SPOTLIGHT ON CHINA

Spotlight on China

Chinese Education in the Globalized World

Shibao Guo and Yan Guo (Eds.)



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Volume 2

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Over the past decades China has experienced unprecedented economic liberalization, industrialization, mass migration, urbanization, and privatization, which have contributed to the rise of China as an emerging economic superpower. At the same time, China is also facing unprecedented challenges, including rising unemployment, socio-economic disparity, corruption, and environment degradation. *Spotlight on China* aims to bring together international scholars with contributions from new and established scholars to explore the profound social and economic transformation that has resulted from the market economy and its concomitant impact on education and society in China. The series includes authored and edited collections offering multidisciplinary perspectives and most contemporary and comprehensive analyses of recent social and educational changes in China.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Foreword vii
Ruth Hayhoe

1. Chinese Education in the Globalized World: An Introduction 1
Shibao Guo and Yan Guo

Section I: Internationalization of Chinese Education

2. Global Paths, Local Trajectories: China's Education and the Global 19
Barbara Schulte

3. Internationalization of Higher Education in China: An Overview 35
Rui Yang

4. Internationalization of Higher Education in China: Two Case Studies 51
Yi Feng

5. Reorientalism/Reorientality/Re-Orientality: Confucius Institutes' Engagement with Western Audiences 67
Heather Schmidt

Section II: Student Mobility and Intercultural Adaptations

6. Internationalization of Chinese Higher Education in the Era of Globalization: Student Mobility between China and the Globalized World 85
Baocun Liu and Qiang Liu

7. Chinese Students in the UK: Learning and Growth in Transition 107
Qing Gu

8. The Unique Features of Chinese International Students in the United States: Possibilities and Challenges 129
Kun Yan and David C. Berliner

9. Informal Preparation of Chinese Students for Study abroad in Sweden 151
Fred Dervin

Section III: Cross-Cultural Teaching and Learning

10. Teaching English as a Global Language in the Age of Neoliberalism: A Case Study of an Expat English Instructor in China 169
Ling Shi and Rae-Ping Lin

11. Academic Sojourners or Global Educators? Teaching Experiences of Western Academics at a UK University in China 187
Zhen Li and John Lowe

12. Teaching in Transnational Spaces: A Journey of Short-Term Study abroad in China 203
Ming-Yeh Lee, David Hemphill and Jacob Perea

13. Learning in an Unfamiliar Culture: Exploring the Experience of Australian Students in Chinese Universities 219
Ting Wang

14. Growing up in Canada: Exploring Factors Affecting the Identification among Chinese Immigrant Youth in Canada 235
Dan Cui

Section IV: Transnational Talent Mobility

15. Emigration Trends and Policies in China: Movement of the Wealthy and Highly Skilled 247
Biao Xiang

16. Chinese Intellectual Migration to the US: Historical Overview and Contemporary Trends 269
Wei Li and Wan Yu

17. Chinese Students' Propensity to Stay in Canada: Transitioning from International Student to Permanent Resident 285
Yixi Lu and Li Zong

18. Living in a Double Diaspora: Transnational Talent Mobility between China and Canada 301
Shibao Guo

19. The Homecoming: An Investigation into the Effect of Studying Overseas on the Returned Chinese Postgraduates' Life and Work in China 319
Scherto Gill

20. Competing for Global Talents: China's Brain Gain Strategies 341
Su-Yan Pan

Notes on Contributors 359

Index 365

FOREWORD

This second volume in the *Spotlight on China* Series by Shibao Guo and Yan Guo turns from the focus on dramatic educational changes taking place within China under the influences of a market economy to Chinese education in a globalized world. There are a number of reasons why this topic is extremely timely. Not only have Chinese students tended to constitute a significant percentage in the growing number of internationally mobile students in recent years, but China's universities have also become the third most attractive destination for students around the world, after American and British universities. Over a difficult twentieth century, marked by revolution, internal political turmoil and a period of isolation from the wider world, China has moved from forms of internationalization that focused on self-strengthening and catching up, to an outward orientation marked by its own unique approach to cultural and educational diplomacy. Given the richness of China's civilization and the historic contributions it made to global well-being, there is much to anticipate from this change and much to learn from the global engagement of Chinese students, teachers and intellectuals more generally.

The four sections of this book give readers many angles for understanding and reflecting on this engagement. A number of fascinating theoretical concepts are introduced in the first section, which are helpful for framing and interrogating the more empirically based chapters that follow. How can the interconnection between the global and the local be best dealt with in world culture theory, unless the global is viewed as a scripted part of the local? What does internationalization mean for higher education in countries such as China, where it has been less a choice than a necessity of self-strengthening in the face of imperialist threat? Will China's historic concept of "All Under Heaven" (*Tianxia*) bring a new dynamic into international relations that have continued to be shaped by the Westphalian system and the European concept of the nation state? And how may China's cultural diplomacy through the Confucius Institute movement be understood and interpreted within concepts of "reorientalism" and "reorientality"?

In subsequent sections we learn about the experience of Chinese students studying in the UK, in USA, and in Sweden, their struggles to adapt, the misunderstandings that sometimes shape their reception and changing trends in terms of career choices, possibilities for emigration and decisions to return. We also learn about the experience of non-Chinese students and teachers, taking up short or long term opportunities for study and teaching in China. There are some thought-provoking interfaces between chapters in different sections. A comparative case study of two British-Chinese joint venture universities in section one is extended and deepened by a chapter in section three that explores the experience of faculty from around the world who have taken

up teaching positions in one of these institutions. An analysis of the adaptation of Chinese students in the UK, based on a series of in-depth studies in section two, resonates with a moving depiction in section four of 8 returnees from the UK to different regions of China. The ways in which they reconnected with family and took up satisfying careers marked by a determination to contribute in meaningful ways to China's development are inspirational.

All of the chapters are richly empirical, whether in terms of detailed statistical information on changing trends and patterns in the internationalization of Chinese education, informative results from survey research or finely sketched qualitative investigations into the experience of students and teachers, Chinese and foreign, living their lives within the current global reach of Chinese education. Many are also intriguing and eye opening in the ways in which they illumine concepts such as identity, otherization, interculturality, transnationalism and neo-liberalism. One of the most striking features of globalization is the multi-directional character of mobility, perhaps illustrated best by the dilemmas facing the double diaspora – Chinese who have emigrated and taken up citizenship in the West, then later returned to live and work in China under the constraints of their legal status as foreigners.

While the experience of individual students and teachers in China and around the world is the main focus of this volume, there are also interesting and important commentaries on national policy and strategy in many chapters. These are particularly evident in the first chapter of section two and the final chapter in section four. The chapter on Student Mobility between China and the Globalized World points out a deficit in China's international educational services and makes constructive suggestions for improving its transnational educational development strategy, especially in terms of quality improvement in its programs and greater support for incoming international students. The final chapter on Competing for Global Talents, by contrast, highlights the success of China's strategy to attract back outstanding members of its diaspora, opening up opportunities for them in academia and high tech industry, also in political leadership.

Readers of this volume will be rewarded by many fascinating insights into the ways in which Chinese educational values are being integrated into global educational thought and practice through a myriad of personal encounters as well as efforts made through China's emerging cultural diplomacy. Given the richness of the Confucian educational heritage, this brings renewed hope for the revitalization of global education and the move "beyond the Enlightenment" envisaged by Tu Weiming in his presentation of Confucianism for the dialogue among civilizations initiated by the United Nations in 2001. As a scholar who has been immensely enriched by engagement with Chinese education over several decades, I can only celebrate this direction of change, while recognizing all the prejudices and barriers that are yet to be overcome in a world dominated by persisting tendencies to arrogance and triumphalism in the West. I would also like to encourage readers to open their minds

to Chinese educational thought and understanding on a regular basis through reading the articles and book reviews coming out in four issues every year of *Frontiers of Education in China*, the first educational journal in the English language to be published in China for a sustained period of time, beginning in 2006.

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SHIBAO GUO AND YAN GUO

1. CHINESE EDUCATION IN THE GLOBALIZED WORLD

An Introduction

China managed to resist contemporary globalization until 1978, when it launched the "open door" policy that gradually shifted China toward a socialist market economy. Joint ventures were encouraged with foreign companies before foreign direct investment took place in the mid-1990s. With its accession to the World Trade Organization in 2001 and the completion of its market opening pledges in 2006, China formally entered the age of the market economy and an era of neoliberalization (Harvey, 2005). Reforms have taken place in the context of a more broad geographical globalization and neoliberal deregulation. As a result, the country has experienced unprecedented economic liberalization, industrialization, mass migration, urbanization, and privatization – all required by economic globalization (Guo & Guo, 2016). In this view, China certainly qualifies as a neoliberal economy, albeit "with Chinese characteristics" (Harvey, 2005, p. 144). China's market economy coincided with a new stage of globalization in which further integration of the world economy required China's cheap labour, its abundant natural resources, and its gigantic consumer market. Without doubt, globalization has increased interconnectivity and integration of China with the rest of the world. It is not clear, however, how such changes have gone beyond the economic sphere to impact education in China. It is therefore the purpose of this book to examine the interactions of Chinese education with the rest of the world in the age of globalization.

CONCEPTUALIZING AND CONTEXTUALIZING GLOBALIZATION

Globalization is an essentially contested concept that incites controversy (McGrew, 2007; Robertson & White, 2007). According to McGrew, polarization of views on globalization within the academy revolves around questions of the reality and significance of contemporary globalization, as well as its supposed revolutionary implications for the classical paradigm of the human sciences. In the public sphere, McGrew argues, globalization elicits sharply divergent responses and fuels radically different political projects from "globaphobia" of the extreme right to the "globaphilia" of neoliberals. It is not surprising then, that there is no agreed-up definition. This lack of consensus in the academic and public worlds is mirrored in the

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transnational sphere, with much deviation regarding ideas about globalization from one national context to another (Robertson & White, 2007). Attempts at definition focus on the following dimensions: speed and time, processes and flows, space, and increasing integration and interconnection (Ritzer, 2007). Careful negotiation of these aspects leads Ritzer to a definition of globalization as "an accelerating set of processes involving flows that encompass ever-greater numbers of the world's spaces and that lead to increasing integration and interconnectivity among those spaces" (p. 1).

The genesis of contemporary globalization can be traced to the early 1970s and the development of sophisticated information technology, economic competition from Japan, demise of the Bretton Woods Agreement, and the oil crisis (Jarvis, 2002). According to Robertson and White (2007), globalization comprises four major dimensions: the economic, the social, the political, and the cultural. Players involved include nation-states, transnational corporations, international governmental organizations (IGOs), international non-governmental organizations (INGOs), and individuals (Thomas, 2007). Among these, the first two are "the most powerful global players" and drive the juggernaut of globalization (p. 87). For their part, IGOs such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund are the ones that set global policies and provide incentive structures for states and other actors. Secondary in influence but nonetheless vital to globalization, INGOs are not-for-profit organizations established and run by activist groups. Well-known actors amongst these are Amnesty International and Greenpeace. These groups play an important intervention role, voicing opposition to political and environmental destruction and injustice, as well as intervening in the proceedings of international courts. Finally, discussions of globalization often exclude the individual from the realm of global change. According to Thomas, under contemporary globalization, individuals are, more so than in the past, authorized to discover problems and to take actions to solve them. The multiple players involved in globalization reveal the complexity of global contexts.

One of the most contentious issues in the field of globalization studies today pertains to the significance of the nation-state in the era of globalization (Ritzer, 2007). Bruff (2005) summarizes this debate into a "three waves" analysis. The first wave literature, characterized by a state constraint perspective, maintains that the state is severely restricted in what it can do as a result of unprecedented changes caused by globalization in the establishment of global markets, prices and production. The state has been pushed into a marketized corner, attracting, facilitating and supporting capital. The second wave, according to Bruff, argues that the change has not been overwhelming, and that the state's capacity to autonomously adapt to new circumstances is still considerable. It stresses the unexceptional characteristics of the present era of "globalization" while also pointing to state capacity in exercising controls over both capital and labour. Bruff criticizes the first wave as overly structuralist, deterministic and narrowly focused, and the second wave as neglecting the extra-state factors that have pride of place in the social world. Bruff goes on

to argue that recognition of a third wave offers a step forward in the analysis of globalization. It seeks to move beyond the empirical focus of the previous two by asking how "globalization" is perceived and acted upon across space and time. It problematizes not just the impact of globalization, but the term "globalization" itself. It posits that globalization is deeply political, contested, contingent and complex. It focuses on how agents interpret and act upon their circumstances. As Ritzer (2007) points out, what matter most from this perspective are these constructions rather than globalization per se. Another important message this perspective conveys is that we should not reify globalization because it is "not a thing, not an 'it'" (Robertson & White, 2007, p. 64). For Robertson and White, recognizing the conceptual status and understanding the global nature of the interest in, the discourse about and the analysis of globalization are more important than viewing it as an ontological matter. It is this conception of globalization, as a set of discourses that are consumed and reproduced as they are acted upon by particular actors in particular circumstances, that provides the theoretical framework for this book.

In the current literature on globalization, the neglect of the social dimension is "rather glaring", particularly with regard to questions of social inequality, power and the global-local relationship (Robertson & White, 2007, p. 58). It is evident that globalization from above favours open markets, free trade, deregulation and privatization, all of which work for the benefit of wealthy nations and, moreover, the economic elite of these nations. Some scholars do draw attention to the ways in which markets and deregulation produce greater wealth at the price of increased inequality (Appadurai, 2002). There is evidence suggesting that we are experiencing widening gaps between the "haves" and the "have nots" in global society, devastating environmental problems, declining civic participation and community, and increasing mistrust and alienation among citizenries (Welch, 2001). Global capitalism, it seems, has created a global society that is unequal and unjust (Jarvis, 2002).

Another aspect which deserves our attention is the implications of globalization for education. As Welch (2001) points out, globalization is having substantial effects on education, as manifested in the homogenization, commodification and marketization of higher education. Another key impact has been the creation of English as the dominant global language of communication, business, entertainment, and the Internet. The increasing dominance of English language is contributing to neo-colonialism by empowering the already powerful, forcing unfamiliar pedagogical and social-cultures on its learners, contributing to the devaluation of indigenous knowledge, and displacing many on the route to real possible loss of their first languages, cultures, and identities (Guo & Beckett, 2007). Furthermore, Spring (2014) observes a process of globalization of education which is referred to as worldwide networks, processes, and institutions affecting local education practices and policies. Global educational policies and practices exist in a superstructure above national and local schools. According to Spring, globalization of education prioritizes global corporatization and economization of education over issues of civic activism, human rights, and social justice and equity. In this view, the goal

of education is to produce better workers to meet the needs of corporations and the workplace to sustain free market economics.

Situated in this broader conceptual and contextual understanding of globalization, *Spotlight on China: Chinese education in the globalized world* aims to explore the impact of globalization on Chinese education and the interactions of Chinese education with the globalized world. This volume is organized into four sections: Section I focuses on the internationalization of Chinese education in the age of globalization (various tensions and confusions facing the internationalization of education in a globalizing China). Section II examines student mobility and intercultural adaptations (analysis of trends of student mobility and country case studies demonstrating experiences of intercultural adaptations and learning in different parts of the world). Section III explores cross-cultural teaching and learning (both international students and teachers at Chinese universities). The volume ends with Section IV which analyzes transnational talent mobility (recent policies and programs as well as general patterns and trends of talent mobility between China and the globalized world).

INTERNATIONALIZATION OF CHINESE EDUCATION

Fuelled by forces of globalization, the internationalization of Chinese education is happening at a rapid pace, particularly in Chinese higher education. However, there has been a great deal of confusion about the relationship between globalization and internationalization. There is a consensus among scholars that internationalization is not globalization (Altback & Knight, 2007; Knight, 2003). Globalization provides the social and economic contexts under which the internationalization of education is taking place, but at the same time they are taken to be very different processes. As Knight (2003) puts it, "internationalisation is changing the world of education and globalization is changing the world of internationalisation" (p. 3). Furthermore, "internationalization" itself is a highly fluid and contested term, which can mean many different things to different people. For some, it means a series of international activities (e.g., academic mobility of students and faculty), international linkages and partnerships, and new international academic programs and research initiatives. For others, it means the delivery of education to other countries through satellite programs (Knight, 2003). At times internationalization is a catch-all phrase to describe anything and everything remotely related to international dimensions of education. Critiques also focus on its neoliberal approach which is driven by economic motives and treats internationalization as business opportunities and marketing strategies (Guo & Chase, 2010; Luke, 2010). The four chapters in Section I examine the above-mentioned tensions and confusions facing the internationalization of education in the context of a globalizing China.

Barbara Schulte opens the section in Chapter 2 with a conceptualization of the global and a discussion of how globalization processes unfold on the ground in Chinese education. The author argues that global paths can only be traced by

scrutinizing the local trajectories of the global. In her analysis of the global she applies the neo-institutionalist world culture theory and actor-network theory to conceptualize actors or carriers in the globalization process. While world culture theory is credited with bringing culture back into the analysis of global education, it has also been criticized for rejecting local agency and bracketing issues of power, friction, and oppression among and between actors in the globalization process. The author argues that the Scandinavian neo-institutionalism has focused on locally induced process of modification and change in the course of global diffusion and that actor-network theory has shifted attention to how actors serve as mediators in social processes. Schulte also outlines the three dimensions that are crucial in researching globalization and education: time and space/place, legitimating myths, and friction/pressures. She ends the chapter by shedding light on how globalization has played out in Chinese education by revealing manifestations of the global in the local.

Rui Yang's Chapter 3 provides a comprehensive overview of China's internationalization of higher education with a focus on its latest developments, dilemmas and challenges. Yang traces the internationalization of Chinese higher education to the late 1970s when it was introduced as a national strategy to modernize China. Having gone through three stages of development, by the 1990s it has established a comprehensive international program of higher education. Yang highlights China's strategies of engaging with the outside world particularly with Western societies and its overemphasis on sciences at the expense of social sciences. One significant dilemma facing China's internationalization concerns the potential loss of its educational sovereignty leading to ambiguity regarding the legal status of foreign higher education activity in China. Yang's analysis shows that the seemingly successful Chinese experience is full of contradictions and paradoxical movements. He ends the chapter with interrogations of Chinese discourses on the West, adding a historical perspective to the discussions of the internationalization of higher education in China. He concludes by arguing that Chinese higher education must transcend the mindset of *Tianxia* as China appears to be regaining its place at the centre of the world development, and the Westphalian nation-state is straining under the weight of globalization.

In Chapter 4 Yi Feng continues to examine the internationalization of higher education by focusing on two case studies. University of Nottingham Ningbo and Xi'an Jiaotong-Liverpool University are two pioneers of internationalization of higher education in China as product and offspring of British and Chinese institutions. Through the analysis of the two cases, the author addresses issues of governance, management, and mission strategies of transnational education collaborations between Britain and China. The findings reveal that both universities have unique governance structures, governed by respective boards with balanced representation from both sides. While the University of Nottingham Ningbo China adopts a British liberal arts education model, Xi'an Jiaotong-Liverpool University creates its own identity through the joint strengths of the two parent universities focusing on sciences, engineering, and management. For the University of Nottingham

Ningbo China, all the curricula are from the home campus of Nottingham, classes are conducted in English, and faculty members serve as individual tutors. Xi'an Jiaotong-Liverpool University introduces a shared control of the curriculum and its graduates receive two separate degrees and a graduation diploma from both China and the UK. Their main strategies, models, and practices differ from each other. The author discusses these differences as well as similarities between the two institutions and their implications for internationalization of higher education in China.

The last chapter of this section by Heather Schmidt explores Confucius Institute (CI) in Canada as partnerships between Chinese educational institutions and a foreign counterpart. Drawing on ethnographic research on the Confucius Institute in Edmonton and the CI Headquarters in Beijing, Schmidt examines the representation of China and Chinese culture to an imagined Western audience in the Confucius Institute project. Established worldwide as a means of promoting Chinese language and culture abroad, the author argues that CIs are caught between *reorientalism* and *reorientality*, two competing regimes of value attempting to deconstruct traditional orientalist discourse and make China more comprehensible and marketable through orientalist tropes. Through these two opposing logics, Schmidt argues, CIs both disrupt and reproduce orientalist narratives of China. CIs also encourage active participation of their audiences in Chinese cultural activities through a logic of *re-orientality* in which foreign body is asked to perform and embody Chineseness, soliciting an emotional investment in Chinese culture. As a global racial project, the CI project meets and resonates with other global and racial projects in the West, specifically in the Canadian context working in tandem with Canada's multiculturalism and the ideal of global citizenship to reproduce a particular globalized subjectivity.

STUDENT MOBILITY AND INTERCULTURAL ADAPTATIONS

One manifestation of the internationalization of Chinese education is student mobility between China and the globalized world, which has reached an unprecedented level since the advent of the "open door" policy in 1978. As the internationalization of Chinese education intensifies, China has become the largest source country of international students to many countries in the world. For instance, the enrolment of Chinese international students in higher education in OECD countries has reached 22% or 624,910 (OECD, 2015). In the US alone, Chinese students accounted for 31% or 304,041 of the total number of international students in 2014–2015 (Institute of International Education, 2016). It is not clear, however, how Chinese international students are adjusting to different academic and cultural environments in the host country. We are grappling with many important questions such as: What are the general patterns and trends associated with student mobility? How do Chinese international students adapt to an academic environment that is substantially different from their own, with different linguistic, cultural and pedagogical traditions? Have they encountered any difficulties in the transition process? If so, what kind of

institutional support is available? Scholars in the following four chapters present analysis of trends of student mobility and country case studies demonstrating experiences of intercultural adaptations and learning in different parts of the world.

In Chapter 6 Baocun Liu and Qiang Liu lead off this section with a comprehensive overview of student mobility between China and the globalized world, including both inbound and outbound students. They first highlight a number of trends and characteristics associated with Chinese students studying abroad, which has undergone significant changes over the past thirty-five years. They trace the movement of Chinese students to the early 1980s that was entirely driven by state interest and later shifted to self-development and "privatization". Another major shift illustrated by the authors relates to the choice of specialization by students from natural and applied sciences to economics, management, and financial disciplines. With respect to destination countries, Chinese students are studying in more than one hundred countries, with the majority concentrated in a handful of developed countries. The authors extend the analysis to include the experience of international students in China, which has reached an unprecedented high level. However, the prior academic credentials of these students tend to be low. Many are non-degree path students from neighbouring Asian countries studying Chinese language and culture, representing a sharp contrast with the composition of Chinese students abroad. Liu and Liu also examine challenges of student mobility, including the widening gap between inbound and outbound students, brain drain, and uneven distribution of international students in China. The authors conclude by offering policy recommendations in the hope to further strengthen student movement between China and the globalized world.

Qing Gu's Chapter 7 examines Chinese students' transitional experiences with respect to their intercultural adaptations within a different educational and cultural environment in the UK. She explores how, why, and to what extent such experiences may or may not contribute to their personal and professional development on their return to work in their home country. The discussion is set in the broad context of the internationalization of higher education in the UK. Following the launch of the long-term worldwide educational campaign in 1999, the UK introduced a series of national polices to boost the recruitment of international students, which subsequently led to a major influx of Chinese students. The chapter is based on a series of studies that the author has led over the last decade, and adopts a bottom-up approach exploring the internationalization of higher education from the experiences and perspectives of international students of Chinese descent in the UK. Gu identifies distinctive patterns of struggles, changes, and achievements that Chinese students have experienced in the UK. The analysis shows that despite various intercultural challenges and struggles, most Chinese students manage to survive the demands of the learning and living environment and to adapt and develop. For most Chinese students, academic achievement and personal independence are the most important achievements. They have experienced major changes in three main areas related to interculturality, maturity, and intellectual development. The author

also reports an important relationship between students' sense of belonging, identity, and self-efficacy.

In Chapter 8 Kun Yan and David Berliner continue to explore student mobility and intercultural adaptations with a focus on Chinese international students in the United States. The authors detail demographic trends of Chinese international students in the US over the past decades, their motivations for studying in the US, their acculturation process, and special challenges they face in US universities. Chinese international students represent the largest number of international students in the US, accounting for one-third of all international students in the US. Chinese students demonstrate striking differences between the contemporary movement and the one in the 19th and 20th centuries. Current students' qualifications are likely to be higher than those of the early periods. In the early periods Chinese international students were home centred, while contemporary Chinese students feature a low rate of return to China. Yan and Berliner identify a number of motivations for Chinese students studying in the US, including pursuing an "American dream" and gaining high prestige and social status from earning an American degree. They also discuss Chinese students' acculturation features in terms of group-level factors such as culture, social life, employment, and immigration issues. The authors highlight a number of challenges facing Chinese students with language barriers, student-advisor relationship, culture shock, social isolation, visa issues, job opportunities, and immigration concerns. The findings suggest that preparation for adjustments could alleviate acculturative stress and ease the intercultural adaptation process.

In Chapter 9 Fred Dervin shifts the focus to Chinese international students in Sweden. Unlike many studies which focus on institutional preparation, Dervin examines informal intercultural preparation of Chinese students for study in Sweden. Drawing on data from a blog hosted by two Swedish students welcoming Chinese students to their country, the author analyzes how Chinese students are positioned when their adaptation to life in Sweden is problematized. He points out that there is a tendency to "otherize" the Chinese in much of the current work on intercultural encounters between the Chinese and other people in the world. In this chapter, Dervin uses the concepts of identity, otherization and representation to examine how self-other are constructed and the potential effects this can have on intercultural encounters and learning. His analysis shows that intercultural preparation in Sweden adopts a *terra firma* approach characterized by its "lyrebird syndrome" which makes people mimic imagined, superior, and annihilating behaviours, attitudes and ways of thinking. It fails to go beyond an essentialist, culturalist and solid constructions with a process of interculturality from which negotiations, instabilities, and co-constructions matter more than solidity, recipes, and the problematic of generalizations that erases the complexity of intersubjectivity. He concludes by stating that moving away from established yet problematic and ideological descriptions should be the main objective of intercultural learning in study abroad.

CROSS-CULTURAL TEACHING AND LEARNING

As the number of Chinese students pursuing studies abroad continue to rise, China is also accepting an increasing number of international students from different parts of the world. As an emerging popular destination country, in 2014 China hosted 377,054 international students from 203 countries with the majority from Asia (60%), Europe (18%), and Africa (11%) (Ministry of Education, 2015). Many of them face challenges with language barriers, culture shock, and different learning traditions. Meanwhile, China attracted an estimated 530,000 long-term and short-term foreign experts, including Chinese expats, who are contributing to China's knowledge-based economy. In addition to the above-mentioned challenges, some also face issues of visa and residency (Zhao, 2015). In light of these, scholars in Section III examine cross-cultural experiences of teaching and learning of international students and teachers at Chinese universities.

In Chapter 10 Ling Shi and Rae-Ping Lin present a case study of an expat English instructor teaching English as a global language in China. The study is based on class observations and interviews with the expat teacher and her students, a local Chinese professor, and an administrator at the participating university in Eastern China. In the age of neoliberalism characterized by its core concepts of individual freedom, a self-regulating market, and the right to private property, English has become the global language for business, politics, the Internet, and academic publications and as such, it is learned as a detachable, marketable and sellable resource for global communication and competitiveness. In a globalizing China, there has been a growing interest in hiring native-speaking English teachers from English countries. Shi and Lin triangulate the views of the expat and locals and analyze how expat teachers' roles and teaching are reassessed in the neoliberal context. Their analysis demonstrates how the neoliberal commodification of English empowers or affects those involved. The authors argue that although English education is driven by a neoliberal discourse, each party (the university, students, and the expat) may have conflicting individual interests creating tensions in the EFL classrooms. The findings imply a concern for the purpose of education in the neoliberal world.

In Chapter 11 Zhen Li and John Lowe report the experiences of British expats teaching on a satellite campus of a UK university in China, a case discussed in Chapter 4. Their study draws on sociological debates over "structure" and "agency" as offering powerful insights into the process by which individuals actively construct their own identities. Li and Lowe collected individual teachers' narratives about their experiences leading up to their coming to the University and their subsequent experiences at the University. Each of their fifteen interviews provides a distinct story about the "pull" and "push" factors as important influences on their initial decision to move to China. The authors also observe a pattern of the familiar U-shape of cultural adaptation theory with initial enthusiasm quickly falling in the face of confusion and then rising slowly as familiarity, accommodation, or engagement

grows. With respect to career choices, their participants have constructed their career paths through a reflexive engagement with options, possibilities and constraints. In their views, the University offers a safe place from which they can observe China or engage with China as far as they wish, while still having a return route open. The authors conclude by noting that the future professional security and identity of the British expats would be tied to the future of transnational higher education in China.

In Chapter 12 Ming-yeh Lee, David Hemphill and Jacob Perea document a short-term study abroad program in China initiated by San Francisco State University for graduate students and local educators. It is a two-week program involving collaborations among San Francisco State University, University of Hong Kong, and South China Normal University. The program aims to explore the impact of globalization on education in both China and the US and help students define their roles and responsibilities as educators in responding to the implications of globalization. The program is delivered through a blended set of activities, such as lectures, individual research projects, a factory visit, and classroom visits to different types of schools. Four cohorts of fifteen students each have been organized over a period of six years. The authors attribute the success of the program to a long-term partnership with internationally recognized institutions, an internationalized curriculum, a balance of theory and praxis, and a learning process characterized by both formal and informal learning opportunities. Students' narratives indicate that their theoretical and embodied understandings of the impact of globalization on education and people's lived experiences have been enhanced through the program.

The next chapter by Ting Wang conducts an in-depth analysis of the experiences of Australian students learning in an unfamiliar culture in China. As a result of rapid increase of international students, China has become one of the top five host countries of international students in the world from South Korea, the US, Japan, Vietnam, and Thailand. However, there is limited empirical research on their cultural and learning experiences in Chinese universities. In this chapter the author conducts qualitative research involving interviews with eight Australian international students who had studied in twelve different Chinese universities for six months to three years. The study focuses on challenges and issues facing Australian international students prior to departure, upon arrival and settling-in, and during their stay in China. The findings reveal considerable differences in teaching and learning between China and Australia, such as learning and teaching approaches, class contact hours, teacher-student relationship, and academic assistance. Due to these differences in learning traditions and teaching approaches, Australian students find it challenging to adapt to the new cultural and learning environment. They also found it difficult to make friends with Chinese students due to separate accommodation, cultural differences, and language barriers. The findings of this chapter provide insights into the cultural and learning experiences of Australian students in China with important implications for deriving strategies to address these challenges and issues.

Dan Cui's Chapter 14 shifts our attention to the experiences of Chinese immigrant youth in Canada with a focus on factors that affect their learning and identity

construction. Chinese immigrant youth in Canada are often depicted as model minority excelling academically but lacking interest in social activities and sports. However, little is known about their experience of racial discrimination which affects their education experiences, their daily interaction with teachers and peers, and their identity construction as racialized minorities. Drawing on interviews with thirty-six Chinese youths in Canada, Cui examines their struggles as racialized minorities in Canadian society whose voices have been silenced behind a model minority discourse. Her analysis shows that despite Canada's multiculturalism policy, racial discrimination deeply rooted in Canadian history has not disappeared and. On the contrary, it has been discursively maintained and reproduced in contemporary Canadian society and negatively impacted identity formation in Chinese youth. The way that they are represented by Canadian media often reinforces racial stereotypes, vilifying their social identities as racialized minorities, and associating them with deficit lifestyles and deviant personalities. The author concludes by stating that these experiences affect how Chinese immigrant youths perceive themselves in relation to the dominant White group and their sense of belonging to Canada.

TRANSNATIONAL TALENT MOBILITY

The last section of the book focuses on transnational talent mobility between China and the globalized world. One of the prominent issues facing Chinese education pertains to the widening gap between inbound and outbound students as well as the number of Chinese students going overseas and those returning to China upon completion of their studies. Chinese educators are concerned that the number of inbound students is significantly lower than those outbound, and the rate of leaving is significantly higher than the returns. To this end, China has introduced a number of national policies and programs to attract international students to study in China. Meanwhile, China's favourable government policies and attitudes towards returnees and their expertise mobilize many expats to relocate to China to work and live there. In recent years "brain drain", "brain gain" and "brain circulation" (Saxenian, 2005) have emerged as topics of great interest that attract the attention of researchers, policymakers, and educators who are interested in Chinese education. The following six chapters in Section IV of the book analyze some of the recent policies and programs as well as general patterns and trends of talent mobility between China and the globalized world.

Biao Xiang leads off this section in Chapter 15 with a comprehensive analysis of emigration trends and policies in China with a focus on the movement of the wealthy and highly skilled. As a country with one of the lowest emigration rates in the world, China's emigration is characterized by a widening divergence between the migration of highly skilled and wealthy individuals on the one hand, and of the low and unskilled on the other. Xiang's analysis shows that the liberalization of visa polices at home and abroad enables high-skilled and wealthy Chinese migrants to enjoy ever-greater freedom in permanent settlement and circulatory transnational movement. They

are motivated to migrate for their children's education, better quality of life, and long-term political, economic, and social conditions. Low or unskilled migration is mainly concentrated in manufacturing industries, construction, and agriculture, forestry and fishing industries through project-tied collective labour deployment and individual overseas employment. The author maintains that exit controls for the unskilled have been substituted by complicated policies to manage recruitment procedures that continue to serve as de factor barriers to emigration. While highly skilled and wealthy migrants predominantly move to Western destinations, unskilled migrant workers tend to move to destinations in the Middle East (e.g., Iraq, Kuwait) and East and Southeast Asia (e.g., Japan, South Korea, Singapore). With a growing diaspora population worldwide, the Chinese government introduced a number of policies to encourage return migration and diaspora engagement which are widely regarded as great successes. Xiang concludes the chapter by arguing that despite economic growth and rising levels of income, emigration from China will likely remain high for a long time to come.

In Chapter 16 Wei Li and Wan Yu examine Chinese migration to the US with a focus on mobility of highly-skilled migrants and international students, also known as intellectual migration. The authors trace the history of Chinese intellectual migration to the US and highlight its contemporary trends. They analyze a number of factors that have contributed to the growth of global mobility of highly-skilled migrants including economic globalization and changing international relations. More recently the return migration of highly skilled migrants can be characterized as brain circulation that challenges the previous dichotomy of brain drain because migration flows are no longer a one-way ticket but in multiple directions. In the case of Chinese intellectual migration to the US, the authors report that large number of highly-skilled migrants from China emerged after Chinese economic reform, and those numbers continue to grow along with the economic development and openness. Meanwhile, China's economic growth has enabled Chinese students, particularly fee-paying undergraduate students, to grow in volume in recent years, placing China on the list of top sending countries to US. Li and Yu conclude that intellectual migration can have positive impacts on both sending and receiving counties, potentially achieving a "triple win" for these countries and for migrants themselves.

The next chapter by Yixi Lu and Li Zong examines Chinese students' propensity to stay in Canada and their transitioning from international student to permanent resident. With a global competition for skilled workers, Canada developed policies to target international students as potential source of skilled immigrants because they are more adaptable to the Canadian labour market than internationally trained workers. Like the case of the US, China has become the top source country of international students to Canada accounting for one third of its total international student population. It has also contributed the highest percent of permanent residents from a student source directly. Drawing from two recent survey datasets, Lu and Zong analyze the major factors which may have influenced Chinese students'

migration intentions. Their analysis shows that Chinese students' intention to immigrate is associated with their perceived ability to obtain work experience and employment opportunities. Their findings also reveal that Chinese students' sense of acceptance as well as their experience of discrimination in the local community and Canadian society may also influence their intentions to immigrate. This research suggests that better social and economic adaptation and integration would facilitate their intention to apply for permanent residency in Canada.

Shibao Guo's Chapter 18 continues the examination of transnational talent mobility from the experience of those who previously emigrated to Canada from China and later "returned". Situated in the debate around transnationalism, this chapter explores the experiences of Chinese Canadians in Beijing, including motivations for the relocation, their employment and income, social integration, and satisfaction with life in China. In this chapter Guo theorizes an emerging phenomenon of "double diaspora" – a hybrid experience that transcends boundaries of ethnicity and nationalism. The findings reveal that the Chinese Canadian double diaspora in Beijing is a young, well-educated, and economically active community that is becoming increasingly internationally mobile as a result of globalization, modern communications, and transportation. Their negative experiences in Canada form the "push" factors which work with China's favourable movement policies as "pull" factors in generating a global force mobilizing Chinese immigrants to repatriate themselves and seek opportunities in China. The double diaspora is characterized by a number of dualities as both Chinese and Canadian, living in Chinese and Canadian diaspora, simultaneously diasporas and returnees, playing a double role as cultural and economic brokers between Canada and China. The double diaspora views the diaspora sojourn as neither unidirectional nor final, but rather as multiple and circular. It rejects the primordial notion of diaspora and theorizes diaspora as heterogeneous and conflictual form of sociality. This study provides an alternative framework in understanding transnational talent mobility and representing multiple ways of affiliations and belonging.

In Chapter 19 Scherto Gill investigates the impact of intercultural learning acquired in the UK on the life and work of returned Chinese postgraduates. China's continued economic growth, economic and business opportunities, and family ties draw many overseas graduates back to China to work and live. As part of the "brain circulation", the returnees play an important part in China's economic growth and technological development. Gill's study focuses on their experiences of re-adaptation and how they deal with the challenges confronting them with regard to the tension between the emerging identity and the expectations of who they ought to be. These findings reveal common factors that motivate Chinese graduates to settle in China, including a desire to play a part in the transformation of modern China, a perception that there are more opportunities for professional development in China, and difficulty finding relevant work in the subject areas in the host country. Re-adjustment and re-adaptation of life styles and values are common experiences among Gill's participants. At the same time, all her participants are able to immerse

themselves with the intercultural awareness and continue to transform their intercultural understanding and self-perception after returning to China.

Chapter 20 by Su-yan Pan explores China's brain gain strategies in competing for global talents. The competition for global human capital often starts with the most highly-educated and highly-skilled personnel, who are seen as globally mobile resources and intangible assets that can help enhance a nation's global competitive advantage. As China continues to be the largest source country for internationally mobile students, it has also introduced a number of policies to attract internationally-trained Chinese nationals back to work and live in China, including policies encouraging them to work for and run businesses in China, recruiting them to senior positions, and offering competitive salaries and more rapid promotion. As a new competitor, China is also emerging as a popular destination for international students from many countries in the world. In this chapter Pan identifies and examines major brain gain strategies that have enabled China to entice foreign-trained Chinese nationals and to become a key competitor for international students. She also examines tensions between the quest for economic prosperity and political stability as embedded in China's brain gain strategies. Drawing upon China's experience, this chapter provides an understanding of the complexity and dynamics of brain gain for enhancing a nation's global competitiveness. Her findings have important implications for understanding global talents mobility between China and the globalized world.

CONCLUSION

Taken together, the diverse concepts and perspectives represented in this book provide rich accounts of the impact of globalization on Chinese education and how globalization has transformed Chinese education and society. The twenty chapters in this volume collectively examine how globalization unfolds on the ground in Chinese education through processes of internationalization of Chinese education, student mobility and intercultural adaptations, cross-cultural experiences of teaching and learning, and transnational talent mobility. It is evident that economic globalization, modern communications, and advanced transportation have increased the interconnectivity and engagement of China with the rest of the world. The examination shows clear patterns and trends demonstrating China's role as an emerging leader in the global flow of talents, information, and knowledge. This is evident in China's contributions as the top source country of international students as well as permanent residents to many countries. China is also emerging as a popular destination country for international students, particularly for those from neighbouring Asian countries. At the same time, the analysis also reveals tensions between the global and local, particularly concerning national education sovereignty and the widening gap between brain gain and brain drain. As globalization intensifies, China has joined the global leaders in competing for most talented, skillful, and resourceful. Its favourable brain circulation policies have achieved a

measure of success in mobilizing Chinese expatriates to relocate to China as part of the transnational diaspora, suggesting that the diaspora sojourn should be seen as multiple and circular rather than unidirectional or final. In this view, China is moving into a form of transnationalism challenging the rigid, territorial nationalism that defines the modern nation-state. As such, transnationalism will likely see China more actively engaged with the globalized world in years to come.

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SECTION I

INTERNATIONALIZATION OF CHINESE EDUCATION

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2. GLOBAL PATHS, LOCAL TRAJECTORIES

China's Education and the Global

INTRODUCTION

In Chinese education and at Chinese schools, the global has become ubiquitous – at least in the urban areas. This is observable at different levels: at the micro level, school children wear Western clothes brands (or imitations of them); Christmas decoration is hanging from the ceilings; classrooms and school yards frequently feature large world maps and huge globes; and the school bells play Mozart or North American children songs. At the meso level, school policies stress the importance of curriculum internationalization; school principals state as their educational aim the formation of global, 'metropolitan' citizens; and teachers with international experience have a distinct advantage in being hired. Finally, at the macro level, the global rise of the 'knowledge economy' has clearly left its mark on Chinese national educational policies, which make international competitiveness and the training of 'creative talents' proclaimed goals of nation-wide strategies in reforming education.[1] Conversely, China has been clearly added to the educational map of policy makers and educators worldwide due to the Chinese students' extraordinarily high performance in cross-nationally conducted student assessments (such as PISA).[2]

But what does it actually mean when we say that something has been globalized? Do the examples above point to a global China? Or do they rather represent manifestations of the global in the local, where the global has become a part of the local, as much as the 'local' has become "an aspect of globalization" (Robertson, 1995, p. 30)? Studies in and beyond comparative education on the global-local nexus have drawn attention to the dialectic processes of meaning-making that take place at various levels of these translocal encounters (Anderson-Levitt, 2003, 2012; Appadurai, 1996b; Beech, 2011; Carney, 2009; Larsen & Beech, 2014; Schriewer & Martinez, 2004; Steiner-Khamsi & Stolpe, 2006; Tsing, 2005).[3] These studies have shown convincingly how what an external onlooker could call identical global phenomena or processes are perceived and acted upon diversely – and sometimes contradictorily – once they enter local contexts. That is, while globalization makes intra- and trans-societal agents across the world become subject to increasingly similar processes, powers, and pressures/potentials, these global forces play out differently, can mean very different things to different actors, and may also entail different consequences for the actors involved.

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Leon Tikly (2010) has pointed to the impossibility of talking about globalization as if this was something general, with generalizable causes and effects. Rather, he argues, 'globalization' is nonsensical if not linked up to particular localities:

> It has been a shortcoming of much of the existing literature on globalisation and education that the specific contexts to which the theory is assumed to be applicable have not been specified. It is problematic to assume that there is one superior vantage point from which global forces can best be understood. (p. 152)

Thus, 'global' paths can only be traced by scrutinizing the local trajectories of the global. But how are we to understand the interaction between the two? How can we pinpoint, for instance with regard to the examples that I gave at the beginning of this chapter, where, how and why the global has hit the ground?

In this chapter, I will discuss various conceptualizations of these 'grounding' processes as they have been employed within the field of comparative education. In the following section, I will debate how the neo-institutionalist 'world culture theory' (see e.g., Ramirez, 2012) – an approach that has proven to be widely influential but also fiercely contested within comparative education[4] – has led to a specific kind of 'cultural turn' within studies on education and globalization. I will then show how the originally constructivist approach inherent in world culture theory was subsequently taken up and developed within Scandinavian neo-institutionalism, while 'culture' within the US-based world culture theory approach was increasingly watered down, becoming a sort of cultural 'add-on' in otherwise de-cultured studies. I will also point to alternative approaches towards conceptualizing actors or 'carriers' in globalization processes – some of which are based on ontological premises that are distinctly different from the assumptions that are guiding the research conducted within the paradigm of world culture theory. This discussion will be followed by an outline of the three dimensions that have proven crucial in research on globalization and education: time and space/place, legitimating myths, and friction/pressures. In a concluding remark, I will refer these concepts back to local Chinese sense-making processes as they occur in interaction with the global.

CONCEPTUALIZING THE GLOBAL

The postulation of a 'world culture' being constructed across the globe (see e.g., the edited volume by Boli & Thomas, 1999) has its distinct roots in a social constructivist perspective on social science (Berger & Luckmann, 1967) and, more specifically, in new institutionalism (Powell & DiMaggio, 1991): structures and agency are seen as taking place within communicative and sense-making frames that transcend individual actors but also ground macro-social processes. It is through institutions that meaning and stability are seen to be provided, as institutions communicate and sanction rules and surveillance mechanisms (regulative dimension), articulate expectations (normative dimension), and embody shared conceptions

(cultural-cognitive dimension) (Scott, 1995). In educational research, this approach helped explain, among other things, the worldwide institutionalization of mass education (Meyer & Ramirez, 2000; Ramirez & Boli, 1987): it discarded purely structural-functionalist explanations and instead brought to the fore the cultural-ideological dimensions of global educational expansion. Rather than responding to any particular local requirements (such as economic or political needs), nation states were now understood as striving towards compliance with globally established cultural scripts of how to constitute a proper nation state and a legitimate member of the global community – and part of this script was a specifically structured mass education system (cf. the early exploration into myths by Meyer & Rowan, 1977).

While earlier studies within the neo-institutionalist framework must be credited with bringing culture back in, two severe flaws began to emerge as the world culture approach developed (Meyer, 2010; Ramirez, 2012).

First, local agency was increasingly rejected as an inappropriate conceptual tool for explaining global processes. Frequently, local agency was conflated with studies of the micro-level, which were depicted as having little to say about macro-processes (which were seen as embodying the global). This was despite Strang's and Meyer's important concept of 'theorization', within the framework of new institutionalism: this concept posits that there are different ways of making sense of the world, and that for a model to become adopted and integrated successfully, it has to resonate with local actors (Strang & Meyer, 1993). Clearly, the world culture approach has turned the local and the global into dichotomous, mutually exclusive entities. By operating increasingly from a diffusionist perspective, world culture theorists place the local at the receiving/reacting end of global diffusion (of e.g., educational models), thus ignoring both the dialectic, inter-penetrative relationship between the global and the local (Robertson, 1995) and the active, creative part that local agents play in this interaction (see below on Scandinavian new institutionalism).

Second, the world culture approach brackets issues of power, friction, and oppression among and between actors. Most studies within this paradigm tend to ignore the more unpleasant circumstances of educational transfer, e.g. when an educational model is imposed due to financial constraints, political dictates, or cultural hegemony. However, if 'culture' in the world culture approach is stripped off its contentious nature, what then is left to legitimize using the term 'culture' at all?[5] This negligence or even refusal to address issues of power and coercion has led critics to suspect that the adherers of world culture theory were actually promoting the benefits of (a mostly Western-framed) 'world culture', rather than just researching it (Carney, Rappleye, & Silova, 2012). More probable, I would argue, world culture theorists' tendency to ignore power, conflicts, and struggles might be a legacy of their neo-institutionalist origins. As Peter A. Hall and Rosemary C.R. Taylor observe,

> the approach that sociological institutionalism takes […] often seems curiously bloodless. That is to say, it can miss the extent to which processes

> of institutional creation or reform entail a clash of power among actors with competing interests. After all, many actors, both inside and outside an organization, have deep stakes in whether that firm or government adopts new institutional practices, and reform initiatives often provoke power struggles among these actors, which an emphasis on processes of diffusion can neglect. In some cases, the new institutionalists in sociology seem so focused on macro-level processes that the actors involved in these processes seem to drop from sight and the result begins to look like 'action without agents'. (Hall & Taylor, 1996, p. 954)

In an important return to the actor, W. Richard Scott has emphasized and conceptualized the role of 'carriers'. Carriers – or actors in processes of diffusion, transfer, and adoption – are "not neutral vehicles, but mechanisms that significantly influence the nature of the elements they transmit and the reception they receive" (Scott, 2003, p. 879). He distinguishes between four different types of carriers: (1) symbolic systems in which meaningful information is coded and conveyed; (2) relational systems, consisting of interpersonal or interorganizational linkages; (3) routines in the form of habitualized behavior; and (4) artifacts (material culture).

Similarly, the Scandinavian variant of new institutionalism (see e.g., Czarniawska & Joerges, 1996) has focused on locally induced processes of modification and change in the course of 'global' diffusion. These studies specifically employ the concept of 'translation' in order to stress the agency and creativity inherent in these local processes. Diffusion is no longer a transmission e.g. across national borders but acts of translation, with far-reaching consequences for both actors and objects: "Each act of translation changes the translator and what is translated" (Czarniawska & Sevón, 2005, p. 8). Others have used the terms "editing" (Sahlin-Andersson, 1996) or "framing" (Snow & Benford, 1992) to denote these processes of appropriation and transformation. Importantly, Scandinavian neo-institutionalists have also differentiated between different types of translation and have thus unpacked the world culture theorists' concept of 'isomorphism': while in some cases actors may take over a model without admitting it outspokenly (e.g. by calling it something different), in other cases actors may evoke a globally popular model or reform and pretend to be adopting it – while in reality implementing something else. This has been termed isopraxism in the first case, and isonynism in the second (see Erlingsdóttir & Lindberg, 2005; Solli, Demediuk, & Sims, 2005). Often, these are strategic choices depending on political climate and/or economic priorities. The concept of 'isomorphism' reflects these different and often conflictual processes only insufficiently since it tends to overemphasize cosmetic similarities (such as e.g. 'human rights education' across different countries), while overlooking underlying commonalities that are, however, labeled differently, precisely due to the world culture theorists' excessive focus on macro processes.

Another way to look at globalization and social agency that has proven influential for comparative education is through the concept of 'networks'. Research on

networks has figured large in studies on governance (Clemens & Cook, 1999; Milward & Provan, 2000) and has found its way into comparative education mainly in studies that are critical of nonstate, 'neoliberal' networks (see Ball, 2008). Here it is above all the powerful, often unholy alliances between specific actors that are seen as essential for specific 'global' models to succeed or fail on a local plane. Steiner-Khamsi (2006) has been particularly interested in the rationales of early and late adopters of educational models and has repeatedly pleaded for the contextualization of educational diffusion and transfer (e.g. Steiner-Khamsi, 2012). More specifically employing a social network analysis (SNA) approach, Roldán Vera and Schupp (2005) have looked at the worldwide diffusion of the monitorial system of education, while Schulte (2012a) has analyzed the social ties among (national and transnational) actors in the vocational education movement in Republican China. Social networks, Schulte argues,

> can illustrate both the flows of ideas (carried by people or organisations) and the flows of power. The nature of the nodes (actors) through which ideas pass can tell us something about how the ideas get processed and changed, and how this has a backlash on actors and their behaviour. […] [Social network analysis] can illuminate the 'how' of social relations, and it can explain the longevity or ephemerality of certain phenomena that are created, maintained, or abolished through social relations… (Schulte, 2012a, pp. 96–97)

Departing from a flat ontology and directing attention to the nonhuman world, studies of translation processes have also been drawing on Bruno Latour's work and his approach towards social reality as an actor-network (e.g., Latour, 1986; also the Scandinavian neo-institutionalists have been inspired by Latour, 2005). Originally, this approach emerged within studies on science in the making (science and technology studies, or STS): taken-for-granted trajectories and narratives of scientific development began to be questioned. Decentering e.g. the role of grand scientists or 'compelling' scientific theories, Actor-Network Theory (ANT) assumes that causality emerges out of interactions and connections within an actor-network. Such a relational network is thought of consisting both of human and nonhuman actants. Any entity can thus become a source of action (or an actant), "including objects, subjects, human beings, machines, animals, 'nature', ideas, organizations, inequalities, scales and sizes, and geographical arrangements" (Law, 2008, p. 141).[6] This relational, symmetrical approach is consequently no longer constricted by the macro-micro distinction so prevalent in social theory; nor is it caught within the structure-agency dichotomy that has shaped so much of social science thinking.[7]

Since a relational perspective shifts attention to how actors serve as mediators in social processes, which are thought of as networks, the idea of 'translation' is a natural characteristic of this approach. Latour distinguishes between intermediaries – who have no impact on the information that passes through them – and (human or nonhuman) mediators, who possess shaping power:

> Their input is never a good predictor of their output; their specificity has to be taken into account every time. Mediators transform, translate, distort, and modify the meaning or the elements they are supposed to carry. (Latour, 2005, p. 39)

Translation, according to Callon (1981), who develops the concept further, consists then of bringing things together that were previously apart or disconnected; such a process always involves the negotiation of actors' identities and possibilities of (inter)action. It also requires that things are perceived as 'problems' in the first place (problematization), actors become interested in them (interessement), and a sufficient number of actors can get mobilized (Callon, 1991). As Callon points out, translation also means a displacement of alternative possibilities.

An important concept within science and technology studies is the idea of blackboxing. Blackboxing denotes the process of obscuring (technological) complexity: things that themselves are actor-networks (consisting of complex interrelationships) become at some point 'punctualized', appearing as obvious and self-evident to the onlooker (like the computer I'm using in my daily work). They thus become black-boxed and are converted into a single point or node in another network (Callon, 1991). A school book for example may become blackboxed in its interaction with teachers, students, the classroom or the curriculum – although it is clearly socially and historically contingent, having emerged out of previous, complex interactions. As Law notes, black boxes are seldom of permanent character but can be re-opened:

> Punctualization is always precarious, it faces resistance, and may degenerate into a failing network. On the other hand, punctualized resources offer a way of drawing quickly on the networks of the social without having to deal with endless complexity. (Law, 1992, p. 385)

For instance, a textbook may at some point in time become the target of criticism, such as from minority groups or teacher unions, and can thus be unpacked.

Also with regard to educational transfer, this shift of focus onto different kinds of entities that are involved in processes of transfer and interaction – human and material – is potentially productive. However, only few studies on globalization and education have made use of this approach more than metaphorically (see e.g. Fenwick, 2010; Resnik, 2006) and it remains to be seen how influential this approach will prove in the future. As it requires a radical ontological re-orientation, it is somewhat questionable whether it will gain a stronger foothold among comparative educationists.

DIMENSIONS OF THE GLOBAL

Elsewhere I have identified three foci in conceptualizing globalization processes in education (Schulte, 2012b) and will re-introduce them in the following three subsections.

Time and Space/Place

This first focus starts from the assumption that the selection, adoption, translation, and appropriation of models are not timeless and placeless phenomena but are intricately linked to both (perceived, construed) needs of adopters and a “time axis” of developments (Steiner-Khamsi, 2012); they are historically contingent. Before a model can look convincing to potential adopters, it has to become visible in the first place. Czarniawska and Sevón (2005) use the concept of ‘fashion’ to explain why certain ideas are attractive at a specific point in time while others are not; fashions pose a potential threat to existing ideas/institutions and can cause their transformation or demise (Czarniawska & Joerges, 1996). Others have used the idea of discourse or “discourse coalitions” (Schriewer, 2000, p. 73) to explain why certain ideologies gain hold in a group/society. From a system theory’s perspective, ideas are seen as becoming selected and filtered “according to the changing problem configurations and reflection situations *internal* to a given system” (Schriewer & Martinez, 2004, p. 32; my emphasis). Similarly, Lieberman (2002) argues that rather than constituting exogenous forces, “shocks” are generally homemade and an outcome of earlier tensions within a given society. This has far-reaching consequences for the alleged stability and universality of certain ideas: “[C]oncepts such as ‘liberty’ or ‘equality’ might be invoked to support very different practices in different contexts by people who all the while believe themselves to be upholding a timeless and unchanging political tradition” (Lieberman, 2002, p. 702).

In congruence with a more general spatial turn in the social sciences, place has also moved more literally into focus by turning attention to how place and space themselves can act upon diffusion and translation processes. Space is not just being compressed through globalization processes, maintain – for example – Larsen and Beech (2014), but has become an actor itself, with performative capacities, and should therefore turn from “an object of study” to “a framework for analysis” (Beech & Larsen, 2011, pp. 194–195). Drawing on Lefebvre (1991), they plead for a relational notion of space in which space, place, and social agency constitute one another.

Legitimating Myths

Ramirez (2012) points to the importance of “myths” as basic human strategies to add meaning to one’s existence – and to legitimate one’s action. He thus takes up again a perspective that has been put forward in earlier neo-institutionalist writings, which sees myths as helping an organization to look “appropriate, rational, and modern”. Their use “displays responsibility and avoids claims of negligence” (Meyer & Rowan, 1977, p. 344). By attributing to myths “[c]eremonial criteria of worth and ceremonially derived production functions” and by using terms like “labels” or “vocabulary” (1977, p. 351), Meyer and Rowan make it clear that myths are less creeds to be believed but beliefs to be performed, in order to gain legitimacy. While

they underline the constructivist character of myths, they pay less attention to the temporality and locality of myths (see previous section).

Roland Barthes develops the idea that myth is not just a concept, but a "system of communication" (Barthes, 1972/2009, p. 131) or a "type of speech chosen by history" (2009, p. 132) and is thus "open to appropriation by society" (2009, pp. 131–132). This appropriation is culturally contingent:

> Myth has an imperative, buttonholing character: stemming from an historical concept, directly springing from contingency […], it is *I* whom it has come to seek. It is turned towards me, I am subjected to its intentional force, it summons me to receive its expansive ambiguity. (2009, p. 148; emphasis in original)

Barthes further observes that myths serve to naturalize historically specific decisions and preferences – they make "contingency appear eternal" (2009, p. 168) and hence depoliticize interaction (that is, detach beliefs from specific interests and goals). It shares some similarity with the above-discussed process of blackboxing.

It is worth asking whether the world culture approach itself has not bought into the eternity and stability of the myths that it had set out to analyze, and whether it has not failed to look at the re-politicization of myths once they enter a different context. This becomes particularly salient when globally circulating myths hit upon local myths, thus producing global-local networks of myths with highly differential consequences for politics, economics, and everyday lives.

From an empirical perspective, one of the originally central concepts of the world culture approach, myths, is only insufficiently operationalized. Often, the mere fact that countries engage in or take over aspects of world culture models is taken as proof that these countries *embody* (parts of this) world culture. To raise an example: to what extent can we treat the number and distribution of human rights institutions as evidence that the respective country that hosts these institutions has actually implemented human right norms (cf. Koo & Ramirez, 2009)? For an approach that takes both time/place and myths/legitimacy seriously, it is imperative to explore also how human rights are understood and enacted in each of these societies. One has to take into account, in Lieberman's words,

> the goals and desires that people bring to the political world and, hence, the ways they define and express their interests; the meanings, interpretations, and judgments they attach to events and conditions; and their beliefs about cause-and-effect relationships in the political world and, hence, their expectations about how others will respond to their own behavior. (Lieberman, 2002, p. 697)

To move local enactments of myths back into focus does not mean that the global dimension needs to be sacrificed. On the contrary, such a move can add to an understanding of how the power of global institutions and ideas materializes. While the growing legitimacy of certain global scripts – such as mass schooling or human rights – is an undeniable fact, this legitimacy has been put forward differently, by different actors within different settings through different scripts. At times, what

is called 'variation' initially even subverts the original idea. Such is the case for example with the US import of 'academic freedom' to Singapore, where it became twisted to strengthen the hegemony of the state (see Olds, 2005). If we are to take the idea of myths seriously, there is not *one* world culture, but a variety of both scripted and on-the-spot constructions of world culture that have repercussions in the 'real world' (i.e., resulting in certain choices, actions, and policies). So not only are the narratives played out differently (implementation), but they are also scripted differently – although they are engaged with each other at the global level.

This is not just a matter of 'decoupling', as maintained by Ramirez (e.g., 2012). Explaining variation by decoupling disguises the failure to come to analytical terms with difference; it has become a black box within this strand of research (and probably even a 'black box' in Latour's sense in that complex relationships have become punctualized). The solution of course cannot be to construct a myriad of independent case studies where each shows how world culture is experienced differently. As already Bertrand Russell (1956, p. 195) noted, "[w]hen one person uses a word, he does not mean by it the same thing as another person means by it." It would be a hopeless enterprise to try and map every single local understanding of globally travelling myths. However, comparative research can contribute by working on a typology of narratives as they are diffused and transformed across the world. Göran Therborn (1995), for instance, notes at least four different routes to modernity that may correspond with different understandings of world culture: the European gate of revolution or reform (endogenous change); the New Worlds of the Americas (transcontinental migration and genocide, independence); imposed or externally induced modernization in Asia (external threat, selective imports); conquest, subjection and appropriation in Africa; and combinations of these different types. Similarly, approaches within the framework of multiple modernities (Eisenstadt, 1999; Schwinn, 2006, 2012) have proved fruitful in comparative education for showing how societies modernize and reform on their own terms, even when they are 'borrowing' (or translating) from other countries (see e.g., Schriewer & Martinez, 2004). Comparative education has yet to find a balance between indulging in a multiplicity of idiosyncratic case studies (that is, a myriad of local 'appropriations') on the one hand, and on the other, risking over-ambitious generalizations (that is, the diffusion of one model in which the specificity of the local actor, or the translator, no longer plays a role).

Friction and Pressures

When different layers of discourses, fashions, or orders come into contact and possibly conflict with one another, there arises friction (or interruptions, from a system perspective). Lieberman sees politics as occurring in "multiple concurrent orders" (2002, p. 702) where friction between these orders leads to action and change:

> Measuring friction, then, is a matter of deriving, from the historical record, accounts of these incentives, opportunities, and repertoires that arise from multiple sources of political order and impinge simultaneously on the same set of actors. (2002, p. 703)

Anna Lowenhaupt Tsing, from an anthropological perspective, understands friction as arising out of encounters and interactions that take place in "zones of awkward engagement, where words mean something different across a divide even as people agree to speak" (2005, p. xi). Like Lieberman, she emphasizes the creative property of friction, which "reminds us that heterogeneous and unequal encounters can lead to new arrangements of culture and power" (2005, p. 5). The concept of friction is also apt to capture the dialectic relationship between the local and the global: friction emerges where the global touches local ground – Tsing talks of "engaged universals" (2005, p. 10) – and it

> keep[s] global power in motion. It shows us (as one advertising jingle put it) where the rubber meets the road. Roads are a good image for conceptualizing how friction works: Roads create pathways that make motion easier and more efficient, but in doing so they limit where we go. The ease of travel they facilitate is also a structure of confinement. Friction inflects historical trajectories, enabling, excluding, and particularizing. (Tsing, 2005, p. 6)

While friction, as I have discussed it so far, is more concerned with how an organization, group, society, or system processes and internalizes external forces, this does not preclude that these more subliminal internalization processes are preceded, accompanied, or prompted by more palpable pressures such as coercion or brute force. Already DiMaggio and Powell (1983), in their widely cited article, differentiate between coercive isomorphism, mimetic processes and normative pressures. It is conspicuous that the world culture approach has tended to neglect the first element in this set. As Scott (2003) notes, it should have an impact on the outcome of diffusion whether models were taken over from soldiers or bankers (or from academic experts, I would add).

CONCLUSION: MAKING SENSE OF THE GLOBAL IN CHINESE EDUCATION

China often lends itself as a case where 'everything is different' (as remarked once by a critical colleague of mine). Are case studies on China, or more particularly, on how global models play out in Chinese education, thus only adding to the 'myriad of local appropriations', of which I warned above? Or can insights from the Chinese case actually tell us something about globalization as such? I believe the latter is a more valid statement, at the same time as I am siding with Leon Tikly (2010; see introductory section) in that I see no point in looking at globalization only in general terms – if we want to attach meaning to *globalization*, we will have

to investigate how globalization processes unfold on the ground. In the following, I will sketch a few of these grounding processes by drawing on some previous studies (both by myself and others). Very obviously, the volume to which this chapter contributes provides further ample evidence of a globalized/globalizing China.

Looking more closely, China is not as 'exotic' a case as often maintained. China has been part of what we today call the 'international community' for a long time and was both agent and patient of East-West and West-East knowledge interchange (for a brief and recent overview, see Schulte, 2013). Regarding contemporary China, scholars have been particularly interested in seeing how deeply ingrained traditions of teaching and learning are impacted by the import of global educational models (such as student-centered learning, communicative language instruction, etc.). Various case studies show how local teaching and learning practices continue to draw on indigenous conceptions and practices (Tan, 2015; Zhao, 2013) and in a curious combination of both embracing and resisting 'Western' teaching and learning models, the latter become creolized (Ouyang, 2003), thus leading to "hybrid reforms" (Paine & Fang, 2006).[8] There is still very little research on how these local re-interpretations of global models may have a backlash on the environments from where these models emerged – for instance, how these Chinese hybrids have an impact on North American conceptions of teaching and learning (but see Tucker, 2011, to get an impression of where this may lead).

In a large comparative case study of educational knowledge over a period of several decades in Spain, Russia/the Soviet Union, and China, Schriewer and colleagues investigated what 'global' or 'international' actually mean in each context by scrutinizing international references in these societies' educational research journals (e.g., Schriewer, 2004). From a bird's eye perspective, increased international references may simply point to an increased internationalization of these societies (or rather, of these societies' academic discourse on education). However, looking more closely at what kind of international authors (educators, psychologists, philosophers etc.) were cited, the project could actually identify rather diverse 'international' reference societies, and thus "alternating constructions of internationality" (Schriewer, 2004, p. 509).

Closing up on one important international reference, namely the appearance of the educator and philosopher John Dewey in Chinese educational discourse, Schulte (2011) has looked at how one and the same reference can stand for very different and even conflicting ideas about education, depending on the time period and the concomitant political and academic climate. Here, as well as in Schulte (2004), which discusses the abuse of the postmodern argument of 'relativism' and thus a reversed orientalism in Chinese academia, it becomes evident that the 'international' or the 'global' often serve as a strategic argument to push forward local interests.[9] Similarly, in another comparative project on how vocational education programs

were integrated into Argentina's and China's modernization schemes, Oelsner and Schulte (2006) note how the adoption of international models is contingent upon these societies' (often competing) perceptions of problems in the first place, as well as their (often historically grounded) bonds with foreign reference societies. Frequently, the apparently 'global' became reduced to one or two countries that were particularly visible in the Chinese or Argentine contexts (termed 'reference horizons' by Oelsner & Schulte, 2006).

The discussion above is by no means exhaustive but is to illustrate how case studies that are grounded in one or more distinct localities can nonetheless yield important insights into the workings of more encompassing processes like globalization. Rather than choosing a "view from nowhere-in-particular" (Jensen, 2011, p. 2), such studies make conscious use of a culturally sensitive, relativist approach – without making the investigated processes unique to the point of incommensurability. To conclude with the words of Jensen,

> [c]omparative relativism is understood by some to imply that relativism comes in various kinds and that these have multiple uses, functions, and effects, varying widely in different personal, historical, and institutional contexts; moreover, that those contexts can be compared and contrasted to good purpose. (Jensen, 2011, p. 2)

NOTES

[1] This becomes for example apparent from the current Ten-Year-Plan of informatizing education (see MOE, 2012).

[2] There has been a debate about PISA both with regard to fundamental aspects of its design and its technical implementation. The first concern raises the question of to what extent assessment studies like PISA can really reflect a student cohort's level of competence and knowledge, what kind of knowledge is entailed in PISA's design and, whether this knowledge is what we would want our children to learn (see e.g. the discussion in Meyer & Benavot, 2013). The second critique raises concerns about the sampling procedures (Kreiner & Christensen, 2014), which, especially with regard to the Chinese PISA (or rather Shanghai PISA), has prompted some criticism – something I cannot go into detail here (but see for example the blog by Loveless, 2014).

[3] See also the special issue *Re-Conceptualising the Global-Local Nexus: Meaning Constellations in the World Society* in the journal *Comparative Education, 48*(4) (2012). In the present chapter, I draw on arguments that have been presented in my contribution to this special issue (Schulte, 2012b).

[4] See e.g. the critique in Carney, Rappleye, and Silova (2012).

[5] See for instance Barnard's and Spencer's understanding of culture as a "site of contestation" (1996, p. 141); see also Morley and Chen (1996).

[6] Note the similarities with Appadurai's concept of 'scapes', which distinguishes between ethnoscapes (people/groups on the move), mediascapes (information/images on the move), technoscapes (technologies on the move), finanscapes (capital on the move), and ideoscapes (ideas/ideologies on the move) (Appadurai, 1996a).

[7] ANT distinguishes between agency and intentionality: somebody or something may serve as an agent without necessarily having the intention to act for a specific purpose.

[8] See also the peculiar integration of the concept of 'creativity', the buzzword of today's knowledge economy, into Chinese education (Schulte, 2015).

[9] This strategic move has been extensively discussed in Zymek (1975).

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3. INTERNATIONALIZATION OF HIGHER EDUCATION IN CHINA

An Overview

INTRODUCTION

Within the past two decades, internationalization has been high on agendas at institutional, national, regional, and international levels. While nearly all national governments are keen to promote internationalization to address both regional and global challenges as a comparative perspective (Ayoubi & Massoud, 2007), internationalization takes various forms and shapes. The actual experiences of various nations differ, often with strikingly different costs and benefits. From the late 1970s, the internationalization of higher education in China has been motivated by a desire for realizing "the four modernizations" (of industry, agriculture, defense, and science and technology, through implementation of economic reform). Under such policy reform, the internationalization of higher education takes three major forms: studying abroad, integrating an international dimension into university teaching and learning, and providing transnational programs in cooperation with foreign/overseas institutional partners in Chinese universities. Such approaches have drastically transformed China's high education in both quantity and quality. Meanwhile, China faces some fundamental issues. Within a much altered context, China's internationalization of higher education has begun to take a different orientation to meet new demands. Based on some previous work (e.g., Yang, 2002), this chapter highlights the dilemmas and challenges of China's internationalization of higher education, and assesses some of the latest developments.

Ever since China's door was burst open by Western powers in the 19th century, China has been struggling with great difficulty to manage its relations with the West. A fundamental reason for this difficulty is that the relationship, although touching upon various social dimensions such as trade and education, is essentially civilizational. With the Chinese epistemology of all-under-heaven, the West does not exist in the geographical West for Chinese thinkers. Rather, the West can only be something either at the periphery or at the center. Acknowledging their peripheral position during modern times as the West has been at the center, the Chinese practice self-rectification to simulate the West. To them, the West is not geographically Western, but at the center of the Chinese selfhood. It has not been a matter of Western or Eastern, Chinese or foreign. Rather, there have only been two positions: center and

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periphery. Such mindsets have a profound impact on how the Chinese perceive and engage with the West. Borrowing from analyses of Chinese civilizational traditions, especially the concept of Tianxia (Shih, 2010; Zhao, 2005), this chapter interrogates Chinese discourses on the West, and adds a historical perspective to the discussions of the internationalization of higher education in China.

CHINA'S APPROACHES TO INTERNATIONALIZING HIGHER EDUCATION

The concept of internationalization in higher education is elusive. People use this same term with very different definitions. While universities worldwide are promoting internationalization, achieving a common definition has not proved simple. In some cases, internationalization is interpreted to mean little more than a requirement to improve facilities for foreign students. In others it is associated with root and branch reform of syllabuses and teaching methods. Different perspectives have been adopted to examine university internationalization, and definitions of the term embody diverse emphases and various approaches. The most cited definition was developed by Knight and de Wit (1995), and refined later for a number of times (e.g., Knight, 2008), with its essence largely unchanged. It defines internationalization as the process of integrating an international, intercultural, or global dimension into the purpose, functions, or delivery of higher education.

The definition has served the field well, especially in the analysis of activities at institutional level. It is, however, only based on and thus suitable for Western experience. Originated from Europe and spreading worldwide from the mid-19th century to the present time mainly due to colonialism, modern universities are an imported concept to non-Western societies. Even the countries that escaped colonial domination adopted Western models (Altbach, 2001). The European-North American university model has never been tolerant towards other alternatives, leading to inefficacy of universities in non-Western societies, for whom a so-called "international" perspective was imposed to them from the outset. What is lacking is a balanced combination of the "international" and the local. Within a context of Western dominance, the internationalization of higher education in non-Western societies necessarily touches on the longstanding knotty issues of and tensions between Westernization and indigenization.

China's approaches to internationalizing higher education are based on how internationalization has been understood in China. Since the late Qing dynasty, internationalization of higher education has been part of China's salvation movement. Its fundamental meaning is to learn Western knowledge and technology to make China strong, to "learn from the barbarians to ward off the barbarians," in the words of the then Chinese best thinkers. China's oldest modern university was only founded in 1893 as a "Self-Strengthening Institute" with European advice (Kirby, 2012). The Western concept of the modern university has been taken for its practicality. A modern Western-style higher education system has rarely been successfully

practiced in China, due to the constant tensions between the institutionalized and the invisible yet powerful systems within Chinese universities, leading to the normality of ineffectiveness (Yang, 2013). China's understanding of internationalization has remained largely unchanged since the late 19th century, although priorities and measures have changed in accordance with the situations of international political economy and China's positioning within them.

Modern Chinese higher education started with the introduction of Western elements. Fusions and collaborations have long existed between the introduced Western and indigenous Chinese cultural values and educational traditions. The introduction of modern Western higher education was intermittent, although deepening gradually overall. After China's defenses were broken in the 1840s (Hsu, 1990), the 'Self-Strengthening' Movement's *Ti-Yong* formula (essential Chinese learning married to Western science and technology) dominated higher education, requiring introduction of foreign technology on the one hand and retention of the traditional cultural spirit on the other. Thus while many engineering schools were established, no teaching of Western philosophy and culture initially occurred in institutions of higher learning. After the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895, the debate on whether China needed to be substantially westernized emerged, the classics were abolished, and the whole higher education system and its philosophical underpinnings began to reflect Western influences.

After the founding of the People's Republic of China in the context of the Cold War, educational exchanges between the two blocs were prohibited. Internationalization was confined to the eastern bloc, with a special focus on the former Soviet Union (Ji, 1994). During the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) China's education was separated from other parts of the world (Yu, 1994). Only after China adopted the 'reform and opening' policy at the end of the 1970s did the internationalization of higher education become a real prospect. International exchange in China's higher education restarted after the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee in December 1978, which decided to both send students to study abroad, and host some foreign students. However, a good understanding of international exchange in higher education did not occur until December 1983 when Deng Xiaoping called for China's education to be geared toward the world. Higher education internationalization then became a conscious target – indeed, a development strategy.

The past three and a half decades have seen different stages in the internationalization of higher education in China. First, China resumed its limited contacts with other countries by 1985 and began to expand its associations internationally. Educational exchange activities began to separate themselves from politics. The central government played a key role in seeking exchange, establishing programs, and controlling overall planning. Second, as devolution increased in China's higher education after 1985, provincial governments and individual institutions of higher education gained more autonomy in

internationalization activities. Institutional exchanges grew swiftly. Third, since the 1990s China has gradually established a comprehensive program of higher education internationalization, to which the main approaches include the following:

First, China's strategies for internationalization have been most strikingly featured by its vigorous engagement with the outside world, especially with Western societies. This attitude is not only unprecedented in its modern history, but also differs much from many other developing countries' interactions with the developed Western world. China's embrace of the English language serves as a telling example here. Seeing the dominant status of English as a historical fact, China has initiated various policies to adapt to it, instead of resisting it, in an effort to promote internationalization. China's efforts are already paying off. Chinese scholars and students in major universities have little difficulty in communicating with international scholars. Their English proficiency has contributed to China's current fast, successful engagement with the international community. From 1980 to 2010, peer-reviewed papers published by Chinese researchers rose 64-fold (Yang, 2012a). Such experience contrasts markedly with those of many other non-English speaking countries including many China's neighbors.

Second, as shown internationally (Cannon & Djajanegara, 1997; de Wit & Callan, 1995), the "hard" sciences usually attain higher levels of internationalization than the "soft." Their development tends to be much more emphasized, while the humanities and social sciences become under-represented in international programs (Altbach, 1998). Chinese humanities and social sciences scholars have not achieved the emerging visibility of their natural science and engineering peers in the international community. While China's overall representation in the international scientific community has grown rapidly (World Bank, 2000), few publications produced by Chinese social scientists have appeared in international citation indices. In 1985, Mainland Chinese social scientists produced 80 international publications. The number increased to 202 in 1996 (Fan, 2000). In 2010, China had 121,500 scientific publications listed by the Science Citation Index, of which 5,287 (2.41%) were in social sciences (Zhang & Yuan, 2011).

Third, China's internationalization faces various dilemmas. China is concerned about the potential loss of its educational sovereignty. Although this issue is increasingly international (Adam, 2001), China has its particular concern (Wang & Xue, 2004), as expressed by the policy on Sino-foreign joint programs. The concern has led to ambiguity regarding the legal status of foreign higher education activity in China. Rather than an integrated part of China's higher education system, the Chinese tend to see it as supplementary during certain stage of their higher education development. The dilemmas have also caused contradictory decisions and inefficacy. For instance, while the central government aims to import the world's most advanced educational resources to boost the capacity of Chinese universities, individual institutions hope by partnering they can capitalize on the demand for foreign qualifications, as they often fail to attract students on their own account. This mismatch of purposes contributes to China's overall failure to upgrade its higher

education and attract foreign capital. Without a clearly-defined legal identity, China fails to govern this new activity within its regulatory frameworks.

Forth, both uniformities and disparities are substantial in China's purposes of, and strategies for, internationalization. Higher institutions of various nature and status within the system act in very similar ways, from national flagships such as Peking and Tsinghua Universities to regional and specialized institutions like the Ocean University at Qingdao in Shandong and to Xinjiang University which is in an ethnic area neighboring Central Asian Islamic countries. At the same time, internal differentiation among Chinese higher education institutions is increasing. While China's best institutions have integrated internationalization well into their daily work and life, internationalization is hardly visible in regional institutions. As academics at major institutions are pushed to publish in English and collaborate with overseas peers, such pressure is nonexistent for their counterparts in regional institutions. It is fair to mention that some "quiet achievers" in Guangxi and Yunnan have substantial collaboration and exchange with their counterparts in the much-neglected Southeast Asian countries (Yang, 2012b).

AN EXPERIENCE OF CONTRADICTIONS AND PARADOXES

The seemingly successful Chinese experience in internationalizing its higher education since the late 1970s is indeed full of contradictions and paradoxical movements. Elements of Chinese historical traditions directly affect China's global engagement in higher education. Since the mid-19th century, China has been a student learning hard from the West. However, China would never be content with a student role. Ever since the late Qing dynasty, internationalization has been part of China's salvation movement to learn Western knowledge and technology to make China strong enough to resume its global influence, instead of being a passive recipient to be influenced by the major world powers. With its recent development, facilitated with its rich and long cultural traditions, China is well positioned to reach out globally to use international exchange and cooperation in higher education as an exercise of soft power (Yang, 2010). By the 2000s, China had reached a new phase of internationalization in higher education, shifting from one-way import of foreign (Western) knowledge into China to a much-improved balance between introducing the world into China and bringing China to the world.

China had a mentality of cultural superiority, which was smashed by humiliating defeats in its modern history by Western powers and Japan (Yang, 2002). Since the first modern university established in 1893, learning from the West has been strongly advocated as the only way to make China strong. The past 35 years of higher education internationalization continued to feature the importing of foreign (Western) knowledge into China. Yet, starting from the early 2000s, China's higher education internationalization has begun to pay more attention to exporting Chinese knowledge to the world. In 2008, those coming to China to study (223,499) historically outnumbered those leaving China to study abroad (179,800) (Su, 2009).

International students in China reached 356,499 in 2013 (CAFSA, 2014). The two numbers have ebbed and flowed, but both keep growing. China remains world's top source of overseas students, accounting for 14% of the global total. Statistics from the Ministry of Education show that 399,600 Chinese students were admitted to overseas educational institutions in 2012 alone, which was 59,900 more than the previous year, making for a 17.65% increase (Tang, 2013). Meanwhile more and more foreign experts work in China. In 2011, the number reached 529,000, with 35% in higher education institutions (*International Talent*, 2013).

China has much to contribute to the world, especially culturally, at a moment when humankind is confronted with serious issues of sustainable development and cultural conflicts. Higher education has a critical role to play here. This is also the height toward which China's higher education should aim in its international exchange and cooperation. In this regard, China is particularly well positioned as Confucianism responds to a range of problems and issues facing Western societies with increasing subtlety and persuasiveness (Tu, 2002). There is the possibility of a deep foundation for creative thinking about a global human future that brings together aspects of the Chinese and Western philosophical heritages. This is an approach to human beings, knowledge, and democratic development that is fundamentally different from those of Enlightenment thought (Hall & Ames, 1999), the neorealism of Samuel Huntington (1993), and rights-based liberalism. While whether or not Confucianism might become the salvation of the social sciences remains to be seen, such ideas open up hopes for genuine and profound forms of understanding and cooperation that embrace the spiritual, cultural, intellectual, and scientific aspects of knowledge and human life. They could enable us to move beyond the concepts of deterrence and the balance of power in neorealism, and the overriding emphasis on a free market in neoliberalism, into dialogue about how to create a better world that is open to cultural and epistemological inputs from diverse regions and civilizations (Hayhoe, 2005).

Given China's historical and cultural background in soft power and moral leadership (de Blij, 2005; Nye, 1997), and against a backdrop of a rising Chinese power, China should have an awareness of soft power projection via higher education. Through promoting Chinese knowledge westward, Chinese universities contribute uniquely to the global community, and establish themselves at the same time. A close scrutiny, however, reveals that China's current internationalization has not aimed so high to work towards these goals. With such a shortage, it would not be surprising if future Chinese world-class universities lack substance. The reality is, on one hand, that China has loomed as a giant of the world, with increasing signs of the expansion of China's soft power (Nye, 2004). On the other hand, however, Chinese universities have gained little impact on their prioritized developed countries, although their impact on those in the developing world has been much more evident, often achieved by provincial institutions (Yang, 2012b). The most systematically planned soft power policy so far involves building up the Confucius Institutes worldwide to

spread the teaching of Mandarin and Chinese culture around the world (Yang, 2010), which have not been always well perceived outside China.

