into the district town of Merzig in the summer 2012. However, the move meant a daily commute of 60 km one way, but for him it was more important that his wife could work near their child's kindergarten, so as to be available if necessary. The family rented a flat in the centre of Merzig. While they have only tenuous contacts with the neighbours in their living environment, primarily the couple have established close relationships with other parents with whom they came into contact at the kindergarten and at the playgroup. Beyond that, Sebastián's circle of acquaintances and friends consists of former colleagues from the university as well as from his previous jobs. Although the friends are spread over Germany, they regularly meet up with their families. In addition to his connections with non-German citizens, e.g. Bulgarians, Dutch, French, Italians, Spanish and Spätaussiedler, his contacts with Germans are of particular interest to him. Sebastián justifies this by saying that some of the non-German residents may return to their countries of origin someday, which would mean that he would lose touch with them. In the case of the German inhabitants, it is likely that they will stay in Germany. In particular, he appreciates the mentality of the "Saarländer" (people living in Saarland), which is characterised by openness and friendliness. He thus feels that he is welcome in Merzig as well as in Saarland, so that he has a sense of belonging and of kinship with the host society and therefore wants to live in Merzig permanently. On the basis of local and regional kinship, in Sebastián's case a national sense of belonging also developed, which is why he defines himself as a "German-Mexican" who has his centre of life in Germany. In particular through his wife, children, friends and colleagues, a personal relationship with Germany has grown. He is grateful for these relations

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[2] Based on the job description, the German Federal Employment Agency "has to check whether priority applicants are available on the regional or national labour market. Only if there is no appropriate person available the Employment Agency is allowed to accept the appointment of the foreign worker" (translated from the text of Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge and Nationale Kontaktstelle des EMN 2010, p. 28).

as well as for the opportunities that were given to him in Germany. Due to his bond with Germany, it was his wish to take German citizenship. In 2013, he and his son became naturalised (Interview No. 9).

15.4.1.2   Migration for Humanitarian and Political Purposes

Karim F.: "Kurdish Heritage Does Not Prevent Integration into German Society as a Kurd."

Karim was born in the late 1970s in Syria, as a member of the ethnic group of Kurds. Following his school-leaving qualification, he began his studies in the field of food science and completed them successfully. He was hired by an international, globalised company in Syria. Accordingly, he worked together with colleagues from all over the world, including Germany. From 2008, due to his German-speaking colleagues as well as his interest in learning foreign languages, Karim attended German-language courses. Unlike his brother, he did not wish to leave the country. However, the outbreak of the Syrian civil war forced him to flee. Even before the war, he was a political opponent of the government, which is why he came under threat from the government and supporters of radical Islam. The supporters of radical Islam in particular threatened him with death, so he decided to flee to Germany. He chose the federal state of Saarland, where his brother and his uncle already lived. On 1 January 2012, Karim entered Germany and applied for political asylum. He was first housed in the reception centre in Lebach (Saarland).

He received support from the authorities with regard to all the formalities, the request for political asylum as well as participation in an intensive language training course. The employees of the department showed respect and esteem for him, feelings that he never experienced as a member of the ethnic group of Kurds in Syria before. In particular, the closeness to his brother and his uncle gave him a sense of safety. However, the situation in Syria as well as his escape weighed on his mind.

After his application for asylum had been assessed, Karim was recognised as a refugee and was thus entitled to begin gainful employment. The work permit is very important for him because on the one hand it means he can become financially independent and on the other hand it enables him to pursue a meaningful activity. As soon as his German-language skills are sufficient, he plans to obtain employment or further training. He also aims to have his degree recognised. His limited language skills restrict him in establishing contact with German citizens. He therefore has only some passing acquaintances amongst his uncle's neighbours. He has experienced openness and sympathy for his situation as well as interest in his country of origin, which has helped him to develop feelings of esteem and well-being. Through intercultural exchange and education, Karim also dreams of establishing a close relationship with the host society. In his opinion, common interests will help to build up a social network. Once he has proficient language skills, he will participate in, for example, cultural events or art exhibitions and establish a German-Kurdish association encouraging intercultural exchange.

As he is aware of the importance of language, he steadily improves his language skills by attending language courses and reading German-language newspapers. He also watches German television. Karim's brother explains unknown words in German to him, while Karim translates the words into Kurdish in order to improve his memorisation of terms. In particular, children's books and films using simple syntax are, he believes, helpful for his language acquisition. While he still requires linguistic support during doctor's visits and visits to the authorities, he does shopping and runs errands independently. Because of the language course that takes place at the adult education centre in Merzig, Karim lives during the week in his brother's flat in the district town. Still, his domicile is the first reception centre in Lebach where he spends the weekends. Together with his brother, he is looking for a flat in the district town of Merzig. However, existing resentments on the part of the majority society as well as the upper limit of rent imposed by the social security office make the flat-hunting more difficult. Karim attributes the lack of understanding for his situation shown by local people primarily to the fact that they have had no personal experience of migration. For example, some landlords with a migratory background were more open-minded about renting to migrants, but even with them, he has not yet succeeded in signing a tenancy.

There are still many bonds to his country of origin, which is why Karim is often homesick and misses his former home. As soon as the political situation allows a return migration, he wants to go back to Syria. At the moment, the civil war and the fear of persecution by supporters of radical Islam make any return absolutely impossible. That is why he maintains his relationships with family and friends via social networks. However, the war and the associated intermittent collapse of the Internet make regular communication more difficult. In addition to his personal contacts, he also maintains his links with Kurdish culture. Thus, for example, Karim celebrates the Kurdish Newroz festival and participates in Kurdish weddings. If the political conditions in Syria do not allow a return, he could also imagine that Germany may become a "home" country for him. The feelings of well-being and security in Germany give him confidence and optimism for his future. Furthermore, the respect as well as the tolerance that the host society has shown for him and his culture enables him to develop multiple cultural links (Interview No. 11).

Both biographies reflect the diversity that accompanies international migration processes. This diversity comprises, for example, socio-demographic aspects, countries of origin, the voluntary nature of migration and the reasons for it, cultural and religious backgrounds as well as the existence of transnational networks. Due to immigration and the associated diversity, not only urban but also rural areas gain plurality and improve international networking.

15.4.2 Cross-Border Migrants at the German-Austrian Border (Bavaria)

At the German-Austrian border there are several German towns with a higher rate of Austrian citizens. Thus, for example, in 2011, there were 117 Austrian citizens living in the Bavarian village of Markt Scheidegg that is located close to the border with the Austrian federal state of Vorarlberg. Forty-seven percent of them were born between 1960 and 1969, 22 % between 1950 and 1959, 13 % between 1980 and 1989, 11 % between 1970 and 1979, and 10 % between 1940 and 1949. The other age groups were less than or equal to 5 %. 53.8 % of the Austrian citizens in Markt Scheidegg were female and 52.1 % resided in the main town. The other inhabitants were spread over small villages or lived in isolated farmhouses (own calculation according to the information from the municipality of Markt Scheidegg, May 2011). 62.4 % of the mapped residential addresses of Austrian citizens were built before 1990 and 32.5 % of the houses need major refurbishment. Otherwise, some of the houses were very newly refurbished imposing villas. Regarding the form of accommodation, 16.2 % of the Austrian citizens lived in apartment houses and 28.2 % in one-or-two-family dwellings. Furthermore 10.3 % resided on a farm. Just under half of the Austrian citizens lived in residential estates, the others lived in mixed-use houses. Other properties besides agricultural ones were hotels/restaurants, garages/repair shops, offices, surgeries or hospitals (analysis of mapping). While Austrians came to Germany in the 1950s and 1960s to find jobs, now people (Austrians or Germans) often work on the Austrian side of the border (Interview with the Mayor).

The qualitative interviews show more in detail why the interviewees moved to rural Germany and reflect the extent of social, professional and identificational connections to Austria that exist. Regarding the reasons for migration, the interviewees in Markt Scheidegg can be grouped into four different types: one group includes marriage migrants, the second group atypical cross-border commuters, the third group Austrian citizens in Markt Scheidegg without a migration experience of their own and a fourth group comprises working migrants. In the following section we will exemplify these groups by analysing one example per type.

The first interviewee to be studied here represents the group of marriage migrants. She is between 60 and 65 years old and came from the Vorarlberg area of Austria that is just across the border. She moved to Markt Scheidegg because she married a German in the 1970s. She still has personal bonds to her sister and brother who live in Austria. However, apart from her former husband, she has no contact with any former friends in Austria. Due to her professional involvement as well as her social networks in Germany (she has contacts to Germans as well as Austrians, especially to two Austrian neighbours), she feels quite integrated in the municipality of Markt Scheidegg. Austria is her home country and she still has very important mental ties to this country, but she has now lived in Germany for 25 years, and prior to that she had already worked in this country for 20 years. Although she feels comfortable about living in Germany, neither a sense of Germany as a homeland

nor a national identification with Germany has developed. However, she wants to grow old in Markt Scheidegg. In her mind, she does not perceive the border between the two states any longer (Interview No. 2).

The second interviewee is between 50 and 59 years old, single and has a different story. He represents an atypical cross-border commuter, meaning that even though he is an Austrian citizen, he lives in Germany, but still works in Austria. This situation causes several problems, such as regarding the different tax systems and insurance systems, as well as bank loans. In 1980 he moved to Germany for the first time. In recent years, on the one hand he has changed his place of residence across the border several times, moving from Austria to Germany and back again, and on the other hand he had various jobs in Germany as well as in Austria. Before settling down in Markt Scheidegg, he lived in Vorarlberg, but he does not originally come from the federal state of Vorarlberg, but from the state of Upper Austria. After his divorce, he searched for a place to live that is closer to his work and decided to move to Markt Scheidegg. He has no contact with Austrians living in Markt Scheidegg, but with Austrians in Austria (family, friends, colleagues), and with Germans in Germany as well as with Germans in Austria. Besides these contacts he maintains links with family members and friends in Switzerland and in Liechtenstein, with whom he is in regular contact. In his opinion, knowledge of the country of destination is mostly important for the integration process. Using the same language in the country of origin as well as in the country of destination is particularly useful. Furthermore, there is the shared history: Markt Scheidegg was part of the Habsburg regime before Napoleon came and the border shifted, and this could positively influence his personal integration. Although he could not really define whether he feels Austrian or German, he limits Germany to Bavaria or even to the region of Allgäu, which he calls "his Germany". One step in his integration process was the gaining of political "power" which allowed him to vote in the municipal council elections in Germany. However, he would not request the German citizenship that would enable him to vote in state or federal elections as well. With regard to his perception of the border, he only recognises the border when he sees the former customs house which reminds him of crossing an open border where there used to be check points in the past. Furthermore, he also has the feeling that the Austrian and German mentalities are somehow changing and drifting further apart. He finished the interview with "It is never perfect. That does not exist" (Interview No. 3).

The third example representing an Austrian citizen without a migration experience of his own is an "Ur-Scheidegger",[3] born and raised in Markt Scheidegg. He is between 40 and 49 years old and lives together with his wife as well as his three children. Whereas his grandfather originally came from Austria, his children have now dual nationality. Other branches of his family moved back to Austria or have recently come to Germany (his brother-in-law). He feels very well integrated, especially as he has been elected to the municipal council of Markt Scheidegg.

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[3] Indigenous person from Markt Scheidegg

So even though he has more contact with Germans, he also has contact with other Austrians (living in Austria or in Germany). Since the border is open and does not close at midnight any longer, many more people cross the border to join sports clubs or other types of associations. However, he is only involved in associations on the German side. The main problems for him as an Austrian citizen living in Germany have been renewing his ID card and obtaining a work permit for his apprenticeship when he was younger. Due to the fact that he was born and raised in Markt Scheidegg, he feels at home and loves the countryside (Interview No. 5).

The last example that will be shown here illustrates the type of working migrant represented by a woman who is between 50 and 59 years old, living in Germany since 1980. She moved directly to Markt Scheidegg even though she worked in the neighbouring district. She feels integrated into the community of this municipality, but outside the district she has no other contacts with other parts of Germany. Her parents, siblings and friends are all still living in Austria. Although she has now been in Germany for longer than she was in Austria, for her Austria and not Germany is the home country. She thinks that her contacts with Germans and Austrians are more or less equal. Once a week she crosses the border for shopping as well as to meet family and friends in Austria. Having her Austrian master craftsman's diploma recognised in Germany caused problems at the beginning, and she had to do an additional 14-day course to enable her to work as a self-employed person, as she does nowadays (Interview No 8).

These four examples show that even though all these people could be called cross-border migrants (see Fig. 15.1), their biographies are very different. Moreover, their reasons for moving to Germany and keeping or cutting their links to Austria are very diverse. The reasons why they moved to a rural region are very heterogeneous too: the main reasons are the proximity to Austria (family, friends, job), marriage (municipality where the husband is from (often farms)) and/or cheap real estate market (especially to rent).

15.5   Conclusion

The biographies of the international migrants in rural German areas in Saarland and Bavaria that have been explored here show some similarities as well as differences. On the one hand we have investigated short-distance international migration, mostly just across a neighbouring border from Austria to Bavaria (Germany), and on the other hand we have long-distance migration from Mexico or Syria to Germany.

Fig. 15.1 Map of the migration patterns of four interviewees (Source: own elaboration)

Moreover, the examples show that the reasons for the decision to move to a rural area are very diverse: e.g. marriage, friends/relatives, work, cheap real estate market or allocation by the first reception centre. Also, the variety of examples shows that even though most of the interviewed migrants came by choice, the migrant from Syria, at least, was forced to flee.

To conclude this chapter, we want to come back to the three characteristics of a "globalized countryside" (Woods 2007) relating to mobility.

Firstly, a globalised rural region "is both the supplier and the employer of migrant labour" (Woods 2007, p. 492). Analysis of the migrants' biographies show that work is an important factor in choosing where to live. If this workplace is in a rural area, it can attract international migrants. Moreover, marriage migration can be combined with work. In the interviews that were explored here, Austrian women came to Germany to marry into farm households and then worked on the farms. So even though work was not the reason for the woman to migrate, it was the reason for her future husband to stay and to marry somebody who is willing to work on a farm as well.

Secondly, a globalised rural region "attracts high levels of non-national property investment, for both commercial and residential purposes" (Woods 2007, p. 493). This statement can hardly be supported by the results of these interviews. It can be partly supported by the mapping of the houses where some houses were very newly refurbished villas, but other houses were in very bad shape. Moreover, in these case studies most migrants rented apartments (e.g. because of the cheaper real estate market) or lived in a house inherited by the husband. Only the example of the Austrian citizen without a migration experience of his own shows investment in property for residential purposes. The self-employed migrant invested in

commercial premises in Markt Scheidegg. However, the interviewees in these case studies did not make a high level of investment.

Thirdly, a globalised rural region "is characterized by increasing social polarization" (Woods 2007, p. 493). Using the results from the mapping, social polarisation can be seen even within the group of Austrian migrants in Markt Scheidegg. Otherwise, the results of these interviews show that international migration to rural regions increases social diversity, for example, in terms of nationality, educational background, forced or voluntary migration, method of integration or relation to the home country. This does not mean that social polarisation is explicitly promoted by international migration, but case study regions exist where this characteristic might be more relevant (e.g. Nienaber and Kriszan 2013) than in the two case study regions mentioned in this chapter.

Although only one of the characteristics of a "globalized countryside" can be fully and the other two characteristics only partly supported by the results of these interviews, the case studies provide strong evidence that rural areas are already part of globalisation processes and of globalised migration patterns. This leads to a constant increase in social diversity and international influences.

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Chapter 16
Causal Relationships Between Economic Dynamics and Migration: Romania as Case Study

Ioan Ianos

Abstract Starting from an analysis made on Romania as a case study, the paper develops causal connections between economic dynamics and migration. The analysis is focused on internal and external migration flows during the post-socialist period. The data sources are collected from official statistics, empirical observations and different academic papers. The methodological steps are defined by each significant economic period and the impact on migration phenomenon. The results show an important correlation between the increasing domestic migration flow and the deindustrialization process. The effects of mining restructuring have totally changed the orientation of interregional flows. The traditional rural-urban flows changed direction in the reverse way. Especially, the metropolitan and peri-urban areas are the main winners in comparison with the cities. Excepting the first 2 years (when the ethnic emigration was dominant), during the entire next period, the emigration increased due to economic factors. If in the first three periods (until 2000) a permanent migration can be remarked, especially of highly educated people to USA and Canada, and working emigration especially in Israel, Germany and Austria, through temporary contracts. After 2001, the emigration flows increased dramatically, especially to Spain and Italy. During the financial and economic crisis, the preferences of migration flows changed the main destination, by replacing Spain with Italy (less touched by crisis). The economic consequences on the origin country are less visible at the national or regional level but relevant for some rural localities or small towns.

Keywords Economic dynamics • Domestic migration • Emigration • Romania

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16.1 Introduction

Migration is one of the socio-economic phenomena studied with priority, both in crisis and in economic boom periods, due to its global repercussions. Migration involves two phases: the first is the emergence of an important migrant potential group and the second is defined by the real move of this population (Docquier et al. 2014). Usually, migration has an international dimension, involving a movement of population from a state to another (Baubock 2003). From a theoretical point of view, the phased dynamics of the optimistic, pessimistic and new-optimistic migration visions were based on the paradigmatic changes that have taken place in the social and development theories (de Haas 2010). On the one hand, there was a different emphasis placed on the relationship between functionalism and structuralism, and on the other hand on the proportion between a balanced growth and an asymmetric development. From a practical point of view, the change of paradigm started from emphasising the migrations' positive role seen as self-help development and passed to assuming the responsibility by the countries providing migrants, countries which have to continue the reforms (de Haas 2012). The whole situation led to a more complicated position for the decision makers at a national level. The current political context and the rights-based liberalism determined the incapacity of the states to assure an efficient migration management (Bonjour 2011). The migration jurisprudence and the role of supranational institutions are the main obstacles in returning to the initial state functions in the possible control of those.

After the fall of the totalitarian regimes, Central and Eastern Europe became an important migrants' source, especially for the older countries in the European Union. Numerous writings in literature are related to the subject of migration, including return migration, on each country from this area (Goeler and Krisjane 2013; Krasteva 2010) and sometimes on the region as a whole (Martin and Radu 2012). At the same time, other papers analyse the importance of the restrictions imposed by different states to regulate the migration in a globalised world (Neumayer 2006; Bailey and Yeaoh 2014). The analysis of the role of remittances on the Eastern European countries is another important topic (León-Ledesma and Piracha 2004; Lianos and Cavounidis 2008; Buch and Kuckulenz 2009). Some interesting issues result from comparative analysis between migration and happiness, confirming the economic motivation hypothesis (Bartram 2013).

The conducted studies show an ethnical migration in the first year (1990) to the Central and Eastern European countries where there was a significant German minority (Ianos and Vîrdol 2002), simultaneously with a rapid ethnical migration of the elites and dissidents (Okólski 2000). Some of the scholars underline the role played by the Habsburg and Ottoman Empires in initiating ethnical migrations and nationalism in the first years of the post-communist period in East and South East Europe (Jennissen 2011). Between 1995 and 2000, migration was dominated by highly qualified people, especially towards the USA, Canada and Germany (Rangelova and Vladimirova 2004), and by a gradual emphasis of the socio-economic one, with an emphasis on the life strategy at a macro-scale level

(Sandu 2005). The migration phenomenon has increased along with the possibility to travel without visa in the Schengen space and with the integration of the 12 new EU countries. The main migrants' suppliers in the EU are Poland and Romania, the first for the labour market in Germany and the second one for Spain and Italy. Moreover, Germany and Spain are major recipients of EU migrants, with almost 7.2 and 5.2 million immigrants (Bradatan and Sandu 2012). The complexity of the migration phenomenon in the EU makes possible the shaping of a European migration pattern (Salt and Almeida 2006), responding to the question raised by a certain researcher at a larger geopolitical context: "How many Europes?" (Agnew 2001).

16.2 A General Overview on Socio-economic Transformations and Migration Within and Outside Romania

One of the most important sources for migrants in the European Union is Romania. The author considers that to understand very well if there are causal relationships between economic changes and migration in this country, it is essential to know its roots through a "complex X-ray" of the internal and external migration process in connection with the recent socio-economic transformations.

The socio-economic and political changes generated by the collapse of the old regime were significant, with direct implications on the use of labour becoming, relatively sudden, oversupplied. Unlike other former socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe, Romania was characterised by an extensive industrial development and by pronatalist population policy, which printed specific elements of the transition (Heller and Ianos 2004).

One of these aspects refers to the fact that socialist industrialisation was dismantled just when the first two waves of population growth imposed by the communist regime were to enter the massive labour. We are talking about four million people, aged between 15 and 24 years (as per Romanian Statistical Yearbook 1990, p. 55), who were dramatically affected by deindustrialization processes, which started in the very first year of the transition. To avoid such a social bomb, given that labour migration in Europe was restricted by visa system, the opportunity in this case was the gap between deindustrialisation and massive agrarian reform. The latter began in the second year of the transition, managing at that moment to mitigate the effects of the massive reduction related to the number of employees in the Romanian economy.

Low incomes, the explosive growth of unemployment (a phenomenon unknown in the communist period) and rampant inflation, especially between 1997 and 1999, were the elements that diminished the purchasing power of the population. As a consequence of this, services have developed very slowly, unable to attract the surplus labour generated by the entire restructuring of the economy.

Increased regional disparities between counties in the first decade and their emphasis in subsequent years have determined a growth of the potential for internal and external migration. Despite the fact that agricultural cooperative processes in the communist period resulted in enhancing the rural-urban migration, Romania still remains the most rural country in the EU. In addition, the farming population represents almost 29 % of the total employed population (as per Romanian Statistical Yearbook 2013, p. 100). The gap between incomes, especially in villages and small towns (with a dominance of agricultural activities), was accountable for the definitive migration flows and employment, both within the country and especially in EU countries.

The migration potential is yet relatively high, due to several factors such as the increased unemployment in impoverished provinces (Moldova, Muntenia rural), the discrepancies in salary levels between urban and rural environment and also the possibility of travelling abroad for work rather than in other Romanian wealthier cities or regions.

Due to its geographical position at the Eastern periphery of the European Union, Romania could be a targeted gate for the migrants coming from other European countries, as Republic of Moldavia or Ukraine (Marcu 2010).

16.3 Methodological Issues

The study of causal relationships between economic transformations and migration starts from two hypotheses: (a) restructuring of the economy and especially industrial activities (this is one of the most explicative factors for both internal and external migration) and (b) other factors, such as the opportunity of gaining a bigger monthly income, which could explain the intensity and variation of the definitive and working emigration.

The study methods are the descriptive ones, and the data sources derive from official statistics, empirical observations and specialised literature. The consequences of diminishing the domestic interregional migration, by amplifying the external one, are various over the local rural communities.

A vital issue for the comparative analysis of the dynamics of migration phenomenon is the inconsistency of statistical data. Thus, by 2010 there is a record of definitive migrations, as from that moment, statistical records refer exclusively to migration abroad lasting more than 12 months. These records only start in 2007, which leads to some fragmentation in measuring direct causal relationship between migration and dynamic economy.

Why is this, relatively classic approach of the migration phenomenon, so important for the study? Because of the actual emigration, dimension cannot be explained only by a sudden change of the internal interregional migration. Deindustrialisation and tertiarisation had total different characteristics: the first one, permanent, and the second one tenuous, relative and unsustainable. To measure this, we consider that it is enough to analyse the dynamics of employees'

number at the economy and industry level too. To find an explanation of the present-day internal migration dynamics, we can consider a cross-correlation approach, using other 11 indicators. At the same time, we tried to learn what has happened with new dynamics of the working emigration, especially in the last years.

Trying to verify the work hypothesis, the methodological steps followed an analytical approach by each significant economic period. This matrix expresses, synthetically, the existing of a causal relationship between economic dynamics and forms, intensity and reorientation of migration flows.

16.4 Results and Discussions

To test the two hypotheses, our approach was an opposite one, namely, to analyse internal and external migration dynamics in the post-socialist, making individualised connections with the major stages in the economic and democratic transformation of Romania.

16.4.1 Particularities of In and Out Migration at the National Level

Internal migration is defined by the change of residence from one county to another, representing a major component of population change in the intranational level (Voss et al. 2002). Its influence on the regeneration of human potential by changing reproductive behaviour was highlighted by some researchers (Lindstrom 2003). Others have shown the link between uneven economic development, changes in migration interdepartmental meaning and importance of political factors (Ianos 1998, 2001; Rotariu and Mezei 1998). To test the hypothesis that the volume of domestic migration correlates with economic dynamics, we analysed data streams to three variables in the range 1990–2012. As the volume of domestic migration in 1990 was exceptional (Table 16.1) due to law abolition, imposed by the communist regime, whereby young graduates have to complete an internship of 3 years in another town, in the undertaken analysis, this year was excluded.