Except for the Confucius Institutes, there has been a shortage of attention paid to everyday interactions between Chinese universities and their foreign counterparts. Neither the Ministry of Education nor individual institutions have a clear understanding of the strategic role played by universities in the projection and enhancement of soft power. In an age of information, international education exchange and cooperation fall squarely under the rubric of soft power, and winning hearts and minds still composes an important part of the international higher education equation. Commensurate with its recent rise of economic and political power, China needs to enhance its concurrent soft power. This needs to be understood in a historical context. Since the mid-19th century, China has been at the receiving end of the eastward movement of Western knowledge. The function of higher education institutions in absorbing knowledge has been emphasized. With China's current rise, the function of Chinese universities to project Eastern knowledge westward needs to be considered seriously in internationalization, especially when there is a growing interest in China for study over traditional non-English speaking destinations (*ICEF Monitor*, 2014). Other facts also point to the growing significance of Chinese higher education, including the largest system in the world in terms of sheer numbers and the second largest producer of scientific papers. They pave the way further for Chinese universities to play their soft power role in their routine international networking. This requires well-thought, long-term planning. Such careful thinking has been largely absent in the internationalization of Chinese universities.

Instead, Chinese universities are looking to their Western (particularly American) counterparts for standards, policy innovations, and solutions to their development problems, regardless of their different status within the Chinese system. Top Chinese universities compare themselves with their prominent Western peers such as Oxford and Yale. Their internationalization focuses overwhelmingly on the West. The catch-up mindset since the 19th century remains strong in China. It has been not only necessary for China's survival but also strategically effective. University reforms in China today are a combination of externally imposed standards, forcing China to adopt international (usually Western, and often American) models of education and administration, as well as voluntary and even enthusiastic acceptance of foreign standards of academic excellence. Most of the international models for reform used by Chinese universities are based on the American experience and gained through educational exchange as well as international collaboration. This is even more the case with China's most prestigious institutions such as Peking, Tsinghua, and Fudan Universities. Such unreserved adoption of Western (especially US) policy and practice may not be totally appropriate for a country with a very different history and cultural traditions (Mohrman, 2005). There is an urgent need for critical examination of the long-term consequences of grafting American academic practices onto a Chinese base.

TRANSCENDING THE MINDSET OF TIANXIA

The aforementioned contradictions and paradoxes are fundamentally cultural. Contemporary China is full of paradoxes in almost every major social domain. From an educational perspective, Chinese theorists are rarely found in China's contemporary university social science textbooks. The society is fitted with dual systems: while official (formal) institutions mimic Western models, the unofficial (informal, yet powerful) system is based on traditional social and cultural values. Their strikingly different cultural roots and orientations mean that the two systems do not support each other and often work against each other. The duality has led to China's remarkable complexities, affected Westerners' development of a nuanced understanding of China for education and schooling, and proven highly difficult for even the Chinese to unpack let alone integrate within a notion of internationalization of higher education.

For the past two centuries, tensions between the traditional Chinese and Western cultures has been the dominant ideological reason for twists and turns in China's modernization of its education system. The dramatic change from a glorious past as a world cultural center to a semi-colony partitioned by the Western powers at will has been extremely turbulent for the Chinese people. Rarely have the Chinese treated their traditional and Western cultures on an equal footing. It is therefore necessary to be aware of the possible damage caused by Chinese nationalistic pride, coupled with its resolute drive to become a central international power. During most of the 19th century and the entire 20th century, it is possible to discern a struggle going on in China: to achieve the economic and social benefits of Western science and technology, while asserting its patterns of culture and knowledge in ways that maintain Chinese identity (Yang, 2002).

Throughout the modern era, Western and Chinese cultures have contended for hegemony in the Chinese political and intellectual circles. An integration that brings together aspects of their philosophical heritages has never been achieved. Although well positioned by the wealth of unique cultural heritage to take their opportunities to contribute substantially to nurturing an international order that reflects and supports the rich diversity around the world, and to counteract the tendency towards homogeneity and standardization fuelled by the interests of technology, communication and commerce, the Chinese have appeared to be bogged down again into a familiar quagmire: either China triumphs or the West conquers, rather than reaching a win-win situation based on an equal footing of both cultural traditions. This has had a great impact on how China engages with the West. Such traditional Sino-centrism, as expressed by the Tianxia (天下) worldview, has affected Chinese people's perceptions of both Westerners and themselves.

Tianxia is the Chinese pronunciation for "all-under-heaven." It is an ancient Chinese cultural concept to denote the lands, space, and area divinely appointed to the Emperor by universal and well-defined principles of order (Zhao, 2005). The center of this land was seen to form the center of a worldview that centered on the

imperial court and went concentrically outward to major and minor officials and then the common citizens, and finally ending with the fringe "barbarians." Narrators taking the Tianxia perspective see China as a state concerned with the interest of all instead of only caring about China's own interest. The country at the center should care about others. Tianxia has no boundary, and therefore has no self-other dichotomy. No one is outside by definition. By considering that everyone in the world belongs to a harmonious world order, they are then hierarchically ranked in accordance with how well one is in compliance with the cultural ideal of selflessness. Accordingly, all are expected to learn their due roles by emulating the selfless state at the center.

In this system, there exists the opportunity to enhance one's status if one is devoted to self-rectification (Metzger, 1986, 2006). While the roles each plays may differ, no one should be fixed upon any specific roles because they are not an essential character of one's identity. Such a worldview was not exclusionary in nature: outer groups, such as ethnic minorities and foreign people, who accepted the mandate of the Chinese emperor were themselves received and included into the Chinese Tianxia. It is a self-cultivation process, without fixed connotation, and thus no fixed other either. Distinction lies between Chinese and barbarians, and the relations between Chinese and barbarians are changeable (meaning that anytime Chinese could turn into barbarians while barbarians could become Chinese). It provides the same identity to all under heaven on the one hand and connects everyone together through differentiated roles played by them on the other. Ideally, no single role player is left alone without being cared for by others.

The concept formed the basis for the worldview of the Chinese people and nations influenced by them, including Japan, Korea, and Vietnam. Within a Western framework of international affairs based on the idea that the sovereign nations dealt with each other as equals, China's traditional Tianxia worldview collapsed. However, it has continued as a cultural worldview even if its political potency was fractured by incursions of Western countries. The mentality becomes stronger and more evident when the Chinese power increases. It is not only a philosophy at the abstract level. It is also a life attitude at the practical level (Parfitt, 1997). Located at the center of traditional Chinese visions of world order, it was essential to the governance and self-understanding of over two millennia of Chinese empire. Associated with political sovereignty, classical Chinese political thought claimed that the emperor of China had received the mandate of heaven and thus became the ruler of the entire world.

However, there would always be areas of the known world which were not under the control of the Emperor. In Chinese ancient political theory, the rulers of the unknown areas derived their power from the emperor. In the ideal form of the Tianxia system, hybrid components coexist peacefully with one another in a kind of ontological democracy. The Tianxia method encourages introspective looking to nullify any incentives from disrupting harmony (Wang, 2004). It combines the seemingly contradictory discourses of nationalism and cosmopolitanism (Callahan, 2008). To Zhao (2005), it is more than a place: it is a method for looking at world

problems and world order from a truly global perspective, rather than thinking about the world from an inferior national or individual perspective. The world needs to be measured according to a world standard, rather than according to national interests. A proper (in its purest form) Tianxia system does not have an "outside", either geographically or ethically, because the system does not reject "the Other". Instead, in the system distinctions are between inside and outside, and even friends and enemies are relative rather than absolute. The system provides a productive form of self/Other relations that do not exclude difference. Its goal is "transformation" that changes the self and the Other.

Although in theory the Chinese-barbarian distinction in the Tianxia system is not fixed, in reality the Chinese were almost always at the center. In this sense, the Tianxia worldview was much in line with the longstanding Sino-centrism. Chinese cultural superiority in the region for thousands of years fostered a mentality of self-conceit. China has been essentially a cultural entity. The traditional Chinese identity transcends ethnic and social institutional entities. Indeed, to be Chinese is in the final analysis the same as to be civilized. A non-Chinese with a belief in Confucianism could be accepted as Chinese by the literati and officialdom while one would be disdained as a beast if perceived as betraying Confucian ethics. The universalism formed by a monolithic moral code has been equated with Confucian ethics. The Confucian culture, systems, and human relations are considered the most highly developed in the world.

The emphasis on superiority leads to the replacement of national identity with Confucian ideology, and the unique Chinese nationalistic attitude: firstly none of the specialties of race, language, or custom can be treated as the basis for national identity – there is a universal *Dao* (principle) overriding all cultural values. Secondly, the Chinese form of human relations, system, and culture can be viewed as the incarnation of the ultimate moral value. China as perceived by its citizens is the center of the world. All other nations are classified as vassal states and, in this respect, the Tianxia worldview replicates the self/other superiority that Said (1978) criticized in the West. Most Chinese people have not gone beyond their traditional Sino-centrism, which fundamentally regards traditional (largely Confucian) culture as the best. Such mentality has been the basis for the old Confucian aim "to learn from the barbarian to defeat the barbarian" (Yang, 2002, p. 9).

The Tianxia concept has faced fatal challenges ever since China's encounters with the West in the 19th century. Repeated defeats led China to feel disadvantaged in its relations with the West, and the West came to China with enormous prestige. Chinese people have ever since been obsessed with becoming Western. Through the powerful presence of the West, Western knowledge has been systematically institutionalized in the school curriculum, university disciplines, official ideology, and even daily discourses. The May Fourth Movement in 1919 advocated a center-periphery frame where science was regarded as the new center of under-heaven (Lin, 1979). Westernization was an attempt to grasp the new norm brought in by Western forces and Scientism took over the role of Confucianism. After realizing

the impossibility of resisting Western modernity, the Chinese began to restore their status at the center by adopting Western science and institutions (Shih, 2012).

With absorption of Western knowledge as the pressing matter of the moment, China's real effort in educational institutions is to upgrade academic programs based on Western models and experience, from teaching content to ideologies underlying how textbooks are compiled. The wealth of traditional Chinese knowledge is largely missing in most school curriculum. Indigenous Chinese knowledge has been given little opportunity to influence the ideas and practices of educational policy and practice in China. They are seldom presented as established and coherent sets of beliefs, and are largely devalued and even ignored as processes or coherent methods of learning and teaching. After the establishment of Western-styled education system for more than a century, fundamental assumptions of Chinese indigenous knowledge have been excluded by the very nature of the dominant Western paradigm to a surprising extent (Yang, 2005). Although still influential, the traditional center-periphery frame has been transformed especially in terms of the way it functions. Ancient Chinese narrative of Chinese-barbarian differentiation has been replaced by Western-Chinese, with the West at the center and the Chinese at the periphery.

As the West became the new force at the center, it took Chinese thinkers an extended period of time to realize how unfit the Chinese perspective of world order was in the context of global history during the mid-19th century. Their quest for supreme morality collapsed with the Western intrusion and restoration became unlikely – unless the Chinese were willing to jettison the traditional understanding of morality to adopt a new standard (Shih, 2012). While the Tianxia worldview has long been dismantled, its influence on the Chinese mentality to perceive their relations with the West has refused to walk away. China always wants recognition of its world stature, even when it lacks economic or military might. When it was difficult to finalize the moral principle at the center, there were imaginations about the physical centrality such as Mao Zedong's two-camp and three-world theories. China has always been keen to have its global role, at least as a model in the developing world. When China detonated its first nuclear device in 1967, Mao proclaimed, "China should not only be the political center of the world revolution, it must also become the military and technical center of the world revolution" (Yim, 1975, p. 161).

Therefore, although ancient concepts of Tianxia and the much related Sino-centrism have been shattered by Western powers since the 19th century, their influence lingers. The two different aspects, universalism and the idea that Chinese culture is the most developed in the world, coexist in Sino-centrism. When China is a powerful nation, this universal aspect is fully displayed. However, the Chinese could go to the other extreme when the nation/culture is beset by crisis looking up to the West as the criterion. As a former cultural empire and latterly a semi-colony, the shift from glory to humiliation caused a shock from which Chinese, from political and academic elites to the populace, could barely recover. Chinese people have shown a mentality either as master or slave in their relations with the West over the past

two centuries. Rarely have they adopted an appropriate attitude toward the West or themselves.

Although the contemporary international systematic theory founded upon the concept of nation-states does not particularly favor the Tianxia worldview, China's recent growth as an international power has been paralleled by increasing calls for traditional values to combat the rapid growth of failed Western ideas. An idealized version of China's imperial past is now inspiring scholars and policymakers in Greater China to form their plans for China's – and by extension the world's – future. Tianxia, as a Chinese model of world order that is seen by them as universally valid, has been gaining currency with both Chinese officials and scholars in the 21st century (Shih, 2012). Unhappy with the Westphalian world order, some argue for new world concepts which will lead to new world structures. The Chinese-style solutions to world problems that Zhao (2005) proposes emerged at the right time. What was seen as the problem over the past two centuries has quickly become the solution to the world's ills. Tianxia has become a heuristic device for understanding how Chinese political and intellectual elites view their role in the world and the world itself (Leheny, 2006). However, like other alternatives, it is state-centric (Callahan, 2008). It therefore presents a new hegemony where imperial China's hierarchical governance is updated for the 21st century.

END REMARKS

Together with other East Asian societies, China's higher education development has been achieving highly, especially recently. Internationalization has been a strong contributor. The achievement becomes even more remarkable when compared with other non-Western societies. Through internationalization, China has established a Western-styled modern higher education system. Although China has an evident pride of the idea that Chinese universities are not willing to assume that Western models define excellence, few are able to theorize their differences from Western universities. Building their own identity is doomed to be an arduous task for Chinese universities. What has been lacking is a cultural perspective that gives weight to the impact of traditional ways of cultural thinking on contemporary development.

To China, modern universities are foreign transplants. Its strikingly different cultural roots and heritages have led to continuous conflicts between its indigenous and the imposed Western higher education values. Chinese universities have their institutional establishments based on Western values on one hand, and another system supported by traditional culture on the other. The two systems do not support each other. Instead, constant tensions between them lead to low efficiency of university operation. Although there have been strong attempts to indigenize the Western idea of a university, little has been achieved. The Western concept of a university has been taken for its practicality (Yang, 2014). This is precisely the bottleneck of Chinese higher education development.

China has much to learn from its own history. Unlike the existent literature on Chinese higher education development that has been overwhelmed by the powerful influence of economic and political realities, such learning demands an appropriate cultural perspective that integrates Chinese indigenous traditions with the West. In history, only twice has foreign influence brought to Chinese culture such a great impact that the host culture was fundamentally changed. One was the introduction of Buddhism to China, which took over a millennium for the Chinese to receive, respond to its challenges, and reshape Chinese mentalities at both the intellectual and the popular levels. The other, the intrusion of Western culture into China since the 19th century, is still ongoing as the result of a large-scale Western expansion. The magnitude is far greater than that in the first case, at a time when the vitality of Chinese culture was just about to exhaust, while the momentum of Western culture was at its zenith (Hsu, 2001). The process is far from completed, and 'pain' is felt constantly and regularly.

Only when the aspects of Chinese and Western philosophical heritages are brought together successfully, can the Chinese higher education system become truly world-class. Universities have three layers: materials on the surface, social institutions in the middle, and values at the core. By far, China's import of the Western model has been centered mostly on the material level, with some touches on social institutions, while the core of the Western model has not been understood fully, let alone implemented. While there lack clear signs of such combination, China is best positioned to achieve this in comparison with any other parts of the non-Western world, provided that the much desired integration is achieved between traditional Chinese and imported Western higher learning values. To do this, however, Chinese higher education must transcend the mindset of Tianxia as China appears to be regaining its place at the center of world development, and the Westphalian nation-state is straining under the weight of globalization.

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4. INTERNATIONALIZATION OF HIGHER EDUCATION IN CHINA

Two Case Studies[1]

INTRODUCTION

This chapter reviews two joint-venture universities in China: University of Nottingham Ningbo and Xi'an Jiaotong-Liverpool University. Both universities are the product and offspring of British and Chinese institutions. They are the pioneers of internationalization of higher education in China and provide a benchmark and standard for the continued reform in China's higher education. In recent years, China has accelerated its efforts to globalize higher education through joint ventures with other countries' universities. New entities have emerged: for example, Duke-Wuhan University campus in Kunshan and New York University Shanghai in collaboration with East China Normal University. Both of them followed the precedent established by British universities which continue to pioneer academic partnerships in China. The UK entered the domain of higher education in China early. A report published by The Quality Assurance Agency (2006) discusses various academic collaborative activities between the United Kingdom and China, ranging from ministerial-level annual summits to degree programs, listing eighty-two UK higher education institutions stating that "they had or were intending to establish a link with a Chinese institution to deliver a UK higher education award" (Quality Assurance Agency, 2006).

Confirming the success of the University of Nottingham Ningbo China (UNNC), Agora, a British think tank, argues a cautious stance towards British educational presence in China, listing different reasons, one of which seems to be that the British should be wise enough not to help a major competitor strengthen its higher education. Sir Colin Campbell, the former Vice Chancellor of the University of Nottingham, however, provided a catalogue of reasons for UNNC, including the recognition of China as an emerging major power, exporting teaching and research expertise to China, and providing a British education in China at a discount (Fazackerly & Worthington, 2007). Establishing an educational operation overseas is a complex challenge. Numerous studies have listed the benefits including impacts on students, benefits for the faculty, reputation for the institution, and broader impacts for state and local communities, as well as associated risks and challenges such as sustainability, funding, student recruitment, tuition sharing, and management

S. Guo & Y. Guo (Eds.), Spotlight on China: Chinese Education in the Globalized World, 51–66.
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(Becker, 2009; Council of Graduate Schools, 2010). A variety of success cases have been identified in the literature including the Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology's campus in Vietnam (Wilmoth, 2004) and Monash University Sunway in Malaysia (Dyt, 2007). Both Australian Universities were able to match their unique strengths with the particular demands of the host countries, focusing on latter's sustainable development as major rationale for an overseas campus. Those cases (Wilmoth, 2004; Dyt, 2007) demonstrate that the success of a transnational educational operation requires a match of the source institution's unique strength with the characteristics of social conditions and development strategies of the host country. Given the demographic, social, and economic circumstances of the host country, the source institution may have a menu of choice in the selection of its host or cooperating partner and through working with the partner, design a governance and management structure suitable for the mission of the new entity. This chapter addresses the issues related to governance, management, and mission strategies of transnational educational collaboration in China through case studies of the joint ventures that the University of Nottingham and the University of Liverpool established in China with their respective local partners.

SOME THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES AND THE CHINESE CONTEXT

There are three predominant issues in transnational education: governance, management, and mission strategy. They are determined not only by the nature and composition of the source university, but also the constraints of the host country. For the latter, host government regulations as well as the interest and capacity of the host partners are dominant drivers. Unlike some other countries that allow foreign universities to have a free hand in setting up and running an educational enterprise, China's Ministry of Education has developed a set of rules and regulations on the presence and operation of foreign higher educational institutions in China. No foreign university can set up a program, let alone, a campus, without establishing a partnership with a Chinese institution and the head of the offspring institution must be a Chinese citizen. The core strategy of the source university may not be consistent with the core strategy of the Chinese partner university. The two institutions may have different goals and expectations in the joint venture. The proportion of the representation by the source and cooperating institutions on the governing board varies in China. The difference in the proportion may have material impact not only on what the source and cooperating institutions see as the best for them, but also on what they may decide as the optimal for the offspring institution.

Therefore, mission strategy and partnership for the joint venture are intertwined and influence each other, with important consequences for the governance and management of the new entity. In a pioneering study of transnational education, Miller-Idriss and Hanauer (2011) discuss two competing theories of mission strategies in transnational higher education – the convergence/globalization model

and the borrowing/localization model. While the former refers to conformity toward an international norm of education, the latter applies to the cases in which a foreign model is adapted and localized to suit the needs of the host country. A joint venture can adopt either model as its core strategy. Miller-Idriss and Hanauer (2011) collect data on transnational education institutions in the Middle East and conduct a systematic study of the genre of these institutions by classifying them into six categories: replica campus, branch campus, turkey foreign style independent institutions, offshore programs, foreign style institutions, and virtual branch campus. Though different prototypes share the common denominator of foreign delivery of higher education in terms of the curriculum and faculty, they differ in foreign governance and ownership. The degree of control by the source university is the strongest under the replica campus and the weakest under the foreign style model.

Finally, Verbik and Merkley (2006) differentiate the establishment of transnational education into three types on the basis of funding sources: those self-funded by the source university, those funded by the host government or domestic private sources, and those with facilities provided for by the host government or other domestic sources. There may be a combination of provisions of host capital and host facilities. Foreign governance is the strongest under the self-funded model, followed by the other two scenarios or a combination of funding and facilities by the host. However, there is a trade-off between risk and responsibility. In order to reduce financial risks and uncertainties, a source university may give up its control in exchange for funding and facilities.

As to be discussed below, the University of Nottingham Ningbo China (UNNC) and Xi'an Jiaotong-Liverpool University (XJTLU) have unique governance structures. Unlike the prototypes described by Miller-Idriss and Hanauer (2011), they are governed by their respective boards, with balanced representation by the British and the Chinese. Though the mission strategies of the source universities (the University of Nottingham and the University of Liverpool, two public universities in Britain) are similar, their offspring campuses in China are different from each other. While the University of Nottingham Ningbo China leans toward the convergence/globalization model and adopts a British liberal arts education model, Xi'an Jiaotong-Liverpool University finds itself closer to the borrowing/localization model by creating its own identity through the joint strengths of the two parent universities.

The core strategies of the two offspring institutions were determined by the selection of a partner. The academically weak partner for the University of Nottingham guarantees the latter's control of the curriculum, the equal academic strengths between the University of Liverpool and its Chinese partner, Xi'an Jiaotong University, results in shared control of the curriculum. While the University of Nottingham Ningbo China was built by its partner's parent company, Xi'an Jiaotong-Liverpool University was constructed with the help of a municipal government. The different sources of investment, in combination with the different objectives of investments, prescribe control over the revenue.

NINGBO AND SUZHOU EXPERIENCES

Ningbo lies seventy-eight miles to the south of Shanghai, across the Bay of Hangzhou. It is an ancient city of over four thousand years of history. With a population of only 5.49 million today, many well-known Chinese originated there, from Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek to the world's most famous cellist Yoyo Ma, along with about ninety members of the Chinese Academy of Sciences and the Chinese Academy of Engineering. Ningbo also leads the country in producing philanthropists for education: Bao Yugang, Shau Yifu, Wang Kuanchen, and Dong Haoyun, to mention a few.[2] Ningbo has also earned a national reputation for its entrepreneurship and business acumen. Toward the close of the First Opium War, Ningbo was among the first Chinese cities seized by the British military force.[3] The fall of Ningbo symbolically ushered in the one-hundred-year decline of China.

One hundred and eighty-five kilometers away from Ningbo, Suzhou was considered the Venice of the Orient, though this acclaim is over-rated. With the exception of a few gardens where brooks crisscrossed the bamboo land, the city is not distinguishable from other Chinese urban areas characterized by high-rise buildings, crowded main streets, and an ever increasing number of automobiles. If Ningbo has built its wealth through entrepreneurship, then Suzhou still sustains the notion of a laidback style and a myth of natural beauty; after all, it used to be a place for emperors to enjoy the moon and the lakes and for poets to fantasize upon a sight of a temple and sounds of raindrops on the lotus leaves.

One hundred and sixty years following the end of the Opium War, the British presence found itself again in Ningbo and two years later, in Suzhou, this time establishing universities. This move by the British represents a strategic decision that has many implications, financial, cultural, and academic, among others. Today, the University of Nottingham and the University of Liverpool are brand names in China. The growing numbers of the Chinese students in these two universities in Britain speak of the success of their strategic goals for setting up their overseas campuses.

Ningbo and Suzhou are at the frontline of the internationalization of higher education in China. Though the two universities in Britain founded their offspring campuses in the two cities with certain similar long-term strategies, their main core strategies, models, and practices differ from each other. For instance, their Chinese partners represent two extremes in the Chinese educational echelon, with very different institutional missions, strengths, and purposes. The educational programs on these two campuses in China also demonstrate unique characteristics, despite the common emphasis on the western tradition of liberal arts education. The choice of location and the physical appearance of the facilities and landscape are consistent with their own, unique, academic visions. Faculty recruitment and management take shape in accordance with the core strategies they have adopted for their long-term vitality and viability. The financial models and structures are divergent, with outcomes representing two different trajectories into the future. This essay

discusses the differences as well as similarities between the two institutions and their implications to internationalization of higher education in China or elsewhere in the world.

The University of Nottingham-Ningbo[4]

The most ambitious endeavor of international academic collaboration in China can be found in the creation of the University of Nottingham Ningbo China. With over 23,000 students, the University of Nottingham is the fifth largest and one of the most selective universities in Britain. Established in 1798 as an adult education school, the University has evolved into a research-led institution, producing applicable knowledge that has changed the world, including the work by the two Nobel laureates on Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI), silicon polymers, vitro culture of plants, and micropropation techniques. Its research has earned the University a seat among the top four universities for private funding in the UK. Currently, it was ranked 74th in the latest 2011–12 Quacquarelli Symonds World University Rankings, up from its 86th position three years ago.[5] It was ranked 84th top university by the 2011 Shanghai Jiaotong University's Academic Ranking of World Universities (ARWU).[6]

At the very beginning of the new millennium, the University of Nottingham chose its own way of ushering in a new era and strategically appointed a Chinese citizen Yang Fujia as its sixth Chancellor. Yang, the former President of Fudan University (1993–1998), enunciated what he saw a first-rate university should possess: unique academic strengths, excellent faculty and students, free expressions and independent thinking, and sufficient non-government financial support (Yang, 2008).

After Yang assumed the Chancellorship in 2000, he brought up the idea of establishing a Nottingham campus in China.[7] At the time, Nottingham was engaged in consolidating its campus in Malaysia, which was established in 2000 as the first overseas campus by any UK university. Chancellor Yang's idea of a Chinese campus prevailed. Initially, Yang made inquiries and attempted to secure municipal support from Shanghai. Ningbo, Yang's hometown, was eventually selected as the location for the future campus because of the strong support from the local government.

In contrast with the University of Nottingham, its partner in China was not a top tier institution. Established in 1993 as a collective ownership specializing in education, Zhejiang Wanli Education Group founded Wanli International Kindergarten, Ningbo International Primary School, and Ningbo Wanli Middle School. In 1998, it received the mandate to take over and manage the Zhejiang Normal Vocational School of Agricultural Technology which, founded in 1950, faced declining enrollments, resource shortages, and a faculty exodus (Xiamen University, 2008). Under Wanli Education Group, the former vocational school reemerged as the Zhejiang Wanli College, transforming a small trade school of 2,000 students, 375 faculty and staff, and 5 departments into a comprehensive university comprised of over 20,000 students, 1,100 faculty and staff, and 9 colleges offering 30 majors.

The pioneer of the Wanli model was Xu Yafen, Chairwoman of Wanli Education Group. The concept of the Wanli model differentiates it from both public and private universities. Unlike the former, Wanli emphasizes the market demand for its curricular development, accepts assessment of its success on the basis of parents' and students' satisfaction, and adopts a compensation system awarding those who make contributions to the University.[8] The Board of Zhejiang Wanli College assumes "responsibility of non-academic affairs, such as infrastructure construction and external coordination," empowering the President to focus singularly on academic administration (Xu, 2007).[9] This governing approach of Wanli Education Group later became the modus operandi of its cooperation with the University of Nottingham, under which the British institution took care of academic affairs while Wanli Education Group took responsibility for the construction of the campus, management of the facilities, and provision of services.[10]

The governance and management structures of Nottingham are interesting. The Board of UNNC has 15 members: 7 from Britain and 7 from China, plus the President of UNNC. In accordance with the Chinese regulation, the President of any joint international campus in collaboration with China must be a Chinese citizen. President Yang Fujia is simultaneously a Chinese citizen and Chancellor of the University of Nottingham, making him the best person to meet the Chinese regulation and to ensure the British interest. The Chairwoman of the Board of UNNC is Madame Xu Yafen, Chair of the Boards of Wanli Education Group and of Zhejiang Wanli College. The UNNC Board appoints the senior staff of the university.

Another interesting personnel arrangement at UNNC is the position of the Secretary of the Communist Party of China. In Chinese universities, as in almost all other social units in the country, the Party Secretary is a powerful and ubiquitous presence. Usually, the positions for the administrative CEO and the Party Secretary are assumed by two individuals; seldom, as is the case at Zhejiang Wanli College, are the two positions filled by a single individual. The University of Nottingham Ningbo China, as a joint venture, had the option of not establishing the position of the Party Secretary. At the insistence of Yang Fujia, President of UNNC and Chancellor of the University of Nottingham, UNNC had a Party Secretary installed. President Yang saw several advantages in having a Party Secretary on the campus. First, the Party Secretary will ensure that UNNC is in compliance with China's laws and policies. Second, the Party Secretary will interface and coordinate with local governments where his or her counterparts are decision-makers. Third, the Party Secretary will help resolve conflict on the campus.[11]

The other major personnel decision that President/Chancellor Yang made was to appoint the Provost as Chief Executive Officer. It is not coincidental that the Provost of UNNC was from Nottingham's home campus. "We want the University of Nottingham Ningbo China to be like the University of Nottingham in Britain," said President Yang, "and it is important not only to have a Provost from Nottingham, but also to make the Provost CEO of the Ningbo campus."[12]

The tempo at which UNNC has grown is mind-boggling. In 2003, the idea of a Chinese campus was crystallized. In 2004, land was secured and Wanli Education Group broke ground of the new campus; simultaneously, UNNC conducted its first class on the borrowed campus of Zhejiang Wanli College. In 2005, the construction of the campus was completed, including the administrative building, instructional building, dormitories, faculty house, and gymnasium. In 2006, UNNC accepted on a trial basis postgraduate students at the master's level. Next year, the master's programs were officially approved. In 2008, Ph.D. students were admitted on a trial basis. In the following year, the Ph.D. programs were officially approved. The University of Nottingham Ningbo China has been so far a unique experience in China. Its curriculum is anchored in and reflects Western liberal arts tradition; classes are conducted in English and faculty serve as individual tutors in addition to lecturing.

Its bucolic campus, fronting the Nottingham Lake and traversed by the Nottingham River, has all the environs of a small elite private college in the West. The administrative building, with its august-looking steeple clock tower, is a replica of the Trent Building on the home campus in Britain. Groves of hollies along the banks of the meandering Nottingham River and gigantic vases of carnations on the sides of the crosswalks enhanced an idyllic ambiance. Except for the towering nine-story student dormitories, extant and under construction, indicative of the size of the student population on the campus at present and in the future, it might be mistaken for a small liberal arts college in British or U.S. suburbia.

In 2009, UNNC had about 3,600 students including 3,291 undergraduate students, 102 pre-master's students, and 184 Master's students. It also had 191 international students, 19 students from Hong Kong, Macao or Taiwan, and 60 exchange students from overseas partner universities as well as Nottingham's UK and Malaysian campuses. The academic staff comprised 123 full-time faculty members and 8 part-time teaching personnel. The University also planned to add about 30 faculty members in the coming year. Chancellor Yang hoped that UNNC would be able to maintain an intimate learning environment, rather than evolving into another large university in China, though he admitted that eventually UNNC might have over 8,000 students just in a few years.

Among UNNC's faculty, roughly 10% of them came from the University of Nottingham in Britain; about 80% were recruited worldwide. The rest were hired among haigui (Chinese who returned to China after receiving education in the West). The standard contract was a five-year renewable appointment.

The UNNC's academic programs are housed in seven schools: International Business, International Communications Studies, International Studies, Engineering, Computer Science, Sustainable Technology, and English Language and Literature. All the curricula are from the home campus of Nottingham.[13] Students enjoy the small-class environment, which helps them develop bond among them. They also have easy access to the faculty and administration. Each student is assigned a tutor

who is a faculty member.[14] While the curriculum was anchored in Western liberal education, certain courses were offered with Chinese market demands in mind such as those in communications studies, business, and computer sciences. Students are also trained to think broadly and critically; they have more freedom to select electives or to transfer to another program than their counterparts in a Chinese university, typical of liberal education in the West. Because of their English skills, extensive training in critical thinking, and well-chosen specialization, job placement rates of UNNC students were very high.

The Xi'an Jiaotong-Liverpool University[15]

The Xi'an Jiaotong-Liverpool University welcomed its first class in September 2006, two years behind Nottingham-Ningbo. It was the joint product of Xi'an Jiaotong University and the University of Liverpool. It aimed at educating technical and managerial professionals with international perspectives and competitive capabilities, matching global economic and social development with its expertise in business and technology, conducting research in areas where humanity faces severe challenges, and exploring new models for higher education that will exert a strong influence on the development of education in China and the world.

Rather than using a comprehensive, liberal arts college model, XJLU adopted science, technology and management as its academic corner stone, with an emphasis on applications. It would not become simply a clone of the University of Liverpool; neither would it be just another typical Chinese university. It was created to have a new identity reflecting the strengths of both parent campuses while duplicating neither.

Like the University of Nottingham, the University of Liverpool is a member of the Russell Group, which is composed of large research-intensive universities that account for two-thirds of government research awards and contracts. It is also a member of the N8 group for research collaboration, which comprises eight research-intensive universities in Northern England. With over 20,000 students, it is one of the largest public universities in Britain. In 2011–12, it was ranked 123rd worldwide in the Quacquarelli Symonds World University Rankings[16] and tied in the 101–150 group in the 2011 Shanghai Jiaotong University's ARWU ranking.[17]

One of the oldest and the most prestigious universities in China, Xi'an Jiaotong University is a member of the C9 League, composed of China's nine top universities (China's Ivy League). With an enrollment of around 32,000 students and about 200 Master's and 100 Ph.D. programs in Science, Engineering, Medicine, Economics, Management, Arts, Language and Law, it remains one of the top universities in China with strengths in science, technology, and management.[18] While the University as a whole was ranked 382nd in QS, its engineering program was ranked 114th, ahead of the engineering program of the University of Nottingham (184th) in the same ranking system. It is not coincident that in the naming of the offspring university, Xi'an Jiaotong precedes Liverpool.

The relationship between the University of Liverpool and Xi'an Jiaotong was described as qiang qiang he zuo (the cooperation of two strong partners), compared to the unequal academic marriage between the University of Nottingham and its partner, Zhejiang Wanli College. The leading fields at the University of Liverpool include veterinary sciences, urban planning, architecture, medicine, engineering, physics, geology, and chemistry. The top disciplines at Xi'an Jiaotong are dynamics and thermal engineering physics, management science and engineering, business, electrical engineering, and mechanical engineering.[19] Because of the combination of the strengths of the two parent universities, Xi'an Jiao-Liverpool University focuses on sciences, engineering, and management.

The core strategy is to develop a unique strength out of the superior endowments of the parent universities. XJTLU's academic programs include biological sciences, computer science and software engineering, electrical and electronic engineering, languages and culture, mathematical sciences, civil engineering, civic design, and business, economics and management. Research priorities were given to new and renewable energy, biotechnology, biological engineering, environmental protection and sustainable development, environmental chemistry, internet and communications, artificial intelligence, financial engineering, financial mathematics, and urban planning.

The goal of the University is the cultivation of technical and management leaders with international visions, who provide services to social and economic development. The prospect of the University is to become an international university in China, with unique Chinese characteristics. "We are unique," said President Xi, "there are several thousand universities in China. We are not interested in adding another similar Chinese university, but we will not clone another British university. We are aiming at creating a university that will have impact on higher education in China and the world… Our goal is to combine the best practice of Chinese universities with the best practice of Western universities to create our own unique pedagogical and management model."[20]

Symbolically, in contrast with UNNC's belfry representing its motherland, the centerpiece for Xi'an Jiaotong-Liverpool University is a group of statues including those of Confucius, Mo Zi, Lao Zi, Socrates, Aristotle, and Plato. Not far away from the main building were two children ensconced in gigantic chairs facing each other, with their architectural theme as Dialogue between the East and the West.

Typically, a graduate of Xi'an Jiaotong-Liverpool University receives two separate degrees and a graduation diploma. One academic degree is from China, and the other from the University of Liverpool. By contrast, University of Nottingham Ningbo China only grants degrees from the University of Nottingham. Xi'an Jiaotong-Liverpool is the only joint venture between a foreign university and a Chinese university that grants a separate Chinese degree approved by the Ministry of Education of China.[21]

In terms of governance, the Chinese have a majority on the Board of XJTLU, compared to the delicate balance on the Board of University of Nottingham, Ningbo.

The Governing Board of Xi'an Jiaotong-Liverpool University was composed of nine members, five of whom are from Xi'an Jiaotong University while the remaining four represent the University of Liverpool. Executive President Xi was one of the four representatives of the University of Liverpool on the Board. The Chair of the Board was Party Secretary, Professor Wang Jianhua, who was also a member of the National Political Consultative Congress. By contrast, the Chair of the Board of University of Nottingham Ningbo China was Chair of the Board of Wanli Education Group, the parent of Zhejiang Wanli College, the academic partner of the University of Nottingham. The Vice Chair of the Board of Xi'an Jiaotong-Liverpool University was Sir Professor Howard Neweby, Vice Chancellor and CEO of the University of Liverpool. Clearly, the Board of the Xi'an Jiaotong-Liverpool University was dominated by the Chinese team in terms of the number, if not the position.

The Executive President and Vice President for Academic Affairs were appointed by the University of Liverpool. The current Executive President Xi used to be Vice President of Xi'an Jiaotong University, and participated in building the new campus. He was selected by the University of Liverpool to become Executive President of Xi'an Jiaotong-Liverpool University, because of which, he also became Pro-Vice Chancellor of the University of Liverpool and consequently stepped down from his position as Vice President of Xi'an Jiaotong University.

The time from conception to birth of Xi'an Jiaotong-Liverpool University was exactly three years. In September 2003, Vice Chancellor of the University of Liverpool, Sir Drummond Bone and Pro-Vice Chancellor Michael Fang were instrumental in setting the joint enterprise with Xi'an Jiaotong University, working with their counterpart, Chancellor Wang Jianhua and Vice Chancellor Xi Youmin. A common understanding was reached between the two institutions in September 2003 for a joint campus. At the meeting, Chancellor Wang suggested that the Suzhou Industry Park be the campus location.

Compared with the self-contained campus of the University of Nottingham Ningbo China, which was constructed and managed by Wanli Education Group, Xi'an Jiaotong-Liverpool University was situated in an industrial park of universities, research institutes, and high-tech companies, constructed with government support and emulating Silicon Valley and Bangalore. Unlike the location of UNNC which was in the same city as its cooperating institution, Zhejiang Wanli College, the campus of XJTLU is 1,425 kilometers away from its cooperating institution, Xi'an Jiaotong University. The selection of an industrial park as its campus reflected XJTLU's emphasis on science and technology and its focus on applied research.[22]

Like the University of Nottingham Ningbo China, Xi'an Jiaotong-Liverpool University has been on the fast track from a concept to reality. In March 2005, the institutional proposal of a joint venture between the University of Liverpool and Xi'an Jiaotong University was evaluated by the Ministry of Education. The new campus was to benefit from the strengths of both the University of Liverpool and Xi'an Jiaotong University and would start with electronics, computer science,

commerce, and eventually increase its coverage in applied sciences, biology and management (Fang, 2010). In August 2005, the Ministry of Education approved the plan to start Xi'an Jiaotong-Liverpool University. In March 2006, the new campus successfully passed the second evaluation by the Ministry of Education. In May 2006, Dr. Tao Wenzhao was appointed the founding President and Dr. Michael Fang, first Executive Vice President. In July 2006, the first class of 164 students was admitted.

Xi'an Jiaotong-Liverpool University now has about 4,000 students registered in 19 different programmes in the fields of science, engineering and management and more than 60 international students. Around 750 XJTLU students are currently studying at the University of Liverpool. Similar to University of Nottingham-Ningbo, Xi'an Jiaotong-Liverpool University may increase its enrollment to 8,000 students, which can be easily achieved. Both universities benefit from the curriculum and quality control of the British educational system and adopt English as the medium of instruction. The classes are small and the faculty are assigned as advisors to a small group of students.[23]

Despite these similarities, the two institutions have very different missions and strategies of development. One has as the fundamental goal the provision of uncompromised, pure English education in China. The other endeavors to establish a unique academic enterprise, which is neither British nor Chinese. One is devoted to undergraduate education with some selected graduate programs; the other aspires to become a leading research university in science, engineering and management. While the University of Nottingham Ningbo China takes liberal arts education as given, Xi'an Jiaotong-Liverpool University adopts a more or less empirical approach. "What is needed by the world in the future? Can the tradition Chinese or Western universities answer the needs? If they can, what will be the solutions" (Xi, 2010)? Instead of directly copying the University of Liverpool or Xi'an Jiaotong University, XJTLU was supposed to draw upon the strengths of both institutions and to create its new entity.

While the Xi'an Jiaotong University and the University of Liverpool are almost equal partners in terms of academic orientation and reputation, the marriage between the University of Nottingham and Zhejiang Wanli College is not on the equal footing. As mentioned earlier, Zhejiang Wanli College was not a leading institution in China, and the involvement by Wanli Education Group was mainly in financial investment and management of the services on the campus. The lack of academic status of Zhejiang Wanli College allowed Nottingham to clone the University of Nottingham in China.

The University of Nottingham not only transplanted its academic programs from Britain to China, but also duplicated in China its buildings on the mother campus in Britain. The rivers, lakes and streets were named after their origin in Nottingham. In contrast with UNNC's self-contained campus, XJTLU was situated in an open environment sharing resources with other universities' branch campuses such as Qinghua University, Peking University, Fudan University, China University of

Science and Technology, Zhejiang University, Nanjing University, and Renmin University. The students and faculty in the Industrial Park share access to the library, dining halls, and shopping malls. It is like a consortium, only without a formal name.

Their financial model also varies. While the data are not public, the understanding is that the revenues at UNNC were apportioned between Wanli Education Group and University of Nottingham. Wanli Education Group built the campus infrastructure, managed the facilities, and collected dorm rent and revenues from auxiliary services. By contrast, both Xi'an Jiaotong University and University of Liverpool agreed that any surpluses generated by the operation of XJTLU stay at XJTLU, rather than appropriated to either Xi'an Jiaotong University or the University of Liverpool. This provided incentives for the offspring campus to manage its own finances and left resources to strengthen XJTLU's academic programs. In addition, in my interview with President Xi, I learned that the Administration of the Suzhou Industrial Park had not charged XJTLU rent for the past four years, which speaks volumes about government support.[24]

At the University of Nottingham Ningbo China, the key faculty members were reassigned from Nottingham to Ningbo, with stipend, housing subsidies, and three-year tax exemption. They would return to Nottingham after a number of years at Ningbo. This personnel model is consistent with the preservation of the British tradition at UNNC, with the British hallmark continuously fortified by British faculty renewal. At Xi'an Jiaotong-Liverpool University, faculty was recruited specially to the campus at Suzhou and there was no reassignment of the faculty from the parent campuses. Once they were hired, they discontinued their employment relationships with their previous institutions. This personnel practice contributes to the cultivation of loyalty to XJTLU and the development of the unique institutional characteristics at XJTLU. Out of its 100–150 faculty members, 70% are international and 50% are Chinese.

Xi'an Jiaotong-Liverpool University aspires to find new ways of learning and teaching. While the road taken by University of Nottingham-Ningbo was mandated, the future path of Xi'an Jiaotong-Liverpool University is fraught of uncertainty. One day, XJTLU may come of age and declare independence of the parent institutions, but UNNC will try to remain true to its intellectual origin, despite all the constrains it may face.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

McBurnie and Ziguras (2007) predict that the market for transnational education will become increasingly competitive. While the number of students in the market may not grow much, the presence of prestigious research universities will increase, and the participation by low-quality foreign institution will decrease; at the same time, the regulation on quality assurance by the host government will become more and more stringent. In a separate study, McBurnie and Ziguras (2009) find that intra-region student mobility will increase and inter-region student mobility will decrease,

particularly in Pacific Asia. This finding implies that with the economic rise and social improvement in Asia, more and more Asian students will stay in the region to pursue higher education, instead of going to other continents. They will be attracted to the Asian countries where economic opportunities abound and the quality of education shines.

What has happened in China's transnational education market is consistent with such predictions. In tandem with the continued rise of China's economic status, Chinese universities will increasingly attract international students from the region.[25]

Over the years, there has been a large influx of students into China from neighboring countries such as South Korea, Japan, Pakistan, and Vietnam. The strategic presence and stance of Western universities in China will only become more and more relevant if they desire to preserve their reputation and position as leading higher education providers in the world.

The lessons all educational institutions, both in and outside China, can learn from UNNC and XJTLU are profound. There are many plausible purposes and objectives in setting up a transnational education presence in China. A Chinese campus may directly produce financial gains, adding tuition revenues and assets overseas to the source university's portfolio, recruit Chinese students to its home campus,[26] enhance social science and humanities research related to the culture, society, economy, politics, literature, and philosophy of the host country, and advance knowledge in science, technology and engineering through international collaboration in research. It may give home campus students a base to observe and study a foreign society or to immerse them in a language and cultural environment. It can also promote mutual understanding between countries, cultures, societies, and peoples.

What critically defines the destiny and destination of a nation are purposive human capital accumulation and applications of innovative ideas. Education remains as the most regulated area in China, where the ultimate authority to issue diplomas and degrees does not reside in colleges and universities, but belongs to the State. Nonetheless, transformational changes in higher education in China are beginning; the role played by transnational education institutions in China will be far reaching.

NOTES

1. The original essay was published in *Higher Education*, Volume 65 (2013), Number 4. The author thanks the Springer Publishers for the permission to use the original work. The data for this chapter were collected before 2013 and may not be current. The chapter offers a historical study of the two universities in China that have set a standard for Sino-foreign ventures in higher education in China. Its analysis and prediction remain to be tested when the two universities continue to evolve in both the international and Chinese context. The author thanks Zhijun Gao for editorial assistance.
2. Chen (2007) surveys financial contributions to Chinese education by wealthy individuals from Ningbo. Philanthropic causes in Chinese education remain limited because of a combination of factors including the level of economic development, the tax laws and codes, the absence of private colleges, etc. The experience of Ningbo, however, does offer an exception to the general lack of private sponsorships in education.
3. It fell on October 10, 1841, a date that later happened to be the National Day of the Republic of China.

[4] The data in this section were from 2009, unless noted otherwise.

[5] QS World University Rankings (2011). Retrieved from http://www.topuniversities.com/university-rankings/world-university-rankings/2011?page=2&campaignkw=Employersurvey2012%2Fsubject-rankings%2Flife-science-biomedicine
Wikipedia (2012). Retrieved from
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/University_of_Nottingham#cite_note-32

[6] Shanghai Jiaotong University: Academic Ranking of World Universities (2011). Retrieved from http://www.arwu.org

[7] The notion by the Agora Discussion Paper that "To pursue their Ningbo venture, Nottingham appointed Yang Fujia…as chancellor" (p. 27) was incorrect. According to the author's interview with Yang Fujia in June 2009, the idea of a Chinese campus was initiated by Yang after he was appointed Chancellor.

[8] Unlike private institutions, Wanli Educational Group registers all its fixed assets, amounting to 800 million yuan, as the public property (meaning giving the ownership to the state) and through the government's audit ensures that "all funds are spent on educational operations and that all expenditures are reasonable and efficient" (Xu, 2007, 5).

[9] For a detailed analysis of the Wanli Model, see Xiamen University Research Group, "The Wanli Model: Lessons for Contemporary Universities," in Studies of Higher Education. Vol. 28 (12): 42–52 and Xu, Yafen. On Wanli Model and Educational Innovation (translated by Chen Juexiang). Shanghai: Wenhui Press, 2007.

[10] It was said that Wanli Educational Group spent about 600 million yuan or 8.8 million US dollars in the first-phase of construction; the second phase would require an even greater sum. Wanli Educational Group also manages non-academic student services such as dining halls and dormitories. The municipal government as a third partner provided 960 mu, or about 158 acres of land for the use by the University. Without this support of land by the government, it would have been impossible to start a campus. Interestingly, the generous land offer by the city was met ambivalently by Nottingham. The Chinese policy on land use by a university requires a ratio of 10 students per mu, and 960 mu implied 9,600 students. Nottingham was not ready to contemplate such a large campus and, alternately, less land would be more consistent with the size of students it planned to have on the new campus. Ultimately, the support for land value won the argument, but not without compromise: the campus was to have lakes and rivers, thereby reducing the total amount of usable land. As a result, the campus was graced with the Nottingham Lake and the Nottingham River which is spanned by seven bridges.

[11] Interview with Chancellor Yang Fujia in June 2009.

[12] Interview with Chancellor, Yang Fujia in June 2009.

[13] At UNNC, all students are required to take a class that is not on the transcript of UNNC and must pass it in order to graduate: Survey of Chinese Tradition and Culture. This class runs two hours a week for the first year and covers ancient Chinese philosophers such as Confucius, Lao Zi and Zhuang Zi, along with Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, and Karl Marx.

[14] A student I met on the basketball court told me that he was particularly attracted to the park-like campus and easy access to the faculty. His sister also graduated from UNNC. He and his fellow students took great pride in being part of UNNC. "Students here are bonded and are actively involved in learning. We have a common identify." He also felt happy that students had good access to the Administration. "I can schedule a meeting with the Provost or the Head of the Department easily." An international business major, he plans to pursue graduate studies in economics in the UK or US.

[15] Based on the field trip to Xi'an Jiaotong-Liverpool University in June 2010.

[16] QS World University Rankings (2011). Retrieved from http://www.topuniversities.com/university-rankings/world-university-rankings/2011?page=2&campaignkw=Employersurvey2012%2Fsubject-rankings%2Flife-science-biomedicine

[17] Shanghai Jiaotong University: Academic Ranking of World Universities (2011). Retrieved from http://www.arwu.org

[18] Wikipedia (2012). Retrieved from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xi'an_Jiaotong_University

[19] Xi'an Jiaotong University was ranked first place nationwide in dynamics and thermal engineering physics, management science and engineering, and business; second place in electrical engineering,

and third place in mechanical engineering. Baidu Baike (Encyclopedia) (2012). Retrieved from http://baike.baidu.com/view/892706.htm

[20] Baidu Baike (Encyclopedia) (2012). Retrieved from http://baike.baidu.com/view/892706.htm

[21] Strictly speaking, all degrees issued at Chinese universities and colleges are national degrees, namely, all belonging to the People's Republic of China, under the regulations of the Ministry of Education. A university or college also provides a diploma indicating graduation from a specific university or college. Therefore, a graduate receives two documents: a degree approved by the Ministry of Education through an institution and the institution's own diploma.

[22] The Park started in 2004 as a joint venture with Singapore for the purpose of adapting the technology, management and administration of Singapore in China. Since 2004, the Park, with 4% of the land and 5% of the population of Suzhou, created annually 16% of total output of the city, growing at an annual rate of 30%. In 2009, there were 640 enterprises producing 5.1 billion RMB. It had 14 universities or branch campuses in 2009, educating and training 28,223 graduate or undergraduate students. As a research and development incubator, it had 107 entities with R&D expenses over 125 million RMB. The applications for intellectual property rights increased from 30 in 2004 to 1,000 in 2009. Annualized investment rose from 0.6 billion to 4.78 billion RMB. The building area completed jumped from 100,000 square meters in 2004 to 1 million square meters in 2009. In 2009, the Park had a population of 68,000, including 56,000 temporary residents and 12,000 permanent residents. To attract investors and researchers from overseas, many of whom are Chinese, the Park built a large church facility on the lake.

[23] At Xi'an Jiaotong-Liverpool, a mentor from a non-academic setting is also assigned to students preparing their applied training.

[24] The occupants of the Suzhou Industrial Park rent the facilities from the Park and after a number of years (e.g. 15 through 20) may have the first right of refusal to purchase the facilities at the original cost of building.

[25] China is emerging as the largest economy, replacing the United States within the next two to three decades according to the forecasting consensus. It is leading the world out of the current financial crisis that started in the United States in October 2008. In the summer of 2010, it surpassed Japan to become the second largest economy in the world.

[26] The largest international student groups at the University of Nottingham are Chinese and Malaysian students; among its 23,310 students in 2010, 914 were from China and 504 from Malaysia, the only two countries where the University of Nottingham set up campuses.

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5. REORIENTALISM/REORIENTALITY/ RE-ORIENTALITY

Confucius Institutes' Engagement with Western Audiences[1]

INTRODUCTION

Confucius Institutes (CIs), which exist as partnerships between Chinese educational institutions (or organizations) and a foreign counterpart, have been established worldwide as a means of promoting China's official national language and culture abroad. Since their inception in 2004, CIs have proliferated with now over 400 globally and a further 600 plus Confucius Classrooms, which are similar but smaller in scale. This paper examines representations of China and Chinese culture to an imagined Western audience in the Confucius Institute project. It draws on my ethnographic research on the Confucius Institute in Edmonton (CIE) and its institutional partners: the two founding organizations, the Edmonton Public School Board (EPSB) and the Shandong Provincial Education Department; as well as the Confucius Institute Headquarters in Beijing (Hanban) and the Edmonton Chinese Bilingual Education Association (ECBEA). CIE was established in 2008 and I have conducted ongoing research since 2009, including eighteen semi-structured interviews with key personnel and participant observation of classes and events in Edmonton,[2] Shandong, and Beijing. I argue that in CIs located in the West representations of Chinese culture are caught between two competing regimes of value which I call *reorientalism* and *reorientality*. *Reorientalism* attempts to deconstruct traditional orientalist discourse and reclaim definitions of Chineseness, ultimately redressing misunderstandings about China. Simultaneously, however, there is an acknowledgement that, given the commodity logic of capitalism, China can be made comprehensible and marketable through *reorientality*, or use of those very Orientalist tropes which *reorientalism* seeks to subvert. Through these two opposing logics, CIs both disrupt and reproduce orientalist narratives of China. Confucius Institutes, however, move beyond the mere representation of China and Chinese culture to foreign audiences. They further engage their audiences at an affective level by encouraging not merely spectatorship but active participation in Chinese cultural activities. In these participatory moments, CIs rely on a third logic which I call *re-orientality* in which the foreign body is asked to perform and embody Chineseness (however tangentially) as a means of soliciting an emotional investment in Chinese culture and, by extension, the People's Republic of China.

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CONFUCIUS INSTITUTES AND THE REDISTRIBUTION OF GLOBAL SYMBOLIC CAPITAL

As China's increasing economic and political influence has captured the world's attention, an equally important but less recognized parallel process has been the global dissemination of Chinese culture. Though this process is multifaceted and complex, a significant and state-initiated component has been the establishment of Confucius Institutes (CIs), and more recently smaller scale Confucius Classrooms (CCs), in host educational institutions around the world. Modelled on, yet distinct from, similar national organizations (such as the Goethe Institut, Alliance Française, and Instituto Cervantes), these institutes are mandated "to promote Chinese language and culture in foreign countries" in order to build "a bridge reinforcing friendship and cooperation between China and the rest of the world" (Hanban, n.d.). With more than 1000 sites globally (combining CIs and CCs), this project has come to exemplify one instance of the "rising China" theory. Entrusted with a mission to advance China's official language and culture outside of China, Confucius Institutes are key institutional sites through which to examine the production and circulation of Chinese culture aimed specifically at foreign consumption. The representations of China, its language and its culture circulated globally through CIs are driven by particular imaginaries of the country's role in world politics and economics and play a vital role in discursively negotiating China's shifting place globally. They also rely on differently racialized understandings of the Self and one's Other. In Canada, Confucius Institutes become a site in which Western notions of a Self and a racialized, Oriental Other intersect with Chinese notions of a Self and a racialized, Western Other. As each discourse understands its Self through its Other, and oscillates between fear of and desire for the Other, CIs become a point at which both discourses become mutually reinforcing.

I conceptualize Confucius Institutes as a *global project* (Tsing, 2008) which imagines and makes globality—a phenomenon in which the world is imagined to be "a single place" (Robertson, 1992, p. 395)—in particular ways. The concept of *global projects* moves away from the temptation to envision a singular cultural logic that is reordering the world, and toward an understanding that, at any given time, there are multiple global projects, each with its own cultural and institutional specificities, and each with its own imaginary of what constitutes that single, global world. CIs, then, are just one global project among many, some working together and some in friction. Confucius Institutes are also a "*racial project*," being "*an effort to reorganize and redistribute resources along particular racial lines*" (Omi & Winant, 1994, p. 56, original italicized). While China has been successful at reorganizing and redistributing global economic capital, it has yet to do the same with global symbolic capital. As many in the West continue to imagine China through a negative lens, the CI project attempts to harness "the power to make people see and believe, to get them to know and recognize,… the power of imposing a [singular] vision of the social world" (Bourdieu, 1991, p. 221). What is at stake is the power to make

people outside China see, know, and recognize China in more favourable terms and in terms defined by China itself. As China's economic capital grows, there is a desire to have its symbolic capital increase in step. Indeed, the push by the Chinese state to cultivate China's "soft power" (a concept I will elaborate below) has been continually reiterated over the past several years by the country's leading political figures. What is often overlooked in this push for soft power, and in discussions of its repercussions, is the degree to which race plays an integral role as "a dense transfer point of power" (Stoler, 1997, p. 192) through which China can negotiate processes of reorganization and redistribution of symbolic capital globally. While concepts of race combine both fixity and fluidity (Stoler, 1997), it has historically been the power of whiteness that has fixed racialized Others in fluid ways. Said (1979), in outlining Orientalism, calls this "flexible *positional* superiority, which puts the Westerner in a whole series of possible relationships with the Orient without ever losing him the relative upper hand" (p. 7). The CI project works discursively to move China out of a position of being fixed, of being defined and understood on someone else's terms, and into a position where it has the power to play with that "flexible *positional* superiority" and thus gain the power to have others accept its own self-made definitions.

As they have expanded globally, Confucius Institutes have been met with a degree of concern that is perhaps unwarranted (Hartig, 2012; Siow, 2011). Since funding for CIs is derived primarily from the Chinese government through Hanban (a government-affiliated office that administers and oversees CIs globally), there is apprehension that at best CIs are a propaganda arm of the Chinese state and at worst are sites through which it conducts espionage (see for example de Pierrebourg & Juneau-Katsuya, 2009, who refer to CIs as a "Trojan horse"). There is also concern in the academic community that such partnerships potentially give the Chinese government (via Hanban and CIs) the power to exert undemocratic influence on Western institutions. Indeed, one of the most common points of contention surrounding CIs is that they, unlike the institutes they cite as models, partner with and are housed within local educational institutions, most typically universities. The closure of McMaster University's CI (Bradshaw & Freeze, 2013) would seem to confirm such fears amidst allegations of discriminatory hiring practices by Hanban, which stipulates members of CI staff cannot be practitioners of Falun Gong, a spiritual movement banned by the Chinese Communist Party. As CI teachers sent from China are hired by Hanban, institutions such as McMaster are seen as supporting such discriminatory practices by proxy.

The existence of apprehensions over Confucius Institutes rests on a politicized othering of China in which the communist Other is imagined as a foil to the democratic Self. In keeping with this preoccupation with China as a politicized Other, most academic commentaries on CIs have tended to focus on their soft power aspects (Ding & Saunders, 2006; Gil, 2008; Paradise, 2009; Yang, 2010). A term coined by Joseph Nye (1990), soft power "co-opts people rather than coerces [and] rests on the ability to shape the preferences of others" (2008, p. 95). While it

would be unwise to lose a critical lens when regarding any state-initiated project, the literature on soft power and CIs seldom bases arguments on any empirical evidence of what CIs actually do (Hartig, 2012), nor what influence they actually garner. The notion of soft power has gained a lot of cachet in China among political leaders (Li, 2009), making it an important area for research. Yet English-language scholarship has tended to involve broad generalizations myopically focused on the negative implications of China's soft power, an assumption which follows a logic that all things democratic are good (as seen in the more positive portrayals of US soft power) and all things nondemocratic are bad. Such concern over communist influence, or "red peril," is entwined with racialized historical fears of a "yellow peril" (Breslin, 2010), a nineteenth-century fear of yellow bodies that embodied multiple anxieties including increased East Asian immigration, military aggression, economic competition, and social degeneration (Keevak, 2011, p. 126, citing Thompson, 1957). Today, there have been changes in the way we talk about such fears, but the underlying tensions remain unchanged. Anxieties still lie behind debates over immigration, and we can still readily find fears over China's possible military aggression, economic competition, and social degeneration (articulated now as communist threat to liberal democracy rather than pagan threat to Christendom). In this complex mix of politicized and racialized fears of China, the articulated threat of the *red peril* displaces the now-unarticulated (yet still present) threat of the *yellow peril*. That is, the politicized Othering of China masks racial undertones and the continued haunting of racial thinking in global forums.

Perhaps the most feared implication of all is that a "rising China" must inevitably mean a "declining West." This fear of "a loss of centrality" has instigated an "identity crisis" in the West (Barr, 2011, p. 6), which I argue CIs both feed and mitigate. Economically, the growing disparity between Western economies increasingly plagued by debts and failing markets and China's growing financial clout is especially highlighted in CIs as China steps in to offer substantial amounts of money and resources (e.g., teachers, performers, books, digital equipment, software, etc.) to educational institutions increasingly starved of funding. The discomfort with the growing financial power of China that this brings to the fore, and the loss of Western centrality at which it hints, is what is truly fearful. Culturally and racially, however, CIs present an orientalized, exoticized, and ancient China, which marks itself as *essentially different* from a normalized white, Western other, enabling Westerners to continue feeling central and thereby unthreatened.

THE IMAGINED FOREIGNER: CONFLATING THE WORLD WITH THE WEST AND WHITENESS

One of the most intriguing things about Confucius Institutes is that, while there is an expressed desire to cultivate an understanding of China *as it is today*, it does so by conveying traditional aspects of Chinese culture which highlight its antiquity. During my interviews, both Canadian and Chinese administrators expressed the

grievance that Westerners have little understanding of contemporary China. They noted that even though China has changed drastically in the thirty plus years of economic reforms, Western imaginations are still mired in a vision of China as closed, undeveloped, authoritarian, and ultimately "backward." One major impetus for the CI project, then, is to show "the world" (a concept often conflated with "the West," as I will discuss below) that China is not antiquated, as is thought, but that there has been fast-paced and sweeping development. When asked why China is investing so much into CIs and why now in particular, one Canadian CI director commented that China has realized that the world is not viewing "the new China"—that the world still holds a perception of China as a "third world country." China therefore, he continued, wants to change perceptions of who it is, what it is doing, and what freedoms it has, to counter Western media portrayals of an oppressive China. The entrenchment of China as Communist Other in the Canadian imaginary, the racialized undertones of that imaginary, as well as the failure of Canadians to comprehend contemporary China, can be found in the words of another Canadian CI director who explained that CIs offer Canadians an opportunity to come to a "true understanding" of Chinese people, instead of "you know, the political, racial, communist thinking sort of thing." The hope is to demonstrate through CIs that China is transformed: it is not what it once was.

However, there is also an awareness in China that these very rapid and expansive transformations provoke fear (Breslin, 2010) by gesturing toward a "rising China/declining West" narrative. If contemporary China's economic developments are fearful, Confucius Institutes work to allay fears by shifting discourses about China onto a cultural terrain rooted in the distant past. Thus, another major impetus of CIs is to demonstrate to the world the richness of Chinese thought and the value of Chinese culture.[3]

In the words of Madam Xu Lin, Director-General of Hanban: "In some way *the world* will realize, sooner or later, that Chinese culture is the best one in the world" (Guangming Net, 2010, italics added). This concept of "the world," which comes up again and again in discourses surrounding CIs, requires some unpacking. Just as China operates as an important Other to the West (Vukovich, 2012), so too does the West operate as China's "*preferred* Other" (Chow, 1997, p. 151; see also Chen, 1995; Dai, 2001). If we accept Dai's (2001) argument that in China there is a conflation of the West (and America) with the world, then we might begin to understand what (or who) specifically is imagined when "the world" is referred to as an agentive subject. This type of discursive slippage, however, is not only the unconscious habit of Chinese administrators involved in the CI project. I noted a frequent and similar conflation of "the world" with "the West" among international delegates, particularly those from western locations, at the annual Confucius Institute conferences I attended. Furthermore, if one were also to take the placement of CIs as an important indicator of Hanban's target audience, then the fact that the United States hosts the largest number of CIs (nearly one quarter the global total) and CCs (over half the global total) is significant. If we consider the total number of CIs

in what may be considered "Western" locations (i.e., North America, Europe, and Oceania) then well over half can be found in "the West."[4]

While "the West" is, in fact, not a geographical concept but a historical one (Hall, 1992), it is still widely used when referring to societies imagined to be "developed, industrialized, urbanized, capitalist, secular, and modern" (p. 277). To this list must be added "white," as race plays a critical role in imaginaries of the West—both in how it is perceived by Western Selves and non-Western Others. The preferred Other of CI programs, then, is not only a Western (American) Other, but specifically a white, Western (American) Other. In contrast to earlier Chinese state programs of outreach abroad that targeted overseas Chinese communities (Barabantseva, 2005; Nyíri, 2001; Thunø, 2001), CIs aim to expand beyond diasporic communities and indeed target a "mainstream public that mostly does not have any special China-knowledge" (Hartig, 2012:63). In Western locations, such as Canada, this "mainstream" audience is imagined as white. The conflation of whiteness with Westernness in China (Ilnyckyj, 2010; Schein, 1994; Stanley, 2013) is not unlike the conflation of whiteness with Canadianness that happens in Canada itself (Bannerji, 2000; Mackey, 1999; Paragg, 2012). In a Canadian Confucius Institute such as Confucius Institute Edmonton (CIE) these two imaginaries from China and Canada of the Canadian body as white meet up and mutually reinforce one another.

To promote Confucius Institutes as a global project, CIs are asked by Hanban to contribute articles about their events and activities for publication in its Confucius Institute magazine. A Canadian CI director recounted a story in which Hanban rejected a submission because the students shown in the attached pictures were Asian—or more to the point, not what a "Canadian" is presumed to look like. The director explained the rejection (with both humour and cynicism) by noting: how can Hanban justify its program of outreach to "foreigners"—and the huge sums of money it requests from the central government to spend on CIs—if the foreigners don't look foreign? A brief survey of the front covers of the English version of the Confucius Institute magazine also shows the centrality of white bodies to the CI project. Of the 35 issues published between 2009–2014,[5] 26 covers display white, Western bodies—usually as the focal point, but not always—typically engaged in some aspect of Chinese culture, be it calligraphy, martial arts, Beijing opera, or tea ceremonies. The Westernness of these white bodies is grounded by captions that generally refer to either their location or point of origin in the UK, US, Australia, or Europe. There is a dual conflation of the world with the West and the West with whiteness with an end result that the white body becomes a proxy for the world. The white body becomes necessary for the CI project as an exemplar of its whole mission – outreach to "the world." Yet this is not necessarily a centering of the white body in a traditional sense, though significantly it is easily read as such, particularly by those white bodies. Whereas during earlier periods of reform era China a preoccupation with the Western Other was seen as a reaction to what seemed like an omnipotent West (see for example Chow, 1997; Dai, 2001), I would argue that in the contemporary global racial project of Confucius Institutes, such "racially

informed standpoint epistemologies" should be seen "not as mere reactions to or simple negations of 'Western' cultural/theoretical dominance" (Omi & Winant, 1993, p. 8). Rather, we should consider what significance the Western Other has as that against which the Chinese Self is imagined.

TWO REGIMES OF VALUE: REORIENTALISM & REORIENTALITY

Since cultural and racial identity is "a *positioning*" (Hall, 1990, p. 226) rather than an essence, representations of Chineseness by CIs attempt to *position* China in relation to its preferred Other—the racialized, white, Western Other. Chineseness is that which is "*not* the West." In a similar fashion, "the Orient has helped to define Europe (or the West) as its contrasting image, idea personality, experience" (Said, 1979, pp. 1–2). Any imaginary about the Other is, in fact, less about that Other than it is about the Self. Yet, imaginaries are not merely imaginative but are bodies of theories and practices with considerable material investment (Said, 1979) and much at stake. This is nowhere more readily apparent than the CI project, in which the Chinese state via Hanban invests huge sums of money (at times a point of contention among Chinese citizens who see the money as better spent at home). So if China defines itself against a Western Other and if, as Hall (1992) argues, the West is understood to be developed, industrialized, urbanized, and modern, how then can China represent its development, urbanization, industrialization, and, most importantly, its modernity if it is meant to be "not the West"? In the title of his book, Barr (2011) asks the question: *Who's Afraid of China?* The answer, he writes, is dependent on the issue under consideration: any individual, community, or country "stands to *win and lose* at the same time, depending on what criterion is used" (p. 2, italics added). This notion of winning and losing hinges on a dualism of good/bad, the desired and the feared often attributed to racialized Others. Similar to how China's Western Other is dichotomized as both demonized and desired (Chen, 1995; Conceison, 2004; Wang, 2003), so too in the West is China often essentialized and then split into exotic/peril. We might reconsider Barr's question, by asking more specifically: *What is frightening (or perilous) and what is enticing (or exotic) about China?* Perhaps in an effort to de-emphasize China's modernity and its 'perilous' economic power and political otherness, Confucius Institutes, in Canada at least, tend to orientalize China. Representations of China highlight the traditional and ancient: women clad in *qipaos* (traditional form-fitting dresses) playing *pipas* (a stringed instrument similar to a lute) and *guzhengs* (similar to a zither); women dressed in imperial garments and headdress performing elaborate tea ceremonies; men wearing *changshan*-style costumes (traditional male garments worn like a robe the length of the body) or *Tang*-style jackets (made from colourful brocades) at display booths promoting Confucius Institutes; men in silk martial arts uniforms performing tai chi. Such representations in CIs play on and play into long-held Orientalist ideas in the West about what China is: intriguing, mysterious, exotic, enticing, and most definitely "Other."

In highlighting those things which are appealing to Westerners, CI representations of China can be seen as not only a discursive strategy to shift attention away from those aspects of modernity and development that make China fearful and threatening, but also as a move that sidesteps China's more recent history since 1949. In the desire to move away from sensationalized images of China as *antiquated political Other*—stuck in a recent past of autocratic rule and subsequent underdevelopment—the CI project ends up portraying China as *anachronistic cultural/racial Other*. If China is represented as occupying "anachronistic space, a land perpetually out of time in modernity" (McClintock, 1995, p. 41), then it ceases to be threatening, but it does so precisely because it cannot occupy the same space of modernity as the West. There is a conundrum of wanting "the world" to understand *China as it is today*, while relying on representations of *China as it was in the past* to mitigate the very fears aroused by *China as it is today*. For those at work in the CI project this is not as contradictory as it may at first seem. When questioned on this seeming incongruity, a CI teacher from China explained:

> … The main value is not just to know the traditional art. It's about the ideas that, you know, are carried by this art. Like for example, when we are doing paper-cutting, all the patterns are about happiness, about peace, about harmony. And when people enjoy this art they also have, you know … they form a view of harmony, and of peace… And Hanban asks us to introduce those traditional arts to the foreign countries. Not just to teach them art lessons. If we just teach art lessons that's, you know, about education but not bridging, you know, not about a cultural bridge … when we are teaching those traditional arts we are trying to let people *feel* our, you know, warmth inside, and *feel* our, you know, like, life values. (emphasis added)

The hope then is that activities, events, and classes which spotlight the traditional and ancient will impart a sense of the social values that continue in China today. Chinese traditional culture can be tapped as a means of understanding some Chinese essence that continues into modern times. As Xu Jialu, an intellectual and political figure in China who has figured prominently in the CI project, put it in his speech at the opening ceremony of CIE, spreading Chinese language and culture (the mandate of CIs) also spreads the philosophies behind that language and culture (personal interview, 24 June 2009). Here, I am drawing attention to how the process is understood by those who work and are invested in the CI project. How it is narrated, however, is not necessarily what is indeed happening.

Perhaps it would be best to consider this adoption of Orientalism – this re-Orientalism or "process of Orientalism by Orientals" (Lau, 2009, p. 572) – as similar to earlier adoptions of Western scientific racial discourse. Like many ideas imported from the West, racial thinking was accepted in late Qing China but importantly readjusted and localized (Bonnett, 1998; Dikötter, 1997; Keevak, 2011; Teng, 2006) to suit China's own ends. Similarly, an appropriation of Orientalism does not necessarily mean abjection, whereby the (semi-)colonized internalizes the

colonizer's discourse to the point where the Self becomes the abject object (Fanon, 1967). The purposeful owning and production of otherness through CIs is an intentional (and official) proliferation of difference which makes use of stereotypes of China. Rather than an internalization of externally given labels of difference, use of the Oriental in CIs seems to almost invert abjection by wilfully drawing on such expected stereotypes. This is something other than simply a postmodern sense of semiotic playfulness. Appropriating Orientalism becomes a means of harnessing the "flexible *positional* superiority" upon which it depends and thereby gaining "the relative upper hand" (Said, 1979, p. 7). If representations of China in CIs do indeed take some form of Western modernity as a category against which Chineseness is Other, then they also do so with the understanding that unmarked Western modernity signifies Enlightenment ideals which have led to the failings of liberal democratic systems in global governance. China hopes to step in and offer different and alternative systems of thought. An understanding of China's difference rests not only on a sense of its history and traditions, but also on the premise that Chinese culture offers something unique and significant to the world which can help address contemporary global problems. In the words of Madam Xu Lin:

> People have found that in the past 30 years the West has made a bad mistake, and that China has been learning valuable experiences from the West whilst the West has learned nothing from China … western economic theory and cultural values are inadequate for solving current problems. Even Westerners think so. The West needs to seek answers from the East… People admire China and consider Chinese culture and values to be *superior*, in some respects, to those of the West … people of other countries have accepted our culture: Confucianism. (Guangming Net, 2010, italics added)

The move to re-orientalize Chinese culture, therefore, may not indicate the global racial formation (Omi & Winant, 1994) one might expect. It is not so much about the extraction of cultural raw materials from exotic locations for consumption in Western metropoles (Kearney, 1995) as it is about an intentional exportation from China to locations around the globe. In this purposeful exportation from China, there are competing agendas. The desire to show China as it is today—to dispel misunderstandings and stereotypes of China as political other—gets bound up with the realization that orientalism, as a branding tool, sells. These representations of Chineseness through CIs function much like Huggan's (Huggan, 2001) "postcolonial exotic," occupying a site of discursive conflict between two regimes of value—one that is oppositional and works to destabilize Western representations of the Other (postcolonialism), and one that capitalizes on the marketability of Otherness in the global economy (postcoloniality). Building from Huggan's work, in place of postcolonialism/postcoloniality, I propose the terms *reorientalism/reorientality* as the two competing regimes of value at work in the CI global project. While *reorientalism* works "*deconstructively from within* hegemonic discourse" (Salgado, 2011, p. 202), attempting to wrestle back control over definitions and representations

of China, *reorientality* works "*constitutively within* hegemonic discourse" (p. 204),[6] normalizing whiteness as that which Chineseness is marked (and marketed) against. CIs may indeed create a particular positive awareness and openness toward China, as is hoped, but they do so by marking China as "Oriental Other" to a racially white West. This re-orientalized representation of Chineseness mitigates fears and holds the West's identity crisis (Barr, 2011) at bay precisely because it enables Westerners to continue feeling central. The traditional and ancient Chinese body, unlike the modern Chinese body, is not threatening, and what is more, it is enriching of "us." The Chinese culture circulated through CIs works to fill the "emptiness" of whiteness and compensate for its lack of culture (Frankenberg, 1993).

With two competing regimes of value in operation in the CI project, Hanban attempts to reclaim definitions of Chineseness and redress misunderstandings about China (*reorientalism*), while also working in a context of global capitalism, commodity logic, and the historical dominance of the West, all of which have made China comprehensible and marketable through orientalist tropes (*reorientality*). *Reorientalism*, as a process of self-definition, carries the potential to subvert Orientalist notions of China and Chinese culture. Unfortunately, *reorientality*, or the marketing of China as "Oriental" to non-Chinese audiences, reproduces the underlying us/them dichotomy of Orientalism and imagines "totalized subjectivities [split] into mutually exclusive, essentialist positions" (Salgado, 2011, p. 205). Through the dual logics of *reorientialism/reorientality*, CIs both disrupt and reproduce orientalist discourses about China.

RE-ORIENTALITY: RE-ORIENTING THE FOREIGNER TOWARD CHINA

There is perhaps a growing awareness among China's leaders that a nation's image abroad "exists in many people purely as *affect* with no knowledge basis whatsoever" (Kunczik, 1997, p. 43, italics added). Concerns over Confucius Institutes are driven more by expectation than actual experience. Indeed, "it is the attitude that seeks the content rather than the content that creates the attitude" (Fanon, 1967, p. 158, quoting Joachim Marcus in a footnote). The goal for China, then, is to shift those attitudes from negative to positive—to turn the fear of China into affection toward it. It is to this end that Confucius Institutes put culture into service as a means of *re-orienting* the foreign body toward China in more affirmative ways. My goal here is not to define culture so much as interrogate how culture functions as a resource for attaining an end (Yúdice, 2003), and in particular "the kinds of racializing work that ideas about culture perform" (Visweswaran, 2010, p. 3).

What CIs accomplish is not so much a labelling of Chinese people as racially different *per se*, but rather of particular cultural activities as Chinese. It is through their participation in Chinese cultural activities that non-Chinese people, it is hoped, can begin to *feel* Chinese culture – a process I call *re-orientality* which I will further outline below. This sentiment has come up time and again in my discussions with CI administrators and teachers, both in Canada and in China. Confucius Institute

activities and events are not simply about displaying Chinese culture to a non-Chinese audience (though CIs do hold traditional performances). Rather, they are typically structured in ways that actively engage the audience, soliciting its participation. Activities are frequently composed of two parts, a demonstration of the activity by a teacher or expert, followed by a hands-on component in which the audience is asked to themselves do the cultural activity (be it calligraphy, knot tying, paper cutting, Beijing Opera, etc.). By participating in Chinese culture, however momentarily, CIs hope audience members will develop an affection towards Chinese culture and thereby China itself. The key to these activities is not just to *inform* non-Chinese about Chinese culture, but to get them to *experience* it on an emotional level. Despite the fact that CIs are educational institutes, the work they do is less about imparting knowledge about China and more about shifting or *re-orienting* people's feelings away from negative associations toward more positive ones. The experience of Chinese culture through CIs is not meant to be an intellectual engagement so much as an emotional one. CIs, then, employ a "politics of affect" (Eng, 2006, p. 52), in which affect, emotions, and passions are mobilized to particular ends, creating "affective economies" (p. 53) that are inextricably bound together with political economies.[7]

The pinnacle of the CI project is the production of non-Chinese (preferably white) bodies with a level of mastery in Chinese language and culture sufficient for on-stage or TV performances that become a spectacle for audiences in China (see image).

Since the 1990s, an increasing array of foreigners have appeared on China's theatrical stages (see, for example, Conceison, 2004), in TV series (see, for example, DeWoskin, 2005), and reality shows (see, for example, Morrow, 2014). At times, these foreigners serve as a foil to Chineseness, displaying a negative Otherness against which Chinese superiority can be measured. They can also serve as a mirror, demonstrating a desire for things Chinese through mimetic cultural performance. The foreigner who dons traditional costumes and performs Chinese culture for audiences in China (as in the CI cover photo) serves to "stoke Chinese national pride" (Lee, 2006), and in this way "the figure of the foreigner is crucial to the national project of self-reinvention" (p. 526, italics added). Yet, it is more complex than simply a means of validating the worth of Chinese culture. Interaction with foreigners (imagined, mediated, or otherwise) becomes a training ground for the rebirth of Chinese people as cosmopolitan subjects in the neoliberal world order (pp. 526–527). Lee's reference to the figure of the foreigner as "crucial" is similar to how I theorize the white, Western body as "necessary" to the CI project. It is important to note, however, that this does not always indicate a global racial power dynamic in which white dominates non-white—for the foreign is often made to serve China (Brady, 2003) and foreigners are easily "shanghaied" into doing things not of their own choosing and which may work toward interests other than their own (Stanley, 2013), even without their own cognizance of such dynamics.

Figure 1. Cover of the September 2009 edition of the magazine Confucius Institute *published by Hanban – the image is a televised performance from the finals of the 8th Chinese Bridge Competition*

The white body is important not only as the unmarked against which Chineseness is marked, but as a necessary stand-in for any non-Chinese body. If, as I have argued, "the world" is conflated in China with "the West/America," then the white body imagined as representative of "the West/America" can also signify "the world." In the CI project, the white body in particular becomes necessary to a performative display of Chineseness, not as a consumer but *as the performer him/herself*. Since white Westerners operate as the preferred Other in China, the white body performing Chinese language and culture becomes the idealized embodiment of China's global outreach program through CIs. These performances are about garnering a positive affect toward China through momentary embodiments of Chineseness. Lancefield (2004), in his examination of early twentieth-century US representations of the Orient in musical performances, uses the term "orientality" to refer to "'what it was' that many people *felt* they heard or saw or *embodied* in moments of orientalist performance" (p. 41, italics added). Combining Lancefield's use of orientality with Lau's (2009) term re-Orientalism, I argue that what is happening in the performance of Chinese culture by non-Chinese bodies in CI activities is a process I call *re-orientality* (conceptually distinct from *reorientality* or that marketable, orientalist aspect of Chinese culture I theorized earlier). In *re-orientality*, the non-Chinese body (preferably a white body) is invited to momentarily embody and thus feel Chineseness in some way as a means of *re-orienting* one's ties to China along affective lines. By experiencing and engaging with Chinese culture through the

body, foreigners are directed away from negative associations with China – such as those negative associations often portrayed in western media – and *re-oriented* toward more positive aspects of China which inevitably rely on Orientalist tropes that make foreigners feel China is mysterious and exotic rather than oppressive and dictatorial (see Schmidt, 2014 for a more detailed theorization of re-orientality).