A simple statistical analysis shows that there is a strong correlation between the number of industrial employees and the number of migrants. It is about an inverse correlation having the coefficient value about -0.7. This means that the deindustrialisation process accentuated the internal migration of the labour force, thus causing the residents to search for new work opportunities. In opposition to this, the correlation coefficient value, between the total employees at the economy level and the number of migrants, is less (-0.53) but having a vital significance: the

Table 16.1 Dynamics of employees (total and industrial) and the absolute num. of migrants

Year	Total employees (thousands)	Industrial employees (thousands)	Number of internal migrants	Number of permanent emigrants
1990	8156	3846	786,471	96,929
1991	7574	3643	262,903	44,160
1992	6888	3245	293,182	31,152
1993	6672	3017	240,231	18,446
1994	6438	2856	266,745	17,146
1995	6160	2615	289,491	25,675
1996	5939	2585	292,879	21,526
1997	5597	2443	302,579	19,945
1998	5369	2272	276,154	17,536
1999	4761	1991	275,699	12,594
2000	4623	1873	244,507	14,753
2001	4619	1901	284,332	9,921
2002	4568	1891	320,819	8,154
2003	4591	1848	331,747	10,673
2004	4469	1741	369,892	13,082
2005	4559	1672	272,604	10,938
2006	4667	1632	334,025	14,197
2007	4885	1615	374,156	8,830
2008	5046	1606	389,254	8,739
2009	4774	1371	330,672	10,211
2010	4376	1237	458,995	7,906
2011	4349	1259	324,626	18,307
2012	4443	1296	372,197	No data

Source: Romanian Statistical Yearbooks (1991–2013), National Institute for Statistics (NIS), Bucharest

incapacity of other economic branches to attract on place the surplus of labour force.

The internal migration process is a complex one, and to find the explanation about the determinants of interdepartmental population change, we took into consideration 11 possible variables (Table 16.2). Computing the correlation coefficient among all these variables, including the net migration, we observed some significant values between internal migration and FDI (0.74), the telephone talks (0.69), the minutes spent on the Internet (0.67) and the GDP per capita (0.58). The conclusion is straightforward that we are talking about an economic motivation (the FDI and GDP having an important role to attract the migrants). At the same time, the migrants are in permanent contact with their families and friends, which explains the correlation with the specified variables.

External migration of Romanians is a complex process, covering two well-known forms: definitive migration and the working one. Definitive migration is well reflected in the national statistics, while working migration is determined by

Table 16.2 Correlation of internal net migration rate with some significant variables of socio-economic development

	X1	X2	X3	X4	X5	X6	X7	X8	X9	X10	X11	X12
X1	0	−0.5	−0.4	1	0.76	0.1	0.81	−1	**0.27**	0.59	0.63	0.53
X2			0.3	−0.2	−0.6	−0	−0.4	0.59	**−0.1**	−0.2	−0.2	−0.1
X3			0	−0.38	0	−0.1	−0.6	0.46	**−0.5**	−0.5	−0.5	−0.4
X4				0	−0.2	0.02	0.79	−0.6	**0.47**	0.69	0.64	0.72
X5					0	−0.1	−0.1	−0.2	**−0.4**	−0.2	−0.1	−0.2
X6						0	0.08	−0.1	**0.15**	0.15	0.15	0.06
X7							0	−0.8	**0.58**	0.84	0.87	0.8
X8								0	**−0.3**	−0.6	−0.6	−0.5
X9									**0**	**0.7**	**0.7**	**0.7**
X10										0	0.92	0.9
X11											0	0.86
X12												0

Explanation of symbols: X1, employees/working population%; X2, aged population%; X3, unemployment rate; X4, net earnings/employee; X5, inhabitants/room; X6, rate of scholar abandon; X7, GDP per capita; X8, agriculture employment rate; X9, internal net migration rate; X10, telephone talks (min/person/year); X11, minutes spent on the Internet (min/person/year); X12, FDI/inhabitant

Fig. 16.1 Dynamics of emigrants' number (1981–2011) (Source: Romanian Statistical Yearbooks (1982–2012), NIS, Bucharest)

comparing official data at a local level with those reported by official statistics of the receiving countries.

The analysis of the definitive migrants since 1975 to date shows an increase after 1980, when it is registered the threshold of 20,000 people, to reach a peak of almost 100,000 people in 1990. The decrease is as sharp as the growth, so as after 1996 the total volume of definitive emigration not to exceed this threshold (Fig. 16.1). This dynamic, disturbed by the values of 1990, was due to massive emigration of German population. The intention of emigrating was clearly expressed during the Ceausescu regime, but the Romanian state expected the compensation received for every German emigrant, according to the agreement settled. For the high values between 1987 and 1991, we may specify other contributors such as the emigration of ethnic Hungarians (Ianos and Vîrdol 2002).

The structure by age group shows a dominance of people between 26 and 40 years, which, together with a group of up to 18 years, exceeds 65 % of all migrants. Hence, the population that has migrated permanently is relatively younger and with a high demographic potential.

Parallel significant mutations occur in the gender structure dynamics (Fig. 16.2). This shows that except for 1992, permanent migrant female population was larger. The balance achieved between the sexes in times increasingly higher shows that the reasons are different. Thus, before 1990, changes in favour of women were determined by reuniting families, most commonly men emigrating illegally in an earlier period. The overall look is given by detaching of female migrants before lifting visa requirements for Romanian people but especially after this decision. The gap is more significant at the peak of the crisis, reached in all developed countries (2007–2009). This shows that female migrants have quickly found a job, much easier than men. In addition, areas in which women were employed as the service one (e.g. restaurants, hotels, care for the elderly or people with disabilities, etc.) were more stable. However, we must not neglect the share of women who were married to citizens of welcoming countries, which exceeded that of men. This

Fig. 16.2 Emigrants by gender (1981–2011) (Source: Romanian Statistical Yearbooks (1982–2012), NIS, Bucharest)

phenomenon has had a strong and negative impact on their families in the origin villages (Piperno 2011).

Regarding the permanent migration after the levels of training, secondary studies dominance can be seen in more than 50 % of migrants until 1990, and currently almost 60 % of them have high school studies. The analysis of the share of population with higher education in the permanent migration process show rapid growth between 1990 and 1994 (from 5 to 16 %), and after a period of stagnation, it has grown explosively after 1998, reaching almost 27 % all migrants (this level remaining constant up to nowadays). The US and Canada policies to provide facilities specialists have had an impact on high-skilled immigration. These specialists migrated massively to the two countries. Moreover, they had about 44 % of all permanent migrants in 2001 and in 2009 a share as important as the previous one (37.6 %).

Permanent migration to countries after 2001 reveals interesting changes, and the most spectacular of these is due to increased population recorded permanently to have moved to Spain in 2010 and 2011. Although this was the most attractive country for Romanian immigrants seeking a job, many of them hesitated to move permanently before the economic crisis, due to large distance. The phenomenon was inverted in Italy, at the beginning of the first decade (Fig. 16.3), where final migration was noticeably stronger than the one in Spain.

The second form was the emigration for work. Current statistics show that in 2012, 2.3 million people had temporary residence abroad (over 12 months). Countries dynamics analysis of this number shows that since Romania's integration in the EU (2007) and by 2012, over 900,000 people emigrated temporarily and that number has increased significantly between 2007 and 2008 (Fig. 16.4).

Its effects have had an impact on the attractiveness of migrants, pointing out a drastic decrease from 1 year to another. The share of migrants, according to destination countries and years, shows that they have changed their preferences in relation to the hardness of the financial crisis. Thus, the share of migrants has

Fig. 16.3 Dynamics of permanent emigration to the main receiving countries (Source: Romanian Statistical Yearbooks (2002–2012), NIS, Bucharest)


Fig. 16.4 Successive annual difference of working emigrants' number (Source: Romanian Statistical Yearbooks (2008–2013), NIS, Bucharest)

increased more than 5 times in the UK and about 2.5 times doubled in Belgium and in Italy (Table 16.3).

Due to the economic recession that has been experienced in Spain, the attraction of temporary migrants was much lower than in Italy. While in Spain the number of migrants in this category increased by about 250,000 people; in Italy the figure was more than 700,000 (2007–2012). The fact that more than one million people emigrated to work in Italy can be explained by a shift of some of the potential migrants to a country less impacted by the crisis, similar in language and behaviour and midway in relation to Spain.

Table 16.3 Dynamics of working migrants to the main receiving countries (%)

	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Austria	1.5	1.4	1.5	1.6	1.8	1.8
Belgium	0.7	0.8	1	1.2	1.5	1.8
Germany	5.5	4.7	4.7	5	5.9	7.3
Greece	1.3	1.3	1.4	1.5	1.5	1.3
Italy	23.8	32.5	37.3	39.7	42.3	45.8
UK	0.8	1	1.5	2.3	3.3	4.1
Spain	37.5	38.2	35.8	34.5	34.2	34.1
Hungary	4.7	3.4	3.1	3.3	3.4	3.1
Other countries	24.2	16.6	13.7	10.9	6.1	0.7

Source: Author's processed data using the Romanian Statistical Yearbooks (2008–2013), NIS, Bucharest

16.4.2   Qualitative Correlations Between Socio-economic Changes and Migration

Analysing, in stages, the main changes in internal and external migration related to economic and democratic transformations in post-communist Romania, direct effects may be seen in the intensity and direction of the main streams (Table 16.4). These steps are customised to cover the visible economic and democratic changes and their reflection on internal and external migration processes.

16.4.2.1   Immediate Impact of the Totalitarian Regime Collapse

The first 2 years after, the totalitarian regime's collapse (1990 and 1991) has passed from one dictatorial regime to another, and the transition was evident from a supercentralised society to a free economy, which meant direct effects on internal migration. The relative stability of the economy, with some revival of agriculture, has made its mark on internal migration flows along with other elements at a macroscale level, noneconomic one. The general configuration of these flows was chaotic, apparently compensatory from a regional point of view, but with a dominance of definitive movements from rural to urban environment. In fact, the big winner of this period is the big city, which in some cases has increased its population (in the first half of 1990) by over 10 %, for example, Constanta – 13.7 %. Furthermore, the population of the capital (Bucharest) has increased by 80,000 people in the same range (Ianos 1994).

These flows were generated by three elements with immediate effects on migrations:

(a) Repeal of laws through which migration to cities was restricted, which led to a huge wave of migrants from rural to urban areas; total internal migrants in the first 2 years reached about 1.5 million people (over 7.0 % of the population).

Table 16.4 A synthetic image on relationships between migration and economic changes

Economic and democratic changes	Internal migration	External migration (emigration)
A. The resumption of economic growth	Resettlement of the internal migration flows	Diminishing of the emigration flows
B. Financial and economic crisis (2009–2012)	Rapid increasing of the internal migration	Inertial migration
		Slow returning migration
		From working migration to permanent migration
C. Resumption and economic growth (2001–2008), inclusively the economic boom (2004–2008)	Increasing migration flows	Explosive increasing of emigration flows (especially to Spain and Italy)
	Preservation the attractive areas, adding Cluj-Napoca area	Permanent important emigration flows of the high qualified people
	Dominant urban-rural migration flows	
D. The closure of unprofitable enterprises (especially mining) (1997–2000)	Returning migration	Increasing the proportion of highly qualified people, especially to Canada and the USA;
High deindustrialisation	Discontinuous migration flows from rural-urban and rural-rural	Consolidation of the economic emigration
E. Pseudo-economic restructuring (1992–1996)	Drastic reduction of the migration flows	Working migration by individual or collective contracts (especially Israel, Greece and Turkey)
Moderate deindustrialisation	Permanent attraction of the cities, reflected in the dominance of the rural-migration flows	Ethnic and social migration flows
Compensatory effects of Land Reform Law	Conservation of attractive power of the traditional areas	
F. Immediate impact of the totalitarian regime collapse (1990–1991)	Compensatory migration flows	Ethnic migration
Inertial economic dynamics	Dominant rural-urban and urban-urban migration flows	Solving familial problems by emigration of all members
	The winners: big cities	

Source: Author's interpretation

(b) Repeal provisions that university graduates were required to perform 3 years in production internship in another village than the city in which they lived; the effect was larger towns of skilled migration from rural areas and small towns.

(c) Massive emigration of ethnic Germans (about 75,000 people), which generated flows of migrants from poor areas to deficit workforce areas; effects are

visible in the rural areas, where homes of the German population were purchased or rented to other ethnic groups (especially gypsies).

Permanent migration was, dominantly, an ethnic one, extremely powerful in 1990, reaching a peak of over 95,000 people. Out of these, German emigrants summed up more than two-thirds and the Hungarians over 11 %, the rest being made out of Romanian migrants (who have emigrated, mainly in the USA – about 5000 people – and in Austria, almost 3500). The same kind of ethnic emigration continued in 1991 but with a much lower intensity (44,000 people). Next, German and Hungarian ethnic population represented over 50 %. A significant dynamic of the Romanian population in those years was caused by the need of family reunification, for those working illegally in previous years.