CONCLUSION

American views of China vacillate between a demonized threat and a romanticized fantasy of China becoming Americanized (Conceison, 2004; Vukovich, 2012). In Canada, however, I argue the romanticization is less about "them" become more like "us," and more precisely because "they" are a different, ethnicized Other that enriches our "us." CIs offer an "authentic" version of Chinese culture in Canada, or as one Canadian administrator put it: "It is like having a little piece of China [here]." The CI project resonates with Canada's multicultural project and feeds white desire for the racialized Other. In an atmosphere where "[t]he average Canadian still thinks of multiculturalism as ethnic celebrations of song and dance" (George, 2006:61), CI activities and events which promote China's traditional culture dovetail nicely with this notion of "song and dance multiculturalism."

As a global racial project, CIs meet and resonate with other global and racial projects in the West. The normalization of white, Western bodies as representative of "the world" in CI promotional material, and the desire to nurture a "sinofied" subjectivity among non-Chinese people, which I have termed *re-orientality*, works in tandem with Canadian ideals of multiculturalism and global citizenship to coproduce a particular globalized subjectivity. While CIs contain the possibility of what I call *reorientalism*, or the ability to disrupt and rewrite orientalist tropes, they also are bound up in the logic of global capital, marketing China and Chineseness as "Other" (or what I refer to as *reorientality*). Thus, unfortunately, what has the potential to be transgressive is not always transformative (Mitchell, 2004). Problematically, CIs not only re-orientalize China but all Chinese bodies, including Chinese Canadians, reinforcing the tendencies of multiculturalism to other nonwhite Canadians (Bannerji, 2000) and make the nonwhite body somehow *not Canadian enough*.

NOTES

1. This paper is a revised version of the article: Schmidt, H. (2013). China's Confucius Institutes and the "necessary white body." *Canadian Journal of Sociology, 38*(4), 647–668.
2. In 2010, I also interviewed, via telephone, two CI Directors in other locations in Canada. Though I have since limited my research to Edmonton specifically, these interviews have provided further support for my findings at CIE.
3. In writing this, I have in mind a quote from Fanon (1967, p. 10): "There is a fact: White men consider themselves superior to black men. There is another fact: Black men want to prove to white men, at all costs, the richness of their thought, the equal value of their intellect."
4. That there is an uneven and seemingly geographically strategic distribution of CIs across the globe can also be seen by the fact that less than ten per cent of CIs are located in all of Africa, despite China's

interest in the continent. After "the West," Asia hosts the second largest number of CIs, the majority of which are located in Korea, Japan, and Thailand.

[5] The Confucius Institute journal is released bimonthly, with a total of 6 issues each year. In the first year of 2009, however, there were only 5 issues published, for a total of 35 over the 6 year period.

[6] Salgado differentiates these two possibilities by referring to the former as reOrientalism and the latter as re-Orientalism, but I have chosen rather to employ and build on Huggan's (2001) terminology.

[7] Eng theorizes about a "politics of affect" in the light of much different phenomena than CIs. While the application of this term to CIs does not describe the "ethically reflective psychoanalytic project" (2006, p. 52) Eng hopes for, I still find it useful in describing what is happening through CIs.

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SECTION II

STUDENT MOBILITY AND INTERCULTURAL ADAPTATIONS

BAOCUN LIU AND QIANG LIU

6. INTERNATIONALIZATION OF CHINESE HIGHER EDUCATION IN THE ERA OF GLOBALIZATION

Student Mobility between China and the Globalized World

Since the 1980s, against the backdrop of economic globalization and the international flow of talents, transnational mobility of students as an important part of international trade in education services and education internationalization has received widespread attention. According to the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the number of students studying abroad surpassed 4.5 million in 2012. Included in this number is a total of 694,041 Chinese students (19.8% of the world's total) and 88,979 international students receiving higher education in China (2.5% of the world's total) (UNESCO, 2015). Clearly China has entered the upper ranks of the most active countries in terms of transnational student mobility. The Chinese Ministry of Education reports that, taking into account all types of students, Chinese students studying abroad totaled 3.5 million by the end of 2014; international students studying in China totaled more than 3 million person-times.[1]

At present, China is at an important transitional and crucial juncture in its rapid economic and social development. Facing new domestic and international conditions, China has introduced new requirements for students studying abroad, students returning home upon completion of studies abroad, and foreign students studying in China. The country also faces new challenges. In this paper, based on in-depth analysis of the status quo and characteristics of transnational flow of Chinese students, we elaborate upon current problems in the student movement to and from China and make relevant policy recommendations that should provide for deeper development of internationalization of higher education in China.

STATUS QUO AND CHARACTERISTICS OF TRANSNATIONAL MOBILITY OF CHINESE STUDENTS

Status Quo and Characteristics of Chinese Students Studying Abroad

"Popularization" of students studying abroad. Wang et al. (2012) hold that the boom of Chinese students studying abroad before the 21st century was typically

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divided into two categories: the intellectual elite, whose excellent performance allowed them to obtain scholarships at public expense or from foreign universities; and the wealthy elite, those from families that could afford the cost of study abroad. Since the beginning of the 21st century, however, the composition of Chinese students pursuing education abroad is gradually changing as ordinary people have begun to displace previously dominant elite groups.

Since China's accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO), the number of Chinese students studying abroad has increased significantly. In 2006, the total number exceeded 1 million. Since 2008, the number of students going abroad grew substantially. Between 2008 and 2012, the annual increase in the number of Chinese students studying abroad was 20% or greater for 5 consecutive years. According to the Ministry of Education of China, the number of Chinese students studying abroad reached a record high of 413,900 in 2013, though the growth rate was only 3.58%. For the period 1978–2013, the total number of Chinese students to study abroad was more than 3.0586 million (see Table 1).

Table 1. Number of Chinese students studying abroad and the annual growth rate during 2000–2013

Unit: 10,000 persons, %

Year	*Total number of Chinese students studying abroad since 1978*	*Total number of Chinese students studying abroad that year*	*Growth over the previous year*	*Growth rate*
2000	34.00	3.90	–	62.50
2001	46.00	8.40	4.50	115.38
2002	58.50	12.50	4.10	48.81
2003	70.00	11.73	–0.80	–6.16
2004	81.40	11.47	–0.26	–2.22
2005	93.30	11.85	0.38	3.31
2006	106.70	13.40	1.55	13.08
2007	121.20	14.40	1.00	7.46
2008	139.00	17.98	3.58	24.86
2009	162.00	22.93	4.95	27.53
2010	190.50	28.47	5.54	24.16
2011	224.51	33.97	5.50	19.32
2012	264.47	39.96	5.99	17.63
2013	305.86	41.39	1.43	3.58

Source: The data of 2000~2011 are from Annual Report on the Development of Chinese Students Studying Abroad *(2012), published by Social Science Academic Press, 2012, p. 7; the data of 2012~2013 are from the data released by the Ministry of Education of China*

Leaving aside growth in absolute numbers, the proportion of Chinese students studying abroad in the total educational population is showing a linear upward trend (see Figure 1). Census data for 2010 indicate that 34% of students studying abroad were from ordinary working families (Xinhua Net, 2012). This shows that the penetration rate and coverage of going abroad for education in China has reached a high level and is still increasing.



Figure 1. Proportion of Chinese students studying abroad to in-school students of secondary schools and higher education institutions in the previous years (1978–2012).
Notes: (1) To make the statistical data consistent, the number of students in institutions of higher education here includes graduate students and in-school students in all ordinary higher education institutions (HEIs) and HEIs for adults; (2) the data of 1978~2010 are from China Education Statistical Yearbook of different years; (3) the data of 2011~2012 are from Statistical Communique on National Education Development of the previous years

Furthermore, since the year 2000, China has seen not only significant growth of number of students going abroad for education, but also the opening of new channels for the pursuit of education abroad. In the previous century, self-funded students accounted for roughly 70% of all Chinese students studying abroad (estimate based on data from the *China Education Statistical Yearbook*, 2000–2012). This proportion now exceeds 90%. This indicates that people's financial capacity to study abroad has improved dramatically, as has their willingness to do so as overseas education has increased in popularity.

"Privatization" of student motivation for studying abroad. While going abroad for education at one's own expense is becoming increasingly popular in China, another distinctive characteristic of Chinese students going abroad for education is the "privatization" of motivation.

Before the 1980s, the movement of Chinese students to study abroad was almost entirely induced by government policy. The government decided the purpose, selected students, and bore the cost of overseas studies. The whole campaign of studying abroad was carried out entirely for the purpose of meeting needs decided

Table 2. Number of Chinese students studying abroad at the government's expense and at their own expense during 2000–2012

Unit: 10,000 persons, %

Year	*Total number of Chinese students studying abroad that year*	*Total number of Chinese students studying abroad at government expense*	*Total number of Chinese students studying abroad at expense of their employers*	*Total number of Chinese students studying abroad at their own expense*	*Proportion of Chinese students studying abroad at their own expense*
2000	3.90	0.30	0.40	3.23	82.8
2001	8.40	0.30	0.50	7.61	90.6
2002	12.50	0.35	0.45	11.7	93.5
2003	11.73	0.35	0.46	10.91	93.0
2004	11.47	0.35	0.69	10.43	91.0
2005	11.85	0.40	0.80	10.65	90.0
2006	13.40	0.56	0.77	12.07	90.07
2007	14.40	0.89	0.61	12.90	89.58
2008	17.98	1.14	0.68	16.16	89.88
2009	22.93	1.20	0.72	21.01	91.63
2010	28.47	1.20	1.27	26.00	91.32
2011	33.97	1.28	1.21	31.48	92.67
2012	39.96	1.35	1.16	37.45	93.72

Source: Ministry of Education of China

by government, meaning that the outflow of Chinese students was fundamentally driven by the public interest. Even from the perspective of the students themselves, most went abroad with the aim of realizing the "dream of saving the country"; they consciously identified their mission as "to serve the nation and the people". With the establishment of the market economy and the breaking of the uniform model of studying abroad at government expense, however, the campaign of studying abroad is increasingly driven by the behaviour of schools and individual citizens. The profit mechanism has also undergone corresponding change (Huang, 1995). This is confirmed by surveys carried out by scholars and education intermediary agents. For example, MyCOS (a leading third-party education data consulting and evaluation) found that, in both 2010 and 2011, "enhancing comprehensive occupational competitiveness" was the most common motive for study abroad. Such results are confirmed by Su Jiazhuo (2013), whose online survey shows that the primary motive for the vast majority (76%) of students with bachelor's degrees or above is "to enhance the employability". Based on the in-depth interviews to 7

undergraduate students in universities in Beijing who want to study abroad, Liu Hongxia and Fang Jiaxu identify 6 motives for college students to choose study abroad, namely "to receive better education, to better achieve career aspiration, to promote personal growth and improvement, to achieve success and recognition, to yearn for foreign environment and living, and to be influenced by the external environment and people" (Liu & Fang, 2011). Based on such research, we can draw two basic conclusions: first, the results of these surveys are consistent and have a high external credibility; second, although data from these sources are somewhat different, they all show that the main motive for Chinese students to study abroad is self-development and indicate a clear trend of "privatization".



Figure 2. Survey of the motives for university graduates in 2010 and 2011 to study abroad. Source: drawn by the authors based on the data provided in MyCOS – Report of the Survey on Social Needs and Training Quality of University Graduates in 2010–2011 in China

"Diversified" choice of specialty by students studying abroad. In the early years when the reform and opening up policy was adopted, Comrade Deng Xiaoping, after listening to a report on Tsinghua University from the Ministry of Education on June 23, 1978 proclaimed his support for "increasing the number of students studying abroad", specifying that "they should be mainly engaged in natural sciences". To meet the needs for resumption of economic development, Chinese students studying abroad specialized mainly in applied science and basic disciplines, an approach somewhat similar to that taken in the years immediately following the founding of New China. Cheng Xi (2001), a researcher with All-China Federation of Returned Overseas Chinese and Overseas Chinese History Museum of China, conducted an analysis of the specialties of 424 outstanding returned overseas scholars recorded in the *Elegance of Students – Record of Performances of Outstanding Returned Overseas Scholars.* This data was compiled by the Chinese Ministry of Education at the beginning of the 21st century and provides a record of those who have made

outstanding contributions to China's development and been recognized with various types of recognitions between the late 1970s and 2000. Cheng (2001) found that the majority of these scholars worked in the natural sciences, with less than a quarter coming from the humanities and social sciences.

Beginning in the late 1990s and even more so after its accession to the WTO in 2001, China progressively opened the door to overseas education. The range of specialties pursued by students studying abroad broadened and the "specialty focus point" shifted gradually from science and engineering to businesses. In 2012, Beijing Zhongjiao Anxue Education & Technology Co. Ltd. cooperated with Chinese Education Online to collect information on the specialties of more than 6,000 students with bachelor degree or above who have studied abroad.[2]

The survey showed that about 46% of the participants chose majors in economics and financial management; about 17% majored engineering and applied technology; and 12% went into the humanities and social sciences. Put differently, about 75% of the students have chosen three major disciplinary categories to study for their master's or doctoral degrees. In addition, nearly half of the undergraduate students studying overseas chose specializations in economics, management, and financial disciplines.



Figure 3. Distribution of students going abroad to pursue postgraduate study.
Source: Report of the survey on trends in Education Abroad in 2012 by China Education Online [EB/OL]. http://www.eol.cn/html/lx/report2012/ 2015-6-12

On the other hand, the Education International Cooperation Group (EIC) has produced data indicating that, in the next few years, the specialization choices of Chinese students studying abroad will likely present 3 characteristics and trends: first, although the numbers of students abroad majoring in different specializations will continue to show an imbalance, the concentration of specialization distribution is showing a downward trend; second, at least in a short term, business and engineering will continue to be the most popular specializations for Chinese students studying abroad (the survey results from EIC show that about 45% of students studying abroad choose business or engineering); third, arts and humanities are growing in popularity. The survey results also show that students who choose arts and human sciences are expected to account for about 20% each, demonstrating that arts and

human sciences are enjoying popularity close to that of business and engineering. In contrast, the number of students choosing natural sciences is declining.



Figure 4. Intentions of specialty choice of Chinese students studying abroad.
Source: Report of the survey on Chinese students' intentions to study abroad 2013 by EIC

"Decentralized" distribution of the target countries for Chinese students to study abroad. Before the 1970s, Chinese students abroad were concentrated in a few countries. From the days when select children of the late Qing Dynasty travelled to the United States to study up until the founding of the People's Republic, China experienced a series of booms in the numbers of students going abroad for study in the United States, Europe (in fact, only Britain and France), Japan, and Russia. Different periods saw different destinations dominate. From 1950 to the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, China sent students to 29 countries for further study. Among these, the most significant destinations were the Soviet Union (78%) and the new democratic states of Eastern Europe. From 1966–1971, during the disruptions of the Cultural Revolution, China sent no students abroad. By 1972, diplomatic relations between China and the Western countries began to ease, and China resumed sending students abroad, increasing the range of target countries in the process. From 1972 to 1978, during which the reform and opening up policy was developed and adopted, China sent students to 49 countries. Since the reform and opening up and especially after students were permitted to study abroad at their own expense, the number of target countries has rapidly grown. According to the Ministry of Education, the period of 1978–2000 saw Chinese students studying in more than 80 countries (Wang, 2012). This trend has continued in subsequent years. According to Zhang Xiuqin of the Department of International Cooperation and Exchange of the Ministry of Education, Chinese students are currently studying in more than 100 countries worldwide (New Oriental, 2013).

On the whole, the distribution of the target countries for Chinese students studying abroad shows the characteristics of "broadly concentrated and widely dispersed". On the one hand, since entering the 21st century, the United Kingdom,

the United States, Australia, Canada and other developed countries have been the top destinations for Chinese students studying abroad. The number of Chinese students going to these four countries accounts for 70% of the total number of Chinese students studying abroad. On the other hand, more and more Chinese students are choosing moderately developed or developing countries for further study. Italy, the Netherlands, Malaysia, South Korea, Ireland, Poland, Spain, Cuba and others have become hot spots for Chinese students studying abroad. Still others go to India, Argentina and other developing countries. ASEAN countries have also become "new favourites" for Chinese students. In 2006, the total number of Chinese students studying in the ASEAN countries was more than 60,000, among whom 34,500 were in Singapore, about 16,000 in Thailand and about 6,500 in Malaysia. At present, China has become the most important source of students for international education programs in Thailand and Malaysia (Wang, 2012).

Status Quo and Characteristics of Foreign Students Studying in China

Rapid expansion of number of foreign students studying in China. Considering now the number of foreign students studying in China, *China Education Yearbook* data reveal that the number of foreign students studying in China grew from 43,000 to 356,000 in the years 1998–2013, increasing by a factor of 8.2 (see Table 3). The number of these students receiving government scholarships increased from 5,088 to 33,322, accounting for less than one tenth of total foreign students studying in China. The number of foreign students studying in China at their own expense accounted for the vast majority (>90%). In 2013, the number of foreign students studying in China reached 350,000 for the first time. A total of 33,322 of these students received scholarships granted by the Chinese government, accounting for 9.35% of the total foreign students in China. 323,177 or 90.65% were self-funded. Students from 200 countries and regions were studying in 746 universities, research institutes and other educational institutions in 31 provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities (excluding Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan).

Low academic credentials of foreign students studying in China. In terms of prior academic credentials, foreign students studying in China can be placed in one of the following four categories: undergraduate students (students who graduated from high schools and were admitted into colleges in China for study for 4~5 years); general visiting students (students who have completed more than two years of undergraduate education who come to China for 1–2 years of study); graduate students (students who have received a bachelor's or master's degree and came to China to pursue a master's or doctorate degree for 2~3 years); and senior visiting students (students who hold a master's degree from universities/colleges or who are PhD candidates and come to China for education in a relevant specialization, generally for one year). On the whole, non-degree path students account for about two-thirds of the total foreign students in China. Among foreign students studying

Table 3. Statistics of self-funded foreign students studying in China and foreign students receiving government scholarships during 1998~2013

Year	*Total number of in-school foreign students studying in China*	*Total number of foreign students studying in China at their own expense*	*Proportion of foreign students studying in China at their own expense*	*Total number of foreign students studying in China receiving government scholarships*	*Proportion of foreign students studying in China receiving government scholarships*
1998	43084	37996	88.19%	5088	11.81%
1999	44711	39500	88.35%	5211	11.65%
2000	52150	46788	89.72%	5362	10.28%
2001	61869	56028	90.56%	5841	9.44%
2002	85829	79755	92.93%	6074	7.08%
2003	77715	71562	92.08%	6153	7.92%
2004	110844	104129	93.94%	6715	6.06%
2005	141087	133869	94.88%	7218	5.12%
2006	162695	154211	94.79%	8484	5.21%
2007	195503	185352	94.81%	10151	5.19%
2008	223499	209983	93.95%	13516	6.05%
2009	238184	219939	92.34%	18245	7.66%
2010	265090	242700	91.55%	22390	8.45%
2011	292611	266924	91.22%	25687	8.78%
2012	328330	299562	91.24%	28768	8.76%
2013	356499	323177	90.65%	33322	9.35%

Source: Summary based on China Education Yearbook 1999–2013 *[the data of 1999 not available in* China Education Yearbook *are based on* Education of Foreign Students in China in the 30 Years since the Reform and Opening up *(2009, p. 114) by Yu Fuzeng]*

in China, general visiting students, short-term students and undergraduate students account for the vast majority, while senior visiting students, master's degree and doctoral degree candidates account for a small proportion and see a slow growth (see Figure 5).

In 2008, 80,005 of foreign students studying in China held an academic degree, accounting for 35.8% of total foreign students in China. Among these, the number of junior college students, undergraduate students and graduate students was 860 (0.4%), 64,864 (29.0%), and 14,281 respectively (6.4%). The number of non-degree students was 143,494 or 64.2%, comprising 83,779 general visiting students, 1,218 senior visiting students, and 58,497 short-term students, accounting for 37.5%, 0.5%, and 26.2% respectively.



Figure 5. Statistics of academic levels of foreign students studying in China during 1998~2008.
Source: Based on the data of China Education Yearbook 1999–2008

Substantial difference in continental distribution of foreign students studying in China. Students from neighbouring Asian countries sharing cultural and geographical proximity make up a large proportion of the international student complement. According to *China Education Yearbook 1998–2009*, four of the top five source countries were Asian (Korea, Japan, Vietnam, and Indonesia). The number of students from these four countries increased from 31,090 to 161,605 over 11 years, an increase of 4.2 times. The number of students from Africa, Europe, the Americas, and Oceania was relatively small, with none contributing more than 40,000 (see Figure 6). Noteworthy is the fact that in 1998, there were only 1,395



Figure 6. Statistics of foreign students in China by continents during 1998~2008.
Source: Summary based on China Education Yearbook 1999–2010 (*the data of 1999 are not available in* China Education Yearbook)

African students in China, but thanks to China's efforts to strengthen its position in Africa, including providing increased aid, this figure had risen to 12,436 by 2009, an increase of about 9 times.

Irrational structure of disciplines and specialties for foreign students studying in China. During 2002–2010, more than half of foreign students studying in China enrolled in liberal arts programs, about two-third of total foreign students. Notably, 70% majored in Chinese, a number that has declined in recent years. In addition, about one-tenth of foreign students majored in medicine. Foreign students majoring in other specialties accounted for less than 10%, less than 1% of foreign students in natural sciences, history, agricultural science, and philosophy (see Table 4). In 2010, 11 specializations received foreign students. Arranged in descending order according to the number of foreign students enrolled, these were liberal arts, medicine, economics, engineering, management, law, education, natural sciences, history, agricultural science, and philosophy. Only 5 of these enrolled more 5,000 foreign students. A total of 165,761 foreign students majored in liberal arts (including 146,149 students majoring in Chinese language and 19,612 majoring in other specializations), accounting for 62.53% of total foreign students in China. Chinese language majors alone accounted for 55.13%. This preference of foreign students for liberal arts reflected to some extent their yearning to learn more about Chinese culture. It may also be that China's recent achievements in economic and social development make it a legitimate source of valuable experience and development knowledge attractive to a growing number of students coming to China to study management, economics, and law. However, highly developed areas in Chinese higher education such as natural sciences and agricultural science have not yet realized their potential as destination specializations for foreign students.

Uneven regional distribution of foreign students in China. The top 5 regions that received the greatest number of foreign students in 2009 were Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, Liaoning, and Jiangsu. Taken together these jurisdictions accounted for about 60% of the total foreign students. Beijing alone received 26% of the total number of foreign students (see Figure 7). Surprisingly, Shaanxi, Sichuan, Fujian, and other provinces received only a small number of foreign students, which did not match with their position in higher education in China. The number of foreign students in provinces with international boundaries and other inland provinces such as Qinghai, Ningxia, Guizhou, Shanxi and Tibet was less than 500. Some universities in the western provinces have yet to enroll a single foreign student. In terms of distribution by institution, Peking University, Tsinghua University, Fudan University, Wuhan University and other key comprehensive higher education institutions give full play to their advantages in a complete range of disciplines. As a result, the number of foreign students in these universities has been increasing year by year. For example, Tsinghua University offers 98 master's and 76 doctoral degree specializations across 34 faculties and schools. As a result, the university

Table 4. Distribution ratio of specialties selected by foreign students in China during 2002~2010

Year	*Literal arts*	*Medicine*	*Economics*	*Engineering*	*Management*	*Law*	*Natural sciences*	*History*	*Agriculture*	*Education*	*Philosophy*
2002	79.74%	7.82%	3.17%	2.85%	1.21%	1.50%	0.46%	1.60%	0.31%	1.10%	0.24%
2003	75.99%	9.24%	3.98%	3.47%	1.99%	2.64%	0.60%	0.62%	0.31%	0.93%	0.23%
2004	75.11%	9.90%	4.08%	3.18%	2.56%	2.20%	0.50%	0.67%	0.27%	0.90%	0.63%
2005	70.75%	12.78%	4.72%	3.16%	2.52%	2.06%	0.53%	0.54%	0.27%	2.29%	0.39%
2006	70.59%	12.51%	4.49%	3.57%	3.66%	2.25%	0.62%	0.56%	0.27%	1.06%	0.42%
2007	69.30%	13.08%	4.50%	3.47%	4.39%	2.40%	0.72%	0.44%	0.39%	0.96%	0.35%
2008	64.14%	12.82%	5.07%	4.08%	4.80%	2.10%	4.46%	0.43%	0.31%	1.52%	0.26%
2009	64.32%	13.94%	6.23%	5.03%	5.32%	2.15%	0.61%	0.45%	0.44%	1.21%	0.27%
2010	62.53%	13.64%	6.36%	5.71%	5.63%	2.32%	0.96%	0.49%	0.40%	1.69%	0.28%

Source: Summary based on China Education Yearbook 2003–2011

has recruited over 1,200 foreign students (Zheng, 2013). In sharp contrast, the phenomenon of "zero enrollment" of foreign students is common in the universities of China's border regions and inland provinces. Regional and inter-institutional distribution of foreign students is seriously imbalanced, with foreign students heavily concentrated in the universities of the economically developed coastal provinces. This is closely related to uneven regional and institutional development of higher education in China.



Figure 7. Regional distribution of foreign students in China in 2009.
Source: Summary based on data in China Education Yearbook *2010 (others refer to the provinces where the number of foreign students is less than 2000, including Henan, Jiangxi, Gansu, Anhui, Hainan, Qinghai, Ningxia, Guizhou, Shanxi and Tibet)*

PROBLEMS WITH TRANSNATIONAL MOBILITY OF CHINESE STUDENTS

Overseas education has not only cultivated a significant number of international talents of international vision and global competence for China's modernization drive, but also a significant international force familiar with China and friendly toward the country. However, the rapid expansion of transnational flows of students has also exposed many problems in the work of education of Chinese students abroad, such as a serious "deficit" in transnational education, huge loss of high-level personnel, and the crisis domestic higher education institutions are facing as they attempt to compete with foreign universities for a finite number of students.

Serious "Deficit" in Transnational Education

Overseas education is one manifestation of the internationalization of education and can be seen as a form of bilateral exchange. To use the term "bilateral," however, suggests that the degree of internationalization of education of a given country ought not to be solely reliant on "output." Rather, to invoke "exchange"

is to aim for a balance between "input" and "output" while maximizing the international mobility. Wang Huiyao et al. have used the term "deficit" to describe the phenomenon of "high output and low input" in the education markets. Here "deficit" refers not only to an "inability to make ends meet" in the field of overseas education services, but also to the number of students studying abroad exceeding the number of foreign students studying in China. We can add to this other manifestations of the deficit phenomena, such as imbalances in student quality and specialization structures.

Considering trade in education services, Chinese scholars have compared the international competitiveness of China and the four major target countries for Chinese students, i.e., the United Kingdom, the United States, Australia, and Canada using the trade competitiveness index (TC index). Their data indicates that the indices of international competitiveness of the four major target countries for Chinese students are positive and consistently on the high side. Britain and Australia are particularly high, while China is notably low. In other words, China's imports of educational services have far exceeded its exports (see Figure 8).

Figure 9 intuitively expresses this deficit in the trade of education services. Although China's education service exports have grown year by year, the growth rate of exports remained far lower than import and the deficit grew rapidly. In 1999, the China's education services trade was about $1.42 billion. By 2007, the deficit reached $12.81 billion, an increase of 802.11%.



Figure 8. Comparison of TC index of overseas consumption of trade in educational services for the four major target countries of Chinese students.
Notes: (1) TC index, also known as trade specialization coefficient, refers to the ratio of the difference between a country's exports and imports of a certain kind of products to the total import and export volume of the products. It is generally used to reflect the competitiveness of a certain kind of products of a country in the international market. (2) Li Hong and He Mubin (2012). Status Quo and International Competitiveness of China's Trade in Educational Services [J]. Finance and Economics, 121(1)



Figure 9. Educational services trade deficit (1999–2007).
Source: China Trade Service Guiding Network,
http://tradeinservices.mofcom.gov.cn/c/index.shtml 2013-12-21

In terms of the number of students studying abroad, data provided above indicates that, since reform and opening up and especially since the year 2000, the number of Chinese students studying abroad has grown by leaps and bounds. In contrast, even though the number of foreign students studying in China also increased from 404 in 1977 to 328,300 by 2012, the gap between inbound and outbound students has continued to widen. In 2004, the difference between the total number of Chinese students studying abroad and the number of foreign students studying in China reached 316,200, and this figure expanded to 808,600 in 2012 (see Figure 10). Taking the most important destination country for Chinese students going abroad, the United States, as an example, according to the *Open Doors*, the annual growth rate of Chinese students studying in the United States is far more than that of US students coming to China. During the school years 1995 and 1996, the number of Chinese students studying in the United States was 38,000 more than the number of the US students studying in China. For the years 2011 and 2012, the deficit grew to nearly 180,000 (see Figure 11).

Beyond sheer numbers, the compositions of the inbound-outbound student bodies are rather different. First, more than 70% of Chinese students went to the UK, the US, Australia, Canada and other developed countries for further study. Foreign students received by China, on the other hand, were mostly from neighbouring Asian countries. The Ministry of Education reports that less than 30% of the foreign students received by China in 2012 were from Europe and the Americas (see Figure 12). Second, the average academic degree of Chinese students studying abroad was much higher than that of foreign students studying in China. According the *Open Doors Report*, in 2012 nearly 44% of the Chinese students in the United States were graduate students. In the same year, only 27% of foreign students enrolled in China were degree holders. The remainders were by and large short-term students in language training programs. Third, while Chinese students studying



Figure 10. Difference between the number of Chinese students studying abroad and the number of foreign students studying in China (2004~2012). Source: The data of 2004~2011 are from: Wang Huiyao et al. Reflections on China's Cultivation of International Talents from the "Deficit" in Overseas Education [J]. The First Resource, 2013 (4): 2; the data of 2012 are from: Hu Jian. Blue Book of Global Talents: Serious "Deficit" Phenomenon in Overseas Education of China [EB / OL] http://www.nbd.com.cn/articles/2013-09-24/775816.html 2014-1-1



Figure 11. "Deficit" of overseas education between China and the US (1995–2012). Source: Open Doors Report 2013 *of the United States*

abroad mostly majored in natural sciences, engineering, and business, more than half of the foreign students studying in China majored in liberal arts, with only a few of them majoring in natural sciences and engineering.

Pessimistic Situation of Chinese Students Staying Abroad

Since entering the new century, the number of Chinese students returning to China upon completion of their studies abroad has grown rapidly. The return rate has



Figure 12. Geographical distribution of foreign students in China in 2012.
Source: Brief Statistics of Foreign Students in China in 2012

risen to some extent, but the prospects for ameliorating the phenomenon of staying abroad are not optimistic. From 1978 to 2012, the total number of all types of Chinese students studying abroad was 2.6446 million. In the same period, the number of students to return was 1.0913 million, a return rate of 41.3%. This represents the highest level of return in 20 years, but remains substantially lower than the return of more than 50% for students studying abroad in developing or emerging developed countries, such as South Korea and Singapore. The situation of Chinese students staying abroad is depicted in Figure 13. The graph compares the number of Chinese students studying abroad and the number of Chinese students staying abroad upon completion of their studies (all data provided in Ministry of



Figure 13. Statistics of Chinese students who have returned home
after completing their study (1978–2012).
Source: the communiqués of the Ministry of Education in the previous years

Education communiqués). The combined area of the blue and red zones in the figure represents the total number of Chinese students studying abroad. The red area represents the total number of Chinese students who have returned home, the blue the number of Chinese students who remain abroad upon completion of their studies. This figure vividly expresses the extent to which brain drain and reverse brain drain are highly imbalanced in China. The problem of brain drain in particular is a severe one.

"Giving up the College Entrance Examination and Going Abroad for Study" Intensifying the "Crisis Concerning the Source of Students" in Higher Education in China

The number of candidates for the college entrance examination (*gaokao*) in China peaked in 2008 and has declined every year since. Candidates for the college entrance examination has been reduced by an accumulated 1.05 million in the four years from 2009 to 2012, meaning that China's higher education system, which had long operated under conditions of enrollment expansion and popularization, was suddenly faced with a crisis of enrollment. It is generally believed that a decline in the school-age population is the main cause of the sharp decline in candidates for the *gaokao*. However, it is noteworthy that in addition to objective demographic factors, in recent years, a large number of high school graduates have declined to participate in the *gaokao*. Statistics show that, during the past three years, a total of more than 3 million students have given up the *gaokao*, nearly 10% of the total number of total eligible candidates (*People's Daily*, 2012). Some of this decline seems to be due to the popularization of higher education itself, which has made it difficult for university students to find jobs, leading some students to hold that the knowledge gained through higher education is useless. Perhaps more significant in recent years, however, is the notion of "Giving up the college entrance examination and going abroad for study." Taking Beijing as an example, nearly 30 thousand students in Beijing gave up college entrance examination in 2013. Among these, the vast majority chose to study abroad (Li, 2013).

Figure 14 depicts the change in the number of candidates for the *gaokao*, the admission rate, and the number of students leaving for undergraduate study in the United States from 2008–2012. The decline in the number of candidates for the *gaokao* and the increasing domestic admission rate reflect increasing competition for students in China's higher education system. At the same time, while the number of candidates for the *gaokao* is declining, more and more Chinese students are taking part in the SAT and other "foreign entrance exams" and the number of Chinese students for undergraduate study in the United States is growing year by year. Population decrease itself represents a danger for the development of China's higher education, but the boom in outbound students means that competition between foreign universities and Chinese universities for students may further aggravate the crisis concerning the sources of students in higher education in China.



Figure 14. Statistics of number of Chinese students participating in college entrance examination, college admission rate and number of Chinese students for undergraduate study in the United States (2008–2012).
Source: (1) the number of people participating in college entrance examination and the college admission rate are from the data released by the Ministry of Education; (2) the number of Chinese students for undergraduate study in the United States is from Open Doors Report *published in various years*

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING THE TRANSNATIONAL MOBILITY OF CHINESE STUDENTS

At the present moment it is crucial that China promote a new round of opening up to the outside world. It must reassess its position and make a plan for the transnational mobility of students. The aim of doing so will be to ensure the healthy and orderly development of transnational education from a global perspective. The following recommendations are offered to promote a leap forward in the development of China's transnational education.

Further Enhancing the Competitiveness and Market Share of China's Transnational Education

While driving the development of related domestic industries and bringing huge foreign exchange earnings, transnational education has the capacity to output politics, diplomacy, culture and values, so it is an important indicator of the level of educational development and comprehensive national strength of a country. Faced with a huge deficit in international education services, China must adjust its transnational education development strategy. It must fully implement plans to attract foreign students to China and strive to improve the quality of education offered domestically. It must move more quickly to integrate the domestic and international

education market to enhance international competitiveness and increase its share of the market in transnational education services. It must gradually reverse the deficit of trade in international education services. Major colleges and universities must become more aware of the need for further internationalization, take initiatives to establish alliances with well-known universities, and actively carry out overseas promotion and marketing to attract talented youth throughout the world to China and expand the overall scale and level of transnational education. We must give full play to China's absolute advantages in language and cultural education and its comparative advantage in education costs and professional basic education, and establish a number of demonstration bases for foreign students studying in China. We ought also to create a number of "brand courses with Chinese characteristics" easily recognized by international students. We must improve supporting policies for scholarships, part-work and part-study and social security for foreign students studying in China and increase the number of scholarships provided by the Chinese government. We must prioritize the funding of students coming to China to pursue academic degrees and recruit outstanding students from developing countries.

Establishing Quality Monitoring and Evaluation Mechanisms to Ensure the Quality of Education

While promoting the development of transnational education in China, we must ensure not only the rapid increase in number of students but also the continuous improvement of quality. We should not simply pursue the expansion of scale, while ignoring the need to enhance quality. If we blindly pursue the expansion of quantity without guaranteeing quality, the development of transnational education in China will remain at a low level. This would not be conducive to the long-term, stable and sustainable development of transnational education in China. Therefore, it is crucial to gradually establish a quality monitoring and evaluation mechanism that meets China's national conditions for foreign students studying in China. On the whole, we propose the following:

Establishing a sound organization. The educational authorities should establish a special quality assurance agency. Its main function would be to carry out macro-monitoring of teaching quality at colleges and universities enrolling foreign students. It would organize expert in different disciplines to evaluate the faculties and schools of these universities.

Establishing and improving an international evaluation and certification system for the academic degrees of China's higher education. Higher education for foreign students in China is a process of cultivating international talents. This task requires that China to establish education quality standards in line with international education development needs. To ensure that the quality of education of foreign students in China is recognized by the international community, we should actively

participate in the research, formulation and evaluation of international education quality standards and strengthen the cooperation and exchanges with highly regarded international educational quality certification organizations.

Establishing a quality review mechanism to combine external expert review, peer review and student review, integrate internal review and external review of schools and regularly assess the quality of education for foreign students. For colleges and universities, the fundamental purpose of assessing the quality of education for foreign students in China is to identify problems through assessment and to sum up the experience and lessons to achieve improvement and development. For management departments at higher levels, the purpose of assessments is to seek out laws of transnational education development so as to provide a scientific basis for management and guidance. Colleges and universities should also strengthen internal quality control for foreign students, strictly formulate cultivation quality standards, and establish teaching a quality monitoring information collection system. For example, they can carry out surveys of graduating students, collect feedback from students on problems with teaching quality, and carry out surveys on the satisfaction of employers and families of students.

An education quality monitoring and assessment system for foreign students in China should be appropriate to the operating conditions of different colleges and universities. The use of a unified assessment approach for all colleges and universities should be avoided at all costs. China remains a beginner in terms of its ability to provide education for foreign students, and the hosting capacity of the schools of different regions remains uneven. While establishing and implementing the assessment and monitoring systems, we should take into consideration the basic conditions that obtain for running different universities in different regions, the software and hardware levels in education of foreign students, and the development history and scale of education for foreign students and other factors. In doing so, we can firmly establish the principle of promoting development through assessment so as to continuously promote and improve the quality and service levels of education for foreign students in China.

Further Improving the System for Sending Abroad and Introducing High-Level Talents

At present, transnational flow of talents has become an unstoppable global trend. At the same time, the flow of talents among different countries is imbalanced. In a time when there is still a significant gap between China and developed countries at the level of economic, technical, and environmental development, brain drain is inevitable, and it is impossible to reverse such a condition overnight. In formulating policies for overseas education, we should proceed from the perspective of long-term development and create stable policies to gradually solve the problem of brain drain. We should be neither eager for quick success nor too quick to obstruct the opening up and development of overseas education for fear of brain drain and the

dispatching of high-level personnel. On the contrary, we should maintain a steady pace of development of overseas education and adhere to principles of invitation and introduction as we further strengthen the international mobility of high-level personnel. In addition, we should promote the reasonable employment of students who have returned home after completing study abroad

NOTES

1 The above data are internal data.
2 For more information, see http://www.liuxue315.edu.cn/StudyAssess. 2015-6-12.

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7. CHINESE STUDENTS IN THE UK

Learning and Growth in Transition

INTRODUCTION

Increasing global competition for students has witnessed an ever more rapid internationalization of higher education. In the case of the UK, there has been a major influx of Chinese students to British universities since the launch of the British Government's long-term worldwide educational campaign in 1999. Drawing upon evidence from a number of studies led by the author in the last decade, this chapter will examine the nature of Chinese students' transitional experiences both in terms of their maturation and human development and their intercultural adaptation within a different educational environment and a different culture and society. It will also explore how, why, and to what extent such experiences may (or may not) contribute to their personal and professional development on their return to work in their home country. The empirical work is based upon a series of research projects that the author has led over the past ten years, including a two-year Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) research project on the experiences of international undergraduate students at British universities (Gu, Schweisfurth, & Day, 2010) and a British Academy funded two-year research project which investigated how, why and to what extent overseas educational experiences may (or may not) contribute to the personal, professional and career development of Chinese students who return to work in China (Gu, Schweisfurth, Day, & Li, 2009).

The research projects were set out in the context of internationalization, which has not been a value free phenomenon since its first emergence (Gu & Schweisfurth, 2011). The historical and current migration of skills and academic talent and the flows of economic, social, and cultural capital continue to show that inequalities inherent in this phenomenon have remained intact. Irrespective of the persistent increase in international student mobility, studying abroad activities remain reserved for a select few (International Association of Universities, 2010). In the case of China – although Chinese students are the largest single international student group in the UK – only less than 2% of tertiary students from China study abroad (UNESCO, 2009). They represent two groups of elites in the society: the socio-economic elite (e.g. mostly self-funded students) and the educated elite (e.g. students funded by scholarships) (Wang & Miao, 2013). The studies presented in this chapter considered the difference in returnees' demographics and backgrounds as indicated by their time of study in

S. Guo & Y. Guo (Eds.), Spotlight on China: Chinese Education in the Globalized World, 107–128.
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the UK (e.g. in the early 1980s versus in the first decade of the 21st century), and sources of funding. However, these studies found that irrespective of the differences in backgrounds, the majority of returnees were able to explore different academic, social, and cultural avenues whilst studying in the UK and through these, develop transnational(ized) connections, competences, and identities that continued to contribute to their capacity and functioning in employment and society at 'home'.

THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF HIGHER EDUCATION: THE CONTEXT

The late 20th and early 21st centuries have witnessed unprecedented change, as the volume and speed of global flows of people, information and images, financial capital, policies, knowledge, and expertise have increased exponentially (Appadurai, 1996; Friedman, 2005). This phenomenon is nowhere better represented than in the dramatic rise of the internationalization of universities in the developed world. In 2004, more than 2.5 million tertiary students studied outside their home countries compared to 1.75 million in 1999 – a 41% increase (UNESCO, 2006). The Global Student Mobility 2025 report (Bohm et al., 2004) foresees that the demand for international education will increase to 7.2 million in 2025.

It is perhaps, then, not surprising that internationalization is perceived to be the most revolutionary development of higher education in the 21st century (Seddoh, 2001). The scope and complexity of this phenomenon have expanded and deepened at an unprecedented pace over the past decade, fuelled by the process of economic, social, and cultural globalization and localization (Rizvi, 2008). Rizvi (2008) posits that in the past two decades, the idea of the "internationalisation of higher education" has become so ubiquitous that "it can now be regarded as part of a global slogan system designed to steer educational reform in a particular direction" (2008, p. 20).

The significant increase in East-West and South-North student mobility (OECD, 2007; Seddoh, 2001; Uvalić-Trumbić et al., 2007) has major implications for the generation of economic and social capital in the receiving nations. The largest exporter of cross-border higher education is the United States, followed by the United Kingdom, and Australia, and international students and their dependents have made considerable contributions to the national economy of these industrialized countries. The total value of American education exports was $14.5 billion in 2007, increased from $12 billion in 2004 (NAFSA, 2006, 2007). The UK economy benefits from earnings of £12.5 billion per year (British Council, 2008a). In 2007–08, Australian education exports enjoyed a massive increase of 23.4% to $13.7 billion (National Liaison Committee for International Students in Australia, 2008).

The part played by the internationalization agendas of universities, however, is not yet clear. On the one hand, those in the developed world are providing opportunities for study and accreditation at all levels for those from so called less well developed countries. On the other hand, the existing scarce supply of empirically grounded knowledge fails to offer a nuanced account of how the proliferation of new forms and modes of cross-border higher education (OECD, 2004a, 2004b, 2007; UNESCO,

2003) is influencing the lives of individuals (including international students and academics) over time.

Some writers try to differentiate between 'symbolic' and 'transformative' internationalization (Turner & Robson, 2008), aimed at promoting the internationalization of higher education as a means and precursor to the transformation of the curriculum in the face of globalization. It is argued that at the 'symbolic' end of the institutional spectrum, universities are becoming "active players in the global marketplace" (de Wit, 2002, p. 227), and are concerned primarily with the revenue generated by international students. This is predicated on a thin understanding of internationalization, and is associated with a prescriptive approach to institutional change, based on doing the least that the market will bear (Schweisfurth & Gu, 2009). A 'transformative' approach, on the other hand, is concerned with knowledge sharing and co-operation, and integrating "an international/intercultural dimension into the teaching, research and service functions of academic institutions" (Knight, 1999, p. 16; see also Knight, 1994).

To deliver quality higher education, it is essential that we understand the purposes, practices and experiences of key stakeholders at all levels of the processes of internationalization. The studies upon which this chapter is based adopt a bottom-up approach exploring the phenomenon of the internationalization of higher education at the level of individual students. International students are a group of key consumers of this rapidly growing phenomenon of the internationalization of higher education. Burslem (2004), Chair of the Board of Trustees of UK Council for International Education (UKCISA, 2007), acknowledged that "international students are vital to the current and future health of UK further and higher education" (2007, p. 5). The part that international students play in the business of cross-border education has academic, cultural, and financial significance to the development of the UK higher education (Burslem, 2004). Thus, it is important that their voices be heard, particularly because experiences of this group of individuals testify the provision of the quality of education. In this sense, the internationalization of higher education is not an end itself, but a means to an end, "with the end being the improvement of the quality of education" (Knight, 1999, p. 20).

The Chinese Students

The upsurge of Chinese students studying abroad can be traced back to China's reformist and former leader Deng Xiaoping's speech in June 1978: "We are going to send thousands or tens of thousands of students to receive overseas education" (Xinhua News Agency, 2004: http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004-08/16/content_365828.htm). Three decades after Deng's speech, the number of Chinese students studying abroad has indisputably met his expectations. According to statistics from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, 1.07 million Chinese students had studied overseas in China's reform and opening-up period between 1978 and 2006. In 2007, an additional 421,000 Chinese students contributed to

the statistics of international student mobility (UNESCO, 2009). Following the internationalization of China's economy and the trend of globalization, central and local Chinese education authorities have placed greater emphasis on international education exchanges, "including permitting large numbers of young Chinese to study abroad on their own or at government expense" (British Council, 2008b: www.britishcouncil.org/eumd-information-background-china.htm). This has, no doubt, further contributed to China's important presence on the world stage of global higher education competition.

In the case of the UK in particular, given the launch of the British Government's long-term worldwide educational campaign in 1999 and the subsequent introduction of a series of national policies to boost the recruitment of international students, soaring interest among students in China has led to a major influx of Chinese students into British universities. Figure 1 illustrates the number of UK Universities and Colleges Admissions Service (UCAS) applications from China and accepted Chinese applicants between 1996 and 2008. These applicants all applied to full time, undergraduate higher education courses offered by universities and colleges in membership of the UCAS scheme. After a drastic rise from 104 in 1996 to a peak of around 9,141 in 2004, the number of Chinese applications for UK degree courses showed a decline in 2005 and 2006, which was then reversed by a rapid recovery in 2007 and 2008. In 2008, close to 9,000 Chinese students submitted their applications to undergraduate courses at British universities and over 6,000 departed for overseas study in the UK. As Figure 2 shows, Chinese students have been the largest single international student group in the UK since 2003.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The study is contextualized in different research literatures concerning the nature of intercultural experience, the stresses of studying abroad, and the impact of culture on study preferences and habits.

The Nature of Intercultural Experience

The notion of cross-cultural experience inherently stresses differences and diversity. Intercultural experience, on the other hand, "encompasses both domestic and international contexts and implies cultures interacting" (Landreman, 2003, cited in King & Baxter Magolda, 2005, p. 572). However, they are not mutually exclusive. Berger and Luckman (1966) and Paulston (1992) observe that some aspects of cultural beliefs and values are beyond modification or 'integration' and will never be completely abandoned for another (see also Byram, 2003). Thus, the degrees of adaptation – the process through which an actor changes to fit in with the host culture – differ depending upon personal and situational factors and their interaction. Individuals may develop "proficiency in self-expression and in fulfilling their various social needs" in the host culture (Kim, 2005, p. 391), whilst continuing to



Figure 1. Numbers of applications from China and accepted Chinese applicants by qualification (Degree, Foundation Degree and HND), between 1996 and 2007



Figure 2. Percentages of accepted applicants by country, between 2003 and 2008. Source: UCAS press releases, various years

experience a sense of boundary or ‘otherness’ when confronted with conflicting values and beliefs.

In the past twenty years there has been a rapid development of theories of intercultural communication competence (ICC) that have provided an understanding of the cognitive, affective, and behavioural development involved in contact with ‘otherness’ in linguistic, national, and ethnic terms (Alred et al., 2003; Bennett & Bennett, 2004a & 2004b; Byram, 1997; Byram et al., 2001; Byram & Zarate, 1997; Fantini, 2001; Gudykunst, 2005; Kim, 2001; Kramsch, 1998; Landis, et al., 2004). Studies on overseas students’ intercultural adaptation have reported numerous transitional and adaptive challenges that overseas students face. Cushner and Karim (2004, p. 292) argue that a study-abroad experience is “a significant transitional event that brings with it a considerable amount of accompanying stress, involving both confrontation and adaptation to unfamiliar physical and psychological experiences and changes.” Particular stresses that confront overseas students include culture shock (Adler, 1975, 1985; Oberg, 1960; Ward, Bochner, & Furnham, 2001), learning shock (Gu, 2005) or education shock (Hoff, 1979; Yamazaki, 2005), language shock (Agar, 1996; Smalley, 1963) and role shock (Byrnes, 1966; Minkler & Biller, 1979).

Ward and Kennedy (1993, p. 222) suggest two major types of reactions to intercultural stress: psychological adjustment (i.e. psychological well-being or satisfaction that is interwoven with stress and coping process) and sociocultural adaptation (i.e. relating to social skills and predicted on cultural learning) (Leung, Pe-Puab, & Karnilowicz, 2006; Li & Gasser, 2005; Mori, 2000; Searle & Ward, 1990; Ward & Kennedy, 1999). Nevertheless, a successful, intercultural experience can be a transformative learning process which leads to a journey of personal growth and development (Adler, 1975; Anderson, 1994; Byrnes, 1965; Furnham, 2004).

Whilst the above studies are valuable as a means of identifying key issues in intercultural education, they are predominantly quantitative and “objectivistic in nature” (Gudykunst, 2005, p. 25) and attempt to predict patterns of adaptation and factors that determine the observed patterns. Thus they fail to explain and present the “richness and fragmentation” of intercultural adaptation (Kim, 2005, p. 376) – a complex and problematic process in which international students are engaged in continuous negotiation and mediation with the surrounding environment, self-analysis (of their values and beliefs), self-reflection, and self-reorientation. The development of each component of their intercultural competence – attitude, knowledge, skills and critical cultural awareness (Byram et al., 2001) – influences and is influenced by the development of the others, and is moderated by the environment in which the individual is engaged.

The Role of Culture – Is It Deterministic?

Interest in what constitutes culture, its deep-rootedness, and its unspoken assumptions has been increasing over recent decades as the phenomenon of ‘sojourning’ (taking up temporary residence in another culture) has become more common. One of the

significant earlier commentators is Hall (1959, 1976). Hall's notion of "hidden cultures" reminds us how cultural factors may influence us without our knowledge and thus is particularly pertinent for educationalists working to understand the interactions between learners and teachers who do not share the same cultural background.

> Everything man is and does is modified by learning and is therefore malleable. But once learned, these behaviour patterns, these habitual responses, these ways of interacting gradually sink below the surface of the mind and, like the commander of a submerged submarine fleet, control from the depths. The hidden controls are usually experienced as though they were innate simply because they are not only ubiquitous but habitual as well. What makes it doubly hard to differentiate the innate from the acquired is the fact that, as people grow up, everyone around them shares the same patterns. (Hall, 1976, p. 42)

The implications are clear in regard to the interaction (or confrontation) between teachers, who see their way of teaching as self-evidently normal and beneficial, and students, whose learning culture has been derived from a quite different set of cultural presuppositions. What is regarded as common sense, natural and beneficial in one culture may be viewed as highly idiosyncratic, psychologically uncomfortable, and counter-intuitive in another. Therein lies part of the problem.

Hall's high/low-context cultures (1976), as well as Hofstede's four dimensions of cultural variability (1980, 1991, 2001), contribute to the understanding of cultural differences in thinking and social behaviour and provide an important basis for the development of theories that attempt to explain different expectations, concerns, and constraints in international students' intercultural communication and adaptation (Bennett & Bennett, 2004a; Gudykunst, 2005; Kim, 1995, 2005; Ting-Toomey, 1985, 2004). However, important though it may be, culture is not the only determinant of teaching and learning practices, preferences, and experiences. All too easily we can fall into the trap of cultural stereotyping. In an earlier study – a mixed method comparative pilot study on Chinese learners' experiences in the UK and in British projects in China (Gu & Schweisfurth, 2006) – in addition to culture, factors such as the identities and motivations of the learners and the power relationships between them and their teachers were also significant issues in the strategic adaptations made by Chinese students. The findings show that despite various intercultural challenges and struggles, most students have managed to survive the demands of the learning and living environment, and to adapt and develop.

THE STUDIES

Study 1

This small-scale study functioned as a pilot (2004–2005) for Study 3 which is a mixed-method research project funded by the Economic and Social Research

Council (ESRC) (Gu & Schweisfurth, 2006). This pilot study involved the collection of both qualitative interview data and quantitative questionnaire survey data. The study investigated the challenges that Chinese students had faced in their adaptation to the British higher education environment. A total of 163 questionnaires were collected from Chinese students on undergraduate and postgraduate courses in four universities in England. Interview subjects included 13 undergraduate and postgraduate students in 10 universities and 2 focus groups from the questionnaire sample. Further triangulation is provided by semi-structured interviews with 10 British lecturers, probing their personal impressions and experiences of Chinese students they had taught.

The research sample size, particularly in the quantitative data, would not enable the author to arrive at generalized conclusions; however, there were indicative patterns emerging from early analysis. These patterns complement findings from the other two studies, revealing a change process in the learners, affected by a range of inter-related personal, cultural, social, psychological, and contextual factors.

Study 2

The second study investigated change and adaptation in Chinese students' learning, with a specific focus upon their plagiarizing behaviour which appeared to have received increased attention amongst British teaching staff, particularly those in the field of English language teaching (ELT) in the last few years (Gu & Brooks, 2008).

Drawing upon the experiences of ten Chinese students on a pre-sessional course and subsequently their postgraduate courses, this study investigated change in 10 Chinese students' perceptions of plagiarism in a different academic community over a period of 15 months (2004–2006). Three English tutors who taught the students on the pre-sessional course were also interviewed to compare their judgment of plagiarism with the students' own accounts of their writing experience. These people were at the forefront of the internationalization of British higher education, often working with international students shortly after their arrival in the UK, and thus may have formed a strong impression about the difficulty of teaching Western academic conventions – of which academic integrity plays an essential part – to their Chinese students.

Study 3

This two-year ESRC funded mixed-method research (2006–2008) was designed to provide an investigation of the experiences of first-year international students during their undergraduate study at four UK universities.[1]

The first stage was a four-page 70-item questionnaire to 1,288 first-year undergraduates at four UK universities – two 'old' universities (institutions which pre-date 1992) and two 'new' ones (former polytechnics) – aimed at exploring the nature of the initial challenges and needs that international students encountered

shortly after their arrival in the UK. The survey resulted in a 19% rate of return. In the second stage, 10 case study students were chosen from among those who volunteered (including one student from the Mainland China and one student from Macao). A series of individual interviews and one group meeting to explore their experiences were carried out over a 15 month period, with special attention to critical incidents, changes over time, and respondents' explanations for how their experiences were unfolding. The qualitative data gathering also used narrative interviews with assistance of an instrument adapted from the VITAE study (Day et al., 2006). This instrument required students to recall peaks and troughs during their stay in the UK and to identify 'turning points' (Strauss, 1959), i.e. key moments and experiences that had had a significantly positive or negative impact on their perceptions of their effective management of their study, lives, and communication with others. They related how these were managed (or not managed) over time (the lines were known as 'Managing the Ups and Downs of Living and Studying (MUDLS)' – see Appendix 1). The final data gathering took the form of a second survey to the same set of undergraduates as in the first stage. This explored changes over time, and tested the qualitative findings from the case studies, to examine whether they had wider validity.

Study 4

The fourth study was funded by the British Academy which investigated the impact of study abroad experiences on the lives and careers of Chinese returnees. This 20-month two-stage research project combined quantitative and qualitative methodologies.

The first stage was an online questionnaire survey which explored the Chinese returnees' perceived professional and personal change resulting from their UK educational experiences. The questionnaire was distributed by the British Council, and a total of 652 completed questionnaires were returned. Although the response rate of 8% was low and we cannot claim the representativeness of the profiles of the sample, the size of the response still enabled us to conduct robust analyses and through these, identify common patterns of the transnational experiences of this distinctive group of travellers and settlers in the current context of internationalization. Results of the survey informed the design of the second stage of the research where fourteen returnees were chosen for face-to-face semi-structured interviews. The purpose of the interviews was to investigate in greater depth the nature of returnees' transnational experiences and the ways in which such experiences continue (or do not continue) to influence them as individuals at work and in their personal lives.

For the purpose of this paper, results related to Chinese students will be selected from the general findings for discussion. By bringing together patterns and themes identified in the four studies, it becomes clear that despite various intercultural challenges and struggles, most students have managed to survive the demands of the

learning and living environment, and to adapt and develop. Key observations of their journey of study abroad include:

- Chinese students come to the UK for language and cultural experiences, but primarily for academic accreditation.
- Academic achievement and personal independence are the most important achievements for most students.
- Whilst some students may have fitted in better socially than others, most have managed to achieve in their academic studies.
- The most profound change lies in their success (or otherwise) in managing the influences which challenge existing identities.
- There is an important relationship between students' sense of belonging, identity, and self-efficacy (the belief that they can achieve and succeed).
- They have experienced three major aspects of change: (1) interculturality: Cross/Intercultural experiences; (2) maturity: human growth and development; and (3) intellectual development.

CHANGE AS TRANSITION: MANAGING ACADEMIC CHALLENGES

Students' learning processes are holistic and developmental in nature. Evidence suggests that the challenges of adapting to a different academic culture can be more acute and overwhelming than settling into a different cultural and social environment on students' arrival. A widely acknowledged initial learning shock was experienced by the Chinese students who were involved in the studies.

Learning Shock

Learning shock refers to some unpleasant feelings and difficult experiences that learners encounter when they are exposed to a new learning environment. Such unpleasant feelings can be intensified and may impose a deeper psychological and emotional strain on learners when they study abroad. The psychological, cognitive and affective struggles that learners experience primarily result from their unfamiliarity with different teaching and learning traditions and a lack of confidence of using the English language for communication in the new learning environment. For example,

> When I first started studying here, I was not used to either the study or the life here. I did not know where to start. In class, I did not understand the purposes of the teaching, and sometimes I did not quite understanding the teacher. (CS1student)

Lewthwaite (1986) argues that the experience of crossing cultural borders is a learning process in which there are many obstacles to overcome. The experiences of the following postgraduate student indicate that differences in cultural, social,

and historical roots between the societies from which students are drawn and in which they are currently based are most likely to lead to an uphill struggle for them to participate fully and confidently in class activities, particularly in the initial phase of their studies. In addition, their stress to cope with an unfamiliar linguistic learning environment would have further contributed to the intensity of their initial struggles. In this sense, learning shock cannot be separated from cultural shock; it is an important aspect of cultural shock.

> When I first started my MA, I felt very strongly that I was not used to the teaching and learning environment at all. … The teaching style was very different from that in China. Chinese students were taught like stuffed ducks in China, whilst here students are encouraged to take part in group discussions. …I also found that language could be a barrier, particularly in listening. I could not quite understand students from countries like Malaysia. A particular teacher had a very strong local accent, which I could hardly understand. (CS2)

Chinese students' learning shock and academic stresses were also noted by their tutors:

> Yes, they have serious difficulty adjusting to expectations of the British education system. … We are trying to encourage an autonomous approach to study. …Understanding that difference [in teaching] is extremely challenging to learners when they come on the course, because they are expecting to be told what to learn, what to read, the answers to produce, and they are ready to work hard doing that. …Some students welcome that. Some students are worried, intimidated, confused by that shift of responsibility. … Yes, the language can be a problem. But I think cultural issues are far more important. (BT1)

Beyond Frustration

Whilst cultural differences may play a crucial part in Chinese students' initial struggle and frustration when adjusting to a 'foreign' academic environment, conclusions from all four studies indicate that the large majority of Chinese students (like most other international students) have experienced positive adaptation and development in their academic studies over time. This can be seen in their improved linguistic competence, increased self-confidence, involvement in class activities, and a strong sense of independence in learning. Thus, by the end of their studies, it is unlikely that culture will continue to function as 'a source of conflict', as Hofstede (2009) maintains on his website, or as a source of stress and struggle. Rather, different fabrics of the host culture of learning and teaching will have been absorbed, integrated and personalized by individual students to take on different forms which enable them to perform in their studies and fuel them with strength, confidence, and power.

The development of students' independent learning abilities and greater responsibility for their own study is depicted in the following quote.

> I have become more independent in my life here. As for study, I enjoy my studying because I like my subject very much. … I have a lot of spare time at university. But I am mostly doing my own stuff in my spare time, something about my subject Art Design. Due to the nature of my subject, I often make connections of what I encounter in my spare time with my subject. (CS3)

Some British lecturers have also noticed their Chinese students' conscious and reflexive change towards more independent learning. For example,

> I had an interesting example of a Chinese student who started a degree with us and she had problems. Very often the Chinese students have problems finding themselves extending from one to two years. But she went from a student who in her first year suffered all sorts of problems to a student who in a second year took a piece of research which she found, challenged it, researched it and actually came up with some original research data disputing quite an important article which she based her research on. (BT2)

Students' change, adaptation, improvement and rebirth experience in their studies can also be seen in their enlightened understanding of the notion of plagiarism over time. Learning to write using unfamiliar academic discourse patterns requires, at the deepest level, the students' cultural appropriation of a possibly different conceptual understanding of the way of writing, and of the meaning of using the literature to develop their written argumentation (Gu & Brooks, 2008). This learning process spans a developmental continuum involving the learners overcoming emotional tensions which arise from changes in their cognition, senses of identity, and sociocultural values. Ample evidence from the experiences of the case study students shows that the intercultural learning experience is also a transitional and rebirth experience. Thus, change in students' perception of plagiarism is indeed part of their wider adaptation to the academic conventions of their host countries. For example, Cui, the female student in English Literature, commented:

> But now [in Master's course] the situation is very different. I have been reading materials in my subject as the course goes along. So I have, consciously and subconsciously, gained some understanding in the field. Sometimes when I come across something interesting in a book, I put it down in my notebook. So when I am writing up my essay, I can use my old notes which are very useful. I also look for more references according to the specific subject of my essay. So the process of preparing for my essays is very different from before. (CS4)

It is clear that what she has acquired over time is not only an improved understanding of her subject. She had also acquired a deeper understanding of ways of writing in the host, dominant, academic community. However, the most profound change in her goes beyond her improved understanding and ability to write in a way that is deemed as "normal" in the dominant academic community. She managed to engage

confidently with the academic conventions as an active and competent learner. What shines through is her successful development and adaptation.

CHANGE AS TRANSITION: MANAGING SOCIAL AND CULTURAL CHALLENGES

Furnham and Bochner (1986) argue that "foreign students face several difficulties, some exclusive to them (as opposed to native students)" (cited in Furnham, 2004, p. 17). In addition to the need of adjusting academically to the local teaching and learning environment, students who study abroad also encounter challenges of acculturation and socialization simultaneously. On the one hand, the differences in values, attitudes, and beliefs between home and host cultures, coupled with the sense of loss of the familiar (including food), put considerable pressure on their acculturation (Lewthwaite, 1986). On the other hand, they are also engaged in a process of socialization – an ongoing dialectic process in which individuals define and redefine themselves and their relationships with others in the 'outside' society (Jenkins, 2004). Jenkins argues that

> 'Society' is a conversation between people; the mind is the internalisation of that conversation; the self lies within and between the two. (p. 42)

Establishing a 'conversation' with people who share different, unfamiliar, and sometimes contrasting traditions, societal values, and social expectations can be emotionally draining and physically exhausting.

"Enjoying Loneliness"

"Enjoy" and "loneliness" do not normally collocate well together. However, when they were put together by a postgraduate student to summarize his social life in the UK, the term conveyed a powerful and profound psychological frustration that this student had coped with in his student life. This frustration was additional to the learning shock related stress and tensions that he might have also suffered.

Leading a boring and lonely social life and feeling a lack of sense of belonging contribute to their feeling of alienation in the host society. For example,

> I was just wondering why I didn't feel lonely at all when I first came here. Because I didn't know what was going to happen. So every day was a new day. … But this time I came back [after Easter break] I know what is going to happen to me. I know I'm going to have a presentation and lots of study … and every day is normal. To be honest I don't like my personal life here. I enjoy my study life but my personal life is kind of boring. … Everyone [friends in England] has got their [own] stuff to do. … I just felt that I didn't belong here. It's not my place. I'm the guest and the guest is always less powerful; and also they are the host or something like that. (CS5)

This student's story is not, unfortunately, unique. Her experience reflects certain aspects of cultural shock, typically featured with "a sense of loss and feelings of deprivation in regard to friends, status, profession and possessions," "being rejected by, or rejecting, members of the new culture," and "feelings of impotence due to not being able to cope with the new environment" (Oberg, 1960, cited in Furnham, 2004, p. 17).

Friendship Patterns

CS5's journey of her student life in England was accompanied by her constant intention to retain friendships and seek a sense of belonging within her class, her accommodation and the local society. She retained friendships with the Japanese and French students whom she met on her pre-sessional English course. In order to keep the friendships, she went to the campus student club with her Japanese friend regularly, despite the fact that she did not like clubbing: "I sometimes feel lonely when everyone is dancing". Towards the end of her first academic year, she began to feel strongly that she wanted to have a close Chinese friend – someone who would have a deep understanding of her cultural values.

More than three decades ago, Bochner (1977) had already expressed a contrasting view to those who were against the co-national friendship network in a 'foreign' context:

> Thus mono-cultural (conational) bonds are of vital importance to foreign students, and should therefore not be administratively interfered with, regulated against, obstructed, or sneered at. On the contrary, such bonds should be encouraged, and if possible, shaped to become more open to bi- [foreign student-host national] or multi-cultural [bonds between non-compatriot foreign students] influences. (p. 292)

The following quote provides further evidence supporting the important role of co-national friendship patterns in students' social and cultural adjustment in the host society:

> I realized my weaknesses when I had to independently deal with everything in life, things like communicating with people and solving problems. When I was in China, I had my parents, relatives and good friends with me. … When I came here, I strongly felt that this country was a strange place to me. So naturally I had made some Chinese friends. I was a little worried that staying with my Chinese friends all the time might not help me to improve my English quickly. But then I found it rather difficult to communicate with English people. (CS6)

IDENTITY TRANSFORMATION: MATURITY AND INTERCULTURALITY

Analysis of data from all four studies suggests that it is important to adopt a holistic and developmental lens to view and interpret Chinese students' experiences while

they are studying in UK higher education. This is because change at the deepest level is related to their perceptions of self, i.e. identity change. Given the distinctive intercultural environment in which they live and study, the process of their identity change has been interwoven with the growth in their maturity (i.e. human development) and interculturality.

The experience of travelling across cultural and social boundaries presents individuals with opportunities to broaden and develop their intercultural awareness and intra-/interpersonal competence. In this process, "identity is constructed in transactions at and across the boundary" (Jenkins, 2004, p. 22). Jenkins asserts that during these transactions, "a balance is struck between (internal) group identification and (external) categorisation by others" (2004, p. 22). To achieve such balance, the social actor is constantly engaged in a process of identity negotiations: in terms of how they perceive themselves and how they would like to be perceived by others each time when they cross the boundary: "I've got two sets of values: one is for here and one is for China", because "I don't want to be treated as a foreigner in either context" (CS5).

Our research on the impact of UK educational experiences on Chinese returnees' careers and personal lives (Gu et al., 2009) revealed that returnees' overseas learning experiences are both transitional and transformational, and necessitate identity change to a greater or lesser extent. The returnees demonstrated a reflexive awareness of this change, which included a sense of being distinctly and permanently different from others around them in the workplace and their local networks. Returnees were virtually unanimous in noting the changes in themselves, which came in many guises. 85% of the survey respondents, for example, reported broadened interests in life. Some interviewees' reported transformations that were about a different attitude to and in work, including a strong sense of their own capacities and a willingness to use these. Confidence gained from the challenges of the study abroad experience and the valuing of gained knowledge and skills struck at the heart of returnees' self-concepts, and ways of living and working: *[I am an employee who] knows both himself and the needs of the employer*' (CS12).

As I have reported in previous studies (Gu et al., 2010; Gu & Schweisfurth, 2006), it is the agency of individuals in navigating the challenges of studying abroad that is of the greatest importance in personal development experienced. The returnees in this study reinforce this finding, and suggest its sustainability over time.

> I hope to start my career from a better position. A big city like Beijing provides us with a wider horizon and enables us to access a greater variety of people, which I think is an advantage for my personal development. I'm not fearful about ups and downs in my life and I don't want to lead a stable life when I am still young. There may be challenges in my present life, but because I am trying my best, I won't be regretful whatever the outcome is. (CS20)

As we have reported before, for returnees like CS20 and CS15, a period abroad and the attendant exposure to new and different ways of life and of living 'make the

familiar strange' and can be a platform for a reflexive process that helps to nurture the self-transforming individual. As CS15 concluded:

> I have changed somewhat, but it is not the experience of studying abroad that exerted influence on me, but the reflection I had done myself. As you know, apart from learning, I spent a lot of time reflecting on the weaknesses in my previous ways of working and dealing with people. So in fact, I just made good use of the time while staying in Britain to reconsider my past…

In a similar vein, 30-year-old CS18 discusses trying to compare the '*imagined me, staying in China*', with his present, more cosmopolitan self, to understand the differences.

Many of the above transnational transformations can be summed up in this quotation from CS13, on her feelings upon returning to China after a year and a half in the UK:

> In a year and a half [of studying abroad], the friendship between my friends and I was very firm…On the one hand, I felt lost, feeling I was leaving everything behind there, including friendship, that pure life style. On the other, I felt afraid, afraid of what awaited me in Beijing, whether everything would be all right here as I expected. What's more, I had hope, hoping to lead a different life with changes. This change was a change in role. I felt I was more often than not in need of help during my stay in England, being regarded by a lot of people as an international student who needed help rather than a real friend. The role I wanted for a change was to help others with my knowledge and accumulated experience.

Thus, the study abroad experience is an intellectual development journey, and, also a personal and emotional journey. For some, this journey is filled with happiness, joy, and fulfilment of personal, academic, and social achievements, despite the ups and downs. For others, however, it is a lonely journey that is filled with bitter experiences, struggles, frustrations, and failures. Coleman (2004) argues, as a result of the "huge range" of internal and external factors, many of which are not associated with culture, the outcomes of study abroad vary considerably from one individual to another:

> In each individual case, biographical, affective, cognitive and circumstantial variables come into play, with students' previous language learning and aptitude impacted upon by their motivation, attitudes, anxiety, learning style and strategies, as well as by unpredictable elements such as location, type of accommodation, and degree of contact with native speakers. (p. 583)

Nonetheless, it is encouraging to see that for the large majority of the students involved in our studies, the study-abroad experience has provided them with an excellent opportunity for personal growth, which Anderson (1994) describes as a 'reborn' experience (see also Montuori & Fahim, 2004). They enjoyed the

achievement of personal independence, broadened life experiences, and interests and improved interpersonal and communication skills. For example,

> I think the biggest change is my ability to independently manage my life. I have to think everything for myself. It is a feeling that there is nobody around to help me with all this. My life in the UK has improved my ability to communicate with people. I came here on my own. I realised that I had to get used to a completely different environment and meet different people. Sometimes when I come across problems, I need to learn to ask for help from those new friends. I feel that my interpersonal abilities have greatly increased. And, I have had some part-time working experience. (CS8)

For CS9, in addition to change in his authorial self, he also demonstrated a personal identity change, refining and modifying his 'ideological' (values that he acquired from his social and cultural background) and 'logical' identities (the "natural" way he used to organize and express his thoughts in Chinese writing) (Shen, 1989, p. 459).

> I think the biggest change for me is that my way of thinking has changed drastically. I begin to feel that my personal views are equally importantly. I seem to have developed a stronger personality. … I wouldn't take someone's views for granted any more. (CS9)

CONCLUSION

This paper has examined the border crossing experiences of Chinese students in the UK. Analyses of Chinese students' experiences were set out in the wider context of the internationalization of higher education. A synthesis of key findings from the literature and empirical studies led by the author has identified distinctive patterns of struggles, changes, and achievements that different groups of Chinese students have experienced over time. Through these, the chapter sends messages to academics, administrators and policy makers, reminding them that the experience of international students' intercultural adaptation "takes on the shape of a personal expansion" (Murphy-Lejeune, 2003, p. 113). The driving force and essential qualities learners require to achieve such 'personal expansion' transcend the boundaries of cultural models. It is the interaction of these learners with their particular living and studying environments that facilitates change. This suggests not only that constructs shaped by culture can be changed, but that the nature of each individual's motivations and experiences are major factors. This is in contrast to deterministic notions of culture and learner. It suggests that culture – as one factor in the emotional journey of change – is not only clearly linked to other factors, such as those discussed above, but that it is itself a flexible and dynamically changing factor. Culture is implicated in Chinese students' study experiences as culture shock and adjustments and continues as an influence on Chinese students after their return. For some, it may influence

their professional work and their subsequent contributions to Chinese society: for those who are teachers, this may include work with future Chinese students who will study abroad in future cycles of study and social and cultural learning.

In *Lost in Translation*, Eva Hoffman (1989) concluded that her Polish insights could not be regained in their purity because "there is something I know in English too" (p. 273). The Polish and English languages and cultures had been blended into her sense of self in creation of the 'new woman'. Such fragmented but empowered image is also mirrored by the Chinese students discussed in this chapter:

> No, there's no returning to the point of origin, no regaining of childhood unity. Experience creates style, and style, in turn, creates a new woman. Polish is no longer the one, true language against which others live their secondary life. Polish insights cannot be regained in their purity; there's something I know in English too. The wholeness of childhood truths is intermingled with the divisiveness of adult doubt. When I speak Polish now, it is infiltrated, permeated, and inflected by the English in my head. Each language modified the other, crossbreeds with it, fertilizes it. … Like everybody, I am the sum of my languages – the languages of my family and childhood, and education and friendship, and love, and the larger, changing world – though perhaps I tend to be more aware than most of the fractures between them, and of the building blocks. The fissures sometimes cause me pain, but in a way, they're how I know that I'm alive. (1989, p. 273)

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APPENDIX I: MANAGING THE UPS AND DOWNS OF LIVING AND STUDYING



KUN YAN AND DAVID C. BERLINER

8. THE UNIQUE FEATURES OF CHINESE INTERNATIONAL STUDENTS IN THE UNITED STATES

Possibilities and Challenges

INTRODUCTION

Since the late 1970s, the government of the People's Republic of China aggressively promoted modernization through international scholarly and technological exchanges. This policy directly increased the U.S.-China educational exchange (Lampton et al., 1986). After the two countries agreed to exchange students and scholars in 1978, the number of students coming to the U.S. soared. The number of mainland Chinese students in the U.S. increased from nearly zero at the beginning of 1978 to a total of approximately 20,030 in 1988. This figure doubled by 1993, and tripled by 2003 (Institute of International Education, 1981–2013). The proportion of foreign students in the United States who are from China increased more than six-fold over the last fifteen years from 1997 to 2013 (Newman, 2014). According to the latest statistics, the U.S. is the leading destination for Chinese students pursuing overseas studies, and almost one-third of all foreign students in the United States are from China. Chinese students now constitute the highest enrollment and there were 235,597 students in the United States (Institute of International Education, 2013). Today, more than ever before, increasing numbers of Mainland Chinese students attend American universities. Such a fast growing population deserves special attention.

Representing the majority of international students in the United States, Chinese international students make a significant contribution to the U.S. economy. In 2007, international education became the fifth-largest U.S. service sector "export" (Bevis & Lucas, 2007). International students enrolled at U.S. universities, along their dependents, in the academic year 2012–2013 contribute more than $24.7 billion to the U.S. economy, through their expenditures on tuition, other fees, and living expenses (Institute of International Education, 2013).

Chinese international students' impact on the U.S. economy continues after they graduate. Chinese students who choose to stay in the U.S. after finishing their degrees become valuable assets—a "stock of intellectual capital"—for their American employers (Bevis & Lucas, 2007). Johnson (2001) reported:

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> Chinese graduate students who earned a Science and Engineering doctorate (21,600) in the United States between 1986 and 1998 conducted basic and applied research in U.S. universities and helped teach students in science, mathematics, and engineering. After earning their degrees, Chinese post-doctorates have contributed to research at U.S. universities and elsewhere. Chinese-born scientists and engineers are part of the U.S. technical labor force, particularly in business and industry. (pp. 3–4)

While there has been national-level interest in and recognition of the importance of Chinese international students to the U.S., not all educational institutions are prepared to satisfy the special needs of these students. To date, few studies have focused solely upon understanding the Chinese international students in the United States. Given that Chinese international students represent the largest number of international students in the United States, and that they encounter a culture very different from their own, it is worth developing a deeper understanding of these students. A systematic examination should be undertaken in order to delineate what Chinese international students' demographic trends are over decades, what their motivations are for studying in the United States, what the unique features of their acculturation process are, and what special challenges they face in U.S. universities that are different from what they might face in Chinese universities? These questions are important and have not previously been addressed. Such research will bridge this research gap and thus enrich the broad literature on international students' adjustment in foreign countries. Such research could help Chinese international students adapt to the American educational environment and also help American universities adjust to their largest group of foreign students.

The article addresses the unique features of Chinese international students in the United States in four dimensions. The first part includes the literature pertinent to the history and demographic information of Chinese international students in American higher education. In the second part, the review turns to the literature concerning what factors drive Chinese students to study abroad. The third part mainly discusses Chinese students' acculturation features in terms of group-level factors such as culture, social life, and employment and immigration issues. In the final part, the discussion moves on to the special challenges Chinese students face while studying in the United States.

THE HISTORY AND DEMOGRAPHICS OF CHINESE INTERNATIONAL STUDENTS

Chinese International Students in the United States: 1890–1950

The Chinese government (Qing Imperial government, 1644–1911) sent the first group of 120 students to the United States from 1872 to 1875. The main stream of Chinese students came after China's defeat by Japan in 1895 and the failure of the Boxer Rebellion in 1899 (Wang, 1965). Through 1951, about 36,000 Chinese

students had studied in the U.S. (Dow, 1975). From the very beginning, the Chinese government had political expectations associated with sending students abroad. Sending students abroad was considered the natural way to face the Western challenge. Students left China with the special mission that linked their studies to the cause of national salvation. Almost all of early students in the U.S. were sent and supported by the government, and most of them were in the natural science and other technically oriented subjects. They were often quite young and many were not prepared for their studies in a foreign culture (Su, 1942).

In terms of the goals of foreign study, the *Qing* government's attitude was conservative and technically oriented. As illustrated by Li Hung-Chang, the Minister of the *Qing* Imperial government from 1870 to 1895, the goal of the foreign study was for these students "to learn about the sciences related to army, navy, mathematics, engineering, etc., for ten-odd years, so that after they have completed their study and returned to China all the technological specialties of the West may be adopted in China, and the nation may begin to grow strong by its own efforts" (Wang, 1965, p. 78). In addition, the *Qing* government was concerned that young people exposed to American society would lose their own cultural identity. As a result of such concern, Chinese learning as substance and Western learning as functional had become the accepted slogan since the late 1890s (Wang, 1992).

After the *Qing* Imperial government was overthrown in 1911, self-supported students from rich families increasingly became the kind of students who studied abroad. The noble goals of foreign study gradually yielded to personal interests (Wang, 1965). The dream of saving China through foreign studies was discredited after 1925 (Wang, 1965). By 1930, the motivation to go abroad had totally switched to personal factors and a foreign education had become the rich men's interest (Ch'en, 1979). While abroad, students' main interest became obtaining the U.S. diploma, the symbol of prestige. In the study of overseas Chinese student history, Bourne (1975) reported, "an American degree was a guarantee of ascent in the social and political structure of China (in the early 20th century)" (p. 269).

Chinese International Students in the U.S: After 1978

From 1949 until the end of Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), China was isolated from the rest of the world and foreign study was highly restricted. Since the late 1970s, however, vast political and economic changes have taken place in China. After nearly half a century of isolation, the post-Mao government abandoned the class struggle approach adopted during the Cultural Revolution to development that favored economic growth through scientific knowledge.

The government of the People's Republic of China aggressively promoted modernization through international scholarly and technological exchanges. This policy directly increased the U.S.-China educational exchange (Lampton et al., 1986). In 1978, when Mr. Frank Press, the science and technology advisor for President Jimmy Carter visited China, the two countries agreed to exchange

students and scholars. About fifty Chinese students were then enrolled at several elite American universities. After that, the number of students coming to the U.S. soared. The number of mainland Chinese students in the U.S. increased from nearly zero at the beginning of this period to a total of approximately 20,030 in 1988, which doubled in 1993, and then tripled in 2003 (see Table 1). The proportion of foreign students in the United States who are from China increased more than six-fold over the last fifteen years from 1997 to 2013 (Newman, 2014). In terms of the specific rank among the international students in U.S., China surpassed Taiwan in 1989 as the country sending the largest number of students to the United States. From 1995–1998, China dropped to the number two sending country behind Japan. In 1998–1999, China became the leading sender again for three years, through 2000–2001. In 2001–2002, India replaced China and became the top sender of students to the U.S. and retained that position for eight years. In 2009–2010, China surpassed traditional "study abroad" heavyweights like India and South Korea, to lead international enrollment across U.S. higher education, and retained the top place for four years. In 2013, Chinese student enrollments increased by 21 percent in total to almost 235,597. Students from China represent 29 percent of total number of international students in the United States. While the majority of Chinese students study at the graduate level, the U.S. continues to experience an upsurge in the number of undergraduate students coming from China. Total undergraduate students from China jumped 257% between 2009 and 2013. Identifying the academic level in which students pursued during 2012–2013, the *Open Doors* reports that Chinese students constitute the highest enrollment, with 43.9% at graduate programs. 39.8% attended Baccalaureate I and II institutions, 6.1% were at other types of institutions, and 10.2% were obtaining their Optional Practical Training (OPT) (Institute of International Education, 1981–2013).

Other features of the Chinese student population in America have remained relatively constant. The majority of the student population continues to be male while there has been a rapid increase in both number and proportion of female students over the years (Institute of Education, 2013). Following the traditional pattern, contemporary Chinese students in the U.S. are still concentrated in natural sciences, engineering, computer programming, biochemistry, and other technology-oriented subjects (Frank, 2000). In recent years, however, the enrollment of Chinese students has significantly increased in such majors as business and management, social sciences, liberal arts, humanities, education, communications, and library science (Zhao, 2005). Since 2010, business and management has surpassed the so-called STEM field for three years as the most popular academic discipline for Chinese international students in America (Institute of International Education, 2010–2013).

In terms of the composition, contemporary Chinese students can be divided into two subgroups: exceptionally capable students with strong academic backgrounds and exceptionally rich students with poor grades (Luan, 2012). The former group of students get into elite Chinese universities due to their good grades. They choose

to pursue a graduate degree abroad and get selected by American institutions based on their high academic records. In contrast, the latter, with high financial resources but low academic preparedness, typically bypass the national entrance exam with the very clear intention that they have the financial resources to directly go abroad to study. Most of them are unable to test into a Chinese university and their parents pay their way into a mediocre university in usually the U.K., Australia, and the United States (Luan, 2012). Besides these two extremes, the middle group is taking interest in studying overseas. There is a growing middle class in China. They live in cities, with a lot of knowledge and a certain level of education background. They value the importance of education and are willing to invest in the children by sending them abroad. They are seeking a higher quality of education and they see world's top-ranked universities are in the United States. Many students in this group flock to the elite U.S. universities. In contrast to those who go abroad when they fail to secure a place at a local Chinese university, these group of students are the best test-takers with strong academic background. They usually forgo elite Chinese universities to study in the United States (Lai, 2012; Narow, 2011).

Lai (2012) analyzed the trends of Chinese international students and pointed out two generations have emerged since the late 1970s (Lai, 2012). China's economic reforms and "opening-up" that began in 1978 under Deng Xiaoping gave rise to the first major generation of students, who were generally reliant on scholarships to study in the United States. Coinciding with China's rapid economic growth, a distinctive second generation emerged in the early 2000s comprising much more affluent students. They don't rely on scholarships anymore. Narow (2011) argued that the increasing number of affluent Chinese has played a significant role in the increasing number of students studying in the United States. This argument was supported by the most recent figures of World Education Service. The U.S.-based institute's study sorts the types of international students into four categories: Explorers, Highfliers, Strivers, as well as Strugglers based on students' academic preparedness and financial resources. Chinese students were identified as more likely to be "explorers" (students with high financial resources but low academic preparedness) or "highfliers" (students with high financial resources and high academic preparedness). "Explorers" and "highfliers" constitute over 70 percent of the total Chinese international students represented in their study (Chang, Schulma, & Lu, 2014).

Jiang (2012) viewed the rising generation of affluent students as China's third wave of study abroad. According to him, the booming economy meant Chinese families could afford to send their child abroad, and so began China's third wave of study abroad. Jiang also pointed out these students lack the cultural loyalty and patriotism of China's first wave (Students from 1890 to 1950) and the academic merit and diligence of the second wave (Chinese graduate students from early 1980s till late 1999s) (Jiang, 2012).

In terms of the goals and outcomes of the foreign study movement, history seems to be repeating itself. Similar to the foreign study movement prior to 1949,

Table 1. Number of Chinese students in American institutions

Year	*Number of students*	*Rank*
2013	235,597	1
2012	194,029	1
2011	157,588	1
2010	127,628	1
2009	98,235	2
2008	81,127	2
2007	67,723	2
2006	62,582	2
2005	62,523	2
2004	64,757	2
2003	63,211	2
2002	59,939	2
2001	54,466	1
2000	51,001	1
1999	46,958	2
1998	42,503	2
1997	39,613	2
1996	39,403	2
1995	44,381	1
1994	45,130	1
1993	42,940	1
1992	39,600	1
1991	33,390	1
1990	29,040	1
1989	25,170	2
1988	20,030	3
1987	13,980	5
1986	10,100	11
1985	8,140	12
1984	6,230	16
1983	4,350	18
1982	2,770	27
1981	Below 1,000	Below 50

Note. Open doors 1980/1981–2012/2013 (Numbers do not include visiting scholars doing research in American institutions)

students' personal economic and academic motivations gradually overshadow the government's unrealistic ideals. The Chinese government's lofty ideals face a gloomy reality. Just as Wang (1992) argued, "after a brief initial period of enthusiasm, coordination between the government and the students has disappeared and the government has lost control over a movement initially designed to foster economic growth and national restoration" (p. 90). Government-supported visiting scholars have been gradually substituted by self-supported students. The turning point occurred at the end of 1984, when the State Council of China stipulated that anyone who had been admitted by a foreign institution and had received foreign financial support or any other kind of assistantship was eligible for applying to go abroad self-funded (Lin, 1998). Since then, the number of non-government sponsored Chinese students has rapidly increased and now represents a large majority of the Chinese students on American campuses (Huang, 1997). Financially, they seek financial aid in the U.S. or self-funded instead of relying on the Chinese Government. As revealed by Orleans (1988), in 1979, the Chinese government provided 54 percent of the funding while in 1985 only 17 percent came from the Chinese government. The share of funding by American universities increased from 18 percent to 57 percent over this time period. Academically, there is an ever increasing number of Chinese students are in degree-seeking programs as opposed to the number of visiting scholars. The percentage of visiting scholars to the U.S. dropped dramatically, from 47 percent in 1979 to 31 percent in 1985 (Orleans, 1988). With students' increasing disenchantment with government policies, the original goal of sending students abroad to bring back valuable Western technology to help modernize China has diminished.

The contemporary Chinese foreign study movement has not only followed the old patterns, but it has also demonstrated some new trends as well. There is a striking difference between the contemporary movement and the one in the 19th and 20th centuries. The contemporary students are more dubious about ever returning home, and the willingness to leave permanently. In the early periods, foreign study was home centered. On one hand, most American educated Chinese returned to China after finishing their studies in the U.S. and were highly relied upon to provide service in higher educational institutions and the government (Meng, 1931). Furthermore, most Chinese students in America had very limited interaction with American life while they were abroad. Most knew they would return home in the end, so their motivation to assimilate or participate in Western life was very limited (Chen, 1979). In contrast to the earlier period, contemporary foreign study features a low rate of return to China. The rate has decreased sharply since the mid-1980s (Orleans, 1988). Of about 80,000 students and visiting scholars who came to the U.S. between 1979 and 1989, only about 26,000 returned, most of them before 1986 (Orleans, 1988). Major reasons accounting for contemporary Chinese students' non-return were obviously the same as what had pulled them here: better living and working conditions, a higher salaries, better research facilities, greater career development opportunities and personal freedom. Apart from these factors, estrangement toward

the home country, as revealed by Cao's study (1997), was also one of the important factors which contributed to the students' willingness to remain in America. The feeling of estrangement appeared to be the product of changes in both the Chinese students and the home environment. On one hand, having been exposed to the customs and lifestyle in the U.S. over a period of years, they faced counter-cultural shock when they went back home even for short visits. On the other hand, there were undoubtedly rapid changes in Chinese social and moral in recent years which went beyond their expectation. Compared to the older generation in the late 19th and early 20th who were more inclined to return, the contemporary generation has less attachment to home. The "brain drain" phenomena became increasingly severe during the contemporary foreign study movement (Wang, 1992).

Another significant difference between the contemporary generation of Chinese students studying abroad and those prior to 1949 is in their academic quality. Contemporary students' academic quality and dedications to science surpass that of the older generations. Most contemporary Chinese students in America entered universities or colleges in China in the late 1970s, 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s. They represent the cream of Chinese higher education after the Culture revolution. Furthermore, the selection process of students was made by U.S. universities rather than by Qing Imperial government. This shift means that current students' qualifications are likely to be higher than those of the 19th or the early 20th centuries (Wang, 1992).

CHINESE STUDENTS' MOTIVATION TO STUDY ABROAD

Once China opened its door to the rest of the world, the positive images of the west held before 1949 have returned with fast speed. With more contact with the West after 1979, the negative depiction of the west as Western Imperialists before and during the Cultural Revolution quickly evaporated and was replaced with positive images, especially among the educated. The glorifying remarks about the West's advancement, and regretful emotion about China's backwardness was pervasive in both the public media and private discussion. With increasing complaints about conditions at home and highly idealized descriptions of the outside world, China became caught in a fever of going abroad (Chen, 1988). Wang (1992) pointed out the fad of studying abroad is strongly "push-oriented". According to him, individuals face little choice when the images of America are nourished by conditions of poverty at home. On one hand, they are frustrated by the insufficient opportunities to realize their potential in China, and on the other hand, they are pushed to study abroad by the "zealous valorization of American culture, education, and technology" (Zhao, 2005).

The empirical study by Brzezinski (1994) explored the underlying reasons which drive Chinese students to study abroad. Based on his findings, the attraction of studying in the United States was expressed by Chinese students in terms of gaining

prestige, an intrinsic-personal attraction, and as a way to get into a system perceived as more fair. Their motives were highly instrumental.

Brzezinski argued that for Chinese students, Chinese society seems to attribute a form of cultural capital to intellectuals with an experience abroad. Western know-how apparently provides better access to promotions and to certain positions. In Chinese students' eyes, the Chinese society in general, and the Chinese manpower system of promotions in particular, encourage students to study abroad. The diploma, for instance, earned in western developed countries, such as the U.S, is a glorious emblem of prestige, one deemed superior to the equivalent degree earned at home. In order to obtain meaningful positions and possible promotions in Chinese intellectual circles, Chinese students believe that they can not afford to be without the cultural capital attributed to a study abroad experience (Brzezinski, 1994). In the minds of Chinese students, status and societal respect as it related to educational achievement and prestige shifted from a Chinese university education to foreign education. If one desires to have a respected position within the Chinese intellectual community, western knowledge and an experience abroad are essential for maximizing one's potential.

The attraction of studying abroad was also viewed as a way to get into a system which was perceived as more fair, according to Brzezinski. Politically, the network system and manpower policies in China are specific forms of political constraint influencing Chinese students' decision to study abroad. Chinese students view the American and Chinese system as diametric opposites. They believe personal goals can be best met via the merit-based system in the U.S., one that they view as being primarily based on competition. This was contrasted with self-directed goals being met through relationships in their homeland. Since students felt they could get trapped in an occupation and because family and personal network is more important than merit, the system was resented. Based on the empirical findings, Brzezinski (1994) concluded that political constraint and internal, cultural-personal factors worked together to propel students abroad.

Besides the factors mentioned by Brzezinski (1994), some emerging factors driving mainland Chinese to study in the United States come into play during late 2000s and early 2010s. The stream of students leaving the country represents an effort by China that their institutions don't have the capacity to enroll. College-age individuals in higher education increase from 1.4 percent in 1978 to more than 20 percent in the 21st century in China (Schuster, 2013). The prestige of U.S. institutions provides significant appeal especially when Chinese universities could not meet the domestic demand. Total undergraduate students from China jumped 257% between 2009 and 2013 in the United States (Institute of International Education, 2013). Chinese students are slightly overrepresented at American colleges in terms of global population ratios. College-age Chinese adults make up about 20 percent of all college-age adults in the world (outside of the United States), but represent almost 30 percent of all foreign students in the United States (Newman, 2014).

Foreign study movements also reflect the bleak job market in China and the globalization force across the world. Chinese students are seeking American credentials primarily to expand their career opportunities. On the one hand, facing the ever-increasing unemployment rate among college graduates, Chinese students are increasingly aware that obtaining a basic university diploma no longer guarantees decent jobs and good incomes (Lin, 2010). A foreign degree can therefore be helpful for individuals who are anxious to differentiate themselves. They expect that a degree from a prestigious college in the U.S. will give them an edge over others in searching for a job. On the other hand, globalization is driving this increasing number of students who go abroad, because study abroad will give them the opportunity to be educated for a global marketplace. The U.S. education offers students a global perspective and different experiences, where soft skills vital to the global business world such as leadership, decision-making, and working in teams are emphasized and often lacking in a Chinese university's curriculum. The international exposure and the skills that they have acquired while studying abroad give students advantage in terms of compensations and promotions (Luan, 2011).

In addition to the factors mentioned above, social and peer pressure is found to be another significant factor propelling Chinese students to study abroad (Cao, 1997; Li, 1993; Shu, 2008). According to a qualitative study conducted at Columbia University, fourteen Mainland Chinese students mentioned that they were influenced by friends and relatives who had already gone abroad, or they felt pressure in their work units because of the departure of their colleagues (Cao, 1997).

CHINESE STUDENTS' GROUP LEVEL ACCULTURATION FEATURES IN AMERICA

According to Berry's acculturation framework (1997), group-level acculturation means that migrant (sojourner) groups usually change substantially as a result of living with two sets of cultural influences. These macro-level changes include economic changes, social changes, culture changes, language shifts, religious conversions, and value systems. This section discusses Chinese students' acculturation features in terms of group-level factors such as culture, social life, and employment and immigration issues.

Culture and Ethnic Relations in America

Berry (1997) argued that the acculturation process is influenced by both societal and individual variables. The discriminating features of the receiving society such as ethnic composition, extent of cultural pluralism, and salient attitudes towards ethnic and cultural out-groups are particularly important. Thus, it is necessary to provide a brief picture about the culture relations in America before discussing Chinese students' group level acculturation features.

America has characteristics of a "world". America is an ideal laboratory of modern cultural relations "given its lack of a centralizing cultural tradition, its acceptance

of humanistic ideas such as freedom and democracy, its obsession with technology, and nationalism based on pride in these ideas and on economic power" (Wang, 1992, p. 24). The culture and ethnic relations in a modern society characterized by rapid acculturation and group identity disintegration holds true for America.

On one hand, assimilation in America is increasingly an ideal rather than a reality. Structural assimilation, the entrance of immigrants into primary group relations with the dominant people, for example, has rarely occurred in America society (Gordon, 1964). The transition from "melting pot ideals" to the acceptance of cultural pluralism, "mixed salad ideals" reflects changing American cultural relations as a result of modernization in American society in the past two centuries (Archdeacon, 1984). On the other hand, American society has become increasing homogeneous in terms of behavior and life style. America excels in its power of acculturation. Forces of acculturation, represented by technology and a highly interdependent industrial lifestyle, are omnipresent and overwhelming; few can escape from them (Wang, 1992).

Taken together, cultural interaction in America changes the behavior and lifestyle, but not the ethnic identity or ideology of different ethnic groups or social classes. Not surprisingly, acculturation in America is largely an individual effort; it is perceived as a choice made by the individual rather than a change forced by the society (Handlin, 1951). The individual takes the risks and reaps the benefits of the change.

Chinese Students' Group Level Acculturation Features

Cultural features. Most Chinese students' cross-cultural experience have been one of confusion, uncertainty and hastened adjustment. Marginal syndrome characterized most Chinese abroad and many of them are caught between their Chinese root and Western ideas. While expressing enthusiasm about western ideas, real western life is strange and alienating, and most Chinese students abroad cling to their native roots and demonstrate sojourner mentalities (Wang, 1992). On the other hand, while longing for the native land and family culture, after years of study in the U.S., students develop a special and deep feeling towards America and the brain drain phenomena has become an increasingly severe result of the contemporary foreign study movement (Xu, 2006).

Culturally, socio-cultural challenge in America is real and unavoidable and most Chinese students are caught in a deep dilemma of needing to change and while at the same time they are unable or unwilling to change. Most Chinese students' responses to the American socio-cultural challenge have been at a higher level of assimilation for their extrinsic cultural traits such as overt behaviors, dress, manners, lifestyle, and English language skills than for their intrinsic cultural traits including religious beliefs, ethnic values, and cultural heritage. They present an Americanized exterior while maintaining a Chinese interior.

Most of them end up ambiguous in their cultural existence, vacillating between Chinese culture and American culture, identifying with neither, nor, for that matter,

being accepted by either. In most cases, their sense of cultural identity is substituted by scientific and economic pursuits. Little cultural reflection is conducted, as most students are more concerned about their personal survival (Wang, 1992).

Social features. America is strange and alien to most Chinese students. The strangeness of American life is either due to the short length of their experience in America or due to the enormous difference between the two cultures. High admiration of the West is mostly based on an affinity of Western science and humanitarian ideas, not real cultural participation and religious encounters (Wang, 1992). Chinese students are strongly attached to China in social, cultural, and patriotic terms and there is no change in identity while in America. Strong ties to home combined with a lack of knowledge about America leads to the severe social isolation (Xu, 2006).

On one hand, Chinese students' social interactions with American people tend to be limited. Most of them are socially isolated from Americans and immerse themselves in abstract technical learning (Chen, 1979). On the other hand, most of them are structurally or socially segregated on a voluntary basis. They speak Mandarin Chinese and associate primarily with fellow Chinese students, or those of similar socio-economic status in their ethnic community (Tsai, 1986). As a result, Chinese students inevitably are caught in a deep spiritual conflict between the professional world which is Western and Americanized and the private world which is related to Oriental and Chinese (Yeh, 2000).

Student communities or Chinese associations in the U.S. are loosely organized and mainly engaged in academic matters, their work dependent on American academic atmosphere and research facilities, with very little organized communication with Chinese associations in China (Zhao, 2005).

Employment and immigration. Uncertainty about their future employment opportunities and immigration status is prevalent among the Chinese student population in the United States. Students' strong sense of uncertainty results partly from their uncertain employment future and immigration status in the U.S. After 9/11, the American job market is not promising because of the nation's economic slump. No matter how capable a person is, without a green card, prospective employees find it difficult to land an interview (Xu, 2006). In addition to the bleak job market, their uncertainty is enhanced by the instability of American immigration law. American immigrant policy is known for its ambivalence and unpredictability (Yeh, 2000). Changes in immigration policy have been frequent and unpredictable. For instance, on June 13, 2007, the State of Department announced that starting July 2007, all employment-based categories for immigrant visas will be "current," meaning that U.S. businesses going through the lengthy and backlogged immigrant visa or "green card" process can, throughout July, file adjustment of status applications. However, only twenty days later, on July 02, 2007, the Department of State revised its July Visa Bulletin published on June 13 and rejected all the applications. Facing this type

of unpredictable policy, most Chinese students realize though immigration is not impossible, it is difficult.

On the other hand, the changing Chinese economy and Chinese peoples' attitudes toward returning students make them gradually less favorable in the Chinese job market. According to Xu (2006), the deprecation of returning students has been caused by a combination of three factors: 1) the steep rise in the number of returnees as the Chinese economy has boomed in recent years, 2) the growth of homebred talent, and 3) the returning students' unreasonably high expectations and lack of working experiences. As a result, a strong sense of uncertainty characterized most Chinese students regarding the prospects of returning to China.

In terms of stay or return, in addition to employment and immigration consideration, socio-cultural factors are taken into consideration in making final decisions. Due both to their strong roots in China, cultural alienation in America, and to the recency of their American experience, return expectations in the short term are low while long term intentions of staying in America are not high.

CHINESE STUDENTS' ADJUSTMENT CHALLENGES

Chinese international students represent the majority of international students in the United States. They are temporary members of American society, but face a number of difficulties due to various factors. Chinese students' stress and concerns are discussed in three major areas: academic, socio-cultural, and personal. Examples of students' statements are cited to illustrate each theme.

Academic Concerns

Chinese culture has gained worldwide recognition for the pursuit of academic achievement of their young (Aldwin & Greenberger, 1987). Traditional Chinese culture places well-educated scholars in the highest social rank. Academic achievement is also an honor to the family. Dedication to scholarship becomes not only a personal goal but also a culture goal for Chinese international students. Succeeding academically was overwhelmingly identified as the greatest concern and the primary goal of Chinese international students. Chinese students indicated they study harder and devote most of their time to schoolwork than the average American student. They also acknowledged that because of their own devotion to academic excellence, they were socially isolated and had few other interests and recreations. A male student in Electrical Engineering department shared his feelings with the authors:

> Due to the cultural demanding for excellence, I have suffered from stress since the day I came to the U.S. As the foreigners of this land, we are particularly burdened because we start far behind in the race for success and must be exceptionally talented or fortunate to catch up. In order to shorten the time to

> catch up, most of us were socially isolated, spent most of their time studying, and had few other interests or recreations.

The most frequently identified motivators of hard work were “good grades bring a feeling of self-esteem and self-worth”, “education is the only hope for social acceptance and financial security in the U.S.”, and “high expectation and sacrifice from parents”. Students spoke about exceptional pressure placed on them by their families’ and cultures’ expectations to excel academically. Because of the influence of Confucianism, scholars are accorded a high privilege and social status in Chinese society. Chinese parents place great emphasis on the academic achievement of their children. Most Chinese students stated that from their families’ point of view, working very hard in their educational achievement and receiving higher degrees from the United States bring honour to the family. In addition, in many Chinese students’ eyes, an American degree is a guarantee of social and economic ascent either in China or in the U.S.

Also, for some students, high parental expectations and constant pressure to do well in school and the fear of failure create extreme stress and anxiety. In their eyes, failure not only brings disgrace to the person concerned, but also to the family and to some extent their ethnic group. For others, since attaining an advanced degree is a major way for them to achieve higher status in China, or to pursue their dreams in the U.S., the potential negative consequences of academic failure are considerable. A student commented, “I am overly concerned with my academic performance. If I am accidentally unable to get an ‘A’ in a quiz or a test, I feel overstressed, frustrated, depressed, like it is the end of the world.”

The most frequently mentioned academic stressors are adjustments to American academic settings, language barrier, and student-advisor relationship. Students said that a large portion of the challenge that university education in the United States poses for them was the need to develop considerable self-management and self-discipline. They argued that for most Chinese students who are accustomed to being given strict direction and rigorous discipline in their studies, university education in America definitely presents problems. Just as a sociology student described:

> I feel everything was specified very clearly in China and rigorous discipline was usually available. However, on American campus it was not very clear what one exactly needed to do or how to proceed step by step to achieve the academic goals. And when I conversed with my advisor about “what my academic future would be”, or “how long will I take to complete this doctoral program”. The common response is “it is up to you”, or “it depends on you”. Facing such unclear answers, I felt overwhelmed and stressed because there were so many choices for me which just made me feel lost. Especially the first semester, I wandered around aimlessly without any goal or direction.

In the American educational system, blind discipline is devalued and self-directedness is encouraged. It is difficult for Chinese students to adjust the highly decentralized

and autonomous nature of American education (Donovan, 1981). For Chinese students, enrolling in American universities means unprecedented challenges they have to encounter. That is, to organize their academic work independently and determine their own academic or career future by themselves. Such challenges accordingly bring a sense of being overwhelmed, because they were trained to totally rely on external guidance and discipline for almost twenty years before coming to the United States.

In terms of language barrier, previous studies found that the English proficiency is a stumbling block for many Chinese students; a lack of English proficiency is the greatest barrier in their academic adjustment process (Lu, 2002; Wang, 2003). In this study, language barriers and communication problems were identified as great stressors by the students who were interviewed. When asked what factors accounted for their language difficulties, students reported that lack of contextual knowledge or cultural background, infrequent chances to practice English, and inadequate language training were the most significant factors. In addition, respondents especially mentioned that the English training they received in China often was designed to enable them to pass the standardized test like the TOEFL or the GRE, widely required for admission to graduate programs in the United States. This type of language training often failed to adequately help them meet the academic demands of their programs and rarely prepared them for the subtleties of social interaction. Many of them indicated that while they achieved extra high scores on the TOEFL or the GRE, they still have had great difficulty in understanding and communicating in English.

Students also expressed there is a tension between their desire to improve their spoken English and their need to communicate freely in Chinese. A female student in the Chemistry major summarized:

> It is just a cycle of stress and frustration. In the hope of improving my English language skills, I sought out opportunities and initiate communications with Americans. However, it is difficult to engage in successful communications with Americans due to my language and cultural deficiencies. After many "communication breakdowns" or "communication disruptions", I became frustrated and tended to retreat back to my "Chinese circle". Then I increasingly interacted with Chinese students. It is so much easier to express thoughts and feelings in Chinese. I enjoyed talking in Chinese with fellow Chinese students, but at the same time I felt guilty since my English language proficiency has not improved as expected. Over the years, the tension between improving my English skills and connecting interpersonally and intrapersonally through my native language still haunts me and makes me feel stressed.

Besides language barriers, the relationship with academic advisors was also identified as very important to Chinese international students. Our informants regarded their advisors as the link to the university and their future career. In spite of this, Chinese international students were reluctant to initiate a conversation with

their professors, as they were unsure of the norms of professor-student interaction and relationship. An education psychology student commented:

> As foreign students, we know a little about this country and our future profession. Also, we are prone to misunderstanding and social isolation from Americans. We hope we can get much guidance from faculties regarding the institution and profession. However, we do not know how to initiate a topic or what is the best way to approach an advisor.

Socio-Cultural Concerns

In this study, Chinese students reported that they experienced high levels of cultural shock and encounter greater difficulty adjustment to life in the United States. These finding are consistent with the findings of other researchers on Asian student's cultural shock (Yang & Clum, 1994). Yang and Clum (1994) studied the life-stresses and suicide rate in the Asian student population in America, and they concluded:

> In a society, the culture always provides normative information to guide an individual's behaviors and thoughts. The absence of the normative information produces a good deal of life-stress. Entrance into one culture from another often results in a temporary vacuum of information regarding behavior appropriate to the new culture. The more different the two cultures, the more stressful the adjustment is likely to be. (p. 127)

Chinese students come from different cultural backgrounds. When they enter a different culture, most of the familiar cues are removed and followed by a feeling of frustration and anxiety. They are unable to understand, control, or predict other people's behavior. They are confused in roles, expectations, and values. They feel impotent on many occasions because of their inability to cope with the new environment. Chinese students' coping experiences are likely to be more difficult, compared to that of students from European countries, or even those students from other Asian countries, since China and the United States have been identified as having a maximum cultural distance (Samovar & Porter, 1991). Furthermore, research indicated that international students who come from non-European backgrounds, the Third-World countries and/or Eastern countries, tended to suffer more stress in adjusting to American campus life (Lin, 1998). China is all of the three: a non-European, Third-World country, and Eastern country. Chinese students encounter the challenges and difficulties people from all three of these backgrounds encounter. With so many difficulties, Chinese students should expect to experience much more socio-cultural anxiety than students from other countries do.

Most students we interviewed described their experiences of culture shock primarily in terms of what they expected based on their pre-conceived ideas about the United States. Students often felt disappointed with their experiences,

particularly if their expectations about life in the United States had been high. A loss of familiarity (including familiar support system) combined with unexpected negative events resulted in anxiety and frustration. A 32-year old male student expressed his disappointment about his experiences his first semester in the United States. "Not only was I adjusting to life in the new culture, but I was also adjusting to the loss of his preconceived ideals, which was a double frustration for me".

Chinese international students' tendency to interact mostly with co-nationals is consistent with the findings of previous research on international students. Students talked about wishing for greater social contact with Americans, but found it difficult to initiate. They identified "making good friends with Americans", and "successfully communicating with Americans" were the most difficult things for Chinese students to adjust to at an American university. Most Chinese students attributed their social ineffectiveness to the cultural distance between China and the United States. Most of them felt it was difficult to decipher the rules and norms of discourse and social engagement. Few of them participated in social activities partly because they did not know how to participate or behave in social situations. All of their confusion was compounded by their language barriers. A general lack of appropriate language and social skills among Chinese students often led to feelings of social isolation. They particularly mentioned that most of American people they interact with are elderly people, such as landladies, missionaries and Christians, and host family. They feel frustrated that they have very few or no "peer" American friends. Just as a student pointed out, "although I have ample opportunities to see Americans on campus, actual communication with them is rather rare". Ties with the home world are lost, and new ones are difficult to make. They feel lonely, isolated and anxious because of lack of social effectiveness.

Although research suggested that interaction with host nationals is the single best predictor of successful adaptation (Bochner, 1981), Chinese students who were interviewed indicated that social and emotional needs were best met by interacting their co-nationals. Students rarely identified Americans as their primary social network. Most of them, however, acknowledged their tendency to withdraw from social activities and confine their interaction to their own community making them further isolated from American culture which negatively impacted their cultural adjustment and English language proficiency improvement. A biochemistry student complained:

> Going abroad is supposed to provide an opportunity for broadening a person's perspective. However, it turns out that most Chinese international students here confine their lives to a small circle of friends and activities. A small circle of Chinese friends is just like a besieged fortress. It seems no one inside the besieged fortress really cares what is going on outside. Consequently, we are further isolated from American culture and lack of culture understanding. Language improvement is hindered as well.

Interview transcriptions also revealed that American people's value of openness and individualism, their tendency to exhibit self-centered behavior, and the ability to confront and to criticize were not well accepted by the Chinese students.

Personal Concerns

Chinese students reside in marginal status positions in the U.S. and many of them learn that it is difficult for them to reach their dreams (finding decent jobs or attaining permanent residency in the United States) due to lack of legitimate access. Visa issues, job opportunities and immigration concerns were identified as the greatest stressor to Chinese students due to current immigration policy. Students reported feeling lots of restraints due to their visa status. Major restraints included the limited number of working hours; the restriction to having an on-campus job, even if the student faced an urgent financial emergency; the limitations in applying for student loans because students are neither citizens nor permanent residents of the United States; the travel restrictions forbidding students return to China to visit their parents, husbands, or wives because they might not be able to obtain a visa to come back to the U.S., once they arrive in China; the difficulties associated with changing visas if students decide to remain in the U.S. to pursue other life goals after graduation; and the very limited opportunities for foreign students to switch their student visas in order to become permanent residents of the United States. Students identified the chronic stress from the "marginal status" as a daily struggle for most Chinese international students. Just as a newly-arrived student claimed:

> Most of us are not sure if we will be able to find jobs, since the immigration regulations really limit our opportunities in many ways, including limited hours for on-campus work, and limited work permits after graduation. Of course, we are unable to receive many social services since we are not U.S. citizens or permanent residents of the United States. I just feel that we are in a disadvantaged position for being Chinese foreign students in this country.

Students also indicated that Chinese students felt American visa policies place them in a role conflict. They must pretend to be dedicated students who are legally in the United States only temporarily to pursue their advanced degrees, yet they secretly want to remain in the United States after their graduation and find a way, though it is not guaranteed, to acquire permanent resident status or U.S. citizenship. Despite the great frustration and restrains associated with their F1 visa status, most students felt that their frustrating lifestyle seems less painful compared to millions of Chinese youth who remain in China because they can not even get entrance visas from U.S. embassies.

In addition, dating and marriage issues also pose serious challenges to Chinese international students. Interview showed single students expressed the great anxiety and frustration in finding Chinese boyfriend/girlfriend or husband/wife among the limited number of candidates. Students were also greatly concerned

that long-distance and long-term separation easily resulted in the break-up of their relationships or marriages. For most Chinese students, the love or marriage in America is difficult to achieve and easily falls apart. Long-time separation, long-distance, limited candidates, and over academic-oriented and less socially involved characters are all contributing factors.

Taken together, Chinese international students are likely to have the less positive or satisfying experience, experience more psychological disturbance, and have greater concerns in general than other international students.

IMPLICATIONS

Since the late 1970s, learning advanced Western technology by sending students abroad has been a central part of the Chinese government's policy. Attracted by educational opportunities and the so-called "American dream", China's educated population vied for opportunities to go to the U.S., despite the great uncertainties involved. Swept away by the fever of foreign study, most of them failed to think about the potential danger and difficulty of going abroad. For most students, many of these difficulties were unexpected and students were unprepared for them since these difficulties were very different from the problems they faced at Chinese universities. When they were in China, many of these Chinese students were unable to imagine the magnitude of difficulties they would eventually encounter in America. They were shocked by both the unexpected nature of the difficulties and their inability to effectively deal with those difficulties. Facing many difficult situations while pursuing their goals and dreams in the United States, Chinese students may become "too frustrated to maintain the aspirations that had originally motivated them to relocate to the United States" (Yingyin, Austin, & Liu, 1995, p. 137). Facing the new environment, new culture, academic challenges, linguistic barriers, financial pressures, long separation from families, as well as concerns over their visa status, Chinese international students find themselves experiencing a variety of stresses.

Study abroad offers greater opportunities, but like life itself, it is full of stress and difficulty. As Yan (2008) argued, Chinese students' cross-cultural adjustment are not only influenced by group-level acculturation factors (e.g. social, cultural, economic, and employment), but they are also influenced by individual-level factors (e.g. age, gender, major, marital status, expectations, pre-departure knowledge and skills). As a mature adult, before making a final decision about study abroad, one should not only look at the overall picture of Chinese students' group acculturation in the U.S., but also take a careful consideration of the individual factors and judge whether they are personally ready for the inevitable stressors and difficulties.

In addition, Chinese students and their parents should obtain more comprehensive and accurate pre-departure information about the life and study in the United States. The current study indicates that thorough preparation for the upcoming adjustments would result in less stress and frustration during the initial weeks and months of their time in the United States. International exposure such as international trips,

short-term visits, and working in international corporations would be very helpful to improve their cross-cultural knowledge, and therefore shorten their cross-cultural and academic adjustment time in the United States. Other convenient ways for students to use in their daily life to enhance their culturally relevant knowledge or skills could be meeting with American students in China, visiting American families living in China, and watching American movies and documentaries.

When in the United States, Chinese international students should try to socialize and actively participate in the host culture. They should adopt an integration strategy (synthesizing the best elements of both Chinese and American cultural traditions, bridging two cultures, and becoming mediating persons) and consciously conduct a deep-structure socio-cultural transformation. This will help Chinese students alleviate their acculturative stress, and shorten their cross-cultural and academic adjustment time.

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9. INFORMAL PREPARATION OF CHINESE STUDENTS FOR STUDY ABROAD IN SWEDEN

INTRODUCTION

> How do you compete with 1 billion Chinese? You don't.
>
> The only way to outgun a billion minds is to think differently. With an MBA from [name of institution], you get to explore your unique leadership abilities. Through action learning and tutored by internationally recognized professors, you will acquire the tools you need to welcome change.

On my way to a conference on Chinese students' international mobility in Europe, I came across the above advertisement for an MBA program. Though my first reaction was that of annoyance – use of the Chinese for marketing purposes, 'war-like' vocabulary, etc. – after reading the ad a couple of times I came to realize that the equation between change and the competition with 1 billion Chinese was in a sense positive for China. Similarly during a recent visit to the UK I noticed an advertisement from a university, showing two 'Chinese' students working on a computer with the word SUCCESS as a caption. These ads are clearly placed under the current historical period of the double-bind of the admiration but also the 'fear' of the Chinese, which Chu labels as *Changst* (portmanteau word of China + angst) (Chu, 2013). This *Changst* is leading to the Chinese being perceived as the 'other' *par excellence*, in Europe and other parts of the world.

It has now become a truism to say that student mobility and migration of Chinese nationals have increased steadily over the last decades. According to the Center for China & Globalization (2013), Chinese overseas students account for 14% of all international students in the world. As such more than 100,000 Chinese have studied abroad annually since 2002, with an increase at about 20% each year. In total, between 1978 and 2011, 2.25 million students were sent abroad. In 2012, a total of 399,600 Chinese students went to study abroad, which represents an increase of 17.65% from 2011. With such a large amount of Chinese students studying abroad, the question of intercultural learning is said to be essential (Byram & Feng, 2006). In this chapter I am interested in how this is happening in what I call 'informal intercultural preparation' of Chinese students, through analyzing how these students are positioned when their adaptation to life in a European country, Sweden, is problematized online by two Swedish students welcoming them to their country.

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The Swedish context is a very interesting one for examining Chinese students' study abroad. In 2011 the country introduced very high 'full-cost' tuition fees for non-European students which led to a collapse in applications (from 132,000 in 2010 to 15,000 in 2011). The fees are around €10,000 a year, which corresponds to what international students would be expected to pay in the UK or in some American universities. In 2011–2012 only 1,600 international students registered in Swedish institutions of higher education – compared to 7,600 the previous year (Mitchell, 2013). According to the Swedish National Agency for Higher Education (Landes, 2012), China accounted for the largest drop in terms of student numbers. In 2012 only 883 Chinese students applied for studies in Sweden (universityadmissions.se). Swedish authorities are currently trying to change this trend through campaigns boasting the benefits of studying in Sweden, by offering more scholarships to international students and by helping international students to integrate – in other words by promoting Sweden as being an easy country to adapt to. Considering the low number of applications from China one can assume that the students who are offered a place at a Swedish university need to be 'pampered' to compensate for high fees. A quick look at Chinese students' blogs and testimonies about life in Sweden suggests that intercultural adaptation to the Nordic country is a big issue. The students also call for more help in terms of intercultural preparation. In this chapter I am examining a form of preparation which I name *informal*. The data is derived from a blog entitled *Chinese People in Sweden* (http://sweden.freedomcharm.com/) which combines texts and recordings. Though the title of the blog is general (see "Chinese people"), the main target audience is Chinese students (envisaging) coming to Sweden to study. The originality of this study is to examine how informal preparation of Chinese students, as an understudied genre, takes place. Most studies have looked into institutional preparation and/or official discourses on the 'intercultural' (Angelova & Zhao, 2014; Holmes, 2014).

INTERCULTURALITY AND THE CHINESE?

> In China a traveller can move from one province to the next and feel as if he or she has passed into another land entirely, rather like travelling through Europe. Yet how many of us would describe all Europeans as 'essentially the same'? (Chu, 2013, p. 24)

A lot of current work is being published about intercultural encounters between the Chinese and other people. What most of these studies show is that there is a tendency to otherize the Chinese; i.e. turn them into Others. It is important to note as a start that Othering is a 'universal sin' (Dervin, 2016). Yet it appears that the Chinese at the moment are being othered from all sides (probably as much as they 'other' others), especially in relation to education and the presence of Chinese students in most universities around the world (Skyrme, 2014). For the philosopher Billetier (2014, p. 9), while China is increasingly present in the world "she is at the same time

absent". By this he means that China's voice is quasi-absent, "mute" (Belletier, 2014, p. 9), to defend herself and her people leading to a lack of understanding about her characteristics. Billetier (2014, p. 9) explains that the "feeling of incomprehension which results is often attributed to a different psychology, cultural gaps and history" – discourses which both 'Westerners' and the Chinese seem to be spreading naively. For Chu (2013, p. 233) China is often represented as being stuck in "the four-hundred year old stereotype of stasis", which gives the impression that China lives in an "iron cage of a rigid culture and an ancient history" (Chu, 2013, p. 48). This phenomenon will be referred to, amongst others, by the concept of *culturalism* below – or the reduction of the Other to simple and solid representations of her culture in interculturality. In their latest book about China entitled *China in Flux* Frenkiel and Rocca (2013, p. 14) suggest that culturalism is 'practical' as it allows its users to answer questions without theorizing. Besides they argue that culturalism "has an answer for everything" (Rocca, 2013, p. 14). For the Chinese the easy answers that are proposed often turn China into a homogeneous society, which limits each member of Chinese society to "a form of subjectivity defined solely by the collectives of which they are members" (Griffiths, 2013, p. 5). This corresponds to the famous, yet highly ideological and problematic, idea of collectivism versus individualism, where the Chinese are collectivistic and the 'West' individualistic (Dervin, 2011; Holliday, 2010).

PREPARING FOR STUDY ABROAD: BEYOND UTILIZING 'CULTURE' AND 'DIFFERENCE' TO DISAVOW THE OTHER?

> With regard to the consensus on group or national identity it is the intellectual's task to show how the group is not a natural or a God-given entity but is a constructed, manufactured, even in some cases invented object, with a history of struggle and conquest behind it, that it is sometimes important to represent. (Said, 1993, p. 33)

Recent work on interculturality has taken on a new perspective on questions of culture, identity and communication (see Dervin, 2012; Piller, 2010). This approach represents an important move from the comparison of cultural practices, manners, thoughts… Comparing such elements ('oranges and apples') has been noted to lead to alarming phenomena such as explicit/implicit moralistic judgments, patronizing attitudes, unjustified ethnocentrism, and the creation of hierarchies (a 'culture' appears to be better than another, more civilized, during the process of comparison).

The work of Holliday is stimulating in this sense. Starting from the keyword of ideology, Holliday (2010, p. 39) reminds his readers of an important point that needs to be taken increasingly into account in intercultural preparation and learning: "the descriptions of culture are themselves ideological, and the […] claim to scientific neutrality and objectivity comprise a naive denial of ideology". Thus discourses on culture, differences and identity can easily serve the purpose of evaluation rather than describing 'neutrally' the Other. There is thus a current call to see

interculturality beyond culture as "Culture is what one sees *with,* but seldom what one *sees*" (Holland & Quinn, 1987, p. 14). This requires critical skills to analyze both discourses and actions of the interaction between self and other. Furthermore such skills need to allow individuals to examine the impact of power relations on intercultural encounters (Hoskins & Sallah, 2011).

Another element which complicates most analyses of intercultural situations is the bias of starting from differences. Of course people 'across cultures' can be different – as much as people from the 'same culture' – yet overlooking similarities is problematic. For Wood (2003, p. 21), "we are drunk with the idea that every difference of ethnic custom, every foreign or regional accent, every traditional recipe and every in-group attitude betokens a distinct worldview." Similarities have tended to be viewed as universalizing in research on interculturality and diversity, with a preference for differences (which are sometimes imagined). Universalising similarities are of course difficult to defend morally. Yet similarities must be negotiated which means that one needs to take the time to discuss with the Other, to question one's own assumptions – as well as the other's. Moghaddam (2012) has proposed an interesting framework in this regard. He suggests (ch. 9: p. 245): "Upon meeting others and during interactions with them, first ask: what is it that I have in common with these other people?"

Finally, the framework used here also relates to three particular conceptions of identity, which is a central concept to examine interculturality: *instrumentalism* (people choose identities as they see fit), *situationalism* (people identify with different categories depending on the situation) and *postmodernity* (identities are changing) (Wimmer, 2013).

The intercultural framework that is defended here is very minor in research and practice in the many and varied fields that work with the notion of the 'intercultural'. It may thus seem unfair to examine the data under scrutiny here – a blog produced by members of the public – from this approach. Yet the bloggers have spent some time studying in China, thus one could assume that they have moved beyond the solid, essentialist and culturalist approach to the Chinese. Besides as the document is available online for anyone to see and download, I feel that a critical analysis of this document can help us to deconstruct the mechanisms behind this form of 'informal preparation'. Again very little is known of such forms of preparing. There are so many (negative) stereotypes and representations about China in different kinds of media that preparing should lead somewhere else, beyond solid culture and difference which tend to disavow the Other.

ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

> What I see and hear of the outer worlds is purely and simply a selection made by my sense to guide my conduct; so what I know of myself is what comes to the surface, what anticipates actions. My sense and my consciousness, therefore, give me only a practical simplification of reality. (Bergson, 2002)

The analytical framework for the data is based on the ideas developed in the previous sections. First it represents a serious attempt to "to put aside established descriptions, seek a broader picture and look for the hidden and the unexpressed" (Holliday, 2010, p. 27). As the philosopher Henri Bergson explains in the opening quote above, my task is to examine how reality in potentially 'simplified' in the blog. It means that every utterance made by the Swedish individuals in the online recordings will be scrutinized against this principle. More specifically, and referring to the helpful framework that Holliday, Hyde, and Kullman (2009) have proposed I use the tools of *identity*, *otherization* and *representation* to examine how self-other are constructed and the potential effects this can have on intercultural learning or, simply on intercultural encounters.

The following guidelines from Holliday et al. (2009, pp. 57–58) are useful to complexify the analysis of interculturality in study abroad preparation. In relation to how people identify in interculturality they propose to look for signs of

> Avoid(ing) easy answers about how people are. Bracket – put aside simplistic notions about what is 'real' or 'unreal' in your perception of 'another culture'
>
> appreciating that every society is as complex and culturally varied as your own.

As to otherization,

> avoiding falling into the culturalist trap of reducing people to less than they are – in the same way as we must avoid racial and sexist traps.
>
> being aware that what happens between yourself and others is influenced very much by the environment within which you are communicating and your own preoccupations.

Finally, dealing with how self and other are represented, the following elements are suggested:

> be aware of the media, political and institutional influences in our own society which lead us to see people from other cultural backgrounds in a certain way.
>
> see through these images and fictions when we encounter people from other cultural background, and always try to consider alternative representations.

Do we find signs of these elements in the data? What do they tell us about the ways Chinese students are viewed and constructed? And what impact might it have on their stay in Sweden?

ABOUT THE DATA: *SHARING WITH AND CARING ABOUT* CHINESE STUDENTS

The name of the program reveals first that the data might be part of what the Swedish anthropologist Ulf Hannerz has called ironically the 'culture shock

prevention industry' (1992, p. 251): *Chinese Students in Sweden: The anti culture shock assistance*. The idea of culture shock, just as culture, is very much debated (see Machart & Lim, 2013).

The authors present their work as "sharing with and caring about Chinese students" who are planning to become students in Sweden. Six episodes were made available in 2013:

1. The 10 steps to prevent culture shock
2. Money, money, money
3. How to find accommodation, solve housing issues and what to bring
4. Study at university: Interview with an international coordinator from China
5. How I got a husband and work in Sweden: interview with a Chinese
6. Christmas, mulled wine and Donald Duck.

The people who created the programme are a couple from Sweden. They have lived and studied in China. This is how they justify their programme:

> We have so many Chinese friends so we thought why shouldn't we make a podcast helping Chinese people coming to Sweden, telling them about our culture because we know what it is like to come to a new country.
>
> yeah we know the difficulties with the culture we have been exchange students in China so we know how it is for westerners in your country so we think we can help you with the culture difficulties to integrate with the Swedish people since we are Swedes.

This short description already seems to indicate a classical approach to the issue of adaptation with an emphasis on 'culture', 'difficulties', 'Westerners' (vs. the East?)… describing the experience as difficult. In order to support their discourse, the couple keep referring to the difficulties they themselves faced when they lived in China. They even speak for "Westerners" in general as an extra argumentative strategy, building up on the imagined East vs. West dichotomy (Sen, 2005). Due to lack of space I am not examining all the episodes, but instead am mostly interested in the first one: *10 steps to prevent the culture shock*. This episode proposes 10 different pieces of advice for dealing with culture differences. When reading the title of this episode I cannot but help think about Chu's somewhat ironic comment about how "our guidebooks, desperate to spare us traumatic culture shock, are full of little notes about Chinese manners" (Chu, 2013, p. 40). The 10 culture shocks are (the elements between brackets are quotes from a written summary of the authors):

1. *fika* (Swedish for having a coffee with one's friends) – "the secret of making friends"
2. "equalness" (equality) – "most equal country in the world; equal in relationship as well as in work"
3. right of public access
4. small population – "more woods than people; private zone important"

5. excellent education system – “no exams, more freedom, dialogue with teachers”
6. right to hobbies – “free time important”
7. shopping – “few markets and no bargain”
8. language – “Swedes are quiet”
9. food – “drink the tap water; could it be simpler than Swedish food?”
10. family – “living apart in privacy; different family hierarchy”.

Finally an interesting aspect of the programme resides in the fact that the episodes are in English. The couple do say a few words in Chinese but the rest is in English. No explanation as to this language policy is given in the blog.

IMAGINING DIFFERENCES? *WE ARE BETTER THAN YOU?*

As explained before, the blog creators started from a nice and honest reason when developing their blog: to help Chinese students adapt to Swedish society. In the first episode when the two Swedes go through the differences between China and Sweden, they seem to be constructing and imagining differences that can easily lead to unfair comparisons and ethnocentrism. In what follows I am looking for “the hidden and the unexpressed” in how they construct self-other (Holliday, 2010).

The first thing to be presented as ‘culture shock’ is related to the ‘Swedish’ idea of *fika* (“a really big Swedish tradition” according to the couples). This is how the bloggers explain the term:

> It is about taking a break about being social it is really about socializing it’s like we do this both at our free time and at work it’s generally a good way to meet people.

> Take a *fika* with your friends it is a good way to get into a culture.

The first quote is already problematic as it seems to assume that while Swedes take breaks around a coffee or tea – and socialize, Chinese people may not be so eager to do so or simply to meet people. The second assertion is also problematic as, based on my understanding of the ‘intercultural’, I argue that meeting friends cannot help people to get into ‘a culture’ – a minima *cultures* in the plural. We have here a good example of the desagentivization of individuals for whom culture becomes the agent. This is how U. Wikan (2002, p. 84) describes this flawed approach:

> This acting subject is in motion; he or she is a feeling, thinking individual with the ability to adapt to new circumstances and respond to changing situations. Culture cannot do such things, for culture is a thought construct. It refers to values, norms and knowledge that we associate with a collectivity of people. But what is to be included in the concept depends on one’s vantage point.

The second point made by the couple is about the concept of equality which is presented as being the essence of Swedishness. Again by posing it as being a Swedish characteristic there seems to be the underlying argument that this does not

apply to the Chinese. The biologization of this element – as if it was part of Swedish blood – is expressed as follows:

> But we are still pretty far so you can expect to see men taking care of children and you can see that we are equal just simply equal.

The last part of the quote "we are equal just simply equal" is constructed in such a way that contradicting it would be difficult (use of *just* which naturalises the assertion and makes it difficult to contradict). Yet, Swedish society is far from being equal between men and women, different social classes, 'native' Swedes and certain types of migrants, etc. (cf. Lundström & Twine, 2011; Rostila, Kölegård, & Fritzell, 2012; Rothstein, 2012).

The couple also comment on the following issues: family, language, nature, and food. Again for each of these items an implicit preference of the cultural self but also judgement of the other appear. The values hidden behind these assertions dichotomize these entities with a preference for what is constructed as being Swedish. Let us start with the idea of family. The couple say:

> When we are 18 we can decide whatever we want our parents don't have so much influence then we take our own decisions maybe we don't pay them as much respect as in Asia.

Of course the last part of the excerpt ("we don't pay as much respect as in Asia" – note how China becomes a continent here) could appear positive for the 'Asians'. Yet the beginning reiterates the ideas of freedom, subjectivity and rationalism (i.e. *I can make my own decisions*), values that are promoted as being positive worldwide. The submission to parents seems to equal to the idea of passivity, indecisiveness and lack of agency. It also refers implicitly to the dichotomy of individualism vs. collectivism, with a general 'imagined' preference for the former in Europe (Holliday, 2010). On the other hand the Swedes are made to pass as rational and free people. Of course the reality is otherwise in Sweden: many religious groups in the Nordic country place family at the centre of value systems and have a strong impact on the future of children; the same goes for the impact of the parents' social class on career plans and important decisions such as intermarriage, etc. (Erikson & Rudolphi, 2010; Liedgren & Andersson, 2012).

In a similar vein, one comment about the Swedish language seems to give the impression that Swedes are 'soft', calm and in a sense 'civilised', 'tamed':

> Swedish speak quite soft you will notice it and quite quiet you won't hear us scream and stuff like that – it might happen but not so often.

This comment seems to derive directly from a folk linguistic approach to Swedish (Niedzielski & Preston, 2000). In other words, the idea that Swedish is 'soft' is both a belief and an ideology positivizing Swedish and completing the ethnocentric view of Sweden that tends to be presented to the Chinese students. At the same time there is clear intertextuality in this comment: the Chinese seem to be constructed as people

who scream ("and stuff like that") and their language is 'hard' (as opposed to Swedish softness) and 'noisy' (while Swedish is quiet). This constructed impression might be related to a later comment on the fact that there are few people in Sweden (around 10 million people) compared to China. In the following comments there seems to be the idea that, in Sweden, quality is preferred over quantity in terms of relationships:

> This will also impact people's relationships like they don't have too much friends maybe they will have close friends but people have integrity and they are private.

> Maybe Swedes don't hang out with so many friends in China like 10 at the same time here.

Quantity seems to be equalled to a lack of integrity and privacy (implicitly this is described as being the case of the Chinese) while quality (less people, not too many friends) symbolizes integrity and privacy. Again one could hear an indirect comment about the 'barbarism' or lack of civilized attitudes from the Chinese compared to a civilized and refined Sweden.

Anyone who has been to China or who has seen documentaries about the country knows that the country is diverse and that the nature – like all other places in the world – is beautiful. Yet the couple, who have lived in Shanghai, seem to believe that Sweden only has 'nice nature' and 'fresh air' (implying indirectly that China does not have any of these):

> Swedes like hiking and we love nature and we have lots lots lots of nice nature.

> When you are in Sweden you should really spend time in a forest, enjoy the fresh air.

Finally the couple make a comment about milk and cows that is interesting. They say:

> In Sweden we have real and fresh milk we have the nature and real cows…

Turning the sentence around one can read that the couple think that 'real and fresh milk' as well as 'real cows' are not components of China. If one lives in a big city such as Stockholm or Gothenburg, one hardly ever sees any cow like in Beijing or Shanghai. According to Dairyco, China owns around 13 million dairy cows out of the 260 million dairy cows in the world in 2011 (http://www.dairyco.org.uk/). Sweden on the other hand owned around 350,000 dairy cows in the same year. Of course one would need to question the use of the adjective 'real' in front of cows in the excerpt. What do the couple mean by it?

SHARING AND MORALIZING?

The slogan of the online programme is *sharing and caring*. As we have seen in the previous section, the couple do share many ideas and arguments about Sweden in

order to ‘care’ for the Chinese students. This act of hospitality is laudable. Yet as any act of hospitality, many and varied forms of hostility can appear (see Derrida, 2000; Dervin & Layne, 2013). In this section we explore how in their advice the couple do just that. In other words, they seem to moralize and judge the students.

If we go back to the notion of *fika*, this is very clear in the comment that the students should “not just working working (sic) take a break and socialize”. There is again intertextuality here: Chinese students are often said to work too hard and not to be very sociable – as they tend to stick together. The next comment presents the Chinese as treating each other unequally: “most people (Swedes) will try to treat everyone equal in every way”. Does this mean that the couple was not treated ‘equally’ – whatever the term refers to – when they were in China? The Chinese are also constructed as invading other people’s space (“Don’t step too close to someone you don’t know yet”) and as unfaithful and untrue to others. In Sweden people are described as follows: “maybe it takes time to make friends but when you have one you have one for your life faithful and true to you”. To be fair this comment is followed by the utterance of the adverb *hopefully* by one of the speakers – which may indicate that they may not believe in this assertion fully.

International students are often (unfairly) criticized for not making friends with ‘local people’ (see Campbell, 2012; Sakurai, McCall-Wolf, & Kashima, 2010). First, the idea of ‘local’ appears to be unsustainable in our *glocal* times, where the global is enmeshed in the local and vice-versa (who is a local? Who decides?). Second, the obsession of the exclusivity of the local can often lead to marginalizing and/or hierarchizing of others: some students wish to avoid people from their own country or from certain countries because they are “here to learn a different language and culture” (Dervin, 2008, p. 45). The couple fall into this trap when they advise the students that:

> When you come here to Sweden make sure you make some Swedish friends don’t hang out with the other exchange students take care and really make friends with the locals.

Later on, the rhetoric of the exclusivity of the local reappears when hobbies are mentioned: “Where can you find people – Swedes preferably – with the same hobby”. This sort of comment often frustrates international students who struggle to meet the ‘locals’. It can also easily create a feeling of incompetence (e.g. *why am I not able to meet them?*). There should be more discussions around this aspect of study abroad which is, I believe, some sort of a hoax. Globalization and interculturality should not just emphasize the importance of the local but also and especially the diversity and interest of every single individual.

The final element that is commented upon is related to educational differences. In relation to education, China appears to be the ‘Other’ *par excellence* again. According to many scholars, but also Chinese themselves, Chinese students lack autonomy, critical thinking (they rote learn), etc. (Marambe, Vermunt & Boshuizen, 2012; Mathias, Bruce, & Newton, 2013). Of course systems of education can be very different, but

when one goes to university, differences in learning and working can apply to anyone being 'local' and 'international' students (see Gale & Parker, 2014). For local students the transition to higher education often resembles what could be referred to as a 'culture shock'. Yet the couple seem to ignore again this phenomenon when they say:

> It is very different and one of the first things you'll notice when you arrive in Sweden is that there is not exams than Chinese people are used to and we have group assignments and mainly we have different ways to study to learn a lot of experiments we do a lot of discussions discuss and question things.

We find here all the negative ideas and ideologies about the superiority of 'our' system of education compared to that of China, see the East. A clear moralizing tone is present here: discussing is important, working with others is important, etc. In a later comment the couple summarize this by saying: "Less class but more freedom". So again Sweden means freedom and equality (one can discuss things) while, implicitly China is exactly the contrary.

To conclude the two analytical sections that have just been presented, let us go back to how the couple introduce themselves and what they want to achieve with their blog:

> We are Elin and Chris; a Swedish couple that simply loves China. We have a passion for connecting with people from different cultures and to travel the world. Both of us share the same fascination for China. It is a country of mystery, rich and long history, great people, amazing food and stunning nature!

These overly enthusiastic discourses on China appear to be both orientalist ("it is a country of mystery") and contrary to many of the critical points that were made in the first episode on culture shock ("stunning nature"). The key term of contradictions is explored in what follows.

CONTRADICTIONS: DIFFERENT OR NOT?

On many occasions the authors of the blog seem to contradict their views on self and other, giving thus an image of incomplete certainty. These contradictions seem to cancel out some of the elements that were proposed in the previous sections.

Let us start with the idea of equality, which the couple has presented as being the quintessence of Swedishness. When the couple deal with the topic, they refer to the fact that when a family gets a baby both parents can take a leave from work:

> Because they say Sweden is one of the most equal countries in the world and I think that's true and when we have a baby here both the woman and man can have a leave from work to take care of the baby – not every father do but it is more and more common right now.

This excerpt shows both certainty and uncertainty in relation to the notion of equality in Sweden. First, again, Sweden is labelled as "one of the most equal countries in

the world", followed by the subjective expression "I think that's true" which seems to give more strength to the assertion. However the couple seem to contradict this assertion with the last part of the quote ("not every father"). With this last assertion, the couple's construction of equality between men and women in Sweden is in dialogue here with Rothstein's (2012) study on Swedish women taking much more responsibility for children and domestic work than men. The scholar notes that as a consequence of this imbalance, gender inequality in the labour market and society at large are reproduced in the Swedish context too.

Two further excerpts contribute to cancelling out the 'rosy' discourse of equality:

> Also like in relationships you share everything what kind of things you do at home yeah so it's not like the woman do this and the guy do this – of course there are differences.

> But it is still much to do one of the most equal country but it is still a long way to go.

The sentences are always structured in similar ways: first in the affirmative and second in the negative, cancelling out the assertion but also the moralizing judgements about China and the Chinese made earlier.

Food is also another theme that leads to contradictions. In what follows the couple seem to be reassuring the Chinese students by explaining that Swedes "are also open to other cultures". The example of food is given to illustrate:

> Sweden are also open to other cultures also with food we have this mixture of food restaurants like the Chinese and pizza.

A few utterances later yet, another mask seems to fall about the kind of 'foreign' food that is served in the Nordic country:

> Yeah many many different but don't have too high hopes for the Chinese in the restaurants (sorry).

Until now, all the comments from the Swedish couple have constructed China and Sweden as being very different – with the excerpts in this section somewhat contradicting some of the differences. On two occasions the couple go beyond over-differentialism (Dervin, 2012) by clearly stating that Swedes and the Chinese are quite similar. In the first excerpt the discourse on similarities relates to drinking:

> Swedish people – maybe like Chinese people too – like to drink but here we only have one store (called) *systembolaget*.

In a later episode similarities are expressed in a clear subjective way as the boyfriend asserts that:

> I think that Swedish and Chinese cultures are very similar.

With this last comment, the couple seem to be doing what Moghaddam (2012) suggested in terms of intercultural encounters: consider similarities too.

What this section shows is that the positive 'branding' of Sweden that has taken place in the programme is somewhat put into question by the couple from time to time, thus potentially leading the careful listeners to a feeling of confusion about self and other and the hyphen between both. What this section also seems to demonstrate is fine examples of *instrumentalism* (positive discourses on Sweden are played with), *situationalism* (the couple seem to identify with different categories depending on the situation) and *postmodernity* (their identities as Swedes are unstably negotiated) (Wimmer, 2013). At the same time the end result is that of fuzzy, hyper-subjective and unstable discourses on China and the Chinese.

CONCLUSIONS

This chapter has dealt with how a Swedish couple proposed to train Chinese students coming to their country informally, over the Internet. The "anti-culture shock assistance" approach that is proposed is aimed at helping students to overcome "Culture issues and language barriers", to "increase their chances of success and happiness in Sweden", to help them to "make Swedish friends", to "Learn Swedish lifestyle", and to get a "deeper understanding of the culture". What appears clearly, especially in the first two sections of the analysis, is that while the Swedish ego is constantly flattered, based on ideologies shared in Europe concerning cultural differences, the Chinese ego is 'put down' in a subtle and implicit way. Interestingly the couple keep repeating during the episodes that "We are here to help you create and achieve an (sic) fulfilling life in Sweden! We know Swedish culture and we also know Chinese culture. We love both cultures and want to help you how to handle (them)". About the last comment, and based on how analysis there appears to be sinophilia in the way they talk about everything Chinese but, clearly at the same time, sinophobia. In the data it is easy to see what seems to influence them in constructing certain preconceived ideas (commonsense, their own 'biased' experiences of China but also Chinese people's own auto-representations).

Going back to Holliday et al.'s (2009) methodological considerations for a renewed way of dealing with the intercultural, it appears that the couple avoid discussions of identity, otherization and representation that move beyond essentialist, culturalist and solid constructions. For example, the descriptions of Sweden and China do not reflect the idea that "every society is as complex and culturally varied as your own". Or the couple does not seem to "see through these images and fictions when (we) encounter people from other cultural background, and always try to consider alternative representations". There are a few alternative representations, especially in the third section of the analysis, but it is difficult to say if they are consciously constructed by the couple.

For most mobile students, there appear to be pressure from institutions, parents, but also the students themselves, to learn and experience the 'local' culture and

to befriend exclusively local people. But as we have seen earlier both the idea of the ‘local’ and culture are now highly contested. Who decides what these elements are? Should students be assisted (read: influenced and brainwashed) about these elements? Do these elements really help to integrate? And what do we mean by integration? Again who decides who is integrated and why?

The proposed approach in the analysed blog corresponds purely to what can be labelled as a *terra firma* approach. In other words, students are turned into the lyrebird, a bird who is known for its ability to mimic natural and artificial sounds from its environment. This ‘lyrebird syndrome’, which makes people mimic imagined, ‘superior’, and annihilating behaviours, attitudes and ways of thinking, does not seem to contribute to processes of interculturality for which negotiations, instabilities, and co-constructions matter more than solidity, recipes, and the problematic of generalizations that erases the complexity of intersubjectivity. I would like to suggest, to finish, that the intercultural preparation of Chinese students – or any student moving around the globe – could be summarized by these words of the performance artists Marina Abramovic (2014) when she talks about her work: “you never know how the experiment will turn out. It can be great, it can be really bad, but failure is so important, because it involves a learning process and it enables you to get to a new level and to other ways of seeing your work”. In order to make intercultural preparation more effective, I believe that this should be the basis of the preferred approach. Moving away from established yet problematic and ideological descriptions should be the main objective of intercultural learning in study abroad. That should apply to both ‘hosts’ and ‘guests’.

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SECTION III

CROSS-CULTURAL TEACHING AND LEARNING

LING SHI AND RAE-PING LIN

10. TEACHING ENGLISH AS A GLOBAL LANGUAGE IN THE AGE OF NEOLIBERALISM

A Case Study of an Expat English Instructor in China

INTRODUCTION

Neoliberalism, which promotes a global economy regulated by transnational market forces, suggests that English language teaching and learning be commodified as English becomes "a way of securing economic advancement, elevated status and prestige and trans-national mobility" (Singh, Kell, & Pandian, 2002, pp. 53–54). As part of this global commodification of English, the number of native-English speakers hired as expat English teachers in EFL (English as a Foreign Language) context is increasing. This chapter reports a case study through the theoretical lens of neoliberalism to explore how Ann (pseudonym), an expat native-speaking English teacher, taught English writing in a Chinese university, and is based on class observations, interviews with Ann, her students, a local Chinese professor, and an administrator at the participating university in Mainland China.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Neoliberalism and Teaching English as a Global Language

English is taught in many places of the world. The driving force of this emphasis has two major assumptions – that English serves as a universal lingua franca and that English language competency is essential for individual economic returns and national economic development (e.g., Kubota, 2011b, 2013). While the issues and challenges of the former have been well documented in scholarly discourse on teaching English as a lingua franca (e.g., Jenkins, 2007; Jenkins, Cogo, & Dewey, 2011) and World Englishes (e.g., Bruthiaux, 2003; Kachru, Kachru, & Nelson, 2009), the latter has received less discussed examination. Due to the growth of the global economy, increasing numbers of scholars from applied linguistics have drawn our attention to "neoliberalism" and its impact on English education in the globalized world (e.g., Kubota, 2011b; Park, 2010).

The concept of neoliberalism, which originated as an economic philosophy in the nineteenth century, has developed into a central guiding principle of political-economic practices and thinking in recent years (Harvey, 2005). With its core

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concepts of individual freedom, a self-regulating market, and the right to private property, neoliberalism claims that "human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets and free trade" (Harvey, 2005, p. 2). In other words, it is a theory of how individuals may lead a good life within certain social, economic, and political arrangements (Ryan, 1993). Compared to traditional or classical economic liberalism that advocates the abolishing of government intervention to allow free competition and huge profits for individuals or private enterprises, the new or revived liberalism defends the *laissez-faire* practices and property rights of commercial and industry capital against modern reformers (Ryan, 1993) while extending unregulated markets from a national to a global scale for the capitalist economy (e.g., Harvey, 2005). Such financial deregulation leads to a flourish of foreign investment and currency trading across borders. Transnational firms, as Gill (1995) has noted, control over 33 percent of global assets. However, the market forces also have a huge downside creating "global inequality, economic disparity, growth of unemployment, social exclusion, environmental destruction, and cultural homogeneity" (Young, 2011, p. 1677). Neoliberalism, therefore, is not a panacea, though it is a reality and appealing for many.

The neoliberal globalization of a free-market economy naturalizes the use and spread of a common language of global communication and competiveness (Piller & Cho, 2013). English, which has outpaced other languages, has now become the global tongue for business, politics, the Internet, and academic publications with greater impact. Global English-medium communication has also led to English-medium education. Education is restructured into market entities to highlight English as a form of human capital for competitiveness. Many non-English medium universities, in order to produce more employable students, are moving towards using English as a medium of instruction (e.g., Costa & Coleman, 2013; Hu, 2009; Piller & Cho, 2013). Such programs have become tantamount to a high quality of education although course content might be reduced or simplified to accommodate students' English competence (Hu, 2009). As English is credited with economic value and social prestige, education in English becomes commodified (Kubota, 2011a, 2011b). Nearly a billion people worldwide are learning English with a hope that this language skill will boost their upward mobility (Johnson, 2009). Thus, many students in China believe "learning any [foreign] language other than English is simply unnecessary in today's world" (Johnson, 2009, p. 143). In neoliberal discourse, English is learned as a detachable, marketable and sellable resource or commodity that can convert into various forms of capital (cf. Bourdieu, 2008) in exchange for economic achievement and social mobility (Cameron, 2005; Heller, 2010; Park, 2011; Park & Wee, 2012). In this sense, English learners and educators are "neoliberal subjects" who "endlessly seek to maximize their human capitals" for social advancement (Park, 2010, p. 27).

The Business of Hiring Native-Speaking English Teachers in Asia

Language learners' demand for more linguistic capital parallels the increasing services of English language education provided by both public and private institutions in EFL contexts such as China (Hu, 2008, 2009; Hu & Lei, 2014), Korea (Park, 2009, 2010; Park & Wee, 2012; Shin, 2007), Japan (Kubota, 2011b, 2013), and Taiwan (Lan, 2011). The huge demand for English underscores the shortage of English teachers, which rewards native English speakers with employment opportunities to teach EFL in many countries. There has been a growing interest in hiring native-speaking English teachers from the "English five", namely the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, New Zealand or United States in EFL contexts (Jeon & Lee, 2006, p. 54). As many advertisements show, being born in the 'English five' is a requirement to be hired as an expat English teacher in middle schools in China (Jeon & Lee, 2006). These native English speakers, however, often have no background in teaching English. For example, Zhang and Wang (2011) reported that one expat teacher from South Africa teaching in China was a waiter in his hometown. A lack of a professional teacher education meant he was incompetent in teaching. Such an inadequacy, however, was disguised as Chinese parents in the school believed that his nativeness could benefit their children's English development. The ideology of "native-speakerism" that regards native speakers as better language teachers in Japan, as Tsunneyoshi (2013) notes, is strengthened by a reliance on hiring native speakers to teach communicative English. These native English speakers, although having no teacher education, are positioned by local students, teachers, and government as experts of the English language and Western cultures.

Despite the increasing number of expat teachers teaching in EFL contexts, especially in Asia, very few empirical studies have explored their experiences from the perspective of Neoliberalism. One study has been conducted by Lan (2011) exploring how expat teachers convert their native English language capital into economic and social capital. Based on interviews with 17 Western migrants in Taiwan, most of whom were teaching English in schools at various levels, Lan reports how these expats enjoyed the prestige of being 'superior others' in Taiwan where parents were eager to turn their economic capital into their children's linguistic capital to become "global elites" when they grew up (p. 1681). Lan notes that along with the great demand of native English-speaking teachers, particularly in private institutions such as cram schools, summer programs, and bilingual kindergartens, the industry of English teaching constitutes the largest number of foreign professional workers in Taiwan. When the demand is greater than the supply, most entry – level English teaching jobs in Taiwan require no previous training or teaching experiences from expat teachers. Taiwan, a society where "foreigners are totally spoiled" (p. 1679), becomes a destination for native English speakers to make easy money by teaching English. Despite the lack of a professional teacher education, these expat teachers are embraced as cultural workers who sell their language capital as a cultural product.

Unlike Lan (2011) who focused on native English speakers of Western descent, Jeon (2012) explored the experiences of American born ethnic Koreans who were hired to teach English in South Korea where English was the governmental focus of language management in their move toward neoliberal globalization. Based on document analyses and interviews with some overseas ethnic Koreans who had been imported as native English speakers to teach English in rural public schools through a government funded English-teaching program, Jeon illustrated how these transnational subjects were defined and their status as native English speakers stratified. Although these expats could speak Korean, they were asked not to speak Korean in their English classrooms. In other words, they were asked to pretend that they were monolingual English speakers, which was believed to make these overseas ethnic Koreans a more valuable commodity in a society that favors English taught by monolingual white native speakers. One participant expat expressed frustration because she was not allowed to explain in Korean when her students could not follow her English. The study illustrates the contradiction between the asset of being transnational or bilingual global citizens and the hindrance of bilingualism which can make one less of a 'real' teacher to deliver 'authentic' English teaching. Such a contradiction shows how the hegemony of English is maintained in the context of the neoliberal commodification of language.

Also exploring the experiences of the Korean-American returnees, Cho (2012) documented how this group of linguistic migrants enjoyed social and economic privilege in South Korea because of their linguistic capital of being able to speak American English. The study involved interviews with a number of Korean-Americans, six of whom were teaching English in two language institutes in Seoul. These expats came to South Korea on a whim and stayed on teaching English, "bank[ing] on their linguistic capital for higher social status" (p. 226). One participant felt that he was like the "King of the Land" (p. 225). However, since the label of a native English speaker in Korea is reserved for white foreigners, the English capital of these returnees is ethically biased and perceived as less valid than that of the Caucasian Americans. These linguistic migrants were also viewed as 'failed' immigrants who could not make it in America. In neoliberal discourse where self-development is expected, some of these expats were actually anxious to go back to pursue a Master's degree, fearing that they might become less marketable in the United States. The narrative accounts of these American-born ethnic Koreans suggest that being a native speaker or someone born in an English speaking country does not guarantee one's linguistic capital to be fully appreciated in EFL contexts.

In another study, Stanley (2013) explored the experiences of nine native English-speaking expats, either Caucasians or of Chinese descent, hired to teach oral communication in a Chinese university. In contrast to the Korean-Americans who enjoyed social and economic privilege given their linguistic capital (Cho, 2012; Jeon, 2012), the participant teachers in Stanley's study were beleaguered in a context where English education became a business to meet the clients' expectations. One

of the teachers, Leo, described the English teaching in China as a sellers' market, seeking native English speakers to sell their labour to meet the demand of English education. Since vocabulary and grammar were more highly valued than oral English in the local exam system, the oral English courses were not core courses but only subsidiary to provide students with opportunities to communicate with a native speaker and learn about Western cultures from an expat with the relevant cultural background. Therefore, these expat teachers felt they were devalued in that job market. The expats were under pressure to design lessons "to be fun rather than effective" (p. 151) in order to keep their jobs, which made them feel that they were perceived not as English teachers but as 'a superior entertainer.'

The above review of previous studies indicates the need to investigate English language education in the neoliberal discourse that emphasizes human and linguistic capital to enhance students' employability and competitiveness in the global market. Focusing on the experiences of the expat teachers in Asia, a limited number of studies documented that some of these native English-speaking teachers, despite the lack of professional training, enjoyed the opportunities to convert their English capital into economic returns (Lan, 2011); some were stratified as less of a native English speaker because of their ethnic background (Cho, 2012; Jeon, 2012); others did not enjoy the social prestige they expected as their nativeness became less sellable when the priority of students was to pass local exams for better jobs rather than to speak and write native-like English (Stanley, 2013). However, these studies, except for Stanley's (2013), all focused on the views of the expats without investigating the views of the local students and teachers. To triangulate the views of the expats and locals, the present study explores how expat teachers' roles and teaching are reassessed in the neoliberal context based on classroom observations and interviews of the participant expat (Ann), students, and local professors. As part of a larger study on the role of expat teachers in China, we followed Ann, a native speaker teaching English majors in a Chinese university in the academic year of 2008–2009, to answer the following two research questions:

1. How does a participating expat English teacher teach and perceive her role?
2. How do a local professor, an administrator, and students perceive the role and teaching of the expat teacher?

METHODS

The Expat Teacher Participant

Ann (pseudonym) was invited to participate in the study when she was teaching English majors in a key university in China. She was one of the two expats hired by the English department when the present data were collected. Ann was around 65 and ran a small farm with her husband in the United States. She and her husband (hired by another department in the same university) took a year leave to come to China because they were interested in China and wanted "to have different

experiences in life." We also learnt from the students later that Ann and her husband also wanted to collect some data to write a book on China. They saw the job ad in a church magazine and applied for it through an agency affiliated to an American university. The agency also ran a training program to prepare applicants for teaching in China. Ann and her husband got some advice from the training program about what to expect (e.g., flexibility of choosing what to teach in class) based on previous teachers' experiences.

Compared with her husband who had no background in language education, Ann had a BA in English and also held a teaching certificate. Ann believed that it was because of her teacher qualification that she was hired to teach English majors (a sophomore speaking course and also a senior writing course) whereas her husband was hired to teach non-English majors. Ann, however, had never taught beyond the practicum as part of the one-year teacher-education program over 40 years before. She decided not to become a professional teacher after she had a taste of what it was like. After graduation, Ann worked on several home-based enterprises and later for some business companies before settling down on her farm several years later. Although they had little teaching experience, both Ann and her husband were hired because, as the job ad specified, no teaching experience was required. Ann claimed that she was more qualified than others because she did have a teaching certificate.

The Participating University

Located in a city in East China, the participating university is a key university with a four-year English major program that has an annual enrolment of about 60 students. In order to be more employable and competitive, these English majors, like most English majors in China, were all doing a minor in business, finance, accounting, or other business or skill related disciplines. There were two expat teachers hired by the English department at the time of data collection. Unlike the expat teachers who did not necessarily have a graduate degree, all local faculty members did. When assigned to teach a course, the instructor was responsible for developing his/her own curriculum. The students would complete an online evaluation at the end of the course, through which the university monitored the teaching quality of each instructor. The result of the evaluation was important, especially for expat teachers if they wanted to renew their contract for another year.

Participating Chinese Students

Twenty-three English majors enrolled in one of Ann's two senior writing classes participated in the study. All students were in their early twenties and the majority was female. Among them, seven students (With pseudonyms Salton, Sanan, Sanborn, Sanderson, Sian, Sunn and Swain) also volunteered to be interviewed in small groups towards the end of the course. Like most English majors in Chinese

universities, these participating students needed to write a 5000-word graduation thesis from a wide range of topics in social sciences and humanities. According to the participating Chinese professor, the senior writing course should prepare students to write their graduation thesis. The writing classes met once a week for two hours throughout the two semesters of the academic year. However, depending who was teaching the course, the content or focus varied from class to class.

Participating Chinese Professor and Administrator

One Chinese professor, Cao (pseudonym), and one administer, Mao (pseudonym), participated in the study. Both were male and full professors, Cao obtained his PhD in Applied Linguistics at a Canadian university whereas Mao got his PhD in Translation in China. Cao was over 60 and Mao was in his early 40s. Compared with Cao, Mao had a reduced teaching load because of his administrative duties as Associate Dean in charge of hiring expat teachers. Both Cao and Mao were interviewed in the second semester on the role and teaching of the expat teachers in general and Ann in particular.

Data Collection and Analyses

Multiple types of data were collected for the study as we followed Ann teaching the senior writing course in the two semesters (from September to June with a one-month winter break in the middle). Ann was asked to keep a journal to record her reflections on teaching, and she submitted a total of eight journal entries. We also conducted two interviews with her, one in the middle of the first semester and the other at the end of the second semester. In between the interviews, we observed ten of Ann's classes and collected her instructional materials. In addition, in the second semester, we conducted interviews with seven students in three small groups as well as with Cao (Chinese colleague) and Mao (Administrator). Table 1 summarizes the data collected. All interviews were about an hour each.

Table 1. Summary of data collected

Types of data	*Frequency*
Interviews with Ann	2
Journal entries	8
Classes observed	10
Students interviewed	7
Local colleague interviewed	1
Administrator interviewed	1

The first author observed three classes and conducted and recorded all the interviews. A research assistant observed seven of Ann's classes and the second author transcribed and translated the interview data. The Chinese interviewees were free to speak in either Chinese or English, and most chose to switch between Chinese and English. In analyzing the data, we first identified thematic categories which emerged from interviews, journals, and class observations by reading the data repeatedly to triangulate participants' perspectives. These thematic categories were then clustered to respond to the two research questions and also to be interpreted in light of the research literature.

FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

Ann's Teaching: Learning about China through Student Writing

Like many other expat teachers, Ann was very excited about her opportunity to work and live in China because she wanted to learn about China and its culture. Although she did not get any directions for the structure of the writing course she was assigned to teach, Ann was not surprised because she learned from the hiring agency that there would be a great deal of flexibility in terms of what and how to teach. However, Ann was frustrated by the lack of teaching materials and had to use some old books that she brought from the United States, including a grammar textbook that she used in the 8th and 9th grade, an old edition of the MLA manual, and a book on research paper writing that she had from many years ago. The following were the six objectives that Ann listed in the course outline:

1. Students will increase their vocabulary of English words.
2. Students will have instruction and practice to improve their writing skills.
3. Students will correctly use the parts of speech in English in their writing.
4. Students will construct meaningful, correctly structured sentences, paragraphs, essays, and reports.
5. Students will have an opportunity to work on their Senior Thesis.
6. Students will have opportunities to learn about the United States and American Culture.

Of the six course objectives, only one (No. 5) was directly related to thesis writing; the rest were related to grammar (No. 1 and No. 3), general writing skills (No. 2 and No. 4), and American culture (No. 6). Ann was actually not confident about teaching thesis writing because she did not have any experience in writing a graduation thesis herself. She obtained a thesis guide from her students but it was in Chinese. All she knew was that students were required to use the MLA citation style. Commenting on how she acknowledged her own weakness in thesis writing to the students, Ann wrote in her journal,

> I think they appreciated my "confession" about my experience with research papers. I … never had to do one for graduation … because I chose the option

> of writing an exam instead of a thesis. And that was 40+ years ago! So we'll learn the current criteria together.

As we observed in her classes, Ann did appear uncomfortable giving lectures on how to write a thesis. Her lectures on topics such as topic selection, outline preparation, paraphrasing, documentation and citation were all based on the book titled *Research writing using traditional and electronic sources* (Joseph, 1998) that she brought from the United States.

Following the course objectives, Ann designed the final grading for the course to include attendance and participation (10%), vocabulary work (10%), in-class assignments (20%), project writing or final paper (60%). The vocabulary work was a dictionary exercise that Ann adopted from her 8th and 9th grade English teacher. Ann used the exercise at the beginning of every class, both in the writing and the speaking classes. Students took turns (about five students each time) selecting and writing three new words from the dictionary on the board. They pronounced the words, explained the meanings, and then gave examples to show how they were used. As Ann described the exercise in her journal:

> I call up only ¼ of the class to write three words on the board. These students then pronounce each word, give the definition(s), and use it in a sentence or example. The students then leave their personal dictionaries at my desk. …They get a certain number of points for each …

The exercise, as Ann explained, could help students build up vocabulary. Although she had a sense that students were not very enthusiastic about it, Ann continued to use the exercises in every class throughout the course.