16.4.2.2 Pseudo-economic Restructuring

The period 1992–1996 was characterised by a process of economic restructuring, which reached equally state industry and agriculture, as a result of the land law. Despite a very slow process of industrialisation, its intensity was revealed by the decrease of employees in industry with about one fourth (about one million people) in just 4 years in total since the beginning of the transition. The first affected by the process of industrialisation were employees of subsidiaries of major industrial enterprises set up in small towns or in villages that were to become cities (under communist development plans). The second wave was represented by diminishing the number of employees in urban industry that travelled to work in metropolitan areas. Protests of those laid off were diminished by the new alternative they had, namely, agriculture, following the implementation of the land law.

The philosophy that has dominated the reform of economy was set up for the modernization of state enterprises to take place firstly and then the privatisation (Ianos 2001). The result was a degrading and permanent liquidation of large enterprises. This was not only because no financial resources were found to support the modernisation process, but also because the chances of survival were very low in the free economy.

After the first years of upheaval of migration flows, the traditional areas attracting migrants rediscovered their power and continued to be principal targets for population in poor areas. Especially mining areas (Hunedoara, Gorj), cities (Bucharest and Constanta) and areas with high economic development, like Banat (Timis and Arad), are outlined.

External migration was transformed from an ethnic one into an economic one. The main countries that attracted people to work were Israel, Greece and Turkey, where the number of labour migrants was estimated at about 150,000 people. Labour migration was carried out on the basis of individual or collective contracts with companies specialised in recruiting labour, particularly in construction and agriculture.

16.4.2.3   The Closure of Unprofitable Enterprises (Especially Mining)

The interval 1997–1999 was a particularly critical one for the Romanian economy, as, for the first time since the country's leadership, a power right party (Democratic Convention of Romania) had removed much of the economy with the loss of industrial activities, especially mining. This activity attracted thousands of people arriving from other parts of the country such as Moldova and Bucovina. Mine closure had direct effects on internal migration, so that within a year, the final migration flows took a reverse configuration. So, we are witnessing a sustained return migration with 24 compensatory wages, paid by the government, which disrupted the national budget. In a period where unemployment reached over 20 % in some counties, rural-urban migration continued, but we are witnessing the first "islands" which were dominant in urban-rural migration (e.g. from Bucharest to Ilfov County).

Final emigration continued on a negative trend in the whole period summing up only 50,000 people. Germany remained the main destination of over 20 %, followed by Canada and the USA by 13 %. Even if the system restricted the movement for work visas, recruitment companies have increased, based on contractual or seasonal jobs for workers who travelled shorter periods in Central and Southern Europe. This clearly reinforced the growing dominance of economic migration, the ethnic one becoming insignificant. Also noteworthy is the high percentage of immigrants educated in the USA and Canada.

16.4.2.4   Resumption and Economic Growth

Since 2000, Romania registered a continuous growth, even hardened by 2008. This is the timeframe in which progress registered politically, economically and socially and determined the acceptance of the country as a member of NATO (2004) and the European Union (2007). Increased foreign investments and their preferential localisation in certain areas or cities caused a rise in the internal migration, even if labour was no longer attracted to the industry. Moreover, as outlined, the decrease in the number of employees in industry (although much lower than in the previous period – 300,000 people) led to an increased internal migration (average of the first and last 2 years during the period 2000–2008 show a growth of over 30 %). In terms of geography, internal migration has the same regions of origin and receiving as the period 1992–1996, with a significant change: it appears Cluj-Napoca city and its surrounding interregional areas through migration flows are among the beneficiaries.

Increased income, particularly in major cities, makes the massive rural-urban population movements to reverse and the dominant contributors to evolve from cities to towns in metropolitan areas (Heller 2013).

In the beginning, inheriting the trends from the previous step, as remarked by D. Sandu (2001), temporary external migration is structured regionally and by

country destinations. In 2000, Italy was the main destination of temporary migrants for the north-east, south-east and south-west regions, the south of Spain, Germany for its western region and Hungary regions in centre and north-west. Bucharest-Ilfov is not noticed among the leading suppliers of temporary migrants to the EU (Ianos and Vîrdol 2002).

The elimination of visas for Romanian citizens travelling to EU countries, since 2002, and the enlargement of EU have had bracing effects on the general emigration (Ceobanu and Koropeckyj-Cox 2013), especially on the Romanian one. Despite the fact that Romania's economy showed signs of revival, the differences in terms of salary incomes made temporary migration to know explosive values and move decisively towards southern European countries. Between 2002 and 2007, about one million people emigrated temporarily, especially in Spain, which is the main destination for Romanian migrants. It creates large communities of Romanians especially around Madrid's and Spain's east coast (Bernat and Viruela 2011). Italy vacated Spain, which in 2007 exceeded the first one by over 200,000 people. Since 2008, Italy recovered much of the gap and together accounted for 70.7 % of all temporary migrants leaving Romania (compared to 61.3 % in 2007). At the same time, following the global pattern (Gamlen 2014), Romanian diaspora institutionalised itself (the emergence of different NGO's) to manage better the migrants' problems.

Following strong inflows of migrant labour, the volume of remittances to Romania reached eight to nine billion, which represented 5 % of GDP. Remittances were used for the maintenance of the 100,000 children left home, as well as for the parents of those leaving to work. Another part was directed to the construction and purchase of housing. If in the cities this tendency was not visible, in the case of rural areas, it was very strong, causing loss of local identity through the phenomenon of imitation of architecture from different parts of Europe. Due to the orientation of remittances in non-productive sectors, the visible consequences are very few at the macro-level (Garip 2012).

Unfortunately, the huge increasing trend of remittances volume has continued a very short time, because after 2008 it dramatically decreased, due to the crisis (Fig. 16.5). This phenomenon reflects especially the economic effects of the crisis in the receiving countries. It seems that it was enough one year (between 2008 and 2009), in order for the remittances volume to find a relative optimal size.

16.4.2.5 Financial and Economic Crisis (2009–2012)

The fifth distinct period in economic development, 2009–2012, individualised effects on migration when the Romanian economy is strongly affected by the crisis. Sudden onset of this crisis and its management was felt in migration flows, both quantitatively and qualitatively. Internal migration is increasing nationally so that in 2010 almost 130,000 migrants were registered, more than in the previous year. Big cities with regional functions, like Bucharest, Cluj-Napoca and Timisoara, and

Fig. 16.5 Dynamics of total remittances in Romania (2005–2014) (Source: Processed by author, using the data estimated by Development Prospects Group, World Bank, 2015, www.worldbank. org/prospects/migrationandremittances, accessed by May 20, 2015)

areas with continuous investment, as Brasov and Sibiu, strengthen their position as nationally leading attractors for migrants.

External migration during the deep economic crisis continued, but with much reduced intensity. Overall upturn, in the number of those temporarily abroad, increased in 3 years only by 150,000 people. While Spain recorded an increase of about 19,000 people, Italy exceeded 170,000, and this expansion is generated by the reorientation of migrants to this country, because in parallel there is a decrease in the share of other countries outside the first eight countries receiving more than half of the emigrants. These figures confirm the ideas that the economic crisis in Spain had an important impact on the immigration flows (Domínguez-Mujica et al. 2014).

It is interesting that during this period Germany recorded an increase of migrant (35,000 people) higher than Spain and lower than the UK (43,000 people). All these mutations take place according to differentiation amidst a crisis in terms of size and also due to population's insertion environments. A curious growth is registered in the UK, while the officials and the media are against immigrants from Eastern Europe.

Return migration is not perceived as a real trend. Some temporary migrants took advantage of the falling prices during the crisis and, using their savings, bought housing in destination countries intending to emigrate permanently. Investments made by them during the period, lower income and higher unemployment were factors that decreased the share of remittances which reached about 3.5 billion US dollars in 2014. A comparative analysis of the origin of remittances reveals some changes; nevertheless, it is about a very short period (Fig. 16.6).

Firstly, we are underlying the detachment of Italy and Spain, about the same contribution in 2010, but 4 years after, with a dominance of Italy (there is a strong correlation with the number of working migrants). Secondly, the USA and Hungary having about the same proportion were replaced by Germany as the third remittances provider for Romania. Thirdly, among the new important provider of

Fig. 16.6 The structure of the remittances' origin, by countries: **a** 2010; **b** 2014 (Source: http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTDECPROSPECTS/0,,contentM DK:22759429~pagePK:64165401~piPK:64165026~theSitePK:476883,00.html (processed data))

remittances appears in 2014 was the UK (the remittances volume increased with 35 %).

16.4.2.6 The Resumption of Economic Growth

The last period is uncertain, and, statistically, there is a continued growth beyond 2012. The decrease in direct investment is questioning the strengthening of this trend. Regarding the internal migration, it seems that we are witnessing a resettlement of migrant flows before the financial crisis, with the same national configuration.

External migration is likely to diminish and there will be a stronger current of return. Some signs exist, but returning migration is a complicated phenomenon (Martin and Radu 2012). However, it is difficult to make assumptions on the trend of emigration, but the fact is that the potential decreased to sustain a great emigration. The expected economic recovery could be delayed, which means the dominance of working emigration. A key component to judge the transnationalism trends of the Romanian migration is the home orientation of immigrants, which could be measured by the frequency of communication with their family and relatives, the volume of remittances and returning plans (Sandu 2010).

16.5   Conclusions

Even though Romania joined the European Union in 2007, the gap between it and the member states belonging to the European community's core continued to increase in absolute value. The Romanian economy is not predictable and does not provide jobs that lead to a reversal of migration currents. On the contrary, the freedom of the workforce to move at EU level from January 1, 2015, increasingly diminishes the demographic and creative potential of Romania.

Current dimensions of the migration phenomenon and trends influence the costs severely as opposed to the advantages that had arisen from the membership. Thus, investment in education may not be reflected in increased economic and social competitiveness, as long as the fittest graduates and professionals leave the country for a higher salary level in EU countries. Migration phenomenon is best known for Romanian doctors (and other former socialist countries, too) towards developed EU countries like France, the UK and Germany. The attraction for choosing the USA and Canada by Romanian specialists in engineering and computer science, in particular, makes Romania lose the most creative of its workforce.

Despite the financial crisis, which affected the whole of Europe, the migratory movement has not changed fundamentally. As opposed, the great number of emigrants has diminished by reducing opportunities to find a job in EU countries and by decreasing emigration visible to potential migrants in the states.

The causal relationship between the economy and migration is reflected in the main stages individualised, which are marked by political changes both at national and at EU level. Deindustrialisation generated an intensification of interregional flows of migrants at the national level. This inverse correlation was sustained in the first post-socialist period through the fact that emigration was limited by restrictions imposed by the EU, the USA and Canada.

Relaxed movement and working conditions in EU interregional migration has not diminished but rather caused an intensification of labour migration. Final migration remained at the same values, but the preferences for those Romanians who emigrated for work purposes have changed: Spain was replaced by Italy, which has become the most important attractor for migrants. This reorientation was based on the fact that Italy has withstood the crisis (triggered in 2008) better.

The economic effects of migration for employment are locally visible but not visible at national or regional levels, as they do not attain the critical mass to make major changes to these levels. The large number of labour migrants apparently alleviates social relations and contributes to Romania's GDP (about 2.0 % through their remittances). Nevertheless, the level of remittances reduced dramatically; an important political issue is to capitalise them for the further development (Careja 2013).

However, the consequences of this type of migration is reflected in: rising unproductive investment in maintaining and increasing material standard of the older population and children left home, multiplication of psychological problems among children (Adumitroaie and Dafinoiu 2013) and increasing cases of suicide.

What is more serious may be expressed directly through the remittances that encourage laziness, and from this there are many consequences, which are reflected in the organisation and exploitation of agriculture resources.

A general remark is that there is a causal correlation between migration and economic level of the migrant provider (area or country). It is too early to define the threshold when especially the emigration will consistently diminish. Certainly, this level is under the development level of area or country attractor but not far.

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Chapter 17
The Human Mobility as Strategy Facing the Volcanic Risks: The Case of Ilha do Fogo (Cape Verde)

Judite Medina do Nascimento, Claudio Moreno-Medina, Alexandre N. Rodrigues, and Herculano Dinis

Abstract Migration patterns at the beginning of the twenty-first century are nothing new, but there are historical forms of spatial mobility that require in-depth analyses and understanding. This can be partly achieved by considering the cultural turn, focusing on migrants' social and cultural behaviour in the context of individual vulnerabilities and interpreting migration studies as an interdisciplinary research field. The example under study corresponds to a new interpretation of mobility linked to natural hazards, such as volcanic eruptions. Human behaviour and attachment to the home place are analysed as a challenge to borders of areas at volcanic risk.