The writing tasks that contributed to a large percentage of the final grading were in-class writing, a writing project (first semester) or a final paper (second semester). Commenting on the multiple writing assignments, Ann explained that she was trying to get students "to submit as many writings as possible to get a good grading basis for them as writers." Another reason for the multi-writing tasks, as Ann explained, was to learn about China and Chinese culture through student writing, an important purpose of her coming to China. Except the final paper assignment which was a representative selection for the graduation thesis (about 1000 words) including an introduction, some supporting material, and a bibliography, the other two writing tasks were all based on students' perceptions and experiences of their individual and personal lives. For example, the in-class writing task consisted of mini writing assignments in each class on topics such as "Using the Aesop's fable (the Tortoise and the Hare) as a metaphor for something in your life," "Who are you and what things are important to you?" "What do I do if I don't get a job?" "My favorite things," "Four years' investment, will it pay off?" Students would write for 20 minutes in each class and then proofread each other's writing (15 minutes) before submitting their writing to Ann.

If the in-class writing assignments focused on student current life, the writing project was an on-going writing assignment for which students wrote something each

week in the form of weekly journals about their life history, including childhood, school years, university life and also letters to their parents and grandparents. Ann described the writing project at the interview:

> It is about their own life histories. And they have to also write letters at the beginning of the semester to their parents and to each set of grandparents, many of them are still living, and ask for information about their life. So each week I have them write an aspect of their life: childhood, their school years, middle school, high school, and their university. … I will … go through it and make suggestions and corrections.

Ann said it took her a lot of time to provide suggestions and corrections every week on the writing project. She also asked students to revise based on her feedback so that they could keep writing better each week. Ann believed that students liked the writing project. One student, as Ann recalled, said that the writing exercises brought her closer to her family as the she reflected on her life. For Ann, it was a great opportunity to learn about China through student writing. As she commented during the interview,

> It's been interesting in terms of the historical perspective how individuals were affected by the various economic situations (e.g., the Cultural Revolution) in China. They are talking about their parents and their grandparents. And that it was interesting to me that there was a whole spectrum of problems or no problems, some families were not affected at all, and others were nearly devastated. So from that stand point it's been interesting to me from a historical point of view and also an individual point of view.

Our observations revealed that all of Ann's classes followed the same routine: roll call, dictionary exercise; return and comment on the in-class writing from the previous week, a lecture on a topic related to thesis writing, and then in-class writing. The class observation notes also recorded how several students came in late for class or disappeared after the break; a few would read some Chinese books, and some were busy sending text messages. Ann also acknowledged at the interview that "sometimes it was hard just to keep students listening, and some of the things don't just work well sometimes."

Despite the lack of attention from the students, Ann believed that she was playing an important role to demonstrate American English in terms of "How do I speak, how do I construct my sentences, what idioms do I give, how does natural native American English sound like." Ann said that her role was to help students be aware of how Americans talked and wrote before they went into the business world and interacted with American speakers. Ann noted that the students used too many pretty words or words of nonsense to convey what they meant. Ann said such features could be "a turn-off to some people." She noted the students had learnt English grammar from their Chinese teachers but needed "an exposure to native-English speakers." She explained,

> They have good Chinese teachers of English but they aren't native and native speech just has its nuances that are different from a learned second language. And I think that having my input hopefully would help them strengthen their English grammar usage and understanding. I think it's good for them … to have input from native English speakers.

To provide students extra time to practice English with her, Ann invited students to join her and her husband for lunch twice a week though, as we learnt from the student interviewees, few actually took the opportunity. Ann said that she did her best at the interview, "I have done what I could do. It has been the opportunity of a lifetime; I hope I have helped make a difference in someone's life."

Ann's experiences illustrate how a native speaker with little teaching experience taught in a key university in China. Like the American-born ethnic Koreans teaching in Korea (Cho, 2012; Jeon, 2012), Ann's status as a native speaker has indeed some market value in EFL China as local teachers would not be hired by the participating university without a PhD degree. Compared to other expats including the one who worked as a waiter in South Africa (Zhang & Wang, 2011), Ann, as she claimed, was better qualified with the teaching certificate she had obtained more than 40 years previously. However, Ann struggled in teaching thesis writing as she had never written one herself. The writing assignments students did were mostly narratives or general English writing related to personal experiences, through which Ann learnt about China, thus fulfilling her purpose of coming to China. The fact that Ann did not get any direction and teaching materials indicates how low expectations of the university were for her to deliver quality teaching. There seems a conflict between hiring a native speaker and not taking her teaching seriously. Such a conflict suggests the shifting market value of the linguistic capital possessed by native speakers. Unlike the expat teachers in Stanley (2013), who struggled to entertain their students to meet the image as funny foreign creatures, Ann, although she sensed dissatisfaction among students, continued her routine of doing vocabulary exercises and writing assignments to record students' and their family's lives. Since English education has become a neoliberal business that needs to put clients' satisfaction as a priority, it is important to turn to the views of the local students.

Students' Views on Ann's Teaching and Sharing Their Personal Stories

Students who participated in the interview expressed their dissatisfaction with Ann's teaching. They found it extremely boring when Ann followed the same routine in all the classes. Salton said he had a hard time sometimes trying to convince himself that he should go to Ann's class. Another student, Sanborn, said that he once missed four classes in a row. He said so with a laugh and appeared unconcerned. Of the routine activities, the dictionary exercise seemed to have generated the most negative comments. Sunn felt they were being treated like primary or high school kids though Ann had not told them that the dictionary exercise was actually adapted

from her high school classes. Commenting on the dictionary exercise, Swain said that it "made [her] want to sleep" and she believed that it was used to kill time in class:

> I hate to say this, but … the dictionary exercise … takes time in class. I have the feeling that that's why she is doing this, even though apparently she knew that we are not interested in it at all.

Swain also said that she "just spent the time in class reviewing … some notes from other classes." To resist the activity, Sanderson just copied words from the dictionary and re-used the same words he used in the first semester in the second semester. He said nobody, including Ann, noticed it.

Apart from the dictionary exercise, the writing project on family history also raised students' eyebrows. Many did not see any connection between the writing project and their graduation thesis. Swain described the project tedious as it lasted forever in the first semester:

> So for the first week, we were supposed to write about our childhood, and the next [week write] about our junior high school life, and the third [week write about] our high school life, and the fourth [week write about] our college life. And starting from the fifth week, we are supposed to write about our mom's childhood and her family life and then our dad's, and then the grandparents on your mother side and then those on your father's side. And at the end we did these very thick, you know, scripts of family history.

Sanan and Sunn felt their stories were used for a profit when Ann told them that the stories would be used for a book she and her husband planned to write. While Sanan was "not comfortable" sharing her personal stories to an unknown audience as it might be published later in Ann's book, Sunn felt it was unfair and suspected that collecting information for their book was Ann's purpose in coming to China:

> We just think maybe she and her husband come to our university and most time doing their research or sometimes collecting materials or information and focus on that part, … maybe I misunderstand that, but it made us think so.

Sunn believed that it was for the same reason (students unwilling to provide materials or information for Ann's book) that none of them accepted the invitation to join Ann and her husband for lunch.

Students' complaints about Ann's class drew our attention to students' needs beyond simple language learning. Indeed, Sanborn, Sian and Salton explained that most students were not passionate about learning English and its culture but considered English as a tool for jobs in accounting, finance, or business. Salton said that the English courses "are something that they have to do" in order to graduate but they would rather spend time reading and building up vocabulary related to their future jobs in business. As he put it,

> It's just like we have to get through this course. … I personally don't care. … we have to get through this course then I can really get down to my own reading and you know vocabulary building [for my own purposes].

Like the above students who said they were not interested in learning English as a language, Swain said that although Ann corrected their writing carefully, it was not what they wanted. In her words,

> … she will correct some of our writing but she wouldn't tell us how to improve or what direction you are heading to when you are writing, so we don't have any idea why we are doing these. … I have no idea.

Swain recalled her experience of taking a "real" or good course with an American teacher during her overseas exchange program and said "a good course would allow [her] to do a real research project that pushes [her] to read, to discuss issues with the instructor, and to write and present the findings." Swain's comment suggests what students needed was not just language learning but learning to develop research skills that would help in their future jobs. Sanborn summarized the students' frustration on Ann's lack of understanding of their needs:

> She doesn't really understand Chinese classes. … She doesn't understand our needs. She doesn't understand how she can raise our interests. She doesn't understand that.

Although the university hired expat teachers to teach native-like English, the interview students expressed their preference to be taught by local Chinese teachers, especially for thesis writing. This is because the students believed that the Chinese professors knew what the students needed and their teaching was, as Sanborn put it, "more direct, more understandable, more instructive." Sanan and Sunn also mentioned how they enjoyed some Chinese professors' classes who shared their successful learning experiences both in China and overseas. In contrast to Ann's comment that she could help students learn better English, students believed that the Chinese teachers were more qualified teachers. As Swain explained,

> They are better teachers because at least a Chinese professor should be from an English teaching background or should have a PhD in English language or English literature. And also they spend quite some years teaching at college or in high school, so they are very familiar with the classroom setting. However, our foreign language teachers … might just be taking a vacation in China while doing some part-time teaching to pay for the bills. That's what is happening here. So I do not trust the foreign teachers…

The negative comments made by the students were reflected in the evaluation score that Ann received for the writing course: it was 64 out of 100 and ranked 356 of the 361 instructors. Several students (Sunn, Sanborn, Sian and Salton) said that they felt sorry because Ann seemed passionate about her teaching and was very careful in

correcting grammatical errors in their writing. Salton described how he tried to pay attention in Ann's class when nobody was paying attention:

> I really feel sorry for her because she is passionate about it, and she really wants to do well in the classes. When people weren't listening, I sometimes convinced myself to raise my head and to pay attention to her because otherwise nobody is paying attention.

The negative views expressed by the students suggest that what the students needed was not a native speaker who could correct their language errors but somebody who could help them develop the relevant skills to enhance their employability in the business world. The participating students were explicit about how their time and energy were wasted sitting in Ann's class doing vocabulary exercises and writing narrative accounts for Ann's book project. In a neoliberal world when time and labour are profitable, it is understandable that these students felt they were being treated unfairly. The present findings confirm previous observations of how the teaching of expats was perceived negatively by students in Chinese universities (Stanley, 2013). Although students believed that there was a lack of understanding of their needs on Ann' side, it was not clear whether Ann would be able to meet the students' needs if she knew what they wanted. After all, she was not trained to teach thesis writing in an EFL classroom. When the Chinese students expressed their preferences to be taught by the local teachers whom they thought were more qualified, the present study indicates that the students, as fee-paying clients, are demanding better service.

Views of the Chinese Professors: Hiring of Expatriate Teachers

Unlike the students, the two Chinese professors stressed the importance of hiring native speakers. Both Cao and Mao stated that they could not have a foreign language department without hiring native-speaking teachers. They said that China, unlike India or Singapore, where there was a variety of English, had not reached the point where one could say that there was a variety of English called China English. Mao believed that expat teachers played an important role in offering genuine and meaningful interactions with the students. He explained,

> You can talk about things in more depth when you communicate with real people. This is different from watching TV because you can't interact with the TV. You can only learn and understand the culture if you interact with expat native speakers in person.

Similarly, Cao claimed that the only way to learn good English was to consult native speakers for native-like usages. Cao said that the Chinese students and teachers did not make good use of the expat teachers. Cao's respect for native speaker's intuition as a yardstick to measure linguistic accuracy matched Ann's self-perceived role to modal natural and native-like American English. In the following quote, Cao argued for the reliance on native speakers' intuition in making linguistic judgment:

> … a non-native speaker without native linguistic intuition is not comparable to the native English speakers. We need to consult native speakers especially when checking students' compositions [because] it's easy to say it's correct but it is very difficult to say it is wrong. … Non-native English speakers should respect native English speakers because of their [linguistic] intuition.

According to Cao and Mao, the salary for expat teachers was not competitive, so the university typically received applications from expats who were retired, young and unemployed in their home country, or interested in traveling. A lot of these expats did not know how to teach, so students, like those in the present study, complained about the quality of their teaching. However, Mao said that since the hiring budget for expat teachers came from the Ministry of Education, they were willing to take the risk of hiring expats who might not teach well. When asked whether a teacher education background was an important criterion in hiring, Mao claimed that people who had a university degree and a sense of responsibility could do a good job even though they had no teacher training:

> I think the most important thing is a sense of responsibility. Teacher training or qualification is secondary. Only people who have a sense of responsibility can teach well because they will work hard to meet the students' needs. … We have teachers who have been trained in methodology. They would do lots of research to prepare their classes but they might not understand students' needs.

Commenting on the complaints from students about how Ann treated them as primary or high school students, both Cao and Mao said such complaints were typical as most expat teachers underestimated the students' level. Mao said,

> The key problem is that they don't know the needs of the Chinese students and the actual level of the Chinese students. They don't know how to motivate the students and they don't know the challenges of the students.

Because of their lack of understanding of the local students' needs, expat teachers, including Ann, were disadvantaged over their Chinese colleagues. Cao explained,

> Actually for the students, teaching English involves a lot of details in the work, like interaction with the students based on the cultural understanding with each other. You [as a teacher] have certain expectations from the students while students have certain expectations from the teachers. So if the teachers are of the home culture teaching the students, they have the advantages, you know, they understand the students' better.

Following the argument, Cao and Mao also believed that English majors preferred Chinese teachers who had expertise in linguistics or literature even though they did not speak native-like English. Echoing what the students said, Cao and Mao said that many students, especially English majors, did not come to the class for a native-like accent or basic language skills.

It is interesting to note that the two Chinese professors stressed the importance of hiring native speakers in teaching English. Although native speakerism, by privileging Anglo-ethnics to use their birth certificate as a professional license, has a negative effect (Water, 2007), the native speaker model "remains firmly entrenched in language teaching" (Cook, 1999, p. 188). Acknowledging that the expats they hired might be under qualified, Mao said that they could not complain because the hiring did not cost the university anything. The implication was that if the university had to pay for the hiring, they would only hire people who were better qualified. It would be interesting to see how long the Chinese government would continue to pay for these hires when universities, according to Piller and Cho (2013), are becoming capitalist enterprises driven by competition for profit. Although the participating administrator claimed that a sense of responsibility was more important than a teacher education background, he believed that expat teachers, being unfamiliar with the local culture, were always disadvantaged compared the local teachers. The linguistic capital of being a native speaker is definitely not enough to compete in the EFL market.

CONCLUSION

Guided by neoliberalism, the present case study explores an EFL classroom in the context of English being a sellable resource for global communication and competiveness. It illustrates how the participating expat, Ann, followed a class routine featuring a dictionary exercise that she experienced in her high school and also a writing project asking students to write about their lives and family history that she planned to develop into her own book project on China's social and economic life. Students, however, were uncomfortable about how their writing might be used and found Ann's classes a waste of time. Agreeing with the students that many local Chinese teachers were more qualified than Ann, the Chinese administrator said that they could not complain because all expat positions cost the university nothing but were paid by the Ministry of Education.

The study illustrates how the neoliberal commodification of English empowered or affected those involved: the participating expat worked transnationally not only to meet the market needs for native-like English but also on her own book project; the university had low expectations for a teaching position they got for free; and the students, as fee paying clients, demanded high quality service. The study suggests that although English education is driven by a neoliberal discourse, each party (the university, students, and expats) may have conflicting individual interests, which creates tensions in the EFL classrooms. The study implies a concern for the purpose of education in the neoliberal world. If education is more than for the pursuit of social mobility and financial gain, then the university might have more rigid hiring criteria rather than just having somebody to teach for free, Ann might not design a writing assignment to fulfill her own goal to promote herself in the American

society, and students might enjoy their university education to, for example, critically reflect on the world we are building.

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11. ACADEMIC SOJOURNERS OR GLOBAL EDUCATORS?

Teaching Experiences of Western Academics at a UK University in China

INTRODUCTION

In this chapter we look at the experiences of expatriate staff at a university in China (hereafter called The University), a joint venture between a Chinese university and a British university. The courses are all taught in English, are generally very similar and in many cases identical to those taught at the UK campus, and are subject to the same quality assurance and other regulatory mechanisms as those in the UK. The academic staff is drawn from a wide range of countries, although those from the UK form the largest national group. A very large majority of the students, especially the undergraduates, are Chinese, but there are also significant numbers of students from diverse other national backgrounds. International exchange experiences and split-site degrees with the UK campus are actively promoted and are one of the attractions of The University for the students. The University aims to give its students a learning experience that is as similar as possible to that in the UK campus in terms of course content and teaching and learning cultures. In order to articulate better between the Chinese High School and UK university systems, therefore, all undergraduate students undertake a preliminary year before starting their UK three-year undergraduate course. This is intended to ensure they have adequate English language skills, but also to induct them into the academic cultural expectations that The University aims to replicate. The University must also comply with key Chinese regulations in various areas of its operation, including the provision of a compulsory course on Chinese culture, taught in Chinese.

OUR RESEARCH

The research project that informs the chapter was partly inspired by our own international teaching experiences. It was initially framed by broad questions such as 'what is it like?' or 'what does it mean to the individual teacher?' to be teaching in The University. These initial, broad questions were gradually refined and operationalized in terms of 'professional identity' as two questions: 'how do academic staff position themselves and become positioned with respect to The University, Chinese students, and China?' And 'how is this reflected in and reflect

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on their perceptions of their professional identity?' We also believed, however, that 'professional identity' is just one part of each individual's sense of who they are, of a broader sense of 'personal identity', constructed through a more-or-less internalized 'narrative of the self' in which various life course strands are intimately interwoven with each other. 'Identity', therefore, provided us with an analytical tool to help disentangle some of the complexity in individuals' accounts, but we also wanted to retain a sense of the synthetic wholeness of their lives as they themselves lived and experienced them – or, at least, those parts we could access and that were relevant to our research questions.

Conceptually and theoretically, we had been drawn to sociological debates over 'structure' and 'agency' as offering powerful insights into the process by which individuals actively *construct* their own identities, rather than merely *acquiring* them. Giddens' (1991, pp. 52–55) notion of the "reflexive project of the self" as a characteristic of life under late modernity is influential on our analysis, although we have a personal preference for Archer's critical realist approach to structure and agency that differs from Giddens' account in some of its core conceptions (see Li, 2014). Whether we express it in terms of Giddens' "reflexivity" or Archer's (2000) "internal conversation", the key principle is that individuals engage in a reflexive self-monitoring of their lives.

Our empirical task, therefore, was to gather individual teachers' narratives about their experiences leading up to their coming to the University and their subsequent experiences at the University. We interviewed fifteen members of staff, chosen to give us a range of length and diversity of professional experience, both overall and at The University. For this phase of the research project, we interviewed only staff from arts and humanities, social sciences and business schools. Because of the difficulties in preserving anonymity in single-institutional studies such as this, we shall not identify the school to which any individual belongs, although this might be implied in some cases in order to make sense of their statements.

Interviews lasted between thirty and seventy minutes, were recorded, and then transcribed verbatim. The aim of the interviews was to locate each individual's move to The University, and experience there, within the context of their wider professional life, as they perceived it. The interviews were therefore very loosely structured around a few key themes: previous experience, reasons for coming to The University and events related to that, The University as a place to work, teaching experiences at The University, and how their time at The University fits into their career and career aspirations.

Experience – or perhaps better, 'experiences' – are both formative of and mediated by an individual's sense of identity. Experiences cumulatively contribute to one's sense of identity and that same, ever-evolving sense of identity influences both the experiences that become available or are sought out, and the meanings they acquire. Experiences, therefore, can be listed and described in the nominally 'objective' terms of the outside observer – what someone was doing, where and for how long, for example – but for the researcher to understand their full significance in the

unfolding life of the individual demands access, in as much as that is possible, to the perspectives and interpretations of that individual. It is for this reason that we adopted an interpretative approach in this research and used loosely structured interviews as a means of encouraging personal narrative accounts from our participants.

All our interviewees provided at least some personal or family life background to explain the unfolding of their professional lives, although the depth and detail of such accounts varied from brief statements of the form – "I had personal issues at the time" – to detailed life histories going back over thirty years. We encouraged the latter when they were offered but respected everyone's right to divulge only that which they considered relevant. No matter how much detail is provided, however, ultimately we as researchers must interpret what we hear, and bring our own subjectivities to the analysis. Where accounts are sparser, there is inevitably more room for these subjectivities to influence interpretation, although through continuous discussion and reflection we hoped to avoid particular and systematic biases in our analysis.

Fifteen teachers, selected purposefully but sometimes opportunistically, out of a total of several hundred members of the academic staff at the university cannot in any way be 'representative', and this was not our intention. We were interested in capturing diversity of experience, and in this we were not disappointed: each of our fifteen interviews provides a distinct story, and we feel that had we increased the number of interviewees to fifty, we would have received fifty distinct accounts. But we were also interested in looking for the emergence of patterns across these stories – not patterns that take in the whole narrative, but fragmentary patterns that appear in various forms and relationships in the construction of individual narratives.

FINDINGS

We present those of our findings relevant to our task in this chapter under three headings but we repeat our concern that each individual's life is ultimately seen as a continuous and coherent whole. Each participant is identified by a pseudonym and readers are encouraged to relate the experiences of individuals across our analytical strands, when we do not do so. We do not attempt to present everyone's account under the various headings but select in order to give a picture of both the diversity and the patterns that we sought.

A: Paths to the University

We found a spectrum of positions on moving to The University and China, along which we picked out four positions indicative of the spread: actively seeking to work in China; not actively seeking to work in China but welcoming the opportunity when it arose; taking the opportunity when it arose but more for other reasons than it being in China; and taking the opportunity but having reservations about coming to China. In the individual narratives, these positions are complicated by a range

of other personal concerns and priorities, amongst which, previous experience of China often play a part. Only five of the fifteen had not been to China in some capacity before taking a post at The University; four had visited China on holiday or on business trips as part of a previous job, and six had previous experience of teaching in China. Prior experience of China often influenced the decision to seek employment at The University, although in a diversity of ways.

Bill, for example, after travelling in the country, had become "fascinated by China" and happily took up an opportunity to teach in language schools there. He had previously decided to qualify as a teacher of English as a foreign language in the hope this would open up opportunities for further travel. While teaching in China he met and married a Chinese woman. Despite going to the UK for a while, difficulties in finding work there and Chinese family links that were now a part of Bill's identity – "I have a Chinese wife and a Chinese family, so I am immersed in that respect" – led Bill willingly to accept a position in the University.

Amy also actively sought work in China, but through a quite different chain of experiences. A chance attendance at a lecture on Chinese history when she was eighteen years old, combined with an interest in learning languages, sparked a desire to learn a "non-alphabetic" language, and so she took her first degree in Chinese studies. She emerged not really knowing what she might do with her qualification until two Chinese friends invited her to take up a teaching job in their university, leading her into teaching as a career, although she had and still has no formal teaching qualifications. Somewhat similarly, Alan emerged from university with a philosophy degree and no idea what to do with it, took a job teaching English in Chinese schools and found that he "enjoyed it enormously", which led him to stay on. Both Amy and Alan later sought employment at The University, Amy because of her continued interest in and knowledge of China, but Alan primarily for "personal reasons", although he had also by this time developed both a fascination with and considerable knowledge of China.

In contrast, Mark had been working in a UK university as a research associate and wanted to further his academic career. He was looking for jobs in the UK but an offer of a lectureship at The University "was the best opportunity I had". He points out that, "I didn't necessarily come to China because I wanted to come to China…I thought, well I've never set foot in China, this is a bit of a risk". Liz, too, had seen her move to The University as potentially opening up a career in academia after completing her doctorate, but having had considerable overseas non-academic work experience prior to that, none of which was in China. At the time of the interview, both Mark and Liz had been at The University for more than seven years and provided important insights into the ways it had developed in that time.

Jim had had experience of teaching in China in the 1980s and had not enjoyed it at all. Since that time, however, he had taught Chinese students at a university in the UK and this experience had "made me realize that if the country is producing young people like this, that the country has changed or that… I am now seeing the country in a different light, and it made me think living there could be good". Nonetheless,

his enthusiasm remained tempered by his previous experience and he would have preferred a job elsewhere. Paul had also taught English in Chinese universities, much later than Jim, but had been fascinated by the country and the awareness of its growing impact in the world. He described his sense of amazement when teaching in a prestigious Chinese university, that his students could be the "future captains of Chinese industry". He eventually became rather disillusioned and returned to the UK, but then soon afterwards came to The University, primarily as a strategic move to further his career aspirations.

The experience of teaching Chinese students in universities outside China was also significant in both Carl and Hugh's decisions to take a job at the University. His experience of teaching Chinese university students in Australia had 'fascinated' Carl, partly because he had found them to be more active in class than the hearsay stereotype had led him to expect, and he wanted to see how they behaved in a Chinese rather than a Western context. Hugh's experience of Chinese students in the UK had been much less positive and largely conformed to the stereotype, but this had more personal implications for him as a British-born Chinese with a Chinese-born Chinese wife. His wife had persuaded him that the Chinese students he had seen performing so poorly in his previous university were those "who can't get into anywhere else", whereas the "really good ones" were going to be in Oxbridge or London "or they are going to be in China". Reflecting on this, Hugh said, "So there was this part of me that thought, if I go and work in [The University], I can see some of these really good Chinese students, and that will change my perception of them". From a career development perspective he was reluctant to go, but felt that The University, "being a UK university based in China", gave him some form of "protection" that would allow him to return to a career in UK higher education. The presence of his wife's family in China was a further source of encouragement to go; although they visited the family every year, his wife wanted to be able to see them more often. Hugh and his wife's decision to come to The University involved a complex "weighing-up" of issues but, in the end, Hugh's feeling that he had been in his previous job too long and "needed that change" seems to have been decisive: "And I thought, rather than going to work in somewhere like Kent, I might just as well go to China".

Tom had applied for jobs in several countries but had particularly hoped to move to the UK or USA, which he saw as offering a life-style that appealed to him and a "full-academic life" beyond the English teaching that he had been doing in Europe for a few years. Offers of work in both countries were not forthcoming and he contemplated having to remain where he was. He had "never been to China, never been interested in China before" but acceptance of his application to The University made him feel that "China just seemed so exciting compared to those countries" and he took up the post enthusiastically.

Pat's account of her decision to come to The University differed from the others in that she saw the move as a "career break" and a "step down" rather than career advancement. The tax-free salary and generous leave allowance meant that she could take time out to indulge her passion for travel in the region and she felt she was at

an appropriate point in her life to do this, before she became "tied down with other things". The opportunity to travel was a great attraction of a post which otherwise she would be reluctant to take because of her distaste for Chinese government policies. "I came here for very pragmatic reasons. I didn't come here because I have a burning love of China", she declared, adding that "If the conditions [of service] had been the same, I would have gone somewhere else". Pat's reservations did not, however, extend to Chinese people; she was learning Chinese and commented that 'I love working with Chinese students'.

In addition to the 'pull' of China that influenced many of our participants, it is also worth noting the 'push' away from their home country that some described as an important influence on their initial decision to work abroad, if not immediately on their decision to come to China and The University. Sometimes the 'push' was due to a lack of jobs, sometimes due to a general sense of malaise about the UK, sometimes more explicitly political, and sometimes all three. Both Phil and Jim despaired of the political regime in the UK in the 1980s: "It was grim, and all you wanted to do was to get out", commented Phil, while Jim remembered "the constrictions of early Thatcherite Britain, which I really disliked intensely". Both left to work abroad and then went on to long and diversely international careers that ultimately brought them to The University and left them with something of an aversion to contemporary Britain: "That small, little island that thinks it's the centre of the world has got such a lot to learn", said Phil. Phil is unique amongst our participants (although not in The University as a whole) in that he was 'head-hunted' for the senior position he holds, presumably, he maintained, because of his status in his academic field and his international experience.

B: Teaching Experiences in the University

The length of time our participants had been at The University at the time of their interview ranged from two months to over eight years, but there were no participants with between three-and-a-half and seven years' experience. This may be a consequence of our participant selection or may reflect the fairly rapid turnover of staff in the institution. Although the standard contract length is five years (with some teaching-only contracts shorter than this), several of our respondents expressed uncertainty over whether they would actually see out this time. Reasons given for this uncertainty were personal or professional, or both. It is worth noting that after three years of service the tax-free component of the financial package – that many identified as a significant influence on their decision to come – comes to an end. This may stimulate reflection on one's career options.

For some participants, but by no means all, we observe a pattern of 'adaptation' to life at the University that echoes the familiar U-shape of cultural adaptation theory: initial enthusiasm quickly falls in the face of confusion, then rises slowly as familiarity, accommodation, or engagement grows. An important aspect of successful adaptation for many appears to be the identification of a role within the institution

that brings a sense of professional satisfaction, a sense of value and of being professionally valued. This is usually accompanied by becoming more competent and confident in matters of daily life – travel, shopping, and so on – in which either a basic knowledge of Chinese language or a means of managing without needing to use Chinese plays a part. So, in both professional life and in dealing with day-to-day demands, a greater sense of competence and satisfaction emerges.

Most respondents stated that learning Chinese was important to assisting this adaptation to life outside the university, and many made deliberate and systematic efforts to achieve a level of linguistic competence that allowed them to function more easily. Phil suggested that the first year at The University is "very, very difficult" for staff and that, "it's the language. It's all the silly little things. Where do I get my shoes repaired? How do I buy decent bread? …cumulatively it can be hard work". Four of our fifteen participants could speak (and in one case could also read) Chinese before coming to The University, either as a result of earlier experience in China or through having taken a first degree that included Chinese language.

Of particular interest to us in the experiences of teaching at The University are the ways in which our participants responded to Chinese students, who constitute a very large majority in most classes, especially at undergraduate level. Ten out of the fifteen had had at least some experience of teaching Chinese students in schools, language schools or universities in China, the UK, Australia, or Singapore before they came to The University. We asked them what had been their first impressions of Chinese students, both at The University and previously, and whether they had felt the need to adapt their teaching as a consequence.

Most interviewees were aware of the common stereotypes of Chinese students, most notably their lack of responsiveness in class and unwillingness or inability to engage in critical thinking. Paul suggested that national stereotyping may be a common starting point for "most people involved in language teaching [who] are working with…rough stereotypes, but we are pretty flexible about it". This summarizing role of national stereotypes was neatly illustrated in Bill's observation that, "with many Chinese students, it's a battle to get them to say anything in a class discussion; with Italians, it's a battle to get them to say nothing!" Bill was also aware however that "it's dangerous to stereotype" and all of our respondents who acknowledged their awareness of the common Chinese student stereotype expressed a self-conscious concern to avoid its influence on their teaching. Culturally essentialist explanations for students' observed classroom behaviour were not generally offered, although they were occasionally implied, as in Bill's observation. Preferred explanations tended to be in terms of the students' previous experience of teacher-centred classes in high school, although Pat located the source outside the education system, in a long history in which "people never had completely free speech … they've never really been free or democratic in the way our society has been".

Several teachers recounted their surprise or even dismay on their first experience of teaching Chinese students, but all took this as a reflection on their own approach to

teaching these particular students, rather than as a 'fault' of the students. Phil's first such experience had been many years earlier and with Chinese students elsewhere, but is typical of what we heard from many participants:

> That really rocked me on my heels. I'd never dealt with classes like that before…these are your quiet Chinese who are not doing what you expect them to. …But I didn't think there was something wrong with the students. To me this was a question for the teacher…What am I doing wrong? So I had to rethink my strategies.

Teachers reported seeking ways to get the students to discuss, ask questions, take a critical perspective and generally engage with the class activities in ways that they thought were not only valuable in themselves but were essential if the students were to be successful in the British teaching and learning environment that The University seeks to present. Their judgements, therefore, mixed implicit deficit models of aspects of the Chinese students' approaches to learning with pragmatic concerns for these students success in a new 'learning culture'. They believed that to meet the assessment demands that are determined by British academic expectations and enforced by British quality assurance mechanisms, the students would have to learn the skills necessary to engage successfully with this new learning culture. To support the students in doing this, the teachers evolved various solutions that typically tended to demand more structuring of the classroom and the use of small-group activities that placed less stress on students than did whole-class discussions, but practices varied. Amy, for example, with considerable experience of teaching in China, identified the initial problem in terms of the students' 'shyness' and her main concern was to gain the students' trust and develop their confidence to speak in front of her and other students. Mark pointed out that the experience of teaching students in their second language had made him much more aware of how "a lot of academics [tend] to be very wordy and over-complicate things" so that he was now more careful about his language when communicating with students. When there are non-Chinese students (usually referred to in The University as 'international students') in the class they were seen by some as a problem because they could easily take a dominant position, which was often conceded by Chinese students. But Tina described how she used them as a 'resource', taking them into her confidence to facilitate Chinese students' participation.

Mark, more than anyone else, was prepared to consider the differences he observed in the behaviour of Chinese students to have a cultural foundation: "cultural background does actually matter and I do think we all think slightly differently". He extended the notion of previous classroom experience influencing students' approaches to teaching and learning to include the more general "way…you are brought up to think". In support, he referred to his Chinese wife's expression of similar views on this but he was also keen to point out that this applied across all cultures and that "Western intellectual traditions…were grounded in a particular time and place". He felt that it was good for Chinese students in his classes to be

exposed to other, non-Chinese "ideas", but he also encourages them "to think about how what they've learned from their own culture might impact on how they think about some of these other theories". Interestingly, he found that, while he was sometimes rather nervous about encouraging critical discussion of certain issues – such as censorship – in China, his students seemed to be less concerned, and he suggested that "if you are critical in a second language, you might in a sense be distancing yourself [from it]".

Just two of our interviewees had doubts about challenging and attempting to change the students' classroom behaviour. Liz thought it was "problematic" because the students' experience at The University "is only temporary" and "you are interrupting their cultural well-being". Sue's reflections on this issue are worth quoting in full:

> I think this is a dilemma for us working in China. Do we have the right to impose our Western views of what it is to be an academic on these Chinese students? My belief is that if they are then going to the UK to study or, for example, for a Master's degree…then it's probably our responsibility to prepare them for what they are going to find when they get to the UK. But if they are continuing their education in China and perhaps not even going on for an academic career, but going out into management or whatever it is, then it's a different culture they are going to be entering when they leave university, and then do we have that right to impose our cultural beliefs on them? I'm not sure.

Our participants also gave positive, enthusiastic evaluations of their Chinese students. 'Hard-working', 'well-behaved' and 'respectful' were common impressions and their 'great attendance' at lectures and reliable completion of homework were welcomed, especially by those who had had very different experiences of students in the UK. John's experience had shown him that "if you know what you are doing with them, they can be very good fun…and very exciting people to teach" but the problem is that inexperienced "foreign teachers…don't know what stimulates them". Both Pat and Liz cautioned against interpreting Chinese students' silence as a lack of engagement, with Pat convinced that they really 'care about their learning' and Liz citing her own research findings to show how the students are interpreting and relating what they learn to the Chinese context in ways that non-Chinese teachers would be unable to do.

C: Career Choices and Life Stories

Our participants have constructed their career paths through a reflexive engagement with options, possibilities and constraints, and this process is intertwined with the reflexive construction of their broader lives – their 'personal life' for want of a better term. During their time at The University, these processes are inevitably, specifically, and inextricably linked to the contexts of China and The University in various ways. Presenting a composite account based on extracts form all of our participants – as we

have done in the previous sections – would make it difficult to show this interleaving of the personal, the professional and the context. Instead, therefore, we begin with an account of how just one of our participants, Mark, has engaged with his professional and personal life during his time at The University and then, more briefly, some glimpses of other participants' accounts.

As mentioned earlier, Mark had joined The University because it offered him the opportunity to embark on a 'full' academic career of teaching and research, rather than the less secure research associate position he had held previously. He has been at The University for over seven years and during that time has gained promotion, but doubts that he will stay at The University "in the long term, because for us as academics there are problems here". The problems he has in mind concern opportunities to carry out the sort of research that he wants to do "if I want to go to the next level" in his career development. Although he is willing to take advantage of being at The University to "incorporate a Chinese perspective" into his research there are limits to what is possible or what he is willing to do. The cultural-political nature of research in the arts, humanities, and social sciences makes it difficult to get any Chinese research funding, for which "you have to basically please the Chinese government. It's all about five-year plans". He also has his longer-term career aspirations in mind and "when you think about an academic career, you are not talking about the institution you happen to be in at that particular moment. … There has to be some narrative or consistency for development over the long term". Most UK sources of funding are closed to him because funders do not treat The University as a British university, so that the possibilities of getting "the big grants… that an associate professor or professor in the UK would be expected to have got… You just can't do that here".

Mark also finds the political environment constraining his work more generally, both in his own research and supervision of PhD students, an activity which he sees as "another thing that you need if you are going to progress up the ladder". He feels subtly intimidated into not being too critical and suggests that this suits The University in its sensitive relationship with the Chinese authorities, "because you get these compliant academics here…They will get involved in business engagement, but they won't be too critical". He finds the less subtle media censorship and internet blocking by the State not so much intimidating as just frustrating in the limitations it places on his access to information needed for his research and teaching. These frustrations to his professional development encourage Mark to conclude that he will eventually move on to a university in the UK; indeed, he declares, "I have probably stayed here longer than I intended". He might consider a job in a third country but is wary of the demands for this would make for a further protracted bout of familiarization with a new cultural and linguistic environment.

In addition to gaining academic promotion, however, during his years at The University, Mark has also acquired a Chinese wife. Because 'now I have a Chinese family', another set of considerations enter his planning for the future. Natural

affection and the strong familial bonds of Chinese culture mean that his wife will at a minimum want to keep coming back to visit her parents, and Mark accepts this as the concomitant to having a Chinese wife and, now, a young child too. Awareness of the need to make decisions about the child's schooling and languages ("at the moment, Chinese, but I hope English too") is beginning to emerge. Plans (eventually) to take up a post in a UK university are not fundamentally altered by Mark's new family status, but their implementation becomes more complex and he gives the impression that there is no great urgency just yet. He is applying for permanent residency status in China, so that "it's easier for me to come back". His professional frustrations with China and The University must now be accommodated within the recognition that China has inextricably become part of his life.

Other respondents' accounts variously reveal similar elements, although in different combinations and with other personal and professional concerns. Liz, for example, also talked of her initial frustrations in trying to engage in research. In her case the problems were not political but the difficulty of engaging with the communities she wished to research, through lack of personal networks and limited language capabilities. This was doubly frustrating because in her field she saw China as "a research playground that is not replicated anywhere else in the world, and that was one of the big attractions". She eventually got around these problems by training Chinese intermediaries, but still finds problems with the reception of her work in the Chinese academic community when her findings are seen to be too critical. One impact of this initial frustration was that she took on pedagogically-oriented research within The University, "because it was accessible", and is very enthusiastic about this side of her research activities. She declared that now "I probably get on with what I find interesting. It probably doesn't do my career path any good but it doesn't matter. …It's important that I enjoy the time I've got left, you know".

Six of the seven teaching-only participants in our study were English language teachers and tutors, and two of those with teaching and research posts had come into The University from an English teaching background. The original motivation to take up teaching English as a foreign language was often the opportunity it offers for travel. Simply having English as one's first language could be enough to open up opportunities to teach overseas, as it did for both Alan and Jim, while others decided an initial language teaching qualification would make things easier. Influenced by her mother's experiences as a teacher and her own desire to learn languages, Tina had thought, "if I taught in foreign countries I might be able to live in them and…continue learning languages and travelling, and just having a different life-style". She recalled meeting travelers – "foreigners from different countries" – who told her, "You're lucky, you speak English. You could get a job teaching English". A similar suggestion to Bill from his mother at a time when he passionately wanted to travel led him to take a TEFL (Teaching English as a Foreign Language) course that enabled him to travel and teach. Tom, too, had taken a CELT (Certificate of

English Language Teaching) immediately after graduating, specifically because “I can use this to teach English and travel the world”, which was “something that attracted me at the time”.

By the time most of these teachers had arrived in The University, however, their experiences had led them to develop a strong sense of professional identity as a teacher. Jim had deliberately and conscientiously developed this through seeking a diversity of experience and professional qualifications along the way. In his case, ‘the way’ had been particularly full of twists and turns brought about by combinations of necessity, opportunity, and personal relationships, and he arrived at The University with what we might call a ‘mature’ sense of his personal and professional identity.

As something of a contrast, Tom had come to The University with a few years teaching experience in Europe and recognized that he had a lot to learn about teaching Chinese students. He contrasted his initial difficulties with the way in which he saw colleagues’ classrooms “bustling with conversations related to the task”. He was not sure whether this could be put down to “experience with this context with Asian students” or “teacher training”, in both of which he felt relatively deficient, but he also commented on how a more experienced colleague uses “her understanding of China and Chinese culture to engage the students”. Since his arrival in China Tom had made conscientious efforts to develop his own linguistic and cultural competence, to engage better with the country and his students. He described his “master plan” as being to work in The University for a few years, achieve a higher education teaching qualification (PGCHE), further his research and publishing aims and then “hopefully move back to the UK”, influenced strongly in this by the wish to be near his parents as they get older. He admits, however, that this plan is very flexible and in particular, “I’m open to the opportunity of meeting someone out here and setting up my life here”. If that were to happen, Tom recognized he would be in a position similar to Mark’s in which he would still be drawn back to the UK “but I would also be interested in a position out here that was longer than five years”.

Finally, John is an interesting example of someone who has always been very strategic in his career decisions and who saw his current time at The University quite clearly as another phase in the development of a professional identity that was difficult to categorize, spanning as it did the worlds of business, teaching and research; his reference to himself as a ‘pracademic’ captures this perfectly. Being multilingual and with a multilingual family, he was quite at ease with a career and personal life that spanned different countries. After having already had eight years’ experience in China he was sure he would not see out the five years of his contract with The University, perhaps timing his departure to coincide with the end of his tax-free status. He was also clear that, on the one hand, The University is ‘not really interested in having us long-term’ while, on the other, any status gained while at The University has ‘no transferability to the UK’ and so offers little in terms of career advancement. He did not see his own future as that of an

academic, however, but as one in senior management, so these limitations did not unduly concern him.

DISCUSSION AND SOME PARTIAL CONCLUSIONS

The University offers an opportunity for teachers and academics from a range of national and cultural backgrounds to interact with China and the Chinese, and vice versa. Within The University itself the immediate interaction is with Chinese students and Chinese administrators (a hugely important group within The University which deserves research attention) and, once again, vice versa. The location of The University within China further offers the opportunity for these international teachers and administrators to interact with wider Chinese society.

The situation is not as clear-cut as this suggests, however. The University is not ‘in China’ as some sort of a ‘bubble’, but is an organic part of China. The boundaries of The University are permeable, and the operation and experience of The University in practice cannot be separated from its wider Chinese context. As Bill put it, “Even though it is a British university plonked down in the middle of China, because it is in the middle of China, there are elements of China always creeping in and it is impossible to keep them out”. This raises the question of what it means to describe The University as “a British university in China”. To what extent can it remain a ‘British’ university when it is in China? Only a partial answer to this question can be proposed based on our limited data – limited numerically and in the constituency within The University that we consulted. We approach this answer looking at how our participants related, professionally and personally, to China, the Chinese students whom they taught, and The University. These relationships are affected by and influential on the construction of professional identities, which are themselves inseparable from other aspects of the ‘reflexive construction of the self’.

From the Chinese students’ perspective, The University offers a portal, a preparatory stepping-off point, to the world beyond China in which many will go on to complete their degrees. For the staff employed to assist in this preparation, The University offers a safe place from which they can observe China or engage with China as far as they wish, while still having a return route open. The majority of those we interviewed welcomed the opportunity to come (or in many cases, to return) to China and hoped to get to know the country and its culture better. This was often more difficult than they anticipated and the difficulty – or the key, depending on how it was experienced – was commonly identified as the need to learn Chinese. Some were already fluent and many made an effort but were surprised at how difficult it turned out to be, so that their engagement with Chinese society was quite limited, except for opportunities within The University through Chinese staff and students, where English could be used. Our evidence suggests, however, that the development of close personal relationships were often the most effective route to deeper social engagement, with or without fluent Chinese. For example, Bill, with his Chinese

wife and in-laws necessitating his travelling – physically and culturally – far beyond the haven of The University, suggested that,

> Some people talk about…they're cocooned within [The University] … basically they are living in a pseudo-China kind of thing. …I have no problem with that, but then I go off into the real China …very different.

In a real sense, for many, China as a State, as a political entity, particularly as 'the Party', remained something of a brooding presence 'out there' that occasionally had to be dealt with for things like visas but also might reach into one's professional life. Its presence was implied as much as stated, as necessitating care over some things one taught and as limiting what might be researched with impunity. In general though, it was not something one was concerned about within The University, where some respondents – occasionally with surprise – noted how much license was actually enjoyed. On the other hand, Chinese people and Chinese culture – traditional and contemporary – were widely seen as a source of interest and fascination, even when people and practices might be described with puzzlement, frustration, or incomprehension. For several respondents, China presents an opportunity for personal and professional development through exposure to and the possibility to further understand a country whose historical and contemporary significance is recognized as immense and different from their previous experiences.

Teacher engagement with the Chinese students is a more complex issue and we must begin by examining the strange status of these students in The University. The potential impact on Chinese students in this detached British university, where language and criteria for successful academic achievement are alien to their previous experience and to Chinese universities around it, is one of being 'Otherized' within their own country. The 'difficulties' that most teachers experienced with Chinese students in class are a construction of this otherization process; they are not inherent to the students themselves but only to the students placed in this 'foreign' environment where their classroom behaviour is at odds with the institutional culture that The University wishes to represent. Tian and Lowe (2014) recorded similar experiences of alienation and otherization amongst American students in a Chinese university when faced with Chinese teachers and teaching methods; the difference is of course that the American students were unequivocally the alien, 'international' students in this context. There is something intuitively strange about British students at The University being described as 'international' students when this international status really only applies outside the enclave of The University. Although the teachers interviewed here saw the 'difficulties' with Chinese students primarily as a challenge to their own professional skills or as an opportunity to extend those skills, their construction of these difficulties is itself a product of the very nature of The University as a British university, and the otherization of the Chinese students is a concomitant result. We gave an example this earlier in Tina's recruitment of 'international' students to help with her very effective teaching strategy to encourage

greater participation from the Chinese students. Which students then are the aliens in this institution?

The teachers we spoke to would generally be upset to be charged with complicity in such a process, seeing it as a challenge to their commonly shared, strong sense of professional identity and integrity as teachers. We have seen how reflections on this troubled at least two respondents, Liz and – in particular – Sue; but even Sue admitted that, despite her deep ethical concerns, "I just do my job…I mean, my remit here is basically to teach here as if I was in a UK university". There also appears to be some awareness amongst Chinese authorities of this potential for cultural alienation of Chinese students, evidenced in the insistence on a minimum exposure to Chinese culture and political thought through a compulsory course, and expressions of concern in the past over the lack of celebration of Chinese culture more extensively in the life of The University. The exact status of The University in relation to the host country seems to receive little serious, public attention from either side, a situation which is probably convenient for both, for the present.

"One of the principles on which this place is operating is obviously at one end you have relatively inexperienced staff, at the beginning of their careers, and at the other end, the old lags", suggested Phil, who saw himself as one of the 'old lags' after more than thirty years of international educational experience. Our small sample, while suggesting that the situation is a little more complex than this, did provide examples of both of Phil's categories. From The University's point of view, the employment of 'old lags' is a means of establishing a core of experience in this relatively new institution, to promote its claims in China of offering high quality education, and to provide a source of advice and support to less experienced members of staff. Several of our less experienced participants did see The University as offering a means to get started on an academic career that would subsequently be continued in a UK or other Western university. Other respondents, notably John, suggested, however, that this promise of The University acting as a career stepping-stone into the UK system, is an illusion. The complex, institutionalized demands for professional success in UK higher education, such as a substantial research profile and a record of entry in the Research Evaluation Framework, are very difficult to achieve in a way that is meaningful in the UK system, as we have noted. The University is a UK university, but it is not 'of the UK', lying instead both physically and professionally somewhere 'offshore'. The teaching component of experience at The University can be 'return-proofed' to some extent through teaching UK-certified courses, by obtaining qualifications such as the PGCHE, and might be enhanced by their experience in teaching Chinese students, given their large numbers in most UK universities. For those participants in language teaching, The University offers a chance to broaden experience, with experience of Chinese students again being particularly valuable, and to continue an international career. But for those in research the challenge is more complex: how to make oneself attractive to a home UK university. Would experience in a Chinese university instead, with the all-important contacts in the

Chinese system that it may generate, actually have been more useful from a home university's perspective? The professional identity of these research academics is harder to construct. Perhaps this is not a problem for any who wish to make The University their long-term career path, but at the moment this may not be part of The University's vision and few respondents suggested it. For those who make such a choice, their future professional security would be tied up with the future of transnational higher education in China, and that is very hard to predict.

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12. TEACHING IN TRANSNATIONAL SPACES

A Journey of Short-Term Study abroad in China

INTRODUCTION

As our world has become increasingly globalized, international and comparative education activities in the form of study abroad programs have become increasingly prevalent, and students in higher education are often motivated to participate in short-term or longer-term study abroad programs (Altbach, Reisberg, & Rumbley, 2009). In addition to providing learning opportunities in students' respective subjects, such programs are also expected to challenge and expand students' worldviews by enabling them to become fully immersed in structured cross-cultural learning experiences.

For the past six years, the authors of this chapter have designed and implemented a two-week, short-term study abroad program for local San Francisco Bay Area educators, graduate students, and teaching credential candidates from the Graduate College of Education at San Francisco State University (SFSU), to provide an opportunity for cross-cultural, comparative educational praxis in a broad range of classrooms in Hong Kong and Guangzhou, China. This program is part of the curricular internationalization endeavors initiated by the leadership of the College, with goal of better preparing Bay Area educators to positively interact with their transnational students. Although the length of the program is relatively short, many of the participants have described their learning experience as "life-changing," or "transformational," stating that the program has impacted their personal and professional lives profoundly. This chapter shares our journey of developing and implementing this endeavor by identifying and discussing the design of this unique program.

The chapter is divided into the following six sections: (1) the context of the program through which the goals of the program emerged; (2) program participants and the recruitment process; (3) a detailed description of program curriculum, including its objectives, teaching strategies, teaching sites, and assignments; (4) key elements that constitute the unique design of the program; (5) student learning outcomes substantiated by participant narratives; and (6) reflections and challenges experienced after conducting the program with four cohorts of participants.

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TRANSNATIONAL PROGRAM

Program Contexts

The Graduate College of Education at San Francisco State University has a history of serving graduate students and credential candidates from culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds. Most of these educators themselves face the continuing challenge of serving an increasingly diverse student population in the San Francisco Bay Area. In the San Francisco Unified School District alone, almost one-third of the students are of Chinese origin, and almost half of the students in the school district are of Asian and Pacific Islander origins (Lapkoff and Goblet Demographic Research, 2010). In addition, many of the students throughout the district are new immigrants and English language learners. Being situated at the strategic doorway to the Pacific Rim, the phenomenon of globalization in San Francisco Bay Area is more intense than ever before. Therefore, it is inevitable that we as Education faculty members reflect on our role and responsibilities in preparing reflective practitioners to effectively interact with their transnational students in a variety of educational contexts. To this end, the following questions were kept in mind when developing the program: What kinds of educators are we creating to respond to this increasingly globalizing society? How can we and our students better serve the students, whose "previous life experience" is primarily unknown to us? What type of domestic and global citizens are we envisioning, when our students' identities are more "transnational," rather than attached to just one country? These questions continued to guide our thoughts as we considered the type of the program to develop for our participants, current and future educators in the San Francisco Bay Area.

Program Participants and Recruitment

Our application process was open to local Bay Area educators, as well as to the graduate students and credential candidates of the Graduate College of Education at San Francisco State University in order to maximize participant diversity. Applicants were required to submit required application documents and letters of recommendation. They were selected based upon faculty assessment of their motivation, goals, and the potential impact of the program on their career development. Each cohort comprised approximately 15 participants. Demographically the program participants were quite diverse; many were reflective of the background of their own students, coming from a range of cultural and linguistic backgrounds with various schooling experiences. All of the participants were either part-time or full time students in graduate and credential programs, or full-time K-12 teachers in the Bay Area. Although every effort was made to minimize costs to participants, some potential participants may not have been able to afford to participate due to financial barriers. To make the program more affordable, scholarships were secured and granted to the first two cohorts of program participants by the leadership of the college through fund-raising efforts.

Program Curriculum

This section presents the program curriculum in terms of its design, course objectives, teaching materials and strategies, and course assignments.

Program design. The process of program design was a collaborative team effort among a group of faculty and staff, incorporating suggestions and feedback from prospective and actual participants. The team decided, after deliberation, that the program should operate at multiple sites, which would enable participants to experience the broadest range of embodied, transnational experiences while critically comparing, contrasting, and examining forces of globalization that shape educational practices in California, Hong Kong, and Guangzhou, China.

The program design that involved multiple teaching sites reflected the results of long-term partnerships among San Francisco State University (SFSU), Hong Kong University (HKU), and South China Normal University (SCNU) in Guangzhou, China. The program participants were enrolled in this program as a graduate seminar course and received course credits from SFSU. HKU and SCNU contributed to the program by providing onsite instruction, site visit coordination, residential support, and local transportation under contract with SFSU. In addition to providing an embodied transnational experience, the multiple teaching sites represented useful opportunities for witnessing the contemporary Chinese Diaspora and multiple "ethnoscapes" (Appadurai, 1996) in globalized contexts.

Course description and student performance objectives. To clearly communicate the goals and mission of the program to our participants and partners, the faculty team outlined on the course syllabus the following course description and performance objectives. The purpose of the course was to examine the impact of globalization on California education and help students to define their roles and responsibilities as educators, activists, and school administrators in order to effectively respond to the implications of globalization. This summer course, offered in collaboration with Hong Kong University and South China Normal University, enables students to critically examine and analyze the patterns of globalization in education and its implications on California education. The program identified four specific performance objectives to guide the student performance. After participating in the course, students should be able to:

- Demonstrate an embodied and improved understanding of globalization and its effects on California education
- Understand the specific nature of Chinese Diasporas that impact California, including their impacts on recent educational developments in China, Hong Kong, and in California
- Develop skill in collaborative, cross-cultural, and comparative education classroom observation and lesson study, drawing useful pedagogical applications from the experience

- Demonstrate improved capacity to address the needs of diverse learners in their own classrooms.

Contents and teaching strategies. The program took place in San Francisco, Hong Kong, and Guangzhou, China. Course lectures were conducted first by SFSU faculty members at San Francisco State University, highlighting fundamental concepts that included: globalization and trans-nationality, the nature and implications of the transpacific Chinese Diaspora; history and recent educational developments in China and Hong Kong; implications of Chinese culture for pedagogy; and research processes in cross-cultural and comparative settings. An overview of educational systems in Hong Kong and China was particularly stressed in order to help participants develop a comparative lens through which to analyze educational practices under three different systems. The series of lectures in San Francisco were followed up with lectures by Hong Kong University faculty members on more specialized issues in the context of Hong Kong and Chinese education: analysis of language policies, assessment and tracking, learning Chinese via computer animation, lesson study, educational issues in contemporary Hong Kong and China, and general equity and social justice issues in Chinese educational contexts.

The literature and readings included in all lectures were selected purposely to represent multiple perspectives grounded in different cultural and socio-political contexts, adding another dimension to foster curriculum internationalization. Research and readings used for program curriculum featured works of Asian American scholars (Hsu, 2000; Ong, 2004), or translated works by Chinese scholars (Gu, 2001). Faculty members, activists, and practitioners in Hong Kong and China also recommended research and literature produced by local experts (Kwo, 1992; Kwong, 2006) in order to enhance the diversity of scholarship presented in the program.

In addition to theoretical discussions, numerous visits to various school sites in Hong Kong and Guangzhou constituted the embodied dimension of this program. During these half-day to whole-day school visits, participants were invited to tour schools, engage in in-depth conversation with teachers and students, and observe several classes for substantial periods (at least one hour). We visited various types of schools serving populations distinctively diverse in terms of socioeconomic status, language as the instructional medium (English, Cantonese, or Mandarin), religious affiliation, and prestige rank (as determined by Chinese government). As a result, we visited schools ranging from very privileged, private sites serving international students, to marginalized institutions hosting new immigrants and children of migrant workers. This diversity of settings enabled program participants to compare and contrast a range of schooling experiences under different educational systems.

Also stressed in the program were the goals of enhancing participants' skills of teaching, interacting, and conducting action research in culturally diverse and cross-cultural classroom settings. To achieve these aims, diverse teaching strategies and

activities were adopted in the curriculum. For instance, participants were required to conduct a research project on a topic of their choice by collecting data through observation and interviews during their school visits and course observations. Participants were also provided with opportunities to teach at a host school (newcomer school for children of Chinese and Southeast Asian immigrants in Hong Kong) with a curriculum they had developed. Panel discussions on topics related to comparative education experiences with graduate students of Hong Kong University and South China Normal University were also implemented to facilitate cross-cultural discussion and understanding. Various learning activities were designed to engage students so that they combined theory and praxis by directly observing, analyzing, critiquing, and comparing educational practices in the San Francisco Bay Area with those of Hong Kong and Guangzhou, China.

Assignments. Two course assignments were used to assess students' academic learning outcomes: an action research paper and a portfolio. Students were required to submit a substantive action research paper synthesizing and summarizing their findings related to a specific research question that they had posed at the start of the course, presented in the context of selected course materials and class observations. They were also required to prepare a digital portfolio (using PowerPoint or other similar program) containing a variety of images and texts to codify findings and learning from the experience. The portfolio was to follow the same thematic focus of the research paper, serving to illustrate and convey issues raised in the paper. In sum, the variety of teaching strategies and learning activities offered by the program curriculum were designed to help the participants achieve enhanced capacities to teach and conduct research in cross-cultural contexts.

Key Components of the Program

The process of program development was non-linear, dynamic and collaborative. The following components reflect the uniqueness and success of this well-received program: a long-term partnership with internationally recognized institutions; an internationalized curriculum; a balance of theory and praxis; and a learning process characterized by both formal and informal learning opportunities.

Long-term overseas partnership. The close partnership between the College of Education at SFSU, Hong Kong University, and South China Normal University was a key factor, largely determining the effectiveness of the program. Given the nature of this complex, transnational program, extensive negotiation, discussion, and deliberation among the three institutions were required to successfully coordinate and implement the program. Without accommodating partners who were both internationally recognized and locally grounded, the program would not have had access to such outstanding lecturers and local experts, or such a comprehensive list of varying school sites for observation. All of these opportunities, accessed through

the networks of the two host institutions, enabled our participants to form their own unique understandings of educational practices in Hong Kong and China.

Curriculum internationalization. Our effort to internationalize the curriculum was reflected in various aspects of program design. The adoption of multiple teaching sites in three cities over two weeks, for example, enabled our participants to attend lectures, make in-depth school visits, and interact with local teachers and students through practicum and panel discussions. The program's transnational design also, both culturally and linguistically, exposed program participants to the highly globalized cities of Hong Kong and Guangzhou, China. Prior to arrival in China, faculty members purposely expanded course reading references to represent multiple perspectives—not only readings by Chinese American scholars, but also works by scholars and experts from China. We also used recent news articles from Hong Kong and China as readings to highlight current local issues. These multi-dimensional efforts at curriculum internationalization were significant in expanding participants' exposure to globalized settings.

Balancing theory and praxis. This program aimed to balance theory and praxis by arranging numerous in-depth school visits, during which time students were required to serve as researchers and sometimes teachers, individually and collaboratively. These opportunities to apply and test theoretical constructs in real contexts were a valuable dimension of the learning process. By engaging in realistic research and teaching practice in cross-cultural classroom settings, participants were able to obtain embodied understandings of key theoretical constructs from the course and enhance their skills of researching and teaching in cross-cultural, comparative educational settings.

Learning process facilitated by formal and informal learning opportunities. The program offered many formal opportunities, such as lectures, discussion, in-depth school visits, and mini-practicum to engage program participants. Participants agreed that the theoretically substantive course materials and readings they were provided with prior to departure, as well as their participation in seminars by faculty from Hong Kong University, enabled them to develop a rich theoretical vocabulary to draw upon in order to interpret their transformational learning experiences. However, as several participants commented, it was not only the formal learning activities, but also their informal learning that contributed greatly to their learning processes.

Three types of informal learning were mentioned by participants: (1) informal interactions with local students and teachers in various contexts; (2) self-directed learning opportunities pursued by different individuals to serve their distinctive learning needs; and (3) participation in critical learning incidents (Merriam, Caffarella, & Baumgartner, 2006). While the program only lasted two weeks, the extensive interactions and collective debriefings that occurred regularly among

faculty and the cohort members helped participants process and make sense of the phenomena that they were constantly experiencing. Some also mentioned their appreciation of the valuable experience of informally chatting with or observing school administrators, teachers, and students. According to one Latino participant, Eric,

> The conversations and interactions that we had at each of the schools was something that I will never forget, specifically how generous our hosts were in allowing us access to their classrooms and spaces and the warmth and generosity that they received us.

Levine, a White female graduate student, described her learning, not just in classrooms, but in other unexpected places:

> [These] experiences took place in the time spent outside of our daily routine. Spending time in the markets, downtown, discussions with fellow students, sitting and catching up to our readings at cafes, interacting with people visiting and living there… this is where we saw the migrant workers, the tourists, the investors, the community, students, etc.

Like Levine, Jeff, an Asian American male elementary school teacher, described how his conversations with teachers from Guangzhou were "…informal but so real. Those candid conversations left a far greater impression than all the 'happy happy propaganda' combined."

Finally, many participants highlighted their attendance at the annual Tiananmen Square Memorial held in Hong Kong's largest park on June 4th as an added informal learning experience. The ceremony was not a mandatory part of the program, but was suggested by a Hong Kong University colleague, and many local students encouraged our students to attend. This public event, demonstrating a local community's passion for social justice and human rights, unintentionally became one of the program's most empowering informal learning experiences.

To sum up, this transnational education program, with its internationalized curriculum, multiple teaching sites, balanced focus on theory and praxis, plus its unexpected informal learning opportunities, represented a blended set of activities that all contributed to the development of reflective teacher researchers and educators, who, it is hoped, can effectively prepare a culturally diverse student population to respond to an increasingly globalized world. The faculty sought to maintain a careful balance between macro- and micro-analysis of teaching practices, theoretical constructs and praxis, and "domestic multiculturalism" and "metropolitan globalization." Many of our participants became deeply aware of the significance of preparing their own students for economic opportunities on a global, competitive scale while they witnessed racial, linguistic and social inequalities in transnational contexts (Appadurai, 1996; Kymlicka, 2004; Levitt & Schiller, 2008; Sassen, 2008). This in turn served to further motivate participants' commitments to serving many of their own marginalized, transnational students.

Student Outcomes

Multiple approaches were used to assess students' learning outcomes as a result of participation in this program: students' research projects, instructors' field notes, as well as an instructor-developed open-ended survey focusing on analyzing students' learning processes. All of the data were used to assess the students' learning outcomes. Based on the evaluation data, faculty concluded that program participants successfully achieved multiple learning outcomes plus some unexpected ones—the accomplishment of implicit transformational learning processes.

Enhanced theoretical and embodied understandings of globalization. Participants' presentations and research projects evidenced their understandings of globalization phenomena and how they affected students in educational contexts. For example, after visiting a variety of private schools in China, numerous participants' research projects evidenced parallel analyses of commercialization and privatization of education practices as affected by globalization, in both the U.S. and China. A few participants, too, reported their research on areas that focused on shifts in language policies in Hong Kong, reflecting varying political climates in the British postcolonial period. Some participants' analyses went beyond the educational context to examine how resources, power, and privilege were redistributed as a result of globalization. One Latino student, Chris, after finishing the program, considered himself to "…better understand not only the Chinese American students I serve, but also the global context of education that affects all my students… [I have] expanded the scope of my analysis to include more issues of globalization and transnationalism in education… An Arab American student, Julia, reflected on the impact of globalization on unequal distribution of power and resources:

> [S]eeing firsthand the flow of people, money, knowledge, materials, etc. that occur between China and the rest of the world was fascinating. It not only illustrated the global web of capital and power, but also decentered my own understanding of where wealth and power is situated and the position of the US in all of this.

These narratives indicate how the participants' theoretical and embodied understandings of the implications of globalization on people's lived experiences were enhanced.

Improved teaching and research skills in the cross-cultural contexts. Participants demonstrated improved teaching and research skills through the curriculum components that focused on Hong Kong. Their opinions were articulated in discussions following school visits, and in their presentation of the research projects at the end of the program. Some participants described specifically how the program sensitized them to cultural influences on teaching and learning and thus enhanced their capacities to conduct research and teaching in cross-cultural contexts. Eric,

a Latino student, said that he would be interested in teaching overseas after the program: "I [also] feel that my horizons have expanded, in regard to my perceived ability to work within an educational environment outside of the United States." A Chinese American female teacher, Renee, described how she came to realize her own teaching style was actually culturally grounded, and therefore might not be well understood by her students who had different cultural backgrounds:

> Now I understand why I have the philosophies and expectations that I do and why I often feel like I was swimming against the tide in my attempt to establish the culture and norms needed for my style of teaching in the classroom… I have also learned how much [influence] important cultural beliefs, traditional philosophies etc. have on teaching and learning.

While some students' cultural awareness was sensitized, others began to consider pedagogies observed in Hong Kong and Guangzhou as useful educational models that could be applied to their own teaching. One Arab American male educator, Joey, discussed how the group-based instruction activities he observed in Hong Kong and China helped him in his own teaching: "The opportunity to see different teaching techniques in China allowed me to understand more about my abilities as a teacher. I now understand the strengths I possess in working with children." Betty, an American-born Asian educator, noted that her observations in Chinese classrooms helped her decenter "Western individualistic values" and appreciate the respect Chinese teachers enjoyed in the classrooms.

> Prior to this course, although I appreciated group projects, I was accustomed to individualistic learning. In other words, I was more focused on learning on my own and not seeking the assistance of others. Through observing the classes in Hong Kong and China, I learned that group work and collectivism in the classroom were both valued and useful. Observing as well as speaking to some students taught me that they took pride in learning together and figuring out the problem together.

In sum, participants' narratives, mini-teaching demonstrations, presentations, and their final research projects reflected their heightened awareness of culturally informed pedagogies and research. As a result, many participants appeared to be better prepared to conduct research and to work with students in cross-cultural contexts after finishing the program.

Transformational Learning as Unexpected Student Outcomes

In addition to the expected student learning outcomes, a majority of program participants reported in program evaluations and research projects, or verbally expressed to faculty members, that they had gone through "transformations", "paradigm shifts," or "life-changing experiences" as a result of the program. Others reported that they had developed "a fresh perspective" or learned to "lean into

discomfort," which in turn led to more self-reflection. One student in particular, Chris, a Latino who worked at a community-based organization, described a process of transformational learning: "This course helped me to step outside of myself and view myself and the world through the lens of another culture. I had to examine my beliefs and prejudices, and [I was] not sure to what extent those beliefs and prejudices changed…" Specifically, "I describe my own transformational learning as a process which involves taking in new information to challenge already held beliefs, assumptions, or practices. This course began a new transformational process in me which is still ongoing." The process he described appeared to have a life-changing nature, as described by multiple transformational learning theorists (Lee, Hemphill, & Perea, 2009).

According to Mezirow (2000), the process of transformational learning is one of the most well researched areas within the field of adult education in recent decades. Mezirow defines transformational learning as a process by which individuals critically challenge their own perspectives to allow for "more inclusive, discriminating, [and] open perspectives to emerge and to guide revised behaviors and actions" (2000, p. 8). Lived experience, critical reflection, and adult development are considered common conceptions underlying *all* kinds of transformational learning (Merriam, Caffarella, & Baumgartner, 2006).

In addition to theoretical dimensions, transformational learning research also focuses on strategies adult educators can apply in their classrooms to facilitate the process of transformational learning (Cranton, 2002). Strategies recommended to enhance various phases of transformational learning have included materials representing multiple perspectives, critical incidents, critical debate, reflective journals, and support groups (Cranton, 2002). Although our program did not intentionally seek transformational learning outcomes, various learning activities used in the program, including the literature representing multiple perspectives, critical discussion and debriefing among the faculty and participants, in-depth visits to various kinds of schools, and extensive exposure to Chinese culture in highly globalized cities seems to have precipitated unexpected transformational learning opportunities for participants. Student narratives regarding unexpected learning outcomes are particularly pertinent in two areas: transformational learning that occurred in the area of professional development, and in the area of deepened commitment to social justice.

Transformational learning in the area of professional development. Many participants noted how the program either opened their eyes to different ways of defining teaching and learning or even altered their career development direction completely. For example, a White female teacher, Patti, described herself to "have gone through a process of transformational learning in the form that my eyes are open to newer ways of teaching… [they] have changed my conception of what education is and what education should be." Three participants in the program have challenged themselves to the extent that they charted out completely different career

paths after finishing the program. One White female participant, Levine, decided to change the topic of her MA thesis to focus on a critical analysis of globalization in education. Sherry and Chris, two students of colour, completely shifted their original career plans and applied to the Ph.D. programs at universities in Hong Kong instead. They were both accepted at these programs, though they would not even have considered the programs accessible or feasible for them before their participation in this program. Not only did they change their career paths, but they also altered their personal life trajectories. To that end, this program reshaped their perspectives for seeing the world, and it expanded their horizons for envisioning new opportunities in their future professional career trajectories.

Transformational learning in the area of deepened commitment to social justice. Many participants articulated deepened commitment to social justice in globalized contexts after they came to realize parallels between the struggles experienced by marginalized communities in the U.S. and Asia. A middle-class Asian American teacher, Jeff, spoke of his observations in Hong Kong and China:

> Prior to this trip, I was able to notice inequities and cultural capital being used in ways that perpetuated various levels of hegemony. Race, class, ability, gender, [sexual] orientation, etc. all played a part. Seeing these inequities in Asia allowed me to step back from experiences in the U.S. and catch a glimpse from an outsider's point of view. At the end of the day, there were many differences, but I think the idea of 'global commonalities' really stood out.

Echoing Jeff's words, Levine summarized her observations in Southeastern China: "It showed how much similar global poverty is across the board and how marginalized people face similar struggles and experiences across borders and continents."

During the program, some participants began to reflect on how their identities (racial and cultural) and lived experience shaped the process of how they made sense of their learning experience (Lee, 1999; Johnson-Bailey & Alfred, 2006). This, in turn, helped to reaffirm their commitment to social justice education. Ken, an African American male educator working at a community-based organization, shared how his witnessing of familiar struggles among marginalized people in China motivated him to better serve his own marginalized students:

> I was able to see firsthand that China is dealing with similar social justice issues as the US. It also reminded me of what it means to be a minority by observing the phenomenon in a different context. I think it reminds me of how important it is to [be] culturally aware and responsive to improve outcomes for all students.

Eric, a Latino student, articulated how the similar struggles experienced by marginalized schools in Hong Kong and U.S. have deepened his commitment to working towards social justice:

> I think that visiting and interacting with the staffs and students at these Band 3 [lowest track] schools grabbed me personally and served as a means of realization that other parts of the world are going through similar experiences… [p]articipation in this program has reinforced my belief of the existence of a global educational community with foundations in equality and social justice.

Another example was voiced by Kattie, a Latina participant, who shared her own experience of baby-sitting White children in New York City when she observed White and Chinese children in the wealthy parts of Hong Kong being cared for by darker-skinned nannies from the Philippines and Indonesia. Reflecting on her own racial identity and lived experience, Kattie made sense of her experience, while also helping her cohort contextualize and analyze issues of transnational labor, rendered by globalization. It was her racial identity and lived experience, through collective critical reflection and discourse, which challenged everyone in her group to recognize patterns of globalized migrant labor.

Generally speaking, student research projects, faculty field notes, and student narratives during group debriefing and surveys evidenced participants' achievement of expected and unexpected learning outcomes. To a large extent, the program aided participants' acquisition of taught theories, and enhanced their teaching and research skills in cross-cultural areas. The program also began to facilitate the process of transformational learning for a number of participants. Moreover, students' powerful narratives demonstrate their critiques and deepened awareness of globalized marginalization and poverty in both China and the U.S. This study abroad program ultimately resulted in changes in knowledge, skills and attitudes, thereby modeling a holistic learning process.

REFLECTIONS AND CHALLENGES

It has been five years since the faculty and staff team of San Francisco State University pioneered the first two-week transnational, study-abroad program for the cohort of 15 participants. Three more cohorts participated in the program since that time. Although the program received consistently positive evaluations from participants, the team continued to improve the curriculum and program design based on collective reflections following each trip and suggestions by prior participants. Highlighted below are those reflections after offering the course for four cohorts of program participants.

The Importance of Developing Long-Term Partnerships with Higher Education Institutions Overseas

One of the most essential elements that made the program a success is the long-term, collaborative partnership that the College developed with the two hosting institutions, Hong Kong University and South China Normal University. The relationship

with these two hosting institutions enabled the program to access networks of relationships, opportunities, and resources that only locally grounded institutions could have developed. Without their support, accommodation, co-ordination, and management, the program would never have been successful, or even possible.

What is particularly worth noting is the nature of the long-term relationships with the involved Colleges. The leaders of the College carefully nurtured a trusting and mutually beneficial relationship over a number of years prior to the launch of the program. While all of the three involved institutions are universities, all universities, especially those situated in different socio-political contexts, have their own distinctive bureaucratic processes, organizational cultures, and regulations. Also culturally grounded, each institution operates based upon taken-for-granted cultural assumptions. This presents additional layers of potential misunderstandings and ambiguities to the already-existing complexities, which could potentially have undermined the efforts at program building. The long-term, well-cultivated relationship valued by all involved institutions rendered the extensive communications, coordination, and collaboration much less challenging, and as a result, the program development process went much more smoothly.

The Significance of Conducting Ongoing Evaluations of the Program

As suggested by all curriculum and program development theorists, faculty and staff responsible, this program maintained ongoing evaluation efforts to collect data for the purpose of continuous curricular improvement. For each program cohort, different types of evaluation were implemented. Initially, needs assessment questions were included in the application forms so that program faculty could develop an initial understanding of the applicants' motivations and goals for participating in the program. Two hosting institutions were contracted to provide programmatic services; their responsibilities included selecting local experts as speakers, identifying appropriate schools for in-depth visits, and providing lodging and transportation service. Each institution also designed an evaluation survey to solicit students' input and feedback for logistical improvement. Third, the fact that this program was offered as a credit-bearing graduate seminar during the university summer session also meant that a regular, end-of-semester, course evaluation was disseminated to assess students' satisfaction with the course. Finally, an additional faculty-developed, open-ended evaluation instrument was distributed to the student cohorts to solicit their reflections, especially on their overseas learning experience. Informal conversations with the students, post-visit debriefings, and discussion among faculty, students, and staff added further valuable insights to improve program quality.

Unlike developing regular courses offered on campus, the team of faculty and staff implementing this program had to go beyond academic considerations in order to make decisions on various logistic issues, which, in turn, may have indirectly affected student learning. For example, how were we to accommodate

vegetarians during the trip? Would it be feasible to have two school visits in one day in Guangzhou, when the temperature there is at least 20 to 30 degrees higher than San Francisco; how would the heat affect people? How should we clearly communicate with our host institutions so they would identify a range of different schools for visit, and not just the "best" ones? At times, we had to make decisions without much information available; at other times, we learned from our mistakes. Nonetheless, we relied a great deal on informal input and data gathered through formal evaluations. Based on the results of numerous evaluations, the curriculum of the program was continually revised multiple times to better meet the needs of the participants.

The Importance of Program Sustainability

As stated previously, the team of faculty and staff implemented this program for four cohorts of 15 students each over a period of six years. There were a number of students in each cohort who commented that the program was one of the most inspirational courses that they took during their entire higher education experience. While many students may have perceived great benefits from participation, other graduate students, teaching credential candidates, or new K-12 teachers may also have regarded the program as unaffordable and thus might have hesitated to apply—despite all efforts to keep course fees as reasonable as possible. As faculty members grounded in research on equity and justice, we are clearly aware of the opportunity gap between the haves and the have-nots, even in the context of higher education. Particularly after the financial crisis in 2008, many school districts reduced or completely eliminated funds for teacher professional development. In response to this, and in order to benefit more participants, the leadership of the College successfully raised funds to support the first two cohorts of participants. This financial support represented an effort to expand professional development opportunities for local educators. It has become more necessary than ever to prepare educators to understand the implications of globalization to better serve the needs of their transnational students, given the financial situations of local educational agencies. Moreover, this effort symbolizes a strong commitment from the College to bridging the gap between the have and have-nots, which may well include many of our students and young educators.

Two particularly influential factors served to make the program possible: one was strong commitment from College leadership and the involved faculty, and the other was ongoing funding to support international education initiatives. To develop a program such as this takes a great deal of time, resources, administrative support, and leadership devotion. Without such commitment, support, and resources, a program like this might never have existed. Continuing to offer it in a shifting administrative, policy, and resource environment will present a continuing challenge for faculty.

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13. LEARNING IN AN UNFAMILIAR CULTURE

Exploring the Experience of Australian Students in Chinese Universities

INTRODUCTION

Globalization has affected China's social and economic system, resulting in the shift from the centralized planned economy to market-oriented socialism (Guo et al., 2013; Huang, 2008). Since the reform and opening-up policy initiated in 1978, and especially when China joined the World Trade Organization in 2001, Chinese higher education has witnessed "an all-dimensional and multi-tiered opening-up pattern" and actively engaged with the world (Xu & Yue, 2013, p. 200). Higher education comprises a policy priority in China, which has been engaged in a significant upgrade in the quality of its top universities as well as in a major expansion of enrolments in all higher education sectors. China is now number one in enrolments, with more than 27 million post-secondary students (Altbach, 2009).

Higher education systems, policies, and institutions are being transformed by globalization, which is "the widening, deepening and speeding up of world wide interconnectedness" (Held, McGrew, Goldblatt, & Perraton, 1999, p. 2). In global knowledge economies, higher education institutions are more important than ever as "mediums for a wide range of cross-border relationships and continuous global flow of people, information, knowledge, technologies, products and financial capital" (Marginson & van der Wende, 2007, p. 5). Chinese higher education is inevitably influenced by the global agendas. It plays an important role in China's engagement in global knowledge economies (Huang, 2003, 2007; Mok, 2005; Mok & Yu, 2011).

China has developed higher education impressively since the 1990s. The gross enrolment rate in Chinese higher education has risen from 9.8% in 1998 to 26.5% in 2010 (MOE, 2010c), compared to the average global gross enrolment rate of 29% in 2010 (UNESCO, 2012). The public expenditure on education in China has increased dramatically in the past decade, and the proportion to GDP grew from 2.79% in 1999 to 3.66% in 2010 (MOE, 2013). In 2001, Chinese students studying abroad accounted for roughly 25% of the world's more than 1.6 million overseas students, making it the world's largest "exporter" of students for overseas studies (UNESCO, 2007). Regardless of the enrolment expansion, China is likely to remain at the top of the export lists in the coming decades (Altbach, 2009).

China is already a major global force in higher education. To attract international students, China has initiated aggressive plans and achieved considerable success. The

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number of international students has risen from 61,869 in 2001 to 265,090 in 2010. In 2004, 110,844 international students from 178 countries studied in 420 colleges and universities nationwide (Cao, 2005). By 2007, China had become one of the five most popular host countries, attracting an increasing number of students from Asia and beyond (Hvistendahl, 2008; Pan, 2013). In 2010, 265,090 international students from 194 countries studied in 620 colleges and universities and other education institutions (MOE, 2011).

Much of the literature on the experiences of international students has been focused on the challenges encountered in new environments and their adaptation at English-speaking western universities (Durkin, 2008; Gu, Schweisfurth, & Day, 2010; Ryan & Viete, 2009). Despite a growing research interest in the emerging education hubs in Asia and experiences of international students in East Asian universities (Lee, 2013; Mok & Yu, 2011), there is limited empirical research on the cultural and learning experiences of international students at Chinese universities. Given the rapid increase of international students in recent years and the expected growth in the future, an in-depth exploration of their experiences in China is significant.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Internationalization of Higher Education in China

In a globalized world, the internationalization of education is viewed as an inevitable trend for countries across the world (Welch, 2005). As some scholars argued, "Integration into the world economy had led to a redefinition of the role of higher education in China" (Vicovich, Yang, & Currie, 2007, p. 105). China's multifaceted policy includes aggressive plans to attract international students to China. In 2007, three-quarters of 200,000 international students who studied in China were from Asian countries. China also awards more than 10,000 scholarships. Many Chinese universities have expanded their campus facilities for international students. Chinese universities view hosting international students partly as a way of earning income as well as adding a valuable dimension to the institution. Government-sponsored Confucius Institutes, now numbering more than 292, with plans for 1,000 by 2025, provides Chinese language instruction and cultural programs, mainly on university campuses worldwide (Altbach, 2009).

The number of international students in China has increased significantly over the past decade. In 2009, among 238,184 students from 190 countries, those from Asia still topped the list (68%) followed by Europe (15%), America (11%), Africa (5%), and Oceania (1%). Korea, the US, Japan, Vietnam, and Thailand were the top five countries that send the largest numbers of international students to China (MOE, 2010b). The fast expansion was backed by the ambitious "Study in China Program," launched in 2010 to attract 500,000 international students by 2020 and to help China become the largest destination country for Asian students studying abroad (MOE, 2010a; Xu & Yue, 2013). In 2010, among 265,090 international students, 22,390

were granted Chinese government scholarship, up by 22.72% over the previous year (MOE, 2011).

Globalization and the evolution of the knowledge-based economy have caused dramatic changes in the character and functions of higher education in most countries, including China. However, there is a need to contextually analyze the interaction between a range of factors that are critical in shaping the local context, and the impetus for change driven by global trends (Mok, 2003). The rise of Asia as a study-abroad locale is perceived by some observers as a triumph of neo-liberalism, characterized by its export-oriented market-driven approach towards higher education (Marginson, 2009; Ng, 2012). Others argue that the economic rationale still dominates the way internationalization is perceived in many western universities, while the cultural integration rationale seem to be at the driving seat of change in Confucian nations in Asia (Maringe, Foskett, & Woodfield, 2013).

Some scholars contend that China's approach to attracting international students is primarily the result of state-directed efforts to enhance international political and academic relations, and expand China's influence (Pan, 2013; Wang, 2013). China has provided financial support, promoted Chinese language and sinology, and used both domestic and international higher education resources to enhance enrolments and program capacity as means of attracting international students (Pan, 2013). An analysis of China's internationalization policies reveals shifts in priorities over the past three decades. The focus was shifted from awareness of internationalization in the 1980s, improvement of education quality in the 1990s to the adoption of a high profile "going global" strategy in the new millennium (Wang, 2013). Higher education is used as an important tool to expand China's influence and introduce the Chinese culture and values to the world.

Cultural and Learning Experiences of International Students

Isolated from their families, friends, and familiar environment, international students may experience culture shock, a sense of loss and loneliness, and study shock. Therefore, universities play a critical role in assisting them to adapt to the new environments in China. Good accommodation in a comfortable and relaxing environment is an important prerequisite for settling down to study (Kinnell, 1990). Chinese universities provide on-campus accommodation for international students. Separate dormitories for international students are required by the administrative authorities, because they may not be used to the living conditions of Chinese students. Six to eight Chinese students usually live in a dormitory, while two international students share a room. Meanwhile, a security guard is employed at each dormitory to ensure international students' safety. Previous research (Thurston, Turner-Gottschang, & Reed, 1994) shows that many overseas students were disappointed at the strict rules despite the good intention of universities.

Appropriate orientation programs should be provided to reduce culture shock and help integration into the new environment. In China, the Overseas Students

Administration Office is generally responsible for arranging orientation programs at the university, and the arrangements vary in different universities. Few universities provide the university-wide orientation programs for both Chinese and international students, because many international students, especially the language course students, arrive at different times of the semester. Orientation activities are arranged especially for international students, such as introducing the university staff, briefing the Chinese laws and regulations, and organizing welcome parties or sightseeing trips (Zhu & Liu, 2005).

Research evidence suggests significant differences in educational philosophies, learning and teaching between Chinese and western traditions (Kennedy, 2002; Watkins, 2000; Watkins & Biggs, 2001). Adapting to a new cultural and learning environment takes time. Most overseas students encounter difficulties and need to cope with the "study shock" (Ballard & Clanchy, 1984) and meet the new demands of the Chinese educational system. Many Chinese teachers who teach overseas students basically follow the textbooks, because "the textbooks currently used for all overseas students in most Chinese universities are designed with little attention paid to the cultural differences between Asian and Western students" (Wu, 2005, p. 96). Meanwhile, Chinese teaching approaches tend to be less interactive than western approaches. Chinese teachers pay particular attention to establishing a systematic structure of knowledge and illustrating fully the relationship among key concepts and theories. It is widely believed that mastering foundational knowledge and basic skills is the prelude to ability development and creativity (Pratt, Kelly, & Wong, 1999). In western countries, students are usually encouraged to speak up in class, and to question and challenge the teacher, while in China, the courses tend to be over-reliant on the teacher and the set textbook.

Moreover, the teacher-student relationship is another focus of discussions on the differences in the learning environment. Chinese learners have been brought up to respect wisdom, knowledge, and expertise of parents and teachers. They have been socialized to respect those who provide the knowledge and to avoid challenging those in authority (Chan, 1999). The relationship between teacher and student is frequently described as hierarchical in China and informal in western countries. However, the teacher-student relationships in China may be not as cold or authoritarian as they at first appear (Cortazzi & Jin, 1996). In class, a teacher's manner might appear to be formal and distant, but out of class, they are expected to be more informal. There is a feeling that teachers and students should think of each other as members of an extended family (Pratt et al., 1999). Some studies show that Chinese teachers usually establish more casual and personal relationship with their students beyond the classroom. Although this personal relationship with teachers is not familiar to Western students, most feel "affection and respect for the dedicated and hardworking Chinese instructors" (Thurston et al., 1994, p. 137).

Much of the literature on international students in China focuses on the analysis of policies and trends (Cao, 2005; Pan, 2013; Wang, 2013; Xu & Yue, 2013; Zhang, 2005), or the perspectives from teachers and administrators (Li, 2005; Wu, 2005;

Zhu & Liu, 2005). There is limited empirical research on the cultural and learning experiences from the perspective of international students in China. This study intended to fill the gap and address two research questions: What are the challenges and issues regarding international students prior to departure, upon arrival and settling-in, and during their stay in China? What are the strategies to address these challenges and issues?

RESEARCH APPROACH

In-Depth Interview

This study attempted to investigate the experiences of international students in China. Since qualitative research essentially aims to "provide an in-depth and interpreted understanding of the social world of research participants by learning about their social and material circumstance, their experience and histories" (Ritchie & Lewis, 2003, p. 3), a qualitative methodology was considered most suitable for this research. A semi-structured, in-depth interview research method was utilized, because in-depth interviews "use individuals as the point of departure for the research process and yield rich insight into people's experiences, values, attitudes and feeling" (Hesse-Biber & Levy, 2006, p. 119).

Participants

A purposive sampling method was employed because the features of purposive sampling (Ritchie & Lewis, 2003, p. 78) make it well suited to small-scale, in-depth qualitative studies. Moreover, the researchers expected a purposive sample to provide diversified experiences being examined. Every effort was undertaken to purposively maximize the coverage of potential variations in student experiences. Eight participants, five males and three females, were Australians who had learning experiences in five cities. They studied Chinese language at twelve universities ranked as the top, second-tier, or third-tier universities in China. The length of study ranged from six months to three years from 1999 to 2006. Five participants studied at two or three different universities as either a self-paid or government-sponsored student. Table 1 shows a profile of the participants. To preserve their confidentiality, pseudonyms were used in this study.

Data Collection

A pilot interview was conducted with a male Australian who had studied in a university in Beijing. This interview sought to ensure clarity and appropriateness of interview questions. Upon receiving the consent forms from the participants, six face-to-face interviews were conducted in Canberra, while two telephone interviews were administered because both interviewees were not in Australia at that time.

Table 1. A profile of participants

Name	*Age*	*Gender*	*City*	*Year of study*	*Length of study*	*University rank*	*Self-paid/ sponsored*
David	34	M	Beijing	2001	6 months	Second-tier	Self-paid
Mike	23	M	Beijing	2002	6 months	Second-tier	Sponsored
				2004	6 months	Third-tier	Self-paid
Jack	30	M	Beijing	2000	6 months	Top	Sponsored
				2001	1 year	Second-tier	Self-paid
Tom	28	M	Beijing	2001–2002	1 year	Top	Sponsored
				1999	6 months	Top	
Joe	35	M	Tianjin	2000	5 months	Third-tier	Self-paid
				2000–2002	2 years	Third-tier	
Sharon	26	F	Beijing	2001–2002	1 year	Top	Sponsored
				2005–2006	2 months	Second-tier	Self-paid
Lucy	22	F	Hangzhou	2004	6 months	Top	Self-paid
			Kunming	2005	6 months	Second-tier	
Cathy	35	F	Guangzhou	1993	6 months	Second-tier	Self-paid

The participants were interviewed individually for 40–90 minutes in 2006. With the permission of the interviewees, the interviews were digitally recorded and transcribed verbatim. A copy of interview transcript was sent to the participants respectively to check the accuracy of transcription.

Data Analysis

Data analysis was dealt throughout the whole data-gathering and transcribing process. This integration of data collection and analysis provides an opportunity to "identify emergent categories within completed interviews and to explore these categories with future respondents" (Parks, 2006, p. 257). The researchers reviewed interview transcripts several times to be familiar with all the data. Then, the excerpts of each interview were coded, which formed the first level of coding. Furthermore, by using "an issue-focused analysis" (Weiss, 1994), the responses of individual participant to each question were listed and put into tables. Followed by the primary categories, the researchers integrated the responses of all participants to each question in the order of the interview questions covering the three stages: prior to departure, upon arrival and settling-in, and during the stay in China.

FINDINGS AND DISCUSSIONS

The findings are categorized into three sections: prior to departure, upon arrival and settling-in, and during their stay. Major challenges and issues regarding participants' cultural and learning experiences in Chinese universities are presented.

Pre-Departure

Access to university information. As for the channels of obtaining information about the university, courses and enrollment procedures, responses from the interviewees varied, ranging from websites, suggestions from teachers and friends, contacts with Chinese universities, and personal experiences. The most widely used method to obtain information were university websites. All respondents visited the university websites prior to their departure to China. However, interviewees who studied in China before 2002 did not obtain sufficient information from the websites. Jack and Mike mentioned that some universities did not have English websites. Other respondents, such as Lucy, Mike, and Sharon, commented that they got adequate information and the websites were much better than before. Mike and Sharon indicated that the quick responses from the university to their emails provided detailed information. Sharon described her experiences in 2001 and 2005.

> My Chinese was not good. There were not much English on the website. So it was very difficult. I knew little about the dormitory and the address. I was very nervous at the first time. (2001)

However, Sharon obtained adequate information on her second visit in 2005 and felt much more comfortable.

> It was pretty good. I had the details of the day I was there, details about the prices of the accommodation, a map of the university and the university posted me information about enrollment… It was very organized.

Most interviewees believed that a comprehensive website with updated information about the university and courses was helpful. Lucy commented that "it is so important because everyone wants to find out before they go. I chose this university since it had a very good website". Cathy agreed, "When students were selecting universities to study, they wanted to choose what fits them 100 percent". David commented that "sometimes the personal experiences in China were more important than the website". Mike and Jack inspected the university before making their decisions. Jack explained, "I went to look at it. They had very good classes, very few foreigners. I thought it was a better place to study Chinese. Finally, I chose this university".

The findings show that the information services in many Chinese universities have been improved in recent years. It is recommended that universities establish a website both in Chinese and English and present comprehensive information

about the university, courses, enrolment and visa application. Moreover, competent bilingual staff should be appointed to provide timely and detailed responses to international student inquiries.

Understanding of Chinese culture and customs. All participants indicated that they knew little about Chinese culture and customs before they came to China. Some participants learned Chinese in Australia, but what they knew about Chinese culture and customs was mainly Chinese festivals. The interviewees believed that it was helpful for international students to have basic knowledge about Chinese culture and customs before coming to China. As commented by Sharon, "It makes life easier and adjustable". David echoed, "When you move from one culture to another, of course it is different. You have to understand basic things about culture". He illustrated his view by citing an interesting example:

> When you give a present to a Chinese person, you do not buy a clock. The word for "clock" (*Zhong*) is the sound of the word for "death" (*Song Zhong* in Chinese). It is not a good present. But if you give a box of eight pieces of fruit, it can mean you can be very successful and have more money because "eight" sounds like "fa" (richness) in China.

Meanwhile, four interviewees maintained that it was difficult for them to have a deep understanding of Chinese culture and customs before coming to China. As Tom explained, "we were given some introduction to Chinese culture, but the image I had was quite different from what it was really like". David shared a similar view, "China has a culture of 5000 years. It is unrealistic to be expected to understand the culture before you go to China". Cathy echoed:

> When I first was in China, I did not know anything about the culture and customs in the first week. We were hosted to visit different people in their offices or at homes. They gave me a glass of tea and I was trying to finish, as in Australia, so I could leave. But they came over and topped it up.

This finding reveals that it is important for international students to have general knowledge about Chinese culture and customs prior to their study in China, which could assist them in adapting to the new environment. However, it is a challenge to understand the local culture and customs without experiencing it personally. Information about Chinese culture and experiences of overseas students at the university could be presented in the promotional materials and on the university websites.

Upon-Arrival and Settling-in

Reception on arrival. Almost all participants had not been met by the university staff or students on arrival at the airport in China. However, most participants would like to be met at the airport. Jack commented that "somebody should meet the

students at the airport because many students do not speak Chinese, and are young and scared". Lucy agreed that it was important to meet new students upon their arrival so that they did not have to "struggle with the transport and the uncertainties when trying to reach their final destinations". Mike echoed:

> When I first came to the airport, I was very scared. … I had a lot of luggage. When I put the luggage into the taxi and the taxi was not big enough. So it would be nice if the university could meet new students at the airport.

This finding shows that airport pickup service is an effective way to reduce overseas students' initial anxieties and uncertainties when coming to a new place. It is recommended that university staff or senior students meet the new students at the airport. Some universities, especially those top universities with a large number of overseas students, may find it challenging to organize the airport pickup service. It would be advisable to provide detailed information in a bilingual form in advance, such as, the university address, how to get there, and taxi fare.

Accommodation arrangement. Appropriate accommodation could help students adapt to a new environment. All participants except Mike lived in the university dormitory when they first came to China. Their rooms had been arranged beforehand. Sharon commented, "It makes us adjustable. If you are in China and you do not even know where you live, that can be worrying". Mike described his stressful experiences.

> We went to the foreign student dormitory. They said: "We do not have a room for you". We were shocked because we came a long way from Australia. In the e-mail, the university staff said we should go to foreign student dormitory on this day… I felt confused and sad, because for most of us, it was our first time to China. The first night we stayed in a hotel.

Mike finally got his room on the next day, but he felt frustrated:

> We went to the university and sat down for maybe two hours… They gave us a room in an old dormitory. The room was not clean and the bathroom was very dirty and dusty. We were very disappointed.

Lucy commented that international students would welcome alternative accommodation. She explained that "it is nice if we have accommodation (on campus) so we can live there until we choose a cheap one to move out". Sharon echoed, "You need somewhere living for a week or some time. So you can organize to find somewhere else".

The finding indicates that proper accommodation arrangement prior to international students' arrival is crucial to help them settle down, especially for those coming to China for the first time. This study suggests that effective measures need to be taken to address overseas students' accommodation needs. It is essential to improve facilities and provide comfortable accommodation for international students.

As for students who prefer to live off campus, the university could offer alternative options and provide temporary on-campus accommodation before they move out.

Orientation week. Participants' responses indicated that orientation programs varied in different universities. Most universities held a brief information session to introduce the teachers and students or invited police officers to introduce Chinese laws and regulations. Some universities also organized a welcome dinner/party. However, many participants like Joe, Mike, and Jack complained that they did not get much information from the university staff and the police officers who spoke Chinese or poor English. Cathy did not obtain any information because she arrived in the middle of the semester. They commented that the orientation week in Chinese university was different from that in Australia. Sharon explained that "all the activities were just arranged for overseas students and nothing was combined with Chinese students". This view was shared by Lucy.

> In China, it (orientation week) is not really like that in Australia. In my university, the foreign student school was very separate. … It was not like the whole university orientation. It was just for overseas students. They did not arrange other Chinese students to mix with us. That was something I thought was a pity.

All interviewees welcomed the university-wide orientation activities and commented that these activities would provide them with more opportunities to interact with local students and make their new life easier. This confirmed Kinnell's (1990) comments that orientation activities should be specifically designed "in consideration of the culture shock experienced" by overseas students. Therefore, it is suggested that university-wide orientation activities be adopted at Chinese universities. Booklets or information sheets in English regarding university life and study should be made available to students arriving at various times. Furthermore, university staff and police officers with good English should be involved in the information sessions or assisted by competent translators.

During Their Stay

Accommodation administration. Most interviewees were dissatisfied with the accommodation administration at Chinese universities due to living separately from Chinese students and a lack of privacy and convenience. Three out of four interviewees chose to live off campus on their second time to study in China, despite the university's intention to provide them with secure and comfortable on- campus accommodation in a separate building. The majority of the interviewees preferred to live with Chinese students and considered this an effective way to make friends with local students and experience the real Chinese student life. Many complained about the strict rules of their dormitories and the security guard on duty. Chinese students were not allowed to come in or were only permitted to stay for a couple of hours after

signing the visitor book. At some universities, the dormitory door was closed by a certain time at night. Joe commented that he had little freedom and privacy. David shared a similar view:

> When foreign students lived in China, privacy did not happen. … We had the man to lock the door. … That was probably the hard thing to getting used to. … If you came back late, you had to ring the door bell… We did not like that. When the door was closed, it was a big problem to come in.

However, David and Cathy mentioned the potential difficulties for both Chinese and overseas students to live together. Cathy commented that due to different cultural backgrounds, overseas students could not stand "living with five or eight people in the same room". Chinese students may not like to live with overseas students who have different living habits. David, who lived with Chinese students in Taiwan, agreed, "If you bring your boyfriend or girlfriend back to your room, it is a problem because all the boys live together and all the girls live together".

It is suggested that an option could be offered to international and Chinese students to decide whether to live in the same building. The differences in culture and lifestyle should be taken into account and the accommodation rules at universities for international students could be flexible. International students who prefer to live with Chinese students need to be well prepared psychologically in order to immerse into the Chinese student life.

Teaching and learning. The interviewees reported considerable differences in teaching and learning between China and Australia, such as learning and teaching approaches, class contact hours, teacher-student relationships, and academic assistance. Most participants claimed that Chinese learning was memorization-oriented, while in Australia more emphasis was placed on creativity, analysis, and independence. Cathy commented that Chinese teaching went like "the teacher tells you what you need to memorize". But in Australia, the teacher will "set the task and give you the skill to meet the task". Students can learn "how to think during the task rather than being told what is supposed to do". The class was viewed as teacher-centred in China and student-centred in Australia, especially at top universities with more overseas students. David commented that "in China, it was the teacher talked and students listened", but in Australia "the students may talk more than teachers".

Most participants indicated that Chinese students were under heavy pressure and had more classes than students in Australia. As Lucy commented, "the hours they studied were much longer and the term was much longer. In Australia, we did 26 weeks a year. In China, they had 40". Some interviewees commented that Chinese teachers depended on the textbooks in class. Jack indicated, "It was a very simple way to teach. It was just like reading the textbook, doing exercises and teacher talking. It was same all the time. There was no variety". Joe and Mike agreed and highlighted the challenges in adapting to the Chinese learning environment.

Most participants indicated that unlike Australian teachers, Chinese teachers had more personal contacts with students beyond classroom and provided help. This finding confirmed Li's (2005a) observation that Chinese teachers enjoy casual and personal relationship with their students beyond classroom. Most interviewees were satisfied with the pleasant teacher-student relationship. Lucy commented:

> Actually, I like it (teacher-student relationship) in China. They always help us, even if it has nothing to do with our study…They are like friends and mothers. In Australia, teachers are friendly, but they concentrate on your study.

Many interviewees claimed that they received excellent personal help from their teachers. Cathy commented, "If I was ill, they would make up the classes again in a couple of days later when I felt well again". Moreover, it was interesting to note that international students at the second or third tier universities obtained more help than those at top universities.

This study suggests that due to the differences in learning traditions and teaching approaches between China and other countries, international students may find it challenging to adapt to the new cultural and learning environments. It is recommended that Chinese teachers consider the prior learning experiences of international students, adopt culturally sensitive teaching approaches, and address the needs of a diverse student body.

Making friends. The majority of interviewees indicated that it was difficult to make friends with Chinese students. However, those studying in China for the second time or living off campus reported that it was much easier to make friends with Chinese people. Sharon described her experiences:

> I found the first time was really difficult for me to make friends with Chinese students. … I lived with foreigners… I did not really have many opportunities to meet Chinese students. … On the second time, I lived with a Chinese couple. We went out together and spoke Chinese together. I met a lot of Chinese people and made many friends.

Most interviewees commented that they found it difficult to make friends with Chinese students due to separate accommodation, cultural differences, and language barriers. Some argued that the universities did not regularly provide activities to make them interact with local students. Several respondents, particularly those at top universities, indicated that Chinese students were under pressure to study hard and had no time to mix with them. Others mentioned that they did not know the available university activities for overseas students. Some interviewees indicated that Chinese students just wanted to practice their English when they mixed with overseas students. Others argued that it was the problem of overseas students. David explained that "the university could not help someone hold my hand. That was something I have to do". Lucy echoed, "If you are willing to be away from other foreigners, Chinese people will welcome you and make friends with you".

Due to the constraints of separate accommodation, language competency and cultural differences, international students may have limited interactions with local students or make Chinese friends. It is recommended that universities organize various socializing activities to bring these two groups together, and help international students know the availability of these activities. International students should also make their efforts to have more interactions with Chinese students and local people.

CONCLUSION

This qualitative research was built on a small sample of eight Australian participants. As the responses of participants from different cultural backgrounds may generate different results, generalizations of the findings to other international students should be undertaken with caution. Further research is needed to cover a larger sample or a wider range of international students in order to provide a more comprehensive picture of their experiences in China.

Despite the limitations of this study, it provides insight into the cultural and learning experiences of Australian students in China. The findings indicate that Chinese universities have made efforts to meet the needs of international students, such as the improvement of information services and establishment of close teacher-student relationship. However, some issues regarding international students' adaptation to the new environments need to be addressed: reception at the airport, accommodation management, orientation programs, teaching and learning environment, and making Chinese friends.

Some findings in this study are consistent with previous research, such as, necessity of good arrangement of accommodation (Kinnell, 1990), cultural differences in teaching and learning (Kennedy, 2002; Wu, 2005) and teacher-student relationship (Li, 2005; Thurston et al., 1994). Some surprising findings are also revealed in this study. One is the discontent of international students with the accommodation administration at Chinese universities. Although separate buildings and security guards at the dormitories are meant to provide better living conditions and guarantee their safety, most participants were disappointed at the regulations. Given the different cultures and lifestyles of international students, it is recommended that the accommodation facilities and administration at Chinese universities be improved. Another surprising finding concerns the reluctance of international students to interact with Chinese students. Many participants claimed that Chinese students may want to practice their English and have instrumental purposes in making friends with them. Further research could be conducted to explore the perspective of Chinese students on this issue.

Initial findings of the researcher's recent study conducted in 2014 with 15 international students who studied Chinese in a university in Guangzhou also confirmed the importance of assisting international students to adapt to new environments and the need for Chinese teachers to adopt culturally sensitive teaching approaches and engage international students in the learning process.

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14. GROWING UP IN CANADA

Exploring Factors Affecting the Identification among Chinese Immigrant Youth in Canada

INTRODUCTION

In Canada, research on Chinese immigrant youth, particularly the second generation has yet to be fully developed. Despite the immigration policy change in the 1960s in which applicants were assessed on their education levels and skills rather than racial and ethnic origin, it is only in the last decades that Canada has received a large number of non-European immigrants from Asia, the Caribbean, Latin America and Africa (Jantzen, 2008). Chinese immigrants account for 3.7% (1.1 million) of the total Canadian population with the majority of them being foreign-born, only 26.7% Canadian – born and 2.8% being third generation or more (Statistics Canada, 2011). In comparison, European descendants, particularly those from British and French groups, are from third-plus generations (Jantzen, 2008). Therefore, research on the descendants of Chinese immigrants is a relatively recent phenomenon in Canada. Further, Chinese students are usually represented as a model minority in the North American context (Cui, 2015; Lee, 1996; Li & Wang, 2008). The model minority discourse depicts Chinese students as a group of high-academic achievers. They excel in math and science but lack interest in social activities and sports. They are smart and hardworking but quiet and non-assertive when facing unfair treatment. Within the model minority discourse, Chinese students' academic performance is overemphasized while other aspects of their school life, such as their struggles as racialized minorities, are often rendered invisible to academic attention. As a consequence, their divergent social positions based on race, class, gender and other socially constructed differences have not been adequately researched. In Canada, the few existing studies on Chinese Canadian youth tend to focus on their academic performance or labour market transition by comparing this population with other ethnic groups (Boyd, 2008). However, racialized minorities may still regard themselves as outsiders even if they are educationally successful. In particular, drawing on Ethnic Diversity Survey, Reitz and Benerjee (2007) found that 33 percent of children of Chinese immigrants reported experiencing racial discrimination and this figure ranked second highest after those of African Canadians. Little is known about how racism affects Chinese students' school experiences, their daily interaction with teachers and peers, and their identity construction as racialized minorities. In this

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context, this paper examines factors that affect identity construction among young Chinese descendants in Canada, with a particular focus on Canadian multiculturalism policy, school, and media.

THE RESEARCH PROJECT ON CHINESE CANADIAN YOUTH

Data used for this paper was drawn from a larger project on the lived experiences of first- and second-generation Chinese-Canadian youth in Alberta. Grounded theory was employed as the main research methodology for this research (Charmaz, 2006). Research participants were recruited through three types of sampling strategies, including maximum variation sampling, snowball sampling and theoretical sampling (Patton, 2002). For example, in order to reach a diverse Chinese youth population, a large number of research recruitment flyers were sent to several local immigrant service organizations, Chinese bilingual schools and some Chinese professional associations in Edmonton and Calgary. They were also posted on the main campuses of the University of Alberta and the University of Calgary as well as major local Chinese websites. After initial contact, thirty-six Chinese youth agreed to participate in a 1.5–2 hour semi-structured interview. Prior to their interviews, participants were required to fill out a questionnaire that was used to collect their demographic information such as age, gender, occupation, place of birth, length of stay in Canada, family members, etcetera. The survey data was then organized in an excel database. Data analysis began simultaneously with data collection. After initial data analysis, further data was collected through theoretical sampling to refine tentative categories (Charmaz, 2006).

Based on the questionnaire information, thirty-six second generation Chinese youth were interviewed, including nineteen males and seventeen females. Twenty-five youth had immigrant parents from mainland China, ten from Hong Kong, and only one from Taiwan. Fifteen youth were first generation who are either born in Canada or immigrated to Canada before the age of six, and twenty-one were second generation who came to Canada after the age of six. Their ages ranged between 15–25 years old with an average age of 19. With only a few of them still in senior high school, the majority of research participants were university students. These participants came from diverse family backgrounds, whose parents' occupations range from university professor, businessmen, engineers and technicians, to bus drivers, restaurant cooks, housekeepers, and the unemployed.

CANADIAN MULTICULTURALISM

Canada's multiculturalism policy attracts large amounts of new immigrants to settle down in this country, who are enticed by dreams of equality and freedom. Since its inception as a government policy in 1971, the multiculturalism policy has fuelled rigorous debates among academics, politicians, social media, and community organizations about its strengths and limitations. One major critique of this policy

centers on the fact that although multiculturalism claims all cultures in Canada enjoy equal status, racialized minorities have yet to be treated as "real" Canadians or as equal partners with the White dominant group (Ali, 2008; Bannerji, 2000). Particularly, such critique interrogates the conceptualization of multiculturalism as a politics of recognition, which is underpinned by the cultural pluralist assumptions. To better understand the lived experiences and identity construction of Chinese Canadian youth in Canada, it is critical to explore the Canadian multiculturalism, which has been considered as an important integration policy and ideology (Reitz, 2012).

For many political philosophers, such as Charles Taylor, multiculturalism is an alternative political philosophy used to address the weakness of liberalism and to deal with an increasingly diverse population in contemporary Western industrial society (Abu-Laban, 2002). For Taylor (1992), a form of liberalism that emphasizes individual rights, state neutrality and the value of difference blindness that treats everyone as equal regardless of one's background is "highly discriminatory," and "impractical in tomorrow's world" (p. 43). In his widely-cited work, "Politics of Recognition," he argues that it is crucial "we all recognize the equal value of different cultures; that we not only let them survive, but acknowledge their worth" (p. 64). His model of multiculturalism as a politics of recognition has sparked debate. Abu-Laban (2002) criticizes this model's essentialized understanding of culture and argues that it is impossible to categorize human beings according to which cultural groups they belong to because individuals may identify with more than one culture and thus have multiple and shifting identities. As well, Li (1999) points out that multiculturalism is mistakenly used by academics as a synonym of cultural pluralism to analyze racial and ethnic relations. In so doing, ethnic groups are defined as members of a group who share a homogenous and primordial ethnic culture rather than one constructed from and through unequal power relations. Li argues that the maintenance of ethnic distinctiveness may not result from ethnic groups' own choices and preference, but rather as a response to their subordinated position in relation to the dominant group. Bannerji (2000) also questions Taylor's politics of recognition by pointing out that it treats difference among people simply as an issue of cultural diversity, and the multicultural state as a power-neutral entity and thus is devoid of social relations based on race, gender, class and other social indicators. As she argues, "Speaking here of culture without addressing power relations displaces and trivializes deep contradictions. It is a reductionism that hides the social relations of domination that continually creates 'difference' as inferior and thus signifies continuing relations of antagonism" (p. 97). In a similar vein, Fraser (2000) identifies two problems associated with Taylor's politics of recognition: reification and replacement. The problem of reification means that through a politics of recognition, homogenous and simplified group identity is imposed on individual members, which denies the complexity and multiplicity of individual identification. As well, it treats one's identity formation as an "auto generated auto-description" rather than resulting from social interaction with other groups (p. 112). Further, Taylor's (1992) politics of recognition tends to

displace a more important issue of distribution by treating misrecognition simply as a problem of cultural depreciation rather than as an inequality based on distribution of limited social resources. In this regard, misrecognition should be viewed as status subordination i.e., one is denied status as a full partner in social interaction through systemic and institutional racism such as laws, government policies or long-standing customs. Canada's multiculturalism policy has been implemented over 40 years; however, racial discrimination that was deeply rooted in Canadian history does not disappear with the initiation of multiculturalism policy; rather, it has been continually reproduced in the contemporary Canadian society, particularly in major social institutions such as school. Participants in my study revealed the difficult time they experienced as racialized minorities at school (Cui, 2011, 2015).

PEER RELATIONS AT SCHOOL

Michael once moved with his immigrant parents to a small town in Alberta and spent his junior high school year there. As the only Chinese student in that school, he recalled being excluded from team projects in social studies class, and being addressed with racial slurs, such as Chinaman, Chink.

> There was one time in the social studies class we all had to assemble into groups. Basically all the White kids got into groups and I was basically forced to be excluded from any of the groups … eventually I got into a group and then they started piling all the work to me.

Michael attributed the discrimination he encountered to the social context of the school, where the majority student populations were white. As he noted,

> The general population [in the small town] is Caucasian. I am the only Asian in junior high. So the White kids, I don't think they've ever met an Asian person before in their life so they are a bit nervous in a way, but also cautious in their attitude toward me. Also at the same time, they are a bit discriminatory. Because just by appearance I look different from them, and also by academic achievement, I differ from them quite a bit too.

When asked how this school experience affected his identification, he said "for me, the main factor is prejudice and discrimination that really gives me the idea that no, you are not Canadian, you are Chinese with Canadian citizenship." Similarly, Catherine described the teasing that bothered her in an urban school.

> There were always teasing from students. The low chances are like, *Me Chinese Me no Dumb*. I cannot remember what other part of the teasing was but that always bugs me. They do actions. It really, really bugs me because it made fun of Chinese people.

The exclusion and discrimination that Chinese students encountered at school is not a recent phenomenon but has a long history in Canadian society (Cui, 2011). During

the early decades of the twentieth century, Chinese children experienced school segregation in British Columbia in the name of so-called the health and moral threat that they presumably posed to white students (Stanley, 2011). Chinese people were viewed as uncivilized and heathen population, thus inferior to Europeans (Anderson, 1991). The ideology of white supremacy was not simply a popular discourse that was prevalent in local media, but more importantly, it was constructed as school knowledge that was used to educate the younger generations of Canadians. Nearly one hundred years have passed; however, the legacy of white supremacy did not disappear in history. The narratives by Michael and Catherine clearly showed that racism has been discursively maintained and reproduced in the school field and continually affected the social interactions between Chinese students and students from white dominant group, no matter how well they have achieved academically.

Further, it is important to note that racism is not only imposed from outside which manifests as a discrimination of white against racialized minorities, but is also reproduced and internalized within the Chinese community as an intragroup distinction (Cui, 2015). More specifically, the intragroup distinction functions via the identity label of "FOB" (Fresh off the boat). This term is often used by the second generation Chinese youths, who are culturally and linguistically assimilated to refer to their newcomer peers, who may still maintain their ethnic cultural characteristics in terms of ways of dressing, talking and doing. For example, Jessica, a Canadian-born Chinese (CBC), described the distinction between FOB and CBC.

> I think calling someone 'FOB' it's like…it's just saying that they are really culturally like the people from China, they would do their hair really…they'd gel it up like the stars there or they would use their peace signs in their pictures. They would be interested in watching Chinese dramas whereas if you are more Canadianized, you like to eat Canadian food and you watch [Canadian] movies and do all the culturally *normal* things from here I guess. We would speak mostly English and they would probably speak Mandarin with each other and stuff…ya just like what interests us were different. They are still really in tune with what's going on in Asia and stuff and we're more not quite with the changing.

Obviously, compared with those who are more "Canadianized", a FOB is viewed as culturally aberrant from the so-called Canadian norms. As a result, participants, especially CBC, indicated that they would maintain a distance from FOBs. As Angela said: "I'm not very good friends with many fobs…Naturally there's a stigma with fobs being not that cool or I don't know how to describe it, culturally not with it". Barbara noted that the identity label of FOB pushed her away from associating with Chinese cultural practices such as Chinese television and music. She explained that although FOB peers she met were generally very nice people but they were not welcomed or accepted by the dominant white group. As she revealed: "… if you talked to the white society, they are just like, oh, they are really *weird*. So because of that, I kind of push myself away from that kind of identity."

Drawing on Bourdieu's theoretical concepts of habitus (1994), I argue that the identity label of FOB demonstrates an intragroup differentiation and a kind of racialized habitus among some Chinese youth (Cui, 2015). Bourdieu refers to habitus as a system of durable dispositions that generate perceptions and practices; racialized habitus functions as social agents' schemes of perception that ensure the active presence and constancy of racism over time. More specifically, the intragroup differentiation in which some CBC students called their newcomer peers as FOB best demonstrated the function of their racialized habitus. As Bourdieu (1984) argues, "social identity lies in difference, and difference is asserted against what is closest, which represents the greatest threat" (p. 479). CBC and FOB are often mistakenly regarded as a homogenous Chinese group due to their similar phenotypical features. Making a distinction between them thus becomes a strategic struggle for CBC to mobilize their social positions in the field of racial hierarchy. In so doing, they unwittingly accepted the legitimacy of devalued Chinese cultural heritage and its associated Chinese identity based on the criteria imposed by the white dominant group. In seeking their membership in the dominant group, they have discursively reinforced a belief of their own racial inferiority via the identity label of FOB.

MEDIA REPRESENTATION

Historically, racialized minorities were usually represented by mainstream media as a "problem" or "social threat" to Canadian society. Despite the implementation of multiculturalism policy for forty years, Canadian media institutions have often been criticized for their reluctance to reflect multicultural commitments of Canada, and their continued insistence on negative coverage of minorities (Fleras, 2003). In November 2010, a Canadian leading news magazine, *Maclean's* published a provocative article, entitled "Too Asian?" which blamed Canadian universities for accepting too many Asian students (Findlay & Köhler, 2010). The "Too Asian?" article depicts Asian students as only academically focused while lacking social skills. Their competiveness and work ethic not only deprives their White counterparts of postsecondary education opportunities, but also ruins their social life on campus, characterized by sports, parties and alcohol.

> Asian kids, meanwhile, say they are resented for taking the spots of white kids. "At graduation a Canadian—i.e. 'white'—mother told me that I'm the reason her son didn't get a space in university and that all the immigrants in the country are taking up university spots. (Findlay & Köhler, 2010, p. 78)

By constructing the US vs. Them division, Chinese Canadians have been "Othered" as foreigners and competitors, even if some of these "Asian kids" were born or growing up in Canada, or self-identified as Canadians. In so doing, individual competition is ideologically constructed along racial lines and represented as a competition between

Asian and white students, or foreigners and Canadians. Consequently, the educational success of racialized minority students was not perceived as good news for Canada, which is an immigrant country; but rather, was interpreted by media as a "threat" to 'real' Canadians and their competition for limited educational opportunities (Cui & Kelly, 2013). Further, what made absent by the "Too Asian?" discourse are the other factors that contribute to unequal access to educational opportunities, such as gender, class, and language barriers. Questions arising here are: Who is the "white" mom? Is she a working class single mom who has to work several part-time low-paying jobs to support her family and who may not have spare time or ability to assist her son with his school work? As well, who is the Asian student that managed to get into university? Is he/she a first generation immigrant youth who has to make more effort to learn the language compared with his/her native speaking peers? In this sense, what is ignored or denied by the "Too Asian" discourse are the efforts made by racialized minority students to overcome various difficulties to get into post-secondary institutions as well as multifaceted factors (other than the presence of "Asians") that may impede the White student's access to university education. In other words, who gets in and who doesn't is more than a racial issue. However, by constructing unequal educational opportunities solely along racial lines, "Too Asian" discourse may achieve the purpose of winning the consent of the "White" majority, provoking racial hostility while keeping hidden the root causes of social inequality that are embedded in social structures (Cui & Kelly, 2013). The publication of "Too Asian?" article concurred during the later stage of my data collection. Participants critiqued the discriminatory discourses that manifest in the "Too Asian?" article. For example, in response to the stereotyped image of Asian students as "nerds" who lack interest in social or extracurricular activities, Xue argues that "When I first read this, my feeling was that a lot of the comments are stereotypical Asian, not all of us are like that, like not all of us just study and have no social life at all." Many participants indicated their various involvements in basketball, volleyball, music band, clubs, student organizations, and church activities as a counter-discourse to the stereotyped "nerd" (Cui, 2011).

The way that Chinese-Canadian students are represented by Canadian media once again indicates that racism as an institutional and systemic problem needs to be addressed seriously before Canada can truly fulfill the multicultural promise where everyone is treated equally. The current reality, however, is that Canadian media continues to construct social issues along racial lines, reinforcing racial stereotypes, vilifying the social identities of racialized minorities, and associating minorities with deficit lifestyles and deviant personalities, or representing them as competitors who grab limited resources from White Canadians. Given the role of Canadian media in constructing "common sense" understandings, manufacturing consent, and influencing how people think about racialized minorities (Cui & Kelly, 2013), such biased media representations of racialized minorities have negatively impacted the identification of Chinese Canadian youth.

CONCLUSION

This chapter examines factors that affect identity construction among first-and second-generation Chinese Canadian youth, with a particular focus on Canadian multiculturalism, peer relations at school, and media representation. The historical dichotomy between the West and the rest, the Canadian and the foreigner, the civilized and the uncivilized, and the superior and the inferior (Hall, 1992) did not disappear with the emergence of multiculturalism policy that claims that all cultures are equal in contemporary Canadian society (Cui, 2011). Rather, it has been argued that multiculturalism policy further reinforces the categorical distinctions between the majority and the minority (Kalantzis & Cope, 1999) and reduces the ethnic others into passive objects to be governed by those nationalists who conceive themselves as having the right to 'worry' about the nation (Hage, 2000). At schools, multicultural education takes on a superficial, pluralist position, which focuses on celebrating diverse ethnic cultures and festivals, rather than addressing the issues of power, privilege, and life chances in a real sense (Kalantzis & Cope, 1999). In this point, I argue that the multiculturalism model that only offers symbolic recognition of different cultures is far from adequate to deal with racial and ethnic relations in an increasingly diverse society. Despite the focus of multiculturalism policy shifts, from addressing racism during the 1980s to the fostering of national unity since the 1990s, the task of the 1980s has not yet finished. Contemporary forms of racism are more implicit and invisible (Cui, 2011). They may be manifested in the teasing against racialized minorities, ignorance at teacher-parent meetings, or a laugh, a discriminatory slipped-in comment or a joke. They could be negative remarks regarding the foods Chinese youth bring to school, or teachers' biased knowledge construction about China. They could also be hegemonic media discourse in terms of who should be restricted from accessing post-secondary opportunities, and what is a normal school life and what is not (Cui & Kelly, 2013). These experiences affect how Chinese-Canadian youth perceive themselves in relation to the dominant White group and their sense of belonging to Canada. Further, by raising the concept of "racialized habitus", I suggest that racial discrimination may also function as an intra-group distinction among the Chinese students themselves, as shown in the identity label of FOB. The term of FOB assumes that there is only one legitimate Canadian culture and Canadian identity, against which other cultural identities are deemed as deviant and inferior. In derogatively labelling those whose ways of doing and speaking are different from the alleged Canadian norms as FOB, some Chinese students, especially Canadian born Chinese, strategically seek their membership in the domain cultural group at the expense of perpetuating racial hierarchy in the long run (Cui, 2015; Pyke & Dang, 2003). Through my study with first- and second-generation Chinese youth, I want to highlight their struggles as racialzied minorities in Canadian society, whose voices have been silenced behind a model minority discourse. The findings of this study also call for more academic attention to the reproduction of racism at the systemic, institutional and individual level.

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SECTION IV

TRANSNATIONAL TALENT MOBILITY

BIAO XIANG

15. EMIGRATION TRENDS AND POLICIES IN CHINA

Movement of the Wealthy and Highly Skilled[1]

INTRODUCTION

China[2] has experienced a noticeable surge in emigration over the past four decades. This chapter analyzes the evolution of Chinese emigration since the end of the 1970s through the present day. The evidence points to a particular trend: more wealthy and well-educated people are moving to a select number of the most developed countries in the global north. By contrast, unskilled labor migration has increased at a much slower pace, reflecting stagnant financial returns and complicated and expensive recruitment procedures. Before 1949, Chinese emigration was primarily composed of low-skilled or unskilled migrants; today, wealthy and highly skilled migrants dominate outflows.

The chapter also traces shifts in government policy toward skilled and unskilled migration, and the motivations behind these changes. The overall trend in the past four decades has been to liberalize exit controls, allowing migrants to leave China but encouraging them to contribute to their country of origin while overseas. For the migration of high-skilled and wealthy individuals, exit controls have been replaced by policies that aim to encourage return and transnational engagement. In the case of low-skilled or unskilled migration, exit controls have now been substituted by complicated policies to manage recruitment procedures that continue to serve as de facto barriers to emigration. These policies are effective in conditioning migration flows, although they by no means determine China's basic migratory dynamics.

CONTEMPORARY EMIGRATION TRENDS IN CHINA

Emigration from China is increasing in absolute terms, though the country still has one of the lowest emigration rates in the world. According to the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA), the stock of international migrants from China increased from 4.1 million in 1990 to 5.5 million in 2000, and to 9.3 million in 2013 (UN DESA, 2013, tables 1, 5, and 12). China is now the fourth-largest source country in the world (representing 4.0 percent of the world's migrants in 2013), having moved up from seventh place (representing 2.6 percent) in 1990.

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Table 1. Net emigration rate from China (per thousand), 1985–2020

1985–90	*1990–95*	*1995–2000*	*2000–05*	*2005–10*	*2010–15*	*2015–20*
0.0	–0.1	–0.1	–0.4	–0.3	–0.2	–0.2

Source: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) data, cited in Asian Development Bank Institute (ADBI), Labor Migration, Skills and Student Mobility in Asia (Tokyo: ADBI, 2014), 55

Nevertheless, these numbers are still disproportionately small when compared with China's total population, which at nearly 1.4 billion in 2014 made up almost 20 percent of the world's population (World Bank, 2015). Data from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) for 2010–11 indicate that China's emigration rate remains one of the lowest in the world, at 0.4 percent of the population (UN DESA and Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2013).

Chinese emigration is characterized by a widening divergence between the migration of highly skilled and wealthy individuals on the one hand, and of the low-skilled or unskilled on the other. The emigration rate of China's highly educated population, at 1.8 percent, was almost five times higher than the overall rate in 2010–11(UN DESA and Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2013). This disparity is certainly not unique to China: OECD averages by continent indicate that the highly educated in Africa are also almost five times more likely to migrate, and the highly educated in Asia are almost four times more likely to migrate. However, in more developed regions of the world, this disparity is lower: in Europe the emigration rate of the highly educated is only marginally higher than the overall emigration rate (0.3), and in North America, it is marginally lower (–0.1).

Alongside the increasing share of wealthy and highly skilled migrants, the percentage of Chinese who migrated to more developed countries (namely, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and countries in Europe and North America) increased from 53.4 percent in 1990 to 58.6 percent in 2013. The share of Chinese migrants moving to developing countries fell from 46.6 percent to 41.4 percent in the same time period (UN DESA cited in Wang, 2014, p. 20). Chinese nationals are among the largest new migrant populations in United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.

The liberalization of visa policies at home and abroad enables high-skilled and wealthy Chinese migrants to enjoy ever-greater freedom in permanent settlement and back-and-forth transnational movement. In sharp contrast, the numbers of low-skilled or unskilled emigrants from China remain much lower, and are subject to tight controls and recruitment procedures that are complicated and costly. This section reviews the trends in investor, student, family reunification, and unskilled labor migration from China.

Emigration of High-Income Individuals

One of the most noticeable developments in China's migration trends over the past few years has been the dramatic increase in immigrant investors—wealthy individuals who obtain residence permits abroad by agreeing to invest a significant sum of money in the destination country. Depending on the country and its investor visa regime, immigrant investors may purchase property, government bonds, or special low- or zero-interest bonds; pay a sum to national development funds; or invest in private-sector businesses (Sumption & Hooper, 2014). In return, immigrant investors receive some residency rights in the destination country, whether immediate citizenship, permanent residence, or temporary residence with an eventual pathway to permanent residence.

Wealthy Chinese investors are driving much of the demand for these immigrant investor programs. For example, in the United States, Chinese nationals received 85 percent of all immigrant investor (EB-5)[3] visas in 2014 (U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs, 2015). China was the leading source country for immigrant investors in Canada throughout the 2000s, until this channel was suspended in 2012, and formally closed in 2014.[4] In 2010, 58 percent of immigrant investors in Canada were Chinese nationals, followed by Taiwanese at 8 percent (Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 2012, p. 4). Similarly, in Australia, Chinese nationals received 87 percent of all Significant Investor Visas between 2012 and 2015.[5]



Figure 1. U.S. EB-5 Visa Holders' Three Main Countries of Birth, 2006–12. Source: U.S. Department of State, Report of the Visa Office, *2008–14 (Washington, DC: Department of State), Table V, Part 3, http://www.travel.state.gov/content/visas/en/law-and-policy/statistics.html*

Many wealthy Chinese nationals have considered, or are considering, emigrating overseas. A recent survey of the high-income population in 18 major Chinese

cities found that 60 percent of "super high-net value" individuals—those who possess assets of RMB 10 million or more (approximately US $1.6 million)—have considered emigrating (Bank of China and Hurun Research Institute, 2011). Among "high-net value" individuals—those who possess assets of RMB 6 million (approximately $970,000) or more—who have considered emigration, 77 percent identified the United States or Canada as their intended destinations (Bank of China and Hurun Research Institute, 2011, p. 8).

Information on the causes of the recent rise in Chinese immigrant investors is limited, but surveys and interviews of wealthy Chinese nationals point toward three possible motivations. One is the high quality of secondary and tertiary education overseas, particularly in destination countries—such the United States and the United Kingdom—that dominate world university rankings.[6] A second motivation is quality of life; China's food-safety record is poor, and levels of pollution are extremely high: between 350,000 and 500,000 Chinese die prematurely each year because of air pollution (Chen et al., 2013, pp. 1959–60). A third oft-cited motivation is broader concerns among the wealthy middle classes about long-term political, economic, and social conditions in China, and the potential for unrest.[7] One recent survey in August 2013 by the magazine *Economic Information* (*Jingji Cankao*) of Chinese entrepreneurs found many were concerned about a lack of regulated business norms and weak rule of law (Wang, 2013).

The emigration of immigrant investors has induced significant capital outflow. One report estimates that immigrant investor emigration from China to the United States in 2012 alone drained between $3.6 billion and $6.1 billion, excluding expenditure on housing, education, and day-to-day living costs (Wang, 2014, p. 22). Chinese nationals[8] were the second-largest group of foreign purchasers of real estate in the United States in 2013, after Canadians (National Association of REALTORS®, 2013). More strikingly, the median price of the houses bought by the Chinese was $425,000, and about 69 percent of all the deals were all-cash purchases, far higher than any other foreign nationality group (National Association of REALTORS®, 2013, p. 28). The concern about the outflow of capital has made this stream of emigration a topic of heated debate in China, with some media referring to these flows as "emptying" the country.[9]

Emigration of the Highly Skilled and Students

China is now the largest source country for international students—who may or may not return after completing their studies. From 1978 to 2013 more than 3 million students left China to study overseas. Their number was 414,000 in 2013 alone (Ministry of Education, 2014)—more than 465 times the 1978 figure of 860 migrants (Ministry of Education, 2008). Figure 2 demonstrates how outflows of Chinese students have increased dramatically in recent years, from less than 50,000 in 2000 to more than 400,000 in 2013.

The United States is by far the most popular destination for Chinese students. Nearly 200,000 students from China were enrolled in tertiary learning institutions in the United States in the 2011–12 academic year, compared with 65,000 in the United Kingdom, 25,000 in Canada, and 23,000 in Australia—the other three leading destinations (China Education Online, 2013). In the 2014–15 academic year, there were 304,000 Chinese students enrolled in the United States, accounting for 31 percent of all foreign students and outnumbering Indian students (the second largest nationality group) by a wide margin.[10]



Figure 2. Outflow and Return of Students from and to China, 1990–2013.
Source: Ministry of Education, China's Annual Book of Statistics, *various years*

Most of these students are self-financed; the number of Chinese paying for their own education overtook the number on scholarships back in the 1990s. This has turned overseas education into a major economic sector, with an estimated annual revenue of US $3.2 billion in 2012—85 percent of which was spent in the destination countries, 13 percent for language training in China, and 2 percent for intermediary services (China Education Online, 2013). The average cost of studying in the United States—$36,000 a year[11]—is about eight times the per capita annual disposable income of urban residents in China, and 25 times that of rural residents in 2013.[12]

In the past decade or so, return migration increased even more significantly than outflows (see Figure 2). The number of returning students began increasing in 2000, and the rate escalated after 2008. In 2013 more than 350,000 students returned: this represented a nearly 30 percent increase from 2012, and an increase of nearly 4,000 percent from 2000 (when fewer than 10,000 students returned to China) (China Education Online, 2014). At the same time, the rate of increase in the outflow of students from China has slowed in recent years.[13] Although government policies play a role in attracting returnees from cutting-edge sectors such as science and technology, this sharp increase in the number of students returning to China is primarily motivated by economic growth in China, coupled with the tightening

of Western job markets following the 2008 financial crisis. The vast majority of returnees are driven by concerns about job and business opportunities (Wang, 2013).

Family Reunification

Chinese emigration through family-based channels is also on the rise, in part linked to increasing levels of emigration among immigrant investors and the highly skilled. Many Chinese nationals immigrate to other countries through family-based streams or as dependents of highly skilled migrants. Family reunion was the single-most important means through which individual emigration from China resumed at the end of the 1970s, following the Cultural Revolution. Since the 1990s, family reunion has been increasingly tied to investor and skilled migration. Throughout the history of the U.S. EB-5 visa program, roughly two family members have been granted conditional permanent residence visas for every immigrant investor (Brookings Institution, 2014, p. 8).

In 2013–14 Chinese nationals represented the largest source of family migrants to Australia, accounting for 17 percent of all family visas granted (Department of Immigration and Border Protection, 2014, pp. 31–35). Many Chinese-born immigrants in Australia sponsor their parents, as well as their partners, for Family Stream visas, of which 42 percent went to parents and 52 percent went to partners in 2013–14 (Department of Immigration and Border Protection, 2013, p. 4). Chinese nationals received about half of all family visas allotted to parents in 2013–14; this was a far greater proportion of parent visas, compared to other major immigrant groups in Australia (Department of Immigration and Border Protection, 2013, p. 4). For many, securing residence for elderly parents and young children in a high-quality living environment is equally—if not more—important than seeking new opportunities for their own career or business.[14]

Chinese nationals now tend to migrate at much younger ages, implying that primary and secondary school opportunities are another relevant consideration for families thinking of emigrating. Families with children may migrate because of the parents' work, for example, or because concerns for their children's future education prompt parents to emigrate. While Chinese student migrants before the mid-1990s tended to be graduate students granted academic scholarships, their post-2000 counterparts are high school and college students from wealthy families who seek elite international education as early as possible. Between 2005 and 2011 the number of Chinese enrolled in high schools in the United States increased more than tenfold (China Education Online, 2013). In 2011, 76,800 students migrated in order to graduate from a high school overseas, accounting for 23 percent of all students migrating (China Education Online, 2013). Many of these younger migrants end up attending elite, costly secondary schools in destination countries. For example, during the 2012–13 academic year, Chinese nationals comprised 15 percent of all overseas pupils enrolled in fee-based (''independent'') schools in the United Kingdom (London: HM Government of the United Kingdom, 2013).

In the United States 23,795 Chinese were enrolled in private high schools (K-12) in the 2012–13 school year, compared with 65 in 2005–06 (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2013). A recent survey of Chinese high net-worth individuals found 29 percent wished to send their children to secondary schools in the United Kingdom, while 26 percent aspired to do the same in the United States (Hurun Institute, 2014).

Unskilled Emigration

Despite comprising 25 percent of the world labor force, China contributed only 1 percent of unskilled international labor migrants in the 2010s. Unskilled labor migration from China takes place through two channels: project-tied collective labor deployment, and individual overseas employment (officially known as "international labor cooperation"). In project-tied migration, workers are hired by Chinese companies and are dispatched overseas. In the case of labor cooperation, migrants are supposedly hired by a foreign company and receive their salary overseas, though the reality can be complex; in some cases, workers are nominally hired by placement agencies or associations of employers. In 2013, 527,000 Chinese nationals migrated as unskilled workers; of these, 271,000 were project-tied and 256,000 were individual migrants (Ministry of Commerce, 2014).



Figure 3. Unskilled Labor Emigration from China, 1989–2013.
Sources: China International Contractors Association (CHICA), Annual Report on China's International Labor Collaboration, *2014–13 (Beijing: CHICA, various years); China's Annual Statistics on International Economy, 1990–2013*

The distribution of Chinese migrant workers by occupation has remained largely unchanged since the end of the 1990s. From 1995 to 2013 around 40 percent of Chinese migrants worked in manufacturing industries (especially textiles and food

processing); 25 percent worked in construction and 15 percent in the agriculture, forestry, and fishing industries. Less than 0.5 percent of migrants worked in white-collar jobs.[15]

When China first allowed individual overseas deployment in the 1980s, most Chinese migrant workers chose to move to destinations in the Middle East, such as Iraq and Kuwait. Since the end of the first Gulf War, more than 70 percent of unskilled and semi-skilled Chinese workers emigrated to countries in East and Southeast Asia (Japan, Singapore, and South Korea were the top three destinations for many of these years). Beyond Asia, an average of 20 percent migrated to Africa, 5 percent to Europe, 3 percent to Australia and New Zealand, and 2 percent to other destinations (primarily the U.S.-controlled Pacific islands of Saipan and Guam) in the same time frame.[16] These migration patterns remained more or less constant between 1991 and 2008, and form a sharp contrast to the trends among highly skilled and wealthy migrants, who predominantly migrate to Western destinations.

Despite the apparent stability of unskilled migration routes, levels of such migration have been volatile in the past few years, due to market fluctuations and frequent policy changes. For example, the onset of the global financial crisis in 2008 and the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake prompted the number of Chinese migrant workers entering Japan to drop from 68,188 in 2007 to 1,923 in 2012 (Shao, 2014, pp. 186–87). Migration to South Korea, another top destination, was suspended between 2008 and 2011 because the two governments could not agree on recruitment procedures. Once a migration scheme is downsized or cancelled, a large number of migrant workers may be left in limbo. An already high level of uncertainty surrounding low-skilled labor migration is compounded by the involvement of a large number of commercial brokers in China and in receiving countries. Brokers often recruit more migrants than needed by employers, in part due to poor coordination among the multiple actors involved.

HISTORICAL CONTEXT: THE EFFECTS OF MARKET-ORIENTED REFORMS ON EMIGRATION

China's liberalization of its emigration policies from the 1980s onward prompted huge increases in emigration and reconfigured the government's relationship with Chinese nationals abroad. Before the 1980s the Chinese state was built upon a foundation of immobility: people were not supposed to move, either internally or internationally. In 2013 nearly 100 million mainland Chinese went abroad—primarily as tourists and students[17]—up from 31 million in 2005, 10 million in 2000, and around 4.5 million in 1995 (National Statistics Bureau, 1996, 2001, 2006).

The Liberalization of China's Emigration Policy, 1980-Present

The year 1986 stands out as a landmark year when three major policy changes took place. First, contractual employment relationships replaced life-tenure jobs. On the

one hand, this created an open labor market where it became normal for individuals to seek and quit jobs; on the other hand, state-owned enterprises could now lay off workers when they privatized or closed down—passing off the costs of business to the workers. This directly fed into the surge of labor emigration, both internally to coastal areas with robust private sectors and internationally in the late 1990s, especially from the rustbelt northeastern region.

Second, national ID cards were introduced for the first time in 1986. Until then, the only documents Chinese citizens could use to prove their identity were their household registration booklets (issued to an entire family) or introduction letters from their work units or township governments (for rural residents). The ID card was introduced to ensure social control, and in particular to fight crime, but it unintentionally provided an unprecedented level of freedom of mobility. The ID cards enabled all Chinese adult citizens to apply for passports and other documents, open bank accounts and make money transfers, purchase air tickets, and sign legal contracts independently—all actions that are indispensable for pursuing overseas opportunities.

Finally, in 1986 any Chinese individual could for the first time apply for a "private" passport, rather than an "ordinary public" passport. While private passports can be obtained by most individuals and are possessed by them, ordinary public passports were reserved for state employees. Public institutions must apply for ordinary public passports on behalf of their employees, and they typically hold them for the individual. Ordinary public passports are different from diplomatic passports which are issued to senior diplomats only. The application procedure was also considerably streamlined; by 2005 most urban residents could obtain a passport within five working days after applying in a major city (and 15 days in other locations). The *Passport Law* (effective beginning in January 2007) enshrined citizens' legal entitlement to possess a passport.

Other institutional changes also have had important impacts on emigration. Urban housing reform, begun in 1998, allowed citizens to purchase state-owned housing at subsidized prices. The resulting property certificates are now widely used by would-be migrants as security when dealing with recruitment intermediaries, loan creditors, and foreign embassies. In the countryside, house property certificates and household contract certificates (for land or forest), introduced in the mid-2000s, have had similar effects. The establishment of public notary offices has also been indispensable in translating local evidence into internationally accepted legal documents. Most foreign embassies in China require documents to be verified by public notary offices, as do many employers and schools overseas.

The liberalization of state regulation over private migration agencies in 2002 was another decisive measure. This policy shift put the responsibility for labor emigration on overseas employers and individuals themselves (and, it turns out, domestic recruiters) rather than on the Chinese state. It broke the state monopoly over labor exports, and allowed private individuals to apply for licenses to enter the labor export and recruitment market (Xiang, 2012, p. 48). Now, four types of

commercial agencies are in operation: overseas education, labor emigration, general emigration, and international tourism.

It is important to stress that these policy liberalizations have not undermined state power, but instead enhanced it. In the old passport application system, for example, would-be migrants had to obtain political approval from their work unit or local government to apply for passports and exit clearance. This system put everyone under strict scrutiny, but in a decentralized and scattered manner. Some corrupt officials managed to obtain multiple passports by manipulating local loopholes, which enabled them to abscond overseas even when they were under investigation. The simplification and centralization of the application procedure means that decisions are now made according to a simple, single set of criteria instead of a subjective assessment, and all the data are administered in a unified manner. The effort is largely successful; the migration industry was formalized and illegal emigration has been contained since the 2000s. Indeed, the strengthening of the regulatory capacity of the state is an important factor underpinning the rise of China.

While these policies of general liberalization have increased population mobility of all kinds, different types of emigration have been affected differently. What follows is a review of specific policy changes relevant to student and labor migration.

Student Migration

A number of policy changes have facilitated greater student migration from China since the 1980s, in a signal of the country's opening up after the Cultural Revolution of 1966–76. This opening up has been a gradual process, as indicated by the slow increase in the numbers of students studying overseas right up to the early 2000s, when student emigration quickly accelerated (see Figure 3).

Studying abroad was out of the question for most Chinese during the Cultural Revolution. Then at the end of the 1970s the Ministry of Education, pushed by Deng Xiaoping, started sending select researchers to the West to pursue their study. This initiative was further facilitated by the Sino-America Understanding on Educational Exchanges of October 1978, and the Agreement on Cooperation in Science and Technology of January 1979 (Zweig & Chen, 1995, p. 19). In 1981 the State Council first recognized self-financed overseas study—that is, going abroad to study without the state's sponsorship—as a legitimate means of exiting China.

In the late 1980s the low return rate of students seeking degrees outside China's borders triggered debates about brain drain. The top leadership argued that those who failed to return should be regarded as China's "overseas reservoir of talent," and as such the government should continue supporting student emigration. This resolve was put to the test in 1989 by the student protests at Tian'anmen Square. Tian'anmen arguably marked a turning point in student migration from China. Following the protests, the United States and other Western countries granted permanent residency to a large number of Chinese students (about 70,000 in the United States alone), turning students into skilled migrants en masse. Meanwhile,

the Chinese government, surprisingly, not only continued sending students overseas, but made a significant policy shift—from implementing punitive policies against students who overstayed their overseas studies, to encouraging return regardless of whether students had ever broken agreements with the state. Returned students were also allowed to quit their jobs in the public sector if they preferred to work in private or foreign-owned enterprises. The new policy line was to "support study overseas, encourage returns, guarantee freedom of movement." This enabled students to come and go from China, with their spouses and children, and work and live in any part of China upon their return (Zweig & Rosen, 2003; Zweig, 2006, pp. 190–91).

The late 1990s saw the emergence of "transnationalism" in Chinese government policy, when the central government altered the slogan of *huiguo fuwu* ("return and serve the motherland") to *weiguo fuwu* ("serve the motherland"). In 2003 overseas students were no longer required to pay back the state to compensate for the public higher education they received before migrating.[18] There are no policies currently restricting student migration; instead, the focus has shifted toward the regulation of private education agencies and the facilitation of efforts to promote returns (see Section IV).

Unskilled Labor Migration

International labor migration from China started with foreign-aid projects in the 1950s, when the Chinese government sent personnel to more than 50 developing countries. Between the 1950s and 1970s, for example, China sent some 150,000 technicians to Africa to work on building infrastructure and the capacity of the agricultural and technology sectors (Politzer, 2008). China set up a group of state-owned companies during the 1980s to engage with labor export on a commercial basis as part of its market-oriented reform program.

In 1992 the category of "individual overseas employment" was formally introduced as a new form of international labor cooperation. This meant that any individual—including one without formal employment—could search for overseas jobs through commercial companies, whereas workers had once needed endorsement from their work units to do so. Workers' new mobility was aided further by a 2002 reform allowing privately owned companies to apply for a special license to facilitate international labor recruitment.

In May 2012 the State Council issued the *Regulation on the Administration of Foreign Labor Cooperation*, which defined in detail the legal relations among recruitment companies, migrant workers, and local governments. The regulation was meant to facilitate labor emigration as well as to enhance the protection of workers' rights and to discipline recruitment companies. It requires written contracts from overseas employers that delineate migrants' employment and labor conditions, benefits, and protection and compensation (Winston & Strawn LLP, 2012).

Unlike the case of skilled migration, unskilled labor migration policy has liberalized even as the migrant recruitment process has become increasingly complex. This

complexity is in part due to the requirements of migrant-receiving countries, and in part to concerns about migrants' rights. For instance, under the policy framework set by the Chinese and Japanese governments, a Japanese employer wanting to hire a Chinese worker must submit hiring plans to local industry associations in Japan, who apply for quotas on its behalf from a national association, which in turn applies to the government. After government approval, the quotas are sent to a public institute in China that distributes the quotas among qualified licensed companies that often, in turn, pass on recruitment tasks to lower-level, unlicensed brokers.

This complex system is compounded by the commercial interests of both licensed and unlicensed brokers. Licensed companies—most of them capital-rich, large-scale corporations located in large cities—regularly outsource actual recruitment tasks to unlicensed brokers that tend to have better access to the labor force itself. However, these brokers' unauthorized status means they cannot send workers overseas (even if they have workers and overseas contacts) without the aid of the licensed companies. This system has created hierarchical recruitment chains and driven up intermediary fees, while migrant incomes have remained stagnant. For example, it is estimated that the average cost for migrants going to Japan, Singapore, or South Korea to work on a two- or three-year contract rose to US $8,000 by the late 2000s, including intermediary fees and airfare. Meanwhile, the incomes of unskilled migrants in these three destinations have either remained stagnant since the early 1990s (averaging $500 a month) or have decreased.[19]

Unlike skilled migrants, who can switch from one visa category to another with relative ease, unskilled labor migrants are constrained. It is almost impossible for Chinese labor migrants to permanently settle in most parts of Asia or Africa. Compulsory return upon the completion of a job contract is stringently enforced. Employers and recruitment agencies in Japan, South Korea, and Singapore are fined or banned from bringing in more migrant workers in the future if their workers go missing or overstay. The employers and recruiters pass on this liability to migrants, who are required to pay sureties—reportedly about $3,500 for going to Japan and $5,000 for South Korea—before their departure to ensure their timely return.[20] Migrants' property certificates are often surrendered as an additional surety.

In sum, policy reforms have created a paradoxical situation in which unskilled labor migration is more orderly than before in the sense that illegal immigration has been mitigated, systematic rules are put in place to guide the procedures about recruitment, and the government has developed various methods to monitor the intermediary business closely, but the process is now far more complicated and costly for migrants.

EMIGRATION AND DIASPORA ENGAGEMENT POLICIES

A study commissioned by the Chinese State Council Office of Overseas Chinese Affairs estimated there were nearly 50 million Chinese nationals and diaspora

members worldwide in 2008, including 73 percent in Southeast Asia, 12 percent in North America, and 5 percent in Europe.[21] Of these, the so-called "new migrants"—those who left China after the 1980s—became a main target for diaspora engagement policies beginning in the early 2000s. Such policies are divisible into three main categories: those that help migrants at destination, those that facilitate the return of overseas nationals and diaspora members, and those that encourage diaspora members to build and maintain strong ties with their country of heritage. Compared with earlier efforts to connect with the Chinese diaspora in the 1980s and 1990s, the current phase has two particular characteristics. First, the policy priority has shifted from financial investment (remittances are almost never mentioned in recent policy discussions in China) to technology transfer, capacity building, and rights protection. Second, diaspora engagement is increasingly conceived as part of China's deeper integration into the world rather than as a means for narrowly defined economic benefits.

Assisting Chinese Migrants at Destination

The Chinese government is increasingly cognizant of its overseas nationals' needs at destination, and has passed a series of regulations in recent years geared at maintaining contact with overseas nationals, protecting their rights, and, when necessary, providing for their security. For example, by 2012 China had stationed education offices (or teams) in 65 overseas missions in 40 countries to maintain close ties with overseas students. Another important example—this time of policies targeting labor migrants at destination—is the aforementioned *Regulation on the Administration of Foreign Labor Cooperation of 2012*, which further formalized the recruitment process for unskilled migrant workers and required written contracts outlining terms of employment and workers' benefits and rights.

China has become much more active in protecting its overseas citizens in times of social unrest. In 2004 China established the Interministry Working Meeting on Protecting the Rights of PRC Legal Persons and Citizens Overseas; and its 2012 regulation includes clauses that require recruitment companies to develop detailed emergency plans and defines it as the responsibility of the local (that is, provincial) government where the recruitment company is registered to facilitate rescue operations if necessary.

The Chinese government has signed bilateral agreements on labor migration with Bahrain, Japan, Malaysia, Russia, and South Korea, and is now negotiating with other countries to develop clear bilateral frameworks to regulate migration and enforce rights protection. Until recently, China had concluded next to no bilateral portability agreements that would allow its overseas nationals to accrue, preserve, and transfer social benefits upon their return (Holzmann & Koett, 2012, pp. 4–5). Now, there are a few exceptions, such as China's portability agreements with South Korea, Denmark, and Germany (Luo, 2014).

Return and Reintegration Policies

China's government has introduced a number of policies geared toward encouraging skilled overseas nationals to return on a temporary or permanent basis. Efforts include providing financial incentives, assisting with the return process itself, and setting up overseas associations for scholars and professionals that then run recruitment drives (Zweig, 2006, pp. 194–197). A Returnee Service Center was created in 2002 as a single window to assist returnees with settlement. In 2002 the Ministry of Education (in conjunction with the Ministry of Public Security and Ministry of Foreign Affairs) designated special "green channels" for returnees that made entry, exit, and settlement easier. The Ministry of Education also devised policies to address returnees' concerns about their children's schooling: for example, it encouraged cities to establish special school programs for returnees' children with poor Chinese language skills (Zweig, 2006, p. 196).

Local-level governments such as in Shanghai often run their own recruitment drives, sending representatives to overseas job fairs. At the local level, many provinces and municipalities offer special research grants or business start-up loans to returnees. Guangzhou municipality hands out $12,000 as a "golden hello" to returnees who decide to work there.

China has established a number of science and business parks, and uses financial incentives and direct recruitment to encourage the return of overseas nationals with expertise in the science and technology sectors. For example, returnees may be provided with low-interest loans or exemptions on importing certain equipment, and given subsidies on housing or salaries. It is estimated that by 2015, China had set up more than 305 industrial parks, with more than 22,000 active enterprises set up by 63,000 returnees (Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security, 2016).

China's state and local governments also run high-profile recruitment drives that sponsor academics or professionals to return and work in China for a period of several years (or permanently). One example at the state level is the Thousand Talents Program, which recruits overseas Chinese nationals who work for an international university or international research institution (an earlier incarnation of this program was the Hundred Talents Program). The central government provides around US $160,000 for every expert recruited, with additional matching grants from the Chinese Academy of Sciences and the University of Chinese Academic Sciences (University of Chinese Academic Sciences, 2014). Local governments often offer further grants: for example, Hangzhou, the capital city of Zhejiang province, provides an additional $160,000 as a gift to the returnee, a $160,000-$800,000 research grant, a research laboratory, five or more research assistants, and generous salary packages (People's Government of Hangzhou, 2010). By the end of 2012, 3,319 high-level experts had been recruited nationwide under this scheme (Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security, 2013).

Diaspora Engagement Initiatives

China also has a number of policies and action plans to encourage transnational ties with its nationals overseas, particularly students and professionals. One 2001 policy called on overseas Chinese students to "serve the country from abroad" (Zweig & Rosen, 2003). These policies range from those encouraging diaspora members to visit China, to organizing conferences and online resources that showcase the contributions of overseas experts and professionals.

A number of government web portals target diaspora professionals and scholars. Notable examples include China Scholar Abroad, China Diaspora Web, Liuxue.net, China Overseas Talent, and CAS Overseas Study and Continuing Education. Most government departments that work with overseas Chinese have established portals (or dedicated sections of their websites) to overseas Chinese. There are also numerous province- or even municipality-based websites such as the Nanjing International Talent Networks and Liaoning Overseas Chinese Scholar Innovation Engineering Network.

As noted, the Chinese government has also introduced a number of policies to encourage diaspora members to visit China on a temporary basis. One example is the 2013 *Law on Border Exit and Entry* and the 2013 *Regulations on Foreign Citizens' Border Exit and Entr*y, which introduced new visa categories Q and S for persons who have close family ties with Chinese citizens. Prior to this law, in June 2010, the Ministry of Public Security liberalized regulations on foreigners' applications for residence in China, in an effort primarily designed to benefit the Chinese diaspora. In 1996 the Ministry of Education set up the Chunhui Plan, which supports short-term visits to China for the purposes of academic exchange, the provision of training, the joint supervision of PhD students, technology transfer to underdeveloped regions in China, and participation in research and development (R&D) at large and medium state-owned enterprises.[12] This plan launched a subprogram in 2001 to enable overseas Chinese professionals (OCPs) to work in China during their sabbaticals; the ministry and hiring university share the financial costs. Other government agencies organize ad hoc, thematic workshops (for example, on the financial crisis or climate change) and visits. Ever since the first Guangzhou Overseas Student Fair was held in 1998, conferences have been convened across China in order to connect overseas professionals, potential investors (many of them are migrants or their descendants who left China before 1949), and local enterprises.

The success of these diaspora engagement programs lies in their multifaceted nature. In sum, what we see is a highly elaborate institutional matrix that consists of multiple actors (local government, various ministries, enterprises, and quasi-governmental associations); different formats and channels of communication (regular conferences, overseas visits by Chinese delegations, and dedicated online portals); and diverse, well-financed, mechanisms to provide financial, political, and symbolic incentives to returnees as well as to the government departments and commercial companies who facilitate their return.

CONCLUSIONS

Emigration from China is likely to remain high for a long time, in spite of economic growth and rising levels of income. The fact that emigration is concentrated among the highly skilled and wealthy indicates that while economic status is an important determinant of people's capability to migrate, Chinese emigrants are also motivated by considerations other than economic opportunities, such as quality of life. Further economic development may only strengthen both the desire and capability of high-skilled and wealthy individuals to emigrate.

The rapid increase in emigration from China is a direct result of the liberalization of exit controls, but is more fundamentally associated with broader socioeconomic developments in China and overseas. Three decades of market-oriented reforms have produced a group of ultra-high-income individuals who are migrating in growing numbers to the West through immigrant investor channels. Families in the growing middle class see overseas education as a central means to secure their newly acquired privileges for their children. At the same time, many unskilled workers are being pushed overseas by layoffs resulting from the privatization of state-owned enterprises, and the marginalization of small household businesses in favor of larger firms. While the transnational mobility of the high income and highly skilled is welcomed by both sending and receiving countries, the transnational mobility of unskilled migrants is carefully controlled by both. As such, emigration from China is increasingly a means of reinforcing and reproducing social inequality rather than a means of mitigating it.

The Chinese government's engagement with emigration can be summarized as a dual movement: simultaneous liberalization and proactive intervention. The Chinese government has developed effective public-private partnerships to facilitate emigration management. Government departments collaborate with high-tech private enterprises to attract the return of highly skilled emigrants, and at the same time work with private recruitment companies to regulate unskilled labor emigration. Efforts to encourage return migration and diaspora engagement are widely regarded as great successes,[22] and various initiatives have certainly intensified transnational movements and connections. The regulation of unskilled labor migration has had more mixed outcomes, as it makes migration safer and more orderly but simultaneously more expensive for migrants themselves. Building and maintaining ties with the growing Chinese diaspora, as well as providing effective assistance and protections to Chinese citizens at destination, will be major new challenges for the Chinese government in the coming years.

NOTES

[1] This chapter was originally published as a report by the Migration Policy Institute (MPI) entitled Emigration Trends and Policies in China: Movement of the Wealthy and Highly Skilled, which is available online at www.migrationpolicy.org/research/emigration-trends-and-policies-china-movement-wealthy-and-highly-skilled. MPI is an independent, nonpartisan think tank dedicated to the study of movement of people worldwide.

[2] Unless noted otherwise, China, as used in this chapter, refers to the People's Republic of China (PRC) excluding Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan.

[3] Immigrant investors must invest US $1 million (or $500,000, if in a Targeted Economic Area) and create or preserve at least ten jobs for U.S. workers. In exchange, they are awarded a temporary residence permit that becomes permanent if they reach this job-creation/-preservation threshold.

[4] Canada launched a much smaller Immigrant Investor Venture Capital Pilot Program in late 2014, which significantly raised the minimum investment threshold (from CA $800,000 to $2 million) and minimum net worth (from $1.6 million to $10 million), and asked for a nonguaranteed investment in a venture capital fund (instead of guaranteed government-issued bonds). The old Immigrant Investor Program still operates in Quebec, which selects its own economic immigrants and refugees.

[5] Data from November 24, 2015, to October 31, 2015. Nationals of Hong Kong, who are counted separately, received an additional 3.2 percent of Significant Investor Visas in this timeframe. See DIBP, "Significant Investor visa statistics," accessed December 7, 2015, www.border.gov.au/about/reports-publications/research-statistics/statistics/work-in-australia/significant-investor-visa-statistics

[6] For example, in 2013, the top ten universities in the QS World Universities Rankings were all either in the United Kingdom or the United States, while China only had two universities in the top 50. QS, "QS World University Rankings 2013/2014: An Overview," www.topuniversities.com/university-rankings-articles/world-university-rankings/qs-world-university-rankings-20132014

[7] See, for example, interviews conducted in the following: Rachel Wang, "Why China's Rich Want to Leave," *The Atlantic*, April 11, 2013, www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/04/why-chinas-rich-want-to-leave/274920/; Jason Chow and Angus Loten, "More Wealthy Chinese Said to Prepare Exits," *Wall Street Journal*, May 11, 2012, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014240527023042036045773938410143130 50; *The Economist,* "Middle Class Flight: Yearning to Breathe Free," *The Economist*, April 26, 2014, www.economist.com/news/china/21601305-more-middle-classes-are-leaving-search-cleaner-slower-life-yearning-breathe

[8] Including Mainland China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macao.

[9] See, for example, "Is the Third Wave of Outmigration Emptying China?" *Southern Daily*, December 13, 2011.

[10] Indian students comprised 13.6 percent of all foreign students in the United States. See International Institute for Education, "Open Doors Data. International Students: Leading Places of Origin," accessed December 7, 2015, www.iie.org/Research-and-Publications/Open-Doors/Data/International-Students/Leading-Places-of-Origin/2013-15

[11] Estimate according to education migration agencies in China, see *Overseas Studies Web,* http://meiguo.liuxue86.com/feiyong/

[12] The urban and rural per capita annual disposable incomes are, respectively, $4,325 and $1,427. See National Bureau of Statistics, *2013 National Economic and Social Development Statistics Bulletin* (Beijing: National Bureau of Statistics, 2014), www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/zxfb/201402/t20140224_514970.html

[13] While the number of students leaving increased by 27.5 percent between 2008 and 2009, this number increased by only 3.6 percent between 2012 and 2013; see China Education Online, *2014 Report on Trends of Student Emigration*.

[14] U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) in 2015 cracked down on a number of businesses in California that allegedly promote "birth tourism"—arranging for the stay of expectant Chinese mothers in the United States until after they give birth, securing U.S. citizenship for their child. Media reports suggest rising numbers of Chinese nationals are choosing to travel to the United States to give birth; while the data are scarce, undoubtedly such travel represents only a small fraction of total Chinese temporary migration to the United States. See, for example, Victoria Kim and Frank Shyong, "'Maternity tourism' raids target California operations catering to Chinese," Los Angeles Times, March 3, 2015, www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-birth-tourism-schemes-raids-20150303-story.html; Benjamin Carlson, "Welcome to Maternity Hotel California," *Rolling Stone,* August 19, 2015, www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/welcome-to-maternity-hotel-california-20150819

[15] See China International Contractors Association(CHICA) 2004-13; Zhang Gesheng, 1999; Yin Hao 2009.

[16] Ibid.

[17] Border Exit and Entrance Administration Bureau, "Statistics on Border Crossing," cited in Xinhua News Agency, "Zhongguo Gong'an Bu: 2013 nian yu 45 yi renci churu jing" [Ministry of Public Security: Over 450 Million People-Time Crossed the National Border in 2013], January 15, 2014, http://news.xinhuanet.com/edu/2014-01/15/c_118985410.htm

[18] According to the rule set in 1993 by the State Commission of Education (now the Ministry of Education), BA graduates must work in China for five years and MA graduates for three years before leaving China. Otherwise BA graduates have to pay RMB 2,000 (US $244 in 2000) for every year short of the five, and MA graduates have to pay RMB 4,000 for every year short of three.

[19] Author's field research in northeast China, Singapore, South Korea, and Japan, 2004-12.

[20] Author's field research in northeast China, Singapore, South Korea, and Japan, 2004–12.

[21] These figures include PRC citizens, foreign citizens originally from China, and people from Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Macau who are currently outside China, regardless of their citizenship status. See Guotu Zhuang, 2010, p. 30.

[22] See, for example, Zweig et al., 2006, pp. 449–71; Wang, 2012.

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EMIGRATION TRENDS AND POLICIES IN CHINA

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16. CHINESE INTELLECTUAL MIGRATION TO THE US

Historical Overview and Contemporary Trends

Increasingly there is a global race for procuring “talents”—those well-educated and highly-skilled migrants who would significantly contribute to a country’s economic development and enhance its global standing. The cross-border movements and transnational activities among this group of people are characterized as “brain circulation.” In this article, we use the newly coined concept of “intellectual migration” (including students and skilled migrants) to explore the characteristics and impacts of those highly-skilled migrants on their sending and receiving countries. We argue that intellectual migration is often rooted in different dynamics, and that members of this group frequently take a different route than family or labour migrants, despite their shared similarities. As such, the flow, pace, and volume of international students and scholars from a given country may be different from, instead of in sync with, that country’s general migration trends.

Upon briefly discussing intellectual migration as a conceptual framework, this paper first traces the history of Chinese intellectual migration and the earlier pioneers’ impact on China. It then provides an overview of contemporary intellectual migration between Asian countries, especially the Newly Industrial Countries (NICs), India and China (IC), and the US. We mainly focus on academic migration as a result of changing geopolitics, global economics, and government policies. Economic growth and increasing wealth in Asian countries has enabled students to go abroad to study. Large numbers of highly-skilled migrants from China emerged after Chinese economic reform, and those numbers continue to grow along with the economic development and openness. We conclude that intellectual migration can have positive impacts on both sending and receiving countries, and may potentially achieve the UN’s “triple win” goal (United Nations, 2006) for these countries and for migrants themselves.

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: INTELLECTUAL MIGRATION

Theoretical concepts on highly-skilled migration mainly include “brain drain,” “brain gain,” “brain loss,” “brain waste,” “brain circulation,” “brain mobility,” “onward migration,” “return migration,” and “reverse migration.” Existing literature generally considers highly-skilled migrants as those who possess high-levels of

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"human capital" that benefit a country's development. Thus, in a contemporary globalizing context, attracting highly-skilled migrants has become an international competition among countries. Scholars use terms such as "brain drain" and "brain gain" to describe the impacts on sending and receiving countries of these high-skilled migrants respectively. To highly-skilled migrants' sending country, the mass emigration of skilled workers imposes significantly negative effects on a country's economic, social, and political development (Lee & Kim, 2010; Massey et al., 1998; Saxenian, 2005). Some scholars and policy makers in developing countries have taken a prevalent pessimistic perspective, considering "Brain drain is detrimental for the country of emigration… [it] can indeed be seen as a negative externality" (Beine et al., 2001, p. 276).