The case study of the 2014 eruption in Ilha do Fogo (Cape Verde) shows the intrinsic spatial relation between nature and people and the resilience of human mobility to overcome natural disasters. The sway of migrations that depend on volcanic eruption processes and on interim stages is a good example of the importance of social and cultural behaviour of inhabitants on volcanic islands. The statistical information of the latest volcanic eruptions (1995 and 2014), changes in the location of populations and dwellings, and especially aerial photographs,

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satellite pictures and galleries of shots and snapshots of areas affected by lava flows, are a powerful testimony of the cultural and economic resilience of human mobility faced with natural hazards.

Keywords Human mobility • Natural hazards • Volcanic risks • Resilience • Cape Verde

17.1 Introduction

Environmental hazards have occurred throughout history, and human groups respond to these events in varied and complex ways (May 2008, p. 9, Klein et al. 2003). In our particular case, volcanic eruptions on Ilha do Fogo, we pay attention to human mobility, one of the most interesting forms of population resilience when faced with natural disasters. We aim to analyse this mobility as a mechanism of response to an environmental setting which involves risks for life and is one of the many forms of resilience that forms part of, in Bankoff's words (2003), "cultures of disaster".

The hypothesis that we vindicate in this article is that the Ilha do Fogo population has developed certain mobility strategies that are a relevant form of resilience when faced with periodical volcanic eruptions. The experience from having lived with these eruptions for five centuries is more than a reasonable time for the island dwellers to be well aware of the impacts caused by volcanic activity and to know how to face the emergency situations they are paired with. So living on a volcanic giant is, historically, a risk that is run. In only 63 years, three volcanic events have taken place in a relatively small area of the island. Chã das Caldeiras has not only seen how fresh lavas build new landscapes but also how its inhabitants leave and return in time with the volcanic beat. These people are used to suffering the worst aspect of a volcano and making the best of a unique landscape (Pérez-Torrado et al. 2015).

In order to confirm this hypothesis, we set a series of objectives. Firstly, we characterised the volcanic nature of the island and focused on the frequency of eruptions. We also analysed the population structure and its relation with lines of volcanic weakness in an attempt to unveil what kind of harmony has been established between historic occupation on the island and volcanic risk settings. Another main objective, the core of this research, was to study population's mobility during the two last eruptions, one in 1995 and the other in 2014–2015. Between the former and the latter, many things on the island have changed, particularly in terms of the adopted study and prevention measures and the coordination of evacuation and rehousing actions at critical times. Yet in both circumstances, certain mobility inertias were confirmed, which took place after the crucial time of the eruption. To suitably interpret this process, we also aimed to study the causes of this mobility from the perspective of the benefits that the volcanic

environment of Fogo represents: tourist attraction, grape and wine growing, promoting research into volcanoes, education and coordination activities in the face of risks, etc.

This research was fundamentally conducted, thanks to the use of the statistical data provided by the *Instituto Nacional de Gestão del Território* (INGT), which is dependent on the *Ministério do Ambiente*, *Habitação e Ordenamento do Território* (MAHOT) of Cape Verde, and it studied the consequences of the last volcanic episode. We also used crisis management and evaluation reports and photographic documents, collected by the Fogo Natural Park, whose facilities were buried by the last eruption. Maps were carefully made from field observations and with satellite pictures and also according to the testimonies of the people who lived through the last eruption.

The aforementioned objectives and the research sources used enabled us to arrange this chapter as follows. This introduction is followed by the section entitled "The framework of the analysis and state of knowledge". The second section examines the analysis of the volcanic environment from the geomorphological issues viewpoint. The third section, entitled "History of eruptions, human responses and adjustments", addresses the relation between historical population settlement and the volcanic area. Section four provides information about the centre for the assessment of volcanic hazards in the Fogo Natural Park and the tasks undertaken to prevent risks and coordinate the actions taken during the last crisis in November 2014. The fifth section is the core of the study, resilience of human mobility as a mechanism to respond to volcanic threats during the last eruptions in Fogo, an idea reinforced in the conclusions drawn from this study.

17.2 The Framework of the Analysis and State of Knowledge

Many authors have investigated the complicated coexistence of towns with natural environments affected periodically by volcanic eruptions. Some like Cashman and Giordano (2008) have pointed out that the study of volcanic hazards leads inevitably to questions of how cultures have lived in volcanically active regions around the world. Some particularly important articles are those published on this subject by several academics in *the Journal of Volcanology and Geothermal Research*, *the Journal of Geophysical Research (Solid Earth)*, Geochemistry, Geophysics, Geosystem and the *Bulletin of Volcanology*. There are many more works in which specialists in Environmental Sciences and in Human and Social Sciences, geomorphologists, volcanologists, environmental engineers, historians, anthropologists, geographers, etc., have described the forms of resilience adopted by these populations, their own form, which we already classified as "culture of disasters" in the introduction of this chapter. Almost all these publications demonstrate attitudes to life in high-risk volcanic areas. They offer an ambivalent interpretation; as Paton

et al. (2013) pointed out: throughout human history, people have established and developed communities and societies in locations that have allowed them to take advantage of the resources there, afforded by the action of natural and geological processes. Yet periodically, the processes that create such short-term benefits become hazards (e.g. tectonic activity can create earthquakes, volcanic eruptions and tsunamis).

The behaviour of a population in its long involvement with volcanoes is an excellent example of the resilience theory. This theory, borrowed from ecology, allows us to consider human mobility as a part of a repeated cycle of growth, release, reorganisation and conservation (Gunderson and Holling 2002) in volcanic environments, a cycle that occurs simultaneously to the periodical crisis being unchained. S and short-distance migration is not relevant to disaster responsiveness, except that it emphasises the mobility and flexibility of the populations who face volcanic hazards. Therefore, population relocation, as stated by Reid et al. (1996), is a natural response to environmental changes or stresses. In the Azores, whose volcanic origin is similar to that of Cape Verde, the work by Dibben and Chester (1999), conducted in the town of Furnas in São Miguel, revealed that abandonment, interior and exterior migration as a result of volcanic eruptions, only occurs during a short period of time, after which occupation begins again.

Nonetheless, this flexibility and this level of adaptation that mobility reflects can take place in places with very little population occupancy. Generally speaking, and as verified in Fogo, at-risk places tend to have small populations because, for other reasons as May (2008, p. 27) well points out, 'if evacuation becomes necessary, a dispersed population may be capable of migration in a more efficient manner'. This would explain why no human lives were lost during the last two eruptions that took place on the island. During the last eruption in 2014–2015, the information collected by the Nature Park technicians in Sede do Parque, the technical information and technical equipment and the arrangement available to conduct evacuation actions coordinated by the Civil Defence Services, which was in charge of locally managing the eruption with the coordination of a Crisis Cabinet created for this purpose, enabled the event to only affect a small group of residents in the town of Chã das Caldeiras. Analysing residents' conduct patterns at the time of the eruption revealed that a huge family-based mobility took place. Ya Blong (1984) previously indicated that in modern volcanic disasters, populations typically evacuate damaged areas as family units, a circumstance that has also been pointed out by Landry et al. (2007) in relation to the evacuation-migration decisions of Hurricane Katrina survivors. To all this we should add the fact that these family groups attempt to save all their domestic goods as they are aware how important the content of their homes is rather than the building where they live, which many of them consider to be a genuine loan from nature.

These attitudes allowed us to assess the need to amend many misunderstandings about human mobility in volcanic areas. As Kelman and Mather (2008) pointed out, the approach of living with volcanic risks and benefits could be adopted and implemented as an integral part of changing perceptions of volcanoes and of

managing volcano-related crisis and noncrisis situations. In this chapter, we attempted to see it from this viewpoint.

17.3 Ilha do Fogo and the Volcanic Environment

The Cape Verde archipelago comprises ten islands and several smaller islands located some 500 km west of Senegal, between longitudes 21–25 W and latitudes 15–17 N, that is, right in the Tropic of Cancer. This archipelago, along with those of the Azores, Madeira, Savage Islands and Canary Islands, all of which are of volcanic origin, forms the so-called Macaronesia Region (Fig. 17.1a).

The geological evolution of Cape Verde is not known in much detail. It seems that the islands began to form at the start of the Miocene by successively emerging from east to west (Fig. 17.1b). Yet this progression of ages is not recorded as a single alignment but as two, which form the so-called Barlovento ("windward", ESE-WNW orientation) and Sotavento groups, the latter with the typical anti-timetable alignment, similarly to that in the Canary Islands and Madeira. This alignment is the result of the African plate moving in the same direction, in whose interior these archipelagos are located. Some authors have referred to the influence of the neighbouring African continental crust, which is more potent and colder, on the mantle's thermal anomaly, which brought about the Cape Verde Archipelago, to explain that this anomaly can lead to the formation of shallow convective currents on this island and to transport the magma formed in the asthenosphere at different points of the archipelago (Carracedo et al. 2015).

The only historical eruptions to have taken place in this archipelago (discovered by the Portuguese in 1460 who began to populate it) have concentrated in Ilha do Fogo. This circular island (surface area ≈476 km^2, with a diameter between 23 and

**Fig. 17.1** Location of Cape Verde in the Atlantic Macaronesia Region (**a**) and the geological ages of this archipelago (**b**) (Source: (**a**) The authors. (**b**) The ages are from the shield stage of each island, compiled in Madeira et al. 2005)

Fig. 17.2 Historic eruptions and geological structures (Source: Modified of Rodríguez-González et al. 2015)

26 km), with a conical profile (2829 m height at the Pico do Fogo stratovolcano top) and with mean slopes between 13° and 15° (23–26 %), has witnessed 28 historic eruptions, some of which have not been properly documented (Ribeiro 1954).

This island's landscape is dominated by four geological structures: the ancient Monte Amarelo stratovolcano, which conditions the morphology of the island today; the subsequent caldera, with a landslide on its E flank that left an amphitheatre with a perimeter of some 20 km and subvertical walls with a drop of up to 1000 m, known as Bordeira; the aforementioned Pico de Fogo stratovolcano, which is nested inside the caldera; and an almost flat plateau between both these structures called Chã das Caldeiras,[1] formed by the filling in of the volcanic

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[1] Chã means flat or level land.

materials from Pico do Fogo and satellite volcanic cones, which face each other and accumulate against Bordeira (Fig. 17.2).

In other words, the geological evolution of Fogo follows the typical patterns of an intraplate volcanic island: a central edifice grows extremely quickly (the previous Monte Amarelo stratovolcano, which could reach a height of about 3500 m), a vast slide of its E flank (an event which apparently took place between 123 and 86 ka) and a new stratovolcano developed (Pico do Fogo) which nested in its interior. This new stratovolcano grew so much that the magmas are no longer capable of reaching its top, which is why all historic eruptions occurred in the satellite cones around its base. Both the historic and subhistoric eruptions that occurred in the interior of the caldera from the landslide produced flows of lava which, depending on their orientation, constitute very different fields. Thus, the lavas that flow towards the E tend to reach the sea after following long routes as narrow sloping lava flows. Westward lavas flow over less pronounced slopes, which means that their fronts broaden and they flow shorter distances.

Fogo's last volcanic eruption began at 10 am on Sunday 23 November 2014 in Chã das Caldeiras. Six eruptive mouths formed on the western side of Pico de Fogo, practically in the same place where the previous eruption occurred in 1995. Two lava flows quickly formed, a southward one and a NNW one. A third westward flow formed from 5 December, which skirted the lava field of the preceding eruption. The speed with which the lava fronts advanced reached 40 m/h, and the maximum distances covered were 2.7 km (the southward flow), 4.7 km (the westward flow) and 6.7 km (the NNW flow). Lavas initially presented morphologies (scabland), but the later secondary flows formed pahoehoe morphologies. In less than 1 month, the whole surface area covered by lavas was some 5 km^2, and the main infrastructure and homes in Chã das Caldeiras were swept away.

In the meantime, a cone grew around the eruptive mouths. It grew to over 100 m in height and was formed by different sized pyroclastic materials, which ranged from bombs to lapilli. Pyroclastic columns rose several kilometres over the craters and almost scattered the finest pyroclasts (ash) all over the island, which meant having to cancel flights at the São Filipe aerodrome located next to the capital, some 16 km from the centre of the eruption.

From early January to 8 February 2015, the date the eruption finished, low-intensity volcanic activity continued, with pyroclastic columns that barely rose a few 100 m and lava fronts that scarcely advanced a few dozen metres.

The exact volume of the pyroclastic material brought up by this eruption is not known, so determining its volcanic explosiveness index (VEI) was not possible. Yet judging by the dimensions of the cone that formed and by the heights of the pyroclastic columns, it can be preliminarily determined as 2, a typical value of Strombolian eruptions, which is the mechanism which gave way to this eruption (Pérez-Torrado et al. 2015).