Furthermore, the changing migration pattern of highly-skilled persons is not merely a consequence of contemporary economic globalization and international relations, but also an important factor to the globalizing economy and nation-state policies. For example, issues of brain drain, skills shortages, lack of career opportunities, and return migration have drawn great attention from policymakers who are concerned with the research and development in governments, academia, and industries (Mahroum, 2005). From developed countries' perspective, large inflow of highly-skilled temporary migrants not only raises public concerns on how to adjust the temporary stay of these new migrants with relatively high socio-economic status, but also triggers the nation-state to change policies on immigration admission. Changing economic and immigration policies in the developed world will further impact the globalizing economy and international politics. Developing countries consider the emigration and return migration of highly-skilled persons beneficial to the country's development in the long-term. Yet, such effect is also largely subject to the changing immigration policies in other countries, as well as economic cycles (Ley & Kobayashi, 2005). Developing countries hence adjust their policies from discouraging emigration to favouring return migration of highly-skilled persons, which further accelerates the global mobility of highly-skilled migrants. This will eventually promote the global exchange of human capital, despite the fact that mobility of highly-skilled labour across political borders sometimes provides a solution to some countries, while engendering problems to others.

Many factors have driven global migration of highly-skilled migrants. In the past several decades, economic globalization and changing international relations have impacted the shifting pattern of highly-skilled migration worldwide from one-way "brain drain vs. brain gain", to a networked "brain circulation." The changing migration pattern of highly-skilled migrants also in turn impacts the globalizing economy, nation-state policies, and international politics.

Based on a review of existing literature and examination of both internal and international migration of students and other highly-skilled professionals, we recently coined the concept of "intellectual migration", and developed an analytical framework to examine the relevant stakeholders. We contest that intellectual migration entails "the migration movement of degree-seeking students as well as

skilled migrants who already have at least a bachelor degree, and migrate to upgrade and utilize their human capital" (Li, Yu, Sadowski-Smith, & Wang, 2015, p. 46). This conceptualization emphasizes the purpose of human capital accumulation and utilization, and as such differentiates it from those who migrate primarily in search of a job, to those to reunite with family, or to those to make a living.

Since the 1980s, economic globalization and changing geopolitics have enhanced the mobility of skilled migrants. Many former migrant sending countries began to experience inflows of skilled returnees from the developed world who contribute significantly to their home countries' development (Castles & Miller, 2009). Thus, many scholars advocate that brain drain is no longer always a curse to the development of origin countries (Commander, Kangasniemi, & Winters, 2004). Instead, the return migration of highly-skilled migrants accomplishes a migration circulation that benefits both immigrant sending and receiving countries. Many scholars now adopt the term "brain circulation" to describe the "dynamic mobility of skilled individuals who return home to their countries while maintaining social and professional relationships with the host country, which in turn enhances their productivity in the home country" (Saxenian, 2005, p. 54). In other words, these migrants often live a transnational life and exert impacts on both sending and receiving countries. Brain circulation challenges previous dichotomy of brain drain vs. brain gain, because migration flows are no longer a one-way ticket, but indeed flow in multiple directions (Blitz, 2005; Le, 2008; Saxenian, 2002). This networked flow of skilled people and technology contributes to both ends of the migration equation.

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF CHINESE INTELLECTUAL MIGRATION

As the first large Asian migrant group to the US, early Chinese migrants suffered a long and unjust history. The 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act was the first and only US federal immigration legislation to prohibit an immigrant group based entirely on race, nationality, and class; it also prevented Chinese immigrants from becoming naturalized citizens. The resulting Chinese Exclusion Era, which lasted 61 years, not only caused reduced numbers of Chinese immigrants, but restricted the entire Chinese population in the US for multiple decades. Political disfranchisement and the difficulty of forming families (other legislations also curbed Chinese female immigrants) gave early Chinese immigrants no choice but to live a transnational lifestyle, travelling back to form families in China, but working and living in the US most of the time (Li, 2009).

Surprisingly, even during such a dark age of US immigration history, there was almost no interruption of intellectual exchange with China. American missionaries established English-speaking schools in coastal China in the nineteenth century and sponsored a number of Chinese students to study in the US. As early as 1818–1825, five Chinese boys studied at a mission school in Cornwall, CT. One of them later served as an interpreter for Commissioner Lin Zexu (林则徐), who led the destruction of stockpiles of opium smuggled into China. The best known Chinese

intellectual for China/US exchange in the nineteenth century was Yung Wing (容闳), the first Chinese graduate from a major American college. Yung later served as the deputy commissioner of the Chinese Educational Mission, the first officially sponsored educational program between China and the US, and the associate minister to the United States. In the 1870s, the Chinese Educational Mission sent 120 young Chinese males to America with a 15-year study plan. The program was abruptly ended in 1881, one year before the Chinese Exclusion Act, when West Point reportedly refused to consider Chinese applicants. This group of Chinese students in the US nevertheless played important roles in China after their return: including the first Premier of the Republic of China (ROC), Tang Shaoyi (唐绍仪); the first president of the then Tsinghua College (financed by Qing Dynasty's Boxer Indemnity (庚子赔款), Tang Guoan (唐国安); and the Chinese railroad industry pioneer, Zhan Tianyou (詹天佑). Moreover, the founding father of the Republic of China and Kuomintang (KMT), Dr. Sun Yat-sen (孙中山), obtained a medical degree and practiced afterward in the US. In the early twentieth century, some females also joined the roster of Chinese students in the US—among them, the famous Soong sisters, two of whom later became Chinese First Lady by marrying Dr. Sun Yat-sen, and Chiang Kai-shek (蒋介石) the leader of KMT and the Nationalist government 1927–1975) respectively (Chang, 2003; Moyers, 2003).

Influenced by the European revolutionary tradition, a group of founding members of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) who later became important first generation leaders of the People's Republic of China (PRC), as well as a future leader of the KMT, had studied/worked in France, Germany, the former USSR, or other European countries in the 1920s. Among them, Zhou Enlai (周恩来), the first Premier of the PRC, and Deng Xiaoping (邓小平), the "paramount leader" of the CCP and the PRC (1976–2007) who led the post-Mao open door policies and economic reforms that contributed significantly to what China is today; and son of Chiang Kai-shek and later president of ROC and KMT, Chiang Ching-kuo (蒋经国). Deng and Chiang were even classmates in the USSR while studying communism (Lee, 1994; Taylor, 2000; Wang, 1982).

There were 3,610 Chinese students and scholars enrolled in 454 US colleges and universities at the time of the establishment of the PRC. Most of them were financially sponsored by Nationalist or provincial government scholarships, and they were supposed to return to China upon graduation. The establishment of the PRC abruptly changed their fate. The US provided scholarships to those students during their studies and assisted with job placement and housing after their graduation under the China Area Aid Act, which appropriated $8 million in the name of fighting communism in China. Among this Chinese scholar group, many were outstanding contributors in various academic fields, including Nobel Physics Laureates T.C. Lee (李政道) and C.N.Yang (杨振宁); as well as the "father of Chinese Rocketry," Tsien Hsue-shen (钱学森), a MIT- and Cal Tech-trained scientist who was detained, house-arrested by FBI, and eventually deported back to the PRC in 1955 (Chang, 2003; Li, 2009). Direct intellectual exchange between the US and the PRC was halted for three decades, but the Cold War period witnessed increase of Taiwanese

students who studied and worked in the US. Many eventually returned to Taiwan and became leaders in science or industrial development, as well as prominent politicians. Taiwan's two-term president, Ma Ying-jeou (马英九), received a Master of Law (LL.M.) from New York University in 1976, a law degree (S.J.D.) from Harvard University in 1981, and then went back to Taiwan the same year (International Herald Tribune, 2010).[2]

US investment in the education systems of Asian countries before and since World War II has been in the form of providing faculty and exchange programs, and increasingly, recruiting students directly from Asia (Ong, Bonacich, & Cheng, 1994). Such programs not only exported American democratic values and ideology, but also initially generated brain drain from source countries, as more Asian international students and scholars came to the US, and then stayed to become permanent US residents, and eventually naturalized citizens. In addition to scholars, waves of Asian immigrants in other visa types—semi-skilled and highly-skilled migrant workers—entered the US after the passage of 1965 Immigration and Naturalization Act, which altogether contributed to the contemporary flow of intellectual migration from Asia to the US.

CONTEMPORARY TRENDS OF INTELLECTUAL MIGRATION

The number of Chinese immigrants to the US skyrocketed after the 1965 Immigration and Naturalization Act, starting largely in the form of migrant family reunification. Meanwhile, educational attainment level among Chinese immigrants has also been steadily growing with a fast speed. Table 1 demonstrates such trends in the past half century. Bachelor or higher degree holders among all foreign-born Chinese increased from less than 14% in 1960 to close to 50% in 2010. The official recommencement of PRC-US intellectual exchange did not occur until after the economic reform of the PRC in 1979. Since then, growing numbers of Chinese students and scholars have arrived in the US, and many American scholars have travelled to China to teach or to conduct research. According to the records of China's Ministry of Education, 1,810 out of the 2,230 (81.2%) Chinese students sent abroad in 1978 and 1979 were graduate students or exchanges scholars, most of whom were funded by the Chinese Academy of Science or by US educational institutions (Hai, 2007). In the next two decades, the overwhelming majority of degree-seeking Chinese students were graduate students, sponsored by Chinese government funds, US scholarships, or China/US exchange programs. The percentage of students and scholars among all Chinese temporary migrants increased approximately 68% in the last decade alone.

Moreover, we argue that intellectual migration is embedded in different dynamics, and often it flows differently than family or labour migration, especially among those migrants whose overseas studies are financed by themselves or their families. When a country's economic growth reaches a certain tipping point, people are less likely to emigrate out of their home country with the primary goal of seeking higher wages, but on the other hand, they are able to accumulate sufficient assets and financial

resources to fund overseas study. As such, the flow, pace, and volume of international students and scholars may well be different from the country's general immigration trends. Table 1 demonstrates the growth of intellectual migration correlates with the growing per capita GDP of China. Similarly, Japanese students' US study is another case in point. "In the 1970s and 1980s, when Japan's economy was booming, the bottom line did not matter for many young Japanese. It was fashionable, stimulating, and affordable for them to travel the world, study English in foreign settings and attend college in the United States. Their parents had money, and jobs were plentiful when they came home" (Hing, 1994, p. 140). The rapid growth of Japanese students coming to the US was at odds when Japanese immigration has levelled off, even decreased, overtime. Similarly Korean immigration to the US has tapered off, whereas their student migration increases steadily.

Table 1. Chinese population and immigration by decade, 1960–2010

Decade ending year	*Total Chinese population (stock data)**	*Decade growth rate*	*Bachelor or higher degree among foreign- born Chinese*	*Chinese immigrants in prior decade (flow data)***	*Decade growth rate*	*Students & scholars among all temporary migrants*	*Per capita GDP by decade end (in current US$) ****
1960	237,292	n.a.	13.8%	25,201	n.a.	n.a.	92.0
1970	436,062	83.8%	21.9%	109,771	335.6%	n.a.	111.8
1980	812,178	86.3%	27.9%	237,793	116.6%	n.a.	193.0
1990	1,645,472	102.6%	31.7%	446,000	87.6%	n.a.	314.4
2000	2,432,585	47.8%	40.0%	539,392	20.9%	8.9%****	949.2
2010	4,025,055	65.5%	49.3%	773,631	46.2%	15.0%	4433.4

Note: "Chinese" in this table includes immigrants from Mainland China, Taiwan, Hong Kong after 1997, and Macau after 1999
Sources: All percentages are calculated by the authors;
**US decennial censuses 1960–2010;*
***Immigration data in each year represents the total number of Chinese migrants who obtained Legal Permanent Residency in the previous decade; retrieved from INS-USCIS/DHS Immigration Yearbooks, 1961–2011.*
****The Word Bank, World Development Indicators: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD;*
*****only includes 1992–1999 data*

The Growing Trend of Chinese Student Migrants

China has not reached the tipping point of declining emigration yet, despite the fact that the growth rate of emigration to the US has been decreasing in the recent decades

(Table 1). However, its rapid economic growth has enabled Chinese students to grow in volume in recent years, and to increase their share of total foreign students in the US. Table 2 illustrates that in 2000, China became the top student sending country to the US. During 2002–2005, there was a slight drop in Chinese student numbers,

Table 2. International students from China to the US, 1995–2014

Year	*Total international students in the US*	*China*	
		No.	*%*
1995/96	453,787	39,613	8.7
1996/97	457,984	42,503	7.8
1997/98	481,280	46,958	9.8
1998/99	490,933	51,001	10.4
1999/00	514,723	54,466	10.6
2000/01	547,867	59,939	10.9
2001/02	564,766	63,211	10.8
2002/03	565,039	64,757	11
2003/04	572,509	61,765	10.8
2004/05	582,984	62,523	11.1
2005/06	582,996	62,582	11.1
2006/07	586,323	67,723	11.6
2007/08	623,805	81,127	13
2008/09	671,616	98,235	14.6
2009/10	690,923	127,628	18.5
2010/11	723,249	157,558	21.8
2011/12	764,495	194,029	25.4
2012/13	819,644	235,597	28.7
2013/14	886,052	274,439	31.0
2014/15	974,926	304,040	31.2

Note: [a] *"No." indicates the number of students from China to the US;*
[b] *"%" indicates the percentage of students from each country of total foreign students in the U.S*
Source: Institute of International Education, 2015. Open Doors: Report on International Educational Exchange, Open Doors 2015 Country Fact Sheet of China, India, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore, Table 1. Institute of International Education, 2015. Open Doors: Report on International Educational Exchange, Table of All Places of Origin of International Students in the U.S., 2001–2015. Unless otherwise noted, figures are from the same sources

despite their shares among foreign students remaining the same as previous years. These changes indicated the post-9/11 US scrutiny of foreign students. One key reason for this decline can be attributed to the delay in issuing student visas, resulting in postponed arrivals for the academic year. This consequently diverted students to other countries, such as Australia, Canada, and the UK, who actively recruit international students. In the academic year after 9/11, about 19% of US higher education institutions reported a substantial decline of Chinese students (Institute of International Education, 2002). Since 2005, however, there has been an unprecedented growth of Chinese student numbers and their share among the total foreign student population.

In addition, the demography of Chinese students is changing as well: from predominately fellowship/assistantship-funded graduate students to increasing numbers and shares of full-tuition/fee-paying undergraduate students (Figure 1). The percentage of Chinese students at the graduate level has decreased drastically in the past decade, dropping from 80.1% in 2000/01 to 48.8% in 2010/11, which, for the first time, is below half of the Chinese student population. Meanwhile, the sharpest decrease of graduate student share started in 2004/05, coinciding with the growing proportion of students attending at the undergraduate level, as the percentage in "other category" grows slightly. The percentage of Chinese undergraduate students has increased from 14.7% in 2006/07 to 36.2% in 2010/11. Such change in student demographics indicates an emerging trend: that recent Chinese students studying in US educational institutions are more likely to be tuition-paying undergraduate students, rather than financially aided graduate students.



Figure 1. Chinese Students in the U.S. by Academic Level, 2000–2014.
Source: Institute of International Education, Open Doors Report, 2001–2015

One reason for this booming in Chinese tuition payers is the increasing wealth of middle and upper class families in China, and their emphasis on overseas educational experiences. Chinese parents often perceive that a foreign higher education degree will guarantee their children's future and give them an edge in the job market, regardless of which country they choose to work/live after graduation. This mentality can be explained by the prestigious reputation of developed countries' academic institutions worldwide, especially compared with Chinese universities. Thus, an educational degree earned in US universities represents more value, or "contains more gold," than a Chinese degree. This phenomenon becomes even more prevalent in post-graduate educations.

Another reason comes from institutional and governmental policies that seek to enhance student exchange with developed countries. On the US side, newly emerged wealth from Chinese families has drawn US universities' attention and prompted them to actively recruit students from China. Compared with US-born students, international students pay much higher out-of-state tuition when studying in US universities, especially in public universities and community colleges. As a result, their enrolment can directly increase the educational institutions' tuition revenue (Staley, 2011). Many US universities have assigned recruiting agencies in China to promote themselves to potential Chinese undergraduate students (Lewin, 2008). These proactive policies have become more prominent after the US economic downturn in 2008. On China's side, the central government has been actively pursuing policies encouraging self-funded overseas students since the 1990s.



Figure 2. International Scholars in the U.S. by Place of Birth, 2000–2014.
Source: Institute of International Education, Open Doors Report, 2001–2015

Compared to the 1980s, when an overwhelming portion of Chinese overseas students consisted of governmental delegates, recent Chinese student migrant groups are largely composed of students who seek overseas education for personal purposes, or in Chinese "因私出国."

Other Forms of Higher Education Migrants

In addition to degree-seeking international students on F-1 visas, exchange students and scholars are also important between China and the US. These scholarly exchanges are initiated by cooperation between the countries' respective higher education institutions in the form of the J-1 visa, which requires a two-year home country service upon finishing their initial exchange period in the US. In many cases, the cost of the exchange period is covered by the sending country. Figure 2, showing numbers of international exchange students and scholars from IC and NICs in the past decade, demonstrates that China has consistently topped all other countries/areas and has become the largest exchange scholar sending country to the US in the 21st century, reflecting the Chinese government's favorable policies toward educational exchange. Indian and South Korean numbers are similar to each other, whereas the number for Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan are significantly lower.

INTELLECTUAL MIGRATION AND IMPACTS

In addition to the increasing number of Asian students and scholars in the US, what is new in recent years is the growing return migration of highly-skilled migrants and their contributions to both their home countries and to the US. When the former Chinese temporary migrants return to China, many actively contribute to Chinese development in various arenas, including academia, economy, and politics. Such increasing trends are the result of economic development in China, which allows more migrants to afford their higher education in the US, and to become highly-skilled professionals after graduation. The return of highly-skilled Chinese migrants contributes to further development in China, which indicates a positive migration circulation of highly-educated and professional migrants, or "brain-circulation" between fast-developing China and the US. Here we will only highlight returnees' political impacts on Asian home countries (returnees' contribution to the Chinese academy and economy have already been well documented, e.g., Chen, 2008; Simon & Cao, 2009; Wang, 2009; Zhang, 2010) and the economic impacts of Chinese students on US side.

Impacts of International Student Migrant Flow on US Economy

While it is safe to say that Asian developing countries have benefitted greatly from "brain-circulation," one may wonder in this circulation of highly-skilled migrants: does the US stand to lose its comparative advantage and influence in Asia? The

answer may well be no. Here we focus only on one aspect: the financial gain enjoyed by the US during students' study period and afterward.

Asian student migrants contribute considerably to the US economy. According to the Open Doors Reports, by Academic Year 2011/12, despite a large amount of international graduate students receiving financial assistance from US institutions, the majority of international students (63.6%) pay educational expenses themselves, with their personal or family savings from their home countries. An additional 5.8% of international students are paid by home country governmental scholarships. Together, the financial resources for 69.4% of international students (a total of 530,868 persons) come from outside of the US. US policy stipulations prevent international students from seeking jobs outside campus during academic years, which makes them primarily consumers outside of academia. Evidence suggests that in many cases, parents in home countries not only pay for their children's educational expenses—such as tuition, fees, and books—but also credit card bills incurred from daily consumption. Although it is difficult, if not impossible, to quantify the total amount international students spent during their time of study, there is a "reverse remittance" inflow to the US that is largely overlooked by the US government, general public, mass media, and academia alike. According to the Department of Commerce, in AY 2011/12, international students contributed $22.7 billion to the US economy by paying their tuitions and living expenses, which makes higher education one of the top insourcing service sectors in the US (Institute of International Education, 2012). To promote this economic benefit, both the US federal government and individual universities have initiated strategies to recruit more international students (North, 2010). Countries other than the US have realized the economic benefit of international students as well; other countries, such as Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Russia, and China itself, have also opened their educational market to attract more foreign students—the effect of which has been to create a global race for international education (Kishikovsky, 2010). Thus, the "brain-circulation" of highly-skilled migrants not only benefits developing countries in Asia, but also brings a new market for US universities, contributing to a win-win situation.

Another aspect of a major potential economic impact that has been almost completely ignored by academia and media alike: those international students' joining the US labour force (and other similar countries with large international student bodies) upon graduation are less likely to accumulate big education debts compared to domestic students, given that they are illegible for most student aids aimed at domestic students. As such, they not only contribute to their receiving countries' coffer (those self/family-funded) and to academia (those scholarship/assistantship-sponsored and others) during their student years, but these debt-free international graduates can become financially independent and contribute directly to the receiving country's economy soon after finding a full-time job that matches their newly-gained human capital level. They are "on their feet," financially, i.e. becoming full-pledge "financial citizens." They spend their earnings by making

purchases, supporting their families, and/or investing in themselves or in financial markets at a faster pace than debt-stricken domestic graduates who must repay their student debts and interests for many years. This is important for two reasons: not only have major Western countries' economies been relying increasingly on consumer spending, but also the recent global financial crisis and economic downturn has made it increasingly difficult for some university graduates to obtain good jobs. A UK study is case in point. The 2011/12 research finds that despite much higher tuitions and fees charged to non-European international students, the majority of this group of college graduates (54%) were debt-free by their completion of undergraduate study, compared to European students (about 1/3) and UK students (roughly 11%; Purcell et al., 2012, p. 164). In the US, only 40% of all American undergraduate degree holders, and 28% of graduate degree holders, were free of education debts upon graduation in 2012.[1] A recent California study finds that in 2010, half of college freshmen in that state took student loans, averaging $8,000 for the first year alone (Johnson, Mejia, Ezekiel, & Zeiger, 2013). International students, on the other hand, face more challenges (legal and financial) than domestic students, including but not limited to the lengthy process of obtaining permanent residency and the hefty fees associated with that process, which has been well documented and is beyond the scope of this paper.

Highly-Skilled Return Migrants and Their Political Impacts on Home Countries

The educational background of return migrants from the US assists some returnees in their career development in the political arena. Publicly available information on those who hold minister-level posts demonstrates that a number of key posts in Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan are held by those who have studied and earned their degrees in Western countries. For instance, by 2013, out of the 11 officials in the Hong Kong government executive council listing their educational background on their CV, eight had attained their degrees abroad. Six of them graduated from US or UK universities with post-graduate degrees, mostly from those prestigious or renowned universities. A more obvious case exists in Singapore and Taiwan: in 2013, 15 of 18 Cabinet Members in Singapore's government received higher education abroad, and eight finished their graduate studies in US universities. Thirty-one out of 48 leaders in Taiwan's Office of the President and Executive Yuan officials have degrees from overseas universities, 27 of them in the US. Additionally, academia may serve as a breeding ground for political leadership, as some Asian political leaders work as academics upon their return before being tapped for government positions. Former Senior Minister and Coordinating Minister for National Security in Singapore, Dr. S. Jayakumar, took a teaching position at the National University of Singapore for more than 15 years when he first returned home with his Master of Law degree from Yale University.

With several Asian countries' previous development experiences, like NICs, it is evident that the highly-skilled returnees from the US have made substantial contributions to their home countries' development, as well as their countries' policy-making. It is true that in the two fastest growing economies, China and India, the impacts of returnees in politics have yet to be very prominent. It is possible that, based on what happened in the NICs, with a generation of leaders helping to change the course for their respective homeland, future leaders might emerge from returnees in China and India, especially in China. This would not only repeat the history of successful returnees becoming national leaders in both countries, but also lead their countries to their resurgence on the global stage.

CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Our chapter briefly traces the intellectual migration between the US and Asia as a result of changing geopolitics and economic growth. When there is no externally imposed exclusion or internally forced isolation, international intellectual migration flows smoothly, and such migration can be beneficial to both sending and receiving countries. Our brief account of contemporary trends shows that immigration and international student flows are often not in sync. Home country economic growth and prosperity may gradually level off and even decelerate emigration flows from a sending country and immigration inflows to a receiving country—evident in the case of Japan since the 1960s and South Korean since the 1990s. On the other hand, increasing wealth in developing economies enables students to study abroad, as shown in the case of the two (re)emerging global economic powerhouses, China and India, since the 1990s; as well as the continuous student flows from South Korea. It is somewhat difficult to pinpoint a conclusive proof, and maybe it is too early altogether to predict the future trend of highly-skilled migration from China and India to the US, given large number of immigrants still enter the country for the purpose of family unification. But immigration trends in Canada can serve as a proxy and signify the changing winds, given that Canadian immigration admission is based on points system that favors migrants with high human capital. China was the number one immigrant source country for Canada from 1998 to 2005 (Milan, 2011), before it was overtaken by India. A new study, based on the 2011 federal National Household Survey, reports that both numbers of Chinese and Indian immigrants to Canada have been decreasing recently (Steurgeon, 2013).

We have tried to make the connections and comparisons between NICs, Asia's early success, and IC in recent decades. Compared with NICs experiences on highly-skilled migration to the US, India and China share similar trends, yet are also impacted under specific contexts. On one hand, similar to the NICs experiences, large-scale migration of highly-skilled migrants from India and China both emerged after their economic reform and grew along with economic development and openness. Such migration also correlates with, and is confined by, both sending

and receiving countries' job markets, as well as governmental policies. On the other hand, the emergence and rapid growth of Indian and Chinese highly-skilled migration to the US are also direct results of the development of high technology industry, as well as economic globalization, which are different from NICs experiences. It is the rapid development of a knowledge-based economy, internet prevalence, and communication technologies in recent years that creates a large demand for professionally skilled workers in developed countries, especially in the US. The development of economic globalization and economic neoliberalism has also facilitated skilled migrants to move internationally and access the job market in different countries. Thus, the case of India and China is neither isolated, nor uniform.

Both China and the US seek to retain and increase their influence on the world stage. The best and most enduring soft power, however, is to win the hearts and minds of people, which in turn serves the best long-term strategic national interests. Further research and analyses can result in concrete recommendations for US immigration reform and education policies based on better understanding and partnership with a resurging Asia—and for the PRC to tap into the resources of highly-skilled Chinese migrants to facilitate mutual understanding between the two countries and peoples, in order to achieve a "win-win-win" (UN, 2006) situation for international migration.

NOTES

[1] http://www.president.gov.tw/Default.aspx?tabid=95#02, last access 10/10/2014

[2] http://trends.collegeboard.org/sites/default/files/student-aid-2013-full-report.pdf, and http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/412849-Forever-in-Your-Debt-Who-Has-Student-Loan-Debt-and-Whos-Worried.pdf, last access 10/10/2014

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17. CHINESE STUDENTS' PROPENSITY TO STAY IN CANADA

Transitioning from International Student to Permanent Resident

INTRODUCTION

Since the late 1990s, competition for skilled workers and the internationalization of education have become fundamental to a successful knowledge economy. As a result, many developed industrial countries have experienced an inflow of scholarly-skilled immigrants. A great portion of these immigrants received their postsecondary education in their host country and often, have decided to become permanent residents during or after their education in their host country. Meanwhile, many Western countries, including Canada, have a great demand for a skilled labour force (Goodman, 2014; Komarnicki, 2012; Louis, 2013). To maintain their economic competitiveness, many developed Western countries view the international skilled workforce as a critical labour pool and international students as a fertile source of qualified skilled workers (Bravo-Moreno, 2009; Dreher & Poutvaara, 2011; Tremblay, 2005; Ziguras & Law, 2006). However, Western countries are not the only competitors for skilled workforces, as skilled workers are also in high demand by emerging economic giants, such as India and China, who were, ironically, the traditional senders of skilled workers and international students to Western countries (Goyal, 2014; Lu, Liang, & Chunyu, 2013; Xinhua Net, 2013).

In Canada, recruiting international students as skilled migrants is an important policy orientation. These international students become an attractive source of skilled immigrants for three reasons. First, they are more adaptive to the Canadian labour market than the workers who are internationally trained. Second, these young people who are at the beginning of their working path are in high demand for sustaining the size of the working-age population to cope with low birth rate and aging population in Canada. Third, the prospect of obtaining permanent resident status in Canada makes Canadian postsecondary education attractive to fee-paying international students who are the active contributors to the internationalization of higher education, especially considering that the average tuition fees for international students in Canadian postsecondary institutions are approximately three times of those for Canadian students (Statistics Canada, 2005). In 2010 their spending translated into $4.9 billion worth of contribution to the Canadian GDP (Roslyn Kunin & Associates, 2012).

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This chapter attempts to provide a critical overview of the recent changes in Canadian immigration policy which are relevant to the Chinese student in Canada, to present an overview of the transitional population who has changed their temporary status from international student to permanent resident, and to explore the factors contributing to Chinese students' migration intentions. Many studies have been done on Chinese students in terms of their immigration patterns, migration intentions as well as transitional experiences (Gao & Liu, 1998; Guo, 2010; Li & Bray, 2007; Liu-Farrer, 2009; Lu, Zong, & Schissel, 2009; Pang & Appleton, 2004; Poston & Luo, 2007). Some focused on how and why postsecondary education in the Western developed countries have become an immigration path for Chinese students (Gao & Liu, 1998; Guo, 2010; Liu-Farrer, 2009; Pang & Appleton, 2004). Some explored the factors influencing their decision to apply for immigrant status, such as the pulling and pushing factors in the host country and China (Li & Bray, 2007; Mazzarol & Soutar, 2002), students' demographic characteristics, family background, and experiences (Guo, 2010; Lu, Zong, & Schissel, 2009). The gender difference between male and female Chinese students in terms of their decision making process in immigration have also been discussed (Lu, Zong, & Schissel, 2009). The vast majority of these studies were conducted before specific policies were widely adopted to recruit international students as immigrants. However, how and to what extent the recent policy changes will affect Chinese students' migration intentions has not received enough attention from social researchers. By using two latest survey datasets which were conducted at the University of Saskatchewan, some major factors which may influence Chinese students' migration intentions are explored and their reactions to some of the Canadian immigration policy changes are examined.

IMMIGRATION POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL STUDENTS IN CANADA

There have been two observable trends in the recent changes of Canadian immigration policy in recruiting skilled immigrants, which would have tremendous impacts on the immigration pattern as well as the temporary international student population in Canada.

Firstly, the immigration selection system is shifting from a focus on general work experience to Canadian experiences. The Federal Skilled Worker program (FSWP) or so-called point system used to select skilled immigrants was created in 1967 and still exists, although a slightly altered form in terms of the assignment of points on selection factors. In the latest changes in 2013, an official language test result became mandatory for assessing applicants' language proficiency, and applicants' previous work experience in Canada receives higher points than before. Meanwhile, work experience is still the most determinative of all the factors – one-year of full-time paid work experience or equivalent is the minimum requirement.

Before 2006, because international students were not allowed to work off-campus during study, their chance of applying for immigration before graduation

was highly restricted. However, since on-campus work experience was considered as eligible by the FSWP, many international students at graduate level who work at on-campus jobs such as teaching or research assistants were able to apply for permanent resident status before graduation. The situation did start to change in 2005. A couple of programs were launched to provide international students with Canadian work experiences and longer Canadian connections. In May 2005, the Post-Graduation Work program extended the length of work permits for foreign graduates from one to two years. The same program made another extension in 2008 to allow students to work for up to three years after completing their studies with no restriction on the type of employment. The number of work permits issued under this program has dramatically increased since 2008 (Tamburri, 2013). Furthermore, the Off-Campus Work Permit program was announced in April 2006. This program allows international students to work up to 20 hours a week during regular academic sessions and the federal government has proposed allowing full-time international students with valid study permits to automatically be eligible to work off campus starting in 2014. To associate Canadian experience with immigration selection, the Canadian federal government announced the Canadian Experience Class (CEC) program in 2008. This program allows international students to stay up to three years after graduation, to collect the Canadian work experience required to apply for permanent resident status. In addition to the immigration programs designed to encourage international students to collect work experience before and after graduation in Canada, the federal immigration policy also showed its favour of the elites among Canadian educated international students. At the end of 2011, a special fast-track was created to help foreign PhD students to immigrate to Canada.

Secondly, along with the increasing government interests in keeping international students in Canada as skilled workers, the policy interest in recruiting skilled workers from overseas has declined. In 2008, the federal government suddenly reduced the number of eligible occupations of skilled worker applicants from 351 to 38; and in the year of 2010, it was further reduced to 29 occupations. FSWP also experienced a "temporary pause" from July 2012 to May 2013 due to inventory pressures and preparation for future policy changes. After the reopening of FSWP, the number of eligible occupations were again reduced to 24. The constantly decreasing number and limiting coverage of the FSWP eligible occupations lead to a sharp shrinking of oversea applications and also point to an extremely market-responsive and pragmatic immigration policy orientation. Meanwhile, international students' postgraduate work experience has become increasingly important through the Canadian Experience Class program, Provincial/Territory Nominee Programs, as well as other recently implemented immigration programs.

The third trend is that, there has been a tendency of decentralization in immigration policymaking process in Canada. The recent policy changes reviewed previously are all based on immigration policies at the federal level. Other than the federal immigration programs, an alternative way to immigrate to Canada is Provincial Nominee Program (PNP). Up until the 1970s, the Canadian federal government

ran all of the immigration programs. The PNP was gradually developed around the 1980s and 1990s by establishing agreements between the federal government and provincial governments to devolve some immigration selection power to the provinces. This program was developed as a device to respond to the problems caused by concentrated immigrant population in metropolitan centres. For example, Saskatchewan is one of the provinces that have traditionally attracted less economic immigrants than neighbouring provinces, especially those along the East and West coast. Along with the growing economy coupled with the retirement of the baby boomer cohort, the prospects for a shortage of skilled labour in Saskatchewan have been growing. Therefore, the international students studying in Saskatchewan find themselves in an advantageous position as they now study in a place with a serious shortage of skilled workers.

When the Saskatchewan Immigrant Nominee Program (SINP) began in January 2005, Saskatchewan provided one of the most welcoming provincial nominee programs for international students who are enrolled in or graduated from a postsecondary educational institution in Saskatchewan. For example, as long as a student has a Master's or PhD degree from the University of Saskatchewan or the University of Regina, they would have a great chance to obtain permanent resident status through the SINP, since they only have to meet one of the following criteria: having six months of paid employment in Saskatchewan related to their field of study, which can be easily achieved as a graduate student taking part-time work on-campus; having a spouse with full time and permanent position in Saskatchewan; or having money to sustain themselves for a short time without work ($10,000 for the principal applicant and $2,000 for each accompanying family member). Due to the increasing job opportunities and welcoming conditions provided by the SINP, Saskatchewan welcomed more than 28,000 immigrants between 2006 and 2011, about three times the number of the previous five years, and the Chinese population has also increased from 11,100 to 13,990 (Statistics Canada, 2011). From 2006 to 2014, the size of the foreign student population in Saskatchewan has grown from 3,483 to 6,734 (Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 2014). In 2012, SINP also made some major changes to respond to the province's economy and labour force needs, which require all applications to be attached with a job offer including the student sub-category. Thus, when international students graduate from a Saskatchewan educational institution, they need at least six months of paid employment in Saskatchewan and a permanent, full-time job offer related to their field of study from a Saskatchewan employer to apply for immigrant status through SINP.

CHINESE STUDENTS IN CANADA: THE STUDENT POPULATION AND THE TRANSITIONAL POPULATION

In the twenty-first century, student mobility in Canada has risen faster than ever before – the number of international students in Canada has increased

approximately 2.74 times from 2000 to 2014 (Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 2014). According to the latest statistics on December 1, 2014, there were 336,497 international students present in Canada (Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 2014). Among the top 20 sources of international students, three of them are the place of origin of ethnic Chinese students, including People's Republic of China, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, and Taiwan (Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 2014). The number of the Chinese student population reached 117,093 in 2014, 94.7% of whom came from Mainland China (Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 2014). Having been the top source country since 2001, the share of students from Mainland China has dramatically increased from 3.4% to 33.0% from 1994 to 2014, while the percentage of Chinese students from other countries or areas has decreased from 23% to 1.8% (Figure 1). Figure 2 also shows the dramatic increase of student population from Mainland China as well as gradual decline of students from Hong Kong and Taiwan. The number of students from Mainland China surpassed Hong Kong in 2000, and they have become the largest international student group in Canada since 2002 (Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 2005).

Based on the statistics in 2012 (Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 2012), students from the top three sending countries, People's Republic of China (PRC), Indian and South Korea, actually show very different patterns in terms of the program type they enrolled. The majority of the students from Mainland China



Figure 1. Percentages of Chinese student populations among international student population present on Dec 1 in Canada, 1994–2014.
Source: Data of 1994–1998 was retrieved from Facts and Figures, 2003 (CIC, 2003); data of 1999–2008 was retrieved from Facts and Figures, 2008 (CIC, 2008); data of 2009–2014 was retrieved from Facts and Figures 2014 (CIC, 2014)

study in Canadian universities (61%). With 49,534 students at Canadian universities, China is the top sending country in this category. Besides, there are 16% of the Mainland Chinese students enrolled in other post-secondary programs and secondary programs or less respectively. Only 6% of this Chinese student group are in trade programs. At the same time, India is the top sending country of international students enrolled in other post-secondary programs, and South Korea is the top sending country of international students studying trade. Therefore, it seems that among the top three sending countries of international students in Canada, Chinese students from Mainland China are mostly associated with trend of internationalization of university in Canada.



Figure 2. Total Chinese student population in Canada and students from mainland China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan, 1994–2014.
Source: Data of 1994–1998 was retrieved from Facts and Figures, 2003 (CIC, 2003); data of 1999–2008 was retrieved from Facts and Figures, 2008 (CIC, 2008); data of 2009–2014 was retrieved from Facts and Figures 2012 (CIC, 2014)

The government policy interest in international students as potential skilled workers corresponds to the general trends of transitioning from temporary to permanent resident status and also manages these transitions at the present and in the future. Table 1 presents a couple of major transitional patterns among Chinese students. Firstly, an increasing trend of transitional population from Chinese student to permanent resident status was not maintained through the development of immigration programs with a specific focus on retaining international student

graduates. There was a significant and constant increase of such transitional population from 2002 to 2008, but a sudden decline occurred since 2009, right after the federal government launched an unexpected reduction of the number of eligible occupations of FSWP applicants from 351 to 38, and also implemented the CEC program in 2008.

Furthermore, Table 1 also shows that among all the international students who were able to transition to permanent resident status, the Chinese students contributed approximately 9% of this population in 2001, and this percentage has been increasing constantly since then. In 2009, more than 20% of the transitional population from international student to permanent resident are Chinese. Meanwhile, since 1999 they have always been the leading group among such transitions (Huystee, 2011). Figure 2 shows that the presence of Chinese student population on December 1 has been increasing dramatically for two decades. Thus, the Chinese student is not only the largest international student group in Canada, but also contributes the highest percent of permanent residents from a student source directly.

Table 1. Transition from temporary to permanent resident status in Canada, 2001–2010

	Chinese Student[a] – PR[b]	*Ratio of Chinese Student – PR[b] to International Student – PR[c]*
2001	686	15.1%
2002	771	16.7%
2003	839	17.5%
2004	1276	20.3%
2005	1723	25.6%
2006	2151	24.8%
2007	2101	23.5%
2008	2407	25.3%
2009	1975	23.8%
2010	1802	23.6%

Sources: Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC), Facts and Figures (2008, 2012); Monica van Huystee's (2011) report for CIC, A profile of foreign students who transition to permanent resident status in Atlantic (2011); Kenny Zhang's (2012) report for Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada.

[a] *The Chinese student includes the students from Mainland China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. Data for Macao was not accessible due to its small number of transitional population.*

[b] *Chinese student – PR: Chinese transitional population from international student to permanent resident.*

[c] *International student – PR: Total transitional population from international student to permanent resident.*

DATA AND METHOD

After a general analysis of the recent reform in Canadian immigration policy as well as its impacts on Chinese students in Canada, we would like to use two sets of the latest survey data to illustrate the effects of these policy changes on a group of Chinese students and to explore whether or not and to what extent these changes may affect these students' migration intentions. The University of Saskatchewan is a Canadian university with a relatively high enrollment of international students. In the fall term of 2012 – 2013, there were 864 Chinese students studying at the U of S. Both survey data were secondary data collected at the University of Saskatchewan during that period of time, and were both used in a triangulation study to increase the validity of the results.

In February 2013, the Canadian Bureau for International Education (CBIE) conducted its 2013 International Survey which received responses from 1,509 international students from 25 universities and colleges across Canada. The first set of data used in this study is a subsection of data from the respondents at the University of Saskatchewan. In total, 284 international students at the U of S participated in this survey, and 92 of them came from mainland China and 1 from Hong Kong. The second set of data comes from the International Student Survey conducted by the University of Saskatchewan at the end of 2012. Among 329 respondents, 118 are Chinese students from mainland China, Hong Kong or Macao. In the rest of the article, we would refer the first set of data as CBIE survey data and the second set as the U of S survey data.

The focus of the data analysis is Chinese students' migration intentions. Both surveys explicitly asked about their migration intentions, and three categories of intentions are identified when they were asked "do you plan/intend to apply for permanent resident status in Canada", which are yes, not sure, and no. Due to small sample size of both datasets, only bivariate cross-tabulation analysis is conducted. All the possible associations in the survey data were analyzed through cross-tabulation, and only the significant associations presenting consistent patterns are presented and discussed. The statistical findings from the data do deliver a very interesting and clear message about the possible interaction between Canadian immigration policy changes and Chinese students' migration intentions, especially when both datasets provide similar information.

DISCUSSION AND FINDINGS

Migration Intentions and Level of Knowledge on Immigration Policy

Before we explore how different variables are associated with the Chinese students' migration intentions, two comparative analysis were conducted to see 1) if there is a difference between the migration intentions of Chinese students (including those from mainland China and the special administrative regions Hong Kong and Macao)

and international students from other countries or regions; 2) these students' levels of awareness of Canadian immigration programs which are related to international students.

Table 2 presents the t-test results of the comparisons in both surveys. In the CBIE survey data, t-test shows that there is a significant difference, $t(175) = 2.067$, $p < .05$ (0.040), which shows the students from countries other than China are more likely to apply for permanent resident status in Canada for sure rather than having an uncertain intention. A similar result can also be found in the U of S survey data, $t(327) = 2.218$, $p < .05$ (0.027). That is to say, compared with the students from other countries, Chinese students are less decisive in terms of migrating to Canada, which leads to an increased possibility for them to return. There is no doubt that this is a partial reflection of China's growing competitiveness in global economy and labour market. According to the statistics from Ministry of Education of the People's Republic of China, the annual increase rate of returned students have largely surpassed the annual increase rate of student studying abroad. For example, compared to 2012, the number of the Chinese going abroad for study has only increased about 4 percent in 2013, and meanwhile there were 353,500 Chinese students coming back, and the increase rate was about 30 percent (People's Net, 2014).

Table 2. Comparison of permanent residence application intentions between Chinese and Non-Chinese students in two surveys (%)

	U of S survey		*CBIE survey*	
Plan to apply for PR	*Chinese students*	*Non-Chinese students*	*Chinese students*	*Non-Chinese students*
Yes	44.6	57.0	44.2	58.8
Not Sure	44.6	35.2	36.5	25.4
No	6.8	7.8	19.2	15.8
Totals	118	335	52	177

Tables 3 and 4 list the three immigration programs which are considered to facilitate the status transition from international student to permanent resident. The programs are the Provincial Nominee Program in Saskatchewan (SINP), Canadian Experience Class (CEC), and Federal Skilled Worker program (FSWP). Both surveys show that the SINP receives the highest awareness among the students while the CEC received the lowest attention. Also, slightly less than 40 percent of the Chinese students in both surveys reported no knowledge of the FSWP, and more than 30 percent of them indicated no intention to apply for immigration under this program. In a survey on Chinese students conducted at the U of S in 2005, it was shown that the vast majority of students have heard of the FSWP (Lu, Zong, & Schissel, 2009). These results show that the vast majority of Chinese students are paying attention to the immigration policy changes.

Table 3. Awareness of immigration programs in CBIE survey (%)

	Awareness (N = 51)			
Immigration programs	*Don't know about it*	*Will not apply for it*	*Not sure about applying*	*Will apply for it*
SINP	27.5	9.8	29.4	33.3
CEC	39.2	17.6	33.3	9.8
FSWP	37.3	31.4	19.6	11.8

Table 4. Awareness of immigration programs in U of S survey (%)

	Awareness (N = 118)		
Immigration programs	*I know of it*	*I know a little about it*	*I never heard of it*
SINP	36.4	37.3	26.3
CEC	10.2	39.8	50.0
FSWP	16.9	44.1	39.0

Factors Associated with Chinese Students' Migration Intentions

Table 5 lists all the variables which are significantly associated with the migration intentions of the Chinese students at the U of S who participated in the CBIE 2013 Survey. In general, we can find three significant patterns among these associations. Firstly, work or employment related variables are significantly associated with their plan to apply for immigration status. For example, when they rate high the employment opportunities in Canada, believe the U of S's education prepare them well for employment in Canada, or plan to work in Canada, they are more likely to apply for immigration status. Secondly, perceived discrimination is a deterrent factor for deciding to immigrate to Canada. Such discrimination can be perceived from university staff, faculty members, or the broader community. Thirdly, when they develop more interests in learning about Canadian culture or have more chances to meet Canadians outside school, they are more likely to have a plan to immigrate. Finally, a decision to study for another degree in Canada would increase their chance to apply for immigration status.

Table 6 echoes some of the findings from Table 5 through the bivariate analysis based on the U of S survey data, especially the first pattern. Work or employment related variables, such as having a work permit, having confidence in finding satisfying job, as well as having access to employment or volunteer opportunities, are all significantly associated with the affirmative response of planning to apply for immigration status. Also, a general feeling of being unwelcomed to the university would have a negative effect on Chinese students' migration intentions. Although the

Table 5. Associations between plan to apply for permanent resident status and variables of significance, CBIE survey 2013

		Plan to apply for permanent resident status			
		No	*Not sure*	*Yes*	
	n	*(%)*	*(%)*	*(%)*	*χ*
Rate Canadian program: prepare me for employment in Canada					10.905*
Poor	19	31.6	42.1	26.3	
Medium	22	4.5	45.5	50.0	
Good	10	40.0	0.0	60.0	
Importance of opportunities for employment in Canada					11.238*
Not important	6	66.7	16.7	16.7	
Somewhat important	34	11.8	44.1	44.1	
Very important	12	16.7	25.0	58.3	
Importance of opportunities of becoming PR					23.798**
Not important	6	83.3	16.7	0.0	
Somewhat important	36	11.1	47.2	41.7	
Very important	10	10.0	10.0	80.0	
Want more experience in Canadian culture					12.663*
Disagree	3	100.0	0.0	0.0	
Neither disagree nor agree	7	42.9	14.3	42.9	
Agree	42	11.9	40.5	47.6	
Feeling difficult to meet Canadians outside school					12.423*
Disagree	11	9.1	9.1	81.8	
Neither disagree nor agree	12	41.7	25.0	33.	
Agree	28	14.3	50.0	35.7	
Additional Education Plan					10.104*
No plan	26	15.4	42.3	42.3	
Study for another degree in Canada	18	11.1	22.2	66.7	
Study for another degree outside Canada	7	100.0	0.0	0.0	

(continued)

Table 5. (continued)

	Plan to apply for permanent resident status				
		No	*Not sure*	*Yes*	
	n	*(%)*	*(%)*	*(%)*	*χ*
Plan for work after education					22.896*
Work several years then return	15	13.3	53.3	33.3	
Work permanently in Canada	17	5.9	17.6	76.5	
Working in home country	8	62.5	12.5	25.0	
No work plan	11	9.1	63.6	27.3	
Discrimination from staff					10.602*
Never experience any	41	12.2	39.0	48.8	
Experience some	6	16.7	50.0	33.3	
Experience a lot	4	75.0	0.0	25.0	
Discrimination from faculty members					13.968*
Never experience any	36	13.9	38.9	47.2	
Experience some	9	11.1	44.4	44.4	
Experience a lot	3	100.0	0.0	0.0	
Discrimination from broader community					10.294*
Never experience any	31	16.1	35.5	8.4	
Experience some	12	0.0	50.0	50.0	
Experience a lot	7	57.1	14.3	28.6	

**p*<0.05, significance level; ***p*<0.001, significance level*

cause of such unwelcomed feeling cannot be specified in this survey, it is reasonable to argue that perceived discrimination in the university can lead to such a feeling.

In general, it is not a surprising to find that the most considered factors for these Chinese students are related to employment and work. The availability and accessibility of employment opportunity in Canada, Canadian work experience, educational preparations for employment, as well as their confidence in finding satisfying job all have significant effects on their plan to apply for immigrant status. It is reasonable to believe that their special focus on employment and work is largely shaped by the Canadian immigration policy reform which highly emphasized international students' post-graduation work experiences and job offers. Furthermore, their sense of acceptance in Canada has also become a key factor when deciding to immigrate or not.

Table 6. Associations plan to apply for permanent resident status and variables of significance, U of S survey 2013

	Plan to apply for permanent resident status				
		No	*Not sure*	*Yes*	
	n	*(%)*	*(%)*	*(%)*	*X*
Having a work permit					6.403*
Yes	48	6.3	33.3	60.4	
No	70	7.1	55.7	37.1	
Having confidence in finding satisfied job					6.981*
Disagree	38	13.2	55.3	31.6	
Agree	80	3.8	42.5	53.8	
Accessibility of employment and volunteer opportunities					6.503*
Disagree	62	8.1	56.5	35.5	
Agree	56	5.4	35.7	58.9	
Feeling welcomed to the university					22.280**
Moderately Disagree	2	100.0	0.0	0.0	
Moderately agree	20	10.0	60.0	30.0	
Strongly agree	29	3.4	41.4	55.2	

**p*<0.05, significance level; ***p*<0.001, significance level*

CONCLUSIONS

One of the most important goals in the recent Canadian immigration reform is to effectively manage and facilitate the transitions from temporary resident status to permanent residency. The international student is a main target of this recruitment. This reform leads a dominant pattern shift in transition processes among international students. Before the reform, the dominant transitional pattern was to use their work experience in home country and/or on-campus teaching or research assistantship to apply for the FSWP, which was applicable for all types of skilled worker immigrants. This transitional pattern was mostly adopted by the international students studying at the graduate level, because compared to undergraduate international students, they are more likely to have work experiences in their home countries and/or work as teaching or research assistants in university. After the reform, the dominant pattern of transition required two phases – becoming a temporary foreign worker through a post-graduation work permit program to obtain enough Canadian work experience,

and a job offer to apply for permanent residency. Despite an extended transitional period, this transitional pattern is applicable for all levels of international students. However, this change also implies that the foreign student may shift their focus from the quality of postsecondary education and their educational achievements to market-oriented employment. This implication requires attention from Canadian universities and educators regarding how the internationalization of higher education can be improved to prepare international students for the Canadian labour market and maintain or even enhance the standard of higher education provided to these students at the same time.

Successful immigration and settlement are not based solely on a simplified and accelerated work permit processes and expedited permanent residency pathways. Without adequately investing in the integration of these potential immigrants, such policies may fail to deliver the desired results. The data analysis in this study show that Chinese students' intention to immigrate is associated with their perceived ability to obtain work experience and employment opportunities, their sense of acceptance, as well as their experience of discrimination in the local community and Canadian society. These associations indicate that better social and economic adaptation and integration would facilitate their intention to apply for permanent residency in Canada. Compared to the new immigrants who have little Canadian experience, these Chinese students may need less help, but they still need welcoming service providers and host communities to increase their abilities to adapt, integrate, and feel accepted by the Canadian society. Although Canada has been successful in receiving an increasing number of international students, the integration services required to support their successful settlement and adjustment are lacking (Cobb, 2012; Lowe, 2011). Such settlement and adjustment responsibilities should not be completely individualized. Therefore, the findings of this study would suggest that educational institutions, governments, communities, and employers should work together to conduct more research and program evaluations to more closely hear and find out the needs of the international students who choose to immigrate to Canada, and also to develop unique and comprehensive settlement programs to meet their needs.

This work lays some foundations for future research on theoretical, policy and practical issues related to Chinese students along with many other international students who decide to become a permanent resident in Canada. However, this study has a small sample size and limited scope due to the use of secondary data. The scale of Chinese student migration proves the need for further research to understand the experiences of Chinese students who become immigrants. Some areas deserve further exploration, for example, larger studies with more participants, to examine age, gender, and class differences in transition experiences, to identify their needs in the process of settlement, adjustment, and integration, as well as to explore their perceptions of and concerns with relevant policies and services at different levels, including educational institution, local community, and government.

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18. LIVING IN A DOUBLE DIASPORA

Transnational Talent Mobility between China and Canada

INTRODUCTION

This chapter theorizes "double diaspora" from the experiences of Chinese Canadians in Beijing who had previously emigrated to Canada from China and later "returned". Early notions of diaspora portray the phenomenon as catastrophic – the traumatic dispersal of victimized groups from an original homeland, and the salience of that homeland in the collective memory of a forcibly dispersed group (Cohen, 2008). More recently the concept has been extended to include labour, trade, imperial, and cultural diasporas. In delineating a diaspora, Cohen proposes nine criteria, including dispersal from an original homeland, the expansion from a homeland in search of work or pursuit of trade or colonial activities, a collective memory and myth about the homeland, an idealization of the real or imagined ancestral home, a return movement or intermittent visits, a strong ethnic group consciousness, a troubled relationship with host societies, a sense of solidarity with co-ethnic members in other countries, and the possibility of a distinctive creative, enriching life in host countries. Commenting on Cohen's typology, Anthias (1998, 2001) argues that it is descriptive and inductivist. Anthias summarizes some of the problems associated with Cohen's typology as follows: reliance on a notion of deterritorialized ethnicity which references to the primordial bonds of "homeland"; privileging the point of "origin" in constructing identity and solidarity; failure to examine trans-ethnic commonalities and relations; and a lack of concern with the intersectionalities of class and gender.

Despite such critiques, diaspora continues to be used as a category of analysis (Brubaker, 2005; Wahlbeck, 2002). More recently, with the development of modern transportation and advanced communication technologies, migration has shifted from "*inter*-national" to "*trans*-national" and subsequently "transnational diaspora" has emerged out of this context (Lie, 1995). In articulating transnational diaspora, Lie argues that "the sojourn itself is neither unidirectional nor final. Multiple, circular and return migrations, rather than a singular great journey from one sedentary space to another, occur across transnational spaces" (p. 304). In this view, migrants are no longer expected to make a sharp and definitive break from their homelands.

Situated in the debate about transnational diaspora, this study examines the experience of Chinese Canadians in Beijing with an aim of theorizing an emerging

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phenomenon of "double diaspora" – a hybrid experience that transcends boundaries of ethnicity and nationalism. The study reveals that Chinese Canadians are increasingly internationally mobile as a result of globalization, modern communications and transportation. The double diaspora is characterized by a number of dualities as both Chinese and Canadian, living in Chinese and Canadian diaspora, simultaneously diasporas and returnees, playing a double role as cultural and economic brokers between Canada and China. The double diaspora views the diaspora sojourn as neither unidirectional nor final, but rather as multiple and circular. It rejects the primordial notion of diaspora and theorizes diaspora as heterogeneous and conflictual forms of sociality. This study provides an alternative framework in understanding transnational talent mobility and representing multiple ways of affiliations and belonging.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This study employs transnationalism as its theoretical framework. Transnationalism and diaspora are often used interchangeably, although they are not synonymous (Wong & Satzewich, 2006). As transnationalism is often viewed as a broader and more inclusive concept than diaspora, it is important to examine the concept of transnationalism before proceeding to further considerations of diaspora. Transnationalism is not a new concept *per se*. Precursors of contemporary immigrant transnationalism can be traced back several centuries (Portes, Guarnizo, & Landolt, 1999). However, although early migrations allowed flows of returnees to their home countries, they lacked the "regularity, routine involvement, and critical mass characterizing contemporary examples of transnationalism" (p. 225).

Portes et al. (1999) propose three criteria for identifying a transnational phenomenon: the process involves a significant proportion of persons in the relevant universe, the activities of interest possess certain stability and resilience over time, and the content of these activities is not captured by some pre-existing concept. When analyzing transnationalism, individuals and their support networks are regarded as the proper units of analysis. According to Portes et al., a study that begins with the history and activities of individuals is "the most efficient way of learning about the institutional underpinnings of transnationalism and its structural effects" (p. 220). Unlike early transnationalism, which was often limited to elites, contemporary grass-roots transnational activities have commonly developed in reaction to government policies, and to conditions of dependent capitalism foisted on weaker countries to circumvent the permanent subordination of immigrants and their families. At the grass-roots level, Portes (1999) points out, transnationalism offers an economic alternative to immigrant's low-wage dead-end employment situations, gives them political voice, and allows them to reaffirm their own self-worth.

Transnational activities can be organized into three types: economic, political, and socio-cultural (Portes et al., 1999). The main goals of each type are different. Transnational economic entrepreneurs are interested in mobilizing their contacts

across borders in search of suppliers, capital and markets; transnational political activities aim for the achievement of political power and influence in the sending or receiving countries; and socio-cultural transnationalism aims to promote or reinforce a national identity abroad via the export of cultural events and goods. Another useful distinction is between transnationalism "from above" and "from below", initiated respectively by powerful states and transnational corporations to advance global capitalism, and by grass-roots transmigrants and their home country counterparts to generate multiple and counter-hegemonic powers among non-elites (Guarnizo & Smith, 2006; Mahler, 2006). In commenting on the fear that transnational activities will slow down the process of assimilation in immigrant host nations, Portes (1999) maintains that transnational activities can actually facilitate successful adaptation by providing opportunities for economic mobility and for a vital and purposeful life for migrant groups. He also points out that the overall impact of transnational activities on sending countries is positive, both economically and politically. Migrant remittances and business investments promote economic growth while political activism is more likely to line up with the forces of change in promoting democracy and reducing corruption and violation of human rights at home.

Commenting on the above discussion, Kivisto (2001) contends that Portes' unit of analysis excludes communities and more overarching structural units such as governments. With respect to the three types of transnationalism, Kivisto argues that labour and professional immigrants are missing from his definition of economic transnationalism and mobile capitalist entrepreneurs have become the sole representation. Regarding his political transnationalism, the emphasis on party officials, governmental functionaries, or community leaders excludes community activists and violates his stated intention of keeping transnationalism from below analytically distinct from transnationalism from above. Lastly, his emphasis of socio-cultural transnationalism on the collective enjoyment of cultural events and goods tends to preserve immigrant's nostalgic "symbolic ethnicity".

As stated above, the concepts of diaspora and transnationalism share a number of similarities, but also have some differences (Satzewich & Liodakis, 2007). First, they have had similar currency in recent years, garnering attention in scholarly circles at about the same time. Second, the concepts were presented as alternatives to the ill-equipped traditional studies of immigration and ethnic relations. Proponents of both concepts argue that diaspora and transnationalism capture "the importance of real and imagined places of origin in immigrant and ethnic groups lives and identities as well as the complex interactions between 'here' and 'there' for individuals, families, and communities that have moved abroad" (Satzewich & Liodakis, 2007, p. 208). However, despite their analytical concerns, the two concepts do have differences. Satzewich and Liodakis further point out, one major difference is the extent to which they permeated popular consciousness and wider public discourse. While the popularity of diasporas has reached outside of an immigrant or ethnic nexus, transnationalism has generally not gone beyond the scholarly community and entered immigrant and ethnic community organizations. At the same time,

the concept of diaspora has been more sharply criticized than its counterpart. For example, Anthias (1998) and Butler (2001) warn us the risk of moving towards essentializing "diaspora" as an ethnic label rather than a framework of analysis.

In the age of globalization, a globalized economy permits greater connectivity and creates new opportunities for diasporas. In articulating transnational diaspora, Lie (1995) argues that "The idea of transnationalism challenges the rigid, territorial nationalism that defines the modern nation-state; the dividing line is replaced by the borderlands of shifting and contested boundaries" (p. 304). According to Lie, transnationalism makes it possible for the imagined diaspora communities to subvert the unidirectionality of migrant passage and to replace it instead with an unending sojourn across different lands. "Along with the complexity of crossings", Lie continues, "the valence of premigration backgrounds has highlighted the diversity of migrant identities" (p. 304). He further notes that scholars now detail the diversity of immigration circumstances, including their class backgrounds, gendered transitions, and the sheer multitude of migration experiences. It is hoped that findings of this study will enrich our understanding about the diversity and rich experiences of Chinese Canadians as transnational talents and the emerging phenomenon of transnational diaspora.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This study combined questionnaires with personal interviews. The questionnaire consisted of four parts. Part one captured the age, gender, marital status, citizenship, and educational background of respondents. It was hoped this demographic information would yield a profile of double diasporas in Beijing. Part two asked respondents about their motivations for moving to Canada, their reasons for returning to China, and whether they had achieved their original goals prior to their moving back to China. Part three formed the core of the questionnaire. It explored the experiences of Chinese Canadians in Beijing, including their employment, income, social integration, and satisfaction with life in China. The last part included only open-ended questions, which invited participants to comment on changes they felt were most needed to help Canadians in China. The questionnaire was made available in both English and Chinese. The reason for adopting the questionnaire approach derived from its capability to maximize the number of responses in a reasonably short period of time.

However, limited space and the non-reciprocal nature of questionnaire prevented me from further probing some of the responses in the questionnaire. Consequently, I chose to enrich the questionnaire data by interviewing a number of the respondents. Semi-structured face-to-face interviewing was selected because it offers flexibility in asking in-depth questions (Fontana & Frey, 2005). In the selection of interviewees, I tried to strike a balance among people of different age, gender, education background, occupation, and citizenship status. Ten interviews

were conducted in English, each lasting between 1 and 1.5 hours. All interviews were taped and transcribed verbatim for analysis, which was an ongoing process. Data from the questionnaires and interviews complemented each other in significant ways, offering enriched understandings of the experiences of Canadians in China. Many of the questions in the questionnaire were explored in greater depth in the interviews; responses from the interviews, in turn, were instrumental to a richer interpretation of the questionnaire responses. Questionnaires were analyzed while collecting them; and interviews were built on what was learnt from the survey results. Each interview was conducted after the previous one was transcribed and preliminary analysis completed. Thus the analysis of preceding interviews fed into the conduct of the interviews that followed.

REPORT OF FINDINGS

Profile of Chinese Canadians in Beijing

The first section of the questionnaire drew together demographic data and migration patterns of participants. Among the 76 respondents who completed the questionnaire, 60.5% were male and 39.5% female. Most (89%) were married with one to two children. The majority of my respondents were young; over 90% were in their thirties and forties. The largest group hailed originally from Beijing (20%). Fifty-three percent held Canadian citizenship, and the rest were permanent residents of Canada. At the time of this study, 38% still had immediate family members residing in Canada. Eighty-four percent had left Canada within six years, and the average length of time the respondents had stayed in Canada before returning to China was five years. Before returning to China, they had resided in Vancouver (30%), Toronto (25%), Montreal (13%), Ottawa (9%), and Calgary (5%). Since returning, they had lived in China for an average three years, with 92% of the sample having returned to China in the past five years. The group was highly educated: 31% held bachelor's degrees, 42% had master's degrees, and 27% held PhDs. Most (70.3%) had completed their highest level of education from institutions in China, a smaller proportion (23%) from Canada, and the remaining 7% from other countries in the world.

According to the 2010 National Census of China (cited in APFC, 2011), about 20,000 Canadians were living in China. However, it is possible that this figure underestimates the true population. It is not clear how many are Canadians of Chinese descent who emigrated to Canada from China and later "returned"; the exact size of Chinese Canadians in Beijing is also unknown. As one of the research participants mentioned later in the interview, it is possible that some of them are not revealing their Canadian identity because of its inconveniences as a foreigner in looking for jobs and finding schools for their children. Despite the difficulties in assessing its size, what emerges clearly from the above findings is a profile which depicts the Chinese-Canadian double diaspora in Beijing as a young, well-educated

and economically active community. Their movement indicates that this is a hyper mobile group.

Understanding the Evolving Push and Pull Factors

What initially motivated participants to move to Canada? This is a big decision requiring careful thinking of immigrants and hence a fundamental question for this study. Preceding studies of Chinese Canadian immigrants show that non-economic reasons such as environment, education, and citizenship, were among their primary motives for moving to Canada (Guo, 2013; Guo & DeVoretz, 2006). Findings from this study show similar incentives, with respondents most often citing natural environment (49%), seeking new opportunities (43%), children's education (37%), and obtaining Canadian citizenship or permanent residence (36%) as reasons for moving to Canada.

Unfortunately, half (50.7%) of the respondents stated they had not achieved their main goals in Canada before moving back to China. Some of the factors which prevented them from achieving their goals were lack of social network (63%), Chinese work experience not being recognized (58%), Chinese qualifications not being recognized (55%), lack of Canadian work experience (47%), and language difficulties (47%). A number of studies conducted by independent scholars (Guo, 2009, 2010, 2013, 2015; Li, 2008; Reitz, 2001) as well as government-sponsored research (Statistics Canada, 2003) have repeatedly reported similar barriers facing immigrant professionals in Canada, constituting the "push" factors that encourage emigration from Canada. The devaluation and denigration of immigrant professionals' prior learning and work experience contrasts starkly with China's favourable government policies and attitudes towards returnees and their expertise, which may mobilize Chinese expats to move again (Zweig, Chen, & Rosen, 2004).

In the personal interviews conducted for this study, several participants discussed the barriers that made it difficult for them to adjust to life in Canada. Feida Deng (all interviewees' names are pseudonyms.) received his bachelor's degree in computer science, and had ten years experience working in the IT field in Beijing before moving to Canada. He had a hard time finding a job in his field in Canada. As a consequence, he worked as an office cleaner, volunteered for a recycling company, worked on a job as an entry level computer technician, and finally moved up to a middle level consultant. Because his Canadian work experiences were neither challenging nor rewarding, he decided to return to China to take up a job in an electronics company as its Chief Information Officer. Recalling his experience in Canada, this is what he had to say:

> I have 10 years experience in IT technology. Yeah, so I feel that I've failed in Canada because your English is not good and uh you don't have network. The employers in Calgary don't recognize our education background, work experience. That is bad. That is too bad.

Another computer engineer experienced difficulties similar to those of Feida. In 1999, Guofang Zhang left Beijing for Vancouver to seek more opportunities in Canada, but returned to Beijing only three years later, in 2002. He worked as a computer programmer and analyst for nine years before leaving China. In the process of seeking work in Canada, he sent out more than 100 resumes, which resulted in only a three months contract. In the meantime, he worked minimum wage jobs to support his family. He stated:

> The job security is crucial. If no job, everything is not possible, you know. In Canada my pressure is very heavy because I have to find a job. But my wife was also a fruit cutter, she only made $800 or $900 a month. My rent is about $500. You feel depressed.

Both the questionnaire and the interview data confirmed that Chinese immigrants experience multi-faceted barriers in Canada, which consist of a *glass gate* blocking entrance to guarded professional communities, a *glass door* denying access to professional employment at high-wage firms, and a *glass ceiling* preventing immigrants from moving into management positions or receiving the same pay with their white colleagues who work on the same job (Guo, 2013). Guo argues that *glass gate, glass door*, and *glass ceiling* may converge to produce *a triple glass effect* – a set of multiple structural barriers causing unemployment and underemployment, poor economic performance, and downward social mobility. When such “push factors” are combined with China’s favourable government policies as “pull factors”, they generate a global force mobilizing Chinese immigrants to repatriate themselves and once again seek opportunities in China.

Experience of Economic Re-Integration

Current literature on Chinese migrants’ motivations to return primarily highlights economic factors. According to Zweig, Chen and Rosen (2004), Chinese returnees went home because they saw excellent opportunities in China’s rich domestic market. In this study, when Chinese Canadians were asked what motivated them to return to China, half (50%) stated seeking new opportunities, followed by taking care of parents (42%), living in Chinese culture (41%), having more opportunities for promotion (37%), and having more job opportunities (34%). These findings support Zweig, Chen and Rosen’s (2004) similar finding that economic opportunities were major reasons behind the decision to move back to China. However, family considerations were also important. Similar to Ho’s (2008) findings about Singaporean migrants, familial considerations here were also important reasons for eventual return. Following the Confucian values of filial piety, many may have decided to return to fulfill family responsibilities. Because of China’s one child policy, which was put in place thirty years ago, it is predicted that more people may return in the future to care for their aging parents. Given this unique demographic

condition, familial obligations and economic motivations may work together to bind transmigrants to particular geographical and national contexts.

In sharp contrast to respondents' accounts of their failure to achieve their goals in Canada, the majority (75%) indicated that they had fared better since returning to China. All participants had secured a job in China, while 12% reported they were unemployed before returning. Eleven percent of respondents had worked in Canada as labourers in processing, manufacturing and utilities; none were employed in these fields upon returning to China. Conversely, employment in the professions increased once respondents returned to China, with the biggest changes occurring in shifts to management and teaching. Senior management positions increased from 5% in Canada to 15.5% in China, and teachers and professors from 19% to 32%. It is also worth noting that 52% played leadership roles in China, a significant increase from 25% who stated they had done so in Canada. Interestingly, 65% stated that their Canadian experience had helped them obtain their current positions in China, suggesting a shift from brain drain to brain circulation that Saxenian (2005) discussed in her research about the benefits of transnational movement of talents between the United States and China and India. When invited to compare their current employment situation in China with their prior one in Canada, it is not surprising that most (81%) felt their current employment was better or much better. Likewise, when participants were asked to compare their current employment with that before leaving China for Canada, the majority (66%) indicated their most recently obtained positions were better or much better. The employment experience of Chinese transmigrants speaks to the liberatory character of transnationalism from below as counter-hegemonic practices (Mahler, 2006), which ironically did not happen in Canada but rather after return to China.

Respondents' improved employment situations in China naturally led to positive impacts on their income. Before returning to China, half of respondents reported a Canadian household income of less than $31,000, a rate much lower than the median family income of $65,500 in Canada (Statistics Canada, 2011). Only a minority of families (13%) earned more than $78,000. Participants' income in China after returning reflected almost opposite trends. An overwhelming majority (93%) reported an annual household income more than ¥50,000 RMB. In particular, it is worth noting that almost one third (30%) earned more than ¥250,000 RMB, while the average annual income per capita in Beijing is less than ¥25,000 RMB (Beijing Municipal Statistic Bureau, 2010). Only 7.1% earned less than ¥50,000 RMB. It is clear that this was an elite group. As Wang, Zweig and Lin (2011) point out, elite migrants are playing a leading role in many aspects of China's booming economy. They are more likely to bring in foreign capital, transfer more goods and services into China, and introduce cutting-edge technology, which subsequently helped with the increase of their income.

Experience of Social Re-Integration

In addition to changing employment patterns, this study also explored the social experience of those living in a double diaspora in Beijing. Since returning to China, the majority reported that they had reconnected with old friends and colleagues (86.8%) or made new friends (84.2%); a relatively smaller group indicated that they lived close to relatives (72.4%). Most of the study participants (78%) did not encounter any difficulties re-integrating into the Chinese society. Those who had cited difficulties noted pollution (47.1%), bureaucracy (41.2%), difficulties in building social network (41.2%), and difficulties in cultural adjustment (35.3%). It is not surprising that so many people mentioned bureaucracy, because China is notorious for this. Many scholars, Cheng (2008) for one, highlight bureaucracy and corruption as two of the major challenges facing China today. The finding on pollution is consistent with people's motivations for initially migrating to Canada (Guo, 2013; Guo & DeVoretz, 2006). Participants' difficulties with building social network were likely to do with their absence from China for a lengthy period of time. Regarding difficulties in readjusting to their home culture, it seems that although the respondents were brought up in Chinese culture, they still needed time to readjust because China has changed so much, and the "home" they returned to was not necessarily the same one they left. Clearly, some experienced reverse culture shock as a result of being away for a lengthy period of time (Christofi & Thompson, 2007; Gaw, 2000). In fact, when asked if China had changed since they left, 76% answered "yes". Major changes included perceptions of China as more open and more developed, and of migration being easier than before. However, the surveyed also indicated that the traffic in Beijing was worse than before and that Beijing was more polluted than before. Despite these problems, the majority (67.2%) indicated no regrets about returning. Overall, most (68.9%) felt happier about their life in China than in Canada, and were happier than before leaving China for Canada (67.1%).

Difficulty of re-adjusting to life in China was discussed by several participants in the interviews. Guifang Lin first moved to Vancouver in 1999 as an international student at the University of British Columbia (UBC), became a permanent resident in 2003, and returned to China in 2006 after she completed her PhD at the University of Toronto. After being away for seven years, she discovered her Chinese had become rusty: "When I just came back, I found I'm not used to speaking Chinese for such a long time, so I always missed the tone, right? I also mixed Chinese with English. I think maybe it sounds strange, especially my husband started teasing me, 'Don't speak English to me.'" She found the traffic in China crowded compared to Canada, and she was now unfamiliar with Chinese popular culture. She noted:

> Many things have changed, so it takes me some time to really learn about some pop culture. When people talk about pop culture, at the very beginning I felt lost because I don't know many of the names of the singers or movie

> stars because you didn't know them, because you didn't get the change to watch their movie or listen to their songs. So it took me some time to know their names, even I don't spend a lot of time, I mean paying a lot of attention to them.

However, she also commented on positive changes coming out of the Olympic Games. She stated:

> So I think Beijing, especially after Olympic, the life is much easier, like public transportation is much convenient, I don't have to drive, now I don't drive actually, I think it's much easier. If you drive, …the parking is not easy to find, it's expensive, so I think it's much convenient to take the public transportation. So now you have a lot of choices: you could take express bus, you could take slow bus, so it really depends.

Like Guifang, Huawei Li moved to Canada in 1989 as an international student working on his MA and then PhD in English literature at the University of Toronto. Before he moved back to China in 2003, he taught at a university in Atlantic Canada. What he found difficult in his process of adaptation was adjusting to a Chinese academic culture, which is challenged by issues of plagiarism and academic integrity. He noted:

> It was difficult in a way because the society has changed quite a lot. So has the educational system, not so much about the system itself as about the quality of the criteria within the system. Um, as you are well aware that there's a lot of corruption, academic corruption, lots of plagiarism, cases like that which are not tolerated at all in western society. But here it's rampant, it's widespread so it's difficult to do the real scholarship here. So that's a big adjustment.

No-Glow Canadian Citizenship

In the process of social and economic re-integration, most participants found their friends and families (88.2%) more helpful than their work units (26.5%) or government organizations (4.4%) when they needed help. This echoes similar patterns in Canada, where Chinese immigrants are more likely to seek help from friends and families rather than government or non-government organizations (Guo, 2013; Guo & DeVoretz, 2006). What differs between the two countries is that in China, the role of NGOs is lacking. Instead work units replaced NGOs in helping returnees with their re-integration. They needed the most help in two areas: finding a school for their children (27.9%) and applying for residence permit (27.5%). Owing to their dual identity as Canadian diasporas and Chinese returnees, the participants fell under the responsibilities of both Canadian and Chinese governments. This finding has important implications for both governments in initiating collaborative efforts to help Chinese Canadians with their re-integration process.

The issues of citizenship and resident permits identified in the surveys concerned many of the interviewees as well. With a relatively prestigious reputation internationally, Canadian citizenship is often perceived to offer security and greater convenience and flexibility in visa-free international travel. For many, holding a Canadian passport is regarded as an open door to countries across the world. However, living in a double diaspora in China is a different matter, even for those of Chinese origin. Participants in this study had little difficulty finding work in China, but as "foreigners" they need to apply for a work permit, which can be a complicated and bureaucratic process. One interviewee had to leave the country to renew her visitor's visa every six months before securing a job in Beijing. Another participant, Lixia Liu, adopted a "hide and seek" strategy to obtain a job in a foreign embassy as a translator. Because this embassy only hires Chinese citizens, she had to hide her Canadian citizenship in order to win the job. Luckily her old Beijing ID was still valid. She said:

> It was interesting experience to look for a job here. Yeah, all those experience actually I worked as a Chinese. I worked as a Chinese because they didn't expect you to be a foreigner with a Chinese face… And so right now I'm still working as a Chinese 'cause this embassy, so the embassy doesn't know I'm not, I'm no longer a Chinese… When I came to look for work at this embassy, in my resume I put down the advantages. One of the advantages I said I hold a Canadian passport. And my friend said "No, maybe you'd better delete that because they, they don't want to hire any foreigners working in the embassy." So if you have the Canadian citizenship, you just pretend, you just say you are Chinese.

Qiang Wu, who is a production director of film and television, always hides his Canadian passport when he travels because, as he stated:

> Sometimes your foreign passport is really trouble. For example, if I got to make a documentary at the border of China and another country, if I show them a foreign passport, that's a big deal. Yeah, it gives me big trouble. It will take much much longer time than a regular inspection.

According to Qiang, a Canadian passport is only good for "show-off purposes." He continued, "You know, I'm pretending I'm not a Canadian, I'm a pure Chinese because sometimes you know the passport you can show off to your friends but it's not convenient when you travel across China."

Another interviewee, Guohua Fang, originally moved to Montreal in 1994 to pursue a PhD in education, and returned to Beijing in 2002 to work in an international school as a principal. He described that he often sees himself as Chinese, but in legal terms he is Canadian. Often, he had found himself caught between these two identities when he forgot to report to the police upon returning to Beijing after visits to Canada. Once he was fined a few hundred *yuan* because he was late to report to the police. He said:

> Based on the Chinese law, a foreigner has to go to the local police station within twenty-four hours after your arrival but I totally forgot that. Each time I just forgot that. I don't think I'm a foreigner. I just take my severance a native local people, local person, native. I don't think there's the need I should go and report to the police station to apply for a residence permit.

For Huawei Li, the penalties for Canadian citizenship were much greater than a few hundred *yuan*. After teaching in a Chinese university for several years, he decided to renounce his Canadian citizenship, owing to its limitations in China. He explained:

> After returning to China I was first hired as so called foreign expert. I brought my certificates with me, my both passports… But then I realized that unless you become you know, full member in the Chinese Society, i.e. you have to have the Chinese citizenship then you would face a lot of difficulties working in the academia. For example, funding application, you're not allowed, you're not eligible as a foreign national to apply for any funding. And your work published theoretically cannot apply for awards, you can't compete with other publications for awards, metals, you know … So that's a big drawback. And also you can't be considered in the normal rank of the academic ranks as a lecturer, associate professor, full professor, so I was only, I was appointed as visiting, sort of visiting professor of English. So you cannot fully integrate into the Chinese academic society. So I decided to renounce my Canadian citizenship and resume my Chinese Canadian citizenship. As you know Chinese government does not recognize dual citizenship, yes, so you have to make a choice there, that's the choice I made.

Following Huawei, several interviewees also commented on the various difficulties of holding dual citizenship. There was consensus among them that Canadian and Chinese governments should work together to design a policy that recognizes dual citizenship. Xiaopeng Sun, who has been actively involved in advocating dual citizenship in China, had this to say:

> I recommend they [Chinese government] should recognize dual citizenship. They should really relax on the visa, you know. They should for overseas Chinese who have joined foreign nationality, they should give them something like the same treatment as people from Hong Kong, have a returning home permit you know, or maybe they should enjoy all the same benefits as the local Chinese.

However, not everyone is optimistic about its possibility. Guohua Fang noted:

> If there is a dual citizenship, I would welcome it. I heard people talking about it. The Chinese government is discussing about that law but whether it's possible or not I really doubt it because there are too many people.

The above discussion suggests that for repatriated Chinese, the "glow" of Canadian citizenship wears off quickly. The limitations and inconveniences of holding Canadian citizenship hinder the efforts of those living in a double diaspora to re-integrate into Chinese society. Fortunately, their dual identity as both Canadian diasporas and Chinese returnees helps minimize the limitations. When their Canadian identity becomes a barrier, they can return to their Chinese roots.

Ambiguities of Home and Homeland

One important feature of a diaspora is maintaining connections with the homeland through intermittent visits, or, often, the development of a return movement (Cohen, 2008; Safran, 1991). In the questionnaire, when asked if they were planning to return to Canada in the future, many (42.9%) were undecided. Those who committed a response one way or the other were evenly split between those who answered "yes" (28.6%) and those who stated "no" (28.6%). Given that 38% still had immediate family members residing in Canada and many frequently visited home while living in China, it is likely that many will return to reside in Canada, while some will continue their transnational journeys between China and Canada, a clear indication of openness to circular migration.

The interview data further illuminated the meanings behind these figures. Among the ten interviewees, four still had immediate families living in Canada. They frequently visit home while living in a double diaspora. Several people mentioned that they missed Canada. Lixia Liu commented:

> I think in the first 2 years we miss [Canada] a lot especially for my children. Yeah, they stayed there, like the older one stayed there for more than 3 years, so he really missed the place. For the little one, he is happy anywhere with parents.

Although Huawei Li had to renounce his Canadian citizenship, he still goes to visit his wife every summer in Toronto, where he still has a house. His daughter also joins them from the United States every year for a family reunion. Indeed, this is a transnational family living in three countries.

Almost everyone who was interviewed indicated that they missed Canada. Michael Liang, who had lived in Vancouver, had, at the time of the interview, lived in Beijing for fifteen years. He described that what he missed the most about Canada was the beautiful mountains and the blue oceans. He often shows the Canadian flag to his children. Michael plays important bridging roles between Canada and China. During the Olympic and the Paralympic Games, he was the team attaché for Team Canada. He also worked for the Team Canada trade mission led by former Prime Minister Jean Chretien. He goes back to visit Canada once every year or two. "Vancouver is still home," he stated. "It was reminding me of the lifestyle back home, the way things are done, so it was just giving me a reminiscent kind of feeling." Despite this,

Michael had no immediate plans to return to Canada full-time because, he claimed, he has "the best of both worlds."