17.4 History of Eruptions, Human Responses and Adjustments (1500–1900)

On Ilha do Fogo, life follows the volcano rhythm. When approaching this island by sea or air, the vertiginous way of climbing from the coast to reach the centre is most impressive, and the symmetry is almost perfect. Volcanic activity over barely 3 million years has raised an edifice to almost 3000 m, which today still opens to lavas. It is a landscape created by volcanoes which man has occupied for more than 500 years. The succession of eruptions has not led to human victims because the society in this island have adapted and learnt to live with this nature.

For five centuries, the Mediterranean and African culture of the populations there (Portuguese, from Ribeira Grande, Santiago, Spaniards, Italians and slaves from the Guinea Coast) outline an eminently farming-forest-pastoral territory, to which the tourist component over the last 20 years can be added. As with any small island area, its socio-economic development is directly related with its few resources (especially water and agrologically rich soils) and a poorly profitable economy that depends on overseas areas. Throughout its colonial history, volcanic eruptions, droughts, famine, etc., have burdened any feasible progress made in its inhabitants' living conditions. This implies that its dwellers have periodically migrated to seek a better future. Nowadays, however, its landscape has become an enormous scenery of beauty and biodiversity, and its natural and cultural heritage offers great potential. All this means a new sustainable resource that is capable of generating much touristic interest, that is, a new window in this life that has developed in the shadow of the *vulcão*.

On Ilha do Fogo, we find some publications that help us to understand the historic process of its society: *A ilha do Fogo e as suas erupções* (1954) by Orlando Ribeiro; *A estrutura social do Fogo em 1940* and *Sobrados, lojas e funcos* by Henrique Teixeira de Sousa (1947, 1958); *Cantigas de Ana Procópio*, *Bandeiras da ilha do Fogo* and *O Senhor e os escravos divertem-se* by Félix Monteiro (1960, 1958); *Apontamentos históricos sobre a ilha do Fogo* by Daniel Pereira (2005); *Chã das Caldeiras* and *Memórias do Passado e Expetativa do Futuro* by Jaime Rodrigues and Paolo Fattori (2008); and *A Ilha do Fogo e Cabo Verde – Uma visão crítica e multifacetada* (2013) and *Chã das Caldeiras*: *História, Cultura e Potencialidades* by Alberto Nunes (2015).

In the second half of the fifteenth century, specifically in 1460, Fogo was recognised in the western world. The first reference to it is found in a royal Portuguese letter, in which it was then identified as São Filipe Island. Its population was verified between 1480 and 1493, immediately after Santiago Island (Nunes 2015).

The first description of the island was provided by Valentim Fernandes at the beginning of the sixteenth century in his *Descripção da Costa Ocidental de África*:

A llha do Fogo jaz a oeste e quarta de sudoeste da ilha de Santiago. E se chama de Fogo porque em meio della há huma serra mui alta mais que nenhuma outra ilha destas, na qual serra sempre arde fogo, que parece a olhos vistos. E em certos tempos de ano ferve.

E as serras em derredor caem dentro e então sai huma grande quantidade de pedras pomes e cinzas e outras coisas. No ano de 1500 caiu grande pedaço da dita serra dentro, assim que o fogo agora parece também em hum lado da serra onde antes não parecia senão em cima. E entao saía tanto cisco e pedra pomes que acerca cobria toda a ilha e mais em derrador. Esta ilha se chama de S. Filipe por ser achada com as outras duas de Maio e Santiago no mesmo día de Maio. Esta ilha hé povoada de gente. Aquí não há casa de pedra e cal nem de madeira, salvo de pedra em soso. Há nesta ilha grande criação de cabras. Agoas tem poucas e salobras de que a gente bebe. Nasce aquí muito algodão. (Pereira 2005)[2]

As we can see from the lines above, Pico de Fogo and its volcanic activity were the first reference made to an island in a place with wild unproductive land, whose population had very little water, lived off livestock and grew cotton. At this time, the town of São Filipe was the only settlement along with San Lourenço. In 1572 it had a population of around 2600, distributed into two centres, without including children. The capital was set up on the SW coast. On *ilha adentro*,[3] there were no settlements and only a disperse population that depended on where water and farmland were available, usually in gully beds.

In spatial terms, the structure of the island occurred around the two aforementioned population centres, at an altitude of between 0 and 500 m on the SW coast leeward to the island. The farming-livestock landscape was defined from the influence of trade winds. Thus, most humidity was found on the NNE front, which is why the island is green. On the north steeply sloped hillsides, from halfway up and to the top of the island, humid woodlands grew which, in landscape terms, contrasted with the dry ridges and gullies of the leeward face. In this last setting, a livestock landscape appeared dominated by goats, along with some dry croplands. It also produced cotton, which spontaneously grew on small holdings where slaves worked and was exported to the Guinea Coast. But in this territorially organised system, where was the volcano? It was simply there, because the place was closed in, isolated and unproductive as from an altitude of 1000 m. There were no settlements and most certainly very few people would have walked around the place.

One description of the island by Father Baltasar Barreira, dated 1 August 1606, well illustrates the role of the volcano in the territorial island structure:

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[2] Fogo Island lies westerly, and one quarter lies to the SW of Santiago Island. It is called Fogo because in the centre of it there is a very high mountain range, much higher than on any of the other islands, from where burning fire (fogo) is always seen, which seems to be boiling at certain times of the year. Around the mountains, pumice stone and ash, among other things, fall inside and outside in large amounts. In 1500 a large part of this mountain range fell, so now this fire also appeared on the other side of the mountain where no signs were seen before. Then such an amount of pumice stone and ash were brought up that they covered the whole island and its surroundings. This island is called Saint Philip (San Felipe) as it was found with the Maio and Santiago Islands on the same day in May. This island has been inhabited. Here there are no stone and limestone houses nor wood houses, but dry stone houses are built without mortar. There are plenty of goats on this island. The water people drink is scarce and salty. Here much cotton grows (Pereira 2005, p. 27).

[3] The Island inland.

A segunda ilha depois desta de Santiago, que está à vista dela, é a de San Filipe e por outro nome a do Fogo, chamada assim por um pico mui alto que tem, o qual nos tempos passados lançava de si ordinariamente fogo, e haverá obra de cinco anos, lançou muitos dias com tão grandes sinzeiros e terramotos, que todos os moradores da ilha padeceram muito e se deram por acabados. Esta ilha ainda que tem em si esta fornalha, que podemos chamar de inferno, porque muitas vezes nestes incendios se ouvem falar neles os demónios, e são deles avexadas algumas pessoas, no mais leva vantagem às outras, porque nela se colhe muito algodão, e vinhas de que se faz muito e bom vinho, e dá todas as frutas que há nas outras mais perfeitas e em mais quantidade. A abundancia faz com que haja ali homens mui ricos e de muitos escravos, com que lavram a terra…[4]

The testimony indicates how the population associated the volcano with hell and, thus, how it was considered to be a hostile place which, at the beginning of the seventeenth century, had already suffered four eruptions in just 54 years (1550, 1563, 1601 and 1604). In the first decade of this century, 3 years of severe drought, diseases, plagues, etc., were added to these eruptions, which brought about complete devastation.

1664 and 1680 saw two new eruptions, of which the second stood out for its very violent earthquakes and lava flows, and the population had to leave the island and move to the neighbouring Brava Island. Any economic development was ruined by volcanic episodes. So it was back to square one.

In this century, the Mosteiros settlement appeared on the humid northern coast where millet and vetch were seeded, and fruit trees (papaya, pineapple, watermelon, etc.) were planted, as were vineyards. Doubtlessly the humid trade winds influence allowed the normally dry gullies to accommodate a somewhat more prosperous irrigated agriculture in the area.

At the beginning of the eighteenth century, American whaler ships stopped at the island. This is a key factor to understand how the eruptions (1769, 1785 and 1799), droughts, famine and diseases hit the island dwellers, who had to migrate. Many followed these sailors to the northern shore of the American Atlantic.

From a territorial occupation viewpoint, a line of settlements developed at the start of the nineteenth century to the south and east of the island, with the Cova Figueira settlement, which was consolidated at the end of this century with "Freguesía" (parish) neighbours from Nossa Senhora de Ajuda, who were affected by the 1799 eruption. Halfway through this century, a famine once again seriously harmed Fogo, which made the previous period of prosperity short lived. In only 5 years, the island lost some 7000 inhabitants, half its population, due to severe

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[4] The second island after Santiago, which is seen from it, is San Felipe Island, or also known as Fogo Island, which is thus called for the very high peak it has, which normally spat fire in the past. Five years ago, for many days, it produced ash and caused earthquakes, and all the island dwellers suffered very much and thought it was the end. This island has this furnace, which we can call hell because often during its fires you can hear demons talking, and some people are caught. Yet it has its advantages because a lot of cotton grows on it, and there are vineyards with which a lot of good wine is made, and plenty of other fruits grow. This abundance has made some men wealthy, and also many are slaves who work the land… (Pereira 2005, pp. 32–33).

mortality and migration. During this period, four strong eruptions took place: 1816, 1847, 1852 and 1857.

Halfway through the nineteenth century, after the eruptions of 1852 and 1857, interest in exploiting the sodium sulphate resources at Pico de Fogo was shown, promoted by some colonial administrative authorities. Reserves of this product were probably scarce, and these exploitations were abandoned. This was the first time that volcanic resources aroused any interest, as Pereira pointed out (2005). It is worth stressing that at around this time, the Frenchman Armand de Montrond arrived at the island and settled there, who was to become a peculiar personality in the island's history because his descendents took the initiative to occupy Chã das Caldeiras, the home of the volcano, for the first time.

And so it is that this long period of this island's populational and functional circle ended. Basically, the distribution of the island's population was dependent on locating sources of water, alluvial lands and volcano territory. For several centuries, sown lands occupied the steep slopes, cotton and fodder were grown on ridges, and vegetable gardens and reed-beds occupied gullies. The last group corresponded to the most productive and profitable areas, and the population appropriated this place. This population organised the area not only according to its interests but also according to its strength because the volcano remained an unmanageable territory (Fig. 17.3).

At the beginning of the twentieth century, around 1917, the first settlement in Chã das Caldeiras was consolidated, the very core of the central summit, where extensive livestocking and dry crops land practices took place. New population centres formed at a higher altitude, towards the natural entry to Chã in the south and towards the wood in the north. The fact that there had been no more eruptions since halfway through the nineteenth century encouraged island dwellers to climb the *vulcão* and manage its territory.


Fig. 17.3 Engravings from the eighteenth century with the volcano erupting (Source: Casa da Memória, São Filipe, Fogo)

17.5 The Resilience of Human Mobility, Tourism: Volcanoes, Wine and the Natural Park (1951–2015)

The population on Ilha do Fogo, which had lived with volcanic eruptions for five centuries, was well aware of the impacts of volcanic activity and knew how to face the emergency situations that these eruptions implied. As previously mentioned, the history of Fogo is an immense effort of human adaptation to a strange form of nature, which made coexisting with nature in continuous harmony a very difficult task; in other words, a problematic and tense relationship formed which was submitted to impulses of crisis and surmounting.

Over the last 100 years, the structure and organisation of the place has not changed that much. Ilha do Fogo is arranged into three concelhos[5]: São Filipe (capital of the island), Mosteiros and Santa Catarina de Fogo. The city of São Filipe is the administrative and economic centre on which the island's life revolves. The Mosteiros concelho was created in the 1990s, and it is an important farming centre, where Fogo coffee plantations stand out. Here vegetables, vines and fruit trees also grow, especially of tropical kinds. However, scarce precipitations did not allow prosperous irrigation agriculture. In 1998 crops of this kind were grown only on 12 ha, which is barely 0.2 % of the crop-growing areas on this island. The head office of the Santa Catarina concelho is located in Cova Figueira, which is relatively near the volcano. This municipal area specialises in livestock. Here we find Chã das Caldeiras, where its famous Vinho do Fogo is produced from vines sown on top of volcanic ash. Land here is very fertile and apt for growing fruit and vegetables, like quince, fig, apple and pomegranate, since the edaphic (lapilli) and climate (higher environmental humidity) characteristics in this area favour productivity. There is also livestock, particularly goats, although today this practice entails stables and is done in a controlled manner because it now forms part of the Natural Park. Finally, after the 1995 eruption, Fogo was recognised worldwide as a tourist destination of much geological interest, high production diversification took place, and tourism was added to the traditional farming-livestock and craft economy.

In its last 65 years of history, along with the rhythm of such transformations, three new eruptions took place in 1951, 1995 and 2014–2015, which have conditioned life on the island. We go on to analyse the mobility of its people, who were affected on all three occasions: when did they leave?; how did they leave?; did they leave as a family or alone?; did they leave with their belongings or did they leave them behind?; when did they return?; and why did they return?