For Guofang Zhang, visits to Canada were desirable, but he would not return there to live. He said Canada is not suitable for someone like himself. Xinsheng Wang, on the other hand, had a specific plan to return to Canada in 2012 so that his children could attend school there. Lixia Liu also shared a plan to return to Canada:

> And now since we have been away for almost five years, so we might go back to have a visit… We are also thinking about maybe going back for the children's education. We don't know right now. Maybe. My older boy attends Grade 10 and we have to see what he likes. What we're thinking right now is at least he should attend the Canadian, if not Canadian but maybe university abroad. Yeah, at least the two boys will stay in Canada.

Qiang Wu's dream was to retire in Canada and purchase a house in Victoria by the seaside, and live with his two children and wife. For Huawei Li, the ideal would be to live for six months in each country. He stated:

> I think when I retire, as we have discussed between my wife and myself, the ideal situation be that we could spend half of the year say six months in China and six months in Canada. Taking advantage of the weather I guess, 'cause in Beijing it's very hot you know, better escape the heat.

The above discussion has clearly shown that transnational travel plans are evolving and changeable rather than complete, which represent certain stopping points in a lifelong trajectory of moves across borders (Ley & Kobayashi, 2005). Similar as the experience of those in Hong Kong, return migration is not sufficient description of the hyper-mobility of Chinese Canadians in Beijing. Their continuing itinerary over time depicts "a perennial openness to further movement at distinctive passages in the life cycle" (p. 123). The transnational experience of Chinese Canadians in Beijing speaks to the phenomenon of transnational diaspora which is "neither unidirectional nor final" (Lie, 1995, p. 304). Instead, multiple, circular and return migrations occur across transnational spaces between Canada and China. It also speaks to the ambiguities of home and homeland which are shifting from static and fixed notions to fluid and evolving conceptualization.

CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATION

This study was set out to theorize double diaspora from the experience of Chinese Canadians in Beijing. The study reveals that Chinese Canadians are becoming increasingly internationally mobile as a result of globalization, modern communications and transportation. Their transnational migration experiences can be classified as "double diaspora" – a hybrid experience that transcends boundaries of ethnicity and nationalism. As part of Chinese diaspora who had previously emigrated to Canada from China and later returned, many also held Canadian

passports and maintained connections with Canada as part of a newly formed Canadian diaspora. The double diaspora is characterized by a number of dualities, such as being both Chinese and Canadian, living in Chinese and Canadian diaspora, living simultaneously diasporas and returnees, and playing double roles as cultural and economic brokers between Canada and China. While some hold Canadian citizenship, others are yet to be naturalized. Their previous homeland (China) is their adopted country, and their newly adopted country (Canada) is also their original homeland. Unlike traditional diasporic communities which are often composed of people who spent much of their lives in their home countries, the length of stay for the participants in this study in Canada has been relatively short, a finding consistent with APFC's (2011) study reporting that naturalized Canadians make up the fastest growing segment of Canadians abroad. Furthermore, these individuals have a dual belonging. They are simultaneously diasporas and returnees. On the one hand, they are Chinese returnees completing the cycle of Chinese diaspora; on the other hand, their migration does not stop here. In fact, China is just a stopping point and they will continue to move across borders after this.

The double diaspora is closely associated with the notion of "transnational diaspora" that Lie (1995) spoke of. Consistent with transnationalism, it views the diaspora sojourn as neither unidirectional nor final, but rather as multiple and circular. As Lie notes, it subverts the unidirectionality of migrant passage, replacing it instead with an unending sojourn across different lands. It demonstrates how diasporic space is configured by multiple locations of home and abroad and contested relations among and between people with diverse subject positions (Knott & McLoughlin, 2010). It challenges the rigid, territorial nationalism that defines nation state as a political organization bound by one common language, culture, and ethnicity, which fails to recognize the reality of multicultural Canada. It rejects the primordial notion of diaspora which relies on "homeland" and "origin" as its criteria in defining diaspora (Anthias, 1998, 2001). More importantly, double diaspora allows for a theorization of diaspora "not as homogeneous, unified, monolithic, harmonious forms of sociality but as heterogeneous and conflictual" (Werbner, 2010, p. 77).

This study demonstrates that the boundaries between diaspora, territory, and transnational migration are blurred. This phenomenon can perhaps be understood from the notion of extraterritoriality, a particular way of representing oneself in space. According to Ma Mung (1998, 2004), the process of extraterritoriality involves a heightened awareness of the spatial configuration of the diaspora; individuals' perception of the multi-polarity of migration; individuals' awareness of potential for inter-polarity as a result of their concrete links with people in other countries; and the development of a diaspora culture, which acts to make the spatial configuration an asset. Ma Mung contends that the diaspora's relationship to territory is fundamentally different from that of a sedentary society. Unlike the traditional territory, which is often defined by the ongoing presence of a population, the diaspora is uprooted from its original territory. As such, it cannot reproduce "in the tangible, circumscribed, closed physical space form which it would traditionally proceed" (1998, p. 37). The

diaspora territory is everywhere, and thus nowhere. It is an imaginary, "fantasized" space. "The territory is virtual, and virtual alone" (Ma Mung, 2004, p. 219). In the age of transnational migration, the identification with a national or territorial space has been transcended by the notion of extraterritoriality. As Ma Mung (2004) notes: "National borders dissolve; they are irrelevant. The feeling of extraterritoriality is thus the key to conceiving of the unity of a dispersed, scattered entity. It unlocks national borders" (p. 218). It is evident that the double diaspora has redefined the concept of territory, not as a single space, or a precise, circumscribed territory, but a part of a supra-national phenomenon. Their dualities as both Chinese and Canadian diasporas have also transcended the traditional definition of identity with its multiple allegiances.

The findings of this study have important implications for transnational talent mobility. Dispersal of talent can be an important resource when it is claimed and optimized by its homeland and subject. As such, sending countries should step up their efforts to strengthen ties with their overseas citizenries through proactive initiatives (Ho, 2008). These might include emphasizing that migrants are an asset to the country of origin; establishing state agencies to promote the formation of migrant associations; disseminating the work of nationalist artists, writers and musicians; and extending dual citizenship to overseas nationals (Ho, 2008). These actions, suggests Ho, nurture an extraterritorial form of national identity. It is time for China and Canada to develop diaspora policies that recognize the existence of double diasporas, facilitates the movement of global talents, maintains their connection with the homeland, and helps them adapt to a new life overseas. It also calls upon Canadian and Chinese governments to collaborate in designing policies that recognize dual citizenship with a broadened understanding of multiple ways of affiliations and belonging.

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19. THE HOMECOMING

An Investigation into the Effect of Studying Overseas on the Returned Chinese Postgraduates' Life and Work in China[1]

INTRODUCTION

Since the 1990s, the internationalization of higher education has resulted in an influx of Chinese students into many western universities.[2] More recently, the number of Chinese graduates returning to China has increased dramatically.

The research reported in this chapter emerged as a follow-up to my doctoral study conducted in 2003/4, which was an in-depth qualitative investigation into ten postgraduate Chinese students' experience of living and studying at a British university (Gill, 2005, 2007a, 2007b). I closely observed these students' adaptation and adjustment and my research uncovered a three-fold 'stress-adaptation-growth' process (Kim, 1988). Through in-depth interviews and collecting life narratives, my research analysed how these individuals coped with the challenges of encountering 'strangeness' in academic setting and everyday situations, and how they developed strategies for adaptation. It concluded that studying overseas could lead to increased intercultural awareness, a transformed perception of self and understanding of learning, as well as a newly constructed intercultural identity (Gill, 2005).

Since late 2004, eight out of the ten students in my original study have returned to settle in China. In the summer of 2008, I went to China and conducted this follow-up study to explore the impact of intercultural learning acquired overseas on these returnees' current experience of living and working in China. I was particularly interested in understanding how the returnees perceived their identity after re-entry into Chinese culture.

THE CHINESE CONTEXT

In China, a returnee is nicknamed a 'sea turtle', a pun on the word for 'returning from overseas' in Mandarin, which refers to someone who was born on a shore, has been across the sea, and is now returning to that same shore again. Potentially, the returnee overseas graduates could make significant contributions to their home country as an outcome of studying abroad and intercultural encounters. According to Wang (2012), each year, over 200,000 Chinese students go overseas to study. To date, over 500,000 Chinese graduates have returned to China. About 100,000

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Chinese overseas students travel in between other countries and China. They are nicknamed 'Seagulls'.

Gittings (2006) notes changes in the attitudes of Chinese students towards studying abroad and returning. In the 1980s, studying overseas was 'a way of escape from China' and its political and intellectual oppression; within a decade, however, many overseas scholars had become eager to return in order to 'make most of their expertise' (p. 263). New economic visions are now "shared by the new generation of young professionals, many of them trained abroad" (p. 322). Returnees often regard themselves as "part of a global community" (p. 322).

Wang and Zweig (2009) maintain that Chinese returnees together with the Chinese Diasporas are playing an increasingly significant role in China's globalization. Being an important global export economy and a major attraction for international investment, China's continued economic growth and technological advancement has resulted an increased demand for international talent. The overseas graduates are part of the new and changing forces in China in 21st century. Gross and Connor (2007) suggest that the pulling factors that draw returnees back to China include economic and business opportunities, family ties, increased political stability, improved housing conditions, and higher salaries compared with local employees. Ip (2006) adds two more factors to the list: the comfort and reassurance of the cultural milieu in China, and the familiarity of the social environment, which facilitates social interaction and friendship. Ip's participants also mentioned that higher professional satisfaction, more space for career development in China and the feeling that they are playing a part in the transformation of China are equally important pulling factors.

When examining the trend in international flows of Chinese human capital, Pan (2010) notes that in the 2000s, China's economic success and subsequent social change has allowed China to effectively drive this flow from provider to receiver. Accordingly, China is now perceived as a land of opportunity, and many overseas Chinese have hence returned to China. Saxenian (2005) regards the flow of scholars and students between Chinese and western institutions as a 'brain circulation' rather than 'brain drain', arguing that 'brain circulation' as such to be a positive trend and that returnees could play a big part in China's economic growth and technological development. This trend is accompanied by Chinese government's effort to attract top overseas Chinese graduates. For instance, since 2009, Chinese government has launched its most liberal and ambitious 'Thousand Talent Programme' which aims to attract two thousand top level overseas scholars, scientists and entrepreneurs, and senior managers (see Wang, 2012). Xu (2009) points out that there are substantial regional differences within China which offers opportunities for returnees to identify an ideal place for themselves. In this way, for Chinese overseas graduates, "a major purpose and big advantage of returning to China is being close to where the action is" (p. 32). Although previously the action was to be found in large major cities, especially those along the coast, more returnees are venturing into the heart of the country as these regions often have more potential for action and possibly more favourable conditions that attract overseas returnees.

However, whilst globalization has brought about tremendous shifts in institutional culture, China continues to struggle over the state's control. Chen's (2008) comparative study on Taiwanese and Chinese returnees' potential to lead the high-tech industry suggests that Chinese returnees are confronted with more challenges (than their Taiwanese counterparts) in forming transnational networks and managing international operations; at the same time, the Chinese returnees have yet to learn how to tap into institutionalised resources (venture capital, research funds, etc.) and embed themselves in the local institutions, a challenge not necessarily faced by returnees in Taiwan due to its longer history of privatizing public assets.

In addition, China's explosive growth in economy means that the country is confronted with the real possibility of moral crisis (Eberlein, 2008). The pursuit of material wealth appears to outweigh some ethical and moral concerns. Eberlein suggests that "today is the worst time of moral degeneration in China's history" (n.p.). Hutton (2007) also cautions that the rising affluence in China needs to be accompanied by concerns about "equity and social solidarity" and "global governance" (p. 346). These could potentially hinder overseas Chinese graduates' decision to return.

TOPICS WITHIN THE EXISTING LITERATURE ON THE GRADUATES' EXPERIENCE OF RETURNING HOME

Reverse Cultural Shock and Re-Adaptation

There is an abundance of literature examining the re-entry experience of individuals who have spent some time abroad as expatriates or students. The theorization of 'reverse culture shock' alludes to 'culture shock', which refers to emotional reactions such as anxiety, helplessness, and distress as a result of losing the familiar symbols of the social and cultural milieu in a new cultural environment (Oberg, 1960). According to Adler (1987, p. 29), culture shock also implies a "profound learning experience that leads to a higher degree of self-awareness and personal growth". Reverse culture shock is defined as "the process of readjusting, re-acculturating, and re-assimilating into one's own home environment after living in a different culture for a significant period of time" (Gaw, 2000, pp. 83–84).

Some research has identified problems associated with reverse culture shock, including academic problems for returnees; conflicts between the newly assumed identity and one's home cultural identity; experiences of alienation and disorientation; feelings of stress and anxiety; and difficulties with inter-personal relationships, and even fear and a sense of helplessness (Adler, 1981; Church, 1982; Zapf, 1991). Amongst all, the most challenging aspect of re-entry adaptation no doubt has to do with how one deals with the tension between one's sense of self after studying overseas and whom one is expected to be by folks at home and by the home society. Many returnees struggle to live with such tension.

Changes Following a Period Studying Abroad

Broadly considered, the most significant changes after studying and sojourning abroad are broadly connected to personal growth and transformation (Adler, 1975; Bennett, 1993; Kim, 1988, 1992), which can be reflected in the following ways. These are, of course, not mutually exclusive and these changes can sometimes happen to individuals at the same time. Without going into details, I briefly list these changes to include: intercultural competence and having an integrated and inclusive worldview (Alred, Byram, & Fleming, 2003; Taylor, 1994); more open and flexible ways of thinking and communicating (Kim, 1988, 1992; Ting-Toomey, 1999); the ability to adopt a 'third space' in which to perceive and understand one's own and other cultures (Gill, 2005, 2007a; Kramach, 1993); becoming more autonomous and independent (Murphy-LeJeune, 2003); assuming a new self-identity as the result of speaking a different language and living in another culture (Alred, 2003; Evans, 1988; Libben & Lindner, 1996).

Indeed, many authors support the notion of transformation from the perspective of an emerging identity and/or personality (hidden or created) following one's experience studying abroad and living in different language and cultural milieu. Through profound intercultural and cross-cultural encounters, some returnees are able to adopt a mode of life that integrates the features of the different cultures he/she has been exposed and become accustomed to. In other words, they create and live in a 'third culture' and become world citizens (Smith, 1996).

Developing Intercultural Personhood

Kim (2001, 2008) sees the transformative dimension of intercultural experience as including the notion of intercultural personhood. Intercultural personhood is the outcome of a person's immersion in the richness of another culture through which he/she acquires a different orientation for their identity (Kim, 2008). Furthermore intercultural personhood

> depicts a dynamic and integrative transformation of identity and … indicate(s) less dualistic and more meta-contextual conceptions of self and others rather than rigid boundedness vis-a-vis conventional social categories such as ethnicity or culture. (p. 365)

In an increasingly globalized world, Kim suggests that intercultural personhood "projects a way of relating to oneself and to fellow human beings with greater objectivity, realism, and even-handedness" (Kim, 2008, p. 367). This concept can indeed serve as a developmental model characterising the overseas students' pathway including their returned journey. It also brings in the complexity and evolving nature of personal identity in the globalised era. Kim concludes that prolonged intercultural encounter and immersion can provide the opportunity for individuals to experience an identity evolution at a larger scale.

Research Findings Concerning Returnees' Experiences in the Context of Their Work and Everyday Lives

Studies on returnees' experiences have increased dramatically over the last decade. Some research tended to analyse returnees' experiences in the context of their contribution to home country's scientific research and enterprises and to the country's overall development (e.g., Shen, 2007; Wang, 2012; Wright, Liu, Buck, & Filatotchev, 2008). The findings from such research pointed to the need to not only recognize the social and human capital that returnee entrepreneurs can provide, but also the necessity to provide more supportive social and political environment so that the returnees could fully express and employ their innovative ideas and heterogeneity.

Other studies analyze the differences between the returnees and how they adapt to and make contribution to the home country's development. Chen's (2008) case study of returned entrepreneurs in China's Silicon Valley in Beijing is a good example of this kind of study. Chen revealed four types of returnees according to their network connections: Type One refers to returnees whose international networks and local connections are both strong. They have a 'comparative advantage' and are 'the archetype of the brain-circulation theory'. Type Two have strong international network contacts but weak local connections. These returnees often continue to work in multi-national companies and mediate between western and Chinese technological management cultures. Type Three have little contact with international networks but have strong local connections. They can take advantage of their knowledge of the complex Chinese '*Guan-Xi*' (cultivation of personal connections with those of power or influence, [my explanation]) to promote technological innovation. The last type of returnees refers to those with neither international nor local connections. These are the majority of Chinese returnees. They are enthusiastic and strive to build networks from the bottom up.

Given the differences in the returnees' network connections, a common theme identified in existing research has been the returnees' under-preparedness to re-adapt and re-engage with their home and work environment (Butcher, 2003; McGrath, 1998), including making significant adjustments in areas such as lifestyle expectations, worldview changes, values, and work place culture (Christofi & Thompson, 2007; McGrath, Stock, & Butcher, 2007). Cao's (2007) study explored the possible reasons why returnees experience difficulty integrating into the workplace back home and looked at institutional factors such as Guan-Xi, low efficiency levels, personal conflicts and loss of contact with international communities within the professional discipline.

Gross and Connor (2007) recommend that it is necessary for the returnees to re-adjust their expectations of work experience. Whilst the returnees are in general would like to be seen as the ones who will spread advanced skills, business ethics and who understand international norms, they may not immediately be able to produce the results they want due to the complexity of the workplace culture and the importance of the '*Guan-Xi*' network.

In addition, the profound influence of studying overseas on the returnees' home culture and economy has been well reported in the literature. Hayhoe (1990) noted that in the 1980s, returnees provided opportunities to open up channels for ideas (within the 'cultural-life world') to circulate between China and the West. Shen (2007) maintains that returnees are vital human capital for securing the growth of the Chinese economy and the development of global cities such as Shanghai. McGrath et al. (2007) suggest that returnees may, in effect, serve as international diplomats to liaise between their host and home countries. Iredale and Gao (2001) identified the influence of returnees as being agents for social change and cultural transformation. Similarly, Wang and Zweig (2009) highlight the bridging role that returnees play in linking China to the rest of the world, especially through entrepreneurial endeavours and international trade and businesses.

The foci of recent research has also left a gap in the field: namely in-depth studies of the returnees' journey of homecoming, their experiences of re-adaptation, and how they deal with the challenges confronting them with regard to the tension between the emerging identity and the expectations of who they ought to be. The research reported in this chapter aimed to respond to such a need for deeper insights.

RESEARCH METHOD: AN IN-DEPTH QUALITATIVE CASE STUDY

This research applied a qualitative case study approach to data collection. It involved in-depth interviews with each participant in Mandarin, during which life stories about their homecoming experiences were collected. It focused on analyzing and interpreting these narratives in order to understand the ways the participants experienced the world. Life narratives provided the mode in which meaning could be socially-constructed through research conversations between the participants and the researcher (Goodson & Sikes, 2001).

A major aim of this research was to explore the complex situations and contextualized factors that had impact on returnees' experiences. This concurred with Stake's (1995, p. 3) view of an "intrinsic study", which can "investigate and report the complex dynamic and unfolding interactions of events, human relationships and other factors in a unique instance". This case study focused on eight Chinese returnees' homecoming journeys after an extended period of sojourn and study in Britain. Using a case study as the research method has allowed the development of a deeper understanding of the uniqueness and complexity of 'the case'. It also helped build up a more complete profile of each participant so that I could concentrate on each individual's unique perspectives on their experiences re-adaptation while paying due attention to the interaction between the participant, their reflection on the experiences and the home contexts. It made it possible to identify the complexity involved in the returnee's homecoming.

Narrative, in my research, was simultaneously a social process of inquiry and the research data. It served to mediate between the persistent aspects and the shifts in a person's identity (Ricoeur, 1992). Although appearing anecdotal, individual life

narratives can provide unique and rich data for multiple readings, interpretations and theorization (Lieblich, Tuval-Mashiach, & Zilber, 1998). Narrative reflection as a social process can unfold meaning perceived from the participant's perspectives and narrative analysis can help unravel the diverse social and cultural issues embedded in the complexity of individual human experiences, events, and actions (Bruner, 1990; Clandinin & Connelly, 2000). By doing so, individuals "impose order on the flow of their experience" (Riessman, 1993, p. 2).

I was interested in two main questions:

a. What was the participant's overall experience of returning and settling back in China?
b. How relevant (or not) was the intercultural learning and understanding gained overseas to the returnees' life and work in China?

These questions were used to elicit the participants' life narratives and lived experience. As explained above, embedded in these questions was an inquiry into the returnees' views of their identities.

Table 1 shows that seven out of the ten participants in my doctoral research returned to China either directly after their study or after a couple of years of working in the UK. All seven returnee participants were interviewed, together with a new participant, Xue-Ting.

I was fully aware of the severe limitations of research into such a small cohort of returnees' experiences and how exclusive these narratives were to the eight individuals involved. However, as Thomas and Znaniecki (1958) explained:

> Whether we draw our material for sociological analysis from detailed life records of concrete individuals or from the observation of mass phenomena, the problems of sociological analysis are the same… If we are forced to use mass phenomena as materials, or any kind of happenings taken without regard to the life histories of the individuals who participated, it is a defect not an advantage, of our present sociological method. (quoted in Hitchcock & Hughes, 1995, pp. 187–188)

I am hoping that the depth of understanding gained from this small scale and limited research would offer the reader the opportunity to begin to engage in a more constructive dialogue about returnee experiences.

RESEARCH FINDINGS

I present the findings in two steps: (1) details the returnees' experiences of re-entry through two examples of participants' narrative sketches; (2) themed findings based on research questions and the results of analyzing and interpreting participants' experiences.

It is worth noting that the narrative sketches were each a collaboration between myself and the participants. The process was: (a) transcribing and translating the

Table 1. Summary of participants' demographic information

Pseudo Name	*Age*	*Gender*	*Place of origin*	*Subject of masters' study*	*Time in UK*	*Current location*	*Participant of Doctoral research*
Jasmine	27	F	Midland China	1. Media Studies 2. Visual anthropology	2 yrs	Midland, China	Yes
Da-Wei	31	M	West China	IT Management	4 yrs	West China	Yes
Lin	34	F	Beijing	International Education	3.5 yrs	Beijing	Yes
Ming	30	M	NE China	Informatics	2 yrs	NE China	Yes
Kenzo	28	F	NE China	International Relations	4 yrs	Beijing	Yes
Mei	28	F	SE China	Multimedia & design	2.5 yrs	Shanghai	Yes
K	29	M	Midland China	1. Law 2. International Law	3.5 yrs	Midland, China	Yes
Xue-Ting	38	F	Beijing	Business Administration	2 yrs	Beijing	No

recorded interviews (conducted mainly in Mandarin) into English; (b) re-reading the text based on my understanding of the person's previous intercultural adaptation (through my doctoral research) and in light of their current narrated experience; (c) re-writing the transcripts into a draft narrative sketch – a shorter and more accessible text depicting the main threads of returnee experiences, highlighting issues relevant to my research questions; (d) the participants interpreting and editing the sketches; and (e) finalizing the text and getting the participants' approval.

The two sketches presented in this article have been shortened by me. The original profiles of these two participants were twice as long and included more details of their journey returning to China, and how they coped with the challenges confronting them.

Holding on to Dreams – Lin's Account of Her Return Experience

Lin grew up in an intellectual family in Beijing. She was in her late twenties when coming to the UK to study for an MA in International Education. She said that the nature of the course and a three-month internship in a UK-based NGO during her course had put wings on her dream to work in education development (ED) in poorer regions in China.

After the MA, Lin stayed in England to look for possible ED work experience. Whilst searching, Lin took on a part-time job at a local charity which supports adults with severe learning difficulties. Although not directly connected to ED, the work nevertheless allowed Lin to form a view that caring and respect for human dignity is the foundation of all educational endeavours.

Despite many attempts, Lin was not able to get the work experience she desired in Britain. Believing that there would be more opportunities for her to do on-the-job training and learning in China, in the summer of 2005 Lin returned to Beijing with her boyfriend, a Chinese graduate whom she had met in England.

The pair arrived in China and fell into the open arms of family and friends. What followed was the celebration of their return, a wedding, and a honeymoon. Lin recalled that during this time, she had to re-adapt to living in Beijing, with its crowdedness and its pollution (owing to over-population and the increased numbers of vehicles on the road), to which she was once so accustomed. Several other re-adaptation challenges were mentioned including re-learning to interact with people in ways that acknowledge social hierarchies; coping with the overall instrumentalism and commercialism embedded in the 'new' Chinese culture; and re-adjusting to a westernised homeland.

The biggest challenge to confront Lin was the enormous pressure to find a job. She seemed to believe that there was a general hostility towards overseas returnees:

> I sensed a kind of anti-Hai-Gui ['sea turtles' or overseas returnees] attitude in the media and from many chatrooms on the internet. People are suspicious of the returnees as if we failed to make it [living and finding jobs] abroad and now

> have returned to compete [for work] with those who didn't have the privilege to go overseas in the first place.

Lin also felt the expectations of her family – they wanted to see that their investment in an 'expensive' education abroad had been 'worthwhile'. Lin explained that returnees who fail to find suitable jobs are nicknamed 'seaweed' (Hai-Dai) a pun on 'unemployed overseas returnees'. The metaphor is clear – an overseas qualification becomes worthless if the returnee cannot find employment.

Within a few months, after persistent searching and six interviews, Lin was eventually employed by an education consulting agency. Her main role was to provide training and consultation to Chinese students who wished to study in English-speaking countries. This was not her passion, but Lin was content that she could help prepare young Chinese students for an overseas experience. Her work also involved providing counselling, consultation, and care to eager young people and anxious parents. However, Lin felt that the deeper level of change whilst studying overseas was not so easily explained to these young people:

> It was possible to explain the differences between Chinese and British education, and, the differences in [educational] values, [learning] approaches and other things. But what I could not explain is that they [students] would become different people after some time abroad.

Indeed becoming a different person was what Lin had experienced, and she said that the biggest change was in her values and beliefs:

> My time in England has changed my way of seeing things, and my way of thinking. My view of the world has also changed. This is a one-way change. What I mean is that I just cannot go back and do things the old way, or see the world in the old way. For example, I now stand in a queue as I did in Britain; and recycle and re-use as much as I can even though this can make my tiny flat look a bit like a rubbish dump. I simply could not do it [otherwise] even though no one else does it here [in China].

Similarly, she had adopted the habit of critical and reflective thinking. This way of thinking was 'forced' onto her when she was learning to become an educational researcher. She said initially she had to learn all the 'techniques' involved in critical reading and thinking critically, one of the hardest things to learn in her MA. Now it was impossible for her to return to being uncritical and unreflective.

However, it was precisely her qualities of being able to think differently that had led to her innovative approach to her work. Thus, within one year, Lin was promoted twice at work. She created new training courses and workshops, and developed summer exchange programs for both Chinese and Western adolescents. Although not directly applying the skills learned from her British education, Lin said that she did draw heavily on her overseas experience and insights in this employment. Through her job, Lin had travelled to Europe and the USA, and attended a conference in

North Africa. Working in an international environment, she realised that she could communicate with people from different cultures with ease. Lin concluded:

> [My] intercultural competence was only possible because I had deeper immersion in British life and work. … [experience at the British] work place was invaluable. I don't think I could have such [intercultural] awareness by merely studying at a [overseas] university.

After eighteen months working in the agency, Lin gave her notice. She wanted to pursue the possibility of working in educational development in China. This coincided with her pregnancy. Lin's family disapproved of her decision to quit her job and regarded her 'dream' of working in the field of educational development as unrealistic. Lin said that she would regret not trying and simply accepting what was available and convenient.[3]

Bridging Cultural Gaps – Da-Wei's Continuing Intercultural Journey After His Return

Da-Wei came from West China. He received an MSc in IT management in the UK in 2004, and had worked in England for two years in a medium-sized software firm. As a student, Da-Wei was highly motivated and adopted an open attitude towards other cultures and was willing to find a sense of belonging to the host community. Later as a professional working in England, he gained more intercultural understanding.

Da-Wei noted the contrast between 'real' Confucian values and the 'new' Chinese culture driven by the pursuit of wealth. He also saw a gap between the Western understanding of China and the depth of its culture, and Chinese over-idealisation of the Western model of democracy, its capitalism and materialism. He called the latter a '*transplanted American dream*'. Da-Wei said that China thus became a fascinating subject for him, in particular, when he was studying it from a distance. He read extensively and followed popular topics from both the Chinese and Western media perspectives. Da-Wei reflected:

> I have become a real 'third culture' person. What does it mean? Well, it means that I am in a place where I have better insights into both worlds. But being in the 'third place', at least in my case, doesn't mean that I don't belong to either world. In fact, I feel at home in both China and England.

Despite being at home in both worlds, Da-Wei got more excited about China's changes each time he visited home. He was especially excited about the transformation in West China from being 'the poorest region' to 'the place of great potential'. In 2006, the desire to 'play a part on the big stage' had eventually led to Da-Wei's decision to return to China. Da-Wei, at the age of 31, was ready for the new challenges China could offer, and wanted to go back and do something worthwhile, which he described as having elements such as "creative thinking, interaction and communication across cultures, and developing something that would contribute

to others' wellbeing". The Western work ethic was not new for Da-Wei as he had studied the topic and had experienced it while working in the UK.

On returning to his home city in West China, Da-Wei didn't forget to do things the Chinese way: he brought home many souvenirs from abroad, so at welcome-home parties, he was able to give out 'a-little-something' to each person, which pleased his family and friends. Da-Wei took this present-giving seriously.

> The gift-giving tradition … is a chore and a costly chore, but the meaning of it has become crystallised for me – this is about keeping your folks in mind, and that you haven't forgotten how to be Chinese.

Remembering the Chinese way was the starting point of Da-Wei's return journey. He uses the local dialect when appropriate, and being the only son, he decided to live with his retired parents. Meanwhile, he stays in touch with his friends abroad, and they communicate regularly through real-time online networks.

Like Lin, Da-Wei was surprised at the changes that China has undergone, especially the way society was becoming increasingly demoralized due to the pressure of competition and the ever-widening social gap between the 'haves' and the 'have-nots'.

After the initial homecoming warmth, Da-Wei began to look for that 'worthwhile' thing to do. Instead of going to large international job fairs as most graduates do, he looked through a few well-known international IT publications for vacancies. Dai-Wei said he went to very few interviews but got to choose between two international companies that both offered him the position he had applied for. In the end, his choice was based on the possibility of doing something really 'interesting and creative'.

Da-Wei said that he was very happy with his post particularly because he was able to do something that helped bridge the gap he had identified earlier. Da-Wei's job involves communicating with overseas clients in North America and Europe, co-ordinating a project development team, and liaising with Chinese blue collar workers. It requires him to be highly flexible, observant, creative, and open to different ways of thinking. Two years on, Da-Wei continues to enjoy his work, which provides enough challenges and spaces to develop professionally and is hoping to take on the regional co-ordinator's role for Greater China. He makes regular trips abroad, and continues to benefit from being exposed to diverse values and practices:

> I can be a European when I travel to Europe, and I am just as Chinese as all my folks. I am happy with who I am, but being who I am, I can bridge the huge gap between the expatriates and the Chinese workers. It is my job to mediate the different values and leadership styles.

Da-Wei said that he is progressively finding a way to help his folks understand the principles of what he calls 'global management ethics' that are gradually entering China.

THEMED FINDINGS

The eight returnees' stories vary, like Lin and Da-Wei's, but shared some common paths as part of their homecoming journeys. Below are the main findings in response to my research questions and my interest in the way the returnees perceived the shift in their identities.

Common Patterns in the Participants' Experiences of Re-Entry into Chinese Society

Motivating factors. What motivated the eight individuals to return to settle in China varied, but there were common factors that oriented them homeward. These were a desire to 'play a part' in the transformation of modern China, a perception that there would be more opportunities for professional development in China, and difficulty finding relevant work in their subject areas in the host country (Da-Wei was an exception). These factors are less complex compared with what Ip (2006) identified, partly perhaps due to the fact that unlike Ip's participants, none of the graduates interviewed in this research intended to emigrate when they first came to study abroad. Jasmine, Mei, and Ming all returned home straight after graduation. Mei said that having experienced a different education, culture, and life style, they were eager to "return and live their lives more fully".

Life style and values adjustments. All eight participants' homecoming journeys seemed to begin with a warm welcome from family and friends. This was the 'honeymoon' period identified in Gullahorn and Gullahorn (1993). Re-adjustment and re-adaptation of life styles and values were common experiences amongst these individuals. Although no participant regarded it as a 'shock', they all confirmed, to varying degrees, an unexpected confrontation with what had once been so familiar to them (Adler, 1981). This included the crowdedness, the pollution, and the lack of respect for personal space (such as in not queuing), the chore of gift exchange (except for Da-Wei), and the general feeling of competitive pressure. This reflects what Stier (2002) explained: the initial reaction to homecoming was more at the emotional level.

Xue-Ting's view, echoed by other participants, was that "China was becoming more westernized and materialistic than expected" and returnees weren't sufficiently prepared for such a shift. Having studied anthropology, Jasmine's own observation of the change was:

> This is a two-way change, I think. You see, while we were abroad, China went through a process of great change, and we couldn't always keep up with it from a distance; at the same time, we ourselves were also changing. These two together have made us feel like strangers at home.

This is in line with Gaw's (2000, p. 86) finding that 'sojourners often expected to return to an unchanged home as unchanged individuals, which was not the case'. Jasmine said that the way she dealt with this 'strangeness' was to keep an open mind or 'to be open and be prepared for changes and differences'.

Several participants, especially Lin, K, Kenzo, and Jasmine found themselves to be 'changed individuals' and noted that changes such as newly adopted gestures, facial expressions, mannerisms, and styles of social interaction were, in fact, more acceptable in modern China. Kenzo, who changed the most in this regard, said that her family and friends welcomed her new 'personality' and perceived it as more western, a positive outcome of her experience abroad. This finding contrasts with Kidder's (1992) research into Japanese returnees. It is possible, as Jasmine pointed out, that a changing China provides a more open environment to accommodate other cultural references and more diverse values.

Adjustments in the workplace. The greatest anxiety common to all the participants was their family's expectations for them to find work. The participants experienced commonplace 'seaweed' characterizations, but despite this, no participant reported finding their job search particularly daunting. When reflecting on the quality of their working lives in China, they all said that it was good for their professional development. The participants also agreed that their work gave them some sense of satisfaction and offered them opportunities to continue their international connections (see Table 2). These comments support McGrath et al.'s (2007) and Ip's (2006) research findings reviewed earlier.

On the other hand, several participants, especially those who had some experience of working abroad, said that they found the mindsets in the work place and work ethics in China rather different from what they had experienced abroad. Ming noted that his colleagues at the college where he worked were heavily embedded in some kind of 'Guan-Xi' net, and a lecturer's promotion is often not based on the quality of their teaching or care for the students alone, but also to do with how well the individual is connected with the senior leadership team. Jasmine was also frustrated that "things are not always straightforward (in terms of language) and you really have to decipher the subtle meaning behind what has been said". Mei and K both mentioned that their colleagues who haven't been abroad are not particularly friendly towards the 'sea turtles'. Mei explained:

> They believe that we are arrogant because we are critical of the quality and standard of work. I don't think I am arrogant, but I can be critical. We are working in a more open environment. I just don't want to accept the phrase "This is China, what do you expect!"

All eight participants seemed to have encountered no significant problem adjusting to Chinese workplace practices. These findings are very similar to Gross and Connor's (2007). Furthermore, Da-Wei and Kenzo, who work within large international companies not only acknowledged the differences between Chinese

Table 2. Overview of participants' work and employment in the UK and back in China

Pseudo Name	*Current location*	*Subject of masters study*	*Work exp in UK*	*Current job in 2008*	*Time in employment after returning to China*	*Employer*
Jasmine	Midland, China	1. Media Studies 2. Visual Anthropology	0 yr	TV documentary producer	3 yrs	Provincial TV
Da-Wei	West China	IT Management	2 yrs	IT Project Manager	2 yrs	Int'l IT Company
Lin	Beijing	International Education	2 yrs	Educational Consultant	2 yrs	Int'l Education Consultation Agency
Ming	NE China	Informatics	0 yr	Lecturer in Informatics	4 yrs	FE College
Kenzo	Beijing	International Relations	2 yrs	Int'l HR Management	2 yrs	Int'l Bank
Mei	Shanghai	Multimedia & design	3m intern	Editor (Women in the World)	4 yrs	Women's Magazine
K	Midland, China	1. Law 2. International Law	0 yr	Junior Lawyer	2.5 yrs	Int'l Law Firm
Xue-Ting	Beijing	Business Administration	0 yr	Business & Financial Consultant	2.5 yrs	Owner of Financial Services Company

and international company work practices but also appeared to bridge the gap between them. As Chen (2008) points out, their comparative advantage lies in their deeper intercultural understanding and willingness to embrace workplace cultures and professional practices in both home country and international contexts.

The Effect of Studying Abroad on the Returnees' Everyday Lives and Work

The participants said that what could be integrated into their home environment as a result of studying overseas was multi-fold, including enhanced cultural awareness, and deepened understanding of the differences in how learning is perceived in China and in the West. It also included the shifts in self-identity, values, and worldviews explored in the next section. According to Jasmine, "these changes are somewhat integrated into yourself as a person", and that returnees 'live' these changes in their everyday lives and work.

English language competence and the capacity for critical and reflective thinking were identified as two domains that have a significant impact on the returnees' home life and work experience. In K, Ming, Da-Wei, and Xue-Ting's work-places, their knowledge of the language and the specific subject vocabulary they acquired through doing their courses has been used extensively, and is considered a key personal attribute. The most sought after language skills are the ability to use the specialist terminology for law, technology, business, and financial management.

Being critical and analytical was a key academic competence promoted in British postgraduate courses, and is a part of the aim of western higher education (Wilson, 1981). All participants felt that this had become the core of their approach to thinking in both the workplace and in everyday life. Jasmine noted that she used this approach in selecting and presenting controversial social issues for TV documentaries; Ming said that he had implemented these skills in his own FE curriculum design, and for Xue-Ting, a successful entrepreneur, the capacity for reflective and analytical thinking has helped open the doors to many new business possibilities.

Closely connected with critical and analytical thinking is these returnees' recognition of the need for originality in ideas and creativity. Xue-Ting and Da-Wei both felt strongly that this was an important outcome of studying in the UK, where they learned to come up with good questions and ideas for research investigations. They both appeared to be creative and willing to break new ground in their current work. Xue-Ting had set up her own company and employed 25 people. She deliberately employs 'sea-turtles' because she firmly believes in the unique competences these individuals can bring to an international company. Xue-Ting summed up these competences as including intercultural communication, tolerance of ambiguity in cross-cultural interactions, independence of thought, and resilience. These echo findings made by Ting-Toomey (1999).

The participants did not want to separate what was learned or not learned through university courses from their overall intercultural experience because they saw the entire time abroad as an integrated whole. They were particularly critical of Chinese

sceptics' portrayal of the value of an overseas academic degree. Ming's comment was representative of all the participants: "the difference was not in the diploma but in the entire process we have been through."

Intercultural Identity

From the participants' detailed narratives, an important finding emerged. The core learning from study overseas is connected with the qualitative changes in the returnees' sense of self, ways of seeing and perceiving the world, values, and (work-related) ethics. This is the case in all eight participants' stories, and is in line with what was identified in some of the research reviewed earlier, specifically the phenomenon of 'identity adaptation and transformation' (Kim, 2008).

Intercultural identity seems to be firmly situated in one's own cultural roots, but with an increased capacity to internalize and transcend other cultural traditions, conventions and values, such as Da-Wei's ability to feel comfortable in his 'Chinese skin in a British suit' and Kenzo's open manner whilst fully appreciating traditional Confucian values. Part of Kenzo's job at the international bank was helping expatriate staff develop Chinese cultural awareness. Wearing Qi-Pau (traditional Manchu dress) and speaking unaccented English, Kenzo said that she could "move smoothly between cultures". She calls herself a "free being and global being (*quan-qiu-ren* in mandarin)". Xue-Ting and Da-Wei pointed out that being intercultural is what "distinguishes the returnees from the local graduates" and it is what "[international] employers are looking for in employees". It was not surprising to discover that six out of eight participants in my research currently work in an international environment.

Intercultural identity is theorized as "an open-ended, adaptive, and transformative self-other orientation" (Kim, 2008, p. 364). Lin summarized it as the result of being exposed to new socio-cultural and work environments and interacting with people of diverse cultural backgrounds, which brings new understandings, meanings and values, and new perspectives of the self (Adler, 1987; Kim, 1988). Having an intercultural identity enables the participants to become 'cultural ambassadors'. Da-Wei works to bridge cultural gaps through project management; Mei introduces 'Women in the World' to their Chinese counterparts through the women's magazine; Ming integrates ideas from the MSc course in the UK into his Chinese classroom; K, a practising lawyer, has developed an interest in international human rights law; and Jasmine was planning a TV series about 'the culture of tea' from across the world.

In summary, intercultural identity seems to encompass two dimensions: (1) A clear understanding of oneself as an individual person with unique qualities, beliefs, values and commitments; (2) an awareness of the sources of one's self which are rooted in one's own culture and influenced by other cultures that the person has been deeply immersed in. The awareness of the sources of self seems to be developed through an investigative process in which the individual reflects deeply on his/her own culture in the light of an understanding of other cultures, and vice-versa. Together with an awareness of the roots of oneself, the individual is more capable

of transforming his/her identity to embrace a common humanity that transcends all cultures and nations.

The new intercultural identity includes universal values and worldviews, more flexible ways of understanding cultures, and more ethical and meaningful ways of being in the world (Mezirow, 1991, 2000; Taylor, 1989; Taylor, 1994). This was found in Kenzo's perception of herself as a global being, and Da-Wei's interest in global management ethics. Wanting to do 'something worthwhile' is another typical manifestation of this transformation in contrast to the 'regular' Chinese attitude which ranks financial reward as a priority for choice of job. This notion of intercultural identity is broader, and not restricted to two particular cultures and differs from Ip's (2006) theorization of hybrid identity, which refers to individuals who trans-migrate between home and host country who have developed a sense of belonging to both cultures.

CONCLUSION

In this limited research, I investigated eight Chinese graduate returnees experience of life and work back in China. The focus of my research was to develop an understanding based on my previous working knowledge of these students and their reflections on their experiences. I was interested to know to what extent and in what way the intercultural learning they had gained from studying abroad continued to play a part in their lives and work.

The eight individuals interviewed in this research, it emerged, had common elements in their experiences of re-adjustment to everyday life and work in China upon their return. It is evident that re-adaptation did not mean that the returnees simply went back to doing things 'the Chinese way', but rather they maintained their level of intercultural awareness and willingness to engage with difference. In this way they were able to immerse themselves with their intercultural awareness and capacities into the local situation, and this distinguished them for a role in helping China to become more integrated into the international community.

In conclusion, the eight individuals in my research continued to transform their intercultural understanding and self-perception after returning to their home country. In many ways, they seemed to be more determined than ever to maintain their newly-developed trans-cultural values and intercultural self-identities. For these returnees, it was apparent that financial success was not enough – they seek the kind of work that has to have an intrinsic value, i.e., worthwhile for its own sake. Furthermore, their ongoing fluency in dealing with different social and cultural perspectives and practices demonstrates their commitment to this way of being and determines their capacity to act on a local stage; but also at the same time, to stand at an international horizon (Taylor, 1989). What began as a personal journey to improve their individual educational status and to experience the world has been developed into a need to use the newly acquired intercultural skills and capacities for the benefit of the wider Chinese society.

Although the sample size was small in this research and the stories personal and anecdotal, it is part of a longitudinal study over nearly seven years which started with the participants' beginning to undertake postgraduate studies in the UK and following them while they undergoing changes in this process (my doctoral research). This follow-up research project thus allowed me to collect the stories of an entire 'cycle' of their experience studying overseas: from leaving home country to study in the UK; to intercultural encounter at the university and in the everyday life in the host country; and/or to further intercultural experience through work experience in the host country; and lastly to returning home to settle and continuing the intercultural identity in workplace and in everyday life in China.

These participants' experiences had largely positive outcomes, in terms of the wider choices and intercultural interactions they can now enjoy. Further research might establish if the outcomes of studying overseas tend to be generally positive, from the point of view of returnees. This could be supported by larger samples to investigate whether their overseas studies had supported or held them back in their experience at workplace – and whether there are regional differences, or perhaps differences related to subject of study or gender.

NOTES

1. This chapter is a revised version of an article published in *Journal of International and Comparative Education* in 2010. See Gill (2010).
2. According to UK Council for International Students Affairs, the number of overseas Chinese students coming to the UK in 2011/12 is 78,715.
3. Lin's husband supported Lin's dream whole-heartedly. During her pregnancy, Lin spent time preparing to become a mother while continuing to read books on her favourite subject. In 2009, she was employed part-time by an NGO to carry out a small research project on educational development in China.

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20. COMPETING FOR GLOBAL TALENTS

China's Brain Gain Strategies

INTRODUCTION: GLOBAL COMPETITION FOR TALENT

Recent literature on globalization and international academic mobility has noticed the ability of individuals – especially highly-skilled personnel with marketable expertise – to move freely in the international labour market (Saxenian, 2002), and therefore the intensified worldwide competition for "brain gain", i.e., governments' "attempts, efforts, programs, and projects aimed to draw scientific workers to a given country" (Jalowiecki & Gorzelak, 2004, p. 299). The competition for global human capital starts with international tertiary students and scholars. These individuals are often seen as globally mobile resources and intangible asset that enhances a nation's global competitive advantage, given that they could be some of the most highly-qualified people in any given country, and thus a vital component of human capital, providing the knowledge and skills on which nation states rely for their economic development (Kuptsch & Pang, 2006; Root, 2007).

Due to worldwide educational inequality, developed countries possess advantages that attract talented academics from developing countries (Frank, 1980; Inkeles & Smith, 1974; Wallerstein, 1974, 1984). Between 1999 and 2004, four Western developed countries hosted 56% of the world's mobile students – the United States (US, 23%), the United Kingdom (UK, 12%), Germany (11%), France (10%); whilst the largest group of mobile students comes from East Asia and the Pacific Rim (701,000, or 29% of the world total) (UNESCO Institute for Statistics, 2007). In recent years, however, Asia is competing with the West for global talents. Certain countries in East Asia and the Pacific – including Australia, Japan, and New Zealand – that have become more attractive to students from that region and are now among the top host countries for Asian students (UNESCO Institute for Statistics, 2009). Some Asian countries and regions, such as South Korea, Singapore, and Hong Kong, have attracted scholars from around the world (Altbach, 2004; Johnson & Regets, 1998; Postiglione, 2005). Many developing countries have set up programs to entice some of their brightest people to return from abroad in that they might contribute to domestic development, in particular in new and competitive areas such as computer technology, economics, biotechnology, and other hi-tech businesses (Engardio, 1994; Zikopoulos, 1991). To remain competitive, developed countries such as the US and Canada are also enacting brain gain policies, including relaxing student visa

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and immigration laws, making it easier for foreign students to remain in the host country after graduating, and offering incentives to lure highly-skilled professionals (Root, 2007). Similarly, policymakers in OECD countries have become increasingly concerned with policies and mechanisms designed to attract and retain highly-skilled labour (Mahroum, 2005). Thus, the competition for global human capital is keener than ever before.

In the midst of this global trend, the People's Republic of China (PRC) is rising as a new competitor. Though it continues to be the largest source country for internationally mobile students (accounting for one-seventh (15%) of the total) (UNESCO Institute for Statistics, 2009), the country is emerging as a new destination for international students. In 2007, the New York-based Institute of International Education reported that China's international enrolment ranked fifth in the world, behind the United States, Britain, France and Germany, and well ahead of other developing nations (Hvistendahl, 2008). In addition, it has received increased return of foreign-trained Chinese nationals to work in China. The annual number of returnees increased from fewer than 10,000 in 2000 to about 108,300 in 2009 (Ministry of Education, 2010a).

China's brain gain phenomenon has sparked heated discussions. Some works have noted that, since the 1990s, China has offered a variety of incentives, including encouraging foreign-trained Chinese nationals to work for and run businesses in China and recruiting them to senior positions in prestigious universities; other preferential policies include more rapid promotion, competitive salaries, and start-up research grants for those performing cutting-edge research (Cao, 2004b; Cheng, 2006; Englesberg, 1995; Zweig, 2006). The recent works on Chinese knowledge diaspora have explored the impact of cross-border academic mobility on China's rise in world economic and academic communities (Welch & Zhang, 2008; Yang & Welch, 2010). Meanwhile, the rise of China as a new destination for international students has been widely reported in both the domestic and international mass media *e.g.*, *International Business Times* (IBTimes Staff Reporter, 2011), *Times Higher Education* (Morgan, 2011), and *Xinhua News Agency* (Guanqun, 2011), though academic research into this phenomenon is lacking.

Still, the topic remains under-researched in three major aspects. First, academic studies on China's brain gain mainly focus on policy which enabled the Chinese government, market, and universities to offer funding and job opportunities to entice its expatriate academic talent to return, but the particular brain gain strategies that have enabled the country to increase its influence in the international student marketplace have gone largely unexamined. Second, much has been discussed from a quantitative perspective, *i.e.*, the increased return rate as an indication of brain gain; less attention has been paid to the qualitative indication of brain gain, *i.e.*, whether the returnees contribute to local development. Third, there is a lack of academic studies to explain a tension between the economic approach and political mechanisms towards brain gain.

This chapter attempts to fill this research void. It will delineate important policy discourses and strategies adopted by the PRC to entice foreign-trained Chinese nationals and to become a key competitor for international students, as well as how the PRC accommodates foreign-trained returnees and international students into China's economic development and political establishment. The chapter concludes by discussing the tension between the quest for economic prosperity and political stability as embedded in China's brain gain strategies.

CHINESE IDEAL OF HIGHER EDUCATION, HUMAN CAPITAL FORMATION, AND NATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS

Higher Education as Talent Incubator

China's pathway to rapid economic development tends to fit the developmental-state model, *i.e.,* education is used as a vital means to enhance the quality of its human capital and to serve as an important tool for national development (Law, 2009). Like other developmental states in East Asia, which focuses on the state's investment in domestic education as an important impetus for economic growth (see details in Ashton, Green, James, & Sung, 1999), China relied on higher education as talent incubators for human capital, to enhance its global competitiveness.

Since the shift in national focus from Maoist "class struggle" to economic modernization, the state has reiterated the importance of higher education to economic prosperity (Jiang, 1998, 2001; Ministry of Education, 1985; Tang, 2004). The adoption of more open economic policies enhanced China's participation in the world economy, eventually leading to its joining the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001. In 2006, President Hu Jintao, in his opening speech to the National Science and Technology Conference, put forward the view that China's scientific and technological development goal is to build an "innovation-oriented country" (*chuang xin xing guo jia*) by 2020. Hu spelt out the following standards for an innovation-oriented country: enhancing science and technology as a means to promote social and economic development and guarantee national security; boosting strength in basic sciences and primary studies; and making a number of globally influential scientific and technological achievements. Hu's speech explicitly expressed the state's desire to turn the nation into a science powerhouse, and that he expected universities and science and technology elites to lead the way (People's Daily Online Reporter, 2007).

Thus, China's growing economy and its growing aspiration to turn the country into a scientific power has increased the demand for personnel with transnational knowledge, good foreign language proficiency (primarily in English), computer skills, and expertise in international trade, law, and business administration. The PRC government has recognized that China must compete with foreign countries in the global labour market for talent. In particular, the state's human capital strategy targeted two groups of talents, *i.e.*, foreign-trained Chinese students and professionals and international students.

Foreign-Trained Chinese Nationals as Sources of Brain Gain

Drawn upon analysis of global competition for human capital, the Chinese government recognized the need to compete with foreign countries for its own people, i.e., foreign-trained Chinese students and professionals who have developed competitive skills that may help China's high tech sector grow and link to the global knowledge-based economy (BJDJ.GOV.CN, 2006). China has a long history of sending students to study in industrialized Western countries such as the US as a quick way to access advanced knowledge and technology, especially in areas relating to national defence and economic development (Pan, 2009). In 1979, China and the US officially announced the renormalization of Sino-American diplomatic relationship, and signed the *Agreement on Cooperation in Science and Technology*, which included academic exchange as an important component and enabled China's reconnection to the international science and technology community. Deng Xiaoping decided that China should send students to study in the US, and quickly increase the number of students going abroad in successive years. He believed that within five years China would be able to reap the benefits from returning students whose talents had been honed abroad (China Education Daily Reporter, 2008).

In the 1980s, however, only a trickle of students returned, and there was heated debate about whether China should continue to send students to study abroad. Some brain drain was anticipated, but the CPC General Secretary Zhao Ziyang and other officials took a longer and more positive view. They saw brain drain as the "storing of brain power overseas" for subsequent use (Zweig, 2006a, p. 67), an idea that suggested Chinese government should endure short-term brain drain in expectation of long-term brain gain.

Between 1978 and late 2006, China sent a total of 1.067 million students and academic personnel abroad; however, only 275,000 (about 26%) returned to work in China, while 792,000 remained overseas, mostly in Western countries (including about 32.1% in the North America, and 28.9% in Europe) (China View News Reporters, 2006; Ministry of Education, 2007c). A number of studies (e.g., Cao, 2004a; Kao, 1971; Lin, 1994; Orleans, 1989; Zweig & Chen, 1995) suggest that China will suffer significant brain drain. From an optimistic perspective, Chinese-American Nobel laureate in physics Chen-Ning Yang, who returned to work in China in the late 1990s, comments that China has stored a large amount of talent abroad (China Youth Daily Reporter, 2008), incubated in universities in Western developed countries.

International Students as Sources of Brain Gain

Recruiting international students constitutes an important part of China's brain gain strategies. The state recognizes that educating international students has helped China to enhance international competitiveness in mainly three aspects. First, it has helped China enhance its international political and diplomatic relations with

other developing countries by helping them train high-level personnel in science and technology, education, and management necessary for national economic development; those international students who have received their higher education in China will, it is hoped, become China's future political and business partners (Ministry of Education, 2001). Second, educating international students served as a way to internationalize China's education, gain international recognition for its delivery of educational services in the global market, and expand Chinese influence worldwide (Zhou, 2006). Third, given that universities have considerable advantages in terms of cross-cultural understanding through their academic exchanges, the state expected China-trained foreign students to improve mutual understanding between China and the world (Liu, 2010). Thus, in September, 2010, China announced its "Study in China Program", designed to make it Asia's largest country of destination for international students by 2020. It aims to increase the number of international students studying in China from 256,000 (in 2010) to 500,000 by 2020, just under current United States' levels (Ministry of Education, 2010b).

BRAIN GAIN STRATEGIES TO ENTICE FOREIGN-TRAIN CHINESE NATIONAL TO RETURN

Since the 1990s, China has provided financial support to those overseas Chinese students and scholars who would agree to return to serve China on either a long- or short-term basis, offering them travel allowances and improving living conditions in China (see details in Cao, 2004b). In the years following, China has made more extensive efforts to entice foreign-trained Chinese nationals to return.

Creating Labour Market for Returning Students

Recognizing that returning students are more likely to join the non-state business sector or run their own private business, and that they could offer new knowledge skills to help China's high tech sector grow, the state created exclusive high-tech development zones for returnees, called "returning-student entrepreneurial parks" (*liuxue huiguo renyuan chuangye yuan*), across the nation to help returnees establish and grow new enterprises. The entrepreneurial parks enjoy preferential treatment, including business start-up loans and tax breaks (CSCSE.EDU.CN, 2006). They created a new labour market to absorb foreign-trained students. A survey by Zweig, Chen, and Rosen (2004) shows that the opportunity to earn a larger profit in the domestic market is an important incentive for foreign-trained Chinese students to return to run a business in China. Their primary income-generating strategy is to sell products and services based on technologies imported from developed countries, most of which is, while new to China, not new internationally. As such, the cost of importing technology is low, the market is big and the potential profits are high.

The entrepreneurial parks offer opportunities for overseas Chinese nationals to pursue new career development opportunities in China. This is in particular attractive

to those who were "young and had no deep roots in the host countries", and who had "no doubt they would risk losing everything by returning to China and restarting their careers" (South China Morning Post Reporter, 2008). The total number of entrepreneurial parks increased quickly from around 60 in the late 1990s to over 150 by 2009. Companies located in the entrepreneurial parks quickly increased from 5,000 by 2003 to over 8,000 by 2009, whilst more than 20,000 returnees have used them to start their businesses (CSCSE.EDU.CN, 2006; People's Daily Reporter, 2008).

Giving Priority to Importing High-Profile

Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, China's brain gain policy has given priority to importing high-profile overseas Chinese scholars who have working experience in developed countries and international reputations in the science and technology community. In 2000, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) and the State Council announced that the state's talent recruitment policies should selectively target "high-level overseas Chinese talent" in order to make brain gain policies more cost-effective (Central Committee of the Communist Party of China & State Council, 2000).

Promptly responding to state policy, universities adopted three major measures to recruit academic talents from abroad. The first involves preferential hiring and promotion policies. Many universities have introduced systems that make overseas educational background and visiting scholar experience key criteria for hiring and promotion (Tongji University, 2006), and holders of overseas PhDs can be made full professors immediately upon their return (Huasheng News Reporter, 2004). The second measure provides for competitive salaries and research funding levels. Chinese universities have actively competed to attract overseas talent by offering competitive salary, and annual salaries for successful candidates can reach US $100,000, the highest pay of its kind in China, about 20 times the average salary of most professors at China's universities (Tsinghua News, 2001). At the same time, the MoE established a Start-up Research Grant program to enable returnees to start laboratories, buy equipment, and hire research assistants (Cheng, 2006), and universities provided large start-up research grants to foreign-trained scholars leading cutting-edge research. For example, Tsinghua University gave a British-trained Chinese scholar US $500,000 to lead its biotechnology research program (Wong, 2005). By 2005, taking advantage of various government programs and university strategic recruitment, more than 8,000 individuals and 90 groups of overseas Chinese scholars had returned to work in Chinese universities on short-term basis; 537 overseas scholars had filled Departmental Chairs in Chinese universities (Ministry of Education, 2004); 13,572 returnees had received start-up research grants worth a total of RMB 400 billion (Cheng, 2006).

Since 2005, China's brain gain policy has become more selective. Four ministries and commissions under the State Council, including the Ministry of Human

Resources, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Science and Technology and Ministry of Finance (2005), jointly define what constitutes "high-level overseas Chinese talent". The ministries' criteria for the selection of high-profile figures stipulate that they should have a good international academic reputation; have held an academic position at a prestigious international university; have been in a senior management/highly-skilled professional position at one of the world's top 500 enterprises; have filled a middle/senior leadership/management position in a foreign governmental, non-governmental or international organization; have a strong record of publication in internationally reputable academic publications; have experience leading international scientific research projects; or possess patents or intellectual property and/or specializations urgently needed by China.

In addition, the Ministry of Education (2007b) promulgated the document (*A Number of Decisions on Further Strengthening the Work of Attracting Back High-profile Chinese Figures from Overseas*) that guided national and local governments at various levels to explore diverse financial resources, job opportunities, information networks, research projects, and functions that facilitate the inflow of high-profile overseas Chinese scientists. To implement the *Decisions*, the state promised more generous state-sponsored programs, such as the Spring Ray Project, Projects 211, 985, and 111, the Changjiang Scholars Recruitment Scheme, and the Start-up Research Fund, all of which include the recruitment of high-level scholars from overseas as an important component (Ministry of Education, 2004, 2006c, 2007b).

Rising Political Stars among Returnees

The rise of political stars among returnees denotes the PRC state's effort to overcome a phobia. After the 1989 student movement, Chinese overseas students have sometimes been seen as potential supporters of complete Westernization, who might advocate the complete acceptance of Western culture, the critical rejection of Chinese culture, and the advocacy of a fundamental reform in all aspects of the Chinese political system, economic structure, culture, and ideology (Z. Deng, 1991). In 1992, seeing the potential overseas scholars had as a source of human capital to speed China's economic modernization, Deng Xiaoping announced that the government no longer cared what overseas students' political attitudes had been (Jiao, 1998). Following Deng's call for overseas students to return, central and regional governments alike sought to recruit foreign-trained Chinese nationals with educational backgrounds in the West, especially in the US, into government positions. The selected returnees were usually appointed to leadership posts in the fields of education, academic research, finance, and foreign affairs (Hu, 2010).

Chinese history suggests that having skills or knowledge of technologies (especially those which may be in short supply within China, but are readily available overseas) greatly facilitates one's upward mobility (Huang, 2002). Likewise, the CPC offered returnees quicker promotion than is available to domestic-trained officials (See details in Li, 2003). The recruitment of officials from their ranks

has been warmly received by Chinese scholars. Returnees interested in pursuing a political career in China may find themselves on the fast track. The prominent role of returnees can be seen by their increasing numbers in the country's highest decision-making authority, the CPC Party Congress; in 2002, foreign-trained returnees accounted for 6.2% of committee members and alternate members of the Sixteenth CPC Party Congress, but 10.5% of the Seventeen CPC Party Congress, held in 2007 (Xinhua News Agency, 2002, 2007).

At the same time, the state used political socialization to accommodate foreign-trained returnees into the political establishment. Since 1991, the state has incorporated a CPC appraisal mechanism into the evaluation of returnees' performance – "setting up models" (*shu dianxing*) – a tradition of the CPC since Mao's era. According to Mao Zedong, members of the CPC organizations at all levels should be knowledgeable about the big picture of national policy; they should be held up as models of policy implementation, and should promote their experience as exemplars for their counterparts (People's Daily Reporter, 2008). Local CPC Committees are responsible for the nomination and selection of "model" returnees; the selection criteria require successful candidates to have a good political record, *i.e.*, "uphold the leadership of the CPC, adoringly love (be devoted to) socialist China as [their] motherland [and] support the CPC's political ideologies" (for example, see Xiamen CPC Committee, 2009). Between 1991 and 2003, the state selected a total of 939 outstanding "model" returnees. The 2003 national conference honouring model returnees was jointly hosted by three ministries under the State Council and three departments of the CPC Central Committee. Senior CPC officials, including General Secretary Hu Jintao, participated in the conference and gave speeches calling on returnees to continue to contribute to the revival of China in the world (Xinhua News Agency, 2003).

As a result, the recruitment of returnees into government positions helped the state to recruit new members from different social and occupational backgrounds, and thereby obtain new legitimacy in the changing domestic and international environment. The exercise of a setting up model for returnees shows the direct involvement of the ruling party in the supervision of the returnees' performance. These political mechanisms served to convert foreign-trained Chinese scholars into political capital in an attempt to increase the state's perceived legitimacy.

BRAIN GAIN STRATEGIES TO RECRUIT INTERNATIONAL STUDENTS

Recruitment Strategy and Economic Cooperation

After being admitted to the WTO in 2001, China used its membership to expand its global education network in accordance with the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), which is designed to increase trade liberalization internationally and includes 'education' as a service sector. China actively dispatched teams to recruit students from foreign countries having strong economic relationships with

China. Between 2002 and 2006, the PRC Ministry of Education enabled China's most prestigious universities to mount "Higher Education in China" exhibitions in Russia, France, Canada, the US, and Brazil. The main goals of the exhibitions were to develop academic exchange and cooperation programs between Chinese and foreign universities, and recruit foreign students (Ministry of Education, 2005).

As a result, there has been a trend towards an increased volume of students coming to China from South Korea, Japan, and the United States – all countries having strong economic relationships with China. In 2006, these countries were the top three sources of international students entering Chinese higher education (Ministry of Education, 2007a). More and more European and American students are attending universities in China, increasing from less than 15% of foreign students in 2003 (11,165 out of 77,715) to 22% in 2006 (36,295 out of 162,695), and more than 27% in 2011 (79,604 out of 292,611) (Counted by the author according to Ministry of Education, 2001, 2005, 2006a, 2006b, 2011b).

Since 2004, China has made further efforts to promote the Chinese language and culture by establishing Confucius Institutes around the world. By August 2011, China had established 353 Confucius Institutes and 473 related Confucian Classrooms in 104 countries and regions where Chinese enjoys an increasing popularity (Chinese Language Council International, 2011). The Confucius Institutes also serve to facilitate the inflow of international students studying in China (Liu, 2010). The general distribution of Confucius Institutes mirrors China's trading partnerships. Of the reported number, 208 of 322 (approximately 65%, calculated by the authors) were in Europe (105) and America (103). The countries with the greatest numbers were China's major strategic and economic partners (Confucius Institute Headquarters, 2011).

Riding on the trend of China's emergence as a significant global economic power, China has successfully promoted Chinese language as a marketable skill in the international community (Paradise, 2009). To access higher education and job opportunities in China, between 1990 and 2003, some 300,000 individuals took the Chinese Proficiency Test (CPT); over 10% of whom were overseas examinees; in 2006 alone, however, 35,000 overseas examinees took the CPT (Xinhua News Agency, 2007). The increasing global significance of Chinese has contributed to the rapid increase in the numbers of international students studying in China. Most international students (62.5%) study Chinese language and sinology (Ministry of Education, 2011a).

Recruitment Strategy and Political Partnership

Meanwhile, strategy to recruit international students was intentionally designed to suit the PRC's political agenda. There is clear linkage between the government's targeted scholarship scheme and its political affiliation. Chinese government offers a wide range of scholarships (e.g., Chinese Government Scholarship, Great Wall Scholarship, the Excellent Student Scholarship, and the Chinese Proficiency Test

Winner Scholarship) to subsidize international students who take undergraduate and/or postgraduate programs in Chinese universities (Ministry of Education, 2005). In addition, China has set up separate scholarship programs to target students from ASEAN (Association of South-East Asian Nations) member countries who are the PRC's political friends. For example, the China-ASEAN Scholarship was established to sponsor students from ASEAN member countries who wish to take Masters and PhD degree programs at Chinese universities. Two additional China-ASEAN Student Exchange Programs were established, with the goal of sponsoring 100,000 ASEAN exchange students to study in China by 2020 and vice versa (IBTimes Staff Reporter, 2011). China limited the disciplinary areas available to exchange students and scholars from ASEAN countries to mainly China-related fields of study, such as Chinese language, culture, arts, sinology, and sports (IBTimes Staff Reporter, 2011), in an effort to spawn a new generation of China supporters in ASEAN countries.

In addition, to enhance its leading role among developing countries, China used its strength in science and technology to appeal to students from other developing countries in the Middle East, Africa, and Central Asia, forming partnerships with governments in those regions to sponsor students in medicine, engineering and agriculture. In 2010, the central government decided that "Chinese government scholarships shall be increased, with financial assistance offered mainly to students from other developing countries" (The Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China, 2010), and more than doubled the amount awarded to foreign students to 800 million yuan (approximate US $121.7 million); the number of awards increased to 22,390, of which just over 50% (11,197) went to students from other Asian countries (Ministry of Education, 2011a). In response, countries such as Thailand, Pakistan, and Vietnam have dispatched government-funded students to study at Chinese universities, in the hopes that they will learn from China's experiences in achieving rapid economic growth and reforming its higher education system in response to economic developments, and become the high-level management personnel and economic experts necessary for national economic development (Ministry of Education, 2005).

DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSION: TENSION BETWEEN A DUAL EFFORT

China's brain gain strategy features a tension between the dual effort to pursue economic development and reinforce political stability. On the one hand, the state used economic mechanisms to create a domestic market to develop a pool of young talent with marketable knowledge, skills, and abilities to drive the development of a knowledge-based economy. The state allowed foreign-trained returnees to take a leading role in translating knowledge and technology they had acquired overseas into the development of high-tech sectors in China. In doing so, the state facilitated the incorporation of foreign-trained returnees into the national economic dynamic. At the same time, the ruling party's promotion and appraisal mechanism incorporated the foreign-trained human capital into the established political order.

The combined economic and political strategies were designed by the state to transform foreign-trained human capital into the economic capital and political power needed to drive economic growth and legitimize the current regime. The strategies also suggest the state's continuing search for balance between "stability, development and reform" as its ultimate goal put forward by Deng Xiaoping (1993) in his response to the CPC's external and domestic threats to in the late 1980s and early 1990s: i.e., the collapse of the former socialist bloc, calls for democratic reform within the structure of the PRC government, and the low rate of return from overseas education. This sort of tension is deeply rooted in, and an extension of the Chinese philosophy of accepting 'Chinese learning as the essence, Western learning for its usefulness' (*zhong ti xi yong*), which aims at gaining strength by learning from other countries and preventing Western learning from unlimitedly spreading and eventually endangering China's political system (Chen, 1997).

A similar tension exists in China's brain gain strategy to recruit international students. On the one hand, China has used and continues to use its growing economic influence to increase the global importance of the Chinese language, which accounts for the drastically increased inflow of foreign students studying in Chinese universities. In return, the intertwined language education and trading linkage helped to enhance economic partnership between China and foreign countries. On the other hand, it has used academic exchange and scholarship programs to enhance its relationship with other ASEAN countries in order to strengthen the political alliance and counter the influence of other world powers (such as the US) over East Asia, which could otherwise limit China's potential to rise. As a result, recruiting and educating international students coincidently fit China's regional strategy well, i.e., China aspires to create a China-led regional order (Bhattacharya, 2010).

The case of China has three major implications for our understanding of the global competition for talents. First, it offers a response to the question raised in recent literature on international academic mobility and brain gain: does the increased return rate of homecoming international students bring a hope for source countries to enjoy brain gain? (Hart, 2006; Saxenian, 2002, 2006). The answer from China is "Yes". As shown in this chapter, foreign-trained Chinese returnees are agents of the state in the pursuit of both economic prosperity and political stability. Findings from this study support Hart's (2006, p. 53) postulate that if "managed wisely", a global knowledge economy might foster "mutual gain" and enable source countries to "absorb knowledge and extract benefits from it, and nurturing knowledge spillovers from receiving countries to source countries".

The second implication of this study questions assumptions about the role of foreign-trained Chinese nationals in national development. W.W. Rockhill, a U.S. ambassador, made a prediction in the early 1900s: if Chinese students could receive American education and then become China's high-ranking government officials, they would be able to facilitate American political, economic, and cultural influence in China (Hunt, 1972). Similarly, Lin (1994) predicts that, if mainland China were to mirror Taiwan's experience, then foreign-trained returnees would not

only create an economic miracle in mainland China, but also transform the PRC state into a democracy. This study argues that it is probably far too simplistic to assume that foreign-trained Chinese returnees will become an active driving force in political reform that conforms to Western definitions of democracy. Rather, they are expected to become supporters and reinforcers of the CPC-led party system. This is demonstrated by the state's policy of "strengthening the nation through human resource development" (*ren cai qiang guo*), which launched 12 projects on human resource development, including the project of *Attracting Back Outstanding Students from Overseas* (Ministry of Education, 2007c). The policy highlights the principal of "Party's supervision over human resources work" (*dang guan ren cai*), which aims to "attract more high caliber personnel to join the CPC, glue them tightly to the Party, in order to increase the Party's governance capability, and to provide solid support for the Party's leadership" (Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, 2012). This may explain the various mechanisms adopted by the CPC to incorporate the returnees into the state's political establishment, as shown earlier in this paper. From a historical perspective, various Chinese regimes have paid a great deal of attention to legitimizing knowledge deemed to be authoritative and essential and to designating certain elites as carriers of that knowledge (Li, 2003). This tradition has been carried on by the PRC state, reflecting a degree of instrumentalism in using foreign-trained talents to reinforce the regime, rather than bringing about changes which might be perceived as threatening to the stability of the existing political order.

The third implication of this study supplements contemporary literature on competition for international students. The rise of Asia as a study-abroad locale is often perceived as the triumph of neo-liberalism in higher education and its commercial export approach to the market for international students (Findlay & Tierney, 2010; Marginson, 2009, 2011; Ng, 2012). However, the case of China shows that international student enrollment is not just another form of cross-border trade, as defined by GATS and theorized by neo-liberalism. Rather, it should be understood as a part of a state's overall strategy in the pursuit of favorable international relations and improved higher education capacity according to the state's political and economic agenda.

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INDEX

A
Actor-network theory (ANT), 5, 23, 24, 30n7
Australian students, 10, 219–232

B
Brain circulation, 11–15, 269–271, 278, 279, 308, 320, 323
Brain drain, 7, 11, 12, 14, 102, 105, 106, 136, 139, 256, 269–271, 273, 308, 320, 344
Brain gain, 11, 14, 269–271, 341–352
Britain, 5, 53–58, 61, 91, 98, 122, 192, 324, 327, 328, 342

C
Canada, 6, 10–13, 68, 72, 73, 76, 79, 92, 98, 99, 171, 235–242, 248–251, 263n4, 276, 279, 281, 285–298, 301–316, 349
Case study(ies), vii, 4, 5, 7, 9, 27–30, 51–65, 115, 118, 169–185, 323–325
China, vii–ix, 1, 4–15, 19–30, 35–47, 51–65, 67–79, 85–124, 129–148, 151–164, 169–185, 187–216, 219–231, 235–242, 247–264, 269–282, 285–298, 301–316, 319–337, 341–352
Chinese education, vii–ix, 1–15, 19, 28–30, 54, 63n2, 67, 90, 110, 206, 222, 272
Chinese emigration, 247, 248, 252
Chinese higher education, 4, 5, 37, 39, 41, 46, 47, 85–106, 136, 219, 349
Chinese immigrants, 10, 11, 13, 235–242, 250, 271, 273, 274, 307, 310
Chinese international students, 6, 8, 129–148
Chinese returnees, 115, 121, 307, 310, 313, 315, 320, 321, 323, 324, 351, 352
Chinese student migration, 298
Chinese students, vii, viii, 6–13, 19, 40, 54, 63, 85–124, 129–148, 151–164, 174, 175, 182, 183, 187, 190–195, 198–201, 219, 221, 228–231, 235, 238, 239, 242, 250–252, 256, 261, 271–278, 285–298, 319, 320, 328, 337n2, 343–345, 351
Chinese youth, 11, 146, 236, 239, 240, 242
Comparative education, 19, 20, 22–24, 27, 203, 205, 207, 208
Confucius Institutes, 40, 41, 67–80, 220, 349
Cross-cultural adaptation, 14
Cross-cultural teaching and learning, 4, 9–11
Cultural experience, 116
Cultural integration, 221
Culture shock, 8, 9, 112, 123, 144, 155–157, 161, 163, 221, 228, 309, 321
Curriculum internationalization, 19, 206, 208

D
Diaspora, viii, 12, 13, 15, 205, 206, 320, 342
Diaspora engagement, 12, 258–262
Divergence in outmigration, 11, 248
Double diaspora, viii, 13, 301–316

E
Educational transfer, 21, 24
English as a foreign language, 9, 169, 171, 172, 179, 182, 184, 190, 197
English language teaching, 114, 169, 198
Expat teachers, 9, 171, 173–176, 179, 181–184

F
Features, viii, 8, 19, 38, 39, 120, 129–148, 178, 206, 223, 240, 313, 322, 350
FOB, 239, 240, 242

G
Global engagement, vii, 39
Globalization, viii, 1–5, 10, 12–14, 19, 20, 22, 24, 25, 28–30, 47, 52, 53, 85–106, 108–110, 138, 151, 160, 170, 172, 204–206, 209, 210, 213, 214, 216, 219, 221, 270, 271, 282, 302, 304, 314, 320, 321, 341
Global project, 68, 72, 75

H
Habitus, 240, 242
Higher education, vii, 3–7, 10, 35–47, 51–65, 85–110, 114, 121, 123, 130, 132, 135–137, 152, 161, 191, 198, 201–203, 214, 216, 219–221, 257, 276–280, 285, 298, 319, 334, 343–345, 349, 350, 352
Human capital, 14, 63, 170, 270, 271, 279, 281, 320, 323, 324, 341–345, 347, 350, 351

I
Identification, 121, 192, 193, 235–242, 316
Identity, viii, 3, 5, 8–11, 13, 24, 39, 42–44, 46, 53, 58, 70, 73, 76, 108, 113, 116, 118, 120–123, 131, 139, 140, 153–155, 163, 187, 188, 190, 198, 199, 201, 202, 204, 213, 214, 235–237, 239–242, 255, 301, 303–305, 310, 311, 313, 316, 319, 321, 322, 324, 325, 331, 334–337
Immigration, 8, 70, 130, 138, 140, 141, 146, 235–242, 258, 270, 271, 274, 281, 282, 286–294, 296–298, 303, 304, 342
Institutional culture, 200, 321
Integration, 1, 2, 13, 30n8, 42, 47, 110, 148, 164, 220, 221, 224, 237, 259, 298, 304
Intellectual migration, 12, 269–282
Intercultural, 4, 36, 107, 109, 112, 113, 115, 123, 152–155, 157, 163, 164, 319, 322, 325, 327, 329, 334
Intercultural adaptation, 4, 6–8, 14, 107, 112, 123, 152, 327
Intercultural experience, 110, 112, 116, 322, 334, 337
Intercultural identity, 319, 335–337
Intercultural learning, 8, 13, 118, 151, 155, 164, 319, 325, 336
International education, viii, 41, 92, 103–105, 108–110, 129, 201, 216, 252, 279
International networking, 41
International students, viii, 4, 6–12, 14, 40, 57, 61, 63, 65n26, 85, 94, 104, 107–110, 112–114, 117, 122, 123, 129–148, 151, 152, 160, 161, 194, 200, 206, 219–223, 226, 227, 229–231, 250, 269, 273–281, 285–298, 309, 310, 342–345, 348–352
Internationalization, vii, viii, 4–7, 14, 19, 29, 35–47, 109, 110, 114, 115, 203, 206, 208, 285, 290

Internationalization of higher education, 5–7, 35–47, 51–65, 85–110, 123, 220, 221, 285, 298, 319

L

Learning experience, 10, 118, 121, 181, 187, 203, 208, 209, 213, 215, 220–223, 225, 230, 231, 321
Liberalization, 1, 11, 248, 254–256, 262, 348
Life stories, 195–199, 324

M

Media, 11, 71, 79, 136, 154, 155, 196, 236, 239–242, 250, 263n14, 279, 326, 327, 329, 333, 342
Multiculturalism, 6, 11, 79, 209, 236–238, 240, 242

N

Native-speaking English teachers, 9, 169, 171–173
Neo-institutionalism, 5, 20
Neoliberalism, viii, 221, 352
Networks, 3, 5, 22–24, 26, 41, 120, 121, 137, 145, 197, 208, 215, 302, 306, 309, 321, 323, 330, 347, 348
New institutionalism, see neo-institutionalism

O

Online, 88, 90, 115, 151, 154, 155, 159, 174, 261, 262n1, 330
Outbound-inbound student flows, 7, 11, 99, 102
Overseas campuses, 52, 54, 55

P

Preparation, 8, 147, 151–164, 177, 199, 287, 296

R

Racial project, 6, 68, 72, 73, 79
Racism, 235, 238–242
Reorientalism, vii, 6, 67–80
Reorientality, vii, 6, 67–80
Return migration, 12, 251, 262, 269–271, 278, 301, 314
Returnees, viii, 11, 13, 107, 108, 115, 121, 141, 172, 251, 252, 260, 261, 271, 278, 280, 281, 302, 306, 307, 310, 313, 315, 319–328, 331, 332, 334–337, 342, 343, 345–348, 350–352

S

Scandinavian neo-institutionalism, 5, 20, 22, 23
School, 3, 10, 19, 24, 26, 37, 42, 44, 45, 55, 57, 67, 87, 88, 92, 93, 95, 99, 102, 104, 105, 141, 142, 171, 172, 178–181, 183, 184, 187, 188, 190, 193, 197, 204–210, 212–216, 228, 235, 236, 238–242, 252, 253, 255, 260, 271, 294, 295, 305, 310, 311, 314
Social justice education, 213
Social network analysis, 23
Social stratification, 172, 173
Soft power, 39–41, 69, 70, 282
Stereotypes, 11, 75, 153, 154, 191, 193, 241
Student mobility, viii, 4, 6–8, 14, 62, 85–108, 110, 151, 248, 288
Study abroad in China, 203–216
Studying abroad, 7, 35, 85–92, 98–102, 107, 109, 110, 121, 122, 136–138, 151, 219, 220, 256, 293, 319, 320, 322, 334, 335
Studying in China, 11, 85, 92–95, 98–100, 104, 154, 203–216, 220, 226, 228, 230, 345, 349, 350
Sweden, vii, 8, 151–164

T
Talent mobility, 4, 11–14, 301–316
Teacher experiences, viii, 174, 193, 197, 200
Teacher identity, 198
Teacher mobility, 14, 301–316
The United States, 8, 65n25, 71, 91, 92, 98–100, 102, 103, 108, 129–148, 172, 173, 176, 177, 211, 249–253, 256, 263n6, n10, n14, 272, 274, 308, 313, 341, 342, 349
Tianxia (all-under-heaven), vii, 5, 36, 42–46
Transformational education, 63, 121, 203
Transformative learning, 112
Transition of status, 290, 291, 293, 297, 298
Translation, 22–25, 175
Transnational education, viii, 5, 52, 53, 62, 63, 97–100, 103–105, 209
Transnational flow of students, 85, 97
Transnational migration, 314–316
Transnationalism, viii, 13, 15, 210, 257, 302–304, 308, 315
Trans-nationality, 206

U
United States, 8, 65n25, 71, 91, 92, 98–100, 102, 103, 108, 129–148, 171–173, 176, 177, 211, 248–253, 256, 263n6, n10, n14, 272, 274, 308, 313, 341, 342, 345, 349
University partnership, 51, 52, 207, 208, 214, 215

W
World culture theory, vii, 5, 20, 21