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[5] A reference administration-territorial unit.

17.5.1 The 1951 Eruption

In 1951, there were only a couple of dozen houses in Chã das Caldeiras and its population did not reach 100. There were no roads to reach the place as the first was built in 1972, so everyone travelled on foot or rode donkeys, mules or horses. The largest buildings were the country houses Estãncia Roque and Cova Matinho, and the latter were located beyond the caldera.

While the eruption was underway, which commenced on 12 June 1951 and affected these population centres, people were unwilling to leave their homes and certainly did not wish to leave their belongings behind. Residents only began to leave their homes when they realised that they had no choice. There are even some references which indicate that people placed a cross in front of their homes because they believed it could divert the lava so that it would not affect their homes.

According to Ribeiro (1954) "Apart from the shock of it all for the population, and although there were no victims, losses were great. Cova Matinho was the most affected town, which lost 17 houses and almost all its croplands. Estãncia Roque lost 11 houses from lavae; Monte Calçada and Chã das Caldeiras lost some houses, while Curral de Asno disappeared under the main lava current... In those places threatened by lavae, inhabitants tried to save the little they had in their homes" (Table 17.1). This last sentence is always found in all the descriptions of places threatened by volcanic eruptions. People save whatever they can recover by thinking about a new beginning and, in most cases, in the same place if at all possible.

Ribeiro (1954) wrote about this new beginning "... however, the waters this year and the next were abundant and, consequently, farming yields were high, which provided food and increased optimism; damage to homes was repaired, another road was built on top of lavae (until the next eruption blocked it); cisterns were repaired; people were housed in Cova Matinho, which could not be rebuilt in the same place or nearby because croplands had been lost. Neighbours from Estãncia Roque also came, and life got back into its usual stride...". This devotion to ones origins shapes the "*sodade*"[6] expression sung in so many mornas[7] and found in so many poems written by Cape Verde poets.

As we can see, this beginning and end are repeated eruption after eruption, almost to the extent that we can state that always having to begin from scratch is the destiny of people of Fogo.

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[6] A term that is hard to define. It only exists in Portuguese and expresses a basic feeling that is similar to melancholy or nostalgia, which reflects the temporal or spatial distance from something loved and wishing to cut this distance.

[7] A type of music from Cape Verde.

Table 17.1 Impact of the 1951 eruption

Populations affected	Bangaeira (in Chã das Caldeiras), Estância Roque, Cova Matinho and Bombardeiro
No. of people affected	Approximately 200
Damage caused	Some homes were lost, mainly in Cova Matinho, as was the road that linked Cova Figueira with Mosteiros and Tinteira, and several hectares of crops in all the affected areas were destroyed
Places where rehousing occurred	Affected people were rehoused near Dacabalaio in a place later known as Roçadas. This new settlement received homeless people from Estância Roque and Cova Matinho. The name Roçadas, given to the new settlement to rehouse people in 1951, was given by the Governor of Cape Verde, Carlos Alberto Alves Garcia Roçadas (Nunes 2015)
Other interesting data	This was the first eruption to affect the people who lived in Chã das Caldeiras. It is stated that the first house built in Chã (Bangaeira), which belonged to the firm resident there, Manuel Montrond, was destroyed by this eruption

Source: The Authors

17.5.2 The 1995 Eruption

Before the volcanic eruption on 2 April 1995, the population at Chã das Caldeiras made their living basically from agriculture, livestock and the production and sale of manecón[8] wine. Life was hard and the population was virtually isolated from the rest of the island, despite a road having been built to access the summit. When this eruption took place, the population had to be evacuated, as did the primary schools in the limiting areas of Chã (Cabeça Fundão, Achada Furna, Figueira Pavão, Cova Figueira, etc.), and those in Monte Largo, Salto, Patim and São Filipe became centres to house people in. It is worth stressing that the first people to occupy these shelters were not residents in Chã but people from other places like Cabeça Fundão, Tinteira and Cova Figueira.[9] The inhabitants of Chã were transferred further up in Fernão Gomes, in Monte Velha, to seek shelter there and to take their belongings with them. After Boca Fonte was destroyed, an order was given to evacuate Chã das Caldeiras. However, part of the population, particularly women and children, had already gone to shelters voluntarily.

There were 574 displaced persons housed in São Filipe. The towns of Patim and Achada Furna welcomed 133 and 116 persons, respectively. Mosteiros housed 18 people, and the small remaining numbers were spread around other towns and stayed with friends or family. Thirteen houses were destroyed and damage amounted to about 170,000 US dollars. The wine cellar also disappeared along

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[8] Homemade wine, fermented in large barrels and robustly filtered. This wine is greatly appreciated by the people of Cape Verde and by visitors from Chã das Caldeiras.

[9] Information provided by Professor Fausto Amarílio do Rosário, who was a representative of the Ministry of Education at the time and was responsible for opening schools to be used as shelters.

Table 17.2 Population evacuated while the 1995 eruption was underway

Population	Persons	Families	Average persons/families	%
Portela	365	66	5.5	36.2
Bangaeira	303	63	4.8	30.1
Boca Fonte	116	20	5.8	11.5
Tinteira	93	16	5.8	9.2
Others	131	24	5.5	13.0
Total	**1008**	**189**	**5.3**	**100.0**

Source: Correia et al. (1997)

with homes. Lavas covered almost 5 km^2, which included farmland, the road to Chã and other infrastructures and the losses of croplands were estimated at 48.8 has, 17 % of the total (Table 17.2).

The process to evacuate those who remained in Chã was not a peaceful one since most people did not want to leave and stated that they knew how the volcano "worked". The armed forces had to intervene to evacuate people in some cases. Later, the government ordered a single shelter to be built as a campsite with tents in São Filipe, specifically in Cutelo de Açúcar, which the locals called "Tchãzin" (Chãzinha). Displaced persons spent almost 1 year in this shelter which, with time, had a school, a church and a basic medical centre.

In order to avoid people returning to live in Chã das Caldeiras, the government of Cape Verde, with the help of German Cooperation, built two population centres for the population: one in Achada Furna with 40 houses and the other in Monte Grande with 70 houses. According to Furtado (2001), the government prohibited operating public services like the primary school, the nursery school and the Basic Medical Centre there. Yet once the eruption ended, people gradually returned to Chã, firstly to continue their farming and livestock activities and then to fix their abode there.

According to David Monteiro (Mr. Neves),[10] people could not stand the heat in São Filipe: "the elderly were more or less desperate and could not adapt to the climate in São Filipe. Many people went back to Chã for this reason. I remember sometimes coming across groups of 10 children, of 15, or even 20, climbing to Chã on foot".[11]

According to the data in a questionnaire conducted by Araújo and Nascimento, the population in Chã das Caldeiras returned to their place of origin and left the houses appointed by the government for the following most frequent reasons for making this decision:

– The lands where the refuge houses were already had an owner and families had no means of survival.

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[10] David Monteiro was born and lived in Chã. During the 1995 eruption, he was in charge of the wine cellar and was the agricultural expert of the Ministry of Rural Development. He was the first President of the Chã Association of Vine Growers.

[11] The distance between São Filipe and Chã das Caldeiras is roughly 34 km.

– Shelters were quite a distance from Chã das Caldeiras, where their farmlands were, which were the most fertile lands of Cape Verde. Their properties were at a walking distance of 3–5 h
– The houses they were offered, of a typically urban style, did not cover their lifestyle requirements; there was no room for animals nor for the agricultural tools they needed.

According to Nunes (2015), thanks to the volcanic eruption on 2 April 1995, the population made full use of the new opportunities and built facilities related with the tourist sector; associations were set up, like the Oenologists Association of Chã and the Farmers Association of Chã, la Chatour, etc., followed by the association for the continuous development of Montinho and the guides association of Chã. Nunes (2015) also stated that children and adolescents started making local crafts and made crafts by hand using volcanic lava stone and straw. Young adults took on the role of acting as the main tourist guides there. Families transformed their homes into small boarding houses for guests and even into restaurants. Farmers increased the size of vineyards and apple and fig orchards, while shepherds obtained more animals and diversified their activity by considerably amplifying milk, cheese and butter production. Businesspeople adapted their houses by creating places to sell products, while vine growers created a new wine brand, Vinho de Chã, with the help of COSPE,[12] which revolutionised wine production on the island. Finally, tourism became the main economic activity for many young people and families.

The (re)settlement of people in Chã and the economic dynamics that followed meant that the government went back on its decision to leave the area with no population, and it reopened the primary school and the nursery school in 1999/2000 and the Basic Medical Centre in 2007.

After these boosts, which began thanks to the persistence and boldness of the population as part of an exercise, characterised by resilience and adaptation to the physical determining factors imposed by the volcano, large public investments reached Chã das Caldeiras. Three main public works were undertaken: tarmacking the road that linked Salto (São Filipe) and Chã das Caldeiras (tarmacking reached only the entry to the park, which was then paved to Chã for environmental reasons and to conserve the constructed heritage there); the do Fogo Natural Park Head Office; and digging wells to supply water.

As the volcanic risk became smaller, all barriers to occupancy disappeared. During almost all recorded eruptions, there have been material losses and farmlands have disappeared. Nevertheless, these territories were reoccupied by old and new residents, and people learned to live with the volcanic risk.

According to a survey conducted by the Technical Panel to reorder populations affected by the eruption, which was done in May 1995, 1008 people were evacuated

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[12] COSPE. Cooperazione per Sviluppo Paesi Emergenti. Cooperation for the Development of Emerging Countries. This association was founded in 1983 in Florence, Italy. It was a non-profit, secular organisation whose aim was to help solve problems of poverty and social injustice in the world (Nunes 2015, pp. 82–96).

from Chã das Caldeiras and from Tinteira, affected by ash whose population was also evacuated.

17.5.3   The 2014–2015 Eruption

The 2014–2015 eruption began on Sunday 23 November at 10 o'clock in the morning and lasted 77 days, until 8 February 2015, when it officially ended. There were no deaths, but a little more than 1000 people lost almost everything they possessed. According to Cape Verde Civil Defence National Service data (SNPC-CV), 922 people were evacuated. They received shelter in the centres of Mosterios (136 people), Achada Furna (406) and Monte Grande (257) and in the São Filipe Emergencies Centre (123) (Correia 2015). This distribution meant that some families were separated. One couple in Mosteiros stated that they did not see their youngest son in 10 days, but they knew he was well in Monte Grande. So apart from the distress caused directly by the eruption, many people had to accept being separated from their family and were even unaware of the whereabouts of some family members. As in the 1995 eruption, people were not willing to leave their homes and certainly not their belongings. Many made huge efforts to save heaters, refrigerators, beds, doors, windows and other belongings, virtually everything they owned (Fig. 17.4).

According to the first evaluation made by the Cape Verde government, economic damage was estimated to be around 50 million euros, which represents 6 % of the countries' GDP. However, a longer period of time is needed to analyse the social, economic and environmental effects of this eruption.

Logically, the worst consequences of the eruption were in Chã das Caldeiras. For the rest of the island, the presence of gases and ash, especially during the first few weeks, worried the population and affected the main economic sectors. Agriculture was affected because ashes turned soil acid and dried some crops. Livestock was affected because less fodder was available since ash affected plants, so milk and cheese production suffered. Tourism was affected because all flights to Fogo and bookings were cancelled.

Lavas occupied only 18.61 % of the island's surface, but its effects were devastating. Portela and Bangaeira, the two main towns in Chã, and much communication infrastructure and social amenities, were literally swallowed.[13] Of all the croplands, 23.21 % were affected, but very important farming facilities were lost, e.g. 15 poultry farms and about 4 groundwater systems.

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[13] The following were destroyed: 234 homes, 170 domestic water systems, 5 hostels, 5 boarding houses, 2 schools, 2 wine cellars, 1 hotel, 2 churches, the Natural Parks' Head Office, the Information Centre, the Municipal Department, the Basic Medical Centre and 2 sports centres; 6.8 km of the main road and 6.5 of tracks were also affected by the eruption.

Fig. 17.4 Eruption and pendular activity (Source: The authors)

In the areas surrounding the volcano, vetch, apples, peaches, cassava, tomatoes, potatoes or sweet potatoes used to grow, and doubtlessly the prized farmland was vineyards, whose profitability ensures good commercial income for a renowned quality wine. The first wine cellar was destroyed after the 1995 eruption. Later a new one was built at another site, Portela, which was also swept away by lavas from the last eruption. On 12 May 2015, the first stone of the third wine cellar was put in place, which will be built in Ilheu de Losna, also in Chã das Caldeiras at the foot of Bordeira. This continuous reconstruction work is a good example of the population's resilient attitude in this geographic setting, a place at high volcanic risk where inhabitants show strong resistance capacity to setbacks, that is, resuscitating new activities from the ashes by transforming threats and weak points into new opportunities. From the social viewpoint, resilience offers the chance for the community to coexist with volcanoes, as they learn to understand their environmental patterns, and they demonstrate they are capable of readapting and overcoming natural traumatic changes.

Another perspective worth remembering of this resilience attitude is the tourist sector. It is supported by its main resource, the volcano, so it is seriously harmed when eruptions commence. Yet as it is green tourism, that is, it is based on the sustainable enjoyment of ecological and geological resources (the do Fogo Natural Park), the volcanic risk is also a good opportunity to reinforce the touristic attraction.

The do Fogo Natural Park was created on 24 February 2003 and 12,000 tourists visit it yearly. Its amenities have been irreparably damaged as accommodation

infrastructures have been destroyed. The area is being restored, especially after the Park's Head Office disappeared. They were built in this protected area of national interest to consolidate the natural and public identity of the place to raise the local population's awareness about the ecological values of the area. The Parks' Head Office was conceived as a place of scientific, cultural and recreational interaction for both the people of Chã das Caldeiras and visitors from elsewhere on the island and also for foreigners, who are attracted by the scientific and recreational interest of its volcanic landscapes.

With its architecture, which perfectly blended in with its surroundings, and its functionality, which was completely respectful of its environment in both energy and water use terms, the building was opened on 14 March 2014, only 8 months before it was destroyed by the volcanic eruption. Lava flows literally lifted the building and shifted it 200 m from its original location. It went down in history that this project was awarded the "Cape Verde National Architecture Award" and the "2014 International Cultural Building Award" of the prestigious Archdaily architecture publication. As an architectural project, it was also awarded in the 2008 World Architecture Festival held in Barcelona and was among the 11 best projects that year.

To the dramatic sequelae of the last eruption, a persistent drought has been added, as well as a wildfire caused by uncontrolled stubble burning on 2 May 2015, which razed and destroyed 90 % of the Park's protected forest area. These ill-fated events have occurred over and over again and have tested the island population's resilience. However, a walk around Chã das Caldeiras only 4 months after the eruption ended showed how, despite lack of precipitation, vines had grown enough to ensure a good wine harvest for this year. With only efforts made by the neighbours from the towns of Portela and Bangaeira and with no mechanical aid, a new track has been built on top of lavas, which has been aptly named *estrada da coragem*,[14] and links Portela with the Montinho vineyards area.

Community efforts have enabled a minimarket and a restaurant to be set up, and some houses have been prepared as boarding houses to receive tourists. This demonstrates that the inhabitants of Chã believe in new excellent opportunities. When you ask them about the risk of making investments, the answer is similar to what Mr. Neves answered: "we are all well aware of the risks we take, but this is our land, and we are today what we are thanks to the opportunities this land has offered us. There is as much risk as there are opportunities, so we have to run risks".

Finally, tourist agencies once again offer tourist routes around this natural area. Physically speaking, the area is reviving. The resilient phenomenon is so powerful; anyone would think that neighbours return as if they had spent the previous night at a relation's house.

This is why the testimonies collected in the in-depth interviews conducted 4 months after the last eruption ended are so important.

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[14] Road of Courage.

First interview: David Monteiro (Mr. Neves), aged 63 years, lived through the 1995 eruption. He lost his house and lands; he watched how lavas destroyed his community and the wine cellar which he was responsible for. He lived through the 2014 eruption more intensely. He was one of the first people to take his belongings from his home in Cova Tina, and he relived the drama of 1995. This time his house was not destroyed, but he witnessed how the lavas swept away the new wine cellar built after the 1995 eruption in Portela, which he was also responsible for (Fig. 17.5). When questioned about his return to Chã, Mr. Neves categorically answered: "They can offer us lands and houses outside Chã, but we're returning. Everyone has at least one plot of land in Chã... it's difficult not to return there. Some people are now returning and building their *funcos*[15]... We all want to live in Chã for its climate, and its favourable conditions for farming and livestock practices...". Mr. Neves also mentioned that "all of us are aware that a new volcanic eruption can happen. So we don't think about making large investments. We live inside a crater and we all know that it's not ours, it belongs to the volcano, but we're not frightened; we're learning to live with the volcano, and a new beginning is always available after each volcanic eruption; that's life".

Second interview: Eduardo Montrond, aged 77, who has lived through three eruptions, said that he no longer has the strength to return to Chã. "In 1995 I returned to Chã because it was the only place on Fogo where I could live, me and my family; it's where the best climate and lands are ... I knew that one day I could lose all I had built, but even so, we returned... my roots are buried there". Mr. Eduardo also stated: "I'm going to build a *funco* to continue working there and I'll leave something for my children, but I'm not going back to live in Chã; it isn't safe".

Third interview: Maria Antónia Monteiro, aged 40, was 21 when the eruption occurred in 1995. She admitted that she had forgotten what her relations had told her about the volcanic eruption of 1951, but she "never imagined that it would be like it was; I was very frightened when we left Chã via Monte Velha to go to Mosteiros on the first day. We went in a group: me, my brothers, my mother and my grandmother... I left home only with my children, some documents and a change of clothes, and we went to the shelter in Monte Velha. It was raining and my children we're crying and said: mum, take us back to Chã, and I organised a route back". So 5 days after leaving, she returned: "if I hadn't returned to see how things were, I'd feel awful, I had to return ... I went back to Chã because I could never live anywhere else as I live here. Besides, the Chã *sodade* was strong". She also recognised the fact that being in tents in São Filipe and depending on others helped her decide about returning to Chã: "when we were at São Filipe, we waited for people to give us food, and because we did not feel right with this situation, we returned to Chã to work our lands and make our living". She was not afraid to return: "I never thought that

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[15] Traditional house.

Fig. 17.5 The construction-destruction-construction cycle of wine cellars (Source: The authors)

the volcano would erupt again. Today I regret having invested so much in Chã. I could have made improvements to my house in Monte Grande instead of building a house in Chã, and now I would live in better conditions". When Maria mentioned better conditions, she referred to the house she received after the 1995 eruption. Then she said: "from now on, I intend to live here in Monte Grande. I'm thinking of building a *funco* in Chã to go to work. I can't say that I'm going to live in Chã permanently as I did in 1995. It was so painful seeing my destroyed house... I will not go back to Chã to live... Yet nowhere else in the world can we live like we do in our Chã. Even those people are are now in America[16] always come back to see their lands and to forget the *saudades*".

Fourth interview: Maria Rodrigues, aged 72, answered us sitting on *jorra*[17] and under the shade of an American acacia. She was evacuated from the caldera and was rehoused in Monte Grande. Maria was not born in Chã, but at a very early age, she went from Mosteiros to live in Chã with her mother. Her face and hands reflect a hard life. She almost always answered with her head down and expressed a few laments: "I saw the eruptions in 1951, 1995 and 2014, so I can no longer live in Chã. I can spend 2 or 3 days there, but I won't stay to live there ... All that we had was there, and we had our crops and our animals in Chã because the land was fertile and productive there. Up until now, we made our life there, we made our living there". After the 1995 eruption, she returned to Chã:

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[16] United States of America.

[17] Lapilli.

"life in Monte Grande was difficult. We had no space to breed goats or hens, not even to tie up a cow. We were all confined to 400 m^2, we had nowhere to go. I told myself: you can't go on like this, here the situation is no good. I handed in the keys of my house to a neighbour and returned to Chã". But for Maria, the situation today has changed. She has no intention of returning despite her telling us: "I miss Chã very much, the smell of the plants among the *jorra*, our farm work, still... we don't need much in Chã... We were happy just walking on the *jorra* [she said while picking a bit up and placing it in her hands]... Whenever I can, I will go to Chã, but not to live ... we can't live without Chã". Her expression appeared somewhat livelier, and she confessed that "3 days ago I spent a whole day in Chã in the *funco* built by my son on one of our croplands".

Fifth interview: António Montrond, aged 24, began to work as a tourist guide in Chã, where he was born, after finishing secondary school education. According to António, the people were very worried about saving their belongings and the evacuation from Chã began to be organised even before the eruption began. "The eruption began on Sunday [23 November] and I left Chã the Friday before... I went to Bangaeira to then go to Portela in the morning, and I saw how José António,[18] Djica and the other drivers, and Professor Madueno, were trying to convince people to leave Chã because the volcano was about to erupt... They wanted to first evacuate children and the elderly... After the eruption had begun, some people decided to leave and went towards Monte Velha... and me and some other young adults left later because we were helping people save their belongings". He quite clearly told us that: "I'm going back to Chã to live and if I could save some money, I'd invest in it in a tourism-type business". He went on: "I'm not going to make a huge investment, I'm thinking about a business that rents bikes, donkeys and climbing material". However, he added: "they're building large infrastructures: schools, health centres, etc, in Chã. But they're working in vain because these works are susceptible to being destroyed again by lavae". António confessed, like the others, "Chã is everything for me, it's where I seek inspiration, where I feel at ease, and I very much doubt I'd feel what I feel in Chã anywhere else... when I make plans, I think about Chã".

Sixth interview: Fausto do Rosário, a 54-year-old teacher and a former government representative on Ilha do Fogo, told us that many people were not going to return to Chã das Caldeiras because the last eruption was still fresh in their minds: "this is always the first reaction for me; while there is still smoke, and it's still hot... when nerves are still on edge, people have this attitude, but later they will return to Chã". According to Fausto, "the problem cannot be solved by forbidding people to live in a volcanic area, it can be solved by providing more means for, and planning all that we can anticipate, and being better prepared for when another eruption starts". He added: "I think there are very few places in Cape Verde, or perhaps nowhere else, that so clearly and obviously represents the struggle of Cape Verde inhabitants with their territory. I think that Chã das

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[18] Head of the volcanic monitoring of Chã das Caldeiras.

Caldeiras is the perfect example that shows us as its people and our capacity to resist... Perhaps lyrically, poetically, naively I'd say that it was necessary to rebuild Chã das Caldeiras 10 times, I'd rebuild it 10 times; and not because we have the resources, but for this psyche matter, and because it's a question of finding ourselves again. Chã das Caldeiras is an example of how we arrived here... of how we are capable of continuing to produce, to reinvent the capacity to unite to this place by winning back this land, reintroducing animals... by making wine, we're saying that Cape Verde is possible".

17.6   Conclusions

The population of Ilha do Fogo, specifically of the volcanic caldera, has developed certain mobility strategies that are a relevant form of resilience to periodic eruptions. Of the ten islands and several smaller islands that make up the Cape Verde archipelago, historical eruptions have only occurred on Ilha do Fogo. This volcano island, with a circular plan and a conical profile, has witnessed 28 eruptions since the Portuguese arrived there. Until the twentieth century, the distribution of the island population depended on the way the scarce resources were distributed (water and suitable lands for crop growing) and also on the presence of the volcano and its eruptions. The population took over this part of the island not only according to its interests but also according to its strength, by respecting the volcanic situation, which had remained an unmanageable and unpopulated place for centuries.

Over the last 100 years, the levelled lands in the central summit of Chã das Caldeiras, volcano territory, began to be gradually occupied, and strong relations of identity formed between neighbours and this unique landscape. Crop growing and livestock practices prospered, thanks to not only the best climate conditions given the altitude but also the agrological potential of the volcanic lands there. Yet this area has been periodically affected by volcanological activity, which has always been a handicap for its inhabitants. Yet since the 1995 eruption, it has been an invaluable tourist attraction to complement traditional farming-livestock practices and has contributed to declare this area as a natural park.

The 1951, 1995 and 2014–2015 eruptions are those that have provided the most interesting information about human mobility behaviour. As it is a small island, with very few technical resources, some recurrent mobility strategies have been developed. Firstly, the neighbours refuse to leave their homes and belongings until an eruption seriously places their lives at risk; secondly, they use traditional evacuation routes officially guided by the initiatives of being housed in shelters and through contacts and family support; finally, once the risk is small, they decide to return. This sequence of events implies pendular mobility, whose rhythm depends on the volcano's activity. Beyond all this coming and going, the testimonies collected after the last eruption clearly indicate the connection of Chã's inhabitants with their territory, which exceeds a merely physical fact: "We are happy just walking on the *jorra*" (Maria Rodrigues, May, 2015); "but even so, we

returned to Chã… my roots are buried there" (Eduardo Montrond, May, 2015); "Chã is everything for me, it's where I seek inspiration, where I feel at ease" (António Montrond, May, 2015).

By way of conclusion, this research work demonstrates that the idiosyncrasy of a population, whose life is lived in the shadow of a volcano, produces a typical human mobility process of societies in whom a risk is taken as a cultural factor of identity.

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